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SECOND EDITION

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SECOND EDITION

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Philip Mattar

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Introduction

The purpose of this new edition of the encyclopedia is to respond to the growing need for an up-to-date, comprehensive compendium of knowledge about the Middle East and North Africa, from 1800 to the present. Indeed, much has changed in the Middle East since the first edition was published in 1996. The then leaders of Jordan, Morocco, and Syria have died and their sons have come to power. There have been two new prime ministers in Israel. Israeli–Palestinian negotiations failed at the Camp David summit in 2000 and were followed by the al-Aqsa Intifada. The events of 11 September 2001 triggered the United States' invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, which resulted in the downfall of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, and in the dispersion of Osama bin Ladin's al-Qaʿida.

The encyclopedia is as timely as ever. During the United States–Iranian crisis in 1979, a *Washington Post* editor, Meg Greenfield, pointed out in her 26 March *Newsweek* column (p. 116) that there are two things to say about American involvement in the Middle East: "One is that no part of the world is more important to our well being at the moment—and probably for the foreseeable future. The other is that no part of the world is more hopelessly and systematically and stubbornly misunderstood by us." In the wake of the tragedy of September 11, and the misunderstanding and hostility it generated towards Islam and the Muslim world among some groups, primarily in the United States, Greenfield's comment is as relevant and prescient now as it was then.

Coverage

This encyclopedia seeks to summarize and organize the most significant factual and analytical knowledge available on the subject and to present it in a readable style that is accessible to high school students, college students, and general readers. The four-volume encyclopedia contains one million words in some 3,000 entries written by approximately 400 scholars of diverse backgrounds and specialization. Entries range in length from 200 to 5,000 words, and about a third of them are biographies. One half of the 3,000 entries are new or have been partly or substantially updated. The revised articles are signed by the original authors, with the new authors'

names preceded by the phrase "Updated by." Such entries include chronological data or other information that did not appear in the first edition.

A number of techniques have been employed to make the work as "user friendly" as possible. The articles are alphabetically ordered, although the *al-* prefix (which is the equivalent of the English word *the*) in some words should be disregarded. For example, al-Qaʿida would be found under Q, not A. Each entry is introduced by a brief summary. Articles are cross-referenced to related entries in two ways. First, at the end of most entries, the reader is guided to a list of other, related articles. Second, throughout the work, alternative words or phrases for subjects are listed as "blind entries" within the alphabetical sequence, and are followed by directions that will send the reader to the appropriate essay. For example, a researcher seeking information on census data would encounter the following: "Census: See Population."

A selected bibliography follows the longer essays. These bibliographies direct the reader to additional works in English that the interested reader might profitably consult for further information on the topic. The appendices include a glossary, genealogies, a list of the contributors to the encyclopedia, a list of all the entries, and a conceptual index of some 185 pages, one of the most thorough and useful in any work of this kind. Maps accompany country articles, and hundreds of newly acquired photographs of ordinary people, leaders, sites, and events enrich the text.

The articles cover a wide variety of topics in the fields of politics, history, economics, religion, sociology, geography, literature, fine arts, and many others. They also review twenty-three countries—all but one (Israel) predominantly Muslim. Coverage extends from Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey to the Fertile Crescent (including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestinian territories, and Egypt) and to North African states such as Libya, Algeria, and Morocco. While each country is presented in depth, the Editorial Board decided that Western readers are likely to require more information on some countries than on others because of their historic significance or contemporary role in the region. For example, the entries covering Israel, Egypt, Iran, Turkey (including the Ottoman Empire), Iraq, historic Palestine, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the countries of North Africa have been allocated longer and more entries, whereas Cyprus and Mauritania have been given less space in these volumes.

Besides allowing us to update the factual data of the original edition, revising the encyclopedia has provided the opportunity to include new articles on topics that were previously neglected or underrepresented. For example, we have added approximately 200 biographies of women and their organizations, and a number of long articles on gender, such as gender and education, law, politics, and economy. In addition, we have added dozens of profiles of Islamic scholars, organizations, theologians, and activists that had been overlooked in the first edition.

This edition of the encyclopedia has also squarely addressed certain sensitive topics and terms, such as terrorism. This edition calls "terrorism" by its name, not just "military action," and the ritual sexual maiming of women is called "female genital mutilation," rather than employing the coldly clinical term, "circumcision." Sensitive topics, such as the war in Iraq (2003) and the Palestinian al-Nakba ("the disaster"), are explained and discussed openly, as are the Armenian genocide and anti-Semitism in the Arab world.

As editor, I have tried neither to reconcile inconsistencies nor to arbitrate between differing interpretations that have been offered by my colleagues, the contributors to this work. The reader will find a variety of quantitative references and data sets—populations, casualties, refugees—invoked in support of the arguments presented in each article. At times, the interpretations of events, treaties, concepts, and personalities offered by individual contributing authors diverge from or even conflict with one another. This diversity of voices and interpretations not only reflects the state of modern Middle Eastern scholarship, it enriches it and helps to stimulate further research.

I have tried to follow two simple guidelines in selecting the scholars who would write the entries. First, I recognized that a reference work is a forum for knowledge based on consensus, not a forum for new ideas and theories, for which there are many journals. Of course, a new emerging consensus

must be reflected in any reference work, and this edition of the encyclopedia provides as wide a view of the field as is supported by rigorous scholarship. Second, I have favored scholars who base their research and analysis on primary material and original languages, and who have a proven record of adhering to high scholarly standards. I have also favored non-partisan scholars who were critical yet empathetic with the people about whom they were writing.

However, some topics are difficult to treat in a non-partisan way, even by scholars. For instance, the encyclopedia includes a considerable amount of coverage on the Palestine problem and Arab–Israeli conflict. In my view, many scholars on these topics are overwhelmed by ideology and emotion, which leads them, at times, to offer the (respective) national narratives rather than the historical record. Although this tendency began to change in the late 1980s, when mainly Israeli historians began to challenge the national myths and distortions present in the history of the conflict, it is nonetheless unavoidable in much Middle Eastern scholarship, even today.

Though comprehensive, this encyclopedia cannot be considered complete, nor is it immune from errors. We welcome readers to send their comments and corrections to Macmillan, for possible use in future editions. Of course, as with all reference works, this encyclopedia should be used as a gateway to knowledge that is found in more detailed books, such as those suggested in the bibliographies that accompany the articles.

Transliteration

The Editorial Board has preferred precision and consistency in the representation of non-English terms, and has generally tried to follow the modified system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* and *Encyclopedia Judaica*. However, we have chosen not to apply these systems universally, for a number of reasons. Many place-names and historical personalities are familiar to the Western reader by their English or French forms rather than by the more technically correct transliteration of their Arabic, Hebrew, Turkish, or Persian names. Thus, we have used the familiar English form, *Beirut*, rather than the more correct transliteration of *Bayrut*. Similarly, we have chosen to use the more familiar *Boumedienne* to refer to the Algerian leader more properly called *Abu Midyan*. Further complicating the transliteration problem is the fact that people from the region often ignore generally accepted practices in spelling the names of places, persons, and things. In such cases we have often adopted local usage. When the correct spelling is not known, we have spelled it according to the generally accepted standard. Where possible, we have provided alternative spellings, either within individual essays or as blind entries.

We have, thus, favored ease of use over scholarly consistency in our presentation of transliterated words, because this work is for the general reader rather than for the specialist. This editorial choice is also evident in our treatment of diacritical marks in Arabic words. Dots under consonants and lines over vowels (macrons) have not been used, because they mean little to anyone not familiar with Arabic. For the same reason, we have excluded the "ayn" (pronounced in the back of the throat) and "hamza" (a glottal stop) symbols from the beginning and end of words, although we have generally retained these two marks in the middle of words in order to distinguish clearly between the letters on either side of the symbols.

Acknowledgments

There are several groups of people without whom this encyclopedia could not have been accomplished successfully and on time. First and foremost are the authors who invested their time and scholarship in this project. They followed the scopes and guidelines, submitted their entries in a timely manner, and revised according to the comments of the editors, readers, and the copyeditor. Some wrote many entries. To all of them, the Editorial Board and I are most appreciative.

I am also grateful to the Editorial Board, whose broad background and knowledge were of enormous benefit at every stage of this project. They reviewed the entire first edition, compiled the article list, wrote the scopes for entries in their areas of expertise, suggested the authors, read the entries and offered revisions, and contributed some of the entries themselves. Charles E. Butterworth, a specialist of Islamic and Arab culture, provided the encyclopedia with missing entries on Islam and the Muslim

world. Neil Caplan, a nonpartisan and leading scholar of Zionism, Israel, the Palestine problem, and the Arab–Israel conflict, reviewed, edited, and wrote many articles. Michael R. Fischbach, an authority on Jordan, Palestine, and the general Middle East, proofread the entire manuscript for transliteration and style, and wrote more than one hundred entries. Eric Hooglund, a foremost expert on Iran, used his broad knowledge and contacts to enhance hundreds of entries, besides writing dozens of articles. Laurie King-Irani, a scholar and prolific writer, designed hundreds of entries on women and gender, and also wrote some fine entries. John Ruedy, one of the leading scholars of North Africa, brought his extensive knowledge to bear on the project. We also benefited from the wise advice of our consultant, Don Peretz, a preeminent scholar whose nonpartisan scholarship on the Arab–Israeli conflict preceded all others' by at least two decades.

I want to also thank my colleagues of the first edition, Reeva S. Simon and Richard Bulliet, both of Columbia University. Although the second edition is thoroughly revised, it would not have been possible without their work on the first. They contributed to the entry list and to hundreds of articles that have remained intact or were only slightly revised. In addition, I wish to thank James Keary, my research assistant, who intelligently and diligently helped me revise the entry list of 3000 articles for the second edition.

I am very grateful to the people at Macmillan Reference USA. Of the dozen publishing houses with which I have worked over two decades, Macmillan provided an editorial team, headed by Hélène Potter, director of development, that is undoubtedly the most professional, efficient, and friendly. They made a complex and intense project seem easy and pleasant. Potter, who commissioned the project, provided us with guidance, encouragement, and, at critical junctures, judicious advice. I am most grateful for her support and friendship.

Potter's team of extraordinarily talented staff deserves special thanks. Corrina Moss, the assistant editor, with whom I was in frequent contact, was very well organized, and she handled relations with authors and associate editors with the skills of a seasoned diplomat. She was followed by an equally competent, organized, and friendly production editor, Kate Millson, who led the project to fruition. Kate and the project benefited from additional support: Editor Nancy Matuszak carefully and cheerfully developed the complex art program; the demanding typesetting program with its proliferation of details was made manageable by senior editor Carol Schwartz; and editor Erin Bealmear provided thorough, valuable support at a moment's notice wherever she was needed.

Finally, I am deeply grateful to my companion and friend—my wife Evelyn—for her loving support and patience from the inception of the project in the early 1990s, through two long periods of gestations and successful completions.

PHILIP MATTAR
WASHINGTON, DC, APRIL 2004

A

AARONSOHN FAMILY

Early Jewish settlers who founded Zikhron Yaʿacov and the NILI spy ring.

Ephraim Fishel Aaronsohn (1849–1939) and his wife, Malka, immigrated to Palestine from Bacau, Romania, in 1882 together with their son, Aaron (1876–1919), in order to fulfill their dream of returning to the land. Fishel was a founder of a new settlement, Zikhron Yaʿacov, and became a farmer. Aaron was educated in the settlement and in France, and became a prominent agronomist. The parents subsequently bore another son, Alexander (1888–1948), and a daughter, Sarah (1890–1917).

Aaron and Sarah are the best known of the family. Aaron's reputation as an agronomist won him an invitation from the United States Department of Agriculture to meet with U.S. agricultural experts. During his visit to the United States in 1909 he also met with prominent Jewish leaders, with whom he discussed his ideas for agricultural experimentation and cultivating Palestine. The outbreak of World War I convinced Aaron that his ideas would never be realized under the Turks, and in 1915 he recruited a number of close friends and family members to found a Jewish espionage group whose objective was to spy on the Turks and provide secret information to British officials of the Arab Bureau in Cairo. The name of the group was NILI, which is an acronym for the text of 1 Samuel 15:29: "The eternity (or 'victory' or 'strength') of Israel will not lie." When Sarah learned that the network had been uncovered by the Turks, she disbanded the group. She was arrested in her home in Zikhron Yaʿacov on 1 October 1917 and was tortured for four days, but rather than disclose the names of her comrades, she committed suicide.

NILI was shunned by Chaim Weizmann and many in the leadership of the Zionist Organization (later known as the World Zionist Organization). On the other hand, the significance of the information uncovered by NILI has been attested to by various British military officers, including General George Macdonogh, Field Marshall Edmund Henry Allenby, and Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen.

Aaron was a passenger in a Royal Air Force mail delivery airplane that went down in the English Channel on 15 May 1919. For years afterward there were rumors that he had been purposely killed by the British, but no evidence to support the allegations was ever found; on the contrary, extensive investigations concluded that his death was accidental.

See also WEIZMANN, CHAIM.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

ABADAN

A city with large oil refineries and an island in the province of Khuzistan in southwest Iran.

The island of Abadan is 40 miles long and from 2 to 12 miles wide. The island is bounded by the Shatt al-Arab River on the west, the Karun River on the north, and the Persian Gulf on the south. The city, 9 miles from the northwestern tip of the island, was first mentioned by Muslim geographers during in the mid-ninth century. In medieval times it was of importance to travelers and navigators as a source of woven straw mats, supplier of salt, and center of shipping and navigation.

The modern city that developed after 1910 was due to the oil industry. The first oil refinery, which was opened by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1912 with an annual capacity of 120,000 tons, grew into one of the world's largest refineries by the 1960s. Abadan's population grew with its economic development. In 1948 refinery employees formed one-third of the city population of about 100,000. By the 1950s the city's population reached about 220,000, and in 1976 it was 296,000, making Abadan the fifth largest city in the country. In August 1978 more than 400 persons burned to death in a fire at an Abadan cinema. This incident became a precursor to the 1979 revolution.

The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) heavily damaged the refinery as well as the city. Most of the population fled during the war, but some returned during the 1990s, when most of the city was reconstructed.

Because it is an industrial islet heavily influenced by foreign capitalist enterprise that uses the country's unskilled labor and raw material, Abadan's social structure is strongly segregated ethnically and economically. According to the 1996 census, the population of the reconstructed city was 206,073.

See also KHUZISTAN.

PARVANEH POURSHARIATI

ABANE, RAMDANE

See FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE (FLN)

ABASIYANIK, SAIT SAIK

See LITERATURE: TURKISH

ABASSI, MADANI

See MADANI, ABASSI AL-

ABAYA

See CLOTHING

ABBAS, FERHAT

[1899–1985]

Leading Algerian nationalist and statesman.

Ferhat Abbas was born in Taher to a family identified with French colonial rule. His father was a member of the Legion of Honor and served as a Qa'id or *caid* (administrator under the French). In 1909, Abbas entered the *lycée* at Philippeville (now Skikda) in Algeria. Following three years in the French army medical service, he enrolled in the pharmacy school at the University of Algiers.

Abbas's political career evolved from an earnest assimilationist to a reluctant revolutionary. In his first book, *Le jeune Algérien: De la colonie vers la province* (1931), he criticized the failure of French colonialism to live up to its assimilationist ideals. Along with Dr. Mohammed Saleh Bendjelloul, Abbas led the Fédération des Elus indigènes (founded in 1927), which continued to espouse the moderate reforms called for by the Jeunes Algériens (Young Algerians). Abbas embraced the ill-fated Blum-Viollette Plan, which would have granted full French citizenship to 20,000 to 30,000 assimilated Algerians. The failure of the Blum-Viollette Plan split the moderates as Bendjelloul founded the Rassemblement Franco-Musulman Algérien (Assembly of French-Muslim Algerians), while Abbas organized the Union Populaire Algérien (Algerian People's Union, UPA), a party that began to affirm a separate Algerian identity while calling for full citizenship for all Muslims. This marked the redefinition of Abbas's position that he had presented in the federation's newspaper, *Entente,* where he wrote that he was unable to locate a historical Algerian nation and therefore tied Algeria's future to France.

Abbas volunteered at the beginning of World War II, but he was alienated by the Nazi occupation of France, Vichy government administration, and then by Free French general Henri Giraud's disinterest in reform while concurrently exhorting Muslims to enlist (though not on an equal basis) and sacrifice their lives. Abbas reacted by presenting the "Manifeste du peuple algérien" (Manifesto of the Algerian People) in February 1943, followed by a more explicit supplement called the "Projet de réformes faisant suite au Manifeste" (Project of Reforms Made Following the Manifesto) in May. These documents called for an autonomous Algerian state that was still closely associated with France.

Charles de Gaulle's ordinance of 7 March 1944 went beyond the provisions of the Blum-Viollette Plan, but it no longer corresponded to the aspirations of the nationalist elite. In March 1944, Abbas organized the Association des Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté (Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty, AML), which briefly unified the Muslim nationalist movements under the leadership of Messali al-Hadj. Under Messalist pressures, the AML took a more radical position, calling for an Algerian government that reduced the attachment with France.

Ferhat Abbas was named on 18 September 1958 to serve as the first president of the Algerian Constituent Assembly. He held this position until 1961. Abbas's political career reflected his interests for political reforms, middle-class moderation, and the assimilation of Algerians and the French. **© Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

The deportation of Messali in April 1945 contributed to the bloody uprising at Setif and Guelma in May. Abbas was placed under house arrest. After being freed, he founded the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto, UDMA) in 1946. The UDMA sought a sovereign Algerian state responsible for internal affairs while being a member of the French union. Abbas was also elected to the Second French Constituent Assembly. He served as a member of the Muslim College of the Algerian Assembly from 1947 to 1955.

During the first eighteen months of the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), Abbas attempted to act as an intermediary between the Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN) and the French, but in April 1956 he joined the FLN with other moderates and declared that it was the only representative force for the liberation of the country.

Appreciating his international prestige, on 19 September 1958 the FLN appointed Abbas president

of the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, GPRA). In January 1961, he participated in a continental conference to establish an African Charter. Abbas signed an agreement with King Hassan II of Morocco in July 1961 to settle border disputes after the end of the war of independence. In August, he was replaced by the more radical Ben Youssef Ben Khedda as president of the GPRA. The ouster of Abbas and the moderates signaled an important change in the FLN.

In fall 1962, Abbas was elected president of Algeria's National Constituent Assembly. He envisioned a democratic parliamentary form of government, which permitted political pluralism. His liberal democratic ideals were anachronistic compared to the revolutionary objectives of the younger elite (e.g., Premier Ahmed Ben Bella), which were based on those of Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The construction of a constitution that ignored the Constituent Assembly and the growing authoritarianism of Ben Bella led to Abbas's resignation in August 1963. He was subsequently removed from the FLN. This was a symbolic repudiation of a revolutionary heritage that had aimed at liberal reform and close ties with France.

Abbas's opposition to Ben Bella led to his arrest in 1964. After Houari Boumédienne took over the government in June 1965, Abbas was released, but he refused to serve the military government. In March 1976, he joined Ben Khedda, Hocine Lahouel, and Mohamed Kheireddine in signing a manifesto entitled "New Appeal to the Algerian People." This courageous act condemned the lack of democratic institutions in Algeria, opposed the growing hostility between Algeria and Morocco over the decolonization of western Sahara and called for Maghrib (North African) unity. Abbas was again placed under house arrest.

Ferhat Abbas's contributions to the creation of the Algerian state were publicly acknowledged in the "enhanced" National Center of 1986, which was published about two weeks after his death. Besides *Le jeune Algérien* (1931), Abbas was the author of several important works: *Guerre de Révolution d'Algérie: La nuit coloniale* (1962) and *Autopsie d'une guerre: L'aurore* (1980) reflect upon the war years. In *L'indépendance confisquée, 1962–1978* (1984), Abbas expressed his disillusionment with postcolonial Algeria, but he also dedicated the book to the emerging new generation. In some ways, his call for youth to restore the true meaning of the revolution has been heard since the October 1988 riots.

See also Algeria; Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté; Ben Bella, Ahmed; Ben Khedda, Ben Youssef; Blum–Viollette Plan; Boumédienne, Houari; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Hadj, Messali al-; Hassan II; Lahouel, Hocine; Maghrib; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Setif; Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA); Young Algerians.

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Phillip C. Naylor

ABBAS HILMI I

[1812–1854]

Viceroy of Egypt, 1848–1854.

Son of Tusun and grandson of Muhammad Ali, Hilmi Abbas was born in Alexandria (or, some sources say, Jidda) and reared in Cairo. A cavalry officer, he accompanied his uncle, Ibrahim Pasha, on his Syrian campaign, served as temporary governor-general of Egypt when Muhammad Ali went to the Sudan in 1839, and succeeded Ibrahim as viceroy upon his death in November 1848.

Abbas was viewed by many Europeans as a reactionary because he dismantled some of his grandfather's Westernizing reforms and dismissed most of the French advisers to the Egyptian government (his policies tended to be pro-British and anti-French), but he reduced taxes on the peasants. He awarded a concession to an English company to build Egypt's first railroad, connecting Cairo and Alexandria. The land route from Cairo to Suez was also improved. He sought the support of the Ulama (Islamic clergy) and the Sufi orders. He laid the cornerstone for the Sayyida Zaynab Mosque, a popular shrine, in Cairo. Abbas sent troops to fight on the side of the Ottoman Empire against Russia in the Crimea, where they suffered heavy casualties.

His policies antagonized many members of the Muhammad Ali dynasty, and he died in Banha in 1854 under mysterious circumstances.

See also IBRAHIM IBN MUHAMMAD ALI; MUHAMMAD ALI; *ULAMA*.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

ABBAS HILMI II

[1874–1944]

Egypt's khedive (viceroy), 1892–1914.

Born in Cairo, Abbas Hilmi was the seventh member of the Muhammad Ali dynasty to serve as viceroy of Egypt but the first whose whole term of office coincided with Britain's military occupation of the country. A high-spirited youth inclined to nationalism when he succeeded his father, Tawfiq, Abbas soon clashed with the British consul-general, Lord Cromer, over the appointment of Egypt's new prime minister. The two men agreed finally on a compromise premier, Mustafa al-Riyad, but Cromer had persuaded his government to enlarge the British occupation force.

In 1894 Abbas, while on an inspection tour of Upper Egypt, quarreled with the commander of the Egyptian army, Sir Herbert (later Lord) Kitchener, over what he viewed as the poor performance of the British-officered units. Kitchener offered to resign, but Cromer made Abbas issue a statement expressing his satisfaction with all the units of his army—a public admission of surrender. Unable to confront Britain directly, he formed a secret society that evolved into the National Party, which initially placed its hopes on French support.



Born on 14 July 1874, Abbas Hilmi II succeeded his father as ruler of Egypt from 7 January 1892 until 18 December 1914, following the declaration of a British Protectorate over Egypt. He abdicated all his powers in 1931. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

When France's challenge to Britain's predominance in the Nile valley waned after the 1898 Fashoda incident, Khedive Abbas moved away from the Nationalists, who were turning to pan-Islam and to appeals for constitutional government. After the Dinshaway incident, he briefly resumed his opposition to the British by helping the Nationalists to publish daily newspapers in French and English. After Cromer retired, however, he was lured away from nationalism by the friendlier policies pursued by the new British consul, John Eldon Gorst. In 1908, he named a new cabinet headed by Boutros Ghali, a Copt (Christian) who favored the British. Abbas adopted a policy increasingly hostile to the Nationalists, reviving the 1881 Press Law, prosecuting the editor of *al-Liwa,* and promulgating the Exceptional Laws after the 1910 assassination of Boutros Ghali by a Nationalist. When Gorst died and was succeeded by Lord Kitchener, Abbas again broke with the British. His hope of using the 1913 Organic Law to bring his supporters into the new Legislative Assembly was only partly successful, since Saʿd Zaghlul, an old enemy, emerged as its leading spokesman.

When World War I broke out in 1914, he was in the Ottoman capital of Istanbul recovering from an assassination attempt. The British forbade him to return to Egypt, using the entry into war of the Ottoman Empire on their enemy's side as a pretext to depose him and sever Egypt's residual Ottoman ties. The former khedive spent most of the war years in Switzerland—plotting at first with the Nationalists to engineer an uprising in Egypt against the British; then with the Germans to buy shares in several Paris newspapers to influence their policies in a pacifist direction; and then with the British to secure the succession of his son to what had become the sultanate of Egypt.

After all these intrigues failed, Abbas returned to Istanbul and cooperated with the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire) until their final defeat (1918). He tried for several years to regain control of his properties in Egypt, but finally accepted a cash settlement and went into business in Europe. He attempted to mediate the Palestine question and supported a Muslim organization. He then backed the Axis powers (Germany, Japan, and Italy) early in World War II (1939). Although energetic and patriotic, he failed to stem British moves to strengthen their military occupation of Egypt.

See also DINSHAWAY INCIDENT (1906); GORST, JOHN ELDON; MUHAMMAD ALI; RIYAD, MUSTAFA AL-; ZAGHLUL, SAʿD.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

ABBAS, MAHMUD

[1937–]

A founder of al-Fatah; first Palestinian prime minister.

Mahmud Abbas (also called Abu Mazin or Abu Mazen) was born in Safed (in Hebrew, Zefat), now in northern Israel but then in the British mandate of Palestine. As a result of the Arab–Israel War of 1948, he became a refugee and ended up working in the Gulf oil states. He eventually obtained his doctorate in Israeli studies in the Soviet Union. During the late 1950s, Abbas began organizing Palestinians in Saudi Arabia and in Qatar. After suffering the disappointment of the Egyptian and Palestinian defeat by Israel in the Arab–Israel War of 1956, he joined Yasir Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir, Salah Khalaf, and others in forming the group al-Fatah.

He has remained one of the most senior al-Fatah members since then. After Israel's assassination of al-Wazir (known as Abu Jihad) in 1988, Abbas became Arafat's closest political strategist.

Abbas became the principal Palestinian architect of the 1993 peace accords concluded between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. He, along with Israel's Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, signed the 13 September 1993 Oslo Accord in Washington, D.C. Although he expressed some dissatisfaction with the course of the peace process thereafter, Abbas remained committed to it. The al-Aqsa Intifada, which broke out in September 2000, all but destroyed the peace process and led the United States and others to exert tremendous pressure on Palestinian Authority (PA) president Arafat

to create the office of prime minister within the PA, a position that would control the PA's security forces. In April 2003 Arafat appointed Abbas as prime minister. Abbas sought to control the security apparatus, while Arafat tried to keep as much control over events in the PA as possible. Tension mounted between the two over Abbas's candidate for the position of minister of the interior. Abbas's ultimate failure to dislodge the security apparatus from Arafat's control and thus assume meaningful powers as prime minister, along with Israel's continuing hard line toward the Palestinians in light of the suicide bombings it was sustaining, led Abbas to resign his position in September 2003 after serving only for a few months.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arafat, Yasir; Fatah, al-; Khalaf, Salah; Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palestinian Authority; Peres, Shimon; Wazir, Khalil al-.

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Steve Tamari
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

ABBAS MIRZA, NA'EB AL-SALTANEH

[1789–1833]

Crown prince of Iran and military leader of its forces against Russia.

Abbas Mirza was the son of Fath Ali Shah Qajar (r. 1797–1834). In 1799, Abbas Mirza was declared the crown prince and became the governor of Azerbaijan, with Mirza Bozorg Qa'em Maqam as his minister and mentor. Beginning in 1804, Iran became involved in a long, disastrous war with Russia in the Caucasus, which was under Iranian rule. The war ended in 1813 with defeat for Iran. Under the Treaty of Golestan, Iran ceded Georgia, Darband, Baku, Shirvan, Ganjeh, Karabagh, and Moghan to Russia. Boundaries were not well defined, which gave a pretext for the renewal of war by 1824. Abbas Mirza led the Iranian forces, which were no match for the better-equipped Russians. Iran was defeated in 1828, and Tabriz, Abbas Mirza's capital, was occupied. The Treaty of Turkmanchai, which ended the war, had dire consequences for Iran: It agreed to cede all the areas north of the Aras River; accept indemnity and capitulatory clauses; and pay 5 million *tumans* (approximately $10 to $25 million) to Russia before Tabriz was evacuated. As a result, not only was Iran's economy undermined, but also the indemnity and capitulatory clauses served as a model for all future treaties with European nations.

In the years that followed the treaty, Abbas Mirza tried to pacify eastern Iran, where rebellion was undermining governmental authority. He also set out to reestablish Iranian rule over Herat, now in northwest Afghanistan. He died during the second expedition, and his father, Fath Ali Shah, declared Abbas Mirza's son, the future Mohammad Shah Qajar, the new crown prince.

During his years as crown prince, Abbas Mirza had come into contact with many European envoys because he often carried out diplomatic negotiations for the shah. He believed that Iran needed to modernize its army and governmental administration. He employed European military advisers toward this end, first from France, then from Britain. He also sent Iranian students to Britain to study such subjects as medicine, arms manufacture, languages, and the arts, and he subsidized the translation of several useful books. His untimely death ended any positive results from this pursuit.

See also Fath Ali Shah Qajar; Qajar Dynasty; Turkmanchai, Treaty of (1828).

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Mansoureh Ettehadieh
Updated by Eric Hooglund

ABBUD, IBRAHIM

[1900–?]

Ruler of the Sudan, 1958–1964.

Born in a village on the Red Sea and educated in Khartoum at Gordon Memorial College (now

Khartoum University) and the military college, Ibrahim Abbud joined the Egyptian army in 1918 and later served with the Sudan Defense Force. During World War II he became the highest-ranking Sudanese officer. In 1956, he became commander-in-chief of the armed forces, when the Sudan became an independent republic.

After he engineered the coup d'état with the support of senior politicians in 1958, he headed the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which ruled the country for six years. Abbud suspended the constitution, closed parliament, and banned political parties and trade unions. He negotiated an accord with Egypt to reapportion the use of the Nile waters, but his hard-line policy toward the south, which included the forced Arabization of schools and government offices and the placement of restrictions on Christian institutions, led to an escalation in fighting in that region, an overall deterioration in the economy, and protests in northern cities. He was overthrown in 1964 during mass demonstrations, led by students, professionals, and trade unions, which sought a return to democracy and the undertaking of diplomatic efforts to resolve the civil war in the south. Abbud was not forced into exile or even arrested; he was allowed to resign and to receive his pension.

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ANN M. LESCH

ABD AL-AZIZ IBN AL-HASSAN

Sultan of Morocco, 1894–1908.

A young boy at the death of his father, Hassan I, in 1894, Abd al-Aziz assumed the powers of sultan in 1900 upon the death of the regent, Ahmad ibn Musa. Under Ibn Musa, the modernizing reforms of Hassan had been undermined by social and economic changes, and Morocco became increasingly vulnerable to European imperialist ambitions. In 1900, France annexed the Saharan oasis of In Salah, previously claimed by Morocco, as well as territory along the Algeria–Morocco frontier.

This inaugurated the Moroccan Question, a period of rising European imperialist ambitions (1900–1912). Abd al-Aziz's lack of experience and penchant for European ways permitted European speculators and business interests to take advantage of the situation. It also contributed to undermining his legitimacy. More important was the incompetent way a new universal tax on agriculture, the *tartib,* was introduced, which provoked revolts in several districts. The most important of these was the 1902 rebellion led by Abu Himara, whose victories enabled him to pose a long-term challenge to the regime. Following Moroccan attacks on Europeans, there were several important diplomatic crises.

The Moroccan crisis deepened in 1904 when, after complex French diplomatic maneuvers, Spain, Italy, and Britain renounced their claims to Morocco (although Spain's renunciation did not last). France sought rapidly to capitalize on the situation. It negotiated a major loan agreement with the bankrupt Moroccan government, thus gaining a dominant position in Moroccan finances. It also issued an ultimatum that Morocco adopt a French reform proposal, which would have amounted to it becoming a virtual protectorate. Seeking to stave off the French proposals, Abd al-Aziz referred them to an assembly of notables, or *majles,* in 1905, while seeking diplomatic support from Germany.

Despite German intervention and the convening of the international Algeciras Conference (1906), however, Morocco was forced to accept the substance of France's proposals. Eventually Abd al-Aziz was compelled to sign the Act of Algeciras (1906) over the vociferous objections of the Moroccan elite. By doing this, he fatally undermined his regime.

In the post-Algeciras period, a new French aggressiveness and the breakdown of rural security gave rise to attacks on French citizens. The landing of French troops at Oujda and Casablanca (1907) led to uprisings in both districts. More importantly, in August 1907, it provoked the rebellion of his brother, Abd al-Hafid, the governor of Marrakech, in alliance with Madani and Tuhami al-Glawi and other rural magnates of southern Morocco. Despite French support, Abd al-Aziz was eventually defeated after a yearlong civil war and compelled to abdicate his throne. Thereafter, he lived in retirement in Tangier.

See also Abd al-Hafid ibn al-Hassan; Abu Himara; Algeciras Conference (1906); Hassan I; Ibn Musa, Ahmad; Moroccan Question; Tuhami al-Glawi.

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Edmund Burke III

ABD AL-AZIZ IBN SAʿUD AL SAʿUD

[1880–1953]

Muslim leader and founder of Saudi Arabia.

Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud (known as Ibn Saʿud) became the greatest of all Saudi rulers, restoring the Arabian empire of his ancestors in the early years of the twentieth century. In his reign of more than a half century he not only recovered the lost patrimony of the House of Saʿud but laid the foundations for the economically powerful Saudi Arabia, over which his sons continue to rule. Along with his ancestors Saʿud ibn Abd al-Aziz and Abd al-Aziz ibn Muhammad (rulers of the Saudi state at the turn of the nineteenth century), he was the only Arabian ruler since the early Islamic era to unify most of the Arabian Peninsula under a single political authority.

As he was growing up in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, where he received a traditional education centered on the memorization of the Qurʾan, he witnessed the last act in the decline of the second Saudi state and its submission to the Al Saʿud family's central Arabian rivals and former vassals, the Al Rashid of Haʾil, a town to the north of Riyadh. His father, Abd al-Rahman, failed in the attempt to reassert Saudi independence and the ten-year-old Abd al-Aziz fled into exile in Kuwait with the rest of the family. In 1902, he led a band of forty companions on a dramatic raid that seized Riyadh from its Rashidi overlords. Over the next quarter century bold military, political, and diplomatic initiatives

Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud, the politically astute founder of the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He unified most of the Arabian Peninsula under one political authority during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Public Domain.

brought all of Arabia except for Yemen, Oman, and the Gulf shaykhdoms under his rule.

In reestablishing Saudi authority, Abd al-Aziz self-consciously re-created the religio-political state of his Wahhabi ancestors. It was based on adherence to the strict beliefs and practices of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the eighteenth-century Islamic reformer whose 1744 alliance with Muhammad ibn Saʿud had created the Saudi state of 1745. Indeed, he looked back to the first Islamic community under the prophet Muhammad in creating, from 1912 on, a series of communities called *hujar* (pl.; echoing the *hijra*—the migration of the prophet Muhammad and his early followers to Medina). Here unruly Bedouin tribesmen were settled as Ikhwan, brethren under the command of preacher/warriors who formed the core of Abd al-Aziz's military force. In addition to the crucial legitimacy provided by identification with Wahhabi Islam, he was able to draw on the established loyalty of many central Arabians, which derived from the significant history of rule by

the House of Saʿud. Moreover, Abd al-Aziz and the Saudi clan enjoyed the advantage of membership in the great Anaza tribal federation, conferring noble (sharifian) lineage, thus joining a critical aristocracy of blood to their religious credentials. Abd al-Aziz was brilliantly adept in his management of tribal relations, utilizing disbursement of material benefits, application of military force, and the establishment of marital ties to build the alliances necessary to secure his power. He made astute use of the bedouin magnanimity, for which he was famous, as when he carefully contrived to avoid casualties in his capture of Hail, last stronghold of the Al Rashid, then arranged for the comfortable confinement of his defeated rivals in Riyadh. Patient and generous treatment of his rebellious cousin Saʿud al-Kabir served to deflect a challenge from within the Al Saʿud and secured the line of succession for the direct descendants of Abd al-Rahman.

If mastery of traditional sources of power in Arabian statecraft carried Abd al-Aziz through the initial phases of reconquest, it was his capacity to utilize Western inventions and techniques as well as to adjust to new international realities that enabled him to establish a state that could endure. The source of this aptitude is not obvious and may be largely traceable simply to his superior intuitive abilities. It is likely, however, that it had something to do with his youthful exile in Kuwait, where the (by Arabian standards) cosmopolitan atmosphere meant exposure to information, ideas, and people not usually encountered in the xenophobic isolation of his native Najd. Early in his career of reconquest he met the British political resident in Kuwait, Captain William Shakespear, and developed an admiring friendship for him. Sir Percy Cox, senior British representative in the Gulf just before World War I, had a very strong influence on Abd al-Aziz, and Harry St. John Philby, a British civil servant who left his government's service to live in Saudi Arabia, provided Abd al-Aziz with advice (not always taken) and a window on the outside world. Abd al-Aziz also relied heavily on a coterie of advisers from Syria, Egypt, and other Arab countries. This awareness of the outside world helped to induce a certain pragmatism, evident early on in his search for British protection and in his 1915 treaty with Great Britain that recognized his independence and guaranteed him against aggression. Similarly, after the 1924–1925 conquest of the Hejaz (western Arabia, with the holy cities of Mecca and Medina), he restrained his zealous warriors and assured his retention of that key province by demonstrating to the world Muslim community that he could provide a more efficient and secure administration of the territory than the Hashimite regime that he had defeated. In 1935, he granted generous terms to the imam of Yemen, whom he had defeated in a border war, doing so both to avert possible European intervention and to avoid inclusion in his kingdom of a population whose cultural distinctiveness would have made its assimilation very difficult.

In 1928, the pragmatic realism of Abd al-Aziz came into conflict with the tribal aggression and religious militancy of the Ikhwan forces he had unleashed. The Ikhwan's revolt followed his acceptance of the British-drawn borders of Transjordan and Iraq to the north—for the first time imposing the constraints of explicit state frontiers on a society to which such notions were alien. By 1930, Abd al-Aziz had surmounted this threat, the gravest to his rule, making effective use of automobiles, machine guns, and radio communications to crush the revolt. The passions that drove it, however, remained alive and shook the Saudi kingdom a half century later, in November 1979, when Islamic extremists and disaffected members of the Utaiba tribe, from which many Ikhwan rebels had come, seized the Great Mosque at Mecca in an effort to overthrow the rule of the Al Saʿud.

With the Ikhwan revolt behind him, Abd al-Aziz moved to draw together the disparate parts of his extensive realm. Since Sharif Husayn ibn Ali had assumed the title King of the Hijaz, Abd al-Aziz adopted the same title after conquering that province; he coupled it somewhat incongruously with the title Sultan of Najd and Its Dependencies in 1926. In the following year, he elevated the second title as well to monarchical status, in effect creating a dual monarchy. In 1932, Abd al-Aziz abandoned this arrangement and explicitly identified the country with the Al Saʿud family by naming it the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The two earlier Saudi states had been Wahhabi commonwealths, largely isolated from the outside world and ruled by a Saudi imam, the title emphasizing religious authority and obligations. The new kingdom, while remaining committed to its original religious pur-

pose, was a nation-state that developed an expanding network of relations with other nations, including the establishment of close ties with secular states beyond the Arab-Islamic world.

To secure the future stability of the state he had created and to preserve the continued rule of his line, in 1933, Abd al-Aziz formally designated his eldest surviving son, Saʿud, to succeed him. This action, which senior princes, religious leaders, and tribal chiefs publicly endorsed, departed from the usual practice of Arabian tribal society. In addition to guaranteeing that future kings would come from Abd al-Aziz's branch of the Al Saud, it was doubtless also intended to avert the fratricidal conflict that had destroyed the second Saudi state at the end of the nineteenth century. It was understood that Faisal (Ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud), the next eldest brother, who possessed a much more impressive intellect and had, as foreign minister and viceroy for the Hijaz, exhibited a much greater capacity for public affairs, would succeed Saʿud. Abd al-Aziz may have had several reasons for favoring Saʿud as his immediate successor, but the establishment of seniority as the determining factor in succession was clearly preeminent. Saʿud and Faisal became rivals, but Saʿud's incompetence eventually drove the senior princes and religious leaders to depose him in favor of Faisal. Nevertheless, the principle that Abd al-Aziz established has, with certain qualifications, been preserved and served to maintain the stability of the kingdom.

The crucial economic and security relationships with the United States, a central pillar of the kingdom's foreign policy, grew from decisions that Abd al-Aziz took in the latter phase of his rule. In 1933, he granted the first oil concession to a U.S. company; he signed a petroleum exploration agreement with Standard Oil of California (SOCAL), choosing it over its British rival, the Iraq Petroleum Company. He did so largely because SOCAL could offer more money for his impoverished treasury but also because he saw an advantage in counterbalancing his close relationship with Great Britain with ties to a faraway country having no political involvement (as yet) in the Middle East. There followed the creation of the Arabian American Oil Company consortium and the exploitation of the world's largest oil reserves, bringing staggering wealth to the companies and the kingdom, and the creation of an intimate alignment with U.S. industry that largely determined the course of Saudi Arabia's economic modernization and development. From this time on—especially on radio, in newsreels, and in newspapers—he became known as King Ibn Saʿud.

Equally significant for Saudi Arabia's future were the agreements that Ibn Saʿud made with the United States to assure his country's external security. The king's meeting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt on a U.S. Navy cruiser in Egypt's Great Bitter Lake, in February 1945, prefigured the close, if informal, U.S.–Saudi security alliance that developed after World War II, as British power declined. In 1947, the king waved aside the suggestion of his son Prince Faisal, the foreign minister, that Saudi Arabia break diplomatic relations with the United States over the Truman administration's support for the United Nations partition plan for Palestine—which paved the way for the creation of an independent Israel and contravened a pledge that Roosevelt had made to Ibn Saʿud. The king, however, expected the United States to offer him something in exchange and, between 1947 and 1950, secret U.S. undertakings gave the king the assurances he sought without a formal treaty. Thus the foundations were laid for the far-reaching security relationship—embracing arms sales, military training, and the massive defense infrastructure whose scope was revealed only forty years later, in the course of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operation of the Gulf Crisis of 1990–1991.

The last years of the long rule of Ibn Saʿud, when his physical health was in decline, were an unhappy coda to an extraordinary career. As massive oil income began to flow in the early 1950s, the king displayed little understanding of the economic or social implications of vast wealth—and some of the ostentation that became the hallmark of his reign was apparent before his death. Politically, he was no longer able to master the novel and complex challenges of a very different world than the one he had earlier dominated. The government of Saudi Arabia remained the simple affair that suited a largely traditional desert monarchy, with a small retinue of advisers and a handful of rudimentary ministries that had been established in an ad hoc manner. Somewhat ironically, the last significant governmental act of the old king was to create the

Council of Ministers, until today the source of executive and legislative authority in the kingdom.

In November 1953, King Ibn Saʿud died at al-Taʾif in the Hijaz. He was buried with his ancestors in Riyadh.

See also Al Rashid Family; Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO); Cox, Percy; Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud; Husayn ibn Ali; Ikhwan; Philby, Harry St. John; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano.

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Malcolm C. Peck

ABD AL-GHANI, ABD AL-AZIZ

[c. late 1930s–]

Yemeni economist and politician.

Abd al-Aziz Abd al-Ghani was born in the late 1930s into a modest household in the Hujariyya, the Shafiʿi south of North Yemen. In 1958 he began studies in the United States, eventually earning his bachelor's and master's degrees in economics. A modernist and technocrat, Abd al-Aziz served as prime minister of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) under three presidents in all but three years in the period between early 1975 and Yemeni unification in 1990. He continued in that office after surviving the assassinations of two of those presidents; from 1980 to 1983, the years in which he did not head the government, he was YAR vice president. From the late 1960s to 1975, he was minister of economics twice and the founding head of the Central Bank of Yemen, one of the earliest and most important modern institutions. After Yemeni unification in 1990, he was for four years a member of the five-member presidential council of the new Republic of Yemen (ROY). He became prime minister of the ROY in 1994, after the civil war, and served in that capacity until he was appointed chairman of the newly created Consultative (Shura) Council in early 1997. In this office, he has over the years become something of an elder statesman.

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Robert D. Burrowes

ABD AL-HADI, AWNI

See Abd al-Hadi Family

ABD AL-HADI FAMILY

Prominent Palestinian Arab family.

The Abd al-Hadis were a leading landowning family in the Palestinian districts of Afula, Baysan, Jenin, and Nablus. Already well established in the seventeenth century, in the 1830s the family supported the rule of Ibrahim Pasha. Family members were prominent in Ottoman political, diplomatic, and military circles, including the Ottoman parliament in 1908 and 1914. Ruhi Abd al-Hadi (1885–1954) served for fifteen years in the Ottoman foreign office, including consular and diplomatic

posts in the Balkans, Greece, and Switzerland. Rushdi Abd al-Hadi fought for the Ottoman army in World War I and remained in Turkey to serve the new republic, whereas Raʾuf Abd al-Hadi was taken prisoner by the British forces and then joined Faisal's Arab army to fight the Ottomans.

The best-known member of the al-Hadi family is Awni Abd al-Hadi (1889–1970), a liberal Palestinian and Arab nationalist who was active in politics and diplomacy. He supported the Arab national movement and worked closely with Faisal in Damascus until his regime fell to the French in 1920. When Faisal's kingdom was destroyed, Awni returned to Palestine and soon became a leading Palestinian political figure. In spring 1930 he participated in the fourth Arab delegation to London, which requested the stoppage of Jewish immigration and land purchases until a national government could be formed. Two years later, Awni established the Hizb al-Istiqlal (Independence Party) as a branch of the pan-Arab party. The party called for complete independence and the strengthening of ties with Arab states. Awni became more militant in the early 1930s, arguing that the Palestinians should focus on opposing the British. Later in his life, Awni held various political posts such as ambassador to Cairo and foreign minister to Amman.

Members of the Abd al-Hadi family had divergent responses to the British mandate in Palestine. Ruhi Abd al-Hadi joined the British administrative service in 1921, initially as a district officer, then rising to become assistant senior secretary in 1944. Majid Abd al-Hadi was a supreme court judge, Amin Abd al-Hadi joined the Supreme Muslim Council in 1929, and Tahsin Abd al-Hadi was mayor of Jenin. Some family members secretly sold their shares of Zirʿin village to the Jewish National Fund in July 1930 despite nationalist opposition to such land sales; other members sold land to the Development Department to resettle landless Arab peasants.

With the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the Abd al-Hadis lost substantial agricultural lands in lower Galilee, but retained important—although gradually diminishing—influence in Jenin and Nablus during Jordanian rule. Awni Abd al-Hadi joined the Jordanian diplomatic corps, serving as ambassador to Egypt.

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Ann M. Lesch

ABD AL-HADI, TARAB

Political activist in Palestine in the first half of the twentieth century.

Tarab Abd al-Hadi (birth and death dates unknown) was a member of the Arab Women's Executive Committee (AWE), which convened the first Palestine Arab Women's Congress in Jerusalem in 1929. She was married to Awni Abd al-Hadi, who was a prominent Palestinian nationalist during the mandate period, and active in the Istiqlal Party, among other organizations. In 1933, after Matiel Mughannam, who was Christian, delivered a speech in the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem during protests of the visit of Lord Edmund Allenby, Abd al-Hadi, a Muslim, delivered a speech before Christ's tomb in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Abd al-Hadi was also a member of the Palestinian delegation attending the Eastern Women's Conference on the Palestine Problem convened in Cairo in 1938. She delivered a speech at that conference and at the subsequent Arab Women's Conference, held in Cairo in 1944.

See also Adb Al-Hadi Family.

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Ellen Fleischman

ABD AL-HAFID IBN AL-HASSAN

[1876–1937]

Sultan of Morocco, 1908–1912.

The fourth son of Sultan Hassan I, Abd al-Hafid served as *khalifa* (royal governor) of Tiznit (1897–1901) and Marrakech (1901–1907) under his younger brother, Abd al-Aziz ibn al-Hassan, who was the sultan of Morocco from 1894 to 1908. In the politically tense period of the Moroccan Question (1901–1912), Abd al-Hafid (also Abd al-Hafiz) found himself increasingly opposed to the policies of his brother. Following the latter's acceptance of the Act of Algeciras in 1906 and acquiescence in France's military landings at Oujda and Casablanca in 1907, Abd al-Hafid joined with Madani and Tuhami Glawi in a rebellion aimed at deposing Abd al-Aziz. A civil war between the two brothers lasted from August 1907 to August 1908. Despite French support for Abd al-Aziz, in 1908 Abd al-Hafid was able to defeat him and take the throne.

Abd al-Hafid was an intellectual, poet, and author of numerous books. He favored the introduction of the ideas of the Salafiyya Movement to the al-Qarawiyyin mosque university in Fez. After becoming sultan in 1908, he appointed Abu Shuʿayb al-Dukkali (later known as "the Moroccan Abduh") to his Royal Learned Council. He sought to suppress heterodox Moroccan brotherhoods of Sufism, notably the Tijaniyya and the Kattaniya.

As sultan, Abd al-Hafid sought to recover Moroccan political and financial independence from France through a policy of alliances with the Ottoman Empire and Germany, and a program of governmental reforms. He cracked down on political dissidents, such as Muhammad ibn Abd al-Kabir al-Kattani and Abu Himara. In 1910, however, he was compelled to enter into a major loan agreement with France, the terms of which ended Moroccan financial independence. The loss of political independence came soon thereafter.

A rebellion of the tribes around Fez and Meknes in 1911 led to the occupation of the Moroccan interior by a French expeditionary force. On 28 March 1912, his authority weakened irreparably, Abd al-Hafid signed the Treaty of Fes, thereby establishing the French protectorate. On 12 August 1912, Abd al-Hafid abdicated as sultan and was succeeded by a French-imposed successor, his brother Yusuf (1912–1927). The protectorates of France and Spain were to last until 1956.

The last sultan of independent Morocco, Abd al-Hafid died in 1937 at Tangier. His legacy is a mixed one—he came to the throne on a program of opposition to the Act of Algeciras and a French protectorate; he faced an impossible task, however, and his defeat was most probable. His support of pan-Islam and of Salafiyya ideas for regenerating Morocco were undermined by the corruption and brutality of his rule, notably the actions of his close collaborators, the Glawi brothers. His shameless bargaining with the French over the terms of his abdication and his willingness to sign the Treaty of Fes earned him the enmity of a later generation of Moroccan nationalists.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn al-Hassan; Abu Himara; Fes, Treaty of (1912); Hassan I; Kattani, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Kabir al-; Moroccan Question; Salafiyya Movement.

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Edmund Burke III

ABD AL-ILAH IBN ALI

[1913–1958]

Regent of Iraq for the child king Faisal II.

The son of Ali, king of the Hijaz, and grandson of the sharif of Mecca, Abd al-Ilah was brought up in Mecca. He came to Iraq at the age of thirteen, after his father lost the Hijazi throne in 1926. He had no strong roots in Iraq and was, or at least became, heavily dependent on British support. Abd al-Ilah came to prominence somewhat unexpectedly in 1939 following the accidental death of his cousin, King Ghazi (ibn Faisal) I. Ghazi's son, Faisal II, was only three years old, and Abd al-Ilah, who was also the child's maternal uncle, was made regent. He became crown prince in 1943, and although formally relinquishing the regency after Faisal reached his majority in 1953, he was always known in Iraq as "the regent" (al-Wasi).

His friend and mentor at the time of his rise to power was Nuri al-Saʿid, another faithful servant of Britain, who would eventually serve as prime minister fourteen times under the mandate and monarchy. It was Abd al-Ilah's misfortune to come to prominence at a time when the central institutions of the new Iraqi state were extremely weak, the result of a combination of several factors, including the premature death of his uncle Faisal I in 1933, the dominant role in politics being played by the officer corps, and the tide of anti-British sentiment flooding over Iraq and the rest of the Middle East at the end of the 1930s.

Although Iraq followed Britain's lead and declared war on Germany in September 1939, the Arab nationalist army officers, led by a group of four colonels known as the Golden Square, were soon able to make their influence felt, and an anti-British and more or less pro-Axis cabinet was formed under Rashid Ali al-Kaylani in March 1940. After a brief reversal of fortune in the early months of 1941, Rashid Ali returned to power on 12 April and he and the Golden Square set in motion a somewhat quixotic but immensely popular revolt against Britain. Although the outcome was a foregone conclusion, the episode showed how little support there was in Iraq for Britain or for Britain's Iraqi partners; Nuri and Abd al-Ilah fled to Jordan in April with British assistance and did not return until after the Iraqi army had been crushed in June. All four of the colonels were eventually tried by Iraqi authorities and hanged in public in Baghdad, apparently on the express instructions of the regent and Nuri.

In 1947 and 1948, the regent managed to alienate himself further from mainstream political sentiment by his support for the renegotiation of the terms of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty. This time the opposition was more organized, and the demonstrations against the new treaty (signed in Portsmouth in January 1948) were so massive and so vehement that it had to be dropped. Over the next ten years there were frequent displays of mass discontent, which were usually countered by fierce repression and the imposition of martial law.

By the mid-1950s, the political situation in Iraq had deteriorated to the point that it was widely understood that it was a question of when, rather than

Former regent of Iraq Abd al-Ilah (1913–1958). In 1939, Abd al-Ilah was appointed regent for his four-year-old nephew, Faisal II, a position he held until 1953. **© Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

if, the regime would fall. Although not always on the best of terms during this time, Nuri and Abd al-Ilah were widely regarded as embodying many of the evils and shortcomings of the regime, especially its almost slavish dependence on the West. But if the end was long expected, the actual occasion was sudden; a group of Free Officers led by Abd al-Karim Qasim and Abd al-Salam Arif managed to take control of a number of key military units and staged a coup on 14 July 1958. The royal palace and Nuri's house were surrounded; Nuri evaded capture until the following day, but the king, the regent, and other members of the royal family were shot in the courtyard of the palace on the morning of the revolution, thus bringing the Iraqi monarchy to an abrupt, violent, and largely unlamented end.

See also Arif, Abd al-Salam; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Faisal II ibn Ghazi; Ghazi ibn Faisal; Golden Square; Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-; Qasim, Abd al-Karim; Sharif of Mecca.

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PETER SLUGLETT

ABD AL-MAGUID, ESMAT

[1924–]

Egyptian diplomat and statesman.

Born in Alexandria and educated there, Esmat Abd al-Maguid (also, Ismat Abd al-Majid) entered the Egyptian foreign service in 1950 and earned a doctorate from the University of Paris in 1951. He took part in the Anglo–Egyptian negotiations of 1954 and negotiated with France after the 1956 Suez War. In 1970 he served as Egypt's ambassador to that country. He headed Egypt's mission to the United Nations from 1972 to 1983 and was minister of foreign affairs from 1984 to 1991 and deputy prime minister from 1985. He was secretary-general of the League of Arab States from 1991 to 2001. An advocate of Arab unity, he worked closely with Mahmud Riyad. Shortly before his retirement Abd al-Maguid spoke at the Arab summit meeting of October 2000, calling on all Arabs to donate one day's pay as a gesture of support to the Palestinians. He was interviewed by the Yale United Nations Oral History Project.

See also RIYAD, MAHMUD.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

ABD AL NASIR, JAMAL

See NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL

ABD AL-QADIR

[1807–1883]

Algerian leader who resisted initial French colonialism.

Abd al-Qadir (also spelled Abd el-Kader, Abdul Qader) was born in Guetna Oued al-Hammam, near Mascara, Western Algeria. His father, Muhyi al-Din, was spiritual head of the Qadiriyya order of Islam; his education was guided by Qadi Ahmad ibn Tahir of Azrou and Sidi Ahmad ibn Khoja of Oran. He pursued religious studies while traveling with his father within the Ottoman Empire, in Syria and Iraq and at al-Azhar in Egypt.

As the leader of Algerian tribal resistance to French colonialism between 1833 and 1847, Abd al-Qadir earned a reputation far beyond Algeria. It was only partly for military leadership, since his skill in founding alliances between hinterland tribes, especially in the western province of Oran and, for a time, as far east as Constantine, presented a political feat of no small consequence.

Abd al-Qadir's father had carried out several raids against the French in the Oran region in spring of 1832. The French had become enraged by the corsairs, pirates, and slave trade of the Barbary coast and wanted to end the taking and selling of Christian sailors from Mediterranean shipping. By this date two figures, neither Algerian, had played roles in reacting to the French presence in the former beylicate of Oran. The only serious previous attempt to defend Oran came between November 1830 and April 1832, when Ali ibn Sulayman of Morocco intervened unsuccessfully in Algeria. Meanwhile, between February and August 1831, a token Tunisian force had come and gone from Oran following an agreement between the bey of Tunis and the French government. According to its terms, the French promised to recognize ill-defined Tunisian responsibility to govern the Algerian west in their name.

By 1833, it was clear that the unorganized Algerian forces under Abd al-Qadir's father could do little more than harass the French in Oran. The decision was made to recognize Abd al-Qadir's leadership, both of the Qadiriyya order and of provincial tribal resistance. This decision proved fateful, since Abd al-Qadir clearly viewed his mission in terms that went beyond mere military leadership. An early sign of this was his insistence that his followers swear allegiance according to the *bayʿa* (the pledge) to the caliphs who succeeded the prophet Muhammad. A good portion of Abd al-Qadir's military and political career—beyond his relations with the French—involved attempts to im-

pose legitimizing symbols of rule on neighboring tribes. Such struggles to command allegiance in Islamic as well as tribal terms were complicated by the fact that some key local tribes were traditionally *makhzanis* (mercenaries), which meant they were willing to receive pay from secular executive authorities. Before 1830, such tribes would have been in the service of the Algerian beys; after 1830, the French tried to recruit makhzanis to their service, thus creating a dilemma in them between Islamic and opportunistic loyalties.

In February 1834, soon after the French opened formal diplomatic contact with the Algerian resistance forces, two treaties, one containing essential French conditions, the second with additional Algerian conditions, were signed between France and Abd al-Qadir. These provided for mutual recognition of two different types of polities in the west: three French enclaves on the coast and Abd al-Qadir's emirate with its capital at Mascara. Thus he was recognized as dey of Mascara.

During this brief truce, Abd al-Qadir may have benefited from French help to defeat Mustafa ibn Ismaʿil, his primary rival for political and religious ascendancy over the western tribes. Another rival, Shaykh al-Ghumari, was also captured and hanged. Had Franco-Algerian peace continued, Abd al-Qadir might have succeeded in extending his unprecedented tax levy (the *muʿuwna*) to more and more subordinates of his emirate. As it was, hostilities resumed in 1835 (after the Ottomans had sent a new governor to Tripoli), and the French were repeatedly defeated by Abd al-Qadir. In 1837, the French signed the Treaty of Tafna, with Marshal Thomas-Robert Bugeaud de la Piconnerie granting most of the Algerian hinterland to Abd al-Qadir.

Perhaps the Tafna treaty was meant to keep Abd al-Qadir from objecting to French advances against the eastern beylicate of Constantine—which fell only four months after the Tafna accords. Once it fell, however, the French were never able to make deals with Abd al-Qadir again.

From late 1837 to 1847, intermittent hostilities with forces under Abd al-Qadir brought clashes as far east as Constantine and as far west as Morocco. It was only after Marshal Bugeaud led a large French expeditionary force into Algeria that systematic sub-

Abd al-Qadir led Algerian tribes against the French, succeeding his father Muhyi al-Din. By 1839 he had gained control of over two-thirds of Algeria and had established a Muslim state.
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jugation of the interior began. At this point Abd al-Qadir's crossings into Morocco involved refuge rather than tactics; and the major battle of Isly in 1844 dissuaded the Moroccans from offering him refuge again. Although the Algerians tried to reverse the inevitable tide, his fate became as insecure in Morocco as it was in Algeria. After his decision to surrender in December 1847, Abd al-Qadir was promised exile but was sent as a prisoner to France. He was released in 1852 by Napoléon III and finally granted his requested exile in Syria. He died in Damascus in 1883. Some eighty-five years later and six years after Algeria's independence, Abd al-Qadir's remains were reinterred in his native land in 1968.

His contribution to the history of North Africa may be viewed from several perspectives. Within the closest political and cultural context, his leadership reflected intertribal dynamics in what was eventually to become the entity of Algeria. His efforts to unify disparate tribes included a certain number of

institutional innovations, suggesting rudiments of governmental responsibility that surpassed anything that had preceded this key period. Among these, formal executive appointments, regular decision-making councils, and taxation figured most prominently. One cannot escape the fact, however, that hinterland submission to Abd al-Qadir's ascendancy, both military and political, often came only after successful imposition of his will by force.

By contrast, those who emphasize the nationalist implications of Algerian resistance to French colonialism would interpret Abd al-Qadir in ways that reflect more on the twentieth-century context of mass political movements than the highly fragmented setting of nineteenth-century Algeria. For the nationalist school, he represents a first stage in a process that became a model for the Algerian National Liberation Front at the end of the colonial era.

The third point of view combines speculation on what actual mid-nineteenth-century appraisals of Abd al-Qadir's leadership were with twentieth-century reflections on the living heritage of the past. This view would emphasize Islamic religious and cultural values embodied—then and thereafter—in resistance to foreign domination in any form. Seen from this perspective, a culturewide hero model like Abd al-Qadir represents a heritage that can be chronologically continuous and spatially all-encompassing. His actions not only had the effect of legitimizing his call to carry out a general jihad (holy war) against the French in the name of Islam but also gave him the assumed responsibility of overseeing the welfare of the entire *umma* (community of believers) in a responsible way that had not been effectively present in Algeria for centuries.

See also BUGEAUD DE LA PICONNERIE, THOMAS-ROBERT; CORSAIRS.

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BYRON CANNON

ABD AL-QUDDUS, IHSAN

[1918–1990]

Egyptian journalist, novelist, and short-story writer.

Abd al-Quddus began his literary career as an editor and writer for the leading Egyptian weekly *Ruz al-Yusuf,* which was founded in 1925 by his mother, Fatima al-Yusuf, a former actress. These writings made him well known throughout the Arab world. In the 1960s and 1970s, he was the editor of the newspapers *Akhbar al-Yawm* and the influential *al-Ahram.* In his column, "At a Cafe on Politics Street," he created fictional dialogues between customers at a cafe to discuss contemporary issues.

Abd al-Quddus wrote more than sixty novels and collections of short stories, many of which were made into films. His works of Arabic literature were characterized by psychological studies of political and social behavior. Among his works translated into English are *I Am Free, The Bus Thief,* and *A Boy's Best Friend.*

See also NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES.

DAVID WALDNER

ABD AL-RAHMAN, AISHA

See BINT AL-SHATI

ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-MAHDI

[1885–1959]

Leader in the Sudan after World War I.

Born after the death of his father, Muhammad Ahmad, in June 1885, Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi was reared in Omdurman under the rule of the Khalifa Abdullahi. Upon the conquest of the Sudan by Anglo–Egyptian forces in 1898, he, as the eldest surviving son of the Mahdi (and consequently his spiritual and legal heir), was kept under close scrutiny by the British authorities until the outbreak of World War I, when they sought his assistance to counter any call for a jihad by the Ottoman Turks, who were allies of the Germans. Sayyid Abd al-Rahman unstintingly supported the British and in return received the freedom to enhance his wealth and his influence among the followers of his father, the Ansar; thus he emerged as the leading religious and

political figure in the Anglo–Egyptian Sudan. Despite tensions between him and the British, who feared a revival of Muslim fanaticism in the guise of neo-Mahdism, the sayyid continued to prove his loyalty to the government. He used his abundant resources to acquire a loyal following among the Ansar, whom he converted into the Umma political party. After World War II he remained the most influential Sudanese in the emerging political system. Like his father, he frustrated Egyptian claims in the Sudan and for a time regarded himself as a possible king of an independent Sudan. This was unacceptable to the vast majority of Sudanese, who did not wish to be dominated by the Ansar as they had been in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Until his death Abd al-Rahman continued to pursue his ambitions to ensure that the Ansar and the Umma would remain preeminent in an independent Sudan.

See also AHMAD, MUHAMMAD; UMMA PARTY.

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ROBERT O. COLLINS

ABD AL-RAHMAN IBN HISHAM

[1789–1859]

Sultan of Morocco, 1822–1859.

During the reign of Abd al-Rahman, Morocco lost its international standing and suffered economic decline and social and political unrest.

A major problem was how to respond to the invasion of Algeria by France in 1830. Abd al-Rahman first tacitly supported Algerian resistance forces, then sought to avoid a confrontation. In August 1844, this policy failed when a Moroccan army was beaten at Isly by General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud de la Piconnerie and Moroccan ports were bombarded by the French navy. Morocco's defeat opened the door to increased European political and economic intervention.

The economic policies pursued by Abd al-Rahman became disastrous as well. The signing of an Anglo–Moroccan commercial agreement in 1856 gave most-favored-nation status to Britain, and its provisions were soon extended to other European powers.

Finally, a major conflict with Spain erupted into war in August 1859.

See also BUGEAUD DE LA PICONNERIE, THOMAS-ROBERT; MOROCCO.

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EDMUND BURKE III

ABD AL-RAHMAN KHAN

[1844–1910]

Ruler of Afghanistan.

Abd al-Rahman Khan Barakzai (also known as Abd er-Rahman) ascended the Afghan throne during the second British invasion of Afghanistan. Embarking on a relentless policy of centralization of power, he weathered four civil wars and a hundred rebellions during his reign (1880–1910).

He was the grandson of Dost Mohammad (ruled 1826–1839; 1842–1863), the founder of the Barakzai dynasty. At the age of thirteen, he was given his first appointment, and he showed his talent when assigned, later on, to command the army of the northern region, of which his father was governor. Playing an active role in the five-year war of succession, he twice won the throne for his father and an uncle before being defeated by yet another uncle, Sher Ali (ruled 1863–1866; 1869–1879). Forced to leave, Abd al-Rahman spent eleven years in exile in the Asiatic colonies of Russia. His opportunity came in 1880, when Britain's invading forces, shaken by the intensity of Afghan resistance, were casting for a candidate acceptable both to them and to the resistance. In return for British control

over Afghanistan's foreign relations, he was recognized as the ruler, in July 1880, and assigned a subsidy by Britain.

In the wake of Britain's invasion, multiple centers of power had emerged in Afghanistan, with two of Abd al-Rahman's cousins controlling major portions of the country. He rejected offers to share power, defeating one cousin in 1880 and the other in 1885, and emerged as the undisputed ruler of the country. His next challenge was to overcome the clans, whom he subdued, in a series of campaigns between 1880 and 1896. He imposed taxation, conscription, and adjudication on the defeated clans. His policies encompassed all linguistic and religious groups but took a particularly brutal form in the case of the Hazaras.

To establish his centralizing policies, he transformed the state apparatus. The army, chief vehicle of his policies, was reorganized and expanded, and the bulk of the state revenue was spent on its upkeep. Administrative and judicial practices were bureaucratized, with emphasis on record keeping and the separation of home and office. He justified these policies on religious grounds, making *shariʿa* (the law of Islam) the law of the land, and nonetheless turning all judges into paid servants of the state.

Abd al-Rahman was able to concentrate on consolidating his rule at home because of Britain's and Russia's desire to avoid direct confrontation with each other. Afghanistan became a buffer state between the two empires; they imposed its present boundaries. Playing on their rivalry, Abd al-Rahman refused to allow European railways, which were touching on his eastern, southern, and northern borders, to expand within Afghanistan, and he resisted British attempts to station European representatives in his country. Toward the end of his reign, he felt secure enough to inform the viceroy of India that treaty obligations did not allow British representatives even to comment on his internal affairs.

When he died, he was succeeded by his son and heir apparent, Habibollah Khan, who ruled until 1919.

See also Barakzai Dynasty; Dost Mohammad Barakzai; Habibollah Khan.

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Ashraf Ghani

ABD AL-RAHMAN, UMAR

[1938–]

Religious Muslim leader sentenced to life in prison for his role in the attack on the World Trade Center in 1993.

An Egyptian Muslim militant and spritual leader of al-Gamaʿa al-Islamiyya, also known as the Islamic Group, Umar Abd al-Rahman was born in the Dakahliyyah province, south of Cairo, in 1938. He was educated at al-Azhar University, where he earned a doctorate in Islamic theology in 1965 and later became a lecturer. Abd al-Rahman's agitating religious sermons in which he challenged the legitimacy of Egypt's rulers (Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak) provoked frequent arrest and imprisonment. He was critical of President Gamal Abdel Nasser and his ideology of Arab socialism. After Egypt's defeat in the 1967 Arab–Israel War, Abd al-Rahman became more bold in his attacks on Nasser and his socialist policies. Abd al-Rahman was briefly arrested in 1968 and dismissed from al-Azhar. He was arrested again after Nasser's death in 1970 but was released as part of the general amnesty President Anwar al-Sadat granted to a number of dissidents and opposition leaders.

Abd al-Rahman traveled and from 1971 to 1978 lived in Saudia Arabia, where he was able to work as a teacher of Islamic studies. He then returned to Egypt and became emphatically opposed to Sadat's signing of the 1978 Camp David Accords as well as his economic liberalization policies, which Abd al-Rahman viewed as moral and material corruption. After Sadat's assassination in October 1981, Abd al-Rahman was arrested and accused of issuing a *fatwa* for the assassination, but he was released due to insufficient evidence.

Shortly after his release, Abd al-Rahman published his book *Kalimat Haqq* (Word of truth), in which he openly attacked Sadat's successor, Husni Mubarak. Abd al-Rahman was arrested in 1984 and accused of instigating violence against the government, but was released, again for lack of direct and concrete evidence. He continued his antigovernment activities, including his demand that Egypt should be governed according to the *shariʿa.* From 1984 to 1989 Abd al-Rahman was actively involved in promoting militant Islam and traveled within Egypt, delivering speeches that inspired followers of several militant organizations. He was arrested and accused of ordering terrorist acts against Egyptian Copts and security forces, and he was prohibited from speaking in public. In response, he issued a *fatwa* instructing his followers to capture weapons from the police and the military and use them against Mubarak's regime.

In mid-1989 Abd al-Rahman fled Egypt to Sudan, where he was refused political asylum. He entered the United States in 1990 after he was erroneously issued a tourist visa by the American embassy in Sudan. In the United States, Abd al-Rahman was in charge of the operation of a mosque in Brooklyn that was frequently attended by Arab Muslim immigrants. In 1991 he was granted permanent residence status. He then moved to the adjoining state of New Jersey. Following the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993, Abd al-Rahman was arrested and tried for inspiring the terrorists who committed the act. In 1996 he was sentenced to life in prison.

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Ahmed H. Ibrahim

ABD AL-RAZIQ, ALI

[1888–1966]

Egyptian Islamic judge, writer, and politician.

Ali Abd al-Raziq, who came from a family of large landowners in southern Egypt, was educated at al-Azhar in Cairo and in England and became an Islamic court judge in Mansura. In 1925, he published a controversial book on the secularization of power in the Muslim state, *Al-Islam wa usul al-hukm* (Islam and the bases of rule), in which he argued for separating Islamic from political authority, on the grounds that the Qurʾan and biographies of Muhammad show that God called on the Prophet to be a religious counselor to his people, not a head of state, and that the caliphate as a political institution was a post-Qurʾanic innovation not essential to Islam. The publication of this book aroused controversy among Muslims, especially Egyptians, because in the new Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) had recently abolished the Islamic caliphate, because many Muslims wanted to elect or appoint a new caliph in a country other than Turkey, and because King Fuʾad I of Egypt had proposed himself as a candidate for the caliphate. Abd al-Raziq was accused of promoting atheism and was censured by the *ulama* (Islamic scholars) of al-Azhar, deprived of his title of shaykh, and relieved of his duties as a religious judge. He was, however, backed by many liberal writers, including Taha Husayn and Muhammad Husayn Haykal.

He continued to defend his ideas in articles written for *al-Siyasa,* the weekly journal of the Constitutional Liberal Party, and in lectures delivered in Cairo University's faculties of law and of letters. He later served twice as *waqf* (Muslim endowment) minister and was elected to membership in the Arabic Language Academy. Following the 1952 revolution, he practiced law and published a collection of writings by his brother, Mustafa Abd al-Raziq, including a detailed biography. He is often cited by Egyptian and foreign writers as a leading secularist thinker and an opponent of King Fuʾad's religious pretensions.

See also Egypt; Fuʾad; Haykal, Muhammad Husayn; Husayn, Taha.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

ABD AL-SABUR, SALAH

[1931–1981]

Egyptian author, journalist, and poet.

Abd al-Sabur was born in the Egyptian countryside but grew up in Cairo. Originally writing poetry in traditional styles, Abd al-Sabur later wrote in free verse and is considered the leader of Egyptian modernists. In all of his works, Abd al-Sabur draws upon contemporary life for his subjects and his symbolism, expressing themes of existentialism, the search for new values, and the longing for youth and for rural life. Among his volumes of poetry are *Al-Nass fi Biladi* (The people of my country), published in 1957, and *Aqulu Lakum* (I say to you), published in 1961. Abd al-Sabur also wrote plays, including *Misafir Layl* (Nocturnal pilgrims) and *Layla wa Majnun,* and several volumes of literary criticism, including *Hayati fi al-Shiʿr* (My life in poetry), published in 1969, and *Qiraʾa Jadida lil-Shiʿrna al-Qadim* (A new reading of our old poetry), published in 1968. In addition, Abd al-Sabur translated the drama of Henrik Ibsen into Arabic, as well as articles and essays that covered a broad range of subjects from British politics to atomic submarines.

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DAVID WALDNER

ABD AL-WAHHAB, MUHAMMAD IBN

[c. 1901–1991]

An illustrious name in twentieth-century Arab music.

An Egyptian with acknowledged talent and a long artistic career extending roughly from the early 1920s to the late 1980s, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab emerged as a leading singer, film star, and composer who wrote hundreds of songs that he and others sang and recorded. Through his mastery of traditional Arab singing and exposure to Western music, he developed a multi-faceted repertoire that combined local and European elements in ways that seemed to reflect both his own artistic outlooks and modern Egyptian taste. Growing up in a poor and conservative Cairo family, Abd al-Wahhab was exposed to Islamic religious music at an early age. After performing traditional vocal genres and taking roles in local musical plays, he composed distinctive works and acted and sang in seven feature films released between 1933 and 1946. Through his early association with the well-known poet Ahmad Shawqi, he gained access to Egypt's distinguished social, literary, and political circles and to the musical culture of the West. Among Abd al-Wahhab's recognized innovations are: the gradual enlargement of the performing ensemble; the introduction of European instruments and instrumentations; the creation of irregular forms, often with sections in strikingly contrastive styles; the quoting of melodic themes from Romantic and post-Romantic European composers; the occasional use of Western ballroom dance meters; and the composition of numerous descriptive, or programmatic, instrumental works. Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab represented both the mainstream and the vanguard in Arab music. Although at times his music was criticized by artistic purists, his legacy is highly acclaimed by musicians, critics, and government officials throughout the Arab world.

See also SHAWQI, AHMAD.

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ALI JIHAD RACY

ABDELGHANI, MOHAMED BENAHMED

[1927–1996]

Algerian military officer; prime minister, 1979–1984.

Mohamed Benahmed Abdelghani was appointed commander of Algeria's first (1962), fourth (1965),

and fifth (1967) military regions. In October 1973 he was charged with dispatching Algerian troops to the Arab-Israel War. Abdelghani supported Colonel Houari Boumédienne's coup against Ahmed Ben Bella's government (1965) and joined the council of the revolution. After the death of Ahmed Medeghri, Abdelghani was rewarded for his loyalty with the portfolio of minister of interior (1974–1979). He was dispatched by Houari Boumédienne on a sensitive diplomatic mission to Madrid in October 1975 in an unsuccessful attempt to dissuade the Spanish government from concluding an agreement with Morocco and Mauritania over the future disposition of Western Sahara. Algerian president Chadli Bendjedid selected Abdelghani as his first prime minister (1979–1984), a strategic political choice to satisfy the Boumédienne faction. Abdelghani served as a minister of state to the presidency (1984–1988) and then retired from political office.

See also Ben Bella, Ahmed; Boumédienne, Houari.

Phillip C. Naylor

ABDESSELAM, BELAID

[1928–]

Algerian prime minister, 1992–1993; minister of industry and energy, 1965–1977.

Belaid Abdesselam was born in Kabylia. A founder of the Union Générale des Etudiants Musulmans Algériens (UGEMA) in 1953 while enrolled at the University of Grenoble, he joined the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and served in the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA) during the War of Independence. Under President Ahmed Ben Bella, in 1963 Abdesselam organized and inaugurated SONATRACH, the state hydrocarbons enterprise. After Colonel Houari Boumédienne seized power in 1965, Abdesselam received the minister of industry and energy portfolio. Under Abdesselam's direction, hydrocarbon revenues fueled impressive industrial capitalization, and Abdesselam became renowned as the "father of Algerian industrialization." He played an important role in the nationalization of French hydrocarbon concessions in February 1971. From 1977 to 1979 he was the minister of light industry, but he was removed from power and eventually was accused of mismanagement—a politically motivated charge.

Abdesselam resumed a public political role in 1989. He was particularly critical of the government's liberalized hydrocarbon policy and teamed with other ex-Boumédienne ministers in opposition to President Chadli Bendjedid. In July 1992 the Haut Comité d'Etat (HCE) appointed Abdesselam prime minister. His policies attempted to stop Islamist assaults and stabilize the collapsing economy. Escalating violence and economic deterioration led to his dismissal in August 1993. Abdesselam remained active in Algerian politics. He ran for the presidency in January 1999, but his candidacy attracted little support and he withdrew from the race.

See also SONATRACH.

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Phillip C. Naylor

ABDUH, MUHAMMAD

[1849–1905]

Islamic reformer and author.

Born in a village in Gharbiyya province, Egypt, Muhammad Abduh moved with his family to Mahallat Nasr in Buhayra province, where he was raised. Educated at the Ahmadi Mosque in Tanta and at al-Azhar University, Muhammad Abduh became interested in philosophy and Sufism. During the sojourn of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in Cairo, Abduh came to know him and became his most loyal disciple. He taught for a while, then became editor of *al-Waqa'i al-Misriyya,* the Egyptian government newspaper, from 1880 to 1882. Although more moderate than his mentor, Abduh nevertheless backed the Urabi revolution. After its collapse he was imprisoned briefly and then was exiled to Beirut.

In 1884 Abduh went to Paris, where he collaborated with Afghani in forming a society called al-Urwa al-Wuthqa (the indissoluble bond), which published a journal by the same name. Although it lasted only eight months, the journal stimulated the rise of nationalism in many parts of the Muslim world. After it was banned, Abduh returned to Beirut to teach and write. He also translated into Arabic Afghani's *al-Radd ala al-dahriyyin* (Refutation of the materialists).

In 1889 he was allowed to return to Egypt, where he became a judge, then a chancellor in the appeals court, and in 1899 the chief mufti (canon lawyer) of Egypt. In 1894 he became a member of the governing council of al-Azhar, for which he proposed far-reaching reforms. He was named to the legislative council in 1899.

His best-known theological work, *Risalat al-Tawhid* (Treatise on unity), based on lectures he had given in Beirut, was published in 1897. He also wrote *al-Islam wa al-Nasraniyya maʿa al-ilm wa al-madaniyya,* published in 1902 in *al-Manar,* a journal edited by his disciple, Rashid Rida. Abduh also began writing a commentary on the Qurʾan, completed by Rida after his death. He advocated reforming Islam by restoring it to what he believed had been its original condition, modernizing the Arabic language, and upholding people's rights in relation to their rulers. He was among the first *ulama* (Islamic scholars) to favor nationalism, and one of his political disciples was Saʿd Zaghlul. His efforts to reconcile Islam with modernization have not fully survived the test of time, but Abduh remains a towering figure in Egypt's intellectual history.

See also Afghani, Jamal al-Din al-; Rida, Rashid; Sufism and the Sufi Orders; Zaghlul, Saʿd.

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Arthur Goldschmidt

ABDÜLAZIZ
[1830–1876]

Ottoman sultan, 1861–1876.

Administratively, the reign of Abdülaziz divides into two eras. During the first (1861–1871), real power was in the hands of the reformist ministers Ali and Fuʾad, protégés of the leader of the Tanzimat reforms, Mustafa Reşid Paşa. Although Abdülaziz was not a figurehead, his powers were limited by his ministers; the bureaucracy ruled. Reforms continued to centralize and rationalize the Ottoman administrative system. Provincial borders were redrawn, and provincial governments were reformed by the Vilayet Law of 1867. The General Education Law of 1869 set a national curriculum stressing "modern" subjects such as the sciences, engineering, and geography. Specialized higher schools were created in the provinces, and in Constantinople (now Istanbul) a university (at least in concept) was established.

The second era (1871–1876) began upon the death of Ali in 1871 (Fuʾad had died in 1869) when Abdülaziz took personal charge of the government. The centralization of power, one of the pillars of Tanzimat reform, was especially attractive to him; he planned to transfer power to himself. To avoid concentrating power in the hands of the bureaucracy, the sultan changed ministers of state often. Grand viziers (the most famous being Mahmud Nedim Paşa) averaged well under a year in office. Serving at the pleasure of the sultan, the bureaucrats adapted themselves to carrying out his wishes and protecting their own careers. Some reformist measures were passed, particularly improvements in central administration and taxation. The thrust of reform, however, was weakened.

The military was greatly improved after 1871. Under Grand Vizier Hüseyin Avni Paşa (1874–1876), the government invested in military hardware, including up-to-date rifles and artillery from Germany. It rebuilt and improved fortresses on the Asian border with Russia and reorganized the Ottoman army corps. Previously garrisoned to face a now-unlikely internal rebellion, they were shifted to meet foreign threats. The Anatolian army, for example, was transferred from Sivas to Erzurum. The Turkish Straits were fortified. Unfortunately,

the Ottoman Empire could not support even these most necessary expenditures.

Militarily, Abdülaziz's reign was relatively quiet. He and his successor, Murat V, who reigned for three months, were the only nineteenth-century sultans who did not fight a major war with Russia. Bloody uprisings in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria, which were to result in the Russo–Turkish War of 1877–1878, began in Abdülaziz's reign. A revolt in Crete (1866–1869) resulted in administrative reforms on the island.

Russia remained the primary enemy of the Ottomans. Balanced in international affairs by the generally pro-Ottoman diplomacy of Great Britain, Russia nevertheless managed to upset the Ottoman Empire. Most damaging was Russia's policy in the Caucasus. When it conquered Circassia in 1864 and Abkhazia in 1867, Russia forced approximately 1.2 million Muslims from their homes. Robbed of their belongings by the Russians, the refugees were herded to Black Sea ports. The Ottomans were forced either to transport them to the Ottoman Empire or to let them die. The Ottomans settled the refugees in Anatolia and the Balkans. There was little but land to give them, so thefts by the starving Caucasians were widespread. Conflicts between refugees and villagers disrupted the empire for a decade.

A patron of public education, Abdülaziz was an Ottoman sultan from 1861 to 1876. This son of Mahmid II was the first sultan to visit Western Europe. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS.

In the face of Russia's threat and despite a good record of military preparedness, the foreign policy of Abdülaziz's later years was more than odd. The government took Russia's ambassador, Count Nicholas Ignatiev, as adviser and accommodated Ottoman policy to Russian wishes. Mahmut Nedim, twice grand vizir and Abdülaziz's main counselor, was widely, and probably correctly, viewed as being in the pay of Ignatiev. If pro-Russia policies were designed to avoid war, they were surely misguided, as Russia's attack in 1877 demonstrated.

Finances were Abdülaziz's undoing. Since the Crimean War, the Ottoman government had existed on a series of European loans. Because of vast defense needs, the costs of reform—advisers, teachers, economic infrastructure—could be paid only through borrowing. The expectation that reform would lead to economic improvement, greater tax revenues, and easy repayment of loans was never realized. The bill came due under Abdülaziz. Famine in Anatolia in 1873–1874 greatly reduced tax revenues, and the bureaucrats were not adept at collecting even what could be paid. Abdülaziz exacerbated the problem with personal expenditures on palaces and luxuries. By the end of his reign, debt payments theoretically took more than 40 percent of state income. European bankers, previously willing to cover Ottoman interest payments with further loans, had suffered from the general stock market crash of 1873 and were unwilling to oblige. The Ottoman government was forced to default on its loans.

Financial disaster turned European governments, always protective of bondholders, against Abdülaziz. Restive bureaucrats, reformers, and those who feared the effects of subservience to Russia already were against him. Popular resentment at weak Ottoman responses to the slaughter of Muslims by Serbian rebels in Bosnia added to the sultan's difficulties. On 30 May 1876, Abdülaziz was deposed in favor of Murat V. On 5 June he committed suicide.

See also CRIMEAN WAR; MUSTAFA REŞID; TANZIMAT.

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JUSTIN MCCARTHY

ABDUL-AZIZ BIN BAZ, SHAYKH

[1912–1999]

Influential religious scholar and leader in Saudi Arabia.

Born in Riyadh in 1912, Abdul-Aziz Bin Baz (also known as Ibn Baz and Ben Baz) began his religious studies at an early age, memorizing the Qurʾan and taking tuition from members of the most notable religious family in the country, the Al Shaykh, descendents of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. At age 20 Bin Baz lost his eyesight due to illness, but his rise through the religious establishment of Saudi Arabia was steady. He was a religious judge in the Kharj region beginning in 1949. He worked for many years in Islamic higher education before being named, in 1975, chairman of the Saudi government's Department of Islamic Research, Guidance, and Proselytizing with the rank of minister. He became the highest religious authority in the country in 1993, when he was appointed grand mufti and head of the High Council of Ulama.

Bin Baz was influential at home and abroad, defining a strict, conservative interpretation of Islam; supporting Muslims under threat in such places as Palestine, Bosnia, and Kashmir; and issuing fatwas on a variety of subjects, including a notable one that declared that Earth was flat. Bin Baz played a prominent role as a defender of the Al Saʿud during the 1990s against domestic Muslim opposition groups such as the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights. Bin Baz died in 1999.

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ANTHONY B. TOTH

ABDÜLHAMIT II

[1842–1918]

Ottoman sultan, 1876–1909.

Abdülhamit II assumed the Ottoman throne in perilous times. The two previous sultans, Abdülaziz and Murat V, had been deposed—the former primarily for financial incompetence, the latter for mental incompetence. The Ottoman Empire was at war with Serbia and Montenegro, and war with Russia threatened.

International Affairs

In international affairs, the main disaster of Abdülhamit's reign came at its beginning—the Russo–Turkish War of 1877–1878. In addition to the loss of more than 250,000 dead and the influx of more than 500,000 refugees into the empire, the war resulted in the largest loss of Ottoman territory since 1699. Under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, the Ottomans lost the Kars-Ardahan region of northeastern Anatolia to the Russians, Serbia's and Montenegro's borders were extended at Ottoman expense, Romania and Serbia became independent, northern Bulgaria was made an independent kingdom, southern Bulgaria (Eastern Rumelia) became autonomous, and Austria's occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was sanctioned.

Losses of territory and administrative control over his empire might have been greater had Ab-

dülhamit and his ministers not acted resolutely. Ceding Cyprus to Britain ensured that the British supported the Ottomans at the Congress of Berlin. The congress overturned the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano, under which almost all of Ottoman Europe was to have been lost. Instead, the Ottomans retained Thrace, Macedonia, and Albania.

The only other war fought by Abdülhamit's army, in 1897 with Greece, was a success, although the European powers forced the Ottomans to renounce their territorial gains. The powers also obliged the Ottomans to make Crete autonomous under a high commissioner, Prince George of Greece, in effect putting the island under Greek control.

Abdülhamit accepted losses that were blows to Ottoman prestige while retaining the empire's core territory. France seized Tunisia in 1881; Britain, Egypt in 1882. Although neither territory had been under Ottoman control, the losses indicated the empire's weakness to both the Europeans and the Ottomans. In 1886 that weakness forced the Ottomans to accept the de facto unification of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The European powers also compelled administrative changes in Macedonia and eastern Anatolia.

In eastern Anatolia, the powers did not bring about significant changes, despite strong sentiment in the West in favor of Armenian independence. From 1894 to 1896, Armenians in eastern Anatolia rebelled, killing Muslims and Ottoman officials. Ottoman troops and local Muslims responded in kind. Diplomatic conflict, however, among Britain, France, and Russia, forestalled any European intervention, and Ottoman offers of administrative changes were accepted by the powers.

Domestic Affairs

Like the Tanzimat reformers, Abdülhamit was concerned with the centralization of authority, the regularization of the state system, and the development of the economy. He blended these goals with the traditional ideal of Ottoman rule—an Islamic state in which all power emanated from the sultan. Although at first he accepted limited democracy, a constitution (1876), and a parliament (1877), he prorogued the Parliament within a year and ruled

Abdülhamit II, son of Sultan Abdülmecit I, ascended the throne as ruler of the Ottoman Empire on 31 August 1876, and held this post for 33 years. He instituted a new constitution, and during his reign the empire saw economic growth through railroad development, creation of secular schools, and expanded telegraph service. © CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

personally. His concept of reform was improvement of finances, infrastructure, administration, and education, not a transition to democracy.

Abdülhamit was more financially adept than his predecessors. Upon taking power, he inherited the debts that had led the empire into bankruptcy under Abdülaziz. He persuaded the European bankers to accept partial payment, so nearly half of the Ottoman debt was forgiven (the Decree of Muharram, 1881). The price, however, was the loss of financial independence. Valuable sources of state revenue (taxes on silk, fishing, alcoholic spirits, official stamps needed for all legal documents, and tobacco, as well as the tribute from Eastern Rumelia, Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, and Montenegro) were ceded to the European-controlled Public Debt Administration. In

effect, Europeans became tax collectors in the Ottoman Empire. The empire was left with too few financial resources, and as a result, borrowing resumed.

Economic development of the empire was a first priority of Abdülhamit's rule. Improved roads increased almost sixfold. Many government-sponsored enterprises thrived—such as mining and agricultural exports. Local industry developed as well, although European manufactures and the Ottomans' inability to levy protective tariffs slowed growth considerably. The telegraph and railroad systems experienced major growth. Fewer than 186 miles (300 km) of railroad track had been laid in Ottoman Asia before Abdülaziz's reign, and trackage grew threefold under Abdülhamit. By the end of Abdülhamit's reign, feeder lines ran to major ports, and trunk lines (the Baghdad Railway and the Hijaz Railroad) were under construction. The length of telegraph line nearly tripled. In education, the number of teachers and schools approximately doubled. The increase, however, was mainly in provincial capitals and, especially, Constantinople (now Istanbul).

Abdülhamit was vilified in the European and American press as the Red Sultan, an image primarily based on press accounts of events in eastern Anatolia, Crete, and Macedonia. He also was known as no friend of liberal democracy, an accurate assertion. In his concern for his personal rule and the continuation of a powerful sultanate, he took action against all manifestations of democratic reform. All publications were censored. His secret police spied on bureaucrats and intellectuals, on the lookout for revolution as well as malfeasance.

Abdülhamit was extremely concerned with his position (historically inaccurate) as caliph of the Muslims. Expenditures from his privy purse included donations to Islamic groups in Asia and Africa, as well as to Islamic revolutionaries against Christian rule. His view of the Ottoman Empire was traditional—a Muslim empire, not a Turkish state. This naturally put him at odds with the Turkish nationalism that developed during his reign.

A combination of economic pressures, foreign interference in the empire, and his own autocracy led to the demise of Abdülhamit's sultanate. In 1907, Bulgarian and Greek revolutionaries in Ottoman Macedonia were fighting guerrilla wars against Ottoman troops and each other. Russia and Austria had forced the sultan to accept European "controllers" over Macedonia. Officers of the Ottoman army in Macedonia felt, with justification, that Abdülhamit had placated the Europeans instead of punishing the guerrillas who were killing Muslim civilians, and that fear of the army had caused the sultan to keep needed support and supplies from them. Abdülhamit's fears were largely justified; army officers had been organized into revolutionary cells since their days at the military academy. They had opened communication with revolutionary groups in western Europe, and some had organized their own rebel bands. A poor harvest in 1907 reduced tax revenues, and salaries were in arrears, causing further disaffection.

Abdülhamit, however, defused the threat of revolution in 1908 by reinstating Parliament and calling elections, deciding to rule as a constitutional monarch. Those who opposed his rule, known as the Committee for Union and Progress, became a major force in the Parliament. Abdülhamit's mistake came in 1909. Conservative reaction against the new Parliament led to a revolt in Constantinople and the expulsion of the Committee for Union and Progress's parliamentary delegates and officials. Abdülhamit associated himself with the revolt to regain power. The Macedonian army, however, proved more powerful than the rebels. They converged on Constantinople, took control, and reinstated the Parliament. On 27 April 1909, Abdülhamit was deposed and exiled to Salonika. At the onset of the First Balkan War in 1912, he was moved to the Beylerbeyi Palace on the Bosporus, where he died in 1918.

See also Abdülaziz; Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Berlin, Congress and Treaty of; Committee for Union and Progress.

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JUSTIN MCCARTHY

ABDULLAH, CROWN PRINCE

See AL SAʿUD FAMILY

ABDULLAH I IBN HUSSEIN

[1882–1951]

King of Jordan, 1946–1951.

Abdullah ibn Hussein, born in Mecca, was a son of Husayn ibn Ali. On his eleventh birthday, he went to Constantinople (now Istanbul) to join his father, who had been summoned by the sultan. In 1908 Hussein was appointed Sharif of Mecca, over the objections of the Committee for Union and Progress (the Young Turks). Between 1910 and 1914, Abdullah represented Mecca in the Ottoman Parliament.

The Turkish authorities tried to strip Hussein of his administrative (but not religious) duties when the construction of railroad and telegraph lines made direct rule from Constantinople possible. Hussein resisted, and he was in danger of dismissal when the dispute was shelved due to the outbreak of World War I.

In February 1914, Abdullah met Lord Kitchener, then minister plenipotentiary to Egypt, and asked him if Britain would aid Sharif Hussein in case of a dispute with the Turks. Abdullah also met with Ronald Storrs, the Oriental secretary at Britain's consulate in Cairo. This meeting led to a subsequent correspondence between Storrs and Abdullah that later developed into the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence, an exchange in which certain pledges were made by Britain to the sharif concerning an independent Arab kingdom (with ambiguous boundaries) in the Fertile Crescent.

The Turks tried to persuade Hussein to endorse the call for jihad against the Allies, but he delayed until 10 June 1916, when the Arab Revolt was declared. Abdullah was entrusted with the siege of the Turkish garrisons in al-Taʾif and Medina. His brother Faisal, meanwhile, scored quick victories in Syria. Faisal set up an independent Arab kingdom with its capital at Damascus toward the end of 1918; the French drove him out two years later. Meanwhile, Abdullah was defeated in an important battle with the Wahhabi followers of Ibn Saʿud. Britain placed Faisal on the throne of Iraq, which had been slated for Abdullah.

One key to understanding Abdullah is his deep loyalty to Islam, which in his mind was linked to the notion that God had favored the Arabs with a unique position as the carriers of culture and faith. For him, Arabism was inseparable from Islam and meaningless without it. His family, which claimed a direct line of descent from the prophet Muhammad, provided the crucial link between the two.

Another key to an understanding of Abdullah's personality is that, as a rule, he sought cooperation, even in the midst of conflict. He preferred bargaining to fighting, and he constantly formulated value-maximizing strategies in which he compromised with his adversaries so that all sides might stand to gain from the outcome.

Although Abdullah strove for unity, he engaged in nation-building on a limited scale when unity was unattainable. When he appeared with a small band of armed followers in Madaba, after the French had ousted his brother Faisal from the throne of Syria in 1920, he was intent on leading Syrian political refugees, members of the Istiqlal Party still loyal to Faisal, and the bedouins he could muster in a bid to wrest Arab rights in Syria from the French. With T. E. Lawrence acting as a go-between, he negotiated a deal with the new British colonial secretary, Winston Churchill, under which Abdullah agreed to administer Transjordan for six months, beginning on 1 April 1921, and was granted a subsidy by Britain. One consequence of this was to remove Transjordan from the sphere of applicability of the Balfour Declaration.

Abdullah took over the administration of an arid plateau with a population of about 235,000, largely bedouin, poor, and uneducated, a land with some two hundred villages, half a dozen towns, and

Abdullah I ibn Hussein ruled as king of Jordan from 1946 until 20 July 1951, when he was assassinated. He supported pro-British policies. © Library of Congress. Reproduced by permission.

no major cities. Governmental services were virtually nonexistent. When he died, he left a nation-state comparable with others in the Middle East, although lacking in financial independence. The period from 1924 to 1940 was one in which central administration was developed, with Palestinians gradually replacing Syrians. An exemplary land program gave farmers property security unmatched in the Fertile Crescent. In 1925 the Maʿān and Aqaba regions were effectively incorporated into Transjordan (they had technically formed part of the Hijaz). In the same period, the bedouins, who had preyed on the sedentary population, were successfully integrated into the state, for which John Bagot Glubb, the organizer of the Desert Patrol, was largely responsible.

In 1928, Transjordan acquired an organic law under which Abdullah gained recognition in international law. It also provided for constitutional government and a legislative council, but Abdullah had wide authority to rule by decree, under the guidance of Britain. Although Transjordan remained militarily dependent on Britain, on 22 March 1946 a treaty was concluded whereby Britain recognized Transjordan "as a fully independent state and His Highness the Amir as the sovereign thereof." Following a name change, the Hashimite kingdom of Jordan concluded a new treaty with Britain in 1948.

Through years of dependency on Britain, Abdullah fell behind the times, continuing to reflect the Ottoman Empire in which he had grown up: dynastic and theocratic, Arabs accepting foreign suzerainty under compulsion. He was out of step with Palestinian and secular Arab nationalism as well as Zionism. He sought to use British influence to forge Arab unity rather than to get rid of the British as a first step toward unity. British residents, notably St. John Philby and Percy Cox, drove a wedge between him and Syrian members of the Istiqlal party, who had perceived the Hashimites as champions of Syria's independence from France. When Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, a nationalist Syrian leader who had been a longtime supporter of Abdullah, was assassinated in July 1940, Abdullah's base of support in Syria died with him.

Abdullah could accept a Jewish homeland only in the context of the old millet system: as a minority with a large degree of autonomy within a kingdom that he ruled. Zionists found this totally unacceptable but valued his accommodating approach to the problem. Yet he was a pioneer of Arab–Jewish understanding. He accepted the Peel Commission Report of 1937, which recommended partition of Palestine, even if he did not embrace a Jewish state. He also publicly accepted the 1939 white paper on Palestine, which was favorable to the Arabs. It has been said that he was driven by personal ambition, hoping to incorporate the Arab portion of Palestine within his domain, yet it is clear that he saw himself as an Arab acting for the Arabs. As his grandson King Hussein pointed out, Abdullah realized that the Jewish community in Palestine was only the tip of the iceberg and that the balance of forces dictated compromise. Abdullah met with Golda Meir, who was acting on behalf of the political department of the Jewish Agency, on 17 November 1947, and it was agreed that Abdullah would

annex the Arab part of Palestine under the UN partition plan but would not invade the Jewish part.

When the British mandate ended on 14 May 1948, the Jews declared the creation of a Jewish state, and war broke out with the Arabs. The Arab Legion (Jordanian army) occupied what came to be known as the West Bank; Britain accepted this as long as Abdullah kept out of the Jewish zone; when Jewish forces and the Arab Legion clashed over Jerusalem, which was to have been designated an international zone, Britain cut off arms supplies and spare parts, and ordered all of its officers to return to Amman. The Arabs held on to East Jerusalem, but the Arab Legion had to withdraw from the towns of Lydda and Ramla, which laid Abdullah open to charges of betrayal. In the final analysis, his strategy salvaged territory for the Arabs that may one day serve as the basis for a Palestinian state.

Abdullah initiated a conference in Jericho at which the Palestinian participants expressed a wish to join in one country with Jordan. Parliamentary elections were subsequently held in the west and east banks, with twenty seats assigned to each. Parliament convened on 24 April 1950, at which time Palestinian deputies tabled a motion to unite both banks of the Jordan. This was unanimously adopted. Abdullah became king of a country that now included the holy places in Palestine, with a population of 1.5 million, triple the population of Transjordan alone.

Abdullah was assassinated at the al-Aqsa Mosque on 20 July 1951 by a handful of disgruntled Palestinians believed to be working with Egypt's intelligence service.

See also Arab Revolt (1916); Balfour Declaration (1917); Churchill, Winston S.; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Glubb, John Bagot; Husayn ibn Ali; Husayn–McMahon Correspondence (1915–1916); Hussein ibn Talal; Istiqlal Party: Palestine; Istiqlal Party: Syria; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Lawrence, T. E.; Meir, Golda; Shahbandar, Abd al-Rahman; Storrs, Ronald; West Bank.

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Jenab Tutunji

ABDULLAH II IBN HUSSEIN

[1962–]

King of Jordan beginning in 1999.

Abdullah II ibn Hussein was born on 30 January 1962, the first-born son of Jordan's King Hussein (r. 1952–1999) and his English second wife, Princess Muna (née Antoinette Avril Gardiner). He briefly was Jordan's crown prince, from 1962 to 1965. Following primary studies in Jordan, Britain, and the United States, Abdullah entered Sandhurst, the Royal Military Academy in Britain, in 1980. He also did graduate work at Oxford University in 1984 and at Georgetown University in 1987. Abdullah became an officer in the Jordanian army in 1985, serving in armored units until 1993, when he became deputy commander of the Special Forces. He was promoted to brigadier-general and made head of the Special Forces in June 1994. By May 1998 he had been promoted to major-general.

Abdullah was catapulted from his quiet life as an army officer into the full glare of national and international attention when his dying father redesignated him crown prince on 25 January 1999. In so doing, Hussein demoted his brother, Hassan, who had been crown prince for thirty-four years. Abdullah became king two weeks later when his father died on 7 February 1999. Despite several drawbacks—his half-English parentage, weak command of formal Arabic, and lack of political and diplomatic experience—Abdullah rose to the occasion of ruling Jordan and carrying on his late father's immense legacy. Although he lacked Hussein's intimate knowledge of Jordan's tribes and traditions, as well as his flair for playing the role of "head shaykh" of the country,

Abdullah II ibn Hussein became the king of Jordan upon the death of his father in 1999. Since taking office, Abdullah II has worked to modernize his country, strengthen its ties with the United States, and bring some measure of accord between Israel and the Palestinians. PUBLIC DOMAIN. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

Abdullah's service in the East Bank–dominated military ensured him a degree of support and good will among key Hashimite constituencies. His Palestinian wife also helped him politically with Jordan's Palestinian population.

Abdullah ushered in his reign speaking of democracy, governmental efficiency, globalization, and technology. He was one of several young "Internet kings" who emerged in the Arab world at the turn of the twenty-first century. His habit of making unannounced inspection visits to government offices around the country, dressed as an ordinary citizen, demonstrated his zeal in improving bureaucratic efficiency, as did his interest in "e-government." Abdullah's "Jordan First" (al-Urdunn Awwalan) campaign also seemed to signal his attempt at promoting a unitary Jordanian national agenda. Although his father also spoke of "the one Jordanian" family, he also promoted a more personalized Hashimite rule than does Abdullah.

Abdullah escalated Jordan's traditional pro-Western orientation by identifying strongly with the United States and its regional policies. His embrace of globalization and his support of President George W. Bush's "war on terrorism," including the permission he gave for U.S. forces to be based in Jordan during the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, was a departure from his father's subtler policies. Like his father, however, he became a mediator in the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian dispute, and hosted a summit in Aqaba in 2003 that brought together Bush, Palestinian Authority prime minister Mahmud Abbas, and Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon.

In June 1993 Abdullah married Rania al-Yasin (b. 1970), a Kuwaiti-born Palestinian whose family hails from the West Bank city of Tulkarm. In the tradition of Hashimite royal women's philanthropy, Rania established the Jordan River Foundation in 1995. She assumed the title "queen" following Abdullah's coronation in 1999 and quickly became a darling of the international media as well as an articulate spokesperson of the causes she champions. They have one son, Hussein (b. 1994), and two daughters, Iman (b. 1996) and Salma (b. 2000).

See also ABBAS, MAHMUD; BUSH, GEORGE WALKER; HUSSEIN IBN TALAL; PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY; RANIA AL-ABDULLAH (QUEEN RANIA); SHARON, ARIEL.

MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

ABDULLAHI, MUHAMMAD TURSHAIN

[1846–1899]

Commander of the Mahdist forces and ruler of the Mahdist domains in the Sudan, 1885–1898.

Known in Western literature as Khalifa Abdullahi, Muhammad Turshain Abdullahi was born at Turdat in southwestern Darfur, one of four sons of a holy man of the Taʿayshe Baqqara. Upon hearing of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi, he went east to join him at Aba Island in the Bahr al-Abyad; he was the first to recognize him as the Mahdi. The Mahdi recognized his military abilities and made him a principal military commander. In 1881 Abdullahi was appointed a caliph, given the name Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, and placed in command of the prestigious black flag division of the Madhist army.

Abdullahi retired with the Mahdi to Kordofan and there organized a series of crushing defeats of the government forces that gave the Mahdist movement the reputation of invincibility. He fought in

the Jazira and oversaw the siege of Khartoum, which, after long resistance, fell in January 1885. On the death of the Mahdi in June 1885, Abdullahi assumed the temporal functions of government as dictator of an empire that extended from Dar Mahas to the Upper Nile and from the Red Sea to Darfur. Except at Omdurman in 1898, when he was overthrown, he did not personally lead his armies, preferring to leave operational details to his field commanders.

Abdullahi ruled harshly and arbitrarily in order to maintain his large military establishment. His genius for organization was revealed in his system of taxation and his attempts to establish factories to manufacture steamers and ammunition, as well as mints to produce coins. He insisted on the strict observance of Islamic law. He was hostile to the religious brotherhoods, suppressing them where the Mahdi had only discountenanced them. His merciless rule at length aroused the opposition of most tribal peoples except his own *baqqara,* to whom he gave a privileged position in the state in return for their loyalty.

After the advance of the army of Egypt and Britain into Dongola in 1896, Abdullahi's prestige suffered. Numerous defeats of the incompetent general Amir al-Umara Mahmud Ahmad and Abdullahi's defeat at Atbara culminated in the battle of Omdurman in September 1898. Fleeing south, he and several companions were killed at Umm Dibaikarat in 1899. He was buried on the battlefield, several miles southeast of Tendelti on the Kordofan railway. His tomb is venerated.

See also Ahmad, Muhammad.

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Robert O. Collins

ABDÜLMECIT I

[1823–1861]

Thirty-first Ottoman sultan (r. 1839–1861); initiated Tanzimat reform program.

Abdülmecit I was the oldest surviving son of the Westernizing sultan Mahmud II. He had a good education, with a strong European component. He knew French well, subscribed to French publications, and admired European music. Abdülmecit was also well versed in Ottoman Islamic culture: His mother, Bezmialem, a formidable lady, had a great influence on his upbringing and may have encouraged him to follow the reformist (*müceddidî*) Naqshbandi teaching of her Sufi spiritual adviser.

When Abdülmecit succeeded to the throne on 1 July 1839, at age seventeen, the empire was in crisis: Its army was defeated and its navy had surrendered to the rebellious governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali. The conflict was resolved only by the intervention of France and Great Britain, which imposed a settlement defining Muhammad Ali as hereditary viceroy and limiting his territories. Henceforth, the Ottoman Empire was forced to recognize that its internal affairs would remain a concern for the Concert of Europe in its aim to establish and protect an international balance of power.

Within a few months of his accession, Abdülmecit brought to power a group of young reformist ministers, who seem to have been motivated as much by the ideals of the Naqshbandi movement as by a strong commitment to Europeanization. The leader of this group, Mustafa Reşid, prepared and publicly proclaimed, in the form of an imperial decree, the Tanzimat reform program, limiting the sultan's arbitrary power and setting forth principles of fiscal, military, and religious reorganization. The young sultan held fast to this program and left political power in the hands of Mustafa Reşid and others of similar conviction, although factionalism among ministers continued among reformists as well.

The Crimean War (1853–1856) illustrates both the Great Powers' involvement in Ottoman affairs and a crucial occasion for Ottoman borrowing from Europe. The loans, obtained at unfavorable rates, were spent on the military as well as various features of material Europeanization that were economically unproductive but symbolically significant. British and French alliance with the Ottomans during the war was promoted in Europe as aiding valiant Ottoman attempts at Westernization. Queen Victoria made Abdülmecit an honorary Knight of the

Garter, while the sultan proclaimed a second reform decree (Islahat) to promote equality for his non-Muslim subjects, as requested by the Great Powers at the end of the war. In the long run, however, foreign loans led to financial distress and submission to European fiscal domination.

Hailed abroad as a sensitive and intelligent ruler, Abdülmecit's reforms were less popular among his Muslim subjects, who perceived little immediate benefit from them. Resentment culminated into violent uprisings in Jidda, Damascus, and Beirut, which occasioned only further European involvement. Neither were Tanzimat reforms sufficient to quell non-Muslim discontent in the Balkans, where various ethnic nationalisms were on the rise.

Abdülmecit died young, of tuberculosis. His Muslim subjects looked to his vigorous brother and successor Abdülaziz to champion their privileges. Among his many children were the last four sultans of the dynasty.

See also ABDÜLAZIZ; CRIMEAN WAR; MAHMUD II; MUHAMMAD ALI; MUSTAFA REŞID; NAQSHBANDI; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; TANZIMAT.

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I. METIN KUNT
UPDATED BY BURÇAK KESKIN-KOZAT

ABDÜLMECIT II

[1868–1944]

Last Ottoman caliph.

The son of Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861–1876) and cousin of Sultan Mehmed VI Vahideddin (r. 1918–1922), Abdülmecit II (also Abdülmecid) was known as a mild and scholarly man. He was elected caliph on 18 November 1922 by the Grand National Assembly in Ankara which, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), had abolished the Ottoman sultanate on 1 November. As caliph, Abdülmecit encouraged the loyalty of Muslims in Turkey and elsewhere, particularly India. His growing influence was seen as a threat to the new Turkish republic, and on 3 March 1924 the assembly abolished the Ottoman caliphate and sent Abdülmecit into exile aboard the Istanbul-to-Paris train known as the Orient Express.

See also ABDÜLAZIZ; ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

ABIDIN, DINO

[1913–]

Turkish painter.

Dino Abidin was born in the Ottoman Empire but spent most of his life in Paris. He was one of the founders of the New Group, an artistic movement of the 1940s that favored socially conscious art, often exhibiting the life of laborers, villagers, and fishermen. Abidin's art is characterized by efforts to forge compromise between seemingly contradictory elements. In addition, Abidin is a prolific author of articles on subjects from philosophy to contemporary cinema.

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DAVID WALDNER

ABU

See GLOSSARY

ABU ALA

See QURAI, AHMAD SULAYMAN

ABU AL-HUDA, TAWFIQ

[1894–1956]

Prime minister of Jordan between 1938 and 1954.

Abu al-Huda formed Jordan's first cabinet of ministers in August 1949; until then, the government was an executive council under the terms of the British Mandate and the Anglo–Jordanian Treaty. He was part of the delegation that negotiated with Britain on amendments that led to new government structures, including a cabinet responsible to the head of state and a legislative council. He was leader of the Executive Council or prime minister twelve times between 1938 and 1954.

Abu al-Huda helped King Abdullah I ibn Hussein steer through the political maze during the Arab–Israel War of 1948 and the union between central Palestine and Transjordan. When King Abdullah was assassinated, Abu al-Huda was chosen by his peers, on 25 July 1951, to form the cabinet that saw Jordan through those troubled times. Paradoxically, he presided over the enactment of the very liberal constitution of 1952 under an impetus from King Talal ibn Abdullah. Yet, during this two-year period, which ended with King Hussein ibn Talal ascending the throne, there was a shift of power from the king to the prime minister. As a consequence, Abu al-Huda exercised more power than any other prime minister in the history of Jordan.

When Fawzi al-Mulqi's cabinet, the first under King Hussein, was shaken by disturbances following border clashes with Israel, the king turned to the veteran Abu al-Huda to form the new cabinet. He convinced the king to dissolve parliament on 22 June 1954 as an assertion of executive dominance over the legislature. He issued the Defense Regulations of 1954, empowering the cabinet to deny licenses to political parties, dissolve existing parties, prohibit public meetings, and censor the press. The opposition charged that the new elections were fixed, and Abu al-Huda's measures encouraged the opposition to seek extraparliamentary forms of dissent. Popular opposition forced his last cabinet to resign.

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JENAB TUTUNJI
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

ABU AL-TIMMAN, JAʿFAR

[1881–1945]

Iraqi nationalist leader.

Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman was born in Baghdad to a rich Shiʿite merchant family. He contributed generously to support troops of the Ottoman Empire who were fighting the British occupation of Iraq during World War I. After the war, he was instrumental in organizing the 1920 Iraqi armed uprising against the British, who had created for themselves a mandate through the League of Nations. By 1922, the British recognized Iraq as a kingdom, under their nominee for king, Faisal I ibn Hussein, but they continued controlling the country. They ended the mandate in 1932, and Iraq was then admitted into the League of Nations. A treaty of alliance, however, had been signed between the two countries in 1930.

Throughout his life, Abu al-Timman focused on two main goals: (1) forging a national union between the two largest Islamic communities, the Sunni and the Shiʿite; and (2) struggling to end British control. Upon his formation of the National Party in 1922, the British authorities exiled him to the island of Henjam in the Persian/Arabian Gulf for a year. In 1928, during the early years of the kingdom, he was elected a deputy of Baghdad in Iraq's parliament. He and the majority in the National Party boycotted the elections of both 1930 and 1933, objecting to the abuse of the democratic process by the governments in power. Abu al-Timman halted his political activities from 1933 to 1935; in late 1935, he started publishing the newspaper *al-Mabda* (The principle) and allied himself with the leftist group called al-Ahali (The people's group). From 1935 to 1939 he served as president of Baghdad's Chamber of Commerce and encouraged national industry as a way toward national independence. He supported the military coup led by Bakr Sidqi in October 1936 and served as minister of finance in the coup cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulayman. He worked for an egalitarian policy and for a larger role for the state in the economy of Iraq. Political infighting prompted him to resign this post in June 1937.

World War II began in 1939. In 1941, he supported the coup led by pro-Axis Premier Rashid Ali al-Kaylani, which attempted unsuccessfully to end

the British presence in Iraq (based on the 1930 treaty of alliance).

See also Ahali Group; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Iraq; Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-; Sidqi, Bakr; Sulayman, Hikmat.

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Mahmoud Haddad

ABU AMMAR

See Arafat, Yasir

ABU DHABI

The largest, wealthiest, and most powerful of the seven shaykhdoms that make up the United Arab Emirates (UAE); also, the capital city.

Abu Dhabi's 28,000 square miles (75,520 square kilometers) make up 87 percent of the federation's area, and its 1.3 million inhabitants comprise about 40 percent of its population. Its terrain is mostly flat and rocky, with areas of dunes in the interior, and salt flats and numerous islands along the coast. Abu Dhabi City, the capital of the emirate and the country, occupies one of these islands. In the eastern part of the emirate lies its second most important city, al-Ayn, which grew from a small village within the Buraymi Oasis. In the western part of the emirate slight rainfall collects in depressions to create the arc of oases called al-Liwa. Abu Dhabi possesses 90 percent of the UAE's approximately 100 billion barrels of oil reserves and 60 percent of its significant gas reserves.

The al-Nahayyan section of the Banu Yas tribal confederation has dominated the political history of the region for more than 200 years. According to the founding legend of the emirate, a hunting party of the Bani Yas followed a gazelle across a shallow ford to an island in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf. After the discovery of water around 1761, a small settlement was established, which was named Abu Dhabi, "Land of the Gazelle." Shakhbut bin Diyab, ruler of the Bani Yas, had a small fort built over the settlement's well, and he moved his seat of power to the island from al-Liwa. The coral block, adobe, and timber fort was the largest structure in Abu Dhabi for most of the town's history and was first mentioned in a written source in 1791. Because of its proximity to rich oyster banks in the Gulf, in the nineteenth century Abu Dhabi was host to many pearling ships. Before the discovery of oil, the principal means of livelihood for the emirate's inhabitants were diving for pearls in the summer and engaging in animal herding and oasis agriculture (mainly in al-Liwa and al-Ayn) during the rest of the year. The rulers of Abu Dhabi signed a series of treaties with Britain in the nineteenth century that put them under the Empire's protection.

The wholesale transformation of the emirate began in the 1960s with the advent of increasing revenues from oil exports. Under the rule of Zayid ibn Sultan al-Nahayyan, which began in 1966, a modern infrastructure and a large range of social services were established. Following the 1968 British announcement of impending withdrawal of military and political protection, Zayid convinced the rulers of the other emirates who were part of Trucial Oman, as the British protectorate was known, to form the UAE. Because of the prestige of its ruling family, and especially the magnitude of its oil and gas revenues, Abu Dhabi dominates the UAE politically and economically. These economic endowments helped to fund the construction of modern international airports, universities, hospitals, museums, towering hotels and office buildings, and a modern communications and transportation infrastructure where only fifty years earlier there were simple palm-frond huts and dusty paths.

See also Al Nahayyan Family; Ayn, al-; Buraymi Oasis Dispute; Dubai; Ra's al-Khayma; Rub al-Khali; Sharjah.

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MALCOLM C. PECK
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

ABUHATZEIRA, AHARON

[1938–]

Israeli politician, member of the Knesset.

Born in Morocco, Aharon Abuhatzeira was elected to the Knesset (Israel's parliament) in 1974 and 1977 as a National Religious Party member and served as minister of religious affairs in the first government of Menachem Begin. In 1981, he founded and chaired TAMI, a party identified with Israel's Moroccan community. He was elected to the Knesset with TAMI in 1981 and 1984. He subsequently joined the Likud and served as minister of labor, welfare, and absorption.

See also ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; KNESSET; LIKUD.

MARTIN MALIN

ABU HIMARA

Arabic for "the man on the she-ass," a nickname of the leader of the 1902–1909 Moroccan rebellion that helped discredit the governments of the sultan Abd al-Aziz and his successor Abd al-Hafid.

Jilali ibn Idris al-Yusufi al-Zarhuni, the real name of Abu Himara, was a minor Moroccan official and former engineering student with a talent for mimicry and some skills as a thaumaturge. Following a 1902 incident, he declared himself to be the *mahdi* (legendary imam who returned to restore justice) and launched a rebellion among the tribes to the northeast of Fez. Subsequently he declared himself to be the sultan's elder brother Muhammad, a claim that, although false, was generally accepted by his supporters.

Between 1902 and his eventual defeat in 1909, Abu Himara (also called Bu or Bou Hmara) ruled much of northeastern Morocco from his base at Salwan, near Mellila. His rebellion derailed a 1901 British-sponsored reform program, and opened the way for the French colonial offensive. The inability of Sultan Abd al-Aziz and his successor, Abd al-Hafid, to defeat him played a significant role in the Moroccan Question.

His unusual sobriquet derives from a precolonial Moroccan tradition, according to which recaptured army deserters would be paraded around camp mounted sitting backwards on a she-ass, to the jeers of the troops. The cultural referent is obscure, but may be a satiric inversion of the Maghribi (North African) tradition that states that the *mahdi* would appear from the west, mounted on a she-ass.

See also ABD AL-AZIZ IBN AL-HASSAN; ABD AL-HAFID IBN AL-HASSAN; FEZ, MOROCCO; *MAHDI*; MOROCCAN QUESTION.

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EDMUND BURKE III

ABU IYAD

See KHALAF, SALAH

ABU JIHAD

See WAZIR, KHALIL AL-

ABU LUTF

See QADDUMI, FARUQ

ABU MAZIN

See ABBAS, MAHMUD

ABU MUSA ISLAND

Small island near the entrance to the Persian Gulf, claimed by both Iran and the United Arab Emirates.

Abu Musa is an island in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf located at 55° E longitude and between 25° 51′ N

and 25° 54′ N latitude. It is 31 miles (49 kilometers) east of Iran's island of Sirri, about 42 miles (68 kilometers) south of the Iranian mainland port of Bandar-e Lengeh, and 40 miles (64 kilometers) east of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates. Abu Musa's total area is approximately 4 square miles (10 square kilometers). There are several fresh-water wells on the island, and these support a covering of dry grass.

Although Iran historically claimed ownership of all the islands in the Gulf, since the late nineteenth century the sovereignty of Abu Musa has been in dispute. The ruler of Sharjah, then a dependency of Britain, claimed jurisdiction over the island after tribesmen owing allegiance to him had begun to transport their domesticated animals by boat to Abu Musa for seasonal grazing there. Initially, Britain did not support the claim of its protectorate, but in 1903 British forces evicted Iranian customs officials on the island and claimed Abu Musa on behalf of Sharjah. At the time, Iran's military was virtually nonexistent and powerless to challenge Britain. Nevertheless, Iran lodged an official protest with the British government and in subsequent years periodically raised the issue.

After Britain in 1968 announced that Sharjah and its other dependencies in the Persian Gulf would become independent, Iran, which by then had reemerged as a regional power, insisted that its claims to Abu Musa be addressed. In 1971, on the eve of Sharjah's independence and admission to the new United Arab Emirates federation, the leaders of Sharjah and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding. This agreement left the question of ultimate sovereignty open but provided for Iranian jurisdiction in the northern half of the island and Sharjah's jurisdiction in the southern part. In addition, both parties agreed to divide the income from petroleum production in waters surrounding Abu Musa.

The agreement on shared sovereignty worked reasonably well for twenty years. In early 1992, however, the United Arab Emirates, with backing from the United States, accused Iran of violating the accord and interfering in Sharjah's administration of the southern half of Abu Musa. Although Iran and the United Arab Emirates subsequently worked out an informal arrangement to continue observing the terms of the 1971 Memorandum of Understanding pending a resolution of their dispute, the issue is one that continues to affect overall bilateral relations negatively. The position of the United Arab Emirates since 1992 has been that Iran should agree to permit the International Court to arbitrate their contending claims to sovereignty over Abu Musa; Iran rejects this position.

See also SHARJAH.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

ABU NADDARA

See SANU, YAʿQUB

ABU NIDAL

See BANNA, SABRI AL-

ABU NUWWAR, ALI

[1925–1991]

Jordanian army officer.

Ali Abu Nuwwar was born in al-Salt. After the Arab–Israel War of 1948, he studied for one year at Sandhurst, the British military academy, returning to Jordan in 1950. Attracted to the ideology of the Baʿth party, he was sent to the Jordanian embassy in Paris by John Glubb, head of the Arab Legion, shortly thereafter to preclude his involvement in any political activities against the monarchy. Abu Nuwwar was also close to a group of anti-British, nationalist army officers who called themselves the Jordanian Free Officers and even advised the young King Hussein ibn Talal of the group's existence. Hussein eventually returned Abu Nuwwar to Jordan in late 1955, against Glubb's wishes, whereupon he

became Hussein's protégé. The king eventually deposed Glubb in March 1956.

In May 1956 Abu Nuwwar was appointed chief of staff of the army and represented Jordan in the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission under the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization. As political turmoil mounted in Jordan from 1956 to 1957, he became involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the king. The attempted coup occurred at the same time that Sulayman al-Nabulsi, who was prime minister at the head of a leftist cabinet, was purging government officials loyal to the king. As a result, suspicions arose that Abu Nuwwar and Nabulsi were coconspirators, although both denied this. Abu Nuwwar was not tried for his actions but was allowed to flee to Syria after Hussein thwarted the coup. He remained in self-imposed exile in Egypt, was eventually pardoned by the king, and returned to Jordan.

See also Arab Legion; Arab–Israel War (1948); Baʿth, al-; Glubb, John Bagot; Hussein ibn Talal; Nabulsi, Sulayman al-.

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Jenab Tutunji
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

ABU QIR, BATTLE OF (1798)

Naval battle in which the English destroyed the French fleet in Egyptian waters.

Abu Qir is a bay located between the Rosetta branch of the Nile River and Alexandria, Egypt. After capturing the island of Malta in the Mediterranean Sea in April 1798, the fleet of Napoléon, then commander of the army of France, avoided the swifter fleet of Britain, commanded by Admiral Horatio Nelson. After French troops landed in Alexandria on 1 July 1798, the French fleet took shelter in Abu Qir bay. On 1 August, Nelson's fleet located and destroyed the French fleet.

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David Waldner

ABU RISHA, UMAR

Syrian poet.

One of the most influential literary figures in the Arab world, Umar Abu Risha was born in Aleppo. He studied at the American University of Beirut. He held several senior positions, including director of the National Library in Aleppo and ambassador of Syria to Brazil, India, and the United States. His literary talent earned him numerous orders of merit from Syria, Brazil, Argentina, Lebanon, and Vienna. Abu Risha's exquisite poetry echoes the beauty of nature and expresses a passion for freedom.

Muhammad Muslih

ABU SAʿID

See Hasan, Khalid al-

ABU ZAYD, HIKMAT

First Egyptian woman appointed to a cabinet-level position.

Originally from a village in Assiut, Hikmat Abu Zayd completed her education and began a career as a teacher at the Hilwan Secondary School in the 1940s. She then studied in England, receiving her doctorate in educational psychology in 1955. She taught at Ain Shams University and published two books before Gamal Abdel Nasser appointed her minister of social affairs in 1962. This achievement was significant in the history of Egyptian women, within the regime itself, and politically, because of Nasser's desire to co-opt female-run charitable organizations into the purview of the Arab Socialist Union.

In the nineteenth century, elite women took the lead in running many of the country's charitable organizations. They sponsored social and welfare programs that the government was unable or unwilling to support, particularly after the British occupation

of 1882. Nevertheless, the 1952 revolution sought to dismantle the *ancien régime* and all vestiges of its power, including women's organizations. Abu Zayd's appointment in 1962 must be viewed in light of these circumstances as well as Nasser's reforms of 1961 and 1962, which included wide-ranging nationalization of industry, income redistribution, land reform, educational expansion, and family planning. Under Abu Zayd's leadership from 1962 to 1965 many charitable organizations came under state control and women's literacy programs expanded. In 1963 she presided over the first national congress convened to study issues related to women and work, which published its findings in 1964 in *Characteristics of the Path Facing the Working Woman* (Arabic).

See also Nasser, Gamal Abdel.

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Mona Russell

ABU ZEID, LAYLA

[1950–]

Moroccan fiction writer.

Raised and educated in French and Arabic in Rabat, Layla Abu Zeid (or Leila Abouzeid) was working as a radio and television journalist and presenter when she began to publish short stories. She followed these with a novel, *Am al-fil* (1983; *Year of the Elephant*), which received critical acclaim and was the first Arabic-language novel by a Moroccan woman to be translated into English. It treats the coming of age and adult struggle of an abandoned Moroccan woman in the context of the fight for national independence. This themes is echoed in her 1993 memoir of childhood, *Ruju ila al-tufula* (1993; *Return to Childhood*) and in her more subsequent fiction, in which she experiments with multiple viewpoints and narrative voices. Her works offer a subtle commentary on nationalist and misogynist misappropriations of Islam and especially of *shariʿa.*

Daughter of a prominent opponent of the colonial regime who was imprisoned for his activism, Abu Zeid grew up with a consciousness of the relationship between language and power. Even as a child, Abu Zeid has said, she resisted reading and writing in French, the language of the colonial administration in the Morocco of her earliest childhood. This resistant stance ensured that she would choose Arabic as her language of literary expression, she notes, rather than being one of many francophone writers in her country.

See also Gender: Gender and Education; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Literature: Arabic; Morocco; Moudawana, al-.

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Marilyn Booth

ACHESON, DEAN

[1893–1971]

U.S. statesman.

As undersecretary of state (1945–1947), Acheson was one of the main proponents of the Truman Doctrine (1947), aiding Greece and Turkey. He is often associated with the U.S. containment policy for communism and promoted the foundation of NATO (1949). As secretary of state (1949–1953), he was concerned primarily with the USSR and Korea, although he had been involved in the early negotiations with Iran's prime minister (1951–1953) Mohammad Mossadegh. He won a Pulitzer Prize in 1969 for *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department.*

See also Truman, Harry S.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

ACHOUR, HABIB

[1913–1999]

Tunisian labor leader.

A native of the Kerkenna islands, off the coast of central Tunisia, Habib Achour founded the Tunisian General Labor Union, which merged with the General Union of Tunisian Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens, UGTT) in 1957. Achour worked closely with Ferhat Hached, father of the Tunisian labor movement, until Hached's assassination in 1952. His adherence to nationalist ideologies led to his imprisonment and deportation in 1947 and 1952. Achour's appointment to the political bureau of the Destour Party in 1964 reflected broad cooperation between the union and the Destour Party, but he was arrested in 1966 because of political differences. During the mid-1970s, this cooperation gave way to tension as the union leadership grew critical of state policies and Achour reasserted the labor movement's autonomy from the government in the context of an unpopular agrarian reform. In January 1978 Achour resigned from the Destour Party political bureau and following the events of Black Thursday he and other leaders of the UGTT were arrested. Achour was pardoned by Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba in 1981 and elected president of the union, a newly created post. In 1984, in a successful power play, he wrested control of the post of secretary-general. The next year, with tensions high between the union and the government of Mohammed Mzali, Achour and other labor leaders were again imprisoned, but he was later released. Achour died in March 1999.

See also BLACK THURSDAY (1978); BOURGUIBA, HABIB.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON
UPDATED BY VANESA CASANOVA-FERNANDEZ

ADALAT PARTY

An Iranian political party that unsuccessfully planned a Communist takeover of Iran.

The Adalat party was established in Iran by veteran Social Democrats, sympathetic to the Russian Bolsheviks, almost immediately after the Russian Revolution of 1917. The leadership of the party consisted mainly of Iranian intellectuals from Azerbaijan who were closely tied to the Bolsheviks. The Adalat founded a bilingual Azeri-Persian newspaper called *Hürriyet* (or Freedom) and was very active among the Iranian workers in the Baku oil fields. The party's membership, according to the party's own estimate, was primarily composed of workers and apprentices, but also included office employees, craftsmen, and tradesmen. After its first major congress at Baku in June 1920, the party changed its name to the Communist Party of Iran (Firqeh-ye Komunist-e Iran) and created a program that included land reforms, formation of trade unions, and self-determination for minorities. Clergymen, landowners, and merchants were barred from its ranks. Most importantly, together with the Jangali in Gilan, the party announced the formation of a Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran, based in Rasht. By the end of 1920, the party, together with the Red Army, was preparing a march into Tehran. The activities of the party at this time greatly contributed to the crisis that paved the way for the emergence of Colonel Reza Khan, who became Iran's ruler as Reza Shah Pahlavi and founded the Pahlavi dynasty.

See also *HÜRRIYET*; JANGALI; PAHLAVI, REZA.

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PARVANEH POURSHARIATI

ADAMIYAT, ABBASQULI

[1861–1939]

A pioneer of the constitutional and freedom movement in Iran.

Mirza Abbasquli Khan Qazvini, later surnamed Adamiyat (humanity), was born in Qazvin, Iran. His political activism started about 1885, in cooperation with Mirza Malkom Khan and Mirza Yousuf Khan Mostashar al-Dowleh. He was involved in the publication of the underground *Qanun* (Law) that was sent to his country from Europe, and he was one of the organizers of the Majma-el Adamiyat (Society of humanity). The society was the organizational expression of liberal and humanist thought in turn-of-the-century Iran; it fought for the formation of a parliamentary government (which was actually drawn up in 1906—but political events intervened until the Constitutional Revolution of 1909).

Adamiyat is the author of several articles, including "Farizeh-ye Adam" (Precept of the human being) and "Bung-i Bidari" (The sound of awakening).

See also Constitutional Revolution; Malkom Khan, Mirza.

Mansoor Moaddel

ADAMIYAT, FEREYDUN

[1920–]

A leading social historian of contemporary Iran.

Fereydun Adamiyat was born in Tehran in 1920; he is the son of Abbasquli Adamiyat, a pioneer of the constitutional movement. Fereydun Adamiyat received his B.A. from the University of Tehran and his Ph.D. in diplomatic history from the University of London. He is known for his original works on various aspects of the social and political history of Persia (Iran from 1935), most of them dealing with the ideological foundations of the Constitutional Revolution—the movement and reform in turn-of-the-century Persia. Although predominantly published in Persian, he is often cited by Western academicians. Adamiyat has also been a diplomat and has served, inter alia, as Iran's ambassador to the Netherlands and India. He has worked as well for the United Nations in various capacities.

See also Adamiyat, Abbasquli; Constitutional Revolution.

Mansoor Moaddel

ADANA

Capital of Adana province, Turkey.

Adana is the leading cotton-, cotton-textile-, and citrus-producing region of Turkey. Known since Hittite times, it was a minor town until the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865), when worldwide cotton shortages induced a boom in Adana's region. Nearby Incirlik Air Base is the largest NATO facility in the eastern Mediterranean. Adana, Turkey's fourth-largest city, had a 2002 population of 1.7 million.

See also Cotton.

John R. Clark

ADANA CONFERENCE

Meeting of Turkish president and British prime minister, 1943.

During World War II, Turkey was faced with a dilemma; for reasons of security, it remained officially neutral for much of the war, but its sympathies lay with the Allies. In the early stages of the war, Turkey stayed out of the conflict and even signed a nonaggression pact with Germany (1941), to forestall a German attack. Turkish neutrality, however, was assailed by the USSR as opportunistic and hypocritical.

On 30 and 31 January 1943, Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill met with Turkey's President Ismet İnönü in Adana, Turkey. Churchill assured İnönü that the Allies, under the Anglo-Turkish agreement of 1939, would continue to guarantee Turkish security. In addition, Churchill agreed to supply Turkey with supplies necessary for self-defense; henceforth, Turkey was eligible for the U.S. Lend-Lease Program and received significant amounts of such aid until 1945. Although Churchill did not extract any binding commitment from İnönü, he was assured that Turkey would do all it could to aid the Allies without violating its neutrality.

See also İnönü, İsmet; Lend-Lease Program.

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Zachary Karabell

ADEN

Seaport city in the Republic of Yemen.

Located on the southeastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, Aden is the second-largest city in the Republic of Yemen and one of the best natural ports on the Arabian Sea. From 1839 to 1967, Aden was a British colony; from 1967 to 1990, it was the capital of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

F. GREGORY GAUSE III

ADENAUER, KONRAD

[1876–1967]

German statesman and first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), 1949–1963.

Adenauer began his political career during the Weimar Republic but was dismissed from his several political posts by the Nazis to live in seclusion until 1944, when he was sent to a concentration camp in a political purge. After the Allied occupation of a defeated Germany in 1945, Adenauer became a founder of the Christian Democratic Union, a supradenominational party aimed at a centrist position and a rebuilding of Germany in the "Christian spirit." He became party leader (1946–1966), president of the parliamentary council (1949) that drafted the new constitution for the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and first chancellor (1949–1963). He tied his country to the Christian West and encouraged German business development away from political controls.

From 1953 to 1965, he oversaw collective indemnification to the State of Israel and the Jewish people for property stolen under the Nazi administration (1933–1945); he admitted Germany's guilt without pressure from the West, and his Federal Republic assumed responsibility for the crimes of the Third Reich. In Israel, reparations became controversial, since they were seen as a political means for Germany to rejoin the West, by buying off Jewish survivors. After a vote in the Knesset, Adenauer and Israel's foreign minister Moshe Sharett signed the Reparations Agreement in 1952, by which Germany agreed to provide $845 million in reparations, in addition to $110 million to Jews outside Israel. Until 1964, payment was made by Adenauer's government in goods and monies; the agreement was carried out fully and Israel's economy received a firm financial base for the development of water resources, a merchant fleet, and the mechanization of agriculture and industry.

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ZACHARY KARABELL
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

ADHAM, SORAYA

[1926–]

Egyptian feminist and nationalist activist.

Born into a large family in Cairo, Soraya Adham was encouraged to pursue learning by her father, who strongly believed in education for girls. She attended Arabic schools and in 1948 graduated from Cairo University with a degree in English literature. As a university student she was drawn to the left wing and became a leader in the youth movement, and later was recruited by the Communist movement. She was one of approximately fifty women activists in the Egyptian Communist Party. Although Communists in Egypt were primarily men, the women activists are noteworthy because their participation involved a rebellion against both colonial society and gender conventions, which restricted interaction between men and women.

Because of ideological differences, Communist women did not take part in Huda al-Shaʿrawi's Feminist Union or Fatma Niʿmat Rashid's Feminist Party. In 1944–1945 Communist women established the League of Women Students and Graduates from the University and Egyptian Institutes (Rabitat Fatayat al-Jamiʿa wa al-Maʿahid al-Misriyya). The League sought to create a forum where women could discuss women's rights and envision Egypt free of colonial influence. It was closed down in 1946 by Prime Minister Sidqi Pasha as part of his attempt to wipe out all opposition.

Adham lived alone, which was unusual for women of this time, in a one-room furnished apartment in the Bulaq neighborhood of Cairo. In 1948 she was beaten by a group of Muslim fundamentalists for participating in political activity. She spent two months in prison in 1948 and another ten months in 1949.

The Egyptian Communist movement was never cohesive but instead fraught with internal dissension. Government opposition required it to remain clandestine and hindered any party unification. Nonetheless, various groups of individuals, motivated by British occupation, widespread poverty, and the rise of fascism in Europe, did form a number of Communist-oriented organizations that encouraged trade unions, strikes, political protests, and political journalism. Male members of the Communist Party generally were reluctant to put women in harm's way and also feared that giving women any prominent role would repel potential male participation. Thus radical women activists eventually took their feminist endeavors outside the party. They formed small feminist societies in institutions of higher learning and tried to establish contact with women working in factories to organize trade unions.

In the 1950s, when the nationalist movement was resurrected to fight British influence in the Suez Canal, women Communists served the nationalist cause and joined the Women's Committee for Popular Resistance (Lajnat al-Nisaʾiyya li al-Muqawama al-Shaʿbiyya), which included women from across the political spectrum. Its members gained access to the Canal Zone by telling the British they were visiting wounded Egyptians in the hospitals and tending to their families. They then established ties with Egyptian women living in the area. Later they informed the domestic and international press of living conditions there. The Women's Committee was reestablished in 1956 to protest the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel.

Although the number of women in the Egyptian Communist movement was relatively small, their commitment to feminism made important contributions to improving gender equality for Egyptian women.

See also Communism in the Middle East; Efflatoun, Inji; Egyptian Feminist Union; Gender: Gender and Politics; Rateb, Aisha; Shaʿrawi, Huda al-; Suez Canal; Zayyat, Latifa.

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Maria F. Curtis

ADIVAR, ABDULHAK ADNAN

[1881–1955]

Turkish doctor, historian, and writer.

Born in Gallipoli to a prominent family of Ottoman *ulama* (Islamic clergy), Abdulhak Adnan Adivar was graduated from the Imperial School of Medicine in 1905. Suspected of working against the regime, he left for Europe and became an assistant at the Berlin Faculty of Medicine. Returning to Constantinople (now Istanbul) upon the restoration of the constitution, he taught at and became dean of the School of Medicine (1909–1911). He worked with the Red Crescent Society during the Tripoli War and with the Ottoman Department of Public Health in World War I, being credited with contributing substantially to the reorganization of both institutions.

At the armistice, Adivar became a member of the last Ottoman parliament but avoided British arrest and deportation, escaping to Anatolia with his wife Halide Edib Adivar and becoming one of Atatürk's inner circle. During the war of independence, he served in various ministerial positions and was vice-president of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. After the armistice, he served in the national government's delegation in Istanbul. He supported the short-lived Progressive Republican Party but was in Europe when news broke of a conspiracy against Atatürk (June 1926).

Tried in absentia for complicity, he was acquitted but chose to remain in exile until 1939, at first

in England, then Paris, teaching at the École des Langues Orientales and engaged in scholarly research and writing. Upon his return, Adivar fostered the teaching and practice of science and was a founder and first president of the International Society for Oriental Research.

He directed publication of the Turkish edition of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* contributing its introduction and a number of articles. His other works include *La science chez les Turks Ottomans* (Paris, 1939), a Turkish translation of Bertrand Russell's *Philosophical Matters* (1936), a two-volume work in Turkish on science and religion through history, and many essays and articles on cultural and scientific topics. He served a final period as deputy for Istanbul (1946–1950).

See also Adivar, Halide Edib; Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Turkish Grand National Assembly.

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Kathleen R. F. Burrill

ADIVAR, HALIDE EDIB

[1884–1964]

Prolific Turkish author (best known as a novelist), journalist, pioneer feminist, nationalist, and educator.

Born in Constantinople (now Istanbul), Halide Edib Adivar lost her mother early in life. Her father (a first secretary to the sultan's privy purse) remarried, and she spent much of her childhood in her maternal grandmother's traditional Muslim household, where she learned to read, write, and recite the Qurʾan. She also came in touch with Christianity and learned Greek (attending a Greek-run kindergarten), and her Anglophile father provided her with English governesses and later with various private tutors. She had spent a year at the American College for Girls when she was eleven but withdrew on orders of the sultan. Reentering in 1899, she was the first Turk to graduate from the college (1901). The same year, she married one of her tutors, mathematician Salih Zeki. They had two sons but were divorced in 1910 when he took a second wife. She later married Dr. Abdulhak Adnan Adivar.

Halide Edib Adivar began writing at the time of the Second Constitution (1908), contributing articles to Tanin that urged educational and social reforms. Vulnerable as a progressive, she left the country during the 1909 counterrevolution. On her return, she taught for a while then served as inspector of schools under the Ministry of Religious Foundations. Believing in democracy and the social responsibilities of the educated toward the people at large, she was a member of the first Women's Club in Turkey, addressing protest meetings on the treatment of women, and was active in relief and nursing activities during the Balkan War. Like other prominent intellectuals, she fell under the influence of Ziya Gökalp and participated in the activities of the Turkish Hearth Association, addressing public demonstrations after the Greek landing at İzmir in particular that of 23 May 1919, in Sultan Ahmet Square. First advocating an American mandate for Turkey, when the British started to deport members of the last Ottoman parliament to Malta, she and Adnan Adivar escaped to Anatolia to join the nationalists (March 1920).

She played an important role during the war of independence in Ankara as one of Atatürk's inner circle and as "Corporal Halide" at the front. Disillusioned after the founding of the republic, she left Turkey with her husband (1926) and, apart from one short visit, returned only after Atatürk's death. She spent the intervening period mainly in London and Paris but also toured India and visited the United States to lecture. Back in Turkey, she held the chair of English language and literature at Istanbul University and served as deputy in the Grand National Assembly (1950–1954).

Halide Edib Adivar's novels fall into three main categories: psychological novels, sagas of the war of independence, and panoramas of city life or period novels. She denied that she herself is the woman behind her heroines—whom she subjects to keen psychological analysis. Their experiences, however, frequently reflect her own, as in *Yeni Turan* (New

Turan, 1912) in which the heroine sacrifices herself for pan-Turkism, a cause then espoused by the author. Her most famous war of independence novel is *Ateşten Gömlek* (Shirt of fire). Serialized in the press before publication in book form (1923), it portrays the popular support for the national movement. *Sinekli Bakkal* (1923), a panorama of Constantinople life in the Abdülhamit II period is a highpoint of her novel writing. Published first in English as *The Clown and His Daughter* (London, 1935), it received the Turkish Republican People's Party Prize for Best Novel (1943). Also serialized, it became a best-seller and was made into a film.

In addition to novels and many articles, she produced translations (including Orwell's *Animal Farm*), a three-volume history of English literature, numerous short stories, and three works in English containing her impressions of India and lectures delivered in India and the United States. Her language and style (influenced by her English-American education) have been criticized by Turks. Nevertheless, she proved popular with the reading public, her Turkish being close to the spoken word of her day. Moreover, her works, which reflect her acute powers of observation and understanding of people, are extremely strong in descriptive passages and bring the Turkish scene alive in a manner not previously achieved.

See also Adivar, Abdulhak Adnan; Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Gökalp, Ziya; Literature: Turkish; Pan-Turkism.

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Kathleen R. F. Burrill

ADLI

[1864–1933]

Egyptian official, cabinet minister, and politician who served as prime minister three times between 1919 and 1930.

Descended from a family of large landowners and related to the Muhammad Ali royal family, Adli split from the popular Wafdist movement, led by Saʿd Zaghlul, beginning in 1919. Adli became prime minister in 1921, but the Wafd undercut his efforts to negotiate an independence treaty with Britain. After Britain unilaterally declared Egypt independent (but with significant restrictions) in 1922, Adli's supporters—large landlords and a handful of reformist intellectuals—formed the Liberal Constitutionalist Party. The Wafd won the parliamentary elections in 1926, but the British regarded Zaghlul as an extremist and refused to let him return to the prime ministry. Adli therefore headed a coalition cabinet with the Wafd. Forced to maneuver between the Wafd, the British, and the palace, neither Adli nor his party ever felt at home in the world of mass politics.

See also Liberal Constitutionalist Party.

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Donald Malcolm Reid

ADL WA AL-IHSAN, AL-

Moroccan Islamic movement.

Al-Adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Benevolence) is modern Morocco's largest Islamic movement, with a membership estimated at about 30,000. Its official foundation dates from 1987, though the organization started to take shape under different names as early as 1981. The structural and ideological nature of al-Adl wa al-Ihsan largely stems from the writings of its founder and charismatic Supreme Guide, Abdessalam Yacine. The movement, which is especially popular on university campuses, is based upon a pyramidal framework whose lowest unit is called *usra* (family). Each *usra* consists of two to ten individuals. Its function is to provide the members with a new familial environment where they may find the Islamic guidance and moral support necessary for their spiritual reeducation. Promoting the re-Islamization of Moroccan society, such small groups meet three times a week to pray, to study Yacine's teachings, and to cultivate the values of benevolence and communal responsibility. Members also bene-

fit from social, recreational, and financial services. The movement provides medical services, offers funds for marriage, plans field trips, and organizes sporting events to build strong bonds between its members. At the top of this structure is a General Council presided over by the Supreme Guide, who retains strong discretionary powers. Although al-Adl waʾl Ihsan remains officially illegal, the Moroccan government tolerates its activities. This is due in part to the movement's quietism: It does not claim the right to partake in politics, nor does it advocate armed struggle against the state. Yacine often makes political statements, but he has so far eschewed direct political involvement.

See also YACINE, ABDESSALAME.

HENRI LAUZIÈRE

ADNAN, ETEL

[1925–]

A Lebanese artist.

Poet, novelist, writer, and visual artist Etel Adnan's work achieved recognition during the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990). Her gripping novel *Sitt Marie Rose* (1978), based on the real life and murder of a pro-Palestinian Lebanese woman by Christian Phalangists, is a brilliant discursive collage of monologues, news bulletins, interviews, and film clips. It depicts the trial of the woman character and angrily lashes out against a violent, macho culture. Originally written in French, it has been translated into more than ten languages and remains a popular choice in women's studies, comparative literature, and Middle East studies curricula.

Born in Beirut in 1925 to a Muslim Syrian father and a Christian Greek mother, Adnan grew up speaking Greek and Turkish and learned French in school. Although she also spoke Arabic, it was like a "forbidden paradise" to her; she later learned English. Her many languages, she wrote in her autobiographical 1996 essay "To Write in a Foreign Language," posed a dilemma for her. Indeed painting, she writes, proved to be an important outlet: "Abstract art was the equivalent of poetic expression; I didn't need to use words, but colors and lines. I didn't need to belong to a language-oriented culture but to an open form of expression."

Etel Adnan established herself in the 1970s and 1980s as an avant-garde artist in multiple mediums. She experimented openly with joint expressions in poetry and drawing, as in her groundbreaking *The Arab Apocalypse* (1989). Although she writes primarily in English and French, she strongly identifies with an Arabic poetic tradition. In an article on the acclaimed Arab poet Adonis, Adnan defends contemporary Arab poets who choose not to write in Arabic. Indeed, she identifies herself as an Arab-American poet and has argued for the importance of including these Arab "foreign" voices in Arabic curricula and scholarship: "Until this is done, no judgment of any worth can be passed on contemporary Arab poetry."

See also ART; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1958); LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); LEBANON; LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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ELISE SALEM

ADONIS

[1930–]

Pen name of Ali Ahmad Saʿid, Syrian-Lebanese modernist poet.

Born in Qassabin, Syria, Adonis was educated at Damascus University and St. Joseph University in Beirut, Lebanon. His critiques of orthodoxy in Islam and of conventional writing made him highly controversial. In poetry and prose, he opposes what he sees as the static and conservative tradition of Arabic literature and culture. His revolutionary ideas were shaped by involvement in the Parti Populaire Syrien, which resulted in his imprisonment in 1956. On release, he escaped to Lebanon, later becoming a Lebanese citizen.

In 1957, his *Qasa'id Ula* (First poems) was published, and he cofounded *Shiʿr* (Poetry) magazine, later starting his own magazine, *Mawaqif* (Attitudes).

Adonis taught Arabic literature at Lebanese University until 1985 when he moved to France, where he held teaching and research posts; he now teaches in Geneva, Switzerland. *Orbits of Desire,* a selection of his poetry translated by Kamal Abu-Deeb, was published in London in 1992.

See also SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONALIST PARTY.

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KAMAL ABU-DEEB

ADOT HA-MIZRAH

The popular term used in Israel for Oriental Jews—those who came from the Islamic countries—now known as Middle Eastern Jews.

The Jewish population that emigrated to Israel from the Middle East, North Africa, India, and Central Asia were considered Oriental by those who had emigrated from northern Europe. The term is problematic, since it lumps Sephardim (Jews expelled from Spain in 1492 to live in Christian Europe and the Islamic Middle East) with Jews who had lived among Muslims since the dispersal in Roman times. These two populations had, in 1,400 years, developed different languages, rituals, and social customs.

The term *Sephardim* had also been employed in Israel for all other Jews but the Ashkenazim (who had lived in and around medieval Germany); consequently another term was needed. In both popular and social science discourse, the accepted term is becoming *mizrahim* (literally, Orientals), while the term *adot ha-mizrah* is falling out of use. The customary English meaning of the term *Oriental* leads to another problem as it has the connotation of East Asia, where very few Jews lived and from where even fewer had immigrated to Israel. In English-language discourse, then, social scientists increasingly use the term *Middle Easterners* (which includes immigrants from India—so a problem remains).

Until the late nineteenth century in Palestine, Middle Easterners dominated Jewish society both politically and demographically. Thereafter, as a result of Zionism and the vigorous pioneer settlement movement of northern European Jewry, the Middle Easterners faltered. Some immigrated, others became absorbed among the Ashkenazim, and over all, they lost political predominance. In 1948, when the State of Israel was established, mass immigration from Islamic nations changed the demography; by about 1970, some 50 percent of Israeli Jews were of Middle Eastern background. Since then, the rate of increase of Middle Easterners has lessened, but the inflow from the former Soviet Union has increased and will probably continue to increase as the new republics strike an economic and social balance in the new Europe. The former Soviet Jews are mostly Ashkenazim. In the long run, the reproduction rates of these two categories of Israeli Jews will probably equalize their populations.

It is notable that the marriages that link Israelis of Middle Eastern and European background amount to about 25 percent. Given the approximately even numbers of these two populations in Israel as of the 1990s, the data imply that the intermarriage rate is about 50 percent of the theoretical optimum, indicating social acceptance, at least on the individual level. In the 1950s and 1960s, both institutional and social discrimination had descended on Middle Eastern Jews to burden the economic plight of impoverished refugees, in many cases. The new state was struggling economically to cope with the flow of immigration, so many were housed in the tents and shacks of transit camps or taken to new settlements far from the cities and population centers—to the Galilee and Negev desert towns, to live in homogeneous settlements. Consequently, many acculturated only slowly to their emerging society.

In the 1970s, Middle Eastern Jews regained important political positions in an electoral shift that led to the ascendance of a Likud-led coalition government of right-wing and religious parties. The support of Middle Easterners for Likud is linked to

their positive view of that party's long-time opposition to the Maʿarakh (Alignment) party. Maʿarakh had formerly dominated them; they are not necessarily in favor of Likud's right-wing politics.

Despite Israel's recent demographic and political developments, the Middle Easterners remain prominent in some of the problem areas of Israeli life. They are overrepresented among the poor, the undereducated, and the criminal fringe. These social problems are rooted partly in the handling of Israel's mass immigration of Middle Easterners in the early 1950s. Like most traditional Jews in the Diaspora, Middle Easterners had filled middleman positions in the economies of their host societies. Those who moved to Western countries soon filled their old economic roles; they did well. These who moved to Israel, however, encountered European immigrants of their own economic type who had arrived earlier, who were politically well connected, and who—crucially—already filled the few available middleman niches in Israel's small, underdeveloped economy; consequently, many Middle Eastern immigrants of the 1950s fell into social, economic, and cultural crises.

Israel's Middle Easterners are composed of ten major populations (listed here according to size): Morocco, Iraq, Yemen, Iran, Tunisia, Turkey, Libya, Egypt, Georgia, and India. According to 1988 figures, more than 600,000 Israelis originate (directly or through their parents) from North Africa; about 260,000 from Iraq; and 160,000 from Yemen. North Africans, the major groups of Middle Easterners, suffered most from the aforementioned travails of immigration. Since the 1950s, the North Africans have evolved certain ways to contend with their depressed condition, particularly through politics and through religio-cultural creativity. The Moroccans in particular have mobilized politically and captured positions within existing political parties dominated by European Israelis (but only secondarily are they engaging in political mobilization on a separatist base). On the religio-cultural plane, Moroccan Israelis have created new holy places to which mass pilgrimages converge, and they engage in the publication of religio-subethnic writings. In the pilgrimages, there figure motifs that enhance various depressed localities, linking them with general Israeli society; there has been a resurgence of interest in traditional religion and in Moroccan origins.

The other two major Middle Eastern groups have taken different paths in Israel. The Iraqis and Yemenis have kept a much lower profile than the Moroccans, both in politics and in religion. The Iraqis had a background of widespread modern education in Iraq, long before emigration. Consequently, once in Israel, the immigrants were better equipped to cope with the limited economic opportunities. Many moved into the professions. In fact, the Israeli Iraqis have done well socially and economically, in comparison with the Moroccans. The Yemenites, in contrast, were relatively less involved in trade but more in crafts in Yemen. Upon arrival in Israel they did not compete to enter trade niches but adapted themselves to opportunities, becoming skilled workers and craftsmen.

Since the 1970s, people of Middle Eastern background have attained many notable positions in Israel. There has been a state president (Yizhak Navon), two army chiefs-of-staff (David Elazar and Moshe Levy), and several cabinet ministers. Also in academics, there has been a Tel Aviv University president (Moshe Many) and several recipients of the prestigious Israel Prize for arts and science. No Middle Easterner has yet attained the pinnacle positions of prime minister or of minister of defense, although one did fill the crucial position of finance minister (Moshe Nissim). Typically, the single Middle Eastern figure who for several years was considered a serious contender for the position of prime minister is David Levy, whose main base of power is the Moroccan ethnic constituency. Although in the early 1990s the Middle Easterners did not succeed in attaining the ultimate political prizes, two fundamental sociopolitical factors operated in their favor. One was the long, slow resolution of the Palestinian problem (which has provided cheap labor for the Israeli market). The second was the early 1990s mass migration from the former Soviet Union, which has had a similar effect on the economic sector. The result is that Middle Easterners have become positioned well above the lowest rungs of the Israeli socioeconomic order—in contrast to conditions that existed before the 1970s.

See also Ashkenazim; Diaspora; Levy, David; Likud; Navon, Yizhak; Zionism.

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SHLOMO DESHEN

ADRIANOPLE

See EDIRNE

ADVISORY COUNCIL (PALESTINE)

An advisory body in Palestine to the British high commissioner during the British Mandate.

Shortly after taking office as the first British high commissioner of Palestine on 1 July 1920, Sir Herbert Samuel set up a nominated advisory council (AC) pending the establishment of a legislative body. The AC was composed of twenty-one members: the high commissioner, ten British officials, and ten nominated nonofficials, of whom seven were Palestinians (four Muslims and three Christians), and three were Jews. In August 1922 Samuel proposed, as a first step to self-government in Palestine, a constitution that called for the replacement of the AC with a Legislative Council (LC), which would consist of twenty-three members: the high commissioner, ten selected officials, two elected Jews, and ten elected Palestinians.

The Zionist Organization reluctantly accepted the offer, but the Palestinians rejected it and boycotted the elections for the LC in 1923 because acceptance of the LC implied endorsement of the Mandate, whose preamble and articles promoted a Jewish national home in Palestine. Also, the Palestinians, who had been seeking a proportionally representative government, were being offered only 43 percent representation in the proposed LC, even though they were 88 percent of the population. Samuel therefore returned to the 1920 system of an AC, which was to be composed now of twenty-three members, eleven of whom would be officials (including the high commissioner); of the rest, ten would be Palestinians (eight Muslims and two Christians) and two would be Jews.

The Palestinians had not objected to the AC in 1920 because it was considered a temporary measure until a legislative body could be established and because the appointees, who were prominent individuals, did not claim to represent the community. But in May 1923, although they had accepted the government's invitation to join the new council, all but three representatives withdrew when the high commissioner associated it with the LC, which had been repudiated by the Palestinians. Consequently, the high commissioner abandoned the idea of nonofficial participation in the Palestine government, and Palestine was run, from 1923 until the end of the Mandate in 1948, by the high commissioner in consultation with an AC composed only of officials.

See also LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (PALESTINE); MANDATE SYSTEM; SAMUEL, HERBERT LOUIS.

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PHILIP MATTAR

AEGEAN SEA

Arm of the Mediterranean between Greece and Turkey.

The Aegean Sea contains more than three thousand islands and is considered the home of the earliest European civilization (formerly the Mycenean-Minoan, now called the Aegean), from about 3000 to 1100 B.C.E. Crete is the largest island, lying almost equidistant from both Greece and Turkey, at the southern end of the Aegean, with the Ionian Sea to its west. Since the Aegean is the only breach in the mountainous belt to the north of the Mediterranean, it has been extremely important as a trading area and trade route; control of this sea has been the cause of wars since early Near Eastern civilization clashed with early European.

In 1820, all the shores and islands of the Aegean belonged to the Ottoman Empire, but the western shore and practically all the islands have since gradually gone to Greece, a cause of Turkish resentment. Two islands, İmroz (Greek, Im bros) and Bozca (Greek, Tenedos), are still Turkish. Greece claims the Aegean as a territorial sea, which Turkey disputes, in hopes of sharing benthic minerals. Petroleum was discovered on the sea bottom east of Thasos in 1970, which has sharpened the dispute.

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JOHN R. CLARK

AFAF, AL-

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES

AFGHANI, JAMAL AL-DIN AL-

[c. 1838–1896]

Influential and charismatic Muslim leader.

One of the most seminal figures of the nineteenth-century Islamic world, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, although not a major philosophical thinker, spoke and wrote effectively on such subjects as anti-imperialism and the strengthening of the self; these themes were to become increasingly central to the Muslim world. Much of what Afghani and his followers said about his life was myth, and many myths about him persist, even now when a more accurate picture can be drawn.

Ample evidence now indicates that Jamal al-Din was born and raised in northwest Iran (not in Afghanistan, as he usually claimed). It also appears that he got his higher education in the Shiʿite shrine cities of Iraq, where treatises in his possession show that he was attracted to the innovative, philosophical Shaykhi school of Shiʿism. From Iraq he went to India (c. 1857), and it seems likely that in India (and possibly in Bushehr in south Iran, which was under British wartime occupation around the time of his stop there) he developed his lifelong hatred for the British. After travels, apparently to Mecca and the Levant, he went across Iran to Afghanistan, where documents show he claimed to be a Turk from Anatolia. He soon entered into the counsels of the Afghan amir, whom he advised to fight the British, but he lost favor and was expelled when a new pro-British amir assumed power. After a brief stop in India, he went to Istanbul (1869–1871).

In Istanbul, he showed the reformist, self-strengthening part of his persona by entering the Council of Higher Education and signing up to give a public lecture at the new university. This lecture in which Afghani said that philosophy and prophecy were both crafts got him and the university and its director (the real targets of the *ulama*) in trouble. (This view accords with the teachings of the medieval philosophers, who are still taught in Iran today, although they are anathema in western Islam.) Afghani was expelled and went to Cairo, where he had stopped briefly on his way to Istanbul.

In Cairo, Afghani did his most important work (1871–1879), educating and inspiring a group of young thinkers and activists, many of whom (such as Muhammad Abduh, Saʿd Zaghlul, Abdullah Naqim, and Ibrahim al-Laqqani) continued to be important influences in later Egyptian political and intellectual life. The Muslim philosophers constituted the subject of Afghani's teachings; he stressed their belief in natural law, in reason, and in speaking one way to the religious masses and a different way to the intellectual elite. In the late 1870s, when government debt thrust Egypt into an international crisis, Afghani and many of his followers ventured more openly into politics. He encouraged his followers, who included Syrian immigrants as well as

Egyptians, to found newspapers, some of which published his lectures. He also gave talks to, secretly joined, and became the leader of a Masonic lodge, which he used as a political vehicle.

He and his chief disciple Abduh favored the deposition of Khedive Ismaʿil and the accession of his son Tawfiq, whom he expected to influence. When Tawfiq became khedive (1879), however, the deposition and accession were accomplished by the British and French, to whom Tawfiq was beholden. Tawfiq opposed Afghani's fiery anti-British speeches and activities, and soon had Afghani deported. There is no evidence that the British had a hand in this deportation.

Afghani went back to India, via Iran, and from 1880 to 1882 he chose to stay in the south-central Indian state of Hyderabad, which was ruled by a Muslim prince. During these years, Afghani wrote his most important articles and the short treatise known in English as "Refutation of the Materialists." In 1883, Afghani went to Paris, where Abduh rejoined him. Using funds that probably came from the Briton Wilfrid Blunt and a Tunisian general, they founded the newspaper *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* (The firmest bond), which was sent free throughout the Muslim world. The paper, which primarily printed theoretical articles and critiques of British policy in Egypt, Sudan, and elsewhere, was one of the chief sources of fame for its two editors.

In Paris, Afghani also wrote a response to an article by Joseph Ernest Renan in which Renan had asserted that religion, and particularly the Semitic Muslim religion, was hostile to science. Afghani's response, frequently misrepresented as a defense of Islam, in fact agreed that all religions were hostile to science; it differed only in saying that Islam was no more hostile to science than Christianity, and that since Islam was several hundred years younger, it might evolve, as had Christianity. Renan then voiced his essential agreement with Afghani, who, he noted, was not a Semite.

After stopping publication of *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa,* probably for financial reasons, Afghani went to London (1885), where he joined Blunt in the latter's schemes to negotiate British withdrawal from Egypt and Sudan. There is no evidence for Afghani's claim that he was at the time an envoy of the Sudanese Mahdi. Although it was the only occasion when he cooperated with the British (and even then it was with the goal of removing them from Egypt and Sudan), this period and Blunt's books about it accounted for the reputation Afghani acquired in some quarters of being a British agent.

Afghani then accepted an invitation from the anti-British Russian publicist Mikhail Katkov to go to Russia, but on the way he stopped in Tehran for several months. His plotting against the British in Russia came to nothing, but both in Iran and Russia, as usual, he won contacts with men in high places by dint of his personality. When the shah's party came to St. Petersburg on its way west, Afghani was snubbed, but he caught up with them in Europe and believed he had been given a mission in Russia by the prime minister. He returned first to Russia and then to Iran, but the prime minister, Ali-Asghar Amin al-Soltan, refused to see him. Amin al-Soltan planned to expel him, but Afghani avoided banishment by going to a shrine south of Tehran, where he continued to see his followers. A letter attacking concessions to Europeans, including the tobacco concession to the British, was attributed to Afghani, and he was forced to leave Iran for Iraq in midwinter.

From Iraq and then also from Britain, Afghani helped influence the movement against the tobacco concession (1891–1892). An invitation from the Ottoman sultan, Abdülhamit II, brought him to Istanbul, where he soon was forbidden to write or speak publicly. When one of his Iranian followers killed Naser al-Din Shah in 1896, the Iranians tried unsuccessfully to gain Afghani's extradition, but his death from cancer (1897) made the issue moot.

Although Afghani is known mainly as a pan-Islamist, the characterization applies to him only from the year 1883 or so. He was primarily concerned with awakening and strengthening the Muslim world, especially against the encroachment by the British, and for this purpose he sometimes stressed political reform, sometimes local nationalism, and sometimes a pan-Islamic approach. He was a charismatic speaker and teacher, but his writings do not measure up to the standard set by the writings of many of his contemporaries. Despite many facets of his life that underscore his unorthodoxy, he remains for many a model figure of modern Is-

lam. Because he voiced so many of the ideas then in the air among politically minded Muslims, the potency of his influence and especially the myths surrounding him have remained strong.

See also Abduh, Muhammad; Abdülhamit II; Amin al-Soltan, Ali-Asghar; Ismaʿil ibn Ibrahim; Naser al-Din Shah; Urwa al-Wuthqa, al-; Zaghlul, Saʿd.

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Nikki Keddie

AFGHANISTAN

This entry consists of the following articles:

Afghanistan: Overview
Afghanistan: Islamic Movements in
Afghanistan: Political Parties in
Afghanistan: Soviet Intervention in
Afghanistan: U.S. Intervention in

Afghanistan: Overview

Central Asian country that has been a republic since 1973.

As of July 2003, Afghanistan had an estimated population of 28.7 million, although no census had been conducted in the country since 1979. In addition, between 1.2 and 1.8 million Afghan refugees lived in Iran, 2 million in Pakistan, and 100,000 elsewhere. After the fall of the Taliban government in the wake of the U.S. invasion in late 2001, an Afghan Interim Authority was established to administer the country. This was reconfigured as the Transitional Authority in June 2002, and it is supposed to remain in place until elections for a representative government are held by June 2004.

Afghanistan has been troubled by political conflict since April 1978, when the Afghan Communist Party came to power in a violent coup. The new government was divided into two factions, and their competition for influence and power led to a splintering of the army and a breakdown of internal security in various parts of the country. The situation prompted the Soviet Union to send troops into Afghanistan in late in December 1979, in order to support the more moderate faction of the Afghan Communist Party. The Soviet intervention, in turn, sparked a revolt that was led by religious and tribal leaders opposed to the policies that Kabul was trying to implement. These leaders and their militias became known as Mujahedin, and they engaged in guerrilla warfare against Soviet troops until the latter withdrew from the country in early 1989. Following the Soviet withdrawal, the Mujahedin fought against the communist regime in Kabul until it fell (April 1992), then fought among themselves for control of the capital and government. As the country became engulfed by civil war, a new movement, the Taliban, arose with the aim of restoring order in accordance with its particular interpretation of Islam. Between 1994 and 1996, the Taliban consolidated its control over 85 percent of the country, the area to the northwest of Kabul being the main region it could not subdue.

Geography

Afghanistan is landlocked, comprising some 251,773 square miles (647,500 sq km). It shares borders with Iran, Pakistan, the Xinjiang province of China, and the newly independent successor Central Asian states of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Kabul remains Afghanistan's capital and its largest city, with more than 1.5 million, including internal refugees. Cities of 50,000 to 200,000 people include Qandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kunduz.

The Hindu Kush Mountains (rising to 24,000 feet [7,315 m]) stretch diagonally from the northeast, through the center, to the Herat region in the west, dominating the country's topography, ecology, and economy. Deep narrow valleys, many of them impenetrable, cover much of the central, northeastern, eastern, and south-central areas, surrounded by the fertile Turkistan plain and foothills in the north and northwest, the Herat-Farah lowlands, the Sistan basin and Helmand valley in the west, and the deserts of the southwest. Four major river systems

drain the Hindu Kush—the Amu Darya (Oxus) drains the northern slopes and marks much of the former Afghan-Soviet border; the Hari Rud drains the northwest; the Helmand-Arghandab, the southwest; and the Kabul, the east. Communications and road systems between these valleys are poor, although a few difficult passes connect them with Central Asia and the subcontinent of India. Temperatures and the amount and form of precipitation are directly dependent on altitude. Summers are very hot and dry, the temperatures reaching 120° F (49° C) in the desert south and southwest. Winters are bitterly cold, the temperatures falling to -15° F (-26° C), with heavy snow cover in the mountains. Precipitation is low, two to six inches (50–150 mm) in the south and southwest, and twelve to fourteen inches (300–350 mm) in the north.

Economy

Afghanistan has thirty provinces (wilayat), divided into districts (woluswali) and subdistricts (alaqadari). According to government figures, the per-capita income in 1986/87 was US$160. Although rich in natural resources, mineral extractions benefit investors or remain undeveloped. For example, in 1985/86, of the annual production of natural gas (estimated reserves of over 100,000 million cubic meters), 97 percent was exported to the Soviet Union at a rate of 2.6 billion cubic meters a year. Deposits of petroleum, coal, copper, high-grade iron ore, talc,



MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

barite, sulphur, lead, zinc, salt, lapis lazuli, and other semiprecious and precious gemstones exist; some are extracted.

Before 1978, 85 percent of the population lived in 22,000 villages; they farmed or were Nomads. Their major subsistence crops are wheat, maize, barley, and rice; major cash crops are cotton, sugar beet, oilseeds, fruits, nuts, and vegetables. Sheep (including Karakul/Persian lamb), goats, and cattle are the main sources of milk, meat, wool, hides, and pelts, while camels, horses, and donkeys serve as means of transportation in the difficult terrain. Livestock become the vital buffer during poor harvests. Since 1978, the civil war has seriously damaged more than half the villages and much of the agriculture infrastructure. Reports show that 1987 wheat production was reduced by 50 percent, sheep and goats to 30 percent, and cattle to 52 percent of 1978 levels.

Industries include rugs, carpets, and textiles, chemical fertilizers, sugar, plastics, leather goods, soap, cement, natural gas, oil, coal, and hydroelectric power. Government figures for 1986/87 show industrial production accounted for 23.87 percent of gross domestic product. Exports, primarily to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, India, and Pakistan, included natural gas, cotton, livestock products, rugs, medicinal herbs, fruits, and nuts, with reported earnings in 1988 of US$512 million. Imports of wheat, foods, textiles, vehicles, machinery, and petroleum products, at a cost of US$996 million in 1988, came mostly from the Soviet Union and Japan.

Language and Ethnic Groups

Two major ethnolinguistic communities, Indo-Iranian and Turko-Mongol, live in Afghanistan. The Indo-Iranians include the dominant Pushtu-speaking Pushtun (usually estimated at 45%); the Afghan-Persian or Dari-speaking Tajik (25–30%); and minority Nuristani, Gujar, Baluch, Wakhi, Sheghni, and Zebaki. The Hazara, who have a Mongol appearance, speak Hazaragi, a Persian dialect, and are estimated at 12 to 15 percent of the population. The Turkic speakers include the Uzbeks (about 10%), Turkmen, Kazakh, and Kirghiz. Persian (most widely spoken) and Pushtu are the official government languages. Islam is the religion of more than 99 percent of Afghans—about 80 percent are Hanafi Sunni and about 20 percent Shiʿite (mostly Imami and some Ismaʿili). Also present are very small numbers of Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, and Christians.

Education

Primary education, grades one through eight, is compulsory for ages seven to fifteen. Secondary school continues for an additional four years (voluntary). Most schools in rural areas were destroyed during the early years of the civil war. International aid agencies since 2002 have been trying to reestablish schools throughout the country. Some poorly equipped and poorly run schools for Afghan refugee children in host countries also exist. Between 1979 and 2001, the execution, imprisonment, and departure of many teachers badly disrupted institutions of higher education. In 1987, an estimated fifteen thousand Afghans received training and education in the Soviet Union, but the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1990 led to a sharp decline in the number of Afghan students studying in what became Soviet successor states. In 1988, the Kabul government claimed eight vocational colleges, fifteen technical colleges, and five universities in operation. Losses of previously trained manpower, along with the damage to educational, health-care, and cultural facilities and the lack of training opportunities for the new generation of Afghans during the 1980s and 1990s left a challenging legacy for post-2001 reconstruction efforts.

Government

The Afghan political leaders who met in Bonn, Germany, in December 2001, agreed to the creation of an Afghan Interim Authority to manage the country's day-to-day affairs. A special assembly, the Loya Jirga, subsequently met in Kabul in June 2002, and created a government, the Transitional Authority, headed by a president and a cabinet of ministers. The Transitional Authority organized a Loya Jirga for December 2003, and it was charged with drafting and approving a new constitution.

History

The emergence of Afghanistan in 1747 as a separate political entity is credited to Ahmad Shah Durrani,



Afghan resistance forces set out on a raid against Soviet positions near Herat, Afghanistan, 25 January 1980. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

who made the city of Qandahar his capital and created a great empire stretching from Khurasan to Kashmir and Punjab; and from the Oxus River (Amu Darya) to the Indian Ocean. His son Timur Shah (1773–1793) shifted the capital to Kabul and held his patrimony together. By the turn of the nineteenth century, the Durrani empire had declined because of fraternal feuds over royal succession. Between 1800 and 1880, Afghanistan became a battleground during the rivalry between Britain and Russia for control of Central Asia. Afghanistan emerged as a buffer state, with its present boundaries demarcated entirely by Britain and Russia—and with Britain in control of Afghanistan's foreign affairs. The Afghan wars fought against the British by Dost Mohammad Barakzai, his son, and his grandson (1838–1842; 1878–1880) had ended in defeat.

With British military and financial help, a member of the Barakzai Pushtun clan—Amir Abd al-Rahman, the so-called Iron Amir—consolidated direct central government rule by brutally suppressing tribal and rural leaders to lay the foundation of a modern state (1880–1901). His son, Habibollah Khan, who ruled from 1901 to 1919, relaxed some of the harsher measures of the previous rule and in 1903 established the first modern school, Habibia. Later, the first significant newspaper, *Siraj al-Akhbar,* was published in Kabul (1911–1918). When Habibullah was assassinated, his son Amanollah took the title of king (1919–1929) and declared Afghanistan's independence from Britain, which was granted after a brief war in 1919. King Amanullah, impressed by the secular sociopolitical experiments of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the new Republic of Turkey, launched a series of secular, liberal constitutional reforms and modernization programs, which led to a rebellion—justified as jihad (religious war) against his rule—forcing his abdication. After nine months of rule by a non-

The Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif is home to the shrine for Hazrat Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Mohammad, the fourth caliph of Islam. Most Muslims, however, believe that Ali's tomb is at Najaf in Iraq. The shrine was founded in the twelfth century and rebuilt in 1481, with blue mosaic tiling added in the nineteenth century. © CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Pashtun (Amir Habibullah II), a member of the Musahiban family of the Barakzai clan, Muhammad Nadir (r. 1929–1933), reclaimed the monarchy. Following Nadir's assassination, his son of nineteen, Mohammad Zahir (r. 1933–1973), became king.

From 1933 to 1963, Zahir reigned while two of his uncles and a cousin ruled as prime ministers. Concerned primarily with preserving their family's position, the Musahiban adopted a cautious approach toward modernization, with highly autocratic domestic and xenophobic foreign policies until about 1935. During Sardar (Prince) Muhammad Daud's term as prime minister (1953–1963), with substantial military and economic aid, initially from the Soviet Union and later from the West, a series of five-year modernization plans was begun, focusing on the expansion of educational and communications systems. In 1963, Daud resigned because of disagreements over his hostile policies toward Pakistan and his favoring of greater dependence on the Soviet Union. King Zahir then appointed Dr. Muhammad Yusuf, a commoner, as prime minister.

King Zahir's last decade (1963–1973) was a period of experimentation in democracy that failed—mostly due to his reluctance to sign legislation legalizing political parties and his unwillingness to curb interference in democratic processes by his family and friends. The Afghan Communist Party and Islamist-opposition movements were formed during this period; they agitated against both the government and each other. In July 1973, Daud, the former prime minister (and king's cousin and brother-in-law), overthrew the monarchy in a military coup, with assistance from the pro-Soviet Parcham wing of the Afghan Communist Party; he became the president of the Republic of Afghanistan (1973–1978). Daud returned autocratic rule and persecuted his perceived enemies, especially members of the Islamist movements. He relied heavily



An Afghan woman with her children. © CAROLINE PENN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

on his old networks and began to distance himself from the pro-Soviet Communists whom he had protected and nurtured. In an environment of growing discontent, in April 1978, a Communist coup ousted and killed Daud.

Nur Muhammad Taraki, the head of the People's Democratic party of Afghanistan (PDPA), was installed as president of the revolutionary council and prime minister (1978/79). He renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), abolished the constitution, and banned all opposition movements. Less than two months later, the coalition of two rival factions of PDPA—Khalq (People) and Parcham (Banner)—that had joined to gain power began to fall apart. Khalq monopolized all power, offering Parcham leaders ambassadorial posts overseas, and began purging Parcham members from military and civilian posts. Supported by the Soviets, Taraki attempted to create a Marxist state, but by the spring of 1979 resistance to these efforts was widespread. Brutal retaliation by government in rural areas forced the flight of thousands of refugees to Iran and Pakistan. In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin, then deputy prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, and an advocate of extreme Marxist policies, suspecting a plot against himself, killed President Taraki and assumed his duties. During Christmas 1979, the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan with eighty thousand troops. They killed Amin and installed Babrak Karmal, leader of the Parcham, as the new head of state. Soviet intervention intensified factionalism between the Parcham and Khalq and also led to riots and strikes in the major cities. It turned anti-government resistance into a jihad for the cause of Islam and national liberation.

From 1980 to 1986, Karmal tried but failed to consolidate his power, reduce factional strife, and promote national unity. In 1986, Dr. Najibullah Ahmadzai, the former head of the state security forces (KHAD) and a member of Parcham, assumed power, relieving Karmal of all party and government duties. He adopted a shrewd policy of unilateral cease-fires, offers of negotiation and power sharing

with his opponents, and the formation of a coalition government of national unity. He also adopted a new constitution in 1987, allowing the formation of a multiparty political system and a bicameral legislature. He won some support from his internal leftist opponents, but the seven-party alliance of Mojahedin (Islamic Unity of Afghan Mojahedin) remained defiant, calling for unconditional Soviet withdrawal and the abolition of communist rule.

The failure to achieve a Soviet military victory and the ever-increasing outside military and financial support for the Mojahedin (from 1984 to 1988) led to the signing of the Geneva Accords on 14 April 1988, under United Nations auspices. The accords called for the withdrawal of 120,000 Soviet troops, which was completed on 15 February 1989. After Soviet troop withdrawal, the continuing civil war in Afghanistan was overshadowed by events such as the democratization of Eastern Europe (1989) and what became the former Soviet Union (1991). The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of its military and financial support to Dr. Najibullah's government, and the desertion of his militia forces to the resistance all contributed to Najibullah's ouster from power on 16 April 1992. A coalition of Islamist forces from northern Afghanistan led by Commander Ahmad Shah Masʿud surrounded Kabul. In Peshawar, a fifty-member Interim Council of the Islamist resistance groups was formed and dispatched to assume power in Kabul. Following two days of factional fighting that resulted in dislodging Golbuddin Hekmatyar's forces from Kabul, Sebghatullah Mujaddedi, the president of the Interim Council—later called Shura-i qiyadi (Leadership Council)—took power on 28 April 1992, as the Head of the Islamic State of Afghanistan for a period of two months. Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani succeeded him as the interim president of the country on 28 June 1992, for four months. During his tenure Rabbani and the Leadership Council were to organize and convene the Loya Jirgah (the Council of Resolution and Settlement or the Grand National Assembly) representing all the peoples of Afghanistan, including those living in exile, to choose the next president for a term of eighteen months. The new president would then oversee the drafting of a new constitution and the first general election.

In opposition to Rabbani's government, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's forces launched a rocket attack in late August 1992 destroying much of Kabul. Other forms of factional fighting along sectarian, ethnic, and regional lines plagued the new Islamist regime, seriously hampering repatriation of the refugees, reconstruction, and the return of law and order in the war-ravaged country. At the end of December 1992, a *shura* (assembly) of some 1,335 members convened and elected the sole candidate, Burhanuddin Rabbani, the interim president for two years. Five of the nine Islamist factions boycotted the assembly, disputing the validity of Rabbani's election. By 1993, all-out civil war had broken out, and much of the countryside was controlled by warlords. It was in this situation that groups of religious scholars and students in the Kandahar area and the nearby Pushtun-populated region of Pakistan began to organize with the aim of providing people with security. The new movement called itself the Taliban; by 1994, the Taliban had captured control of Kandahar and during the next two years extended its control over most of the country, including the capital, Kabul.

Afghans in the city of Herat dance in celebration after opposition forces captured the city from Taliban forces in November 2001. © AFP/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

See also Amanollah Khan; Amin, Hafizullah; Amu Darya; Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Barakzai Dynasty; Daud, Muhammad; Durrani Dynasty; Habibollah Khan; Hekmatyar, Golbuddin; Hindu Kush Mountains; Kabul; Karmal, Babrak; Nadir Barakzai, Mohammad;

PARCHAM; RABBANI, BURHANUDDIN; ZAHIR SHAH.

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M. NAZIF SHAHRANI
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

AFGHANISTAN: ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN

Ideologically based, politically motivated, organized Islamic movements.

Islamic movements were formed when Afghanistan established official *madrasas* (Muslim colleges) and the faculty of *shariʿyat* (Islamic law) at Kabul University to train modern Islamic scholars and functionaries during the 1940s and 1950s. The government sent a group of young faculty to al-Azhar in Egypt for graduate training in Islamic studies and law. In the early 1960s they returned home impressed by the Islamist ideals and political goals of Egypt's al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) and its struggles against Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser. This small group of *ustazan* (professors) met clandestinely, translating, disseminating, and discussing the writings of Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abu al-Aʿla al-Mawdudi, and other Islamist thinkers. The patron and guide of this emergent movement was Ghulam Muhammad Niyazi, who later became dean of the faculty of *shariʿyat* in Kabul. Led by Islamic intellectuals and reformist *ulama* (Minhajuddin Gahiz, Mowlana Khalis, Mowlawi Faizani, and others), groups also formed outside the university.

After the adoption of Afghanistan's 1964 liberal constitution and the unsanctioned establishment of the Khalq communist party on 1 January 1965, the pace of political activities quickened. Agitation and demonstrations against the government and violent confrontations among members of the Islamic movements and the communist parties marked the years from 1965 to 1972. The student branch of the Islamic movement Sazman-i Javanani Musalman (Organization of Muslim Youth), nicknamed the *Ikhwan-i-ha* (the Brothers), became increasingly active. In 1972 the "professors" also formally, but secretly, organized themselves as Jamiʿat-e Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Association of Afghanistan). Its fifteen-member executive council (shura-i ali), which was composed of students and faculty, primarily of rural and provincial origins, recognized Niyazi as founder and unofficial leader and appointed Burhanuddin Rabbani "amir" of the movement.

The movement's declared goal was the establishment of a completely Islamic political order that would oppose communism, atheism, corruption,

Gulbuddin Hekmatyer, *mojahedin* leader, and Abdul Gadser, eastern Nangarhar province governor, listen to speeches at a Jalalabad rally. The fatwa, or religious legal opinion, plays a critical role in Islamic movements and is used to take public opinion into political reality. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

and all forms of social and economic discrimination, internal oppression, external domination, and exploitation. Its initial strategy was to work methodically and peacefully against the government and the communists. After the overthrow of the monarchy (17 July 1973) Muhammad Daud and Parcham, the pro-Soviet communist party, Niyazi and 180 members of the movement were jailed; they were executed (29 May 1978) soon after the Khalq and Parcham parties overthrew Daud and took power.

Only a few leaders, including Rabbani and Golbuddin Hekmatyar, managed to escape to Pakistan during Daud's regime. In 1975 they failed at a revolt against Daud. Their efforts proved more effective when they organized the *jihad* (religious war) against the Khalq/Parcham communist coalition following the coup. Four of the seven major *mojahedin* parties that participated in the 1979 to 1989 struggle against the Soviets and the subsequent civil war after the Soviet withdrawal were splinter groups from the original Jamiʿat-e Islami movement. Their objectives are similar, although their strategies and organizational styles differ. Several Afghan Shiʿite Islamic organizations and three traditionalist Islamic groups were also formed after the 1978 communist coup.

The Islamist opposition fought effectively, defeated the communist regime in April 1992, and assumed power to establish the Islamic State of Afghanistan. The Islamists were unable to reconcile their political differences, however, and their factional fighting plagued the new government headed by Rabbani and contributed to its overthrow in 1996 by a very different kind of Islamic movement—the Taliban.

The Islamic Movement of the Taliban was created by Muhammad (Mullah) Omar and other religious teachers and students in response to the political insecurity that spread throughout much of Afghanistan following the establishment of the Rabbani government. Most of the Taliban leaders received part or all of their religious education in the *madrasas* of the conservative Deobandi movement, which is strong in the rural Pushtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Deobandi approach to Islam derives from the religious ideas of an eighteenth-century Indian Muslim who was influenced by his contemporary, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab of Arabia. Like the followers of Wahhab in Saudi Arabia (the Muwahhidun), Muslims trained in Deobandi Islam reject liberal interpretation of sacred texts, insisting upon a literal reading. The affinity between the Muwahhidun and Deobandi approaches to Islam predisposed the Taliban to be receptive to Saudis such as Osama bin Ladin, who took up permanent residence in Afghanistan in 1995 or 1996.

Afghan schoolgirls clad in burqas walk the streets of Faizabad. The burqa is an Afghan version of *hijab,* a term used by religious Muslims to mean that women ought to cover their hair or entire bodies when in public places where men can gaze at them. © Reuters NewMedia Inc./Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

The Taliban disliked most *mojahedin* leaders, who were viewed as warlords who violate true Islamic codes of conduct in order to further their personal interests. Thus, in 1994 the Taliban began a campaign to reclaim the country by capturing Kandahar, the country's second-largest city. By summer 1996 most of eastern, southern, and western Afghanistan had fallen under Taliban control. Then Kabul was captured, although the Rabbani government escaped to northern Afghanistan, where it organized resistance. The Taliban set up a government in which Mullah Omar became the "amir of the faithful" assisted by a *shura* (council). In August 1998 Taliban forces captured most of the north, reducing the territory held by the Rabbani government to a small strip of land in the northeast. This situation prevailed for three years until the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States.

Persuaded that bin Ladin's al-Qaʿida network had organized these sensational attacks from his sanctuary in Afghanistan, the United States sent an ultimatum to the Taliban government warning of severe consequences if bin Ladin were not extradited. The Taliban temporized, and was overthrown in the subsequent U.S. air and ground assaults on Afghanistan.

See also Azhar, al-; Banna, Hasan al-; Bin Ladin, Osama; Daud, Muhammad; Hekmatyar, Golbuddin; Jamiʿat-e Islami; Jihad; Mawdudi, Abu al-Aʿla al-; Muslim Brotherhood; Omar, Muhammad (Mullah); Parcham; Qutb, Sayyid; Rabbani, Burhanuddin; *Shariʿa*; Taliban.

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M. Nazif Shahrani
Updated by Eric Hooglund

Afghanistan: Political Parties in

The development of mature political parties in Afghanistan did not occur until the 1960s, and they grew particularly upon the reforms of King Zahir Shah beginning in 1963.

Strong ties to tribal, regional, religious, or ethnic identities, the lack of class awareness, and the very small size of the intelligentsia limited the formation of political parties in Afghanistan. There were political societies as early as 1911, including the Young Afghan Party, which was centered on the personality of Mahmud Tarzi and his weekly journal *Siraj al-Akhbar,* and in 1947 the Awakened Youth (*Wish Zalmayan* in Pakhtun) was formed in Kandahar by members of the Pakhtun upper class.

Political parties arose in earnest during the constitutional reforms under King Zahir Shah (1933–1973) in 1963, especially with the liberalization of the press laws in 1964. By the mid-1970s three types of political parties had emerged, each representing the sentiments of a relatively small educated class. One type was based on the European socialist-nationalist model and included the Jamʿiat-e Social Demokrat (the Social Democratic Society), usually called *Afghan Millat* (Afghan Nation), led by Ghulam Mohammad Farhad. This strong Pakhtun-oriented party led to several spin-offs, the most important of which was the *Millat* (Nation). The other major party of this type was the *Jamʿiat Demokrate-ye Mottaraqi* (Progressive Democratic Party), founded by the popular prime minister Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal (1965–1967). It advocated evolutionary socialism and parliamentary democracy. By the 1980s these parties had ceased to play a major role in Afghan politics, even though remnants exist today.

Socialist parties also emerged in the mid-1960s. The most prominent was the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), founded in 1965 by Babrak Karmal, Hafizullah Amin, and Mohammad Taraki. It was pro-Soviet and had a Marxist-Leninist ideology. In 1967, this party split into two factions, the *Khalq* (People's) faction, led by Taraki and Amin, and the *Parcham* (Banner), led by Karmal. In April 1978, the factions temporarily united and the PDPA led a successful coup. This party ruled Afghanistan until 1992.

Other parties on the left included the *Setem-e Melli* (National Oppression), led by Taher Badakhshi, which was Marxist-Leninist and strongly anti-Pakhtun. *Sholay-e Jawid* (Eternal Flame), another popular Marxist party, was led by Rahim Mahmudi. Both were popular among minorities (non-Pakhtun), especially the Shiʿa and the ethnic groups in northern Afghanistan. The leftist parties dominated campus politics at Kabul University and were influential in the government of Muhammad Daud that took over Afghanistan in 1973.

Islamic parties also appeared in Afghanistan in the late 1960s, partly as a reaction to the increased secularization of Afghan society and the government's growing friendship with the Soviet Union. Islam had played an important role in national politics in earlier periods, often as a means of mobilizing national sentiment against an outside force, usually the British. The Islamic parties were of two types: those of the traditional *ulama,* or religious

scholars, and those that were hostile to the *ulama* and advocated a new and more radical Islam. The new and more radical parties sprung up on the campus of Kabul University, where a number of professors had studied at al-Azhar University in Cairo and had established contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*). Those professors brought the Islamic fundamentalist message back to Afghanistan, and in 1970 they established the *Javanan-e Muslimin* (Islamic Youth) movement on campus. That year, Javanan-e Muslimin won the university student elections, ending several years of leftist control of student government. In 1971 the Islamist movement became a party called *Jamiʿat-e Islami* (Islamic Society) led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.

In 1973 Muhammad Daud Khan took over Afghanistan in a political coup, ending the democratic experiment. He incorporated many of the leftist parties into his government, but the Islamic parties were forced underground or into exile. Rabbani and Sayyaf fled to Peshawar, Pakistan, and began an armed insurrection against the government in Kabul. By 1980 the Islamic movement had split into four factions, including the original *Jamiʿat-e Islami*; the *Hezb-e Islami* (Islamic Party), led by Golbuddin Hekmatyar; another *Hezb-e Islami,* led by Mohammad Unis Khalis; and *Ittihad-e Islami* (Islamic Union), led by Sayyaf. These political groups were more regional militias than political parties, and each of their leaders had been allied with Jamiʿat-e Islami at one time.

The traditional clergy also fled to Pakistan in the late 1970s and formed resistance parties to fight against the Marxist government in Kabul and, after 1980, the Soviet Union. These parties included *Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami* (Islamic Revolutionary Movement), led by Maulawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi; *Jebhe-ye Nejat Milli* (National Liberation Front), led by Sufi Pir Sebghatullah Mojaddedi; and *Mahaz-e Islami* (Islamic Front), led by Sufi Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani.

The seven Islamic parties formed a loose coalition in Peshawar, Pakistan, during the 1980s to coordinate their war effort and to attempt to form an Afghan government in exile. In February 1989 they formed an Afghan Interim Government (AIG) in Pakistan and elected Mojaddedi president. Very soon, however, conflicts arose, and the Hezb-e Islami led by Hekmatyar withdrew from the AIG.



Royalist Pushtun Hamid Karzai was endorsed as Afghanistan's head of state by the country's Loya Jerga (Grand Assembly) in July 2002. Karzai, a native of Kandahar, previously served as deputy foreign minister in Afghanistan's post-Soviet *mojahedin* government from 1992 to 1994. © AFP/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Other religious parties, primarily the Shiʿite parties, were excluded from the AIG. Shiʿa make up between 15 and 20 percent of the population of Afghanistan and are mostly Hazara. They have several political parties, most with ties to Iran. The first Shiʿite parties, founded in 1979, were the *Shura-ye Ittifagh-e Islami* (Islamic Council), led by Sayyed Beheshti, and the *Harakat-e Islami* (Islamic Union), led by Shaykh Asaf Mohseni. The *Shura* was formed as a quasi-government of the Hazarajat, and in the early 1980s it operated as such. However, by the mid-1980s the Shiʿite areas of Afghanistan, primarily the

Hazarajat, were taken over by Iranian-based parties, especially the *Nasr* (Victory) and the *Pasdaran* (Revolutionary Guards). These parties, imbued with Islamic fervor resulting from the Iranian revolution, ruthlessly pushed out the more moderate Shiʿite parties. In the late 1980s, these Iranian-based parties united in a political front called the *Wahadat* (Unity), which represents most of the Shiʿite parties and is led by Ustad Karim Khalili.

In 1992, the Islamic political parties returned to Kabul to form a government, but by late 1993, any unity that might have existed among them had disappeared, and there was bitter fighting between rival Islamic parties in Kabul and other major cities for control of Afghanistan. In the chaos a new political force emerged called the *Taliban,* a Persianized Arabic word meaning "religious students." The Taliban movement arose among the Afghan refugee population living in Pakistan in the early 1990s, the Taliban movement also received support from elements within the Pakistan government. The Taliban preached a puritanical form of Islam that combined Wahabi-style Islamic practices with strict tribal customs regarding the proper role of women and public behavior in general. Most of its followers were from southern Pushtun tribes in the Kandahar area. The Taliban seized control of Kandahar in 1994, and although opposed at first by most non-Pushtun groups, they were able to exert their control over most of Afghanistan by 1998. The leader of the Taliban government was Muhammad (Mullah) Omar.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in New York City, the United States began a military campaign to drive the Taliban out of Afghanistan. By December 2001 the Taliban had been forced from power, and on 21 December 2001 a new government, led by Hamid Karzai, took control in Kabul. The government was originally formed as an interim government at a conference in Bonn in November 2001, then was reaffirmed, albeit in a somewhat different form, by a national council, Loya Jerga, held in Kabul in July 2002. This new Afghan government is composed of several political factions, which can be divided into three major groups: the Northern Alliance, the Rome Group, and the Peshawar parties. The Northern Alliance holds the majority of the important cabinet positions in the interim government, except for the presidency. It includes the *Jamiʿat-i-Islami,* a predominantly ethnic Tajik group officially led by former president Burhanuddin Rabbani; the *Shura-i-Nizar,* composed of Panjshiri Tajiks who were followers of the late Ahmad Shah Masʿud; *Jambish-i-Melli,* a predominantly ethnic Uzbek militia led by General Rashid Dostum; and *Hezb-i-Wahadat,* a predominantly Hazara militia led by Mohammad Karim Khalili. The Rome Group is composed primarily of followers of the king, who was in exile in Rome. The Peshawar parties consist of those resistance groups that fought against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s out of the Pakistani city of Peshawar.

As many of the older parties that orignallly had been organized essentially as military militias were attempting in early 2003 to reinvent themselves as electoral parties, new parties were emerging to vie for seats in the new parliament. These parties included the National Council of Peace and Democracy of Afghanistan, which was composed of students, university professors, liberal republicans, and nongovernmental agency (NGO) workers; and the *Nizat-i-Milli,* formed by Younus Qanooni, the former interior minister, and Wali Masʿud, the brother of the assassinated leader Ahmad Shah Masʿud.

See also Amin, Hafizullah; Awakened Youth; Gailani, Ahmad; Hazara; Hekmatyar, Golbuddin; Hezb-e Islami; Jamiʿat-e Islami; Karmal, Babrak; Khalis, Mohammad Unis; Mohammadi, Maulawi Mohammad Nabi; Mojaddedi, Sebghatullah; Parcham; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan; Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Revolutionary Guards.

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Grant Farr

AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET INTERVENTION IN

Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 to preserve a shaky Communist government, but after failing to quell guerrilla resistance, they withdrew in February 1989. A cutoff of military and economic aid from the collapsing Soviet Union led to the Afghan government's fall to a resistance coalition in April 1992.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) secretly encouraged and financed Afghan communists from before the formation of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1965 until the party unexpectedly came to power through a military coup d'état on 27 April 1978. There was no evidence that the USSR organized or controlled the coup, but it rushed advisers to Kabul to help consolidate the new regime under the PDPA leader, Nur Muhammad Taraki. When popular opposition to the regime's economic and social changes provoked armed resistance, Moscow supplied weapons and military advisers who took unofficial command of the Afghan armed forces. In mid-1979, the Soviets sought the removal of Taraki's deputy, Hafizullah Amin. They blamed Amin for antagonizing the Afghan people into rebellion.

Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev was angered by Amin's overthrow of Taraki on 14 September 1979 and Amin's later order to murder Taraki. Brezhnev and other Soviet officials also feared that Afghanistan's communist regime might be defeated by strengthening Muslim guerrillas, that such a defeat would damage Soviet prestige worldwide, and that the adjacent Muslim areas of the USSR would be destabilized. Brezhnev decided on 12 December 1979 to send the Soviet army into Afghanistan.

The Soviet army seized control of Kabul on 27 December, killing Amin and installing Babrak Karmal as president. Moscow claimed its army had been officially invited into Afghanistan. Through advisers, the USSR ran Karmal's government until Moscow decided he was a failure and replaced him in May 1986 with Mohammed Najibullah.

The Soviet invasion turned what had been a civil war into a defense of nationalism and the Islamic religion against foreign atheists and their Afghan puppets. A Soviet force that reached about 118,000 men fought an estimated 200,000 or more *mojahedin* (Islamic holy warriors). The Soviet army was not trained or equipped for counterinsurgency warfare, and it never mastered the situation. Although it could mount offensives that temporarily seized control of any desired part of the Texas-sized country, it and the weak Afghan army were unable to maintain lasting control of much more than main towns and key communications lines. Soviet military operations drove some 5 million Afghans into refuge in Pakistan and Iran, and another 2 million sought shelter in towns from Soviet devastation of rural areas. Soviet soldiers slaughtered unarmed civilians in retaliation for guerrilla attacks—unproven reports said they used poison gas on unprotected villagers—and they spread millions of land mines that continued to kill and maim long after the war ended.

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan became a contest of endurance and—primarily in the case of the Afghans—national pride. The Soviets found themselves outmaneuvered by *mojahedin* fighters, like these in Kunar, who knew the rocky terrain intimately and used this knowledge to their advantage. **© AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

The *mojahedin,* armed by the United States and its allies, and trained and directed by Pakistan's military intelligence service, ambushed roads and

harassed garrisons. Soviet adaptations for more mobile warfare, including sending raiding teams into guerrilla territory to interrupt supply lines, had only limited success. The guerrillas' introduction in September 1986 of U.S.-supplied Stinger antiaircraft missiles curtailed the Soviet advantage of air power to attack guerrillas and move troops over the rugged terrain. The military advantage began shifting to the resistance as the Soviets lost heart. Nonaligned nations voted in the United Nations against the Soviet troop presence in Afghanistan, and Western countries restricted ties with the USSR.

After becoming the Soviet leader in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev decided that the economically staggering USSR needed to improve relations with the West to reduce its military spending burden and obtain technical aid. He recognized the Afghanistan war as an obstacle to better Western relations as well as a source of Soviet public malaise. Therefore, Moscow coerced Afghanistan into signing agreements—under UN auspices in Geneva 14 April 1988—that the Soviet army would withdraw from Afghanistan. (Pakistan was also a signatory.) After the withdrawal was completed on 15 February 1989, the USSR said 14,453 of its personnel had been killed in Afghanistan and 11,600 had been rendered invalids. The number of Afghans killed—among the regime, *mojahedin,* and noncombatants—was estimated between 1 and 1.5 million, with tens of thousands of others crippled.

The Soviet Union continued to arm and finance the Najibullah regime after the withdrawal, enabling its survival against disunited *mojahedin* groups. The USSR and the United States had agreed in 1988 to terminate their support of their respective clients in the ongoing civil war on or before 31 December 1991. As it happened, the USSR was formally disbanded a few days before that. Deprived of aid, Najibullah's regime lost support and collapsed. The *mojahedin* who had fought the Soviet Union took control of Kabul on 28 April 1992.

The USSR's bitter Afghanistan experience created an "Afghan syndrome" that Moscow commentators compared with the "Vietnam syndrome" of U.S. wariness about foreign commitments after 1975. As a result, the Soviet Union was unwilling to get involved in the Gulf Crisis in 1991, and later some Russian soldiers wanted to avoid commitment to regional conflicts in republics of the former USSR.

See also Amin, Hafizullah; Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich; Gulf Crisis (1990–1991); Karmal, Babrak; Najibullah.

Henry S. Bradsher
Updated by Robert L. Canfield

Afghanistan: U.S. Intervention in

The involvement of the United States in Afghanistan, from the 1950s through the period following the events of 11 September 2001.

The United States was actively involved in Afghanistan during the 1950s through the 1970s. The U.S. presence in Afghanistan ended in 1979 with the assassination of the U.S. ambassador Adolph Dubs in Kabul on 14 February 1979 and with the Soviet invasion the following December. Subsequently, U.S. involvement was indirect, primarily the provision of military aid to the Afghan resistance through the 1980s. After 11 September 2001, U.S. interest in Afghanistan was renewed as it became apparent that al-Qaʿida, the group responsible for the terrorist attack on the United States, was based in Afghanistan and was supported by the Taliban government in Kabul. On 14 September 2001 the U.S. Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing President George W. Bush to engage in a military response to the 11 September attacks. Following unsuccessful political attempts to force the Taliban government to expel Osama bin Ladin and his group, the United States began a bombing campaign on 7 October 2001, directed at Taliban military and political installations. By 13 November 2001 the Taliban government had fallen, and a U.S.–backed Afghan interim government was formed in December at a meeting sponsored by the United Nations in Bonn, Germany.

By early 2002 the United States had moved to restore political, military, and economic ties with Afghanistan. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul reopened on 17 January 2002, and the Afghan Embassy in Washington, D.C., opened that same month. U.S. military forces in Afghanistan grew to more than 8,000 troops as the U.S. military undertook the major task of finding and eliminating remnants of

the Taliban and al-Qaʿida. The U.S. military rebuilt the former Soviet air base at Bagram, north of Kabul, as its headquarters and established smaller military bases in Kandahar, Mazar-e Sharif, and Farah.

U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan were led by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which focused on rebuilding Afghanistan's infrastructure and dealing with immediate emergency needs. In addition to providing food and shelter for displaced persons, returning refugees, and widows, the U.S. reconstruction effort aimed to rebuild the Afghan educational system, restore agricultural productivity, and rebuild the Afghan transportation system, especially the interurban highways. The Kabul-Kandahar road, which was originally constructed by Americans during the 1950s and 1960s, became an important symbol of U.S. involvement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

On the political side, U.S. involvement in Afghanistan since 11 September 2001 has focused on providing support to the Afghan Transitional Administration, particularly to President Hamid Karzai, and on supporting the process of constitutional reform aimed at creating a representative government in a parliamentary system. The United States supported and financed the Emergency Loya Jerga in June of 2002 and exerted pressure on the ex-king, Zahir Shah, to withdraw from active political leadership. U.S. officials have been placed in the major Afghan ministries to oversee daily operations of the Afghan government.

Despite political, military, and financial support from the United States, a number of problems remain. The Afghan Transitional Administration has been slow to gain credibility in Afghanistan, in part because many Afghans believe this government to have been externally imposed by the Americans without a natural constituency in Afghanistan. Weaknesses of the Afghan government are blamed on the United States; for example, the United States has received criticism over the ethnic composition of the Karzai government, since ethnic Tajiks dominate major cabinet positions, alienating the Pushtun tribes. Human rights groups have cited widespread extortion, lawlessness, and kidnapping by Afghan police and intelligence officials. These groups accuse the United States of supporting some of the worst offenders and for not doing more to stop the abuses. U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is also complicated by Afghanistan's large opium production. Afghanistan grows more than 70 percent of the world's opium, and the U.S.–backed government has had little success in stopping its cultivation or halting its illegal smuggling to neighboring countries.

Afghanistan's Northern Alliance, a multi-ethnic, non-Pushtun opposition group, provided intelligence and military support to the United States during the American invasion of the country in 2001. Prior to the military operation, the Northern Alliance controlled approximately 5 percent of Afghanistan and relied on a core group of fifteen thousand armed fighters. © AFP/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan also have faced problems. In attempting to capture or kill al-Qaʿida or Taliban forces, the U.S. military inadvertently has caused a number of civilian deaths and dropped bombs on the wrong targets, including as a Red Cross warehouse and a United Nations mine-removal office. It is estimated that as many as 20,000 Afghans have died as the direct or indirect results of U.S. bombing, creating animosity toward the U.S. presence. The U.S. military also has been inadvertently involved in regional conflicts between contentious warlords, some of whom have induced the U.S. military to attack rival warlords by claiming that they are Taliban members.

After several years, the U.S. military has largely failed to accomplish its major goals: The United States has been unable to pacify or bring security to

much of Afghanistan; it has been unable to find bin Ladin or Muhammad (Mullah) Omar, head of the Taliban; it has been unable to eliminate the Taliban, which is regrouping; and it has alienated a growing number of Afghans, who are becoming impatient with the U.S. military presence. U.S. reconstruction efforts also have come under criticism. Despite some progress, poverty remains, many children are still not able to go to school, and women still find their lives constrained and must veil when they are in public.

See also Afghanistan; bin Ladin, Osama; Karzai, Hamid; Pushtun; Tajiks; Taliban.

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Grant Farr

AFGHAN WOMEN'S COUNCIL

Humanitarian women's organization.

The Afghan Women's Council (AWC) is a nonprofit organization that provides humanitarian relief to Afghan women refugees in Pakistan. It was founded in 1986 in Peshawar, Pakistan, by Fatana Gailani, who belongs to a prominent Afghan clerical family. The AWC provides education and medical care for newly arrived Afghan women refugees. It also publishes a monthly journal, *Zan-i-Afghan* (Afghan women), which promotes women's rights, children's rights, and peace-building in Afghanistan. The AWC has received several international awards, including the U.S. Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children Award in 1992 and the United Nations Association of Spain's Peace Award in 1999.

See also Afghanistan: Overview; Gender: Gender and Politics; Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA).

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Senzil Nawid

AFLAQ, MICHEL

[1910–1989]

Syrian Christian pan-Arab nationalist; intellectual, teacher, journalist, and politician; one of the founders of the Baʿth party.

Michel (also Mishayl) Aflaq was born the son of a Greek Orthodox grain merchant in the Maydan quarter of Damascus. During the French mandate over Syria, he began his secondary education in the Greek Orthodox lyceneum in Damascus (1922–1926), but after long-standing disagreements with students and teachers, he transferred in his final year to the Damascus state secondary school *(al-tajhiz).* He studied at the University of Paris (1928–1934), where he took the licentiate in law. After returning to Damascus, he taught history in the state secondary school and in the French lay secondary school. He participated in Arab nationalism in Damascus and Paris, but after returning to Damascus devoted himself to literary activities, writing short stories, a novel, and a play. Social reform was his preoccupation in his earliest political action—articles published in *al-Tali,* a weekly that he and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a fellow student and friend in Paris, and others published for six months in 1935 to 1936. Aflaq and Bitar were attracted by Marxism and were friendly with communists in Paris and in Syria, but they never joined the party. The French author André Gide (1869–1951) was their greatest influence; the two friends became disillusioned by communist support for the 1936 Franco–Syrian treaty and the denunciation of the communists by intellectuals such as Gide.

With the start of World War II, Aflaq and Bitar organized a group of pan-Arab students, but the group's principal activity before 1943 was the distribution of occasional handbills. These circulars were identified simply as from al-Ihya al-Arabi (the Arab Awakening) or, from the later half of 1941 on, al-Baʿth al-Arabi (the Arab Resurrection), a term that Zaki al-Arsuzi had used to designate a similar

group of students formed by him in 1940. Meanwhile, in May 1941, Aflaq and Bitar organized a group to send arms and volunteers to assist Rashid Ali al-Kaylani against the British.

Aflaq's literary activity won him a substantial reputation, and his teaching had a great impact on some students. Aflaq and Bitar were of middle economic status, but their families were considered notable and aristocratic. Nevertheless, with fewer than ten members in 1943, growth was slow and organization weak until two better positioned notables, Jalal al-Sayyid of Dayr al-Zawr and Midhat al-Bitar of Damascus, joined the leadership during 1942 to 1943. Thereafter, the undefined group without a fixed name became in 1943 the movement *(haraka)*, in 1944 the party of the Arab Resurrection (al-Baʿth al-Arabi), with a permanent office, and in 1946 a newspaper. The followers of Arsuzi—now led by Wahib Ghanim—then joined, and a congress of 247 members met in Damascus to adopt a constitution on 4 April 1947.

Aflaq was elected the first *amid* (dean) and thereafter held, at least nominally, the leading position in the Baʿth party, as well as the editorship of the newspaper. Yet he was soon the focus of unending controversy. The most detailed information is provided by self-interested sources other than Aflaq, but these are consistent with each other and the public actions of the party. Aflaq possessed both ambition and envy. He ran without success for the Syrian parliament in 1943 and 1947. He was minister of education during the Hinnawi period but resigned when he failed to be elected to the constituent assembly; then when al-Sayyid was offered a place in the cabinet, Aflaq and Bitar foreclosed the appointment by demanding two positions. Unlike al-Sayyid, Aflaq had no power base of his own. Consequently, he was neither willing nor able to prevent the appropriation of the party by Akram al-Hawrani (also spelled Hurani, Hourani). Although party rules forbade membership by the military, Aflaq cooperated with Hawrani, whose greatest strength was a following in the officers corps. Despite the opposition of al-Sayyid, the Baʿth and Hawrani's Arab Socialist party cooperated and merged in November 1952 to form the Arab Socialist Baʿth party. Aflaq and Hawrani became political exiles from January to October of 1953, but in 1954 their party numbered 2,500, in contrast to the 500 of premerger Baʿth in 1952. Hawrani's military friends and his political strength and skill kept the party at the center of power until Syria's union with Egypt in 1958—the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR). Aflaq and Hawrani had been instrumental in this, but they defected at the end of 1959 and moved to Beirut (Lebanon). The party organization had been amended in 1954 to reflect its pan-Arab character, which was based on its growth outside Syria. Aflaq had been reelected secretary general and a member of the National Command (the executive body composed of representatives from the various regions [countries]), and he had retained these positions even though the party had been dissolved in Syria. As a strong pan-Arab, he broke with Hawrani, who took a Syrianist line, especially after Syria's secession from the UAR in 1961.

Aflaq's position in the party enabled him to take an active part in both Iraqi and Syrian politics after their Baʿthist coups in early 1963, but as the military Baʿthists gained control in Syria, Aflaq's influence waned until finally, following the coup of 23 February 1966, he fled Syria and was expelled from the party. During the rivalry between the Syria Baʿth and the Iraqi Baʿth, which came to power in 1968, the Iraqis continued to recognize Aflaq as secretary general of the party. In Syria, he was sentenced to death in absentia in 1971, and Arsuzi was accorded the honor of being the true founder of the Baʿth. Aflaq moved to Baghdad around 1980 and died there in 1989. At his death the Iraqi Baʿth announced that he had long been a secret convert to Islam.

Aflaq's version of Arabism is idealistic and metaphysical; it presents the ideology that became standard by the 1930s—Islamic modernism is combined with the historical vision of the Arab nation that holds that from the time of the earliest-known Arabs, the ancient Semitic peoples, they have been in perpetual conflict with aggressive neighbors—notably the Aryans—including the Europeans. Periods of Arab power and glory have been followed by corruption and disunion due to foreign influences and abasement by imperialism, from which the nation has recovered by returning to its true culture. The greatest of these awakenings was engen-

dered by the gift of Islam, which, in Aflaq's version, was induced or earned by the prophet Muhammad's acting for the nation. To regain the lost greatness, according to Aflaq, every Arab must act as Muhammad did.

Amidst the chaos in Baghdad that accompanied the fall of the Baʿthist government in Iraq at the hands of invading U.S. troops in the spring of 2003, the tomb and mosque complex built over Aflaq's grave was looted (including by a Western journalist, who openly wrote about his act). The American-selected provisional government of Iraq later reportedly ordered the destruction of the tomb as part of the "de-Baʿthification" program in Iraq. Before this could occur, the tomb complex was found to conceal a secret Baʿth party archive containing over three million documents.

See also Arsuzi, Zaki al-; Baʿth, al-; Bitar, Salah al-Din al-; Hawrani, Akram al-; Hinnawi, Sami al-.

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C. Ernest Dawn

AGADIR CRISIS

Known as the second Moroccan crisis.

The Agadir crisis erupted as the almost inevitable outgrowth on the 1906 Algeciras Conference, which allowed for Spanish and French control over nominally independent Morocco. In 1911, local opposition culminated in revolts against the French. France responded by sending an occupation force to Fez (Morocco) in May 1911, and Germany concluded it would not permit any revision of the Algeciras Act without some compensation. In July, under the pretext of protecting German citizens, the Germans then ordered the gunboat *Panther* to proceed to Agadir (Morocco) to pressure the French to negotiate. In November, after a brief war scare amid Britain's promises of support for France (Prime Minister Lloyd George's Mansion House speech), a Franco–German accord was signed, granting a French protectorate over Morocco in return for some French sub-Saharan territories to be ceded to Germany. This end to Morocco's nominal independence contributed directly to the outbreak of the 1911 Tripolitanian War and, thus, the Balkan Wars (1912–1913).

See also Algeciras Conference (1906); Balkan Wars (1912–1913).

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Jon Jucovy

AGAL

See Clothing

AGAM, YAACOV

[1928–]

Israeli artist and sculptor.

The son of a rabbi, Yaacov Agam was born in Rishon le-Zion and studied at the Bezalel Academy of Arts and Design in Jerusalem, at the Johannes Ittan School in Zurich, and at the Academy of Abstract Art in Paris. Since 1951, he has spent most of his time in Paris, where he became widely recognized for his optic and kinetic art and sculpture. Agam achieves motion in his works by endowing his creations with mobile segments or by giving the impression of movement through the viewer's changing position. His works also include religious objects such as the menorah, mezuzah, or Star of David. President Georges Pompidou of France commissioned him to decorate a room in the Elysée Palace. Agam's works are displayed in many public buildings and areas including the president's house in Jerusalem, the Juilliard School of Music in New

York, the Elysée Palace, and the Defense Quarters in Paris.

ANN KAHN

AGNON, SHMUEL YOSEF

[1888–1970]

Hebrew writer who won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1966.

Born in Buczacz (Buchach), Galicia, Shmuel Yosef Agnon emigrated to Palestine in 1907. In 1913 he went to Germany, where he married Ester Marx and started a family. In 1924 he returned to Palestine and settled in Jerusalem.

Agnon was influenced by a variety of social, cultural, and literary sources. The pious milieu of the small Jewish town where he grew up and the Jewish scholarly traditions in which he was steeped from an early age had a deep and lasting effect on his writing. The development of Hebrew literature at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth also had a formative influence on him. In 1908, after his arrival in Palestine, Agnon became involved with the literary world of the Zionist pioneers, whose ideals and way of life remained important to him throughout his life. The horrors of World War I, which Agnon witnessed in Germany, were influential for his development as a writer. He saw the world he knew disappear before his eyes.

In his works Agnon examines the psychological and philosophical repercussions of the great historical changes that occurred during his lifetime. In particular, he writes about the demise of traditional Jewish culture in Eastern Europe after World War I and the development of a new Jewish center in Palestine. Although he uses the archaic language and pious style of earlier generations, Agnon gives full expression to the vicissitudes of modern human existence: the disintegration of traditional ways of life, the loss of faith, and the loss of identity.

Agnon published four novels, each of which represents a stage in his literary development. The first, *The Bridal Canopy,* was written in Germany between 1920 and 1921. The novel tells about a pious Jew who travels across Galicia to collect money for his daughter's wedding. The novel evokes a bygone world of faith and superstition through a complex



Israeli author Shmuel Yosef Agnon, born in 1888, began at age 15 to publish his stories and poems in the Hebrew and Yiddish languages. His works relay Hassidic folklore and Jewish traditional life from the eighteenth century to the present. He received the Nobel Prize for literature in 1966. © DAVID RUBINGER/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

blend of nostalgia and irony. The second novel, *A Guest for the Night,* is an account of a writer's visit to his hometown shortly after the end of World War I. The account is an attempt to grapple with the devastating impact the war had on traditional Jewish life in Eastern Europe and with the responsibility of the artist as witness. Written in the 1930s, the novel eerily foreshadows the destruction of European Jewry during the Holocaust. The third novel, published in 1945, is called *Only Yesterday* and takes place in Palestine during the 1920s. It revolves around the unsuccessful attempt of its hero, an idealistic pioneer who came to settle the land, to live up to his ideals. The novel is a harsh account of one of the most important periods in the development of Zionism. The fourth novel, *Shira,* explores the social

forces in Palestine during the 1920s and 1940s through the life of a Jerusalem academic who is torn between his petit bourgeois world and his desire to live his life to the fullest.

In addition to his novels, Agnon published many parables, short stories, novellas, and other works in varying genres, including psychological love stories *(The Doctor's Divorce, Fahrenheim),* social satires *(Young and Old),* grotesque tales *(The Frogs, Pisces),* and pious fables about Hassidic sages *(The Story of Rabbi Gadiel the Baby).* Their polished exterior and detached tone hide a deep sense of pathos and pervasive irony. Agnon's frequent use of ancient Jewish sources, and the new ways in which he interprets them, create a tension between style and content that enhances the meaning of both.

Agnon had greatly influenced several generations of Hebrew writers, who found in his works a link between the Jewish world that vanished after the world wars and the existential concerns of their own time. Admired by readers and critics alike, he is one of the most acclaimed Hebrew writers and among the most widely translated. *The Collected Works of S. Y. Agnon,* which includes twenty-four volumes of his fiction, was published in eight volumes between 1953 and 1962. Many of his works have been published posthumously.

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YAROM PELEG

AGOP, GULLU

[1840–1891]

Early Turkish theater director and actor.

Gullu Agop was born in Constantinople as Gulluyan Hagop Vartovyan, to Armenian parents. He began working in theater in 1862 and, in 1867, founded the first Turkish language theater in the Ottoman Empire, called the Ottoman Theater. In 1870, he obtained a government monopoly on Turkish-language theater for fifteen years. He was known for innovation, producing in 1873 the first modern play written originally in Turkish: *Vatan Yahut Silistre* (The motherland silistre [a Bulgarian province and city on the Danube that was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1420 to 1878]) by Namik Kemal.

In 1884, Sultan Abdülhamit II labeled the theater subversive and had it burned down in 1885. Ironically, Agop then spent his last years as state director at the sultan's palace.

See also ABDÜLHAMIT II; NAMIK KEMAL.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

AGRICULTURE

The cultivation and harvesting of food in the Middle East, and how it has responded to the pressures of local and global demand and available environmental resources.

Soil cultivation for the production of crops began in the ancient Near East around 10,000 B.C.E. (the Neolithic Revolution), and agriculture is the base of the past and current civilizations of the region. In 1996, 50 percent of the Middle East's population still lived in rural areas. Through the centuries, various rural cultures have developed, and they have balanced environmental and social factors. For example, they have introduced various collective water-management systems. Nevertheless, in terms of food, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has become the least self-sufficient of the world's major populated regions.

Increasing Demand

In 2000, values for the agricultural exports for the entire MENA region were about US$11 billion, whereas the value of agricultural imports totalled

Camels, such as the one shown here turning a water wheel, are used by farmers in the Middle East to perform many types of labor. The camel is uniquely adapted to the dry desert climate, possessing many physical attributes that allow it to withstand the often harsh environment. © Owen Franken/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

about US$33 billion. Although the differences among Middle Eastern countries are great (for example, Turkey is an occasional exporter of wheat, but Sudan repeatedly experienced famine during the 1980s and early 1990s), some regional generalizations can be made. Rapidly increasing demand for food has outpaced the domestic supply, because of population increase and considerable expansion of per capita incomes during the period of the petroleum boom (roughly 1973–1985). Supply response has been significant, although it has been constrained by nature, history, and public policy, but the agricultural systems of the region have undergone considerable transformation as a result of recent efforts to increase domestic food supplies.

During the period from 1980 to 1990, population in the MENA grew at 3.1 percent each year (only sub-Saharan African populations are growing more swiftly) but then slowed in the period from 1990 to 1999 to 2.2 percent, reaching a population of 301 million in 2001. From 1965 to 1988, per capita income was also growing at about 3 percent each year, but in the decade from 1991 to 2001 economic growth was slower in MENA than in any region except sub-Saharan Africa and the transition economies of Europe and Central Asia. From 2000 to 2001, the growth of output per capita was less than 1 percent.

Middle Easterners spend a substantial fraction of their additional income on food, especially on luxury foods such as meat and fresh produce. Accordingly, the demand for all food rose at about 4 to 5 percent each year, and the demand for meat, milk, vegetables, and fruits rose at roughly 6 percent each year in the same period.

Few of the world's agricultural sectors could have met this increased demand from domestic supply alone. The countries of the MENA could not,

and they became increasingly dependent on food imports. Most countries in the region now import at least 290 pounds (130 kg) of grain per person per year, and many import far more. In 2001, Libya imported 885 pounds (402 kg), Jordan imported 764 pounds (347 kg), and the United Arab Emirates imported 1,852 pounds (841 kg). These are similar to the amounts needed by the nonagricultural city-state of Singapore. Over the decades, this increasing food dependency has led many national planners in the region to try to accelerate agricultural growth, but they have had to deal with significant natural and social issues.

Water

The scarcity of fresh water is the main natural obstacle to greater food production in the region. With only 1.847 cubic yards (1,413 cubic meters) of fresh water available per capita in 2000, the MENA ranks well below the average of other regions. Drought, a recurrent phenomenon in the region, seriously affects agricultural production. Many of the desert areas receive less than 20 inches (50 cm) of rain per year, making non-irrigated agriculture extremely risky or impossible. Seasonal rainfall patterns are highly variable; only the shores of the Caspian and Black seas receive rainfall year round. Elsewhere, precipitation follows one of two seasonal patterns: (1) a winter maximum along the Mediterranean shore, in the Fertile Crescent, and in central and southern Iran, or (2) a summer monsoonal maximum in Southern Arabia and Sudan. Precipitation within these areas often varies considerably, and rain may fall at the wrong time during the planting cycle.

From the early 1960s, the total irrigated land area increased from about 30 million acres (12 million ha), some 15 percent of arable land, to about 42 million acres (17 million ha), or about 17 percent of arable land, in 1985. Irrigation resources are unequally distributed across countries. Roughly 34 percent of all irrigated land in the region is in Iran. In descending order, the four countries with the largest amount of irrigated land are Iran, Egypt, Turkey, and Iraq. Likewise, irrigated land as a percentage of arable land varies widely by country. At one extreme, virtually all (97%) of Egypt's farmland is irrigated, as is 65 percent of Israel's. By contrast, only 8 percent of Turkey's and 7 percent of Morocco's arable land is irrigated. Iran and Iraq irrigate roughly 33 to 40 percent of their arable land. Since irrigated land produces much more per acre than nonirrigated land, and produces crops of higher value, such as fruits and vegetables (as opposed to grains), these numbers understate the economic contribution of irrigated farming in the Middle East. In the MENA, the proportion of irrigated land has increased from 25.8 percent of cropland in 1979 through 1981 to 35.5 percent in 1995 through 1997.

However, the development of irrigation has too often neglected long-term environmental issues, thereby jeopardizing the sustainability of the short-term gains from expanding irrigation. Two problems dominate: the neglect of drainage and the overexploitation of groundwater. Irrigation without drainage raises soil salinity, which reduces crop yields. Because irrigation raises output immediately, while neglect of drainage reduces it only after ten to twenty years, governments short of cash have often sacrificed the future by underinvesting in drainage. This problem has plagued most irrigation systems in the region as well as throughout the world. Overexploitation of groundwater is another example of heavily discounting the future. In many cases (Sahara, the Arabian Peninsula), this is fossil water, which is not renewable. In time, these ancient stores of water (similar to underground pools of petroleum) will be depleted and the farms and such ecosystems as oases that depend on such water will have to be abandoned.

It is often argued that since water is free to farmers they have no incentive to economize it. In fact, it is the giant irrigation projects, more than the farmers, that have overused this scarce resource. Two types of solutions were applied to this water problem: large-scale and small-scale infrastructure. Both are technical solutions and underestimate the social dimension of the problem. The large-scale solution is exemplified by such state projects as the Aswan High Dam (Egypt) and the Great Man-Made River (Libya). Drip irrigation is typical of the small-scale solution. Pioneered in Israel, it delivers precisely calibrated amounts of water to individual fruit trees or vegetables but costs at least three times as much to install as conventional flow irrigation. Drip techniques also require literature and trained technical personnel to operate them effectively. In addi-

Rice, one of Iran's most frequently consumed foods, is planted in the spring and harvested in September and October. Thanks to heavy annual rainfall, the Mazandaran and Gilan provinces alone produce 80 to 85 percent of the country's rice crop. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

tion, water conservation imperatives have an impact on the choice of crops, and may reduce the allocation of land to water-intensive crops such as alfalfa, rice, sugarcane, and cotton.

The region's rain-fed farming systems generally employ Mediterranean dry-farming techniques, in which winter wheat or barley alternates with fallow and the grazing of sheep, goats, cattle, or camels. Also found in the region are systems that employ the dry-farming techniques of Sudan. The Sudanese-type systems run up against the problems of desertification and the relationship between semi-migratory cattle herders and sedentary farmers.

Cereal grains are the dominant crop in the Middle East, occupying more than 40 percent of the arable land. Wheat (indigenous to the northern Fertile Crescent) is planted on about 25 percent of the farmed area in any year and constitutes more than 50 percent of all regional cereal production. It stabilized at 55 percent in the period between 1961 and 2001 in Middle East but grew from 55 percent to 73 percent during the same period in North Africa. Barley, which is also indigenous, is especially well suited to drier areas and is a distant second. About one-third of all the land planted in wheat in less developed countries is found in the Middle East. Because of natural and social constraints, grain production has grown less rapidly than population in the region. Increasingly, greater output of grains and all other foodstuffs will require a shift from bringing additional land into cultivation to raising the output per unit of land. The only country with significant unexploited or underexploited areas of land is Sudan. Such intensive agricultural growth, however, is constrained not merely by water resources but by social conditions and economic policies.

Land Ownership

The principal social constraints to agricultural development have been unequal access to land and

other problems concerning property rights; unfavorable terms of trade facing farmers (local but also international trade with Western countries); low levels of investment; and technical difficulties, such as those involved with irrigation.

Despite considerable differences between countries and regions, certain generalizations on land tenure may be made. Prior to land reform, land tenure was generally bimodal, with a small number of farmers owning large areas of land and a large number of others holding small parcels or working on the large ones as sharecroppers. In addition, states were and are active in shaping land-tenure patterns. Land reform has reduced but not eliminated unequal distributions of land. Governments have usually intervened in land-tenure patterns largely for political reasons, specifically to ruin their enemies. However, states often have had development strategies or programs that involved transferring resources from agriculture to industry and urban areas. Thus, states have tried to monopolize the distribution of farm inputs (fertilizer, equipment, and other resources necessary for agricultural production) and farm outputs (the actual agricultural products). Under injunctions from international organizations (the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund), states throughout the region have retreated from land reform as part of a general regional economic trend giving an expanded scope to the private sector.

Governments often created state marketing monopolies as part of land reform programs, eventually allowing them to tax farmers by reducing the price of agricultural products below world market levels and raising the cost of inputs above world market levels. Such price policies, combined with macroeconomic and trade policies that distorted foreign exchange rates, weakened the incentives for farmers to produce the taxed crops. Not all crops were taxed, but grains and major export goods (e.g., cotton) usually were. These unfavorable pricing policies help explain the sluggish growth of grain output until the early 1980s. After that, governments increasingly recognized the need to offer farmers adequate incentives if the goal of food security was to be met. Taxes on farming have been reduced in many countries, and price policies have been improved. Less success has been achieved in improving life for small farmers (current policies bankrupt the family economy) and in improving macroeconomic policies that affect agriculture, such as inflation control and exchange-rate management.

Increased output per land unit is usually associated with greater use of higher yielding crop varieties (HYVs), which have been bred to be more responsive to fertilizer. The adoption rate for HYV wheat has been constrained by both limited water supplies and pricing policies. Only about 30 percent of Middle Eastern wheat fields are planted with HYVs, compared with nearly 80 percent in Latin America and Asia. By contrast, farm mechanization, especially tractor use, has spread rapidly, especially for such power-intensive tasks as land preparation. From 1979 through 1981, there were twelve tractors per thousand agricultural workers in the region, and from 1995 through 1997, 25 per thousand, which is higher than the world average. In 1960, there were some 2,470 acres (1,000 ha) for every tractor in Iran, but only some 247 acres (100 ha) per tractor in 1985. The use of harvesting machinery, such as combines, has spread more slowly than the use of tractors. The pattern of mechanization indicates that machines were substituted for animal labor as opposed to being substituted for human labor; animals had become far more valuable as producers of meat and milk than as work animals, and governments in the region often subsidized fuel.

However, mechanized techniques are also important as a way to economize on human labor, since recent emigration from the countryside has negatively affected the agricultural sector in many MENA countries. Everywhere, the proportion of agricultural laborers has declined. From 1960 to 1985, the number of farm workers fell in Algeria, Jordan, and Syria, though it remained roughly stable in Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia, and Turkey. Labor migration, both from rural areas to cities and from non-oil to oil-exporting countries within the region, accounts for most of the decline in rural population figures. Education in the countryside has raised skill levels and expectations, leading many young people to abandon farming. Only if the educated youth are given the technology and incentives to succeed in agriculture will the MENA be able to mitigate water scarcity and even partially meet the growing demand for food.

See also FOOD; WATER.

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ALAN R. RICHARDS
UPDATED BY VINCENT BATTESTI

AGUDAT ISRAEL

Organization of Orthodox Jewry; political party of Orthodox Jews in Israel.

The organization was founded in Katowice (Upper Silesia, now in the southwestern part of Poland), in 1912, as a worldwide movement of Orthodox Jews. It established the Council of Torah Sages as its religious authority on all political matters. Opposed to secular Zionism and the World Zionist Organization (the settlement of Jews in Palestine; a return to Palestine), it consisted of three major groups: German Orthodox followers of Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch; the Lithuanian yeshiva (religious school) community; and Polish Hasidic rabbis and their followers—especially the Gur Hasidic group. The major objective was to provide a range of religion-based communal services to strengthen the Orthodox community.

In Palestine, Agudat Israel was established to be independent of the organized Jewish community (the Yishuv). Despite its ideological opposition to secular Zionism, in 1933 it entered into an agreement with the Jewish Agency there (which represented the Yishuv to the British mandate authority), according to which Agudat Israel would receive 6.5 percent of the immigration permits. In 1947, just before Israel's independence, it entered into an even more comprehensive agreement, which has come to be known as the status quo letter. This purported to guarantee basic religious interests in Israel and served to legitimize Agudat Israel's joining the government-in-formation and the initial 1949–1951 government coalition. At this point, it bolted—opposing the government's decision to draft women into the military. In 1977, Agudat Israel supported the Likud-led coalition; it joined Israel's national unity government in 1984 and has since remained part of the government, although it has refused a ministry.

Agudat Israel experienced a number of internal rifts that came to a head in the 1980s and have resulted in the emergence of a group of ultra-Orthodox, or *haredi,* parties. In 1983, due to long-simmering anger over the absence of Sephardic leadership in the party, the Jerusalem *sephardi* members of Agudat Israel broke away and established the Sephardi Torah Guardians party, SHAS; it was so successful in the municipal elections in Jerusalem during October 1983 that it ran a national slate of candidates in 1984 and became an impressive force. At the same time, an old conflict between the Hasidic and Lithuanian-type yeshiva elements within Agudat Israel—represented by the Hasidic rabbis of Gur and Vizhnitz, on one side, and the head of the Ponevez yeshiva in B'nei Brak, Rabbi Eliezer Shach, on the other—reached new heights and culminated in the formation of Shach's Degel HaTorah (Torah Flag) party for the 1988 national elections.

Agudat Israel, like the other *haredi* parties, is generally moderate on foreign-policy issues, including the administered territories; but it is concerned with all matters of domestic policy, those it

perceives as affecting religion, in general, and especially its own educational institutions.

See also ISRAEL, POLITICAL PARTIES IN.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

AHAD HA-AM

[1856–1927]

Early Zionist author; pen name of Asher Ginzberg.

Born in Skvire in the Ukraine, Ahad Ha-Am (in Hebrew, One of the People) was moved to a rural estate in 1868, rented by his wealthy father, a follower of the mystical Hasidic movement. There he was educated in Jewish topics by private tutors, while teaching himself Russian, German, French, and English. Ginzberg broke with traditional Judaism and, in 1886, settled in Odessa, a center of progressive Jewish life. There he quickly rose to prominence in the emerging Zionist movement, then spearheaded by the Odessa-based Hovevei Zion. He worked as an editor of several periodicals and founded *Ha-Shiloah,* a pioneering Hebrew-language journal. In 1908, he moved to London, where became a close adviser to Chaim Weizmann during the negotiations leading to the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Ginzberg settled in Palestine in 1922; he died there at the age of seventy.

For several decades after 1889, when he first published his major article "Lo zeh ha-derekh" (This is not the way), Ahad Ha-Am became prominent in Hebrew letters. His ironic spare prose set new standards for the Hebrew essay. His stand on Jewish nationalism was based on two interlinked themes—the perils of Jewish assimilation and the role of Palestine as a spiritual center. He saw not mounting antisemitism but the threat of assimilation as the spur for Zionism. He saw the return of Jews to their homeland accompanied by a return to their original language and by a rebirth of political institutions—which had been supplanted by adherence to theology and ritual after the Roman conquest of Palestine in the first century C.E. In his view, before the Haskalah (enlightenment) movement of the late eighteenth century, Jewry had been sustained by commitment to community, to collective life—but modernism and citizenship or the prospect of citizenship in European states was isolating Jews from their natural community and from each other. He championed the Russian-based Hovevei Zion (Hibbat Zion) movement as the natural heir to the Jewish people's legacy of exile and the focal point of Jewish identity in a world where both the refusal to assimilate outside influences and an unchecked eagerness to do so could result in the disappearance of Jewry. Herzlian Zionism, which came to dominate Jewish nationalist circles following the First Zionist Congress in 1897, was, he contended, shortsighted in its stress on diplomacy and politics—and its indifference to the colonizing efforts of the Hovevei Zion.

As an alternative both to philanthropic and to diplomatic Zionism, Ahad Ha-Am promoted his concept of "spiritual center"—since, in the past, Jewry had owed its collective existence to an ability to concentrate its spiritual resources on the rebuilding of its future. Martin Buber, Mordecai Kaplan, Judah Magnes, and Zionist socialists read his work and respected his views, in part, while at the same time others criticized his politics as elitist, apolitical, and impractical.

He was the first Zionist to see the darker side to the Arab-Jewish relationship in Palestine, insisting that there were threats to the Jewish national enterprise. As early as 1891, in his essay "Emet me-eretz yisrael" (The truth from the land of Israel), he argued that the brutal recent treatment of Arabs by some Jews was a tragic reaction to a history of Jewish subjugation in the Diaspora. The weight he gave to the issue of Arab retaliation to Jewish settlement activity placed it, however tenuously, on the Zion-



Russian-born author Ahad Ha-Am was born Asher Ginzberg. He specialized in Talmudic and Hassidic literature, and he was a proponent of political Zionism and proposed a Jewish center of learning to strengthen cultural and national solidarity among the Diaspora Jewry. His pseudonym Ahad Ha-Am means "one of the people." © LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ist agenda. In the last years of his life he argued that Palestine would face its greatest test in how it treated the "strangers" in its midst.

Ahad Ha-Am's reputation declined after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. His caution appeared misguided, his pessimism idiosyncratic rather than prescient. After the election of Menachem Begin in 1977, however, he was put to use by some intellectuals on Israel's liberal-left who were frustrated by the ability of the right-wing Revisionist Zionists to win not only control of the government but to usurp classical Jewish nationalism as well.

See also BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917); BEGIN, MENACHEM; BUBER, MARTIN; HASKALAH; HIBBAT ZION; MAGNES, JUDAH; WEIZMANN, CHAIM.

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STEVEN ZIPPERSTEIN

AHALI GROUP

Political group in Iraq, 1930–1958.

At the Ahali group's forefront in early 1930 were several young intellectuals imbued with liberal ideals and a strong desire to reform the economic, political, and social conditions of Iraq. Four of them stand out: Husayn Jamil, Abd al-Qadir Ismaʿil, Muhammad Hadid, and Fatah Ibrahim. The first two were Sunni Muslims from Baghdad who were classmates in high school and briefly at Baghdad Law College. Both were active in the opposition politics of the 1920s and were suspended from school. Muhammad Hadid was a Sunni Muslim who belonged to a wealthy conservative family from Mosul. He studied at the American University of Beirut and did a year of graduate work at Columbia University. Both Hadid and Ibrahim were influenced by liberal and socialist thought while studying abroad.

These four young men and other individuals decided to publish a newspaper to express their ideas and philosophy. They chose the name *Ahali* to stress their ties and unity with the people—this name has since been applied to the whole group. The first issue of the newspaper, dated 2 January 1932, appeared under the slogan "People's Benefit Is Above All Benefits." *Al-Ahali* quickly gained popularity and became the most influential paper in Baghdad. It served as a mouthpiece for the most constructive, the most modern, and the most progressive minds in Iraq. *Al-Ahali* was distinguished for its coverage and analysis of the social and economic conditions of the country and for its sharp attack on government policies. Consequently, it had difficulties with

government officials and publication was repeatedly suspended.

Initially, the members of the Ahali Group were united by their anti-British sentiment, their critical stand against the government, and their desire for reform. They advocated ideas of the French Revolution and called for a strengthening of the parliamentary system. In 1933, Kamil Chadirchi, a young liberal lawyer from an aristocratic family in Baghdad, joined the group. Chadirchi was a member of the opposition group who in the 1920s became disenchanted with the Ikha al-Watani Party headed by Yasin al-Hashimi. In 1934, the Ahali Group adopted a more socialist agenda. They called their new emphasis "*Shaʿbiyya*" (populism) to avoid the misunderstanding surrounding the word *Ishtirakiyya* (socialism). *Shaʿbiyya,* a doctrine that seeks welfare for all people regardless of gender, class, race, or religion, stresses the importance of human rights, equal opportunity, and freedom from tyranny. It emphasizes the state as provider of health care and education for its people, and recognizes the importance of religion, family, and the parliamentary system.

In 1933 the Ahali Group established the Baghdad Club and the Campaign Against Illiteracy Association. Both organizations had cultural objectives but were designed to broaden popular support for the Ahali Group. In 1934, under the leadership of Chadirchi, the group was able to influence and recruit Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman to head the Campaign Against Illiteracy Association and later to join the Ahali Group. Al-Timman was formerly the leader of the national al-Watani Party. He was a well-respected national figure in Iraq and a believer in democratic institutions. His accession to Ahali enhanced the status of the group. Moreover, Chadirchi was able to recruit Hikmat Sulayman, a former member of the Ikha Party who left because of disagreements with its leader.

In 1935 the Ikha came to power and inspired the Ahali Group to work more actively toward achieving power. At this juncture it was decided to de-emphasize the Shaʿbiyya ideas and adopt a broader program of liberal reform to gain wider support. Through Sulayman's influence the Ahali Group recruited a few army officers; chief among them was General Bakr Sidqi. Sulayman persuaded Sidqi to conduct a coup against the Ikha government. On 29 October 1936 the coup was successfully executed, the first in the modern history of Iraq and in the Arab world. The Ahali Group was a reluctant participant. Abu al-Timman, Chadirchi, and Hadid opposed the idea, fearing it could lead to tyranny and military dictatorship. However, Sulayman's opinion prevailed. Ahali received the lion's share of cabinet positions in the new government and organized the Popular Reform Society to propagate the group's reform ideals. The group, however, soon discovered that the real power was in the hands of Sidqi and Sulayman. Even though Sulayman was a member of Ahali, he abandoned its ideas in favor of "politics as usual." Unable to push for reform, the Ahali ministers resigned from the government on 19 June 1937. The Popular Reform Society and al-Ahali ceased to exist. The members of the group were scattered, exiled, or imprisoned.

In the 1940s and 1950s, Ahali's members and supporters continued to play an active role in Iraq's national politics. In 1946 three influential members of the group—Chadirchi, Hadid, Jamil—formed the National Democratic Party, which advocated democracy and moderate socialism. It functioned both openly and secretly, taking an active part in opposition politics of the 1940s and 1950s. It participated in the uprisings against the government in 1948, 1952, and 1956, and supported the revolution of 1958. The party eventually split into two factions because of internal disagreement over the regime of Abd al-Karim Qasim. In the 1960s and 1970s, Ahali's influence faded as other ideologies and groups, such as the Baʿth party, replaced it in the political spot-light.

See also Abu al-Timman, Jaʿfar; Baʿth, al-; Hashimi, Yasin al-; Ikha al-Watani Party; National Democratic Party (Iraq); Sidqi, Bakr.

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AYAD AL-QAZZAZ
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AHARDANE, MAJOUB

[1921–]

Moroccan political leader.

Born into a Middle Atlas Berber family, Majoub Ahardane served in the French army during World War II and then supported Moroccan nationalism. After independence in 1956, he led the effort to form the primarily Berber-based Popular Movement (Mouvement Populaire; MP) in 1957, which was recognized in 1959. As secretary-general of the MP (1962–1986), Ahardane remained closely tied to the throne, serving King Hassan II as minister of defense twice (1961–1964 and 1966–1967) and in other cabinet posts during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1991, after being ousted from the MP, he founded the Mouvement National Populaire, serving as its secretary general since that year.

See also BERBER; MOUVEMENT POPULAIRE (MP).

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AHD, AL-

A secret Arab nationalist society composed of Iraqi and Syrian officers in the Ottoman army in 1913.

Al-Ahd (literally, The Covenant) was headed by Aziz Ali al-Masri, an Egyptian officer. There is very little information on the society and how it was formed; it is significant, however, that it was formed after the Ottoman Empire lost Tripolitania to Italy (1911–1912) and was defeated in the first Balkan Wars (1912–1913). Apparently, member Arab officers were fearful that the Arab Ottoman Asiatic provinces were about to face a destiny similar to that of Tripolitania or the Balkans. The Arab officers may have had some grievances also against the ruling government of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP). While al-Ahd called for Arab autonomy within a federated Ottoman state, it also spoke of Arab–Turkish cooperation to defend the East from the West and insisted on keeping the Islamic caliphate (religious leadership) under Ottoman control.

The most prominent members of al-Ahd were: Taha al-Hashimi, Yasin al-Hashimi, Nuri al-Saʿid, Mawlud Mukhlis, Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Jamil Madfaʿi, Abdallah al-Dulimi, Tahsin Ali, Muhammad Hilmi, Ali Rida al-Ghazali, Muwafaq Kamil, Abd al-Ghafur al-Badri (Iraqis); Salim al-Jazairi, Awni Qadamani, Muhammad Bek Ismail, Mustafa Wasfi, Yahya Kazim Abu al-Khair, Muhi al-Din al-Jabban, Ali al-Nashashibi, and Amin Lufti al-Hafiz (Syrians).

According to some sources, the society had some local branches. The Mosul branch in northern Iraq was said to have been led by Yasin al-Hashimi and included Mawlud Mukhlis, Ali Jawdat, Abd al-Rahman Sharaf, Abdullah al-Dulymi, Sharif al-Faruqi, Majid Hassun (Iraqis), and Tawfiq al-Mahmud, Hassan Fahmi, Sadiq al-Jundi, and Mukhtar al-Tarabulsi (Syrians).

See also AYYUBI, ALI JAWDAT AL-; COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS; HASHIMI, TAHA AL-; HASHIMI, YASIN AL-.

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MAHMOUD HADDAD

AHDUT HA-AVODAH

An Israeli socialist party founded in 1919 by veterans of the Jewish Legion and other Palestine pioneers.

With strong support in the Kibbutz ha-Me'uhad movement, Ahdut ha-Avodah (also Achdut Ha'-Avodah; The Unity of Labor) worked for the unification of Jewish labor movements and the development of new forms of settlement and labor

units. It rejected Marxist doctrines of class warfare in favor of social democracy. In 1930, it joined with others in founding the MAPAI party. Becoming independent from that party in 1944, Ahdut ha-Avodah joined with ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir, a Zionist socialist youth movement, to found the more radical left-wing MAPAM in 1948. It split with MAPAM in 1954, formed an alignment with MAPAI in 1965, and in 1968 merged again with MAPAI and the Rafi Party to form the Israeli Labor Party. Among those closely associated with it were David Ben-Gurion, Yizhak Ben-Zvi, Yitzhak Tabenkin, Moshe David Remez, and Berl Katznelson.

See also Ben-Gurion, David; Ben-Zvi, Yizhak; Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzaʿir; Israel: Political Parties in; Katznelson, Berl.

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Walter F. Weiker

AHL-E HAQQ

A heterodox sect of Shiʿite Islam based in Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan.

Ahl-e Haqq (followers of truth) is an esoteric sect of around one million members, found primarily among the Kurds of Iran and Iraq; they are closely related to the Alevi and Bektashi of Turkey, and the Alawi and Nusayris of Syria. Popularly known as Alielahi (deifiers of Ali), the Ahl-e Haqq call their faith Din-e yari (religion of God) and themselves Yaresan (in Iran) or Kakaʾi (in Iraq). The sect dates from the fourteenth or fifteenth century C.E., a time of extreme proliferation of Sufi and Shiʿite religio-political groups in the Irano-Turkic world, which culminated in the establishment of the Safavi dynasty in Iran in 1501, with Shiʿism becoming the official religion.

Regarded as heretics by their Shiʿite and Sunni neighbors, the Ahl-e Haqq adopted a strict code of secrecy. They came to define their faith as a *sirr* (mystery), to be guarded from the outside world at any cost. The mystery was transmitted orally, in Gurani and other Kurdish languages, in the form of poetry known as *kalam,* which forms the sect's sacred narrative. Two cardinal dogmas are belief in transmigration of souls and belief in manifestations of the divine essence in human form. There have been seven manifestations and in each the divine essence was accompanied by seven angels. Ali (the first Shiʿite imam) was the second manifestation; his position is overshadowed by the fourth, Sultan Sohak, the founder of the sect. The Ahl-e Haqq neither observe Muslim rites, such as daily prayers and fasting during the month of Ramadan, nor share Islamic theology and sacred space. Instead, they have their own sacred universe and their own rituals, centered on the *jam* (assembly), when they chant their *kalam,* play the sacred lute *(tanbur),* make offerings *(niyaz),* and share a sacrificial meal *(qorbani).* A primary feature of their religious organization is the division into two broad strata: *seyyeds* and commoners. *Seyyeds* are eleven holy families *(khandan),* descended from Sultan Sohak or one of the later manifestations. Each *khandan* is headed by a certain *seyyed* referred to as *pir,* who supervises the religious welfare of the commoners initiated into his following.

See also Alawi; Alevi; Bektashis; Kurdistan; Kurds; Shiʿism; Sunni Islam.

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Ziba Mir-Hosseini

AHMAD AL-JAZZAR

[1735–1804]

Mamluk governor of Acre, Syria, and Lebanon; known as the Butcher (Arabic, al-Jazzar) for his harshness.

Bosnian by birth, Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar started his military and political career as part of a Mamluk

household in Egypt. In 1768, he went to Syria and was appointed governor of Sidon (Lebanon) in 1775. Ahmad Pasha ruled southeastern Syria and Lebanon at a time when local forces posed serious threats to the Ottoman government. Although nominally subservient to the Ottoman Empire, Ahmad al-Jazzar, like Zahir al-Umar in Galilee, the Azm family of Damascus, the Chehab family of Mount Lebanon, and the Mamluks of Egypt, virtually ruled his territory independently.

Ahmad Pasha made concerted efforts to weaken the control of the Chehabs of Mount Lebanon and, by the end of his tenure, he had reduced them to subservience. Ahmad al-Jazzar's control over Lebanon interrupted economic ties between Beirut and Western Europe for a quarter century. He was appointed governor of Damascus in 1785, though Acre (in today's Israel) always remained the base of his power. With British help, he repulsed Napoléon Bonaparte, who invaded Palestine in 1799.

See also CHEHAB FAMILY; MAMLUKS.

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STEVE TAMARI

AHMAD BEY HUSAYN

[1806–1855]

Bey, 1837–1855, who attempted to Westernize Tunisia and detach it from the Ottoman Empire.

Ahmad Bey's mother was a Sardinian slave captured in a raid on San Pietro in 1798; his father was Mustafa ibn Mahmud (bey of Tunis, 1835–1837). Ahmad was the tenth bey of the Husaynid dynasty. Ahmad Bey received a traditional education, learning the Qurʾan by heart. Besides studying the traditional Qurʾanic sciences and Turkish, Ahmad learned European history and geography. The latter knowledge influenced his efforts to modernize Tunisian society and turned his foreign policy orientation away from the Ottoman Empire and closer to Europe.

Ahmad Bey's upbringing introduced him to palace intrigues and political disputations. A month before his ascension to power, he participated in the execution of a prominent Mamluk official, Shakir Sahib al-Tabi, keeper of the seal. He had been the most powerful official in the bey's court. When Ahmad Bey assumed the throne in October 1837, he quickly consolidated his authority and built his own patron-client political machine. To do so, he appointed his own clique of friends, mamluks, and clients to key positions.

Ahmad had two primary goals: to maintain Tunisia's relative independence vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire and France's colonial regime in Algeria, and to strengthen Tunisia's internal political order. To accomplish the first, he avoided implementing the Ottoman Tanzimat reform program that had begun in 1837. He also sought international legitimacy through recognition by nations of Europe (especially France). To placate the Ottomans, he continued to send the obligatory annual gift in exchange for the *firman* (decree) of investiture while avoiding implementation of the Tanzimat by pleading Tunisia's lack of resources to do so. Ahmad Bey maintained good relations with France, and continued to seek France's guarantees of Tunisian independence and to deny Ottoman claims of sovereignty. In the 1850s, he sent troops to the Crimea to show support for the Ottomans rather than to reject their sovereignty.

Ahmad Bey's goal of reforming the fabric of the state has been criticized for attempting too much and accomplishing too little. Inspiration for his reform efforts came from Napoléon's France, Muhammad Ali's Egypt, and the Tanzimat program. All of these taught him that military strength was paramount. Wedged between France's colonial regime in Algeria and a resurgent Ottoman Empire in Libya, Ahmad saw modernizing the military as one way to maintain Tunisia's territorial integrity against the aspirations of its powerful neighbors.

In 1831, Husayn Bey had begun reforming the military by inviting Europeans to train a *nizami* corps of infantry based on the latest European and Ottoman models. The term *nizami* was borrowed from the Ottoman designation *nizam-i cedit* (new order), applied by Sultan Mahmud II to Ottoman military modernization efforts. The Tunisian *nizamis* wore

European uniforms and Tunisian *shashiyas* (small red hats with tassels).

Mustafa Bey accelerated the expansion of the *nizami* corps by developing a conscription system. An informal system of recruiting troops (in exchange for returning an earlier batch to the same area as reserves) was developed in order to minimize friction between recruiters and the local populace. To avoid antagonizing the Turkish military elite, the bey maintained Turkish-Mamluk domination of the upper ranks. The army thus remained top-heavy in inefficient higher-rank officers who were traditional in outlook and ill-suited to the disciplinary codes of modern armies. The lower ranks and noncommissioned officers were reasonably motivated but poorly led. As a result, the reforms largely failed to produce the desired results.

From a small contingent of about 1,800 men at the beginning of his reign, by 1850 Ahmad Bey had expanded the *nizami* forces to between 26,000 and 36,000, with 16,000 actually in service at any one time. Seven regiments of infantry, two of artillery, and a partial one of cavalry comprised the corps. In the last two years of his reign, financial constraints forced Ahmad Bey to drastically reduce the size of the military.

A critical step in Ahmad Bey's military reform efforts was the establishment in 1840 of a military academy *(maktab harbi)* adjacent to the Bey's Palace at Bardo (a suburb of Tunis), to train young Mamluks, Turks, and sons of prestigious Arab families in the military arts. The school prepared an elite cadre of graduates who later led reform efforts in the 1870s, during the administration of Prime Minister Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi (1873–1877). It set the precedent for Sadiqi College (established in 1875), which trained Tunisians in modern subjects. Its graduates were members of the Young Tunisians in the 1890s and early 1900s. Most Tunisian nationalists who formed the Destour and Neo-Destour political movements studied at Sadiqi, including independent Tunisia's first president, Habib Bourguiba.

Seeking to make Tunisia self-sufficient in military-related goods, Ahmad ordered the construction of a cannon foundry, a small arms factory, powder mills, tanneries, saddle/leather factories, a textile factory, and other industries. He imported European technicians to train Tunisian workers in modern manufacturing techniques. These efforts provided the Tunisian elite and some workers with a rudimentary understanding of European industrialization practices.

Between 1841 and 1846, Ahmad Bey abolished slavery, initiated with the closing of the slave market in Tunis (the Suq al-Birka) and culminating with the January 1846 decree officially abolishing slavery in Tunisia. At al-Muhammadiya, about ten miles southwest of Tunis, he built a magnificent governmental complex, which he intended to serve as Tunisia's Versailles. Europeans designed and furnished this complex with the latest European gadgets.

The last five years of Ahmad's reign were a period of financial chaos, declining agricultural production, his poor health, and overall ruin of his accomplishments. His need for money to finance his military reforms led him to depend on a ruthless tax farmer, Mahmud ibn Ayad. Ahmad Bey tolerated the financial oppression of his subjects so long as ibn Ayad increased the state revenues. The decline of those state revenues between 1849 and 1852 culminated in the flight of ibn Ayad to Paris and his subsequent attempts to sue Tunisia's government. Khayr al-Din arbitrated the matter in Paris, but recovered none of the funds ibn Ayad had taken.

In July 1852, Ahmad Bey suffered a stroke, which impaired his ability to rule. In 1853, he was forced to disband his army due to financial problems. Ahmad Bey died in May 1855, at age forty-eight. He had sought to modernize a backward and traditional state and society through emphasis on military reforms. He established positive precedents in the Bardo military academy and the conscription of native Tunisians, and negative ones in the lack of accountability of his leading ministers and in his own financial irresponsibility.

See also Bourguiba, Habib; Khayr al-Din; Mahmud II; Mamluks; Sadiqi College; Tanzimat; Young Tunisians.

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LARRY A. BARRIE

AHMAD BEY OF CONSTANTINE

[c. 1784–1850]

Commander of the province of Constantine in eastern Algeria, 1826–1837.

When the French conquered Algiers in 1830, ending Ottoman rule, al-Hajj Ahmad assumed direct authority in the name of the sultan. The latter, however, was unable to provide support, and after an initial victory over the French (1836), Ahmad was forced to abandon Constantine (1837) and eventually to surrender (1848). Nationalists today consider him, together with Abd al-Qadir, one of the heroes of resistance.

PETER VON SIVERS

AHMAD DURRANI

[c. 1722–1772]

Ruler of Afghanistan; founder of the Durrani dynasty.

Ahmad Durrani was elected ruler by an assembly of Pakhtun elders in Kandahar in 1747, at a time when the Moghul empire in India was disintegrating and the recent Afshar dynasty in Persia was collapsing. He united the Pakhtun (Pushtun) clans and led them to create an empire that went from Meshed to Punjab. This Durrani empire did not outlast him by long, but Afghanistan did become a polity with Pakhtuns playing the dominant role in the country's politics.

Born in Herat around 1722, Ahmad belonged to the Saddozai lineage of the Abdali clan. His ancestors had led the clan since 1588. In 1717, the Abdalis proclaimed Herat an independent state but were defeated by Nadir Afshar in 1732 and relocated in Khorasan (in Persia). Then in 1736, they were permitted to go to Kandahar. That year Nadir became king of Persia and Ahmad joined Nadir's army, rising to prominence. When Nadir was assassinated in 1747, the Abdali contingent serving in his army returned to Kandahar. In a *loya jirga* (grand assembly) of clan elders, it was decided to create a Pakhtun kingdom, and Ahmad was elected leader.

Ahmad spent most of his reign campaigning in India and Persia (Iran). His most memorable encounter took place in the field of Panipat, near Delhi, on 14 January 1761, when he destroyed a Mahratta army and briefly became the master of Northern India. The Pakhtuns were unable to consolidate their hold, but the destruction of Mahratta power paved the way for the conquest of India by the British. Booty and revenue from the provinces of Punjab, Kashmir, and Sind provided the riches to consolidate Ahmad's rule at home and to keep content the Pakhtun, Baluchi, Uzbek, and Kizilbash clans that constituted his army. As his reign drew to a close, Sikh resistance in the Punjab made campaigning in India less and less profitable.

By then, an Afghan polity was already in place. To incorporate the various clans within the structure of the state, Ahmad systematically assigned to each clan a khan (leader) who was allowed to farm taxes *(iltizam)* in the newly conquered territories or was granted a regular stipend. Ahmad's own clansmen were given even more privileges—the khans among them controlled most key positions in the state, while the rest were exempted from taxation and paid salaries during their campaigns in India. Investing their newly found wealth in land, they became the dominant power in southern Afghanistan and acquired land elsewhere. To reflect their enhanced status, Ahmad changed their name from Abdali to Durrani (Persian, *dur,* or pearl).

A poet and a patron of Sufis (Muslim mystics and scholars of Islam), Ahmad justified his campaigns in India in Islamic terms. During his reign, Sunni Islam flourished in Afghanistan; mosques, shrines and Islamic schools enjoyed the financial support of the state. He died in the mountains east of Kandahar, and his son Timur Shah succeeded him (1772–1793).

See also HERAT; KANDAHAR; PUSHTUN; SUNNI ISLAM.

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Ashraf Ghani

AHMAD HIBAT ALLAH

[c. 1870–c. 1920]

Moroccan resistance leader against the French, 1912–1920.

Ahmad Hibat Allah (also known as El Hiba) was the son of the noted scholar of Islam and patriot Ma al-Aynayn. He led an important millenarian movement in the Sous valley, which was able to capture Marrakech in August 1912, following the abdication of Abd al-Hafid as sultan. After his defeat in September 1912, he withdrew into southern Morocco and established his headquarters at Tiznit.

During World War I, Hibat Allah was a major beneficiary of a pan-Islamic Turco–German effort to support Moroccan resistance from Spain. Together with his brother Murabbih Rabbuh, who succeeded him upon his death about 1920, he sought with little success to organize attacks on the French positions in the Sous valley.

See also Abd al-Hafid ibn al-Hassan; Ma al-Aynayn.

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Edmund Burke III

AHMAD IBN MUHAMMAD AL-RAYSUNI

[?–1926]

Political figure in Morocco from 1900 until his death in 1926.

A descendant of the Sharifian lineage of Bani Arus and a charismatic personality, Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Raysuni (also called al-Raysuli or El Raisuni) parlayed his position as a rural power broker in Morocco and leader of local anti-European feelings to rise to prominence in the period 1903–1906. By organizing a series of political kidnappings, the most celebrated of which was of the American Ian Perdicaris, he helped to undermine the regime of Sultan Abd al-Aziz.

Following the establishment of the protectorates of France and Spain in 1912, al-Raysuni became an official in the Spanish protectorate. Following the rebellion of Abd al-Karim against the Spanish authorities (1921), al-Raysuni came briefly to prominence again by playing off the two sides and enhancing his own position. In this, his career resembles those of other Moroccan regional figures of the period.

See also Khattabi, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-; Morocco; Sharifian Dynasties.

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Edmund Burke III

AHMAD IBN YAHYA HAMID AL-DIN

[1891–1962]

The second of the three Hamid al-Din imams to govern Yemen after independence in 1918, from 15 March 1948 to 18 September 1962.

During his father's tenure as imam, from 1904 to 1948, and as king of Yemen, from 1918 to 1948, Ahmad ibn Yahya Hamid al-Din was apprentice to and an important supporter of his father. Ahmad was also the governor of Taʿiz province, Yemen's primary military commander, and the designated successor to his father as both imam and king.

After Imam Yahya's assassination in 1948, and the effort at major reforms, Ahmad organized important tribal elements to overthrow the usurpers and became imam and king. Although he had earlier established some tenuous links with reform elements, he introduced very few changes to the autocratic and highly centralized system established by his father. By the early 1960s, the extent of op-

position to his rule had resulted in numerous revolts and assassination attempts, even by some of the tribal elements that had earlier supported him. He died in September 1962, and was succeeded by his son Muhammad al-Badr who, however, was deposed one week later in the revolution that turned Yemen into a republic.

See also Badr, Muhammad al-; Yahya ibn Muhammad Hamid al-Din.

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Manfred W. Wenner

AHMAD, MUHAMMAD

[c. 1840–1885]

Islamic politico-religious leader, called al-Mahdi, known as the father of Sudanese nationalism.

Born Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abdullah, Muhammad Ahmad was the son of a boat builder on Labab island, in the Nile, south of Dongola, Sudan. His father claimed descent from the family of the Prophet. The family moved to Karari, north of Omdurman, and then Khartoum, while Muhammad Ahmad was a child. He was enrolled in Qurʾanic schools and then pursued advanced studies under Shaykh Muhammad al-Dikar in Barbara and then under Shaykh al-Quashi wad al-Zayn in the Sammaniyya *tariqah* (religious order) school in Khartoum. An ascetic person, who sought a puritanic, meditative lifestyle, he broke with his religious teacher in 1881, soon after he moved to Aba island in the White Nile.

In June 1881, he dispatched letters to religious leaders throughout the Sudan, informing them that he was the "expected Mahdi," the divine leader chosen by God to fill the earth with justice and equity at the end of time. After emissaries from the Turko–Egyptian government tried to dissuade him, an armed force was dispatched to capture him and his small band of followers. His three hundred adherents, armed only with swords and spears, defeated the expedition on Aba island, 12 August 1881. Following that seemingly miraculous victory, the Mahdi led his followers to Qadir mountain in the region of Kurdufan. Their migration imitated the prophet Muhammad's *hijra* (holy flight) from Mecca to Medina. The move to Kurdufan also enabled him to recruit adherents from the Nuba and *baqqara* (cattle-herding Arab) tribes of the west, who had long defied the control of the central government. The Ansar (helpers or followers) defeated government expeditions in December 1881, June 1882, and November 1883.

By then, the Mahdi had flooded the country with letters that explained the politico-religious significance of his mission: his task was to reverse the socioreligious abuses of the Turko–Egyptian regime, which had departed from God's path, and to revive the simple and just practices of early Islam. Since his mission was divinely ordained, those who opposed him were termed infidels. Efforts by the government and established clergy to denounce him as an imposter had diminishing effect, as growing numbers of tribes and religious leaders rallied to his banner. By the time that the Mahdi besieged Khartoum in late 1884, some 100,000 Ansar were camped outside. The Mahdi captured Khartoum on 26 January 1885 and established his capital across the White Nile at Omdurman. Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi died of a sudden illness on 22 June 1885 and was succeeded by his principal *baqqara* follower, Abdullahi ibn Muhammad, who converted Mahdi's religious state into a military dictatorship and ruled until the Anglo–Egyptian conquest in 1898. Under the leadership of his son Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the Mahdi's followers formed a brotherhood to continue his teachings.

Sudanese nationalists later viewed the Mahdi as "the father of independence," who united the tribes, drove out the foreign rulers, and founded the Sudanese nation-state; he saw himself, rather, as "a renewer of the Muslim Faith, come to purge Islam of faults and accretions" (Holt and Daly, p. 87). Moreover, as the successor to the prophet, he was restoring the community of the faithful: That belief justified his political role. Finally, his belief that he was the "expected Mahdi" emphasized the ecstatic dimension and the idea that his coming foretold the end of time. The combining of those elements—political, religious, and social—produced a powerful, popularly based movement that swept away the decaying Turko–Egyptian regime. The Mahdi's death, immediately after gaining control over almost

all of northern Sudan, made it impossible to assess whether he had the ability to craft an Islamic polity on the basis of his charismatic authority.

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ANN M. LESCH

AHMAD QAJAR

[1869–1929]

Sixth and last monarch of Persia's Qajar dynasty.

Ahmad Qajar was the son of Mohammad Ali Shah and Malekeh Jahan (daughter of Kamran Mirza, a son of Naser al-Din Shah, the fourth Qajar monarch). Ahmad Shah (also called Soltan Ahmad Shah) ascended to the throne at age eleven, when his father was deposed in 1909. Care was taken with his education; besides the traditional studies, he had a French professor who taught him political science and administrative law. A regent was appointed until he reached his majority, and the second *majles* (assembly) was called by him.

Ahmad Shah's reign coincided with a change in rivalry between Britain and Russia. The Convention of 1907 had divided Persia into three zones: Russia in the north, Britain in the southeast, and a neutral zone. The old rivalry between Russia and Britain, which had guaranteed Persia's independence, became an alliance that threatened to control. Russia issued an ultimatum that they would occupy Tehran unless Persia dismissed Morgan Shuster, an American financier, employed with the approval of the *majles* to reform Persia's financial administration. This was done and the regent closed the *majles* for three years, until Ahmad Shah came of age in 1914 and had to take his oath of office in the *majles* before he could be crowned. The coronation actually preceded the opening, on the eve of World War I.

At the outbreak of war, Persia declared neutrality, but the belligerents disregarded it and soon turned the country into a battleground. Nationalists and the *majles* favored the Germans and Turks—who opposed Persia's traditional enemies, Britain and Russia. When the Russians threatened to advance on Tehran, Ahmad Shah was persuaded that were he to go he would forfeit his throne.

Until the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Allies controlled Persia, with financial aid and military occupation. The Russian Revolution left the British in sole control. They tried to take advantage of the new situation by negotiating a treaty to keep financial and military control—and Ahmad Shah signed it, reluctantly, since it was opposed by the nationalists, who eventually defeated it.

A succession of weak governments, civil war, and communist infiltration from the newly formed Soviet Union caused a coup d'état in 1921, partly planned and inspired by the British occupying forces, which were soon to evacuate the country. The coup was carried out by Reza Khan, commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade, and a pro-British journalist, Sayyid Ziya al-Din. Overcome by the turn of events, Ahmad Shah installed them in power—Sayyid Ziya as prime minister and Reza as minister of war. Reza ousted Sayyid Ziya and became prime minister, controlling the new army he had formed. His modernization policy also won him the support of the young nationalists.

In 1923, Ahmad Shah left Iran, appointing his brother to be in charge. A movement to establish a republic with Reza as president was defeated, especially by the *ulama* (body of mullahs), who feared secularization, as was established in Turkey. In 1925, the Qajar dynasty was deposed by the fifth *majles,* which voted to give the monarchy to the Pahlavi dynasty, with Reza Khan becoming Reza Shah Pahlavi, the founder. Ahmad Shah has been maligned by the historians of the Pahlavi era, shown as weak and vacillating; recent historians have emphasized his democratic nature, his wish to reign and not to rule. He lived and died in exile and was buried in Karbala, a holy Shiʿite city in southern Iraq.

See also NASER AL-DIN SHAH; PAHLAVI, REZA; QAJAR DYNASTY; SHUSTER, W. MORGAN.

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MANSOUREH ETTEHADIEH

AHMAD SHAH MASʿUD
[1953–2001]

Afghan resistance leader.

Ahmad Shah Masʿud was a well-known Afghan resistance fighter and political figure. Born in the Panjshir valley in 1953, Masʿud joined the Afghan Islamic group Jamiʿat-e Islami Afghanistan (the Islamic Society of Afghanistan) in 1973, as a student at the Kabul Polytechnic Institute for Engineering and Architecture. With the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, Masʿud retreated to the Panjshir Valley, where he led a guerrilla war first against the Soviet-supported government and later against the Taliban government. As an ethnic Tajik and one of the few non-Pushtun commanders in the resistance movement, he gained a large following in the northern areas of Afghanistan. He also attracted an international reputation and was sometimes referred to as the Lion of the Panjshir, or as Afghanistan's Che Guevara. When the Islamic resistance fighters captured Kabul in 1992, Masʿud became defense minister under the Burhanuddin Rabbani government.

In 1996, he was forced to flee Kabul in the face of the advancing Taliban forces. Retreating to the north part of Afghanistan, he formed the Northern Alliance, also called the United Front, which continued its guerilla war against the Taliban. The Northern Alliance recaptured Kabul in November 2001. However, Masʿud did not live to see the recapture of Kabul. He was assassinated on 9 September 2001 at his headquarters in northern Afghanistan. Because of the timing of his murder and the way in which it occurred, it is thought to be linked to the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center in New York City.

See also JAMIʿAT-E ISLAMI; PUSHTUN; RABBANI, BURHANUDDIN; TALIBAN.

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BARNETT R. RUBIN
UPDATED BY GRANT FARR

AHMAR, ABDULLAH IBN HUSAYN, AL-
[1919–]

Yemeni politician and leader of the Hashid, one of the two most powerful tribes in North Yemen.

Abdullah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar's father, Shaykh Husayn al-Ahmar, was executed by Imam Ahmad ibn Yahya; as a result, during the Yemen Civil War Abdullah al-Ahmar sided with the republicans against the royalists and was appointed governor of Hajja, but he refused to join the Egyptian-backed government of Abdullah al-Sallal. After Egypt withdrew from Yemen, he helped topple the Sallal government and his tribes provided crucial support to the new regime of Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani against the royalists.

In 1970, the civil war ended with the abolition of the monarchy and al-Ahmar became the chairman of the new Consultative Council. When Colonel Ibrahim al-Hamdi seized power in 1974, he tried to limit the representation of the tribal leaders, which led to an open rebellion by the Hashid tribes. After the assassination of Hamdi in 1977, Saudi Arabia helped bring about a reconciliation between the tribes and the new government in

1978, first under Ahmad Husayn Ghashmi and then under Ali Abdullah al-Salih. Al-Ahmar was appointed to the Constituent People's Assembly. Although he opposed the government of South Yemen, he supported the 1990 unification of North and South Yemen and formed the Islah Party, which represents tribal as well as Islamic interests. The Islah Party won 62 seats out of 301 in the parliamentary elections of 1993, in which it ran in coalition with President Salih's People General Congress (PCG). In 1997, the party won 56 seats and al-Ahmar was elected speaker of parliament. Though his party won only 45 seats in the 2003 elections and is no longer in coalition with the PGC (which won a majority of 225 seats), al-Ahmar was re-elected speaker of parliament.

See also Bakil Tribal Confederation; Hamdi, Ibrahim al-; Iryani, Abd al-Rahman al-; Islah Party; Salih, Ali Abdullah; Sallal, Abdullah al; Yemen Civil War.

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Maysam J. al Faruqi

AHMET İHSAN TO'KGOZ

[1868–1942]

Ottoman Turkish publisher.

Ahmet İhsan To'kgoz was born in Erzurum, where his father was a civil servant, and graduated from the Mülkiye civil service school in Istanbul, where he studied literature with Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem. Upon graduation, he began to work as a French translator in the foreign ministry and to publish a journal, *Ümran* (Prosperity). In 1891, he began to publish the journal *Servet-i Fünun* (The wealth of sciences), which was the main medium for the literary movement known as the new literature. Disputes between Ahmet İhsan To'kgoz and his editor, Tevfik Fikret, hastened the downfall of *Servet-i Fünun,* which was ordered closed in 1897. Ahmet İhsan To'kgoz joined the Committee for Union and Progress in 1907, and, following the revolution, began to publish *Servet-i Fünun* as a daily political paper. Tiring of politics, he turned it into a weekly literary digest, the organ of the Fecr-i Ati literary movement. In 1931, he became a member of parliament representing Ordu.

See also Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem; Tevfik Fikret.

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David Waldner

AHMET İZZET

[1864–1937]

Ottoman general and grand vizier.

Ahmet İzzet rose to prominence in 1893 as an influential second scribe of Abdülhamit II. After the 1908 revolution, he became chief of general staff under the Young Turks and commander of the Caucasus front during World War I. During his brief tenure as grand vizier (October–November 1918), he negotiated the Mudros Armistice with the British, formally ending Ottoman participation in World War I. He closed his career as minister of war in the early years of the Turkish Republic.

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Elizabeth Thompson

AHMET RASIM

[1864?–1932]

Turkish journalist and short-story writer.

Born in Istanbul during the Ottoman Empire, Rasim grew up in poverty after his father, a Cypriot postal official, divorced his mother. Forced to at-

tend school at an orphanage, he graduated at the head of his class. After a short period as a postal worker, he began to work as a journalist; for the next forty-eight years, he wrote in the major Istanbul newspapers. He was also an elected member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly from 1927 to 1932 in Atatürk's new Republic of Turkey.

Rasim's writings are characterized by his incorporation of the folklore and anecdotes of daily life in Istanbul. Using sparse language, he captured the vitality of the different neighborhoods of the city, making him an important source of information about the daily existence of Old Turkey. Rasim's contributions to Turkish literature also include memoirs, travelogues, historical accounts, and articles on various subjects.

See also ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL.

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DAVID WALDNER

AHMET RIZA
[1859–1930]

Young Turk leader and educator.

Born in Istanbul to an Austrian mother and to a father who was an Anglophile Ottoman bureaucrat, Ahmet Riza grew up among the wealthy elite. He attended the prestigious Galatasaray Lycée in Istanbul and studied agriculture in France. As an idealistic young man, he sought to improve the condition of the Ottoman peasantry, first at the Ministry of Agriculture, then at the Ministry of Education, where he served as the director of education in the city of Bursa.

At the age of thirty, Ahmet Riza returned to France, where he became an early leader of the Young Turks. In 1894 he published a series of tracts demanding a constitutional regime in the Ottoman Empire based on Islamic and Ottoman traditions of consultation. In 1895, he began publishing a bimonthly newspaper, *Meşveret,* which soon became a locus of the exile Young Turk movement. The newspaper was also smuggled into the empire and circulated among liberal intellectuals there. Ahmet Riza's chief rival was the more radical Prince Sabahettin, who founded a separate Young Turk group and newspaper in Paris. Ahmet Riza opposed the prince's calls for revolution and European intervention in the empire at the 1902 Congress of Ottoman Liberals in Paris. At the Second Young Turk Congress in 1907, Ahmet Riza at first reluctantly endorsed the use of violence to depose the sultan, but later reversed his position.

Ahmet Riza returned to Istanbul after the 1908 revolution and headed the Unionist Party, which was backed by the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) and which opposed Prince Sabahettin's Ottoman Liberal Union Party and Islamist groups. The Unionists were successful in the elections, and Ahmet Riza became president of the Chamber of Deputies. In April 1909, however, leaders of a mass demonstration at the Sultan Ahmet mosque organized by the Society of Islamic Unity called for Ahmet Riza's resignation and for his replacement by a "true Muslim." Two deputies were killed, apparently mistaken for Ahmet Riza, when the crowd entered the Parliament buildings. Ahmet Riza was deposed, and Isma'il Kemal was elected the new president of the Chamber in the ensuing reorganization of government.

Ahmet Riza remained loyal to CUP during his years in government. But, in 1919 he founded a new party, the National Unity Party, and allied himself with Sultan Vahidettin against the Kemalists. He spent the years of the Independence War in Paris, then returned to Istanbul, where he was an instructor at the prestigious Dar al-Fonun school until his death.

Riza's contribution to the Young Turk movement went beyond his organizational abilities. As a follower of the French sociologist Auguste Comte, he first formulated the principles that would influence the development of secularist reform in Turkey. For example, the slogan heading his magazine *Meşveret,* "order and progress," was drawn from French positivist ideas and is probably linked to the simultaneous naming of an Istanbul opposition group, Union and Progress.

See also COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS; YOUNG TURKS.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

AHMET VEFIK

[1823–1891]

Ottoman administrator and scholar.

Like his father and grandfather, Ahmet Vefik entered government service and soon rose to positions of great importance during the Tanzimat period of the Ottoman Empire. He served twice as minister of education (1872 and 1877) and helped to reform the Ottoman educational system. In 1877, Sultan Abdülhamit II appointed him president of the first Ottoman parliament, and when it was dissolved less than a year later, Ahmet Vefik served as the sultan's grand vizier for several months in early 1878, as governor of Bursa (1878–1882), and briefly as grand vizier once more at the end of 1882.

In spite of his illustrious political career, Ahmet Vefik is better remembered for his work as a writer, translator, and educator. Having served as ambassador to France, he translated Molière into Turkish. He also edited the first modern dictionary of the Turkish language, published in 1876, and he compiled a history of the Ottoman Empire that became the standard text in the Ottoman *ruşdiye* (adolescence) schools.

See also TANZIMAT.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

AHRAM CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, AL-

A policy research institute founded in Cairo in 1968.

Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies is part of the publishing empire that Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal built up around the famous newspaper *al-Ahram.* It is showcased in a dazzling, steel and glass twelve-story building. The center's original name—Center for Zionist and Palestine Studies—is revealing. In the wake of Egypt's devastating defeat by Israel in the 1967 Arab–Israel War, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Haykal agreed that Egyptians could no longer afford to remain ignorant of Israeli social and political dynamics. As Nasser's closest journalist confidant, Haykal offered the center's researchers protection from outside interference. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the respected academic who later served as secretary-general of the United Nations, became general supervisor of the center, and a son-in-law of Nasser served as director.

The center's privileged young social scientists set to work to analyze as dispassionately as possible such topics as the reasons for Egypt's defeat, the sources of Israel's strengths, and the nature of U.S.–Israel relations. Soon after its founding the center adopted its current name, which reflected its branching out into far-ranging social, economic, and political analyses, probing possible options as Egypt moved from the era of Nasser to that of Anwar Sadat, and then Husni Mubarak. The center also invited foreign scholars to make scholarly presentations.

Haykal fell out with Sadat and was dismissed from al-Ahram in 1974, and Nasser's son-in-law lost his post. The center drifted briefly, having lost its facile access to the top political elite. Sayyid Yasin, from the National Institute for Criminological Research, gave the center new direction. With the help of such talented social scientists as Ali al-Din Hilal Dessouki and Saadeddin Ibrahim, Yasin directed the center's efforts toward the educated elite in Egypt and the Arab world. The center's scholars often were able to make limited yet pointed criticisms of regime policies that would not have been tolerated in the regular press or other political forums. In place of Sadat's effusions about the new era of Egyptian–Israeli and Egyptian–U.S. re-

lations, for example, the center's scholars offered hard-headed, detached analyses of Egyptian national interest.

See also Haykal, Muhammad Hasanayn.

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Donald Malcolm Reid

AHRAR, AL-

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

AHSAʿI, AHMAD AL-

[1753–1826]

Innovative Shiʿite thinker.

Ahmad al-Ahsaʿi was born in 1753 in al-Hasa or al-Ahsa, then nominally an Arabian/Persian Gulf province of the Ottoman Empire with a largely Shiʿite population. Ahmad may well have been from an artisan family, since he knew metalworking and carpentry, but a series of visions of the Shiʿa imams led him to study the seminary subjects of Islam. Around 1792, he went to Iraq for higher studies, staying in Najaf and Karbala for four years, and afterward lived in Bahrain. From 1800 to 1806 he was based in Basra and journeyed in southern Iraq. From 1806 to 1814 he lived in Yazd, and from 1814 to 1824 in Kermanshah, although he continued to travel widely. He was in Karbala in 1825 and died in 1826 on his way to Medina.

His move to Persia (Iran) had come at the invitation of the shah and of Qajar princes who offered him patronage to adorn their cities. In 1808, Fath Ali Shah summoned Ahmad to Tehran and attempted to persuade him to stay in the capital, but the shaykh declined for fear that he would eventually come into conflict with the shah. Ahmad claimed authority not only as a trained jurisprudent *(mujtahid)* but also as the recipient of intuitive knowledge from the imams (the holy figures of Shiʿism); he emphasized the esoteric, gnostic heritage within Twelver Shiʿism, writing about letter/number symbolism (numerology) and other cabalistic subjects. He innovated in Shiʿite theology both in his doctrine of God's attributes and his positing of two sorts of body, the ethereal and the physical, allowing him to suggest that the resurrection would be of the ethereal type. He appears to have been influenced by the medieval Iranian illuminationist Suhravardi and wrote original commentaries on the metaphysical works of such Safavid thinkers as Mulla Sadra Shirazi and Mulla Muhsin Fayz, criticizing their monistic tendencies but accepting many of their other premises and technical terms. Only very late in life, from 1823, was Ahmad denounced by some of his colleagues as heterodox, and this appears to have been a minority position in his lifetime. His followers coalesced in the Shaykhi school, which for a time contended with the scholastic Usuli school for dominance of Twelver Shiʿism in the nineteenth century.

See also Shaykhi; Shiʿism; Usuli.

Juan R. I. Cole

AHVAZ

Capital of the province of Khuzistan in southwestern Iran.

Located on the Karun River, Ahvaz developed as a flourishing pre-Islamic city, and it became the capital of the province of Khuzistan in the late tenth century. Its silk textile and sugar production were very important. Ahvaz declined after the Mongol invasions. By the nineteenth century it had dwindled to a small town. But the opening of the Karun River in 1888 to international navigation, the beginning of oil exploration in 1908 at nearby Masjed Suleyman, and the construction of the Trans-Iranian railroad, which reached Ahvaz in 1929, all stimulated the growth of the city. By the 1950s the population of Ahvaz had reached more than 100,000. The primary causes of growth during this period were commerce and port activity. Beginning in the 1960s and continuing throughout and after the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), Ahvaz developed as a major industrial center. The population was 804,980 in the 1996 census.

See also Iran.

Parvaneh Pourshariati

AICHA, LALLA

[1930–]

Eldest sister of King Hassan II of Morocco.

Lalla Aicha was born in the royal palace of Rabat in 1930. Her father, King Muhammed V, gave her the same primary education as he gave his sons. In 1942, she was one of the first women in Morocco to pass the exam allowing access to secondary schools. In 1947, she delivered a speech in Tangiers on behalf of her father without wearing a veil. It was a major political event in Morocco, which was at this time a French Protectorate, marking the accession of Moroccan women to modernity. Her gesture was intended to encourage fathers to send their daughters to school, and some did so, although others were critical. When Morocco gained independence in 1956, real change of the legal status of women was not forthcoming. The Moroccan code of personal status, al-Moudawana, is considered restrictive.

As king, Lalla Aicha's brother, Hassan II, appointed her ambassador to the United Kingdom (1965–1969), Greece (1969–1970), and Italy (1970–1973). Since 1973, she has remained active in charities and in the Red Crescent Society.

See also HASSAN II; MOUDAWANA, AL-.

RABIA BEKKAR

AIN SHAMS UNIVERSITY

The second largest university in Egypt.

Ain Shams (or Ayn Shams) University was established in Cairo in 1950 under the name Ibrahim Pasha University. In the wake of the 1952 revolution it was renamed Heliopolis University for about a year, then changed to an Arabic equivalent—Ain Shams. The founders evoked the tradition of learning associated with the ancient temple of the sun god Ra-Horakhty (who was depicted as a hawk) in the city of On (Heliopolis to the Greeks). The colleges of arts, science, commerce, education, engineering, and agriculture evolved from pre-existing higher institutes scattered around Cairo; the college of medicine had been a branch of Fuad I (Cairo) University. After the revolution, the administration, which had been located in the Munira district, was moved to the Zaʿafaran palace on the main campus in Abbasiyya. The university differed from the older universities of Cairo and Alexandria in maintaining a separate college for women, which had evolved out of a teacher-training institute and became almost a mini-university in itself.

The university consists of thirteen faculties and seven institutes and research centers covering a broad spectrum of specializations including law, arts, commerce, medicine, engineering, language, and agriculture. In 2002 it had about 127,000 students and a teaching staff of 6,450.

The university library consists of the central library and the faculty libraries, which contain valuable manuscripts, maps, drawings, encyclopedias, and collections of books. Full medical care is provided for its undergraduate and graduate students. The university has a central residential campus with various branches in different quarters. The main body of male residences, ten buildings, is situated at Khalifa al-Mamun Street near the university, whereas the main body of female dormitories, eight buildings, is situated at the faculty of women, some distance away from the main campus.

Each faculty has a student union that consists of elected members. Unions cooperate with the student welfare offices of the faculties in taking care of all student activities.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

AIOC

See ANGLO–IRANIAN OIL COMPANY

AIPAC

See AMERICAN ISRAEL POLITICAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

AISHA: ARAB WOMEN'S FORUM

A network of progressive Arab women's organizations dedicated to promoting the rights of Arab women.

The Arab Women's Forum was founded by a group of Arab women's organizations in December 1992 in order to enhance collaboration and promote shared objectives. Members of the group include nongovernmental organizations from North Africa and the Levant. Objectives include the advancement of democratic principles, legal rights for Arab women, gender equality in all areas of society, and women's participation in the public sphere at the decision-making levels, as well as confronting all forms of discriminations against girls and women. It addresses such issues as violence against women, media portrayals of women, the promotion of human rights, and laws that discriminate against girls and women, and it works to educate women, especially on reproductive rights and on other health care and feminist concerns. It organizes panels, conferences, and presentations on these issues and on others that pertinent to women's lives. It also provides resources for research and awareness.

The forum also maintains a Web site, called NISAA (*women* in Arabic). This helps creates a network for Arab women and organizations, allowing them to make connections, exchange ideas, and share research and documentation on women's experiences. The Web site is maintained by the Women's Center, a legal aid and counseling center in Jerusalem, run by a Palestinian private organization. The forum relies heavily on the Internet to act as a central clearinghouse for ideas and research in its fight against injustices affecting women.

See also Gender: Gender and Education; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics.

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Mirna Lattouf

AIS (ISLAMIC SALVATION ARMY)

See Islamic Salvation Army (AIS)

AIT AHMED, HOCINE

[1926–]

Algerian revolutionary, opposition party, and Kabyle (Berber) leader.

Although his father served as a colonial magistrate *(caid,* or *qaʾid),* Hocine Ait Ahmed joined Messali Hadj's nationalist Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) and its successor, the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD). He headed the paramilitary Organisation Spéciale (OS) until accused of "Berberist" tendencies. He left Algeria in 1951 but became one of the cofounders of the revolutionary Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in 1954. During the War of Independence he led the FLN delegation to the Bandung Conference in April 1955. French colonial authorities skyjacked an Air Maroc flight carrying Ait Ahmed in October 1956 along with other chief FLN leaders, including Ahmed Ben Bella, Mohamed Boudiaf, and Mohamed Khider. Ait Ahmed spent the rest of the war in prison. After his release, he helped to draft the Tripoli Programme of June 1962.

Opposed to Ben Bella and his ally, Colonel Houari Boumédienne, Ait Ahmed organized the Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS) in 1963 and led the Kabyles in revolt against the government. He was captured but escaped from prison in 1966 and fled to exile in France and then Switzerland. He denounced the National Charter of 1976 as an undemocratic document. Ait Ahmed blamed Algerian special services for the murder in April 1987 of André-Ali Mecili, an activist of Kabyle descent. After the destabilizing October 1988 riots, he returned to Algeria in December 1989. The FFS was legalized as an opposition party. He actively campaigned in the national parliamentary elections of December 1991 to January 1992 and organized a huge rally in Algiers in support of democracy. Although he had reservations regarding the Islamist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), the expected winner of the elections, Ait Ahmed condemned the forced resignation of President Chadli Bendjedid and the cancellation of the elections by Haut Comité d'Etat in January 1992. In July 2002 he rebuked

General Khaled Nezzar, the chief architect of the overthrow of the government, calling the coup d'état "a catastrophe." Ait Ahmed supported the Sant Egidio Platform (national contract) of January 1995. The FFS has participated in national (1997) and local (2002) elections. Ait Ahmed was one of six presidential candidates who withdrew in protest over irregularities before the April 1999 presidential election. He reproached the government of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika after the killing of a Kabyle youth in police detention in April 2001 incited violent protest and severe suppression. Ait Ahmed is a fervent advocate of democracy, political pluralism, and human (especially Berber) rights. He authored *La Guerre et l'après guerre* (1964; The war and the aftermath) and *Mémoires d'un combattant* (1983; Memories of a combatant).

See also ALGERIA: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

AJMAN

Smallest of the seven emirates comprising the United Arab Emirates.

Ajman extends over a distance of 10 miles (about 100 square miles) between the emirates of Sharjah and Umm al-Qaywayn, and covers about 0.3 percent of the total area of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). The emirate is composed of three regions: the town of Ajman, which includes the commercial district; Masfut, an agricultural area in the southeastern mountainous portion of the emirate; and Manama in the eastern portion of the emirate. The population of Ajman was estimated to be 118,812 in 1995. The ruler of Ajman is Shaykh Humayd bin Rashid Al Nuʿaymi.

The Ajman economy has traditionally relied on fishing and trade. In recent years the general economic development trend in the U.A.E. has extended to Ajman as well. The emirate has attracted numerous commercial and industrial enterprises due to its proximity to the commercial centers of Dubai and Sharjah and its relatively low rents. Especially prominent additions to the economy are the Free Zone, Ajman City Centre shopping complex, and several resort hotels, including the Ajman Kempinski, which is a popular destination for European and U.A.E. resident tourists. Ajman also hosts educational institutions: the Gulf Medical College Ajman and the Ajman University College of Science and Technology.

Ajman is perhaps best known for its cultural attractions. The Ajman Museum, which opened in 1981, is set in an eighteenth-century fort. The Dhow Yard is one of the most active boatbuilding yards in the country. Al Muwayhat was discovered in 1986 and is a major archaeological site on the outskirts of the city of Ajman.

See also ABU DHABI.

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KAREN HUNT AHMED

AKBULUT, AHMET ZIYA

[1869–1938]

Ottoman Turkish painter.

Born in Istanbul, Ahmet Ziya Akbulut was graduated from the Ottoman Empire's military academy in 1877 and spent the next fifteen years painting in the art studio of the General Staff. A student of Hoca Ali Riza, Akbulut was known for his close attention to perspective, about which he wrote articles. He taught painting at the Fine Arts Academy and at the military school.

DAVID WALDNER

AKÇURA, YUSUF

[1876–1935]

Turkish nationalist and writer.

Born Yusuf Akçurin in the Russian city of Simbirsk (Ulyanovsk), on the Volga river, Yusuf Akçura migrated to Istanbul, capital of the Ottoman Empire,

with his family at an early age. He studied at a military school there and then at the Institut des Sciences Politiques in Paris, where he met several Young Turks. In 1904, Akçura wrote the first manifesto of Turkish nationalism, "Uç Tarz-i Siyaset" (Three Ways of Government), in which he considered Ottomanism and pan-Islam to be impractical routes for Turkish political development. Akçura soon became one of the most influential nationalists—promoting Pan-Turkism before World War I. He spent a number of years in Russia spreading Turkish nationalist ideas, returning to Istanbul after the Young Turk revolution of 1908.

Akçura was a cofounder of the Türk Yurdu Cemiyati (Turkish Homeland Society) in 1911, with Ziya Gökalp, publisher of its famous periodical *Türk Yurdu.* The group campaigned to simplify the Turkish language, to adopt the customs of Western civilization, and to promote the interests of Turks inside and outside the Ottoman Empire. He joined the Kemalist movement in 1921, but maintained that it was the embodiment of pan-Turkism, and continued to write on Turkism for Russian Turks.

See also GÖKALP, ZIYA; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA; PAN-TURKISM; YOUNG TURKS.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

AKHAVAN-SALESS, MEHDI

[1928–1991]

Iranian poet and literary critic who wrote under the pen name Mim Omid, or Omid.

Born in Mashhad, Mehdi Akhavan-Saless later lived in Khorramshahr and Tehran. During his youth, he was politically active and was imprisoned briefly after the coup d'état of 1953.

Akhavan's first published collection of verse, *Zemestan* (Winter; 1956), expresses a nostalgia for love by using nature imagery. His later verse at times reflects a deep cynicism and sarcasm, and at times is lively and witty. Akhavan is known for his long narrative poetry, which captures the reader's attention with its flowing dialogues. In addition to poetry, Akhavan has written a book for children, *Derakht-e Pir va Jangal* (The old tree and the jungle), and articles on literary criticism brought together as *Majmuʿa-ye Maqalat* (Collection of articles).

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PARDIS MINUCHEHR

AKHBAR, AL- (EGYPT)

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES

AKHBAR, AL- (JORDAN)

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES

AKHBAR AL-YAWM

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES

AKHBARI

The school of Shiʿite jurisprudence.

Origins of the Akhbari can be traced to the twelfth century. It firmly rejected *ijtihad,* or the power of *ulama* to interpret the Qurʾan and the teachings of the Prophet of Islam. Rather, it emphasized the supremacy of the teachings of God, the Prophet, and the infallible imams of Twelver Shiʿism, arguing that Islamic law can be derived directly from the *akhbar,* or traditions of the imams and the Prophet.

Akhbari traditionalism reemerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Safavi Iran. Undermining the position of an independent clergy, the Akhbari school, at least by extension, advocated a fusion between government and religion by rejecting all forms of intercession between believers and the Prophet, plus his twelve infallible progeny. From the ascendancy of the Safavis to the nineteenth century, most Akhbari clerics resided in the shrine cities of Iraq. In Iran, the Akhbaris were eventually

defeated by the rival Usuli camp, which favored a hegemonic clerical hierarchy. In Bahrain, however, Akhbarism triumphed by the end of the eighteenth century. During the Iranian constitutional revolution from 1905 to 1911, elements of Akhbari teachings were drawn upon by pro-constitutionalist *ulama* in refuting challenges by more conservative clergymen who objected to the un-Islamic nature of constitutionalism.

See also USULI.

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NEGUIN YAVARI

AKHIR SA'A

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES

AKHONDZADEH, MIRZA FATH ALI

[1812–1878]

Azerbaijani playwright, propagator of atheism, and proponent of alphabet reform.

After an early education in Azerbaijan along traditional lines, Mirza Fath Ali Akhondzadeh entered a Russian school in Tiflis (Tbilisi, Russian Georgia), where he swiftly mastered the Russian language and became acquainted with European literature and ideas. He was soon a pronounced Russophile, and from 1834 until the end of his life, he was continuously in the employ of the Russian government. His most important literary works were six satirical comedies, written in Azerbaijani Turkish (Azeri), intended to discredit the traditional classes of the Muslim world and their beliefs and to propagate a positivist worldview. Important for the development of modern Azerbaijani literature, these plays were also widely circulated in Persia (now Iran), in Persian translation.

Akhondzadeh expressed his hostility to Islam more systematically in a series of fictitious letters attributed to two princes, one Persian and the other Indian, in which the criticisms of Islam current in Christian nineteenth-century Europe were fully reflected. Among the Persian politicians and reformers with whom he was in contact, the most significant was Mirza Malkom Khan (Malkum Khan), with whom he shared not only a belief in the need for unconditional Westernization but also an enthusiasm for reforming the Arabic alphabet in its application to the Persian and Turkish languages by introducing letters to indicate vowels.

See also AZERI LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE; ISLAM; MALKOM KHAN, MIRZA.

HAMID ALGAR

AKKAD, MUSTAFA

[1935–]

Hollywood-trained Syrian-American filmmaker.

Mustafa Akkad was born in Aleppo, Syria, and moved to Los Angles in 1954 to study filmmaking. He worked as an assistant to the director Sam Peckinpah and then worked in American television, producing a public affairs show, *As Others See Us,* as well as documentaries and a syndicated travel show.

In 1976 Akkad directed his first feature film, *The Message,* which tells the story of the birth and early growth of Islam. Before filming, he submitted drafts of his script to Islamic scholars at al-Azhar University in Cairo for approval. Respecting Islamic injunctions against representing the Prophet, Akkad shot the film so that Muhammad is neither seen nor heard. Two versions were filmed, one in English with an international cast including Anthony Quinn and another in Arabic with an Arab cast.

In 1977, when the film was finally released in the United States, its first showing was delayed because of a hostage-taking incident in Washington, D.C., and the film faced protests from Muslim groups in both the United States and the Islamic world. Scholars at al-Azhar ended up condemning the film, and it was banned across the Arab world with the exception of Libya, where it had been

filmed. Arab and Muslim audiences have nevertheless been able to view it on video, and in 2003 Egyptian authorities sought to lift the ban.

Akkad's second historical epic, *Lion of the Desert,* released in 1981, portrays the proto-nationalist struggle of Libyan resistance leader Umar al-Mukhtar, who used guerrilla tactics to fight Mussolini's Italian army in the early 1930s.

Although neither film met with commercial or critical success, they represent a form of transnational filmmaking in which narratives of Islamic and Arab history are told to global audiences within the conventions of Western film. Akkad's efforts to make other epic films, including ones on Gamal Abdel Nasser and Hannibal, faced financing difficulties, but in 2004 he began scouting locations in Jordan for a film about Saladin.

While making *Lion of the Desert,* Akkad agreed to finance a low-budget horror film, *Halloween* (1978), which became the highest-grossing independent film up to that time. It spawned a series of big-budget sequels and made Akkad one of the most successful Arab-American producers working in Hollywood.

See also FILM; MUKHTAR, UMAR AL-.

WALEED HAZBUN

AKP (JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY)

Political party with Islamic roots that was formed in 2001 and swept Turkey's 2002 parliamentary elections.

The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkünma Partisi), known in Turkey by its Turkish acronym, AKP, was formed by a group of reformist politicians with roots in the Islamic movement. Its most prominent leaders are Abdullah Gül and Tayyip R. Erdoğan. After the Constitutional Court closed the Virtue Party, the successor to the banned Refah Partisi, its conservative faction founded the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) in 2001. The more moderate members broke away to form AKP in August 2001, thereby cementing a division in the Islamic political movement.

AKP defined itself not as a splinter group of the Virtue Party but as a dynamic new conservative-modern force for rebuilding the collapsing center

The leader of Turkey's Justice and Development Party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, greets his supporters at a November 2002 rally in Bursa. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

of politics by redefining the political domain in terms of the needs of the populace. It is a socially conservative, Muslim-Turkish party that espouses economically liberal policies and integration with the European Union (EU). The charisma of Erdoğan, his conservative lifestyle, and his role as a generational bridge between younger and older voters gave the AKP broad appeal. The AKP capitalized on the public consensus about joining EU and curtailing the role of the Turkey's military-bureaucratic elite.

The AKP's success in the 2002 elections gave the socially Muslim party an opportunity to restructure the political landscape and expand civil rights. Of the eighteen political parties that competed for seats in the parliament, only two actually won any because parties are required to obtain 10 percent of the nationwide vote in order to seat representatives in the assembly. The AKP had the larger share, winning 34.26 percent of the popular vote and 363 of the 550 seats in parliament. The Republican People's Party won almost 19.40 percent of the votes, securing 178 seats. Independent candidates unaffiliated with any party on the other nine

seats. The AKP formed the government under the leadership of Abdullah Gül because the party's leader, Erdoğan, was banned from being on the ballot in the elections. After AKP assumed control of the parliament, it passed legislation to annul the ban on Erdoğan; he subsequently won a seat in a by-election and in March 2003 became prime minister.

AKP's identity and ideology is a pragmatic form of Islamic politics, and for that reason the party has broad appeal. It is simultaneously Turkish, Muslim, and Western. This pluralist aspect has worked well politically, given the diverse lifestyles in Turkey. The AKP's Islamism has a very heavy Turkish accent, rooted in the Turko-Ottoman ethos of communal life and a sense of leadership that requires full obedience to the party "ruler," Erdoğan.

See also Erdoğan, Tayyip; Refah Partisi; Republican People's Party (RPP).

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M. Hakan Yavuz

AKRAD, HAYY AL-

Kurdish quarter on the slopes of the mountain of Qasiyun, overlooking Damascus, Syria; the other two quarters are the Muhajirin and the Salihiyya.

The three quarters owe their existence to the water of the river Yazid, a tributary of the Barada River, which splits from it in the gorge of al-Rabwa. While al-Muhajirin was created by the municipality of Damascus, capital of Syria, and the Salihiyya is almost a replica of Damascus, Hayy al-Akrad has been described as a sheer fantasy. Its streets, though wide, are irregular and do not present a defensive aspect like those of Damascus because its inhabitants, the Kurds, were feared and not attacked.

Still inhabited mostly by Kurds, Hayy al-Akrad was originally a village for Kurds, starting in the time of Saladin in the twelfth century, and attracted a new wave of Kurdish immigrants in the nineteenth century. Engaged primarily in livestock trade and serving in the military and as aides in tax-farming, the Kurds polarized around their clan leaders, who played major roles in the life of Damascus as notables, landowners, military chieftains, and also Communists. The head of the Communist Party since its early years has been the octogenarian Khalid Bakdash, who comes from Hayy al-Akrad and has the support of many of its Kurdish inhabitants.

See also Kurds.

Abdul-Karim Rafeq

AKSARIYAT

See Feda'iyan-e Khalq

AL-

See Glossary

ALA, HOSEYN

[1883–1964]

Iranian statesman.

Hoseyn Ala, son of Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan Ala al-Saltaneh, was also known as the Muʿin al-Wizara. Similar to many political dignitaries of Pahlavi Iran, his father had served the Qajars as prime minister, minister, and ambassador, and was a main actor in the constitutional revolution from 1905 to 1911. Hoseyn Ala filled cabinet posts in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Agriculture, Trade, Court, and Public Welfare. He served as a delegate to the Paris Peace Conference following World War I, was Iran's chief delegate to the United Nations after World War II, and served as ambassador to the United States, Spain, and England.

Considered a royalist, Hoseyn Ala was appointed as prime minister by the monarch Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1951, following the assassination of Prime Minister Razmara by an Islamic group, the Feda'iyan-e Islam. During his tenure as prime minister, the Iranian Parliament passed the Oil Nationalization Bill of 1951. Unable to withstand public pressure in favor of nationalization, Ala resigned his position in 1952, and resumed his duties as Minister of Court. He was appointed as prime minister for a second time in 1955, and headed Iran's delegation to the first meeting of the Baghdad Pact, held in Iraq in 1955. Po-

litical dissatisfaction with the Baghdad Pact was manifested in an assassination attempt on Ala's life, before his departure to Baghdad, by a member of the Feda'iyan-e Islam. In 1957, Ala was reappointed as Minister of Court, retaining his position until 1963, when he was demoted to senator because of his opposition to the shah's policies in the quelling of the June 1963 uprisings.

See also Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza.

Neguin Yavari

ALAINI, MUHSIN

See Ayni, Muhsin al-

AL AL-SHAYKH FAMILY

An important family or clan in Saudi Arabia; one of only two nonroyal families, the other being the Al Sudayri, with whom Al Saʿud princes may marry.

The Al al-Shaykh (the family of the Shaykh) are descendants of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the Islamic reformer who formed an alliance with Muhammad ibn Saʿud in the mid-eighteenth century. This association has shaped their families' fortunes and those of most of the Arabian peninsula since. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in 1703 in the Najd, probably in the central Arabian town of al-Uyayna. Influenced by the strict teachings of Ibn Taymiya, a thirteenth-fourteenth century jurist of the conservative Hanbali Law School, he returned home from prolonged study to preach a simple, puritanical faith that eschewed theological innovations and aimed at countering the moral laxity of his Najdi contemporaries. Those who accepted his teaching and its emphasis on tawhid, the oneness of the Qurʾanic god unchallenged and untainted by any earthly attributes, were Muwahhidun (unitarians), known outside Arabia as Wahhabis. Unwelcome in al-Uyayna, the preacher moved to al-Dirʿiya, where Muhammad ibn Saʿud was amir, ruler of a district in Najd. The latter's political leadership and the military abilities of his son, Abd al-Aziz, combined with the reformer's zeal, brought all of Najd under Saudi rule within thirty years. In 1803, the year of his death by assassination, Abd al-Aziz took Mecca, and his son Saʿud expanded the first Saudi state over the course of the next decade to approximately its present limits.

During his lifetime, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was the imam (Muslim spiritual leader) of the expanding Saudi state, a title conveying responsibility for enforcing norms of correct Islamic belief and behavior as well as carrying the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam to the rest of the Islamic world and beyond. When he died, the title passed to the Al Saʿud rulers. The shaykh's descendants did not exercise direct political power in the decades that followed, although they were accorded special respect. The Al Saʿud have continued the practice of intermarriage with members of the Al al-Shaykh, begun when Abd al-Aziz ibn Muhammad married a daughter of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The late King Faisal's mother was Tarfa bint Abdullah, daughter of a distinguished Al al-Shaykh scholar and jurist, making Faisal the great-great-great grandson of the original shaykh. Moreover, the family continued to produce religious leaders who exercised great influence on all decision-making in a state whose legitimacy depended on adherence to and propagation of Muwahhidin beliefs. Members of the Al al-Shaykh held the post of *qadi* (judge) of Riyadh, the Saudi capital, and later the position of grand mufti, highest judicial office in the state.

In recent years the position of the Al al-Shaykh has changed in significant ways. In 1969, as part of his effort to create a more efficient government securely under Al Saʿud control, King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz abolished the office of grand mufti and replaced it with a ministry of justice. Although the first minister of justice deliberately was not an Al al-Shaykh, subsequent ministers have been. Moreover, from the early 1960s on, members of the Al al-Shaykh have held ministerial positions. The family's representation in the cabinet dropped from three to two members with the reshuffle of April 2003: minister of justice, Dr. Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh; and minister of Islamic affairs, waqf, *daʿwa,* and *irshad,* Salih ibn Abd al-Aziz ibn Muhammad Al al-Shaykh. Other members of the family serve in important military and civilian capacities, as well as serving as *qadis* and other religious figures. Although the Al al-Shaykh domination of the religious establishment has diminished in recent decades, the family alliance is still crucial to the Al Saʿud in maintaining their legitimacy. At the same time, the Al al-Shaykh wholeheartedly support the continued rule of the Al Saʿud because of

the exceedingly close ties between the two families.

See also Al Saʿud Family; Muwahhidun; Shaykh.

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ALAM, AMIR ASADOLLAH

[1919–1978]

Iranian politician of the Pahlavi period.

Amir Asadollah Alam was the son of Showkat al-Molk Alam, who was governor of Birjand under Mozaffar al-Din Shah of the Qajars and also a member of Reza Shah Pahlavi's inner court. He was born in Birjand into a family that originally came from an Arab tribe of the southern region of Khuzistan. Patronized by Reza Shah from the start, Alam married Malektaj Qavam, the sister-in-law of Ashraf Pahlavi, the shah's daughter. His long-standing friendship with the crown prince was fostered in this period. Alam was one of the few members of Iran's traditional aristocracy who not only manifested his loyalty to the Pahlavi dynasty from the very start, but repeatedly did so in the course of an unusually long political career during which he held several gubernatorial and ministerial positions. A confidant of the new shah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, he was ordered to found the Mardom (People's) Party, which was envisioned as the party of loyal opposition. In 1962, Alam was appointed prime minister, to facilitate the implementation of the White Revolution, launched in 1963 by the shah. He was also prime minister at the time of the uprisings engineered by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Qom (1963), in protest against the White Revolution. In 1964, he was appointed president of the Pahlavi University in Shiraz, and under his leadership it became Iran's model university. In 1966, he was appointed minister of court, and in this capacity he allegedly was one of the strongest influences on the shah. He retained this position until 1977, when he was forced to resign because of illness. He died in 1978 of leukemia.

See also Khomeini, Ruhollah; Mardom Party; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Pahlavi, Reza; White Revolution (1961–1963).

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Neguin Yavari

ALAMAYN, AL-

Village in northwest Egypt, on the Mediterranean, northeast of the Qattara depression, site of the battle of El Alamein, where the British drove back the Germans in a pivotal battle of World War II, 23 October–4 November 1942.

General Bernard Law Montgomery's British and Commonwealth Eighth Army met and overcame General Erwin Rommel's German–Italian Afrika Korps at al-Alamayn, approximately 80 miles (128.7 km) west of Alexandria. The retreat of Rommel's forces ended the Axis threat to conquer Egypt and seize the Suez Canal. Montgomery had some 195,000 men, 1,150 tanks, and 1,900 guns against Rommel's 100,000 men, 530 tanks, and 1,325 guns. Montgomery attacked at 9:30 P.M. on 23 October with an artillery barrage from 1,000 guns. The Afrika Korps held and counterattacked on 27 October. Montgomery resumed the offensive the next day, with a weeklong tank battle. British air superiority and force of numbers wore down the Afrika Korps, and Rommel withdrew a few miles to the west on 1 November. Another attack on 3 November resulted in Rommel's ordering another withdrawal, at first countermanded by Adolf Hitler, but finally approved. Montgomery's pursuit on 5 November stalled because of a rainstorm, and Rommel was able to disengage his force and retreat to the Libyan border by 7 November. The Afrika Korps had 59,000 men killed, wounded, and captured and lost some 500 tanks and 400 guns, against

Eighth Army losses of 13,500 men, 500 tanks, and 100 guns. Moreover, most of the British tanks were reparable while Rommel had only twenty operational tanks at the end of the fighting.

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ALAMI FAMILY, AL-

A leading Arab family in Jerusalem that claimed direct descent from Hasan, a grandson of the prophet Muhammad.

The Alami ancestors migrated in the seventh century C.E. from Arabia to Morocco, where they adopted the name *Alam,* from Mount Alam. In the twelfth century Shaykh Muhammad al-Alami assisted Salah al-Din in expelling the Crusaders from Palestine and Lebanon and was granted substantial land, including most of the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem. The family played a prominent role in the civil and religious life of Jerusalem during the following centuries.

Faydi al-Alami (1865–1924) was the leading family member in the late Ottoman period. He worked in the finance department, as a tax assessor, as district officer of Bethlehem in 1902 and of Jerusalem in 1904, and as mayor of Jerusalem (1906–1909). He was then elected to the administrative council for the Jerusalem district and, in 1914, to the parliament in Istanbul. He returned to Palestine after World War I.

Musa al-Alami (1897–1984), Faydi's son, was born on 8 May 1897 in Jerusalem and was drafted into the Ottoman army during World War I. Musa studied law at Cambridge University from 1919 to 1924. The British administration appointed him junior legal adviser in 1925, assistant government advocate in 1929, private secretary to the high commissioner in 1932–1933, and then government advocate until 1937. Musa criticized the British tax policy that increased rural indebtedness and thereby encouraged land sales to Jewish land-purchasing organizations. He urged the British to balance the interests of the Arab and Jewish communities and to establish a legislative assembly. In June 1936 the high commissioner allowed him to circulate a petition that 137 senior Arab government officials signed, calling upon the government to suspend Jewish immigration as a precondition for ending the Arabs' general strike, which had begun in April.

Alami was fired in October 1937 after the Peel Commission report recommended his replacement by a British advocate. Forced into exile in Lebanon and then Iraq, he served in the Palestinian delegation to the London conference in 1939, then was allowed home to Palestine in 1941. In 1944 Alami represented the Palestinians at the Alexandria conference that established the League of Arab States. Alami had close relations with Arab leaders, notably his father-in-law, the Syrian nationalist Ihsan Jabri. Alami persuaded the conference participants to set up a fund to improve conditions in Palestinian villages and buy land from impoverished farmers, and also to establish information offices abroad to promote Arab perspectives on Palestine. Alami headed the London information office and organized the Constructive Scheme to help villages. In late 1945 the Arab League forced Alami to place these efforts under the Husayni-dominated Arab Higher Committee (AHC). By December 1947 Alami and his brother-in-law Jamal Husayni established rival information offices abroad.

Alami was in London during the Arab-Israel War of 1948–1949. Israel seized his property in Jerusalem and his agricultural land in the Baysan and Jaffa districts. Afterward, he established the Arab Development Society, which ran an orphanage for refugee boys on reclaimed land near Jericho. Despite the difficulty of growing produce, raising poultry, and promoting dairy products in that saline environment well below sea level, Alami turned the orphanage into a flourishing enterprise. During the 1967 war the Israeli army overran the farm; most of its residents fled to Jordan, but the farm continued, albeit at a sharply reduced level. After Alami's death in 1984, an international board of directors maintained the project.

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ANN M. LESCH

ALAMI, MUSA AL-

See ALAMI FAMILY

ALAVI, BOZORG

[1904–1997]

One of Iran's most important twentieth-century writers.

Alavi was born in Tehran into a wealthy merchant family. Both his father and grandfather were active supporters the Constitutional Revolution. His father, Mortezar Alavi, opposed the British and Russian presence in Iran and during World War I fled to Germany, where he became one of the founders of the Iranian exile journal *Kaveh.* In 1921, Alavi and his older brother joined their father in Germany; he finished high school there and completed the equivalent of a B.A. at the University of Munich. Alavi returned to Iran in 1928 and initially taught at a technical school in Shiraz. He joined the faculty of a German technical high school in Tehran during 1931. At this school he became acquainted with several other foreign-educated Iranians, especially Dr. Taqi Arani, and he eventually joined Arani's weekly study circle, which read and discussed the works of European Marxists and socialists. The members of Arani's group gradually expanded, and in 1937 the police arrested fifty-three men, whom they charged with forming an illegal Communist party; all were tried and sentenced, with Alavi receiving a seven-year prison term. Arani died in prison, but Alavi and the others were freed in 1941, following the joint Anglo-Soviet invasion and occupation of Iran.

Alavi's first collection of short stories, *Chamedan* (Suitcase), was published in 1934. His prison experiences resulted in a second collection of short stories, *Varaq parehha-ye zendan* (Paper scraps of prison; Tehran: N.p., 1942), and a powerful account of his trial, *Panjah-o-seh nafar* (Fifty-three persons; Tehran: N.p., 1944). Although Alavi was among the founders of the Tudeh Party in 1941 and participated in party meetings, literary pursuits rather than political activities seem to have occupied most of his time. He was a close friend of Sadegh Hedayat and regularly socialized with other prominent writers of the 1941 through 1953 period. He also continued to write, and his most famous work in Persian, the novel *Cheshmahayesh* (Her eyes), appeared in 1952. Alavi had left Iran for East Germany to take up a visiting appointment at Humboldt University when the 1953 coup d'état against the government of Mohammad Mossadegh took place. He decided not to return home, but remained in East Berlin, where he married a German woman and became a professor of Persian literature. He published several scholarly books about Iran in German during the 1950s and 1960s. After the Iranian Revolution, he made brief visits to Iran in 1979 and 1980.

See also CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION; HEDAYAT, SADEGH; IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD; TUDEH PARTY.

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ALAWI

An offshoot of Ismaʿilism.

Historically both the Druze and the Alawis are offshoots of Ismaʿilism, which was an earlier split from the Shiʿite Imamis. The Shiʿia are distinguishable in important respects from the majority of Muslims, namely the orthodox Sunnis, who believe and accept the *sunna* (sayings and doings) of the prophet Muhammad, side by side with the Qurʾan, as their main source of inspiration. Although the Sunnis generally have endorsed the caliphate as the legitimate head of political and religious power, the Shiʿite Imamis have by and large rejected the caliph's claim to leadership, recognizing instead Ali ibn Abi Talib, who was the fourth caliph and cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, as their first imam, or politicoreligious leader, and his two sons Hasan and Husayn as, respectively, the second and third imams. Starting with Ali, the Shiʿia leadership progressed through a line of twelve imams, the last of which

mysteriously vanished in 878. As such, the twelfth imam is known as the hidden imam.

The Ismaʿilis broke with the Shiʿite Imamis over the issue of the succession to the sixth imam Ismaʿil (d. 760), from whom they claimed to be the legitimate descendants. What historically distinguished the Ismaʿilis from the other more orthodox Shiʿia was their secrecy and their belief in the inner and allegorical meanings of the Qurʾan. The mainstream Shiʿia, by contrast, held the view of the infallible imam who can guide the community to the right path and who possesses that unique power to interpret the scriptures. Both the Druze and Alawis maintain doctrines close to Ismaʿilism.

The Alawis or, to use their more appropriate religious name, the Nusayris, are of an unknown origin, and there is much speculation as to their inner (hidden) beliefs. An accepted reference on their initial rites and doctrines was published in Aleppo in 1859 as *Kitab al-Majmu.* According to its author, Sulayman al-Adhani, the Nusayris, like other sects of the Syrian mountains on the Mediterranean, primarily believed in the transmigration of souls. He also argues that the term *Nusayri* is traceable to Abu Shuʿayb Muhammad (ibn Nusayr al-Abdi al-Bakri al-Namri), who in turn acted as the *bab* (communicator) of Hasan al-Askari (d. 874), the eleventh Shiʿite imam.

It remains uncertain, however, whether any of the historical genealogy and doctrine propounded in the *Kitab* is still held by the majority of Alawis today. Since the French mandate over Syria (1920–1946), the term *Nusayri* has been dropped in favor of the more common *Alawi,* and a doctrinal, if not political, rapprochement has been in the works with the majority of Shiʿias. In 1936 a body of Alawi *ulama* officially declared that "the Alawis are nothing but partisans of the imam Ali . . . the cousin, son-in-law, and executor *(wasi)* of the Messenger." That position was reiterated in a similar *ulama* declaration in 1973, three years after Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad (r. 1970–2000), himself an Alawi, came to power.

Today most Alawis are located in the southern Iskandarun region of Turkey (renamed Hatay by the Turks after its annexation in 1939, and still claimed by the Syrians) and the Syrian coastline. Only in Syria, however, where the Alawis comprise roughly 10 percent of the population, have they gained a political status. Although some had been members of the original Syrian army after the French mandate, and more took positions with al-Baʿth in 1963, it was only under President Asad that their power consolidated. Out of the thirty-one officers whom Asad handpicked between 1970 and 1997 as chief officers in the armed forces, for the élite military formations, and for the security and intelligence apparatus, no fewer than nineteen, or 61.3 percent, have been Alawis. The overall socioeconomic status of the Alawis within the Syrian community at large, however, does not seem to have improved much in the last few decades.

See also Asad, Hafiz al-; Ismaʿili Shiʿism; Shiʿism.

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ALAWITE DYNASTY

Moroccan rulers since 1666.

The Alawite Dynasty is part of the greater sharifian Arab sultanate whose origins are in the Middle East. The Sadi and Alawi (Alawite) sharifians migrated to Morocco from the Arabian Peninsula and settled there as early as the thirteenth century. They claim to be descendants of the prophet Muhammad. The Sadi sharifians gained control over Morocco in the first half of the sixteenth century, wresting it from the former Wattasid rulers.

In 1666, the Sadi family branch lost power to its Alawite counterpart when the latter gained possession of Fez, then the Sharifian capital. Under the Sadi sultans, the country suffered from internal turmoil owing to endless disputes among local petty rulers. When the Alawite dynasty took charge, they curbed the excessive powers of these local rulers and restored the country's political unity. The challenges and achievements of the Alawites can best be

Muhammad IV became king of Morocco upon the death of his father, Hassan II, in July 1999. The new ruler immediately introduced a more progressive and popular tone to the country's government, declaring war on bureaucratic corruption and expressing concern for human rights causes. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

discussed in two periods, from the onset of their rule to the French protectorate, and from independence in 1956 to the present.

The founders of the Alawite dynasty, Mawlay Rashid (d. 1672), who undertook the early conquests, and Mawlay Ismaʿil (d. 1727), who consolidated the empire and established a new capital at Meknès, set up a national administration and a workable taxation system to guarantee the trade routes and defend against Christian incursions. They also established an army that proved responsive to the sultanate, not to any local or tribal group. In response to these imperatives, Mawlay Ismaʿil established a centralized administration and a Janissary-like national army of slaves (*abid*) loyal to the person of the sultan. Muhammad III (d. 1790) emphasized the family's status as sharifs (nobles) and attempted to establish the regime's legitimacy on a religious basis as defenders of the Muslim community against the encroaching European infidels. Weaker successors eventually capitulated to European demands and, in 1912, France established a protectorate over Morocco and gave Spain control over the northern sector. Muhammad V (d. 1961) played an instrumental role in the independence process.

Following Morocco's independence, the Alawite regime experienced a different set of challenges in building a postcolonial state. Muhammad V and his successor, Hassan II, inherited a unified nation (despite Spanish possession of Ifni, the Western [Spanish] Sahara, Ceuta, and Melilla), a coherent administration, and a strong popular sense of the regime's legitimacy based on their defense of Moroccan nationalism and the king's position as imam of the Moroccan Muslim community as well as head of state. Their task was to build a modern developed state, ensure the loyalty of divided political and regional groups, deliver social services, and stimulate employment and economic development for a population with heightened expectations. A war in the Western Sahara to reclaim territory considered part of historical Morocco proved popular.

The regime's greatest weaknesses since independence in 1956 have been administrative corruption, periodic disaffection of segments of the armed forces, a limited national resource base, drought, and most important, an expanding population. The regime has been challenged by popular discontent, due in part to the severe strain on state resources as the regime has tried to meet the needs of a rapidly expanding population while at the same time satis-

The Alawite Dynasty

Ruler	Reign
1. al-Rashid	1664–1672
2. Isma'il	1672–1727
3. Ahmad al-Dhahabi *and*	1727–1728
4. Abd al-Malik	[*contested*]
Second reign of Ahmad	1728–1729
5. Abd Allah	1729–1757
6. Muhammad III	1757–1790
7. Yazid	1790–1792
8. Sulayman	1792–1822
9. Abd al-Rahman	1822–1859
10. Muhammad IV	1859–1873
11. al-Hassan I	1873–1894
12. Abd al-Aziz	1894–1908
13. Abd al-Hafidh	1908–1912
14. Yusuf	1912–1927
15. Muhammad V	1927–1961
16. Hassan II	1961–1999
17. Muhammad VI	1999–present

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

fying vital interest groups. By 2003, the population of Morocco exceeded 30 million. Initially, Hassan II, who ruled the country with a firm hand from March 1961 until his death in July 1999, countered his political opponents by imposing stiff prison sentences or by forcing them into exile. It was only in the early and mid-1990s that Hassan turned serious attention to domestic reforms and the nation's chronic social and economic problems. He laid the groundwork for modernization, privatization of the economy, and the fostering of trade relations with the European Union and the United States, and he tolerated the proliferation of human rights and women's rights groups. He also maintained, since the early 1960s, clandestine intelligence and military ties with Israel and he helped bring the Egyptians and Israelis together in 1977, leading to the historic visit of Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat to Jerusalem. Upon his death, Crown Prince Sidi Muhammad (b. 1963), now Muhammad VI, succeeded him to the throne. He has shown a predilection for western-style reforms and the notion of a civil society. He is seeking to expand his father's embryonic reforms.

See also Hassan II; Morocco; Muhammad V.

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See Archaeology in the Middle East

AL BU SAʿID FAMILY AND TRIBE OF OMAN

One of the principal tribes of Oman.

A merchant from the tribe Ahmad ibn Saʿid rallied Omani forces against the invading troops of Nadir Shah in the 1740s and was elected Imam in gratitude. His descendants became the present ruling family of Oman, also known as the Al Bu Saʿid. Ahmad's grandson, Saʿid ibn Sultan, became ruler by assassinating his cousin in about 1807, and an alliance with the British enabled him to defeat threats from neighbors. Saʿid built up his maritime power and expanded his authority over the East African littoral, eventually moving his residence to Zanzibar and sending the first Arab envoy to the United States in 1840. On his death in 1856, his Arabian possessions, chiefly Oman, went to his eldest son, Thuwayni, and another son, Majid, received Zanzibar. The Al Bu Saʿid gradually evolved into separate ruling families and Omani fortunes subsequently declined under the Al Saʿid, as the descendants of Saʿid ibn Sultan are known (other members of the family are still known as Al Bu Saʿid). There were numerous struggles for power in the following decades until the accession of Faysal ibn Turki in 1888. Faysal's reign saw both the loss of the interior of Oman to tribal and religious forces and British domination of affairs in Muscat. He was succeeded on his death in 1913 by his son Taymur, who was forced in 1920 to give autonomy to the Omani interior. Taymur abdicated in 1931 in favor of his son Saʿid and died in 1965. Saʿid was overthrown by his son Qabus (also Qaboos) in 1970 and died in exile in 1972. Saʿid's half-brother Tariq ibn Taymur returned to Oman on Qabus's accession and served as prime minister for about a year.

See also Al Bu Saʿid, Qabus ibn Saʿid; Al Bu Saʿid, Saʿid ibn Taymur; Oman.

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AL BU SAʿID, QABUS IBN SAʿID

Ruler of Oman.

Qabus ibn Saʿid ibn Taymur Al Bu Saʿid became sultan of Oman in 1970 and is the fourteenth member of the Al Bu Saʿid dynasty to rule Oman. Qabus (also Qaboos) was born in Salala, in the southern Omani province of Dhufar, on 18 November 1940. His father was Sultan Saʿid ibn Taymur (r. 1932–1970) and his mother came from the Bayt Maʿshani tribe of the Dhufari mountains. In 1958, Qabus was sent to England for schooling, and he subsequently attended the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. His return to Oman in 1964 was followed by years of enforced inactivity in Salala under his father's watchful eye.

The late 1960s saw increasing unrest in Oman due to Sultan Saʿid's apparent refusal to spend his new oil revenues and because of a rebellion in Dhufar against the sultan's paternalistic rule. By mid-1970, the situation had worsened and Qabus joined forces with his friends in Salala and British and Omani backers in Muscat to organize a coup d'état against his father on 23 July 1970.

In contrast to his father, Qabus threw the country open to development and welcomed back the thousands of Omanis working abroad. Within a week of his accession, the country's first true Council of Ministers was formed with Qabus's uncle, Tariq ibn Taymur, as prime minister. Two weeks after the coup, Sultan Qabus arrived in Muscat for the first time and took charge of the new government. Differences between the two men forced Tariq's resignation in 1971; Sultan Qabus has served as his own prime minister since then.

From the beginning of his reign, Qabus faced two primary challenges: economically transforming one of the world's most underdeveloped countries and dealing with the serious rebellion in Dhufar. In the early 1970s, development activity concentrated on providing education, healthcare, water, and electricity to the people and creating a modern infrastructure. At the same time, the course of the Dhufar rebellion was reversed with British, Jordanian, and Iranian assistance and through an intensive "hearts and minds" campaign. The sultan was able to declare the war over in 1975.

Sultan Qabus clearly stands at the apex of the political system of Oman. Decision-making tends to bypass the Council of Ministers and flow directly up to him. He also has steered the country to a moderate path in international affairs, establishing diplomatic relations with China and Russia while maintaining close political and security links with Britain and the United States. Sultan Qabus was one of the few Arab leaders not to break off relations with Egypt following the Camp David Accords. He was careful to keep channels open to both sides during the Iran–Iraq War (1988) and permitted Western powers to use Omani facilities during the hostilities against Iraq in 1990 and 1991. He also agreed to border treaties in the early 1990s with Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Sultan Qabus has no direct heirs. A marriage arranged by his father to the daughter of an important tribal shaykh never was finalized. A marriage in 1976 to his cousin Kamila, a daughter of Tariq ibn Taymur, ended in divorce.

See also AL BU SAʿID FAMILY AND TRIBE OF OMAN.

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J. E. PETERSON

AL BU SAʿID, SAʿID IBN TAYMUR

[1910–1972]

Sultan of Oman from 1932 to 1970.

Saʿid ibn Taymur Al Bu Saʿid was born in Muscat to Sultan Taymur ibn Faysal Al Bu Saʿid and an Al Bu Saʿid mother. Like his father, Saʿid was sent to Baghdad and India for education. Upon his return to Muscat at the age of eighteen, Saʿid effectively was made regent in the absence of his father and succeeded his father in 1932. By the end of World War II, Sultan Saʿid had pulled Oman out of debt and reduced British influence in internal affairs. With British military assistance, he restored Al Bu Saʿid control over the interior in the 1950s. But his paternalistic rule led to growing discontent, especially after the discovery of oil in 1964. A rebellion in the southern province of Dhufar led to Saʿid's overthrow in July 1970 by his son Qabus ibn Saʿid Al Bu Saʿid. Saʿid died in exile in London in October 1972.

See also Al Bu Saʿid Family and Tribe of Oman; Al Bu Saʿid, Qabus ibn Saʿid; Muscat; Oman.

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J. E. Peterson

ALCOHOL

An element of Middle Eastern life with a long and controversial history.

The drinking of alcoholic beverages has been a continuous feature of Middle Eastern life since the fourth millennium B.C.E. Beer played an important role in the Sumerian civilization of Mesopotamia, and the use of wild grapes to make wine originated in the region, where it became ritually important in Judaism and Christianity. In the medieval period, Muslim chemists pioneered the distillation process used to produce concentrated alcoholic beverages. Running counter to this historical tradition, however, are the clear strictures against wine drinking in Qurʾanic verses 4:43, 2:219, and 5:90–91. Yet the Qurʾan also visualizes paradise as containing rivers of wine "delicious to the drinkers" (47:15).

Since *khamr,* normally translated as "grape wine," is the only beverage specifically mentioned in the Qurʾan, Muslim legists long debated how broadly to interpret the prohibition against drinking it. All agreed to ban its sale to Muslims and to absolve anyone who destroyed wine in a Muslim's possession. They also held that the slightest taint of wine invalidated the ritual purity required for prayer. Shiʿite, Maliki, Shafiʿi, and Hanbali jurists further agreed that any intoxicating beverage should be considered as belonging to the category of *khamr.* The Hanafis, whose legal interpretations were favored by the Ottoman government, disagreed; they maintained that *khamr* denoted only the fermentation of uncooked fruit such as grapes, dates, raisins. They thereby permitted the use of certain beverages fermented from cooked juices and from uncooked materials like honey, wheat, barley, millet, and figs. These, however, could be consumed only in "non-intoxicating" amounts. The legists, who also debated this limitation, produced definitions of intoxication that ranged from "giddy" and "boisterous" to "blind drunk."

Islamic legal variations, local custom, and the acknowledged right of non-Muslims living under Muslim rule to make, sell, and consume alcoholic beverages resulted in an almost continual presence of alcohol in Middle Eastern society throughout the Islamic period. Drinking songs, royal and aristocratic drinking sessions, drunkenness as a metaphor for love of God, and the breaking of wine jars as an expression of moral outrage are commonplace in Islamic literature.

In the nineteenth century, alcoholic beverages were produced in many parts of the Middle East. Most of the vintners were non-Muslims, although some employed Muslims in their vineyards. In French-dominated Algeria, the alcoholic beverages produced were mostly designated for the European market. By World War I, Algerian grapes were yielding over 2 million metric tons (2.2 million tons) of wine per year. The yield from the Ottoman Empire

was more modest and local. The region of Bursa, for example, produced some 12 metric tons (13.2 tons) of grapes in 1880, of which around one-third—from Christian growers—was made into wine or *raki,* an anise-flavored spirit distilled from grape pulp and allowed to ferment after pressing. (In Arab lands, *raki* is known as *araq.*)

The rise of secularism and socialism led to varying degrees of permissiveness and state control with respect to the production and sale of alcoholic beverages. In the Republic of Turkey, for example, a state monopoly *(tekel)* on tobacco and alcohol was established. After the Egyptian revolution of 1952, Greek-owned vineyards and European-owned breweries were nationalized, and the state became the primary producer. Algeria continued to produce wine for the French market after winning its war of independence in 1962. Regulations on importing alcohol in these countries varied according to the overall import policies of the country and its desire to protect profits from state enterprises.

Efforts to ban or sharply limit alcoholic beverages are often associated with states that favor a traditional way of life, often under an Islamic political ideology. Saudi Arabia and Libya strenuously enforce bans on both the production and importation of these beverages. Iran and Yemen strictly limit consumption to non-Muslims, although South Yemen (the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) once had a brewery that was destroyed by Muslim activists. Flogging (usually forty or eighty strikes) is the prescribed punishment for violating the religious proscription.

See also QUR'AN.

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RICHARD W. BULLIET

AL-E AHMAD, JALAL

[1923–1969]

Iranian author; prominent nonestablishment intellectual.

The son of a Shiʿite Muslim cleric, Jalal Al-e Ahmad was educated at Tehran University and was the author of four volumes of short stories, four novels, and nearly a dozen volumes of essays. Al-e Ahmad focused on the present in his writing, concerned primarily with the negative influence of aspects of traditional Islam and of the modern West on Iran. His writings and life embody ongoing dilemmas for secular-minded Iranians, among them the values of the past versus the present, religion versus secularism, and West versus East. His strident attacks on historical Western imperialism and post–World War II U.S involvement in Iran, together with his recognition of the unifying capacity of Islam, persuaded some Iranians to consider him influential in the success of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Consequently, in Persian literature, this most-translated prose writer has suffered a loss of reputation among secular-minded Iranian intellectuals.

His best-known work of fiction is a realistic 1958 story about public education at the local elementary school level, *The School Principal,* available in two English translations (1974, 1986). Another of his longer fictions, a 1961 novel called *By the Pen,* available in a 1989 English translation featuring M. Hillmann's prefatory assessment of Al-e Ahmad's fiction in general, tells the story of an unsuccessful religious revolution.

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MICHAEL C. HILLMANN

ALEMDAR

See BAYRAKDAR, MUSTAFA

ALEPPO

The principal city of northern Syria.

Syria's second-largest metropolis after Damascus, Aleppo has long been a prominent economic, cultural, and political center, and, with a population of 4.2 million (2002 estimate), it ranks among the leading cities of the Middle East. Located about 70 miles inland from the Mediterranean Sea, at an elevation of 1,280 feet (390 m), Aleppo has a moderate climate, with short, cool, wet winters and long, dry, hot summers. Its surrounding region, parts of which are semiarid, supports extensive agriculture as well as the raising of livestock.

The majority of Aleppo's townspeople are Sunni Muslims, but they live alongside substantial numbers of Christians affiliated with various churches. Tens of thousands of Armenian refugees from Anatolia settled in Aleppo during World War I and strengthened the traditionally prominent Christian presence. The local Jewish community, whose roots went back to pre-Islamic times, also grew during the modern period, but the Arab–Israeli hostilities caused most of its members to leave the country around 1948. The remaining Jewish presence, which continued to dwindle thereafter, came to a historic end with the departure of the last Jews in 1994.

During the period of Ottoman rule in Syria (1516–1918), Aleppo served as the administrative capital of a large province that extended over much of northern Syria as well as parts of southern Anatolia. Ottoman governors dispatched from Istanbul administered the affairs of the area with the cooperation of Aleppo's local Muslim elite. The city's politics were characterized by the competition for influence among local powerful figures and by periodic local clashes with the Ottoman authorities. The unusually troubled years from 1770 to 1850 witnessed violent factional strife, popular unrest, and occupation by the Egyptian army (1832–1840). In the calmer period that followed, more orderly Ottoman control was restored, and the community began to experience the benefits of European-inspired innovations, including modern schools, improved sanitation and health care, street lighting, printing, newspapers, and wheeled transport. The local notable families integrated themselves more fully into the Ottoman provincial administration at this time and strengthened their power by acquiring large amounts of rural land.

Located in Syria's large central plain, Aleppo is one of the country's two major population centers, along with Damascus. Aleppo, which includes a sizable community of Armenians who fled the Soviet Union in the mid-1940s, was also one of the centers of Syria's emerging independence movement beginning in the 1890s. K.M. WESTERMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

With the establishment of modern Syria in 1920, Aleppo continued to serve as the seat of government for the surrounding region. Its Sunni landowning families, with their counterparts from Damascus, dominated national politics during the French mandate (1920–1946) and the first two decades of independence. As of the 1960s, however, the old landed notables began to be displaced by a new political elite composed of men of provincial and minority origins (particularly Alawi). Land-reform measures resulted in the expropriation of the great agricultural estates and helped to break the political back of the Sunni elite. In the 1970s and 1980s, opposition in Aleppo and other Sunni centers to the new political structure gave rise to clashes of Muslim organizations with Hafiz al-Asad's regime.

The modern period also transformed Aleppo's commercial role. Since the sixteenth century, the city had been a leading center of regional and international trade, with a network of markets that in-

cluded cities in Anatolia, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Arabia, Egypt, Europe, and Asia. In the nineteenth century, however, much of the region's external trade, now oriented increasingly toward Europe, shifted from inland cities such as Aleppo to the Mediterranean coastal towns. The end of the Ottoman Empire (1918) cut Aleppo off from some of its traditional markets in the region and narrowed still further its commercial horizons. The city's manufacturing sector, however, remained strong, and today, as a major industrial center, Aleppo produces fine silk and cotton fabric, soaps and dyes, processed foods, leather goods, and articles of gold and silver.

Like other major Middle Eastern cities, Aleppo grew dramatically during the modern period, especially since around 1950, when the migration from rural regions to urban centers began to assume massive proportions. Its population, about 90,000 in 1800, had risen modestly to 110,000 in 1900 and to 320,000 in 1950, but it then increased sharply by 1.5 million in the next forty-five years.

With this population growth came a corresponding physical expansion. Beginning in the 1870s, vast new areas developed all around the old historic city, thereby giving birth to modern Aleppo. The new districts, built on a European model of apartment buildings and wide streets laid out in a regular grid pattern, contrasted sharply with the dense environment of courtyard houses and narrow, winding alleyways in the old parts. As the better-off townspeople gradually moved out of the old city, it deteriorated into an overcrowded habitat for the urban poor and for rural migrants. This exodus represented the rejection of an environment that had come to be regarded as backward and unsuited to modern living. The old city has nevertheless remained among the best preserved and most handsome of the traditional Middle Eastern cities, and since the 1970s a movement to conserve its historic monuments and urban fabric has taken hold, although with still unresolved debates over proposed rehabilitation plans.

Aleppo, which has remained one of Syria's leading centers of cultural life, is particularly renowned, in the country and wider region, for its role as a creative center of traditional music. The *muwashshah,* a song traced back to Muslim Spain, has been a local specialty; hundreds of these vocal pieces—now known as *muwashshahat halabiyya*—were composed or preserved in the city and diffused from there throughout the region. Ottoman music has also been popular, and Turkish influences continue to distinguish local approaches to music theory. Many accomplished Arab musicians have hailed from Aleppo, among them the violin virtuosos Sami al-Shawwa (1887–1960) and Tawfiq al-Sabbagh (1890–1955) and the popular singer Sabah Fakhri (1933–). The most influential figure was Ali al-Darwish (1884–1952), whose encyclopedic knowledge of the Arab and Ottoman musical systems and repertoires, derived from thirty years of travel in the Middle East and North Africa, has profoundly marked the region's musical scene and scholarship.

See also SUNNI ISLAM.

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ABRAHAM MARCUS

ALEVI

A sect of Shiʿite Muslims in Turkey.

Alevis are the adherents of a belief system fitting loosely under a Shiʿite rubric; they constitute a significant minority in contemporary Turkey. Although no reliable statistics exist, estimates of their numbers run as high as 20 percent of Turkey's population, or somewhere between ten million and fifteen million people. Depending on the observer's political or social agenda, they have been understood to be a religious sect for some purposes and an ethnic minority group for others. Categorization ultimately proves futile, as the term *Alevi* refers to a number of diverse groups, all maintaining different levels of identification with Alevi-ness (in Turkish, *Alevilik*) and with each other. Scholars have posited numerous theories about Alevi influences and origins. Alevis are variously believed to be the descendants of Neoplatonists, gnostics, Manicheanists, Zoroastrians, pantheists, and early Anatolian Christian cults. Some of these lines of cultural descent would place them closer to Kurdish and Iranian el-

ements than to Turkish. A popular theory, advocated by some nationalist politicians as well by as some Alevi leaders, links them with pre-Islamic Turkic belief systems (frequently mislabeled *shamanism*).

Language and Beliefs

Many Alevis living in the predominantly Kurdish regions of eastern Anatolia, particularly in the Dersim (Tunceli) region—the spiritual/historical heart of Kurdish Alevis—speak one of the indigenous Kurdish languages. Others, in southern Anatolia near the Syrian border, speak Arabic, while many in western Anatolia speak Turkish. Groups such as the Shabak Kurds of northern Iraq are also Alevis. By contrast, the Ahl-e Haqq of Iran, although they share some concepts and institutions with the Alevis, diverge historically and in their ritual practices and beliefs. However, most of these groups recognize a sacred hierarchy that includes a trinity consisting of Allah, the prophet Muhammad, and his cousin and son-in-law Ali; they also revere the twelve imams who are central to mainstream Shiʿism.

After these, the next most important figure in Alevi belief is the saint Haci Bektaş Veli, who settled with his followers in the Kir Şehir region of central Anatolia in the thirteenth century. A village bearing his name, Haci Bektaş Köyü, became the center of this group of dervishes, and a large *tekke* (local headquarters for Sufi orders) and a *medrese* (Ar. *Madrasa*; religious school)—still important today—were established there. Presumably Haci Bektaş Veli was part of a larger movement of Turkmen *babas* practicing a mystical tradition influenced by Ahmet Yesevi, the central Asian Sufi whose tomb remains an important pilgrimage site. Bektashis were associated with the Ottoman Janissary corps; Janissaries styled their headgear after the cloak said to have been worn by Haci Bektaş Veli. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the reformist Young Turks counted Bektashis among their members, as did the Freemasons.

History and Traditions

The history and traditions of the followers of Haci Bektaş Veli, the Bektashis, overlap with Alevis. However, in some respects Bektashis function much like many Sufi orders. Among the Bektashis, there has been a distinction between Yol Evladi (children of the Path) and Bel Evladi (natural descendants). The former believe that Haci Bektaş was celibate, and membership in the order can only be accomplished through study with a *murşit,* or spiritual guide, and eventual initiation at an *ayin-i cem.* The *dedebaba,* the leader of the entire order, is elected by their *babas.* The Bel Evladi segment believe that Haci Bektaş married, begot a son, and that the order's leadership since that time should go to his descendants, the Çelebis. Çelebis need not go through initiation (although their followers, *talips,* must be initiated). Many Alevis concur with the Bel Evladi interpretation.

In the past, and to a lesser extent today, some village-based Alevis have been the *talips,* the client-disciples, of a Bektashi *effendi,* or Çelebi based in the *tekke* of Haci Bektaş Köyü, who might have visited them annually, collected tribute, officiated at an *ayin-i cem,* and mediated in disputes. Other Alevi villages have maintained the *talip* relationship with *pirs,* members of holy lineages not directly related to the Bektashis.

The central communal ritual for Alevis, as for Bektashis, is the *ayin-i cem,* held, if in a village, in a *cem evi.* Sites for the ritual exist in Turkish (and European) cities as well, often as part of Alevi cultural centers. The *pirs* officiate over the symbolic reenactment of the martyrdoms of Hasan and Hüseyin (Husayn), the second and third of the twelve imams, by dousing twelve candles, which is accompanied by impassioned wailing. Some groups of Alevis include wine or *raki* as part of the *cem.* Past and present *aşiks* or *ozans* (minstrels) are revered, and an essential component of the *cem* is the playing and singing of the poetry and songs of early Alevis such as Pir Sultan Abdal and Hataʿi (pseudonym of Shah Ismaʿil Safavi). The songs sung in a *cem* are called *nefes* by Bektashis and *deyiş* by village Alevis. *Düvaz* (short for *Düvazdeh imam,* the twelve imams) are the most sacred of the songs sung at a *cem.* The poetry can be understood on multiple levels; ostensible love songs also refer to mystical aspects of the relationship between humans and God, for example. Music typically is played on the *saz,* a plucked instrument resembling a long-necked lute, sometimes said to be the embodiment of Ali. The strumming and fingering can be complex, demanding a high level of

technical virtuosity; many of the rhythms are repetitive, conducive to the *semah,* trance-inducing dancing performed in the *ayin-i cem.*

Beliefs and Practices

Other beliefs and practices of many Alevis include fasting during the first twelve days of Muharram and the celebration of Nevruz. A well-known Alevi precept is *eline, diline, beline, sahip ol* (be the master of your hands, tongue, and loins). This guides behavior for Alevis, who avoid making an outward show of their piety at the expense of inner purity. This is consonant with the permitted practice of *taqiyya* (dissimulation). *Taqiyya* reflects the pervasive belief in esotericism, which emphasized the internal, the unseen, the purity of one's heart. Many Alevi beliefs have been codified and inscribed in Buyruk (decree), believed by some to be the collected sayings of Imam Cafer-i Sadik, the sixth of the twelve imams.

Other religious tenets include a belief in divine incarnations and in reincarnation. Spiritual guidance is manifested in the hierarchy of the four gates of *şeriat, tarikat, hakikat,* and *marifet.* Alevis are differentiated from Sunnis in their attitudes and practices surrounding the social and ritual status of women. An Alevi saying, *kadin, toplumun annesidir* (woman is the mother of society), summarizes the central role of women, who are integral to the *cem* ceremony and can take leading roles. It is uncommon to see Alevi women wearing headscarves in urban settings. In villages they may; however, their scarves do not cover all their hair. This is consistent with a belief system that values the inner aspects of life more highly than the external.

Politics and History

As a minority that explicitly opposed the hegemonic Sunni power of the Ottoman Empire, the Alevis have been seen as threatening and have long been subject to persecution. The pejorative sobriquet *kizilbaş* (redhead) derives from an implication that they were traitors, in league with the Iranian Safavi Empire and its founder, Shah Ismaʿil, who established a similar form of Shiʿism as the dominant religion of his realm; the terminology thus has its origins in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In 1925, republican Turkey closed all Sufi orders, *tarikats,* and *tekkes;* banned the use of related titles; and prohibited certain practices; the Alevis were driven underground in their religious practices.

A sense of victimization and martyrdom pervades the Alevi worldview. Subject to persecution and massacres throughout their history, Alevis revere and identify with ancestral martyrs. Twentieth-century massacres and oppression are conceptualized in mytho-historical terms, as part of the cultural logic of their understanding of history. Killings and attacks in Malatya, Kahraman Maraş, and Çorum in the late 1970s, and in Sivas in 1993, serve as proof for many Alevis of the persistence of persecution. The attacks in the 1970s, many perpetrated by right-wing Sunnis, were incited by the fascist National Movement Party and depended on the collusion of local police and the army, many of whom identified the Alevi not only with immorality and religious heresy but also with communism.

In the 1970s and 1980s many Alevi youth, particularly from the Dersim area, were attracted by Maoism; with the collapse of the left in Turkey, this was one of the few surviving outposts. Some of these activists moved away from the Turkish Maoists and developed an Alevi variant, proposing the ethnic basis of *Alevilik,* and advocating an Alevistan or Zazaistan as the rightful homeland of the Zazas. Such movements have been stronger in the European Alevi diaspora than in Turkey. One of the consequences was that the PKK, the dominant Kurdish nationalist group, vied for Alevi allegiance and in 1994 established a publication, *Zülfikar,* laden with Alevi symbolism and meant to attract Alevi adherents. The PKK also attempted to win Alevi followers by adopting an anti-Turkish-state stance, associating state oppression with Turkish Bektashi-ism. Ultimately many Dersim Alevis were forced through threats of violence to choose sides.

Beginning in the late 1980s, a resurgence of *Alevilik* emerged both in Turkey and in the European Alevi diaspora. In Turkey, numerous publications appeared in bookstores, *Alevilik* was discussed in the national press, and there were efforts to establish a special Alevi desk at the Directorate of Religion in Ankara. No longer associated exclusively with the political left, some Alevis have moved to the right. In the 1980s, the popular annual festival at Haci Bektaş Köyü began to be patronized by politicians

of all persuasions, eager to win over the Alevi electorate; the state became a sponsor of the festival as sanctions against Alevi self-expression were lifted. Official support may have been meant "to counterbalance the growth of Sunni Islamism, but also to stop Kurdish nationalism making further inroads among Kurdish Alevis. There was some pressure to emphasize the Turkishness of Alevism." Since the 1990s, Alevi organizations and publications have proliferated in Turkey and Europe (predominantly in Germany). Internet technology has fostered new expressions of Alevilik, as it has facilitated transnational links.

See also AHL-E HAQQ; ALAWI; ALLAH; ANATOLIA; BEKTASHIS; JANISSARIES; KURDS; MADRASA; MUHAMMAD; MUHARRAM; SHIʿISM; SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS; TEKKE; TURKEY; YOUNG TURKS.

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RUTH MANDEL

ALEXANDRETTA

Mediterranean port city in Turkey, founded by Alexander the Great, 333 B.C.E.

Alexandretta (in Turkish, Iskenderun) is located in Turkey's Hatay province on the southeast shore of the Gulf of Iskenderun, just north of Syria. The ancient port city, noted for its fine harbor, was founded by Alexander the Great c. 333 B.C.E. It remained relatively small and unimportant in late Roman times, referred to as "Little Alexandria" (hence Alexandretta) in contrast to the much larger Alexandria in Egypt. It was captured by the Ottomans in 1515 under Selim I. Under Ottoman rule it became an important Mediterranean port and trade center. It developed into an outlet for trade during the 1590s due to its position as an overland trade route to the Persian Gulf. Because of rampant malaria, however, only its commercial functions kept it alive. Yet with the draining of its marshes, health improved—and thus so did commerce and production. With the agricultural boom that began around 1890, Alexandretta gained importance as an outlet for farm produce, but it was eventually eclipsed by Tripoli and Beirut, since the railroad came to it only in 1913.

During World War I, the *Sanjak* of Alexandretta was assigned to France under the Sykes-Picot Agreement. It became part of the French League of Nations mandate in Syria. Its population was an ethnic mix. In 1936, French authorities estimated that 39 percent were Turks, 28 percent Alawi Arab, 11 percent Armenian, 10 percent Sunni Arab, and 8 percent various other Christians. In December 1937 Turkey denounced its 1926 treaty of friendship with Syria, and France sent a military mission to Ankara threatening war. By July, France and Turkey came to an agreement to supervise elections in Alexandretta with 2,500 troops each. Fearing Italian expansionism, France had taken the Turkish side, arranging that twenty-two of the forty members of the new assembly would be Turkish. Alexandretta was ceded to Turkey in 1939.

Since annexation, Alexandretta has become strategically and commercially important to Turkey. During the Cold War, North Atlantic Treaty Organization planners assumed that the Turkish defense against a Soviet thrust into eastern Turkey could be supplied only through Alexandretta and Mersin. Consequently, a network of paved roads was built from the Gulf of Iskenderun into the eastern interior. Hostility between Iraq and Syria during the 1960s and 1970s threatened to close pipelines that brought Iraqi petroleum to Syrian ports. Iraq then

arranged with Turkey to build pipelines from Iraq to the Gulf of Iskenderun, at Yumurtalik and near Dortyol, just north of Alexandretta. The first oil arrived in 1977. Alexandretta's tidewater location at the point in Turkey nearest its major Middle Eastern markets led to the construction of a large steel plant. These investments have made Alexandretta one of Turkey's fastest growing cities. As of 2003, the population was 171,700.

See also TURKEY.

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JOHN R. CLARK
UPDATED BY NOAH BUTLER

ALEXANDRIA

Egypt's second largest city and main port.

Modern Alexandria stands on the site of the ancient city of the same name, founded by Alexander the Great in 331 B.C.E. It is located on a narrow spit of land with the Mediterranean Sea to the north and Lake Mariut to the south. The climate is temperate and averages 45°F during the winter months. Summer weather, although not as hot as in Cairo, is significantly affected by seaborne humidity and reaches 90°F.

Alexandria is bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, and the city's white sand beaches are a popular recreation spot for tourists and natives alike. © SAMER MOHDAD/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Alexander the Great's general Ptolemy I made the new port city his capital, and his Greek-speaking dynasty ruled until Cleopatra VII's suicide in 30 B.C.E. as Octavian's Romans invaded the country. Famed for its lighthouse, museum (primarily a research institute), and library, Hellenistic Alexandria continued as a great Mediterranean center of commerce and learning through Roman times. Eratosthenes, Euclid, and Claudius Ptolemy were among its mathematical and scientific luminaries, and Callimachus, Theocritus, and Apollonius stood out as Greek poets. Alexandria declined in importance under Islamic rule as Egypt's center of gravity returned inland to the Cairo area, where it remains today.

Contemporary Alexandria is the site of oil refineries, food-processing plants, and car-assembly works. The port is the main point of export for cotton and other agricultural products and is one of Egypt's major venues for imports. Because of its significance to the commercial activity of the city, the harbor underwent major expansions in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Its size and position made it the headquarters of the British Royal Navy's Mediterranean squadron until the end of World War II.

The history of modern Alexandria begins in 1798 when the French occupied it until 1801 as part of Napoléon Bonaparte's Egyptian campaign. By then the city's population had shrunk to under 10,000. Alexandria experienced a remarkable revival in the early nineteenth century when Muhammad Ali connected it to the Nile River by the Mahmudiyya Canal, dredged its long-neglected harbor, and made it the site of his naval building program and arsenal. By 1824, because of Muhammad Ali's agricultural policies, Egypt was experiencing the first of two significant cotton exporting booms. Both booms led to the arrival of numerous European entrepreneurs involved with cotton, a combination that was to govern Alexandria's commercial and political fortunes until the advent of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Suez Crisis of October 1956.

During the U.S. Civil War and the ensuing Union naval blockade of the Confederacy, Alexandria experienced a resurgence of its commercial and urban fortunes as well as a population explosion, reaching more than 180,000 inhabitants. With the

Sightseers float past the Bibliotheca Alexandria, an integrated cultural complex comprising libraries, museums, exhibition halls, educational centers, research institutes, and an international conference center. The Bibliotheca was built on the same site where the ancient library of Alexandria stood before it was destroyed by fire more than two thousand years ago. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

disappearance of cotton from the southern United States, European—especially British—mills turned to Egypt as the closest source of acceptable cotton. This in turn led to feverish economic activity aimed at improving agriculture and increasing urban development, manufacturing, and transport, and culminated in the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. The Egyptian viceroy had embarked on an ambitious program of modernization, heavily indebting his country to Europe. European financiers and entrepreneurs settled in Alexandria, transforming it from a marginal seaside town into the major entrepôt of the eastern Mediterranean. The seaport also became the financial and political center of the country while Cairo remained the political capital of Egypt. By World War I, Alexandria's population had grown to nearly half a million and had reached a million when King Farouk abdicated in 1952.

Unable to repay or service its debt, in 1876 Egypt came under the supervision of Anglo-French financial advisers. This helped fuel a nationalist reaction that culminated in the revolt led by Ahmad Urabi. In 1882 the British bombarded and then occupied Alexandria in order to crush the nationalist insurrection. The town was then rebuilt along European lines with clearly demarcated areas for business, industry, and residence. The new city grew into nearly separate European and indigenous sections reflecting, like much colonial urbanism, the demographic dichotomies of its population.

Thus from the middle of the nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth century, Alexandria was home to a polyglot population representing the Mediterranean littoral and comprising different national, ethnocultural, and religious backgrounds. The Greeks were the most numerous of the European communities, followed in number by Italians, British subjects (many of whom were actually Maltese), and Frenchmen. Poet Constantine Cavafy stood out in the vigorous Greek cultural scene; British residents

gathered at the Sporting Club and in 1901 imported the English public school model for Victoria College. Today Alexandria still presents a unique mixture of architectural styles, blending Venetian rococo, turn-of-the-century Beaux Arts, Bauhaus, Mediterranean stucco, and, more recently, postmodernist high-tech, although it lacks Cairo's rich Islamic architectural heritage.

Extensive beaches and the moderate summer climate turned the city into a seaside resort where the well-to-do and a growing middle class escaped the heat of the interior. Ra'́s al-Tin and especially al-Muntaza Palace became the royal family's summer residences. In 1934 the construction of the fourteen-mile-long Corniche along the city's coast began.

The vast and disproportionate wealth and commercial influence of Egypt's foreign population was still particularly glaring in Alexandria when Nasser's Free Officers seized control in 1952. It was no coincidence that Nasser chose Alexandria, that most European of Egypt's cities, to deliver a speech in July 1956 announcing the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The Suez Crisis, the ensuing Arab–Israel War of 1956, and expropriation of foreign-owned property and businesses led to a mass exodus of Alexandria's foreign residents in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Those developments also encouraged Nasser to Arabize and Egyptianize the city's ethos.

Until the 1960s Pompey's Pillar (actually dating from the reign of Diocletian), the Roman-era Kom al-Shuqafa catacombs, the Mamluk Qaitbay Fort, and the Greco-Roman Museum attracted cursory attention from Western tourists passing on their way to the richer antiquities of the interior. The shift from steamship to air travel, however, put Alexandria off the beaten path as Western tourists flew directly into Cairo. This often reduced Alexandria to an optional day trip from Cairo for Westerners on a nostalgic quest for the lost (and highly imaginary) city of Lawrence Durrell's *Alexandria Quartet.* The UNESCO-sponsored Bibliotheca Alexandrina opened in 2002, an attempt by the city to regain something of its cosmopolitan glitter by invoking the glories of ancient Alexandria. With perhaps five million people today, greater Alexandria sprawls westward toward El Alamein and Marsa Matruh, with beachside resorts devouring the once pristine desert coastline.

See also Arab–Israel War (1956); Free Officers, Egypt; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Suez Canal; Suez Crisis (1956–1957); Victoria College.

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ALEXANDRIA CONFERENCE OF ARAB STATES

See League of Arab States

ALEXANDRIA CONVENTION

Agreement made between the British and Muhammad Ali of Egypt to end Egypt's territorial aggression.

By the London Convention of July 1840, Muhammad Ali Pasha, ruler of Egypt, was given an ultimatum by the Ottoman Empire and its allies, to evacuate his troops from Anatolia and Syria. He refused, and Britain sent a naval squadron under Admiral Charles Napier to aid Syria. After the defeat of Egypt's forces in Syria, the British sailed to Egypt's port of Alexandria. Muhammad Ali recognized the weakness of his position and the strength of the forces arrayed against him; he sued for peace and signed the Alexandria Convention with Napier on 27 November 1840.

Under its terms, Muhammad Ali renounced his claims to Syria and agreed to yield to the Ottoman sultan. In return, the sultan granted him hereditary possession of Egypt. When news of the Alexandria Convention reached Europe, there was some concern that the terms had been too light; it was months

before the sultan fully endorsed the agreement, fearing additional empire-building on the part of Muhammad Ali. The convention was used to signify the end of Muhammad Ali as a threat to the integrity of the rest of the Ottoman Empire—an integrity that was thenceforth preserved with the aid of the European powers.

See also MUHAMMAD ALI.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

ALEXANDRIA PROTOCOL

See LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

ALEXANDRIA UNIVERSITY

Egyptian institution of higher learning founded in 1942.

Originally named Farouk University after the country's ruling monarch, Alexandria University is Egypt's second oldest state university, after Cairo University, which was founded in 1925. It was renamed following the 1952 revolution that toppled the monarchy.

The university depicts itself as heir to ancient Greco-Roman Alexandria's tradition of learning centered in its famous library and museum. In the fall of 1942, only weeks after Britain's defeat of invading Axis forces a few miles outside the city, King Farouk opened the new university. At its opening the university had colleges of arts and law (founded as branches of the Egyptian—now Cairo—University in 1938) as well as colleges of commerce, science, medicine, agriculture, and engineering. Colleges of dentistry, pharmacy, nursing, education, and tourism were added later. The language of instruction is Arabic although English is used in classes in dentistry, medicine, science, and some branches of engineering. As of 2002, the university enrolled over 130,000 students and had a teaching staff of 5,550 in sixteen faculties and six institutes. As at other Egyptian institutions of higher education, Alexandria University faces difficulties in maintaining quality in the face of overcrowding, insufficient funding, and a hard-pressed teaching staff.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE (1906)

Conference (16 January–7 April 1906) convened in Algeciras, Spain, to resolve the first Moroccan crisis over German attempts to break up the Anglo–French entente cordiale that dated from April 1904.

Anglo–French agreements recognized France's paramount interests in Morocco and Britain's special position in Egypt. They also secretly provided for the future partition of Morocco between France and Spain. In 1905, German chancellor Prince Bernhard von Bülow believed that Germany should demonstrate its great-power status and its right to be consulted over such issues. He pressed Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II to undertake a trip to Tangier (March 1905) to assure the sultan of German support for Moroccan independence. French Premier Théophile Delcassé resigned, and Germany appeared to have achieved its goal of disrupting French–British ties. Nevertheless, von Bülow insisted on pressing his advantage and forced the convening of an international conference at Algeciras in Spain to discuss France's reform program for Morocco.

The conference was a disaster for the Germans. Their policy of threats had so alienated governments and public opinion throughout Europe that Germany found itself all but isolated, with only the Austro–Hungarian Empire and Morocco itself siding with the Germans. On the surface, Germany appeared to have gained its goal, for the conference reaffirmed Moroccan independence. But it also approved French and Spanish control over the Moroccan police and banks, and it paved the way for

France to further encroach on Moroccan independence. The first Moroccan crisis encouraged closer relations between France and Britain and revealed the weakness of Germany's diplomatic position. By permitting French penetration of Morocco, it practically guaranteed the rise of Moroccan nationalist opposition to the agreements. Such opposition was almost certain to lead to further French encroachments over Morocco's merely formal independence. The Algeciras Act was doomed from the outset, culminating in the Agadir Crisis of 1911.

See also Agadir Crisis.

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Jon Jucovy

ALGERIA

This entry consists of the following articles:

Algeria: Overview
Algeria: Constitution
Algeria: Political Parties in

Algeria: Overview

Arab republic situated in North Africa.

The second largest country in Africa, the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria comprises an area of some 920,000 square miles in the Maghreb (North Africa). It is bounded by the Mediterranean Sea on the north, Morocco on the west, Western Sahara and Mauritania on the southwest, Niger and Mali on the south, and Libya and Tunisia on the east. Its population at the end of 2002 totaled about 32 million. Major cities include the capital Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Annaba.

Algeria is divided into the relatively moist and mountainous north, which is part of the Atlas Mountain system, and the Saharan south, which makes up roughly five-sixths of the country. The north consists of three major regions: the Tell Mountains near the sea, the steppe-like high plateaus to their south, and the Saharan Atlas farther down that abuts the desert. The Sahara, stretching south for 990 miles, is interrupted by several plateaus and in the farthest south by the great massif of the Ahaggar Mountains, whose highest point is about 10,000 feet and whose crystalline and volcanic peaks extend southwestward into Mali.

Climate

Northern Algeria, whose mountains are interspersed with agriculturally productive coastal plains and valleys, is subject to a Mediterranean subtropical climate. Most precipitation occurs between fall and spring; winter temperatures are cool. Summers are generally dry and can be subject to extremely hot winds from the south known as *chehili.* Some of the higher mountain areas to the center and east can receive annual rainfall of more than 39 inches, though averages in the north range between about 16 and 32 inches. Rainfall can vary greatly from year to year, however. A year of average and well-timed precipitation can be followed by one of extreme drought, which in turn can be succeeded by a winter of deluges, floods, and mudslides.

Average annual precipitation in most of the Sahara is less than 5 inches, and in some parts it is less than a half inch. Temperatures on many summer days can rise as high as 50°C and on some winter nights they can fall below freezing. Although rain-watered and irrigated agriculture are impossible in Saharan Algeria, the desert is sprinkled with a number of extremely productive oases. The region also contains most of the country's hydrocarbon reserves.

People and Culture

The 2003 Algerian population was estimated to contain 103 men for every 100 women. The fertility rate per woman was 2.79 and this, coupled with rapidly declining mortality rates, caused the population to grow at about 1.82 percent annually. In 2003 the percentage of Algerians under 15 years of age was 34.8, and the percentage over 65 was 4.1. Life expectancy for men was 68.7 years and for women, 71.8. Although the native population was overwhelmingly rural in the mid-twentieth century, by the beginning of the twenty-first it was slightly more than 60 percent urban. There was also a significant Algerian population living overseas, particularly in France, the former colonial power.

Map by XNR Productions, Inc. The Gale Group.

Arabs constitute the majority of Algeria's population, but Berbers are a significant minority. Since official censuses do not count ethnicity (the question has been politically charged since Algeria's independence), accurate determination of the percentages of each group is very difficult. Most estimates place the Arabic-speaking population at between 80 percent and 81 percent and Berber speakers at 19 percent to 20 percent. The majority of Berbers live in the mountainous Kabylia region east of Algiers and speak a variety of Berber known as Tamazight. Many of these Kabyles have moved to

the cities over the decades, however, especially to Algiers, where they constitute a significant percentage of the capital's population. Other Berber speakers are Chaouias in the Aurès Mountains, Mzabis in the northern Sahara, and Twaregs in the far south.

The sole official language of Algeria after it gained independence in 1962 was Arabic, but a range of distinct Arabic dialects was and is spoken. In 2002, after decades of dissension, Tamazight, the Berber language of the Kabyles, was accepted as the second official language. Large numbers of Algerians, especially the better educated and the Kabyles, still speak, read, and write French, the official language of the colonial era.

Religiously, the overwhelming majority of Algerians are of Sunni Muslim heritage, though considerable numbers are nonobservant or only partially observant. A small number of Muslims are Ibadiyya, offshoots of the Kharijis, Islam's first splinter sect. Some rural Muslims still adhere to certain Maraboutic, populist, mystical traditions. There are also a few small Christian communities left from the colonial era.

Since independence, the Algerian state has greatly emphasized the importance of education. Adult literacy rates, which for native Algerians were calculated at about 10 percent at the outbreak of the Algerian War of Independence in 1954 had risen to 66.7 percent by 2002. While twelve years of education for boys and ten years for girls are compulsory, rates of compliance are difficult to assess. Access to schools can be difficult in some rural areas and in cities many schools are greatly overcrowded, detracting from the quality of the experience. Fearing attacks from Islamist insurgents during the 1990s, many parents in dangerous regions decided to keep their children home. Algeria has established a significant number of universities and technical institutes and it is estimated that 11 percent of the relative age group currently access postsecondary education at some level.

History

In the sixteenth century Ottoman Turks began establishing the political entity stretching along the coast from Morocco to Tunisia which came to be known until the French conquest as the Regency of Algiers. That regency was technically a part of the Ottoman Empire, but from the late seventeenth century it was effectively an independent state in which actual power was held by local Turkish military dominated by the elite Janissaries whose leaders were the *deep.* Beyond the Algiers region (Dar al Sultan), the country was divided into three *beyliks,* or provinces, centered respectively on Constantine, Oran, and Médéa. Beys (governors), who were usually Turks, controlled provinces. The *deys* and *beys* ruled directly in cities and in productive agricultural areas close to them. In much of the country, however, they depended on tribes. These extended family networks were the predominant sociopolitical formations of the indigenous Berber and Arab inhabitants, whether settled farmers, transhumants, or nomads. The regency would enlist some tribes as *makhzan* allies, whose role was to maintain control and extract taxes from other tribes known as *rayat* (subjects), a divide and conquer strategy. In more distant plains mountain tribes were largely independent, though control over some could be gained through periodic alliances.

In 1830 France, motivated by a complex mix of strategic, commercial, and domestic political concerns, invaded Algeria. The Turkish Janissaries were defeated and deported within weeks of the French landing, and France quickly occupied major coastal cities. As the occupation expanded into the interior, resistance devolved upon provincial Turks and especially upon Arab and Berber coalitions, the most prominent of which was led by the Amir Abdelkadir in the 1830s and 1840s. It was not until 1871 that the major wars of conquest in the north ended. Subsequently, due primarily to the late-nineteenth-century European scramble for Africa, France expanded its occupation to include what is now the Algerian Sahara.

During the first decades of colonial rule Algeria remained essentially under control of the French military, and during the 1848 revolution it was formally annexed to France, with the major administrative subdivisions of Constantine, Algiers, and Oran becoming *départements* of the French Republic. As French business interests invested increasingly in the Algerian economy and its infrastructure, and as others acquired through expropriation and other means more and more of the most productive farmland, tensions grew between them and the military,

An oasis town in the Algerian Sahara. Oases spring up in the rare areas of the desert where there is sufficient water supply to irrigate crops. Often home to Berbers who remain unassimilated to modern Arab culture and language, these oases are increasingly becoming popular attractions for tourists. © CORBIS.

who often felt compelled to make concessions to native Algerians in order to reduce the levels of resistance soldiers had to handle. With the collapse of the French military during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, Paris inaugurated a process that effectively ceded power to the settlers. Although they were never more than one-ninth of the total population, the *colons* (settlers) created political, administrative, and judicial institutions that protected and enhanced their control over the means of production while assuring the subordination of native Algerians. Algerians were not citizens of the French Republic, but they were its subjects. A small minority of them were allowed to vote for members of local councils, the central *délégations financières,* effectively the Algerian parliament, but they were entitled to between one-fourth and one-third of the seats on the councils and twenty-one of sixty-nine in the central body. These arrangements assured the political dominance of the settlers and also their control of tax revenues, the largest proportion of which always came from the native Algerians. The judicial system was totally European except in certain areas of religious and family law. With the imposition of such institutions, the tribal and clan systems, which had once determined access to land and the major means of production, and mediated internal and external disputes, lost their relevance. Algerian society was progressively proletarianized, with more and more peasants working on French-owned farms, gradually moving into services in French-controlled cities, and, toward the turn of the twentieth century, beginning a slow but accelerating process of emigration to France. At the same time, the traditional colonial establishment had dismantled most of the traditional Arab/Islamic educational system and created a secular system in which the language of education was French. Due to financial considerations and *colon* fears of the challenges an educated native elite might present,

Muslim access to education was severely limited. The result was that by 1954 only 397,000 (12.75%) of elementary-age Muslim children were enrolled in schools. Only 5,308 Muslims were enrolled in secondary schools, and 686 attended the University of Algiers.

Resistance to colonial rule in the first decades of the twentieth century came from two sources: the small French-educated elite who began demanding the rights of citizens, and a smaller group, mainly clerics, who were educated in Arabic and refused to accept the imposition of French culture. Between the two world wars various strains of Algerian nationalism began to emerge. One was an Islamic reformist movement that expressed its demands in mainly religious terms; another was a liberal movement headed by French-educated elites that, after failing to persuade the *colon* government to grant them the rights of Frenchmen, began pressing for an independent Algeria based upon secular democratic principles. A third movement, with roots amongst the working-class expatriates in France, was essentially Marxist. But within each of the major strains there always remained significant ideological, tactical, and personal differences. With the establishment's continuing refusal to allow major reform, elements of these opposition movements fused into the National Liberation Front (FLN), which launched the War of Independence on 1 November 1954. The war, which lasted until 1962, was extremely violent and bloody, eventually taking the lives of more than 500,000, causing the displacement of as many as 3,000,000 rural Algerians, and wreaking havoc upon the economy. Although the Evian Accords of March 1962, which led to Algeria's independence on 5 July, guaranteed the personal and property rights of French Algerians, at least 90 percent of them chose to leave the country before the end of that year. In anger, departing settlers methodically destroyed libraries, hospitals, government buildings, factories, machinery, communications facilities, and other valuable infrastructure. Their departure also deprived Algeria of the largest part of its professional, technical, and managerial expertise, and accelerated the flight of private capital that had begun several years earlier.

In addition to major economic challenges, independent Algeria faced challenges of national identity. The motto of the new state was "Islam is our religion, Arabic is our language, and Algeria is our nation." Yet the exact role of religion was (and has continued to be) a major source of debate, as was the question of language. The operative language of independent Algeria was French, but a range of Arab dialects was spoken in a majority of homes and Tamzight was spoken by the largest Berber minority. Regional, clan, and personal divisions among elites also divided the emerging nation.

Ahmed Ben Bella, one of the FLN's historic leaders who spent the last years of the war in French prisons, became the country's first president. He led the way to the drafting of the country's first constitution, which declared Algeria to be a socialist state, transformed the FLN into the sole legal political party, and created a strong executive in which Ben Bella was both head of state and head of government. Many opponents of Ben Bella's rule were imprisoned or forced into exile. He was overthrown in June 1965 in a military coup led by Colonel Houari Boumédienne, who sought to preserve the position of the military but also inaugurated a period of collegial leadership which, at least rhetorically, reached out more broadly to the Algerian masses. Under him Arabization of the educational system moved forward, and he sought to give the Algerian economy greater independence through a program of industrialization based on core industries that were state enterprises funded by rapidly increasing income from the petroleum and natural gas sectors. At the same time, neglect or mismanagement of the agricultural sector caused Algeria, which had been agriculturally self-sufficient at independence, to import 65 percent of its foods by 1978. A second constitution, approved in 1976, sought to give the system a more populist image, but it is clear that the country was run by a coalition of technocrats and military, and that the gap between these elites and the masses was growing both economically and culturally.

When Boumédienne died in 1978, he was succeeded by Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, who promised Algerians "a better life" and brought about a small degree of economic decentralization. But a plunge in global oil prices made Bendjedid's task much more difficult. During the 1980s, protest against

The Sahara desert covers about five-sixths of Algeria and sustains little life, but it contains vast oil and natural petroleum deposits, which make Algeria one of the wealthiest nations in Africa. © PHOTOWOOD INC./CORBIS.

the regime took on a more and more Islamic character, with major demonstrations and even some guerrilla activity in the countryside. Acceleration of Arabization policies was one of Bendjedid's responses to this problem, but this approach generated increasing opposition from the Kabyles, who felt more excluded than ever. Major strikes that led to riots broke out in Algeria's biggest cities in October 1988, and the army and other forces repressed them with great violence. In the wake of the riots, President Bendjedid announced a series of liberalizing reforms that led to the adoption in 1989 of Algeria's third constitution, which formally ended Algeria's socialist single party system. Civic organizations proliferated, Algeria's press became arguably the freest in the Arab world, and, by 1991, thirty-three political parties had been formally recognized. The overwhelming majority of parties were secular, but the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS, or Islamic Salvation Front), a coalition of Islamists headed by Abassi al-Madani, a Muslim sociologist and educator, and Ali Belhadj, a popular preacher, became the most popular and far-reaching of them. In local and provincial elections held in June 1990, the FIS won 54 percent of the popular vote and gained control of 850 of 1,500 municipal councils. After much delay and contention, including the arrests of al-Madani and Belhadj, national parliamentary elections were held on 26 December 1991. FIS candidates won majorities in 188 of 430 electoral districts. It was clear that in runoffs for the remaining districts, which were scheduled for 16 January, FIS

A leading producer of leather, woolen, and linen goods, Constantine is the largest city in eastern Algeria and the oldest continually inhabited city in the country. Constantine is almost completely surrounded by the Rhumel Gorges, and access to the city is provided by several spectacular bridges. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS PRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION WASHINGTON, D.C.

would win an absolute majority of parliamentary seats.

On 11 January the military, most of whom had opposed the elections, forced Bendjedid to resign the presidency. It then canceled the second round of elections and created a collective interim presidency, the Haut Comité d'Etat (HCS, or High State Council) to fill out the remainder of his term to 1994. The FIS was banned and more of its leaders were imprisoned. In response to this military takeover, many dedicated Islamists began moving toward violent opposition. Initial targets were security forces, bureaucrats, and government facilities, but as time went on, more and more ordinary civilians were targeted, including intellectuals, cultural figures, individuals noted for their secular views, foreigners, and ultimately anyone who refused to support the Islamist insurrection. The most violent fighters came together as the Groupes Islamiques Armées (GIA, or Armed Islamic Groups), and a group closer to the FIS leadership, the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS, or Islamic Salvation Army) fought in a somewhat more targeted way. The Algerian security forces used brutal measures in fighting the insurrection, including mass executions, torture, killing of prisoners, and encouragement of fights between local villagers and clans. By the end of the twentieth century, as violence began to taper off, estimates of the number of Algerians killed in the civil war ranged between 100,000 and 200,000. Surveys showed, however, that the overwhelming majority of Algerians, even those who had originally supported the FIS, opposed the tactics of the guerrillas, and also that secular liberals and Berbers would support the repressive military to whatever extent was necessary to suppress the violent fundamentalists.

The minister of defense, General Liamine Zeroual, was appointed to the presidency of the republic in January 1994, and was subsequently elected to that office by 61 percent of the vote in multiparty elections the next year. It was Zeroual's government that drafted and submitted to a referendum Algeria's fourth constitution, which was accepted by the voters in November 1996.

Government

Algeria's current government is based upon the constitution of 1996 which, in the Algerian tradition, establishes a strong presidency and provides for a considerably less powerful prime minister. Presidents are elected to five-year terms and are limited to two terms. Although the constitution provides for a multiparty political system, it prohibits parties based on religion, ethnicity, or regionalism. There are two houses of parliament. The lower house, or National Assembly, is elected by proportional representation (as opposed to the district system of the 1989 constitution), and this is the primary legislative body. In the upper house, or Council of the Nation, two-thirds of the seats are filled by indirect election and one-third are appointed by the president. To become law, bills must be approved by three-fourths of the members of the upper house, thus assuring veto power for the executive branch.

Algeria's central government is augmented by subnational units at the *wilaya* (provincial) level, of which there are presently forty-eight, and at the local level by communes, of which there are 1,540. Each has executive and legislative assemblies. In addition, an intermediate unit, the *daira,* facilitates a number of administrative and legal issues that neither the *wilaya* nor the commune engages.

The most important political parties in Algeria are the Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND, or National Democratic Rally), which was created by the government; the FLN, whose strength faded in the 1990s but which outplaced the RND in the 2002 elections; the Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix (MSP, or Movement of Society for Peace) and the Mouvement National pour la Réforme (MNR, or National Movement for Reform), both of which are have Islamic roots; the Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS, or Socialist Forces Front) and the Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD, or Rally for Culture and Democracy), both of which are based primarily on Kabyle populations. There are also several smaller parties.

President Zeroual stepped down before the end of his five-year term, reportedly because of disputes with more hard-line generals. He was succeeded in 1999 by Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a long-time supporter of Boumédienne, and the first nonmilitary man to hold the office since the overthrow of Ben Bella. Fearing that the military who had nominated Bouteflika were going to rig the elections, most of his opponents withdrew days before the 1999 elections took place. Consistent with a campaign pledge to try to end the violence afflicting the country, Bouteflika put forth a Civil Concord policy that called for amnesty for most who would lay down their arms. The amnesty was approved in a popular referendum in September 2000. As Algeria moved closer to a functioning democracy in the first decade of the new century, many believed that a group of generals and retired military known popularly as *le pouvoir* still maintained ultimate control of the system. Some also believed that President Bouteflika had fallen out with the military and that the presidential elections of 2004 might prove to be a major political turning point for the country.

Economy

With a gross domestic product (GDP) of $54.6 billion in 2001, Algeria is one of the richest countries in Africa. Industry constitutes 47.7 percent of GDP, of which manufacturing represents 4.3 percent. Services contribute 40.6 percent to GDP and agriculture, 11.7 percent. The most important portion of the manufacturing sector is petroleum and natural gas. Although Algeria exports some consumer products to neighboring North African countries, the majority of exports are from the hydrocarbon sector, which uses tankers for oil and a trans-Mediterranean pipeline and LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) for exporting gas. Money transfers from expatriates also contribute significantly to income. Algeria imports many important consumer products, including about two-thirds of its foods and many household items. Its most important trading partners continue to be France and other countries of the European Union.

Beginning in the 1980s, with balance of payments worsening and foreign debt rising, the international community put Algeria under increasing pressure to restructure and privatize its economy. Important manufacturing sectors were privatized during the 1990s, but the government, led by the military, kept majority control of the hydrocarbon sector. During several of the tumultuous years of the 1990s annual growth of the economy was negative, but it had rebounded to 1.6 percent by 1999 to 2000. This growth rate is still lower than the rate of population increase, however. Roughly 25 percent of the workforce is employed in agriculture, 26 percent in industry, and 49 percent in services. The unemployment rate in 1997 had risen to 28 percent, and in 2000 GDP per capita was $1,750, with very large distributional inequities. As violence subsided in the first years of the new decade, domestic and foreign investment increased somewhat, raising hopes for accelerated economic growth.

See also Algerian Family Code (1984); Algerian War of Independence; Algiers; Algiers, Battle of (1956–1957); Annaba; Belhadj, Ali; Ben Bella, Ahmed; Bendjedid, Chadli; Berber; Boumédienne, Houari; Bouteflika, Abdelaziz; Constantine; Evian Accords (1962); Front Islamique du Salut (FIS); GIA (Armed Islamic Groups); Ibadiyya; Islamic Salvation Army (AIS); Kabylia; Madani, Abassi al-; Mzab; Oran; Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA); Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND); Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD); Twareg; Zeroual, Liamine.

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John Ruedy

Algeria: Constitution

Algeria has had four constitutions, in 1963, 1976, 1989, and 1996.

Algeria's four constitutions reflect its political development since attaining independence from France in 1962. The first two constitutions illustrated Algeria's commitment to socialism in its state-building. The third constitution responded to the turmoil wrought by the October 1988 riots. The civil war of the 1990s influenced the framing of the fourth and present constitution. Algeria's postcolonial constitutional history has in many ways been an existential project—an effort to define a nation. The four constitutions collectively indicate the evolution of that difficult process.

The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) successfully led the political struggle against France, but it failed to present a complementary postcolonial political, economic, and social program. Roiling intraparty rivalries resulted in civil strife in the summer of 1962. Ahmed Ben Bella, supported by Houari Boumédienne, the commander of the external Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), seized power from the wartime Gouvernement Provisioire de la République Algérienne (GPRA). Ben Bella was selected prime minister by the Assemblée Nationale, whose chief authority was constituent—the crafting of a constitution. But Ben Bella and his FLN supporters ignored the Assemblée, drafted a constitution themselves, and forced its acceptance.

The Constitution of 1963 expressed the fervor of Algerian revolutionary nationalism and the authoritarianism of the Ben Bella government, the FLN, and the ALN. Taking into account the FLN's Tripoli Programme of June 1962, the constitution defined Algeria as a socialist state committed to the anti-imperialist struggle internally and externally. It extolled *autogestion*—the spontaneous takeover by self-management committees of properties abandoned by colonial settlers *(pieds-noirs)*—as the model and means to assert socialism and egalitarianism. The FLN, described as "the revolutionary force of

Algerians wait to cast ballots in the 1996 constitutional election. Over 85 percent of voters approved the new constitution, which banned political parties based on religion or language, extended the president's powers, and affirmed Islam as the state religion. © Corbis-Sygma. Reproduced by permission.

the nation" in the preamble, acquired a political monopoly as the only permissible legal party. The military was also to be politically engaged. The executive branch received great power at the expense of the legislative, as the Assemblée Nationale was reduced to a subordinate ratifying body. The constitution proclaimed Islam as the official religion and Arabic as the official language. After a national referendum approved the document, Ben Bella was elected Algeria's first president.

The rival ambitions of Ben Bella and Boumédienne produced political and personal hostility. In June 1965 Boumédienne successfully deposed Ben Bella's government in June 1965 and suspended the constitution in favor of a Conseil de la Révolution. Boumédienne was a fervent socialist who favored strong leadership and direction in state-building. He pursued state plans along with simultaneous industrial, agrarian, and cultural revolutions. In 1975 Boumédienne declared the need to assess the country's development. This resulted in remarkable public discussions that produced a National Charter, which also framed Algeria's second constitution.

The Constitution of 1976 introduced a 261-member Assemblée Populaire Nationale (APN). Its representatives were nominated and slated by the FLN, which retained its predominant constitutional privileges. The APN served as a ratifying body for legislation proposed by the FLN political bureau and central committee. Mirroring Boumédienne's domination, the constitution enormously empowered the executive branch. The president was commander in chief of the armed forces and secretary-general of the FLN. When the APN was not in session, the president could rule by decree. The cabinet was also responsible to the president rather than to the APN. Civil and political freedoms—including rights for women—were stipulated but not in fact exercised.

The constitution reaffirmed the official roles of socialism, Arabic, and Islam. The constitution also vested Boumédienne with a mantle of legitimacy after a decade of authoritarian rule. Ironically, it soon played an important role in ensuring a smooth transition after his untimely death in 1978.

Algeria underwent substantial changes during the presidency of Chadli Bendjedid. State-planning shifted greater attention to the first sector. The FLN also became increasingly inert and corrupt. A minor, though significant, Islamist insurgency also occurred. The Family Code of 1984 reinforced the *shariʿa* and contradicted the Constitution of 1976 regarding gender equality. The plunge in petroleum prices in the mid-1980s severely affected the economy and exacerbated chronic unemployment. These conditions deepened the distress of the educated but disillusioned youth. In October 1988 riots broke out throughout Algeria, destabilizing the government. After suppressing the violent protests, Bendjedid shifted some of his power to the prime minister and promised reform. This was the historical context for the Constitution of 1989.

The new constitution redefined the Algerian republic as "democratic and popular," but not "socialist." The FLN also lost its hegemonic position, as the constitution stipulated the freedom "to form associations of a political nature" (Article 40), thereby projecting a multiparty political system. Human and civil rights—including "freedom of expression, of association and of assembly" (Article 39)—were guaranteed, though women's rights were not specifically stated as in the Constitution of 1976. Significantly, the army's role was relegated to nonpolitical responsibilities. Though the president still had predominant power—including rule by decree—the end of the FLN's political monopoly promised substantial reform and a greater role for the APN. The president could still select his prime minister and cabinet, but the APN had to approve his choices. Islam and Arabic retained their official status.

Subsequent legislation in July 1989 secured the right to organize political parties. By early 1990 Algeria was experiencing remarkable liberalization and freedom. Regional and local elections held in June 1990 astonished observers, as the recently organized Islamist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) won most of the contests. Scheduled parliamentary elections in June 1991 had to be postponed after violent confrontations between the FIS and the government. After the FIS decisively won the first round of the rescheduled elections in December, alarmed military and civilian elites forced President Bendjedid's resignation in January 1992, suspended the constitution, and canceled the elections. A Haut Comité d'Etat (HCE) took control of the government. These events provoked the civil war chiefly between the government and alienated Islamists that resulted in an estimated 150,000 deaths. A cautious reinstitutionalization began in January 1994 when the HCE dissolved itself after announcing the appointment of Liamine Zeroual as president. In presidential elections that were remarkably free (though the officially disbanded FIS was not allowed to participate) Zeroual was elected to a full term in November 1995.

The Constitution of 1996 symbolized Algeria's deliberate "redemocratization." Approved by referendum that many considered rigged, the constitution prohibited parties based on religion, regionalism, gender, and language. This was meant to neutralize the political potential of Berbers (primarily Kabyles) and Islamists. The president was limited to two terms but preserved the power to dissolve parliament, choose a prime minister and cabinet, and rule by decree. The constitution inaugurated a bicameral legislature. It regenerated the APN as a lower house and introduced the Conseil de la Nation (CN) as an upper house. The president received the privilege of appointing one-third of the membership of the CN. Subsequent elections continued Algeria's redemocratization. Parliamentary and local elections in 2002 were marked by the remarkable renascence of the FLN. Concurrently, roiling events in Kabylia resulted in the recognition of the Berbers' Tamazight as an official national language in 2002. The question of whether the constitution needs to be amended to include Tamazight with Arabic remains controversial.

Algeria's constitutional history illustrates a country defining and redefining itself. That existential quest continues today as Algeria exercises an albeit limited democratic process. Most observers believe that for Algeria to have an authentic democ-

racy, the military must withdraw from political affairs. In addition, accountability and transparency must be institutionalized. If pursued, this will probably mean more constitutional revision or reform.

See also Algeria: Political Parties in; Algerian War of Independence; Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN); Ben Bella, Ahmed; Bendjedid, Chadli; Berber; Boumédienne, Houari; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Front Islamique du Salut (FIS); Zeroual, Liamine.

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Phillip C. Naylor

Algeria: Political Parties in

Political parties have been an integral part of Algerian politics since the days of French colonial rule.

Until 1945, Algerian political parties included the Parti Social Français (PSF) and Parti Populaire Français (PPF), representing segments of the European settler population; the Parti Communiste Algérien (PCA), integrating educated Muslims, Jews, and Europeans; and the Reformist Ulama Movement, the Etoile Nord-Africaine (ENA), the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) and the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), representing the parties and associations of Algerian nationalism.

When the Algerian War of Independence commenced in November 1954, one major movement-party, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), became dominant. It incorporated under its wings nationalist movements and leaders of different generations; it even developed its own liberation army—the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). Only one movement sought to challenge, albeit with little success, the nationalistic monopoly of the (FLN). It was the Mouvement Nationale Algérien (MNA), led by the veteran nationalist Messali al-Hadj.

The FLN as Ruling Party and the Absence of Real Political Opposition

Upon independence, Algeria became a republic under President Ahmed Ben Bella, a key figure within the FLN. Under the first constitution (1963) the FLN regime eliminated all political competition that posed a danger to its rule. Dissident forces led by former FLN revolutionaries, among them Mohamed Boudiaf's Parti de la Révolution Socialiste (PRS), Belkacem Krim's Mouvement Démocratique de Renouveau Algérien (Democratic Movement for Algerian Renewal—MDRA), and Hocine Ait Ahmed's Front des Forces Socialistes (Front of Socialist Forces—FFS), were either outlawed or neutralized by the FLN regime, and several of their leaders were exiled or assassinated. The parties that were tolerated, yet not officially recognized, could not participate in free elections, and served as mere adjuncts to the government. The justification given for the political monopoly of the FLN under Ben Bella was that it had obtained a national mandate as a "front" and, therefore, all groups needed to function as adjuncts to the FLN-dominated regime.

Because the FLN had been mandated as a "front," trade unions, women's groups, and civil associations came under FLN control and enjoyed scant autonomy. These included the FLN-formed Union Nationale des Etudiants Algériens (National Union of Algerian Students—UNEA) and the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (General Union of Algerian Workers—UGTA). The UNEA was quite active throughout the 1960s despite government attempts to quell the movement. Strikes, boycotts, and other violent clashes between student groups and government officials continued to upset numerous university campuses until the UNEA was suppressed and dissolved in 1971. The student movement was subsequently integrated into the National Union of Algerian Youth (Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Algérienne—UNJA), a national conglomerate of youth organizations guided by the FLN.

The Algerian women's movement, which became institutionalized within the FLN's Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes (National Union of Algerian Women—UNFA), subordinate to the FLN, had made few inroads since independence. Those who played a significant part in the War of Independence were relegated to marginal public

roles. The only significant breakthrough for the women's movement was the Khemisti Law of 1963, which raised the minimum age of marriage. Although girls were still expected to marry earlier than boys, the minimum age was raised to sixteen for girls and eighteen for boys. This change facilitated women's pursuance of advanced education, but it fell short of the age-nineteen minimum specified in the original proposal.

Although the FLN was buttressed by the military and monopolized Algeria's public life under the presidencies of Ahmed Ben Bella (1962–1965), Houari Boumédienne (1965–1978), and Chadli Bendjedid (1978–1991), it lacked mass appeal. The central FLN leadership gradually lost touch with its regional branches and failed to mobilize the masses to endorse its domestic programs. The party's "self-management" socialist economy under Ben Bella, which intended to involve agricultural and industrial workers in the operation of state companies, soon gave way to an unpopular centralized socialist economy imposed from above. As the party branches on the local level became dormant, and bureaucratic inefficiency permeated the system, the FLN declined in popularity and was no longer regarded as a "front," as its name suggested.

By the 1980s, Algeria's economic polarization was such that 5 percent of the population earned 45 percent of the national income, and 50 percent earned less than 22 percent of the national income. Members of the party elite enjoyed privileged access to foreign capital and goods, were ensured positions in the helm of state-owned enterprises, and benefited from corrupt management of state-controlled goods and services. The masses, on the other hand, suffered from the increasing unemployment and inflation resulting from government reforms and economic austerity in the mid- to late 1980s. The riots of October 1988 indicated that the FLN had completely lost legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

Toward Reform: The Road to Free Elections and a Multiparty System

A new constitution in 1976 that was subsequently amended in 1979 was to sanction the proliferation of political parties and facilitate free elections. Yet, the articles referring to this matter were vague and, well into the 1980s, no real progress was made to enforce this policy. It was only under the new constitution of 23 February 1989—modified in 1996—that changes finally could be implemented. These came in the wake of large-scale riots in October 1988 protesting food shortages. President Bendjedid and the FLN were pressured to surrender their monopoly on power and institute democratic reforms. During the riots, thousands of young protestors were wounded and at least 100 were killed.

According to the constitutional reforms, Algeria had universal suffrage. Unlike in past years, the president of the Algerian Republic would be elected as the head of state to a five-year term, renewable once. He would become the head of the Council of Ministers and of the High Security Council. He would appoint the prime minister, who also would serve as the head of government. The prime minister was to appoint the Council of Ministers. The Algerian parliament became bicameral, consisting of a lower chamber, the National People's Assembly with 380 members, and an upper chamber, the Council of Nation, with 144 members. The Council of Nation would thereafter be elected every five years. Regional and municipal authorities were to elect two-thirds of the Council of Nation; the president would appoint the rest. The Council of Nation members were to serve a six-year term with one-half of the seats up for election or reappointment every three years. As had been the case throughout much of Algeria's recent history, and not part of the new reforms, the country is divided into forty-eight *wilayas* (states or provinces) headed by *walis* (governors) who report to the minister of the interior. Each *wilaya* is further divided into communes. The *wilayas* and communes are each governed by an elected assembly.

Chadli Bendjedid's decision to engage in constitutional reform signaled the downfall of the FLN. The 1989 constitution not only eliminated the FLN's monopoly but also abolished all references to the FLN's unique posture as party of the avant-garde. The new constitution recognized the FLN's historical role, but the FLN was obliged to compete as any other political party. By mid-1989 the military had recognized the imminent divestiture of the FLN and had begun to distance itself from the party. The resignation of several senior army officers from party membership in March 1989, generally interpreted as a protest against the constitutional revisions, also reflected a strategic maneuver to preserve

This poster urged Algerian voters to support President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's "Civil Concord" policy to help end years of antigovernment violence, which began after the military canceled elections that seemed likely to favor fundamentalist Islamic parties. Approval of this referendum in September 2000 led to amnesty for most militants, but the military continued to resist the dominant moderate parties' attempts at total democratization. **© AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.**

the military establishment's integrity as guardian of the revolution. In July 1991 Bendjedid himself resigned from the party leadership.

The legalization of political parties, further enunciated in the Law Relative to Political Associations of July 1989, was one of the major achievements of the revised constitution. More than thirty political parties emerged as a result of these reforms by the time of the first multiparty local and regional elections in June 1990; nearly sixty existed by the time of the first national multiparty elections in December 1991.

The Turning Point—Political Parties and Elections: 1990–2002

On 12 June 1990 the country's first free municipal elections took place. Chief among the numerous political parties contending for power were the ruling FLN; the Islamist fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut—FIS), founded in 1989 and led by Abassi al-Madani and Ali Belhadj; Hocine Ait Ahmed's pro-Berber Front of Socialist Forces (Front des Forces Socialistes—FFS); and another pro-Berber party—the Rally for Culture and Democracy (Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie—RCD). The results were stunning: The FIS won a majority of the municipal seats in the country's four largest cities—Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Annaba—as well as 65 percent of the popular vote and 55 percent of 15,000 municipal posts throughout Algeria. It won representation in 32 of the 48 provinces.

Support for FIS was part of the growing admiration in the Arab-Muslim world for Islamic fun-

damentalist leaders in the wake of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the parliamentary victory achieved in 1989 by the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Many of the voters used their votes to protest against low salaries, spiraling inflation, and limited economic choices for young people under the FLN regime. In fact, the vote for the fundamentalist party was not so much massive support for FIS as a reaction against the FLN's record of authoritarian rule and economic mismanagement and corruption.

Its electoral successes notwithstanding, FIS was somewhat vague from the outset about its objectives. It is known, however, that Madani struck an alliance with local merchants and espoused a free market economy in lieu of the FLN's state socialism. Both Madani and Belhadj described a woman's primary role as rearing a family, and limited women to such jobs as nursing and teaching. The local and provincial municipal councils, which serve five-year terms, have jurisdiction over such matters as renewal of liquor licenses, the type of activities allowed at cultural centers, and the issuance of permits to build mosques. Madani and Belhadj vehemently opposed public drinking, any form of dancing, and secular programming in the media.

At the time, in addition to the many secular parties that were newly created or had been revived after years of virtual clandestine existence, there also emerged Islamist parties who competed with the FIS. Among them two are noteworthy: the Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix (Society for Peace—MSP), also known at one time as Harakat al-Mujtama al-Islamiyya, or Hamas); and the Mouvement de la Réforme Nationale (Movement for National Reform—MRN). Both parties were moderate vis-à-vis central government control, sought to take part in the ruling cabinet, and opted for a gradual Islamization of society through religious education. The MSP and MRN shunned violence, unlike the FIS, which in the early 1990s developed the Islamic Salvation Army (Armée Islamique du Salut—AIS), a paramilitary force to struggle against the authorities.

The backing for FIS in 1990 and subsequently came primarily from the Arab population, which constituted at least 70 percent of the total Algerian Sunni Muslim population of approximately 28 million. The Berber Muslims, as well as the ethnically mixed Arab-Berber population, were prone to support secular parties, including the Berber parties, especially the FFS and RCD. Both the FLN and the FIS were challenged in the June 1990 elections by the Kabyles, members of the largest, most important Berber group. The Berbers demanded then, as they still do, greater political freedom and the ability to expand their cultural heritage. The RCD is especially stubborn about the need to augment the influence of their Tamazight Berber dialect. Besides the FIS, the other major beneficiaries of the 1990 elections were the FFS and RCD. The latter gained 8 percent of the municipal vote.

The gains made by Islamist and Berber parties prompted these forces to pressure the authorities to call for general parliamentary elections, which were scheduled for 27 June 1991. The elections did not take place, however. Fearing an Islamist victory, the army declared martial law and arrested, on 30 June 1991, the top FIS leadership, including Madani and Belhadj.

Under relentless pressure from all political parties, the government rescheduled new parliamentary elections for December 1991, with second-round runoffs planned for January 1992. These elections were to provide a serious national test for the new multiparty system; they were open to all registered parties. Voting was by universal suffrage and secret ballots, and assembly seats were awarded based on a proportional representation system. Only 231 of the 430 seats were decided in the first round of elections, in which 59 percent of eligible voters participated, but a FIS victory seemed assured by the Islamist command of 80 percent of the contested seats. The second round of elections never took place following the coup d' état on 11 January 1992 because the military canceled them to avert a sweeping Islamist victory. The coup also marked a temporary end to FLN rule, and led to the resignation of President Bendjedid. From this point until the parliamentary elections of 1997, Algeria was guided by a five-member High State Council, which was backed and manipulated by the military.

The canceling of the second round of elections, coupled with political uncertainty and economic

turmoil, led to a violent reaction on the part of FIS adherents and other Islamists. These elements organized themselves into the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the more extreme Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and a faction that seceded from it—the Salafist Group for Islamist Preaching. A campaign of assassinations, bombings, and massacres gained unprecedented strength. The High State Council officially dissolved and outlawed the FIS in 1992 and began a series of arrests and trials of FIS members that reportedly resulted in over 50,000 members being jailed. Despite efforts to restore the political process, violence and terrorism rocked Algeria throughout much of the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century. As many as 100,000 Algerians died as a result.

In November 1995 presidential elections took place despite the objection of some political parties to holding elections that excluded the FIS. Liamine Zeroual, who also headed the High State Council, was elected president by 75 percent of the vote. In an attempt to bring political stability to the nation, the Rassemblement Nationale Démocratique (National Democratic Rally—RND) was formed soon thereafter as the regime's new ruling party by Zeroual and a progressive group of FLN members. It was meant to constitute Algeria's major secular party alongside the declining FLN. Zeroual announced that presidential elections would be held in early 1999, nearly two years ahead of the scheduled time. In April 1999 the Algerian people elected Abdelaziz Bouteflika president with an official count of 70 percent of all votes cast. Bouteflika was the only presidential candidate that enjoyed the backing of the FLN and RND. His inauguration for a five-year term took place on 27 April 1999.

President Bouteflika's agenda focused initially on restoring security and stability to the country. Following his inauguration, he proposed an official amnesty for those who had fought against the government during the 1990s unless they had engaged in "blood crimes," such as rape or murder. This "Civil Concord" policy was widely approved in a nationwide referendum in September 2000. Government officials estimate that 85 percent of those fighting the regime during the 1990s, except for members of the GIA and the Salafists, accepted the amnesty offer and have been reintegrated into Algerian society. Bouteflika also launched national commissions to study educational and judicial reform, and to restructure the state bureaucracy. His government has set ambitious targets for economic reform and attracting foreign investors.

In the 2002 parliamentary elections the tables turned in favor of the FLN, which won a majority of 199 seats in the 389-body parliament; the RND suffered a devastating defeat, with its representation reduced to 47 seats. The Islamist MRN and MSP won 43 and 38 seats, respectively. The FFS and the RCD had called for a boycott of the vote because they expected fraud and because of strained relations at the time between Berber leaders and the regime. With an absolute majority in the legislature and the support of the RND and the moderate Islamists, the FLN has an opportunity to push forward reforms, but the party and President Bouteflika face resistance from the army—the real power holders who often oppose genuine reforms.

See also Algerian War of Independence; Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN); Belhadj, Ali; Ben Bella, Ahmed; Bendjedid, Chadli; Boudiaf, Mohamed; Boumédienne, Houari; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Front Islamique du Salut (FIS); GIA (Armed Islamic Groups); Hadj, Messali al-; HAMAS; High State Council (Algeria); Islamic Salvation Army (AIS); Madani, Abassi al-; Mouvement National Algérien; Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques; Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA); Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND); Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD); Zeroual, Liamine.

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Michael M. Laskier

ALGERIAN FAMILY CODE (1984)

The Algerian Family Code of 1984 sanctions, after years of internal debates, a conservative model of family in which the male kin have privileges and power over women.

After Algerian independence in 1962, fundamental questions arose concerning the trajectory of Algerian society. The status of women was intrinsic to these concerns and ensuing debates. Some women, the *mujahidas,* contributed very actively in the struggle against the French, serving as liaison officers, nurses, and even combatants, sometimes carrying bombs or weapons, as did Hassiba Ben Bouali, Zohra Drif, Jamila Bouhired, and Zoulaika Boujemaʿa. The necessity to improve the legal condition of women was recognized in the "charte nationale" but the conservatism of some Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) leaders, especially those close to Islamist forces, led to demands for a stricter enforcement of the Islamic law and traditions.

The tensions and debates between these two tendencies lasted from 1962 to 1984. There were many attempts to modify family laws during this period, and some minor changes were introduced. The first comprehensive codification project emerged in 1981, and was considered very conservative. Leaked to the press, news of this project catalyzed many demonstrations by women. The project was withdrawn, making this one the few examples of this kind in Algeria.

But with the rising popularity of Islamist movements in the face of economic failures of Algerian policies during the 1970s, a new code, almost the same as the earlier project of 1981, was presented and passed virtually without any discussion at the National Assembly in June 1984. It is still in force today.

The main provisions of this code are the following:

- minimum ages for marriage are 21 years for men, 18 for women;
- the necessity of a matrimonial guardian (the father or a close agnatic man has to consent to the marriage, not the bride) for a woman to get married;
- up to four wives allowed per man, the consent of the other wives not being required;
- husband's privilege of repudiation.

See also Algeria: Overview; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics.

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Rabia Bekkar

ALGERIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

See Parti du Peuple Algérien

ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

This war ended more than 130 years of French colonial rule over Algeria.

The Algerian war of independence began in the early hours of 1 November 1954 and ended officially on 3 July 1962, when France's President Charles de Gaulle formally renounced his nation's sovereignty over Algeria and proclaimed its independence.

The French occupation of Algeria, begun in 1830, led to a colonial situation in which a minority of European settlers and their descendants dominated the Algerian economy. They maintained that domination through monopolies of political power and the means of coercion. During the first half of the twentieth century, a series of initiatives by various indigenous leaderships sought first to secure meaningful political participation for the Muslim majority within the colonial system and later to negotiate autonomy, confederation, or independence. When these efforts proved fruitless, a group of radical young nationalists founded the Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA; Rev-

Police clear a street with tear gas after a demonstration by 20,000 French settlers turns into a riot in Algiers, 8 February 1956. The demonstration protested the arrival of French premier Guy Mollet, who was in Algeria to resolve French problems with Algerian nationalists. Mollet was pelted with tomatoes and rocks, and police had to use clubs to restore order. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

olutionary Committee of Unity and Action), which began, in the spring or summer of 1952, to plan an insurrection. Six CRUA members, together with three political exiles, are considered the *chefs historiques* of the Algerian revolution. The CRUA chiefs, led by Mohamed Boudiaf of M'sila, included Moustafa Ben Boulaid, Mourad Didouche, Belkacem Krim, Rabah Bitat, and Larbi Ben M'hidi. The external leaders were Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Khider, and Ahmed Ben Bella, who later became Algeria's first president.

Estimates of the number of militants taking part in the initial insurrection range from nine hundred to about three thousand. It began with attacks on French installations in several parts of the country, but the most effective actions took place in the Aurès region of the southeast. During the ensuing winter, the French managed to contain the insurrection, limiting its manifestations to distant and inaccessible regions. In August 1955, the leadership, concerned that neither the bulk of Algerians nor the European community were taking the insurrection seriously, decided to begin targeting European civilians in some twenty-six localities in the eastern part of the country. As many as 123 people were killed in what were called the Philippeville massacres. In outraged reaction, French forces responded by taking a far larger number of Muslim lives. These events served to polarize the two communities in such a way that a narrowly based insurrection became a nationwide revolution; thousands of men joined guerrilla units, while France rapidly built its own forces into the hundreds of thousands.

Muslim girls celebrate Algerian independence, July 1962. The Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962) claimed over 300,000 French and Algerian lives. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

In its initial proclamation, on 31 October 1954, the CRUA had announced the creation of a Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front) to which it had invited Algerians of all political persuasions to rally. As a result of the polarization following the events of August 1955, Algerian political classes across a broad ideological spectrum gradually closed down their independent operations and joined the FLN in revolution. By the summer of 1956, only Messali Hadj, long leader of the most radical wing of the Algerian nationalist movement but now bypassed by events, remained outside of the FLN.

In order to accommodate the dramatically broadened movement, the revolutionaries organized a clandestine congress in the Soumamm valley of the Kabylia during August and September 1956. It created a broad Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne (CNRA) to serve as a protoparliament and a Comité de Coordination et d'Éxécution (CCE; Committee of Coordination and Implementation) to bear the executive functions. One of the first decisions of the new executive was to initiate, at the end of September 1956, the urban warfare strategy that became known as the Battle of Algiers. A very visible phase of the war that the French managed to win by the middle of 1957, the recourse to urban warfare brought the war home in a physical way to the majority of Colons, who were urban residents, and attracted the attention of metropolitan Frenchmen and the wider world for the first time to the Algerian situation. Another result of the Battle of Algiers was that the severe French repression drove the top FLN leadership out of the country to Tunis. This in turn generated problems in communications and orientation between the external leadership and the internal *mojahedin.* These problems caused troublesome divisions within the movement that lasted throughout the war and beyond.

Between the fall of 1957 and the spring of 1958, the French army, now grown to roughly 500,000 men, succeeded in bringing most of Algeria under its physical control and was concentrating on limiting cross-border raids by Algerian guerrillas from Morocco and Tunisia. But the military were apprehensive. They feared that their achievements might be undone by the divided political leadership at home, which was sensitive to the violence involved in pacification and to growing world pressure. Thus, the army, under the leadership of General Jacques Massu and with the enthusiastic support of the colons, proclaimed the creation on 13 May 1958 of a Committee of Public Safety at Algiers. This challenge to government authority brought down the Fourth French Republic and propelled de Gaulle to power as head of the Fifth Republic, pledging an early resolution of the Algerian conflict. By the autumn of 1958, de Gaulle offered Algerians the opportunity of total integration as equals into the French republic, inaugurated a massive plan of economic renewal, and invited the revolutionary troops to join their French compatriots in a "paix des braves."

The CCE and the CNRA rejected these terms and, instead, created a Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement Provisoir de la République Algérienne; GPRA) at Tunis, with Ferhat Abbas at its head. From this point on, even though French forces remained in control of most of Algeria, the GPRA campaigned to win world support for Algerian independence. The campaign centered primarily on developing and eastern bloc countries and upon the United Nations. Within a year, de Gaulle began speaking of Algerian self-

determination. The war of independence might have ended soon afterward, but there were obstacles. Principal among these was the fate of the Sahara, in which French companies had recently discovered oil. Even more important was the resistance of the colon community, which increasingly found more in common with the military. During 1960 they created a Front de l'Algérie Française in order to fight against independence and in January 1961 the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS; Secret Army Organization), which eventually led an armed insurrection against French civil authority and launched a campaign of terror against Muslim Algerians.

After several abortive attempts at negotiations, the provisional government and France finally signed the Evian Agreement on 18 March 1962, which led to unequivocal independence in July. The war had caused the dislocation from their homes of about 3 million Algerians, the destruction of much social and economic infrastructure, and the deaths of several hundred thousand Algerians. The rebuilding tasks faced by independent Algeria would be formidable.

See also Abbas, Ferhat; Ait Ahmed, Hocine; Ben Bella, Ahmed; Ben Boulaid, Moustafa; Ben M'hidi, Muhammad Larbi; Bitat, Rabah; Boudiaf, Mohamed; Colons; Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA); Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne (CNRA); Didouche, Mourad; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Hadj, Messali al-; Kabylia; Khider, Mohamed; Krim, Belkacem; Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS).

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John Ruedy

ALGIERS

Capital of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.

Algiers is located at the northwestern end of a large bay in the Mediterranean Sea. The city's industrial activity is concentrated to the south and east, on the plain of the Mitidja. The region contains 48 percent of the country's factories and 55 percent of its industrial workforce. In 2003, it had a population of 3 million.

The city's origins reach back to the Phoenicians and Romans (300 B.C.E.–100 C.E.). Berbers reestablished Algiers in the ninth century, naming it al-Jazaʾir (islands) because of rock outcroppings in the bay. In the early sixteenth century, Algiers was drawn into Castile's overseas expansion and the Ottoman reaction against it. After expelling the Spaniards in 1529, the Ottomans established a corsair principality. At its height in the 1600s, the city, with perhaps forty thousand inhabitants, held as many as twenty thousand Christians for ransom. In the eighteenth century, Western states forced an end to corsair activities and Algiers began to specialize in grain exports. A dispute over payment for grain deliveries to Napoleon led to the occupation of Algiers by the French (1830).

French army rule gave way to French civilian control in 1871. Both the military and the settlers initially erected their residential and commercial structures in the lower part of the Casbah (qasba, citadel), as the pre-1830 part of Algiers was called. In contrast to other areas of North Africa, no new European city center sprang up outside the existing one.

The end of the nineteenth century was a time of rapid population increase (by 41 percent from 1886 to 1896, and then to a total of 155,000 settlers and 45,000 Muslims by 1918) and considerable commercial wealth, particularly from wine exports. Public building included a central train depot and a new harbor (both completed by 1896), streetcar lines (begun in 1896), and municipal and educational infrastructures (water, gas, hospitals, a university). Ambitious plans to turn the entire lower Casbah into a city with wide boulevards were quashed by the military, but the incorporation of the suburb of Mustapha in 1904 opened the way for a more systematic southern expansion. Regional Algiers was born.

In the new city, the French rejected the Arab architecture of the Casbah for French bourgeois classicism, while the residents of the wealthier suburbs

opted for imitations of Turkish gardens (*jinan*) architecture. After World War I, European monumental classicism took over, and in the 1930s functional modernism began to emerge. Construction of a new waterfront neighborhood pushed the Casbah into the hills, where it was greatly reduced in size. The former corsair city was finally cut off from the sea.

During the interwar period, Muslim agriculture in Algeria reached its productive limits on the less fertile lands that the colonists left for the indigenous population. The capital offered alternative employment in the port, shipyards, mechanical industries, and trucking firms. In addition, there were small-scale construction firms, an industry for the processing of agricultural products, and a large administrative sector. French settlers, however, held most of the skilled jobs. Muslim rural immigrants provided the unskilled labor. They crowded into shantytowns in the hills or into the Casbah, which had twice as many people as it had held in 1830, packed into one-quarter as many buildings.

In 1954, overwhelming agrarian inequality and misery triggered the Algerian War of Independence. The war hastened the rural exodus, and around 1956, for the first time, more Muslims than Europeans lived in Algiers. In 1957, the war extended to the city, where it was fought briefly in the Casbah's maze of cul-de-sacs. In 1962, France's President Charles de Gaulle grew weary of the political divisions the war was creating in France, and Algeria achieved its independence. Furious settlers scorched parts of downtown Algiers before leaving the city en masse (311,000 left between 1960 and 1962).

In a mad rush, many of the 550,000 Muslims in town occupied dwellings vacated by the settlers. The new independent government nationalized the vacated housing stock and introduced rent controls. The colonial pattern of urbanization continued: the central city of mixed business and residential structures; the decaying, overpopulated Casbah; the well-off (uphill) and poorer (downhill) suburbs; and the shantytowns in the hillside ravines. Free-market rents continued in the traditionally Muslim quarters, which were composed of mostly low-grade dwellings. Rural-urban migrants flowed into the shantytowns and slums, creating a total of 1 million inhabitants toward the end of the 1960s.

A state-led industrialization program that lasted from 1971 to 1985 provided Algiers with factories for mechanical and electrical machinery, processed agricultural goods, building materials, textiles, wood, and paper. These attracted new masses of migrants. At first, the government neglected to provide adequate housing for the new workers. Uncontrolled urban sprawl moved into Algiers's rich agricultural belt around the bay. When the population reached nearly 2 million in the early 1980s, the government finally began a program of urban renewal. Plans were made to move squatters to solid housing or back to their villages, to rehabilitate the Casbah, and to build subways and freeways to relieve urban gridlock.

Low world market prices for oil and gas from 1986 to 1992 triggered a severe financial crisis and brought the renewal program to a halt. The subsequent civil war (1992–2001) between the military, in control of the government, and Islamist challengers brought Algiers extortion rackets, bombings, shootouts, and abductions. Villagers fled from even worse carnage in the countryside, swelling the population of Algiers to over three million during the 1990s. At the same time, many middle-class professionals fled abroad, taking with them much of the city's previously flourishing intellectual and artistic culture. The civil war had abated considerably by 2001, but insecurity continued to a degree in the capital and country. Early in the twenty-first century, unemployment in the city was estimated at 35 percent.

See also ALGERIA: OVERVIEW; ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; DE GAULLE, CHARLES.

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PETER VON SIVERS

ALGIERS AGREEMENT (1975)

Agreement between Iran and Iraq to settle border and political disputes.

On 6 March 1975 Iran and Iraq announced in Algeria that they had agreed to recognize the *thalweg* (middle) of the Shatt al-Arab River as their common border and to resolve other contentious issues.

Their riparian border had become a major issue in 1969 when Iran unilaterally abrogated a 1937 treaty that had reaffirmed, with the exception of a *thalweg* line at the Iranian port of Abadan, an Iran-Ottoman Empire treaty of 1913 establishing the common boundary along the Iranian shore of the Shatt al-Arab. Iran claimed that the 1937 treaty had been signed under British duress and that the principle of *thalweg* should be applied along the entire course of the river. Iran's action led to a series of border clashes beginning in 1971. Algeria mediated the 1975 agreement, which led to the signing of a bilateral border treaty at Baghdad in June.

Iraq renounced the Algiers Agreement and abrogated the Baghdad Treaty in September 1980 just before launching its invasion of Iran. Iran and Iraq accepted UN Security Council resolution number 598 establishing a cease-fire in 1988, but most of the graduated steps, including those pertaining to their common border, remained unimplemented in the early 2000s. However, even though the Algiers Agreement has not been reinstituted formally, Iran and Iraq have observed a de facto *thalweg* as their border in the Shatt al-Arab since the fall of 1990.

See also Shatt al-Arab.

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Mia Bloom
Updated by Eric Hooglund

ALGIERS, BATTLE OF (1956–1957)

Events generally dated from September 1956 to May 1957 that marked an important turn in the 1954–1962 Algerian war for independence from France.

In Algeria, key developments led to the decision by the nationalist leadership of the Front de Libération National (FLN; National Liberation Front), which had largely concentrated on organizing rural opposition to French rule, to bring the war to the capital, Algiers, and other urban centers. These included an increasingly effective French military response to the nationalist insurgency in the countryside as well as the desire on the part of the FLN leadership to both demonstrate its standing in Algerian society and to focus international attention on conditions in Algeria.

The decision to launch a coordinated campaign in Algiers was accompanied by the announcement by the FLN of an eight-day national strike. Organized by Muhammad Larbi Ben M'hidi, a founding member of the executive leadership of the FLN, and Saadi Yacef, the military commander of Algiers, the campaign itself was launched with a series of bombings and assassinations carried out against both the French official and civilian populations. Targets included cafés, restaurants, and offices as well as the French police, soldiers, and civil officials. These acts of urban violence capped a series of similar events carried out by parties on both sides in the summer of 1956.

France's response was harsh. The French commander-in-chief, Raoul Salan, assigned command of operations to General Jacques Massu, commander of the Tenth Paratroop Regiment. Massu turned ruthlessly to the task—his troops broke the back of the general strike by rounding up strike participants and forcing open shops and businesses. More violent still were the measures taken to suppress the FLN network under Yacef and his lieutenant, Ali la Pointe (né Ali Amara). Adopting tactics used in the rural areas, Massu isolated the Arab Muslim quarters and subjected them to massive searches and military assaults. "Most notably he instituted widespread and systematic use of torture as an aid to interrogation" (Ruedy, p. 168). Among the large numbers of victims of interrogation was Ben M'hidi. In 1958, publication of *La Question,* a firsthand account of torture by French Communist editor Henri Alleg, brought home to many in France the nature of French activities in Algeria.

Massu's measures were in the short term effective; by the summer of 1957, Yacef was in prison and la Pointe dead, their network largely silenced. The level of seemingly indiscriminate violence had soured popular support for the FLN, while continued French suppression led to the flight of the surviving FLN leadership to Tunisia—hence the weakening of its command and contact with the movement within Algeria. In the long term, however, French policies and the nine-month-long conflict in Algiers generated considerable world attention and sparked heated debate within France

over Algeria and French colonialism. Negative press outside France and growing disillusionment within France contributed in a significant manner to the ultimate decision by the administration of Charles de Gaulle to accept Algerian independence.

The events in Algiers were the subject of an important film by Gillo Pontecorvo, an Italian director. Released in 1966, the documentary-style dramatic *La Battaglia di Algeri* contributed to the angry debate in France and, more significantly, brought home to a world audience sharp images of French policies in Algeria. Filmed in a grainy black and white and starring, among others, Saadi Yacef, the docudrama remains widely shown on university campuses in the United States and Europe.

See also Ben M'hidi, Muhammad Larbi; Front de Libération National (FLN).

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Matthew S. Gordon

ALGIERS CHARTER

The document that redefined the goals of Algeria's FLN after the country gained its independence.

The Algiers Charter is a 176-page document adopted by a congress of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front) held in Algiers between 16 April and 21 April 1964. The processes of drafting and adoption were carefully managed by President Ahmed Ben Bella and his followers. The charter's aims were to reshape the FLN, a war-time organization that had led Algeria to independence, into an avant-garde party that would become the motor of social and economic revolution and to sharpen the ideologies and strategies of that revolution.

The charter formalized the organization of the FLN and defined, at least in theory, its relationship to government. Highly populist in tone, it reaffirmed Algeria's socialist option and laid out plans for agrarian reform and for nationalization of most major sectors of the economy. The Algiers Charter remained until 1976 the official statement of Algeria's political and ideological orientation.

See also Ben Bella, Ahmed; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).

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John Ruedy

ALGIERS SUMMIT (1973)

See Arab League Summits

ALI

See Islam

ALIA, QUEEN

[1948–1977]

Queen of Jordan, 1972–1977.

Alia Baha al-Din Tuqan was born a Palestinian in Cairo, 25 December 1948, the daughter of the Jordanian ambassador to Egypt, Baha al-Din Tuqan of Salt, and Hanan Hashim of Nablus. Ambassador Tuqan served in several other diplomatic posts, including Istanbul, London, and Rome, allowing Alia and her two brothers broad multicultural experience. Alia completed her undergraduate degree in political science at Loyola University's Rome Center and pursued graduate studies in business administration at Hunter College in New York. She then took a post in public relations for Alia Royal Jordanian Airlines. She married Jordan's King Hussein ibn Talal in 1972 and was named queen. They had two children, Haya (born in 1974) and Ali (born in 1975), and adopted a third, Abir (born in 1972). Known for her warm personality, intelligence, and wit, Queen Alia was devoted to her family and her country. She sponsored numerous charities and development programs and was particularly concerned with the welfare of children. Her active support for orphanages, schools for the deaf and blind, mobile medical units for the rural poor, and training cen-

ters for the physically and mentally handicapped established a model for women's participation in public affairs in Jordan as well as among her native Palestinians. Queen Alia died in a helicopter crash during a storm on 9 February 1977, returning from an inspection of an orphanage she had funded in southern Jordan. Her children carry on her charitable work through various foundations.

See also Hussein ibn Talal; Tuqan Family.

Tamara Sonn

ALI NASIR MUHAMMAD AL-HASANI

[1939–]

A Yemeni politician and government official.

Born in 1939, Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani is a member of the Dathina tribe from Abyan, in the rugged up-country northeast of Aden. An early activist in the National Liberation Front in the 1960s, Ali Nasir served as the South Yemen's prime minister throughout the 1970s. This forceful but moderate politician served as president of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and head of the ruling Yemeni Socialist Party from late 1980 until 1986. This period was distinguished by a pragmatic approach to domestic policy and by broadly cooperative external relations, most notably with the Yemen Arab Republic, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Fearing an imminent coup by senior domestic opponents, Ali Nasir launched a bloody preemptive attack against his enemies in early 1986; it failed and he and many of his supporters were forced to flee abroad. Ali Nasir took up exile in Damascus, from where he was able to influence in Yemeni politics only indirectly and from a distance. Many of his civilian and military supporters who fled north soon aligned themselves with President Ali Abdullah Salih before Yemeni unification in 1990 and then sided with the Salih regime in the 1994 civil war; some of these supporters have attained high positions in that regime.

See also National Front for the Liberation of South Yemen; Salih, Ali Abdullah; Yemeni Socialist Party.

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Robert D. Burrowes

ALI, RASHID

See Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-

ALI RIZA

[1858–1930]

Ottoman Turkish landscape painter.

The son of an army officer, Ali Riza was born in Üsküdar, the district on the Asian shore of Istanbul. A pioneer of modern painting in Ottoman Turkey, Ali Riza was graduated from the Ottoman Empire's military academy and taught art there for many years. Like other nineteenth-century Ottoman artists, he used new brush techniques to create color effects, especially in his scenic watercolors and oils depicting Istanbul and Üsküdar.

Through his teaching and his detailed ornamental landscapes, Ali Riza was instrumental in the spread of secular concepts in painting in a culture long accustomed to nonrepresentational Islamic art forms.

See also Istanbul; Ottoman Empire; Üsküdar.

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David Waldner

ALI, SALIM RABBIYYA

See Rabbiyya Ali, Salim

ALISHAN, GHEVOND

[1820–1901]

Armenian writer and historian.

Ghevond Alishan, baptized Kerovbe Alishanian, was born in Constantinople (now Istanbul) and attended an Armenian Catholic school before going to Venice to continue his education at the Mekhitarian monastery. He joined the Armenian Catholic order of monks known as the Mekhitarians in 1838 and later was ordained a priest. Although the author of a number of religious works, Alishan spent his adult years as an instructor in the educational institutions maintained by the Mekhitarians. Early on, he developed an interest in Armenian folklore and had turned to composing poetry. The last third of his life was devoted solely to scholarship.

Alishan gained fame as a prodigious writer of historical works. He published a twenty-two-volume series of Armenian primary sources from the manuscript collection in the Mekhitarian monastery. He also issued a set of large, illustrated volumes on various provinces of historical Armenia—*Shirak* (1881), *Sisvan* (1885), *Ayrarat* (1890), and *Sisakan* (1893)—containing therein all the geographical, topographical, historical, architectural, and other information culled from ancient and contemporary sources. These volumes provided the basis for the development of a strong sense of national identification with Armenia among Armenians in expatriate communities and among younger generations of Armenians. These people began to perceive of Armenia as a land imbued with history and creativity and not just desolation and oppression. In the last year of his life, on the occasion of the two-hundredth year of the founding of the Mekhitarian order, Alishan issued his culminating work, called *Hayapatum* (Armenian history), in which he arranged selections from Armenian historians into a comprehensive narrative history.

While most Armenian translators put works from French and German literature into Armenian, Alishan was one of the rare figures of the nineteenth-century Armenian cultural renaissance who also learned English. He traveled to England in 1852 and published that same year the translation, in Armenian, of a section of Milton's *Paradise Lost.* Subsequently he issued translations of Byron and Longfellow. In 1867 he published his *Armenian Popular Songs Translated into English,* believed to contain the first English renditions of Armenian poetry. Alishan died in Venice.

ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

ALI SUAVI

[1838–1878]

Ottoman intellectual.

Born into a working-class family in Istanbul, Ali Suavi became a teacher in *ruşdiye* schools (for adolescents) in Bursa and Filibe before being dismissed by an irate governor for his unorthodox ideas. He traveled to Paris and London and there joined such individuals as the poets Namik Kemal and Ziya Paşa, members of the Young Ottomans. In 1867, Ali Suavi became the editor of *Munbir,* a Young Ottoman newspaper devoted to issues of government reform.

Ali Suavi was deeply religious and passionately devoted to the unification of all Turkic-speaking peoples; he soon broke with the other Young Ottomans, who were more interested in the reform of the Ottoman Empire along the lines of European liberalism. After opposing Midhat Paşa, grand vizier of the empire, and the Constitution of 1876, Suavi gained the favor of the autocratic Sultan Abdülhamit II, and he was rewarded with an appointment as director of the Galatasaray Lycée. But Ali Suavi soon became dissatisfied with the new sultan, and after the ignominious defeat of the Ottomans in the Russo–Ottoman War of 1877–1878, Suavi led a coup attempt to restore the deposed Murat V to the throne. The coup failed, and Ali Suavi was executed.

See also ABDÜLHAMIT II; GALATASARAY LYCÉE; MIDHAT PAŞA; NAMIK KEMAL; RUSSIAN–OTTOMAN WARS; YOUNG OTTOMANS.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

ALI, WIJDAN

[1939–]

A Jordanian artist and art historian.

Princess Wijdan Ali, who often goes by the name "Wijdan," was born in 1939, in Baghdad. She is a former diplomat, a painter and art historian, the founder and director of the Jordan National Gallery

of Fine Arts, a member of the Jordanian royal family, and the author of two major books on contemporary Islamic art. She holds a B.A. from the Lebanese American University (1961) and a Ph.D. in Islamic art history from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (1993). She trained under Armando Bruno and Muhanna Durra. The latter influenced her early abstract works on the expressive properties of color. A second body of work includes landscape paintings of the Jordanian desert. She is best known for her recent contributions to the developing tradition of Islamic art, which experiments with the abstract and graphic elements of Arabic calligraphy. This foray into the aesthetics of the Arabic language as a vehicle for connecting with her roots and exploring issues of tragedy and injustice was especially motivated by the onset of the 1991 Gulf War. Both her art and her writings have contributed to the development of a recognized school of modern Islamic art in the Arab world and beyond.

See also ART; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION.

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JESSICA WINEGAR

ALIYAH

Hebrew term for Jewish immigration to Palestine.

The Hebrew word for "ascent," *aliyah* (also *aliya*) is the term used in both religious tradition and secular Zionism to refer to Jewish immigration to Palestine. Within those ideological frameworks, emigration from Israel is called *yeridah* (descent).

During the almost two-thousand-year absence of Jewish sovereignty in the Holy Land, Palestine continued to play a significant role in traditional Jewish culture. Small Jewish communities persevered in Jerusalem, Safed, and a few other areas, aided by contributions from Jews in the Diaspora. Some Diaspora Jews visited Palestine, others actually managed to settle there on a more permanent basis, and others arranged to be buried there. Overall, the numbers who actually immigrated were small. During the nineteenth century, with the emergence of the Zionist movement, as well as a growing deterioration in the condition of Jews in Europe, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased. From that time until the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, historians and demographers have categorized various waves of immigration, or *aliyot.*

The first *aliyah,* or wave, lasted from 1881 to 1903. It was comprised of 30,000 to 40,000 Jews, most of whom were from Eastern Europe. They were part of a much larger emigration of Jews out of Eastern Europe at the time, sparked by economic, political, and physical persecution, especially pogroms. The vast majority who fled went to the United States, but many of those who had been in the early Zionist movements went to Palestine and, with support from Baron Edmund de Rothschild, established agricultural communities, including Petah Tikvah,

Jewish refugees arrive in Haifa, Palestine. From 1881 until the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, five successive waves of Jews immigrated to Palestine, many fleeing poor economic conditions and political persecution in their home countries. **© HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

A ship bearing hundreds of Jewish immigrants steams into Haifa in 1946, flying a banner instructing Palestine to "keep the gates open, we are not the last." © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Zikhron Yaʿacov, Rehovot, Hadera, and Rishon le-Zion. During this period some 2,500 Jews from Yemen also emigrated to Palestine.

Another series of pogroms in Russia in 1903 and 1904 led to the next wave, the second *aliyah,* which numbered between 35,000 and 40,000 (mostly socialist-Zionists) and lasted until the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Among them were the pioneers of the kibbutz movement and the labor Zionist establishment in the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine.

The Balfour Declaration as well as the Russian Revolution and its aftermath sparked the third *aliyah.* Between 1919 and 1924 another 35,000 Jews, mostly from Russia and Poland, immigrated and contributed to the early pioneering efforts in building up the Yishuv, including the establishment of the first cooperative settlements, *moshavim.*

The fourth *aliyah,* which lasted from 1924 to approximately 1930, differed from the previous waves in that it was sparked almost exclusively by economic conditions. As a result of a series of harsh taxation policies in Poland, some 80,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine, and the vast majority settled in the developing urban center, Tel Aviv. It may be assumed that a significant number of them would have preferred immigrating to the United States but were prevented from doing so by the restrictive immigration acts of 1921 and 1924, which brought immigration into the United States to a halt. That assumption is bolstered by the relatively high emigration rate among those of the fourth *aliyah* who settled only briefly in Palestine.

Approximately 225,000 Jews, primarily from Eastern Europe and also including a significant minority from Germany, arrived during the 1930s and were known as the fifth *aliyah.* Many of the immi-

Table 1: Aliyah, 1840–2000

Years	Numbers	Countries of Emigration	Motivation
1840–1881	20,000–30,000	Primarily Central and Eastern Europe	Religio-national
1882–1903	35,000	Primarily Eastern Europe—“First Aliyah”	Religio-national and “push” factors
1904–1914	40,000	Primarily Central and Eastern Europe—“Second Aliyah”	Religio-national and “push” factors
1919–1923	35,000	Primarily Eastern Europe - “Third Aliyah”	Religio-national and “push” factors
1924–1930	80,000	Primarily Poland—“Fourth Aliyah”	“Push” factors—Holocaust
1931–1939	225,000	Primarily Central and Eastern Europe—“Fifth Aliyah”	“Push” factors—Holocaust
1940–1948	143,000	Primarily Central and Eastern Europe	“Push” factors—Holocaust
1948–1951	667,613	About half North African and Asian	Mixed “push” and “pull” factors
1952–1967	582,653	About 65% North African and Asian	Mixed “push” and “pull” factors
1968–1988	532,744	More than 75% European and American, 43% of whom were from USSR	Religio-national and economic factors
1989–2000	1,039,821	Overwhelmingly FSU; about 56,000 Ethiopians	FSU—primarily economic; Ethiopians—religious and “push” factors

SOURCE: Courtesy of Chaim I. Waxman

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

grants from Germany had high educational and occupational status, and they played an important role in the economic development of the Yishuv.

World War II gave a critical impetus to *aliyah.* The numbers legally entitled to immigrate under the 1939 MacDonald White Paper quota were much too low for the hundreds of thousands who were fleeing the Holocaust in Europe. An illegal immigration movement known as Aliyah Bet was established by a branch of Yishuv's defense force, the Haganah, enabling approximately 70,000 Jews to reach Palestine.

With the establishment of Israel as a sovereign state, *aliyah* was accorded formal priority with the enactment of the Law of Return, which grants immediate citizenship to Jews who immigrate. Although the law initially had both ideological and self-interest components—it was widely perceived that the country was in need of population growth for its defense and survival—the resulting massive immigration, especially from North African countries, was viewed by some as threatening to Israel's economic stability and to the Ashkenazic or Westernized character of the state, and they called for restrictions on immigration. Nevertheless, the government continued to encourage mass immigration, even though it was ill-equipped to manage it. The mass immigration during the years of early statehood dramatically altered the ethnic composition of Israel, and continuing interplay between ethnicity and socioeconomic status has been an increasing source of tension and strain on the entire society.

Following the 1967 War there was a significant increase in *aliyah* from Western countries because of heightened nationalistic attachments as well as the pull of Israel's growing economy. By the end of the 1970s, those numbers receded to pre-1967 levels.

During the 1970s *aliyah* was boosted by emigrés from the Soviet Union, most of whom came for both ideological and persecution reasons. By contrast, the vast majority of the massive influx of close to one million immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) in the 1990s came for economic reasons. The Soviet immigrants in general, and especially those of the 1990s, retain strong identification with their former backgrounds and have forced Israeli society and politics to become much more multicultural. In addition, the relatively high rate of religious intermarriage among the FSU immigrants has created or heightened Jewish interreligious tensions in the country.

Finally, the immigration of some 60,000 “Beta Israel” or Falasha Jews from Ethiopia has created a whole set of new social, political, and religious issues that will probably increase before they recede, if indeed they ever do. This is a group that was cut off from contact with other Jewish communities for

millennia. Their contemporary process of connection began with Christian missionary activities that brought them and world Jewry to mutual awareness. Since then, there had been only sporadic efforts to assist them. The mass immigration to Israel was sparked by deteriorating political and economic conditions after the Marxist overthrow of Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie and the rescue efforts of the Israeli government. The radical and immediate changes experienced by the Ethiopian immigration are unique and make it a fascinating case study for students of migration and absorption.

See also Ethiopian Jews; Law of Return; Zionism.

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Chaim I. Waxman

ALIYER, FATIMAH

[1862–1936]

Pioneer in the early Ottoman women's movement.

Fatimah Aliyer Hanoum, daughter of Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, the Western-minded Ottoman bureaucrat and codifier of Ottoman Civil Law (Mecelle), was a pioneer in early feminist writing, especially in *Kadinlara Mahsus Gazete* (Newspaper for women, 1895), and in the early Ottoman women's movement.

Fatimah Aliyer was brought up in an upperclass Ottoman household, receiving the *konak* (Ottoman mansion) education of the typical pasha's daughter of her time. She was taught at home, learning reading and writing in Arabic, Persian, and French, as well as geography, history, and literature. She first appeared in the Ottoman press as the "lady translator" of George Ohnet's *Volonte* (1888); her identity was only later revealed by Ahmed Midhat, and her competence as a writer was confirmed by him in the preface he wrote to her romantic novel, *Muhazarat* (Stories to remember, 1892).

Aliyer wrote within a moderate, modernist-Islamicist inspired framework, like male writers such as Namik Kemal, Ibrahim Sinasi, Şemseddin Sami, and Ahmed Midhat, who stressed the importance of women's roles as mothers and educators of the young and therefore promoted reform in women's education. The themes during this phase of Ottoman feminism were criticism of the Ottoman family system, arranged marriages and polygamy, the husband's one-sided right to divorce his wife, concubinage, and slavery.

Although Aliyer was against polygamy, she argued in her 1982 book, *Nisvan-I Islam* (Muslim women), that the West held a prejudiced view of Muslim women. She held that the situation of Ottoman women within a polygamic marriage was more secure than that of mistresses and their illegitimate children in Western societies.

See also Art; Gender: Gender and Education; Literature: Turkish; Newspapers and Print Media: Turkey.

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Ayse Durakbasa Tarhan

ALIZADEH, GHAZALEH

[1946–1996]

Iranian writer, critic, and feminist.

Ghazaleh Alizadeh was born in Mashahd in 1946 and lived in Tehran, where she began a successful

career as a writer of newspaper articles, novels, and short stories. Her stories represent the continuation of modernist genre inaugurated by Nima Yusij in the 1920s. Reminiscent of Hermann Hessse, they are best known for their allegorical realism laden with deep meanings that produce a surreal, distorted sense of fictional characters and places. Alizadeh's early collections of short stories, *Safar-e nagozashtani* (1976; The impossible journey), *Bad az tabestan* (1977; After summer), and *Do manzare* (1984; Two views) explore the individual's search for identity outside the restrictions of society. Likewise, her most famous novel, *Khaneh Edrisi* (1999; Edris house) continued the allegorical-realist approach in a narrative form, with fictional historical characters caught in a metaphorical clash between a decadent revolutionary state and a defiant emerging culture set in a male-dominated society. Alizadeh helped to reshape the permissible boundaries of gender representation in the modern Persian literature of postrevolutionary Iran; her works also helped to advance the critical feminist discourses of the woman's movement. Alizadeh's 1996 death was suspicious; her body was found hanged from a tree in a forest north of Iran.

See also LITERATURE: PERSIAN.

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BABAK RAHIMI

ALKALAI, JUDAH BEN SOLOMON HAI

[1798–1878]

Precursor of modern Zionism.

Judah ben Solomon Hai Alkalai, a Sephardic rabbi who was born in Sarajevo and studied in Jerusalem, served as a rabbi in the Balkans and was influenced by Serbian Nationalism and the Damascus Affair (1840). Also, well-versed in the kabbalah, Alkalai believed that the era of messianic redemption was at hand. He asserted that redemption must be preceded by the return of the Jews to the land of Israel. In his books *Darkhei No'am* (1839) and *Shalom Yerushalayim* (1840), he called upon Jews to prepare for the coming redemption and to donate money to those already residing in the Land of Israel. In *Minhat Yehudah* (1843), he advocated the formation of an Assembly of Jewish Notables to represent the Jewish people in their appeals to other nations to permit their return to their homeland. Alkalai wrote numerous pamphlets and articles and, in 1851 to 1852, toured several countries to spread his ideas. In 1871, he visited Palestine and founded a settlement society there, which was unsuccessful. In 1874, he settled in Palestine.

See also DAMASCUS AFFAIR (1840).

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MARTIN MALIN

AL KHALIFA FAMILY

Ruling family of the State of Bahrain, 1782–.

In 1782, the Al Khalifa, a prominent trading clan originally based in Kuwait, captured the Bahrain islands. The leader of the family, Shaykh Ahmad bin Khalifa, called "the Conqueror" by his allies, ruled the islands from Zubara, on the northwestern coast of Qatar, until his death in 1796. His sons Sulman, based first at Zubara and then at Manama on the main island of al-Awal, and Abdullah, based in Muharraq on al-Awal, then shared the rulership. They cosigned the pivotal 1820 treaty with Britain that recognized the Al Khalifa as the legitimate rulers of Bahrain. Abdullah outlived both Sulman and Sulman's son Khalifa, acting as sole ruler from 1834 to 1843. He was ousted by Sulman's grandson Muhammad, precipitating a quarter-century of fighting between the descendants of Sulman, based at Manama, and Abdullah, who formed alliances with powerful tribes in Qatar and al-Hasa. In 1869, British forces stepped in to end the fighting and appointed Shaykh Isa bin Ali, a great-grandson of Sulman, who had been in charge of the family's remaining holdings in Qatar, as ruler. Treaties in 1880 and 1892 confirmed Isa's undisputed position.

Around 1900, British officials demanded greater authority over Bahrain's internal affairs. Senior

members of the Al Khalifa tried to buttress their deteriorating position by raising taxes on agricultural estates. This sparked riots on the islands in 1923, which prompted Britain to exile Isa and replace him with his son Hamad, who worked with British forces to restore order. Hamad acquiesced in the appointment of a British adviser, who took charge of all branches of the local administration. Hamad died in 1942 and was succeeded by his son Sulman, who preserved the family's prerogatives in the face of intense popular challenges during the mid-1950s. At the height of the unrest, tribes allied to the Al Khalifa formed a militia to protect the regime. These retainers were handsomely rewarded as oil revenues escalated, funding a dramatic expansion of state offices and business opportunities. Hamad named his son Isa heir apparent in 1958, ensuring a smooth transition upon his death three years later.

When Britain granted Bahrain independence in 1971, Shaykh Isa took the title *amir* and appointed his brother Khalifa prime minister and his son Hamad minister of defense. Other senior shaykhs of the Al Khalifa headed key ministries, particularly those of the interior, foreign affairs, and labor and social affairs. Matters of importance to the family but peripheral to governing the country were left to a council of elders, presided over by the ruler. This institution ensured the integrity of the Al Khalifa by controlling marriage choices, distributing allowances in proportion to each individual's power and status, and underwriting economic ventures undertaken by family members. Supported by plentiful oil revenues, along with an extensive security service, the Al Khalifa kept firm control over the country throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

In 1999, after four years of widespread popular unrest in the mid-1990s, Isa died and was succeeded by Hamad. The new ruler introduced a number of political reforms in an attempt to restore the regime's tarnished legitimacy. A 2001 referendum transformed Bahrain into a constitutional, hereditary monarchy, with Hamad as king. Hamad then repealed the draconian 1974 Penal Code, abolished the State Security Court, and reinstated public employees who had been fired for their political activities. He also appointed a committee to revise the 1973 constitution and prepare for elections to a new advisory council. Opposition organizations charged that the proposals diluted the rights guaranteed by the earlier constitution but commended the king for entertaining a revival of popular participation in policy-making.

See also Bahrain; Manama.

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Fred H. Lawson

ALLAH

The Arabic equivalent of the English word God.

A likely etymology of the term is that it is an ancient contraction of *al-ilah* (Arabic for "*the* god") and was probably first used in Arabian cosmologies before Islam to refer to some kind of high deity who may have been considered the progenitor of a number of lesser divinities. The word *Allah* is best known in the West as the name Muslims ascribe to the one and only God, whom they believe to be the transcendent and partnerless creator, lord, and judge of the universe. It is important to note that according to Muslim teaching, Allah is not only the God of the prophet Muhammad but also the God of Moses and Jesus—and is therefore identical to the divine being of Jewish and Christian sacred history.

While Muslim tradition recognizes Allah to be the comprehensive name of God encompassing all the divine attributes, it also ascribes to the deity an additional ninety-nine "beautiful names" *(al-asma al-husna),* each of which evoke a distinct characteristic of the godhead. The most famous and most frequently referenced of these are "the Merciful" *(al-rahman)* and "the Compassionate" *(al-rahim).*

See also Islam.

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Scott Alexander

ALLENBY, EDMUND HENRY

[1861–1936]

British officer who commanded British forces in the Middle East during World War I; military governor of Palestine and high commissioner of Egypt.

Edmund Henry Allenby's early career included extensive service in Africa, including the Boer War (1899–1902). Posted to France at the start of World War I, he was sent to the Middle East in June 1917, where he led Britain's Egyptian Expeditionary Force and took Beersheba and Gaza (1917); with the help of Colonel T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) and Prince Faisal I ibn Hussein, he occupied Jerusalem in December 1917. He launched his final offensive in 1918, taking Megiddo from 18 September to 21 September. This classic of military strategy led to the collapse of Ottoman Empire forces and the British occupation of Syria.

At the peace conference in Paris, Allenby argued, as military governor of Palestine, that Britain should support Faisal as king of Syria, but the League of Nations awarded the French a mandate over Syria; they occupied the new kingdom and ousted Faisal. Created a viscount in 1919, Allenby was appointed high commissioner for Egypt (1919–1925). There he advocated accommodation with rising Arab Nationalism, thus clashing over policy with British Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill. His threat to resign persuaded the British government to issue the Allenby Declaration on 28 February 1922, which granted formal independence to Egypt but retained enormous rights for the British over Egyptian affairs.

See also FAISAL I IBN HUSSEIN; LAWRENCE, T. E.

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JON JUCOVY

ALLIANCE ISRAÉLITE UNIVERSELLE (AIU)

International Jewish organization created in Paris, 1860.

Until 1860 the Jews of France had been represented by the Consistoire Central des Israélites de France, headquartered in Paris, with branches throughout the country. The AIU was founded in Paris on 17 May 1860, by several idealistic French Jews—businesspeople, political activists, and members of the free professions. Certainly the most important older leader of the AIU was Adolphe Crémieux, who in 1870 became minister of justice while serving as AIU president.

The decision to create the AIU, a move to diversify and extend Jewish political activities outside France, was partly hastened by the controversy over the Mortara Case, concerning the abduction of a Jewish child by Roman Catholic conversionists. On the night of 23 June 1858, Edgardo Mortara, the six-year-old son of a Jewish family in Bologna, Italy, was abducted by the papal police and taken to Rome. The boy had been secretly and unlawfully baptized five years earlier by a Christian domestic servant, who thought he was about to die. The parents vainly attempted to get their child back, and the case caused a universal outcry. Young French Jews created the AIU two years later in the name of religious freedom.

The AIU's aim was to aid Jews and Judaism—mainly in the Ottoman, Sharifian (Morocco), and Qajar (Iran) empires—in three ways. The first was to "work toward the emancipation and moral progress of the Jews." While it did not state that education was the basic motivation behind emancipation and moral progress, the first aim defined the educational sphere. Moral progress meant combating disease, poverty, and ignorance, and acculturating Jews in the tradition of French education. Therefore, the AIU established schools that taught Jews in Mediterranean-basin countries the concepts of liberty, equality, and fraternity.

The most important schools were created between 1862 and 1914 in Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. The teachers dispatched to these countries were alumni of the AIU schools from the Ottoman Empire—Sephardim trained in Paris at the AIU teacher-training center, the École Normale Israélite Orientale (ENIO). Although the French language was used in AIU schools, the AIU did not advocate total emulation of French culture, attempting to strike a balance between secular learning, embodying Western ideas, and the sacred education of Jewish communities.

The second goal, "lending effective support to all those who suffer because of their membership in the Jewish faith," referred to allocating funds to help Jews in distress outside Europe. More importantly, it included forging contacts with European leaders and their diplomatic representatives in countries where Jews were harassed. Further, it meant that the AIU had to alert the leaders of both the Middle East and North Africa when such injustice occurred, possibly wresting concessions from them to remedy the situation.

The third aim was to awaken Europe to the Jews' plight. It called for "encouraging all proper publications to bring an end to Jewish sufferings." Whereas the second category called for quiet negotiations and diplomatic action, the third stressed the utilization of AIU and other periodicals to influence public opinion. For example, it published the *Bulletin de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle* (1860–1913) and *Paix et Droit* for this purpose, and utilized the French press and the London *Jewish Chronicle* to point out human rights violations, particularly in Iran and Morocco.

The AIU Central Committee in Paris obtained information on the abuses perpetrated against Jews in Muslim lands where it had schools through its personnel or regional committees. These forces also apprised local European consuls and plenipotentiaries about the abuses by regional governors and chieftains. The AIU Central Committee then brought the problems before the Foreign Office in London or the French Foreign Ministry in Paris, which in turn pressured the Ottoman Porte, the Qajar Shahs, and the Moroccan *Makhzan* to protect their Jewish subjects *(dhimmas).*

In terms of its educational influence, the AIU survived from the Ottoman and precolonial eras into the colonial period and beyond—well into the decolonization stage. In 1956 the AIU had 143 schools and approximately 51,000 students in Morocco, Iran, Tunisia, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. In 2000 the AIU had 73 schools, mostly in Israel, France, Morocco, Canada, Belgium, and Spain; the total number of AIU schools, or AIU-affiliated ones, exceeded 29,000. Until the 1960s most AIU schools—primary, secondary, and vocational—were concentrated in the Muslim world; since then, school expansion has taken place in Israel, France, Canada, Spain, and Belgium. In the wake of Jewish emigration from the former Soviet Union, the trend is to expand the schools in Europe and Israel. The AIU in France still helps to maintain the schools in the Muslim world—notably in Morocco and Iran—because Jewish communities continue to exist there despite attempted emigration to Europe, the Americas, or Israel. After 1997 plans were underway by the AIU, in conjunction with affluent Iranian Jews living in the United States, to open schools in the states of New York and California.

Since its inception, the AIU has been financed by membership fund-raising, conducted by the regional committees throughout the world. After World War I, however, as its school networks expanded in the Middle East, and especially in North Africa, a substantial portion of the AIU's budget was derived from the French government. Since the end of World War II, the AIU schools have also received subsidies from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, which uses funds of the United Jewish Appeal.

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MICHAEL M. LASKIER

ALLIED MIDDLE EAST COMMAND

Military administrative command of the World War II era, headquartered in Cairo, Egypt, created by the British government in 1939 to organize the war effort in the Middle East.

General Sir Archibald Wavell was the first commander, taking charge in June 1939. At first encompassing Egypt, the Sudan, Cyprus, and Transjordan, the command spanned two continents and encompassed an area 1,700 by 2,000 miles (2,735 to

3,218 km). After the beginning of World War II, the command was expanded to include Aden, British Somaliland, and the Persian/Arabian Gulf. Under Wavell's command, the British were successful in operations against the Italians but failed when the Germans, under General Erwin Rommel, counterattacked. Command passed to General Sir Claude Auchinleck in July 1941, and then to General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander in August 1942. During this period, the British finally prevailed against German and Italian forces in North Africa. In August 1942, Iran and Iraq were detached from the command, and consideration was given by Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill to renaming it the Near Eastern Command. To preclude confusion, the Cabinet persuaded Churchill to retain the original name for the command in Cairo. After the successful American and British invasion of North Africa in November 1942, under the leadership of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Middle East Command was primarily concerned with administrative and logistic problems.

See also WAVELL, ARCHIBALD PERCIVAL.

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR

ALLON, YIGAL

[1918–1980]

Israeli politician; deputy prime minister, 1969–1974.

Born in Kfar Tabor, Palestine, Yigal Allon was originally named Yigal Paicovitch. He changed his name to Allon—which means oak, to symbolize his commitment to Israel—in 1948, at the time the state of Israel was proclaimed. Allon's early education took place in Palestine, at the Kadoorie Agricultural School and the Hebrew University, but he subsequently attended St. Anthony's College in Oxford. In 1937, he was one of the cofounders of Kibbutz Ginossar, on the western shore of Lake Tiberias.

From 1937 to 1939 he served in the Haganah; at the same time, he was working for the British as an officer in the Jewish Settlement Police. Along with Moshe Dayan, Allon was one of the leading forces in the creation of the Palmah, the commando unit of the Haganah, and in 1945 he attained the rank of commander in the unit. During World War II, he fought with Allied forces to liberate Vichy-held Syria and Lebanon and in 1948 was made brigadier general. A senior officer in the Israel Defense Forces at the time of the Arab–Israel War of 1948, he fought in a number of campaigns in that conflict.

Allon was a member of Knesset throughout Israel's early years. In 1960, he resigned his seat in order to attend Oxford University for a year, but in 1961 he was reelected and continued to serve. He was minister of labor from 1961 to 1967, deputy prime minister from 1966 to 1968, minister of education and culture from 1969 to 1974, and minister of foreign affairs from 1974 to 1977. From 26 February to 17 March 1969, he served as acting prime minister following the death of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, until Golda Meir received a vote of confidence from the Knesset and took over the position of prime minister.

During Meir's term in office, Allon, who remained deputy prime minister, was an important adviser to the prime minister. The role he played during the period leading up to the Arab–Israel War of 1973, however, and his agreement with the position taken by Meir that Israel should never again engage in a preemptive strike against its Arab neighbors (even if they were threatening to attack) made him a nonviable candidate to succeed Meir when she resigned in 1974. Yitzhak Rabin, a war hero untainted with any part of the blame for the decision in 1973, was chosen by the Labor Party to succeed Meir, and Allon was appointed foreign minister. In 1975, during the era of Henry Kissinger's famous shuttle diplomacy, Allon actively participated in the peace talks, but his efforts were not repaid by substantive results.

Allon may best be remembered for suggesting, in discussions on Israeli defense, that since the Jewish people had a clear right to the lands on the West Bank of the Jordan River, it was necessary to act strategically to make sure Israel would be secure. The Allon Plan, as it became known, called for Israel to keep the Jordan River valley as its own territory (while returning about 70 percent of the West Bank to Jordan). In addition, Allon recommended that the Gaza Strip should also become part of Israel.

Although Allon did not reject the idea of a Palestinian state, he argued that it should not come about at the expense of Israel's security or its right to exist. His endorsement of the idea of a dense belt of Jewish villages along the Jordan River that would provide security for Israel continues to be cited to this day.

See also Gaza Strip; Haganah; Meir, Golda; Palmah.

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Gregory S. Mahler

ALL-PALESTINE GOVERNMENT

Post–World War II concept for forming an Arab government for the whole of Palestine after the end of the British mandate, 14 May 1948.

The All-Palestine Government was the product of the complex relationship between the Palestinian national movement led by Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, and the Arab states loosely organized within the Arab League. After World War II, when the British mandate over Palestine was to expire and the struggle between the Arabs and the Jews was approaching its climax, the weakness of the Palestinian Arabs made them ever more dependent on the Arab League. Within the league, however, no one policy existed for the future of the region: The mufti's plan was maximalist, an independent Palestinian state throughout the whole of Palestine; King Abdullah of Transjordan's plan was to accept the partition of Palestine with the Jews and to incorporate the Arab part into his kingdom.

From December 1947, the mufti pleaded with the Arab League for the establishment of a Palestinian government to manage the affairs of the country and direct the struggle against the Jews, but his pleas fell on deaf ears. He and his colleagues on the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) were progressively marginalized. Thus, when the British mandate over Palestine expired and the State of Israel was proclaimed on 15 May 1948, the Arabs of Palestine had no government, no administrative regime, and no unified military command.

On 8 July 1948, the Arab League decided to set up a temporary civil administration in Palestine, to be directly responsible to the Arab League. This was a compromise proposal that failed to satisfy either of the two principal claimants. With strong opposition from King Abdullah, and only half-hearted support from the AHC, the new body was never properly established.

The Egyptian government, suspicious of King Abdullah's growing power in Palestine, put a proposal to the Arab League meeting that opened in Alexandria on 6 September 1948. The plan would turn the temporary civil administration, which had been agreed to in July, into an Arab government with a seat in Gaza for the whole of Palestine. The formal announcement of the Arab League's decision to form the Government of All-Palestine was issued on 20 September. In the eyes of its Egyptian sponsors, the immediate purpose of this government was to provide a focal point of opposition to King Abdullah's ambition to federate the Arab part of Palestine with Transjordan. The other Arab governments supported the Egyptian proposal at least partly because it furnished them with a means for withdrawing their armies from Palestine with some protection against popular outcry.

Despite the unpopularity of the Mufti of Jerusalem in most Arab capitals, the AHC played a major part in the formation of the new government, which was headed by Ahmad Hilmi Abd al-Baqi. Hilmi's cabinet consisted largely of followers of the mufti but also included representatives of the other factions of the Palestinian ruling class. Jamal al-Husayni became foreign minister, Raja al-Husayni became defense minister, Michael Abcarius was finance minister, and Anwar Nusayba was secretary of the cabinet. Twelve ministers in all, living in different Arab countries, headed for Gaza to take up their new positions.

During the first week of its life in Gaza, the All-Palestine Government revived the Holy War Army, with the declared aim of liberating Palestine; sought international recognition without much success;

A meeting of the Arab League, Cairo, Egypt, 1948. Established in 1945 between the countries of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, the Arab League was based on the notion of Pan-Arabism, which sought to unite all Arabs under one Arab state. The League also sought to further the collective interests of member countries and to protect their mutual security. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

and issued several thousand Palestinian passports. To endow the government with legitimacy, a Palestinian National Council was convened in Gaza on 30 September 1948, under the chairmanship of the Mufti of Jerusalem. The council, in a mood of great elation, passed a series of resolutions culminating in a declaration of independence over the whole of Palestine. Although the new government claimed jurisdiction over the whole of Palestine, it had no administration, no civil service, no money, and no real army of its own. Even in the small enclave around the town of Gaza, its writ ran only by the grace of the Egyptian authorities. Taking advantage of the new government's dependence on them for funds and protection, the Egyptian paymasters manipulated it to undermine King Abdullah's claim to represent the Palestinians in the Arab League and international forums. Ostensibly the embryo for an independent Palestinian state, the new government was thus reduced to the unhappy role of a shuttlecock in the ongoing power struggle between Egypt and Jordan.

The Jordanian authorities were determined to stop the growth of the mufti's army. On 3 October, Jordan gave the order to the Arab Legion to surround, and forcibly disarm, various units of the Holy War Army. This move effectively neutralized the All-Palestine Government's military power and checked the growth of public sentiment in favor of an autonomous Palestinian state.

Shortly afterward, on 15 October 1948, Israel launched an offensive against the Egyptian army, forcing it to retreat down the coast to Gaza. Ironically, mid-October was also when the Arab governments got around to recognizing the All-Palestine Government. Nothing is more indicative of their half-hearted support than the lateness of their

formal recognition. By the time it was granted, the game was over.

The Egyptian defeat deprived the All-Palestine Government of its last and exceedingly tenuous hold on Palestinian soil, forcing it to transfer its seat from Gaza to Cairo. Its weakness was exposed for all to see, its prestige slumped, and its authority was undermined. In Cairo, the Government of All-Palestine gradually fell apart because of its impotence, ending up four years later as a department of the Arab League. Thereafter, it continued to exist in name only until Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser closed its offices in 1959.

Although the All-Palestine Government was projected as the nucleus of Palestinian self-government, it was an Egyptian-led phantom deliberately created by the Arab states to meet their publics' opposition to partition and to challenge Transjordan's claim to the rest of Arab Palestine. It was for selfish reasons that the Arab states created it, and it was for selfish reasons that they abandoned it. True, in the first three weeks of its short life, this fledgling government did represent a genuine attempt by the Palestinians to assert their independence from their dubious sponsors—to assume control over their own destiny; but the attempt was short-lived. Born of inter-Arab rivalries, the All-Palestine Government soon foundered on the rocks of inter-Arab rivalries. Consequently, if there is one lesson that stands, it is the need for Palestinian self-reliance, especially for defending the Palestinian cause against control and manipulation by the Arab states.

See also LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES.

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AVI SHLAIM

AL NAHAYYAN FAMILY

Ruling family of Abu Dhabi emirate and the dominant family of the United Arab Emirates.

The history of Abu Dhabi, the largest emirate in the United Arab Emirates, is closely intertwined with that of the ruling Al Nahayyan family. The family originally presided over the tribes around the Liwa Oasis, but under Shakhbut ibn Dhiyab Al Nahayyan it ruled from a fort on Abu Dhabi Island beginning in the 1770s. The family's influence expanded to the al-Ayn Oasis under Shakhbut's grandson, Zayid ibn Khalifah. He also established friendly relations with the al-Maktum family of Dubai, the Qawasim in Sharjah, and the Al Bu Saʿid sultans of Muscat. The family presided over a period of economic growth fueled by the pearl trade, and its political influence became solidified as a result of its relations with British officials, who established a protectorate over the region.

Zayid's sons ruled until 1928, and his grandson, Shakhbut ibn Sultan, succeeded them and was in power when oil was discovered in 1958. Shakhbut's brother, Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nahayyan, became ruler in 1966 and was instrumental in establishing the United Arab Emirates in 1971.

See also ABU DHABI.

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M. MORSY ABDULLAH
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

ALONI, SHULAMIT

[1929–]

Israeli politician; civil rights, social affairs, and peace activist.

Born in Tel Aviv, Shulamit Aloni served in the 1948 Arab–Israel War, attended a teachers training seminar, and later studied law at the Hebrew University. In the 1950s and early 1960s, she earned a reputation as an advocate for social justice, civil and human rights, consumer protection, and above all the separation of religion from politics. She had a popular weekly radio program and a weekly column in which she propounded her antiestablishment

views. In 1966, she established and headed the Israel Consumers' Council.

Elected to the Knesset in 1965, she served on various committees but was dropped from the Labor ticket in 1969 at the demand of Golda Meir. In 1973, she established the Civic Rights Movement (Ratz) and was elected to the Knesset, where she served until 1999. In 1974, she served briefly in the Yitzhak Rabin's first cabinet but resigned when the National Religious Party joined his cabinet. She was a prolific legislator, proposing scores of laws and serving mainly on the Knesset's Law and Constitution Committee. Rabin appointed her minister of education in 1992, after her party merged with Shinui to form Meretz. Pressure from the ultra-Orthodox Shas party forced her to give up some of her responsibilities. A well-known peace activist, she has advocated close ties with Israeli Arabs and the neighboring Palestinians and fought vehemently for the rights of the secular population and against what she considered undue religious coercion in Israel. She is the author of four books in Hebrew. Their titles, translated into English, are *The Citizen and His State, The Arrangement, Children's Rights in Israel,* and *Women as Human Beings.* In 2000 she was awarded the Israel Prize for lifetime achievements.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1948); MEIR, GOLDA; RABIN, YITZHAK.

MERON MEDZINI

ALPHA, OPERATION

Code name for a major secret peace initiative in the mid-1950s.

Growing from British and U.S. concerns about the Near East conflict, Operation Alpha began as a shared initiative in October 1954 and eventually, after several stages, became a solely U.S. project a year later. Until March 1955, Francis Russell (U.S. State Department) and Evelyn Shuckburgh (British Foreign Office) made detailed plans for a peace settlement that involved financial aid for the resettlement of Arab refugees and security guarantees for Israel within agreed borders.

Subsequently, various efforts were made to "launch" Alpha: discussions with Israel's prime minister David Ben-Gurion and Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser via normal diplomatic channels, a meticulously prepared speech by U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles in August 1955, and public proposals by British prime minister Anthony Eden in his November 1955 Guildhall speech. In a last-ditch attempt to save the initiative, U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the secret mission of a special envoy, Robert Anderson, a Texan lawyer and personal friend with ties to the U.S. Defense Department. From January to March 1956, Anderson engaged in CIA-supported shuttle diplomacy for negotiations with Ben-Gurion, Israel's foreign minister Moshe Sharett, and Nasser. In spite of the high-level support, Alpha failed. The question of blame remains controversial but the incompatibility of Israeli and Egyptian interests, insufficient willingness to make painful concessions, and inadequate U.S.-U.K. commitment all played a role. Instead of bringing peace, Alpha deepened mutual Israeli-Egyptian distrust and Anglo-American disillusionment with Nasser, thus contributing to developments that led to the Sinai War in 1956. In Washington, D.C., Alpha gave way to "Omega," a project to isolate and politically neutralize Nasser.

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IRIS BOROWY

AL RASHID FAMILY

Rulers based in Haʾil, north central Arabia, from 1836 to 1921.

Although Abdullah ibn Rashid, the first of the Rashidi dynasty, was for a time allied with the Al Saud family, the two families were the principal political rivals in the region for a century. Abdullah came to power in 1836 by obtaining the support of Egyptian occupation forces. After the Egyptians left Arabia, Abdullah and his successors were able to consolidate their rule by winning the loyalty of the powerful Shammar tribal confederation and the residents of the important market town of Haʾil.

Talal ibn Abdullah ibn Rashid (r. 1848–1868) was responsible for increasing trade and commerce in Haʾil. In addition to treating Shiʿite merchants from Iraq with tolerance, he oversaw the construction of commercial buildings in his capital and the development of agriculture and rural settlement in the hinterland. The apogee of Rashidi rule in Arabia came under Muhammad ibn Rashid, who ruled the longest (1869–1897) and conquered the most territory. Rashidi influence extended across northern Arabia to northern Hijaz and the outskirts of Basra, Damascus, and Aleppo, and down as far as Oman. In 1891 the Rashidi capture of Riyadh forced the Al Saʿud into exile in Kuwait. Rashidi rule ended in 1921 with the Saudi capture of Haʾil.

See also Saudi Arabia.

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AL SABAH FAMILY

The ruling family of Kuwait.

"If the Al Sabah had not existed, it would have been necessary to invent them." This saying, reported by historian Alan Rush, reflects how deeply embedded the family is in the history of Kuwait. This clan has provided all the rulers of the small community since tribes from the Najd district of the Arabian Peninsula collected on the shores of the bay at the far northwest of the Persian Gulf early in the eighteenth century. The family also provided a rallying point for the community some 240 years later, after it was invaded and annexed by Iraq.

Within decades of the original settlement of what is now Kuwait, the Al Sabah were chosen as leaders by community consensus. The ruler was the local administrator of the community and the liaison between it and the shaykh of the Bani Kalid tribe on which Kuwaitis depended for protection. He is chosen by consensus among senior family members rather than acceding through an automatic mechanism like primogeniture.

The first Kuwaiti ruler, Sabah, served from about 1752 to about 1756 and was succeeded by his youngest son, Abdullah, who ruled until 1814. Abdullah was reared to rule in consultation with his relatives and the leaders of the merchant clans who were the main beneficiaries of orderly governance. The primary crises of his reign were the migration of the Al Khalifa, the richest family of Kuwait, to Bahrain, where they became rulers in their own right, and the beginning of what would become a series of wars against the Wahhabi Ikhwan (followers of the family of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the "al-Shaykh," who ruled in tandem with the al-Saʿud).

Abdullah's son Jabir became amir following Abdullah's death in 1814. He was noted for his charity to the poor and for his political craft. He kept Kuwait on good terms but not aligned with the many rivals whose conflicts beset the region: Britain, the Ottomans, Egypt, and the Al Saʿud. His reign lasted until 1859 and is noted for the prosperity Kuwaitis enjoyed during that time.

Sabah II took power while in his seventies, having served for many years at his father's right hand and accepting most of the community's administrative responsibilities for some five years before his accession. Sabah maintained Kuwait's neutrality during tribal wars between the Al Saʿud and the Ajman and managed to keep the peace with Kuwaiti merchants who threatened to abandon Kuwait if his tax collector was not removed. Like his father, he was known for his charity.

Abdullah II, who ruled until 1892, was forced by Midhat Paşa to relinquish Kuwait's neutrality and become an ally of the Ottomans, thereby averting a war with Turkey and gaining an ally for himself and the merchants. He later accepted the title of *quaʾimmaqam* and a subvention from the Turkish government. Abdullah was assassinated in 1896, probably by a son of his successor, Mubarak.

Mubarak was the only Kuwaiti ruler to take power through a coup, having masterminded the assassination of two of his brothers, Abdullah II and his close adviser Jarrah. Mubarak's political base lay

with the Bedouin tribesmen rather than the merchants, who disliked him for his high-handedness as much as for his high taxes. During Mubarak's rule, a group of merchants left Kuwait for Bahrain and, despite Mubarak's assurances, not all of them returned. Mubarak was a skilled diplomat, taking subventions from the Ottomans and also from the British, whom he persuaded to sign a series of secret agreements guaranteeing protection to Kuwait in exchange for surrender of its foreign policy autonomy and sovereignty over whatever oil reserves it might possess. Mubarak also got the British to agree that only his descendants would be allowed to rule Kuwait in the future, thereby denying the corporate rights of the sons of his brothers and impairing family solidarity.

Mubarak was succeeded by two of his sons, Jabir II (1915–1917) and Salim (1917–1921). Jabir was hearty and outgoing and presided over a short, war-fueled economic boom. His untimely death brought his brother Salim, a devout Muslim, to power. Salim wanted the boundaries of Kuwait to be set according to the terms of the unratified Anglo–Turkish convention, signed in 1913 when his father's authority over neighboring tribes was at its height. The Al Saʿud objected and relations with them deteriorated. Kuwait was attacked by a Wahhabi army under Faysal al-Darwish in 1920. Defeated in the south, the Kuwaitis constructed a wall around Kuwait and Salim led an army to Jahra, successfully heading off the Wahhabi assault.

Jabir's son Ahmad became ruler upon Salim's death in 1921. He agreed to govern with the assistance of a council of notables but once installed never called it into being. Ahmad was ruler when the 1922 Treaty of Uqayr set the boundaries of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. The only ruler who did not have a representative at the conference, he ended with a far smaller Kuwait than his grandfather had envisioned. Ahmad resisted merchant demands to share authority and also refused to provide even minimally for the welfare of the population, moving the merchants to establish newspapers, schools, and, after oil was discovered, a parliament elected from among themselves to write a constitution and pass laws that would force Ahmad to share the income. Ahmad closed the 1938 parliament and its 1939 successor, the latter in a showdown in which one Kuwaiti was killed and after which many went into exile.

Ahmad's successor was Abdullah al-Salim, his cousin, who had been his emissary in negotiations with the 1938 and 1939 parliaments. Abdullah al-Salim inaugurated many programs to distribute oil income, not only to his family and their merchant allies but also to the common people. He established hospitals, schools, and housing programs and placed a large, interest-free deposit in the nascent merchant-owned National Bank of Kuwait. Beset throughout his rule by economic corruption within his family, he was forced to borrow money from the merchants to cover state obligations, in return agreeing to keep his family members from competing against them. The most notable accomplishments of Abdullah al-Salim's rule were the writing and adoption of a modern constitution and the election of a parliament under its aegis.

Sabah al-Salim III succeeded his brother in 1965 and in 1976 suspended the constitution and the civil liberties it enshrined in an attempt to quash a growing merchant-led opposition from within the parliament to Al Sabah autocracy. Yet most Kuwaitis were satisfied with their social benefits and high living standard. During Sabah's rule, the Reserve Fund for Future Generations was launched. It receives 10 percent of the state's income for investment in blue-chip securities to provide for a post-oil future.

Upon Sabah's greatly mourned death in 1977, his nephew, Jabir al-Ahmad, became ruler of a country undergoing a crisis of legitimacy because of the constitution's suspension. Agreeing to hold elections, he attempted first to amend the constitution and then, when popular opinion turned against this plan, naturalized thousands of Bedouin tribesmen and redistricted the country to make it unlikely that a merchant-led opposition could dominate a reinstated parliament. A growing Islamist movement, encouraged by the ruling family, and candidates who were members of dominant clans and tribes, were heavily represented in the parliament elected in 1981, but its 1985 successor, in which these groups also were heavily represented, proved to be contentious. The amir dismissed the parliament and suspended civil liberties again in 1986, after a crash in oil prices and amid grave

doubts that the government could continue to deliver social benefits at established levels. A broad-based movement demanding the restoration of constitutional government swept the country in 1989 and 1990. Jabir al-Ahmad responded by calling for the election of an interim national council that would recommend reforms. Two months after the election, on 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait.

The senior Al Sabah fled into exile but others fought the invaders and served in the resistance. The amir became the focal point of efforts to reclaim the country and was reconciled with the leaders of the opposition, promising a new election for the constitutional National Assembly, not his extra-constitutional substitute, after liberation. That election took place in October 1992, returning a parliament ridden by dissension. Its successor proved even less able to legislate on pressing national issues. In 1999, Jabir al-Ahmad suspended the 1996 parliament but not the constitution, calling for new elections within the sixty days, as prescribed. Meanwhile, he issued more than sixty decrees, including one that would have enfranchised Kuwaiti women. The parliament elected in July 1999 voted down all but the budgetary decrees, leaving the country bemused by the spectacle of a liberal amir and a conservative parliament.

In 2003, Jabir al-Ahmad was frail and ill and his nominated successor, Crown Prince Abdullah al-Salim, was even less well. Despite his occasional ventures into querulous national politics, the amir is mostly a shadow of the vigorous man he was before an assassination attempt in 1985 initiated his gradual withdrawal from active public life. Still, following the 2003 elections, he initiated the separation of the post of crown prince and prime minister, offering at least the eventual possibility of empowering a parliamentary majority to bring down a government. Meanwhile, within the Al Sabah, barely veiled struggles over the succession were spilling over into national and international politics.

See also Al Khalifa Family; Al Sabah, Mubarak; Kuwait; Midhat Paşa; Muwahhidun.

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Mary Ann Tétreault

AL SABAH, MUBARAK

Ruler of Kuwait, 1896–1915.

Mubarak Al Sabah, often called "Mubarak the Great," has been called the most forceful ruler of Kuwait. He is the only ruler in Kuwait's history to achieve his position as the result of a coup; he killed one of his brothers, Muhammad, the ruler at the time, and one of his sons killed another of Mubarak's brothers, Jarrah, who was Muhammad's close adviser. Apologists excuse these actions by pointing to Muhammad's pro-Turkish proclivities. Critics agree that Mubarak prevented the absorption of Kuwait into the Ottoman Empire but note that he did this not by keeping Kuwait independent but by making it a British client. The result of Mubarak's several secret treaties with Britain was to relinquish Kuwait's autonomy in foreign policy. This amounted to a larger concession of sovereignty than had been made to the Ottomans by Mubarak's predecessor. More important for the political development of Kuwait in the twentieth century, however, was Mubarak's use of British economic and military resources to attenuate the power of local notables, a process that was continued by his successors, who relied on oil revenues to insulate themselves from popular checks on their power.

Kuwait's economy thrived during Mubarak's reign. His domestic power, however, rested on his close relationship to the bedouin tribes rather than to the urban merchants. Even after he became ruler,

Mubarak spent time camping with the bedouins in the desert. Unlike the tradition established by most previous amirs of Kuwait, however, Mubarak publicly enjoyed a lavish lifestyle. His income from taxes, British payments and annuities, and family investments (including date gardens located in Iraq) enabled Mubarak to live well and to employ armed guards to protect himself from his subjects. Resentment of his high taxes and military levies provoked several leading pearl merchants to leave Kuwait for Bahrain in 1910. A delegation from the ruler that carried Mubarak's promise to rescind the burdensome taxes encouraged only some to return.

Mubarak's military campaigns against the al-Rashid shaykhs of the Jabal Shammar were aimed at allies of the exiled relatives of Muhammad and Jarrah. In September 1902, British warships were sent against a force commanded by two of Mubarak's nephews who were seeking revenge for their fathers' deaths. But Mubarak's military adventures were also problematic for the British, who wanted to maintain their alliance with the Ottomans. Nevertheless, they continued to support him, and in 1905 the Turks abandoned their efforts to incorporate Kuwait into the *vilayet* of Basra.

Mubarak had confidence in the British as Kuwait's ultimate protectors against the Turks. But British rapprochement with the Sublime Porte prior to the outbreak of World War I produced the Anglo–Turkish Convention of 1913. This declared Kuwait to be a *kaza* (autonomous province) of the Ottoman Empire and recognized Turkey's right to have a political representative in Kuwait. Mubarak was shocked by what he saw as a betrayal of his interests. The convention, however, never went into effect. On 3 November 1914, it was repudiated, and two centuries of diplomatic ties between Kuwait and the Ottomans were broken. One year later, Mubarak died. True to their promise to a leader who had become a staunch ally, the British planned to honor another of their pledges to Mubarak: that they would ensure that the next ruler of Kuwait would be his designated heir rather than a descendant of the brothers he had killed in 1896. In the event, no external intervention was necessary. Subsequent rulers of Kuwait have also been direct descendants of Mubarak.

See also JABAL SHAMMAR; KUWAIT.

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MARY ANN TÉTREAULT

AL SAQR FAMILY

Family prominent in the politics of Kuwait.

Members of the Al Saqr family were among the founders of Kuwait in the eighteenth century. They made their money in shipping and trade and were reputed to be among the toughest dealmakers in the country. They acquired the first stock ticker in Kuwait in the 1920s, and shortly afterward they cornered local coffee supplies after learning that a storm had destroyed much of the year's crop.

Like other prominent merchant families, the Al Saqr participated in the democratization movements that recurred throughout the twentieth century. In 1921 Hamid Al Saqr led an organization of notables who petitioned the ruling family for the right to advise on the succession to the amirship. After Ahmad al-Jabir became amir he refused to consult with the notables. Hamid Al Saqr became leader of the opposition and, upon his death in 1930, was succeeded by his son Abdullah Hamid.

The Al Saqr family founded the Ahliyya Library, where the opposition met to plan its strategy. Abdullah Hamid was a leader of the 1938 to 1939 majles movement. He was a member of both councils elected during this period and among those who refused to disband when the amir suspended the second council's activities. He was forced to flee the country when the movement failed. He died in India.

The merchants developed a close relationship with the amir's brother, Abdullah al-Salim, who had served as the president of the elected councils and attempted to mediate the many conflicts between the councils and the amir. After Abdullah al-Salim became amir in 1950, a group of five merchant families,

including the Al Saqr, approached him about establishing a bank. He granted the National Bank of Kuwait a charter in 1952 and helped to capitalize the bank with a large interest-free deposit.

The Al Saqr family continued its political activities during the rule of Abdullah al-Salim. Abd al-Aziz, another of Hamid Al Saqr's sons, was a wealthy trader and shipyard owner. He was a member of the Constitutional Assembly that was convened in 1961 to prepare Kuwait's first constitution and was elected to the first National Assembly. He became its president and the minister of health in the first cabinet. Abd al-Aziz was one of the leaders of Kuwait's prodemocracy movement of 1989 to 1990 and, at the time, president of the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry. With Ahmad al-Saʿdun, the president of the 1985 National Assembly that had been suspended by the amir in 1986, Abd al-Aziz effected a reconciliation between the ruling family and the political opposition at an October 1990 meeting in Jidda, Saudi Arabia.

Another sibling, Jasim Hamid, served on the board of Kuwait University and was a private sector member of the board of the Kuwait National Petroleum Company before resigning, along with the other private members, in a 1960s dispute with the government representatives over selecting Hispanoil as a partner in an exploration concession. Jasim also served in the National Assembly and was its presiding officer when it was reorganized following the 1992 elections.

The Al Saqr family retains extensive business and financial interests in Kuwait and overseas and continues to be involved politically, both through its interests in the newspaper *Al-Qabbas* and in the person of Jasim's son Mohammad Jasim, who is the editor of *Al-Qabbas* and has been an elected member of the National Assembly since 1999.

See also BANKING; KUWAIT.

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MARY ANN TÉTREAULT

AL SAʿUD FAMILY

The ruling family of Saudi Arabia, the wealthiest and most powerful group in the country.

The king of Saudi Arabia, key government ministers, and other high officials are members of the Al Saʿud family, who control the instruments of political power and the principal sources of wealth. In this patriarchal and conservative society, women are excluded from political office, but the Al Saʿud consult with the religious establishment, wealthy merchants, and local and tribal leaders. Saudi domestic and foreign policy thus is greatly influenced by the interactions among these forces and is strongly stamped with the personalities of the king and top officials in the family. Because the family is so large, with several thousand "princes," and so diverse in outlook and interests, political divisions can be deep and struggles fierce within the ruling family, if oftentimes difficult to see from the outside. Still, it has managed to maintain its position on top of the Saudi political system by compromise, co-optation, and force.

The Foundation of the Kingdom

The ancestors of the Al Saʿud ruled towns in the central Arabian region of Najd dating back to the fifteenth century. However, the family's influence and domains grew dramatically after the amir of the town of Dirʾiyya, Muhammad ibn Saʿud, made an alliance with the religious leader Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1744. During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the Al Saʿud and their allies attempted to conquer lands beyond Najd, they clashed with local and foreign groups, including the Hashimites of Hijaz, the Rashids of Jabal Shammar, and the Banu Khalid in al-Hasa, as well as Ottoman and Egyptian forces. During the late nineteenth century, the power of the Al Saʿud was eclipsed by the Rashids, who controlled most of Najd as well as

King Ibn Saʿud (shown here with three sons and a grandson) returned from exile in Kuwait at the beginning of the twentieth century and reclaimed his family's historical domains, expanding them over the years to create the kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.
© BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Jabal Shammar. However, beginning in 1902, Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman Al Saʿud, after living for years in exile in Kuwait, began a reconquest of his family's historical domains and those of its rivals. According to his contemporaries, the courage, intelligence, charisma, and occasional ruthlessness of Abd al-Aziz helped him win supporters and defeat opponents in his drive to expand his domains. In 1932 he proclaimed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Opposition, sometimes violent, on occasion arose to Abd al-Aziz from within the family, but the ruler managed to consolidate his preeminent role by eliminating threats from his other relatives while assuring the power of his sons, and keeping rival families such as the Rashid, the Al Shaykh, and the leading families of important tribes subordinate by marrying and divorcing many of their daughters in rapid and routine succession.

Abd al Aziz died in 1953 and was succeeded by his oldest son, Saʿud (1902–1969), who had been designated crown prince in 1933. Saʿud's reign has been described by analysts as exhibiting incompetence, greed, and self-indulgence, compounded by the ruler's serious medical problems. By 1958 debt and political crisis forced Saʿud to yield power, but not the crown, to his brother and rival, Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud. Once Faisal had restored the country's solvency and repaired foreign relations that Saʿud had disrupted, Saʿud thrust himself back into full power in alliance with Talal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud and other brothers identified as the Free Princes, who called for a constitutional monarchy. But once more a conclave of senior princes forced Saʿud to yield power to Faisal. In 1964 Saʿud tried for a final time to reclaim the powers of his office. The senior princes, backed by the *ulama,* forced Saʿud's abdication on 2 November 1964.

The reign of Faisal (b. 1906) was shaped greatly by tremendous increases in oil revenues and his efforts to carry out previously neglected social and economic development projects using the framework of five-year plans. While overseeing these massive projects, Faisal tightened his grip on political power by assuming the title of prime minister as well as king and dividing key state positions among his half-brothers, thus removing any vestiges of his predecessor's influence. Some of Faisal's projects and social reforms, such as the introduction of education for girls and television broadcasting, were strongly opposed by conservative religious factions. In fact, he was assassinated in 1975 by the brother of a Saudi prince who had taken part in an antitelevision demonstration in 1965 and was shot dead by police.

Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz (b. 1912) became king shortly after Faisal's death. The serious tensions caused by the influx of great wealth, technological and social change, royal family abuses, and a desire to maintain Islamic values that had begun to build during Faisal's reign exploded into open revolt during Khalid's. He used both force and compromise to deal with the takeover of the Grand Mosque and Shiʿite uprisings in the Eastern Province. Toward the end of his rule, failing health and competition from the crown prince, Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz, forced him to become merely a figurehead.

Fahd (b. 1921) took over formal rule of the country after Khalid's death in 1982. Sharp drops in oil revenues during the 1980s forced Fahd to face dire economic and social questions, such as the role of the large foreign workforce, priorities for economic development, and the need to diversify the economy. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, ill health prevented him from carrying out his day-to-day responsibilities, and so his crown prince, Abdullah ibn Abd al-Aziz, became de facto ruler.

Abdullah and the Princes

Abdullah has had to contend with increased internal opposition to the ruling family's role in the country. While some groups merely have called for reform, others have called for a violent overthrow of the Al Saʿud. Abdullah has responded by cracking down on these militant groups, incrementally increasing avenues for political participation, downplaying the kingdom's military and economic ties with the United States, and becoming an international advocate for issues important to Muslims around the world. The attacks of 11 September 2001 drew increased attention to the royal family and its complex relationship with militant Islam inside the country and worldwide. While Osama bin Ladin, has had support within Saudi Arabia, a series of deadly bomb attacks in 2003 attributed to his organization have drawn widespread popular condemnation and elicited a vigorous response from the government's security forces.

Besides the rulers, members of the Al Saʿud have held key ministry positions and played other influential roles. For example, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud (1910–1990), the sixth son of Abd al-Aziz, held no official positions in his later years, although he played a key role in the affairs of the kingdom as a strong-willed senior prince. When still in his twenties, Muhammad served as deputy to Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz al Saʿud, then viceroy of Hijaz (later king of Saudi Arabia). Muhammad, however, lacked a natural power base in the family and was notorious for his ungovernable rages, which led in late 1963 to his renunciation of a place in the royal succession. His younger full brother Khalid took his place. Khalid subsequently became king in 1975.

Muhammad strongly opposed his half brother Saʿud ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud, the successor to their father Ibn Saʿud, as unfit to rule. He was the

only son not to swear allegiance, and from 1955 on, he led efforts to depose Saʿud in favor of Faisal, playing a major role in pressing the case to its conclusion in 1964. He gained international notoriety from the television production "Death of a Princess," which was a dramatization of the execution—at his insistence—of his granddaughter, Princess Mishal, and her lover for adultery.

Sultan ibn Abd al-Aziz (b. 1924) has been deputy prime minister since 1982. Born in Riyadh, he is the next oldest full brother of King Fahd, a son of Hassa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri, the favorite wife of King Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud. He is a key part of the Al Fahd—the king and his six full brothers—often referred to in the Western press as the Sudayri Seven—who began to consolidate their power within the Saudi royal family during the reign of Khalid.

Sultan and the other members of the Al Fahd are the first princes to build their careers through service in the bureaucracy. When Sultan was still in his early twenties, his father appointed him governor of the province of Riyadh. King Saʿud named him minister of agriculture in the first Council of Ministers in 1954. In 1960, Sultan replaced his half brother Talal, one of the Free Princes, as minister of communications. In 1962 Crown Prince Faisal, then serving as King Saʿud's prime minister, appointed Sultan defense minister—the position that he has held for thirty years. Faisal gave Sultan great authority in determining Saudi Arabia's military needs and in filling them. He also relied extensively on his advice in general matters, in part to balance the views of conservatives in the Al Saʿud family with Sultan's progressive perspectives. After 1975, during the reign of Faisal's successor, King Khalid, Sultan became part of the inner circle of senior princes who direct the nation's course. In 1982, when Fahd became king, Sultan was made second deputy prime minister, de facto successor after Crown Prince Abdullah—and likely will become king if he survives those two brothers.

Talal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud (b. 1931), the twenty-third son of Abd al-Aziz, has been another influential member of the family. He reportedly lived an opulent lifestyle as a young man, and became comptroller of the royal household at age 19. He persuaded his father to permit him to establish a cement factory, one of the first princely ventures

King Ibn Saʿud (shown here with his eldest son Saud) proclaimed the kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932 and quickly consolidated his power. **© AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

in entrepreneurship in Saudi Arabia. Talal also displayed early on a certain intellectual sophistication and, from a number of sources, drew ideas for liberal reforms that he intended to implement in Saudi Arabia. He may have assimilated some of these ideas from his first wife, the daughter of Lebanon's former premier, Riyad al-Sulh. When his ties to dissident army elements led in 1955 to his dismissal as minister of communications in King Saʿud's Council of Ministers, he went to Paris as ambassador (accredited both to France and Spain) and there further developed democratic constitutional concepts for Saudi Arabia.

In 1960 Saʿud named Talal minister of finance and economy. The king, though not in sympathy with Talal's ideas, saw him and his several reformist brothers as useful allies in his attempt to regain and consolidate power. Earlier, Saʿud had yielded most of his authority to Crown Prince Faisal in the

monarchy's 1958 crisis. In this Talal saw an opportunity to implement his ideas for reform. Neither brother satisfied his expectations, and Saʿud forced Talal out of the cabinet after less than a year.

Talal subsequently left Saudi Arabia for Beirut, Lebanon, where in the summer of 1962 he issued a manifesto titled "Letter to a Fellow Countryman." It called for a constitutional monarchy with a national assembly, two-thirds of its members to be elected, which could propose legislation, with the king retaining veto power. In the Saudi context, such notions were radical, and when Talal proceeded to criticize the Saudi government in public, to call for the freeing of slaves and concubines, and to introduce more extreme notions such as centralized "socialism," the king took his passport. Talal's full brother Nawwaf and his half brothers Badr and Fawwaz, collectively called the Free Princes outside Saudi Arabia but self-described as Young Najd (Najd al-Fatat), gave up their passports in sympathy and joined Talal in exile in Cairo. Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser tried to use the situation to his advantage against Saudi Arabia, hoping that the defections by the princes could lead to the monarchy's collapse.

The episode shook the Saudi ruling family severely, especially as it immediately preceded a republican coup in neighboring Yemen and the defection of officers from the Saudi Air Force to Nasser's Egypt. It strengthened the resolve of the Al Saʿud never again to permit family differences to be aired in public. The exiled princes all eventually returned, Talal doing so in 1964 and making an "admission of guilt." He has resumed a respected place in the royal family and, since 1979, has served as a special envoy to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Nayif ibn Abd al-Aziz (b. 1933) is the twenty-sixth son of Abd al-Aziz, and is a full brother of King Fahd. He is one of the six brothers of the Sudayri Seven, or Al Fahd, to hold a senior government position. He was governor of Riyadh from 1953 to 1954, and in 1970 became deputy minister of the interior when Fahd headed that ministry. Since 1975, when Fahd became crown prince and relinquished the ministry, Nayif has been minister of the interior, and the youngest of the Al Fahd, Ahmad, has been his deputy.

Nayif is known as pious and austere, though he has amassed a considerable fortune, and has been sympathetic to conservative demands for more extensive restrictions on both Saudi and foreign conduct in public. He has a special interest in the Gulf Arab states, with which he has developed close internal security ties. Fahd places special trust in Nayif and, after the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, directed him to head a committee to draft plans for a consultative council (Majlis al-Shura) that was finally implemented in 1992.

Turki ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud (b. 1934) is another brother of Fahd, and served as deputy defense minister from 1969 to 1978. The erratic behavior of his wife, which created unwelcome publicity, forced him to relinquish that post.

Fawwaz ibn Abd al-Aziz (b. 1934) was one of three Saʿud princes who publicly called for a constitutional monarchy for Saudi Arabia in 1962. In 1971, King Faisal appointed him governor of Mecca. In November 1979 the leader of the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca attacked Fawwaz for moral laxity; he resigned the governorship shortly afterward.

Saʿud ibn Faisal Al Saʿud (b. 1940) served as the country's foreign minister since 1975. The fourth son of King Faisal, Saʿud is the eldest of the four born to the king's favorite wife, Iffat. Like his full brothers, he received a Western education, earning a bachelor's degree in economics at Princeton University. His father's influence was strong as was that of his maternal uncle Kamal Adham, former head of Saudi intelligence. Following King Faisal's assassination in 1975, Saʿud assumed the position of foreign minister that was previously held by his father for over forty years. Both as crown prince and king, Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz al Saʿud has valued his nephew Saʿud's intelligence and skill in handling foreign assignments, but their relationship is not particularly warm. Based on his strong belief in nationalism, Saʿud has seen the U.S.-Saudi relationship as excessively one-way, in Washington's favor, and has argued for a nonaligned policy. He is probably the most likely candidate among the grandsons of King Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud to become king.

Turki ibn Faisal Al Saʿud (b. 1945) is the youngest son of Faisal by Iffat. He received his college education in the United States and did gradu-

ate studies in Islamic law at London University. He became deputy to the head of the General Intelligence Directorate, Kamal Adham, his uncle. In early 1979 Turki replaced Adham, who had taken much of the blame for failure to foresee Egypt's peace initiative with Israel succeed in the agreement called the Camp David Accords.

In November 1979 Turki distinguished himself by taking charge of the operations to regain government control of the Grand Mosque in Mecca after Islamic extremists had seized it in an effort to promote the overthrow of the monarchy. Turki has acted as a polished spokesman for Saudi Arabia's international interests. Like his father, he combines a sophisticated knowledge of the contemporary world with genuine piety and a firm belief in his country's inherent moral superiority.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Camp David Accords (1978); Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud; Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud; Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud; Majles al-Shura; Saudi Arabia.

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AL SAʿUD, SAʿUD IBN ABD AL-AZIZ

[1902–1969]

Succeeded his father, Ibn Saʿud, as king of Saudi Arabia, 1953–1964.

Saʿud ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud's life appeared to begin auspiciously, since he was born on 16 January 1902—the same day that his father Abd al-Aziz reconquered Riyadh. In 1919, the death of the eldest son, Turki, made Saʿud the eldest surviving son. He received the usual court education of memorizing the Qurʾan, formal instruction in practical subjects, and more relevant lessons in court business.

In 1921, Saʿud led troops in the final campaign against the Al Rashid, and in 1926, Abd al-Aziz appointed him viceroy of Najd, the Saudi heartland. In 1933 his father directed Saʿud's designation as crown prince. Ibn Saʿud was aware that Saʿud's abilities were greatly inferior to those of Faisal, his next son, or other potential candidates among the princes. What almost certainly led him to insist on Saʿud's designation as his successor was the memory of the family's internal rivalries, which shortly before had brought their fortunes to their lowest ebb: Also, there were potential challenges emerging to continued rule through Ibn Saʿud's line.

Despite a long tenure as viceroy and crown prince, Saʿud had never exercised meaningful authority before becoming king of Saudi Arabia in 1953, and he lacked any understanding of modern state administration and finance. Rather than relying on the council of ministers, Saʿud delegated authority to his sons and cronies. Self-indulgent and good-hearted, he regarded the country's oil wealth as his own, to be spent as he pleased. Serious physical infirmities were a major liability throughout his reign.

By 1958, debt and political crisis forced Saʿud to yield power to his brother Faisal. The precipitating factor was Saʿud's ill-considered attempt to challenge Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser by acting as leader of the conservative Arab camp, supported by the United States. Once Faisal had restored the country's solvency and established a temporary modus vivendi with Nasser, Saʿud thrust himself back into full power in alliance with Talal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud and other brothers identified as the Free Princes, who called for a constitutional monarchy. But once more a conclave of senior princes forced Saʿud to yield power to his brother Faisal.

In 1964, Saʿud tried for a final time to reclaim the powers of his office. The senior princes, backed by the *ulama,* forced Saʿud's abdication on 2 November 1964. The remainder of his life was passed in sybaritic exile, largely in Athens, Greece, where he died on 23 February 1969.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Al Saʿud Family; Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud; Nasser, Gamal Abdel.

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AL SUDAYRI FAMILY

Important family or clan in Saudi Arabia; part of a tribe of the same name.

The Al Sudayri (also spelled Al Sudairi or al-Sudairi) family's origins can be traced to a branch of the Dawasir tribe, which was a *sharifian,* or noble, tribe that lived on the edge of the Rub al-Khali desert in about 1400. By about 1550, the Al Sudayri were situated at the town of Ghat in Sudayr, an area in Najd, to the northwest of Riyadh, which took its name from the tribe. The main branch of the family, whose fortunes have been closely linked with the fortunes of the Al Saʿud family of Saudi Arabia, comes into view in the early eighteenth century.

First to achieve special prominence among the Sudayri was Ahmad al-Kabir, whose life spanned the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century. He served the Al Saʿud for fifty years in a number of civilian and military capacities, including the governorship of al-Hasa, the country's eastern province. His daughter Sara was the mother of King Abd al-Aziz (also known as Ibn Saʿud), and it was largely from her that he inherited his imposing physical stature. Ahmad al-Kabir's grandson and namesake, Ahmad bin Muhammad Al Sudayri (1869–1935), further cemented his family's ties to the Al Saʿud. In the early twentieth century, he participated in the Al Saʿud's military campaigns against their Al Rashid rivals. His daughter Hassa was a favorite wife of Abd al-Aziz, who also married two of Ahmad's nieces, Haya and Jawhara. The extent and significance of the interrelationship between the Al Saʿud and Al Sudayri is evident in the fact that nearly two dozen of Abd al-Aziz's sons or grandsons were Sudayris in the maternal line. The first wife of his son Faisal (r. 1964–1975) was Sultana bint Ahmad Al Sudayri, younger sister of Hassa. Six of Ahmad's eight sons became governors of provinces. Other Sudayris have also served as governors, especially in strategic border areas of the kingdom, and in other high-level government positions.

The impact of the Al Sudayri on the ruling family is most apparent in the dominant position of the sons of Abd al-Aziz by Hassa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri. These constitute a grouping of senior princes known as the Al Fahd, the present king and his six full brothers. (The term *Sudayri Seven,* sometimes used in the West to refer to this grouping, is not used in Saudi Arabia.) The Al Fahd are the largest group of full brothers among the sons of Abd al-Aziz, and all but one, Prince Turki (who earlier served as deputy minister of defense and aviation), occupy key positions in the government. Sultan has been minister of defense and aviation for over three decades and Abd al Rahman has been the deputy minister, while Nayif is minister of the interior with Ahmad as his deputy. Salman has been governor of Riyadh since 1962 but exercises more influence than his official position suggests. Moreover, Sultan is second deputy prime minister and probably next after Crown Prince Abdullah to succeed Fahd as king.

While all the sons of Hassa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri are intelligent and ambitious, they differ significantly in character and in political and philosophical outlook. Fahd and Sultan are the most secular and the most pro-American, while Nayif and Ahmad most notably embody the traditional, conservative Islamic virtues. Ties of blood and a strong sense of self-interest, however, outweigh any differences. Moreover, their differences help to gain the family support from various constituencies within the Al Saʿud and in the country at large. It is likely that after Abdullah succession will continue through the Al Fahd. Should the Al Saʿud find themselves divided over the succession, Salman, who commands

broad support, would be a likely compromise candidate. Other Sudayris have frequently served as governors of various provinces.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Al Saʿud Family; Hasa, al-; Najd.

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Malcolm C. Peck
Updated by J. E. Peterson

AL SUDAYRI, HASSA BINT AHMAD

Wife of Ibn Saʿud, mother of Saudi kings.

Hassa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri was one of three Hassa cousins from a prominent clan in eastern Saudi Arabia who married King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud (known as Ibn Saʿud). Her sons include King Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud and Defense Minister Sultan ibn Abd al-Aziz and constitute the most important bloc of senior places among the Al Saʿud family.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud; Saudi Arabia.

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Malcolm C. Peck

AL-SUSWA, AMAT AL-ALIM

[1958–]

Yemeni minister for human rights.

Amat al-Alim al-Suswa (b. 1958 in Taʿiz) is the second woman to act as a full cabinet member in the Yemeni cabinet, following Wahib Farʿa, the state minister for human rights. Al-Suswa is a journalist by education. She started her career early at age seven in Taʿiz as an announcer of children's programs on a local radio station. While working she completed her secondary education in Taʿiz and went on to Cairo University to complete a B.A. in mass communications (1980). She has an M.A. in international communications from the American University, Washington, D.C. (1984). In addition to her long career in Yemeni radio and television as an announcer and program director, Al-Suswa has also lectured at Sanʿa University in the faculty of political science and has published reports on women's issues (e.g., *Yemeni Women in Figures,* Sanʿa 1996). She joined the ruling People's General Congress prior to Yemeni unification and gained high posts in the party hierarchy, including as member of the Permanent Committee (1986–). She is a long-time activist in Yemen's women's movement and a founding member of the National Women's Committee (NWC). She has chaired both the NWC (1993) and the Yemeni Women's Union (1989–1990). In 1991 she was nominated assistant deputy minister of the ministry of information and in 1997 she became the deputy minister. After leaving the ministry, she served as the country's ambassador to the Netherlands from 2001 to 2003—the first woman in a high foreign ministry position since unification. In May 2003 al-Suswa was nominated as the state minister for human rights. She is particularly interested in questions of freedom of opinion and freedom of the press.

See also Farʾa, Wahiba; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; National Women's Committee (Yemen); Yemen; Yemeni Women's Union.

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Susanne Dahlgren

ALTALENA

Armed IZL ship sunk by the Israel Defense Force on 22 June 1948 on Tel Aviv's shore.

Purchased in America in 1947 by an official of the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi (IZL) and renamed *Altalena,*

A cargo ship used by the Irgun extremist group burns in the waters off Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel, 29 June 1948. The group, formed in 1931 to combat Arab and, later, British aggression in Palestine, was trying to run arms ashore, in violation of the Palestine truce. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Zeʾev Jabotinsky's Italian pen name, the 1,820-ton landing craft was at first used to carry European refugees to Palestine. It became a transporter of arms for the Irgunists following the United Nations's (UN) partition resolution on 29 November 1947, which set off the first Arab–Israel War (1947–1948). On 1 June 1948, Menachem Begin, a leader of the Irgun, met with official military leaders of the newly independent state of Israel to sign an agreement for the incorporation of the Irgun battalions into the Israel Defense Force (IDF) but did not let the government know of Irgun's negotiations with France, which had agreed to supply the Irgun with arms materiel from war overstock. The arms—including 5,000 British rifles, 4 million bullets, 300 Bren guns, 250 Stens, 150 Spandau rifles, and 50 eight-inch mortars—would be transported on the *Altalena,* also carrying 900 trained Irgun recruits from Europe.

The *Altalena* left Port du Bouc with its cargo of arms and men on 11 June 1948, the first day of a month-long UN-brokered peace that pledged Arabs and Jews not to import arms into Israel. In view of the truce and a newspaper article (10 June 1948) and a BBC broadcast (11 June 1948) that made Irgun's *Altalena* operation public, Begin notified the Israeli government of the ship's impending arrival. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion considered the Irgun's actions a danger to the truce and a critical challenge to the authority of the state, but he conditionally permitted the ship to proceed because of the country's vital need for arms. In the ensuing negotiations between the Irgun high command and government representatives, which began on 16 June 1948, Irgunists agreed to hand over to the IDF half of the stock of arms, provided a considerable portion of the remaining supply would be apportioned to the incorporated Irgun units and that one-fifth would be allocated to the Irgun forces in Jerusalem (which, according to UN decree, had not become part of Israel). The Irgun leaders also agreed to dock the *Altalena* at Kfar Vitkin, a settlement north of Tel Aviv loyal to Ben-Gurion forces, to which the ship came on 19 June 1948. As a result of an unresolved difference as to where the arms would be warehoused, the government issued an ultimatum to Irgun to turn over the arms.

When the Irgun men ignored the ultimatum, government forces attacked disembarked Irgunists. Disregarding Begin's orders to stay and fight, the Irgunists removed the *Altalena* to Tel Aviv, where they believed the government would not hazard starting a civil war. In the port of Tel Aviv, on 22 June 1948, Ben-Gurion ordered government forces to take all measures necessary to put down Irgun's "revolt." An initial Irgun advantage was overcome by reinforced IDF units, which hit the ship with shells from a cannon ("a blessed gun," according to Ben-Gurion). In spite of a call for a truce from the mayor of Tel Aviv and the raising of a white flag by the Irgunists, government forces continued to hit the *Altalena* until the ammunition below deck caught fire and the burning ship had to be evacuated. It sank with bombs and ammunition detonating. In the fighting, a total of twenty Irgunists were killed and eighty-seven wounded.

In the aftermath of the sinking of the *Altalena,* the Irgun accused Ben-Gurion of conspiring to get rid of his opponents, and the government accused the Irgun of planning a revolt against it. The extended conflict, which increased the tension between the two groups, represented the last physical confrontation between the organized Yishuv and the dissenters. Two cabinet ministers resigned in protest of the government's handling of the situa-

tion, and for many years the events surrounding the *Altalena*'s sinking cast a pall over Israeli politics.

See also Begin, Menachem; Ben-Gurion, David; Irgun Zva'i Le'umi (IZL); Jabotinsky, Vladimir Ze'ev; Yishuv.

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Yaakov Shavit

ALTERMAN, NATAN

[1910–1970]

Israeli poet, playwright, essayist, and translator.

A central author of modern Hebrew poetry and an influential cultural and political figure of the first decades of the State of Israel, Natan Alterman immigrated to Palestine in 1925 from Warsaw via France, where he had studied agronomy. The five volumes of his collected poetry, his plays, his satirical works, and his children's books are noted for their wit, their creative use of traditional form in modernist variations, and their manipulation of the language. Alterman is considered the most prominent poet of Hebrew literature since Hayyim Nahman Bialik.

Alterman's affinity with the Russian and French avant-garde shaped his Hebrew poetry and, in turn, filtered into the mainstream of Israeli poetry. He was the leading imagist of his time and an exponent of the well-wrought poem that employed symmetry and balanced stanza, meter, and structured rhyme schemes. These poetic characteristics were turned against him in the 1950s, when Anglo–American literary tastes—with their preference for concrete poetry, free verse, irony, and colloquialism—replaced the neoromanticism of the previous generation.

Much of his work is enigmatic and hermetic. Autobiographic materials are coded into symbolic and abstract terms, personal experiences are suppressed, and historical events allegorized. Yet the tensions and drama of personal anguish are transmitted through a virtuoso use of language and intellectual structure. In *Stars Outside* (1938), his first collection, Alterman created a world in which troubadours and wandering minstrels roam roads and frequent taverns as they worship a symbolic merciless lady who represents the universe or earth. This poetry suggests that the role of the poet is to be the lyric transmitter of the world as he subjectively experiences it. Similarly, Alterman refrained from extensive employment of intertextual references to traditional Hebrew sources, an otherwise dominant characteristic of Hebrew literature. He thus maintained a universal, existential poetic perception.

In 1943 Alterman began to publish a weekly satirical column, "The Seventh Column," in which he reflected in verse on the turbulent circumstances of the Jewish population in Palestine on the road to independence and statehood. This column both expressed and formed the mood of the many people who read and quoted it weekly. One such column, "The Silver Platter" (November 1947), was a mythic poem of foresight and somber fortitude anticipating the war of independence. This poem soon reached the status of a national hymn and is still recited and performed annually in Memorial Day ceremonies.

Many of Alterman's poems have been set to music, in addition to the songs, ballads, and verse plays he composed for the stage. He translated into Hebrew the major works of Shakespeare, Racine, and Molière, among others, as well as classics of Russian and Yiddish literature. Only a few of his works have been translated into English (*Selected Poems* [1978]; *Little Tel Aviv* [1981]).

See also Bialik, Hayyim Nahman; Literature: Hebrew.

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Zvia Ginor

AL THANI FAMILY

Ruling family of Qatar since the late nineteenth century.

The founder of this dynasty was Muhammad ibn Thani (r. 1868–1876), whose political skills won British recognition of Qatar's independence from Bahrain. After 1868, political life in the country was

dominated by conflict within the family. Because there were no rules of succession, the strongest and most aggressive family factions have tended to take power. The rule of Ahmad ibn Ali Al Thani (r. 1960–1972) was characterized by inefficiency and personal greed, which resulted in his being deposed by Khalifa ibn Hamad Al Thani (r. 1972–1995). Khalifa used oil revenues to develop the country, pay off an often fractious family, and fund an extravagant lifestyle. Hamad ibn Khalifa Al Thani became de facto ruler in 1992, when his father allowed him to appoint cabinet members, and in 1995 he led a bloodless coup to end his father's reign officially.

After taking power, Hamad retained his post as minister of defense and commander of the armed forces. Although he had taken the position of prime minister as well, he turned it over to Abdullah ibn Khalifa Al Thani in 1997. Hamad named his son Jassem heir apparent in 1996 and attempted to address the family's chronic succession struggles by amending the constitution to regularize the process. He survived a coup attempt in 1996 and oversaw national municipal elections in 1999. A controversy arose in 2002, when published reports noted that Interior Minister Abdullah ibn Kahlid Al Thani had supported al-Qaʿida, a sensitive issue for the United States because of newly established U.S. military facilities in the country.

See also QATAR.

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ANTHONY B. TOTH

AL THANI, HAMAD IBN KHALIFA

[1950–]

Amir of Qatar, 1995–.

Shaykh Hamad ibn Khalifa Al Thani became the amir of Qatar on 27 June 1995 when he ousted his father in a bloodless palace coup. The eldest son of his predecessor, Shaykh Khalifa, Hamad was born in Doha in 1950. He was graduated from the Royal Military College in Sandhurst, England, in 1971, and in 1977 he was named heir apparent and defense minister by his father. In 1992 he took control of the day-to-day governing of Qatar when his father allowed him to appoint a cabinet of his own choice. In his first cabinet, appointed in July 1995, he retained for himself the positions of defense minister and commander of the Qatari armed forces and, in addition, appointed himself prime minister, a position previously held by his father.

F. GREGORY GAUSE III

AL THUNAYYAN FAMILY

A branch of the Al Saʿud, the ruling family of Saudi Arabia.

The Al Thunayyan (also Al Thunayan, Al Thunaiyan) are descended from an eponymous ancestor who was the brother of the dynasty's founder, Muhammad ibn Saʿud. That Thunayyan joined his brother in support of the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the Islamic reformer whose teachings (known outside Arabia as Wahhabism) have provided the essential ideological legitimacy for the rule of the Al Saʿud family.

Abdullah ibn Thunayyan was briefly ruler of Najd (1841–1843), following the second Egyptian occupation of the Saudi state, then met defeat at the hands of Faysal ibn Turki Al Saʿud, who restored Saudi rule over both central and eastern Arabia. Subsequently, the family of Abdullah moved to Istanbul, acquiring there a certain cosmopolitanism that set them apart from their Najdi cousins. His great-grandson, Ahmad, returned to Arabia to serve as private secretary to Amir (later King) Abd al-Aziz, also known as Ibn Saʿud, from before World War I until his death in 1921. Ahmad accompanied the young Prince (later King) Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz on the latter's diplomatic tour of Europe in 1919. Ahmad's intelligent and well-educated niece Iffat later became Faysal's very influential wife. A number of Al Thunayyan hold mid-level positions throughout the Saudi government and two are deputy ministers.

See also AL SAʿUD FAMILY; FAYSAL IBN TURKI AL SAʿUD; MUWAHHIDUN.

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MALCOLM C. PECK
UPDATED BY J. E. PETERSON

ALTINAY, AHMED REFIK

[c. 1879–c. 1935]

Turkish historian, journalist, and poet.

Born in Istanbul, Ahmed Refik Altinay was the son of an agha from Ürgüp who had migrated there to serve the government of the Ottoman Empire. Altinay joined the military in 1898 and later taught French and history at the war school. He worked as an official censor during the Balkan War and World War I, when he began writing history articles. Before and after the wars, he served on a government historical commission and in 1918 became a professor of Ottoman history at Istanbul University. He retired to his home on Büyük Ada Island in the 1930s.

His vast output of popular histories was written in simplified Turkish. He had a flair for storytelling. He wrote on many eras—from the period of Alexander the Great to the rise of the Prussian state—but is best remembered for his evocations of daily life in Constantinople through the centuries. Throughout his life, he contributed articles, sketches, and poems to newspapers, and he wrote several children's history books.

ELIZABETH THOMPSON

ALUSI, MAHMUD SHUKRI AL-

[1857–1924]

Iraqi historian, writer, and teacher; a Sunni reformer.

Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi was born in Baghdad to a well-known but impoverished family of clerics. Educated in Islam by his father and uncle, he taught in Madrasa (Islamic schools) attached to mosques, wrote, and occasionally engaged in politics.

In 1889, the Ottoman Empire's governor *(wali)* of Baghdad named Alusi to be Arabic-language editor of the official journal *al-Zawra*; the next wali, however, persecuted Alusi for his pro-Wahhabi inclinations—Alusi had attacked Ottoman innovations and so-called superstitious religious practices. Around 1905, he was exiled for a short period when the wali accused him of incitement against the Ottoman sultan.

Due to Alusi's great popularity with the Sunni Muslims, in 1911 the Ottoman wali Cemal Paşa asked him to join the administrative council of Baghdad's province. In November 1914, he was sent to persuade the Saudi amir Ibn Saʿud to support the Ottoman Empire in World War I, but he failed.

In his writings, Alusi defends Islamic reformists, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida; he attacks deviationist practices in Sunni Islam, which he saw as a return to polytheism. More ferocious were his attacks against the Shiʿites. He branded them *rafida* (renegades) and accused them of rejoicing in the Ottoman's defeat by the Russians; he also issued legal opinions *(fatwa).* His histories deal with Baghdad, its *ulama* (body of Islamic scholars), and mosques; Islamic Spain; the Najd; Arab markets, eating and drinking habits, and punishments in the Jahili period; Arab games; and Baghdadi proverbs. He also wrote essays on Arabic philology.

See also ABDUH, MUHAMMAD; AFGHANI, JAMAL AL-DIN AL-; RIDA, RASHID.

AMATZIA BARAM

AMAL

Resistance movement in Lebanon.

The AMAL movement was established in 1975 by Imam Musa Sadr. In Arabic the name means hope, but it is also the acronym for Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya (Lebanese Resistance Detachments). The name was originally used for the military arm of the Movement of the Disinherited, which Sadr founded in 1974 to promote the Lebanese Shiʿite cause. Although Sadr established his own militia, he later opposed a military solution to the Lebanese Civil War, refusing to involve AMAL in the fighting during 1975 and 1976. This reluctance discredited the movement in the eyes of many Shiʿa, who chose instead to support the Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO) and members of the Lebanese National Movement. AMAL was also unpopular for endorsing Syria's military intervention in Lebanon in 1976.

Several factors caused AMAL to make a dramatic resurgence during the late 1970s. First, Shiʿa became disillusioned with the conduct and policies of the PLO and its Lebanese allies. Second, the mysterious disappearance of Sadr while on a visit to Libya in 1978 made him a symbol of the Shiʿite heritage; the significance attached to his absence was not unlike the concealment/absence of the twelfth imam of the Shiʿite Twelvers. Third, the Iranian Revolution revived hope among Lebanese Shiʿa and instilled a sense of growing communal solidarity. Moreover, when the PLO feared AMAL's increased power, it tried to crack down on its cells using military force. This strategy backfired and rallied an even greater number of Shiʿites around AMAL.

Husayn al-Husayni, former speaker of parliament, headed AMAL from 1979 until April 1980, when Nabi Berri assumed the leadership and transformed the movement into one of the most powerful political and military forces in Lebanon. Although its charter expressed dedication to the Palestinian cause, the movement laid siege to Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and started the war of the camps, which lasted from 1985 until 1988. In 1994, Berri was speaker of parliament, and AMAL's role had been enhanced by the 1992 landslide victory of Berri's slate of candidates in the South. The disarming of militias during the late 1980s forced AMAL into the political arena, and it remains a major force. Its success has been aided by Berri's political subservience to Syria.

AMAL's broad support in predominantly Shiʿite areas notwithstanding, neither AMAL's rank and file nor its leadership is cohesive. The movement has become a political tool for Berri, who uses his influential position in government to advance the cause. Many members and leaders of AMAL have been appointed to key government positions. The movement's fortunes declined in the late 1990s; it barely managed to keep its seats in the parliament in the 2000 election. Hizbullah benefited from the reputation for corruption and insensitivity that surrounds AMAL leaders and deputies, but the Syrian government forced Hizbullah and AMAL to run on the same list in South Lebanon. In 2003 Nabi Berri revealed an internal crisis in AMAL when he forced the resignation of his two representatives in the cabinet, accusing them of corruption, although his motives were most likely political. Berri remained protected by strong Syrian support, although his popularity in South Lebanon suffered greatly.

See also Berri, Nabi; Husayni, Husayn al-; Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanese National Movement (LNM); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Shiʿism.

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As'ad AbuKhalil

AMAL, AL-

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

AMANOLLAH KHAN

[1892–1960]

King of Afghanistan, 1919–1929.

Amanollah Khan (also called Amanullah Barakzai) launched a jihad (holy war) against Great Britain and declared Afghanistan's independence from Britain in 1919. He embarked on an ambitious program of modernization, introducing secular reforms and education.

He was the third son of Habibollah Khan (ruled 1901–1919), who was assassinated. Amanollah, then governor of Kabul, persuaded the army and power elite to prefer his claim to the throne over his brothers and uncle. In May 1919, he went to war against the British administration and, at the end of a one-month campaign, was able to negotiate control of his country's foreign policy (which his grandfather Abd al-Rahman Khan had surrendered). He welcomed recognition of his regime by the then new

and revolutionary government of the Soviet Union; he soon turned, however, to countries without territorial designs on Central Asia, establishing ties with France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire. He failed to initiate official relations with the United States.

Advised by Ottoman-educated Afghans and impressed by Ottoman Turkey's example, Amanollah embarked on his own scheme of development. First he promulgated a constitution and convened three *loya jirga* (grand assemblies, composed of various segments of the power elite) to ratify his important decisions. Second, he systematized the administrative divisions of the country into a territorial hierarchy of subdistricts, districts, and provinces. The centrally appointed administrators at each level were assisted by a locally elected consultative body. Third, he replaced *iltizam* (tax farming) with directly collected taxes in cash. Fourth, he tolerated a free press, entrusted the intelligentsia with responsible positions in the government, and spent a major portion of the revenue of the state on the expansion of education.

These reforms proved to be enduring. Nevertheless, he alienated his subjects with more symbolic policies such as the mandatory unveiling of Afghan women and the imposition of European attire on civil servants and schoolchildren. Simultaneously, he canceled the monetary and symbolic sinecures enjoyed by the leaders of the clans and the headmen of villages. Furthermore, his new tax policies weighed heavily on agricultural producers and were unpopular in the countryside. Opposition was organized under the symbolic defense of the values of Islam and spearheaded by leaders of the religious establishment. Leaders of clans and social bandits also played an important role. He might have overcome the challenge had he paid more attention to his army—but he had neglected its welfare and was unable to prevent soldiers from joining the several revolts that broke out simultaneously in 1928. He was forced to abdicate in May 1929 and went into exile in Italy.

See also AFGHANISTAN; HABIBOLLAH KHAN.

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ASHRAF GHANI

AMARI, RAJA

[1971–]

Tunisian film director.

Born in Tunis, Tunisia, Raja Amari trained as a dancer at the Conservatoire de Tunis (Tunis conservatory) and also received a degree in Romance languages with an emphasis on art history from the University of Tunis. After working as a film critic for *Cinécrit* (1992–1994), Amari moved on to film studies in Paris at the Institut de Formation et d'Enseignement pour les Métiers de l'Image et Son (National higher institute for audiovisual media studies) between 1994 and 1998. Her short films include *Le bouquet* (The bouquet; 1995), *Avril* (April; 1997), and *Un soir de juillet* (One evening in July; 2000). Her award-winning, full-length film *Satin rouge* (Red satin; 2002) is about the transformative powers of self-expression, which a middle-aged Tunisian widow, the seamstress Lilia, discovers through belly dancing. While it is common for Arab and Tunisian films to present women as being in conflict with society, Amari notes she was interested in how Lilia adapts to social hypocrisy, to the distance between individual desire and social mores, doing as she wishes while avoiding a frontal attack. Amari lists as her influences Pier Paolo Pasolini, François Truffaut, and the new French cinema, as well as actresses from Egyptian musicals from the 1940s and 1950s, such as Samia Gamal, whose freedom and ability to shift between oriental and occidental styles reflect Amari's own love of dance.

See also ART; FILM; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; TUNISIA.

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LAURA RICE

AMER, GHADA

[1963–]

New York–based multimedia artist from Egypt.

Ghada Amer was born in 1963, in Egypt. She trained in Paris and lives in New York and is one of the few Arab artists to be recognized in international avant-garde circles. She exhibited in the 2000 Whitney Biennial and won the UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) prize at the 1999 Venice Biennial. Her work is primarily concerned with pleasure, the female body, and women's sexuality. She is best known for her two-dimensional stitchings of women in erotic poses, often taken from pornographic magazines. Observers have noted her reference in needlework to women's traditional labor, her reworking of the visual aspects of male-dominated abstract expressionism, and the ways in which her work reclaims women's sensual pleasure and challenges stereotypes about passive Muslim women. Amer describes her work as a series of ruminations on the problems of religious and feminist extremism, which she says are similar in their problematic views of the body and how it seduces. In 2000, she became the first Arab artist to receive a one-person show at the Tel Aviv Museum of Art, setting off a firestorm of controversy in her native Egypt, where most artists and intellectuals are against the normalization of cultural relations with Israel until it ends the occupation of Palestinian territories.

See also Art; Gender: Gender and Education.

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Jessica Winegar

AMERICAN COLLEGE FOR GIRLS

See Ramses College for Girls

AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR JUDAISM

Once formidable anti-Zionist campaigning body seeking to preserve the nonpolitical nature of liberal religious tradition in North American Judaism.

The American Council for Judaism (ACJ) was founded in 1942 by a group of prominent non-Zionist Reform rabbis opposed to the affirmation of political Zionism by the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR). The ACJ initially sought to reaffirm the fundamentals of Classical North American Reform Judaism stated in the Pittsburgh Platform of 1885, which eliminated references to Jerusalem and Zion in prayer services and affirmed the absolute loyalty of Jews to the nation in which they lived. In 1942, CCAR support for a refuge in Palestine for Jews fleeing European antisemitism left non-Zionists concerned that their universalistic, liberal values and North American identity were in question. The ACJ initially had considerable impact on liberal Christians but was undermined by increasing sympathy toward Zionism within the North American establishment. The AJC's increasingly non-religious and anti-Zionist manifesto always attracted far smaller numbers of rabbis and laymen than Zionist organizations did (notably Women's International Zionist Organization, Hadassah, and the American Israel Political Affairs Committee). The largest secular Jewish bodies—notably the American Jewish Committee and American Jewish Congress—have identified firmly with the defense of Israeli interests, and religious Zionism has dominated mainstream Reform organizations since the 1970s. Some of the ACJ's most prominent spokespersons have been Louis Wolsey, William Fineshriber, Morris Lazaron, and Elmer Berger. The ACJ is sympathetic to Israeli critics of Zionism, religious traditionalism, and state policy, but has had weaker ties with Arabs in the Middle East.

See also American Jewish Committee; American Jewish Congress; Zionist Organization of America.

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George R. Wilkes

AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Umbrella organization, founded in 1954, to lobby the U.S. Congress in support of Israel.

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC; originally known as the American Zionist Public Affairs Committee) was established in 1954; the name of the organization was changed in 1959. Isaiah L. Kenen (1905–1988), the organization's executive director and chief lobbyist from 1959 to 1974, is credited with shaping AIPAC and overseeing its emergence as the leading Jewish-sponsored pro-Israel lobby in Washington, D.C. Kenen also served as chairman of AIPAC in 1974 and 1975 and as honorary chairman from 1975 to 1988. In these capacities, Kenen created the biweekly bulletin *Near East Report,* which he edited from 1957 to 1973, and introduced the widely distributed annual guidebook *Myths & Facts.* The latter was discontinued in 1992.

Thomas A. Dine, who served as AIPAC's executive director from 1980 to 1993, succeeded Kenen. Under Dine's tenure, AIPAC's membership rose from 11,000 to more than 50,000, and the organization's annual budget from $750,000 to more than $3 million. By 2003 AIPAC had 65,000 members nationwide and was regarded as one of the most effective and sophisticated lobbying groups in the United States.

In general, AIPAC serves as a watchdog group, tracking political, financial, and military attitudes and policies toward Israel in U.S. public life. AIPAC policy analysts regularly review hundreds of periodicals, journals, speeches, and reports and meet with foreign policy experts in order to track and analyze current events and trends related to Israel and the Middle East.

As a registered Washington lobby, AIPAC is prohibited from contributing funds to political candidates and elected officials. However, the organization does have a long-standing history of supplying U.S. politicians, elected officials, and government agencies with information and data on Israel and Middle East affairs. (In fact, during his tenure with AIPAC, Kenen drafted statements and speeches on Israel and U.S. policy in the Middle East for many politicians, including Harry S. Truman, Hubert H. Humphrey, and John F. Kennedy.) To this end, the organization conducts regular meetings with U.S. legislators and their support staff. AIPAC also promotes Israel on U.S. college campuses and maintains leadership development programs that educate and train young U.S. Jewish leaders in pro-Israel political advocacy.

See also American Council for Judaism; American Jewish Committee; Zionist Organization of America.

Mark A. Raider

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Defense organization led by U.S. Jews and established in 1906.

The American Jewish Committee was established in 1906, after a series of pogroms in Eastern Europe convinced prominent U.S. Jews of the need to create a defense organization dedicated "to prevent the infraction of civil and religious rights of Jews in any part of the world." The present-day American Jewish Committee continues its focus on the welfare and security of world Jewry. In addition, it seeks to enhance the quality of Jewish life in the United States. The committee attempts to achieve these dual objectives by opposing antisemitism and attacks against Israel and by helping to strengthen Jewish identity through, among other things, deepening the ties between American Jews and Israel.

Although the American Jewish Committee was established by a small coterie of self-appointed and co-opted individuals rather than by elected leaders, the committee viewed itself as representing the needs and interests of the wider Jewish community. During World War I, a newly emerging U.S. Jewish leadership charged the committee with elitism and demanded a democratically elected American Jewish Congress to represent U.S. Jewry at a postwar peace conference. The American Jewish Committee first opposed and then negotiated an agreement whereby three-fourths of the delegates to such a

congress would be elected and one-fourth appointed by the American Jewish Committee. The committee, perhaps in order to maintain its leadership position within the Jewish community, forged a relationship first with the Zionist movement and then later with the state of Israel.

In 1929 the chair of the American Jewish Committee, Louis Marshall, and the president of the World Zionist Organization, Chaim Weizmann, signed an accord establishing the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which would support Jewish development of Palestine and represent Jewish interests in Palestine. In 1950, two years after the state of Israel was established, Jacob Blaustein, the chair of the American Jewish Committee, and David Ben-Gurion, prime minister of Israel, signed an accord in which the prime minister recognized that "the Jews of the United States, as a community and as individuals, have one political attachment and that is to the United States of America." The chair of the American Jewish Committee, for his part, noted that "the vast majority of the American Jewry recognizes the necessity and the desirability of helping to make it [Israel] a strong, viable, self-supporting state. . . . The American Jewish Committee has been active. . . and will continue to be. . . in rendering. . . every possible support to Israel." The ideas and assurances expressed in the 1950 accord have served as the basis of the committee's subsequent approach to Israel and world Jewish affairs.

By 2003 the American Jewish Committee had a membership of 100,000 and was headquartered in New York City, with thirty-three regional offices in the United States and international offices in Israel, Germany, Switzerland, and Poland and partnership agreements with Jewish communal associations in nine different countries as well as with the European Council of Jewish Communities. The American Jewish Committee no longer claims to be the sole representative of U.S. Jewry. Rather, it supports the security and well-being of Israel and seeks to safeguard world Jewry and to enhance the continuity and quality of Jewish life in the United States and elsewhere.

See also AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR JUDAISM; AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS; ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA.

JERRY KUTNICK

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

Organization founded in 1917 to secure Jewish civil, political, and religious rights in Central and Eastern Europe and in Palestine.

The American Jewish Congress (AJC) is the second Jewish defense organization established in the United States. It was founded during World War I in order to fight antisemitism and help find a solution to the problems facing Jews in Europe. Its early history helped shape its present political perspective and its approach toward Jewish affairs.

Responding to the plight of millions of Jews caught in war-torn zones and suffering from antisemitic outbreaks during World War I, proponents of the idea of a congress sought to create a democratic institution that could represent the views and will of American Jewry. Supporters of the congress opposed what they considered the self-appointed leadership of the American Jewish Committee, which in their view represented mainly the wealthy and influential segments of the community. After much debate, the two sides reached an agreement allowing for the formation of a one-time-only congress in which one-quarter of the delegates would be appointed by the American Jewish Committee and three-quarters would be elected by U.S. Jews. In 1918, for the first and only time, some 330,000 Jews throughout the United States elected delegates to an American Jewish Congress. The AJC sent a delegation to the Paris Peace Congress. Once the conference was over and the delegation submitted its report, the congress, in accordance with its agreement with the American Jewish Committee, was dissolved.

In 1922, however, proponents of the congress idea formed a second American Jewish Congress, which was to become a permanent body within the organized Jewish community. Unlike its predecessor, this new AJC was a membership-based organization that did not purport to represent the views of all U.S. Jews. But, like its predecessor, the new AJC continued to seek support for its positions more through mass appeals and public protests than through the quiet intervention of well-connected individuals—the style that typified the American Jewish Committee.

Since the Holocaust, the U.S. Jewish community and the state of Israel have constituted the main

centers of the Jewish people. The AJC is headquartered in New York and maintains an office in Jerusalem; it has 50,000 members. It continues to fight antisemitism throughout the world and to support liberal causes in the United States and Israel. On the U.S. scene, the AJC is an active supporter of civil rights and civil liberties and an advocate of church-state separation. A supporter of Zionism since its founding, the AJC seeks to ensure the security and prosperity of the state of Israel and supports Israel's quest for peace with the Palestinians and with her Arab neighbors. It took a lead in supporting the 1993 Oslo Accords. Although the AJC generally supports the Israeli government in power as the democratically elected representative of its citizenry and is wary of interfering in Israel's domestic affairs, the AJC's policies and positions are viewed as reflecting a liberal perspective in both the United States and Israel.

See also American Jewish Committee; Paris Peace Settlements (1918–1923).

Jerry Kutnick

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO (AUC)

A small, international university founded in 1919 by U.S. educators.

The American University in Cairo (AUC) opened in 1920 under its founder and president Charles R. Watson, the Egyptian-born son of missionary parents from the United States. Although he had worked for the United Presbyterians' Board of Foreign Missions, Watson insisted that the university be independent of that organization; he wanted a Christian but nondenominational school.

The university opened modestly with a preparatory section (which closed in the early 1950s). Characteristic of colleges throughout the United States but then new to Egypt, there were also four other programs: an undergraduate College of Arts and Sciences; a noncredit Extension (now Public Service) Division; a Department of Education; and a School of Oriental Studies to serve missionaries, businessmen, diplomats, and other Westerners. AUC also featured physical education, coeducation, an open-stack library, a journalism major, and extracurricular clubs.

After twenty-five years, Watson was succeeded by John Badeau (1945–1953), who brought AUC into the postcolonial era. Arabic-speaking and affable, he cultivated Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser and other influential Egyptians. As U.S. ambassador to Egypt (1961–1964), he kept a friendly eye on the university.

The students were drawn mainly from economic and cultural elites, including many foreigners and minorities—Jews, Greeks, and Armenians were numerous until their communities emigrated en masse during Nasser's regime. Egypt's Coptic Christians were part of the student mix, as were women. Muslims were few, especially during the 1930s, when it was charged that AUC was proselytizing them for Christianity. AUC dropped hymns and prayers from its assemblies, but it was not until the 1960s, when AUC began closing on the Muslim holy day, Friday, and hired some full-time Muslim academics, that Muslim students enrolled in great numbers. Today they outnumber Christians.

Tiny in comparision with other Egyptian universities, AUC has sought distinctive offerings for both its Egyptian and foreign students. In 1961 to 1962, when Cairo University had almost 30,000 students, AUC had only 360 enrolled; in 2002 AUC had about 5,000 students enrolled and a teaching staff of 396. Since 1950 graduate programs have been added, as well as the Social Research Center, English Language Institute, Center for Arabic Studies, Center for Arabic Studies Abroad (CASA), university press, Management Extension Services, and Desert Development Center. In the late 1950s the Ford Foundation and the U.S. government provided major funding to replace funding once provided by private U.S. donors with missionary ideals. In the 1980s a Saudi business alumnus was the largest private donor.

When the United States replaced Britain as the dominant foreign power in the Middle East, the highly visible AUC campus became the target of anti-American demonstrations. During the Arab-Israel War of 1967 the university was sequestered, but Nasser's personal interest (he had sent a daughter there) soon restored things to normal. Egypt's President Anwar Sadat (1970–1981) had pro-U.S. policies, which brought new opportunities to the university. Both President Husni Mubarak's wife

Suzanne and his politically prominent son Gamal are AUC alumni.

In 2007 the university is scheduled to move its main campus from Tahrir Square in the heart of downtown Cairo to the planned community of New Cairo being developed on the desert plateau east of the city. Its full-time enrollment is then planned to reach 5,500.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT (AUB)

Prominent institution of higher education in Lebanon.

The American University of Beirut (AUB) was once the most famous university in the Middle East, if not in the entire African and Asian region. It was established as the Syrian Protestant College by the American Protestant Evangelical Mission to Syria in 1866. The AUB is run by a New York–based board of trustees, whose members are citizens of various countries. The university was incorporated under the laws of the State of New York.

The arts and sciences faculty awards bachelor's and master's degrees; the faculty of medicine awards bachelor's and master's degrees in science, master's degrees in public health, and certificates in undergraduate nursing and basic laboratory techniques; the faculty of engineering and architecture awards bachelor's and master's degrees in engineering and bachelor's degrees in architecture; the faculty of agriculture and food sciences awards master's degrees in all departments, as well as doctorates in agronomy. English is the language of instruction except in courses within the department of Arabic.

Initially, most of the students at the university came from elite Christian families. But the university's reputation soon eliminated any sectarian label, and it attracted Arabs from various countries. Its admissions standards and tuition made it, and continue to make it, inaccessible to most students from lower income groups. However, the student body has become somewhat diversified through scholarships and grants.

Although the university took its Christian message seriously in the early years, to the point of dismissing a popular professor for daring to teach Darwinism, its curricula became secularized during the twentieth century—perhaps to reflect the religious diversity of the Lebanese population.

AUB's medical school has been one of its most important divisions, training generations of physicians who practice throughout the Middle East. It was, and to a degree it remains, one of the most prestigious educational institutions in the region. The American University Hospital has become known as one of the best hospitals in the Middle East. The university has benefited from a relatively large endowment and from U.S. congressional support. The liberal atmosphere of Lebanon, at least before the Lebanese Civil War, allowed the university to attract scholars, faculty, and staff from the world's best educational institutions.

The AUB has been criticized by many thinkers and political activists, including such alumni as Dr. George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, for its U.S. associations. It was seen by some as a bastion of cultural pluralism, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, when the university administration responded firmly to student protests. For militant student leaders, the campus was considered no more than an espionage den and a recruiting center for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Yet militants and moderates, secularists and fundamentalists, all wanted to be admitted. A degree from AUB provided the best financial prospects; in fact, until the 1970s it almost always guaranteed a job for its holder. Political and economic changes in Lebanon, however, decreased its value, especially when some Lebanese could afford to attend far more prestigious foreign universities.

The AUB underwent tremendous changes because of the civil war (1975–1990). Despite extensive damage, it continued to function, even during repeated interruptions due to intense fighting. Some

of its professors were threatened or kidnapped, and its president, Malcolm Kerr, was assassinated in 1984 by unknown gunmen. Its main administrative building, College Hall, bombed in the early 1990s, has been reconstructed. The division of the city of Beirut into eastern and western zones affected the life of the campus community, which became more sharply divided along sectarian lines. The administration authorized the opening of an off-campus program in East Beirut during the war for those who could not reach predominantly Muslim West Beirut.

The quality and standards of the AUB have declined as a result of the war. Many foreign nationals on the faculty left, depriving students of some of the most qualified teachers. The flight of many Lebanese and Palestinian professors forced the administration to accept applicants who in previous times would have been considered underqualified. The shortage of professors in some departments led the administration to accept applicants with an M.A. as teachers, which was uncommon before the war.

The end of the civil war promised improvements at the university, and the restoration of peace and normalcy increased the number of professors returning from exile. The new president, Robert Haddad, formerly of Smith College, announced that his goal was to bring AUB back to its former level of excellence. Haddad was succeeded by John Waterbury in 1998, and he did much to improve the relationship between the administration and the faculty. Haddad had alienated the faculty by appearing to impose standards and procedures that many on the Beirut campus did not find suitable. Waterbury's tenure coincided with a deteriorating economic situation in Lebanon, and yet he remained committed to an ambitious fundraising campaign. Waterbury attracted professors from outside Lebanon, and from outside the Arab world, hoping to return AUB to its prewar days when faculty and students represented different cultures and religions. But the declining economic situation in Lebanon and the end of interest-free loans through the Hariri Foundation (formed in 1984 by Rafiq al-Hariri, who later became prime minister), has increased the percentage of upper-class students. Although financial aid exists, it is not sufficient to offset the higher cost of living and education in Lebanon. But AUB has benefited from the consequences of the 11

The American University of Beirut was incorporated in 1866 under a charter of the state of New York. The independent, coeducational university has five faculties and offers bachelor's and master's degrees. © CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. Many Arab students from the Gulf region began to avoid higher education in the United States, long a favored destination for Middle Eastern students, and sought to study in Lebanese universities, especially AUB. The high cost of AUB education, however, still deters some applicants, and selectivity has been sacrificed across the board. AUB has also suffered from the proliferation of private universities in Lebanon (some forty-seven by one count). Gulf Arab countries have also competed with AUB by opening up their own versions of American universities. In 2003 the American University of Kuwait was added to the list of American universities in the Middle East.

See also BEIRUT; BLISS, HOWARD; HABASH, GEORGE; HARIRI, RAFIQ BAHAʾUDDIN AL-; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; PROTESTANTISM AND PROTESTANT MISSIONS.

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AS'AD ABUKHALIL

AMICHAI, YEHUDA

[1924–2000]

Hebrew poet, playwright, and novelist.

Yehuda Amichai, born in Würzburg, Germany, emigrated with his family to Palestine in 1936. He grew up in an Orthodox Jewish home and was educated in religious schools, where he absorbed sacred texts, especially the prayer book. He served in the Jewish Brigade of the British army during World War II, in the Palmah in Israel's War of Independence, and later in the Israel Defense Force. Amichai studied Bible and literature at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, then taught for decades, mostly in Jerusalem schools and colleges. He received the Israel Prize for poetry in 1982.

Amichai published his first poems in the late 1940s. His first book, *Akhshav Uvayamim Ha-aherim* (1955; Now and in other days), and his retrospective collection *Shirim 1948–1962* mark a major turning point in Hebrew poetry. Amichai's lyrics introduced new sensibilities, a new worldview, and new values, as well as a lower diction and style along with a whimsical irreverence toward central beliefs and texts of Judaism. His poetry was a quintessential expression of the "Generation of the State" literary revolution of Israel in the 1960s.

The individual's happiness is, for Amichai, the yardstick for all things. National, social, and religious commands are inferior to intimate human relationships; love (not God) is the only, yet fragile, shelter in a world of war. "I want to die in my bed," Amichai says, rejecting heroism and glory in one poem; he portrays God as responsible for the shortage of mercy in the world in another. Amichai achieves his unique, hallmark diction by absorbing and reworking prosaic materials (such as colloquialisms and technical, military, or legal terms), then combining them with fragments of prayers or biblical phrases. He has rejuvenated classical Hebrew, and dismembered and rebuilt idioms. His playful inventiveness is manifest in his surprising figurative, conceitlike compositions.

Love, war, father, God, childhood, time, and land—Amichai's main themes—form a pseudoautobiographical diary that, together with his blend of the modern and conventional, has contributed to his great popularity. His poetry is at once deeply personal and a universal expression of the human condition. The long lyrical epic "Travels of a Latter-Day Benjamin of Tudela" (1968) stands out for its account of specific events.

Landmark collections of the 1970s and 1980s are *Time, Great Tranquility: Questions and Answers,* and *Of Man Thou Art, and Unto Man Shalt Thou Return.* Amichai's late poetry is looser in form and less sure of its stand. The placard statements are replaced with understatement, even resignation. Metaphors are fewer but are carefully wrought, suggestive, and intertextually loaded. Experience is more intimate, yet Amichai's awareness of the role of camouflage in his poetry grows.

Although Amichai is known mainly for his poetry, his works of fiction have a significant place in modern Hebrew literature. His novel *Not of This Time, Not of This Place* (1963), with its complex structure and its protagonist's double existence, is a precursor of postmodernist works. Amichai's works have been translated into more than twenty languages.

See also LITERATURE: HEBREW.

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NILI GOLD

AMIENS, TREATY OF

Treaty that brought peace to Europe under Napoléon, as signed by England and France, 27 March 1802.

The Napoleonic wars had reached a point where France and England concluded that further fighting was useless. Under the terms of the treaty, all of England's conquests were surrendered to France, but Napoléon Bonaparte delayed the signing be-

cause he still hoped to retain Egypt, which he had invaded in 1798; after his troops there capitulated to the British, however, he agreed to return Egypt to the Ottoman Empire and Malta to the Order of the Knights of Malta. Because of the treaty, peace was also concluded between France and the Ottomans. Napoléon became consul for life of the French Empire, with the right of appointing his successor, but his interlude was brief and Napoléon hinted at the possible reconquest of Egypt.

Britain, during this period, could not abide French control of Europe under Napoléon and refused to evacuate Malta. By 1803, war had resumed. Napoléon never managed to recover his position in the eastern Mediterranean.

See also BONAPARTE, NAPOLÉON.

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JON JUCOVY

AMIN, AHMAD

[1886–1954]

Egyptian Muslim educator and writer.

Ahmad Amin was born in Cairo, the son of a shaykh at al-Azhar. His early education was in *kuttabs,* at a government primary school, and then at al-Azhar. In 1907 he entered Madrasat al-Qada, a mosque school, spending four years as a student and some ten as assistant to the director, who introduced him to Western and particularly English scholarship. After a few years as a *shariʿa* judge, he joined the faculty of the Egyptian University (now University of Cairo) in 1926 and remained there until retirement in 1946. He was dean of the Faculty of Arts from 1939 to 1941. From 1914 until his death, he chaired the Committee on Authorship, Translation, and Publication (Lajnat al-Ta'lif wa al-Tarjama wa al-Nashr), editing its weekly literary magazine, *al-Thaqafa,* from 1939 to 1953. He was also a member of the Arabic Language Academy, founded the Popular University (later, Foundation for Popular Culture), and served as director of the Cultural Department of the Arab League. Through these and other activities, he was a prominent participant in the intellectual life of Egypt.

The best known of his writings are his eight-volume series on early Islamic cultural history, *Fajr al-Islam* (The dawn of Islam, 1929), *Duha al-Islam* (The forenoon of Islam, 1933–1936), and *Zuhr al-Islam* (The noon of Islam, 1945–1955), the first effort by an Arab Muslim writer to make use of Western scholarship in writing this history. He wrote over 600 articles on almost every conceivable topic except party politics for periodicals such as *al-Thaqafa, al-Risala,* and *al-Hilal*; most of these were republished in ten volumes of *Fayd al-Khatir* (Overflowing thoughts, 1938–1955) or in *Zuʿama al-Islah fi al-ʿAsr al-Hadith* (Leaders of reform in the modern age, 1948). He collaborated in editing a number of classical Islamic texts and wrote or cowrote books for schools and books on Western philosophy and literature. Other writings include *Yawm al-Islam* (The day of Islam, 1952), *al-Sharq wa al-Gharb* (The East and the West, 1955), and his autobiography, *Hayati* (My life, 1950, 1952).

He held opinions close to the secularist ones for which Ali Abd al-Raziq and Taha Husayn were criticized but stated them more cautiously; he was particularly known for questioning the authenticity of the *hadith* (legends and traditions surrounding the prophet Muhammad). He wanted his compatriots to learn from the West but at the same time affirm their own Arab–Islamic cultural personality. Thus, much of his work seeks to present the treasures of Islamic civilization to his readers. His series on Islamic cultural history uses Western scholarship to help make that history accessible to modern Muslims, while, by stressing the contribution of non-Muslim cultures to early Islamic culture, the series conveys the message that Muslims today can also learn from non-Muslims. Other writings also give a positive presentation of Western ideas and ways, although his criticism of Western colonialism and materialism could be harsh and angry, especially in some of his last writings.

See also ABD AL-RAZIQ, ALI; HUSAYN, TAHA.

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WILLIAM SHEPARD

AMIN AL-DOWLEH, MIRZA ALI KHAN

[1844–1904]

One of the most influential statesmen of the Qajar dynasty.

Born in Tehran (Persia) to an important court official, Mirza Ali Khan was a proponent of Westernization and modern education and an opponent of the *ulama* (Islamic clergy). He is regarded as a reformer who tried to centralize revenue collection and cut expenditures. He held a succession of high posts under the Qajar dynasty, under Naser al-Din Shah, serving for twenty years as his private secretary. He enriched himself by managing the mint and the postal system. His archrival was Ali-Asghar Amin al-Soltan.

In 1880, the shah granted him the title Amin al-Dowleh (Trusted of the State). In 1897, Mozaffar al-Din Qajar named him prime minister. To alleviate the fiscal crisis, he encouraged the shah to contract foreign loans, a disastrous policy that contributed to the downfall of the dynasty. After failing to obtain a large loan from the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia, to which he had promised significant concessions, including control of the southern customs, rivals at court helped to engineer his dismissal from office on 5 June 1898. Amin al-Dowleh, although noted for his personal pessimism over the country's prospects for reform, was later (especially during Iran's Constitutional Revolution) admired for his progressive policies.

See also AMIN AL-SOLTAN, ALI-ASGHAR; MOZAFFAR AL-DIN QAJAR; NASER AL-DIN SHAH; QAJAR DYNASTY.

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LAWRENCE G. POTTER

AMIN AL-SOLTAN, ALI-ASGHAR

[1858–1907]

One of the most influential politicians of late nineteenth-century Persia and prime minister to three Qajar shahs.

Ali-Asghar Amin al-Soltan was notorious for surrendering Persian sovereignty to foreign interests in order to raise money for the king (shah). His father was reportedly a slave boy of Christian Circassian origin who rose from a lowly position in the shah's household to become his most trusted adviser. Upon his father's death in 1883, Ali-Asghar inherited his title, *amin al-soltan* (Trusted of the Sovereign), and many of his duties.

During his first period in power, until 1896, he was regarded as pro-British. He supported the granting of a monopoly on Iran's tobacco crop to a British subject (1890), a key event in Persian history that led to mass protests and the cancellation of the concession. He retained the confidence of the king and his own power, however, and was able to maintain order in Tehran after the assassination of Naser al-Din Shah in 1896. He was briefly replaced by his archrival Mirza Ali Khan Amin al-Dowleh, after which he enjoyed a second period as prime minister (1898–1903). During this time he was regarded as pro-Russian, having secured two large loans with conditions compromising his country's sovereignty. In 1900, he was granted the exceptional title, *atabak-e aʿzam.*

Before being forced to resign, he was supposedly excommunicated by the Shiʿite *ulama* (Islamic clergy) living in Iraq. Following a world tour, he returned in 1907 to head briefly a new government under Mohammad Ali Shah. The details of his assassination are still disputed.

See also AMIN AL-DOWLEH, MIRZA ALI KHAN; MOHAMMAD ALI SHAH QAJAR; NASER AL-DIN SHAH.

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LAWRENCE G. POTTER

AMIN AL-ZARB, MOHAMMAD HASAN

[1837–1898]

Custodian of the state mint under Naser al-Din Shah and the most prominent entrepreneur in late nineteenth-century Persia.

Born in Isfahan, Persia, to a family of modest traders, Mohammad Hasan Amin al-Zarb had only an elementary education. He moved to Tehran in the 1860s and within two decades had achieved great success as a banker and as a leading trader with Western Europe.

In 1879, as master of the mint for the Qajar dynasty, he instituted currency reforms. In the 1880s and 1890s, he was widely, and probably erroneously, believed to have enriched himself while debasing the Persian currency. After a rapid drop in the value of copper coinage used in local transactions, he was arrested in 1896, imprisoned, and given a large fine. He later regained government favor. Mohammad Hasan was an advocate of reform and was closely associated with Ali-Asghar Amin al-Soltan.

See also Amin al-Soltan, Ali-Asghar; Qajar Dynasty.

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Lawrence G. Potter

AMIN BEY, AL-

Head of the Husaynid beylicate of Tunisia, 1943–1957.

Al-Amin assumed power following the ouster by the Free French of Tayyib Brahim Munsif Bey. In 1942, Munsif Bey had acceded to power but was removed because of his nationalist stance against French control of Tunisia. Al-Amin, in his early sixties at the time of his accession, proved unable to rally nationalist support for the beylicate and to resist French demands on his government. The Neo-Destour movement headed by Habib Bourguiba and Salah Ben Yousouf dominated the movement for nationalism from that point forward. Following Tunisia's independence in March 1956 and the election of a constituent assembly, the beylicate was abolished. Al-Amin was formally deposed in August 1957.

See also Ben Yousouf, Salah; Bourguiba, Habib.

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Matthew S. Gordon

AMIN, HAFIZULLAH

[1929–1979]

Prime minister and president of Afghanistan, 1979.

Hafizullah Amin was born in the Afghan province of Paghman near Kabul to a Gilzai Pushtun family, the youngest son of seven children. His father was a low-ranking civil servant, and Amin attended the local village school. He continued his education as a boarder at the Dar al-Moʿallamin Teachers Training High School in Kabul and, after graduation, became a schoolteacher. His extensive connections with the United States included receiving a master's degree from the University of Wisconsin and serving as the cultural officer at the Embassy of the Royal Government of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C., from 1952 to 1953. He also worked for the United States Agency for International Development in Kabul from 1955 to 1958 and was a U.S. embassy translator in Kabul from May 1962 to September 1963. He was expelled from the United States in 1965 for his political activities among Afghan students while he was working on a doctorate at Teachers College, Columbia University.

Amin was a well-known teacher in Kabul and became active in leftist politics during the period of constitutional reforms by Zahir Shah (1963–1973). Amin was one of the founding members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a Marxist organization with strong Leninist leanings that was founded in 1965. In 1967, the PDPA split into rival factions over issues of personality and ideology. Amin became a leader of the Khalq, or people's faction of the PDPA, which had strong Pushtun and rural ties.

When the PDPA gained control of Afghanistan in the Saur Revolution in April 1978, Nur Mo-

hammad Taraki became president and prime minister and Amin became foreign minister and deputy prime minister. Amin subsequently became prime minister in March 1979 and, after a power struggle with Taraki, became president in September of the same year. As president, Amin inherited a government that was near collapse after the Marxist reforms instigated by the PDPA had led to massive revolt in the countryside. Amin sought to bring the revolt under control by imposing increasingly harsh measures that included arresting thousands of people and imposing conscription for military service.

Amin also sought to develop a foreign policy that would move Afghanistan away from dependence upon the Soviet Union. He was unsuccessful, and on 23 and 24 December 1979, a large Soviet military contingent occupied Kabul. Amin and his family were killed in a barrage of gunfire in the Tapi Tajbek Palace, where they had taken refuge on 27 December 1979.

Opinion is divided on Amin's place in history. Some see him as a Soviet puppet who was responsible for numerous killings—including the killing of Adolph Dubs, the U.S. ambassador to Kabul—and who was ultimately responsible for the Soviet invasion that ironically led to his own death. Others liken him to Abd al-Rahman and consider him an Afghan nationalist with strong American sympathies who tried to steer Afghanistan away from its close reliance on the Soviet Union. His reign, either way it is viewed, was short and tragic.

See also AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN.

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GRANT FARR

AMINI, ALI

[1905–1991]

Iranian statesman of the Pahlavi period.

Ali Amini was born in 1905 to Qajar aristocracy. His father was Amin al-Dowleh, prime minister in the Qajar period, and his mother was Fakhr al-Dowleh, daughter of Qajar monarch Mozaffar al-Din Shah.

After being educated in France, Ali Amini returned to Iran and entered government service. By 1947, he was a member of the Iranian parliament and was known as a pro-American liberal. The shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, distrusted Amini primarily because of the latter's support for a limited constitutional monarchy. In 1950, after the nationalization of Iranian oil, Mohammad Mossadegh, the premier, appointed Amini minister of finance, but he was dismissed in 1952. He was reinstalled as minister of finance in the cabinet of General Fazlollah Zahedi, following the CIA-engineered coup against the government of Mossadegh.

Amini was the main Iranian statesman to negotiate the Consortium Oil Agreement of 1954, whose signatories were made up of a number of foreign oil companies (several American companies with 40 percent of the shares, several British ones with another 40 percent, and a host of French and Dutch companies with the remaining 20 percent). According to the agreement, the companies would produce and market Iranian oil for twenty-five years, and the Iranian government would receive 50 percent of the proceeds. The agreement in effect annulled the nationalization of Iranian oil achieved under Mossadegh.

In 1961, faced with popular unrest over the state of the economy and lack of political freedom, the shah reluctantly appointed Amini prime minister. In 1962, Amini was forced to resign because of the shah's refusal to curtail military expenditures in the national budget. As manifested in the tenets of the White Revolution of 1963 (renamed the Revolution of the Shah and the People after 1967), the shah appropriated Amini's pro-American, liberal, and land-reform policies. While not silent during the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Amini did not assume a prominent position in it. He left Iran shortly thereafter and died in Paris in 1991.

See also MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD; WHITE REVOLUTION (1961–1963).

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NEGUIN YAVARI

AMINI, FATEMEH

[1933–]

Founder of first seminary for women in Iran.

Fatemeh Amini was born in 1933 to a traditional family in Qom, Iran. Her parents were against women's education and she obtained her high school diploma only after the 1979 Islamic Revolution at the age of 47. She was granted her divorce and the guardianship of her two young daughters in 1965, raised them alone, and supported herself and her children as a tailor. She taught sewing to the female relatives of religious authorities in Qom, regularly visited their homes, and came to be known as a pious woman. The late Grand Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari supported her in 1972 in establishing the first religious seminary for women in Qom, called Makteb-i Tawhid. She then founded three more seminaries, including Maktab-i Ali, for which she enjoyed the moral and financial support of Ayatollah Haeri-Shirazi, the Imam Jomeh in Shiraz. She also founded Maktab-i Zahra in Yazd with the support of the late Ayatollah Saddouqi. After the revolution, when Ayatollah Khomeini ordered all seminaries to unite and appointed a council of management, she moved to Tehran and founded an independent religious seminary called Fatemeh-ye Zahra in 1988. She believes that according to the Qurʾan men and women are equal, and her aim is to train women *mujtahids* (doctors of jurisprudence) capable of finding solutions to women's problems. Women from religious backgrounds who seek advice in practical and spiritual matters consult her. The seminary, which in 1994 had 250 students, including high school and university students, also assists poor women in order to increase their self-esteem and to boost their activities in the public sphere.

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AZADEH KIAN-THIÉBAUT

AMIN, QASIM

[1865–1908]

One of the first modern Arab writers to treat women's issues.

Qasim (also Kassim) Amin was the son of Muhammad Bey Amin Khan, an official of the Ottoman Empire who at one point served as governor of Kurdistan. When Kurdistan revolted, the sultan retired him with a land grant near Damanhur in Egypt. Qasim's father married into the family of Ahmad Bey Khattab and became a brigadier in the military of Ismaʿil Khedive in Egypt. Qasim was born in Alexandria, and he attended the aristocratic primary school in Ra's al-Tin. The family then moved to Cairo, where Qasim studied French in the Khedivial primary school. In 1881, he received a bachelor's degree from the School of Law and Administration. From 1881 to 1885 he studied law in Montpelier, France; he then began a career in the Egyptian judicial system.

In 1894, he married a daughter of the Turkish admiral Amin Tawfiq, who had been raised by an English nanny. Thus, his own daughters were given European nannies. Amin's first book on women's issues, *Les Égyptiens,* published in 1894, defended the treatment of women by Islam in the Middle East. He reversed himself in 1899 with *Tahrir al-Mar'a* (Liberation of women), cowritten with Muhammad Abduh and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. This tract was rooted in Islam, but it argued for a reform of women's position. In a third book, *Al-Mar'a al-Jadida* (The new woman), Amin advanced an even more liberal, social Darwinist argument, jettisoning many of its Islamic arguments.

See also ABDUH, MUHAMMAD.

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JUAN R. I. COLE

AMIR

See GLOSSARY

AMIR, ABD AL-HAKIM

[1919–1967]

Egypt's minister of war, 1954–1967.

General Abd al-Hakim Amir played a role in securing military support for Gamal Abdel Nasser as president of Egypt. He was graduated from the military academy in 1938 and served in the Arab–Israel War of 1948. In 1964 he was appointed first vice president of Egypt but resigned after the Arab defeat in the Arab–Israel War of 1967. On 14 September 1967 Amir committed suicide after being arrested for allegedly plotting a military coup against President Nasser.

See also NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL.

KAREN A. THORNSVARD

AMIR, ELI

[1937–]

Israeli writer and civil servant.

Eli Amir was born in Baghdad and immigrated to Israel in 1950 at the age of twelve. As part of the systematic absorption process of the great immigration waves of the 1950s, Amir was separated from his family and sent to be educated on a kibbutz. He later studied the Arabic language and literature and the history of the Middle East at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Following his studies he joined the Israeli civil service and served in various immigration absorption and educational capacities.

In 1984 Amir published his first novel, *Scapegoat.* Loosely based on his own life, the novel tells the bittersweet story of an Iraqi immigrant boy who is torn between the world he knew and loved in the old country and the new one he must adopt. The novel describes the clash between two different Jewish cultures—European and Middle Eastern—through the eyes of an innocent adolescent. Amir's novel brought back into national consciousness one of the most painful social conflicts in Israel's short history: an internal conflict that marked the beginning of the momentous social and cultural changes that shape Israeli society to this day. *Scapegoat* was an immediate success and established Amir as a promising writer and a keen critic of Israeli society.

Amir's second novel, *Farewell Baghdad,* is about the Jewish community in Baghdad on the eve of its mass immigration to Israel in the 1950s.

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YAROM PELEG

AMIR-ENTEZAM, ABBAS

[1933–]

An Iranian political activist.

Abbas Amir-Entezam was born in Tehran into a bazaar carpet-manufacturing family. As a student at Tehran University in the early 1950s he became politically active, eventually joining the National Resistance Movement, a clandestine group formed by religious nationalists following the 1953 coup d'état against the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. The National Resistance Movement was a forerunner to the Freedom Movement, of which Amir-Entezam became a founding member in 1961. From 1964 to 1969 he lived in the United States, where he obtained a master's degree in engineering from the University of California at Berkeley (1966) and was active in the Muslim Student Association and the Confederation of Iranian Students. Upon returning to Iran, he resumed his participation in the Freedom Movement. In 1977, the party selected him to be a contact with the U.S. embassy in Tehran. Freedom Movement leader Mehdi Bazargan chose Amir-Entezam to be his deputy prime minister in the provisional government he formed in February 1979 to rule Iran in the wake of the Iranian Revolution. Later that year he went to Stockholm to serve as Iranian ambassador to the Scandinavian countries.

After Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran (November 1979), they found documents indicating several meetings between Amir-Entezam and U.S. diplomatic personnel. Although Bazargan insisted that Amir-Entezam had met with the Americans at the behest of the government, he was recalled to Iran, where a revolutionary court charged him with being a spy. Amir-Entezam was convicted of espionage in 1980 and sentenced to life impris-

onment. Beginning in 1996, however, he was permitted to have periodic weekend home visits. In December 1997, prison authorities failed to pick him up at the end of one such visit, but he was rearrested in September 1998 after criticizing his former prison warden in a radio interview. He was released on bail in early 2002 but rearrested again in April 2003, a few days after faxing to national and international media outlets an appeal for a referendum on the country's political system. Amir-Entezam is believed to be modern Iran's longest-serving political prisoner.

See also Bazargan, Mehdi; Confederation of Iranian Students; Freedom Movement (*Nezhat-e Azadi Iran*); Iranian Revolution (1979); Mossadegh, Mohammad.

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Neguin Yavari
Updated by Eric Hooglund

AMIR KABIR, MIRZA TAQI KHAN

[1807–1852]

Prime minister and the most famous reformer of nineteenth-century Persia.

Born the son of a cook in the Farahan district in western Persia, Mirza Taqi Khan joined the staff of the crown prince, Abbas Mirza, at Tabriz. He later held several positions in the army of Azerbaijan. In 1848, he accompanied Naser al-Din to Tehran upon his accession, and the new Shah of Persia's Qajar dynasty gave him the titles *amir-e kabir* (the great amir) and *atabak-e aʿzam,* which referred to his function as the shah's tutor (who was then only sixteen years old).

Before he went to Tehran, Mirza Taqi Khan had participated in several diplomatic missions to Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and he sought to institute in Persia some reforms he had observed abroad. One key to reform, he believed, was reducing the power of the *ulama* (Islamic clergy). Amir Kabir suppressed the Babi insurrection, a major challenge to central authority, and executed Sayyid Ali Mohammad, the Bab, in 1850.

During his four years as prime minister, Amir Kabir instituted numerous administrative and economic reforms and built up-to-date factories, often with the aim of strengthening the military. He was also active in building public works throughout the country. Particularly significant was his founding of Iran's first technical school, the Dar al-Fonun (Abode of Sciences). In foreign affairs, he sought to avoid dependence on either of the predominant outside powers, England or Russia.

Amir Kabir made many enemies at court and alienated others because of his haughty manner and successful measures to extract revenue. Ultimately the shah turned against him, dismissed him from office in November 1851, and subsequently had him assassinated. By the twentieth century, Amir Kabir had become an idealized figure, regarded as the most enlightened statesman of his time who was regrettably prevented from modernizing the country. Modern critical scholars (Abbas Amanat, Hamid Algar, John Lorentz), however, regard his goal as improving the system to increase the power of the shah, not ushering in democratic government.

See also Abbas Mirza, Naʾeb al-Saltaneh; Bab, al-; Dar al-Fonun; Naser al-Din Shah.

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Lawrence G. Potter

AMIS DU MANIFESTE ET DE LA LIBERTÉ

Algerian nationalist organization (usually called AML), 1944–1945 (in English, Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty).

The AML represented a remarkable synthesis of Algerian groups dedicated to nationalism—moderates, followers of Messali al-Hadj (Messalists), and the *ulama* (Islamic scholars). It was chiefly organized by Ferhat Abbas, a moderate nationalist who was increasingly pessimistic over the prospects of genuine colonial reform; he had written the "Manifesto of the Algerian Muslim People" in February 1943. Messali al-Hadj, the most radical nationalist, was

recognized as the AML's titular head. In addition, the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (or Reformist Ulama) supported the new nationalist front. The AML was blamed for the violence of the Setif Revolt in May 1945. Its fragile unity, fissured before this tragedy, fractured afterward as the nationalists resumed their separate paths toward independence.

See also ABBAS, FERHAT; ASSOCIATION OF ALGERIAN MUSLIM ULAMA (AUMA); HADJ, MESSALI AL-; SETIF REVOLT (1945).

PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

AMIT, MEIR

[1921–]

Israeli business executive, former director of Military Intelligence and head of the Mossad.

Born in Mandatory Palestine, Meir Amit joined the Haganah underground in 1936 and rose in its ranks. He commanded a regiment in the 1948 Arab–Israel War and made the army his career. From 1949 to 1951 he commanded the Golani Infantry Brigade, and later served as head of the Instruction and Southern Commands. During the 1956 Sinai–Suez War he served as chief of military operations of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) General Staff. In 1958 he commanded the Central Command, but a parachuting accident hospitalized him for a year. From 1959 to 1961 he studied economics and business at Columbia University and in May 1961 was appointed director of military intelligence. In March 1963, following the resignation of Isser Harel, he was appointed head of the Mossad, a position he held for five years. He was instrumental in strengthening ties with the Kurdish rebels in Iraq and with the Morocccan and Iranian intelligence services. He also modernized the Mossad.

On the eve of the Arab–Israel War of 1967 he was sent to Washington to ascertain America's intentions. In a meeting with U.S. defense secretary Robert McNamara, Amit realized the United States had no plan of action to relieve the seige of Israel and would not be averse to Israel's launch of a preemptive strike, a move he strongly urged the Israeli cabinet to adopt. When Amit asked MacNamara what he would do if he were in Amit's place, MacNamara said, "Go home, that's where you belong." Israel launched its strike two days after Amit's return from the United States.

Amit retired from the Mossad in 1968 and headed Koor Industries until 1977. That year he was a founding member of the Democratic Movement for Change, a centrist party seeking electoral reform. Elected to the Knesset in 1977, he served briefly as transport minister in the first Menachem Begin government. He resigned his post in September 1978, claiming that Begin was not doing enough to bring about peace with Egypt. Later he realized his mistake, when Begin and Anwar al-Sadat signed a peace treaty in 1979. Since 1978 he has held managerial posts in various high-technology industries in Israel and has written two autobiographical books.

See also HAGANAH; MOSSAD.

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MARTIN MALIN
UPDATED BY MERON MEDZINI

AMMAN

Capital and largest city of Jordan.

Amman enjoys a special position in Jordan because of its size and population composition, as well as its importance as the capital and the center of communication, commerce, banking, industry, and cultural life. Unlike the ancient capitals of other Arab countries, Amman is a relatively new city. Before 1875, what is now Amman consisted solely of the site of the long-forgotten biblical town of Rabbath Ammon. That town later became the prosperous Roman city of Philadelphia, of which significant ruins, including an amphitheater, remain. Encouraged by the Ottoman Empire, the Circassians started settling the area in the 1870s, and the Circassian village of Amman developed with a minor reputation as a commercial center. In 1905 this role was considerably augmented by the construction of the Hijaz railroad, which reached the vicinity of the village, three miles (5 km) distant. This major communi-

cations link connected Amman with Damascus, Constantinople (Istanbul), and eventually the Hijaz—the western Arabian peninsula of Mecca and Medina. The official role of the budding town of Amman was established in 1921, when Amir Abdullah I ibn Hussein, the head of the newly formed Hashimite Emirate (princedom) of Transjordan, made it his residence and his capital.

Although the departments and institutions of government were centered in Amman, its population growth was slow. It reached only about 20,000 in the early 1940s. After 1948 the establishment of the State of Israel and the influx of Palestinians caused the town to experience very rapid growth: 108,000 in 1952; 848,587 in 1979; and 1,864,500 in 1999. While the impetus and sustaining cause for this population growth was the arrival of the Palestinians, refugees and nonrefugees alike, it was also increased by rural-to-urban migration and a rising birth rate. Still, Amman by the 1980s was called the "largest Palestinian city in the world" given its size and the preponderance of Palestinian inhabitants in the city.

By the early 1990s Amman possessed a well-developed infrastructure. From an original small town built on precipitous hills, called *jabal*s, it has spread to rolling plains in all directions from the city center. Throughout are found the royal palace, parliament, the courts, ministerial and government offices and institutions, numerous parks, sports facilities, schools, hospitals, colleges, and a major university (the University of Jordan). Banking and commerce are a vibrant part of the city, including a stock exchange and the Amman central vegetable market, which sells as far afield as the United Arab Emirates and Iraq. Amman is served by a major international airport, a railroad, and major trunk roads to all parts of the nation and to neighboring countries. Radio has long been present; television was introduced in the 1960s. Newspaper, magazine, and book publishing is part of the political and cultural life. Since the 1970s, with the increase in hotels and meeting facilities, Amman has become a much frequented center for both regional and international conferences.



Jordan's capital city of Amman, home to almost two million inhabitants, is a busy commercial and administrative center and a major travel hub of the Middle East. Amman was originally built on seven hills, like Rome, but after a rapid population growth that started in the late 1970s, it has expanded to cover a much larger area. © ROBERT LANDAU/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Amman witnessed many changes in the 1990s. During and after the Gulf Crisis (1990–1991), it housed hundreds of foreign journalists and became the port of embarkation for those traveling overland to Iraq, the only way to reach the country. The city's population swelled; thousands of Palestinians holding Jordanian passports arrived, following their expulsion from Kuwait after its liberation from Iraqi occupation, in addition to large numbers of Iraqi refugees. Wealthy newcomers began constructing palatial new homes for themselves and investing money in construction projects in the city to replace their investments in Kuwait. The 1994 Israeli–Jordanian peace treaty later boosted hopes of increased tourism, leading to another building boom as many large hotels were constructed to accommodate large numbers of tourists (who did not come in the numbers hoped). These trends, combined

with the construction of many new bridges and tunnels to ease traffic congestion, led to great changes in the western part of the city by the early twenty-first century, although this was not nearly the case in the poorer eastern quarters.

See also REFUGEES: PALESTINIAN; UNIVERSITY OF JORDAN.

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PETER GUBSER
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

AMRI, HASAN AL-

[c.1920–1989]

North Yemen soldier and politician.

Hasan al-Amri was born around 1920 in the highlands of North Yemen. In 1936, along with Abdullah al-Sallal, he was among the first group of thirteen boys sent to Iraq by Imam Yahya for modern military training. As an army officer, he was deeply involved in Yemeni politics during the 1940s and 1950s. He participated in the 1962 revolution and was closely associated with President al-Sallal in the nascent Yemen Arab Republic. Nevertheless, he survived al-Sallal's overthrow in 1967 and became the military strongman during the first four years of the regime of President Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, serving as either commander-in-chief of the armed forces or as prime minister, or as both together. Hailed as the "Sword of the Republic," al-Amri was revered for his military leadership in the field during the Yemen Civil War and especially during the siege of Sanʿa in 1968. Volatile, if not unstable, he was called by some the General George C. Patton of Yemen. He was forced into permanent exile by President al-Iryani over a bizarre 1971 shooting incident involving a journalist who had angered him. He lived in exile in Egypt and was never again involved in Yemeni politics; he died in Egypt in 1989.

See also IRYANI, ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-; SALLAL, ABDULLAH AL-; YAHYA IBN MUHAMMAD HAMID AL-DIN; YEMEN CIVIL WAR.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

AMROUCHE, FADHMA AT MANSOUR

[1882–1967]

Kabyle Berber writer and mother of Jean and Taos Amrouche.

Fadhma At Mansour was raised in a mission school for girls in Algeria's Kabyle Berber region, where she became one of the first Kabyle girls to learn to read and write French. She converted to Christianity in 1899 following her marriage to Belkacemou Amrouche. Facing a difficult economic situation, the couple moved to Tunis in 1906. She gave birth to eight children, two of whom (Jean and Taos) went on to become key figures in Algeria's Berber identity movement. In 1956 Amrouche returned to Kabylia. Three years later, following the death of her husband, she emigrated to France.

Fadhma Amrouche is best known for her autobiography *My Life Story,* the first published memoir by a Kabyle woman. The work recounts her difficult childhood in Kabylia and her experiences raising a family as an immigrant in Tunis. Although she wrote most of the narrative in 1946, in keeping with her wishes it was not published until after her husband's death. Amrouche's legacy also includes the transmission of dozens of Berber stories, poems, and songs, which she taught to her son Jean and her daughter Taos, who published and recorded them. Fadhma Amrouche is now revered by Berber activists for her documentation of Berber culture.

See also ALGERIA; AMROUCHE, JEAN; AMROUCHE, MARY LOUISE (A.K.A. MARGUERITE TAOS); BERBER.

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JANE E. GOODMAN

AMROUCHE, JEAN
[1906–1962]

Algerian poet and essayist.

Jean Amrouche was the son of Kabyle Christian converts. Though assimilated into French culture, Amrouche was deeply drawn by his native roots, as he reflected: "France is the spirit of my soul, Algeria is the soul of my spirit." Among his poetic works are *Cendres* (1934) and *Étoile secrète* (1937); *L'éternel Jugurtha* (1943) is his renowned essay. He significantly influenced the Generation of 1954 writers (e.g., Mohammed Dib, Yacine Kateb, Malek Haddad, Moulaoud Mammeri, Mouloud Feraoun). During the war of independence, Amrouche attempted to serve as an intermediary between Ferhat Abbas and Charles de Gaulle. Taos (Marie-Louise) Amrouche (1913–1976), another prominent Algerian literary figure, was his sister.

See also DIB, MOHAMMED; FERAOUN, MOULOUD; HADDAD, MALEK; KATEB, YACINE.

PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

AMROUCHE, MARIE LOUISE (A.K.A. MARGUERITE TAOS)
[1913–1976]

Kabyle Berber singer and novelist.

Marie Louise Amrouche was an influential figure in the development of Berber cultural identity as well as an important novelist and singer in her own right. Born to an Algerian Berber Christian family and raised in Tunis, she traveled periodically to her parents' natal region of Kabylia, Algeria. She later emigrated to France, where she produced and hosted cultural programs for French national radio. The first female Algerian writer to publish under her own name, Amrouche wrote four autobiographically inspired novels set in Tunisia and France. These works highlight the identity conflicts stemming from the multiple allegiances Amrouche developed throughout her life: to her Berber heritage, her Tunisian childhood, and her Christian upbringing, as well as to French culture.

Amrouche was committed to preserving Berber oral traditions. Inspired by her mother Fadhma's singing, she recorded six albums of Berber folk songs and performed in concerts throughout Europe and Africa. She also published a collection of traditional Berber stories, proverbs, and poems. Her support for Berber culture was frowned upon by the Algerian government, however, and she was not permitted to sing at the 1969 PanAfrican Festival in Algiers.

The life and works of Amrouche have been commemorated at Berber cultural events in North Africa, Europe, and North America since the 1980s.

See also ALGERIA; AMROUCHE, FADHMA AT MANSOUR; AMROUCHE, JEAN; BERBER.

JANE E. GOODMAN

AMU DARYA

Afghan river.

The Amu Darya, also known in the past as the Oxus River, forms the principal boundary between Afghanistan and the Tajik and Uzbek republics, a distance of about 680 miles (1,094 km). The Amu Darya begins in the Pamir mountains, runs a total distance of about 1,500 miles (2,414 km), and eventually empties into the Aral Sea.

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GRANT FARR

ANATOLIA

The Asian region of Turkey, called Anadolu in Turkish.

Anatolia, also known as Asia Minor, is a large, mountainous peninsula of approximately 755,000 square kilometers (291,500 square miles) that extends from the Caucasus and Zagros mountains in the east and is bordered by the Black Sea on the north, the Aegean Sea on the west, and the Mediterranean Sea on the south. It comprises more than 95 percent of Turkey's total land area.

Central Anatolia consists of a series of semiarid basins, with average elevations of 600 to 1,200 meters (1,970 to 3,900 feet), surrounded by higher

Set amidst the hills of Aphrodisias in Turkey stand the ruins of what was once the preeminent temple to the Greek goddess Aphrodite in Asia Minor. The temple was constructed in the first century B.C.E., but excavations have shown the site was used as a place of religious worship as early as the fifth millennium B.C.E. **© JONATHAN BLAIR/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

mountains. This region is called the Anatolian Plateau and generally is considered to be the heartland of Turkey; it was here that the major events associated with the creation of the Republic of Turkey took place between 1919 and 1924. The Pontus Mountains separate the plateau from the Black Sea to the north, and the Taurus Mountains separate it from the Mediterranean Sea to the south. Although the plateau receives an average of only 200 to 300 millimeters of precipitation per year, most of this falls in the winter months and seeps into the soil as groundwater. Consequently, the Anatolian Plateau has sufficient water to support both rain-fed and irrigated agriculture. The most important urban center on the plateau is Ankara, historically a significant regional market town (ancient Angora) and since 1923 the capital of Turkey. Other large cities include Kayseri, Konya, Sivas, and Yozgut.

Western Anatolia has many bays and coves along the Aegean Sea and broad, fertile inland valleys that produce an extensive variety of crops. İzmir, Turkey's third largest city, is a major port, while the equally ancient inland city of Bursa is a major manufacturing center. Southern Anatolia, in contrast, has narrow coastal plains along the Mediterranean, with the Taurus Mountains coming right to the sea in some places. The major population centers of this area are Antalya in the west and Adana in the east.

Eastern Anatolia is not properly a peninsula because to its south is the landmass that forms part of Syria and Iraq. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers originate in the high mountains of eastern Anatolia. Other significant natural features include Mount Ararat, which at 5,166 meters (17,000 feet) in elevation is the highest point in Turkey, and Lake Van. The people, especially in the southeast, are predominantly Kurds.

See also ADANA; ANKARA; BURSA; İZMIR; KURDS; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; TAURUS MOUNTAINS; TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES RIVERS.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

ANAWATI, GEORGES CHEHATA

[1905–1994]

Egyptian scholar and Dominican priest.

Georges Chehata Anawati was born in Alexandria, Egypt, in 1905 and died in Cairo in 1994. He was raised as a Greek Orthodox, joined the Roman Catholic Church in 1921, and entered the Dominican order in 1934. He studied Arabic language and literature, Islamic jurisprudence and theology, Arabic philosophy and science, and the history of the Arabic/Islamic world at the Institute of Oriental Languages of the University of Algiers. There he met Louis Gardet and began the intellectual and spiritual collaboration that resulted in their famous *Introduction to Muslim Theology* (1948).

In 1944 Anawati was sent to Cairo to found the Dominican Institute of Oriental Studies. It opened in 1953 as a center for Christian and Muslim dialogue where Western scholars interacted with Muslim scholars and teachers. Central to the institute were its library and journal, *Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Études Orientales (MIDEO).*

Anawati defended his Ph.D. dissertation on creation according to Avicenna and St. Thomas in 1956 at the Institute of Medieval Studies, University of Montreal. He was active in work on the edi-

tions of Avicenna's *Kitab al-Shifa* (Healing), prepared a bibliography for the millenary of Avicenna's birth, and translated his *Metaphysics* from the *Healing* into French. He also edited works by Averroes and Abd al-Jabbar in addition to composing about 350 scholarly articles on mysticism, pre-Islamic Arab Christian literature, political philosophy, fasting, Gnosticism, and Islamic science.

Indefatigable traveler to conferences around the world, constant contributor to improving interfaith relations and fostering informal meetings among religious leaders in Egypt, Anawati opened philosophical theology in French Catholic circles to Islam and attracted like-minded confreres and friends to Cairo where, with local Muslim and Christian supporters, they formed part of a unique research and faith-based institute. Moreover, his studies of Islamic and Christian philosophy and theology served to bring about greater dialogue on matters of faith and learning between Christians and Muslims.

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CHARLES E. BUTTERWORTH

ANDRANIK OZANIAN

[1865–1927]

Leading figure in the Armenian resistance against Ottoman rule.

Andranik Ozanian is popularly known as General Andranik (Andranik Zoravar in Armenian). He was born in Shabin Karahisar in central Anatolia. He received only an elementary education and was trained as a carpenter. He became involved in revolutionary activities in 1888 and joined the Dashnak Party (ARF) in 1892. Soon after, he emerged as the leader of a band of guerrilla fighters involved in the defense of Armenian villages in the region of Sasun and Moush during the 1895–1896 mass killings instituted against the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. He gained legendary stature among provincial Armenians after breaking out of the Arakelots Monastery in the Moush area, in which he had been trapped by Turkish troops. Andranik retreated with his men into Iran, resigned from the ARF, and thereafter traveled to Europe, where he participated in the First Balkan War in 1912 at the head of a small group of Armenian volunteers fighting in the Bulgarian army.

With the outbreak of World War I, Andranik went to Transcaucasia and took command of a contingent of Armenian volunteers supporting the Russian army in the campaigns against the Ottomans. He was promoted to the rank of major general, and eventually placed in charge of a division consisting of Armenians, who were left to defend the front as the Russian Army disintegrated in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution. Forced to retreat against superior Ottoman forces, Andranik had a falling-out with the political leadership of the just-founded Republic of Armenia for submitting to Ottoman terms in the Treaty of Batum signed on 4 June 1918. Resigning his command, Andranik formed a new brigade consisting of Western Armenians. He took refuge in the Zangezur district of Eastern Armenia, where he continued fighting against local Muslim forces, and was about to march to relieve the Armenians of Karabagh when a telegram from General Thomson, the British commander in Baku, informed him of the end of the war and ordered him to cease hostilities. The moment proved fateful, as the British commander subsequently decided to place Karabagh under Azerbaijani jurisdiction. Forced by the British to disband his forces, Andranik left Transcaucasia in 1919 and traveled to Europe to plead the cause of the Western Armenians dispersed by the Ottomans. He eventually settled in the Armenian community of Fresno, California, where he spent his remaining years. Communist authorities in Armenia denied his remains entry while in transit; thus he was buried at Père Lachaise cemetery in Paris.

See also BALKAN WARS (1912–1913); DASHNAK PARTY.

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ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

ANGLO–AFGHAN TREATY (1855)

Peace treaty favoring the British.

Signed in 1855 in Peshawar for the British by Sir John Lawrence, chief commissioner of the Punjab, and for the Afghans by Ghulam Haider, the eldest son and heir apparent to Dost Mohammad, king of Afghanistan, the Anglo–Afghan peace treaty emphasized three points: mutual peace and friendship, respect for each other's territorial integrity, and a recognition that the enemies and friends of one country would be regarded as the enemies and friends of the other.

Most historians now believe that the treaty favored the British, who wanted to maintain the status quo in their relationship with the Afghans. Since the British defeat by the Afghans in the war of 1838–1842, the British had rapidly expanded their control over the Indian subcontinent and by 1855 their controlled area extended to the Afghan border. They wished, therefore, to reach an accommodation with the Afghans on potentially problematic border issues so that they would be left free to pursue military campaigns elsewhere.

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GRANT FARR

ANGLO–AFGHAN WARS

Three wars (1838–1842; 1879–1880; 1919–1920) that defined the northernmost limit of British expansion in Central Asia, determining the present boundaries of Afghanistan.

The first two wars took place in the context of the Great Game that pitted the empires of Britain and Russia against each other for the control of Central Asia and Persia (now Iran). The backdrop for the third war was an increasingly assertive Asian nationalism and a turbulent civil war in Russia following the revolution.

Interpreting a Persian attack on the city of Herat in 1837 as inspired by Russia, British officials decided to intervene in Afghanistan and restore a former ruler, Shah Shuja Durrani (ruled 1803–1809; 1839–1842). In November 1838, they assembled an army of 21,100 soldiers and 38,000 camp followers. The army entered Afghanistan on 14 April 1839. Kandahar fell without a struggle on 20 April. Shuja was proclaimed king on 8 May and marched toward Kabul on 27 June. The major confrontation took place in Ghazni on 23 July, when British forces swiftly overpowered the Afghan garrison. Abandoned by his followers, Dost Mohammad Barakzai (1826–1839; 1842–1863) the ruler of Kabul, fled to the northern region. Shuja entered Kabul on 8 August.

British and Afghan perceptions of the events differed considerably. The British officials attributed the initial absence of resistance to their military might. Afghans attributed Shuja's success to his legitimate claims and his skills at forging alliances. The British role was viewed as one of assistance rather than domination of Shuja; but it soon became evident that Shuja was no more than a tool for British power and that the British were keen to gain direct control of the affairs of the country. Armed resistance followed, reaching its peak in 1841. On 2 November 1841 Afghan forces attacked the British garrison in Kabul. On 6 January 1842 a British force of 16,500 evacuated the city but was attacked on the road to Jalalabad. Only one officer made it safely to tell the story of the army's destruction. Having spent 8 million pounds sterling on the conquest of Afghanistan, Britain judged the cost of conquest too high and decided to abandon its plans. To restore prestige, however, Britain sent a punitive expedition in 1842 that looted the city of Kabul, then returned to India at the end of December 1842. Dost Mohammad regained power.

By 1876, the Russian Empire had established itself as the paramount power in Central Asia. Alarmed at this expansion, Britain renewed plans to gain control of Afghanistan. Following a diplomatic squabble, British forces crossed into eastern Afghanistan on 21 November 1878, and in a treaty signed on 25 May 1878, gained their key objectives—one of which was the posting of British officials in Kabul. Afghan resentment grew at the increasing power of the British envoy, who was killed when his

A British camp in Afghanistan, December 1879. Britain had long sought influence in Afghanistan, and after a disastrous defeat there in 1842, it sent troops back to the country in 1878. This second occupation resulted in the deaths of over 4,000 British and Afghans.
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embassy was burned down on 3 September 1879. British forces retaliated by taking over the city of Kabul on 5 October 1879, and unleashed a reign of terror in Kabul, Kandahar, and their surroundings. In December, the Afghan *ulama* (Islamic leaders) called for a jihad (holy war) against the British. By 14 December, the 10,281-strong British army in Kabul had been forced to withdraw to its cantonment. Afghan resistance in other locations was equally intense.

Shaken by the intensity of the opposition, British officials decided to withdraw from Afghanistan, but not before attempting to dismember the country into a number of principalities. Extensive campaigns against Afghans were undertaken. But the Afghan victory at the battle of Maiwand of 27 July 1880 shook the foundation of this policy. British forces were withdrawn from Kabul and its surroundings on 7 September 1880, and from Kandahar and its surroundings on 27 April 1881.

To prepare for the evacuation of Afghanistan, British officials carried on intensive negotiations with Afghan leaders. On 22 July 1880 they recognized Abd al-Rahman Khan, a grandson of Dost Mohammad, as the ruler of Afghanistan. He agreed in return to cede control of his country's foreign relations to the British. Some districts were also annexed to British India.

Domestic and international conditions were quite different at the onset of the third Anglo–Afghan war. Internally, Abd al-Rahman had bequeathed his son and successor Habibollah Khan a centralized state in 1901. During his rule (to 1919)

a group of Afghan nationalists had also forged a conception of Afghan nationalism, emphasizing the need for full sovereignty. Britain appeared exhausted by its travails in World War I, and nationalists were actively challenging Britain's domination of India. The Russian Empire had collapsed in revolution and was in the throes of civil war. And in Central Asia, independent Muslim governments were emerging.

Habibollah was assassinated on 19 February 1919. His son, Amanollah Khan (1919–1929), succeeded him, after thwarting an uncle's claim to the throne. On 13 April 1919 Amanollah officially declared his country independent. Britain, however, refused to accept the unilateral declaration of independence. On 4 May 1919 the undeclared third Anglo–Afghan War began when two Afghan columns crossed into the North-West Frontier province of British India. Afghan troops were initially victorious, but the British responded by using their air force to bomb Kabul and Jalalabad. The duration of the clashes was brief, as both parties agreed on 24 May to end the hostilities. The willingness of the Pakhtun tribes in the North-West Frontier province of India to join their Afghan kinsmen against the British troops was a major factor in driving British officials to the negotiating table.

Diplomatic negotiations started in earnest after the end of hostilities, but it took three conferences before an agreement could be reached. By 8 December 1921, Britain had agreed to recognize the full independence of Afghanistan. The brief war had cost the British Empire some 16.5 million pounds. Persia, Turkey, and the Soviet Union were the first countries to recognize the fully independent Afghan state in 1920.

See also Abd al-Rahman Khan; Afghanistan; Amanollah Khan; Britain and the Middle East up to 1914; Britain and the Middle East from 1914 to the Present; Dost Mohammad Barakzai; Great Game, The; Habibollah Khan; Herat; Iran; Nationalism; Pushtun; Russia and the Middle East.

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Ashraf Ghani

ANGLO–AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY (1946)

A collaboration of the United States and United Kingdom to create a solution for the Arab–Jewish conflict in Palestine and the Jewish refugees who survived the Holocaust.

With the termination of World War II in Europe in the spring of 1945, U.S. president Harry S. Truman sent special envoy Earl G. Harrison to Europe to report on the state and treatment of the European displaced persons (DPs) by U.S. troops. The Harrison report gave special attention to the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust among the DPs. It stated that "we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them except that we do not exterminate them." To ameliorate the conditions of the Jewish DPs, Harrison recommended segregating them and granting them a favored status. His most crucial recommendation was to vacate 100,000 Jewish DPs from the DP camps and admit them into Palestine. A linkage was thus created between the plight of European Jewry and the future of Palestine. Soon after, the call for admission of the 100,000 Jews into Palestine became official U.S. policy, marking the beginning of active U.S. involvement in the conflict over Palestine.

The British government did not accept the U.S. demand, fearing vehement Arab resistance to an influx of Jewish DPs into Palestine. Instead Great Britain offered Washington to form an Anglo–American Committee of Inquiry (AAC) that would offer a solution to the Arab–Jewish conflict in Palestine and to the European Jewish refugees who filled the DP camps in Europe. Ernest Bevin, British foreign secretary at the time, was committed to the application of whatever solution the committee unanimously suggested, providing Washington joined forces with British troops if it became necessary to enforce the policy.

Early in January 1946 the AAC—composed of six Britons and six Americans (the "Twelve Apostles") headed by two high court judges—started its public hearings in Washington, applying judicial standards to an inherently political and religious conflict. From Washington the AAC moved to London, then to mainland Europe to inspect the ruins of European Jewry, visit the remains of concentration camps, and hear delegations of Jewish DPs. The AAC then moved to Cairo, conducting hearings with the high-ranking officials of the recently established Arab League and with the British military headquarters in the Middle East. It then moved to Palestine to confer with British civil and military administrators there, as well as with representatives of the Palestinian Arab and Jewish communities, and concluded its investigation by visiting Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Finally, the AAC moved to Lausanne, Switzerland, and in April 1946, after a month of deliberation, produced its unanimous report.

The report dealt with five subjects: immigration, land, form of government, development, and security. It recommended that the 100,000 Jewish DPs be authorized to enter Palestine as rapidly as possible. It also called for the annulment of the 1940 Land Transfer Regulations restricting Jewish purchasing of Arab land to specific zones in Palestine. Regarding future government in Palestine, the AAC recommended that the country be neither Arab nor Jewish; it also called for the indefinite extension of trusteeship in Palestine—practically the extension of the British Mandate system in that country. Reflecting Christian interests, the report also declared that Palestine was "a Holy Land . . . [that] can never become a land which any race or religion can claim as its very own" (*Report of the Anglo–American Committee of Enquiry,* p. 3). Based on the belief that the great disparity between the Jewish and Arab standards of living was one of the chief causes for friction in Palestine, other recommendations advocated equality of standards in economic, educational, agricultural, industrial, and social affairs between the Jewish and Arab communities. The tenth recommendation called for the suppression of any armed attempt—Arab or Jewish—that sought to prevent the adoption of the report.

Just a few months afterward, in early summer 1946, the report was shelved and the AAC became, according to one count, the sixteenth commission to be asked to offer a solution to the Palestine problem. Britain backed away from adopting the report, and Washington was unwilling to assist in implementing it or quelling probable Arab or Jewish resistance to it. A year later, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) devised a recommendation to partition the disputed land.

See also Bevin, Ernest; Truman, Harry S.; United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 1947 (UNSCOP).

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ANGLO–EGYPTIAN TREATY (1954)

The 1954 Anglo–Egyptian Treaty terminated the British armed forces presence along the Suez Canal by June 1956.

The Anglo–Egyptian Treaty ("Heads of Agreement") was signed on 27 July 1954, ending more than seventy years of British occupation of the Suez Canal Zone. When Britain relinquished its military presence in other parts of Egypt after the end of the Second World War, it continued to keep its forces in scores of camps, a number of airfields, and other military installations along the Canal. Despite the British withdrawal from India and other colonies

"East of Suez" in the late 1940s, British and U.S. strategists continued to consider the installations along the Canal vital in case of war with the Soviet bloc.

The "Young Officers" who took power in Cairo in July 1952 persisted in the demand for total British withdrawal as one of the main items on their political agenda, and they resorted to guerrilla warfare using *fidaʾiyyun* (suicide attackers) against British troops in the Canal Zone. Given the urgent need to further curtail its financial burdens, and under some pressure from U.S. president Eisenhower's administration, Great Britain decided to quit the Canal. The treaty provided, however, for British civilian contractors to maintain some of the installations in peacetime, because Egypt agreed that British forces would be allowed to return and use the Canal base in the event of war. The last British troops left the Canal, according to treaty provisions, in June 1956, a few weeks before the eruption of the Suez Crisis sparked by President Nasser's July 26 announcement of the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The failed Suez–Sinai War at the end of October 1956 rendered the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty null and void. The civilian maintenance team did not return to the bases, and the last remnants of British presence along the Canal came to a final end.

See also Suez Canal; Suez Crisis (1956–1957).

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Mordechai Bar-On

ANGLO–IRANIAN AGREEMENT (1919)

Controversial agreement giving Britain extensive economic privileges in Iran.

Signed at Tehran on 9 August 1919, the Anglo–Iranian Agreement provided for Britain to supply, at a cost to Iran, administrative advisers, officers, munitions, and equipment for the formation of a uniform military force; to assist in the construction of railways and a revision of customs tariffs; to cooperate in the collection of war compensation from belligerent parties; and to lend Iran £2 million at 7 percent annual interest. In return, Britain obtained a monopoly in supplying administrative advisers as well as military experts and equipment, and Iran's customs' revenues were pledged to repay the loan. The agreement produced bitter controversy. The Iranian negotiators believed that it would finance administrative and military reforms, avert social revolution, and assist in maintaining order. The opposition and most foreign observers believed that the agreement would make Iran a virtual protectorate of Britain. Following the 1921 coup d'état, the new government of Seyid Ziya Tabatabaʾi and Reza Khan (the future Reza Shah Pahlavi) abrogated the agreement.

See also Pahlavi, Reza; Tabatabaʾi, Ziya.

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ANGLO–IRANIAN OIL COMPANY

British-organized oil company, based on a concession agreement with the shah of Persia, 1901; nationalized by Iran, 1951.

The history of the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) goes back to 1901 when a British engineer, William Knox D'Arcy, obtained a concession from Persia's shah giving him exclusive rights for the discovery, exploitation, and export of Petroleum in return for 16 percent of his annual profits and 20,000 pounds sterling in cash and another 20,000 pounds sterling in paid-up shares of stock in the venture enterprise. Oil was discovered in 1903. In 1905, D'Arcy became a part owner of the newly founded British Oil Company. In 1908, the British government bought D'Arcy's shares. In

An aerial photograph of the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company plant at Abadan, Iran, 28 June 1951. The company's headquarters were seized by Iranian officials after the British ordered 130 technicians out of the oil fields. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

1909, the Anglo–Persian Oil Company (APOC) was formed.

Because of its bias, the 1901 concession was not ratified by the parliament of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911. Moreover, APOC did not consistently follow the terms of the agreement. For example, during World War I from 1914 to 1920, oil output had increased from 274,000 to 1,385,000 tons (250,000 to 1,255,000 t) annually; by 1933, the company had made a profit of 200 million pounds sterling. By contrast, Persia had received only some 10 million of the 32 million pounds sterling due contractually—less than one-third of the share to which it was entitled by the concession.

In 1933, Reza Pahlavi terminated the concession of 1901 and concluded a new agreement with the British that reduced the area of concession from 400,000 to 100,000 square miles (1,036,000 to 260,000 sq. km), assured a minimum payment of 225,000 to 300,000 pounds sterling annually as a tax on the production of crude petroleum, and provided for a specific royalty of 4 shillings per ton of the oil sold. Iran was also to receive 20 percent of the net profit over and above a dividend guarantee of 671,250 pounds sterling. The agreement changed the company's name to the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company and, in 1935, Persia officially became Iran.

For Britain, the new agreement had certain advantages over the 1901 concession. It extended British control over Iranian oil for an additional thirty-two years, until 1993, while the previous concession was due to expire in 1961. Unlike the concession of 1901, the 1933 agreement was not a contract between a private individual and the shah of Iran, which could be terminated without much difficulty. The 1933 agreement had the character of public law because it had been ratified by the Iranian parliament; it could not be annulled without entailing political complications. The 1933 agreement, however, was not as beneficial to Iran, and some of its terms were particularly disadvantageous. For example, prices for refined petroleum products in Iran were based upon average Romanian or Gulf of Mexico f.o.b. (free on board) prices—whichever was lower—plus actual transportation and distribution costs, less a 10 percent discount. The bias of the agreement was argued based on the production cost of oil in the Middle East averaging only US $1.2 per ton compared to US$12.45 per ton in the United States. The AIOC's labor and housing policies were also less than satisfactory from the Iranian perspective.

The Anglo–Iranian oil disputes were not resolved amicably; they culminated in the nationalization of the British-run Iranian oil industry in 1951 under the premiership of Mohammad Mossadegh. AIOC then became the National Iranian Oil Company.

See also CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION; IRAN; MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD; PAHLAVI, REZA; PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS; WORLD WAR I.

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MANSOOR MOADDEL

ANGLO–IRAQI TREATIES

Four treaties between Britain and Iraq, signed in 1922, 1926, 1930, and 1948.

As a result of the dispositions between the victorious allies after World War I, Iraq became a mandated state of the newly formed League of Nations; in April 1920, under the terms of the Treaty of San Remo, Britain was awarded the mandate for Iraq. By the end of 1920, Britain had decided to set up an Iraqi monarchy and had selected Faisal, the third son of Husayn ibn Ali, the Sharif of Mecca, as king. In the summer of 1921, before Faisal's coronation on 23 August, Sir Percy Cox, the high commissioner in Baghdad, suggested that the mandate might be made more palatable if its terms were to be embodied in a treaty between Britain and Iraq. This was the genesis of the treaty of 1922.

A long period of bargaining followed, during which the British were intent on having their powers fully defined, and Faisal tried to convince them of the importance of his not being made to appear too blatant a British puppet. The treaty itself covered such matters as the framing of a constitution, the number and duties of British officials employed in Iraq, British supervision of the judicial system, Iraqi diplomatic representation abroad, equality of

access to Iraq for all foreign states, and agreements governing the financial and military arrangements between the two states. Iraq was eventually to take responsibility to defend itself against external aggression; at the same time, British imperial interests in and around Iraq had to be secured.

What all this implied was a change in the form without any change in the substance; Britain would, ultimately, force the government of Iraq to comply with the terms, and the treaty was widely unpopular in Iraq. The opposition was so persistent that its leaders had to be arrested, and the prime minister eventually was coerced into signing the treaty, since Faisal had taken ill with appendicitis a few days before his signature was due. A protocol to the treaty was negotiated in 1923, reducing its operative period from twenty years to four years after the signature of the peace treaty with Turkey. Even so, ratification by the Chamber of Deputies in June 1924 was quite problematic; a bare quorum was obtained, with only 37 out of 59 deputies present (out of a chamber of 110) voting in favor.

The treaty of 1926 was less contentious, since its main function was to take account of the new circumstances that had come into being with the "final" settlement of the Turco–Iraqi frontier. Apart from guaranteeing a measure of local administration and Kurdish linguistic rights for the population of the area (mostly honored in the breach), this treaty extended the provisions of the 1922 treaty for twenty-five years, unless Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations before the end of that period.

The remaining six years of the mandate formed a period of general cooperation with Britain, in sharp contrast to the conflicts of earlier years. At the time of the first reconsideration of the treaty in 1927, it was suggested that Iraq should be considered for league membership in 1928; negotiations dragged on until September 1929 when the matter was dropped on the understanding that unreserved British support would be given for an application for 1932.

The Anglo–Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was concluded much more rapidly than its predecessors, largely because this time there was no real opposition. Apart from stipulations about the precedence to be given to the British representative, the employment of British officials, and the employment of a British military mission, the treaty declared that "responsibility for the maintenance of internal order rests with the King of Iraq," while Britain was bound to go to the aid of her ally in the event of invasion from outside. Air bases were to be maintained rent-free in Iraq for the (British) Royal Air Force, and the treaty was to last until 1957, twenty-five years from Iraq's entry into the league in 1932.

It was not until the late 1940s that Iraqi opposition became sufficiently articulate or organized to oppose continued British control and influence. In 1946 and 1947, the British government expressed interest in extending the 1930 treaty under the guise of revising it. On the Iraqi side, the negotiations were masterminded by Nuri al-Saʿid and the regent, Abd al-Ilah, but actually carried out by the Shiʿite prime minister, Salih Jabr. Jabr and his colleagues spent late December 1947 and the first part of January 1948 in Britain working on a new Anglo–Iraqi treaty, the text of which was released on 15 January; it turned out to be almost identical with the treaty of 1930 and was rejected out of hand by crowds in the streets of Baghdad—so vehemently, in fact, that the regent was forced to disavow it. Relations between Britain and Iraq remained governed by the treaty of 1930 until 1958, when it was repudiated by the revolutionary government.

See also Abd al-Ilah ibn Ali; Cox, Percy; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Jabr, Salih.

Peter Sluglett

ANGLO–OMANI TREATIES

Agreements concluded by Oman's rulers and British India's local representatives that successively expanded British involvement in Omani affairs and culminated in Oman becoming a virtual British protectorate.

British interest in Oman and the Persian/Arabian Gulf was based on the India trade. It became a political interest as the East India Company's focus shifted in the late eighteenth century from commerce to the administration of India as the British government's trustee. In addition, the gulf's strategic significance increased, since communications linking Britain to India skirted the region. The consequences became apparent in 1798 when, after Napoléon Bonaparte annexed Egypt, French plans

to invade India were countered by a British diplomatic offensive to protect India's frontiers. Among this effort's fruit was the first formal treaty between an Arab state of the gulf and Britain, the Anglo–Omani Qawl-nama (agreement) signed 12 October 1798, by the Omani ruler, Sultan ibn Ahmad, and an East India Company representative. This excluded France and her allies, such as the Indian ruler, Tipu Sultan, from Omani territories and was amended in 1800 to permit stationing a British "agent" at Muscat. Since Oman was then a leading Indian Ocean maritime power, these engagements constituted an alliance between ostensible equals and implied no Omani dependency upon Britain.

Increased Omani subordination became apparent in the treaty of commerce signed 31 May 1839 by Omani and East India Company representatives. Concluded six years after the United States obtained a commercial agreement, and at a time when Muhammad Ali's Egypt seemingly threatened gulf peace, this treaty placed Anglo–Omani relations on firmer legal footing. It also significantly diminished Omani sovereignty, by limiting the duty Oman could levy on British goods, by formalizing British extraterritorial jurisdiction over its subjects resident in Oman, and by permitting British warships to detain Omani vessels suspected of slave trading, thereby expanding an 1822 anti-slave-trade engagement.

The 1839 treaty was superseded by one signed 19 March 1891 by Sultan Faysal of Oman and Britain's Political Resident Sir Edward Ross. Although this treaty barely increased Britain's formal privileges, an accompanying secret declaration issued 20 March 1891 bound Oman's ruler and his successors never to "cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation" any part of his possessions except to Britain. Actually, these engagements were reached in lieu of formally declaring a British protectorate over Oman, an idea shelved because it conflicted with an 1862 Anglo–French guarantee of Oman's independence. Nevertheless, the 1891 declaration initiated a fifty-year period when Oman, albeit legally independent, functioned as a veiled British protectorate. The legal regime founded on these undertakings began eroding in 1939, when the 1891 treaty was renegotiated and, especially in 1951, when the present Anglo–Omani treaty was concluded and Oman resumed formal control over its foreign relations. It shattered completely between 1958—when the territorial nonalienation declaration of 1891 was mutually terminated—and 1967, when Britain's extraterritorial rights in Oman finally lapsed. Only an updated version of the original 1798 Anglo–Omani alliance endures.

See also PERSIAN (ARABIAN) GULF.

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ROBERT G. LANDEN

ANGLO–PERSIAN WAR (1856)

War occasioned by Iran's seizure of Herat.

In March 1856, the government of Iran's Qajar monarch, Naser al-Din Shah (ruled 1848–1896), dispatched a military force to capture Herat, a city in western Afghanistan whose control had been a source of contention between the Afghans and Iranians since Afghanistan asserted its independence from Iran in the mid-eighteenth century. After a long siege, Herat surrendered to the Iranians in October 1856. The capture of Herat prompted Great Britain, which had long opposed Iran's claims to the city, to declare war. Actual hostilities between Iranian and British forces were limited, but Britain captured Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf and landed a military contingent at the port of Bushehr. Iran sued for peace, but the British captured the port of Khorramshahr before negotiations were completed. Under the terms of the Treaty of Paris of March 1857, Iran agreed to evacuate Herat, renounce all claims to the city, and recognize the independence of Afghanistan.

See also HERAT; KHARG ISLAND; NASER AL-DIN SHAH; PARIS, TREATY OF (1857).

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ERIC HOOGLUND

ANGLO–RUSSIAN AGREEMENT (1907)

Accord that divided Iran into spheres of influence.

During the last third of the nineteenth century, Russian imperial advances into Central Asia and the consolidation of British imperial domination in south Asia led to intense rivalry between the two European empires. The conflicting interests centered on Afghanistan, Iran, and Tibet, three states that constituted buffers between Britain's and Russia's colonial possessions in Asia. The emergence of Germany as a world power and the humiliating defeat in 1905 of Russia by a nascent Asian power, Japan, helped to persuade some British and Russian officials of a need to resolve their respective differences in Asia. Consequently, in 1907, Britain and Russia signed an agreement to regulate their economic and political interests. With respect to Iran, the Anglo–Russian Agreement recognized the country's strict independence and integrity, but then divided it into three separate zones.

The agreement designated all of northern Iran, which bordered Russia's possessions in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, as an exclusive sphere of influence for Russian interests. This northern zone was defined as beginning at Qasr-e Shirin in the west, on the border with the Ottoman Empire, and running through Tehran, Isfahan, and Yazd to the eastern border, where the frontiers of Afghanistan, Iran, and Russia intersected. A smaller zone in southeastern Iran, which bordered Britain India, was recognized as an exclusive sphere for Britain. The British zone extended west as far as Kerman in the north and Bandar Abbas in the south. The area separating these two spheres, including part of central Iran and the entire southwest, was designated a neutral zone where both countries and their respective private citizens could compete for influence and commercial privileges. For Britain and Russia, the agreement was important in establishing a diplomatic alliance that endured until World War I. The government of Iran, however, had not been consulted about the agreement; it was informed after the fact. Although not in a position to prevent Britain and Russia from implementing the Anglo–Russian Agreement, the Iranian government refused to recognize the accord's legitimacy, since from an Iranian perspective, it threatened the country's integrity and independence. Iranian nationalists, in particular, felt betrayed by Britain, a country they had idealized as a democratic beacon during the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1907). Thus, an important legacy of the agreement was the growth of anti-British sentiment specifically and anti-Western attitudes more generally as strong components of Iranian nationalism.

The Anglo–Russian Agreement did not eliminate all competition between the two powers with respect to their policies in Iran, but after 1907 it did foster broad cooperation, often to the detriment of Iranian interests. In particular, Britain and Russia intervened in Iran's domestic politics by supporting the royalists in their contest with the constitutionalists, and increasingly, their intervention assumed military dimensions. The agreement lapsed in 1918 after it was renounced by a new revolutionary government in Russia.

See also CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

ANI, JANANNE AL-

[1966–]

A London-based multimedia artist of Iraqi-Irish descent.

Jananne Al-Ani was born in 1966, in Iraq. She is primarily a video and video installation artist and emigrated from northern Iraq to England in 1980, where she trained at the Byam Shaw School of Art and Royal College of Art. Her early works were photographic but in the late 1990s she began to work most frequently in video. Al-Ani's work is primarily concerned with the complexities, ambiguities, and power relationships that are part of the processes of cultural contact and mixing. She often draws on her own experience of moving from Iraq to Britain,

and of being the child of an Iraqi father and Irish mother to explore these issues, but she intentionally disrupts the easy correlation between her work and her background. Al-Ani has done a series of pieces dealing with the male gaze and the female body, and the orientalist Western male gaze of Middle Eastern women in particular. A number of pieces that both confront and entice voyeurism exemplify her work on this theme, as do the works that deal with the politics and practices of veiling. Her video installations on the veil are part of the larger body of work being produced by women artists from the Middle East examining the complicated issue of the veil from their own diverse perspectives. Another theme running through Al-Ani's works is the relationship between memory and narrative, a topic motivated by her personal history. Like several other prominent artists of Arab descent, Al-Ani's artistic exploration of her mixed and diasporic identity was initially motivated by the 1991 Gulf War, which brought into focus the interwoven personal and political aspects of life in exile. Al-Ani is particularly interested in the ambiguities of personal histories as constructed through narratives of memory, and has created a series of works involving family members that explore the multiple layers of experience and identity. She has exhibited widely in the United States and Europe and is also active in curatorial projects.

See also Art; Attar, Suad al-; Gender: Gender and Education; Iraq.

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Jessica Winegar

ANIS AL-JALIS MAGAZINE

An Egyptian monthly that promoted women's rights; 1898 through 1907.

This Alexandria-based woman's monthly, whose title means *the intimate companion,* began publication in 1898 and continued for a decade. Its editor, Alexandra Avierino (1872–1926), was a wealthy Greek Orthodox woman who had immigrated to Egypt from Beirut in 1886 and later married a wealthy transplanted European, Miltiades di Avierino.

While avowedly eschewing politics, Avierino used her magazine as a platform to call for girls' education, women's rights, and improved conditions for women. Although she used the topic of domesticity and household management to discuss such issues, her journal lacked the concrete household advice evident in journals targeting a less elite audience. The magazine had an extremely localized readership, as evidenced by the shops and service personnel advertising in the journal, which clustered around Sharif Street in Alexandria. Avierino optimistically projected her potential readership at over 31,000, a figure close to the literate female population of Egypt (including foreigners); however, actual numbers were but a tiny fraction of that figure. Although clearly a woman's magazine, its readership and contributors included men.

Avierino was a pioneer among Egypt's editors of the early twentieth century in her use of advertising to support for her publication. As much as a third of the journal might be dedicated to advertising. She even wrote an article touting the benefits of advertising as a means of promoting not only the exchange of goods but the exchange of ideas, because advertising would allow publications to proliferate. Despite Avierino's considerable talent and vision, she was forced to close the journal due to losses incurred after the 1907 recession.

See also Egyptian Feminist Union; Gender: Gender and the Economy; Gender: Gender and Education.

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Mona Russell

ANJOMAN

Persian word for "assembly."

Used as far back as the eleventh century in Firdawsi's *Shah Namah* (Book of kings) in the sense of "assembly" or "meeting," the term *anjoman* had come to refer to cultural, religious, political, administrative, and professional "associations" by the late nineteenth century. During the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1912), a number of secret or open political groups that were often called *anjoman* played important roles. In the latter part of the twentieth century, a variety of Islamic associations, especially those formed among students in Iran and abroad, called themselves *anjoman.* Originally religious and cultural associations, these groups were politicized during the 1978–1979 Iranian revolution, when both Islamic and secular popular assemblies (called *shura,* or *anjoman*) appeared all over Iran, at all levels of society. With the consolidation of the new Islamic regime, however, these independent organizations were eliminated or else were turned into government organs. The notion of *anjoman,* or *shura,* as some ideal form of popular self-rule is nevertheless still current, especially in leftist political literature.

See also CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION; IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); *SHURA.*

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NIKKI KEDDIE

ANKARA

Capital of Ankara province and of the Republic of Turkey.

Ankara (formerly Angora) originally was a Hittite settlement and remained a provincial city throughout its history, except when it was made capital of the Celtic kingdom of Galatia (284 B.C.E.–17 C.E.). Subsequently, Romans, Persians, Byzantines, Seljuk Turks, and Crusaders conquered the city. The Ottoman Turks conquered it in 1360 and since then Ankara has been a Turkish city. However, it remained a minor provincial center of the Ottoman Empire until the late nineteenth century, when it received a spur of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. In December 1919, after the Ottoman defeat in World War I, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk chose Ankara as headquarters of the nationalist resistance because of its transportation links with the capital, Istanbul, which was occupied by foreign forces. Subsequently, the new Turkish Grand National Assembly met in Ankara (1920) and voted to move the national capital there in 1923.

The modern city initially was built between the medieval citadel and the railroad station to its west. In 1932, architects began laying out a new city based on a plan by Austrian architect Hermann Jansen. The plan provided only for the upper and middle classes, not for the masses of villagers who came to Ankara to become tradesmen and artisans. To avoid the authorities, the migrants built houses, known as *gecekondu,* by night, which now ring the planned city and contain the majority of Ankara's inhabitants. The plan envisioned a population of 335,000 by 1985; in that year the population had reached 2,300,000, By 2000, Ankara's population was 3,540,522.

Ankara is the economic and transport center of Anatolia. Railroads were extended eastward to Kayseri, Sivas, Erzurum, and Diyarbakir in the 1920s and 1930s, and a network of paved roads connecting Ankara to all parts of the interior was built in the 1950s. The airport at Esenboğa has become the hub of Turkey's domestic air network. The government and the military are Ankara's major employers. Most service employment is directly related to government (education, legal services, support of the foreign community) or to the needs of running the metropolis (transportation, construction, and general services). Industry also is concentrated in the government sector (armaments, official publishing). The burgeoning of ministerial bureaucracies has fueled the city's rapid growth, which has led to problems other than *gecekondu* slums. These include serious air pollution from the burning of fossil fuels; severe traffic congestion; and respiratory ailments and other health conditions aggravated by the degraded urban environment.

See also ANATOLIA; ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; BERLIN–BAGHDAD RAILWAY; *GECEKONDU.*

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JOHN R. CLARK
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

ANKARA, TREATY OF (1930)

Treaty of friendship between Greece and Turkey, signed on 30 October 1930.

The Treaty of Ankara affirmed the boundaries between Turkey and Greece, settled the property claims of repatriated populations, and established naval parity in the eastern Mediterranean. The rapprochement was due particularly to the exceptional efforts of Greek prime minister Eleutherios Venizelos and Turkish president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to normalize the historically problematic relations between the two countries. Turkish-Greek relations continued without any major conflict until the Cyprus Crisis (1954). The Ankara treaty also influenced Turkey's accession to the League of Nations (1932) and the establishment of the Balkan Pact (1934).

See also ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON
UPDATED BY BURÇAK KESKIN-KOZAT

ANKARA UNIVERSITY

A public university in the capital of Turkey.

Founded in 1946, Ankara University includes faculties of letters, pharmacy, education, science, law, divinity, political science, medicine, veterinary science, agriculture, and dentistry, as well as schools of home economics, journalism, justice, and health sciences, and vocational schools in neighboring Çankiri, Kastamonu, and Kirikkale provinces. In the 2002–2003 academic year, the university had about 2,600 teaching staff and 42,400 students (40 percent female).

Ankara University came into being with the incorporation of three existing colleges. The first to be established in Ankara, the new capital of the Republic of Turkey, was the Faculty of Law, founded in 1925. The Faculty of Language, History, and Geography was established in 1936. In the same year, the Faculty of Political Science, originally established in Istanbul in 1859 to train civil servants for the Ottoman Empire, was moved to Ankara. These were merged as Ankara University in 1946, and new faculties were subsequently added.

I. METIN KUNT
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ANNABA

Algerian seaport situated near the Tunisian border.

Called Bona (or Bône) before the independence of Algeria (1962), Annaba was one of North Africa's major trading posts prior to the French invasion in 1830. Bona itself, where France had obtained certain trading privileges prior to the invasion, was occupied in 1832. The city remained an important trading port throughout the nineteenth century. It was singled out by the French government in the 1950s for a number of major industrial projects, including Algeria's most important steel plant. These were part of the final effort by France—the so-called Constantine plan of 1958—to tie Algeria's postindependence economic development to the *métropole* (France itself).

After independence, Annaba emerged as an important harbor and industrial center. This was based in part on the earlier steel industry that had been started by the French and on heavy industries related to Algeria's socialist strategy adopted shortly after independence. Annaba's population is about 620,000 (2002).

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DIRK VANDEWALLE

ANNAN, KOFI A.

[1938–]

Seventh secretary-general of the United Nations.

Kofi A. Annan was born in Kumasi, Ghana. After studying at the University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, he completed his bachelor's degree in economics at Macalester College, in the United States, in 1961. He later was awarded an M.A. in management from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1972. He began working for the United Nations' World Health Organization in Geneva in 1962. Annan later served with the UN Economic Commission for Africa in Ethiopia, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in Egypt, and the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva, as well as in a number of positions at the UN Secretariat in New York beginning in 1987. These included assistant secretary-general for peacekeeping operations (1992–1993) and under-secretary-general (1993–1996). When Annan began his first term as UN secretary-general in January 1997, he became the first-ever UN staff member and the first non-Arab African to hold that position. In December 2001, Annan and the United Nations were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Annan's UN service has involved him in Middle Eastern problems and issues. His first exposure to the region came during his service with UNEF II in Egypt. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, he was the top UN official responsible for evacuating more than 900 Westerners and international staff workers from Iraq. He also led the first UN team that negotiated the terms of the oil-for-food program in Iraq. Later as secretary-general, he negotiated with Iraq over the ability of the UN Special Committee to search for banned weapons in Iraq. His biggest challenge as head of the UN came during and after the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003, when the low-key Annan tried to guide the UN through its biggest challenge since the first Gulf War of 1990. His task was made more difficult by a Security Council torn by bitter arguments, and by the subsequent need to ensure a UN role in the reconstruction of an American-controlled Iraq.

See also United Nations Emergency Force; War in Iraq (2003).

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Michael R. Fischbach

ANSAR, AL-

Disciples of Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abdallah, the self-declared Mahdi in the Sudan, who led the tribes to overthrow Turko–Egyptian rule in the early 1880s.

The Ansar (in Arabic, the Helpers or Followers) had three components during the Turko–Egyptian period in the Sudan: the religious disciples of the Mahdi, who joined him on Aba Island in 1881 and followed him on his *hijra* (holy flight) to Kurdufan that summer; the *baqqara* (cattle-herding Arab) nomads of Kurdufan and Darfur, who traditionally opposed the authority of the central government and one of whose members, Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, succeeded the Mahdi as ruler; and members of the Ja'aliyyin and Danaqla tribes of north Sudan who had been dispersed to the southwest where they became traders. Others also joined the Ansar from the Nuba tribe in southern Kurdufan and the Hadendowa (Beja) near the Red Sea. The Ansar thus joined the Mahdi for a combination of religious and material motives: the belief in him as the heir to the prophet Muhammad; and the benefit derived from him against government control and taxes.

When the Turko–Egyptian government was defeated in January 1885 and Abdallahi succeeded the Mahdi as ruler in June 1885, strains appeared among the Ansar. Those reflected tensions between the tribes that originated in the Nile valley *(awlad al-balad)* and those from the west *(awlad al-Arab).* Moreover, they reflected the tribes' resentment that the new government imposed taxes and control in a manner not dissimilar to the previous regime. Nonetheless, Abdallahi ruled the Sudan until 1898, when Anglo–Egyptian forces defeated the Ansar and Abdallahi died.

The Mahdi's posthumous son, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman, gradually regained authority in the traditional Mahdist areas during the 1920s and 1930s. Even in 1908, the Anglo–Egyptian government permitted him to cultivate land on Aba Island, the Mahdi's original stronghold. During World War I, he won contracts from the government to supply wood from the island for river steamers and, in the early 1920s, he won government contracts to supply materials to construct the Sennar Dam. The government also allowed him to cultivate substantial areas distant from Aba Island. Ansar from Kurdufan and Darfur worked on those projects, generally

without pay. They received food and clothing from Sayyid Abd al-Rahman, who also conferred his blessing upon them. The economic and religious blessings were mutually reinforcing and helped provide the basis for his subsequent political strength.

The British authorities supported Sayyid Abd al-Rahman because he served as a counter to the nationalist politicians influenced by Egypt. He founded the Umma Party in 1945, which pressed for the separation of the Sudan from Egypt. The Ansar underlined his power: When the Egyptian president came on 1 March 1954, for example, to inaugurate the parliament in Khartoum, 40,000 Ansar demonstrated and the ceremony was postponed. When the Egyptians relinquished their claims to rule the Sudan, Umma participated in the first independent government (January 1956).

Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi died on 24 March 1959 and was succeeded by his son Sayyid Siddiq al-Mahdi as head of the Ansar and the Umma Party. When he died in September 1961, his brother Sayyid al-Hadi al-Mahdi became imam (leader) of the Ansar and his son Sayyid al-Sadiq al-Mahdi headed the Umma Party. That bifurcation weakened the movement, since al-Sadiq al-Mahdi challenged his uncle's authority. When Jaʿfar Muhammad al-Numiri seized power in a coup d'état in May 1969, he determined to destroy the power of the Ansar. After clashes between the army and the Ansar in Omdurman and Aba Island, Numiri launched an attack by the air force on Aba Island on 27 March 1970. Hundreds of Ansar died, Imam al-Hadi was killed as he attempted escape to Ethiopia, and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi fled into exile. Numiri confiscated the Mahdi family's holdings, to undermine their economic power.

Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi was a leader of the exiled opposition to Numiri and mounted a major attempt to overthrow the regime in July 1976. When he and Numiri reconciled in 1977, he returned to the Sudan and slowly rebuilt the economic and religious bases of the Ansar. When Numiri was overthrown, the Ansar-based Umma Party won 38 percent of the vote in April 1986, and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi became prime minister. He, in turn, was overthrown by a coup d'état on 30 June 1989. By then, Ansar was no longer a formidable paramilitary force. Its 1 to 2 million members provided guaranteed votes for the Umma Party but were not the cohesive movement that they had been in previous years.

See also ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-MAHDI; *MAHDI*.

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ANN M. LESCH

ANSAR DETENTION CENTERS

See HUMAN RIGHTS

ANTAKYA

Ancient Antioch and capital of Hatay province, Turkey.

Antakya (Antioch in English) was the capital of Hellenistic and Roman Syria and remained an important commercial, cultural, manufacturing, political, and religious center for more than a thousand years, until it was looted and destroyed by Mamluk armies in 1268. The city never recovered from this devastation, although after it was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in 1517 it reemerged as an important regional trade center. French forces occupied Antakya in 1918 and subsequently incorporated it as part of the French mandate of Syria on the grounds that its population was largely Arab Christian and Armenian rather than Turkish. The Republic of Turkey contested this action, and for several years the status of Antakya and nearby Alexandretta was a source of tension in Franco-Turkish relations. In 1939, France, against the wishes of Syrian nationalist politicians in Damascus, ceded Antakya back to Turkey, a move that prompted most of the city's Armenian population to depart.

Antakya has grown rapidly since 1950 and is a prosperous commercial center for Turkey's southernmost province of Hatay. It has a well-known archaeological museum and the extensive ruins of

its ancient walls, as well as its old churches, are important tourist attractions. In 2000, the city's population of approximately 175,000 was diverse, both ethnically (Arabs, Kurds, and Turks) and religiously (Alevis, Christians, and Sunni Muslims).

See also ALEXANDRETTA.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

ANTAR, ALI AHMAD NASIR
[ca. 1935–1986]

South Yemeni politician and government official.

Ali Ahmad Nasir Antar was a veteran of the Radfan Rebellion in the mid-1960s and a top leader in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) from the late 1960s through the mid-1980s. He held high army, government, and party posts, among them longtime minister of defense, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, deputy prime minister, minister of local administration, and member of the politburo of the Yemeni Socialist Party. He came from al-Dhala region directly north of Aden and enjoyed up-country support; he also found much support in the military. Politically ambitious and fiercely competitive but non-ideological, Antar always seemed to be at the center of the political struggles. He was much involved in the armed fight that allowed Abd al-Fattah Ismaʿil to triumph over Salim Rabiyya Ali for control of the PDRY in 1978; he was also involved in the intrigues that first brought Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani to the top position in the PDRY in 1980 and then sought to rein him in after 1983. Antar was killed in an intraparty blood bath in early 1986 when he tried to save himself by preemptively ambushing enemies who were allegedly planning a coup against him.

See also ALI NASIR MUHAMMAD AL-HASANI; PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN; RABIYYA ALI, SALIM; YEMENI SOCIALIST PARTY.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

ANTISEMITISM

Hatred of Jews, expressing itself in racist prejudice, discrimination, and sometimes violence.

The term *antisemitism* (also anti-Semitism), first coined by German pamphleteer Wilhelm Marr in 1879, denotes a modern form of Jew-hatred based on emerging theories of racial superiority and inferiority. Mistakenly appropriating terminology from linguistics (i.e., the "Semitic" language grouping), the term has become commonly understood to mean hatred of Jewish people, whether defined as a religious or as a racial group, and not hatred of "Semites."

Although the term *antisemitism* is relatively modern, the roots of Jew-hatred lie in folklore and popular prejudices dating back to antiquity. Perhaps the most serious contributions to antisemitism can be found in early Christian religious teachings. The first Christians blamed the Jews not only for rejecting Jesus Christ as the savior and messiah, but also—and more ominously—for killing him. Although not as widespread as it once was, the charge of deicide has persisted in some quarters in spite of the fact that Christ was crucified not by the Jews but by the Roman rulers of the Holy Land. Many, but not all, Catholics have accepted the 1965 Vatican ruling (*Nostra Aetate*) that the Jews neither then nor now should be blamed for Jesus' death.

A second Christian anti-Jewish motif introduced in medieval times was the "ritual murder" accusation, according to which Jews would supposedly kidnap an innocent Christian child so as to obtain drops of blood to bake unleavened bread (matza). This infamous "blood libel" has incited hatred and fear of Jews for centuries and has resurfaced in recent times even in Islamic societies, enjoying a resurgence thanks to racist Internet Web sites.

Apart from deep-seated theological rationalizations for despising Jews, situational factors such as political or economic rivalries and jealousies often help to account for overt expressions of antisemitism. Because of the Christian church's prohibition on

usury, Jews—who were forced to live in ghettos and forbidden to own land in medieval Europe—became money-lenders who ended up wielding unexpected power over Christian borrowers, causing resentment and jealousy, and creating the long-enduring stereotype of all Jews being wealthy and greedy.

Many antisemites also believe in the existence of a Jewish conspiracy to dominate the world, directed by a secret council of which all Jews are agents. This myth, which first appeared toward the end of the eighteenth century, is fueled by the frequently republished hoax entitled *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (also *The Jewish Peril*). Despite the fact that the *Protocols* were shown in the 1920s to be a forgery (actually, a plagiarized version of a French anti-Freemason pamphlet), many antisemites continue to regard this text as an authentic document "proving" the evil intentions of the Jews. The *Protocols* and most other modern expressions of antisemitism were imported into the Middle East through European powers that came to dominate the region in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The ritual murder accusation was raised against Jews in Damascus (1840) and has resurfaced periodically ever since.

Anti-Jewish motifs were also present in early Islamic teachings, some originating in the tensions that existed between Muhammad and the Jewish tribes of Arabia. Early Muslims accused the Jews of having broken their covenant with God and of having corrupted the divine teachings. Along with positive references to Christians and Jews as the "people of the book," the Qurʾan also contains a number of verses warning believers of the "wretchedness and baseness" of the Jews (Sura 2:61) and accusing the Jews of having "schemed" against Jesus (Sura 3:54). Despite such theological warrants and despite their status as *dhimmis* (minorities), Jews living under Islamic rule were never subjected to the same level of hateful and demonic stereotyping characteristic of Christian antisemitism.

Antisemitism has played a role in, and has been fueled by, the protracted Arab–Zionist and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. Early Zionist thinkers saw the creation of an independent Jewish nation-state in the Middle East as a response to European antisemitism in the sense that this would normalize the Jewish people as having their own country instead of being strangers everywhere. On the other hand, some Middle Easterners and Muslims have come to regard the establishment of the state of Israel, and the corresponding defeat of the Arabs and the Palestinians, as being connected to a Jewish conspiracy to dominate the world. In 2002 and 2003, major Egyptian and Lebanese television networks screened several historical-fiction series based on this theme as well as on the blood libel story.

The Palestinians' struggle to maintain the Arab character of their country against Jewish immigration, settlement, and political control has on occasion expressed itself in antisemitic terms. For example, Palestinian leaders Musa Kazim al-Husayni (addressing Winston Churchill in 1921) and Muhammad Amin al-Husayni (testifying before the Peel Commission in 1937) invoked the spectre of a world Jewish conspiracy when arguing their case against Zionism during the period of British mandatory rule over Palestine. Since the late 1940s, this view has been strengthened by the widespread perception throughout much of the Arab-Islamic world that Israel and U.S. Jews have wielded undue influence over the making of U.S. foreign policy.

The true extent and depth of antisemitism in the modern Middle East remain a matter of contemporary controversy. There is a tendency among some commentators to equate criticism of Israel's policies or military actions against the Palestinians with antisemitic intentions or beliefs, and this has the effect of inhibiting open discussion and debate. The unresolved Arab–Israeli and Israeli–Palestinian conflicts have elicited extreme antisemitic statements from some quarters, such as the resolutions of the Conference of the Academy of Islamic Research (Cairo 1969) or Syrian president Bashshar al-Asad's welcome address to the pope (Damascus 2001), both of which attacked world Jewry as an ominous force in the course of expressing their support for Palestinian rights. While some intellectuals and leaders are careful to distinguish between anti-Zionism and antisemitism, escalations of violence involving Israel, the Arabs, and the Palestinians are often accompanied by hostile press and public comment not only directed against Israel as a belligerent country but also fanning antisemitism through the demonization of its leaders and Jews in general as sinister and evil.

See also Asad, Bashshar al-; Damascus Affair (1840); Dhimma; Husayni, Muham-

MAD AMIN AL-; HUSAYNI, MUSA KAZIM AL-; JEWS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION.

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NEIL CAPLAN

ANTONIUS, GEORGE

[1891–1942]

Egyptian-born Christian Arab; member of the British Palestine Administration; political mediator between the Arabs and the British.

George Antonius was an author, administrator, and sometime intermediary between the British and the Arabs, whose only book, *The Arab Awakening* (1938), generated an ongoing debate over such issues as the origins of Arab nationalism, the significance of the Arab Revolt of 1916, and the machinations behind the post–World War I political settlement in the Middle East.

Born in Alexandria to a Greek Orthodox family of Lebanese origin, Antonius was raised as a privileged member of his native city's commercial upper class. His father, Habib, had immigrated to Egypt from the Lebanese village of Dayr al-Qamr. He speculated on the Alexandria cotton exchange, served as a *wakil* (agent) for prominent absentee landlords, and may have become a landowner himself. His business success ensured that his four sons, Michael, George, Albert, and Constantine, could be educated at private schools and that he himself was able to retire to his native Lebanese village a prosperous man.

George Antonius attended Alexandria's elite Anglo-Arab public school, Victoria College, graduating as head of his class in 1910. He continued his education at King's College, Cambridge, earning a degree in engineering in 1913. The influence that he was later to exercise stemmed from his ability to function in two cultural environments—that of the Oxbridge-trained British elite and that of the Arab notability. In circulating between these two elites, Antonius achieved the unique status of becoming recognized by each of them as its spokesman to the other. Despite his elegant use of the English language and his cultured manner, Antonius was never able completely to transcend the classification of "native" in the eyes of the British imperial administrators with whom he worked. Despite his command of Arabic and his disenchantment with British policy in Palestine, he was not regarded as a completely reliable colleague by Palestinian Arab Muslim leaders—who viewed him as something of an Anglophile.

During World War I, Antonius was employed in the censorship office of the British government in Egypt, stationed in Alexandria. As was to be the case throughout his life, his social and intellectual gifts enabled him to enjoy a diverse range of friendships, and he became a central figure in the literary and social circle that revolved around the British novelist E. M. Forster, the Greek poet Constantine Cavafy, and the bon vivants Demetrius Pericles and Robin Furness. Forster's published letters show that Antonius acted as his guide to Arab Alexandria, his traveling companion, and his confidant.

In 1921, Antonius accepted an appointment in the fledgling British Palestine Administration as assistant director of education. Jerusalem became his home for the rest of his life, and he came to regard himself as a Palestinian. Because of his administrative experience, his language abilities, and his interpersonal skills, however, Antonius was frequently ordered by British officials to undertake assignments outside Palestine. The most important of these required Antonius to spend much of the period from 1925 to 1928 on six arduous missions in Arabia and Yemen, five of them as first secretary to Sir Gilbert Clayton, the former head of the Arab Bureau. These missions found Antonius, the urbane Christian intellectual, serving as the principal negotiator between the British government and the Wahhabi tribal chieftain, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud (known later as King Ibn Saʿud of Saudi Arabia). The missions achieved their objectives of satisfying

Ibn Saʿud's desire to be recognized as the ruler of Arabia and Britain's wish to obtain agreement on the demarcation of the frontiers between ibn al-Saʿud's domains and the British mandates in Iraq and Transjordan. In another instance of using his skills as a mediator, Antonius was called on by Lord Lloyd, the British high commissioner in Egypt, to play a crucial role in resolving the confrontation that became known as the Egyptian army crisis of 1927.

Although Antonius's service in Arabia earned him a commander of the British Empire, his lengthy absences from Jerusalem contributed to the ruin of his career in the Palestine government. Denied a promotion he thought he deserved and transferred against his will to the high commissioner's secretariat, he resigned in 1930.

From that point until shortly before his death, Antonius was employed as the Middle Eastern field representative of the Institute for Current World Affairs, a New York-based organization inspired and funded by the Chicago millionaire Charles Crane. In the course of his work for the institute, Antonius broadened his network of friends and acquaintances in high places and became a valued contact for many prominent foreigners visiting Jerusalem. His range of contacts was further expanded by his marriage in 1927 to Katy Nimr, the daughter of the wealthy Lebanese-Egyptian publisher and landowner, Faris Nimr. A vivacious and generous hostess, Katy Antonius made the Antonius home a focal point of Jerusalem social life, "a centre where people of all races could meet and talk and where a long succession of journalists, officials, officers and politicians were plunged, often for the first time, into a stimulating Arab intellectual milieu" ("Katy Antonius," obituary, *The Times* [London], 8 December 1984).

Once he resigned from government service, Antonius was able to associate freely with the Palestinian Arab community. He became an informal adviser to the Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin al-Husayni, and he endeavored to mediate a simmering dispute between the Arab members of the Greek Orthodox clergy in Jerusalem and the patriarch in Alexandria. Antonius's major triumph within the Palestinian movement occurred during the London Conference of 1939, when he served as a member and secretary of the Palestinian delegation as well as secretary general of the entire Arab delegation. Antonius's book, *The Arab Awakening,* figured in the proceedings of the conference. The book contained the previously undisclosed Husayn–McMahon Correspondence, copies of which Antonius had acquired from Amir Abdullah ibn Hussein of Transjordan. By publishing the correspondence, Antonius compelled the British government to acknowledge its secret wartime pledges to the Arabs, to print an official version of the documents, and to address the question of the existence of potential contradictions between the pledges and the reality of the postwar settlement.

In addition to its immediate impact in British official circles, *The Arab Awakening* exercised a considerable influence on scholarship for many years. Although several of Antonius's interpretations have now been successfully challenged, his book remains an eloquent statement of the Arab perspective on the events that led to the division and occupation of the Arab states after World War I.

Antonius was given little opportunity to bask in the acclaim accorded *The Arab Awakening.* He died in Jerusalem in 1942, during World War II, at the age of fifty-one, disillusioned by a warring world that had for the moment cast aside the need for mediators like himself.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Arab Nationalism; Arab Revolt (1916); Clayton, Gilbert; Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-; Husayn–McMahon Correspondence (1915–1916); Nimr, Faris.

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William L. Cleveland

ANTUN, FARAH

[1874–1922]

Lebanese intellectual.

Though originally from Tripoli in Lebanon, Antun spent much of his adult life in Cairo (Egypt) and in New York. He was the editor of the Arabic periodical *al-Jamiʿa* and the author of several books, including the famous *Ibn Rushd wa Falsafatuhu* (Ibn Rushd and his philosophy). Antun was one of the pioneers of modern secular thought in the Middle East. As a Christian, and heavily influenced by the French orientalist Ernest Renan, Antun addressed the question of religion and science in Islam and the Middle East. He concluded that neither can claim to be more true than the other. In Antun's view, the only solution to the dichotomy is to allow each its sphere, although he was critical of religious law (what he termed the "inessential part of religion"). In the same vein, he believed in the separation of church and state. Only through such secularism, he argued, could the Middle East avoid being overtaken by Western civilization. Antun was sensitive about the capacity of Islam to tolerate other creeds, be they different religious faiths or alternative world models, such as the one posited by Western science. Though Antun was at odds with individuals such as the Islamic reformers Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida over these questions, he deeply respected Islamic culture and strove to defend it against the intellectual onslaught of the West.

See also Abduh, Muhammad; Rida, Rashid.

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Zachary Karabell
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

AOUN, MICHEL

[1935–]

Lebanese army officer.

Michel Aoun (also Awn) was born in 1935 in a suburb of Beirut to a lower middle class Maronite (Christian) family. He entered the military academy at Fayyadiyya in 1955 and graduated as a lieutenant in the artillery corps. He attended advanced courses in the United States and France and was promoted to commander of the artillery corps in 1976. Aoun, who rose through the ranks to general during the 1980s, sympathized with the Maronite-oriented militias during the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) and staunchly opposed the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. He supported the deployment of the army against the Palestine Liberation Organization and its Lebanese allies.

In 1977 Aoun persuaded enlisted men and officers from different religious sects to join him in forming an integrated brigade, known later as the Eighth Brigade. In June 1984 President Amin Jumayyil appointed him commander in chief of the Lebanese army. Just before the expiration of his term, and when deep divisions in the country prevented the emergence of a national consensus to elect a president, Jumayyil appointed Aoun head of an interim government (in effect, head of state). The appointment was rejected by many Lebanese. Aoun declared a "war of liberation" against the Syrian presence in Lebanon but wound up fighting Muslim militias, and later fought fiercely with the Maronite-oriented Lebanese forces. Aoun greatly alienated Muslims and others when he resorted to indiscriminate shelling of Muslim neighborhoods as a way of fighting the Syrian presence. Syrian forces intervened militarily and ousted him in October 1990. Aoun was forced into exile in France, where he remained as of 2003.

Aoun continued to challenge the Lebanese government and still commanded some following among Christian students on Lebanese university campuses in Christian areas. In 2003 Aoun reversed course and agreed to run a candidate in a Lebanese parliamentary by-election. This ran counter to his previous position, which was that no election in Lebanon was legitimate given the Syrian influence there. His candidate lost the election, and he further provoked his critics when he appeared before

a U.S. congressional subcommittee to support the Syrian Accountability Act, which was designed by hawkish, pro-Israeli forces in Washington, D.C., to punish Syria's regional role.

See also Jumayyil, Amin; Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Maronites; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

As'ad AbuKhalil

AOZOU STRIP

Disputed border land between Libya and Chad.

The Aozou Strip is disputed land along the common border between Libya and Chad some 310 miles (800 km) long and 40 miles (100 km) deep, encompassing at its northwestern end the Tibesti massif. The strip was ceded by France from French Equatorial Africa to Italian Libya under the Mussolini–Laval Treaty in 1935. Although the treaty itself was ratified by both France and Italy, the instruments of ratification were never exchanged and, under the 1955 Franco–Libyan Treaty and the 1956 Franco–Libyan exchange of letters, the previous border, stemming from the 1899 Anglo–French Agreement over their respective spheres of influence in Africa, was generally regarded as being the appropriate international border—although not by Libya. In November 1972, Libya occupied the Aozou Strip and administered it until forced out of most of the region in March 1987. The dispute over the strip between Libya and Chad is now before the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

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George Joffe

APPELFELD, AHARON

[1932–]

Hebrew writer and essayist.

Aharon Appelfeld, born near Czernowitz, Bukovina, grew up in a German-speaking, affluent, assimi-



Aharon Appelfeld. Photo by Frederick Brenner. Reproduced by permission.

lated Jewish home, close to Hasidic grandparents and Ukrainian caretakers. The Holocaust reached his family when he was eight: His mother and grandmother fell victim to it. Appelfeld spent the subsequent four years in constant flight, battling hunger and fear in forests or villages, often with other hunted Jewish children. When World War II ended, he made his way to a displaced persons camp in Italy and, in 1946, finally made his way to Palestine. There he went to agricultural boarding schools, joined the army, and attended the Hebrew University of Jerusalem where, at last, he filled the gaps in his education.

Continuously searching for his roots, Appelfeld delved into Hasidic, Yiddish, and mystical texts as well as into Kafka's works—all of these materials reverberate later in his own stories of uprootedness. Being a figure at the margins of the Israeli "generation of the state" writers, Appelfeld struggles with the Jewish, rather than the strictly Israeli, experience. With an idiosyncratic diction—attempting to

forge silence with words, his memory's black hole with details—Appelfeld depicts the disintegrating prewar central European Jewish milieu and its dislocated, fragmented, post-Holocaust remnants, be they in Israel or elsewhere.

The 1983 Israel Prize laureate and author of nearly twenty books, Appelfeld published his first collection of short stories, *Ashan* (Smoke), in 1962 and a first novel, *The Skin and the Gown,* in 1970. These and other works such as *Badenheim, 1939* (1980), *The Healer* (1985), and *Katerina* (1989) situate him among the foremost chroniclers of the impact of the Holocaust on the human psyche. He is a dispossessed writer whose protagonists, tongueless and homeless, are forever in exile. Appelfeld teaches literature at the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

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NILI GOLD

AQABA

Seaport at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, on the Red Sea, and just across the border from Elat in Israel.

Aqaba was a small fishing village and site of an Ottoman fort when it became officially incorporated into the Emirate of Transjordan in 1924, giving Jordan its only outlet to the sea. In 1959, Aqaba's port became operational, and in 1976, a free trade zone was opened. The port experienced substantial development as a result of aid from Iraq, which needed safe access to a seaport during its war with Iran. Iraqi aid also helped develop the country's roads and overland transportation systems. Cargo handled through Aqaba increased steadily throughout the 1980s, peaking in 1988 at 20 million tons, and fell sharply to 10 million tons after the United Nations embargo of Iraq in 1990. In 1999 Aqaba handled 12.8 million tons of cargo. Port facilities will require modernization to increase handling potential once the embargo is lifted. In addition to the port, Aqaba, with a population of 40,500 (1998), is a popular tourist resort known for its beaches, water sports, and spectacular coral reefs.

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JENAB TUTUNJI

AQABA, GULF OF

Jordan's only seaport, at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, on the Red Sea.

Aqaba was a small fishing village and site of an Ottoman fort when it was incorporated into the Emirate of Transjordan in 1925, giving Jordan its only outlet to the sea. In 1959 Aqaba's port became operational, and in 1976 a free trade zone was opened. The port experienced substantial development as a result of aid from Iraq, which needed safe access to a seaport during its war with Iran from 1980 to 1988. By mid-1990, facilities at the port included twenty berths, one container terminal, two 40-ton gantry cranes, and 358,000 square yards of storage area. Iraqi aid also helped to develop the country's roads and overland transportation systems.

Cargo handled through Aqaba increased steadily throughout the 1980s, peaking in 1988 as trade with Iraq increased to 18.7 million tons of imports and exports handled in 1989. Cargo handling fell sharply to 10 million tons after the United Nations imposed sanctions against Iraq in 1990. The continuation of sanctions hurt Aqaba considerably. Jordanians complained that crews from warships from the United States and other countries boarded and searched their ships for illicit Iraq-bound cargo. The lifting of UN sanctions in 2003 boded well for Aqaba's economy. The city's population at that time was 95,000.

In addition to the port, Aqaba is a popular tourist resort known for its beaches and water



MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

sports, and it is the site of some of the world's most spectacular coral reefs.

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JENAB TUTUNJI
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

AQABA INCIDENT

Border crisis in 1906 in the Sinai peninsula, also known as the Taba incident.

In 1906, Ottoman troops occupied Taba, an Egyptian town in the Sinai peninsula west of Aqaba (in present-day Jordan), to enlarge Ottoman access to the Red Sea. The British, who occupied Egypt, forced them to withdraw. The two sides later agreed to cede to the Ottoman Empire a small area west of Aqaba, while retaining Taba in Egypt.

The Taba incident provoked a wave of secular nationalist agitation led by Mustafa Kamil and others who challenged Britain's right to negotiate Egyptian territory. Mustafa Kamil had started a newspaper, *al-Liwa,* to encourage nationalism.

See also AQABA; KAMIL, MUSTAFA; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

AQL, SAʿID

[1912–]

One of Lebanon's most prominent poets and intellectuals, whose career spans the 1930s to the twenty-first century.

Born in Zahla, Lebanon, Aql is the foremost representative of the symbolist movement in Arabic poetry. He once noted that poetry's power derives from its ability to hint at and allude to something. His poems indeed are rarely explicit; instead they are characterized by images and a gifted use of words to convey emotions. A prolific writer, he is the author of some thirty books, plays, and anthologies, several written in French. Early in his career, he became the leading proponent of "Lebanonism," according to which modern-day Lebanese are viewed as the descendants of the ancient Phoenicians and thus as having a separate Lebanese identity that has little to do with Islam or Arabism. Aql has argued that the distinctiveness of the Lebanese people is also reflected in a separate language, Lebanese, which he regards as being more than merely a dialect of Arabic. He even developed a version of the Latin alphabet that he thought was better suited to the Lebanese language, and he has repeatedly contended that Lebanon's children should be taught this language instead of standard classical or modern Arabic.

In the 1930s his ideas found a favorable reception among Maronites who were trying to build a Lebanese Christian brand of nationalism that em-

phasized distinguishing Lebanon from its Arab Muslim environment. Although the appeal of Lebanonism declined after Lebanon became independent in 1943, Aql's ideas were revived in the 1970s, when they served to inspire the Guardians of the Cedars, a quasi-fascistic, violently anti-Palestinian Maronite militia whose proclaimed mission was to fight for the survival of a Christian Lebanon. Aql also founded The World's Most Beautiful Books publishing house in 1968 and the weekly *Lebnaan* in 1975.

See also MARONITES.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

AQQAD, UMAR ABD AL-FATTAH AL-
[1927–]

Palestinian-Saudi engineer and banker.

Umar Abd al-Fattah al-Aqqad began his career as a director of the Saudi British Bank. He has subsequently directed the Saudi Bank and the Arab Investment Company of Luxembourg and Switzerland. Aqqad has been a major supporter of Palestinian educational institutions such as Bir Zeit University.

STEVE TAMARI

AQSA INTIFADA, AL-

A Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Al-Aqsa Intifada, or the Second Intifada, began after Ariel Sharon, a leader of Israel's right-wing Likud Party, visited al-Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem on 28 September 2000. Al-Haram, which contains al-Aqsa Mosque, is the third holiest shrine of Islam. The visit itself was provocative, especially because Sharon was accompanied by 1,000 riot police. But what triggered the Intifada the following day was the Israeli police's use of live ammunition and rubber bullets that killed 6 and injured 220 rock-throwing (but otherwise unarmed) Palestinian demonstrators.

The fundamental cause of the Intifada ("shaking off") was the continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israeli–Palestinian negotiations at Camp David in July 2000 that were supposed to end the occupation had broken down. Palestinians had expected that the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) recognition of Israel would lead to an end of the thirty-three-year Israeli occupation and to the establishment of a Palestine state. However, in the 1990s the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza had doubled to 200,000, for which Israel confiscated more Palestinian land for the settlements and their access roads. Israel extended its policy of closures, which restricted movements, and its network of checkpoints, where Palestinians were often humiliated. Israel also continued to demolish homes and to uproot and burn olive and fruit trees for security reasons and as a form of collective punishment for acts of terrorism. In short, Israeli repression and Palestinians' unmet expectations of freedom and independence had contributed to years of pent-up Palestinian frustration, despair, and rage.

As in the first Intifada (1987–1991), in October 2000 Palestinians began by using nonviolent methods. But after 144 Palestinians had been killed, Islamist groups such as HAMAS and Islamic Jihad began a campaign of suicide bombings against mostly civilians in occupied territories and Israel. Groups associated with al-Fatah such as al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade focused on resisting Israeli army incursions and attacking settlers in the West Bank and Gaza. Starting in January 2002, al-Aqsa Brigade also began conducting suicide bombings against mostly Israeli civilians, a practice condemned by the international community. Although Yasir Arafat, head of al-Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and president of the Palestinian Authority (PA) since 1996, did not initiate the Intifada, he reportedly gave tacit approval to armed resistance and terrorism despite his promise made in the Oslo Accord in 1993 to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to renounce "the use of terrorism and other acts of violence."

Palestinian violence contributed to the downfall of Israel's Labor prime minister Ehud Barak and to the rising popularity of Ariel Sharon, who became prime minister on 6 February 2001. Sharon—a proponent of Greater Israel, an architect of the

settlements, and an opponent of the Oslo process—proceeded with broad public support to use harsh measures against the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. In response to Palestinian violence he initiated a policy of assassinations—euphemistically called "targeted killings"—of suspected terrorist leaders, that sometimes included activists and innocent bystanders. He reoccupied major Palestinian cities, using helicopter gunships, warplanes, and tanks. Some of Sharon's methods were considered to be war crimes by human rights groups, and were condemned by the United States.

The Intifada was costly to the Palestinians, to Israel, and to the United States. Some Palestinian analysts considered the militarization of the Intifada to be a blunder. The Oslo process was destroyed, Arafat sidelined, the Palestinian economy damaged, and PA areas occupied, as Israeli settlement construction and a separation barrier (called wall by Palestinians and fence by Israelis) continued apace. By early 2004 Sharon's harsh measures had led to the deaths of about 3,000 Palestinians, of whom most were civilians, including about 500 children. In addition, the Palestinians lost much popular, moral, and diplomatic support around the world. The Intifada also cost the lives of about 900 Israelis, most of whom were civilians, and brought insecurity to the everyday lives of Israelis, who lost faith in the Palestinians as peace partners. It also contributed to Israel's worst economic recession, for which the government sought a large loan from the United States. President George W. Bush's neglect of the peace process and support for the hard-line policies of Sharon resulted in anger at the United States in much of the Muslim and Arab world, which has helped anti-American Muslim extremist groups to recruit members.

The Intifada also had unintended positive consequences. Pressure from Sharon and Bush prompted reform of the PA, which most Palestinians had sought for years because they viewed the PA as corrupt, inept, and autocratic. A new office of prime minister was created to assume many of the duties and much of the authority of the president of the PA. One diplomatic by-product of the Intifada was the Arab League's approval in March 2002 of a Saudi plan calling for Arab recognition and normalization of relations with Israel, provided that United Nations Resolution 242 is implemented and an independent state of Palestine is created. Another was the United States's initiation of another peace effort, the Road Map, in 2003, The Intifada also increased support within Israel for the dismantling of most of the settlements and withdrawal from Gaza. Despite the violence, destruction, and insecurity, and despite the failed leadership of Arafat, Sharon, and Bush, most Israelis and Palestinians continued to support the concept of a two-state solution as the only viable solution to the Arab–Israel conflict.

See also Arab–Israel Conflict; Arafat, Yasir; Bush, George Walker; Fatah, al-; Gaza (City); HAMAS; Haram al-Sharif; Intifada (1987–1991); Islamic Jihad; Israeli Settlements; West Bank.

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Philip Mattar

ARAB

A person who speaks Arabic as a first language and self-identifies as Arab.

Arabs comprise less than one-quarter of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims. Arabic is a Semitic language, as are Aramaic, Hebrew, Amharic, and some other languages. In its original Arabic meaning, an Arab is a pastoral nomad. Before the introduction of Islam in the seventh century C.E., Arabs participated in most ancient Near Eastern civilizations as traders, auxiliary warriors, and as providers of camels and other desert produce. They migrated with their extended kin and animals, following seasonal patterns of available water and vegetation, and made a sophisticated adaptation to arid environments. Poetry, their main artistic expression, presented their most strongly held beliefs and values:

bravery in battle, patience in misfortune, persistence in revenge, protection of the weak, defiance toward the strong, hospitality to the guest, generosity to the needy, loyalty to the kin grouping, and fidelity in keeping promises. Most early Arabs were animists or ancestor-worshipers, but some adopted Judaism or Christianity before the advent of Islam.

Islam came to humanity through the last Messenger of God, Muhammad, an Arab of the Quraysh tribe (570–632 C.E.) who profoundly affected not only the Arabs but world history. Arab clans took part in the early conquests to extend Islamic rule into the Fertile Crescent and across North Africa as far west as Morocco and Spain (711 C.E.) and eastward to the borders of India and China. The Arabic language and the Islamic religion were widely adopted by non-Arab conquered peoples, some of whom intermarried with Arabs.

Politically, the term "Arab" has been applied to all citizens of states in which Arabic is now the official language, whether or not they are native Arabic speakers. These "Arab" states, listed from west to east in North Africa and the Middle East, include: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Culturally, the term has also been applied to persons of Arab descent living outside the Arab world.

Arab identity can mask linguistic and other ethnic identities in North Africa and the Middle East. Culturally and linguistically, Iranians (Farsi), Pakistanis (Urdu), and Afghanis (Pashtun) are not Arabs, although they employ Arabic script in writing their languages. The Turks, leaders of the Ottoman Empire since the fifteenth century, are not Arabs, and before the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the 1920s, they too wrote Turkish using Arabic calligraphy. The term "Arab" has also been used as a racial designation, in some cases used in racial profiling after 11 September 2001.

During the late 1800s Arab nationalism began to emerge in Beirut student societies. Some Arabs called for the restoration of Arab rule in the caliphate, as it was then claimed by the Ottoman sultans. In World War I, a family of Arabs (Hashimites) led by the Sharif of Mecca and Amir Husayn, a Sayyid and descendant of Muhammad, revolted against Ottoman rule and freed parts of the Hijaz (Arabia), Palestine, and Syria. Aided by Britain, these Arabs hoped that they might form a united Arab state in the Arabian peninsula and the Fertile Crescent, but Britain honored other promises it had made to its allies (especially France) and to the Zionist movement. Husayn took but later lost control of the Hijaz; his son Faisal I ibn Hussein briefly ruled in Syria (until the French mandate took over in 1920) but was then made king of Iraq; another son, Abdallah, was given an emirate called Transjordan (now the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan). In the peace settlement that ended World War I, Arabs in Syria and Lebanon were placed under a League of Nations mandate administered by France;

Even those as far removed from the modern world as the nomadic Arabic Bedouin (desert dwellers) have found their simple and traditional lifestyles increasingly altered by the universal encroachment of technology. © MOSHE SHAI/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.



Muslims at prayer. Muslims are followers of Islam, a monotheistic faith that has 1.2 billion followers, or one-fifth of the world's population. Although less than 20 percent of Muslims are Arabs, many Muslim believers can be found in the Middle East and North Africa. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Britain held similar mandates in Palestine (initially including Transjordan) and Iraq. These mandates were intended to be temporary means for Arabs to govern themselves, but the winning of independence from European control between 1932 and 1946 did not facilitate Arab unification. Arab energies from 1900 to about 1950 were devoted mainly to achieving independence and to unifying the Arabic-speaking states. Continuing these efforts, the League of Arab States was created in 1945, with Egypt assuming a leadership role. In its first major test, the League failed to protect the Palestinians from the creation in 1948 of the state of Israel.

"Arab Nationalism" is a term used by anticolonial, nationalist leaders throughout the Middle East, especially recognized when Gamal Abdel Nasser, the first postindependence leader of Egypt, nationalized the Suez Canal and succeeded in gaining Egyptian control over the canal despite imperial pressure from Britain and France, allied with Israel. Generally political efforts at Arab union and federations have not succeeded, but inter-Arab pacts to create customs and telecommunications unions have been implemented. Arab success in imposing an oil embargo on the United States during and after the October 1973 war with Israel raised hopes for Arab unity. However, Egypt's separate peace with Israel in 1979; the division of Arab countries over the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (Gulf Crisis, 1990–1991); and two Gulf wars all pointed to deep-seated divisions among Arab governments and peoples. Petroleum revenues have enriched some Arab regimes, but on the whole the Arab people have not prospered. In the second American war against Iraq in 2003, Arab nationalism was revived in the widespread response of the Arab world to what was described as an "invasion" and "occupation" of Arab territory. New Arab tele-

vision networks, such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiyya, have facilitated this revived solidarity.

Historically, appeals to the Arab Nation have come from Palestinian nationalists, whose lack of a territorial base makes Arab nationalism a matter of essential politics. The juxtaposition of "Arab" and "Israeli" in the usually hyphenated "Arab–Israeli conflict" adds to the sense of the Arabs being constituted as a single nation.

Arab nationalism has been a secular movement, with religion either irrelevant or kept separate from politics. Although people may still respond emotionally to the call for Arab unity, the political dynamic is shifting away from Arab nationalism to political alternatives framed by Islamic discourse, generally referred to as "Islamist," meaning the political use of the Islamic faith.

If Arabs have been deeply frustrated by their failure to unite, they still take pride in their historical achievements, their culture, notably their language and literature, their role in the development and spread of Islam, and their keen family loyalty, generosity, and hospitality.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT
UPDATED BY CAROLYN FLUEHR-LOBBAN

ARAB ACADEMY OF DAMASCUS

Center for Arabic studies.

Modeled on the Académie Française, the Academy of Arab Learning in Damascus (al-Majma al-Ilmi al-Arabi bi Dimashq) was established in June 1919 as a center for Arabic linguistics and studies in literature and the humanities. It was part of a concerted effort by the government of the newly established Kingdom of Syria to make Arabic the language of administration, the armed forces, high culture, and education within its boundaries. Its founders included Amin Suwayd, Anis Sallum, Saʿid al-Karmi, Abd al-Qadir al-Maghribi, Isa al-Maʿluf, Dimitri Qandalaft, Izz al-Din al-Tanuhi, and Muhammad Kurd Ali (who was its president). Influential nationalists such as Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, Rashid Baqdunis, and Faris al-Khuri were early members.

The academy, headquartered in the historic Adiliyya School (al-Madrasa al-Adiliyya), sponsored public lectures on a wide range of cultural subjects and supervised the editing of important Arabic-language texts. In addition, it was responsible for overseeing the extensive collection of manuscripts and books that had been gathered by Shaykh Tahir al-Jaza'iri during the final decades of the nineteenth century in the adjacent Zahiriyya School (al-Madrasa al-Zahiriyya), as well as for administering the Syrian National Museum. By the spring of 1920, growing fiscal difficulties forced the government of King Faisal to cut back funding for the organization, which disbanded later that summer.

In early September 1920, Kurd Ali proposed to the French mandatory authorities that the academy reopen. The high commissioner, who saw the proposal as an opportunity to split Damascus's intelligentsia, immediately approved the proposal. Successive mandatory governors provided generous financial support for the organization, severely limiting its ability to serve either as a forum for open political debate or as an incubator of Arab nationalist sentiment. Nevertheless, the academy's cultural activities flourished under French patronage. A journal *(Majalla al-Majma al-Ilmi al-Arabi)* appeared in January 1921, along with a series of critical editions of writings by prominent Arab authors. The academy merged with the Syrian University in June

1923, and was reincorporated as a research institute for the study of formal Arabic language *(al-lugha al-fusha)* three years later. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the academy organized international festivals celebrating the contributions of major Arab literary figures. By the 1950s the circle of corresponding members had expanded to include such influential Western scholars as Carl Brockelmann, Ignaz Goldziher, Snouck Hurgronje, and Louis Massignon.

See also Kurd Ali, Muhammad; Shahbandar, Abd al-Rahman.

Fred H. Lawson

ARAB BOYCOTT

Various measures of economic warfare against Israel by the League of Arab States.

In an attempt to assist the Palestinians in their struggle against Zionism, the newly formed League of Arab States (Arab League) passed Resolution 16 on 2 December 1945, calling on its member states to prohibit the purchase of products made by the Jewish sector of Palestine. After the Arab defeat in the first Arab–Israel War (1948), the Arab League expanded the boycott to include three levels. The primary boycott barred Arab states, companies, and individuals from buying from or selling to Israel any goods or services, and prohibited other commercial or financial relationships with Israel. In 1950, a secondary boycott extended the prohibitions to dealings with companies anywhere in the world who themselves engaged in important economic relations with Israel. A subsequent tertiary boycott was aimed more broadly at individuals and organizations seen as supportive of Israel. An example of the secondary boycott concerned the giant Coca-Cola Company. Because of the company's activities in Israel, many Arab countries boycotted it and gave their business to the rival Pepsi Cola Company instead. An example of the tertiary boycott can be seen in the policies of Jordan, which boycotted entertainers it considered pro-Israel, including Danny Kaye and Frank Sinatra, and banned their films and recordings from entering the country.

In 1951, the Arab League set up the Central Office for the Boycott of Israel in Damascus, Syria, operating under the league's secretary-general. It administered boycott activities and maintained a roster of blacklisted companies with which member states were not to trade. By the 1970s, the league had enacted over forty articles clarifying how the boycott was to work. By 1976, 6,300 firms from ninety-six countries had been blacklisted. However, rulings from the office were only advisory. Several Arab states, including Tunisia, Sudan, and Algeria, chose not to follow the secondary and tertiary boycotts or followed them only selectively. International reaction to the boycott ranged from repeated expressions of outrage and judicial counteractions by the United States and some European countries, to Japanese and Korean reluctance to engage in economic dealings with Israel for fear of offending Arab countries.

The boycott failed to throttle Israel's economic development, even though Israel's economy was weak in the years following the first Arab–Israeli War. Among other things, Israel benefited financially early on from its confiscation of the land left behind by the Palestinian refugees, which enabled it to settle new immigrants inexpensively. Israel also began demanding that the compensation it had pledged to pay the refugees for their property be reduced to account for the boycott's damage to its economy. Additionally, Israel benefited in the 1950s and 1960s from massive infusions of goods from West Germany in the form of reparations for Nazi crimes, as well as from funds donated by Jewish individuals and organizations around the world. In 1992, the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce estimated that the boycott had reduced Israeli exports by 10 percent and investments by 15 percent for a cumulative loss of $45 billion. Yet by that point, Israel had defeated the Arabs in four major wars and had clearly thrived despite the boycott.

The boycott was dealt several further major blows when Egypt and Jordan signed peace treaties with Israel (1979 and 1994, respectively), and ended their participation in the boycott. The Palestine Liberation Organization also gave up the boycott as a result of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, and in February 1995 joined Egypt and Jordan in pledging to support an end to boycott activities. Other Arab states, including Oman and Qatar, began establishing trade ties with Israel after the October 1991 Madrid Conference and

the subsequent Israeli–Palestinian peace process. Countries outside the Arab League, including Japan, have also begun dropping their adherence to the boycott. Despite this, the Arab League has not formally rescinded the boycott, and the Central Office for the Boycott of Israel still exists. Although this office it did not hold its biannual conference for a number of years after 1993, it did convene its seventy-first conference in Damascus in October 2003, which even a delegation from American-occupied Iraq attended.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); League of Arab States; Madrid Conference (1991); Refugees: Palestinian; West German Reparations Agreement.

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ARAB BUREAU (CAIRO)

Intelligence and propaganda agency operated by the British in Cairo from 1916 to 1920.

From 1916 through 1920, to counter Muslim opposition arising from their war against the Turks, the British sought to ally themselves with the Arabs within and north of the Arabian peninsula. In 1916, when he returned to London from his tour of the area for Lord Kitchener, Mark Sykes established the Arab Bureau in Cairo. The Arab Bureau reported to the Foreign Office in London, and most of its expenses were met by Egyptian taxpayers. The Arab Bureau was housed in Cairo's Savoy-Continental Hotel, and its work included collecting intelligence, finding collaborators, and producing propaganda. With its officers posted in different parts of the Arabic-speaking world, this wartime improvisation produced the *Arab Bulletin,* which disseminated intelligence to British officialdom.

The Arab Bureau was more influential during World War I than T. E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt, whose exploits were heroically depicted by postwar legend makers. Among the colorful British personalities involved with the bureau were Gertrude Bell, a wealthy spinster who believed that she cut a more imposing figure in the East than in the West; Gilbert Clayton, a tough-minded army intelligence officer who ran often ruthless operations; and Reginald Wingate, the chief British soldier in Sudan who continued his proconsular posturing in Cairo. The Arab Bureau saw collaboration with Sharif Husayn ibn Ali and his sons as a way of avoiding all the expensive trappings and personnel associated with the government of India and the British army. Because of its hostility to Zionist settlement in Palestine, those who ran the Arab Bureau have been depicted as romantic partisans of Sharif Husayn and his family, the Hashimites, but the Arab Bureau simply used the Arabs for its own ends, just as the British used the Zionists, the Armenians, and others in the Middle East during and immediately after World War I.

See also Bell, Gertrude; Clayton, Gilbert; Hashimite House (House of Hashim); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Sykes, Mark; Wingate, Reginald.

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Roger Adelson

ARAB CLUB

Early twentieth-century organization that promoted Palestinian nationalism.

The Arab Club (al-Nadi al-Arabi) was originally set up in Damascus as an offshoot of al-Fatat by Palestinian nationalists who moved to the city after it fell to the armies of Field Marshal Viscount Edmund Allenby and Faisal I, king of Iraq, toward the end of World War I. The same organization emerged in Jerusalem in June 1918 and was dominated by younger members of the al-Husayni family, most

notably Hajj Amin, who became the president of the Palestine branch of the club. Real power rested in the hands of Damascus-based Palestinians from Nablus. Before the decline of its activities at the end of 1920, the club had over five hundred members, with branches in major Palestinian towns. Although al-Nadi was openly engaged in cultural and social activities, its overriding concerns were political. Under the direction of its Damascus central organization, the club opposed Zionism and called for the unification of Palestine with Syria. The club's principal instruments of mobilization were the mosques, the press, and political activists in Palestinian towns and villages. With the collapse of Faisal's Arab government in Syria in the summer of 1920 and the disintegration of its Arab nationalist lieutenants, the Arab Club lost the two most important sources of its support. It was eventually overtaken by the Arab Executive and the Muslim–Christian Association.

See also Fatat, al-; Husayni Family, al-; Palestine.

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Muhammad Muslih

ARAB COLLEGE OF JERUSALEM

One of the most important Arab educational institutions in Palestine during the British Mandate.

The Arab College of Jerusalem was officially established in 1926 in Bab al-Zahira (Herod's Gate) in Jerusalem, on the premises of the Teacher Training Academy (Dar al-Muʿallimin). In 1935, it was moved to Jabal al-Mukabbir in Jerusalem, where it remained until 1948, when its activities were suspended after the creation of the state of Israel.

The Teacher Training Academy was established by Britain, which conquered Palestine in the winter of 1917/1918. A number of Egyptian teachers were appointed to positions at the academy. In 1919, Khalil al-Sakakini, a Palestinian Christian and a well-known Arab literary figure, was named director. He remained in that office until 1922, when he resigned to protest British policy.

Soon after, Khalil Totah, another Palestinian Christian and an educator with a master's degree from Columbia University, was appointed director. In 1925, he too resigned when the students and teachers went on strike to protest the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (the strike coincided with the visit to Palestine of Britain's Arthur James Balfour). Ahmad al-Samih al-Khalidi then assumed the post of acting principal, and in 1926 he became principal. Al-Khalidi introduced important changes in the curriculum that made it necessary to change the name from Teacher Training Academy to Arab College of Jerusalem (al-Kulliyya al-Arabiyya fi al-Quds). Al-Khalidi remained principal until the college closed in 1948, when about 726,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled from historic Palestine and took refuge in the neighboring Arab countries, most never to return or be allowed to return again.

The Arab College of Jerusalem and its predecessor, the Teacher Training Academy, were open to both Arabs and Jews, but Jews refrained from enrolling; of the twenty-three students enrolled at the academy in 1918, only one was Jewish. As the years went by, only Arab students attended the college; but although the majority of Arab students were Muslim, they also included Christians and Bahaʾis.

The total number of students in the college rarely exceeded one hundred; most graduating classes numbered around twenty. With such small numbers, one would not expect the college to have a great impact on the cultural life of Palestine. In fact, however, it acquired wide fame in both Palestine and in neighboring Arab countries. This was due primarily to the quality of its students and of the education they received. It was a mark of outstanding performance for a student to be admitted to the college.

The principal of the college recruited his first-year students from the various Arab elementary schools in Palestine; he would choose good students who had finished elementary school, interview them, and then select the best from among them. (There were rare exceptions to this rule: Prince Nayef, of the ruling Hashimite family in Transjordan, and Prince Abd al-Ilah, a Hashimite who became regent during the early 1930s in Iraq, were admitted to the college on the basis of their social status.) Al-Khalidi was the first educator in the Arab

world to apply intelligence tests to college applicants.

Once admitted, the students did not generally have to pay tuition. They were taken as boarders, for which they paid a modest stipend. This was necessary, since most students came from poor villages. The curriculum of the college was unique in the Arab countries; it was conceived on the pattern of modern British schools, with special emphasis on English language and literature, Arabic, Latin, and practical training in teaching, in addition to history, geography, science, and mathematics. Upon graduation, the students who proved themselves worthy were sent to continue their education at British universities or at the American University of Beirut. The remaining graduates continued their educations at Arab universities. The college's graduates distinguished themselves in the Arab world as doctors, professors, ambassadors, and ministers.

The teachers at the Arab College were outstanding in science, literature, and the arts; the English-language instructors were, in most cases, British. The college attracted numerous visitors from Arab countries and Britain, including Colonel Bertram Thomas, the explorer of Rub al-Khali in the Arabian Peninsula, and Rudyard Kipling, poet laureate of the British Empire.

See also American University of Beirut (AUB); Balfour Declaration (1917); Khalidi, Ahmad al-Samih al-; Rub al-Khali; Sakakini, Khalil al-.

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Hisham Nashabi

ARAB DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY (ADS)

See Alami Family, al-

ARAB FEMINIST UNION

Pan-Arab women's organization committed to Arab nationalism as well as to women's rights.

Huda al-Shaʿrawi (1882–1947) was an early leader in Arab women's rights in Egypt. Her husband, Ali al-Shaʿrawi, was the treasurer of the Wafd Party, and during his exile and after his death her interest in the nationalist cause continued. Frustrated with the Wafdist lack of commitment to the feminist cause, she and other women who had worked diligently in the nationalist struggle left the Wafdist Women's Central Committee to form the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU; al-ittihad al-nisaʾi al-misri). While women's rights had been a key component of nationalist and modernist rhetoric prior to independence from Britain, feminist issues were not a part of the Wafdists concern after they officially took office. Feminist groups certainly helped shape reform in Egypt, but their victories were hard fought and their activities sometimes seen as being contrary to national concerns. Efforts to improve the lives of women that had at first been rooted in the struggle against Britain now became a separate endeavor as the major focus shifted toward changing local Egyptian social conventions regarding the status of women.

After its establishment, the EFU sponsored schools, workshops, women's clubs, and training for women. Its goals were to make education available to girls, raise the minimum age of marriage to sixteen, ensure equal employment opportunities, abolish prostitution, and establish orphanages, women's centers, and workshops where unemployed women could earn a living. To familiarize women with the goals of the union, the EFU disseminated a magazine, *Egyptian Woman* (al-Misriyya), which was published in French and Arabic.

The EFU formed ties with the International Alliance of Women (IAW) while its goals were universal women's suffrage. The EFU eventually had difficulty justifying ties with the IAW, whose leadership bore traces of British imperialism. The IAW's refusal to take a stand for the women of Palestine against Zionism marked the end of the EFU–IAW collaboration. In 1944, the EFU was instrumental in establishing the All-Arab Federation of Women, which set an example for the Arab League, developed two years later.

Palestinian women nationalists called upon the EFU to help them in their struggle and in 1944, Shaʿrawi and EFU members traveled to Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Trans-Jordon, discussing a

confederation of Arab feminist unions, and the Arab Feminist Conference convened in Cairo later that year. The goal of consolidating Arab women's struggles led to the formation of the Arab Feminist Union in 1945. In addition to propounding nationalist causes, women from Arab countries challenged patriarchal values, practices, and institutions, and demanded the reform of personal status laws throughout the region.

See also Gender: Gender and the Economy; Gender: Gender and Education; Gender: Gender and Law; League of Arab States; Shaʿrawi, Huda al-.

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Maria F. Curtis

ARAB FILM

See Film

ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE (PALESTINE)

Umbrella organization formed in 1936 to represent the Palestinian Arabs.

The Arab Higher Committee (AHC) was formed on 25 April 1936 to present Palestinian demands to the British government during the general strike launched by local committees five days earlier. Chaired by Supreme Muslim Council President Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the AHC included the heads of six political parties—Palestine Arab, National Defense, Istiqlal (independence), Reform, National Bloc, and the Youth Congress—and two Christians. The AHC resolved to strike until the British stopped Jewish immigration. It also called for banning land sales to Jews and establishing a national government responsible to an elected assembly. The AHC did not control the local committees or militias, but it moderated their calls to stop paying taxes and to include Arab government officials in the strike. As Britain poured in troops and the strike caused increasing economic hardship, the AHC arranged for Arab rulers to ask the Palestinians to end the strike. The AHC endorsed that appeal on 10 October 1936.

Although not formally recognized by the British, the AHC presented the Palestinian position to the Peel Commission early in 1937. After the AHC rejected that commission's report in July 1937 and a British official was killed in September, the British banned the local committees and the AHC, deported five leaders to the Seychelles, and banned four others from returning to Palestine. Amin al-Husayni and his cousin Jamal al-Husayni fled abroad; they coordinated the subsequent revolt from exile.

Despite the ban, the British let the AHC participate in the London Conference in 1939, freeing the politicians held in the Seychelles but banning Amin al-Husayni. The AHC rejected the subsequent White Paper, fearing that its promise of independence was illusory, but tried to persuade Britain to improve its terms.

The AHC was moribund during World War II. In November 1945 and May 1946 the Arab League reorganized the AHC, giving disproportionate representation to the Husaynis. The AHC testified before the United Nations in spring 1947 but boycotted the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 1947 (UNSCOP) mission and was quoted in the *New York Times* as rejecting its partition plan as "impracticable and unjust" (9 Sept. 1947). After the United Nations endorsed partition, the AHC failed to design a Palestinian government or an effective military strategy. It tried to form an All-Palestine Government in Gaza in September 1948, but subsequently lost its leadership role. Amin al-Husayni remained the nominal head, living in exile.

See also ALL-PALESTINE GOVERNMENT; LONDON (ROUNDTABLE) CONFERENCE (1939).

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ANN M. LESCH

ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL COMPANY (ARAMCO)

Petroleum partnership between U.S. firms and Saudi Arabia, 1933–1990.

The origins of the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) go back to the May 1933 signing of an oil concession agreement between Saudi Arabia's finance minister, Shaykh Abdullah Sulayman, and Lloyd N. Hamilton, an attorney representing Standard Oil of California (SOCAL, now Chevron). Oil exploration was begun three months later by CASOC, the SOCAL subsidiary established to operate the Saudi concession.

At that time, SOCAL was seeking a partner to market the oil it was producing in Bahrain and hoped to produce in Saudi Arabia. In 1936 it transferred 50 percent of the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) and 50 percent of CASOC to the Texas Company (Texaco), receiving in return $21 million in cash and deferred payments, plus a half interest in Texaco's marketing facilities east of Suez, which were reorganized as a subsidiary of BAPCO and named CALTEX. On 3 March 1938 CASOC brought in its first commercial oil well, Dammam number 7. On 1 May 1939 King Abd al-Aziz was present when the first oil tanker was loaded with Saudi crude oil and sailed from Ras Tanura.

The development of Saudi Arabia's oil fields was hampered, but not halted, by World War II. In 1940 Italian aircraft bombed Dhahran, where CASOC was headquartered, and the war at sea limited shipping to and from the Perisan Gulf throughout the conflict. During the war, fears of oil depletion sparked U.S. government interest in the resources of Saudi Arabia. Although plans for the U.S. government to buy all or part of CASOC eventually were shelved, in late 1943 steel and other rationed materials were allocated to the company to construct a tank farm, refinery, and marine terminal at Ras Tanura, along with a submarine pipeline to the BAPCO refinery on Bahrain.

CASOC had an unusually close relationship with its host government and its personnel made great efforts to be good guests in the kingdom. CASOC also protected its conception of Saudi interests within its parent corporations, primarily by opposing any move that would restrict production. SOCAL and Texaco were equally committed to a long-term relationship with the kingdom. In January 1944, at the suggestion of State Department adviser Herbert Feis, who had taken part in the negotiations over government participation in CASOC, SOCAL and Texaco changed the name of the operating company to the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). ARAMCO became the chief conduit communicating Saudi Arabia's interests to its parent corporations and to the U.S. government.

ARAMCO's rapid growth was assured once the Red Line Agreement was canceled and the company was able to acquire two new partners, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Vacuum, in December 1948. The infusion of capital fueled the rapid development of Ras Tanura and the construction of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline. That, along with continuing exploration and development efforts, transformed ARAMCO into the largest oil-producing company in the world. In 1978, forty years after oil was discovered in commercial quantities in Saudi Arabia, ARAMCO's cumulative total production exceeded 30 billion barrels.

The concern for and protection of one another's interests by Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO's parent companies were remarkable. A notable instance of efforts made on behalf of Saudi Arabia's government took place in 1973 when the parent

companies mounted an intensive campaign in the United States to convince policymakers and the public that the continued failure of efforts to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict could lead to an oil embargo if another war broke out. The success of the oil embargo imposed by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) during the Arab-Israel War of 1973 was underpinned by ARAMCO's decision to observe its conditions to the letter. The government of Saudi Arabia supported ARAMCO through its oil-pricing policy. In the early 1980s the government kept prices below the OPEC average, thus enabling the ARAMCO partners to earn huge profits through purchase of cheap Saudi oil, some of which was deliberately produced in excess of the OPEC-established quota.

Before the oil revolution of 1970 to 1973, the ARAMCO parents might have hoped to retain some of their equity in ARAMCO's operations, even though "participation" as a concept was developed by the oil minister of Saudi Arabia and a participation agreement was reached between the Persian Gulf producers and their concession holders in 1972. In June 1974 Saudi Arabia took over 60 percent of ARAMCO under that participation agreement. By the end of the year, the government told the unwilling ARAMCO parents that it wanted 100 percent of the company. In 1976 arrangements for the transfer were worked out; in 1980 the government acquired 100 percent participation interest and almost all of the company's assets.

Under Saudi ownership the company commissioned construction of east-west pipelines to carry crude oil and natural gas liquids from the Eastern Province to Yanbu, on the Red Sea, and in 1984 it acquired its first four supertankers. In 1988 the name of the company was changed to the Saudi Arabian Oil Company, or Saudi Aramco. During the 1990s Saudi Aramco took complete control of its domestic oil industry, expanded the capacity of its pipelines, and added to its transport fleet. It began acquiring overseas interests, including shares in the Ssang Yong Refining Company in South Korea and Petron, a Philippine refiner, and established an overseas marketing company, Star Enterprises, with Texaco.

Saudi Aramco has made every effort to train and employ Saudi nationals. Its first Saudi president, Ali al-Naimi, took the company's helm in 1989. By 2000 more than 85 percent of its 54,500 workers were Saudi citizens, and most of its contracts went to Saudi-owned or joint venture businesses.

See also Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Red Line Agreement; Trans-Arabian Pipeline.

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Mary Ann Tétreault

ARABIAN GULF

See Persian (Arabian) Gulf

ARABIAN HORSES

The Arabian horse is a particular breed of horse that likely evolved during the prehistoric period from Central Asian regions, eventually finding its home in Arabia and Egypt, perhaps introduced into Egypt by the Hyksos.

The existence of the Arabian horse in early periods is indicated by inscriptions found on the walls of ancient Egyptian temples. Its type is evident in the concave head, refined features, and arched tail carriage.

The modern Arabian horse emerged from the Arabian Peninsula after the period of Islamic conquest in the seventh century. Arab tribes produced horses whose beauty evolved from traits acquired from life in an unforgiving desert: large eyes, strong

bones, and great heart and lung capacity. These traits proved vital attributes in their use in military ventures and eventually in the founding of the modern English thoroughbred racehorse.

Arabian horse pedigrees were items of extreme importance to their Arab breeders. Oral transmission of a horse's history took place in front of witnesses who swore to its accuracy. The importance of Arabian horses held such high priority that they were used as gifts between tribal leaders, rulers of city-states, and later, heads of state, in diplomatic exchanges. Rulers such as Muhammad Ali of nineteenth-century Egypt sent expeditions into Arabia to acquire elite horses for his armies and his personal stables. Many travelers throughout the centuries noted the esteem in which Arabian horses were held.

Modern appreciation of the Arabian horse manifests itself in a worldwide network of Arabian horse breeders and owners who provide educational forums and exhibitions of their prized horses. They sometimes compete with one another in horse shows, or simply appreciate the unique heritage of their fine animals.

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ARABIAN MISSION

Mission for Protestant proselytization in Arabia; established in 1889.

The mission was founded by James Cantine and Samuel Zwemer, students at the New Brunswick Theological Seminary, under the guidance of Professor John G. Lansing. Initially independent, it came under the Reformed (Dutch) Church's Board of Foreign Missions in 1893 but remained nondenominational.

By 1902, missions had been established at Basra, Bahrain, and Muscat, and in 1910 another was started in Kuwait. Despite the distribution of a considerable amount of Christian literature, the missionaries' objective of winning converts made little headway against the conservative Islam of Arabia. Many people were reached, however, through the work of dedicated teachers and medical doctors and received modern education and health services for the first time. Between 1889 and 1938, eighty missionaries went to Arabia, and, in the years between the world wars, tens of thousands of patients were treated each year in the Arabian Mission's seven hospitals.

The missionaries' work left a legacy of goodwill that has persisted to this day, and the sons of missionaries later played a significant role as American diplomats in the Arab world.

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MALCOLM C. PECK

ARABIAN PENINSULA

Great peninsula of southwest Asia bounded by the Persian/Arabian Gulf to the east and the Red Sea to the west.

The Arabian Peninsula is about 1,300 miles (2,090 km) wide at its maximum breadth and about 1,200 miles (1,900 km) in length along the Red Sea. It is bounded at the north by Jordan and Iraq. It is fertile in some of the coastal regions, but the center is an arid plateau, called in ancient times Arabia Deserta (not to be confused with the Arabian Desert of Egypt, east of the Nile River to the Gulf of Suez). No rivers exist in the peninsula's arid region, but there are many short wadis and a few oases. The Arabian Peninsula is an important region for petroleum production, and the Gulf states of the peninsula that produce petroleum include Bahrain (islands in the Gulf), Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen, and the large central kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Arabian Sea is that part of the Indian Ocean between India on the east and the peninsula on the west.

The people of the peninsula belong to Semitic tribes; they are mainly Arab whose consolidation

was begun by the prophet Muhammad. The consolidation was extended after his death in 632 C.E. but collapsed into tribal warfare during the 700s, after the disintegration of the Umayyad caliphate (661–750). Arabia was then generally dominated by the Mamluks until the early 1500s, then by the Ottoman Empire—but various parts were virtually independent—al-Hasa, Oman, Yemen, and Najd. The Wahhabi movement of Islam began in Arabia, centered in Najd, where resistance against the Ottoman Turks was organized in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Reconquered for the Turks by Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt (1811–1820), the Wahhabi Empire was reestablished from 1843 to 1865, but internal strife continued between tribes and Islamic sects. During World War I, the British officer T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) directed a resistance effort here with Amir Faisal and his followers against the Ottoman Empire. In the early 1920s and 1930s, a gradual consolidation was effected by Ibn Saʿud into the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

See also ARAB; KUWAIT; MAMLUKS; MUHAMMAD; OMAN; PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS; QATAR; SAUDI ARABIA; UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.

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MARTHA IMBER-GOLDSTEIN

ARABIAN PENINSULA: TRIBES

See TRIBES AND TRIBALISM: ARABIAN PENINSULA

ARABIC

Language of Islam, the Qurʾan, and about 185 million people.

Arabic is a Semitic language and the major language of the modern Middle East; it is spoken by an estimated 185 million people. It spread throughout the region during the seventh century C.E., replacing in the Levant Aramaic—as well as non-Semitic languages—as Islam began its conquest and conversion. The Arabic language went as far east as Iran and as far west as all of North Africa, crossing Gibraltar to the Iberian Peninsula in the early eighth century.

Arabic is related to two Semitic languages still used in the Middle East: chiefly Hebrew in its ancient liturgical and modern (nineteenth- and twentieth-century) revival forms, but also Amharic, the official language of Ethiopia. Arabic is classified as South Central Semitic, sharing features not only with Amharic but also with the ancient languages Geez and Akkadian. Some countries that are now home to predominantly Arabic speakers also have speakers of traditional, non-Semitic languages, such as Berber, Nubian, Kurdish, and Coptic.

Arabic has a special relationship to Islam; it is considered the divine language of Allah by Muslims. The language has therefore been constrained by reverence, with the liturgical or classical Arabic (called *Fusha,* the "purest" style) remaining basically unchanged since the revelation of the Qurʾan in the seventh century. Today's spoken Arabic is, however, considered corrupt, with diverse local vernacular versions used throughout the region.

Arabic script is written in phonetic symbols similar to Hebrew letters in that each symbol represents a letter and words are written and read from right to left. A feature of Arabic script is its use as an Islamic art form, since there is a religious pronouncement against rendering figures in art. Such calligraphy decorates books, buildings, banners, and jewelry; most words are so stylized that they cannot be read, but as they are often taken from the Qurʾan, their sources are recognized by most Muslims.

Arabic Dialects

The most noticeable linguistic situation in the Arab world is termed *diglossia,* which literally means "twin vocabularies," referring to the fact that every speaker of Arabic knows a local spoken vernacular and learns the formal *Fusha* in addition to it. Because of the historical spread of Islam and, with it, Arabic, the language has today been spoken for more than 1,300 years over a wide territory that includes parts of Europe, North Africa, and the Levant. Despite the freezing of the literary grammatical style of Arabic, the colloquial versions, like all spoken lan-

guages, changed unfettered by normalized rules or classical prescriptions of correctness. Often speakers from one end of the region cannot understand speakers from another without difficulty, although they can understand the versions spoken in adjacent areas.

At the same time, Arabic is said to be the uniting factor of the modern Arab world—the one institution all Arabs share regardless of the cultures or subcultures of the countries they now inhabit. Where Arabic is the nation's official language, the classical style is used for government, religion, and schooling. No pressure seems to exist for adopting a type of "Esperanto" Arabic, or even agreeing on one dialect as the standard for all sophisticated communication.

With the advent of radio, television, and the broadcasting of news in literary Arabic, comprehension of that form has increased. Knowledge of other dialects has also been spread by the motion picture industry. For example, Egyptian Arabic (Cairene) has been used in the scripts of many movies, and television soap operas produced in Cairo have helped to familiarize many non-Egyptians with that dialect.

Of the large number of Arabic dialects, only a few have been given names and studied in any detail: Egyptian and Iraqi Arabic refer to the colloquial dialects of the educated classes of Cairo and Baghdad, respectively. Media broadcasts from country capitals have also become comprehensible to rural and nomadic speakers with access to radios, televisions, and video- and audiocassette recorders. Uneducated or rural vernacular dialects differ, though, sometimes dramatically, because many have developed in relative isolation. Nevertheless, speakers of similar backgrounds understand one another over short geographic distances.

The differences between dialects are mostly confined to vocabulary and the shifting or loss of some sounds. The Egyptian use of *gim* for *jim* or even *djim* is one of the best examples of a sound shift. Greater shifts have affected the entire sound of a dialect; for example, in North Africa, most short vowels have been lost and the stress of most words moved from the medial to the last syllable. This produces many words that start with consonant clusters. In contrast, the dialects of Cairo and those farther to the east have maintained most of the short vowels and lost mostly those at the end of the word, keeping the stress, as in *Fusha,* on the next-to-last syllable. Consonant clusters are generally limited to word-final positions and are no more than two consonants in length. In addition, word borrowing from other languages has occurred in both *Fusha* and the dialects. In some cases older Arabic words are used to meet the needs of modern life, but in others a borrowed word is used—the word for "telephone" might be written *hatif* ("one who calls out"), and it might be spoken as *telefon.*

Arabic-language academies exist—in Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad—each attempting to minimize the use of borrowings. They publish lists of desired usages, but it is difficult to legislate language change.

Classical Arabic

Fusha, the high style, is characterized by a complicated system of conjugations that change the case of words, which are composed of three consonants (*s-l-m,* for example). Using prefixes, infixes, and suffixes, as well as a change of vocalization according to rules, is basic to all Semitic languages—and formal Arabic demonstrates this practice to a greater extent than any of the others. None of these case markings has survived in the dialects; however, the Qurʾan and children's books are published with them written in place so that they will not be read aloud incorrectly. Nevertheless, even the pronunciation of *Fusha* varies with the colloquial background of the speaker. *Fusha* is used in all writing that does not attempt to represent casual speech. In most novels the characters speak in *Fusha,* but cartoon characters speak in vernacular Arabic, as do actors in most modern plays, and some modern novels are written in dialect. The Arabic version of *Sesame Street* uses *Fusha* because it is the language style that children must learn to read.

Rise and Development of Arabic

The early history of *Fusha* is not clear. Before the appearance of Islam there are few traces of Arabic in the Arabian Peninsula, but it is clear from the language of the Qurʾan that an oral tradition of poetical style was well established before the revelation of that holy book. The language of the Qurʾan is

not just a reflection of the dialect of the Hijaz (western Arabia, the original center of Islam); it is a style reflecting the koine of the poets, used for sophisticated performances of oral poetry at the markets to which the nomads came at least once a year. It is probably a combination of both language usages, which is why it is said to have been unique and miraculous at the time of Muhammad's reception of it.

Arabic script was already in use before the codification of the Qurʾan, but it was unified and provided with diacritical marks to resolve ambiguities in the holy text. As the Islamic conquests began in the seventh and eighth centuries, the language of formal usage was being standardized by grammarians in the towns of Basra and Kufa (Iraq). By the ninth and tenth centuries, this linguistic work was completed, and these rules became the standard by which to measure all future literary Arabic output. To this day, "correct" Arabic is measured by these rules, and they are maintained in the belief that to change them is to offend Allah, who produced them.

See also Arabic Script; Calligraphy; Hebrew; Islam; Qurʾan; Semitic Languages.

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Carolyn Killean

ARABIC SCRIPT

Used to represent the Arabic language, as well as certain non-Arabic and non-Semitic languages.

The Arabic script is an alphabet in which each written symbol represents a single sound. It is Semitic and, thus, a near relative of the Hebrew alphabet but also historically related to the Roman alphabet. The Arabic alphabet is second only to the Roman in use today. It is used by over 185 million first-language speakers of Arabic. As the medium in which the Qurʾan was revealed and much Islamic learning was recorded, Arabic is a second or liturgical language for Muslims worldwide. In addition, the Arabic alphabet has been adapted for use in other non-Arabic and non-Semitic languages, among them Persian, Urdu, and Ottoman Turkish.

The Arabic script is written from right to left. It is cursive, so that each letter in a word is joined to the following letter (exceptions to this rule are the letters *alif, dāl, dhāl, rā, zāy,* and *wāw*). The alphabet is consonantal, consisting of twenty-eight consonants and semivowels. Other signs or diacritical marks indicate short vowels and other sound changes, but these do not typically appear in written texts. In theory, at least, the lack of written vowels causes a certain ambiguity when it comes to deciphering the written word. To take one example, the word *ktb* can be read in several ways: *kataba,* "he

Arabic Alphabet

Name	Letter	Name	Letter
'alif	ء	*t ā̇ ’*	ط
bā’	ب	*ẓā’*	ظ
tā’	ت	*'ayn*	ع
tha’	ث	*ghayn*	غ
jīm	ج	*fā’*	ف
hā’	ح	*qāf*	ق
khā’	خ	*kāf*	ك
dāl	د	*lām*	ل
dhāl	ذ	*mūm*	م
rā’	ر	*nūn*	ن
zāy	ز	*hā’*	ه
sīn	س	*wāw*	و
shīn	ش	*yā’*	ى
ṣād	ص		
dād	ض		

Table by GGS Information Services, The Gale Group

wrote"; *kutiba,* "it was written"; *kattaba,* "he dictated"; *kuttiba,* "he was made to take dictation"; *ktab,* "[the act of] writing"; *kutub,* "books." In practice, however, context plays a considerable role in clarifying meaning. In a sentence such as "he wrote five *ktb* on this topic, *ktb* could only mean "books." Where lack of ambiguity is necessary or desirable, as in the written text of the Qurʾan, in classical Islamic or literary texts, and in writings for children, the diacritical marks are written as a matter of course.

The Arabic alphabet is not simply a vehicle for written communication but is the medium for one of the most highly developed art forms of the Arab and Islamic world, the art of calligraphy. For the Arabic language, calligraphy recognizes two principal types of Arabic script, *kufi* and *naskhi,* where the former is generally more square in shape and the latter more rounded. This binary division, however, hardly reflects the tremendous diversity of scripts, from the tiny Turkish *ghubari,* or "dust," script, to the large *jali* scripts that decorate the walls of certain mosques, from the severely "squared" *kufi,* with right angles rather than curves, to the elaborate "tied" scripts, in which the capitals are linked to form knotted arabesques.

In the Arab world and elsewhere, Arabic script is a powerful symbol of ethnic and religious affiliation. Its significance does not make it inviolable, however. The Arabic alphabet was replaced by the Roman alphabet in Turkey in 1928 and by the Cyrillic alphabet in a number of republics in the former Soviet Central Asia, to name two examples. Proposals to Romanize the Arabic alphabet in the Arab world have been advanced since the late nineteenth century. To date, however, only in Malta, which was conquered by the Sicilians in the eleventh century, is any variety of Arabic regularly written in other than the Arabic script.

ELIZABETH M. BERGMAN

ARAB–ISRAEL CONFLICT

Conflict over the post–World War I mandated territory of Palestine.

In Palestine, the conflict began at the end of the nineteenth century, more than fifty years before the state of Israel was established in 1948. The crux of the conflict has been between Jewish nationalism (called Zionism) and Palestinian Arab nationalism for political control over the area that, in the peace settlement after World War I (1914–1918), became the League of Nations mandated territory of Palestine—held by Britain from 1922 to 1948. When Israel was established, the struggle became known as the Arab–Israel conflict.

Palestine before 1948

Soon after the first late-nineteenth-century Eastern European Jewish settlers arrived in Palestine (whose population in 1882 consisted of about 450,000 Arabs and 25,000 Jews), they clashed with local Arabs over Jewish-owned land and grazing rights. By the 1920s, Palestinian opposition to Jewish settlement and to the Zionist movement became widespread because Palestinians feared that continued Jewish immigration would lead to their domination or expulsion. During 1920, 1921, 1929, 1933, and from 1936 to 1939, Palestinian nationalist demonstrations led to violence. Palestinians demanded that the British authorities halt further Jewish immigration into Palestine; that sale of Arab and government lands to Jews cease; and that immediate steps be initiated toward granting Arab Palestinian independence.

The 1929 riots in Jerusalem arose over prayer rights at the Temple Mount, site of the sacred Western (or Wailing) Wall, which is believed by pious Jews to be the last remnant of the Second Temple (destroyed by the Romans in 70 C.E.). Because the wall adjoins the third most sacred site in Islam, the Haram al-Sharif (Sacred Enclosure, containing two important mosques), it has been a source of continuing conflict. Many Muslims believed then and continue to believe that Jews seek to destroy the mosques and replace them with a new temple.

By 1936 Palestine's Jewish community, the Yishuv, increased to 384,000, mainly from European immigration; the number of Jewish cities and towns, industries, and agricultural settlements extended widely through the country, raising fears among Palestinians that they would soon become a minority in their native land. The 1936 to 1939 uprising, called the Palestine Arab Revolt, galvanized most of the Palestinian community to oppose the British authorities, and the Yishuv Zionist attempts to assuage Palestinian fears were unsuccessful. Even proposals by a small group of Jewish intellectuals in

favor of establishing a binational Arab–Jewish state based on political parity between the two communities received only a faint response from Arab leaders. Both Arabs and Jews rejected proposals by the 1937 British Royal Commission under Lord Peel (the so-called Peel Commission) to partition Palestine between its two communities, although many Zionist leaders accepted the partition principle, if not specific details of the Peel plan. Massive British force ended the Arab revolt in 1939, just as Britain became involved in World War II (1939–1945). Focus on Europe then kept the Arab–Jewish conflict quiescent until 1946.

Partition

With international postwar pressure on Britain to remove all restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchases in Palestine—because of the Holocaust in Europe—and calls for for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth, tensions between the Yishuv, the mandatory government, and the Arab community brought Palestine to the brink of civil war. Britain appealed to the United Nations, which recommended that Palestine be partitioned into Arab and Jewish states with an international enclave containing the Jerusalem area. The mainstream of the Zionist movement accepted the proposal (but a nationalist minority continued to insist on a Jewish state on both banks of the Jordan River). Palestinians, supported by leaders throughout the Arab world, rejected the principle of partition. Clashes that occurred between Palestinians demonstrating against violation of their right to self-determination and Jews celebrating their coming independence soon turned into a full-scale civil war. Since Britain's mandate was to end on 14 May 1948, a disorderly withdrawal of British troops began from disputed areas. By May 1948, as the Yishuv organized its military forces, many Palestinians retreated, fled, or were expelled from territory held by the new state of Israel despite military assistance from the Arab world, which continued until 1949. After Israel was established on 15 May 1948, the term *Palestinians* referred to members of the Arab community while Palestinian Jews were called *Israelis.*

Arab–Israel Wars

The first Arab–Israel war lasted until Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria signed armistice agreements with Israel in 1949. As a result of that war, Israel was able to extend its frontiers approximately 2,000 square miles from the UN partition borders to those of the armistice agreements. More than 700,000 Palestinians became refugees, unable to return to their homes and lands, which were confiscated by Israel; most lived in refugee camps in the surrounding Arab countries, but some moved to North Africa, Europe, and North America. Territory intended as part of the Arab state in the UN partition plan became controlled by Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. Jerusalem was divided between Jordan and Israel.

Since the end of the first Arab–Israel war there has been continuing dispute between Israel and the surrounding countries over borders, refugee rights to return or to compensation, the status of Jerusalem, the equitable division of Jordan River waters, and Arab recognition of Israel. The United Nations dealt with these issues through several organizations. An armistice regime was established with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to oversee the 1949 agreements between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. In 1948 the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was established to achieve a peaceful settlement by dealing with the refugee problem, Middle East economic development, and equitable distribution of water resources. But the Arab states refused to enter direct negotiations unless Israel withdrew to the UN partition borders and permitted the refugees to return. U.S. and UN proposals for refugee resettlement in the context of the broad economic development of the Middle East were also rejected without the resolution of the other key issues.

Opinion in the Arab world was so strongly anti-Israel that defeats sparked antigovernment uprisings in several countries and led to the assassination of several Arab political leaders. Egypt's setbacks in the 1948 war, for example, contributed to its 1952 revolution. In Israel, tensions heightened by 1955, when Egypt's new ruler Gamal Abdel Nasser (who had led the coup that overthrew Egypt's monarchy) was perceived as a growing threat, and relations with Egypt deteriorated with an increase of infiltrations and attacks into Israel by Palestinians from Egyptian-held Gaza. The situation sparked an arms race; Egypt acquired large amounts of military equipment from the USSR and the Eastern bloc, while Israel obtained advanced aircraft from France.

By 1956, uneasy relations between Egypt and Israel became part of the larger conflict between Egypt and the West over control of the Suez Canal. Israel formed a secret alliance with Britain and France to overthrow Nasser after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956. As Israel attacked Egypt in October, Britain and France occupied the northern Canal Zone. This tripartite scheme was stymied by U.S. and Soviet intervention at the United Nations and by Moscow's threat of military action to aid Egypt. In November 1956 the UN General Assembly established the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise the withdrawal of the invaders' troops and to act as a peacekeeping body between Egypt and Israel. Egypt–Israel frontiers were relatively quiet until the 1967 Arab–Israel War. But incidents also erupted along other Israeli borders. Continued Palestinian refugee infiltration and guerrilla attacks from Jordan plus clashes with Syria over Israeli projects to divert the Jordan River created obstacles to a peace settlement. In 1960, the Arab League (officially, the League of Arab States) called Israel's Jordan River diversion scheme "an act of aggression" and in 1963 adopted its own diversion blueprint, which would have greatly diminished Israel's access to water.

1967 Arab–Israel War

The tensions caused by the Jordan River dispute, the escalation of border incidents, the Middle East arms race, and increasingly bitter rhetoric led to several border clashes in 1967. When President Nasser threatened to blockade Israel's passage through the Strait of Tiran (at the southeast Sinai Peninsula), ordered UNEF to leave the Sinai, and massed his troops on the border, Israel's leaders responded with a preemptive strike in June 1967 against Egypt. After firing on Israel-controlled Jerusalem, Jordan also became involved, and Israel mounted an attack against Syrian positions on the Golan Heights several days later. After six days Israel emerged from the 1967 Arab–Israel War as the dominant power, with the Arab states thrown into disarray. Israel had conquered the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan. The war intensified competition in the Middle East between the United States, which supported Israel, and the Soviet Union, which backed Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. It led to further escalation of the arms race, Egypt's closing of the Suez Canal, and an additional 300,000 West Bank and Golan Heights refugees, who fled to Jordan and to Syria.

Although defeated, the Arab states refused direct negotiations with Israel, demanding that Israel first withdraw to the 1967 armistice lines and permit the return of refugees. Efforts to end the conflict through the United Nations were blocked by disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviets supported resolutions condemning Israel and called for return of the territories. The United States supported Israel's insistence that territory be returned only through direct negotiations and the signing of a peace agreement.

The stalemate was somewhat eased by UN Security Council compromise Resolution 242 in November 1967, which called for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories" occupied in the war, termination of belligerency, "just settlement of the refugee problem," and "the need to work for a just and lasting peace." The parties disagreed over interpretation of Resolution 242. The Arab side insisted it meant Israel's withdrawal from all territory seized in 1967; Israel and its supporters insisted that the resolution did not mean total withdrawal. Most Arab states no longer demanded that Israel withdraw to the 1947 partition lines, only to the 1949 armistice frontiers; they also recognized that a just solution of the refugee problem would have to include alternatives to total repatriation of the Palestinians and their descendants to their original homes, since twenty years had passed.

After the 1967 war, Palestinian nationalists brought several guerrilla factions into the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an umbrella group established in 1964. Israeli and Palestinian forces clashed along the borders, and Palestinian guerrillas attacked Israeli civilians at home and abroad. After King Hussein ibn Talal of Jordan put down a Palestinian-initiated civil war and drove guerrilla factions from the protection of his country in September 1970, several factions set up bases in south Lebanon to attack northern Israel.

1973 Arab–Israel War

With the failure of diplomacy, Egypt and Syria attempted to regain territories lost in 1967 through a two-front surprise attack on Israel in October 1973.

Initially, Egypt recaptured large sectors of the Sinai, and Syria retook the Golan but within a few days, Israel recovered the territory. Nevertheless, the 1973 Arab–Israel War shattered the myth of Israeli invincibility. Following a formalistic two-day conference in Geneva in December 1973, the United States initiated a step-by-step process that led to disengagement agreements in which Egypt regained parts of Sinai and Syria reoccupied al-Kuneitra in the Golan region.

In November 1977 the visit to Jerusalem by Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat made direct negotiations possible—this marked a new phase in Arab–Israel relations. As the talks faltered, U.S. president Jimmy Carter convened a conference in September 1978 of Egypt's and Israel's leaders at the presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland, where they eventually agreed on Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and autonomy for the Palestinians. After some communication difficulties, but the continued mediation of President Carter, a peace treaty was signed by Egypt and Israel in Washington, D.C., on 26 March 1979 that provided for mutual recognition and normalization of relations.

Relations remained strained by differing interpretations of the Camp David Accords and the treaty terms and by continued hostilities between other Arab states and Israel. Attempts to involve local Palestinian representatives in negotiations for autonomy led nowhere. In June 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon to uproot an entrenched PLO, force Lebanon into a peace agreement, and remove Syria's troops from the country. Only one of these objectives was realized: PLO headquarters and its infrastructure were uprooted (and relocated to other Arab states). After several months of Israeli occupation, Lebanese militia attacks forced Israel to withdraw to a narrow southern border strip—an Israeli "security zone"—that Israel continued to occupy until 2001.

Intifada and Negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s

Twenty years of Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank caused increasing unrest among the Palestinian inhabitants, which led to a major uprising, or intifada, in December 1987. Unlike previous occasions, demonstrations did not die down but escalated into a full-scale civil resistance. Palestinian demands to end the occupation galvanized the PLO to revise its political program, and in November 1988, it proclaimed an independent Palestinian state and for the first time accepted UN Resolution 242, recognized Israel, and renounced terrorism.

International attention on the intifada and the Palestine problem and the Persian Gulf crisis that led to war in 1990 and 1991 also led to the Middle East Peace Conference convened in Madrid, Spain, in October 1991 by the United States and the Soviet Union. The conference initiated a series of bilateral, direct negotiations between Israel and the Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian-Palestinian delegations, with multilateral discussions on Middle Eastern refugees, security, environment, economic development, and water. After secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway, in September 1993 Israel and the PLO signed an agreement providing for mutual recognition as well as Palestinian self-government to begin in Gaza and the town of Jericho in the West Bank during a five-year transition period.

Progress in negotiations between Israel and the PLO led to improvement of relations between Israel and Jordan, culminating in a peace treaty between them in October 1994. However, direct negotiations with Syria collapsed over differences on the border along the Lake Tiberias shore. The Oslo negotiation with the PLO was followed by agreements providing for redeployment of Israeli forces from parts of the West Bank and Gaza and establishing Palestinian self-government, but each side charged the other with violating the agreements, and violent clashes arose. An attempt by the United States to resolve the conflict at a tripartite summit at Camp David in July 2000 failed, leading to further violence. A clash at the Temple Mount in Jerusalem in September 2000 was followed by Palestinian suicide bombings in Israel and retaliations that caused thousands of Israeli and Palestinian casualties and reoccupation of Palestinian territory. Dispute continued over Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and Jewish settlement there, the refugee "right of return," the future of Jerusalem, borders, and security.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Camp David Accords (1978); Carter, Jimmy; Gaza Strip; Golan

HEIGHTS; GULF CRISIS (1990–1991); HOLOCAUST; HUSSEIN IBN TALAL; INTIFADA (1987–1991); ISLAM; ISRAEL: OVERVIEW; JERUSALEM; JORDAN RIVER; LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; PALESTINE; PALESTINE ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939); PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); PEEL COMMISSION REPORT (1937); SADAT, ANWAR AL-; SINAI PENINSULA; SUEZ CANAL; TIRAN, STRAIT OF; UNITED NATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST; UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE (UNCCP); UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE; UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (UNTSO); WEST BANK; YISHUV; ZIONISM.

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DON PERETZ

ARAB–ISRAELI GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS (1949)

United Nations–sponsored armistice agreements concluded in 1949 between the state of Israel and four Arab states.

Between February and July 1949, General Armistice Agreements (GAAs) were signed between the state of Israel and four Arab states: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Iraq, which had participated in the war with an expeditionary force, did not conclude an agreement since it did not have a common border with Israel; its forces just left the arena. All negotiations were mediated on behalf of the United Nations (UN) by Ralph Bunche, whose achievement earned him the 1949 Nobel Peace Prize. These agreements put an end to the Arab–Israel War of 1948. The failure of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine to achieve more comprehensive peace treaties created a de facto situation that made the General Armistice Agreements into quasi-permanent arrangements that regulated the relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors until the 1967 war.

The first GAA was signed by Col. Mohammad Ibrahim Sayf el-Din for Egypt and Walter Eytan for Israel on the Greek island of Rhodes on 24 February 1949. It provided, among other stipulations, for large demilitarized zones in the Nitzana-Abu-Agayla sector. On the other hand, it did not specify the rights of Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran. Israel considered the blocking of these waterways incompatible with international law and the armistice provisions and brought the Suez blockade to the attention of the UN Security Council on several occasions. But neither the support received in the form of UN Security Council resolution 95 (1951) nor the military achievements of the Sinai campaign of 1956 were successful in changing Egypt's view, and the blockade in the Canal persisted for thirty years.

The controversy over the demilitarized zones caused much irritation and warfare, especially after Israel decided to establish, on its side of the Nitzana zone, settlements that the Egyptians considered military strongholds. In the aftermath of the 1956 Suez–Sinai War, Israel considered annulling its GAA with Egypt, but this failed to receive international recognition. The positioning of the UN Emergency Force along the demarcation lines after 1957 introduced a new factor into Egypt–Israel relations, in effect superseding application of the Egypt–Israel GAA. Israel's conquest of the Sinai Peninsula in June 1967 rendered the GAA inoper-

With UN mediator Ralph Bunche (second from left at far side of table) and his associates in attendance, Israeli representative Walter Eytan (at right) signed the armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt on 2 February 1949 on the Greek island of Rhodes. Three similar agreements between Israel and Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria were signed by July, ending their 1948–1949 war. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ative, while the return of Sinai to Egypt in 1982 in accordance with the 1979 Egypt–Israel peace treaty resulted in its final, legal termination.

The Israel–Lebanon GAA was signed by Lt. Col. Mordekhai Makleff for Israel and Lt. Col. Tawfiq Salim for Lebanon in Ra's Naqura on 23 March 1949. Israel's forces, having retreated from parts of southern Lebanon that they had occupied in the summer of 1948, agreed to fix the armistice demarcation lines along the old international borders and thus introduced greater stability to Israeli–Lebanese relations for more than twenty years. However, after "Black September" of 1970, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the different Palestinian guerrilla groups transferred the locus of their operations from Jordan to the refugee camps in Lebanon, causing the Israel–Lebanon frontier to become a recurrent battlefield. Israel attacked and briefly occupied southern Lebanon in March 1978, and again in June 1982. Israel failed, in the wake of the 1982 invasion, to push Lebanon into a peace agreement, and the border region remained one of aggravated instability for almost two decades; the presence of a special UN force (UNIFIL) did little to change the situation. The final retreat of Israel's forces from southern Lebanon in 2000 marked the return of relative tranquillity to this zone. In the absence of an alternative binding arrangement, the 1949 Israel–Lebanon GAA remains the only legal instrument regulating relations between the two countries.

The Israel–Jordanian GAA was formally signed in Rhodes on 3 April 1949 by Col. Ahmad Sidqi Bey al-Jundi for the Hashimite kingdom of Jordan and by Reuven Shiloah and Col. Moshe Dayan on behalf of Israel. The real breakthrough and terms of agreement were actually concluded in secret talks between king Abdullah and Israeli representatives in the king's palace in Shuna. The Israel–Jordan GAA left a number of issues, such as the access of Jews to the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem's Old City and the access of Jordanians to the south through the Bethlehem road, to be resolved in later negotiations. But the failure of the secret peace negotiations between Israeli officials and Abdullah during 1949 and 1951, the assassination of the king in July 1951, and the ensuing rapid deterioration of Israeli–Jordanian relations served to block the resolution of those outstanding issues. Nevertheless, with many ups and downs, this agreement was maintained for almost twenty years as a more or less effective framework regulating relations between the two states.

The most difficult issue, one that triggered occasional violence, was the widespread infiltration of Palestinians (mostly 1948 refugees) across the armistice demarcation lines. These actions provoked Israeli retaliatory assaults and brought into question the viability of Article II of the agreement. Nevertheless, both sides were loath to destroy the foundations of their GAA and kept using its mechanisms for the exchange of mutual complaints and also for keeping the tenuous status quo alive. No-man's-lands designated by the GAA were divided by consent; the biweekly convoy to the Israeli enclave at the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus was permitted to supply the Israeli police force stationed there and replace the policemen regularly; the mutual vulnerability of citizens in Jerusalem induced both sides to keep the city's division lines quiet most of the time. The conquest of Jerusalem and the West Bank of Jordan in June 1967 by Israeli forces brought an end to the applicability of the Jordan–Israel GAA, since neither Jordanian civil government nor the Jordanian army ever returned to these areas. The peace treaty concluded between Jordan

and Israel in 1994 brought about the termination of the Jordan–Israel GAA.

The last agreement, the Syria–Israel GAA, was concluded after prolonged bickering and many delays. It was signed on 20 July 1949 near the Banat Yaʿqub bridge on the Jordan River by Lt. Col. Makleff on behalf of Israel and Col. Fawzi Silo for the Syrians. Two main issues continued to obstruct the full implementation of this GAA: the status of the demilitarized zones and the use of the waters of the river Jordan and its tributaries. These issues eventually contributed to the main causes of the June 1967 Arab–Israel War and the conquest of the Golan Heights by Israeli forces. The Syria–Israel GAA provided for a number of stretches of land, previously held by the Syrian army, to be declared demilitarized zones. Sharp disagreement, often leading to violent measures, erupted from the outset regarding the status and disposition of these areas. Israel implemented several civilian projects in these zones without paying attention to the rights of the Arab landowners, while Syrian gunners shot at the operators of such projects, which they considered to be in violation of the GAA. Some of these clashes, especially in the 1960s, escalated into major flare-ups, including the engagement of artillery, armor, and air force.

Negotiations on the sharing of the Jordan's waters in the early 1950s failed to achieve results, leaving Israel to press ahead to execute its own plan to divert a big part of these waters to the south of the country. The attempt of Syria to divert the headwaters of the Banyas River in 1965 provoked Israeli threats and attacks that stopped the Syrian diversion efforts. These tensions climaxed in May 1967 when Egypt responded to a call from Syria for help and moved its army into positions along the Israel border in the Sinai, removing the UN Emergency Force from the frontier. Israel's response was a successful offensive that resulted in the total conquest of the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of Jordan, and the Syrian Golan Heights. This development rendered the 1949 Israel–Syria GAA irrelevant. The legal vacuum was eventually filled following the October 1973 war. The May 1974 "Separation of Forces" agreement mediated by U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger resulted in a new demarcation line, which returned the town of Qunaytra to Syrian control, and has since then been supervised by UNDOF, a special UN disengagement observer force.

The text of all four GAAs includes some similarly worded clauses. Article I, clause 2, for example, reads: "No aggressive action by the armed forces—land, sea, or air—of either party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other." Article II, clause 2, declares that: "No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military force of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party." Other clauses specify the settlement of problems specific to the terrain and military situation of each of the different frontiers.

All four agreements also provided for a mechanism of supervision and settling of disputes. The UN operated a Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), staffed by a corps of officers from different countries, headquartered in a piece of no-man's-land in Jerusalem, and empowered to investigate complaints of violations of the GAAs. Such complaints were also adjudicated by Mixed Armistice Commissions, each chaired by a senior UN officer. Complaints of major violations were referred by the parties to the UN Security Council, which based its discussions on reports prepared by the UNTSO chief of staff.

From the outset, the Arab–Israeli GAAs were plagued by discord and disagreement. One basic disagreement concerned the level of responsibility the contracting states had to shoulder for criminal and often violent activities of irregulars who crossed the demarcation lines. The scope of such infiltration during the early 1950s worried the Israelis, and the inability of the UNTSO and several Arab states to effectively curb them triggered severe Israel Defense Force (IDF) reprisal actions, which were themselves equally in breach of the GAAs. Perhaps the most serious disagreement was over the very nature of the agreements that had been signed. While Israel took them as giving permanence to the demarcation lines as finite borders, awaiting only the final stage of signing full peace treaties, the Arab states interpreted them only as long-term cease-fire arrangements that did not end their status as belligerents

and did not give any permanence to their different provisions.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Suez Crisis (1956–1957); United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

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Mordechai Bar-On

ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1948)

The first conflict between the Arabs and the new state of Israel.

The Arab–Israel war of 1948 culminated half a century of conflict between the Arab and Jewish populations in Palestine. It began as a civil conflict between Palestinian Jews and Arabs following announcement of the United Nations (UN) decision in November 1947 to partition the country into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an international enclave encompassing the greater Jerusalem area. While the majority of the Jewish population approved the plan, Arabs in Palestine and surrounding countries vehemently objected, considering it a violation of Palestinian Arabs' self-determination. In Palestine, Arab demonstrations against the UN decision and Jewish celebrations welcoming it met head-on and quickly erupted into violent clashes between the two communities. Within a few days armed Arab and Jewish groups were battling each other throughout the country.

Palestinian Arab guerrillas received weapons and volunteers from the neighboring states and were assisted by unofficial paramilitary units from Syria and Egypt. The Arabs, however, were not as effectively organized as the Jewish forces. The latter consisted of three principal groups: the Haganah, the defense organization of the mainstream Jewish community; and two dissident factions, the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi (IZL or Etzel; National Military Organization) and Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Lehi; Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), also known as the Stern Gang. The latter two were associated with Revisionist Zionism.

Following the partition resolution, casualties mounted on both sides. Arabs attacked Jewish settlements and bombed such urban targets as the *Palestine Post* and the headquarters of the Jewish Agency. Retaliatory and preemptive Jewish attacks against the Arab population—such as the Etzel raid on Dayr Yasin, which has been viewed by some as an instance of ethnic cleansing—set off a mass flight and military expulsion of the Arab population from areas seized by the Jewish forces.

By the end of the mandate in May 1948, when the British army left Palestine, Jewish forces had seized most of the territory allocated to the Jewish state in the UN partition plan as well as land beyond the partition borders.

With departure of the British and Israel's declaration of independence on 15 May 1948, the struggle became an international conflict between the Jewish state and the regular armies of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Saudi Arabia sent a token unit, and Yemen was nominally involved.

Arab states other than Transjordan intervened to preempt the plans of Amir Abdullah, developed in accord with Israel, to take over the largely Arab-inhabited parts of Palestine. In an attempt to gain Transjordan's cooperation in the war against Israel, the other Arab combatants agreed to appoint Abdullah commander in chief of the invading forces. The Arab military plans called for Egypt's units to move north along the Mediterranean coast toward Tel Aviv; for Syria's, Lebanon's, and Iraq's troops

Palestinian refugees flee from the Galilee region during the Arab–Israel War of 1948. The war, which established Israel as an independent state, resulted in 726,000 Palestinian refugees. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

to come through Galilee and move to Haifa; and for Transjordan's Arab Legion to approach the coast after occupying central Palestine. The Arab Legion, however, did not cross the UN partition line, and the other Arab forces were blocked from their objectives. Despite appointment of a commander in chief, the Arab armies failed to coordinate their plans, each operating under its own generals without integrating its actions with those of its allies. Except for the Arab Legion, the Arab armies were poorly trained and badly equipped, and morale was low. By June 1948 their offensive lost its momentum. Both sides accepted a twenty-eight-day truce ordered by the UN Security Council that went into effect on 10 June.

With resumption of fighting on 8 July, Israel's forces, now consolidated and equipped with heavy weapons, took the offensive. Arab areas including Nazareth in Galilee were seized, although attempts to capture the Old City of Jerusalem failed. Efforts to break through Egypt's lines to reach Jewish settlements in the Negev also were unsuccessful.

A second truce, initiated on 19 July, was broken several times when Israel's forces attempted to break Egypt's blockade of the Negev; Israel captured Beersheba in October and isolated most of Egypt's units south of Jerus alem. By the end of the year, Egypt's forces were either driven from Palestine or besieged in the south. In the north, another offensive

extended the area under Israel's control to Lebanon's territory adjoining upper Galilee.

On 5 January 1949, Egypt agreed to accept a Security Council call for a new truce and negotiations for an armistice. Negotiations opened on 13 January 1949, on the island of Rhodes, under the chairmanship of Ralph Bunche. The General Armistice Agreement signed on 24 February 1949 served as a model for similar armistices with Lebanon on 23 March, with Jordan on 3 April, and with Syria on 20 July. Iraq refused to participate in armistice negotiations.

The armistice agreements were considered preliminary to permanent peace settlements. They established frontiers between Israel and its neighbors that remained in effect until the Arab–Israel War of 1967. A UN Truce Supervisory Organization with four Mixed Armistice Commissions, comprised of Israel and of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, was established to deal with disputes between the signatories.

Israel's casualties in the war, which it called the War of Independence, were heavy—over 4,500 soldiers and 2,000 civilians killed (about 1 percent of the Jewish population). The Arab regular armies lost 2,000; there were no reliable figures for Palestinian irregulars, although some estimates ran as high as 13,000.

Israel extended territory under its control from the 5,400 square miles (13,986 sq km) allocated to it in the partition plan to 8,000 square miles (20,720 sq km), including land allocated to the Arab state and to what became Jewish West Jerusalem; Jordan occupied the old city and Arab East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Israel emerged from the war as a regional power equal in strength to any of its Arab neighbors.

A major consequence of the war was the Palestine Arab refugee problem. Although there was no accurate census of the refugees, their number was estimated by the United Nations to be over 700,000—more than half the Arab population of mandatory Palestine. Failure to prevent establishment of the Jewish state was considered a major disaster in the Arab world; loss of the war, the flight of the Palestinians, and the establishment of Israel were called by many the *nakba,* a disaster that was to intrude into inter-Arab politics, affect Arab relations with the West, and color Arab self-perceptions for decades to come.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Bunche, Ralph J.; Haganah; Irgun Zva'i Le'umi (IZL); Lohamei Herut Yisrael; Mixed Armistice Commissions.

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Don Peretz

ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1956)

A war that lasted from 29 October to 6 November 1956, waged by Britain, France, and Israel against Egypt.

Although Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser's accession to power in 1952 was initially viewed as a positive development by Israel and the West, his leadership of Arab nationalism and his growing military and political strength were viewed with apprehension by Great Britain, France, and Israel.

Preparations for War

Nasser's nonalignment policies, including recognition of the People's Republic of China and opposition to a Western-sponsored alliance in the Middle East, were seen as threats to British and French hegemony in the region. The French were alarmed at Egyptian support of Algerian (FLN) nationalists; the Israelis, by Egypt's support of Palestinian guerrillas located in the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian blockade of Elat and the Gulf of Aqaba. Egypt's formation of a joint command with Syria and Jordan, and increased Fida'iyyun incursions from Gaza into

Israel, were seen as signs that Egypt was preparing for war. In February 1955 Israel retaliated with a full-scale attack on military bases in Gaza; this prompted Egypt to negotiate an arms deal with the Soviet Union for the purchase of weapons from Czechoslovakia.

When the United States, angered by Egypt's growing ties with the Soviet Union, cancelled negotiations for a development loan to construct a new Nile dam at Aswan, Great Britain and the World Bank also cancelled loan negotiations. Nasser retaliated on 26 July 1956 by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, in which the British government held the majority of shares. The headquarters and many shareholders of the company were in France. Both Great Britain and France regarded Egypt's action as reason for war.

Throughout the summer of 1956 Israel, England, and France planned for war along parallel but independent lines. Israel negotiated with France for arms and developed operations to open the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping (Operation Kadesh). The British moved ships to Cyprus and to Malta with the aim of seizing the canal and bringing down Nasser (Operation Musketeer). The French then made overtures to the Israelis for joint planning and participation in the operation against Egypt; exploratory meetings began in early September. In October (22–24), at the invitation of the French, David Ben-Gurion, Shimon Peres, and Moshe Dayan met with French prime minister Guy Mollet and British foreign minister Selwyn Lloyd at Sèvres to plan the joint campaign, in which Israeli forces were to cross the Sinai and link up with the British and the French in the area of Port Saʿid. It was understood that the Anglo-French intervention would be seen as an "impartial"; separation of combatants and that Israel would be able to withdraw its troops if England and France did not carry out their military missions. The allies relied on the assumption that the Soviet Union (involved in Poland and in Hungary) and the United States (in the midst of presidential elections) would be too busy to interfere. Tensions on the Israeli-Jordanian border gave the impression that Israel was preparing to invade Jordan rather than Egypt.

As British and French troops were massing on Cyprus and Malta in August, Nasser anticipated an attack on Egypt and redeployed much of the Egyptian Sinai garrison to the delta region, leaving only 30,000 men in the northeast triangle of al-Arish, Rafah, and Abu Aqayla under the eastern command of Major General Ali Amr, headquartered at Ismaʿiliyya. The troops consisted of one Egyptian division and one poorly trained and lightly armed Palestinian division commanded by Egyptian officers and supported by field artillery and antitank guns, three squadrons of Sherman tanks, and a motorized border patrol. In addition, Amr commanded two infantry divisions and an armored division just west of the canal that could be used in the Sinai. The garrison at Sharm al-Shaykh was directly under the control of headquarters at Cairo. Of Egypt's 255 aircraft, only 130 were operational. Despite intelligence reports of Israeli mobilization, Amr did not return to Egypt from an official visit to Syria and Jordan until the morning of 29 October.

By the evening of 28 October, Israel had mobilized 45,000 men assigned to the southern command and six brigades held in reserve in the north. Israel's objective was to threaten the canal by securing the Mitla Pass (30 miles from the canal) and to achieve the flexibility either to advance—if the British and French carried out their part of the agreement—or to withdraw if necessary.

Outbreak of War

On 29 October Israeli parachutists landed east of the Mitla Pass and encountered heavy Egyptian resistance. This action was followed by a high-speed mobile column dash that met up with the Israelis at the pass. The next day, the British and the French issued an ultimatum calling for the withdrawal of forces from both sides of the canal in order to allow their troops to establish themselves along its length. Israel accepted, but Nasser rejected the ultimatum and began to issue orders for an Egyptian withdrawal from the Sinai to the delta. The British and the French vetoed UN-sponsored cease-fire resolutions. They began air attacks on Egypt on 31 October. Nasser subsequently sank all ships in the Suez Canal (4 November) in order to block passage. By 2 November Israel had taken Abu Aqayla and opened up a supply route to the Mitla Pass, cutting the Egyptians off from Gaza. On 5 November Sharm al-Shaykh was taken and Israeli troops reached the canal. Speed and mechanized transport, combined

with tank warfare and air superiority, enabled the Israelis to outmaneuver the Egyptian forces sent to defend Sinai, who had no air cover for their troops due to the destruction of more than two hundred aircraft on the ground.

The British, anticipating heavy opposition by the Egyptian forces, set sail from Malta only on 1 November, delaying their landing in Egypt. The delay permitted the buildup of negative reactions to the mission both at home and in the international community. The allies tried to speed up the process, landing paratroops at Port Saʿid on 5 November and taking the city on the next day just as hostilities ceased.

By then, both the United States and the Soviet Union threatened to intervene, and the newly reelected U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered a global alert of U.S. armed forces. The British, in the midst of the biggest crisis in Anglo-American relations since World War II, fearful of Soviet intervention, and worried about the falling pound sterling (later shored up by a line of credit from the U.S. Export-Import Bank), accepted a cease-fire. France and Israel followed suit.

Aftermath

During the fighting Israel lost about 190 soldiers: an additional 20 were captured and 800 wounded. Egyptian casualties were several thousand killed and wounded and about 4,000 taken prisoner by Israel. Egypt also lost massive amounts of military equipment.

On 4 December United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) troops moved into Sinai, and on 22 December Britain and France withdrew from Egypt. Israeli troops withdrew from the Gaza Strip and the Strait of Tiran on 7 and 8 March under heavy pressure from the United States and following the stationing of UN troops at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba and assurances from the United States that it would uphold the right of innocent passage of Israeli and all other shipping through international waters. The last Israeli forces left Sinai in January 1957; they evacuated Gaza and Sharm al-Shaykh in March 1957. Although Nasser did not acknowledge Israel's right of passage through Egyptian waters, he allowed UNEF forces to remain in Sinai until 1967.

The war marked the end of an active British role in the region and its replacement by U.S. influence. It resulted in the development of modern armed forces in Israel, the beginnings of large-scale U.S. support for Israel, and the emergence of Nasser as victor and hero not only of the Arab region but the Third World as well.

See also Arab–Israel Conflict; Nasser, Gamal Abdel.

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Reeva S. Simon
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ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967)

Rapid and decisive victory by Israel over the combined forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq.

The third major military conflict between Israel and the Arab states, the Arab–Israel War of 1967 between Israel and Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, continued the century-old confrontation by Zionists and Arab nationalists over Palestine. The war erupted because of the failure to settle issues left unresolved by the wars of 1948 and 1956 and by the establishment of Israel in 1948. These issues included the problem of Palestinian refugees, disputes over water rights and the borders between Israel and the



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Triumphant Israeli soldiers in Old Jerusalem, which the country won from Jordan during the 1967 war. © Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Arab states, the Middle East arms race, the rising tide of Arab nationalism, and the question of Israel's right to exist.

Buildup to War

Efforts to peacefully resolve the Arab–Israel conflict had been unsuccessful since 1948; despite the defeat of the Arabs in 1948 and 1956, the state of war continued and intensified many of the problems it had caused. As the number of Palestine refugees increased, their infiltration from the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip and from the West Bank of Jordan created incidents that led to repeated border skirmishes. In retaliation for Fidaʾiyyun raids, Israel attacked Egyptian and Jordanian outposts. Disputes over the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between Israel and Syria erupted in battles that escalated into air warfare in which six Syrian MIGs were shot down in early 1967. Israel's insistence on proceeding with land development in the DMZ and its unilateral diversion of the Jordan River headwaters following the failure by the Arabs to ratify the Eric Johnson Jordan Valley Development project led to the decision by the Arab League to begin its own water-diversion scheme. The conflict over the Jordan River was a major cause of rising tensions and repeated border incidents.

The confrontation between Israel and the Arab states became a factor in the Cold War between the Soviet bloc and the West, with the Soviet Union providing arms to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq and with France and the United States helping to supply Israel. Israel continued to resist demands by the Arabs that it permit the return of the Palestinian refugees and that it withdraw to the borders established in 1947 by the UN partition plan.

Hostility to Israel, intensified by the Palestinian refugee problem, increased nationalist fervor throughout the Arab world, and this sentiment was rallied by Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser. After the air battles between Syria and Israel in April, the Arab states (under Egyptian leadership) drew up a military pact to confront Israel. Egypt and Syria signed the agreement on 4 May, Jordan on 30 May, and Iraq on 4 June. The pact was backed by the Soviet Union, which supported Egypt's military buildup along the borders with Israel in Sinai, Gaza, and the Gulf of Aqaba. Border tensions between Israel and Egypt and Syria were intensified by false reports disseminated by the Soviet Union in Damascus and Cairo about an Israeli army buildup along the Syrian border and Israel's intent to attack Syria.

Responding to the challenge by Arab nationalists that he take a more confrontational position, in May Nasser ordered the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force from its post along the Egyptian-Israeli border. Despite Egypt's heavy military involvement at the time in the Yemen civil war, Nasser deployed thousands of troops along the Israeli border and ordered a blockade of Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba.

The War and Its Aftermath

These actions created a sense of crisis in Israel, which led to the formation of a national unity government that for the first time included Menachem Begin and his right-wing Herut Party. Efforts to mediate the crisis through the United Nations and the Western nations failed, and proposals to form an international naval flotilla to test free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba were rejected. While negotiations to ease tensions were still being discussed in the United States, the Israel cabinet decided to initiate preemptive surprise strikes in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, and early on 5 June 1967 Israeli warplanes bombed airfields in these countries. Simultaneously, Israeli forces attacked Gaza and quickly advanced into Sinai. After three days, the Egyptian

army was routed, and Israel seized the Gaza Strip, Sinai up to the Suez Canal, and Sharm al-Shaykh at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

Shortly after Israel attacked Egypt, Jordanian forces fired on the Jewish sector of Jerusalem, despite Israel's warnings to King Hussein not to intervene in the fighting. However, Hussein entered the war as a result of mass pressure to join forces with Egypt in expectation of a decisive victory. Within three days, Israel captured Jordanian East Jerusalem and most of the West Bank. On 7 June the UN Security Council called for a cease-fire, which Syria refused to accept. Shelling of Israeli settlements in northern Israel led Israel to attack and then capture the Golan region, and Syria to accept a cease-fire on 10 June. In the six days of combat, Israel destroyed over 400 Arab aircraft (mostly on 5 June), destroyed or captured more than 500 tanks, and demolished 70 percent of Egypt's, Syria's, and Jordan's military equipment. Egyptian casualties included more than 11,000 men killed and 5,600 prisoners of war; Jordan lost 6,000 men; and Syria about 1,000. Israel lost more than 20 planes and 60 tanks, and 700 of its soldiers were killed.

As a result of the war, Israel occupied territory equivalent to more than three times its pre-1967 area, including the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, Jordan's West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. The routing by Israeli forces and flight of some 300,000 Palestinian and Syrian civilians increased the refugee problem and further intensified Palestinian nationalism. The defeat led to the discrediting of most Arab leaders and to a new phase in the Palestine national movement, which ultimately resulted in the expansion of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Immediately after the war, efforts to establish peace were renewed through the United Nations and passage of Security Council Resolution 242, which called for Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories and peaceful resolution of the conflict. Resolution 242 became the basis of most attempts to settle the conflict. Although the Arab states passed a resolution at a summit meeting in Khartoum in September 1967 that called for no peace, no negotiations, and no recognition of Israel, they eventually moderated their demands for a settlement from a return to the 1947 UN partition borders to an Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967—that is, to the 1949 armistice lines. They also no longer insisted on the repatriation of all refugees to their original homes within Israel.

In Israel, the war reinforced those militant nationalists who called for unification of the "whole land of Israel" and led to the formation of the Likud Party, which opposed withdrawal from territory acquired in June 1967. Arab East Jerusalem was for all practical purposes annexed by Israel soon after the war, and the Golan area was subjected to Israeli law in 1981. Israel's victory polarized politics between those who favored a peace settlement based on return of territory in exchange for secure borders and those who opposed any territorial concessions.

Victory in the 1967 War underscored Israel's position as the dominant military power in the region and strengthened the view of those who believed that territorial concessions were neither necessary nor advisable to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict. This perception led to a program to establish a network of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, Gaza, and Sinai, and plans to integrate the economies of the conquered areas into Israel's economy. However, occupation and the imposition of military government in the territories stimulated Palestinian nationalist sentiment and led eventually to the Intifada in December 1987.

See also Arab–Israel Conflict; Begin, Menachem; Fida'iyyun; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); United Nations Emergency Force.

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DON PERETZ

ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1973)

War in October 1973 between Israel and Egypt and Syria; the fourth major military confrontation between Israel and the Arab states.

The 1973 Arab–Israel War resulted from failure to resolve the territorial disputes arising from the Arab–Israel War of 1967. Despite UN Resolution 242, which called for Israel to withdraw from territories occupied in June 1967, little progress was made in its implementation. President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt sought to obtain the return of Sinai through diplomacy, and offered to reopen the Suez Canal if Israel would withdraw to the Mitla and Gidi passes in the Sinai Peninsula. He also offered to resume diplomatic relations with the United States and sign a peace pact with Israel, but Israel refused to withdraw to the armistice lines established before 5 June 1967.

While making diplomatic approaches to the conflict, Sadat was preparing for war. He contacted President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria to plan a two-front attack on Israel. Egypt, however, still depended on the Soviet Union for modern weapons. Angered by the Soviet Union's failure to respond to his demands for an assured supply, Sadat surprised the international community in July 1972 by expelling all 21,000 Soviet military advisers and personnel in Egypt. Although many in the West believed that the gesture would delay moves toward war, the Soviet Union responded by stepping up arms deliveries to both Egypt and Syria in an attempt to regain Sadat's favor.

In Israel, the governing Labor Party generally accepted the principle of "territory in exchange for peace," but it adamantly opposed return of all the occupied lands, asserting that for security reasons, Israel would have to continue occupation of substantial areas. Sadat's failure to follow through after his proclamations about the "year of decision" in 1971, and again in 1972, led Israel's general staff to conclude that the country was safe from an attack for the indefinite future and that the Bar-Lev line along the Suez Canal was impenetrable. Thus Israel's army commanders were unprepared for the October attack by Egypt and Syria. Israel's intelligence misinterpreted the buildup of Egyptian forces along the canal before the war as military exercises unlikely to escalate into a full-fledged attack.

The Two-Front War

The war began on two fronts on 6 October 1973, the Jewish Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur); hence, in Israel it was called the Yom Kippur War. It also was the Muslim month of fasting, Ramadan; thus, the conflict was called the Ramadan War by the Arabs. Egypt's forces quickly crossed the Suez Canal and overran the Bar-Lev line. In the north, Syria moved into the Golan Heights, nearly reaching the 1967 border with Israel. Because Israel had not fully mobilized, it was outnumbered almost twelve to one when the fighting began. Within the next few days, however, rapid mobilization of reserves redressed the balance.

The fighting was the heaviest since 1948, with major losses of manpower and material on both sides. The numbers of tanks, planes, and artillery pieces destroyed was larger than in any battle fought since World War II. Each side had to be rearmed in the midst of the fighting, Egypt and Syria by the Soviet Union, and Israel by the United States.

During the first days of the war, there was great consternation in Israel and fear that Arab forces, especially those of Syria in the north, might succeed in penetrating the pre-June 1967 borders. Within a week, however, Israel's counteroffensives turned the tide of battle. Syria was beaten back on the Golan Heights, and Israel's forces crossed the Suez Canal and began to push toward Cairo. The war precipitated an international crisis when the Soviet Union responded to an urgent appeal from Egypt to save its Third Army, which was surrounded by Israeli forces in Sinai. Despite the UN Security Council cease-fire orders, Israel's troops continued to attack. When the Soviet Union threatened to send troops to assist Egypt, the United States called a worldwide military alert. The crisis ended when all parties agreed to negotiate a safe retreat for the Egyptians.

When the combatants accepted a cease-fire on 22 October, Israel's forces had regained control of

Sinai and crossed to the west side of the Suez Canal. Most of the Golan was recaptured, and the IDF occupied some 240 square miles of Syrian territory beyond the Golan Heights. Both Egypt and Israel claimed victory: Egypt, because it drove Israel's forces back into Sinai; and Israel, because it defeated the Arab forces. However, the price of victory was steep. Nearly 3,000 of Israel's soldiers and more than 8,500 Arab soldiers were killed. Wounded numbered 8,800 for Israel and almost 20,000 for the Arabs. Israel lost 840 tanks; the Arabs, 2,550. The cost of the war equaled approximately one year's GNP for each combatant. Israel became more dependent on the United States for military and economic aid, and the Arabs turned to the Soviet Union to restock their arsenals.

The October War also emboldened the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to double prices for its oil, and the Arab members to insist on tieing the sale of oil to support from consuming nations in the war against Israel. Saudi Arabia placed an embargo on shipments to the United States in retaliation for U.S. arms supplied to Israel. Gasoline shortages in the United States resulted, and the rise in oil prices began a spiral of worldwide inflation and a recession in 1974 and 1975.

The town of Qunaytra in the Golan Heights was destroyed by Israeli forces during the Arab–Israel War of 1973, an act that later led to a United Nations accusation against Israel for violating the Geneva Convention. After the war, the Syrians refused to rebuild and reoccupy Qunaytra, insisting rather that the flattened remains stand as mute testimony to what they consider Israeli brutality. © AP/WIDE WORLD. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Peace Negotiations

Attempts to resume the peace process began with Security Council Resolution 338, passed at the same time as the cease-fire ordered on 22 October 1973. It called for immediate termination of all military activity, implementation of Resolution 242, and the start of negotiations "aimed at establishing a just and durable peace." Resolution 338 subsequently became a companion piece to Resolution 242 as the basis for a peace settlement. In December a Middle East peace conference was convened in Geneva under the cochairmanship of the Soviet Union's foreign minister, the U.S. secretary of state, and the UN secretary-general. Egypt, Jordan, and Israel attended, but Syria refused to participate. After two days of wrangling over procedure, meetings were suspended; the conference failed to reconvene.

Its collapse provided U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger with the opportunity to bypass the United Nations and the Soviet Union in striving for a settlement. The first step was a cease-fire agreement providing for relief of Egypt's besieged Third Army and return to the lines of 22 October. This was the first bilateral accord signed between Israel and Egypt since the 1949 armistice. In January 1974 Kissinger began another round of shuttle diplomacy, persuading Egypt and Israel to sign a disengagement agreement calling for Israel to withdraw its forces back across the Suez Canal. It was much more difficult to attain the disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel. After several trips between Damascus and Jerusalem, Kissinger finally persuaded Israel to withdraw from territory seized from Syria during October 1973 and from the town of Quneitra in the Golan region. A buffer zone patrolled by United Nations Deployment of Forces was established between forces of Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights, and Syria's President Asad agreed to prevent Palestinian guerrillas from using Syria as a base from which to attack Israel.

The disengagement agreements, which represented the diplomatic climax of the 1973 war, were

the major accomplishment in Israel–Arab relations for the next several years. Egypt's military "accomplishments" opened the way for receptivity to Kissinger's diplomatic approaches, and they were a prelude to Sadat's startling peace initiative in 1977.

Israel's setback broke through a psychological barrier to territorial concessions and the belief in Israel's invincibility against any combination of Arab forces. While it enhanced Arab self-confidence, it shook Israel's belief that no concessions were necessary. But some of the long-term consequences of the war were disastrous for Israel. Israel's casualties exceeded those of the two previous wars, and military intelligence was discredited for not having predicted the attack. The Agranat Commission, established in November 1973 to probe the reasons for the setback, blamed the mistaken IDF assessment of Egypt's war prowess for Israel's failures and recommended removal of the chief of staff and other high-ranking officers. Its report led to a major shake-up of the Labor government, the resignation of Prime Minister Golda Meir, and a new cabinet led by Yitzhak Rabin in June 1974. The 1973 setback and the Agranat Report were among the major factors leading to Labor's defeat in the 1977 Knesset election.

See also Arab–Israel Conflict; Arab–Israel War (1967); Asad, Hafiz al-; Golan Heights; Kissinger, Henry; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Sadat, Anwar al-.

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Don Peretz

ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1982)

War that began with Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982.

Israel invaded Lebanon on 6 June 1982 in order to destroy the infrastructure and leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and to install in Lebanon a Maronite-dominated government, led by the Phalange Party, which would ally itself with Israel. Israeli defense minister Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan believed that the elimination of the PLO would convince West Bank and Gaza Palestinians to seek an accommodation on Begin's terms of limited autonomy, thereby preempting the establishment of a Palestinian state, which was gaining international support.

The timing of the invasion favored Israel. The Arab world was in disarray. The most powerful Arab country, Egypt, had made peace with Israel in 1979 under the terms of the Camp David Accords. Support for Israel in the Reagan administration was strong. Israel's border with Lebanon had been quiet since July 1981, when U.S. emissary Philip Habib negotiated a cease-fire between Israel and the PLO. The invasion, however, was triggered not by a border incident, but by the attempted assassination on 3 June of the Israeli ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov. This was a pretext for invasion, though, because the attacker belonged to the anti-PLO Abu Nidal group, and PLO officials were also on the hit list.

The invasion might have been regarded in Israel and the United States as a necessary preemptive invasion (Israel called it "Operation Peace for Galilee") if it had been confined to "surgical" action against PLO forces within the 25-mile belt south of the Litani River, as Sharon had declared. However, once the invasion began on 6 June, Sharon ordered the Israel Defense Force (IDF) to proceed north to Beirut, defeated Syrian forces in the air and on the ground, and drove the PLO forces back to Beirut. The IDF reached Beirut in mid-June, laid siege to and shelled West Beirut for seven

Israeli troops moved into Damour, Lebanon, in June 1982, early in the invasion of that country. The Israeli attempt to destroy the entrenched Palestine Liberation Organization and place Lebanon under the control of Maronites ultimately proved costly not only to the Lebanese and Palestinians but also to Israel and its closest ally, the United States. © WEBISTAN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

weeks, and linked up with Israel's Lebanese allies, the Phalange.

Originally, Sharon had hoped that the Phalange forces (rather than the IDF) would enter PLO strongholds in West Beirut. Phalange leader Bashir Jumayyil and his aides had sought Israel's intervention and shared Sharon's goal of eliminating the PLO, especially from South Lebanon and West Beirut. Sharon's advisers, who lacked confidence in Phalange military ability, rejected such an operation; but fearing a high level of Israeli casualties, they also counseled against an Israeli assault. The result was a stalemate, and heavy Israeli bombardments and air strikes against West Beirut led to heavy civilian casualties. The nightly television pictures of death and destruction caused disquiet in the West. Although U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig seemed to acquiesce, the White House in fact disapproved of the bombing of civilians. Haig resigned shortly thereafter, and the U.S. government sent Habib to Beirut to try to reach an agreement on PLO withdrawal.

An accord was reached wherein a multinational force, including U.S. Marines, would supervise an orderly PLO evacuation and safeguard civilians in the refugee camps. By 1 September, about 14,420 PLO fighters and officials had departed West Beirut for various Arab locales—particularly Tunis, which became PLO headquarters. About 3,000 Syrian troops were withdrawn from the city; U.S. troops were also removed. The same day, the United States announced the Reagan Plan, which opposed Israel's annexation of the West Bank and Gaza and called for a freeze on Israeli settlements there. The plan also declined to support the establishment of a Palestinian state. Instead, it supported Palestinian autonomy in association with Jordan, which the United States urged to begin negotiations with Israel. Some

Arab states, the PLO, and Israel rejected the plan.

Much of Sharon's grand design seemed to have been realized, including the election in late August of Bashir Jumayyil as president of Lebanon. However, Jumayyil resisted Begin and Sharon's demands for an immediate Lebanese–Israeli treaty and rejected Israeli insistence that their proxy in the South, Saʿd Haddad and his troops, remain under Israeli authority. Then, on 14 September, Jumayyil was assassinated—according to some, with Syrian help. Two days later, Sharon and Eitan ordered the IDF into West Beirut, in violation of the U.S.-brokered truce agreement.

Sharon approved the entry of Phalange forces into the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, provided them with light at night, and extended their stay in the camps. The Phalange proceeded to kill between 800 and 1,500 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians from 16 to 18 September. An Israeli commission of inquiry, the Kahan Commission (1983), found that Israeli officials, in particular Sharon and Eitan, were indirectly responsible for the killings. An international commission chaired by Sean MacBride charged that Israel was directly responsible because it had been the occupying power and had facilitated the actions of its ally. In 2001 both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International called for an investigation of Ariel Sharon's involvement into the Sabra and Shatila massacres.

In late September 1982 the IDF evacuated Beirut and were replaced by the multilateral force that included the U.S. Marines. The Arab–Israel War of 1982 was costly for all involved. According to Lebanese authorities, 17,825 Lebanese and Palestinians were killed, 84 percent of whom were civilians. Israel lost more than 1,000 soldiers by 2000, and spent $3 billion on the three-month operation. The war hurt Israel's international image and divided its own people; 400,000 Israelis (8 percent of the population) demonstrated against the war. Even the United States, which had sent the Marines to help fill the vacuum left by the Israeli departure from Beirut, got mired in Lebanese politics. The new secretary of state, George Shultz, engineered a security agreement between Israel and Lebanon that ignored Syria's interests in Lebanon, ratified Israel's control of South Lebanon, and hinted at U.S. support for Maronite primacy. Lebanese Muslims responded by bombing the U.S. embassy in Beirut, and after the White House approved naval shelling of Druze villages, a suicide bomber attacked the Marine naval barracks, killing 241 Marines. U.S. forces were withdrawn four months later, and the Lebanese–Israeli agreement was aborted on 5 March 1984. Similar attacks took place against the French and the Israelis, who finally withdrew from Lebanon in 1985 after establishing a six-mile security zone patrolled by Haddad's army.

In 1999 a new Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, sensed the growing unpopularity of Israel's protracted involvement in southern Lebanon. In May 2000 Barak unilaterally and unconditionally withdrew all Israeli troops from Lebanon, except for those in a small disputed area called Sheba Farm.

See also Barak, Ehud; Begin, Menachem; Camp David Accords (1978); Eitan, Rafael; Gaza; Habib, Philip Charles; Haddad, Saʿd; Israeli Settlements; Jumayyil, Bashir; Kahan Commission (1983); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Phalange; Reagan Plan (1982); Sabra and Shatila Massacres; Shamir, Yitzhak; Sharon, Ariel; West Bank.

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Philip Mattar

ARABIZATION POLICIES

Maghrebian countries' (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) efforts to adopt the Arabic language following their independence.

After Morocco and Tunisia gained their independence in 1956 and Algeria in 1962, they decided, as

an affirmation of their cultural identity against the former colonial power, to adopt Arabic as the official language instead of French. But the most common languages used by their citizens were Arabic dialects and Berber, not classical Arabic, which was known only in limited circles.

Algeria

By the time Algeria became independent in 1962, written communication, except in the religious sector, was almost exclusively conducted in French. Algeria's first constitution declared Arabic the only official language, although French remained the de facto language of government and industry.

Beginning in 1964, the gradual Arabization of the educational system was inaugurated. As there were few able teachers of Arabic in the country, many came from Egypt. By the 1970s, the secondary school system featured an Arabic track and a bilingual French-Arabic track. But the shortage of openings for non–French speakers in most scientific, technical, and managerial fields caused frustration among Arabized students and graduates and led to increasing unrest on university campuses. In response, in 1979 the government accelerated the Arabization of education and totally Arabized the judicial system, creating overnight significant new outlets for graduates of the Arabized track. By the end of the 1980s, most curricula, except in the physical sciences, had been Arabized and the parliament had passed a law calling for total Arabization of the administration.

In 1996, the National Council of Transition prohibited the use of any language other than Arabic after 1998 in government, commerce, and civil organizations, and after 2000 in the higher education system. Strong opposition appeared, especially in Kabilia, the heart of Berber country.

Morocco

Morocco had been a French protectorate, not a French colony, so some educational institutions had continued to use Arabic before independence, although most used French. Those using Arabic included the religious institutions connected to the Qarawiyyin Mosque of Fez just before its independence. Slightly more than 10 percent of Moroccan Muslim children attended French schools; most attended Qurʾanic schools, where they memorized verses from the Qurʾan and learned to write Arabic.

After it became independent in 1956, Morocco began a process of Arabization similar to Algeria's, but more human resources were available internally. Fewer than a hundred teachers were hired from Egypt and Syria. Arabic become the official language of political power, and French remained the vehicle of the governmental administration and economic sectors. Outside the main cities, Berber remained the most common language.

In 1962, an Egyptian high school was open in Rabat and a Iraqi college of science in Casablanca. Both were closed a year later as political tension arose between Rabat and Cairo, which was supporting Algeria in territorial disputes. In addition to public institutions, numerous French schools, supported by the French government, and bilingual French/Arabic schools continued to function. The former attracted mainly children from privileged backgrounds, because they were more able to open the doors to higher education.

Tunisia

After gaining independence in 1956, Tunisia, which had also been a French protectorate, was the most able of the three countries to shift to Arabic without outside help. It was only after 1970 that some teachers from the Middle East were invited to teach in Tunisian universities. With fewer Berber speakers than its neighbors, Arabization policies in Tunisia never gained the political attention they received in Algeria. The internal political debate focused more on curricula than on the language of instruction.

Under the Protectorate, some Arabic public schools functioned beside French schools: *les écoles franco-arabes.* An Arabic high school, Sadiki College, was created in Tunis as early as 1876. The influence and the prestige of the famous mosque of Zituna in Tunis was considerable, since most Arabic teachers received their training there.

In the first reform after independence, the bilingual system was not abrogated, but some courses about Islam and the history of the Arab world were introduced. After a short period between 1968 and 1971, where there was a clear attempt to separate citizen education (in French) from religious teaching (in Arabic) in secondary schools, Islam began to be taught in all public schools. Today, French remains widely used in business circles.

Cultural Identity in the Maghreb

A debate exists about the role foreign teachers played, especially in Algeria. Many of them came from small villages of Egypt and were criticized by their students' parents, who considered their methods old-fashioned and based too much on memorization. In return, some of these professors accused the families of non-Arabic, non-Muslim behavior.

Linguistic identity in the Maghreb is twofold: The language used within the family can be either local Arabic or Berber, and the language of the Qur'an is the link to Muslim identity. In Algeria, due to direct French rule and the violent struggle for independence, Arabization is a far more politically sensitive issue than it is in the neighboring countries.

See also ALGERIA: OVERVIEW; ARABIC; BERBER; MOROCCO: OVERVIEW; TUNISIA: OVERVIEW.

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JOHN RUEDY
UPDATED BY RABIA BEKKAR

ARAB LEAGUE

See LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

ARAB LEAGUE SUMMITS

Meetings of Arab heads of state since 1964.

Since 1964, heads of states (as opposed to foreign ministers) of member states of the Arab League have met periodically to deal with issues of regional and

Issues at Arab League summits

No.	Date and location	Resolutions, outcomes
1st	January 1964, Cairo	Agreed to oppose "the robbery of the waters of Jordan by Israel."
2nd	September 1964, Alexandria	Supported the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in its effort to liberate Palestine from the Zionists.
3rd	September 1965, Casablanca	Opposed "intra-Arab hostile propaganda."
4th	29 August–1 September 1967, Khartoum	Held post-1967 Arab-Israeli War, which ended with crushing Israeli victory; declared three "no's": "no negotiation with Israel, no treaty, no recognition of Israel."
5th	December 1969, Rabat	Called for the mobilization of member countries against Israel.
6th	November 1973, Algiers	Held in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, it set strict guidelines for dialogue with Israel.
7th	30 October–2 November 1974, Rabat	Declared the PLO to be "the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," who had "the right to establish the independent state of Palestine on any liberated territory."
8th	October 1976, Cairo	Approved the establishment of a peacekeeping force (Arab Deterrent Force) for the Lebanese Civil War.
9th	November 1978, Baghdad	Condemned the Camp David Peace Accords between Egypt and Israel, and threatened Egypt with sanctions, including the suspension of its membership if Egypt signed a treaty with Israel.
10th	November 1979, Tunis	Held in the wake of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1978, it discussed Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon.
11th	November 1980, Amman	Formulated a strategy for economic development among League members until 2000.
12th	November 1981/September 1982, Fez	Meeting was suspended due to resistance to a peace plan drafted by Saudi crown prince Fahd, which implied de facto recognition of the Jewish state. In September 1982 at Fez, the meeting reconvened to adopt a modified version of the Fahd Plan, called the Fez Plan.
13th	August 1985, Casablanca	Failed to back a PLO- Jordanian agreement that envisaged talks with Israel about Palestinian rights. Summit boycotted by five member states.
14th	November 1987, Amman	Supported UN Security Council Resolution 598 regarding cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War. Also declared that individual member states could decide to resume diplomatic ties with Egypt.
15th	June 1988, Casablanca	Decided to financially support the PLO in sustaining the Intifada in the occupied territories.
16th	May 1989, Casablanca	Readmitted Egypt into Arab League, and set up Tripartite Committee to secure a cease-fire in the Lebanese Civil War and re-establish a constitutional government in Lebanon.
17th	May 1990, Baghdad	Denounced recent increase of Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel.
18th	August 1990, Cairo	12 out of 20 members present condemned Iraq for invading and annexing Kuwait. Agreed to deploy troops to assist Saudi and other Gulf states' armed forces.
19th	June 1995, Cairo	Held after a hiatus of five years. Iraq not invited.
20th	October 2000, Cairo	Set up funds to help the Palestinians' Second Intifada against the Israeli occupation, and called on its members to freeze their relations with Israel. Iraq was invited.
21st	March 2001, Amman	Held after the election of Ariel Sharon as Israel's prime minister, it appointed Egypt's Amr Mousa as the Arab League's new secretary-general.
22nd	March 2002, Beirut	Adopted the Saudi Peace Plan of Crown Prince Abdullah, which offered Israel total peace in exchange for total Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories conquered in the 1967 war. Opposed the use of force against Iraq.
23rd	March 2003, Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt	Agreed not to participate in the U.S.-led attack on Iraq, but allowed the United States to use military bases in some of their countries.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP

inter-Arab importance. The following chart summarizes the main issues discussed or approved at the various summit meetings.

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PHILIP MATTAR

ARAB LEGION

Transjordan/Jordan military.

In September 1923, after Britain created Transjordan, the Reserve Mobile Force, commanded by Capt. Frederick G. Peake, was reorganized and merged with all other forces in Transjordan, and given the name *al-Jaysh al-Arabi* (Arab Army), more commonly referred to as the Arab Legion. The Legion served initially as a force for British colonial rule in Transjordan. Just as importantly, the Arab Legion also served as the protectors of the regime of King Abdullah I ibn Hussein, and even played a central role in constructing Jordanian national identity itself, including tieing that sense of identity and nationhood to loyalty to the Hashimite monarchy. Like the modern Jordanian army, the Arab Legion was widely viewed as the best-trained and best-equipped army in the Arab world.

The Arab Legion began as a small, elite armed force of a little over a thousand men. Peake organized it to high efficiency, recruiting Arab volunteers from Transjordan, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Hijaz. Peake recruited mainly villagers rather than bedouin. By 1926 Peake had 1,500 men. Between 1923 and 1926 the Arab Legion fought bedouin raiders, repulsed incursions by the Wahhabi Ikhwan, established order, and extended the centralizing power of the Hashimite state. From its inception until 1957, the costs of the Arab Legion were subsidized entirely by Britain.

The creation of the Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF) in April 1926, to protect the borders from Saudi Arabia's territorial ambitions, resulted in a reduction in the Arab Legion's strength. This changed, however, when Capt. John Bagot Glubb arrived from Iraq, in November 1930, to be second in command to Peake. Glubb created the Desert Mobile Force, composed mainly of bedouin, and provided it with fast transport and communications facilities. This force was able to shore up the Arab Legion's diminished functions and was the nucleus of the striking force of the future Jordan Arab Army.

The Arab Legion was further strengthened in the period from 1936 to 1939 with augmentation of manpower, arms, and equipment. Glubb succeeded Peake as commander of the Legion at the outbreak of World War II in 1939. Unlike Peake, who had seen the bedouin as the central challenge to Hashimite rule, Glubb shifted the emphasis completely toward bedouin recruitment, co-opting the tribes to be loyal bastions of support for the monarchy. During the war, the Arab Legion's main task was to support Britain by thwarting any attempt by the Axis powers to encroach on British or French interests in the mandated areas. In May 1941 the Legion reinforced British troops who had been rushed from Palestine to crush Rashid Ali al-Kaylani's rebellion in Iraq. The Desert Mobile Force won a battle at Falluja and, in cooperation with the Basra-based British-Indian military contingent, entered Baghdad at the end of May.

When Jordan gained full independence in 1946, the Arab Legion remained under Glubb's command but was transformed into a regular national army and renamed the Jordan Arab Army. It participated in the Arab–Israeli War of 1948, acquitting itself well despite its small size, and resisting Israeli assaults on East Jerusalem. At the end of hostilities, it was in complete control of the West Bank, which was formally incorporated into the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan in April 1950. In the 1950s, demonstrations in Jordan protested the Baghdad Pact, the continuing presence of British troops in the kingdom and of British officers commanding the Jordanian army. In a hasty attempt to reassert legitimacy, King Hussein ibn Talal in 1956 dismissed and deported the long-serving Glubb. Although the incident caused a temporary diplomatic rift with Britain, British subsidies to the Arab Legion continued without interruption.

Under the command of General Ali Abu Nuwwar, the Jordanian Arab Army underwent a process of "Arabization," in which all British officers were dismissed and replaced by Jordanians. Abu Nuwwar also pursued a policy of modernization and profes-

The Camel Corps was one division of the Arab Legion in its heyday under Lt.-Gen. John Bagot Glubb. Others included a long range reconnaissance unit called the Desert Patrol and the Desert Mobile Force, a motorized strike force. © LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

sionalization of the army, moving beyond Glubb's model of a bedouin-dominated force to one that represented Transjordanians of varied village, town, and tribal backgrounds. Palestinians too were recruited into the army, but the institution then and now remained nonetheless largely East Bank or Transjordanian, both in the enlisted ranks and even more so in the officer corps. In 1957 the last British troops left the kingdom but unrest nonetheless reached the ranks of the army itself, as the palace thwarted an attempted coup by nationalist officers (allegedly including Abu Nuwwar himself), purged the ranks of suspect officers, and reinforced the army as the most loyal base of Hashimite support. That same year, the Eisenhower administration in the United States declared Jordan "vital" to the U.S. interests, particularly as an anti-communist bulwark in the regional and global Cold War. In material terms, this increasingly close U.S.-Jordanian alliance resulted in a steady shift toward ever larger reliance on U.S. military aid and arms. This process accelerated further following Jordanian and Arab losses to Israel in the 1967 war.

Anticipating that war was imminent, King Hussein hastened to sign a military alliance with Egypt. This placed the Jordanian army under direct Egyptian command as Israeli forces launched a surprise attack in June 1967. In the six days that followed, Jordanian forces fought tenaciously in the West Bank, and desperately attempted to retain control of East Jerusalem. The task proved too difficult, given the lengthy cease-fire lines demarcating the West Bank. Despite strong efforts, the outnumbered and outgunned Jordanians were ultimately defeated, losing the Holy city and indeed all of the West Bank to Israeli forces. After the war, the trend toward closer U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation continued, as Jordan relied heavily on U.S. arms, material, training, and financial assistance in reconstructing the Jordanian armed forces.

In the wake of the disastrous 1967 war, tensions within Jordan increased between the Jordanian army and guerrilla forces from the Palestine Liberation Organization. For a brief period in 1968, however, the two forces collaborated successfully in repelling an Israeli attack. Following Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israeli forces routinely responded with massive retaliation. In March 1968, Israeli forces assaulted Karama, a town in the Jordan valley and base of Palestinian fighters. Unlike the 1967 war, this conflict proved more of a pitched battle, with heavy losses on all sides. Palestinian guerrillas and Jordanian soldiers, supported by artillery and tanks of the Jordanian army, eventually repelled the attack, and Karama quickly became legendary. The town's name, significantly, means "dignity." But despite the military success at Karama, the battle soon added to Palestinian-Jordanian tensions as each side claimed to have played the decisive role in the Arab victory. Ultimately, the episode fed into the tensions that culminated in the Jordanian Civil War. From "Black September" 1970 through the summer of 1971, Jordanian army units (particularly bedouin-dominated units) defeated Fidaʾiyyun forces and expelled them from the kingdom. The civil war was a particularly brutal affair, involving considerable urban warfare and the shelling of many Palestinian refugee camps. Given its losses in the 1967 war, and the trauma of the 1970–1971 civil war, Jordan refused to open up a third front in the Arab–Israel War of 1973. Instead, King Hussein sent a small contingent of Jordanian soldiers to Syria to bolster the Syrian front against the Israelis. Since that time, Jordan renounced its claims

to the West Bank (1988) and signed a peace treaty with Israel (1994) formally ending hostilities between the two countries.

The Jordanian armed forces remain the heirs of the original Arab Legion. The Jordanian army continues to occupy a privileged position within Jordanian society as a central pillar of the Hashimite state, with close transnational ties (in both equipment and training) to military counterparts in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Pakistan. Especially since the 1999 succession to the throne of King Abdullah II ibn Hussein (former commander of the special forces units within the Jordanian army), Jordanian troops have played an increasingly large role in United Nations peacekeeping throughout the world.

See also Abu Nuwwar, Ali; Arab–Israel War (1948); Basra; Glubb, John Bagot; Jordanian Civil War (1970–1971); Peake, Frederick Gerard; Transjordan Frontier Force; West Bank.

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Jenab Tutunji
Updated by Curtis R. Ryan

ARAB LIBERATION ARMY

Military force of the Arab League in Palestine, 1947–1949.

After the United Nations voted to partition Palestine, in November 1947, the Arabs resisted the partition and went to war against Israel in the Arab–Israel War of 1948. The Arab League (also known as the League of Arab States) sponsored a military force after the 1947 vote, which was composed of Palestinians and non-Palestinian Arab volunteers, headed by a former Iraqi officer, Fawzi al-Qawuqji. This force was separate from the armies sent in by the five surrounding Arab states and the Palestinian forces under the command of Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni.

The first contingents of the Arab Liberation Army reached Palestine in January 1948. Between February and May, they suffered a string of defeats in northern Palestine. Between May and October, the Arab Liberation Army controlled parts of western Galilee but by October were completely defeated by Israel's forces.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Husayni, Abd al-Qadir al-; League of Arab States; Palestine; Palestinians; Qawuqji, Fawzi al-; United Nations and the Middle East.

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Steve Tamari

ARAB LIBERATION FRONT

Faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

The Arab Liberation Front was established in 1969 in Baghdad, Iraq, by the Iraqi Baʿth party to counter the formation of the Syrian Baʿth party's al-Saʿiqa faction. The Front opposed a separate Palestinian state and in 1974 joined the Rejection Front against the al-Fatah faction's diplomatic initiatives. It also fought in the Lebanon war (Arab–Israel War, 1982). In the late 1980s, the Front's 400 members were led by Abd al-Rahim Ahmad, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization's executive committee.

See also Arab–Israel War (1982); Fatah, al-; Rejection Front.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

ARAB MAGHREB UNION

Political body created 17 February 1989, consisting of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.

Five North African states fashioned the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU; Union du Maghreb Arabe) in the image of the European Union (EU), originally intending to create a body through which members could negotiate trade relationships with the EU and improve relations among its member states. Specifically, the AMU sets out the conditions for an eventual free-trade zone among member states, a unified customs regime for extra-union trade, and a common market where people, products, and capital circulate freely.

The AMU is governed by a council made up of the heads of state of the five member states. The council meets biannually, with the chairmanship rotating annually. The union also includes a council of the ministers of foreign affairs from member states, a secretary general, and joint committees made up of the heads of various ministries, including the interior, finance, energy, tourism, and postal ministries. A judicial body made up of two magistrates from each member country serves to mediate issues between member states and advise AMU councils on matters of law.

Strained relations between Morocco and Algeria during most of the 1990s paralyzed the AMU, with Morocco claiming the Western Sahara as part of its territory while Algeria backed the Polisario Front in winning independence. The AMU's stance against Libya in the bombing of an airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 also prevented further collective agreements.

The AMU has become more active as relations between Algeria and Morocco have improved and as Libya has attempted to make amends for the Lockerbie incident. Since 1999 it has established a number of joint bodies to address common concerns, including the International Organization for Migration, the Maghrebi Bank for Investment and External Trade, the Working Group on Fisheries, and the Maghrebi desertification observatory.

See also ALGERIA; LIBYA; MAURITANIA; MOROCCO; TUNISIA; WESTERN SAHARA.

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DAVID GUTELIUS

ARAB NATIONALISM

Ideology that Arabs are a nation.

The ideology that dominated the Arab world for most of the twentieth century, Arab nationalism, evolved, much as did other nationalisms in the developing world, out of a reaction to the prospect (and later the reality) of European domination and under the influence of European ideas about nationalism. The emerging ideology, whose core premise was that the Arabs are and have been a nation unified by language and a shared sense of history, but long divided and dominated by outside powers, drew on elements of the Arab and Islamic heritages. It incorporated them into a new narrative of Arab history and pride in the Arab past that was disseminated through the press and in novels, poetry, and popular histories.

By the 1920s, Arab nationalism was the hegemonic ideology of the eastern Arab world—the *mashriq*—and its influence continued to spread in succeeding decades. By the 1950s and 1960s, thanks to the espousal of Arab nationalism by the charismatic Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the capacities for mobilization, organization, and clandestine action of parties such as the Baʿth and the Movement of Arab Nationalists, it appeared to be ascendant throughout most of the more than twenty independent states of the Arab world. Its decline in succeeding decades has been just as rapid, with

nation-state nationalist tendencies and Islamic radicalism filling the apparent vacuum.

The first stirrings of Arab nationalism have been detected by some historians as early as the 1860s, but it is more commonly accepted that as a sustained political movement it began early in the twentieth century. This followed the reimposition of the Ottoman constitution in 1908, and the greater freedom of the press and of political expression that resulted throughout the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. A tendency that has since come to be known as "Arabism" rapidly appeared: It stressed the ethnic identity of the Arabs and emphasized their common cultural roots. It also called for equality for Arabs with other national groups within the empire. As well as being influenced by European models and by reinterpretations of the Arab and Islamic past, Arabism was strongly affected by the rise of nationalism among the Turks, Armenians, and other peoples of the Ottoman Empire at this time.

The Arabist tendency built on the work of several groups of writers and thinkers, including the pioneers of the renaissance of the Arabic language, the Nahda. Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, this group produced new printed editions of the classics of Arabic literature, as well as encyclopedias, dictionaries, and works of history and literature, mainly in Beirut and Cairo. Another group, whose work was influential in a different way, was the Islamic reformers known as *salafis,* most of them from Syria and Lebanon, who argued for a return to the practices of the earliest days of Islam, and thus emphasized the period of Islamic history when the Arabs were dominant. Among them were the writers Rashid Rida, Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Tahir al-Jaza'iri, Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi, and Abd al-Razzaq al-Bitar. In addition, there were authors and publishers who traveled to Egypt to escape the censorship that increasingly afflicted the rest of the Ottoman Empire after 1876, and remained to publish newspapers, journals, and books. All these groups contributed to the growth of the Arabist idea.

The Arabist tendency identified politically with the liberal opposition to the ruling Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) in the Ottoman Empire. This was partly a response to strong Turkish nationalist tendencies in the CUP, and partly to its policy of tight centralization, which infringed on the autonomy of the Arab provinces. Although this Arab–Turkish tension did not erupt into open conflict until World War I, when the British helped to foment an Arab revolt in the Hijaz against the Ottoman state, it did have a lasting impact on the historiography of this and later periods. Some Arab writers reacted strongly against what they saw as Turkish suppression of Arab rights before the war, and the execution of some of the most prominent Arabist leaders during the war. This reaction engendered a version of Arab history that rendered the four centuries of Ottoman rule very negatively, in black and white, obliterating the nuances—and with them any understanding of the fruitful political and cultural symbiosis that characterized this lengthy period. This chauvinist version of modern Arab history—which ascribed the "backwardness" that afflicted the Arabs throughout much of their history to outsiders—is still influential in Arab schoolbooks and in much writing both within the Arab world and outside it.

In the wake of World War I, the Arabist aspiration to see an independent Arab state or federation of states stretching across the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula was frustrated by Britain and France, which carved up the region into a series of mandates, protectorates, and nominally independent states, all of which were under the strong influence of their foreign patrons. The postwar response to European rule was a sequence of revolts in several Arab countries that impelled the granting of a measure of self-rule, and sometimes nominal independence, as in Egypt in 1922 and Iraq in 1932. The end result, however, was the perpetuation of the divisions that the European powers had imposed. Thereafter, within these new borders there gradually developed both a strong de facto attachment to the new states and the interests they represented, and a powerful, unrealized, and somewhat utopian aspiration for unity among them. Although these sentiments originated during the interwar years mainly in the newly created states of the Fertile Crescent—Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and Iraq—they were mirrored in other Arab regions in succeeding years, even in areas where the existing states had much older and more historically

rooted foundations, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, and Oman.

The tension between the contradictory sentiments of pan-Arabism and nation-state nationalism has characterized Arab politics since about 1945. On the one hand, most Arabs recognized that they had a common language, history, and culture, and that if these commonalities could find proper political expression, the Arab peoples might be able to rise above the fragmentation and weakness that have characterized their modern history. Such ideas were particularly appealing at the mass level, and long aroused the enthusiasm of the publics in many Arab countries. On the other hand, the states that existed in the Arab world for most of the twentieth century and on into the twenty-first century are in some cases rooted in long-standing entities with a strong, independent administrative tradition, have all engendered a powerful network of vested interests, and in recent decades have taken on an aura of permanence. The existence of these separate Arab states was reinforced by the Charter of the League of Arab States, established in March 1945, which reaffirmed the independence of the signatory states, provided that decisions had to be made unanimously in order to be binding, and forbade interference in the internal affairs of any Arab state by others.

In practice, most Arab governments have at most times been motivated by pragmatic varieties of *raison d'état* rather than any ideological vision. At the same time, their leaders have often clothed their actions in visionary Arabist rhetoric. Such ideological motivations were never entirely absent from the actions of most governments, if only because their respective public opinions resonated to such ideas. The result appeared to be hypocrisy, whereby governments did things for one reason while claiming an entirely different one as their real motivation. The paradoxical effect of all this was to discredit Arabism as an ideology when the failures of the various nominally Arab nationalist regimes finally exasperated their citizens and Arab public opinion generally. The ensuing bankruptcy of Arab nationalism as an ideology, and of the parties and regimes that still espouse it, would appear to be among the enduring features of modern Arab politics.

See also Armenians in the Middle East; Baʿth, al-; Committee for Union and Progress; Fertile Crescent; Kawakibi, Abd al-Rahman al-; League of Arab States; Nahda, al-; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Rida, Rashid; Turks.

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Rashid Khalidi

ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT (ANM)

Organization dedicated to the unification of the Arab world.

The Arab National Movement (ANM) was established by Palestinian students at the American University of Beirut in the 1950s. In Kuwait it found a spokesman in Dr. Ahmad al-Khatib, a member of the National Assembly since 1963. The ANM also had some impact in Bahrain, but not elsewhere in the Gulf, and as of the mid-1990s was an almost wholly spent force.

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ARAB REVOLT (1916)

Uprising of Arab nationalists against the Ottoman Empire during World War I.

Although many Arabs had reached the highest positions in the Ottoman government by the end of the nineteenth century, opposition to Turkish authority was spreading through the empire's Arabic-speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire. A separatist nationalist movement had followers in many Arab towns and cities, including Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, and Jerusalem by the early 1900s. Members formed secret cultural and political organizations, including groups of Arab officers in the Ottoman military. Prominent secret societies were al-Qahtaniya and al-Fatat; the former sought to establish a dual Arab–Turkish monarchy similar to the Austro–Hungarian Empire. Al-Fatat wanted to establish Arabic as the official language in the Arab provinces, where it would be taught in all schools.

Efforts by the Young Turk regime that seized power in 1908 to repress Arab nationalism intensified opposition to the government and increased demands for separation from the empire. The arrest for treason in 1914 of Major Aziz Ali al-Masri, an Ottoman staff officer of Arab origin, brought opposition to the regime among Arab officers to a head.

Among the ardent nationalists was the sharif of Mecca, Husayn ibn Ali, a Hashimite descendant of the prophet Muhammad, and his four sons, Ali, Abdullah, Faisal, and Zayd. Because the authorities suspected their loyalty, they were forced to live in Constantinople (now Istanbul) from 1893 until 1908. After they returned to Mecca, Husayn began to rally surrounding tribes against attempts to conscript Arabs into the Ottoman armed forces. Although the Turkish governor-general of Mecca backed down from the conscription order, Husayn sought an alliance with an outside power against further Ottoman attempts to undermine his authority.

In February 1914, Husayn sent one of his sons to negotiate with the British agent and consul general in Cairo, Lord Kitchener, but Great Britain was not yet ready to support an Arab uprising against the Ottomans. With Turkey's entry into World War I on the side of Germany (October 1914), the British authorities reconsidered the sharif's offer to revolt in return for guarantees of Arab independence after defeating the Turks.

Ottoman efforts to rally support among Muslims throughout Asia for a jihad against the Allies failed to win over many Arab subjects. Rather, most Arab notables were sympathetic to the growing demands for independence, and many looked to Husayn for leadership. As relations between the Arab provinces and Constantinople continued to deteriorate due to poor economic conditions, mass arrests of suspected Arab nationalists, and resentment of conscription, Husayn attempted to reestablish contact with the British.

British commander-in-chief Sir Edmund Allenby enters Jerusalem on 11 December 1917, days after capturing it on 9 December. The loss of the city, which fell in just one day, was a demoralizing blow to Turkish forces in World War I. **© LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

In 1915 he reopened negotiations through Lord Kitchener's successor in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon. In an exchange of ten letters known as the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence, the sharif offered assistance to Great Britain against the Turks in return for a British promise to recognize the independence of what was to become Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and most of the Arabian Peninsula, and to endorse proclamation of an Islamic Arab caliphate. The British, however, refused to accept

so precise a definition of the area for Arab independence because of conflicting promises and obligations regarding the territory. McMahon eventually replied that Britain would recognize the territory demanded by the sharif except for certain areas "not purely Arab." The imprecision of British promises was the cause of postwar quarrels between Great Britain and Arab nationalists, particularly with regard to Palestine.

Following the exchange of correspondence with McMahon, Ottoman authorities initiated a massive crackdown on Arab nationalists. In May 1916, twenty-one leading Arab citizens of Damascus and Beirut were arrested and executed by public hanging. These events undermined what little loyalty remained among Arab subjects of the sultan, and sparked widespread support for open revolt against the Ottomans. Opposition to the government was further intensified by famine resulting from destruction of crops by a locust plague in 1916. In retaliation for Arab opposition, the Turkish authorities refused to permit outside relief supplies into the region; as a result, some 300,000 people died of starvation.

Sharif Husayn gave the order to tribes in the Hijaz to strike at Ottoman garrisons and proclaimed Arab independence in May 1916. After three weeks the Ottoman garrison in Mecca fell, followed shortly thereafter by most others in the main towns of the peninsula. Arab forces were supplied by Britain, and British officers served as military advisers. The most prominent was Colonel T. E. Lawrence, an adviser to Faisal.

The Arab revolt against the Turks ended in October 1919 when Faisal's armies captured Damascus, and an Arab regime was established with Faisal as king. At the end of the war, Husayn alienated many of his Arab neighbors when he proclaimed himself "king of the Arab countries." Although the British government refused to recognize him as more than "king of Hijaz," he persisted in the grander title, leading to confrontation with Ibn Saʿud and eventual defeat by the latter, followed by the annexation of the Hijaz into the Saudi kingdom.

The Arab revolt played an important and controversial role in postwar negotiations, and in the decisions taken by Great Britain and France about the territorial divisions of the former Arab provinces in the Ottoman Empire.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Fatat, al-; Husayn ibn Ali; Husayn–McMahon Correspondence (1915–1916); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Lawrence, T. E.; McMahon, Henry; Young Turks.

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DON PERETZ

ARAB REVOLTS (1936–1939)

See PALESTINE ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939)

ARAB SOCIALISM

Political philosophy advocating governmental and collective ownership of the means of production and distribution.

Arab socialism emerged as a result of colonialism in the Middle East coupled with the corruption and underdevelopment characteristic of Arab societies at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was not until the late 1940s that Arab thinkers began writing about the socialist option. Among the major parties and movements that emerged as a result of this effort were the Arab Renaissance Socialist party (al-Baʿth) and the movement called the Free Officers, led by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. The aims of Arab socialism were to free the Arab world from Western colonial rule, to establish pride and social justice within Arab societies, and to unify the Arab world.

Arab socialism emerged at a time when liberation movements were sweeping developing countries, so self-determination and tight controls against multinational corporations and their exploitation of local resources became a major priority. Arab socialism rejected Marxism and class struggle as basic tenets; it promoted cooperation between classes for the welfare of the entire community, based on the principles of justice and the equal distribution of wealth, with government provisions for the poor and underprivileged.

Agrarian reform and land redistribution were important goals. The nationalization of industries provided the government with funds, but some forms of private property were retained if they were in the national interest. In Egypt, under the radical economic policies adopted by Nasser, nationalization hit French and British economic interests first. Then, in 1960, banks, newspapers, most foreign assets, industrial and mining industries, and export-import businesses were all nationalized. The land reform promulgated in 1952 had set limits on land ownership, and in 1960 these were cut in half, to 100 *feddan.* These same nationalization policies were also applied in Algeria, Libya, and Iraq, with tighter government control of the petroleum and gas industries. In the 1990s, several Arab regimes whose economic policies had been inspired by Arab socialism attempted to liberalize some sectors of their economies. These efforts were not always successful and faced stiff resistance from the bureaucracy.

In foreign policy, Arab socialism advocated a constant struggle against imperialism and Zionism. Support for the Palestinians' cause became a major issue, especially for Nasser. He and other Arab revolutionary leaders used the Palestinian issue to enhance their own power and legitimacy. Nonalignment and support for liberation movements were also goals of Arab socialist regimes. After the defeat of Arab armies by Israel in 1967, after Nasser's death in 1970, and after a bitter rivalry between the two sections of the Baʿth Party—one in Syria and the other in Iraq—Arab socialism lost much of its appeal. Lack of democracy, corrupt and huge bureaucracies, and the emergence of a new class composed of bureaucrats and army officers all contributed to the end of Arab socialism.

In the Middle East, a few political parties and regimes still claim inspiration by Arab socialism. These are the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt; the Sudanese Socialist Union in Sudan; the People's General Congress of the Socialist Jamahiriya of Libya; the National Liberation Front of Algeria; the Baʿth Party in Syria; the Revolutionary Socialist Party in Somalia; the socialist parties of Yemen, including the People's Socialist Party; and the Destour Party of Tunisia.

See also BAʿTH, AL-; COLONIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST; FREE OFFICERS, EGYPT; IMPERIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA; PALESTINE; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; ZIONISM.

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ARAB SOCIALIST RENAISSANCE PARTY

See BAʿTH, AL-

ARAB SOCIALIST UNION

Egypt's sole legal political organization, 1962–1977.

The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) was preceded by the Liberation Rally (1953–1956) and the National Union (1956–1962). All three organizations served President Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime as instruments of mass mobilization as Egypt shifted from capitalism to socialism and from a laissez-faire policy to a planned economy.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser (right) created Egypt's only legal political organization, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), two years before this 1964 meeting with President Ahmed Ben Bella (left) of Algeria and Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union. The ASU, part of Nasser's plan to make Egypt a socialist country, lasted until 1977. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

In May 1962 Nasser presented to the National Council of Popular Forces his Charter for National Action, an ideological document outlining a plan for the socialist transformation. It called for the creation of the ASU, which was to symbolize "the working forces of the people," defined as workers, peasants, intellectuals, national capitalists, and the armed forces. Because workers and peasants were to be the main beneficiaries of socialism, they were to occupy at least 50 percent of all elected posts in parliament and the ASU. Egyptians whose property had been nationalized or sequestered were declared "enemies of the people" and denied political rights. The National Council accepted the charter, with a few modifications, in July 1962.

The ASU's basic law was issued on 7 December 1962. Its organization was based on place of residence and profession, and branches (basic units) were established in villages, city quarters, schools, universities, and factories. They were organized on district, provincial, and national levels; the latter included a general committee, a supreme executive committee, a secretary-general, and a president.

In theory, the ASU was supposed to serve as the supreme authority of the state. Both parliament and the cabinet were to implement its policy decisions. In practice, however, the ASU's institutional development was confused and episodic. Its elections were not conducted on time, leaders were both elected and appointed, and for a while elected and appointed committees coexisted. In 1965 Nasser decided to establish a more radical "vanguard" organization consisting of cells whose members were appointed and whose activities were secret. In addition, the ASU created a Youth Organization as a means of recruiting and indoctrinating students and workers between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five (some of the leaders were as old as thirty-five) and set up an academic center called the Higher Institute for Socialist Studies to train future Youth Organization leaders in Nasser's doctrines and socialism.

As in many developing countries, the single party was an organization that claimed to represent the people's will. It was not intended to be an active institution with decision-making powers. Indeed, it was viewed more as a means of mobilizing political support than as a vehicle for popular par-

ticipation. Lacking any real authority, the ASU served as an appendage of the executive.

Following Egypt's defeat in the 1967 Arab–Israel War, student and worker demonstrations revealed popular discontent with the organization. Nasser agreed on 30 March 1968 to hold new ASU elections, but no drastic changes took place. After Nasser died in 1970, his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, called for a reexamination of the ASU, which both Egypt's leaders and people had come to view as ineffective. In 1971 Sayyid Marʿi, who became the ASU secretary-general after the "Corrective Revolution" had purged the leftist elements from the Egyptian government, issued a "guide for political action" that hinted at some political liberalization for the organization.

After the 1973 Arab–Israel War, Sadat spearheaded a critique of the ASU by issuing a paper on the need to reform its structure and introduce diversity into Egypt's political life. Between 1974 and 1976, politically articulate Egyptians debated the ASU's future, leading to the regime's creation of three platforms *(manabir)* within the organization: the right (under Mustafa Kamal Murad), the center (headed by Mahmud Abu Wafiyya, acting for Sadat, his brother-in-law), and the left (led by Khalid Muhyi al-Din). Satisfied with their performance in the November 1976 parliamentary elections, Sadat announced that the platforms would become political parties. Once the Parties Law was issued in May 1977, the ASU faded away. It has never been revived.

While the ASU served the Egyptian government as a means of indoctrinating the people, it did not enable Egyptian citizens to influence their leaders. It failed to promote a rigorous analysis of Egypt's society or to solve any of the country's problems.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab–Israel War (1973); Liberation Rally; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; National Union (Egypt); Sadat, Anwar al-.

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ARAB WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINE

A women's organization founded in Jerusalem in 1929 after the Wailing Wall riots.

The Arab Women's Association of Palestine (AWA) was founded in Jerusalem at the first Palestine Arab Women's Congress on 26 October 1929. The impetus for its establishment was the 1929 Western (Wailing) Wall riots and the national mobilization that came in their wake. The goals of the AWA, according to its bylaws, were to "work for the development of the social and economic affairs of the Arab women in Palestine, to endeavor to secure the extension of educational facilities for girls, [and] to use every possible and lawful means to elevate the standing of women" (Mogannam, p. 77). The AWA subsequently formed branches in most of the major cities and towns in Palestine and became the leading organization of the Palestinian women's movement during the mandate period. Its members were particularly active from 1929 to 1939 in demonstrating against the mandate; in providing support for the prisoners and rebels of the 1936 through 1939 revolt; in meeting with, writing memoranda to, and protesting to British government authorities; and in rallying international and regional support for the Palestinian national movement. The organization subsequently split into two: the AWA and the Arab Women's Union, which emerged sometime after the convening of the Eastern Women's Conference on the Palestine problem, in Cairo in 1938. The AWA continued its work as a charitable association in Jerusalem after 1948.

See also Arab Women's Executive Committee; Palestine; Zionism.

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Ellen L. Fleischmann

ARAB WOMEN'S CONGRESS

The first group of Palestinian women leaders, active during the British mandate.

Initiated in Palestine by elite Muslim and Christian women, the first Arab Women's Congress met in Jerusalem in 1929, marking the beginning of the modern Palestinian women's movement. The executive committee submitted frequent protests to British mandate authorities concerning the immigration of Jews and their land purchases, as well as general economic conditions. The congress focused on education and welfare activities.

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Steve Tamari

ARAB WOMEN'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The coordinating committee directing the women's groups that formed the Palestinian women's movement during the mandate period.

The Arab Women's Executive Committee (AWE) was formed in Jerusalem in 1929 with the aim of founding a women's movement in Palestine. The members of the committee were: Wahida al-Khalidi (president), Matiel Mogannam and Katrin Deeb (secretaries), Shahinda Duzdar (treasurer), Naʿimiti al-Husayni, Tarab Abd al-Hadi, Mary Shihada, Anisa al-Khadra, Khadija al-Husayni, Diya al-Nashashibi, Melia Sakakini, Zlikha al-Shihabi, Mrs. Kamil Budayri, Fatima al-Husayni, Zahiya al-Nashashibi, and Saʿdiyya al-Alami. Many of these women came from prominent nationalist families in Palestine, especially in the Jerusalem region. The committee planned and convened the first Palestine Arab Women's Congress in Jerusalem in 1929, during which it visited the High Commissioner of Palestine and presented its resolutions to him as a form of protest. According to the bylaws of the Arab Women's Association of Palestine (AWA), the umbrella organization for the local branches of the movement, the AWE was to be the coordinating and administrative committee for these affiliates. In actuality, the AWE was not active much beyond the early 1930s, after which the local chapters often behaved autonomously yet in cooperation with the Jerusalem AWA, which apparently took over the functions of the AWE, acting as the central coordinating body of the women's movement.

See also Arab Women's Association of Palestine; Jerusalem; Palestine; Zionism.

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Ellen L. Fleischmann

ARAB WOMEN'S SOLIDARITY ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL

International Women's Rights organization that advocates liberation of Arab women.

The Arab Women's Solidarity Association International (AWSA) was founded in Egypt in 1982 by 120 women under the leadership of Dr. Nawal al Saadawi to promote Arab women's active participation in social, economic, cultural, and political life. Its aims were to link the struggle of Arabs for liberation and freedom from economic, cultural, and media domination to the liberation of Arab women. By 1985, AWSA International had 3,000 members and was granted consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Between 1982 and 1991, AWSA International organized several international conferences, developed income-generating projects for economically underprivileged women, published liter-

ary magazines and books, and produced films about Arab women's lives. In 1991, AWSA International took a stance against the Gulf War and demanded that the UN takes a firm position against the war.

This action provoked the Egyptian government to close down *Noon,* the magazine published by the association and later to close down the association and turn its funds to an Islamic women organization. AWSA sued the government but lost the case. Egyptian government officials maintained that the banning was due to "irregularities" in AWSA's financial accounts. AWSA International's headquarters shifted to Algeria and then to Cairo by 1996.

In the United States, AWSA has two active chapters in Seattle and San Francisco with a board of directors of seven elected members. In 2001, AWSA San Francisco published a paper entitled "The Forgotten '-ism': An Arab American Women's Perspective on Zionism, Racism, and Sexism" that served as a training guide for activists. AWSA members have established Cyber AWSA in 1999, a web site and e-mail listserv that connects Arab women internationally. The Cyber AWSA listserv provides a space for Arab women and their allies to discuss and share information around issues relevant to their lives and experiences. It also serves as a springboard for activism related to Arab women's issues.

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RITA STEPHAN

ARAFAT, YASIR

[1929–]

Chairman of al-Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and president of the Palestinian Authority.

Between early 1969 and early 1994, Yasir Arafat (also Yasser Arafat) was transformed from a guerrilla leader advocating armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine to the president of the quasi-state of Palestine after negotiations with Israel, which had long denounced him as a terrorist. Despite frequent quarrels with rivals and subordinates, no other figure has been as closely identified with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Palestinian national struggle as Arafat. Born Muhammad Abd al-Raʾuf al-Arafat al-Qudwa, "Yasir" became Arafat's nickname during his early guerrilla days. He has since gone by Yasir Abd al-Raʾuf Arafat or just Yasir Arafat, except when using the nom de guerre Abu Ammar. Arafat and his family have always insisted that he was born 4 August 1929, in his mother's family home in Jerusalem. Nevertheless, an Egyptian birth registration exists, suggesting that he was born in Egypt on 24 August 1929. His father had been living in Egypt, but his mother may have returned to her home to give birth; others suspect that the record has been altered to give Arafat a Palestinian birthplace. He is, in any event, of old Palestinian lineage: The Qudwas (his father's line) are an offshoot of a Gaza branch of the Sunni Muslim al-Husayni (Husseini) family, whereas Arafat's mother came from the more prominent Jerusalem branch of the Husaynis. His father was a merchant trading in Gaza and Egypt; whether or not Arafat was born there, he spent many of his teenage years in Egypt and long had a detectable Egyptian accent. He was the sixth of seven children. In 1942, his father returned to Cairo, and Arafat continued his schooling there. He reportedly became an aide to the military leader of the Palestinian resistance, Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, a kinsman on his mother's side. The young Yasir fought with the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza during the Arab–Israel War of 1948. Following the war, the family returned to Gaza. In the 1950s, Arafat studied at Fuʾad I University in Cairo (now Cairo University), majoring in civil engineering. He was reportedly a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and also became active as a Palestinian student organizer, heading the Union of Palestinian Students from 1952 to 1957. He then served in the Egyptian army for about a year.

A master of survival, Yasir Arafat has fought for a Palestinian homeland for over forty years, finally winning the presidency of the Palestinian Authority in 1996. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

Al-Fatah and the PLO

Arafat and other Palestinian activists were in Prague in 1957 when some of their colleagues were arrested in Egypt, suspected of Muslim Brotherhood activities. Arafat and the two men who were to become his closest aides until their assassinations, Khalil al-Wazir and Salah Khalaf, remained in Europe. Arafat studied engineering further in Stuttgart and then went to Kuwait. While working for the public works department, he started his own contracting firm. This engineering firm prospered, and Arafat reportedly became quite wealthy. Some accounts suggest that his personal wealth helped fund the beginnings of al-Fatah. The nucleus of al-Fatah had already been formed in the late 1950s, by Arafat, al-Wazir, Khalaf, Khalid al-Hasan, and others in Kuwait, who would become lifelong colleagues. Initially, al-Fatah was one of many small Palestinian exile groups advocating armed struggle to free Palestine. Arafat received some training in Algeria, it is believed, and in Syria, where al-Fatah's armed wing, al-Asifa, was formed. He also was imprisoned in Syria for several weeks at this time.

After the 1967 war, al-Fatah's prominence increased greatly. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), originally created under Egyptian auspices in January 1964, was overshadowed by the new guerrilla groups, which increasingly won control of the Palestine National Council (PNC). In 1968 al-Fatah fought off an Israeli attack on a base in Karama, Jordan, and its prestige increased further. In early 1969, al-Fatah and its allies won enough seats in the PNC to elect Arafat the new chairman of the PLO's executive committee. Arafat, now head of both al-Fatah and the PLO, set up his headquarters in Amman, Jordan. In 1970, the PLO was drawn into conflict with the government of Jordan when one of its member organizations, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), hijacked several aircraft. In the ensuing Black September of 1970, the PLO was driven out of its Jordanian operational base. Arafat, who escaped from Amman, set up his new base in Beirut, while the PLO began operations against Israel from southern Lebanon. After the Arab–Israel War of 1973, some PLO leaders began discussing the possibility of a settlement short of the previously envisioned secular state in all of Palestine. On 14 November 1974, Arafat addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations, claiming that he held both "an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun."

The UN speech marked a high point, but Arafat's career took another turn downward with the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975. The PLO found itself fighting not only Maronite forces but eventually the Syrian army, though these alignments shifted as the war went on. The 1977 visit of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem and the 1978 peace between Israel and Egypt were yet further blows, and then in 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon. Having been driven from Jordan more than a decade before and besieged in Lebanon by Syrians and others from time to time, the PLO had nevertheless managed to maintain its base in Lebanon. In June 1982 Israel not only occupied all of Lebanon up to Beirut but also (unsuccessfully) tar-

geted Arafat personally. Arafat and ten thousand Palestinian fighters were evicted from Beirut in August. An attempt to form a new base in Tripoli, Lebanon, failed due to Syrian opposition and an intra-Fath mutiny, and Arafat and the PLO moved to Tunis, far from the zone of Israeli–Palestinian confrontation (although in 1985 Israel did bomb PLO headquarters there in 1985, including Arafat's compound).

In 1984, Arafat entered into negotiations with King Hussein ibn Talal of Jordan to seek a common ground for a joint Jordanian–Palestinian negotiating position—the so-called Jordanian Option. The effort failed, with Jordan blaming Arafat for the failure. In December 1987, the Intifada, or Palestinian uprising, began in the occupied territories. Although Arafat's al-Fatah was a major player in the Unified National Leadership of the Intifada, it was local cadres, not the Tunis leadership, who were in charge of the actual uprising. This led many analysts to once again predict that Arafat's days were numbered and that the central PLO leadership had lost its relevance. As in 1970, 1982, and 1984—when earlier political obituaries had been written—they were wrong. One of the strengths that had kept Arafat in his position for so long, despite squabbles, plots, and even fighting and assassinations among Palestinian factions, was his ability to forge a grand coalition of very differently oriented factions, left and right, communist and capitalist. Increasingly unable to hold such a broad umbrella group together, Arafat was finally willing to gamble on seizing a moderate, pronegotiation position despite the fact that this meant the more radical factions now considered him a curse.

Peace Negotiations

In 1988, the PLO leadership—now more and more Arafat and the old al-Fatah elite—agreed to recognize Israel's right to exist, the principle of negotiating with Israel on peace in exchange for territorial withdrawal, and a renunciation of terrorism. After some adjustment, the formula finally met the United States's preconditions for a direct dialogue with the PLO, and this dialogue began with the U.S. ambassador to Tunisia, Robert Pelletreau. It was subsequently suspended in June 1990 when Arafat failed to condemn an attack on Israeli territory by a PLO faction. When the Madrid Conference was held in October 1991 with U.S. president George H. W. Bush, the U.S.-PLO talks had been suspended and Israel's Likud government under Yitzhak Shamir adamantly refused to deal with the PLO, which was still seen as a terrorist organization. Therefore, the Palestinians were awkwardly represented in Madrid by a panel of moderate Palestinians, all of whom were acceptable to the PLO but none of whom had been formally members of it. As long as Likud was in power, they were also technically half of a "joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation." Once again, despite the insistence by the delegation that they were in coordination with the PLO leadership in Tunis, many analysts declared that Arafat and the PLO were no longer relevant to the search for a Palestinian–Israeli solution. Meanwhile, in 1992, as Arafat was flying to Sudan in a private aircraft, his plane crashed in the Libyan desert, killing the pilots and several passengers. Arafat survived, but he was badly injured and required surgery to correct further problems. His friends later indicated that his survival, when so many others had died, convinced him that he had been providentially spared for some reason. The lifelong bachelor also married, further putting his guerrilla days behind him. These factors may have helped prepare him for the decision that he soon would have to make.

As long as Likud was in power, no breakthrough was possible, and the Palestinian side of the peace talks went nowhere. But Shamir was replaced by Yitzhak Rabin and the Labor Party in 1992. Frustrated with the difficulties of negotiating with a Palestinian delegation that had little real authority to offer compromise, a secret back-channel negotiation began via Norwegian intermediaries. Ultimately, the result was the Oslo Accord, signed on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993. For the first time, Arafat—once denounced as a terrorist by U.S. presidents and forbidden entrance into the United States after his 1974 UN speech—came to the White House to be greeted by a U.S. president. Even more dramatically, at the signing of the agreement he offered his hand to Yitzhak Rabin, and Rabin accepted it, albeit with apparent reluctance. That dramatic handshake on the White House lawn underscored the fact that Arafat had survived his enemies within the PLO as well as in Israel and the United States. Arafat became the provisional

head of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which took over self-government in Jericho and Gaza in the summer of 1994 and, eventually, more of the West Bank as well. Arafat's entry into Jericho in June 1994 marked a personal vindication for Arafat, at least in his own view.

Palestinian Authority

Arafat formally was elected president of the Palestinian Authority during elections in January 1996. He oversaw the growth of a PA bureaucracy and a number of security and intelligence agencies. His leadership came under mounting criticism by Palestinians both inside and outside the PA. The most intractable were the Islamist movements HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, both of which vowed to continue attacks against Israel. These groups had the support of the Palestinian community, and Arafat had to balance the support extended by the Palestinian street with his needs both to placate his Israeli and U.S. peace partners and to maintain his tight grip on power in the PA. The failure of the peace process led to the violence of the al-Aqsa Intifada in October 2000, which in turn led to Israel's reoccupation of large parts of the PA, the destruction of its infrastructure, and the lengthy siege of Arafat's compound in Ramallah that began in 2002 and continued into 2004. Despite the efforts of Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon to ignore and isolate him, and similar efforts by U.S. president George W. Bush, Arafat has remained head of al-Fatah, the PLO, the PA, and the Palestinian national movement generally, and no one of even remotely the same stature or power has emerged to take his place.

Arafat had never married during his long guerrilla years. In 1991 or early 1992, however, he married Suha Tawil (1963–), the daughter of a PLO activist father and a lawyer mother who often represented accused Palestinians in the territories. Tawil had served as Arafat's secretary. A Christian who reportedly converted to Islam, she is more than thirty years his junior. She has given a number of interviews to the Arab and Western press (and even to the Israeli press), providing for the first time an intimate view of Arafat. A daughter, Zahwa, was born to the couple in 1994. Arafat himself is a practicing Sunni Muslim and is believed to practice his faith. After the 1992 plane crash, his religious convictions were reportedly strengthened. In his younger days he was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, but in middle age he stands staunchly against the Islamist elements in the Palestinian movement. His health has deteriorated noticeably in recent years, but he remains a survivor in a region that recently has witnessed the passing of several long-standing Arab rulers.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Black September; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Bush, George Walker; Cairo University; Fatah, al-; Gaza (City); HAMAS; Hasan, Khalid al-; Husayni, Abd al-Qadir al-; Intifada (1987–1991); Islamic Jihad; Jordanian Option; Khalaf, Salah; Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Likud; Madrid Conference (1991); Muslim Brotherhood; Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palestine National Council (PNC); Palestinian Authority (PA); Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Rabin, Yitzhak; Sadat, Anwar al-; Shamir, Yitzhak; Sharon, Ariel; Wazir, Khalil al-; West Bank.

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Michael Dunn
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

A'RAJ, WASINI AL-

[1954–]

Algerian novelist and critic.

Wasini al-Aʿraj was born on 8 August 1954, in the village of Sidi-bou-Jnan, near Tlemcen, Algeria. He received his Ph.D. in Arabic literature from the University of Damascus, and he is a professor of Arabic literature at the University of Algiers.

Al-Aʿraj, who writes in Arabic, is one of the most prolific of the new generation of Algerian writers. He initiated a new trend in the structure of the novel and experimented with its language. The most striking aspect of his style is the explosion of the rigid traditional frame of the novel. The linear approach is abandoned for a more provocative and richer technique that depends on flashbacks, fragments of history, and childhood memories intermingled with folk traditions. His innovative technique has attracted the attention of critics to his novels, which include *Waqa'i, min Awja Rajulin Ghamara Sawba al-Bahr* (Facts from the sufferings of a man who ventured toward the sea [Algiers, 1983]), *Masra' Ahlam Mariam al-Wadiʿa* (The death of sweet Myriam's dreams [Beirut, 1984]), *Jughrafia al-Ajsad al-Muhtariqa* (The geography of the burned bodies [Algiers, 1979]), and *Nuwwar al-Luz* (Almond blossoms [Beirut, 1983]).

In his collection of short stories, *Alam al-Kitaba an Ahzan al-Manfa* (The pain of writing about the sadness of exile [Beirut, 1980]), al-Aʿraj presents a highly emotional text on the theme of love of homeland, which is personified as a woman. He often employs the soliloquy, a narrative form that is more an exercise in writing than in storytelling. Even in his romance novel, *Waq al-Ahdhiya al-Khashina* (The sound of the rough shoes [Beirut, 1981]), the narration is driven rather more by literary style than by events.

Al-Aʿraj's writings criticize the shortcomings of government and its failure to fulfill the promises made during the war of independence. Some of the problems he evokes are related to the struggle of the poor and hungry to survive, a struggle that is described in his collection of short stories, *Asmak al-Barr al-Mutawahhish* (The fish of the wild land [Algiers, 1986]).

Like other writers of his generation, al-Aʿraj treats the killing of Communists who fought during the war of independence in *Ma Tabaqqa min Sirat Lakhdar Hamrouche* (Whatever is left of the biography of Lakhdar Hamrouche [Damascus, 1986]). He often uses events and characters from Arab history to evoke the Algerian present, a common trend to be found among the writers of his generation. Al-Aʿraj's latest novel (as of 1995), *Faji'at al-Layla al-Sabiʿa Baʿda al-Alf* (The tragedy of the seventh night after the thousand, 2 vols. [Algiers, 1993]), conveys his interpretation of the events of the present on the basis of the characters and events of the *Thousand and One Nights.* The time frame of the novel is stretched to encompass fourteen centuries of Islamic religion, and the Qurʾanic story of the People of the Cave and the last years of the Andalusian political life are used to allude to the atrocities committed in Algeria in the name of Islam and democracy. It is clear that al-Aʿraj wants the Arab rulers of the present to learn from history in order that they might build a better future for their peoples. His pain reveals a confused man who is grappling to find a solution to a complex situation.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN.

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AIDA A. BAMIA

ARAL, OĞUZ

[1936–]

Turkish comedian and cartoonist.

Born in Istanbul and educated at the Istanbul Academy of Fine Arts, Aral first became known in the 1950s as a cartoonist. In the early 1960s, he made his name on the Turkish stage as a comic actor and pantomime artist. Aral became editor of the political comic-strip magazine *Girgir* in 1973. Under his direction, it became one of the top-selling humor magazines in the world, reaching a circulation of 450,000 in the late 1980s. In the 1990s he established his own humor magazine, *Avni,* and returned to producing plays.

ELIZABETH THOMPSON

ARARAT, MOUNT

Mountain in eastern Turkey that figures prominently in the Bible.

Mount Ararat (in Turkish Ağri Daği) is in the province of Ağri, eastern Turkey, near the border

of Iran. First climbed in modern times in 1829, the mountain consists of two peaks—Great Ararat at 16,946 feet (5,165 m), and Little Ararat at 12,877 feet (3,927 m). According to the Book of Genesis in the Bible, Mount Ararat was the landing spot of Noah's Ark.

DAVID WALDNER

ARAZ, NEZIHE

[1922–]

Turkish journalist, biographer, and playwright.

Nezihe Araz is known for writing that is ideologically shaped by traditional Turkish and Islamic culture. Works such as *Anadolu evliyalari* (1959), *Dertli dolap—Yunus Emre'nin hayati* (1961), and *Ask Peygamberi Mevlana'nin romani* (1962) are structured around narratives about Anatolian Sufism and the two representatives of Sufi orders, Yunus Emre and Mevlana. Some of her plays have won national prizes; one of these, *Afife Jale* (1988), is based on the life of the first Muslim actress to appear on stage, who struggled with the established social mores of a society that did not allow women on stage. Other works concentrate on women's problems, including her first play, *Bozkir guzellemesi* (1975), about the struggle of women from Central Anatolia, and the later *Kuvayi milliye kadinlari,* about women in the Turkish War of Independence. *Kadin erenler* is based on the life stories of the twenty-eight women mystics in Islamic history. Araz also has written a biography and screenplay about Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's wife, Latife Hanim, whom he divorced in 1925 after only two years of marriage. The research that has inspired her plays and biographical writing is based on records collected through the family connections of her father, who was a member of parliament from the second Turkish Parliament until 1954.

See also ART; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY; THEATER; TURKEY.

AYSE DURAKBASA TARHAN

ARCH

Kabyle tribal structure.

The *arch* is a tribal structure founded on real or sometimes imagined family relationships that emerged in the Kabylic region of North Africa during the fifteenth century, when the dynastic system that had provided considerable central government control disintegrated. Free of external authority, different tribes needed to provide themselves with tools for dealing with conflict, land allocation, and other critical problems. In this context they developed relationships, and alliances merged within larger structures known as *arch* (plural, *arouch*). Under the Ottomans this sociopolitical form of organization was maintained largely intact for four centuries, but it faded away progressively during the colonial period as more and more power was assumed by the state.

In spring 2001 two events in the Kabylia, the killing by police of a high school student on 18 April and subsequent student demonstrations commemorating the 1980 Berber Spring, led to widespread demonstrations and violent repression by securty forces that resulted in the deaths of more than fifty-one and injury to some 1,500. The period and its events came to be known as Black Spring. One local response was the creation of a populist movement known as the Coordination des Archs, which resurrected the traditional institution as a vehicle for expressing the social, cultural, and political demands of the Kabyles within an Algerian system dominated by Arabs. A laterally structured organization that reached decisions by consensus, it represented Kabyles from a broad range of communities and classes in seven *wilayas* (provinces)—Tizi Ouzou, Boujaia, Bouira, Setif, Bordj, Bou Arreridj, Boumerdes, and Algiers. In its platform, elaborated in the meeting of Illoula Oumalou on 17 May 2001, this essentially pacifistic organization affirmed its autonomy from state institutions and political parties. Its tactics included boycotts of national events and holidays, sit-ins, demonstrations, and celebrations of local culture. Because of its inclusive and populist approach, the Coordination encountered a considerable amount of internal dissidence and was criticized by Berber political parties. It did, however, achieve significant success as an interlocuter with the Algerian government.

See also BERBER SPRING; BLACK SPRING.

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AZZEDINE G. MANSOUR

ARCHAEOLOGICAL MUSEUM (ISTANBUL)

A major museum complex of three pavilions.

The pavilions are the Çinili Köşk (Tiled Pavilion), which, as its name indicates, is where Turkish tiles and ceramics are displayed; the Museum of the Ancient Orient, which houses mostly Hittite and Mesopotamian antiquities; and the Archaeological Museum building, which displays classical artifacts.

The Archaeological Museum building, commissioned by the first museum director in Turkey, Osman Hadi Bey, was opened to the public in 1891. The Museum of the Ancient Orient had been first founded as the Academy for Fine Arts in 1883.

Originally the Çinili Köşk housed the Ottoman collection. The spectacular discovery of a large number of sarcophagi at the Royal Necropolis at Sidon, Lebanon, in 1887, however, together with the growing Ottoman interest in the empire's antiquity-rich hinterland, necessitated the creation of a new space. These factors led to construction of the Archaeological Museum, first named the Museum of Sarcophagi. Important architectural elements of the museum's design were inspired by two of its most famous sarcophagi—the Alexander Sarcophagus and the Sarcophagus of the Mourning Women.

The Archaeological Museum houses some 45,000 pieces: Of these, 9,000 are stone objects; 12,000 are pieces of pottery; 10,000 are terra-cotta figurines; 10,000 are metal objects; and 3,000 are glass objects. A shortage of space allows only a small portion of this collection to be displayed at any one time. The museum has a library that contains approximately 80,000 books covering a wide range of topics. The museum also has an enormous cuneiform tablet collection (about 75,000 pieces) and a rich coin collection (about 760,000 coins).

KAREN PINTO

ARCHAEOLOGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Serious archaeological inquiry in the Middle East began during the Renaissance when Europeans became interested in their Christian and classical roots.

The key sources for the Middle East's archaeological past, the Bible and Homer's *Iliad,* inspired gentlemen scholars, travelers, and, later, members of the various European diplomatic missions, to discover sites and decipher scripts that launched the newly developing discipline of archaeology. Their interest was the ancient world—the Islamic period was deemed too recent and not particularly relevant to European historical interests. Europeans collected statues, pottery, and tablets for the sake of knowledge and the glory of imperialism and shipped them back to European metropoles, often without permission of local authorities.

The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

Napoléon Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition (1798–1801) initiated the scramble for the acquisition of antiquities from the Middle East. The discovery of the trilingual Rosetta Stone enabled Jean-François Champollion to decipher ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics. French scholars continued to remain heavily involved in Egyptology on Egyptian soil until 1952. Auguste Mariette, dispatched to Egypt by the Louvre to collect papyri, received permission from Khedive Ismaʿil ibn Ibrahim to establish the Egyptian Antiquities Service (1858) and the Egyptian Museum in Cairo in 1863. His successor, Gaston Maspéro, encouraged excavation by other foreign scholars. The British established the Egyptian Exploration Fund and sent Flinders Petrie (1853–1942), who set new standards for exact recording, publishing, and the study of pottery, and founded the British School of Archaeology in Egypt.

Napoléon's short sojourn in Palestine sparked new interest in the land of the Bible, which, until then, was solely the destination of religious pilgrims. Travelers found significant sites. Johann Ludwig Burckhardt (1784–1817) located Petra, and Lady Hester Stanhope (1776–1831) visited Palmyra. The field of biblical archaeology was inaugurated by the work of Edward Robinson (1858–1931). Robinson was followed by groups of international sponsors: the American Oriental Society; the American Palestine Oriental Society; the British Palestine Exploration Fund, which began work on Jerusalem in 1867; the German Society for the Exploration of Palestine (Deutscher Palästina-Verein); the École Biblique; and the Deutsche Orient Gesellschaft, which excavated Megiddo from 1901 to 1905. Maps and surveys of Jerusalem and other sections of the Holy Land were produced during the formative period in

Wall painting from the tomb of Queen Nefertari in Egypt. Discovered in 1904, the tomb features many beautifully colored wall paintings that were restored in 1994 by the Egyptian Antiquities Organization and the Getty Conservation Institute. Admission to the tomb, which lies in Luxor's Valley of the Queens, is limited to 150 persons per day to aid in the preservation of the structure. © CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

biblical archaeology. Intense interest in the area by U.S. Protestant groups led to the establishment of various Catholic and Russian (Eastern) Orthodox institutions. Jewish archaeological work began with the formation of the Jewish Palestine Exploration Society shortly before World War I.

In Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Persia (Iran), the British, Germans, and French achieved the major breakthroughs. The British resident of the East India Company in Baghdad, Claudius James Rich (1787–1820), surveyed Babylon and published his findings in 1818. In the 1840s Paul Emile Botta (1802–1870), the French consular agent at Mosul, worked at Assyrian Nineveh, while Austen Henry Layard (1817–1894) excavated ancient Nimrud, and the French explored areas around Basra. Most of the work was sponsored by the British Museum and ceased during the Crimean War, resuming in the 1870s.

Georg Friedrich Grotefend (1775–1853) and Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson (1810–1895) worked on Old Persian and deciphered cuneiform. This could not have been accomplished without the transcriptions of Karsten Niebuhr (1733–1815) at Persepolis and Rawlinson's own painstaking copy of the inscriptions on the Behistun Rock. Cracking the cuneiform code expanded human history to prebiblical eras, and enabled Sir Leonard Woolley (1880–1960) to work on Abraham's Ur and the pre-Akkadian Sumerians. U.S. interest in Mesopotamia was fostered by the American Oriental Society, which focused on Assyria and Babylonia in addition to its goal of cultivating learning in the "Asiatic, African, and Polynesian languages."

The secular underpinnings of modern archaeology, namely that human existence predated the biblical Flood, the theory of evolution, and the categorization of human existence into the Stone, Bronze, and Iron Ages, affected the secularly oriented countries of the Middle East less than the Islamic monarchies. For the religious Muslim, the period before Islam, the *jahiliyya,* was the age of ignorance, and they had no interest in it. Egyptians, both Copts and Muslims, became interested in Egypt's pre-Islamic past very early. Rifaʿa al-Rafi al-Tahtawi, intrigued by the work on the Rosetta Stone, published a history of Egypt from the Pharoanic period and encouraged Egyptians to become involved in archaeology. Ahmad Kamal (1851–1923) established Egyptology for the Egyptians.

The Twentieth Century

Excavations in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine, were directed by Europeans. The discoveries at Byblos, Ras Shamra (Ugarit, 1929), Tall al-Hariri (Mari) in Syria, and Ebla revealed the link between ancient Semitic cultures in the Bronze Age. As a result, history was worked into pan-Arab ideology and local nationalisms. Pan-Arabism stressed the unity of pre-Islamic Semites, and Maronites in Lebanon

and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party in Syria looked to their Phoenician and Canaanite forbears. The governments of North African countries became interested in Carthaginians and the Romans who settled along the southern coast of the Mediterranean.

As Middle Eastern countries achieved independence or asserted their national identities, they began to control the study of their own pasts and to direct their own archaeological excavations. By 1936, Iraq, newly independent, placed legal restrictions on foreign excavations and in 1941, appointed Tahir Baqir curator of the Iraqi National Museum in Baghdad and editor of *Sumer* (founded in 1945), which was devoted to investigating the Mesopotamian past. This study was continued under the Baʿth Party. Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq, used archaeology to stress the unity of ancient Mesopotamia in a country beset by ethnic and religious strife and, in pan-Arab terms, to emphasize Iraq's glorious Semitic past as opposed to Iran's later development. In spite of almost constant war since 1980, Saddam renovated the National Museum, designated the State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage to control all excavations, renovations, and tours to sites, and began rebuilding Babylon, completing the Ishtar Gate, amphitheater, ziggurat, and Ishtar Temple, in order to stress the city's special significance in Mesopotamian history.



Nestled in the mountains of Jordan lie the ruins of Petra (known in the Bible as Sela), a fortress city carved out of high sandstone cliffs that once controlled the main commercial routes in the region. The ruins were rediscovered in 1812 by the Europeans, but were not fully surveyed and classified until the beginning of the twentieth century. © JOSE FUSTE RAGA/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Until the early 1960s, archaeology in Iran was dominated by the French, who began to excavate at Susa in the nineteenth century. In 1961 the government established a department of archaeological services and the Iran Bastan Museum in Tehran. By then, under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran's Persian past was stressed almost to the exclusion of its Islamic significance. The Islamic religious population was angered by the intensive linguistic study, additional excavations at Siyalk, Tepe Yahya, and Marlik, and the lauding of the Pahlavis as successors to a long line of Persian dynasties whose capital at Persepolis was used as the setting for the 2,500th anniversary party of ancient Persian rule. Since the overthrow of the shah in 1979 and the establishment of a theocratic regime in Iran, there has been little concern with the country's pre-Islamic roots.

Biblical archaeological research continued during the British mandate for Palestine, on both sides of the Jordan River. William Foxwell Albright's work on ancient Moab in Transjordan (Jordan) and in the Dead Sea area complemented Kathleen Kenyon's excavations at Jericho. The Jewish Palestine Exploration Society, founded in 1914 by Nahum Slouschz, undertook its first excavations at Hammath-Tiberias in 1921, and by 1928, the archaeology department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem was headed by noted Jewish scholar E. L. Sukenik. Noted Palestinian Arab archaeologists during the mandate included Tawfiq Canaan, Dmitri Baramki, and Stephen Hanna Stephan. The Rockefeller Museum (later called the Palestinian Archaeological Museum), situated in what became in Israeli-occupied East Jerusalem after 1967, became a major repository for biblical artifacts.

A sixth-century wall relief in ancient Persia's capital, Persepolis, depicts figures climbing a stone staircase with offerings to the king. Excavation and documentation at Persepolis began in earnest in the 1930s. © CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Archaeology in Israel remains focused on religious history, primarily of the Jewish and early Christian periods. Politically, excavations at biblical sites of the Megiddo of King Solomon, patriarchal Tel-Sheva at Beersheba, and at Davidic and Second Temple Jerusalem serve to authenticate Zionist claims to the land. Yigael Yadin's finds at Masada proved the existence of the heroic Jew—a counterfoil to the Holocaust victim—and provided physical evidence for the histories of Jewish Roman historian Josephus Flavius. The Dead Sea Scrolls, housed in the Shrine of the Book at the Israel Museum, focus on the origins of Christianity.

Heinrich Schliemann's excavations at Hissarlik (thought to be Troy) and Hugo Winckler's identification of the Hittite capital Hattusas at Bogazköy in 1905 sparked interest in the multicultural antecedents of Anatolia, which only recently was inhabited by the Turks. Saudi Arabia had explored early sites on the pilgrimage routes to the Hijaz, and in the late 1960s become interested in the significance of the Arabian peninsula in the development of human civilization. In the mid-1970s the Saudi government sponsored surveys of pre-Islamic sites in the peninsula and scholarly work on the Nabateans and early Semitic peoples. Kuwait, Oman, and some of the United Arab Emirates began collecting Islamic antiquities and opened museums, such as the Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyya in Kuwait.

Politics of Archaeology in the Middle East

Archaeological sites and finds have provoked controversy in the Middle East. Whereas governments and political movements in the region have used archaeology and archaeological artifacts to bolster their ideological claims, terrorists have targeted archaeological and cultural sites, sometimes in an effort to kill Western tourists and disrupt tourism. In November 1997 seventy-one people died in an attack on tourists at the Luxor temple site in Egypt. Islamic militants are assumed to have been the culprits. In late 1999 Jordanian officials uncovered a plot by the al-Qaʿida network to attack tourists at several biblical sites in the country.

The theft and/or destruction of archaeological artifacts and cultural heritage items, particularly during wartime, also has created political storms in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Washington Pact of 1935 deal with the necessity of belligerent powers to protect one another's cultural property. The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (14 May 1954; entered in effect 7 August 1956) also forbids the removal of cultural artifacts by an occupying power. The Arab–Israel conflict has been particularly fraught with violations of these policies. Both Israeli and Jordanian authorities failed to prevent the desecration or destruction of religious sites and cemeteries in Jerusalem (and elsewhere) after the first Arab–Israel War in 1948. After Israel's occupation of the West Bank, including the eastern half of Jerusalem, in June 1967, Israeli archaeologists carried out numerous digs in the territory; Palestinians claimed they were pillaging their cultural artifacts. So sensitive has the issue of ownership of these items become that the Israeli–Palestinian peace process that began in 1993 early on addressed continued Israeli digs in certain areas. The Department of Antiquities of the Palestinian Authority has expressed its desire to regain items excavated from the West Bank by the Israelis, if and when a final peace treaty is signed. Palestinians also have expressed fears that digs in Jerusalem could com-

promise the structural integrity of important Islamic shrines nearby. For example, Israel's opening of an ancient tunnel in the city near al-Haram al-Sharif prompted disturbances in September 1996. Archaeological digs have also provoked violent confrontations among Jews in Israel, particularly in Jerusalem, where religious Jews have battled Israeli police over archaeological digs in areas deemed by some to be ancient Jewish cemeteries. Finally, some have complained that Israeli and Western archaeological activity has ignored the Islamic and Ottoman periods in favor of Biblical excavations.

One related issue rose to the international level. When Israel took over the Rockefeller Museum in East Jerusalem in 1967, the museum and its artifacts were incorporated into the Israeli Department of Antiquities and administered by the Israel Museum. Israel confiscated the Rockefeller Museum on the grounds that it was the property of the conquered Jordanian government (Jordan nationalized the museum in November 1966). When the Israel Museum tried to include some items from the Rockefeller Museum in a 1985 exhibition in the United States titled "Treasures from the Holy Land: Ancient Art from the Israel Museum," the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York challenged Israel's acquisition of some of the items. The United States's Smithsonian Institution then agreed to host the exhibit the following year, but objected to the inclusion of eleven artifacts from the Rockefeller Museum. Israel refused to change the exhibition, which consequently was canceled.

Other examples of the theft of cultural property or destruction of archaeological sites abound. In October 2000 during the al-Aqsa Intifada, Palestinians sacked Joseph's Tomb, the reputed tomb of the biblical figure Joseph, in the West Bank city of Nablus, completely destroying the shrine that was venerated by Jews. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1991, Iraqi museum officials carted away the contents of the Kuwait National Museum and Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyya to Baghdad. The collections were returned after the Gulf War by the United Nations Return of Property (UNRP) agency, although fifty-nine valuable items were missing. During the U.S. invasion of Iraq in Spring 2003 there was an international furor when Iraqi museums were looted after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. As the occupying power, the United States was responsible for securing these storehouses of archaeological and cultural treasures dating back 5,000 years, but in April 2003 the National Museum in Baghdad was looted by common pilferers and professional art thieves who stole nearly 15,000 artifacts. Although some precious objects had been hidden by museum employees and were recovered, more than 10,000 items were still missing by September 2003. These included the world's oldest example of representational sculpture, the Sumerian Warka Mask (3500 B.C.E.), and the Akkadian Bassetki Statue (2300 B.C.E.). Not all examples of destruction or theft occurred during wartime. In March 2001 the Taliban regime in Afghanistan destroyed 1,500-year-old statues of the Buddha in its own city of Bamyan because they were deemed idols that were offensive to Islam.

Despite such setbacks, virtually every country in the Middle East has established its own department of antiquities, where local employees either undertake or supervise foreign work, and they have enacted strict legislation against the export of national historical treasures. Countries have also worked with international agencies to save cherished monuments, including in Iraq, where Interpol tracked down some of the items looted from the National Museum in Baghdad. By November 2003 more than 3,400 items from the museum had been recovered, including the Warka Mask and the Bassetki Statue.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab–Israel Conflict; Bamyan; Basra; Beersheba; Bonaparte, Napoléon; Copts; Crimean War; Dead Sea; Dead Sea Scrolls; Egyptian Museum; Haram al-Sharif; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hijaz; Hussein, Saddam; Isma^cil ibn Ibrahim; Jericho; Jerusalem; Luxor; Mariette, Auguste; Maronites; Masada; Maspéro, Gaston; Mosul; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Palestinian Authority; Palestinians; Palmyra; Petra; Rockefeller Museum; Syrian Social Nationalist Party; Tahtawi, Rifaʿa al-Rafi al-; Taliban; Tiberias; West Bank; Yadin, Yigael.

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REEVA S. SIMON
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

ARCHITECTURE

An area of great cultural creativity.

The architecture and city planning of the countries of North Africa and the Middle East are steeped in a history that has been marked by the development of Arab and Islamic culture since the seventh century. The architectural and urban traditions generated by this culture produced a remarkable built environment—composed of beautiful monuments of the Islamic art—and spatial typologies. Since the nineteenth century, this architectural inheritance has cohabited with and contrasted with a contemporary architecture that was produced on the one hand by an endogenous dynamics of "Westernization" developed during the Ottoman imperial period, and on the other hand by different forms of colonial domination (mainly French and British).

Since the independence of the region's countries, architecture has been the product of essentially two tendencies. In the vernacular, "minor" architecture, age-old traditions rooted in the materials, climate, and social structure of the local environment mark buildings in both rural areas and in new urban districts, where the self-construction is encouraged. There, the population produces an architecture without architects, and old forms cohabit, harmoniously or in a disjointed way, with modern structures. By contrast, in official, "major" architecture, buildings whose construction relied on governmental or institutional patronage have undergone a metamorphosis that has altered dramatically historical traditions and reflects the increasing impact of international styles and construction methods.

In addition to this influence, during the last thirty years the rate of construction in this part of the world has been intense, so architectural development has been rapid and buildings production radically transformed. However, as Udo Kultermann explained in *Contemporary Architecture in the Arab States,* this "rapidity and gigantic dimension of the transformation caused problems, among them waste, inefficiency, and misstated priorities, [and] the focus of international architectural activity shifted from Europe and North America to the Arab states as the world elite of the architectural profession competed with each other and with the emerging generation of Arab architects" (p. 1).

The Islamic Legacy

In the contemporary architecture, the influence of the Islamic legacy and local traditions is apparent not only superficially, in building forms and ornaments; instead, it affects the very design process. It "became, as the Aga Khan said, an instinctive manner of expression for any architect designing anywhere in the Islamic world" (The Aga Khan, 1979, cited by Kultermann, p.4). Old principles that governed the organization of space and the Isalmic aesthetic are actualized according to modern building requirements and are reintroduced to satisfy the religious rules and the climate. In addition, new buildings are least likely to complement the existing buildings so changes to the city environment are generally made house by house, block by block, and not by urban overhaul. If planned buildings are close to cities' historic districts, architects and governments build with care and sensitivity, but in cities' peripheries, they often propose buildings that do not correspond to the population's needs or lifestyles.

The Colonial Legacy

Even before the establishment of colonial empires in the Middle East, economic decline had reduced the quantity and quality of official patronage of architecture. Simultaneously, European styles influenced the building of European embassies and commercial concerns and the way that official patronage relied upon architects and builders who had traveled or studied in Europe, European publications on architecture, and changing tastes in Islamic courts. In the Ottoman Empire, for example, the Balyan family provided three generations of official architects for the sultans beginning in 1822, producing mosques, palaces, and other official buildings that reflected a mixture of European styles.

The Shahid Motahari Mosque in the Iranian capital of Tehran was built in the thirteenth century during the Qajar period. The mosque and school consists of chambers, porticos, a palace for prayer, a reputable library, and eight minarets from which the city can be viewed. © PAUL ALMASY/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

European governments, banks, commercial trading enterprises, and missionary institutions began to erect buildings in the European style. French styles prevailed in Algeria and later in the Maghrib; the style of the Balyans and later the Italian architect Montani gained currency in the Ottoman capital of Constantinople (now Istanbul); in Egypt, Muhammad Ali (r. 1805–1848) favored buildings in a Europeanized Ottoman style, and the Khedive Isma^cil ibn Ibrahim (r. 1863–1879), who had studied in Europe, imported European architects to build his palaces and to make over modern Cairo in the image of Paris under the Second Empire. Elsewhere on the Mediterranean littoral, and to an extent in

Iran, French, Italian, and British architectural ideas left their stamp on museums and government buildings.

Nationalism and Architecture

By the end of the nineteenth century, European architectural ideas had provoked reactions from Middle Eastern architects and from Europeans who were sensitive to local traditions. Moreover, as the neo-Islamic building style gained popularity in Europe in the nineteenth century, it began to appear in the Middle East as well. In Egypt a substantial number of Islamic Revival buildings were erected by local and foreign architects in Cairo and in Alexandria; these used European construction methods and floor plans but were decorated with Islamic motifs. Examples include Alfonso Manescalo's Islamic Museum (1903–1904) and Mahmud Fahmi's Awqaf Ministry building (after 1898). In the Ottoman Empire a revival of governmental patronage in the late nineteenth century led to an early-twentieth-century Ottoman Revival style, whose chief practitioners were the architects Kemalettin Bey and Mehmet Vedat, and to a new-Islamic style that drew its inspiration from Spain and the Maghrib, exemplified by the Valide Mosque (1873) by Montani, and by the mid-nineteenth-century neo-Marinid gateway to what is now Istanbul University. In Casablanca, the Law Courts and other official buildings that were built under the French protectorate reflected an attempt to understand and to promote "appropriate" local styles.

Nationalist architecture in the Middle East emerged during the twentieth century. The Ottoman Revival under the Young Turks in the early twentieth century manifested a new Turkish nationalism and sparked a tradition reflected today in the neo-Ottoman contemporary buildings of Sedad Hakki Eldem, such as his many Bosporus villas *(yah)* and the massive central complex of Istanbul University. After the Atatürk revolution, German architects were invited to devise a city plan for modern Ankara; public monuments in European styles often drew upon what their designers believed were the pre-Islamic Hittite and Assyrian traditions of Anatolia.

Similar attention to the pre-Islamic past was seen in the architecture of Iran under the Pahlavis, where the monarchy stressed cultural continuity not only with the Safavid Islamic past but also with a Persian heritage stretching back to Cyrus the Great. The government of Reza Pahlavi spent vast sums on restoring monuments, especially those that had been built with earlier royal patronage, while largely adopting the modern international style in its new institutional buildings. The regime's Islamic successor has produced no significant architecture that indicates its own political and religious agenda, mostly because of the country's economic decline and the demands of its war with Iraq.

Morocco's independence from the French, gained in 1956, led to a pronounced nationalism in architecture, first expressed in the tomb complex of Muhammad V in Rabat, and in the 1990s in a series of laws that required that the construction budgets for all institutional and governmental buildings allot a substantial percentage of funds to strictly defined traditional Moroccan crafts.

In Egypt, by contrast, the revolution of the 1950s led to a socialist government whose official architecture often imitated the monumental style popular in the Soviet Union, best exemplified in the massive and forbidding Central Government Building in Cairo. National revolutions thus developed architectural patronage that reflected their own ideologies. For example, the secularist Baʿthist regime in Iraq, when it drew on the past for inspiration, typically looked to the neo-Babylonian period rather than to traditional Islam, a tendency that increased under the government of Saddam Hussein. In a parallel though far less pronounced tendency, Egypt has sought pharaonic inspiration for building styles and public monuments. In Central Asia, Russia first pushed its Stalinist architectural agenda, then later espoused the Soviet version of modernism. At the same time, the Soviet governments in Central Asia put significant effort into restoring Islamic monuments such as the giant mosque of Bibi Khanym in Samarkand, and religious monuments in Tashkent and Bukhara.

Contemporary Dilemmas

Middle Eastern attempts to adapt modern Western architecture often conflicts with the desire to bring about a renaissance of traditional architecture, or to produce a modern Islamic architecture that can

The Süleymaniye Mosque in Istanbul, Turkey, was commissioned in 1550 by Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent and completed seven years later. Sinan, the mosque's master architect, used four main columns to support the structure: one from Baʿalbak, one from Alexandria, and two from ancient Byzantine palaces. **© Lawrence Manning/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

keep its distinctive local or regional style while drawing upon the best of the new technology. There have been several institutional attempts to deal with this dilemma, but none has been more influential than the Aga Khan Awards, established in the late 1970s by the leader of the world's Ismaʿili Muslims. Beginning in 1980 an international jury composed of architects and others from the Islamic world, Europe, and the United States has periodically awarded prizes for contemporary Middle Eastern architecture that best reflects Islamic traditions and values combined with artistic distinction. The honored styles have varied widely, from the neotraditionalist architecture of Hassan Fathy in Egypt, typified in his buildings for the Wissa Wassef Foundation in Harraniya, near Giza, to the technically and formally avant-garde water towers designed for Kuwait City by the Swedish firm VBB. In general, the juries have shown remarkable breadth of vision and have taken an inclusive and eclectic (rather than ideological and purist) approach to the enormous range of distinctive modern Middle Eastern architectural styles. Awards have been given for domestic architecture, historical restoration, institutional buildings, adaptive reuse, and commercial buildings. The first awards were memorialized in 1983 in a publication edited by Renata Holod; subsequent years' awards, and other subjects of Middle Eastern architecture, have been featured in the periodical *Mimar: Architecture in Development* (up to 1994).

Three main issues confront governments, patrons, architects, and urban planners in the Middle East today. The first is how and whether there should be an ideology of architecture; the answer in Morocco has been an unequivocal yes, reflected in neotraditionalist building codes that emphasize traditional ornament and decorative crafts while utilizing modern technology to the fullest. For example, the mosque of Hassan II in Casablanca (thought of

as a pendant to the impressive twelfth-century ruins of the Almohad mosque in Rabat), although constructed in classical Moroccan forms and proportions with classical decoration, is an outsized reinforced-concrete giant whose skyscraper minaret is surmounted by a huge laser that sends beams far into the sky. Its construction has been hailed for its Islamic symbolism and condemned for its extravagance during a time of financial difficulties. Similar ideology prevailed in the reconstruction of the two major pilgrimage shrines in Mecca and Medina by the Saudi government. Although they greatly facilitate the comfort and ease (if not the safety) of vastly increased numbers of pilgrims, these structures, lavish in size and decoration and traditional in style, raise more questions than they answer about the future of Middle Eastern religious architecture.

Examples of the opposite approach, which could be termed "creative pluralism," are found in Turkey and Tunisia, where many different styles, structures, and forms of decoration exist side by side in a creative mixture. The issue remains: Is appropriate architecture to consist of a traditional decorative veneer on what are essentially Western buildings in plan and construction, or is the new architecture of the Middle East going to be based from the ground up on the rich mosaic of social, environmental, and historical traditions? In fact, with few exceptions, local vernacular architecture is disappearing, replaced by undistinguished modern structures or by an equally alien homogenized national traditionalism that often consists of little more than employing the arch solely as a decorative device on building surfaces.

The second issue is curricula in architectural schools and colleges. The twentieth-century conflict about the role of teaching and learning the art and architecture of the past exists in the Middle East as it does elsewhere; the almost universal acceptance of Western-originated construction techniques and equipment (reinforced concrete, steel, glass, the tower crane, and so on) lends an almost surreal quality to some of these debates, and the issues often have been obscured as much as illumined by the polemics against the West exercised by individuals such as the late Ismaʿil Faruqi. The dialectic between historicism and artistic creativity is as old as art itself, however, and these debates are bound to survive as an essential part of the creative process.

The third issue is one that confronts architects and patrons everywhere. Even an examination of the record of the Aga Khan Awards demonstrates an impressive array of beautiful structures that are creative in design and impressive in sensitivity to tradition, but for the most part, whether they are private houses or public monuments, expensive to construct and affordable to few. Whether architecture in the Middle East can fulfill its implicit role—to provide decent housing and urban environments for exploding populations while reflecting its national and local traditions and remaining affordable—is a dilemma that will not easily be resolved.

See also Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Balyan Family; Baʿth, al-; Eldem, Sedad Hakki; Fahmi, Mahmud Pasha; Hussein, Saddam; Ismaʿil ibn Ibrahim; Istanbul University; Kemalettin Bey; Muhammad Ali; Pahlavi, Reza; Young Turks.

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Walter Denny
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ARD, AL-

A Palestinian political movement within Israel.

Al-Ard (Arabic, "the Land") was a pan-Arab nationalist movement supportive of Egyptian presi-

dent Gamal Abdel Nasser that emerged in 1959 among Palestinian citizens in Israel. It not only challenged the legitimacy of Israel; it also opposed the traditional leadership of the Palestinian community in Israel, which it accused of cooperating with the Israelis. Al-Ard also presented an alternative to the communists, who had dominated Arab politics in Israel. Leading figures included Sabri Jiryis, Habib Qahwaji, Salih Baransi, Mansur Qardawsh (also Kardosh), and Muhammad Miʿari.

Israeli authorities banned al-Ard in 1964. The following year, al-Ard tried to field a list of candidates for the Knesset elections of 1965 using the new name the Arab Socialist List, but the Israeli authorities banned it once again. Some of the leaders, like Miʿari, went on to form the Progressive List for Peace in the early 1980s.

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ARENS, MOSHE

[1925–]

Israeli politician and cabinet minister.

Born in Lithuania, Moshe Arens immigrated to the United States in 1939 and to Israel in 1948. Having received his academic training at the Massachusetts and California Institutes of Technology, he was professor of aeronautical engineering at Haifa University from 1958 to 1961. He was vice president of Israeli Aircraft Industries from 1962 until 1971. Arens was elected to the Knesset in 1977 and served as chair of the Herut central committee from 1977 to 1978. From 1977 to 1982, he was also chair of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. Hawkish in his security views, Arens opposed the 1978 Camp David Accords in the Knesset vote. During Israel's invasion of Lebanon (1982–1983), he was ambassador to the United States. He returned to Israel to become minister of defense (1983–1984), replacing Ariel Sharon. In the National Unity Government (1984–1986) Arens was a minister without portfolio, and in 1986 was placed in charge of Arab affairs. From 1988 to 1990 he was foreign minister, and in 1990 once again was appointed minister of defense.

See also Camp David Accords (1978); Knesset.

Martin Malin

ARFA, HASAN

[1895–1986]

An Iranian general; supporter of Pahlavi dynasty.

Born in Tbilisi, Georgia, of an Anglo-Russian mother and Iranian father, Hasan Arfa was a career military officer in the Iranian army and retired with the rank of general. His mother, Ludmilla Jervis, was the daughter of a British diplomat and a Russian woman of the aristocratic Demidov family. His father, Reza Khan Arfa al-Dowleh, was an Iranian diplomat serving as counsul-general in Tbilisi; he later served as ambassador to Turkey and Russia. Arfa's parents divorced in 1900, after Arfa and his mother had moved to Paris, but the senior Arfa al-Dowleh provided comfortable homes in Europe for them.

Arfa received his early education from tutors and later attended private schools in Switzerland, Paris, and Monaco. From 1912 to 1914, he attended the Military Academy in Istanbul. After arriving in Iran in 1914, he joined the Imperial Guards, and during the early part of World War I that organization sponsored his training as a cavalry officer with the Swiss army. He joined the Iranian gendarmerie in 1920, and later joined the army. As a cavalry officer, he campaigned against rebellious tribes in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Lorestan, and Turkoman Sahara during the 1920s and rose rapidly through the ranks.

The Pahlavis

Arfa first met Reza Shah Pahlavi (ruled 1926–1941), who was then minister of war, at the outset of the campaign against the Kurds in 1921. Reza Shah's forceful character left a deep impression on him,

and Arfa remained a loyal supporter of the Pahlavis throughout his life. In 1923, Arfa married Hilda Bewicke, a British ballerina in Sergei Pavlovich Diaghilev's Russian Ballet whom he met in Monaco; they had one daughter, Leila. He subsequently served a brief tour in 1926 as military attaché in London and attended the Staff College in Paris from 1927 to 1929. After his training in France, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and placed in command of the newly formed Pahlavi Guards Cavalry Regiment, which he turned into a highly disciplined and professional unit. Reza Shah made him commandant of the Military Academy and in 1932 promoted him to the rank of colonel. In 1934, Arfa accompanied Reza Shah on his official visit to Turkey. He was appointed inspector general of the cavalry and armed forces in 1936 and promoted to general in 1939. During the joint Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in August 1941, the shah appointed Arfa chief of staff in charge of the defenses for Tehran. After the British and Soviets defeated the Iranian army and forced Reza Shah to abdicate, his son and successor, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1941–1979), appointed Arfa chief of military intelligence.

Arfa became involved in national politics during the 1940s and 1950s. As chief of the general staff from 1944 to 1946, he authorized the supply of weapons to the Shahsavan tribesmen who opposed the autonomous government of Azerbaijan. In early 1946, Arfa was instrumental in gathering signatures of parliamentary deputies for a petition supporting Iran's complaint before the United Nations Security Council that Soviet forces continued to occupy northern Iran in contravention of an agreement to withdraw. Arfa's actions placed him in the camp of political leaders who tended to perceive malevolent intentions in Soviet policies but benign intentions in British policies. The pro-Soviet/anti-British politicians denounced Arfa in the parliament and the press, and consequently Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam insisted that Arfa be dismissed from his post as chief of the general staff. In 1946, Arfa was imprisoned for seven months. He was eventually exonerated, but he was retired summarily from active duty in March 1947.

Arfa blamed his successor, Gen. Ali Razmara, for his forced retirement and subsequently cooperated with his political rivals, especially after Razmara was appointed prime minister in 1950. Nevertheless, Arfa genuinely was disturbed when Razmara was assassinated in 1951, because he believed the increasing level of political violence threatened the country. He served as minister of roads and communications in the brief government of Prime Minister Hosayn Ala during the month following Razmara's assassination, before the parliament voted in Mohammad Mossadegh as premier. Arfa distrusted Mossadegh and formed a political group, the National Movement, to disrupt gatherings of Mossadegh supporters, whom he considered to be extremists opposed to the continuation of the monarchy and a strong army. The National Movement's newspaper published many articles written by Arfa, supporting the shah and respect for Islam. Arfa maintained contact with a variety of political activists, including Mozaffar Baqai of the Toilers' party, the fiery preacher Ayatollah Sayyed Abu al-Qasem Kashani, and Shaban Jaafari, an organizer of street mobs. Arfa became a founding member of the secret committee of military officers, the Committee to Save the Fatherland, formed in 1952 with the objective of overthrowing Mossadegh. Following the 1953 military coup that restored the shah to power, he served as Iran's ambassador to Turkey (1958–1961) and Pakistan (1961–1962). Subsequently he retired from active government service. He left Iran at the time of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and died in France in 1986.

See also Azerbaijan Crisis; Iranian Revolution (1979); Kashani, Abu al-Qasem; Mossadegh, Mohammad; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Pahlavi, Reza.

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Eric Hooglund

ARFA, MUHAMMAD IBN

[1877–?]

Interim puppet ruler of Morocco, 1953–1955.

A relatively unknown member of the Alawi dynasty, Muhammad ibn Arfa was selected by Tuhami al-

Glawi and other supporters of French colonialism in Morocco to replace Sultan Muhammad V, who was forced to abdicate in 1953. Following several attempts on his life and amid the mounting pressures of Moroccan nationalism, ibn Arfa was removed in October 1955, to be replaced by the restored Muhammad V, who ruled as king until his death in 1961, when his son Hassan II assumed the throne.

See also HASSAN II; MUHAMMAD V; TUHAMI AL-GLAWI.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON

ARGOUD, ANTOINE

[1914–]

French officer during Algerian War of Independence.

Antoine Argoud is a graduate of the prestigious Ecole Polytechnique and an outstanding staff officer who became politicized to the cause of French Algeria. He supported the January 1960 settler *(pied-noir)* revolt against President Charles de Gaulle and was one of the French planners and participants of the unsuccessful April 1961 putsch against the government. He then joined the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS). He escaped Algeria and reached West Germany. He was kidnapped by French agents in 1963, brought back to France, and received a life sentence. He was released as a result of the amnesty of 1968. He has authored *La décadence, l'imposture et la tragédie* (1974; Decadence, imposture, and tragedy) and *Les deux missions de Jeanne d'Arc* (1988; The two missions of Joan of Arc). Although he opposed clandestine summary excecutions during the war, Argoud remains a defender of most military actions in French Algeria. He regrets that the military did not receive clear governmental guidance and support.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

ARIF, ABD AL-RAHMAN

[1916–]

President of Iraq, 1966–1968.

Abd al-Rahman Arif was born in Baghdad to a poor Sunni Arab rug merchant. Graduating from the military academy in 1937, he followed an undisturbed military career, both under the monarchy and the republic of Iraq. He joined a clandestine Free Officers organization before the revolution in 1958. After the Ramadan Revolution of 1963, he replaced his deceased younger brother Abd al-Salam Arif as president of the republic in April 1966. Under Abd al-Rahman, Iraq retained close ties with Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt, but carefully refrained from any unification steps (to join the United Arab Republic). A less capable leader than his brother, he lost power to the Baʿth party in July 1968; his downfall was accelerated by Iraq's ineffective participation in the Arab–Israel War of June 1967. He stayed in Ankara until 1980, when he was allowed to return to Baghdad, where he has lived in retirement.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967); ARIF, ABD AL-SALAM; BAʿTH, AL-; IRAQ.

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AMATZIA BARAM

ARIF, ABD AL-SALAM

[1921–1966]

President of Iraq, 1963–1966.

Abd al-Salam Arif was born in al-Karkh, Baghdad, to a poor Sunni Arab rug merchant. His family had strong tribal connections in the Ramadi province (west of Baghdad) of Iraq. From 1938 to 1941, he attended military college. While he was too junior to be held responsible for the Rashid Ali al-Kaylani pro-Axis revolt of 1941, Abd al-Salam strongly sympathized with the revolutionaries. He first met Abd

al-Karim Qasim in 1942. In 1948, Arif participated in the Iraqi Expeditionary Force that fought in the first Arab–Israel war.

Because of Qasim's insistence, Arif was incorporated into the central organization of the Free Officers in 1957. Until the 1958 revolution, he was regarded as Qasim's protégé. On the eve of the revolution (14 July), Arif's brigade was ordered to move to Jordan through Baghdad, but in coordination with Qasim, he entered the city and took it during the early morning hours. In the revolutionary government, he became deputy prime minister of the interior, and deputy supreme commander of the armed forces. By September 1958, he was relieved of all his posts, since he supported Iraq's unification with the United Arab Republic. In November, he was arrested and sentenced to death for attempting to kill Qasim; but he was released in early 1961, to be made figurehead president by the Baʿth regime that toppled Qasim in the Ramadan Revolution of 8 February 1963. Later that year, he ousted the Baʿth from power and became sole leader. His power base was the loyalty of the Pan-Arabian army officers, most of whom came from his family's region, Ramadi.

In 1964, he signed a unification agreement with Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser and introduced social and economic changes designed to create a similar system to that of Egypt; these included the establishment of a Nasserite political party and wide-ranging nationalizations. Actual unification with Egypt never materialized, however. His social policy caused an economic decline, and his attempt to crush the Kurdish revolt failed. Arif was killed in a helicopter crash on 13 April 1966. Despite his many failures, his charisma and devotion to Islam were highly regarded by many Sunni Arabs in Iraq. The Shiʿites feared him, but his religiosity and tolerance for their educational autonomy enabled the two Islamic sects to coexist. He was succeeded by his older brother Abd al-Rahman Arif.

See also ARIF, ABD AL-RAHMAN; KURDISH REVOLTS; PAN-ARABISM; QASIM, ABD AL-KARIM.

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AMATZIA BARAM

ARIF, ARIF AL-
[1892–1973]

Palestinian historian, administrator, and journalist who became mayor of Arab Jerusalem in the 1950s.

Arif began his political career in his native Jerusalem as editor of the first Arab nationalist newspaper in Palestine, *Suriyya al-Janubiyya,* in 1919. He was a supporter of unity with Syria and of the Amir Faisal of the short-lived Arab Kingdom in Syria (later King Faisal I ibn Hussein of Iraq). He fled from British rule in Palestine to Syria with al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni after political disturbances in 1920, although he was allowed to return and began a career as a civil administrator in Palestine. He served in a variety of posts in Jenin, Nablus, Baysan, Jaffa, Beersheba, Gaza, Ashkelon, and Ramallah. He served briefly in Transjordan from 1926 to 1928 and was mayor of Jordanian-controlled East Jerusalem from 1949 to 1955.

Al-Arif was also one of the most prominent Palestinian historians. Among his most important books are *Taʾrikh Biʾr al-Sab wa Qabaʾiliha* (History of Beersheba and its tribes, 1934), *Taʾrikh Ghazza* (History of Gaza, 1934), *al-Mufassal fi Taʾrikh al-Quds* (History of Jerusalem, 1961), and the seven-volume *Taʾrikh al-Nakba* (History of the disaster, 1956–1962).

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STEVE TAMARI
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

ARISH, CONVENTION OF AL- (1800)

Agreement between France and the Ottoman Empire, providing for the French retreat from Egypt.

Napoléon Bonaparte and his troops had invaded Egypt in 1798. Besieged by British and Ottoman

forces, his successor, General Jean-Baptiste Kléber, negotiated the terms of French withdrawal. The Convention of al-Arish, signed by Kléber and the Ottoman grand vizier Yusuf on 24 January 1800, allowed for a dignified retreat of France from Egypt.

The convention was rejected by both Napoléon and Britain and, within a year, the French were completely defeated and evicted from Egypt.

See also KLÉBER, JEAN-BAPTISTE.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

ARKOUN, MOHAMMED

[1928–]

French-Algerian Islamic teacher and writer.

Mohammed Arkoun was born in 1928 in Algeria. He received his doctorate in Islamic studies from the Sorbonne in Paris and joined its faculty in 1963, teaching courses in Islamic thought. His writing is greatly influenced by French philosophy, especially that of Michel Foucault, whose thinking he tries to apply to the study of Islamic legal and philosophical traditions. Arkoun's writings are varied and cover a wide array of Islamic subjects. He believes that the study of Islam should be freed from the monopoly of interpretations exercised by the state-sponsored clerical establishment, which promotes a particularly conservative interpretation of Islam, and he calls for an "audacious, free, productive" thinking on Islam. Arkoun argues for multiple interpretations of tradition and text, and he is a proponent of both multiculturalism and secularism (although he avoids using the Arabic word *ilmaniyya* because it is widely equated with unbelief).

In recent years Arkoun has traveled widely, teaching and lecturing in the United States and Europe and serving for a time as a leader of a Muslim center in the Netherlands. Arkoun was the only male Muslim member of the twenty-person presidential commission (Stasi Commission) appointed by French president Jacques Chirac in fall 2003 to recommend solutions regarding the protection of nonreligious against the increasing presence of religious symbols in public schools and buildings. (The other Muslim was a woman sociologist, Hanifa Cherifi.) The commission recommended that the wearing of any conspicuous religious symbol (scarf or headress, skullcap, or large cross) be banned from public schools and buildings, and that there be state observance of a Jewish and a Muslim holy day. The commission's recommendations came under attack in Muslim countries, and Arkoun was singled out for blame as being insufficiently strong in his defense of Islam.

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AS'AD ABUKHALIL

ARLOSOROFF, CHAIM

[1899–1933]

Labor-Zionist intellectual and leader.

Chaim Arlosoroff was born in the Ukraine, and his parents moved to Berlin in 1905, following a pogrom. He received his doctorate in economic sociology from the University of Berlin. Arlosoroff opposed the Marxist doctrine of class conflict and developed a unique version of Zionist socialism, which he termed *Volksocialismus*—a Jewish national socialism that focused on the unity of the Jewish people historically and culturally as well as economically.

Arlosoroff became a leader of ha-Poʿel ha-Tzaʿir and in 1924 settled in Palestine, where he continued his political activity. He was critical of many in the Zionist leadership who, he felt, were blind to the reality of Arab nationalism. He was convinced of the need for reconciliation between the two nationalist movements. In 1926, he was appointed to the Zionist delegation to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission. He was a staunch supporter of Chaim Weizmann, whom he accompanied on several visits to the United States. When Ahdut ha-Avodah and Ha-Poʿel ha-Tzaʿir merged to become MAPAI in 1930, Arlosoroff assumed a leadership position and in 1931 was elected to the Jewish Agency Executive to serve as head of its

political department. In this capacity he met with some Palestinian leaders and encouraged economic contacts and cooperation with Transjordan's Amir Abdullah and members of his coterie. By June 1932, however, he reached the despairing conclusion that Zionism would be unable to proceed gradually and peacefully toward the achievement of a Jewish majority in Palestine.

After Adolf Hitler's rise to power, Arlosoroff negotiated with the Nazis for the emigration of the Jews and the transfer (*haʿavara*) of German Jewish assets to Palestine. The agreement was bitterly denounced by the Revisionists as a violation of the international Jewish boycott of Germany. In June 1933, shortly after his return from Germany, Arlosoroff was murdered while walking with his wife along Tel Aviv's beach. In the context of the bitter divisions between MAPAI and the Revisionists, many on the left were convinced that the Revisionists had assassinated Arlosoroff. Three Revisionists were arrested and charged with murder, two of whom were exonerated. The third, Avraham Stavsky, was found guilty and sentenced to death but was eventually freed on appeal on the grounds of insufficient evidence. Uncertainty as to the murderer(s) remains to this day, despite the report of an official commission of inquiry in 1982.

See also Ahdut ha-Avodah; Israel: Political Parties in; Zionist Revisionist Movement.

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Chaim I. Waxman
Neil Caplan

ARMÉE DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE (ALN)

The fighting force mobilized to wage the Algerian war of independence.

Beginning in 1954, the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN; National Liberation Army) was composed of guerrilla units divided into five and later six *wilayas* (military districts within Algeria). From 1956 onward, standing armies began to emerge among expatriate Algerians in both Morocco and Tunisia, which, by 1960, came under a unified general staff.

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John Ruedy

ARMENIAN COMMUNITY OF JERUSALEM

Site of the Armenian patriarchate and center of the Armenian community in Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan.

The Armenian presence in Jerusalem had its beginnings in early Byzantine monasticism. Armenian inscriptions in mosaic floors from this era are found in and around Jerusalem, attesting to the existence of permanent settlements. The present boundaries of the Armenian quarter, covering nearly one-sixth of the Old City at the southwestern corner, appear to have been in place prior to the First Crusade (1099), with a patriarchate established during the sixth century.

History

After the defeat of the Crusaders, the Muslim rulers formed an alliance with the Armenians in Jerusalem, since both groups were persecuted by their common enemy, the Byzantines, because of religious differences. Likewise the Ottomans, during their rule, sided with the Armenians against the Greek Orthodox Church—and at times against the Roman Catholics—over ownership, control, or maintenance of sacred sites, especially within the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. (In both churches, Armenians have nearly equal holdings with the other two denominations.) The Armenian community in Jerusalem traces its status to the original edicts issued on its behalf by several Muslim rulers, beginning with Umar ibn al-Khattab, affirming the rights of Armenians to their possessions in Jerusalem and elsewhere. The last of these rulers was Sultan Mahmud II, whose edict of 1813 settled a long dispute with

the local Greek hierarchy over ownership of Saint James Monastery with its cathedral, the seat of the Armenian patriarchate. Rights to traditional holy places since then have remained unchanged by virtue of the famous *firman* (edict) issued by Sultan Abdülmecit I in 1852, establishing the status quo for the various churches' control over such sites, a decree honored by all successive administrations governing Jerusalem.

The prominence of the Armenian patriarchate of Jerusalem rests on the tradition that Saint James Cathedral marks the site where the apostle James, the brother of Jesus, had his residence. It is also where the Jerusalem Council was held under his leadership, as recorded in Acts of the Apostles, chapter 15. The Armenian patriarch of Jerusalem is deemed the successor of Saint James. His office is much coveted by the local hierarchies, who have schemed throughout history to possess the site and appropriate the office. Also within Saint James Cathedral is the traditional burial place of the head of Saint James, son of Zebedee and brother of the apostle John, whose martyrdom is also recorded in Acts of the Apostles, in chapter 12. Thus the Saint James compound, with its traditions surrounding the two apostles named James, is one of Jerusalem's most venerated sites as well as the largest monastic center in the country. The cathedral, built during the tenth century and expanded during the twelfth, is a prized monument of Eastern Christianity.

As head of the largest Monophysite church in the Holy Land, the Armenian patriarch traditionally champions the cause of the Syriac, Coptic, and Ethiopian churches.

Beginning in the seventeenth century, some patriarchs played significant roles, with lasting benefits for the Armenian community. Grigor V (1613–1645) expanded the community's estates beyond Jerusalem; Grigor VI (1715–1749) implemented financial reforms; Yesayi III (1865–1885) promoted publishing; and Yeghishe I (1921–1930) founded new schools. The insightful leadership of these and other patriarchs, especially during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, enabled the monastic community to stabilize its resources and to acquire additional properties in and around Jerusalem. These continue to provide a regular—albeit meager—income for the brotherhood.

Until recently 1931, the patriarch's jurisdiction extended over all Armenians in the Arab world. With the settlement at Antelias, near Beirut, of the displaced catholicosate of Cilicia (the ancient pontificate of Armenia domiciled in southern Turkey until 1921) during the French administration of Lebanon (1923–1943), the patriarch's jurisdiction over Lebanon, Syria, and Cyprus was ceded to Antelias. To help that fledgling establishment, Jerusalem provided clerical administrators and instructors. Until 1991, because of communism in Armenia, where the Catholicos of All Armenians resides, Jerusalem took the lead in providing parish priests for nearly all Armenian communities in the diaspora—a task now shared competitively with Antelias.

Manuscripts and Treasures

Unlike other ancient Armenian communities, whether in Armenia or in the diaspora, the Jerusalem community was rarely disturbed. Its continuity enabled it to flourish as a center of learning and religious worship. Over the centuries, the monastic community was enriched by a constant flow of pilgrims, including kings and other members of the Cilician Armenian royal family, prelates of the Armenian church, and scholiasts who took residence. Some of the accumulated treasures, and by no means the best, are on permanent display at the monastery.

The monastery holds the world's second largest collection of ancient Armenian manuscripts, which are housed in the Chapel of Saint T'oros. Four thousand medieval codices (manuscript books), including more than a hundred works of which only a single copy exists, are fully described in an eleven-volume catalogue. Some of these works were composed by local authors and many of the others are copies made by local scribes who, in personal comments at the end of the works, chronicled contemporary and near-contemporary events and encounters with other Christians, as well as with non-Christian entities. These manuscripts have not been sufficiently considered for their historical significance—especially their bearing on the medieval history of Jerusalem.

In addition to the library of ancient manuscripts and a few other chapels, the Saint James Monastery houses several academic establishments: a seminary largely supported by the Alex Manoogian Fund

of Detroit; a modern library supported by the Calouste Gülbenkian Foundation of Lisbon; the Edward and Helen Mardigian Museum of Armenian Art and Culture; a printing press established in 1833, which published nearly 500 titles in the first hundred years of its operation (its earliest publications, including a complete concordance to the Armenian Bible, and the first issue of *Sion,* the scholarly journal of the patriarchate since 1866, are on display at the site); and a high school for the local community, built early during the twentieth century, when the Armenian population of Jerusalem more than doubled as a result of the Turkish persecutions of World War I. More Armenians moved into Saint James when their properties were confiscated by Israel during the Arab–Israel War of 1948. The sharp increase in the lay population brought a degree of secularism into the life of the monastic community.

The Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries

The number of Armenians in Jerusalem decreased during the final forty years of the twentieth century, from about 4,000 in 1960 to about 1,500 in 2000; nearly two-thirds of them lived within the compound of Saint James and were increasingly dependent on the monastery for their livelihood. This was largely a result of the unification of Jerusalem under Israeli rule in 1967, which affected the population of East Jerusalem generally. The various partisan and political divisions among Armenians worldwide are represented in this small community, which until 1990 was further fragmented as a result of families taking sides with feuding bishops.

As one of the few minority groups with a presence for more than one millennium in the Holy Land, the Armenian community of Jerusalem maintains close ties with other such groups of various faiths. The current jurisdiction of the patriarchate includes Israel and Jordan, with an Armenian population of 3,000 and 8,000, respectively. While members of the older community continue to emigrate, mostly to Australia, Canada, and the United States, an influx of immigrants in mixed marriages arrived in Israel from Armenia during the 1990s. The consequences of the first Palestinian Intifada became evident in the near disappearance of Armenian merchants from Jerusalem's Old Marketplace, and the Israeli response to the al-Aqsa Intifada—building a security wall—has introduced new challenges to the Armenian community and the Armenian patriarchate, whose historic properties now straddle this new line. The solicitude of the government of the Republic of Armenia for the welfare of the Armenian patriarchate resulted in visits to the compound by presidents Levon Ter-Petrossian and Robert Kocharian. The Cathedral of Saint James and the other religious sites in the care of the patriarch remain the object of pilgrimage by Armenians the world over.

See also Abdülmecit I; Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab–Israel War (1948); Holy Land; Intifada (1987–1991); Jerusalem; Mahmud II.

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Abraham Terian
Updated by Rouben P. Adalian

ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

The systematic expulsion and extermination of the Armenian population of historic West Armenia and Anatolia during and immediately after World War I.

In April 1915 the Ottoman government embarked upon policies designed to bring about the wholesale reduction of its civilian Armenian population. The persecutions continued with varying intensity until 1923 when the Ottoman Empire itself went out of existence and was replaced by the Republic of Turkey.

The Armenian population of the Ottoman state was reported at a little over two million in 1914. Nearly a million had already perished by 1918, while hundreds of thousands had become homeless and stateless refugees. By 1923 virtually the entire Armenian population of Anatolian Turkey had disappeared and total losses had reached up to 1.5 million.

The unraveling of Armenian society in the Ottoman Empire began with the crisis precipitated by the Balkan Wars and the 1913 coup staged by the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP, *Ittihad ve Tarraki*) which catapulted the triumvirate of Enver, Talaat, and Cemal to the head of government as minister of war, minister of the interior (and grand vizier in 1917), and minister of the marine, respectively. The coup effectively ended all hopes of securing constitutional rule and liberal change in the Ottoman Empire as the clique in power, which concentrated all critical decision making in its hands, also represented the extremist wing of the Young Turk movement. Exponents of Turkism and Pan-Turanism, the CUP promotion of an exclusive Turkish nationalism, threatened the multi-ethnic fabric of the Ottoman state at a time when the Armenian minority's hopes for administrative reforms and participation in local self-government had been elevated with the overthrow of Hamidian autocracy.

World War I provided cover for the implementation of the plan to eliminate the Armenian population putatively from the flank of the Ottoman Empire exposed to Russia. The military debacle on the Russian front in December 1914 and January

1915, and the barricading of the Armenian population inside its quarter of the city of Van in April 1915, in fear of threatened massacre, provided a pretext to validate charges of sedition by Armenians and justification for their evacuation. The announced purpose of Young Turk policy aside, the facts of the matter proceeded by a different course. The Armenian population in the war zone along the Russian front was in the main slaughtered in situ and not subjected to deportation. The mass expulsion of the Armenian population stretched the entire length of the Anatolian Peninsula from Samsun and Trebizond in the north to Adana and Urfa in the south, from Bursa in the west and all other communities around the Sea of Marmara, including the European sector of Turkey, all the way to Erzerum and Harput in the east and everywhere in between, including Ankara, Konya, Sivas, and Malatia.

The beginning of the deportations actually represents the second phase of the annihilation plan. On 24 April 1915 two hundred prominent Armenian leaders in Istanbul were summarily arrested, exiled, and subsequently executed. The expulsions had been preceded since February 1915 by the disarming of Armenian draftees in the Ottoman army, who were then reassigned to labor battalions and were eventually executed. With the elimination of able-bodied men from the Armenian population, the deportation of the civilian population proceeded with little resistance.

The journey of the convoys of families on the open road for hundreds of miles from all across Anatolia toward Syria, through the primary concentration point of Aleppo, resulted in massive loss of human life. The deliberate exhaustion of the population through deprivation of access to water proved a particularly excruciating and effective means of reducing numbers quickly. Though guarded to prevent escape, the convoys were by no means protected. Their arrival at predetermined locations in remote areas turned out to be appointments with the killer units known as the *Teshkilati Mahsusa,* the Special Organization, under the direct command of CUP functionaries reporting to Talaat. These wholesale massacres were also occasions for the abduction of children and younger women. In places like Sivas, Harput, and Bitlis, massacres as much as deportation announced the implemention of the policy of genocide.

The survival rate of deportees entering Syria from the farthest distances were as low as 10 percent. Deportees from regions closer to Syria, such as Adana Aintab and Marash, stood a fairer chance because of the shorter distances traveled; yet on arrival they were herded into concentration camps at places like Islahiya, Katma, Meskene and Raqqa, which became the breeding ground of epidemics that easily wiped out tens of thousands of the exhausted and starving refugees. From these locations smaller groups were sent farther into the desert to killing centers such as Raʾs al-Ayn and the infamous Dayr al-Zawr, where possibly more Armenians perished than at any other place on earth. The subterranean caves in some of these desert sites became the graveyard of thousands who were herded into them and burned alive. The deportees who were spared massacre were scattered from Syria as far as Maʿan and Petra in southern Jordan. To the east, deportees were sent all the way to Mosul and Kirkuk in northern Iraq. In all, only about 150,000 Armenians were found still living in Syria and Iraq at the end of the war.

The catastrophic loss of life and the violent and traumatic treatment of the deportees constituted only part of the larger scheme to reduce the Armenians. A second element was the total confiscation of their wealth; the government attempted to organize the transfer of title of their immovable properties to its cohorts, while the general population helped itself to all the movable property that deportees could not conceivably carry with them. More secure assets, such as bank accounts and corporate holdings, were seized by the government. Communal property, in the form of churches, schools, orphanages, and other institutions, was expropriated outright. It is presumed that much of the plunder was acquired by Young Turk party functionaries, with liquid assets deposited into party coffers. Since the genocide was implemented as much as a CUP scheme as government policy, the looting associated with the deportations constituted part of the payment system to the actual implementers of the genocide, effectively covering the expense of the mass deportation and murder of the Armenians with the plundered wealth of the victims, making the entire plan a highly profitable enterprise sanctioned by the allowances of martial law in wartime.

The plunder represented more than the loss of physical ownership by the Armenians, for in the

process of looting, the cultural possessions of an entire people accumulated over the ages were turned into artless stone and metal. Centuries-old sanctuaries, from town chapels to pontifical cathedrals, were torched and demolished. Entire manuscript collections of monastic libraries vanished. Libraries went up in flames. The entire output of Armenian civilization since its beginnings was subjected to a policy of desecration and destruction.

The collapse of the Russian front ensuing the Bolshevik Revolution opened the way for Ottoman armies to advance through the Caucasus, creating additional opportunities for the slaughter of Armenian civilians in a campaign reaching Baku by September 1918. The end of the war prompted survivors to trek back to their former homes only to find them in possession of Turks, Kurds, and other Muslim refugees violently reluctant to return property to the Armenians. Under dire economic conditions, with so many Armenian refugees unable to resettle in their native towns, new tensions arose between the Armenians and the Turkish populace, who within a year began rallying to the Turkish Nationalist banner. Between 1920 and 1921 the Armenians of Anatolia were made refugees yet again, driven from their resettlements. The withdrawal of French occupation forces from Cilicia facilitated the uprooting of the Armenians through another series of massacres in Marash, Hadjin, and other towns in the area. The partition of the Republic of Armenia in the east in 1920 by Kemalist forces and the Sovietization of the Russian half had already been accomplished with the total excision of the Armenian population of Turkish-occupied Kars. The sweep through Smyrna in 1922 meant the utter and total eradication of the Armenians from all of Turkey in Asia.

Resistance to the deportations was infrequent. In only one instance were Armenians reasonably successful in avoiding certain death by taking flight up the mountain of Musa Dagh on the Mediterranean coast, where French naval vessels rescued them. The Armenians in the city of Van held out for a month until the arrival of the Russian army in May 1915, only to have to evacuate the city upon the retreat of the Russians in the face of an Ottoman counteroffensive. The mass flight to the Russian border proved no less a tragic affair than actual deportation. Of the more than 300,000 refugees counted in the Armenian republic in 1918, more than half perished within a year. Armenians in Urfa and Shabin-Karahisar who suspected the true intentions of the government defied the deportation edict in a vain attempt by barricading themselves in their neighborhoods. In these rare instances where the gendarmerie was unable to abide by the deportation timetable, artillery was called in to simply exterminate the resistant population through bombardment.

During the armistice period nearly 400 of the key CUP officials implicated in the atrocities committed against the Armenians were arrested. A number of domestic military tribunals were convened by the postwar Ottoman government, which brought charges ranging from the unconstitutional seizure of power, the conduct of a war of aggression, and conspiring the decimation of the Armenian population to more explicit capital crimes, including massacre. Some of the accused were found guilty of the charges. Most significantly, the ruling triumvirate was condemned to death. They, however, eluded justice by fleeing abroad. Their escape left the matter of avenging the countless victims to a clandestine group of survivors who tracked down the CUP archconspirators. Talaat, the principal architect of the Armenian genocide, was gunned down in 1921 in Berlin where he had gone into hiding. His assassin was arrested and tried by a German court, which acquitted him.

The chapter on the Armenian Genocide, however, was more conclusively closed by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which, in extending international recognition to the Republic of Turkey, also absolved it of all responsibilities for the rectification of the crimes committed against the Armenians or for the resettlement of the tens of thousands made homeless and stateless. With immunity assured by the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish government subsequently adopted a policy of categorically denying that crimes had been committed against Armenians of the Ottoman Empire. Still concentrated in their historic homeland in 1915, surviving Armenians were scattered across the entire Middle East by 1923. All that was left of a once prosperous community were deportees living in squalid refugee camps. Under such circumstances the modern Armenian diaspora took form.

See also ARMENIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; LAUSANNE, TREATY OF (1923); OTTOMAN EMPIRE.

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ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

ARMENIAN MILLET

Armenian community or nation in the Ottoman Empire since the fifteenth century.

The Armenian millet (Turkish, Ermeni millet) existed in the Ottoman Empire as an institution devised by the sultans to govern the Christian population of the Monophysite churches. The millet system extended internal autonomy in religious and civil matters to the non-Muslim communities while introducing a mechanism for direct administrative responsibility to the state in matters of taxation. The reach of the Armenian millet expanded and contracted with the changing territorial dimensions of the Ottoman state. Originally the Armenian millet was defined as a broad religious group rather than narrowly as a denomination reinforcing ethnic distinction. Not only Armenians of all persuasions, which by the nineteenth century included Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant, were treated by the Ottoman government as constituents of the Armenian millet; other Oriental Christian denominations, which were excluded from the Greek millet, also were included in the Armenian millet.

The evolution of parallel Armenian and Greek millets has led to the proposition that the Armenian community was introduced by the Ottoman government as a way of denying the Greek millet, and its leadership in the form of the Orthodox patriarch, governance over the entire Christian community in the Ottoman state. Although Ottoman political theory divided the populace along the lines of the three principal religions—Islam, Christianity, and Judaism—the Christian community was further divided to differentiate between the two branches of Christianity, Monophysite and Duophysite, and to foster competition within the sizable Christian population of the empire. From the standpoint of the overall system, the Oriental Christian communities related to the Ottoman regime through the intermediary of the Armenian leadership in the capital city of Constantinople (now Istanbul). In practice, direct communication with local Ottoman governors as the intercessors with the central authorities was more common. Nor did the system necessarily encompass the entire Armenian population as its settlements entered the Ottoman Empire during the period of expansion. In the remoter parts of the empire, the reach of the millet system was tenuous, and communities operated on the basis of interrelations traditional to the region. Only in the nineteenth century did the purview of the Armenian millet attain influence comprehensive to the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire. By that point, however, the Ottomans had agreed to the further fractionalization of the Armenian millet by extending formal recognition, in 1831 and 1847, respectively, to the Catholic and Protestant millets, both of which were predominantly Armenian.

The history of the Armenian millet as an imperial institution is more properly the history of the Armenian patriarchate of Constantinople. Though in the strictest sense an ecclesiastical office functioning within the framework of the Armenian church, the patriarchate was created by the Ottomans, and its occupant served at the pleasure of the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman government). There was no precedent of an Armenian bishopric in Constantinople predating Ottoman occupation of the city. The early history of the patriarchate is barely known. Armenian tradition attributes its origins to the settlement of the Armenians of Bursa in the city upon the command of Mehmet the Conqueror and of the designation in 1461 of the Ar-

Khorvirap, a twelfth-century Armenian Apostolic cathedral, is pictured in the foreground on Mount Ararat. In 2001 Armenian religious leaders celebrated the 1,700th anniversary of that country's conversion to Christianity. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

menian bishop of Bursa, named Hovakim, as head of this community by the sultan himself. During the first 150 years of its existence, the importance of the office was restricted to the city and its environs. The rapid turnover of bishops deprived the patriarchate of political or practical significance to Armenians at large.

The patriarchate emerged as an agency central to the Armenian millet structure in the eighteenth century. Three factors appear to have contributed to the consolidation of ecclesiastical and political control by the patriarchate: growth in the Armenian population in and around Constantinople, which had been an area at some distance from the centers of Armenian demographic concentration in the Ottoman Empire—mostly eastern and central Anatolia and northern Black Sea coast; the strengthening of the economic role of the growing community in local trade, international commerce, and government finances; and finally the appearance of primates who commanded respect and expanded the role of the patriarchate in Armenian communal life. The key figure in this century was Hovhannes Kolot, whose tenure lasted from 1715 to 1741. Thereafter, the Armenian patriarch of Istanbul was regarded as the most important figure in the Armenian church despite the fact that within the hierarchy of the church itself other offices, such as that of the Catholicos at Echmiadsin in Persian (and subsequently Russian) Armenia or the Armenian patriarch of Jerusalem, could claim historical and moral seniority.

The commercial success of the Armenians was evidenced by the rise of the so-called *amira* class in Constantinople. Originally merchants, the *amiras* gained prominence mostly as *sarrafs* (bankers) who played a critical role in financing the empire's tax-farming system. For their services the Duzians, for

example, were awarded management of the imperial mint. The Balyans held the post of chief architect to the sultan from 1750 to the end of the nineteenth century and were responsible for the construction of virtually all imperial residences and palaces. These Armenian notables put their stamp on the Armenian community of Constantinople when they also received license from their sovereign to establish educational centers, charitable institutions, hospitals, and churches.

Although their status was defined by their connection with the Ottoman system, the role of the *amiras* in the Armenian millet was determined by the influence they exercised over the patriarchate. A conservative oligarchy by nature, nevertheless the *amira* presence underscored the growth of secular forces in Armenian society, which soon derived their importance from their role in the economy of the city independent of the monarchy. Those very forces were further encouraged by the revival of interest in Armenian literature sponsored by *amiras.*

The Tanzimat reforms unraveled the system of government on which the *amiras* depended. It also provided additional impetus to the growth of an Armenian middle class increasingly composed of smaller merchants, called *esnaf,* who demanded a voice in the management of the millet and the election of the patriarch. Soon popular sentiment called for the regulation of the election process and the adoption of a formal document prescribing the function and responsibilities of the patriarchate. A long drawn-out debate among conservative clergy and amiras, liberal-minded *esnaf,* and the press through the 1840s and 1850s resulted in the drafting of a so-called constitution for the Armenian millet. The compromise document was adopted by an assembly composed of laymen and ecclesiastics on 24 May 1860. Its formal approval by the Ottoman authorities took three more years. The Armenians called it their national constitution, and the rights and responsibilities contained in the document became the framework by which Armenians throughout the empire reorganized their communities. Placing millet leadership in the Armenian church, the national constitution also guaranteed a role for the lay community and provided specific mechanisms for its participation at all levels of management.

The constitution also elevated the office of patriarch to that of national leader with immediate responsibility in representing the concerns of the Armenian millet with the Sublime Porte. That proved a heavier burden than intended as the flock in the distant corners of the empire began to appeal more and more to the patriarch for relief from their woes at the hands of corrupt administrators and officials prone to violence. The patriarchate cataloged these problems and appealed to the resident ministers of the great powers to plead the Armenian case with the sultan. This problem of enhanced responsibility in the face of increasing unrest in the provinces while being powerless to persuade the Sublime Porte in political matters seriously compromised the patriarchate. Segments of the Armenian millet felt disfranchised; adherents turned to the Catholic and Protestant millets for protection. The Sublime Porte, in turn, closely scrutinized elections and appointments to contain the rising tide of Armenian nationalism.

The millet system remained in place until the end of the empire. The patriarchate remained in place until its suspension in 1916 by the government of the Young Turks. And although many of the later patriarchs, such as Mkrtich Khrimian (1869–1873), Nerses Varzhapetian (1874–1884), Matteos Izmirlian (1894–1896), and Maghakia Ormanian (1896–1908), were very important figures, Armenian loyalties were already divided by the late nineteenth century. Political organizations vied for leadership in the Armenian community and the religious basis of national organization was facing serious competition from these and other sources. The patriarchate was restored in 1918 and its role reconfirmed by the Republic of Turkey. By that time, however, the Armenian bishop presided over a community whose congregants had been seriously reduced in numbers and mostly inhabited the city of Istanbul, much as when the millet system was first introduced among Armenians. As for the Armenian national constitution, it remains a living document. Armenian communities throughout the world rely on its principles of mixed representation under ecclesiastical leadership in the organization and management of their now dispersed communities.

See also Khrimian, Mkrtich; Ormanian, Maghakia; Sublime Porte; Tanzimat; Young Turks.

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ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

Nationalist movement among Armenians of the Ottoman Empire, which lasted from 1878 to 1921.

In the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, the Ottoman government agreed to undertake reforms in the so-called Armenian provinces of the empire. Based on a track record of reforms promulgated but seldom implemented, Armenian nationalists disbelieved that any meaningful changes would be made in the Ottoman administration of the Armenian-populated regions of the Turkish state. Moderate and conservative Armenians, on the other hand, placed much stock in an international treaty signed by the great powers containing an explicit Ottoman commitment to reform. The failure of the great powers to hold Abdülhamit II to his promise as they became embroiled in the competition to carve up Africa and Asia and the sultan's recalcitrance in introducing voluntary reforms left many Armenians disillusioned with the Ottoman regime. A rising national consciousness obstructed by an increasingly despotic administration under Abdülhamit II did not take long to prompt a revolutionary movement among Armenians of the Ottoman Empire.

Local self-defense units had already taken to resisting Ottoman authorities. Particularly egregious from the standpoint of rural inhabitants was the government's license and tolerance of Kurdish predation over Armenian towns and villages. In response to this predicament, the first formally organized Armenian political society made its appearance in 1885 in the city of Van. The group was quickly disbanded by Ottoman police.

The Armenian revolutionary movement acquired its real impetus in the Russian Empire. In an atmosphere of greater freedom, better education, and social advancement, the new intellectual class taking form in the Russian Caucasus spawned a group of political thinkers who began to articulate serious concern with the fate of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Influenced by Russian populism and radicalism, they organized two groups advocating Armenian national goals. The Armenian Social Democratic Party first appeared in Geneva among Russian-Armenians studying abroad. The husband and wife team of Avetis and Maro Nazerbekian led the group. The party soon was known by the name of its publication, *Hunchak* (Clarion), selected in imitation of the Russian-language publication by the same name issued by the Russian revolutionary Alexander Herzen.

The Hunchak Party subscribed to socialism and called for the restoration of Armenian statehood. Members focused their activities on the Ottoman Armenians whom they tried to propagandize and provide with arms. Though it found adherents among Armenians in both the Russian and Ottoman Empires, the Hunchak Party never garnered a large following. Its ideological positions were viewed as too radical and its program infeasible in the face of the overwhelming power of the state and the absence of real political consciousness among the rural masses.

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) had better success. Organized in Tbilisi in 1890 by a trio of ideologues known as Kristapor, Rostom, and Zavarian, the organization became known less by its acronym than by the Armenian word for federation, *dashnaktsutyun.* Its members and supporters were thus called Dashnak. The Dashnak Party gained greater mass appeal as it sought to define a populist platform that was based not so much on ideological propositions as on the objective conditions of the Armenian population. In its early years it advocated reform, autonomy, and self-government, forsaking independent nationhood. The ARF emphasized the need for political organization and support for

Armenian women join the defense of Adana, Galicia, 19 November 1920. The women of the city, which was being besieged by Turkish forces, feared what would happen to them should Muslims overrun the city. Rather than watch from the sidelines, many of them took up arms alongside the men. **© Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

groups engaged in local struggles, which it tried to bring under one umbrella, hence the notion of federation. The object of their program remained the fate and status of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.

After its formative years, three critical developments—the 1894–1896 violence and the 1905 and 1917 Russian revolutions—redirected the thrust of the Armenian nationalist movement. The destruction visited upon the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire between 1894 and 1896 compelled Armenian society to rethink its condition and Armenian political organizations to reassess their course of action. The level of lethal violence unleashed by the Turkish state reached beyond anything experienced by the Armenians to that point. With hundreds of thousands affected and tens of thousands dead, the revolutionaries were confronted with a very serious dilemma. The sultan's regime used the charge of revolutionary activism against the Armenians to justify its wholesale measures. Armenians in the provinces and in Istanbul were openly challenging the state and its representatives. Demonstrations, reprisals against corrupt officials, underground publications, and revolutionary cells frightened the sultan and provided evidence of the emerging nationalism of one more minority in the empire. From the standpoint of the ruling Ottoman class, Russian tolerance of Armenian organizations advocating political change in the Ottoman Empire appeared particularly seditious.

The havoc wreaked in Armenian society by the killings alienated a large segment of the masses from political involvement. It also destroyed a good part of the Hunchak and Dashnak organizations. Thereafter, the distrust between the Ottoman regime and the Armenians was never repaired. The ARF and the Committee for Union and Progress cooperated in their opposition to the sultan Abdülhamit, whom even progressive-minded Turks accused of preventing the modernization of the state. After the Young Turk revolution of 1908, Armenian political organizations were legalized in the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the charge of sedition would be brought up again by the Unionist government during World War I, and once again measures taken against the Armenian population at large. Executions and mass deportations brought an end to the existence of Armenian society in the Ottoman Empire and with that also completely halted Armenian political and revolutionary activism in Turkey.

Events in the Russian Empire took a very different course. The 1905 revolution witnessed the intensification of radicalism all across society. Armenians were no less affected. In fact, Armenian society already had been galvanized by a measure introduced by the government that had seriously undermined Armenian loyalty to the regime. In 1903 the czar had issued an edict confiscating the properties of the Armenian church. Designed to undercut the strengthening of Armenian ethnic consciousness by depriving Armenian society of its principal means of support for its educational institutions, the edict energized the moribund revo-

lutionary organizations and helped attract new interest and membership in them. It also compelled them to consider socialism more seriously and finally to oppose czarism as a repressive system of government. The igniting of racial animosity and virtual warfare between the Armenians and the Azeris to distract them from the revolution augmented the prestige of the ARF all the more as it took to the defense of the populace in the absence of Russian policing to contain communal violence. The repression that followed once again curbed the activities of the Armenian organizations. By that point, however, the ARF had gained mass appeal and clearly had emerged as the leading political organization in Armenian society. When the Russian Empire broke up after the 1917 revolution, the ARF was in a position to assume charge of the process resulting in the establishment of the Republic of Armenia. From 1918 to 1920 during the entire duration of the independent republic, the ARF was the dominant party.

Armenian socialists, who were members of Russian organizations and opposed to specifically Armenian nationalist parties, soon gained prominence after the Bolshevik revolution. Though they were only a single strand of the Armenian revolutionary movement, the sovietization of Armenia placed the Armenian Bolsheviks at the helm of Armenian society. Calling Dashnaks and others bourgeois nationalists, the Bolsheviks excluded them from the political process in Soviet Armenia and persecuted them as counterrevolutionaries. By 1921, the momentum of the movement was spent, leaving a legacy of catastrophe in the Ottoman Empire and of successful nation-building in the Russian state.

See also ABDÜLHAMIT II; COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS; DASHNAK PARTY; HUNCHAK PARTY.

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ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

ARMENIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A people of Asia Minor, long ruled by others, who became independent in 1991.

The territory of historic Armenia covered the Armenian plateau. The Pontic range on the north, the Little Caucasus chain to the east, the Anti-Taurus range to the south, and the Euphrates River in the west defined its perimeter. Armenian settlement in the area dates back at least to the second half of the second millennium B.C.E. Armenian statehood emerged in the sixth century B.C.E. and was maintained or revived after periods of occupation until the eleventh century C.E. Turkish penetration and settlement from the eleventh century C.E. gradually eroded the Armenian presence in the plateau area. A new Armenian state took shape in and around Cilicia on the Mediterranean coast between the tenth and fourteenth centuries. Thereafter, Armenians concentrated in towns and cities stretching in a belt from the Aegean coast of Anatolia to the Caspian Sea. Further dispersion placed Armenians across much of Eastern Europe and Western Asia as far as India. Ottoman state policies during the 1915 to 1923 Armenian genocide eliminated the Armenians from Anatolia and historic West Armenia and drove many of them into East Armenia within the zone of Russian domination. Armenian-inhabited territory at the beginning of the twenty-first century is confined to the Caucasus region that includes the current Republic of Armenia; the territory of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nogorno, or Mountainous, Karabagh; and the districts of Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda (formerly Bogdanovska) in southern Georgia. The remainder of the Armenian population inhabits what are known as diaspora communities throughout the temperate zone of the globe.

Language

A majority of Armenians speak Armenian, an independent branch of the Indo-European family of languages. Armenian is spoken only by Armenians. Because most Armenians are bilingual, over the centuries the language has absorbed a vast vocabulary of foreign words. First recorded in the early fifth century, Classical Armenian served as the principal medium of written communication until the mid-nineteenth century. By that time, the spoken tongue had evolved into numerous dialects. With

the spread of literacy, the dialects spoken in the two foremost centers of Armenian cultural activity outside of historic Armenia, namely Tbilisi and Constantinople (now Istanbul), emerged as the standard modern vernaculars of Eastern and Western Armenian. The former was used in the Russian Empire and Iran and the latter in the Ottoman Empire. The boundary between the two dialects holds to this day. In the twentieth century, Eastern Armenian became the state language of the Republic of Armenia. Western Armenian is now spoken only in the diaspora communities.

Religion

Most Armenians belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church, a denomination of Eastern Orthodoxy. The church traces its origins to the evangelizing missions of the Apostles Thaddeus and Bartholomew in Armenia. Formal Christianization traditionally is dated to the year 301 with the conversion of the reigning monarch, Trdat (Tiridates) IV. Political and theological differences led to the break from the Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches by the sixth century, and a series of Armenian ecclesiastical councils rejected the Chalcedonian Creed, which condemned portions of the Armenian beliefs. Thereafter, the Armenian church was defined by its national character and became the focal point of Armenian cultural development. Roman Catholicism returned with the Crusaders and the growth of Mediterranean trade beginning in the eleventh century. Protestant denominations appeared under the influence of U.S. missionary activities in the mid-nineteenth century. Although voluntary adherence to Islam is recorded, most Armenian conversion occurred under duress and mainly during the period of Ottoman rule. Official atheism during the Soviet period drove religion from the Republic of Armenia. The pontiff of the Armenian church, titled Catholicos of All Armenians, resides at Edjmiadsin in Armenia, but church attendance is mostly symbolic and sparse. Religion plays a larger role in Armenian diaspora communities as a marker of national identity.

Demographics

The global Armenian population is difficult to calculate because many states do not measure ethnic constituencies. It is estimated at 8 million. In the Republic of Armenia the 2001 census reported the population figure at 3 million, down from 3.7 million in 1993. The current population of Nagorno Karabagh is estimated at 150,000 Armenians. About 500,000 live in Georgia, and another million or more are spread throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics including Central Asia. Between 1988 and 1991 a forced population exchange resulted in the departure of 350,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan. Armenians in the diaspora are concentrated in cities throughout the Middle East, Europe, and North and South America. An estimated half million or more live in the Middle East, with the larger communities of about 100,000 found in Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. Smaller communities are located in Turkey (60,000), Cyprus (3,000), Israel (3,000), Jordan (5,500), Egypt (6,500), United Arab Emirates (3,000), and Iraq (3,000). The bulk of the estimated million Armenians in Europe are found in France (450,000), and smaller concentrations in England (18,000), Belgium (8,000), Switzerland (5,000), Italy (2,500), Austria (3,000), Germany (42,000), Czech Republic (10,000), Romania (10,000), Bulgaria (10,000), and Greece (20,000). The combined North and South American population is estimated at nearly two million, with the larger portion living in the United States. Other significant communities are located in Canada (80,000), Brazil (40,000), Uruguay (19,000), and Argentina (130,000). An estimated 60,000 live in Australia.

Livelihood

Agrarian life dominated traditional Armenian society until its complete displacement during World War I. Throughout centuries of dispersion, Armenians adapted economically. Most notably they formed a strong urban commercial class that eventually became involved in international trade. Armenians, especially in the Middle East, occupied the role of middlemen in virtually every city they inhabited. Between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries, in places such as Istanbul, Tbilisi, Isfahan, Tehran, Aleppo, Cairo, and Beirut, whether through official sponsorship or individual and communal ability, Armenians dominated various sectors of the local, and in some instances the national, economy. They tended to be traders, craftsmen, retailers, and shopkeepers in earlier centuries, but the twentieth century saw the rapid rise of an

urban professional class in the fields of medicine, engineering, banking, electronics, and computers. In the Republic of Armenia, the Soviet period was marked by intensive industrialization that produced a country with a high density of factories involved in heavy manufacturing. The breakup of the Soviet Union placed the entire economy of Armenia in jeopardy. A crippling energy crisis, compounded by the blockade of the country by Turkey and Azerbaijan, led to a considerable shrinkage of the economy and serious hardships in the 1990s. By the start of the twenty-first century, Armenia had turned the corner on its economy and was steadily recovering through market reforms. Upon independence in 1991, Armenia proceeded rapidly toward privatization. Agricultural lands were distributed to farmers, dwellings were declared real estate and titles were transferred to residents, making them homeowners, and both small and large industries were progressively privatized.

Major Historical Figures

The 3,000-year span of Armenian history is mostly recalled in narratives recording the deeds, valor, and accomplishments of a multitude of figures. Certain kings, religious leaders, noblemen, and men of culture stand out. The extinction of the Armenian royal and princely families by the fifteenth century meant waiting until the early modern period for the reappearance of figures of national significance. In the absence of the men of the sword, men of the cloth and men of the pen—and often of both—began to lead the Armenian nation out of its dark ages. Mekhitar Sebastatsi founded an Armenian Catholic monastery in Venice in 1717 and guided the cultural recovery of the Armenians. Mikayel Chamchian, a member of the Mekhitarian order, resumed the writing of Armenian history and began shaping a modern national identity. Khachatur Abovian in Russian Armenia promoted modernism through the use of the vernacular by authoring the first Armenian novel in 1848. Mikayel Nalbandian in Russia advocated Armenian nationhood. Mkrtich Khrimian, writer, publisher, and priest, embodied the coalescing of Armenian consciousness by the end of the nineteenth century. As Armenian patriarch of Constantinople, in which capacity he was head of the Armenian Millet and subsequently Catholicos of All Armenians in Edjmiadsin, he allied the conservative Armenian church with the advocates of national emancipation. While repression and autocracy in the Ottoman and Russian empires were challenged by many locally, others took up arms, and the Armenian Revolutionary Movement found its leaders among intellectuals who formulated ideology and unschooled men who fought skirmishes with the police and militia of the tsar and the sultan. Andranik, the guerrilla fighter, entered national lore as he escaped every snare of the sultan's police while defending the Armenian rural population with his own brand of resistance against exploitation.

The founding of the Republic of Armenia in 1918 tested the mettle of men. Some, such as Aram Manukian and Simon Vratsian, defended its territories; others, such as President Avetis Aharonian and Prime Minister Alexander Khatisian, negotiated for its survival. The Soviet period reversed the roles of the hero and antihero. The dissident, more so than the Communist Party leader, captured the national imagination. In Soviet Armenia he came in the form of the poet, Yeghishe Charents or Paruyr Sevak, who spun with words an alternative consciousness to escape and defy totalitarian control. National sentiments that had been preserved underground resurfaced in a mass movement in 1988, finding a guiding figure in a scholar, Levon Ter-Petrossian, who, with independence restored in 1991, became the first democratically elected president of his country. Robert Kocharian, who led the struggle in Nagorno Karabagh in the early 1990s, succeeded him in 1998.

See also ANDRANIK OZANIAN; ARMENIAN COMMUNITY OF JERUSALEM; ARMENIAN GENOCIDE; ARMENIAN MILLET; ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT; CHAMCHIAN, MIKAYEL; CILICIA; KHRIMIAN, MKRTICH.

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ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

ARMS AND ARMAMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Arms supply, imports, and control in the countries that comprise the modern Middle East.

The Arab–Israeli conflict has generated the most significant arms race in the Middle East, but rivalries involving Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey also have contributed heavily to regional instability. Attempts to control the supply of arms have been of limited duration and success.

During the Arab–Israel War in 1948, Israel bought arms from Czechoslovakia, a Soviet client state. The arms were obsolete, but with them Israel defeated several Arab states equipped with British and French arms. That war also brought the first attempts at arms control in the region. Britain and the United States withheld arms from the combatants, but the United Nations embargo, imposed in May 1948, prevented neither smuggling nor clandestine purchases.

In May 1950 the United States, Britain, and France announced the Tripartite Declaration and in June 1950 created the Near East Arms Coordinating Committee (NEACC), intending to regulate the sale of arms to the region. In fact, the United States left the Middle East arms markets to its allies, supplying few arms even to Iraq, with which in 1954 it signed a military aid agreement. Thus, in mid-1955, nearly all arms in the region were of Western European origin.

In 1955 the Soviet Union radically altered the Middle East balance with a deal that provided Egypt (through Czechoslovakia) with modern arms, including MiG-15 jets, worth $250 million. France's conflict with Egypt over its aid to the rebels in Algeria and the nationalization of the Suez Canal were the impetus for its sale in 1956 of seventy-two Mystère jets and other arms to Israel. France became Israel's main supplier until 1968, when it cited Israeli preemption in the June 1967 Arab–Israel War as reason for an embargo.

After the 1956 Suez–Sinai crisis, the Soviet Union accelerated supply to its regional clients. From 1956 to 1967, the Soviet Union equipped Egypt with nearly 1,000 tanks and 360 jets, transferred 400 tanks and 125 jets to Iraq, and sold Syria 350 tanks and 125 jets. In 1964 the United States sold tanks to Jordan and in 1966 F-104 jets in order to preclude Soviet penetration. In 1966 the United States sold Israel A-4 Skyhawk jets, marking the first time it released combat aircraft to that country. Following the 1967 Arab–Israel War and during the 1969–1970 War of Attrition and the 1973 Arab–Israel War, the Soviet Union rearmed the Arab states, while the United States became Israel's principal supplier. The 1979 Israeli–Egyptian peace treaty was another turning point in arms supply to the region, after which the United States increased military aid to both Israel and Egypt. Israel continues to receive $1.8 billion annually in U.S. military assistance, and U.S. military aid to Egypt exceeds $1.3 billion. The United States sells Israel F-15I and F-16 multi-role jets; Egypt has purchased the latter model.

By the mid-1970s U.S. sales to Saudi Arabia, and Soviet transfers to Iraq and Syria, reached proportions similar to those of the Arab-Israeli context. Moreover, from 1977 to 1980, Iran purchased $3.4 billion in military equipment, mostly from the United States. In 1981, the United States sold Saudi Arabia an Airborne Warning and Command System (AWACS). Saudi expenditures on arms rose steadily and from 1987 to 1997 totaled $262 billion. Saudi Arabia's purchases have included U.S. M-1A2 Abrams tanks, F-15 jets, and Patriot surface-to-air missiles. Turkey's procurement has been more gradual but from 1981 to 1999 reached $11.55 billion worth of U.S. arms. The armaments levels of several states in the Middle East are comparable to those of the leading powers of Western Europe. Israel maintains some 1,300 high-quality main battle tanks and 350 high-quality jet aircraft. Syria has 1,600 first-line (T-72) tanks, purchased mainly from the Soviet Union and (after 1991) Russia, and 280 combat jets. Egypt's arsenal includes some 500 top-quality tanks of U.S. manufacture and 200 jets. Saudi Arabia has 200 such tanks and 170 jets.

Turkey fields medium-quality armor but maintains 225 high-quality jet aircraft.

Israel is the only state in the region with a sophisticated indigenous arms industry, producing the Merkava tank and Arrow surface-to-air missile. Israel is regarded as a nuclear power, but several other states in the Middle East possess non-conventional arms. Iraq has attempted to acquire a nuclear capability, and Libya and Syria have chemical weapons. All of the states of the region claim to support a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, yet no agreements control the flow of arms to the Middle East.

See also MILITARY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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ZACH LEVEY

ARSEVEN, CELAL ESAT

[1876–1972]

Turkish art professor and historian.

Born the son of a pasha in Istanbul, Celal Esat Arseven was graduated from the Beşiktas Military School in 1888 and studied drawing at a fine arts school for a year before going to the war college. He continued writing and painting while in the army, from which he resigned in 1908. In the years before World War I, he worked at the humor magazine *Kalem* with Cemil Cem, one of the great early caricaturists of Turkey.

Arseven was a writer and artist of diverse talents. In 1918, he wrote a libretto for one of the first Turkish operas and went on to write several musical plays performed at the Istanbul municipal and state theaters. In addition to being an accomplished watercolorist, he was also a professor of architecture and municipal planning at the Istanbul Fine Arts Academy from 1924 to 1941. He published a five-volume art encyclopedia between 1943 and 1954 and many books on Turkish painting and architecture during his lifetime. Before his death, he was awarded a doctoral degree by Istanbul University. He was also a delegate to the Turkish Grand National Assembly during its seventh and eighth sessions.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

ARSLAN, ADIL

[1880?–1954]

Syrian Arab nationalist politician.

Born in Shuwayfat (Lebanon), son of Amir Hamud, Adil Arslan was educated in the Maronite French Christian mission school, Madrasat al-Hikma, and at the Ottoman College in Beirut. He was also educated in France, then attended the Mülkiye (the Ottoman Empire's civil service school) but, according to one source, did not complete the course. He entered Ottoman political life under the wing of his paternal uncle, Amir Mustafa, whose tenure as leader of the Yazbaki Druze was just being successfully challenged by Amir Tawfiq Majid Arslan, and like his elder brother, Amir Shakib, Adil prospered as a member of the Union and Progress Party.

Adil Arslan became secretary, first grade, in the ministry of the interior in 1913, director of immi-

gration in the *vilayet* of Syria in 1914, *qa'immaqam* of the Shuf in 1915, and representative from Mount Lebanon *(mutasarrifiyya)* from 1916 to 1918. According to some sources, he joined an Arab secret society before World War I, but older sources date his membership to the postwar period. Like many others who had served the Ottomans until the beginning or end of World War I, he joined up with Emir Faisal I ibn Hussein (who was promised a government by the British because of the effectiveness of his troops under T. E. Lawrence [of Arabia]). Arslan was appointed governor of the Lebanon in the fall of 1919, then aide to the military governor of Syria and, in 1920, political counselor to Faisal, who had become the new king of independent Syria. Despite Arslan's and his cousin Amin's efforts, most Druzes in Mount Lebanon followed Nasib Jumblatt or Tawfiq Majid Arslan and accepted the French mandate over Syria—hence Faisal's short-lived kingdom fell, and Adil Arslan fled to Transjordan, to Faisal's brother Amir Abdullah I ibn Hussein, where he served as chief of the *diwan* (court staff) from 1921 to 1923. When in response to the British, Abdullah exiled the Syrian Arab nationalist expatriates, Arslan took refuge in Saudi Arabia. In exile, he was closely associated with Shukri al-Quwatli and the Istiqlalists (independence movements). During the Syrian rebellion of 1925–1927, he was active as a fund-raiser and combat commander. Again condemned by the French, he continued his activities outside Syria, mainly in Egypt. When he was expelled from Egypt for anti-Italian activities in 1931, he went to Baghdad (since Faisal was then king of Iraq under British treaty protection). He was in Switzerland in 1937, continuing to participate in pan-Arab activities. After the Syrian National Bloc (to which Quwatli and the Istiqlalists adhered) reached agreement with France and formed a government, Arslan was appointed minister to Turkey, a post he held until 1938, when the Alexandretta territorial question reached a crisis (an Ottoman district that became a semiautonomous region of Syria in 1920, the Republic of Hatay in 1938, but was incorporated into Turkey in 1939 by agreement between France and Turkey). Arrested, then released by the French in 1940 and 1941, he fled in late 1941 to Turkey, where he spent the rest of World War II. Like other Arab nationalist politicians, he sought support for Arab causes from the Germans, but he opposed Rashid Ali al-Kaylani and Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin al-Husayni, declining invitations to go to Germany.

Returning to an independent Syria after the war, he was minister of education in two National Party cabinets in 1946 and 1947 and was elected to parliament from al-Jawlan in 1947. He was a member of the Syrian delegation to the London roundtable on Palestine in 1946 and 1947. He was a member and, after 19 April 1948, chief of Syria's United Nations delegation, but he resigned on 20 October, blaming the Syrian government for the Arab defeat in Palestine (Israel had declared independence in May 1948 and was fighting off invading Arab forces to remain a new state). In the volatile condition of Syrian politics, in December 1948 he twice failed to form a cabinet. Colonel Husni al-Zaʿim turned to him immediately after the coup of 30 March 1949 and made him his chief political aide. He served as foreign minister from 16 April to 26 June 1949. After Zaʿim's fall, Arslan was minister in Turkey from late 1949 to early 1952. He died at his home in Beirut on 23 January 1954. He was a writer and a poet, but his only books were *Dhikrayat al-Amir Adil Arslan an Husni al-Zaʿim* (Amir Adil Arslan's recollections concerning Husni al-Zaʿim [Beirut, 1962]) and *Mudhakkirat al-Amir Adil Arslan* (Memories of Amir Adil Arslan), edited by Yusuf Ibbish, in three volumes (Beirut, 1983).

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Alexandretta; Druze; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-; Lawrence, T. E.; National Party (Syria); Quwatli, Shukri al-; World War II; Zaʿim, Husni al-.

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C. Ernest Dawn

ARSLAN FAMILY

One of the two most important Druze families in Lebanon.

The Arslan family, in the Druze community for centuries, are now in competition with the Jumblatt Family to retain that position. Druze in Lebanon have historically been divided into Yazbakis and Jumblatts, and the Arslan family heads the Yazbaki confederation. Its head is now Amir Talal Arslan, who inherited the position from his father, Majid.

See also JUMBLATT FAMILY.

AS'AD ABUKHALIL

ARSLAN, SHAKIB

[1869–1946]

Lebanese poet, journalist, and political activist.

Shakib Arslan was a Druze notable from the Shuf region of Lebanon. He was dedicated to the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and to the social order of Islam. Between World War I and II, he became an anti-imperial activist and a relentless campaigner for the cause of Islamic solidarity. His voluminous writings, his well-connected network of associates, and his knack for attracting publicity made him one of the most visible Arab figures of this era.

The Arslans were a powerful Druze family whose members had the right to bear the title of amir (roughly equivalent to prince). Shakib's somewhat eclectic education—he studied at both the Maronite College and the Ottoman government school in Beirut—was designed to prepare him to carry on the family tradition of political leadership in changing times; his primary interest as a young man, however, was literature. He published his first volume of poetry at seventeen and continued to engage in literary pursuits for the next several years, earning for himself the honorific title "the prince of eloquence," by which he was known throughout his life. Eventually, he assumed the role expected of an Arslan amir by serving as *qa'immaqam* of the Shuf—in 1902 and from 1908 to 1911. He was elected to the Ottoman parliament in 1914 and spent the years of World War I defending the Ottoman cause—to hold the empire together. He disavowed the Arab Revolt of 1916, branded its leader Sharif Husayn ibn Ali a traitor to Islam, and predicted that an Allied victory would lead to the division and occupation of the Arab provinces by the forces of European imperialism.

When this prediction was realized, Arslan became an exile, barred by British and French authorities from entering the Arab states that came under their control through League of Nations mandates. Instead of being marginalized by his changed circumstances, Arslan emerged as an international figure during the period between the world wars. His residence in Geneva, Switzerland, served as a gathering point for Arab and Muslim activists, and his position as the unofficial representative of the Syro-Palestinian delegation to the League of Nations afforded him opportunities to present the Arab case to the European community. His influence was expanded through the journal *La Nation Arabe* (1930–1938), which he founded and edited with Ihsan al-Jabiri. *La Nation Arabe* attacked all aspects of European imperialism but devoted special attention to French policies in the Maghrib (North Africa) and to Zionism in Palestine.

Notwithstanding his Druze origins, Arslan made his reputation as a staunch defender of mainstream Sunni Islam. He contributed frequent articles to such Islamic-oriented Egyptian journals as *al-Shura* and *al-Fath*; wrote biographies of his friends Rashid Rida and Ahmad Shawqi; compiled a history of Arab rule in Spain; and wrote other books on Islamic subjects. The purpose of his writing was to awaken among Muslims an awareness of their shared Islamic heritage and to summon them to action in the name of Islamic unity against the Western occupation. He believed in the primacy of an Islamic-inspired social order, and his interwar writings refuted all who challenged that belief, from the Egyptian liberal nationalists to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding president of the new secular Republic of Turkey.

More than any other figure of the era, Arslan endeavored to bring together the leaders of the North African and eastern Arab independence movements. He played an especially important role as political strategist and personal mentor to the group of young Moroccans associated with the Free School movement, and his orchestration of their international Islamic propaganda campaign against the French decree known as the Berber Dahir

(1930) was certainly one of the most successful Arab protest movements of this period.

Arslan's final reputation was diminished by his World War II association with the Axis powers; at the peak of his popularity, he endeavored to coordinate an Italo–German alliance with the Arab world in order to generate leverage against Britain and France. His pro-Axis stance during the war served to discredit him, and his death in Beirut in 1946 attracted little notice.

See also Arab Revolt (1916); Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Berber Dahir; Druze; Husayn ibn Ali; Sunni Islam; Zionism

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William L. Cleveland

ARSUZI, ZAKI AL-

[1900–1968]

Alawite Syrian Islamic pan-Arab intellectual and political activist; a founder of the Baʿth party.

Zaki al-Arsuzi was born in Latakia (north Syria) in or around 1900. His father, Muhammad Najib al-Arsuzi, originally from the Alexandretta district, was an Alawite Islamic landowner and the leading attorney for his coreligionists. Within the Ottoman Empire, his vehemence in the courtroom resulted in a transfer to Antioch (Turkey), and during World War I, the Ottomans banished him to Konya (Turkey). He is commonly said to have been of middling circumstances, but his official biography states that the family's material wealth in Alexandretta was great. Zaki attended the primary school in Antioch and completed his secondary education in Konya. He studied at the French lay mission school in Beirut (Lebanon) after World War I and the demise of the Ottoman Empire. He taught mathematics in the secondary school at Antioch (1920–1921), was director of the Arsuz *nahiya* (county; 1924–1925), and served as secretary of the department of education (1926–1927). After studying philosophy in Paris from 1927 to 1930, he taught philosophy and history in the secondary schools, briefly in Antioch, and then in Aleppo and Dayr al-Zawr from 1930 to 1934. He built up a following among his students, in whom he instilled pan-Arabism, including the need for Arab resurrection (*baʿth*). He was an early member of the League of National Action (Asaba al-Amal al-Qawmi). He resigned or was forced out of his post in 1934 and returned to Antioch, where he was head of the Alexandretta province branch of the league. From 1936, his campaign to keep Alexandretta a part of Syria became violent and resulted in his expulsion in late 1938. He continued his protests from Damascus, but he broke with the league as well as the National Bloc. An agreement with Michel Aflaq, Salah al-Din al-Bitar, and three others to form a political party was fruitless, as was his own effort to organize a party that he called the Arab Nationalist Party (al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Arabi). After experiencing disappointment as a teacher in Baghdad during 1939 and 1940, he resided in Damascus without employment, living with a group of students, fellow refugees from Alexandretta, but he continued to attract students from throughout Syria.

On 29 November 1940 he and six students formed al-Baʿth al-Arabi (which later became the ruling Baʿth party). The peak membership was twelve within the university, with a few more from the high school. Meanwhile, a similar group, calling itself at different times al-Ihya al-Arabi or al-Baʿth al-Arabi, gathered around Aflaq and Bitar. Most members of Arsuzi's group were students of Aflaq and Bitar, and members of their group frequently visited Arsuzi, but there was rivalry. Arsuzi disliked Aflaq intensely. Arsuzi was undeniably the more prominent. He had presided over the most successful branch of the League of National Action and won the acclaim of nationalist students throughout Syria. The head of the Italian Armistice Commission in Syria sought a meeting, but Arsuzi declined because he thought the British were about to occupy Syria. On similar grounds of military realism, he opposed Rashid Ali al-Kaylani's action in Iraq; his position was unpopular. Arsuzi became progressively unwilling to brook dissent; he was biting and sarcastic in his sessions with followers and opponents. His followers diminished, while Aflaq's group grew. The group dwindled, then broke up in

1944. In the same year, Arsuzi moved first to Latakia, then to Tartus, a Syrian coastal town. The members of his group, led by Wahib Ghanim, joined the Aflaq–Bitar organization in 1945–1946, but Arsuzi refused urgings to reenter politics. Accepting a teaching appointment secured through the intercession of his followers, he taught in Hama (1945–1948), Aleppo (1948–1952), and at the Dar al-Muʿallimin al-Ibtida'iyya in Damascus until retirement in 1959. He published books and articles on cultural and philosophical subjects and Arab nationalism and gave frequent lectures to army units. In the 1960s, as Alawite officers increased their influence in the Baʿth party and Syrian government, Arsuzi's reputation and influence rose as Aflaq's position declined.

Arsuzi died in Damascus on 2 July 1968. His collected works were published in six volumes by the Political Administration of the Army and the Armed Forces (*al-Mu'allafat al-Kamila,* Damascus, 1972–1976). His writings have received little attention in the published scholarship of Western languages, but his concept of the Arab nation, its mission, predicament, and future, is close to that of other writers of the 1920s and 1930s. His use of the Islamic theological term *baʿth* was not unprecedented, but he gave it unusual emphasis.

See also Aflaq, Michel; Baʿth, al-; Bitar, Salah al-Din al-; Pan-Arabism.

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C. Ernest Dawn

ART

Art in the Middle East encompasses a broad range of cultural traditions and artistic ideologies.

The visual arts play an important role in cultural and political processes in the contemporary Middle East. The importance of visual art's relationship to politics and culture is largely due to how deeply embedded traditional art forms are, the tenuous relationship between figural art and Islamic theology, the ongoing entanglement between Western and Middle Eastern modern arts dating back to the colonial period, and significant governmental interest in the visual arts as an expression of political ideologies or cultural achievement. Most importantly, historical and contemporary arts together define concepts of local identity (e.g., national, religious, class) in relation to regional and global political and economic forces.

"Hanging Gardens," oil on canvas, by Syrian artist Madiha Umar. Umar graduated from a London university and taught art in Iraq in the 1930s before moving to the United States for further education. Umar pioneered the modern use of Arabic calligraphy in abstract painting, and her critically acclaimed work often appears in art history books. "Hanging Gardens" by Madiha Umar, oil on canvas, 1962. © Madiha Umar. Reproduced by permission.

Jananne al-Ani's "Untitled I" and "Untitled II" photographs are always displayed as a pair. The Iraqi artist's work is influenced by her interest in the female form as depicted in Orientalist painting and photography. "Untitled I," by Jananne Al-Ani, 1996, Silver Gelatin Prints, 180cm x 120cm, Collection: Smithsonian Institution/Victoria & Albert Museum. © Jananne Al-Ani. Reproduced by permission of the artist.

Since the nineteenth century, the visual arts have been produced in relationship to several historical and contemporary trends, which highlight the particular connections between art, culture, and politics in the region. First, artists, critics, collectors, and arts administrators have engaged with the styles, media, and ideologies of modern art from Europe, the Eastern bloc countries, and the United States. Beginning in the colonial period, Western European artists and teachers brought Western concepts, techniques, and styles of modern art to the Middle East. They were often instrumental in setting up arts institutions and East/West cultural hierarchies. Between the 1950s and 1970s, the Eastern bloc, with its socialist realism, replaced Western Europe as the main source of external cultural engagement, particularly in countries like Iraq and Egypt. Since at least the 1980s, classical and avant-garde Western European trends and cultural exchanges have again become influential, particularly with the advent of Western interest in opening up the canon of modern art to non-Westerners. In Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel especially, one finds intensified interest in American art forms, but in many cases this is complicated by dissatisfaction with American foreign policy.

The second major factor that has influenced the production of visual arts since the nineteenth century is recognition of the artistic achievements of the past, especially historical Islamic art, Pharaonic art, Assyrian art, and Phoenician art. Artworks from these traditions are seen not only as aesthetic accomplishments but also as emblems of a time when Middle Eastern countries were at the height of their political, economic, and cultural development. In many cases, these historical artworks have been incorporated into nationalism as artistic traditions, or

As of 2003, Jananne al-Ani was involved in the production of an exhibition dedicated to displaying contemporary works involving the veil. "Untitled II," by Jananne Al-Ani, 1996, Silver Gelatin Prints, 180cm x 120cm, Collection: Smithsonian Institution/Victoria & Albert Museum. © Jananne Al-Ani. Reproduced by permission of the artist.

into broader ideologies of Arab or religious identity.

The same is true for folk arts and crafts, a third major influence on the production of modern art. Objects made by peasants or craftspeople, and the visual styles they developed, have also been made part of national canons and been used by modern artists seeking to legitimate themselves as part of local collectivities rather than elites who imitate the West—a common charge in the Arab world.

It would be a mistake to characterize this blending of historical and contemporary artistic trends as the degraded by-product of Western cultural imperialism, industrialization, socialist propaganda, or nationalist elitism. Rather, the arts of the Middle East (like arts everywhere) have always developed in relationship to cultural and political trends from within the region and to relationships between the region and the outside world. The situation of the visual arts in the Middle East is complicated by the Western modernist notion of the strict separation and hierarchical ranking of fine art over craft or applied art—a separation which was introduced to the Middle East through the colonial encounter. It is further complicated by the history of European orientalist painting, which is criticized by many Middle Eastern and Western scholars for stereotypical portrayals of the Orient that assisted colonialism, but which greatly influenced the development of national subjects and styles within the Middle East itself.

Further complicating the situation of the visual arts is the unresolved debate over the acceptability of representational painting and sculpting *(taswir)* in Islam. Condemned as idolatrous by traditional theologians, works of art depicting people and animals nevertheless flourished from earliest Islamic times, especially under royal patronage. The efforts of some modern theological commentators to reinter-

pret or eliminate the theological ban on *taswir* through a revisionist view of the important *hadith* on the subject seem to have had an influence on the acceptance of such art among most Middle Eastern artists with the exception of many in the Gulf countries and in Iran, where there has been strict censorship of public art by the clerical regime. For the general population, the increasing acceptance of *taswir* owes much to the influence of television, film, and advertising, which provide public images that are highly figural, pervasive, and popular. Still, conventional Islamic mores concerning the image, and particularly the nude figure, still shape the choices that artists, curators, and collectors make, and are most noticeable in art education curricula.

All these factors have shaped the art worlds of Middle Eastern countries. In general, artistic production and the processes of evaluation, patronage, and consumption of the arts have been most marked by struggles to define cultural, national, and religious identity in relation to two poles: on the one hand, the achievements of historical art traditions and contemporary crafts, which are endangered by industrialization, and on the other, the influence and hegemony of Western modern art.

Arts Institutions

Arts institutions, including art colleges, museums, and galleries, exist in all Middle Eastern countries. While some date back to the colonial period, such as the first College of Fine Arts in the Arab world (Cairo, 1908), most were formed in the post-Independence period of nation-building. The 1990s also witnessed a growth in the number of arts institutions in both the public and private sectors. During this period, many private galleries opened in Cairo and Beirut, especially. Middle Eastern countries now have national collections, many housed in notable museums of national modern art, such as the Museum of Modern Egyptian Art in Cairo, the Jordan National Gallery of Fine Arts, and the Sursock Museum in Beirut. Many works from the Iraqi National Collection were destroyed during the 2003 war.

Artistic Trends

These specifics of modern Middle Eastern cultural production have produced a number of artistic trends and responses. One of the most popular trends is to take the spirit, principles, or forms (especially calligraphic and geometric) of historical Islamic art and put them into a contemporary artistic context through manipulation of form or material or by using them to address current political or cultural issues. This trend has been most influential in Jordan, Palestine, the Maghrib, the Gulf, and Iran. The creation of what has been called modern Islamic art challenges the common notion that Islamic art declined in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a direct result of the influence of Western techniques and styles. The changing economics of patronage, particularly after 1700, were the primary cause of the dramatic changes in Islamic art in the modern period. The talk of decline, it may be argued, comes from nostalgia for a premodern Muslim past. Not satisfied with being kept out of modernity, Muslim critics have engaged in significant attempts to develop Islamic aesthetic theories, and artists have produced some of the most original interpretations of the history of Islamic art. For example, calligraphy—the most distinctive, pervasive, and religiously embedded Islamic art form—has, due to the printing press, been less important in the media of pen and paper but has found expression in a host of new media, from oil on canvas and silk screen to neon-filled glass tubing and polymer or stone sculpture. In another example, geometric and vegetal arabesque forms, as well as the classic *muqarnas* architectural device (a honeycomb or stalactite vault), have been manipulated in new ways, often in combination with European or American abstraction devices. This innovation has occurred in both two- and three-dimensional art, including installation art. Faced with some resistance among those who see abstract art as an imitation of Western excesses, some art theorists have argued that abstraction actually originated in Islam (with its opposition to the image), and they have delved into the history of Islamic art theory in order to reinvigorate it. Sufi philosophy and practice, with its emphasis on experimentation and altered consciousness, has also been inspirational for many artists in the Middle East, although it is worth mentioning that Christian, and sometimes Muslim, artists also use traditional Christian motifs in their work. This is most apparent in Egypt, where Coptic history has been incorporated into the national artistic patrimony.

The most widespread trend among contemporary Middle Eastern artists is the visual search for and expression of cultural identity, which is usually defined in national terms but can also be formulated as Arab, Mediterranean, Mesopotamian, Maghribi, Kurdish, Berber, Nubian, Persian, Turkish, or a combination of any of these, depending on the context. The central importance of cultural identity in contemporary Middle Eastern art is related to several factors: the rich artistic sources found in the historical arts and in contemporary folklores, landscapes, and local materials (e.g., certain kinds of stone, plant dyes, found artifacts, local consumer goods, and industrial objects); the incorporation, through modern nationalist projects, of these sources into national traditions; state, local elite, and Western patronage, all searching for visual representations of cultural uniqueness; the anxiety, produced through colonialism, over Western influence and the desire to protect and develop what are seen as more authentic local traditions; and, often, secular artists' desires to create a nonreligious cultural identity through art. The art of cultural identity is found in most countries of the region and is especially dominant in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Tunisia, and Turkey. In Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey, in particular, it has had tremendous support from the secularist regimes. The most common themes in this trend are pastoral landscapes, premodern urban and rural architecture, peasants (especially rural women), the popular (*shaʿbi*) urban classes, ancient civilizations (e.g., Pharaonic, Phoenician, Assyrian), and images from folk art. Popular styles include figurative primitivism and semi-impressionist realism in both painting and sculpture. Younger generations of artists in the Middle East, however, are engaging in their own searches for cultural identity, which sometimes draw on the past, the rural, and the folk but also try to account for the contemporary changes engulfing the region, particularly those related to consumer capitalism, technological globalization, and war and violence. They often explore their shifting, yet usually rooted, cultural identity in newer media, such as installation art, video art, and performance. Sometimes this art takes a completely conceptual and abstract, rather than literal and figurative, form.

Another major trend is the use of avant-garde media, styles, and art theory to launch critiques against the West or Israel and, less often, the artists' own governments. Many of these artists are concerned with such issues as the inequality of capitalist globalization, conspicuous consumerism, threats to morality (defined broadly) or cultural integrity, the oppression or commoditization of women, and violence.

Consumption and Patronage

Many governments of the region have put significant resources into supporting and reinvigorating traditional crafts, and into restoring historical monuments and architecture. These projects have often been connected to tourism planning, and to educating the population about the national artistic patrimony. Governmental and private sector attempts to market modern art to tourists, foreign curators, or the local population have been less successful for two primary reasons. First, foreigners often come to the region looking for objects that unambiguously reflect their preconception of a unique traditional culture, and modern art—particularly in its more experimental forms—does not fit these expectations easily. Second, the general population is often alienated by modern art forms and the institutions that display them.

That said, there has been a continuous growth in the consumption and patronage of contemporary art in several countries since 1985, which is due to several factors. One of the most important is the growth of capitalism and the effects of globalization generally, engendering increased exposure to contemporary avant-garde art from the United States and Europe and producing (in many countries) a local class of nouveaux riches (many of them under the age of forty-five) who are eager to support modern art and, it could be argued, display their cultural capital by purchasing it. These forces have also brought Western curators to the Middle East in unprecedented numbers. Having opened their canons to non-Western modern art, many of them are interested in finding Middle Eastern artists who challenge stereotypes of the region—particularly its women (though not its men). These Europeans and Americans have increased Western exposure to Middle Eastern art and artists, though sometimes their tactics have been criticized by local artists and governments. Not only do anxieties about Western

influence and the effects of the colonial encounter still exist, in many cases they are heightened by the globalization of Middle Eastern art. A final factor contributing to increasing support for modern art is the attempt by government to raise the international status of the nation by developing the arts of the country and encouraging artistic expression as a counterweight to the rise of radical Islamism. In several countries, the state has become the primary collector of modern art as a result.

A major consequence of these global shifts has been the development of a significant body of art produced by the Middle Eastern diaspora in Europe and the United States. The themes of cultural identity, memory, political critique, and especially gender have been the most prominent.

See also Ali, Wijdan; Attar, Suad al-; Baya; Caland, Huguette; Efflatoun, Inji; Faraj, Maysaloun; Ghoussoub, Mai; Hatoum, Mona; Ishaaq, Kamala Ibrahim; Jacir, Emily; Kadri, Mufide; Karnouk, Liliane; Khal, Helen; Khemir, Sabiha; Neshat, Shirin; Niati, Houria; Saudi, Mona; Shawa, Laila; Sidera, Zineb; Sirry, Gazbia; Tallal, Chaibia; Umar, Madiha; Zeid, Fahralnissa.

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WALTER DENNY
UPDATED BY JESSICA WINEGAR

ASʿAD, AHMAD

Leader of the influential Shiʿite family of Jabal Amil.

The Asʿad family (also spelled al-As'ad), which was descended from the Saghir family of Jabal Amil, traces its origins to Arab tribes in southern Arabia. This large landowning family has monopolized the political representation of the Shiʿites of south Lebanon for centuries. Ahmad Asʿad, the leader of the family in the first half of the twentieth century, was elected to parliament from 1937 to 1960; was briefly speaker of parliament; and served in several cabinets. His popularity in south Lebanon was so strong that his entire list of candidates was assured victory. People in south Lebanon joked that a stick would win a parliamentary seat if included on Ahmad al-Asʿad's list. He and his son Kamil were both in the 1953, 1957, and 1960 parliaments. After Ahmad's death, his wife, known as Umm Kamil, shared political responsibilities with her son.

See also Asʿad Family; Asʿad, Kamil.

ASʿAD ABUKHALIL

ASAD, BASHSHAR AL-

[1965–]

Syrian army officer, ophthalmologist, president of the Syrian Arab Republic since 2000.

Born in Damascus on 11 September 1965, Bashshar al-Asad was the second son of the late president, Hafiz al-Asad. He attended the Franco-Arab al-Hurriyet school in Damascus and Damascus University, studying medicine and specializing in ophthalmology. He had three brothers and a sister, all of whom, at the insistence of their father, completed their education in Syria. The ethos of the Asad household was somewhat puritanical. While the children saw little of their father, they were intensely loyal to him. Bashshar al-Asad later continued his postgraduate education and specialization in the United Kingdom.

Asad entered the Homs Military Academy in 1994, graduating first in his class and rising quickly through the ranks to become a colonel in 1999. Immediately entrusted with heavier military and political responsibilities than would be justified by his junior rank, he later became commander in chief of the armed forces as well as secretary general of

the Baʿth party. Also president of the Syrian Computer Society, an organization devoted to promoting the diffusion of information technology throughout the country, Asad's role there has often been cited as an indication of his interest in modernization.

After his father's death, Asad was elected to a seven-year presidential term on 10 July 2000, receiving 97.29 percent of the official vote tally. He was sworn in as the sixteenth president of the Syrian Arab Republic on 17 July 2000. In a speech immediately after the ceremony, he set the tone for the early years of his administration, emphasizing the dual themes of continuity and change that have characterized his presidency.

Asad immediately displayed political skill by gracefully eliminating potential political rivals and promoting younger officials dedicated to economic and technological modernization. He also made clear his distaste for the cult of personality, a prominent feature of his father's regime. Another sign of a more liberal inclination was his promise to activate the role of the Progressive National Front, a coalition of political groups established in 1972 and dominated by the Baʿth party. Asad also granted amnesty to several hundred political prisoners, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood and some communists. Another noteworthy step was to decree a 25 percent salary raise for public sector workers.

Growing regional conflict later diverted Asad's attention from domestic issues, dampening expectations of rapid economic and political change. Early liberalization measures, known as the Damascus Spring, were soon tarnished by steps taken to reassert the authority of the old regime, including a crackdown in 2001 on political discussion groups and the imprisonment of prodemocracy militants. Asad then reversed course in mid-2003, implementing a new round of minor reform measures, dismissed by some as cosmetic. Baʿth party officials were told to stay out of the day-to-day running of the bureaucracy, three private banks were licensed in an important step toward reforming the state-dominated economy, and two new private universities and four radio stations were approved. Broader economic reforms were delayed, in part out of fear of possible political destabilization; consequently, the economy remained the primary long-term issue in Syrian domestic politics.

When compared with the domestic front, there was less immediate movement on regional and international levels. Syria remains committed to a just and comprehensive Middle East peace, including the recovery of every inch of Syrian territory. With this as the top national priority, Syrian foreign policy continues to revolve around three axes: Egypt–Saudi Arabia–Syria, Iran–Syria, and Lebanon–Syria. Departures in foreign policy under Asad include a dramatic opening to Iraq, better relations with Turkey, and support for the Palestinian intifada. The unresolved peace process with Israel continues to cloud development of healthy relations between Syria and the United States. In the process, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, U.S. occupation of Iraq, and concerns that the war on terrorism could target Syria all reinforce the intransigence of the old guard in Syrian politics and become a pretext for obstructing change in both external and internal policies.

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Ronald Bruce St John

ASʿAD FAMILY

A prominent family of southern Lebanon.

The Asʿad family claims descent from the family confederation of al-Saghir, who in turn trace their lineage to tribes in Arabia. Ahmad al-Asʿad and his son Kamil were dominant politicians in the twentieth century; both held ministerial positions and Kamil was speaker of Parliament for much of the 1970s and also in the 1960s and 1980s. His family leadership suffered from the rise of radical political parties among Shiʿites in the early phase of the civil war of 1975. In later years, the rise of AMAL and Hizbullah, eclipsed the influence of the family. Kamil al-Asʿad failed to win a seat in the 1992 parliamentary elections.

See also AMAL; ASʿAD, AHMAD; ASʿAD, KAMIL; HIZBULLAH.

AS'AD ABUKHALIL

ASAD, HAFIZ AL-

[1930–2000]

Syrian air force officer and statesman, late president of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Born in Qurdaha, near Latakia, Asad was the ninth of eleven children of Ali Sulayman, a peasant of Alawi origin whose strength, bravery, and chivalry made him a pillar of his village. Until his death in 1963, Ali carried on the family tradition of mediating quarrels and giving protection to the weak. Asad was one of a handful of boys in his village to receive formal education when the French opened primary schools in remote villages. From his father he acquired a lifelong determination not to submit when pressures mounted.

This family legacy offers an important clue to Asad's proud and vigorous personality. While a student, Asad joined the Baʿth party in 1947 and became one of its stalwarts in Latakia. After graduation from secondary school in 1951, he entered the military academy at Homs and later the flying school at Aleppo, graduating as a pilot officer in 1955. He then plunged into the intrigues of the highly politicized and faction-ridden officer corps, traveling to Egypt in 1955 and to the Soviet Union in 1958 for further military instruction. Asad returned to Egypt in 1959, having already joined the Baʿth party as a follower of Zaki al-Arsuzi, an Alawi from Alexandretta and one of the three founders of the Baʿth party. With four fellow officers who also followed al-Arsuzi, Asad founded in Cairo in early 1960 a secret organization they called the Military Committee. These young men had never admired the other two Baʿth party founders, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, considering them to be middle-class Damascene theorists of the Baʿth, and believing that they had caused the party's demise by entering impulsively into an ill-fated union with Egypt in February 1958. Egypt's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, distrusted political parties, and as a condition for accepting union with Syria, he had insisted on the dissolution of the Baʿth party.

Rise to Power

Being Baʿthists who aspired to positions of dominance in Syrian public life, Asad and his colleagues in the Military Committee were very careful not to reveal the existence of their organization to Egyptian intelligence. Following the breakup of the Egypt-Syria union in September 1961, Asad was jailed briefly in Egypt before returning to Syria, where he was granted indefinite leave from the air force and demoted to a low-paid clerk position in the Ministry of Economics. At times incarcerated in Lebanon as well as in Syria, he spent 1962 conspiring with his colleagues on the Military Committee to take power in Syria. In March 1963 he played a leading role in the coup that brought Baʿth officers to power. Following the coup, Asad was promoted to major general and made commander of the air force in 1964. From 1965, he was a member of the regional *(qutri)* and national *(qawmi)* Baʿth High Command.

During the seven years following the 1963 coup, Asad mastered the techniques of survival in the factional struggles that plagued Syria. Rejecting Aflaq and the social and economic order from which he came, Asad sided with the radical faction of Salah Jadid and Muhammad Umran, making in the process both lasting friendships and permanent enemies. Umran kept an eye on the government machine, Jadid ran the army, and Asad helped the Military Committee extend its networks in the armed forces by bringing every unit under its close control and by ensuring that Committee loyalists occupied the sensitive commands.

For ideological guidance, Asad sought the advice of Aflaq's early rival, the Alawite Zaki al-Arsuzi, who contributed editorials to the party and army press and provided Asad with insights until Arsuzi's death in 1968. In February 1966, following a bloody intraparty shootout, Asad was made Minister of Defense, thus moving very close to the top of the government. He was then promoted in 1968 to the rank of lieutenant general. To get to the top, he had to neutralize or purge the leftist team of Jadid and the officers who supported them. Asad believed the radicalism of the Jadid-led team caused Syria's isolation in the Arab world, and the army it tried to build was ill prepared to cope with Israel. In February 1969 he gained control of the government and

party command but agreed to keep some of his adversaries in positions of power. In November 1970 Asad seized full control in what he termed a "corrective movement," purging and dismissing his opponents and detaining their leaders, including president and prime minister Nur al-Din al-Atasi.

With Asad's rise to power, a new chapter in the domestic and foreign policies of Syria began to unfold. On the domestic front, Asad sought to establish his rule on a firm footing, primarily by building stable state institutions and by wooing disenchanted social classes with measures of political and economic liberalization. Socialism, retained as a tenet in the rhetoric of the ruling party, became etatism or state capitalism. The Asad regime also relaxed restrictions on the private sector. Rapid economic growth, mostly through public expenditure, was the primary objective of both economic and development policies. In response, the Syrian economy grew at an annual rate exceeding 9 percent throughout the 1970s. After 1973 additional rounds of economic liberalization followed in 1979, 1987, and 1991.

Asad emphasized the need for reconciliation and national unity after the divisive years of the Jadid-led faction. To heighten the impression of a fresh start, he introduced a more liberal climate for writers and novelists and set about courting former Baʿthists who had been generally out of favor with the previous regime. Stable political structures also emerged after Asad's coup. A People's Council or parliament was established in 1971, and the following year, the Progressive National Front, an institutionalized coalition of the Baʿth party with a collection of smaller parties, was set up. In 1973, a new constitution was promulgated. On the other hand, Asad allowed no opposition to his rule. He ruthlessly suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood, virtually eliminating its resistance during the Hama uprising of February 1982.

Asad also neutralized or en ded factional struggles within the army and the Baʿth party. The institutional pillars of his rule were the army, a multilayered intelligence network, formal state structures, and revitalized party congresses. The People's Council in 1971 appointed Asad president following nomination by the Baʿth command; thereafter, plebiscites regularly endorsed his re-



A lifelong Baʿth Party member, Hafiz al-Asad was the president of Syria from 1970 until his death in 2000. © GETTY IMAGES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

election for seven-year terms. The consolidation of the state, accompanied by a concentration of power in Asad's hands, was accepted by the political elite as a necessary measure to confront the threat the country and regime faced following its defeat and occupation in the Arab-Israel War of June 1967. Asad's state-building was largely dependent on external resources, with the Soviet Union providing the arms to rebuild the military and Arab oil money funding an expansion of the bureaucracy and the co-opting of the bourgeoisie.

A Three-Stage Foreign Policy

In foreign policy, Asad called into question the radical policies of his predecessors, setting Syria on a new, more pragmatic course that took greater account of Israel's military superiority. Three stages of Syria's foreign policy in the Asad years can be identified. The first lasted from 1970 to 1974. During this stage, Asad moved quickly to improve

relations with Egypt, which had been strained since the 1961 breakup of its union with Syria. He even joined the stillborn federation of Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan in November 1970. He also set about putting Syria's relations with Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia on a friendly basis. To show good faith toward Saudi Arabia, he closed a Damascus-based, anti-Saudi radio station. The Arab-Israel War of October 1973, at least in part, was an efficiently coordinated Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi affair. While not a military success, it proved a political victory for Asad. Although Syria failed to regain the Golan Heights, he derived a high degree of legitimacy and considerable political leverage from a credible challenge to the Israeli status quo as well as from the Arab oil embargo initiated in response to the war.

Asad also moved very quickly to convince the Soviet Union that Syria was a reliable and valuable regional partner. This entailed facilitating a stable Soviet presence in the region to curtail American influence. Soviet arms deliveries proved vital to Syria's relative success in the 1973 war and were stimulated later by Egypt's separate peace with Israel and Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Soviet military power expanded steadily under Asad's rule in an effort to give Syria sufficient parity with Israel to constitute a credible deterrent and to give backing to Syrian diplomacy. The role of the Soviet Union as patron-protector also served as a deterrent to Israeli freedom of action against Syria. As for the United States, mutual hostility and mistrust kept the two countries diplomatically apart until the 1990s. In Asad's view, the United States biased the regional balance of power in Israel's favor by ensuring its military superiority and also by dividing the Arabs, notably by detaching Sadat's Egypt from the anti-Israeli coalition.

Stage Two

In the second stage, which lasted from 1974 to the end of the 1980s, there were three major modifications in Syria's foreign policy. The first was the revision of its alliance strategy with Egypt; it now sought to isolate Egypt in the Arab world. The aim was to discredit Anwar al-Sadat and eliminate any possibility of a Camp David–type agreement between Israel and other Arab states, especially Jordan and Lebanon. Asad worked to bring neighboring Lebanon and Jordan, together with the Palestinians, into the Syrian orbit; and in 1983 and 1984, he struggled mightily to kill the May 1983 Israel-Lebanon accord, brokered by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. Soviet support was pivotal here in giving Asad the confidence necessary to challenge Israeli power and U.S. diplomacy in Lebanon following the 1982 Israeli invasion.

A second change concerned Asad's relations with the leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, who remained Asad's most implacable Arab adversary. Nonpersonal considerations notwithstanding, including the party schism and the geopolitical rivalry that divided the two countries, Asad swallowed his pride and went to Baghdad in 1978, following Egypt's entente with Israel. In June 1979 he again visited Iraq in an unsuccessful bid for a federation between the two countries. Suspecting that the federation scheme was intended to undermine his position of dominance in Iraq, Saddam did not bother to meet Asad at the airport and later accused Syria of hatching a plot to overthrow him. The following year, when the Iran-Iraq war broke out, Asad condemned Iraq and backed Iran. Asad denounced the Iraqi invasion of Iran as the wrong war at the wrong time with the wrong enemy, rightly predicting it would detract Arab attention from the Israeli threat. The alliance with Iran proved helpful in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, when Iranian-sponsored Islamic resistance to Israel helped check a dangerous challenge to the Asad regime. Over time, Syria and Iran became increasingly close partners, to the displeasure of the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, who saw in Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolution a potentially fatal threat to their regimes and to the territorial integrity of their countries.

The third change concerned Syria's relations with Israel. The process of change in this regard was relatively fast in getting under way. The first visible step was Syria's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242 in March 1972. In the past, Asad had reiterated Syria's rejection of Resolution 242 on the grounds that without redressing the military and political balance with Israel, the Arabs could not force Israel to solve the Palestine question and withdraw from the Arab territories it had seized in June 1967.

A more tangible step was the May 1974 disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel, negotiated under the auspices of the U.S. government in the wake of the Arab-Israel War of 1973. The Soviet Union remained neutral except for hints in the Soviet press warning Asad not to be tricked into accepting half measures. One significant aspect of the agreement was the two sides' declaration that the disengagement of forces was only a step toward a just and durable peace based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Another was Asad's oral commitment not to allow any guerrilla raids from the Syrian side of the disengagement line.

Stage Three

The third stage in Syrian foreign policy, dating from the end of the 1980s, concerned its entente with Egypt, its participation in the U.S.–led alliance against Iraq, and its subsequent involvement in the U.S.–sponsored Middle East peace process that began with the Madrid Conference in October 1991. These events transpired in a milieu in which the negative impact of the decay of pan-Arabism in the 1980s was compounded by deteriorating domestic economic conditions as Syria wrestled with a prolonged economic crisis from 1985 to 1990. Triggered by a sudden decline in oil prices and foreign aid, the economic problems of the Asad regime were rooted in a history of excessive military spending, stifling economic regulations, and political corruption that combined to distort markets and drain resources.

Whereas in the previous stage Syria had been adamantly opposed to Egypt, it abandoned its policy of seeking "strategic parity" with Israel in 1988 and 1989 and entered into an alliance with the Egyptian government of Husni Mubarak, a pact involving de facto acceptance of the Camp David Accords. These moves led to Syria's entry, for the first time, into face-to-face negotiations with Israel. Not only did Syria drop its insistence on an international peace conference under UN sponsorship, but it helped to create the psychological climate for promising bilateral negotiations with Israel.

The end of the Cold War thus marked a period of transition for Asad. Faced with a hostile international environment, he adapted begrudgingly to the new power balance. The implosion of the Soviet Union, and its withdrawal as arms provider and reliable protector, exposed Syria to Western animosity for its long-time opposition to the Middle East peace process. Asad rightly concluded that the struggle with Israel would now have to take a diplomatic form and would require détente with the United States, which alone had leverage over Israel. The Gulf War coalition thus provided an opportunity for Asad to trade adhesion to the coalition for at least limited U.S. recognition of Syrian interests. In the process, Asad hoped to influence the new world order, as opposed to becoming its victim.

Syrian entry into the Madrid peace process marked not an abandonment of long-term goals, but their pursuit by other means. The containment of Israel remained center-stage in Syrian strategic thinking. Asad still hoped to maximize territorial recovery and minimize the concessions Israel expected in return. While Syria displayed newfound flexibility in the talks, negotiations eventually stalled over Israeli insistence on a surveillance station on Mount Hermon, which Asad saw as an affront to Syrian sovereignty, and the 1996 Likud election victory in Israel. Talks with Israel resumed after the 1999 election of Ehud Barak but later broke down over control of Golan water resources and Israeli insistence on modifying the pre-1967 border around Lake Tiberias.

As the transition from a state of belligerency to one of coexistence with Israel continued, Asad initiated a new round of economic reforms. The decade of the 1990s saw the slow dismantling of the public sector and the socialist measures associated with it. Private investment overtook public investment, and agriculture became almost exclusively the domain of the private sector. At the same time, resistance to additional economic reforms from members of the bureaucracy, the Baʿth party, and the military, together with widespread patronage, waste, and corruption, continued to constitute serious obstacles to rational economic policies. Moreover, while the continuation of economic reforms and the peace process generated pressures for greater political openness, political liberalization, especially democratization, remained anathema to the Asad regime.

The principles governing Asad's foreign and domestic policies have been compared to those that

governed the policy of British statesman Lord Palmerston (1784–1865), who once said, "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." In the execution of these principles, Asad proved himself a cautious and calculating tactician as well as a master politician. President Hafiz al-Asad died on 10 June 2000. He was replaced by his second son, Bashshar al-Asad, on 17 July 2000.

See also Arsuzi, Zaki al-; Baʿth, al-; Golan Heights; Hama; Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Madrid Conference (1991); Muslim Brotherhood.

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Muhammad Muslih
Updated by Ronald Bruce St John

ASʿAD, KAMIL

[c. 1930–]

Lebanese political leader, son of Ahmad Asʿad.

Kamil Asʿad (also al-As'ad) was born in Tayba and educated in Beirut. He earned a law degree at Saint Joseph University in Beirut. As the only son of Ahmad al-Asʿad, he was prepared for a political career from an early age. Asʿad served in parliament from 1957 until 1992 (but lost the 1960 election), when he failed to win a seat in the highly controversial election. Asʿad was speaker of parliament in 1964, 1968, and from 1970 until 1984, when he was replaced by Husayn al-Husayni. Asʿad had a reputation for detesting the poor. The civil war brought an end to his political career as Shiʿites rebelled against "feudal" traditional families, who were seen as arrogant and insensitive. The rise of the left, the AMAL movement, and later Hizbullah brought a final end to the major role played by this family for centuries. Asʿad heads the Democratic Socialist Party.

See also AMAL; Asʿad, Ahmad; Asʿad Family; Hizbullah; Husayni, Husayn al-.

Asʿad AbuKhalil

ASʿAD WALI

Wali of the Vilayet of Sidon.

Asʿad Wali is not to be confused with the Asʿad Pasha who was a prominent Ottoman official in Istanbul. In 1843, under Asʿad's rule, as *wali* of the *vilayet* (province) of Sidon, the Mount Lebanon region was divided into Druze and Maronite (Christian) sections in the wake of Druze–Maronite conflict. Some historians think that he sincerely tried to reconcile the various religious factions in Lebanon, but the intensity of conflict, not only between Maronites and Druzes but also between Maronites and Greek Orthodox, for example, prevented the establishment of a harmonious political arrangement in the

mountains of Lebanon. The government of the Ottoman Empire accused him of bias in favor of Christians and replaced him in 1845. His replacement ushered in an era of more bloodshed and killing.

See also DRUZE; MARONITES.

AS'AD ABUKHALIL

ASH

See FOOD: ASH

ASHKENAZIM

European Jews whose daily language was Yiddish (often in addition to the languages of the countries and regions in which they lived during the Diaspora).

Ashkenazim is the plural of *Ashkenazi,* a term derived from the Hebrew name Ashkenaz, a great-grandson of the biblical Noah. The Ashkenazim are Jews whose Middle East ancestors migrated to Germany (called Ashkenaz by medieval Jews) and the surrounding areas, where they spoke Middle High German during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and that evolved into Jüdisch Diutsch, or Yiddish. Their liturgical Hebrew differs markedly in both rhythm and pronunciation from that of today's Middle Eastern Jews or of the Sephardic Jews of Southern Europe and North Africa.

In modern Israel, the Ashkenazim were, until recently, a minority, outnumbered by Sephardic and Middle Eastern Jews; as large numbers of refugees from the former Soviet Union arrive, however, the Ashkenazim may become the majority of the Jewish population.

Although the Hebrew language taught in Israel's public schools uses the Sephardic pronunciation, Ashkenazic Hebrew can be heard during services in East and Central European congregations. Small but strongly cohesive communities of Ashkenazic pietists—particularly in the United States, Jerusalem, and B'nei B'rak—speak Yiddish, regarding Hebrew as too sacred for secular matters and daily conversation. In the modern Middle East, outside Israel, only Turkey has a small but viable Ashkenazic community.

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ARNOLD BLUMBERG

ASHMAWI, MUHAMMAD ABD AL-RAHMAN SALIH, AL-

[1911–1983]

Ideologist of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Muhammad Abd al-Rahman Salih al-Ashmawi is one of the leading ideologists and journalists of the Muslim Brotherhood. He joined the Brotherhood in 1931 and graduated from the Faculty of Commerce, Cairo University, in 1932. He was appointed general secretary of the Brotherhood in 1936. He was the editor-in-chief of the main journals of the Brotherhood, *al-Nazir, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun,* and others. Upon the request of Hasan al-Banna in the 1940s, Ashmawi founded and became the editor-in-chief of the Islamist journal *al-Daʿwa,* which played a central and successful role in Islamic politics and organization. He became the head of the special apparatus in 1941 and was arrested in 1948. After al-Banna's assassination in 1949, Ashmawi led the Brotherhood for two and a half years. When judge Hasan al-Hudaybi became the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ashmawi joined the radical faction that opposed al-Hudaybi. It was Ashmawi who recruited Sayyid Qutb into the Brotherhood after his return from the United States. While President Gamal Abdel Nasser tried to convince Ashmawi to join his government, the supreme leader Hudaybi fired him from the organization. *Al-Daʿwa* continued to be published independently by Ashmawi, who owned its license. When Umar al-Tilmisani assumed the leadership of the Brotherhood in 1973, Ashmawi joined again, and his journal was again published as its mouthpiece. President Anwar al-Sadat ordered his arrest along with other Muslim Brothers in 1981 in the aftermath of the Camp David Accords.

See also MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD.

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AHMAD S. MOUSSALLI

ASHMAWI, MUHAMMAD SAʿID AL-

[1932–]

Egyptian jurist and writer.

Muhammad Saʿid al-Ashmawi graduated from Cairo University's law school in 1954. This retired Egyptian Supreme Court justice and former head of the Court of State Security has become one of the most influential liberal Islamic thinkers today. He is an effective polemicist against the Islamic fundamentalist trend in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world. He has published widely on the subject of Islamic law *(shariʿa),* using his understanding of Islam combined with his reading of orientalist literature to undermine the conservative interpretation of Islam. He aims at distinguishing between Islam the religion and Islam as a political enterprise aimed at earning political legitimacy for the ruling regime. He tries to refute the myths about Islamic history held by Muslim fundamentalists and by students of state-sponsored Islamic education, arguing that Islamic history does not necessarily constitute the golden age that it is said to be. Al-Ashmawi's writing have been disseminated through state-sponsored publications in Egypt, perhaps in an effort to undermine the legitimacy of the fundamentalists, but he has had to rely on round-the-clock police protection due to death threats from Egyptian militants.

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ASʿAD ABUKHALIL

ASHOUR, RADWA

[1946–]

An Egyptian novelist.

Radwa Ashour (also Ashur) is a novelist, short-story writer, literary critic, and university professor from Egypt. She earned her M.A. in comparative literature from Cairo University (1972) and her Ph.D. in African-American literature from the University of Massachusetts (1975). She is professor of English literature at Ain Shams University, Cairo, and is active in the Committee for the Defense of National Culture. In addition to academic literary studies in both Arabic and English, Ashour has published prize-winning fiction: Her novel *Gharnata* (Grenada, 1994), first of a trilogy on the Muslim community in Spain during the period of the Spanish Inquisition, has garnered much praise for its subtle historical focus, beautiful descriptive writing, and rendering of gender and generational relations; the second and third parts were published as *Maryama, wa al-rahil* in 1995. She had already published three novels that differed widely in technique and theme—*Hajar dafi, Khadija wa-Sawsan,* and *Siraj*—and a travel memoir, *al-Rihla*; since then, she has published an autobiographical novel, *Atyaf,* that plays with conventions of authorship and the inside/outside of the text, and a volume of linked short stories in the form of reports by an elusive narrator, playing ironically with the notion of an authorial double and perhaps with the still-prevalent critical tendency to equate the characters created by female writers with the author herself *(Taqarir al-Sayyida Ra).* Ashour has published critical studies on West African literature, on the Palestinian writer Ghassan Kanafani, on Kahlil Gibran, and on William Blake; she has also published a collection of critical essays *(Sayyadu al-dhakira).* Several of her short stories have been translated into English *(My Grandmother's Cactus),* and in 2003 an English translation of *Gharnata* was in press.

See also BAKR, SALWA; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION.

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MARILYN BOOTH

ASHUR

See Glossary

AS-IS AGREEMENT

Agreement establishing a cartel of Western oil companies, 1928.

Price wars among major oil companies in the 1920s, most significantly one in India between Standard Oil of New York and a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, threatened major oil company profits, especially those from relatively high-cost production in the United States. At an August 1928 secret meeting at Achnacarry Castle in the Scottish Highlands, the As-Is Agreement was devised by the leaders of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later BP), Royal Dutch Shell, and Standard Oil of New Jersey (later Exxon). Together with the Red Line Agreement, the As-Is Agreement formed the basis of what a U.S. Senate subcommittee in 1952 called "the international petroleum cartel."

The As-Is Agreement consisted of seven "principles" to limit "excessive competition" that had led to enormous overproduction by dividing markets, fixing prices, and limiting the expansion of production capacity. The agreement affected the development of oil production capacity in the Middle East by limiting price competition in product markets and, as a result, supporting the prices of products made from high-cost, primarily American, crude oil. This strategy was implemented as a "basing-point" system under which all sellers calculated delivered prices as the sum of FOB prices at one or more specific locations—basing points—plus a standardized freight charge from that point to the point of delivery. Such a system is very effective because it ensures that all sellers quote the same prices and that producers with low costs cannot use that advantage to expand their market shares by passing on the low costs.

The impact of the As-Is Agreement on the position of Middle Eastern oil producers was profound. It was substantially responsible for the reluctance of concession holders to expand production in this low-cost region. In 1928, when it was adopted, more than a third of worldwide production capacity was shut down due to oversupply. Owners feared that expanding low-cost capacity in the Persian Gulf would only add to their losses. The As-Is and Red Line agreements retarded the development of Middle Eastern oil resources until after World War II; at the same time they led to the depletion of reserves in what were later seen as politically "safe" areas, such as the United States and Canada. The resulting division of production shares between Middle Eastern countries and others aggravated anticolonial and anti-Western feelings among the populations of many Middle Eastern states, most notably Iraq and Iran. It also established a pattern for ensuring oil profits by exercising market control that the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries later tried to emulate.

See also Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO); Iran; Iraq; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Persian (Arabian) Gulf; Red Line Agreement; Royal Dutch Shell.

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Mary Ann Tétreault

ASIYAN

See Literature: Turkish

ASKARI, JAʿFAR AL-

[1887–1936]

Arab nationalist and military leader; friend of Faisal I ibn Hussein during the Arab revolt in World War I; political leader under Faisal as king of Syria, 1920, and as Faisal I of Iraq, 1921–1932.

Jaʿfar (also Ja'far) al-Askari was born in Baghdad, the son of a military leader for the Ottoman Em-

pire. He was educated in both military and legal affairs, graduating from the Ottoman military academy in 1904. He served in the Ottoman army and was captured by the British in Egypt during World War I. Following a dramatic escape from an Egyptian fort, he later joined the Arab revolt against the Ottomans under T. E. Lawrence and Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca. Jaʿfar organized Husayn's army and led it, becoming the trusted friend of Husayn's son Faisal, who in 1920 became king of Syria (before he was removed by the French mandate).

When the British supported Faisal and made him king of Iraq in 1921, Jaʿfar was named first minister of defense (1920–1922) and assumed that position in 1930 and again in 1931 and 1932. He was also prime minister of Iraq (1923, 1926–1928) and Iraq's minister of foreign affairs (1926–1928 and 1931–1932).

See also ARAB REVOLT (1916); FAISAL I IBN HUSSEIN; HUSAYN IBN ALI; IRAQ; LAWRENCE, T. E.

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AHMAD ABDUL A. R. SHIKARA

ASMAHAN

[1917?–1944]

Actress and singer.

Asmahan was a gifted singer known principally for her work in films. Her delicate and flexible high voice was clear, powerful, and brilliant, and she was frequently compared to Umm Kulthum (the Arab world's most famous female singer), although their voices and musical styles were very different. Many saw her as Umm Kulthum's only serious rival.

Asmahan was born Amal al-Atrash in Jabal al-Duruz (in Syria) to Fahd al-Atrash and Aliya Husayn. The mother and the children, Amal, Farid, and Fu'ad, moved to Cairo in about 1924, to escape the fighting in Syria during the French mandate. Amal began her performing career in the music hall of Mary Mansur in Cairo around 1930 and adopted her stage name at the suggestion of one of her mentors, composer Dawud Husni. Asmahan's career was interrupted by marriage to her cousin Hasan al-Atrash in Jabal al-Duruz in 1933. They separated in 1939, and she returned to Cairo with her daughter. Asmahan subsequently appeared in two successful Egyptian films, *Intisar al-Shabab* and *Gharam wa Intiqam,* both with music composed by her brother Farid al-Atrash.

Asmahan performed at private parties, for radio broadcasts, and made commercial recordings. Her popular and financial success was limited, because she abhorred public concerts and preferred films. The film companies of the day typically released one film per singing star every two years; thus her performances were fewer than those of her principal competitors, notably Umm Kulthum and Layla Murad—both of whom performed extensively in public.

Asmahan's private life may have been too public: Her alleged affairs with a succession of prominent men, including journalist Muhammad al-Tabaʿi, banker Talʿat Harb, and royal aide Ahmad Hasanayn, were topics of public conversation. In 1941, she returned to Jabal al-Duruz, allegedly as a British spy, an activity that did little to enhance her popularity. She was, in many respects, her own worst enemy; her habits of cigarettes, alcohol, and late nights had a deleterious effect on her voice. Asmahan died in an automobile accident in Egypt in 1944. She was equally comfortable with Arab and European singing styles. Among her most famous songs were "Dakhalt marra fi al-jinayna," "Ya tuyur" (in which her skills in European virtuosic singing were aptly displayed), and "Alayk salat Allah wa salamuh."

See also ATRASH, FARID AL-; UMM KULTHUM.

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VIRGINIA DANIELSON

ASMAR, FAWZI AL-

[1937–]

Palestinian journalist, activist, author, and poet.

Fawzi al-Asmar (or Fouzi El-Asmar) was born in Haifa, Palestine, and grew up in Israel. He studied history and political science in the United States and received his Ph.D. from the University of Exeter in Britain. He became a U.S. citizen in 1981. Asmar served as managing editor of the international Arabic-language daily *al-Sharq al-Awsat* and is bureau chief of the United Arab Emirates news agency in Washington, D.C.; he is also a columnist for the Saudi Arabian daily *al-Riyadh.*

Al-Asmar is best known for his book *To Be an Arab in Israel* (1975), in which he describes Israeli confiscation of his family's land, his arrest for political activity, and discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel between 1948 and 1970. The work has been translated into eight languages. Another of his books is *Through the Hebrew Looking-Glass: Arab Stereotypes in Children's Literature* (1986).

See also Palestinian Citizens of Israel.

Jenab Tutunji
Updated by Philip Mattar

ASSOCIATION DES FEMMES TUNISIENNES POUR LA RECHERCHE ET LE DÉVELOPPEMENT (AFTURD)

Tunisian nongovernmental organization for research and outreach on women's legal rights.

The idea of establishing a Tunisian women's research group, Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche et le Développement (Association of Tunisian Women for Research and Development; AFTURD), which was to be affiliated with the larger women's research network, Association des Femmes Africaines pour la Recherche et le Développement (Association of African Women for Research and Development; AFARD), began with discussions among members of the Club Tahar Haddad in 1986. AFTURD was formalized in 1989. Proactive on national, regional, and international levels, AFTURD has participated in networks of exchange among women in the Arab and African region, such as the Collectif Maghreb Egalité 95 activities in preparation for the fourth UN-sponsored Women's conference (Beijing 1995). In addition to networking, AFTURD scholars have produced an important body of qualitative and quantitative research on the status of Tunisian women, including the two-volume *Tunisiennes en devenir* (Tunisian Women on the Move). They have developed basic, accessible guides to women's legal rights and obligations (*La marriage* [Marriage] and *Le divorce* [Divorce]). Engaged also in activism to achieve effective emancipation for women, AFTURD participates in projects such as the Espace Tanassof, a women's shelter offering information, legal and psychological counseling, and training on specific themes concerning gendered approaches to social issues. AFTURD also sponsors forums on key women's issues such as inheritance, where ongoing research is presented and vigorously debated with an eye to developing culturally appropriate solutions to discrimination against women.

See also Gender: Gender and the Economy; Gender: Gender and Law; Tunisia; Tunisia: Political Parties in.

Laura Rice

ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS (AFGHANISTAN)

Afghan organization of the 1920s.

The Association for the Protection of Women's Rights (*Anjoman-i-Himayat-i-Niswan*) was founded in 1927 in Kabul, Afghanistan, under the direction of King Amanullah's (1919–1929) sister, Princess Kobra, its president, and Queen Soraya, Amanullah's wife, its main leader. Its main objectives were to help women become self-reliant and take part in the development of Afghanistan; to ensure women's right to education and to work outside the home; and to protect women against domestic abuse, including threats by male family members to prevent women from working outside the home. Cases of domestic abuse were heard and dealt with in special family tribunals presided over by the queen. The association offered courses in sewing, weaving, and other handicrafts, and it recruited women from low-income families to work in factories. In September 1928 several women participated in the *Loya-Jirga* (Grand Assembly) as representatives of the association to promote reforms to improve the status of women. The association had drafted a political platform and was ready to participate in upcoming parliamentary elections when its activities were interrupted by widespread opposition to Queen Soraya's campaign, begun in 1928, to unveil and emancipate women. The association was closed down shortly thereafter.

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Senzil Nawid

ASSOCIATION OF ALGERIAN MUSLIM ULAMA (AUMA)

Islamic clergymen in Algeria organized to promote Muslim and Arab values during the French colonial period.

The Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama was formed in 1931 under the leadership of Shaykh Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis. In the Islamic reformist tradition, it affirmed Muslim values and the Arab identity of Algerians. In 1956 its leaders dissolved the organization and rallied to the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front).

See also Ben Badis, Abd al-Hamid; Front de Libération Nationale.

John Ruedy

ASSYRIANS

A Semitic people indigenous to Mesopotamia, with a history spanning 4,700 years.

Contemporary Assyrians are the descendants of the Akkadian-speaking inhabitants of the Assyrian Empire, which ended in 612 B.C.E. Ancient Assyrians worshipped the god Assur until 256 C.E.; their descendants were among the first to accept Christianity, with the founding of the Assyrian Church of the East by the apostle Thomas in 33 C.E. By 1300, the modern culture's homeland included the territories of present-day northern Iraq, southeastern Turkey, northeastern Syria, and northwestern Iran. Contemporary Assyrians are ethnically distinct from Arabs and Jews and speak Neo-Syriac. Islam and Arab civilization engulfed the Assyrian Christians and some converted to Islam, but the Mongol invasions led by Tamerlane forced others into the Hakkari Mountains of eastern Turkey. Others continued to live in northern Iraq and Syria. Assyrian Christians of this period belonged to either the Assyrian Church of the East or the Syriac Orthodox Church. In 1550, a religious schism resulted in the creation of the Chaldean Church of Babylon and a Roman Catholic Uniate. The Assyrian Church of the East is Nestorian, but English speakers in the West classify Nestorian churches as belonging to the Oriental Orthodoxy. Contemporary religious divisions include the Chaldean, Syrian Catholic, Maronite (Uniate), and Jacobite churches, but Protestantism (Evangelical, Pentecostal, and Presbyterian) has also attracted converts.

Assyrians migrated to Europe and the United States by 1870, but the end of World War I witnessed genocides and dispersal throughout the world. From 1915 to 1918, approximately 750,000 Assyrians were massacred by Turkish and Kurdish forces. The French in Syria and the British in Iraq exacerbated the plight of the Assyrian survivors, who lost their ancestral lands and dispersed throughout the Middle East, Europe, and North America. Persecutions in Iran (1948), the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), unrest in Iraq (1970s), and the Gulf War (1991) resulted in increased immigration. By 2000, the Assyrian population was estimated at 3.5 million, with approximately one-third in a diaspora. Current demographic estimates are: Iraq, 1,500,000; Syria, 700,000; United States, 400,000; Sweden, 120,000; Lebanon, 100,000; Brazil, 80,000; Germany, 70,000; Russia, 70,000; Iran, 50,000; Jordan, 44,000; Australia, 30,000; Turkey, 24,000; Canada, 23,000; Holland, 20,000; and France, 20,000. Smaller numbers migrated to Belgium, Georgia, Armenia, Switzerland, Denmark, Greece, England, Austria, Italy, New Zealand, and Mexico. Chicago, Detroit, and Phoenix have substantial populations. Assyrians in the diaspora seek to maintain their language, culture, and religion, and financially support Assyrian refugees in the Middle East and other countries.

See also Gulf War (1991); Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Maronites.

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CHARLES C. KOLB

ASWAN

Upper Egyptian province and its capital city, health resort, and industrial center.

Originally named Syene, the city was located on the east bank, at the first cataract of the Upper Nile River; it marked the southern border of pharaonic Egypt. About 3.5 miles (5.5 km) south of the city is the Aswan dam, erected by British and Egyptian engineers from 1899 to 1902 and enlarged in 1912 and 1934. The dam's construction facilitated the conversion of Middle Egypt and parts of Upper Egypt to perennial irrigation. From 1960 to 1971, this process was completed with the construction of the Aswan High Dam. One of the largest public works ever built, the High Dam has enabled Egypt to reclaim some desert land for cultivation (but not the 1.2 million acres [0.5 million ha] hoped for) and to generate hydroelectric power. It has cost dearly in soil erosion, the loss of fertile alluvium from the annual flood and of nutrients that used to support marine life, and the resettlement of Nubians who used to live in lands flooded by the waters of Lake Nasser, created by the dam. The province had some 801,400 inhabitants in 1986.

See also ASWAN HIGH DAM; EGYPT; NASSER, LAKE; NILE RIVER; NUBIANS.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

ASWAN HIGH DAM

Dam to control Nile River waters.

The first dam at Aswan, Egypt, on the Nile River, was completed in 1902 and heightened twice, in 1912 and 1934, to expand its capacity. This first dam, actually a barrage without the capability of holding multiyear water, proved insufficient for the growing water and power needs of Egypt, so a larger dam and reservoir, the Aswan High Dam, was constructed from 1960 to 1971. The High Dam is of embankment construction, 365 feet high and nearly 3,300 feet wide at its base. Lake Nasser, impounded behind the High Dam, is 300 miles long and 10 miles wide at the widest point. The power station at Aswan has a yearly capacity of 2.1 gigawatts at full pool.

In March 1953 the Free Officers of Egypt's army, which had overthrown King Farouk in a military coup, began planning for a high dam on the Nile some 5 miles south of the older British-built Aswan Dam. The U.S. and British governments and the World Bank agreed to finance construction conditional on Egypt's acceptance of Western government control of Egypt's economy, no new Egyptian arms purchases, and open bidding for the construction contract (excluding communist countries). Despite its reluctance, Egypt accepted these terms, but U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, alarmed by the ties to the Soviet Union of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's president, subsequently vetoed the deal. In response, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, intending to use canal tolls to pay for the dam's construction; this created an international incident.

In 1958 the Soviet Union financed the dam, providing the equivalent of $330 million, and work commenced in 1960. The hydroelectric power plant began operation in 1968. The reservoir formed by the dam created Lake Nasser, forcing the relocation of the Nubian people living upstream and generating an international effort by UNESCO to rescue antiquities within the soon-to-be-flooded valley. The temples at Philae and elsewhere upstream, dating from dynastic Egypt, were flooded. Ramses's Temple at Abu Simbel with its colossal statuary was raised to overlook the lake.

The dam's completion permitted downstream reclamation of 675,000 acres and the conversion of an additional one million acres to perennial irrigation. Twelve electric turbines initially provided 60 percent of Egypt's electrical needs, but economic growth has reduced this percentage. Increased use of irrigation without adequate drainage has caused waterlogging and salinization downstream. The dam has also been criticized for causing a variety of other adverse environmental consequences.

See also NILE RIVER.

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DAVID WALDNER
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ASYUT

See EGYPT

ATABAT

Shiʿa holy places in Iraq.

Atabat, literally "thresholds," are Shiʿite holy places in Iraq, at Karbala, Qadimayn, Najaf, and Samarra, containing the tombs of six imams revered in Twelver Shiʿism, serving also as holy sites for pilgrimage. Ali ibn Abi Talib, the first imam of Shiʿism, is buried in Najaf. His son, Husayn ibn Ali, the third Shiʿa imam; Husayn's half-brother Abbas; and Husayn's son Ali Akbar were martyred and buried in Karbala, fighting the Umayyads in 680. Qadimayn is the burial site of the seventh and ninth imams, Musa al-Kazim, who died in 802, and Muhammad al-Taqi, who died in 834. Samarra, which lies at a distance from the remainder of the Atabat, is the burial site of the tenth imam, Ali al-Naqi, who died in 868, and the eleventh imam, Hasan al-Askari, who died in 873.

The Atabat have historically served as centers of Shiʿite learning. During the Iranian constitutional revolution from 1905 to 1911, the Atabat, under Ottoman suzerainty, served as a safe haven for the revolutionaries. Ayatollah Hasan Shirazi, who engineered the retraction of the Regie tobacco concession in 1870, resided in Samarra. The Atabat also played a decisive role in fostering clerical opposition in the Pahlavi period, as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini lived in exile in Najaf from 1965 to 1978.

See also KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH.

NEGUIN YAVARI

ATASI, HASHIM AL-
[1876?–1960]

A prominent Syrian politician.

Hashim al-Atasi hailed from a Sunni Muslim family of landowning, scholarly Ashraf from Homs. In mandatory times this commercial city in west central Syria was commonly referred to as al-Atasi's fief. Atasi served three times as president of Syria (1936–1939, 1949–1951, and 1954–1955) and as prime minister for a short time in 1949.

Having received an advanced Ottoman education in Istanbul, he served as a district governor in the imperial bureaucracy of the Ottoman state. In 1920 he acted as chairman of the Syrian-Arab Congress. For a short time, he was also prime minister in Amir Faisal's government in Damascus. With the French occupying Syria, Atasi distinguished himself in Syria's struggle for independence. He was one of those who formed the core of the National Bloc (al-Kutla al-Wataniyya), a nationalist organization that steered the course of the independence struggle in Syria from 1927, when its seeds were planted at the Beirut conference (held in October of that year), until the completion of the fight for independence nineteen years later.

He belonged to an older generation of nationalists who subscribed to a policy of "honorable cooperation" with France—that is, a policy of collaboration based on reciprocity of interests and mutual obligations. Proponents of this policy believed that France supported the Syrian national cause and that establishing confidence through cooperation between the two nations would help the cause of independence. Nevertheless, French insensitivity to Syrian aspirations exposed the fallacy of the National Bloc's assumption and made Atasi increasingly frustrated by the bloc's failure to make any meaningful progress toward independence through the policy of "honorable cooperation." In 1931 and 1932 he assumed a more radical posture, which helped him attract to the bloc council more activist Syrian nationalists, most notably the Istiqlal Party leader Shukri al-Quwatli.

Atasi headed the Syrian delegation sent to Paris in March 1936 to negotiate Syria's independence with the government of Albert Sarraut. The inflexibility of the Sarraut government's bargaining po-

sition would have caused the complete breakdown of the negotiations had it not been for the victory of a left-wing coalition (known as the Popular Front) headed by the Socialist Party leader Leon Blum in the general French elections of April 1936. The advent of a new French government, together with the subsequent appointment of a second French negotiating team headed by the enlightened and forward-looking Pierre Vienot (who viewed the French mandate in the Levant as transitory) set the stage for the signing of the Franco–Syrian Treaty of 1936. The treaty, which was never ratified by France because the right-wing French forces were able to persuade the French parliament not to accept it, provided for peace, friendship, and alliance between France and Syria and defined France's military position in Syria as well as the relations of the Syrian state with Syrian minorities and with Lebanon.

With factionalism plaguing the National Bloc and other nationalist organizations, and with the French government suspending the Syrian constitution and instituting almost direct French control in the country, Atasi resigned his office as president in 1939 and adopted a less activist stance in Syrian politics until August 1949, after Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi's coup against Husni al-Zaʿim. In December of the same year Atasi became a titular president, with real power concentrated in the hands of Adib Shishakli, the tough pro-French colonel who overthrew Hinnawi on 19 December 1949, allegedly to save Syria from British influence and a union with the pro-British Hashimite monarchy of Iraq. It was convenient for both Hinnawi and Shishakli to have the veteran Atasi as president because he was the finest symbol of Syria's struggle against French imperialism. Differences with Shishakli, together with the chaotic Syrian politics, compelled Atasi to resign from the presidency in November 1951. He then began conspiring for the overthrow of Shishakli. In March 1954, Atasi returned to the presidency, and in September 1955 he retired from Syrian politics, disaffected by the internal struggles of officer cliques. Perhaps he was also bemused to see the door of Syria, whose allegiance remained with the West for much of the decade that followed independence, thrown open to Egyptian influence and to the flow of Soviet and East European arms and other blandishments.

See also Hinnawi, Sami al-; National Bloc; Quwatli, Shukri al-; Zaʿim, Husni al-.

Muhammad Muslih

ATASI, JAMAL AL-

[1922–]

Syrian psychologist and politician.

Jamal al-Atasi was born in Homs, where he completed his primary and secondary studies. In 1947, he enrolled in the School of Medicine in Damascus, where he obtained a doctorate in psychology. He was then appointed doctor in the Ministry of Health. He is one of the founding and prominent members of the Syrian Baʿth party and editor of one of its newspapers, *Al-Jamahir.* In 1963, he was appointed minister of information in the cabinet headed by Salah al-Din al-Bitar. After a long fight with the Baʿth, he left the party and became general secretary of the Nasserist Arab Socialist Union. Atasi was also a member of the "Committee of Thirteen" which undertook the task of forming the National Progressive Front. During the regime of the late Hafiz al-Asad, Atasi was considered one of the president's main opponents.

See also Arab Socialist Union; Asad, Hafiz al-; Baʿth, al-; Bitar, Salah al-Din al-; National Progressive Front (Syria).

George E. Irani

ATASI, NUR AL-DIN AL

[1929–1994]

President of Syria, 1966–1970.

Atasi was a member of a Sunni landowning and scholarly family from Homs. A physician who had served as a medical volunteer in the Algerian revolution, he was a leader of the second civilian generation of the Baʿth party. Two other prominent leaders of this generation were Ibrahim Makhus and Yusuf Zuʿayyin. This generation, which was composed mainly of rural minorities—Alawis, Druzes, Ismaʿilis, with a sprinkling of Sunnis like Atasi—imbued the Baʿth party in the early 1960s with vaguely argued ideas of class struggle and scientific socialism. Its members formed what came to be

known as the neo-Baʿth. Their opponents believed them to have subordinated Arab unity to their program of revolutionary socialism. The neo-Baʿth was centered in Damascus, building up branches in other Arab countries; members of the old Baʿth (for example, Salah al-Din al-Bitar and Michel Aflaq) were either imprisoned or escaped to operate from Beirut or elsewhere. After the Baʿth officers' coup of March 1963, Atasi became minister of the interior (August 1963–May 1964), deputy prime minister (October 1964–September 1965), and a member of the Revolutionary Council and the Presidential Council in 1964. Atasi's political beliefs were consistent with those of the neo-Baʿthists: fearing communism, distrusting popular movements, endorsing economic reform along socialist lines, and subscribing to the theory of popular war, especially through the Palestinian resistance movement, which was developing around the mid-1960s.

In the internal power struggles that were buffeting Syria, Atasi sided with the hawkish faction of the group that came to power in the coup of 23 February 1966. This faction rejected the proposal of a peaceful solution with Israel and tried in vain to assert party authority over the army. Atasi's alliance with the faction of Salah Jadid put him on a collision course with the more powerful, army-supported faction of Lieutenant-General Hafiz al-Asad, whose position as defense minister and commander of the Syrian air force, together with his pragmatic and calculating approach, enabled him in February 1969 to occupy strategic points in the Syrian capital and to gain full control of the Syrian state in November 1970. After Asad's semi-coup of February 1969, Atasi retained his posts as president, prime minister, and secretary general of the party, due in part to the weakness of Asad within the party and in part to the intervention of Algeria, Egypt, and the Soviet Union. This created a duality of power in Syria, with Atasi and his colleagues in the Jadid faction controlling the regional (Syrian) Baʿth organization and its cadres—hence nominally the government; and Asad's faction controlling the army and intelligence—hence practically the government.

When Asad took full control in November 1970, Atasi was dismissed from all his posts and sent to jail, where he languished until his release in 1994. He died shortly thereafter.

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MUHAMMAD MUSLIH
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL

[1881–1938]

Turkish soldier and nationalist leader; founder and first president of the Republic of Turkey, 1923–1938.

Born in Salonika, the eldest of the two surviving children of a lower-middle-class family, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was given the name Mustafa at his birth. His father, Ali Riza Efendi, had been a minor officer in the Ottoman customs before trying his luck in trade. Although he died when his son was only seven, Ali Riza Efendi had a great influence on him through his adherence to secular values and his decision to send Mustafa to a secular elementary school. Like all Ottoman women in her situation, the mother, Zübeyde Hamm, had to be supported by relatives after her husband's death. It is during the years of refuge in the extended family that Mustafa seems to have developed the lifelong characteristics of both the ambitious, captivating loner and the resolute, charismatic leader.

It was his decision to pursue a military career. He was an outstanding student from the time he entered military middle school in Salonika (1893), where he was given his second name, Kemal, until the staff college from which he was graduated (1904) with the rank of captain. He also developed a strong interest in politics as well as literary and rhetorical pursuits during his school years. The command of late Ottoman Turkish with touches of pedantry that his writings disclose are the result of Mustafa Kemal's extensive readings in history and literature. Throughout his military and political career, his speeches and improvised harangues were marked by the eloquence and persuasiveness that he cultivated as early as his high-school years. His interest in pol-

itics developed somewhat later, when he attended the War Academy, and at a time when the negative aspects of Sultan Abdülhamit II's absolutism had become more offensive.

Mustafa Kemal served with the Fifth Army in Damascus (1905–1907), where he joined the revolutionary secret society Fatherland and Freedom. This society was soon subsumed in yet another secret society based in Salonika, the Ottoman Freedom Society, which subsequently took the name Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) after its merger with the Young Turk group that was active in Paris (1907). When Mustafa Kemal was transferred to the Third Army in his native city (late 1907), he joined the CUP, and for a long time thereafter he remained a frustrated member with minor influence in that society.

Aerial view of the Boulevard Atatürk in Ankara, Turkey. Named after the title given to Turkish president Mustafa Kemal in 1933, the boulevard was modernized as part of a $100,000,000 program. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

During the period between the Young Turk Revolution (23 July 1908) and the end of World War I, Mustafa Kemal emerged as an outstanding soldier with remarkable organizational skills, tenacious ambition, and a quarrelsome demeanor toward superiors with whom he disagreed. He distinguished himself in Libya, where he fought the Italians in the regions of Derna and Tobruk (1911–1912), but his political career was obstructed by the CUP leaders, who disliked his vocal criticism. After an unsuccessful bid for election to the Chamber of Deputies (1912), he was sent off as a military attaché to Sofia (1913–1914). He became a hero during World War I, thanks to his successes against the armies of the Triple Entente countries (France, Great Britain, Russia), which he checked twice in the Gallipoli Peninsula (1915). Promoted to brigadier general at the age of thirty-five, he was transferred to the eastern front, where he retook Bitlis and Muş from the Russians (1916). As the commander of the Seventh Army in Syria, he was in charge of the front north of Aleppo when the Mudros Armistice was signed (30 October 1918).

At the end of World War I, Mustafa Kemal organized a movement in Anatolia that consisted of both a constitutionalist rebellion against the sultan and resistance against the designs by Triple Entente countries to partition the Ottoman Empire. Mainly because of the support of local military authorities and of the notables whose provinces were threatened by partition, he managed to convene the Sivas Congress (4–11 September 1919), which forced the sultan to return to the parliamentarian rule the latter had suspended in November 1918. When the new Chamber of Deputies adopted the document known as the National Pact (28 January 1920), rejecting the dismemberment of the lands under Ottoman sovereignty at the conclusion of the armistice, the Triple Entente powers occupied Istanbul (16 March 1920). Subsequently, Mustafa Kemal called for the meeting of an extraordinary parliament in Ankara, thereby marking the beginning of the Turkish Revolution.

As the president of the Grand National Assembly (GNA), which opened on 23 April 1920, Mustafa Kemal successfully conducted a diplomatic and military campaign to defeat the stipulations of the Treaty of Sèvres imposed on the Ottoman government by the Triple Entente (10 August 1920). After he had succeeded in checking the Greek advance on Ankara in the battle of the Sakarya (August–September 1921), he was promoted to the rank of marshal and given the title ghazi (victorious) by the GNA. Under his command, the Turkish national forces launched an offensive (August 1922) that completed the liberation of practically all the territory considered Turkish homeland by the National Pact and forced the Allies to call for a new peace conference. The question of Turkish representation at the Lausanne Conference was given a radical solution by the GNA, which dissolved the

Former president of Turkey Mustafa Kemal. One of Kemal's innovations was the adoption of surnames. In 1933, he was given the honorific title Atatürk, meaning "Father of the Turks."
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Ottoman state after Mustafa Kemal's proposal to abolish the sultanate took effect on 1 November 1922.

The Treaty of Lausanne recognized an independent and fully sovereign Turkey (24 July 1923). Having gained complete control of the GNA through his newly founded People's Party, Mustafa Kemal embarked on a series of revolutionary changes. First he proclaimed the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923. The following year he instituted measures that set the republic on a secular path, including abolishing the caliphate and the ministry of *shariʿa* and *waqf,* unifying education under state authority (3 March 1924), and abolishing the religious courts (8 April 1924). These developments prompted the growth of political opposition, which came out into the open with the founding of the Progressive Republican Party (November 1924). Seizing as a pretext the rebellion by Shaykh Saʿid (February 1925), Mustafa Kemal's republican regime quickly put an end to all political opposition in the country by passing the Law on the Maintenance of Public Order (4 March 1925). In 1926, a plot to assassinate its leader gave the regime the opportunity to suppress the remnants of the CUP, whose leaders had posed a threat to Mustafa Kemal's power since the period of national resistance in Anatolia. By the time Mustafa Kemal read his famous speech in the GNA (October 1927), in which he gave his personal account of the recent history of Turkey, the country had entered the period of a de facto single-party regime, which, with the exception of the brief free party period (August–November 1930), lasted until after World War II.

In this political setting, Mustafa Kemal realized his far-reaching social-engineering program. Secularization was completed by the adoption of the Civil Code (4 April 1926) and the amendment of Article 2 and Article 26 of the Turkish constitution (10 April 1928), which, respectively, referred to Islam as the official religion and entrusted the GNA with enforcing the *shariʿa*. Latin characters were adopted in 1928, thus putting an end to a long debate on the reform of the Turkish alphabet. Citizenship rights were extended to women in 1934 with a constitutional amendment that introduced universal suffrage. A new law, passed the same year, required all citizens to have a patronym in Turkish. The revolution also employed such symbolic measures as replacing the fez with Western-style hats (1925), obliging religious authorities to wear their particular garments only when officiating (1934), and banning the use of such honorific titles as pasha, bey, and effendi (1934).

In accord with the law on Turkish patronyms, Mustafa Kemal was named Atatürk (Father Turk) by the GNA (1934). Suggestive of the Roman *pater patriae*, the name reflected Mustafa Kemal's achievement and political status, but to its bearer, the connotations of "mentor" or "guide" that it had in old Turkish were probably more meaningful. The role of mentor, which his numerous remarks indicate he had assigned himself, was evidently accepted by Turks, as attested by the huge crowds that paid homage to his memory after his death in Istanbul (1938).

Mustafa Kemal's regard for modern science was conspicuous in many of his speeches but was only to a limited extent responsible for his comprehen-

sive secularization campaign. Rather than being motivated by positivistic determinism, his policy grew out of his personal reading of the history of Islam and the vision of an astute politician. Two days before abolishing the caliphate, he told the GNA what amounted in fact to a secular rewording of the pious contention that the politics of humans tarnished Islam: "We see that the emancipation of Islam from the status of political tool that it has been constantly reduced to for centuries, and its exaltation, are really necessary" (*Parliamentary Minutes,* 2nd Session, vol. 7, pp. 3–6). Convinced of the autonomy and primacy of politics in the history of Islam in general, and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, Mustafa Kemal, in a way that was ahead of his time, was able to see that far from creating a dual society by introducing Western institutions into an Islamic polity, successive generations of Ottoman statesmen—from Sultan Selim III (1789–1807) to the Young Turks—had Westernized an age-old, secular state tradition. The perceived dualism was only an exacerbation of the secularity of the state. Under these circumstances, if what was sought was an organic relation between state and society (that is, democracy) the society must be synchronized with the state by strictly confining religion to the sphere of the individual. Hence, it would be more accurate to attribute Mustafa Kemal's secularizing measures to the radical anticlericalism of a standard-bearer of *raison d'état* than to interpret them as a reform of Islam or as the manifestations of anti-Islamic prejudice.

Although a nation builder, Mustafa Kemal was more of a patriot than a nationalist. His interest in the cultural and ideological aspects of nation building (as manifested by the founding of the Turkish Historical Society in 1931 and the Turkish Language Society in 1932) surfaced rather late in his life, and only after the economic and political upheavals of the Great Depression had revealed an ideological vacuum in the country. His first years as president of the republic were necessarily devoted to the strengthening of the new regime against an opposition that predated its founding. Even after establishing his de facto single-party system, however, he did not proceed in a nationalistic direction. His humorous references to the excesses associated with the "Turkish historical thesis" and the "Sun-language theory"—developed, under his guidance,

Turkish president Mustafa Kemal (foreground) and his officers, 6 March 1923. During his rule, Kemal was instrumental in bringing Turkey out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire and transforming it into a modern state. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

by the historical and language societies—also indicate his lighthearted approach to nationalist ideology and his view of such theories as a transient pedagogic device in the training of the common citizen.

Mustafa Kemal's aversion to ideological speculation is apparent in his reactions to the attempts to define his regime during his lifetime. Influenced by the proliferation of single-party dictatorships in Europe throughout the interwar period, zealous admirers tended to formulate a doctrine they called Kemalism to describe his government. Mustafa Kemal courteously discouraged such definitions, because he did not want anything to arrest the dynamism of the regime. For the same reason, he published his book *Civic Notions for the Citizens* (in Turkish; Istanbul, 1930) as the work of his adoptive daughter, Afet. This reluctance to associate his name with the actual politics of his time can best be explained by his view of his regime as being transitory and his ultimate vision of Turkey in the future as a liberal democracy.

Although his was a personal rule in which he went so far as to select individually all the candidates for the GNA, ample evidence shows he very much disliked such dictators as Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini and was genuinely offended by Western

commentators and journalists who placed him in the same category as them. He rationalized that his role was exactly the opposite of theirs, in that he was trying to establish a democratic tradition in Turkey; that is why he took care to do everything through the legislature and did not envisage suspending the constitution of 1924 or altering its liberal spirit. He also refused life presidency; he preferred to be reelected by the GNA at the beginning of each term. Mustafa Kemal's dictatorial rule was in effect an apprenticeship in democracy in the paradoxical tradition of Jacobinism, and he was aware of the tragic role he was playing in Turkish history. Very early on, he told a group of journalists how objective conditions prevail over ideas: "An individual would think in a particular manner in Ankara, in a different manner in Istanbul or Izmir, and in yet another different manner in Paris" (in Turkish, 1923; edited by Ari Inan, Ankara, 1982, p. 51).

Mustafa Kemal knew that the establishment of democracy was accompanied by legal, economic, social, and ideological prerequisites, and his regime was designed to prepare the country in these areas.

See also ABDÜLHAMIT II; ANKARA; COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS; KEMALISM; LAUSANNE, TREATY OF (1923); SELIM III; SÈVRES, TREATY OF (1920); *SHARIʿA*; SIVAS CONFERENCE (1919); TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; WAQF; YOUNG TURKS.

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AHMET KUYAS

ATATÜRK UNIVERSITY

A public university in Erzurum, Turkey.

Founded in 1957, it comprises faculties of agriculture, medicine, arts and sciences, economics and administrative sciences, education, engineering, dentistry, theology, and veterinary science (the last located in Kars), as well as the College of Education (one in Agri and one in Erzincan), the School of Nursing in Erzurum, and the College of Vocational Education (one in Erzurum and one in Erzincan). In 1990, the university had about 850 teaching staff and about 18,000 students (about 4,500 were female). The state-funded budget of the university for 1991 was 200 billion Turkish lire, of which about 50 billion was for capital investment.

Named for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, first president of Turkey (1923–1938), the university was founded in an era of increasing U.S. influence in Turkish politics and society. While older universities in Ankara, Istanbul, and İzmir were patterned after European models—mainly German and French—Atatürk University in Erzurum was modeled on an American land-grant college. Its original emphasis was on academic areas that would have a direct bearing on the needs of eastern Anatolia. From its inception, Atatürk University was aided by its association with the University of Nebraska; climatic similarity, especially in relation to the development of the region's agricultural potential, was an important consideration in this association. The university's teaching and research in the humanities, too, have been in harmony with the conservative and relatively traditional outlook of eastern Anatolian provincial society.

See also ANATOLIA; ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; ERZURUM.

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I. METIN KUNT

ATAY, SALIH RIFKI

[1894–1971]

Turkish Kemalist politician and journalist.

Born in Istanbul, Salih Rifki Atay became a disciple of the Turkish nationalist Ziya Gökalp at an early age, joined the Committee for Union and Progress, and as a journalist wrote on nationalism during the final years of the Ottoman Empire. In the 1920s, he invested in the development of radio in the new Republic of Turkey and became a leading example of language reform, known for his beautiful style in the new Turkish language.

Atay became a close associate of Atatürk in the 1930s and 1940s and edited *Ulus* (Nation), the official newspaper of Turkey's ruling political party, the Progressive Republican. He was linked with the party's hard-line modernists, such as Recep Peker, prime minister from 1946 to 1947. He left *Ulus* in 1947 amid intraparty intrigue and was replaced by a more moderate editor. In the 1950s, he published the newspaper *Dünya* (World), opposing Democrat Party rule (Turkey's new second party, which became oppressive and was removed in the coup of 1960). Atay published several books on Atatürk and the nationalist struggle, as well as a number of travel books.

See also Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Committee for Union and Progress; Democrat Party; Gökalp, Ziya; Nationalism; Turkish Language.

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Elizabeth Thompson

ATLAS MOUNTAINS

Mountain system in northwest Africa.

The Atlas Mountains extend approximately 1,300 miles (2,090 km) through the Maghrib countries of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia—from the Atlantic Ocean, south of Agadir, to the Mediterranean Sea near Tunis. This system comprises a series of roughly parallel ranges. From west to east, these include the Anti-Atlas, High Atlas, and Middle Atlas in Morocco; the Saharan Atlas, maritime Tell Atlas (itself formed of a series of distinct massifs such as the Ouarsenis, Grande Kabylie, and Petite Kabylie), and Aurès in Algeria; and the Kroumirie, Medjerda, and Tébessa Mountains in Tunisia, which are extensions of the Algerian ranges. Some authorities also include the Rif range (al-Rif), along Morocco's Mediterranean coast in the Atlas system.

The Atlas ranges dominate the landscapes of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, differentiating them from the other North African countries, where desert lowlands prevail. These ranges serve as a barrier to the Sahara, sheltering the coastal lowlands of the three countries from the desert conditions to the south. They also function as orographic barriers to moisture-laden winter storms off the Atlantic and Mediterranean, causing rainfall in the coastal lowlands. Finally, they serve as vast water towers, capturing rain and snow and giving rise to numerous permanent rivers and streams. As a result, the northern portions of the three Maghrib countries are relatively well watered and have major agricultural potential. This potential has long fostered relatively dense settlement by the Berbers—indigenous Caucasoid tribal peoples—particularly in the mountains. The region's agricultural potential has attracted colonizers, beginning with the Phoenicians and Romans, then later the Arabs and French. Europeans have referred to the Maghrib highlands as the Atlas Mountains since classical times, because of the Greek legend that they were the home of the god Atlas; the Arabs have referred to the entire highland area as Jazirat al-Maghrib, the "Island of the

The Atlas Mountains stretch from Morocco to Algeria and Tunisia, contain many fertile valleys, and are rich in minerals. Jebel Toubkal, pictured here, is one of the mountain range's highest points, reaching 4,165 meters. **© Yann Arthus-Betrand/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

West," because it represented a relatively lush mountainous island jutting out of the deserts.

The most impressive range within the Atlas system is the High Atlas, which extends for some 350 miles (560 km) through the center of Morocco and has an average elevation of around 10,000 feet (3,050 m). Many High Atlas peaks are snow-clad for much of the year. Jabal Toukal, south of Marrakech, reaches 13,665 feet (4,165 m) and is the highest peak in the High Atlas as well as in North Africa. The Middle Atlas range possesses the most luxuriant vegetation in the Atlas system, with extensive stands of fir and cedar at higher elevations. Forests of various species of oak are common on the more humid slopes throughout the Atlas system, with open stands of pine and juniper typical on drier slopes. Generally, the mountains diminish in elevation from west to east and become more barren of vegetation from north to south.

Historically, the Atlas Mountains have functioned as a refuge area for the indigenous Berber peoples, helping them to preserve their distinctive languages and customs. Portions of the Moroccan Atlas and the Kabylie in Algeria remain strong bastions of Berber culture. Tribal areas in the Atlas had autonomy in the precolonial period; only occasionally did they fall under the control of rulers in the lowland capitals. This tradition of dissidence continued during the colonial period: The Atlas Mountains figured prominently in the resistance and independence movements, serving as effective strongholds for rebel groups.

See also BERBER.

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WILL D. SWEARINGEN

ATRASH, FARID AL-

[1915?–1974]

Composer, singer, and oud player.

Farid al-Atrash appeared in and composed music for numerous films and wrote songs for many other performers as well. His low-pitched voice was characterized by a poignant and evocative sadness *(huzn),* and he commanded vocal styles considered to be authentic *(asil)* in Egypt as well as in the Levant.

He was born in Jabal al-Duruz (Syria) to Aliya Husayn and Fahd al-Atrash. Aliya moved to Cairo with her children Fu'ad, Farid, and Amal (later the professional singer and film star known as Asmahan) in about 1924, to escape the fighting against the French mandate troops, in which her husband was involved. To sustain the family, Aliya sang for private radio stations in Cairo and appeared in music halls.

Farid began his performing career in the music halls of Mary Mansur and Badiʿa Masabni. Ibrahim Hamuda, then a rising star in musical theater, encouraged Farid and hired him to play the *ud* (oud; a short-necked lute) in his accompanying ensemble. Soon thereafter, Farid enrolled in the Institute of Arabic Music and studied with oud virtuoso Riyad al-Sunbati. He also worked with Daud Husni and composer Farid Ghusn.

Farid's reputation spread via local radio stations. He was introduced to radio audiences by Medhat Assem, one of his mentors, who was then the director of music programming for Egyptian Radio. Farid's career as a composer blossomed in the late 1930s, and he flourished as a composer, singer, and oud player until his health began to deteriorate in the 1970s.

In his compositions, Farid, like Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab and many of his contemporaries, evinced interest in Western music and incorporated many Western instruments. He tried to modernize Arabic music while preserving its essential character. His efforts along these lines extended into harmonization, adoption of Western dance rhythms, and use of genres such as the operetta. In his vocal style, however, he cultivated local nuances, and his voice was believed to carry the flavor of authentically Egyptian and Arabic song.

He made over thirty films, for which he composed the music and appeared as the star; among them were *Bulbul Afandi, Matqulsh li-Hadd, Ayza At'jawwiz, Lahn al-Khulud,* and *Lahn Hubbi. Intisar al-Shabab,* with his sister Asmahan, was particularly successful. Several, such as *Wa-ja al-Rabi,* closely followed Western mod-

els. He also wrote hundreds of songs, sung by himself and others. Among the most famous are "Awwal Hamsa" and "al-Rabi."

See also ABD AL-WAHHAB, MUHAMMAD IBN; ASMAHAN.

VIRGINIA DANIELSON

ATRASH, SULTAN PASHA AL-

Prominent Syrian Druze chieftain.

Sultan Pasha was feared by the French because of his continued efforts to rally the Druzes against French interference in the Jabal Druze in Syria. He was the leader of the Jabal Druze revolt (1925–1927) against French administration in Syria, during which he called on all Syrians to fight for the complete independence of Syria. Although the revolt was under Druze leadership, it assumed a truly national character and became Syria-wide. Sultan Pasha's anti-French activities compelled him to live years of exile with many of his followers. Exile, which ended with the French amnesty of May 1937, allowed new rivals to Sultan Pasha to emerge in the Jabal Druze. Sultan Pasha remained close to the faction of Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, a prominent Syrian politician who had British and Hashimite links.

See also JABAL DRUZE; SHAHBANDAR, ABD AL-RAHMAN.

MUHAMMAD MUSLIH

ATTAR, NEJAT AL-

[unknown]

Syria's first woman minister.

Nejat al-Attar was the longest-serving woman minister in the Arab world, and Syria's first woman minister. She was appointed minister of culture in 1976 and served in all the governments named by the Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad, until her retirement from government after the reshuffle of March 2000. Attar comes from a respected Damascene family. She received a Ph.D. from the University of Edinburgh in 1970. Her appointment in 1976 as a minister came during the Syrian regime's struggle with the Muslim Brotherhood, of which her brother, Isam al-Attar, had been the leader since 1957. Attar remained in her post even after the assassination attempt on her brother in 1981, which led to the death of his wife. She is known for her strong character, and served in the 1980s and 1990s as the mouthpiece of Asad. After retiring from government, Attar assumed the post of chairman of the board of trustees of Syria's first private and virtual university.

See also ASAD, HAFIZ AL-; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; SYRIA.

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KHALIL GEBARA

ATTAR, SUAD AL-

[1942 –]

An Iraqi painter and printmaker.

Suad (also Suʿad) al-Attar was the first Iraqi woman to hold a solo exhibition in Baghdad (1965). She was trained at California State University, at the University of Baghdad, and also at the Wimbledon School of Art and the Central School of Art in London. Al-Attar's work is rooted in the visual traditions of her native Iraq and makes use of elements of Islamic design, Assyrian art, and folk art in particular. Many of her works represent scenes from Arab legends and folklore, or detailed gardens filled with flora and fauna, both done in styles influenced by medieval Baghdadi painting and the broader tradition of miniature painting. Much of her work since the 1990s has been inspired by the tragic situation of Iraq and by the untimely death of her sister (also an artist as well as an influential curator) during the bombing of Baghdad during the 1991 Gulf War. Al-Attar has described her work as emotional archives that deal centrally with myths, sensuality, dreams, and taboos. She has exhibited in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. She is the winner of the Miró Award and of several prizes at international biennials.

See also ANI, JANNANE AL-; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; IRAQ.

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JESSICA WINEGAR

ATTAS, HAYDAR ABU BAKR AL-

[c.1939–]

President, Democratic Republic of Yemen, and prime minister, Republic of Yemen.

Born in approximately 1939 in Wadi Hadramawt, Haydar Abu Bakr al-Attas is a member of a prestigious, highly respected, and learned family. After South Yemen gained independence from Britain in 1967, he was regarded as a loyal, hard-working technocrat and became a longtime second-level leader who despite, or possibly because of, a reputation for not being political, became prime minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). He had been in that post for nearly a year at the time of an intraparty blood bath in 1986 that effectively decapitated the ruling Yemeni Socialist Party. He became PDRY president in the regime of survivors which followed that event and remained so until Yemeni unification in 1990. Al-Attas became prime minister of the united Republic of Yemen in 1990, remaining in that post until he was forced into exile in mid-1994 as a leader of a failed attempt at secession by southerners only two months earlier; during this brief period he was prime minister of the newly proclaimed Democratic Republic of Yemen. Subsequently, he and four other South Yemeni leaders were tried and sentenced to death in absentia; the five were granted amnesty by Republic of Yemen president Ali Abdullah Salih in 2003. Thereafter, al-Attas remained in exile in Saudi Arabia and was not actively involved in politics.

See also PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN; WADI HADRAMAWT; YEMENI SOCIALIST PARTY.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

ATTLEE, CLEMENT

[1883–1967]

British Prime Minister (1945–1951) and leader of the Labour Party (1935–1955).

Clement Attlee was a member of Winston Churchill's war cabinet as Lord Privy Seal (1940–1942) and deputy Prime Minister (1942–1945). He resigned in May 1945 and won the general election in July of the same year. His premiership came at an important juncture in the Middle East, even though his government's Middle Eastern policy was conducted mainly by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones.

Attlee initiated the formation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to make recommendations on the future of Palestine (1946), and won the consent of U.S. president Harry S. Truman. He was reluctant, however, to meet the latter's request to lift the barriers to Jewish immigration to Palestine. Under Attlee's premiership, an Anglo-Egyptian draft treaty was concluded in 1946, paving the way for the eventual British evacuation from Egypt. In the same year, Britain surrendered its mandate over Jordan and in 1948 its mandate over Palestine, which resulted in the establishment of the state of Israel.

See also ANGLO–AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY (1946); BEVIN, ERNEST; CREECH JONES, ARTHUR.

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JENAB TUTUNJI
UPDATED BY JOSEPH NEVO

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Austria and Hungary joined to form the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1867, under Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph, a member of the Hapsburg dynasty that had ruled since 1278.

During the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries, before Hungary joined Austria, both countries had been repeatedly attacked, first by the Turks and then by the Ottoman Empire attempting to expand into Europe by way of the Balkan Peninsula. In the sixteenth century, western and northern Hungary accepted Austrian rule to escape Ottoman occupation. In 1683, the Ottoman armies were halted at Vienna, but fighting continued in the Balkans until a peace was signed in 1699, the Treaty of Karlowitz. After suppression of the 1848 revolt of Hungary against Austrian rule, the dual monarchy was formed in 1867, as a Christian empire, but one relatively tolerant of the religious and ethnic diversity that characterized its citizens.

Austro-Hungarian policy toward the Middle East was focused on two main concerns—preservation of the Ottoman Empire and containment of Balkan nationalism, which had emerged in the Serbian revolt of 1804 against Ottoman rule. The Balkan Peninsula was inhabited by both Christians and Muslims, most of them Slavs. Russia was in the process of instigating a pan-Slavic movement (in an attempt to link Russian Slavs with Poland and the Balkans and gain access to the warm-water ports of the eastern Mediterranean—crucial to Russian trade interests before aviation allowed a way around frozen northern ports). As a multinational empire encompassing several Slavic groups, Austria-Hungary was vulnerable to these same forces of Slavic nationalism and pan-Slavism that threatened the European possessions of the Ottoman Empire. Austro-Hungarian Slavs included Poles, Ukrainians, Czechs, Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, and Slavonized Bulgars. Nationalism in the Balkan Peninsula was seen as the beginning of the potential breakup of both the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.

Even before the eruption of Balkan nationalism in the nineteenth century, Austrian statesmen had been concerned with the potential breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the resulting politics that would affect the Austrian Empire. Therefore, Austria-Hungary adopted a dual strategy: (1) help preserve Ottoman suzerainty over the Slavs where possible and (2) make sure that Austria, not Russia, gained when preservation of Ottoman authority was no longer possible. Toward this end, Austro-Hungarian bankers floated loans to the Ottomans and, to improve communications, sponsored the construction of the Vienna-Istanbul railroad. Under Klemens von Metternich, Austria's foreign minister from 1809 to 1848, and for the rest of the nineteenth century, Austria looked to expand its domain over the northwestern Balkan territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the beginning of the great Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Julius Andrássy sent the Andrássy Note of 30 December 1875, calling for autonomy for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ottoman reform of its administration of its Balkan provinces. Andrássy was simultaneously trying to curtail Russian pan-Slavism, which dictated Russian support for Serbian and Bulgarian expansion. The resulting crisis led to the defeat of the Ottomans by the Russians in the Russian–Ottoman War of 1877–1878 and the subsequent Treaty of San Stephano, which resulted in a vastly enlarged Bulgaria and a clear advantage for Russia in the Balkans. Andrássy sided with the British to attempt to force a revision of the treaty in Austria-Hungary's favor and, at the July 1878 Congress of Berlin, he prevailed, when a virtual protectorate over a technically autonomous Bosnia-Herzegovina was given to Austria-Hungary.

The following years saw increasing nationalist activity in the Balkans and increasingly complex alliances among the European powers. During the height of the Macedonian crisis at the turn of the twentieth century, Austria-Hungary at times supported Serbia and at times opposed it—all with the overall goal of obtaining Austrian influence on the northern Aegean. When the Albanians revolted against the Ottomans in 1912, Austro-Hungarian pressure on the Ottomans led to the creation of an independent state, which was advantageous from an Austrian perspective, because Albania provided a buffer against Serbian expansion to the Adriatic. The Ottoman defeat in the two Balkan wars, fought just prior to World War I, was disadvantageous to Austria-Hungary. Spurred by victories in the Balkan wars, Serbia overran northern Albania to the

Adriatic. Serbian ambitions in Bosnia-Herzegovina led to the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, in July 1914; this was used as a symbolic outrage that allowed for the beginning of World War I in August.

Ultimately, both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires were on the losing side of that war, and their territories were allowed to become independent states or protectorates of the winning European countries—mainly Britain and France—by the peace treaties and the League of Nations.

See also BALKANS; BALKAN WARS (1912–1913); BERLIN, CONGRESS AND TREATY OF; NATIONALISM; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; RUSSIAN–OTTOMAN WARS; WORLD WAR I.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

AVNERY, URI

[1923–]

Israeli Journalist, writer, politician, and peace activist.

Born Helmut Ostermann in Beckum, Germany, Avnery immigrated to Palestine at the age of ten. As a youth he was close to the Canaanite movement, which advocated the creation of a new "Hebrew nation" by severing ties with the Jewish diaspora. Avnery also joined the Revisionist Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi in 1938, but left the dissident organization several years later because of its anti-Arab ideology.

Avnery recognized, early on, the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and advocated a "Semetic alliance" of both nations: Jews and Arabs. In the Arab-Israel War of 1948 he fought and was wounded as a combat soldier; he later published his critical views of the war in two best-selling books. During the 1950s and 1960s Avnery owned and edited the controversial but successful weekly magazine *ha-Olam ha-Zeh,* which combined radically critical political editorials with socialite gossip and mild pornography. In 1965, cashing in on the popularity of his magazine, he established a party named after his journal and won two seats in the Knesset in which he served, with a one-term intermission, for ten years.

Ever since the Arab–Israel War of June 1967, Avnery has become one of the most outspoken radical leaders of Israel's peace movement, leading various groups and advocating both the recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the creation of a Palestinian state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. He was one of the first Israelis to establish contacts with PLO representatives, first with Saʿid Hamami in London and then with Issam Sartawi in Paris. Avnery was also one of the first Israelis to meet personally with Chairman Yasir Arafat, initially during the siege of Beirut and then at his headquarters in Tunis, in open defiance of Israel's ban on such meetings. After the Oslo Accords of 1993, Avnery founded a group called Gush Shalom (the Bloc for Peace) which advocated a total withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories, total dismantling of all Jewish settlements in these territories, and the solution of the conflict by the creation of "two states for two nations" in historic Palestine. This message has been vigorously disseminated by vigils, demonstrations, clashes with the police, and paid advertisements, as well as through Avnery's regular newspaper columns and his personal web site "Avnery News."

See also SARTAWI, ISSAM.

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MARTIN MALIN
UPDATED BY MORDECHAI BAR-ON

AWADHI, BADRIA A. AL-

[1943–]

Kuwaiti attorney, educator, author, and activist.

A noted attorney and women's rights activist, Badria al-Awadhi received her L.L.B. and L.L.M. from Cairo University and her Ph.D. in international law from University College London. She served as Dean of the Faculty of Law and Shariʿa at Kuwait University from 1979 to 1982. Her international service includes membership on the Committee of Experts advising the International Labor Organization (1983–1996) and work with environmental and human rights groups. She has written extensively on family law and maritime environmental issues. A tireless advocate for women's rights, in 1992 she was the first woman to speak at a public campaign event sponsored by a candidate running for the Kuwaiti parliament. As of 2003 she directed the Arab Regional Center for Environmental Law and headed a private law practice, both in Kuwait City.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; KUWAIT.

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MARY ANN TÉTREAULT

AWAD, LOUIS

[1914/15–1991]

Egyptian scholar and essayist.

Louis Awad was born in the village of Sharuna in the district of Mina. He studied literature at the universities of Cairo, Oxford, and Princeton. As chairman of the faculty of letters at Cairo University, Awad inaugurated in Egypt the modern study of literary criticism based on scientific principles. From 1945 to 1950 he joined with other writers who drew from Marxism and other sources in a call for the total reform of Egyptian society. His novel *al-Anqa* (the Phoenix) expresses this orientation. In a volume of poetry, *Plutoland,* he introduced free verse forms to Egyptian literature and presented a scathing attack on traditionalism. Awad's unwavering critical stance continued after the 1952 revolution. As a consequence, he was forced to resign his position at Cairo University in 1954.

In 1960 Awad became the literary editor at the newspaper *al-Ahram.* He published a devastating critique of higher education in Egypt in 1964, arguing that students wished to be instructed, rather than to engage in independent study and research. Awad's writings in *al-Ahram* made him one of the leading opinion-makers in the Arab world. From the mid-1970s through the 1980s he served as a faculty adviser at the American Research Center in Egypt, developing a strong following among graduate students there.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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DAVID WALDNER
UPDATED BY CHARLES E. BUTTERWORTH

AWAKENED YOUTH

Afghan political-literacy organization.

Awakened Youth was a political-literacy group formed in 1946 or 1947, in part as a reaction to the autocratic Afghan prime minister Shah Mahmoud. One of its founders was Muhammad Daud, a future prime minister and a member of the royal family. The party advocated social change and promoted the cause of Pushtunistan. Later it became more radicalized, and many members were arrested at the end of the Seventh Afghan National Assembly in 1952 when liberal laws allowing political activity expired.

See also DAUD, MUHAMMAD.

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GRANT FARR

AWALI, AL-

Town located in the middle of the island of Bahrain.

Situated atop Bahrain's oil field, Awali lies approximately 2 miles (3 km) south of Rifa, the town where the ruling family of Bahrain resides. Awali was built during the British protectorate by the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), following the discovery of petroleum in 1932, to provide housing for the company's expatriate, especially European and American, personnel. The town consists primarily of small garden homes; it offers cultural and recreational facilities for its residents.

See also BAHRAIN; PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS.

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EMILE A. NAKHLEH

AYAN

Plural of the Arabic word ayn, *meaning notable person.*

The term *ayan* was used in the Ottoman Empire to refer to a variety of elites, particularly landed notables in either cities or the countryside. *Ayan* were usually tax farmers from merchant, *ulama,* or Janissary families, although their origins differed in various regions of the empire. In the provinces of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, the *ayan* were typically Mamluks or local Ottoman officials like governors. In eastern Anatolia, they were called *derebeys,* or valley lords affiliated with dominant clans.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, many provincial *ayan* amassed personal armies and control of local finances, challenging the influence of the central state. Particularly in the European provinces, the *ayan* were able to gain power in the late eighteenth century because they supplied crucial military support to the sultan in the several wars against Russia. Their power was formalized when the sultan granted them official status *(ayanlik)* as representatives of the people to the government in exchange for their support.

In the early nineteenth century, the *ayan* openly rebelled against the central state in the Serbian revolt (1803–1805) and in their refusal in the Balkans to cooperate in conscription to Selim III's new army, the Nizam-i Cedit. In 1807, *ayan* from the European provinces cooperated with opponents of reform to overthrow Selim. An attempt to negotiate a truce between Constantinople and provincial notables produced in 1808 the ineffective and largely ignored Sened-i Ittifak (Pact of Alliance). Mahmud II devoted the latter part of his reign to undermining the autonomy of the *ayan* and enlarging central power, reforms continued in the Tanzimat era.

See also ANATOLIA; MAMLUKS; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; TANZIMAT; *ULAMA.*

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

AYA SOFYA

Religious structure in Istanbul, now a museum.

The Aya Sofya (also known by its Greek name, Hagia Sophia) was built by the Roman emperor Constantine from 325 to 330 C.E. during his rebuilding of the city of Byzantium as his capital. It was built as a Christian church, the cathedral of Constantinople (now Istanbul), for the first Roman emperor to espouse that faith. The present structure dates from the sixth century, when the cathedral was rebuilt by the Byzantine emperor Justinian. In 1453, the Ottomans conquered the city and transformed the church into a mosque. In 1935, the new Republic of Turkey transformed it again, this time into a museum. The Aya Sofya served as the inspiration for several mosques built during the Ottoman Empire, including Süleymaniye Mosque, designed by Sinan, and the Sultan Ahmet Mosque (popularly known as the Blue mosque).

See also MOSQUE; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; SULTAN AHMET MOSQUE.

ZACHARY KARABELL

AYN, AL-

The second-largest city in the emirate of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates.

Originally one of nine oasis villages in the Buraymi region, the urban conglomeration of modern al-Ayn has enveloped the six villages that became part of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) after the resolution of the Buraymi Oasis dispute. The region around al-Ayn contains some of the most important archaeological sites in the UAE. For example, the country's oldest monumental sites are located at Jabal Hafit, south of al-Ayn, and include hundreds of tombs that date to 3200–2800 B.C.E. The ruler of Abu Dhabi has encouraged the study and promotion of the emirate's early history, much of which is showcased at al-Ayn's historical museum. Al-Ayn means "the spring" in Arabic, and in addition to having wells and springs, the oasis has been watered for centuries by a series of man-made underground channels *(aflaj* in Arabic; sing. *falaj),* a technique also found in Iran. Until the advent of oil revenues, al-Ayn's economy depended on oasis agriculture, links with pastoral nomads, trade, and migrating laborers who fished and pearled in the Persian Gulf. Modern al-Ayn continues to be an important agricultural region. In addition, the city hosts the Emirates University, Zayid Military Academy, a historical museum, and a world-class zoo.

See also BURAYMI OASIS DISPUTE.

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ANTHONY B. TOTH

AYN AL-DOWLEH, ABD AL-MAJID MIRZA

[1845–1926]

Prominent Iranian political figure during Mozaffar al-Din Shah's reign, 1896–1907.

Ayn al-Dowleh, Sultan Abd al-Majid Mirza Atabak-e Aʿzam, was the son of Sultan Ahmad Mirza Azod al-Dowleh, Fath Ali Shah Qajar's forty-eighth son. After administering several governorates, he was given the title of Ayn al-Dowleh by Naser al-Din Shah in 1893. Shah Mozaffar al-Din appointed him chief minister in 1903, and he was promoted to prime minister the following year. His vociferous opposition to the constitutional movement brought about his dismissal in 1906. He was reinstated for brief intervals in 1915 and 1917, but British disapproval and the hostility of the parliament proved insurmountable. Following the coup d'état in 1921, he was arrested and heavily fined.

See also MOZAFFAR AL-DIN QAJAR; NASER AL-DIN SHAH.

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NEGUIN YAVARI

AYNI, MUHSIN AL-

[1932–]

Yemeni politician.

A Yemeni nationalist identified with republican, progressive, and unionist policies, al-Ayni was exiled from North Yemen by Imam Ahmad in the 1950s. He then became involved in South Yemen's politics, associated with the Aden Trade Union Congress and its political wing, the Popular Socialist Party. With the military revolt and the fall of the imamate in North Yemen in 1962, he became the first foreign minister of the Yemen Arab Republic. He was also appointed prime minister four times, between 1968 and 1975. During his various tenures in that office he presided over the 1969 and 1970 reconciliation between republicans and royalists that ended the North Yemen civil war; he also negotiated the 1972 unity agreement with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen; established 1967). Because he is a controversial political figure, al-Ayni's career after 1975 was limited to overseas diplomatic posts, including that of his

1990 appointment as the first ambassador of the Republic of Yemen to the United States.

See also YEMEN.

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F. GREGORY GAUSE III

AYN, RAS AL-

Town in northeastern Syria near the border with Turkey.

This Syrian town has one of the world's largest karst springs, which are formed from Paleogenic (nummilitic) and marine Miocene limestone. The springs' average annual discharge is estimated at 1,056 gallons (4,000 liters per second) or 1,594 million cubic yards (1,219 million cu m). The springs form the Khabur River, which flows south into the Euphrates River near Dayr al-Zawr in Syria's province of Dayr al-Zawr. They have been called the "Queen of Springs" on account of their high, exceptionally steady discharge throughout the year.

ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

AYYUB, DHU AL-NUN

[1908?–1988]

Iraqi novelist of the 1930s and 1940s and social critic.

Born in Mosul to a Sunni Arab lower middle-class merchant family, Ayyub was graduated from the Higher Teachers' College in Baghdad in 1928. For over a decade afterward, he worked as a high-school mathematics teacher in a number of places in Iraq. At the end of the 1930s, he became director of Baghdad's institute of Fine Arts, and between 1938 and 1944 he was chief editor of the cultural magazine *al-Majalla.* In 1941–1942, he was a member of the central committee of the Iraqi Communist Party from which he was expelled due to a controversy with its secretary general over Ayyub's demand for democratization in the party. Upon his expulsion, he established his own moderate left-wing party, the Congress *(al-muʾtamariyyun).* In 1944 he decided to try his luck in agriculture and leased a plot of government land. This enterprise, however, failed miserably, and he lost his investment. In 1959, he was appointed by General Abd al-Karim Qasim as director general of guidance and broadcasts, but in June 1960 he was dismissed. For a while, he was a press attaché in the Iraqi Embassy in Vienna, but most of the time he lived off a small pension from the Iraqi government. He also tried unsuccessfully to run a restaurant. In the 1980s, due to the Iraq–Iran war, his pension was stopped. He died in Vienna.

Ayyub's first recognition as a writer resulted from a number of translations from Western prose, first published in 1933. His first, and most important novel, *Doctor Ibrahim,* was published about 1940 in his hometown. Until then, writing novels was regarded as a far less prestigious occupation than the writing of poetry. Ayyub contributed to this change in public opinion. His second book, a volume of short stories, *al-Yad wa al-Ard wa al-ma (The Hand and the Land and the Water),* reflecting his experience as a farmer, came out in 1948. Among his other writings were: *Burj Babil (The Tower of Babylon), al-Kadihun (The Toilers),* and *Rusul al-Thaqafa (The Messengers of Culture).* His novels and short stories are written in a naive, realistic style. They reflect the feeling that all good social values are the creation of simple working people, and they contain scathing criticism against the widespread corruption in Iraqi society, yet they lack a revolutionary message. *Doctor Ibrahim* portrays an ambitious and unscrupulous Iraqi politician, who some believed to be modeled after the Shiʿite politician Muhammad Fadhil al-Jamali. Ayyub's last novel was published in Beirut in the 1970s. Six volumes of his memoirs, still unpublished, are in the possession of Iraqi poet Buland al-Haydari, who lives in London.

See also COMMUNISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST; IRAQ; JAMALI, MUHAMMAD FADHIL AL-; QASIM, ABD AL-KARIM; SUNNI ISLAM.

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AMATZIA BARAM

AYYUBI, ALI JAWDAT AL-

[1885?–1969]

Friend and retainer of Faisal I ibn Hussein during the Arab revolt of World War I; politician in Iraq, 1920s–1958.

Ali Jawdat was born in Mosul (Iraq) during the Ottoman Empire, to a family who practiced Sunni Islam. His father was a military man, chief sergeant in the gendarmerie, and Ali's education was basically military. During World War I, he joined the Arab revolt against the Ottomans under Sharif Husayn ibn Ali and became a trusted friend of the sharif's son Faisal, who in 1920 became king of Syria (until the French mandate), then king of Iraq in 1921 under the British mandate.

Ali Jawdat was appointed military governor and head of several government ministries (finance, interior, and foreign affairs) during the early years, when Iraq tried to gain independence from the British. In 1932, the British mandate was ended, but Britain kept troops there until the mid-1950s. During the 1930s, Ali Jawdat became a chief administrative and diplomatic officer, representing Iraq in London, Paris, and Washington. He was made prime minister of Iraq in 1934 and 1935, 1949 and 1950, and during 1957 (just before the government was overthrown by a leftist military coup in 1958, headed by Abd al-Karim Qasim). In 1967, Ali Jawdat published his memoirs in Beirut, covering the years 1900 to 1958.

See also Arab Revolt (1916); Faisal I ibn Hussein; Husayn ibn Ali; Iraq; Ottoman Empire; Qasim, Abd al-Karim; Sunni Islam; World War I.

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Ahmad Abdul A. R. Shikara

AZERBAIJAN

Province in northwestern Iran; also, a republic (fully independent since 1991) along the western coast of the Caspian Sea, with Baku as capital.

An Iranian province with documented history going back to the Achaemenian period (700 to 330 B.C.E.), Azerbaijan was gradually Turkified by the end of the twelfth century through the migration of Turkic tribes from central Asia. Its spoken language, Azeri, is a Turkic language strongly influenced by Persian. Alongside the Turkish-speaking population, Azerbaijan is also home to a substantial Kurdish minority. Most Turkish-speaking Azerbaijanis are Shiʿa Muslims, and the Kurds are mostly Sunni.

Iranian Azerbaijan is divided into three provinces: Western Azerbaijan, with its provincial seat in Urumia; Eastern Azerbaijan, the capital of which is Tabriz; and Ardebil, with its provincial capital at Ardebil. The independent Republic of Azerbaijan, formerly a republic within the Soviet Union until its dissolution in 1991, also had been a part of Iranian territory but was ceded to Czarist Russia under the provisions of the Treaties of Golestan (1813) and Turkamanchai (1828).

In 1945 a Soviet-backed autonomous republic, led by local Marxist leaders Jaʿfar Pishevari and Gholam Yahya, was declared in Iranian Azerbaijan. Opposition from the United States, combined with the shrewd diplomacy of Azerbaijan's prime minister, Ahmad Qavam, secured the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and led to the demise of the short-lived and self-styled Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan.

Iranian Azerbaijan has varied climatic conditions. It includes some of Iran's richest agricultural lands, producing barley, wheat, rice, and potatoes. Tabriz is the region's industrial center, where tractors, factory machinery, electrical equipment and turbines, motorcycles, clocks and watches, cement, textiles, processed foods, and agricultural implements are produced. In other parts of Azerbaijan sugar and textile mills and food-processing plants are in operation. There are copper, arsenic, coal, and salt mines in the province. According to the 1996 census, the total population of East Azerbaijan was 3,369,000, of which 64.8 percent lived in urban areas. West Azerbaijan's population was 2,496,320, of which 57.39 percent were urban dwellers. Of Ardebil's 1,197,364 inhabitants, 647,154 live in urban areas. According to the Statistical Center of Iran, in East Azerbaijan 75.4 percent of the

population is literate; in West Azerbaijan, 69 percent; and in Ardebil, 73.3 percent.

See also Azeri Language and Literature; Iran; Tabriz; Turkmanchai, Treaty of (1828).

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Neguin Yavari

AZERBAIJAN CRISIS

A clash between the USSR and Iran that presaged the Cold War.

Considered by diplomatic historians to be one of the international political disputes that initiated the Cold War, the Azerbaijan crisis erupted in October 1945, when the newly formed Democratic Party of Azerbaijan in Iran's northwestern province began taking over local governments with the backing of the Soviet army, which had been occupying the area since the joint Anglo–Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941. By December 1945, the Democratic Party had established an autonomous government in Tabriz, the provincial capital of Iranian Azerbaijan, and this regime threatened to resist with force any effort by Tehran to restore central authority. A similar movement emerged in Mahabad, the main town in the Kurdish area of Iranian Azerbaijan. The Soviets prevented security forces of the central government from interfering with these takeovers, thus prompting fears in Tehran that Moscow intended to separate the province from Iran and possibly unite it with the neighboring Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan. These fears intensified when the Soviet Union declined to set a date for the withdrawal of its troops from the country, in contravention of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance (1942) stipulating that all foreign military forces were to be withdrawn from Iran within six months of the end of World War II.

The Iranian government sought diplomatic support from the United States, which encouraged Iran to submit a formal complaint to the newly created United Nations. The Azerbaijan crisis thus became one of the first issues to be considered by the Security Council. Although the Security Council discussions about the Azerbaijan crisis were not substantive in nature, the publicized manifestation of tensions between the former wartime allies Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States probably contributed to its resolution. While the situation in Iranian Azerbaijan remained on the Security Council's agenda during the first three months of 1946, Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam of Iran negotiated an agreement for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The agreement provided for the evacuation of all Soviet forces from Iran by May 1946, in return for Tehran's promise to withdraw the complaint it had brought before the United Nations, to negotiate peacefully with the autonomous government of Azerbaijan, and to submit for parliamentary consideration a proposal for a joint Soviet–Iranian oil company with exclusive rights to exploit any petroleum resources in northern Iran.

Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, the central government discussed economic and linguistic grievances with the Azerbaijan autonomous government, but throughout the spring and summer of 1946 the two sides were unable to resolve their political differences. Finally, in December 1946, on the pretext that nationwide security had to be reestablished prior to holding elections for a new parliament that would consider the proposed Soviet–Iranian oil company, Qavam ordered the army into Azerbaijan, including the Kurdish area around Mahabad, and the autonomy movements were crushed. Parliamentary elections were held subsequently, but in June 1947, the new parliament rejected the prime minister's proposals for creating a joint Soviet–Iranian oil company.

See also Democratic Party of Azerbaijan; Tripartite Treaty of Alliance.

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Eric Hooglund

AZERI LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Language spoken in Azerbaijan and northwestern Iran by the Azeris.

Azeri is spoken by 6,770,000 Azeris (1989 census) in Azerbaijan and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Millions of additional speakers of Azeri live in northwestern Iran. Azeri (together with the closely related languages Turkish and Turkmen) belongs to the southwestern, or Oghuz, branch of the Turkic languages. Azeri was originally written using Arabic script (and in Iran is now written again in Arabic script); the Azeris of the former Soviet Union adopted Latin script in 1927 and a modified Cyrillic alphabet in 1939. There is a current move to adopt a Turkish-style Latin script.

Azeri literature enjoyed continuous close ties to Persian, Turkish, and Chaghatay literature since its beginnings in the thirteenth century. Major figures of classical Azeri literature include İsfaraini, Nesimi, Hatai, Habibi, Fuzuli, and Vakil. The founders of modern Azeri literature include Kasim Beg Zakir (1784–1857), who introduced satire, Abbas Kuh Agha Bakihani ("Kudsi," 1794–1848), İsmail Beg Kutkaşinli, and Mirza Şefi ("Vazeh," 1792–1852). Mirza Feth-Ali Ahundzade (1812–1878) first introduced drama and other prose genres, and Necef Beg Vezirli (1854–1926) was another notable playwright. Mirza Ali-Ekber Sabir (1862–1911) wrote fine satire, and Celil Mehmedkuhzade (1869–1932) wrote important prose.

See also ARABIC SCRIPT; AZERBAIJAN; LITERATURE: PERSIAN; LITERATURE: TURKISH; TURKISH LANGUAGE.

ULI SCHAMILOGLU

AZHAR, AL-

Official mosque and university at Cairo, the world center of Sunni Islamic learning.

Jawhar the Sicilian, the general of al-Muʿizz li-Din-Allah, established al-Azhar in 970; it was to be the official mosque of the new Fatimid regime and to serve as the center of the effort to bring the Egyptians into the Shiʿite fold. For this reason, it lost its official status under the Sunni Ayyubids but regained it under the Mamluks. The line of succession of its head, known as Shaykh al-Azhar, has been traced to Muhammad Abdullah al-Kurashi (d. 1690). Although the shaykh was always a member of a religious elite, the occupant of this position only gradually became the chief Muslim religious official in Egypt.

Al-Azhar is the world's oldest school of higher learning in continuous operation. Although the Islamic disciplines have dominated, it has a history of secular education as well. Moses Maimonides taught medicine there. By the middle of the nineteenth century, with over 7,000 students, it had achieved a preeminent position in Egypt and was attracting students from the entire Islamic world. In 1903 al-Azhar had 104 foreign students, mostly from Arab countries and Africa, but also from Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, and China. Although all four Sunni rites were represented there, the Maliki, Shafiʿi, and Hanafi rites, each with its own shaykh, dominated. The student residential sections were endowed for specific rites or geographical groups. The only organization to integrate this segmented structure was the office of the Shaykh al-Azhar, who sided with his own group when interests conflicted. There were no formal programs of study, no degrees, and no general examination system. Students sat in circles in the mosque, each group surrounding its teaching shaykh, who sat in front of one of the numerous columns. The teacher commented on a classical or postclassical text, which the students were to memorize. When a student was deemed to have mastered a text, the teacher wrote a note authorizing him to teach it. When a student had acquired a number of these certificates and a sufficient reputation, he could compete in the informal process by which teachers were given the right to teach in the mosque.

In the late nineteenth century al-Azhar came under sharp criticism for outmoded educational content and methods, not only from the secular elite but also from such Muslim reformers as Muhammad Abduh, himself an alumnus. The curriculum had almost no secular content, its religious content was more theoretical than applied, and student performance was very low. As early as 1812, the state intervened by appointing the Shaykh al-Azhar, and in 1895 to 1896 Abduh, representing the government, intervened by introducing a salary law, a government salary subsidy, the Azhar Administrative Council,

and the Azhar Organization Law. A conservative reaction thwarted this effort, which was followed by a new organization law in 1911 that was designed to introduce a bureaucratic organization and modern programs of study, examinations, and degrees. In that year 62 percent of al-Azhar's budget came from the government (it reached 96 percent by 1959). In 1930, under Shaykh al-Azhar Muhammad al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri, a major reform law established a true college program with three departments: theology, Islamic law, and Arabic. For the first time diploma programs roughly paralleled the Western bachelor's, master's, and doctorate system.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser promoted even more change. In 1961, under Shaykh al-Azhar Muhammad Shaltut, a secular campus was added at a different site; it had the various degree programs of a full university, including medicine and other sciences. The following year the government decreed the opening of the first of several al-Azhar colleges for women. In 2002 al-Azhar University had twelve colleges in Cairo, eight in Assiut, and twenty more in other parts of the country, with a total of 185,000 students and 9,000 teachers.

An extensive primary and secondary system of Azhar institutes had meanwhile been built throughout Egypt, with a core program of secular courses, but also including a significant number of courses in the Islamic disciplines. Thus al-Azhar established a viable, comprehensive Muslim alternative to the state education system, which Egypt's *ulama* tended to view as a secular threat to Islamic society and mores.

By virtue of the increased organizational differentiation and hierarchy, some positions began to enjoy a presumption of religious authority and cor-

The al-Azhar university and mosque in Cairo was established in 970 C.E. under the Fatimid regime. Though it focused mostly on Islamic religious subjects in its early years, course offerings have since expanded to include many secular studies. **© OWEN FRANKEN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

rectness of opinion. The 1911 law created the Corps of High Ulama, which was partly an effort to coopt senior *ulama* who might otherwise have opposed the reform, and also a response to a perceived need to have a group to pronounce on Islamic issues. The 1961 organization law transformed this body into the Academy of Islamic Research, specifically to research and pronounce on Islamic issues. The academy holds conferences to bring together *ulama* from most Muslim countries to present and discuss studies. The academy, along with the non-Azhar positions of the *mufti* of Egypt, the minister of *awqaf* (religious properties), and the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, assists the state with important issues of control. All these positions, both in and outside al-Azhar, are filled by state appointees.

Since a number of Muslim countries have created their own centers of Muslim learning, it is a tribute to al-Azhar that it continues to enjoy the greatest prestige internationally, even if its dominance is somewhat eroded. However, both in Egypt and abroad, Muslims with differing views, including those who oppose current regimes in the Muslim world, criticize the Azharis as "official" or "government" *ulama.* It is true that most violent Muslim radicals in Egypt are neither Azhar *ulama* nor Azhar graduates, but the case of Umar Abd al-Rahman, a professor at al-Azhar's Asyut campus who associated with the jihad organization that killed Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat, as well as well-known cases where Azharis oppose government policies (for example, in the realm of family planning), indicate that Azhari autonomy of opinion and action is far from totally compromised. Today, as in the past, al-Azhar performs an essential role in the accommodation of Muslim and secular institutions and maintains continuity in the face of rapid social and cultural change.

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A. CHRIS ECCEL
UPDATED BY DONALD MALCOLM REID

AZHARI, ISMAʿIL

[1900–1969]

First prime minister of independent Sudan.

Ismaʿil Azhari, a descendant of the nineteenth-century religious leader Ismaʿil al-Wali and a grandson of the mufti of the Sudan, was educated at Gordon College in Khartoum and the American University of Beirut. After teaching mathematics in the Sudan Department of Education (1921–1946), he became a major figure in the Sudanese nationalism that favored union of the Nile Valley with Egypt. It remains unclear whether his support for this union was a sincere conviction or a device to eliminate Britain's control of the Sudan.

As he became increasingly absorbed in politics, Azhari was a founder of the Graduates Congress, whose members consisted of most of the educated elite. To promote his political aims, he founded the Ashigga (Brothers) Party; its principal goal was union of the Nile Valley with Egypt. In order to broaden his political base, he became the first president of the National Unionist Party (NUP), founded in 1952. The NUP dominated the elections for parliament.

Following his election as prime minister, Azhari continued his campaign for union with Egypt until he realized that the overwhelming majority of Sudanese wanted independence without Egypt. He then declared the independence of Sudan on 1 January 1956, creating a split in the NUP that led to the fall of his government. During the subsequent military regime of General Ibrahim Abbud, he held no political office and was active in the opposition to the government.

After the overthrow of the Abbud regime in 1964, Azhari again led the NUP, often in alliance with his former enemies, the Umma Party. He was elected permanent president of the Supreme Council, an office he held until the military revolution of Muhammad Jaʿfar Numeiri.

See also ABBUD, IBRAHIM; NUMEIRI, MUHAMMAD JAʿFAR; UMMA PARTY.

ROBERT O. COLLINS

AZIB

Land ownership in precolonial Morocco in a system similar to feudalism.

In precolonial Morocco, *azib* was land property owned by a sharif, for whom people called *azzaba* would work. *Azib* land is usually conceded by the *makhzan* (state) to some *shorfa. Azzaba* would work within a relationship of servitude toward the sharif to whom they owed respect and obedience from father to son. In case anyone wanted to leave the *azib,* they had to seek permission from the landowner. The most important *azib* were to be found in the Gharb, such as the *azib* of Ahl Wazzan.

See also GHARB; MOROCCO; SHARIF; SHORFA.

RAHMA BOURQIA

AZIZ, TARIQ

[1936–]

Iraqi politician.

Tariq Aziz was born Mikhaʾil Yuhanna to a lower-middle-class Chaldean Christian family in the village of Baʾshiqa, near Mosul. He lost his father at the age of seven. Joining the Baʿth party in the early 1950s, he became one of its first members in Iraq. In 1958 he graduated from Baghdad University with a degree in English and later received a master of arts degree. From his first days in the party he was one of its leading intellectuals. During most of the 1950s and 1960s, he edited the clandestine party magazines *al-Ishtiraki* and *al-Jamahir.* After the Ramadan Revolution of 1963, Aziz supported the centrist faction in the party, under General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr.

During the mid-1960s Aziz became very close to the Baʿthist figure Saddam Hussein. After Hussein became the strongman in Baghdad during the early 1970s, Aziz served as his close confidant and mouthpiece. Winning Hussein's trust may have been easier for a Christian than for a Muslim, since he posed no threat to the ruler. Under the Baʿthist regime, Aziz served as chief editor of the party daily newspaper and as minister of information. Beginning in 1977 he was a member of the two highest bodies: the Revolutionary Command Council and the party's Regional (Iraqi) Leadership. Beginning in 1979 he served as a deputy prime minister. From 1983 to 1991 Aziz was Iraq's foreign minister, in which capacity he managed to greatly improve Iraq's foreign relations during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988).

During the Gulf Crisis of 1990 to 1991, however, he did not dare to oppose Hussein, and thus his contacts with the West were of no use to his country. He traveled to the Soviet Union to seek Soviet help, which also was not forthcoming. Aziz finally met with U.S. secretary of state James A. Baker in Geneva in January 1991 to discuss a negotiated end to the crisis, once again to no avail. After the Gulf War, he was relieved of his position as foreign minister but retained his position as a deputy prime minister. Because of his level of education and relations with the West, Aziz (along with Saʿdun Hammadi) remained an exceptional figure at the top of the Baʿth hierarchy. It was he who served as the regime's point man in Iraq's controversial dealings with United Nations weapons inspectors from 1991 to 1998.

Following the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq in March 2003, Aziz became a wanted man. He surrendered to U.S. forces and was detained in April 2003.

See also BAʿTH, AL-; GULF CRISIS (1990–1991); GULF WAR (1991); HUSSEIN, SADDAM; IRAN–IRAQ WAR (1980–1988); WAR IN IRAQ (2003).

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AMATZIA BARAM
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

AZM, SADIQ AL-

[1937–]

Syrian Marxist intellectual and author.

Sadiq al-Azm (al-Adhm) was born in 1937 in Damascus to a family of Syrian notables. He studied at

the American University of Beirut (AUB) before leaving for the United States to study philosophy at Yale University. After finishing his Ph.D. (his dissertation on Immanuel Kant was subsequently published by Oxford University Press), he returned to Lebanon and joined the faculty of AUB. He flirted with several political ideologies in the region before settling on Marxism-Leninism. He was vocal in his criticisms of the United States and Israel, and often clashed with the administration of AUB. After 1967 he achieved great intellectual prominence with the publication of his *Self-Criticism After the Defeat,* in which he called for a thorough investigation of Arab social and political weaknesses and shortcomings. He believed that Arab leaders had deceived their people, and that Arab society's problems must be resolved before the political problems can be addressed. He called for a scientific approach to the Palestinian problem instead of the religious fatalistic outlook that was promoted by Arab leaders. Azm championed Palestinian guerrillas and was ideologically close to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. His views got him fired from AUB, where he was quite active in the student movement, but he continued to teach, at the Lebanese University. Azm got into legal problems in 1969 when he published *Critique of Religious Thought*; his secular and materialist criticisms of religious thought stirred an uproar in Lebanon, especially among the Sunni clerical establishment. He was put on trial, but was exonerated. Azm was one of the best-known Arab Marxist intellectuals, and his contributions in journals and newspapers were hotly debated. After the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Azm moved back to Damascus, where he joined the philosophy department. He kept a lower profile, and his views became more liberal. In the early 1990s Azm spent a few years as a visiting professor at Princeton University and at the Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington, D.C. He also published a book in defense of the British novelist Salman Rushdie. He then moved back to Syria where, along with other Syrian intellectuals, he signed petitions in demand of political liberalization.

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As'ad AbuKhalil

AZURI, NAJIB

[?–1916]

Ottoman official and Arab nationalist.

Najib Azuri, a Christian Arab born in Azur in south Lebanon, was an Ottoman official in Jerusalem. Through his Paris-based League of the Arab Homeland, in 1904 he issued manifestos appealing to the Arabs of Iraq and Syria to overthrow the sultan of the Ottoman Empire. In his book, which was published in Paris in 1905 under the title *Le réveil de la nation arabe* (The awakening of the Arab nation), he posited the existence of an Arab nation that was entitled to independence from Ottoman rule. He openly advocated the secession of the Arabs from the Ottoman Empire—this was the first open demand for complete detachment of the Arab provinces.

From the perspective of Azuri, the Ottomans were barbarous oppressors who inflicted much suffering on the Arabs. His accusations against the sultan and the governor of Jerusalem, Kazem Bey, were violent and bitter. Azuri directed his most violent attack against Abdülhamit II, whom he described as a pernicious "beast," running the empire through intrigue and espionage from his "cave" in Istanbul. Azuri also ridiculed Abdülhamit's claim to the caliphate because he did not know Arabic and because, at the age of sixty-five, he still had not performed the pilgrimage (Hajj) to Mecca.

Against this background, Azuri stated that the Arabs, with their national feelings now revived, would form an empire comprising Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and the Arabian Peninsula. Within these boundaries, Azuri wanted to see the emergence of an Arab nation under the protection of a European power—France having a "better right" to rule the Arabs than the rest.

Azuri's preference for France stemmed from his anti-Russian stance and his apparent belief in the right of France to protect the Catholics and their establishments in the Ottoman Empire. In his book, Azuri warned that should Russia control the Turkish Straits and penetrate the Ottoman Empire, the people of the East would never attain their national independence.

Azuri had had close connections with French political figures in Paris and Cairo. Among them

were René Pinon, Edmond Fazy, and Eugène Jung. In partnership with Jung, Azuri tried to create the impression, by means of articles and periodicals, that an Arab movement was under way in the Ottoman Empire. Both men, however, were rebuffed by the French, the Italians, and the British. Their ten-year partnership, which lasted roughly from 1905 to 1916, made no progress toward their goal of raising the Arabs against the Ottomans.

Azuri was also equally famous for his anti-Zionist position and for his prediction that the Zionist movement was destined to conflict with Arab nationalism. Beyond his contribution to Arab nationalist thought, one deduces in Azuri's work a European brand of antisemitism that was typical of other writings by Arab nationalists in this period. It is probable that Azuri had developed his antisemitic sentiments during the Dreyfus affair, at which time he was a student in Paris.

See also ABDÜLHAMIT II; DREYFUS AFFAIR.

MUHAMMAD MUSLIH

AZZAM, ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-

[1893–1976]

First secretary-general of the Arab League.

Abd al-Rahman al-Azzam started his political life as an anti-British Egyptian nationalist. Although he was a Wafdist in the first phase of his political life, he became associated with King Farouk and the anti-Wafdist prime minister Ali Mahir from the mid-1930s on. He was pan-Arabist and pan-Islamist at the same time. When Italy conquered Libya, then an Ottoman province in 1911, Azzam volunteered against the Italian invaders. During World War I, he left Egypt and fought alongside Sanusi forces in Cyrenaica (east Libya today) and the Egyptian western desert.

From 1934 on, Azzam called for the formation of an Arab bloc since, according to him, there was no place in the present age for small countries with limited resources. He also believed closer Arab ties would bring Egypt political, economic, and strategic advantages.

Azzam was appointed by the council of the League of Arab States in 1945 when the pact of the league was signed by member countries. He served as secretary-general until 1952, when he was replaced by Abd al-Khaliq Hassuna. Before becoming the league's secretary-general, Azzam served in a number of diplomatic positions and carried numerous diplomatic missions on behalf of Egypt to many Arab capitals.

See also FAROUK; LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES; PAN-ARABISM.

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MAHMOUD HADDAD

B

BAʿALBAK

City in Lebanon famous for its archaeological remains.

Located in the Biqa Valley some 53 miles (85 km) from Beirut, Baʿalbak (or Baʿalbek), is the foremost tourist site in Lebanon. Perhaps a center of the cult of the great Semitic god Baal, it owes its fame today to its Roman temples, which date to the late second century and the beginning of the third century. The Temple of Bacchus is the best-preserved Roman temple of its size in the world.

Prior to the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990), Baʿalbak was known for its annual international festivals, which offered a typical Lebanese blending of Eastern and Western cultures. The present city, the capital of one of the least Westernized districts of Lebanon, had an estimated 29,400 inhabitants in 2002, with a strong Shiʿite majority and a Christian minority. The political significance of the city was heightened in 1982–1983, when it became the base for a contingent of revolutionary guards sent by the Iranian regime to help build, organize, and train the militant group Islamic AMAL, which provided the nucleus for the better-known Hizbullah. In the early 1990s, Hizbullah's headquarters were in Baʿalbak.

See also AMAL; BIQA VALLEY; HIZBULLAH; REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX

BAʿALBAKKI, LAYLA

[1936–]

Lebanese novelist, short-story writer, and journalist.

Born to a Shiʿite family of modest means in south Lebanon, Layla Baʿalbakki pursued her postsecondary studies intermittently while working as a secretary at the Lebanese parliament. While still in her twenties she began publishing articles and short

stories that were defiant in tone and focused on sensitive topics. Baʿalbakki's work sparked controversy by questioning the status quo, particularly gender roles and relations, and by discussing the body and sexuality in a frank and open manner. She published her first novel, *Ana Ahya* (I live), in 1958, when she was just twenty-two. It offered a bleak and uncompromising view of the world from the perspective of a rebellious, ultimately self-destructive young Arab woman. As a journalist and public speaker in the late 1950s, Baʿalbakki was a passionate advocate of self-criticism, social reform, equality between men and women, and freedom of expression. In 1960 she received a one-year scholarship to study in France. She returned to Lebanon in 1961, and in 1964 published a book of short stories entitled *Safinat hanan ila al-qamar* (A spaceship of tenderness to the moon). The title story of this collection is set in a young married couple's bedroom one morning. The husband is naked and the discussion is implicitly erotic. A line in the story, "he placed his hand on her stomach," was deemed obscene, and Baʿalbakki had to go to court to face charges that her writings were provocative and offensive to public morality. She won her case and in the following year went on to publish another novel, *Al-alihah al-mamsukha* (The monstrous gods), in which she broached the topic of virginity and hypocrisy surrounding the ideal of female purity in Arab society. Baʿalbakki married and raised a family in Lebanon during the war years (1975–1990). She has not published any novels or short stories since the 1960s.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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LAURIE KING-IRANI

BAB, AL-

[1819–1850]

Charismatic leader of an Iranian religious movement that began in 1844.

Sayyid Ali Mohammad Shirazi was born on 20 October 1819 in Shiraz (southwestern Iran). His father, a clothier, had married into a clan of long-distance merchants. His family had adopted the Shaykhi school of Shiʿism, as had his elementary teacher, Shaykh Abid. Sayyid Ali Mohammad had an uneven education and rebelled against dry scholasticism and the minutiae of Arabic grammar. He engaged in the family trade, spending 1835 to 1840 in the Iranian port city of Bushehr on import–export affairs. But his real interests were religious devotions and Shaykhi-style dreams and visions of the imams (the holy figures of Shiʿism). He settled his accounts and left for the shrine cities of Iraq in 1841, in part to meet Sayyid Kazim Rashti, leader of the esoteric and millenarian Shaykhi school of Shiʿism. He spent eleven months there, but appears to have spent little time in seminary study, concentrating on devotions at the shrines. His family put pressure on him to return to Shiraz, which he did in 1842, where they married him off to Khadija Khanom and set him up once again in business. He continued to think and write about esoteric religious subjects and began to have a following as a charismatic figure.

When Rashti died in Karbala, in early 1844, a section of the Shaykhis, convinced that the appearance of the Muslim Mahdi (messiah) was near, set off in search of him. One of these, Molla Hosayn Bushru'i, stopped in Shiraz on his way to Kirman and accidentally met Sayyid Ali Mohammad, who put forward a charismatic claim. When Molla Hosayn became his disciple on 22 May 1844, followed by other Shaykhi seminarians in his circle, he was recognized as *al-Bab,* "the Gate"—an ambiguous term implying divine inspiration. Belief in his spiritual leadership spread rapidly among urban craftspeople and merchants, as well as some peasants.

The Bab went on pilgrimage later in 1844 to proclaim his mission to the sharif of Mecca but proved unable to get his attention. In the summer of 1845, he returned to Shiraz, but the municipal authorities, alarmed by his claims, put him under house arrest. In 1846 and 1847 he resided in Isfahan, gaining the protection of the Qajar governor there, who attempted to arrange an interview with the shah for him. The chief minister, however, thwarted this meeting, and ordered the Bab to be imprisoned in Maku, in Azerbaijan. There the Bab

openly claimed to be the Mahdi and a manifestation of God and wrote his book of laws, the Bayan, intended to supplant the Qurʾan. In July 1848, he was interrogated by a group of clerics and pronounced a heretic. He spent the last two years of his life imprisoned in the even more remote fort of Chihriq.

In 1849 and 1850, several outbreaks of violence occurred between Shiʿites and Babis, and the state began to feel the need to act decisively. On 8 July 1850, the government ordered the Bab executed in Tabriz. He was taken during a conversation with a disciple, then suspended against a wall with ropes. The first firing squad missed him, severing his ropes and allowing him to disappear, which many in the crowd took as a divine sign. He was found completing his words to the disciple. Another firing squad had to be commissioned to complete the execution.

The religion he founded was brutally persecuted in Iran and driven underground. From the late 1860s, most Babis became Bahaʾi, which remains Iran's largest non-Muslim religious community.

See also Arabic; Bahaʾi Faith; Qurʾan; Shaykhi; Shiʿism.

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Juan R. I. Cole

BAB AL-MANDAB

The narrow waterway separating Asia and Africa.

Because of its place on the sea-lanes between Europe and the Indian Ocean and points east, the Bab al-Mandab straits have been assigned considerable strategic importance over the centuries, particularly with the building of the Suez Canal, the flowering of the British Empire, and the more recent dependence of Europe on oil from the Persian/Arabian Gulf. The two Yemens meet on the Asian side of the strait, and Ethiopia and Djibouti meet on the African side. This geography helps explain Yemeni interest in the politics of the Horn of Africa.

See also Persian (Arabian) Gulf; Suez Canal.

Robert D. Burrowes

BABAN FAMILY

Prominent Iraqi family.

The oldest known ancestor of the Baban family is Mufti Ahmad, who was granted a huge lot of land by the Ottoman authorities in the north of Iraq. His son Sulayman Baba established himself as a powerful ruler and, in 1670, became the governor of the *sanjak* (an administrative unit smaller than a governorate) of Baban, from which the family derived its name. The most well-known ancestor of the family is Sulayman Pasha al-Kabir, who was called Abu Layla.

Mamoon A. Zaki

BABIS

A millenarian religious movement developing out of Iranian Shiʿite Islam, begun by the Bab, Sayyid Ali Mohammad Shirazi, in 1844.

By 1849 there may have been 100,000 Babis in Iran and Iraq. The movement spread chiefly to cities, towns, and large villages, attracting the middle and lower-middle classes. Middle-ranking clerics, seminary students, urban artisans, laborers, and small landowners appear to have been its principal constituents, along with some influential merchants and retailers. The movement spread throughout Persia (Iran), with an especially strong showing in Khorasan to the northeast, as well as in Mazandaran, Fars, and Iraqi Ajam.

Between the beginning of the Bab's mission in 1844 and his execution in 1850, most Babis probably knew relatively little about his doctrines, and were attracted to him for charismatic and millenarian reasons. The Bab's works, many in Arabic, are abstruse and inaccessible except to the highly literate among his followers. The main emphases of mature Babi belief were that the Bab was the returned Mahdi (messiah), the hidden Twelfth Imam, and that the judgment day had symbolically occurred; that the Bab had the authority to reveal a new divine law; that he and his disciples possessed esoteric knowledge; that martyrdom was noble and that holy war could be declared by the Bab; and that a future messianic figure, "He whom God shall make manifest," would appear. The Bab allowed the taking of interest on loans and was favorable toward

middle-class property; slightly improved the position of women by limiting polygamy; and admired what he had heard of Western science.

The rise of this new religion was attended by violence, as it was rejected by the Shiʿite clerics and by the state. The Babi movement often became implicated in the quarter-fighting that was typical of Qajar cities. A major clash took place in Mazandaran in 1848 and 1849, at the shrine of Shaykh Tabarsi, where several hundred Babis, including prominent disciples of the Bab, like Molla Hosayn, having raised the black banner of the Mahdi, were besieged by government troops and finally defeated, and killed or captured. In some small cities Babi quarters developed, with their own clerics and notables, and came into conflict with conservative neighborhoods. The Babis defended their quarters, withstanding sieges, until finally government troops intervened to crush them (Zanjan, 1850 and 1851, and Nayriz, 1850–1853).

In 1850, the Bab was executed in Tabriz; in 1852, a faction of about seventy notable Babis in Tehran plotted to assassinate the monarch, Naser al-Din Shah, in revenge for his execution of the Bab. The attempt failed, and in response the Qajar state ordered a nationwide pogrom against the Babis. By the middle 1850s perhaps five thousand had been killed, and most of the rest had gone underground.

Most Babis recognized Mirza Yahya Sobh-i Azal (1830–1912) as the successor to the Bab. After the failed attempt on the shah, he followed his elder half-brother, Hosayn Ali Bahaʾullah, into exile in Baghdad in 1853. From 1853 to 1864 he faced a number of regional challenges to his authority, but appears to have retained at least some loyalty among the furtive and much reduced Babi community. In the late 1860s, however, Bahaʾullah asserted that he was the messianic figure foretold by the Bab, and in the space of a decade most Babis had gone over to him, becoming Bahaʾi. The Babis who remained loyal to Azal were called Azalis, and by 1900 they numbered probably only two thousand to four thousand.

The small Babi community remained determinedly anti-Qajar and was open to Western ideas and culture. It produced radical intellectuals, such as Aqa Khan Kermani and Shaykh Ahmad Ruhi (both became atheists and were executed in 1896 in connection with Naser al-Din Shah's assassination); and Yahya Dawlatabadi, Mirza Jahangir Khan, Malik al-Mutakallimin, and Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani (all activists on the constitutionalist side in Iran's Constitutional Revolution that began in 1905). In the twentieth century, the Babi community shrank to negligible size and influence.

See also Bab, al-; Bahaʾi Faith; Constitutional Revolution; Naser al-Din Shah; Qajar Dynasty.

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Juan R. I. Cole

BACCOUCHE, HEDI

[1930–]

Prime minister of Tunisia, 1987–1989.

Hedi Baccouche holds a degree in political science from the Sorbonne in Paris. He was leader of the nationalist Neo-Destour Party, then party director of the Destourian Socialist Party during the 1980s, and a member of the political bureau of its successor after Zayn al-Abdine Ben Ali came to power. As ambassador, he served in Berne (1981), the Vatican (1981), and Algiers (1982).

Baccouche was chosen as prime minister by President Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali in November 1987, following the latter's overthrow of thirty-year president of Tunisia Habib Bourguiba; he was charged with pursuing the platform of reforms promised by Ben Ali upon his accession to office. These included the lifting of restrictions on press freedoms, the introduction of political pluralism, and reforms of the judicial system. Shortly after taking office, Baccouche met with leaders from the Communist and Social Democratic parties and permitted the media to report the activities of these opposition parties. Moves toward a multiparty system continued through 1988 and included a loosening of restrictions on even the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI); in May of that year, the head of the MTI, Rached Ghannouchi, was pardoned by the

Ben Ali government. It remained clear, however, that the dominant political institution was to remain the ruling party, the Destourian Socialist party, renamed the Constitutional Democratic Rally in 1987.

From the start of his tenure in office, Baccouche and his cabinet faced severe economic problems, including a mounting payments deficit, a faltering tourist industry, and high unemployment; little progress was made toward solving these problems. In September 1989, Baccouche was replaced by Dr. Hamed Karoui. According to rumors, Baccouche was too cautious for Ben Ali's tastes in pursuing political and economic reforms, since he reportedly disagreed with austerity measures proposed by other cabinet members.

During the late 1990s, Baccouche served as President Ben Ali's special envoy to Algeria on occasion, since as former ambassador to Algiers he kept close contact with the neighboring country.

See also BEN ALI, ZAYN AL-ABIDINE; BOURGUIBA, HABIB; GHANNOUCHI, RACHED.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON
UPDATED BY ANA TORRES-GARCIA

BADRAN, MUDAR

[1934–]

Prime minister of Jordan 1976–1979, 1980–1984, and December 1989–June 1991.

Before becoming prime minister of Jordan in 1976, Mudar Badran had risen through the ranks as a public security (intelligence) officer. He was asked to form a government at a time when security was a high priority in the kingdom. He was known not to be on friendly terms with Syria, even supporting the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion in Syria in 1978 and 1979, and may have been the target of a Syrian-backed assassination attempt. During the 1980s, he supported the development of a close relationship with Iraq. During the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988, Iraq was given access to the port of Aqaba, providing it with a vital supply line and providing Jordan with the economic benefits that ensued. In December 1989, Badran headed the cabinet formed after the first general elections to be held in Jordan in twenty-two years.

See also AQABA; IRAN–IRAQ WAR (1980–1988); MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD.

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JENAB TUTUNJI

BADR, LIANA

[1950–]

Acclaimed Palestinian author.

Born in Jerusalem, educated in Jericho, Amman, and Beirut, Liana Badr worked for a magazine and for refugee organizations in Jordan and Lebanon. Her first novel, *A Compass for the Sunflower* (1979), published in Beirut, was acclaimed for its lyrical style and broke the dominance of male characters in Palestinian writing. Upon the Israeli invasion of 1982, she fled to Damascus, marrying activist Yasir Abd Rabbo, future negotiator of the Oslo Accords, and moving with him to Tunis and Amman. During that time she published two novels (*The Eye of the Mirror* [1991] and *Stars of Jericho* [1993]), four collections of short stories and novellas (*Stories of Love and Pursuit* [1983], *Balcony over the Fakahani* [1983], *I Want the Day* [1991], and *Golden Hell* [1993]) and five children's books. Returning to Palestine in 1994, she published an interview-memoir (*Fadwa Tuqan* [1996]) and an anthology of poetry, directed three documentaries (*Fadwa, A Tale of a Palestinian Poetess* [1999], *Zaytunat* [2000], and *Green Bird* [2002]), and wrote the script for another film (*Rana's Wedding* [2002]). Badr's work focuses on Palestinians, particularly women, in war, in exile, and under military rule. She heads the Cinema and Audiovisual Department at the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Culture, and is a founding editor of the ministry's periodical, *Dafatir Thaqafiyya*.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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GEORGE R. WILKES

BADR, MUHAMMAD AL-
[1926–1978]

Ruler and 111th Zaydi imam of Yemen, 1962.

Muhammad al-Badr (also called Imam al-Badr) was the son of Imam Ahmad ibn Yahya Hamid al-Din, who ruled Yemen following his election to the imamate on 13 March 1948. In October 1961, Muhammad al-Badr was designated by his father as successor despite earlier disagreements. He became the ruler and the 111th imam after his father's death on 9 September 1962. Imam al-Badr was the last Zaydi imam of the Rassid dynasty to hold the title. This dynasty of Shiʿite Muslims was established in northern Yemen (Sanʿa) in the final decade of the ninth century. The Zaydi imams traced their origin to Ali ibn Abi Talib, the prophet Muhammad's cousin and fourth caliph. They base their absolute rule on their claim of descent from the Prophet and on the allegiance given them by individual tribes—who, at least in Yemen, were the mainstay of the imamate.

Imam al-Badr was educated in Egypt and in the 1950s presented himself as interested in nationalism and liberal reform. He admired Gamal Abdel Nasser during his presidency of Egypt; he also supported the nonalignment movement and advocated a neutral role for Yemen in world affairs. In the 1950s, al-Badr traveled to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and tried to establish friendly relations with the communist world. In Yemen, he consolidated tribal support for himself and supported the South Yemen (Aden) political struggle for independence from Britain.

Upon assuming power, Imam al-Badr proclaimed social and economic reform in Yemen. He announced the establishment of a forty-member advisory council, of which half would be elected, and he appointed himself prime minister. Egyptian, Soviet, and Chinese leaders believed he was implementing a policy of socialism and sent him their best wishes.

Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with al-Badr emerged immediately among the military and within the tribes seeking revenge for the execution of some of their leaders by al-Badr's father, Imam Ahmad. Within a week, a group of army officers formed the Free Officers movement and sought Egypt's support for a coup. Egypt encouraged them to move against al-Badr quickly, since he had not yet consolidated his power; the British were preoccupied with the problems of federating South Yemen, and the Saudi ruling family had its internal problems. Within a month, a republic was declared by General Abdullah al-Sallal.

On 27 September 1962, Radio Sanʿa announced that a coup was in progress; it also announced, erroneously, that al-Badr had been killed. The Yemen Civil War was under way; Imam al-Badr was overthrown and Egyptian forces entered Yemen in large numbers to support the new regime. Saudi Arabia, where Imam al-Badr had fled, and Jordan supported the royal forces. The civil war continued until 1970.

In 1968, however, a split developed within the royalist ranks that resulted in al-Badr relinquishing the imamate in favor of the new Imamate Council, headed by Muhammad ibn Husayn. Al-Badr died in 1978.

See also AHMAD IBN YAHYA HAMID AL-DIN; FREE OFFICERS, YEMEN; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; NATIONALISM; SALLAL, ABDULLAH AL-; YEMEN; YEMEN CIVIL WAR; ZAYDISM.

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EMILE A. NAKHLEH

BAGHDAD

The largest city and capital of Iraq.

Al-Kazimayn Mosque was constructed in Baghdad during the Abbasid caliphate, which founded the city in the eighth century to serve as its administrative capital. For centuries, Baghdad was also a major commercial and cultural center of Islam, until invaders nearly destroyed it in the mid-thirteenth century and again 150 years later. © The Art Archive. Reproduced by permission.

Baghdad is the largest city in Iraq and is situated on both sides of the Tigris River at a point 40 miles from the Euphrates River. The city is approximately 300 miles from the northern, southern, and western borders of the country. It has a temperature range of 29°F (-1.6°C) to 31°F (-0.5°C) in the winter and 114°F (45.5°C) to 121°F (49°C) in the summer. The name and the site of Baghdad are pre-Islamic. The etymology of the name is not clear. It is not of Arabic origin; it may be a combination of two Persian words, *bad* and *dad,* which together mean gift of God. Others suggest that the name existed before the time of Hammurabi as the name *Baghdadu.* Records of Baghdad's early history before Islam are sketchy. There are some indications that in the late period of the Sassanids and at the time of the Islamic conquest of Iraq, Baghdad was a small village next to major cities such as Ctesiphone of Sassanide.

Early History

Baghdad was founded on the west bank of the Tigris by al-Mansur, the second caliph of the Abbasid Empire, in 762 C.E. It was to be the administrative capital of the new empire. The construction of Baghdad

was completed in 766 C.E. It cost more than 883,000 dirhams to build, and employed more that 100,000 architects, craftsmen, and workers drawn from all over the Muslim world. It was built in a circular form, in the Parthian Sassanid tradition. It had three concentric walls with four gates opening toward Basra, Syria, Kufah, and Khorasan. It was surrounded by a deep moat and had four highways radiating out from the four gates. Unlike the Greek, Roman, and Sassanid emperors, who named cities after themselves, al-Mansur chose the name Dar al-Salam, abode of peace, a name alluding to paradise. Furthermore, he did not object to the use of the ancient city name of Baghdad. The city later gained many more appellations, including al-Mudawara, meaning round city, because of its circular form, and al-Zawarh, meaning the winding city, because of its location on the winding banks of the Tigris.

The site for the city was chosen because of its strategic location in the middle of Mesopotamia. It was a meeting place for caravan routes on the road to Khorasan. It had a system of canals that provided water for cultivation and could be used as ramparts for the city. It also had an adequate water supply for the people of the city and provided an environment more or less free of malaria. The city was first built as an administrative center, but it grew into a veritable cosmopolis of the medieval world. It became a conglomerate of districts on both banks of the Tigris that gained fame and importance socially, economically, and culturally. Baghdad reached its Golden Age during the fourth and sixth reigns of Harun al-Rashid (786–809 C.E.) and his son al-Maʾmun (813–833 C.E.). In the ninth century, Baghdad, with a population of 300,000 to 500,000, was larger than any other Middle East city except Istanbul. The population included Arabs and non-Arabs, Muslims and non-Muslims who had come to Baghdad to work, to trade, and to study. Baghdad became an international trade center for textiles, leather, paper, and other goods from areas that ranged from the Baltic to China. Baghdad also became a center for scientific and intellectual achievements. The famous Bayt al-Hikma Academy, established in 830 C.E., had facilities for the translation of scientific and philosophical works from Greek, Aramaic, and Persian into Arabic.

Baghdad lost its splendor with the decline of the Abbassid Caliphate due to religious, ethnic, and regional strife. In 1258 C.E. Hülegü Khan, the grandson of Chinggiz Khan (Jengis Khan), sacked Baghdad. He burned the schools and the libraries, destroyed the mosques and the palaces, and ruined the elaborate system of canals that made it possible to support agricultural production for a large population. The fall of Baghdad at the hands of Hülegü, and the subsequent destruction of Baghdad by Timur Lenk (Tamarlane) in 1401, were turning points in the history of the city, and the city never recovered. Successive Persian and Turkish dynasties controlled Baghdad. It was captured by Shah Ismaʿil of Persia in 1501 and later by the Ottomans under Süleiman the Magnificent in 1556. The city remained under Ottoman rule until the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, except for a short period of Persian Safavid control in the seventeenth century (1623–1638). During the Ottoman's period, Baghdad lost its importance as a center for trade and learning. The heart of Islam had shifted to Istanbul, and Baghdad sank to the level of a decaying provincial town with doubtful authority, even over the neighboring country districts. Furthermore, a succession of plagues, famines, floods, and other disasters besieged Baghdad, destroying thousands of houses and killing thousands of people. The population was reduced, according to one report in the sixteenth century, to less than 50,000 people.

In the nineteenth century, Baghdad began to receive some attention from both the Ottoman rulers and Western powers. Two Ottoman governors, Daʾud Paşa (1816–1832) and Midhat Paşa (1869–1872), made some serious attempts to improve the conditions of the city. Daʾud tried to control the tribes and to restore order and security. He cleaned up the irrigation canals, established textile and arms factories, and encouraged local industries. He built three large mosques and founded *madrasas* (schools). He organized an army of 20,000 soldiers and had them trained by a French officer. Midhat Pasha laid telegraph lines, built a horse tramway to Kasimayn, and built several schools. He introduced a Turkish steamboat line between Baghdad and Basra. Western powers, particularly Britain, showed some interest in Baghdad for commercial reasons and as a land route to India. Britain established a consulate in Baghdad in 1802, and France followed soon after. Western countries introduced steam navigation on the Tigris in 1836 and telegraph lines in 1860s.

Twentieth Century

Late in the nineteenth century, Baghdad was chosen to be the terminal railroad station for the line that ran between Istanbul and Baghdad (later extended to Basra). In 1917 Baghdad was occupied by the British. In 1921 Baghdad became the capital of the new country of Iraq. Since 1921, Baghdad has grown by leaps and bounds both in size and in population. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Baghdad covered an area of less than 4 square miles that was surrounded by dikes in several directions to protect it from the unpredictable flooding of the Tigris. These dikes limited Baghdad's outward expansion, but thanks to flood-control projects in the 1950s, Baghdad's area increased from less than 30 square miles in 1950 to 312 square miles in 1965, and from 375 square miles in 1977 to more than 780 square miles in 1990. Modern Baghdad incorporates many of the surrounding areas and numerous suburbs.

The city's population increased from 200,000 in 1921 to 515,000, in 1947 and from 1,490,000 in 1965 to about five million in 1990. The huge increase was due in part to natural increases in population, but also to the large number of immigrants, particularly those from southern Iraq who had been driven north by the desperate economic conditions present in the south and by the lure of better employment opportunities. Baghdad was the headquarters of most government agencies, the center for most industrial establishments and economic activities, and the home to major educational facilities. It was also a center for health and social services, as well as a major site for recreational activities. The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1982) and the Gulf War of 1991 contributed to Baghdad's population as thousands of people fled the war zone searching for safety. Many of the early southern immigrants lived in temporary *sharaif* (mud houses) on the northern edge of the city.

In the early 1960s the regime of Abd al-Karim Qasim built numerous housing projects to improve the living conditions of these immigrants. Also, the area was renamed al-Thawra (Revolution) City, commemorating the revolution of 1958. This, in turn, attracted more immigrants. By the early twenty-first century, the city was home to more than one-third of Baghdad's population and was informally known as Saddam City.

Despite ongoing violence and shortages of many essential supplies since Baghdad was occupied by American military forces on 9 April 2003, the marketplace in Saddam City—a section of Baghdad renamed by its residents Sadr City, after a leading Shiʿite cleric assassinated in 1999—was bustling just eighteen days later, when this photograph was taken. © ANTOINE GYORI/FRANCE/REPORTAGE/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

In 1980 the Iraqi government spent more than $7 billion to give Baghdad a facelift in preparation for hosting the Non-Aligned conference in 1982. The conference did not convene in Baghdad due to the Iran–Iraq War. The government constructed new freeways and wider streets across the city, opened several five-star hotels and a plethora of modern shopping centers and high rises, and built several new bridges. The government adorned the city with historical and modern monuments, as well as pictures and posters of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. Names of some of the districts were changed to commemorate famous people and places in Islamic Arabic history and the contemporary Arab world; examples are Khalid ibn al-Walid, Tariq Ibn Ziyad, and Palestine.

Modern Baghdad, as in the past, is divided into two parts by the Tigris River; the eastern part is called al-Risafa and the western part is called al-Karkh. Al-Risafa is more historic and contains many of the historical monuments, popular markets, and al-Thawra City. Al-Karkh is more modern, with wealthy districts such as al-Mansur and al-Yarmuk, modern hotels, the international airport, government buildings, and many palaces housing high-ranking government officials.

Baghdad is the burial place of several important religious people, among them the seventh and ninth Shiʿite Imam, in the Kasimayn district; Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, the great Muslim Sunni Sufi, in the Bab al-Shaykh district; Abu Hanifa, the founder of the Hanafi School of Law in the Sunni tradition, in the Asamiyad district. It also is the site of the tomb of the famous Sufi Maʿruf al-Karkhi, who died in 815 C.E. Baghdad and its environs are home to a number of Jewish shrines, notably the reputed tomb of Joshua and those of Ezra and Ezekiel. Baghdad has several other historical sites, including the Arch of Ctesiphion, the Mustassriya School, the Abbasid Palace, and the Jami al-Khulafa and Mirjan mosques.

In the 1990s, and until it fell to the invading U.S. military forces on 9 April 2003, Baghdad suffered like the rest of the country from the sanctions imposed on it by the United Nations in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War. The United States and the Allied Forces bombed Iraq, including Baghdad, relentlessly for forty-three days in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991. The bombing, in the words of a United Nations report, pushed Iraq into a preindustrial age. The Iraqi government repaired and restored some of the destroyed and damaged facilities, but it was unable to restore them to prewar levels due to the sanctions that limited Iraq's ability to sell its oil and import spare parts. Electricity, clean water, medicine, and food were in short supply, and many children, women, and elderly people died. United Nations documents reported that more than one million Iraqis (including Baghdadis) died as a result of the sanctions.

On 9 April 2003 Baghdad surrendered to the U.S. armed forces, and Iraq was occupied. During the invasion, Baghdad was relentlessly attacked by the U.S. forces, which bombed Baghdad on a daily basis for three weeks, destroying many major government buildings with one notable exception, the ministry of oil. Extensive looting and some burning took place in the aftermath of the fall of Baghdad, which lasted for more than a week. The looting took place in front of the occupying American forces, which did not intervene until later. Baghdad suffered from shortages in electricity, clean water, and other essential supplies. The city also lacked security and became a major center for the resistance against the occupying U.S. forces. The residents of al-Thawra or Saddam City decided to change the name of their city to Sadr City to commemorate Ayatullah Sadiq al-Sadr, a leading Shiʿite cleric who was killed in southern Iraq presumably by government assassins in January of 1999.

See also Daʾud Pasha; Gulf War (1991); Hussein, Saddam; Iraq; Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Midhat Paşa; War in Iraq (2003).

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Ayad Al-Qazzaz

BAGHDADI, ABD AL-LATIF AL-

[1917–]

Egyptian officer, politician, and cabinet minister.

A graduate of Egypt's military academy, Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi joined the Free Officers, who plotted the 1952 revolution, and later the Revolutionary Command Council. He was the inspector general for the liberation rally in 1953 and defense minister under Muhammad Naguib in 1953 and 1954.

When Gamal Abdel Nasser took power of Egypt in 1956, Baghdadi transferred to municipal affairs and later became minister of planning. He became the first president of the National Assembly in 1957 and, after the formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958, he became vice president for economic affairs and minister of planning. After Syria seceded in 1961 Baghdadi became minister of finance and economic planning. In September 1962 Baghdadi became one of Egypt's five vice presidents and resumed the chair of the assembly.

Removed in 1964 from the vice presidency, Baghdadi also left the Assembly and has not been active in politics since then. Poor health and differences with Nasser over Yemen war policy and

Arab Socialism have been offered as reasons for his mysterious early retirement, but the deciding factor was probably the rise of his rival, General Abd al-Hakim Amir, to Egypt's second highest political post in March 1964. Baghdadi criticized Egypt's friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971 and its peace treaty with Israel in 1979. His memoirs, *Mudhakkirat Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi* (Memoirs of Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi), were published in 1977.

See also AMIR, ABD AL-HAKIM; FREE OFFICERS, EGYPT; REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL (EGYPT).

ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT
UPDATED BY DONALD MALCOLM REID

BAGHDAD PACT (1955)

Anti-Soviet security pact sponsored by Britain and the United States.

The Baghdad Pact formally came into existence in 1955; it was an exemplary Cold War agreement reflecting the priority the Eisenhower administration gave to containment of the Soviet Union through collective security agreements. The member states—Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain—formed a bulwark of the "northern tier" states against the Soviet Union. The pact's headquarters were in Baghdad.

The pact's most forceful Middle Eastern proponent, Nuri al-Saʿid of Iraq, championed the agreement because it tied Iraq more closely to the West and provided the Iraqi leader with potential leverage against his chief rival, Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser viewed the Baghdad Pact, with its British membership, as another manifestation of Western imperialism, and he used all the means at his disposal to persuade other Arab states not to join. In this he was successful—Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan refused offers of membership.

The United States, although heavily involved in the various security guarantees, did not become an official member. Nonetheless, the security agreement fit U.S. strategic interests in the region. Through Turkey, the Middle East was linked to NATO, and through Pakistan, to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). U.S. influence continued through guarantees of military aid and diplomatic support.

The Iraqi revolution in July 1958 led to the deaths of the monarch and Nuri al-Saʿid. Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact in 1959 and denounced it as a vestige of Western imperialism. The group was then renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

See also NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL.

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ZACHARY KARABELL
UPDATED BY WILLIAM L. CLEVELAND

BAGHDAD SUMMIT (1978)

Arab summit held after the Camp David Accords.

Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat's diplomatic overtures to Israel beginning in late 1977 came as a tremendous shock to the rest of the Arab world, which was concerned by the prospects of Egypt, Israel's strongest Arab enemy, splitting Arab ranks by signing a separate peace with the Jewish state. Iraq, emerging as a powerful force in intra-Arab politics, was instrumental in convening a summit meeting after the Camp David Accords, signed by Israel and Egypt in September 1978. Leaders from twenty Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) met in Baghdad between 2 and 5 November 1978, to consider the Arab world's response.

The summit acted on several major issues. It rejected the Camp David Accords and offered its own peace proposal. Based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, it called for Israel's full withdrawal from occupied Arab territories, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and recognition of the right of all states within the region to exist.

Second, the summit threatened Egypt with severe penalties if it followed up on the Camp David Accords by signing a formal peace treaty with Israel. Although Saudi Arabia tried to prevent such drastic steps, these threats amounted to total isolation of Egypt from the rest of the Arab world. Specific

measures included expelling Egypt from the League of Arab States, moving the league's headquarters from Cairo, breaking off diplomatic relations, and halting all economic and military aid.

Third, the summit adopted financial measures to bolster the remaining frontline states and prevent further defections from Arab ranks. Some Arab states were particularly concerned that Jordan, which had expressed guarded interest in President Sadat's diplomatic initiatives with Israel, might follow his lead. Responding to a proposal by Iraq, the summit created a $9 billion fund to provide financial assistance for Syria, Jordan, and the PLO. The action proved crucial in discouraging Jordan from going against Arab consensus.

The summit also was important in paving the way for collective action among Arab states after several years of tension. Iraq and Syria set aside their poor relations, at least temporarily, just as the summit and the financial aid it provided symbolized Jordan's improving relations with Iraq.

Representatives of the summit were dispatched to meet with Sadat on 4 November, but he refused to receive them. On 27 March 1979, the day after the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was signed, the council of the League of Arab States met in Baghdad to follow through on the reprisals promised at the November summit; representatives of Sudan, Oman, and the PLO were not present. The sanctions were applied on 31 March, the final day of the meeting: All Arab states except Sudan, Oman, and Somalia terminated diplomatic relations with Egypt and halted all forms of assistance. Egypt was expelled from the League of Arab States, the headquarters of which were transferred from Cairo to Tunis.

See also Camp David Accords (1978); League of Arab States; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Sadat, Anwar al-.

Michael R. Fischbach

BAGHDAD UNIVERSITY

Administrative unit, dating from 1957, which centralized ten of the twelve autonomous colleges in Iraq.

In Baghdad, the first institutions of modern higher education were the College of Law and the Higher Teachers' Training School. By the time steps for unification were taken, schools of medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, engineering, agriculture, commerce, arts and sciences, and veterinary science had been added. The Shariʿa College (of Islamic law) was incorporated into the university in 1960.

In 1992, there were twelve colleges and seven higher institutes under the Baghdad University administration, and the colleges in Basra and Mosul originally attached to Baghdad have developed into separate universities. Student enrollment in 1985 was 44,307, with 1,346 engaged in postgraduate studies. Iraq has been ranked second to Egypt in the region for producing university graduates in the sciences; it does, however, lose many trained scientists through emigration.

John J. Donohue

BAHA'I FAITH

Bahaʾism is a religion founded in the second half of the 1860s by an Iranian Babi, Mirza Hosayn Ali Nuri (1817–1892), known as Bahaʾullah (the Glory of God).

Bahaʾism grew out of the millenarian (messianic) Babi movement that began in the 1840s. Bahaʾullah, a Babi nobleman, had been exiled for his beliefs to Baghdad in the Ottoman Empire in 1853. He declared himself in 1863 to a small group of close relatives and disciples as the messianic figure promised in Babism, "He whom God shall make manifest." He was exiled to Istanbul (1863), to Edirne (1864–1868), and finally to Acre in Ottoman Syria (1868–1892). From about 1864 he began sending letters back to Babis in Iran, announcing his station. He later asserted that he was the fulfillment of millenarian hopes, not only in Babism, but in Islam, Christianity, Zoroastrianism, and in other traditions as well. Within a decade or so the vast majority of Babis had become Bahaʾis.

Bahaʾullah, in an age of Middle Eastern absolutism, advocated parliamentary democracy. His own religion lacked a formal clergy, and he put executive power in the hands of community-steering committees he called "houses of justice," which later became elective bodies. Bahaʾullah preached the unity of religions, progressive revelation, and the

unity of humankind. He urged peace, criticized states for engaging in arms races, and advocated a world government able to employ collective security to prevent aggression. He said all Baha'is should school their children, both boys and girls, and he improved the position of women, saying that in his religion women are as men. Baha'i women are not constrained to practice veiling or seclusion. The initial social base of the movement was the urban middle and lower-middle classes and small landowners who had been Babis. Merchant clans who claimed descent from the prophet Muhammad (Sayyids) emerged as especially important in the leadership of the Baha'i community in Iran. Substantial numbers of Shiʿites, Jews, and Zoroastrians also became Baha'is throughout Iran.

Baha'ullah was succeeded by his eldest son, Abdu'l-Baha, who presided over the religion from 1892 to 1921. By 1900, the community had recovered from the persecution of the 1850s and had reached from 50,000 to 100,000 out of a population of 9 million. Shiʿite clerics and notables agitated against the Baha'i faith, and major pogroms broke out in 1903 in Rasht, Isfahan, and Yazd. In 1905, the Constitutional Revolution broke out in Iran. Abdu'l-Baha at first supported it, but later declared his community's neutrality. Nonintervention in party politics then became a Baha'i policy. The religion spread internationally. Restricted to the Middle East and South Asia in Baha'ullah's lifetime, it now spread to Europe, North America, East Asia, Africa, and South America.

From 1921 to 1957, the Baha'i faith was led by Shoghi Effendi Rabbani, Abdu'l-Baha's grandson, from his headquarters in Haifa, Palestine/Israel. Thereafter, from 1963, the worldwide Baha'i community periodically elected a central body, the Universal House of Justice, as prescribed in Baha'ullah's writings. The religion developed close ties with the United Nations, and it is recognized as a nongovernmental observer. In Iran, the rise of the Pahlavi state from 1925 to 1978, and a more secular policy had both benefits and drawbacks for Baha'is in Iran. Greater security and a decreased clerical influence produced less violence toward them, although they continued to face harassment. The authoritarianism of the Pahlavi state also led to tight restrictions on Baha'i activities and publications, and occasional state persecution, as in 1955.

The Shrine of the Bab on Mount Carmel, near Haifa, Israel, is the second-most holy place for those of the Baha'i faith.
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By an accident of history (Baha'ullah's Ottoman exile), the world headquarters of the religion since the nineteenth century, Haifa, are now in Israel, although less than a thousand Baha'is live in that country. Critics of the Baha'is in the region charge them with being Zionist agents, but Baha'is point to their principle of nonintervention in partisan politics. Israel has granted Baha'is freedom of religion, as it has other religious communities, and no evidence of political collusion has ever been produced. In the 1960s, the rise of authoritarian populist regimes stressing Arab nationalism led to the persecution of Baha'is in Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Arab world, a situation that continues to this day.

In Iran, by 1978, the Baha'i community numbered around 300,000 out of a population of 35 million. Most Baha'is were lower-middle and middle class, although they included a few prominent millionaires. The Islamic Republic of Iran launched an extensive campaign against the Baha'is from 1979 through 1988. Many Muslim clerics despised the Baha'is as heretics and apostates, whose beliefs posed a dire threat to traditional Islam. Iran executed nearly 200 prominent Baha'is for their beliefs and imprisoned hundreds more. Baha'i investments and philanthropies were confiscated. Baha'is were denied ration cards, excluded from state schools and universities, and often forced to recant their faith. After 1988, most were released from prison but still suffer widespread official discrimination in Iran.

As the religion has grown in India and the Americas, the often persecuted and constrained Middle Eastern communities have come to represent less than 10 percent of Bahaʾis worldwide—estimated in 2001 at 5 million.

See also Arab Nationalism; Babis; Constitutional Revolution; Muhammad; Zoroastrianism.

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Juan R. I. Cole

BAHARINA

Ethnically Arab and mainly Shiʿite descendants of the original inhabitants of Bahrain Island; also refers to the Shiʿa in al-Hasa and al-Qatif, Saudi Arabia.

Bahrain is the only Arab country on the Persian (Arabian) Gulf to have a population with a Shiʿite majority. While official census figures do not provide religious affiliation, estimates for the Shiʿite population range from 60 to 70 percent. In addition to its Baharina component, the Shiʿite population has been augmented by immigrants arriving from Iran. Because political power has been monopolized by the Sunni Khalifa family and its associates for more than two centuries, the Shiʿite population has suffered discrimination in employment, political rights, and social benefits. These and other grievances have been cited by Shiʿite and other opposition leaders as grounds for political protest and demands for reform. During the 1990s the Shiʿite opposition intensified, involving both peaceful and violent expressions of dissent. Prior to 2000, the government attempted to crush opposition with harsh enforcement measures, including torture, exile, and mass imprisonments. These actions were criticized by international human rights organizations, which continue to monitor the situation of the Baharina.

See also Bahrain.

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Emile A. Nakhleh
Updated by Anthony B. Toth

BAHARIYA

A group of Egyptian oases in the Western Desert, located about 217 miles (350 km) southwest of Alexandria.

These oases in Egypt's Matruh governorate were known in the early history of Islam for their excellent dates and raisins. Cereals, rice, sugarcane, and indigo were also grown there. The fertility of the oases is due to hot springs containing various chemicals. Roman temples and Coptic (Christian) churches were built in the oases, and their ancient population probably exceeded today's estimated six thousand.

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Arthur Goldschmidt

BAHAR, MOHAMMAD TAQI

[1886–1951]

Iran's last great qasideh *(ode) poet, also a literary scholar and politician.*

Mohammad Taqi Bahar was born in Mashhad. In response to a congratulatory *qasideh* he composed on the occasion of Mohammad Ali Qajar's accession to the throne, in 1907 Bahar was named *malek al-shoʿara* (king of poets, or poet laureate), the last Iranian poet to have that title. In 1906, when the constitution of Persia (now Iran) was granted, Bahar joined the constitutionalists in his hometown of Mashhad. For the next decade, he wielded his pen as poet, journalist, and editor for progressive causes and suffered incarceration and banishment.

In the 1920s he was elected to the parliament. A target for assassination, he turned from politics

to literary scholarship and joined the faculty at Tehran University upon its founding in 1934. His *Divan* (Collected poems) appeared after his death, revealing Bahar as firmly traditionalist in terms of poetic form but modern in terms of poetic subjects. Among his many other books, his history of Persian literature called *Sabkshenasi* (1942) stands out.

See also Literature: Persian; Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar.

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Michael C. Hillmann

BAHITHAT AL-LUBNANIYYAT, AL-

Nonpartisan women's organization.

The Association of Lebanese Women Researchers was officially registered in 1992, although a group of female scholars had been meeting informally since the early 1980s, during the Lebanese Civil War. These women increasingly felt the need for a space and a forum in which to share their opposition to the war, to political division, and to confessionalism within the Lebanese system. In 2003, the association had thirty-five members. Most were published scholars, professors at the various universities in Lebanon, who prided themselves on their religious and ideological diversity and on the democratic principles upon which the association was founded.

Since the mid-1990s, the association has held conferences, such as the 2001 conference on Arab women in the 1920s, and published proceedings. Its most visible publication is the annual *Bahithat,* a multilingual collection of essays on various themes, including "Women and Writing," "Women and Politics in Lebanon and the Arab World," and "The West in Arab Societies." The association regularly puts out scholarly books on subjects like television media, women and nongovernmental organzations in Lebanon, and Lebanese female writers. Further activities include monthly research workshops and seasonal retreats, as well as occasional outreach programs.

Bahithat fills a need in Lebanon. Although other women's organizations exist, the association remains nonpartisan and autonomous of institutional or financial dicta. However, because its focus has been on published research, and not on socio-political activism, its impact has not always been measurable.

See also Gender: Gender and Education; Lebanon.

Elise Salem

BAHRAIN

An independent state comprising an archipelago of thirty-three islands in the heart of the Persian Gulf.

The Bahrain islands lie some 15 miles off the northeast coast of Saudi Arabia and 13 miles to the northwest of the Qatar peninsula. Connected by causeway to Saudi Arabia, al-Awal, the largest, is 27 miles by 10 miles. The total land area of the country, 213 square miles, in 2001 supported a population of 650,600. Manama is the capital and largest city. The ruling family, the Al Khalifa, is a branch of the

The King Fahd Causeway connects Bahrain with the mainland of Saudi Arabia. The cornerstone of the 26-kilometer bridge was placed in a 1982 ceremony by Saudi Arabia's King Fahd and Bahrain's Shaykh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa, and the causeway was completed in 1986. © Jacques Langevin/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.



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Bani Utub confederation of the northern Gulf, which conquered the islands in 1782 and set up a commercial, estate-holding elite. Class distinctions between the new rulers and the indigenous population were reinforced by religious ones, since the Al Khalifa and their tribal allies were and remain adherents of Sunni Islam, while the local farmers, pearl divers, and fisherfolk remain Shiʿa. A British protectorate was imposed in 1880.

British Era: 1910s to 1973

Outbreaks of nationalist, labor, and religious unrest have been a recurrent feature of modern Bahraini politics. During the 1910s and 1920s, local merchants, tradespeople, and pearl divers rose in opposition to a number of innovative economic regulations imposed by the government of British India, which took charge of the islands' affairs at the end of the nineteenth century. From the 1930s to the 1950s, a broad coalition of merchants, intellectuals, and oil workers (petroleum was discovered in 1932) demonstrated against continued British domination, against the presence of large numbers of foreign workers, in favor of allowing local labor to unionize, and in favor of establishing an elected legislature.

After the 1950s, outbreaks became increasingly localized and intermittent. Some episodes, such as the March 1972 general strike by the construction, shipyard, and aluminum-factory workers remained class based, while others took on sectarian overtones, as when Shiʿa openly demonstrated support for the Iranian Revolution during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Shaykh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa became ruler of Bahrain in 1961, upon the death of his father, and took the title amir at independence in 1971. Since then, close relatives of the ruler have filled the most important posts in the country's cabinet. Ministers who are not members of the Khalifa family usually have been sons of the established wealthy merchant families and have received specialized training in Western universities. Bahrain's largest industrial concerns also are managed by this group of royal family members and influential civil servants.

Independent Bahrain: 1973 to Present

Political parties, like trade unions, were prohibited by the 1973 constitution. The constitution did, however, provide for an elected National Assembly, the first elections for which were held in December 1973. College-educated professionals, shopkeepers, middle-income merchants, and the country's intelligentsia were the strongest supporters of the electoral system. The commercial elite remained largely noncommittal and did not participate in the elections, either as candidates or as voters. Radical groups, most notably the local branch of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf, tried to convince voters to boycott the proceedings and advocated more comprehensive freedoms of press and assembly, while agitating for the release of political prisoners and the adoption of

laws permitting the formation of trade unions. Younger, comparatively radical delegates nevertheless emerged victorious from the balloting, although the government manipulated technicalities in the election law to block several newly elected delegates from taking their seats.

Although only empowered by the constitution to give advice and consent regarding laws initiated by the cabinet, the National Assembly began to debate three volatile issues during 1974. The first concerned a general labor law that would have authorized the formation of trade unions and reduced the number of expatriate workers in the country. The second was the renewal of the informal arrangement whereby the United States maintained a small naval facility at the port at al-Jufayr. The third was the continuation of the strict Public Security Law, which had been promulgated to suppress radical organizations during the early 1960s. By mid-1975, the two largest informal groupings of deputies, the People's Bloc and the Religious Bloc, could find no common ground on which to cooperate in overturning this statute. Consequently, the assembly became deadlocked and, in August 1975, the prime minister submitted the cabinet's resignation to the amir, who dissolved the assembly but reinstated the government, giving the cabinet "full legislative powers."

After the dissolution of the National Assembly, organized opposition to the regime came primarily from Bahrain's heterogeneous Islamist movement. Advocates of moderate reform could be found in the Sunni Social Reform Society and Supporters of the Call, as well as in the Shiʿite Party of the Islamic Call. Proponents of more profound social transformation belonged to the Islamic Action Organization (IAO) and the Islamic Guidance Society, both predominantly Shiʿite; demonstrations organized by these two associations erupted periodically during late 1979 and early 1980, culminating in a series of large marches in support of the new Islamic Republic of Iran during April and May of 1980. State security forces broke up these demonstrations by force, killing a number of marchers. In the wake of these events, underground groups, such as the IAO, changed tactics, abandoning mass popular demonstrations and turning instead to isolated acts of sabotage carried out by small groups of committed cadres. This shift was buttressed by the formation of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) in Tehran, Iran, at the end of 1979; the clandestine operations envisaged by the leaders of this organization were epitomized by the alleged December 1981 plot to overthrow the Al Khalifa and set up an Islamic republic on the islands. Sizable caches of small arms belonging to clandestine groups of radical Shiʿa continued to be uncovered in rural districts as late as the fall and winter of 1983-84.

King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa assumed the throne upon the death of his father in 1999. The Al Khalifa family has ruled the country since 1782, the title generally passing from father to son. **© Brooks Kraft/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

Concerted efforts on the part of the authorities to expose and destroy militant Shiʿite cells disrupted the IAO and IFLB during the late 1980s. Some one hundred people were charged in December 1987 with conspiring to assassinate the ruler and seize the country's main oil facilities, the radio and television studios, the international airport, and the U.S.

The al-Fatah Mosque near Juffayr is Bahrain's largest religious structure. The mosque can hold up to seven thousand worshippers and also houses the Religious Institute for Islamic Affairs. © ADAM WOOLFITT/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

embassy; this group may have been affiliated with the IFLB, but Bahraini officials refused to implicate Iran in the plot. Nevertheless, the government imposed strict curfews on Shiʿite residential districts and prohibited Bahraini Shiʿa from taking jobs in the armed forces. Police made further arrests in the days following the death of Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989.

In late 1994, simmering popular discontent erupted into a series of mass demonstrations calling for the reinstatement of the National Assembly and the constitution. The government responded by ordering the police and security service to break up the protests, prompting a wave of violence and sabotage that crested in 1996 and 1997. When Hamad bin Isa became amir after the death of his father in 1999, the uprising had already subsided. The new ruler introduced a series of reforms in an attempt to restore the regime's legitimacy. In a 2001 referendum, voters approved the transformation of the emirate into a "constitutional, hereditary monarchy." The draconian penal code and state security court were subsequently terminated, and in October 2002 elections took place for a reconstituted advisory council.

See also AL KHALIFA FAMILY; IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH; MANAMA; SHIʿISM; SUNNI ISLAM.

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FRED H. LAWSON

BAHRAINI–QATARI WARS

A series of conflicts from the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries over disputed territory.

When it left Kuwait around 1760, the Al Khalifa clan landed at Zubara, on the northwestern coast of the Qatar peninsula. After capturing Bahrain in 1782, it kept Zubara until 1796. The Al Khalifa reoccupied Zubara in 1799, but by the early 1800s control of the area was contested by the Al Thani, based at Doha on the eastern coast of Qatar. Skirmishing persisted until 1880, when Britain imposed a truce. A 1913 treaty committed Britain to preventing the Al Khalifa from annexing any territory on the peninsula; a later pact promised British assistance to repel attacks against the Al Thani.

These agreements terminated Al Khalifa intervention at Zubara, but left indeterminate the status of the Hawar Islands and Fasht al-Dibal reef, situated just off the coast. In 1939, Britain put the sixteen islands under Bahrain's jurisdiction. Armed clashes erupted around the archipelago in 1978, 1982, 1986, and 1991. In 1992, Qatar asserted sovereignty over the islands, now thought to command a significant oil field, and rejected Bahrain's proposal to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. In 1994, Qatar changed tack and petitioned the court for a ruling, over the protests of Bahrain. In 1998, when proceedings lagged, Bahrain started work on a causeway and tourist facilities on the islands. Me-

diation attempts by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates failed to resolve the dispute, which threatened to polarize the Gulf Cooperation Council. Bahrain and Qatar set up a joint committee to deal with the matter in 2000, but it soon deadlocked. In 2001, the International Court of Justice awarded the Hawar Islands to Bahrain and Zubara and Fasht al-Dibal to Qatar.

See also Al Khalifa Family; Al Thani Family; Bahrain; Gulf Cooperation Council; Qatar.

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Fred H. Lawson

BAHRAIN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Bahrain's twentieth-century effort to gain autonomy from Britain.

Nationalism has a long history in Bahrain, because local notables persistently resisted British influence over the rulers in the years after 1880. When British officials deposed the ruler in 1923, Sunni Islamic notables opposed to overt British interference in the country's internal affairs organized a Bahrain National Congress to demand the ruler's restoration and the creation of an advisory council to assist him in governing the country. In 1934, Shiʿite leaders (of the petite bourgeoisie and working class) unsuccessfully petitioned the ruler to promulgate a basic law and institute proportional representation on the municipal and education councils. In 1938, Sunni reformers demanded the establishment of a popular assembly *(majlis)* and an end to administrative inefficiency. When students and oil workers (petroleum was found in 1932) threatened a general strike in support of the *majlis* movement in November 1938, the regime arrested some prominent reformers and deported them to British-controlled India. Several clandestine opposition groups—including the Representatives of the People, the Secret Labor Union, and the Society of Free Youth—remained active after the suppression of the reform movement, but none posed a serious challenge to the regime during the 1940s.

Unrest emerged in 1953 and 1954, culminating in a general strike in July 1954. Liberal reformers from both the Sunni and Shiʿite communities organized a Higher Executive Committee (HEC) that October to call for greater national autonomy, the convening of a legislature, the right to form trade unions, and the creation of an appellate court. Protracted negotiations between the ruler and the HEC led to formal recognition of a Committee of National Unity, in return for the HEC's agreeing to end its demands for a national assembly. Activists in the industrial labor force responded by forming the National Liberation Front-Bahrain, pressing for more fundamental changes in the country's political structure. Anti-British demonstrations at the time of the Suez (Sinai) War of 1956 precipitated restraints on all opposition forces and the declaration of a state of emergency, which effectively terminated the nationalist movements of the 1950s. Shaykh Isa ibn Sulman al-Khalifa succeeded to the throne in 1961; he announced Bahrain's independence on 14 August 1971.

See also Bahrain; National Liberation Front (Bahrain); Sunni Islam.

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Fred H. Lawson

BAHRAIN NATIONAL OIL COMPANY (BANOCO)

State-owned oil company.

The Bahrain National Oil Company was established in 1976, following the decision of the government of Bahrain to assume a direct 60 percent interest in Bahrain's petroleum business—which previously was totally owned by Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO). By 1981, BANOCO took over the complete management and operation of offshore oil exploration, producing, and refining activities.

See also Bahrain.

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EMILE A. NAKHLEH

BAHRAIN ORDER IN COUNCIL

Effort to establish Bahrain as a formal British protectorate, 1909–1913.

In response to active German interest in the Persian/Arabian Gulf during the first decade of the twentieth century, Britain became concerned with protecting its trade, position, and interests there. In 1909, Britain's Committee of Imperial Defense saw the necessity for better trade and port facilities, but it rejected the India Office suggestion to issue an Order in Council delineating the jurisdiction of the British resident agent in Bahrain—thus establishing a formal British protectorate (although Bahrain had been under British protection since 1820). It was concerned that the Order in Council might create unnecessary complications, since Persia (now Iran) and the Ottoman Empire both claimed the islands. An order was drawn in 1909 but was tabled in 1911 because of Anglo–Ottoman negotiations. The Bahrain Order was prepared in 1913, but it was withheld and never formally implemented; in that year, however, Bahrain was informally placed under a protectorate status.

See also PERSIAN (ARABIAN) GULF.

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EMILE A. NAKHLEH

BAHR AL-ABYAD

The White Nile.

Bahr al-Abyad rises in Lake No, from which it flows 625 miles (1,000 km) to Khartoum and its confluence with the Blue Nile. Flowing east, it receives significant water from its major tributary, the Sobat, which originates in Ethiopia, then swings north to contribute one-third of the total mean annual flow of the Nile. Along the reach of the White Nile the land becomes increasingly arid, and the river is dotted with clusters of water hyacinth and papyrus that become islands. It forms the reservoir behind the Jabal Awliya Dam 29 miles (47 km) south of Khartoum.

See also KHARTOUM; NILE RIVER.

ROBERT O. COLLINS

BAHR AL-ARAB

River separating southern Sudan from Darfur and Kordofan.

Bahr al-Arab is more important as the frontier between the Africans of Southern Sudan and the Arab Muslims of Darfur and Kordofan than as a hydrological entity. Rising on the watershed between Sudan and the Central African Republic, it flows sluggishly east in a great arc to its confluence with the Bahr al-Ghazal at Gabat al-Arab, by which point it has lost most of its water through evaporation. Its lower reaches are choked with aquatic vegetation.

See also BAHR AL-GHAZAL; KORDOFAN; SUDAN.

ROBERT O. COLLINS

BAHR AL-GHAZAL

Tributary of the Nile.

Bahr al-Ghazal (the Gazelle River) drains a basin the size of France, yet its contribution to the Nile is insignificant. Its tributaries, which come from the Congo–Nile watershed as well as from rivers of Darfur and Kordofan, are consumed by evaporation and transpiration in the great swamps along the river. The river should not be confused with the province in southern Sudan of the same name.

See also KORDOFAN; NILE RIVER.

ROBERT O. COLLINS

BAHR AL-JABAL

Tributary of the Nile.

Bahr al-Jabal (Mountain River) begins at the outlet of Lake Albert (Lake Mobutu Sese Seko); from there to the river port of Nimule, it is frequently called the Albert Nile. At Nimule, the river turns north-

west and plunges through a narrow gorge 100 miles (160 km) long. At Bor the Bahr al-Jabal enters the Sudd, the world's largest swamp. It then flows 231 miles (370 km) to Lake No where it joins the Bahr al-Ghazal to form the Bahr al-Abyad.

See also Bahr al-Abyad; Bahr al-Ghazal; Sudd.

Robert O. Collins

BAIDA

City and administrative district (baladiyya) *of Cyrenaica, Libya.*

Baida (also called Zawiya al-Baidu) was the site of the first Sanusi *zawiya* (Islamic lodge) in Libya in 1843. In the 1960s it was developed as Libya's new administrative capital. The project was abandoned after the 1969 revolution, because of its impracticality, remoteness, and close association with the Sanusi monarchy (although much of the infrastructure, parliament house, and government buildings had been completed). The population of Baida in 2002 was 130,900.

See also Sanusi Order.

John L. Wright

BAKDASH, KHALID

[1912–1995]

Head of the Syrian Communist Party.

Khalid Bakdash, head of the Syrian Communist Party at the time of his death in 1995, was the longest serving secretary-general of any communist party in the Middle East region. He joined the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon (CPSL) in 1930 when he was only eighteen and quickly rose in the ranks to become one of the most influential leaders of any Arab communist party.

Bakdash was of Kurdish origin and his father was either an army officer or a watchman who guarded olive orchards. He was recruited into the CPSL in Damascus by Armenian communists who had dominated the party structure in the late 1920s. In 1933 Bakdash was sent by a party decimated by arrests to study in Moscow at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. Upon his return to Syria in 1936 to 1937 he undertook the role of secretary-general of the CPSL at a time when communist parties everywhere were being ruthlessly purged of members whose loyalty to Stalinist orthodoxy was suspect and when the Comintern was trying to Arabize communist parties in the Middle East. Bakdash never wavered from the Stalinist style of leadership that he acquired in Moscow in the 1930s, and that eventually led to a split of the CPSL into Syrian and Lebanese branches in 1958 and then later, in the 1970s and 1980s, to the creation of multiple Syrian communist factions.

Bakdash played a significant role in Syrian politics during several periods of his life. After the Popular Front government came to power in France in 1936, Bakdash was part of a Syrian delegation that went to Paris to negotiate Syrian independence from the French Mandate. In 1954 Bakdash was elected to the Syrian Chamber of Deputies and was instrumental in leading the successful opposition to Syria's entry into the U.S.-led Baghdad Pact. In 1970 Bakdash supported Hafiz al-Asad's ascendancy to power and was rewarded by being allowed to appoint several ministers to the government. Because of Syria's strategic alliance with the Soviet Union until 1991, Bakdash and the Syrian Communist Party became permanent fixtures in political officialdom, including the Baʿath-sponsored Progressive National Front, even though the party had been severely weakened by splits. Bakdash thrived in an overall environment of personality cult and dynastic politics. Shortly after his death on 15 July 1995 he was succeeded as secretary-general of the Syrian Communist Party by his wife, Wissal Farha.

See also Asad, Hafiz al-; Communism in the Middle East.

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Garay Menicucci

BAKER, JAMES A.

[1930–]

U.S. secretary of state, 1989–1992.

As secretary of state during most of the administration of U.S. president George H. W. Bush, James Baker played a crucial role in U.S.-sponsored negotiations to end the Arab–Israel conflict. In late 1989 he proposed the "Baker Plan," which dealt with Israel–Palestinian talks over the future of the West Bank. Israel rejected the plan in the spring of 1990.

In the wake of the Gulf War, Baker—known as a blunt and persistent negotiator willing to pressure and cajole Arabs and Israelis alike—exerted tremendous efforts in arranging for negotiations that included not only Israel and the Arab states but Palestinian representatives as well. In the spring of 1991, he traveled to Jerusalem and met with prominent Palestinians titularly independent of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which both the United States and Israel refused to include directly in the proposed negotiations.

In October 1991, face-to-face negotiations began in Madrid, under U.S. and Soviet involvement, within a framework established by Baker: Palestinian representatives would participate as part of a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation, and the various parties would engage both in bilateral talks aimed at producing peace treaties and in multilateral talks dealing with wider regional issues, such as refugee repatriation and water. Although not completely responsible for the successful Arab–Israel agreements that followed, the negotiations were the most significant diplomatic effort undertaken on behalf of a comprehensive settlement to the conflict.

See also Bush, George Herbert Walker; Gulf War (1991); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); West Bank.

Michael R. Fischbach

BAKHTAR-E EMRUZ

See Newspapers and Print Media: Iran

BAKHTIARI

Luri-speaking tribal people of central Iran.

The Bakhtiari historically are members of several tribes claiming descent from a common ancestor and residing in the Bakhtiari region of the Zagros Mountains. The Bakhtiari primarily practiced pastoral nomadism. During the mid-nineteenth, Bakhtiari khans (leaders) organized the tribes into a large confederation that played an important role in Iran's national politics for fifty years. In particular, the khans were active supporters of the Constitutional Revolution between 1909 and 1911. Reza Shah Pahlavi's policy of forcible sedentarization of all nomadic tribes effectively destroyed the Bakhtiari confederation. Following his abdication in 1941 under Anglo-Soviet pressure, several thousand Bakhtiari villagers resumed pastoral nomadism, but the majority did not, and the sons of the former khans preferred urban life, where they were integrated with the political and social elite of the country. During the 1970s, an estimated 100,000 Bakhtiari—about 20 percent of the total—continued to carry out the twice-annual migrations. By the early 2000s, only 10 percent of Bakhtiari practiced pastoral nomadism, while an estimated 50 to 60 percent lived in cities.

See also Constitutional Revolution; Pahlavi, Reza.

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Lois Beck
Updated by Eric Hooglund

BAKHTIARI, NAJAF QOLI KHAN SAMSAM AL-SOLTANEH

[1854–1930]

Prime minister of Iran, 1911–1913.

Born to a leading family of the Bakhtiari tribe, Najaf Qoli Khan Samsam al-Soltaneh was prime minister of Iran after Mohammad Ali Shah was deposed and the Constitutionalists assumed power in 1911. Samsam al-Soltaneh, with the aid of his tribal army, was instrumental in militarily defeating Mohammad Ali Shah, and thus he enjoyed significant mass support during his tenure in office. As a consequence, when the Russian legation in Tehran, together with the British, issued an ultimatum to the newly founded Iranian parliament asking for his resignation, popular uprisings ensued and he retained his position until 1913. He was made prime minister again, briefly, in 1918. During his premiership,

Swedish officers were charged with the founding of the pro-reform internal Iranian gendarmerie, which was modeled on the Ottoman Tanzimat. In 1921, Bakhtiari was named governor of Khorasan, but he refused the appointment because of his support for the rebellious Colonel Mohammad Taqi Khan Pesyan, who had set up government in Mashhad. Samsam al-Soltaneh died in the Bakhtiari region in 1930.

See also CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION; KHORASAN; TANZIMAT.

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NEGUIN YAVARI

BAKHTIAR, SHAPUR

[1915–1991]

Last royalist prime minister of Iran, 1979.

Shapur Bakhtiar was born in the Bakhtiari region of Iran. He was brought up in a family of political influence that included his maternal grandfather, who was prime minister of Iran in 1912 and 1918. Bakhtiar was educated in France at the Sorbonne, from which he graduated in 1939 with a doctorate in political science and international law. He volunteered to serve in the French resistance to German occupation during World War II. Bakhtiar returned to Iran in 1946 and served as director of the labor department in the province of Esfahan, and in 1949 joined the National Front Party led by Mohammad Mossadegh. He served as deputy minister of labor in the Mossadegh government from 1951 to 1952.

After the coup that overthrew the Mossadegh government in August 1953, Bakhtiar opposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's rule and devoted much of his time reorganizing the National Front. Consequently, he was arrested and briefly imprisoned in 1961. When antigovernment demonstrations intensified in December 1978, the shah tried to get support from the secular opposition. Bakhtiar agreed to become prime minister, a decision that prompted the National Front to expel him. Bakhtiar was overthrown within two months, when the Iranian Revolution under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini triumphed. Shortly after, Bakhtiar fled to France where he formed and led the National Resistance Movement of Iran that opposed the Islamic Republic. In August 1991 three Iranians, believed to be agents of the Islamic Republic, killed Bakhtiar in his home near Paris.

See also IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH; MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD.

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AHMED H. IBRAHIM

BAKHTIAR, TIMUR

[1914–1970]

Iranian general.

The son of Sardar Muʿazzam Bakhtiari, Timur Bakhtiar attended the French military college at St. Cyr (1930–1935). During the premiership of Mohammad Mossadegh, he was commander of several provincial garrisons, but he enjoyed greater success after the fall of Mossadegh (1953), because he had the same tribal lineage as Soraya Esfandiari, who was then queen of Iran.

As military governor of Tehran, he was largely responsible for eradicating the opposition to the Pahlavi dynasty, whether the opposition stemmed from the leftist Tudeh Party, the liberal National Front, or the religious Feda'iyan-e Islam quarter. In 1958, he was appointed the first chief of SAVAK (Sazman-e Ettelaʿat va Zed-e Ettelaʿat-e Keshvar, or the National Intelligence and Counterintelligence Agency). Influenced by his premier, Ali Amini, who feared Bakhtiar's grasp on power and resented his reported meeting with U.S. president John F. Kennedy in Washington, D.C., Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi removed the general from his position. Bakhtiar joined the ranks of the opposition in exile, and he was active in Europe, Lebanon, and Iraq in contacting both Ayatollah Khomeini and remnants of the leftist Tudeh Party. In 1970, by instruction of the shah, Bakhtiar was murdered in Iraq, close to the Iranian border, by a SAVAK agent.

See also AMINI, ALI; FEDA'IYAN-E ISLAM; KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH; MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD; NATIONAL FRONT, IRAN; PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA; TUDEH PARTY.

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NEGUIN YAVARI

BAKIL TRIBAL CONFEDERATION

One of Yemen's two largest and most important tribal confederations.

The tribes of Yemen have traditionally been the basic unit of social, political, and military organization in the country. Until the reign of Imam Yahya (1918–1948), the vast majority of the tribes of Yemen belonged to one of four large confederations; the Bakil is one of the two largest and most important. Imam Yahya's campaign to subject the country, and more specifically the tribes, to his control, led him to undertake massive campaigns against their influence and power; in fact, his efforts succeeded in permanently eliminating all but two of the ancient confederations (the Hashid is the other one to survive).

Many writers have referred to the Hashid and Bakil confederations as the "two wings" of the Zaydi imamate; in the sense that many of the tribes that belong to these confederations are and were strongly committed to Zaydi Islam, the imams were recognized—to a greater or lesser degree—as the heads of the Zaydi community and could, therefore, count on a measure of support and loyalty. Not all the tribes, however, accepted the temporal and even legal role that the imams arrogated to themselves; consequently, many imams (Imam Yahya and Imam Ahmad in the twentieth century included) complained bitterly about the tribes' inordinate political power.

The member tribes of the Bakil Confederation are found primarily in the mountains of the west, northwest, and far north of the country; its leaders today are the Abu Luhum clan, of the Nihm tribe.

See also YAHYA IBN MUHAMMAD HAMID AL-DIN; ZAYDISM.

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MANFRED W. WENNER

BAKKAR, JALILLAH

[1952–]

Tunisian actress and playwright.

Born in Tunis in 1952, Jalillah Bakkar studied French literature at the Ecole Normale Supérieure before joining the Théâtre du Sud de Gafsa in 1972. With her husband Fadhel Jaïbi, Bakkar co-founded Tunisia's first independent theater troupe, the Nouveau Théâtre de Tunis (1975), and later the production company Familia (1994). Bakkar's film performances include *Les Magiciens* (The magicians; 1975), *Civilisées* (1988), *La Nuit Sacrée* (1992) based on Tahar Ben Jelloun's novel of that title, and *Chich Khan* (1992). In *al-Bahth an a'ida* (Looking for Aïda), Bakkar plays an actress going from theater to theater, from Tunis to Lebanon, to rendezvous with a Palestinian woman, Aïda, which means she who returns. Bakkar replicates the pain of the Palestinian diaspora in her monologue, talking continuously to an absent, displaced Aïda. Bakkar's 2001 play *Junun* (Madness) is based on psychotherapist Néjia Zemni's account of treating Nun, an illiterate psychotic youth at Hôpital Razi where Frantz Fanon once worked. Nun's flashes of lucidity and poetry illuminate how individual pathology mirrors social pathology. On stage, Bakkar plays the psychotherapist; off stage, she thinks of herself as a citizen-actress, using performance as critique, staging real acts to reveal the contingent nature of social and political truths.

See also ART; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; THEATER; TUNISIA: OVERVIEW.

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LAURA RICE

BAKLAVA

See FOOD: BAKLAVA

BAKR, AHMAD HASAN AL-
[1914–1982]

A senior Iraqi military officer and politician.

Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr (also called Abu Haytham) was born in Tikrit, Iraq, to a family of small landowners of the Begat tribe. Upon graduation from a teachers' training high school in Baghdad in 1932, he served as a primary school teacher. In search of a more promising career, in 1938 he joined the military academy that had recently been opened for cadets from middle- and lower-middle-class backgrounds. By 1958, he was a lieutenant colonel. In the mid-1950s, he became involved in political activity as a member of the Free Officers.

Simultaneously, al-Bakr became interested in the newly formed al-Baʿth party (although he did not officially join the party until 1960). After the republican revolution of 14 July 1958, he became associated with Abd al-Salam Arif and pan-Arabism, which demanded unification of Iraq and Egypt into the United Arab Republic under Gamal Abdel Nasser. As a result, when Arif lost power in October 1958, al-Bakr was dismissed from the army by the ruler, General Abd al-Karim Qasim. During the following years, al-Bakr became a central link between the two most potent pan-Arab opposition groups, which sought to bring down Qasim's "secessionist" regime: the civilian al-Baʿth Party and the Nasserite army officers—both retired and active—chief among whom was Arif.

Al-Bakr assisted in planning the first Baʿth coup d'état on 8 February 1963. Following this Ramadan revolution, he became a powerful prime minister, while Arif was made a ceremonial president. Throughout the nine months of Baʿth rule, al-Bakr served as a mediator between the civilian and military wings of the party as well as between its left and right factions. In September 1963, he became a member of the regional leadership of the Baʿth party and, a few months later, of the pan-Arab leadership.

On 18 November 1963, a severe rift between the party's left and right caused him to opt for a third solution: He supported President Arif and his Nasserite army officers in their coup d'état, which toppled the Baʿth from power. After a few months of cooperation, during which he served as deputy prime minister, Arif sacked him and his Baʿthi colleagues. In September 1964, most of the party leadership, including al-Bakr, were jailed for an attempted coup. Upon their release a few months later, they once again attempted to overthrow the Arif regime.

Iraqi president Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr salutes during a military parade celebrating the first anniversary of Baʿthist Party rule in Iraq, 17 July 1969. **© Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

The Arab defeat in the Arab–Israel war of June 1967 presented al-Bakr and his conspirators with a golden opportunity to agitate against the regime for its failure to give adequate military support to the Arabs. On 17 July 1968, independent army officers joined the Baʿth to assume power in a bloodless coup d'état. Al-Bakr led one of the army units that participated in the takeover. He then became president of the republic and chairman of the all-powerful Revolutionary Command Council. By 30 July, the Baʿth rid themselves of their partners, with al-Bakr becoming prime minister and field

marshal. He also held the positions of commander-in-chief of the armed forces, secretary-general of the regional leadership for the party, and deputy secretary-general of the pan-Arab leadership under Michel Aflaq as a figurehead. Between 1973 and 1977, al-Bakr also served as minister of defense.

Throughout these years, al-Bakr cooperated very closely with his young relative, the civilian party and internal-security apparatchik, Saddam Hussein. This cooperation stemmed from mutual interdependence. Al-Bakr needed Hussein as a watchdog against actual and potential enemies both inside and outside the party. Hussein, for his part, could not survive on his own even when he became the strongman in Baghdad in 1970 and 1971, because he lacked the necessary contacts with the military and sufficient support from the party old-timers—and because he was not yet known among the Iraqi public. Thus, while al-Bakr needed protection, Hussein needed time.

Throughout the 1970s, the two effectively purged the army of politically ambitious officers and turned it into a docile tool in the hands of the party, which sent its tentacles into every army unit. The relatives also shared their approach to politics—both were pragmatists, preferring Iraqi interests over those of Arabism, as interpreted by traditional party ideology. Yet, on a few occasions, al-Bakr showed more attachment to traditional party doctrine in terms of his commitment to Arab unity and the struggle against Israel. Differences, however, were minor, until the issue of Iraqi–Syrian relations came up in 1978 and 1979, after the Camp David Accords. Following a rapprochement, al-Bakr favored a loose federation with Hafiz al-Asad's Syria, while Hussein objected to it for fear of losing his position.

On 16 July 1979, Hussein—who by then had complete control of all internal-security branches and through them of the party and the army—staged a bloodless coup, forcing al-Bakr to announce his resignation, caused by ill health (Bakr's health was indeed somewhat shaky). A few days later, Hussein announced that he had uncovered a (Syrian-sponsored) plot to strip away his power, and he used this excuse to execute all his remaining opponents who, until then, could hide behind al-Bakr's back. Hussein also took advantage of this opportunity to sever ties with Damascus.

Between 1979 and 1982, when his death was reported, al-Bakr was living under house arrest and was not involved in matters of state. According to a widely believed rumor, al-Bakr was murdered by poisoning because in 1982, at a low point in the Iran–Iraq War, Hussein was afraid that the retired president might become a focus of opposition against him.

See also Aflaq, Michel; Arif, Abd al-Salam; Asad, Hafiz al-; Baʿth, al-; Camp David Accords (1978); Hussein, Saddam; Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Pan-Arabism; Qasim, Abd al-Karim.

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Amatzia Baram

BAKR, SALWA

[1949–]

Egyptian writer.

Salwa Bakr was born in 1949 to a lower-middle-class family in Matariyya, Egypt. The stories and rituals of her widowed and unschooled mother sparked Bakr's interest in the world views and speech styles of the poor or uneducated women who inhabit much of her fiction. Bakr was educated in the Cairo area, receiving a degree from the College of Business at Ayn Shams University in 1972 and a second degree in literary criticism in 1976. Her early stories explore the lives of women marginalized by poverty or social norms. In her collections *Zinat in the President's Funeral Procession* (1986) and *An al-ruh allati suriqat tadrijiyyan* (About the soul that gradually was stolen, 1989), Bakr focuses on portraying women's emotional worlds and the material circumstances of their lives through a language that claims a middle ground between standard and colloquial Arabic. Bakr received local and international critical attention for

her satirical novel *The Golden Chariot* (1995), in which she makes use of circular and digressive narrative techniques, similar to those used in the *Thousand and One Nights,* to explore the lives and histories of inmates in a women's prison in Egypt. Bakr's experiments with narration and her focus on exploring women's private worlds have influenced writers of both her own and a younger generation. Bakr names Chekhov, Cervantes, and Isabel Allende among her literary influences.

See also Ain Shams University; Gender: Gender and Education; Literature: Arabic.

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Caroline Seymour-Jorn

BALACLAVA, BATTLE OF

Battle that occurred during the Crimean War.

On 25 October 1854, a Russian field army under General Menshikov attempted to relieve Sevastopol, besieged by British, French, and Turkish forces, by driving a wedge among British units. The relative success of the attack netted some Turkish cannons, but a subsequent Russian cavalry attack was repulsed by the British Heavy Cavalry Brigade and the stubborn resistance of the 93rd Highlanders. The latter's success gave rise to the phrase "the thin red line," after their uniforms and signifying dedication against high odds.

The British Light Cavalry Brigade, in suicidal disregard for conventional military wisdom, then attacked the Russian field guns to their front. Whether Lord Lucan, commander of the cavalry division, or Lord Cardigan, commander of the Light Brigade, gave the order for the attack or whether it was the result of confusing dispatches has remained a mystery. The brigade's charge into the mile-long valley under murderous enemy crossfire from both flanks was immortalized by Alfred Tennyson's poem "The Charge of the Light Brigade." The brigade reached the guns and rode beyond them to clash with Russian cavalry. Returning through the same crossfire, the survivors were assisted by the Fourth French Chasseurs d'Afrique. Of the 673 mounted officers and men entering the twenty-minute-long charge of the Light Brigade, 247 men and 497 horses were killed. A fitting epitaph was coined by French General Pierre-Jean-François Bosquet, who remarked: "It is magnificent, but it is not war." The Russians retained possession of the Vorontsov ridge commanding the Sevastopol–Balaclava road while the allies kept Balaclava and the approaches to Sevastopol. Neither the battle itself nor the charge of the Light Brigade had any effect on the outcome of the campaign.

See also Crimean War.

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Jean-Marc R. Oppenheim

BALAFREJ, AHMED

[1908–1990]

Moroccan nationalist; prime minister in 1958.

Ahmed Balafrej earned degrees from Cairo University and the Sorbonne in Paris. Active in Rabat and Paris among student groups for reform and nationalism (Morocco was under French and Spanish protectorate from 1912), he founded the newspaper *Maghrib* in 1932. In 1943, he cofounded the Istiqlal political party. Following independence in 1956, and as secretary-general of Istiqlal, he was made foreign minister. In 1958, he became prime minister, a post from which he resigned in December of that year. By the late 1960s, Balafrej was largely inactive politically.

See also Istiqlal Party: Morocco.

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Matthew S. Gordon

BALBO, ITALO

[1896–1940]

Governor of Libya (by then the united Italian province of Libia), 1934–1939.

Italo Balbo was responsible for introducing state-aided settler colonization in Libya from 1938, which brought in 32,000 settlers before the outbreak of war under Italy's *Quarta Sponda* (Fourth Shore) program. This program replaced the previous scheme of allowing autonomous companies to organize sharecropping settler colonization alongside private colonization. By 1939, when Libya had been formally integrated into metropolitan Italy, there were approximately 110,000 Italians in Libya. Marshal Balbo was also an advocate of the Fascist Italianization program for Libya, in which Libyan Muslims were to become Muslim Italians. He was killed at Tobruk in June 1940.

See also TOBRUK.

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GEORGE JOFFE

BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917)

A British declaration supporting the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

Few documents had such far-reaching consequences in the modern history of Middle East as did the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917. It was drafted by Zionist leaders, revised and approved by the British war cabinet, and forwarded by Lord Arthur Balfour, the British foreign secretary, to Lord Rothschild, a Zionist philanthropist and one of its drafters. It consisted of a single sixty-seven-word paragraph:

> "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." (Hurewitz, 1979)

This was one of a number of contradictory promises Britain made during World War I. Needing Arab support against the Ottoman Empire, Britain promised in the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence (1915–1916) to support the establishment of an independent Arab nation, which Arabs understood to include Palestine (which Britain later denied); and needing French and Russian support, it promised in the Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916) to rule the region, including Palestine, with its allies. The cabinet issued the declaration for a number of reasons, both immediate and long term. It hoped to enlist American and Russian Jews help to bring America into the World War I and to keep Russia from abandoning it. In addition, the cabinet sought to preempt a similar German pro-Zionist declaration and needed Jewish money for Britain's own war effort.

The climate of opinion in England favored Zionist goals for Palestine. Fundamentalist Christians, some of whom were antisemites, considered it their duty to assist Jews to go to Palestine so that biblical prophesy could be fulfilled. Liberals such as Balfour and Prime Minister David Lloyd George believed that the West had committed a historical injustice against the Jewish people, one that must be atoned for. To this intellectual climate can be added the sociopolitical factor: Jewish contributions to British society were disproportionate to their numbers and were recognized and admired. Sir Herbert Louis Samuel, who later became the first high commissioner of Palestine, was a philosopher and a statesman who served in several cabinets; and Chaim Weizmann was a chemistry professor who assisted the British munitions industry. Both were persuasive advocates of a Jewish state. By 1917, the war cabinet accepted the view that postwar strategic advantages could be derived from a Jewish state or commonwealth allied to Great Britain.

The phraseology of the declaration was carefully chosen; even its ambiguity was deliberate. The phrase "national home" was new, with no precedence in international law; it was used in the dec-

laration to pacify anti-Zionist Jews, who feared that creation of a state would jeopardize the rights of Jews in the diaspora. In private, however, British officials were clear about the objective. Lord Balfour and David Lloyd George explained to Weizmann in 1921 "that by Declaration they always meant an eventual Jewish State" (Ingrams, 1973).

Little thought was given to the indigenous Palestinian population, in large part because Europeans considered them inferior. The declaration referred to these Palestinians, who in 1917 constituted 90 percent of the population, as the "non-Jewish communities in Palestine," a phrase that conceals the identity of the majority. Yet the declaration contained a promise to guarantee the civil and religious rights of the "non-Jews," a promise that the British attempted to enforce even at the expense of Jewish religious rights. At the Wailing, or Western, Wall (in Hebrew, ha-Kotel ha-Maʿravi), the British, in order to protect Muslim property and religious rights to the wall, allowed the Palestinians to restrict Jewish visitation and prayer, even though the wall was the holiest shrine of Judaism.

But British political support for a Jewish national home worked against Palestinian national interests. The Balfour policy, which was incorporated in the League of Nations mandate for Palestine, was backed by the European powers and by the British military. It gave the Yishuv (Jewish community) time to grow through immigration, from about 50,000 in 1917 to more than 600,000 by 1947, and time to develop quasigovernmental and military institutions. Palestinians, fearing domination or expulsion, protested and resisted through political violence—in 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1933—that was put down by the British military. The Palestine Arab revolt of 1936 through 1939 was suppressed by both British and Zionist forces. The Palestinians were a weak, underdeveloped society, no match for the British and, after 1939, for the Zionists. Ultimately, the 1917 Balfour policy paved the way for the establishment in 1948 of the state of Israel and the exodus of some 726,000 Palestinians who left out of fear and panic or were expelled by the Israel Defense Force. The refugees were not allowed to return to their homes and their properties were confiscated.



The Balfour Declaration was issued in 1917 by Lord Arthur James Balfour. Balfour became the British prime minister in 1902, but resigned three years later due to dissention within his Unionist Party. Balfour remained active in politics, however, and was Britain's foreign secretary at the time the Balfour Declaration was drafted. © MICHAEL NICHOLSON/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

See also DIASPORA; HUSAYN–MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE (1915–1916); ISRAEL; LLOYD GEORGE, DAVID; SAMUEL, HERBERT LOUIS; SYKES–PICOT AGREEMENT (1916); WEIZMANN, CHAIM; WESTERN WALL; YISHUV.

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PHILIP MATTAR

BALKAN CRISES (1870s)

Regional unrest led to independence for much of the peninsula but no permanent solutions.

As the Ottoman Empire decayed in the nineteenth century, various crises erupted in the empire's European regions as a result of the national awakening of its Christian subjects. Religious conflict and economic oppression led the Christian peasants of Herzegovina to revolt in July 1875, and despite Ottoman promises of reform, the uprising continued and soon spread into neighboring Bosnia. Despite diplomatic intervention by the Austro-Hungarians aimed at bringing an end to the conflict in the Ottoman Empire's two western-most provinces, fighting intensified, and within nine months approximately 156,000 refugees had fled to Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Montenegro. Public opinion in the latter two states demanded intervention on behalf of their fellow Slavs, whose rebellion was joined in May 1876 by revolutionaries in Bulgaria. In that same month, the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and German governments, associated in the Three Emperors' League, tried to mediate the conflict. The resulting Berlin Memorandum provided that refugees be repatriated, reforms enacted, and that the great powers supervise both. Nevertheless, the plan ran into opposition from the British government of Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, who was determined to introduce a new, more active foreign policy and unwilling to approve a plan that his government had not cosponsored. Collective mediation thus failed and the following month, Serbia declared war on the empire and Montenegro quickly followed suit.

Britain clung to its policy of nonintervention even after news of Ottoman mass killings in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Horrors, provoked outrage throughout Western Europe. Public pressure for intervention eventually caused Czar Alexander II of Russia to issue an ultimatum to the Ottoman sultan demanding a six-week armistice for the Serbs. The Turks yielded and accepted the armistice on 30 October 1876, but Disraeli's refusal to accept a peace proposal that would have increased Russia's influence in the Balkans led the Turks to reject the settlement. Russia responded on 24 April 1877 by declaring war on the Ottoman Empire.

Russia's armies marched through Romania and into Bulgaria. Despite several months' delay caused by unexpectedly tenacious resistance by the Turkish garrison at Pleven (or Plevna), the Russians resumed their advance in January 1878. As Turkish defenses withered, armistice negotiations began, and Russian forces moved to within 10 miles (16 km) of Istanbul. Meanwhile, the British countered by sending their fleet to the Sea of Marmara as a show of support to the sultan and as a warning to the Russians. Negotiations between the Russians and the Turks ended in the Treaty of San Stefano, which was signed 3 March 1878. The treaty provided that reforms be enacted in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that Serbia and Montenegro become fully independent and receive more territory. Romania, which had entered the war against Turkey, was to receive part of the region of Dobruja, in return for giving southern Bessarabia back to Russia, which also was to receive Batum, Kars, Ardahan, and Bayazid in eastern Asia Minor. A Greater Bulgaria was to be created as an autonomous principality, with an elected prince.

The treaty, however, aroused the opposition of Britain and Austria-Hungary, who feared Russian access to the Aegean and control over Istanbul, and by Greece and Serbia, who could not accept the notion of a Greater Bulgaria that included areas that they coveted, especially Macedonia. The Russians recognized that the San Stefano settlement infringed upon the Peace of Paris (1856), which had, among other provisions, guaranteed Ottoman independence and territorial integrity, and the Russians now acknowledged the right of the signatories to the Paris treaty to consider the provisions of the new settlement. Meeting at the Congress of Berlin, those powers determined that Greater Bulgaria should be divided into three parts: an autonomous

Bulgaria, still under Turkish sovereignty but with its own elected prince; Eastern Rumelia, south of the Balkan mountains, which was to have a Christian governor appointed by the sultan but approved by the powers; and Macedonia, which was returned to direct Turkish rule. Serbia and Montenegro now became fully independent and were enlarged, while Romania did receive part of Dobruja in return for ceding southern Bessarabia to Russia. Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar were placed under the political administration of Austria-Hungary, and Russia received Batum, Kars, and Ardahan, while Cyprus came under British rule.

Signed on 13 July 1878, the Treaty of Berlin was the single most important agreement for the Balkan nations in the nineteenth century. While allowing the Ottoman Empire to maintain its presence in Albania, Macedonia, and Thrace, it left all of the Balkan peoples, with the exception of the Albanians, with independent or autonomous states. Its provisions, however, were an immediate source of frustration to them, and led to further strife and eventually World War I.

See also Berlin, Congress and Treaty of; Bulgarian Horrors; San Stefano, Treaty of (1878).

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John Micgiel

BALKANS

While racially similar, the peoples of the Balkans diverge in language and religion.

Five peoples inhabit the Balkan Peninsula, an area in southeast Europe that is generally considered to be bounded by the Danube River plain to the north, the Black Sea to the east, the Aegean Sea to the south, and the Adriatic Sea to the west: South Slavs, Romanians, Greeks, Albanians, and Turks.

The most numerous group, the South Slavs, comprises five nations, settled in a broad band across the central Balkans from the Adriatic to the Black Seas: the Slovenes, northeast of the Adriatic; the Croats to the southeast; the Serbs farther east; the Macedonians to the south; and the Bulgarians along the Black Sea. The Slavs arrived in the sixth century and began assimilating and displacing the older inhabitants of the northern and central Balkan Peninsula—the Illyrians, Thracians, and Dacians. Some Illyrians and Thracians found refuge in isolated mountain areas, and their descendants eventually became Albanians and Vlachs, respectively. The latinized Dacians were pushed north and emerged as the modern Romanians. As the South Slavs settled down, some were conquered by the Bulgars, an Asiatic people few in number and so quickly assimilated that only their name survives.

Meanwhile, the ancient Greeks inhabited the peninsula farther south, as they do today. The arrival of the Ottoman Turks in the fifteenth century brought scattered Turkish settlements; with the exception of Eastern or Turkish Thrace (European Turkey), few Turks remain there at the end of the twentieth century. Germans came to the area as a result of Austrian defense policies that called for frontier colonization. Few, however, of the 1.5 million Germans in the area before World War II remain. Jews fleeing persecution in Spain and Portugal were given refuge by the Ottomans in the sixteenth century in what later became Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece, while many Jews arrived in Romania from Russia and Poland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Of the 1.2 million Jews in the Balkans before World War II, fewer than 50,000 remain. Gypsies arrived in the fifteenth century and more currently comprise a small and persecuted minority, particularly in Romania.

The Balkan peoples are predominantly Orthodox Christians. But the overwhelming majority of Slovenes and Croats are Roman Catholic, and Protestant communities exist in the northwest. Eastern Thrace is predominantly Muslim, as is 70 percent of Albania's population. Substantial Muslim minorities exist in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria.

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JOHN MICGIEL

BALKAN WARS (1912–1913)

Warfare among the states of the Balkan Peninsula that affected the balance-of-power politics in Europe and contributed to the outbreak of World War I.

In the first Balkan War (October 1912–March 1913), the Ottoman Empire fought against the Balkan League composed of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro. The second Balkan War (June–July 1913) pitted the former allies against each other and also involved Romania.

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 in the Ottoman Empire precipitated changes in the Balkan status quo. Bulgaria declared independence, and Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, reducing Ottoman control in Europe to Thrace, Macedonia, and Albania. Fear of Austro-Hungarian expansion and the vulnerability of the Ottoman Empire, at war with Italy over Libya since 1911, prompted the formation of the Balkan League with Russia's blessing. The Christian Balkan states temporarily reconciled conflicting geopolitical ambitions and irredentist disputes over ethnically mixed Macedonia. They hoped for a more advantageous repartitioning of the region at the expense of the Ottoman state.

Montenegro opened hostilities against the empire over border disputes. At the same time, Bulgaria and Serbia, which had launched in March 1912 the series of alliances that led to the Balkan League, mobilized their armies. The Ottoman government hastily concluded peace with Italy and declared war against the Balkan allies on 17 October 1912. The Ottomans suffered defeats in both Macedonia and Thrace, as Albania declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire in November. On 16 December 1913, upon a ceasefire agreement and appeals from Anglophile Ottoman Grand Vizier Kamil Paşa, ambassadors convened at the London Conference. The Ottomans surrendered Macedonia and Western Thrace but refused to yield Edirne, which was besieged by Bulgaria. Failure to agree on revised borders led to a Bulgarian offensive in February 1913. This action forced the Ottomans to surrender the European territories to the west of the Enez–Midye Line, a situation formalized at the London Conference of 30 May.

Disagreement about the repartitioning of Macedonia revived old rivalries. Bulgaria, dissatisfied with its allotment, surprised former allies Serbia and Greece with an attack on 29 June. This led to an anti-Bulgarian realignment that also included Romania, which feared losing territory to its southern neighbor. The Ottomans exploited the disarray to recover Edirne from the Bulgarians in July. The Treaty of Bucharest of 10 August 1913, between Bulgaria and its former allies, was followed by the Istanbul Treaty between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire (29 September 1913), which left Edirne in Ottoman hands. The Ottomans concluded separate treaties with Greece (in Athens on 14 November) and Serbia (in Istanbul on 14 March 1914). Greece obtained the Aegean islands, except the Dodecanese, which went to Italy. The Muslims of ceded territories were given a choice of immigrating into the empire. The borders that emerged at the end of these treaties have changed remarkably little despite the shocks of World War I and later events.

In the Balkan wars, the Ottomans lost more than 80 percent of their European territory inhabited by 4 million people. The new demographic and geopolitical realities triggered domestic political and ideological change in the Ottoman Empire. On 23 January 1913, the Committee for Union and Progress implemented a coup against Kamil Paşa, ostensibly because he lost Edirne. At the end of the wars, with the Ottoman relinquishment of predominantly Christian territories, the empire was largely reduced to its Muslim-dominated Asian lands. This fact was reflected in the ideological reorientation toward a distinctly Islamic Ottomanism and in the proliferation of Turkish cultural activity.

See also COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS; EDIRNE.

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HASAN KAYALI

BALTA LIMAN, CONVENTION OF (1838)

Agreement expanding British trade rights in Ottoman Empire.

Signed between Britain and the Ottoman Empire on 15 August 1838, the agreement reaffirmed and widened Britain's rights under the capitulations (privileges granted by the Ottoman government) that gave British subjects the right to trade freely in the Ottoman Empire. In a move designed to weaken the power of Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt, the convention also forbade the formation of commercial monopolies in the Ottoman domains.

See also MUHAMMAD ALI; OTTOMAN EMPIRE.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

BALUCHI

See IRANIAN LANGUAGES

BALUCHIS

Ethnic group that lives in the border region where Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan meet.

The Baluchis are members of Baluchi-speaking tribes inhabiting the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and coastal Makran, adjoining southwestern Afghanistan, and southeastern Iran. Detribalized Baluchis have been migrating to the United Arab Emirates and Oman since at least the 1950s. Baluchi, an Indo-Iranian language, has five million speakers; the majority live in Pakistan. Traditionally Baluchis were nomadic sheep and goat herders and camel breeders; during the nineteenth century some became sedentary farmers (growing dates, almonds, apricots, and wheat) or fishers. The Baluchi tribal organization is hierarchical, with four social classes (aristocracy, nomads, farmers, and slaves); most tribes are led by a tribal chief *(sardar)* but sociopolitical organization is variable. Most Baluchis are Sunni Muslim. The area known as Pakistani Baluchistan was conquered by the British in 1887. In Iran and Pakistan, Baluchis have been migrating to non-Baluchi urban areas in search of employment since the 1950s. Most of the small Baluchi population of Afghanistan fled to Iran and Pakistan as refugees during the 1980s.

See also BALUCHISTAN.

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CHARLES C. KOLB

BALUCHISTAN

Literally "land of the Baluch"; the name given to the region of approximately half a million square miles that straddles southeastern Iran, southwestern Pakistan, and southern Afghanistan.

Although its precise boundaries are still undetermined, it is generally thought to stretch from the edge of the Iranian plateau (the Dasht-e Lut), including parts of the Kirman desert east of Bam and the Bashagird mountains, to the coastal lowlands of the Gulf of Oman, up to the rugged Sulaiman range in the East, at the edge of the western boundaries of the Pakistani provinces of Sind and Punjab. The volcano of Kuh-i Taftan (13,500 ft. [4,104 m]) located on the Iranian side is considered Baluchistan's most spectacular peak. Its most important cities are Iranshahr (formerly Fahraj), the capital of Iranian Baluchistan and Quetta, the capital of Pakistani Baluchistan.

Due to the nature of its divergent topography, Baluchistan appears to have been divided throughout its history between Iranian "highland" and Indian subcontinent "lowland" spheres of influence. Indeed, its hybrid population, comprising Baluch, Brahuis, Djats, and other South Asian elements, thought to amount to a little more than two million, reflects this. In particular, the region has been influenced greatly by the politics of the neighboring areas of Kerman, Sistan, Kandahar, Punjab, Sind, and Oman.

The Baluch are generally divided into two groups, the Sarawan and the Jahlawan, separated from each other by the Brahuis of the Kalat region.

The exact origins of the Baluch are unclear. It is generally thought that they migrated to the region either from the east, beyond Makran, or from north of Kerman sometime in the late medieval period. The earliest mention of them occurs in an eighth-century Pahlavi text, while a number of the medieval Muslim geographers mention a group called the "Balus," in the area between Kerman, Khorasan, Sistan, and Makran.

When they actually began to see themselves as a distinct cultural unit is another matter of debate. The idea of a single, politically unified Baluchistan seems to date back to the eighteenth century and the time of their only successful indigenous leader, the Brahui Nasir Khan, who attempted to consolidate all the Baluch into one unified nation. This idea of a single Baluchistan was further fueled by the British—who began to take a great interest in the area in the nineteenth century and formally incorporated large sections of it into their subcontinental empire as part of their divide-and-rule policy. Indeed, it was the British who first began extensive mapping of the area, promoted scholarship on the Baluchi tribes, and negotiated the formal international boundaries with Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in 1947, ultimately spurring Iranian and Russian interests in the area.

Regardless of the debates, it can be said with certainty that a distinct ethnic and social entity, complete with an independent language, Baluchi, and a distinctive social and political structure based on a primarily nomadic way of life, emerged in the region known as Baluchistan.

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NEGUIN YAVARI

BALYAN FAMILY

Ottoman architects.

The Balyan (also Balian) family was composed of nine Ottoman architects: Meremetçi Bali Kalfa (d. 1803; after whom the family is named); his sons Krikor Amira (1767–1831) and Senekerim Amira (d. 1833); Krikor's son Garabet Amira (1800–1866); Garabet's sons Nikogos (1826–1858), Sarkis (1835–1899), Agop (1838–1875), Simon (1846–1894), and Levon (1855–1925). These architects were responsible, individually or in collaboration with each other, for the majority of the buildings for the Ottoman Empire in and near Constantinople (now Istanbul) during the nineteenth century.

Prominent among these works are the Nüsretiye (Tophane), Bezm-i Alem Valide Sultan (Dolmabahçe), Büyük Mecidiye (Ortaköy), Küçük Mecidiye (Cirağan), Pertevniyal Valide Sultan (Aksaray), Cağlayan, Teşvikiye, Hamidiye (Yildiz) mosques; Mahmud II and Abdülmecit tombs; Dolmabahçe, Beylerbeyi, Cirağan, Yildiz, Küçüksu, Ihlamur, Baltalimani, Adile Sultan (Kandilli) palaces; Aynalikavak, Izmit, Mecidiyeköy, Zincirlikuyu, Ayazağa, Kalender royal pavilions; the Imperial College of Medicine (now Galatasaray Lycée); the Military School (Mekteb-i Harbiye); Selimiye, Davutpaşa, Rami, Gümüşsuyu, Maçka barracks and Taş Kişla near Taksim; Gümüşsuyu hospital; the Mint (Darphane); Bahçeköy Valide and Mahmud II dams; Terkos waterworks; Bayezid fire tower; Tophane, Dolmabahçe and Yildiz clock towers.

As leading figures of the Armenian Millet, members of the Balyan family were also responsible for the construction of Armenian churches, schools, and a hospital in Istanbul. They also were commissioned by other Armenian amiras to construct some of the earliest industrial plants around the capital. Their patronage of local Armenian talent made many of the official structures they raised almost entirely the work of Armenian artisans. Altogether they developed an art form described as Ottoman Baroque.

See also ARMENIAN MILLET.

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APTULLAH KURAN
UPDATED BY ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

BAMYAN

Ancient Gandharan site; central Afghan province and city.

The modern province of Bamyan is located in the high mountains of central Afghanistan in Hazarajat. The population of 300,000 consists mostly of ethnic Hazara, a Persian-speaking ethnolinguistic group thought to be of Central Asian ancestry. The provincial capital is the city of Bamyan.

Bamyan was also an important Buddhist site of the Gandhara empire. In the Bamyan valley in central Bamyan Province there were several large statues of Buddha, the oldest dating from the second half of the third century, which were destroyed in 2001. During the rule of the Taliban government (1996–2001) the Bamyan valley became a major battlefield in the fighting between the Hazara political organization Hizb-e Wadat and Taliban forces. As the fighting spread north, thousands of refugees from other parts of Afghanistan took refuge in the valley. The Bamyan valley changed hands several times from September 1998 to the middle of May 1999. Taliban forces killed several hundred Hazaras citizens and many others starved to death.

In March 2001 the Taliban government declared that the Buddha statues were idolatrous and offensive to Islam, citing the Islamic stricture on representation of the human form. Despite condemnation from the international community, the Taliban government destroyed the statues with explosives on 8 and 9 March 2001.

See also HAZARA.

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GRANT FARR

BANDUNG CONFERENCE (1955)

Assembly of twenty-nine developing nations, including many from the Middle East, to discuss international relations, colonialism, and cooperation.

The conference was convened by prime ministers Muhammad Ali of Pakistan, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, U Nu of Burma, Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon, and Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia. Twenty-nine developing nations assembled in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955 to discuss their role in a world dominated by the superpowers. Major issues were colonialism, economic and cultural cooperation, the legitimacy of defense pacts such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the viability of peaceful coexistence.

The Middle Eastern states were represented by such leaders as Dr. Charles Malik of Lebanon, Dr. Muhammad Fadhil al-Jamali of Iraq, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and Prince Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia. The conference passed resolutions supporting the independence struggles of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia against France, and it called for a peaceful settlement of the issue of the Palestinians in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

The Bandung Conference saw Nasser emerge as an international leader. The ties that he established there with Nehru would lead in six years to the first Nonaligned Nations Conference in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

See also FAISAL IBN ABD AL-AZIZ AL SAʿUD; JAMALI, MUHAMMAD FADHIL AL-; MALIK, CHARLES HABIB; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO).

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ZACHARY KARABELL

BANI-ETEMAD, RAKHSAN

[1954–]

An Iranian filmmaker.

Rakhsan Bani-Etemad was born in Tehran in 1954 and is one of post-Revolutionary Iran's foremost

film- and documentary-makers. Her career began in Iranian television after the revolution (1984–1987); she has made both documentaries and feature-length films, including *The Yellow Canary, Narges, The Blue Veil, The May Lady,* and *Under the Skin of the City.* Working in television and as a documentary filmmaker not only gave her full access and permission to film but also kept her close to the pulse of society, lending her feature films social import. Her style uniquely blends the documentary with the feature film to the degree that characters from her documentaries (most particularly Tuba, whose story she has followed and developed over sixteen years, resulting in her seminal feature film *Under the Skin of the City*) also appear in her feature films. While her most personal work, *The May Lady,* was the first to stray from her usual themes—social inequality, crime, blue-collar laborers, and strong female protagonists—and looks inward at the life of a female television documentary filmmaker from the upper middle class, it stays within the general themes that Bani-Etemad has developed over the course of her career: the struggle to survive emotionally and physically in postwar Iran, the particular strain the socioeconomic situation places on the mothers of young men, and a gendered perspective on the ever-changing role and responsibility of the documentarian, artist, and citizen.

See also Art; Iran; Makhmalbaf Family; Milani, Tahmineh.

Roxanne Varzi

BANI SADR, ABOLHASAN

[1933–]

First president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1980–1981.

Abolhasan Bani Sadr was born in Hamadan to a relatively wealthy, religious landowning family. He studied theology and law at Tehran University, where he played an active part in the Islamic branch of the National Front. He left Iran for France in the 1960s to pursue higher education after being exposed to the ideas of Paul Vieille, the French Marxist sociologist with whom he later coauthored a book (*Pétrole et violence,* Paris, 1974). While in opposition, he became convinced that Iran's only political solution was a return to a (reformed) Islamic ideology.

Bani Sadr met Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1972 while in Iraq for his father's funeral, and the two kept in close contact. They were reunited in Paris in 1978, shortly before Khomeini's triumphant return to Iran.

After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Bani Sadr served as foreign minister and minister of finance before becoming Iran's first elected president in 1980. The early stages of his presidency were fraught with conflicts with two pivotal members of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, although Bani Sadr still enjoyed the support of Ayatollah Khomeini. The tension between Bani Sadr and the IRP had become apparent after the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979 by a radical group of Muslim students, the so-called "Students following the Imam's Line." Bani Sadr opposed the takeover and tried in vain to secure the freedom of the hostages.

Khomeini appointed Bani Sadr commander in chief and chairman of the Revolutionary Council in February 1980. Under his influence the government sought to restore normalcy and order in the country. Bani Sadr's efforts to stabilize the country and curb revolutionary excesses did not bear fruit, however, and his influence was undermined by the IRP's sweeping victory in the first parliamentary election and the subsequent imposition of the IRP candidate, Mohammad Ali Rajaʾi, as prime minister. An attempted coup backed by part of the Iranian military in July 1980 was a further blow to his presidency. The armed forces were purged severely, and Bani Sadr's appointees to several key positions were executed.

After Iraq attacked Iran in September 1980, Bani Sadr was appointed by Khomeini as chairman of the Supreme Defense Council. Spending most of his time at the front and away from Tehran, he failed to exploit the opportunities provided by the war to bolster his power. From September 1980 until its closure by the IRP in June 1981, Bani Sadr used his newspaper, *Jomhuri-ye Eslami* (Islamic Republic), to criticize the IRP and other hard-line factions in the government. The IRP, for its part, criticized Iran's repeated defeats on the war front and Bani Sadr's policy of favoring the regular armed forces over the Revolutionary Guards in combat.

Further showdowns with the IRP drove Bani Sadr to seek support from various opposition groups active in Iran, including the National Front and the Mojahedin-e Khalq. Bani Sadr was dismissed as acting commander in chief of the armed forces on 10 June 1981. Following repeated failed attempts at reconciliation the parliament, with Ayatollah Khomeini's approval, proceeded to impeach him. Bani Sadr fled the country with the help of the Mojahedin-e Khalq and, once in Paris, joined the leadership of the National Resistance Council alongside Masud Rajavi, the head of the Mojahedin. It was a short-lived union, mainly owing to Rajavi's increasingly dictatorial and cultic personality, and Bani Sadr severed his ties with the National Resistance Council in 1984. In 1997 he was in the limelight once again, when he testified against Iran in a court in Berlin, where the Iranian government was accused of complicity in the murder of four of its opponents, including the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party. The court ruled that the murder had been approved at the highest echelons of the Iranian government.

As of 2003, Bani Sadr continued to live in Paris, pursuing political activity mostly in the form of lectures and public statements on political developments in Iran, and signing his name always as the "elected President of the people of Iran." His many books include *L'espérance trahie* (Hope betrayed, 1982), *The Fundamental Principles and Precepts of Islamic Government* (1981), and *My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution, and Secret Deals with the U.S.* (1991).

See also BEHESHTI, MOHAMMAD; KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH; RAFSANJANI, ALI AKBAR HASHEMI; RAJAVI, MASUD.

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NEGUIN YAVARI

BANI SAKHR TRIBE

See TRIBES AND TRIBALISM

BANKING

Banking and finance issues in the context of the modern Middle East.

Commercial banks are especially strategic intermediaries between enterprises and investors in most countries of the Middle East and Africa, where alternative sources of private capital, such as stock markets, are relatively underdeveloped. In most of these countries, the banks are also important instruments of political control and patronage. Structural adjustment, undertaken on the advice of international financial institutions since the mid-1980s, has not significantly altered the patterns of political control discussed in this article.

History

Although the basic instruments of European finance were probably imported from Egypt to Italy (and from there to the rest of Europe) in the early Middle Ages, Britain, followed by France, Germany, and other European powers, introduced modern banking into the region in the nineteenth century. European trading houses founded banks in Alexandria, Egypt, as early as 1842, shortly after the British obliged Muhammad Ali to dismantle his state monopolies. The British opened a bank in İzmir, Turkey, in the same year. Moses Pariente, a Moroccan Jew operating under British consular protection out of Europe's trading entrepôt of Tangier, opened Morocco's first bank, a trading house tied to the Anglo-Egyptian Bank based in London and Gibraltar, in 1844.

Although Britain's İzmir venture failed, the Ottoman authorities took up the challenge to modernize their finances. The Porte (the Ottoman authorities) prevailed upon two *sarraflar* (money changers) to establish the Bank of Istanbul in 1847 to trade in *sehim kaimesi* (treasury bond documents), and Tunisia's infamous finance minister, Mahmud Bin Ayad, immediately followed suit with a central bank, Dar al-Mal, to issue treasury bills. But these experiments in central banking were short lived: Bin Ayad looted his bank and fled the country in 1852.

Virtually all of the other commercial banks founded in the nineteenth century were European, and they displaced the moneychangers or, like the National Bank of Egypt, subcontracted with them for business in the informal agricultural sector. The oldest survivor into the twenty-first century is the Osmanli Bankasi (Ottoman Bank), originally founded in London in response to the Ottoman decree of 1856, inspired by Her Majesty's Government, calling for "banks and other similar institutions" to promote and monitor overseas loans to the Ottoman treasury. The Ottoman Bank acquired a distinctly French look after 1863, when a consortium led by Crédit Mobilier doubled its shares and renamed it the Banque Impériale Ottomane (Ottoman Imperial Bank). As the result of a merger in 2001, it became Turkey's ninth largest bank but is wholly owned by an even larger Turkish private sector bank. The National Bank of Egypt, founded in 1898 and nationalized by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1964, is one of Egypt's two most powerful state banks. The only other recognizable remnant of nineteenth-century European imperialism is the Banque Franco-Tunisienne, founded in 1878 but barely surviving in the twenty-first century after years of mismanagement by a leading Tunisian public sector bank.

National Banking Systems

Banking was too strategic an industry to escape the control of national governments once they achieved a degree of economic and political independence from their foreign sponsors. The patterns of control varied with the political and economic strategies of the respective regimes. The monarchies tended to prefer indirect family control through their business interests, whereas the single-party states, such as Turkey in the 1930s, and Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Tunisia in the 1960s, established public sectors for absorbing most or all of the banks, whether they were foreign or locally owned. Iran followed suit after the revolution of 1979. Israel had to bail out its big banks in 1983 but succeeded in selling off the government's share in some of them. The only republic in the region to support a privately owned banking system is Lebanon. Until the Civil War broke out in 1975, Lebanon was the financial center and trading entrepôt for much of the Middle East. Its Bank Control Commission regulates the eighty or so commercial banks on behalf of the Banque du Liban, the country's central bank, and remains a model in the region for the professional supervision of banks.

Like Lebanon, the monarchies that survived the revolutions sweeping the Arab world in the 1950s and 1960s tended to conserve their banks as well as their ruling families, and they encouraged local businesspeople to gain control of the banks in the 1970s and 1980s, usually continuing a close association with their foreign founders. Until 2003, for instance, Citibank not only had a 30 percent interest in the Saudi American Bank but also a management contract. The leading Moroccan banks, despite the Moroccanization of commerce in 1973, have kept close ties with the French banks that founded them. In Jordan, the Arab Bank deserves special mention: Founded by Abd al-Hamid Shoman in Jerusalem in 1930, the bank survived the creation of Israel in 1948 and Jordan's subsequent takeover of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. It is not only the oldest locally owned bank but also one of the largest international ones to be based in an Arab country. The other large international players, such as Arab Banking Corporation, are based in the Persian Gulf states (see Table 1). Bahrain, a money-market center for offshore international banking since the mid 1970s, became the center for Islamic finance in the twenty-first century as well.

Market Penetration

Many Muslims tend to distrust banks, either out of a general distrust of public institutions or because they object to interest on religious grounds. The banking systems that preserved continuity with their foreign origins tended to be more in touch with local depositors than the public sector monopolies that broke with the foreign banks. The percentage of money held in banks, rather than as cash under people's mattresses, was high in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) city states and also in Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran—countries that had delayed or never gotten around to nationalizing their respective banking systems.

The small size of a country may ease the penetration of banks into household finance, but the banks of large countries like Turkey and Iran also substantially outperformed those in all Arab countries except Lebanon. Lebanon had always encouraged commercial banking, which became its virtual

Top 100 Arab banks

Country	Bank	Capital (US $m)	Total assets (US $m)	Capital assets ratio (%)	Return on assets (%)
Syria	Commercial Bank of Syria	730	66,215	1.1	0.2
Bahrain	Arab Banking Corporation	2,110	26,586	7.94	0.6
Saudi Arabia	National Commercial Bank	2,275	26,569	8.56	na
Egypt	National Bank of Egypt	1,027	22,631	4.54	0.61
Jordan	Arab Bank	1,865	22,228	8.39	1.41
Saudi Arabia	Saudi American Bank	2,243	20,623	10.87	2.91
Saudi Arabia	Riyad Bank	2,139	17,933	11.93	2.01
Egypt	Banque Misr	528	16,130	3.27	0.44
Bahrain	Gulf International Bank	1,236	15,232	8.11	0.61
Kuwait	National Bank of Kuwait	1,421	14,551	9.77	2.52
Saudi Arabia	Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation	1,794	13,816	12.99	2.98
Saudi Arabia	Saudi British Bank	1,055	11,194	9.42	1.98
Saudi Arabia	Arab National Bank	887	10,785	8.23	1.2
Saudi Arabia	Al Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi	1,075	10,683	10.06	2.11
Egypt	Banque du Caire	358	9,422	3.8	0.39
U.A.E.	National Bank of Dubai	1,133	8,893	12.74	1.38
U.A.E.	National Bank of Abu Dhabi	878	8,782	10	1.96
Libya	Libyan Arab Foreign Bank	445	8,769	5.08	1.52
Qatar	Qatar National Bank	1,294	7,797	16.6	1.86
Kuwait	Kuwait Finance House	685	7,674	8.93	2.26
U.A.E.	Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank	1,035	7,241	14.3	2.35
Algeria	Banque Extérieure d'Algérie	244	7,116	3.43	0.11
Saudi Arabia	Saudi Hollandi Bank	550	6,721	8.18	1.96
Morocco	Crédit Populaire du Maroc	536	6,716	7.99	1.63
U.A.E.	Emirates Bank International	1,075	6,406	16.78	2.38
Lebanon	Blom Bank	285	6,285	4.54	1.41
Egypt	Bank of Alexandria	322	6,225	5.18	0.55
U.A.E.	Mashreqbank	797	6,181	12.89	1.93
Kuwait	Gulf Bank	619	6,114	10.12	2.24
Algeria	Banque Nationale d'Algérie	312	5,944	5.25	0.6
Algeria	Crédit Populaire d'Algérie	273	5,557	4.91	0.02
Kuwait	Commercial Bank of Kuwait	618	5,503	11.22	2.12
Kuwait	Burgan Bank	530	4,839	10.95	1.46
Lebanon	Banque de la Méditerranée	470	4,659	10.09	0.64
Lebanon	Byblos Bank	271	4,651	5.83	1.14
Lebanon	Banque Audi	247	4,567	5.42	0.95
Morocco	Banque Commerciale du Maroc	441	4,313	10.23	2.14
Morocco	Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur	449	4,199	10.7	1.11
U.A.E.	Dubai Islamic Bank	310	4,175	7.41	1.02
Egypt	Commercial International Bank (Egypt)	351	4,143	8.47	2.43
Bahrain	Ahli United Bank	542	4,103	13.22	1.34
Saudi Arabia	Saudi Investment Bank	594	4,073	14.59	1.99
Kuwait	Al-Ahli Bank of Kuwait	518	3,859	13.42	1.18
U.A.E.	Union National Bank	401	3,613	11.11	1.83
Kuwait	Bank of Kuwait & the Middle East	445	3,519	12.64	1.47
Oman	BankMuscat	318	3,502	9.08	0.68
Bahrain	Investcorp Bank	918	3,443	26.66	1.46
Lebanon	Banque Libano-Française	186	3,286	5.66	1.23
Morocco	Wafabank	317	3,253	9.73	1.6
Lebanon	Fransabank	218	3,108	7.03	1.3
Bahrain	Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait	299	2,929	10.21	1.52
Egypt	Misr International Bank	232	2,910	7.99	1.92
Bahrain	National Bank of Bahrain	330	2,868	11.5	1.68
Egypt	Arab International Bank	405	2,746	14.75	0.38
Tunisia	Société Tunisienne de Banque	235	2,668	8.8	1.17
Oman	National Bank of Oman	245	2,472	9.89	-0.64
Egypt	Suez Canal Bank	166	2,450	6.77	0.94
Jordan	The Housing Bank for Trade and Finance	362	2,410	15.01	1.76
Tunisia	Banque Nationale Agricole	243	2,242	10.84	0.97

[continued]

Top 100 Arab banks [CONTINUED]

Country	Bank	Capital (US $m)	Total assets (US $m)	Capital assets Ratio (%)	Return on assets (%)
Egypt	Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt	77	2,221	3.45	0.39
Lebanon	Credit Libanais	108	2,123	5.1	0.92
U.A.E.	Commercial Bank of Dubai	333	2,002	16.63	2.94
Jordan	Jordan National Bank	98	1,910	5.12	-0.03
Tunisia	Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie	156	1,810	8.62	1.55
Qatar	Doha Bank	172	1,787	9.64	1.17
Oman	Oman International Bank	229	1,749	13.08	0.38
Lebanon	Bank of Beirut & the Arab Countries	78	1,682	4.64	0.79
U.A.E.	Arab Bank for Investment & Foreign Trade	336	1,573	21.35	0.7
Egypt	National Bank for Development	95	1,567	6.05	0.89
Egypt	Egyptian American Bank	116	1,537	7.56	1.06
Egypt	National Société Générale Bank	125	1,487	8.41	2.27
Libya	Sahara Bank	269	1,483	18.14	1.18
Qatar	Commercial Bank of Qatar	182	1,431	12.71	1.94
Morocco	Crédit du Maroc	128	1,417	9.04	1.13
Saudi Arabia	Bank Al-Jazira	185	1,365	13.53	1.12
Jordan	Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance & Investment	76	1,280	5.9	0.15
Bahrain	Shamil Bank of Bahrain	258	1,242	20.8	1.69
Qatar	Qatar Islamic Bank	102	1,213	8.4	1.52
Tunisia	Banque du Sud	101	1,079	9.35	1.55
Jordan	Bank of Jordan	75	1,040	7.18	2.52
Egypt	Arab African International Bank	142	1,029	13.84	1.01
Tunisia	Banque de Tunisie	116	945	12.28	2.59
U.A.E.	First Gulf Bank	141	938	15.08	1.79
Bahrain	United Gulf Bank	214	931	23.01	0.43
Bahrain	Bahrain International Bank	176	888	19.78	-5.29
Egypt	Cairo Barclays Bank	64	877	7.3	1.49
Oman	Oman Arab Bank	100	832	12.01	2.14
Jordan	Jordan Kuwait Bank	76	804	9.44	1.78
U.A.E.	National Bank of Fujairah	151	718	21.1	2.66
U.A.E.	Invest bank	135	700	19.31	3.11
U.A.E.	Rakbank	147	660	22.32	2.49
Bahrain	Bahraini Saudi Bank	88	595	14.82	2
U.A.E.	National Bank of Sharjah	188	557	33.8	3.73
Egypt	Delta International Bank	108	544	19.88	5.9
Bahrain	TAIB Bank	145	540	26.88	1.84
U.A.E.	Bank of Sharjah	93	525	17.78	2.6
Egypt	Société Arabe Internationale de Banque	85	500	16.89	2.1
U.A.E.	United Arab Bank	117	484	24.08	4.04
U.A.E.	National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain	126	466	27.04	3.45
Bahrain	Albaraka Islamic Bank	62	260	23.83	1.06

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

government during the anarchy of 1975 through 1990. Turkey systematically encouraged a Turkish private sector after 1924, and Iran delayed its revolutionary attack on privately owned banks until 1979, when the banks had already acquired substantial control over the country's money—a control that would be recovered in the 1990s (see Table 2).

Liberalization

Under the gun of international debt workouts after 1982 (but this time by international financial institutions rather than the nineteenth-century imperialists), most of the commercial banking systems in the region were partially liberalized in the 1990s. In the predominantly state-owned banking systems of Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, liberalization meant adding a satellite private sector, whereas reform in the monarchies tended to strengthen privately owned oligopolies in defense of their respective ruling families. The different regimes of the Middle East and North Africa were able to parry the international pressures for reform so as to reinforce rather than undermine their enduring authoritar-

The Saudi Arabia Bank in Riyadh. Banks in much of the Middle East and North Africa serve as important means of exercising political control and patronage, and many of them, particularly in countries with royal families, have maintained close ties to foreign founders or investment groups. **© Thomas Hartwell/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

Money in banks as percent of money supply

	1975	1980	1985	1989	1990	1995	1998
Algeria	62.2%	54.7%	65.8%	61.1%	60.6%	68.7%	69.7%
Bahrain	86.9%	88.9%	91.3%	91.9%	88.7%	92.6%	95.0%
Egypt	52.4%	67.2%	73.0%	82.9%	85.0%	86.0%	85.8%
Iran	85.9%	72.5%	76.1%	81.3%	82.7%	89.0%	90.1%
Iraq	46.5%	43.3%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Israel	85.0%	91.3%	98.2%	96.4%	96.2%	96.7%	n/a
Jordan	52.4%	64.1%	71.7%	73.1%	71.3%	78.1%	82.5%
Kuwait	88.6%	91.2%	92.6%	93.7%	n/a	95.2%	95.4%
Lebanon	79.0%	86.2%	91.4%	92.2%	91.3%	95.4%	96.9%
Libya	74.6%	83.3%	80.5%	78.1%	76.4%	77.7%	68.6%
Mauritania	69.5%	66.4%	66.1%	71.2%	73.8%	71.6%	n/a
Morocco	67.4%	67.3%	71.5%	73.7%	74.3%	76.8%	79.3%
Oman	67.4%	70.8%	80.9%	82.8%	81.7%	84.4%	88.5%
Qatar	86.3%	84.7%	90.1%	91.3%	90.1%	92.4%	93.6%
Saudi	62.4%	66.8%	75.7%	81.1%	76.1%	82.1%	84.1%
Sudan	61.0%	61.3%	n/a	n/a	59.4%	64.2%	60.0%
Syria	48.0%	44.1%	53.4%	48.5%	48.1%	53.4%	54.3%
Tunisia	75.6%	79.3%	80.0%	83.1%	82.0%	83.2%	84.4%
Turkey	77.9%	77.0%	88.2%	88.8%	87.9%	92.5%	95.0%
U.A.E.	92.9%	90.9%	93.7%	94.3%	92.4%	92.1%	91.7%
Yemen	n/a	n/a	n/a	54.9%	n/a	47.4%	57.6%
PRDY				52.9%			

Table by GGS Information Services, The Gale Group.

ian traits. Neither in Egypt nor Tunisia, for example, were the patronage operations of their respective state banks seriously threatened, nor has the Moroccan private sector escaped a business oligopoly that is partly owned by the Makhzan (royal treasury). But foreign competition may pose new challenges under measures that break down national barriers to financial services.

Islamic Finance

One response to global economic pressures is Islamic finance, designed to attract the savings of people who distrust conventional banks. Islamic banking emerged officially for the first time in Dubai in 1974, and two Saudi entrepreneurs, Prince Muhammad al-Faisal (son of the late King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud) and Shaykh Salih Kamil, then projected such banks to over twenty countries, including the United Kingdom and Denmark, in the subsequent decade. In some of the less developed countries, such as Sudan and Yemen, the Islamic banking movement made important inroads. The Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan enabled Hasan al-Turabi to cultivate new business networks that supported his seizure of power in 1989 (but then deserted him in 1999 when his military allies removed him). The wealthy Gulf countries, however, fuel most of the steady growth of these new institutions. In Saudi Arabia in particular, conventional banks have opened up Islamic windows to satisfy customers who reject interest as a matter of Islamic principle but who are eager to receive legitimate returns on investment. Most of the savings attracted by Islamic banks are just as likely, however, to be reinvested abroad, in the United States or Europe, as those of the conventional banks.

The international crackdown on money laundering after 11 September 2001 adversely affected Islamic banks because the Al-Baraka group of Shaykh Salih Kamil was confused with a company called Al-Baraka in Somalia, which transferred workers' remittances but was also suspected by the U.S. Treasury of being associated with international terrorists. The United States, however, has put only one very marginal Sudanese Islamic bank on its blacklist, and the Islamic banks not only recovered after the shock of 11 September but increased their share in the wealthy Gulf markets to well over 10 percent of their respective commercial banking assets.

See also Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud; Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Turabi, Hasan al-.

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Clement Moore Henry

BANKS

See Banking

BANNA, HASAN AL-

[1906–1949]

Founder of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Hasan al-Banna was born in October 1906 in al-Buhayra, one of Egypt's northern Nile delta provinces, to a religious father. He was educated first at a traditional Islamic *kuttab* (religious school) and later, at the age of twelve, joined a primary school. During the early part of his life al-Banna became involved with Sufism and continued that association for most of his life. At the age of fourteen he joined a primary teachers' school and two years

later enrolled in Dar al-Ulum College, from which he graduated as a teacher.

In Cairo during his student years, al-Banna joined religious societies involved in Islamic education. However, he soon realized that this type of religious activity was inadequate to bring the Islamic faith back to its status in the public life of Egypt. He felt that more activism was needed, so he organized students from al-Azhar University and Dar al-Ulum and started to preach in mosques and popular meeting places. During this period, al-Banna came to be influenced by the writings of Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, and Ahmad Taymur Pasha.

When he graduated in 1927 he was appointed as a teacher of Arabic in a primary school in al-Isma˓iliyya, a new small town in Egypt with a semi-European character. It hosted the headquarters of the Suez Canal Company and a sizable foreign community. In al-Isma˓iliyya al-Banna started to preach his ideas to poor Muslim workers, small merchants, and civil servants, warning his audience against the liberal lifestyle of the Europeans in the town and the dangers of emulating it, thus cultivating fear and anxiety in them.

In March 1928 he founded the Muslim Brotherhood, or Muslim Brethren. In the first four years of its existence, al-Banna's primary goal was to recruit membership, establishing branches along the eastern and western edge of the delta. The quick and remarkable spread of the Brotherhood engendered governmental resistance, especially during the cabinet of Isma˓il Sidqi.

In 1932 to 1933 al-Banna was transferred to Cairo and his group merged with the Society for Islamic Culture, forming the first branch of the Muslim Brothers, and Cairo became the headquarters of the society. During this period, the number of branches reached 1,500 to 2,000; most branches ran schools, clinics, and other welfare institutions. Branches also were established in Sudan, Syria, and Iraq, and the society's publications were distributed throughout Islamic countries.

At the beginning of his political career al-Banna did not have an elaborate program; his message focused on the centrality of Islam. Gradually, he developed the notion of Islam as a religion that embraces all aspects of human life and conduct. He declared that the objective of the Muslim Brotherhood was to create a new generation capable of understanding the essence of Islam and of acting accordingly. He believed that Islam was the solution to the problem of Egypt and the Islamic world. Following World War II, al-Banna assumed a greater political role. He started to call for the replacement of secular institutions by Islamic-oriented ones and asked for major reforms. However, al-Banna did not advocate violent political action as the means toward achieving political goals; in fact, he and several members of his organization ran for parliamentary elections more than once and lost. Al-Banna accepted the legitimacy of the Egyptian regime and tried to work from within the system. His condemnation of Egyptian parties was not based on a rejection of the idea of multiparty systems but on the rejection of corruption and manipulation. This is why the Egyptian Brethren today have been able to embrace as legitmate theories pluralism, human rights, and democracy (respectively, *ikhtilaf, al-huquq al-shar˓iyya,* and *shura*).

By the end of World War II al-Banna was an acknowledged political figure, and the Muslim Brethren had emerged as a strong force presenting itself as a political alternative. As was the case with other parties, the society established a military wing, which assassinated a number of its adversaries. The Brethren reached its apogee during the Arab-Israel War of 1948, in which the Muslim Brothers participated through their paramilitary organizations. However, the expansion of the society, its growing influence, and its development of a strong military force brought it into a clash with the government. In February 1949 al-Banna was assassinated by police agents. Today, his ideology still informs most of the moderate Islamic movements across all of the Islamic world, and his movement is still the leading ideological power behind the expansion of Islamism.

See also Abduh, Muhammad; Kuttab; Muslim Brotherhood; Rida, Rashid.

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BANNA, SABRI AL-

[1937–2002]

Palestinian militant who broke with the Palestine Liberation Organization and formed his own group.

Born in Jaffa, Sabri al-Banna (also called Abu Nidal) fled Palestine as a refugee in 1948, joined the Baʿth party in the 1950s, and later joined al-Fatah in 1967. Al-Banna eventually headed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Baghdad but also worked with the Iraqi intelligence services. He opposed the PLO's move toward a two-state solution in 1974, was expelled from al-Fatah, and formed his own group, al-Fatah—Revolutionary Council. After his eventual expulsion from Iraq, he based himself in Syria and Libya.

Abu Nidal's radical group served the interests of several Arab states, assassinating Arab and Israeli diplomats as well as other Palestinians, including moderates like Isam Sartawi in 1983. The group also gained notoriety for terrorist attacks in nearly two dozen countries, including the random killing of passengers at the Rome and Vienna airports in 1985. In 1989, internal conflicts weakened his organization, which effectively ceased to function after 1996.

Abu Nidal died of gunshot wounds in Baghdad in August 2002. Although Iraq claimed it was a suicide, al-Banna most likely was killed by Iraqi agents.

See also Baʿth, al-; Fatah, al-; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Sartawi, Issam.

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Steve Tamari
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BANNIS, MOHAMMAD

[1948–]

Moroccan poet and critic.

Mohammad Bannis was born in Fez, Morocco. He received his Ph.D. in modern Arabic poetry from the University of Rabat in 1989, and is a professor of Arabic literature at Muhammad V University in Rabat. He is director of the House of Poetry.

Bannis has published many books of literary criticism and poetry, as well as an Arabic translation of Abdelkabir Khatibi's *La Blessure du Nom Propre* (*al-Ism al-Arabi al-Jarih* [1980]). An avant-garde poet, Bannis's interests extend from poetics to graphic arts, and his writings are deeply rooted in Moroccan life and culture.

Bannis is closely involved in the political life of Morocco, and favors the involvement of the individual in changing society; otherwise, the written word is equivalent to a dead word, as he suggests in his poem "Belonging to a New Family." He is among the group of poets who changed the structure of the poem and presented a new interpretation of reality, dynamic and optimistic. His collection of poetry, *Hibat al-Faragh* (1992; Gift of leisure), clearly reflects these structural and thematic changes. Another experimental technique is employed in *Mawasim al-Sharq* (1986; Festivals of the east), in which he combines poetic prose with free verse. The poems adopt the shapes of the ideas they embody. In *Kitab al-Hubb* (1995; Book of love) Bannis delves into the world of dreams to understand the emotions of love, whereas in *al-Makan al-Wathaniyy* (1996; Pagan place) the poet seeks a close connection with nature.

See also Literature: Arabic, North African.

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Aida A. Bamia

BANOCO

See Bahrain National Oil Company

BAQRI FAMILY

Prominent Jewish family in Algeria.

The Cohen–Baqri family (not related to the Arab Bakri family) was one of three Livornese (Italy) Jewish clans (the others were the Boucharas and the Busnachs) that were prominent in Algerian com-

merce and politics throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Invariably it was a member of one of these three families who served as *muqaddam* (government-appointed head) of the Jewish community in Algiers.

In 1797, Joseph Baqri and his brother-in-law Naphtali Busnach went into partnership. Naphtali was the chief adviser of the newly elected Dey Mustafa, and all diplomatic and commercial contact with the regency had to go through the Baqri & Busnach firm. It was over a debt of 5 million French francs owed to the firm by the government of France since the 1780s that the Dey Husayn insulted France's consul in 1827. This touched off an international "incident" that ended with the French invasion of 1830. The last Baqri of importance was Jacob, who was reconfirmed as "Chef de la Nation Juive" by the French in November 1830 but moved to France shortly thereafter.

See also BUSNACH FAMILY.

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NORMAN STILLMAN

BARAHENI, REZA

[1935–]

An Iranian poet, essayist, novelist, and literary critic.

Reza Baraheni was born in Tabriz and educated in his native city through college. He went to Turkey for graduate work, obtaining a Ph.D. in literature from Istanbul University in 1963. After returning to Iran, he became a professor of English at Tehran University. During the 1960s and 1970s, he produced several volumes of verse and essays and established literary criticism as a serious discipline. In 1972, government censors banned publication of his first novel, *The Infernal Days of Mr. Ayaz.* By this time, his essays were becoming increasingly critical of political and social life in Iran under the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. In the fall of 1973, after returning from a one-year sabbatical in the United States, he was arrested by the secret police and detained under brutal conditions for 102 days. He described his prison experiences in *God's Shadow: Prison Poems.*

Baraheni left Iran in 1975 and settled in the United States but continued to be an outspoken critic of political repression in his native country. After the shah was deposed in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Baraheni returned to Iran and resumed teaching at Tehran University. However, he was purged from the faculty in the cultural revolution of 1980 and was arrested briefly in 1981 and again in 1982. During the 1980s and early 1990s, he published numerous essays and several popular novels, but he also became critical of intellectual repression. In 1994, he was one of the signatories of an open letter to authorities condemning the lack of freedom of expression in Iran. In 1997, he decided for a second time to live in exile and moved to Canada, where he became a professor of comparative literature in Toronto. In June 2001, Baraheni was elected president of PEN Canada, an international organization of writers.

See also IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA.

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BARAKA

See GLOSSARY

BARAKAT, HODA

[1952–]

A Lebanese novelist.

Hoda (also Huda) Barakat was born in Beirut in 1952 and grew up in a Maronite family. She studied French literature, married a Muslim, and in 1989 left Lebanon, with her two sons, for Paris, where she began to write and publish in Arabic. Although she had published a collection, *Al-Thaʿirat* (The female rebels), in 1985, Barakat is best known for her powerful novels, set during or after the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990). Her 1990 *Hajar al-Duhk* (Stone of laughter) won the prestigious Al-Naqid Award. It brilliantly investigates the

distorting consequences of war. Her 1993 *Ahl al-Hawa* (People of the breeze) extends the Lebanese narrative to a postwar era in which war is clearly still playing itself out within the national psyche. The 1998 *Harith al-Miyah* (Tiller of waters) focuses on Beirut, a city Barakat admits to both loving and hating, a city totally altered by the war experience.

Although she lives and writes in France, Barakat is intent on writing in the language she worships, Arabic. All of her novels to date are first-person male narratives, complicating gender perceptions and revealing how entwined sex, violence, and identity are. Barakat has emerged as one of the more interesting literary voices from Lebanon, pushing the boundaries of narration by internalizing the war in fiction written in an idiosyncratic Arabic language.

See also Gender: Gender and Education; Lebanese Civil War (1958); Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanon; Literature: Arabic.

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Elise Salem

BARAK, EHUD

[1942–]

Professional soldier and Israeli politician, prime minister (1999–2001).

Ehud Barak, a distinguished and decorated professional soldier, will likely be remembered as the Israeli prime minister who failed in a dramatic attempt to reach a peace agreement with Yasir Arafat. Barak was born in 1942 and educated in a kibbutz. He joined the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in 1959, became a professional soldier and rose quickly through the ranks, holding positions such as commander of the prestigious central commando unit—a position in which he personally distinguished himself in a number of audacious commando raids. One such operation was the rescue of passengers of a Sabena airliner that was hijacked at Lod Airport, in which Barak and ten other commando fighters penetrated the plane dressed as mechanics. Barak, disguised as an Arab woman, also led a squad to assassinate top-level Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) officials in Beirut.

During the October 1973 Arab–Israel War, Barak distinguished himself as a tank battalion commander on the Sinai front. In 1976 he was a member of the team that planned the Entebbe operation, in which the passengers of an Air France plane hijacked to Uganda were rescued and brought back to Israel.

In 1982, as chief of operations at the General Staff, he rose to the rank of major general. During the 1982 war in Lebanon, he was the deputy commander of an army corps fighting against the Syrians in the Biqa Valley. In 1983 he was appointed chief of military intelligence, and in 1986 he served as the commander of the Central Command in charge of the West Bank and the Jordanian front. In 1987 he became deputy chief, and in 1991 chief, of the General Staff, reaching the rank of lieutenant general.

During his military service he gained the highest number of any soldier of medals and citations for bravery and courage in battle, among them the highest Exemplary Medal. Twice during his service he was sent by the IDF to take up academic studies, earning a bachelor's degree in physics and mathematics from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and a master's degree in systems analysis from Stanford University in California.

As chief of staff he had reservations regarding the Oslo Accords but loyally implemented them and coordinated the military aspects of the first deployment of the PLO in the Gaza Strip and Jericho. He also participated in discussions with the Syrians led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and met twice with the Syrian chief of staff.

In 1995 Ehud Barak ended his term as chief of staff and brought to a close thirty-six years of service in the IDF. After the required "cooling-off period" of six months, he joined Rabin's government as minister of the interior. After the assassination of Rabin, Barak was elected in November 1996 to the 14th Knesset, after winning third place on the list in the Labor Party's primary elections. When Shimon Peres failed in his bid to be elected prime minister, Barak replaced him as the head of the Labor Party. For two years he led the opposition to

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Knesset and defeated him in the May 1999 elections by an impressive majority of 56 percent of the votes.

In July 1999 Barak became prime minister, heading a broad coalition. His first dramatic act was to order the final and total retreat of the IDF from the southern Lebanon "security zone," dismembering on this occasion the South Lebanese Army, which had been allied with the IDF. He also tried to arrive at an agreement with the Syrians but failed. He was ready to retreat only to the international border, and rejected the Syrian demand for a withdrawal to the lines of 4 June 1967, which would have permitted them to sit on the northeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee and to have some claim to its waters.

Barak then turned to the Palestinians and offered them the most far-reaching concessions ever offered by an Israeli prime minister. This included withdrawal from over 90 percent of the territories occupied in 1967, sovereignty over the Arab parts of Jerusalem, and recognition of a Palestinian state. But he rejected Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount and was unyielding in his demand that the Palestinians publicly forgo the "right of return" of their refugees. While there is much dispute over the reasons for the collapse of the Camp David summit convened by U.S. president Bill Clinton in July 2000, Barak blamed Yasir Arafat for his refusal to accept his "generous" offer and to accede to Israel's conditions.

By late summer 2000, Barak's coalition was tottering and was given a death blow by the failure of Camp David and the outbreak of riots and other forms of violence that ushered in the second intifada (the al-Aqsa Intifada). Barak lost his majority in the Knesset and called for new elections, in which his party lost miserably to the Likud, led by Ariel Sharon. Barak resigned his position as Labor Party leader and also his Knesset seat. He began a new business career, but remained in the public eye, commenting frequently on issues of peace and security and leaving many with the feeling that Ehud Barak might one day return to politics.

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MORDECHAI BAR-ON

BARAKZAI, AFDAL

See BARAKZAI DYNASTY

BARAKZAI DYNASTY

Rulers of Afghanistan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The Barakzai dynasty of Afghanistan was created gradually. Although the Barakzai were Durrani Pushtuns, their advent marked a departure from the

Zahir Shah (photographed about 1950) was the king of Afghanistan from 1933 to 1973, but relatives serving in turn as prime minister wielded actual power until 1963. This was followed by a decade of emerging reforms under a new constitution, until the king's cousin overthrew him. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

The former king, Zahir Shah (second from right), returned to Afghanistan in April 2002, after a 29-year exile in Italy. Days later, joined by Afghan interim leader Hamid Karzai (to his right), he prayed at the mausoleum of his royal father, Nadir Shah, in Kabul. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

imperial mode of government that characterized the Durrani dynasty and empire. Unable to preserve the empire, the Barakzai divided the country into a series of competing principalities, which fought one another. This competition eventually resulted in the creation of a centralized state and the concentration of power in the hands of the Mohammadzai lineage of the Barakzai clan. The Mohammadzais faced a number of domestic and foreign challenges to their power but held on until 1973.

The Barakzai brothers rose to prominence during the reign of Shah Mahmud Durrani (1809–1818), when Fateh Khan Barakzai became chief minister and appointed several of his brothers to important governorships. In 1818, the crown prince had Fateh Khan blinded; seeking revenge, his brothers overthrew Shah Mahmud and brought about the collapse of the Durrani dynasty. They were, however, unable to agree among themselves and ended up carving three principalities centered around Kabul, Peshawar, and Kandahar. Dost Mohammad, who gained control of Kabul in 1826, was ousted from power in 1838 in the course of the first Anglo–Afghan war. He returned in 1842 and extended his control to all the Afghan provinces. During the wars of succession that followed his death, the country again was divided. Sher Ali (r. 1863–1866; 1869–1879) succeeded in establishing a centralized state, but the second British invasion of 1878–1880 shattered the political structure he had built.

Ceding control of the country's foreign relations to Great Britain, Abd al-Rahman Khan (r. 1880–1901) concentrated his efforts on consolidating yet again a centralized polity in Afghanistan. He also attended to the welfare of his Mohammadzai lineage by assigning both its male and female members a regular stipend disbursed by the state. During his reign, the country acquired its present boundaries, including the disputed Durand Line dividing the Pushhtuns between Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier Province of British India. He was the last Barakzai ruler to die peacefully while still in power. His son and successor, Habibollah Khan (r. 1901–1919), was assassinated, and his grandson Amanollah Khan (r. 1919–1929) was overthrown.

The Barakzai briefly lost power in 1929 when a Tajik villager, Habibollah Khan, Bacha-e Saqqao, the son of a water carrier, became ruler for nine months. They regained control under the leadership of Nadir Shah (r. 1929–1933), a descendant of Dost Mohammad's brother. Nadir Shah derived most of the state's revenue from taxes on foreign trade. In return, he conceded many privileges to the merchant class, who established modern financial and industrial enterprises. Following his assassination by a student, his son Zahir Shah (r. 1933–1973) succeeded him.

Zahir Shah reigned but for the most part did not rule. In a first phase, his two uncles, Muhammad Hashem (prime minister 1929–1946) and Shah Mahmud (prime minister 1946–1953), managed the affairs of the state. Then for a decade his cousin and brother-in-law, Muhammad Daud, exercised power, also as prime minister. Daud, taking advantage of the polarization of world politics, welcomed offers of foreign aid from both the Soviet Union and the United States. The state's shift from relying on domestic revenue to relying on foreign aid reinforced the power of the Mohammadzai lineage at the expense of the merchant class. The Afghan bureaucracy expanded substantially. A number of state-sponsored projects in irrigation and road building were initiated.

Daud was forced to resign when his policy of confrontation with Pakistan backfired in 1963. Za-

hir Shah promulgated a new constitution and assumed actual power, selecting prime ministers from outside the lineage. During the following decade, the country witnessed the formation of political movements and the emergence of a free press. In 1973, Daud overthrew Zahir and proclaimed a republic, although he suppressed the political freedoms that had been implemented by Zahir Shah. His overthrow by an Afghan Marxist party in April 1978 marked the end of the Barakzai rule in Afghanistan.

See also Abd al-Rahman Khan; Amanollah Khan; Dost Mohammad Barakzai; Durand Line; Durrani Dynasty; Habibollah Khan; Nadir Barakzai, Mohammad; Pushtun.

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Ashraf Ghani
Updated by Eric Hooglund

BARBARY PIRATE

See Corsairs

BARBARY STATES

Sixteenth-century term for states of North Africa's Mediterranean shore.

Morocco and the Ottoman Empire provinces of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, which ranged along the southern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, became known in the West as the Barbary states beginning in the sixteenth century. In the West, they became synonymous with Corsair raiding and the so-called Barbary pirates, who waged the Barbary wars against ships of Christian states until 1821.

See also Barbary Wars; Corsairs.

Jerome Bookin-Wiener

BARBARY WARS

Naval battles from the sixteenth century until 1821 between European powers and corsairs of North Africa who were attacking merchant shipping in the Mediterranean.

With the Christian reconquest of Spain from the Moors in the west and the rise of the Ottoman Empire in the east, the Mediterranean basin became the stage for a major, long-running confrontation between Christianity and Islam. Naval warriors (called the Barbary pirates, but more correctly corsairs) based in the North African port cities of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Rabat-Salé in Morocco were among the most important frontline participants in the conflict. They began in the sixteenth century and lasted until the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1821) outlawed their activity.

The corsairs seized the ships of the Christian states whose rulers did not have treaties with their political overlords, took their goods, and sold their passengers and crews into slavery. As a result, a series of wars was fought throughout the period between the Europeans (after 1800 the newly independent United States of America also became involved) and their North African corsair adversaries. Because the corsairs served the interests of some of the Europeans, and their depredations against commercial shipping served the interests of the mercantilist policies of the time, the Christian nations never formed a common front against them.

It was only with the rise of free trade as the dominant theory in international trade that the powers banded together to quash the corsairs following Napoléon Bonaparte's defeat in 1815. The final stand of the corsairs came in 1818, with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1821 putting an end to the era by banning piracy, privateering, and corsairing.

See also Corsairs.

Jerome Bookin-Wiener

BARDO, TREATY OF

See Tunisia: Overview

BARGHUTHI FAMILY

Prominent Palestinian family from the Ramallah area, north of Jerusalem.

Since the latter years of the Ottoman Empire, members of the Barghuthi family have played

prominent roles in Palestinian politics. Umar Salih (1894–1965), a lawyer, politician, and historian, was an active Arab nationalist during Ottoman rule in Palestine. He received a law degree from the Government Law School in Jerusalem in 1924 and taught there from 1933 to 1948. He was a founding member of the Palestinian Arab National Party in 1923. In 1952, he was appointed to the Jordanian senate and in 1954 was elected to the chamber of deputies. Bashir (1931–), the general secretary of the Palestinian People's Party (formerly the Palestine Communist Party), founded Jerusalem's Palestinian weekly *al-Taliʿa* in 1978. In 1996, he was appointed minister without portfolio in the Palestinian Authority. Mustafa (1954–) is a physician and chairman of the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, one of the grassroots organizations that formed the social and political backbone of the first Intifada.

See also Arab Nationalism; Barghuthi, Marwan; Intifada (1987–1991); Palestinian Authority.

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Steve Tamari
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

BARGHUTHI, MARWAN

[1959–]

Palestinian activist and parliamentarian.

Born in the West Bank village of Kubar, Barghuthi joined al-Fatah at age fifteen and helped form Shabiba, its youth group in the West Bank. After six years of Israeli imprisonment, he was deported in May 1987. While in exile, he was elected to the Revolutionary Council of al-Fatah in August 1989. Exile also saw him finally finish the B.A. studies in history and political science he had begun at Bir Zeit University eleven years earlier, which had been interrupted by his imprisonment and deportation. He later earned an M.A. in international relations from Bir Zeit in 1988.

As a result of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, Barghuthi returned from exile in April 1994 and became secretary-general of al-Fatah's Higher Committee in the West Bank. He supported the peace process and tried to mobilize Palestinian support for it. In January 1996, he was elected to the Palestinian Council as an independent when Yasir Arafat, head of al-Fatah, refused to let him run as a candidate for the movement. Barghuthi grew vocally critical of the abuse of power in the Palestinian Authority over which Arafat presided, even presenting a no-confidence motion in the legislature in April 1997. He became one of the most popular and important political figures in the West Bank, and as a dynamic young West Bank insider was seen by some Palestinians as a possible replacement for the aging Arafat and the PLO outsiders who had returned with him from exile in 1994.

With the intense Israeli-Palestinian fighting of the al-Aqsa Intifada, which began in October 2000, Barghuthi broke with other al-Fatah figures and supported the Palestinians' use of arms against the Israelis. Israel accused him of leading both the Tanzim, a Fatah militia, and Fatah's al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a militant movement implicated in terrorist attacks against Israelis. In April 2002, Barghuthi was arrested in Ramallah by Israeli forces and became the highest ranking Palestinian seized to date. He was put on trial in an Israel civil court, rather than the usual military tribunal, in June 2002 to face charges of murder. Barghuthi refused to recognize the court's standing and continued to call for change in the Palestinian Authority.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arafat, Yasir; Barghuthi Family; Fatah, al-; West Bank.

Michael R. Fischbach

BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY

University in Ramat Gan, Israel, that features Jewish studies.

The university was founded in 1955 as an institution of higher learning that would fulfill the basic aims of Judaic tradition. The curriculum for both

men and women includes required courses in Jewish studies, which pursue the goals of integrating Judaism and present-day reality—cultivating a respect for Jewish principles and customs. Pinhas Churgin was the university's founder and first president. In 2003 it had 32,000 students, including those studying at five regional colleges. The university offers undergraduate and graduate degrees in liberal arts, social sciences, and natural sciences. There are faculties in Jewish studies, humanities, social sciences, natural sciences, and law.

In November 1995, Yigal Amir, a law student at Bar-Ilan, assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The following day all classes were canceled and the university's president issued a statement expressing "deep shock, horror and utter condemnation." Bar-Ilan was subjected to massive criticism for fostering or allowing religious and political extremism. One of the most significant points made was that while students were exposed to the extreme religious politics of Jewish settlers on the West Bank and Gaza, no moderate alternative views were to be heard on campus. This derived, at least in part, from the fact that the university's founders decided to follow the pattern of Roman Catholic universities in the United States, rather than that of Yeshiva University in New York. Ironically, Bar-Ilan originally neglected direct religious education. This was changed in 1970 when a religious studies unit was established.

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MIRIAM SIMON
UPDATED BY PAUL RIVLIN

BARING, EVELYN

[1841–1917]

British consul general and Egypt's virtual ruler, 1883–1907.

One of Britain's most illustrious proconsular figures, Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, contributed profoundly through his policies in Egypt to the



Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer) was consul general of Egypt for twenty-four years. During his tenure he reorganized its army, modernized its financial system, and extended its trade and communication along Western lines. PHOTOGRAPH BY ELLIOTT & FRY, LONDON. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

modern history of that country. As an administrator he stressed fiscal stability, hydraulic reform, and the cultivation and export of cotton. Critics charged him with neglecting industrialization and failing to fund vital social services, especially education. During his latter years in Egypt the nationalist movement revived, having been moribund since the Urabi revolt, and from then on became a vital force in Egyptian politics.

Lord Cromer was born Evelyn Baring on 26 February 1841 at Cromer Hall in Norfolk, England, a son of Henry Baring, a member of Parliament. His father died when Evelyn was seven, and the youngster was raised by his mother. In 1855 he entered the military academy at Woolwich and was commissioned as an artillery officer three years later. His first posting was to the Ionian Islands; it

proved formative for him. Not only did he meet his future wife, Ethel Stanley, there but he also learned Greek and acquired an interest in ancient history—an intellectual avocation he pursued throughout his lifetime.

Upon returning to Britain he entered the military staff college, but instead of pursuing the military career for which his education had prepared him, Captain Baring in 1872 became private secretary to his cousin, Lord Northbrook, who was viceroy of India at the time. This decision cast his fate with Britain's overseas imperial interests. He quickly distinguished himself as a resourceful and skilled administrator and a person destined for high office. In 1877, at a time when the government of Egypt was endeavoring to stave off bankruptcy under the profligate rule of its viceroy, Khedive Ismaʿil ibn Ibrahim (1863–1879), Baring was selected as the British representative on a multinational financial body, the Caisse de la Dette Publique, or Egyptian Public Debt Commission, which protected the interests of the European creditors of the Egyptian government. In May 1879 Baring left Egypt, resigned his army commission, and planned to run for Parliament in 1880. Instead, he briefly returned to Egypt in October of that year as British comptroller on the Liquidation Commission. He was not involved directly in the decision of the European powers to replace Khedive Ismaʿil with his son, Tawfiq. In June 1880 Baring became the financial adviser to the viceroy of India's council under George Robinson, Lord Ripon.

Baring's absence from Egypt proved shortlived. Discontent had surfaced within the Egyptian army during the crisis of 1879. It welled up again in 1881. A group of young native-born Egyptian officers, led by Ahmad Urabi, galvanized a movement of opposition to Ottoman Turkish rule and the growing foreign influence over the country. In September 1882, the British invaded Egypt, defeated the Egyptian army at al-Tall al-Kabir, exiled Urabi and other nationalists, and restored Tawfiq to power in Cairo. The British promised a swift evacuation of Egypt, which remained legally part of the Ottoman Empire and in which several European powers, notably France, had substantial financial and cultural interests. The British hastened to reform Egypt's administration so as to facilitate their withdrawal.

In 1883 Baring was named Britain's consul-general in Egypt. Although his choice came as a surprise to many—he was only forty-two and had not previously held such a responsible position—he was in fact ideal for the job. He already had considerable knowledge of Egypt from having served on the Caisse de la Dette. He was familiar with the imperial administration from his duties in India, and he was a recognized expert on fiscal matters. Egypt's single most pressing administrative problem was financial. In 1880 the government's external debt had totaled 100 million pounds, the interest on which consumed nearly half of Egypt's tax revenues. To realize its goal of withdrawal—a goal enunciated repeatedly in official pronouncements—Britain would have to reform Egypt's budget.

Baring devoted his first decade as consul (1883–1892) to achieving fiscal solvency. He rightly judged that the only way Egyptian finances could be reformed was by increasing agricultural production and thereby raising the tax base. The key to agricultural development, in his estimation, was irrigation, since Egypt, as the gift of the Nile River, was totally reliant on irrigation waters for its agricultural success. Muhammad Ali, ruler of Egypt from 1805 until 1849, had first begun to transform Egyptian irrigation from a basin or flood system to what was called perennial irrigation. By digging deep canals and erecting dams and weirs along the Nile, he had enabled parts of Egypt to receive irrigation waters year-round instead of only during the flood season. As a result, Egyptian farmers had begun to cultivate cotton, which, as a summer crop, required irrigation waters when the Nile was at its lowest. Unfortunately, in the latter years of Ismaʿil's reign the hydraulic system of Egypt had fallen into disrepair. Bringing some of Britain's most talented irrigation engineers to Egypt, Baring put the old system in order and then embarked upon a vigorous program of hydraulic improvement. Critical in this first decade was the repair of the Delta Barrage—a wide dam at the bifurcation of the Nile, just north of Cairo—which had been built by French and Egyptian engineers in pre-British days but never rendered serviceable.

Even the dramatic events in the Sudan in the 1880s were tied to Egyptian finances. Egypt had expanded steadily into the Sudan in the nineteenth century. The Mahdist movement threatened Egypt's

control. Because of financial pressures the British government compelled Egypt to withdraw its forces from the Sudan and to leave the fate of that territory to the Sudanese. Baring secured the evacuation of the Sudan but not before the Mahdists had killed one of Britain's war heroes, General Charles Gordon, slain while defending Anglo-Egyptian interests at Khartoum.

In 1892 Khedive Tawfiq died. He had worked closely with Baring to bring fiscal stability to the country and to improve agricultural productivity. His eldest son, Abbas Hilmi II, succeeded him. In the same year Baring was elevated to the peerage as Lord Cromer in recognition of his services to the British Empire. The political tranquillity that had characterized British rule to that point was shattered soon after Abbas came to the throne. In January 1893 the new khedive tried to replace his pro-British cabinet with a more nationalist one, and Cromer needed a letter from Foreign Secretary Archibald Primrose, Lord Rosebery, confirming the need for Egypt's viceroy to consult with the British representative about ministerial changes as long as British troops occupied Egypt. In the following January, Abbas publicly criticized the Egyptian army, which he was reviewing, and its commanding general, Sir Horatio Herbert Kitchener. Kitchener offered to resign, but Cromer, already worried by the nationalist advisers whom Abbas had brought together in his palace, moved with alacrity to defeat this challenge to British authority. A British battalion was diverted from its homeward journey and marched to Cairo in a show of strength. Abbas was compelled to back down. He reinstated Kitchener as commander. Although Cromer prevailed, these two incidents left a legacy of bitterness between the khedive and the consul. Although Abbas never again openly challenged British authority, the palace became a patron of various nationalist parties when they emerged during the early twentieth century.

During Cromer's second decade as consul, Britain extended its authority over Egypt's internal affairs and reconquered the Sudan. No longer was the prospect of evacuation imminent, although the British continued to proclaim their occupation a temporary one. Now British "advisers" were appointed in the ministries of justice, interior, and education. They sought to impose British cultural standards where previously Turkish, Egyptian, and French influences had predominated. Hydraulic reform continued apace, culminating in the construction of a massive dam at Aswan in 1902. Cotton accounted for more than 80 percent of the value of Egyptian exports at this time.

Cromer had hoped to postpone the military conquest of the Sudan until Egypt's finances were unshakable and the Aswan High Dam had been completed. The European scramble for African territory forced his hand. By the mid-1890s the Sudan was one of the few territories still independent of European colonial authority. The British deemed the upper Nile basin of vital importance to their African empire and feared that if a hostile power, like France, took control of the area, it would threaten British interests in Egypt. Hastily preparing the Egyptian army for action, Cromer sent troops into the Sudan in 1896. Khartoum fell to an Anglo-Egyptian force in 1898. A tense moment occurred on the upper White Nile at Fashoda (now Kodok) in 1898 when British and Egyptian forces under Kitchener met a small band of French soldiers under Jean-Baptiste Marchand. Both leaders claimed the territory for their countries, and war fever briefly stirred both the British and the French. Only after France had backed down and recognized Anglo-Egyptian preeminence in the Sudan did the Fashoda Incident end.

Once Cromer had engineered the military occupation of the Sudan, he set about creating its administrative system. Here he used considerable ingenuity to devise a way for Britain and Egypt to share in the governance of the Sudan. Seeking to spare the Sudan the tangle of international obligations that bedeviled Britain's rule over Egypt, he established the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium over the Sudan in 1899. By the terms of his anomalous political organization, the Sudan was exempted from the jurisdiction of the Capitulations and the Mixed Courts, while Egypt retained its formal suzerainty over the Sudan, and Britain became the effective sovereign power. Cromer's annual reports on the administration of Egypt and the Sudan were published, widely circulated, and sometimes even translated into Arabic to influence Egyptian opinion.

In the latter years of Cromer's administration, anti-British, nationalist sentiments gained in

The first Aswan Dam was constructed by the British to harness the Nile River and provide irrigation for cotton crops. Baring served as Britain's consul-general in Egypt at the time the dam's construction began. He initiated hydraulic system improvements as part of his plan for Egypt to achieve fiscal solvency. **© Hulton-Deutsch Collection. Reproduced by permission.**

strength. New political movements, like the National Party and the Umma Party, came into being, and new leaders, like Mustafa Kamil, attacked Cromer's autocratic rule. The nationalists castigated Cromer for failing to share power with Egyptians, neglecting parliamentary institutions, and starving the educational system of funds. A galvanizing nationalist event occurred in the village of Dinshaway in 1906 where the British hanged four villagers and imprisoned and publicly flogged several others for allegedly killing a British soldier while trying to protect their possessions. The severity of the sentences appalled many Egyptians (and Europeans) and came to symbolize the heavy-handedness of British rule in Egypt. Nine months after the Dinshaway Incident, Cromer submitted his resignation and left a country that he had dominated for a quarter of a century. He had never won the affection of the Egyptians, nor had he sought to do so.

In Britain Cromer did not completely cut his Egyptian ties. Always a prolific writer, with a marked scholarly bent, he published a two-volume account of Egyptian affairs before and during his time there. *Modern Egypt* (1908) was for many years the standard treatment of British rule in Egypt. It is read now, however, for its insights into the imperial mentality rather than for its descriptions of Egyptian so-

ciety or its assessment of British rule. He also wrote *Ancient and Modern Imperialism* (1910) and *Abbas II* (1915) and collected his many essays on diverse subjects into three volumes, entitled *Political and Literary Essays* (1913).

A reassessment of Cromer's work in Egypt is long overdue.

See also Abbas Hilmi II; Aswan High Dam; Capitulations; Dinshaway Incident (1906); Fashoda Incident (1898); Gordon, Charles; Isma^cil ibn Ibrahim; Kamil, Mustafa; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Mahdist State; Mixed Courts; Muhammad Ali; National Party (Egypt); Urabi, Ahmad.

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Robert L. Tignor
Updated by Arthur Goldschmidt

BARKAN, ÖMER LUTFI

[1902–1979]

Turkish social and economic historian who pioneered the study of the Ottoman state and society based on archival documentation.

Born in Edirne in 1902, Ömer Lutfi Barkan studied philosophy at Istanbul University (1927) and social sciences at the University of Strasbourg (1931).

Barkan served briefly as lycée (secondary school) teacher in Eskişehir (1931–1933) before he joined the newly organized Istanbul University in 1933. He stayed there, first in the Faculty of Letters and from 1937 in the Faculty of Economics as docent, professor (1940), dean (1950–1952), and founder and director of the Institute of Turkish Economic History (from 1955) until his retirement in 1973. He married Süreyya Meriç in 1951 and had three sons. He was a member of the Turkish Historical Society and of various international organizations.

Barkan was the first historian in the Republic of Turkey to base his historiography entirely on the vast archives of the Ottoman Empire. His publication and analysis of Ottoman provincial regulations (*Kanunlar,* 1945), provincial population and production surveys (in many articles and *Hüdavendigar* [Bursa], published posthumously), and sixteenth-century Istanbul *waqfs* (1970), to name the truly seminal of his numerous important contributions, brought Ottoman historiography to the attention of non-Orientalist Western historians, especially Fernand Braudel and the Annales school. Facilitating this mutual respect must be considered his most significant legacy.

See also Edirne; Istanbul University.

I. Metin Kunt

BAR-LEV, HAIM

[1924–1994]

Israeli general and politician.

Born in Vienna, Haim Bar-Lev grew up in Yugoslavia and immigrated to Mandatory Palestine in 1939. He joined the Palmah in 1942 and led many operations against British military installations. In the 1948 Arab–Israel War he commanded a battalion in the southern front. He remained in the army, and in 1954 and 1955 he commanded the Gi^cvati Brigade. In the 1956 Arab–Israel War Bar-Lev commanded an armored brigade that came close to the Suez Canal, and in 1957 he became chief of the Armoured Corps. From 1961 to 1963 he studied economics and business at Columbia University in New York City.

Returning to Israel, Bar-Lev became chief of military operations in 1964, deputy chief of staff in 1967, and in 1968 succeeded Yitzhak Rabin as chief of staff. He led the Israel Defense Force (IDF) in

the War of Attrition (1968–1970); Israel's line of defense along the Suez Canal, the Bar-Lev Line, was named after him. Retiring from the IDF in 1972, Bar-Lev joined Golda Meir's cabinet as minister of commerce and industry, a position he held until 1977. During the 1973 Arab–Israel War, in light of the initial debacle, he was sent to oversee the southern front and was the de facto commander of that theater.

Elected to the Knesset in 1973, Bar-Lev served as secretary-general of the Labor Party until 1984 when he was appointed minister of police in the Government of National Unity. He held this position until 1988. In 1992 he was appointed Israel's ambassador to the Russian Federation and served there until his death in 1994. Known as a tough and determined leader, he insisted on top performance and attention to details.

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MARTIN MALIN
UPDATED BY MERON MEDZINI

BAR-LEV LINE

See BAR-LEV, HAIM

BARON, DVORA

[1887–1956]

Israeli writer.

Dvora Baron was born in a small Jewish town in Lithuania. From her father, who was the rabbi of that community, Baron learned Hebrew and became versed in traditional and sacred Hebrew texts, an education unavailable to women before that time. At age sixteen she began to publish short stories in Hebrew. Baron immigrated to Palestine in 1911 and served as the literary editor of a major Zionist periodical. Although she spent most of her life in the land of Israel, the thirteen volumes of her short stories describe life in the eastern European community of her childhood, particularly the plight of women under the yoke of traditional custom and law. Regeneration through family and community, and individual victimization and human suffering, are the main themes of her work. Her style has been likened to that of Chekhov and Flaubert, authors whose works she translated into Hebrew.

See also LITERATURE: HEBREW.

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ZVIA GINOR

BARZANI FAMILY

Kurdish family of religious shaykhs and nationalist leaders.

This family is rooted in the village of Barzan, in what is today Iraqi Kurdistan (but was for centuries the Ottoman Empire). Unlike the Shemzini or the Barzinji shaykhs, the Barzanis do not claim any famous genealogy; they were uneducated and obscure mullahs until Taj ad-Din became the *khalifa* (deputy) of Mawlana Khalid (died 1826), who introduced the Naqshbandi *tariqa* (sufi order) to Kurdistan. Shaykh Muhammad (died 1903), his great-grandson, was himself a half-educated mullah but had nevertheless a considerable number of followers; after the disposition of his rival shaykh, Ubaydallah of Shemzinan, he marched on Mosul, to be captured by the Ottomans.

His sons continued the family tradition: Shaykh Abd al-Salam II (1885–1914), a nationalist leader and a religious shaykh revered by his followers, was hanged by the Ottomans. Shaykh Ahmad (died 1969), the second brother, led his first revolt in 1931 and gave up politics after the collapse of the Kurdish republic of Mahabad. Mullah Mustafa (1904–1979), the third brother, became famous under the name General Barzani. The family leadership was later split between Shaykh Muhammad Khalid, son of Shaykh Ahmad, and Masʿud Barzani, son of the general, who, after the death of his brother Idris (1944–1987), claimed the political heritage of his father.

See also KURDISH AUTONOMOUS ZONE; KURDISH REVOLTS; KURDISTAN.

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CHRIS KUTSCHERA
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

BARZANI, MAS'UD AL-

See BARZANI FAMILY

BARZANI, MUSTAFA

See BARZANI FAMILY

BASHIR

See CHEHAB, BASHIR

BASIC PEOPLE'S CONGRESSES

Part of the Libyan political structure.

The congresses provide the second level (above village and submunicipal congresses) of popular consultation and participation in the exercise of popular power in the Jamahiriyya (state of the masses) of Libya proclaimed in March 1977. Each of some two hundred basic people's congresses send three delegates to the chief debating and decision-making forum—the annual General People's Congress.

See also GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (GPC); JAMAHIRIYYA.

JOHN L. WRIGHT

BAŞIRET

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

BAŞIRETCI, ALI

[1838–1912]

Ottoman Turkish journalist.

Ali Başiretci was educated at the Imperial Service school but did not enter palace service. In 1863, he began to work for the finance ministry, and in 1869, he began to publish the daily newspaper *Başiret* (Insight), which popularized Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's ideas about Muslim unity. Accused of pro-Prussian activities during the Franco–Prussian war, Başiretci was forced into exile in Jerusalem. After being pardoned, he reentered government administration as a *qa'immaqam* in various districts. After 1908, he attempted to reestablish *Başiret,* but it was closed soon after.

See also AFGHANI, JAMAL AL-DIN AL-.

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DAVID WALDNER

BASMA BINT TALAL

[1951–]

Philanthropist and sister of Jordan's King Hussein ibn Talal (r. 1952–1999).

Princess Basma bint Talal was born into the Hashimite family as the sixth and final child of Jordan's King Talal ibn Abdullah. She was educated in Jordan and then at the Benenden School in Britain. She later studied languages at Oxford University, and in 2001 she was awarded a D.Ph. in development studies from Oxford. Noted for her work on issues of development and gender, she founded the Queen Alia Fund for Social Development in 1977 at King Hussein's request. Following his death in February 1999, the fund's name was changed to the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JHFHD). In 1992 Princess Basma founded the Jordanian National Commission for Women, part of the JHFHD, and in 1996 established the Princess Basma Women's Resource Center as part of the Queen Zein Al-Sharaf Institute for Development. From 1995 to 1997 she served as special advisor on sustainable development to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and she has also worked with the United Nations Development Programme, the World Health Organization, and UNESCO.

See also BOUTROS-GHALI, BOUTROS; HASHIMITE HOUSE (HOUSE OF HASHIM); HUSSEIN IBN TALAL; TALAL IBN ABDULLAH.

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

BASRA

City in Iraq; Iraq's only seaport, but situated some 75 miles (120 km) north of the Persian/Arabian Gulf, on the Shatt al-Arab.

Basra is an administrative and commercial center for Iraq, with a population of some 1.3 million (according to a 2002 estimate). It is linked to Baghdad, the capital, by railroad and is governed by the *muhafiz,* a chief of the administrative unit who is also the representative of the central government in Baghdad.

The seaport itself is actually situated at the head of the Shatt al-Arab, the confluence and the lower reach of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which flows for some 112 miles (180 km) to empty into the Persian Gulf. Basra is bounded on the north by the governate of Maysan, on the east by Iran, and on the west by the Western Desert. Basra has a desert climate with great temperature variations between day and night, summer and winter. The high temperature reaches 106°F (50°C); the low is above frost. Annual relative humidity is 44 to 59 percent; annual rainfall ranges between 2 and 8 inches (50–200 mm). Winters are warm, with temperatures above freezing.

Basra Harbor, ca. 1955. Once called the Venice of the East, the Iraqi city of Basra has been a major center in the Arab sea trade for over 1,300 years. Today, it is an important source of oil refining and export. **© HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

With its multitude of waterways, Basra has the right conditions for the successful cultivation of dates; the incoming and outgoing tides of some 635 rivers and channels that water approximately 14 million palm trees make the region one of the world's most fertile. Despite the devastation that occurred here during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), the orchards are still farmed in quantity. Besides the 530 kinds of dates, other crops include maize (corn), citrus, apples, and many types of vegetables.

Petroleum has become the leading industry of Basra. The upstream operations are carried out by the Iraq National Oil Company, beyond the areas allotted to the British Petroleum Company, according to laws passed in 1961. In 1975, Iraq nationalized the Basra Petroleum Company, and the era of oil concessions ended. The oil refineries and the petrochemical and fertilizer plants were moved out of Basra during the Iran–Iraq War, but the paper, fishing, and date industries still operate. Through Basra as a port-of-entry come imports, such as sugar, timber, coffee, and tea. The main exports are crude oil and petroleum products, dates, leather, and wool.

Although historically Basra was a multiethnic city, because of the political changes in Iraq since 1958, Muslim Arabs form the majority: Armenians, Indians, and Iranians are, for the most part, gone, as are the Jews. Arabic is the language of the city, and Shiʿism is the predominant form of Islam—although some few Christians, Jews, and Sabaeans remain.

The University of Basra and a branch of the University of Technology are the schools of higher education; some 385 primary schools, 175 secondary schools, and 15 vocational schools exist. The Center for Arab Gulf Studies was located in Basra, but it was moved to Baghdad in 1985.

Basra was founded by Caliph Umar I in 638 C.E. It is the Bassorah of the *Arabian Nights* and Sinbad. In 1534, Basra was made part of the Ottoman Empire by Sultan Sulayman, who incorporated Iraq into his empire; along with Baghdad and Mosul, Basra was designated one of the *vilayets* (provinces) of Ottoman Iraq. Although the Mamluks ruled Iraq for several centuries, the Ottomans reestablished their authority in 1831, ousting the Mamluks and forcefully subjugating the tribal areas. British companies meanwhile established a sphere of influence, strengthening ties with tribal shaykhs and controlling the import–export market. The strategic position of Basra as a link in the overland route to Asia or the Mediterranean created a competition between the Ottomans, Germans, British, and Indians. The growth of the British and German presence in Basra during the eighteenth century awakened the Ottomans to its importance. They therefore attempted to reestablish their domination over Basra, Kuwait, and the surrounding region.

During World War I, Basra was the first Ottoman city to fall to a British–Indian occupation, on 23 November 1914, and a military governor was appointed. Britain was planning to keep Basra under permanent jurisdiction, perhaps linking it to the Indian administrative unit, but international events worked against this. Although Britain was granted a mandate over Iraq by the League of Nations in 1920, they recognized Faisal I ibn Hussein as king in 1922 and dissolved the mandate in 1932, when Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations.

One of the factors that led to the Iran–Iraq War was control of the Shatt al-Arab, the major waterway connecting the Gulf with Iraq's port of Basra and Iran's ports of Khorramshahr and Abadan. This had been the very issue between the Ottomans and Persia (now Iran) before World War I. Because of its location, then, Basra became central to the struggle, and the surrounding countryside suffered ecological damage, which was made worse by the destruction wrought by the Coalition forces during the Gulf Crisis of 1990–1991.

See also BAGHDAD; DATES; FAISAL I IBN HUSSEIN; GULF CRISIS (1990–1991); IRAN–IRAQ WAR (1980–1988); IRAQ; MAMLUKS; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; PERSIAN GULF; PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS; SHATT AL-ARAB; TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES RIVERS.

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NAZAR AL-KHALAF

BAST

Inviolable sanctuaries in Iran used to seek protection from political or religious persecution.

Bast means sanctuary or asylum. Mosques, holy shrines, and foreign embassy compounds have most frequently been used as *bast.* Although the period of the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911) is when the most famous *bast* were taken, instances existed in early Islamic Iran. In April 1905, pro-constitutionalist merchants, bankers, and retailers took *bast* at the Shah Abd al-Azim shrine in Rayy. The most celebrated *bast* in Iranian history took place in July 1906, when between twelve thousand and sixteen thousand Tehrani demonstrators took *bast* at the British legation in Tehran, while about one thousand clergymen left the capital in protest for Qom. The *bast* at the British compound was instrumental in the granting of a constitution, and the creation of a national assembly by the monarch, Mozaffar al-Din Qajar. In turn, the anticonstitutionalist cleric Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri took *bast* at the Shah Abd al-Azim shrine with some followers for ninety days, to protest the granting of the constitution. At times, the inviolability of *bast* was breached, when for instance Sayyid Jamal al-Din Asadabadi was expelled from the Shah Abd al-Azim shrine during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah. After the constitutionalist period, the *majles* (national assembly) was also considered a *bast.* Mohammad Mossadegh took refuge there in 1953.

See also CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION; MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD; MOZAFFAR

al-Din Qajar; Naser al-Din Shah; Nuri, Fazlollah.

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Neguin Yavari

BAʿTH, AL-

A pan-Arab political party.

The Arab Socialist Renaissance (Baʿth) party was founded in Syria in 1944. In one version of the foundation myth, it was established by two Damascus schoolteachers, Michel Aflaq, an Orthodox Christian, and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a Sunni Muslim; in the other, it was started by an Alawite, Zaki al-Arsuzi. In both versions, the party advocated a mixture of national socialism, independence from foreign rule, and pan-Arabism (the creation of a unitary Arab state), and was to be the main instrument through which the goal of Arab unity would be achieved. Its main slogan was and is, "One Arab nation with an eternal mission." Baʿthist ideology is muddled and often contradictory: It advocates socialism yet at the same time stresses the sanctity of private property. The two countries in which Baʿthism has flourished, Syria and Iraq, either have been or still are dictatorships where any form of political pluralism is or has been either closely controlled or severely repressed.

Syria

During its early days in Syria, just after the departure of the French, the party drew support from radical secondary school and university students. Initially, the Baʿth did not enter formal politics, preferring to focus attention on developing its ideology rather than attempting to gain political power. Small party branches were established in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq in the late 1940s. Political instability in Syria and the crushing Arab defeat in the Arab-Israel War of 1948 led Aflaq and Bitar (al-Arsuzi had left the leadership by then) to merge their organization with Akram al-Hawrani's Arab Socialist Party in 1953, and as a result the group's membership increased from five hundred to two thousand members. The party ran candidates in the Syrian elections in 1954 and won sixteen seats.

By the middle 1950s, however, the dominant opposition force in Syria was the Syrian Communist Party, whose leader, Khalid Bakdash, had also been elected to parliament in 1954. The Communists' popularity was boosted by their association with a Czech arms deal in 1955, under which the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states agreed to sell arms to Syria and Egypt. Fearing eclipse by the Communists, Aflaq and Bitar approached Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser with a scheme proposing Syrian-Egyptian unity, which resulted in the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR). The Baʿth was taking a calculated risk; they knew that Nasser had dissolved the Egyptian Communist Party and would require the Syrian Communist Party to wind up its affairs, but they also knew that the Baʿth Party would be dissolved as well. The gamble did not pay off and the UAR gradually developed into a way for Egypt to exploit Syria, for which Aflaq and Bitar received much of the blame. In 1961, a military coup in Syria brought the UAR to an ignominious if unlamented end. The Baʿth leaders and Hawrani went their separate ways, leaving the party open for new leadership and young recruits, primarily from junior Alawi officers in the army.

In March 1963, a group of Baʿthist officers took control of Syria scarcely a month after a Baʿth-supported coup in Iraq. As the military began to dominate the Syrian party, disagreements began to develop between them and Aflaq and Bitar. On 23 February 1966, a neo-Baʿth coup led by Ghassan Jadid ousted a moderate government led by Bitar. Bitar retired from politics and went to France and Aflaq went into exile in Iraq, where he was appointed secretary-general of the Iraqi Baʿth Party in 1968, a position he held until his death in Iraq in 1989. The new and more radical Syrian government, with a strong Alawi support base, nationalized industry, implemented a land reform program, and vigorously supported the Palestinian struggle against Israel. Jadid aligned himself with the civilians in the party and was challenged for the leadership by his minister of defense, the former air force commander Hafiz al-Asad.

By 1970, Asad had gained control of the internal security apparatus and forced Jadid from power. Asad's principal support came from the Alawi minority in Syria (about 12% of the population) and from family members and trusted associates who held key positions in the security services and the military. By the middle 1980s, much of the more radical social and economic measures taken by the neo-Baʿth had been reversed or abandoned and the socialist sector of the economy no longer had much importance. In addition, a major rift had developed between Asad and the Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. By the time of Asad's death in 2000, Baʿthism was devoid of whatever coherent ideological content it might once have had and the party was largely confined to applauding the actions of the leadership and eventually of endorsing the succession of Asad's son Bashar al-Asad.



Baʿth party leader Bashshar al-Asad was elected president of Syria by referendum in July 2000. Although the country has seen a relaxing of regulations since Bashshar assumed leadership, criticism of the government is still not permitted and the press is heavily censored. © Reuters NewMedia Inc./Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Iraq

Baʿthist ideology was brought to Iraq by Iraqi students studying in Syria. The first Iraqi secretary-general was Fuʾad al-Rikabi, a Shiʿite engineer from Nasiriyya who collected a following of some one hundred to two hundred individuals, mostly recruited from among his own relatives and friends. Unlike the Syrian party, the Iraqi Baʿth remained at least nominally under civilian leadership. When Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Iraqi Free Officers overthrew the monarchy in July 1958, the Baʿth initially supported his coup but in 1959 ordered Qasim's assassination, fearing his left-leaning proclivities and the fact that he was dependent on the Communists. After the failure of the assassination attempt, the perpetrators, including Saddam Hussein, went into exile to Syria and Egypt.

In 1963, the Baʿth supported a military coup led by the Nasserist Abd al-Salam Arif, which overthrew Qasim and initiated a campaign of persecution of the left, but its initial success was short lived. A split between the militant pragmatists and the centrists led the centrists to appeal to Damascus for mediation, and in the ensuing confusion, Arif ousted the Baʿth from the government. While out of power, the Iraqi Baʿthists, led by General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and his young relative Saddam, reorganized themselves, deriving support increasingly from their kinsfolk from their home town, Tikrit, while seeking to maintain political legitimacy by remaining loyal to Aflaq. Now more politically astute and better organized, the Baʿth organized a coup on 17 July 1968, quickly purged their non-Baʿthist coconspirators, and took complete control of the Iraqi government on 31 July.

By 1970, the Iraqis had separated completely from the Syrian Baʿth. The new Iraqi constitution established a Revolutionary Command Council to operate as the supreme executive, legislative, and judicial institution of the state, separate from the regional command of the party. With Saddam in charge of security, al-Bakr was able to control the government, purging the party of military officers who opposed him. In 1972, in an extremely popular move, the government nationalized Iraqi oil. The boom that followed the oil price rise in 1973 created jobs, and improved health, educational and social welfare services, and the economic lot of

Iraqis, especially Baʿth party members, whose numbers increased substantially throughout the 1970s. Oil revenues went straight to the government, by then coterminous with Saddam and his circle, with no accountability as to how the money was spent.

At the same time, Saddam systematically purged his rivals from power and consolidated his position sufficiently to urge al-Bakr to retire in 1979. Between then and his fall in 2003, as head of both government and party, Saddam substituted personal for party rule. Relying more and more on family members for important positions, he repeatedly purged the party and the military and maintained the party structure purely for ceremonial purposes. His miscalculations in foreign policy during the war with Iran and during and after the invasion of Kuwait and the serious social and economic dislocations that followed resulted in the reversal of economic gains for most Iraqis, with the exception of a small coterie of loyalists. The U.S.-led coalition did not take the opportunity to remove him from power in 1991. Both Baʿthism and pan-Arab nationalism have been discredited by the activities of the Syrian and Iraqi regimes.

See also Aflaq, Michel; Alawi; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arafat, Yasir; Arif, Abd al-Salam; Arsuzi, Zaki al-; Asad, Hafiz al-; Bakdash, Khalid; Bitar, Salah al-Din al-; Hawrani, Akram al-; Hussein, Saddam; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Qasim, Abd al-Karim; Tikrit; United Arab Republic (UAR).

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Reeva S. Simon
Updated by Peter Sluglett

BAYA

[1931–1998]

Algerian painter.

Baya Mahieddine was born in 1931 in Algeria. She was a self-taught painter whose work is notable in part because she did not study under colonial teachers at the early fine art schools in North Africa. Orphaned and illiterate, she never received a formal education in colonial Algeria. She worked as a servant for a French woman, who arranged Baya's first exhibition at the age of seventeen. The show was held in Paris, and both Spanish artist Pablo Picasso and French critic André Breton were impressed by her work. Picasso took her to his country home and watched in fascination as she molded clay animals. Breton tried to categorize her work as part of the Surrealist school; others, focusing on her Algerianness and lack of education, characterized her work, along with that of other self-taught Algerian artists of the time, as belonging to the naive tradition. She rejected both categories. Her work consists primarily of fanciful, colorful drawings of women, plants, insects, and animals, which some critics have linked to the decorative traditions of Islamic art and Algerian folk art.

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Jessica Winegar

BAYAR, CELAL

[1884–1986]

Turkish politician and statesman; Turkey's third president.

Celal Bayar was born in Umurbey, near Bursa, the son of a village teacher. Educated at the French school in Bursa, he worked as a clerk in a German bank there and rose rapidly in banking circles. In 1907, he joined the Union and Progress Society and became an important official in Bursa and Izmir; he was elected deputy for Saruhan (Manisa) in the last parliament of the Ottoman Empire. He was an active political leader during Turkey's war of independence, a member for Saruhan in the Turkish Grand National Assembly when it was first organized by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in 1920; later he represented Izmir in all the republic's assemblies until 1960.

In 1920, he was made minister of economics. He was also founder and longtime head of the Türkiye Iş Bankasi (Turkish Labor Bank), and, by 1932, his vigorous advocacy of etatism (state economic enterprise) led to his being regarded as the leading promoter of state factories. He continued as minister of economics during much of the 1920s and 1930s. In 1937, Atatürk appointed him to replace Ismet İnönü as prime minister, continuing a bitter rivalry between the two men. His tenure in office lasted until shortly after Atatürk's death and İnönü's succession as president in 1938.

Celal Bayar was the democratic president of Turkey from 1950 to 1960. Here Bayar is shown in Durham, North Carolina, visiting a Liggett and Myers' tobacco plant while on a tour of the United States. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Until 1946, Turkey had a one-party political system under the aegis of the Republican People's Party (RPP); in that year Bayar became one of four RPP deputies who initiated Turkey's multiparty period by forming the opposition Democrat Party (DP). After only moderate success in the 1946 election, the Democrats came to power in 1950, and Bayar was elected the republic's third president. He presided over a decade that saw modifications to (but not basic reversal of) several of Atatürk's policies—which included the RPP's strong attitude of hostility toward the private sector and a relaxation of some aspects of secularism. In foreign affairs, Bayar and his associates continued a strong identification with the West, particularly the United States.

Convergence of several favorable factors enabled the Democrats to preside over a period of rapid economic growth, which together with more conservative social policies resulted in their electoral victory in 1954. Fear that the party's popularity would not continue, plus their intense dislike of the RPP and its leader Ismet İnönü, led to increasingly repressive measures. These included actions against the opposition party and the press, the partisan use of state funds, and eventually to accusations of serious election fraud in 1957, when they were returned to office but with a much reduced margin. In 1959, university students and others began violent demonstrations that led to the ouster of the DP government by the armed forces on 27 May

1960. Many Democrat officials, including all the party's assembly members, were arrested and brought to trial on the island of Yassiada, near Istanbul, on a long list of political and criminal charges. Bayar was one of four defendants sentenced to death, but he was spared due to his advanced age. He went to prison and was released in 1973. He was constitutionally barred from returning to active politics and so confined himself to occasional statements until his death at the age of 102.

See also Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Democrat Party; İnönü, İsmet; Republican People's Party (RPP); Turkish Grand National Assembly.

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Walter F. Weiker

BAYATI, ABD AL-WAHHAB AL-

[1926–]

A leading Iraqi and Arab poet from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s, who broke with traditional patterns of modern Arab poetry.

Born in Baghdad to a merchant family of the largely Sunni Arab Bayat tribe north of Baghdad, Abd al-Wahhab al-Bayati graduated in 1950 from the Higher Teachers' College and taught the Arabic language in Ramadi, western Iraq. In 1953, he returned to Baghdad, where he taught and edited a communist intellectual magazine *al-Thaqafa al-Jadida* (though he always claimed that he was an independent Marxist and never joined the party). Due to this political affiliation, in 1954 he lost his teaching job and in 1955 had to go to Syria, then to Egypt. Following the "Free Officers" coup d'état of 1958, Bayati returned to Baghdad to become one of the leading intellectuals in the regime of Abd al-Karim Qasim. But in 1959, following an estrangement between Qasim and the Communists, he was sent as a cultural adviser to Moscow. In 1964, he moved to Egypt, and in 1972 he returned to Baghdad, where Baʿth party officials made him cultural adviser for the ministry of information. A few years later, he was sent as a cultural attaché to Madrid, where he served in this capacity in the early 1990s.

His first *diwan, Mala'ika wa Shayatin* (1950), was written in a conventional romantic style. Following the example of two other Iraqi poets, Badr Shakir al-Sayyab and Nazik al-Mala'ika, in 1954 Bayati adopted the new style of free verse (al-Shiʿr al-Hurr), in which the length of the line and the rhyming flow freely. Until the late 1970s, his poetry reflected most of the innovations that appeared in Arab poetry. Again, following al-Sayyab, since the mid-1960s his poetry is heavily loaded with surrealistic symbolism. Dominant among the various mythological symbols used were those borrowed from ancient Mesopotamia, chiefly Tammuz and Ishtar. Since the mid-1970s, the main tools in his poetry have been Sufi mystical motifs. In much of it, al-Bayati expresses the frustration and alienation of a secular revolutionary intellectual in a traditional society—a humanistic socialist under totalitarian revolutionary regimes that betrayed their human ideals.

See also Baʿth, al-; Diwan; Mala'ika, Nazik al-; Qasim, Abd al-Karim; Sayyab, Badr Shakir al-.

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Amatzia Baram

BAYAT, MORTAZA QOLI

[1886–1958]

Iranian statesman.

Mortaza Qoli Bayat was the son of a wealthy landowner of Arak, a constitutionalist during the Revolution of 1906, and a member of the Eʿtedali (moderate) party. He was elected to the *majlis* (national assembly) in 1922 and was reelected nine times. In 1925, the fifth *majles* deposed the Qajar dynasty, voting in the Pahlavi dynasty, with Reza Shah

Pahlavi as monarch, and Bayat became minister of finance, then prime minister in 1945. He resigned in six months because he had to deal with the removal of Allied forces, especially the Soviets, who were entrenched in Azerbaijan. He also had to deal with the all-powerful Anglo–Iranian Oil Company and Soviet demands for oil concessions in the north.

In 1950, Bayat was elected senator and vice-president of the senate; after the nationalization of the petroleum industry by Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, Bayat (who was related to him) was appointed head of the new Iranian oil company. From 1955 to 1958, he headed the newly formed oil consortium.

See also Azerbaijan; Mossadegh, Mohammad; Pahlavi, Reza; Petroleum, Oil, and Natural Gas; Qajar Dynasty.

Mansoureh Ettehadieh

BAYDH, ALI SALIM AL-

[ca. 1940–]

South Yemen revolutionary and republican leader.

Ali Salim al-Baydh was born into a family from the Hadramawt, with Yafi tribal origins. An early participant in the struggle against the British in South Yemen, al-Baydh (also al-Bid) survived intraparty struggles and rose from the second rank of party leaders and ministers to become head of the ruling Yemeni Socialist Party after an intraparty blood bath in Aden in January 1986. Over the next few years, he emerged as the most influential member of the new collective leadership of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). In 1990 al-Baydh took the PDRY into merger with the Yemen Arab Republic, at which time he became vice president of the new Republic of Yemen (ROY). In 1994, at the peak of the political crisis in unified Yemen, he led the fight for southern secession from the ROY and announced the birth of the Democratic Republic of Yemen, with himself as president; he fled into exile in Oman when his forces were defeated in the short civil war that ended in July 1994. Except for a brief flurry of talk and activity in the late 1990s, when he was sentenced to death in absentia, al-Baydh has maintained a low political profile in exile. He has remained in Oman, despite being granted amnesty in 2003.

See also Aden; People's Democratic Republic of Yemen; Yemen Arab Republic; Yemeni Socialist Party.

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Robert D. Burrowes

BAYRAKDAR, MUSTAFA

[1775–1808]

Ottoman grand vizier.

The son of a Janissary, Bayrakdar was a notable of Ruschuk (or Ruse) in Bulgaria who served as a lieutenant in Tirsinikioğlu Ismail Ağa's large provincial army. He inherited command of the army in 1806 and used it in 1807 to restore order in Constantinople (now Istanbul) after the Janissaries deposed Selim III. But Bayrakdar was denied power in the new regime, and in 1808, in concert with the secret Ruschuk committee of Selim supporters, he and his army replaced the conservative new sultan Mustafa IV, with the reform-minded Mahmud II.

As Mahmud II's first grand vizier, Bayrakdar used his military standing to defy opposition and resume reform efforts. He invited all important local notables to Constantinople to negotiate new relations between the sultan and provinces, producing the October 1808 Sened-i Ittifak (Pact of Alliance). But the following month, Bayrakdar's planned military reforms produced another Janissary revolt, during which he was killed. Bayrakdar's defeat postponed military reform for nearly twenty years.

See also Janissaries; Mahmud II; Selim III.

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Elizabeth Thompson

BAYRAM V, MUHAMMAD

[1840–1889]

Tunisian reformer, writer, administrator, and newspaper editor.

Muhammad Bayram V was born into an illustrious family of *ulama* in Tunis. His paternal uncle Muhammad Bayram III was *bash mufti* (chief jurisconsult) at the time of his birth. His mother was the daughter of Mahmud Khujah, a Mamluk official of Ahmad Bey; his father, Mustafa, was a farmer. His earliest recollections were of his father's laborers complaining of their situation. This, coupled with his maternal grandfather's political involvement, led him to consider a career in politics.

Upon completion of his studies at Zaytuna University, Bayram became a teacher of religion in a secondary school. When his uncle Bayram IV died in 1861, Bayram V was too young to succeed him as Shaykh al-Islam. (Apparently the designation "V" stemmed from the near assumption of this important religious office.)

The death of his uncle enabled Bayram V to establish a closer relationship with political reformers among the Mamluk class, especially Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi. When Khayr al-Din became prime minister in 1873, he appointed Bayram V editor of the official gazette, *Al-Ra'id al-Tunisi,* and head of the Hubus *(waqf)* Administration to regulate religious trusts. The *hubus* constituted an important economic base for the *ulama.* Bayram V regularized the *hubus,* eliminating corruption, improving efficiency, and maintaining accurate records of transactions. Bayram V also directed the state printing office, organized the new library at Zaytuna University, and regulated the curriculum at Sadiqi College.

After his ministry collapsed in 1877, Khayr al-Din left the country under a cloud of suspicion and failure. Bayram remained in government service until 1879. During these years, Bayram may have conspired with Khayr al-Din, who had become Ottoman prime minister, to seek French assistance in deposing Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey, ruler of Tunisia.

Bayram was allowed to go to Mecca in October 1879. He never returned to Tunisia but went to Constantinople for four years (where he reconciled with Khayr al-Din) and then to Egypt in 1884, where he spent the rest of his life. While in Egypt, Bayram launched an Arabic-language newspaper, *Al-I'lam* (The clarion), which became the most widely read and most influential Arabic newspaper of the 1880s. He also published a history of nineteenth-century Tunisia. He died 18 December 1889.

See also AHMAD BEY HUSAYN; KHAYR AL-DIN; MAMLUKS; MUHAMMAD AL-SADIQ; SADIQI COLLEGE; SHAYKH AL-ISLAM.

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LARRY A. BARRIE

BAZAARS AND BAZAAR MERCHANTS

Iranian traditional marketplaces.

The bazaar (Persian; Arabic, *suq*; Turkish, *çarşi*), traditional marketplace located in the old quarters in a Middle Eastern city, has long been the central marketplace and crafts center, the primary arena, together with the mosque, of extrafamilial sociability, and the embodiment of the traditional Islamic urban lifestyle. Merchants and commercial trade are esteemed in Islamic civilization. At the time of the rise of Islam, the society of Mecca, the birthplace of Islam, was already a major center of local, regional, and at times international trade. The city of Mecca itself was dominated by the merchant patricians. Friday congregational prayer, one of the most important Islamic institutions articulating the religious community and the state, coincided with the day on which the business activities of the weekly bazaar heightened because the people of the town and surrounding areas gathered in the marketplace for business transactions. The prophet Muhammad—whose first wife was among the city's prosperous merchants, as were many members of his clan—himself engaged in trade on behalf of his wife. In the pre-prophetic period of his life, he was called Muhammad al-Amin (trustworthy), an epithet be-

stowed upon him by the bazaar merchants with whom he did business.

The Traditional Bazaar

The traditional bazaar consists of shops in vaulted streets closed by doors at each end, usually with caravanserais connected into the middle of the bazaar. In small towns, the bazaar is made up of a covered street, whereas in large cities it can take up miles of passageways. Bazaars are divided into various parts, each specializing in a single trade or craft—carpet sellers, goldsmiths, shoemakers, and so forth. The social hierarchy of the bazaar includes the big merchants *(tujjar)* at the top of the pyramid; the master artisans and shopkeepers, loosely organized within over a hundred guildlike associations *(asnaf),* at the middle level; and apprentices and footboys, as well as such marginal elements as poor peddlers, dervishes, and beggars, at the lowest levels.

In premodern times, the bazaar served the governing notables as a source of tax revenues, custom dues, road tolls, credit, and unpaid labor. In return, the government provided the bazaars with internal protection and a system of justice. Although daily concerns such as the quality of the merchandise, the fairness of prices, and the accuracy of weights were supervised by local government, the state dealt with the bazaar's merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans collectively, through the chief of merchants and the guild masters.

The Modern Bazaar

Middle Eastern bazaars underwent drastic changes during the twentieth century. Rapid population growth, mass migration of villagers to the cities, modern urban planning, the development of modern quarters at the outskirts of old quarters, and the shift of the main economic activities from old bazaar to modern districts all led to the decline of Middle Eastern bazaars. In most cases, the bazaars have been reduced from their glory days as the commercial center of the city to their present function as retail centers of crafts, domestic commodities, and (often imported) industrial products. In Cairo, the most radical changes in the fabric of the old city began in the early nineteenth century, when Muhammad Ali Europeanized the city and developed modern commercial and residential areas on the outskirts of the old quarters. The old bazaar became the quarter of the poor in the twentieth century and the Khan al-Khalili, a more affluent section of the old bazaar, has remained to serve the tourist demand for Egyptian crafts. In Damascus, the western section of the grand bazaar, Suq al-Hamidiyya and its surrounding area, underwent extensive modernization during the later half of nineteenth century, and the modern quarters developed on the western outskirts of the town. Damascus still produces traditional handicrafts, such as high quality textiles, silk, leather goods, filigreed gold, and silver, inlaid wooden, copper, and brass articles. Although the bazaar remains as a center of exquisite craftsmanship, the center of economic activity has moved to the modern quarters of the city. The Grand Bazaar of Istanbul, Kapali Çarşi, once the center of economic life of the city, has in the twentieth century been adversely affected by rapid urbanization and construction of modern buildings and serves only as an important retail and crafts center.

Iranian Bazaars

The main exception is the Grand Bazaar of Tehran and the bazaars of major Iranian cities, which, in spite of Iran's rapid modernization during the latter half of the twentieth century, have shown remarkable economic resilience. Iran's bazaars have continued to serve as the financial and political power base of the Shiʿite religious establishment and a bastion of nearly all popular political protest movements in modern times, including the Tobacco Revolt (1890–1891), the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911), the oil nationalization movement (1950–1953), the urban riots of 1963, and the Islamic revolution (1979). The commercial power and the political role played by the bazaar-mosque alliance remain unparalleled in the contemporary history of Middle Eastern cities. Compared to the bazaars of other major Middle Eastern cities, which experienced the consequences of modernization as early as the latter half of the nineteenth century, the bazaar of Tehran, founded in the early nineteenth century, developed as the bastion of the bazaar-mosque alliance, with a solid power base in the twentieth century.

Functionally, three major types of bazaars developed in modern Iran; (1) the unique bazaar of Tehran, functioning as a strategic center for local, national, and international trade; (2) the provincial

bazaars, engaged in wholesale and retail trade for the central city and its hinterland; and (3) the local bazaars of small towns and large villages, in which retailers and peasant peddlers serve primarily the town and surrounding rural areas. The more significant provincial bazaars also played an important role in foreign trade. The bazaars of Isfahan, Kashan, Kerman, Kermanshah, Mashhad, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Yazd were in this category until the midtwentieth century. The bazaar of Tehran, however, monopolized most of the foreign trade during the latter half of the twentieth century and became the main center of import, export, collection, and distribution of agricultural cash crops, modern manufactured consumer items, and Iran's most important handicraft product, Persian carpets.

The socioeconomic and morphological changes in urban Iran since the 1960s have reduced the traditional function of the bazaar as the sole urban marketplace, supplementing it with many new shopping centers in various parts of the city rather than replacing the bazaar's shops. In Tehran, for example, the bazaar underwent a rapid expansion as its surrounding residential areas were increasingly used for commercial and small-scale manufacturing establishments. The southern sections of the bazaar became a shopping area for the lower middle classes, the urban poor, and rural families, whereas its northern sections catered primarily to middle-class clients. As a result, in most cases, the shops' business price increased several times during the late 1970s, reaching as high as several hundred thousand dollars in the case of well-located shops.

Modernization and urban development created a socioeconomic and cultural duality in large urban areas of Iran, particularly in Tehran. This duality consists, on the one hand, of the religiously conservative merchants, master artisans, and shopkeepers who practice traditional urban lifestyles, living mainly around the bazaar and the old quarters of the town, and on the other, the elites and the new middle classes living in the more modern city quarters. The traditional bazaar lifestyle, shared with the *ulama,* includes such elements as sitting, eating, and sleeping on rugs or *kilims,* participating in prayer congregations in mosques, taking part in or organizing Shiʿite rituals of mourning for the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, and insisting on the veiling of women.

The main form of collective action of the bazaaris, from the Tobacco Revolt to the Iranian Revolution, was initially reactive, like bread riots, tax rebellions, and peasants' uprisings throughout history—responses caused by people being deprived of a privilege or by the imposition of oppressive measures. The novel feature of the Tobacco Revolt and the Constitutional Revolution was that they evolved from recurrent local riots to national movements. The national dimension was achieved by the increasing connection and cooperation among the bazaars of major cities in the latter half of nineteenth century. The coalition of the intelligentsia and the bazaar-mosque alliance burgeoned during the Constitutional Revolution and reemerged in the oil nationalization movement and the Iranian Revolution.

The bazaar's relationships with the state under the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (r. 1941–1979), were fraught with tensions and conflicts. Bazaaris made considerable material gains during the 1960s and 1970s, and the threats they faced were, more often than not, in the form of state intervention in commercial activities and the regime's repressive policies rather than the expansion of the new shopping areas. The government's arbitrary and discriminatory implementation of commercial regulations, its tax laws, and a campaign against price gouging were the major sources of the bazaaris' hostility toward the state. Another aggravating factor was the shah's and the elite's thinly disguised contempt for the "fanatic bazaaris [who] were highly resistant to change" (Pahlavi, p. 156). Bazaaris, along with the *ulama* and the young intelligentsia, constituted the major faction in the revolutionary coalition of 1977 through 1979. In the absence of labor unions, political parties, professional societies, and neighborhood associations, the bazaar-mosque alliance as well as schools and universities have proved to be the main vehicle for social protest.

The post-revolutionary period of the 1980s witnessed a bitter struggle between the rising young, radical, leftist elements within the new Islamic regime, on the one hand, and the merchants' and artisans' guilds and their old allies the conservative *ulama* on the other over such critical policies as nationalization of foreign trade, anti-price gouging measures, and state control over guild councils. By the early 1990s, with the normalization of the revo-

lutionary situation, the government adopted a moderate approach to bazaar merchants and artisans.

See also Constitutional Revolution; Iranian Revolution (1979); Mecca; Mossadegh, Mohammad; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Shiʿism; Tobacco Revolt; *Ulama*.

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Ahmad Ashraf

BAZARGAN, MEHDI

[1907–1995]

Muslim intellectual and politician in Iran.

Mehdi Bazargan was born in Tehran. In 1931, he went to Paris to study engineering. Returning home in 1936, he taught at the college level. During the 1951 oil-nationalization movement, Bazargan worked with Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and served as the director of the National Iranian Oil Company. After Mossadegh was deposed by the 1953 coup, Bazargan resumed teaching.

In the early 1960s, with the help of Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, Bazargan founded the Freedom Movement (Nehzat-e Azadi), which played an important role in the Iranian Revolution of 1979. After the revolution, Bazargan became the premier of the provisional government. With its fall, Bazargan lost much of his political influence but was elected, with a huge margin, as Tehran's representative to the parliament of the new Islamic Republic of Iran in the 1980 election. Throughout his career, Bazargan was a leading advocate of democracy. He also was a prolific writer, publishing more than twenty books and articles.

See also Freedom Movement (Nezhat-e Azadi Iran); Iranian Revolution (1979); Mossadegh, Mohammad.

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Mansoor Moaddel

BAZZAZ, ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-

[1913–1971]

Iraqi jurist, politician, and writer.

Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz was born in Baghdad to a Sunni Muslim family. He completed elementary school and high school in Baghdad and was graduated from Baghdad Law College in 1934. He completed his law studies in 1938 at King's College of London University. As a young man he was active politically. In the 1930s, he was a member of the Muthanna and Jawwal clubs, the intellectual focus of which was pan-Arabism and promotion of Arab nationalism. In 1941 he supported the Rashid Ali al-Kaylani uprising against the British. After the uprising's collapse and with the second British occupation of Iraq, he was interned during World War II. Shortly after the war ended, he was released from jail and appointed dean of the Baghdad Law College. In 1956 he was removed from his post for protesting the aggression against Egypt by England, France, and Israel. He and several educators signed a petition critical of Iraq's government's stand during the Suez crisis. He returned to his job as dean of the law college in the aftermath of the revolution of 14 July 1958.

Bazzaz's interest and activities in the pan-Arab movement again put him in conflict with the new government of Abd al-Karim Qasim. After the collapse of the Shawwaf uprising in 1959, he was arrested and tortured. Upon his release, he went to Egypt, where he assumed the deanship of the Institute of Arab Studies at the Arab League. He returned to Iraq after the military overthrow of the

Qasim regime in 1963. This coup marked a turning point in al-Bazzaz's political career. President Abd al-Salam Arif, a close friend, assigned al-Bazzaz to several government positions. He was appointed ambassador to the United Arab Republic (UAR), and later to England. In 1964–1965, he became the secretary-general of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. On 6 September 1965, he was named deputy prime minister. The prime minister then tried to unseat the president and seize power. The coup failed, however, and President Arif invited Bazzaz to form a new government on 21 September 1965. Al-Bazzaz was the first civilian prime minister since the collapse of the monarchy in 1958.

President Arif died unexpectedly on 13 April 1965 in a helicopter crash. A brief power struggle for the presidency ensued. In the first joint meeting of the Defense Council and cabinet to elect a president, al-Bazzaz held a plurality of one vote over the two military candidates. Nevertheless, he needed a two-thirds majority to win the presidency. A compromise candidate, Abd al-Rahman Arif, the brother of the late president, was chosen instead. The new president asked al-Bazzaz to form a new cabinet on 18 April 1966. Al-Bazzaz was forced to resign, however, on 6 August under pressure from various political groups. Chief among them was the group of politically minded senior officers who took for granted their right to govern the country. These officers resented al-Bazzaz's outspokenness concerning the proper role of the army and his intentions to reduce military salaries and privileges.

Furthermore, the officers opposed his attempts to solve the Kurdish problem peacefully. The leftist groups, including the Communists, denounced al-Bazzaz as an agent of the imperialists. The supporters of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Baʿthists accused him of being an enemy of Arab socialism and paying only lip service to the proposed union of Egypt and Iraq. On 24 January 1969, he was accused by the newly established Baʿthist government of involvement in clandestine activities against the government. He was tortured and imprisoned for fifteen months. In 1970, he was released because of illness and went to London for treatment, dying there in 1971.

Several features distinguished al-Bazzaz's eleven months as prime minister. First, he strongly advocated the rule of law and an end to the erratic behavior of military officers who had dominated Iraq's politics since the revolution of 14 July 1958. His government became increasingly civilianized. He replaced the Revolutionary Military Council with the National Defense Council and limited its function in regard to defense and internal security. The political system was open compared with previous regimes. As prime minister, al-Bazzaz held numerous news conferences and appeared on radio and television. Constructive criticism was encouraged, and he promised to restore parliamentary life and hold elections as soon as possible.

Second, in the field of economy, al-Bazzaz announced the First Five Year Plan (1965–1970). He advocated "prudent socialism," which attempted to strike a balance between the public and private sectors. He encouraged joint ventures between public and private sectors as well as between foreign and domestic investors. The doctrine of prudent socialism sought to increase production without abandoning the principle of equitable distribution. It was designed to lessen the impact of nationalization measures issued by the previous government.

A third distinguishing feature of al-Bazzaz's administration was the announcement of the twelve-point agreement in June 1966. Its purpose was to solve the Kurdish problem, the most unsettling difficulty of Iraq's government since 1960. The pact provided statutory recognition of the Kurdish nationality; recognized Kurdish as an official language, along with Arabic, in schools and local administration; and permitted the employment of Kurds in local administrative posts. The plan promised to hold a parliamentary election within the period stipulated in the provisional constitution of 1964. It provided for proportional representation of the Kurds in all branches of the government, including the cabinet, the Parliament, and the judiciary. It gave the Kurds the right to publish their own newspapers and to organize their own political parties. The plan provided general amnesty to all persons who had taken part in the Kurdish revolt and restored them to their previous posts and positions. It created a special Ministry for Rehabilitation and Reparation to pay

damages incurred in Kurdish territory. It also endeavored to compensate Kurdish victims in northern Iraq. Unfortunately, al-Bazzaz was forced to resign in August 1966, and the agreement was never enacted.

In foreign policy, al-Bazzaz emphasized that Iraq needed to maintain a friendly relationship with its neighbors, including the non-Arab countries of Turkey and Iran. He visited both in order to improve relations, which had deteriorated since the 1958 revolution. As for the union with Egypt, he adhered to the pronouncement concerning the Iraqi–UAR Unified Political Command of 25 May 1965. He did little to advance the union, however, because of Iraq's internal affairs, including the Kurdish problem.

Al-Bazzaz was a prolific writer. He published more than twelve books on subjects including law, Iraq's history, Arab nationalism, and Islam. In his writings, he saw no apparent contradiction between Arab nationalism and Islam. Arab nationalism was not a movement based on race or solidarity of the blood. Rather, it was based on ties of language, history, spirituality, and basic interests in life. In addition to religious belief, Islam was viewed as a social system, a philosophy of life, a system of economics and of government. It belonged to the Arabs before becoming a world religion. The Prophet was an Arab. The language of the Qurʾan is Arabic, and many of the Islamic rules and customs are Arabic. For example, the pilgrimage to the Kaʿba was an ancient Arab custom before its incorporation into Islamic tradition.

See also Arif, Abd al-Rahman; Arif, Abd al-Salam; Kaʿba; Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-; Kurds; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; Qasim, Abd al-Karim; Suez Crisis (1956–1957); United Arab Republic (UAR).

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Ayad al-Qazzaz

BEAUFORT, CHARLES-MARIE-NAPOLÉON D'HAUTPOUL DE

[1804–1890]

Commander of the French expeditionary force to Lebanon, 1860–1861.

Because of General Charles-Marie-Napoléon d'Hautpoul de Beaufort's past service in Syria, Italy, Algeria, and Morocco, Napoléon III sent him with seven thousand men to stymie the massacre of the Christians in Mount Lebanon. Chanting "*Partant pour la Syrie,*" they disembarked late, but their presence reassured the Christian population and foreshadowed the return of the French at the end of World War I. The expedition drew a geographic survey that later inspired proto–Lebanese nationalists in their quest for an enlarged and independent state.

See also Lebanon, Mount.

Bassam Namani

BEDEL-I ASKERI

Tax paid by non-Muslims for exemption from Ottoman military service.

The *bedel-i askeri* essentially replaced the *jizya* (head tax) traditionally paid by non-Muslims, which was abolished with the 1856 Hatt-i Hümayun declaration that all subjects of the Ottoman Empire were equal and therefore obligated to serve in the military. The attempt to legislate equality among Muslims and non-Muslims, however, met opposition from all sides. In 1857, non-Muslims were once again allowed exemption from military duty. The *bedel-i askeri* tax of fifty liras was levied only on those theoretically required to serve, 1 out of 180 male subjects of age. It was much lower than the exemption tax paid by Muslims. In 1909 the *bedel-i askeri* and all other conscription-exemption taxes were abolished, and all male subjects regardless of religion were required to perform military duty.

See also Jizya; Tanzimat.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

BEERSHEBA

City in southern Israel.

Located in the northern Negev (Arabic, Naqab) desert, Beersheba (Hebrew, B'er Sheva; Arabic, Bir al-Sabi) is midway between the Dead Sea to the east and the Mediterranean to the west. It is one of the biggest cities in Israel, after the metropolitan centers of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Haifa. Its principal industries are chemicals, porcelain, and textiles. Beersheba is the home of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev and the Negev Institute for Arid Zone Research.

Historically, the city has been an important trading center between a variety of ecological zones—the mountains to the east, the desert to the south, and the seacoast to the west. In biblical times, it marked the southern limit of Palestine. In 1901, the Ottoman Empire made Beersheba the administrative center for the bedouin tribes of the Negev. In 1917, it was the site of a British victory over the Turks that opened the way for the Allied conquest of Palestine and Syria. After Israel became a state in 1948, Beersheba was settled and enlarged by new immigrants. The population estimate in 2002 was about 182,000.

See also BEN-GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV; DEAD SEA; MEDITERRANEAN SEA; NEGEV.

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STEVE TAMARI

BEGIN, MENACHEM

[1913–1992]

Israeli statesman and sixth prime minister of Israel, 1977–1983.

Menachem (also Menahem) Begin was born on 16 August 1913 in Brest Litovsk, the third child of Ze'ev Dov and Hassia Begin, who were murdered by the Nazis. He studied law at Warsaw University. He joined the Zionist youth movement Betar in 1929. Ze'ev Dov—who had once struck a Polish sergeant who was cutting off a rabbi's beard and had come home bruised and bleeding—bequeathed his son a profound awareness of Jewish vulnerability as well as the courage to fight back. The Holocaust set it in steel. Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the founder of Betar and radical prophet of Revisionist Zionism, added an ideological conviction that Jews must be soldiers before they could be farmers if they wanted a homeland. Between them, they made Begin proudly Jewish, stubborn, single-minded, and unbending. He could be gracious, but never ingratiating. In 1938 Begin was elected to head Betar in Poland. After the Germans invaded, he escaped to Vilna. Following the Soviet conquest, in September 1940, he was sentenced to hard labor in the Arctic region. He refused to be broken by the harsh conditions and interrogations. After he was released along with other Polish citizens, he joined General Władysław Anders's Free Polish Army at the end of 1941 and was posted to Palestine. A year later, he was released and took command of the Irgun Zva'i Le'umi (IZL), the National Military Organization. On 1 February 1944, Begin declared the opening of a revolt against British rule.

This campaign turned into a four-year underground struggle. Begin did not flinch from terrorism, believing that the fighting Jew had to be no less ruthless than his enemies. In hiding, Begin conducted the Irgun's military and political operations. Its first targets were British immigration, tax, and Criminal Investigation Department (CID) offices. The Irgun also robbed and extorted from Jewish banks and businessmen to fund its campaign. Begin kept it active in spite of the severe blows it suffered during the "saison" declared on it by the Haganah, the official Jewish defense force. Begin forbade the Irgun from retaliating against fellow Jews, but he was less scrupulous toward the British. In 1946 his men kidnapped six British officers to

Menachem Begin celebrates with fellow Likud Party members after the May 1977 Knesset elections that brought them to power. Begin served as prime minister of Israel from 1977–1983. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

secure a reprieve for two Irgun fighters on death row. In July 1947 they hanged two sergeants in revenge for the execution of three Irgun men. Begin felt the hanging had achieved its purpose: No more Irgun prisoners went to the gallows.

At the end of 1945, Begin led the Irgun into the umbrella Hebrew Resistance Movement with the Haganah and LEHI (the "Stern Gang"). As its contribution, the Irgun destroyed twenty Royal Air Force planes on the ground and caused £ 100,000 worth of damage to railway rolling stock. However, Begin ignored a request from the mainstream Zionist leadership and sent the Irgun to blow up the King David Hotel, the British headquarters in Jerusalem, with the loss of ninety-one lives. The Irgun revolt was not the only factor that propelled the British out of Palestine, but it played its part.

In June 1948, a month after the declaration of the Jewish state, Begin was on board the *Altalena,* an Irgun arms ship shelled by the Israeli army after he had refused to hand over its cargo to the government. In the same year, he founded the nationalist Herut Party, which he led through three decades of opposition and eight electoral defeats. Begin's commitment to parliamentary government was ambivalent. He argued for constitutional propriety and safeguards for the individual, but he incited a mob that stormed the Knesset building in 1952 in protest at a reparations agreement with West Germany. From 1965 onward, Begin strove to wrest Herut from its isolation, first by establishing Gahal through a merger of Herut and the Liberals and eight years later by broadening it to form the Likud. In May 1967, just before the Arab–Israel War of 1967, he was named minister without portfolio in a National Unity government. He resigned in 1970 to protest the government's acceptance of the United Nations framework for regional peace, Resolution 242, and the Rogers Plan for a cease-fire between Israel and its Arab neighbors. But it had been an apprenticeship of power, an end to the inevitability of opposition.

In the "upheaval" of the elections of 17 May 1977, Begin became the head of Israel's first right-wing coalition, and he won a second term in 1981. Almost immediately after setting up his government,

Begin (right) with Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat (left) and President Jimmy Carter of the United States (center) sign the Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979. The termination of war between the two countries was the shining achievement of Begin's prime ministry. © Getty Images. Reproduced by permission.

Before becoming Israel's prime minister, Begin was head of the organization Irgun Zva'i Le'umi, which protested British policy in Palestine. The organization was behind several terrorist attacks against British and Palestinian targets, including the bombing of the British headquarters in Jerusalem in 1945. **© Hulton-Deutsch Collection. Reproduced by permission.**

Begin initiated secret negotiations with Egypt, which led to President Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Israel in November 1977, the Camp David summit in September 1978, and a peace treaty in March 1979. Begin, together with Sadat, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The treaty was made possible by Begin's readiness to withdraw from Sinai. He also agreed to autonomy for the Palestinians, but he was determined to keep the "liberated territories" of the West Bank and the plan came to nothing. During his reign, Israel extended its law to East Jerusalem (June 1980) and the Golan Heights (December 1981), which was interpreted as de facto annexation. On 7 June 1981, Israeli planes destroyed Iraq's Osirak reactor, thus denying Saddam Hussein nuclear weapons for the rest of the century.

In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon. The war aimed to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization's fighting capability, rid Lebanon of Syrian troops, and install Israel's Maronite allies in power. It succeeded only in the first objective. The mounting Israeli death toll, the massacre of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps (for which an Israeli commission found his government indirectly responsible), a series of strokes, and the death of his wife Aliza all plunged Begin into a deep depression that culminated in his resignation on 19 September 1983. From that time until his death on 9 March 1992, he remained secluded in his Jerusalem home, played no part in politics, and rarely appeared in public.

Menachem Begin was asked during his six years as prime minister how he would like to be remembered. He replied: "As the man who set the borders of the Land of Israel for all eternity." When he resigned in 1983, he appeared to have succeeded. The number of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip had grown fourfold from 24 to 117. The Jewish population living beyond the pre-1967 border had grown from 3,000 to 40,000. Under previous Labor governments, the emphasis had been on the Jordan valley, on populating the strategic frontier. Under Begin, most of the new settlements were planted among the Palestinian towns and villages. It seemed impossible to repartition Palestine. Yet within two decades, his successors as leaders of the Likud followed Labor in ceding territory to the Palestinian Authority and acknowledged that Begin's Greater Israel dream was no longer attainable. His other major achievement, the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, proved more durable. It remained, however, a peace of the head rather than the heart. On the domestic front, he brought alienated Jews of Middle Eastern and North African origin into the centers of government. A decade after Begin's death, Israel had an Iranian-born defense minister and a Tunisian-born foreign minister.

See also *Altalena;* Camp David Accords (1978); Irgun Zva'i Le'umi (IZL); Israeli Settlements; West German Reparations Agreement.

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ERIC SILVER

BEHAR, NISSIM

[1848–1931]

Zionist and educator.

Born in Jerusalem, Nissim Behar has been called the founder of modern Hebrew education. After being taught the Hebrew language by Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, he became a teacher of modern Hebrew at the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Jerusalem and was the school's director from 1882 to 1887.

In 1901, Behar moved to New York City, where he directed the National Liberal Immigration League from 1906 to 1924. During his years in New York, he continued to develop his method for teaching Hebrew, which became known as Ivrit be Ivrit. At the same time, he was an active propagandist for Zionism, calling for the return of the Jews to Palestine, and along with Baron Edmond de Rothschild tried to regain the Western (Wailing) Wall for the Jewish community in Jerusalem. His methods were not always to the liking of U.S. Jewish leaders, some of whom were uncomfortable with the public meetings and protests that he organized to further the cause of the Jews of Palestine.

See also ALLIANCE ISRAÉLITE UNIVERSELLE (AIU); BEN-YEHUDA, ELIEZER; ROTHSCHILD, EDMOND DE; WESTERN WALL.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

BEHBEHANI, SIMIN

[1927–]

Iranian poet.

Simin Behbehani was born in Tehran. Her father, Abbas Khalili, was a writer and newspaper editor. Her mother, Fakhr Azami Arghoon, was a noted feminist, teacher, writer, newspaper editor, and poet. Behbehani began publishing poetry at the age of fourteen. She has become one of Iran's most important poets, using the traditional *ghazal* form—a set of couplets all with the same rhyme and usually dealing with themes of love and wine—in innovative ways. Influenced by modern writers like Nima Yushig, she has developed a unique style that has earned her a special place in the literary history of modern Iran. The honesty, openness, and passionate engagement of her poetry has allowed her work to serve as a social vehicle for her times, from mourning the Iran–Iraq War to voicing a strong cry for freedom of expression. She has become an important voice of post-Revolutionary Iran. Behbehani lives and works in Iran but has traveled widely, giving poetry readings and advocating freedom of expression.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; LITERATURE: PERSIAN.

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ROXANNE VARZI

BEHESHTI, MOHAMMAD

[1928–1981]

Iranian religious scholar and a principal figure in the founding of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Receiving his early education in his birthplace of Isfahan, Mohammad Beheshti began his specialized studies in Islam in Qom (Qum) in 1946, studying under a series of prominent scholars that included Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. He also obtained a doctorate from the Faculty of Theology at Tehran University and took pains to learn English and German. In the early 1960s, he contributed articles on the contemporary problems of the Muslim world to the numerous Islamic periodicals that were flourishing at the time. Despite his links to Khomeini, he escaped arrest in the aftermath of the June 1963 uprising in Iran and in 1965 was permitted to leave to become director of the Islamic Center in Hamburg,

Germany. He returned to Iran in 1970 and resumed his educational activities in Qom.

From 1975 on, Beheshti was active in mobilizing the religious scholars against the regime of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. In 1978, he met with Khomeini to assist in the planning of the revolution; early in 1979 he was named to the Revolutionary Council that was intended to function as an interim legislature. After the success of the revolution, in 1979, he was appointed head of the Supreme Court and elected to the parliament as a leading figure in the Islamic Republican Party. In the latter capacity, he became the leading adversary of Abolhasan Bani Sadr, the first president of the Islamic Republic. Beheshti was killed on 28 June 1981 in an explosion that destroyed the Tehran headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party.

See also BANI SADR, ABOLHASAN; KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH; PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA.

HAMID ALGAR

BEHRANGI, SAMAD

[1939–1968]

An Iranian teacher and short-story writer.

Samad Behrangi was born in Tabriz, capital of Iranian Azerbaijan, in 1939. He attended schools in the city and completed the two-year teachers' training program for elementary school teachers in 1957. He spent the next eleven years teaching in village schools in the Azar Shahr district, about 30 miles (50 kilometers) southwest of Tabriz. He early developed a fascination with Azeri Turkish folk tales. His first book, published in 1965, was a collection of several such stories that he had translated into Persian. That work brought him to the attention of literary circles in Tehran. The subsequent publication of an essay on educational problems, several original children's stories dealing realistically with social issues, and a second volume of Azeri folktales established his reputation as a rising star among a new generation of writers. Behrangi was drowned in a swimming accident in September 1968; he was only twenty-nine. At the time, his most famous children's stories, including "The Little Black Fish," were at the press; they were published posthumously. The popularity of Behrangi's work continued even after the 1979 revolution, with numerous editions of single stories, often illustrated by noted artists, appearing regularly throughout the 1980s and 1990s. His stories and folktales also were translated into Azeri Turkish.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

BEHROUZI, MARYAM

[Unknown]

Political activist and representative in the Iranian parliament.

Maryam Behrouzi was a political activist prior to the Iranian Revolution and was imprisoned for her activities and beliefs.

As a veteran member of the majlis (the Iranian parliament), Behrouzi pushed through a bill allowing women to retire after twenty years of active service, instead of twenty-five. She was also instrumental in reforming Iran's divorce laws and providing national insurance for women and children. She is the head of Jameʿe Zainab (Zainab Society), an organization that aims to enhance Iranian women's cultural and social relations by bringing together Muslim women under one umbrella. The organization's main activity is to provide courses on Islamic education, interpretation of the Qurʾan, and the Arabic language. The organization is not politically active, although it is known to have supported the hard-line conservative speaker of the parliament, Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, in the 1997 presidential elections.

Behrouzi has been labeled an "Islamic feminist," and as such, she is linked with Monireh Gorji, the female representative in the Assembly of Experts, who is responsible for nominating the national leader, and Faezeh Hashemi, among others. In their different capacities, these women have put forward new interpretations of Islamic texts in order to challenge laws and policies that are based on orthodox or literary interpretations.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; HASHEMI, FAEZEH; IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979).

CHERIE TARAGHI

BEIRUT

The capital of Lebanon.

Beirut, on the coast of the Mediterranean, is Lebanon's center of government and finance. It has been part of various empires through history, and its archaeological treasures attest to the multiplicity of its historic occupiers and rulers. The city has undergone substantial changes in its appearance, as devastating earthquakes have hit the city several times in the last two millennia. There are no reliable demographic statistics on the current inhabitants of Beirut. The city has over 1 million inhabitants, and Greater Beirut has around 1.5 million. The city has existed since the time of the Canaanites. The origin of its name is unknown, although it is often said to be *Ba'l Brit,* one of the deities of the Canaanites. A variation of the name in Hebrew, Syriac, and Phoenician means "a well," referring to its rich water sources. The city's name was given to a *vilayet* during the Ottoman Empire and was in a jurisdiction separate from Mount Lebanon.

The association of Beirut and Lebanon is a twentieth-century phenomenon. When the French formed Greater Lebanon in 1920, Beirut, along with other districts, was joined with the area of Mount Lebanon to compose a new political entity. Beirut was added for economic reasons: Mount Lebanon needed access to the sea, and the port of Beirut had had a crucial economic regional role since the nineteenth century. The people of Beirut at the time had a different demographic composition than Mount Lebanon, which was predominantly Druze and Maronite (Christian).

Beirut gradually grew in size and political significance. The centers of administration and government were located there, as were educational institutions such as the American University of Beirut and the Jesuit Saint Joseph University, both of which were founded in the nineteenth century. The centrality of Beirut increasingly marginalized other regions, including Mount Lebanon. This led to massive waves of migration into the city by people seeking education and jobs. This population movement changed the demographics of the city, which had been mainly Sunni and non-Maronite Christian: Maronites were increasingly present in the city, and Shiʿa began settling in large numbers as early as the 1950s.

Soldiers walk the streets of war-torn Beirut, 3 February 1985. This photo was taken during the darkest days of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, a period marked by intense Israeli shelling and frequent car-bomb explosions. © WEBISTAN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Beirut was enlarged in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of the inflow of former rural residents who could not afford to live within the city boundaries. The "suburbs" of Beirut (as they came to be called) grew to include more than half a million migrants. Hundreds of thousands of Shiʿa fleeing southern Lebanon, the center of the confrontation between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel, resided in East Beirut and South Beirut, in what was later called the "poverty belt." Factories in East Beirut attracted Lebanese looking for work. During the period of prosperity and glamour before the Lebanese Civil War of 1958, Beirut was actually two cities: the old Beirut, where the rich and the middle class lived and prospered, and the old *suq* (market) attracted shoppers from around the region; and the suburbs, where poor Lebanese (mostly Shiʿa, Armenians, Palestinians, and poor Christians) lived. The poor Lebanese came into contact with Palestinians in refugee camps in and around the city. This contact revolutionized the political situation in Lebanon for much of the 1960s and 1970s. The presence of a large student population in the capital helped the efforts of the PLO and its

A helicopter view of Beirut and the coastline of the Mediterranean Sea, 1967. © ROGER WOOD/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Lebanese allies who wanted to draw attention to the plight of the South and the poor in general.

The primacy of Beirut was shattered by the Lebanese Civil War of 1975 to 1990. The city that had symbolized prosperity and ostentation came to symbolize bloodshed and cruelty. The war began in Beirut, in the Maronite suburb of Ayn al-Rummana, where a bus carrying Palestinians was ambushed in April 1975 by gunmen belonging to the Phalange Party. The war sharpened sectarian divisions in the capital and produced the Green Line, a street that separated East Beirut (predominantly Christian) from West Beirut (predominantly Muslim, although it continued to house a substantial Christian population). The length of the war brought some degree of "sectarian purity" to the two sections, although Lebanese belonging to the "wrong sect" continued to live—at their peril—in their customary dwelling places. Attempts at "sectarian cleansing" were relatively successful in East Beirut, when forces loyal to the Phalange Party evicted hundreds of thousands of Shiʿa and Palestinians from their homes. Refugee camps located in East Beirut were razed and demolished. There was no eviction of Christians from West Beirut, although some voluntarily left due to hightened sectarian tensions and the rise of Islamic fundamentalist parties in the 1980s.

In the course of the civil war, the downtown area (where the parliament and the financial district were located) was completely destroyed. Looting of shops in 1975 and 1976 forced businesses to relocate into sectarian enclaves. Local militiamen controlled the downtown area through much of the war. Although those Lebanese who could afford to emigrate did so, the city did not suffer from underpopulation because many were still coming to the capital seeking jobs and education: The instability of southern Lebanon continued to send waves of migrants into the southern suburbs of Beirut.

The end of the civil war was supposed to bring an end to the division of Beirut. Reference to the

Green Line is now politically unacceptable. The government of Rafiq al-Hariri has emphasized and showcased its reconstructed downtown Beirut, although critics complain about the purely commercial nature of the enterprise. Concerned economists warn that the reconstruction plans have only reinforced the service-sector bias of the prewar economy, which, according to critics, was responsible for the social injustices that were manifested in the civil war. War damage was repaired with great success, and new residential and office buildings have have been constructed, although only the rich can afford to occupy them: Residential apartments can sell for $1 million. The newly completed downtown area of Beirut attracts tourists and visitors from around the region, and some from Europe. The reconstruction plans undertaken by the government of Hariri have been largely responsible for the ballooning of the foreign debt of Lebanon, now exceeding $30 billion. Most of the downtown enterprises are restaurants and cafes; the office buildings have not yet been occupied.

See also American University of Beirut (AUB); Green Line; Hariri, Rafiq Bahaʾuddin al-; Lebanese Civil War (1958); Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanon; Lebanon, Mount; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Phalange.

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As'ad AbuKhalil

BEIRUT COLLEGE FOR WOMEN (BCW)

Four year college for the education of women in Lebanon, now a member college of the Lebanese American University of Beirut.

In 1914, the American Mission for Lebanon and Syria discussed developing a more demanding curriculum for its American School for Girls, founded in 1860, and drafted a plan for the American Junior Women's College. In 1924 the American Protestant mission received authorization to develop the junior college, and the Presbyterian Church of America in New York supplied the faculty and administration.

During its first year, the college enrolled eight students, five of whom continued on to the sophomore year. In June 1926, three of them graduated: Munira Barbir, Saniyya Habbub, and Armenouchic Megnodichian. Both Habbub and Megnodichian went on to become doctors. During 1936–1937 academic year, the junior college moved to larger accommodations in Raʾs Beirut. Classes included history, sociology, psychology, chemistry, math, biology, religion, languages, and athletics. Students participated in sports, class trips, and various clubs. During the summers the college created a "village welfare camp," where student interns visited villages and taught girls and women various skills, such as literacy, childcare, and handicrafts.

After World War II, the junior college applied for four-year institutional status due to the high interest in developing education in the region. One of the most notable students to study at the college during that period was the young Princess Fatmeh, the shah of Iran's sister. On its twenty-fifth anniversary (1949–1950), the school was granted a provisional charter to award the degree of Bachelor of Arts as it graduated its first senior class. In March 1955, the college was granted an absolute charter as a four-year institution and changed its name to the Beirut College for Women. Soon after, the Lebanese government recognized the college's bachelor's degree and allowed its graduates to register for the examinations for major government appointments.

The college produced two newspapers. *Veils Up* was dedicated to the eradication of illiteracy and poverty, and to the promotion of mother-child healthcare. The *College Tribune* was the first attempt by young women to tackle such issues as the role of women in politics and the labor force.

In 1973, the college became coeducational and changed its name to Beirut University College. In the

same year, it established the Institute for Women's Studies in the Arab World (IWSAW). The institute researches and documents women's status in the Arab world, publishing a quarterly journal called *al-Ra'ida* (The pioneer).

Improvements to the college came to a halt in 1975, when war broke out in Lebanon. From 1975 until 1990, very little quality education was available at any level. However, during that period, female enrollment rose while the number of male students declined. Also beginning in the mid-1970s, the college's administrators were Arab rather than American. During the civil war years IWSAW assumed an important, albeit informal, role as a research center and provider of services to widows and orphans, and it received significant financial support through grants from the Ford Foundation and several European governments. In 1978, Beirut University College decentralized its operations and opened a branch in the north, near Byblos, and one in the south of Lebanon, in Saida. After the war, developing and strengthening the university became a priority. In 1994, the New York Board of Regents approved another name change, to the Lebanese American University, reflecting its status as a full-fledged university. By the year 2002, it was a thriving coeducational institution and boasted more than 5,000 students, graduate as well as undergraduate.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1958); LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); LEBANON.

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MIRNA LATTOUF

BEITADDIN DECLARATION

A 1978 attempt by six Arab countries to end the Lebanese civil war of 1975–1990.

The Beitaddin Declaration was issued following a meeting (15–17 October 1978) in Lebanon, attended by the foreign ministers of the six Arab countries contributing troops to the Arab Deterrent Force (Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Sudan). The meeting took place during the Lebanese civil war, amid heightened tension. A national reconciliation document adopted by the Lebanese parliament (April 1978) had never been implemented. Further, Christian militias of the Lebanese forces and Syrian troops were involved in heavy clashes in east Beirut. In March 1978, Israel had invaded southern Lebanon. The resolutions adopted at Beitaddin (also Bayt al-Din, a famous residence of Lebanese amirs) included a recognition of Lebanon's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; a call for the dissolution of all armed presences in the country; and the full implementation of the agreements adopted by Arab heads of state in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and Cairo, Egypt (1976), which involved the establishment of a phased program for the rebuilding of the Lebanese army and the creation of a follow-up committee with delegates from Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Kuwait.

See also LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); LEBANESE FORCES.

GEORGE E. IRANI

BEJA

A people of the eastern Sudan.

The indigenous people of eastern Sudan are a people of great antiquity who have had a variety of names; since medieval times they have been known as the Beja. They inhabit the hills and the coastal plain along the Red Sea. Much of their past is uncertain, but they were known to the pharaohs, and certainly to the British in the modern age. The British viewed them as a people who had survived

the interest and the impact of more powerful nations without losing their character. They are composed of five clans: Ababda, Bisharin, Hadendowa, Amarar, and Beni Amir. They are nomadic, and are known for a mental and physical toughness that has helped them to overcome the harshness of their environment and blood feuds. Despite contact with the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans, it was the Muslims who finally had a real and lasting impression on the Beja. The Beja Conference is a political and armed opposition to the central military government ruling Sudan since 1989.

There are a number of cultural markers of the Beja. Some of these are shared with neighboring people groups; others are uniquely Beja. The men wear a typical Sudanese white *jallabiya* (a long, loose-fitting shirt with baggy pants underneath), and a white turban. Usually they add a colored vest to the outfit. Men usually own a sword that can be used as a weapon or for special ceremonial dances at celebrations. Often, Beja men have a big bush of hair composed of large curls. It is common to see a carved wooden comb sticking out of the top of a man's head as a decoration. Beja women wrap a brightly colored cloth called a *tawb* around their dresses. Often, both Beja men and women have three decorative vertical scars on each cheek. The women often wear beaded jewelry and large nose rings.

The dominant Beja language in Sudan is the TaBedawie, which is a Cushitic language influenced by Semitic languages such as Tigre and Arabic. Until the early 1990s TaBedawie was an unwritten language, and therefore it has no literature. It is common for Beja to speak Arabic (Sudanese dialect) as a second language. The Beja like to sing and play musical instruments, in particular the *rababa,* which is similar to a guitar. Since they are renowned camel herders, camels are the most popular subject matter for songs, but many songs also describe the beauty of women or express a longing for a special place such as a village, a mountain, or good grazing lands.

The coffee ceremony is one of the most dominant elements of Beja life, because it is the main setting for socializing and sharing news. In the ceremony, first the beans are roasted and mixed with ginger root and pounded into a powder. Next, the

A Beja tribesman clutches his sword as he rests. The members of this nomadic tribe, composed of five clans in eastern Sudan, have endured their harsh environment since ancient times. © PENNY TWEEDIE/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

powder is poured into a *jebana* or coffeepot, which is then filled with water. When the pot has boiled, the coffee is strained through a hair filter into small china cups the size of espresso cups, which are half-full of sugar. Once the pot has been emptied, more water is added, and the coffee is reboiled to produce a second, weaker round. This is usually repeated at least three times, and sometimes five or six. Coffee is very important to the Beja. The Beja, particularly the Hadendowa, spend 15 to 25 percent of their monthly incomes on coffee. It is a common saying in Sudan that a Hadendowa would rather starve than go without coffee.

See also SUDAN.

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ROBERT O. COLLINS
UPDATED BY KHALID M. EL-HASSAN

BEJERANO, MAYA

[1949–]

Israeli poet.

Maya Bejerano was born in Haifa in 1949. She studied art, literature, philosophy, and music. In addition to writing poetry she works as a librarian. Bejerano won the Prime Minister's Prize and other literary awards.

Bejerano's poetry is concerned with the age-old journey of self-discovery, which, in her poems, takes place outside of the self. Bejerano makes frequent use of space-age terminology as metaphors for observation. In such books as *Ostrich* (1978) and *Song of Birds* (1985), she invokes technical imagery—computers, spaceships, laser light—in order to create the distance and the precision necessary for effective observation. Bejerano does not emphasize the existential emptiness and social detachment that is sometimes associated with modern scientific knowledge. Rather, she uses science to enhance and facilitate human communication. Unlike some of the somber and more iconoclastic Israeli poetry that preceded hers, Bejerano's poetic journeys emphasize the positive and humanistic. Humanity, according to Bejerano, is the center of meaning and it is only through humanity that the world around us can be intelligible. She is constantly aware of the very act of writing and uses that consciousness to infuse her poems with wit and irony. Bejerano does not promote a specific ethical or ideological message in her poems. To her, the very vacillation between conflicting choices is the basis of human existence. She muses freely in her poems without being afraid where that may take her. The focus of Berjerano's poetry is the journey itself and the inherent promise of change it holds.

See also LITERATURE: HEBREW.

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YAROM PELEG

BEKIR FAHRI

Ottoman Turkish writer.

Bekir Fahri was graduated from the Mülkiye and entered the civil service. A partisan of the Young Turks, he was forced to take refuge in Egypt, returning to Istanbul after the 1908 revolution. In 1910, his novel *Jönler* (The youngsters) was published, and he became literary editor of the journal *Piyano.* The last years of his life, like the early years, remain a mystery; all that is known is that in 1914, he sent some stories to the magazine *Ruhab* from Cairo. His naturalist style was heavily influenced by the French author Émile Zola.

See also LITERATURE: TURKISH; YOUNG TURKS.

DAVID WALDNER

BEKTASHIS

Members of a heterodox Sufi order that blends pre-Islamic, Christian, and Shiʿite elements.

Although different sources dispute the date of the appearance of the legendary Hajji Bektash, it is probable that he fled to Seljuk, Anatolia, around 1230 with Kharezmian Turkmen tribes of Central Asia seeking refuge after the Mongol conquests. He was welcomed into the Oghuz tribe of Çepni, where he was a healer and thaumaturge and led a life of meditation. After his death, Kadıncık Ana of the Çepni, who was either his adoptive daughter or spiritual wife, founded the order that today bears his name with the help of her disciple, Abdal Musa.

Unlike his contemporary Jalal al-Din Rumi, who fled to Anatolia near the same time, Bektash did not study Islam in a formal Sunni *madrasa,* but

retained pre-Islamic practices of the Central Asian plains. There is some overlap in religious practices between Mevlevi and Bektashi dervishes, such as the semah, or whirling ceremony, although the former tends toward Sunnism. Bektashism incorporates elements of traditions of pre-Islamic Central Asia and Anatolia, including some Christian practices, and displays a distinctively intense veneration for the fourth caliph, Ali.

The Ottoman Empire recruited janissary soldiers from its Christian Balkan populations who found Bektashism easier to follow than Sunni Orthodox Islam. It is their adherence to Bektashism that helped it to spread during Ottoman times. Its characteristic liberalism, support for the oppressed, and support for political revolts attracted disfavor from the Sunni Ottoman establishment. In 1826 Sultan Mahmud II attempted to suppress the Bektashis by annihilating the janissaries. Devotees operated clandestinely, and their network of lodges (Tekkeler/Cem Eviler) helped the Young Turks before the revolution of 1908.

Bektashis welcomed Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's successful challenge to Ottoman rule because his secular policies curbed Sunni influence. They continued to support him despite his suppression in 1925 of all dervish orders, including their own. They survived in hiding in Turkey and openly in the Balkans—until the 1960s when some restrictions were lifted on religious groups. Their annual festival, held in mid-August in Hacibektaş, has become a significant national event publicly celebrating their mystical poetry, music, and dance as contributions to Turkish culture.

Estimated at between five and twenty million in Turkey in the 1990s, devotees are divided between those, commonly known as Alevis, whose leaders claim descent from their patron saint, and those who assert that he had no children. According to Alevis, one must be born Bektashi. Others claim that one becomes Bektashi by choice and can rise to the higher ranks of *baba, halife,* and *dedebaba.* However, all share a deep attachment to the trinity of Allah, Muhammad, and Ali, and the Twelve Imams, Fourteen Innocents, and Forty Saints of the spiritual hierarchy, and a conviction that their interpretation of Islam absolves them from the obligations observed by Sunni Muslims. Most practice in their own lodges instead of in mosques and do not make the pilgrimage to Mecca, but on visits to Hacibektaş they observe pre-Islamic and Meccan pilgrimage rituals. They are traditionally monogamous and proud of the equal participation of the women of their order. Their enjoyment of alcohol and nonadherence to the fast of Ramadan contributes to their popular image as irreligious and their famed satirical wit. Despite their differences regarding individual Bektashi membership entitlement, the terms *Bektashi* and *Alevi* are sometimes used interchangeably or hyphenated to indicate a blend of the two orientations.

Many Alevi Bektashis lost their lives when attacked by Sunni right-wing extremists at Kahramanmaraş in 1978, and at Sivas in 1993. Since the 1980s, Alevi Bektashi villagers come under growing pressure to improve their material lot by abandoning support for left-wing politicians and resistance to Sunni Islam. Though Alevi Bektashis trace their heritage to rural roots, they have become increasingly aware of the potential for tapping into urban discourses of democracy to strengthen their order. They run their own radio stations, print literature, and claim adherents in Western societies who come to them through the channels of Westernized Sufism.

See also ALEVI; ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; JANISSARIES; MAHMUD II; SHIʿISM; SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS; SUNNI ISLAM; TEKKE; YOUNG TURKS.

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JOHN D. NORTON
UPDATED BY MARIA F. CURTIS

BELGRAVE, CHARLES DALRYMPLE

[1894–1969]

Adviser to the Bahraini ruling family, 1926–1957.

Born in England, Charles Dalrymple Belgrave was a junior officer in the British Colonial Office on leave from a tour of duty in Tanganyika when, in the summer of 1925, he answered a classified advertisement in the *Times* (London) for the position of permanent adviser to the ruler of Bahrain, a British protectorate since 1820. He arrived on the islands in March 1926 and took charge of all branches of the local administration, assisted by a small corps of British civil servants.

Under his supervision, petroleum was discovered in 1932 and the oil revenues accruing to the state were used to build the country's infrastructure and create a variety of new government departments, including those of education and public health. He gradually extended his influence over virtually all aspects of the country's fiscal and administrative affairs; by the mid-1950s, his identification with both the ruling family and British imperialism in the Persian/Arabian Gulf made him the focus of widespread popular discontent. At the urging of the ruler, Shaykh Sulman ibn Hamad al-Khalifa, he retired as adviser in April 1957 and returned to London, where he died on 28 February 1969. Bahrain announced its independence in 1971, under Sulman's successor, Shaykh Isa ibn Sulman al-Khalifa.

See also AL KHALIFA FAMILY; BAHRAIN; IMPERIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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FRED H. LAWSON

BELHADJ, ALI

[1956–]

Leader of Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria.

Born in 1956 in Tunis, Ali Belhaj is a popular figure, fiery preacher, and the second leader of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut; FIS), the main Islamic opposition party in Algeria. Belhaj's father died in the Algerian war of liberation, and his family originates from the desert city of Ourgal in the south of Algeria. He received an entirely Arabic education at Islamic schools in Algiers and became a secondary school Arabic teacher. He was educated by prominent Algerian religious figures such as Abdellatif Soltani (d. 1983), Ahmad Sahnoun (b. 1907), and Omar Araboui (d. 1984), and was influenced by the Salafi doctrines, particularly those of Ibn Taimiyya and Ibn Qayim al-Jauziyya, and the writings of Muslim Brothers' leaders such as Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. Shaped by these influences, Belhadj represents the orthodox and uncompromising trend within the FIS.

Belhadj started his Islamic activities in the 1970s by delivering religious sermons and lectures. He was imprisoned from 1983 to 1987 for his association with the Mustapha Bouyali's armed group that sought to topple Chadli Bendjedid's socialist regime. After his release, he became a prayer leader in the mosques of al-Sunna and al-Qubba in Algiers. Belhadj's thorough religious knowledge, modest lifestyle, and remarkable oratory skills, particularly in addressing the depressed segments of society, enabled him to gain popularity and build a large constituency of followers. This popularity was asserted on several occasions when thousands of people responded to Belhadj's calls for peaceful marches in protest to certain policies of the state. Following a general strike that resulted in violent clashes with the military forces, Belhadj and the FIS's leader, Abbasi Madani, were arrested in June 1991, and Belhadj was later sentenced to twelve years in prison.

See also BENDJEDID, CHADLI; FRONT ISLAMIQUE DU SALUT (FIS); MADANI, ABASSI AL-.

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EMAD ELDIN SHAHIN

BELKACEM, CHERIF

[1930–]

Algerian officer and government minister.

Born in Morocco, Cherif Belkacem joined the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) in 1956. By the end of the Algerian War of Independence in 1962, he became a prominent general staff officer. As a member of the National Assembly, he influenced the passage of the Algerian constitution of 1963. He became minister of national orientation (1963) and then of education (1964) under Ahmed Ben Bella. After Colonel Houari Boumédienne's overthrow of Ben Bella in June 1965, Belkacem, then a member of the new Conseil de la Révolution, was charged with revitalizing the ruling one-party Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and with coordinating its policies with those of the new government. He served as minister of finance from 1968 to 1970 and then as a minister without portfolio charged with the reorganization of the FLN. After this ministry was dissolved Belkacem left Algeria for Europe and did not return until after the October 1988 riots. He resurfaced prominently in 1991 as a leader of a faction composed of former Boumédienne government ministers and officials who opposed the policies of President Chadli Bendjedid. In 2000 he participated in a colloquium regarding torture and the War of Independence. Though a longtime friend of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Belkacem questioned his administration and advocated the convening of representatives of Algerian civil society to regenerate the country. In 2001 he called upon the beleaguered Algerian president to resign. Belkacem remains a critic of the Pouvoir—the ruling military-civilian establishment.

See also BOUTEFLIKA, ABDELAZIZ; FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

BELL, GERTRUDE

[1868–1926]

British explorer and orientalist.

A graduate of Oxford, Gertrude Bell traveled throughout the Middle East and wrote several popular books about her travels, including *The Desert and the Sown* (1907), about Syria, and *Amurath to Amurath* (1911), about Baghdad and Mosul.

Her skill as a linguist and her knowledge of the region brought her during World War I to Britain's Arab Bureau in Cairo, Egypt, where in 1915 she compiled information on the bedouin of Arabia. In 1916, at the request of Britain's viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge, she went to Basra in Mesopotamia (Iraq) to aid the Indian Expeditionary Force and gather military intelligence. She remained in Mesopotamia for much of the next ten years, as oriental secretary to both Sir Percy Cox and Sir Arnold Wilson, British administrators. In 1920 and 1921, she was an active partisan of Faisal I ibn Hussein and helped bring him to the throne of Iraq in July 1921. Aside from her political work, Bell was honorary director of antiquities in Iraq and took part in creating the national museum in Baghdad.

See also COX, PERCY; FAISAL I IBN HUSSEIN; WILSON, ARNOLD T.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

BELL ORGANIZATION

See HUNCHAK PARTY

BELLOUNIS, MUHAMMAD

[1912–1958]

Algerian nationalist and Messalist.

Muhammad Bellounis was a staunch supporter of Messali al-Hadj and served in the Parti du Peuple Algérien (Party of the Algerian People, PPA), the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties, MTLD), and particularly the Mouvement National Algérien (Algerian National Movement, MNA). The MNA (established in December 1954) disputed the claim of the Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN) to be the only revolutionary voice of the Algerian people.

Bellounis was charged to organize a military MNA presence within Algeria. Instead of the French forces, the MNA targeted the FLN's military, the Armée de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Army, ALN). In the summer of 1955, the ALN, under the command of the fierce Colonel Amirouche (nom de guerre of Aït Hamouda), engaged Bellounis and 500 of his MNA fighters at Guenzetin, Kabylia. Bellounis and a small number of men survived the assault and escaped to the Mélouza region of Algeria, south of Kabylia, where there was still significant Messalist support. This provoked the fratricidal Mélouza massacre on 28 May 1957 by the ALN, where about 300 died, forcing Bellounis to turn to the French for logistical support.

With French assistance, Bellounis mustered 1,500 to 3,000 men by the summer of 1957 who were given their own uniforms and flag. Bellounis named this force, which Messali did not officially embrace, the Armée Nationale Populaire Algérienne (or du Peuple Algérien, ANPA) and styled himself as a two-star general. At first, Bellounis succeeded against the ALN, but his counterproductively severe treatment of civilians and of his own soldiers forced the French to terminate this collaboration (known as Operation Ollivier). The French army tracked down Bellounis in July 1958 and executed him. His death signaled the end of the MNA's military threat to the FLN.

See also Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN); Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Hadj, Messali al-; Mouvement National Algérien; Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques; Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA).

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

BELLY DANCE

See Dance

BEN-AHARON, YITZHAK

[1906–]

Israeli politician.

Yitzhak Ben-Aharon attended school in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in Berlin, and emigrated to Palestine from Austria in 1928. He was active in the labor movement and was a founder of ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir (a Zionist socialist youth movement). During World War II he fought with the British and was taken prisoner by the Germans. After Israel's independence, he became a member of the Knesset (1949–1977); he helped found and led MAPAM, and was instrumental in creating the Labor Party in 1968. He served as secretary-general of Histadrut (1969–1973) and remained active in politics after his retirement from the Knesset in 1977. He has served on boards and committees, and has written two books, *Messianic Regime: The End of the Road* (1988, Hebrew) and *Pages from the Calendar* (1994, Hebrew). The April 2003 issue of *Executive Intelligence Review* carried an interview with him discussing Israel's present and future.

See also Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzaʿir; Histadrut; Israel: Political Parties in; Knesset; Labor Zionism.

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ZACHARY KARABELL
UPDATED BY GREGORY S. MAHLER

BEN ALI, ZAYN AL-ABIDINE

[1936–]

President General of Tunisia, replaced Habib Bourguiba in a bloodless six-day constitutional coup in November 1987.

A member of the Destour movement since his teens, Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali pursued a military career, receiving training in France (St. Cyr Academy and Châlons-sur-Marne) and the United States (Ft. Bliss, Texas). He was the head of Tunisian military security from 1964 to 1974, when he became a military attaché in Morocco. Returning to Tunisia three years later, he became the head of national security, and ambassador to Poland in 1980. In 1984 he was appointed state secretary for national security and a cabinet minister in 1985. He suppressed riots in 1978 and 1984; in 1986, when he became minister of the interior, he set out to eliminate the Mouvement de Tendance Islamique (MTI; Islamic Tendency Movement), a group that opposed President Habib Bourguiba's secularist reforms. Despite two periods of disfavor between 1974 and 1984, Bourguiba appointed him prime minister in October 1987. He also served as secretary-general of the Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD; Destour Socialist Party). Many considered Bourguiba, who had ruled Tunisia for thirty years since independence from France in 1956, unfit to govern; a month after Ben Ali became prime minister, he ousted Bourguiba in a peaceful coup.

Tunisian president Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali in 1999. In 1975 the National Assembly named Habib Bourguiba president for life, but he was deposed by a constitutional coup in 1987 on the grounds he was becoming senile. Ben Ali, then serving as prime minister, took over the presidency in November of that year. **© AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.**

Initially Ben Ali claimed he would ease some of Bourguiba's stern political measures concerning opposition movements, particularly the Mouvement des Démocrates Sociaux (MDS; Social Democrat Movement) and the MTI. His interest in a multiparty system led to the signing of a national pact with opposition leaders in 1988. Nevertheless, he maintained strong ties with the ruling party, the old PSD, renamed the Rassemblement Constitutionelle Démocratique (RCD; Constitutional Democratic Rally) in 1987. He pursued strong links with other North African states through the Arab Maghreb Union, founded in 1989. As head of the RCD, he won reelection in 1994 and 1999 with more than 99 percent of the vote. Although the constitution limits the president to three terms, it seemed it might be amended as the central committee of the governing RCD requested he run again in 2004.

In 1991 Ben Ali banned the Hizb En Nahda (Renaissance Party), an offshoot of the MTI that tried to legalize its party status, and severely restricted the actions of its leader, Rached Ghannouchi. On 12 July 1992 one of the harshest court cases in Tunisian history was launched against Hizb En Nahda's members; 280 were accused of taking part in a plot and fifty were threatened with the death penalty. This case caught the attention of Western countries and international human rights groups, who exerted pressure to release the defendants. Thirty defendants were sentenced to life in prison.

Ben Ali's repression of Islamist and opposition leaders as well as human rights activists increased through the 1990s. In 1994 Moncef Marzouki, General of the League of Human Rights, was jailed for considering a run against Ben Ali, the only presidential candidate. When press agencies such as

Le Monde and *Libération* showed concern, they were banned. Despite Ben Ali's promise to improve human rights and his introduction of a more liberal press law, Human Rights Watch continued to denounce the government's human rights record. Tunisia had more than 1,000 political prisoners, was listed as one of the ten countries in the world most hostile to a free press, and is among the U.S. State Department's list of countries that use excessive "stress and duress" interrogation tactics. Ben Ali's government defends its policies. After the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, Foreign Minister Habib Ben Yahia visited London, where he spoke on the alleged danger of Tunisian Islamists abroad and called for the extradition of Hizb En Nahda leadership.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Tunisia faced serious economic problems, such as chronic unemployment, a balance of payment deficit, and an unwieldy state subsidy and price control system. Despite drought conditions, Tunisia's economy has improved, with gross domestic product up 6 percent in 2001, tourism up 3.5 percent in 2000, and direct foreign investment up 144 percent to $768 million. Despite the privatization of thirty-five of forty-one firms, with an average 5 percent improvement in their turnover, unemployment remains high at 15.6 percent.

See also Arab Maghreb Union; Bourguiba, Habib; Ghannouchi, Rached; Marzouki, Moncef.

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Matthew S. Gordon
Updated by Maria F. Curtis

BEN AMMAR, TAHAR

[?–1985]

Tunisian nationalist and diplomat.

A wealthy landowner, Ben (also ibn) Ammar served as president of the Tunisian section of the Grand Council in the early 1950s. In 1955, as premier, he signed a series of six conventions on internal autonomy for Tunisia with the French government of Premier Pierre Mendès-France. In March 1956, he was one of four Tunisian signatories to the official protocol granting independence to Tunisia. Ben Ammar died in 1985.

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Matthew S. Gordon

BEN ARFA

See Arfa, Muhammad Ibn

BEN BADIS, ABD AL-HAMID

[1889–1940]

Algerian nationalist and founder of the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (AUMA).

Born to a traditional Muslim family in Constantine, northeast Algeria (although his father had served on France's colonial *conseil supérieur*), Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis received his higher education at Zaytuna mosque university in Tunis. There, he was influenced by the reformist Salafiyya Movement of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. Determined to apply Salafiyya principles to Algerian society, Ben Badis engaged in educating Algerians to proper Islamic practice and observance. Besides establishing schools, his ideas appeared in periodicals such as *al-Muntaqid* and *al-Shihab.* In 1931, he founded the Algerian Association of Reformist Ulama (Islamic scholars), known also as the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama.

Although chiefly concerned with education, Ben Badis also entered the political arena by asserting that French assimilation was impossible. He declared: "This Algerian nation is not France, cannot be France, and does not wish to be France."

This complemented his famous conviction that "Islam is my religion, Arabic my language, Algeria my fatherland." These views inevitably brought him into contact with nationalists Ferhat Abbas and Messali al-Hadj. Ben Badis, however, preferred a cultural rather than a political role in Algerian history and nationalism. If later the Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN) purposely ignored the contributions of other nationalist rivals, Ben Badis's legacy was recognized and respected.

See also ABBAS, FERHAT; ABDUH, MUHAMMAD; ASSOCIATION OF ALGERIAN MUSLIM ULAMA (AUMA); FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE; HADJ, MESSALI AL-; NATIONALISM; RIDA, RASHID; SALAFIYYA MOVEMENT.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

BEN BARKA, MEHDI

[1920–1966]

Moroccan nationalist politician.

Mehdi Ben Barka, the son of a local Moroccan religious leader, was raised in a traditional milieu. He excelled in his studies, particularly in mathematics, entered the French system, and completed a baccalaureate. At twenty-one, he was graduated from the university in Algiers. Postponing graduate study in mathematics, he taught in Rabat, for a time at the imperial college, where Crown Prince Hassan was his student.

Drawn into nationalist, anticolonialist politics, he held a number of significant Istiqlal Party positions and various government posts following independence in 1956, culminating in King Muhammad V's appointing him president of the first National Consultative Assembly. Ben Barka devoted particular attention to party youth and the labor movement. As a second-generation Istiqlal leader, his policies of party reform often put him at odds with the senior leaders. He challenged the regime by calling for elections, a constitutional monarchy, and a greater role for labor and popular participation. Despite his progressive stance, he used party institutions to build a personal power base.

In 1959, Ben Barka announced the formation of a new political party, the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). In 1963, accused of participation in a reputed plot against King Hassan, he went into exile, where he continued to denounce the Moroccan monarchy. In October 1965, Ben Barka was abducted in Paris, possibly tortured, and killed by a conspiracy that involved the French secret service, Moroccan minister of the interior General Muhammad Oufkir, and Ahmed Dlimi, Moroccan chief of security. General Oufkir was brought to trial in absentia and found guilty. The refusal of the Moroccan government to extradite Oufkir generated a breach in Moroccan–French relations that lasted almost four years.

See also DLIMI, AHMED; ISTIQLAL PARTY: MOROCCO; OUFKIR, MUHAMMAD.

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DONNA LEE BOWEN

BEN BELLA, AHMED

[1916–]

First premier (1962–1963) and president of Algeria (1963–1965).

Born in Marnia near Oran, Ahmed Ben Bella was decorated during World War II. Like other young Algerians, Ben Bella was deeply affected by the Setif Revolt (May 1945) and its bloody suppression. He joined Messali Hadj's Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) and later the paramilitary Organisation Spéciale (OS). He participated in an attack on the main post office in Oran in April 1949. He was later

Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria's first president, was an organizer of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) during the country's battle for independence from France. Ben Bella was imprisoned by the French for six years and was elected president in 1963, a year after his release. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

captured by French police and imprisoned in 1950. He escaped to Egypt in 1952.

Along with other younger nationalists, Ben Bella planned an armed insurrection against the French. He is regarded as one of the nine historic chiefs of the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962) who founded the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). During the revolution Ben Bella sought assistance in foreign capitals for the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). He was viewed as the head of the external faction of the FLN, which competed with the internal group for leadership of the revolution. France's skyjacking in October 1956 of a plane carrying Ben Bella and three other historic FLN chiefs—Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Boudiaf, and Mohamed Khider—postponed an inevitable intra-elite confrontation. Ben Bella was incarcerated in France until 1962.

After the war Ben Bella and Colonel Houari Boumédienne established the Bureau Politique in opposition to the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA) and seized power in August 1962. Ben Bella emerged as Algeria's first prime minister in 1962, then was elected president in 1963 and served until 1965. Criticized for his flamboyance and demagogy by detractors while projected as a political exemplar of the Third World by supporters, Ben Bella faced enormous problems. Nevertheless, he restored order in Algeria, steered his country toward a socialist economy highlighted by the self-management *(autogestion)* system, and allocated considerable sums toward education. In foreign policy, he supported wars of national liberation movements and espoused nonalignment. He also pursued close cooperation with France, because Algeria remained deeply dependent on the former *métropole.* Despite declarations of Maghrib (North African) unity, relations with Morocco deteriorated, as illustrated by the brief border conflict (the Moroccan-Algerian War) in late 1963.

Ben Bella became increasingly authoritarian in reaction to exacting political and military perils such as the Kabyle Revolt led by Ait Ahmad (1963) and the insurrection of Colonel Mohammed Chaabani (1964). Recognizing the competitive ambitions of Vice President Boumédienne, Ben Bella moved against his rival's supporters—notably, Interior Minister Ahmed Medeghri and Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Boumédienne retaliated by deposing Ben Bella in a nonviolent military coup on 19 June 1965. He was placed in closely monitored and isolated house arrest. Ben Bella's disappearance incited considerable international concern. President Chadli Bendjedid freed Ben Bella in July 1979. He moved to France and organized an opposition party called the Mouvement pour la Démocratie en Algérie (MDA) in 1984. Ben Bella and Ait Ahmed reconciled in exile in 1985 and jointly called for constitutional reforms guaranteeing political rights in Algeria.

In 1990 the beleaguered Algerian government permitted Ben Bella to return to Algeria, where he continued his opposition to the Bendjedid government. For a brief period, observers believed that

Ben Bella could bridge secular and Islamist movements and promote political reconciliation, but Ben Bella discovered that he had no popular or political base. He strongly supported Iraq during the crisis leading to the Gulf War of 1991. The forced resignation of President Bendjedid by military and civilian elites and the inauguration of the Haut Comité d'Etat (HCE), briefly presided over by his old comrade Mohamed Boudiaf, still left Ben Bella consigned as a marginal political figure. He participated in opposition party discussions and signed the Sant Egidio Platform (National Contract) in January 1995. Given the constitutional referendum of 1996 that restricted political parties, the MDA was forced to disband. Ben Bella remains an important, historic figure determined to remain an active rather than anachronistic participant in Algerian affairs.

See also ALGERIA: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; ARMÉE DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE (ALN); FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE (FLN).

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

BEN BOUALI, HASSIBA

[1938–1957]

Algerian nationalist.

Hassiba Ben Bouali was born in the city of El Asnam (today Chlef) and moved with her family to Algiers in 1947. She was studying at the University of Algiers when she became involved in the Algerian nationalist movement against French rule and participated in the student strikes of 1956. Ben Bouali quickly joined the National Liberation Front (FLN) and became the liaison officer of Ali La Pointe, deputy chief of military operations in the urban zone of Algiers. After a series of bombings in 1956 and 1957, the French army launched a security (offensive) operation often referred to as the Battle of Algiers. Hassiba Ben Bouali died on 8 October 1957, with Ali La Pointe, in the explosion of the house where she was surrounded by the French paratroopers in the oldest part of the Algerian capital (the Casbah). Along with some other young women, Ben Bouali is considered a key figure in the Algerian struggle against French colonialism. Her name was given to the university in her native town.

See also BOUHIRED, JAMILA; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS.

RABIA BEKKAR

BEN BOULAID, MOUSTAFA

[1917–1957]

A historic chief of the Algerian revolution (1954–1962).

Moustafa Ben Boulaid (also Mostefa Ben Boulaïd) was born to a peasant family in the impoverished Aurès (Awras) mountain region. A Free French veteran, Ben Boulaid was an enterprising man who eventually owned a bus line. Colonial authorities terminated his business license due to his support of Messali al-Hadj. Like other young nationalists, Ben Boulaid grew impatient with Messali's leadership and demanded immediate action against colonialism. He played an important role in establishing the Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA; Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action), the parent organization of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front), which earned him his reputation as one of the nine historic chiefs *(chefs historiques)* of the revolution. He unsuccessfully attempted to gain Messali's support for the FLN.

Guerrillas in the Aurès under his command opened the Algerian war of independence with attacks on 31 October and 1 November 1954. Ben Boulaid was captured by the French in February 1955, but he escaped in November. Resuming his guerrilla command, he died in March 1957 while examining a booby-trapped field radio.

See also ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; COMITÉ RÉVOLUTIONNAIRE D'UNITÉ ET D'ACTION (CRUA); FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE (FLN); HADJ, MESSALI AL-.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

BENDJEDID, CHADLI

[1929–]

Third president of Algeria, 1979–1992.

Chadli Bendjedid was born near Annaba, Algeria. His father was a small landholder. A veteran of the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), Bendjedid became a professional officer in the Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP). After his deposal of President Ahmed Ben Bella in 1965, Colonel Houari Boumédienne appointed Bendjedid to the Conseil Nationale de la Révolution Algérienne (CNRA). Bendjedid was entrusted with the command of strategic military regions—Constantine, then Oran. He also monitored French troop withdrawals, including from the strategic naval base at Mersel-Kébir in 1968. After Boumédienne's death in December 1978 Bendjedid emerged as a compromise presidential candidate within the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and the military. He was elected president of Algeria in February 1979.

Despite the institution of such reforms as opening up the economy, encouraging a free press, and providing for a multiparty government structure, Chadli Bendjedid's presidency was ultimately not a popular one, and he was forced to resign in 1992. © IMPRESS/GETTY IMAGES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Bendjedid was less ideological than his predecessors. Characterized as a pragmatic man, Bendjedid tempered Algeria's ambitious state-planning and foreign policy. His five-year plans emphasized more balanced sector development, with more attention to agriculture and services. He also reorganized the large state companies and encouraged smaller enterprises. In addition, he pursued tentative economic liberalization. Bendjedid also strove to realize Maghrib unity through amity treaties with Tunisia and Mauritania in 1983. Relations were restored with Morocco in 1988 after having been severed over the Western Sahara conflict. Though Western Sahara's future remained unresolved, the Arab Maghreb Union was proclaimed in February 1989. Bendjedid also was accorded a state visit to France in 1983.

Bendjedid consolidated his power internally by promoting military officers and removing Boumédiennist rivals such as Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a future president. He was reelected in 1985. The National Charter of 1976 was revised in 1986. The "enriched" charter included a section commemorating the historic struggle for independence and mentioned Messali Hadj and Ferhat Abbas, who had been previously proscribed. The revised document reaffirmed Algeria's Arab identity. This particularly dissatisfied restive Berbers, notably the Kabyles, who were fearful for the future of their distinct culture and language and had demonstrated in violent outbursts in 1980 and 1985. The continued official ideological attachment to secular socialism also alienated populist Muslims. Chronic unemployment exasperated the disillusioned younger generation. Furthermore, the collapse of oil prices, which were indexed to natural gas prices, crippled the economy. These variables contributed to widespread discontent that produced rioting in October 1988 resulting in hundreds killed and wounded and a state of siege.

Bendjedid quickly promised and delivered reforms—including political pluralism and civil rights—highlighted by the Constitution of February 1989. He was reelected president in 1989, but he failed to acquire political and popular support, as illustrated by a quick succession of prime ministers (Kasdi Merbah [1988–1989], Mouloud Hamrouche [1989–1991], and Ahmed Ghozali [1991–1992]). The rise of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) and its stunning success in regional elections in June 1990 astonished the ruling elite, but Bendjedid was determined to permit the democratic process to complete its imperfect course. Parliamentary elections in June 1991 had to be postponed, however, because of inflammatory protests and pronouncements by the FIS that were provoked by eleventh-hour gerrymandering by the FLN. The FIS's first-round electoral success in the rescheduled December 1991 elections incited a military and civilian coup in January 1992 that forced Bendjedid's resignation. He was kept under house arrest until October 1999. Since then, Bendjedid has criticized the policies of President Abdleaziz Bouteflika and has denounced the U.S.-led war against Iraq in 2003. Although Bendjedid's presidency is popularly discredited, he rehabilitated nationalists and helped restore Algeria's historical memory.

See also Arab Maghreb Union; Conseil Nationale de la Révolution Algérienne (CNRA); Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Front Islamique du Salut (FIS).

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Phillip C. Naylor

BENFLIS, ALI

[1945–]

Prime minister of Algeria; minister of justice.

Ali Benflis pursued a legal career before entering politics. His initial interest was in juvenile delinquency and in rehabilitation. He assisted in the founding of the state-sponsored Ligue Algérien des Droits de l'Homme (LADH) in 1987. He was appointed minister of justice in 1988 by Prime Minister Kasdi Merbah, and he maintained this portfolio in Mouloud Hamrouche's government from 1989 to 1991. He resigned, however, when Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali sought legislation for internment camps. After the deposal of President Chadli Bendjedid and the cancellation of the elections in January 1991, Benflis became increasingly involved within the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and was a rare successful party candidate in the first round of the parliamentary elections in December 1991. After the deposal of President Chadli Bendjedid and the cancellation of the elections in January 1992, Benflis devoted his political activities to the FLN. He managed Abdelaziz Bouteflika's successful presidential campaign in 1999, and served as interim general secretary to the president and the chief of staff. He opposed Prime Minister Ahmed Benbitour regarding privatization issues. In August 2000 Benbitour resigned and Benflis replaced him. As prime minister, Benflis has pursued prudent privatization and structural reform. He has also had to deal with Kabyle unrest since April 2001 as a consequence of police brutality and repression. Benflis was also selected as head of the FLN in September 2001. After the resounding success of the FLN in the parliamentary election of May 2002, President Bouteflika asked Benflis to continue as prime minister.

Bouteflika and Benflis reportedly disagreed over the speed of Algeria's economic liberalization. However, the rift that widened between them was primarily political. Bouteflika dismissed his prime minister in May 2003. Benflis remains one of the most significant members of Algeria's political elite.

See also Algeria: Political Parties in; Bouteflika, Abdelaziz; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).

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Phillip C. Naylor

BENGHAZI

Chief city and Mediterranean seaport of Cyrenaica (Barqa), second in Libya only to Tripoli.

Originally founded by the Greeks as Berenike on a small natural harbor on the gulf of Sidra, Benghazi (also Marsa ibn Ghazi) was refounded and renamed in the Middle Ages. Its importance was due to its position as the only port between Tripoli and Alexandria, as an outlet for the agricultural produce of northern Cyrenaica, and as a center of local administration. In the early nineteenth century, Benghazi was still an impoverished village of some five thousand people. Its prosperity and importance increased with the spread of the Sanusi order in Cyrenaica and, beginning in the 1840s, in the eastern Sahara and the Sudan. It became the main Mediterranean outlet for the newly opened, Sanusi-controlled trade route to the rising sultanate of Wadai in eastern Sudan (now Chad). In the later nineteenth century, despite being the local seat of Ottoman administration, it was one of the few remaining North African shipment markets for the trans-Saharan slave trade.

Benghazi was still largely undeveloped (with a cosmopolitan population of about 20,000) when Italy invaded in 1911. As in Tripoli, the Italians created a modern, European-style city outside the old Arab quarters, particularly after the defeat of the Cyrenaican rebellion in 1931 and 1932. By 1937, the population was fifty thousand, but expansion was constricted by its position between the sea and an inland saltwater lagoon.

During the North African campaigns of World War II (1940–1943), Benghazi changed hands five times and suffered some 2,000 air raids. Destruction was extensive and the British military administration, set up after the city's final capture by the British Eighth Army in November 1942, could not fund rebuilding. In 1949, Benghazi became the seat of the first Cyrenaican government and was later recognized as the joint capital—with Tripoli—of the independent United Kingdom of Libya (proclaimed December 1951). Over the next five years, the town and port were rebuilt, but rapid urban expansion and development started only with the oil boom of the 1950s and 1960s, with thousands of migrant families forced into shanty settlements. After the 1969 revolution, Benghazi was deprived of its joint-capital status, regaining its traditional role as chief port and city of Cyrenaica, a center of administration, industry, commerce, and education. It houses the University of Gar Younis and an international airport (at Benina). Benghazi is linked by road to Tripoli and Egypt and to the Saharan regions of eastern Libya. The 2002 population was some 708,000.

See also Cyrenaica; Sanusi Order; Slave Trade.

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John L. Wright

BEN-GURION, DAVID

[1886–1973]

Labor-Zionist leader and a founder of the Histadrut; Israel's first prime minister and first minister of defense.

David Ben-Gurion was born David Gruen (later changed to David Green) in October 1886 in Plonsk, Poland. He was educated at an Orthodox Hebrew school. In 1903 he helped to organize the Polish branch of the Workers for Zion movement, known as Poʿalei Zion. In 1906 he moved to Palestine, where he worked as a farmer in agricultural settlements and served as a guard against Palestinian attackers. He was an organizer of the Palestine Labor Party and became the editor of its newspaper, *Ahdut* (Unity), in 1910, which is when he Hebraized his surname to Ben-Gurion.

In 1913 he studied law at the University of Istanbul. When World War I began Ben-Gurion returned to Palestine, but was deported by the Turks in 1915 with his friend Yizhak Ben-Zvi, who later became the president of Israel. Both Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi left Palestine and moved to New York City, where Ben-Gurion met and married his wife, Paula.

In the United States Ben-Gurion helped to found the organization ha-Halutz (Young Pioneers) from 1915–1916 to support immigration to Palestine. Following the November 1917 British Balfour Declaration, he agreed with Zionist leader Chaim Weiz-

mann that Zionist goals would be best served by supporting the British government. Accordingly, Ben-Gurion enlisted in the British army's Jewish Legion to fight the Ottoman regime. Ben-Gurion enlisted in Canada in 1918, and after training in Nova Scotia, England, and Cairo, he served with General Edmund Henry Allenby in fighting the Turks.

Back in Palestine in 1920, Ben-Gurion helped to create the Histadrut, the national labor federation, and was elected its first secretary-general in 1921. The Histadrut—referred to as a "state within a state," or a "government within a government"—was a major force in economic, social, and labor policy in the Jewish community in Palestine.

Mandatory Palestine

In 1923 the League of Nations mandate for Palestine passed to Great Britain. In 1929 the mandatory government recognized the Jewish Agency as the body representing Jewish interests in Palestine. The following year Ben-Gurion helped to found the Israel workers' party, Mifleget Poʿalei Israel (MAPAI), and became its head.

In 1933 Ben-Gurion became a member of the executive board of the Jewish Agency for Palestine; in 1935 he became chairman of the Zionist executive. Ben-Gurion felt that the 1929 Arab riots against Jewish settlement required that the Jewish Agency push for the classic goals of Zionism: a Jewish majority in Palestine and Jewish self-defense. During this period Ben-Gurion published three books dealing with the labor movement, the Jewish working class, and Zionism. After the creation of the state of Israel, he took the position that real Zionism required migration to Israel. Jewish life outside of Israel, when migration was a possibility, was anathema to Zionism.

In 1936 a royal commission of inquiry—known by the name of its chairman, Lord Peel—arrived in Palestine to investigate Arab-Jewish tensions. Ben-Gurion testified before the Peel Commission. When the commission recommended the partition of Palestine in 1937, Ben-Gurion persuaded the Zionist Congress to accept the principle. In 1939 Britain changed its attitudes toward the Middle East, and adopted a strong pro-Palestinian line. Ben-Gurion called for the Jewish community to resist Britain and advocated "the fighting Zionist." The MacDonald



David Ben-Gurion served as prime minister and defense minister of Israel from 1948 to 1953, and then again from 1955 until he resigned in 1963. His paramount and partly successful political goal was to introduce stable majority rule to a disparate, divided Jewish society. PHOTOGRAPH BY HENRY GROSSMAN. PUBLIC DOMAIN.

White Paper on Palestine called for severely restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine over the five-year period starting in 1939; all immigration would end in 1944. At the outbreak of World War II, Ben-Gurion argued for Jewish forces to support Britain, despite the 1939 White Papers. He thought that Winston Churchill deserved the support of Zionists and that a solution to Zionist demands would be found at war's end. As late as 1940 he was still urging compromise.

In 1947, at the end of the war, Britain handed jurisdiction for the Palestine problem to the new United Nations. The United Nations formed a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) and in November 1947 voted to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, maintaining control of a small area around Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency executive council began to focus their attention on security for the Jewish population in

In 1956, shortly after becoming Israel's prime minister for the second time, David Ben-Gurion appointed Golda Meir as foreign minister. Meir replaced Moshe Sharett, whom Ben-Gurion had asked to resign due to political differences. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Palestine against Arab attacks during the transition period and defending the new state of Israel from neighboring nations once independence was declared.

Israeli Statehood

In April 1948 a people's council of thirty-seven members headed by Ben-Gurion was established as an unofficial provisional legislature and government after the departure of the British. On 14 May 1948 Ben-Gurion publicly read the declaration of independence of the state of Israel. The state was attacked by its Arab neighbors in what became known as the War of Independence. One of Ben-Gurion's priorities was access to Jerusalem; ultimately, access was achieved to only the western edge of the city. Another priority, access to the Red Sea, was achieved with conquest of the small city of Elat. An armistice took effect in February 1949; soon thereafter a parliament, the Knesset, and other democratic institutions were formed. Ben-Gurion formed a coalition government that lasted until 1953, and again from 1955 to 1963. He served as both prime minister and minister of defense.

The first Knesset was to draft a new constitution, but decided not to adopt a draft authored by Leo Kohn, legal adviser to the Jewish Agency. Ben-Gurion argued against rushing into any constitution for fear of alienating any sector of Israel's heterogeneous population. Second, he argued that debate over constitutional structures would distract Israel from other issues including resolution of the war, immigration, housing, and finding jobs for new immigrants. Third, the role of religion in the new state needed to be resolved; the extent to which the new constitution would incorporate religious dogma was a contentious one that could not be ignored. (Indeed, many Orthodox Jewish leaders of the day argued that Israel already had a constitution in an assortment of Talmudic documents known to Israel's Jewish population.) Eventually an agreement was reached to respect the religious status quo while a constitution was worked on in piecemeal fashion.

Ben-Gurion had conflicts with his coalition partners over the years, primarily with Orthodox religious parties, the support of which was needed to maintain a majority of seats in the Knesset. His socialist background and secular beliefs often conflicted with the principles espoused by the religious parties, however. Each time his government fell, Ben-Gurion and his cabinet would stay in office as a caretaker government until a new coalition could be assembled. Typically, he would be able to construct a new coalition, usually with the same partners, with a majority in the Knesset.

In 1951 Ben-Gurion had to make a difficult decision concerning war reparations proffered by the West German government. There was an emotional outcry in Israel about whether this was "blood money." Ben-Gurion believed it was aid to help Israel absorb immigrants and survivors of the Nazi regime, not a gesture to allow Germany to forget its war crimes. Demonstrations and acts of violence bordering on civil war, led by opposition leader Menachem Begin, were unable to dissuade Ben-Gurion, and in 1952 an agreement was signed.

In 1953 Ben-Gurion resigned as prime minister for what he cited as health reasons, and Moshe Sharett became prime minister. Ben-Gurion moved to a kibbutz just outside Beersheba, Kibbutz Sde Boker. In 1955 he returned to political life as defense minister under Prime Minister Sharett. Later that year, following new elections, Ben-Gurion resumed the position of prime minister, with Sharett becoming foreign minister. In 1956 Ben-Gurion asked for Sharett's resignation when he felt he could not rely upon Sharett's unquestioning loyalty with regard to cooperation with Britain and France in a possible attack on Egypt. Sharett was replaced by the more supportive Golda Meir as foreign minister.

Ben-Gurion was a supporter of development in the sciences, especially atomic energy. As early as 1956, he decided to proceed vigorously to develop nuclear capability in Israel, primarily as a source of energy. The defense potential of the industry was not lost on him, however.

In 1963 Ben-Gurion again resigned from the government for "personal reasons," and was succeeded by Levi Eshkol. Ben-Gurion's base of power had been eroding for many years as a result of the Lavon Affair—an Israeli spy and sabotage operation in Egypt that had gone awry and embarrassed the Israeli government. Although he was officially out of power, he continued to be regarded as "the Old Man" and was kept informed of government decisions. Even the top-secret decision to launch preemptive strikes against Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq in June of 1967, which led to the Arab–Israeli War of 1967, was shared with Ben-Gurion before the fact; he gave it his blessing. In his later years Ben-Gurion tempered what were often militaristic views of Israel's security needs. Following the 1967 War he was a supporter of negotiating land for peace, arguing that Israel did not need the conquered territories, save those of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.

Ben-Gurion retired from the Knesset in 1970 and moved back to his kibbutz. He died on 1 December 1973 in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War.

See also Allenby, Edmund Henry; Balfour Declaration (1917); Begin, Menachem; Ben-Zvi, Yizhak; Ha-Halutz; Histadrut; Israel: Political Parties in; Jewish Agency for Palestine; Jewish Legion; Knesset; Labor Zionism; Lavon Affair; Meir, Golda; Peel Commission Report (1937); United Nations and the Middle East; United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 1947 (UNSCOP); Weizmann, Chaim; White Papers on Palestine; Zionism.

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Gregory S. Mahler

BEN-GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV

Israeli university.

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev was established in 1969 by David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, to develop the Negev desert (60 percent of Israel's land mass and 10 percent of its population). Originally called the University of the Negev, in 1973 it was renamed to honor Ben-Gurion. The center of education and research in the area, it focuses on desert research, high technology, medicine, and regional development. The university has campuses at Beersheba and Sde Boker.

Besides a medical school, there are four faculties: engineering sciences, natural sciences, health sciences, and humanities and social sciences. The student population in 2002 was 15,000.

See also Beersheba; Negev.

Miriam Simon

BEN JELLOUN, UMAR

[1933–1975]

Moroccan political activist.

Umar Ben Jelloun, born in Oujda, studied law and telecommunications in Paris, and was president of the Association of Muslim North African Students. In the late 1950s, he was among Mehdi Ben Barka's supporters within the Istiqlal Party, and joined him in the breakaway from it and the formation of the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP). He was a member of the UNFP's national committee and political bureau and director of its newspaper, *al-Muharrir.* His duties led to clashes with trade union leaders over their alleged corruption and advancement of their personal interests. Ben Jelloun served several prison terms, underwent torture, and was sentenced to death in 1963 (pardoned in 1965). He was tried again in 1973 for plotting to overthrow the government and acquitted on 30 August, but was held and charged with another offense. In 1974 he received a limited pardon. Ben Jelloun was murdered by unknown assailants on 18 December 1975, in Casablanca. Clement Henry Moore described Ben Jelloun as a major casualty of a political system whose rules he rejected.

See also Ben Barka, Mehdi; Istiqlal Party: Morocco; Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP).

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

BEN KHEDDA, BEN YOUSSEF

[1920–]

President of the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne, 1961–1962.

Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, born in Berrouaghia, Algeria, worked as a pharmacist and was an active member of Messali al-Hadj's Parti du Peuple Algérien (People's Party). He rose to secretary-general of its successor organization, the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties, MTLD), but he sided with the centralists in opposition to Messali.

Ben Khedda joined the revolutionary Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN), earning a reputation as an ideologist. He co-drafted the Soummam Congress Platform and wrote for the FLN's newspaper, *al-Moudjahid.* In 1958, he was selected as minister for Social Affairs in the first Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, GPRA) and also served as an FLN diplomat before replacing Ferhat Abbas as the GPRA's president (August 1961). Ben Khedda supported the conclusion of the Evian accords (March 1962), which gave Algeria its independence.

That summer, Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumédienne, who had the support of a trained external army, took over the leadership of the government. Ben Khedda returned to private life until 1976 when he cosigned a manifesto criticizing the policies of Boumédienne. After the October 1988 riots and the constitutional reforms of 1989, Ben Khedda formed an Islamic party called Oumma.

See also Abbas, Ferhat; Ben Bella, Ahmed; Boumédienne, Houari; Evian Accords (1962); Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques; Newspapers and Print Media; Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA).

Phillip C. Naylor

BEN M'HIDI, MUHAMMAD LARBI

[1923–1957]

Algerian revolutionary leader.

Muhammad Larbi Ben M'hidi was born to a farming family in Ain M'Lila near Constantine. A follower of Messali al-Hadj, he joined the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA; Algerian People's Party) and the paramilitary Organisation Spéciale (OS; Special Organization), which was affiliated with the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD; Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties). Like other members of the

younger elite, Ben M'hidi grew impatient with the venerable nationalist Messali and collaborated in the founding in 1954 of the Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA; Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action) and subsequently the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front). He is regarded as one of the nine historic chiefs *(chefs historiques)* of the Algerian revolution against French colonialism.

During the Algerian war of independence (1954–1962), Ben M'hidi initially commanded Wilaya I (the military district in the Oran region) and played an important role at the FLN's Soummam conference in August 1956. Ben M'hidi believed that the revolution should be directed by "internal" rather than "external" revolutionaries. During the Battle of Algiers (1956–1957), he headed FLN operations until his capture in February 1957. The French announced in March that Ben M'hidi had committed suicide in his cell. This account was disputed by others, who have contended that he was in fact tortured and murdered.

See also Algerian War of Independence; Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA); Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Hadj, Messali al-; Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques.

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Phillip C. Naylor

BENNABI, MALEK

[1905–1973]

Algerian Islamic thinker.

Born in a poor family in Constantine, Malek Bennabi became a leader of modern Islamic thinking in independent Algeria. As a youth, he attended a Qu'ranic school in Tebessa. Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis, the influential leader of the Islamic Reformist Movement *(ulama),* persuaded Bennabi to pursue his studies in Paris. There he obtained a diploma in engineering. His writings began appearing during the 1940s. Among the most notable are *The Qur'anic Phenomenon* (1946, translated 2001), *Les conditions de la renaissance: Problème d'une civilisation* (The conditions of the [Islamic] renaissance: A problem of civilization, 1948), and *La vocation de l'Islam* (The vocation of Islam, 1954). Bennabi joined the Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN) during the 1950s and served as one of its representatives abroad. While in Cairo in 1956, he wrote *L'Afro-Asiatisme* and began *Le problème des idées dans le monde musulman* (The problem of ideas in the Muslim world), which he gave up because of, in his words, "ideological struggles." The book was eventually published in 1970.

From 1963 to 1967, Bennabi served as director of superior studies at the ministry of education; he was removed because of suspicions that he belonged to al-Qiyam, an Islamist organization opposed to the regime. During the late 1960s, Bennabi's disciples established a mosque at the University of Algiers. Bennabi, who organized private discussions in his own home, attracted primarily French-speaking students enrolled in science departments. He and his disciples alienated Arab-speaking Islamists mainly because of Bennabi's criticism of the *salafists,* the followers of the so-called purist movement, who reject progress, urging Muslims to eschew modernity and go back to the "strictness" of the Prophet's epoch, which they view as the golden age of Islam. The Algerian *salafists* drew their inspiration from Egyptian and south Asian sources. During the 1990s a current within the Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front, FIS), known as the Jaz'ara, or Algerianists, formed an elitist Islamist group, purporting, implausibly, to be inspired by Bennabi's ideas. Nourredine Boukrouh, an opponent of the FIS and founder of the Algerian Party for Renewal, rejected that claim, insisting that he was Bennabi's true disciple. He edited a book, *Pour changer l'Algérie* (To change Algeria, 1991), which contained Bennabi's newspaper and magazine articles organized into sections on political, economic, cultural, and international themes. In view of Bennabi's enlightened approach, it is doubtful that he would have endorsed the radicalism of the Jaz'arists or any other violent Islamist group.

See also Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Front Islamique du Salut (FIS).

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YAHIA ZOUBIR

BEN-PORAT, MORDECHAI

[1923–]

Israeli politician and community leader.

A native of Baghdad, Mordechai (also Mordekhai) Ben-Porat joined the Halutz movement in 1942 and emigrated to Palestine in 1945. He joined the Haganah in 1947. During the 1948 Arab–Israel War he fought in the Latrun and Ramla-Lyddad battles. He studied political science at the Tel Aviv branch of the Hebrew University. He was sent to Iraq in 1949 to organize Jewish emigration and remained there until 1951, while mass emigration plans known as the Ezra and Nehemiah Operations were proceeding.

From 1955 to 1969 he was head of the Or Yehuda Local Council. In 1965 he was a founding member of the Rafi Party. He was deputy speaker of the Knesset in 1965; deputy secretary-general of the Labor Party from 1970 to 1972; and a member of Israel's United Nations mission in 1977. In 1982 he was reelected to the Knesset on the list of Telem, the party founded by Moshe Dayan. In 1983 he established the Movement for Social Zionist Renewal. He joined the Likud in 1988.

Ben-Porat founded the Tehiyah (revival) movement, the World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries, and the Babylonian Jewry Heritage Center, of which he is chairman.

See also EZRA AND NEHEMIAH OPERATIONS; ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN.

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NISSIM REJWAN
UPDATED BY GREGORY S. MAHLER

BEN SALAH, AHMED

[1926–]

Tunisian political and labor leader.

Ahmed Ben Salah was born in Moknine, attended Sadiqi College in Tunis, and began his political career as a Destour student leader at the University of Paris. Neo-Destour was the Tunisian political party that led the nationalist struggle against French colonial control. Returning to Tunisia in 1948, he remained active in the party but became involved with the Union Generale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (General Union of Tunisian Workers, UGTT). From 1951 until 1954, he worked with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels. Following his election as general secretary of the UGTT in 1954, he advocated the introduction of socialist economic concepts.

In 1955 Tunisia was granted autonomy by France; Ben Salah's success in maintaining UGTT loyalty to Habib Bourguiba, leader of Destour and first president of the Republic of Tunisia (1957–1987), when he was threatened by a radical movement within the party headed by Salah Ben Youssuf, assured Ben Salah of an influential political role. Although Bourguiba initially rejected Ben Salah's socialist approach, the deterioration of the new republic and the economy led to Ben Salah's appointment as minister of planning in 1961.

Ben Salah, who was dubbed the economic czar, introduced a ten-year plan built around socialist development projects, intending to promote self-sufficiency and raise living standards. His ideas generally met with success in the industrial sector, but his insistence on organizing state-run agricultural cooperatives and his plan to bring all cultivable land under state management provoked widespread rural antagonism. Accusations of corruption and mismanagement followed and, in 1969, fearful that popular opposition to these policies would undermine the entire government, Bourguiba renounced Ben Salah, who was arrested and sentenced for ten years but escaped in 1973. In exile, he organized the opposition party Mouvement de l'Unite Populaire (MUP), embodying the socialist principles he had tried to introduce while in office. A group of dissidents led by Mohamed Bel Haj Omar later left the MUP and established a new party, the Parti de l'Union Populaire (PUP). In 1988 Ben Salah re-

turned briefly to Tunisia, but left later for his European exile because of denial of his political rights. Ben Salah finally returned to Tunisia in September 2000 and did not assume an active political role.

See also Bourguiba, Habib; Mouvement de l'Unité Populaire (MUP); Tunisia.

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Kenneth J. Perkins
Updated by Emad Eldin Shahin

BEN SEDDIQ, MAHJOUB

[1925–]

Cofounder of the Moroccan Labor Union.

In 1955, after serving jail sentences for having organized a general strike, Mahjoub Ben Seddiq and Tayyib Bouazza founded the Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT). Ben Seddiq has been its secretary-general since 1960. The UMT, which initially was closely affiliated with the Istiqlal Party, was the first—and for a time the most important—all-Moroccan trade union. Ben Seddiq, one of the Istiqlal's "Young Turks" during the late 1950s, is also considered to be one of the founders of the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP), which broke away from the Istiqlal in 1959. He formally disassociated himself from the UNFP in January 1963, while remaining associated for a time with "loyal opposition" politics. Ben Seddiq was sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment in July 1967 for undermining the authority of the state after he sharply criticized the government's decision to block the firing of Jewish employees in state-owned firms in the aftermath of the Arab–Israel War of 1967, alleging that the government was colluding with Zionists.

In subsequent years the 700,000-member UMT was generally less confrontational, especially in comparison to the two other competing labor confederations—the Confédération Démocratique du Travail (CDT), which is affiliated with the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), and the Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains (UGTM), which is affiliated with the Istiqlal Party. Ben Seddiq himself adopted a lower public profile, and assumed the post of secretary-general of Royal Air Maroc, the Moroccan national airline. In 1995 the heads of the three unions held an unprecedented joint meeting during which Ben Seddiq called for unity among the unions as a prerequisite to a social pact that would enable genuine democratic change. Although real unity remained out of reach, the unions did exhibit greater coordination.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Confédération Démocratique du Travail (CDT); Istiqlal Party: Morocco; Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains (UGTM); Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT); Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP).

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

BEN SIMEON, RAPHAEL AARON

[1848–1928]

A leading Sephardic legal scholar and modernist.

Born in Rabat, Morocco, and raised in Jerusalem, Raphael Aaron Ben Simeon avidly studied foreign languages, read modern Hebrew literature, and kept abreast of scientific and technological developments in addition to learning traditional rabbinics. In 1891, Ben Simeon was appointed Hakham Bashi in Cairo. Together with his liberal colleague, Elijah Bekhor Hazzan, the chief rabbi of Alexandria, Ben Simeon made Egyptian Jewry the most progressive in the Middle East and the Maghrib (North Africa). His many *responsa* (writings and interpretations) show his openness to modernity, which he understood brought with it an unprecedented measure of freedom of choice to the individual.

He retired to Palestine in 1923 and lived his remaining years in Tel Aviv. His voluminous writings

include *Nehar Mitzrayim* (Alexandria, 1908), a work on Egyptian Jewish customary legal practice; *Tuv Mitzrayim* (Jerusalem, 1908), a biographical dictionary of the Egyptian rabbinate; and *Umi-Zur Devash* (Jerusalem, 1911–1912), his collected *responsa.*

See also HAZZAN, ELIJAH BEKHOR; MAGHRIB.

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NORMAN STILLMAN

BENTWICH, NORMAN
[1883–1971]

First British attorney general in mandatory Palestine; legal scholar and author.

An English Jew, Norman de Mattos Bentwich was born in London and educated at St. Paul's School and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he studied classics. After qualifying in law, he entered the Egyptian Ministry of Justice in 1912 as inspector of Native Courts. During World War I he served in the Camel Transport Corps of the British Army in Egypt. In 1918 he became senior judicial officer in the British military administration in Palestine and, after the establishment of a civil administration in 1920, legal secretary (later termed attorney general). A lifelong Zionist, Bentwich was close to the moderate wing of the movement. As the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine escalated, his presence in the mandatory government became an embarrassment to the British. In 1929 he was slightly wounded in an assassination attempt. In 1930 he went on leave to England and a year later his appointment was "terminated." In 1932 he became professor of international relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. During the 1930s he played an active role in welfare efforts for German Jewish refugees. Bentwich was the author of more than thirty books on Judeo-Greek civilization, international law, and Israel.

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BERNARD WASSERSTEIN

BENVENISTI, MERON
[1934–]

Israeli reformer.

Formerly deputy mayor of Jerusalem (1967–1978) and Knesset member, Meron Benvenisti became head of the West Bank Data Project, a group formed to monitor and evaluate Arab–Israeli relations. He has been one of the most vocal critics of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians and the West Bank. In 1981, he put forth the "Benvenisti Prognosis," which foresaw a continued stalemate over the occupied territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and predicted that inertia, religious beliefs, and Israeli "imperialism" would prevent the Israelis from withdrawing in the near future.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

BEN-YEHUDA, ELIEZER
[1857–1922]

Author and editor; pioneer in the restoration of Hebrew as a living language.

Born in Lushky, Lithuania, where he received both a Jewish traditional and a secular education, Eliezer Ben-Yehuda was impressed by the nationalist struggles in the Balkans (1877–1878) against the Ottoman Empire and became interested in the restoration of a Jewish homeland in Palestine and the revival of the Hebrew language. In 1881, he settled in Palestine, working as an editor for various Hebrew periodicals and establishing his own, *Ha-Tzvi,* in 1884. In 1889, he established the Va'ad ha-Lashon (Hebrew Language Council), among whose tasks was the coining of new Hebrew words. He served as chairman of the council until his death.

Ben-Yehuda's greatest work was the compilation of a comprehensive dictionary of the Hebrew language, several volumes of which were published in his lifetime. The complete edition of seventeen volumes was published in 1959.

See also HEBREW.

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MARTIN MALIN

BEN YOUSOUF, SALAH

[1910–1961]

Tunisian lawyer, political activist, and leader of a radical group within the anticolonial movement that challenged Neo-Destour party leader Habib Bourguiba on the eve of independence.

Born on the island of Djerba (Jerba), Salah Ben Yousouf was an early associate of Habib Bourguiba (who became president of Tunisia, 1957–1987) and was a member of the Neo-Destour political party, which was led by Bourguiba and which challenged French colonial control. The French had formed a protectorate in 1883, after the La Marsa Convention, and had suppressed first the Destour and then the Neo-Destour attempts to modify Tunisia's political status.

In 1937, Ben Yousouf was named to the Destour political bureau; in 1945, he became secretary-general of the party. At a congress of Tunisian opposition groups in 1946, he expressed the frustration of many politically conscious Tunisians by calling for immediate and unequivocal independence—a demand that Bourguiba had never voiced and one that invited a split between party radicals and moderates. Anxious to prevent the radicals from dominating the party, the French permitted Bourguiba to return from exile in 1949.

In 1950, Ben Yousouf accepted the post of minister of Tunisian justice in a government pledged to explore the possibility of internal autonomy. When French-settler protests caused the abandonment of political reforms in 1952, Ben Yousouf traveled to Paris to place the Tunisian case before the United Nations Security Council. Amid a campaign of repression of the Neo-Destour, the resident general ordered his return, but Ben Yousouf fled to Cairo. Influenced there by pan-Arabism, Ben Yousouf continued to insist on Tunisia's complete break with France and its establishment of ties with other Arab states.

In April 1955, Bourguiba negotiated an agreement with France granting Tunisia home rule, but allowing France to retain considerable influence in many important areas. Although this Franco–Tunisian convention enjoyed widespread support within the Neo-Destour, Ben Yousouf regarded it as a betrayal both of Tunisian national interests, by withholding the full sovereignty he sought, and of pan-Arabism, by allowing France to concentrate on the suppression of nationalist uprisings in Algeria and Morocco. Thus, he returned to Tunisia in September, determined to block the party's endorsement of the convention. Ousted from the political bureau because of his opposition, Ben Yousouf turned to the party membership for support. In addition to the backing of many small businessmen (especially fellow Djerbans who dominated the retail grocery trade), he also had the support of old aristocratic families and conservative religious leaders, both traditionally opposed to Bourguiba. But Ben Yousouf's efforts to mobilize a broader following were thwarted by Neo-Destour loyalists. In November, the party congress voted overwhelmingly to accept the convention.

Unwilling to admit defeat, Ben Yousouf and his aides set about creating rival Neo-Destour branches throughout the country. His most militant supporters resorted to a campaign of terrorism that resulted in a police crackdown in January 1956. Ben Yousouf fled to Egypt, but violence continued in his name until mid-1956. His denunciations continued even after Tunisian independence in March, with criticisms not only of Neo-Destour's undemocratic tendencies, but also of Bourguiba's decision to concentrate on resolving domestic problems before committing himself to pan-Arab concerns. In 1961, Ben Yousouf died at the hands of an unidentified assassin in Cairo.

The vehement opposition of this once-trusted colleague undoubtedly shaped Bourguiba's views on political dissent. For the rest of his career, Bourguiba refused to tolerate an opposition element, no matter how benign, within his party.

See also BOURGUIBA, HABIB; LA MARSA CONVENTION; PAN-ARABISM.

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KENNETH J. PERKINS

BEN-ZVI, RAHEL YANAIT

[1886–1979]

Israeli labor leader and educator.

Born in Maline, Ukraine, Rahel Yanait Ben-Zvi (nee Lishansky) studied Hebrew in heder (a Hebrew day school), graduated from a Russian high school, and attended university for a year. An ardent Zionist-socialist from an early age, she was a founding member of the Zionist-Socialist Party (Poʿalei Zion) of Russia in 1906. A year earlier, she had been a delegate to the 1905 Zionist Congress. In 1908, she immigrated to Palestine and embarked on a multifaceted career in politics, defense, and education. She joined the ha-Shomer Self-Defense Organization, was editor of *Achdut,* the organ of the Poʿalei Zion Party of Palestine, and a founder of the Hebrew Gymnasium in Jerusalem, where she also taught. She studied agronomy in Nancy, France (1911–1914). During World War I, she supported Britain and helped create the Jewish Legion in 1918. In that year, she married Yizhak Ben-Zvi, well-known Labor leader and future president of Israel. In 1919, she was a founder of the Ahdut ha-Avoda party, which succeeded Poalei Zion and eventually became MAPAI in 1930. In 1920 she was one of the heads of the Haganah defense organization in Jerusalem. She was instrumental in developing agricultural training facilities for women and established a number of schools and farms. In 1927, she was an emissary to the United States for Pioneer Women. After the creation of Israel, she continued her work in agricultural training and in immigrant absorption into Israeli society. An outspoken woman who held intense convictions in many issues, she accompanied her husband on various missions during his term as president of Israel (1952–1963). She aspired to succeed him after his death, but Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion chose Zalman Shazar. The rest of her long life was devoted to her educational endeavors and writing her memoirs, *We are immigrating* (1962, in Hebrew).

See also ALIYAH; HAGANAH; HA-SHOMER; ZIONISM.

MERON MEDZINI

BEN-ZVI, YIZHAK

[1884–1963]

Journalist; Labor Zionist leader; second president of Israel, 1952–1963.

Born in Poltava, in the Ukraine, into a family active in Zionism, Yizhak Ben-Zvi served as second president of Israel until his death. He assumed the role of chief theoretician of Labor Zionism from his arrival in Palestine in 1907.

As a childhood friend of Ber Borochov, Ben-Zvi had attended the founding conference of the Poʿalei Zion (Workers of Zion) movement in Russia in 1906. He lived near the center of Russian revolutionary activities and the site of major pogroms. Committed to socialism and Zionism, Ben-Zvi's intellectual and political activities had one overwhelming purpose—to bridge the gap between Labor Zionist theory and conditions in Palestine. One of the founders of the Poʿalei Zion Party in Palestine, he also organized a clandestine Jewish defense society called Bar Giora (a name associated with one of the Jewish leaders fighting the Romans in 66–70 C.E.). Bar Giora's members aimed at replacing the Arab guards usually hired to secure outlying Jewish agricultural settlements. Hoping to raise class consciousness among Palestine's Jews, Ben-Zvi edited his party's newspaper and opened a small school in Jerusalem with a curriculum appropriate to the needs of a modern Jewish society.

With the restoration of the Ottoman Empire's constitution after the Young Turk revolution in 1908, Ben-Zvi and one of his closest friends and party comrades, David Ben-Gurion, traveled to Constantinople (now Istanbul) to study law as an avenue of entry into Ottoman politics. With the outbreak of World War I in Europe, he and Ben-Gurion returned to Palestine but were unable to remain. Exiled by Ottoman authorities as potential troublemakers, Ben-Zvi and Ben-Gurion lived and lectured, on behalf of the Poʿalei Zion movement,

Born in the Ukraine, Yizhak Ben-Zvi was president of Israel from 1952 until 1963, succeeding Chaim Weizmann. Ben-Zvi died in office in 1963. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

in the United States. Ben-Zvi returned to Palestine as a soldier in the Jewish Legion.

Ben-Zvi's commitment to the fundamental principles of Labor Zionism never wavered. The possibilities opened by the advent of British rule altered the perspective of many Labor Zionists and the positions adopted by the political parties and institutions. Ben-Zvi maintained his close personal friendship with Ben-Gurion despite the latter's departure from such Labor Zionist strictures as the inevitability of class struggle. As Ben-Zvi saw it, only a clear Labor Zionist ideology and program would unify Jews in Palestine and create the foundations for a humane society. Sensitivity to the differences between Zionist and Palestinian national interests led Ben-Zvi to devote considerable effort to uncovering the history of Ottoman Palestine. As a prolific journalist, he also undertook research of ancient and remote Jewish communities.

Elected to the Jerusalem municipality several times, he established ties with the council's Arab representatives. He participated in the Vaʿad Leʾumi (National Council), first as a member and then later as its chair. He became a link between the British mandate government and the organized Labor Zionist leadership. He founded the Institute for the Study of Jewish Communities in the Middle East, later renamed the Ben-Zvi Institute. As president of Israel until his death in 1963, he lived in a simple house in a quiet Jerusalem neighborhood, personifying the original egalitarian impulse of Labor Zionism. He is the author of *The Jewish Yishuv in Peki'in Village* (1922), *Eretz-Israel under Ottoman Rule* (1955), *The Exile and the Redeemed* (1957), and *The Jewish Legion: Letters* (1969).

See also BEN-GURION, DAVID; JEWISH LEGION; LABOR ZIONISM; VAʿAD LEʾUMI; YOUNG TURKS.

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DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

BERBER

Person(s), language(s), and culture of North African groups descended from the pre-Arab Mediterranean-type indigenous populations.

The term *Berber* was first applied centuries ago by foreign conquerors. Modern-day Berbers generally prefer their own designations—*amazigh* (male Berber) and *tamazight* (female Berber or Berber language/dialect)—or the local variants of these. Speakers of Berber languages, those who are now referred to as Berbers, are most numerous today in western North Africa, but they can be found as far east as eastern

Berber women, dressed in festive garb, attend the Douz Festival of the Sahara in Tunisia. Douz, an oasis at the edge of the Sahara, hosts the four-day international festival celebrating the arts and traditions of the desert people. © Patrick Ward/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Libya and even western Egypt (Siwa) and as far south as the Sahara Desert, northern Saharan regions of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The nation of Senegal takes its name from a Berber-speaking group, the Zenaga, who live in an area of southwestern Mauritania.

No Berber race can be distinguished, rather the variety of features found throughout the Maghrib (North Africa) are essentially those associated with Mediterranean peoples generally. There seems always to have been a considerable mixture and, at present, one is confronted with Berbers having a wide spectrum of skin colors, statures, and cranial and facial proportions.

Several of the largest groups of Berbers that are characterized by linguistic and cultural distinctiveness are referred to using terms of non-Berber origin, usually from Arabic—the Kabyles in Kabylia (Djurdjura mountains, east southeast from Algiers); the Chawia (Aurès mountains in eastern Algeria, south of Constantine); the Tuareg (Saharan Algeria, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso); the Chleuh (High Atlas and Anti-Atlas mountains, Sous valley in southern Morocco); and the Braber (also called simply *imazighen,* plural of *amazigh*) of the Middle Atlas mountains of Morocco. Virtually all other Berbers go by terms referring to the name of their place or region of origin: Nefusi, Djerbi, Mzabi, Rifi, and so on.

North African countries have not chosen to include native language data in their census process—but taking Berber speakers as constituting between 30 percent and the commonly cited 40 percent of Morocco's population, around 20 percent of Algeria's, adding several tens of thousands each from Tunisia, Libya, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Maurita-

nia, one could very roughly assess the total to be somewhere around 12 million in the mid-1990s.

The overwhelming majority of Berbers have their homes in rural environments, far from the urban centers. In general, they can be found on the least productive lands—the mountains, the high plateaus, the pre-Saharan *hammada,* and in the Sahara Desert. Although the Tuareg—camel nomads of the central Sahara—more vividly capture our imagination by their fascinating aspect and institutions, their lifestyle is not particularly representative. Most Berbers are—and have been throughout recorded history—sedentary agriculturalists. Along the mountains bordering on the high plateaus and desert, some Berbers practice forms of seminomadism, or transhumance, during part of the year to maintain their flocks (especially in the Aurès mountains and the southern part of the Middle Atlas).

Sedentary Berbers typically live in villages and eke out a meager peasant existence from small irrigated gardens, dry cereal culture, arboriculture, and small flocks of sheep and goats, occasionally a cow or two. In today's world, it is necessary for many of the most able-bodied men to export, for a time, their most marketable asset, their labor. It is not uncommon to find villages largely devoid of men between the ages of sixteen and forty. They emigrate temporarily, usually without families, both to North African cities and to European industrial centers and, from there, send home the money that, by living frugally, they are able to accumulate. Without their support, these villages and areas simply could not survive.

In many instances, by virtue of a natural tendency of younger emigrants to follow their elder family members, a village or even a whole area becomes specialized in a particular vocational field to the extent that they hold a near monopoly on one or another activity or commercial enterprise. Interestingly, this has happened in the grocery trade in all three of the main Maghrib countries. In each case, Berbers from a specific area have come to dominate to such an extent that, in the towns and cities, one typically does not go to the grocer's: In Tunisia one goes to the Djerbi's (from the island of Djerba), in Algeria to the Mzabi's (pre-Sahara), in Morocco to the Sousi's (Sous river valley and Anti-Atlas mountains). It is a significant instance of very successful adaptation to nontraditional ways, but it should be noted that its purpose, for the overwhelming majority, is precisely to permit the maintenance of the traditional homeland and lifestyle.

Art

The forms of Berber artistic expression, at least in the modern period, are primarily linked to utilitarian objects—pottery, weaving, and architecture—and to jewelry. All are characterized by predominantly geometrical, nonrepresentational patterns. Neither the forms and patterns nor the techniques appear to have changed significantly since ancient times, and they can be related directly to forms found in the Mediterranean basin from as early as the Iron Age. While they are not especially original or exclusive to Berbers, one is struck by the extraordinary persistence and continuity, in Berber country, of the tradition. Some of the most remarkable examples of Berber artistic expression are: (1) the fortified architecture of the southern Moroccan *ksars,* massive but majestic rammed earth and adobe-brick structures with intricate decorative patterns seemingly chiseled into their towers and facades; (2) Kabyle and Chawia pottery, extraordinary for the variety and elegance of its modeled forms as well as the composition and proportion of its applied patterns; (3) silver jewelry, embossed and inlaid with stones as well as with enameled cloisonné, especially—but by no means exclusively—that represented by the Kabyle tradition; (4) textiles throughout North Africa, but particularly in southern Tunisia and in central and southern Morocco.

Social Organization

Traditional social organization is family based and therefore quite segmentary. Relations between extended families—or, if need be, between clans or villages—have in the past been (and continue to some extent to be) mediated by an assembly of heads of family, or elders, called the Djemaʿa. In today's more centrally administered bureaucratic world, many of the traditional competencies of the assembly have been taken over by government agencies. Nonetheless, a number of issues—those concerning local resources of common interest and responsibility: Maintenance of paths, irrigation canals, mosques, and Qurʾanic schools; hiring of the Qurʾanic teacher; usage of forests and pastureland;

setting of plowing and harvest dates; protection of crops; cooperative support (usually in the form of labor) of disadvantaged families; collective meat purchasing; hospitality for outsiders; organizing local religious or secular celebrations; and so forth—continue to require consensus decisions and the shared provision of labor and material resources. While the term *democratic,* which has often been applied to Berber institutions, does not appear appropriate, one is struck by their profound egalitarianism, less as a moral imperative than one born of a distrust of power concentrated in the hands of one segment or another. This is often summarized in the terms *balance* and *opposition:* balance of power maintained by a constant resistance to the other segments' natural self-interest and by vigilance to assure that all segments bear burdens and reap benefits equally.

Berbers seem always to have had, and earned, a reputation of fierce independence, of inclination to rebellion, of resistance to any imposition of control over their lives. North African history is extremely fragmented, constantly jostled by new revolts, realignments, and alliances. Every schismatic movement seems to be welcomed against the previous orthodoxy, Donatism when the Berbers were being Christianized, Kharijism in the early years of Islamization. As often as not, the not yet entrenched conqueror is joined with to throw off the previous tyrant—whether either or both were Berber or not. Each time that a choice was to be made, it was seemingly made in the direction of greater local control and independence. Only on rare occasions in their history did the Berbers put together something like a Berber nation, uniting for a time over a vast territory to create a state or empire. In the two most important instances, the Almoravid and the Almohad dynasties of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, they were drawn together by the ideal of reform of the previously dominant regime(s), seen as having fallen into corrupt ways. This search for ever purer forms is, along with their deep cultural conservatism, one of the most constantly recurring themes throughout their history.

Religion

Virtually all Berbers by the twenty-first century were Muslims and, like most North Africans, are of Sunni Islam orthodoxy. In the Mzab and in Ouargla in Algeria, on the island of Djerba in Tunisia, and in the Nefusa mountains of Libya, there subsist Ibadite communities—all essentially Berber-speaking—who trace their history back to the Kharijite schism of the seventh and eighth centuries.

Little reliable detail can be given as to the nature of the Berbers' pre-Islamic religious beliefs and practices. There is evidence from archaeology, from the remarks of observers in antiquity, and also from popular practices that have survived into the present in North Africa, of a generally animistic set of beliefs manifested in sacralization of promontories, outcroppings, caves, trees, and water sources. The usages seem to have been highly varied and local in their expression but widespread and reflective of the quasi-universal need to assuage the spirits to which the vicissitudes of everyday life can be—and are still—attributed. Much of the North African fondness for the veneration of local saints, so-called Maraboutism, tolerated by the central tradition of Islam as somewhat deviant and marginal, can be understood as deriving in large part from this substratum: Saints' "tombs" are often situated next to trees, caves, topographical features, or water sources that give evidence of cultic activity going back well before the life of the nominal vessel of *baraka* (blessedness, protection, God's power made present).

Language and Literature

Berber languages constitute together one branch of the Afro–Asiatic (or Hamito–Semitic) language family, whose other four branches are Semitic, Egyptian, Cushitic, and Chadic. Berber languages show a high degree of homogeneity in their grammar, somewhat less in their phonology. The differences that one notes between them are fewer and less considerable than those within the Semitic, Cushitic, or Chadic branches (Egyptian is manifested as essentially homogeneous at any historical moment). In a number of important respects, Berber bears a closer resemblance to Semitic languages than to the other branches: (1) the sound system employs contrasts of consonant "length" and pharyngealization (emphatics); (2) there are three basic vowels *a, i, u* with an archaic contrast of short versus long vowels found in the important set of Tuareg languages; (3) the morphological system is highly complex, characterized by a prevalence of tri-radical roots (less than Semitic, however), and

A Berber groom is introducing his bride to friends at this Muslim festival in Imilchil, Morocco. The festival, held in this small mountain village every year, allows the men and women to become engaged. The participants dress in their local costumes. © Nik Wheeler/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

considerable use of both consonant length and intraradical vowel alternation to express grammatical categories such as verb aspect and noun number; (4) the verbal system is based on a fundamental contrast of perfective versus imperfective aspect, with tense being secondary; (5) word order is predominantly V(erb) S(ubject) O(bject), though SVO is very frequent in main clauses.

Some noteworthy features peculiar to Berber include the following: (1) as reflected in the words *amazigh, tamazight* (cf. supra), as well as many place names on maps, masculine nouns begin with a vowel and feminine nouns begin with *t* + vowel and most often end in *t* as well (the vowel is *a* in 80% of nouns); (2) a special form of the noun (the annexed or construct form), characterized by an alteration of the vowel of the first syllable *(amazigh > umazigh, tamazight > tmazight),* is used for the subject noun after its verb, after prepositions, and as the second element in a noun-complement construction; (3) the subject markers of finite verb forms are both prefixed and suffixed to the stem (with the prefix elements being clearly identifiable with those of the Semitic prefix conjugation); (4) pronominal objects of the verb basically go immediately after the verb but must precede it in a number of conditions (essentially those of subordination); (5) particles can be used with the verb to "orient" the verbal action: *d* = "toward speaker" and *n* = "away from speaker."

Berber languages are generally only spoken, seldom written. Among the Tuareg, however, there subsists an alphabet, the *tifinagh,* which descends

Most Berbers live in rural areas, far from urban centers—in the mountains, on high plateaus, and in the Sahara Desert. The Tuareg, camel nomads of the central Sahara, represent a subset of nomaidic Berbers, while other groups are sedentary. © OWEN FRANKEN/CORBIS.

from the Libyan alphabet that is found in ancient inscriptions throughout much of North Africa (but principally present-day Tunisia and eastern Algeria). This alphabet, which like Arabic is essentially consonantal, can be written right to left or left to right, occasionally vertically. Among the Tuareg, it is used primarily for short inscriptions on rocks and for brief messages but does not seem to be employed for the recording of stories, documents, or history, those uses for which writing is basic in our Western cultures. Some efforts have been made by advocates of Berber cultural affirmation, to adapt the *tifinagh* to such functions and to broaden its use to other Berber-speaking groups, as in Kabylia and in Morocco. These efforts have had only very limited success and those publications (several in Algeria and in Morocco) written in the Berber language generally use the Latin-based transcription system employed by the French.

Berber literature is then essentially oral. It includes many traditional stories—tales of animals, marvelous tales with ogres and monsters, tales of kings and princesses (à la *Thousand and One Nights*), hagiographic legends, and myriad other stories that hand down the moral and ethical base of Berber society. As for poetry, among the Berbers it goes with music and is—unlike the tales and stories—constantly regenerated around a wide spectrum of subjects. There are extremely traditional forms, such as the often bantering repartee in the context of celebratory line dances in Morocco. There are more lyrical forms, songs of the heart and its joys and pains. There are the elaborate and often quite lengthy commentaries by troubador-like itinerant singers who hold forth, often quite bitingly, on all subjects, including the political scene. And, of course, one cannot fail to mention Berber popular music, which constitutes the richest and most fertile field of Berber literary expression today.

Of the languages with which Berber has shared North Africa at different times and places—among them Phoenician, Latin, Germanic (German and

English), Turkish, Italian, Spanish, and French—none has had the profound effect that the Arabic dialects have had. Most Berber languages have a high percentage of borrowing from Arabic, as well as from other languages (these often indirectly through Arabic, however). Least influenced are the Tuareg languages; most influenced, those that are near urban centers and from whose areas there has traditionally been much temporary emigration for work.

Berber languages survive because children learn their first language from their mothers and it continues to be the language of the home, of the private world, long after they become adults and the men become bilingual. Berber women continue, in most areas, to have little education and little contact with the Arabic-speaking world around them, so their children will doubtless continue to learn and to perpetuate Berber languages. The movements to preserve Berber culture, most developed in Kabylia and somewhat in Morocco, will also doubtless have a conservative effect. Where Berber is spoken only in a village or two surrounded by Arabic speakers, it is disappearing. In the larger Berber-speaking regions, however, it is quite resistant, and the numbers of speakers are growing at nearly the same rate as that at which the population increases.

In postindependence North Africa, Berber languages and cultures have been neglected and even repressed by the agencies of the central governments. This seems to have been caused by a perceived need to discourage cultural differences in the building of the nation-state—cultural differences that, it was felt, had been exploited by the French colonial regimes to divide the colonized and impose their authority. On occasion, the reaction to this repression has been violent, as in 1980 in Kabylia. Not surprisingly, political movements have grown up around the issues of cultural expression and autonomy. In both Algeria and Morocco, there exist official political parties made up essentially of Berbers, with Berber cultural preservation as one of their highest priorities.

See also DJEMAʿA; MAGHRIB; MARABOUT; MAURITANIA; SUNNI ISLAM.

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THOMAS G. PENCHOEN

BERBER DAHIR

The sultan's order that in 1930 removed Morocco's Berbers from the jurisdiction of Islamic law.

The Berber Dahir, a decree issued by Morocco's sultan at the instigation of French colonial authorities on 16 May 1930, created courts in Berber-speaking regions that decided cases by codified local custom *(urf)* instead of Islamic law *(shariʿa)*. The mass urban protests against the decree served as a catalyst for Morocco's nationalist movement and drew support from Muslims worldwide.

See also SHARIʿA.

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DALE F. EICKELMAN

BERBER SPRING

An uprising, from March to June 1980, for linguistic and cultural rights in Berber-speaking Kabylia in northeastern Algeria.

Between March and June 1980, the northeastern Algerian provinces of Kabylia became the site of a violent social and political drama that would become known as the Berber Spring (*Printemps Berbère* in French, or *Tafsut n Imazighen* in Berber/Tamazight) and set the stage for the modern transnational Berber/Amazigh cultural movement. Kabylia has a history of resistance to state authority and since independence has been the center for advocacy of Berber cultural and linguistic rights in an officially Arab-speaking state.

On 10 March 1980 local authorities banned a lecture on ancient Berber poetry, which was to be given at the University of Tizi-Ouzou by the writer and ethnologist Mouloud Mammeri. In response, students went on strike, demonstrating across the country for an end to "cultural repression," and on 7 April they occupied the university. When on 20 April the military stormed the university, arresting and injuring hundreds of demonstrators, a series of violent confrontations between Kabyle youth and police broke out, which together with a four-day general strike shut down the region for nearly a week. Although calm was subsequently restored, antigovernment protests continued until the last of the arrested students was released on 26 June.

The Berber Spring made Berberism a political force in postcolonial Algeria and more broadly in North Africa. Commemorations of the events have become the indispensable activity of Berber cultural associations worldwide and have been moments for the elaboration of political programs and, in the case of the April 2001 Black Spring, for new confrontations with state authorities.

See also Black Spring; Kabylia; Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD).

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Paul Silverstein

BERIHAH

See Brichah

BERKOWITZ, YIZHAK

[1885–1967]

Hebrew and Yiddish writer and editor.

Born in Belorussia, Yizhak Berkowitz won a prize in a 1904 literary contest sponsored by the Warsaw Jewish newspaper *Ha-Zofeh* for his story "Moshkele Hazir." By 1905, his writings appeared in most of the contemporary Hebrew and Yiddish journals. From 1905 to 1928, Berkowitz served as editor of numerous Hebrew and Yiddish journals in Eastern Europe and the United States, among them *Ha-Zeman, Di Naye Velt, Ha-Toren,* and *Miklat.*

He reached Palestine in 1928 and became an editor of the weekly *Moznayim.* He translated into Hebrew and published the collected works of Sholem Aleichem, his father-in-law. Berkowitz is recognized as a master of the short story, many of which are set in Russia at the turn of the twentieth century. They deal with the social upheavals that confront Eastern European Jews.

See also Literature: Hebrew.

Ann Kahn

BERLIN–BAGHDAD RAILWAY

Begun in the Ottoman Empire in 1903, it was to extend the existing Anatolian railway from Konya, in south-central Anatolia, to Baghdad and the Persian/Arabian Gulf.

In 1886, Sultan Abdülhamit II, desirous of greater economic control over his empire, proposed a railway from the Bosporus to the Persian/Arabian Gulf. It would extend Baron Maurice de Hirsch's Oriental Railway, which linked Berlin to Istanbul at its completion in 1888. In the same year, the Ottoman government granted the Anatolian Railway Company, a syndicate dominated by the Deutsche Bank, the concession to construct a railway from the Bosporus to Ankara, in order for Germany to pursue its economic penetration of the Ottoman Empire. This railway line, completed in 1893, was extended to Konya by 1896.

Developing Ottoman–German political and economic cooperation induced the Ottomans to grant the Anatolian Railway Company the concession to extend the railway from Konya to Baghdad and beyond. The Baghdad Railway Company, dominated by the Deutsche Bank and other German interests, was formed in 1903.

Construction was hampered by technical and financial difficulties, Anglo–French–Russian fears of German penetration of the region, and World War I. The Ottoman and German governments agreed to Britain's demand that the railway end in Basra, and not extend to the Gulf. The lines from Istanbul to Nusaybin, and from Baghdad to Samarra in the south, were not completed until 1917. Track laying and tunnel construction continued throughout

the war, as late as September 1918. The Nusaybin–Mosul–Samarra gap was finally closed in 1939–1940, and the first train set out from Istanbul to Baghdad in 1940.

See also Abdülhamit II.

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Francis R. Nicosia

BERLIN, CONGRESS AND TREATY OF

Treaty that ended the Russo–Turkish War, redividing the countries of southeastern Europe that had belonged to the Ottoman Empire.

In March 1878, following the Russian victory over the Ottoman Turks in the Russo–Turkish War of 1877–1878, the Treaty of San Stefano was imposed. The principal feature of that pact was the creation of a large Bulgarian state, possessing coastal territory on the Mediterranean as well as on the Black Sea. The new Bulgaria also included the bulk of Macedonia, denying Austria-Hungary any avenue for advancement south to the coveted Mediterranean coast. Britain disliked the treaty, because it could allow the Russians to become a naval power in the Middle East, using the Mediterranean ports of the newly created Bulgarian puppet state. A grave danger existed that Austria and Britain would make war rather than tolerate such Russian aggrandizement.

Prince Otto von Bismarck, chancellor of the new German Empire (1871–1890), realized that such a major war might provide France with allies and a chance to avenge Germany's 1871 conquest. He therefore proffered his services as an "honest broker" who sought peace disinterestedly, since Germany had no ambitions in the Balkans or Middle East. Thus, the Congress of Berlin was convened in June–July 1878, attended by the plenipotentiaries of Turkey and all the major powers. Benjamin Disraeli, prime minister of Great Britain (1874–1880), and Count Gyula Andrássy, foreign minister of Austria-Hungary (1871–1879), made their advance preparations carefully, offering African territory to France and Italy and slashing the size of Bulgaria by returning most of it to the Ottomans, so that Russia's satellite would no longer claim Macedonia or a Mediterranean coast line. The Austrians gained a protectorate over Bosnia-Herzegovina and prepared for a future thrust southward to the Mediterranean by leaving their intended avenue of advance, the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, in Ottoman hands. Even Russia, deprived of a Mediterranean base, received compensations on the Asian Caucasus frontier. In a separate treaty, the Ottomans yielded the valuable island of Cyprus to Britain for ninety-nine years, in return for guaranteeing the Ottomans possession of their Asiatic lands for that period. Only afterward did the Ottomans realize that they had surrendered a valuable naval base in exchange for a British guarantee that neither could be nor would be fulfilled.

The Congress of Berlin is, therefore, the point at which Britain ceased to be Ottoman Turkey's great defender and Germany gradually took on that role. In the next generation, Germany, which had had no major Middle Eastern interests, was to become the principal protector of the Ottoman Empire and of Islam.

In the long term, by supporting Britain and Austria against Russian claims, Bismarck threatened that perfect harmony among the Great Powers—his chief instrument in keeping France isolated. To his credit, Bismarck "kept the telegraph lines open to St. Petersburg" as long as he held office. Nevertheless, Russian fears of an Austro–German alliance came to fulfillment in 1879, and those fears led to the Franco–Russian alliance, consummated from 1892 to 1894.

See also Russian–Ottoman Wars; San Stefano, Treaty of (1878).

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Arnold Blumberg

BERNADOTTE, FOLKE

[1895–1948]

United Nations mediator in Palestine, 1948.

A scion of Sweden's royal family and chairman of Sweden's Red Cross, Folke Bernadotte was appointed mediator by the United Nations (UN) on 17 May 1948, at the termination of the British Mandate in Palestine. The Security Council reinforced his mandate by declaring an arms embargo. The terms Bernadotte proposed included the establishment and supervision of a truce between the forces of Israel and five Arab states, and "adjustment of the future situation." He established a truce, which was broken and restored several times and never properly supervised due to lack of personnel. Being a novice in the Middle East, Bernadotte received assistance from a UN team headed by the able African-American Ralph Bunche, who became the brains behind Bernadotte's mission and political plans. However, Bernadotte's design for a settlement of the Palestine issue was molded under Anglo-American pressure, motivated mainly by the Cold War policy of containing Soviet expansion in the Middle East.

The so-called Bernadotte Plan for Arab–Israeli settlement was sent out twice: in June as a trial balloon and in September as a proposal for UN action. The plan called for a modification of the partition recommended by the UN Assembly in November 1947. The boundaries he proposed reflected the status quo of the frontlines as of July, with Jerusalem in the first version allotted to Transjordan and in the second placed under UN auspices. Palestinians who had lost their homes in the war were to be given a choice between repatriation and receiving compensation and settling elsewhere. Implicit in the proposal was the abandonment of the UN Assembly's plan to establish a Palestinian Arab state beside Israel. Instead, Bernadotte proposed to cede the residual area to Transjordan.

Both the Arab states and Israelis rejected the proposals, the former because they entailed recognition of the Jewish state and the latter because the Israelis assumed they would not be able to retain their sovereignty within the boundaries proposed. Bernadotte expected the UN to enforce his proposals, as Britain and the United States initially seemed prepared to back the plan.

On 17 September 1948, before going to the UN General Assembly to submit his plan, Bernadotte was gunned down in Jerusalem by members of the LEHI (Lohamei Herut Yisrael [Freedom Fighters of Israel]), a diehard Israeli underground terrorist group, headed by a triumvirate, one of whose members, Yitzhak Shamir, would become Israel's prime minister forty years later. The assassination at first seemed to increase the chances of UN endorsement of Bernadotte's proposals, but the situation changed dramatically. This was in part because of Israel's military victories in October, which altered the front lines and broke the backbone of the military coalition of the Arab states, and in part because of a shift on the part of the U.S. administration during 1948 elections. A watered-down version of Bernadotte's proposals was endorsed on 11 December 1948 in UN Assembly Resolution 194, which created the Palestine Conciliation Commission and contained a declaration on the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. No one was ever punished for Bernadotte's assassination. Israel never exhausted all means to bring the culprits to justice and the Swedish government eventually accepted this lack of progress in bringing the culprits to justice.

Bernadotte's mediation mission was defeated by insufficient UN backing resulting from the Cold War; the utter rejection of his proposals by the rival parties. Ironically, it was also the result of the unforeseen impact of the UN embargo, which aimed to dry up the military resources of both warring parties but in fact increased Israel's military edge over the Arabs, resulting in an Arab defeat and an armistice based on lines more favorable to Israel than those Bernadotte had recommended earlier. In the end, those lines received international legitimacy.

See also Lohamei Herut Yisrael.

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Amitzur Ilan

BERRADA, MOHAMMED

[1938–]

Moroccan novelist and literary critic.

Mohammed Berrada was born in Rabat, Morocco, studied in Rabat and Cairo, and received his Doctorat Troisième Cycle from the Sorbonne in 1973. Although he is bilingual, his creative writing is in Arabic; he also has translated books from French into Arabic. Berrada recently retired from his position as professor of Arabic literature at Muhammad V University in Rabat. He was editor in chief of the journal *Afaq* during his presidency of the Union of Moroccan Writers.

Berrada is an accomplished short-story writer who relies on symbols to convey his ideas. His short story "Qissat al-Raʾs al-Maqtuʿa" (The story of the cut-off head) is an excellent illustration of his technique; the absence of free expression in Morocco is portrayed through the surrealistic journey of a cut-off head. He also can be extremely realistic and direct, as in his short story "Dolarat" (Dollars). Berrada is concerned with the human quest for meaning in life and solutions to its dilemmas.

Berrada's novel *Luʿbat al-Nisyan* (1987; The game of forgetfulness) adopts a philosophical approach to human memory. While relating the childhood memories of the characters from different sources, the author demonstrates the workings of memory by sifting and discarding the events of the past. This process reveals the thin line that separates reality from imagination and casts doubt on a person's conscious recollection of the past. The only reality remains the city of Fez, a sign of immutable truth and a symbol of cherished souvenirs and elating emotions, regardless of their truth. A respect for reality is achieved through the dialogue of the various narrators of the novel, each of whom speaks the dialect that denotes his or her cultural level. Thus, Si Brahim, who is illiterate, speaks only colloquial Moroccan. A similar concern with the past is addressed in Berrada's second novel, *al-Daw al-Harib* (1993; The fugitive light). His semiautobiographical text *Mithla Sayfin lan yatakarrar* (1999; Like a summer that won't recur) sheds light on Moroccan students' lives in Egypt with a perceptive, in-depth look at Egyptian society from the perspective of narrator Hammad, who speaks for Barrada himself. The major event of the summer is the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The eye of the literary critic that Berrada revealed himself to be in *Muhammad Mandur wa Tandhir al-Naqd al-Arabi* (1975; Muhammad Mandur and the theorizing of Arabic literary criticism) is visible in the background of the creative writings but does not overwhelm them.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN.

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AIDA A. BAMIA

BERRI, NABI

[1938–]

Politician in Lebanon.

Nabi Berri was born in Sierra Leone in 1938 and received his law degree from Lebanese University. He became a close associate of Imam Musa Sadr and came to prominence in the political life of Lebanon during the late 1970s after Musa Sadr disappeared in 1978, which thrust Berri, as a key leader of the AMAL movement, into the forefront of political activity. He assumed the presidency of AMAL in 1980. He has held several ministerial posts since 1984. His charismatic personality has helped his political fortunes, but it is his political deference to the government of Syria that has been primarily responsible for his ability to limit the influence of his rivals within the Shiʿite community. Berri transformed the AMAL movement from an organization loyal to the legacy of Musa Sadr into one under his political control. He headed the Liberation List in the 1992 election and formed the largest bloc in parliament, thereby becoming its speaker. Although Berri is not from a traditional political *(zuʿama)* family, he has not refrained from forming coalitions with traditional landowning families. His popularity has sunk since he took office as accusations of corruption and extravagance have surrounded him and his key associates. His movement almost lost the 2000 parliamentary election, but Syria forced the popular Hizbullah to form a joint ticket with AMAL. Berri was subsequently reelected, and he also was reelected speaker of the parliament. In 2000, his movement suffered a setback with the ouster of two

key leaders, including the popular Muhammad Abd al-Hamid Baydun.

See also AMAL; HIZBULLAH; LEBANESE UNIVERSITY.

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AS'AD ABUKHALIL

BETHLEHEM

City in the West Bank.

This small city is a center of Christian pilgrimage to the birthplace of Jesus and to the site of the Church of the Nativity, built in the fourth century. Greek Orthodox, Armenian, and some Latin-rite churches also exist. In Judaism, it is the setting for most of the biblical Book of Ruth; King David lived there when it was called Judaea and was anointed king of Israel there by the prophet Samuel.

Bethlehem is 5 miles (8 km) southwest of Jerusalem. In addition to being a center of tourism and pilgrimage, Bethlehem is now an agricultural market and trade center, with a population of 21,673 Palestinian Arabs as of 1997. The town has long had a disproportionately high percentage of Christian residents, and it traditionally has a Christian mayor.

The city was part of the territory that brought the Crusaders to fight the Muslims; became part of the Ottoman Empire; then, with the dismemberment of the empire after World War I, became part of the British mandate territory of Palestine. During the Arab–Israel War of 1948, Jordan annexed the city, which became part of the West Bank. Israel controlled Bethlehem from 1967 to 1994, after which it passed into the control of the Palestinian Authority. Pope John Paul II visited the town in March 2000. In April and May of 2002, after the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada that saw Israel reoccupy the city for some time, the Church of the Nativity was the scene of a five-week standoff between Israeli forces and armed Palestinians.

See also AQSA INTIFADA, AL-; ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1948); PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY; WEST BANK.

BENJAMIN JOSEPH
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

BEVIN, ERNEST
[1881–1951]

Foreign secretary of Great Britain (1945–1951).

Ernest Bevin was associated with the Bevin–Bidault agreement of December 1945, which provided for the evacuation of Britain's and France's troops from Syria and Lebanon. He was also responsible for the abortive Bevin–Sidqi agreement, signed between Britain and Egypt in October 1946, and the equally unsuccessful 1949 Bevin–Sforza Plan concerning Libya.

It was Bevin's involvement with the Palestine problem for which he is best known. When the affairs of the Palestine mandate came under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office, Bevin took an active role in the formulation of British policy during the crucial years of the Arab–Jewish struggle for Palestine. In November 1945, Bevin announced the formation of the Anglo–American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. Although he desired the United States to become involved in the resolution of the Palestine problem, he envisaged a dominant role for Britain in the Middle East.

Although Bevin pursued a policy that closely followed the aims of the British white paper of 1939—which restricted the number of Jewish immigrants from Europe to Palestine—it became clear that Britain could not resolve the differences between the Zionists and the Palestinians. In April 1947, Bevin decided to pass the Palestine problem to the United Nations. When the United Nations recommended partitioning Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, he refused to allow the British mandate authorities to participate in the implementation of the agreement. Instead, he ordered them to dismantle their administration and withdraw British forces by May 1948.

Many Zionists suspected Bevin opposed the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, but recent revisionist scholarship has shown that he tacitly

cooperated in implementing the partition plan. According to new accounts based on declassified documents from Israel's archives, Bevin met secretly with Transjordan officials in London and privately sanctioned King Abdullah ibn Hussein's plans to seize the West Bank. This plan had been arranged by Abdullah and Golda Meir, a prominent Zionist leader.

See also ABDULLAH I IBN HUSSEIN; BEVIN–SFORZA PLAN; MEIR, GOLDA.

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LAWRENCE TAL

BEVIN–SFORZA PLAN

A post–World War II plan to administer former Italian colonies in North Africa.

After World War II, Italy was forced to relinquish its African colonies by the terms of its February 1947 peace treaty with the Allies. Libya was made the temporary responsibility of the United Nations, although Britain and France continued to administer it. Partly to protect their interest and partly to avoid Soviet interference, the British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, and the Italian foreign minister, Count Carlo Sforza, promulgated a joint plan on 10 May 1949, for the United Nations to grant trusteeships to Britain in Cyrenaica; Italy in Tripolitania; and France in the Fezzan, for a ten-year period, after which Libya would become independent. The plan, which met massive hostility in Libya itself, was rejected by the United Nations General Assembly eight days later.

See also BEVIN, ERNEST.

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GEORGE JOFFE

BEY

See GLOSSARY

BEYOGLU PROTOCOL

Terms that reorganized the administrative structure of Lebanon as province of Ottoman Empire.

Following the massacres by the Druze of thousands of Lebanese and Syrian Christians in the summer of 1860, the Ottoman sultan, Abdülmecit I, sent Mehmed Fuat Paşa, foreign minister, to Syria to resolve the crisis. Fuat had two goals: to restore order and to prevent the European powers from intervening. Though France landed troops and Britain sent a fleet, Fuad was thorough and provided them with no excuse to intervene further. In June 1861 the French withdrew their forces, and on 9 June the sultan issued the Beyoglu Protocol, which reorganized the administrative structure of Lebanon. Under the terms of the protocol, Lebanon was given a new Organic Law that established Lebanon as a privileged province headed by a non-Lebanese, Ottoman Christian governor (*mutasarrif*) appointed by the sultan after consultation with European governments. The predominantly Christian mountain region was detached from the coastal district of Beirut and Tripoli as well as from the inland Biqa Valley. It was a smaller, more homogenous province, but it survived intact without major disruptions until World War I.

See also ABDÜLMECIT I; DRUZE.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

BEZALEL ACADEMY OF ARTS AND DESIGN

School located in Jerusalem.

The former Bezalel School of Arts and Crafts was founded in 1906 by the sculptor Boris Schatz and named for the biblical architect of the Tabernacle, Bezalel ben Uri. Within the Ottoman Empire, Schatz wanted to establish a cultural center and craft industry in Jerusalem's *yishuv* (Jewish settlement).

The Bezalel Museum was founded as part of the school.

From the outset, efforts were made to preserve a uniquely Jewish artistic style. Funding for the project was provided by wealthy Zionists in Germany. During World War I, the school was destroyed but later rebuilt. It closed in 1932 but soon reopened as Jewish refugees fled Hitler's Germany (1933–1945). The "new" Bezalel, independent of the museum, opened in 1935. In 1955, it began training teachers and, in 1970 became an academy, with its diploma recognized as a B.A. equivalent. Under the directorship of Dan Hoffner, it was modernized, emphasizing design.

ANN KAHN

BIALIK, HAYYIM NAHMAN

[1873–1934]

Acclaimed "national poet," formative influence on modern Hebrew poetry.

Hayyim Nahman Bialik grew up in Radi and then in nearby Zhitomir (Ukraine). His strict, pious, and scholarly grandfather placed him in a traditional religious school (cheder) before sending him to Volozhin Yeshiva, a leading Orthodox academy at which he and other students (including Abraham Isaac Kook) secretly pursued their interest in modern European literature, philosophy, and Zionism. The tension between the old faith and modernity, echoed later in poems such as "Levadi" (Alone) and "ha-Matmid" (The Talmud student), encouraged Bialik to embark on a literary career as a disciple of Ahad HaʿAm. During the First Zionist Congress (1897), Bialik supported Ahad HaʿAm's "spiritual Zionism" against Theodor Herzl's political Zionism. Ahad HaʿAm also influenced Bialik's attitude regarding the relationship between Jewish and European culture, ethics, and aesthetics (see "Megillat ha-Esh"; Scroll of fire).

His first anthology appeared in 1901 in Odessa, Bialik's home for the next twenty years. There he wrote his epic "Metei Midbar" (The dead of the desert, 1902), in which boundaries between self and nation are blurred, a hallmark of his poetics. The epic's failed rebels may symbolize unleashed psychic energies, cosmic powers, or a national uprising. The 1903 Kishinev pogrom prompted a less equivocal call for Jewish self-defense: "On the Slaughter" and "In the City of Slaughter" were the basis for his recognition as modern Jewry's "national poet."

Bialik then strove to revitalize Hebrew, creating a publishing house and translating classic rabbinic and European texts. He dominated the Hebrew literary scene, both as literary editor of *Ha-Shilo'ah* (1904–1909), *Keneset* (1917), and *Reshumot* (1918–1922) and through essays on the state of Hebrew culture (1907–1917).

In 1921 Maksim Gorky helped Bialik and other Hebrew writers leave Soviet Russia. Bialik resumed his literary activities in Berlin and, in 1924, settled in Tel Aviv. There he headed the Hebrew Writers Union, worked as a publisher and scholar of medieval poetry, and wrote the first children's poems in Hebrew.

Before Bialik, modern Hebrew poetry was conventional and collective, imitating biblical diction and old European models. Bialik, inspired by the themes and style of contemporary Russian literature in particular, subordinated linguistic and conceptual traditions to modern verse and to the conflicts of the individual and nation in crisis. Arabs appear infrequently in his work, living in an exemplary romantic harmony with the desert. Unlike Ahad HaʿAm, Bialik gave little attention to problems of coexistence—the spiritual and national revival he foresaw in "return to the East" would parallel Arab life, not conflict with it.

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NILI GOLD
UPDATED BY GEORGE R. WILKES

BIDONVILLE

One of many shantytown communities in French colonial North Africa, situated near cities and towns.

Bidonville is one of three forms of living space in colonial France's Maghrib possessions—the other

two being the traditional Arab medina, which formed the nucleus of precolonial cities and towns, and the *villeneuve,* its Western counterpart that was designed by Europeans and built during colonial times. Bidonvilles in their original sense referred to the flimsy shacks and shantytowns that emerged in the nineteenth century at the margins of North African cities and towns—often built from "*bidons à pétrole,*" tin containers used to distribute kerosene.

The emergence of bidonvilles across North Africa was both directly and indirectly linked to the colonial presence. In several instances bidonvilles emerged as entire villages and populations were displaced, when in Algeria during so-called *cantonnements* and *regroupements*—policies that were aimed at either providing agricultural land to colonial settlers or to keep the local populations away from what were considered by the colonial authorities to be strategic areas.

What contributed to the physical growth of a population that could no longer be incorporated into the confines of the precolonial city or town included: the growth of the North African coastal cities, linked to their new and intermediary role in the French economy; the impoverishment of the rural areas either through neglect or their incorporation into wider economies; the burgeoning population as a result of the introduction of health, sanitary, and hygienic standards; and the creation of an urban salaried class employed by France. As a result of this uncontrolled and more often than not hasty growth, bidonvilles contrast sharply both with the planned *villeneuves* of North African towns and the carefully integrated design of the traditional medinas; as a result, they have often been described by French colonial observers as monotonous and unpleasing.

At the time of independence of the North African countries in the 1950s and 1960s, and in the two decades that followed, bidonvilles became firmly established features of the urban landscape. Often, they possess only rudimentary sanitary systems, water, or electricity. The conditions that had contributed to their creation or existence in the colonial period were continued and often exacerbated by the economic and development strategies of the new governments. In several cases, substantial portions of city populations—in some instances up to 40 percent—found themselves temporarily but more often than not permanently in bidonvilles that often remained for years without the amenities enjoyed by other citizens. Perhaps not surprising, as bidonvilles became permanent fixtures throughout North Africa, they often were the focal points for riots and violent demonstrations against local governments—forcing them to devote considerable resources to upgrading and incorporating the bidonvilles into their towns and cities, providing water and electricity, sanitation and transportation. Despite this, one of the unavoidable and seemingly enduring sights of the Maghrib remains that of bidonvilles that physically, socially, and economically are literally at the margins of each country's society.

See also Cantonnement/Refoulement; Maghrib; Medina.

Dirk Vandewalle

BILAD, AL-

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

BILHAYR, ABD AL-NABI

[?–1930]

Local leader of the powerful Warfalla tribal group located to the south of Misurata during World War I.

Abd al-Nabi Bilhayr participated in the Council of Four, the ruling body of the short-lived Tripolitanian Republic, although, as the republic collapsed under Italian pressure, he also fell out with its most important leader, Ramadan al-Suwayhli. Eventually he retired to southern Tripolitania and Fazzan, where he continued to resist Italian occupation. In 1927 he retired to southern Algeria, where he died in 1930.

See also Suwayhli, Ramadan al-.

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George Joffe

BILKENT UNIVERSITY

Nonprofit private university in Ankara, Turkey.

Bilkent University was established in 1984 by a nonprofit foundation. Its founder, Professor Ihsan Doğramaci, who was serving as chairman of the Council of Higher Education at the time, received much criticism for being the benefactor of his own university.

Bilkent admitted its first students in 1986. In 2003, it had nine faculties (art, design, and architecture; administrative and social sciences; business administration; education; engineering; humanities and letters; law; natural sciences; and music and performing arts), five vocational schools (applied languages; applied technology and management; computer technology and management; English; tourism and hotel services), and six research institutes. Its language of instruction is English.

In 2002, Bilkent employed 1,230 faculty members (of whom 1,010 had full-time and 220 had part-time appointments) and had 10,086 students (of whom 2,274 held full scholarships and 110 were international).

Bilkent was the only private university in Turkey until 1993, when several other nonprofit universities were established. As a private university, it has higher tuition and fees than the state universities, but these charges are comparable to those of other private universities. Like its counterparts, the university receives financial support from the state. In 2003, its budget amounted to 97,100 billion Turkish liras, 4 percent of which came from the state.

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I. Metin Kunt
Updated by Burçak Keskin-Kozat

BILTMORE PROGRAM (1942)

Resolutions adopted at a Zionist conference held at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City, 9–11 May 1942.

About 600 U.S. Zionists were joined by a number of visiting Zionist leaders, including the Zionist Organization's president, Chaim Weizmann, and the Jewish Agency chairman, David Ben-Gurion, at the Biltmore Hotel to call for "the fulfillment of the original purpose of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate."

One of the conference's eight resolutions strongly denounced the British White Paper of May 1939 as "cruel and indefensible in its denial of sanctuary to Jews fleeing from Nazi persecution." In its final resolutions, the Biltmore Program declared that "the new world order that will follow victory cannot be established on foundations of peace, justice and equality, unless the problem of Jewish homelessness is finally solved." To that end, the program was clearer and went further than any previous official Zionist statement in risking a breach with Britain and orienting the movement's fate toward U.S. sponsorship. The conference "urged that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world."

The debates during and after the Biltmore conference were an important reflection of internal Zionist disputes between gradualists and radicals—a struggle characterized, somewhat simplistically, as one between Weizmann, the pro-British diplomat, and Ben-Gurion, the uncompromising activist. The Biltmore Program's call for the establishment of Palestine "as a Jewish Commonwealth" was interpreted by many as equivalent to the maximalist demand for a Jewish *state* in *all* of Palestine and, hence, aroused some internal controversy.

The Biltmore Program was endorsed by authoritative Zionist and Yishuv bodies, and remained official policy until late 1946, when a Jewish state in *part* of Palestine became the new operative goal of the movement's leadership.

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NEIL CAPLAN

BILU

See ALIYAH

BINATIONALISM

Political theory for Palestine current during the British mandate, 1922–1948.

Binationalists asserted that Palestine belonged equally to Palestinian Arabs and Jews and that its ultimate political disposition should be based on this principle—that Palestinians and Jews are equally entitled to national self-determination within the full territory. Constitutional arrangements for any binational state should be based on parity, regardless of the relative numbers of each group, to assure equal representation for both in all the institutions of the national government.

The original supporters of binationalism formed a small but articulate minority within the political spectrum of the Yishuv (Palestine's Jewish community). Among the leading proponents of binationalism were idealists and humanists, rather than political tacticians: Judah I. Magnes, president and chancellor of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; world-renowned philosopher Martin Buber; and land-purchase agent Chaim Kalvaryski. The most notable of the associations formed to advance binationalism during the mandate period were Brit Shalom (Covenant of Peace; founded in 1925), the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation (founded in 1939), and Ihud (Unity; founded in 1942). Two left-wing workers' parties, Poʿalei-Zion Smol (Left Faction, Workers of Zion) and ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir (the Young Watchman), also took an active part in advocating a binational solution.

Binationalism never became a strong force within the Zionist movement, within the Yishuv, or among any Palestinian political groups. The idea reached a high point in the year 1946, when the arguments advanced by Magnes and Buber before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry influenced the committee's report, which proposed that "Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew," and that "Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state." But the committee's recommendations soon proved unworkable and, subsequently, the United Nations opted for the partition of mandatory Palestine (i.e., Palestine under British Mandate). Faced with the reality of the State of Israel after 14 May 1948, Magnes reluctantly abandoned binationalism and began advocating instead a confederation between the new Jewish state and a Palestinian Arab state-to-be-created. Thereafter, the concept of binationalism surfaced from time to time (e.g., following the 1967 Arab–Israel war), usually in academic discussions of alternative approaches to resolving the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

Binationalists were opposed to the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states on the grounds that it would fragment the integral unity of the small country and would give rise to irredentism (where a territory ethnically related to one political unit comes under the control of another). Likewise, they rejected as unjust and unworkable the mutually exclusive quests for either an Arab or a Jewish state, each with its recognized minority. Finally, binationalism—with its essential stress on the rights and status of Arabs and Jews as coequal but autonomous national communities living in a single state—should not be confused with either a "two-state" solution or Palestinian proposals for a non-sectarian, secular democratic state.

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NEIL CAPLAN

BIN DIYAF, MUHSEN

[1932–]

Tunisian novelist and short-story writer.

Muhsen Bin Diyaf, born in Tunis, received a B.A. in Arabic language and literature. Although he is bilingual, he writes in Arabic. Bin Diyaf has published two novels, *al-Tahaddi* (1972; The defiance) and *Yawm min al-Umr* (1976; A certain day in a life), and a collection of short stories, *Kalimat ala Jidar al-Samt* (1977; Words on the wall of silence). His writings reflect a concern with human beings and the quality of life in political and social contexts. Bin Diyaf's latest novel, *al-Irtihal wa Zafir al-Mawj* (1996; Departure and the exhalation of the waves), is a detective novel, a genre that is slowly making its way in Maghribi literature.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN.

AIDA A. BAMIA

BIN LADIN, OSAMA

[1957–]

A Saudi militant; head of al-Qaʿida.

Osama bin Ladin was born in Riyadh to a Yemeni father who settled in Saudi Arabia in 1930. The father quickly rose in the construction business, built palaces for the senior members of the royal family, and died in a plane crash in 1970, leaving a fortune to his children. Osama was forty-third among the surviving siblings and twenty-first among the sons. His mother is believed to have been Syrian (his father married at least ten women). He had a childhood of privilege. No evidence exists of either a wild period or intense religiosity during his teen years. He most likely gravitated toward fundamentalism while studying public administration at King Abd al-Aziz University in Riyadh in the late 1970s. There he fell under the spell of a charismatic Palestinian Islamist, Abdullah Azzam, while the latter was on a speaking tour to raise funds for the Mojahedin (Islamic holy warriors) in Afghanistan. While at the university, bin Ladin is reported to have begun a study of the works of Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb. One can still see the influence of Qutb's thought in bin Ladin's organization, especially his categorization of people into either believing Muslims or infidels, the latter group including Muslims who disagree with his interpretations of Islam.

Exiled Saudi dissident Osama bin Ladin, seen here in an April 1998 photograph in Afghanistan. Bin Ladin is the leader of the international terrorist organization al-Qaʿida, responsible for many terrorist activities, including the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. He is currently ranked by the F.B.I. as one of the ten most wanted fugitives in the world. **© AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

After earning his degree, bin Ladin moved, with his sizable inheritance, into Pakistan, which was then the staging area for the Mojahedin struggle against the Soviet-backed government of Afghanistan. He did not distinguish himself in battle, although he carries an AK-47 that he claims to have captured from a Soviet soldier. His organizational skills, however, were impressive. He started a database to account for all the Arab volunteers who were passing through Afghanistan, and he used it as a nucleus for his later organization. During those years, bin Ladin was on excellent terms with the Saudi government, and he coordinated closely with Prince Turki al-Faysal, head of Saudi foreign intelligence. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the subsequent assassination of Abdullah Azzam, bin Ladin began to organize the Arab volunteers who had relocated to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet infidels, and those followers formed what became known as al-Qaʿida.

His troubles with the Saudi government did not begin until 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Bin Ladin was concerned about the U.S. desire to base troops in the kingdom, and he met with most of the Saudi senior princes, including the minister of defense, the head of foreign intelligence, and the crown prince. He proposed forming an army of Muslim volunteers to expel Saddam's army from Kuwait, but the royal family invited U.S. troops instead, and bin Ladin broke with the royal family and was expelled from the kingdom in 1991. He moved to Sudan, where he stayed until 1996. In Sudan, he was hosted by the powerful Sudanese Islamist politician Hasan al-Turabi, and the latter still claims that Bin Ladin was an entrepreneur while in the Sudan. It is not known what bin Ladin did in the Sudan, although he did use his construction experience to engage in business. The Saudi royal family stripped him of his citizenship in 1994, and under pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia, the Sudanese government asked him to leave the country. He returned to Afghanistan, where his militancy grew and where he connected with the militant Egyptian Islamist Ayman al-Zawihiri. The Taliban came under the influence of bin Ladin (rather than vice versa), and bin Ladin and Zawahiri pooled their resources and skills to form, in February 1998, the Islamic Front for the Combat Against Jews and Crusaders. Bin Ladin's rhetoric was typically crude, and his agenda typically militant and violent. He came to world attention in August 1998, when he was blamed by the U.S. government for the suicide bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Bin Laden was operating his global networks from bases in Afghanistan. He survived U.S. strikes on his bases there and managed to organize the 11 September 2001 attacks on targets within the United States. This led to the U.S. war on Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban government. Bin Ladin managed to survive war and is believed to be in hiding somewhere between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He communicates with the outside world through carefully managed and produced video- and audiotapes. His group has been linked to acts of violence worldwide.

See also Qaʿida, al-; Qutb, Sayyid; Taliban; Turabi, Hasan al-.

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As'ad AbuKhalil

BINT

See Glossary

BINT AL-SHATI

[1913–1999]

Egyptian scholar and writer.

A'isha Abd al-Rahaman, known as Bint al-Shati, was born in Dumyat to a religious and conservative family. Her father sent her to a *kuttab*—a Qurʾanic school—to study the Qurʾan. With the help of her mother, Bint al-Shati was able to continue her education. She received her B.A. in Arabic Language and Literature from Cairo University. She got her Ph.D. in the same field under the supervision of the illustrious Taha Hussein in 1950.

Bint al-Shati held various academic posts in Egypt. She was the chairperson of the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies at Ain Shams University, an academic inspector for the Egyptian Ministry of Education, and a visiting professor in several Arab universities such as Khartoum University in Sudan and Qarawiyyin University in Morocco. She also taught in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates.

Aisha Abd al-Rahman started writing articles for Egyptian women's magazines. When she began publishing in widely circulated journals and daily papers in 1933, she adopted her pen name Bint al-Shati ("daughter of the riverbank/beach") in order to hide her identity from her father, a well-known religious scholar at that time, Shaykh Mohammad Ali Abd al-Rahman. Her father, guessing her pen name—which refers to her birthplace, Dumyat, where the waters of the Nile and the Mediterranean meet—and recognizing her style, encouraged her later to keep writing. In addition to writing in academic and scholarly journals, she wrote for the prestigious newspaper *al-Ahram* until her death.

A prolific writer, Bint al-Shati had more than forty books and one hundred articles to her credit. Although she published some fiction and poetry, she is best known for her social, literary, and Islamic studies. Her first two books, which appeared in 1936 and 1938, deal with the difficulties facing Egyptian peasants. Her other books deal with Arabic literature (1961), contemporary Arab women

poets (1963), Abu al-Ala al-Maʾarri (1968 and 1972), and a new reading of *Risalat al-Ghufran* (1972).

Bint al-Shati was a vehement defender of the rights of women. Some of the titles of her articles attest to the wide scope of her knowledge and interest: "The [woman] Loser," "The Lost Woman," "The [woman] Stranger," "The Rebellious," "The Dreamer," "The Innocent," "The Sad," "How Do Our [male] Literary Figures View Women?," "The Image of Women in our Literature," "We Are No More Evil than Men," and "Will a Woman Become a Shaykh in al-Azhar?" Her 1942 novel *Master of the Estate* depicts a peasant girl who is a victim of a patriarchal and feudal society.

Bint al-Shati excelled, however, in the field of Qurʾanic studies, in which she published more than fifteen books, including *The Immutability of the Qurʾan* (1971), *With the Chosen* (1972), *The Qurʾan and Issues of Human Condition* (1972), and *Islamic Character* (1973). She published several biographies of early Muslim women, including *The Daughters of the Prophet* (1963), *The Mother of the Prophet* (1966), and *The Wives of the Prophet* (1959), which was translated into English.

Her autobiography, *On the Bridge* (1986), provides invaluable information about the different stages of her life.

See also AIN SHAMS UNIVERSITY; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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SABAH GHANDOUR

BIQA VALLEY

Fertile region of eastern Lebanon.

Running parallel to the Mediterranean coast between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon mountain ranges, the Biqa valley throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries enjoyed close ties to Damascus, whose populace constituted a ready market for its agricultural produce. Nevertheless, in August 1920, French mandatory authorities incorporated the Biqa into the newly created state of Lebanon. Thereafter, it served as the breadbasket for the rapidly expanding port city of Beirut.

After the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, the towns of the Biqa provided strongholds for a number of militant Shiʿite organizations. These included not only Hizbullah and Islamic AMAL, headquartered around Baʿalbak, but also a detachment of Revolutionary Guards seconded from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Neither Syrian troops, which controlled the Beirut-Damascus highway beginning in the summer of 1976, nor Israeli forces, which raided the area by air and land on numerous occasions, succeeded in dislodging the militants, who supported their activities by producing opium and other drugs for export. When the fighting stopped in 1989, Syrian military units maintained their positions in the area, and the local economy retained its wartime links to southern Syria.

See also BAʿALBAK; HIZBULLAH.

FRED H. LAWSON

BIRET, IDIL

[1942–]

Turkish pianist.

Born in Ankara in 1942, Idil Biret displayed an outstanding talent for music from the age of three. Her mother played the piano rather well and with other musical members of the family, there was always chamber music at home. Biret was sent to Paris with her parents by the Turkish government when she was seven. Trained at the Paris Conservatory by Nadia Boulanger, Biret performed Mozart's Concerto for Two Pianos with Wilhelm Kempff at Théâtre des Champs-Elysées under the baton of Joseph Keilberth in 1953 when she was only eleven. At age fifteen she graduated from the Paris Conservatory with three first prizes. Biret continued studying piano with Alfred Cortot and was a lifelong disciple of Wilhelm Kempff.

Even though Nadia Boulanger never encouraged her to enter competitions, Biret's concert career started very early. She was invited to the Soviet Union for an extensive concert tour when she was sixteen years old by recommendation of Emil Gilels.

Her debut in the United States, with the Boston Symphony Orchestra conducted by Erich Leisendorf, where she played Rachmaninov's Piano Concerto no. 3, unfortunately took place on the day of President John F. Kennedy's assassination in 1963. The following year she performed the same work with the London Symphony Orchestra conducted by Pierre Monteux.

In 1986 Biret launched a colossal project of recording all of Beethoven's nine symphonies' piano transcriptions by Liszt. In the same year she performed the nine symphonies in a series of four concerts at the Montpellier Festival in France. Since this outstanding event she has continued to record the complete solo piano works and piano concertos of Chopin, Brahms, and Rachmaninov. She was awarded the Grand prix du Disque Chopin prize in Poland in 1995. That same year her recording of the Pierre Boulez Sonatas won the annual Golden Diapason award and was selected among the best recordings of the year by the French newspaper *Le monde.*

Idil Biret has completed the recording of the Etudes of György Ligeti and the piano transcription of Stravinsky's *Firebird.* Her latest project is recording Beethoven's thirty-two Sonatas for the piano.

Biret has been a major influence on the musical life in Turkey. Generations of young people were encouraged by her example and chose music as their profession. Such younger Turkish pianists like Gulsin Onay, Huseyin Sermet, Fazil Say, Ozgur Aydin, and lately Emre Elivar followed the example of Biret toward international reputation.

See also Gender: Gender and Education; Music.

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FILIZ ALI

BIRTH CONTROL

Control or regulation of conception and birth, either to limit population growth, to increase births among particular populations, or to enable conception through medical intervention.

The terms *birth control* and *family planning* (in the sense of limiting births) and the concept of population reduction are controversial in the Middle East. Population, its growth, reduction, and control are at the heart of some of the region's most volatile political conflicts, such as the Arab–Israel conflict and the civil war in Lebanon, a country founded on the notion of proportional power-sharing between Christians and Muslims. Issues related to birth control and contraception also serve as lightning rods for some of the sharper social, cultural, and ideological controversies in the contemporary Middle East, particularly those centering on secular versus religious modes of organization and frames of meaning, women's rights, and the tension between individual and collective rights. In attempting to alter, influence, or control the literal and figurative reproduction of the family as the region's basic social institution and moral structure, birth-control policies straddle political, moral, and religious fault lines, highlighting contending sources of authority and revealing ongoing challenges of national integration and identity in the region.

Advocated by the state and international organizations, birth-reduction campaigns usually target impoverished, powerless, and marginalized groups, thus drawing attention to long-standing socioeconomic inequalities and class-based tensions in major cities such as Cairo, Tehran, and Istanbul. But birth control is not only imposed from above or beyond the contemporary Middle East—it is also chosen in increasing numbers by those living in the region as part of a larger trend toward claiming rights, taking control of personal health and the body, and domestic decision making and financial planning for families' futures. As a facet of projects designed to ensure women's increasing agency in and control over their own lives, birth control has drawn the attention and earned the censure of conservative religious authorities, be they Christian, Muslim, or Jewish.

Manipulating Population Growth

Population growth results from increased birth rates and falling mortality rates, as well as migration. In the major cities of the Middle East, rapid urbanization and dramatic population increases have been a common feature of the last sixty years. Most countries in the region have just attained, or soon will

attain, the demographic transition—the stage at which birth rates slow down to replacement levels, death rates having dropped earlier. Rapid population increases in the Middle East have affected patterns of urbanization, labor, and immigration, and have often strained the provision of education, health, and social services in resource-poor countries. For many, state-sponsored policies encouraging birth control symbolize interference in family matters and the negation of such traditional values as the importance of marriage and family. Women's control over their own bodies and their own fertility, afforded by birth control, conflicts with some communities' values concerning the importance of women's chastity, their role in the home, and their status as mothers and nurturers. Others view contraceptive technology as an important tool in areas ranging from national development policy to a woman's safeguarding of her health.

Although the region shares a common culture and a dominant religion (Islam), variations of geography and resource allocation have generated different policy responses to population growth. Whereas some countries seek to limit their populations, others seek to increase theirs. Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Tunisia, Lebanon, and Morocco, lacking a sufficient resource base to support their growing and largely young populations, have supported national family-planning programs designed to reduce population growth. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Iraq, and the Gulf oil states, on the other hand, lack sufficient populations to supply their labor needs and have had pronatalist (probirth) policies. Israel also has a pronatalist policy for its Jewish population, and actively encourages Jewish women to have many children. This policy, however, does not extend to Israel's Arab citizens, who, representing 20 percent of Israel's population, have a higher birth rate and a younger median age than do Israeli Jews. Assisted conception and infertility treatments in Israel are the most advanced in the region, and state subsidies render these services affordable for all Israeli citizens, Arabs and Jews alike.

Overall, the rapid growth of population in the Middle East is a matter of concern within as well as beyond the region. In 1993 the population of the Middle East was approximately 360 million; by 2025 it is expected to reach 700 million. The region's population is young: 41 percent are under 15 years of age. Fears that resources, particularly water, may not stretch to support populations have prompted many governments to make contraceptive use an integral part of their public-health programs and to mount campaigns to encourage the use of family-planning techniques and mechanisms. Yet, women's fertility rates are often influenced more by educational levels and employment than by access to birth-control pills, intrauterine devices, or condoms. Women's status and life possibilities greatly shape their reproductive behavior; women who complete high school and college tend to marry later, and thus give birth to fewer children. Trends toward later marriage in most countries of the region (with the exception of the Occupied Palestinian territories, Yemen, and Oman) should translate into lower birth rates in the coming decades.

Demographic evidence suggests that disease, poverty, and warfare combined to keep population figures relatively even and stable until the beginning of the twentieth century. The population of the central Middle East (excluding North Africa) is estimated to have been around 40 million at the beginning of the twentieth century. By 1950 it had doubled to 80 million (1993, 265 million; 1999, 380 million). Explosive growth followed the end of World War II, when greater emphasis upon public sanitation and healthcare reduced the death rate while the birth rate remained high. In the early 1960s Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia were the first national leaders to appreciate the potentially negative relationship between unrestricted population growth and socioeconomic development, and they feared that the resulting pressure could spur political unrest. The family-planning programs they initiated encountered opposition, but since about 1970 their programs, along with those of Lebanon, Turkey, Morocco, and Iran, have achieved limited success.

Cultural, Political, and Religious Opposition to Family Planning

Opposition has come from political, military, religious, and cultural quarters. Both the culture of the Middle East and the religions of the area—Islam, Christianity, and Judaism—encourage marriage and family. The term *birth control (tahdid al-nasl)* is considered highly perjorative because it connotes preventing the birth of children. Less objectionable

Egyptian women wait to see a doctor at a birth control clinic in Cairo. Information is available on contraception, family planning, and other female health issues. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

terms are *tanzim al-usra* and *takhtit al-aʾila* (family planning), which connote organization and ordering rather than the outright limitation of progeny. Nations of the Middle East have historically sought to augment their strength against enemies by increasing their numbers. To many, birth control is suspect and assumed to be another facet of Western imperialism in disguise; family-planning programs are often considered Western impositions designed to weaken the Middle East.

Political parties and nationalist groups throughout the Middle East affirm that having children constitutes a national duty in order to supply a large population base for military endeavors. Following heavy military losses at the end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988, both Iran and Iraq emphasized pronatalist policies. Competition among Middle Eastern nations for regional prominence has led them to discourage family planning and advocate high birth rates. National, ethnic, or religious factionalism often translates into lack of support for family planning as each group seeks to enlarge its numbers. European Community governments decided in the 1990s to attack root problems of immigration from the Middle East by initiating programs supporting family planning in North Africa.

Most of the major religious traditions of the area hold that contraception is permitted. Christians are divided on its permissibility. The traditions of Judaism differ, but largely consider it permissible. Islamic jurisprudence condemns a pre-Islamic form of birth control, *waʿd* (exposure of female infants), but, reasoning from *hadith* texts, Islam does permit contraceptive use as analogous to coitus interruptus *(azl)*. This is a personal, mutual decision of the husband and wife. Muslim opponents of contraception see it as murdering a potential creation of God and as a denial of the will *(irada)* and sustaining power *(rizq)* of God. Furthermore, Islam acknowledges the importance of and

the right to sexual fulfillment for both men and women, and thus does not teach that reproduction is the sole or primary justification for marital intercourse.

The continuing importance of family in the Middle East has proved to be the largest obstacle to family planning. Because the status of both spouses, particularly the wife, depends upon the birth of children, family-planning programs have had difficulty encouraging both men and women to consider contraceptive use. One important support has been the Qurʾan's injunction to nurse children for two years, and most women appreciate the risks of becoming pregnant while nursing. The spacing of children as an important contributor to a mother's health is becoming better understood. Children have traditionally been seen as providing economic support for the family and, in the absence of social-security programs, are considered guarantors of parents' financial security in their old age. Finally, children are loved and valued as a true blessing and a gift from God in all the faith traditions and cultures of the region.

Contraception

The most common methods of contraception used by women in the Middle East are birth-control pills and intrauterine devices (IUDs). Concern over sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS has led to increased use and availability of condoms. Much interest has been shown in injectable or implantable contraceptives. Nonreversible sterilization for men or women is prohibited by Islam. Tubal ligations, however, are increasingly common, and because new medical technology makes the procedure reversible, they can be considered religiously permissible. Abortion is frowned upon but permitted in particular situations, mostly those in which the mother's life is threatened. The majority of states ban abortion except when the health of the mother is endangered, at which point responsibility devolves onto the woman's doctor. Tunisia permits abortion.

Family planning and contraception in the Middle East was the subject of worldwide attention and debate at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo. That gathering, as well as the other United Nations conferences held in the 1990s—the 1995 Beijing Conference, the 1999 five-year review of the ICPD (ICPD+5), and the 2000 five-year review of the Beijing Conference (Beijing+5)—witnessed an alliance of conservative Catholic and Muslim religious authorities joining forces to oppose and restrict Middle Eastern women's right to control their own bodies and sexuality.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND HEALTH; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH.

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DONNA LEE BOWEN
UPDATED BY LAURIE KING-IRANI

BIR ZEIT UNIVERSITY

Palestinian university.

Founded in 1924 as a primary school on the West Bank, the school began to offer secondary education in 1930. In 1942, the institution became known as Bir Zeit College, and provided instruction above secondary level in the 1950s. In 1972, the name of the institution officially became Bir Zeit University. Students earn degrees in arts, commerce and economics, engineering sciences, and, since 1995, graduate degrees in fields such as Arabic studies and international studies.

Bir Zeit University became a center of anti-Israel activism in the 1970s and 1980s, with student groups becoming increasingly involved in Palestinian politics. Israeli authorities have viewed the university as a center for militancy. After the outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987, classes were disrupted, and the university closed during curfews imposed by Israel's military authorities. The university remained closed from 1988 to 1992. More than 5,000 students were enrolled in the 2001–2002 academic year, although closures and curfews have continued to disrupt classes.

See also INTIFADA (1987–1991); PALESTINE; PALESTINIANS; WEST BANK.

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LAWRENCE TAL

BISHARA, ABDULLAH

[1936–]

Kuwaiti diplomat, lecturer, and columnist.

Abdullah Bishara was born in Kuwait and educated in Cairo, Oxford, and New York. A diplomat since 1964, he was Kuwait's ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations from 1971 to 1981, representing Kuwait on the Security Council in 1978 and 1979. From 1981 to 1993 he was the secretary-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council and a member of its Supreme Advisory Assembly from 1998 to 2004. Beginning in April 1993, Bishara served as special adviser to the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in Kuwait, commenting frequently on current issues in the press. In 2003 he became a Commander of the British Empire and published his second book.

See also GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL; KUWAIT.

LES ORDEMAN
UPDATED BY MARY ANN TÉTREAULT

BISHARA, SUHA

[1968–]

Communist activist.

Born in the village of Dayr Mimas in South Lebanon, Suha Bishara joined the Lebanese Communist Party in her teens. She became famous in 1989 when she attempted to assassinate the Israeli-appointed head of the South Lebanon Army (a militia founded by Israel during its occupation of South Lebanon), Antoine Lahad. After the assassination attempt, which left Lahad seriously wounded, Bishara was incarcerated and tortured in the notorious Khiyam prison. She was kept in solitary confinement for six years and was released in 1998. Lebanese filmmaker Randa Shahhal Sabbagh made a documentary about Bishara's experience, titled *Suha: Surviving Hell.* Bishara settled in Paris, where she published her memoirs and took classes in Hebrew. Bishara became a folk heroine in Lebanon, and the communist movement took pride in her role. She, however, now avoids the limelight, living in Switzerland in 2003. Bishara has stressed the nationalistic dimensions of her political actions, and seems to have played down the role of communist ideology in her political motives.

See also LAHAD, ANTOINE.

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AS'AD ABUKHALIL

BISITUN

Important archaeological site in western Iran (also Behistun; Bagestana; Bisutun).

On a limestone cliff in Lorestan province, Iran, is a ruined town and a monument to Darius the Great (550–486 B.C.E.), consisting of sculpture and cuneiform inscriptions that are considered the "Rosetta Stone of Asia" (its deciphering by Henry Rawlinson in 1846 led to our knowledge of Assyrian and Babylonian). Carved in 520 B.C.E., it shows Darius and two companions facing nine defeated rebels, accompanied by an inscription in Elamite, Old Persian, and Babylonian describing Darius's restoration of the Persian monarchy.

The site also contains remains of various epochs, notably Hellenistic and Parthian rock reliefs and a rock-cut terrace (called Teras-e Farhad) of Kosrow I and three capitals from his palace. A modern village of the same names exists at the base of the cliff.

See also IRAN.

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A. SHAPUR SHAHBAZI

BITAR, SALAH AL-DIN AL-

[1912–1980]

Syrian politician.

Born to a traditional and religious family from the Maydan quarter in Damascus, Salah al-Din al-Bitar studied physics at Damascus University and then in Paris. While studying in Paris from 1929 to 1934 he met Michel Aflaq and the two men became inseparable. Back to Damascus, Bitar started teaching physics at one of the city's most prestigious schools. In 1935 he coedited a left-wing weekly magazine, the *Vanguard,* which was known for its revolutionary views. He cofounded the Baʿth Party and was elected secretary-general during the first congress, which took place in a coffee shop in Damascus in 1947. He was elected to parliament for the first time in 1954 and served as foreign minister in 1957. In these capacities Bitar, along with Baʿthist colleagues, played a key role in the forging of the United Arab Republic. He was appointed minister of state for Arab affairs and minister of national guidance in the United Arab Republic. After the coup that brought the Baʿthist, Nasserist, and independent officers to power in March 1963, Bitar served more than once as prime minister, but his influence was fading away until his arrest in the wake of the February 1966 coup in which the leftist/military faction of the Baʿth Party, best known as the Neo-Baʿth, seized power.

Exiled to Lebanon, Bitar distanced himself from the Iraqi faction of the Baʿth led by Aflaq, who also had been expelled from Syria by the Neo-Baʿthists. Bitar settled in Paris, where he started publishing a magazine called *Arab Resurrection.* Although he was sentenced to death by the Neo-Baʿthists in absentia in 1969, he was pardoned and was granted a visit to Syria in 1978 where he met then Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad. He was assassinated in Paris in 1980, presumably by the Syrian regime although the identity of his assassin has never been confirmed. Unlike Aflaq, Bitar was not an ideologue or philosopher and he did not leave any written work. He was known for his arid and reserved manner and did not enjoy the same popularity in the party as did Aflaq. He is mostly remembered for the editorial he wrote on the eve of his assassination in which he asked the Syrian people for forgiveness for all the mistakes the Baʿth Party had made.

See also AFLAQ, MICHEL; ASAD, HAFIZ AL-; BAʿTH, AL-; UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (UAR).

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BITAT, RABAH

[1927–2000]

Algerian revolutionary, government minister, and president of Assemblée Nationale Populaire (ANP).

Rabah Bitat was a founder of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and is regarded as one of the nine historic chiefs of the Algerian revolution. The French captured Bitat and he remained in deten-

tion until the end of the Algerian war of independence in 1962.

Bitat first supported, then opposed, Ahmed Ben Bella. He held the transportation portfolio under Houari Boumédienne before becoming the first president of the ANP (by the constitution of 1976). Bitat served as acting president (December 1978–February 1979) after Boumédienne's death in December 1978. Bitat returned to the ANP following Chadli Bendjedid's election. After the October 1988 riots, Bendjedid's accelerated reforms compounded by a declining dinar alienated Bitat, who resigned in protest in 1990. He remained a critic within FLN circles. His wife was Zohra Drif, a heroine of the Battle of Algiers. Bitat died in 2000.

See also Algerian War of Independence; Algiers, Battle of (1956–1957); Ben Bella, Ahmed; Bendjedid, Chadli; Boumédienne, Houari; Front de Libération Nationale.

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Phillip C. Naylor

BITTARI, ZOUBIDA

[1937–]

Pseudonym of Algerian novelist Louise Ali-Rachedi.

Zoubida Bittari, an Algerian, has written a single autobiographical novel. She was born in Algiers, to a Muslim family of modest means who withdrew her from school at age twelve in order to marry her to a man of their choice. After her divorce at age fourteen, she left Algeria to work for a French family in France. While there she wrote *O Mes Soeurs Musulmanes, Pleurez!* (1964; Oh! My Muslim sisters, weep!). The book relates the story of a young married woman at odds with her in-laws. She sees her dreams of freedom crushed as a result of her marriage. The highly melodramatic book analyzes the situation of women from the colonial position.

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Aida A. Bamia

BITTON, SIMONE

[1955–]

Moroccan-French-Israeli documentary film director, prominent in Arab-Jewish peace activities.

Born in Rabat, Morocco, Simone Bitton emigrated to Israel with her family at the age of twelve. At sixteen she became a supporter of the radical Mizrahi Black Panthers movement and the left-wing party Matzpen. After national service in the Israeli army, Bitton left for film school in Paris. The 1982 massacres at Sabra and Shatila provoked her into an activist career of making films, writing articles, and directing conferences that highlighted the plight of the Palestinians and Sephardim (Jews native to the Middle East, also known as Mizrahim), who are also, in her view, victims of Zionism. She founded the Mizrahi peace group Perspectives Judéo-Arabes, and was a key organizer of the historic 1989 meeting between Mizrahi Jews and Palestinians in Toledo, Spain. Her films include *Citizen Bishara; Ben Barka: The Moroccan Equation; The Bombing; Mahmoud Darwish: As the Land Is the Language; Arafat Daily; PLO: the Dialogue Desk; Daney/Sanbar: North-South Conversation; Palestine: Story of a Land; Great Voices of Arabic Music: Um Kulthum, Muhammad Abdel Wahab, and Farid al-Atrache; Chouf Le Look; Life Beyond Them; Between Two Wars* (in Hebrew, *Yoredet*); *Mothers; Nissim and Cherie;* and *Solange Giraud, Born Tache.*

See also Adot ha-Mizrah.

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George R. Wilkes

BIZERTE

Northern Tunisian seaport situated between a large inland lake and the Mediterranean Sea.

Although a settlement had existed on the site of Bizerte since Phoenician times, the town first attained significance in the sixteenth century when an influx of Moorish and Jewish refugees from Roman

Catholic Andalusia (Spain) spurred both agricultural and artisanal development. Like other North African seaports, Bizerte served as a base for Barbary corsairs of the Barbary states and their raids against European ships. In retaliation, Spanish forces seized and fortified the city in 1535. Troops of the Ottoman Empire recaptured it briefly in 1572, but definitively only in 1574 when its garrison was sent to defend the more important Spanish positions at Tunis. Throughout the seventeenth century, Bizerte's economy continued to depend almost exclusively on the raiding of its corsairs.

France set up a trading post at Bizerte in 1738 as one of a string of such establishments along the Algerian and Tunisian coasts. Although poor relations between French merchants and the Tunisian government led to the post's temporary closing in 1741 and 1742, it operated until Ali Bey evicted the French in 1770. This, plus French anger over corsair forays staged from Bizerte, led to a naval bombardment that badly damaged the city. A similar attack by a Venetian fleet in 1785 all but destroyed Bizerte. Despite these hostilities, Marseilles merchants continued to import wheat from Bizerte, especially during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. In 1789, a French consulate opened there.

The Tunisian government's renunciation of corsair activity in 1819 hurt Bizerte, but the silting up of the port was an even more serious problem, causing a steady decline in commercial activity in the first half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, however, Tunisia was being drawn into a more extensive relationship with Europe. A telegraph line linking Tunisia with Algeria and France passed through Bizerte in the 1850s, and the city was the starting point for a submarine cable that opened communications with Italy in 1864.

Following the Treaty of Bardo (1881), which established a strong French presence in Tunisia, the canal connecting the lake with the sea was improved. This, and other extensive French public-works projects in Bizerte in the 1880s and 1890s, made its harbor and port facilities among the finest in the Mediterranean. Much of this work revolved around the creation of a French naval base and arsenal, which, by the turn of the twentieth century, were widely regarded as among the largest and most powerful in the Mediterranean. During World War II, this base, and its proximity to the narrow channel between Sicily and Africa joining the eastern and western Mediterranean basins, gave Bizerte great strategic importance. The city was occupied by the Axis immediately following the Anglo–American landings in Morocco and Algeria in 1942. Allied air raids destroyed 70 percent of Bizerte prior to its liberation in the following year, but the canal remained intact and the base became a jumping-off point for the successful Allied invasion of Sicily.

France retained control of the naval facilities at Bizerte after Tunisian independence (1955–1956) and refused to accede to demands for their evacuation in 1961. France's attempts to break a blockade of the base led to violent confrontations with hastily mobilized Tunisian civilians and paramilitary units. Tunisia appealed to the United Nations, which called for negotiations on the base's future. Only after lengthy delays did France agree to abandon the installation in late 1963.

In the years since Tunisian independence, Bizerte and other cities around its lake have become major industrial centers, while the port remains the country's primary import–export terminal. The 2002 population was estimated at 527,400.

See also CORSAIRS; TUNIS; TUNISIA.

KENNETH J. PERKINS

BIZERTE CRISIS (1961)

Tunisian blockade of French naval base at Bizerte.

Tunisia imposed a blockade on France's naval base at Bizerte in July 1961, hoping to force its evacuation. French soldiers broke the blockade and gained control of most of the city in fierce fighting with hastily mobilized Tunisian civilians and paramilitary units. Tunisia appealed to the United Nations, which called for a negotiated settlement. French troops remained in occupation of the city until autumn, while the base itself was not abandoned until late in 1963, following the conclusion of the Algerian War.

See also ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; BIZERTE.

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KENNETH J. PERKINS

BLACK PANTHERS

An Israeli protest movement of second-generation Middle Eastern immigrants, mostly Moroccan.

The Black Panthers aimed at improving material conditions in Israel in Middle Eastern Jewish communities *(adot ha-mizrah).* Erupting briefly as street demonstrations in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, in 1971, the movement attracted publicity. The name, taken from the U.S. black-pride movement, was chosen to shock Israelis out of complacency. The movement led to improved community services and some activists began their political careers.

See also ISRAEL; MIZRAHI MOVEMENT.

SHLOMO DESHEN

BLACK SEA

Large inland saltwater sea between Turkey on the south and Ukraine on the north, connected to the Mediterranean Sea.

About 180,000 square miles (466,000 sq. km.), the Black Sea is connected to the Aegean Sea, the northeast arm of the Mediterranean Sea, by the Turkish Straits (the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosporus). Until the late eighteenth century, the Black Sea was controlled almost entirely by the Ottoman Empire, but the sea was opened to Russia in the Treaty of Kuçuk Kaynara (1774). Over the next century and a half, the Russians and the Ottoman Turks vied for control of the Black Sea. The Ottoman Empire attempted to keep Russia from establishing a military presence in the Black Sea, and the Russians attempted to push the Ottomans ever southward and prevent access to the Black Sea by the other European powers through the Turkish Straits. Control of the straits remained a live issue well into the twentieth century. After World War II, Josef Stalin, USSR premier, unsuccessfully pressured Turkey to revise the 1936 Montreux Convention, which barred belligerents from the straits and hence limited the ability of the USSR to use the Black Sea as a naval base. The Black Sea is also a major commercial shipping region. It is thus a vital economic link between Eastern Europe, Russia and other states of the former USSR, Turkey, and the states of western Central Asia, as well as a link between these states and the countries of the Mediterranean and the world.

See also MONTREUX CONVENTION (1936); OTTOMAN EMPIRE; STRAITS, TURKISH.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

BLACK SEPTEMBER

A Palestinian terrorist group that grew out of the defeat of the Palestinians in the September 1970 Jordanian civil war.

Black September is generally believed to have been established by elements of al-Fatah in the autumn of 1971 as a result of pressure from groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to wage a more radical war against the Palestinians' enemies. The group took its name from the term used by some Palestinians to describe their military defeat during the Jordanian Civil War of 1970. It is widely believed that Black September was the creation of al-Fatah's intelligence chief Salah Khalaf (a.k.a. Abu Iyad), who recruited Ali Hasan Salama as its operational mastermind. Al-Fatah always denied any connection with the organization, and many details about the group remain unclear. The shadowy group's first strikes were aimed against Jordanian targets; they included the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tall in Cairo in November 1971.

Black September's most dramatic attack involved seizing eleven Israeli athletes as hostages at the September 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. All the athletes and five Black September operatives later died during a gun battle with the West German police. Black September was also at the forefront of an

underground war of assassination between the Israelis and the Palestinians that was carried out in Europe and the Middle East. In March 1973, Black September terrorists seized guests at a diplomatic reception at the Saudi embassy in Sudan in March 1973, and later murdered the U.S. ambassador. No actions were carried out in Black September's name thereafter.

See also Fatah, al-; Jordanian Civil War (1970–1971); Khalaf, Salah; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Tall, Wasfi al-.

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Steve Tamari
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

BLACK SPRING

A violent uprising, from April to August 2001, against state security forces in the northeastern Algerian region of Kabylia.

Between April and August 2001, the Kabyle provinces in northeastern Algeria witnessed a violent uprising of local youth against national gendarmes that has become known as the Black Spring. On 18 April, high school student Massinissah Guermah died of gunshot wounds received while in police custody in the village of Beni Douala, on the outskirts of Tizi-Ouzou. Occurring on the eve of the twenty-first anniversary of the Berber Spring—the 1980 insurrection of Kabyle students for Berber cultural and linguistic rights—and in a civil war context of violence and socioeconomic marginalization, Guermah's death transformed a generalized sense of despair into one of explicit outrage against the state and drew thousands of male youths into the streets throughout the region. "Refusing pardon" to Guermah's "assassins," they attacked state security forces and government buildings with rocks and homemade Molotov cocktails. The gendarmes responded with tear gas and live ammunition, launching a four-month cycle of protest and violent repression in which over one hundred local residents were killed and as many as five hundred injured.

The Black Spring brought about the emergence of a new political actor, the Coordination des Archs (CADC), which quickly became the principal Kabyle representative in the ongoing dialogue with the state. Whereas the institutionalized Kabyle political parties had failed to control the conflict, this informal committee of village and tribal assemblies succeeded in directing a series of general strikes and a 500,000-person Black March in Tizi-Ouzou on 21 May.

See also Berber Spring; Coordination des Archs (Algeria); Kabylia; Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD).

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Paul Silverstein

BLACK THURSDAY (1978)

Tunisian riots between government forces and striking workers over a sagging economy.

On 26 January 1978, demonstrations organized by the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT; General Union of Tunisian Workers) in Tunis led to clashes between state security forces and striking workers. Scores of demonstrators were killed and injured, and hundreds of UGTT members, including its leadership under Habib Achour, were arrested. The demonstrations were organized to protest a worsening economic crisis in Tunisia brought on by state policies as framed in the Five-Year Plan of 1973–1977.

See also Achour, Habib; Tunisia.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON

BLED AL-SIBA/BLED AL-MAKHZAN

A theory recognizing the pragmatic governance of a multicultural society.

French colonial theorists developed the idea that pre-colonial Morocco consisted of two areas, *bled al-makhzan,* the land of government, where the sultan ruled over plains and cities and collected taxes more securely, and *bled al-siba,* the many Berber mountainous areas where the sultan was relatively powerless. The use of the term *makhzan* (treasury) for the government clearly showed the relationship between taxation and authority. The sultan's authority over *siba* areas, they said, was confined to his religious role. The *makhzan-siba* division laid the theoretical basis, under the protectorate, of a system of "indirect rule," under which the Berber areas would be administered separately from the Arab-speaking areas, supposedly in accordance with their customary law. Arabic-speaking nationalists saw this as an attempt to "divide and rule." Nationalist historians pictured the sultan not as a powerless figurehead but as an arbitrator who stepped in to settle disputes in the mountainous and Berber areas, but who was otherwise content to allow these more remote and poor areas to use local systems to maintain order.

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C. R. PENNELL

BLISS, DANIEL

[1823–1916]

The American University of Beirut's first president.

Born in the United States, the Reverend Daniel Bliss came to Beirut in 1856, as one of a group of American Protestant missionaries sent to what was then called Syria. When in 1862 the mission decided to create a college in Beirut, he was given responsibility for raising money for the project in England and the United States. His success in doing so was one of the factors that made possible the establishment in Beirut in 1866 of the Syrian Protestant College, which later was renamed the American University of Beirut. He became the college's first president and retained that position until 1902, when he retired and was succeeded by his son, Howard Bliss.

See also AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT (AUB); BLISS, HOWARD.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX

BLISS, HOWARD

[1860–1920]

Missionary and educator.

Howard Bliss's claim to fame is the role that he played in continuing the Bliss family Protestant missionary legacy in Beirut—namely, the founding and administration of the American University of Beirut, then known as the Syrian Protestant College. Born in 1860 in Suq al-Gharb during the bloody Maronite-Druze riots, Bliss learned at a young age how to cope with conflict and rise above it. Growing up as the son of the first president and founder of the college provided him with the wherewithal to successfully negotiate with rich and influential people. It is said, for instance, that he and his brother, Frederick, were close boyhood friends with Theodore Roosevelt. Thus, Bliss was able to use his friendship with Roosevelt to shore up the status of the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut and secure its official recognition by the Ottoman government in 1903.

Bliss grew up on the campus in Beirut but returned to the United States for his higher education. There he earned degrees from Amherst College (1882) and Union Theological Seminary (1887). He also studied in Oxford and Berlin, then returned to the United States to be ordained in the Congregational ministry in 1890. Bliss was pastor of the

Christian Union Congregational Church in New Jersey until 1902, when he returned to Beirut to take over the reins of the college from his father to serve as its second president.

At his death in 1920 Bliss was credited with steering the college through its most precarious years, which were marked by World War I and the vacuum following the demise of the Ottoman Empire, and the political and financial pressures that the war unleashed. Although the college officially did not become the American University of Beirut during his lifetime, Bliss is credited with having paved the way by modernizing the college and increasing the size of its non-Christian student body. Upon his death, the eminent scholar Philip Hitti eulogized him as "one who brought relief during the disastrous experiences of war, . . . irradiating idealism and democracy . . . and love for his fellow men."

See also American University of Beirut (AUB); Bliss, Daniel; Protestantism and Protestant Missions.

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Karen Pinto

BLOC D'ACTION NATIONALE

See Glossary

BLOOD LIBEL

See Antisemistim

BLUDAN CONFERENCES (1937, 1946)

Inter-Arab conferences convened in response to proposals for the solution of the Palestine question.

A conference was held on 8 to 10 September 1937 at the Syrian summer resort of Bludan, attended by more than 400 delegates (none an official government representative) from Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, Transjordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

Formally organized by the Damascus Committee for the Defense of Palestine, it was in fact the brainchild of the mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni. The conference members turned down the Peel Commission's recommendation to divide Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state, and rejected the idea of a Jewish state. They called for a boycott of Jewish goods and threatened to take similar measures against British interests if the British government endorsed the Peel recommendation. The conference was considered a landmark in external Arab involvement in Palestine affairs and an achievement for the mufti, who had made great endeavors for its realization.

A second conference was convened in Bludan in June 1946, when the Council of the Arab League met to discuss the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The participants criticized U.S. interference in the Palestine question, recommended an economic boycott of the Jews, and pledged to assist the Arabs of Palestine. The conference also adopted secret resolutions regarding Arab military intervention in Palestine as well as steps against British and U.S. interests, including cancellation of oil concessions.

See also Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-.

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Elizabeth Thompson
Updated by Joseph Nevo

BLUE MOSQUE

See Sultan Ahmet Mosque

BLUE SHIRTS

See WAFD

BLUM–VIOLLETTE PLAN

French legislation that intended to give Algerian Muslims full citizenship rights.

Influenced by ex-Governor General and then Minister of State Maurice Viollette, Pierre Viénot, and historian Charles-André Julien, France's Premier Léon Blum submitted a bill to Parliament in 1936 that aimed at giving approximately 30,000 Muslims in Algeria full rights without the loss of their Muslim status. The Senate defeated it in 1938 and the legislation was never brought to the floor of the Chamber of Deputies. This was a terrible blow to the évolués (assimilated Algerians) and convinced many of them (including Ferhat Abbas) to pursue other directions of reform. It has been called a "lost opportunity" that might have prevented the savage Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962).

See also ABBAS, FERHAT; ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

B'NAI B'RITH

The world's oldest and largest international Jewish service organization.

B'nai B'rith (Hebrew, "sons of the covenant") was founded by twelve Jewish immigrants of German descent in New York on 13 October 1843 to respond to the needs of Jewish communities worldwide. The organization has since created three major institutions that have played a key role in contemporary Jewish life worldwide: the Anti-Defamation League (1913); Hillel (1923), the largest Jewish campus organization worldwide; and the B'nai B'rith Youth Organization (1924), concerned with the problems posed by the assimilation of Jewish youth in the diaspora and still operating an extensive network of summer camps.

B'nai B'rith lodges were established in the Middle East, starting with the Maimonides Lodge in Cairo (1887) and the Eliahu Hanabi Lodge in Alexandria (1891), followed by lodges in Istanbul, Edirne, and Beirut (1911). The organization's central concern was and is the promotion and implementation of programs that allow for the appreciation and maintenance of "Jewish unity, Jewish security, and Jewish continuity" worldwide.

The organization has five centers that develop and implement its programs: the Center for Community Action; the Center for Jewish Identity, devoted to "the transmission of Jewish values, ethics, and knowledge"; the Center for Human Rights and Public Policy (CHRPP), serving as the organization's research and advocacy arm; the Center for Senior Services, making B'nai B'rith the world's largest operator of affordable housing for seniors; and the World Center, established in 1980 to serve as the organization's official center in Jerusalem.

Within the United States, the organization acts as a powerful lobbying group, seeking the continuation of support for Israel. B'nai B'rith's CHRPP lists among its concerns "the security and welfare of Israel, rising Islamic militancy, resurgent anti-semitism, Jewish renewal in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, [and] the security and welfare of Jewish communities worldwide." The organization has criticized human rights organizations that oppose the policies of the state of Israel, condemned the position of the European Union toward Israel, and consistently denounced what the organization calls "prejudiced reporting" about Israel by the foreign media.

B'nai B'rith is the only Jewish nongovernmental organization to be accepted as part of the Organization of American States, and it maintains a visible presence in South American countries. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it supported the attempts on the part of the United States to establish stronger ties with the republics of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

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VANESA CASANOVA-FERNANDEZ

BNEI AKIVAH

See GUSH EMUNIM

BODRUM

Town in southwestern Turkey on the Anatolian shore of the Aegean Sea on a peninsula of the same name at the northern end of the Gulf of Kerme, opposite the Greek island of Kos.

It is said that Bodrum (Turkish for "underground vault" or "cellar") gets its name from the vaultlike ancient ruins that abound in the area. Originally it was called Halicarnassos by its first settlers, the Dorians from the Peloponnese (1000 B.C.E.). Bodrum was the birthplace of many famous Greek intellectuals, notably Herodotus (ca. 484–ca. 420 B.C.E.), who chronicled the struggle for control of the city's fortunes between Greece and Persia in his *Histories.* In 1402 the Knights of St. John came from Rhodes and built one of its most famous landmarks, the Castle of St. Peter. The peninsula was brought back into Ottoman rule in 1523 when Süleyman the Magnificent ousted the Knights of St. John from Rhodes, and consequently from Bodrum.

Bodrum is part of the present-day Turkish Riviera and is known for its historic sites, clement weather, colorful jazz bars, idyllic whitewashed houses, marina and yachting facilities, and its resident artist community. Celebrated novelist Cevatsakir Kabaağaçlu immortalized the lore and legends of the local seafarers in a collection of short stories.

The 2000 Turkish government census listed the urban population as 32,227 and 65,599 in outlying rural areas (97,826). A favorite vacation spot, the population varies greatly in the summer, with an annual number of visitors totaling 1.5 million between June and August.

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KAREN PINTO
UPDATED BY MARIA F. CURTIS

BOĞAZIÇI (BOSPORUS) UNIVERSITY

Public university in Istanbul, Turkey.

Founded in 1863 as Robert College, an American missionary school, Boğaziçi (Bosporus) University maintains English as the language of instruction even though its administration was transferred to the Turkish state in 1971. It comprises four faculties (engineering; arts and sciences; economics and administrative sciences; and education), the School of Foreign Languages, the College of Vocational Education, and four research institutes (modern Turkish history; biomedical engineering; environmental sciences; and earthquake research). In the 2002–2003 academic year, it had 956 faculty members and 9,731 students (4,027 of whom were female). Its budget for the year amounted to 46,479 billion Turkish liras, 99 percent of which came directly from the state funds.

Robert College was founded by Dr. Cyrus Hamlin, a U.S. missionary, with the initial support of Christopher Rheinlander Robert, a wealthy merchant and philanthropist. The school was administered and financed by a U.S. board of trustees in New York. Being a missionary establishment, it was not allowed by the Ottoman state to admit any Muslim students, but a small number of Muslims was secretly enrolled in the school at the turn of the century.

The school had an academy, or lower, division in addition to the college. Its School of Engineering opened in 1912. As consequence of the financial problems during the Great Depression, it was merged with the American College for Girls in 1932. The college was substantially reorganized in 1958 in accordance with the changes in the Turkish educational system. The School of Business Administration and the School of Sciences and Languages were established in 1959. The Turkish state, which had strictly regulated foreign schools in the country, conceded to the college's enlargement primarily due to the increasing influence of the United

States after the World War II. The college responded favorably to the government's expectations: Its The School of Business Administration provided well-educated managers for the booming private sector, and its innovative curriculum set a high standard for its counterparts. Nevertheless, financial difficulties, even more than the campus militancy of the 1960s, compelled the American board of trustees to turn over the college division to the Turkish state in 1971. The trustees, however, retained the administration of the high school, which still operates under the name of Robert Lycée.

In the 1970s, Boğaziçi University grew steadily, becoming an academically prestigious institution. In the 1980s, however, it was forced to increase its student intake at an unrealistic rate, as were all other universities. It remains one of the major universities in the country, but faces escalating competition from the other state universities, including Middle East Technical University and Istanbul Technical University, and from the private universities, including Bilkent University and Sabanci University. Boğaziçi University has close ties with Turkish business circles, and many of its graduates have taken up academic positions throughout Turkey, as well as in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.

See also Bilkent University; Istanbul Technical University; Middle East Technical University.

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I. Metin Kunt
Updated by Burçak Keskin-Kozat

BOGAZKÖY

City in Turkey on the site of the probable Hittite capital in central Anatolia.

Known as Hattushash (or Pteria, in Greek), today's Bogazköy was built over a site first inhabited by Hittites in the third millennium B.C.E. It was a major trading town and became the Hittite capital in the second millennium B.C.E. Thousands of clay tablets impressed with cuneiform writing have been excavated. The Hittite kingdom was extended into Syria, where a famous battle was fought with the Egyptians at Qadesh (near today's Homs) in 1285 B.C.E. By 1200 B.C.E., the Hittite Empire was destroyed by migrating tribes known as the "sea peoples."

Elizabeth Thompson

BONAPARTE, NAPOLÉON

[1769–1821]

French general and emperor.

The ascendancy of Egypt on the modern world stage can be traced to the period of French occupation, 1798 to 1801. French armies under the command of General Napoléon Bonaparte landed at Abuqir Bay on 1 July 1798, stormed Alexandria the next day, and proceeded to Cairo. On 21 July 1798, outside the city, the French, although less than 30,000 strong, defeated a Mamluk army twice their number and occupied the city. Bonaparte's initial reason for the Egyptian expedition was to threaten Britain's supply line to India. Once in Egypt, however, he realized the advantage to France that an occupation would ensure and set about structuring a system of local government to that end.

Suggesting that he himself was intent on becoming a Muslim, Bonaparte tried to convince the Egyptians of the sincerity of his intentions regarding their country. Among his claimed intentions were the liberation of Egypt from the stranglehold of the Mamluks, the introduction of enlightened government responsive to local needs, and respect for Egyptian religious traditions. Not surprisingly, the Egyptians were quite wary of his conversion, although given his intellectual makeup, he may very likely have found in Islam appealing characteristics.

He appointed *diwans,* or councils, composed of *ulama* (Muslim legal scholars), to stabilize local government by giving French policies the sanction of the country's notables. Having established relatively good relations with the local population, Bonaparte set about threatening the Ottoman Porte and Britain through an expedition to Palestine. Defeated and decimated by cholera, his troops returned to Egypt. Bonaparte, informed of the changes in the French political winds, left his army in Egypt in the care of General Jacques Menou and returned to France in August 1799. Menou was forced to capitulate to an Anglo–Ottoman force in 1801; he and the army returned to France.

Though historians considered it a failure from a military perspective, Bonaparte's occupation of Egypt had great impact on the world of learning. One member of the expedition was Jean-François Champollion, whose discovery of the Rosetta Stone in the Nile delta permitted the deciphering of hieroglyphics and the development of Egyptology. The expedition also included dozens of artists as well as hundreds of social and natural scientists representing most of the academic disciplines. Their task was to catalog all the flora, fauna, and architecture—ancient and contemporary—of Egypt as they discovered it. To that end, once he established himself in Cairo, Bonaparte founded the Institut d'Egypte, whose purpose was to store and structure the immense body of newly discovered information. Between 1808 and 1829, the institute published the *Description de l'Egypte* in twenty-three enormous volumes of narrative and accompanying plates.

Certain recent scholarship has credited Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt with a development of dubious honor: orientalism. Originally considered the study of the Orient, "orientalism," in the postmodernist view, represents the textual deconstruction of the non-Western cultural heritage. The *Description de l'Egypte,* for instance, in laying bare the structure of Egyptian culture, may be seen as making that structure "vulnerable" to what such critics call Western "imposition."

See also Champollion, Jean-François; Mamluks; Menou, Jacques François.

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Jean-Marc R. Oppenheim

BORATAV, PERTEV NAILI

[1907–1998]

Turkish scholar, folklorist, translator, and editor.

Pertev Naili Boratav was born in Gümülcine (now Ziotigrad, in Bulgaria). He received his elementary education in Istanbul, where the family had moved upon the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in 1912, and in various provincial towns of Turkey. After attending the Kumkapi French School in Istanbul, he graduated from the Istanbul Lycée in 1927. He continued his studies at the Istanbul Faculty of Letters and at the Teachers Training College (1927–1930). After his graduation he taught at these institutions and the Konya Lycée. In 1936 and 1937, Boratav studied in Germany on a government scholarship, but he was called back because of his liberal and anti-Nazi views. Upon his return, he first worked at the library of the School of Political Science of Ankara University and in 1938 he became an associate professor of Turkish folk literature at the same university. He was promoted to full professor in 1946 and folklore studies became an independent department at Ankara University under his leadership. Boratav encouraged popular interest in folklore by editing *Halk Bilgisi Haberleri* (News of folk culture) and turning it into a major instrument of research on social and religious groups, nomadic tribes, agricultural methods, and other matters of interest to the villages.

Boratav always spoke out for academic freedom, freedom of the press, and human rights at a time of transition to multiparty democracy. There were, however, certain limits to liberalism in Turkey of his time, especially when the fear of communism was rapidly escalating. In 1948, he was one of four professors at Ankara University who lost their posts for spreading Marxist views. Boratav spent the next two years directing the establishment of the Turkish collection at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University. In 1952, he joined the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (National center for scientific research) in Paris, where he remained until his retirement in 1974. He continued his research and writing in France until his death in 1998.

Boratav succeeded in attracting global attention to Turkish folklore and literature and became a highly respected figure among the international scholarly circles. He produced various books and translations on the general studies of folklore. He also published several collections on Turkish folk genres and individual figures. With Wolfram Eberhard, he compiled Typen Türkischer Volksmörchen (1953), a significant milestone in Turkology studies for its employment of Aarne and Thompson standards. His works in French included *Contes Turcs* (1955) and his contributions on folk literature in *Philologiae Tur-*

cicae Fundamenta, II, edited by Jean Deny, et al. (Wiesbaden, 1965). His publications in Turkish were on the other hand far more numerous: *Zaman Zaman İçinde* (Once upon a time; 1958); *Az Gittik Uz Gittik* (We went a little, we went afar; 1969); *100 Soruda Türk Halk edebiyati* (Turkish folk literature in 100 questions; 1969); *100 Soruda Türk Folkloru* (Turkish folklore in 100 questions; 1973); *Ağitlar, Türküler, Destanlar* (Eulogies, folk songs, legends; 1980); *I, Nasruddin Hoca, Never Shall Die* (1999).

See also BALKAN WARS (1912–1913).

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BOREK

See FOOD: BOREK

BOROCHOV, BER

[1881–1917]

Ideologist of Marxist Zionism.

Ber (Dov) Borochov was born in the Ukraine. He had a formal high school education and subsequently was self-educated. As a young adult, Borochov was attracted to the Zionist Socialist Workers Union. He wrote numerous essays in which he developed a synthesis of class and nation, and argued that for Jews, nationalism was the most viable institution for conducting the class struggle. According to Borochov, once a Jewish society was reestablished, Jews would control their own economic infrastructure and would be integrated into the revolutionary process, and the Jewish economic structure would be reconstituted as a base for the class struggle of the Jewish proletariat. Zionism, Borochov asserted, would help to create "the new territory," Eretz Israel, and pioneer a new migration pattern among Jews that would culminate in the "stychic" (natural or automatic) migration of the Jewish masses to Eretz Israel, which is a precondition for Jewish national and economic liberation.

Borochov opposed Theodor Herzl on the Uganda Project, and at the Seventh Zionist Congress in 1905 he headed a faction of Poʿalei Zion delegates who were against the plan. Several years later Borochov played a central role in the secession of the Russian Poʿalei Zion, which had moved much further left, from the Congress and the World Zionist Organization. He left Russia in 1907, and from then until the beginning of World War I, he was a publicist for the World Union of Poalei Zion in Western and Central Europe. In 1914 Borochov went to the United States, where he continued his work as publicist for Poʿalei Zion and also did publicity work for the American Jewish Congress. Borochov was in Kiev on behalf of Poʿalei Zion when he contracted a fatal bout of pneumonia. He was buried in Russia, then reinterred in the cemetery of Kibbutz Kinneret in 1963, next to other founders of Labor Zionism.

See also AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS; HERZL, THEODOR; LABOR ZIONISM; UGANDA PROJECT.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

BORUJERDI, HOSAYN

[1865–1962]

Religious leader and teacher; director of the Feyziyeh in Qom, 1944–1962.

Ayatollah Hosayn Borujerdi was director of the religious teaching institution in Qom, the Feyziyeh, for seventeen years, and for fifteen years the most prominent *marja al-taqlid* (source of emulation) for

Shiʿite communities throughout the world. He was born in Borujerd, Iran, to a family of scholars; and at least five *marja al-taqlid* appear in his ancestry. He received his formal religious training in Isfahan and Najaf. In the early 1900s, Borujerdi moved to Najaf, to study with the famous Akhund Molla Mohammad Kazem Khorasani. In 1910 he returned to Iran. In 1944, he was appointed as head of the Feyziyeh religious seminary in Qom. The institution flourished considerably under his supervision, rivaling older such establishments of Najaf.

Borujerdi's tenure both as *marja al-taqlid* and head of the Feyziyeh was marked by his apolitical, compromising, and quietist stance. He actively pursued a Sunni–Shiʿite rapprochement and was in constant correspondence with the director of al-Azhar, his Sunni counterpart, in Egypt. In the 1950s, when the radical Islamic group Fedaʾiyan-e Islam (Devotees of Islam) embarked on a series of political assassinations, Borujerdi repeatedly denounced their actions, and he distanced himself and the Feyziyeh from any confrontation with the government of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. He in fact expelled the Fedaʾiyan-e Islam from their headquarters at the Feyziyeh.

In 1955, Borujerdi involved himself with the anti-Bahaʾi campaign of another prominent cleric, Abu al-Qasem Falsafi, grounding his opposition in religious rather than political motivations. Borujerdi also denounced the land reform program of the shah, launched in 1951, on the grounds that it was contrary to Islamic law. Borujerdi's public denouncement of the bill was the first instance of open confrontation between the clergy and the government of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. In 1953, when Mohammad Mossadegh, the prime minister of Iran, moved to nationalize the oil industry, Borujerdi distanced himself from the activist stance of Ayatollah Abu al-Qasem Kashani, who, together with the Fedaʾiyan-e Islam, opposed Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in support of Mossadegh. In that same period, he was steadfast in his conviction in the autonomy of Qom, and the unacceptability of any government interference in its religious and financial affairs. When the government tried to impose its representative in Qom's office for religious endowments, Borujerdi flatly denounced the move.

Borujerdi was closely associated with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had worked as Borujerdi's special assistant. But Borujerdi died in March 1962, before the clerical uprisings of 1963 led by Khomeini, along with several other clerics, his successor as *marja al-taqlid.* Borujerdi's death also paved the way for the coming to power of the more radical, reform-minded *ulama* in Qom, who sought to preserve Islam's sociocultural hegemony by direct participation in the political life of the country, and later criticized Borujerdi's conservative, apolitical policies. During his lifetime, Borujerdi was one of the few Iranian, Qom-based, *marja al-taqlid* who enjoyed considerable support and financial backing by Shiʿites outside Iran, notably in Najaf and Karbala, Iraqi centers of Shiʿite learning that tend to emulate their own clerical leadership.

See also FEDAʾIYAN-E ISLAM; KASHANI, ABU AL-QASEM; KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH; MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD; PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA; QOM.

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NEGUIN YAVARI

BOSPORUS

See STRAITS, TURKISH

BOST

Afghan city and ancient Ghaznavid site.

The city of Bost, later renamed Lashkar Gah, was once the site of a Ghaznavid palace and soldiers' bazaar near the confluence of the Helmand and Arghandab rivers in southeastern Afghanistan. Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni built Bost around the year 1000. The city is now the capital of Helmand province and has a population of about 20,000 inhabitants. In the 1950s and 1960s, Bost and its surroundings became part of the Helmand Valley Project, in which the Helmand River, which drains over half of the Afghan watershed, was dammed and a series of canal projects diverted water for irrigation. Afghan

farmers were resettled from other areas of Afghanistan to farm this new agricultural area. Although many eventually left and the project was viewed by some as a failure because of the technical problems encountered and the salination of the soil, many thousand acres of arable land were reclaimed from the desert.

During the years of Afghan civil war (1980–2001) the area around Bost was ruled by a series of warlords. In addition, the drought of the late 1990s and early 2000s drastically reduced stream flows, restricting cultivation and leading to pockets of food shortages. The cultivation of opium poppies moved into this region by the early 1990s.

See also HELMAND RIVER.

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GRANT FARR

BOUABID, ABDERRAHIM

[1920–1992]

Moroccan diplomat and opposition party leader.

Abderrahim Bouabid joined the movement for Moroccan nationalism, becoming a member of the Istiqlal Party in the 1950s. In 1956 France and Spain recognized the independence of Morocco, and Bouabid was placed in charge of economic planning in the first independent government. He played a leading part in the political crisis of 1958–1959, which led to a split in the Istiqlal. With Mehdi Ben Barka and others, he formed a new progressive party, the National Union of Popular Forces; in 1975 he helped form an offshoot party called the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), which emerged as the leading opposition to King Hassan II. In 1981, following riots in Casablanca, Bouabid and others were jailed, although he remained at the head of the party. In the early 1990s Bouadbid took a more moderate approach in view of the king's call for alteration in power, which promoted the inclusion of the left into the government. Upon Bouabid's death in 1992, his succesor as USFP secretary-general was Abderrahmane Youssoufi.

See also BEN BARKA, MEHDI; YOUSSOUFI, ABDERRAHMANE.

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BOUCETTA, MUHAMMAD

[1925–]

Moroccan lawyer and political figure.

Muhammad Boucetta was educated in Fez and at the law faculty at the Sorbonne in Paris. After joining the movement for nationalism in the 1940s, he became a leading member of the Istiqlal political party by the early 1950s. Morocco became independent of French colonialism in 1956; during the 1958–1959 split of Istiqlal, Boucetta remained in the more conservative wing, under Allal al-Fasi. As secretary-general of the party (1974; then 1978–present), Boucetta held a series of government posts, including minister of state for foreign affairs (1977; then 1981–1983).

See also FASI, ALLAL AL-; ISTIQLAL PARTY: MOROCCO.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON

BOUDIAF, MOHAMED

[1919–1992]

Algerian revolutionary; president of the Haut Comité d'Etat, 1992.

Born in M'Sila, Mohamed Boudiaf was drafted in 1943 into the French Army, where he tried to or-

ganize nationalist cells in the Algerian ranks. He supported the nationalist ideals of Messali Hadj and joined the paramilitary Organisation Spéciale (OS). He eluded French authorities and later became a party organizer for the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD) in France. Aligning with the restive younger Messalist elite, Boudiaf played an important role in launching the Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA), which led to the formation of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). He is regarded as one of the nine "historic chiefs" of the Algerian War of Independence. He served in the external faction of the FLN until a controversial French skyjacking in October 1956, when he was captured along with historic chiefs Ahmed Ben Bella, Hocine Ait Ahmed, and Mohamed Khider. Boudiaf spent the rest of the war in prison.

Boudiaf supported neither Ben Bella nor the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA) in the power struggle after the war. He founded instead an organization called the Parti de la Révolution Socialiste (PRS). Boudiaf was arrested in 1963 and condemned to death, but was later sent into exile. He supported a coalition of opposition groups known as the Comité National de Défense de la Révolution (CNDR), which was established in 1964. After President Ben Bella's deposal in June 1965 Boudiaf opposed the successor regime led by Colonel Houari Boumédienne.

Unlike his former FLN "brothers" Ben Bella and Ait Ahmed, Boudiaf did not return to Algeria right after the October 1988 riots that led to political liberalization. The crisis caused by the Front Islamique du Salut's resounding first-round victory in the parliamentary elections in December 1991 forced apprehensive civilian and military elites to depose President Chadli Bendjedid in January 1992. Then they inaugurated the Haut Comité d'Etat (HCE), a collective executive body, and persuaded Boudiaf to preside over it. His presence was viewed as historical and symbolic. Boudiaf claimed to serve no party except the Algerian nation. He inaugurated the advisory Conseil Consultatif National (CCN) in April. In an effort to mobilize and legitimize his authority, in the following month Boudiaf organized the Rassemblement Patriotique National (RPN).

Boudiaf's energetic engagement earned him respect and even popularity. Nevertheless, he also provoked important enemies. He was staunchly anti-Islamist and determined to address official corruption. His assassination in Annaba in June 1992 was a national tragedy that has been commemorated yearly. The reasons why a bodyguard shot him remain wrapped in mystery. It was reported that the assassin had Islamist tendencies, but clearly Boudiaf also threatened the privileges of members of the Pouvoir—the military and civilian power establishment. Fatiha Boudiaf, the president's widow, has appealed for the truth. She has earned an international reputation for her activism.

See also Algeria: Political Parties in; Algerian War of Independence; Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA); Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques.

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Phillip C. Naylor

BOUDJEDRA, RACHID

[1941–]

Algerian novelist.

Rachid Boudjedra was born in Aïn Beïda near Constantine and attended secondary school in Tunis. He was wounded while serving in the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), and then served as an overseas representative of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) during the Algerian Revolution. He earned a philosophy degree at the Sorbonne in Paris. Boudjedra's literary reputation stemmed from his novels *La répudiation* (1969; The repudiation) and *L'insolation* (1972; The sunstroke), which dramatically questioned contemporary social conventions and traditions through psychologically complex characters. Other novels include *Topogra-*

phie idéale pour une agression caractérisée (1975; Ideal topography for a characterized aggression), *L'escargot entêté* (1977; The stubborn snail), *Les 1001 années de la nostalgie* (1979; 1001 years of nostalgia), and *Le vainqueur de coupe* (1981; The cup winner). Boudjedra announced in June 1982 that he would no longer write in French. His Arabic novel *al-tafakkuk* (1982; The falling apart) appeared in French translation as *Le démantèlement* (1982; The dismantling). Other Arabic novels that have been translated into French are *al-mart/La macération* (1984/1985; The maceration), *Laylat imraʾa Ariqa/Journal d'une femme insomniaque* (1985/1987; Nights of an insomniac woman), *Maʿarak zuqaq (The battle of the alleys/La prise de Gibraltar* (1986/1987: The taking of Gibraltar), and *Fawda al-Ashya/Le désordre des choses* (1990/1991; The disorder of things). He gradually returned to writing in French, in the novels *Timimoun* (1994; Timimoun), *La vie à l'endroit* (1997; The life at the place), and *Fascination* (2000; Fascination). He is also a poet (*Pour ne plus rêver* [1965; For not to dream] and *Greffe* [1985; Graft]) and a playwright (*Mines de rien* [1995; Mines of nothing]). His nonfiction includes *La vie quotidienne en Algérie* (1971; The daily life in Algeria), *Naissance du cinéma algérien* (1971; Birth of the Algerian cinema), *Journal Palestinien* (1973; Palestinian journal), *Lettres algériennes* (1995: Algerian letters), and *Peindre l'Orient* (1996; To paint the Orient). Boudjedra has opposed political Islamism, as illustrated by his *FIS de la haine* (1992; The Fis [Islamic Salvation Front] of Hatred).

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

BOUHIRED, JAMILA
[1935–]

Algerian nationalist.

Born to a middle-class family in 1935 and educated in a French school, Bouhired joined the Algerian Liberation Front (FLN) when she was a student activist, or *mujahida* like Hassiba Ben Bouali and many others. She was the liaison officer and personal assistant of the FLN commander of Algiers, Yusef Saadi, when she was wounded in a shootout and arrested by French troops in April 1957. Though tortured, she did not speak and was sentenced to death in July on terrorism charges. The execution was postponed thanks to an international press campaign launched by her French lawyer, Jacques Verges (whom she later married). She was transferred to a prison in France in March 1958. In the film *Jamila the Algerian* (1958), Yusuf Chahine, the Egyptian filmmaker, depicted her courageous actions. Freed in 1962, Bouhired became a national heroine in Algeria.

Following Algeria's independence in 1962, she ran for a seat in the first National Assembly. Bouhired has worked then for many years with Verges for *Revolution africaine,* a French magazine devoted to nationalist struggles throughout Africa. In the beginning of the eighties, Bouhired was involved in the demonstrations by women in Algeria against the conservative Family Code, a set of laws finally adopted in 1984.

See also BEN BOUALI, HASSIBA; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS.

RABIA BEKKAR

BOUIH, FATNA EL-
[1955–]

Activist, writer, and former political prisoner.

Fatna el-Bouih was born in Benahmed in Settat province. In 1971 she received a scholarship to a prestigious Casablanca girls' high school, Lycée Chawqi, where she became active in the national union of high school students (Syndicat National des Elèves). She was first arrested as a leader of the 24 January 1974 high school student strike. After her second arrest she was forcibly held from May to November 1977 in Derb Moulay Cherif in Casablanca with other women activists, including Latifa Jababdi, Ouidad Baouab, Khadija Boukhari, and Maria Zouini. They were later kept in Meknes Prison from 1977 to 1979 without trial. Bouih was charged with conspiracy against state security for membership in the illegal Marxist-Leninist group March 23 and for distributing political tracts and posters. She completed her sentence at Kenitra Civil Prison (1980–1982).

Bouih began to speak actively in 1991 as a member of the council for women's groups (al-Majlis

al-Watani lil-Tansiq). These groups worked to change the *mudawana* with the Union d'Action Feminine (UAF), whose president is Latifa Jababdi, whom Bouih knew from March 23. Since 1995 Bouih has volunteered at Morocco's first center for battered women. She began writing about other women political prisoners, feeling that their stories should be part of Moroccan history. She wrote a book, *A Woman Named Rachid,* while in prison, but waited twenty years before publishing it. Her ability to publish this book in French and Arabic indicates a new openness since the end of the Hassan II era.

Bouih ran unsuccessfully in 1997 for councilor *(mustashara)* of Casablanca as a candidate of the Organization of Democratic and Popular Action (OADP), an official political party and successor to the March 23 group. She and her husband were founding members of the Moroccan Observatory of Prisons (OMP) in 1999. They work to help prisoners reintegrate into society. She finished a degree in sociology, and has been teaching Arabic since 1982 as part of her civil service.

See also Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Jababdi, Latifa; Morocco: Political Parties in.

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Maria F. Curtis

BOUMÉDIENNE, HOUARI

[1927?–1978]

First vice-president of Algeria, 1962; second president of Algeria, 1965–1978.

The son of a small farmer whose family originated in the Kabylia (Berber) region of Algeria, Houari Boumédienne was born Mohammed Ben Brahim Boukharouba at Clauzel (now al-Hussainiya), a small village near Guelma in the Constantinois region of the country. As a young man, he spent his school years attending both Qur'anic and French primary schools in Constantine and, at one point, a conservative *madrasa,* or religious school. After finishing his studies, he returned to his native village and became a teacher at the local school. Active early on in student politics, Boukharouba, as many of his generation, became interested in the growing nationalist sentiments and the emerging struggle against the French. His early involvement culminated in his participation in the 1945 Setif Revolt and, later, in the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962). In the aftermath of the insurrection, he joined the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA; Algerian People's Party), headed for a short while by Messali al-Hadj. To avoid forced enlistment in the French army, Boukharouba left Algeria in 1952.

During his years in exile in Cairo, he attended al-Azhar, the famous Islamic university. Although he remained a secularist throughout his years in power, he adhered to a secularism that was always tempered by respect for the Islamic/Arab heritage that Algeria had experienced. He infiltrated back into Algeria in 1955 and joined the *mujahidin* (fighters) of Wilaya V (the Oranie region) where he assumed his nom de guerre—Houari Boumédienne—a name he would keep after the Algerian War of Independence. As an assistant to Abd al-Hafid Boussouf, commander of Wilaya V at the time—the best organized and disciplined of the military apparatus in the interior of Algeria—Boumédienne was put in charge of the Moroccan wing of the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN; National Liberation Army). He slowly rose to the top of the external army structure between 1957 and 1960 and became the chief of the western general staff in September 1958, then located in Oujda, Morocco, where most of the important army commanders of postindependence Algeria were gathered at one time or another.

In February 1960, he was again promoted—this time to chief of the united general staff, headquartered in Ghardimaou, Tunisia. His position as one of the most prominent officers and powerbrokers within the future Algerian army was confirmed in 1959 when Boumédienne was put in charge of a military court that prosecuted a number of ALN colonels in Tunisia who had plotted the overthrow of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA).

In time, however, Boumédienne himself grew disenchanted with the GPRA and resigned as the second round of the Evian agreements (the negotiations between France and representatives of the Algerian leadership) limped to a halt. Although

Boumédienne cited disagreement with the Algerian participants at the Evian agreements on a number of issues, the real dispute centered on the power of the ALN versus the GPRA as independence grew nearer. At that point Boumédienne received the support of Ahmed Ben Bella, whose visibility, despite his incarceration in France, had steadily grown among Algerian participants in the struggle for independence. Ben Bella's help became crucial in 1961 and 1962 when Boumédienne wanted to remove a number of old-time revolutionaries and politicians from the GPRA. Boumédienne then returned to the provisional government, but the internal battle for power was far from settled and would resurface once independence was achieved.

After independence in 1962, Houari Boumédienne, as a key member of the Algerian military, became minister of defense and first vice-president of the republic under the presidency of Ben Bella. His primary task was to convert the internal and external units of the Algerian army that had emerged during the war of independence into a unified force. Disenchanted with the lack of direction of the newly independent government, faced with lingering internal political battles, and resentful of the foreign ideologues rather than local nationalists who helped determine Ben Bella's outlook on politics, Boumédienne deposed the first president of independent Algeria in June 1965 and assumed the presidency of the Council of the Revolution, the ruling body of the country, calling the coup a "historic rectification" of the Algerian revolution.

The 1965 coup, however, was not an indication of the personal power of the new president but reflected the political power of the armed forces whose independence Boumédienne had attempted to preserve. This would largely explain the collegial rule Boumédienne instituted after assuming power, a careful balancing act that he would be forced to maintain until his death.

Self-effacing, austere, pragmatic, and imbued with the ideals of the anticolonial struggle for which he had fought for almost two decades, Boumédienne after 1965 charted a political and economic future for his country that would slowly yield grudging admiration both abroad and at home. Its political and economic principles were described in detailed fashion in the 1976 national charter that



Algerian president Houari Boumédienne, 3 March 1975. Boumédienne was president of Algeria from 1965 until his death in 1978. Under his leadership, the country saw a period of steady economic growth and strong international presence. **© Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

became the guiding document for Algeria's socialist experiment.

The basis for his internal economic policies was a commitment to a socialist strategy that was simultaneously less draconian than that of his predecessor but still managed to put the Algerian state in charge of virtually all economic enterprises in the country. Boumédienne held the conviction that only coherent and centralized decision making would allow the country to overcome both the disastrous economic effects of the eight-year struggle for independence and the lingering factionalism within the country. Businesses were grouped into a number of state

enterprises, forming the basis of what was called an "industrializing industry" strategy. This contained the notion that, with direct and consistent state intervention, Algeria would build a heavy industry base—fueled by the income from petroleum and natural gas—that would serve as a platform for creating intermediary and eventually consumer products. The ultimate aim, according to Boumédienne, was greater economic self-sufficiency.

In foreign policy, Boumédienne steered Algeria toward a policy of neutrality in international affairs while committing the country to increased solidarity with developing countries. Under Boumédienne, Algeria became one of the original sponsors of the New International Economic Order at the United Nations and remained one of the most vocal members of the nonaligned movement. Boumédienne's cautious approach in international politics paid off as Algeria became, in several instances, a valuable interlocutor in mediating conflicts, with a corps of skilled diplomatic representatives at its service. Internally, however, Boumédienne increasingly relied on a coalition of technical experts and professional military advisers, particularly after an attempted coup by a fellow officer, Colonel Tahar Zbiri, in 1967. The outcome was that the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front), the country's single party, lost much of the legitimacy and the mobilizing potential it had possessed. The long-term result of this increasingly technocratic/military alliance was a gradual loss of popular confidence in the single party and a further narrowing of the political base during the remainder of Boumédienne's tenure.

Boumédienne's economic strategy also was not as successful in the long run as he had hoped. The heavy state intervention had created an enormously inefficient public sector by the mid-1970s, exacerbated further by the easy borrowing privileges that Algeria enjoyed when oil prices rose after the Arab–Israel War (1973), and made worse by the one-party system where patronage and favoritism rather than personal capability provided criteria for recruitment. By the end of Boumédienne's life in December 1978, there was substantial disagreement over his economic strategy. This potential struggle had been kept in abeyance because of the personal respect Boumédienne enjoyed, and it reflected the crucial role he had played in Algeria's factional politics, which had never truly been resolved after independence.

After his death, the succession was not settled until 1980 at a special party congress but according to institutionalized procedures—a testimony in part to Boumédienne's political skills but also to the stranglehold the one-party system and the ALN, its most powerful defender, had on the country. The newly elected president, Chadli Bendjedid, abandoned his predecessor's economic strategy and embarked on a more market- and Western-oriented development that would have been anathema to Boumédienne and many of his advisers. Algerian socialism died along with its enigmatic second president.

See also Algerian War of Independence; Arab–Israel War (1973); Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN); Ben Bella, Ahmed; Bendjedid, Chadli; Berber; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Hadj, Messali al-; Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA); Sétif Revolt (1945); Zbiri, Tahar.

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Dirk Vandewalle

BOURGUIBA, HABIB

[c. 1903–2000]

Leader of Tunisia's independence movement and first president of the Tunisian republic, 1957–1987.

The seventh child of a former army officer, Habib Bourguiba was born, according to some sources, on 3 August 1903, in Monastir, a small village in the Sahil, Tunisia's fertile coastal region. Other sources claim that Bourguiba was born in 1901. He was an intelligent youngster and won admission to Sadiqi College, a Tunis secondary school established before the imposition of the French protectorate in 1881. This institution provided the sons of the Tunisian elite with a superior education in both Arabic and French. He then went on to study law at

the Sorbonne in Paris from 1924 to 1927, where he met and married a French woman, the mother of his only child, a son named Habib Bourguiba, Jr. (He later married Wassila Ben Ammar, the daughter of a powerful Tunis family.) In Paris, Bourguiba encountered other Maghrebi (Moroccan and Algerian) intellectuals as well as French liberals, and his interest in politics deepened. Upon his return to Tunisia, he opened a law office and became active in the Tunisian nationalist party, known as Destour (Constitution).

The Struggle for Independence

By the early 1930s, as the Great Depression deepened, Bourguiba grew impatient with the inability of the predominantly bourgeois Destour leaders to address the disproportionate burden of the economic crisis borne by Tunisian peasants and farmers while French settlers were being given special dispensations by protectorate authorities. He founded a French-language newspaper in 1932 to give voice to his demands on behalf of the predominantly rural Tunisian population, and in 1934 he led a secession from the Destour, establishing what became known as the Neo-Destour Party.

Openly agitating for independence with Bourguiba at its helm as secretary-general and later president, the Neo-Destour methodically organized a countrywide network of branches, turning the nationalist cause, previously an elite campaign, into a genuine mass movement. Moreover, although Bourguiba was clearly the principal figure in the movement, his willingness to encourage other leaders within the party ensured that his colleagues were able to sustain the momentum of the movement in the face of French repression. Many Neo-Destour leaders were repeatedly imprisoned or exiled, including Bourguiba himself, who was in detention for nearly ten years between 1934 and 1955.

In July 1954, facing rising local agitation, the French government (then headed by Pierre Mendès-France) decided to open negotiations with the Tunisian nationalists. In April 1955, the French granted Tunisia autonomy, reserving control of defense and foreign affairs, and within a year Bourguiba concluded a treaty granting the country full independence. On 25 June 1957, the Tunisian monarchy was abolished and Bourguiba was elected president of the new republic. It was not until 1963, however, and at the cost of nearly a thousand Tunisian lives following a military showdown in the French naval base of Bizerte (July–September 1961), that the French evacuated their last military base.

Habib Bourguiba was one of Tunisia's prominent leaders during the country's struggle against France for independence. He became the country's first president in 1957—two years after Tunisia won the right of home rule—and worked to modernize his nation until his deposition in a bloodless coup in November 1987. **© AFP/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

Bourguiba's willingness to pursue a gradualist approach in negotiations with the French enhanced his reputation in the West as an artful, pragmatic leader, but it earned him enemies at home. In fact, the autonomy agreements nearly precipitated a civil war, as Bourguiba was opposed by other nationalist leaders, such as Salah Ben Youssouf, who argued that Bourguiba had conceded too much. Although Bourguiba won the war and eventually independence as well, he took the challenge very seriously. It was alleged that he ultimately arranged Ben Youssouf's assassination in 1961 at the latter's place of exile in Cairo.

Ideological Independence

Bourguiba's policies in the early years of independence demonstrated an independence of mind that only some of his fellow statesmen, both at home and abroad, appreciated. During the 1960s, like many Third World rulers, Bourguiba embraced socialism, declaring the Neo-Destour (later known as the Parti Socialiste Destourien) the sole political party, nationalizing much of Tunisia's trade and industry, and establishing cooperative farms. By the end of the decade, however, the policy was meeting increasing domestic resistance, particularly among the coastal farmers, who had been Bourguiba's most important supporters in his battles with the French and later with Ben Yusuf. In 1969, in a dramatic reversal, Bourguiba dismissed the prime minister associated with the policy, Ahmed Ben Salah (later to accuse him of treason), and became one of the Arab world's earliest proponents of economic liberalism as the surest path to development.

Bourguiba's ideological independence—the pragmatism that became known in Tunisia as *Bourguibisme,* contesting Egyptian Nasserism, which accentuated the importance of pan-Arabism—was also evident elsewhere. On 6 March 1965, during a visit to Jordan, he spoke in Jerusalem and at a Palestinian refugee camp at Jericho, openly urging Arab leaders to opt for a negotiated settlement with Israel to end the Arab–Israeli conflict. Bourguiba elaborated the reasons why the Arabs should recognize Israeli sovereignty: Military confrontation with Israel always ended in Arab defeat and this was bound to also be the outcome in the future; not only was war counterproductive, but the United States would never allow the Arab states to defeat or decimate Israel; prudence and wisdom had to prevail over emotionalism, for this only made Israel more powerful; Arabs needed to rid themselves of the feelings of humiliation that had resulted from past wars, and Israelis had to free themselves of the complex of embattlement; coexistence with Israel, even de facto recognition, would result in regional stability and prosperity for all parties involved in the conflict; and negotiations with Israel would mean direct Arab-Israeli contact, with Palestinian representatives leading the process from the Arab side. Bourguiba did not offer himself as a mediator and doubted that there would be a quick solution to the conflict.

At the time, such an initiative was virtually unimaginable. The Israelis followed his proposals closely, even though they would require Israel to accept U.N. Resolutions 181 (the 1947 Partition Plans) and 194 (repatriation of the 1948 Palestinian refugees). On the other hand, most Arab leaders opposed it outright.

This placed Tunisia on the fringes of inter-Arab politics. Similarly, although Tunisia was described in its constitution as an Islamic country, Bourguiba had little patience for what he viewed as the anachronisms of religious observance. Thus, he advocated abandoning the obligatory fast during the month of Ramadan, arguing that the consequent loss of worker productivity interfered with the country's development. He also engineered Tunisia's family code, one of the most far-reaching personal-status laws in the Muslim world, so that it outlawed polygamy and made access to divorce, support, child custody, and the like benefits that enabled women to be more equitable with men.

Weakening Influence

While many of these positions won him great esteem abroad, by 1975, when the national assembly declared him president for life (a position he had previously refused), Bourguiba's command of the Tunisian political scene had begun to weaken. Health problems that had appeared in 1967 recurred periodically, and although he proved not to be nearly as frail as many feared, his intellectual agility diminished. In the 1970s, his government was drawing increasing criticism for failing to accompany its economic liberalism with political reform. The architect of his economic policy, Prime Minister Hedi Nouira, was openly contemptuous of multiparty politics, but it was not until he suffered a stroke in 1980 that Bourguiba saw fit to replace him.

Nouira's successor, Mohammed Mzali, initially lived up to his more liberal reputation, authorizing a number of opposition parties and calling for contested elections, but he was soon consumed by the jockeying for position among the political elite that was precipitated by Bourguiba's increasingly erratic behavior. Bourguiba was said to be out of touch with most daily events, often preoccupied with plans for his own state funeral, yet unwilling to surrender any of his virtually absolute authority.

In the late 1970s, Bourguiba agreed to have the headquarters of the Arab League of States moved from Cairo to Tunis. At the time, the Arab world was boycotting Egypt for signing a peace agreement with Israel. Between 1958 and 1967, Bourguiba had regularly walked out of Arab League meetings, regarding it as an instrument of Nasser's involvement in inter-Arab politics. In 1982, Bourguiba allowed the Palestine Liberation Organization to establish its headquarters in Tunis after the Israel Defense Force ousted it from Lebanon.

By the middle of the 1980s, however, the country needed a strong hand; it faced serious economic problems, a growing Islamic political movement (al-Nahda, whose participation in Tunisian politics was anathema to the secularist Bourguiba), and a political elite divided by a preoccupation with its own political future. Although Bourguiba had designated Mzali his successor, he dismissed him in 1985, appointing in his place General Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali, the first military officer ever to serve in a Tunisian cabinet.

As Bourguiba, long an advocate of a small and apolitical military establishment, might well have predicted, it was Ben Ali who ended Bourguiba's political career. After a Tunisian court failed to hand down death sentences to Islamists convicted on charges (real or trumped up) of seeking to overthrow the state, Bourguiba demanded that they be executed anyway. Instead, Ben Ali arranged to have several doctors certify that the president was too ill and too senile to govern effectively and Bourguiba was deposed in a coup on 7 November 1987. He retired to live in seclusion in the palace he had earlier built for himself in Monastir. He died on 6 April 2000.

See also Ben Ali, Zayn al-Abidine; Ben Salah, Ahmed; Ben Yousouf, Salah; Mzali, Mohammed; Partition Plans (Palestine); Tunisia: Overview; Tunisia: Political Parties in.

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Lisa Anderson
Updated by Michael M. Laskier

BOUTEFLIKA, ABDELAZIZ

[1937–]

President of Algeria (1999–); foreign minister (1963–1979).

Born in Morocco, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was educated in his native Oujda and then at Tlemcen, Algeria. During the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962) he served in the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) as a political officer and became a confidant of the powerful Colonel Houari Boumedienne. He served as minister for youth sports and tourism before being appointed foreign minister by President Ahmed Ben Bella after the assassination of Mohamed Khemisti in 1963. Apprehensive over Boumedienne's political ambitions, Ben Bella moved against the colonel's supporters, especially Bouteflika. This contributed to Boumedienne's June 1965 coup that deposed Ben Bella.

Bouteflika retained the foreign affairs portfolio during Boumedienne's rule. He continued Algeria's foreign policy of support for revolutionary movements and nonalignment. He especially championed the rights of the less developed countries, highlighted by his chairmanship of the United Nations special session on north-south relations in 1974. He negotiated the Algiers Accords of 1965 with France regarding hydrocarbons and industrial cooperation, and resumed difficult discussions with France in 1969 regarding the future of the hydrocarbons sector. This led to the nationalization of French hydrocarbons concessions in 1971. Having concluded conventions with Morocco regarding border disputes in 1972, Bouteflika misperceived Morocco's territorial intentions and ambitions concerning Western Sahara (the former Spanish Sahara). The tripartite Madrid Accords of November 1975 divided the territory between Morocco and Mauritania. An alienated Algeria gave POLISARIO—the Saharan liberation organization—substantial support and havens within its borders for guerrillas and refugees. Bouteflika subsequently lobbied with notable success for the international recognition of POLISARIO's Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

Most observers viewed Bouteflika as the probable successor of President Boumedienne. He delivered the eulogy after Boumedienne's untimely death in December 1978. Nevertheless, the military and the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) opted for

Abdelaziz Bouteflika (left) hosts French president Jacques Chirac (center) during an official visit to Algiers in December 2001. Chirac returned to the capital city in 2003 to sign a declaration promising increased cooperation between his country and Algeria. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

a compromise candidate, Chadli Bendjedid, who was elected president in February 1979. Bouteflika served as a minister without portfolio and as an adviser. In 1981 he was removed, however, from the FLN's political bureau and central committee. Bouteflika began a self-imposed exile the following year and was charged with corruption and embezzlement in 1983. His return to Algeria in 1987 was viewed as an effort for intra-FLN reconciliation. After the Third Extraordinary Congress of the FLN in 1989 that followed the destabilizing October 1988 riots, Bouteflika became a member of the expanded central committee. He campaigned for FLN candidates in the elections of June 1990 that were won by the increasingly popular Front Islamique du Salut (FIS).

Bouteflika kept a low profile after the January 1992 coup that forced Bendjedid to resign the presidency. As civil war raged, the Haut Comité d'Etat—a collective executive—urged Bouteflika to accept the restored presidency. He refused, and Liamine Zeroual was selected in 1994 and elected in November 1995—the first free multiparty election in Algeria's history (although the banned FIS could not participate). Zeroual's decision in late 1998 to leave office before his term expired led to Bouteflika's candidacy. The April 1999 elections were tainted by charges of corruption that resulted in the withdrawal of six other candidates a day before the voting. Bouteflika—the favored candidate of the Pouvoir (the military and civilian "powerful" and influential establishment elite)—stood alone for election and was the inevitable winner.

Now as president, Bouteflika addressed the Algerian desire to end the civil war that had claimed an estimated 100,000 lives. He presented in September 1999 the Civil Concord Referendum, which was enthusiastically endorsed. The FIS's military wing—the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS)—took advantage of the government's offer of amnesty and disbanded in 2000. Two other Islamist groups have continued their operations against the government—the Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA) and the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC)—but the violence has significantly decreased. The referendum also served to legitimize Bouteflika's presidency.

The April 2001 killing of a Kabyle (Berber) youth while in police custody incited widespread rioting in Kabylia, resulting in scores killed. Rumors circulated that Bouteflika intended to resign. The Kabyles' restlessness had important national ramifications; their appeal for political reform and economic development resonated sympathetically throughout Algeria. In an effort to mollify the Berbers, the Bouteflika government recognized Tamazight as an official, national language (with Arabic) in 2002, although institutionalizing this decision remains problematic.

Differences over the direction and pace of economic planning and privatization provoked other problems, and led to Bouteflika's sacking of prime ministers Ahmed Benbitour in 2000 and Ali Benflis in 2003. Furthermore, Bouteflika has aspired to exercise independence, although detractors have portrayed him as a puppet of the Pouvoir. This has created chronic tensions between the civilian president and the military.

Bouteflika's greatest achievement as president has been the restoration of a respectable international image of Algeria after years of strife and scorn. He helped mediate differences between

Ethiopia and Somalia in 2000. He also has sought a rapprochement with Morocco and a mutually satisfying resolution regarding Western Sahara. Relations with France improved markedly, resulting in Bouteflika's state visit in June 2003. Bouteflika reciprocated by hosting French president Jacques Chirac in March 2003. Furthermore, Algeria was among the first countries to offer support and assistance to the United States after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. It is expected that Bouteflika will run for re-election in 2004.

See also Boumedienne, Houari; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); POLISARIO; Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

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Phillip C. Naylor

BOUTROS-GHALI, BOUTROS

[1922–]

Egyptian politician and UN secretary-general, 1992–1996.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali was born in Egypt, the son of a former minister of finance and the grandson of Boutros Pasha Ghali, who served as prime minister from 1908 until he was assassinated in 1910.

Boutros-Ghali earned an LL.B. from Cairo University in 1946 and a Ph.D. in international law from the University of Paris in 1949. He was a Fulbright scholar at Columbia University from 1954 to 1955. He started his career as a professor of international law and international relations at Cairo University, where he also served as chair of the political science department and as head of the Center for Political and Strategic Studies. He was a founder of *Al-Siyasa al-Dawliyya* and the economic weekly *Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi.*

When President Anwar Sadat decided to launch his peace initiative with Israel, Boutros-Ghali was appointed Sadat's minister of state for foreign affairs after Ismaʿil Fahmi, then foreign minister, resigned in protest to Sadat's peace moves. Boutros-Ghali accompanied Sadat on his historic trip to Jerusalem.

Throughout the negotiations with Israel that eventually led to the Camp David Accords (1978) and the subsequent Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty, Boutros-Ghali was one of the principal Egyptian negotiators. In 1991 he was appointed deputy prime minister for foreign affairs.

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar decided in 1991 to step down as secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) after two terms. Boutros-Ghali immediately began actively campaigning for the position, something that had never been done before. He was elected on the first ballot. During his term as secretary-general, the UN went through a transition from a world dominated by the U.S.–Soviet rivalry to a more multipolar political environment. This has meant a greater role for the world body in peacekeeping and peacemaking. Boutros-Ghali attempted to expand the mission of the UN to make it more relevant in solving ethnic conflicts and to redefine the use of UN forces in solving inter- and intranational conflicts. The transition was not easy, as the difficulties the UN faced in brokering peace in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia demonstrated. Nor was there consensus on what the role of the UN should be in the post–Cold War world. Moreover there were criticisms over waste and abuse in the UN bureaucracy. Principal among the critics was the United States, which regularly withheld financial contributions. During his tenure as secretary-general, Boutros-Ghali pleaded that without the necessary resources, the UN could not fulfill its historic mission. He was replaced by Kofi Annan.

See also Annan, Kofi A.; Camp David Accords (1978); Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier; Sadat, Anwar al-.

Bryan Daves

BOUYALI, MOUSTAFA

[1940–1987]

Leader of Mouvement Islamique Armé in Algeria.

Moustafa Bouyali was the first major Islamist insurgent of independent Algeria and the leader (*amir*) of

the Mouvement Islamique Armé (MIA). Born in Draria, near Algiers, Bouyali joined the war for independence at a young age and fought alongside the armed groups of the Algiers region. Motivated by religious convictions, he was soon disappointed by the secular inclination of the new Algerian regime. His call for the implementation of Islamic law reached more adepts by the mid-1970s when he became preacher at the al-Achour mosque in Algiers. By 1979 Bouyali had gathered local Islamic groups under his leadership and gradually departed from the quietist Islamic current. His first organization, the Group for Defence Against the Illicit, carried out punitive interventions against behaviors that it regarded as un-Islamic, such as the selling of alcohol. Unable to secure the approval of other Islamic movements and prompted by the murder of his brother during a confrontation with the police in April 1982, Bouyali went underground, founded the MIA, and began to advocate revolutionary armed struggle against the state. Based upon the guerrilla tactics used by the National Liberation Front (FLN) during the colonial struggle, the MIA targeted state institutions and their representatives, with the intent of establishing an Islamic state. Bouyali pursued his clandestine struggle for five years until he was tracked down and killed by the secret services in 1987. He became the precursor of revolutionary Islamism in Algeria and many prominent members of the GIA (Armed Islamic Groups) and the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), including Ali Belhadj, were among his followers.

See also Belhadj, Ali; Front Islamique du Salut (FIS); GIA (Armed Islamic Groups); Madani, Abassi al-; Sahnoun, Ahmed; Soltani, Abdellatif.

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Henri Lauzière

BRAHIMI, ABDELHAMID

[1936–]

Algerian prime minister, 1984–1988.

After serving as an Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) officer during the Algerian War of Independence, Abdelhamid Brahimi became director of the Organisme de Coopération Industrielle, an institution established by the hydrocarbons Algiers Accords of 1965 to stimulate French-Algerian economic cooperation. He also represented the national hydrocarbon enterprise, SONATRACH, in the United States. President Chadli Bendjedid appointed Brahimi minister of planning and organization of the national territory in 1979. Brahimi then served as prime minister beginning in 1984 until he was replaced by Kasdi Merbah after the October 1988 riots. Brahimi favored conciliation between the ruling Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and the Islamist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). He was held responsible for the plummeting decline of the economy, and he became increasingly alienated. He charged that the cost of the corruption within the FLN amounted to $26 billion—coincidentally, the size of the foreign debt. This damaged the party's already tarnished image and consequently its performance during elections. Brahimi left the FLN and remains very critical of the Pouvoir—the military-civilian power establishment—and he believes that the military was responsible for the assassination of President Mohamed Boudiaf in June 1992. He remains an outspoken critic of the Algerian political establishment. Brahimi is the author of *Stratégies de développement pour l'Algerie: 1962–1991* (1992; Development strategies for Algeria) and *Justice sociale et développement en économie islamique* (1993; Transsocial justice and development in an Islamic economy).

See also Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).

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Phillip C. Naylor

BRENNER, YOSEF HAYYIM

[1881–1921]

Hebrew and Yiddish writer and editor.

Born in Novi Mlini (Ukraine), Yosef Hayyim Brenner's conversion to secular Zionism was accelerated by service in the Russian army (1901–1904) and exile to London and Lemberg. Editing, writing, translating, teaching and preaching socialism and

the virtues of labor, he was recognized as one of the leading literary pioneers of the Second Aliyah. A contributor to the main Hebrew journals of the time, *ha-Poʿel ha-Tzaʿir* and *ha-Ahdut,* Brenner also published the *Revivim* and *ha-Adamah* periodicals and cofounded the Histadrut in 1920. He was murdered by Arab rioters in Jaffa on 2 May 1921.

Brenner drew stylistic and ideological inspiration from Leo Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, M. J. Berdichevsky, Mendele Mokher Sefarim, and Hebrew writers close to the Hibbat Zion movement, and gave all his fiction a strong existential and autobiographical twist. The novel *Ba-Horef* (In winter, 1902) established Brenner's literary reputation, treating the experiences of a young boy who moved from yeshiva to the city, as Brenner had himself, becoming a secular intellectual. In *Shanah Ahat* (One year, 1908), Brenner wrote about military service, and in *Min ha-Metzar* (Out of the depths, 1908–1909) he dealt with Jewish workers in London. *Aggav Orha* (1909) describes the Second Aliyah, while *Ben Mayim le-Mayim* (Between water and water, 1910) depicts life in the settlements of Eretz Yisrael (mandatory Palestine). Throughout his stories, characters wander in the hope of ameliorating their unhappy destiny: from town to city *(Ba-Horef)*; from eastern to western Europe *(Min ha-Mezar)*; from Diaspora to Eretz Yisrael *(Aggav Orha, Azzabim)*; and within Eretz Yisrael itself. He judged the foremost Hebrew writers—Perez Smolenskin (1910), Yehudah Leib Gordon (1913), Sefarim (1907, 1914)—by the same existential criteria, assessing how successfully they harmonized experience and expression and opposing pompous writing and the literary tendency to glorify life in Eretz Yisrael/Palestine. Brenner sought to capture spoken Hebrew, then in a state of flux and frequently dependent on Yiddish, German, or Russian words and phrases to compensate for words lacking in Hebrew. His existential preoccupations drew mixed reviews from contemporaries and pitched him against Ahad HaʿAm's conception of a revived Jewish culture drawing on the traditions of the Diaspora, traditions deemed irrelevant to the secular Jewish intellectuals and workers of Brenner's generation. Later, critics reappraised the complexity of his characters and his simple style, and Brenner was a role model for many young Israeli writers who preferred his existential approach to the patriotic perspective espoused by many of his peers.

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ANN KAHN
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BREZHNEV, LEONID ILYICH

[1906–1982]

Soviet politician; president of the USSR, 1960–1964 and 1977–1982; premier, 1964–1982.

Son of a Russian metalworker in the Ukraine and a factory worker himself, Brezhnev went on to study land management and reclamation. He joined the Communist Party (CPSU) in 1931 and was appointed secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk (industrial center in Ukraine) regional party committee in 1939. After World War II, Brezhnev became first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Party organization and, subsequently, of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1954, he was promoted to the leadership of the Kazakhstan party organization and placed in charge of Nikita Khrushchev's "virgin land" campaign. Recalled to Moscow in 1956, Brezhnev was appointed Central Committee secretary in charge of heavy industry and capital construction and, in 1957, was graduated to full membership in the Politburo. In 1964, having led the group that ousted Khrushchev, he became secretary-general of the CPSU, remaining in that position until his death in 1982.

In his foreign relations, Brezhnev adhered to many of the policies initiated by Khrushchev while introducing some changes of his own. Thus, he rejected the notion of superpower conflict and insisted that differences between Moscow and Washington be settled by peaceful means. Brezhnev did, however, allocate considerable resources to achieving relative nuclear parity with the United States. In this task he was successful. Like Khrushchev, Brezhnev insisted on superpower competition in developing countries.



Leonid Brezhnev (front left) meets with Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser (front right) in August 1965. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

While Khrushchev distributed Soviet largesse virtually for the asking, however, Brezhnev picked his clients with care. The determining factor was their ability to provide the USSR with tangible benefits (such as naval and air bases) or political advantages in its global competition with the United States. In the Middle East, in particular, the Soviets required naval and air bases to counter the U.S. Sixth Fleet and Polaris submarines. Khrushchev's efforts to obtain the bases failed. Brezhnev succeeded, but only temporarily. Gamal Abdel Nasser's "war of attrition," waged against the Israeli positions along the Suez Canal, led to Israeli deep-penetration raids against Egyptian targets. In desperation, Cairo asked Moscow for help. Brezhnev obliged but on the condition that Soviet naval and air bases be established on Egyptian territory. These important gains, made in 1970, did not last. In 1972, Anwar Sadat ordered the Soviet military advisers and the air force to leave Egypt; the navy followed in 1976. Nevertheless, the USSR had stood by its clients: Moscow backed the Arabs during the wars of 1967 and 1973. In the late 1970s, however, relations with Egypt and Iraq deteriorated sharply. Syria and South Yemen (or the PDRY) remained friendly but, by 1980, the Soviet position in the Middle East had grown much weaker than it had been a decade earlier.

In 1968, upset by the Communist reform movement in Prague, Brezhnev ordered Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. The move was subsequently explained by Moscow's obligation to "protect socialism" in countries where it was being endangered by "anti-Communist elements." This Brezhnev Doctrine was invoked only once in the Middle East: In 1979, Soviet troops crossed into Afghanistan to back its Communist regime against powerful antigovernment rebels *(mujahidin).* A quick victory did not materialize and, by 1982, Soviet forces were bogged down in a stalemated conflict with the anti-Communist opposition, finally withdrawing in 1989.

See also KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA S.; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; SADAT, ANWAR AL-.

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OLES M. SMOLANSKY

BRICHAH

Underground movement, both organized and spontaneous, of Jewish Holocaust survivors fleeing Eastern Europe for Palestine.

Functioning from about 1944 through 1948, the Brichah (Hebrew for flight) organization was officially established in Lublin, Poland, in January 1945, under the leadership of Abba Kovner. Among the founders were Jewish resistance fighters, partisans, and Zionist underground groups, all of whom had had previous experience in smuggling Jews across hostile borders in Nazi-occupied Europe during the Holocaust. The key transit points were Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Italy, and U.S. army–controlled zones in Germany and Austria.

The height of Brichah activity was in 1945 and 1946, when about 180,000 Jews fled or migrated. In 1946 the USSR closed its borders; in early 1947 Poland halted its lenient policy of allowing Jews to cross freely; in April 1947 the U.S. army declared that it was no longer accepting Jews in D.P. (displaced persons) camps. By 1948 Brichah activity was winding down, although some crossing points remained on the borders of Eastern Europe.

From 1944 through 1948, Brichah helped approximately 200,000 Jews to flee Eastern Europe.

The organization's ideology was Zionism, and its importance lay not only in helping these Holocaust survivors flee lands of persecution, but, by bringing masses of Jews to Palestine, it also played a key role in the establishment of the State of Israel.

See also Holocaust; Israel; Kovner, Abba; Zionism.

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Ann Kahn

BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST FROM 1914 TO THE PRESENT

Britain's short-lived Middle East empire was a product of economic interests and strategic imperatives.

British involvement in the region long antedated World War I, but Britain's "moment" in the Middle East, as it has been called—the period in which it was the dominant power in much of the area—lasted from 1914 to 1956. The axis of Britain's Middle Eastern empire stretched from the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf. At its height between the two world wars, Britain's supremacy was almost unchallenged either by other powers or by indigenous forces. Yet after 1945, British dominance quickly crumbled, leaving few relics of any kind.

The initial impetus toward deeper British involvement in the Middle East arose from the entry of the Ottoman Empire into World War I on the side of the Central Powers at the end of October 1914. The British did not seek conflict with the Turks, seeing it as a diversion from the primary task of defeating Germany; they nevertheless moved quickly both to confront Turkey in the battlefield and to plan postwar dispensation in the Middle East. The "Eastern question" in its traditional form terminated abruptly, and a new phase began in which the Allied powers struggled over the postwar partition of the Ottoman Empire among themselves.

WWI and British Entry in the Region

The British cabinet decided on 2 November that "after what had happened we ought to take a vigorous offensive." In a public speech at Guildhall in London on 9 November, the prime minister, H. H. Asquith, declared: "It is the Ottoman government, and not we who have rung the death knell of Ottoman dominion not only in Europe but in Asia." The next month Britain severed the formal constitutional link between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, declared a protectorate over the country, deposed the anti-British Khedive Abbas Hilmi II, and installed a successor, Husayn Kamil, as sultan.

Despite misgivings in the High Command, which favored concentration of Britain's limited military resources on the western front against Germany, an onslaught against the Ottoman Empire was launched on three fronts: at the Dardanelles, in Mesopotamia, and on the border between Egypt and Palestine; Russian forces, meanwhile, engaged Turkey from the north.

The attack on the Straits resulted in one of the great catastrophes of British military history. An initial naval attempt to force the Dardanelles was easily repulsed. Subsequent landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula by British and empire troops gained no significant military objective and led to a bloodbath. Turkish forces led by Mustafa Kemal (later known as Atatürk) repelled the invaders, causing many casualties. The reputation of Winston Churchill, then first lord of the admiralty, who had been the chief political patron of the operation, was damaged.

In Mesopotamia, too, the British were humiliated. An army was dispatched from India to invade the country, from the Persian Gulf. But in April 1916 General Charles Townshend's Sixth Division was forced to surrender at Kut al-Amara. The British nevertheless brought in new forces, which advanced to conquer Baghdad by March 1917.

On the Egypt–Palestine front, Turkish raids on the Suez Canal led to British occupation of the Sinai Peninsula. Thereafter, a stalemate developed, partly because of lackluster leadership but mainly because of British inability to commit large forces to a front that was regarded as peripheral to the outcome of the war. In 1917, however, the advance resumed under General Edmund Henry Allenby who entered Jerusalem in triumph in December 1917. He moved on the following autumn to win the battle of

After a single day's fighting in December 1917, Jerusalem fell to British forces under the command of General Edmund Allenby. Subsequent Turkish counterattacks failed to recapture the city, and its loss represented a serious blow to Ottoman pride. **© Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

Megiddo and to conquer Syria. This was the last great cavalry victory in the history of warfare. By the time of the Turkish armistice on 30 October 1918, British forces were thus in control of most of the Fertile Crescent.

Meanwhile, the British had sponsored and financed a revolt of tribesmen in the Arabian Peninsula against their Ottoman Turkish overlords. Organized by a Cairo-based group of British Middle East experts known as the Arab Bureau, the revolt began in June 1916. It engaged, in particular, the followers of the Hashimite ruler of the Hijaz, Sharif of Mecca (Husayn ibn Ali), and his sons. Among the British officers who advised the rebels was T. E. Lawrence, who fought with bands of Arab guerrillas against targets in Arabia. They blew up Turkish installations along the Hijaz Railroad, captured Aqaba in 1917, and harassed the enemy on the eastern flank of Allenby's army as it advanced north toward Damascus. In recognition of their efforts, and as a sop to Arab nationalist feeling, Allenby stage-managed the capture of Damascus on 1 October 1918, allowing the Arab army to enter the city in triumph, though the victory had been chiefly the work of Australian cavalry commanded by General Sir Harry Chauvel.

The parade fitted into larger British schemes. During the war, the British had given benevolent but unspecific encouragement to Hashimite aspirations toward the creation of a unified Arab state under their leadership. Later Arab claims made much of alleged promises made in correspondence in

1915–1916 between the British high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, and Sharif Husayn, though the exchanges were vague and inconclusive on both sides and never resulted in a formal treaty.

Carving Up the Ottoman Empire

Britain entered into more specific obligations to other allies. In April 1915, it signed a secret treaty promising Constantinople to Russia, thus explicitly jettisoning Britain's long-standing reservations about Russian control of the Straits. (In fact, British governments since the time of Lord Salisbury at the turn of the century had resigned themselves to eventual Russian control of Constantinople.) At the same time, as part of the price of persuading Italy to enter the war on the Allied side, Britain agreed in the Treaty of London that, in a postwar carve-up of the Ottoman dominions, Italy would receive southwest Anatolia. Under an agreement negotiated in 1916 between Sir Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot, Britain promised France most of Syria, Cilicia, and the oil-bearing region around Mosul in northern Mesopotamia. Most fraught with evil consequence for the British was the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 in which Britain undertook to facilitate the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine—with provisos protecting the "civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities" and the rights of Jews in other countries. All of these engagements were designed to serve urgent wartime objectives rather than long-term interests.

These overlapping (many said conflicting) claims came home to roost at the Paris Peace Settlements in 1919, at which all parties presented their claims. Both the Zionists and the Arabs were represented by pro-British leaders: the Zionists by Chaim Weizmann, the Arabs by a Hijazi delegation headed by Amir Faisal (Faisal I ibn Hussein). T. E. Lawrence acted at the conference as adviser to Amir Faisal, who conformed to British desires in all matters—even to the extent of making friendly gestures toward Zionism. The French, however, proved less amenable. They spoke darkly of "a new Fashoda" and vigorously asserted their territorial demands in the Levant and Anatolia.

In large measure, Britain, as the power in possession, was able to impose its own design on the region. Its forces, commanded by Allenby, were in occupation of the Fertile Crescent and Egypt. Although Allenby's army included French, Italian, and other national units, these were too weak to form a counterweight to British military might. The Bolshevists had in the meantime published the text of the Constantinople convention and renounced their predecessors' claim to the city. The implosion of Russian power and the outbreak of the Russian civil war eliminated Britain's great historic fear of Russian movement south toward the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and India.

British solider and author T. E. Lawrence joined the British Expeditionary Force with the rank of major in 1917, and helped to coordinate the Arab revolt against the Turks. Better known as Lawrence of Arabia, he made friends with the Arabs, learned their language, wore their clothing, and ate their food. **© Library of Congress. Reproduced by permisison.**

Postwar Consolidation of British Influence

Overwhelming military power also enabled the British to dispose of indigenous challenges to their

authority. Rebellion in Egypt in 1919 was repressed by Allenby with a dexterous mixture of force and diplomacy. Revolt in Iraq in 1920 was put down by General Arnold T. Wilson with an iron fist. Riots in Palestine in April 1920 and May 1921 were suppressed, in the latter case by bombarding villages from the air, and succeeded by political concessions.

The Paris Peace Conference did not, in fact, achieve a resolution of territorial issues in the Middle East. In August 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres, by which Turkey gave up all its non-Arab provinces as well as parts of Anatolia, was signed by the Allied powers and representatives of the Ottoman government, which by this time was little more than a diplomatic ghost. Simultaneous secret agreements among the Allies provided for an additional carve-up of much of what remained of Turkish Anatolia. The treaty never came into effect. As a result of the Kemalist revolt, it was disavowed by the Turks and fell into abeyance.

Following the peace conference, France continued to squabble with Britain over a division of the Middle East spoils. The British conceded control of Syria and Lebanon to their erstwhile ally. They were dismayed, however, when the French, in July 1920, unceremoniously ejected Faisal from Damascus, where his enthusiastic supporters had proclaimed him king of Syria. Faisal arrived in British-controlled Palestine as a refugee with a large entourage. A harried British governor of Haifa complained that they were "in and out like a swarm of bees" and warned that "they cannot stay here indefinitely." There was no disposition, however, on the part of his British patrons to seek to reinstall Faisal in Damascus. As a kind of consolation prize, the British arranged for his "election" by cooperative Mesopotamian notables as king of Iraq.

The British successfully resisted broader French territorial aspirations. The northern oil-bearing region of Mesopotamia, inhabited mainly by Kurds, was assigned to British-controlled Iraq. This departure from the wartime agreement had been informally agreed to at a meeting of the British prime minister, David Lloyd George, and the French prime minister, Georges Clemenceau, in November 1918, but the French continued for some time to grumble about the arrangement. French aspirations to a role in Palestine, where they saw themselves as historic protectors of Christian interests, were thrust aside by the British.

Meanwhile, in Transjordan, Faisal's brother, Abdullah I ibn Hussein, had suddenly appeared in October 1920 at the head of a motley army, threatening to attack the French in Syria and to reclaim his brother's "kingdom" there. The British government saw little advantage in taking over the unfertile hollow of the Fertile Crescent. On the other hand, they could not permit Abdullah to drag them into a war with the French. The foreign secretary, Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, reluctantly sanctioned the dispatch of some British officers to the territory, ostensibly to prevent its "relapse into anarchy"—in reality to restrain Abdullah from adventures against the French.

In March 1921, Churchill, then colonial secretary, convened a conference in Cairo of British officials in the region. This meeting set out broad lines of British administration in the Middle East that were to endure for the next decade. Under this arrangement, Abdullah was established as amir of Transjordan; the territory was to form part of the British mandate over Palestine without, however, being open to Jewish settlement. While Abdullah formally ruled the country, the British resident and a small number of other officials discreetly steered policy in directions compatible with British interests.

Reduction of Military Presence

Having established their paramountcy, the British rapidly reduced their military establishment in the Middle East. In the early 1920s, the conservative press in Britain, particularly newspapers owned by Lords Northcliffe and Beaverbrook, agitated against large military expenditures in the region and called for a British exit from recent acquisitions there. In a general climate of demobilization and budget cutting, the government felt obliged to withdraw the bulk of its troops. Henceforth, except in times of crisis, the British did not maintain a large standing army in any part of the Middle East except at the strategically vital Suez.

For the rest of the period between the wars, the British maintained security in the Middle East mainly with locally recruited forces financed by locally collected revenues. Riots, disturbances, and

other challenges to British authority were suppressed by the new tactic of aerial bombardment, demonstrative shows of strength, and limited political concessions.

In the age of Gordon and Kitchener, Middle East empire building had a jingoistic tinge, but after 1914 this tendency disappeared. Unlike other parts of the empire—notably, regions of white settlement—Middle East imperialism had no significant popular constituency in Britain. (France, where there was a strong pressure group on behalf of Roman Catholic interests in Syria, was very different.)

At the same time, the legend of Lawrence of Arabia, stimulated first by public lantern shows in Britain and America and later by T. E. Lawrence's writings on the Arab revolt, encouraged the growth of public interest in Arabia. Although the Arab revolt had only minor military significance, it formed the basis of myth and countermyth. The myth was of a natural affinity between the British Empire and Arab desert warriors. The countermyth was of the betrayal of Arab nationalism by duplicitous British diplomacy. Both myths exercised a powerful subliminal influence on Anglo–Arab attitudes over the next generation. The Arab vogue was further encouraged by the writings of Middle Eastern explorers, travelers, and administrators, such as Freya Stark, Gertrude Bell, and Ronald Storrs. The great Victorian classics of Arabian exploration by writers such as Charles Doughty and Richard Francis Burton were revived and achieved a certain réclame.

The official mind of British imperialism, however, was shaped less by sentimental considerations than by hardheaded, realistic calculation of national interest. More than anything, official thinking was predicated on concern about India—specifically, about the security of routes to the subcontinent and the Far East and the possible effects of Middle East developments on internal security in India. With the growth of aviation as well as sea traffic, the need for a string of secure air bases was seen as vital. Indian priorities also lay behind British officials' anxiety about the inflammatory threat, as they saw it, of growing pan-Islamic feeling on the large Muslim minority in India. As it turned out, such fears proved exaggerated: Indian Muslims were not greatly preoccupied by Middle Eastern concerns.

Horatio Herbert Kitchener had a highly successful military career. Among his duties, he was sirdar (or commander) of the Anglo/Egyptian army in 1892, involved in the 1898 battle of Omdurman and Fashoda incident; governor-general of the Sudan in 1899; and commander in chief of British Forces in South Africa from 1900 to 1902. **© HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

The resurgence of Turkey under Atatürk caused some anxiety in Britain and led to a momentary crisis at Chanak (near Constantinople) in the autumn of 1922. As the revived Turkish army advanced on Constantinople, British and French forces, in occupation of the city, prepared to resist. Lloyd George, who had given encouragement to the disastrous Greek invasion of Anatolia, was at first inclined to order British forces to stand and fight. But there was no enthusiasm in Britain for such a war. The episode led to the withdrawal of Conservative support for Lloyd George and his fall from power. With the evacuation of British and French forces

from Constantinople, the crisis passed. The new Turkish regime signed the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, giving up any claim to the Ottoman Empire's former Arab provinces—but holding on to the Turkish, Kurdish, and former Armenian regions of Anatolia.

With the settlement in 1923 of differences over the border between Palestine and Syria, British diplomatic conflict with the French diminished. Disputes with the United States over oil concessions were settled in 1925 with a division of interests in the northern Iraqi petroleum industry. For the next decade, Britain could control the region without worrying about any significant great-power competitor.

British policymaking in the Middle East was not centralized in any one government department. The foreign, colonial, India, and war offices all held responsibility at certain periods for different parts of the region. Broadly speaking, the foreign office was responsible for Egypt, the India office for the Persian Gulf, and the colonial office (from 1921) for the mandates in Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. Each of these departments refracted its specific angle of vision and concerns in its formulation of policy. Aden, for example, whose importance to Britain was primarily as a coaling station for ships en route to India, was ruled until 1932 directly from Bombay; after that, responsibility was taken over by the central government in Delhi, and, beginning in 1937, Aden became a crown colony. In some cases, diffusion of responsibility led to conflict between departments: Palestine, over which the colonial and foreign offices clashed repeatedly, was a case in point.

Indirect Rule and "Benevolent Paternalism"

Britain's favored method of rule in the Middle East was indirect and inexpensive: this was a limited liability empire. The model was not India but Egypt, where British advisers had guided government policy since the start of the British occupation. Hardly anywhere did direct rule by a British administration survive intact until after World War II. Typical of British attitudes throughout the region during the period was the comment of the colonial secretary, Lord Cranborne, in 1942: "We not only disclaim any intention of establishing direct rule, but also quite sincerely and genuinely do not wish to do so." Warning against direct British administration of the tribal hinterland of Aden colony, Cranborne added: "We must keep steadily in front of us the aim of establishing in Aden protectorate a group of efficient Arab authorities who will conduct their own administration under the general guidance and protection of His Majesty's government." The characteristic tone of British governance was set by Sir Percy Cox in Iraq and by Allenby in Egypt: benevolent paternalism in time of peace; readiness to resort to brute force in reaction to civil unrest.

The British did not believe in large public investment in this new empire. They nevertheless greatly improved the primitive economic infrastructure bequeathed them by their Ottoman predecessors, established sound public finances, built solid judicial and (though slowly) educational systems, rooted out corruption, and protected minorities. Efficient government was not the primary purpose of imperial rule, but the British installed it almost by reflex.

The mandatory system in Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq was a constitutional innovation. Formally, the British ruled these territories not as a colonial power but under the ultimate authority of the League of Nations. Mandatory government was to last for a limited period with the specific goal of preparing the countries for self-rule. All this, in the eyes of most observers, was merely a fig leaf to cover the nakedness of imperial acquisition. Although Britain was ultimately responsible to the league for its conduct of affairs in the mandated territories and was obliged to render account annually of its administration, the league exercised little influence over policy. In effect, Britain ruled the mandated territories as if they were colonies, though here too they sought to establish limited local self-government.

As in other parts of the empire, British power ultimately rested on a collaborative equation with local elements. Its exact form varied depending on local contingencies. In some places, the British practiced a variant of the politics of notables inherited from the Ottomans. In others, they established mutually beneficial alliances with minorities—as with the Jews in Palestine for a time. Elsewhere, they combined these policies with patronage of dynastic rulers, particularly with the family of Sharif Husayn.

Britain's patronage of the Hashimites was dealt a blow in 1925 when Sharif Husayn was driven out of the Hijaz by the resurgent Wahhabi army of Ibn Saʿud, ruler of Najd. Husayn escaped in a British ship bound for Cyprus. Although Ibn Saʿud had been granted a British subsidy in 1916, he had not joined in the Arab revolt and had remained jealous of his Hashimite neighbor. Compelled to accept realities, the British quickly came to terms with Ibn Saʿud. In 1927, they signed a treaty with him that recognized his sovereignty over the Hijaz and, as a result, his leading position among native rulers in the Arabian Peninsula.

Although Ibn Saʿud employed a freelance British adviser, Harry St. John Bridger Philby, a convert to Islam, the Saudi regime's relations with Britain were never intimate. In the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which Ibn Saʿud proclaimed in 1932, U.S. rather than British companies were favored in the scramble for oil concessions. At the time, this seemed of minor importance; later, when vast oil reserves were discovered, the British regretted the failure. Oil production on a large scale, however, did not begin in the country until after World War II.

Until the late 1930s, the limited liability system survived more or less intact. The independence granted to Egypt in 1922 and Iraq in 1932 did not fundamentally affect Britain's paramountcy. In each case, Britain retained effective control over vital strategic and economic interests. The continuation of this "veiled protectorate," as it became known in the Egyptian case, exacerbated nationalist frustrations and resentments, but these posed no imminent threat to Britain. Independence in Iraq was followed by the mass killing of members of the Nestorian Christian community, known as Assyrians. Thousands fled overseas. Like other minorities, they had looked to the British for protection; the failure to assure their security left a dark stain on Britain's imperial record in the country.

Increasing Threats to British Control

From 1936 onward, Britain's dominance in the Middle East was increasingly threatened from within and without. Mussolini's determination to create an Italian empire around the Mediterranean and the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935 posed a sudden danger to Britain. The powerful Italian broadcasting station on the island of Bari began broadcasting anti-British propaganda to the Middle East. The Italian dictator wooed Ibn Saʿud and other Middle Eastern rulers and gave covert support to anti-British elements in the region, including the anti-British leader of the Palestine Arab nationalist movement, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. The Palestine Arab Revolt between 1936 and 1939 tied down large numbers of British troops at a time when, with the Nazi threat looming in Europe, the British could ill afford such a diversion.

Conscious of their limited resources, particularly of military manpower, the British faced unpalatable policymaking dilemmas in the final months of the peace and felt compelled to subordinate all other considerations to the imperatives of imperial security: hence, the White Papers on Palestine of May 1939, which reversed the Balfour Declaration policy of support for a national home for the Jewish people and restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine at a time of mounting danger to Jews in Europe.

World War II

During World War II, the Middle East played a vital part in British strategic calculations. As prime minister from May 1940, Churchill placed a high priority on bolstering British power in the region. At a critical phase in the war, he insisted on dispatching large numbers of tanks and men to reinforce British forces confronting the Italians, and later the Germans, on the border between Egypt and Libya.

The British could no longer afford the luxury of a piecemeal bureaucratic approach to the Middle East. Economic planning and supply questions for the entire region were coordinated by the Middle East Supply Center in Cairo. A British minister resident was sent to Cairo to take charge of overall policy making. (One incumbent, Lord Moyne, a close friend of Churchill, was murdered in November 1944 by Zionist terrorists as a protest against British policy in Palestine.)

After Italian entry into the war in June 1940, the danger of attack in the Mediterranean precluded use of the Suez Canal by British ships carrying supplies to and from India and the Far East. Ships carrying reinforcements to British forces in Egypt had to take the Cape of Good Hope route before passing through the canal from south to north.

Except in Egypt, where they built up their forces to confront the Italians and later the Germans, the British could not afford to maintain more than a thin crust of military control in most of the region during the war. Yet by a mixture of diplomacy, guile, and occasional demonstrative concentrations of force, they succeeded in averting serious challenge from nationalist opponents. The two most dangerous threats came in Iraq and Egypt. A pro-Axis coup erupted in Iraq in April 1941, headed by Rashid Ali al-Kaylani, aided by Italian and Nazi agents and by the ex-mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. With pro-Vichy forces in control of Syria and Lebanon, British power throughout the Fertile Crescent seemed for a moment on the verge of toppling. But in May, a small British force from the Habbaniya air base moved into Baghdad. Al-Kaylani and the ex-mufti fled to Germany where they devoted themselves to anti-British propaganda. The following month, British and Free French forces, operating from Palestine, advanced into Syria and Lebanon and installed new French administrations sympathetic to the Allied cause.

The other threat appeared in Egypt, where nationalist elements, particularly in the Egyptian army, were impressed by Axis military successes and sought to take advantage of Britain's moment of weakness. The British reacted firmly. In February 1942, British tanks surrounded the royal palace as a weeping King Farouk was forced by ultimatum to appoint a prime minister acceptable to the British, Mustafa al-Nahhas, head of the Wafd party. From the British point of view, the Abdin palace coup, as the episode became known, gave a salutary demonstration of British resolve at a time of acute military pressure from the Germans in the western desert.

The battle in the western desert swung to and fro. In the initial phase, between June 1940 and February 1941, a British army under General Archibald Wavell beat back an offensive by Italian forces under Marshal Rodolfo Graziani and advanced into Cyrenaica. In the spring of 1941, however, Axis forces were bolstered by the arrival of the German Afrika Korps commanded by General Erwin Rommel, a brilliant strategist. The tide was reversed: the British were routed from Libya, and the British garrison at Tobruk was besieged and captured. By mid-1942, the Germans had advanced deep into Egypt. Government departments in Cairo began burning secret documents, and emergency evacuation plans were prepared.

In November 1942, the critical battle of the campaign was fought against Rommel at al-Alamayn by the British Eighth Army under General Bernard Montgomery. Months of careful planning coupled with imaginative mobile tactics, intelligent exploitation of ultra signals intelligence, as well as British superiority in numbers of men and machines, brought a decisive victory. This was, in Churchill's phrase, "the end of the beginning." Thereafter, the British strategic position in the region eased. Almost simultaneously in Morocco and Algeria, Operation Torch, the landing of U.S. and British forces commanded by General Eisenhower, had opened a new front against the Axis. By May 1943, the Germans and Italians had been cleared out of northern Africa.

Churchill's preoccupation with the Mediterranean led him up some blind alleys. He tried repeatedly to draw Turkey into the war on the Allied side but without success. Turkey remained neutral until early 1945, when it declared war on Germany at the last moment in order to qualify for membership in the United Nations (UN). The United States opposed Churchill's Mediterranean strategy both on military grounds and because the United States did not wish to give the appearance of propping up British imperial interests. Ibn Saʿud, too, remained neutral until the last moment, though he received handsome subsidies from the British and the United States and made some gestures of support for the Allied cause.

Britain did not seek territorial acquisition in the Middle East in World War II. It nevertheless found itself drawn into new responsibilities. Following the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, Britain joined the USSR in occupying Iran. Arms and other supplies to the Soviet Union were sent by rail through Iran. With the expulsion of the last Axis forces from Libya in 1943, that country was placed under military administration—French in the Fezzan and British in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. British forces also occupied the former Italian possessions of Eritrea, Abyssinia, and Italian Somaliland. Abyssinia was restored to its indigenous imperial ruler. Eritrea remained under British rule until 1952 when it was annexed by Abyssinia. Italian

Somaliland was returned to Italy as a UN trusteeship in 1950. Libya became independent in December 1951, though Britain was granted the right under the Anglo–Libyan Alliance Treaty of 1953 to maintain military installations there.

During the war, large reserves of oil in the Arabian Peninsula had come onstream. Because of the closure of the Mediterranean to British commercial shipping, British use of Middle East oil during the war was mainly restricted to the area east of the Suez. Elsewhere, Britain mainly relied on imports from the Americas. After the war, the balance changed. Over the next three decades, Britain became steadily more dependent on oil imports from the Middle East, especially Kuwait.

Postwar Loss of Empire and the Cold War

In the later stages of the war, the British government, seeing the nationalist mood in many Arab countries, tried to move toward a new relationship with the Arabs. Following a speech by the British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, in which he indicated British sympathy for the idea of Arab unity, a conference of Arab states at Alexandria in October 1944 approved the foundation of the League of Arab States. The effort to ride the tiger, however, had only limited success; the British soon found that Arab nationalism turned strongly against them.

During the war, the Soviet Union had cautiously raised its diplomatic profile in the Middle East. After 1945, the region became a secondary arena of great-power conflict in the Cold War. In 1945 and 1946, the USSR signaled its newly aggressive posture by attempting to establish pro-Soviet administrations in northern Iran. Eventually British and American, as well as Russian, forces withdrew from Iran and a pro-Western regime was consolidated under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Elsewhere, Soviet influence was exercised by propaganda and subversion rather than direct military intervention. Although Communist parties remained weak in the region, Soviet sponsorship of Arab nationalist movements posed a growing threat to Western interests in general and the British in particular.

The end of British rule in India in 1947 lessened the strategic argument for a major British military commitment in the Middle East. But oil—both investments and supply—and the security of the Suez Canal remained central British concerns. British policy now faced acute difficulties in the Middle East: on the one hand, Britain retained vital interests there; on the other, its postwar economic debilitation left it unable to muster the military forces required to meet any serious challenge to control those interests.

As a result, Britain was increasingly overshadowed by the United States in the Middle East. Under the Truman Doctrine, enunciated in 1947, the United States replaced Britain as the main provider of military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey. The United States had already begun edging the British out of monopolistic control of oil concessions. Now, the United States became the dominant external diplomatic power, particularly in Saudi Arabia. It established a large air base in Saudi Arabia, built the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, and became the major external source of arms and other aid. Saudi relations with Britain were meanwhile clouded by the Buraymi Oasis Dispute (claimed by Abu Dhabi and Oman, which were both under British protection). The dispute flared into military conflict in 1952 and again in 1955; it led to a breach in Anglo–Saudi diplomatic relations between 1956 and 1963.

Palestine. British military and political weakness was damagingly demonstrated to the world by the collapse of the British mandate in Palestine. In spite of the presence of substantial British forces and the experience gained in crushing Arab insurgency between 1936 and 1939, the mandatory government proved unable to assert its authority in the face of a revolt by the half million Jews in the country.

The international ramifications of the Palestine conflict created serious difficulties for the British between 1945 and 1948. In the British-occupied zones of Germany and Austria, the military authorities were faced with growing numbers of Jewish displaced persons, the majority of whom demanded to be allowed to proceed to Palestine. In the United States, on which Britain depended for economic aid, the assertive and electorally significant Jewish community pressed Congress and President Harry Truman to secure a pro-Zionist outcome in Palestine. Meanwhile, British diplomats

throughout the Arab Middle East reported that the Palestine question had become a central mobilizing issue for Arab nationalists and anti-British agitators.

Although the colonial office remained formally responsible for Palestine, these international complications led the foreign office to take effective control of British policymaking on the issue after 1945. The Labour Government's foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, adopted an anti-Zionist position, which at times tipped over the edge into antisemitism; his undiplomatic outspokenness secured applause from frustrated officials but was bitterly resented by many Jews. In the final stages of the crisis (1947–1948), the British publicly washed their hands of the matter, professing to leave it to the decision of the United Nations. Yet, following the decision of the UN General Assembly on 29 November 1947 to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, the British barely cooperated in implementing the decision. Privately, Bevin encouraged the government of Transjordan to reach a modus vivendi with the Zionists on the basis of a different kind of partition, one in which the Transjordanians would take over the Arab-inhabited hill regions of the country and coexist with a Jewish state in the rest of Palestine. In the end this was, broadly speaking, the outcome.

The Arab–Israeli War, which lasted from 1947 to 1949, tightened the British connection with Transjordan. Although the country had been granted independence in 1946, it remained under British tutelage. In March 1948, an alliance treaty was concluded in which the two countries promised each other military assistance and Transjordan agreed to the stationing of British forces in the country "until such a time . . . that the state of the world renders such measures unnecessary." Britain was the only country in the world to recognize the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank.

The Zionists' feat in driving the British out of Palestine in 1948 depressed British prestige throughout the region. The British government after 1945 made strenuous efforts to dissociate itself from Zionism; Arab nationalists for the next generation nevertheless attributed the creation of Israel in large measure to Britain's earlier support of a national home for the Jewish people.

British Influence in Decline

After Palestine, the second significant test of British political will in the Middle East came in Iran. In 1951, the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company, in which the British government owned 51 percent of the shares, was nationalized by legislation in the Iranian parliament. A nationalist government, headed by Mohammad Mossadegh, defied British attempts to secure a reversal of the nationalization. With the support of major international oil companies, the British government organized a boycott of Iranian oil. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken. The departure of foreign oil exports led to closure of the Abadan oil refinery. As the oil companies refused to process, ship, or purchase Iranian oil, the entire petroleum industry in the country ground to a halt. At the height of the crisis in 1953, the Shah, who strongly opposed Mossadegh, fled the country.

Meanwhile, in November 1952, the British had approached the United States about the possibility of organizing a joint covert operation to protect western interests in Iran. Shortly afterward, an Iranian army coup, engineered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency with British help, overthrew Mossadegh and brought about the return of the Shah. The Iranian oil industry was reorganized: The British granted formal recognition of Iranian ownership of the oil industry in exchange for the lease of its operations to a multinational consortium. The British share in this consortium was reduced to under a half, with the remainder held mainly by U.S. companies.

Of even greater concern to British governments was the deterioration of the British position in Egypt. Egyptian nationalists, chafing under what was seen as continued behind-the-scenes British influence, demanded the renegotiation of the Anglo–Egyptian treaty of 1936 and the closing of British bases. There was also conflict with Britain over the Sudan, which was ruled by Britain though it was formally an Anglo–Egyptian condominium; the Egyptian government now sought to annex the country to Egypt. In January 1952, anti-British riots broke out in Egypt and paved the way for the revolution of July 1952 in which a group of military officers, headed by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, seized power, deposed the king, and declared a republic.

The British now began to consider moving the center of gravity of their Middle East operations to a more secure point. A first step was the decision in December 1952 to move the Middle East headquarters of the British armed forces from Egypt to Cyprus.

In the hope of constructing a bulwark against Soviet subversion and of limiting the growth of anti-Western influences in the region, Britain and the United States had proposed in October 1951 the creation of the Middle East Defense Organization. Turkey, which was concerned about Soviet pressure for a new regime at the Straits, expressed willingness to join such an alliance; but Egypt rejected it, and no other Middle Eastern state expressed interest, whereupon the scheme was abandoned.

Other such proposals met similar fates. The Baghdad Pact of 1955 represented a final attempt by the western powers, with the United States by this time playing the leading role, to create a regional framework under their auspices. The core of the scheme was a multilateral military aid treaty signed by Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, with the United States acting as an interested outside party. No Arab state apart from Iraq could be induced to join the pact, and Egypt, in particular, opposed it vigorously. The failure to attract Arab members was seen as a further sign of the decline of British authority in the region.

In Jordan, the young King Hussein ibn Talal, educated at Harrow and Sandhurst, became the most pro-British of postwar Middle East rulers. His cultural formation was as much British as Arab; he maintained a home in Britain and was the one Arab ruler who was a popular public figure in Britain (his second wife was British). Such personal predilections, however, could not overcome the larger forces shaping events. Hussein, whose long career was marked by frequent shifts of policy consummated with supreme maneuvering skill, found himself compelled to bend to the anti-British wind. In March 1956, responding to external and internal political pressures, he dismissed the British commander of his army, Sir John Bagot Glubb. Since the formation of the Transjordanian emirate in 1921, the state's army, the Arab Legion, had always been commanded by a British officer. In his ability to reconcile loyalties to the British and to his Arab employer, Glubb had been characteristic of a fading type of British officer in the Middle East. While commanding the Arab Legion he had routinely supplied the British government with secret copies of Jordan's war plans. The dismissal of "Glubb Pasha" was generally regarded as the end of an era and a telling sign of the decline of British influence.

The Suez Canal

The supreme crisis of British power in the Middle East came later that year, appropriately at the focal point of Britain's interests in the region and the reason d'être of its presence there—the Suez Canal. In spite of its gradually diminishing economic position relative to other powers, Britain remained the world's foremost shipping nation, and the British merchant fleet was by far the largest user of the canal. With the growth of motor transport and the switch from coal to oil as the main industrial fuel, Britain had become overwhelmingly reliant on the importation of Middle East oil carried through the canal in tankers. Pressure from the Egyptian government for a British evacuation of the Suez Canal zone, therefore, encountered stiff resistance.

In October 1954, Britain had promised to withdraw all its force from the canal zone by mid-1956. The agreement, however, was hedged with several provisos reminiscent of the veiled protectorate, among them a stipulation that Egypt continue to offer Britain "such facilities as may be necessary to place the Base [in the canal zone] on a war footing and to operate it effectively" if any outside power attacked a member of the Arab League or Turkey. In November 1955, British troops withdrew from the Sudan as the country moved toward full independence in January 1956. The following July, in accordance with the 1954 agreement, Britain withdrew the last of its troops from the canal zone.

Nationalism and the Brink of War. Hardly had the last British soldiers packed their bags, however, than the Egyptian president afforded the British a pretext to return. On 26 July, Nasser, infuriated by the withdrawal of an offer by the United States, Britain, and the World Bank to finance the construction of a new dam at Aswan, announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, which operated the canal. The British *locus standi* in the matter was doubtful. The British government owned a minority stake

in the company, but nationalization in itself was no offense against international law, provided compensation was paid, and the Egyptians insisted that they would continue to operate the canal as before.

The nationalization was, nevertheless, regarded by the British prime minister, Anthony Eden, as an intolerable affront. When diplomacy failed to secure an Egyptian retreat, the British prepared for war. They were joined by France, which had its own reasons for opposing the Nasser regime on account of Egypt's support of Algerian rebels. Israel, which had suffered a series of border incursions from Egypt, was also drawn into military and diplomatic planning. Conspiratorial discussions among representatives of the three countries at a villa in the Paris suburb of Sèvres from 22 to 24 October culminated in a secret treaty. The agreement mapped out a scenario for war with Egypt. Israel would attack first across the Sinai peninsula. The British and French would then enter the conflict, ostensibly to secure the Suez Canal, in fact to destroy Nasser's regime.

The Israelis attacked on 29 October, and the British and French duly issued an ultimatum the next day calling on Israel and Egypt to withdraw to positions 10 miles east and west of the Suez Canal (the Israelis had not yet, in fact, reached the canal). In the absence of Egyptian acquiescence, British and French planes began bombing Egyptian military targets on 31 October. On 5 November, the two powers landed paratroops. The next day, however, British policy went into reverse as a result of U.S. opposition to the invasion and of growing market pressure on sterling. Britain and France were humiliatingly obliged to agree to a cease-fire, and by Christmas they had withdrawn their forces from Egypt.

Britain's collusion with France and Israel in the events leading to the Suez war became the subject of bitter controversy in Britain. The issue is said to have divided the nation more than any foreign-policy question since Munich. The Labour Party, a small part of the Conservative party, some foreign office officials, and most enlightened opinion were hostile to Eden's policy. For the British government, Suez was an unmitigated catastrophe—not least in the severe strains it placed on relations with the United States. Eden resigned a few weeks later, complaining of ill health.

Although Suez is generally regarded as a watershed in British history, heralding a wider imperial withdrawal, Britain continued for another decade to maintain a substantial military presence in the Middle East and to be ready on occasion to use it forcefully in defense of its interests.

Last Vestiges of Empire

The next flashpoint was Jordan. In March 1957, a nationalist government in Jordan abrogated the Anglo–Jordanian Treaty. In July 1958, the Jordanian regime was severely shaken by the revolution in Iraq, in which the Hashimite regime was ousted and the young King Faisal II ibn Ghazi and the pro-British Prime Minister Nuri al-Saʿid were both murdered. British paratroops were sent, at the request of King Hussein, to prevent a similar revolution in Jordan. Two aspects of this intervention, code-named Operation Fortitude, illustrated the changed political environment within which the British, perforce, now operated. First, the cabinet refused to commit British forces until the approval of the U.S. government had been secured. Second, the British requested and received permission from Israel to overfly Israeli territory in order to transport troops from bases on Cyprus. The British force succeeded in bolstering the Hashimite monarchy without firing a shot. The pro-British Jordanian monarchy survived, but Britain lost its bases in Iraq as well as its oil interests there.

In 1961, when Kuwait, hitherto a British protectorate, secured independence, the military regime in Iraq threatened a takeover of the oil-rich principality. As at the time of the intervention in Jordan in 1958, the British made sure that they had U.S. approval before taking military action. Eight thousand British troops were sent to Kuwait and remained there as a deterrent against Iraqi invasion until 1963.

In Aden in the mid-1960s, British forces conducted a miserable campaign against nationalist insurgents supported by Egypt. The British military headquarters at Aden were evacuated in November 1967 when the Federation of South Arabia achieved independence as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Although the writing was on the wall for what remained of British power in the Middle East, there was no complete pullout yet. With the liqui-

dation of the base at Aden, Britain expanded its military presence in Bahrain and other Gulf principalities.

In the crisis prior to the outbreak of the Arab–Israel War of 1967, the British government of Harold Wilson briefly considered participating in the dispatch of an international naval flotilla to assert the right of passage to Israel through the Strait of Tiran, which the Egyptian government had declared closed against Israeli and Israeli-bound ships. But no other country was prepared to join in the effort, and the idea was dropped. Although both Wilson and his foreign secretary, George Brown, were sympathetic to Israel, their attitude was not governed by any pro-Zionist altruism. The British remained vitally interested in free passage through the Suez Canal. Upon the outbreak of war with Israel in June 1967, Nasser closed the canal to all shipping; it did not open again until 1975. The closure severely affected the British balance of payments. The British economy was blown off course, and the government was compelled, against its wish, to devalue sterling in November of that year.

Only in 1968 did the Wilson government abandon pretensions to world-power status by dropping the east-of-Suez defense policy. In March 1970, the revolutionary government in Libya, headed by Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi who had attended an officers' training school in Britain, ejected the British from their bases in the country. British forces withdrew from Bahrain in 1971, but retained naval facilities there. Also in 1971, British forces left Abu Dhabi, whereupon the seven Trucial Coast shaykhdoms formed the federation of the United Arab Emirates. The British retained troops in Oman, where they helped suppress a leftist rebellion in the Dhufar region. Although British forces were formally withdrawn in 1976, many senior British officers remained on individual contracts as commanders of the Omani army. Only in 1984 was the British commander in chief of the country's armed forces replaced by an Omani. After that, the sole remaining permanent British military presence in the Middle East was in the sovereign bases on Cyprus.

With the elimination of its military power in the region, Britain found itself relegated to a secondary role in Middle Eastern politics. More and more, Britain was buffeted and unable to deflect ill political and economic winds blowing from the Middle East.

Militant Leila Khaled was one of the two hijackers who placed a time bomb on an American TWA plane and damaged the jet in Damascus, Syria, on 29 August 1969. Pictured with a machine gun, she rejoined her guerrilla unit in Amman, Jordan.
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Oil, Terrorism, and the British Economy

During the 1970s, the exploits of Palestinian Arab terrorists and the anti-Western rhetoric of Middle East leaders like Qaddafi evoked some admiration on the radical left of the political spectrum in Britain as elsewhere in Europe. Episodes such as the hijacking by Palestinian terrorists of two planes to a desert aerodrome in Jordan—the episode that occasioned the Black September conflict between the Jordanian government and the Palestine Liberation organization in 1970—riveted television audiences in Britain. In that instance, the government of Prime Minister Edward Heath decided to give way to terrorist demands and released an imprisoned Palestinian, Leila Khaled, who became a folk hero of the revolutionary left.

The Arab–Israel War of 1973 and the ensuing international energy crisis had dramatic and damaging effects on the British economy. The sudden huge increase in the price of oil and the restriction of supply by the oil producers' cartel, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), were the major causes of the stagflation that afflicted Britain in the mid-1970s. The coal miners' union attempted to seize the opportunity offered by the general rise in energy prices to secure a large increase in wages paid by the nationalized coal industry. The miners' strike ushered in a bitter confrontation with the Conservative government of Heath, which called a general election on the issue in February 1974 and narrowly lost to the Labour Party.

As a member of the European Economic Community (EEC) from 1973 onward, Britain generally sought to adjust her diplomacy in the Middle East to conform to a consensus of EEC members. In the aftermath of the 1973 and 1979 oil crises, this resulted in a suddenly humble attitude by former imperial powers to sometime protégés such as Iran and the Gulf emirates. A case in point was the Venice Declaration, issued by the EEC in June 1980, which marked a significant shift in diplomatic posture toward the Arab position in the conflict with Israel.

The power of OPEC enabled the producing states at last to seize effective control over their oil industries. During the 1970s and 1980s, they moved toward vertical integration of the industry, nationalizing the extraction installations, establishing refineries and petrochemical industries, investing in their own transportation of products by tanker or pipeline, and creating their own marketing mechanisms. The power of the international oil companies in the region consequently dwindled. The British government's direct interest in Middle East oil evaporated in the 1980s when the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sold off government share holdings in British Petroleum and Anglo–Dutch Shell.

Unlike most western industrial countries, however, Britain enjoyed fortuitous good fortune in the discovery and successful development of indigenous oil resources. Its dependence on Middle East oil imports ended after 1980 with the arrival onstream of large oil reserves from the North Sea. As Britain's oil production grew, it was able to play a major role in weakening and ultimately destroying the effectiveness of OPEC. Although oil production costs were much higher in the North Sea than in the Middle East, the British, in concert with other non-OPEC producers, proved able to undercut the floor prices set by OPEC. Several OPEC members, desperate for revenues to sustain their commitments to large expenditures on armaments or social programs, broke cartel discipline and secretly sold at lower prices. With demand flagging, this led in 1986 to a sudden collapse in oil prices.

In the 1980s, Middle Eastern politics spilled over onto the streets of London with a spate of terrorist incidents, including assassinations, bombings, and embassy seizures. In 1984, a British policewoman was murdered in the street during a demonstration in front of the Libyan People's Bureau in Saint James's Square in London. The gunshots were fired by a Libyan diplomat from within the embassy. There were also attacks on several Israeli and Zionist targets in Britain, as well as on Jewish institutions that had nothing to do with Israel. The most shocking terrorist incident was the midair explosion in 1988 aboard a Pan Am plane over Lockerbie, Scotland, in which all the passengers and crewmembers were killed. Scottish and U.S. prosecutors sought to secure the extradition of two Libyan citizens suspected of responsibility for planting the bomb. But the Libyan government long refused to yield up the men, in spite of the imposition of economic sanctions by the United Nations in 1992.

Perhaps the most bizarre of all these episodes was the *fatwa* (legal opinion) issued in 1989 by the leading Iranian cleric, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, pronouncing a death sentence against the British novelist Salman Rushdie, who is of Indian Muslim background. Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses* was held by some, but not all, devout Muslims to contain blasphemous libels against Islam. Rushdie was forced to live in hiding for several years, protected by the British security services. In spite of pressure, at first private and discreet, later public and emphatic, from the British and other western governments, the Iranian theocracy proclaimed itself unable to rescind the decree even after Khomeini's death in 1989.

By the 1990s, the Middle East occupied a relatively lower place in British diplomatic preoccupations than in any other decade since World War I. British economic interest in the region became focused primarily on trade rather than investment. But with their reduced purchasing power following the collapse of the oil cartel, the Middle East oil producers no longer offered such abundant markets. British arms and engineering exports to the Middle East assumed greater importance as the balance of oil imports decreased. During the long-drawn-out Iran–Iraq war between 1980 and 1988, Britain, like other western countries, sold arms to both sides.

This policy rebounded against the British government in 1990 when Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. The British joined the United States and twenty-six other countries in sending forces to the Gulf to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait in 1991. Although Britain played only a secondary role in the war, the crisis lit a slow-burning fuse in British internal politics in the shape of a scandal concerning the authorization of earlier British arms sales to Iraq. The Conservative government was gravely discredited by the affair and several senior politicians and civil servants were strongly criticized by a committee of inquiry in 1995.

Britain's Legacy in the Middle East

The cultural and social residue of Britain's Middle East empire was slight. Unlike France, Britain left behind no significant network of religious or educational institutions. Anglican Christianity had found few adherents in the region. Its mainly British clergy in the Middle East was gradually replaced at all levels by indigenous priests. The British Schools of Archaeology in Jerusalem, Ankara, and Baghdad continued to make a central contribution to excavations; but the one in Baghdad was defunct by the 1990s, and the Jerusalem school was largely inactive after the 1967 War (it later opened an Amman branch). In the Sudan, the Christian population in the south retained some links with the Church of England, but the University of Khartoum (formerly Gordon College) no longer looked to the English university system as a model. In Jordan, the royal court and the army maintained intimate links with Britain and copied British styles. Elsewhere, few relics of British cultural influence remained. Unlike most other parts of the former British Empire, the imperial language did not survive into the postcolonial era in the Middle East as the primary means of communication. Insofar as English continued to be spoken, this was a reflection of new American, not old British, influence. Probably the most significant British cultural export was the World Service of the BBC: Its broadcasts in English, Arabic, and other languages commanded a wide audience in the region.

At no time in the twentieth century did the Middle East take priority over the rest of the world in British diplomatic or strategic preoccupations. Yet the most striking land victories of British arms in both world wars were won respectively at Megiddo in 1918 and at al-Alamayn in 1942; the resignations of three British prime ministers (Lloyd George, Eden, and Heath) were occasioned by Middle East conflicts; and Britain's most severe economic recession after the 1930s came about as a direct result of the interlinked political and energy crises in the Middle East in 1973. For all these reasons, the Middle East occupied a central position in the history of British external relations in the twentieth century.

See also Abbas Hilmi II; Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Alamayn, al-; Allenby, Edmund Henry; Anglo–Iranian Oil Company; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab Legion; Arab Revolt (1916); Assyrians; Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Baghdad Pact (1955); Balfour Declaration (1917); Bevin, Ernest; Churchill, Winston S.; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Fertile Crescent; Hijaz; Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-; Hussein ibn Talal; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Lausanne, Treaty of (1923); Lawrence, T. E.; League of Arab States; McMahon, Henry; Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO); Middle East Supply Center (MESC); Mossadegh, Mohammad; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Ottoman Empire; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Palestine Arab Revolt (1936–1939); Paris Peace Settlements (1918–1923); Philby, Harry St. John; Qaddafi, Muammar al-; Sèvres, Treaty of (1920); Suez Canal;

TIRAN, STRAIT OF; UNITED ARAB EMIRATES; WEIZMANN, CHAIM; WHITE PAPERS ON PALESTINE; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II.

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BERNARD WASSERSTEIN

BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST UP TO 1914

Britain's engagement in Middle East affairs has a long and troubled history.

In the Middle East, Great Britain is remembered most for its interlude of paramountcy. The political-geographical concept of the Middle East was coined early in the twentieth century, several decades after Britain entered the region. In a review of Britain's relations with the region before then, and how it rose to the top, this must be kept in mind. Most of the territory that composed its Middle East empire from the end of World War I to the end of World War II had once been under Ottoman rule. Before the ratification in 1924 of the peace settlement with the Turkish Republic, the Ottoman Empire's lineal successor, the inspiration and rationale for adding each politically identifiable unit, with the arguable exception of Sudan in 1899, had come from the perceived need to defend British India.

On India's north (Afghanistan) and northwest (Persia—Iran after 1935—and the Ottoman Black Sea coastline and its interior), Russia's southward thrust stirred anxiety among Britain's empire builders. In the southern Mediterranean, France's tenacious pursuit of influence in Egypt made both Britain and India, as guardians of the imperial routes to the subcontinent, nervous. The anxiety dated from Napoléon's dramatic appearance in the self-governing Ottoman province of Egypt in 1798, through the opening in 1869 of the French-built Suez Canal, to the long-lived yet contested British presence that began in 1882.

In the first half of the twentieth century, to confirm its regional primacy, Britain served in effect as Europe's imperial coordinator in the Ottoman succession. Later, in the crisis of its global imperial mobilization in World War II, Britain was the region's unifier, after 1941 in close harmony with the United States. In retrospect, if the port of Aden (even including its insular appendages, it encompasses little more than 100 square miles [260 sq km]) is set aside, the rise and fall of Great Britain's regional preeminence lasted less than a century (1878–1971). This is not to suggest that the Ottoman sultan's Asian Arab and adjacent northeast African provinces were available earlier for easy European plucking. They were not.

The Levant and East India Companies

Napoléon's appearance in Egypt in 1798 with a massive armada and the declared aim of shortening the sea route to India, in order to reconquer the empire there that France had lost to Britain over the preceding half-century, marked a change in Britain's relations with the Sublime Porte from commercial to political imperialism and diplomacy. During Britain's monopoly of commerce under successively renewed royal charters (1581–1825), the Levant Company had cultivated trade with the Ottoman Empire's eastern Mediterranean territories from Greece to Egypt. As late as 1798 the company, at its own expense but in the name of Britain, handled all formal diplomatic and consular relations with the Ottoman Empire. It also paid the salaries of the British ambassador and the consul general in Constantinople (now Istanbul), and of other British consular officials in Aleppo and selected Ottoman ports. Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, the ambassadors, though still on the company payroll, were gradually integrated into the regular diplomatic service. The Foreign Office did not begin paying their salaries until 1804 (five years after Britain entered into its first formal alliance with the Sublime Porte). The consuls remained employees of the Levant Company until just before its dissolution in 1825.

Once the industrial revolution had taken hold in Britain late in the eighteenth century, the Levant Company faced no serious competition from Western European rivals. With few exceptions, even during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars (1789–1815)—indeed, until 1825—the company enjoyed the most profitable phase of its 244 years of Anglo–Ottoman monopoly trade. Given the long head start before the industrial revolution crossed the English Channel, Britain captured and held first place in the external Ottoman trade until World War I. In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was Britain's third-best foreign customer.

Early on, the Levant Company yielded to the reality that the deep interior of its assigned zone lay beyond reach and released the privileges to the East India Company (1600–1858). The oldest charters of the two companies, both issued under authority of Queen Elizabeth I, were mirror images. But in the pursuit of monopoly commerce in the allotted areas, the prospects for each differed sharply. The East Indies titled not a fixed state, like the Ottoman Empire, but a zone in South Asia lacking precise geographic definition. At its height the Mogul Empire (1526–1857) ruled much, but not all, of the subcontinent and lacked diplomatic ties to Europe. Although the East India Company (EIC) trade centered on the Indian subcontinent, that sphere spread over more than a single suzerainty.

EIC agents moved freely, seizing commercial opportunities, including those in the Islamic empires (Ottoman, Persian, and Omani) and self-ruling shaykhdoms around the Gulf, with half the Gulf's littoral. Persia lay beyond the Levant Company's assured circuit. But in theory that circuit did embrace the Ottoman Gulf littoral, which varied in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Beyond Ottoman reach, and thus freely claimed for EIC trade, sprawled Oman (variously known as Muscat or as Muscat and Oman) and the "independent" shaykhdoms along the lower Gulf and the Arabian Sea as far as the entrance to the Red Sea.

Despite its exercise of Britain's diplomatic and consular duties, the Levant Company remained to the end a trading association. The EIC, by contrast, had become the primary instrument for conquering India and integrating it into the British Empire. In 1757 it rose from a decade-long war with its French rival as the governing agent for Britain. Within a dozen years the French company expired. After yet another war with France (1778–1783), the EIC absorbed the remaining Mogul provinces and districts until the Islamic empire passed out of existence in 1857. (By the 1780s French India had shriveled into the Union of Pondichéry, comprising four disconnected enclaves in the subcontinent's southeast with a total area of 143 square miles [372 sq km].)

Not until the shock of Napoléon's lightning entry into Egypt (July 1798) and his stealthy personal departure (August 1799), leaving behind for two years a large French military and civilian body of occupation, did British India begin building a durable political presence and strategy in the Gulf. At the EIC's request, the sultan of Oman signed a pledge—not honored by his successors—that nationals of France and the Netherlands, Britain's Gulf

rivals in the preceding two centuries through their own East India companies, would be shut out of his realm. Oman was then more substantial than a shaykhdom yet less than a suzerain state (on European criteria). Thus, the true meaning of a second agreement, early in 1800, that looked like a provision for the Gulf's first permanent, if only quasi-diplomatic, mission, was that it reflected the dramatic structural transition of the EIC, which since 1757 had blossomed into the government of British India.

Parliament toughened its supervision of the EIC. In 1784, following the second and virtually complete rout of French rivals from the subcontinent, Parliament passed the Government of India Act, laying down strict rules of accountability. The president of the company court (board) of directors was given a nonvoting seat in the British cabinet, to serve as the channel for guiding the EIC's governance of India. To carry out the new duties of protecting and promoting British interests, the company began reorganizing its own administrative structure. Starting in the 1820s, the EIC changed its former commercial residencies into political residencies and agencies at key ports in the Gulf, broadly interpreted to include Basra and Baghdad, which could be reached by vessel via the Shatt al-Arab and the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

Relations of Britain and British India with Persia in the eighteenth century had been the least satisfactory in the Gulf, because of the domestic political chaos in the decades between the effective end in 1722 of the Safavid dynasty and the rise of its Qajar successor, which in 1794 reunited the shahdom. As part of the strategy of defense in depth against Napoleonic France, in 1801 the EIC signed commercial and political agreements with the new dynasty designed to establish continuous diplomatic links. Fath Ali Shah (1797–1834), however, repudiated both agreements because British India had dallied for six years before returning the ratifications. The Foreign Office in London and the EIC unknowingly had separately framed plans in 1808 for fresh exchanges with Persia—the Foreign Office, out of anxiety about Russia; the EIC, about France. Their emissaries met for the first time in Tehran. In stages, from 1809 to 1814, a treaty of defensive alliance emerged, laying the base for Britain's permanent diplomatic relations with Persia. From then on, Persia fell into the diplomatic jurisdiction of the Foreign Office, with only two lapses (1823–1835, 1858–1859) when the Asia-focused Political and Secret Department of the Bombay Presidency managed Britain's interests in Tehran.

Britain and the Arabian Peninsula

In 1858, after the last vestige of Mogul rule had vanished, the EIC charter was revoked. Responsibility for governing India passed from Calcutta—and for managing British affairs in the Gulf, from Bombay—to London. In London the secretary of state for India, with full voting rights in the cabinet but no longer attached to a nongovernmental company, presided over the India Office and thus over framing imperial policy. Even then, anxiety over India's defense colored all major decisions on the Middle East until World War II. By then, British India had to share the center of imperial concern with Britain's interest in Gulf oil, which at that time still came largely from Iran, with a modest supplement from Iraq.

Against this background it becomes possible to chart the origins, rise, and style of British Middle East imperialism east of the Red Sea and the complementary yet reactive diplomacy and imperialism in the Ottoman Empire. During the century-long conquest of the Mogul Empire, British India was distracted enough not to plan simultaneous expansion beyond the subcontinent. The distraction went far to explain India's nervous yet cautious reply to inflated fear of perils looming in and around the Gulf, reaching back to 1798. From time to time (1806, 1809, 1819), the EIC deployed in the lower Gulf, chiefly for service along the coast of the Arabian Peninsula, vessels of the Bombay Marine to suppress what the Anglo–Indian monitors labeled a rampant tribal piracy that "even preyed upon" vessels flying the Union Jack.

In 1820 the coastal shaykhs and their neighbors as far as the Bahrain archipelago were forced to sign a general treaty banning piracy and the slave trade. The pact was renewed semiannually until 1835 by all (except Bahrain), and then annually until 1843, when it was prolonged for a decade and finally hardened into a permanent maritime truce. By then the EIC had come to view the Persian Gulf as an Anglo–Indian lake. Upon authorization by

Tehran, the EIC named the British consul at Bushehr on the Persian coast as the EIC political resident, with the duty of observing the execution of the truce and guarding against piracy. He was assisted by the political agent for the Trucial Coast (at Sharja) and, at the turn of the century, by political agents named to the other pact signatories. In 1822, for the resident's service, British India deployed vessels of the Bombay Marine and, after 1879, of the Indian navy, berthed at the rented Basidu based on Persia's Qeshm Island, at the entrance to the Persian Gulf.

It was the port of Aden, however, lying outside the Gulf, that became Britain's first onshore presence in the Middle East. By the beginning of the second third of the nineteenth century, new anxieties had arisen. As seen in Britain and in India, the benefits of the dramatic shrinkage between the two of distance and time in transport and communication were risks when they served an imperial rival such as France. By the 1830s the EIC had developed a regular route between India and England via the Mediterranean and Red seas, with overland transfer in Egypt of passengers, goods, and mail between Alexandria and Suez in both directions.

In the Mediterranean, which had British bases at Gibraltar and Malta, there were no bunkering problems. East of Suez, the company chose Aden as the site for resupply of fuel and other needs of increasingly larger and more modern oceangoing ships. After six years of talks with the sultan of Lahij, punctuated by forcible occupancy, two treaties and a bond defined the terms of the Anglo–Indian use of the harbor at Aden, for an annual rent of £1,300 ($6,500). By handling its first onshore presence in the Middle East as a quasi-commercial station with a modest rental, British India minimized the likelihood of tribal hostility.

In 1854, the five virtually unpopulated Kuria Muria islets, east of Aden on the southwest coast of Oman, were given to Britain by the sultan of Oman for a telegraph station. The experiment (1859–1860) in the Red and Arabian seas with submarine cables to tie into the European lines failed. Britain finally built alternative routes to British India via the Ottoman Empire as well as Russia and Persia. Attached by conquest to Aden in 1857 was the strategic islet of Perim, not quite in the center of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, then the only water entrance to the Red Sea. All the islands annexed by Britain were virtually uninhabited. Aden remained Britain's first and only dependency in the Middle East until 1878. Even with the port's enlargement by the addition of Little Aden in 1868 and its further enlargement by British India's purchase of the adjacent promontory belonging to Shaykh Uthman in 1862 and 1888, Aden's total area, islets and all, barely exceeded 100 square miles (260 sq km). Until 1937, it was administered as if it were the Bombay Presidency's private colony.

Britain and the Eastern Mediterranean

Also in the 1830s, Britain's primary Middle East attention, still inspired by India, moved from the Gulf and the periphery of the Arabian Peninsula to the eastern Mediterranean, and basic policymaking, from the Political and Secret Department in Bombay to the Foreign Office in London. With Viscount Palmerston as foreign minister (1830–1834, 1835–1841, 1846–1851) and as prime minister from 1855 until his death in 1865, Britain dug in its heels to deny France economic and strategic domination of the key link between Western Europe and South Asia. In 1840 and 1841 Palmerston framed a strategy that rested on an Anglo–Ottoman alliance and committed the major powers to preserve the European balance by upholding the territorial sovereignty and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. By consensual diplomacy the powers, with Britain serving as the balancer, prevented the overthrow of Muhammad Ali, the self-made governor of Egypt, by internal revolt (in 1839–1841); the shrinkage of the Ottoman Empire by European conquest (by Russia in 1854–1856 and by France in 1860–1861); and the unilateral revision of a concert agreement (by Russia of its 1856 Straits Convention with the Ottoman Empire, in 1871). In each European–Ottoman dispute, Britain kept France and Russia apart by forming temporary great-power coalitions that isolated the would-be offender.

Despite Palmerston's precautions, Anglo–French rivalry in and over Egypt deepened. In the 1840s French engineers began framing feasible designs for linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas by canal, to assure uninterrupted ocean travel from Britain and Western Europe to the African and

Asian rims of the Indian Ocean, as well as Australia and New Zealand. In the mid-1850s, once Ferdinand de Lesseps pocketed a ninety-nine year concession for building and running the waterway, French magnates and bankers promptly oversubscribed the operating company. But at the height of the Anglo–Ottoman alliance (from 1841 to 1879–1882), Palmerston's diplomacy had interrupted the canal's construction for more than a decade. At his urging, in order to escape an imperial contest for dominance in Egypt, British investors put their sterling into an Alexandria–Suez railroad via Cairo, completed in the 1850s.

In November 1869, four years after Palmerston's death, the French promoters finally opened the Suez Canal. As might have been expected, ships flying the Union Jack made up 70 percent or more of the traffic in the first years. The absence of British shareholders, however, denied British users a voice in canal policy. Even the secret purchase in 1875 of the 44 percent interest in the company owned by Egypt's khedive, making Britain the largest single shareholder, proved inadequate to modify rates and other rules of use. Nor did the boost to Egypt's treasury long delay Khedive Isma'il's fiscal collapse. In 1876 he accepted a Dual Control, the working title of the Anglo–French Public Debt Commission, to manage Egypt's finances. Two years later, after the dual controllers reported continuing breach of the commission's rules, the khedive installed a cabinet government, with the Briton as finance minister and the Frenchman as minister of public works. When Isma'il tried to restore direct rule by abolishing the cabinet in June 1879, British diplomacy in Constantinople brought his son Tawfiq to the governorship.

Occupation of Cyprus and Egypt

While Anglo–French rivalry in and over Egypt was turning explosive, a crisis in the north had led Russia to declare war against the Ottoman Empire in April 1877; eleven months later it imposed a humbling peace on the Sublime Porte that was promptly ratified. Britain saw its eastern Mediterranean interests squeezed yet again between renewed threats from Russia and continuing ones from France. Benjamin Disraeli's cabinet cobbled together a strategy of detaching Austria from its alliance with Russia, wooing France with an offer not to oppose its conquest of Ottoman Tunisia, and coercing the reluctant sultan into allowing Britain to occupy Cyprus, purportedly to inhibit further intrusion by Russia into the Islamic realm.

After deliberate delay, with the secret deal on Cyprus in hand, Disraeli finally agreed to attend the Berlin Congress (13 June–13 July 1878), called by Chancellor Bismarck of Germany to cool the overheated diplomacy in Europe through top-level accord. Only toward the close of the congress did Disraeli divulge the text of the Cyprus convention for integration into the collection of approved actions. The congress modified Russia's crippling terms and sorted out the imperial rivalries, thus avoiding wider war in Europe. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire paid the price by having to make major land transfers to Russia in northeastern Anatolia and, to Russia and its Balkan allies, in southeastern Europe; placement of Cyprus under Britain's occupation without fixed time limit; and—unmentioned—Britain's promise to France of diplomatic support in assimilating Ottoman Tunisia. In the Ottoman view, the congress, by annulling the ban on European expansion into the Ottoman Empire, had erased the essence of its durable alliance with Britain. Britain's replacement by Germany came four years later.

Once on Cyprus, Britain added two other Ottoman provinces—Egypt and Sudan—to the western portion of its future Middle East empire. It is far from clear, however, that the island was originally meant to be the first such unit. Occupation by formal, if also forced, agreement without time limit was intended as notice that Cyprus had been taken over only temporarily. The island's administration, without transfer of ownership title, was simply handed to Britain for such use as might serve its immediate imperial interest and, it was claimed, that of the Sublime Porte, which received a British pledge to stop deeper penetration by Russia into Anatolia. Britain had already denied Russia possession of the Turkish Straits and Constantinople. Without the Turkish Straits, Russia could not become a Mediterranean power. To buttress the notion of a rental contract, the Disraeli government assured the Sublime Porte that all public revenue, beyond administrative needs, would revert to the sultan along with a fixed annual payment of £5,000 ($25,000).

More important, yet unmentioned in the convention, Britain saw Cyprus as a convenient military base to shore up its political and military stance in the eastern Mediterranean as a deterrent to both France and Russia. Within a fortnight of the outbreak of the Russian–Ottoman war in April 1877, Britain had warned Russia against blockading the Suez Canal and/or the Turkish Straits or occupying Egypt and/or Constantinople. The security planners in London felt a gnawing need for a nearby military presence to defend the Suez Canal, which they had come to see as the lifeline to India and to Britain's widening empire along the rim of the Indian Ocean and beyond. In this scheme, Cyprus "would enable us without any act of overt hostility and without disturbing the peace of Europe, to accumulate material of war and, if requisite, the troops necessary." This observation was embodied in Foreign Minister Salisbury's instructions to the British ambassador in Constantinople, charged in mid-May 1878 with imposing on the Sublime Porte the convention for Britain's open-ended occupation of Cyprus. (Egypt, though unmentioned, also was firmly in mind.)

Britain finally occupied Egypt in 1882 to quiet the long-standing fear of French conquest. The war in Europe that the British action threatened did not break out, even though the major powers withheld de facto recognition of the reality for nearly a quarter-century. After the British invasion, six years elapsed before the European maritime powers initialed a convention to assure free transit through the Suez Canal in peace and war, and seventeen more passed before its ratification. France kept goading Britain to fix a date for military withdrawal; Britain, no less stubbornly, insisted on recognition as the canal's sole defender for the duration of its military presence in Egypt.

Together with Russia, France did not stop condemning Britain for its occupation of Egypt, and particularly its refusal to share the Suez Canal's protection with the convention's signers. Nonstop collaboration against Britain in Egypt contributed to a Franco–Russian entente on European imperial issues in 1894. Ten years later, France and Britain finally signed their own Entente Cordiale in a trade-off: Britain's free hand in Egypt in return for France's free hand in Morocco. Within a year, the Suez Canal convention finally went into effect, carrying with it European de facto recognition of Britain's occupation of Egypt and, for its duration, as the waterway's exclusive guardian.

Conquest of Sudan

Lacking any document in its files to verify an unqualified Ottoman surrender of legal titles to Cyprus and to Egypt, Britain did not seriously seek the Sublime Porte's recognition of the conquest of Sudan in 1896 through 1898. Judged by the record, Britain seems to have concluded that without legal confirmation, it would be best to continue needed imperial expansion on the Mediterranean side of the Middle East by means of temporary tenancy. For this, given the Ottoman denial of legitimacy, the search for European recognition seemed the logical course of action.

The political status of Sudan had been complicated ever since 1885, when all British and Egyptian troops were pulled out after defeat by the self-proclaimed Mahdi (Messiah), Muhammad Ahmad, and his *mujahidin* (religious warriors). The mahdi did not long survive his declaration of Sudan's independence. But the independent Mahdiyya of Sudan survived under his dynastic *khalifa* (successor) for more than a decade, until Major General Horatio Herbert Kitchener, commanding a modest Egyptian force, reclaimed the province in the name of Egypt (1896–1898). The victory was capped by an Anglo–French standoff at Fashoda (19 September–3 November 1898), micromanaged by the Foreign Office in London and the Foreign Ministry in Paris.

Kitchener was pitted against Major Jean Baptiste Marchand, a desert explorer who for more than two years had trekked some 3,000 miles (4,800 km) from the Atlantic seaboard of French Equatorial Africa, with a small band of infantry volunteers, before arriving at the southern reaches of the White Nile. Fifteen months before Marchand and his commandos set out in June 1896, the undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, Sir Edward Grey, announced in Commons that the entire Nile (White and Blue) basin, from sources to mouth, formed a British sphere of influence. Any intrusion would be viewed as an unfriendly act. En route from the Atlantic to the White Nile, Marchand and company received little public notice, less the result of planned secrecy than of crude communications.

At Fashoda, one of the few rural towns along that stretch of the White Nile, Marchand subdued the *mudir,* who surrendered the patch of well-watered desert that made up his *mudiriyya* (municipality). On that basis, Marchand, as instructed, claimed for France all of southern Sudan, as yet without boundaries and thus undefined. The situation was formally resolved not by Marchand and Kitchener, on the bank of the White Nile, but by the foreign secretaries on the banks of the Thames and the Seine. Indeed, a confident Kitchener reached Dover on 27 October 1898 (before France had officially backed down) for weeks of national celebration.

The decision on how to factor Sudan into Britain's burgeoning Middle East empire was left to Lord Cromer, the British agent and consul general in Cairo. He rationalized a complex arrangement to establish Britain's right to rule Sudan at its pleasure, yet leave no more than a nominal role for Egypt, and to do so without seeking the Sublime Porte's approval. Cromer devised a formula to assure British supremacy while calming France and denying European powers capitulatory privileges.

The British claim to dominance in governing the Anglo–Egyptian condominium rested on the right of conquest, in the name not of the Ottoman sultan but of his viceroy, the Egyptian khedive, though the occupation had nullified the khedive's subordination to the sultan. In Cromer's scheme, except for the low-level civil and military service, Egypt had little more to show than its flag. Even that had to fly below the Union Jack. Though run as an undeclared British colony, Sudan was governed by the Foreign—not the Colonial—Office, which prided itself on installing a paternalistic regime. Until 1914, however, Sudan's public revenues came primarily not from local sources or Britain's Exchequer but from interest-free loans granted by Egypt.

In Sudan, as in Cyprus and Egypt, the Sublime Porte was infuriated by the denial of a policy voice or even of a nominal administrative role. In all three cases, the Foreign Office was pressed into an unaccustomed Colonial Office role by having to recruit and supervise senior administrative personnel. The makeshift handling of Cyprus had set the precedent for the later assimilation of Egypt and Sudan into the expanding western sector of Britain's Middle East empire. Named custodian of such borrowed territory was the Foreign Office, the branch of the British government best equipped to cope with problems of international law and diplomacy, but one of the most poorly equipped for colonial administration.

In Cyprus, Egypt, and Sudan, Britain did not stray from the fiction that the Foreign Office's exercise of Britain's de facto sovereignty had introduced neither legal nor political change into the former Ottoman provinces. The Ottoman Empire responded with an absolute refusal to surrender the title of ownership. Thus, the western sector of Britain's rising Middle East empire still lacked legal solidity at the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914—indeed, for a decade longer, until the peace settlement with the Turkish Republic.

Humbling the Gulf

In contrast with the political tenancies that Britain imposed on the Sublime Porte, British India continued to devise its own forms of British primacy along the periphery of the Arabian Peninsula. This activity must be seen in the context of India's progressive intrusion into the Gulf in the nineteenth century. The office of resident was a title that the EIC had used, ever since its arrival in South Asia, to identify its factors (merchants) at chosen commercial posts. The step-by-step politicization of the office traced back to the 1820 maritime truce and reflected the slow conversion after 1757 of the EIC from a merchants' monopoly into Britain's formally recognized empire-building and governing agency in the subcontinent. As early as 1822, the Bombay Presidency began appointing a "resident in the Persian Gulf" at Bushehr, on Persia's upper Gulf Coast, to oversee the truce, with instructions to take action against violators and advise on policy. Commonly a middle-level officer of the Indian army or navy, the resident was authorized to call upon the Indian navy (known as the Bombay Marine until 1830), which from 1822 deployed a token squadron at the rented base of Basidu on Qeshm Island, near the Gulf entrance. Soon after the EIC lost its charter in 1858, the Indian navy's facilities and manpower were folded into the Royal Navy.

The long-delayed 1841 British commercial treaty with Persia had reaffirmed the right of the

resident to keep his office at Bushehr. Not much later, Persia grudgingly allowed Britain to confer on the incumbent a second and separate title of consul general for the coastal provinces, thus formally assuring that his jurisdiction embraced the Gulf's entire rim except for the Ottoman segment. Nominated through 1872 by the Bombay Presidency and thereafter by the governor-general and viceroy in Calcutta, the political resident, as he had been formally designated for some time, was still British India's senior official and policy coordinator in the Gulf. He also served as envoy at large to the Arab tribalities, shaykhdoms, and ministates on the coast of the Arabian Peninsula. As necessary, British India delegated political agents to selected shaykhdoms growing into ministates; and by the turn of the twentieth century, political officers were delegated to troublesome tribalities. Meanwhile, from the start of the truce, Indian naval officers who served on patrol duty at times doubled as surveyors to map the Gulf and its bed for navigation, pearl fisheries, and other marine sources of commercial value.

By 1880, British India's presence rested on a system of control by an experienced and informed bureaucracy that steadily deepened its knowledge of the Gulf and its rim's inhabitants. With such proved interests, British India was ready to fend off aspiring European rivals. The Anglo–Indian custodians of the British Empire then, and for some time to come, persisted in viewing the Persian/Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula not as part of the Middle East (a term not yet invented) but as a region that fell into the subcontinent's influence sphere. Still, British India's uncontestable presence remained offshore.

The Sublime Porte inadvertently sparked the growth of British India's onshore presence. On reabsorbing al-Hasa in 1871, the Ottoman Empire had reentered Gulf politics. Hasa's governor later gave asylum to a disgruntled faction of the Al Khalifa, the clan that ruled the Bahrain archipelago. To British India's political resident, the Sublime Porte appeared to be testing a rediscovered political option in 1879, when Hasa's governor and Isa ibn Ali, Bahrain's ruler, explored the rental of a coaling bunker on one of his islands. The action was seen as a likely Ottoman first step in claiming Bahrain, lying off Hasa's coast.

In December 1880, India undertook to protect Isa and his heirs as the shaykhdom's governing dynasty, assuring it full domestic sovereignty and a guaranteed safeguard against local opponents. In return, the ruler surrendered to Britain, and to India acting in Britain's behalf, the archipelago's external sovereignty. He agreed to an absolute ban on relations with other governments, the nearby shaykhdoms excepted, expressly disallowing the creation on his territory of "diplomatic or consular agencies or coaling depots . . . unless with the consent of the British Government." In March 1892, Shaykh Isa more explicitly reaffirmed his original surrender of external sovereignty by adding a general nonalienation clause that he would "on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory save to the British Government." Thus Bahrain became the model for what British India later called a system of independent states in special treaty relations with Great Britain.

In 1887 a first version of parallel exclusionary pacts with the shaykhs of the six tribalities of the Trucial Coast proved porous. Defying the Anglo–Indian ban, French agents appeared in 1891, seeking to open formal relations with the Trucial six by tempting them with such promises as the revival of slave trading under the French flag. India finally plugged the leak in 1892. In the next twenty-four years India, in Britain's name, absorbed the external sovereignty of Kuwait (1899) and, in World War I, of Najd (1915) and Qatar (1916). In the Trucial Coast, Fujayra broke away from Sharjah in 1902 but did not receive Britain's formal recognition until a half-century later. Between 1913 and 1932, starting with Kuwait's shaykh, British India won explicit pledges from the rulers of Bahrain and each Trucial shaykhdom never to grant an oil concession to anyone except an official British governmental nominee. In the accords with Najd and Qatar, such commitments were assumed in promises to issue no concessions whatsoever without British consent.

Meanwhile, in 1891, Sayyid Faysal ibn Turki of Oman also had placed himself in nonalienation bondage. Clearly, Oman still had not been reduced to the status of a shaykhdom. It persisted in styling itself a sultanate, and as such it remained larger than 80,000 square miles (208,000 sq km), nearly nine-tenths the size of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland. Oman still flaunted imperial pretensions with the residual possession of Gwadar, a port on the Baluchi coast with some 300 square miles inland that was not returned to Pakistan until 1958. Indeed, in earlier decades of the nineteenth century, Oman had held long-term leases on the island of Qeshm and the nearby port of Bandar Abbas, issued by Persia's Fath Ali Shah and renewed by his successor. Until 1856 it also comprised the African islands of Zanzibar and Pemba and the coastal towns of Mombasa and Dar es-Salaam, which collectively had served as the major conduit of the once thriving slave trade in the Gulf. For that commerce the realm's capital, Muscat, served as the entrepôt.

The key to understanding Oman's vague ties to the system of protected ministates was Britain's inability to gain full command over the sultanate's foreign relations. By the time British-India began moving to tighten its hold on the ministates, Oman had long since entered into capitulatory treaties with the United States (1833), France (1844), and the Netherlands (1877). Its ruler could not unilaterally cancel such instruments, even if he had wished to. Nor did Britain, in the exercise of its treaty rights in the sultanate, ever vigorously challenge the capitulatory powers, with the occasional exception of France.

Britain's management of its affairs in the Persian Gulf after 1858 was settling slowly and not always happily into the joint duty of the Foreign and India offices. Through World War I, the top administrator was recruited from the British officer cadre of the Anglo–Indian Army at the rank of lieutenant (or full colonel) and held appointments from both offices. In the overseas hierarchy of the Foreign Office he was the consul general at Bushehr, attending to Anglo–Indian and British interests in Persia's coastal provinces of Fars and Khuzistan and its islands in the Gulf. At the India Office and in India he was titled political resident in charge of Anglo–Indian affairs along the Gulf peninsular coast. Accountable to him in that role by 1914 were political agents for Bahrain and Kuwait, and political officers for the Trucial Coast and later also Qatar, all drawn from British India's political service. The political resident in the Persian/Arabian Gulf was thus responsible to the Anglo–Indian government and ultimately to the India Office in London for basic policy, at first with advice from the Foreign Office, largely regarding interactive Gulf politics of Persia and the Arab ministates. But the Foreign Office's influence steadily increased as the Gulf was drawn, issue by issue, into European imperial politics after Britain's occupation of Cyprus and Egypt.

Sole Policeman in the Gulf

An immediate effect of abandoning the long-lived alliance with the Sublime Porte was that Britain lost its leverage in the European imperial rivalry over Ottoman territory. That loss promptly encouraged Russia and France to cooperate against Britain on Ottoman issues. No less important, it opened the way for Germany's belated entry into the competition. Germany, in fact, replaced Britain as the Porte's durable ally, a friendship that lasted until the armistice ending World War I in 1918. At first, Chancellor Bismarck still discouraged official promotion of German interests in the Ottoman Empire despite the Porte's receptivity. In 1881, when Germany sent its first military mission to Constantinople on Ottoman invitation, the chancellor cut the mission's formal national ties. By the time of Kaiser Wilhelm II's accession in 1888, the new friendship came into the open. German industry had made such striking advances after the nation's unification in 1870 that it sought new markets. Between 1886 and 1910, Germany vaulted from fifteenth to second place in Ottoman foreign trade, surpassed only by Britain.

Much of this upturn could be attributed to the kaiser's enthusiastic response to Sultan Abdülhamit II's national goal of building railroads across his Asian domains to underpin their economic expansion, unity, and defense. With official encouragement, investors in France centered their projects in Palestine, Syria, and the latter's adjacent zone in southern Anatolia. The sultan's chosen enterprise was a trans-Anatolian railroad linked to Europe via its international railway complex. The sultan coaxed the new kaiser, on his first visit to Constantinople, to arouse interest in the plan among German bankers and entrepreneurs. An initial segment was promptly begun that would link Constantinople to Europe's international railway complex. By 1896 the German-built segment (with limited French investment) had pierced western Anatolia as far as Eskişehir with a spur to Konya.

There the venture stalled. On a second visit to Constantinople in 1898, the kaiser's zeal was rehoned. But ahead, between Konya and Basra, lay the mountains of eastern Anatolia and Mosul province, where it would be far more expensive to build each kilometer of roadbed than it had been in the plains of west Anatolia. Also envisaged were four spurs along the way: to Aleppo, Urfa, and Khanaqin (on the Persian side of the Ottoman border, some 90 miles [154 km] north of Baghdad), and from Zubayr (9 miles [14.5 km] south of Basra) to a point on the Persian Gulf "to be agreed upon." Wilhelm II enlisted the aid of Georg von Siemens, director of the Deutsche Bank, to promote the project as a German national interest, and the sultan issued a preliminary concession in 1899. Limiting its concern largely to the venture's commercial side, the bank did not agree to the definitive concession until 1903, after having canvassed banks of other nations—notably France and Britain—to invest in the project. In March 1903 the Deutsche Bank finally signed a ninety-nine year concession for the Berlin–Baghdad Railway.

The quickening of European interest in the Persian/Arabian Gulf, especially the confirmation of the Berlin–Baghdad Railway concession on 5 March 1903, led Britain to update its defensive strategy. Precisely two months later, on 5 May 1903, Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne disclosed the commercial and strategic principles that would guide Britain's government in the future. Although high priority would be given to "protect and promote British trade" in the inland waters, Lansdowne ruled out the notion of excluding "the legitimate trade of other Powers." Yet he left no doubt that Britain would "regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian/Arabian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal."

The British strategy of depriving other European powers of a military presence in the Persian/Arabian Gulf, never seriously disputed, remained fixed through World War II and, with the exception (from 1949) of a modest U.S. naval station in Bahrain, lasted until Britain's final withdrawal in 1971.

Unlike the British-occupied Ottoman provinces, which European powers recognized but the Sublime Porte did not, the protected ministates in the Gulf won the approval of neither. Still, the European governments—not even Germany, the latest entrant into the contest—did not effectively dispute Britain's exercise of rights in the shaykhdoms. In the decade before the eruption of war in 1914 the Gulf's guardians, particularly in British India but also in Britain, perceived a mounting threat from Germany, which was enlarging its trade with Ottoman Asia and opening markets in the Gulf. In 1906 the Hamburg–Amerika Line began calling on a fixed monthly schedule at promising ports, offering lower rates and better banking services that those of the entrenched Anglo–Indian and British shipping firms.

In 1911, less concerned than British India, Britain finally responded to the persistent overtures of Germany and the Ottoman Empire to reconsider the differences over completing a railway with a terminal at the head of the Gulf. Britain felt the least pressure, since the Porte depended on British assent to increase the tariff rates, the only reliable funding source for Ottoman subsidies to the railway builders. Britain insisted on preserving its role as the Gulf's sole policeman to safeguard Anglo–Indian commercial and maritime primacy. On these terms Britain consented to pursue, with the Ottoman Empire and Germany, a multilateral settlement by weaving together three bilateral accords: British–Ottoman, British–German, and German–Ottoman.

From the outset the Sublime Porte had challenged the legality of Britain's protected ministate of Kuwait so as to reassert the sultan's suzerainty in the shaykhdom. Instead, the convention initialed in July 1913 gave the Porte only the symbols of political ownership. Although obliged to fly the Ottoman flag (with the inscription "Kuwait"), the shaykh was assured of "complete administrative autonomy." The Ottomans also conceded the validity of the shaykh's agreements with Britain. The purpose of the accord—whether, when, and under what terms the railroad might build its terminal in Kuwait—was described and the decision deferred. Beyond assuring Britain membership on the Berlin–Baghdad Railway directorate and guaranteed equal rates for all users, the British–German convention, initialed in June 1914, stated that the Baghdad–Basra extension would be built and run by a separate Ottoman

company with an assured 40 percent British interest and a pledge of no extension to the Gulf without full prior approval by Britain, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire.

A fourth bilateral accord, framed by the Deutsche Bank and the French-dominated Imperial Ottoman Bank, was reached and initialed in February 1914. It was essentially designed to protect the special position of France's railroad entrepreneurs in Syria and Alexandretta, as well as their planned branches in western Anatolia, all to be linked to the German trunk line.

Ratification of the bilateral instruments awaited the drafting of the Ottoman–German convention. Preliminary talks, begun in June 1914 but interrupted by war in August, ended in a secret treaty of defensive alliance. The Sublime Porte became an active ally of Germany and Austria late in October. Early in November, Britain amplified the existing territorial guarantees to Shaykh Mubarak by declaring Kuwait, together with its islands and the ruler's date groves in the Faw district of the Basra *vilayet,* "an independent Government under British protection" as a reward for his pledged cooperation in the war effort.

Aden: Settlement and Protectorates

Reshaping the British protected shaykhdoms in the Gulf into potential ministates had run parallel with dividing Aden's upcountry, between 1880 and 1914, into projected tribalities that remained politically frozen in that condition until after World War II. The two imperial initiatives were sparked by perceived threats to Anglo–Indian security. Also, both Arabian coastal zones were recurrently infused with tribal migrants from the interior. Some tribal groups in each zone had passed in and out of the Ottoman Empire. This occurred for the last time in the early 1870s, when the sultan's troops reannexed Hasa, on the Gulf, and Yemen, on the Red Sea. In both retaken provinces, the Ottoman Empire did not simply seek recognition for its new international borders. The Sublime Porte clearly hoped to regain more of the land lost and to reintegrate tribal groups on the southern edges of Hasa and Yemen.

British India's imperial process in the southwestern Arabian Peninsula differed from that in the Gulf. Under the Gulf's enforced maritime truce, adjacent shaykhdoms gradually began to settle their common borders. Except for Aden itself, however, few upcountry tribalities had mutually defined borders before the eve of World War I. Instead, the process was essentially limited to those blending into unmarked edges of Yemen on the north. In this period British India had not yet negotiated Aden's upcountry periphery alongside Oman on the east or the suitably named Rub al-Khali (Empty Quarter) at the southern rim of the vast Arabian Desert. On neither of the two frontiers did the British face obstructions comparable with those in Ottoman Yemen.

Until January 1873, the Bombay Presidency had served as British India's ultimate custodian of the Gulf. Thereafter, it became accountable to the viceroy in Calcutta; beyond that, to the India Office; and, within the British cabinet after 1882, increasingly to the Foreign Office. Yet in regard to running Aden and its interior until 1932, the Bombay Presidency seems largely to have slipped through the net of accountability. From the outset, the Bombay Presidency treated the town of Aden as a private colonial trust. Even Aden's bureaucracy, below the top level, was almost wholly recruited in Bombay, joined in time by a swelling number of Indian settlers, mostly immigrant shopkeepers.

The presidency also kept watch on Aden town's hinterland, which widened eastward from slightly more than 30 miles (48 km) at the harbor to about 200 miles (320 km) and a total length close to 500 miles (800 km), for possible Ottoman or European intrusion. By 1902 Aden's administration in the interior covered some twenty-five to thirty local rulers with a wide range of titles—sultan, amir, sharif, *naqib,* shaykh. Even after agreements with the presidency, their number kept changing as a result of tribal fission and fusion in what finally compassed a thinly populated expanse of 112,000 square miles (291,200 sq km). Its eastern two-thirds was largely desert; its western sector, partly desert and partly hill country. Frequent regime changes reflected the absence of Anglo–Indian dynastic guarantees and stabilizing boundaries, and they revealed the rulers' loss of much domestic as well as all external sovereignty. They thus resembled less the Gulf's shaykhdoms than the contemporary European colonies on the nearby Horn of Africa.

In 1900 Aden town was renamed the Aden Settlement, to sharpen its distinction from the inland protected tribalities it administered. The resident was accordingly retitled governor. Nature roughly fixed the frontier with the Rub al-Khali. Like most boundary lines separating ownership claims to deserts that seem to have little or no commercial prospects, a straight line sufficed. That was also true, for the most part, of the eastern border with Oman.

From 1902 to 1905, when it came to marking the boundaries of Yemen, once again an Ottoman province after 236 years, the issue could not be resolved by British India in exchanges with Yemen. Only Britain could deal with the Sublime Porte. Because of Ottoman delays, the accord was not ratified until 1914, too close to the outbreak of war to take solid effect. Indeed, in 1915 Ottoman troops occupied a few adjacent British-protected tribalities and stayed for the duration of the war. The unresolved problem of legal title was thus left for renegotiation with the sovereign imamate of Yemen, which after World War I because an Ottoman successor state.

Persia and Afghanistan

The Anglo–Russian imperial rivalry over Persia, which traced back to the Napoleonic wars, grew menacing after the 1860s. It was then that Russia completed the conquest of Central Asia, thus extending its border with Persia to its full length (the formal line was not confirmed until 1885). Russia's territorial advance coincided with Britain's continuing effort to consolidate its strategic control of the Persian Gulf—in the case of Persia, by locking in its coast, the longest national segment on the Gulf's rim. Simultaneously, the tension roused by the imperial competition in and over Persia enveloped Afghanistan, which in the south looked to India, and in the north, to Russian Central Asia. The two Asian countries had thus become trapped between expansion by Russia and by British India. For the security planners in Britain and India at the turn of the century, Russia's designs on Persia appeared more threatening than those on Afghanistan.

To underpin eventual imperial claims to Persia, the contenders began laying the groundwork in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. They extracted military and fiscal privileges from the shah that trimmed his power. An 1879 agreement provided for a Persian Cossack Brigade, which enlisted Persians to serve under Russian officers chosen by Russia and paid by Persia. It remained a nominal brigade even after the murder of Naser al-Din Shah in 1896, when it was upgraded to an imperial guard for protecting the monarch and the dynasty, and even a decade later, when the Persian Cossacks, joined by a contingent of the regular Russian Army, failed to prevent adoption of the new constitution and the inauguration of a parliamentary regime—both realized with the implied blessings of Great Britain. (Only in 1916 did Russia finally transform the Cossacks into a fighting division and pay fully for its upkeep.) British India did not start responding until 1911, when it recruited and financed a gendarmerie or provincial police under Swedish officers. (In November 1916, the gendarmerie, without the Swedes, was integrated into the newly raised South Persia Rifles, trained and commanded by British officers.)

Less concealed and in most respects far more effective were the encroachments on the shah's fiscal sovereignty. In 1889, Baron Julius de Reuter, backed by the Foreign Office and the British legation in Tehran, procured a sixty-year concession to open the Imperial Bank of Persia, the first such institution in Persia. Its branches, in all the cities and larger towns, introduced the country to modern banking services. More significantly, the Imperial Bank received the exclusive right to serve as the fiscal agent of Persia and had the authority to issue banknotes. Two years later, Russian nationals, with active endorsement of their government, procured a parallel concession to launch the Banque de Prêts, originally designed to provide small-scale loans to Persians. Russia's Ministry of Finance bought the bank in 1894 and, under its new name, Banque d'Escompte de Perse, it pursued a deliberate policy of offering generous mortgages to rich landowners.

Russia's Foreign Ministry opened consulates not only in Mohammerah (present-day Khorramshahr), at the lower end of the Shatt al-Arab, but also in the major gulf ports of Bushehr and Bandar Abbas, where it sought to build coaling bunkers. In 1901 and 1902 the Banque d'Escompte issued personal loans to the shah totaling £3.4 million ($17 million). As surety, Russia's Finance Ministry won the pledge of customs, without explicitly omitting

those collected in the Gulf ports. The Finance Ministry also lowered the customs rates on Russian imports while doubling them on those from Britain and British India, thereby violating their entitlement to most-favored-nation treatment under an 1841 commercial treaty. After briefly trying to soften Britain's rigid stance against such a meddlesome presence on the Gulf coast, Russia ended its discriminatory practice. Soon thereafter the customs service was transferred to Belgian officials employed by Persia.

Even more clearly in Afghanistan, Britain's imperial thrust was driven by strategic rather than economic concerns. Before 1747 Afghanistan had never formed a united independent state. It had passed back and forth, in whole or in part, between Persia and the Mogul Empire. From the mid-eighteenth century, the ruling dynasties came from tribesmen in the Kandahar area. Yet even after tearing itself away from the neighboring Asian empires, Afghanistan did not remain united. In the middle of the nineteenth century, rival khanates or principalities once again were struggling for supremacy.

While the outcome of the Russian–Ottoman War and the search for a renewed consensus in Europe at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 fully engrossed Britain, a small Russian force entered Afghanistan, seeking to round out Russia's recently captured Central Asian provinces. Anglo–India refused to tolerate such a prospect. In the early fall of 1878, the Russian mission and its Afghan puppet fled before advancing Anglo–Indian troops. Amir Shir Ali named his eldest son, Yaʿqub, regent at Kabul. In the treaty of peace of May 1879, Yaʿqub Khan surrendered Afghanistan's external sovereignty to Britain, accepted a resident Anglo–Indian mission at Kabul, and ceded the Khyber Pass and other strategic districts to British India. Yaʿqub abdicated five months later.

Not until the midsummer of 1880 did British India finally inaugurate a new regime that took three years to put in place. The authority of Abd al-Rahman Khan, Yaʿqub's cousin, at first did not reach beyond the district of Kabul. After demonstrating his ability to rule and his loyalty to British India, in 1883 he was finally allowed, with Anglo–Indian financial and military support, to take over the districts of Kandahar and Herat, thereby reuniting the country. In June 1883, Abd al-Rahman reaffirmed the status of Afghanistan as a British protectorate, in return receiving assurance that he and his dynasty would be insured against external aggression and that he would receive a monthly subsidy of £10,000 ($50,000) to cover the costs of his troops and related expenses.

The border with British India was drawn in 1893 at a line, traced under the supervision of the foreign secretary in Calcutta, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, that confirmed the cession to the British of the Khyber Pass and adjacent areas. Two years later, the Amu Darya River was accepted as Afghanistan's northeast boundary with Russia's Central Asian Tajik province.

Given the mutual fears aroused by the hardening rival positions, the European imperial strategies had been shaped to shut the adversary out. With boundaries fixed by the turn of the century, Afghanistan was removed temporarily from the zone of British–Russian contention. After the close of the Victorian era in 1901, Britain favored the division of Persia into mutually recognized spheres of imperial influence: Russia's in the north and Britain's in the south, with the two separated by a buffer. The Russian–Japanese war (1904–1906) interrupted exploratory talks that were resumed in the spring of 1906 and concluded in the summer of 1907. The convention divided Persia as originally agreed. Russia recognized Afghanistan as a British protectorate, won equal commercial opportunity, and gained the right to conduct local, nonpolitical frontier relations with Afghanistan.

The Coming of the Oil Age

Baron Julius de Reuter's 1889 bank concession in Persia included—as had his aborted railway concession more than a quarter-century earlier—the exclusive right to search for and develop mineral resources, including oil. To this end, he founded the Persian Bank Mining Rights Corporation, which never seriously pursued oil exploration. A decade later the Persian government canceled the mineral privileges. In 1901, William Knox D'Arcy, a wealthy British speculator with gold-mining experience in Australia, won the sole right to a sixty-year concession to explore for and extract oil across Persia except for the five northern provinces. The first

commercial well in Persia was drilled in 1908, in the southern province of Khuzistan. A year later D'Arcy founded the Anglo–Persian Oil Company (APOC) to activate the concession. By 1912, on Abadan Island in the Shatt al-Arab, APOC put into operation the first units of its refinery to distill crude oil into fuel.

APOC's discovery of oil coincided with the British Admiralty's shift from coal to oil as the fuel for its war vessels. "In the year 1909," First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill reported to the House of Commons on 17 July 1913, "the first flotilla of ocean-going destroyers wholly dependent upon oil was created, and since then, in each successive year, another flotilla of 'oil only' destroyers has been built. There are now built or building more than 100 [such] destroyers. . . . Similarly, during the last five years, oil has been employed in coal-burning battle-ships and cruisers, to enable them to realise their full powers in an emergency."

Churchill's statement prepared Parliament for the British government's partnership in APOC, so as to assure both British India and the Admiralty access to much of their oil needs at reduced cost. In an agreement of 20 May 1914, Britain bought 51 percent of APOC's shares and amended the company statutes to empower the government to veto any policy inconsistent with the national/imperial interest. As a further precaution, British India obtained explicit pledges from the shaykhs of Kuwait (1913) and Bahrain (1914) "never [to] give a[n oil] concession . . . to any one except a person appointed from the British Government."

Oil also figured prominently in the Anglo–German talks of 1913 and 1914. By then three groups were pursuing oil concessions in the Ottoman provinces of Mosul and Baghdad: the Deutsche Bank, APOC, and the Anglo–Saxon Oil Company (a subsidiary of Royal Dutch–Shell, an Anglo–Dutch combine). The Deutsche Bank's claim rested on a 1904 option that had been allowed to lapse; APOC's, on a series of appeals to the Sublime Porte after 1906, with the active backing of the British embassy in Constantinople; and that of Royal Dutch–Shell, on "the good offices of Mr. C. S. Gülbenkian, an Ottoman subject of considerable influence and ability, sometimes called the Talleyrand of oil diplomacy." Britain insisted that APOC be given the largest share. When the two other groups acceded, a deal was framed at the Foreign Office in London on 19 March 1914. APOC procured a 47.5 percent interest in the Turkish Petroleum Company; the Deutsche Bank, 25 percent; the Anglo–Saxon Oil Company, 22.5 percent; and Gulbenkian, "a beneficiary five percent . . . without voting rights." On 28 June 1914, the Sublime Porte promised Britain and Germany that it would issue an oil concession in the Mosul and Baghdad *vilayets.*

The 1914 agreement etched the guidelines that, with appropriate adjustments to reflect the evolving postwar realities, assured Britain the largest share of the output of an international consortium that became operative in 1928, with a French company taking over the German allotment and a group of American companies, half of APOC's.

See also Abd al-Rahman Khan; Al Khalifa Family; Baring, Evelyn; Berlin–Baghdad Railway; Bonaparte, Napoléon; Churchill, Winston S.; D'Arcy Concession (1901); Dual Control; Durand Line; East India Company; Fath Ali Shah Qajar; Ismaʿil ibn Ibrahim; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Lansdowne, Henry Charles Keith Petty Fitzmaurice; Lesseps, Ferdinand de; Naser al-Din Shah; Palmerston, Lord Henry John Temple; Sublime Porte; Suez Canal.

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J. C. HUREWITZ

BRITISH EAST INDIA COMPANY

See EAST INDIA COMPANY

BRITISH–FRENCH OIL AGREEMENT

Agreement that placed Palestine and Iraq under British mandate and the newly partitioned Syria and Lebanon under French mandate.

The British–French Oil Agreement was announced on 5 May 1920 at the meeting of the Supreme Council of the League of Nations. It was held in San Remo, Italy in response to and in repudiation of the March 1920 Damascus resolution of the General Syrian Congress that proclaimed the independence of Syria. Under the agreement, Greater Syria was partitioned into Syria and Lebanon, which were placed under French mandate while Palestine was placed under British mandate. The British mandate for Palestine was charged with implementing the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, which called for the establishment of a homeland for the Jewish people without having to "prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." Under the terms of British–French Agreement, Iraq in its entirety came under British mandate.

The agreement also gave the British permanent control over any entity exploiting Mesopotamian oil, including the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), which was established with the successful manipulation of the Armenian businessman Calouste Gulbenkian. Mesopotamia was strategically important to the British because of its military and commercial routes to India. With its decision before World War I to replace coal with oil as the main source of energy for its naval fleet, Britain planned to control the possible sources of the Iraqi oil even before the TPC was established in 1912. Even though Iraq became a British mandate in 1920, there was no guarantee that TPC was to be given a concession for oil exploration in Iraq. Complications arose from terms of the San Remo Agreement, which stipulated that Iraq could hold 20 percent interest in TPC if it invested. In spite of Iraq's objection, it was decided that Iraq would receive a flat fee as royalties per ton payable in British pounds, but with a gold clause, meaning in units of gold per pound on the day of the agreement. Iraq meant to safeguard the future payments it receives from royalties from possible devaluations of the pound. TPC won the oil exploration concession in Iraq in 1925, and the discovery of oil in the vicinity of Kirkuk occurred on 15 October 1927. TPC was renamed Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1929.

In its quest to have control over Iraq, the British–French Agreement—known also as the San Remo Agreement—was preceded by several relevant developments. The most important one was the conclusion of the secret 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement by Britain, France, and Russia, which divided the spheres of influence over Syria and Iraq, the latter of which would be under the domain of the British. In fact, the French–British Agreement was simply a formulation of what had been secretly agreed. Following the communist revolution in 1917, terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement were revealed by Moscow in order to embarrass both England and France and to give a push to Arab revolt and nationalism.

See also COMPAGNIE FRANÇAISE DES PÉTROLES (CFP); GÜLBENKIAN, CALOUSTE; IRAQ PETROLEUM COMPANY (IPC); PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS; SAN REMO CONFERENCE (1920); SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT (1916).

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ZACHARY KARABELL
UPDATED BY IBRAHIM M. OWEISS

BRIT SHALOM

See BINATIONALISM; MAGNES, JUDAH; RUPPIN, ARTHUR

BROOKINGS REPORT (1975)

Study that encouraged U.S. mediation in Arab–Israeli peace process.

In December 1975 a study group at the Brookings Institution, a liberal Washington, D.C., think tank, issued a report endorsing five principles for an Arab–Israeli peace. The intent of the report was to be more precise than the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 had been in directing U.S. policymakers on the degree of mutual recognition that would be necessary, and it urged U.S. acceptance of Israel's 1967 borders and Palestinian national aspirations.

The sixteen-member Middle East Study Group met monthly from June 1974, particularly encouraged by Princeton University sociologist Morrow Berger and former diplomat Charles Yost, who argued that the outcome of the 1967 and 1973 Arab–Israel wars favored a U.S. peace initiative. The group balanced pro-Arab and pro-Israeli perspectives, and included academics and former U.S. officials and ambassadors from Republican and Democrat administrations, including Robert Bowie, Philip Klutznick, and Najeeb Halaby (father of the future Queen Noor of Jordan).

The report's deliberately general compromises were widely taken as an indication that solid grounds existed for a phased settlement between Israel and its neighbors. Moreover, two key study-group members—Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Adviser, and William Quandt, National Security Council Director for Middle Eastern Affairs—subsequently helped to guide Jimmy Carter's administration to the Camp David Accords (1978). The report complemented Brzezinski's work with Carter on a wider security "architecture" at the Trilateral Commission (a non-governmental organization established in 1973 to promote coordination between North American, Western European, and Japanese foreign policies), encouraged the administration's inclusion of the 1967 borders and Palestinian autonomy in U.S. policy, and directly informed the Camp David discussions, at which Brzezinski and Quandt played active roles.

See also CAMP DAVID ACCORDS (1978); CARTER, JIMMY.

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Quandt, William. *Decade of Decisions: American Foreign Policy Toward the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

GEORGE R. WILKES

BROWNE, EDWARD GRANVILLE

[1862–1926]

British Iranologist.

Born of a wealthy Gloucestershire family, E. G. Browne was educated at Eton and Cambridge, England, where he qualified as a physician. In 1877, his interest stimulated by the Russian–Ottoman War, he began a largely informal study of Turkish, followed by Persian and Arabic. Elected a fellow of Pembroke College at Cambridge, he spent the year 1887–1888 in Iran, which he described in *A Year amongst the Persians* (London, 1893, reprint 1926). On his return he was appointed university lecturer in Persian, then in 1902 Sir Thomas Adams Professor of Arabic. He married in 1906 and remained in Cambridge until his death.

As a rich man holding a virtual sinecure, Browne was able to direct his enormous energy and phenomenal memory into an almost virgin field. In

Britain, Middle East studies had formerly been concerned mainly with Arabic. Persian studies, a legacy via the "back door" from the Mogul Empire (of India, which had become part of the British Empire following the Sepoy mutiny of 1857), had been confined to the few literary classics used in examinations for the Indian Civil Service. Browne unlocked the "front door" to post-Islamic Persia (now Iran) and to the full range of New Persian studies—including the modern spoken and literary language, religious history, and politics.

His most important contribution is the four-volume *A Literary History of Persia* (1902, 1906, 1920, 1924), still a valuable resource for scholars. It quotes extensively from original sources and from information provided by his Iranian friends and correspondents, including major writers and scholars of the time such as Ali Akbar Dehkhoda and Mohammad Qazvini. Apart from his large scholarly output, Browne also promoted Oriental studies at Cambridge by attracting prospective diplomats and administrators to an academic training; these included later historians of the Middle East, such as Laurence Lockhart and Sir Reader Bullard.

Even before his journey to Iran, Browne had taken a sympathetic interest in the Babis movement (c. 1844–1853) and its successors, the Azali and Bahaʾi faiths. He wrote a detailed account of these for the Royal Asiatic Society in 1889, met with leading adherents of the sects (especially Azalis), and published some of their works. He is best remembered in Iran for his active support of the constitutional movement from 1905 to 1911, which was characteristic of his liberal sympathies with all aspirants to self-determination. In 1908 he helped found the Persia Committee, composed of prominent members of the British Parliament (MPs); through this pressure group, in lectures, and in letters to the press, Browne sharply criticized his own government's and Russia's machinations in Iran. His book *The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia* (1914) is not merely a supplement to his *Literary History* but an avowedly partisan promotion of the democratic ideals he saw in the vigorous free press of constitutionalist Iran.

Browne was awarded the Persian Order of the Lion and Sun and, on his sixtieth birthday, he received accolades from his Iranian admirers and his British colleagues. Both as a scholar and an activist, he did much to present a sympathetic picture of Iran's people and culture to a Western public, whose view of the Middle East was already being shaped chiefly by the dictates of geopolitics, and petroleum.

See also BABIS; BAHAʾI FAITH; DEHKHODA, ALI AKBAR.

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JOHN R. PERRY

BUBER, MARTIN

[1878–1965]

Religious and social philosopher.

Martin Buber is most prominently known for his volume of 1923, *I and Thou (Ich und Du),* in which he introduced his concept of dialogue, or an attentive and sympathetic listening to the Other, in which one suspends one's pre-established opinions and categories of perception and judgment, thus allowing the Other (*qua,* Thou, that is, an autonomous subject) to stand before oneself in the fullness of his or her existential reality. A life-long Zionist, Buber applied this principle to the "Arab Question," concluding that the land the Jews call *Eretz Yisrael* and the Arabs, Palestine, is "a land of two peoples." The fact that both Jew and Arab regard the land as their home and birthright must serve as the moral and political basis of a just and humane solution to the conflict between the two peoples. Accordingly, he supported binationalism, which envisioned shared political sovereignty over Palestine, with neither national community dominating the other.

In 1942, Buber joined Judah Magnes (1877–1948), then president of Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in founding the *Ichud* (or *Ihud,* i.e., Union), a political party that regarded "the Union between the Jewish and Arab peoples as essential for the upbuilding of Palestine." In a testimony before the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee, which convened in Jerusalem in March 1946 to explore solutions to the question of Palestine, Buber presented the vision of the *Ihud*: ". . .Jewish settlement [in

Palestine] must oust no Arab peasant, Jewish immigration must not cause the political status of the present inhabitants to deteriorate. . . A regenerated Jewish people in Palestine has not only to aim at living peacefully together with the Arab people, but also at a comprehensive cooperation with it in developing the country." Earlier, shortly after his emigration to Palestine in March 1938, in an open letter to Mohandas K. Gandhi, he set forth the presuppositions of this vision. It is the duty of the Jews, he explained, "to understand and to honor the claim which is opposed to ours" and to seek to reconcile the two claims that tragically divide Jew and Arab. For "we love this land and we believe in its future; and, seeing that such love and faith are surely present also on the other side, a union in the common service of the Land must be within the range of the possible." Although the political circumstances would radically change with the establishment of the state of Israel and, its wake, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Arabs, this remained Buber's conviction.

See also Magnes, Judah.

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Paul Mendes-Flohr

BUBIYAN ISLAND

Island at the head of the Persian/Arabian Gulf, off the north coast of Kuwait and west of the Shatt al-Arab.

Separated from Kuwait by a narrow waterway, Bubiyan is Kuwait's largest island. Along with al-Warba Island, it lies at the mouth of Iraq's Gulf port, Umm Qasr. Both islands have been the focus of Iraq's territorial claims. In 1990, before invading Kuwait and announcing an annexation of Kuwaiti territory, Iraq's President Saddam Hussein demanded that Kuwait cede its sovereignty over both islands. Following Iraq's defeat in spring of 1991 by a United Nations coalition of forces, and the restoration of Kuwait's ruling Al Sabah family, this boundary dispute cooled but has not been settled.

See also Al Sabah Family; Hussein, Saddam; Persian (Arabian) Gulf.

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Emile A. Nakhleh

BUCHAREST, TREATY OF (1812)

Treaty ending the Ottoman–Russian war by which Russia returned territory to the empire.

After six years of war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, the Treaty of Bucharest was concluded between 16 and 18 May 1812. With Napoléon Bonaparte, emperor of France, prepared to attack Russia, Tsar Alexander I renounced Russian rights to the Romanian principalities and evacuated most of the Black Sea coast territory that Russia had won during the war, excepting Bessarabia. The treaty also contained a provision for autonomy of the Serbs, who had rebelled against the Ottomans.

See also Bonaparte, Napoléon; Russian–Ottoman Wars.

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Zachary Karabell

BUDAPEST CONVENTION (1877)

Agreement between Austria and Russia regarding Russia's planned war against Ottoman Empire.

Determined to amend the decisions made by the 1876 Istanbul Conference, Russia made plans for war against the Ottoman Empire. By the Budapest Convention of 15 January 1877, Austria agreed to remain neutral in the coming war in return for the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Provision was also made for the partition of the Balkans in the event the Ottoman Empire collapsed.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

BUGEAUD DE LA PICONNERIE, THOMAS-ROBERT

[1784–1849]

French military officer; governor-general of Algeria, 1841–1847.

In the early nineteenth century, North Africa was under the Ottoman Empire, but local rulers sponsored corsairs, pirates, and the slave trade in their coastal towns. The Europeans tried to salvage Mediterranean shipping from attack and end the taking of Christian sailors as slaves. In 1830, a French force took Algiers, but by 1832, local leader Abd al-Qadir of Mascara defeated the French and was recognized as dey of Mascara. Abd al-Qadir repeatedly defeated French forces from 1835 to 1837.

Marshal Thomas-Robert Bugeaud de la Piconnerie was sent to negotiate the Treaty of Tafna between France and Abd al-Qadir (30 May 1837), which abandoned most of Algeria to Abd al-Qadir. In 1839, the French broke the treaty, and in 1841 Bugeaud led a large force on the offensive against Abd al-Qadir. Bugeaud served as governor-general from 1841 to 1847. He was recalled to France and forced to resign in 1847 for disobeying orders; ironically that was the year that Abd al-Qadir surrendered to the French.

See also ABD AL-QADIR; CORSAIRS; SLAVE TRADE.

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KENNETH J. PERKINS

BU HAMARA

[1865–1909]

The nickname of al-Jilali ibn Idris al-Zarhuni, a Moroccan pretender to the Alawi throne.

Initially a minor official in the Alawite dynasty in Morocco, Bu Hamara (Arabic, "the man with the she-ass") was imprisoned in 1894 on charges of forgery. Between 1901 and 1903, passing himself off as a brother of the sultan Abd al-Aziz, he rallied the forces of the Ghiyata tribal confederation in the middle Atlas mountains. His activity can be understood as one in a series of rural movements opposed to heavy-handed policies by the *makhzan* government. Bu Hamara effectively controlled northeastern Morocco until his defeat in 1908 and execution in 1909 by the new sultan, Mulay Hafid (Abd al-Hafiz).

See also ALAWITE DYNASTY; HAFID, MULAY.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON

BUHAYRA

Egypt's westernmost delta province (governorate).

This province has existed as an administrative unit since Fatimid times. Nearest of Egypt's rural provinces to Alexandria, it was known while under the Mamluks and under the Ottoman Empire as a center of rebellious bedouin Arab tribes. Its capital is Damanhur. The estimated 1986 population of Buhayra was 1.8 million. Of its entire area, some 4,000 square miles (10,150 sq km) are in the Nile delta.

See also DAMANHUR; MAMLUKS.

ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

BU JANAH FAMILY

See BUSNACH FAMILY

BULGARIAN HORRORS

Phrase coined by British politician Gladstone to describe the atrocities perpetrated by the Turks in putting down the revolt of the Bulgarians in 1876.

In 1875, a revolt began in Bosnia and Herzegovina that spread to neighboring Bulgaria the next year. Public opinion in Serbia and Montenegro soon caused them to declare war against the Ottoman

Empire in an effort to intervene on behalf of their fellow Slavs. Meanwhile, eyewitness reports revealing that more than 10,000 Christians had been slaughtered in Bulgaria by Turkish irregulars reached England, which had fought the Crimean War to preserve the Ottoman Empire and was intensely interested in the conflict. A wave of moral indignation swept over the country, fired by the revelations of the liberal press, the high point of which was an indictment by William Ewart Gladstone of Turkish rule in his pamphlet, "Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East." In it he argued passionately in favor of autonomy for the empire's Christian subjects, with little effect.

Although Gladstone was successful in rallying public opinion in Western Europe on behalf of the Bulgarians, the situation there was not resolved until after Russia attacked Turkey in 1877. In the following year, the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin established Bulgaria as an autonomous principality under Turkish sovereignty.

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JOHN MICGIEL

BULGUR

See FOOD: BULGUR

BUNCHE, RALPH J.

[1903–1971]

U.S. diplomat.

Ralph Bunche was born in Detroit, Michigan. His father was an itinerant barber. Orphaned at eleven, he was brought up by his grandmother in the Watts district of Los Angeles. Success at school both as student and athlete took him to the University of California, Los Angeles and, as a graduate student, to Harvard University. Colonialism was the subject of his Harvard doctoral thesis, and he did field work in Cameroon, French Togo, South Africa, Kenya, and Congo.

His writings on the race problem in the United States are part of the earliest literature of the Civil Rights movement. In *A World View of Race* (1936) he made a spirited connection between the nature and causes of the race problem in United States and of the international phenomenon of colonialism. In 1935, with A. Philip Randolph, he founded the National Negro Congress to give a voice to wider spectrum of the black population. He was chief assistant and researcher to Gunnar Myrdal in writing the classic *An Ameran Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy,* eventually published in 1944.

During World War II Bunche worked in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). In 1944 he moved to the State Department and was its first black official. There, and at the 1945 San Francisco Conference, he was the principal drafter of Chapters XI (Non-self-governing Territories) and XII (The International Trusteeship System) of the United Nations Charter.

In 1946 Bunche set up the Trusteeship Division of the United Nations Secretariat. In 1947 in Palestine, he wrote both the majority (partition) proposal and the minority (federation) proposal of the UN Special Committee on Palestine. In 1948, as chief assistant to the UN mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, he set up the UN Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine. When Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem by the Stern Gang in September 1948, Bunche took over as mediator and negotiated armistice agreements between Israel and its four Arab neighbors. For this feat he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. From 1953, as Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Bunche was the chief political adviser to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, and to Hammarskjöld's successor, U Thant. During the Suez Crisis in 1956, he set up the first UN peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force in Middle East (UNEF I) and organized and directed subsequent peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, the Congo, and Cyprus. He personally led the largest of these, in the Congo, in 1960.

Bunche's complete integrity and fair-mindedness were universally acknowledged and respected, and his intellectual grasp, ingenuity, and determination as a negotiator were widely admired. He turned down efforts by successive U.S. presidents to woo him away from the United Nations. At his death in 1971, U Thant hailed him as "an international institution in his own right."

See also BERNADOTTE, FOLKE; UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE, 1947 (UNSCOP); UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (UNTSO).

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BRIAN URQUHART

BUND

Jewish socialist workers' association.

The Bund (full name in Yiddish: Algemeyner Yidisher Arbeiter-Bund in Rusland und Poylen, translated as "General association of Jewish workers in Russia and Poland") was founded in Vilna (now Vilnius, Lithuania) in 1897. It was opposed to the emigration of Jews from Eastern Europe and asserted that the survival and development of Jewish life was dependent, instead, on Jews joining the struggle for social change and social justice in their respective countries of origin. It was staunchly opposed to Zionism as well as to the Zionist emphasis on Hebrew as the Jewish national language. It promoted the value of Yiddish. It was originally neutral on the notion of a collective Jewish national identity, but in 1901 it endorsed the ethnicity of Russia's Jews, and in October 1905 it adopted the notion Jewish cultural autonomy.

After the Bolshevik Revolution (1917), government repression led to the Bund's demise in the Soviet Union. The Bund continued to play an influential role in Poland until the Nazi invasion in 1939 and the beginning of World War II. After the war, the remnants of the Bund in Europe and the United States continued to oppose vigorously the establishment of a Jewish state.

See also ZIONISM.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

BURAYMI OASIS DISPUTE

Territorial dispute over the oasis villages in the Buraymi region, 1952–1974.

The oasis settlements of the Buraymi region have been coveted by regional powers for centuries. The principal contenders for sovereignty during the nineteenth century were the rulers of Muscat, Dubai, and Abu Dhabi, and the Al Saʿud. In the first half of the twentieth century there were nine villages in the Buraymi region, of which three were claimed by Oman, six by Abu Dhabi.

The scramble for oil helped to intensify territorial claims in the region after World War II, and the Buraymi dispute arose when the Saudis aggressively asserted their claim to the oasis region. In 1952, in support of claims by Abu Dhabi and Muscat, a British official established himself in the village of Buraymi. In opposition, a group of Saudi officials occupied the village of Khamasa. With military conflict looming, a standstill agreement was signed in 1952, and an international tribunal created in 1954. Disagreements among the parties precipitated the collapse of the tribunal in 1955. The rulers of Oman and Abu Dhabi subsequently sent a military force to occupy the Buraymi villages and expel the Saudis. In 1972 the United Arab Emirates and Oman divided the Buraymi oasis among themselves. In 1974 Abu Dhabi ceded to Saudi Arabia a territorial corridor to the Persian Gulf south and east of Qatar in exchange for recognition of the Abu Dhabi–Omani claim to Buraymi.

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MALCOLM C. PECK
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

BURCKHARDT, JOHANN LUDWIG

[1784–1817]

Swiss explorer; known in the Arab world as Ibrahim ibn Abdullah.

Born in Switzerland to an Anglophile father, Burckhardt was educated at Leipzig University in Germany, then hired by the London-based Association for Promoting the Discovery of Africa. To perfect his disguise as a Muslim traveler, he gained their approval to study Islam in the Middle East. In this manner, he became the first European to produce detailed eyewitness accounts of Mecca and Medina and rediscovered Petra in 1812. Burckhardt wrote *Travels in Syria and the Holy Land* (1822), *Travels in Arabia* (1829), and *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys* (1830).

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BENJAMIN BRAUDE

BUREAU OF TRANSLATION

Ottoman agency (Bab-i Ali Tercüme Odasi) that also served as a training ground for diplomats and government officials.

Having long employed Greeks as translators, in 1821 the Ottoman Empire reacted to the Greek war of independence (1821–1830) by dismissing the last Greek translator of the Imperial Divan, appointing a Bulgarian convert to Islam to replace him. In 1821, Mahmut II created the translation office, which led an obscure existence for the next twelve years—serving more as a school than as a translation bureau, because few Muslims then knew European languages well enough to translate. Upgraded during the Ottoman–Egyptian diplomatic crisis of 1832 and 1833 (during which Muhammad Ali of Egypt demanded all Syria as a reward for his aid in Greece), the translation office assumed an important role in preparing young men to serve abroad as embassy secretaries; some of these later became ambassadors, foreign ministers, even grand viziers. Primarily a diplomatic translation bureau, the office became part of the Foreign Ministry (Hariciye Nezareti) when it was organized in 1836.

For a generation, the translation office was one of the best sources of Western education in Istanbul, and men trained there dominated the ranks of reforming statesmen, Westernizing intellectuals, and opposition ideologues. Patterns of bureaucratic mobility changed within the Ottoman civil service, but this office kept its prestige as a place to begin a career, and it continued to function until the end of the empire (1922).

See also GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; MAHMUD II; MUHAMMAD ALI; OTTOMAN EMPIRE: CIVIL SERVICE.

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CARTER V. FINDLEY

BUREAUX ARABES

French military administration in Algeria, 1830–1847.

The expansion of French power and influence in Algeria after the July 1830 conquest of Algiers necessitated intermediaries besides interpreters to deal with both Arab and Berber tribes. A systematic administration run by specially trained military officers was structured by Governor-General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud de la Piconnerie and established by decree in 1844 to execute this service. These *bureaux arabes* provided the governor-general with mediation and intelligence. The officers viewed their operations as a civilizing mission and were often paternalistic and protective of native rights. The civilian colons (European settlers in Algeria) resented this flaunted example of "rule by the sabre." After Bugeaud's departure (1847), the personnel and performance of the *bureaux arabes* declined. A French decree in October 1870 restructured the administration, which effectively ended the system though an analogous organization continued in south Algeria. The military resumed a similar political and social mission with the Sections Administratives Spécialisées (SAS) during the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962).

See also Algeria; Algerian War of Independence; Algiers; Bugeaud de la Piconnerie, Thomas-Robert; Colons.

Phillip C. Naylor

BURG, AVRAHAM

[1955–]

Israeli political leader.

Avraham Burg was born in Jerusalem in 1955, the son of Yosef Burg, veteran and founder of the National Religious Party. After serving in the Paratroop Division of the Israel Defense Force, Burg became a leader of the Yesh Gvul protest movement against the war in Lebanon. In 1985, Prime Minister Shimon Peres appointed Burg to serve as his adviser on Diaspora Affairs. Burg held that position until 1988, when he was elected to the Knesset with the Alignment Party. While in the Knesset Burg served on several key committees, including the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Finance Committee and the State Control Committee. He was reelected to the Knesset in 1992, and continued to serve as chairman of the Knesset Education and Culture Committee.

In 1995 Burg was elected chairman of the executive of the Jewish Agency for Israel and the World Zionist Organization and resigned from the Knesset. As chairman of the Jewish Agency for Israel he led policy initiatives in restitution of Jewish property stolen during the Holocaust and religious pluralism and tolerance among Jews. He held that position until 1999, when he once again ran for the Knesset on the One Israel list, a new political alignment including the former Labor Party. After being reelected Burg was chosen in July 1999 to be speaker of the Fifteenth Knesset.

See also Burg, Yosef.

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Gregory S. Mahler

BURG, YOSEF

[1909–1999]

Israeli politician.

Born and educated in Germany, Burg received a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Leipzig and later was ordained as a rabbi at the Rabbinical Seminary in Berlin. Emigrating to Palestine in 1939, he was a research fellow at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. From 1945 to 1949, he worked in Paris as director of the Religious Rescue Projects in Europe, caring for Holocaust survivors.

He served in the Knesset from 1949 until 1988. He helped found the National Religious Party (NRP). From 1951 to 1986 Burg served in every Israeli government; he was minister of health (1951–1952), posts (1952–1958), social welfare (1959–1970), interior (1970–1984), and religious affairs (1984–1986). He was relatively moderate on Arab-Israel relations. As a member of Menachem Begin's 1977 Likud government, he participated in negotiations with Egypt following the Camp David Accords. Burg resigned from the government in October 1986, to make way for younger leadership when Yitzhak Shamir succeeded Shimon Peres as prime minister in the rotation of the National Unity government.

In 1977 Burg was elected president of the World Mizrahi Movement. He was selected as a member of the Presidium of the Zionist Actions Committee in 1992. He died in October 1999.

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Zachary Karabell
Updated by Gregory S. Mahler

BURJ AL-BARAJNA

See Human Rights

BURLA, YEHUDA

[1886–1969]

First modern Hebrew writer of Middle Eastern Jewish descent.

Yehuda Burla was born in Jerusalem, the child of a family of Turkish rabbis and scholars who settled in Ottoman Palestine in the eighteenth century. He was educated at yeshivas (Hebrew schools) and at the Jerusalem Teachers' Seminary. He served as an interpreter for the Ottoman Empire during World War I. After the war, during the British mandate over Palestine, he directed and taught at various Hebrew schools. From 1930, he headed the Arab department of Histadrut, was envoy of Keren ha-Yesod to Latin America, was director of Arab affairs in the ministry of minorities, and served as president of the Hebrew Authors' Association.

After reading the works of modern Hebrew writers, Burla realized that they dealt exclusively with Ashkenazim. He was therefore determined to present the rich world of Middle Eastern Jewry. His first novella, *Lunah* (1918), is a love story among Sephardim in old Jerusalem. His first novel, *Ishto ha-Senu'ah* (1928, His hated wife), concerns a man who hates his wife but, fearing economic ruin, does not divorce her. He also wrote about bedouins in *Beli Kochav* (1937, Without a star). Burla was a realist; his style is narrative and the mood evoked is romantic.

See also Adot Ha-Mizrah; Histadrut.

Ann Kahn

BURNOOSE

See Clothing

BURQAN OIL FIELD, AL-

See Suwaydiya Oil Fields

BURSA

Fourth largest city of Turkey, in northwest Anatolia.

Bursa was the first major conquest of the early Ottomans in 1324. A modest Byzantine provincial market town, it quickly developed as the first capital of the growing Ottoman Empire, featuring many of the finest examples of early Ottoman architecture. Positioned on the northern foothills of Uludağ (Bithynian Mount Olympus) close to the Sea of Marmara, with easy access to the Mediterranean and on the natural extension of Anatolian routes, it became a major international commercial center, where European, mainly Genoese, merchants bought silk and other Eastern goods. It was also widely known for its abundant hot springs and magnificent baths.

Even after the conquest of Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 1453, when it became the definitive capital of the empire, Bursa remained an imperial city and a thriving international market, with significant manufacture of cotton and silk textiles, in addition to its long-established role as terminus for long-distance Asian caravan trade. With a population of about 40,000 in the sixteenth century, it was the largest city in Anatolia. Bursa's growth was hampered in the seventeenth century as a result of the Ottoman policy of promoting İzmir as the major port for Asian and European trade, but the city retained its position as a prominent, if less prosperous, cultural, manufacturing, and commercial center. During the Tanzimat period of free trade, with competition from industrialized Europe, Bursa's silk and cotton textile manufacture suffered significantly, but both the Ottoman policy of industrialization and private investment in steam-powered plants allowed recovery of local production before the end of the century. Bursa became the seat of an enlarged province incorporating several northwest Anatolian districts. Abdülhamit II's efforts to glorify the early Ottoman heritage also contributed to the city's growing fortunes.

Bursa was occupied by the Greek army after World War I, and the city suffered during the ensuing Turkish War of Independence, especially with the destructive retreat of the Greek army in 1922 and the loss of its non-Muslim population. As a result of the state-led industrialization during the 1920s and 1930s, Bursa recovered its textile manufacturing prominence, but its real growth came in the 1960s, with the establishment by private enterprises first of large-scale canning and food processing and then of the automotive industry. In 2000, Bursa was the third largest contributor to Turkey's gross domestic product, with its population of 2,106,687, of whom 1,288,068 reside in the city center. It also ranked fifth among Turkish cities

with respect to socioeconomic development. Even with this rapid industrial transformation, however, Bursa still maintains its role as a spa and a heritage center; Uludağ has recently become a favorite winter resort and its highland pastures have regained their early-Ottoman importance for summering. Uludağ University, opened in 1975, aims to foster the city's traditional position of cultural and intellectual prominence.

See also Abdülhamit II; Anatolia; Istanbul; İzmir; Ottoman Empire; Tanzimat.

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I. Metin Kunt
Updated by Burçak Keskin-Kozat

BURTON, RICHARD FRANCIS

[1821–1890]

British explorer, orientalist, author, and consul.

Richard Francis Burton was born in England the son of a gentleman army officer and raised in Europe. He was expelled from Oxford University and became an intelligence officer in the army of the British East India Company, before being sent home after exposing the common resort of British soldiers to Indian brothels. During years of exploration and service to the British Empire, Burton learned forty languages and dialects, mostly by mixing with locals in India, the Middle East, Africa, the Americas, and Europe. A consistent admirer of Arab Islamic culture, in 1853 Burton posed as an Afghan doctor and joined the *hajj* (pilgrimage), gaining celebrity status in Britain after publishing his *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah* (1855–1856). In 1856 he was sent to explore the Nile by the British Foreign Office. This led to a competition with John Speke over who could find the headwaters or source of the Nile; Speke won. Burton went on to serve as British consul in West Africa (1861), South America (1865–1868), and Damascus (1869–1871).

His last years were spent publishing acclaimed translations of Arabic and Indian literature on religion, society, and sexuality, notably the *Kama Sutra* (1883) and "The Arabian Nights," which was published as *The Thousand Nights and a Night* (1885). Burton also published much-noted works on Africa, encouraging a wave of British explorers to follow in his stead.

See also East India Company.

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Benjamin Braude
Updated by George R. Wilkes

BUSH, GEORGE HERBERT WALKER

[1924–]

U.S. president (1989–1993).

George H. W. Bush was born in the state of Connecticut. He was a decorated naval combat pilot in the Pacific during the Second World War despite the fact that he was the youngest pilot in the U.S. Navy. After the war he graduated from Yale University, and moved to Texas to work as an oil executive. Bush later entered public life and served in the U.S. House of Representatives, and was director of the Central Intelligence Agency, American ambassador to the United Nations, and vice president of the United States, among other positions.

During Bush's presidency, the United States undertook several major initiatives in the Middle East. He continued the first official U.S. dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization, which had begun in December 1988, the month before Bush took office, and which lasted until June 1990. The U.S.-led military engagement that defeated Iraq's occupation forces in Kuwait during the Gulf Crisis of 1990–1991 marked the first major American military involvement in the Middle East. Following Iraq's defeat, Bush decided to take advantage

of the new regional climate to convene the Madrid Conference in October 1991, the first face-to-face Arab–Israeli peace negotiations since the 1979 Israel–Egypt peace treaty. The United States and the Soviet Union presided over both bilateral and multilateral talks among Israeli and Arab delegations, including Palestinians for the first time as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

See also Baker, James A.; Gulf Crisis (1990–1991); Madrid Conference (1991); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

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Michael R. Fischbach

BUSH, GEORGE WALKER

[1946–]

U.S. president (2001–); dramatically increased America's role in the Middle East.

The son of President George H. W. Bush, George W. Bush earned a B.A. in history from Yale University in 1968 and an M.B.A. from Harvard in 1975. Like his father, he worked in the petroleum industry and he later served as governor of Texas (1995–2001). George W. Bush was elected president as a result of controversial elections of November 2000, in which his opponent, Albert Gore, actually received more popular votes than Bush but failed to win the presidency after the U.S. Supreme Court intervened in a disagreement over which candidate had carried the vote in Florida.

Attacks against targets in New York and Washington, D.C., mounted by the al-Qaʿida organization of Osama bin Ladin on 11 September 2001, profoundly changed the Bush presidency and America's role in the Middle East and southwest Asia. Bush's earlier disdain for involvement in the region's complexities gave way to his need to respond to the biggest terrorist attack in American history. He ordered the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, which succeeded in destroying the government of the Taliban and severely disrupting the al-Qaʿida network, which had used the country as a base for training and operations. The United States then worked with the United Nations in trying to rebuild the country around President Hamid Karzai. Beginning in 2002, Bush dramatically escalated pressure on Iraq and its president, Saddam Hussein. Claiming that Iraq still possessed weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons, he argued that the country constituted a threat to U.S. security. Despite massive global opposition, even from traditional American allies like Germany and France, U.S. and British forces invaded the country in March 2003 and overthrew Saddam Hussein's government.

Bush also picked up the efforts of his predecessor, Bill Clinton, to forge peace between Israel and the Palestinians. He became the first U.S. president openly to call for the creation of a Palestinian state, although his administration refused to deal with Palestinian Authority leader Yasir Arafat and pressured Arafat to cede some of his powers to a newly created prime minister's position. On the other hand, Bush was willing to work with Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon, whom he called a "man of peace." The Bush administration, along with the United Nations, Russia, and the European Union, developed a "Road Map" for peace between the two sides, which Bush tried to push in 2003.

See also Arafat, Yasir; bin Ladin, Osama; Hussein, Saddam; Karzai, Hamid; Qaʿida, al-; Sharon, Ariel; Taliban.

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Michael R. Fischbach

BUSNACH FAMILY

Prominent Jewish family of Algeria.

The Busnach (in Arabic, Bu Janah) family was one of three Livornese (Italy) Jewish families (the others were the Boucharas and the Cohen-Baqris) that were prominent in Algerian commerce and politics throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth

centuries. The patriarch of the clan, Naphtali Busnach, established a shipping business in Algiers in the early 1720s. He was also involved in the ransoming of European captives of the corsairs (Barbary pirates).

His grandson Naphtali II was the right-hand man of Mustafa Bey of Constantine. When Mustafa was chosen dey in 1797, Naphtali became his chief courtier. At about the same time, Naphtali went into partnership with Joseph Baqri, with whom he was related by ties of marriage, and the firm of Baqri & Busnach came to hold a virtual monopoly on trade with the regency. Naphtali was appointed *muqaddam* (chief) of the Jewish community by the dey in 1800. Naphtali, who had survived one attempt on his life during a failed coup in 1801, was assassinated by a janissary in 1805. The incident touched off anti-Jewish riots among the Ottoman troops. Most of the Busnachs fled to Livorno at this time, although their relatives, the Baqris, remained in Algiers.

See also CORSAIRS.

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NORMAN STILLMAN

BUSTANI, SULAYMAN

[1856–1925]

Ottoman writer and government official.

Born to a Maronite Christian family in the village of Bkashtin in the Shuf region of Mount Lebanon, Sulayman Bustani was educated from 1863 to 1871 in the National School (al-Madrasa al-Wataniyya) in Beirut (founded by his relative Butrus al-Bustani). There he studied English and French in addition to Arabic and Turkish. He traveled extensively in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and beyond, to Persia and India. He assisted Butrus al-Bustani and his sons, Salim and Najib, in writing and editing the first Arabic encyclopedia, *Daʾirat al-maʿarif,* and contributed to the periodical *al-Muqtataf,* published in Cairo, Egypt. In 1904, he published his most important contribution to the interaction between Arabic culture and Greek literature—the first Arabic translation of Homer's *Iliad.*

In 1908, after the coming of the Young Turks to power in Istanbul and the beginning of the second Ottoman constitutional period, Bustani published *Ibra wa Dhikra aw al-Dawla al-Uthmaniyya Qabla al-Dustur wa Baʿdahu* (A lesson and a memory, or the Ottoman state before the constitution and after it), which implicitly criticized the autocratic rule of Sultan Abdülhamit II and sang the praises of liberal policies in all aspects of political, social, economic, and religious life. He hammered away at the theme of allegiance to the Ottoman state and criticized Western educational institutions in the country, which undermined that allegiance. Bustani also believed that the best way to eradicate religious fanaticism was to make the Christians serve alongside the Muslims in the Ottoman army. Further, he thought the best way to eradicate ethnic conflict was to spread the Turkish language among the population by making it mandatory in all the empire's schools.

In 1908, Bustani was elected to serve as deputy for the province of Beirut in the lower chamber of deputies in Istanbul; in 1911, he became a member of the upper chamber. In 1913, he was appointed minister for commerce, agriculture, forests, and mines—he resigned, however, at the end of the following year when the Committee for Union and Progress, the effective Ottoman power, decided to enter World War I on the side of Germany. Bustani then belonged to a group of Ottoman officials who held that a policy of neutrality would serve the empire best.

See also ABDÜLHAMIT II; COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS; YOUNG TURKS.

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MAHMOUD HADDAD

BUTAYNA TRIBE

See TRIBES AND TRIBALISM: BUTAYNA TRIBE

BUYUK MILLET MECLISI

See TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

C

CAIRO

The capital of Egypt, the largest city in the Middle East and Africa, and a major political, religious, and cultural hub for the Arab, Islamic, and African worlds.

A city with fertile hinterland and a crossroads location for river, sea, and land trade has flourished near the juncture of the Nile valley of Upper Egypt and the delta of Lower Egypt for five thousand years. In 640 C.E. the conquering Muslim Arabs founded al-Fustat (now *Old Cairo* to Westerners), which superseded the Babylon of the Romans and its predecessor across the river, the Memphis of the pharaohs. In 969 the invading Fatimids founded al-Qahira (the Victorious), and Cairo acquired its current name and resumed its ancient role as an imperial center. (In Arabic, *Misr* has long been used interchangeably for both Egypt and Cairo.) The Fatimids established the renowned mosque-university al-Azhar, and Salah al-Din (Saladin) of the Ayyubid dynasty built the hilltop Citadel, which remained the seat of power until the mid-nineteenth century.

Its population weakened by epidemics and the ruling Mamluks' internecine warfare, Cairo fell to the Ottomans in 1517. By the seventeenth century the Cape of Good Hope route had deprived Cairo (reduced once more to the status of a provincial city) of much of its spice trade. Europeans no longer spoke with awe of the city Egyptians called the Mother of the World. In 1798 the cartographers of Napoléon Bonaparte's military expedition found a city of a quarter of a million people, half of the population of Cairo at its fourteenth-century peak. The narrow, irregular streets of the preindustrial city served pedestrians, riders, and pack animals well enough, and balconies provided welcome shade. Gates that closed at night and dead-end alleys marked off city quarters, which were defined mainly along religious, ethnic, and occupational lines. Waqf endowments supported mosques, schools, Sufi lodges, baths, fountains, and hospitals.

The military, economic, administrative, and educational reforms introduced during Muhammad Ali's reign (1805–1848) left few external marks on Cairo, and the city's population, checked by epidemics and competition from burgeoning Alexan-

Cairo's famous al-Azhar mosque was built in 970 C.E. on the orders of the Fatimid caliph al-Muʿizz. Shortly after its completion, the mosque became known as a center of religious and secular learning, and the university which sprang up around it is generally considered to be the oldest in the world. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

dria, remained stagnant until the middle of the century. After 1850, however, the population grew because of lower mortality rates, an influx of people from the countryside, and the immigration of European and Levantine entrepreneurs. The Alexandria-Cairo Railroad and the Suez Canal, whose construction was completed respectively in 1855 and 1869, quickened the pace of life in Cairo. The city's share of Egypt's total population, which had dipped from 5.8 percent in 1800 to a low of 4.7 percent in 1865 (when Alexandria was in full bloom), rose to 6.9 percent in 1897. Today it accounts for over a quarter of the total population of Egypt.

Under Muhammad Ali's grandson Ismaʿil (r. 1863–1879) and the British occupation (1882–1922), the unused space between Cairo and its river ports Bulaq and Old Cairo was developed. Inspired by the municipal improvements effected in Paris by Baron Georges Haussmann and determined to impress the Europeans at the ceremonies celebrating the Suez Canal's completion, Ismaʿil instructed engineer Ali Mubarak to equip the suburb Ismaʿiliyya with Parisian-style boulevards, traffic hubs, gardens, palaces, and even an opera house. Ismaʿil had two boulevards for vehicle traffic cut through the old city before the bankruptcy of Egypt intervened and cost him the throne. European connoisseurs of "Oriental Cairo" persuaded his successor to found the Comité de Preservation des Monuments de l'Art Arabe (1881), and preservationists still fight to save some monuments and neighborhoods in Cairo from relentless overpopulation, decay, and demolition for urban renewal.

Under the British, Cairo's European population (30,000, or 6 percent of the city's population in 1897) dominated big business and filled the fashionable new quarters of Heliopolis, Garden City, Maʿadi, and Zamalek with their Mediterranean-style villas. European concessionaires developed the

Boasting an ever-expanding population of seventeen million, Cairo, the largest city in the Middle East and Africa, lies at the center of all routes leading to and from the continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe. The city covers an area of more than 453 square kilometers and is located on both banks of the Nile River. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

water, gas, electricity, telephone, and tramway services, and built the bridges across the Nile. Bridges made accessible the first artery to the West Bank in 1872. By 1914 the access provided by additional bridges to more arteries to the West Bank and to the islands of Rawda and Gazira resulted in rapid development. Between 1896 and 1914 electric tramways (soon replaced by motor vehicles) revolutionized transportation within the city and made possible the swift development of suburbs to the northeast (Abbasiyya, Heliopolis), the north (Shubra), and the west (Rawda, Zamalik, Giza).

Between 1922 and 1952 the domination by Europeans of economic and political life in Egypt ebbed. In 1949 the closing of the Mixed Courts put an end to special privileges for Westerners, and Cairo belatedly acquired a municipal government that was distinct from the national ministries. Life in the old city deteriorated (see the masterful portrayal of this time by novelist Najib Mahfuz). Well-to-do Egyptians left for the suburbs, Egyptians from rural parts of the country crowded in, and the overflow of tens of thousands of inhabitants spilled over into the cemeteries of the City of the Dead.

Cairo Population Estimates

1798:	264,000
1846:	257,000
1897:	590,000
1927:	1,065,000
1947:	2,048,000
1960:	3,416,000
1970:	7,000,000
2003:	9,600,000

Sources: Abu-Lughod, Janet. *Cairo: 1,001 Years of the City Victorious.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971; *World Almanac 2004*. New York: World Almanac Education Group.

Under Gamal Abdel Nasser (r. 1952–1970) there was an acceleration of both planned and unplanned urban development. Private utility and transport concessions reverted to the state, *waqf* reform freed land for development, a new airport opened, and a revamped road network briefly alleviated some of the traffic congestion. The Corniche exposed Cairo to the river, and Maydan al-Tahrir became the city center. The Nile Hilton and the new Shepheard's were the first of many luxury hotels built to cater to the expanding tourist trade. Heavy industry was set up in suburban Hilwan and Shubra al-Khayma. The 1956 Master Plan for Cairo recommended that the city limit its population to 3.5 million (a maximum that had already been exceeded) and advocated planned satellite communities and development on desert rather than on agricultural land. The resulting Nasr City—with government offices, housing blocks, schools, a 100,000-seat stadium, and a new campus for al-Azhar—was a success, but Muqattam City, perched high on the desert cliffs, was not.

Since 1970 the Hilwan–al-Marj metro line has been opened in Cairo, sewer and telephone systems have been upgraded, and more satellite cities have been built in the desert (Sadat City, 10th Ramadan, 6th October, al-Ubur, 15th May). The population crush nevertheless threatens to dwarf such efforts. The runaway sprawl into agricultural lands in the delta and Giza continues while the problem-plagued desert satellite cities sit half empty and a purple cloud of polluted air regularly hangs over Cairo. Opportunities for jobs, schooling, housing, and healthcare are better in Cairo than in the teeming countryside, and people from rural areas keep pouring in. Shanty towns proliferate. One out of every four Egyptians lives in this Third-World megalopolis of seventeen million people.

Cairo remains the cultural capital of the Arab world. Its assets include al-Azhar and four modern universities, twenty-odd museums, a major movie industry and playhouses, a radio and television industry, bookshops and publishing houses, *al-Ahram* and other periodicals, a zoo, a new opera house, the headquarters of the Arab League, and the Academy of the Arabic Language.

See also Azhar, al-; Bonaparte, Napoléon; Cairo University; Egypt; Mahfuz, Najib; Mamluks; Mixed Courts; Muhammad Ali; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Suez Canal; Waqf.

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Donald Malcolm Reid

CAIRO CONFERENCE (1921)

Meeting of Middle East experts to decide on administration of British mandates of Iraq and Transjordan.

The Cairo Conference was convened by Winston Churchill, then Britain's colonial secretary. With the mandates of Palestine and Iraq awarded to Britain at the San Remo Conference (1920), Churchill wished to consult with Middle East experts, and at his request, Gertrude Bell, Sir Percy Cox, T. E. Lawrence, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, Sir Arnold T. Wilson, Iraqi minister of war Jaʿfar al-Askari, Iraqi minister of finance Sasun Effendi (Sasson Heskayl), and others gathered in Cairo, Egypt, in March 1921. The two most significant decisions of the conference were to offer the throne of Iraq to Amir Faisal ibn Hussein (who became Faisal I) and the emirate of Transjordan (now Jordan) to his brother Abdullah I ibn Hussein. Furthermore, the British garrison in Iraq would be substantially reduced and replaced by air force squadrons, with a major base at Habbaniyya. The conference provided the political blueprint for British administration in both Iraq and Transjordan, and in offering these two regions to the Hashimite sons of Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of the Hijaz, Churchill believed that the spirit, if not the letter, of Britain's wartime promises to the Arabs would be fulfilled.

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Askari, Jaʿfar al-; Bell, Gertrude; Churchill, Winston S.; Cox, Percy; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Heskayl, Sasson; Lawrence, T. E.; San Remo Conference (1920); Wilson, Arnold T.

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Zachary Karabell

CAIRO FAMILY PLANNING ASSOCIATION

Egyptian association to promote family planning.

In 1967, the Cairo Family Planning Association (CFPA) was established as a branch of the Egyptian Family Planning Association. Dedicated to the promotion of voluntary family planning, the CFPA advocates for the creation of comprehensive family planning services and health education. The CFPA is comprised of thirty-four associations and, in conjunction with the Ministry of Social Affairs, supervises forty-one health centers in Greater Cairo. The CFPA provides technical, administrative, and organizational support to member associations, directs two model reproductive health clinics, and has supervised the renovation of eighteen health centers in Cairo.

The activities of the CFPA are not limited to family planning. Conceptualizing family planning as a human right, the CFPA is also involved in direct service, research, and media campaigns on issues such as infertility, prenatal and pediatric care, and female circumcision. In 1979, the CFPA became a pioneer in the field of female circumcision, establishing the first seminar in Egypt on the subject. Dedicated to combating the practice, the CFPA has conducted studies, sponsored seminars and lectures, and trained health service providers to increase awareness about the detrimental health implications of female circumcision. The CFPA also documents and disseminates information about reproductive health through the production of a quarterly bulletin highlighting news, research findings, and recent publications.

See also Birth Control; Female Genital Mutilation; Gender: Gender and Education; Gender: Gender and Health; Gender: Gender and Law.

Angel M. Foster

CAIRO UNIVERSITY

Flagship modern university in Egypt.

Cairo University's early founding and location made it a model for later universities throughout the Arab world. Opened as the small, private Egyptian University in 1908 and taken over as a state university in 1925, it became Fuʾad I University in 1940 and Cairo University in 1954.

The retirement in 1907 of Britain's consul general, Lord Cromer (formerly Sir Evelyn Baring), who had opposed a university for fear of Egyptian nationalism, allowed the plan for the private university to proceed. Egypt's minister of education Saʿd Zaghlul, feminist judge Qasim Amin, and others insisted that Egypt needed a Western-style university to complement its state professional schools and the Islamic religious university of al-Azhar. Europe provided the models and a number of the professors when the university opened with Prince Ahmad Fuʾad as rector in 1908.

In 1925 Fuʿad, by then king, transformed the Egyptian University into a major state institution, with colleges of arts, science, law, and engineering—the latter two formed from existing higher schools. Other schools were introduced later: engineering, agriculture, commerce, veterinary science, and the teachers college of Dar al-Ulum. The university now has seventeen colleges and six institutes in Cairo and a number of branch colleges in Fayyum, Bani Suayf, and Khartoum. Alexandria (then Farouk I) University split off in 1942; today Egypt has a dozen state and several new private universities.

During the quarter-century after 1925, the British overtook the French in influence at the university, but slowly lost out themselves to pressures to Egyptianize the faculty. The battle for coeducation was won, with the first women graduating in 1933. In

the 1930s Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, rector, and Taha Husayn, dean of arts, fought for university autonomy from palace and cabinet interference, as the students were inevitably caught up in turbulent national politics.

At serious cost in quality, Gamal Abdel Nasser opened Cairo and other universities more widely to provincials and the poor. His purge of 1954 crushed student and professorial opposition until after the 1967 war. President Anwar al-Sadat initially encouraged Islamist groups on campus to counter the left, and campus Islamists remain a major challenge to the regime of Husni Mubarak. With about 155,000 students in 2003, Cairo University still has its pockets of excellence, but it is desperately underfunded and overcrowded and continues churning out thousands of poorly educated graduates onto a glutted job market.

See also Alexandria University; Amin, Qasim; Dar al-Ulum; Husayn, Taha; Zaghlul, Saʿd.

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Donald Malcolm Reid

CALAND, HUGUETTE

[1931–]

Lebanese artist and fashion designer.

Huguette Caland is an abstract painter and sculptor who has also worked in fashion design (notably for Pierre Cardin) and filmmaking. The daughter of a former president of Lebanon, she trained under Fernando Manetti and George Apostu and at the American University in Beirut. In Lebanon, she cofounded the Inʿash al-Mukhayyim art center. She lived in Paris for many years and participated in individual and group exhibitions, primarily in Europe and Lebanon. In her paintings, Caland has brought out the sensuous properties of color, the emotive qualities of line, and the tensions that can be created by the juxtaposition of different colors and lines in compositions that often involve the innovative use of negative space. She has participated in major exhibitions in Europe, notably the Venice Biennial.

See also Art; Gender: Gender and Education; Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanon.

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Jessica Winegar

CALIPHATE

The caliph was the temporal and spiritual ruler of Islam until the office was abolished in 1924.

The Ottoman dynasty's claim to the office had been widely recognized in the Muslim world by the end of the nineteenth century, even though its historical basis was controversial. The claim was based on an alleged transfer of caliphal authority to the House of Osman after Ottoman armies conquered Mamluk Egypt. There an Abbasid caliph with descent from the Quraysh tribe of the Prophet Muhammad had been maintained as a dependent figurehead.

Nationalism and the Caliphate

The caliphate signified the ideal of pan-Islamic unity and solidarity and served as a psychological rallying point for Muslims against imperialist encroachments. The impending collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I mobilized Muslims worldwide to campaign for the retention of the caliphate. The India Khilafat Congress was especially active in this cause during the peace negotiations of 1919, since Indian Muslims were seeking self-determination based on allegiance to the caliph.

After the Ottomans were defeated in the war, the Anglo-French occupation of Constantinople (now Istanbul), the seat of the caliphate, further compromised the authority of Sultan-Caliph Mehmet VI Vahidettin. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and other leaders of the Anatolian independence movement declared that a principal objective was to liberate the sultanate and the caliphate from occupation forces. At the same time, Vahidettin denounced the resistance on Islamic grounds. Political and military

circumstances, however, gradually transformed the nationalists' attitude toward the caliphate. In view of the successes of the independence struggle and the complicity of Vahidettin with the occupying powers, the rival Ankara government promulgated in January 1921 the Fundamental Law which established the nation's sovereignty. On 1 November 1922, it passed legislation to abolish the Ottoman monarchy, separating the sultanate from the caliphate and maintaining the caliphate as a vague spiritual and moral authority. On November 16, Vahidettin sought asylum with British authorities and left Constantinople for Malta and later the Hijaz.

A Caliphate without Political Authority

The new law authorized the Turkish Grand National Assembly to select a meritorious member of the Ottoman dynasty as caliph. As the Muslim world debated the legitimacy of a caliphate without political authority, the assembly conferred the title of caliph on Abdülmecit II (1868–1944), son of Sultan Abdülaziz. The separation of the caliphate from the defunct monarchy was a tactical step toward abolishing the House of Osman and soothing domestic and international Muslim public opinion.

Foreign reaction was apathetic as the Khilafat Congress recognized the new caliph. In Turkey, though, the caliph quickly became the focus around which the proponents of the constitutional monarchy rallied. In October 1923, Mustafa Kemal declared the Turkish republic. The designation of the president of the republic as the head of state further compromised the caliph's position.

In December 1923, Indian Muslim leaders Amir Ali and Aga Khan, the imam of the Ismaʿili sect, wrote a letter to the Turkish prime minister Ismet Inönü urging retention of the caliphate. The Indian plea only accelerated the end. The Kemalists denounced the intervention of the two Muslim leaders as interference in the affairs of the new state and discredited them as Shiʿite British proxies. Indian religious scholars called for an international conference to determine the status of the caliphate. On 3 March 1924, the assembly passed legislation eliminating the office as part of a string of secularizing measures, including the abolition of religious education. The Kemalists argued that the caliphate was superfluous because the government of each Muslim country should administer both temporal and religious affairs.

Attempts to Create a New Caliphate

Abdülmecit left Turkey for Switzerland and later France. Since Turkey had emerged as the strongest independent country in the Muslim world, its abandonment of the caliphate elicited concern and disapproval from colonized Muslims, while in Turkey and other independent Muslim countries there was relative indifference. There was no Muslim consensus on how to respond to the Turkish fait accompli. The sharif of Mecca, now the king of the Hijaz, Husayn bin Ali, immediately put forward his claim, which was sanctioned by Vahidettin. King Fuʾad of Egypt and Imam Yahya of Yemen also emerged as possible candidates, as did the Moroccan and Afghan kings. Others advocated the continued recognition of Abdülmecit as the legitimate caliph. Husayn had a strong claim due to his prestige and descent from the Hashimite family of the Quraysh. Further, the British had revived the notion of a Meccan caliphate on the eve of the Arab Revolt. However, by 1924 Husayn lacked real political authority. In fact, Indian Muslims were inclined toward his rival, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud of Najd. Ibn Saʿud, surrounded by Hashimite power in the Hijaz, Iraq, and Transjordan, felt even more threatened by Husayn's caliphal ambitions and invaded the Hijaz, forcing Husayn to exile.

There could be no agreement on a single candidate when no consensus existed on the continuation of the office. A Caliphate Congress *(muʾtamar al-khilafa)* convened in Cairo in May 1926 with the participation of *ulama* (clergy) from several Muslim countries. At this conference, King Fuʾad hoped to promote his claim, but the relative apathy toward the meeting and disagreement about eligibility requirements resulted in its adjournment with only the group's affirmation of the need to reinstitute a caliph. Yet the caliphate appeared as an ever-more-incongruent political institution in a Muslim world that was becoming increasingly fragmented. The issue of caliphal succession became embroiled in the nationalist rivalries and inward-looking struggles of the Muslim countries.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Abdülmecit II; Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Hashimite House (House of Hashim);

İnönü, İsmet; Isma῾ili Shi῾ism; Osman, House of; Sharif of Mecca; *Ulama.*

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Hasan Kayali

CALLIGRAPHY

Fine Islamic writing as an art form.

In the Islamic context, calligraphy refers to the artistic writing of the Arabic script, either in the Arabic language or in other languages transcribed with the Arabic script. Originally, Islamic calligraphy was an expedient to ensure legibility. It soon became the primary visual art in the realms of Islamic religious influence and remained so at least until the nineteenth century.



Qur᾽an leaf with heading of sura 29. Possibly dates from Iraq, before 911 c.e. © Art Resource. Reproduced by permission.

Islamic calligraphy shares the characteristics of other fine arts: a long and well-documented history, an extensive roster of renowned practitioners, an elaborate educational protocol, a wide selection of acknowledged masterpieces, a variety of media that are peculiar to it, and a wide range of accepted techniques and styles. In addition, there are religious and cultural regulations that pertain to the teaching, production, and display of Islamic calligraphy. There are also ancillary professionals and amateurs who produce the tools and materials used in the production of the art works, such as inks, marble paper, and pens. Finally, a well-developed body of literature deals with the criticism and appreciation of Islamic calligraphy.

From the beginning of the Islamic period, and possibly substantially before it, two types of writing were used, according to occasion, in the Hijaz region of the Arabian peninsula. One was a simple, loose, and informal script for everyday use. The other—reserved for special purposes, especially religious uses that demanded a spectacular presentation—was the "dry" or stiff style of writing commonly, albeit incorrectly, called Kufic. In Islamic times, this became the favored style for Qur᾽anic transcriptions, due to its gravity, legibility, grace, and sheer visual impact.

By the tenth century, new scripts had taken shape from the earlier, informal writing and had gained in popularity. Because the shapes and sizes of the letters were calculated geometrically, these scripts were called "the proportioned scripts." They include the Thuluth, Naskh, and Muhaqqaq scripts. These are commonly referred to as Naskhi (supposedly meaning cursive), a name that has no basis in history.

Four important calligraphers, working in Baghdad during the Abbasid caliphate, founded the modern trend in Islamic calligraphy. These were Muhammad ibn Muqla (d. 940); his brother Abu Abdullah ibn Muqla (d. 939); Ali ibn Hilal, called Ibn al-Baw wab (d. 1022); and Yaqut al-Musta'simi (d. 1298). Through the works and teachings of these



Monogram of Sultan Murat III. The monogram was created in 1575 for Murat III, who was sultan of the Ottoman Empire from 1574 until his death in 1595. © ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

masters, the art of calligraphy radiated to other important Islamic cultural centers.

By the sixteenth century, the center of Islamic calligraphy was to be found in Constantinople (now Istanbul) of the Ottoman Empire. There the pivotal Şeyh Hamdullah (1429–1520), a lifelong calligrapher, completely revised the structure of the basic scripts, of Thuluth and Naskh in particular, giving them a more precise, lighter, and more dynamic look. Since the life and teaching of this great master, the Ottoman Turkish method has been paramount. This method is distinguished by its special teaching protocols, its attention to detail, and its insistence on the highest standards.

Another Ottoman master, Mehmet Asat Yesari (d. 1798), took the Persian style Nastaʿliq and, while maintaining its basic rules, transformed it into a powerful visual instrument, especially in its large (Celali) version.

Other trends in Islamic calligraphy of significant historical and artistic merit have existed continuously in the Maghrib-Andalusian orbit, in the Persian orbit, and in China. Although Islamic calligraphy reached its apogee in the late nineteenth century, it is experiencing a revival today, in particular due to the efforts of the Research Centre for Islamic History, Art, and Culture in Istanbul (IRCICA). The art continues to reign supreme in its ability to convey in the most emphatic way the written Islamic texts.

See also ARABIC SCRIPT.

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MUHAMMAD ZAKARIYA

CAMBON–LANSDOWNE AGREEMENT (1904)

Pact between France and Great Britain affecting each country's activities in Egypt and Morocco.

After having been rivals for a long time, France and Great Britain mutually agreed to desist. According to the agreement, France had total freedom of action in Morocco; meanwhile France would stop interfering with English financial activities in Egypt, as it had since 1882. The English enjoyed immediate but limited advantages. As for the French, it meant getting potential interests and indicated the end of an obsessional opposition. The agreement

took place on 8 April 1904 in a general atmosphere of mutual reconciliation, for the two countries were worried about Germany's growing power.

RÉMY LEVEAU

CAMELS

Domesticated ruminant of central Asia, Arabia, and North Africa.

A domesticated animal, with one or two humps, that is used as a mode of transportation in the Middle East, the camel is a survivor of an almost vanished group of ungulates (hoofed mammals) that once populated all the large land masses of the world except Australia. Its close relatives are the South American llama, alpaca, guanaco, and vicuña. The only camels existing today are two domesticated species: the Arabian dromedary, *Camelus dromedarius* (or *ibil*), which has one hump and is used for riding; and the two-humped Bactrian camel, *Camelus bactrianus,* which has shorter legs and is more heavily built. A few survive in the Gobi Desert.

Traditional belief has it that one-humped camels do not adapt well to cold or moist climates nor the two-humped camel to extremely hot climates. Both store fat in their humps, have long necks suitable for feeding on bushes and trees, and have padded feet suited for travel on sand but ill-suited for travel on mud. Both have the capacity to go long intervals without water. Camels do not store water as some folk stories allege. Rather, they conserve it through highly efficient kidneys that allow them to process water with a high concentration of impurities; they also have the capacity to absorb heat by allowing their blood temperature to rise, without ill effect. The horn of Africa constitutes the largest and most abundant camel territory in the world and today Somalia alone has a camel population exceeding four million. Camel milk is a dietary staple in Somalia. Camels exist as a form of wealth and nourishment and form part of the traditional bride-price.

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MIA BLOOM

CAMP DAVID ACCORDS (1978)

Agreements signed by Egypt, Israel, and the United States on 17 September 1978.

In November 1977, Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat shocked the world by announcing his readiness to travel to Israel to resolve the Arab–Israel conflict, and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin promptly issued an invitation. Sadat's visit to Israel on 19 and 20 November included an electrifying speech before the Knesset and inaugurated a series of unprecedented direct Egyptian–Israeli peace negotiations. The talks bogged down, however, over Israel's withdrawal from and Egypt's demilitarization of the Sinai and the future status of Gaza and the West Bank (all occupied by Israel in the June 1967 war), and over terms of normalization between Israel and Egypt. When it appeared that the negotiations would collapse, U.S. president Jimmy Carter invited Sadat and Begin to the presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland.

The Camp David conference, 5 through 17 September 1978, ended with two accords signed by Egypt, Israel, and the United States: "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and "A Framework for Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel." Participants included the three leaders, their foreign and defense ministers, and teams of top civilian and military officials. Sadat and Begin's acrimonious relationship threatened to derail the conference, but President Carter's personal intervention saved it from failure. Sadat and Begin later received the Nobel Peace Prize.

The relatively straightforward framework for an Egypt–Israel peace embraced UN Security Council Resolution 242 and called for a treaty implementing the land-for-peace principle: Israel would return the Sinai to Egypt and Egypt would make peace with Israel. Also anticipated was the full normalization of diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations. The Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty of 26 March 1979 conformed to these September 1978 expectations.

With its complex and problematic formula for Palestinian self-rule, the framework for Middle East peace was crucial to Sadat's defense against Arab charges that he had sold the Palestinians short by making a separate peace with Israel. The other Arab states were invited to follow Sadat to the negotiat-

ing table. This framework envisioned Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and representatives of the Palestinians negotiating a five-year, three-stage plan for the future of Gaza and the West Bank, including full autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza; the withdrawal of Israel's military government and civilian administration; the election of a self-governing Palestinian authority; and the redeployment of Israeli forces. Final-status negotiations during the five-year transitional period would resolve the disposition of the West Bank and Gaza, the refugee problem, and the entire Israeli–Palestinian conflict in a manner that would "recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements."

The Camp David Accords were not without opposition. The Knesset ratified the agreements, but more members of the opposition than of the prime minister's coalition supported them. Those who abstained or voted against them scored Begin for accepting the precedent of territorial concessions for peace and for recognizing the Palestinian people as a negotiating partner. In Egypt, opposition elements, including Islamic, Nasserist, and other Arab nationalist groups, protested the peace negotiations with Israel. No Arab states supported the accords, and the Palestinians, aware of Begin's extremely narrow interpretation of "full autonomy," rejected them and demanded statehood. The refusal of the Palestinians and Jordan (the latter mentioned no less than fifteen times in the document) to cooperate with Egypt and Israel made the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" a dead letter. Dependent only upon the actions of Egypt and Israel themselves, however, the second of Camp David's two frameworks—"For the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel"—came to fruition in the signing of the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty of March 1979.

See also BEGIN, MENACHEM; CARTER, JIMMY; EGYPTIAN–ISRAELI PEACE TREATY (1979); GAZA STRIP; KNESSET; SADAT, ANWAR AL-; WEST BANK.

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DON PERETZ
UPDATED BY LAURA Z. EISENBERG

CAMP DAVID SUMMIT (2000)

Failed Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, mediated by the United States (11 July–24 July 2000).

At the initiative of President Bill Clinton and Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, an Israeli–Palestinian summit was convened at the U.S. presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland, on 11 July 2000 to discuss the final-status issues foreshadowed by the 1993 Oslo Accords regarding such issues as Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, Palestinian refugees, and the borders of a Palestinian state. Because no official records or documents were exchanged, most public knowledge about the discussions comes from some of the participants and the media.

Regarding Jerusalem, Israel reportedly proposed turning some Palestinian villages and neighborhoods over to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and allowing Palestinian autonomy in the Muslim and Christian quarters within the Old City, with Israel retaining sovereignty over the rest of East Jerusalem and the Old City. The Palestinians reportedly proposed that East Jerusalem should be capital of the new Palestinian state and that Israel should withdraw to its pre-June 1967 borders, in accordance with UN Resolution 242.

On the issue of refugees, the Palestinians maintained the 3.7 million Palestinian refugees should have the right of return to their homes in what is now Israel or the right to receive compensation, in

accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 1948. Israel rejected the right of return as a demographic threat to its Jewish character and denied that Israel had any legal or moral responsibility for the refugee problem. However, it would permit the return of a large but limited number of refugees to the state of Palestine under Israeli supervision and would allow some Palestinians to return to Israel as a family reunification measure.

Regarding Jewish settlements (of which there were in 1999 some 125, with about 200,000 settlers), Israel apparently proposed annexing some 10 percent of the West Bank territory, in which some 80 percent of the settlers lived, and ceding the remaining 90 percent to the Palestinians. The Palestinians disputed these figures because they did not include Jerusalem, parts of the Jordan Valley (which the Israelis wanted to lease for a long period), and other areas. The Palestinians were prepared to accept Israeli annexation of the largest West Bank settlement blocs, although they objected to the size, in exchange for an equal amount of territory in Israel of similar arable quality. After fourteen intense days of negotiations, the parties could not bridge their differences.

In the months and years following the summit, each side blamed the other for the failure. In a failed effort to ensure Barak's reelection, President Clinton publicly blamed Yasir Arafat, despite the fact that he had promised the Palestine Liberation Organization chairman—who had been reluctant to come to the summit because he said the parties were not prepared—that he would not be blamed if the discussions broke down. Barak also vigorously blamed Arafat, who he said was intent on the destruction of Israel, even though Arafat had championed the two-state solution embodied in the Oslo Accords in 1993 and had recognized Israel and endorsed UN Resolution 242 a dozen years before. The Palestinians blamed Barak, even though he was politically courageous in making far-reaching proposals, a number of which broke long-standing Israeli taboos, such as sharing Jerusalem, returning 90 percent of West Bank lands, and swapping territory.

The media and public of all sides accepted their governments' respective official versions, even though each was a distortion of what happened at Camp David. In reality, all three sides contributed to the breakdown of the negotiations. Barak wasted several months negotiating with Syria; reneged on a third partial redeployment of troops from the West Bank and on handing over three villages near Jerusalem to the PA; continued to confiscate Palestinian land for Jewish settlements and access roads; and allowed for the increase of settlers in the territories, all of which raised suspicions among Palestinians about his sincerity. At Oslo, Barak's negotiating style—refusing to negotiate directly with Arafat, revising supposedly final offers, and presenting take-it-or-leave-it proposals—further alienated the Palestinians, who viewed him as arrogant. His demand for sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount was difficult for Arafat to accept for fear of Palestinian, Arab, and international Muslim reaction. In addition, Barak's offer, while generous from an Israeli point of view, would not have allowed for a contiguous and independent Palestinian state.

The Palestinians, on the other hand, in addition to being unprepared, seemed bereft of any strategy, were internally divided, and—most significantly—did not make serious, clear, and specific counteroffers to the Israeli side. Arafat—whose popularity was declining due to his inability to stop the settlement expansion and the obvious corruption in the PA, and who feared a trap by the Israelis and the Americans—was reluctant to make major concessions and seemed more interested in surviving the negotiations than in viewing them as a historic opportunity for peace.

The Americans ignored the extent to which settlement expansion had poisoned the peace process among the Palestinians and insisted on convening a meeting for which none of the parties was truly prepared. Although they were supposed to be honest brokers, their position—due to domestic pressure and the cultural and strategic relationship between the United States and Israel—was so close to the Israelis' that at times they presented Israeli positions. It was not until after Camp David that the United States presented its own position, called the Clinton proposals, on 23 December 2000. After the failure at Camp David, Palestinian and Israeli teams resumed negotiations in Taba, Egypt, and thanks to Clinton's suggestions, considerably narrowed their differences. The process begun at Camp

David might have thus ended successfully, but time ran out when—against the backdrop of the escalating violence of the al-Aqsa intifada—Clinton left office on 20 January 2001 and Barak was defeated by Ariel Sharon in the Israeli elections of 6 February 2001.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arafat, Yasir; Barak, Ehud; Clinton, William Jefferson; Haram al-Sharif; Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Sharon, Ariel; United Nations and the Middle East.

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Philip Mattar

CAMUS, ALBERT

[1913–1960]

French Algerian author.

Albert Camus was born in eastern Algeria at Mondovi near present-day Annaba. His father represented grape-growing and wine-making interests and also served as a Zouave, an Algerian member of a French infantry unit. He died in 1914 from wounds received at the Battle of the Marne in France. His mother was illiterate and of Spanish descent. Camus grew up with her and her extended family in the poor Belcourt neighborhood of Algiers. He received a degree in philosophy from the University of Algiers. During the 1930s, he publicized Kabyle deprivations and briefly joined the Algerian Communist Party. He distinguished himself in the Resistance by editing *Combat.* He associated with French existentialists Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. While his writings have "existentialist" themes, he claimed that he did not subscribe to that philosophy. His novels include *The Stranger* (1942), *The Plague* (1947), and *The Fall* (1957). His most important essays are *The Myth of Sisyphus* (1942) and *The Rebel* (1951). He also wrote short stories and plays. He received the Nobel Prize for literature in 1957. During the war of independence, Camus proposed a French–Algerian federation that was rejected by both sides. He died in an automobile accident.

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Phillip C. Naylor

CANNING, STRATFORD

[1786–1880]

The most influential European diplomat in the Ottoman Empire during the first half of the nineteenth century.

While still an undergraduate at Cambridge, Stratford Canning (Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe) joined the British Foreign Office then headed by his cousin, George Canning. His first posting to Constantinople (now Istanbul) as secretary to the British mission occurred in 1808 in the midst of the Napoleonic wars. Upon his superior's departure, Stratford Canning became the acting chief. Despite his inexperience and with even less than the usual guidance from home, he secured the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812. By ending the war between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires, this treaty freed the Russians to repel the invasion of Napoléon Bonaparte. He then left for other assignments, but from 1825 to 1827, Canning returned to Constantinople to confront two problems: the Greek revolt and the deprivatization of the British consular service in the Levant (countries of the eastern Mediterranean).

Despite Canning's best efforts, he failed to mediate an end to the Greek conflict. As for the second, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, British affairs in the Ottoman Empire—commercial, consular, and diplomatic—had been managed by the Levant Company, which had been granted a monopoly to trade with the eastern Mediterranean by British royal charter in 1581. The transformation of

British interests in the East, particularly the growth of political and military concerns as a result of the Napoleonic wars, undermined the old arrangement. The British government took over direct responsibility for the embassy in 1804 and the consular posts in 1825; Canning's skill in overseeing this transition helped established Britain's diplomatic preeminence.

After his Ottoman tour had ended, Canning embarked upon an unremarkable parliamentary career, which quickly revealed that his skills were far greater as a diplomat than as a politician. Consequently, in 1831 and 1832 he returned to Constantinople on a successful mission to fix a more favorable frontier for the Kingdom of Greece, which was newly independent of Ottoman rule.

His last period of service in Constantinople was the most important and the longest, from 1842 to 1858, occasionally interrupted by efforts to resign. Canning played a key role in the major events of the era: Russian intervention in the region culminating in the Crimean War and the Tanzimat reforms—most notably the Islahat Fermani (Reform Decree) of 1856. He also succeeded in removing from the Ottoman realm to the British Museum such archaeological discoveries as the Bodrum frieze and the winged lions of Nineveh.

Although Canning began his career by promoting peace with Russia, he spent much of it as the Romanov Empire's implacable foe. Ottoman weakness in the face of the Russian threat forced ever greater dependence on Britain's diplomatic and military support, which Canning offered at a price—a program of internal reform that insisted upon the equality of the empire's Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. Canning's experience and personality backed by Britain's dominant position enabled him to secure Ottoman assent, at least on paper, to the effective annulment of Islamic law on this question.

Although he maintained close personal ties with the then-reigning sultan, Abdülmecit I, his deepest sympathies were reserved for the Christian subjects of the empire, whose improved status, he hoped, would maintain Ottoman integrity in the face of Russian ambition. Later in his life, when that hope proved false, he welcomed the end of Ottoman control in the Balkans.

See also Abdülmecit I; Bucharest, Treaty of (1812); Crimean War; Tanzimat.

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Benjamin Braude

CANTONNEMENT/REFOULEMENT

French colonial policies.

These French policies were meant—first in the mid-nineteenth century and then in the years just before independence—to confine sections of the Algerian population to areas that could be supervised by the colonial army. This was to prevent access to agricultural land by the local population or to areas judged strategically important by the French. By the independence of Algeria in 1962, an estimated 3 million rural Algerians had been displaced, thus adding considerably to the extremely high urbanization rates the new government faced as a result of these earlier cantonnement and refoulement policies.

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Dirk Vandewalle

CAPITULATIONS

Term derived from capitula *(chapter or paragraph, in Italian) that refers to the clauses of an international treaty, particularly between a Muslim state and a European state.*

The term *capitulation* was originally a "privilege" given by a powerful Middle East government, such as the Ottoman Empire, to a weaker government in Europe. An early Ottoman treaty of this type was negotiated between Sultan Selim I and Venice in 1517. Formerly, Venice had enjoyed exclusive trade privileges with Mamluk Egypt in order to expedite the

profitable spice trade. There is a similarity between this type of privilege (and the accompanying attitude) and the type of privileges the Chinese emperors accorded to lesser lands of Asia that wished to trade with China. The traditional attitude might be stated as follows: "Our realm is self-sufficient and superior; thus we have no need to trade with you. But because we are a civilized people, we show our beneficence in this manner."

Next consider the types of privileges accorded by such treaties. The most important clause dealt with mutual trade relations. Both governments agreed to provide, in their respective countries, a place for warehousing items to be traded; protection for those goods from theft or damage; and on the amount of tariff to be charged *ad valorem* for each item. Protection was also accorded to the vessels delivering the merchandise, and the flag under which these vessels could enter territorial waters was carefully controlled. For example, France obtained an *imtiyaz* (capitulation) early in the sixteenth century; thereafter, until Britain received its own *imtiyaz* about 1580, British ships entering Ottoman waters had to fly the flag of France (and doubtless pay for the privilege). In case of shipwreck, the capitulation provided for protection, docking, and repair.

To these general commercial clauses were gradually added legal clauses dealing with the right of extraterritoriality, protection of foreign personnel working in the trade facility, and specification of the court that held primary jurisdiction in case of a dispute. Generally speaking, if the trading company was established in a country where a diplomatic representative of its home country was in residence, the primary jurisdiction over, say, a foreign merchant committing a crime in the host country would be the merchant's own consular court. Often, however, in the case of a capital crime, such as the rape or murder of a Muslim subject, the primary jurisdiction would be the Muslim court.

These were provisions of what might be called the ordinary capitulation-type treaty. This arrangement underwent important changes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as certain European countries, and the United States, grew much more powerful than their counterparts in the Middle East. First, foreign businesses selling their goods in the Middle East, as a means to save costs, often sought out local Muslims, Christians, or Jews to assist in their transactions: interpreters and expediters to speed wares through customs, longshoremen, workers, secretaries, managers, agents, and sales personnel. Gradually these persons were placed officially under the protection of the company or the foreign government consular service by a device known as a *berat* (minor government decree). A bearer of such protection was known as *beratli* (bearer of a privilege). At first these *berats* were issued under the auspices of the grand vizier or his subordinates. Later, some embassies issued *berats* from their own chanceries.

Because the Muslim populations often were more interested in learning Arabic, Persian, or Turkish, it fell to the Christian and Jewish minorities to learn the languages of western Europe. Hence, many minority families came to be closely associated with Western firms and their governments. Often this relationship proved very advantageous financially. These subject people's *beratli* status extended to them, and often to their relatives and family, the privileges of extraterritoriality and the protection of a powerful foreign country; thus, in the nineteenth century, Muslim government officials began to harbor doubts about their loyalty. The *beratli* held a kind of dual citizenship. Thus, capitulations, originally straightforward trade agreements, became intertwined with issues of national sovereignty for Muslim governments, and for powerful governments of Europe, with the protection of their property, trade agreements, missionaries, and "*beratli* agents" for powerful governments of Europe. For some members of minority communities, the *berat* had become a cover for illegal activities. In the case of outright disagreement, the governments of Europe and the United States often resorted to gunboat diplomacy or "showing the flag" to coerce states of the Middle East. If this did not have the desired effect, such states as imperial Russia often resorted to open warfare. Thus, the Ottoman government and other states of the Middle East in the nineteenth century could not protect locally made crafts or manufactures from cheap imports because foreign powers blocked the raising of tariffs, nor could they directly punish violations of law within their own borders.

Various states of the Middle East, in the twentieth century, sought to abolish these trade treaties

that had been turned into major tools of imperialist intervention and control by foreign powers. Ottoman Turkey, upon entering World War I on the side of Germany in 1914, announced the abolition of the capitulation agreements, a move that was not fully approved by Germany. The capitulations had become so burdensome that they constituted grounds for nations of the Middle East to join with a friendly power such as Germany against the exploiting states of Europe. True to their own attitudes toward weaker states, when the Allied powers of Europe won the war, they quickly declared the capitulations once again in full force. Only after Turkey's war of independence (1919–1922) were they forced to accept the end of these lopsided trade treaties under the terms of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. At the Cairo Conference in 1921, establishing the semi-independence of Egypt from Britain, the powers of Europe agreed to lift most clauses of the capitulations, but the mixed courts, where foreign litigation had taken place, were left in place.

See also CAIRO CONFERENCE (1921); LAUSANNE, TREATY OF (1923).

C. MAX KORTEPETER

CARPETS, PERSIAN

Heavy woven floor coverings with traditional patterns; considered works of art today.

The twentieth century witnessed unparalleled expansion of Persian pile carpet weaving *(qalibafi)* in Iran. Gone were court manufactories and extensive weaving by nomadic tribal peoples. In their place came commercialization of the craft, the gradual introduction of quality controls and standards, and an unprecedented availability of a wide variety of Persian carpets of tribal, village, town, and city provenance for sale in the bazaars and abroad. Throughout the Iranian plateau, Persian carpets generally appear on the floor of all rooms except for the kitchen and bathroom. Often they constitute a room's main or only art, taking the place of a mural or large painting on the wall in Western homes.

Thus, Persian carpets achieved quite a high point in the twentieth century, although Persian pile carpet weaving is generally thought to have experienced its golden age with the curvilinear "city" designs of the Safavid period (1501–1736 C.E.) and with the rectilinear "tribal" carpets of the Qajar dynasty (1796–1925). Art historians, oriental carpet experts, and scholars generally think twentieth-century Persian carpets inferior because of their commercial production circumstances and less intricately designed patterns.

Early in the century, Isfahan and then Qom and other new production centers joined such famous traditional weaving centers as Kerman and Tabriz in producing carpets, almost all with traditional designs, but with synthetic dyes, mechanically spun yarn, and often the help of trained designers. Earlier Caucasus design traditions were continued in Ardabil and surrounding towns. Throughout Iran, classical medallion, garden, hunting, and prayer carpet designs continue to be produced, along with hybrid designs exhibiting the mutual influence of cartoon-prepared city patterns of the medallion sorts and the memory-produced repeat patterns typical of tribal weaving—Afshar, Bakhtiari, Qashqaʾi, and Turkmen.

All the major twentieth-century Persian carpet design types appear to pay tribute in a decorative or symbolic way to springtime or paradise gardens, important culture-specific images in Persian art since Persepolis (begun in 518 B.C.E.); they feature columns, representing a sacred, or paradisial, grove of trees. The existence of the Pazyryk Carpet (at the Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg) is evidence that pile carpet weaving existed in Central Asia and on the Iranian plateau from at least the Achaemenid period (559–330 B.C.E.), although few Persian carpets or even fragments have survived from before the sixteenth century C.E.

In the 1960s and after, Iranian scholars began paying attention to Persian carpets from technical, sociological, and cultural perspectives, which resulted in the shifting of predominant scholarship in this field from Europe to Iran. In particular, as nomadic and seminomadic communities have dwindled in size, Iranian scholars have provided records of their textile traditions, especially for Turkmen, Qashqaʾi, Shahsavan, and Kurdish carpets.

In the Islamic republican era, beginning in 1979, carpet production continued unabated, although the U.S. embargo on Iranian goods in the 1980s changed the export market for Persian carpets. The same decade also witnessed a dramatic in-

crease in the production of flat-weave products called *gelim* (Turkish, *kilim*) with their mostly uncomplicated geometric patterns. The Carpet Museum of Iran, inaugurated in 1979, the last year of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1979), remained the world's best showcase for carpets in the 1990s.

See also BAKHTIARI; QAJAR DYNASTY; TRIBES AND TRIBALISM.

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MICHAEL C. HILLMANN

CARTER, JIMMY

[1924–]

U.S. president who mediated the Camp David Accords.

James Earl Carter, Jr., was born on 1 October 1924, in Plains, Georgia. After serving as governor of Georgia for one term (1971–1975) he rose from relative obscurity to win the Democratic nomination and defeat incumbent president Gerald Ford in 1976.

Carter came into office stressing the role of human rights in U.S. foreign policy and rejecting the Cold War perspective of previous administrations, particularly as embodied in the policies of former secretary of state Henry Kissinger. Carter argued that constructive engagement with the Soviet Union, rather than a hostile policy of containment, would advance U.S. interests by reducing Soviet inclinations to play the spoiler role in U.S. policy initiatives. Ironically, it was an early cooperative effort with the Soviets—a plan to cosponsor an Arab–Israeli peace conference in Geneva, announced in a joint communiqué on 1 October 1977—that contributed to Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat's surprise decision to travel to Jerusalem in November 1977 for direct peace negotiations with Israel. Neither Sadat nor Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin wanted to harness the relatively straightforward Egyptian–Israeli issues (Israel's return of the Sinai to Egypt in exchange for a peace treaty) to the more difficult Palestinian and Syrian conflicts with Israel, and they effectively derailed Carter's Geneva idea by inaugurating bilateral Egyptian–Israeli talks.

When those negotiations threatened to break down, however, Carter invited Sadat and Begin to the presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland. After thirteen days of intense discussions personally mediated by Carter, on 27 September 1978 the three heads of state signed the Camp David Accords, which in turn led to the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty, signed on 26 March 1979 in Washington, D.C. The Egyptian–Israeli agreements constituted Carter's greatest foreign-policy triumph, though he later expressed regret that some aspects of the agreements went unfulfilled. The Egyptian–Israeli breakthrough made Israel and Egypt, respectively, the number one and two recipients of U.S. aid.

The Middle East brought success to Carter with Egypt and Israel, but it proved to be his undoing, with Iran. In January 1979 Islamic radicals inspired by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini overthrew the shah of Iran, a long-time ally of the United States. On 4 November 1979 militant Islamic students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking fifty-two Americans hostage. Carter's attempts to negotiate their release failed, and on 8 April 1980 the United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran and focused on a series of international legal and economic maneuvers designed to pressure Iran into letting the hostages go. On 24 April 1980 a commando attempt to free the hostages failed when U.S. helicopters crashed in a desert staging area 200 miles outside Tehran. The Iranian hostage crisis dominated the U.S. media and Carter's agenda throughout his failed reelection campaign against the Republican challenger, Ronald Reagan. Carter continued to work for the hostages' release until the very last day of his presidency, when Algerian mediation finally secured their freedom in exchange for the unfreezing of Iranian assets in the United States and a U.S. pledge of nonintervention in Iranian affairs. Carter received word that the hostages had been freed on 20 January 1981, several hours after Reagan took the presidential oath of office.

Despite losing the 1980 presidential election, Carter continued his career of public service. He published widely—memoirs, political observation and

analysis, poetry, and fiction—and established the Carter Presidential Library at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. He has remained an active statesman, working through the Carter Center to help resolve international crises around the globe.

See also Begin, Menachem; Camp David Accords (1978); Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty (1979); Hostage Crises; Human Rights; Kissinger, Henry; Reagan, Ronald; Sadat, Anwar al-.

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Mia Bloom
Updated by Laura Z. Eisenberg

CASABLANCA

Largest city in Morocco.

As of 2002, Casablanca (al-Dar al-Bayda, in Arabic) had a population of 3,334,300. The *wilaya* (province) of Greater Casablanca, which covers 646 square miles (1,615 sq km), is composed of twenty-three urban districts and six prefectures. Situated on the Atlantic coast, the city is the principal maritime and air transport hub and the major industrial center of the country.

The site of modern Casablanca was occupied by Anfa, a commercial center in the thirteenth century. After being held briefly by the Portuguese, who called it Casa Branca (White House), it was abandoned in ruins about 1468. The village was rebuilt in 1770 by Sultan Muhammad III (1757–1790), who translated the name into Arabic as *al-Dar al-Bayda.* It was later retranslated into Spanish as Casablanca.

Muhammad III hoped to encourage trade with Europe through the port of Essaouira (Mogador); thus Casablanca remained small and inactive. When the tribes of the Shawiya district around Casablanca revolted in the 1790s, Sultan Sulayman (1792–1822) closed Casablanca and several other ports to European commerce. It began to revive under Sultan Abd al-Rahman (1822–1859), who reopened it to commerce in 1831. Trade slowly grew from 3 percent of Moroccan maritime trade in 1836 to 10 percent in 1843. The port handled mainly agricultural produce: hides, wool, and grain. The population was estimated at 1,500 in the late 1850s and perhaps 4,000 a decade later as European merchants set up agencies, and steamship services started to call. By the late 1880s the population had increased to around 9,000. Although the port still had no proper wharves, it was important enough for French agents to take control of the customhouse following the Act of Algeciras (1906). European attempts to construct a modern port in 1907 led to an attack on

The Hassan II Mosque in Casablanca, Morocco. Completed in 1984, the mosque features a 22-acre prayer hall and the world's highest minaret, measuring 200 meters. © Chinch Gryniewicz; Ecoscene/Corbis. Reproduced by permisison.

the worksite by people from the surrounding countryside. A French warship bombarded the port, local people looted the town, and French and Spanish troops then occupied it.

The population grew quickly after the imposition of the French protectorate in 1912. It rose from perhaps 40,000 in 1914 to around 250,000 in 1930. The first French resident general, Louis-Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, decided to make Casablanca the main port and the commercial center of Morocco; Rabat became the political capital. The port relied in particular on the export of phosphates, which became Morocco's largest and most valuable export.

European speculators quickly bought up land, and the city began to grow haphazardly. In 1914 Lyautey gave the French architect Henri Prost the task of designing the city. Prost developed an overall master plan for a European city surrounding the old Muslim *madina* and Jewish *mellah.* Public buildings were required to harmonize with traditional Moroccan styles; the post office, the city hall, and the Palais de Justice made particular use of Islamic architectural elements within a European-style structure. The commercial district was dominated by the kilometer-long Boulevard de la Gare (now Boulevard Muhammad V). The European suburbs spread quickly with little control. To the rapidly growing European population was added an explosive growth in the Moroccan population. This led to the emergence of shantytowns (bidonvilles) in the early 1930s. By the mid-1930s, some 70,000 to 80,000 Moroccans lived in bidonvilles.

European working-class immigrants brought French socialist politics with them, and Moroccan workers were soon involved. In June 1936 a series of strikes began in state enterprises and spread to commercial enterprises in Casablanca; both European and Moroccan workers took part.

After the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942, Sultan Muhammad V had two meetings with U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. This assured the sultan of American interest and support for Moroccan independence and raised his reputation in the eyes of the Moroccans. After the war, the political movements in Casablanca became increasingly militant for independence. This was reinforced by an incident on 7 April 1947, when

Two men walk along the stone pavers in the Casbah, the Old Medina section in Casablanca, Morocco. One man wears a business suit, while the other wears the jellaba, a long, loose hooded garment with full sleeves, commonly worn in Muslim countries, along with a fez, a box-shaped hat. **© Roger Wood/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

Senegalese troops in France's colonial army fired on a crowd in Casablanca, apparently after an argument over the molestation of a Moroccan woman. French officials did little to stop the massacre, in which several hundred people were reported killed.

Following Morocco's independence in 1956, Casablanca's population continued to grow and to become predominantly Moroccan as the Europeans left. By 1960 the population was nearly 1 million, and by 1970, 1.8 million. Although some attempt was made to house the new residents, most of whom moved in from the countryside, the apartment blocks that were built were woefully insufficient. This led to continued political radicalization in Casablanca, and there were riots in the poorer districts in 1965, in which large numbers of people were killed. A state of emergency was declared and remained in force for five years. Tension continued throughout the 1970s, and there were more, and very serious, riots in June 1981. In the 1980s and 1990s Ali Yata, the leader of the Party of Progress and Socialism (Parti du Progrés et Socialisme, the renamed Communist Party) repeatedly

won election for a Casablanca constituency. There has been some Islamist activity as well. The importance of Casablanca politically was graphically shown when King Hassan II chose it as the site of the world's biggest mosque (the Hassan II Mosque), which was opened in 1993.

See also Bidonville; Communism in the Middle East; Lyautey, Louis-Hubert Gonzalve; Muhammad V; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Yata, Ali.

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C. R. Pennell

CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

See Tunisia: Overview

CASBAH

See Glossary

CATHOLICS

See Roman Catholicism and Roman Catholic Missions

CATROUX, GEORGES

[1877–1969]

French general, governor-general, minister, and ambassador.

A graduate of the military college at Saint-Cyr, Georges Catroux served in Algeria, Indochina, and Morocco before he was wounded and imprisoned during World War I; after the war he was a political delegate of the high commissioner in Damascus and subsequently a military attaché in Turkey. He returned to Morocco in 1925 and held several commands there and then in Algeria. In 1940 he joined Charles de Gaulle in London and was dispatched to rally Syria and Lebanon to the Free French cause. He negotiated an agreement between Henri Giraud and de Gaulle concerning the leadership of the Free French.

Catroux was governor-general of Algeria in 1943 and minister of North Africa in 1944. Catroux understood that France must ultimately heed the rising expectations of the colonized. He demonstrated this view in the delicate negotiations that returned Muhammad V to Morocco in 1955. His appointment as resident minister of Algeria in 1956 provoked the outrage of European settlers, forcing Catroux's resignation and his replacement with Robert Lacoste.

See also de Gaulle, Charles; Lacoste, Robert; Muhammad V.

Phillip C. Naylor

CATTAN, HENRY

[1906–1992]

Palestinian lawyer and writer.

Henry Cattan was born in Jerusalem and educated at the University of Paris and the University of London. After becoming a licensed barrister, he was a lecturer at the Jerusalem Law School from 1932 to 1942, a practicing lawyer in Palestine and Syria, and a member of the Palestine Law Council until 1948. Cattan testified before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine in 1946. On behalf of the Arab Higher Committee, he presented the Palestinian case to the UN General Assembly in 1947 and 1948. Cattan later negotiated with Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN mediator for Palestine. Cattan's best-known publications include *The Palestine Question* (1988); *The Jerusalem Question* (1981); *Palestine, the Arabs, and Israel* (1969); *Palestine: The Road to Peace*; and *Palestine and International Law.*

See also Anglo–American Committee of Inquiry (1946); Arab Higher Committee (Palestine); Bernadotte, Folke.

Lawrence Tal
Updated by Philip Mattar

CAYLAK

[1843–1893]

Turkish Ottoman writer and journalist.

Born Mehmet Tevfik in Istanbul, Caylak was the son of an Ottoman official. After working as a civil ser-

vant and attempting poetry, Tevfik found fame as a journalist and folklorist; he was called Caylak after the newspaper in which he wrote humorous pieces. He also wrote for the newspapers *Geveze* and *Letaif-i Asar.* Worried that Turkish customs and traditions were vanishing, he devoted himself to gathering folk stories. Among his publications is a three-volume collection of the stories of Nasruddin Hoca.

See also NASRUDDIN HOCA.

DAVID WALDNER

CEM

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

CEMAL PAŞA

[1872–1922]

Ottoman general, statesman, and influential leader of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP).

Ahmet Cemal Paşa was born on 6 May 1872 in Mytilene, Greece, the son of a military pharmacist. He graduated from the War Academy (Mekteb-I Harbiye) in 1895 as staff officer and was appointed to the General Staff in Constantinople (now Istanbul). He transferred to the Second Army unit of construction works stationed in Edirne and in 1898 to the Third Army in Salonika. As military inspector for railways, and later as staff officer in the Third Army headquarters, he contributed to the regional organization of the underground resistance movement to Abdülhamit II. He joined the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), and during the Young Turk Revolution in July 1908 he emerged as a prominent committee leader. Cemal took part in the first delegation that the Salonika CUP dispatched to Constantinople and received promotion to lieutenant colonel.

After July 1908 Cemal went to Anatolia with a reform commission. When a counterrevolutionary uprising broke out in Constantinople in April 1909, he rejoined the Third Army units (the Army of Deliverance) that suppressed the uprising. Subsequently, he accepted the district governorship of Üsküdar, Istanbul-in-Asia (May 1909). The threat of foreign intervention in response to widespread massacres of Armenians in Adana Province led to his appointment as governor of Adana (August 1909). In 1911 he became governor of Baghdad. Upon the outbreak of the Balkan War in 1912 he went to Thrace as commander of reserve units and was promoted to colonel. Following the CUP's coup against the Kamil government (January 1913), which Cemal helped to engineer, he was made general and commander of the First Army in Constantinople as well as military governor of the capital. He consolidated the CUP's position in the capital by suppressing the Ottoman Liberty and Entente party's opposition and sending its leaders to the gallows. In the CUP-dominated cabinets of 1913 to 1914 he served first as minister of public works and later as minister of the navy. He is credited with the modernization of the Ottoman fleet.

As a senior and most versatile member of the Central Committee, Cemal had a strong following in the CUP. He was implicated in conspiring against the other two members of the Young Turk trio, Enver Pasa and Mehmet Talat, and even accused of attempting to establish a state in Syria as a base to supplant the leadership in Constantinople. His disagreements with other influential members notwithstanding, Cemal's political ambitions remained consistent with the broader goals of the CUP as a political organization.

Known for his pro-French proclivities, Cemal went to Paris in June 1914 to seek a wartime alliance with France. He returned empty-handed, except for the Legion of Honor. During World War I he served as the commander of the Fourth Army and governor of Syria while maintaining his portfolio as minister. He led the ill-fated expeditions against British military positions along the Suez Canal in February 1915 and August 1916. By virtue of the fact that he controlled Syria, Cemal had oversight of the last phase of the Armenian genocide. By mid-1915 Syria was dotted with concentration camps where the weakened population was starved to death while the still able-bodied were employed as slave laborers on construction projects including the Baghdad railroad. The infamous killing sites such as Raqqa, Raʾs al-Ayn, and Dayr al-Zawr, at the end of the deportations routes where Armenians were exterminated en masse, were located in Cemal's jurisdiction.

As wartime governor in Syria Cemal gained notoriety for executing Arab leaders for their foreign sympathies and alleged nationalist aims and also

for his draconian measures in the management of grain supplies. He also undertook construction and preservation projects designed to improve material conditions in Syria. He resigned in December 1917 and returned to Constantinople.

Together with other CUP leaders, Cemal fled abroad at the end of the war (November 1918). Along with Talat, Young Turk minister of the interior, and Enver, minister of war, Cemal was tried in absentia by a military tribunal convened in postwar Istanbul, was found guilty of war crimes, and was sentenced to death. Cemal went first to Berlin via Odessa, then to Switzerland. He also went to Russia and had contacts with the Bolshevik leaders. He entered the services of the Afghan king, Afdal Barakzai, to reorganize his army against the British. In 1922 he returned to Moscow and went to Tbilisi, where he hoped to monitor the independence movement led by Mustafa Kemal, possibly with an eye on returning to Anatolia. He was assassinated in Tbilisi on 21 July 1922 by two Armenians. He is buried in Erzurum, Turkey.

Cemal authored a tract to justify his stern policies in Syria, which was published in Turkish, Arabic, and French (*La vérité sur la question syrienne*; The truth about the Syrian question). His memoirs were published posthumously. He also commissioned a study of old monuments in greater Syria, *Alte Denkmäler aus Syrien, Palästina und West-Arabien* (Ancient Monuments of Syria, Palestine, and West Arabia).

See also Armenian Genocide; Committee for Union and Progress; Enver Paşa; Talat, Mehmet.

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Hasan Kayali
Updated by Rouben P. Adalian

CENSUS

See Population

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Principal U.S. agency responsible for collection and assessment of worldwide intelligence data.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established in 1947. It is responsible directly to the president of the United States and carries out functions ordered by the president and the president's staff. The agency and its director (called the director of central intelligence, or DCI) are charged not only with collecting and analyzing intelligence data but also with coordinating the activities of other U.S. intelligence agencies, including those attached to the military services and those of the state and defense departments. The agency is divided into three principal directorates: for clandestine collection of foreign intelligence and the conduct of covert actions; for analysis of political, military, and economic developments outside the United States; and for collection and analysis of technical and scientific intelligence. It also maintains the DCI Counterterrorist Center. The CIA is headquartered just outside Washington, D.C., in Langley, Virginia.

In the Middle East, the CIA is best known for having organized the 1953 overthrow of Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh and having returned Reza Shah Pahlavi to Iran's Peacock Throne in a covert operation. Mossadegh, although widely seen in the Middle East as a nationalist, was viewed by the Eisenhower administration as a tool of the Soviet Union who threatened U.S. interests. The CIA has also been implicated in General Husni al-Zaʿim's 1949 coup in Syria, and the Free Officers' 1952 coup in Egypt. Other CIA covert actions in the Middle East have included providing arms and covert support to rebel groups, including the Iraqi Kurds in the early 1970s; the Afghan guerrillas following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; and Chad's forces opposing a Libyan invasion in 1980.

Lebanon was for some time the center of much CIA activity. According to newspaper accounts, during the 1970s and the early 1980s, the CIA and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had a cooperative arrangement, centered in Beirut, to ensure security against terrorist attacks to Americans. This occurred despite the U.S. government's official, public refusal to deal with the PLO. Apparently in the hope of gaining diplomatic advantage, the PLO warned of any impending attack on U.S. citi-

zens and provided physical protection to U.S. diplomats and installations. The principal PLO contact person in this arrangement, Ali Hasan al-Salama (1940–1979), was killed in a 1979 car bombing believed to have been engineered by Israel, but the security cooperation continued until the PLO left Beirut in the aftermath of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The following year saw a marked upsurge in attacks on U.S. installations and large numbers of American deaths. According to one account, following bombings of the American embassy and a U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and 1984—all believed to be the work of the Shiʿite group Hizbullah, whose spiritual leader was Shaykh Husayn Fadlallah—the CIA arranged to have Fadlallah stopped. A car bomb was detonated in March 1985 at his apartment building; Fadlallah, however, was not harmed. The CIA denied involvement, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, following an investigation, concluded that no direct or indirect CIA involvement could be shown.

Although not responsible for maintaining diplomatic relationships with other countries, the CIA often provides a vehicle by which the U.S. government can solidify a relationship through unofficial contacts or cooperate with another country covertly on operations of joint interest. This often occurs through regular meetings between a CIA official and a foreign leader. Liaison between the CIA and the intelligence services of friendly nations provides another means of cooperation. This type of liaison—involving cooperation on counterterrorist operations, coordination on other specific operations, and the exchange of intelligence data—has been conducted with many Middle East countries, most particularly Israel. The CIA has also been involved as a diplomatic intermediary between nations, as was the case when senior CIA officials Kermit Roosevelt, James Jesus Angleton, and Miles Copeland provided a secret channel of communication between Egypt and Israel in 1954 and 1955. The CIA helped coordinate security arrangements made by Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the late 1990s, and DCI George Tenet even offered his own plan for resolving the Israel–Palestinian conflict in June 2001.

The CIA was actively involved in stepped-up counterterrorist activities in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington that were engineered by the al-Qaʿida network. CIA operatives were active in Afghanistan during the American invasion of that country beginning in October 2001, and one became the first American to die there as a result of hostile activity. They were also present in Iraq during and after the U.S. invasion in the spring of 2003. The inability of the American forces to find the chemical and biological weapons the United States had claimed the Iraqi regime was stockpiling led to criticism of the CIA's and other U.S. intelligence agencies' prewar intelligence. In February 2004, President George W. Bush called for an investigation into U.S. intelligence failures prior to the invasion.

See also Bush, George Walker; Fadlallah, Shaykh Husayn; Free Officers, Egypt; Hizbullah; Mossadegh, Mohammad; Pahlavi, Reza; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Qaʿida, al-; Roosevelt, Kermit; Zaʿim, Husni al-.

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Kathleen M. Christison
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION (CENTO)

Mutual-defense group of Middle Eastern countries and Britain, 1959–1979.

After the Iraqi revolution of July 1958, Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact in March 1959. With its patronymic city now in a hostile country, the pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Its membership included Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Great Britain, with the United States as an associate member. CENTO, like its predecessor, was initially conceived as a defense organization on the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO); the northern tier of Middle Eastern countries that formed the southern boundary of the USSR were strategically important to the cold warriors of the West. While not officially part of CENTO, the United States was an active supporter, and it obtained the use of military bases and intelligence outposts in each of the northern-tier countries. By the late 1960s, CENTO had become more important as an economic bloc, though it remained a crux of American military planning. CENTO became defunct after the 1979 Iranian revolution.

See also BAGHDAD PACT (1955); NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO).

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ZACHARY KARABELL

CENTRE DE RECHERCHES, D'ÉTUDES, DE DOCUMENTATION ET D'INFORMATION SUR LA FEMME (CREDIF)

Tunisian research center on matters concerning women, also known as CREDIF.

CREDIF, a public agency instituted on 7 August 1990 that performs research for the government, is now the scientific branch of the Tunisian Ministry of Women's, Children's, and Family Affairs, which was established in 1992. Its mission is to carry out research on women's rights and the status of women, to gather information, organize and maintain databases concerning gender, and produce reports on the evolution of women's condition in Tunisia. CREDIF has created a number of ways of intervening in the production of knowledge about women: by hosting forums for national and international exchange on women's issues; by creating an Observatory on Women's Condition, which allows for permanent, ongoing oversight and evaluation of women's condition through cross-disciplinary research, annual reports, and national and regional seminars on the changing condition of women; by establishing statistical databases disaggregated by gender; by disseminating information concerning bibliographic research, women's information networks, and nongovernmental development projects whose stakeholders are women; by extending outreach to women to increase their legal literacy concerning rights and obligations; by studying the representation of women in the mass media; by holding training seminars on gender analysis; and by publishing a bilingual (Arabic/French) magazine, *Info-CREDIF.*

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; TUNISIA: OVERVIEW; TUNISIA: POLITICAL PARTIES IN.

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LAURA RICE

CERAMICS

A durable material with a history spanning 10,500 years that is significant to the study of archaeology and history.

Ceramic figurines and pottery vessels in Anatolia and the Iranian Plateau date to 8500 B.C.E.. The archaeological, ethnographic, and historic evidence for ceramic production in the Middle East and North Africa is complex and has a voluminous literature. The earliest Islamic potters (Umayyad dynasty, 661–750 C.E.) inherited extant traditions: Blue- and green-glazed wares had been produced in Egypt since Roman times; the alkaline-glazed ceramics of Syria, Iraq, and Iran had been made since Achaemenid times (seventh to fourth centuries B.C.E.); and the Roman lead-glazed ceramic tradition had been continued by the Byzantines. Chinese influences (Tang stoneware, ninth to eleventh centuries; Song whitewares, twelfth to fourteenth centuries, and Ming blue- and whiteware, fifteenth

to nineteenth centuries) were significant. The spread of Islam correlates with the distribution of hybrid production methods (molds, tin glazes, underglazes, polychromy, and metallic pigments) and products (architectural tiles). Early Islamic wares included Umayyad (Mediterranean/Middle Eastern influence), Abbasid (Tang influence), Central Asian Samanid, Egyptian Fatimid, and Mesopotamian/Persian wares (twelfth to fifteenth centuries) from Rayy, Raqqah, and Kashan. Later Persian ceramics (fifteenth to nineteenth centuries) were made at Kubachi, Tabriz, and Kerman; Syrian artisans produced work at al-Fustat, Raqqa, and Damascus; Seljuk Turks fabricated wares at Iznik and Kütahya. Lusterware, Mina'i, Iznik, Gombroon, and Zillij are notable Islamic contributions to ceramic history.

The Museum of Islamic Ceramics in Cairo, the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York house specimens from different Islamic eras that span the region from Morocco in the west through Iran, Afghanistan, and Indonesia in the east. Although Iznik ceramics were prized by the Ottoman court into the early twentieth century, ceramic vessels and tiles produced from the earliest times to the present in Islamic lands, including Central Asia, are esteemed by museums, art historians, and collectors. With the availability of metal and plastic replacements, utilitarian production has diminished, but ceramic art and tile production remains strong.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON
UPDATED BY CHARLES C. KOLB

CERIDE-I HAVADIS

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

ÇERKES HASAN INCIDENT

Assassination of Hüseyin Avni and Raşit Paşa.

Çerkes Hasan was a Circassian infantry captain, a brother-in-law of Ottoman Sultan Abdülaziz, and a member of the personal staff of Prince Yusuf Izzeddin. On 15 June 1876, he entered a meeting of cabinet ministers being held in the house of Midhat Paşa and assassinated Chief of Staff Hüseyin Avni and Foreign Minister Raşit Paşa, while wounding several others. Çerkes Hasan was swiftly tried and convicted, and on 18 June he was executed. Though Çerkes Hasan claimed that he was taking revenge against Hüseyin Avni for a personal affront and against Raşit Paşa for his supposed role in the death of Abdülaziz on 4 June 1876, conservative politicians viewed the incident as a plot manipulated by Midhat Paşa to remove the only rival minister in the cabinet, paving the way for cabinet approval of the new constitution. Sultan Murat V, who was already showing signs of mental unhealth, was so disturbed by the incident that he was unable to continue in his position.

See also ABDÜLAZIZ; MIDHAT PAŞA.

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DAVID WALDNER

CEUTA

Spanish enclave and port city on the Moroccan shore of the strait of Gibraltar.

Ceuta is a Spanish possession with a population in 2002 of 69,000 and an area of 7 square miles (18 sq km). It commands the strait of Gibraltar and was settled by Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, and Byzantines. Taken by the Arabs in 711, it was the base for the invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. Under Muslim rule, Ceuta (Arabic, Sibta) was disputed by the various Spanish and Moroccan dynasties, interspersed with periods of autonomy. During the thirteenth century, Ceuta was a rich port, linking the trans-Saharan trade with the Mediterranean. In 1415, it was taken by Portuguese King John and abandoned by its Muslim inhabitants. After the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns in 1580, Ceuta became Spanish, which it has remained.

Until the mid-nineteenth century, it was frequently besieged by Moroccan government and tribal forces, and in 1860 this led to war between Spain and Morocco, following which the boundaries were expanded in favor of Spain. The independent Moroccan government has repeatedly demanded that Ceuta be handed over by Spain. Fishing and food processing are important economic activities.

C. R. PENNELL

CEVDET, ABDULLAH

[1869–1932]

Ottoman Kurdish writer, political activist, poet, and doctor.

Abdullah Cevdet was born in Arapkir, in eastern Ottoman Turkey, the son of an Islamic religious official and physician. After attending a provincial military school, he went to Istanbul at the age of fifteen to study at the army medical school. While at the medical school, Cevdet participated in a growing movement calling for liberal reform of the Ottoman Empire. In 1890 he and three colleagues, all non-Turks, formed a political society that, after a succession of name changes, became known as the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP).

Along with other members of the CUP, Cevdet was arrested in 1892. In 1896, he was sent into exile in Tripoli, where he served as the eye doctor for the military hospital. Continuing his political activities, he was forced to flee to Tunisia and from there to Europe. In 1900, Cevdet agreed to become the medical officer of the Ottoman Embassy in Geneva, Switzerland, in exchange for the release of political prisoners in Tripoli. For this compromise with Abdülhamit II, the sultan, Cevdet was branded a traitor and never attained high office once the CUP came to power.

Cevdet, however, never ceased his agitation for reform and, in 1905, was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment. Between 1905 and 1911, he lived in Cairo, where he joined the Young Turks group that became the Decentralization Party. In 1911, following the abdication of Sultan Abdülhamit, he returned to Istanbul. There his freethinking ideas, especially his atheism, led to frequent clashes with the new government. Cevdet's opposition to the empire's entry into World War I also aggravated his relationship with the regime. Although after the war he was appointed director of public health, his writings on religion led to charges of heresy. His trial started during the empire and continued into the early period of the new Republic of Turkey. The case was finally dismissed in December 1926, but he was prohibited from publishing political works.

While in Geneva, Cevdet had founded the journal *Osmanli,* in which he published articles in French and Turkish opposing the absolute rule of Sultan Abdülhamit. After this journal was closed, the principal vehicle for Cevdet's political writings was the monthly newspaper he published and edited, *Ijtihad* (also known as *Içtihat*; The struggle). *Ijtihad* was founded in 1904 and continued until his death in 1932, although it was shut down several times, particularly during World War I. Alongside attacks on despotism, *Ijtihad* published articles attacking theocracy, tradition, and religion but advocating secular modernism.

In 1885, while a medical student, he met the poet Abdülhak Hamit Tarhan and began writing poetry. His four volumes of poetry, published in the 1890s, were influenced by Hamit and two other Ottoman Turkish poets, Namik Kemal and Mahmut Ekrem, as well as by French poets.

Two books strongly influenced Cevdet's intellectual orientation: Felix Isnards's *Spiritualisme et Matérialisme* (Paris, 1879), which presented a skeptical outlook toward religion, and Ludwig Buchner's *Force et Matière,* which provided the intellectual basis for a radical critique of religion. This orientation informed his political writings as well as his writings on sociology, psychology, science, and philosophy. Two important collections of his essays are *Science and Philosophy* (1906) and *An Examination of the World of Islam from a Historical and Philosophical Viewpoint* (1922). In addition, he translated into Turkish and wrote the preface to the mid-nineteenth-century book *Histoire des Musselmans* (History of the Muslims) by Reinhart Dozy—which created a furor on its publication.

See also ABDÜLHAMIT II; COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS; DECENTRALIZATION PARTY; LITERATURE: TURKISH; NAMIK KEMAL; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY; RECAIZADE MAHMUD EKREM; TARHAN, ABDÜLHAK HAMIT; YOUNG TURKS.

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DAVID WALDNER

CEVDET, AHMED

[1822–1895]

Ottoman Turkish scholar-statesman.

Born at Lofça (Lovech, Bulgaria) to an Ottoman Turkish family, Ahmed Cevdet, at the age of seventeen, went to Istanbul, capital of the Ottoman Empire. During seven or eight years of study in *medrese* (higher schools of religious studies), he also found ways to learn other subjects—Persian, astronomy, mathematics—that were not taught in these schools. Mixing with learned company in dervish (Sufi religious fraternity) halls and literary men's homes, he formed important contacts. He began writing verse, and one of his literary benefactors, the poet Süleyman Fehim Efendi, gave him the pen name Cevdet. In the 1840s, he took the examination required to become a *qadi,* thus beginning his career as a member of the *ulama* (Islamic religious scholars).

Cevdet's work in administration began with Mustafa Reşid Paş's first appointment as grand vizier in 1846. Seeking an expert on the *shariʿa* (law of Islam) to consult about laws and regulations he planned to issue, Reşid Paşa asked the Şeyh ül-Islam to send him a broadminded *alim* (singular of *ulama*), and Cevdet was assigned. He remained close to Reşid Paşa for the rest of the latter's life, settling into his household and tutoring his children. There, Cevdet came under the influence of Reşid Paşa's efforts to simplify the Ottoman Turkish language and make it an effective means of mass communication; he also began to study French. In 1850, Cevdet collaborated with the future grand vizier Keçecizade Fuʾat Paşa in writing an Ottoman grammar. In the same year, he became a member of the council on education (Meclis-i Maarif) and director of the teachers' college Dar ül-Maarif, founded in 1848, playing a major role in organizing the college. Serving the education council as its first secretary, he had an important role in founding the Encümen-i Daniş (Academy of Sciences, 1851), which published his coauthored grammar, the *Kavaid-i Osmaniye,* as its first publication. When the Academy of Sciences decided to produce a history of the Ottoman Empire, Cevdet was asked in 1852 to write on the period from 1774 to 1826. So began the *Tarih-i Cevdet* (Cevdet's history).

Writing the first three volumes during the Crimean War, Cevdet was named official historian *(vakʿanevis)* in 1855. Over the next few years, he continued his *History* and studied the medieval Arab historian Ibn Khaldun, finishing the Ottoman translation of Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddima* in 1860 (begun by Pirizade Sahib, 1674–1749). Based on European as well as Ottoman sources and emphasizing the importance for the empire of developments in Europe, Cevdet's twelve-volume *History* was completed over thirty years. The work distinguished Cevdet not as an old-style chronicler but as a standard-setter for later historians.

In the 1850s, Cevdet also began to work in legal reform. Following his appointment to the Meclis-i Ali-i Tanzimat (High Council of Reforms) in 1857, Cevdet presided over the commission that drew up the land law *(arazi kanunnamesi)* of 1858. He inaugurated the publishing of laws in a volume, subsequently a series, which continues still—the *Düstur.*

When Mustafa Reşid Paşa died in 1858, and Ali Paşa became grand vizier, Cevdet was offered the governorship of Vidin province. He was not yet ready to change from the religious to the civil service, a move he deferred until 1866. The incident indicates, however, Cevdet's emergence, following Mustafa Reşid's death, into the top bureaucratic echelons—where statesmen rotated among ministerial positions and provincial governorships. This Cevdet did for the rest of his career.

Although he held many high offices, the emphasis of Cevdet Paşa's career thereafter was on law and justice. He served as minister of justice five times. He had a critical part in developing the empire's civil *(nizamiye)* courts, especially in introducing—with the Divan-i Ahkam-i Adliye—an appeals instance in 1868. The Hukuk Mektebi (Ottoman Law School) opened in 1880, while he was minister, and he gave its first lecture. His greatest legal contribution, however, emerged from a controversy over whether the Ottoman Empire should adopt the French civil code. Cevdet Paşa successfully championed the opposing view that a compendium of *hanafi* jurisprudence should be adopted. In 1869, he

chaired a committee of Islamic legal scholars that produced the *Mecelle-i Ahkam-i Adliye,* a pioneering attempt to codify Islamic law. He had a hand in preparing all the *Mecelle*'s sixteen books, placed in effect by imperial decree between 1870 and 1876 as the civil code for both Islamic and secular courts. The *Mecelle* remained in force until the Turkish republic adopted the Swiss civil code in 1926; in some successor states of the Ottoman Empire, it served much longer. The *Mecelle* constitutes a unique case of successful resistance to the Ottoman tendency toward adopting European law.

Close to the palace and reluctant about the constitutional movement, Cevdet Paşa was politically very conservative. As his transfer from the *ulama* to the civil hierarchy and his close association with reformist statesmen suggest, however, he was intellectually broadminded. He also founded an extraordinary family. He took part personally, to an unusual degree, in educating his children, in addition to hiring private tutors. His son Ali Sedad (1859–1900) wrote several books on logic. His daughter Fatma Aliye (1862–1936) became the first Turkish woman novelist and a leading figure in the women's movement. His younger daughter, Emine Semiye (1864–1944), was allowed to study psychology and sociology in France and Switzerland, before returning to Turkey as an educator, writer, and political activist.

Cevdet Paşa's writings contributed to several fields. In history, he wrote not only his *History* (*Tarih-i Cevdet,* revised edition, Istanbul, 1891–1892) but two sets of historical "memoranda" *(tezakir, maʿruzat)* that historians value as sources; he also completed the Ottoman Turkish translation of Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddima.* In law, the *Mecelle* is largely his monument. He wrote, too, various pedagogical works, especially his multivolume *Kisas-i Enbiya ve Tevarih-i Hülefa,* presenting accounts of the prophets and Islamic rulers, down to Sultan Murad II.

See also Mustafa Reşid; Newspapers and Print Media: Turkey; Qadi; *Shariʿa*; Sufism and the Sufi Orders; *Ulama*.

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Carter V. Findley

CHADOR

See Clothing

CHALABI, AHMAD

[1945–]

Iraqi politician.

Ahmad Chalabi, a member of an oligarchic Shiʿite family with close ties to the Hashimite kingdom installed by the British imperial authorities in Baghdad after World War I, was born in 1945. He is a leading but controversial opponent of Saddam Hussein who in 1992 founded the Iraqi National Congress in London. His family, including his father, a member of the monarchy's Council of Ministers, fled Iraq during the 1958 coup d'état. Until Chalabi's Pentagon-staged return during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, he had lived in exile for forty-five years. He studied at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Chicago, where he developed connections that would later serve his ambitions. He taught math at the American University of Beirut, and founded Petra Bank in Jordan in 1977. He turned to Iraqi politics after his bank collapsed in 1989. He had relative success lobbying the U.S. halls of power for "regime change" in Iraq. He claimed credit for the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act passed by the U.S. Congress. His critics allege that he promised to privatize Iraqi oil and privilege U.S. companies in return for U.S. assistance in grabbing power in Baghdad. He continues to be dogged by accusations of fraud, including a 1992 conviction in absentia for embezzlement in Jordan, as well as by allegations of spying for the Mossad and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the U.S. appointed him to the Iraqi Governing Council that they formed. His support among the U.S. State Department and intelligence professionals waned after the invasion, when the Pentagon's predictions about Iraq, based mostly on intelligence provided by the Iraqi National Congress, turned out to be inaccurate. However, he continued to have the support of the Pentagon in early 2004.

See also American University of Beirut (AUB); Hussein, Saddam; Iraqi National Congress.

Karim Hamdy

CHALLE, MAURICE

[1905–1979]

French air force general and commander in chief of French forces in Algeria, 1958–1960.

Born in Le Pontet, Vaucluse, France, Maurice Challe was a Saint-Cyr graduate and, in 1953, was commandant of the École de Guerre Aérienne (School of Air War). In 1956, he assisted in the planning of France's operation to retake the Suez Canal after Egypt's nationalization of it. France's President Charles de Gaulle appointed Challe as commander in chief of the French forces in Algeria in December 1958. Challe responded by initiating highly effective aerial tactics (Challe Plan) against the nationalist Armée de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Army, ALN).

Although reassigned in 1960 to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Challe was deeply affected by his Algerian experience and had become disaffected with de Gaulle's policy of decolonization—especially with the plight of Algerian loyalists (Harkis). In February 1961, he resigned; in April, he and three other generals staged a revolt in Algiers against Paris, which failed to mobilize the anticipated support. Challe gave himself up and was interned until 1966 and then was granted amnesty in 1968. He wrote *Notre Révolte* (1968), which recollected his Algerian experiences and especially the April 1961 insurrection.

See also Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN); Harkis; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

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Phillip C. Naylor

CHAMCHIAN, MIKAYEL

[1738–1823]

Armenian intellectual, regarded as the first modern Armenian historian.

Mikayel Chamchian was born in Istanbul to an Armenian family of the Roman Catholic faith. He was trained as a jeweler in the employ of the Armenian *amira* Mikayel Chelebi Diuzian, the imperial jeweler. Abandoning secular life, Chamchian joined his brother in Venice at the monastery of the Armenian Mekhitarian order in 1762. Upon completion of his education and training, he was sent as a preacher among the Armenians of Aleppo and Basra. In 1774 he was appointed instructor of Armenian language and grammar at the monastery, and in 1795 he was assigned to Istanbul as the resident Mekhitarian representative. He died there, after a long and productive life.

Chamchian was more than a missionary and educator. As grammarian, theologian, and historian, he was the intellectual giant of his age. His *Kerakanutiun Haykazian Lezvi* (Grammar of the Armenian language, 1779) is a landmark in Armenian linguistic studies. It was the first descriptive grammar of the Armenian language, though still of classical Armenian. His theological studies were defenses of Roman Catholicism, which, however, did not pass the censor at Rome for their attempt to reconcile Roman Catholic theology with Armenian Orthodoxy.

He made his most important contribution, however, as a historian. He wrote *Patmutiun Hayots i Skzbane Ashkharhi Minchev tsam diarn 1784* (Armenian history from the beginning of the world to the year 1784). Writing a universal history, in these volumes Chamchian developed a continuous narrative depiction of the Armenian people from the Creation to his own time. Though grounded in the biblical framework of the origin of humankind and of nations, Chamchian nevertheless crossed a number of important thresholds from a medieval worldview. His interpretation of events suggests more modern practices of historiographic methodology: He familiarized himself with current scholarship; he contextualized Armenian history by studying the classical historians; he examined all the extant Armenian historical works; and he constructed a comprehensive history of the Armenians. As a result, Chamchian's *Patmutiun Hayots* is regarded as the first work in modern Armenian historical scholarship.

See also Armenian Millet.

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Rouben P. Adalian

CHAMOUN, CAMILLE

[1900–1987]

President of Lebanon, 1952–1958; one of the most charismatic and influential Maronite politicians of the post–World War II period.

Born in Dayr al-Qamar, a predominantly Christian village located in the mixed Druze-Maronite district of the Shuf, in southern Mount Lebanon, Camille Chamoun (also Shamʿun) was graduated from the Faculty of Law of Saint Joseph University in Beirut in 1925 and elected to Lebanon's parliament in 1934. A member of Bishara al-Khuri's Constitutional Bloc, he rapidly rose to political prominence and became minister of finance in 1938.

In the late 1930s and early 1940s, he developed a close connection with the British and American governments and repeatedly headed Lebanese missions overseas. It was then that he began to acquire the reputation of being one of Lebanon's most cosmopolitan and most sophisticated politicians. After playing an important role in the events that led up to the gaining of independence by Lebanon (1943), he was a minister in several of President al-Khuri's governments. He nevertheless broke with al-Khuri in May 1948, when the latter sought to have the constitution amended to allow for his reelection. In 1951, Chamoun created the so-called Socialist Front with Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt and Maronite leaders Pierre Jumayyil and Raymond Eddé. The members of the Socialist Front accused President al-Khuri of corruption, nepotism, and violations of the law, and they sought to obtain his resignation. In the summer of 1952, they organized a successful countrywide general strike that forced al-Khuri to step down, and soon afterward, on 23 September 1952, Chamoun was elected president.

President Camille Chamoun (right) converses with King Hussein of Jordan in 1995. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

His presidency can be credited with several achievements. He increased the independence of the judiciary, induced Parliament to grant women the right to vote, and took measures to liberalize trade and industry that greatly contributed to the subsequent period of economic expansion and prosperity in Lebanon. He was criticized, however, for many of the very same practices he had accused his predecessor of fostering, particularly corruption and abuses of his authority. The political establishment distrusted his authoritarian leanings and his attempt to undercut the influence of traditional leaders. The Sunni Islam community especially felt alienated by his effort to undermine the authority of the premiership, which by convention was reserved for a Sunni, and by his unabashedly pro-Western foreign policy. During the 1956 crisis, for instance, he had refused to heed Muslim pressures to break off relations with France and Britain. As the pan-Arab rhetoric of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser became increasingly popular among the Sunni masses of Lebanon, he defiantly intensified the alignment of Lebanon with the United States, and, in 1957, he was the only Arab leader to publicly endorse the Eisenhower doctrine. Such open hostility to the rising tide of Arab nationalism in Lebanon made him very unpopular among Sunni Muslims. More generally, his heavy-handed, provocative style alienated many, including those within the Christian community. As a result, during his last two years in office, the people of Lebanon became increasingly polarized and discontented with his administration.

In 1957, Chamoun rigged the parliamentary elections to weaken his rivals and permit parliament to approve a constitutional amendment that would have enabled him to be reelected for a second term. Several of the country's most prominent political bosses thus failed to regain their seats in the Chamber of Deputies, which was then dominated by Chamoun loyalists. Such a blatantly illegal but effective maneuver to undermine their power led Chamoun's rivals to rise up against him during what came to be known as the 1958 Lebanese civil war.

Although Chamoun was allowed to remain in office until the end of his term, September 1958, he had to abandon any ambition of being reelected.

He never again exerted as much power as he had between 1952 and 1958, but he remained active in public life and continued to display his skills as a populist, pragmatic politician. In 1959, he founded the National Liberal Party (NLP), which, of all parties, became the most consistent advocate of free enterprise and close ties with Western countries. He also rapidly emerged as a determined opponent of President Chehab and his policies, and in 1967 he formed the so-called Tripartite Alliance with the other chief opponents of Chehab, Raymond Eddé of the National Bloc and Pierre Jumayyil of the Phalange Party. He thus was instrumental in electing Sulayman Franjiyya to the presidency in 1970 and remained a behind-the-scenes power broker in the years that followed.

As Lebanon slowly drifted toward civil war in the early 1970s, Chamoun proved himself to be one of the most hawkish voices within the Christian community. He was determined to maintain Christian domination over state institutions and to resist calls to end the confessionalism. During the first phase of the civil war, from 1975 to 1976, he was minister of the interior. In the course of the hostilities, he and his followers were rapidly overshadowed by Bashir Jumayyil and his Lebanese Forces. In July 1980, the Lebanese Forces destroyed the military infrastructure of the Tigers, NLP's small militia. Although Chamoun joined the Government of National Unity formed in 1984, he was then no longer in a position to influence the course of national politics. He died of a heart attack in August 1987.

See also Eddé, Raymond; Franjiyya, Sulayman; Jumayyil, Bashir; Jumayyil, Pierre; Jumblatt, Kamal; Khuri, Bishara al-; Lebanese Civil War (1958); National Liberal Party.

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Guilain P. Denoeux

CHAMOUN, DANY

[1934–1990]

Leader of Lebanon's National Liberal Party.

Son of former President Camille Chamoun, Dany Chamoun became active in Lebanese politics during the 1975 civil war, when he assumed the leadership of the Tigers, the small militia of his father's National Liberal Party (NLP). After the Tigers were thoroughly defeated by the Lebanese Forces in July 1980, Dany Chamoun was forced into exile in Paris. When his father died, in August 1987, he inherited the leadership of the NLP and returned to Beirut. From 1989 to 1990, he backed General Michel Aoun and opposed Syrian influence in Lebanon. He was assassinated in his Beirut apartment on 21 October 1990, together with his wife and two of their young children.

See also Aoun, Michel; Chamoun, Camille; Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); National Liberal Party.

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Guilain P. Denoeux

CHAMPOLLION, JEAN-FRANÇOIS

[1790–1832]

French linguist and historian whose breakthrough in 1822 in deciphering hieroglyphics made him the founder of modern Egyptology.

The availability of the Rosetta Stone (uncovered in 1799) and other inscriptions, together with his mastery of Coptic, were the prerequisites to Jean-François Champollion's success. The Rosetta Stone's text was inscribed in two languages (Egyptian and Greek) and three writing systems—Greek, hieroglyphics, and demotic (a form of ancient Egyptian cursive writing). Having started studying Eastern languages as a child, Champollion recognized that the scriptural language of the Coptic Christian church was the latest form of ancient Egyptian.

As conservator of Egyptian antiquities at the Louvre museum in Paris, Champollion arranged the impressive Egyptian galleries, which opened in 1827. In 1828 and 1829, he and Ippolito Rosellini led a French–Tuscan expedition to Egypt to copy inscriptions from the ancient monuments. Champollion died at forty-two, leaving his elder brother Jacques-Joseph Champollion-Figeac to publish many of his manuscript works.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

CHAMRAN, MOSTAFA

[1931–1981]

Iranian political activist.

Born in Tehran, Mostafa Chamran was an engineer by training, having earned a Ph.D. in electromechanics from the University of California at Berkeley in 1962. While studying in the United States, he cofounded, with Sadeq Qotbzadeh and Ibrahim Yazdi, the Muslim Students Association, which opposed the shah. He entered political life during the days of the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry and the premiership of Mohammad Mossadegh (1951–1953) as a member of the National Resistance Movement, the more religiously inclined branch of Mossadegh's National Front. In the 1970s he moved to Lebanon and joined the AMAL group led by the Shiʿite cleric Imam Musa Sadr. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Chamran was assistant to the prime minister and a member of parliament, until his mysterious death on the frontline during the war between Iran and Iraq. In addition to being a political activist, Chamran was also the author of several collections of mystical poetry.

See also AMAL; IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD; NATIONAL FRONT, IRAN.

NEGUIN YAVARI

CHAZAN, NAOMI

[1946–]

Member of the Knesset, political scientist, and prominent advocate of peace, dialogue, religious pluralism, and civil and women's rights.

Born in Jerusalem, Naomi Chazan received her B.A. at Columbia University and earned a Ph.D. at Hebrew University (1975). Director of the Truman Institute for Peace Studies at Hebrew University (1990–1992), then professor of political science and African studies (1994), Chazan has published widely on comparative politics, women's rights, and Israeli-Arab relations, and has occupied leading positions in the Israeli branches of the Society for International Development and the International Association of Political Science. She is better known, however, as an activist and politician.

As cofounder of a series of feminist organizations—the Israel Women's Network (1984), the Israel Women's Peace Net (1989), the Jerusalem Link/Engendering the Peace Process (1996–1998, with Hanan Ashrawi), and the Center for Women in Politics in Israel—Chazan has frequently focused public attention on the link between militarism and obstacles to women's rights, and on the unique contributions made by women peace activists. A member of the left-wing Zionist Meretz party executive, Chazan entered the Knesset in 1992, became deputy speaker in 1996, and has been one of the most active legislators, focusing on social issues, women's rights, and foreign affairs. She has been prominent in Peace Now, an active supporter of the unofficial Geneva Accord of 2003, and a leading campaigner for the rights of non-Orthodox Jews in Israel.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; KNESSET; PEACE NOW.

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GEORGE R. WILKES

CHÉDID, ANDRÉE

[1920–]

One of the most prominent and prolific authors writing in French from the Middle East.

Andrée Chédid was born in Cairo, Egypt, in 1920 to a Lebanese family. After receiving her B.A. from the American University in Cairo and marrying, at twenty-one, Louis Chédid, she moved with her hus-

band to Paris, where she has been living since 1946. Although her first collection of poems was written in English (*On the Trails of My Fancy,* 1943), most of Chédid's work is in French, and includes novels, short stories, plays, essays, and poetry, as well as children's books.

Like other francophone writers from the Middle East such as Amin Maalouf, Andrée Chédid is a product of both the Orient and the West. This hybrid aspect is reflected in her entire work, whose universality and humanity appeal to readers throughout the world. In most of her early novels, such as *Le sommeil délivré* (1952; *Sleep Unbound*), *Le sixième jour* (1960; *The Sixth Day*), *L'autre* (1969; *The Other*), and *Nefertiti et le rêve d'Akhnaton* (1974; *Nefertiti and Akhnaton's Dream*), Chédid used her native Middle East as the setting for her stories. Her poetry deals with nature, love and brotherhood, but is also an outcry against the violence and wars that constantly devastate not only the Middle East, but the entire world. Her plays, such as *The Goddess Lar* (1977), *Les nombres* (1965; *The Numbers*), and *Le montreur* (1967, *The Showman*), deal with the disenfranchisement of women in traditional societies. More recent works include the poems *Guerres* (1999; *Wars*); *Territoires du souffle* (1999; *Territories of Breath*), and *Le souffle des choses* (2000; *The Breath of Things*), and the novel *Le message* (2000; *The Message*).

Most of Chédid's writings have been translated into more than fifteen languages, and two of her novels, *L'autre (The Other)* and *Le sixième jour (The Sixth Day)* were made into films by, respectively, Bernard Giraudeau (1990) and Youssef Chahine (1996).

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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NABIL BOUDRAA

CHEHAB, BASHIR

[1767–1850]

Early nineteenth-century ruler in Lebanon.

After consolidating his power in Lebanon, Bashir Cheheb built a lavish palace at Bayt al-Din. © ROGER WOOD/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Bashir Chehab (sometimes Shihab) born in Ghazir, was converted to Christianity with the rest of his family. Growing up in poverty, he may have received some elementary education at home. He subsequently went to Bayt al-Din, where land had been left to him by his father. Chehab's rise to power was not accidental. He first became wealthy by marrying the widow of a relative, and he cultivated good relations with al-Jazzar in Acre. When the rule of his relative Prince Yusuf became intolerable, Ahmad al-Jazzar chose him as his replacement in 1789 with the support of the Jumblatts. When Yusuf went to Acre to regain his throne, he was briefly reappointed ruler of Lebanon. Chehab, however, was able to persuade al-Jazzar to reverse his decision, and Yusuf was arrested and executed.

But Chehab's rule remained precarious, depending on the whims of al-Jazzar. In 1793, 1794, and 1798, al-Jazzar appointed Yusuf's sons as princes of Lebanon. The occupation of Egypt by Napoléon and his advance toward Palestine secured Chehab's position for a while. When the French besieged Acre, al-Jazzar asked for Chehab's help; Chehab declined, citing the instability of the situation. He also refused to aid the French, fearing the wrath of the Druzes if he did so, because the French were supported by the Maronites. When the French withdrew, al-Jazzar, intent on punishing Chehab, appointed five different people to challenge his authority. Chehab fled Lebanon and sought support

from the Ottoman Empire. He remained in fear of al-Jazzar until the latter died in 1804.

Beginning in 1804, Chehab focused on consolidating his rule. Al-Jazzar had turned the Druze landlords against him, and he punished the latter by curtailing their economic and political power. Even members of his own family were not spared—many were killed and their holdings confiscated. By 1806, Chehab was promoting himself as the undisputed amir, and he built an opulent palace at Bayt al-Din that is now a tourist attraction. Chehab was secure in his position until 1819, when Abdullah Pasha took over as *wali* of Acre and demanded additional taxes from Chehab. The resulting protests and turmoil forced Chehab to abandon his emirate in 1820 and flee to Hawran. The resulting chaos alarmed Abdullah, who allowed Chehab to return in 1821. Chehab quickly reestablished order, for which he was rewarded with Abdullah's support of his claims against the *vilaye* of Damascus. When Abdullah was removed by the sultan, Chehab went to Egypt. There he befriended Muhammad Ali, who secured his reappointment.

Chehab's return to Lebanon marked the beginning of the disintegration of the emirate. Intoxicated with the backing of Muhammad Ali, Chehab assumed that a crackdown against Jumblatti Druzes would be safe; he had Bashir Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze community, killed. The Druzes never forgave him. The advance of Ibrahim Pasha to Acre in 1831 forced Chehab to provide help—against the wishes of the Druzes and to the delight of the Maronites. Fighting broke out between Druzes and Maronites. When Ottoman and European forces landed in Lebanon to expel Ibrahim Pasha from Syria, Chehab was evacuated on a British ship. He died in Istanbul.

See also Ahmad al-Jazzar; Bonaparte, Napoléon; Ibrahim ibn Muhammad Ali; Jumblatt Family; Muhammad Ali.

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As'ad AbuKhalil

CHEHAB FAMILY

A politically influential family in Lebanon.

The Chehab (also Shihab) family can be traced to Arab tribes from Hawran, Syria, who settled in southern Lebanon. The power of the family was established in 1697, when it inherited the leadership of the Mount Lebanon area from the last Maʿnid prince, who had no heirs. Originally a Sunni Muslim, Bashir II converted to Maronite Christianity, which displeased the Druze population in the mountains. Family members continued to occupy important positions in government and administration in the twentieth century. Its best-known member is General Fuʾad Chehab, one of the most powerful and popular presidents in twentieth-century Lebanon.

See also Chehab, Bashir; Chehab, Fuʾad; Lebanon, Mount.

As'ad AbuKhalil

CHEHAB, FU'AD

[1902–1975]

The most important Lebanese statesman of the twentieth century.

Fuʾad Chehab (sometimes Shihab) was born to a Maronite family. During the French Mandate, he served in the Special Forces of the Levant, established by the French government to legitimize their presence in Lebanon, and rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel. In 1946, with the official withdrawal of all French troops from Lebanon, Chehab was appointed the first commander in chief of the Lebanese army. He transformed the French-created force into a small national army, modernized the forces, and introduced Western-style military academies.

Chehab's name first appeared in a political context in 1952, when he refused to obey the orders of President Bishara al-Khuri to suppress demonstrators expressing their outrage at the corruption of Khuri's regime. Chehab strongly believed that the army should be kept out of internal political disputes. He also feared that any attempt to politicize the army would encourage a coup d'état. When al-Khuri resigned, Chehab was appointed prime minister (in effect, interim president) because the

Maronite establishment did not want to leave the country in the hands of a Sunni prime minister. Chehab led a smooth transition of power and oversaw the democratic election of Camille Chamoun as president.

When a civil war broke out in 1958, amid signs that Chamoun desired a second term (contrary to the provisions of the constitution and the wishes of the Lebanese) and wanted to use the army to crush the rebels, Chehab again refused to commit troops to support the president. His stance won him the backing of Lebanese Muslims. He feared that the deployment of troops would aggravate the social tensions in the country. His neutral position in those critical times made him the logical choice for the presidency, and with the support of Egypt (Nasserist) and the United States, Chehab was elected president in July 1958.

As president, Chehab initiated reforms to create an efficient and noncorrupt bureaucracy. He wanted to promote representatives of the professional middle class in order to end the monopolization of political power by traditional *zuʿama* (landholding elites). He also furthered social concord at home by transcending the sectarian interests of most politicians. Unlike other presidents of Lebanon, he was aware that political radicalism among Muslims was deeply rooted in socioeconomic dissatisfaction. He initiated a program of development in poor Muslim areas, although it did not, according to critics, go far enough. His presidency was not without problems. So disgusted was Chehab with the petty considerations and interests of the traditional political class that he tried to undermine their power by consolidating the security apparatus, which was accountable only to him. The rule of the Deuxième Bureau instilled fear and intimidation among civilians (especially Palestinians) and politicians.

The term *Chehabism* came to denote the political movement that pledged allegiance to the president. Unlike other political movements of the twentieth century, his power base cut across sectarian lines. Uninterested in power and politics, Chehab tried to resign before the end of his term, but was not allowed to do so by the deputies in parliament. He was succeeded in the presidency by his protégé Charles Hilu. Chehab shunned the limelight and rarely gave interviews. He died in seclusion.

See also CHAMOUN, CAMILLE; HILU, CHARLES; KHURI, BISHARA AL-.

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AS'AD ABUKHALIL

CHEHAB, KHALID

[1892–1978]

Lebanese prime minister (1937, 1952–1953), minister of finance (1927–1928), deputy, and speaker of parliament (1936–1937).

Born in Hasbeya, Lebanon, Khalid Chehab was first elected to the Lebanese parliament in 1922. A member of Bishara al-Khuri's Constitutional Bloc, he was minister of finance from 1927 to 1928. Following a short tenure as speaker of Parliament, he was appointed prime minister in 1937. Although he was one of the most influential Lebanese politicians under the French mandate, he is best remembered for the seven months during which he served as President Camille Chamoun's first prime minister (30 September 1952 to 30 April 1953). Chamoun, who had been elected with a mandate to modernize the administration, entrusted him with this important task. As head of a four-man cabinet, Chehab wielded emergency powers and issued several dozen decrees that consolidated the administration by defining much more clearly than before the responsibilities of civil servants and of the administrative departments. Other significant accomplishments of his cabinet included giving women the right to vote, changing the electoral system in a way that weakened the power of traditional patrons, substantially reforming the judiciary, and liberalizing the press law. Well-established persons who had been hurt by his policies acted in coordination with radical critics to force his resignation.

See also CHAMOUN, CAMILLE; CONSTITUTIONAL BLOC; KHURI, BISHARA AL-.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX

CHELOW

See FOOD: CHELOW

CHENIK, MUHAMMAD
[1889–1976]

Tunisian businessman and political figure.

During World War II, as a member of Tunisia's Grand Council, Muhammad Chenik was chosen in 1942 by the bey, Muhammad al-Munsif, to lead a pro-nationalist government. The effort was suppressed by the Free French the following year. In 1950, with the campaign for the independence of Tunisia in full swing, Chenik was picked to head a new government that featured a Tunisian majority. In 1952, during a French repression of the nationalist movement, Chenik and his cabinet, along with Habib Bourguiba and other leading activists for nationalism, were arrested.

See also BOURGUIBA, HABIB.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON

CHERKES

See CIRCASSIANS

CHINA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Since the late 1980s, China's Middle East policy primarily revolves around its desire to maximize its economic interests without becoming entangled in political controversies.

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949, China has had a roller-coaster relationship with the region. Periodic domestic upheavals and its long exclusion from the United Nations (UN) resulted in China oscillating from isolation and disengagement to active involvement with groups and movements hostile to Middle Eastern regimes. Even though the Bandung Conference (1955) opened the doors to the Middle East, Chinese diplomatic progress was slow and painful. Conservative Middle Eastern regimes that were apprehensive of atheist communist ideology were further threatened by China's identification with revolutionary regimes such as Egypt and Iraq and its support of radical movements. Likewise, some Middle Eastern countries maintained diplomatic relations with the breakaway Taiwanese republic, and this in turn raised concerns in Beijing.

China's admission to the UN in 1971 resulted in a nuanced foreign policy, and confident of its international recognition and acceptance, China toned down its criticism of the conservative monarchies and began adopting a friendlier posture with all the major countries. The emergence of pragmatic leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 brought about significant shifts in China's Middle East policy.

As part of its four modernization processes, China commercialized its arms supplies and looked to the Middle East as a prime customer. The prolonged Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s and the U.S.–U.S.S.R. arms embargo upon the warring nations proved advantageous to China. As Iran and Iraq looked to Beijing for arms supplies, Chinese weapons were in action on both sides of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Military modernization also compelled China to look to Israel as a possible ally, and military ties were established between the two long before the establishment of political relations.

In the 1980s China actively promoted proliferation of nonconventional weapons and helped countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria to acquire missile capabilities. The Saudi apprehension over the intensification of missile attacks during the Iran–Iraq War enabled China to conclude a multibillion-dollar deal for the supply of CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Riyadh, with whom China had not yet established normal relations.

Israel occupies an important position in China's Middle East policy. Even though the Jewish state was

the first Middle Eastern country to recognize the People's Republic of China (in January 1950), it was the last country in the region to be recognized by China (in January 1992). Initial Israeli reluctance, owing to perceived pressure from the United States, was followed by Chinese recognition of the political value of and ideological affinity to the Palestinian cause. The Suez Crisis of 1956 alienated China further. Political rivalry with Moscow and ideological competition with Washington influenced China to become the staunchest supporter of the Palestinian cause, and in January 1965 it became the first non-Arab power to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Besides political support, Beijing also provided military support and training to various Palestinian groups.

The 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait tested China's diplomatic skills and threatened its delicate relations with countries such as Saudi Arabia. Unwilling to join the U.S.-led coalition and unprepared to abandon Iraq, its political ally and economic market, during the critical UN Security Council vote authorizing the use of force to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait (Resolution 678) China abstained. This tacit support endorsed the liberation of Kuwait without unduly damaging the Sino-Iraqi relations.

The resolution of the Kuwait crisis, coupled with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of the United States as the preeminent global power, posed new challenges to China. Eager to participate in the Madrid peace process, in January 1992 China recognized and established diplomatic ties with Israel. Greater Chinese emphasis on economic relations is strengthened by increasing Chinese dependence upon Middle East for its hydrocarbon requirements. As China's economic growth continues, its energy needs shape its Middle East policy, especially towards countries such as Iraq and Iran, which were identified by U.S. president George W. Bush as part of an "Axis of Evil." During the Iraq war of 2003, China vehemently demanded Iraq to comply with the UN Security Council Resolution 1441 but opposed the use of force to secure Iraqi compliance. However, when the war broke out, China's Middle East policy reflected the traditional policy of seeking to maximize its economic interests without becoming entangled in political controversies.

Zhou Enlai, first premier of the People's Republic of China, attends the African Asian Conference with Egyptian president Nasser (third from left). It was during the later years of Zhou's reign that China's position towards the conservative Middle Eastern monarchies began to soften. **© Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

See also Bandung Conference (1955); Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); War in Iraq (2003).

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Kazuo Takahaski
Updated by P. R. Kumaraswamy

CHOLERA

See DISEASES

CHRAIBI, DRISS

[1926–]

Moroccan novelist.

Born in al-Jadida to a Muslim Berber family, Driss Chraibi studied at the French lycée Lyautey in Casablanca. He received a college degree in chemistry in 1950 and went on to study neurology and psychiatry. Two months before qualifying for his doctorate in science, he gave up his studies and decided to travel in Europe while working at various jobs.

In his early novels, *Le passé simple* (1954; The simple past) and its sequel *Succession ouverte* (1962; Heirs to the past), Chraibi drew on his own experiences to depict the generational conflict and culture shock experienced by Moroccan youth. *Les Boucs* (1955; The Butts) describes the harsh living conditions of the Maghribi workers in France. In his next novels, *L'ane* (1956; The donkey) and *La foule* (1961), Chraibi conveys his views as a Muslim Maghribi vis-à-vis the West, whose civilization and philosophy he had acquired through education. A biting tone was set through the author's sense of cynical amusement in *La foule,* but much lighter humor was evident in *La civilisation, ma mère* (1971; Mother comes of age). In *De tous les horizons* (1958; From all horizons), a book described as narration *(récits),* Chraibi again tapped into his personal experiences, with his parents and as a Maghribi in France.

The novel *Une enquête au pays* (1981; Flutes of death) marked a turning point for Chraibi: He embarked on a quest for his Berber identity, exploring pre-Islamic times and emphasizing the ties of Berbers with the land of the Maghrib and on the relatively recent Arabization and Islamization of North Africa. He continued the quest in *La mère du printemps (L'oum-er-Bia)* (1982; Mother spring). As a consequence, Chraibi found himself trying to dissociate himself from Arabic and the Arabs without rejecting the Islam brought to the Maghrib by the Arabs. A few of Chraibi's novels focus on more general topics—for example, the condition of the emancipated woman in *Un ami viendra vous voir* (1967; A friend will come to see you) and the story of a man and woman's struggle to establish a relationship in *Mort au Canada* (1975; Death in Canada). More recent works include the novels *Naissance à l'aube* (1986; Birth at dawn) and *L'Inspecteur Ali* (1991; Inspector Ali), and the nonfiction work *Une place au soleil* (1993; A place in the sun).

In 1994 Chraibi published a fictionalized biography of the prophet Muhammad, *L'homme du livre* (1998; Muhammad), an account of the two days that preceded the Revelation. His latest work is an autobiography, *Vu, lu, entendu* (1998; Seen, read, heard).

See also MAGHRIB.

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AIDA A. BAMIA

CHRAKIAN, ARTIN

[1804–1859]

An Armenian, minister of commerce and foreign affairs in Egypt, 1844–1850.

Artin Chrakian was born in Istanbul. His father, Sukias Chrakian, managed the commercial affairs of Tosun Pasha, one of the older sons of Muhammad Ali, the *vali* of Egypt. Sukias emigrated to Egypt in 1812, and two years later, his family followed him there. Artin Chrakian, his brother Khosrov, and a third Armenian, Aristakes Altunian, were allowed to attend school in the palace, where the young prince Abbas, later to inherit the governorship of Egypt, was one of their classmates. Sent to Paris, Artin Chrakian studied civil administration. His education completed, he returned to Egypt and began working at the war ministry at the mundane chore of translating French military manuals into Turkish. In succeeding years, however, Chrakian, along with other Armenian colleagues, was entrusted with the responsibility of reorganizing the educational system in the country. In May 1834, he opened the School of Engineering at Bulak, and in September of the same year, in conjunction with another Armenian, Stepan Demirjian, he opened

the School of Translation in the citadel of Cairo. In 1836, he was appointed a member of the school council, which subsequently became the ministry of education.

By this time, Chrakian was a full-fledged member of the administrative machinery governing Egypt. His appointment as a member of the *majlis al-ali,* the council for civil affairs, brought him in direct contact with the viceroy. From then on, his promotion was rapid. Muhammad Ali chose him as his first secretary in 1839 and sent him as an envoy to Paris and London in 1841. Upon the death of Boghos Bey in 1844, Chrakian succeeded as minister of commerce and foreign affairs. He remained in that post during the regency of Ibrahim ibn Muhammad Ali. Along with many other Armenians in the employ of the Egyptian government, he fell out of favor after Abbas assumed the post of viceroy. He was removed from office in 1850 and went into exile in Europe. He returned after Saʿid, the succeeding viceroy, invited him back to Egypt. Chrakian may have been the first Armenian in Egypt to receive the hereditary title of pasha.

See also IBRAHIM IBN MUHAMMAD ALI.

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ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

CHRISTIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Originally a Jewish offshoot, Christianity has been present in the Middle East since the first century C.E.

Christianity is based on the spiritual and ethical teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, who lived and preached in Judea during the first century C.E. and was crucified by the Roman authorities; adherents of the faith believe he rose from the dead. To Christians, Jesus was the awaited Messiah of the Jewish people (*christos,* "the anointed one," is a Greek translation of "Messiah"). His teachings were compiled in the Gospels, which, together with the teachings of his earliest followers, the Apostles, form the corpus of the New Testament. These twenty-seven books, along with the Jewish Bible and the books of the Apocrypha, make up the Christian Bible.

History of Christians in the Middle East

Although the earliest Christians were all Jews, some time around 45 C.E. some of the Apostles—especially Paul and Barnabas—began to preach to the Gentiles throughout the Near East. Antioch, Edessa, and Alexandria emerged as early centers of Christianity. By the fourth century the spread and influence of Christianity were such that it had become the official religion of the Roman Empire, whose capital had been moved by the emperor Constantine from Rome to Constantinople. At that time, too, the religion underwent a series of theological disputes centered primarily on the relationship of the divine and human nature of Christ. At the Council of Chalcedon (451), those that stressed the unitary nature of Christ (the Monophysites) were deemed heretical. (They constituted the Oriental Orthodox family of churches.) The Eastern Orthodox (Greek) Church, centered at Constantinople, remained the official imperial church of the Byzantine Empire. With the expansion of the Latin-based, Western-rite church centered at Rome and looking west to Europe, the theologies, languages, and rituals of the two centers of Christianity—Constantinople and Rome—developed in their distinctive fashions, leading ultimately to the formal split of 1054. Throughout the formative period of Christianity, the Middle Eastern churches—Coptic, Armenian, Chaldean (centered in Iraq), Assyrian, and Syrian Orthodox (Jacobite)—drew their followers from the indigenous population, most of whom eventually converted to Islam after the invasions of the seventh century. The Western, Roman Catholic Church became interested in the region once again after the period of the Crusades (eleventh to fourteenth centuries). The churches of the Protestant Reformation (sixteenth century) were not yet in existence.

European economic and political penetration of the Ottoman Empire began in the sixteenth century with the issuance of capitulations to France; missionary work was initiated, as were attempts to reconcile the Eastern churches with Rome. The Catholic and Uniate churches in the Middle East (Syrian Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Chaldean Catholic, and Greek Catholic churches) that looked to Rome for authority date from the seventeenth and

eighteenth century, except for the Maronite Church, whose union with Rome was initiated in the twelfth century. The Uniate churches, Eastern-rite churches that acknowledged the pope's authority, retained only a minority of Christianity's adherents. Protestantism came into the region through the efforts of, primarily, U.S. and British missionaries in the nineteenth century.

European strategic interests and the "Eastern Question" dovetailed with renewed religious interest in the Holy Land. Protection of Christian minorities by the European powers and the installation of Anglican and Roman Catholic institutions in Jerusalem were part of a growing European agenda to represent the interests of the various Christian minorities. Altercations over Christian holy sites led to the outbreak of the Crimean War. The fact that there are only four historical patriarchates and many contenders for their leadership has led to intercommunal acrimony. For example, Monophysite Copts, Catholic Copts, and Greek Orthodox Copts claimed the patriarchate of Alexandria; and Maronite, Greek, and Syrian Catholics, as well as the Greek Orthodox and the Jacobites, claimed the patriarchate of Antioch.

Christian communities were a part of the Millet system of the Ottoman Empire, which in turn was an elaboration of the *dhimmi* status given to Christians and Jews in early Islamic times. This system provided a measure of toleration, freedom of worship, and self-governance for the Christian communities, but always under the Islamic umbrella. Under this system Christians were barred from certain public offices and suffered certain legal disabilities vis-à-vis their Muslim neighbors. Proselytism was prohibited, as was conversion to Christianity from Islam.

Secular Nationalism and Christianity

It is therefore not surprising that Christians were among the more enthusiastic advocates of secular nationalist ideas at the turn of the twentieth century. They were also influenced by foreign mission schools, where such ideas were taught and discussed. Christians thus became prominent among the secular Palestinian and Lebanese leadership, and a Christian, Michel Aflaq, was one of the theorists of the Baʿth movement that provided the ideology for modern Iraq and Syria. An important exception to this tendency has been a sector of Lebanon's Maronite population, which has favored the creation in Lebanon of a Christian enclave.

The challenge posed to secular nationalism by Islamist movements has led some Christians to reexamine their advocacy of secularism, but it remains the most attractive option for the majority of Christians in the region. Census figures for Middle Eastern countries, particularly as they reflect religious affiliation, are notoriously unreliable or, in some instances, nonexistent. An educated estimate, however, would put the number of Christians in the region at 8 to 12 million. Emigration, however, has been a growing trend in recent decades. The Christian population of Jerusalem, for example, has shrunk from 26,000 in 1948 to an estimated 6,000. The number of Syrian Orthodox people in southeast Turkey dwindled from about 30,000 in 1980 to 7,500 in 1992. There are no reliable figures for Christian emigration from Lebanon, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the proportion of Christians there has dropped from roughly 50 percent to 30 or 35 percent during the course of Lebanon's sixteen-year civil war. In 2001, out of a total population of 3,500,000 Lebanese, the number of Christians hovered between 1,300,000 and 1,500,000. There are a large number of Lebanese Christians who live in the diaspora. Reasons frequently cited for emigration are war, including the Gulf War (1991), poor economic prospects, and anxieties about the future. Despite the deteriorating situation of Christians in the Middle East—or perhaps in response to it—Christian churches in the region have reached a historically unparalleled degree of unity in recent years. In 1974 the Middle East Council of Churches, based in Beirut, brought together the two Orthodox families and the Protestants for common witness and service. In 1987 the Catholic family joined this council.

The Eastern (Greek) Orthodox Church

The Eastern Orthodox Church in the Middle East developed around the four patriarchates of the early church: Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople. During the Ottoman period the Eastern Orthodox millet (community) was represented

Greek Orthodox Christians take part in a Christmas procession in Manger Square, Bethlehem. In the city of Jerusalem and elsewhere in the Middle East, there is a gulf between the Greek leadership of the Eastern Orthodox Church and its predominantly Arab parishioners; only the patriarch of Antioch is an Arab. © Hanan Isachar/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

before the sultan by the patriarch of Constantinople, the ecumenical patriarch, who was considered *primus inter pares* among the patriarchs. Of the other patriarchates, which serve predominantly Arab parishioners, only one—that of Antioch—has an Arab serving as patriarch. The patriarchs of Alexandria and Jerusalem are Greeks who preside over Greek hierarchies. Particularly in the see of Jerusalem, this has created a gulf between Palestinian and Jordanian parishioners and their leadership. Of the four patriarchates the largest, both geographically and numerically (about 760,000), is Antioch. This patriarchate includes Syria, Israel, Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait, with a few parishes in southern Turkey. The smallest is Constantinople—the Greek Orthodox population in Turkey has dwindled to about 3,000. The ecumenical patriarchate, however, continues to exercise leadership for the Greek Orthodox diaspora outside the Middle East.

The Oriental Orthodox Churches

The Oriental Orthodox family in the Middle East includes three other churches: Coptic Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic Orthodox, and Syrian Orthodox (Jacobite). The largest of the three—indeed, the largest denomination in the Middle East—is the Coptic Orthodox, numbering perhaps 5.5 to 6 million. The Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Church includes four jurisdictions in the Middle East: the patriarchates of Jerusalem and Constantinople and the catholicates of Cilicia (based in Beirut) and Etchmiadzin, Armenia. The Syrian Orthodox Church—whose patriarch presides from Damascus, just a few buildings away from the Greek Orthodox patriarchate of Antioch—had its heartland in what is now southeastern Turkey, northern Iraq, and northern Syria. In recent years disturbances in Turkey (related both to the Kurdish question and to the Gulf War) have contributed to the emigration of many

Iraqi Christians gathered in the Chaldean Church of Saint Ephraim, in the northern city of Mosul, and in other churches on 20 April 2003 to celebrate the first Easter mass since the fall of Saddam Hussein. About 250,000 Christians in Iraq, or 75 percent of the total Christian population there, are Chaldean Catholics, whose head is the patriarch of Babylon. © AFP/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

members of this community to Syria and Lebanon or to Europe and North America. The Syrian Orthodox people, locally called Suryanis, continue to speak their ancient Syriac dialect and use it in their liturgy.

Eastern Rite and Latin Catholics

The Eastern-rite Catholic churches owe their origins to Roman Catholic missionary activity in the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. These churches follow in general the rites of the orthodox churches from which their membership was drawn, but they acknowledge the primacy of the pope.

The Greek Catholic (or Melkite) church drew from Greek Orthodox membership. The patriarch of this church—the largest of the Middle East eastern-rite Catholic churches, at about 450,000 members—presides in Damascus. The largest concentrations of Greek Catholics are found in Lebanon, Syria, Israel and the West Bank, and Jordan.

The Coptic Catholic, Armenian Catholic, and Syrian Catholic churches are related historically to the three corresponding Oriental Orthodox churches. The largest is the Coptic Catholic, with about 100,000 members. The patriarch of this church resides in Cairo. The Syrian Catholic Church was reorganized by the Ottoman authorities in the nineteenth century. The Syrian Catholics, unlike their Orthodox brethren, use the Latin liturgy instead of the Syriac. Today, Syrian Catholics number about 80,000. The patriarchal sees of both the Syrian and Armenian Catholic churches are located in Beirut.

The Chaldaean Catholic Church, whose head is the patriarch of Babylon, historically drew its membership primarily from the Assyrian church of the

East. Chaldaean Catholics constitute roughly 75 percent (250,000) of the Iraqi Christian population. In 2003 Patriarch Bidawid passed away in the midst of the U.S.-led war against the Iraqi regime.

The two other Middle Eastern Catholic churches are the Maronite and Latin Catholic churches. The early history of the Maronites is clouded in legend, but it is generally agreed that their origin had to do with the fifth-century dispute over the human and divine natures of Christ. The forerunners of the Maronites, seeking to find a compromise between the contending parties, proposed a "monothelite," or "one will," position. By the thirteenth century the Maronites, who four centuries earlier had sought refuge in the mountains of Lebanon, had concluded an agreement with the Church of Rome, whereby the primacy of the Pope was acknowledged. Like the Eastern Orthodox patriarch in Antioch and the Greek Catholic and Syrian Catholic primates, the Maronite patriarch bears the title Patriarch of Antioch and All the East. The Maronites remain the largest of Lebanon's recognized Christian sects. Given the vacuum in political leadership, the Maronite patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir has in recent years become both the spiritual and political leader of his community.

The Latin Catholic patriarchate was first established in Jerusalem in 1099 and subsequently moved to Acre. Effectively terminated in the latter part of the thirteenth century, it was reestablished in Jerusalem in 1847. The Latin Catholics in the Middle East are, for the most part, expatriates from Europe and North America—with the important exceptions of those in Israel and the occupied territories and Jordan, where the approximately 50,000 Latin Catholics are predominantly Palestinian. The election of Michel Sabbah, a Palestinian from Nazareth, as Latin patriarch in 1987 represented the first such election of an indigenous Middle Easterner. Since his election Patriarch Sabbah played a prominent role in supporting the Palestinians' right to self-determination as well as the Israeli people's need for security, reflecting the pope's often-stated policies regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. During the two Palestinian intifadas Sabbah issued statements that were thought to be controversial by other Christian groups and by the Israeli government.

Protestants

Protestants make up a tiny minority within the overall Christian minority in the Middle East. Their influence has been substantial, however, both in the fostering of the ecumenical movement in the region and in the areas of education (secondary schools, colleges, and seminaries), medicine, and publishing.

See also Aflaq, Michel; Constantinople; Copts; Eastern Orthodox Church; Maronites; Millet System; Missionary Schools; Protestantism and Protestant Missions; Roman Catholicism and Roman Catholic Missions; Sfeir, Nasrallah.

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Dale L. Bishop
Updated by George E. Irani

CHUBAK, SADEQ
[1916–1998]

Iranian novelist, short-story writer, playwright.

Sadeq Chubak was born in Bushehr, the son of a wealthy merchant. Chubak published his first collection of short stories, *Khaymah shab bazi* (The puppet show) in 1945. His novel *Tangsir* (A man from Tangestan) was first published in 1963 and translated into English as *One Man with His Gun* together with four short stories and a play in *Sadeq Chubak: An Anthology.* This novel was later turned into a popular movie by Amir Naderi in 1974. Chubak's other major novel, *Sang-e sabur,* was also translated into English, as *The Patient Stone.* One of the most prominent "Southern" writers, Chubak resided in California at the time of his death in 1998.

See also Literature: Persian.

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Pardis Minuchehr

CHURCHILL WHITE PAPER (1922)

A 1922 British statement of policy regarding Palestine.

Drafted by the first high commissioner of Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, the white paper (also called the Churchill memorandum) was issued in the name of Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill in June 1922. A year earlier the Palestinians participated in political violence against the Jews, which a British commission found to have been caused by Arab hostility "connected with Jewish immigration and with their conception of Zionist policy." Samuel therefore urged Churchill to clarify to both communities the meaning of the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 and to reassure the Palestinians.

The Churchill statement reaffirmed British commitment to the Jewish national home. It declared that the Jews were in Palestine "as a right and not on sufferance" and defined the Jewish national home as "the further development of the existing Jewish community [Yishuv], with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race *[sic],* an interest and a pride." In order to fulfill the Balfour policy, "it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration."

At the same time, the memorandum rejected Zionist statements "to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine," which would become " 'as Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Government regard any such expectations as impracticable and have no such aim in view." It assured the indigenous Palestinians that the British never considered "the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic [*sic*] population, language, or culture in Palestine" or even "the imposition of Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole." In addition, the allowable number of Jewish immigrants would be limited to the "economic capacity of the country."

The Zionist leaders regarded the memorandum as a whittling down of the Balfour Declaration but acquiesced, partly because of a veiled threat from the British government and partly because, off the record, the Zionists knew that there was nothing in the paper to preclude a Jewish state. (Churchill himself testified to the Peel Commission in 1936 that no such prohibition had been intended in his 1922 memorandum.) The Palestinians rejected the paper because it reaffirmed the Balfour policy. They were convinced that continued Jewish immigration would lead to a Jewish majority that would eventually dominate or dispossess them. Both Zionist and Palestinian interpretations of the memorandum were largely valid: The British did pare down their support for the Zionist program, but the Balfour policy remained intact long enough to allow extensive Jewish immigration and the establishment of semiautonomous Jewish governmental and military institutions.

See also Balfour Declaration (1917); Churchill, Winston S.; Samuel, Herbert Louis; Yishuv.

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Philip Mattar

CHURCHILL, WILLIAM

[?–1864]

Newspaper publisher.

An Englishman affiliated with the Tory Party, William Churchill went to Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 1832, where he worked for the British embassy as a merchant and as a newspaper correspondent, particularly for the *Morning Herald.* In

1840, he founded the first private Turkish-language newspaper in the Ottoman Empire, *Ceride-i Havadis* (Journal of events). This broke the monopoly of the Ottoman state's official paper, *Takvim-i Vekayi,* published since 1831. Churchill's lively coverage of the Crimean War (1854–1856) attracted a new audience to newspaper reading. *Ceride-i Havadis* was published irregularly, roughly every one or two weeks, until 1860, when it began daily publication. The paper closed when Churchill died in 1864, although his son Alfred revived it for one year.

See also Crimean War; Newspapers and Print Media: Turkey.

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Elizabeth Thompson

CHURCHILL, WINSTON S.

[1874–1965]

British statesman; prime minister, 1940–1945 and 1951–1955.

Winston S. Churchill's connections with the Middle East were based on two concepts—the national interest of Great Britain and what he called "the harmonious disposition of the world among its peoples." These concepts were not necessarily contradictory. Thus, in advocating British support for the establishment and maintenance of independent Arab states in Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria after World War I and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, his objective was to produce a satisfactory harmony of local Arab needs, in the hope of creating states that would be well-disposed toward Britain and its defense and petroleum needs.

As a young soldier serving in India at the turn of the twentieth century, Churchill had seen the importance of Egypt and the Suez Canal for the maintenance of Britain's sea link with India and Asia. He had participated in the reconquest of the Sudan, where he had been repelled by the cruel attitude of the British commander in chief toward wounded Sudanese soldiers, and he had expressed his disgust in a book published in 1900. While British control of Egypt was something he took for granted (although nationalist movements were already a problem for Britain), at the same time, he was insistent that the British connection should be beneficial for the well-being and advancement of the Egyptian people.

First Direct Interaction with the Middle East

At the time of the Young Turk revolution in 1909, Churchill not only supported the modernization efforts of the Young Turks for the Ottoman Empire, but met several of their leaders during a visit to Constantinople (now Istanbul) that same year and remained in contact with them. In August 1914 when World War I began, he appealed directly to the Turkish minister of war, Enver Paşa, to keep Turkey neutral and thereby preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Two months later, when Turkey committed itself to the Central Powers (against the Allies) and began the bombardment of Russia's Black Sea ports, it fell to Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill, to direct naval operations against Turkey. These culminated in the attack on the Dardanelles (Turkish Straits), the failure of which led to Churchill's own temporary eclipse from politics.

In 1915, Churchill suggested that once the Ottoman Empire had been defeated, Palestine should be given in trust to Belgium, since Germany had violated Belgian neutrality and overrun most of the country. As compensation for this, Churchill wanted Belgium to be made the European overseer of the establishment of a Jewish national home.

Once the war ended in 1918, Churchill became secretary for war and air (1919–1921). In 1919, at a time when Britain herself had assumed the responsibility for Palestine, Churchill encouraged the Zionist leader Dr. Chaim Weizmann to consider the southern desert region of the Negev as an area of potential Jewish settlement (in 1949, David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, was to urge this same policy on his fellow citizens). Churchill's own instinct was, at first, to keep Britain clear of all Palestine responsibilities and even to reject the League of Nations mandate for Palestine—on the grounds, he warned the cabinet in 1920, that "the Zionist movement will cause continued friction with the Arabs." Nor were his feelings entirely supportive of Zionism: Writing in a cabinet memorandum

British prime minister Winston Churchill joins his commander in chief of Middle East forces, General Sir Claude J(ohn) E(yre) Auchinleck, in Egypt, on 23 August 1942. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

in 1919 of those who stood to gain from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, he declared: "Lastly there are the Jews, whom we are pledged to introduce into Palestine, and who take it for granted that the local population will be cleared out to suit their convenience."

Views on the Formation of a Jewish State

As colonial secretary in 1921 and 1922, it then fell to Churchill to fix the terms of the Palestine mandate. His attitude on Zionism had changed. In a public article in 1920, he stated: "If, as may well happen, there should be created in our own lifetime by the banks of the Jordan a Jewish State under the protection of the British Crown which might comprise three or four millions of Jews, an event will have occurred in the history of the world which would from every point of view be beneficial, and would be especially in harmony with the truest interests of the British Empire."

Having made the link of Jewish national aspirations and British interests, Churchill was also impressed by the ideological convictions of the Zionists and by their determination to create a flourishing world for themselves in a region that had been their home many centuries earlier. During a visit to Palestine in 1921, he was impressed by the Jews' success at cultivation and by the labor Zionist work ethic—the redemption of the land through toil. Henceforth, he encouraged the Jews to enter the region, stating in the terms of the mandate, as presented to the League of Nations in 1922, that the Jews were in Palestine "of right, and not on sufferance." He also gave the Zionists monopoly rights over the development of the hydroelectric power of the country.

During this same visit to Palestine, Churchill encouraged the development of a Jewish Agency for Palestine, through which the Jews would acquire virtual autonomy over health, education, and communal life, as well as participation in the political and diplomatic discussions concerning their future. At the same time, he urged the Palestinian Arabs to accept the fact of Jewish immigration and settlement and to recognize the economic benefits that the Jews would bring to the country.

When a Palestinian Arab delegation asked Churchill to suspend all future Jewish immigration, he replied (on 28 March 1921): "It is manifestly right that the Jews, who are scattered all over the world, should have a national centre and a National Home where some of them may be reunited. And where else could that be but in this land of Palestine, with which for more than 3,000 years they have been intimately and profoundly associated? We think it will be good for the world, good for the Jews and good for the British Empire. But we also think it will be good for the Arabs who dwell in Palestine, and we intend that it shall be good for them, and that they shall not be sufferers or supplanted in the country in which they dwell or denied their share in all that makes for its progress and prosperity."

At the Cairo Conference in 1921, Churchill agreed to the establishment of Arab self-government in Iraq and Transjordan and to the exclusion of Jewish settlement in Transjordan (now Jordan). He also argued in favor of a national home for Kurds in northern Iraq but was overruled by his officials.

During the 1930s, Churchill resented the pressure of the Arab states of the Middle East to curtail Jewish immigration into Palestine. He was an opponent of the white papers on Palestine (1939), by which the British government gave the Palestinian Arabs an effective veto over any eventual Jewish majority in Palestine. He also opposed the restrictions on Jewish land purchase in Palestine. These restrictions were introduced in 1940, shortly after Churchill had reentered the government as first lord of the admiralty, and as such he opposed the use of Royal Navy warships to intercept illegal Jewish immigrant ships heading for Palestine. As prime minister in 1940, he rejected Arab calls for the deportation of illegal Jewish immigrants.

During World War II, while he was prime minister (1940–1945), Churchill had to take steps to defend the Middle East from German encroachment. Although in 1942 he failed to persuade Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Allies, he did encourage Turkish neutrality. He also secured the basing of British military experts on Turkish soil, to immobilize oil pipelines and facilities crossing Turkey from Iraq, should German troops try to cross Asia Minor in any attack through Palestine to the Suez Canal. During the war, the pro-German revolt of Rashid Ali in Iraq was thwarted and the pro-German Vichy French government in Syria was ended by British initiatives. Throughout 1940, 1941, and the first half of 1942, Egypt and the Suez Canal were defended by Allied troops against continuous Italian and German military threats. Later in the war, Palestinian Jews were encouraged to volunteer not only for British military tasks, but for clandestine parachute missions behind German lines in Europe.

As wartime prime minister, Churchill watched sympathetically over Zionist aspirations. In 1942, he warned a personal friend "against drifting into the usual anti-Zionist and antisemitic channel which it is customary for British officers to follow." A year later, he told his cabinet that he would not accept any partition plan for Palestine between Jews and Arabs "which the Jews do not accept." Even the murder of his close friend Lord Moyne by Jewish terrorists did not deflect Churchill from his belief that a Jewish state should emerge after World War II, and he called upon the Jewish Agency for Palestine to take action against the terrorist minority in their midst.

In 1945, during a meeting in Egypt, Churchill tried to persuade King Ibn Saʿud of Saudi Arabia to become the leader of a Middle East federation of independent states, in which a Jewish state would form an integral part. Only Churchill's defeat in the general election five months later prevented him from setting up a Middle East peace conference and presiding over it, with a view to establishing such a federation. In 1946, as leader of the opposition, he told the House of Commons, after a Jewish-extremist bomb in Jerusalem had killed ninety people, including many Jews, at the King David Hotel: "Had I the opportunity of guiding the course of events after the war was won a year ago, I should have faithfully pursued the Zionist cause, and I have not abandoned it today, although this is not a very popular moment to espouse it." In 1948, Churchill pressed the Labour government to recognize the State of Israel. As prime minister for the second time, from 1951 to 1955, he argued in favor of allowing merchant ships bound for Israeli ports to be allowed to use the Suez Canal—which had been taken from British control by Egypt's military in 1952 during the revolt that ended in Farouk's abdication and the establishment of the republic.

Churchill's sympathies for Zionism were public and pronounced, alienating many Arabs. Yet he was not without understanding of Arab aspirations and of the vast potential of the Middle East. "The wonderful exertions which Israel is making in these times of difficulty are cheering for an old Zionist like me," he wrote to Weizmann, the first president of the State of Israel, in 1951, and he added: "I trust you may work with Jordan and the rest of the Moslem world. With true comradeship there will be enough for all."

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Cairo Conference (1921); Enver Paşa; Farouk; Jewish Agency for Palestine; King David Hotel; Weizmann, Chaim; White Papers on Palestine; Young Turks.

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Martin Gilbert

CILICIA

Valley in southern Turkey situated between the Taurus Mountains and the Mediterranean Sea, bordering Syria.

Cilicia is an important agricultural region. Adana is its largest city, and Alexandretta and Mersin are its major ports. In the late nineteenth century, Cilicia's growing cotton industry attracted large numbers of Muslim refugees from the Balkans and Russia. Cilicia's centuries-old Armenian population, descended from the eleventh century Kingdom of Little Armenia in Cilicia, was largely exiled or killed in the revolts and wars of the early twentieth century. The French occupied Cilicia from 1918 to 1921, when it was incorporated by the Franklin–Bouillon Agreement into the Turkish Republic.

See also Adana; Alexandretta.

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Elizabeth Thompson

ÇILLER, TANSU

[1944–]

Turkey's first female prime minister, 1993–1996.

Tansu Çiller was born in Istanbul. After getting her B.A. in economics from Boğaziçi (Bosporus) University in 1967, she went to the United States for graduate studies. She received her M.A. from the University of New Hampshire and her Ph.D. from the University of Connecticut. Having taught for a year at Franklin and Marshall College, she returned to work at Boğaziçi University. During her academic career, she also worked as a consultant to the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, the Istanbul Chamber of Industry, and the Turkish Industry and Business Association.

Çiller became an economic adviser to Süleyman Demirel before joining his True Path Party (DYP). In 1991, she was elected vice president of the DYP and served as minister of economy in the coalition between the DYP and the Social Democratic Populist Party. When Demirel was elected Turkey's ninth president in 1993, Çiller became the chairperson of the party. Having opted to continue the DYP-SHP coalition, she announced her government's program, which focused on fighting the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), combating inflation and unemployment, and promoting democracy and human rights. It was with this program that she came to be known as Turkey's "iron lady."

After the 1995 elections, Çiller stepped down from the government and formed a coalition with Mesut Yilmaz's Motherland (Anavatan) Party. In 1996, however, the cabinet resigned due to insurmountable disagreements between the two leaders, and Çiller formed another coalition with Necmeddin Erbakan's pro-Islamist Refah Partisi (Welfare Party). She served as minister of foreign affairs in the new government until the military forced Erbakan to resign in 1997. Çiller continued her political career as the minority leader of the parliamentary opposition. After the DYP's electoral defeat in 2002, she resigned as chairperson and withdrew from active politics.

Çiller became a significant role model for many Turkish women, but her political failures and the scandals about her family's finances contributed to a widespread mistrust about female politicians as well. In July of 2003, there was a pending parliamentary investigation proposal about her misdeeds during the prime ministry.

See also Boğaziçi (Bosporus) University; Demirel, Süleyman; Erbakan, Necmeddin; Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK); Refah Partisi; True Path Party.

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Nermin Abadan-Unat
Updated by Burçak Keskin-Kozat

CIRCASSIANS

A term that includes several groups linked by language and culture.

Circassian refers to indigenous peoples of the northwestern Caucasus who are found today as minority communities in Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Israel, and Egypt. The term encompasses several groups linked by language and culture who refer to themselves in their own languages by different ethnonyms; primary among them are the Adyge, Abaza, and Ubykh. The terms *Circassian* (English), *Çerkes* (Turkish), *Cherkess* (Russian), and *Sharkass* (Arabic) are used by outsiders loosely to include various north Caucasian peoples. In addition to the Russian Federation and the Middle Eastern countries mentioned above, migrations since the 1960s have led to a Circassian presence in Western Europe and the United States. One can thus speak of a widely dispersed Circassian diaspora that is linked through kinship, intermarriage, transnational social and political organizations, and cultural flows.

Russian and Ottoman Empires

The territories in which the Circassians lived were zones of contention between the Russian and Ottoman empires. After the Russian Empire consolidated its control over the region during the 1850s, Circassians and many other north Caucasian peoples began to migrate into the Ottoman Empire, and a mass migration ensued in 1864. At first they were settled by imperial agencies in the Balkans, although later most were settled in Anatolia and the Syrian Province.

Although this migration led to the current configuration of the Circassian population in the Middle East, there is a long history of linkages across the Black Sea and the Transcaucasus. A slave trade in men, women, and children was an important part of this and Circassians, like many others, fed imperial appetites for warriors, administrators, concubines, and servants. The presence of Circassians in Eygpt as well as some of the major cities of the former Ottoman empire is the complex result of this long history. Thus in Egypt, the Circassian presence goes back to the Circassian Mamluk dynasties of the thirteenth through sixteenth centuries, and Circassian identity persisted after the overthrow of the Mamluks and was augmented in the Ottoman period by a continuing inflow of administrators and slaves of Circassian origin.

In contrast, the mass migration during the second half of the nineteenth century led to the formation of farming communities in areas of Anatolia and along what is commonly referred to in the literature on pastoralism as the interface of the "desert and the sown" in the Syrian province. The new Circassian communities often came into conflict with indigenous inhabitants over resources, water, and government services but eventually arrived at various accommodations, as evidenced by intermarriage and mixed settlement.

The Circassian migration also led to a peak in the Circassian female (and to some extent, child) slave trade. Under pressure from the British Empire, black slavery via North Africa had ceased and the Balkans were no longer under Ottoman control, leaving the Caucasus as the main source of slaves for the Ottoman state. This trade was not without its contradictions and contestations, with the state attempting to close slave markets and limit or even sometimes forbid the slave trade while still maintaining the imperial privilege of purchasing women for the harem. Circassian slave and harem women became an integral part of Orientalist literature and arts.

Circassian Communities as Minorities

The breakup of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century meant that the various Circassian communities became minorities within new nation states rather than part of a multiethnic empire. Colonial powers in Syria, Jordan, and Palestine had varying policies towards Circassians and other ethnic groups. Cultural, social, and political organization and patterns thus differ across countries, types of settlement, class, and other factors. However, Circassian identity does persist across time and space. The Circassian language, which is indigenous to the northwest Caucasus and unrelated to Semitic, Turkic, or Indo-European, continues to be spoken across these communities. In addition, Circassians speak the languages of the countries where they live and participate fully in economic, social, and political life. In none of the Middle Eastern countries are the Circassians legally designated as a minority, although some forms of recognition may exist. For

example, in the Jordanian parliament a certain number of seats are designated for Circassian as well as for Chechen representatives (the Chechens are also a Caucasian group with a history and presence in Jordan similar to that of the Circassians).

No accurate count exists of the Circassians in the Middle East, as the censuses do not differentiate by ethnicity. Turkey has the largest Circassians' presence—well over 1 million, spread over rural and urban settlements all across the country. The wide variety of lifestyles and life conditions make it difficult to generalize, but Circassians in Turkey have been active in organizational and associational life and have been affected by the legal and political measures to limit ethnic self-expression that stem from the conflict between the state and the Kurdish population.

Syria is the next in terms of numbers, with possibly as many as 100,000. Although pan-Arab ideology is the basis of the Syrian state, Circassians have not suffered from assimilationist policies. However, almost half the Circassian settlements in Syria were originally in the Golan Heights around the city of al-Qunaytra, which was destroyed and captured by the Israelis during the Arab–Israel War of 1973. Almost all the Circassians of this region moved to Damascus and a good percentage then migrated to the United States, forming the core of a community in New Jersey.

In Jordan, the community of around 35,000 was historically influential in government, military, and the security apparatus, and was well represented in the cabinet and parliament. The community grew wealthy with the choice of Amman as the capital during the 1920s, since they were settled mainly in Amman and neighboring villages. Several ethnic associations and clubs, some established as early as the 1930s, form a focus of community activities and there is also a school (kindergarten through twelfth grade) that teaches Circassian language and history in addition to the regular government curriculum.

In Israel, there are two Circassian villages in the Galilee, Kufr Kama and Rihaniyya, with a population of around 3,400. Like the Druze, they serve in the Israeli military and are somewhat privileged over the Arab population. Circassian is taught in schools and folklore groups exist. Until the 1990s and the Oslo Accords, there was little interaction between the Circassians in Israel and those in Arab countries, but it is now increasing.

The most definitive recent change in terms of identity and self-perception has come about with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This has enabled Circassians to travel to their homeland for the first time in 150 years and has led many to question their history and identity. Some have chosen to settle in the Russian Federation and others have reaffirmed their ties to their Middle Eastern settlements and citizenship. For all, it has led to the formation of diasporic cultural, social, and economic networks, which may play transformative roles in the future.

See also Arab–Israel War (1973); Black Sea; Golan Heights; Oslo Accord (1993); Ottoman Empire.

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Seteney Shami

CIRCUMCISION

For males, circumcision involves removal of the foreskin of the penis. For females, it is the excision of all or part of the external genitalia, and is commonly referred to as clitoridectomy or female genital mutilation.

When done as part of tradition, male circumcision often signifies a rite of passage—admission into

group membership, or the achievement of a particular status. Jewish boys are circumcised on their eighth day of life (unless the procedure will complicate their health) in accordance with the biblical commandment symbolizing the covenant *(brit)* with God. The ritual, called *brit milah* in Hebrew, is also required of male proselytes. Male proselytes who were previously circumcised are required to have a drop of blood, called *tipat dam* in Hebrew, removed from the penis. Both rituals are to be performed by a *mohel,* a Jewish person trained in the ritual. Male circumcision is also widely prevalent in Muslim society. Deviation from this practice in both societies is related to an attenuated degree of observance of religious observance in general.

The practice of circumcising females may be attributable to an attempt to depress sexual desire and preserve the virginity of young girls, but the original motivation is unclear. (Major religions neither support the practice nor refer to it explicitly.) Female circumcision is often performed between five and twelve years of age, or after childbirth. It is widely criticized for medical and sexual reasons, and because of the pain, disfigurement, and mental anguish it may cause. The World Medical Association condemned the act in 1993, calling it "female genital mutilation." The practice is more widespread in African countries than it is in Western countries, despite criticism by African leaders.

Male circumcision has its medical proponents. About 60 percent of U.S. male infants undergo circumcision, but the practice is being increasingly challenged. Medical associations now render a more cautious appraisal of the medical benefits of male circumcision, and raise new questions about possible physiological, sexual, and psychological consequences.

See also FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION.

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EPHRAIM TABORY

CIVIL CODE OF 1926

Civil laws of the Republic of Turkey, a secular body of laws that covers all citizens—Muslims and non-Muslims.

Turkey's civil law was enacted in 1926; unlike the gradual evolution of European civil codes, the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey brought a new code that has undergone relatively few changes.

Prior to the foundation of the Turkish republic, from 1869 to 1926, Ottoman legislators promulgated private (civil) law—rules derived from the *shariʿa* (Islamic law), comprising 1,851 articles and called *Mecelle-i Ahkam-i Adliye* (Compilation of legal rules). It had no laws concerning family and inheritance matters. Near the end of World War I, in 1917, a decree on family law, *Hukuku Aile Kararnamesi,* was promulgated by the sultan. In 1919, the pressure of organized religious forces abrogated this decree.

The Ottomans had been allied with the losing Central Powers in World War I. With the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the founders of the Turkish republic committed themselves to Western institutions; and they decided to undertake, in the shortest possible time, radical changes in Turkey's legal system. For Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and his colleagues, the major tools of social change were education and legal reform. An additional factor forced them to act swiftly: According to the peace of Lausanne (of 24 July 1923), the Kemalist government was pledged to adopt—under the supervision of the League of Nations—a legal statute protecting their non-Muslim minorities. Turkey obliged by introducing a general code and juridical system that would be acceptable to all citizens—Muslim and non-Muslim. The secularization of the legal system became one of Mustafa Kemal's major goals.

Kemalism used a number of Swiss and other European codes with relatively few amendments as models. In 1926, the Kemalists produced the new civil code, the code of obligation, and the trade

code; in 1927, the code of civil procedure; in 1929, the sea trade code. With these steps they realized very quickly two of Mustafa Kemal's goals while depriving the conservative Islamic clergy and others of time to organize resistance: (1) the domestic scene was free of all remnants of the Ottoman-Islamic legal system, and (2) their international relations had been freed from the obligations of the treaty of Lausanne.

The Swiss civil code was used as a model because it is based on twenty-five-year community studies of existing norms and mores in Swiss cantons where French, German, Italian, and Romansh were spoken. The Swiss code seemed best to accommodate the needs of a country with diverse cultural and linguistic groups. Turkey's Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat Bozkurt had studied law in Switzerland, and Swiss law professor G. Sausser-Hall was engaged to act as legal counsel to the government of Turkey. On 17 February 1926 the modified version was adopted in a single session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly; it entered into force on 4 October 1926. Some attempts to modify the code began in 1951—concerning human rights, family law, adoption, and divorce. Although the acceptance of the code has not been universal, and Islamic law is used in some remote rural regions, the civil code has served Turkey well.

See also ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; KEMALISM; LAUSANNE, TREATY OF (1923); OTTOMAN EMPIRE; *SHARIʿA*; TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

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NERMIN ABADAN-UNAT

CIVIL SERVICE SCHOOL (OTTOMAN)

Established to train civil servants to administer the Ottoman state of the mid-nineteenth century.

Established on 12 February 1859, the Civil Service School (Turkish, Mektebi-i Mülkiye) of the Ottoman Empire trained administrators in accordance with the new Tanzimat reforms. (The term *mülkiye* refers to the civilian—the nonmilitary and nonreligious—branches of government.)

The school offered courses in humanities, social sciences, and foreign languages, as well as special courses on public administration. In 1877, the curriculum was expanded and modernized. The first graduating class had 33 members; by 1885, there were 393. Graduates often filled the provincial posts of *qaʾimmaqam* (district governor). In 1935, the name was changed to School of Political Science; as the Faculty of Political Science, it is now located in Turkey's capital, Ankara.

See also TANZIMAT.

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DAVID WALDNER

CLARK–DARLAN AGREEMENT (1942)

Armistice agreement ending Vichy French resistance to Allied invasion of French North Africa.

During World War II, after the Allies invaded North Africa in November 1942, the Vichy French commander in chief, Admiral Jean François Darlan, signed this agreement on 22 November with General Mark Clark of the United States in Algiers, capital of Algeria, then under French control. Darlan ordered an end to French resistance, was made high commissioner of French North Africa, and severed ties with Vichy France. Because of Darlan's reputation as a Fascist, the deal aroused intense criticism.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

CLAYTON, GILBERT

[1875–1929]

British officer and administrator in Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq.

After serving under Lord Kitchener in the Sudan, Gilbert Clayton received a commission in the Royal Artillery (1895); he was subsequently private secretary (1908–1913) to Sir Francis Reginald Wingate, commander of Egypt's army and governor-general of the Sudan. He was the Sudan agent in Cairo and director of intelligence of Egypt's army from 1913 to October 1914, when he was promoted to head of all intelligence services in Egypt, a post in which he remained until 1917. Clayton rose to the rank of brigadier general in the General Staff, Hijaz Operations, in 1916, and became chief political officer to General Edmund Allenby of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in 1917. He was adviser to the Ministry of the Interior in Egypt (1919–1922), replaced Wyndham Deedes as chief secretary in Palestine (April 1923–1925), and was high commissioner and commander in chief in Iraq (1929).

In September 1914, Clayton wrote a secret memorandum to Lord Kitchener suggesting that Arabs could be of service to Britain during World War I and that an Arab leader friendly to Britain should be made caliph in place of the Ottoman sultan. This sparked the Abdullah–Storrs correspondence, which led to the Husayn–McMahon correspondence. Clayton and his fellow officers convinced Sir Mark Sykes that the Arabs in the Ottoman Empire might split from the Turks and join the Allies.

Clayton, who had reservations about the Balfour Declaration, supported Zionism within a limited definition whereby the Yishuv would serve merely as a cultural center for Jews in a multinational Palestine under Britain's administration. He argued against giving Syria to France under the Sykes–Picot Agreement and wanted Britain to take control of both Syria and Palestine. Although he believed Britain ought to continue to govern the Arabs, he attempted to reconcile Britain's interests and Arab nationalist aspirations while chief secretary in Palestine. He allowed his political secretary, Ernest T. Richmond, to expand the authority of the Supreme Muslim Council and increased Palestinian Arab appointments to government positions. Clayton helped negotiate the borders between Transjordan, Najd, and Iraq in the Hadda Agreement, signed in November 1925.

See also ALLENBY, EDMUND HENRY; HUSAYN–MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE (1915–1916); KITCHENER, HORATIO HERBERT; SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL; SYKES, MARK; SYKES–PICOT AGREEMENT (1916); WINGATE, REGINALD; YISHUV.

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JENAB TUTUNJI

CLEMENCEAU, GEORGES
[1841–1929]

French socialist journalist and statesman; French premier, 1906–1909 and 1917–1920.

In foreign policy, Georges Clemenceau pressed for military preparedness against German expansionism through closer strategic alliance with Great Britain and the expansion of military conscription among France's colonial populations. This brought Clemenceau into contact with the leaders of the Young Algeria movement: gallicized Muslims who were formed in the colonial educational system but found limited opportunities in the local administration or economy. Their proposals for military service in exchange for full civil rights found favor with Clemenceau and other liberal policymakers, especially after the armistice, when he led the effort to compensate Algerians for their payment of the "blood tax." The resulting Jonnart Law of 1919 was nevertheless greatly diluted by settler *(colon)* opposition to colonial reforms, and its failure to satisfy native demands may be considered a defining moment in the development of Algerian nationalism. Clemenceau headed the French delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, where he united with British prime minister Lloyd George to undermine the initiatives of U.S. president Woodrow Wilson and to realize the territorial provisions of the Sykes–Picot Agreement that pertained to the Arab provinces of the former Ottoman Empire. After his electoral defeat in 1920 Clemenceau retired from public life and devoted his remaining days to writing his memoirs.

See also SYKES–PICOT AGREEMENT (1916); YOUNG ALGERIANS.

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ZACHARY KARABELL
UPDATED BY O. W. ABI-MERSHED

CLIMATE

Middle Eastern climatic conditions vary greatly, depending on the season and the geography.

The Middle East and North Africa are perceived as both homogeneous and intensely arid, but the region is best characterized by its climatic variation. Although the hot arid, or desert, climate predominates in the region, the well-watered highlands of Turkey and the mountains of Iran and Ethiopia are important as sources of the region's major rivers. Climatic variation finds further expression in the temperature regimes of the northern and southern parts of the area. Average July maxima for inland locations near 30° north latitude are as high as 108°F (42°C), while summer maximum temperatures in northern locations such as Ankara, Turkey, do not exceed 86°F (30°C). Black Sea coastal stations' (e.g., Trabzon, Turkey) average summer maxima may be as low as 79°F (26°C). January average minimum temperatures fall to 50°F (10°C) in Aswan, but reach 10°F (−12.5°C) in Erzurum on the Anatolian plateau.

North African Taghit Oasis sand dunes, located in the Sahara Desert—Grand Erg Occidental, Algeria. © JOSE FUSTE RAGA/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Desert conditions are primarily the result of the subtropical zone of high pressure that coincides with 30° north latitude. In this area, cold, subsiding air warms as it approaches the earth, thus increasing its ability to hold moisture. This results in extreme evaporation from all surfaces, and under such conditions, very little rain falls. During the summer solstice, the sun is directly overhead at 23° 30′ at north latitude (e.g., at Aswan, Egypt). Annual periods of high sun in combination with clear skies through much of the year allow intense solar radiation with subsequent extreme evapotranspiration demands.

Evapotranspiration refers to the water needed by vegetation to withstand the energy of incoming solar radiation. This is accomplished through the mechanism of heat transfer by means of evaporation from inert surfaces and transpiration from stomata (pores) on leaf surfaces. Total demands made upon an individual plant are termed potential evapotranspiration (PE). Actual evapotranspiration (AE) is the amount of water actually available and used by the plant and reflects climatic conditions rather than optimal plant requirements. The difference between PE and AE defines the degree of aridity or drought and also the amount of irrigation water that would have to be applied for such vegetation to survive.

In the deserts of North Africa and Southwest Africa, total annual precipitation is between 2 inches (50 mm) and 14 inches (350 mm). The area from Aden to Baghdad receives from less than 2 inches (50 mm) annually to about 6 inches (150 mm). More than 39 inches (1 m) of water would be required in those places to sustain rain-fed agriculture. Under such conditions, sparse natural vegetation allows animals some seasonal grazing at best. Hyperarid areas, which seldom if ever receive rain,

have no vegetation at all. Rainfall variability within the area of desert climate exceeds 40 percent, reducing to 20 percent on the moist margins of the semiarid zone, which forms a transition between the true desert to the south and the more humid areas farther north.

Precipitation on the semiarid margins of Middle Eastern deserts ranges from 14 inches (350 mm) to 30 inches (750 mm) annually. Dry farming of grains employing alternate years of fallow can be carried out with 16 inches (400 mm) or more of rain. It should be remembered that, while rainfall variability is greatest in the desert, this also means that aridity there has high predictability. Thus, the semiarid transition between regions of predictable aridity and predictable rainfall is one where rainfed agriculture is possible but has a high chance of failure. This is biblical country—years of plenty followed by years of famine—and one to which pastoral nomadism was a practical adaptation.

The Black Sea coast of Turkey receives from 78 inches (2,000 mm) to 101 inches (2,600 mm) per year, although the transition from the windward, watered side of the Pontic range to the leeward, dry side can be very abrupt due to the topography. The Mediterranean climate, which is limited to a narrow coastal strip reaching from Gaza to Istanbul and from Tunis in the west to the Atlantic, is marked by mild winters with ample rain and long, hot summers when Sahara-like conditions prevail.

Precipitation results from three different processes. Orographic precipitation occurs on the Pontic and Taurus mountains of Turkey; the Elburz and Zagros mountains of Iran; the peaks of Lebanon and the hills of Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan; the highlands of Ethiopia; and the Atlas and Anti-Atlas mountains of northwest Africa. Such precipitation occurs as warm, moisture-bearing winds are forced to higher elevations over the mountains. When the air cools, it loses its ability to hold moisture, and rain or snow falls on the windward sides of those ranges.

The Anatolian plateau and the steppes of northern Syria experience small quantities of rain in the form of convectional summer showers from thunderstorms. Equatorial convectional rains provide the waters of the White Nile.

Overhead view of *feluccas* (sailboats) navigating near the Nile Delta's Elephantine Island and Aswan, Egypt. © JONATHAN BLAIR/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

A third cause of precipitation, particularly in the wintertime, is the passage of frontal systems from west to east across the region bringing alternating high and low pressure cells with associated cold, clear, or moist warm air masses. Frontal systems are propelled eastward by the subtropical jet stream, the position of which varies latitudinally by as much as 15° from a winter position in the north to its summer position in the south. Summer months find the path of the jet stream located from central Turkey northeastward to central Asia. Six months later the jet stream is at its maximum along a path traced across the Gulf of Suez to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba and beyond. This shift accounts for the changes in temperature and precipitation noted above.

Surface winds in the Middle East have distinctive qualities and have received local names famous throughout the region. The cold northern wind blowing from the Anatolian plateau to the southern Turkish shore in the winter is the *Poyraz* (derived from the Greek: *bora,* i.e., north); the warm onshore wind in the same location is known as the *meltem.* Searing desert winds are infamous: The Egyptian *khamsin,* which blows in from the desert, is matched by the *ghibli* in Libya and the *simoon* in Iran.

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JOHN F. KOLARS

CLINTON, WILLIAM JEFFERSON

[1946–]

U.S. president (1993–2001); closely involved in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process.

Bill Clinton received a B.A. from Georgetown University and a law degree from Yale University. Although he assumed the presidency of the United States in 1993 without a significant foreign policy background, Clinton almost immediately found himself thrust into Middle Eastern and South Asian issues. Attacks by Islamic militants against the World Trade Center in New York in 1993, and later against U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, prompted Clinton to order bombing attacks against targets in Sudan and Afghanistan to disrupt the activities of Osama bin Ladin and his al-Qaʿida network. Clinton also focused considerable attention on Iraqi refusal to cooperate with United Nations (UN) weapons inspections and ordered that country bombed on several occasions.

Yet it was the Arab–Israeli peace process to which he devoted more personal attention and prestige than any other U.S. president. Clinton's administration was taken by surprise by the revelations in August 1993 that Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had agreed to a framework on peace through secret talks in Norway. Although the United States had not been involved in the talks, the subsequent Oslo Accord was signed by Israel and the PLO in Washington on the White House lawn. Clinton signed the accord as well, as a witness. When PLO chairman Yasir Arafat then reached out his hand to a hesitant Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, Clinton, known for his people skills, nudged the two men together for a handshake—the first public greeting ever between such high-level Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Given the long-standing U.S. refusal to deal with the PLO publicly, Clinton became the first sitting president ever to meet Arafat and to allow him to enter the country since he delivered a speech at the UN in 1974. In 1994, Clinton played host to Rabin and Jordan's King Hussein, who agreed to the second-ever peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state. Clinton later traveled to the Jordanian-Israeli border in October 1994 to witness the signing ceremony. In general, however, his administration allowed the various parties to the Arab–Israeli conflict to continue the pace of talks and negotiations themselves, removing the U.S. to a role of "honest broker."

Clinton's desire to keep the Israeli–Palestinian peace process alive was severely tried by the resumption of violence and the mutual recriminations between the two sides under Rabin's successor, Benjamin Netanyahu. In October 1998, Clinton invited Netanyahu and Arafat to Wye River, Maryland, where he persuaded them to negotiate a further set of Israeli redeployments from the West Bank. Two months later, he became the first U.S. president to visit the Palestinian Authority, addressing the Palestine National Council meeting in Gaza. In October 2000, Clinton traveled to Egypt for the Sharm al-Shaykh summit. His most significant effort to conclude a final Israeli–Palestinian peace treaty occurred in July 2001, when he hosted lengthy talks between Arafat and Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak at his presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland. The talks ultimately failed and Clinton left the presidency having failed to see either a final peace settlement between Israel and the PLO or a resolution of the weapons inspections issue in Iraq.

See also ARAFAT, YASIR; BARAK, EHUD; BIN LADIN, OSAMA; CAMP DAVID SUMMIT (2000); HUSSEIN IBN TALAL; ISRAEL: OVERVIEW; NETANYAHU, BENJAMIN; OSLO ACCORD (1993); PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY; QAʿIDA, AL-; RABIN, YITZHAK.

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

CLOT, ANTOINE BARTHÉLÉMY

[?–1860]

French doctor who started first medical school in Egypt in 1827.

Known as Clot Bey, Dr. Antoine Barthélémy Clot was one of a group of European experts recruited by Muhammad Ali Pasha, viceroy of Egypt, to introduce European technology into Egypt. Clot Bey established the first medical school in Egypt in 1827, as well as Qasr al-Ayni hospital. The aim of the school was to train doctors and medical aides for the Egyptian army. Abbas I, who ruled from 1848 to 1854, dismissed Clot Bey along with most of Muhammad Ali's European advisers. Clot Bey returned to Egypt in 1856 and retired in 1857.

See also ABBAS HILMI I; MUHAMMAD ALI.

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DAVID WALDNER

CLOTHING

Overview of traditional and modern clothes in the Middle East.

Most contemporary Muslim societies reflect both old and the new realities. Resurgence of religion and nationalist attitudes of the postcolonial (twentieth-century) era are reflected in the modes of clothing. The traditional modes remain strongly defended and sometimes enforced by the governments of some Islamic nations. The great shift in political, social, and religious participation of women in many Muslim nations has affected clothing styles as well. In the twentieth century, there were two opposing models for Muslim women: the Westernized

A Bedouin man in Petra, Jordan, combines some modern clothing with traditional headgear. Headscarves and other coverings are among the most important items of clothing for men, and their size, colors, patterns, and other attributes can signify social or religious status, age, and tribal affiliation, among other things. © LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

lifestyle prominent among minor upperclass and elites, and the more restrictive, traditional "Islamic" way of life for the majority of women. A third, alternative lifestyle that has attracted a large number of Muslim women is both Islamic and modern, the result of more education and an understanding of the difference between the patriarchal interpretation of Islam and the text of the Qurʾan by the religious *ulama.*

Historical Background

Very little has been written regarding the dress of Arabs in classical historical literature. In terms of the Near Eastern people, more visual evidence survived

Israeli boys wearing decorated skullcaps called kippah, or yarmulke, study in a yeshiva, or Jewish day school, in the Galilee. The styles sometimes indicate political or religious affiliation. © Annie Griffiths Belt/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

in forms of stone carvings. The earliest evidence of Arab clothing from the first and second millennia B.C.E. shows that scant clothing was worn with a variety of headdresses. Men and women wore almost identical clothing in the early Islamic era of the seventh century and the time of *jahiliyya* (pre-Islamic era), as is still the case today among non-urban inhabitants of the Middle Eastern regions.

Arab material culture was influenced by contact with other great empires. Arab Muslim rulers influenced the clothing styles of the countries they ruled, while the fashion styles of the countries ruled influenced the rulers. Many customs regarding clothes have roots in ancient Near Eastern (Iranian plateau, Iraq) superstition found also in the Talmud, and still are practiced as they were during the *jahiliyya.* From the time of the Prophet (seventh century forward), early Islamic clothes fashions were an extension of the preceding period, with some modifications for new Islamic moral codes after the prophet Muhammad. The clothes of the villagers and bedouins of the Middle East are simpler, more functional, and more suitable to the climate and geography of the regions than those of urban dwellers, who are far more conscious of conservative modes of behavior.

In the urban Middle Eastern regions, Western styles of dress for the most part have replaced traditional clothing. Westernization of the Middle Eastern clothes styles is in itself unique and innovative at times and, importantly, accepted by the indigenous population. Traditional items of clothing mix with Western styles. For example, it is common to see Arab men of the Gulf region wearing the traditional long, ankle-length *jillaba,* or *dishdasha, kaffiya,* and *agal* along with a Western-style man's suit jacket and dress shoes.

Headgear

Among the most important items of clothing for men is the headgear, and the most common form of head dress for men is the *imama,* or turban. Historically, turbans were used for purposes other than merely covering the head—for example, for hiding objects, tying down a person, or using as a prayer rug. Turbans were wrapped in a variety of styles, as well. It was customary to leave a corner of the *imama* free to serve as a veil to protect the wearer against heat, dust, and the evil eye, and to conceal the wearer's identity. The locus of a man's honor and reputation was his head; therefore, to cover the head was proper and dignified and to leave it uncovered was considered shameful. In the book *Palestinian Costumes* Shelagh Weir notes: "Men swore oaths on their turbans, and the removal of a man's turban in anger was a slur and provocation and could necessitate material compensation."

The turban has long been worn by both Muslims and non-Muslims. The English word *turban* derives from the Persian *dulband* via the Turkish *turban* or *tulbent.* In Persian, the most common word for turban is *amama,* from the Arabic form of the word *imama.* Other less commonly known Persian terms for *imama* are *mandil* and *dastar-e-sar.*

The *imama* is usually wrapped around a small cap, which is placed at the crown of the head. This small cap is called *aragh chin* (Persian sweat collector), *tubior araqiyya* in Arabic. The early turban did not have the symbolic significance that it gained later, when it became associated with Islam and came to be referred to as "the badge of Islam" *(sima al-Islam),* "divider between unbelievers and believers" *(hadiza bayn al-kufr wa al-iman),* and "crowns of the Arabs" *(tidjan al-arab).*

According to an old Arab tradition, removal of a man's *imama* signified losing his manhood and abandoning his morals. Exceptions to this rule included removing the turban for prayer, to show before God, and for punishment, to show the public that the punished man is not respected. There are contradictory *hadiths* (Islamic traditions) regarding wearing or not wearing *imama.* In early Islamic times, the turban was forbidden to a person in a state of *ihram* (during the *Hajj* rituals).Turbans had to be removed before entering Mecca as a sign of humility and respect before God. The prophet Muhammad's turban was named *al-sihab,* "the cloud," and the prophet Muhammad was known as *sahib al-imama,* meaning "Master of the state turban," which is significant in terms of religious and community leadership. Numerous terms found in Arabic literature refer to different manners of wearing the turban: *al-saʿb, al-masaba, al-mikbar, al-mashwad,* and *al-khamar.*

In some Middle Eastern cultures, turbans were associated with sexual and social maturity. For example, in Palestinian culture, different types of headgear marked stages of maturity, and usually young boys were not allowed to wear a turban. The turban remained important even after the death of its wearer, and a traditional Muslim stone grave may have a mark with a turban. Non-Muslims who were ruled by Muslim Arab rulers were required to follow certain sumptuary laws regarding their garments. Among such obligations were the caliphs' orders to wear "the interchange," which referred to headgear, outerwear, shoes, and belts that would differentiate believers from nonbelievers in public. Non-Muslims were required to use special marks on their turbans to segregate them visually from Muslims.

In addition to marked turbans, the size and color of the turban was a badge of identification for certain classes and ages of people. The color associations have changed over time and place with various Muslim Arab rulers. For example, black turbans were associated with officials during the Abbasid period (ca. 750–950), and red was a sign of high rank. The Safavid court of Iran during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries adopted a particular form of turban that contained a tall, red stick at its center. This red stick became a religious and political divider between the official Shiʿite court of

Female Iraqi students in traditional and modern—but modest—dress walk side by side at the University of Mustansiriyah in Baghdad. **© Shepard Sherbell/Corbis Saba. Reproduced by permission.**

Iran and its rival, the Ottoman Turks. Safavid soldiers wearing red-stick turbans were known as *qizel baş* ("red heads"), by the Turks. Religious and learned scholars wore smoothly wrapped flat, white turbans. Yellow was reserved for Jews, blue for Christians. Apparently, at various times the colors red and purple were also reserved mostly for Jews and Christians.

Men in the prime of life wore turbans in bright, warm colors; men of fifty exchanged their colored turbans for plain white ones. Until the early part of the twentieth century green turbans were worn by *hajjis* (men who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca) and by *sada* (men who claim descent from the house of the prophet Muhammad) to indicate a religious status with high social value. The extensive use of green turbans by illegitimate users led to the re-

A girl in Bahrain wears traditional clothing comprising an ornamental headdress and a chador extensively embellished with gold embroidery and sequins. © ADAM WOOLFITT/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

placement of the green turban with the black turban, to distinguish the legitimate *sada.* In Iran after the Islamic Revolution of 1978, where separation of mosque and state is nonexistent, identification as a cleric denotes access to power, so it is significant that white turbans are associated with theologians and scholars, and black turbans indicate an association of the wearer to the house of the prophet Muhammad. There is no way to guarantee the legitimacy of the turban color vis à vis its intended meaning by its wearer. In general, the public trusts the wearer on this issue.

Because the turban originally was considered a part of a man's attire, traditionally, Arab men objected to women wearing this symbol of manhood. However, some literary references indicate that women at times in various parts of the Arab world wore turbans for certain occasions, perhaps in the privacy of the home. Young women sometimes wore turbans to appear more attractive, and when a woman gave birth to her first baby, she wore a turban comprised of six yards of material. After the second baby, she wore a turban with six additional yards. Northern Iraqi women wore turbans made of printed material and decorated with Ottoman Turkish gold coins. The practice of women wearing turbans is not unusual. and it is present even in the modern history of fashion, where there is an affinity for "exotic" headgear.

Another popular form of Arab headgear is the *agal,* which is a ringed cord or rope that goes over the headscarf worn by men in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Syria, and Palestine. The head rope was originally a camel hobble (the word *agal* means "to hobble") that was carried on the head when not in use. Later, this rope came to distinguish the bedouins of north and central Arabia (and the ruling families descended from them) from other bedouins. The earliest reliable report on the *agal* dates back to the early eighteenth century, from a picture depicting the imam Abdullah Ibn Saʿud wearing an elaborate and highly decorative type of *agal* that is sometimes called *mugassab.*

Along with the *agal,* men wear the Arabic *kaffiya* (or *pocu,* pronounced *poshu* in Turkish and the dialect of the Turkish Kurds). The *kaffiya* (also *shamagh* or *hatta*) is a head cloth folded diagonally and secured on the head by the *agal.* Men from the Arabian Peninsula, Syria, Iraq, and Palestine wear the *kaffiya.* It comes in a variety of designs and colors that denote tribal affiliation. In modern history it has acquired another layer of meaning as a symbol of solidarity among Palestinians and their supporters in their quest for political and geographical autonomy. It is sometimes worn in defiance, as if a substitute for the long outlawed Palestinian flag. Like the black-and-white *kaffiya* of Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which is worn by both Palestinian men and women as a sign of unity, the *pocu* has the same symbolic meaning for independence of the Kurds under the autonomy of the Turkish government. The *pocu* is also black and white, which are the colors associated with urban Kurdish intellectual men and women. It signifies political leftism, cultural freedom, and rights

to an independent state. Both the *pocu* and *kaffiya* are draped over the shoulders by men and women, worn like a scarf on the head by women, or worn in the traditional manner with the *agal* by men only.

Another popular headdress for men is the fez, a word derived from Fez, a city in Morocco where it traditionally is manufactured. It is a brimless, cone-shaped, flat-crowned hat that usually has a tassel made of silk. The fez is made of red felt and is worn in Syria, Egypt, North Africa, and Palestine. Another name for the fez is *tarbush* or *tarboosh.* It was banned during the Tanzimat period in Turkey (beginning in 1839), when dress regulation took place. However, the *tarbush* also played a significant political role after the Young Turk Revolution of July 1908.

Also common among men in the Middle East region is the *sidara,* an Iraqi cap commonly made of black velvet, black lamb's wool, or black felt. The *sidara* is brimless, has a crown at the center, and folds like a pocket around the crown of the cap. It resembles the hat worn by the cadets in the U.S. military. This cap at one time was very popular with middle-class, upper-middle-class, and elite members of Iraqi society. The *sidara* lost its popularity after the 1958 deposition of the last king and the establishment of the Republic of Iraq. Muslim men of the subcontinent of India wear a similar hat in black as a sign of Muslim identity.

The *kippah,* commonly worn by Jewish men in the Middle East, is a skullcap that is also known in Yiddish as the yarmulke. Ashkenazic Jews wear the yarmulke at all times, and Sephardic Jewish men generally do not. In Israel, wearing a yarmulke also has social significance: Not wearing a yarmulke is like stating, "I'm not religious." The style of yarmulke in Israel can also indicate political and religious affiliation.

The most common headdress for Muslim women is some form of a veil. The generic term for veil, known by Muslims regardless of their cultural and linguistic heritage, is *hijab.* The *hijab* refers to a physical veil, a tangible item covering the hair and face of a woman. The word is of Arabic origin, from the verb *hajaba,* "to hide from the view, to conceal." *Hijab* also refers to the Muslim woman's dress code in accordance with interpretation of Islamic law. Muslim women around the world wear various forms of veils, each community according to its own cultural and religious interpretations, so there is no universal form of veiling among Muslim women. Other common interchangeable words for veil are *yashmek, purda, chador, paranja, burqa, bushia, niqab, pece* (pronounced *peeche* in Turkish), and *khimar.* Each represents some specific form of head or face veil commonly used by Muslims of various nationalities. The chador, which in Persian literally means "tent," is a form of *hijab* (head veil), consisting of a full-length semicircular piece of material. It is placed on top of the head and covers the entire body. It is held in place with one hand at all times. Sometimes a corner of it is pulled over the face to cover part of the mouth.

Other Clothing

Other important clothing for men and women are forms of long dress, wrap, outerwear gown, or caftan. The most common outerwear garment is the *aba* or *abaʿa,* also known as *rida,* which is an ankle-length loose mantle or coat worn by Arab men over the shoulders. The *aba* opens at the front with no fastening device and has two openings for the arms to be pulled through. Piping sewn on the *aba* goes around the entire edge of the garment and around the sleeves. Customarily the *aba* is draped over the shoulders rather than worn as a coat. The fabric used for making the *aba* or *rida* identifies its region of origin, and a clear distinction is not made between fabric and garment. Traditional wraps or mantles are worn in most traditional Islamic societies, yet there is a considerable variety of draping styles from one region to another. Wearing an *aba* has religious associations in some regions of the Islamic world such as Iran or Egypt. In Iran, a man wearing an *aba* and turban is identified as a non-secular person associated with the mosque and theological schools.

Another form of wrap or cloak is the burnoose, which is a large, one-piece, hooded cloak worn by men throughout the Maghrib (Northern Africa). The burnoose is also used in religious ceremony as the chasuble of the Coptic priests in Egypt. Yet another common form of cloak or wrap is the *haik,* which is a large, voluminous outer wrap, usually white, worn by both sexes throughout the Maghrib. The *dishdasha* is a long, A-line, ankle-length, long-sleeved, light-colored shirt worn by Arab men in

the Gulf region. A similar style of man's garment commonly worn by men in Egypt is the *jillaba.*

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FAEGHEH SHIRAZI

CLUB NATIONAL ISRAÉLITE

A Zionist association.

The Club National Israélite (Arabic, al-Nadi al-Qawmi al-Isra'ili) was founded in Syria in June 1924 by Tawfiq Mizrahi, a Jewish journalist and director of the Bureau de Presse et Publicité advertising agency in Damascus, and Dr. Sulayman Tagger, the chief rabbi of Beirut, together with seven other provisionary committee members. The group's name was chosen in obvious imitation of the Arab Club, which was the focal point of Syrian and pan-Arab nationalism.

The Club National Israélite set out a nine-point program that, in addition to moderate Zionist goals, included working for friendly ties with other religious and ethnic communities in Syria. The club shifted its headquarters to Beirut in the late 1920s when the atmosphere in Damascus became increasingly hostile to any form of Zionism. It did not continue to be active for long, and most of its members joined other Jewish organizations with Zionist orientations.

See also ARAB CLUB; PAN-ARABISM.

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NORMAN STILLMAN

CODE DE L'INDIGÉNAT

Law code in French colonial Algeria.

Imposed by France on the native Muslim population of Algeria in 1881, the Code de l'Indigénat (Code of the Indigenous People) was exercised summarily, covering a vast array of offenses. Its arbitrary application was tempered in 1914 and 1919 by the Clemenceau and Jonnart reforms. Nevertheless, the colonial lobby in France kept the intimidating code in effect until General Charles de Gaulle issued the ordinance of 7 March 1944 that gave Muslims French rights. Discrimination and prejudice, however, continued to prevent the full enjoyment of these new privileges. Summary rule resumed during the Algerian war of independence (1954–1962).

See also ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; CLEMENCEAU, GEORGES; YOUNG ALGERIANS.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

COFFEE

See FOOD: COFFEE

COHEN, GE'ULA

[1925–]

LEHI radio announcer and politician.

Geʾula Cohen was one of nineteen members of the Lohamei Herut Yisrael (LEHI) who were arrested when the British seized LEHI's radio transmitter on 19 February 1946 as part of a crackdown on Jewish terrorist groups. Cohen was a leading figure in the radio broadcasts of the LEHI underground led by Yitzhak Shamir. She was sentenced to nineteen years in prison but escaped and resumed the illegal broadcasts. As a journalist in Israel, she was an active participant in the militant struggle on behalf of Soviet Jewry.

In 1970 she joined the Likud party. She was first elected to the Knesset in 1973, and served through 1992, the Eighth through the Twelfth Knesset. She

served first as a member of the Likud and then as a member of the Tehiya, a party she helped found that was to the right of the Likud. In the Twelfth Knesset she served as deputy minister of science and technology. After the defeat of the Tehiya party in the 1992 elections, she rejoined the Likud party. One of her most visible public roles was as a leading opponent of Israel's peace agreement with Egypt and its withdrawal from the Sinai; she is associated with the ideology of the hard-liners who espouse the vision of a Greater Israel, and she has consistently opposed concessions to any of Israel's Arab neighbors.

She was awarded the Israel Prize in 2001; the award cited her accomplishments as a LEHI fighter, writer, journalist, and member of Knesset, as well as her efforts to absorb immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia. She has published her autobiography, *A Story of a Warrior* (Tel Aviv, 1962; in Hebrew), and she regularly writes articles for daily newspapers.

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YAAKOV SHAVIT
UPDATED BY GREGORY S. MAHLER

COLE, USS

American destroyer attacked in 2000 while refueling in Yemen, focusing international attention on the developing conflict between the United States and terrorists in the region.

On 12 October 2000 two men exploded a small boat in the port of Aden alongside USS *Cole,* killing themselves and seventeen U.S. sailors and wounding thirty-nine. Despite suspicion that the bombing was sponsored by the al-Qaʿida network, initially no links were found and the U.S. administration decided against a retaliatory strike on al-Qaʿida camps in Afghanistan. In a videotaped speech in January 2001, Osama bin Ladin praised the attack as a blow against American "injustice" but denied his own involvement, in an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper *al-Raʾy al-Amm.* In June an al-Qaʿida recruitment tape that claimed responsibility for the bombing was brought to public attention by the newspaper; and in December, a letter was discovered ordering attacks on American ships in Yemen, purportedly written by bin Ladin in late 1997, before U.S. ships began to refuel in Aden. In the months following the attack, Yemen captured a number of mostly local suspects; in 2003 it revealed confessions had been made alleging that the attack was ordered by the prominent cleric Shaykh Zindani, a leader of the Islah Party. In 2002 U.S. forces killed one fugitive suspect and in 2003 indicted two of ten further suspects when they escaped from jail in Yemen.

GEORGE R. WILKES

COLONIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

European control of Middle East areas beginning during the nineteenth century and continuing until World War II.

Between the mid-nineteenth century and World War I, most of the Middle East and North Africa either already was, or later came, under different forms of colonial rule. In North Africa, France began to conquer Algeria in 1830, conquered Tunisia in 1881, and (together with Spain) imposed a protectorate upon Morocco in 1912. All three were "colonial settler states" in that a substantial proportion of the population (12 percent in the case of Algeria in 1854) were Europeans, mostly French families, who came to live and work in North Africa, both on the land and in the cities. Some of their descendants remained there until forced out by the independence struggles of the 1950s and early 1960s. On a somewhat smaller scale, Libya was annexed by Italy in 1911 and attracted some 110,000 Italian settlers during the inter-war period.

Britain and France Take Leading Roles

In Egypt, following the rise of a nationalist movement that threatened to challenge the British and French administration of the public debt (put in place in 1876), British troops invaded in 1882 and occupied the country informally until the declaration of

a British protectorate on the outbreak of World War I. Although large numbers of foreigners resided in Egypt, they were generally neither "settlers" nor *colons* in the French North African sense (since they lived mostly in the cities and engaged in commerce or in other service occupations) and a majority of them were not citizens of the occupying power.

On the coasts of the Arabian Peninsula, Britain's concern to keep the route to India safe and open led to the signing of a series of treaties with the rulers of Bahrain and of what are now the United Arab Emirates. In 1853 the rulers signed a Perpetual Maritime Truce; in 1892 Bahrain and the lower Gulf emirates, including Muscat and Oman, signed further agreements with Britain under which they agreed not to dispose of any part of their territories except to Britain, and to conduct their foreign relations exclusively through the British government. Britain concluded similar agreements with Kuwait in 1899 and Qatar in 1916. In 1839 Britain annexed Aden and turned it into a naval base; later, "exclusive" treaties were signed with the tribal rulers of the interior, and in 1937 the area was divided into the port and its immediate hinterland (Aden Colony) and the more remote rural/tribal areas (Aden Protectorate).

In the Levant, a form of colonialism of a rather different kind came into being after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by Britain and France in 1918. The Ottoman Arab provinces were assigned to Britain and France as mandates from the newly created League of Nations, Britain taking responsibility for Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan, and France taking responsibility for Lebanon and Syria. The guiding principle of the mandate system was that the states concerned should remain under the tutelage of the mandatory power, until such time as they were able to "stand alone," a period that, although unspecified, was viewed as not being of indefinite length.

Of the five states, Palestine was unique among its neighbors in that it was a settler state, since the text of the Palestine mandate included the terms of the Balfour Declaration (1917), in which Britain undertook to facilitate the setting up of a "national home for the Jewish people." European Jewish migration to Palestine had begun during the last decades of the nineteenth century with the rise of Zionism, whose objective was the creation of a Jewish state, although the specific details were not to be formulated until the early 1900s. By World War I there were some 65,000 Jews in Palestine, some 8 to 10 percent of the total population. In 1922 there were 93,000 Jews and about 700,000 Arabs; in 1936, three years after the Nazis had come to power in Germany, there were 380,000 Jews and 983,000 Arabs; and in 1946, about 600,000 Jews and 1.3 million Arabs. Thus the Jewish population had increased from 13 percent to 31 percent over a period of twenty-four years. Arab opposition to Jewish immigration was focused at least as much on the Jews' perceived character as European settlers (as in, say, Algeria) as on their religious affiliation.

The rest of the Middle East never experienced direct colonial control, although the Ottoman Empire's borrowings from European sources, and its mounting trade deficit, led it to declare bankruptcy in 1875 and then to the imposition of financial controls by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, a committee representing the interests of the European bondholders. After the collapse of the empire at the end of World War I, Anatolia was occupied by the French, Greek, and Italian armies, but a national resistance movement formed around the Ottoman general Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and an independent Turkish republic was declared in 1923. Iran had also been the object of external economic and political interest from the last decade of the eighteenth century; Britain wanted to control Iran because of its proximity to India, while Russia was expanding its empire in Central Asia and was also, or so Britain claimed, intent on gaining access to ports on the Persian Gulf. Iran achieved a certain degree of independence with the rise to power of Reza Khan, subsequently Reza Shah Pahlavi, who set up his own dynasty in 1925. Principally because of their remoteness and lack of major strategic importance, central Arabia and northern Yemen were never colonized. However, Ibn Saʿud, the ruler of central Arabia, gradually extended his rule over most of the rest of the Arabian Peninsula with substantial assistance from Britain, eventually establishing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

Independence Movements

The states of North Africa were generally fairly quiescent until after 1945, although the colonial regimes,

with their policies of widespread confiscation of tribal land for the benefit of the settler population, were deeply unpopular. In Morocco, the French generally were able to contain the movement for national independence, but they precipitated a major crisis by exiling the sultan, Muhammad V, to Madagascar in 1953. As a result, the rallying cry of the national movement became the return of the sultan from exile, which led to the sultan/king retaining his position as ruler after independence in October 1956. In Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba took over the leadership of the national movement after his release from prison in 1936; his Neo-Destour party had about 110,000 members in 1954 and was closely linked with the labor movement. After the war a guerrilla movement formed and attacked French farms and settlers. Probably because France could not take on anticolonial wars in both Tunisia and Algeria at the same time, Tunisian independence was negotiated fairly smoothly in April 1955.

Algeria's road to independence was far rockier than that of any other state in the region, largely because of the large numbers of French settlers in Algeria and of Algerian workers in France. Postwar French governments attempted to incorporate Algeria into France, a step that appealed to the settlers but was vigorously opposed by the great majority of the Arab population. In 1954 the Algerian resistance formed the Front de Libération Nationale under the leadership of Ahmed Ben Bella; after his capture in 1957, some of his colleagues set up an Algerian government in exile in Tunis. The "war of national liberation" lasted from 1954 until 1962; between a million and a million and a half Algerians were killed, and 27,000 French.

In Libya, Italian conquest and pacification between 1911 and 1932 had faced bitter resistance, involving major losses of life, but because of the country's sparse population, this general hostility did not produce a nationalist movement. The country's liberation in 1942 came about as part of the North Africa campaign; the British entered into a tentative alliance with the Amir Idris al-Sanusi, head of the Sanusi order, who was brought back from exile in 1944. After several years of negotiations, Libya became independent under United Nations auspices in 1952, and Idris became the new state's hereditary ruler.

Fearful of Jewish domination in their country, Palestinians rioted against unrestricted Jewish immigration in the 1920s and 1930s. British policy toward Jewish immigration into Palestine vacillated in the pre–World War II years, and by 1939 Britain again was restricting Jewish immigration to the area. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

In Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, and Syria—the situation in Palestine was of course unique—the British and French set up monarchies and constitutional republics, respectively. This new political order was widely contested, and the mandate regimes were generally unpopular, especially in Syria and Palestine. After having set up a compliant government in Iraq, the British felt able to make a formal withdrawal in 1932, although real independence was not obtained until 1958. In Lebanon the French were welcomed by the Maronites and the other Catholic Christians but by few others. In Syria there was a major national rising between 1925 and 1927, which the French had considerable difficulty in controlling, although a notable-dominated group, al-Kutla al-Wataniyya, emerged as the voice of moderate nationalism, with whom, it seemed, the French

might be persuaded to work. Expectations were raised in 1936 with the victory of Léon Blum's Popular Front government in France in 1936, but negotiations for independence ceased when it fell a year later, and Syria remained under French control until 1945.

Egypt, already under British tutelage since the declaration of the protectorate in 1914, escaped the formal structures of the mandate system. Late in 1918, some Egyptian politicians asked the British authorities for permission to send a delegation *(wafd)* to the Paris peace conference. When permission was refused, a widespread national uprising broke out in March 1919. Eventually, Britain conceded limited Egyptian independence in 1922; further agitation during the 1920s and 1930s led to the signature of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty in 1936 that enabled Egypt to enter the League of Nations as an independent state. Nevertheless, a substantial British military presence remained in the country until Gamal Abdel Nasser's seizure of power in 1952.

Palestine and Zionism

In Palestine, the special situation created by Zionist settlement led to increasing hostility and resentment on the part of the Arab population. The British attempted to act in an even-handed fashion toward the two communities, but in general the Arab political leadership was disinclined, for example, to participate in any British constitutional proposals that would imply recognition of the Zionist presence. The Jewish National Fund gradually bought up land in Palestine from (mostly absentee) Arab landlords. It amassed about a quarter of the cultivable area between 1920 and 1948 and settled Jewish immigrants on it in farming cooperatives. Jewish immigrants also settled in the cities: Between 1911 and 1929 the population of Tel Aviv grew from 550 to 38,500. For this and other reasons, there were serious outbreaks of rioting in 1921 and 1929, and a more sustained Palestinian rebellion between 1936 and 1939.

During World War II there was a considerable amount of illegal immigration to Palestine, but in spite of their obvious discontent with Britain, many Zionists fought in, or in units attached to, the British army. After the war Britain decided that it could not solve the problems of Palestine on its own and referred the problem to the United Nations. In November 1947 the United Nations voted that Palestine should be divided into an Arab state and a Jewish state; the British began to evacuate and had left by May 1948. In January 1948 volunteer units from some of the surrounding Arab countries began to infiltrate into Palestine from Syria. The volunteers and the armies of the other Arab states proved no match for the Zionist forces, which outnumbered them about two to one. On 14 May 1948 the state of Israel was declared. Throughout 1948 large numbers of Arabs left Palestine, unaware that they would not be allowed to come back. By January 1949, there were some 730,000 Palestinian refugees, 280,000 in the West Bank (which became incorporated into Jordan in 1951), 200,000 in the Gaza Strip, and the rest in Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan.

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PETER SLUGLETT

COLONIAL OFFICE, GREAT BRITAIN

British government department responsible for administration of dependencies, including most of those in the Middle East.

Until 1854 the colonies of the British Empire were managed by the secretary of state for war and the colonies. As colonial affairs grew in importance, a separate Colonial Office with its own secretary was established, which was responsible for administration of Britain's colonies and for the recruitment of colonial civil servants (who comprised the Colonial Service). The lines of Colonial Office authority often overlapped and conflicted with those of the India Office and the Foreign Office. The India Office administered British territories around the Persian Gulf (including the Trucial Coast emirates Bahrain, Qatar, and those that later formed the United Arab Emirates) and the Indian Ocean (including Muscat, part of present-day Oman). The Foreign Office oversaw certain areas of informal British rule, such as Egypt. At the end of World War I, Palestine and Mesopotamia came under British military administration and were therefore the responsibility of the War Office. When civil administrations were established in 1920, the Foreign Office took over responsibility for these territories, designated mandated territories by the League of Nations. Under Winston Churchill, colonial secretary in 1921 to 1922, the Colonial Office took over responsibility for the mandates. At the Cairo Conference in March 1921 Churchill established the basic structure of British overlordship of the Middle East for the next generation. The Colonial Office remained responsible for the administration of Iraq until 1932, for Transjordan until 1946, for Palestine until 1948, and for Aden and its hinterland until 1967. After World War II the Colonial Office became the administrative organ for decolonization. In 1966 it merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office, which itself was later absorbed into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

See also FOREIGN OFFICE, GREAT BRITAIN.

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BERNARD WASSERSTEIN

COLONS

European settlers (mostly French) who lived in Algeria during France's colonial rule.

When the Algerian war of independence broke out in 1954, the country's colon population stood at 984,000. Only 11 percent of the population, the colons dominated economic life, held a monopoly of political power, and comprised the majority of the professionals, managers, and technicians who kept the country functioning. Their per capita income was roughly seven times that of Muslim Algerians.

The first colons came to Algeria directly on the heels of the French invasion of 1830, mainly because the collapse of the Turkish power structure left large amounts of property available on attractive terms. By the 1840s, it became official French policy to encourage settlement on the land to ensure the permanence of French conquests and to provide a tax base that could put the colony on a self-supporting basis. Demographic pressures inside France, where population was growing more quickly than the economy, added momentum to the colonization movement. Similar pressures in Italy and particularly in Spain led to large immigration from these two countries as well.

Starting in the 1850s and the 1860s, Algeria also attracted significant amounts of French capital because large amounts of state land became available

to corporate interests, and opportunities for investment in rails and other infrastructure were lucrative. The earliest colonial vision saw an Algeria peopled by thousands of small European freeholders. The outcome by the mid-twentieth century, however, was that most agricultural land was held by large landholders who mainly employed cheap native labor, while 80 percent of Europeans lived in cities and towns, employed in industry and, particularly, in services.

From the 1840s onward, colons realized that their ability to maintain and improve their economic status depended upon access to political power. In 1848 they won for the first time the right to elect municipal councils, and in these they were assured two-thirds majorities. Until the last years of colonial rule, the settlers were guaranteed two-thirds or three-fourths majorities in all municipal and departmental bodies. Legislation under the Second Empire in 1865 provided that Europeans were citizens of France, while Muslims were subjects. On numerous occasions during the nineteenth century, the Algerian government attempted to intervene in defense of indigenous rights, which were regularly threatened by expanding settler hegemony. Colons were usually able to foil such attempts by invoking republican principles and condemning what they called government authoritarianism. By the twentieth century, however, republican rhetoric quieted; most colons were increasingly out of tune with the more liberal political discourse of the *métropole.* In each decade of the century, they mounted vigorous movements to block native attempts at improving their status and sharing meaningfully in the political process.

When, during the Algerian war of independence, colons began to fear that the government might make unacceptable concessions to the revolutionaries, they allied increasingly with disillusioned elements of the military to challenge civil authority. While the Evian Agreement of 18 March 1962, which provided the framework for Algerian independence, also included specific guarantees of colon rights, many of them, in the last months of French rule, joined with the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS; Secret Army Organization) in attacks upon Muslims and in systematic destruction of the country's infrastructure. At the same time, unable to countenance minority status, they packed bags and trunks and headed for the ports and airports. By the end of 1962, not more than 30,000 colons remained in Algeria, mostly elderly, or among the minority who had favored the Algerian cause. Their numbers progressively declined in the years that followed.

See also ALGERIA; ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; EVIAN ACCORDS (1962); ORGANISATION ARMÉE SECRÈTE (OAS).

JOHN RUEDY

COMITÉ D'ACTION MAROCAINE (CAM)

The first Moroccan nationalist party, established in 1933 and 1934, also known as the Bloc d'Action National, or simply kutla *(bloc).*

The Comité d'Action Marocaine (CAM) was the largest of three organizations created during the early 1930s by young urban nationalists to advance their aims; the two smaller bodies, the *zawiya* and the *taifa,* were clandestine. The most important of the initial cells of the *zawiya,* based in Fez, was led by Allal al-Fasi and Muhammad Hassan al-Wazzani (Ouezzani). Along with five others from the Fez cell, and Ahmed Balafrej and Ahmad Muhammad Lyazidi of the Rabat cell, they constituted the core leadership of the budding nationalist movement. Fasi was *primus inter pares* owing to his capabilities as a thinker and organizer, and to his personal charisma.

Their platform was disseminated through the Paris-based magazine *Maghrib,* and various Moroccan-based French and Arabic periodicals. Formally compiled and published in 1934 as the *Plan des réformes,* the CAM's program argued for comprehensive reform of the French protectorate—politically, administratively, judicially (mixing Western and Islamic legal codes), economically, and educationally—so as to achieve the protectorate's stated goal: the moral and material revival of Morocco with the aid of France. The plan was explicitly reformist. It did not contain any demand for discontinuing the protectorate or achieving independence.

The CAM made little headway from 1934 to 1935 in persuading the French authorities to respond to their demands. The ascent of Popular

Front governments in France and Spain in the first portion of 1936 temporarily gave them new hope; the subsequent lack of progress led the CAM leadership to convene a series of mass meetings in order to mobilize wider public support. In response, in November 1936, the French authorities arrested al-Fasi, al-Wazzani, Lyazidi, and others but released them a month later. The CAM then adopted a more vigorous strategy of broadening its ranks. By early 1937, it had expanded its official membership to about 6,500 (excluding the Spanish zone), had established thirty-two sections throughout the country, and was demonstrating mass appeal among urban workers, artisans, and unemployed rural migrants to the cities.

Alarmed by its success, the French authorities dissolved the CAM on 18 March 1937. The CAM leadership, however, quickly managed to reconstitute itself a month later as the Parti National (National Party for the Realization of the Plan of Reforms). Concurrently, a rupture occurred between a majority of the leadership, led by al-Fasi, and al-Wazzani, who formed the Parti Démocratique Constitutionnel.

See also Balafrej, Ahmed; Fasi, Allal al-; Parti Démocratique Constitutionnel (PDC); Parti National; Popular Front; Wazzani, Muhammad Hassan al-.

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

COMITÉ DE COORDINATION ET D'EXÉCUTION

The executive cabinet of Algeria's FLN, 1956–1958.

The Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution (CCE; Committee of Coordination and Implementation) was created by the Soummam Valley Congress of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front) in September 1956. It was composed of five leaders of the spreading guerrilla movement in colonial Algeria. Revamped and enlarged in 1957, it lasted until September 1958, when it gave way to the new Gouvernement Provisional de la République Algérienne (GPRA; Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic).

See also Front de Libération Nationale.

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John Ruedy

COMITÉ JUIF ALGÉRIEN D'ÉTUDES SOCIALES

A Jewish antidefamation organization.

The Comité Juif Algérien d'Études Sociales (CESA; Algerian Jewish Committee for Social Studies) was founded in 1917 by Dr. Henri Aboulker to function as a kind of antidefamation league in the face of continued, virulent *pied noir* antisemitism in Algeria. CESA's expressed goal was "to be on the alert that the free exercise of the Jews' rights as citizens not be violated or ignored."

The group lobbied through French political channels to achieve fuller social and civil rights for Algerian Jews, not as Jews, but as Frenchmen. One of its first campaigns was to remove the barrier preventing Jews from being accepted into the Algerian General Association of Students. As part of its public relations, CESA published and distributed to French military and public figures the *Gold Book of Algerian Jewry,* which listed all Algerian Jews who were killed in action during World War I and all who received military decorations and citations.

Having achieved most of its goals, the group became inactive after several years but revived as the leading voice of Algerian Jewry during the late 1930s.

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Norman Stillman

COMITÉ RÉVOLUTIONNAIRE D'UNITÉ ET D'ACTION (CRUA)

The body that planned the 1954 Algerian insurrection and gave birth to the FLN.

The Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA; Revolutionary Committee of Unity and

Action) was a clandestine organization that kept few formal records. The details of its origins and development have been the subject of dispute among several participants and scholars.

During the early 1950s, frustration grew within the nationalist Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD; Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties). That frustration resulted from the failure of political participation to produce tangible results for the Algerian people and also from the political infighting within the party leadership, particularly that which pitted the Central Committee against followers of Messali al-Hadj. In March 1954, Mohamed Boudiaf, an activist from M'Sila, called together a group of young militants, many of whom, like himself, had been members of the revolutionary Organisation Spéciale. Other founders identified with the MTLD Central Committee. It appears that the initial goal of the CRUA was to mediate between the Messalists and the centralists and bring about the reunification of the party. By the summer, when it became clear that the MTLD was irretrievably split, a Committee of Twenty-two decided that direct action was the only solution to Algeria's predicament and named an executive committee to take concrete steps toward armed action.

Boudiaf was to be the coordinator. The committee also included a leader for each of the *wilayas,* or military districts into which the national territory was divided. These were Moustafa Ben Boulaid of the Aurès and Nemencha, Mourad Didouche of the northern Constantine, Rabah Bitat of the Algiers region, and Larbi Ben M'hidi of the Oran. Later a Kabylia *wilaya* was recognized, and its leader, Belkacem Krim, became the sixth member of the executive committee. In October, three exiled militants, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Khider, and Ahmed Ben Bella were also named part of the executive committee. These nine men were considered the historic chiefs *(chefs historiques)* of the Algerian revolution. But it was the six militants inside Algeria who made the critical decisions.

At an October meeting or meetings, the exact date or dates of which are debated by the participants, the internal CRUA leadership decided to create the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front) and drew up a proclamation calling Algerians of all classes and political persuasions to join them in a war of national liberation. The insurrection broke out in the early morning hours of 1 November 1954.

See also Ait Ahmed, Hocine; Ben Bella, Ahmed; Ben Boulaid, Moustafa; Ben M'hidi, Muhammad Larbi; Bitat, Rabah; Boudiaf, Mohamed; Didouche, Mourad; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Hadj, Messali al-; Khider, Mohamed; Krim, Belkacem; Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques.

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John Ruedy

COMMERCIAL AND NAVIGATION TREATIES

Allowed European merchants special privileges in trading with the Ottoman Empire; regulated passage of ships through the Dardanelles.

Beginning in 1352, the Ottoman Empire granted special privileges to the merchants of Genoa, Venice, and Florence. These privileges, known as the capitulations, placed European merchants under the direct jurisdiction of their own consular representatives—who judged the civil and criminal cases that involved their own citizens. In addition, the capitulations granted Europeans the right to travel and trade freely within the empire and to pay low customs duties on imports and exports. The capitulations allowed European merchants to organize almost all trade between the empire and Europe.

The first commercial treaty with a maritime state of western Europe, the Draft Treaty of Amity and Commerce, was negotiated with France in 1535. Based on the model of the earlier capitulations, this treaty, which was never confirmed by Sultan Süleyman (reigned 1520–1566), stated that French merchants would be permitted to move and trade freely within the empire and to pay only the taxes and duties paid by Turkish merchants. These privileges were eventually granted in 1569. In 1580, a similar

treaty was concluded, granting these privileges to Britain, to English merchants who until this point had been required to conduct business with the empire under the French flag. In 1581, the English Levant company was chartered: All English consular and diplomatic officials became employees of the company, which supervised the execution of the capitulations.

These treaties governed commerce between the empire and western Europe until 1809, when the Treaty of Peace, Commerce, and Secret Alliance (the Dardanelles treaty) was signed between the empire and Great Britain. This treaty, which followed a brief period of British–Ottoman enmity, reaffirmed the capitulations while granting limited reciprocal privileges to Ottoman merchants. More importantly, the treaty granted the empire the right to close passage through the Bosporous and Dardanelles straits (the Turkish Straits) to foreign warships during times of war. The issue of free passage through the Straits would be a subject of diplomacy for the next 150 years. On 7 May 1830 the United States signed its first commercial and navigation treaty with the Ottoman Empire. This treaty extended to the United States the same privileges granted to European merchants.

Following British assistance to the sultan in defeating the army of Ibrahim ibn Muhammad Ali of Egypt, the Commercial Convention of Balta Liman was signed on 16 August 1838. This treaty, a renewal of the Commercial Convention of 1820, was a decisive defeat for the Ottoman government, which had sought to ease its fiscal constraints by raising the duties paid by British merchants. The negotiated increase from 3 to 5 percent *ad valorem* on imports was offset by a large reduction of duties paid on the internal movement of goods. The benefits accruing to Britain were strengthened by the 1861–1862 convention, which raised the external tariff to 8 percent in exchange for the gradual reduction of duties on exports to 1 percent; this convention transformed the empire into a virtually free-trading country. The 1838 and 1861 conventions expressed the political incapacity of the Ottoman government to substitute for the capitulations a new mode of organizing trade, and it signaled the continuing economic subordination of the empire to Western states.

After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I, the Lausanne Treaty of Peace with Turkey and the accompanying Straits Convention was signed at the conclusion of the Turkish war of independence, dated 24 July 1923. It reestablished the principle of freedom of navigation through the Straits by demilitarizing the shores; it also established an international supervisory commission, under the permanent presidency of Turkey, to execute this agreement. In addition, the treaty bound the Republic of Turkey to maintain the prewar level of tariffs at their low rates.

Angered by the restrictive clauses of the treaty's Straits Convention, Turkey pushed for revisions, resulting in the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits, dated 20 July 1936. This conferred on Turkey all the duties and powers previously granted to an international commission, while permitting the remilitarization of the Straits. The passage through the Straits of warships that threatened Turkey was left to the discretion of the Turkish government, subject to ratification by the League of Nations.

In 1945, after World War II, the USSR demanded that unilateral Turkish control over the Straits granted by the Montreux Convention be replaced by joint Turkish–Soviet responsibility; the Soviets also demanded the right to establish military bases in Turkey for the defense of the Straits. These veiled threats were countered by the admission of Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

See also Balta Liman, Convention of (1838); Capitulations; Dardanelles, Treaty of the (1809); Ibrahim ibn Muhammad Ali; Lausanne, Treaty of (1923); Montreux Convention (1936); North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Ottoman Empire; Straits, Turkish.

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DAVID WALDNER

COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The first independent human rights organization in Iran's history.

The Iranian Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights was established in Tehran in fall 1977. It was founded by twenty-nine members of the opposition to the government of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, including Shahpur Bakhtiar and Mehdi Bazargan, both future prime ministers of Iran. Their first act was to draft a letter of protest to the secretary general of the United Nations, decrying human rights abuses in Iran. The committee's various activities contributed to the onset of the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

See also BAKHTIAR, SHAPUR; BAZARGAN, MEHDI; IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA.

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NEGUIN YAVARI

COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE RIGHTS

Saudi dissident group established in 1993.

Founded in Riyadh by six Saudi scholars, the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) had an agenda of political protest that was couched in a Sunni Islamic idiom that used the Qurʾan and hadith (sayings of the prophet Muhammad) to buttress its claims. The group's founding letter called for an end to injustice and the establishment of individual rights based on the precepts of *shariʿa,* or Islamic jurisprudence. The Saudi government banned the organization, forcing its members to go underground or leave the country. In 1994 the CDLR established its headquarters in London under the leadership of Muhammad al-Mas'ari, a former physics professor who had been imprisoned briefly in Saudi Arabia for his role in the committee. From London the group established a web site and used other forms of modern technology to promote a more strident program of opposition to the Saudi regime. Al-Mas'ari criticized the profligacy and absolutism of the Al Saʿud ruling family and called for a government that was more open and a more equitable distribution of the country's vast wealth. He criticized religious authorities *(ulama)* who provided Islamic justifications for the Al Saʿud's policies, and he supported those who called for reform of the system.

See also SAUDI ARABIA.

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ANTHONY B. TOTH

COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS

The principal Young Turk organization that left its mark on the politics of the Ottoman state from the 1890s to 1918.

The Turkish name translates literally as the "Society for Union and Progress," although reference to it as *komite* is common in its conspiratorial phases. Its members are referred to as unionists. Its precursor was the Ottoman Union Society, a secret circle of liberal-minded students in the imperial military medical school in Constantinople (now Istanbul) who aspired to overthrow the autocratic regime of Sultan Abdülhamit II. The founders were Ibrahim Temo (Albanian); İshak Sükuti and Abdullah Cevdet (both Kurds); and Mehmet Reşid (Circassian). Despite its clandestine organization modeled along the Italian Carbonari, Abdülhamit's police discovered and suppressed the society as its cell spread among higher schools in Constantinople.

After 1895, the society established contact with Ottoman liberals in European exile. Its name changed to Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) under the influence of positivist Ahmet Riza, who became the president of the first European branch of the committee and represented the centralist camp in the Young Turk movement abroad. The first issue of Riza's *Meşveret* on 3 December 1895 publicized the CUP's program. The internal and external branches of the CUP differed on the appropriateness of use of force against the regime. Over this issue, the gradualist Ahmet Riza forfeited his leadership temporarily to Murat Bey (Mehmet Murat), a revolutionist exile from the Constantinople organization. After two unsuccessful coup attempts in 1896 and 1897, the domestic leadership, which now included high officials and officers, was imprisoned. In Europe, rivalries between Young Turk groups and within the branches weakened the committee.

After 1906, underground revolutionary activity intensified in the empire, particularly in Macedonia. Two groups, Patrie and Liberty and the Ottoman Liberty Society, merged in Salonika and contacted Ahmet Riza, who had reorganized with Bahattin Şakir the exile community under the name Progress and Union. The Macedonian and the external branches agreed to cooperate under the more familiar name of Committee for Union and Progress around the revised program of forcing Abdülhamit to submit to constitutionalist demands. The leadership of the domestic branch used the organizational tactics of Macedonian nationalist committees, masonic lodges, and Sufi brotherhoods to expand membership. Committee army officers had ready access to arms and disaffected men, whom they led in July 1908 to rebellious acts that triggered the revolutionary wave.

The 1908 revolution brought an end to the secrecy of the CUP. Its central committee, however, dominated by ethnic Turks and still in Salonika, remained exclusive and its proceedings clandestine. The administrative inexperience and social insecurity of its leaders (among them civilians Mehmet Talat, Bahattin Şakir, Midhat Şükrü; and officers Cemal Paça and Enver Paşa) kept the committee from taking charge of the government. After securing a decisive majority of approved candidates in parliament, the CUP established a parliamentary group. It redefined itself as a political party only in 1913. The headquarters of the committee moved to Constantinople at this juncture, and decision making was broadened with the institution of a general assembly next to the central committee.

The society exercised more direct control over government after the counterrevolutionary attempt of April 1909 by placing its men in key cabinet positions. Its main objective was to unify all ethnic and religious groups around an Ottomanist allegiance. The CUP cultivated friendly relations with the great powers, while seeking the abolition of the capitulations. The centralist policies it imposed in the name of preserving the territorial integrity of the empire at a time when large territories were breaking away, strengthened the CUP's decentralist rivals. Its manipulation of the 1912 elections through its control over the state machinery gave the society a Pyrrhic victory. It was forced to give up power to the leaders of the old regime in 1912.

Alarmed by losses in the Balkan War and fearful of the government's suppression of their clubs, the unionists carried out a coup on 23 January 1913, to topple Kamil Paşa and replace him with Mahmut Şevket Paşa. The assassination of Mahmut Şevket later in 1913 gave the excuse to the society to crush its opposition and come to uncontested power. Wartime emergency after 1914 facilitated the establishment of single-party rule. The disastrous outcome of World War I discredited the unionist leadership. In November 1918, as the three strongmen—Talat, Enver, and Cemal—fled abroad, the Committee for Union and Progress dissolved itself.

Both as society and party, the Union and Progress had a diverse membership and grassroots political organization. Its clubs sponsored cultural and educational activities. It coopted the notables in the countryside, even though the latter did not always favor its policies. Its constituency included the officialdom, army officers, workers, and younger professionals and small merchants (especially in the Turkish provinces).

See also Abdülhamit II; Ahmet Riza; Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Capitulations; Cemal Paşa; Cevdet, Abdullah; Enver Paşa;

KAMIL, KIBRISH MEHMET; ŞEVKET, MAHMUT; TALAT, MEHMET; YOUNG TURKS.

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HASAN KAYALI

COMMUNICATION

Because of the Middle East's central location and the relatively high percentage of its people who engage in commerce, ease and speed of information transmission have long been major concerns.

Early Muslim dynasties, including the Abbasids, the Zengids, and the Mamluks, used carrier pigeons to convey military intelligence or vital state information. Messengers mounted on camels or mules carried official information throughout the Umayyad and Abbasid realms. Although this service *(barid)* was unavailable for private or commercial use, unofficial couriers *(fuyuj)* carried mail on land and sea, and some merchants used private messengers. The Ottoman and Safavid states had postal and courier services. Modern postal service began in the Ottoman Empire as early as 1823 and was extended to most cities by 1856. Private courier services existed in Egypt by the 1830s; the government post office, founded in 1865, carried mail from the outset and money orders from 1868.

France's occupation of Egypt in 1798 and the spread of European commerce in the Middle East in the early nineteenth century led to the introduction of new courier services and communication devices, including semaphores and heliographs. The electric telegraph first came to Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 1839; Sultan Abdülmecit I authorized a telegraph line from the capital to Edirne in 1847 (it was not completed until 1855); and the first cable was laid under the Black Sea, from Varna to the Crimea, in 1854. Companies based in Britain vied to extend telegraph lines across the empire to Egypt and the Persian Gulf, but the Ottoman government undertook the task; the lines reached Baghdad by 1861. A telegraph line was built between Alexandria and Cairo in 1854, at the same time that Egypt's first railway was built. Under Saʿid Pasha (1854–1863) and Khedive Ismaʿil (1863–1879), telegraph lines were extended to all inhabited parts of Egypt.

The Sepoy Mutiny (1857), news of which took forty days to reach London, made Britain aware of its need for telegraphic communication with India. After an abortive attempt to lay an underwater cable from Aden to Bombay, Britain's government negotiated with the Ottomans and the government of Iran for the right to extend lines across their territories. The Indo-European Telegraph Department of the government of India began to string lines across Iran in 1863; two years later the telegraph was operational from Baghdad to Baluchistan, although problems arose, both from attacks by nomads and from official obstructionism. The Indo-European Telegraph Company, which was formed in 1867, built a more efficient line across Iran and Russia to Germany that began service in 1870. Telegraph operators, whether French-speaking Turks and Armenians in the Ottoman Empire or English-speaking Indian officers in Iran, soon became potent agents of Westernization and of tighter state control over provincial and local government.

The telephone was introduced to Constantinople and Alexandria in 1881. Used at first by European merchants, this new medium of communication was soon adopted by Egypt's government and later by businesses and households. The telephone's spread in the Ottoman Empire was upheld by Sultan Abdülhamit II (1876–1909), who was fearful of electricity, then accelerated by the Young Turks (1909–1914). Wireless telegraphy was introduced into the Ottoman Empire and Egypt in 1913.

World War I accelerated public familiarity with modern means of communication. After 1918, the governments of the states in the Middle East, new and old, set up ministries to manage the postal, telegraph, and telephone services for both official and private uses. Radio broadcasting began in Egypt in 1932 and soon spread to most other countries in the area, which established transmission facilities and radio stations under government auspices. During World War II and later, during regional conflicts such as the Arab–Israel War of 1948, extensive state censorship was imposed on all communications; this has been maintained in some

Palestine Telecommunications, developer of an intricate computerized network, helps rebuild part of the infrastructure of the Palestinian state, damaged by recent violent conflict with Israel. Severe damage and destruction by Israel to commercial and industrial projects, political institutions, water systems, etc., reversed the progress Palestinians built during seven years of peaceful co-existence with Israel. © Ricki Rosen/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

countries in the area. Television broadcasting began in Iraq in 1958 and soon spread to all other countries of the Middle East, generally under state control. In the last three decades of the twentieth century, governments expended large sums in updating their communications systems, replacing telegraphs with telex facilities and, later, augmenting telephones with fax machines.

The 1990s saw the region further revolutionized by the introduction of satellite dishes, mobile telephones, and the internet. Although some countries tried to regulate new technology—Iran and Iraq, for example, were among those banning satellite dishes, and Saudi Arabia and Syria tried to control internet access—such media allowed an unprecedented exchange of ideas, news and information, and entertainment to wide audiences in a region where censorship has reigned and the free exchange of ideas has been tightly controlled.

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Arthur Goldschmidt
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

COMMUNISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Origins of Middle Eastern Communism.

Communism reached the Middle East shortly after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. Armenians, Azeris, Greeks, Jews, and Kurds were among the first to form trade unions and organize communist parties. But the transmission of Marxism was not purely an intellectual project of minorities, nor did minorities ultimately comprise the majority of communists in any country.

Formation of the Communist Parties in the Middle East

Turkish workers and students in Germany participated in the uprising of the Spartakusbund in January 1919. Some of them subsequently established the Workers' and Peasants' Party of Turkey. The first Iraqi Marxist, Husayn al-Rahhal, was a student in Berlin at the time and discussed the events with children of the participants. Iranian migrant workers became familiar with socialist ideas in Russia. The first communist parties in the Middle East were in Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, and Iran.

Joseph Rosenthal, a Palestinian-born Jew, emigrated to Egypt around 1898 and became active in

the trade union and socialist movement in Alexandria. Rosenthal, Mahmud Husni al-Urabi, and Anton Marun founded the Egyptian Socialist Party in 1921. Al-Urabi then traveled to Moscow for a course in Marxism. After returning he transformed the Socialist Party into the Communist Party of Egypt (CPE) in 1923 and expelled Rosenthal for "right-wing deviationism" in the first of many struggles between Jews and Muslims and Copts in the Egyptian communist movement. After leading an adventurous series of strikes in Alexandria in 1924, the CPE was destroyed by the newly installed nationalist government.

Communism in Palestine was born of the disaffection of a small number of Jewish immigrants from socialist Zionism. The Communist Party of Palestine (PCP) was officially recognized in 1924. Despite their anti-Zionist stand, the party's new-immigrant Jewish members were isolated from the country's Arab majority. Arabs began to join the PCP in the late 1920s. Radwan al-Hilu spent three years training in Moscow and upon his return in 1934 became party secretary general. As a result Al-Hilu's rise to the party leadership was due to the directive of the leadership of the Comintern, the international organization of communist parties, to Arabize the PCP. During the Arab Revolt of 1936 to 1939 the party suffered the first of several splits along ethnic lines. Another split in 1943 resulted in the establishment of the National Liberation League (NLL) in 1944 by young Arab intellectuals led by Bulus Farah and trade unionists of the Federation of Arab Trade Unions and Labor Societies. Jewish party members claiming to uphold internationalism reorganized the PCP in 1944 under the leadership of Shmu'el Mikunis. However, the post-1944 PCP was mostly a Jewish national communist group parallel to the NLL.

Palestinian Jewish communists encouraged the formation of the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon. Fu'ad al-Shamali, a Maronite tobacco worker, led a Lebanese Workers' Party in Alexandria that was affiliated with the Egyptian Socialist Party from 1920 to 1922. He was deported in 1922 to Lebanon, where he joined forces with Yusuf Yazbak. In 1924 the Comintern dispatched PCP member Joseph Berger to meet with Shamali and Yazbak. The next year Elie Teper, a PCP member and Comintern emissary, connected the Shamali-Yazbak circle with a circle of Armenians. The two groups formed a Provisional Central Committee for the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon.

The Communist Party of Iran was established in 1920. The next year the communists and the Jangalis—a guerrilla movement of small landowners led by a Muslim cleric—briefly established a Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran in Gilan. After their insurrection collapsed, the communists extended their activities to the interior of the country. Together with the Socialist Party they established a Central Council of Federated Trade Unions. Reza Shah Pahlavi destroyed the trade union federation and the Communist Party between 1927 and 1932. Party leaders in exile in Moscow were liquidated in the Stalinist purges.

The Growth of Middle Eastern Communism, 1930s to 1960s

From the mid-1930s on, continuing Anglo-French colonial and semicolonial rule, the Arab revolt in Palestine, the global challenge of communism and fascism to a capitalist world mired in protracted depression, and—after June 1941—the prominent role of the Soviet Union in the antifascist struggle enhanced the appeal of communism. The young intelligentsia and urban working classes—the principal social base of communism—grew substantially, while their standards of living declined. Unlike socially conservative nationalist leaders, the communists embraced the economic, social, and cultural changes in the region. In several countries they became the leading force for modern political organization and action, demanding both national independence and social justice. In the 1930s the Egyptian communist movement was revived and the Algerian communists became independent from the Communist Party of France, which equivocated on the question of Algerian independence. New parties were established in Tunisia (1934), Iraq (1938), and Morocco (1943). Communism became legal in Palestine in 1944, allowing both the NLL and the PCP to achieve some modest successes. In the same year the Communist Party of Syria separated from its Lebanese base. Its leader, the Kurdish figure Khalid Bakdash, became the most prominent orthodox Arab communist.

By the late 1930s, Iranian Marxism spread beyond its initial base among Armenians and Azeris

to the Persian-speaking intelligentsia. They were the principal founders of the Tudeh (Masses) Party in 1941. The Tudeh became a mass movement after the deposition of Reza Shah Pahlavi, with some 100,000 members by 1946 and regional allies in the Democratic Parties of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. It led a trade union federation of 355,000 members. The party was repressed between 1946 and 1950 but rose to prominence again during the oil nationalization movement of 1951 to 1953. It was all but destroyed after the CIA-sponsored coup in August 1953.

The Communist Party of Iraq (CPI) grew out of the Association against Imperialism established in 1935. Led by Salman Yusuf Salman (known by the *nom de guerre* Fahd), the CPI became a mass movement and the only truly national political force in Iraq from 1941 to 1949. Many Jews joined the party in the 1940s and three served briefly as secretary general in 1948 and 1949. The fortunes of the party declined sharply with the arrest of Fahd in 1948 and his execution the next year. It recovered and became a substantial force in the 1952 popular uprising and the 1958 coup that overthrew the pro-British monarchy.

The revival of Egyptian communism was fraught with factionalism and contention over the Jewish leadership of several of the organizations. Three Jews—Ahmad Sadiq Saʿd, Raymond Douek, and Yusuf Darwish—emerged from a circle of minorities and resident foreigners in Cairo to establish the New Dawn group (after the magazine they published in 1945 and 1946). In the 1950s their organization became the Workers' and Peasants' Communist Party. Darwish's work as legal counsel for many trade unions gave his comrades a foothold among textile workers and others in Cairo's northern suburbs.

Between 1940 and 1943 three other Jews established rival communist organizations: Marcel Israel (People's Liberation); Hillel Schwartz (Iskra); and Henri Curiel (the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation). From 1947 to 1948 the three factions united briefly under Curiel's leadership as the Democratic Movement for National Liberation (HADETU).

Curiel's unorthodox political style and his opposition to the open ideological confrontation with Zionism favored by Iskra and the New Dawn group made him suspect even before HADETU endorsed the UN partition plan for Palestine. The rebellion against Curiel's leadership in 1948 expressed both the desire of young Muslim and Coptic intellectuals to Egyptianize the movement and the tensions over Zionism that affected every Arab communist party. The Communist Party of Egypt was established in 1949 in opposition to the existing communist organizations and it excluded Jews from membership.

The nucleus of the future Communist Party of Sudan was formed in 1946 by Sudanese in Cairo under Curiel's patronage. In the 1950s and 1960s the party established a strong base among the intelligentsia, railway workers, and farmers in the Jazira—sectors of society that grew rapidly with capitalist development. Unlike in several other countries, foreigners and minorities were insignificant in the party. Hence, its national character was unassailable. It was nonetheless banned in 1965.

The Decline of Middle Eastern Communism, 1960s to the Present

Many assert that communist prospects in the Arab world were fatally undermined by support for the establishment of the state of Israel. Far more damaging in the long run was the ascendancy of authoritarian populist nationalist regimes favored by the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of Algeria dissolved itself in 1956 and directed its members to join the National Liberation Front, which became an ally of the Soviet Union after it came to power in 1962. The Egyptian communists enthusiastically supported Gamal Abdel Nasser's Arab Nationalism and Arab Socialism, even as they languished in jail. In 1964 the two principal Egyptian communist parties disbanded. The Soviet Union courted Iraq's Abd al-Karim Qasim even after he turned on his erstwhile communist allies. The CPI was decimated by a CIA-facilitated massacre during the Baʿth's brief rule in 1963. By the 1970s the Iraqi and Syrian communists became appendages of regimes allied to the Soviet Union. The failure of the 1971 coup led by the Communist Party of Sudan and supported by the Soviet Union marked the last serious possibility for communists to achieve significant power anywhere in the Middle East and North Africa.

The Communist Party of Israel split largely along national lines in 1965. The emergence of the New Communist List (RAKAH) ultimately allowed the Arab communists to establish an electoral front (HADASH) that became the leading force among Arab citizens of Israel in the 1970s and 1980s, in sharp contrast to the downward trajectory of communists elsewhere in the Arab world.

See also Curiel Family; Labor and Labor Unions; National Progressive Front (Syria); Qasim, Abd al-Karim; Tubi, Tawfiq; Yusuf, Yusuf Salman.

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Joel S. Beinin

COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

See Communism in the Middle East

COMMUNIST PARTY: EGYPT

See Communism in the Middle East

COMMUNIST PARTY: IRAN

See Tudeh Party

COMMUNIST PARTY: IRAQ

See Communism in the Middle East

COMMUNIST PARTY: ISRAEL

See Communism in the Middle East

COMMUNIST PARTY: JORDAN

See Communism in the Middle East

COMMUNIST PARTY: LEBANON

See Communism in the Middle East

COMMUNIST PARTY: MOROCCO

See Communism in the Middle East

COMMUNIST PARTY: PALESTINE

See Communism in the Middle East

COMMUNIST PARTY: SYRIA

See Communism in the Middle East

COMMUNIST PARTY: TURKEY

See Communism in the Middle East

COMPAGNIE FRANÇAISE DES PÉTROLES (CFP)

A company, usually called CFP, formed to handle French share of Mesopotamian oil.

Formed in 1923–1924, the Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP) was organized to handle the 25 percent French share of the Turkish Petroleum Company. This percentage of oil from Mesopotamia (now Iraq) was stipulated by the Long–Berenger Agreement of 1919 and confirmed by the British–French Oil Agreement of 1920. Owned in part by the government of France, CFP cosponsored the 1928 Red Line Agreement, and after World War II, it was part of the Iranian oil consortium.

See also British–French Oil Agreement; Red Line Agreement.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

CONDOMINIUM AGREEMENT (1899)

The 1899 pact that conferred and described joint British–Egyptian dominion over the Sudan.

The concept of condominium in international law refers to a joint dominion over a certain territory by two or more states, which jointly exercise their sovereignty over it. A unique feature of the condominium is that the territory in question belongs simultaneously to two or more states and is in this sense a part of the territory of each of them. Hence, each state is entitled to implement its authority in accordance with the condominium agreement.

In the context of Egyptian–Sudanese relations, the Condominium Agreement refers to the Anglo–Egyptian agreement on the Sudan signed 19 January 1899, by Lord Cromer, the British counsel-general in Egypt, and Boutros Ghali Pasha, the Egyptian minister of foreign affairs. Since Egypt itself was occupied by the British, the agreement legalized British control of the Sudan and framed it as an Anglo–Egyptian rule and administration. The Condominium Agreement was meant to offset potential Ottoman and European opposition to British expansionism.

The Condominium Agreement referred to "certain provinces in the Soudan [*sic*] which were in rebellion against the authority of the Khedive, but which had now been reconquered by the joint military and financial efforts of Britain and Egypt." The first two articles defined the Sudan by reference to territories south of the 22d parallel that had previously been administered by Egypt and had now been reconquered or that might in future be reconquered by Anglo–Egyptian forces or that had never been evacuated by Egyptian troops. Therefore, according to the agreement, the territories of the Sudan included both Wadi Halfa, a town in northern Sudan, and Suakin, a city on the Red Sea.

The third and fourth articles dealt with executive and legislative matters in the new joint administration. The supreme military and civil command of the Sudan was to be vested in one officer, termed the governor-general, who was appointed by a khedival decree on the recommendation of the British government and could be removed only by a khedival decree with the consent of the British government. The Condominium Agreement also dealt with judicial matters in the Sudan and stressed the independence of the Sudanese judicial system and the prohibition of slave trade. With the new arrangements, Lord Kitchener, who was the commander of the Anglo–Egyptian forces, was appointed as the first governor-general of the Sudan.

The Condominium Agreement lasted until 1954 when Sudan gained its independence.

See also KITCHENER, HORATIO HERBERT.

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ALI E. HILLAL DESSOUKI

CONFÉDÉRATION DÉMOCRATIQUE DU TRAVAIL (CDT)

Moroccan trade union confederation usually referred to as the CDT.

Affiliated with the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), the Confédération Démocratique du Travail (CDT) was organized in 1978 in opposition to the largest labor confederation, the Union Marocaine du Travail, whose leadership it accused of corruption and stagnation. Its membership in the mid-1990s was about 300,000, making it the smallest of the three trade unions (the third is the Istiqlal-affiliated Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains [UGTM]). Following widespread riots and student unrest in 1981, the CDT was accused of helping to foment the troubles; all offices were closed, and many of its activists were imprisoned. It was allowed to reopen in April 1987.

During the early 1990s, the CDT and the other labor federations pressed the authorities for improved wages and working conditions. With the UGTM, the CDT led a one-day general strike in late December 1990 that resulted in a number of

fatalities. The CDT's secretary-general, Noubir Amaoui, was sentenced to two years' imprisonment, in the spring of 1992, for "libel and insult" in his criticism of the government published in a Spanish newspaper. He was released in July 1993. The CDT received four seats in the 1993 indirect elections for parliament, an increase of one from the 1984 elections.

See also Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains (UGTM); Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT); Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP).

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

CONFEDERATION OF IRANIAN STUDENTS

The most active organized opposition to the shah's regime during the two decades prior to the 1978–79 revolution.

Following the August 1953 coup, all activities against the Iranian government were brought to a halt. When opposition reemerged in the early 1960s, students in Iran and abroad were its leading force. Linking activists in France, Germany, and England, the Confederation of Iranian Students (CIS) was formed in April 1960. In the same year, the Iranian Students' Association in the United States (ISAUS), originally set up as a pro-government organization, was taken over by the opposition. The leaders of this new student movement were young National Front and Tudeh Party members and sympathizers.

Between 1960 and 1962, the National Front became the leading force in Iran and in the student movement abroad. In January 1962, the CIS and the ISAUS joined together and founded the Confederation of Iranian Students, National Union (CISNU), opposing Premier Ali Amini and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. The latter tried to combine unconstitutional rule with a reform project, the White Revolution, which included female enfranchisement and the formation of a literacy corps, demands previously articulated by the CISNU.

When legal opposition in Iran was once again crushed in 1963, the CISNU survived and intensified its activities abroad. Its young National Front leaders moved leftward in cooperation with a splinter faction of the Tudeh Party. During the second half of the 1960s, while Marxist and Islamist revolutionaries in Iran clandestinely prepared for guerrilla armed struggle, the CISNU remained the country's only aboveground opposition organization. In 1965, some former CISNU leaders were arrested and tried in response to a failed attempt on the shah's life. This led to a direct confrontation with the government, pushing the CISNU toward further radicalization.

The CISNU also played an important role in the international youth and student protests of the 1960s and 1970s. The June 1967 demonstrations by Iranian and German students against the shah's visit to West Germany triggered militant student upheavals across that country and were in the forefront of the European-wide student protests of 1968 and 1969. The CISNU's U.S. branch became an active participant in the U.S. antiwar and radical student movement of the 1960s and 1970s. About half of Iran's university population was studying abroad, which made possible the CISNU's extraordinary growth and impact.

The second decade of CISNU activities saw its further radicalization and support for urban guerrilla operations in Iran. Already in 1971, the Iranian government had declared the CISNU illegal. By 1975, the CISNU had split into a number of independent, mainly Maoist and pro-guerrilla student organizations. However, both the effectiveness and numerical strength of the student opposition abroad continued to grow as these rival groups cooperated in a united front.

During the 1970s, in addition to being active in France, England, Germany, and the United States, the CISNU had spread its activities to Austria, Italy, Sweden, Holland, Turkey, Canada, and India. International attention to the shah's dictatorship and repression in Iran had increased considerably. Two decades of relentless activities by the CISNU may have been the most important factor in bringing

about criticism of the shah's regime by international human rights groups, news media, political circles, and governments.

During the late 1970s, as a pre-revolutionary situation emerged in Iran, splinter CISNU factions gained even more publicity via events such as militant protests during the shah's 1977 official visit to the United States. By 1978, most student leaders and activists were returning home to join the revolution directly. A key chapter in the history of twentieth-century Iranian opposition had come to an end.

See also Amini, Ali; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Tudeh Party; White Revolution (1961–1963).

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Afshin Matin-asgari

CONFEDERATION OF TURKISH TRADE UNIONS

The largest labor confederation in Turkey.

The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions, known as Türk Iş, was founded in 1952. Its history has reflected the increasing importance of industrial labor in a developing economy in which political regimes have been uneasy about voluntary associations whose appeal is bound to involve class interests. During the 1950s, the confederation played cat and mouse with the government, which sought to extend control over the organization, which, in turn, appealed to the opposition for support. The right to strike was finally legalized in 1963, opening the way for genuine trade unionism. The confederation's efforts to solidify its dominant position, however, were resisted by rival organizations. In 1966, the Revolutionary Confederation of Labor Unions (DISK) broke away and aligned itself with the socialist Turkish Workers Party. This split strengthened Türk Iş's relations with the ruling conservative Justice Party, which tried to solidify the confederation's dominance of labor through new legislation. The proliferation of often politically motivated strikes and lockouts, increasingly accompanied by violence, was a factor in bringing on the military intervention of 1980. Ironically, the coup finally made possible the achievement of the confederation's goal of obtaining a monopoly in labor organization, since all other labor unions were simply banned by the military regime. This drastic measure was followed by a series of restrictive conditions written into the constitution that was adopted by popular referendum in November 1982.

See also Justice Party; Turkish Workers Party.

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Frank Tachau

CONFESSIONAL SYSTEM

See Lebanon

CONGRESS OF OTTOMAN LIBERALS (1902)

Forum for opposition groups.

Organized by Prince Sabahettin to reconcile differences among various groups opposed to the unconstitutional rule of Sultan Abdülhamit II, the first Congress of Ottoman Liberals was held in Paris between 4 and 9 February 1902. Participants included Young Turk liberals living in exile in Europe and representatives of minority national groups. A renewed attempt to coordinate opposition movements resulted in a second congress, held in Paris 27–29 December 1907, chaired by Sabahettin, Ahmet Riza, and K. Maloumian of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks).

See also Abdülhamit II; Ahmet Riza; Dashnak Party; Young Turks.

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David Waldner

CONSEIL NATIONAL DE LA RÉVOLUTION ALGÉRIENNE (CNRA)

The parliament of the Algerian revolution, September 1956 to July 1962.

The Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne (CNRA; National Council of the Algerian Revolution) was created by the Soummam Valley Congress of the Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front) to accommodate the broadening of the revolutionary movement that occurred during 1955 and 1956. The first CNRA, which for logistical reasons never formally met, included seventeen members of the founding Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action, members of the former Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien, the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques, and the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama.

The first formal meeting of the CNRA took place in Cairo in July 1957 and formalized the growing authority of the external militants over the internal. The second and third meetings, held at Tripoli from December 1959 to January 1960 and during August 1961, reshuffled the membership of the Provisional Government, dealing with internal power struggles between civilian and military leaderships. The final session, held in Tripoli in May and June 1962, adopted the Tripoli Program, a statement of leftist ideological orientation. But, as Algeria faced independence, the CNRA was unable to agree on fundamental political arrangements.

See also Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (AUMA); Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA); Front de Libération Nationale; Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques; Tripoli Programme (1962); Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA).

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John Ruedy

CONSTANTINE

One of Algeria's major cities.

Constantine is located about 330 miles (530 km) east of the capital, Algiers, near the coast, with a population of 909,700 (2002). While known as a trading center, Constantine is best known for its association with the so-called Constantine plan, an attempt announced by the French in 1958 to tie Algeria economically to the *métropole* (the French nation) through a number of rural and industrial development plans. After independence in 1964, Constantine became an important educational center with the country's only Islamic university.

Dirk Vandewalle

CONSTANTINOPLE

Ancient Roman and Byzantine capital, now the city of Istanbul in modern Turkey.

The construction of the Roman city of Constantinople was begun in 324, after the final victory of the Roman emperor Constantine the Great (r. 306–337 C.E.) over his rivals for power. It was intended as a new, central capital, which would straddle the eastern and western portions of the Roman Empire. Originally known as New Rome, it came to be known as Konstantinoupolis, the City of Constantine.

The city was completed in May 330 on the site of the existing Greek settlement of Byzantium. It was set on a promontory extending eastward into the Sea of Marmara at the mouth of the Bosporus and was bordered on the north by a sheltered inlet known as the Golden Horn, which served as its harbor. In homage to the city of Rome, it was laid out on seven hills, with its own royal palace and square, senate, forum, and hippodrome. Lying at the crossroads of land routes through Europe and Asia and guarding the strategic and lucrative sea routes connecting the Mediterranean and Black Seas, it quickly assumed prominence as one of the wealthiest cities in the empire and benefited from both imperial patronage and intercontinental trade. The city's growth led it to extend toward the west and construct a new set of walls under Theodosius in 439.

A fire in the time of Justinian (r. 527–565) during the Nika Rebellion of 532 destroyed half the city. In its wake, Justinian embarked on an ambitious program of new building. This included a new

hippodrome, which held up to 60,000 spectators, a new palace, and a massive church, the Cathedral of Hagia Sophia, dedicated to the wisdom of Christ. The latter stood on the site of the original church, which was built by Emperor Constantius in 360 and replaced after a fire in 404. Completed in 537 and rebuilt in 558 after an earthquake damaged it, the church is noted for its impressive, 110-foot-diameter domed vault, which dominates the city skyline to this day.

With the decline of Rome, Constantinople remained the capital of the Eastern (Byzantine) Roman Empire and the center of Eastern Christianity. A period of decline occurred during the eighth century, when losses to the early Muslim conquests threatened the empire. Yet Constantinople went on to become the wealthiest and largest city in medieval Europe, home of various nationalities and a transshipment center linking Europe with southwest and central Asia. It was venerated as the home of libraries and countless sacred relics. Its wealth and prestige made it the target of several invading armies. It was attacked and besieged variously by the Slavs (in 540, 559, and 581), the Persians and Avars (in 626), the Arabs (in 669–679 and 717–718), the Bulgarians (in 813, 913, and 924), and the Russians, who assaulted it four times in the period from 860 to 1043.

Following the schism of 1054, which divided Christianity between the Eastern and Western churches, Constantinople became a commercial rival to the Roman Catholic kingdoms in the western Mediterranean, especially Venice. The bishop of Constantinople came to be the ecumenical patriarch of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and the religious power of the city continued to be strengthened into the late Byzantine and Ottoman periods. The crusades of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries passed through Constantinople relatively peacefully. However, the common perception among the Crusaders that the Byzantine Empire sympathized with the Seljuk Turks allowed Venice to persuade the leaders of the fourth crusade to sack Constantinople. This established a Latin kingdom, centered on the city, that lasted until 1261, when the Byzantines restored their ancient capital. The city was greatly weakened and depopulated as a result and never reclaimed its earlier splendor. The weakness of Constantinople led the Byzantines to ally with Genoa, which came to eclipse the Byzantine state.

In 1453, the Ottoman Turks under Mehmet II defeated the last Byzantine emperor of Constantinople, Constantine XI, who was killed in battle over the city. Turks resettled the city under the Ottomans, changing its cultural makeup over time, although Greeks remained an important part of the population until the early twentieth century. Ottoman building activity ushered in a new age of Islamic architecture, and the church of Hagia Sophia became a mosque, surrounded by four towering minarets. Over time, the Turkish corruption of the Greek phrase *eis teen polin* (into the city) led to the popular renaming of the city as Istanbul. The city became the administrative capital of the Ottoman Empire, and continued as the capital until it was moved to Ankara under the modern state of Turkey in 1923. It remains the largest city in Turkey, and that nation's most important commercial center. In the early twenty-first century it had a population of more than 12 million.

See also Eastern Orthodox Church; Istanbul; Ottoman Empire.

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Paul S. Rowe

CONSTITUTIONAL BLOC

Twentieth-century parliamentary bloc in Lebanon.

The Constitutional Bloc was formed in 1936 to call for the restoration of the constitution in Lebanon after its suspension by French mandate authorities. It was headed by Bishara al-Khuri, who championed the cause of Lebanon's independence. Although the bloc cannot be considered a political party, it did not differ from other political organizations in Lebanon in terms of its personality-oriented structure. Its members were drawn from the commercial and political elite, who did not agree with the views

of Emile Eddé, a supporter of French policies in Lebanon. It was most active in Mount Lebanon and Beirut, among Maronites and Druze. After 1941, the bloc became identified with British policy in the Middle East. The cohesiveness of the bloc, which was based on the shared goal of independence, quickly splintered after al-Khuri was elected president in 1943. He continued to use the bloc as a tool against his well-organized enemies. It continued to operate as a political force, with limited influence and appeal, into the 1960s. After al-Khuri retired, his son Khalil al-Khuri assumed leadership of the bloc. With the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, the bloc ceased to exist, and Khalil retired to France.

See also Eddé, Emile; Khuri, Bishara al-; Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990).

As'ad AbuKhalil

CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC RALLY

Tunisian government political party, formerly the Neo-Destour Party.

Tunisian nationalists formed the Destour Party in 1920. In 1934, the Ksar Hellal Congress consecrated the rupture between the Néo and Archéo sectors of the Destour under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba and Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Thaalbi respectively. Bourguiba and other younger members of the party formed the Neo-Destour Party, which would successfully lead the national struggle for independence. The French authorities made the party illegal in 1938. In 1964, the party changed its name to Parti Socialiste Destourien (Destourian Socialist Party, PSD). Between 1963 and 1981, the PSD was the only legal political formation in Tunisia. The presidency was held by Mahmoud Materi (1934–1938); Habib Thameur (1939–1948); and Bourguiba (1949–1987).

The structure of the PSD reflected a highly hierarchical division: The National Congress, comprising around a thousand members, met every five years. Below were the party's political bureau (the executive organ of the party), a central committee composed of eighty members, the regional coordinating committees, local circumscriptions, and cells. Bourguiba, heading the party in a highly personal fashion, transformed the Neo-Destour into a grassroots populist party grounded in the Sahel middle class. Prior to independence, Neo-Destourians worked closely with Moroccan and Algerian nationalists. Following independence, the Neo-Destour won the first elections in 1956. A year later, the party won the first local elections in which Tunisian women were allowed to vote, with more than 90 percent of the vote.

The Neo-Destour worked closely with the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (General Confederation of Tunisian Workers; later the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens, UGTT), staging numerous demonstrations, riots, and strikes. Salah Ben Yusuf, the Neo-Destour's secretary-general, fled to Egypt in 1952. Under the influence of Jamal Abd alNasir's pan-Arab nationalism, he opposed Bourguiba's gradualist, pragmatic approach toward independence. Ben Yusuf opposed the Paris agreements that had abrogated the Al Marsa Convention of 1883, and upon his return to Tunisia broke with Bourguiba and contested his authority within the Neo-Destour Party. He would eventually return to Cairo to lead a leftist opposition movement from exile until his assassination in 1961.

The introduction of Destourian socialism in 1961 consecrated the party's central role in the state policy of economic interventionism. Following independence, economic reforms led to a decline in the party's influence as a mass movement. Bourguiba's reorganization of the party in 1963 followed the proscription of the Parti Communiste Tunisien (Tunisian Communist Party, PCT; later known as Movement of Renewal). The 1964 congress endorsed centralized state planning, and the party was renamed the Parti Socialiste Destourien (Destourian Socialist Party, PSD). Single-party rule effectively consecrated the fusion of party and state in Tunisia. During the late 1960s and the 1970s, popular discontent with land collectivization and internal divisions within the party led to the expulsion of Ahmed Ben Salah, architect of the centralized state planning strategy and the decolonialization of the Tunisian economy.

The 1971 party congress signaled a new rift between the supporters of economic liberalization and the supporters political liberalization, headed by Ahmad Mestiri, while social unrest kept growing. In

1981, Islamist dissidents formed the Mouvement de Tendance Islamique (Islamic Tendency Movement), and student organizations in combination with workers' movements weakened the influence of the PSD. Other political organizations such as the Mouvement de l'Unité Populaire (Movement of Popular Unity) and the PCT remained very critical of PSD policies. During the extraordinary congress of 1981, the PSD approved a shift toward limited political pluralism while firmly excluding the Islamists from the political process.

On 7 November 1987, Zayn al-Abidine Ben Alı, then prime minister and secretary-general of the PSD, deposed President Bourguiba. In February 1988, the PSD was renamed Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (Constitutional Democratic Rally, RCD), and Ben Ali was elected president of the RCD during the party's first congress on July 1988. The second congress (1993) confirmed the shift toward complete economic liberalization. In the 1994 presidential elections, Ben Ali ran for office unopposed. In 1999, he was reelected for a third term with 99.4 percent of the vote, running against Mohamed Belhadj Amour and Abderrahmane Tlılı. In accordance with changes made to the electoral code, the RCD currently holds 148 seats in the Tunisian parliament; the opposition parties hold 34 seats. The RCD maintains a strong grip on the political system, amidst increasing popular discontent. Hailed as a model of economic development and liberalization in the United States and the European Union, the government's continuous and often unreported human rights violations, its curtailment of freedom of the press, and its arbitrary imprisonment of members of leftist and Islamist organizations remain the source of harsh criticism.

See also Ben Ali, Zayn al-Abidine; Ben Salah, Ahmed; Bourguiba, Habib; Mestiri, Ahmad; Movement of Renewal; Thaalbi, Abd al-Aziz; Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT).

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VANESA CASANOVA-FERNANDEZ

CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION

Movement in opposition to the shah's rule that led to the convening of the majles.

Iran's Constitutional Revolution began in April 1905 when a group of merchants from Tehran sought sanctuary in the Abd al-Azim shrine south of the capital to protest against foreign control of the country's customs administration, the government's economic policies, and the repressive political regulations of the Qajar monarch Mozaffar al-Din Qajar (ruled 1896–1906). The merchants who led this demonstration belonged to a secret society that had formed several weeks earlier to oppose oppression and seek the establishment of a house of justice. Their protest—effectively a business strike—attracted the support of other secret societies with similar grievances. The demonstration was defused after two weeks when the shah agreed to discuss the complaints of the protesters, but he soon left for a prescheduled private tour of Europe and forgot about his promises. The secret society of merchants, as well as other clandestine political groups in Tehran and in Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan province and the official residence of the crown prince, circulated pamphlets calling for fulfillment of the shah's promises and the implementation of other reforms. By December 1905, when the shah had returned to the country and it seemed obvious that he would not honor his commitments, a much larger group of two thousand merchants, joined by two of the city's leading clergy and their theology students, again took sanctuary in the Abd al-Azim shrine and demanded, in addition to action on their earlier requests, that the government create a house of justice.

The second protest had been sparked by the arbitrary arrest and beating of two respected sugar merchants, whom the government tried to blame for

the inflationary rise in sugar prices. Popular indignation over this incident was widespread. In addition to the merchants who sought sanctuary, artisans and laborers in the capital went on strike to register their sympathy with the merchants demanding justice. Unable to force an end to the general strike in Tehran, the shah agreed in January 1906 to dismiss the Belgian national who was director of customs and to establish a house of justice. In subsequent months, however, Mozaffar al-Din Qajar again failed to fulfill his promises, thus prompting a third round of demonstrations during the summer of 1906.

The demonstrations of 1906 were ignited by the arrest of a fiery Shiʿite preacher who had denounced the shah's government during religious ceremonies and the arrest of several other critics of the regime. A crowd gathered outside the police station to demand their release; in the ensuing confrontation, the police killed a protester. A huge crowd attended the funeral the next day, and demonstrators clashed with the Russian-officered Cossack Brigade; twenty-two persons were killed and more than one hundred injured. The incident transformed the antigovernment protests into a mass movement. In July 1906, most of Tehran's Shiʿite clergy demonstrated its disapproval of the government by departing in a group for Qom, a shrine city about 90 miles (145 km) south of the capital, thereby leaving Tehran without spiritual direction. In addition, more than ten thousand merchants took sanctuary in the British embassy's summer property in the mountains a few miles north of the city.

By mid-July 1906, most of the capital was on strike; even women organized demonstrations in front of the shah's palace. The growing opposition movement spread to several provincial centers, including Iran's second most important city, Tabriz; committees sent telegrams from all over the country to express sympathy with the protesters and their demands. The main intellectual ferment and negotiations took place among the ten thousand protesters who had camped out for three weeks in the British legation. Their most important decision was to change the former request for a house of justice to a new demand for an elected, constitutional assembly, or *majles.* The crisis forced the shah to accede to the popular demands, and on 5 August 1906 he signed a decree convening a constituent assembly.

The constituent assembly met immediately, drew up an electoral law, divided the country into electoral districts, and scheduled elections. The country's first elected *majles* met in October 1906. It drafted a fundamental law, based on the Belgian constitution, which provided for a parliamentary form of government. Special features that were incorporated into the constitution included articles authorizing the establishment of provincial assemblies and the creation of a body of senior Shiʿite clergymen to judge the conformity of legislation with Islamic law; these two provisions, however, were never implemented. Since the constitution limited the powers of the monarch, Mozaffar al-Din Shah indicated his opposition to the document by denouncing its main architects as religious heretics. His ploy not only failed, but, instead, incited mass demonstrations in favor of the constitution in the capital and several other cities, including Isfahan, Kermanshah, Mashhad, Rasht, Shiraz, and Tabriz. The disturbances climaxed with the assassination of the shah's prime minister, the public suicide of the assassin in front of the *majles* building, and a mass funeral procession for the assassin. Deeply distressed by these developments, the shah reluctantly signed the fundamental law in December 1906, a few days before his death. A supplementary fundamental law was signed by his son and successor, Mohammad Ali Qajar, in 1907. These two documents made up the Iranian constitution, which remained in force until 1979, when it was replaced by a new constitution.

To some historians, the Constitutional Revolution refers only to the events of 1905 to 1907, but other historians also view the struggles over the constitution during 1907 to 1909 as part of the Constitutional Revolution. Although Mohammad Ali (ruled 1906–1909) disliked the limits the constitution placed on his authority, the united opposition to the court within the *majles* initially forced him to abide by the new constraints. Factions of conservatives, moderates, liberals, and radicals soon emerged in the *majles,* however, and their differences over policies throughout 1907 provided the opportunity for the shah and his supporters to make political alliances with the conservatives and some moderates. By June 1908, the shah, feeling strong enough to mount a coup against the *majles,* ordered the Russian colonel of the Cossack Brigade to attack

the volunteer militia defending the *majles* building and to arrest the deputies who had not escaped. After the bombardment, in which more than 250 persons lost their lives, the shah dissolved the *majles* and suspended the constitution.

Mohammad Ali's coup effectively put the capital under his control, but not the rest of the country. In Isfahan, Rasht, Tabriz, and other cities, volunteers took up arms to defend the constitution. For a year, constitutionalists and royalists waged a civil war for control of Iran's provincial centers, with the constitutionalists gradually gaining the upper hand. Constitutional forces finally advanced on Tehran from Rasht in the north and from Isfahan in the south. A mass uprising against the government opened the city to the constitutionalists in July 1909. Mohammad Ali, who had fled to the Russian embassy, was deposed; his twelve-year-old son, Ahmad (ruled 1909–1925), was installed as the new shah; the constitution was reinstated; and elections for a new *majles* were scheduled.

See also Ahmad Qajar; Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar; Mozaffar al-Din Qajar.

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Eric Hooglund

CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, IMPACT ON WOMEN

The effect of Iran's Constitutional Revolution of the nineteenth century on the status of women in that country.

During the early stages of the revolution and during the entire period of the first *majles* (councils; 1906–1908), women's roles were minimal and their participation kept under control, restricted to staging street demonstrations in support of the constitutionalist religious and social welfare causes. But they also demanded the right for a public, and not just private, education, and many began to attend what were then the only available institutions, the American and the French girls' schools. Here they won the intelligentsia's full support. Since the late nineteenth century, poets and journalists had championed this cause, arguing that it would benefit the fatherland to have educated women raise future generations of Iranians and, by the same token, pleading for the abolition of polygamy. Neither the *hijab* (wearing of the veil) nor the right to vote was addressed. Nonetheless, the *ulama* (community of learned men), led by Ayatollah Fazlollah Nuri, proclaimed their demands to be part of a Babi conspiracy to eradicate Islam in the country.

Following the royalist coup of June 1908, in the period of national resistance to the restored autocracy and throughout the second *majles* (1909–1912), small organizations of women, the close relatives of prominent secular constitutionalist leaders, began to express publicly their aspirations for the right to vote. A few even dared to manifest their revolt against the *hijab* in public. Fearful of the *ulama*'s onslaught, constitutionalist politicians and journalists dismissed these "extremists" as unrepresentative of women's constitutional interests. The Fundamental Law then guaranteed women's right to education, but nothing else. Nonetheless, women's organizations continued to play a role in support of the constitution, increasing pressure on court officials and *majles* deputies in their resistance to the Russian ultimatum that threatened the very existence of the constitutional government. By January 1912, the battle was lost, the *majles* suspended, and women gained no public recognition for their political participation.

See also Gender: Gender and Education; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Iran; Qajar Dynasty; Tobacco Revolt.

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Mangol Bayat

CONSTITUTIONAL UNION PARTY

See MOROCCO: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

COORDINATION DES ARCHS (ALGERIA)

A political grouping that grew out of disorders in the Kabylia region of Algeria during the spring of 2001.

On 18 April 2001, a high school student named Massinissa Guermah was killed in a police station in Beni Douala, a small town near Tizi Ouzou, the capital of the Berber region of Kabylia. Over the next several weeks, numerous protest demonstrations took place and violent riots broke out in several localities. Some fifty people were killed in the ensuing disorder.

Bypassing established political parties such as the Socialist Forces Front and the Rally for Culture and Democracy, local activists created a new organization, which was referred to as the Coordination des Archs, Dairas, et Communes (CADC; *archs* refers to the traditional Kabyle clans or tribes, *dairas* to the administrative subprefectures, and *communes* to the local village councils). The CADC organized a series of marches and boycotts while articulating a set of demands that expressed the long-simmering anger of Kabyle youth toward the military-dominated regime in Algiers. Among the grievances summed up in the El-Kseur Platform of June 2001, the new association called for criminal proceedings against the policemen guilty of armed violence, total withdrawal of the National Gendarmerie from Kabylia, and recognition of the Berber language, Tamazight, as a national language.

Initially organized at the departmental *(wilaya)* level of Tizi Ouzou, the CADC quickly expanded into the Interwilaya des Archs, bringing together delegates from seven of the country's forty-eight *wilayas*: Tizi Ouzou, Bejaia, Boumerdés, Bouira, Bordj Bouéridj, Setif, and Algiers. The most prominent figure in the movement was an economist and professor at the University of Tizi Ouzou, Belaid Abrika, a long-standing Berber cultural activist. The group led boycotts of the 2002 parliamentary and local elections, but by 2003 the organization was increasingly viewed as obstructionist and, despite a hunger strike by Abrika, was losing influence.

See also AIT AHMED, HOCINE; BERBER SPRING; BLACK SPRING; KABYLIA; RASSEMBLEMENT POUR LA CULTURE ET LA DÉMOCRATIE (RCD).

ROBERT MORTIMER

COPTIC MUSEUM

Cairo museum of antiquities from the Roman and Byzantine eras.

Founded in 1908 by Marcus Simaika, the Coptic Museum in Cairo has the world's greatest collection of antiquities reflecting the culture that flourished in Egypt after the introduction of Christianity in the first or second century. Many of the objects reflect the influence of pharaonic and Greco-Roman artistic styles on early Coptic art. Among the categories of approximately 14,000 antiquities are textiles, sculpture, relief, icons, woodwork, metalwork, glass, ceramics, ivories, and manuscripts. Perhaps the most famous works in the collection are the Coptic gnostic texts known as the Nag Hammadi Gospels, named after the town in southern Egypt near their site of discovery between 1945 and 1948.

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DONALD SPANEL
UPDATED BY DONALD MALCOLM REID

COPTS

Adherents of the Egyptian Orthodox Church

The Copts are the largest Christian community in the Middle East. Yet determining an exact number is extremely difficult. Population counts of the Copts made by the Egyptian government and by the Coptic Church are vastly divergent. In 1975 the Egyptian government placed the number of Copts at 2.3 million, but the Coptic Church suggested a figure of

6.6 million. A United Nations population estimate for Egypt in the year 2000 reckons the total inhabitants at 64,588,000; of this number, 3,128,000 persons are estimated to be Copts who openly acknowledge their faith. However, in addition to active members of the church, many more Copts are registered in church records (baptisms, marriages, deaths, etc.). Thus, a fair estimate of the actual number of all Copts as of 2000 is 9,817,000.

The term *Copt* comes directly from the Arabic *qbt,* which appears to derive from the Greek *aigyptos* (Egypt) and *aigyptioi* (Egyptians), a phonetic corruption of the ancient Egyptian word *Hikaptah,* one of the names of Memphis. The Greeks used the native name for the ancient metropolis Memphis as a term to describe the whole country. When the Arabs conquered Egypt between 641 and 643 C.E., they used a similar word to name the country's inhabitants *(qibt),* the vast majority of whom were Christian. Thus the word *Copt* began as a geographical and ethnic designation. Later the term *qibt* came to distinguish the native Christian inhabitants from the Arabs, who were Muslims. When the majority of Egyptians gradually converted to Islam, they naturally ceased to be Christians *(qibt).* In that sense, *Copt* and the adjective *Coptic* are relatively elastic in a historical, ethnic, religious, cultural, and social sense.

In theological terms, *Copt* describes an adherent of the Egyptian Orthodox church, which had become a national church after the Council of Chalcedon (451 C.E.). The patriarchs and bishops of several Eastern churches, particularly those of Alexandria in Egypt and Antioch in Syria, refused to accept what has been called the Chalcedonian Definition of Faith. By this exposition, Christ had two natures, human and divine, which coexisted but were not confused with each other. The Western church, with its two seats at Rome and Constantinople, favored this declaration of belief. The patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch believed that this would divide the person of Christ and destroy his essential unity. Both the content of and the differences between Eastern and Western Christology are often exceedingly difficult to understand. The theology that slowly developed among the Eastern churches has been called *Monophysite,* from the Greek words for "single" and "nature." Notably, Anba Shenouda III, Pope of Alexandria and Patriarch of the See of St. Mark the Evangelist (1971–), and other ecclesiastical officials of the Eastern churches rejected the term *Monophysite.*

Shenouda III, the current Coptic pope, joined the Coptic Orthodox Seminary after graduating from Cairo University. In the 1950s he devoted himself to monastic seclusion and lived for six years as a hermit in a cave he excavated himself. After serving as Bishop of Christian Education and president of the Coptic Orthodox Theological Seminary in the 1960s, Shenouda was proclaimed the 117th pope of Alexandria on 14 November 1971. **© AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.**

Perceiving themselves as upholders of the true faith, Copts have always referred to themselves as "orthodox," as the name of their denomination—Coptic Orthodox—indicates. Because several other churches that are in communion with Rome also have "orthodox" as a part of their names, scholars use the phrase "Oriental Orthodox Churches" to designate the churches from Egypt, Armenia, Ethiopia, Syria, and India, which refused to acknowledge the Council of Chalcedon. The Ethiopic Orthodox Church is commonly called Coptic with some justification. Historically, it has shared close ties with the Coptic Orthodox Church of Egypt, especially in its recognition of the Coptic patriarch, but in modern times it came to exist as a separate entity. The liturgy of the Ethiopic Orthodox Church derives much from its Coptic counterpart, although significant differences give it a distinct identity. Nevertheless, many adherents of the Ethiopic Orthodox Church refer to themselves as Copts. Of the other Christian denominations in Egypt, at least two have

the word Coptic in their names: the Coptic Catholic Church and the Coptic Evangelical Church. The former came into being during the late nineteenth century. The Coptic Evangelical Church was established in 1854 by U.S. Presbyterian missionaries. Communicants of both churches represent small minorities that had been drawn from Coptic parishes.

The word Coptic retains its original geographical and ethnic value as descriptive of the art and written language of Egypt in past centuries. The Coptic language is the last phase of the ancient Egyptian language. It is written in Greek letters except for six letters that were taken from Demotic writing. Coptic continued to be the spoken daily language among a considerable segment of the Egyptian population, perhaps as late as the eleventh century C.E., before its gradual replacement by Arabic. Today, Coptic is still used in the liturgy of the Coptic Church.

Coptic art is among the richest and most continuous of the Christian arts in the Middle East. As an independent form, it appeared toward the end of the third century C.E. and survived as late as the fourteenth century. Although Christian themes prevail in Coptic art, both pharaonic and especially classical themes and motifs are also prominent. Coptic art often reflects styles and fashions of the Byzantine world, adapted with originality and local individuality. In the absence of court patronage, it can perhaps be best characterized as folk art. Contemporary Coptic art reflects the deep roots of ancient Egyptian and Coptic theology, art, and culture, and uses several media, including icons, frescos, mosaics, and stained glass windows; icons are produced in the greatest number.

Historians speak of a Coptic Period of Egyptian history from the second century C.E.—the beginning of the formation of the Coptic language—or from 451 C.E.—the Council of Chalcedon—to the Arab conquest of Egypt in 643 C.E. However, although the Copts never ruled Egypt, they contributed and still contribute to all aspects of Egypt's culture, with their most important contribution to world civilization being monasticism.

The French expedition of 1798–1801 under Napoléon is considered a turning point toward Egypt's modernization. Muhammad Ali (1805–1849) as well as most of his descendants, whose rule of Egypt dominated for decades following the French expedition, were relatively tolerant of the Copts. During the nineteenth century, the Coptic population began to flourish, as they became exempt in 1855 from the traditional poll tax imposed on Christians and Jews living under Muslim rule (the *jizya*). This revival was visible in the cultural movement within the Coptic Church sponsored by Patriarch Cyril IV the Reformer (1854–1861), who established many schools and patronized a revival of the Coptic language.

During the first half of the twentieth century a Coptic elite, educated in the West and in Egypt, came to play a crucial role in the economic and cultural development of the country and strove to establish a more democratic system in Coptic community affairs and in the management of church properties. Meanwhile, the Egyptian nationalist movement was gaining ground among the populace, characterized by its vocal opposition to British rule, which had begun in 1882. Mustafa Kamil (1874–1908) struggled to make the Egyptian question an international one and formed the Nationalist Party in 1907. Although some leading Copts joined his political movement, most Copts rejected the movement's religious aspect of pan-Islamism and Kamil's support of the Ottoman Empire. In 1910 a Muslim partisan of the National Party assassinated Prime Minister Boutros Ghali, who was a Copt. His assassination sparked serious quarrels between Copts and Muslims; concord and national unity were reached only in the revolution of 1919. In fact, the forced exile of the Egyptian leader Saʿd Zaghlul to Malta by the British government fueled the popular uprising and resulted in the formation of the largest political party, al-Wafd.

One of the most significant achievements of this revolution was national unity among all Egyptians. It was arguably the highest expression of harmony and understanding between Muslims and Copts in the modern history of Egypt. The emblem of this revolution was a crescent enclosing a cross. Zaghlul succeeded in unifying Muslims and Copts in the Wafd party. Muslims as well as Copts were exiled and put in jail in their struggle for independence. The establishment of a secular and liberal trend in Egyptian nationalism paved the way for the integra-

A Coptic monk studies in a monastery in Wadi al-Natrum in Egypt. Several monasteries were built in this area by monks fleeing persecution in their homelands of Iraq and Syria during the eighth century. One of the more famous is the Monastery of St. Macarius, from which many Coptic popes have been selected. © JOHANNES ARMINEH/CORBIS-SYGMA. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

tion of the Copts into the national movement. The promulgation of a constitution in 1923 allowed the formation of a parliament by general election. Zaghlul and most Copts refused a proportional representation of the Copts in the parliament. Thus the number of elected Coptic representatives in the parliament was much higher than a special status would have allowed. In 1923 Copts comprised nearly 44 percent of the Wafd executive committee. In that sense, the "liberal period" between 1923 and 1952 is unique and is indeed a kind of honeymoon in the relationship between Muslims and Copts.

The second half of the twentieth century brought difficulties for the Copts. Although the Egyptian army did not lack Copts, none of the Free Officers of the military coup of 1952 was a Copt. Because of the wide popular support, this military coup is known as the 1952 Revolution. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's land reform in 1952 and his introduction of social measures during the 1960s fell heavily on wealthy Coptic families, the Coptic patriarchate, and land-holding Coptic monasteries. The number of Copts in high government posts decreased dramatically. Nasser's interest in Arab nationalism led to a departure from Egyptian nationalism. During his tenure (1952–1970), a few Copts had been nominated to the parliament, often in consultation with the Coptic patriarch, so as to keep a formal Coptic representation in the political structure. This led to the gradual abolition of the influence of the Copts in political life and enhanced the role of religious institutions and church hierarchy.

Under President Anwar al-Sadat (1970–1981) the parliament adopted an amendment to the constitution stating that the *Shariʿa* (Islamic law) would be the principal source of legislation in Egypt. Sadat furthered the Islamization of national life and, at the expense of political leftists, favored extreme Islamists, whose influence increased dramatically in Egypt, particularly at universities. Muslim militants

plundered and burned Coptic shops, especially jewelers and pharmacies at al-Minya and Asyut; some churches were attacked in villages throughout Upper Egypt. In 1981 bloody riots resulted in the burning of three churches at al-Zawiya al-Hamra in Cairo; these incidents affected the community to the extent that Pope Shenouda III canceled Easter celebrations. In September 1981 Sadat arrested eight bishops and four priests, and various Muslim clergy including Muslim Brothers were banned. About 2,500 individuals representing all political leanings were detained. Shenouda was forced to stay in the Monastery of St. Pschoi at Wadi al-Natrun under what was effectively house arrest. Ironically, a few weeks later, militant Muslims assassinated Sadat. In the years to follow, political prisoners were gradually released. Shenouda was not allowed to return to his patriarchate in Cairo until January 1985. However, Muslim militants reorganized themselves and targeted unarmed Christians, plundered shops, and burned churches. During the 1980s and the 1990s, those militants attempted to assassinate a number of ministers and slaughtered scores of foreign tourists in their insurgency against the Egyptian government under President Husni Mubarak. Most Muslim politicians and intellectuals strongly condemned the criminal activities of these militants.

Despite the guarantee of religious equality before the law contained in article 40 of the Egyptian constitution, Copts suffer discrimination, particularly concerning the appointment to governmental leadership positions such as provincial governors, city managers, police commissioners, university presidents, and directors of educational districts. Scarcely any Copts are appointed to posts in the judicial system, police ranks, or army. Copts are not proportionally represented in the People's Assembly: only 2 out of 444 are Copts. Restrictions on the building of churches often means that building projects take years or even decades. Still, the Coptic community, because of its relatively pacifist attitude, its economic success, and its members' profound attachment to their Christian faith and church, has sustained itself throughout 1,350 years under Islamic rule.

See also Cyril IV; Free Officers, Egypt; Kamil, Mustafa; Mubarak, Husni; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Sadat, Anwar al-; Shenouda III; Wafd; Zaghlul, Saʿd.

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Donald Spanel
Updated by Milad Hanna and Gawdat Gabra

CORCOS FAMILY

A Jewish family of Morocco.

The Corcos family was one of the premier families of Morocco's Sephardim from the sixteenth through the twentieth centuries. They produced many rabbinical scholars.

Members of the Corcos family also held posts as court advisers, bankers, and *tujjar al-Sultan* (commercial agents of the ruler). Several acted as British and American consular representatives. Straddling the traditional and modern worlds, the Corcoses were a classic example of the Jewish comprador class.

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NORMAN STILLMAN

CORSAIRS

Naval freebooters (often mistakenly called pirates) of many nations.

The corsairs sailed under the colors of the so-called Barbary states of North Africa from the early sixteenth century until the European naval powers suppressed their activity after the end of the Napoleonic wars. The North African corsairs attacked commercial ships sailing the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea of those Christian powers that did not have treaty relations with their political masters, seized the vessels, cargoes, and crews, and sold them in their home ports—Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Rabat-Salé, and other smaller coastal towns. In Algiers, and to a lesser extent in Tunis and Tripoli, the corsairs came to control the (nominally) Ottoman Empire's political systems in the latter part of the sixteenth century, while in Morocco the Alawi (of the Alawite dynasty) sultans used them as a tool of their foreign policy after their rise to power in the 1660s. The corsairs were chief participants in the Barbary wars that ended in 1821.

See also ALAWITE DYNASTY; BARBARY STATES; BARBARY WARS.

JEROME BOOKIN-WEINER

COSSACK BRIGADE

Iranian cavalry unit that became the basis for the Iranian national army under Reza Shah.

Naser al-Din Shah established the Iranian Cossack Brigade in 1879. Hoping to emulate the ruthless reputation of Russia's Cossacks, he solicited the czar's assistance in contracting for a few Russian instructors to create a similar six-hundred-man mounted force. Reduced in its early years to two hundred, the so-called brigade (normally a 5,000-troop unit) was almost disbanded. In 1896, it helped maintain order in the streets after the shah's assassination; notoriety came when the shah used the unit to shell and intimidate the *majles* (parliament) in 1908.

With only Russians in command until 1920, the unit, which was reorganized as a division in 1916, served as a visible manifestation of Russian influence in northern Iran. The departure of all czarist officers in 1920 permitted Reza Khan, who had risen through the ranks, to take command of the division. In February 1921, his Cossacks supported the coup that led to the overthrow of the Qajar dynasty and transformed Reza Khan into Reza Shah Pahlavi by 1925. Under his control, the Cossack division became the nucleus of the forty-thousand-man national army he demanded as his first priority.

See also NASER AL-DIN SHAH; PAHLAVI, REZA; QAJAR DYNASTY.

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JACK BUBON

COTTON

A valued fiber crop.

An important fiber crop in the Middle East from the early Islamic period onward, cotton acquired new significance in the nineteenth century as the region's paramount export crop and most important raw material link to the world of European industrial capitalism. Egypt took pride of place in the development of the cotton industry as the earliest and long the largest producer of cotton for export. Traditionally, Egyptians had grown several different short-fiber varieties for domestic use, but under Muhammad Ali the government experimented with a locally discovered long-fiber variety of the sort preferred by European textile manufacturers. The first large harvest, overseen at every stage by experts from Syria and Anatolia, was realized in 1822. It brought a good price in Europe, where specialists appraised it as second in quality only to American Sea Island cotton from Georgia.

Poor agricultural practices and quality control, stemming partly from the Egyptian government monopoly's reluctance to reward peasant farmers

Young girls from poor villages in the Nile Delta pick cotton during the early fall harvest. Tens of thousands of children work the fields during Egypt's annual cotton harvest, which begins in September. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

for following the advice of the experts, led to a decline after initial success. After the mid-1830s, the frustration of Muhammad Ali's ambitious industrialization efforts, which had included textile factories for producing military uniforms, contributed to the decline. Recovery was unexpectedly prompted by the American Civil War, which made it difficult for European mill owners to acquire high-quality raw materials. Exports soared from 25,000 tons, the plateau reached in the 1850s, to 125,000 tons in 1865. After a postwar readjustment, exports resumed their increase, hitting a record 374,000 tons in 1910. By that time, cotton, to which almost a quarter of all cropped land was dedicated, accounted for 80.1 percent of Egypt's total exports, up from 66.6 percent in 1884. Later, nationalist critics charged the British, in control of Egypt since 1882, with turning the country into a giant cotton farm for the benefit of British manufacturers.

The American Civil War stimulated cotton exports from Syria and Anatolia, as well, but the postwar slump in prices drove production back down. Iran, too, shared in the wartime boom; but there the postwar fall in prices was eventually countered by a twelvefold expansion in general trade with Russia, particularly from the 1880s on. By World War I, Russia received 70 percent of Iranian exports, with cotton the most important product. Volume was 25,000 metric tons in 1913, amounting to some 95 percent of all cotton exports. In the 1930s, the Iranian government entered on an industrialization drive that increasingly exploited cotton for domestic manufacturing. By the end of the decade, production had grown to 38,000 metric tons, of which only one-seventh was being exported; and Iranian mills were supplying half the domestic market for cotton cloth.

Cotton developed as the major cash crop of the Sudan from 1925 onward with the development of new irrigation projects. Turkish production expanded after World War I and boomed in the 1950s when the Korean War raised world commodity prices. The same circumstances turned cotton into Syria's biggest cash crop. Israeli and Afghan production expanded in the 1960s, much of the latter country's cotton being destined for export to the Soviet Union. By the late 1970s, 11.6 percent of the world's cotton production came from the Middle East, and the region encompassed 7 percent of the total world acreage devoted to cotton. The largest outputs, in thousands of metric tons, were those of Turkey (522), Iran (490), Egypt (413), Sudan (166), Syria (150), Israel (65), and Afghanistan (50). Much smaller amounts were produced in Morocco, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen.

Cotton is the fabric of choice for clothing in much of the Middle East. Its lightness and absorbency particularly suit it to hot climates. Terms of Middle Eastern origin pertaining to types of cotton cloth—damask from Damascus, gauze from Gaza—testify to the long history of cotton textiles and are a reminder of a time when many cities of the area were known for their distinctive weaves and patterns. The transition from handwoven cotton fabrics to factory-made products initially favored the export of raw fiber and the import of inexpensive finished goods. This led, in turn, to disarray in the domestic textile industry, largely based on small workshops. Though tens of thousands of workers were still using handlooms at the end of World War I, and such distinctive local fabrics as the block-printed cottons of Iran and the embroidered tablecloths of Damascus survive to this day as choice products of national handicraft industries, most cotton textile production now takes place in modern spinning and weaving mills.

In 1977 the region produced 500,000 metric tons of cotton yarn, with the highest output from

Egypt, Turkey, and Syria. It also produced 2,640 million square meters of cotton fabric, with production concentrated most heavily in Egypt, Iran, and Syria. These figures represent approximately 5 percent of total world production from a region then comprising roughly the same proportion of the world's population.

See also MUHAMMAD ALI.

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RICHARD W. BULLIET

COUNCIL FOR DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION (CDR)

Council founded to design and supervise the reconstruction of Lebanon in 1977.

The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) was founded to design and supervise the reconstruction of Lebanon in 1977 when the government falsely assumed that the civil war had ended. The CDR was supposed to receive and disburse foreign aid money to rebuild Lebanon, to assess the extent of damages resulting from Lebanon's civil war, and allocate international and Lebanese financial aid for reconstruction purposes.

The CDR enjoyed wide powers, often superior to those of the cabinet, and was directly accountable to the office of the prime minister. In 1978, $454 million was committed by the CDR for road repairs, housing, transportation, and the rebuilding of Beirut International Airport. In 1983, following Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon, which resulted in massive destruction and thousands of deaths, the CDR could raise only $571 million of the $15 billion necessary for the rebuilding of Lebanon's infrastructure. International and Arab pledges of financial support were never totally forthcoming; some countries did not make good on their pledges. Between 1985 and 1988, the activities of the CDR were undermined by government paralysis, rampant inflation, financial crisis, and the growing violence inside Lebanon.

In 1990, following the Taʾif Accord and the formation of a new government in Lebanon, the CDR was reinstated, and it became an arm of the political and economic apparatus of powerful prime minister Rafiq Bahaʾuddin al-Hariri.

See also HARIRI, RAFIQ BAHAʾUDDIN AL-; TAʾIF ACCORD.

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GEORGE E. IRANI
UPDATED BY ASʿAD ABUKHALIL

COUSCOUS

See FOOD: COUSCOUS

COX, PERCY

[1864–1937]

British diplomat and colonial administrator.

After six years (1884–1890) in the British and Indian armies, Sir Percy Cox entered the Indian Political Department, where he was to spend most of the rest of his professional life. At this time, the government of India controlled British diplomatic relations with much of the coast of East Africa and with the shaykhdoms of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf. After postings at Zailaand and Berbera (Somalia), Cox was appointed British consul and political agent at Muscat (now a part of Oman), his first major post, in 1899. His knowledge of Arabic was crucial in enabling him to restore the relationship between the sultan, Faysal ibn Turki al Bu Saʿid, and the British and Indian governments, which had become strained as France attempted to replace British influence. By 1903 Faysal's subsidy had been restored, Faysal's son Taymur had attended the Delhi Durbar, and Lord Curzon, the viceroy of India, had

visited Muscat and invested Faysal as Grand Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire (GCIE).

Cox spent most of the rest of the period before World War I in the Gulf, first as acting political resident and political resident, then as consul general (under the British minister in Tehran) for southwestern Persia (now Iran) including the Gulf islands, at a time when British trade with the area was rapidly increasing. In 1914 Cox, who had been knighted in 1911, was appointed secretary to the Foreign Department of the government of India. But a few months later, at the outbreak of World War I, he became chief political officer to Indian Expeditionary Force "D" that landed at Iraq's Fao Peninsula at the end of 1914. Apart from two years as acting British minister to Tehran (1918–1920), the rest of Cox's career was spent in Mesopotamia/Iraq. In the early part of the war, he also played a crucial role (although at a distance) in ensuring the neutrality of the Saudi ruler of Najd, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud al Saʿud (Ibn Saʿud), and postponing, if not ultimately preventing the differences between the former and Britain's other protégé, Husayn ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca, from breaking out into open conflict.

Southern Mesopotamia was invaded in the last few weeks of 1914; British imperial troops reached Baghdad in March 1917 and Mosul a few days after the 1918 armistice that ended the war. One of the consequences of the fact that British authorities conducted the Mesopotamia campaign from India and the campaign in Egypt and Palestine from London and Cairo was that Cox, head of Iraq's civil administration, was not informed of the details of the Sykes-Picot Agreement until May 1917. As neither Cox nor his subordinates (notably Arnold Wilson) were kept abreast of London's thinking on possible future developments in the Middle East, they proceeded to set up an administration on the lines of the British Indian provinces with which they were familiar. When it became clear, toward the end of the war, that this kind of old-style colonialism was no longer acceptable (in the new international atmosphere that engendered the League of Nations), the result was a period of great uncertainty for British officials in the field.

Lord Curzon had asked Cox to go to Tehran to negotiate a new Anglo–Persian Agreement, but the turbulent political circumstances in Persia made this impossible. By June 1920, when he was appointed British high commissioner in Iraq, after spending nearly two years in Tehran, the situation had become extremely volatile, especially since the award of the Iraqi mandate to Britain at the San Remo Conference in April. During the summer, a rebellion broke out that threatened the whole future of the British connection with the country; Cox advised firmly against the lively "Quit Mesopotamia" campaign in the British press. He went to Iraq in the autumn and managed to secure the candidature of Faisal I ibn Hussein (whom the French had ousted from Syria) for the throne of Iraq. In October 1922, Cox forced through the signature of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaties (which replaced the mandate in form while maintaining its substance) and fixed the borders between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq over the next two months. After his retirement from Iraq in May 1923, he acted as British plenipotentiary in the negotiations over the Anglo–Iraqi frontier with Turkey in 1924.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Husayn ibn Ali; San Remo Conference (1920); Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916).

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Peter Sluglett
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

CRANE, CHARLES R.

[1858–1939]

U.S. philanthropist, internationalist, and advocate for Arab independence.

Heir to a fortune from his father's plumbing-fixture business, Charles R. Crane was a major contributor to Woodrow Wilson's U.S. presidential campaigns. His experience as a member of the King-Crane Commission of 1919 turned him against Zionism and made him a passionate spokesman for the independence of the Arab states. Following a term as a U.S. minister to China (1921–1922),

Crane founded the New York–based Institute for Current World Affairs (ICWA) in 1925. The institute employed field representatives in Mexico, Jerusalem, and occasionally Moscow. The representatives compiled regular reports on developments in their regions and shared their expertise during ICWA-sponsored lecture tours to major U.S. universities. The reports were also made available to the U.S. State Department. From 1930 to 1941, the institute's Middle East representative was George Antonius, who researched and wrote his groundbreaking study *The Arab Awakening*; while in the employ of the ICWA. In the late 1920s Crane became so enamored of the rugged beauty of Yemen that he sponsored a team of engineers to develop that country's communications infrastructure.

See also Antonius, George; King–Crane Commission (1919).

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Mia Bloom
Updated by William L. Cleveland

CREECH JONES, ARTHUR

[1891–1965]

British colonial secretary.

A member of the Labour Party and an expert on imperial issues, Arthur Creech Jones served as colonial secretary in Clement Attlee's government from 1946 to 1950. In this capacity, he was formally responsible for the British administration of Palestine, although the primary determinant of government policy there was the Foreign Office, headed by Ernest Bevin. Creech Jones was involved in discussions and negotiations over the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine (1946), the termination of the British mandate over Palestine, the transfer of responsibility to the United Nations, the partition of Palestine between Jews and Arabs, and the resettlement of European Jewish refugees in Palestine. Although mildly pro-Zionist, he presided over a British policy that incurred the violent opposition of the Zionist movement.

See also Anglo–American Committee of Inquiry (1946); Bevin, Ernest.

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Bernard Wasserstein

CRÉMIEUX DECREE

French legislation that granted full French citizenship to the Jews of French colonial Algeria.

Named for Adolphe Crémieux, France's minister of justice, the Crémieux Decree was one of a series of acts affecting the political organization of Algeria that were issued by the French republic on 24 October 1870, shortly after it had come to power. Since the French occupation in 1830, Algerians had been French subjects but not French citizens. Only a handful had applied for naturalization, primarily because doing so necessitated acknowledging the primacy of French law and renouncing the right to be judged in accordance with religious statutes—a step almost no Muslims and very few Jews were prepared to take.

Because the Crémieux Decree accorded Jews—a religious minority in Algeria—a right denied to the country's religious majority, it angered Algerian Muslims. Further alienating Muslims was the decree's automatic application to the entire Jewish community, without conditions concerning their acceptance of the French legal system. Moreover, many of the European settlers in Algeria were opposed to the decree, because it permitted Algerian Jews to vote with them for local officials as well as for Algeria's seats in the French parliament.

Shortly after the passage of the Crémieux Decree, revolts erupted in the Algerian countryside, which threatened French settlers rendered especially vulnerable by the withdrawal of significant portions of the French army for service in the Franco–Prussian War. Asserting that Muslim anger over the Crémieux Decree had directly inspired these challenges to French authority, many settlers demanded its abrogation before it caused further troubles.

The settler reaction against the naturalization of the Jews was so vehement that the government did consider withdrawing the decree, but refrained from doing so to avoid antagonizing European Jewish financiers whose support it badly needed. It became clear in the light of subsequent evidence that the decree had played little, if any, role in sparking the rebellions. Rather, the rural Algerian Muslims involved in them had seized the opportunity presented by the decrease of French military power to challenge the newly constituted republican government—which, they were convinced, would sacrifice their interests while promoting those of the French settlers.

Settler opposition to the decree—and the deliberately deceptive attempt to tie it to the revolts—revealed a pervasive strain of antisemitism that continued to recur among lower-class Europeans in Algeria throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1940, during World War II, the German-sponsored French Vichy government abolished the Crémieux Decree when it took control of Algeria, but the provisions were reinstated after the war and remained in effect until the end of French rule in Algeria, in 1962.

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KENNETH J. PERKINS

CRIME

See LAW, MODERN

CRIMEAN WAR

The Crimean War developed out of a basic misunderstanding between Great Britain and imperial Russia over fundamental aims regarding the disposition of the territories of the greatly weakened Ottoman Empire.

About 1830, a Russian war against the Ottoman Empire had assured the independence of Greece. Until that time, the British, a close trade partner of Russia, had largely acquiesced to Russian acquisition of protector status over certain of the Ottoman Empire's Orthodox Christian territories, such as Serbia and the Romanian principalities.

There had always been Russophobes among British leaders, including William Pitt, the Younger, and George Canning. But it was only when Lord Palmerston was appointed secretary of state for external affairs that a clear British policy concerning the Middle East was conceived. The Treaty of Hunkar-Iskelesi, following Egypt's invasion of Asia Minor in 1833, appears to have been the catalyst. Apart from awarding to Muhammad Ali Pasha control of Syria and the island of Crete, a secret clause recognized Russia's right to intervene in Turkish affairs to "protect" the interests of Orthodox subjects. Palmerston made it clear to Parliament that this arrangement must be undone. He proposed that, to protect Britain's lifeline to India, Britain must either station soldiers in the Middle East at strategic points or energetically assist the Ottoman leadership to reform its armed forces and liberalize its system of government.

Britain chose the less expensive route of assisting such pro-British viziers as Mustafa Reşid Paşa and their protégés to reform the Ottoman system. Upon the accession of Sultan Abdülmecit I in 1839, the Ottoman government launched the so-called Tanzimat reform, which would culminate in the first Ottoman constitution of 1876. Also in 1839, the combined European powers forced Muhammad Ali, who was on the verge of usurping further powers from the Ottoman sultan, to withdraw his forces from Syria and the Sudan in exchange for the conciliatory gesture of receiving Egypt as his hereditary kingdom.

Despite this heightened British interest in the Mediterranean region, apparently Russia missed the message. When Czar Nicholas I (1825–1855) paid a state visit to Britain in 1842, he queried the British about the disposition of "the Sick Man of Europe." In typical British fashion, officials in London failed to give the czar a direct answer; consequently, he and his delegation concluded that if Russia strengthened its hold over Ottoman Turkey, Britain would not be upset.

A clash of interest and a cause célèbre was not long in developing. Sultan Abdülmecit, after consulting the powerful and popular British resident

Attendants during the Crimean War flank Ismail Pasha, mounted on horse. The photograph was taken in 1855 by the world's first war photojournalist, Roger Fenton. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ambassador, Stratford Canning, decided to award to France the traditional function and title of Protector of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. Imperial Russia, which annually sent thousands of pilgrims to the Holy Land and had recently invested sizable funds in Jerusalem for churches and pilgrim hostels, took grave offense at not receiving the honored designation. After long drawn-out bickering over the issue, Russia issued an ultimatum. With the Ottomans supported by the British ambassador, who now ordered the British fleet into the Black Sea, Russia declared war and marched on the Balkans, where the Turks put up a stiff resistance. Meanwhile, the British and French landed troops in the Crimea in 1853 and 1854 and besieged Russian fortifications at Inkerman and Sebastapol. Ill-equipped and ravaged by cholera, the Russians capitulated in 1855, and Czar Nicholas abdicated to be replaced by Czar Alexander II.

In the Peace of Paris (1856), Ottoman Turkey, France, Britain, and Austria—the latter not having been an active participant—forced upon Russia a humiliating settlement. Russia was to cease its meddling in Ottoman affairs, including Romania, and it was not permitted to fortify any point on the Black Sea. Her naval vessels also were placed under strict control of the allies.

This embarrassing result was an important factor in forcing Czar Alexander to declare the liberation of the serfs in 1861. Moreover, the heavy commitment by Britain in the war and the great loss of life, in spite of heroic medical assistance by Florence Nightingale's field hospital in Istanbul, played a major role in Britain's decision twenty-five years later to occupy Cyprus and then Egypt to assure its lifeline to India without recourse to Ottoman Turkey.

See also ABDÜLMECIT I; CANNING, STRATFORD; HUNKAR-ISKELESI, TREATY OF (1833); MUHAMMAD ALI; MUSTAFA REŞID; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; PALMERSTON, LORD HENRY JOHN TEMPLE; TANZIMAT.

C. MAX KORTEPETER

CRIMES OF HONOR

Crimes, usually by men against women, committed in the name of honor.

The terms *crimes of honor* and *crimes committed in the name of honor* are commonly used to refer to violence with a claimed or imputed motivation related to honor. Recent regional and international attention to crimes of honor pays most attention to honor killings, which are documented across communities in different parts of the Middle East, including Jordan, Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, and Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as elsewhere in the world. The honor that is claimed or assumed to be behind the murder is family honor rather than the fidelity of a woman to her husband. The majority of victims are female and the majority of perpetrators are male. Family honor may be held to be impugned by sexual "misconduct" on the part of a woman—that is, intimate relationships with a man to whom she is not married. Honor killings thus typically involve the murder of a woman by a male blood relative who claims as motivation or defense her actual or suspected sexual activities outside marriage.

A number of civil organizations in the Middle East, particularly women's groups, conduct research, support, and advocacy activities related to crimes of honor. One target of their efforts is legislative and judicial policy. In some Arab states, there remains a partial defense in law (in Jordan, it is an absolute defense) in the event that a man surprises his wife or one of his close female relatives in the act of adultery and kills her and/or her partner in the act. Such

provisions have antecedents in both French and Ottoman penal codes of the nineteenth century. Recent research shows that, in defending their actions, perpetrators rely on other partial defenses available in the law, notably that they acted in a "fit of fury" and in defense of their honor. Sentences may be substantially reduced in such cases. Research also shows that husbands as well as natal family members have recourse to arguments of honor in seeking reduced sentences for murder.

Among activists seeking to eliminate crimes of honor, there is deep discomfort over the apparent meaning of *honor* in the construction *crimes of honor,* since it implies that women embody the honor of males and seems to endorse violence against women. Using the term *honor killing* risks endorsing the description articulated by the perpetrator and obscuring (as may be the intention on the part of the perpetrator) the real motivation for the crime, which may be related to property disputes or other family or nonfamily matters.

Attention to crimes o f honor has increased in recent years across the region, enhanced by regional networking among women's organizations, and has been matched by growing attention among international organizations and at the United Nations.

See also Gender: Gender and Health; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Harem; *Hijab;* Husseini, Rana; Khader, Asma.

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Lynn Welchman

CROMER, LORD

See Baring, Evelyn

CROSSMAN, RICHARD
[1907–1974]

British statesman and journalist.

The son of a judge, Richard Howard Stafford Crossman was an Oxford don, a journalist (long associated with the *New Statesman* and *Nation*), and a leading figure in the British Labour Party. During World War II he served in the Psychological Warfare Division of the British Army and in the spring of 1945 was one of the first British officers to enter the concentration camp at Dachau. A few weeks later he was elected to Parliament. Later that year the foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, appointed Crossman to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine. The committee's report, submitted in April 1946, included a recommendation that 100,000 Jewish "displaced persons" be permitted to enter Palestine. The recommendation was rejected by the British government, deepening the Anglo-American rift over Palestine. Thereafter, Crossman strongly opposed British policy in Palestine, incurring the enmity of Bevin. Probably as a result, Crossman failed to secure a ministerial appointment before the fall of the Labour government in 1951. In 1955 to 1956 he served unproductively as a liaison in unofficial talks between Israel and President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. He held senior positions in Harold Wilson's government between 1964 and 1970. Toward the end of his life, Crossman was appointed official biographer of the Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann, whom he had known and greatly admired, but he completed only a fragment of the work before his death in 1974.

See also Anglo–American Committee of Inquiry (1946).

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BERNARD WASSERSTEIN

CUKUROVA

See CILICIA

CUMHURIYET

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

CURIEL FAMILY

Family of European Sephardim and Marranos who became active in Jewish life in Egypt in the nineteenth century. Most were Italian nationals who entered the banking profession.

The most noted family member was Henry Curiel (1914–1978), who joined Marxist groups during the years between the two world wars. In 1941, he opened a bookshop in Cairo, where Marxist and antifascist elements engaged in political discussions. As a fervent proponent of Egyptianization despite his communist leaning, Curiel was instrumental in creating the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation (al-Haraka al-Misriyya lil-Taharrur al-Watani; MELN) during World War II to promote the idea among Marxists. In 1946, Curiel's MELN and Hillel Schwartz's pro-communist ISKRA merged to become the Democratic Movement for National Liberation (al-Haraka al-Dimuqratiya lil-Taharrur al-Watani; HADITU), and membership quickly rose to several thousand.

HADITU enjoyed an ephemeral existence, for in May 1948, in the wake of the Palestine war, many of its activists were arrested along with the Zionists. HADITU was organized into sections of students, workers, women, and even army officers. Pursuing the Soviet line, HADITU advocated the creation of a secular democratic state in Palestine integrating Jews and Arabs. Subsequently, however, it advocated the two-separate-states solution—Arab and Jewish. In 1950, following the emergence of Egypt's Wafdist government, noted communists, either interned or under surveillance, were expelled from Egypt. Henry Curiel spent the rest of his life in Europe, promoting revolutionary movements. In 1978, he was assassinated in France.

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MICHAEL M. LASKIER

CURZON, GEORGE NATHANIEL
[1859–1925]

English statesman who stressed Iran's strategic importance to Britain.

Born in Britain, George Nathaniel Curzon, the Viscount of Keddelston, was emerging as a British authority on the Middle East when he traveled to Iran in 1889 as a newspaper correspondent. During the six months he spent traveling throughout the country on horseback, he became impressed with Iran's importance to the strategic defense of British India. Russia had become Britain's principal imperial rival in central Asia, and Curzon perceived Russian interests in the region as being inimical to those of Britain. In his monumental work, *Persia and the Persian Question,* he argued that Britain should protect Iran, the gateway to India, from European (and especially Russian) encroachments. The book also contained insightful descriptions of Iran's politics and society at the end of the nineteenth century.

Following his tour of Iran, Curzon was appointed foreign office undersecretary for India and subsequently viceroy of India. As the de facto British ruler of India from 1899 to 1905, he played a major role in shaping policy toward Iran, which fell under the purview of the India office. In 1903, Curzon made a ceremonial naval visit to the Persian Gulf that he viewed as intended to convey to Russia the extent of British power in the area.

Curzon was appointed to the House of Lords after he returned home in 1905. He distrusted efforts by the government to establish an understanding with Russia and opposed the Anglo–Russian Agreement (1907), which he criticized for abandoning

British interests in Iran to Russia. After World War I, he was appointed foreign secretary. He was the architect of the Anglo–Iranian Agreement (1919), which would have made Iran a virtual British protectorate; much to his disappointment, the Iranian parliament failed to approve the controversial treaty.

See also Anglo–Iranian Agreement (1919); Anglo–Russian Agreement (1907).

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Eric Hooglund

CYPRUS

The largest island in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Cyprus Republic was established as a sovereign independent state in 1960. It is a presidential republic in which the president is elected by popular vote to a five-year term and the legislature consists of the unicameral House of Representatives. Covering 3,700 square miles (9,251 sq km), Cyprus lies south of the Turkish mainland and east of Syria. Prior to 1960, Britain ruled Cyprus, after having annexed it from the Ottoman Empire in 1878.

Cyprus has been divided since 1974 when Turkey invaded and occupied the northern part of the island. Turkey's troops control this territory, which makes up about a third of the island. The Turkish occupation of 1974 caused 200,000 Greek Cypriots to move southward and 50,000 Turkish Cypriots to relocate to the occupied territories. In 1983, a Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established, but has not been recognized by any country besides Turkey.

Population and Major Cities

The last census to survey the entire island, in 1973, recorded a population of 631,788, of whom about 80 percent were Greek-speaking Orthodox, 18 percent Turkish-speaking Muslims, and the remaining 2 percent Maronites and Armenians. A 1986 census found the population in nonoccupied Cyprus to be 677,200, whereas that in the north was estimated to be about 160,000 (not including about 65,000 people from mainland Turkey who had settled in northern Cyprus). An official estimate for the population of the entire island in 1991 came to 708,000.

The capital of Cyprus, Nicosia, was divided by a "green line" that separated the northern occupied part from the rest of the city and effectively closed the city's international airport. The other major cities are Larnaca (where the international airport was relocated), Limassol, and Paphos; in occupied Cyprus, the largest towns are Kerynia, virtually deserted since the invasion in 1974, and Famagusta. With the exception of Nicosia, all the major towns are seaports. Two mountain ranges on the island run east to west, one in the north and the higher Troödos range in the south.

Economy

After Cyprus gained independence in 1960, its economy changed dramatically. Within the next three decades, the formerly agrarian character of the island was transformed as domestic manufacturing and international trade were developed vigorously, in the process raising the per capita income from $350 in 1960 to $7,500 in 1986. The development of tourism was also a significant factor in this period.

The millet system, which operated in Cyprus during the period of Ottoman rule (1570–1878), allowed the Greek Orthodox church of Cyprus to play an important role in the affairs of the majority Greek-speaking population of the island. The leader of the church, Archbishop Kyprianos, and a group of notables who supported the Greek war of independence (1821) were executed by the authorities. The Tanzimat reforms of 1839 and especially the Hatt-i Hümayun reforms introduced in Cyprus in 1856 improved living conditions for the Greek Orthodox inhabitants and enhanced their commercial and educational opportunities.

British Rule

Cyprus was awarded to Britain at the Berlin Congress (1878), and Britain took over its administra-

tion. The island, however, remained formally part of the Ottoman Empire until 1914, when it was annexed by Britain as a consequence of the Ottoman Empire's siding with the Central Powers in World War I. British rule brought a greater degree of self-government for the population and a Western-based judicial system but also much higher taxation, imposed to finance the compensation Britain had undertaken to pay the Ottomans after 1878.

The disaffection of the local Greek Orthodox population with British rule served to encourage sentiment in favor of union with Greece. During an uprising in support of *enosis* (union with Greece) in Nicosia (1931), the British Government House was burned down. The authorities retaliated by suspending the island's legislative council. The pro-enosis movement grew again in the late 1940s after the referendum—organized by the all-party Ethnarchic Council under the new Greek Orthodox Archbishop Makarios III—that decided overwhelmingly in favor of union with Greece.

The Greek Cypriots took their case to the United Nations (UN) and Archbishop Makarios traveled to the United States to publicize the movement, but the UN assembly declined to take up the issue and more anti-British demonstrations occurred on Cyprus. On 1 April 1955 attacks on British installations signaled a new phase in the island's anticolonial struggle. The campaign was led by the Ethniki Organosis Kipriakou Agonos (EOKA; National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), a Greek Cypriot guerrilla organization headed by Georgios Theodoros Grivas, a colonel of the Greek army who used the nom de guerre Dighenis. In retaliation, Britain exiled Archbishop Makarios and his close collaborators to the Seychelles (1956). While diplomatic initiatives began to resolve the Cyprus crisis at the UN and in London (1957), the minority group of Turkish Cypriots on the island, fearing the consequences of enosis, declared themselves to be for either a federation or partition.



Makarios III (1913–1977), statesman and Orthodox Eastern archbishop (1950–1977). He supported the enosis movement, the political unification of Cyprus and Greece, and was the first president of independent Cyprus (1959–1977). **© Library of Congress. Reproduced by permission.**

Independence and Internal Conflict

Diplomatic negotiations between the British, Greek, and Turkish governments led to the Zurich Agreement between Greece and Turkey and the London Agreement between Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaderships. The series of arrangements brought about the establishment of an independent state, the Cyprus Republic, whose sovereignty was to be guaranteed by Britain, Greece, and Turkey. Small garrisons of Greek and Turkish forces were to be stationed on Cyprus, and the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority were enshrined in the constitution, which provided for the office of a Turkish Cypriot vice president of the republic with extensive veto powers. In December 1959, Makarios was elected president and Fazil Kuçuk vice president. Elections for the legislative assembly were held in 1960, and in August of the same year the last British governor, Sir Hugh Foote, announced the end of British rule on the island (Britain retained two military bases under its sovereignty), thereby paving the way for the formal proclamation of the Cyprus Republic.

After a breakdown in Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot relations led to intercommunal fighting

in 1963, the areas populated by Turkish Cypriots were separated administratively by a so-called green line. When the situation continued to be tense in 1964, the Greek Cypriots began fearing a military invasion from mainland Turkey. Through a series of negotiations held under the aegis of the UN, diplomats sought a more practical resolution of the intercommunal conflict. Their proposals ranged from a reaffirmation of the original constitutional structure to either union with Greece or division of the island, but none of these measures was acceptable to both sides. The arrival of a UN peacekeeping force (1964), however, helped to reestablish peace. By remaining committed to preserving the Cyprus Republic, Makarios incurred the opposition of the Greek Cypriot nationalists and their leader, Colonel Grivas. Aided by the Greek dictatorship established in 1967, Grivas, working through an organization named EOKA-B, led a renewed struggle for enosis from 1971 till his death in 1974.

Growing conflict between Makarios and the Greek dictatorship culminated in the latter's support of Makarios's overthrow and the imposition of a dictatorship headed by Greek Cypriot nationalist Nikos Sampson (July 1974). Makarios survived an assassination attempt and left the island. Claiming to be exercising its rights as a guarantor of the sovereignty of Cyprus, Turkey launched a military invasion and eventually placed the northern third of the island under its control. The Greek dictatorship and the Sampson regime collapsed, and Glafkos Clerides was made acting president, pending the return of Makarios in December 1974.

After 1974, the two sides undertook numerous negotiations and held many meetings under the auspices of the UN, whose General Assembly called for the withdrawal of the Turkish occupying forces and the return of all the refugees to their homes. Several plans designed to resolve the crisis were submitted and although the Greek Cypriots agreed to a number of successive concessions, no overall arrangement has been acceptable to both sides.

Makarios died in 1977. His successor, Spyros Kyprianou, was president until 1988. As the candidate of the Democratic Party, he then lost the presidential elections to George Vasileiou, who was supported by, among others, the large Communist Party (AKEL). Vasileiou's tenure ended in 1993, when Glafkos Clerides won the presidential elections. In the meanwhile, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash had declared the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983. He was elected president of TRNC in 1985 and reelected in 1990.

See also BERLIN, CONGRESS AND TREATY OF; DENKTASH, RAUF; GRIVAS, GEORGIOS THEODOROS; MILLET SYSTEM; TANZIMAT.

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ALEXANDER KITROEFF

CYPRUS CONVENTION (1878)

Agreement to let the British occupy Ottoman-held Cyprus in return for promise of military aid.

The Russian–Ottoman War of 1877 to 1878 ended with the Treaty of San Stefano, forced on the defeated Ottoman Empire by Russia's czar and his minister Nikolas Ignatiev. San Stefano, however, was not to the liking of Britain's prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli. He offered to support the Ottomans and seek a revision of the treaty. In return, he demanded the island of Cyprus. The British had been looking for a naval base in the eastern Mediterranean, and Cyprus was ideally situated. By the Cyprus Convention of June 1878, the Ottoman sultan allowed the British to occupy Cyprus in return for a British guarantee of military aid if Russia refused to withdraw from the eastern Anatolian provinces occupied during the war. It took some time for the details to be arranged to the satisfaction of both parties, and the final terms of the convention were not settled until 3 February 1879. With the tentative agreement in hand by 4 June 1878, however, Britain engineered a drastic revision of the San Stefano treaty in favor of the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Berlin in July 1878.

See also Berlin, Congress and Treaty of; Ignatiev, Nikolas Pavlovich; San Stefano, Treaty of (1878).

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Zachary Karabell

CYRENAICA

Traditional region of Libya.

The three historic North African regions of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and the Fezzan combine to make up the modern state of Libya, officially known as the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Al Jumahiriyah al Arabiyah al Libiyah ash Shabiyah al Ishtirakiyah al Uzma). With an area of approximately 305,000 square miles (790,000 sq km), the boundaries of Cyrenaica stretch east from the Gulf of Sidra to the Egyptian border, west to Tripolitania, and south from the Mediterranean Sea to Chad and the Sudan. Geographically, Cyrenaica is divided into three distinct areas, consisting of the coastal plan, a mountainous area in the east, and the southern desert.

The city of Benghazi, the second-largest population center in Libya and the commercial center for the eastern half of the country, is located in Cyrenaica on the eastern side of the Gulf of Sidra. Five ancient Greek cities, known collectively as the *pentapolis,* are also located in Cyrenaica. Thought to have been founded around 631 B.C.E., the city of Cyrene is the best preserved of the five. After it became part of the Roman Empire, Cyrene was severely damaged during a Jewish revolt in 115 C.E. By the fourth century C.E., all five of the *pentapolis* cities lay virtually deserted.

Throughout history, Cyrenaica has looked eastward to the Mashriq, or eastern Islamic world, maintaining especially close ties with Egypt. When defeated in tribal wars, Cyrenaican Bedouins sometimes migrated to Egypt, often eventually settling there. Other tribal members retained their nomadic way of life, crossing back and forth into Egypt with little concern for vague, unmarked borders. During the period of Italian occupation, which began in 1911, Cyrenaicans received arms and other supplies from Egypt in support of their struggle against the European invaders. Eventually, the Italian army built a barbed-wire fence the length of the Libya–Egypt border in an effort to stop the passage of military supplies to the insurgents.

The Sanusi Order, a Sufi religious movement dedicated to spreading religious enlightenment in areas where Islam was only lightly observed, was established in Cyrenaica in 1842 by Sayyid Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanusi. Eighty years later, his successor, Sayyid Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi, was forced by the Italians to seek refuge in Egypt, where he remained for almost three decades. He later returned to Libya as King Idris I to head the newly created United Kingdom of Libya in 1951.

With approximately 1 million people as of 2003, or almost 20 percent of the Libyan population, Cyrenaica is a vibrant economic and commercial center. The Jabal al-Akhdar, a high plateau in eastern Cyrenaica known as the Green Mountain, together with Kufrah and other irrigated areas in the south, are important centers of agricultural production. However, it is the petroleum sector that drives both the Cyrenaican and Libyan economies. Oil and gas from Cyrenaica, first discovered in commercial quantities in 1959, account for almost all of Libya's exports and approximately one-third of the national gross domestic product. The continued expansion of the petroleum industry into the twenty-first century led to the modernization of the port of Benghazi and the construction of many oil-exporting facilities along the coast of Cyrenaica.

See also Benghazi; Idris al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sanusi; Libya; Sanusi, Muhammad ibn Ali al-; Sanusi Order.

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JOHN L. WRIGHT
UPDATED BY RONALD BRUCE ST JOHN

CYRIL IV

[1816–1861]

110th Coptic patriarch of Egypt, 1854–1861.

Despite his short tenure, Cyril IV was the father of reform in the Egyptian Coptic church, both in the laity and the clergy; he remains one of the greatest modern Coptic patriarchs. Concerned for education in its broadest sense, Cyril established many schools throughout Egypt, promoted basic literacy, advanced theological training, and published new editions of important Coptic documents. The most famous institutions founded by the patriarch were the Coptic Orthodox College for clerics and Egypt's first women's college, both in Cairo. Empowered by the tuition received at these new schools, Copts attained important governmental positions in unprecedented numbers. Cyril's aggressive reform of church administration, particularly in land management, made him unusually popular among the laity, which had long sought a more equitable balance of power with the clergy. Unfortunately, Cyril's successors had no interest in continuing the enfranchisement of the laity and thus created a tension that has been played out even in recent times. Cyril fostered Coptic nationalism through an aggressive campaign of restoring ancient churches and building new ones, his greatest achievements being the construction of Saint Mark's Basilica in Azbakiya. A skillful negotiator, Cyril successfully mediated a dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia from 1856 to 1858. His dream of closer ties with the Russian Orthodox Church and the Church of England led to a conflict with Saʿid Pasha, who feared foreign interference. Cyril's assassination (by poison) was rumored to have been ordered by the pasha.

See also COPTS.

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DONALD SPANEL

CYRIL V

[1824–1927]

112th Coptic patriarch of Egypt, 1874–1927.

Cyril V enjoyed the longest tenure of any Coptic patriarch but had a relatively insipid career. Even his admirers commented upon his simple-minded disinterest in matters foreign to his conservative, clerical background. Like his predecessor, Demetrius II, Cyril supported education. In 1894, he established the Coptic Clerical College in Cairo. Nonetheless, Cyril lacked Demetrius's zeal, and he even closed some schools. To his credit, Cyril fostered Coptic nationalism by restoring ancient churches and building new ones, although he was unconcerned for the most crucial issue confronting his church, the sharing of power with the laity, which had enjoyed a promising but abortive start under Cyril IV.

The neglect by Cyril V further widened the gap between the progressive populace and the more conservative clergy. As a former monk, Cyril was solidly entrenched in that tradition. He especially infuriated the populace by reneging on his promise of cooperation in the administration of the *waqfs* (religious endowments). Worse still, he refused to attend the sessions of the Community Religious Council (Majlis Milli), which had come into existence shortly before his patriarchate, to empower the Coptic laity in the areas of church property, personal rights, and social welfare. Cyril's nonparticipation led to the suspension of the council and had serious consequences for the equitable adjudication of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, thus worsening the rift between ecclesiastical and secular factions within the church. Despite parliamentary restoration of the council in 1883 and 1891, Cyril's continued noncompliance left both assemblies powerless. The khedive acquiesced reluctantly to the council's petition for Cyril's banishment because he had enjoyed good relations with the patriarch. The action proved highly controversial; even many of Cyril's foes found his punishment unfair. Nevertheless, Cyril was exiled in 1892 and 1893 for his

stubborn opposition to the council. Ironically, when restored, he enjoyed widespread support from friend and foe alike.

See also COPTS; DEMETRIUS II.

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DONALD SPANEL

CYRIL VI

[1902–1971]

116th Coptic patriarch of Egypt, 1959–1971.

Cyril became pope of the Coptic church amid a long and bitter controversy between the Holy Synod of bishops and the Coptic Community Council, which consisted of laypersons. At issue was the appropriate field of candidates for the office. Until the twentieth century, the patriarch had been chosen from the monks. Beginning with the tenure (1927–1942) of John XIX, however, the selection had shifted to provincial bishops. Yusab (Joseph) II, bishop of Girga in southern Egypt, served as acting patriarch from 1942 to 1944. After the brief tenure of another bishop, Makarius III, as pope (1944–1945), Yusab II was elected to the office and served from 1946 to 1956. Following his death, Athanasius, bishop of Buni Suwayf, became acting pope from 1956 to 1957. Because all four pontiffs had undistinguished and even disastrous (in the case of Yusab II) terms of office, both the government of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the populace generally favored a monk. In a confusing inversion of preference, however, the assembly of bishops favored a monk and the community council sought a monk. So divided was the church over the selection of a new pontiff that the government temporarily suspended the papal election in 1957. The choice of Cyril, a monk from Baramus in the Nile delta, represented a victory for the Nasser regime and the laity.

Cyril's name, adopted at the time of the papal election, honored several illustrious predecessors, particularly Cyril I (patriarch 412–444), a preeminent early Alexandrian theologian widely regarded as one of the fathers of the Coptic church. The true first name of Cyril VI was Mina. As a monk, he had enjoyed wide renown as an ascetic and a mystic. For many years he had sought unsuccessfully to rebuild the ancient monastery of his namesake, St. Menas (Mina), near Alexandria and lost no time as patriarch in realizing this project. At his behest, more than forty other churches and monasteries were excavated, restored, or built anew. These endeavors attracted criticism as well as praise. To many, Cyril was aloof, more interested in antiquarian and monastic concerns than with either the country's or the church's pressing needs. This complaint was repeated throughout Cyril's administration. Nonetheless, even Cyril's detractors admired his piety, which had been honed through his years as a monk.

Cyril's efforts at reform met with some success. He sought closer relations with the other Christian churches of the Near East. Coptic missionary activity flourished in many parts of Africa, and numerous African divinity students received scholarships to study at the Coptic Theological College and the Institute of Coptic Studies in Cairo. Of all African countries outside Egypt, Cyril was especially interested in Ethiopia because its primary Christian church had for centuries been under the jurisdiction of the Coptic patriarch and, in more recent years, had demanded autonomy. One of Cyril's first acts as patriarch was to convene a council that addressed the Ethiopians' demands. The historic accord of 1959 remains the foundation upon which the relations between the Coptic and Ethiopic orthodox churches are grounded. Although the Coptic pontiff retained his position as head of the Ethiopic church, the Ethiopians could henceforth participate in papal elections. Furthermore, the Ethiopians could now elect their own leader. Heretofore, the Ethiopians had had a metropolitan or archbishop but no patriarch. The new patriarch or *abuna* of the Ethiopian church was to be an Ethiopian, not an Egyptian. The *abuna* could consecrate his own clergy. Ethiopians could participate in all synods convened by the Coptic pope. Several other important privileges were granted to the Ethiopians.

In other areas, Cyril's achievements were more limited. In 1960, the government placed the handling of waqf property (endowments given to the church) under a special committee composed of

Copts. This move was hailed by some as an efficient administrative reform because the high clergy and the Coptic Community Council had clashed for decades over the handling of the waqfs, and it was condemned by others because the action took away much responsibility from both the clergy and the community council. The latter was left with responsibility for little more than administration of the Coptic centers for theological education and for building various projects.

Cyril's struggle to alleviate the discrimination toward and persecution of Copts tolerated by the Islamic regime was similarly inspired but fruitless. Believing that close cooperation with the Islamic government would foster better relations between Muslims and Copts, Cyril joined with Muslim leaders in denouncing Israel on several occasions. Furthermore, through wider participation in international religious conferences and meeting with leaders of other churches, Cyril reckoned that oppression of the Copts would abate if the rest of the world were watching. Although the plight of the Copts is now more widely recognized, unfortunately it has not improved.

See also Copts; John XIX; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Waqf.

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Donald Spanel

D

DABBAGH, MARZIEH

[c. 1942–]

Islamist activist in Iran.

Marzieh Dabbagh was born in Hamadan, Iran, in the early 1940s. She was married at the age of thirteen, gave birth to eight children, and moved to Tehran. There she joined the circle of Ayatollah Saidi, a protégé of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and became a dedicated Islamist. In 1972, she was arrested by the SAVAK and severely tortured. After a second arrest, when her health began to fail, she was released. Dabbagh left Iran for Europe. In England and France, she participated in hunger strikes on behalf of Iranian prisoners. In Saudi Arabia, she distributed Khomeini's clandestine fliers among Muslim pilgrims to Mecca. In Syria, she helped set up a military camp where anti-Shah combatants were trained. With the help of the dissident Shiʿite cleric Imam Musa Sadr, an Iranian who was mobilizing the Shiʿa of Lebanon, Dabbagh trained a new generation of young Iranian combatants in paramilitary tactics. She was a confidant and bodyguard of Khomeini in Paris in 1978. After the Iranian Revolution, she participated in the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) and served as a military commander. She joined the Pasdaran paramilitary group and took an active role in destroying all rival organizations, from the Kurdish Komeleh and Democrat parties to the secret cells of the Fedaʾiyan and Mojahedin organizations. In the late 1980s, she went to Moscow as part of a delegation to negotiate with Mikhail Gorbachev. In the 1980s and 1990s, she headed the Islamist Women's Society. She served four terms in the Iranian parliament (the First, the Second, and the Fifth Majles) until 2000, when she was not elected to the more reformist Sixth Majles.

See also Iranian Revolution (1979); Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Khomeini, Ruhollah.

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Janet Afary

DABBAS, CHARLES

[1885–1935]

President of Lebanon.

Charles Dabbas (also Debbas), born to a Greek Orthodox family, earned a law degree. His close association with French interests in the Middle East led France to select him to be the first "elected" president of Lebanon before independence. He assumed the presidency in 1926, during the French mandate. The selection of a Greek Orthodox as president was intended to appease the Muslims, who were displeased with the idea of Lebanon's separation from Syria.

Dabbas's judicial and administrative background and his French wife made him extremely acceptable to the French mandate authorities. His rule was facilitated by his strong alliance with the Sunni Muslim speaker of the Senate, Shaykh Muhammad al-Jisr. Dabbas worked to extend the authority of the government to areas outside of Beirut. He made trips to the Shuf and to the south, and he criticized the low standard of state services—or their absence in some cases. Ultimately disillusioned, he resigned in 1933 and moved to Paris, where he died two years later.

See also SHUF; SUNNI ISLAM.

AS'AD ABUKHALIL

DADDAH, MOKHTAR OULD

[1924–2003]

First president of Mauritania, 1960–1978.

Mokhtar Ould Daddah was born 25 December 1924 in Boutilimit in the Trarza district, southwestern Mauritania, 60 miles southeast of Nouakchott. A member of a prestigious Marabout tribe, he became Mauritania's first university graduate, earning a law degree in Paris. During the late 1950s he assumed a leadership role in organizing Mauritania's independence. In 1961 Daddah officially became head of state as well as head of government under a newly established presidential regime. Central to his efforts at nation building was the idea of a unique desert civilization, encompassing Spanish Sahara (now Western Sahara), southern Morocco, and Mauritania, to the banks of the Senegal River.

In the mid-1970s Daddah drew Mauritania closer to both France and Morocco, against the background of the Western Sahara conflict. In 1976 Mauritania and Morocco agreed on the partition of Western Sahara following its evacuation by Spain. But the ensuing war there with Algerian-backed Polisario forces placed inordinate stress on Mauritania, and Daddah lost the support of key sectors of the society. He was overthrown by a military committee in a bloodless coup on 10 July 1978 and placed under arrest.

In 1980 Daddah was allowed to leave, going briefly to Tunisia and then to Nice, France, where he kept a low profile for many years. As Mauritanian political life slowly opened up during the mid-1990s, Daddah began to speak out against the regime. His brother Ahmed headed the leading opposition group. Daddah returned to Mauritania on 17 July 2001.

See also MAURITANIA; WESTERN SAHARA.

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BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMAN

DAFTARI, AHMAD MATIN

[1896–1971]

Iranian politician.

The son-in-law of Mohammad Mossadegh and father of the cleric Hedayatollah Matin Daftari (a leading member of Mojahedin-e Khalq, the Baghdad-based opposition group), Ahmad Matin Daftari was born to an Iranian vizierial family. In 1929, he was sent to Europe by the Iranian government to study law. He was Reza Shah Pahlavi's minister of justice in 1936 and prime minister in 1939. Throughout his political career, Daftari also taught at Tehran University, as a member of the faculty of law, and wrote several books on the subject of law. His participation in politics was stalled in 1962 because of his opposition to the price hikes imposed by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's government and the political activism of his two sons, who opposed the shah's regime. Daftari died in Tehran.

See also MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ; MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD; PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA; PAHLAVI, REZA.

NEGUIN YAVARI

DAĞLARCA, FAZIL HÜSNÜ

[1914–]

Prolific Turkish poet.

The son and grandson of army officers, Fazil Hüsnü Dağlarca was educated at the Küleli Military Lycée in Istanbul. He won his first poetry prize at age thirteen. From 1933 his poems appeared in leading journals and newspapers, and his first collection was published the day of his graduation from Mekteb-i Harbiye (the war academy) in Ankara (1935). He continued publishing during fifteen years as an army officer and seven as a Ministry of Labor inspector. In 1959 he became a bookstore owner and publisher in Istanbul and edited a monthly literary journal between 1960 and 1964. His shop was a gathering place for leading literary figures until he closed it to devote himself fully to literature (1970). He has won numerous Turkish and foreign awards. In 1967 a five-man jury of Turkish writers named him Turkey's leading poet, and he received the International Poetry Forum's Turkish Award in 1968.

In general, critics connect him to no literary school (Turkish or foreign), noting his highly developed individuality and originality, even in the formative years. Some liken his method to that of free association. His profound influence led to a new Turkish surrealism. He has written in diverse forms, from epic to quatrain, and his verses range from lyric and inspirational to satire and social criticism.

Among the themes in the poetry that built his reputation are the individual's relationship to God, the cosmos, nature, and fellow human beings; the beginnings of the Ottoman Empire; Turkish heroism at the Turkish Straits and in the war of independence; and praise of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In the 1950s, Dağlarca turned to social and political criticism, protesting the plight of the Turkish villager over the centuries and denouncing the West for colonialism and exploitation, taking up, for example, events in Algeria, the atom bomb, and in *Vietnam Savaşimiz* (Our Vietnam war, 1966), expressing the strong anti-American feelings of the day.

Some have taken him to task for sacrificing his art to politics, arguing that his social and political poetry lacks the significance of his earlier work. In all, Dağlarca has published some fifty books, including a number for children.

See also ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; LITERATURE: TURKISH.

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KATHLEEN R. F. BURRILL

DAHLAN, MUHAMMAD

[1961–]

Palestinian activist and security official in the Palestinian Authority.

Born in Khan Yunis refugee camp in Gaza, Muhammad Dahlan later headed Shabiba, the youth movement of al-Fatah, in the West Bank during the 1980s. He was imprisoned by Israel on numerous occasions between 1981 and 1986, was active in the first Intifada, and was eventually deported in 1988. In exile in Tunis, Dahlan helped the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) coordinate the Intifada.

Upon the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, Dahlan returned from exile and headed the Gaza branch of the Preventative Security Forces. A frequent participant in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during the 1990s, he became one of the most powerful figures in the PA. With the breakdown of the peace process, he ran into political difficulties. His crackdown on groups such as HAMAS that were opposed to the peace process, and his good working relationship with Israel and the United States, angered some Palestinians. His call for PA political reform angered Arafat. Dahlan resigned in June 2002 but was appointed minister of state for security affairs in the spring of 2003 by PA prime minister Mahmud Abbas. During the power struggle between Abbas and Arafat in the summer of 2003, Dahlan found himself pitted against Jibril Rajub, former West Bank head of the Preventative Security Forces, whom Arafat had appointed his national security adviser.

See also ABBAS, MAHMUD; FATAH, AL-; INTIFADA (1987–1991); PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY; RAJUB, JIBRIL; WEST BANK.

MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

DAMANHUR

City of the Nile delta.

Damanhur is the capital of Buhayra (Beheira) governorate; it is southeast of Alexandria, Egypt. Its original name was Timinhur (city of Horus), and it was called Hermopolis Parva in Byzantine times. It has been the seat of a Coptic bishop since the fourth century C.E. It became a commercial center during the early spread of Islam and was made the residence of a senior Mamluk officer because it commanded the entire Nile delta region and was a major stage on the post road from Alexandria on the Mediterranean Sea to Cairo on the Nile River. In April 1799, its inhabitants destroyed a company of Napoléon's troops.

Now a major station on the railroad and the center of a network of secondary rail routes within the delta, it is an important market center for cotton and rice. Its population was estimated at about 222,000 in 1992.

See also BUHAYRA; COPTS; MAMLUKS.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

DAMASCUS

Syria's capital and largest city.

Damascus is situated on the edge of an ancient oasis, al-Ghuta, where the Barada River runs along the eastern base of the Anti-Lebanon mountains. The city is mentioned by name as early as the fifteenth century B.C.E., when it was captured by the Egyptian pharaoh Thutmoses III. It was subsequently occupied by the Israelites, Assyrians, Babylonians, Greeks, and Nabataeans before being conquered by Rome, whose governors constructed the network of streets, plazas, walls, and gates that continues to define the contours of the Old City. When the Byzantines took charge of Damascus around 395 C.E., they consecrated the massive temple to Jupiter in the center of the city as the Church of Saint John the Baptist. The largely Monophysite population remained hostile to the Melkite rulers of Byzantium and welcomed the Sassanid army that occupied the city in 612.

Byzantine forces retook Damascus around 627, but after a brief siege the city opened its gates to the Arab Muslims led by Khalid ibn al-Walid in September 635. Byzantium's counterattack was crushed on the banks of the Yarmuk River the following summer, and in December 636 an Arab/Muslim army commanded by Abu Ubayda ibn al-Jarra marched into the city once again. Upon the death of the governor Yazid ibn Abi Sufyan three years later, Yazid's brother Muʿawiya assumed command of the Arab Muslim forces based in Damascus. Muʿawiya succeeded Ali as caliph, or leader, of the Muslims after a series of confrontations in 658–661 and designated the city as the capital of the new Umayyad dynasty.

During the Umayyad era from 661 to 750, Damascus constituted the center of a political and economic domain stretching from Spain in the west to Khorasan in the east. The third Umayyad ruler, al-Walid, transformed the comparatively modest mosque that had been built on the grounds of the Church of Saint John into a much grander structure, known as the Umayyad Mosque. This building and other monuments constructed by the Umayyads were ransacked when an Abbasid army occupied the city in the spring of 750. Damascus fell into relative obscurity after the Abbasid dynasty transferred the Muslim capital to Iraq; its inhabitants repeatedly rose in revolt, but Abbasid forces crushed each of these insurrections. The powerful governor of Egypt, Ahmad ibn Tulun, incorporated Damascus into his domain in 878, as did a powerful Turkic confederation, the Ikhshidids, sixty years later.

By the late tenth century, Damascus stood at the intersection of conflicts involving the Fatimid rulers of Egypt, the Hamdanids of Aleppo, the Byzantines to the west, various Turkoman tribes from the north, and the collapsing Abbasid Empire in the

east. Continual raids and occupations severely disrupted the city's trade and destroyed whole commercial and residential districts. A series of Seljuk governors struggled to gain control of the city during the last quarter of the eleventh century, but it was only when the military commander *(atabeg)* Zahir al-Din Tughtaqin seized power in 1104 that a modicum of order returned. Tughtaqin's successors, the Burids, oversaw a marked recovery of the Damascene economy and the establishment of several new suburbs, although the dynasty faced a combination of internal challenges from the Batiniyya and external threats from the Crusaders and the Zangids of Aleppo until the last Burid ruler was supplanted by Nur al-Din Mahmud in 1154.

Nur al-Din reestablished Damascus as the capital of Syria. New fortifications were constructed; religious schools and foundations proliferated. The city fell into the hands of Nur al-Din's former lieutenant, Salah al-Din ibn al-Ayyubi, in 1176 and remained an important Ayyubid center for the next half century. During these decades, European merchants turned the silk brocade, copper wares, and leather goods manufactured in the city into lucrative items of international commerce. Profits generated by the burgeoning trade with Europe enabled the court to patronize large numbers of prominent scholars and artisans. This illustrious era ended only when the Mongols overran the city in the spring of 1260. In the wake of the Mongol defeat at Ayn Jalut, Damascus became subordinated to the Mamluk rulers of Egypt, for whom it served first as a forward base of operations against Mongol incursions and later as a provincial capital.

Damascus put up little resistance to the Ottomans, who occupied the city in September 1516. When Sultan Selim I died five years later, however, the long-standing governor Janbirdi al-Ghazali declared the city independent. Janissaries quickly suppressed the revolt, pillaging and burning whole neighborhoods. Thereafter, Damascus lost much of its political and economic importance and became the seat of one of three Ottoman governorates *(vilayets)* in Syria. The city's fortunes rose whenever local families captured the office of governor, most notably during the period of al-Azm rule in the early eighteenth century, but fell when such families relinquished power to outsiders. Throughout the Ottoman era, Damascus served as a key way station along the pilgrimage route between Anatolia and Mecca. The governor of the city assumed the office of commander of the pilgrimage (amir al-hajj) for the arduous trip south across the Syrian desert, a position from which both his administration and his fellow Damascenes derived considerable revenue. The link to the Hijaz was reinforced with the opening of a railway line between Damascus and Medina in 1908.

Umayyed Mosque, originally a pagan temple, then a church, now a mosque representing the fourth holiest Islamic site, overlooks nearby structures in Damascus, the capital of Syria. © Charles & Josette Lenars/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

By the first years of the twentieth century, Damascus had become a major center of agitation against the Ottoman regime. The reformist governor Midhat Paşa not only tolerated the growth of Arab nationalist sentiment, but also inaugurated improvements in the city's roads and commercial districts that strengthened the local bourgeoisie. The liberal atmosphere encouraged Damascenes to demonstrate in support of the 1908 revolution in Istanbul, but the outbreak of World War I brought a reassertion of Ottoman authority. The wartime governor Cemal Paşa cracked down on Arab nationalists, most famously by hanging twenty-one prominent leaders in the main squares of Damascus and Beirut on 6 May 1916. The Ottoman troops did not withdraw from Damascus until the end of September 1918, and on 1 October Arab forces led by Amir Faisal I ibn Hussein of the Hijaz marched into the city alongside British imperial units.

Faisal immediately set up a military government in Damascus then supervised the formation of a general Syrian congress, which on 7 March 1920

declared Syria a sovereign state with Faisal as king. When the establishment of the new civilian administration went unacknowledged by the European powers meeting in San Remo the following month, and France was given charge of the country's affairs by way of a mandate from the League of Nations to prepare the country for eventual independence, Damascus exploded in rioting; the general congress declared a state of emergency and ordered the formation of a militia to assist in restoring order. Despite the efforts of the Syrian authorities, popular unrest persisted, prompting the French army to occupy the city at the end of July 1920 and exile King Faisal. Strikes and demonstrations continued throughout the mandate period; the rebel Druze leader Sultan al-Atrash managed to gain a foothold in the southern suburbs during the revolt of 1925. French commanders responded by bombarding Damascus twice, in October 1925 and April 1926. Nineteen years later, on the eve of France's final evacuation and Syria's independence, the city was bombarded yet again.

With a population (2002) of 1,368,300, contemporary Damascus is not only the largest city and capital of the Syrian Arab Republic but also a major industrial and commercial center. Damascus University, founded in 1923, remains the country's most prestigious institution of higher education, and al-Asad Library houses Syria's largest collection of printed materials. An annual international trade fair, initiated in 1954, promotes a wide range of Syrian-made goods, while encouraging the city's influential business community to establish closer connections with the outside world.

See also Atrash, Sultan Pasha al-; Cemal Paşa; Damascus University; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Janissaries; Mamluks; Midhat Paşa; Umayyad Mosque.

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Fred H. Lawson

DAMASCUS AFFAIR (1840)

Blood libel accusation leveled by Christians at the Jews of Damascus.

On 5 February 1840 a Capuchin friar named Thomas disappeared from Damascus with his Muslim servant, Ibrahim. Their whereabouts were never discovered. The friar was under the jurisdiction of the recently appointed French consul, Count Ratti-Menton, who supported the accusation of local Christians that the Jews were responsible for the alleged murders in order to obtain blood to make their matzot for Passover. Several prominent Jews of Damascus were thereupon rounded up and subjected to torture; several died, one converted to Islam, and a confession of guilt was extracted.

In March, the Jews of Istanbul, alarmed at the libel of Damascus and a simultaneous libel in Rhodes, alerted western Jewish leaders to the events. An international campaign to rescue the Jews of Damascus and to pressure the Egyptian governor of Damascus, Sharif Pasha, was organized in England. The defense efforts were spearheaded by Moses Montefiore of England and Albert Crémieux of France. Press coverage and parliamentary condemnations of injustices in the East heightened public interest in the Jewish plight in general and Ottoman judicial malpractice in particular. Interventions by Queen Victoria, Lord Henry Palmerston, U.S. Secretary of State John Forsyth, and Klemens von Metternich of Austria to obtain a release of the victims were of no avail.

In the summer of 1840, Montefiore and Crémieux set off for Egypt and Syria to win the freedom of the Jews of Damascus. The fate of the delegation was monitored by the European press as the Damascus affair became a cause célèbre. Newly emancipated European Jewry was haunted by the specter of a return to medieval anti-Jewish prejudice. British

parliamentary liberals were also concerned about the continued use of torture and the need for Ottoman judicial reform. Great Britain, additionally, expressed an interest in protecting the Jews of the East as a counterbalance to French and Russian protection of Roman Catholics and Orthodox Christians in the Muslim world. In August, Montefiore and Crémieux won the release of the tortured Jews of Damascus, but Muhammad Ali refused to exonerate them. Montefiore then proceeded to Istanbul to obtain the sultan's condemnation of the libel and future protection for Ottoman Jewry. The Ferman of Abdülmecit I of 6 November 1840 denounced the blood libel and stressed "that the charges made against them and their religion are nothing but pure calumny." The sultan further specified that Jews were to be specifically included in the reforms embodied in the Hatt-i Serif of Gülhane and that "the Jewish nation shall possess the same advantages and enjoy the same privileges as are granted to the numerous other nations who submit to our authority. The Jewish nation shall be protected and defended."

Despite Montefiore's success and the imperial rescript, blood libels recurred throughout the Middle East. Libels in Damascus (nine occurred there between 1840 and 1900), Aleppo, Beirut, Chios, Safad, the Dardanelles, Gallipoli, Cairo, Alexandria, Dayr al-Qamar, Hamadan in Iran, Salonika, Smyrna, and elsewhere were instigated by Armenians and Greeks as well as Muslims. The havoc wrought by these repeated accusations was partially responsible for the decline and emigration of Ottoman Jewry beginning in the late nineteenth century. The vulnerability of Ottoman Jewry led as well to the formation of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in 1860.

See also ALLIANCE ISRAÉLITE UNIVERSELLE (AIU); FERMAN.

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UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

DAMASCUS UNIVERSITY

Oldest of the present four universities in Syria.

Damascus University is one of four universities currently operating in Syria; the other three are the University of Aleppo, the University of Tishrin (at Latakia), and the University of the Baʿth (at Homs). The earliest institutions of higher learning in Ottoman Syria were the Institute of Medicine (Maʿhad al-Tibb) established in Damascus in 1903 and the School of Law (Madrasa al-Huquq) established in Beirut in 1913. After the end of Ottoman rule in Syria in 1918 and the establishment of the Arab government of King Faisal in Damascus (1918–1920), the Institute of Medicine and the School of Law, which had experienced difficulties and closures during World War I, were newly opened in Damascus in 1919. The Institute of Medicine was then renamed the Arab Institute of Medicine (al-Maʿhad al-Tibbi al-Arabi) and was headed by Dr. Rida Saʿid, who became president of the newly established Syrian University from 1923 to 1936.

On 15 June 1923, the head of the Union of Syrian States, created by the mandatory authorities of France, issued a decree establishing the Syrian University (al-Jamiʿa al-Suriyya) which was to include medicine and law in addition to the Arab Scientific Academy (al-Majma al-Ilmi al-Arabi), and the Arab Directorate of Antiquities (Dar al-Athar al-Arabiyya). On 15 March 1926, the academy and the Directorate of Antiquities were removed from the Syrian University. A School of Higher Literary Studies (Madrasat al-Durus al-Adabiyya al-Ulya) was established in 1928 and attached to the university. The school taught Arabic language and literature and Arabic philosophy and sociology over a period of three years. In 1929, it was renamed the School of Higher Letters (Madrasat al-Adab al-Ulya); between 1935 and 1956, it was closed.

The number of students in medicine and law rose from 180 (1919–1920) to 1,094 (1944–1945). Women first enrolled in medicine and law from

1922 to 1923. Their numbers in 1945 were 72 in medicine and 12 in law.

After Syria became independent in 1945, faculties of sciences and arts and a Higher Institute for Teachers were established the following year in the Syrian University. A Faculty of Engineering was opened in Aleppo the same year as part of the Syrian University. This faculty later became the nucleus of the University of Aleppo, established in 1958. In 1954, a Faculty of Islamic Law (*shariʿa*) was established in the Syrian University. In 1956, the Institute of Commerce was established and attached to the Faculty of Law, becoming the Faculty of Commerce (1959–1960).

On 19 October 1958, during the union between Syria and Egypt, a new law was issued regulating the affairs of the universities. The Syrian University changed its name to Damascus University. Two new faculties for engineering and dentistry were added to it from 1959 to 1960.

Under the Baʿth party, which has been ruling Syria since 1963, and especially after the Correctionist Movement of President Hafiz al-Asad in 1970, university education expanded tremendously and the number of both students and faculty increased. The University of Tishrin was established in 1971 and the University of the Baʿth in 1979. In 2002 Damascus University included fourteen faculties plus the Institute for Administrative Development, as well as several teaching hospitals, a nursing school, and language centers. The university offers M.A. and Ph.D. programs in various disciplines. Enrollment for the 1998–1999 academic year was more than 23,000.

See also ALEPPO; ASAD, HAFIZ AL-; BAʿTH, AL-; FAISAL I IBN HUSSEIN; HOMS; LATAKIA.

ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

DAMMAM, AL-

Saudi Arabian port on the Persian Gulf.

Al-Damman is a city on Saudi Arabia's gulf coast and capital of the Eastern Province since 1952. Transformed by the discovery of oil at nearby Dhahran, al-Dammam boasts a major port (built in 1950) and the terminus of the Riyadh railroad. An Anglo-Saudi conference in al-Dammam in 1952 failed to produce agreement on Saudi-Qatar and Saudi-Abu Dhabi frontiers. Al-Dammam's population has surged as a result of the steady economic growth in the Eastern Province, although no reliable figures are available. The city, in combination with the Saudi Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) headquarters at Dhahran and the residential town of al-Khubar, lies at the center of a commercial, industrial, and petroleum hub. King Faisal University is located in al-Dammam. The nearby King Fahd Causeway provides the only land link with Bahrain, and the King Fahd Airport, the newest of the kingdom's three international airports, was opened in 1999, replacing an older facility at Dhahran.

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J. E. PETERSON

DANCE

A social activity that takes on a multitude of forms within sacred and everyday contexts in Middle Eastern societies.

The Middle East abounds in forms of dance and stylized movement ranging from those associated with ritualized religious ceremonies, such as the Semaʾa of the mystical Sufi Whirling Dervishes, to more spontaneous dancing, such as belly dancing, that occurs in informal everyday contexts. One of the earliest documents of Middle Eastern expressive arts is the multivolume tome written by Abu Faraj al-Isfahan in the tenth century, *Kitab al-Aghrani* (The book of songs), which indicates that the realm of the arts has always been highly cosmopolitan. Various courts had ethnically and religiously diverse dance troupes that regularly accompanied musicians. Their participation was considered a necessary element in creating *tarab*—the joy that is felt by performers and audience members during musical events.

Far from being merely a pastime, dance in the Middle East carries heavy symbolic meaning. Although some Middle Eastern communities adhere

closely to interpretations of religious texts that warn against the carnal aspects of music and dance, other communities cannot conceive of celebrating life's important moments without music and its by-product, dance. In the Middle East, one's ability to dance can signify a number of things. In some countries such as Morocco, for example, a woman's dance style is read as a text from which spectators make assumptions about her personality: If she shows little interest in dancing at a wedding, others may conclude that she is not sincere in her happiness for the union of the couple, or that she is not fun-loving. Small flourishes taken from international pop stars and included in one's own locally based repertoire speak volumes about taste and the cultural influences absorbed through media. And although male dancers in the Middle East have been able to reach a sort of professional *(maʿalim)* status, the same has not always been true for women. Sources such as Isfahan's indicate that women have been performers as long as there has been music and dance, but female performers have often been stigmatized. Although displaying a talent for dance among family and friends is desirable and in some cases required, dancing as a profession is often discouraged, and paid performers are not always accorded high social status.

Most mainstream communities in the Middle East attach a great deal of importance to dance as a necessary component to any significant celebration. Although traditions vary from region to region, dance may be present at engagement ceremonies, weddings, births and naming ceremonies, seasonal harvests, holidays (both national and religious), festivals, and circumcisions, not to mention the day-to-day visits among close friends and family that are common among women. Some religious scholars very deliberately delineate the boundaries between sacred and profane contexts, but patterned bodily movement may occur as well during Sufi *dhikr* ceremonies, visits to saints' shrines, and local religious ceremonies that may blend Islamic and pre-Islamic syncretic elements. In many instances there is an overlap between Christian, Jewish, and Muslim celebratory practices, as these communities have lived side by side for many centuries and have imparted their individual artistic expression to other faith groups. The Fez Festival of World Sacred Music is a case in point. Created after the first Gulf War (1991), the festival featured music and arts from around the world in order to underscore the common features of shared traditions. Such world music festivals are sites of great innovation and provide impetus for the cultural preservation and reinvention of traditions.

A crowd gathers to dance the *freylekhs*, a traditional Jewish dance of celebration. © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Among the better-known forms of dance in the Middle East are the hora, the debka, and Israeli dance, which blend the cultural traditions of the various ethnic groups living in Israel. These dance traditions are done in groups and reinforce familial and community bonds rather than showcase an individual dancer's skill. The debka (also, dabka), is performed on joyous occasions in Greater Syria. Dancers (traditionally, young men) join hands in an open circle and move slowly in step to drumbeats. The steps become faster at specific intervals, with intermittent bounces. The dancers are usually accompanied by a single dancer waving a cloth or a stick. A modified version may be performed by a new husband and wife at their wedding celebration. Similar styles of dance occur in Turkey as well. The debka is originally an Arab dance, but Israelis have created many versions of it that are performed at Israeli national festivals.

Exotic belly dancers provide nighttime entertainment in an Istanbul hotel. © David Lees/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Emigrants from the Middle East take their dance traditions with them, and many Middle Eastern dance groups exist outside the region. The origins of the Hora can be traced back to the Balkans, but it was brought to Palestine after World War I by Baruch Agadati, an actor of Romanian origin. Many Israeli composers have written music using the rhythm of the Hora. Because the Balkans were once Ottoman territories, similar forms of dance exist in many regions of Turkey. In Turkey, high-school students practice various folk-dance forms and perform in traditional costumes on a Youth Day, which was created by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the early days of the Turkish Republic. Turkey's preservation of pre-Ottoman Turkish culture spawned a national interest in folkloric dance genres that still thrives today. Jews moving to Palestine during the twentieth century brought with them a variety of folk dances of national and local origin, including the dances of Yemenite Jews and Hasidim, and the hora, which became Israel's national dance. Dancing, with a strong folk emphasis, is a popular recreation on kibbutzim in Israel.

Raqs Sharqi, or belly dancing, was made famous in the Middle East and beyond primarily through Egyptian television. There are many variations of belly dancing throughout the Middle East, but all share an emphasis on rythmically moving the stomach, pelvis, and hips. The range of movement depends on the individual dancer's ability, and can be done casually among friends or in entertainment settings with elaborate costumes and acrobatic flourishes.

See also Music.

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Maria F. Curtis

DANESHVAR, SIMIN

[1921–]

Prominent Iranian fiction writer.

Simin Daneshvar was born in Shiraz. In the late 1930s she moved to Tehran to study at the then new Tehran University, from which she received a Ph.D. in Persian literature in 1949. Her collection of short stories, *Atash-e Khamush* (Quenched fire; 1948), was the first such publication by a woman in Iran. In 1950, she married Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923–1969). She spent two academic years (1952–1954) as a Fulbright scholar at Stanford University in the United States. Upon returning to Iran, she was hired as a lecturer by the Archaeology Department of Tehran University and taught there for twenty-five years. However, she never received tenure because the gov-

ernment considered both her and her husband too critical of conditions under the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.

Daneshvar's most famous work is *Savushun* (Mourners of Siyavosh), which was published in 1969, the first novel by an Iranian woman; it subsequently was translated into English. Throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, she continued to write short stories and novels. In addition, her Persian translations of major American and European novelists have contributed to the corpus of works available in Persian literature.

See also Al-e Ahmad, Jalal; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza.

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DAR AL-DAʿWA WA AL-IRSHAD

Shaykh Rashid Rida opened this Institute of Propaganda and Guidance in Cairo, Egypt, in 1912 as a reformist Islamic school.

As a youth in Tripoli (now in Lebanon), Rashid Rida had seen American missionaries use a bookshop to proselytize, and his master, Muhammad Abduh, had commented similarly on a Capuchin monastery-school in Sicily. Egypt's higher state schools ignored Islam, and Abduh was unable to reform the mosque-university of al-Azhar. When he died in 1905, Abduh was trying to found his own reformist Islamic school.

Rida's efforts to found such a school in Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 1909 fell through. The Cairo Dar al-Daʿwa offered free room, board, and tuition to Muslims aged twenty to twenty-five, with preference to students from distant lands. Three years of study were to qualify one as a guide *(murshid)* fit to preach and teach among Muslims; six years were to qualify one as a missionary *(daʿi)* to non-Muslims. Although World War I closed the school, its example was presumably not lost on Rida's later admirers among the Muslim Brotherhood.

See also Abduh, Muhammad; Rida, Rashid.

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Donald Malcolm Reid

DAR AL-FONUN

One of the first secular institutions of higher education, established on the European model, in Iran.

The Dar al-Fonun (Abode of Arts) was founded in 1851 in Tehran, Iran, by Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir, one of the chief reform-minded ministers of the long-ruling Qajar dynasty king Naser al-Din Shah.

As elsewhere in the Middle East, the establishment of the school was stimulated by the desire to import European science and technology, especially military technology, and to train army officers and civil servants. Dar al-Fonun's teachers were usually Europeans. Its first cadre included seven Austrians who were hired to give military training in the cavalry, infantry, and artillery divisions, and courses in engineering, medicine, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and mineralogy, as well as foreign languages. The first efforts at translation of Western books into Persian as well as the publication of the first Persian textbooks is also associated with the Dar al-Fonun. The students of the Dar al-Fonun were usually sons of the aristocracy, some of whom, upon graduation, were sent to Europe to pursue further education, and who came to assume important positions later in their careers.

See also Amir Kabir, Mirza Taqi Khan; Naser al-Din Shah.

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Parvaneh Pourshariati

DAR AL-ISLAM

An abode, country, territory, or land where Islamic sovereignty prevails.

In Dar al-Islam, the citizenry abide by the ordinances, rules, edicts, and assembly of Islam. The Muslim state guarantees the safety of life, property, and religious status (only if the religion is not idolatrous) of minorities *(ahl al-dhimma)* provided they have submitted to Muslim control.

Dar al-Harb (the abode of war) provides the contrast to Dar al-Islam. *Shariʿa* (Islamic) law divides the world into these two abodes. Dar al-Harb denotes territory that is not governed by the assembly of Islam, and is directly contiguous to the abode of Islam. Warfare (jihad) can be invoked in order to convert the abode of war into the abode of Islam, or to rescue the bordering abode. Theoretically, an abode of war can extend ad infinitum. Muslim states, in order to avoid conditions requiring constant jihad, yield to the decision of legal experts *(ulama),* who, based on certain criteria, accept or reject the notion that an area has converted from, or needs to be reconfigured into, Dar al-Islam. These are as follows: (1) the edicts of unbelievers have gained ascendancy; (2) unprotected Muslims and peoples of the book must be rescued; (3) territorial proximity to unbelievers has become repugnant.

Of the above conditions, the first is probably the most important since even if a single edict of Islam is observed, a territory cannot be deemed Dar al-Harb. Further, jihad can be invoked for the sole purpose of turning Dar al-Harb into Dar al-Islam—in other words, to allow for the prevalence of Islamic edicts and the protection of Muslims.

CYRUS MOSHAVER

DAR AL-KUTUB AL-MISRIYYA

The Egyptian national library.

The Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya library was founded in 1870 in Cairo as the Khedivial Library by Ali Mubarak, Khedive Ismaʿil's minister of education. German orientalists directed the library until World War I, when Egyptians took over. In 1904, along with the Museum of Arab Art, "the Dar" was installed in a neo-Islamic-style building. The Dar was moved again in the 1970s to new quarters on the Nile in Bulaq. President Husni Mubarak's wife Suzanne made a personal commitment to expanding literacy and reading, promoting the opening of numerous additional libraries throughout the country.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

DAR AL-MOʿALLAMIN

Teacher-training school in Afghanistan.

The first Dar al-Moʿallamin (House of teachers) teacher-training school was established in Kabul in 1914 by Amir Habibollah (1901–1909), who sought to bring the secular European pedagogy and curriculum to Afghanistan. Initially, students received three years of instruction after having had six years of primary-school education, but the system was changed during the reign of King Amanollah (1919–1929) so that students enter the Dar al-Moʿallamin after nine years of primary school.

Dar al-Moʿallamins were established in other major provincial centers of Afghanistan and by 1970 there were fourteen institutions teaching more than 5,000 students annually. Because most of the Dar al-Moʿallamins were boarding schools, they have played an important part in educating rural youth sent to provincial centers to be educated. They have also served a political function in Afghanistan because public-school teachers form an important segment of the Afghan intelligentsia and have been an influential political force. Dar al-Moʿallamin students participated in the student demonstrations during the late 1970s. As a result, the Dar al-Moʿallamins were closed for some time. During the chaos of the fighting of 1980s and the Taliban rule of the 1990s the students and the teachers of the Dar al-Moʿallamins fled or were unable to teach, and the Dar al-Moʿallamins ceased to function, as did all of Afghanistan's educational system. Although teacher training is again a high priority for the Afghan government, the old Dar al-Moʿallamin system has been largely abandoned and teacher training has

been taken over by the University of Kabul School of Education.

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GRANT FARR

DAR AL-ULUM

Teacher-training school in Egypt.

Khedive Isma^cil Pasha and Minister of Education Ali Mubarak opened Dar al-Ulum in 1871 to train teachers of Arabic for Egypt's new state schools. Its mixed curriculum included both the religious subjects of Islam taught at al-Azhar and "modern" subjects such as history, geography, and mathematics. A college of Cairo University since 1946, Dar al-Ulum in 2003 had 108 faculty and nearly 9,000 students.

See also AZHAR, AL-; CAIRO UNIVERSITY.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

D'ARCY CONCESSION (1901)

Oil concession granted by the Iran to British national D'Arcy in 1901.

William Knox D'Arcy (1849–1917) was a successful British entrepreneur who in 1901 obtained from the government of Iran a sixty-year concession to search for and produce petroleum in an area of central and southern Iran covering 480,000 square miles. In return, the Iranian government received 20,000 British pounds in cash, paid-up shares of an equal value, and a promise of 16 percent of the annual net profits. In 1905, after failing to find oil and having spent most of his capital, D'Arcy assigned his concession rights to Burma Oil, in return for 170,000 barrels of petroleum. Oil was discovered in commercial quantity at Masjed-e Soleyman in 1908, and Burma was reincorporated the following year as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC, later, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, then British Petroleum). In 1914, the British navy decided to convert its ships from the use of coal to oil as fuel, and in tandem the British government became a majority shareholder in APOC. The concession subsequently proved highly profitable for Great Britain. Up to Iran's nationalization of the concession in 1951, APOC paid nearly $600 million in profits and $700 million in corporate taxes to the British government; the Iranian government received a total of $310 million in royalties.

See also PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS; PETROLEUM RESERVES AND PRODUCTION.

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

DARDANELLES, TREATY OF THE (1809)

Officially known as "The Treaty of Peace, Commerce, and Secret Alliance: Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, 5 January 1809," with ratifications exchanged in Istanbul on 27 July 1809.

The Treaty of the Dardanelles grew out of the international rivalries surrounding the Napoleonic wars. The one constant rivalry during this period was that between Great Britain and France. The other European powers sided with one or the other as their military fortunes ebbed and flowed. Until 1805, Russia and France were allies. After Russia joined the Third Coalition against Napoléon, France endeavored to involve the Ottoman Empire in a war with Russia as a distraction. This war began in 1806 and lasted until 1812. Now allied with Russia, Britain sent a naval expedition against Istanbul in 1807; although Britain was able to force its way through the Dardanelles, the Ottomans pushed them back with a loss of two ships. Britain also occupied Alexandria but was forced to withdraw. Except for Britain, France was able to defeat the Third Coalition powers, and in 1807 Russia once more allied with France while continuing its war against the Ottomans. This set the stage for a change in British relations with the Ottomans, now fighting an ally of their perpetual enemy, France.

Sir Robert Adair led the British negotiations with the Sublime Porte that led to the 1809 treaty. The treaty contained eleven articles to which were appended four "separate and secret articles" and one "additional and secret article." The basic articles addressed the recent war between the two powers. They provided for an end to hostilities between Great Britain and the Ottomans with the exchange of prisoners; restoration of any Ottoman fortresses in British possession; mutual restoration of the property of British and Ottoman citizens seized by either side during the war; continuation of the 1675 Treaty of Capitulations; mutual good treatment of the merchants of both countries; an Ottoman tariff set at 3 percent; customary honors to the ambassadors of each nation on the same basis as all other ambassadors; appointment of consuls to facilitate trade; British agreement not to appoint Ottoman subjects as consuls nor to grant patents of protection to Ottoman subjects; and recognition of Ottoman authority to prohibit ships of war passing through the straits in time of peace. This latter was of special significance as it marked Britain as the first European power to recognize this Ottoman prerogative. General recognition of this did not, however, occur until 1841.

The "separate and secret articles" dealt primarily with France and Russia. Britain pledged to support the Ottomans should France declare war on them, including sending a fleet to the Mediterranean for that purpose. Britain also agreed to provide military supplies if France threatened the Ottomans short of declaring war. Regarding Russia, Britain offered to help secure a peace with Russia should this be possible before the Ottomans were able to end their war. This part of the treaty also included a provision for adjudication of the claims of both parties surrounding the British invasion and retreat from Alexandria.

The "additional and secret article" promised 300,000 pounds sterling to the Ottomans as a confirmation of friendship. Although Britain ratified this article, it was not to be presented for exchange unless France began a war with the Ottomans, which never took place.

In addition to ending the war between Britain and the Ottomans, recognizing the right of the Ottomans to close the straits, creating an alliance against France, and reconfirming the capitulations, the treaty is of particular interest because of its language. Normally, treaties are drawn in the language of the parties negotiating them. Because the Ottomans had a limited knowledge of English, however, they insisted that the treaty be drawn in Turkish and French, with which they were much more comfortable. This was a matter of some discussion in the foreign office, but the Ottoman position prevailed.

See also BONAPARTE, NAPOLÉON; SUBLIME PORTE.

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR

DARÜLFÜNÜN

The Darülfünün (Imperial Ottoman University) was the first institution of higher learning in the Middle East modeled along Western lines.

As a prominent symbol of the Tanzimat reforms, the Darülfünün the was the frequent victim of the Ottoman Empire's domestic politics in early years and suffered repeated closures. Its creation was first proposed in 1846 by Mustafa Reşid Paşa, but the school did not actually open until 1870, and then only for one year. On the impetus of the minister of education, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, it was open again between 1874 and 1881. Then it remained closed until opening permanently in the fall of 1900, largely because of the efforts of a leading Ottoman politician, Mehmet Küçük Sait Paşa. Its curriculum included law, mathematics, chemistry, biology, philosophy, and the humanities, as well as courses on the Qurʾan, the *hadith* (traditions of Muhammad), and other aspects of Islam. In 1933, the Darülfünün was renamed Istanbul University, and it remains one of the preeminent universities in the Middle East.

See also CEVDET, AHMET; ISTANBUL UNIVERSITY; MUSTAFA REŞID; TANZIMAT.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

DARWAZA, MUHAMMAD IZZAT

[1889–1975]

Palestinian politician and historian.

Muhammad Izzat Darwaza, born in Nablus, was an Ottoman bureaucrat in Palestine and Lebanon. He was a major figure in several Arab nationalist organizations, including al-Fatat, during the waning years of the Ottoman Empire, and helped organize the first Arab Congress (Paris, 1913). A pan-Arab nationalist who believed in the unity of Greater Syria after the Ottoman defeat and the establishment of the British and French mandates, Darwaza was also concerned with resisting Zionism.

During the British Mandate in Palestine, Darwaza became a leading figure in the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, a pan-Arab nationalist party reestablished in Palestine in 1932. When the Palestine Arab Revolt that began in 1936 flared up in 1937, Darwaza coordinated guerrilla activities from Damascus for the Arab Higher Committee.

He was a member of the reconstituted Arab Higher Committee for one year in 1947, then retired from active politics to write on Arab, Islamic, and Palestinian history.

See also ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE (PALESTINE); FATAT, AL-; ISTIQLAL PARTY: PALESTINE; PALESTINE ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939).

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

DARWISH, ISHAQ

[1896–1974]

Palestinian politician.

The nephew of Jerusalem mufti Amin al-Husayni, Muhammad Ishaq Darwish was born in Jerusalem. He went to Beirut for his higher education, and was a soldier in the Ottoman army during World War I. Darwish's long career in politics began after the war, when he joined the Arab Club and supported pan-Arabism and the regime of King Faisal I in Damascus, Syria. With Faisal's fall, however, Darwish turned toward Palestine-centered nationalism and in the early 1920s became the first secretary of the Palestine-wide Muslim–Christian Association, headquartered in Jerusalem. He joined the Palestine Arab party after it was founded in 1923, and was one of the founders of the Istiqlal Party in 1932. Through most of these years, Darwish was an aide to his uncle, the mufti. In 1947, he was elected to the Fourth Arab Higher Committee, which that year staged a protest strike and boycotted UNSCOP, the UN committee researching plans for the partition for Palestine. Darwish lived with his uncle in Lebanon and London, England, briefly in the 1960s and returned to Jerusalem before his death.

See also FAISAL I IBN HUSSEIN; HUSAYNI FAMILY, AL-; HUSAYNI, MUHAMMAD AMIN AL-; ISTIQLAL PARTY: PALESTINE; PAN-ARABISM.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

DARWISH, MAHMUD

[1942–]

Palestinian poet.

Mahmud Darwish, recognized since the mid-1960s as the leading national poet of the Palestinian people, was born to a peasant family in al-Birwa, east of

Mahmud Darwish, one of the most acclaimed poets of the Arab world, wrote of the lives of his fellow Palestinians under Israeli rule. In the 1960s, as Darwish's popularity began to spread, the Israeli military placed him under house arrest on several occasions. © ROBERT H. TAYLOR, UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Acre. The village was destroyed by Israeli troops in 1948, causing Darwish's family to flee to Lebanon, the first of the poet's many displacements. Darwish returned to his homeland two years later, under the care of an uncle, but it was too late to be included in the census of Palestinians who had stayed through the war.

Darwish became a refugee, a "present-absent alien," and the peculiar status of Palestinians under Israeli dominion became the subject of many of his early poems, including "Identity Card," perhaps his most famous. Darwish began to recite his poetry at festivals and rallies, exciting the interest of the Israeli military. Between 1961 and 1969, Darwish was imprisoned several times, but he continued to write, publishing his first collection of poems, *Leaves of Olive,* in 1964. He also published articles for *al-Ittihad* and *al-Jadid,* periodicals of the Arab faction of the Israeli Communist Party (RAKAH).

In 1967 four of Darwish's poems were published in Yusuf al-Khal's prestigious literary magazine, *al-Sh'ir,* marking the first time many critics in the Arab world had read poetry written by Palestinians living under Israeli rule. This new genre of writing—which borrowed its strident, self-affirmative tone from Palestinian poets such as Ibrahim Tuqan and Abd al-Rahim Mahmud—was dubbed "resistance poetry," and Darwish became its best-known practitioner. By the end of the decade, translations of his poetry were reaching international audiences, and in 1969 the Afro-Asian Writer's Union awarded him its Lotus Prize.

After a year in Moscow, where he studied political economy, Darwish moved to Cairo and wrote for *al-Ahram.* Two years later, in 1973, Darwish settled in Beirut and became editor of *Shuʾun Filistiniyya,* a journal of the Palestine Research Center. In 1981 he founded the internationalist literary journal *al-Karmil,* which he continues to edit. After Israel's siege of Beirut in 1982, Darwish was evacuated with the Palestinian forces. From a new exile, in Paris, he wrote weekly columns for *al-Yawm al-Sabi* as well as several new volumes of poems. In 1986 he published his prose memoir of the days of siege in *al-Karmil,* and the text was later published as a book, *Memory for Forgetfulness.* Darwish's memoir is a modernist blend of diary, literary criticism, political commentary, and visionary narrative; it is one of the most singular and ambitious works of modern Arabic prose.

Darwish joined the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1973 and became a member of its executive committee in 1987. In 1993, after the government of Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles, Darwish resigned from his position and distanced himself from the newly created Palestinian Authority. In 1996 he moved to Ramallah.

Darwish's early poetry is characterized by its uncompromising postures, political directness, and, at times, a sloganlike simplicity. His later work shows much greater range. In poems like "Intensive Care Unit," a personal intimacy balances the heroism; and Darwish has become more adept in his handling of history and myth, especially in the poems of *Mural*

(2000), his twentieth volume. Throughout his oeuvre, the trope of writing has a privileged place in Darwish's thinking about the existential situation of the Palestinian people. Writing is at once an insufficient weapon in the battle for national self-determination, as well as a necessary tool for recording the history of that battle; it is a concrete mark, and an erasable trace. As Darwish promises in "We Date Our Days with the Butterflies": "We will write our names to reveal their roots east of our bodies. / We will write what the bird writes in the open spaces, and forget the signatures of our feet."

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Kamal Boullatta
Updated by Robyn Creswell

DARWISH, SAYYID

[1892–1923]

Egyptian composer and singer.

During his short life, Sayyid Darwish composed thirty musical plays and dozens of other songs, including light strophic tunes, virtuosic love songs, and religious songs. His work drew upon the language, songs, and images of working-class Egypt. He took Arabic song in a new direction by laying the foundation for Egyptian populist musical expression that endured throughout the twentieth century and has been heard echoing in the compositions of Zakariyya Ahmad and Sayyid Makkawi. As a consequence, he remains a dominating figure in Egyptian cultural life.

He was born in Alexandria and around 1917 moved to Cairo, where he composed for the theatrical troupes of George Abyad, Ali al-Kassar, Munira al-Mahdiyya, the Ukkasha Brothers, and Najib al-Rihani, often in collaboration with his friend, the poet Badi Khayri. Together they helped develop a colloquial comic theater based on indigenous language, music, and characters. Sayyid Darwish infused his compositions with the anti-imperialist political sentiments of his day and with pride in an Egyptian heritage. He and his music expressed sentiments widely shared by the Egyptian people at the time of the Revolution of 1919, and they remain identified with attitudes of popular resistance to the present day.

Among Sayyid Darwish's best-known works are "al-Ashara al-Tayyiba," a play mocking Turkish governance written by Muhammad Taymur, and songs such as "Zuruni Kull Sana Marra" (Visit me once every year). His "Biladi, Biladi" (My country), with a text derived from a speech by nationalist leader Mustafa Kamil and an arrangement by lyricist Yunis al-Qadi, was adopted as the Egyptian national anthem in 1977.

See also Kamil, Mustafa.

Virginia Danielson

DASHNAK PARTY

Translated as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), the Dashnak Party sought to improve the lives of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, eventually embracing Armenian nationalism.

The Dashnak Party was founded in 1890 by Armenians in Tbilisi, Georgia, then part of the Russian empire. The initial focus of its attention was western Armenia or so-called Turkish Armenia, the sector of historic Armenia in the Ottoman Empire. In the early twentieth century, it also began to organize seriously in eastern Armenia in the Russian empire, as well as in Armenian communities across Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Between 1918 and 1920, during the period of the independent Republic of Armenia, its activities were centered in the new

country. After Sovietization, the ARF moved abroad, first fleeing to Iran and eventually settling in Beirut, Lebanon, from where it guided Armenian political life in the Middle East until the Lebanese civil war began in 1975.

The ARF was organized to gather and coordinate the efforts of numerous small groups of Armenians in the Caucasus region involved in revolutionary activity. Bringing together a literate elite, local activists, and peasant guerrillas into a single party was probably its principal ideological achievement. With its leadership schooled in the Russian educational system and its revolutionary, nationalist, populist, and socialist ideas, the ARF articulated the goals of these numerous strands of Armenian society into coherent collective national objectives.

Relieving the plight of the Armenians in the Ottoman provinces as its primary objective, the ARF concentrated on organizing, educating, and arming the population in the countryside to resist the arbitrary rule of Ottoman administrators. Eventually it resolved to assassinate Sultan Abdülhamit II, who was held responsible for a series of brutal massacres in the 1890s. The overthrow of the sultan by the Young Turks and the restoration of the Ottoman constitution in 1908 seemed to affirm that the struggle against the sultan's regime, despite the increased brutalization of the Armenian population by the army, police, and the Hamidiye corps, had been worth the price. The 1909 massacres of Armenians in Adana province soon reversed expectations and revived tensions.

Reluctant to divide its energy and its attention, initially the ARF had chosen to sidestep the problem of autocracy in the Russian Empire. Events leading up to the 1905 revolution, however, precipitated the decision to oppose the tsar also as a despotic ruler devising and implementing policies oppressive to the Armenians. Crossing that threshold proved decisive because the consequences of World War I compelled the ARF to reconsider its objectives. With the decimation of the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire, the ARF goal of seeing a national home secured in the Armenian-inhabited eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire was voided. The breakup of the tsarist empire in 1918 instead provided an opportunity to develop the former Russian province of Yerevan, which was declared an independent republic, into the nucleus of an Armenian state. ARF members virtually ran the entire government of the Armenian republic. This close association had its drawbacks for the Armenian state in that Western powers were unsympathetic to a government run by a party whose platform advocated socialism. Conversely, its nationalist program made it a foe of Bolshevism and hence subjected it to the enmity of the Soviet regime. Banished from Soviet Armenia in 1920, the ARF assumed the mantle of a nationalist government-in-exile. When it reorganized in the diaspora, the ARF completely lost its Russian-Armenian character as it found a new basis for its existence among the exile communities in the Middle East, mostly composed of the survivors of the former Armenian population of the Ottoman state.

Part of the success of the ARF is explained by the fact that from 1890 to 1920 it attracted a sizable contingent of the Armenian intellectual elite. Whether as party members, advocates, or supporters, they created a huge body of nationalist literature. The practice was started by its founders, Kristapor Mikayelian (1859–1905); Stepan Zorian (1867–1919), known as Rostom; and Simon Zavarian (1866–1913). The party organ, *Droshak* (Banner), was the leading journal of Armenian political thought. During the independent republic, many distinguished figures from Russian-Armenian society became associated with the ARF. Avetis Aharonian, famed as a writer, became president and traveled to Paris to negotiate with the Allies. Alexander Khatisian, one-time mayor of Tbilisi, became prime minister. Others who rose to prominence during this period, such as Simon Vratsian, Nigol Aghbalian, and Levon Shant, remained central figures in the Armenian diaspora and its endeavors to educate a new generation of Armenians in exile. The ARF also attracted numerous guerrilla leaders and frontline revolutionaries into its ranks. Papken Siuni led the capture of the Ottoman Bank in 1896 in Constantinople. Men like Andranik, Aram Manoogian, and Drastamard Kanayan, called Dro, led organized armed defense of Armenian communities and of the Armenian republic. In diaspora, the ARF has been less successful in finding the kind of charismatic leadership that once distinguished it as the leading Armenian political organization. From this standpoint, the evocation of past leader-

ship has become an important feature sustaining the organization in diaspora communities.

From an organizational standpoint, the ARF bridged two major gulfs in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Armenian society: It created an alliance between Turkish Armenians and Russian Armenians, who had become divided by a boundary, and between the rural population and the urban population, who inhabited completely separate spaces as the Armenian bourgeoisie lived outside the Armenian heartland. To maintain a network that spanned so widely both socially and geographically, the ARF developed a highly decentralized organization that empowered regional bureaus with the privilege of devising policy.

Throughout its existence, the ARF has relied on direct financial support from Armenian society. With a large following and popular base, the organization has maintained a substantial infrastructure. Despite the destruction of innumerable Armenian communities, the ARF continuously maintained its operations and reorganized its network as Armenians migrated across the Middle East. Though based in urban Armenian communities and deriving support from the lower and middle classes, the ARF program addressed principally the condition of the Armenians in the Turkish provinces and of the agrarian population in general. Beyond equal treatment before the law and structural reform in the Ottoman government, the ARF placed great emphasis on improving the lot of Armenian farmers. An economic program therefore always formed a vital part of its doctrine. With many socialists among its ranks, the party as a whole was still slow to adopt socialism as the party platform despite its ideological currency in Russia. Ideas of the kind seemed remote from Armenian reality in the distant provinces of the Ottoman and Russian Empires. Consequently, despite its urban base, the ARF did not agitate as strongly among industrial workers, who tended to be drawn to social democratic groups, but rather concentrated on the program of national liberation.

Because Armenians constituted a subject minority unequipped to resolve its own problems, in the judgment of the ARF Armenian emancipation depended on the attention of the European powers. Their sympathetic influence was required to compel the reluctant Ottomans to introduce reforms. This policy remained controversial throughout the period as outside powers involved themselves with the Armenian question on their own timetable of interests and as the Ottoman government in its state of weakness looked upon the strategy with enormous suspicion. The persecution of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during World War I, resulting in the Armenian Genocide, finally aligned the Western powers on the side of the Armenian republic. The Western failure to extend sufficient assistance to make a difference in preserving Armenian statehood, however, raised the question of whether the ARF had not misplaced its trust.

The ARF regards itself as a vanguard organization. In its early decades, its membership consisted of professional revolutionaries who published its papers, organized its cells, manufactured weapons, led guerrilla operations, and briefly ran a government. Its constituency has not been restricted to any class because it derived its strength from its popular nationalist program. The ARF constituency remains the larger segment of the Armenian diaspora though it no longer draws the same level of critical support from the professional class as it once did.

With its main political mission defused by 1920, the ARF devoted considerable attention to resurrecting Armenian communal life among the exile communities. The emergence of a new independent Republic of Armenia has posed special challenges to the organization, which for long sustained itself with the myth of national leadership. The rise in the 1980s of a major nationalist movement in Armenia independent of the ARF left the party somewhat stranded. These problems combined with earlier difficulties when its principal base was destroyed by the civil war in Lebanon. The largest and most dynamic diaspora community in the Middle East had provided the ARF a secure home in the post–World War II decades. Even so, with the independence of Armenia in 1991 and the conflict over Nagorno Karabagh, the ARF redirected its attention toward supporting domestic change in Armenia and enlisting international support for the Armenian struggle for sovereignty and self-government.

See also Armenian Genocide; Armenian Revolutionary Movement; Hunchak Party; Ottoman Empire: Overview.

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ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

DASHTI, ALI

[1896–1981]

An Iranian writer, member of parliament, and ambassador.

Born near Bushehr and trained in Muslim religious studies at Karbala, Iraq, Ali Dashti became a journalist upon his return to Iran in 1918. He established the paper *Shafaq-e Sorkh* (Red twilight) in 1922, and for several years the paper supported the policies of Reza Shah Pahlavi. After Dashti became disillusioned with and his paper critical of the shah in the late 1920s, he was taken to prison on several occasions. His first book, a collection of articles titled *Prison Days,* described his incarcerations. From 1928 to 1978 he spent many terms in the parliament, first as an elected deputy and from the mid-1950s as a senator appointed by the shah. During the 1940s, he was the leader of the Justice Party, a political group that opposed the Tudeh Party and supported a constitutional monarchy. In 1948, the shah named him Iranian ambassador to Egypt and Lebanon. In the 1950s, Dashti published several novels treating the plight of upper-class Iranian women. His book on Hāfez's poetry, the first of a series of important impressionistic critiques of major classical poets of Persian literature, appeared in 1957. *In Search of Omar Khayyam* (1971) typifies his literary, critical, and scholarly work. Dashti's Pahlavi-era political career led to his harassment and incarceration after the Iranian Revolution (1979). *Twenty-Three Years: A Study of the Prophetic Career of Mohammad,* published posthumously in 1985, illustrates his secular concerns about Islam in the modern world.

See also IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); LITERATURE: PERSIAN; PAHLAVI, REZA; TUDEH PARTY.

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MICHAEL C. HILLMANN
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

DATES

Throughout history, the date palm has satisfied the needs—from food to fuel to construction materials—of those who live in desert and tropical regions. Now, the importance of its cultivation is waning.

Since the dawn of recorded history, the date palm has been associated with the Middle East. It has featured prominently in the rituals of the religions of antiquity, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Perfectly suited to the climate of the region, the date palm can endure desert heat, withstand long periods of flooding, and tolerate high levels of salinity. In general, a plentiful supply of water together with prolonged periods of high temperatures are ideal for the growth of the tree and for the ripening of its fruit. An average tree will produce approximately fifty pounds of fruit each year. The date palm has been for the settled Arabs what the camel has been for the nomads, providing a commercial crop to exchange for imported necessities, material for construction, bedding, and an important source of fuel. Beneath its shade they can grow other fruit trees, vines, and aromatic plants, and beneath these cultivate vegetables, melons, and fodder crops. For many it provides a staple food, rich in calories and with appreciable amounts of vitamins. The fruit can be easily packed and transported, while the seeds are ground up and used as camel food.

Date-palm cultivation is labor intensive. Trees may be grown from seed but are usually grown from shoots, suckers, or buds. Soil preparation for date-palm cultivation involves a multistage process, and an elaborate system of irrigation requiring regular maintenance is essential. Because half of all trees grown from seeds are male and unproductive, sophisticated means of growing plants, relying most especially on artificial pollination, have been practiced from ancient times. Each tree requires special care and pruning for optimum yields. Harvesting of dates usually occurs in September and October but may begin as early as mid-August and continue until December, depending on the variety. In Iraq, the

unique art of date cultivation has, since antiquity, been acknowledged legally by awarding to tenant cultivators hereditary property rights to the tree independent of the rights attached to the land on which it is grown. Contractual arrangements between cultivators and landowners vary according to differences in the inputs of skill and capital. Tenure practices and juristic ramifications associated with date cultivation are therefore complex.

Dates are most prolific in Iraq where there are 627 varieties. The groves along the Shatt al-Arab make up the largest single area of date cultivation, at one time covering over 100 square miles (260 sq km). Their harvest season long determined trade patterns in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf and much of the Indian Ocean. Until World War II, Iraq provided some 80 percent of the world's date crop, and dates constituted its largest export earnings. With the growth of the oil industry, the importance of dates in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East has declined. Greater oil earnings have reduced dependence on date palms for necessities, the attraction of other more remunerative and less arduous employments has depleted the pool of skilled cultivators, while the pollution associated with oil and modernization generally has had a detrimental effect on date palms.

See also SHATT AL-ARAB.

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ALBERTINE JWAIDEH

DAUD, MUHAMMAD

[1909–1978]

President of Afghanistan, 1973–1978.

Muhammad Daud, who earned the nickname of Sardar-i Diwana (the crazy prince) because of his hot temper and ruthlessness, was born in Kabul. His father, Sardar (Prince) Mohammad Aziz Khan, was a half brother of King Mohammad Nadir Barakzai (1929–1933), the founder of the Musahiban ruling dynasty of the Mohammadzai clan, of the Barakzai family of the Pashtuns (or Pakhtun) who dominated national politics in Afghanistan since the early 1800s. Daud attended Habibia and Amania schools in Kabul before continuing his education in France from 1921 to 1930. He returned to Kabul and after a one-year course at the Infantry Officers School, was appointed a major general and commanding officer of the armed forces in Mashriqi province, eastern Afghanistan (1932–1935). In 1933, Daud's uncle, King Nadir Shah, and his father, the Afghan envoy in Berlin, were assassinated separately as a result of political and family feuds. Nadir Shah's son, Mohammad Zahir, assumed the Afghan throne, and in 1934 Daud married the sister of Zahir Shah. Between 1935 and 1953, Daud rose from governor and general commanding officer in the western provinces to minister of defense and interior.

Daud was prime minister from 1953 to 1963. An ardent secular nationalist, Daud made strong military and economic progress his top priority. Initially denied assistance by the United States and the West, he turned to the Soviets. With their help he created a mechanized military force and adopted an *etatist* (state socialist) economic policy that concentrated on transportation and communication infrastructures and the expansion of education. Exploiting Pushtun nationalism, Daud pursued an aggressive territorial claim (for Pushtunistan) against Pakistan, which resulted in greater trade and with economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union. An alleged rift within the royal household over this issue culminated in Daud's resignation as prime minister in March 1963. He spent the next decade in retirement, unhappy with the constitutional developments in 1964 that curtailed participation of royal family members in government and political processes. Assisted by a group of junior military officers active in the pro-Soviet Parcham (Banner) Communist party, Daud returned to power on 17 July 1973 and proclaimed himself president of the Republic of Afghanistan, thus ending the monarchy.

Shortly thereafter, Daud consolidated power by relying on his old networks and persecuting his perceived enemies, among whom were members of the Islamist political movements. Toward the end of his rule, he appeared to distance himself from his old ally, the Soviet Union, in favor of closer ties with Iran and the Gulf States, while striving to improve

relations with Pakistan. In spite of these attempts, his presidency proved to be a period of confusion, contradictions, and indecision. In the end, Daud met his death at the hands of pro-Soviet Afghan communists, whom he had protected and nurtured during the previous decades.

In retrospect, some remember him as a patriot who single-handedly sought, but failed, to bring about progress and economic development in Afghanistan. Although intelligent, he was also a stubborn dictator and was ill informed about Soviet thinking and long-term goals in the region. Thus, he allowed himself to be used as a conduit for communism and Soviet influence, which led to ongoing strife.

See also Barakzai Dynasty; Nadir Barakzai, Mohammad; Parcham; Zahir Shah.

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M. Nazif Shahrani

DA'UD PASHA

[1812–1872]

Ottoman official in Lebanon.

Da'ud Pasha was born in Constantinople (now Istanbul; some sources say in 1816 and others say in 1818) to an Armenian Catholic family. He received his education at a French school and then attended a French college in Vienna, where he earned a law degree. He then entered the foreign service, and his first post was in Berlin. He wrote a book on Western jurisprudence and was known as a doctor of law. Da'ud Pasha also served as consul general in Vienna and later was director of publications and then director of post and telegraphic services in Constantinople. His French education brought him close to French circles in Constantinople. He was the first *mutasarrif* in Lebanon after the 1861 *mutasarrifiyya* order was designed for Lebanon by the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire.

Before he began his mission in Lebanon, Da'ud Pasha was promoted to the rank of minister, thus becoming the highest-ranking Christian working for the Ottoman government. He improved tax collection in Lebanon and established public schools. He also founded a school for the Druze, in an attempt to appease that community after the end of the Druze–Maronite armed conflict. His mission was abruptly ended in 1868 after he became embroiled in the politics of Lebanon and tried to expand the area of "Lebanon." He then held various administrative positions in Constantinople. He died in Switzerland.

As'ad AbuKhalil

DAVAR

See Newspapers and Print Media: Israel

DAʿWA AL-ISLAMIYYA, AL-

Iraqi Shiʿite political party, whose name means Call to Islam.

Al-Daʿwa al-Islamiyya was formed by Shiʿite clerical figures in the 1960s to combat secularist tendencies among the Iraqi elites. It operated underground, since religious expression was suppressed by the secular socialist Baʿth Party, which came to power in 1968, attempted to control the national religious life and internal structure of the Shiʿite clergy. Members of the clergy, including Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Ayatullah Muhsin Hakim, backed or helped in the creation of the party, which organized antigovernment demonstrations on behalf of the deprived Shiʿite population of southern Iraq in the early 1970s. With the Shiʿite clergy in power in Iran after the revolution of 1979, the party became more politically active and received funding and backing from Iran. This led to heavy persecution and mass imprisonment and executions by Saddam Hussein's government. In turn, the Daʿwa Party launched attempts to assassinate government officials. In 1985, various Shiʿite parties, including the Daʿwa Party, formed in Tehran the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. But the Daʿwa Party was weakened by the counter-efforts of the Iraqi government to court the Shiʿite masses with economic and religious concessions, and by the Iraqi Shiʿa's lack of identification with their Iranian coreligionists.

After the 1991 Gulf War, the Daʿwa Party led a rebellion against the government of Saddam Hussein, but it was ruthlessly crushed. Party members established a London branch, which joined the coalition of Iraqi opposition groups aligning themselves with the United States. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Daʿwa Party was revived within Iraq, but political differences seem to have surfaced between the London branch and the Iraqi branch regarding the U.S. occupation of Iraq. The party cooperated with the U.S. forces and its leader, Abd al-Zahra Uthman Muhammad (editor of several newspapers and magazines), joined the Iraqi Governing Council appointed in July 2003 by Paul Bremer, the official leader of the U.S. civil administration of Iraq.

Although the party is supported by Ayatullah Kazim al-Haʾiri, many within it look to the guidance of other ayatollahs as well, including the powerful Grand Ayatullah Ali al-Sistani. Despite their differences, the various branches seem to be united in their desire to swiftly end the U.S. occupation, and in creating an Islamic state in Iraq, though not necessarily along the Iranian lines of clergy domination.

See also Baʿth, al-; Hussein, Saddam; Shiʿism; War in Iraq (2003).

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Maysam J. al-Faruqi

DAWASIR TRIBE

See Tribes and Tribalism: Dawasir Tribe

DAYAN, MOSHE

[1915–1981]

Israeli military leader and politician.

Moshe Dayan was born at Kibbutz Degania in the Jordan valley. His family left in 1920 to join the founders of Nahalal, the first *moshav* (cooperative settlement) in the Jezreel valley, where Dayan was educated at an agricultural school. During the Arab revolt, Dayan served in a Jewish patrol unit *(notrim)* of Britain's mandatory police in Palestine under the command of Captain Orde Wingate. As a member of Haganah—the defense force of the Jewish national institutions in Palestine—and a student of its officers' school, he was arrested in 1940 by the British. Released after fifteen months in jail, Dayan commanded an advance unit of the Haganah that was sent by the Allies into Syria, then controlled by Vichy France. It was here that he lost an eye in battle, and the black patch that he subsequently wore became his trademark. The injury put a temporary halt to Dayan's military career. In 1946, he received his first political assignment, representing the MAPAI (Labor) at the World Zionist Congress in Basel.

At the beginning of the Arab–Israel War of 1948, Dayan served as an officer for Arab affairs at Haganah headquarters. In May he was given his first combat position—organizing the defense of the kibbutzim on the Kinneret (Sea of Galilee) front. He next led a mobile commando regiment that captured the city of Lydda. In July 1948, Dayan was named commander of Jerusalem. In this position, he negotiated a cease-fire in the Jerusalem area and an armistice with Jordan. He and Reuven Shiloah drew up a draft of principles for a territorial agreement with King Abdullah of Jordan; it was not negotiated, however, because the king refused to be the only Arab ruler to sign a peace treaty with Israel.

Between 1949 and 1953, Dayan held several senior positions in Israel's army. Appointed chief of staff in December 1953, he reshaped Israel's army as a fighting force. The greatest achievement of the army under Dayan's direct command was the Sinai campaign of 1956, in which it took over the entire Sinai peninsula in a week. Dayan objected to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's decision to withdraw Israel's forces from all positions in Sinai in response to U.S. pressure and Soviet threats, and in return for Western guarantees of free passage in the Strait of Tiran and the placement of UN observers in Sharm al-Shaykh and Gaza. Dayan resigned from the army in January 1958. Following two years of study at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, he was elected a MAPAI member of the Knesset and named minister of agriculture in Ben-Gurion's government

Moshe Dayan (1915–1981) had a distinctive military career, culminating in his election as chief of staff of the armed forces. In 1958, Dayan left the military to take up a career in politics. He played a role in negotiating the landmark Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979. © David Rubinger/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

(1959). With Shimon Peres, Dayan became prominent in MAPAI's young leadership club, which aspired to democratize the party and take over its leadership. Although Ben-Gurion had encouraged their entry into politics and the government, his veteran associates, including Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir, felt threatened by the younger group and were alienated by its criticism of the party. Eshkol succeeded Ben-Gurion as prime minister in June 1963. In November 1964, Dayan resigned from the Eshkol government to protest what he described as the prime minister's lack of confidence in him.

Prior to the 1965 elections, Dayan joined Ben-Gurion's Rafi Party. His greatest political hour came in the Arab–Israel War of 1967. Criticism of Eshkol's hesitancy to react forcefully to Egypt's blocking the Strait of Tiran to Israel's shipping and its rapid military buildup in Sinai created pressure for Dayan's appointment as defense minister and the formation of a national unity government. Dayan led the army as a civilian. He was reluctant to occupy the Golan Heights but succumbed to pressure from the government. He also did not want Israel's forces to reach the Suez Canal but did not prevent it. After the war, Dayan was put in charge of the territories occupied by Israel—the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. He promulgated the economic integration of the territories, Israeli settlement there, and the maintenance of open bridges over the Jordan River.

The 1967 war and its aftermath made Dayan a leading, though controversial, national political contender. In 1968, Rafi joined MAPAI to form the Labor Party. Dayan supported the merger but kept alive his option to run as an independent until the Arab–Israel War of 1973, which severely undermined his public support. The coordinated attack by Egypt and Syria, which caught Israel unprepared, shattered Dayan's leadership credibility and produced demands for his and Prime Minister Meir's resignations. The Labor party managed to win the next election (31 December 1973), though with decreased representation. Although a state commission of inquiry (the Agranat commission) found no personal negligence in the conduct of the war, criticism did not wane. A large segment of the public was not prepared to put all the blame for the army's lack of preparedness on military officers. Israel's advantageous military position at the end of the war, and the beginning of diplomatic negotiations, did not put an end to criticism.

Prime Minister Meir resigned on 18 January 1974, and Dayan refused to serve in the Labor government headed by Yitzhak Rabin. In the 1977 elections, Dayan ran on the Labor party's Knesset list; he had first negotiated with the Likud and had contemplated an independent run. Following Likud's electoral victory, its leader, Menachem Begin, invited Dayan to serve as foreign minister in his government. In this position, Dayan launched the secret talks with Egypt that eventually led to President Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, and he is largely credited with playing a major role in the

Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt (1978), and the subsequent peace treaty with Egypt (1979). Nevertheless, he resigned from the Begin government on 23 October 1979, criticizing its handling of the talks with Egypt on the implementation of the Camp David autonomy plan for the Palestinians in the occupied territories. He believed that Israel should have negotiated more vigorously, unencumbered by internal political restraints. Subsequently, Dayan advocated unilateral implementation of the autonomy plan. Under this banner he ran as an independent in the 1981 elections, but his list (Telem) received meager support. He died soon afterward. An accomplished amateur archaeologist, Dayan also was a prolific writer.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab–Israel War (1973); Ben-Gurion, David; Camp David Accords (1978); Israel: Political Parties in; Meir, Golda; Peres, Shimon.

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Nathan Yanai

DAYAN, YAEL

[1939–]

Israeli writer and civil rights activist.

Yael (also Yaʿel) Dayan was born in Afula to Moshe Dayan, who later became chief of staff of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) and defense and foreign minister, and Rahel (also Rachel) Dayan, a well-known social activist specializing in immigrant absorption. Yael studied international relations at the Hebrew University and biology at the Open University. She served as an officer in the IDF Spokesman Unit and covered the June War of 1967 in that capacity. There she met her husband, General Dov Sion (1924–2003). In the 1980s, already a well-established author and commentator on public issues, she entered politics and was elected to the Knesset in 1992 as a Labor Party member. Her three terms in the Knesset were marked by intensive and outspoken attempts to promote the rights of minority groups, chief among them Israeli Arabs, gays, and lesbians. She was also active in Arab-Israeli peace causes and was involved in various efforts to intensify rapprochement between the two peoples after the signing of the September 1993 Oslo Accord. In the 2003 elections she was not included on the Labor party list and joined the Meretz Party list of candidates but was not reelected.

A prolific writer, she has written several novels and memoirs, some of which have been translated into English, including *New Face in the Mirror,* 1959, *Death Has Two Sons,* 1967, *Dust,* 1963, and *Envy the Frightened,* 1960 (fiction); and *A Soldier's Diary: Sinai 1967,* 1968, *Three Weeks in October,* 1979, and *My Father, His Daughter,* 1983 (nonfiction), as well as many articles and film scripts dealing with women's issues, peace, and social criticism.

See also Dayan, Moshe; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Israel: Overview; Israel: Political Parties in; Oslo Accord (1993).

Meron Medzini

DAYR AL-ZAWR PROVINCE

Province in eastern Syria on the Euphrates River named after its major town, Dayr al-Zawr.

The name Dayr al-Zawr means literally the convent of the grove where clusters of tamarisks grow alongside the river. Apparently, a convent was originally established there. The town of Dayr al-Zawr is located on the right bank of the Euphrates River 640 feet (195 m) above sea level. The river is crossed by a suspension bridge 1,476 feet (450 m) long, completed in 1931.

The province of Dayr al-Zawr (or al-Furat), according to official data, in 1982 included 29 villages

and 261 farms spreading over 3 *qadas* (subprovinces) currently referred to as *mintaqas*: Dayr al-Zawr, Abu Kamal, and al-Mayadin. They are divided into 14 *nahiyas* (smaller administrative units).

The total population of the province in 2002 was 1,311,700, and of the town of Dayr al-Zawr, 216,200.

ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

DAYR YASIN

Palestinian village.

Dayr Yasin (Deir Yasin), 3 miles (5 km) on the outskirts of Jerusalem, was attacked by Jewish paramilitary units during the civil war between Palestinians and Jews in the period between announcement of the United Nations partition plan in November 1947 and proclamation of the state of Israel in May 1948. Although only one of a number of incidents in which Jewish forces attacked Palestinian civilians, the Dayr Yasin massacre became the most notorious and the longest remembered because of the unusually large number of deaths, Palestinian loss of the village, and the extent to which the reports of the massive loss of lives that circulated through the Palestinian community exacerbated fears that led to mass flight of Palestinians.

The attack on Dayr Yasin occurred on 9 April 1948, and was initiated by the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi, or Etzel (National Military Organization), and Lohamei Herut Yisrael, or Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), which was also known as the Stern Gang. Etzel, which was headed by Menachem Begin (who would later become Israel's prime minister), was a dissident faction of the Haganah, the quasi-official defense organization of the Palestinian Jewish community, or Yishuv. Although Dayr Yasin's residents had not been involved in any significant incident against the Yishuv, and had signed a nonaggression pact with the Haganah, the leaders of Etzel and Lehi justified their surprise attack by charging that the village had been a base for Palestinian guerrillas, an accusation that was not substantiated by the Haganah. During the attack about 105 men, women, and children were murdered, although a figure of 250 is often cited; many bodies were mutilated and thrown into a well. There was some armed resistance to the attack.

The leaders of the Yishuv, including David Ben-Gurion (who would later become Israel's first prime minister), strenuously denounced the attack and disclaimed any responsibility for it. However, there is credible evidence that the Haganah had been informed of the impending attack in advance and that a Haganah unit had provided covering fire for Etzel and Lehi. During the incident, residents of Dayr Yasin who were not slain were driven from the village, and most of it was destroyed. Later, the remains of the village were taken over and occupied by the Haganah.

Dayr Yasin symbolized the extent to which the struggle between Palestinian and Jewish communities in Palestine was becoming an all-out civil war with civilian casualties. It thus contributed to the panic that led to the collapse and mass flight of the Palestinian community.

See also BEGIN, MENACHEM; HAGANAH; IRGUN ZVAʾI LEʾUMI (IZL); LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL.

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DON PERETZ

DEAD SEA

Salt-water lake situated between Jordan, the West Bank, and Israel.

The Dead Sea (Arabic, Bahr al-Lut; ancient Greco-Romano, Lacus Asphaltites), the lowest surface point on the planet (the actual lowest point is under the ocean), is situated in the 350-mile-long (560 km) Jordan–Dead Sea rift valley, bordered by the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan to its east, the

MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

State of Israel to its southwest, and the West Bank to its northwest. The surface of the Dead Sea is 1,302 feet (397 m) below Mediterranean sea level, with an area of about 395 square miles (1,020 sq km). It is 51 miles (82 km) long.

This inland lake is the world's saltiest; its water contains about 25 percent solid concentrates, as compared to ocean concentrates of some 4 to 6 percent. The lake has no outlet and is fed from the north by waters of the Jordan River and *wadis* (streams that are usually dry but fill during the rainy season). In its middle, it is divided by the Lisan (tongue), which stretches across some 75 percent of the lake's width from Jordan toward Israel. Economically, the Dead Sea is important to the bordering regions, since each uses it for tourism—many visitors seek its purported medicinal properties and spas exist to allow such visits, especially in Israel. The land near its shores is also cultivated, with sweet irrigation water brought to those fields. From the Dead Sea's brine, both Jordan and Israel extract potash, an important component of agricultural fertilizer.

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PETER GUBSER

DEAD SEA SCROLLS

Ancient religious documents.

The Dead Sea Scrolls are ancient manuscripts found at Khirbat Qumran, in caves in the Judean desert near the Dead Sea, 7.5 miles (12 km) from Jericho. The scrolls were uncovered in 1947. Archaeologists later discovered a cemetery of over one thousand graves, a central building, and central caves containing fragments of old documents. The area was apparently destroyed by an earthquake in 31 B.C.E. and then rebuilt. The authors of the scrolls lived there until 68 C.E. The contents of the scrolls and other evidence show that the authors belonged to a Jewish sect. The scrolls or fragments include two complete copies of Isaiah and fragments of nearly every other book of the Bible. Their discovery advanced the study of the Hebrew Bible, since the earliest versions before the scrolls were discovered dated to the Middle Ages. Fragments of the Apocrypha and the Pseudepigrapha and other unknown books were also found, including the Book of Tobit, the Hebrew version of Jubilees, and the Aramaic version of the Book of Enoch. The scrolls include sectarian books as well, including a commentary on Habakkuk, parts of a commentary on Micah and Nahum, and others. These commentaries explain the prophetic writings in relation to the history of the sect. Other scrolls deal with the sect's organization and theological doctrines. They also contain fragments of the Zadokite documents

that were found in Cairo. The Temple scroll minutely details the Temple. The sect responsible for the scrolls was assumed to have been the Essenes, but recent scholarship has placed this thesis in doubt. They beheld the power of good ruling in a world in opposition to the power of evil, and they saw themselves as the chosen "sons of light."

Their apocalyptic circles, among whom Enoch was composed, probably influenced the beginnings of Christianity, especially those close to Paul and John the Evangelist.

Some of the scrolls came into the possession of Hebrew University through E. L. Sukenik, who was responsible for the first publication of selections. Others went to the United States where they were published by Burrows, Brownlee and were subsequently purchased for the government of Israel through the agency of Sukenik's son, Yigael Yadin. They are housed in the Shrine of the Book in the Israel Museum. The publication of the many fragments was entrusted to a group of scholars whose slow progress generated international controversy. In 1991, the system was overhauled to ensure speedy publication. The Huntington Library in San Marino, California, in the interim, published photographs of the collection and made them available without restrictions.

See also YADIN, YIGAEL.

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MIA BLOOM

DEBKA

See DANCE

DE BUNSEN, MAURICE

[1852–1932]

British diplomat.

Maurice De Bunsen entered the diplomatic service in 1877 and helped settle the dispute between France and Spain over Morocco in 1911 and 1912. In 1915, Prime Minister H. H. Asquith appointed him head of a committee to determine British wartime policy toward the Ottoman Empire in Asia. The resulting report of the De Bunsen committee established the foundation for British policy in the Middle East.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

DECENTRALIZATION PARTY

Political party of the Ottoman Empire from 1912 to 1916.

The Ottoman Administrative Decentralization Party was founded in Egypt in December 1912 by Muslim and non-Muslim Syrian émigré intellectuals. Party leaders included Rafiq al-Azm (president), Iskandar Ammun (vice-president), Rashid Rida, and Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib. The party espoused a program of decentralization for the multiethnic and multireligious empire. But it formed branches only in Arab areas and lacked official status. Along with the empirewide Ottoman Liberty and Entente Party, it sought wider powers for provincial councils in education, financial affairs, religious foundations, and public works. It advocated local military service and two official languages in each region, Turkish and the local language. The party maintained close links with the reform societies that emerged in Arab cities in 1912 and 1913. Despite dissension in its ranks after the Arab Congress (June 1913), the party survived until World War I as the coordinator of Arab autonomist movements. The dominant Committee for Union and Progress implied that party members advocated separatism and pro-Western treason. Cemal Paşa sentenced prominent members to death in 1915 and 1916.

See also CEMAL PAŞA; COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS; RIDA, RASHID.

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HASAN KAYALI

DECLARATION OF LA CELLE ST. CLOUD

Agreement by France to allow Morocco independence.

In August 1953, France deposed the Moroccan sultan, Sidi Muhammad bin Yusuf. Until then, the Moroccan opposition had been divided, but the exile of the monarch united the country. A wave of strikes, violence, and disturbances swept the country, accompanied by demands for the sultan's return and the immediate independence of Morocco. The French government of Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France finally recognized that Morocco would not be pacified, except at a cost far greater than the French were willing to pay. In October 1955, the exiled sultan went to France, and the Declaration of La Celle St. Cloud was issued by the French foreign minister, Antoine Pinay, on November 6. Under its terms, France agreed to grant Morocco independence in accord with the principle of Franco–Moroccan interdependence. This concept raised some concern in Morocco about the sincerity of the French, but in March 1956, the promise enshrined in the declaration became fact, with the former sultan becoming King Muhammad V, ruler of the new state.

See also MUHAMMAD V.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

DEDE ZEKAI
[1825–1899]

Ottoman Turkish composer.

Dede Zekai, also known as Hoca Zekai Dede Efendi and Mehmet Zekai Dede, was born in the Eyub district of Istanbul. His father was a teacher and imam of the local mosque. As a child, he was schooled in singing, calligraphy, and memorization of the Qurʾan; his music teachers included Hammamzade Ismail Dede and Dellalzade İsmail. At the age of thirteen, he went to Egypt where he was a court musician in Cairo. He acquired the title "dede" after studying Sufism, and the title "hoca" for teaching music at the Darüşşafaka. Among his students were Subhi Ezgi, Rauf Yekta Bey, and Ahmet Rasim. Over 260 of his compositions survive today. Half of these are religious compositions; the other half were composed in the *beste, ağir semai, yürük semai,* and *şarki* genres. Fifty-five of his pieces are melodies, and 182 of his compositions were published in a four-volume collection.

See also AHMET RASIM; DELLALZADE İSMAIL.

DAVID WALDNER

DEEDES, WYNDHAM
[1883–1956]

British colonial official in the Middle East.

After serving in World War I, the British Brigadier General Sir Wyndham Henry Deedes was posted to Istanbul as a military attaché and to Cairo, then a British protectorate, as public security director. From 1920 to 1922 he served as chief secretary to British High Commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel in Palestine, then under British mandate. Although known for his pro-Zionist sympathies, Deedes played a role in promoting the Supreme Muslim Council as an Arab counterweight to the Jewish Agency.

See also JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE; SAMUEL, HERBERT LOUIS; SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

DE GAULLE, CHARLES

[1890–1970]

President of France, 1958 to 1969; instrumental in ending French colonialism in the Middle East and North Africa.

Charles de Gaulle, one of republican France's great statesmen, earned his place in French history by the spirited exercise of leadership in the face of national adversity—first when he placed himself at the head of the Free French movement in 1940 to meet the challenges of the German occupation in World War II, and again when he took the lead in reshaping French political institutions in 1958 to meet the challenges of the Algerian war of independence, European integration, and the cold war. Faced, in both periods, with the contradiction of ensuring France's well-being in Europe and sustaining a precarious hold on remnants of the French Empire, de Gaulle did not deviate from his primary objective for long. The relative ease, therefore, with which he could divest France of claims to empire helped pave the way for full independence in the Middle Eastern mandates of Lebanon and Syria by 1945 and for the decolonization of Algeria by 1962.

De Gaulle established this priority early in his military career when he reluctantly deferred his passionate interest in French defense strategies to complete a tour of duty in the Middle East from 1929 to 1931. While there, he hinted at the charismatic didacticism that was to become the hallmark of his speeches. This was when, overriding the contradictions that separated colonial administrators from the political aspirations of their subjects, he urged Lebanon's youth to build a progressive state with the help of France. Returning to the Middle East during World War II, after its liberation in 1941 by British and Free French forces, General de Gaulle was incensed when he saw how Britain, with tacit American backing, was exploiting French weaknesses to support the Lebanese and Syrian nationalist movements. Ultimately, however, he refrained from exerting what would have been a corrosive resistance to Allied demands for France's retreat from empire in the area.

When de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, he had to deal with the French army's repression of Algeria's nationalist struggle against a colonial social order. This morally and materially debilitating war also affected France's relations with neighboring Arab states as well as with the United States, Britain, and the international community. De Gaulle initially mapped out a progressive future for what was to be a felicitously integrated Franco–Algerian society. He concentrated, however, on turning the sometimes dangerously rebellious military around to building France up as a nuclear power independent of its erstwhile allies and able to lead with Germany in the development of the European community. With these priorities uppermost in his mind, de Gaulle agreed in 1962 to the nationalist demand for a fully independent Algeria, and France subsequently closed this chapter in the history of empire with the absorption of a massive flight of colonists from across the Mediterranean.

In the aftermath of the Algerian peace, de Gaulle favored a resolution with the Arab world to complement French links with Israel. In the last years before he resigned his presidency in 1969, he assumed France's heightened stature would justify the role of arbiter in the Arab–Israel conflict, but he failed to make allowances for the complexity of the problem and the greater involvement of the superpowers.

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JOHN P. SPAGNOLO

DE HAAN, YAʿAKOV YISRAEL

[1881–1924]

Dutch-born poet and journalist who was assassinated because of his anti-Zionist activities.

Yaʿakov Yisrael de Haan was assassinated on 30 June 1924 near the Shaʿare Tzedek Hospital in Jerusalem by two members of the Haganah. He joined the Mizrahi Zionist movement early in his career, but after moving to Palestine he eschewed Zionism, joined the Agudat Israel, and became the spokesman for the Ashkenazi Council. He wrote increasingly

anti-Zionist articles and sent pro-Arab reports to the League of Nations and the British mandatory authorities. These activities made de Haan an enemy of the Yishuv leadership and led to his assassination.

See also AGUDAT ISRAEL; ASHKENAZIM; YISHUV; ZIONISM.

BRYAN DAVES

DEHKHODA, ALI AKBAR

[1880–1956]

A leading reformist voice during Iran's Constitutional Revolution, 1905–1911; lexicographer.

Ali Akbar Dehkhoda's journalistic and satirical prose—for example, in *Charand Parand* (Balderdash) and in *engagé* (politically concerned) verse (collected in his Divan)—influenced later writers of Persian literature.

During the Pahlavi era (1925–1941), like some other literary intellectuals, Dehkhoda left politics to work on academic projects. In the early 1940s, he returned as an administrator to his old secondary school, which had become the Faculty of Law at Tehran University. With the approval and support of Iran's parliament, in 1945 he began work on his Persian encyclopedic dictionary called *Loghatʾnameh* (Book of words). Some twenty thousand pages later and years after his death, the work reached completion in 1980.

See also LITERATURE: PERSIAN.

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MICHAEL C. HILLMANN

DELLALZADE İSMAIL

[1797–1869]

Ottoman Turkish singer and composer.

Dellalzade İsmail, the son of a palace official, was born in the Fath district of Istanbul. Upon finishing primary school, his musical talents were noticed, and he became a student of the great Dede Zekai Efendi. At the age of nineteen, he joined the palace orchestra as a singer; later, he became the companion and chief prayer caller of Sultan Mahmud II. In 1846, Sultan Abdülmecit appointed him singing instructor in the newly established Academy of Music. Dellalzade is considered one of the musical geniuses of a period in which the flowering of Turkish classical music was met by the increasing popularity of Western music. He composed more than seventy pieces, including solemn folk tunes *(semai)* and ballads *(şarki)*. Among his most well-known compositions are *Yegah Ağir Semai, Suznak Beste,* and *Şehnaz Şarki.*

See also ABDÜLMECIT I; DEDE ZEKAI; MAHMUD II.

DAVID WALDNER

DELOUVRIER, PAUL

[1914–1995]

Delegate general of the French government in Algeria in the 1950s technocrat.

Born in Remiremont, Vosges, in France, Paul Delouvrier was a financial specialist, a member of the French Underground in World War II, and an associate of Jean Monnet, who pioneered European economic integration. While serving in the European Coal and Steel Union, President Charles de Gaulle appointed Delouvrier delegate general to Algeria, a difficult position because of the ongoing Algerian War of Independence and France's complex internal politics. Delouvrier's chief task—where he had considerable success—was to supervise social and economic projects of the Constantine Plan (outlined by de Gaulle in in a speech in October 1958), which aimed to accelerate Algeria's development. Nevertheless, Delouvrier's authority disintegrated during this fitful period of decolonization, and he resigned in 1960. After his return to France, de Gaulle tapped him in 1961 as delegate general to rejuvenate Paris and its environs—a responsibility covering three departments. This was one of the great urban projects in modern French history. Delouvrier succeeded in creating satellite cities and in linking suburban rail systems with Paris's métro. He was prefect of the Paris region from 1966 to 1969. He headed France's electricity board from 1969 to 1979 and promoted its nuclearization. He served on the Conseil Economique et Social until he retired in 1984.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

DELTA

Often called Lower Egypt, the land between the mouths of the Nile.

The delta is a triangular area (shaped like the Greek letter Δ) that has been built up by the silt carried within the waters of the Nile River. When the Nile approaches the Mediterranean, much of the solid wastes and organic matter picked up during its long trip to the sea is screened out at the marshy estuaries and left behind to build more delta land. Although in ancient Egypt the Nile delta had seven mouths, today it has two—the Damietta on the east and Rosetta on the west—and many small channels. The broad coastal rim of the delta measures about 150 miles (240 km) from Alexandria in the west to Port Saʿid in the east. It is about 100 miles (160 km) from the Mediterranean coast south to Cairo, Egypt's capital.

The delta landscape is flat and mostly fertile, but the area nearest the coast is marshy, dominated by brackish inlets and lagoons. Since the construction of the Delta Barrages in the early nineteenth century, most of the farmland has been converted from basin to perennial irrigation, which supports two or three crops per year instead of one. Almost half the inhabitants are small landowners, sharecroppers, or peasants working for wages who live in villages surrounded by the lands they till. The others live in towns or cities. Fruits, vegetables, and cotton are the important delta crops. Delta Egyptians have generally had more contact with the outside world than have Upper Egyptians and are therefore more Westernized.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

DELTA BARRAGES

A special type of dam on the Nile.

Delta Barrages are designed to regulate the upstream level but not the flow of water in the two distributary branches of the Nile, so that when the river is low, water can still flow into irrigation canals.

Construction of the original Rosetta and Damietta Barrages, 70 miles north of Cairo, Egypt, proposed by Linant de Bellefonds Pasha, a Belgian engineer in the employ of Muhammad Ali Pasha, viceroy of Egypt, was started in 1833 and completed in 1843. This ultimately permitted conversion of over 754,000 acres of the Nile delta from basin irrigation to perennial irrigation, lengthening the growing season and dramatically increasing agricultural output. Muhammad Ali originally proposed using stones from the nearby Giza pyramids as building material for the barrages, but was dissuaded by Linant, who argued that it would be too costly. Poorly constructed, the barrages were rebuilt during the British occupation. Additional barrages were subsequently constructed at Idfina (1915) and Zifta (1943) in the delta. Three major barrages were later built on the main Nile between Cairo and Aswan.

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DAVID WALDNER
UPDATED BY GREGORY B. BAECHER

DE MENASCE FAMILY

Sephardic family who arrived in Egypt during the eighteenth century, via Palestine and Morocco.

The leading member of the family in the nineteenth century was Jacob De Menasce (1807–1887), who began his career in Cairo as a money changer *(sarraf)* and banker and gradually emerged as the private banker of the Khedive Ismaʿil. He was one of the earliest entrepreneurs in Egypt to recognize the opportunities offered by European trade and, with

Jacob Cattaoui, opened the banking and trading establishment of J. L. Menasce et Fils with branches in England, France, and Turkey. In 1872 and 1873, De Menasce was granted Austro-Hungarian protection and subsequently was given the title of baron by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, along with Hungarian citizenship. In 1871, he moved to Alexandria, the new and permanent seat of the family. His son, Béhor Levi, continued in the family's financial enterprises, but his grandson, Baron Jacques Béhor De Menasce (1850–1916), deserted the banking profession in favor of the cotton and sugar businesses. In 1890, Jacques served as the president of Alexandria's Jewish community and remained in that capacity for about twenty-five years. His younger brother Félix Béhor (1865–1943) became concerned with Zionism and was a personal friend of Dr. Chaim Weizmann, then president of the World Zionist Organization. In September 1921, Félix represented the Egyptian Zionist organization in Carlsbad at the twelfth World Zionist Congress; in later years he served as Alexandria's Jewish community president. The De Menasce family was not merely wealthy. It was European-educated and Western-oriented and led the Alexandria community from the early 1870s into the 1930s.

See also WEIZMANN, CHAIM; WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO).

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MICHAEL M. LASKIER

DEMETRIUS II

[?–1870]

111th Coptic patriarch of Egypt, 1862–1870.

Because Khedive Saʿid Pasha had likely ordered the murder of Demetrius II's predecessor, Cyril IV (for his pursuit of closer associations with foreign churches without the viceroy's approval), Demetrius adopted a modest domestic agenda. His sometimes obsequious loyalty to the khedive guaranteed that his tenure was trouble-free but undistinguished. He continued Cyril's support of education for the clergy but had little of his interest in church reform, which was eagerly sought by the progressive laity, specifically in matters of finance and land management. As a result, the Coptic populace's long-held mistrust of the conservative clergy, having been suspended during Cyril's enlightened tenure, was renewed in intensity and has flared intermittently to the present. After Demetrius's death, the patriarchate went empty for almost five years.

See also COPTS; CYRIL IV.

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DONALD SPANEL

DEMIREL, SÜLEYMAN

[1924–]

The Republic of Turkey's ninth president.

Born in Islamköy, Isparta, Süleyman Demirel graduated from the Department of Civil Engineering of Istanbul Technical University in 1949, after which he was employed at the Istanbul Administration of Electricity. In 1954, he went to the United States as an Eisenhower Fellow to conduct research on dam construction, irrigation, and electrification. Upon his return, he was appointed general director of the State Irrigation Administration, where he supervised the construction a series of dams. From 1962 through 1964, he taught hydro-engineering at Middle East Technical University.

Demirel joined the Justice Party (JP) in 1962 and was elected chairperson upon the sudden death of its founder in 1964. In the general elections of October 1965, the JP won 248 seats in the National Assembly and Demirel became Turkey's twenty-ninth prime minister. In the next general elections, in October 1969, the JP gained 46.53 percent of the vote and 256 seats, retaining its predominant position in the parliament. Nevertheless, Demirel's new cabinet failed to resolve the problems posed by the radical student movements, and he was forced by the military to resign in March 1971.

Turkish president Süleyman Demirel votes in the 1999 local and general elections. Two nationalist parties received the most votes, guaranteeing a continuance of a three-party government, but afterwards there were many reports of irregularities and abuses in the election process. © AFP/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

In 1974, Demirel formed the first National Front government with several rightist parties. In 1977, hyperinflation and escalating civil strife resulted in an early general election. Having won 213 parliamentary seats, the Republican People's Party formed a minority government under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit. When Ecevit's cabinet resigned after ten months, Demirel once again became prime minister of a coalition government with the National Salvation Party and the National Action Party. The new cabinet remained in power for only six months and resigned after failing to obtain a vote of confidence in December 1978. Two years later, Demirel formed his third National Front government with the National Salvation Party and the National Action Party. However, growing domestic violence, ethnic clashes, economic bottlenecks, and the parliament's inability to elect a president paved the way for another military intervention on 12 September 1980. Demirel was taken for his "personal safety" to Hamzaköy and was deprived of his political rights for the following ten years.

In the early 1980s, Demirel was placed under house arrest by the ruling military junta and sent to Zincirbozan for four months. During the 1986 general elections he supported the True Path Party (DYP) and after his political ban was lifted in 1987 he became its chairperson. In the elections of 1991, the DYP won a parliamentary plurality (178 out of 450 seats) and Demirel formed Turkey's first rightist/leftist coalition government with the Social Democratic Populist Party. Upon the sudden death of President Turgut Ozal on 17 April 1993, Demirel was elected ninth president of the Republic and resigned from his post in the DYP.

Demirel served the full seven-year presidential term. He believed that the head of state should foster effective coordination among the public institutions, including the military, state organizations, the government, and the parliament, and therefore achieve "the smooth functioning of the state" with minimum interference on his/her part. Demirel never hesitated to use his presidential powers toward this objective. For instance, on the occasion of his meeting with the members of the opposition within the DYP, he asserted that he was trying to establish the stability of the political system. The stability of political parties, including the DYP, would, for him, contribute to the stability of the system as a whole.

Demirel left the office on 16 May 2000, when the National Assembly rejected a constitutional amendment that would have allowed him to serve a second term. He later joined the international Mitchell Committee on the Middle Eastern peace process and did not return to active involvement in Turkish politics.

See also ECEVIT, BÜLENT; JUSTICE PARTY; MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY; TRUE PATH PARTY.

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NERMIN ABADAN-UNAT
UPDATED BY BURÇAK KESKIN-KOZAT

DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION OF AFGHAN WOMEN (1965)

A Marxist-oriented political group active between 1965 and 1992.

The Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW) was founded in 1965 as a component of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) by Anahita Ratebzad, who served as its first president. After the PDPA seized power in the military coup of April 1978, DOAW became an important organization in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). Ratebzad announced that the DOAW's primary objective was to fight against feudalism and Western imperialism in defense of the objectives of the "Saur (April 1978) Revolution." In 1979 President Taraki (1978–1979) changed the name of the organization to the Khalq (People's) Organization of Afghan Women (KOAW). In 1980 the organization retook its original name and started a monthly journal, *Zanan-i-Afghanistan* (Women of Afghanistan), to publicize its objectives. It also expanded its activities in the provinces and launched a literacy campaign to make education available to women of all ages and to inform them of the objectives of the Saur Revolution. In 1981 the DOAW claimed nineteen district and seven municipal committees and 209 primary organizations whose main function was to attract women to the organization in support of revolution. When Najibullah came to power in 1986 he eliminated all Marxist rhetoric in an effort to lessen growing opposition to the PDPA regime. In line with this policy, the organization's name was changed from *Sazman-i-Democratic-i-Zanan-i-Afghanistan* (Democratic Organization of Afghan Women) to *Shura-i-Sarasari-Zanan-i-Afghanistan* (All Afghanistan Women's Council), and Ratebzad was replaced by Firuza Wardak as president of the organization.

See also AFGHANISTAN: OVERVIEW; AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET INTERVENTION IN; ARAB SOCIALISM; GENDER: GENDER AND THE LAW.

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SENZIL NAWID

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN

Political party that supported autonomy for Iranian Azerbaijan.

The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (DPA) was created in September 1945 in Tabriz (Iranian Azerbaijan) under the leadership of Jaʿfar Pishevari. He and other DPA leaders were Azerbaijani Turks of middle-class or landowning origin. Earlier, many had been involved in communist movements (Gilan or Khiyabani revolts, 1920); some had lived or been educated in Soviet Azerbaijan or Moscow. DPA, however, was an independent organization established to secure autonomy for Azerbaijan within Iran. The local branch of the communist Tudeh Party dissolved itself and joined DPA.

Reacting against the brutal policies of economic neglect and Persianization by Reza Shah Pahlavi's dynasty, a DPA-led All Peoples Grand National Assembly (in Tabriz, November 1945, just after World War II) declared rights to national self-determination within sovereign Iran, to retain a just share of their tax revenues, and to use Azerbaijani Turkish (called Türki) as the official language of an autonomous province of Azerbaijan. Elections in December produced an all-DPA *majles* (parliament); Pishevari formed a government that enfranchised women, began land reform, and established Azerbaijani Turkish as the official language.

The autonomy movement had the support of the occupying Soviet troops, which prevented the forces of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi from entering the province to suppress it. Western observers interpreted the DPA, therefore, as a Soviet puppet. In June 1946, after Soviet forces were withdrawn, Tabriz and Iran signed an agreement that fulfilled

most DPA demands. In December 1946, however, Iranian forces entered Azerbaijan and suppressed the DPA government and autonomy movement, so the June agreement was abrogated. Pishevari fled to Baku and died there the following year after mysterious complications from an automobile accident.

See also AZERBAIJAN; PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA; PAHLAVI, REZA; TUDEH PARTY; TURKISH LANGUAGE.

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AUDREY L. ALTSTADT

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN (IRAN; KDP)

Political party that organized 1945–1946 revolt to form an autonomous republic for Kurds in Iran.

The Democratic Party of Kurdistan, Iran (KDP), was formed in 1945 by Kurdish nationalists in Mahabad, a predominently Kurdish town in West Azerbaijan province, a region that came under Soviet military occupation following the joint Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941. While declaring its desire to remain within Iran, the party demanded the use of the Kurdish language in state schools and government offices in Kurdish areas; the retention of tax revenues for the benefit of the region; and the establishment of provincial assemblies as upheld by the constitution. The party claimed for Kurds a "distinct national identity" based on language, history, and culture. Finding the government unresponsive to its demands, the party, with the help of local tribes, launched a revolt and declared the formation of the independent Republic of Kurdistan in December 1945. The Soviet army did not oppose the move, nor a similar effort by Azerbaijan Turks in the provincial capital at Tabriz. In fact, Soviet occupation forces prevented the central government in Tehran from suppressing the revolts during the first half of 1946. Nevertheless, under the central government's Royal Army attack, the Mahabad government fell in December 1946.

During the revolutionary upheavals of 1979 Kurdish intellectuals from the Kurdish Democratic Party formed councils *(shuras)* that held local power in conjunction with the leading cleric in Mahabad, Shaykh Ezz al-Din Hosseini, and his followers. They also boycotted the referendum on the country's new constitution. The party and its activities have been suppressed since 1980. On 13 July 1989 Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, secretary-general of KDP, and two other high-ranking party members were assassinated in Vienna, Austria. Ghassemlou's successor, Sadegh Sharafkandi, met with a similar fate on 17 September 1992 in Berlin.

See also AZERBAIJAN CRISIS; KURDS.

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PARVANEH POURSHARIATI

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN (IRAQ)

Political party advocating the autonomy of the Iraqi Kurds.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was founded on 16 August 1946 at the suggestion of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who was then in the Kurdish republic of Mahabad. Its creation sanctioned the split of the national movement of the Kurds into different, sometimes opposing, Iranian and Iraqi organizations.

In the absence of Barzani, who went into exile in the Soviet Union, KDP became a progressive party, led by Kurdish intellectuals quite close to the Iraqi Communist Party. After he returned in 1958, the party was shaken by a severe crisis, opposing Barzani's acceptance to the political bureau, along

with Ibrahim Ahmad and his son-in-law Jalal Talabani. KDP never fully recovered from these events of 1964 and became a mere instrument of Barzani.

After the collapse of the Kurdish movement in 1975 and discredited by Barzani's decision to stop the resistance, KDP lost the monopoly it had enjoyed for thirty years. Today, the KDP led by Masʿud al-Barzani must share leadership of the movement in Iraq with its rival, Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and several smaller organizations.

See also Barzani Family; Kurds; Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); Talabani, Jalal.

Chris Kutschera

DEMOCRATIC WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION (TUNISIA)

Tunisian organization promoting women's rights.

Formally created in 1989, the Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD) is an autonomous activist women's organization dedicated to the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, the transformation of patriarchal attitudes, the defense of women's acquired rights, and the participation of women in all aspects of political and civil rights. Based in Tunis, the ATFD is comprised of approximately 200 volunteer members, the majority of whom are educated and professional women in their thirties and forties. Like those involved in the broader human rights movement, both the organization and individual activists continue to face significant opposition to their activities.

On International Women's Day 1993, the ATFD opened the first domestic violence center in Tunisia, staffing both a listening center and a hotline. To provide women with a safe environment to discuss their situations, the ATFD center is dedicated to validation, confidentiality, resource referral, and empowerment. The ATFD also works with other Tunisian and international organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, to increase awareness of domestic violence and provide services to a larger sector of the population. Finally, the ATFD works on improving the legal status of women and sponsoring educational campaigns dedicated to women's rights in Tunisia.

See also Gender: Gender and the Law; Human Rights.

Angel M. Foster

DEMOCRAT PARTY

Turkish political party.

Four members of the Republican People's Party (RPP)—Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Mehmet Fuat Koprülü, and Refik Koraltan—founded the Democrat Party (DP; Demokrat Parti) on 7 January 1946. The immediate impetus for the establishment of the party was to oppose an RPP-sponsored land reform bill. More generally, the DP founders criticized the government for being authoritarian and arbitrary, and for its extensive control of the economy. The DP campaigned on a platform of economic, political, and cultural liberalism.

The DP participated in the elections of 1946, which were held before the party had a chance to build a national organization or make known its candidates. The party gained only 64 out of 465 seats. Over the next four years, party leaders built a strong organization and attracted the support of many groups that had become alienated from the RPP over the previous decade and a half. In the 1950 elections, the DP received 53.3 percent of the popular vote and 86.2 percent of the seats in the Grand National Assembly. On 29 May 1950 the DP formed its first government as the new assembly elected Bayar as president, Menderes prime minister, and Koprülü foreign minister. In the 1954 elections, the DP increased its share of the vote to 56.6 percent, capturing 408 out of 503 assembly seats. In the 1957 general elections, held in the context of growing economic crisis, the DP still managed to garner 325 seats.

Despite encouraging the private sector, DP policies maintained wide latitude for state control over the economy, particularly through investments in the state manufacturing sector. Between 1950 and 1953, inflows of foreign aid and high prices for agricultural goods induced the DP government to encourage agricultural production and exports. A diverse array of policies increased peasant incomes, helping to cement DP popularity in the countryside. After 1953, a combination of declining world

prices and a growing shortage of foreign exchange led the DP to implement trade policies that encouraged import-substituting industrialization. Despite growing investment and manufacturing output, large government deficits and the lack of coherent policy led to severe economic problems, and by 1958, the government was forced to impose austerity measures.

The DP pursued a staunchly pro-West foreign policy, joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in February 1952 and, on several occasions, siding with the West, even at the expense of creating tensions with its neighbors. Turkey's support for the Baghdad Pact, for example, prompted the Egyptian government to label Turkey a Western surrogate in the region.

As economic conditions deteriorated, the DP became increasingly authoritarian. A series of antidemocratic laws, designed to cripple the RPP while muzzling dissent in the press and in universities, alienated the liberal intelligentsia and the liberal wing within the party. In early 1960, to stifle growing opposition, the government passed some unconstitutional measures. When these measures only catalyzed further opposition, the government declared martial law. At this point, the DP paid the price for never having established harmonious relations with the military: The combination of economic crisis and increasing authoritarianism triggered a military coup that deposed the DP government on 27 May 1960. The leading members of the DP were subsequently placed on trial for treason. On 15 September 1961, fifteen of them were sentenced to death. Twelve of these sentences were commuted, but Menderes and two of his top ministers were executed.

See also BAGHDAD PACT (1955); BAYAR, CELAL; KOPRÜLÜ, MEHMET FUAT; MENDERES, ADNAN; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO); REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (RPP); TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

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DAVID WALDNER

DENKTASH, RAUF
[1924–]

Turkish Cypriot statesman.

Rauf Denktash (also Denktaş) was born in Paphos, Cyprus, in 1924. His father was a judge. After graduating from the English school in Nicosia, he worked briefly as a columnist for *Halkin Sesi* (The people's voice), a Turkish Cypriot newspaper founded in 1940 by Dr. Fazil Küçük, the veteran leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. In 1944, Denktash went to study law in England, and in 1947, he was called to the bar.

Upon his return to Cyprus, which was then a British crown colony, Denktash became a barrister, serving from 1949 to 1957 as junior crown counsel, crown counsel, and acting solicitor general. During this time, he also embarked on a political career. He became Küçük's chief aide and served his community as a member of the Consultative Assembly (1948–1960) and as a member of the assembly's Turkish Affairs Committee. He was also elected president of the Federation of Turkish Cypriot Associations, a voluntary organization for the purpose of coordinating the social and economic life of the Turkish Cypriots and organizing their resistance to Greek Cypriot agitation for enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece).

In 1954, the efforts of the Greek Cypriot leaders, Archbishop Makarios III and Georgios Grivas, to achieve enosis and hellenize Cyprus culminated in a full-fledged guerrilla war against the British colonial administration and all those who opposed the Greek Cypriot aims. Denktash helped organize the Turkish resistance movement (TMT) to protect his community.

Küçük and Denktash represented the Turkish Cypriot community at the London Conference of 1959, which resulted in an agreement to establish an independent partnership state in Cyprus. Shortly thereafter, Denktash represented his community on

the Constitutional Committee, which drafted a constitution for the new state, and at the Athens Conference, which specified how the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee (which were to provide security for the new state) were to be implemented. Denktash, therefore, was one of the chief architects of the bicommunal Republic of Cyprus, which came into being in 1960. That year, Denktash was elected president of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber.

In December 1963, Küçük (who had been elected vice president of Cyprus) and Denktash both opposed the proposal by Archbishop Makarios (who had been elected president of Cyprus) to amend the Constitution of 1960 on the grounds that the projected changes would pave the way for enosis. As a consequence, all Turkish Cypriot officials and parliamentary deputies were dismissed, attacks were carried out against Turkish Cypriot enclaves, and the Turkish Cypriots were forced to evacuate 103 villages.

Early in 1964, Denktash flew to New York to present his community's case before the United Nations (UN) Security Council, but he was not allowed to return to Cyprus and remained in what he termed "de facto banishment" for several years. In October 1967, when he returned to Cyprus secretly, he was arrested but then freed as a result of international pressure. After his release, he resumed his position as president of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber (April 1968). Since the Turkish Cypriot community was no longer being represented in the national government, the Communal Chamber had become the backbone of what was gradually becoming an autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration.

Denktash was one of the founders of the provisional Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which was established in northern Cyprus in February 1975, following the overthrow of the Makarios regime by the Greek junta and the military intervention of Turkey, which the overthrow precipitated (July–August 1974). In June 1976, Denktash was elected as the federated state's first president. In June 1981, he was reelected.

Denktash was also one of the founders of the secessionist Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which was established in November 1983, following the collapse of negotiations with the head of the Greek Cypriot government, Spyros Kyprianou. In June 1985, Denktash was elected as the republic's first president; he was reelected to that position in June 1990.

Denktash has been a strong advocate of a federal solution to the Cyprus problem, championing the establishment of a bizonal, bicommunal partnership state on the island. He has also been one of the chief promoters of the UN-sponsored intercommunal talks, which have taken place at various intervals since 1975.

Denktash is the author of numerous articles and several books. His best-known work is *The Cyprus Triangle* (London, 1982).

See also Grivas, Georgios Theodoros.

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Pierre Oberling

DENTZ, HENRI-FERNAND

[1881–1945]

Vichy French high commissioner and commander in Syria and Lebanon.

Appointed an officer in 1927, Dentz climbed the upper echelons of the French Army in the 1930s, and was appointed high commissioner and commander-in-chief in the Levant in December 1940 by the Vichy government. In May 1941 the premier of Vichy France, Philippe Pétain, ordered Dentz to arm the Iraqi leader Rashid Ali al-Kaylani and to support the Luftwaffe; latest research suggests that Dentz refused the latter order because he was concerned about keeping his troops loyal. On 8 June 1941 the British and the Free French—provoked by Pétain's decision—invaded. Dentz counterattacked, but surrendered to the British in July after receiving guarantees that soldiers would be repatriated to France

rather than compelled to join Charles de Gaulle. Condemned to death in 1945, he died in prison the same year.

See also De Gaulle, Charles; Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-; World War II.

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George R. Wilkes

DERAKHSHANDEH, PURAN

[1949–]

Iranian film director.

Puran Derakhshandeh is credited as being the first woman prior to the Iranian Revolution (1979) to direct a feature-length film. Her most daring film, *Love Across Frontiers* (2000), about an American woman married to an Iranian man, was the first post-revolution film to show a woman without Islamic veiling as well as physical contact between a man and a woman (in this case, a hug)—both of which are forbidden by the codes of morality enforced in Iranian filmmaking after the revolution. Derakhshandeh began her career in television and has continued to make socially aware, women-centered films since the 1980s.

See also Bani-Etemad, Raksan; Milani, Tahmineh.

Roxanne Varzi

DERB

See Glossary

DERGAH

See Newspapers and Print Media: Turkey

DESALINIZATION

A solution to hydrate the arid Middle East.

Desalinization, also referred to as desalination, is the removal of salts and dissolved solids from brackish water or seawater. In the past three decades, due to increasing water demand and increasing resource scarcity, desalinization has become a critical, relatively drought-proof, resource of potable, irrigation, and industrial water in arid regions of the globe. In the Arab countries, which have 5 percent of the world population but only 0.9 percent of the water resources, water shortages are a constant challenge, and desalinization is playing an increasing role. Once so prohibitively expensive and technologically troublesome as to be totally impractical, it is now often the solution of choice in conditions of unreliable water resources. Capital investments and costs of production are going down as innovations improve the technologies involved.

The desalinization plant at Jubail, Saudi Arabia, was the largest such facility in the world when it was photographed for the first time by foreign news media, in 1991. One of several plants along the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, between Kuwait and Qatar, it was then capable of processing 230 million imperial gallons of seawater into drinking water per day. **© Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

Of the more than 12,500 desalinization plants in operation or in construction worldwide, 60 percent are located in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The Shuʿayba Plant Phase II in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for a time the world's largest plant, supplies the daily water needs of 1.5 million people. Saudi Arabia, whose desalinization output exceeded one billion cubic meters in 2002 to provide 70 percent of its water needs, is the largest desalinated water producer in the world, contributing to 30 percent of global output. Desalinized seawater currently constitutes Saudi Arabia's main source for potable water. This water is transported in a network of 1,550-mile pipelines, 21 pumping stations, 131 depots, and 10 stations for mixing the desalinated water with underground water. Around 1972, the MENA region "ran out of water" as the consumption surpassed the rate of resource renewal. Since then, MENA has relied heavily on desalinization, and is poised to remain for the foreseeable future the largest desalinization market in the world.

Desalinization systems can be membrane-based, such as Reverse Osmosis (RO) and Electro-Dialysis Reversal (EDR), or thermal, such as multi-stage flash (MSF) and multiple-effect distillation (MED). Boiling, leading to desalinization through evaporation, a process of thermal distillation, was known and practiced from ancient times. However, now most desalinization plants use membrane-based reverse osmosis, a process that allows the separation of 99 percent of dissolved salts and impurities from water, by means of pressure exerted on a semipermeable membrane. Between 15 and 50 percent

Bahrain's installed desalination capacity (July 2000)

Facility	Date of commissioning	Capacity (MGD)	Technology
Sitra power and water plant (I, II, III)	1974, 1984, 1985	27.5	MSF
Ras Abu Jarjur RO plant	1984	12.5	RO
Addur RO plant	1992	3	RO
Hidd power and water plant	2000	30	MSF
Total installed capacity	—	73	—

SOURCE: *Ministry of Electricity and Water, Bahrain.*

Table by GGS Information Services, The Gale Group.

of seawater intake into a plant is purified; the rest becomes brine, or high-salt water, in need of dilution, then dumping. Environmental regulations dealing with the impact of desalinization on the environment vary from country to country. In addition to brine, other effluents include discharged process chemicals used for defouling, and toxic metals, as well as small amounts of solid waste (spent pretreatment filters, filtered solid particles, etc.).

Energy requirements for desalinization are high, mostly to power machinery and to heat feed-water. RO and distillation plants are often located with energy generation plants to improve efficiency. In such cases, additional environmental impacts have to be taken into account on a case-by-case basis. Fortunately, many of the water-starved countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Libya are major oil and gas producers and have significant reserves. They have invested heavily in desalinization from early on. The first plant in Saudi Arabia was inaugurated in 1954. The Saline Water Corporation in Saudi Arabia is the largest investor in, and operator of, desalinization plants in the world.

Cost reduction is the single most important factor necessary to increase the implementation of desalination. Capital investment unit costs range from $1,000 to $2,000 per cubic meter of capacity, and can be amortized over 20 to 30 years. Unit production costs per cubic meter range from $0.50 for large plants to over $1.50 for small plants, or about one-half the cost of desalinated water in the recent past. It is not economical to operate a plant part time. Economies of scale play an important role in investment decision-making but are more easily achieved in distillation than in RO process. The Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC), established in 1996 in Muscat, Oman, has been conducting basic and applied research to reduce the cost of water desalinization.

Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait were the only water-scarce countries in the region in 1950s. In 2003, twelve countries have water scarcity, and by 2023, six more countries will suffer the same vulnerability, including Israel and Palestine. If the participants in the Palestine–Israel conflict do not exploit water as a unilateral security issue and insist upon retaining control over water resources in the Occupied Territories, the desalinization option may contribute to a solution.

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John F. Kolars
Updated by Karim Hamdy

DESERT MOBILE FORCE

See Arab Legion

DESERTS

Predominant landscape of the Middle East and North Africa.

Stretching from the Atlantic coast in the west to Pakistan in the east, a band of arid land (15° and 30° north latitude) dominates this region. The North African expanse is generally known as the Sahara, although subdivisions within it have individual names indicating the nature of the surface. The terms *erg* (as in the Great Eastern Erg of Algeria) and *serir* (as the Serir of Kalanshu in Libya) indicate a region of sand dunes. Where the surface is rocky underfoot the terms used are *reg* or *hamada* (for example, the Hamada of Dra south of the Anti-Atlas mountains). Individual areas may also be given the name desert, the Western Desert and the Eastern Desert in Egypt, although they are smaller parts of

the whole. On the peninsula of the same name, the Arabian Desert is an extension of the Sahara and is divided into the Rub al-Khali (Empty Quarter, a region of vast sand dunes) and the Nafud and Najd. To the north is the Syrian Desert, and to the east the two deserts of the Iranian plateau are known as the Dasht-e Kavir and the Dasht-e Lut.

The term *desert* is one in common usage and therefore difficult to define. Most experts prefer to speak of "drylands" or "arid lands" and to define such places through various measures of the availability of water for plant growth (implying that not all deserts are hot.) A common definition of desert, however, is those regions of Earth's surface having fewer than 10 inches (250 mm) of precipitation annually and extreme high temperatures. This classical approach relates such measures to areas with types of vegetation adapted to hot, arid conditions. In areas with much sunshine and small amounts of precipitation and/or natural moisture from the soil, only plants called *xerophytes* survive—those adapted to such conditions. In certain hyperarid locations, precipitation may be even less and no vegetation of any kind is found.

Desert rainfall is not only sparse but is also extremely variable in time and space as well as in quantity. Such variance means that human occupancy of the desert must depend for survival on reliable springs and rivers for irrigation rather than on precipitation. Traditional pastoral nomadism, located on the desert margins, was adapted to this environment by moving its productive units (i.e., herds and flocks) to where grass and water seasonally occurred. But even nomads ventured into the true desert only for travel as transporters and raiders. The few permanent inhabitants of the deserts were those oasis dwellers dependent upon perennial springs for intensive agriculture and the growing of date palms.

Desert soils are usually of poor quality except for those in the valleys of rivers where alluvial deposits have accumulated. True desert soils—called *aridisols*—have low biomass, very sparse or no organic acids and gases, few or no bacteria, and are essentially mineral in character. Any rain or sheet flooding and runoff that percolate beneath the surface rapidly evaporate. As a result, soluble salts are precipitated and redeposited, forming a crusty layer on the surface or just beneath it. Repeated leaching and

Women in veils approach the town of Shibam, filled with skyscrapers and known as the "Manhattan of the Desert." Shibam is located in the desert Valley of Hadhramout, and is one of the most fertile areas of Yemen. **© Wolfgang Kaehler/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

deposition can result in concentrations of sodium chloride (NaCl), white alkali (salt), or similar deposits of sodium carbonate (Na_2CO_3), black alkali, which poison the soil and make agriculture impossible. Under desert conditions agriculture is extremely difficult, and even the use of irrigation water can cause salinity, through evaporation and the precipitation of the dissolved salts it may carry, which leads to the abandonment of such farmland.

The natural xerophytic vegetation found in deserts has adapted to conditions of high temperatures and scant and irregular amounts of precipitation. Xerophytes often occur as drought-resisting plants with heavy cuticles, which reduce transpiration, or with stomata, which can be closed for the same purpose. Other xerophytes reduce water use by shedding their leaves and remaining leafless during the dry season. Among these plants are the euphorbia and the cacti, the latter originally found only in the Western Hemisphere.

Phreatphytes constitute another class of desert vegetation, which includes palms. These plants have developed long taproots, which reach the water table, allowing them to survive the driest of surface conditions. Other plants evade drought by flowering and seeding only during brief rainy periods.

During the intervening months and years of drought, the seeds remain dormant.

Desert vegetation under such conditions is sparse, and soil-forming conditions (including the creation of humus) are poor. Rainstorms can be intense, although of short duration, and often soil particles are carried away from desert surfaces by sheet flooding. The result of these conditions is erosion—which results in hills lacking deep layers of soil. Their profiles are characteristically steep sided with thick strata forming cliff faces rising vertically from the surrounding plains. Flat-topped mesas and steep buttes dominate the landscape, while valleys are flat bottomed with vertical side slopes. Wind erosion and deposition are also significant factors in desert landscape formation. Crescent-shaped barchan dunes are found where sands are insufficient to completely mantle the underlying surface. Copious sands form "seas," with longitudinal sief dunes and star-shaped rhourd dunes. Such seas, however, are the exceptions and rocky desert surfaces are common.

In desert areas, underground supplies of water assume great importance. Porous and permeable strata deep beneath the surface sometimes contain large quantities of water. Such aquifers may have impervious layers (aquicludes) above and below them that confine the water and keep it from escaping except in limited amounts at oases. Other aquifers occur in unconsolidated alluvial materials in river valleys (Arabic, *wadis*). This water is recharged from river seepage and/or rainfall. In the Middle East, most of the major aquifers are nonrenewable and contain fossil water, which once used—extracted or mined—will not be replaced. Desert countries, such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, with few or no surface streams have in the last two decades turned to the exploitation of such aquifers as part of their economic development plans. An ambitious agricultural program in Saudi Arabia has used tube wells and central pivot irrigation to produce bumper wheat crops in an otherwise hostile desert environment. Libya is engaged in constructing a "Great Manmade River"—actually a gigantic system of pumps and pipelines—with which to bring water from aquifers beneath the central Sahara to coastal locations, for municipal and agricultural use. In both these cases and others, the critical element is the quantity of water available and whether it will last long enough to justify such expensive projects. Many experts counsel caution in undertaking such attempts to remake, or "green," the desert.

See also Climate; Desalinization; Eastern Desert; Geography; Nafud Desert; Syrian Desert; Water.

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DESERT SHIELD

See Gulf War (1991)

DESERT STORM

See Gulf War (1991)

DEVRIM, IZZET MELIH

[1887–1966]

Turkish novelist.

Born in Jerusalem, the son of an Ottoman administrator, Izzet Melih Devrim was graduated from the prestigious Galatasaray School in Istanbul and worked at various commercial jobs. His first literary effort was a volume of prose poetry, titled *Çocuklara Mahsus Gazete* (The children's newspaper), published in 1898, but he did not receive public recognition until 1905 when he was the runner-up in a competition sponsored by a French literary journal. Many of his subsequent works were published in French, and in 1938, he was awarded a doctorate from the Faculty of Letters in Paris. Among Devrim's principal works are *Leyla* (1912), *Sermed* (1918), and *Hüzün ve Tebessüm* (Sadness and a smile, 1922).

See also Galatasaray Lycée.

David Waldner

DEY

See GLOSSARY

DHAHRAN

Town that is the center of Saudi Arabian oil production.

Dhahran (al-Zahran) is a town of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia of perhaps 100,000, not far from al-Dammam and the gulf coast. There was no settlement at Dhahran before Saudi Arabia's first oil strike was made there in 1935. Since then, Dhahran has grown to incorporate the headquarters of the Saudi Arabian American Oil Company (Saudi ARAMCO) and hosts the King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals. From 1946 to 1962, the United States operated an air force base at Dhahran that subsequently became a major base for the Royal Saudi Air Force. An international airport at Dhahran was closed after completion of a new airport at al-Dammam.

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DHIMMA

The legal status of monotheistic non-Muslims and Zoroastrians under Islamic rule which they, collectively or individually, expressly accept.

Dhimma is based on verse 9:29 of the Qurʾan and finds precedent in the conquest of Mecca. Caliph Umar's pact with non-Muslims, granting them life and property protection, constitutes the detailed provisions of the institution. Under this status, minorities enjoyed exemption from military service, freedom of religion, freedom to practice their religious duties, and the right to renovate, although not to erect, houses of worship.

In return, a poll tax *(jizya)* was levied; in addition, *dhimmis* were prohibited from criticizing the Qurʾan, expressing disrespect to the Prophet or to Islam, conducting missionary activity, or having sexual relations with or marrying Muslim women. They were not allowed to make their crosses, wine, and pork conspicuous, or to conduct their funerals in public. Riding horses was prohibited, as was erecting houses taller than those of the Muslims. *Dhimmis* were required to wear clothes that made them recognizable and were barred from holding certain public positions.

Modernity has posed for Muslims problems of equality, freedom of religion, and human rights, which seem to originate in an ever-increasing contact with the West, free communication, and multiculturalism. Historically speaking, *dhimma* was conceived during the Islamic conquest but diminished when foreign powers gained the upper hand, especially during the reign of the later Ottoman period and the rise of nationalism. Since the late second half of the twentieth century, the "clash of civilizations," and the increase of Muslims in foreign countries, it has become a symbol for the relationship between Islam and the rest of the world.

The institution of the *dhimma* remains controversial, and there is an extensive debate over whether to abolish it altogether, amend it, or maintain it. The more traditional thinkers reject any thought of changing the institution. Their views range from denying the principle of equality to religions other than Islam, through blocking certain positions of influence in the state to non-Muslims, to reiterating their rights and Islam's traditional liberal attitude according to the *sunna,* especially by comparison to European historical record. Some even go as far as to offer "Islamic citizenship" to non-Muslims. Others claim that the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim is one of political administration, not of human rights, according *dhimma* to all religionists. The debate over *dhimma* includes political issues: Some of the minorities are accused of having abused it internally, and the West has been accused of having created and exacerbated the entire problem of "minorities."

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ILIA ALON

DHOW

A term, probably of Swahili origin, referring to several types of sailing vessels (many now outfitted with motors) common to the Gulf Arab states.

Arabs refer to dhows by names specific to each type, determined principally by size and hull design. Four kinds of dhows account for most of these vessels. The *sambuk* (or *sambook*), perhaps the most widely represented, is a graceful craft with a tapered bow and a high, squared stern; it was often used for pearling, and today is used for fishing and commerce. A larger vessel, the *boom,* is still common in the Gulf. It ranges from 50 to 120 feet (15–35 m) in length, 15 to 30 (5–9 m) feet in width, and up to 400 tons (363 metric tons) displacement. Like early Arab ships it is double-ended (pointed at both ends) with a straight stem post. It is important in Gulf commerce. Now rare is another large ship, the *baggala,* formerly an important deep-sea vessel. Sometimes over 300 tons (272 metric tons) and with a crew of 150, it was built with a high, squared poop, reflecting the influence of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Portuguese vessels. Like the *sambuk* and *baggala,* it has two masts. The *jalboot,* a single-masted vessel and much smaller (20–50 tons [18–45 metric tons]), formerly was widely used on the pearling banks of the Gulf. Its name and its features, notably an upright bow stem and transom stern, indicate its probable derivation from the British jolly boat. Other smaller craft, all single masted, occasionally found in Gulf or adjacent waters include the *bedan, shuʿi,* and *zarook.*

Dhows were well adapted to Gulf waters because of their shallow draft and maneuverability. Their lateen sails, long stems, and sharp bows equipped them well for running before the monsoon winds of the Indian Ocean, toward India in summer and toward Africa in winter. Wood for planking and masts was imported from the Malabar Coast of India or from East Africa. Traditionally no nails were used; cord made from coconut husks was used to lash together the planks of the decks and gunwales. By the eighth century Arab fleets of such ships were part of a commercial maritime network not matched or superseded until the European circumnavigation of the globe. In the latter part of the eighteenth century, the Qawasim Emirate of the lower Gulf created a maritime empire that displaced earlier Omani dominance. Their power rested on the large fleets of dhows and the skill and ferocity of their crews. The attacks of these "pirates" on Anglo–Indian shipping brought Britain's naval intervention in the early nineteenth century and the eventual establishment of a trucial system under Britain's oversight. Until the 1930s hundreds of dhows made up the fleets that sailed over the pearling banks from June to September. Today a considerable number of commercial cargoes are carried in motorized dhows between Dubai, especially as a transshipment point, and Iran. Some dhows are used for recreational purposes. Traditionally the Gulf's most important manufacturing industry was the construction and outfitting of dhows. In the early twentieth century

there were some 2,000 dhows in Bahrain alone, and 130 were built there yearly. Small numbers continue to be built in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Gulf, still with the planks of the hull formed into a shell and the ribs then fitted to them.

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MALCOLM C. PECK

DHUFAR

Southern geographic region and governate of Oman.

Dhufar comprises about one-third of the total area of Oman and is environmentally and ethnically distinct from the rest of the sultanate. Its mountainous interior receives monsoon winds, resulting in a wet, temperate climate suited to cattle grazing. Dhufar also produces frankincense and possesses several oil fields. Many of the 125,600 (1993 census) residents speak ancient South Arabian dialects that predate, but are similar to, Arabic.

After a period of nominal control beginning in the 1820s, the Al Bu Saʿid dynasty of Oman began to assert more permanent authority over Dhufar in the 1890s. The province remained administratively distinct, even having its own coinage. An uprising erupted in the late 1960s due to Dhufari dissatisfaction with Al Bu Saʿid rule. The more enlightened reign of Sultan Qabus ibn Saʿid after 1970 removed much of that dissatisfaction, and by 1976 the separatists were defeated. The province, along with Muscat and Masandam, remains under a governor who reports directly to the sultan, but it has been integrated more fully into Oman through economic and social development. Salala serves as a secondary capital and Raysut is now the second largest port in Oman.

See also DHUFAR REBELLION.

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MALCOLM C. PECK
UPDATED BY CALVIN H. ALLEN, JR.

DHUFAR REBELLION

Armed insurrection against the ruler of Oman in the southern province of Dhufar (1965–1975).

In 1965, the Dhufar Liberation Front (DFL) initiated an uprising against the rule of Sultan Saʿid bin Taymur Al Bu Saʿid of Oman, whose neglect of social and economic development in the Dhufar region was especially pronounced. At first the uprising was primarily a tribal separatist movement, organized by the DFL in a part of Oman never meaningfully integrated with the rest of the sultanate, and it received encouragement from Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The course of the rebellion changed dramatically in 1968 after a Marxist state had emerged in neighboring and newly independent South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen; PDRY). The uprising then had a secure PDRY base and a steady flow of money and weapons from the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist states that also offered training to the rebels. The movement's goals were reflected in its new name, Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). By the end of 1969, PFLOAG controlled all of Dhufar except for a coastal enclave around the capital, Salala. When another rebel movement, the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (NDFLOAG), emerged in northern Oman in 1970, disaffected Omanis, including the sultan's exiled uncle, conspired with military advisers from Britain and with Qabus ibn Saʿid Al Bu Saʿid, the sultan's son, to depose Saʿid. Qabus, who came to power in July 1970, made defeating the Dhufar rebellion his first priority.

Support from Britain, especially in the form of seconded and contract military officers, was crucial, and Iran's supplies of material and manpower were important in countering a determined insurgency in mountainous terrain where, for half the year, monsoon weather severely reduced visibility. Also significant were Jordan's loan of military officers

and large financial infusions from the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, all of which feared the radical leftist threat.

In 1971 PFLOAG and NDFLOAG merged, becoming the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf. The insurgency, however, succumbed over the next four years to Qabus's combined military, political, and economic initiatives, including, importantly, amnesty for rebels who laid down their arms. The success of the government's counteroffensive was reflected in the rebel movement's assumption of the more modest title Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) in 1974. By the end of the following year, only isolated pockets of resistance remained in the rugged interior, and the rebellion essentially ended.

See also Al Bu Saʿid, Qabus ibn Saʿid; Dhufar; Ibadiyya; National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf; People's Democratic Republic of Yemen; Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf.

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Malcolm C. Peck
Updated by Eric Hooglund

DIASPORA

The dispersal of ethnonational groups.

The term *diaspora* is derived from the Greek verb *speiro* (to sow) and the Greek preposition *dia* (over). All diasporas have in common significant characteristics: They result from both voluntary and imposed migration; their members wish to and are able to maintain their ethnonational identity, which is the basis for continued solidarity; core members establish in their host countries intricate organizations that are intended to protect the rights of their members and to encourage participation in the cultural, political, social, and economic spheres; and members maintain continuous contacts with their homelands and other dispersed segments of the same nation.

Ethnonational diasporism is a widespread perennial phenomenon not confined to the Jews, although in many contexts the term is presumed to refer specifically to the Jewish diaspora. Some ethnonational diasporas are dwindling or disappearing, but other historical, modern, and incipient diasporas are multiplying and flourishing all over the world, including in the Middle East.

Middle Easterners of various ethnic backgrounds permanently reside in foreign host countries within or outside the region; simultaneuosly, Middle Eastern states host diasporas. The larger diaspora communities in the Middle East include Palestinians, Egyptians, Yemenis, and guest workers from elsewhere (Chinese, Pakistanis, Koreans, Vietnamese, and Filipinos) who reside in the Gulf states and in Saudi Arabia; Armenians, Druze, and guest workers from Romania, Turkey, the former Soviet Union, Thailand, the Philippines, and African countries residing in Israel; Palestinians, Druze, and Armenians in Lebanon; Palestinians, Druze, and Armenians in Syria; and Sudanese, Palestinians, and a small number of Greeks in Egypt. Some of these diapsoras, such as the Armenians, come from established states, while others, such as the Kurds, Druze, Gypsies, and the Palestinians, are stateless.

Age, dispersal in and outside the region, group size, status, organization, and connection (or lack thereof) to their homelands influence each of these diasporas' positions in and strategies toward host countries an d homelands. Because of globalization and growth in worldwide migration, their economic and political roles have become increasingly significant.

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Gabriel Sheffer

DIBA, FARAH

[1938–]

Queen of Iran, 1959–1979.

Farah Diba, born on 14 October 1938, was the only daughter of Sohrab Diba from Azerbaijan and his

wife, Farideh Ghotbi, from Gilan on the Caspian coast. Diba's mother supervised her schooling at Tehran's Jeanne d'Arc and Razi schools, and then at the Ecole d'Architecture in Paris, where she was studying when she met Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Diba became his third wife on 20 December 1959, after he had divorced successively queens Fawzia and Soraya, neither of whom had borne him an heir. As queen, Diba had four children: Cyrus Reza in 1960, Yamina Farahnaz in 1963, Alireza in 1966, and Leila in 1970. Crowned *shahbanou* in 1967, she and the shah hosted a celebration of 2,500 years of monarchy at Persepolis in 1971. Although the event showcased Iran's history to world leaders, detractors criticized its excesses, given the country's underdevelopment. Queen Farah supported her husband's modernization of Iran, championing the arts, education, and women's issues. The revolution of 1978 to 1979 sent her and the shah into exile; he died in Cairo in 1980. Diba since has lived in the United States and France. Although she rarely seeks the spotlight, she remains a patron of the arts and an advocate for children in Iran and around the world.

See also Iranian Revolution (1979); Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza.

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Haleh Vaziri

DIB, MOHAMMED

[1920–2003]

Algerian novelist and poet.

Mohammed Dib was born into a middle-class family in Tlemcen. He was educated there and in Oujda. Before devoting his time to a literary career, Dib was a teacher and journalist. He was forced to leave Algeria in 1959 and subsequently settled in France. Dib's works chronicle Algeria's decolonization and postcolonial periods. A theme in his writings is the search for authentic self or identity. Dib's body of work illustrates the common pursuit of human dignity.

Dib earned his literary reputation as a result of a remarkable series of novels: *La grande maison* (1952; The great house); *L'incendie* (1954; The fire); *Le métier à tisser* (1957; The weaving loom); Un été Africain (1959; An African summer); Qui se souvient de la mer (1962; Who remembers the sea), *Cours sur la rive sauvage (1964; Run on the wild shore); La danse du roi* (1968; The dance of the king); *Dieu en Barbarie* (1970; God in Barbary); *Le maître de chasse* (1973; The master of hunting); *Habel* (1979; Habel); *Les terrasses d'Orsol* (1985; The terraces of Orsol); *Le sommeil d'Eve* (1989; The sleep of Eve); *Neiges de marbre* (1990; Snows of marble); *Le désert sans détour* (1992; The straightaway desert); *L'infante maure* (1994; The Moorish infanta); *L'arbre à dires* (1989; The tree with statements); *Si diable veut* (1998; IF the devil wants); *Comme un bruit d'abeilles* (2001; Like a sound of bees); *L.A. Trip* (2003), and *Simorgh* (2003; Simorch). Dib also crafted short stories, including the collections *Au café* (1955; At the cafe); *Le talisman* (1966; The talisman); and *La nuit sauvage* (1995; The savage night).

Dib primarily perceived himself as a poet. His poetry collections include *L'ombre gardienne* (1961; The shade guardian); *Formulaires* (1970; Forms); *Omneros* (1975; Omneros); *Feu beau feu* (1979; Fire, beautiful fire); *O vive* (1987; Oh, live); *L'enfant-jazz* (1998; The jazz child, which received the Prix Mallarmé); and *Coeur insulaire: Poèmes* (2000; Insular heart). He also wrote several children's books. Dib is distinguished as a leading member of the Generation of 1954, which also included Kateb Yacine, Mouloud Mammeri, Malek Haddad, and Mouloud Feraoun.

See also Literature: Arabic, North African.

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Phillip C. Naylor

DIDOUCHE, MOURAD

[1922–1955]

A historic chief of the Algerian revolution.

Mourad Didouche was born into a relatively prosperous family in Algiers. He was a member of Messali Hadj's Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA; Algerian People's Party) and Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD; Movement for

the Triumph of Democratic Liberties). He became a leader in the north Constantine region of the Organisation Spéciale (OS; Special Organization). After the OS's suppression, he fled Algeria and collaborated with Mohamed Boudiaf in Paris. He was a prominent member of the Committee of 22 and the Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA; Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action), earning his inclusion among the nine historic chiefs *(chefs historiques)* of the Algerian revolution. Didouche also edited the Front de Libération Nationale's (FLN; National Liberation Front) Proclamation of 1 November 1954, inaugurating the war of liberation. He died in combat. After the war, the Algerian government renamed rue Michelet in downtown Algiers as Didouche Mourad.

See also Boudiaf, Mohamed; Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA); Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Hadj, Messali al-; Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques; Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA).

Phillip C. Naylor

DILMUN

Prehistoric society of about 2000 B.C.E. that existed in the Persian/Arabian Gulf region, especially on the island of Bahrain.

The search for Dilmun was undertaken by Dr. Geoffrey Bibby and his 1953 Danish archaeological expedition to Bahrain. His excavation of 100,000 burial mounds yielded dates and documents about Dilmun as a rich seafaring civilization. It extended from Kuwait in the north to Oman at the south end of the Persian/Arabian Gulf. Bahrain is believed to have been the center of that civilization.

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Emile A. Nakhleh

DIMONA

Israeli frontier city.

Located 22 miles southeast of Beersheba and about 7 miles east of Yeruham, in Israel's southern region, the city is named after the biblical Dimona, a Judean city in the Negev. Initially a residential area serving the Dead Sea Industries workforce in Sodom and the operators of the potash works at Oron, Dimona was originally settled by thirty-six Moroccan immigrant families, joined later by additional newcomers. During the period between 1978 and 1988 it registered a negative immigration balance. Subsequently, however, additional immigrants were brought in (in 1991 Dimona absorbed 1,500 families from Russia and Ethiopia).

Dimona is also home to the Hebrew Israelites, a group of some 2,000 African Americans who initially settled in Dimona in 1969 and who consider their immigration to Israel the final destination of their journey home. Their leader, Ben Ami Ben Israel Carter, supervises the group's communal life. Because, in their view, religions constitute a rift among people, the Hebrew Israelites do not consider themselves disciples of any religion.

Dimona is neither particularly large nor strategically located. Its population in 2002 was 33,700. It is, however, immensely important to Israel because it is home to scientists stationed at the nearby nuclear reactor. The Dimona reactor was built with the aid of the French; during the mid-1960s, it became a source of concern to both the Arabs and the United States, who feared that the reactor would be used to produce nuclear-weapons-grade plutonium. The Israelis gave assurances that the Dimona reactor was for peaceful use, but suspicions remained. In 1980 the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that the Dimona reactor was capable of producing weapons-grade ore. Though it has never been publicly acknowledged, it is likely that the Israelis have used the Dimona reactor to help develop nuclear weapons.

In September 1986 Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at the Dimona nuclear reactor, disclosed to the world that Israel had secretly produced 100 to 200 nuclear warheads. Before the publication of this information in the *New York Times,* Vanunu was kidnapped by the Israeli secret service. At a trial held in camera in Israel he was convicted of treason and espionage and was sentenced to eighteen years in prison; the first eleven and a half years were spent in solitary confinement. His petition for an early release was denied.

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ZACHARY KARABELL
UPDATED BY YEHUDA GRADUS

DINAR

See GLOSSARY

DINKA

A people of Sudan.

The Dinka are a Nilotic people in the Republic of Sudan. Numbering over two million, they are the most numerous ethnic group, inhabiting about a tenth of its 1 million square miles (2.6 million sq km). The land of the Dinka is rich savanna broken by the Nile River, its tributaries, and the Sudd, the great swamps of the Nile that flood the grasslands during the rainy season (May to October) and fall during the dry season (November to April). The Dinka are separated by these rivers and swamps into some twenty-five independent groups. In the past they were governed by lineages rather than any single authority.

Their physical characteristics, ethnic pride, and striking cultural uniformity bind the Dinka together as one people, despite their widespread geographical dispersion. They call themselves not Dinka but Monyjang, which means "the man," or "the husband of men." They are convinced of their superiority to all others, whom they call "foreigners" (*juur;* singular, *jur*).

The Dinka are devoted to their cattle, which provide them with many of their worldly and spiritual needs, from dairy products (supplemented by fish and grain) to protection against illness or death. Cattle are the social cement for "bride wealth" (for marriage) and "blood wealth" (to resolve disputes). The Dinka are a proud people who, despite the ravages of civil war in Sudan, will nevertheless continue to survive.

See also NILE RIVER; SUDD.

ROBERT O. COLLINS

DINSHAWAY INCIDENT (1906)

British atrocity committed in June 1906 against Egyptian peasants accused of assaulting British officers.

Some British officers were hunting pigeons near Dinshaway village in Minufiyya province. One officer died, most probably of sunstroke, but the villagers were accused of assaulting him. As the news spread, the British assumed that a national insurrection might occur, so they called for exemplary punishment of the villagers. The accused assailants were arrested and hastily tried by a special tribunal; some were sentenced to death, some to public flogging or imprisonment.

Their sentences led to widespread protests in Europe and in Egypt. The summary public execution of the convicted peasants caused the rise of Egypt's National Party and the retirement of Britain's consul general, Lord Cromer (born Evelyn Baring). For Egyptians, it remains a black mark against Britain's rule.

See also BARING, EVELYN; NATIONAL PARTY (EGYPT).

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

DIRHAM

See GLOSSARY

DISEASES

Major diseases in the Middle East since 1800.

Endemic and epidemic diseases spread in the modern Middle East and North Africa in the wake of expanding European political and economic power. Political and medical responses to diseases changed over time according to the interests of the imperial and local powers and influenced the allocation of

resources to research and policies governing medical intervention. Plague, syphilis, malaria, schistosomiasis, and cholera led to the establishment of new forms of government control and modern medical and public health infrastructures.

Plague epidemics decimated the Middle East and North Africa from the sixth through the nineteenth centuries. In Egypt, famine usually followed plague outbreaks because without intense maintenance normally undertaken by the fellahin (peasantry), the irrigation canals became overgrown with reeds and silted up. Plague and famine were largely responsible for a population decline from perhaps 8 million in 1347 at the onset of plague to 3 million in 1805 when Muhammad Ali became viceroy. Bedouin, however, were able to outrun the disease by fleeing into the desert and their numbers remained constant at about several hundred thousand. Outbreaks continued to decimate urban and rural populations in the Middle East until the nineteenth century when Ottoman and Egyptian authorities took steps to introduce quarantines and other public health controls. In then underpopulated Egypt, when Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman viceroy, learned in 1812 that plague had broken out in Istanbul, he promptly imposed strict quarantine on Ottoman ships. The plague did not arrive. When plague again broke out in the eastern Mediterranean Muhammad Ali established a quarantine station at the port city of Damietta. The time the travelers evaded the quarantine and plague broke out in other port cities. Muhammad Ali imposed a cordon sanitaire around Alexandria and ordered his police and troops to imprison plague victims and burn their possessions. Battling widespread resistance, the authorities rounded up poor families and imprisoned them in quarantine stations on the edge of town, shot heads of households who refused to report sick members, and isolated the wealthy in their homes. Families went to great lengths to bury their dead in secret to evade the draconian measures and plague soon spread up the Nile. About a seventh of the Egyptian population and many European residents of Egypt perished. In a secondary outbreak in 1841 Muhammad Ali stiffened the quarantines and soldiers had orders to shoot to kill villagers who attempted to evade them. Fallahin were rounded up, men and women separated and forced to bathe under the supervision of male and female medical personnel, and given clean clothing. Egypt was plague free for three generations.

Between 1894 and 1898 Drs. Shibasaburo Kitasato, Alexander Yersin, and Paul Lewis Simond discovered the plague bacillus and the role of the rat flea in transmitting the disease. Quarantines, rat control, and antibiotics now control plague in most regions of the Middle East and North Africa, but it remains a threat in remote regions of Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey.

Muhammad Ali was equally concerned with syphilis, which also afflicted his troops and impaired the efficacy of his army. Muhammad Ali recruited Antoine-Barthelme Clot (Bey) to organize a Western-style teaching hospital, which opened in 1827. In an attempt to control the disease, he had Clot Bey organize a school to train women medical practitioners *(hakimat).* The *hakimat* vaccinated people against smallpox, reported on and treated the prostitute population for syphilis, registered midwives, and performed postmortem exams.

The British occupied Egypt in 1882 and proceeded to further develop Egyptian agriculture. British engineers completed a dam at Aswan in 1902 and in subsequent years raised it and built and expanded a series of barrages to better control the Nile river flow. The Nile Delta was converted from basin to perennial irrigation enabling fellahin to produce three crops a year but at the same time allowing schistosomiasis (bilharzia), hookworm, and other waterborne diseases to spread to formerly uninfected areas.

In 1913 a Rockefeller Foundation survey of Egypt found that about 60 percent of the population was infected with hookworm, bilharzia, nonfalciparum malaria, and other parasitic diseases. World War I and the Great Depression exacerbated the disease load in Egypt and many suffered from typhus, typhoid fever, and plague. In 1936 the now independent Egyptian authorities upgraded the Department of Public Health to the Ministry of Health but funding remained limited. In 1940 a leading medical researcher estimated that 75 percent of the Egyptian people had bilharzia, 50 percent ancylostomiasis, 50 percent other parasitic diseases, 90 percent trachoma, 25 percent malaria, 7 percent pellagra, and nearly all had severe childhood dis-

eases. Life expectancy was thirty-one years for men and thirty-six years for women.

In 1942 a severe malaria epidemic broke out in Egypt. Malaria, caused by the *Plasmodium falciparum* parasite, is transmitted to human beings by the anopheles mosquito. The mosquitoes can breed in standing water in irrigation channels, rainfall pools, streams, marshes, and oases, and malaria has been reported in all regions of the Middle East and North Africa, including oases in the Arabian Peninsula and the Sahara. In 1942 nationalist Egyptians insisted that British military aircraft had imported malaria from Sudan, where malaria was endemic. Others connected the disease with the expansion of irrigation. Subsequent research suggested that the mosquito vector might have traveled downriver by boat. Because hundreds of thousands of British troops were in Egypt the British asked the Rockefeller Foundation to launch a malaria control project. Working closely with the Egyptian Ministry of Health the foundation eradicated the disease.



A doctor examines an Ethiopian boy for symptoms of trachoma, a highly contagious eye infection. Outbreaks of malaria are common in North Africa, and the region's medical personnel are also inundated with cases of AIDS, tuberculosis, and various parasitic diseases such as the fly-borne kala azar. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

In 1950 and 1951 malaria appeared in Jidda and Mecca, with the increased pilgrim traffic apparently facilitating the spread of the anopheles mosquito. The World Health Organization, the Rockefeller Foundation, and other assistance programs in coordination with national ministries of health, utilized DDT and other pesticides to eradicate the disease almost completely. In recent years, however, newly resistant strains of malaria have reappeared in the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, and southern Sudan, where it is the leading killer.

Schistosomiasis is endemic in the Nile Valley of Egypt and Sudan and in irrigated regions of Iraq. Schistosomes (blood flukes or parasitic worms) grow in freshwater snails which, when adult, leave the snail and survive in the water for forty-eight hours. The schistosomes may enter the skin of persons wading, washing, or swimming in contaminated water or through the lining of the mouth or intestinal tract of persons who drink contaminated water. The schistosomes grow inside the blood vessels of the body and produces eggs. The eggs travel to the bladder or intestine and are excreted. The infected person must urinate into water infected with freshwater snails for the lifecycle of the schistosomes to be continued. The body's reaction to the parasite's eggs may cause rash, fever, cough, muscle aches, or general debilitation and can damage the liver, intestines, lungs, and bladder. The opening of the Aswan High Dam in 1970 increased land under irrigation by more than 30 percent but also spread schistosomiasis into new regions. A study done in al-Ayaysha, a village on open water in the Nile Delta, found that children swimming in the Nile acquired the disease through repeated contact with contaminated water. They were treated with chemotherapy (Praziquantel), educated about the disease, taught appropriate sanitation procedures, and retested annually. Reinfection rates dropped markedly, but similar intervention throughout the infected region is prohibitively expensive.

Six pandemics of cholera spread between 1817 and 1923 with increased trade, travel, and troop movements from south Asia where the disease is endemic. Cholera is transmitted by contaminated water or food and causes massive diarrhea, dehydration, anuria, acidosis and shock. The fact that the disease was new led Muslim physicians to con-

sult European medical sources. Ottoman physicians began translating medical works from European languages in the early nineteenth century. In 1819 the Ottoman physician Sanizade Atallah studied medicine in the Muslim medical school and then in Padua. He wrote a medical book based on a Viennese source and added sections from other European works. In 1831 Mustafa Behcet, head of the medical college in Istanbul, published a treatise on cholera based on an Austrian source, which Ottoman authorities distributed free throughout the empire. Ottoman authorities established a quarantine service in about 1832 and had religious leaders publish treatises showing that quarantines were not contrary to Islamic law.

In the early nineteenth century European physicians were no better at treating cholera and other diseases than were traditionally trained Muslim physicians. Westernizing Muslim rulers had deducted from the demonstrably superior European weaponry and other scientific and technological advances that European medicine ought to be superior as well. In addition, European physicians were useful for political purposes and by the mid-nineteenth century had largely displaced their Muslim counterparts.

Cholera again spread in 1883, 1896, and 1902. In each of the epidemics, pilgrims returning from Mecca apparently carried the disease with them. In 1883 while working in Cairo, Robert Koch discovered the causative agent, *vibrio cholerae.* Following the cholera epidemics and outbreaks of plague from 1898 to 1905 the British authorities upgraded the al-Tawr quarantine station, which the Egyptian government had established in 1855 and used for the first time in 1862.The discovery of the cholera vibrio and the means of transmission led to improved public health and quarantine procedures in Mecca and throughout the region, which nearly ended the pandemics. The last major epidemic occurred in Egypt in 1947. The outbreak occurred near a British base where troops returning from India were quartered and Egyptians accused the British of having introduced the disease, creating a major and unresolved political controversy. Cholera is treated effectively with oral rehydration solutions to replace lost fluid and rarely is seen in epidemic form. In recent years the al-Tawr cholera vibrio has appeared in sporadic outbreaks.

Tuberculosis was widespread throughout the region but since the 1950s WHO and UNICEF helped ministries of health to vaccinate their populations and the rate of infection dropped significantly. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) and the Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners (HRCAP) recently has reported that severe overcrowding, poor ventilation and sanitation, and inadequate nutrition in Egyptian prisons has led to the rapid spread of tuberculosis and other diseases among the prison population.

Eye diseases leading to impaired vision and blindness are common throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Trachoma, the most serious of them, is caused by the bacterium Chlamydia trachomatis. The Chlamydia bacterium infects the conjunctiva and inflammation may result in scarring and even blindness. The disease is spread through secretions from the infected eye spread directly or through common use of towels or bed clothing. Trachoma is prevalent in hot, dry climates with poor sanitary conditions and water shortages. The disease can be treated with tetracycline, but surgery is often necessary to repair damage to the eye. Improved public health and personal hygiene has reduced the incidence of trachoma, but it remains a threat in many parts of the Middle East and North Africa.

Pellagra, caused by inadequate niacin in the diet, is often seen in impoverished regions where corn is a staple and intake of varied plant and animal foods limited. Pellagra causes a distinctive reddish rash and lesions on the neck and is easily prevented by dietary supplements or vitamins. Other debilitating conditions resulting from nutritional deficiencies, such as anemia, are widespread and result directly from poverty.

Hepatitis A, a viral infection of the liver transmitted by the fecal oral route, is endemic throughout the region but can be avoided by consuming only well-cooked food and potable water. Hepatitis B, a viral infection of the liver, is transmitted primarily through behaviors that result in the exchange of blood or body fluids containing blood. Vaccinations are available for Hepatitis A and B. Hepatitis C, also a viral infection of the liver, is endemic in many regions. Recent research suggests that efforts to prevent schistosomiasis may have contributed to its

Blind children in Iraq. The major cause of blindness in developing countries is xerophthalmia, a disease associated with a lack of vitamin A in the diet. If untreated, xerophthalmia leads to keratomalacia, a deterioration and ulceration of the cornea. © J.B. Russell/Corbis Sygma. Reproduced by permission.

spread. Improperly sterilized needles often were used to administer medications for schistosomiasis and apparently transmitted Hepatitis C, which is now a major health problem.

Changes in lifestyle resulting in part from urbanization, increased smoking, a high-fat diet, lack of exercise, and increased obesity have resulted in exceptionally high rates of diabetes. Diabetes is a major public health challenge in Egypt and much of the Eastern Mediterranean region.

AIDS/HIV infection rates in the Middle East and North Africa are relatively low compared with Asia, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa, but the incidence is rising rapidly and deaths from AIDS have increased since the early 1990s. The disease is most often spread through heterosexual intercourse and to a lesser extent through the transfer of blood and other bodily fluids from an infected person to an uninfected person. Early intervention is crucial because the disease spreads widely once a threshold is reached. Safe sex education, public information programs, greater use of condoms, convenient voluntary testing services, and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases can avert much suffering and crippling medical expenses. Yet the vast majority of infected persons live in the developing world where poverty, malnutrition, and limited education complicate preventive efforts. In addition, some Muslim authorities believe that safe sex education encourages or implies promiscuity and view the disease as a punishment for immoral behavior. In an effort to encourage preventive action, the World Bank, WHO/EMRO and UNAIDS, recently prepared a report titled "Overview of the HIV/AIDS Situation in the Middle East and North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean Region." The report encourages governments to establish national plans for prevention and management of the disease. The government of Morocco is one of the first to prepare

a National AIDS action plan and has received funds from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria to launch its program. Islamic reformers are advancing the concept of *darar* (the sin of harming others) to argue that men and women are each other's protectors and that spouses are obliged to protect their partners and in turn are entitled to self-protection from exposure to the disease. Recognizing the limits of law enforcement programs, Indonesia and Iran have introduced needle exchange programs to curtail transmission of HIV and hepatitis. Lebanese and other women in the region have argued that women's status must be raised through education, training, and economic independence to enable women to avoid contracting and transmitting the disease by gaining control over their sex lives.

In recent years, the most serious recurrence of disease was in Iraq where the eight-year war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, the twelve years of sanctions, and the 2003 U.S. and British occupation resulted in deteriorating conditions, especially for children and the elderly. During the 1990s about 5,000 children died every month from acute diarrheal diseases caused by bacteria, viruses, helminths, or protozoa. In most regions of the world, oral rehydration solution, a mixture of water, glucose, sodium, potassium, and electrolytes, greatly reduced infant mortality rates. The solution, distributed throughout the region by ministries of health, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and nongovernmental organizations, helps children retain vital fluids and nutrients leading to full recovery. In Iraq, however, potable water and oral rehydration therapy were unobtainable and one in eight children died before his or her fifth birthday. Cholera, easily treated with oral rehydration, also appeared in parts of Iraq and chronic diseases went untreated. The percentage of underweight children increased by over 400 percent, and one in four children under age five was chronically malnourished. After the war UNICEF shipped thousands of tons of emergency medical and water supplies for the prevention and cure of waterborne diseases and high-protein food to fight malnutrition, but unstable conditions greatly impeded distribution.

In the Occupied Territories of Palestine nearly 10 percent of Palestinian children suffer from acute and 13 percent from chronic malnutrition. Malnutrition impairs physical and mental development and when combined with the trauma that Palestinian children have suffered from being exposed to gunfire, tank and helicopter attacks, tear gas, and house demolitions, will have serious long-term consequences. The Israeli reoccupation of Palestinian territories undermined the Palestinian health system and economy; severe overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions, shortage of health facilities, and political unrest have resulted in a massive public health crisis.

Despite setbacks, most regions of the Middle East and North Africa have in recent years experienced substantially decreased infant mortality and increased life expectancy. The current life expectancy now exceeds 65 years of age and is increasing. Noncommunicable diseases are more prevalent than communicable diseases and public health policy makers must adapt their priorities and strategies to the new disease patterns.

See also MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH.

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NANCY GALLAGHER

DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS

See Arab–Israel War (1973)

DISHDASHA

See Clothing

DIWAN

Pronounced "divan" in Persian and Turkish; a term that has been used in a variety of senses.

The term *diwan* has been used to mean all of the following:

- A collection of poetry or prose written by one author.
- A register of census, from the Arabic *awwana,* to collect. The first diwan was the *diwan al-jund,* the register that covered the people of Medina, Medina's military forces, émigrés and their families during the time of Muhammad.
- Ministries from the Umayyad period onward in the Arab world and in India and Iran. Three basic *diwans* corresponded to the three essential needs of the state: chancellery and state secretariat *(diwan al-rasa'il),* finance *(diwan al-amal),* and the army *(diwan al-jaysh).*
- The imperial privy council of the Ottoman Empire.
- Place of meeting, understood as a separate apartment or sitting room.
- A council chamber or a smoking room.
- A large couch or sofa without a back or arms, often used as a bed.

Mia Bloom

DIYARBAKIR

City and province in southeastern Turkey.

Diyarbakir province is bounded on the north by the Bitlis Mountains and on the west by the Euphrates River. The province comprises thirteen districts with a total area of 15,355 square kilometers. Its total population is 1,282,628 (2000 census).

The city of Diyarbakir, known in former times as Amida and Kara-Amid, is the principal urban center and capital of the province, which is populated mostly by Kurds. Located on the Tigris River, the city is renowned for its distinctive black basalt fortification walls that date from the fourth century C.E. The walls, with a circumference of 5.5 kilometers, are 12 meters high and 3.5 meters thick.

Diyarbakir has grown rapidly since 1950, when its population was 45,495. After 1984 the city's population multiplied as a result of the army's forcible relocation of Kurdish villagers in an effort to suppress an armed insurrection by the Kurdistan Workers Party. According to the 2000 census, the population had reached 818,396.

During the nineteenth century, Diyarbakir had strong economic links with cities that now are in Iraq and Iran, but these were severed after 1918. Contemporary Diyarbakir is an agricultural market center known also for its cotton textiles, leather products, and trade in grain, mohair, and wool. It has long been known for its goldsmith and silversmith work. The city is linked to western Turkey by railroad and is also the site of an air base.

See also Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK); Kurds.

Elizabeth Thompson
Updated by Eric Hooglund

DIYOJEN

See Newspapers and Print Media: Turkey

DJAOUT, TAHER

[1954–1993]

Algerian poet, novelist, and journalist.

Taher Djaout was born on 11 January 1954 in Azzefoun, Great Kabylia. After he studied political science and journalism, he worked at the weekly *Algérie-actualité* until his assassination in 1993.

Djaout, who wrote in French, was deeply anchored in his country's history. Algeria is always in the background of his writings, whether they evoke the growing pains of a poor boy during the colonial period in *Les rets de l'oiseleur* (1983; The hunter's net),

or tackle the more complex situations of the post-independence years. Many of these themes are central to his first novel, *L'exproprié* (1981; The expropriated).

Djaout began his literary activity as a poet. His collection of poems, *Solstice barbelé* (1975; Thorny solstice), revealed a solid poet who believed in creative freedom. He achieved fame, however, through his fiction, particularly *Les chercheurs d'os* (1984; The bones seekers), which won the Duca Foundation Prize. Like other Algerian writers, in this work Djaout deplores the abuse of the martyrs' memory in postindependence Algeria. His next novel, *L'invention du désert* (1987; Inventing the desert), contracts history with present-day ordinary activities, particularly the problems of a journalist like himself. The novel raises questions dealing with the search for identity and the ordeal of exile.

It is in his last novel, *Les vigiles* (1991; The vigils), that Djaout steps into present-day Algeria, revealing the early signs of religious fervor as an escape and a solution to insurmountable daily problems on the administrative, political, and economic levels. There are also memories of the Algerian war of independence, which continue to haunt Algerian writers.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN.

AIDA A. BAMIA

DJEBAR, ASSIA

[1936–]

Algerian francophone novelist and filmmaker.

Assia Djebar (Fatima Zohra Imaleyene) received her earliest education in Blida and Algiers and went on to study at the L'École Normale Supérieure de Sèvres, the first Algerian woman to be admitted there. She participated in the Algerian War of Independence by interviewing Algerian refugees in neighboring countries for the National Liberation Front newspaper *al-Moudjahid,* work that structures her most famous novel, *L'amour, la fantasie* (1985; published in English as *Fantasia: An Algerian Cavalcade,* 1993). Her first novel, *La soif* (1957), was written during the 1956 student uprising; it was followed by *Les impatients* (1958), *L'enfants du nouveau monde* (1962), *Les alouettes naïves* (1968), and a trilogy composed of *Fantasia, Ombre sultane* (1987; published in English as *A Sister to Scheherazade,* 1988), and *Femmes d'Alger dans leur appartement* (1980; published in English as *Women of Algiers in Their Apartment,* 1992). Her novel *Loin de Medine* (1991; published in English as *Far from Medina,* 1994) imaginatively renders the earliest Muslim society, putting its women at the center and lyrically evoking pre-Muslim Arab heroines. Most of the other novels focus on the experience of the civil war, offering a view of women's participation that counters the portrayal given by Franz Fanon and others. A novel, *So Vast Is the Prisona* (*Vaste est la prison: Roman,* 1995), appeared in English in 1999. The memoiristic *Algerian White (Le blanc de l'Algérie: récit)* appeared in English in 2002.

Djebar has worked extensively in cinema; her best-known film was her first, *La nouba des femmes du Mont Chenoua,* winner of the 1979 Venice Bienniale Critics' Prize. Another is *La Zerda et les chants de l'oubli* (1982). She uses Algerian dialect in these films, making a nationalist as well as feminist statement in her focus on women's conditions and agency. She has taught at the University of Rabat, the University of Algiers, Louisiana State University, and New York University, having chosen self-exile since the outbreak of civil war in Algeria. She has won several literary prizes, including the Neustadt International Prize for Literature (1996) and the Fonlon-Nichols Prize of the African Literary Association (1997).

See also ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; FILM; FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE.

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World Literature Today: Special Issue on Assia Djebar 70, no. 4 (Autumn 1996).

MARILYN BOOTH

DJEMAʿA

Constituent assembly, usually regulating the village or clan but occasionally tribe or confederation; also the place where its members gather, usually daily.

The traditional form of governance in rural communities in North Africa, the djemaʿa (jamaʿa)con-

sists of the heads of landholding families or lineages. Its head (*amghar* in most Berber-speaking areas) is chosen, usually annually, on a rotating basis by the members. Decisions are made by consensus, typically after considerable consultation. Its responsibilities include maintaining roads and paths, water and irrigation systems, and the local mosque and its school; hiring the school's teacher; ensuring hospitality for visitors; organizing community support for families needing manpower (especially in plowing and harvesting); organizing community festivities; assigning communal land to families for cereal production; and setting times and rules for wood collection, grazing, and beginning the harvest. In the past, the djemaʿa had greater judicial functions: In accordance with the local *qanun*—essentially a list of fines and punishments for a wide variety of misdeeds—it regulated community life and ensured equal justice, responsibility, and benefit.

See also QANUN.

THOMAS G. PENCHOEN

DJERBA

An island off the southeast coast of Tunisia, near the Libyan border.

The island of Djerba (Jarba) is 198 square miles (514 sq km), shaped like a molar tooth, and connected to the mainland of Tunisia on the southeast by a ferry at Adjim and on the southwest by a bridge that dates from the Roman Empire. Between Djerba and the mainland is the shallow inland sea of Bou Grara. The island's elevation is low—barely 188 feet (54 m) above sea level at its highest point—and is surrounded by shallow beaches of fine sand and palm trees, especially in the northeast. The principal population center is Houmt-Souk, a market and fishing port on the north coast. Since Tunisian independence in 1956, dozens of tourist hotels and an airport have been built on Djerba.

Djerba is reputed to be the island of the lotus eaters in Homer's *Odyssey.* Djerba's early history is one of contact with many peoples—Berbers, Carthaginians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, and others. Companions of the prophet Muhammad brought the Arabic language and religion of Islam to Djerba in 665 C.E. Berber Kharijites, considered heretics by many orthodox Muslims, took refuge in southern Djerba after the Almohads expelled them from western Algeria. Since then the southern part of the island has tended to be Berber and Kharijite, the northeast Arab and Malekite, and the center mixed in population.

During the Middle Ages, Djerba was the scene of continuous persecutions, conquests, revolts, reconquests, civil wars, and plagues. Spaniards, Sicilians, Hafsids, Corsairs, and Ottoman Turks controlled the island at various times. In the eighteenth century, Tunis eventually won the contest with Tripoli for jurisdiction under the Ottoman Empire over Djerba. During the French protectorate, Djerba was under military administration from 1881 to 1890, then French civil administration until independence in 1956. The island is today part of the Tunisian Governorship of Medenine, and its population is a mix of Arab and Berber, plus elements of black African, Turkish, and Maltese origin.

The center and southeast of Djerba and portions of the nearby mainland are among the rare areas of Tunisia where a Berber language is spoken, although it is highly mixed with Arabic vocabulary.

An inside view of the *Griba* (wonderful) synagogue, located on the Isle of Djerba off the coast of southern Tunisia. Built in the time of Ezra (fifth century B.C.E.), it is believed that Ezra visited the island and that relics from the Temple of Jerusalem are within the synagogue's walls. Pilgrimages are still made in honor of Rabbi Simeon bar Yohai, the Talmudic sage attributed with writing the Zohar, a mystical book. The synagogue was the target of a terrorist attack on 11 April 2002 that took the lives of several German tourists. © FULVIO ROITER/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Midoun Jerba (or Djerba) passersby fill this Tunisian street on a sunny day. Djerba is an island in the central Mediterranean Sea, off the southeast coast of Tunisia. The island contains the remains of an ancient Roman civilization and is a popular tourist destination. © Nik Wheeler/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

According to Arab historian Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) "Djerba" originally referred to a branch of the Lemata Berbers.

Djerba is home to one of the few remaining Jewish communities in North Africa, the towns of Hara Sghira and Hara Kebira. According to local tradition, the Jewish community of Djerba dates from after the Babylonian captivity in 586 B.C.E.; others claim that Judeo-Berbers migrated to the island in the late eighth century C.E., following the Arab conquest of North Africa. The town of Hara Sghira is the site of the Ghriba—a Jewish synagogue, shrine, and site of a popular annual pilgrimage.

Djerba has low and irregular rainfall—averaging 8 inches (21 cm) per year—and high humidity. The only freshwater sources on the island are a few wells in the northeast and rainwater captured by cisterns. This limits local agriculture to date palms of mediocre quality, olive trees, fruit trees, and some grains and legumes.

In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the pressures of increasing population on this ecologically marginal island have gradually forced people out of the traditional occupations of agriculture, fishing, weaving, and pottery-marking. As the island's population increased from 31,800 in 1906 to 62,445 in 1956 to more than 82,000 in 1991, Djerbians began to rotate between the island and the mainland as shopkeepers. In reaction to anti-commercial policies of the Ben Salah government of the 1960s, Djerbians increasingly turned to international migration, and many of them have become successful shopkeepers and businessmen in the Paris area. The 2002 population of Djerba was estimated to have decreased to 60,300.

See also Arabic; Ben Salah, Ahmed; Berber; Islam; Ottoman Empire; Tunisia.

Laurence Michalak

DLIMI, AHMED

[1931–1983]

Moroccan military officer.

Ahmed Dlimi achieved dubious prominence during the Ben Barka affair of 1965 and 1966, when he was acquitted in a Paris trial. By the mid-1970s, he was King Hassan II's closest military adviser; as a colonel, he was given command of the military seizure of the contested former Spanish colony of Western Sahara in 1974 and 1975. Promoted to general and given full control over theater operations, from 1979 to 1980 Dlimi oversaw the building of the "wall" in Western Sahara—a fortified sand barrier stretching across nearly 25 percent of the northern border. In early 1983, with relations souring between the military and the throne, Dlimi died in a mysterious auto accident.

See also Ben Barka, Mehdi; Hassan II.

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Matthew S. Gordon

DO'AR HA-YOM

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ISRAEL

DOHA

Capital and largest city of Qatar.

Situated almost midway down the east coast of the Qatari peninsula, Doha is the country's center of administration, finance, culture, transportation, and social services. The modern city grew from the fishing and pearling port of al-Bida, which at the end of the nineteenth century had around 12,000 inhabitants. The town's economy depended to a large extent on pearling, and the busy port had some 300 pearling ships in 1939, just before the industry collapsed. After oil revenues began enriching the emirate in the 1960s, the city grew rapidly. Its simple one- and two-story stone, mud, coral block, and timber dwellings were replaced by high-rise apartments and offices, palatial villas, and tree-lined subdivisions supported by modern infrastructure. The city's waterfront is lined by a gracefully curving roadway and landscaped walkway, or corniche. Although the oil and gas industry dominate the local economy, fishing and trade also bring activity to the port town. According to the 1997 census the city had 264,009 inhabitants. Because most of the city's residents are non-Qataris, the character of the city resembles others in the Persian Gulf such as Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Dhahran, where there are large numbers of Iranians, Indians, Pakistanis, Filipinos, and Bangladeshis who influence the types of restaurants and the items sold in the markets.

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MALCOM C. PECK
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

DOLMA

See FOOD

DOLMABAHÇE PALACE

Ottoman sultan's palace.

Built in 1853 by Sultan Abdülmecit I, Dolmabahçe is located on the banks of the Bosporus in Beşiktaş, north of the centuries-old sultanic residence Topkapi. The new palace, built in a mixture of European styles, replaced an older one on the site, where Sultan Mahmud II had moved in 1815. While it was used for official functions through most of the nineteenth century, Dolmabahçe was the sultan's official residence for only a few years, as Abdülmecit soon moved to Çağiran Palace and Abdülaziz moved to a newer palace on the hill above it at Yildiz. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk died at Dolmabahçe on 8 November 1938.

See also ABDÜLAZIZ; ABDÜLMECIT I; ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; MAHMUD II; TOPKAPI PALACE.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

DONANMA

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

DÖNME

A group in Turkey descended from followers of the mystical messiah Shabbetai Tzevi (1626–1676) who converted from Judaism to Islam.

By the mid-seventeenth century the apocalyptic events of the early modern era (expulsions, persecutions, the rise and fall of empires) inspired many to expect the messiah soon. Shabbetai Tzevi, a descendant of Iberian (Sephardic) exiles, was steeped in Kabbalistic beliefs that sought to hasten messianic redemption. In 1665 his followers proclaimed him the messiah. He eventually acquired a following greater than any other Jewish messianic movement since Christianity. In 1666 Shabbetai Tzevi tried to overthrow the sultan. Thwarted, to avoid execution, he converted. At this point most abandoned him,

but a minority did not. His loyalists remained, at least outwardly, Jews, but a few converted. Those who converted still maintained contact with a larger support system of secret allies within the Jewish community. They also were close to an important Sufi order, the Bektashis, who promoted doctrines, notably *taqiya* (religious dissimulation), that provided an Islamic rationale for contradictory beliefs.

After Shabbetai's death, his followers flocked to the major Jewish center in the Ottoman Empire, Salonika. Outwardly good Muslims, with great secrecy they conducted Sabbatean prayers, initially in Hebrew and later in Ladino (Judeo-Spanish), until late the nineteenth century, when they adopted Turkish. The Dönme became a significant element in Salonika. They may have accounted for as much as half of its Muslim population.

During the twilight of the Ottoman Empire, Salonika was the birthplace of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) and of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). Cavit Bey, a direct descendant of an early disciple and a leader in his own right, was an important minister in the CUP government. Atatürk had studied in a progressive school founded by a Dönme educator. Although the claim that Atatürk was a Dönme is untrue, their complex and sophisticated values shaped the environment of his youth.

In 1924, following the Treaty of Lausanne, the entire Muslim population of Salonika—including the Dönme—was deported to Turkey. In 1925 all Sufi orders were abolished. Shorn of the Dönme support system, intermarriage and assimilation eroded the community. In 1924 Ahmed Emin Yalman, a prominent journalist, had publicly renounced all ties to the sect and called for its complete integration into Turkish national life. Although some are still identified as Salonikli (often a code for Dönme), there is no evidence that their distinctive beliefs and practices survive today.

See also BEKTASHIS; SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS.

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BENJAMIN BRAUDE

DOR DEʿA

Jewish educational reform movement.

The Dor Deʿa (Hebrew; Generation of Knowledge) was a Jewish enlightenment movement founded by Hayyim Habshush (?–1899) and Rabbi Yihye ben Solomon Qafih (1850–1932) in Sanʿa, Yemen, in the late nineteenth century. The two men were inspired in part by their personal contacts with the European Jewish scholars, Joseph Halévy and later Edouard Glaser, who explored Yemen.

Dor Deʿa aimed at reforming Jewish education by purging it of Cabalistic elements (a mystical interpretation of Scriptures) and by introducing a small amount of modern secular subjects and vocational training. From 1910 to 1915, Rabbi Qafih operated a modern school that included the Turkish language as well as Hebrew and Arabic. He was encouraged by the Alliance Israélite Universelle, whose support he had sought. The movement faced strong opposition from conservative elements led by Rabbi Isaac Yiyha (?–1932), supported by the imam of Yemen. The community remained split into opposing factions, which called each other derisively the Daradeʿa (a mocking Arabic plural derived from Dor Deʿa) and the Iggeshim (the crooked ones) until their mass emigration to Israel.

See also ALLIANCE ISRAÉLITE UNIVERSELLE (AIU); QAFIH, YIHYE BEN SOLOMON.

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NORMAN STILLMAN

DORNER, DALIA

[1934–]

Israeli jurist, member of Israel's Supreme Court.

Born in Turkey, Dalia Dorner came to Israel in 1944 and studied in a Youth Immigration institution. In 1951, she graduated from the exclusive Reali High School in Haifa. As a teenager, she was active in a leftwing youth movement and fought for egalitarian causes. She enrolled in the Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and was awarded an M.J. degree in 1956. Between 1960 and

1973, she served in the Judge Advocate General Corps of the Israel Defense Force (IDF), specializing in defending soldiers. She also served as command defense attorney, deputy judge advocate general, and chief defense attorney of the IDF. Between 1973 and 1979, she was president of the Central Command District Military Court and was later appointed judge in the Military Appeals Court.

Discharged with the rank of colonel, she served for five years as a judge on the Beersheba District Court (1979–1984) and for ten years on the Jerusalem District Court (1984–1994). Appointed to the Supreme Court in 1994, she earned a reputation for being on the liberal wing of the court. She wrote a pioneering decision recognizing the rights of a same sex-mate and she opposed discrimination based on sex. She based her ruling in part on the basic law: human freedom and dignity. She was in the minority in a case dealing with the continued detention of Hizbullah leaders such as Shaykh Abd al-Karim Ubayd seized by Israel as hostages for the return of Israeli prisoners and those missing in action. She argued that this act contradicted the laws of war in the framework of international law and that no one should lose his or her freedom except as punishment or to prevent clear and evident danger. But she supported moderate use of force by the General Security Services to extract confessions. She retired from the court in 2004.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS.

MERON MEDZINI

DOST MOHAMMAD BARAKZAI

[1792–1863]

Amir of Afghanistan, 1826–1838, 1842–1863.

Dost Mohammad Barazkai, also called the Great Amir (Amir Kabir), was born in Kandahar in the Mohammadzai branch of the Durrani Pushtun subtribe. Considered the founder of the Mohammadzai dynasty that ruled Afghanistan until 1973, Dost Mohammad first became ruler of Afghanistan in 1826 after a period of civil war. After battling even his own brothers for control, he gradually united the country. He also attempted to regain Afghan territory lost to the Sikhs, who ruled Peshawar at that time. Having defeated the Sikhs at the Battle of Jumrud (1837), he assumed the title Amir al-Muʾminin (Commander of the Faithful).

In the 1830s, Dost Mohammad began to turn away from the British and to make overtures to Persia and Russia. As a result the British invaded Afghanistan (1839) in the first Anglo–Afghan war. Once they had defeated Dost Mohammad and taken him as a hostage to India (1840), the British placed Dost Mohammad's rival Shah Shuja on the throne. The occupation of Afghanistan soon turned into a disaster for the British, however, and they were forced to retreat from Kabul in the winter of 1842, losing almost all of their troops in the process. In 1842, Dost Mohammad returned to the throne and ruled for another twenty years. Three of his twenty-seven sons became rulers of Afghanistan, although only Sher Ali ruled for a prolonged period.

See also ANGLO–AFGHAN WARS.

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GRANT FARR

DOUʿAJI, ALI AL-

[1909–1949]

Tunisian short story writer, dramatist, and painter.

Ali al-Douʿaji, born in Tunis, worked for literary journals, contributing articles mainly to *al-Alam al-Adabi.* He joined the group of bohemian writers known as Jamaʿat Taht al-Sur (Group under the wall), which was active between the two world wars. Many of them indulged in drinking and drugs to escape the harsh realities of their lives.

Al-Douʿaji's short stories and essays deal with the problems of the poor and struggling classes. The pessimism of the subjects is tempered by the subtle humor of the writer. He often used dialect in the dialogue of his short stories for a more truthful portrayal of life. His collection of short stories *Sahirtu minhu al-Layali* (1969; Sleepless nights) concerns Tunisia's society and its social ills. His sketches *Jawlatun bayna Hanat al-Bahr al-Abyad al-Mutawassit* (1973; A Tour around the bars of the Mediterranean)

reveal his humor, his powers of observation, and his capacity to portray human ridicule.

See also Literature: Arabic, North African.

Aida A. Bamia

DOUGHTY, CHARLES

[1843–1926]

English author and traveler in Arabia.

Born in Suffolk to an Anglican cleric, Charles Montagu Doughty studied geology at Cambridge University. Motivated by a desire to examine ancient inscriptions and to explore the origins of humanity in what he considered its primitive setting, from 1876 to 1878 he traveled among the bedouin, whom he considered the original people. Though dressed and living as a simple wanderer in central and western Arabia, he never disguised himself as a native. He was the first literary traveler openly to proclaim his Englishness and never to deny his Christianity, to the point of imagining himself a Christlike figure.

In undertaking his voyage, Doughty benefited from Europe's economic and political penetration of the Middle East. But as he approached what he believed was the beginning of time, that very world of wealth, industry, and capital was interfering with his quest. Remote Anaizah in Central Arabia was by now the home to merchants who discussed Otto von Bismarck and Czar Alexander and life under English rule in Bombay. Hundreds of Najdis had gone down to Egypt "to dig for wages in the work of the Suez Canal," which Doughty called "this moral quagmire."

The result of his labor, *Travels in Arabia Deserta,* published in 1888, did not gain popular success until after World War I. T. E. Lawrence, whose *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* had made him an international literary star, rescued Doughty's book from neglect by arranging for a handsome second edition, which he endorsed with a ten-page introduction. Doughty also wrote patriotic poetry but, unlike his champion, he played little role in public affairs.

See also Lawrence, T. E.

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Benjamin Braude

DOWLATABADI, MAHMOUD

[1940–]

An Iranian writer and actor.

Mahmoud Dowlatabadi was born in Dowlatabad, a village in northwestern Khorasan province. His parents were peasants, and as a child Dowlatabadi learned the various tasks associated with farming and tending livestock. There was no secondary school in his village and after finishing primary school Dowlatabadi went to Sabzevar to continue his education. By the time he was in his late teens, he had to work full-time and thus could not finish high school. He held various jobs in Sabzevar before moving to Mashhad for work, and eventually to Tehran. While in Sabzevar, he developed a great love for reading, especially American and European fiction that had been translated into Persian. By the mid-1960s, he had begun to write short stories. Rural Khorasan—and the social problems intertwined with its relative poverty—is the background for his fiction. By the early 1970s, he was acquiring a reputation as a serious writer who used social realism. He was arrested in 1974, apparently because the SAVAK believed his fiction represented implicit criticism of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's government. He began writing his epic 3,000-page novel, *Klidar,* in 1978 and did not complete the fifth and final volume until 1983.

Klidar established Dowlatabadi as one of Iran's most significant literary figures in the second half of the twentieth century. Yet his background set him apart from the country's other famous writers, the majority of whom came from middle- or upper-class urban families, had attended college—often outside Iran—and had began their careers by translating foreign works into Persian. Dowlatabadi's contributions to Persian literature since the completion of *Klidar* include essays, novels, short stories, and screenplays. In 1994, he was one of the 133 writers who signed a declaration calling for freedom of expression in Iran. In 2000, he was among twenty-nine intellectuals arrested and charged with anti-state activities for participating in a conference in

Berlin on the reform movement in Iran; he was acquitted in January 2001.

See also PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

DRAGOMANS

Translators of Turkish, Persian, and Arabic into European languages.

When the Ottoman Empire began commercial dealings with the Europeans, translators were employed by European agents and diplomats in the capital, Istanbul. As no business could be conducted without these translators, they fulfilled a vital intermediary role in European–Ottoman relations, both political and commercial. Known as dragomans, these translators were usually Christians and often Greeks from the Phanar district of Istanbul. By the nineteenth century, they occupied a position of power and influence in Istanbul.

The Ottoman ministry for foreign affairs employed an official dragoman, and many European diplomats dealt with him or his deputies rather than directly with Ottoman administrators. Ottoman embassies in Europe also employed dragomans. After the Greek revolt in 1821, part of the Greek War of Independence, Muslims and Turks began to act as dragomans, and some became important figures during the Tanzimat reform period of the mid-1800s. One of the many Tanzimat reforms was the creation of a bureau of translation in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which centralized and incorporated the dragomans.

See also GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; TANZIMAT.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

DREYFUS AFFAIR

Famous turn-of-the-century case of French antisemitism.

In 1894 Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish captain in the French army, was convicted in a secret military court-martial of espionage on behalf of Germany and was sentenced to life imprisonment on Devil's Island in French Guyana, off the coast of South America. His alleged espionage prompted virulent antisemitism and was cited by some French editorialists as but one manifestation of widespread Jewish perfidy. Two years later, an army intelligence investigator concluded that Dreyfus was innocent and the guilty party was Major Walsin Esterhazy. The army at first resisted reopening the case; when it did, it acquitted Esterhazy despite the blatant evidence against him. Later that year the new head of army intelligence confessed he had forged documents implicating Dreyfus and subsequently committed suicide in his jail cell.

A number of prominent liberals and leaders on the Left united in support of Dreyfus, whose conviction they viewed as an unholy antisemitic alliance of France's political Right and the church leadership. The novelist Emile Zola published his famous letter, "J'accuse," in which he vociferously denounced both the military and civil authorities, forcing the investigation into Dreyfus's conviction. A second court martial reiterated Dreyfus's guilt, but shortly thereafter he was pardoned. A number of years later he was declared innocent and returned to his former military rank.

The brazen corruption and antisemitism led to the end of the rightist government in France and, later, the firm separation of church and state there. The antisemitism that manifested itself in many liberal as well as rightist quarters deepened the ties of some Jewish intellectuals to the nascent Zionist Organization. The Viennese journalist Theodor Herzl, who had previously taken some interest in the organization, reported on the trial and, along with his colleague Max Nordau, became totally committed to Zionism.

See also HERZL, THEODOR; NORDAU, MAX.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

DROBLES PLAN

See ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

DRUGS AND NARCOTICS

Drugs have long played a prominent role in the affairs of the Middle East.

The Middle East is ideally suited to profit from all phases of the drug trade. Climate, geography, and, more recently, politics have combined to make the region an important source and transit point of drugs destined for Europe, the United States, and many of the countries of the Middle East itself. Traditionally, the most important drugs in the Middle East have been opium and marijuana, which provide the raw material for the heroin and hashish that form the staple of the illicit drug trade in the region. Both the opium poppy (*Papaver somniferum*) and marijuana (*Cannabis sativa*) grow easily in many parts of the Middle East and North Africa, and the centuries-old trade routes that crisscross the region give illicit drug producers ready access to the major international drug markets. Although the drug trade is driven largely by the profits inherent in any lucrative criminal activity, in the Middle East it has taken on an important political dimension as rival groups have used enormous drug revenues to pay for the arms necessary to pursue their political ambitions. With a metric ton of heroin worth between $100 million and $600 million, retail, on the streets of the United States, drug sales are an appealing source of immediate, vast revenues for clandestine or criminal activities.

Two dealers of opium, an illegal drug produced from the poppy flower, openly weigh the drug in the marketplace.
© BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

The importance of the Middle East in the international drug trade has varied according to the demand for certain illicit drugs. The taste for drugs is cyclical, alternating between periods of demand for stimulants such as cocaine and amphetamines, and times when the drug-abusing public seeks depressants such as opiates (e.g., morphine, heroin, and other opium derivatives) and hashish. Because the Middle East primarily produces depressants, its importance as a drug source increases when opiates are in demand, as in the 1930s, 1970s, and 1990s.

Opiates

Because *Papaver somniferum* grows best at higher altitudes, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, and more recently Lebanon, have at different times been major sources of heroin and other opiates. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Turkey gained international notoriety as the principal source of the heroin that fed an epidemic of drug abuse in the United States and Europe. In 1973, as part of an agreement with the United States, Turkey first banned, then allowed only very restricted cultivation of opium poppies for medicinal purposes. This is still the only successful drug crop-control program of its kind, with virtually no leakage into illicit channels.

With Turkey effectively eliminated as a source in the mid-1970s, the center of illicit opiate production shifted eastward to Afghanistan, Lebanon, and, to a lesser extent, Iran. In both Afghanistan and Lebanon, the chaos created by civil war, coupled with the absence of a strong central government and rival combatants' desire for a source of revenue for arms purchases, led to an explosion of opium cultivation. By 1992, Afghanistan had become second only to Myanmar (Burma) in the production of illicit opium. The U.S. government estimated that at the end of 1992, Afghanistan had over 48,000 acres (nearly 19,500 ha) of opium poppy under cultivation, capable of producing 705 tons (640 metric tons) of opium or 70 tons (64 metric tons) of heroin. This would be enough to satisfy estimated heroin needs in the United States six times over and to pump between $6.4 billion and $38.4 billion into the underworld economy. While a large percentage of these opiates is probably consumed by addicts in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, the remainder flows into the international drug trade through Iran for transshipment to heroin refineries in Turkey and Lebanon. There is also evidence that Afghan opium is flowing northward into new routes opened in central Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

An Afghan poppy farmer carries an assault rifle while combing through his crop. Poppy growers have been encouraged to cultivate wheat instead of the illicit poppies, the flower used for making opium and heroin. Some farmers are angry because the profit margin for wheat is considerably lower than that for the opium poppy crop. **© Reza/Webistan/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

Although not an opium producer on the scale of Afghanistan, Lebanon is an important country in the international heroin trade. Following Syria's occupation of the Biqa valley in 1976, eastern Lebanon became a center of opium cultivation and heroin refining. The Lebanese government has blamed the Syrian military for the Biqa valley drug trade, which in 1991 had the capacity to produce an estimated 37 tons (34 metric tons) of opium (or 3.7 tons [3.4 metric tons] of heroin) from an estimated nearly 8,400 acres (3,400 ha). Subsequently, a combination of harsh weather and joint Syrian–Lebanese eradication efforts have reduced cultivation to an estimated nearly 1,100 acres (440 ha) in late 1993, though clandestine laboratories may be refining more than 5.5 tons (5 metric tons) a year of heroin from Afghan opium.

Despite Iranian government efforts to ban the opium poppy in 1980, Iran in 1992 was still an important potential source of opium. The U.S. government estimated that nearly 8,650 acres (3,500 ha) of *Papaver somniferum* were under cultivation at the end of the year. There are indications, however, that Iran's addicts consume most domestic opium production. Iran continues to be a conduit for Afghan and Pakistani opiates moving to Turkey and onward along the Balkan route into Europe.

Hashish

Although there is cannabis cultivation in nearly every country of the Middle East, only Morocco and Lebanon are significant hashish producers and exporters. Hashish is simple to manufacture, requiring little of the intensive labor and none of the chemicals needed to refine opiates. And while it does not generate profits on the same scale as opiates,

hashish production is a multimillion-dollar criminal enterprise. In 1992, Morocco's nearly 74,000 acres (30,000 ha) of cannabis potentially yielded nearly 9,918 tons (9,000 metric tons) of hashish, most of which was destined for Europe. Lebanon, with an estimated nearly 38,800 acres (15,700 ha) of cannabis under cultivation in 1993, potentially had 623 tons (565 metric tons) of hashish available for export. Cannabis may be sold and used legally in many countries so most governments accord cannabis control a relatively low priority. The hashish trade is likely to remain steady therefore, even as the governments of the Middle East intensify efforts to suppress illicit opiates and stimulants.

See also BIQA VALLEY; CLIMATE; GEOGRAPHY.

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W. KENNETH THOMPSON

DRUMMOND–WOLFF CONVENTION

Abortive pact (1885) between Britain and the Ottoman Empire.

Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff negotiated an agreement with Sultan Abdülhamit II at the behest of British Foreign Secretary Lord Robert Salisbury; the pact was to terminate Britain's occupation of Egypt after a three-year period. Because the agreement would have empowered Britain to reenter Egypt under certain conditions, the French and Russian ambassadors in Istanbul persuaded the sultan to withdraw his approval. Consequently, the British occupation of Egypt was greatly prolonged.

See also ABDÜLHAMIT II.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

DRUZE

A small religious community that emerged in eleventh-century Cairo and spread to what is today Lebanon, Syria, and Israel.

The name *Druze* (in Arabic *Duruz,* meaning Druzes) was given to the community by outsiders based on the name of al-Darazi, an early convert who came to Cairo in the year 1015, joined the missionary ranks, and was eventually killed or executed in 1019. The Druze manuscripts consider him an apostate and refer to members of the community as Unitarians *(Muwwahhidun)* or People of Unitarianism *(Ahl al-Tawhid).* The Druzes are also known as Sons of Mercy or Sons of Beneficence *(Banu Maʿruf).* In addition, the word *Maʿruf* is derived from the Arabic words *arafa* (to know); thus, Druzes are often mentioned in their manuscripts as *Aʿraf* (those who possess knowledge).

Druze Communities

There are approximately one million Druzes in the world today with 85 to 90 percent of them living in the Middle East. Smaller communities can be found in Australia, Canada, Europe, the Philippines, South America, West Africa, and the United States. Within Druze villages and small towns in the Middle East, the predominant occupation has always been farming, and two classes of landowners and peasants have dominated the Druze economic landscape for centuries. Although most Druzes remain predominantly rural, rapid urbanization and modernization have not only transformed Druze village economics but also facilitated increases in educational levels and professional training.

Despite these recent transformations, social and religious authority among the Druzes remains persistent and comes from a religious elite that has an extraordinary influence on Druze communities. Thus, it may be said that Druzism both unites Druzes into socially cohesive communities and divides them into two main classes: the initiated or wise *(uqqal)* and the uninitiated or, literally, "ignorant" *(juhhal).* Only those believers who demonstrate piety and devotion and who have withstood the lengthy process of candidacy are initiated into the esoteric teachings and oral traditions of the faith. Women initiates undergo a less rigorous training because the Druze doctrine considers women to be more spiritually prepared and therefore not in need of the arduous initiation process that men are required to undertake.

The initiated persons are further subdivided based on their spiritual level of advancement. Only a small group of the most devout of the initiated members are called *ajawid,* meaning the selected, or, literally, "the good." In the eyes of the rest of the community, the *ajawid* serve as models for righteous behavior, truthfulness, and wisdom; they reinforce the cultural attributes of the entire community. Uninitiated persons comprise the majority of Druze society. They may seek initiation at any age, but their acceptance is based on their character, which is assessed by the initiated ones. Although the uninitiated are indeed "ignorant" of the Druze doctrine, their behavior is expected to conform to certain prescriptions both spiritual (e.g., fealty to God, His prophets, and His luminaries) and moral (e.g., respect for elders, honor for women, and care for children).

Emergence of Druzism (996–1043)

Druzism is traced to Fatimid-Ismaʿili-Shiʿite Egypt, and more specifically to the sixth Fatimid caliph al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah (r. 996–1021). Druze history may be divided into three main phases: the emergence of Druzism (996–1043), the era of emirates (1040s–1840s), and recent times (since the 1840s). Although almost all sources date the beginning of Druzism to 1017, the year 996 was not only the beginning of al-Hakim's rule but also, and more importantly, there is evidence of covert preparatory activity between 996 and 1017. The nearly fifty-year period of the emergence of Druzism revolves around three main leaders, al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, Hamza ibn Ali al-Zawzani, and Baha al-Din al-Samuqi. In the eyes of many historians, al-Hakim was the most controversial among Fatimi caliphs due to a claim for divinity, which apparently he never made but others attributed to him, and because of his early rigid or unacceptable resolutions against the social and religious practices of Sunnis, Christians, and Jews. Although al-Hakim's attitude toward the Druze faith is not fully discernible from the available sources, it can be concluded that al-Hakim did not prevent Druze missionaries from propagating their doctrine; on the contrary, he appears to have allowed their proselytizing activities, approved their writings, and protected their followers.



During the Lebanese Civil War, Walid Jumblatt took over leadership of the Druze after the assassination of his father, Kamal, in 1977. Walid's forces fared well during the confrontation, which lasted fifteen years and resulted in an estimated 140,000 deaths. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

Hamza ibn Ali is the central authority behind Druze teachings and as such is considered by some writers to be the actual founder of Druzism. He came to Cairo in December 1016, met the Druze missionaries in the Ridan Mosque, and then proclaimed the new movement in 1017. Four years later, in 1021, al-Hakim left on one of his routine

Druze rebels in Lebanon during the 1958 revolts when the Progressive Socialist Party, led by Kamal Jumblatt, demanded social and political reforms for all sects in Lebanon. Today, the Druze are one of seventeen recognized sects in the country, which requires all citizens to carry a government-issued identification card encoded with his or her religion. © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

trips to the hills of al-Muqattam east of Cairo but never returned. In the same year, Hamza and his close associates went into retreat, announcing that a period of persecution by al-Hakim's successor, the seventh Fatimid caliph al-Zahir, had begun, and that the affairs of the community were delegated to Baha al-Din. After the hardship years of 1021 to 1026, Baha al-Din resumed missionary activity and wrote epistles until the closing of Druzism in 1043, when he departed to an undisclosed location. Since then, no one has been permitted to join the Druze movement.

Era of Emirates (1040s–1840s)

The second phase of Druze history is represented in three emirates—the Buhturis, Maʿnis, and Shihabis—that played important roles in providing leadership to the Druze masses. The Buhturis (1040s–1507) are a branch of the Tanukhis, who had origins in Arabia but migrated to northern Syria and then settled in Mount Lebanon beginning in the middle of the eighth century. In the first half of the eleventh century some of the Tanukhi princes joined the Druze faith. The relationship of the Buhturi amirs with the Islamic central governments was at times affected by the Islamic power struggles. For example, the Mamluks and Ayyubids fought not only each other, but also the Mongols. Nevertheless, the Buhturis remained in power until the takeover of the Arab lands in 1516 by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (r. 1512–1520), who is said to have been encouraged by the Druze Maʿni Prince Fakhr al-Din I.

With the help of the Buhturis, the forefather of the Maʿnis, Prince Maʿn, moved with his supporters to the Shuf in 1120. This Maʿni clan remained relatively insignificant until the emergence of their prince Fakhr al-Din I (r. 1507–1544). Although he was asked to support the Mamluks, Fakhr al-Din instead joined the Ottoman forces of Sultan Selim, whose army defeated the Mamluks in 1516 in the decisive battle of Marj Dabiq. Subsequently, the Ottomans allowed the Maʿnis to have independent political control within the region, as long as taxes reached Istanbul promptly. With the continued support of the Ottomans, another Druze prince, Fakhr al-Din II (r. 1585/1590–1635), extended the Maʿni principality north to the Syrian city of Palmyra and south to the Sinai Peninsula. Although he initially re-established good relations with the Ottoman Empire, he also signed treaties with the Grand Duke of Tuscany (1606–1608). As a result, the Ottomans became gradually suspicious of Fakhr al-Din II's overt ambition; they mobilized against him and defeated his army at Hasbayya in 1635. He was then executed with his two sons in Istanbul, but the Maʿni amirs were allowed to rule until 1697, when the emirate was transferred to the Shihabi house.

With the transfer of power from the Maʿnis to the Shihabis, the Druzes as a whole continued to enjoy a relatively high degree of autonomy. But within a decade, Druzes became divided and eventually turned against each other. At the battle of Ain Dara in 1711 two Druze factions fought—the Qaysis of northern Arabian origin and the Yamanis of southern origin. The decisive victory of the Qaysis caused many of the Yamanis to flee to the Hawran region, reducing Druze influence in Mount Lebanon. The Shihabi principality slowly fell under the political and military control of external rulers. Sectarianism began to take root and religious consciousness was on the rise. Moreover, in the late

eighteenth century the Shihabis converted to Christianity, which further reduced the Druze influence in Mount Lebanon.

Modern History (1840s to the Present)

The reign of the last of the Shihabi amirs, Bashir II (1788–1840), reinforced a strong central authority exercised over Mount Lebanon and the areas adjacent to it. However, Bashir II was constrained by the Egyptian rulers and a decade of Egyptian occupation; this led to his fall and, subsequently, to the end of the Shihabi emirate and the beginning of internal civil strife in the early 1840s. In 1843 European foreign powers convinced the Ottoman sultan to pacify the area, and to relinquish affairs in the north to the French-supported Maronites and in the south to the British-backed Druzes. The uneasiness in Mount Lebanon grew and finally exploded into open confrontation, beginning with the Maronite peasants rising against their Maronite landlords in 1858 and then against their Druze landlords in 1860. The bloody events of that year ended in the special autonomous administration of Mount Lebanon within the Ottoman Empire. This arrangement quickly failed and was replaced by a political regime known as *Mutasarrifiyya,* headed by a *mutasarrif* (governor) that imposed a ruler from outside Lebanon who was a subject of the Ottoman sultan. The French mandate replaced the *Mutasarrifiyya* in 1918, and the Druzes in Syria and Lebanon came under the French rule; the Druzes in Palestine and Jordan came under the British mandate. The 1920s and 1930s marked a period of revolts and unrest in the entire region, leading to the independence of Lebanon (1943), Syria (1944), and Israel (1948), and the separation of Druze communities by new national boundaries.

The Syrian Druzes have participated in politics largely through the Atrash family and its recent prominent figure Sultan Pasha al-Atrash. An Arab nationalist symbol of the 1925 to 1927 Jabal Druze revolt against the French forces, Sultan al-Atrash continued to influence local and national politics amongst Druzes until his death in 1982. In the 1967 war between Israel and the Arab states, Israel conquered vast lands, including the Syrian Golan Heights, where four Druze villages have resisted Israeli attempts for annexation; they continue to reassert their Syrian identity, and wish to reunite one day with their relatives in Syria.

The Druzes in Palestine in the 1930s and 1940s were a part of the Arab Legion forces despite their feuds with the surrounding Muslim populations. But in 1947 to 1948 a split took place in the Druze community, and some Druzes voluntarily enlisted in the Israeli army, while others resisted any form of cooperation with the Israeli forces. Subsequently, the first faction prevailed, and in 1956 Israel passed a law requiring three years of military service for all Druze males. Since the 1970s the social and political standings of Druzes in Israel have been gradually improving.

The Druzes in Lebanon have participated in the politics of the country through the two major factions of Jumblattis and Arslanis. In 1958 Kamal Jumblatt and his Progressive Socialist Party, which he founded in 1949, demanded political and social reforms for all Lebanese sects. This crisis led to the deployment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon for seven months to help the national government to restore the peace. Two decades later, however, Lebanon faced a military confrontation that erupted into a full-scale civil war in the spring of 1975. At the beginning of the war the Druzes were a part of a loose coalition of Sunnis, Shiʿa, and Greek Orthodox that fought the Maronite Christian militias, but while the war was still raging, Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated in 1977 and his son Walid took his place. Walid Jumblatt's forces regained previously lost towns, established control over the Shuf Mountain, and emerged victorious in the eyes of the community. In the war many Christians were displaced and it was only in the 1990s that arrangements were made for their return.

Finally, the Lebanese civil war of 1975 to 1990 forced Druzes in Lebanon and elsewhere to put aside their factional politics and to focus on their community's welfare. Furthermore, the civil war also promoted interactions between the Lebanese, Syrian, Israeli, and Jordanian Druze communities. Druzes are likely to continue being loyal to the countries in which they live while doing what is necessary to protect their local and regional communities.

See also Atrash, Sultan Pasha al-; Golan Heights; Israel: Overview; Jabal Druze;

JORDAN; JUMBLATT FAMILY; JUMBLATT, KAMAL; JUMBLATT, WALID; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); LEBANON; LEBANON, MOUNT; MARONITES; PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY; SHUF; SYRIA.

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ROBERT BETTS
UPDATED BY SAMY S. SWAYD

DRUZE REVOLTS

Druze uprisings in Syria and Lebanon in the 1830s.

These large-scale revolts erupted among the Druze (particularly in Hawran) beginning in 1837, when Ibrahim Pasha ibn Muhammad Ali sought to force conscription in the region to support his adventures and those of his father. The Egyptian force sent from Damascus to suppress the rebels was defeated. The Druze of Hawran were soon aided by those from Shuf and Wadi al-Taym, and by Muslims from Mount Nablus in Palestine, who also were subject to conscription. During the revolt, a Druze warrior named Shibli al-Aryan became a national hero. Ibrahim Pasha's frustration in dealing with Druze rebels led him to request Bashir II to send Christian fighters to quell the rebellion. The Christian soldiers were under the command of Bashir's son Khalil, which reinforced Druze suspicions about Bashir's sectarian biases. The revolt failed, but it resulted in intensified sectarian animosities in the mountain regions for years to come.

See also DRUZE; IBRAHIM IBN MUHAMMAD ALI.

AS'AD ABUKHALIL

DUAL CONTAINMENT

U.S. policy toward Iran and Iraq from 1993 to 1997.

In May 1993, the U.S. administration of President William Clinton announced a new policy to contain two countries—Iran and Iraq—that it claimed were threats to U.S. interests in the Middle East. Since Iraq effectively was contained by United Nations sanctions and daily aerial patrols of two no-fly zones in the north and south of the country, the real focus of dual containment was Iran. The stated objective was to apply sufficient international diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran to induce its government to modify its behavior in five areas alleged by the United States: its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction; its repression of domestic political dissent; its support for international terrorism; its efforts to destabilize governments in the Middle East; and its opposition to the Middle East peace process. Although key U.S. allies supported efforts to contain Iraq, they criticized the confrontational approach toward Iran and generally declined to cooperate with the U.S. efforts to isolate it. After 1997, U.S. officials stopped using the term *dual containment,* and the de facto policy became one of finding ways to engage in dialogue with Iran to discuss U.S. concerns. In 2001, the new administration of George W. Bush reverted to viewing Iran as a threat to U.S. interests, although it did not revive the term *dual containment.*

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F. GREGORY GAUSE III
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

DUAL CONTROL

Joint British–French supervision of Egyptian government revenues and disbursements from 1878 to 1882,

supplementing the supervision provided by the Caisse de la Dette Publique set up in 1876.

The first controllers were members of the so-called European cabinet, in which a British subject was finance minister and a Frenchman held the portfolio for public works. This cabinet, appointed by Egypt's Khedive Ismaʿil in August 1878, under pressure from his European creditors, lasted only six months because of its fiscal stringencies, which included placing many Egyptian army officers on half pay. Four months later Khedive Ismaʿil was deposed in favor of his son, Tawfiq.

The British and French governments appointed their controllers: Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer), who had served on the Caisse, and de Blignières, the former Egyptian works minister. They drew up what would become the 1880 liquidation law, which reduced Egyptian government indebtedness by strictly limiting government expenditure. This caused either antiforeign sentiment or feelings of nationalism among Egyptian officers and officials, leading to the 1881 and 1882 Urabi revolution.

Once the cabinet headed by Mahmud Sami al-Barudi took control in February 1882, the controllers could no longer direct the budget. Dual Control was formally terminated when the British occupied Egypt in September 1882. Without access to military force, which Britain and France refused to apply until the Urabi revolution, Dual Control could not impose its program on Egypt's economy and body politic.

See also Baring, Evelyn; Ismaʿil ibn Ibrahim; Urabi, Ahmad.

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Arthur Goldschmidt

DUBAI

The second largest and second wealthiest of the seven emirates in the United Arab Emirates; also, the city of the same name.

The story of the emirate of Dubai revolves around that of Dubai City. The emirate was established by the Al Maktum ruling family around 1833 when the family's clan, the Al Bu Falasa, broke away from the Bani Yas tribal confederation that dominated the region of Abu Dhabi. In its early years Dubai was a small fishing village on the best natural harbor (called Dubai Creek) in the region. Under the Al Maktum rulers it became an important pearling port, and by the early years of the twentieth century it was second only to Kuwait among the commercial ports on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf.

Dubai's rulers historically have encouraged commercial development, attracting merchants from around the region to the city. Consequently, large and visible expatriate communities from Iran, South Asia, and around the world give the city a vibrant, colorful, and cosmopolitan character. The largest city in the United Arab Emirates and its commercial capital, Dubai had an estimated population in 2000 of 886,000. In addition to its port and massive dry dock facilities, the city has one of the region's busiest airports. In 1999 the city boasted the world's tallest hotel, the Burj al-Arab, or Tower of the Arabs.

See also Abu Dhabi.

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DUBS, ADOLPH

[1920–1979]

U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, 1977–1979; assassinated in Kabul.

Ambassador Adolph ("Spike") Dubs was the American ambassador to Afghanistan at the time of the Saur Revolution in April 1978. On 14 February 1979, Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul and held hostage by unidentified people claiming to be opponents of the Afghan Marxist government. He was shot to death after a few hours by police allegedly trying to free him. His death had a deleterious effect

on relations between Afghanistan and the United States.

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GRANT FARR

DUFFERIN REPORT (1883)

Report commending reorganization of Egyptian government under British occupation.

Lord Dufferin, the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in Constantinople (now Istanbul), was sent to Egypt following the defeat of the Urabi revolt to recommend policies for the administration of Britain's occupation. His report on the reorganization of the Egyptian government was issued on 6 February 1883. Recognizing the importance of the rising tide of Egyptian nationalism, Lord Dufferin sought middle ground between the restoration of Egyptian sovereignty and full annexation by England. British officials were to take advisory positions in key offices within the Egyptian administration, including the ministries of finance, interior, public works and irrigation, justice, police, and the army. Other specific measures and reforms discussed in the report were the establishment of an elected government under the khedive (ruler of Egypt, viceroy of the sultan of the Ottoman Empire), the promulgation of civil and criminal codes for the Native Tribunals, the abolishment of forced labor, and putting an end to the use of whippings to collect taxes and obtain evidence of crimes. As a result of Dufferin's report, a Legislative Council and a General Assembly were established, changing the contours of Egyptian politics. Contrary to Dufferin's intention of minimizing British control over the Egyptian government, the reforms discussed in his report increased British presence in Egypt and enhanced Egyptian opposition to the occupation.

See also URABI, AHMAD.

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DAVID WALDNER

DUKAN DAM

The dam was built on Iraq's Little Zab River to control flooding and to provide irrigation and hydroelectric power.

Severe, recurrent flooding of the Little Zab River to northeastern Iraq was formerly commonplace. The rate of flow in this river as it passes through the Dukan gorge is about 34 cubic yards (26 cu m) per minute during the dry season, rising to more than 4,000 cubic yards (3,000 cu m) per minutes at flood time. Iraq's Development Board was already considering major flood control, drainage, and irrigation schemes throughout the country when the Little Zab gave rise to a series of major floods in 1941, 1946, 1949, 1953, and 1954. The highest flood levels were recorded in this latest year when the river's rate of flow reached 4,800 cubic yards (3,660 cu m) per minute despite a normal average daily rainfall.

In 1954, to control further flooding of the Little Zab and to provide water for irrigation in northeastern Iraq, the Development Board awarded a contract to a French consortium for the construction of an arch dam at Dukan gorge on the Little Zab, some 37 miles (60 km) northwest of Sulaymaniya and 60 miles (100 km) northeast of Kirkuk. Between 1,000 and 1,200 families, representing the population of some fifty villages in the adjacent region, were moved and settled to the northwest at Sanga Sir. The Dukan dam and reservoir were completed in 1959 although structural problems necessitated ongoing repairs and further expense. As part of the Dukan project, a series of regulators and dams were built on the Little Zab and adjacent Udayn River, while a spillway conveying water from the Little Zab to the Udayn provided irrigation to the Ghurfa lands and the lands on the right bank of the Udayn River.

The project was tested almost immediately when the Little Zab flooded in 1959, depositing over 2.6

billion cubic yards (2 billion cu m) of water into the reservoir. This allowed a constant runoff for irrigation during the dry season from August to November. Over 20 billion cubic yards (15 billion cu m) of water were processed through the reservoir during the first six years of its operation.

The dam itself is an enormous structure, 382 feet (116.5 m) high and 1,180 feet (360 m) long. It is 20 feet (6.2 m) wide at the top and 107 feet (32.5 m) wide at its base. The reservoir behind it, covering an area of some 104 square miles (270 sq km) or more, has an estimated usual capacity of 8.9 billion cubic yards (6.8 billion cu m), but a maximum capacity of 10.9 billion cubic yards (8.3 billion cu m). The complex serves multiple purposes including flood control, the provision of hydroelectric power (originally rated at 200,000 kilowatts), and the storage of water for lean periods when the Tigris is low. Indeed, the water contained in the reservoir is intended chiefly for the Kirkuk irrigation project whereby over 890,000 acres (360,000 ha) of land around Irbil, Kirkuk, and Diyala districts are to be brought under cultivation, almost 494,000 acres (200,000 ha) around Kirkuk alone.

See also IRAQ; KIRKUK; SULAYMANIYA; ZAB RIVERS.

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ALBERTINE JWAIDEH

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER

[1888–1959]

U.S. secretary of state, 1953–1959.

John Foster Dulles came to public service after a long and successful legal career that afforded him valuable experience in international affairs. He was a senior adviser to the U.S. delegation to the 1945 founding conference of the United Nations Organization in San Francisco, and a member of the U.S. delegation to the first UN General Assembly in 1948. In 1950 and 1951 he earned the praises of U.S. secretary of state Dean Acheson for negotiating a "peace of reconciliation" with Japan.

As President Dwight D. Eisenhower's secretary of state from 1953 to 1959, Dulles directed U.S. foreign policy in tandem with the president. The USSR was their focus because communism was considered an immoral and dangerous system. Concerned with the strategic northern tier of Middle Eastern countries bordering on the USSR, Dulles supported conservative pro-American rulers such as Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran, the Hashimites and Nuri al-Saʿid in Iraq, and Adnan Menderes in Turkey. Although he supported the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact of 1955, Dulles held back from fully committing the United States to membership in the alliance. When Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh threatened to supplant the shah in 1953, Dulles advocated the removal of the prime minister. Together with his brother, CIA director Allen W. Dulles, he organized Operation AJAX, which contributed significantly to Mossadegh's fall in August 1953. In August 1955, in accordance with a secret Anglo-American plot to encourage Israeli-Egyptian talks (Operation ALPHA), Dulles proposed a solution to the Arab–Israel conflict based on resettlement of the Palestinian refugees, treaties to establish permanent frontiers, and guarantees of security for both sides.

Dulles distrusted the attempts of various Middle Eastern states, particularly Egypt, to remain neutral in the Cold War between the superpowers. In 1955 he responded favorably to Egypt's request for funding of the Aswan High Dam, but was disconcerted when Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser made an arms deal with the USSR, via its client Czechoslovakia, in September 1955. Nasser's aspirations to lead the bloc of nonaligned nations, his failure to respond positively to Operation ALPHA, and his recognition of Communist China in May 1956 further alienated Dulles's sympathies.

In July 1956 Dulles decided, with Eisenhower's approval, to revoke the funding offer for the dam project. The withdrawal of funds led to Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, which in turn precipitated an international crisis that culminated in the Arab–Israel War of October 1956. Dulles refused to support the actions of Israel, France, and

Great Britain in their joint attack on Egypt aimed at seizing the canal and toppling Nasser. In early 1957 Dulles participated in the formulation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which offered U.S. military aid to any Middle East state threatened by the USSR. Invoking the doctrine, Dulles and Eisenhower sent U.S. troops into Lebanon in July 1958 in the wake of the revolution in Iraq.

Struggling against the onset of cancer, Dulles resigned his government position in April 1959 and died in May.

See also Alpha, Operation; Baghdad Pact (1955); Menderes, Adnan; Mossadegh, Mohammad; Pahlavi, Reza; Suez Crisis.

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Zachary Karabell
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DUNUM

See Glossary

DURAND LINE

Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

The present border of approximately 1,500 miles between Afghanistan and Pakistan was agreed upon in a treaty signed on 12 November 1893, in Kabul by Sir Mortimer Durand, representing British India, and Abd al-Rahman, amir of Afghanistan.

Durand, the Indian foreign secretary, had been sent by Lord Landsdowne, the viceroy of British India, to pursue Britain's "Forward Policy" designed to control tribal activity along the northwest border of British India. Afghanistan has never accepted the legitimacy of this border, however, arguing that it was intended to demarcate spheres of influence rather than international frontiers. In addition, the Afghans contend that this border bisects the Pushtun tribal area, leaving more than half the Pushtun tribes in Pakistan. Afghans believe that Pushtuns are true Afghans and therefore the Pushtun area, sometimes called Pushtunistan, should be part of Afghanistan. The "Pushtunistan question" has remained an obstacle to good relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

After the communist takeover of Afghanistan in 1978, the government of Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin actively challenged the legitimacy of the Durand line, largely because of their strong Pushtun sentiments. For this reason, the Afghan government formally repudiated the Durand Agreement in 1979. In 1993, 100 years since the signing of the agreement, the Durand Agreement formally lapsed. Afghanistan refused to renew the treaty, leaving Afghanistan and Pakistan with no official border.

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Grant Farr

DURRANI DYNASTY

Rulers of Afghanistan.

The Durrani dynasty (1747–1842) was founded in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 1747, when a group of Pakhtun (Pushtun) elders elected Ahmad Durrani to lead them. Members of the house of Ahmad Shah ruled over the empire he created until its collapse in 1818. A branch of the family maintained control over Herat and the northwestern region until 1842. A grandson of Ahmad Shah regained the Afghan

throne in 1838 but was overthrown in 1842, in the course of a popular uprising against British forces.

The province of Kandahar had changed hands repeatedly between the Moghul and Safavid empires when, in 1708, a coalition of Pakhtun and non-Pakhtun elements under the leadership of Mir Wais Hotak freed the province from the Safavids. In 1722, the Pakhtuns conquered Isfahan, establishing a short-lived Ghilzai empire. By 1737, their capital in Kandahar was taken over by the Persian conqueror, Nadir Shah Afshar, whose death in 1747 provided Ahmad Shah with the opportunity to establish the Durrani empire.

Ahmad Shah belonged to the Saddozai lineage, which had provided the Abdali clan with its leaders for several centuries. On assuming power, Ahmad Shah changed the name of the clan from Abdali to Durrani (Pearl of Pearls). He be stowed special privileges on the Saddozai lineage but confined the kingship to his own house. The crown was hereditary in the house of Ahmad Shah. But in the absence of clear rules, every succession gave rise to an intense struggle for the throne. When Ahmad Shah died, two of his four sons emerged as contenders, but their conflict was quickly resolved in favor of the eldest, Timur Shah (ruled 1772–1793). When he died, the continuous struggle among his numerous sons became a permanent feature of the politics of the dynasty, ultimately leading to its collapse. Three of his sons became rulers, Shah Zaman (ruled 1793–1800), Shah Mahmud (ruled 1800–1803; 1809–1818), and Shah Shuja (ruled 1803–1809; 1838–1842).

Under Ahmad Shah, foreign conquest was the main goal of the dynasty. To build himself a base of support at home and provide a force for conquest abroad, Ahmad Shah showered the Durrani clans with privileges, investing their leaders with the main offices of the empire. Most of the ministers and generals belonged to various branches of the Durrani clan, though rarely to the Saddozai lineage to which Ahmad Shah's house belonged. But near the end of his rule, changed regional conditions had rendered further conquests unprofitable. Timur Shah, who fought only defensive wars, rarely called the Durrani clans to action. To reduce the power of his ministers, he moved the capital from Kandahar, the heartland of Pakhtuns, to Kabul, a predominantly Persian- (Farsi-) speaking city. He also created new offices, to which he appointed non-Durranis owing loyalty to his person.

The warring princes, however, not only had to reconfirm Durrani nobles in their privileges but had to concede to them new powers as well. The cumulative effect of these concessions resulted in the weakening of the crown to the point that ministers were in a position to depose rulers at will. Most of the rulers, however, managed to prevent members of a single lineage from monopolizing all official positions. But under Shah Mahmud, members of the Barakzai clan managed to gain control of the most important offices. When, in 1818, the crown prince blinded the powerful Barakzai chief minister, the latter's brothers, seeking revenge, overthrew the house of Ahmad Shah and brought about the collapse of the Durrani empire.

A civil war ensued. The Indian provinces of the Durrani empire gained their independence, and Afghanistan was divided into a number of independent principalities. A great-grandson of Ahmad Shah, Prince Kamran, gained control of the province of Herat, which he ruled until 1842. Shah Shuja, a grandson of Ahmad Shah and former ruler, mounted a number of expeditions from his exile in India to regain power but without success. Fearing the rising influence of Russia in Persia and Central Asia, British officials in India decided to extend their support to Shah Shuja. To help restore him to power, they sent forces simultaneously against the rulers of Kabul and Kandahar in 1838, thereby initiating the first Anglo–Afghan War. The house of Ahmad Shah still retained enough legitimacy, and Shah Shuja was welcomed by the people. Soon, however, he revealed himself to be no more than a stooge of British power. In 1841, anxious about their own loss of influence, Afghan notables led a popular revolt against the British forces. The British army was destroyed, and Shah Shuja was assassinated in 1842. His descendants fled to India, and from then on, no member of the house of Ahmad Shah ever played a prominent role in the politics of Afghanistan.

The advent of the Durrani dynasty transformed the Pakhtuns in general, and the Durrani clans in particular, into the dominant political force in Afghanistan. The dynasty, however, derived its model of power from the ancient Persian and Islamic theories of government. Persian was the language of

bureaucracy, and it gradually became the language of the court.

See also Ahmad Durrani; Barakzai Dynasty; Kabul; Pushtun.

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See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

E

EASTERN DESERT

Also called the Arabian Desert; it makes up almost a quarter of Egypt's land surface, covering an area of 85,690 square miles (221,937 sq km).

The northern sector, from the Mediterranean coast to the latitude of Qena, is a limestone plateau marked by rolling hills. At Qena the Eastern Desert is marked by cliffs, some as high as 6,500 feet (2,000 m), and scored by deep *wadis* (dry streambeds or valleys) that are difficult to cross. Farther south the desert becomes a sandstone plateau broken by ravines, but some can be traversed easily, such as the ancient trade route from the Nile River to al-Qusayr. In the eastern section of the desert, a chain of hills, more like a series of interlocking systems than a continuous range, runs from near Suez south to the border of the Sudan. At the foot of these hills lies the Red Sea coastal plain, which gradually widens as one moves south.

The sedentary population lives in towns and villages on the Red Sea coast; their main occupations are fishing, transport, and serving the growing Red Sea tourist trade. Nomadic pastoralists make up about 10 percent of the Eastern Desert's population. Pasturelands and water suffice to support small herds of sheep, goats, and camels. Arab tribes include the Huwaytat, Maʿaza, and Ababda. In the south are the Bisharin, part of the Beja, a Hamitic ethnic group.

See also BEJA.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

EASTERN ORTHODOX CHURCH

Direct descendant of the Byzantine State Church; also includes a group of independent national Christian churches.

The Eastern Orthodox Church comprises a group of autonomous Christian churches united by doctrine, liturgy, and internal hierarchical organizations. The heads are patriarchs or metropolitans, with the patriarch of Constantinople only the first among equals. Orthodox churches represented in the Middle East include the Russian, the Balkan, the Greek; the churches of Antioch (now based in Damascus), Alexandria, Jerusalem, and the See of Constantinople (now Istanbul); and the old churches that date to the fifth century C.E., which emancipated themselves from the Byzantine State Church—the Nestorian Church in the Middle East and India (with a half million members) and the Monophysite churches (with some 17 million, including the Coptic of Egypt, the Ethiopian, the Syrian, the Armenian, and the Mar Thoma of India). There are also the Uniate churches, which, properly speaking, are not Orthodox churches because, though they retain traditional eastern liturgies, they acknowledge the primacy and authority of the pope in Rome. Orthodox Christians today number some 150 million or more worldwide—with 125 million in Europe, 25 million in Africa, 3.5 million in Asia, and about 1 million in North America.

Eastern Christianity, with its decentralized organization, diverged from the Western hierarchically organized Roman (Catholic) Church after the fourth century C.E., when Constantinople became the capital of the Roman Empire. The theological split between the Western and Eastern churches was formalized in the Schism of 1054. Rivalry between Rome and Constantinople, aided by longstanding differences and misunderstandings, led to the schism: The Eastern Orthodox churches recognize only the canons of the seven ecumenical councils (325–787 C.E.) as binding for faith, and they reject doctrines that have subsequently been added in the West.

After the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1453 to the Ottoman Turks, the Orthodox patriarch was entrusted with full civil administration over all Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. This centralized administration contrasted with the Eastern church's traditional localist organization. Although the Ottomans granted Christians freedom of worship, the restrictions they imposed on the public profile of the church bred resentment and stagnation in theological scholarship.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Ottoman Empire's Orthodox community once again splintered under the impact of European Catholics and Protestants and of emerging nationalism. The Russian Empire assumed a pan-Slavic stance in its attempts to expand south and east into warm-water ports during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the affinity of Russian Orthodoxy with other Eastern Orthodox communities was stressed. World War I, the Russian Revolution, and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire ended that gambit, although Russian and Soviet interests in the Middle East never diminished.

Today in the Arab East, the Antioch (Melkite) church represents the largest Arab Christian group, with dioceses in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. The Alexandria church has become the center of emerging African Orthodox communities.

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Elizabeth Thompson

EASTERN QUESTION

A concept coined in the initial stage of the Greek War of Independence (1821–1829) to describe the territorial effect of the political decline of the Ottoman Empire on great-power diplomacy in Europe.

In the seventeenth century the Ottoman Empire, at its greatest extent, sprawled across southeast Europe (Hungary included), southwest Asia, and northern Africa (Morocco excluded). The weakening of the sultan's power began in the last decade of the reign of Sultan Süleyman (1520–1566). Europe, however, remained paralyzed by religious wars until the Peace of Westphalia (1648), and the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman imperial government) did not admit its growing frailty vis-à-vis Europe until the end of the seventeenth century. Only then did it negotiate

treaties and other international acts, chiefly with the great powers of Europe. In the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), for the first time, the sultan ceded large tracts in Christian Europe—in this instance to Austria and Poland—which were never recovered.

For a century longer, Ottoman military might was still respected on the Continent. Tsar Peter I (1682–1725), the first European monarch to send troops into Ottoman Asia, occupied the Sea of Azov and its Crimean rim in 1696, only to lose the short-lived conquest along with a claim to power over the Black Sea after a disastrous defeat (1711) at the Prut River (later in Romania). The Ottoman recapture of the Crimea's Tatar khanates was ratified in 1713, in the Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople). That delayed for six decades—until Catherine II (1762–1796), after a six-year war with Turkey—Russia's taking the first solid step toward establishing itself as a Black Sea power through the treaty of Kuçuk Kaynarca (1774), which detached the khanates from the sultan's realm by declaring them independent. Russia did not annex them until nine years later. Finally in 1792, after four more years of war, the Sublime Porte, in the treaty of peace at Jassy, the capital of the Ottoman province of Moldavia (later part of Romania), at last acknowledged this segment of the Black Sea coast as Russian. The victories set in motion Ottoman territorial attrition in southwest Asia; it spread to North Africa in 1830, when France began its conquest of Algeria.

Europe's expansion into the Ottoman Empire at times appeared to consist of predators rushing as far and as fast as they could, paying no heed to the risks of collision. Such a judgment, however, belies the realities. Contenders for the same or overlapping districts were sensitive to one another's interests. Avoidance of conflict became the name of the game as early as the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815). At the end of the Congress the conveners—Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia—styled themselves the Concert of Europe to act as a permanent executive for settling all their disputes by conference or consensual diplomacy.

In 1818, at Aachen, the four powers admitted France to their ranks and promptly instructed the restored Bourbon monarchy to join Britain, as the Concert's sole maritime powers, in suppressing the institutionalized piracy in the western Mediterranean, carried out by the sultan's autonomous *ocaklar* (garrisons) or provinces of Tripoli (Libya), Tunis, and Algiers. A dozen years elapsed before the Barbary garrisons of the Ottoman Maghrib were finally put out of the piracy business.

Only once between 1815 and 1914 did the great powers resort to war over a dispute arising from the Eastern Question. In that case Britain, France, and Russia were the Concert's belligerents in the Crimean War (1854–1856); Austria served as mediator, and Prussia stayed aloof. The entry of the Kingdom of Sardinia, alongside Britain and France, as allies of the Sublime Porte against Russia served, in effect, as its application for membership in the Concert. Having led the Risorgimento for the political unification of the city-states in the Italian peninsula after 1848, Sardinia provided the monarchs following the emergence in 1861 of the kingdom of Italy, which was promptly made a member of the Concert.

The great-power contest for ownership or denial of the sultan's strategic realm reflects the pace and the modes of Europe's expansion into Asia and Africa. The Ottoman Empire spanned the heart of the eastern hemisphere by joining its three continents. The desire to control the Turkish Straits, which separate Asia and Europe while linking the Black and Mediterranean Seas, became a fixed, if also thwarted, aim of Russia after 1774. The Black Sea remained closed to Russia's naval power while the tsardom was exposed to possible attack by hostile maritime powers, as occurred in the Crimean War.

Similarly, on occupying Egypt in 1798, Napoléon declared, in the name of France, his intention to construct and own a manmade waterway from the Mediterranean's landlocked southeast corner to the Red Sea. By cutting across Asia and Africa, such a canal would reduce the distance (and the time) of uninterrupted travel from western Europe, notably from Britain and France, to India by two-thirds, and by lesser amounts to all points along the African and Asian shores of the Indian Ocean.

Given the challenge of two rivals, the cautious shaping by Britain, as the world's foremost maritime and naval power, of its own strategy to deny Russia and France a naval presence on the Mediterranean's eastern littorals was remarkable.

A portrait of Ismet Pasha, chief Turkish negotiator at the Lausanne Conference, which began in November 1922. The present-day territory of Turkey was essentially recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

As the decades passed, Saint Petersburg's aspiration became an obsession. In preparation for the expected takeover of the Turkish Straits, Russia continued swallowing Ottoman property that circled the Black Sea in both Europe and Asia, in the latter from the Crimea through the Caucasus; the last bit was the adjacent corner of Anatolia in 1878. To support the quest for the Turkish Straits even before the Crimean War, Russia established precedents to assert its right to protect the sultan's Orthodox subjects in Anatolia and Syria (including Lebanon and Palestine). In 1856, the Islahat Fermani (Reform Edict) of Sultan Abdülmecit I (1839–1861), reinforced by Article 9 of the Treaty of Paris ending the Crimean War, briefly interrupted, but did not end, the Russian practice.

Meanwhile, over Britain's resolute opposition, French investors in the late 1850s launched the Suez Canal Company, which in 1869 completed the waterway. Backed by the government of France, these entrepreneurs also preempted Britain's moves to take control of the company's policy-framing executive before and after Britain's occupation of Ottoman Egypt in 1882. By 1914 Algeria and Tunisia were part of France's empire, although the Sublime Porte withheld formal recognition of the protectorate in Tunisia. Of the surviving Ottoman provinces in Asia, France's interest centered on Lebanon and Syria from 1860 on. After a lapse of about a century, France in the 1840s had revived earlier treaty rights to custody of papal institutions and their members, covering affiliated eastern Uniate churches as well as Roman Catholicism. Finally, the financial community of France bankrolled railway, harbor, and other concessions in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine and became the dominant shareholder in the Ottoman Imperial Bank, the Ottoman Empire's official agent.

But above all, the overseers of Britain's empire saw the shrinking Islamic state as both a continuing barrier and an unfolding passage to India. In both functions, the Ottoman Empire had grown into a major asset for Britain. Little wonder that, under Britain's persistent lead, the Concert of Europe in 1840 began nearly four decades as guarantor of the integrity of Ottoman Asia and Africa. The chosen formula was that of a self-denying protocol, first used in the Concert's convention of 1840 for "the Pacification of the Levant," which stated that "in the execution of the engagements resulting to the Contracting Powers from the . . . Convention, those Powers will seek no augmentation of territory, no exclusive influence, no commercial advantage for their subjects, which those of every other nation may not equally obtain." Even France, which had upheld Egypt in the crisis, rejoined the Concert in 1841.

Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston, the strategy's author, saw in Egypt's threats to the Osmanli dynasty's survival (1831–1833, 1839) a threat to the British Empire. With the appearance of the steamship in the 1820s, Britain belatedly discovered what the East India Company had begun learning under sail more than half a century earlier: that through the sultan's realm there ran developing routes of communication and transportation between the métropole and the empire in India. In the regional contest of the 1830s, Russia backed the sultan, and France, the viceroy. The main problem,

in Palmerston's diagnosis, was to keep Russia and France apart, for if they joined forces, Britain would suffer along with the Osmanli dynasty. Palmerston preferred a weak Ottoman Empire to a powerful Egypt. He thus responded favorably in 1839 and 1840 to the tsar's proposal for joint military intervention, with the cooperation of the Sublime Porte, to contain an ominous threat to the survival of the Ottoman Empire posed by Muhammad Ali, the viceroy of Egypt, backed by France. Austria and Prussia adhered to this plan of action.

France returned to the fold in 1841, as part of the settlement of the regional crisis. It reduced Muhammad Ali from quasi independence to Ottoman vassalage, but only upon his being recognized as the founder of a hereditary provincial dynasty with full domestic autonomy (though subject to Ottoman control of Egypt's foreign policy). "[A]ll the Treaties concluded and to be concluded between my Sublime Porte and the friendly Powers," read the Sultan's *ferman,* "shall be completely executed in the Province of Egypt likewise." This clause immediately imposed on Egypt the Porte's obligations to Britain, France, and the Netherlands to change the basis of Ottoman foreign commerce from protection to free trade. That deprived Muhammad Ali of the assured revenues from his commercial and industrial monopolies and put an early end to his integrated program of economic and military modernization. Those steps reduced the innovative, self-made, ambitious governor to manageable size. Later they enabled Palmerston, as foreign minister and prime minister, to delay for a dozen years execution of Egypt's grant of a ninety-nine year concession to a national of France to build and operate the Suez Canal.

In 1840 and 1841 the Concert had thus created a subsidiary system expressly to defuse crises in Europe arising from the rivalry over the Middle East (and North Africa) portions of the sultan's realm. For nearly forty years the great powers, with the Sublime Porte taking part and Britain playing the balancer in alternating alliances with Russia against France or the reverse, met five times—in London (1840–1841, 1871), Paris (1856, 1860–1861), and Berlin (1878)—and framed obligatory guidelines on policies toward the Ottoman Empire. Military occupation without time limit, commonly unilateral, was denied legitimacy; formal protectorates were legitimated by the powers, not by the Sublime Porte (in the end by the Turkish Republic); direct annexation was invariably solemnized by formal agreement with Constantinople. All three practices rested on general usage under (Western) international law.

Ismet Pasha of Turkey, his assistants, and detective Colonel Tafik at the Allied Conference with the Turks at Lausanne. The Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1922–1923. © Hulton/Archive by Getty Images. Reproduced by permission.

Other styles of Europe's imperialism were particular to the Eastern Question. In the economic sphere the practices derived from the capitulations (nonreciprocal commercial treaties that the Porte had concluded with Europe's governments from the fifteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries), assured Western residents unilateral extraterritorial privileges. They and their enterprises—banks, railroads, harbors, the Suez Canal—were immune from sultanic and provincial laws and taxes, and subject only to those of home governments. To such built-in dominance by Europe over key developmental aspects of the Ottoman economy was added guardianship of selected religious communities, with Russia and France the leading practitioners. The prevalence in the same districts of resident missionaries and their many charitable, medical, and educational, as well as religious, institutions attested to this.

Strategy apart, Britain's most valuable interest was commerce. As the sole industrializing nation from the last third of the eighteenth century through the Napoleonic wars, Britain speedily moved into first place in the foreign trade of the Ottoman Empire. By 1850, the Porte had become Britain's third-best customer. Britain clung to its commercial lead up to the outbreak of World War I. Financial investment by British nationals lagged far behind. The quest for oil in Ottoman Arab Asia quickened only when the Anglo–Persian Oil Company discovered commercial quantities in Persia in 1908, too late for the find to become practicable before the outbreak of war six years later. Still, the oil potential of the *vilayet* (province) of Mosul riveted the attention, during World War I and afterward, of Britain's companies and their bureaucratic supporters on the Sublime Porte's promise of a concession, in June 1914, to the Turkish Petroleum Company, a non-operating international consortium of British, Dutch, and German interests registered in London.

Meanwhile, Italy, upon its unification in 1861, promptly entered the fray. After losing a bid for Tunisia in Berlin in 1878, Italy finally occupied Libya and the Dodecanese Islands in a lackluster war with the Ottoman Empire (1911–1912). One of Italy's primary aims in entering the war in 1915 was to legalize the titles to both and, if possible, enlarge its imperial holdings.

Upon replacing Continent-centered Prussia in 1871, unified Germany was the final entrant into the competition. Otto von Bismarck moved into the role vacated by Benjamin Disraeli. Germany centered its regional activity after 1882 on serving as military and naval adviser and supplier to Sultan Abdülhamit II (1876–1909). And from 1903, German entrepreneurs, with their government's encouragement and protection, sponsored the building of the Baghdad Railroad to link Europe, across Anatolia through the *vilayets* of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, to the head of the Persian Gulf, with Ottoman assurances of privileged investment rights along the way.

Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882 helped draw Russia and France together, binding them twelve years later in a formal alliance. In all this time and for a decade longer, France kept urging Britain to fix a date for leaving Egypt, while Britain refused to ratify the 1888 Suez Canal Convention until France accepted, for the duration of the occupation, Britain's exercise of the supervisory powers of the projected international commission. Finally the two quarrelers signed an entente cordiale in 1904 that rested on a trade: Britain's responsibility for the canal's security by occupation in return for France's creating a protectorate in Morocco. Before the year's end, the Concert ratified the amended convention that implied approval of Britain's military presence in Egypt. Finally, Britain and Russia reduced irritants in their relations in the Ottoman Empire by reaching an accord on Iran, Afghanistan, and Tibet in 1907.

The three bilateral instruments underlay the formation of the Triple Entente (Britain, France, and Russia) on the outbreak of war in 1914 against the Central Powers (Germany and Austria). For the first time, the Sublime Porte, which entered World War I in November 1914 as an ally of the Central Powers, placed itself simultaneously at war with the three countries that had territorial scores to settle with the sultan—Britain in Egypt (and Sudan), France in Tunisia, and Russia at the Turkish Straits. The secret accords of the Entente powers (the Constantinople Agreement of 1915 and the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916) proposed assigning the Turkish Straits and eastern Anatolia to Russia, parceling the Fertile Crescent (later Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Transjordan) under variable terms among the three allies, and declaring the Arabian Peninsula a British sphere of influence.

In April 1915, Italy associated itself with the Entente for the express aim of legitimizing its occupation of Libya and the Dodecanese Islands. Two years later, after the overthrow of the tsarist regime, Italy concluded a separate agreement (treaty of Saint-Jean de Maurienne) with Britain and France, to become a party to the Entente plans for sharing in the Ottoman spoils; to the Sykes–Picot arrangement were added zones for Italy's administration and influence in southern and western Anatolia. But the instrument never won the requisite assent from the Bolshevik regime, which seized power in the fall of 1917. After the war the unratified draft did not deter Italy from trying—but failing—to anchor itself in Anatolia.

Meanwhile, the secret correspondence of Sir Henry McMahon (Britain's high commissioner for

Egypt) with Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca (the Ottoman governor of the province of Hijaz) served as the basis for mounting an Arab rebellion against the sultan. Clearly, Britain perceived McMahon's exchanges with Husayn, which were started and finished (July 1915–March 1916) before the Sykes–Picot negotiations (December 1915–April 1916), as a solidifying step in the Arabian Peninsula. They agreed on mutual military commitments but left unsettled their political differences that gave rise to bitter Anglo–Arab quarrels. The later conflicting Anglo–French–Arab claims in the Fertile Crescent were compounded by the Balfour Declaration: Britain's secret understanding with the Zionists and public declaration of sympathy for the formation in Palestine of a Jewish national home. This was the price that Britain's government had to pay for finally acquiring an exclusive mandatory presence in Palestine in defense of the Suez Canal.

The Eastern Question thus was not resolved until the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the empire's formal dissolution in 1922, and the peace treaty of Lausanne—the only such settlement negotiated but not imposed after that war—that the Entente and associated powers signed with the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and ratified a year later. Even then, Turkey's nationalist regime at Ankara contested the proposed transfer of two territorial slivers, losing one (the *vilayet* of Mosul to Iraq) in 1926 but winning the other (the return to Turkey by France, as mandatory of Syria, of the *sanjak* [provincial district] of Alexandretta) in 1939. In between, at Turkey's insistence, in the Montreux Convention of 1936, the naval signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne restored to the Republic of Turkey full sovereignty over the Turkish Straits by dissolving the International Straits Commission.

See also Abdülhamit II; Abdülmecit I; Balfour Declaration (1917); Capitulations; Crimean War; Fertile Crescent; Greek War of Independence; Husayn ibn Ali; Husayn–McMahon Correspondence (1915–1916); Lausanne, Treaty of (1923); McMahon, Henry; Montreux Convention (1936); Muhammad Ali; Palmerston, Lord Henry John Temple; Paris, Treaty of (1857); Sublime Porte; Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916).

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J. C. Hurewitz

EAST INDIA COMPANY

British trading firm doing business in the Middle East during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The East India Company was active on behalf of Britain in the Persian Gulf, from 1820 until World War I, to ensure the security of Britain's merchant vessels heading toward ports in southern Iraq and Iran. This was achieved by signing peace treaties with the shaykhs of the lower Gulf, the first in 1820 and two more in 1835 and 1853. The main objectives of these treaties were to put an end to piracy, to prevent traffic in slaves, to curb widespread smuggling of arms and other goods, and to promote peaceful trade. By 1869, Britain was able to conclude a treaty in which the Gulf rulers pledged to refrain from conducting foreign relations with powers other than Britain, in effect providing Britain with protectorate powers over those territories.

Britain's interests were represented in the Gulf by the government of India through the local political resident, headquartered in the coastal township of Bushehr in Iran (moved after World War II to Bahrain). The political resident had representatives, called political agents, posted in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, and political officers in the Trucial Coast.

See also Trucial Coast.

Jenab Tutunji

EBADI, SHIRIN

[1947–]

Iranian attorney and human rights advocate.

Shirin Ebadi was born in 1947 and graduated in 1969 from the Law Faculty, Tehran University. Ebadi

became one of the first female judges in Iran. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, when women judges were dismissed, she lost her position but remained an employee of the Ministry of Justice until 1984, when she took early retirement. In 1992 Ebadi obtained a license to practice as an attorney, and she soon emerged as the leading figure in the Iranian human rights movement. In 1994, along with other women, Ebadi founded the Society for Protecting the Rights of the Child, which has lobbied parliament to introduce legal reforms in line with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. She has defended many victims of human rights violations. In 1998 she was defense lawyer for the families of the victims of the political assassinations of writers and intellectuals by rogue elements of the Ministry of Intelligence. Ebadi's vocal defense of human rights has antagonized the Iranian judiciary, who arrested her in June 2000. She was accused of producing and distributing a videocassette that allegedly "disturbs public opinion" and implicates certain senior officials in atrocities against reformist personalities and organizations. She was tried in closed court, sentenced to a suspended sentence, and banned from practicing law, but this sentence was overturned in a court of appeal. Ebadi has published many books in Persian and has received many awards, including the 1996 Human Rights Watch Award and the Rafto Prize for Human Rights 2001, in recognition of her sustained fight for human rights and democracy in Iran. In October 2003 the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded Ebadi the Nobel Peace Prize for 2003, citing her efforts for democracy, human rights, and the rights of women and children.

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ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI

EBAN, ABBA (AUBREY)

[1915–2002]

Israeli politician; foreign minister, 1966–1974.

Born in Capetown, South Africa, Aubrey Eban was educated at Queens' College, Cambridge, where he specialized in Middle Eastern languages and literature. He received a master's degree in this field in 1938 and stayed on at Cambridge as a lecturer in Arabic, Persian, and Hebrew literature. After Cambridge, Eban joined the British army, and in 1941 he served as a British army major in Cairo. In the British army, he helped train Jewish volunteers to fight against a German invasion of Palestine.

Eban worked for the Jewish Agency in 1946, and in 1947 he was made a liaison officer to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. He also served as a member of the Jewish Agency's delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN). After the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, Eban was appointed Israel's representative at the UN; he held that position from 1950 to 1959, during which time he also was Israel's ambassador to the United States.

In 1959, Eban was elected to the Knesset for the first time. From 1960 to 1963, he served in David Ben-Gurion's cabinet as minister of education and culture, and, from 1964 to 1965, he was deputy prime minister in the government of Levi Eshkol. During this time, from 1959 to 1966, Eban also was president of Israel's prestigious Weizmann Institute of Science. He was foreign minister from 1966 to 1974, and it was during this period in 1967 that he achieved his greatest international visibility, when he presented the case for Israel's war policy before the UN Security Council.

While a member of the Israeli cabinet, Eban argued against the idea of Arab migrant labor, which Moshe Dayan and other cabinet members supported. Eban thought that Israel should not become dependent upon Arab labor, both for economic reasons and for more philosophical reasons relating to the pioneering character of Israel. He was in the minority on this question, however, and Arab day labor increased over time.

In 1974, when Golda Meir resigned, primarily because of political criticism of her government's handling of the Arab–Israel War (1973), Eban was mentioned by some as a possible successor to the prime minister, but his candidacy did not generate much excitement or support from either the public or from members of the MAPAI Party. In many

respects, Eban subsequently had a bigger following overseas than in Israel. To the surprise of many, he failed to win reelection to the Labor Party's list of nominees for the Knesset. He thereafter retired from politics and devoted himself to educational pursuits and to writing. He died on 17 November 2002 in Israel.

See also Arab–Israel War (1973); Ben-Gurion, David; Dayan, Moshe; Eshkol, Levi; Israel: Political Parties in; Jewish Agency for Palestine; Knesset; Meir, Golda; United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 1947 (UNSCOP); Weizmann Institute of Science.

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Gregory S. Mahler

EBTEKAR, MAʿSUMEH

[1960–]

Iranian feminist and politician.

Maʿsumeh Ebtekar was born in 1960 in Tehran. She spent part of her childhood, from age three to nine, in the United States, but received most of her education in Iran: a B.S. in medical technology from Shahid Beheshti University, in Tehran, in 1985; an M.S. in 1989; and a Ph.D. in immunology from Tarbiat Modarres University, in Tehran, in 1995.

As one of the students who participated in the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979, Ebtekar came to be known as Mary, the spokesperson for the student militants to the U.S. media. She appeared on almost every U.S. television program that was aired during the 444 days of the hostage crisis. Twenty-one years later, she wrote a book, *Takeover in Tehran: The Inside Story of the 1979 U.S. Embassy Capture,* in order "to set the record straight."

Aside from a few articles on immunology, most of Ebtekar's writings and professional activities have been in the area of women's studies, particularly on issues related to the integration of women into the processes of socioeconomic development. She was a member of the official Iranian delegation to the 1985 Third World Conference on Women, in Nairobi, and vice chair of the national committee for the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, in Beijing. She was a founding member and has been a member of the board of directors of the Center for Women's Studies and Research since 1986; a faculty member of the Tarbiat Modarres University School of Medical Science from 1989 to 1995; editorial director and license holder of *Farzaneh: Journal of Women's Studies* since 1994; and director of the Women's NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) Coordination Office since 1994. Appointed by President Mohammad Khatami in 1997 as vice president and head of the Department of Environment, Ebtekar became the first woman in the cabinet since the Iranian Revolution and the first female vice president in Iran's history.

See also Iranian Revolution (1979); Khatami, Mohammad.

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Nareyeh Tohidi

ECEVIT, BÜLENT

[1925–]

Turkish politician and prime minister.

Born in Istanbul, Bülent Ecevit graduated from Robert College, in Istanbul, in 1944 and then studied English literature at Ankara University. Following his appointment to the Press General Directorate, he was sent as an assistant to the press attaché at the Turkish Embassy in London. After his return to Turkey, he worked for the daily *Ulus.* In 1957, he received a Rockefeller scholarship and spent a year at Harvard University. In the same year, he was elected to parliament on a ticket of the Republican People's Party (CHP). After the 1960 military coup, Ecevit

Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit at a polling station during the 2002 national elections. Dogged by ill health and fresh political crises throughout the year, Ecevit lost the election, and his government was supplanted by members of the Justice and Development Party. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

served as the minister of labor until 1965 and was elected secretary general of the CHP in 1966. During this period, he also wrote a daily commentary in *Milliyet,* where he developed his political philosophy, which he called "left of center." His ideas found a large audience within the CHP, which elected him chairman in 1972.

In the general elections of 1973, the CHP gained the highest number of seats, and after long negotiations Ecevit established a coalition government with the pro-religious National Salvation Party. His government intervened in Cyprus in 1974 to protect the ethnic Turkish minority. Nevertheless, insurmountable conflicts between Ecevit and his coalition partner, Necmeddin Erbakan, led to the resignation of the government on 17 September 1974.

Ecevit became prime minister again in 1978, but he had to resign after the CHP's defeat in the 1979 by-elections. Following the 1980 military coup, Ecevit was detained, together with other party leaders, at Hamzaköy for "safety" reasons and was deprived of his political rights for ten years.

Ecevit was arrested twice in 1982 for declaring, in statements to the foreign press, that the new constitution was undemocratic. During this period, his wife, Rahşan Ecevit, founded the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and became its first chairperson. In 1987, after his political ban was lifted, Ecevit assumed leadership of the DSP. When the DSP failed to receive 10 percent of the national vote in the 1987 elections, he resigned from his party post with the intention of withdrawing from politics. Two years later, however, he resumed his party duties and in the general elections of 1991 his party gained seven seats in the National Assembly.

In the 1995 elections, the DSP gained 14.64 percent of the votes and won 76 parliamentary seats. In 1997, Ecevit joined a coalition with Mesut Yılmaz's Anavatan (Motherland) Party and became deputy prime minister. The government, however, stepped down in 1998 after allowing a parliamentary investigation into Yılmaz's financial affairs. Ecevit formed and led a minority government until the 1999 general elections, in which his party won the highest percentage of votes and 136 parliamentary seats. In 1999, he formed a coalition with the Motherland Party and the ultranationalist National Action Party.

This coalition lived through two economic crises and two devastating earthquakes, but the most serious challenges to its survival came from the insurmountable differences among the coalition partners, primarily between the DSP and the National Action Party, and from Ecevit's deteriorating health. Ecevit remained prime minister until the 2002 general elections, when his party received only 1.22 percent of the votes and no parliamentary seats.

See also CYPRUS; ECEVIT, RAHŞAN; ERBAKAN, NECMEDDIN; MOTHERLAND PARTY; REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (RPP).

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NERMIN ABADAN-UNAT
UPDATED BY BURÇAK KESKIN-KOZAT

ECEVIT, RAHŞAN

[1923–]

Founder of Turkey's Democratic Left Party and wife of the former prime minister, Bülent Ecevit.

Rahşan Ecevit was born into a middle-class family in Bursa. She graduated from Robert College in Istanbul, where she met her husband, Bülent Ecevit. Although she was interested in the arts, she did not pursue a career in the field.

Ecevit always supported her husband's political activities. When he was banned from politics after the 1980 military intervention, she founded the Democratic Left Party (DSP) in 1985 and served as its chairperson. When the ban was lifted in 1987, she left her post to Bülent Ecevit and became the party's general secretary. Although she retained that position, she never participated in general or local elections.

Ecevit is widely believed to advise her husband on political matters, especially his pardoning of prisoners during his two separate terms as prime minister. The Ecevits frequently have been criticized for imposing absolute authority and eliminating any opposition within the DSP. Rahşan Ecevit particularly has been accused of isolating the upper cadres so that they would resign rather than challenge her husband. During her husband's last term in government, especially from 2000 to 2002, she was strongly criticized for failing to care for his deteriorating health.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; TURKEY.

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BURÇAK KESKIN-KOZAT

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID

Countries of the Middle East are prominent both as recipients and donors of foreign assistance.

Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey are major long-term recipients of economic aid, but nearly every country in the region has, at one time or another, received economic and development aid as well as military assistance. These transfers have come in the form of grants and concessional loans for goods and services, for projects and programs, and for direct budgetary support. From the mid-1950s until 1991 the United States and the Soviet Union divided and sometimes shared the region's aid clients, providing most of the assistance to the region. France and Britain, along with other countries in the European community, have also been major benefactors, and in recent years Japan has provided direct assistance. Bilateral aid aside, many Middle East states have looked to regional and international lending institutions for financing.

In spite of suspicions about foreign interference, most governments in the region actively seek foreign aid in order to strengthen economies, improve technologies, and bolster military capabilities. The loans and grants are intended to overcome the constraints of insufficient capital investment resulting from limited savings and foreign exchange. Chronic domestic budget deficits—often traceable to generous consumer subsidies and heavy outlays for arms—help to create and perpetuate a dependence on foreign aid. Some governments in the region have become chronically dependent on these and other rental incomes.

Politics of Bilateral Aid

In the 1980s and 1990s major donors, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the United States government, pushed for liberal economic reforms in recipient countries, stressing export-led growth and expansion of the private sector at the expense of state-owned enterprises. Support for market-oriented economies is thought to enhance political pluralism and strengthen civil societies in the region. Increasingly, the United States and others have said that the promotion of democratic institutions and human rights is an objective in giving aid. Environmental and population concerns are also reflected in programs, and humanitarian assistance remains available in times of acute need. But strategic political objectives overshadow other motives. Donors seek to reward political friends or woo others by improving the ability of governments to realize the demands and fulfill the expectations of their elites and wider publics. Political expediency can lead to minimizing developmental objectives, waiving economic reforms,

On 18 January 1957, Arab leaders met in Cairo, Egypt, to sign an agreement providing aid to Jordan, giving that country the capability of cutting its final ties to Great Britain. Jordan continues to receive economic and military aid from oil-rich nations in the region. © Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

and ignoring democratic-rights violations. Emphasis on political criteria by the more important donors has, moreover, resulted in the lion's share of foreign aid going to middle-income countries rather than to the poorest, most needy ones.

U.S. economic aid obligated through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) is deemed specifically to be in the foreign-policy interests of the United States. Over the history of the program, aid to Israel and Egypt has dominated expenditures. With strategic concerns uppermost, regimes in Turkey, Jordan, and Morocco have also been amply rewarded. Proponents argue that U.S. economic and military aid to the Middle East contributes to cooperation and stability, and that it helped to thwart communist penetration into the region. Thus, U.S. policymakers have at various times actively discouraged direct or indirect assistance to Libya, South Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, all of which have been at one time beholden for aid to the Soviet Union. More recently, efforts to prevent technological assistance to Iran have figured strongly in U.S. policy.

U.S. assistance to the Middle East advanced dramatically with the Arab–Israel War of 1973 and its aftermath. Israel was first resupplied militarily, and then helped to recover economically from the war. Egypt, which had been heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for aid, was supported in its decision to join the Western camp with promises of development, commodity, and military assistance. U.S. aid subsequently provided critical incentives for signing the Camp David Accords and a peace treaty. Since 1977, Israel and Egypt have received

nearly 40 percent of all U.S. aid—more than $75 billion in total.

Egypt, with annual aid at roughly $2.1 billion, had by 2000 received more than $40 billion from the United States—in the last decade, mainly in the form of grants rather than repayable loans. As a reward for Egypt's helpful role in the 1991 Gulf War, the United States agreed to the cancellation of $7 billion of military debts. Jordan, after concluding a peace agreement with Israel in October 1994, also came in line for debt relief and a major increase in weapons aid from the United States.

Creditors to the region also include the wealthier, oil-exporting states of the Persian Gulf, most notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. They have assisted the Yemen Arab Republic, Jordan, Sudan, Egypt, and Syria, among others, in filling their investment-resource gap and relieving budgetary pressures. Arab aid has also been designed to buy off potential enemies.

Israel in May 2000 unconditionally withdrew most of its forces from the southernmost part of Lebanon, which it had invaded and occupied in June 1982. Days later, Martin Indyk, the U.S. ambassador to Israel, visited the northern Israeli village of Metulla and announced the release of $50 million in U.S. military aid for improvements to Israeli security along its border with Lebanon. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

Economic Reform and Multilateral Aid

Politically motivated bilateral aid is less bound by stringent economic requirements than that set by the IMF and the World Bank. Middle East countries receiving aid from these multilateral-aid sources have been obliged to agree to comprehensive structural reforms of their economies in order to attain loans and to reschedule previous debts. These reforms may include the elimination of state subsidies and removal of other price distortions, reform of tax collection, reduction in imports, devaluation of currency, and unification of exchange rates—essentially deflationary policies aimed at greater adherence to free-market principles.

Demands for fiscal and monetary changes and revised development strategies have been widely resented and often resisted. Under pressure from the IMF and World Bank, governments that have accepted the conditions for aid have been forced to introduce economic reforms that bear down hardest on the least well-off in their societies. As a consequence, several countries in the region have had to contend with popular demonstrations against mandated changes. IMF austerity programs over the years have led to street violence in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco, and contributed to antigovernment activities in Algeria and Sudan.

Among the regional multilateral-aid givers, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, and the OPEC Fund for International Development are the most prominent. The Arab Monetary Fund assists members in balance-of-payments difficulties. Between 1978 and 2002 it lent $4.3 billion to Arab countries. The Islamic Development Bank offers interest-free loans (with a service fee), mainly for infrastructural financing, agricultural projects, and technical assistance, all of which are expected to have an impact on long-term social and economic development. Priority is given to the import of goods from other member countries of the bank. Major contributors to the bank are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya. Loans have been made to several countries outside the region in Africa and Asia. The OPEC fund is a multilateral agency that seeks to reinforce financial cooperation between OPEC member countries and other developing countries. It provides concessional loans for balance-of-payments support, the implementation of development projects and programs, and technical assistance and research financing through grants. The OPEC fund, which has had recipients

General Hugh Shelton of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, followed by Israeli Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz, passes an honor guard in Tel Aviv after arriving in Israel in August 1999 to discuss military cooperation between Israel and the United States. Israel has long been a major recipient of U.S. economic and military aid, followed by Egypt and other countries in the Middle East. **© AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.**

in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, gives priority to countries with the lowest income. Yet, with heavy debts of their own owing to the Gulf War and low oil prices, the bilateral and multilateral generosity of the once-cash-rich Arab states declined in the 1990s.

Foreign Military Aid

Foreign military credits and grants have greatly eased the burden of defense spending for many Middle East countries. The region is the largest arms market in developing countries, accounting for 56 percent of all agreements from 1990 to 1993. With an average of some 30 percent of government expenditures for the military, the Middle East ranked ahead of any other region. In terms of the percentage of gross domestic product devoted to arms expenditures over the last two decades, nine of the top twelve countries—Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Oman, Syria, Egypt, Libya, the Yemen Arab Republic, and the Yemen People's Democratic Republic—have been in the Middle East. Among the leading recipients of major conventional weapons in the last decade are Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Syria, Israel, and Iran. The major suppliers of arms to the region were the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Britain, and China.

U.S. military sales have been based in large part on a loan program set up in 1975 under which the U.S. Treasury, bypassing the U.S. Congress, provides credits from a special fund at prevailing commercial interest rates. Since most commercial lenders are reluctant to finance weapons purchases, these credits represent a form of foreign assistance. Several countries in the Middle East also received some or all of their arms from the United States on concessionary-loan terms or as outright grants. Beneficiaries include Turkey, Morocco, and Jordan, but Egypt and Israel virtually monopolize the most favorable military-assistance programs. From 2001 to 2003 the United States extended to Middle East countries foreign military assistance worth $10.2 billion, nearly all of which went to Egypt and Israel. The annual value of Russian arms to the Middle East, having fallen to only $400 to $500 million in 1997 to 2001, had been running at more than $15 billion annually during the 1980s.

Effects of Foreign Aid

It is difficult to assess whether foreign aid has improved the lives and increased the security of most people in the Middle East. Bilateral- and multilateral-aid programs have brought visible infrastructural improvements throughout the region. They have also addressed humanitarian needs, especially in areas of armed conflict, and induced estimable health and social gains. In recent years, foreign advisers have succeeded in forcing national planners to rationalize strategies of economic growth and have promoted integration within the global economy. But foreign aid also has disappointed both recipient countries and their donors. Aid-giving countries and agencies have complained about the inefficiencies and domestic corruption that often accompany sponsored programs, and they doubt the will of national leaders to implement reforms fully. Critics point out that much foreign assistance never actually reaches those it was intended to help. The region has lagged behind most of the world in economic liberalization. Recipient-country industries and trade continue to be highly protected, and although

donors applaud evidence of growing democratization in several Arab states, they are concerned about the likely political beneficiaries of free elections. Bilateral donors are also frequently left unsatisfied with the diplomatic cooperation they have extracted from policymakers in Middle East countries.

Aside from the political resentments it provokes, foreign aid is criticized by recipients for its failure to put development on a self-sustaining basis and for possible disincentive effects on domestic production. Although donors have made industrial growth and higher agricultural output high priorities, unemployment remains a serious problem, and appropriate technologies and training are sometimes withheld. Considerable foreign assistance for agriculture that began in the 1980s has neither paid off in terms of impressive export earnings nor greatly improved the capacity for food self-sufficiency in the region's less well-off countries. With the mandating of difficult economic reforms, foreign assistance is also seen as increasing inequities and exacerbating domestic class conflicts.

Most controversial is whether, by selling arms to the Middle East, the United States and other suppliers are reducing conflict by allowing countries to better protect themselves, or stimulating defense spending and a regional arms race. Investment of borrowed money and domestic savings in weapons programs may also come at the expense of efforts to deal with severe economic problems and address the welfare of citizens. Accumulated loans have created considerable national debt and a long-term drain on national treasuries. Even so, although the end of the Cold War and the outcomes of recent regional wars have changed some of the sources and character of military and economic assistance, the quest for and dependence on foreign aid is unlikely to diminish any time soon.

Some of the poorer states in the region have received large flows of finance from abroad that have been essential for their survival. These have come from oil-rich countries in the region and from outside the region. The classic "rentier state" state is Jordan; other significant recipients have been Egypt and Syria. Aid has been bilateral and multilateral, civilian and military. It has taken the form of loans, grants, and debt write-offs. Between 1973 and 1989, poorer states in the Arab world received $55 billion of interregional aid. This was made possible by the huge rise in oil income in the region. Political rents have been paid to help maintain the state and the regime. Often the two were the same, but with the rise of fundamentalism within Arab states, aid has been provided to governments in order to maintain them in power.

Foreign aid has fallen in value since the 1980s for several reasons. First, Arab oil wealth has declined, and so there was less to give. Second, it did not result in economic improvements in the recipient countries (or at least not on a scale that satisfied the donors) and was thus considered as wasted. Third, the decline of pan-Arabism led countries to go their own ways and be less interested in inter-Arab relations. Fourth, Western countries and multilateral bodies have tied aid to economic reforms, the success of which reduced the need for external assistance.

The share of aid given on a concessional basis to countries in the Middle East and North Africa was higher than anywhere else in the developing world. In 1999, 38 percent of long-term debt in the region was concessional, compared to 19 percent on average for developing countries. In Egypt it came to 86 percent; in Jordan, 54 percent; in Syria, 93 percent; and in Yemen, 92 percent. This was an indication of political favor.

See also International Debt Commission; International Monetary Fund; Russia and the Middle East; United States of America and the Middle East; World Bank.

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MARVIN G. WEINBAUM
UPDATED BY PAUL RIVLIN

Traders at the Baghdad Stock Exchange (BSE). The self-financed, nonprofit BSE began operation in March of 1992; by 2000, it was holding three trading sessions a week, with approximately ninety companies listed. © MICHAEL S. YAMASHITA/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ECONOMICS

The economics of the Middle East can be divided into oil producers and nonproducers.

The main oil producers in the Middle East include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Oman, Algeria, and Libya. There are three marginal producers: Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria. The nonproducers or minimal producers are Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia, and Morocco.

Oil is a major resource commodity of the Middle East, with its top producing countries containing over 65 percent of the world's oil reserves. Additionally, the total number of oil reserves in the world has doubled in the last two decades, almost entirely due to exploration in the Middle East. © GEORGINA BOWATER/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Another taxonomic variable is population. The Middle East has countries with large populations—Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, and Algeria. Others, such as Qatar and the U.A.E., have minimal indigenous populations.

The production of oil per capita tends to define the type of economy to which each Middle Eastern country belongs. Countries with oil production of more than 0.25 barrels per day per capita tend to emphasize the development of low-labor, high-capital industries. Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., and Qatar have sought to develop alternatives to their dependence on crude oil by investing heavily in industry, mainly in petrochemicals, which require large amounts of natural gas or crude oil, energy, and capital, but minimum labor. Until 1995 most of the development in oil and petrochemicals was spearheaded by the governments, with some support from the private sector. Due to lessening income streams from lower oil prices, efforts are being made to include private industry more fully.

The non-oil economy in the countries with high per capita oil output tends to be liberal, except in Libya. None of the countries in this group has any foreign-exchange controls, restriction on import or export of capital by nationals, or limits on imports and exports of products (except pork products and alcohol). Most prices are set by supply and demand, although some food staples are subsidized by the governments.

The countries with production between zero and 0.10 barrels per day per capita mostly have large populations. Some are minor oil producers, but major producers like Iran, Iraq, and Algeria have a low production per capita. These low per capita producers tend to emphasize centrally planned industrial growth with more labor content. They have very stringent regulations on investments and on foreign-exchange and capital export by residents. Large segments of their economy tend to be nationalized, including banks, mining, and large manufacturing plants. Their economic growth has been minimal, and most are attempting to deregulate their economies.

The final group (Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, etc.), with very limited earnings from oil,

Agricultural products are a primary export for some Middle Eastern countries, including Israel, Egypt, and Morocco. However, due to limited water supplies, poor land quality, and a reluctance to adopt newer, more mechanized farming techniques, the majority of Arab countries produce less than half of their food requirements and must import heavily from other regions. **© Attal Serge/Corbis Sygma. Reproduced by permission.**

Country	Oil Production Average 2002 in thousands of b/d	Population in thousands	Bbls/Capita	Reserves in billions of barrels 2001	GDP in billions of $
Kuwait	1,853	1,970	0.94	96.5	30.9
Qatar	640	700	0.91	15.2	16.3
United Arab Emirates	1,952	2,650	0.74	97.8	51
Oman	950	2,620	0.36	5.5	21.5
Saudi Arabia	7,551	21,030	0.36	261.8	248
Libya	1,317	5,410	0.24	29.5	40
Iraq	2,014	23,580	0.09	112.5	28.6
Iran	3,470	64,530	0.05	89.7	456
Bahrain	27	650	0.04		8.4
Syria	530	16,720	0.03	2.5	54.2
Algeria	883	31,840	0.03	9.2	177
Yemen	470	19,110	0.02	4	14.8
Egypt	630	67,890	0.01	2.9	258
Turkey	48	68,610	0		468
Tunisia		9,670	0	0.3	24.9
Jordan		6,850	0		22.8
Lebanon		6,560	0		22.8
Israel		6,450	0		122
Morocco		650	0		112
Total	**22,335**	**357,490**	**0.06**	**727.4**	

SOURCE: This table compiles information from *Middle East Economic Survey*, vol. XLV, 2002; the EIA country analysis briefs (available from <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html>); and the U.S. State Department Country Background Notes (available from <http://www_state.gov>)

Table by GGS Information Services, The Gale Group.

relies on private local and foreign investment as well as foreign aid to fund their development.

A large segment of the population in the Middle East is active in agriculture (35.35%). However, this average is skewed by the large numbers of people employed in that sector in Egypt (43%) and Morocco (50%). Mining, manufacturing, and construction employs about 20.57 percent; public administration and services employs 23.54 percent; and trade, transport, and communication employs 9.27 percent.

Oil producers tend to have a much larger percentage of their population in public administration and services, suggesting that oil resources are downstreamed to the population through the creation of jobs in the civil service (34% in Saudi Arabia, 40% in Qatar, 39% in Iraq, 53% in Kuwait).

See also PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS.

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JEAN-FRANÇOIS SEZNEC

EDDÉ, EMILE

[1884–1949]

Prime minister (1929–1930) and president (1936–1941) of Lebanon.

Emile Eddé, a Lebanese lawyer and politician, was a strong supporter of French policies in Lebanon and the Middle East. He was a devoted Francophile who came from a family that was well connected to French interests. Eddé was prime minister in 1929 and 1930 and president from 1936 to 1941 under the French mandate over Lebanon (1920–1943). He also initiated and headed during the mandate the Parliamentary National Bloc, which became a party in 1946 after independence. Eddé was highly controversial due to his conservative views, anti-Arab sentiments, and zealous adherence to French colonialism. Raymond Eddé, Emile's son, headed the party in 1949 and directed it toward more liberalism and less dependency on France.

See also EDDÉ, RAYMOND; LEBANON.

SAMI A. OFEISH

EDDÉ, RAYMOND

[1913–2000]

Lebanese politician and leader of the National Bloc party since 1949; minister of the interior, social affairs, and communications (1958–1959); minister of public works, hydraulic and electric resources, agriculture, and planning (1968–1969).

The eldest son of former president of Lebanon Emile Eddé, Raymond Eddé was trained as a lawyer at St. Joseph University in Beirut. Following his father's death in 1949, he took over the leadership of the National Bloc party. A leader of the opposition to President Bishara al-Khuri, he was elected to parliament in 1953 from the Jubayl district. He was reelected in 1960, 1968, and 1972. Appointed minister following the 1958 civil war, Eddé soon broke with President Fuʾad Chehab over the latter's reliance on the Deuxième Bureau (military intelligence) to implement his policies. In 1967, arguing that the growing influence of the military posed a threat to the open and democratic nature of Lebanon's society, he joined the Tripartite Alliance (with Pierre Jumayyil and Camille Chamoun), thus ensuring the defeat of the Chehabist candidate Ilyas Sarkis in the 1970 presidential elections.

By the time civil hostilities broke out in 1975, Eddé had become the most outspoken and prominent Christian opponent of the Phalange, which he described as a fascist organization. A representative of the more moderate Maronites, he warned about the potentially disastrous consequences of the growth of paramilitary organizations in Lebanon and strove to prevent the growing polarization in the country by reaching out to like-minded Muslim leaders. However, because he never was a grassroots organizer, lacked mass support within the Maronite community, and refused to organize a militia of his own, he was rapidly marginalized. In January 1977, after three attempts on his life, he went into exile in Paris. In 1989 he opposed the Taʾif Accord on the grounds that it institutionalized Syria's power in Lebanon, and expressed support for General Michel Aoun. Following the 1992 legislative elec-

tions, he refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new Parliament. Although he was widely respected as a man of principle and was often described as "the moral conscience of Lebanon," his long exile cut him off from the realities in Lebanon, and his influence over politics there became very limited. He died in Paris in May 2000.

See also AOUN, MICHEL; CHAMOUN, CAMILLE; CHEHAB, FU'AD; JUMAYYIL, PIERRE; PHALANGE.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

EDEN, ANTHONY

[1897–1977]

British statesman; prime minister, 1955–1957.

Richard Anthony Eden, first earl of Avon, was elected a Tory member of Parliament between 1923 and 1957. As minister without portfolio for League of Nations affairs (1935) and as secretary of state for foreign affairs (1935–1938), he concluded the "gentlemen's agreement" with Italy's Count Ciano in 1937 concerning the Mediterranean, after negotiating the 1936 Anglo–Egyptian treaty and the Montreux Convention with Turkey. He resigned in disagreement with the policy of Sir Neville Chamberlain concerning Hitler's ambitions for Nazi Germany and the Munich conference but returned as foreign secretary in the World War II governments of Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill.

After the war, he objected to the Labour Party's conciliatory policy toward Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. When he resumed office in 1951, he opposed Mossadegh's nationalization of the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company and worked with the United States to bring him down. In 1954, he negotiated an agreement with Egypt for the withdrawal of Britain's troops from the Suez Canal zone and, in the years following, hardened against Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

As prime minister from 1955 to 1957, Eden was determined to maintain Britain's prestige in the Middle East. Convinced that Nasser was dangerous, Eden reacted quickly after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956. With France and Israel as allies, Eden orchestrated the October attack on Suez—the Arab–Israel War of 1956—without informing his main ally, the United States. Furious, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles refused to support Eden in the United Nations, insisting on a withdrawal. Humiliated and ill, Eden resigned in January 1957 and was replaced by Harold Macmillan. Eden was made first earl of Avon and Viscount Eden in 1961. He is the author of *Full Circle* (1960), *Facing the Dictators* (1972), and *The Reckoning* (1965).

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1956); CHURCHILL, WINSTON S.; DULLES, JOHN FOSTER; EISENHOWER, DWIGHT DAVID; MONTREUX CONVENTION (1936); MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

EDIRNE

Turkish province in Europe and city on the Bulgarian border, 209 kilometers (130 miles) northwest of Istanbul.

The city of Edirne (in English, Adrianople) was founded by the Roman emperor Hadrian in 125 C.E.. It was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in the fourteenth century and served as their capital between 1361 and 1453. Between 1829 and 1923, the city was occupied by foreign forces several times: by Russia in 1829 and 1879; by Bulgarian forces in 1913; and by Greece from 1919 to 1922. The modern city is a manufacturing center and a commercial center for western Thrace (European Turkey). It has notable tourist sites, including ruins of its ancient and medieval walls, and three mosques and a covered bazaar that date from the fifteenth century. According to the 2000 census, the population of

Edirne city was 230,908; that of Edirne province was 402,606.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

EDOT HA-MIZRAH

See ADOT HA-MIZRAH

EDUCATION

Education and social transformation in the Middle East.

Institutions of formal education have undergone marked transformations in societies of the Middle East since 1800. Education refers to processes in which knowledge, skills, moral behavior, values, tastes, loyalties, and a range of cultural competencies and dispositions get transmitted, learned, and negotiated in various settings. Schooling, on the other hand, refers to a set of practices and behaviors that occur in the bounded institutional universe of the school and is referred to as "formal education."

Institutions of learning in the Middle East once held a position of global preeminence. During the height of the Islamic civilization from the ninth to possibly as late as the sixteenth century, they contributed to staggering advances in fields as diverse as optics, mathematics, medicine, physics, astronomy, philosophy, geometry, translation, architecture, and music. Similarly, the *madrasa* (plural, *madaris*), the Islamic college of law, produced the dual intellectual movements of humanism and scholasticism which, as George Makdisi methodically documents, were borrowed in the medieval period by the Christian West and incorporated into their institutions of higher learning (Makdisi 1981, 1990). Despite the primacy of formal learning in the Muslim Middle East for many centuries, by the eighteenth century the region began looking elsewhere for educational models. In the wake of the European Renaissance, Industrial Revolution, and rise of Europe as a global economic and imperial force, and also within the context of Russian imperial expansion, there rose an urgency among the leaders of Ottoman, Egyptian, and Iranian states to modernize their armies and supporting institutions, including scientific and humanistic educational institutions. The educational model from Europe and to some extent Russia was considered to contain the formula for achieving power, economic success, and scientific advancement in the new world order.

The type of schooling that became increasingly important for projects of military, social, political economic, scientific, and cultural reform throughout the last two centuries has been variously termed "modern," "Western," "civil," "foreign," "secular," "new order," "new method," or simply "new"; what is clear is that this new schooling was intended to transform the organization of knowledge transmission by utilizing new disciplining techniques of power, as Timothy Mitchell and Brinkley Messick elaborate in their discussions of new schooling in Egypt and Yemen respectively (Mitchell; Messick). In their ideal configurations the new schools differed in content, organization, and culture in certain fundamental ways from the existent Islamic indigenous *madaris* and schools for elementary learning, the *kuttab* (plural, *katatib*) or *maktab* (plural, *makatib*), in which students learned the Qurʾan by rote and might acquire basic writing and reading skills. Among the more distinguishing features of the new schooling were that students were separated into classes by age groups; knowledge—including religious knowledge—was codified and fixed into textbooks and curricula, thus contributing to secularization; the school day was organized according to a regimented timetable; school grounds, classrooms, and equipment were spatially arranged to instill discipline and order in students; a new professional class of teachers competent in new pedagogies and located to a large degree outside the Muslim scholarly class *(ulama)* was trained to staff the new schools; and the planning and administration of formal schooling over time became more centralized in state bureaucratic apparatuses.

In actuality, however, the new schools often overlapped with and contained elements of the preexisting indigenous schools in areas such as staff, disciplinary codes, and texts, testifying to their syncretic nature. As Benjamin Fortna demonstrates in his outstanding social history of new schooling in

the late Ottoman period, members of the *ulama* often served as teachers in the new schools, in which (Islamic) morality played a central role. Furthermore, even with the rise of new schooling as a dominant educational paradigm, Islamic institutions of learning in countries such as Iran and Morocco maintained a position of eminence, as Roy Mottahedeh and Dale Eickelman show in their portrayals of religious education in the contemporary period in the two countries respectively (Mottahedeh; Eickelman).

Although the appearance of "Western"-looking and -organized schools in the Middle East from the nineteenth century has sometimes been interpreted as reflecting a kind of cultural Westernization of those societies, or at least of their institutions, the reality has been much more complex. The new schools have embodied the tensions, aspirations, and negotiations inherent in processes of institutional and cultural adaptation.

Pre-1800 to 1877: The Incipient New School Movement between the State and Private Sphere

As early as the 1720s official state delegations from the Ottoman Empire traveled to Europe to visit and study their institutions of learning. As Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu notes, one of the first attempts to "set up an Ottoman intellectual institution without an organic structure" occurred during the reign of Ottoman Sultan Ahmet III when scholars were assembled in 1720 for the purpose of translating works of history and philosophy from European languages into Turkish and Arabic (Ihsanoğlu, p. 165). By the first decades of the nineteenth century, states more systematically supported the use of nonorganic education for modernizing reforms.

The figure most often credited with utilizing new schooling for military and accompanying scientific and technological reform was the viceroy of Egypt, Muhammed Ali Pasha (r. 1805–1849). In 1809 he sent the first group of students on an educational mission to Europe, and over the next decades he established numerous schools in Egypt—roughly equivalent to vocational high schools and technical colleges—that specialized in military sciences, medicine, agriculture, veterinarian medicine, midwifery, pharmaceutics, chemistry, engineering, and translation (Heyworth-Dunne). With the exception of the School of Midwives, all schools were exclusively for male students. In 1825 the first state preparatory (postprimary) school for boys, Qasr al-Ayni, was established to supply students for the new specialized schools. The new schools, many of which did not endure beyond his reign, were administered by the Ministry of War *(Diwan al-Jihadiyya)* and depended largely on foreign staff. The education policies under his grandson Khedive Ismael (1864–1879), in which the famous teacher-education college, Dar al-Ulum (est. 1872), and the first state school for girls, al-Saniyya School (est. 1873), were established, had more lasting impact.

Parallel developments occurred throughout the Ottoman Empire under the reigns of Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) with his "New Order" *(Nizam al-Jadid)* program; Mahmud II (1808–1839); Abdülmecit (r. 1839–1861), the Tanzimat sultan; and Abdülhamit II (1876–1909). Similar to Egypt, students were sent on educational missions abroad, state schools for higher technical and vocational training were established, and primary *(rüşdiye)* and preparatory *(idadi)* schools were developed. Among the more famous Ottoman state schools for secondary and higher learning were the School of Military Medicine (est. 1827), the War College (*Mekteb-i Harbiye,* est. 1846), Mülkiye School (est. 1859), and Galatasaray Lycée (*Mekteb-I Sultanî,* est. 1868). The *ulama* in Iran, who were politically stronger than *ulama* in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, maintained a near monopoly on formal education, and very few new schools were founded. During the reign of Qajar Shah Nasir al-Din (r. 1848–1896), however, Crown Prince Abbas Mirza initiated a New Order reform program and established the renowned *Dar al-Funun* (est. 1851), an elite military institution in which French was the language of instruction.

As it became increasingly evident in the early decades of the nineteenth century that the new education was to become an enduring part of state apparatuses of power and reform, legislation was issued and new administrative bodies formed to manage it. Among the early landmark education legislation from Istanbul was an 1824 decree mandating compulsory elementary education for boys. In Egypt the Primary School Regulation of 1836 led to the establishment of the first education ministry, the Department of Schools *(Diwan al-Madaris).*

Tanzimat era (1839–1876) reforms included the Education Regulation of 1869 *(Maarif Nizamnamesi),* which was the blueprint for the empire's first centrally organized and controlled network of schools, and the 1876 Iranian Constitution stipulated that elementary education was to be compulsory and provided by the state free of charge. Such ambitious far-reaching plans would not begin to be effectively implemented until the middle of the twentieth century, but they indicated the hopes the Muslim majority government placed on new schooling for societal change.

States also pursued policies of school expansion with the aim of cultivating a Muslim middle class that would be able to compete with the prosperous segments of foreign and minority communities in matters of trade and other commercial endeavors. The economic success of non-Muslim groups in Egypt and the Ottoman territories was attributed in part to the legal privileges afforded them by the capitulations, but also to the skills, languages, and other competencies they acquired through their participation in the new schooling.

New education had been spreading among minority *millet* and foreign communities since the eighteenth century. By the 1860s, a period of precarious European economic investment and colonial encroachment in the region, there arose a vast proliferation of schools established by religious missions, foreign governments, local communities, and private associations from France, Britain, Austria, Greece, England, Germany, the United States, and Italy. They served ethnic minority and religious communities such as the Armenians, Jews, and Christians, and also progressively higher numbers of elite Muslim children who were attracted to the prestigious foreign schools. Among the organizations with notable quantitative and qualitative educational impact were the Church Missionary Society of Great Britain (CMS) (est. 1799), the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (est. 1810), and the French-based *Alliance Israélite Universelle* (est. 1860). Collectively these organizations founded hundreds of schools throughout the region, serving tens of thousands of students. Foreign schools played pioneering roles in, among other areas, girls' and women's education, and higher education (Thompson). The institutions of higher education founded by foreign missions and organizations included the Syrian Protestant College, later named the American University of Beirut (est. 1866); Saint Joseph University, also located in Beirut and founded by French jesuits (est. 1874); Robert College, Istanbul, which became the location for Bogazici University in 1971 (est. 1863); the Istanbul-based American College for Girls (est. 1890); and the American University in Cairo (est. 1920).

The proliferation of foreign educational institutions in the region did not occur without a great deal of tension, and schooling became an ever more hotly debated issue as the century progressed.

1878 to 1913: Colonialism, Nascent Nationalist Movements, and Fragmented Schooling

The new schooling was involved in forging a different kind of society, and its role in societal transformation was widely debated by government officials, foreign missionaries, social reformers, public intellectuals, ordinary citizens, Muslim clerics, and colonial government representatives. They raised pressing questions relating to what populations should participate in the new schooling, who should fund and regulate it, and what its content, methods, and objectives should be. Whereas the British Mandate government in Egypt (1882–1922), for example, advocated limited educational development to maintain the local population in a subordinate position, the French considered the spread of schooling as part of their *mission civilatrice.* Members of emerging reform and nationalist movements, engaged citizens, local notables, and officials, on the other hand, perceived new schooling as a requisite for much-needed social reform; however, they largely frowned upon foreign control over it. Foreign schooling was criticized for contributing to a climate of intensified sectarianism and for threatening local religious, cultural, and national sovereignty. Local groups and individuals spearheaded educational alternatives for the moral, scientific, and political socialization of their youth.

A notable experiment that took place in the Levant and Egypt was the Benevolent Society school movement. Benevolent societies were locally funded Muslim, Christian, and intersectarian associations that provided social services by way of support for widows and the poor, hospitals, libraries, student hostels, and, most prominently, schools for boys

and girls. These schools were modeled on the government and foreign schools but placed more emphasis on Arabic studies, regional history, vocational training, religion, and morals. The first school of this type was the Maqasid School of the Maqasid Benevolent Society *(Jam ͑iyat al-Maqasid al-Khayriyya),* established in Beirut in 1878 by Abd al-Qadir al-Qabbani. The following year the Benevolent Society School of Alexandria, which later added the word *Islamic* to its name *(Madrasat al-Jam ͑iyya al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya bi al-Iskandariyya),* was opened in Egypt by Abdullah al-Nadim. Within two decades a growing network of benevolent-society schools spread in the region, the most famous among them the *al-Maqasid* schools of Egypt started by Muhammad Abduh in 1892. Similar examples of local alternative schooling in later periods include the Moroccan Free Schools, which proliferated in the 1920s as an alternative to French colonial schools, and the extensive network of Muslim Brotherhood schools in Egypt from the 1920s until the organization was outlawed in the 1940s.

It is no coincidence that the founders and advocates of benevolent-society schools were in many instances prominent figures in the emerging press, which constituted, with the schools, a powerful component of the new education. With the growth of the press (including a vibrant women's press), an active and engaged public sphere was in the making. As with schools, governments increasingly regarded with trepidation the press because it could be a means of fomenting popular unrest and political opposition. The new education ministries in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, for example, took on the task of not only supervising schools, but also of censoring the press. School texts, journals, pamphlets, plays, and books of all sorts were subject to censorship. Education ministries have also been closely linked with state security apparatuses. During the Hamidian period, for example, the secret police monitored classes in the Ottoman University (est. 1890), where potentially subversive subjects such as politics, sociology, history, and philosophy were excluded from the curriculum. Censorship and surveillance policies were ultimately unsuccessful, for the secret revolutionary society that eventually aided in the overthrow of the Ottoman sultan, the Committee of Union and Progress or "Young Turks," was begun by four cadets in the Military Medical College in 1889, and their literature spread largely through the growing networks of schools and school inspectors.

Throughout the period leading up to World War I, schooling, including religious schooling, was gradually taken out of the jurisdiction of the ministries of religious endowments *(awqaf)* and put under the legal authority of new state education ministries. The process of centralization of formal schooling would continue with a vengeance in the period following World War I.

1913 to 1960s: Nationalization and Centralization of Mass Education

In the post–World War I era the Ottoman Empire was dismantled and the political configuration of the region altered substantially. Turkey became an independent republic, and the Arab territories of the Gulf, Maghreb, Levant, Transjordan, and Egypt were carved up and divided between England and France. In 1948 the Jewish State of Israel was established by British mandate. The age of direct European colonialism came to an end as sovereign nation states were born. The new governments, influenced by modernist ideologies that advocated mass education as the panacea for economic, social, and political development, pursued policies of vigorous educational expansion. Education also figured prominently in the new and revised constitutions, which, with the exception of Saudi Arabia's and Bahrain's, made stipulations for compulsory schooling for boys and girls. This period also witnessed the development of national universities, to which women eventually gained full access.

Two major features characterized national education at the preuniversity level in the Arab states and Iran: Education was centrally administered, one consequence being that foreign schools to a large degree were incorporated into national systems; and education was organically linked to upbringing (*tarbiya* in Arabic, and *parvaresh* in Persian). Schools are socializing institutions par excellence, but in Muslim majority states the upbringing aspect of schooling is expressed in explicit terms. As Gregory Starrett notes, "Muslim states have followed a different course to modernity, insisting explicitly that progress requires a centrally administered emphasis upon moral as well as economic development" (Starrett, p. 10). Most of the education ministries in the region contain the word *upbringing* in their official

designations, as in the Ministry of Upbringing and Education *(Wizarat al-Tarbiya wa al-Taʿlim)* in Egypt, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates; the Ministry of National Upbringing *(Wizarat al-Tarbiya al-Wataniyya)* in Algeria and Morocco; and the Ministry of Education and Upbringing *(Vezarat-e Amuzesh va Parvaresh)* in Iran.

The upbringing component of state-monitored formal schooling serves as a way of ensuring that indigenous, usually Islamic cultural tenets get incorporated into national, and tacitly "secular," education programs. Through school policies that include mandatory religion classes and a host of formal and informal cultural policies such as sex segregation, dress and grooming codes, and supervision of youth behavior in and outside school grounds, educators attempt to guide youth toward socially acceptable conduct. Yet the contours of what is "acceptable" shift and differ according to the historic moment and individual interpretation, social class, region, life stage, and gender. Similar to the Muslim majority states, in the Jewish state of Israel religion is a required subject in state schools from the first grade through high school. The state also supports Jewish religious state schools in which moral conduct and behavior based on Jewish principles play a central role.

Education has long been regarded as a means of national-identity building. Schools are infused with ideological and nationalist content that gets transmitted through curricula, rituals, celebrations, and symbols. In the Arab states, particularly in the post-1950s when pan-Arabism was at its peak, education was seen as a means of solidifying the "Arab nation." In Israel, schools and kibbutzim were intended to generate allegiance to the Jewish state, a process that the non-Jewish Arab minority remained outside of. In secular republican Turkey, education was a means of forging a secular citizenry, and in Iran under the Pahlavi Dynasty, education was geared toward cultural secularization. However, national-identity building does not always evolve according to state policy. The decline of Arab nationalism, the onset of the Iranian revolution, the rise of Islamism throughout much of the region (including "secular" Turkey), and the appearance of an increasingly fragmented polity in Israel have all posed challenges to national education systems. National educational policies would undergo further challenges and changes in the succeeding period characterized by a new globalization.

1970s to the Present: Education between the Local and the Global

The Middle East has undergone dramatic economic, political, and ideological changes since 1970, all of which have had a major impact on development and practice of formal education. The 1970s oil boom in Persian Gulf countries and subsequent massive interregional labor migrations; the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which gave way to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran; the Iran–Iraq War; the 1967 Arab–Israeli War and ensuing Israeli occupation of Arab lands; the first and second (al-Aqsa) Palestinian intifadas; the ongoing civil war in Sudan; the 1990 Gulf War; the U.S. war on and occupation of Iraq; the rise of Islamism as a political and sociocultural movement; and the rise of Middle Eastern states as major debtor nations are all some of the major factors that have contributed to profound changes in the realm of education.

Education has long developed as a result of transnational, regional, and global exchanges, borrowings, and adaptations, but certain unique characteristics underpin education in the current period of globalization. To a growing extent supranational, nonlocally accountable organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.), and United Nations (UN) determine policies and measurements of education as Robert Arnove and Carlos Torres put forward in their tome on comparative education (2003). The "success" or "failure" of national education sectors tend to be measured in quantitative terms and based on factors such as enrollments rates and test scores, with scant attention to "quality." The Arab world has not fared well in these global assessments with illiteracy rates in the mid-1990s as high as roughly 55 percent for females and 30 percent for males. Debtor states of the Middle East and elsewhere have also been compelled to follow certain austerity measures that have included increased privatization and decentralization of national education. Studies on the Middle East region and other regions of the south have repeatedly shown that such policies unequivocally disadvantage the poor, rural populations, and women, and accentuate social inequality. Indeed, these "global" policies are often in direct contra-

vention of national and community interests, indicating a lack of real autonomy and sovereignty among postcolonial states and in educational policy design.

Yet, with growing homogenization of education policies a host of local responses have emerged. In the Middle East there has been an unmistakable revitalization of religious-oriented education. In "secular" Turkey, for example, there was a prodigious growth of the Islamic-oriented *Imam Hatip* schools until they were curbed by legislative intervention from the end of the 1990s. There has also been a rise in religious Jewish schools in Israel. Various types of Islamic schools, including *katatib* and new hybrid private Islamic schools, have been on the rise in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Palestine. With the growing privatization and subsequent commercialization of education (with its lucrative financial possibilities), new manifestations of religious schooling have appeared, such as the "five-star" Islamic school, which incorporates up-to-date computer labs, swimming pools, and other signs of prestige and desires being produced in a globalized world in their programs (Herrera, p. 185). In keeping with the privatization pattern, the decade of the 1990s also witnessed prodigious growth in the private university sector, with the opening of twelve new private universities and higher education institutions in Jordan, fifteen in Turkey, seven in Lebanon, and six in Egypt, with plans in all countries for more. Much of the privatized higher education discourse has focused on issues of accreditation, competitiveness, professional degrees, financing, profit, and the needs of the global economic markets, largely removing the new private universities from humanistic endeavors.

The record of national regional universities in social science, humanities, and sciences, however, has been mixed at best. The scientific quality of universities and individual faculties varies substantially. In the Arab countries and Iran, national universities have reflected authoritarian political systems and been characterized by especially cumbersome bureaucratic structures and severe restrictions on academic freedom, both of which have contributed to the problem of "brain drain." In the Persian Gulf countries, for example, scholarly research is allowed except where the "general social system . . . religious precepts, social traditions, cultural and ethical considerations are concerned" (Morsi, p. 44). National universities in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria are heavily monitored and censored by state security apparatuses that interfere in aspects of research, student conduct, travel of faculty, and topics of conferences. In Iran during the "cultural revolution" under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (r. 1979–1989), faculty and students were purged from universities on ideological grounds and materials censored. Under the previous regime of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, censorship and surveillance were also widespread. Lack of freedom in academia, however, is not necessarily indicative of the absolute power of political regimes, for state policies have often been subverted and resisted at the sites of schools and universities. Students movements, as Ahmad Abdallah documents in the case of Egypt from the 1920s to the 1970s, have been a powerful social and political force.

Early in the twentieth century women struggled for the right to join universities as full participating members. In the 2000s the participation of women in universities throughout the region is proportionally high. In Persian Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait, women make up more than half of the undergraduate population. In 2001 Iranian women overtook men in university entrance. In Egypt women make up more than half of the students in some of the prestigious medical faculties. Although women have made tremendous strides in higher education, at present the attainment of university degrees does not translate into comparable participation in the political arena and the labor force. However, as history has repeatedly demonstrated, the outcomes of mass education are unpredictable at best, and the trend toward increased female attainment of higher education could very well translate into far-reaching social changes.

Conclusion

The "new" education of the past two centuries has developed alongside movements of modernism, nationalism, pan-Arabism, Islamism, and globalism. As with other forms of institutional borrowing and adaptation, education has been characterized by "intertwined and overlapping histories" (Said, p. 18). It has served as a force in cultural and political reproduction and in social transformation, with often unintended and unpredictable consequences.

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Linda Herrera

EFFENDI

See Glossary

EFFLATOUN, INJI

[1924–1989]

A painter, activist, and pioneer of modern Egyptian art.

Inji Efflatoun was an instrumental part of the women's movement in Egypt. She is known for her leftist activities, including her involvement in forming a student group dedicated to women's rights, and for her writing on the relationships among class difference, women's oppression, and colonial imperialism. These activities eventually resulted in her imprisonment under Gamal Abdel Nasser in the postindependence period. Noted for her Van Gogh-esque paintings, filled with lively brushstrokes of intense color, Efflatoun's art explored political and social subjects throughout her lifetime. Much of her work was in the nationalist vein, including early spirited depictions of nationalist activities and icons such as peasant women.

Although like many Egyptian artists she continued to turn to the countryside and peasant life to express her cultural identity, her paintings during and after her imprisonment took on a significantly more emotional and tragic character. Important works from this period include dark portrayals of the women's prison and the violent struggles on the battlefield in the Egyptian/Arab wars with Israel. A significant portion of her paintings deal with women's and feminist issues, and much of her work reflects her Marxist politics. Efflatoun also wrote a number of books dealing with social issues, including *We Egyptian Women* and *Eighty Million Women with Us.*

See also Gender: Gender and Education.

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Jessica Winegar

EGE UNIVERSITY

Public university in İzmir, Turkey.

Ege (Aegean) University was founded in 1955. In 1982, its academic body was divided into two separate universities, Ege and Dokuz Eylül, for administrative reasons. Ege University has eleven faculties (administrative and social sciences; agriculture; communication; dentistry; education; engineering; letters; medicine; natural sciences; pharmacology; and water products), a conservatory of Turkish music, eight vocational schools, and seven research institutes. Some of its establishments are located in the neighboring provinces: Manisa, Aydın, and Uşak. Instruction is in both English and Turkish. During the 2001–2002 academic year, the university had more than 2,800 faculty members and 30, 887 students, 2,807 of whom were graduate students. Its budget in 2003 amounted to 128,029 billion Turkish liras, 99 percent of which came directly from state funds.

Turkey's third-oldest university, Ege was established in response to a growing demand for higher education in the region around İzmir, whose traditional agricultural and commercial potential led to rapid industrial development during the early 1950s. As befits its name, the university has tried to establish programs emphasizing its relationship with the Aegean Sea and the rest of the Mediterranean area as a cultural and ecological region.

See also İZMIR.

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I. METIN KUNT
UPDATED BY BURÇAK KESKIN-KOZAT

EGYPT

Arab country controlling northeastern Africa and the Sinai Peninsula.

Egypt is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea on the north, Sudan on the south, the Red Sea on the east, and Libya on the west. It consists of three regions: (1) the Nile Valley and Delta (less than 4% of the total area), extending from Sudan north to the Mediterranean; (2) the Eastern Desert–Sinai Peninsula (28%), extending from the Nile Valley to the Gulf of Aqaba and the border with Israel; and (3) the Western Desert (68%), stretching from the Nile Valley west to Libya.

Egypt's geographic position makes the country easy to control and rule. Its society and polity are characterized by central rule and the absence of long-standing regional allegiances. Dependence on the Nile River for irrigation has called for central administration and enabled the government to extend its authority to the distant parts of the land. Because most of the territory is desert, 96 percent of the Egyptian people live on less than 5 percent of the country's total land area, despite a massive land reclamation project that is starting to irrigate parts of the Western Desert.

Population and Social Structure

Egypt is one of the oldest continuously settled lands in the world. Egyptians, except for a few Nubians, speak Arabic. About 90 percent of the people are Muslim, and Islam is the state religion. The Copts are the largest non-Muslim religious group. Estimates of their numbers vary between six million and nine million. In 2003, the total population of Egypt was seventy million and was increasing by one million every ten months. The birth rate in 2002 was 24.4 per thousand and the death rate was 7.6 per thousand; the natural rate of population increase was 16.8 (the world average for the period in question was 13.5).

Half of the Egyptian people are under twenty years of age; two-thirds are under thirty. The number of dependent children supported by working adults is high, a situation that severely strains the economy. Egypt's government and economy are increasingly unable to meet the demands for food, shelter, education, and jobs. Some three million Egyptians have migrated to other Arab countries, particularly the oil-producing states, in search of work. Their remittances to their families constitute a major source of Egypt's hard currency and help to offset the difference between the country's imports and exports.

In contrast to many developing countries, Egypt has a high degree of social and national integration. Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954–1970), Anwar al-Sadat (1970–1981), and Husni Mubarak (1981–) have all spoken proudly about Egypt's national unity, by which they mean the peaceful coexistence



Map by XNR Productions, Inc. The Gale Group.

between the country's Muslims and Copts. This unity has been tested when Muslim extremists attacked, robbed, and occasionally murdered Copts. The Copts also began to fear growing pressure to apply Islamic law in Egypt, which could weaken their position relative to the Muslim majority.

Population growth has limited Egypt's development efforts by aggravating unemployment, increasing the ratio of mouths eating to hands working, spurring rural migration to urban centers, and diverting resources from investment to consumption. Population rises by almost 2 percent annually, a rate that exceeds the increase of arable land and is far beyond Egypt's educational and industrial development. Although the cropped area almost doubled between 1882 and 1970, the population growth absorbed and exceeded the increase. Once the bread-

In Egypt, school enrollment is compulsory for children between the ages of six and fourteen, and primary and intermediate education is free. Despite the irregular attendance of children who must work to support their families, classrooms tend to be overcrowded, and many Egyptian schools lack up-to-date equipment and texts. © Thomas Hartwell/Corbis Saba. Reproduced by permission.

basket of the ancient world, modern Egypt has had to import cereal grains, making it more dependent on the outside world and vulnerable to the fluctuations of food prices.

Economy

Economic factors have played a crucial role in Egypt's politics. In 1991, inflation was nearly 21.3 percent a year, the national debt was US$25 billion, the gross national product (GNP) per capita was US$600, and the country agreed to a major restructuring program. Indeed, since World War II, Egypt has had a balance-of-payments deficit that has had to be made up from other sources. From 1945 to 1958 it simply drew down existing reserves, which had accumulated during World War II. From 1958 to 1964, Egypt received foreign aid from Eastern and Western sources; from 1965 to 1971, the former Soviet Union paid for most of the deficit; from 1971 to 1977, the aid was primarily from Arab states; and since 1978, support has come from the United States and other Western nations. The rate of inflation in 2001 was 2.3 percent, the national debt was US$29 billion, and the GNP per capita reached US$3,600. The economy declined slightly during the period from 2001 to 2003 and the Egyptian pound has been allowed to float against the U.S. dollar; it lost half its value between 1997 and 2003.

In 1974 Sadat inaugurated his *Infitah,* or open-door economic policy, to attract foreign investment. He justified it on the following grounds: (1) the failure of Nasser's socialist policies; (2) the availability of capital from Arab oil-producing countries; and (3) the superpowers' détente. From an economic standpoint, the *Infitah*'s main purposes were twofold: to attract export-oriented foreign enterprises by setting up duty-free zones and to attract foreign capital through a liberal investment policy. Its ultimate goal was to develop Egypt's economy through joint ventures and projects, combining Egyptian

labor, Arab capital, and Western technology and entrepreneurship.

Egypt's policy of liberal reform led to a restructuring of its economy. In 1991 the government implemented financial stabilization (unifying the rate of exchange, reducing subsidies) and started a program of structural adjustment (privatization and trade liberalization). The economy grew rapidly during the 1990s but stagnated in the early twenty-first century. Per capita GDP skyrocketed, and imports exceeded exports in value by a factor of three to one, but the deficit was made up by remittances, Suez Canal tolls, pipeline fees, and tourism. After the terrorist attack on New York's World Trade Center in September 2001, most of these sources diminished. The trade deficit in the first quarter of 2002 was US$1.6 billion. In addition, the gap between rich and poor Egyptians widened perceptibly as a result of both Sadat's *Infitah* policy and the economic restructuring. In 2000 it was estimated that the top tenth of Egyptians enjoyed 25 percent of the national income, while the bottom tenth earned only 4.4 percent.

History and Politics

On 1 July 1798 the people of Alexandria watched some 400 French ships in the Mediterranean bring 34,000 soldiers and 16,000 sailors to Egypt. Led by Napoléon Bonaparte, this expedition subjected Egypt, then a part of the Ottoman Empire, to direct confrontation with European expansionism. The occupation was harsh and stirred up popular resistance in Cairo, but it took a joint Anglo-Ottoman expeditionary force to expel the French in 1801. Following France's withdrawal, a popular uprising in Cairo forced the Ottoman government to name Muhammad Ali as governor of Egypt. Ruling from 1805 to 1848, Muhammad Ali modernized Egypt's administrative, economic, and military structures by introducing Western methods and technologies on a large scale.

In 1854, during the reign of his son, Saʿid Pasha, a French diplomat secured permission to build a maritime canal across the Isthmus of Suez. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 greatly increased Egypt's strategic importance to the European powers and helped attract large numbers of Europeans to settle in Egypt's main cities. The Egyptian government also borrowed large sums of money from European banks at ruinous rates of interest, resulting in a state debt of 100 million Egyptian pounds by the end of the reign of Muhammad Ali's grandson, Ismaʿil ibn Ibrahim, in 1879. Egypt's European creditors established the Caisse de la Dette Publique (Fund for the Public Debt) to supervise the collection and disbursement of government revenues in 1876, followed later in that same year by the Office of Dual Financial Control. By 1881, the government was frantically cutting its expenditures to avert bankruptcy, contributing to the rise of a reformist movement led by Ahmad Urabi. The British intervened to suppress the revolt, bombarding Alexandria on 11 July 1882 and occupying Cairo nine weeks later, marking the start of an occupation that would last for seventy-four years. Initially British rule took the form of a veiled protectorate, honoring Ottoman suzerainty and the authority of the khedive (Egyptian ruler) and his ministers, although in reality Egypt was governed by Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer) and his successors. In December 1914, following the Ottoman entry into World War I on the German side, the British government proclaimed a formal protectorate over Egypt.

Following the war, a nationwide revolution, led by Saʿd Zaghlul, broke out. His movement, known as the Wafd, achieved success on 28 February 1922, when Britain formally terminated the protectorate, proclaimed Egypt a sovereign, independent kingdom, and reserved four issues for future negotiations: (1) imperial communications, (2) defense, (3) minorities, and (4) the Sudan. On 15 March 1922 Ahmad Fuʾad was proclaimed king, and a constitution was issued on 9 April 1923. Free elections were held in two stages, resulting in a large parliamentary majority for the Wafd, which reconstituted itself as a political party.

From 1923 to 1936, negotiations took place on the four reserved points. The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty settled most of the issues between the two countries. Britain's troops remained in Alexandria, Cairo, and the Suez Canal Zone. The treaty was opposed, however, by a number of political forces, including the popular Muslim Brotherhood. On 15 October 1951, Egypt's government unilaterally abrogated the treaty and Egyptian commandos attacked British soldiers and installations in the Canal Zone. Egypt's military defeat in the Arab-Israel War of 1948 coincided with social and political instability

that had begun in the early 1940s as a result of increasing class disparities, uncontrolled urbanization, and labor unrest.

Egypt's government failed to respond to these conditions, nor did it respect the will of the people. The monarchy violated or suspended the 1923 constitution and dissolved parliaments whenever its power was threatened. The Wafd, the political party that won every election that was not rigged, held power less than eight years altogether and was dismissed from office on four separate occasions. Between 1923 and 1952, no popularly elected Egyptian parliament ever completed its term, and the average life of a cabinet was less than eighteen months.

These tensions led to frequent demonstrations, widespread political alienation, and the growth of revolutionary movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Young Egypt Party, Communist organizations, and the Free Officers. The insistence of the palace on absolute rule, the opposition of the ruling class to reform, and Britain's rigid refusal to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone led the Egyptians to believe that only revolution could bring about reform. On 23 July 1952, the army seized control; three days later King Farouk abdicated in favor of his infant son. In June 1953, the monarchy was terminated and a republic was declared. All political parties, including the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood, were abolished.

From 1952 to 1970, the basic characteristics of Egypt's government under Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser were military dictatorship, concentration of power, emphasis on mobilization rather than participation, and the supremacy of the executive branch. In the absence of political parties, three successive organizations became vehicles for political mobilization: the Liberation Rally (1953–1956), the National Union (1956–1962), and the Arab Socialist Union (1962–1977). An imbalance clearly existed between politics and administration. The bureaucracy, police, and army far eclipsed interest groups and political organizations. Whenever possible, the government attempted to penetrate and dominate groups such as trade unions, professional societies, and religious institutions. During the same period, the state took control of the economy in order to achieve rapid development and social justice, a policy known as Arab Socialism.

Gamal Abdel Nasser (left) took power in 1954 and in 1956 declared Egypt a socialist state with a single-party system. Nasser ruled Egypt for eighteen years, garnering a reputation for being a champion of Arab interests, but turning the country into a veritable police state in the process. © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

After Nasser's death in 1970, Egypt's political system began to change. The ruling elite became increasingly civilianized, and a pluralistic political culture began to emerge. Anwar al-Sadat professionalized the army, disengaged it from politics, and appointed more civilians to high posts. For the first time since 1952, civilians held the posts of vice president and prime minister. The gradual democratization of the political structure led in 1977 to the formation of a controlled multiparty system. Domestically, Sadat was eager to establish his legitimacy apart from Nasser's. Most Egyptians acknowledged that the Arab Socialist Union had failed as an instrument of popular mobilization, and intellectuals and professional associations came to advocate political pluralism. Sadat often called for popular plebiscites to ratify his policies, such as the peace treaty with Israel. Externally, Sadat's rapprochement with the United States and his desire to make Egypt seem more democratic reinforced these

Husni Mubarak, a former military pilot, became president of Egypt following the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in 1981. Mubarak is a skilled mediator who has worked hard to nurture and strengthen diplomatic relations with the United States and Russia, as well as with the other Arab countries. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

trends. Although Sadat was assassinated by Islamist militants in 1981, his successor, Husni Mubarak, has cautiously allowed the democratization process to continue by holding multiparty parliamentary elections at regular intervals.

The judiciary, an independent and respected institution, referees many issues, including the formation of new political parties. Applications for new parties must be submitted to a government committee whose decisions are subject to judicial review. Since the committee was established in 1977, it has never approved any applications, but its rejections have been reversed by court verdicts, thus allowing new parties to form.

In 2002, Egypt had fourteen political parties. The most important were the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), headed by President Husni Mubarak and claiming 85 percent of all parliamentary seats; the Socialist Labor Party, led by Ibrahim Shukri, which adheres to Islamist ideology and formerly had a coalition with the Muslim Brotherhood; and the leftist National Progressive Unionist Party, also called Tajammu, led by Khalid Muhyi al-Din. The other parties are the New Wafd, Socialist Labor, Umma, Socialists, Greens, Social Justice, Democratic Union, Nasserist Arab Democrats, Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt), Democratic Peoples, and Takaful (Solidarity). Few of these parties play any meaningful role in parliament, and only the NDP actually takes part in Egypt's government. Islamist movements, no matter how many Egyptians support them, are not recognized as political parties.

Since 1977, Egypt's political life has been dominated by the NDP, which has not become a credible political force. All of Egypt's political parties suffer from lack of a strong organization and a coherent ideology. Opposition parties have been reluctant to compromise and have failed to master coalition politics. Ideological cleavages, historical legacies, and leadership rivalries have kept them from working together to challenge the NDP. In the 2000 elections, the ruling party won 388 of the 444 seats in Egypt's parliament.

Egypt has not succeeded in integrating Islamist groups into the political process. The Muslim Brotherhood, which wants to make the *shariʿa* the law for the country, had approximately fifty members in parliament in 1987–1990. Their boycott of the 1990 parliamentary elections and their opposition to the government during the Gulf War weakened their position, yet they remain the most influential Islamist group. Members of the parliament elected in 2000 who were listed as independent were mainly Muslim Brothers. Smaller but more militant Islamist groups, such as al-Jihad and al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya, have resorted to violence against government officials, foreign tourists, and Copts, especially between 1992 and 1997. By 1992, Islamist groups controlled most university student unions and professors' associations, as well as a number of professional societies (e.g., of engineers, physicians, pharmacists, and lawyers), and the state passed laws in 1995 to limit their influence. The Egyptian

government's efforts to weaken the militant groups have curbed terrorism, but at grave cost to human rights and its own legitimacy. Thousands of Islamists languish in Egyptian prisons, often without having been tried and convicted of any crime. The Islamist newspapers and magazines were closed after Sadat's assassination and have not been allowed to reopen. Mosque sermons are monitored, and any expression of Islamist militancy is suppressed. It is noteworthy that four of the nineteen men implicated in the 11 September 2001 attack against the United States were Egyptians.

Both Islamists and the Egyptian government have stifled the growth of a civil society. For publishing scholarly articles critiquing early Arabic literature, Nasr Abu Zayd, a Cairo University professor, was obliged to leave Egypt after a secular court, inspired by Islamists, asked his wife to divorce him for allegedly renouncing Islam. Saʿd al-Din Ibrahim, a respected sociologist, was tried and condemned to hard labor by a military court for defaming Egypt, accepting foreign money for his research center without government authorization, embezzlement, and bribing public officials. After a widespread public outcry, he was released, retried by a civilian court, and set free. Neither case speaks well for the independence of Egypt's judiciary.

What is the balance sheet for the democratization process in Egypt? On the positive side are a liberal tradition, a strong sense of national identity, and a complex civil society. Another positive element is a middle class that has organized itself into a growing network of business associations, trade unions, and professional syndicates, thus helping to form a civil society outside the political process. On the negative side, Egypt has a tradition of authoritarianism. The ruling elite has grown up with and worked within a single-party system. The ruling and opposition parties have little internal democracy. Many parties espouse ideologies that are incompatible with democratic institutions. The government uses the armed forces and the police to stifle dissent, creating an atmosphere of fear and leading to either apathy or conspiracies against public order. Ultimately, Egypt's democracy and political stability will rest on its ability to increase economic production and to narrow the yawning gap between the few rich and the many poor.

See also Alexandria; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab Socialist Union; Baring, Evelyn; Bonaparte, Napoléon; Cairo; Communism in the Middle East; Copts; Farouk; Free Officers, Egypt; Fuʾad; Infitah; Islam; Ismaʿil ibn Ibrahim; Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya, al-; Liberation Rally; Ottoman Empire; Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar; Mubarak, Husni; Muhyi al-Din, Khalid; Muslim Brotherhood; Naguib, Muhammad; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; National Progressive Unionist Party; National Union (Egypt); New Wafd; Nile River; Sadat, Anwar al-; *Shariʿa*; Suez Canal; Wafd; World War I; World War II; Young Egypt; Zaghlul, Saʿd.

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Ali E. Hillal Dessouki
Updated by Arthur Goldschmidt

EGYPTIAN FEMINIST UNION

The first formal, self-consciously feminist organization in Egypt, al-Ittihad al-nisaʾi al-misri *(in English, the Egyptian Feminist Union, or EFU).*

The Egyptian Feminist Union was founded in Cairo on 16 March 1923 by a small group of women from elite families who had been active in the struggle for independence from British occupation. The group

originally had aligned itself with the Wafd movement and was called the Wafdist Women's Central Committee (founded 1919). Bringing together a larger group of women, the EFU worked for Egyptian nationalist aims while opposing women's subordinate status in the Wafd Party and focusing on women's objectives for their own lives. From the start, its leader, Huda al-Shaʿrawi, made connections with international feminist organizations, notably the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA); in May 1923, the EFU sent a delegation to the IWSA's Rome meeting, and the presence of Egyptian feminists received notice in Egypt's press—as did a public act of unveiling by Shaʿrawi and fellow delegate Sayza Nabarawi in the Cairo train station upon their return from Rome.

The EFU's agenda ranged from demands for political rights—the EFU picketed the opening session of the Egyptian parliament in 1924 after the new constitution had failed to grant women the right to vote—to social activism, carrying on the philanthropic work of earlier generations of women. In its second year of existence, the EFU started a dispensary for women and a program to train girls in handicraft production; when new headquarters on Cairo's Qasr al-Ayni street were ready in 1932, these became part of a professional and domestic school, and throughout the decade other dispensaries and training programs were founded outside the capital. The EFU founded two journals, the French-language *L'Egyptienne* (1925–1940) and the Arabic-language *Al-Misriyya* (1937–1940), through which it outlined its demands for legal reform in personal status law, equal education for girls, and the right for women to enter university and have access to professional training and positions. Careful to emphasize Egypt's Islamic character and pharaonic past, Shaʿrawi, the EFU's leader until her death in 1947, steered a careful path between her European contacts and the nationalists, both liberal and conservative, at home, while increasingly turning to regional Arab concerns. Although the EFU encompassed a range of feminist perspectives, it was not the only Egyptian organization of the time working to advance women's rights.

See also ARAB FEMINIST UNION; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; WAFD; WAFDIST WOMEN'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

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MARILYN BOOTH

EGYPTIAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY

Group of geographers in Egypt.

Khedive Ismaʿil founded the Khedivial (later Royal, now Egyptian) Geographical Society in 1875 to promote and legitimize his empire in the Sudan and the Horn of Africa. The society later shifted its concentration to Egypt itself and evolved from a foreign-dominated layman's society into the professional society of Egyptian geographers.

See also ISMAʿIL IBN IBRAHIM.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

EGYPTIAN–ISRAELI PEACE TREATY (1979)

Treaty signed by Egypt and Israel on 26 March 1979.

The Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty derives from the Camp David Accords signed by Egypt, Israel, and the United States on 17 September 1978. The 1978 agreements included two documents, "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel." The other Arab states and the Palestinians rejected the Camp David Accords and declined to pursue talks with Israel toward a comprehensive peace. Although they required many more rounds of negotiations, U.S. mediation, and a Middle East visit by U.S. president Jimmy Carter, Egypt and Israel successfully brought the framework for a bilateral peace to fruition.

The Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty signed by Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli

prime minister Menachem Begin and witnessed by Carter is a relatively short document: nine articles, three annexes, and a series of side letters among and between the three signatories. In a classic land-for-peace swap, the treaty explicitly terminates the state of war between Egypt and Israel and establishes a full and formal peace, including an exchange of ambassadors; in return, the parties accept the international boundary between Egypt and the former Palestine Mandate as the permanent border between them, allowing for the phased return of the entire Sinai Peninsula, captured by Israel in the 1967 war, to Egypt. The treaty called for demilitarized zones and United Nations' forces to monitor the border and, clearly bearing in mind the catalysts which led to war in 1956 and 1967, both sides agreed that neither could unilaterally request the withdrawal of UN personnel. The treaty also affirmed Israel's right of free passage through the Suez Canal, the Strait of Tiran, and the Gulfs of Aqaba and Suez. The normalization of Egyptian–Israeli relations included full recognition; diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations; and the termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people.

Although the preamble to the treaty references UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and calls repeatedly for Israel's other Arab neighbors to join this peace process, the Arab world reacted angrily to Sadat's separate peace with Israel and refused to endorse or participate in it. The Arab League moved its headquarters from Cairo and most of its members broke ties with Egypt, ushering in nearly a decade of Egyptian isolation. Within Egypt, opposition elements protested the peace with Israel, and Islamic radicals, already at odds with Sadat over his economic and social programs, assassinated him on 6 October 1981. Israelis generally welcomed the treaty, although some on the right opposed establishing the precedent of Israeli territorial concessions and Israeli soldiers had to bodily remove protestors from homes in the Sinai town of Yamit.

Husni Mubarak succeeded Sadat and managed to reap the benefits of the treaty, especially massive U.S. foreign aid, without the stigma of having negotiated it. Under his stewardship, Egypt regained its leadership role in the Arab world while preserving the peace with Israel. Despite Israel's initial enthusiasm, Egyptian wariness has made it a cold peace, however, with low-level trade exchanges, few cross-border visitors, and correct but frosty relations at the top. The treaty has withstood numerous regional crises, but genuinely warm relations would seem to hinge on the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

See also Begin, Menachem; Camp David Accords (1978); Carter, Jimmy; League of Arab States; Mubarak, Husni; Sadat, Anwar al-.

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Laura Z. Eisenberg

EGYPTIAN MUSEUM

Museum containing the world's finest collection of pharaonic antiquities.

In 1858 the Ottoman Empire's viceroy of Egypt, Saʿid Pasha, commissioned French Egyptologist Auguste Mariette to create an antiquities service and a museum. In 1863 Saʿid's successor, Ismaʿil Pasha, inaugurated the Egyptian Museum in the Bulaq district of Cairo. The museum was moved to Giza in 1891, then to its present building in Tahrir Square in Cairo in 1902. Gaston Maspéro succeeded Mariette as director of the museum and the antiquities service in 1881. For ninety-four years, until the 1952 revolution, all

directors of the service were French. In 1954 Mustafa Amir took over as the first Egyptian director. The museum gradually relegated subsidiary collections to the Greco-Roman, Arab (later called Islamic), and Coptic museums. Since the 1920s, the Tutankhamen collection has been the museum's greatest treasure. The present building has been overcrowded almost since it opened. A 1925 proposal by U.S. Egyptologist James Henry Breasted and John D. Rockefeller, Jr. to fund a more spacious new museum foundered on political grounds. In 2001 an international competition was announced for the design of a UNESCO-sponsored Grand Egyptian Museum on a site just north of the Giza pyramids plateau.

See also Archaeology in the Middle East; Mariette, Auguste; Maspéro, Gaston.

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Donald Malcolm Reid

EGYPTIAN WOMEN'S UNION

Women's rights organization.

Often called the Egyptian Feminist Union, the Egyptian Women's Union was founded by Huda al-Shaʿrawi in 1923 to demand voting rights for women in Egypt. It also spearheaded the rejection of the veil by Egyptian women as a step toward their emancipation. After opening a women's clubhouse in Cairo, the group published monthly journals in both French and Arabic, ran a clinic and a dispensary for poor women and children, and established child-care centers for working mothers. As a result of their actions, the government set a minimum marriage age and opened its first secondary school for girls. As the Palestine conflict intensified, the Egyptian Women's Union convened an Arab women's conference in 1938 and another in 1944; it thus laid the groundwork for the Arab Feminist Union, which elected Huda al-Shaʿrawi as its first president. Following her death in 1947, the Egyptian Women's Union was eclipsed by other feminist groups that attracted younger women. After the 1952 revolution, the union's functions were taken over by government ministries, and it faded away.

See also Shaʿrawi, Huda al-.

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Arthur Goldschmidt

8 MARS NEWSPAPER

Newspaper of the grassroots Moroccan women's organization Union de l'Action Féminin (Feminist Action Union).

8 Mars (8 March) was launched in the mid-1980s. Its title is the date of International Women's Day. Published in Arabic by women, for women, *8 Mars* has a monthly circulation of over 20,000. Featuring articles on and analyses of legal and political issues that affect women's lives, as well as reports on educational and cultural issues, the publication's proceeds fund the activities of the Union de l'Action Féminin, which was founded in 1983 and as of 2003 had twenty-five branch offices in Morocco and one in Cairo. *8 Mars* advocates women's full exercise of all citizenship rights and features articles and editorials on gender equality in law, everyday life, and culture; it encourages women's integration into decision-making positions at all levels and in all sectors of Moroccan society. Union de l'Action Féminin undertakes projects such as literacy classes, income-generating projects, and public advocacy on women's rights, as well as projects involving women in the political process and all levels of government and advocacy on legal issues, particularly a campaign to change Morocco's *mudawwana* (family law) to give women more legal and economic rights and en-

hanced personal independence. Partly through grassroots networking and partly through *8 Mars,* the Union de l'Action Féminin gathered over 1 million signatures for a petition to change the *mudawwana* laws in the mid 1990s.

See also JABABDI, LATIFA.

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LAURIE KING-IRANI

EISENHOWER, DWIGHT DAVID

[1890–1969]

U.S. Army officer; president of the United States, 1953–1961.

Born in Denison, Texas, Dwight David Eisenhower was graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, in 1915. During World War II, he was chief of the war plans division, U.S. general staff, before becoming commander in chief of U.S. forces, European theater, and commander of allied forces in Northwest Africa. In 1943, he was appointed general, supreme commander in North Africa and the western Mediterranean, and he planned the invasions of North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. He was made general of the army in 1944 and planned and commanded the European invasion at Normandy, France, called D-Day (6 June 1944). After conquering Nazi Germany, Eisenhower remained in Europe as the U.S. member of the Allied Control Commission for Germany and chief of staff of the U.S. Army (1945–1948).

In 1948, Eisenhower returned to the United States and became the president of Columbia University (1948–1953) while remaining supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Europe (1951–1952). He was then persuaded to run for president of the United States on the Republican ticket, won, and served two terms (1953–1961). Along with his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, he was concerned about preventing Soviet incursions in the Middle East, whether economic, political, or ideological. Careful to maintain good relations with the Arab states, he showed no undue favoritism to the new State of Israel. At first he was interested in funding the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, but President Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1955 arms deal with Czechoslovakia, a Soviet satellite country, led Eisenhower, on the advice of Dulles, to deny the loan. In the 1956 Arab–Israel War, when France, Britain, and Israel attempted to take back the Suez Canal from Nasser's nationalization of it, Eisenhower angrily brought the matter to the United Nations, calling for a cease-fire and a withdrawal. This stance won him few friends in the Middle East—only Hashimite-ruled Iraq and Reza Pahlavi's Iran.

On 5 January 1957, Eisenhower proposed the policy that became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, calling on Congress to provide military and economic aid to any Middle Eastern nation that believed itself under risk from "armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism." In July 1958, in the wake of the revolution in Iraq, President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon appealed to the United States for help. Believing that the security of Lebanon was endangered by Nasser and by communism, Eisenhower dispatched a contingent of U.S. Marines from the Sixth Fleet; they landed on 15 July to be greeted by astonished sunbathers but stayed for almost four months. Order was restored to Lebanon, and power passed from Chamoun to General Fu'ad Chehab.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1956); CHAMOUN, CAMILLE; CHEHAB, FU'AD; DULLES, JOHN FOSTER; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO); PAHLAVI, REZA; SUEZ CANAL.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

EITAN, RAFAEL

[1929–]

Chief of staff of the Israeli military; member of Israel's Knesset.

Rafael ("Raful") Eitan was born in Mandatory Palestine, at Moshav Tel Adashim. He attended Tel Aviv University and Israel's National Security College. He joined the Palmah in 1946 and fought in the Arab–Israel War of 1948. After serving in a number of high posts in the Israeli military, he became chief of staff in 1978, serving until 1983. As chief of staff, he worked with Defense Minister Ariel Sharon to plan and execute the invasion of Lebanon in the Arab–Israel War of 1982. In the aftermath of that war, he was criticized by the Kahan Commission, which investigated Israel's conduct in the war, for failing to prevent the mass killing of Palestinian civilians by Lebanese militiamen in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.

In 1983, Eitan entered politics, founding the right-wing nationalist Tzomet Party, which united with the Tehiya Party before the 1984 elections. Eitan has been a member of the Knesset (Israel's parliament) representing the Tzomet and Tehiya parties since 1984 and advocating annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. He served as minister of agriculture and the environment and deputy prime minister from 1996 to 1999.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1982); Gaza Strip; Israel: Political Parties in; Knesset; Palmah; Sharon, Ariel; West Bank.

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Martin Malin

ELDEM, SEDAD HAKKI

[1908–1988]

Turkish architect.

Sedad Hakki Eldem was born into an artistic Istanbul family. His uncle was Osman Hamdi Bey, founder of the Istanbul Fine Arts Academy. Eldem went to school in Switzerland and Germany before studying architecture at his uncle's academy from 1924 to 1928; he remained a teacher at the academy until 1962. By age thirty-one, he had designed some of the major buildings in the new Republic of Turkey: the Yalova Termal Hotel (1937), the office building for the prime ministry (1938), and the Turkish pavilion at the New York World's Fair (1939). He became the most influential architect in mid-twentieth-century Turkey.

Eldem wrote articles defending local architectural styles over international styles and, in a nationalist vein, argued that foreign architects should never be allowed to build in Turkey. Nonetheless, because of German influence and a shortage of materials in the 1940s, Eldem built the faculties of arts at Ankara and Istanbul universities in a modern, monumental, streamlined style. His only gesture toward Turkish roots was ornamental detail. In 1954, he built the modern-style Istanbul Hilton Hotel. Eldem also served as president of Turkey's antiquities committee and wrote a book on Turkish domestic architecture.

See also Architecture.

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Elizabeth Thompson

ELITES

Small but powerful minorities with a disproportionate influence in human affairs.

Both tribal society and Islam have a strong egalitarian component, but early Islamic writers assumed a distinction between the few *(khassa)* and the many *(amma)* not unlike that in modern Western elite theory between the elite and the masses. Like the term *elite, khassa* had vague and various meanings. It was applied on occasion to the following: the early (661–750) Arab aristocracy under the Umayyads; the whole ruling class; the inner entourage of a ruler; educated people generally; and philosophers who pursued a rational (and sometimes a mystical) road to truth.

In the 1960s and 1970s, elite analysis—pioneered by V. Pareto and G. Mosca early in the twentieth century, partly as an alternative to Marxist class

analysis—attracted many Western scholars of the Middle East. National political elites received much of the attention, although anthropologists continued their special interest in local elites. Economic, social, and cultural elites attracted notice particularly when they overlapped with political elites. Elite studies examine the background, recruitment, socialization, values, and cohesiveness of elites. They probe elite-mass linkages, circulation into and out of the elite, the effects of elite leadership on society, and the evolution of all these factors over time.

The Ottoman Empire, which ruled loosely over most of the Middle East in the late eighteenth century, conceived of society as divided into a ruling class of *askaris* (literally, "soldiers" but also including "men of the pen"—*ulama* [Islamic scholars] and scribal bureaucrats) and a ruled class of *reʿaya* (subjects). "Ottomans" were the core elite among the *askaris,* presumed to be Muslim, available for high state service, and familiar with the manners and language (Ottoman Turkish, which also entailed a knowledge of Arabic and Persian) of court. The recruitment of slaves into the elite was one mechanism that made for extreme upward social mobility.

Ever shifting social realities rarely match prescriptive theories. Although theoretically excluded from the *askari* elite, merchants, Coptic scribes, Jewish financiers, and Greek Orthodox patriarchs wielded considerable power in some times and places. Women attained such great informal power during one seventeenth-century period that the Ottomans called it "the sultanate of women." When central control weakened—as in the Fertile Crescent provinces in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a "politics of notables" mediated between the center and the provincial masses. Notable status often ran in families; the notables could include *ulama,* tribal shaykhs, merchants, large landowners, and local military forces.

Since 1800, the Middle East and its elites have greatly changed under the impact of the Industrial Revolution, European conquest and rule, the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, nationalism and independence struggles, the Arab–Israel conflict, the petroleum and oil bonanza, secularist and Islamic ideologies, and the frustrations of continuing military, cultural, and economic dependency. Yet there has been continuity too.

Sunni *ulama,* or Islamic scholars at such sites as Yildiz Mosque, were among the elites of the Ottoman Empire at the height of its power in the Middle East. In the past two centuries, however, the influence of *ulama* declined in what eventually became Turkey and much of the rest of the Sunni-dominated countries of the region, even as the military elite generally remained powerful.
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In the countries where colonialism prevailed, foreign elites forced the partially displaced indigenous elites to make the painful choice of collaboration or resistance. Collaboration was particularly tempting to some religious and ethnic minorities. In the Fertile Crescent, tribal shaykhs and large landowners functioned as notables mediating between the colonial power and the people, as they had once done with the Ottomans. Whether one collaborated or not, knowledge of the West and Western language became a career asset for officials and the emerging professional class. In the milieu of mandates and of party and parliamentary politics between the two world wars, lawyers flourished in both government and opposition. After World War II, as most Middle Eastern countries regained control of their affairs, landed elites and reactionary politicians in many cases still frustrated serious social reform. Pressure built, and army officers of lower-middle-class origin overthrew one regime after another. Was it a return to the praetorian politics of the Ottoman Janissaries and the Mamluks—the

The shah of Iran and Empress Farah used oil wealth and authoritarian rule to withstand the socialist challenge that spread elsewhere in and around the Middle East. However, the monarchs and their elite associates in Iran eventually fell before determined opposition by a revolutionary counterelite under the leadership of Islamic clerics. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

armed forces that early nineteenth-century rulers had destroyed to clear the way for Western-style armies? The new armies remained on the political sidelines for most of the nineteenth century, reemerging briefly in Egypt during Ahmad Urabi's vain attempt to resist colonial control.

After 1900, armies reentered politics first in countries that had escaped colonial rule—Turkey with the Young Turks and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Iran with Reza Shah Pahlavi. Military coups in the Arab countries began later, following independence from colonial rule: Iraq in the 1930s and again in 1958, Syria in 1949, and Egypt in 1952. The regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser—with its Soviet alliance, single-party authoritarianism, and Arab socialism—became a prototype for many others. Hopes that the new military elites and their civilian technocratic allies—economists, engineers, scientists—represented the progressive vanguard of a new middle class soon proved to be overblown.

Patrilineal monarchies in Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula weathered the revolutionary Arab socialist challenge. Oil wealth helped rulers purchase political acquiescence, but it did not save the monarchs of Iraq, Libya, or Iran. In both the monarchies and their revolutionary challengers, patterns of authoritarian rule persisted. Family connections, old-boy networks, and patron-client relations still figure prominently in elite recruitment and perpetuation despite the widespread longing for a fair and open system.

Unlike the military, the *ulama* have lost much of the influence they had in 1800. During the nineteenth century, reforming rulers appropriated revenues from religious endowments, tried to turn the *ulama* into bureaucrats, and bypassed them with Western-style courts and state-school systems. In the *ulama*'s willingness to provide legitimization for almost any regime in power, they have jeopardized their moral authority. Engineers and others associated with the state schools, not the *ulama,* have been in the forefront of Islamic and Islamist protest since the late 1960s. Yet in contrast to the turbulent 1950s and 1960s, most Middle Eastern regimes proved remarkably durable in the 1970s and 1980s. In Iran, however, the distinctive tradition of Shiʿism enabled a counterelite of *ulama* to lead a revolution against the shah and to consolidate its power as the core of a new ruling elite. Attempts to export the revolution to Sunni-dominated countries have met little success.

See also ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; COLONIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST; FERTILE CRESCENT; JANISSARIES; MAMLUKS; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; NATIONALISM; PAHLAVI, REZA; SHIʿISM; *ULAMA*; URABI, AHMAD; YOUNG TURKS.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

EMERGENCY REGULATIONS

During the British mandate of Palestine and as adopted by Israel, rules allowing the restriction of civil rights in emergencies.

On 22 September 1945, Britain's high commissioner in Palestine issued Defense Emergency Regulations that in turn were based on the 1937 Palestine (Defense) Order in Council. That order gave the commissioner broad powers to adopt measures needed in defense of "public safety" and to suppress mutiny. The regulations were originally enacted to subdue the Palestine Arab Revolt of 1936–1939. They were later used against Zionism's guerrilla organizations fighting to remove British rule from Palestine.

The regulations were carried over after the State of Israel was established (15 May 1948), under the 1948 Law and Administration Ordinance. On 21 May 1948, the Provisional State Council proclaimed a state of emergency that has never been revoked, although various sections have been amended or adapted. The regulations, consisting of 170 articles divided into fifteen sections, allow the government and the military to introduce extreme measures and abolish the most elementary rights, such as freedom of movement, travel, and work. Thus, between 1948 and 1966, approximately 90 percent of Israeli Arabs were placed under military administration, with military governors appointed directly by the defense minister. The governors drew their virtually unlimited powers from the Emergency Regulations. The regulations have also been widely used to detain Israeli Arabs and Palestinian refugees without trial, without formal charges, and without judicial or legislative review.

See also PALESTINE ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939).

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BENJAMIN JOSEPH

ENTEBBE OPERATION

Israeli hostage rescue operation, code-named Kadur ha-Ra'am (Thunderbolt).

On 27 June 1976, two German nationals and two Palestinians boarded Air France Flight 139 en route from Tel Aviv to Paris during a stopover in Athens, and hijacked it first to Benghazi, Libya, then on to Entebbe Airport in Uganda. Following a plan masterminded by Dr. Wadi Haddad, renegade figure associated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Ilyich Sanchez Ramirez, which involved terrorists of varied affiliations (including the notorious "Carlos") the hijackers were there joined by a second team, the passengers divided into Jews and non-Jews, and the latter released. While feigning negotiation with the hijackers and with their host, President Idi Amin of Uganda, Israel made preparations for a military rescue mission. On the night of 3 July four Hercules transport jets carrying 150 Israeli commandos took off from Sharm al-Shaykh and flew 2,484 miles (4,000 km) to Entebbe, evading detection throughout. Accompanied by diversionary measures, the paratroopers stormed the terminal where the 101 hostages were kept, killing all eight captors and numerous Ugandan soldiers. The Israeli commander, Lieutenant Colonel Yonatan Netanyahu, and three hostages were killed during the operation, which lasted some forty-five minutes from landing to takeoff. (An elderly Jewish woman who had been hospitalized in Kampala and was not present during the rescue was later murdered.) The jets refueled at Nairobi and returned to a tumultuous welcome the following morning in Israel. Arab and African countries and the Communist bloc condemned the Israeli action, while in the West reaction was largely positive.

See also HADDAD, WADI; POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; SHARM AL-SHAYKH.

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ZEV MAGHEN

ENTE NAZIONALE IDROCARBONI (ENI)

Italian oil company that sought access to Algeria's oil industry.

Ente Nazionale Idrocarboni, a multistate petroleum company, was headed by Enrico Mattei. Mattei promised both arms and money to Algeria's Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation

Front) during the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962) in return for unspecified future access to the oil and natural gas supplies discovered in Algeria's Saharan region. Mattei's private plane crashed under mysterious circumstances in October 1962, and Algeria nationalized its oil and gas industry after independence.

See also Algerian War of Independence; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).

Dirk Vandewalle

ENVER PAŞA

[1881–1922]

Ottoman general and strongman of the Committee for Union and Progress.

Enver Paşa was born in Constantinople (now Istanbul) 23 November 1881. When his father, a railway employee, was transferred to Macedonia, Enver attended the Monastir military junior high school. He was graduated from the War Academy (Mekteb-i Harbiye) as staff corporal in 1902 and was posted to the Third Army in Macedonia.

In 1906 Enver joined the Ottoman Liberty Society in Salonika, a constituent group of the reorganized Committee for Union and Progress (CUP). He led one of a series of revolts in Macedonia in 1908 that triggered the Young Turk Revolution of 23 July 1908. In Constantinople he was hailed as a revolutionary hero. His appointment to Berlin as military attaché at the end of 1908 failed to remove him from the political changes taking place in the capital. During the counterrevolutionary uprising of April 1909, he joined the Army of Deliverance, which marched to Constantinople to restore order, then returned to his post in Berlin. In 1911, after a brief assignment in Scutari at the time of the Albanian uprising, he transferred to Libya, where he commanded Ottoman forces in Benghazi against the Italians. His betrothal to the granddaughter of Sultan Abdülmecit II, Naciye Sultan, was concluded in his absence, presaging a more prominent public role for him in Constantinople.

Enver led the armed CUP coup against the Kamil government in January 1913. He fought for the recapture of Edirne from the Bulgarians during the Balkan War. Enver received multiple promotions and became minister of war in January 1914 and proceeded to reorganize the army by purging the senior officers. He set up a paramilitary intelligence and propaganda organ.

Enver Paşa was a general and a leader of the Young Turks, a reformist movement in the last years of the Ottoman Empire. Although the group's revolution restored a liberal constitution in 1908, he soon assumed dictatorial power and made an alliance with Germany, leading the empire into World War I and its final defeat. © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Enver Paşa was responsible for authorizing the passage of German dreadnoughts into the Black Sea in November 1914, effectively committing the Ottoman Empire to war on the side of Germany. As deputy commander in chief of Ottoman forces, he personally led the Russian campaign in Eastern Anatolia that resulted in the earliest and most devastating setback of the entire war for the empire. After Russia withdrew from the war, however, Enver

delegated his uncle Halil and brother Nuri to lead the Ottoman armies into the Caucasus, seeking a pan-Turkish union. This strategy was aborted by Ottoman defeats on other fronts.

Following the Ottoman surrender at Mudros, Enver fled abroad with other prominent CUP leaders. In November 1918, he first went to Odessa and was arrested attempting to travel to the Caucasus, possibly to establish a resistance against Allied armies in occupation of Ottoman territories. He managed to flee to Germany. In August 1920, he returned to the Soviet Union. After an audience with the Bolshevik leaders in Moscow, Enver went to Baku and participated in the Congress of Eastern Nations. The Turkish nationalist government in Ankara prevented his entering Anatolia. The Bolsheviks allowed him to go to Turkistan to form an Islamic army to liberate India. Instead, in September 1921, Enver joined the Turkistan resistance movement in Bukhura, which he coordinated signing communiqués as "the son-in-law of the caliph." He was killed near Dushanbe, 4 August 1922, as he personally led attacks against the Bolshevik forces.

Enver's reputation as the "hero of liberty" and his notoriety as the dictator of the CUP, though both exaggerated, cast him in history as a controversial figure. A similar hyperbole is the occasional German reference to the Ottoman Empire as "Enverland." Enver personified the eclectic currents prevalent among the Ottoman political elite after 1908. He was sympathetic to the Turkish, and following the Ottoman loss of the Arab provinces, to pan-Turkish ideas. As a member of the royal household and a pious man, Enver was also deeply committed to Ottomanism and the Islamic principles that sustained the Ottomanist ideology.

See also Abdülmecit II; Committee for Union and Progress.

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Hasan Kayali

EQBAL, MANOUCHEHR

[1908–1977]

Iranian politician and prime minister.

Born in Mashhad to a prominent Khorasani family, Manouchehr Eqbal pursued his medical studies in France and returned to Iran in 1933. In 1939, he joined the Faculty of Medicine at Tehran University and was promoted to full professor in 1941. He began his political career in 1942 as deputy minister of health in the cabinet of Ahmad Qavam, when the authority of Reza Shah Pahlavi was challenged by the *majles* (parliament). In 1949, after an attempt on the life of the shah, it was Eqbal who announced the government's decision to outlaw the Tudeh Party. In that same year, he was appointed minister of interior. In 1950, he was made governor of Azerbaijan and chancellor of Tabriz University but he was forced to resign in 1951, a few months after the nationalist government of Mohammad Mossadegh assumed power. After the Central Intelligence Agency-sponsored coup, which brought back the shah from exile, Eqbal's political career flourished. He was appointed a senator in 1954, chancellor of Tehran University in 1954, and minister of the royal court in 1956. In 1957, he was made prime minister.

In that same year, as part of the shah's plans to effect U.S.-supported reform of Iran's political system, a two-party system was implemented and Eqbal was charged with founding the government majority party, Hezb-e melliyun (Nationalist Party). Eqbal's long-time rival and another member of the shah's inner circle, Amir Asadollah Alam, established the loyal opposition party, Hezb-e mardom (People's Party). During Eqbal's tenure as prime minister, the SAVAK (the domestic intelligence service) was created in 1957, and an abortive land reform law promulgated in 1960. In 1961, under U.S. pressure and faced with increasing domestic criticism, the shah reluctantly removed Eqbal from the premiership. In 1961, he was made Iran's representative to United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and in 1963 chairman of the National Iranian Oil Company. With the rise to prominence of Alam during the 1960s and the 1970s, Eqbal gradually fell from favor. He was also a grand master of several Freemason lodges, including Homayun and Mowlavi, from the 1950s to the 1970s.

See also Mossadegh, Mohammad; Pahlavi, Reza; Tudeh Party.

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Neguin Yavari

ERBAKAN, NECMEDDIN

[1926–]

Turkey's most prominent Islamist politician, 1970–1998; prime minister, 1996–1997.

Necmeddin Erbakan was born in Sinop on the Black Sea. He graduated from Istanbul Technical University as a mechanical engineer in 1948 and then went to Germany for further study. Beginning in 1962 he taught in Istanbul Technical University, and he became full professor in 1965. With the support of Turkey's small merchants and artisans, he was elected chairman of the Union of Chambers of Commerce. His opposition to state-led economic policies, which favored large-scale industrialists, led to his removal from office. Thereafter he became the spokesman of the "little man" in Turkey, and in 1969 he was elected to parliament as an Independent from Konya. In 1970, with the support of Naqshbandi Shaykh Mehmet Zahid Kotku, Erbakan formed the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi), which had an Islamic, anti-Western, anticapitalist agenda. The Turkish Constitutional Court closed down the party in 1971 because of its antisecularist activities. It re-merged as the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) in 1973. The party stressed "heavy industrialization" and "moral and spiritual development" as the two principles of its political agenda. Erbakan became the vice-premier and minister of state in 1973, when his party formed a coalition government with Bülent Ecevit's RPP. Erbakan also served in the National Front cabinets of Süleyman Demirel (1977). The leaders of the 1980 military coup banned all parties, including the National Salvation Party. Erbakan was arrested, and after a long trial in military court, he was acquitted. He returned to national politics in 1987 as head of the Refah Party, which won major mayoral offices in the 1994 municipal elections and dominated Turkish politics in the 1990s. Refah won the largest number of seats, but not a majority, in the 1995 parliamentary elections, and Erbakan became prime minister in a coalition government formed in 1996. He was forced out of office following the military's "soft coup" of 28 February 1997. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court banned Refah for antisecular activities (1998). Erbakan and other party leaders then organized the Virtue Party, which was banned in 2000. The younger and more reformist members challenged Erbakan's domination of the party beginning in 1998; they eventually split and formed the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan.

See also Black Sea; Demirel, Süleyman; Ecevit, Bülent; Erdoğan, Tayyip; Naqshbandi; National Salvation Party; Refah Partisi.

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Frank Tachau
Updated by M. Hakan Yavuz

ERBIL, LEYLA

[1931–]

Turkish novelist and short-story writer.

Born in Istanbul, Turkey, Erbil studied at the Kadiköy Girls School and the Faculty of Literature. She began writing stories while working as a secretary and translator. Her first poetry was published in 1945, but she is known for her stories, which began to appear in various journals in the 1950s. Breaking away from the traditional techniques of Turkish literature and the syntax of the Turkish language, Erbil searched for a new narrative voice to depict the existential struggles of the modern individual who clashes with society. Erbil is noted for her ability to observe individuals using different societal perspectives, and her stories are characterized by efforts to depict the multiple dimensions of reality. Among her books are *The Wool Carder* (1960), *At Night* (1968), *A Strange Woman* (1971), *The Old Lover*

(1977), and *The Day of Darkness* (1985). She was a founding member of the Turkish Union of Writers in 1974.

See also LITERATURE: TURKISH.

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DAVID WALDNER

ERDOĞAN, TAYYIP

[1954–]

Turkish politician and leader of the Justice and Development Party who became prime minister in 2003.

Tayyip Erdoğan was born in the Black Sea town of Rize. He moved to Istanbul in 1967 and subsequently graduated from the business school at Marmara University. As a candidate of the Refah Party (Refah Partisi), he was elected to a four-year term as mayor of Istanbul in 1994. During his tenure as mayor of Turkey's largest city, he achieved a reputation for improving public services and for making the city greener and cleaner. After the Constitutional Court banned the Refah Party in 1998, Erdoğan joined its successor, the Virtue Party. In that same year the State Security Court charged him with inciting religious hatred for reciting a poem by Ziya Gökalp at a public gathering; he was convicted and sentenced to ten months in prison, of which he served four months. In 2001, after the Constitutional Court, under military pressure, banned the Virtue Party, Erdoğan joined with a group of former Virtue parliamentarians to form the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and he led it to victory in the November 2002 elections. However, because of his previous conviction, he could not become prime minister until March 2003, after the Turkish Grand National Assembly had amended the constitution so that he could be a candidate in a by-election for Siirt. Erdoğan has disavowed some of the extreme Islamic views of his past and is trying to recast himself as a pro-Western conservative. For example, he does not insist on Turkey leaving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and he says that the country's membership in the European Union is a necessary and useful step. He has avoided the issue of Islamic dress for women by saying he will not bring his own wife—who wears a headscarf—to official functions.

See also AKP (JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY); BLACK SEA; GÖKALP, ZIYA; ISTANBUL; REFAH PARTISI; TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

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M. HAKAN YAVUZ

ERETZ YISRAEL

The Hebrew phrase meaning Land of Israel.

The name *Eretz Yisrael* is biblical in origin, where it refers, variously, to parts of the region that were under Jewish sovereignty at different times. Since the dispersion of the Jews in 70 C.E., it has been used to designate Zion and "the Promised Land." Its actual borders are defined variously in the Talmud. It was also the Hebrew name for Palestine under the British Mandate. Indeed, when the first Palestine stamps were being issued, strong albeit unsuccessful pressures were exerted on the British authorities to have the designation be *Eretz Yisrael* rather than Palestine, the latter being a Roman designation.

After 1948, David Ben-Gurion insisted on the term *State of Israel (Medinat Yisrael),* because of his statist emphasis. By contrast, Menachem Begin frequently spoke of *"Eretz Yisrael,"* reflecting his allegiance to the historic Israel, the "Greater Israel." Likewise, *haredi* (ultra-Orthodox) Jews, whose attachments are much more religious than political—even if they accept the political legitimacy of the state—are apt to refer to *Eretz Yisrael* rather than *Medinat Yisrael.*

After the 1967 war, the Greater Land of Israel movement *(Eretz Yisrael ha-Shelema)* developed. Sparked by an enhanced attachment to the biblical Promised Land, its adherents—predominantly religious but comprising secular nationalists as well—opposed ceding sovereignty over the newly conquered territories and embarked on a settlement campaign.

See also BEGIN, MENACHEM; BEN-GURION, DAVID.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

ERSOY, MEHMET AKIF

[c. 1870–1936]

Turkish poet and Islamist.

Mehmet Akif Ersoy was born in Istanbul to a religious Muslim family; his father was a teacher at Fatih Medrese, and his mother's ancestors were from the Uzbek city of Bukhara. He learned Arabic, Persian, and French privately and studied veterinary medicine at the Halkali Baytar high school, which he finished in 1893. He held various posts as a veterinarian and teacher. In 1908, he began writing and became editor of the monthly Islamist journal *The Straight Path* (which proclaimed the cause of Islam), later called *Fountain of Orthodoxy,* to which he contributed poetry and essays. During the Turkish war of independence, he preached the cause of nationalism in the mosques and local newspapers of the Anatolian provinces.

Later in life, Ersoy would become known as one of the greatest poets in modern Turkish and the leader of the most intellectual of the Islamist movements in Turkey. He opposed nationalist reformers who argued that Turkey must import the West's civilization as well as its technology. He contended that the two were not necessarily linked and that importing the ethics and institutions of another culture would widen the cultural gap between elites and common people. Ersoy advocated an Islamic (not a secular) democracy, with a parliament based on consultative councils, as used by the prophet Muhammad's followers.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

ERTUĞRUL, MUHSIN

[1892–1979]

Turkish actor and director in cinema and theater.

Muhsin Ertuğrul was born in Istanbul, where he attended state-run schools. He began acting in 1909, and in 1911 and 1913 he went to Paris to study theater. Known as the pioneer in all areas of modern Turkish drama, Ertuğrul was the principal man of the stage in Turkey between 1908 and 1923 and the sole movie director in the country until 1939. He received personal support from Atatürk in the development of the theater arts.

Ertuğrul turned the Istanbul Municipal Theater into an influential institution when he was appointed its director in 1927, substituting for the usual vaudeville shows and melodramas foreign classics and innovative new scripts in the Turkish language. When he was appointed director of the state theater and opera in Ankara in 1947, he produced *Kerem,* the first opera composed by a Turk. As director from 1947 to 1958, he opened local theaters in other cities, such as İzmir, Adana, and Bursa.

Meanwhile, Ertuğrul began making films in 1922; his 1935 *Aysel, Daughter of the Marshy Village* is now considered his masterpiece.

See also ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

ERZURUM

The most important city in eastern Turkey and the capital of Erzurum province.

Erzurum is an ancient frontier town that historically was a site of contestation between Byzantium and Persia, Byzantium and the Arabs, and the Ottoman and Safavi empires. Erzurum is located in a high valley 2078 yards (1,900 meters) of the Kara

Su and Aras rivers. During the Ottoman period, the town had a large Armenian population, but the community was forcibly deported during the Armenian genocide of 1915. Later, Erzurum was the site of the first nationalist congress in 1919, which was attended by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and issued the declaration of the Turkish war of independence from Allied occupation. Modern Erzurum has grown into the major urban center of eastern Turkey, with a population of 565,516 (census of 2000). It is the site of a large military base and Atatürk University, and is a trade center, especially for local products such as iron, copper, sugar, grain, cattle, and leather.

See also ARMENIAN GENOCIDE; ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; ERZURUM CONGRESS (1919).

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

ERZURUM CONGRESS (1919)

Congress called to assert the integrity of the Ottoman state, 1919.

Named for the city in which it was held, the congress was called immediately after the Ottoman Empire had been on the losing side of World War I; the empire was to be dismembered. It was feared that the local area around Erzurum would become part of an Armenian state. The congress declared the nationalists' intention of defending the sultanate/caliphate against foreign occupiers and appealed to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's principles of national self-determination. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) was elected chairman of the congress, and although the Istanbul government declared the congress illegal, ordering his arrest, he escaped. It was here that he made his first declaration of principles that would guide his war to unite Turkey as an independent nation.

See also ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; WILSON, WOODROW.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

ERZURUM, TREATY OF (1823)

Two treaties, 1823 and 1847, that settled boundary disputes between the Ottoman Empire and Iran.

Although the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639 had established the boundary between Ottoman Turkey and Iran, the border in the mountainous Zuhab region remained a site of intermittent conflict in the subsequent two centuries. Attacks from Iran into Ottoman territory prompted Sultan Mahmud II in 1821 to declare war on Iran. Fath Ali Shah Qajar's army had initial success and marched east as far as Diyarbekir in the south and Erzurum in the north. The first Treaty of Erzurum was signed in July 1823, but it essentially confirmed the 1639 border and thus failed to resolve the disputes that had led to conflict. A series of border incidents in the 1830s again brought Iran and Turkey to the brink of war. Britain and Russia offered to mediate, and a second Treaty of Erzurum was signed in May 1847. This treaty divided the disputed region between Iran and Turkey and provided for a boundary commission to delimit the entire border. The boundary commission's work encountered several political setbacks but finally completed its task in 1914.

See also FATH ALI SHAH QAJAR; MAHMUD II.

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ZACHARY KARABELL
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ESENDAL, MEMDUH ŞEVKET
[1883–1952]

Turkish novelist, short story writer, and politician.

Memduh Şevket Esendal was born in Çorlu to the Karakahyaoğullari family, which had migrated there from Rumelia. After attending elementary school in Istanbul and high school in Edirne, he returned to Çorlu to tend the family farm. He joined the Committee for Union and Progress party in 1906, and during the Balkan War fled to Istanbul, where he held several government jobs. He was Turkey's representative to Azerbaijan in 1920, ambassador to Iran from 1925 to 1930, and ambassador to Afghanistan

and the Soviet Union in the early 1930s. Esendal was in the Turkish Grand National Assembly from 1939 to 1950 and was general secretary of the Republican People's Party from 1941 to 1945.

Esendal is perhaps best known for his many short stories, which he wrote in a distinctively direct and realistic style, with careful depictions of daily life. He evoked daily life in Turkey often in a humorous way and with kindliness. With Sait Faik Abasiyanik, he is associated with the emergence of the modern Turkish short story form. Esendal also wrote several novels, which resembled his short stories in style.

See also Committee for Union and Progress; Republican People's Party; Turkish Grand National Assembly.

Elizabeth Thompson

ESFANDIARY, FEREYDUN

[1930–2000]

An Iranian essayist and novelist.

Fereydun Esfandiary was born in Belgium to Iranian parents. His father was a diplomat, and as a child Fereydun Esfandiary lived in several foreign countries, including Afghanistan, India, and Lebanon, although he also spent long periods with family in Iran. In 1948 he was a member of Iran's national team at the Olympics in London. He then studied at the University of California, first in Berkeley and later in Los Angeles. In the early 1950s, he worked at the United Nations on the Conciliation Commission for Palestine and subsequently taught at the New School for Social Research in New York. In the 1960s, he moved to Los Angeles, where he lectured at the University of California.

In the late 1950s, Esfandiary turned to writing. Three of his novels dealt with his perception of Iran's ills: *Day of Sacrifice* (1959), *The Beggar* (1965), and *Identity Card* (1966). By the early 1970s, he was writing mostly essays. He embraced futurist ideas and legally changed his name to FM2030. His better-known futurist books include *Optimism One, Up-Wingers, Telespheres,* and *Are You a Transhumanist?* In these books he depicted modern technology as dehumanizing and school as obsolete. Esfandiary died of pancreatic cancer in July 2000; in accordance with his wishes, his body was frozen and stored in a special vault where it can be retrieved and revived once science has perfected a way to increase human longevity.

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Michael C. Hillmann
Updated by Eric Hooglund

ESHKOL, LEVI

[1895–1969]

Israel's Labor Party leader; prime minister, 1963–1969.

Born in Kiev, Ukraine, as Levi Shkolnik Eshkol immigrated to Palestine in 1914, where he was a founder of Kibbutz Degania Bet and served in the Jewish Legion from 1918 to 1920. He was active in labor politics and Zionism throughout the period of British mandate (1922–1948). For three years, Eshkol headed the settlement department of the Palestine office in Berlin during the period of Nazi rule. He organized immigration and transfers of funds from Germany to Palestine, using the money to establish new settlement projects and the Mekorot Water Company, of which he was both the founder and the first president. In the same period, he was active in the High Command of the Haganah as the chief financial administrator, organizing arms procurement for the defense organization.

After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Eshkol served in numerous government, Jewish Agency, and cabinet positions including director general of the ministry of defense (1948), where he was instrumental in establishing the Israeli weapons industry; head of the land settlement department of the Jewish Agency (1949), where he coordinated the settlement of the masses of new immigrants arriving in Israel; treasurer for the Jewish Agency (1950–1952); minister of agriculture (1951); and minister of finance (1952), where he was responsible for the implementation of the reparations agreement with Germany from World War II.

In 1963, upon the retirement of David Ben-Gurion as prime minister, Eshkol took his post and

that of defense minister (with Ben-Gurion's recommendation)—Ben-Gurion, however, soon accused him of mishandling state business, especially the government scandal called the Lavon Affair (in which Israeli spies were caught in Egypt but no one in the Israeli cabinet admitted to knowing about the mission). Consequently, Ben-Gurion left the MAPAI Party and formed Rafi.

Eshkol continued as prime minister during the period leading to the Arab–Israel War of 1967 and was faced with a divided cabinet over the question of war with Egypt. Because of public pressure, he ceded the defense portfolio to Moshe Dayan. Eshkol also enlarged the cabinet and brought in members of the right-wing Gahal bloc, establishing a National Unity government, which was retained in the 1969 elections to the sixth Knesset but ended when Gahal broke away in 1970.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Ben-Gurion, David; Dayan, Moshe; Haganah; Israel: Political Parties in; Jewish Agency for Palestine; Lavon Affair.

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Martin Malin

ESKINAZI, ROZA

[c. 1895–1980]

Popular Greek singer.

Roza Eskinazi was the most celebrated Greek café singer of the twentieth century. Born Sarah Skinazi in Constantinople to Sephardic Jewish parents, Avram and Flora Skinazis, Eskinazi dominated Greek popular music during the late 1920s and 1930s, just as sound recording technology was enabling the dissemination of Levantine musical forms to a large and growing diaspora. Possessing a sweet and lilting soprano, Eskinazi sang in Greek, Turkish, Arabic, Ladino (Djudezmo), Italian, and Armenian. Her recordings in Athens for both Columbia and Orthophonic Records assured Eskinazi's international popularity. Her recordings were marketed to a worldwide network of Greek, Armenian, and Sephardic Jewish diaspora communities uprooted by the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the population transfers of the early 1920s. Several notable records, such as *To Neo Hanoumaki,* included multilingual songs of the Greek and Balkan café scene. By the 1920s, vibrant Greek emigrant communities were found not only in North America but in the Congo, Abyssinia, and especially in the Egyptian cities of Alexandria and Suez. As a consequence of the targeted marketing of Eskinazi's recordings, several ethnic groups claim her as a part of their musical heritage.

Although Eskinazi's popularity waned after World War II, she toured in Turkey and the United States during the 1950s. In 1952, she recorded some forty songs for the Balkan Record Company of New York City. During the 1960s and 1970s, she still commanded considerable interest in Greece and continued to appear in limited public performances. Throughout the 1980s, a growing resurgence in Greek café music placed the genre firmly in the world music scene. At the same time, scholars of ethnomusicology and social history argued for a conflation of various Balkan and Middle Eastern musical genres into one: *rebetika.* Eskinazi was soon recognized as one of the most prominent *rebetika* performers of all time. The enduring power and beauty of her performances is evidenced by the fact that, even when removed from her original cultural setting and musical traditions, her work continues to attract new listeners with every passing year.

Roza Eskinazi died on 2 December 1980 and is buried in an unmarked grave at Stomio, near the Gulf of Corinth.

See also Diaspora; Music; Ottoman Empire.

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Stavros Frangos

ESMATI-WARDAK, MASUMA

[1930–]

Afghan woman writer and politician.

Masuma Esmati-Wardak was born in 1930 in Kabul. She graduated from Malalai High School in 1949 and from Kabul Women's College in 1953. In 1958 she received a degree in business administration in the United States. Upon her return to Afghanistan, she became principal of Zarghuna High School in Kabul, and then in 1959, the director-general of secondary education. She was a member of the Constitutional Advisory Commission and a participant in the *Loya-Jirga* (National Assembly) that endorsed the 1964 Afghan Constitution. In 1965 she was elected from Kandahar to the *Wulosi Jirga* (the lower house of parliament) and became a voice for women's rights. In 1976 she was recognized by the Women's Coordination Committee of India for her contribution to the cause of women. She served as president of *Shura-i-Zanan-i-Afghanistan* (Afghanistan's Women's Council) and then as minister of education during the government of Najibullah (1986–1992). She has written extensively on issues pertaining to women, including a book in Dari (the Persian dialect of Afghanistan) on the history of Afghan women, and a book in Pashtu titled *Women's Contributions to Pashtu Oral Tradition* that was translated into English.

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SENZIL NAWID

ETEMADI, SALEHA FARUQ

[1928–]

Afghan activist for women's rights, 1962–1974.

Saleha Faruq Etemadi, an important public figure in Afghanistan in the 1960s and early 1970s, was born in 1928 in Kabul. She was among the first graduates of Malalai High School, a French lycée for girls in Kabul. After graduation from the college of literature for women in 1951, she became a teacher and then was appointed vice principal and later principal of Malalai High School. In 1962 she became president of the government-sponsored Women's Association *(De Mirmono Tolena).* She was also editor of the association's monthly magazine, *Mirmon* (Woman). Under her leadership, the Women's Association became an important force for the promotion of women's rights in Afghanistan in the 1960s and the early 1970s. Etemadi was out of office during the presidency of Muhammad Daud (1974–1978) and the Marxist regimes of the Khalqis and Parchamis, the two divisions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. However, during the government of Najibullah (1987–1992), she once again gained prominence as a public figure when she was appointed minister of social security *(Amniyyat-i-Ijtemaʿi)* in 1990. After the fall of Najibullah in 1992, Etemadi left Afghanistan to live in exile in Switzerland.

See also AFGHANISTAN: OVERVIEW; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW.

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SENZIL NAWID

ETHIOPIAN JEWS

Jews of Ethiopia, many of whom have emigrated to Israel.

In Ethiopia, the Jews referred to themselves as Beta Israel (the House of Israel) but were most commonly known as Falashas (wanderers, outsiders). In Israel, these same people call themselves Ethiopian Jews, symbolically expressing their equality with other Jews and rejecting the stigma they once held in Ethiopia.

There were 85,000 Ethiopian Jews living in Israel in 2002, 23,000 of whom were Israeli born. Their mass emigration from Ethiopia began during the early 1970s, encouraged by a decree issued by Israel's chief rabbis that the Jews from Ethiopia were "full" Jews (although they still required symbolic conversion to Judaism). In Operation Moses (which took place during 1984–1985), 7,700 Jews were airlifted to Israel from refugee camps in Sudan. A second large-scale airlift known as Operation Solomon took place in 1991. As the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime was collapsing in Addis Ababa, 14,400 Ethiopian Jews were transferred to Israel.

The majority of the early immigrants to Israel from Ethiopia hailed from the northern province of Tigre and are Tigranian speaking. More than 80 percent of Ethiopian Jewry in Israel originate from Gonder, Semien (or Simyen), Woggera, and other areas. They speak Ethiopia's official language, Amharic, which is a Semitic language. The younger immigrants in Israel speak Hebrew. Beta Israel holy books, including the Bible, are written in Geez, the script of Ethiopian scholarship.

In Ethiopia, the Beta Israel community observed a unique form of Judaism that was based on biblical commandments and was influenced by Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity (which in turn displays remarkable similarities to aspects of Judaism). The Beta Israel did not know the Oral Law; nor were they aware of rabbinic interpretations. They strictly observed rules of purity and pollution. The cornerstone of their religion until this century was monasticism, with the monks passing down liturgy, literature, and religious edicts.

During the twentieth century, urged on by visiting Jews such as Dr. Jacques Faitlovitch from Paris, some Beta Israel were exposed to mainstream Judaism. Faitlovitch's pupils, who studied in Europe and other countries, included Taamrat Emmanuel (1888–1962), aide to the Emperor Haile Selassie; Tadesse Yacob (1913–), deputy minister of finance in Ethiopia; and Yona Bogale (1908–1987), who acted as teacher and intermediary between Jews in Ethiopia and Israel.

The Ethiopian Jews are in the process of coming in line with Israeli Judaism, although some *kessoth* (priests) and members of the community do not wish to accept the authority of Israel's chief rabbinate. In 1985 the Ethiopian Jews demonstrated in front of the rabbinate's offices, objecting to the ritual immersion they had to undergo for acceptance as "full" Jews. To date, Ethiopian Jews are referred to one particular rabbi for marriage purposes.

In 1992 some Ethiopian Jews organized demonstrations to demand that the Feresmura, Jews who had converted to Christianity in Ethiopia from the nineteenth century on, should be allowed to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return (1950). In 2003 the Ariel Sharon government gave 19,000 Feresmura the right to immigrate to Israel.

A group of Ethiopian Jews from the Quara region arrive in Israel in 1999. Ariel Sharon, at the time Israel's outgoing foreign minister, led the effort to implement the relocation. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

In Ethiopia, the Beta Israel were primarily agriculturists and tenant farmers. They also engaged in petty trading and seasonal occupations, such as metalwork and sewing. In Israel, they have been settled almost exclusively in seven concentrations in a few localities (Netanya, Rehovot, Haifa, Hadera, Ashdod, Ashkelon, Beersheba) where they are largely employed in manufacturing and public services. In 1999 53 percent were in the labor force. Most Ethiopian Israelis own their homes. There is still a difficult situation regarding the housing of singles who live in mobile-home sites.

All Ethiopian Jewish children study in regular Israeli schools. Teens attend residential schools. Large numbers of young people have undergone occupational retraining courses. Several hundred Ethiopian Jews study in institutes for higher learning in Israel; many more have graduated from colleges and universities, majoring in technological and social sciences and in paramedical fields.

See also LAW OF RETURN.

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EUPHRATES DAM

The Keban, Tabaqa, and Atatürk dams on the Euphrates river.

Since 1970, Turkey and Syria have built three major dams on the Euphrates, which as a group will severely limit the river's flow into Iraq. The Keban dam, near Elaziğ, was the first to be completed. It supplies electricity to large cities in western Turkey. The Tabaqa Dam in Syria is both a major power and irrigation project. The Atatürk (Karababa) Dam, near Urfa, is the most ambitious of the three. It is intended to spur development in the Turkish southeast (something the Keban project failed to do) by irrigating nearly 4.5 million acres (1.7 ha), almost three times the area to be irrigated by the Tabaqa.

When all dams are in operation, of the 30 billion cubic meters of water that once reached Iraq, only 11 billion cubic meters will remain. Since Iraq claims that its minimum requirement is 13 billion cubic meters, there will be a shortfall. Since no treaty exists to allocate the water, Iraq has no recourse; in its weakened political position (since the Gulf Crisis of 1990/91) it will be in a poor position to bargain.

See also TABAQA DAM.

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JOHN R. CLARK

EVIAN ACCORDS (1962)

March 1962 agreements between the French government and the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne.

The Evian Accords—reached between the French government and the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale's (FLN) Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA)—were very difficult to conclude. Their negotiation took place in a climate roiling with rebellion and revolution. Belkacem Krim presided over the Algerian delegation, ably assisted by Saad Dahlab. Louis Joxe headed the French team.

Negotiations began in May 1961 in Evian, France, one month after President Charles de Gaulle suppressed a military rebellion by recalcitrant generals who opposed Algerian decolonization. The talks soon broke down over the future status of the Sahara (with Joxe suggesting the possibility of its partition) and the option of double citizenship in a future Algerian state for the *pieds-noirs,* or European settlers. Secret discussions in late 1961 resulted in a resumption of full negotiations in February 1962 at Les Rousses, a hideaway in the Jura Mountains. By that time, the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS) was wreaking havoc in an increasingly anarchic, uncontrollable Algeria. Furthermore, ideological fissures in the FLN widened. There were intense pressures on both sides to arrive at a settlement. De Gaulle had already ruled out partitioning the Sahara. The FLN, in turn, allowed France to preserve its petroleum and natural gas concessions and its military and nuclear testing bases. The *pieds-noirs* also received numerous guarantees on the assumption that most of them would remain in Algeria. After settling these arduous issues, negotiations adjourned briefly. Krim and Dahlab successfully defended their actions and compromises before the GPRA and the increasingly hostile general staff of the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). The negotiators returned to Evian to complete the accords, which were signed on 19 March 1962.

A joint cease-fire introduced the accords. This was followed by five "chapters." Chapter I addressed the formation of an interim, provisional government whose chief task was to prepare a self-determination referendum. Chapter II stipulated the *pieds-noirs'* future role in independent Algeria, and it framed the future French-Algerian relationship of "cooperation." Chapter III considered "military questions." Chapter IV stated that disputes would be negotiated with "recourse" to the international

court of justice. Chapter V asserted that if self-determination (i.e., Algerian independence with cooperation) was affirmed by the referendum, France pledged to recognize immediately the new nation. The meticulous guarantees to protect the settler minority ensued, followed by detailed "declarations of principles" particularly regarding post-colonial cooperation.

Given the neocolonial implications of the accords, alienated FLN members and the general staff officers condemned the loss of sovereignty symbolized by the perpetuated French economic and military presence. The Tripoli Program of June 1962 displayed the nationalists' discontent. Differences over the accords contributed to an intra-FLN fratricide in the summer of 1962 that overthrew the GPRA. Succeeding Algerian governments subsequently aimed to revise the accords and pursue "postcolonial decolonization" in moves such as the nationalization of French Saharan concessions in February 1971. In addition, changing historical realities vitiated the guarantees meant to secure the *pieds-noirs.* The violent nihilism of the OAS and the general insecurity forced hundreds of thousands of settlers—almost the entire community—to flee Algeria for France, thereby making the protective stipulations anachronistic. Despite their controversial shortcomings, the accords liberated Algeria and freed France from a destructive colonial relationship.

See also Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Krim, Belkacem; Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS).

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Phillip C. Naylor

EVIN PRISON

See Human Rights

EVREN, KENAN

[1918–]

Seventh president of the Republic of Turkey; architect of 1982 constitution.

Kenan Evren graduated from military college in 1938 and the military academy in 1948. He rose to the rank of general in 1964. He served as Turkey's commander of land forces from 1977 to 1978 and the chief of the general staff from 1978 to 1980. He was the leader of the September 1980 military coup against the government of Süleyman Demirel, and afterwards he ruled the country as the head of the National Security Council, which had full powers of the legislature and executive. In 1981 Evren and the National Security Council formed a Constitutional Assembly to prepare a new constitution, which was approved in a national referendum in November 1982. The constitution included a temporary article that automatically conferred on the head of the National Security Council the office of president for a seven-year term; subsequently the president would be elected by the parliament. Thus, with the ratification of the constitution, Evren became the seventh president since the establishment of the republic in 1923. Upon becoming president, he gave up his military duties and served as a civilian president until November 1989.

See also Demirel Süleyman; National Security Council (Turkey).

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EXODUS (1947)

An illegal immigration ship carrying Holocaust survivors to British-ruled Palestine in 1947, which became a symbol of the Zionist struggle for a Jewish state.

The *Exodus* was purchased in the United States by the Mossad le-Aliyah Bet, a Zionist agency that organized the illegal immigration of Jews to Palestine. It set sail from France in July 1947 carrying 4,500 refugees from the displaced persons (DP) camps in occupied Germany. When the ship approached Palestine, the British attacked it. In the ensuing bat-

tle, three were killed and dozens were wounded. The damaged vessel, escorted by British warships, sailed to Haifa, Israel (then Palestine), where the passengers were transferred to three ships that deported them to France. Following their resistance to landing in France, culminating in a hunger strike, the British expelled them to Germany. From Germany they emigrated to Palestine within a year.

The "Exodus Affair" played a part in the propaganda war against the British. The arrival of the ship at Haifa during the widely publicized visit of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) spread the story worldwide, and the ship's symbolic name drew attention, too: Originally named *President Warfield,* the ship was renamed after the second book of the Bible, which tells the story of the ancient exodus of the Jews from Egypt.

Since the 1990s, a post-Zionist trend in Israel has elicited a debate as to whether the Zionist leadership exploited the illegal immigrants in order to win points in the struggle for the foundation of a Jewish state or whether they acted in true partnership in the interests of the refugees and in pursuit of a common national goal.

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RACHEL WEISSBROD

EYÜBOĞLU, BEDRI RAHMI

[1911–1974]

Turkish painter and poet.

Bedri Rahmi Eyüboğlu was born in Giresun-Görele, the son of a *kaimmakam* (local ruler). He attended the Istanbul Fine Arts Academy in 1927 and studied in Paris in 1931 and 1932. From 1937 to his death, he was a teacher at the Fine Arts Academy, while producing paintings, drawings, mosaics, and three books of poetry. His works are most notable for their motifs drawn from Anatolian popular culture.

Eyüboğlu was associated with two important art movements of the mid-twentieth century. While painting in a fauvist style in the 1930s he joined the D-Group, which eschewed academicism in art and promoted the latest Western trends. In the 1940s, he and his students formed the Group of Ten, which sought a synthesis between Western technique and Eastern decorative motifs.

See also ART.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

EZRA AND NEHEMIAH OPERATIONS

Massive airborne transfer in 1950–1951 of the overwhelming majority of the Jews of Iraq to Israel.

The mass emigration, invoking names of the two organizers of the return of Jews from the Babylonian Exile to the Holy Land some 2,500 years earlier, was made possible by a draft law introduced into Iraq's Parliament on 2 March 1950, permitting Jews to leave the country provided they surrendered their Iraqi nationality. The measure came in the wake of a massive wave of illegal emigration of Jews via Iran, organized by the Zionist underground. Prime Minister Salih Jabr told Parliament, "It is not in the public interest to force people to stay in the country if they have no desire to do so."

The number of emigrants far exceeded original estimates. Whereas immigration authorities in Israel had planned to receive about 300 persons a day—and this with difficulty—the daily influx at its peak reached an average of 1,400. By the end of 1951, Iraqi Jews airlifted to Israel totaled 107,603; some 16,000 others had departed the country by other means—some illegally to Palestine, some legally to countries in the West. By the beginning of 1952, it was estimated that no more than 6,000 (out of a total of some 130,000) Jews remained in Iraq.

See also JABR, SALIH.

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NISSIM REJWAN

F

FADAN KHARASA

See Tribes and Tribalism: Fadan Kharasa Tribe

FADLALLAH, SHAYKH HUSAYN

[1935–]

Shiʿite scholar and teacher in Lebanon.

Shaykh Husayn Fadlallah was born in 1935 in al-Najaf, Iraq, where his father Abd al-Raʾuf served as religious scholar and teacher in the famed Shiʿite religious seminaries. Fadlallah attend religious schools very early, and studied under some of the most famous Shiʿite Grand Ayatullahs of the twentieth century such as Muhsin al-Hakim, Abu al-Qasim al-Khuʾi, Husayn al-Hilli, and Mahmud Al-Sharawadi. Fadlallah started teaching in al-Najaf, entering into the polemical debates between the Marxists and their rivals, which were common in Iraqi politics at the time. He returned to Beirut in 1966 and settled in the Eastern suburbs of Nabʿa, where he founded the society of Usrat at-Taʾakhi, a cultural Islamic organization. He also founded a religious seminary, which he continues to head, and teaches weekly seminars in the Shiʿite religious seminary in Damascus. He believes that Islamic jurisprudence should be freed from its abstract formulations and expressed in a language that can be understood by lay people. His literary taste is also evident in his poetic language.

Fadlallah came to international prominence after 1982 and the rise of Hizbullah. He was blamed by the United States for serving as its "spiritual guide" and for religiously sanctioning the suicide attacks against Israeli, French, and U.S. targets in Lebanon in 1980s. Fadlallah had close ties to the Iraqi al-Daʿwa Party and to Hizbullah, but he has denied occupying an official position in the partys' hierarches. In 1985 Fadlallah miraculously survived a car bomb that reportedly was planted by the CIA in the neighborhood of Bir al-Abd, where he had settled after the eviction of Shiʿa from the eastern suburbs of Beirut after 1975. Fadlallah was an advocate of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's doctrine of *Wilayat al-Faqih* (Persian: *velayat-e faqih*) in the 1980s, but seems to have moved away from it in the

1990s. His views have moderated in recent years—he now stands for multiculturalism and does not call for an Islamic republic in Lebanon. His relations with Iran and Hizbullah have been strained in recent years. Fadlallah is now referred to as *Ayatullah,* a sign of his emergence as a Shiʿite senior *marji.*

See also Daʿwa al-Islamiyya, al-; Hizbullah; Marja al-Taqlid; Najaf, al-.

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As'ad AbuKhalil

FAHD IBN ABD AL-AZIZ AL SAʿUD

[1921–]

King of Saudi Arabia, in power since 1982 but unable to rule since the late 1990s because of failing health.

King Fahd of the Al Saʿud dynasty took power in Saudi Arabia after his brother, Khalid, died of a heart attack in 1982. Until he was sidelined by failing health in the mid-1990s, Fahd played a significant role in mediating inter-Arab conflicts and attempted to strengthen his country's ties with the United States. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud was born in 1921 in Riyadh, the eleventh son of Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman Al Saʿud, the founder of Saudi Arabia. Like other Saudi princes, he received an education in the royal court, where the emphasis was on Islam, but also included a grounding in history and political affairs. As the eldest of seven sons of Abd al-Aziz's favorite wife, Hassa bint Ahmad al Sudayri, Fahd and his full brothers form the largest and most cohesive grouping within the Al Saʿud (House of Saʿud), the Al Fahd or, in popular Western (not Saudi) usage, the Sudayri Seven. They are thus the dominant faction in a system of government in which political power is held mainly by the Al Saʿud ruling family. Fahd is the first Saudi king to attain power after rising through the bureaucracy. In 1953 he became the country's first minister of education, and he has been instrumental since then in developing the country's education system. In 1958 he helped lead the attempt to force the abdication of his half brother, King Saʿud. When the older half-brother Faisal assumed executive powers as prime minister in 1962, he named Fahd interior minister, confirming a close partnership that would continue until King Faisal's death. Fahd was effective in implementing Faisal's reforms and by the early 1970s had emerged as the most influential prince, already a key voice in foreign-policy issues.

In 1965 the royal family had agreed on Fahd's designation as second deputy prime minister, shortly after it had prevailed on the reluctant Prince Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz to become crown prince. (Thus a smooth succession was assured when an unbalanced nephew assassinated King Faisal on 25 March 1975.) Khalid and Fahd had formed an effective partnership, with contrasting personalities and qualities. Fahd was, in the Saudi context, a progressive and had made his mark as an able administrator. He enjoyed the exercise of power and worked effectively with bureaucrats and technocrats.

Though King Khalid suffered from heart disease, undergoing open-heart surgery both before and after his accession, he played an active role in all major decisions, and Fahd was always careful to defer to the king in his presence. Together they guided the kingdom through a period of great perils—the U.S.-brokered Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, which estranged Saudi Arabia from its principal Arab ally; the Iranian

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (right) with Egyptian president Husni Mubarak. Relations between the two countries became strained after Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, but Fahd reestablished diplomatic relations with Mubarak in 1987, ushering in Egypt's return to the Arab fold. © Reuters NewMedia Inc./Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Revolution of 1979 that fomented Shiʿite unrest in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province (al-Hasa) and helped to trigger a profoundly unsettling attempt at a neoconservative Islamic uprising when militants seized the Great Mosque at Mecca; and the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War, which threatened to spill over into Saudi Arabia. In 1981 he put forward a proposal for settling the Arab–Israeli dispute, which came to be known as the Fahd Plan.

When Khalid succumbed to a heart attack on 13 June 1982, Fahd's accession was smooth, with his next eldest half-brother Abdullah immediately confirmed as crown prince and Sultan ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud, his next eldest full brother, designated as second deputy prime minister and effectively the next in succession.

Serious challenges have marked Fahd's rule. He became king just as petroleum prices were beginning a downward plunge that reduced the kingdom's oil revenues more than fivefold. This forced the king to cut back on implementing development plans and increased pressure to wean the country from its overreliance on foreign labor. The country's economic woes made it easier for voices of dissent to gain credibility among segments of the population. Fahd responded to some expressions of dissent with arrests and suppression. However, by the early 1990s he had put together a series of government reforms meant to signal his willingness to open up new channels of consultation. On the regional stage, Fahd was successful in asserting the kingdom's role as an important actor, mediating political conflict in Lebanon, nurturing Egypt's

return to the Arab League, and laying the groundwork for greater cooperation among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, in the form of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Fahd's attempts to expand his country's good relations with the United States in the area of military cooperation ran into difficulties when a planned sale of advanced warning and air control aircraft (AWACS) ran afoul of congressional opposition in 1986, and the revelation of the purchase of Chinese missiles brought similar criticism from some U.S. quarters two years later. Finally, the Iran–Iraq War presented Saudi Arabia with a constant menace.

In 1986, in order to make a statement about his importance in the Islamic world, he adopted the title custodian of the two holy mosques. He personally supervised an aggressive Saudi oil policy to protect the kingdom's long-term interests. In the Gulf Crisis, his decision to invite U.S. and other non-Muslim forces to enter Saudi Arabia in August 1990, over Crown Prince Abdullah's objections, to defend the kingdom against possible invasion by Iraq and then to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation fatally upset the calculations of Iraq's President Saddam Hussein that Fahd would remain passive. The decision also has been one of the principal points of contention between the ruler and segments of the Islamist opposition, some of whom sent petitions, others engaged in protests, and still others carried out violent attacks against Saudi and U.S. targets. On 1 March 1992 Fahd issued a new basic law that included provision for a long-discussed consultative council (Majlis al-Shura) but going beyond what had been anticipated in the scope of proposed governmental changes, including the opening of the royal succession to the grandsons of Ibn Saʿud. Reforms of this period also included a restructuring of the regional government system. One of the last significant accomplishments of Fahd was a reshuffling of the Council of Ministers, the most extensive in twenty years. In 1995 Fahd suffered a stroke, and his deteriorating medical condition prevented him from carrying out his responsibilities as ruler. As a result, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, Abdullah gradually has taken over leadership of the country, acting as de facto ruler.

See also Al Saʿud Family; Camp David Accords (1978); Fahd Plan (1981); Gulf Crisis (1990–1991); Iranian Revolution (1979); Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud.

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FAHD PLAN (1981)

Arab–Israel peace plan proposed by Crown Prince Fahd in 1981.

Because the Camp David Accords had failed to address several central issues of the Arab–Israel conflict, Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia unveiled an eight-point peace proposal on 7 August 1981. The plan called for Israel's withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem, and the dismantling of Israel's settlements in those territories; guarantees of freedom of worship for all in the holy places; the Palestinian people's right to self-determination; indemnity for Palestinian refugees not exercising the right of return; West Bank and Gaza placed under UN control for a transitional period (a few months), leading to an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital; subsequent Security Council guarantee of peace among all states in the area, including the new Palestinian state; and the Security Council guarantee of the above principles. The plan was adopted in a modified form, at the Arab summit in Fez, Morocco, on 9 September 1982, and remained the Arab position until the Madrid conference in 1991.

Jenab Tutunji

FAHMI, MAHMUD PASHA

[1839–]

Egyptian officer and politician associated with the Urabi revolution.

Born in the small village of Shantur to a poor family, Mahmud Pasha Fahmi benefited from a governmental decree requiring villages to send one of their children to the new schools set up by Muhammad Ali Pasha. He later studied at the engineering college at Bulaq and after graduation joined the Engineers corps of the Egyptian army. He was assigned to teach at the new military academy created by Muhammad Saʿid Pasha and later was given the task of overseeing the building of military fortifications in the northern districts. He participated in the Ottoman war against Serbia and returned after it ended to public service. As one of the few Arab officers in an army dominated by Circassians, he was called to serve in 1881 in the ministry of war under Mahmud Sami, who had replaced Circassian Uthman Rifqi Pasha after the army's revolt at the latter's arrest of Colonel Ahmad Urabi. Urabi was reinstated but the Khedive's policies of containing the army led to a new revolt with demands for parliamentary representation and new army regulations.

The attempts by France and Britain to limit constitutionalism caused the new cabinet to fall and Mahmud Sami was called to form a new cabinet in which Urabi and his friends dominated, and Mahmud Fahmi was given the ministry for public works. But the 1882 riots of Alexandria, caused in part by the increased impoverishment of Egyptians as a result of the Capitulations, and the threats to European economic interests and lives, led England to send in its navy and to order the Egyptian army out of the city. The Khedive initially ordered the army to fight back, but later cooperated with the British and fled to Alexandria. In Cairo, a hastily convened council with broad popular support declared the Khedive a traitor and directed Urabi to fight back. The resistance was organized by Urabi, Mahmud Fahmi, and fellow officers at Kafr al Duwwar. The Egyptian army was not able to resist the British who invaded Egypt in due form and restored the Khedive to power. However, Britain prevailed over the latter's attempts at having his former officers executed. Instead, Urabi, Fahmi, and five other officers were exiled to Ceylon. Embittered by the way he was treated by his fellow officers and by what he saw as a defeat caused by their mistakes and arrogant demands, Mahmud Fahmi distanced himself from them and refused to return to Egypt. He died in exile in Ceylon.

MAYSAM J. AL-FARUQI

FAISAL IBN ABD AL-AZIZ AL SAʿUD

[c. 1904–1975]

King of Saudi Arabia, 1964–1975.

Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud was the third son of Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud (known in the West as Ibn Saʿud), born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, probably in 1904 or 1905, though some accounts place his birth on 9 April 1906, to coincide with one of his father's important early victories. With no full brothers and no half brothers close to him in age, Faisal grew up in relative isolation. He left the royal court at an early age to study under his maternal grandfather, a prominent religious scholar, which served to reinforce that isolation.

Faisal assumed military, political, and diplomatic responsibilities at a young age. He led Saudi forces in the Asir campaign of 1920 and by 1926 was his father's viceroy in charge of the recently conquered province of Hijaz. This included responsibility for the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina and the annual *hajj* (pilgrimage). He early developed a special, broadly informed expertise in the area of foreign affairs; this began in 1919 when he represented his father on a diplomatic mission to Europe, the first of the Al Saʿud family to do so. In 1930, Faisal officially became foreign minister, retaining that position until his death in 1975, with only a brief interruption, thus making him the longest serving foreign minister in the twentieth century.

Faisal's natural intelligence and his success on important state assignments, such as representing Saudi Arabia at the creation of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945, clearly marked him as the ablest of the sons of Ibn Saʿud. Yet in 1933, Ibn Saʿud had the family recognize Faisal's elder brother Saʿud, the crown prince, as successor despite Saʿud's obvious lack of intellectual gifts or meaningful preparation for rule. Faisal had doubtless hoped, perhaps expected, that his demonstrated abilities would have secured him the succession, consistent

with the well-established Arabian custom of choosing the ablest near relative of the deceased as the new shaykh or amir. Ibn Saʿud evidently sought to avoid intrafamily rivalries that had fatally weakened the Al Saʿud during his own father's generation. Though Faisal came to feel contempt for his incompetent elder brother, he insisted in family councils on a scrupulous adherence to the oath of allegiance *(bayʿa)* to Saʿud that he had led the family in swearing. To do otherwise would, in his view, have established a dangerous precedent in undermining the family's rule.

King Saʿud's reign, 1953–1964, brought nearly constant crisis, with a pattern of events in which the Al Saʿud called Faisal to assume responsibility for the government, although Saʿud subsequently reasserted his claim to power. In early 1958, the kingdom was financially bankrupt from Saʿud's profligacy and at risk because of his ill-conceived challenge to Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser and radical Arab nationalism. Faisal then assumed executive powers, imposing for the first time fiscal austerity with real limits on princes' pensions and a true budget. He came to a *modus vivendi* with Nasser, with whom he had earlier been careful to cultivate tolerable relations, though ideologically they were poles apart. By 1959, Saʿud had forced Faisal out of the government and allied himself with a group of reformist half brothers, the Free Princes, whose embarrassing public split with the rest of the Al Saʿud and declaration of solidarity with Nasser helped to place the kingdom in real peril.

In 1962, Faisal once again assumed executive powers as prime minister, doing so as a republican coup was about to overthrow the traditional imamate in Yemen and Saudi Air Force officers were preparing to defect to Cairo (Egypt). Faisal revamped the Council of Ministers and established the team of princes that continues to lead Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s. This included the progressive and ambitious Fahd and Sultan ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud. They comprise part of the largest and most powerful grouping of full brothers in the family, those born to the favorite wife of Ibn Saʿud, Hassa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri. Fahd at forty-one was both interior minister and, in a new departure, was designated second deputy prime minister behind Prince Khalid, while thirty-eight-year-old Sultan ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud became defense minister, the position he holds today. To counterbalance them, Faisal selected the traditionalist Abdullah who, in contrast both to the king and the Al Sudayri family enjoyed close ties with the Arab tribes, a constituency whose support was critical to the monarchy. Faisal himself, with his genuine piety and austere morality well established (after sowing a few youthful wild oats), secured the support of the crucial religious establishment. Faisal's care in creating and maintaining balance in the government was key to preserving stability. Thus, when Saʿud's final attempt to recover his powers led the senior princes, backed by a *fatwa* (ruling) from the *ulama* (religious establishment), to force his abdication in 1964, the government had been put in place that would endure with few changes through King Faisal's own eleven-year rule and then Khalid's seven years as king, with its core still intact in the early 1990s.

The creation of an efficient, stable government in place of the circle of cronies or inexperienced sons on which Saʿud had heavily relied was typical of the reforms that Faisal enacted. They were meant not to open up the political system in a modern, democratic sense but to enable it to confront the challenges of the twentieth century, so as to preserve the kingdom's traditional values. Thus, Sultan, Fahd, and King Faisal's brother-in-law Kamal Adham, head of the state intelligence service, were given full rein to build up the military and internal security establishments. Bright young technocrat commoners—such as Ahmad Zaki Yamani, who long served as petroleum minister, and Ghazi al-Qusaybi, for many years minister of industry and electricity—began to play significant roles, though without political power, as the bureaucracy began a rapid expansion. Modern public instruction at all levels underwent massive expansion, with girls admitted for the first time, reflecting the king's realization of the necessity of an educated population. The press and radio broadcasting experienced rapid expansion and, against strong conservative opposition, Faisal introduced television—he saw the need to diffuse information rapidly in a modern state and viewed the print and broadcast media as means of promoting national unification.

Faisal met external dangers to the kingdom with reliance on restored prestige and stability at home and on bold initiatives when required. Financial assistance to Yemeni royalists helped to checkmate the

radical threat in that quarter, and Nasser's defeat in the Arab–Israel War of 1967 greatly strengthened Faisal's hand in dealing with the Arab nationalist challenge. As oil revenues mounted toward the end of his reign, "riyal diplomacy" helped to moderate the behavior of radical recipients of largesse and to strengthen conservative regimes. The new wealth gave substance to Faisal's attempt to promote an international policy based on the conservative values of Islam. In 1970, he took the lead in establishing the Organization of the Islamic Conference as an intended alternative to the Arab League (the League of Arab States). Ultimately, however, Faisal knew that Saudi Arabia's security against external threats—principally the Soviet Union, its regional allies, and proxies—could come only from the United States. This dependence placed Saudi Arabia in the painful dilemma of being intimately linked to the principal supporter of Israel. The dilemma became an acute crisis in U.S.–Saudi relations when Faisal led the imposition of the 1973–1974 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargo after President Richard M. Nixon's decision to resupply massively Israel's armed forces during the Arab–Israel War of 1973. It was typical of Faisal's pragmatic realism that, within months of that crisis, the U.S. and Saudi governments had signed agreements, especially the Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation, that created unprecedented links between the two countries.

In his statecraft, Faisal balanced a fundamental commitment to traditional values with an informed acceptance of the means of creating a strong modern state. He combined a rigorous Islamic view of the world with a sophisticated realpolitik, and he devoted himself unswervingly to the survival of Saudi Arabia. It is likely that, next to his father, Faisal will be remembered as the greatest of the twentieth-century Saudi rulers.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Al Saʿud Family; Al Sudayri, Hassa bint Ahmad; Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab–Israel War (1973); Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud; Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud; League of Arab States; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Organization of the Islamic Conference; Yamani, Ahmad Zaki.

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Malcolm C. Peck

FAISAL I IBN HUSSEIN

[1889–1933]

King of Iraq, 1921–1933; also known as Amir Faisal, leader of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turks, 1916; king of Syria for a brief period in 1920.

The third son of Sharif Husayn of the Hijaz, Faisal was from a prestigious, wealthy family (Hashimite) that traced its lineage back to the Prophet Muhammad. He spent his early boyhood among the bedouin in Arabia, educated by private tutors, and, at age six, moved to Istanbul, capital of the Ottoman Empire, where he lived during his father's exile until 1908. Faisal completed his education in Istanbul, becoming multilingual and well versed in court etiquette and politics. Life in cosmopolitan Istanbul and his later service as representative from Jidda in the Ottoman parliament, where he was an early spokesman for Arab interests, provided valuable political experience that served Faisal well in his later negotiations with the European powers.

In January 1915, Faisal was sent by his father to Istanbul to determine the political situation of the Hijaz and to contact secret Arab societies in Damascus, Syria, to ascertain if there was support for an Arab uprising against the Ottoman Turks. At first, signs were positive; but at a second meeting in Damascus in January 1916, after these groups had been disbanded by Cemal Paşa, the few remaining nationalists indicated via the Damascus Protocol that Hussein should initiate a revolt for Arab independence. Hussein incorporated these ideas in his correspondence with the British. Faisal was less sanguine about British support than was his brother,

A portrait of Faisal I ibn Hussein (1889–1933), king of Iraq from 1921 to 1933. Faisal died of a heart attack in Geneva, Switzerland, on 7 September 1933. He was succeeded by his son, Ghazi ibn Faisal. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/ CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Abdullah I ibn Hussein, but Ottoman Turkish moves to strengthen their hold on Medina made action more imminent. (The Turks were fighting on the side of the Central powers—Austria-Hungary and Germany—and against the Allies, including Britain and France, in World War I.)

Faisal's note to Cemal Paşa advocated an Arab *umma* (community). His statement and the cutting of the railroad lines between Damascus and Medina launched the Arab Revolt on 10 June 1916. Concern in Cairo that the Arab troops in Arabia needed military training led to the dispatch of the British Colonel T. E. Lawrence, who by December 1916 had joined Faisal and suggested to the British that the amir become the field commander of the Hijaz. The suggestion was taken, and, though unable to take Medina, Faisal's troops later occupied Aqaba on 6 July 1917, a victory that provided the Arabs credibility with the British. Faisal was deputized a British general under the command of General Edmund Allenby, commander in chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. Faisal's troops, some 1,000 bedouin supplemented by approximately 2,500 Ottoman ex-prisoners of war, proceeded to harass the Ottoman Turkish army as the British moved to take Gaza, Beersheba, and Jerusalem.

On 25 September 1918, Allenby ordered the advance on Damascus. As party to the Sykes–Picot Agreement, Britain attempted to assign organized administration of the city both to the French and to the Arabs, but in the confusion of the British advance and the Ottoman retreat, the Damascus Arabs hoisted their own flag before Faisal and his army had time to reach Damascus. With the aid of Faisal's supporter, Nuri al-Saʿid, pro-Faisal officials controlled the city and were later confirmed by the French. Lawrence asserted that Faisal's men had slipped into the city on 30 September to 1 October and had liberated it in advance of the British and Australian troops.

At the Versailles conference in 1919, Faisal was caught between British–French international diplomacy and events in the Middle East that were taking their own course. As the Arab representative to Versailles, Faisal pressed claims for Syrian independence, but under British sponsorship. Discussions with American proponents of Zionism and with Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann elicited Faisal's support for Jewish immigration to Palestine, culminating in the Faisal–Weizmann Agreements signed on 3 January 1919. To the published document, Faisal added a handwritten addendum that Arab support for Jewish aspirations would be conditional upon the achievement of Arab independence. Faisal continued to support Jewish immigration within the context of his later pan-Arab federation programs.

In May, Faisal called for a general congress to be held in Damascus to endorse his position at Versailles. Convened in June, the meeting was dominated by the prewar Arab nationalist clubs—the primarily Iraqi al-Ahd, the Palestinian Arab Club

(al-Nadi al-Arabi), which tried to persuade Faisal to relinquish his support for Zionism, and the al-Fatat (youth) dominated Istiqlal Party. The congress called for an independent Syria that also would include Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. Backed by the British, who wished to exclude the French from the Middle East, Faisal received a grudging acquiescence for an Arab regime from the politically weakened French president, Georges Clemenceau.

Still in session in March 1920, the congress declared Syria (including Lebanon and Palestine) an independent kingdom ruled by Faisal as constitutional monarch. Some Arabs in Palestine proclaimed Palestine a part of Syria, and Basra and Baghdad were declared independent by a group of Arabs in Iraq who wished to be ruled by Faisal's brother, Abdullah. In spite of the international repercussions, Faisal accepted the Syrian draft and allowed Arab nationalists to harass French troops in Syria while he began to negotiate with the forces of Kemalism in Anatolia who had proclaimed an independent Turkey. As the British withdrew their support from the Arabs in Syria, and a new government in Paris followed a more vigorous policy in Syria, the French ordered their high commissioner in Syria, General Henri-Joseph-Eugène Gouraud, to confront Faisal. Occupying Damascus on 26 July 1920, the French forced Faisal into exile the following day and proclaimed Syria to be under French rule.

A shift in British priorities affected policy after 1920, influenced by an Arab revolt in Iraq against the British occupation and the policies of Winston Churchill, newly appointed colonial secretary, which included leaving Syria to the French and installing Hashimites elsewhere as local rulers who would "reign but not govern" in order to save the expense of full-scale occupation. At the Cairo Conference in March 1921, Churchill and his aides proceeded to redraw the map of the Middle East and to plan the installation of Faisal as king of a newly created Iraq.

The British looked to Faisal as a malleable vehicle for their Mesopotamian/Iraqi policy, which was to secure the area and its oil for themselves. He was deemed suitable to both the Sunni and Shiʿite Iraqis because of his Hashimite lineage and his Arab nationalist credentials as leader of the Arab Revolt. Any local candidates, such as Sayyid Talib of Basra, were duly eliminated. The British contrived a plebiscite in July 1921 to authorize Faisal's candidacy. In August 1921, Faisal arrived in Iraq to a lukewarm reception and was proclaimed king.

The leader of the Arab Revolt brought with him to Iraq a coterie of Iraqi (former Ottoman) Arab nationalist army officers who had supported him in Syria and who now took top positions in the new Iraqi administration. Jaʿfar al-Askari became minister of defense; perennial cabinet minister Nuri al-Saʿid became chief of staff of the new Iraqi army; and Ottoman educator Sati al-Husari instituted an Arab nationalist curriculum in Iraqi schools. Faisal's tenure in Iraq was a tightrope walk between nationalism and cordial relations with Britain, without whose financial and military support and advisers he could not rule. Always maintaining his own goals, while remembering the bitter Syrian experience, Faisal worked from 1921 until his death in 1933 to create a modernized, unified country with a centralized infrastructure, to achieve immediate political independence from Britain, and to continue his dream of uniting Arab areas of the Middle East into a pan-Arab union under Hashimite aegis. From the beginning, the British regretted their choice, as Faisal proved to be less docile than they had anticipated.

Throughout the 1920s, Faisal was preoccupied with the fact that Iraq was a British mandate and not an independent state. Faced with local nationalist opposition to himself and to the British presence in the country, he used his considerable personal charisma to garner the support of urban nationalists and tribal leaders in Shiʿite areas. Comfortable both in traditional dress meeting with bedouin and in Western-style clothes playing bridge with British officials in Baghdad, Faisal negotiated for independence. He also understood the necessity for British political and military support to ensure the territorial integrity of the new state until Iraq was able to build up its own army and defend its interests against the Persians, Saudis, and Turks, from whom Britain managed to secure Mosul for Iraq.

During treaty negotiations in 1922, delayed by his appendicitis attack, and again in 1927, the king encouraged the anti-British nationalist opposition,

all the while advocating moderation by both sides. The result was an agreement signed in 1930 that gave Britain control of Iraqi foreign policy and finances but also resulted, in 1932, in Iraq's nominal independence and admission to the League of Nations.

The Iraqi constitution gave Faisal the power to suspend parliament, call for new elections, and confirm all laws. During his tenure, the king attempted to forge a united Iraq with a nationalist focus instead of the patchwork of disparate religious and ethnic groups. Once independence was assured, Faisal used his prestige and his position as king of an independent Arab state to engage in foreign policy.

Faisal never abandoned his interest in Syria. In contact with the French in Syria over the possibility that a Hashimite such as Abdullah or Ali (especially after the latter lost his throne in Arabia to the Saudis) might be installed there as he was in Iraq, Faisal was also active in local Syrian politics. In 1928 he organized a monarchist party aimed at making him ruler both in Iraq and in Syria. To Faisal, Iraqi independence in 1932 would be but the first step toward an Arab union to include not only Syria and Palestine, but possibly Arabia as well. From 1929 until Syrian elections in 1932, Faisal sent emissaries to lobby Syrian politicians, conducted an intense propaganda campaign to promote his interests, and used the Islamic Congress that met in Jerusalem in 1931 to advance his cause. Plans were made for another congress to meet in Baghdad in 1933, despite British opposition to Faisal's pan-Arab plans. The defeat of his cause in the Syrian elections, anti-Saudi revolts in the Hijaz, and his untimely death put Hashimite unity attempts on hold.

In June 1933, Faisal left for London on a prearranged state visit, leaving an anti-British government in power in Baghdad. He then spent the summer in Switzerland for reasons of health. When word reached him of the crisis with the Assyrian minority in Iraq, Faisal pleaded for moderation. But the exploits of the new Iraqi army that resulted in hundreds of Assyrian civilian deaths were popular in Baghdad, where there were demands for Faisal's resignation. On 7 September 1933, Faisal died of a heart attack in Geneva. He was succeeded by his son, Ghazi ibn Faisal.

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Allenby, Edmund Henry; Arab Revolt (1916); Askari, Jaʿfar al-; Cairo Conference (1921); Cemal Paşa; Faisal–Weizmann Agreements; Ghazi ibn Faisal; Hashimite House (House of Hashim); Kemalism; Lawrence, T. E.; Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916).

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Reeva S. Simon

FAISAL II IBN GHAZI
[1935–1958]

King of Iraq, 1953–1958.

Born in May 1935, Faisal II ibn Ghazi was killed, along with his uncle Abd al-Ilah ibn Ali and other members of the royal family, on 14 July 1958, in the course of the Iraqi revolution. Faisal's father Ghazi ibn Faisal had died in an accident in April 1939 when Faisal himself was only three years old. For most of his life, he was overshadowed by his uncle, who acted as regent until he came of age in 1953.

Faisal was educated in the palace in Baghdad and then at Harrow School near London between 1949 and 1952. Although personally popular, he could not escape the stigma that attached to his uncle and the other *éminence grise* of Iraqi politics, Nuri al-Saʿid—both of whom were stout defenders and major beneficiaries of the close connection with Britain that characterized Iraqi politics in the 1940s and 1950s.

See also Abd al-Ilah ibn Ali; Ghazi ibn Faisal; Hashimite House (House of Hashim).

Peter Sluglett

FAISAL–WEIZMANN AGREEMENTS

Signed in London, 3 January 1919, between Amir Faisal I ibn Hussein ("representing and acting on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of Hedjaz") and Dr. Chaim Weizmann ("representing and acting on behalf of the Zionist Organisation").

The agreement between Faisal ibn Hussein and Chaim Weizmann was worked out with Colonel T. E. Lawrence, who acted as both midwife and translator in an arrangement whose immediate purpose was to harmonize the positions of all three parties before the Paris Peace Conference that followed World War I. Its preamble contained remarks about "the racial kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish people," and called for "the closest possible collaboration" between the signatories as "the surest means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations." In its nine articles, the agreement spelled out methods and areas of cooperation between two mutually recognized entities: "the Arab State" and Palestine. The latter was to be governed in a way that would "afford the fullest guarantee for carrying into effect" Britain's Balfour Declaration. This meant the promotion of large-scale immigration and settlement of Jews and the protection of the rights of "the Arab peasant and tenant farmers," who would also be "assisted in forwarding their economic development." Separate articles assured the free exercise of religion and the keeping of "Mohammedan Holy Places . . . under Mohammedan control." The World Zionist Organization promised to "use its best efforts to assist the Arab State [i.e., the independent Greater Syria to which Faisal was aspiring] in providing the means for developing the natural resources and economic possibilities thereof." In an important proviso, Faisal linked his signature on this agreement to the complete fulfillment of Arab demands as submitted in a memorandum to the British Foreign Office.

The agreement, which remained secret for several years, quickly became inoperative, as neither signatory proved to be in a position to "deliver the goods" to the other. The authenticity of the agreement was challenged by some Arabs during the 1930s when Zionist leaders sought to gain propaganda advantage by publishing the text. Recent historical research has established that the document is genuine enough; thus, only Faisal's motives remain the subject of some debate.

See also Balfour Declaration (1917); Faisal I ibn Hussein; Greater Syria; Lawrence, T. E.; Weizmann, Chaim; World Zionist Organization (WZO).

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Neil Caplan

FALCONRY

The art of training falcons, hawks, and other game birds to hunt.

Rooted in pre-Islamic Arabia, falconry became a fashionable courtly pastime from the time of Caliph Yazid ibn Muʿawiya (680–683 C.E.) to that of the Ottoman Empire sultans. Also practiced by commoners, falconry's popularity spread from Persia to Morocco. Most prized were the gyrfalcons of Siberia. These Siberian birds were often exchanged as ceremonial gifts among ambassadors. Many treatises were written on the art of training, and the hawk became a common motif in the Islamic arts. Hunting with falcons remains a popular pastime of the wealthy today on the Arabian Peninsula.

Elizabeth Thompson

FAMILY PLANNING

See Birth Control

FANON, FRANTZ

[1925–1961]

French West Indian psychiatrist, author, and ideologue of the Algerian Revolution.

A black man born in 1925 on the French Antilles island of Martinique, Frantz Fanon became the best-known theoretician of the Algerian revolution and, through it, one of the best-known theoreticians of African liberation in general. The child of middle-class parents, Fanon spent the early years of his life attempting to be French. During World War II, however, humiliating experiences of racism in the Antilles and in North Africa and Europe, where he served in the French armed forces, made him increasingly aware of the anomalies confronted by a black man in a world dominated by whites.

After the war Fanon went home to Martinique, but in 1947 he returned to France and entered medical school. He received a degree from the University of Lyons in 1951. In July 1953 he passed his *Médicat de hôpitaux psychiatrique* and, in November 1953, he accepted a position as chief of staff *(chef de service)* in the Blida-Joinville Hospital, the largest psychiatric hospital in Algeria.

While serving at Blida, Fanon treated many patients suffering from the pressures of their colonized status and from the trauma of the revolutionary situation. He came to the conclusion that the resentment that had brought about the Algerian revolution was of the same order as the resentment he had come to feel as a black man in a white world. In 1956, Fanon resigned his medical post and secretly joined the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front). Receiving in January 1957 a "letter of expulsion" from the colonial authorities, he fled to Tunis, where the FLN was beginning to establish its headquarters. There he became an editor of *al Moudjahid,* the official organ of the FLN, served in FLN medical centers, and became a roving ambassador to solicit support for Algeria in African countries. In December 1960, Fanon was diagnosed with leukemia. He died of that illness a year later in Bethesda, Maryland.

Fanon wrote three books. The earliest, *Peau Noire, Masques Blancs* (Black skin, white masks), appeared in 1952. It diagnoses the psychologically dependent status of Caribbean blacks and suggests ways for them to transcend that dependency and discover self-possession and authenticity. The second, *L'an V de la Révolution Algérienne* (Year 5 of the Algerian revolution), was written in great haste in 1959 and is essentially a sociology of the revolution. In it, Fanon describes the transformation of Algerian society brought about by individuals' decisions to revolt. In revolting against colonial oppression, militants also revolt against patriarchal and other oppressions. Out of these individual decisions, a nation of free men and women is born, a process that cannot be reversed. Fanon's last book, *Les Damnés de la Terre* (Wretched of the Earth), was published in 1961. It takes up many of the themes of the preceding works, but with greater urgency. Fanon insists that it is only through violence that colonialism can be defeated and the native overcome his dependency complex. Native bourgeoisies must also be overturned, because they are in a state of permanent dependence upon the West. The Algerian revolution is the model for global revolution, because it represents a peasant revolution led by a genuinely popular party. A fourth book, *Pour la Révolution Africaine* (For the African revolution), a collection of articles written during Fanon's *Moudjahid* period, was published after his death.

See also FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE (FLN).

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JOHN RUEDY

FAO PENINSULA

The southernmost tip of Iraq.

The Fao Peninsula lies between the Shatt al-Arab and Bubiyan Island. It became the site of the landing place of the submarine cable to India in 1964, of an oil port in 1951, of an offshore oil rig, and of heavy fighting (February 1986 to April 1987) during the Iran–Iraq War.

See also BUBIYAN ISLAND; IRAN–IRAQ WAR (1980–1988); SHATT AL-ARAB.

ALBERTINE JWAIDEH

FAQIR, FADIA

[1956–]

A Jordanian novelist.

Fadia (also Fadiya) Faqir was born in Amman, Jordan. She earned her Ph.D. in England and teaches Middle Eastern politics, Arabic literature, and women's studies at Durham University. She is one of a number of Arab novelists writing in English. Her first novel, *Nisanit* (1990), is a grim account of Palestinian life under Israeli occupation. Torture, hate, love, and sacrifice are intertwined in this bleak and powerful text. Her second novel, *Pillars of Salt* (1996), is the story of two women confined to a mental hospital in Jordan during and after the British Mandate. The novel contains a strong homoerotic subtext. Her narrative techniques undermine the centrality of Islamic religious texts. Faqir has been recognized as a new kind of storyteller and one who, because of the accessibility of her English texts, is being discovered in the West.

Faqir also gained visibility as a critic with the collection she edited, *In the House of Silence: Autobiographical Essays by Arab Women Writers* (1999), and because of her leadership in the Arab Women Writers series, published by Garnet in London. To date, five novels by Arab women have been published in the series.

See also Gender: Gender and Education; Jordan; Literature: Arabic.

Elise Salem

FARAJ, MAYSALOUN

[1955–]

Iraqi artist and curator.

Maysaloun Faraj was born in the United States to an Iraqi family. After a childhood there, she moved to Iraq, where she received a degree in architecture from Baghdad University. She later received training in England, where she has lived and worked since 1982. She is a noted ceramicist and mixed media painter, as well as the curator of a major exhibition, *Strokes of Genius: Contemporary Iraqi Art,* which traveled through England and the United States between 2000 and 2002. Faraj also edited a volume of the same title to accompany the show. The exhibition was the first major presentation of contemporary Iraqi art in the West and reflects Faraj's concern with challenging stereotypes that perpetuate political conflicts involving her native country. Many of her paintings and ceramics make innovative use of Arabic calligraphy in a manner that links her contemporary, often political, concerns with her heritage. Some of her work also contains symbols reminiscent of Iraqi folk art and ancient Assyrian art. Faraj has described her work as an attempt to recover all that is being destroyed in her homeland, from its ancient civilization to its people and their spirit. She is inspired by her Muslim faith. Her work is included in the public collections of the British Museum as well as in Washington, D.C.'s National Museum for Women in the Arts.

See also Ani, Jannane al-; Art; Attar, Suad al-; Gender: Gender and Education; Iraq.

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Jessica Winegar

FARAJ, MURAD

[1866–1956]

Egyptian Jewish-Karaite author and theologian; Egyptian nationalist and Zionist.

Murad Faraj was born in Cairo and trained as a lawyer; he became a government official during the reign of Khedive Abbas Hilmi I (1892–1914) and wrote articles and poems for the two epoch-making newspapers of the pre-1914 era, *al-Jarida* and *al-Muʾayyad.* He wrote books on Jewish-Karaite topics, theology and law, biblical exegeses, Hebrew and Arabic philology, medieval Jewish poets who wrote in Arabic, and current legal issues. He also translated Hebrew works into Arabic.

By the mid-1920s, as a noted author in the field of modern Arabic culture, he advocated Egyptian national unity and interreligious dialogue. His essays, notably *Harb al-Watan* (The national battle), appealed to Muslim Egyptians to treat their Christian and Jewish compatriots as equals. By the mid-to-late 1920s, Faraj advocated Jewish nationalism, hoping that Zionism would be seen as similar to Egypt's national aspiration. His poetry, the *Diwan Faraj,* collected in four volumes (1912–1935), stresses Zionist themes.

See also Abbas Hilmi II.

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Michael M. Laskier

FAR'A, WAHIBA

[1954–]

First Yemeni minister for human rights.

Wahiba Far'a, born in 1954 in Ta'iz, Yemen, was the first woman as full cabinet member in the Yemeni government. She acted as the minister of state for human rights during 2001–2003. She was the first minister in this new ministry, which was established in 2001. She is a prominent women's rights activist and scholar. Far'a received her B.A. in English literature from San'a University, continued her studies at Cairo University with a specialization in women's education, and earned her Ph.D. in Cairo (philosophy). She worked as a lecturer at San'a University while conducting research on women and development, women in higher education, child labor, and polygamy in migration. Far'a is the founder and rector of Queen Arwa University in San'a (established in 1996) and dean of Yemen International Language Institute (established in 1989, and now a department of the university). She is a member of the Supreme National Committee for Human Rights and the ruling People's General Congress Party. As a minister, Far'a made women's rights, prison reform, and the rights of children and people with disabilities key priorities. The minister was confronted with challenges: a record of human rights abuses, an independent judiciary that limits freedom of the press, and a civil society proposing a large number of human rights initiatives.

See also Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Yemen.

Susanne Dahlgren

FARÈS, NABILE

[1940–]

Algerian novelist and poet.

A key figure in post-colonial Maghrebi literature and literary experimentation, Nabile Farès is known for a unique, dreamlike style of writing that blurs the boundaries between the novel and poetry, the two genres in which he works.

Often identified primarily as a Berber writer, Farès has sought a new language to make sense of new, post-colonial, transnational experiences; likewise, he has attempted to find a voice and a place for indigenous people in contemporary literature. Like most of his contemporaries, he writes in French, and very few of his works have been translated into English. His key themes are displacement, migration, exile, and the cultural, psychological, and historical ruptures implied by these phenomena, so familiar to North Africans.

Born on 25 September 1940 in Collo, Algeria, Nabile Farès was influenced by his grandfather, a well-read and contemplative man, and his father, a well-known politician who later became president of the provisional executive committee during the transition to independence. Farès was educated at the college of Ben Aknoun of Algiers, where he developed an interest in philosophy, anthropology, and literature. In France, he received a *doctor d'état* in literature, and he taught literature in Paris and in Algiers.

His first novel, published in 1970, was *Yahia, pas de chance* (Yahia, No Chance). In it, he introduced themes that have preoccupied him ever since: ruptures on all levels—linguistic, psychological, physical, and cultural. His novels also reveal the important role Berber women have played in sustaining and enlivening cultural and literary oral traditions, whether in post-independence Algeria or in France. Much of his work is autobiographical and is conveyed in a semi-confessional tone, exploring the impact of dramatic sociopolitical change on Berber and Algerian subjectivity. Farès is currently a professor of literature at the University of Grenoble.

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Laurie King-Irani

FARHAD, GHULAM MUHAMMAD

[1917–1984]

Mayor of Kabul, 1948–1954.

Born in Kabul in 1917, Ghulam Muhammad Farhad was educated in Kabul and Germany and trained as an engineer. Twenty years after being elected mayor of Kabul, he was elected to the Afghan parliament (1968). He was an active member of the Afghan socialist party Afghan Nation and was the publisher of a newspaper of the same name (1966–1967).

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Grant Farr

FARHAT AL-ZAWI

Muslim judge and politician from Tripolitania.

Farhat al-Zawi studied in Tripoli, Tunis, and Paris and was a judge in Zawiya, Tripolitania, as well as a member of the Ottoman parliament from 1908 to 1912. A leader of the Tripolitanian resistance to Italian rule in Libya (1911–1912), he negotiated with the Italians for the region's future (December 1912) and became their adviser, helping to consolidate Italian rule.

See also Tripolitania.

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Rachel Simon

FARHI FAMILY

Dynasty of Jewish financiers in Ottoman-controlled Damascus during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The Farhis were granted the status of *sarrafs* (bankers) by the authorities in the Ottoman provinces of Damascus and Sidon; they subsequently emerged as the chief financial administrators of these provinces' treasuries.

The most illustrious member of this family was Hayyim Farhi, who in the 1790s entered the service of Ahmad al-Jazzar Pasha, the governor of Sidon. There he became responsible for al-Jazzar's financial affairs until the latter's death in 1804. The following year Farhi was involved in the political succession struggle that led to Sulayman Pasha's ascendance to the governorship of Sidon. Given Farhi's assistance to this development, Suleiman allowed him to manage Sidon's financial administration as al-Jazzar had done previously. It was only during the second decade of the nineteenth century under Abdullah Pasha, Suleiman's successor, that Farhi's position declined, eventually resulting in his execution.

Their financial power in Sidon eliminated, the Farhis nonetheless continued to exercise considerable financial influence in Damascus until the early 1830s. In the wake of the Egyptian occupation of Syria and Palestine (1831–1840), the family's status declined temporarily in Damascus. Yet once the Ottomans regained authority in the province, the Farhis once again were partially responsible for running its financial affairs.

See also Ahmad al-Jazzar.

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Michael M. Laskier

FARHUD

Persian word, commonly used in Iraq to refer to the anti-Jewish rioting of June 1941.

After the defeat of Rashid Ali al-Kaylani's pro-Nazi coup and his flight from Baghdad on 1 and 2 June

1941, Jewish life and property were attacked in what came to be called in Baghdad the Farhud. The looting was started by Iraqi soldiers who had been allowed to roam the streets of Baghdad carrying their weapons. On the second day, when bedouin started pouring into the city across the unguarded bridges, authorities began to worry that the attacks would spread beyond the Jewish community; order, however, was finally restored.

The looting and killing had continued for two days while the British army sat on the outskirts of the city, prevented from intervening by order of the British ambassador, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis. Hundreds of houses and businesses were looted. Accounts vary from 120 Jews killed to more than 600; 2,118 injured; and more than 12,000 who lost part or all of their property. An official committee of inquiry reported the lowest figure; but the text of the secret report was published by the chronicler Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani, who said that a member of the committee reported the largest figures, and orders were given to reduce this figure.

No attempt was made by Iraq to seek out and punish the perpetrators, but some token compensation to the victims was promised.

See also Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-.

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Sylvia G. Haim

FARID, NAGWA KAMAL

[c. 1950–]

The first woman appointed to the shariʿa *court system in Sudan and perhaps, in the modern era, in Islamic Africa.*

Nagwa Kamal Farid's appointment was a rare step in the Muslim world, since some religious scholars believe that women should be precluded from positions where they exert power and authority over men. The Qurʾanic verse "men are in charge of women, because they spend of their property" (Sura 4:34) has been interpreted by some as precluding women from holding public office ranging from judge to president or prime minister in predominantly Muslim states. For example, a female judge was not appointed in Egypt until 2003; however women judges have been appointed in Tunisia, Iraq, and Indonesia, and women have been heads of state in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, and Indonesia. In Islamic Africa, women judges in the Islamic *(shariʿa)* courts are virtually nonexistent. In Sudan, *shariʿa* female judges did not act as sitting judges in public courts—where their personal honor and dignity might be compromised—but they worked in offices in the judiciary, protected from public view.

Nagwa Kamal Farid was appointed in 1970 by the last grand *qadi al-quda* (chief justice) of the *shariʿa* courts, Shaykh Muhammad al-Gizuli. A liberal in his interpretations and in practice, Chief Justice al-Gizouli had been Sayeda Nagwa's *shariʿa* law professor at the University of Khartoum. (*Sayyida* is the respectful term of address for a married woman, and is the customary honorific used when referring to a female jurist.) She was appointed shortly after her graduation in 1970 and was quickly promoted to first-class judge assigned to the High Court, where she heard cases on appeal from the lower district and provincial courts. After her appointment, other women were appointed in 1974 and 1975, including justices Amal Muhammad Hassan, Rabab Muhammad Mustafa Abu Gusaysa, and Fatima Makki al-Sayyid Ali.

Avoiding political activism, Justice Farid survived the political turmoil of the Muhammad Ja'far Numeiri presidency (1969–1985). When Islamic law was made state law in 1983, the *shariʿa* and civil courts were combined into a single system of judges, courts, and appeals. When the National Islamic Front (NIF) seized power in 1989, many judges were purged for their politics, not necessarily their gender. The NIF saw itself as an Islamic modernist movement and therefore did not oppose women holding positions of power and influence; however some non-NIF women were removed. Justice Farid survived this purge and retains her position within the High Court of the Sudan Judiciary.

See also NUMEIRI, MUHAMMAD JAʿFAR; *SHARIʿA*; SUDAN.

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CAROLYN FLUEHR-LOBBAN

FARMANFARMA, ABD AL-HOSEYN MIRZA

[1857–1939]

Persian prince and prominent politician. His other titles were Nosrat al-Dowleh and Salar Lashkar.

Abd al-Hoseyn Mirza Farmanfarma was the son of Firuz Mirza and the grandson of Abbas Mirza, who had been heir to the throne of Fath Ali Shah, the second monarch of the Qajar dynasty. His mother was Homa Khanum, daughter of Bahman Mirza Baha al-Dowleh, another son of Abbas Mirza.

Abd al-Hoseyn Mirza was educated in the military school in Tehran, run by Austrian officers. He married the daughter of the crown prince and, by his proximity to the throne, gained great influence and wealth. He was an astute and ambitious politician of great resilience in the face of adversity, which was not lacking, as Persia underwent revolution, civil war, foreign invasion, and a change of dynasty in his lifetime.

Farmanfarma first served at the court of the crown prince until he became shah in 1896. He was then made governor of Tehran and minister of war in that year. He was exiled to Iraq when the shah was said to fear him, but he was recalled in 1906 and appointed governor of Kerman, just as the first stirrings of the Constitutional Revolution were beginning. He became minister of justice, then governor of Azerbaijan. In 1909, he became minister of the interior, then of war, and, later, governor of Kermanshah.

During World War I, his sympathies were with the British in the complicated relations that developed between the government and the belligerents on the one hand and, on the other, between the government and the nationalists. In 1915, he was made minister of the interior, then prime minister. He remained in this post only a few months, then was appointed governor of Fars, which was under British control. This was his last government post. His son, Nosrat al-Dowleh, however, served the new shah, Reza Shah Pahlavi, and was executed in 1937 by a monarch grown suspicious and tyrannical. Abd al-Hoseyn Mirza died in 1939.

See also ABBAS MIRZA, NAʾEB AL-SALTANEH; PAHLAVI, REZA; QAJAR DYNASTY.

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MANSOUREH ETTEHADIEH

FARMANFARMIAN, SETTAREH

Advocate for social services in Iran.

Settareh Farmanfarmian, the daughter of a wealthy *shahzade* (prince), spent her childhood during the 1920s and 1930s in a Persian harem compound in Tehran. She began her education at home, and as a young woman she traveled across Iran, India, and the Pacific to attend the University of Southern California in the United States, where she earned an advanced degree in social work.

Farmanfarmanian returned to Iran in the 1950s and in 1958 founded the Tehran School of Social Work, which she directed until 1979. It was the only independent, private school of social work in Iran. As director, she was responsible for creating social welfare agencies for fieldwork placement of the school's graduates and for supervising their work in private clinics, schools, and health centers throughout Iran. From 1954 to 1958 she served as a United Nations expert for the Middle East, in Baghdad, Iraq. She also founded the Family Planning Association of Iran.

Farmanfarmanian introduced the concept of the community welfare center and provided motivation for various laws, including juvenile court laws and the legislation on the status of women. From 1980 to 1992 she worked for the County of Los

Angeles Department of Social Services, Children's Services. She published her autobiography in 1992.

See also Gender: Gender and Health.

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Cherie Taraghi

FAROUK

[1920–1965]

Egypt's last king, 1936–1952.

Farouk, the son of King Fuʾad (reigned 1922–1936) and Queen Nazli, and the grandson of Khedive Ismaʿil ibn Ibrahim (reigned 1863–1879), was born in Cairo, on 11 February 1920. Privately tutored until the age of fifteen, Farouk intended to enter a British public school. He was, however, unable to gain admission to Eton and the Royal Military College at Woolwich, but he went to England anyway to pursue his studies. At the Royal Military College he took afternoon classes as an unenrolled student. His formal education was cut short by the death of his father, King Fuʾad, on 28 April 1936. Returning to Egypt, he ascended the throne as a minor and ruled with the assistance of a Regency Council until July 1937.

Upon first coming to power, he enjoyed much local popularity. Young, handsome, and seemingly progressive, he was thought to be an ideal person to foster parliamentary democracy in Egypt. In truth, however, he engaged in the same anticonstitutional practices that had so marked his father's tenure of power. During his reign he constantly plotted against the Wafd, Egypt's majority political party, contended with Britain over monarchical privilege, and intrigued to enhance the sway of the monarchy over the Egyptian parliament. In 1937, shortly after coming to the throne, he removed the Wafd from office. The Wafd had just concluded the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which increased Egypt's autonomy but fell far short of realizing the long-cherished goal of complete independence.

With the onset of World War II, Farouk's clashes with the British intensified. The monarch supported a series of minority ministries, many of which were, in British eyes, insufficiently committed to the Allied war cause. Political tensions came to a head in early 1942 while Germany military forces under the command of General Erwin Rommel were advancing in the western desert toward Alexandria. The British demanded a pro-British Wafdist ministry. When Farouk delayed, the British ambassador, Miles Lampson, on 4 February 1942 surrounded Abdin Palace with tanks and compelled the monarch, under threat of forced abdication, to install the Wafd in office. That day was a defining moment in Egypt's twentieth-century history. It undermined the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy and prepared the way for the military coup of 1952.

The immediate postwar years in Egypt were full of political violence and official corruption. In 1948 the Egyptian army suffered a humiliating defeat in the Arab–Israel War as the state of Israel came into being. During this period, groups opposed to parliamentary government increased their following throughout the country, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood, the Communists, and the Socialists. Within the army an elite of idealistic, young officers organized themselves in the Free Officers movement. Increasingly, King Farouk came to symbolize all that was wrong with the old order. Outrageously wealthy, he flaunted his wealth in a country wracked by poverty. His penchant for gambling and carousing with women offended many. Learning of the growing opposition to his rule inside the military, he tried to move on his enemies before they turned on him. He did not succeed. On 23 July 1952 the Free Officers, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, seized power. Three days later, on 26 July 1952, the new rulers exiled the king. Sailing from Alexandria harbor on the royal yacht *Mahrussa,* he was accompanied into exile by his family, gold ingots, and more than two hundred pieces of luggage. His deposition in 1952 effectively brought an end to the rule over Egypt of the family of Muhammad Ali, who had come to Egypt as a military leader in the midst of Napoléon Bonaparte's invasion and had installed himself as Egypt's ruler in 1805. Farouk's infant son, Ahmad Fuʾad, succeeded briefly to the throne, but in June 1953 Egypt abolished the monarchy and

became a republic. Farouk continued to lead a dissolute life while residing in Rome. On 18 March 1965 he succumbed to a heart attack in a nightclub.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1948); FREE OFFICERS, EGYPT; FUʾAD; ISMAʿIL IBN IBRAHIM; MUHAMMAD ALI; MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; ROMMEL, ERWIN; WAFD.

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ROBERT L. TIGNOR

FARROKHZAD, FORUGH

[c. 1934–1967]

A leading modernist female Iranian poet.

Forugh Farrokhzad was the first woman poet in over a thousand years of Persian literature to present feminine perspectives with recognizably female speakers in lyric verse. In her 150 or so mostly short poems, composed from the mid-1950s onward, she established the female gender and voice in the Persian language.

Farrokhzad is controversial and the most translated twentieth-century Iranian poet. Frank and personal representations of feelings and views in everyday situations, both palpably Iranian and emotionally universal, characterize her verse, for which faith in art and love constitute the spiritual underpinnings.

See also LITERATURE: PERSIAN.

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MICHAEL C. HILLMANN

FASHODA INCIDENT (1898)

Crisis in which both France and Britain, vying for territory in Africa, claimed control over a Sudanese outpost.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the European powers were competing for control of Africa. As the French extended eastward from the Congo, the British expanded south from Egypt. In July 1898, a French expedition commanded by Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand arrived at the Sudanese outpost of Fashoda on the Nile, some 400 miles (644 km) south of Khartoum. After British General Herbert Kitchener's victory at Omdurman on 2 September, he proceeded to Fashoda on orders from the British prime minister, Lord Salisbury. He arrived on 19 September and met with Marchand. Kitchener claimed the entire Nile valley for Great Britain, and, after several days, both parties withdrew peacefully. The solution to the conflicting claims was later worked out by diplomats in Britain and France, and it reflected the fact that Britain had an army in Khartoum while France had no appreciable forces in the vicinity. France renounced all rights to the Nile basin and the Sudan in return for a guarantee of its position in West Africa. The Fashoda incident is seen as the high point of Anglo–French tension in Africa.

See also KITCHENER, HORATIO HERBERT.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

FASI, ALLAL AL-

[1906–1973]

Moroccan nationalist politician and writer.

From a prominent Fez family of scholars of Andalusian (Spanish) origin, Allal al-Fasi was an early Moroccan nationalist, involved with the Salafiyya Movement during his education at the Qarawiyyin University. In the 1920s he helped organize the Free School Movement, which established schools to educate Moroccan youths in a modernist Islam tradition rather than according to French colonial ideas,

and in 1930 he led protests against the Berber Dahir. In 1934 he helped draw up the "Plan of Reforms," a manifesto that demanded radical reforms of the administration and economy of the French protectorate so that Moroccans might benefit from French rule. After his 1937 exile to Gabon, he maintained contact with the founders of the Istiqlal Party and at independence in 1956 returned to lead the party, remaining its leader after the split with the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP; National Union of Popular Forces) in 1959. The party adopted a strongly nationalist program but was committed to a constitutional monarchical system.

After being minister of state for Islamic affairs (1961–1963), al-Fasi resigned and led the Istiqlal Party into opposition, while remaining loyal to the monarchy. He was secretary-general of the party until his death in May 1973. Al-Fasi wrote *al-Haraka al-Wataniyya fi al-Maghrib al-Arabi,* translated by Ahuzen Zaki Nuseibeh as *Independence Movements in Arab North Africa* (1954), and *al-Naqd al-Dhati* (Self criticism; 1966).

See also Berber Dahir; Istiqlal Party: Morocco; Salafiyya Movement; Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP).

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C. R. Pennell

FASI, MUHAMMAD AL-

[1908–1991]

Moroccan academic and political leader.

Muhammad al-Fasi was educated at Qarawiyyin University in Fez and at the Sorbonne and École des Langues Orientales (School of Oriental Languages) in Paris. He taught at the Institut des Hautes Études Marocaines (Moroccan Institute of Higher Studies; 1935–1940); tutored the crown prince, later King Hassan II; and modernized the Qarawiyyin when he served as its president (1942–1944, 1947–1952). A founding member (1944) of the nationalist Hizb al-Istiqlal Party, he was held under restriction by the French authorities (1944–1947, 1952–1954). Fasi was minister of national education during the transition to independence (1955–1958). He wrote *Contes Fassis* (Tales of Fasi; 1926), *L'evolution politique et culturelle au Maroc* (The political and cultural evolution of Morocco; 1958), and *Chants anciens des femmes au Maroc* (Ancient songs of Moroccan women; 1967).

See also Hassan II; Qarawiyyin, al-.

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C. R. Pennell

FASSIH, ISMAIL

[1935–]

Persian novelist and translator.

Ismail Fassih was born in Tehran and left Iran in 1956 to study English literature in the United States. Upon his return, he became an employee at the National Iranian Oil Company and taught at the Abadan Institute of Technology. His first novel, *Sharab-e kham* (The unripe wine; 1968), treats the life of an employee of the National Iranian Oil Company, Jalal Aryan, who is unwittingly involved in a crime mystery. Fassih's later novels continue the life of this fictitious character and his family in Tehran. In addition to his popular novels, Fassih has published a collection of short stories titled *Namadha-ye dasht-e moshavvash* (Symbols of the shimmering desert; 1990). Fassih is now retired and lives in Tehran.

See also Literature: Persian.

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Pardis Minuchehr

FATAH, AL-

Palestinian nationalist movement headed by Yasir Arafat.

The name *Fatah* has a double meaning: It is both the Arabic word for *conquest* (literally, "opening up"), used to denote the seventh-century Muslim Arab conquests of the Middle East and North Africa, and

a reversed acronym of *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Filastini* (Palestinian Liberation Movement). The full name of the group is Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini (Palestinian National Liberation Movement). Although it was identified for nearly three decades with the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), al-Fatah (also al-Fateh, al-Fath) existed separately and before the foundation of the PLO. It was established by a group of Palestinian exiles working in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf countries, many of whom would be its principal leaders for many years. Most important were the engineer Yasir Arafat; his friend and colleague Salah Khalaf; Khalil al-Wazir; Khalid al-Hasan, an employee of the Kuwaiti government, and his brother Hani al-Hasan; and others working in Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Europe. The founders sometimes date al-Fatah's beginning to 1959, when the Kuwait group was working together and took over a magazine, *Filastinuna* (Our Palestine).

The movement has been led from the beginning by a central committee, and occasionally holds general conferences. A revolutionary council was formed early on, but gradually its power was overshadowed by the central committee. (It should not be confused with al-Fath—Revolutionary Council, the name adopted by the dissident organization of Sabri al-Banna.) It also created a military wing that operated under the name *al-Asifa* (the storm), which began military action against Israel at the end of 1964. During 1965 it continued to claim guerrilla operations, though these had little effect upon Israel. Meanwhile, in 1964, the League of Arab States, with Egyptian prodding, had created the PLO under Ahmad Shuqayri, to some extent preempting al-Fatah's constituency. After the June 1967 Arab–Israel War, Arafat and other al-Fatah leaders slipped into the West Bank (from which al-Fatah had previously launched operations) to organize resistance. Failing to successfully pull together a revolt in the newly occupied territories, Arafat and other al-Fatah leaders withdrew and established new training camps in Jordan and Syria. Al-Fatah and other Palestinian guerrilla groups were able to increase their military capabilities and training in the camps.

Al-Fatah's ideology was ill defined and not highly theoretical. Its main principles were armed struggle, "Palestine first," and noninterference in the affairs of the Arab states. Al-Fatah cadres insisted upon liberating Palestine themselves rather than waiting for the Arab states to do it, and through armed struggle rather than negotiation. This "people's war" would also give the Palestinian people an identity and a sense of empowerment. Instead of viewing the liberation of Palestine as a derivative of pan-Arab unity, al-Fatah stressed "Palestine first": The Palestinian cause could not wait any longer for Arab unity. Finally, al-Fatah sought to avoid the radical sociopolitical agendas advocated by some leftist Arab parties that sought to bring about revolution in the Arab world. Al-Fatah pledged to cooperate with both radical and conservative Arab states. All considered, this vague bourgeois nationalist agenda reflects the conservative background of al-Fatah's founders: Most were middle-class Muslims whose vision of national liberation did not

Yasir Arafat (left), seen here with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) spokesman Kamal Nasser in Cairo, Egypt, in 1971, has led al-Fatah ever since about 1959, when he and other Palestinian exiles founded the movement for armed struggle against Israel. A decade later, Arafat and his al-Fatah colleagues won control of the PLO, an interconnected but distinct coalition of resistance groups. **© AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.**

include sweeping socioeconomic change in Palestinian society.

Meanwhile, al-Fatah began to undermine Shuqayri's leadership of the PLO. In December 1967 Shuqayri, who had close ties to Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser and therefore to Egypt's massive defeat in June 1967, resigned. In January 1968 al-Fatah convened a meeting in Cairo of most of the guerrilla groups and set up a coordinating bureau among them. On 21 March 1968, Israeli forces raided al-Fatah base at Karama in Jordan. Forewarned, the guerrillas were able to inflict relatively heavy losses on the Israeli attackers with considerable support from Jordanian troops, and Karama became a rallying cry for the Palestinian resistance. Al-Fatah's numbers and reputation swelled. During the fourth and fifth Palestine National Council (PNC) sessions in 1968 and 1969, the various guerrilla groups, including al-Fatah, won larger and roles in addition to an amendment to the Palestine National Charter to support armed struggle. At the fifth PNC in February 1969 in Cairo, al-Fatah elected Yasir Arafat the new chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO. The following year, he was given the title commander in chief as well. Thereafter, al-Fatah gained greater control of senior PLO positions, with Arafat's close aides Salah Khalaf (known by the nom de guerre Abu Iyad), Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), Faruq Qaddumi (Abu Lutf), Khalid al-Hasan, and others taking key posts.

Since 1969 the history of al-Fatah has been intertwined with that of the PLO, though the other guerrilla movements have often been able to limit al-Fatah's freedom of action. Until after the PLO's withdrawal from Beirut in 1982, al-Fatah's positions were sometimes hard to distinguish from the PLO's, but with each successive split within the PLO (or withdrawal of various rejectionist groups from the PLO leadership), al-Fatah's role as the main pro-negotiation faction became more pronounced. Starting in the late 1970s, al-Fatah merged its al-Asifa forces within the PLO's Palestine Liberation Army.

With the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada in Gaza and the West Bank in 1987, al-Fatah leaders inside the occupied territories became prominent in the Unified National Leadership of the Intifada. At the same time, Arafat and his al-Fatah colleagues in exile were the main force in pushing the PLO toward recognition of Israel's right to exist. Despite many predictions over the years that al-Fatah would lose control of the PLO or that Arafat, at least, would be replaced as its head, and despite the assassinations of Khalaf and al-Wazir, Arafat and the al-Fatah leadership moved the PLO toward a negotiated peace with Israel in the September 1993 Oslo Accord.

The Oslo Accord led to the emergence of the Palestinian Authority (PA), an autonomous government under the PLO's leadership. Al-Fatah-dominated leadership cadre became the leaders of the PA, as factions opposing the Oslo Accord either broke from the PLO or were unable to reverse the new course. Yet the former al-Fatah exiles, some of whom built luxurious homes in the West Bank and were involved in cronyism and corruption, were resented by West Bank al-Fatah veterans who had lived through years of Israeli occupation. The outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in October 2000 led to the emergence of armed al-Fatah groups in the West Bank, the Tanzim militia and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. The latter was involved in suicide bombings and other attacks on Israelis. The divisions within al-Fatah were most acrimonious during the summer of 2003, when Arafat was locked in a bitter power struggle with his former colleague and PA prime minister, Mahmud Abbas, which he eventually won. Abbas was replaced by another veteran al-Fatah member, Ahmad Qurai (Abu Ala), who also faced a power struggle with Arafat. In February 2004, the revolutionary council met for the first time in three years to deal with al-Fatah's mounting internal strife, which included mass resignations over alleged misrule by the group's veteran leadership.

See also Abbas, Mahmud; Arafat, Yasir; Banna, Sabri al-; Hasan, Hani al-; Hasan, Khalid al-; Khalaf, Salah; League of Arab States; Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine National Charter (1968); Palestine National Council; Palestinian Authority; Qaddumi, Faruq; Qurai, Ahmad Sulayman; Shuqayri, Ahmad; Wazir, Khalil al-.

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MICHAEL DUNN
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

FATAT, AL-

A clandestine Arab organization that made a significant impact on the development of Arab nationalism.

Al-Fatat was founded in 1911 by a small group of Arabs from Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine in the course of their higher studies in Paris. Initially called Jamʿiyyat al-Natiqin bi al-Dhad (literally, the "society of those who speak the letter Dad," i.e., Arabic), its name was later changed to al-Jamiʿa al-Arabiyya al-Fatat (The Young Arab Society). The original aim of al-Fatat was the administrative independence of the Arab lands from Ottoman rule. This meant that the Arab and Turkish nationalities should remain united within the Ottoman framework, but that each should have equal rights and obligations and administer its own educational institutions. Al-Fatat moved its offices from Paris to Beirut late in 1913 and set up a branch in Damascus.

The new environment created by World War I, particularly the Turkish government's execution of prominent Arab nationalists in 1915 and 1916, made al-Fatat amend its political program and opt for the complete independence and unity of Arab lands. By enlisting Amir Faisal (Faisal I ibn Hussein) in 1915, al-Fatat put itself in direct contact with the family of Sharif Husayn ibn Ali and, through them, with the British. In 1915, al-Fatat and the Iraqi-dominated al-Ahd drew up the Damascus protocol, which expressed the Arab nationalists' readiness to join the British war effort against the Ottoman state if Britain pledged to support complete Arab independence and unity. After the war, al-Fatat shifted its attention to the principle of pan-Syrian unity. It reached the height of its political influence during Faisal's short-lived Arab government in Damascus (1918–1920). Although al-Fatat was the backbone of Faisal's government, its founding members preferred to operate clandestinely. They used Hizb al-Istiqlal al-Arabi (Arab Independence party) as a public front for their organization. Differences over Faisal's controversial dealings with the Zionists and the French, as well as the different political priorities of the Iraqi, Palestinian, and Syrian elements that constituted al-Fatat, created serious schisms within the organization. The collapse of Faisal's government in Damascus in the summer of 1920 sealed al-Fatat's fate as a structured political organization. Many of its members, however, continued to be active in the politics of Arab nationalism in the generation after World War I.

See also AHD, AL-; ARAB NATIONALISM; FAISAL I IBN HUSSEIN; HUSAYN IBN ALI.

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MUHAMMAD MUSLIH

FATH ALI SHAH QAJAR

[1771–1834]

Second monarch of Persia's Qajar dynasty, 1797–1834.

Born Baba Khan, Fath Ali Shah Qajar took the name Fath Ali Shah upon his accession to the throne. He was the nephew of the first shah, Agha Mohammad Qajar, and had been designated heir apparent. In 1796, when Agha Mohammad was on his second military campaign to Georgia, Baba Khan was governor of Isfahan; news reached him that his uncle had been assassinated. His right to the throne was immediately challenged by several pretenders who had to be eliminated before he could be crowned in 1797. Fath Ali Shah's reign was marked by wars with Russia—attacks on the Caucasus principalities that had passed out of Persian suzerainty during the several years of turmoil and civil war.

The war with Russia began in 1804 and drew Persia into the European rivalries that are called the Napoleonic Wars. On one side was Britain, nervous of Russian and French designs on India; on the other was France's Napoléon Bonaparte, who was at war with Britain and Russia. The Persian forces were led by Crown Prince Abbas Mirza, who was then also governor of Azerbaijan.

Fath Ali Shah needed European aid in his war against Russia, so first he allied himself with the French, then with the British—but each time was abandoned when they changed their policies. Persia suffered a disastrous defeat in 1813 and signed the Treaty of Golestan. This treaty did not prove final, since the borders between Persia and Russia were not well defined and neither country was satisfied. War resumed in 1824, despite the unwillingness of the shah—who would not send sufficient financial help. Persia was defeated and signed the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828. According to this treaty, Persia ceded to Russia all the areas north of the Aras River, paid an indemnity of 5 million *tuman,* accepted other indemnity and capitulatory conditions that weakened the economy, and gave to Russian consuls judicial powers in disputes involving Russian subjects. The Treaty of Turkmanchai, in spirit if not in actuality, became the model for all the future treaties Persia (or Iran) was to conclude with other European nations.

The first premier *(sadr-e azam)* of Fath Ali Shah was Mirza Ebrahim Khan Eʿtemad al-Dowleh, who had helped Agha Mohammad Shah gain the throne; he subsequently grew so powerful that he was feared by the shah, who put him and his family to death. The next premier was Mirza Shafi, a man of modest background. During his ministry, the bureaucracy of the Qajar dynasty and the administration of the country were developed. Iran, disrupted after the fall of the Safavids, was once again strongly centralized and expanded. The capital, Tehran, was developed and endowed with new palaces, mosques, and pleasure gardens.

During the reign of Fath Ali Shah, some attempts at modernizing the army were made to meet any foreign challenge, but none was successful. Modernization was attached to European rivalries and lost ground each time policy shifted. Because of the interest of the European nations, the shah's court was visited by many envoys who have left their accounts of its splendor and extravagance. Nevertheless, the reign of Fath Ali Shah left Persia impoverished and with less territory than he had inherited.

See also Abbas Mirza, Naʾeb al-Saltaneh; Qajar, Agha Mohammad; Qajar Dynasty; Turkmanchai, Treaty of (1828).

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Mansoureh Ettehadieh

FATWA

Technical term for the legal judgment or learned interpretation that a qualified jurist (mufti) can give on issues pertaining to the shariʿa *(Islamic law).*

Originally only a *mujtahid,* that is, a jurist satisfying a number of qualifications and trained in the techniques of *ijtihad* ("personal reasoning," the fourth source of Islamic law after the Qurʾan, the Prophet Muhammad's *sunna,* and *ijma,* or consensus), was allowed to issue a legal opinion or interpretation of an established law. Later, all trained jurists were allowed to be muftis. Fatwas are nonbinding, contrary to the laws deriving from the first three sources, and the Muslim may seek another legal opinion. The fatwas of famous jurists are usually collected in books and can be used as precedents in courts of law.

Because most Muslim countries stopped following the *shariʿa* during the twentieth century and adopted secular legal systems, fatwas are issued mostly on a personal basis or for political reasons. The practice of having a government-appointed mufti issue fatwas justifying government policy has been a major criticism by reformist contemporary Muslim movements. However, many of the latter often allow individuals without the requisite legal training to issue fatwas. Such edicts may be considered by their followers as binding but they are not

recognized by the jurists or the rest of the Muslim community as legitimate juristic opinions.

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WAEL B. HALLAQ
UPDATED BY MAYSAM J. AL FARUQI

FAWWAZ, ZAYNAB

[c. 1850–1914]

Lebanese essayist, novelist, poet, and dramatist.

Zaynab Fawwaz immigrated from south Lebanon to Egypt as a young woman and became a prominent writer on gender issues in the nationalist press. Much remains mysterious about her early life: She was the daughter of a Shiʿite family of modest means from Tibnin, Jabal Amil, and as a young girl she apparently was employed or taken into the local ruling household of Ali Bey al-Asʿad. She caught the attention of Ali Bey's consort, Fatima bint Asʿad al-Khalil, a literate woman who taught her the rudiments of reading and writing, and perhaps more. Sources provide divergent narratives on Fawwaz's first marriage(s) and her move to Egypt. She became the protégée of newspaper publisher and litterateur Hasan Husni Pasha al-Tuwayrani, in whose newspaper, *al-Nil,* she published essays in the early 1890s while also publishing in women's journals and other periodicals. Her essays and poetry were published in *al-Rasaʾil al-Zaynabiyya* (The Zaynab epistles, c. 1906); like other intellectuals of her time, she wrote across genres, publishing a massive biographical dictionary of famous women, *al-Durr al-manthur fi tabaqat rabbat al-khudur* (Scattered pearls on the generations of the mistresses of seclusion, 1894), as well as two novels, *Husn al-awaqib aw Ghada al-zahira* (Good consequences, or Ghada the radiant, 1899) and *al-Malik Kurush awwal muluk al-Fars* (King Kurush, first sovereign of the Persians, 1905), and one play, *al-Hawa wa al-wafa* (Passion and fidelity, 1893). She is considered an Arab feminist pioneer; her work is notable for emphasizing the importance of women's access to income-generating employment.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION.

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MARILYN BOOTH

FAYRUZ

[c. 1933 –]

One of the Arab world's most popular modern singers.

Fayruz (also Fairouz) was born Nuhad Haddad in Lebanon in approximately 1933. In the early 1950s, after several years of singing in Radio Lebanon's choir, she began to collaborate artistically with the brothers Asi (1923–1986) and Mansur al-Rahbani (1925–). She married the latter in 1954. The vast majority of the hundreds of songs that she sang during the first thirty years of her career were written and composed by the al-Rahbani brothers. Most of them were written for her, and the al-Rahbani brothers' folkloric musical theater extravaganzas—works such as *Jisr al-Qamar* (The moon's bridge, 1962) and *Bayya al-Khawatim* (The ring seller, 1964)—were staged at the Baʿalbak Festival beginning in 1959 and eventually at a variety of venues throughout Lebanon and the Arab world.

The annual Baʿalbak Festival evolved into a mixture of local and international avant-garde and folkloric acts. The al-Rahbanis' plays, which became more extravagant and operatic as the 1960s progressed, were in large part vehicles for Fayruz's talent. In light of the civil violence of 1958, these works, performed in the site's spectacular ancient Roman ruins, contributed to the effort by the country's Christian political elite to unify a diverse population cobbled together after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I.

All of Fayruz and the al-Rahbani Brothers' plays were broadcast repeatedly on local television and radio. Three were made into feature films, including

one by the Egyptian director Yusuf Shahin. In addition to songs from the plays, Fayruz's numerous recordings also contain tunes from her pre-theater career on radio and from her live concerts, as well as Christmas carols and liturgical hymns. In addition to songs by the al-Rahbani brothers, she also sang songs written or composed by Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, Saʿid Aql, Tawfiq al-Basha, al-Sayyid Darwish, Juzif Harb, Jubran Khalil Jubran (also Kahlil Gibran), Zaki Nasif, Nizar Qabbani, al-Akhtal al-Saghir, and Filmun Wahba.

In an age when songs in the Egyptian dialect dominated regional markets, Fayruz and the al-Rahbani brothers were credited with popularizing a distinctly Lebanese idiom. However, at the beginning of their collaboration they often performed Latin-style dance tunes and waltzes, and much of their music depended on nonindigenous instruments, such as the piano, and non-Eastern techniques, such as harmonization.

Due to radio and to recording technologies, increased emigration, and her and her composers' use of diverse musical styles, Fayruz's fan base rapidly transcended Lebanon's borders. In addition to working for Radio Lebanon, Fayruz and the al-Rahbani brothers sang and recorded for the British Near East Radio, Radio Damascus, and Gamal Abdel Nasser's influential Voice of the Arabs. It was at the latter organization's behest in 1955 that the al-Rahbanis and Fayruz recorded the Palestinian resistance song "Rajiʿun" (We shall return).

After the Arab defeat in the war of June 1967, Fayruz and the al-Rahbanis's songs and musical theater works became more urban in theme and setting. What remained consistent, however, was the contrast between their theatrical representations of a unified Lebanon—usually embodied in miraculous solutions to conflict offered by Fayruz's character—and the increasing sectarian tension, which culminated in the outbreak of a protracted Lebanese civil and regional war in 1975.

Shortly after the outbreak of war, the artistic trinity fell apart with the divorce of Asi and Fayruz. During the war and since its end, Fayruz has worked extensively, albeit not exclusively, with her son Ziyad al-Rahbani (1956–). Although this collaborative effort resists simple categorization, it has been characterized—for example, on records such as *Kifak inta?* (How are you? 1991)—by jazzy orchestration and relatively sensual lyrics. This shift has not prevented Fayruz from continuing to sing old al-Rahbani standards, many of which have been re-orchestrated, sometimes ironically, by Ziyad, such as those on the record *Ila Asi* (To Asi, 1995). Whatever the style, period, or medium, Fayruz and her voice have consistently been considered symbols of freedom and unity, not just for the Lebanese, but for all Arabs.

See also Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad ibn; Aql, Saʿid; Art; Gender: Gender and Education; Lebanese Civil War (1958); Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanon; Music; Qabbani, Nizar; Theater.

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Christopher Reed Stone

FAYSAL IBN TURKI AL SAʿUD

[c. 1785–1865]

Ruler of central Arabia for more than a quarter century (1834–1838, 1843–1865).

Faysal ibn Turki Al Saʿud was the eldest son of Turki ibn Abdullah, who was murdered in 1834. Faysal succeeded his father and soon consolidated his rule over most of the original Al Saʿud domain. He acknowledged Abdullah ibn Rashid as overlord of the dependent emirate of Jabal Shammar in northern Najd, thus laying the foundation for the Al Rashid dynasty that would briefly eclipse the Al Saʿud. In 1837, Egypt, which had crushed the Saudi state in 1811–1818 while acting in the name of the Ottoman sultan, again invaded central Arabia, this time to further Muhammad Ali's ambition of a Middle East empire. The next year the defeated Faysal was imprisoned in Cairo, and Khalid, son of "Saʿud the Great" (1803–1814), ruled as an Egyptian puppet. Faysal's dramatic escape from Egypt in 1843 (prob-

ably with the connivance of Muhammad Ali's son, Abbas) led to the rapid reassertion of his rule. He overthrew Abdullah Thunayyan, who had supplanted Khalid in 1841. Faysal soon took control of Najd, the Saudi state's core, and of al-Hasa on the Persian/Arabian Gulf. To the southeast he once again asserted Saudi authority in the Buraymi Oasis area and other parts of northern Oman, but the Hijaz and its holy cities of Mecca and Medina remained beyond his reach. Throughout the second phase of his rule, Faysal was preoccupied with the rebellious Qasim area of north-central Najd and with recalcitrant tribes, especially the Ajman.

A follower of the puritanical Wahhabi Islamic reform movement, Faysal ruled in accordance with its austere dictates. His regime, however, lacked the proselytizing thrust of both the eighteenth-century creation and the twentieth-century re-creation of the Saudi realm. In a state with only a rudimentary administrative apparatus he served as imam, leader of the community of the faithful, as well as chief executive of the state and commander in chief of its military forces. At the same time, he allotted considerable power to his three eldest sons. Abdullah was administrator for the capital of Riyadh and central Najd, Saʿud and Muhammad governed the southern and northern districts, respectively. In the rebellious Qasim district, Faysal installed his brother, Jiluwi.

Agricultural produce and livestock were taxed, as were Muslim pilgrims crossing Saudi territory. Tribute from Musqat and other territories supplemented tax revenues. Towns and tribes throughout the realm were obligated to provide quotas of men and animals when military emergencies required them. Soldiers were paid largely in the form of booty. Faysal's external relations established patterns for the future, especially in the three-way diplomatic game played with the Sublime Porte and Great Britain. Britain thwarted Faysal's designs on Muscat and Bahrain, but he and they generally cooperated on maritime issues, roughly prefiguring relations between Britain and Saudi Arabia on the Gulf littoral in the twentieth century.

At his death Faysal had regained and consolidated authority over the principal part of the Al Saʿud patrimony. Although his sons squandered their patrimony, Faysal's long reign reestablished the rule of the Al Saʿud in central Arabia and thus made possible the restoration under his grandson, Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman (Ibn Saʿud), in the next century.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Ajman; Hasa, al-; Hijaz; Jabal Shammar; Muhammad Ali; Najd; Sublime Porte.

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Malcolm C. Peck

FAYSAL, TUJAN

[1948–]

Jordanian feminist, democracy activist, and former member of parliament.

In 1993, Tujan Faysal became the first woman ever elected to the Jordanian parliament. Born in Amman, Jordan, in 1948, Faysal grew up in the capital, attended the University of Jordan, and earned bachelor's and master's degrees in English. Although Jordanian society features a relatively small gender gap in terms of education levels and literacy, this has not translated into a similar degree of equality in political representation. Women in Jordan received the right to vote and to run for office in 1974, but no new national elections were held until the kingdom's liberalization program began in 1989.

Faysal, by then a well-known television commentator and talk-show host, registered her candidacy, running for one of the three seats reserved for the kingdom's minority Circassian community. She became the victim of a smear campaign engineered by Islamists opposed to any participation of women in Jordanian public life. These activists were especially hostile to Faysal, who was an outspoken feminist and had published a newspaper article refuting Islamist interpretations of women's rights in Islam. A mufti of the Jordanian army declared Faysal apostate, despite her devout Muslim beliefs, and Islamist activists tried to have her marriage rescinded. She was forced to stand trial, but the case was ultimately dismissed just before election day. However, the

character assassination had been effective and Faysal lost the election. When she again ran for parliament in 1993, similar levels of Islamist opposition emerged, but this time Faysal was successful. From 1993 to 1997, she was the only female deputy in the lower house of parliament, the Majlis al-Nuwwab. Faysal served on the parliamentary committees on education, health, and environmental protection—important but nonetheless gendered assignments familiar to female parliamentarians and cabinet ministers in many parts of the world. She promoted the rights and opportunities of women, regardless of religion, ethnicity, or social class.

Faysal narrowly lost her reelection bid, and the 1997–2001 parliament included no women. With the exceptions of Layla Sharaf and Rima Khalaf, few women have been included in the royally appointed upper house, or in roles as cabinet ministers. But in 2003 King Abdullah II ibn Hussein issued a decree reserving a minimum of 6 seats (out of 110) in the lower house for women.

In 1997 Faysal had intended to run for office, but instead found herself on trial again. She had been arrested for sending an e-mail to the king accusing the prime minister, Ali Abu al-Raghib, of having personally benefited from a new government policy that doubled the costs of car insurance. She was sentenced to eighteen months in prison but was pardoned and released by the king after serving one month. She was banned from running in the 2003 elections for having been sentenced to prison. Nonetheless, from outside the walls of parliament, Faysal continued to campaign for women's rights and democracy in Jordan.

See also Abdullah II ibn Hussein; Circassians; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Jordan.

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Curtis R. Ryan

FEDAʾIYAN-E ISLAM

A small religious terrorist group active in Iran between 1945 and 1955.

Fedaʾiyan-e Islam (Devotees of Islam) was founded by Sayyed Mujtaba Mirlavhi, a theology student, who adopted the name Navab Safavi. His followers were mostly youngsters employed in the lower levels of the Tehran bazaar. The group interpreted the Qurʾan literally, demanded a strict application of the *shariʿa* (Islamic law), and called for the physical elimination of the "enemies of Islam." Despite ideological affinity with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the two groups had no organizational links. The Fedaʾiyan-e Islam's victims included Ahmad Kasravi, the iconoclastic writer, and General Ali Razmara, Iran's prime minister in 1951. It also tried to assassinate Husayn Fatemi, Mohammad Mossadegh's foreign minister, and Hoseyn Ala, the prime minister in 1955. After the last attempt, the government destroyed the organization by executing Safavi and his three closest colleagues. Immediately after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, some members tried to revive the Fedaʾiyan-e Islam, but others sabotaged the attempt, arguing that there was no need to resurrect the organization. Other members, however, channeled their activities into an influential right-wing group named the Coalition of Islamic Societies. Consequently, some surviving members of the Fedaʾiyan can now be found in the majles, in the cabinet, in the Council of Guardians, and, most noticeably, in the Tehran Chamber of Commerce.

See also Muslim Brotherhood.

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Ervand Abrahamian

FEDAʾIYAN-E KHALQ

The main Marxist guerrilla movement in contemporary Iran.

Fedaʾiyan-e Khalq (The People's Devotees) was created during the early 1970s by young dissidents from both the Tudeh Party and Mohammad Mossadegh's National Front who felt that their parent organizations, with their conventional political strategies, would never succeed in overthrowing the Pahlavi regime. These young activists were inspired by Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, and, most important of all, Che Guevara. A few of them received guerrilla training from the Palestinians in Lebanon. Their first military exploit was to assault a gendarmerie station in the Caspian village of Siyahkal in February 1971. This attack, famous later as the Siyahkal incident, acted as a catalyst for the whole revolutionary movement in Iran. It prompted others, especially religious radicals such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq, to follow their example. Even Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's disciples have admitted that Siyahkal left a "deep impression" on the Iranian population.

In the years following Siyahkal, the Fedaʾiyan lost all its original leaders and most of its rank and file—either in shoot-outs, under torture, or by firing squads. Most of these martyrs came from the ranks of the intelligentsia—they were teachers, engineers, and university students. By the time of the Iranian revolution, the Fedaʾiyan enjoyed a widespread mystique of revolutionary heroism and martyrdom, but little remained of its armed organization. This little, however, did play a part in delivering the old regime its coup de grace in the dramatic days of February 1979.

After the revolution, the Fedaʾiyan grew quickly to become the main Marxist organization in Iran, far outshadowing the older Tudeh Party. By early 1981, it had a nationwide structure, its Tehran rallies attracted over 100,000 participants and, with the Mojahedin, its armed cells posed a serious threat to the clerical Islamic Republic. After 1981, however, the Fedaʾiyan went into sharp decline in part because of a massive government repression and in part because of constant internal fragmentation. Government repression took more than 600 Fedaʾiyan lives. The backgrounds of these martyrs were similar to those before the revolution, with one minor variation—the new ones included many more high school students.

The main split came over how to deal with the clerical state. One faction, known as the Aksariyat (Majority), viewed the Khomeini regime as intrinsically anti-imperialist and, therefore, potentially progressive. In this respect, it followed a policy similar to the Tudeh. But the other faction, labeled the Aqalliyat (Minority), saw the regime as the executive committee of the petty bourgeoisie, and, therefore, inherently conservative and even reactionary. The two factions published newspapers with the same title of *Kar* (Work). Both, however, soon experienced their own splits over such issues as the Tudeh Party, the Mojahedin, the Iraqi war, the Kurdish revolt, and the fall of the Soviet Union. By the early 1990s, there were at least six groups in exile, each with its own newspaper, each tracing its origins to Siyahkal, and each incorporating into its formal name a variation of the term *Fedaʾyi.* By the early 2000s, these had withered down to two—both based in Germany.

See also Mojahedin; National Front, Iran; Tudeh Party.

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Ervand Abrahamian

FEDDAN

See Glossary

FELAFEL

See Food

FELLAGHA

See Glossary

FELLAH

See Glossary

FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION

Surgical operation performed on girls in the Nile Valley, northeast Africa, and parts of West Africa

Female circumcision has been the subject of fascination, horror, and feminist agitation in the West. There is little doubt that circumcising women is linked to control of female sexuality. In the feminist literature, the term *female genital mutilation* (FGM) has tended to replace *female circumcision* as a more accurate description of the operation performed upon young African girls in the Nile Valley, northeast Africa, and parts of West Africa.

There is no reference to female circumcision in the Qurʾan, and it is only mentioned in the *hadith* where Muhammad is said to have advised the use of the *sunna* (customary) method, not to destroy or mutilate, for this is better for the man and would make the woman's face glow. The right of a woman to sexual satisfaction in marriage is upheld in Muslim interpretations. There is general agreement that female circumcision was already customary in societies where Islam spread, and that since it was not prohibited by Islam its continued practice was permitted.

The greatest prevalence of female circumcision is in the African continent—especially in northeast and eastern Africa and across the Sahel to West Africa—where it is also practiced by some Christian groups in Ethiopia and Egypt. The Islamic faith enjoins modesty and proper sexual conduct for both males and females, but as is true for other faiths originating in the Middle East, the sexual double standard demands more protection and greater monitoring of women to guard their chastity. Female circumcision is a powerful ally, but it is neither the only approach nor is it commanded by Islam. The religious scholars *(ulama)* in different Muslim countries have at different times interpreted the *shariʿa* as either being neutral to the practice (Sudan during colonial times) or in favor of female circumcision (Egypt under recent Islamist pressure). The grand shaykh of Al-Azhar University, Gad al-Haq Ali Gad al-Haq, ruled in a 1995 *fatwa* that "female circumcision is a noble practice that does honor to a woman," and that medieval scholars had ruled that both male and female circumcision is mandated by Islamic law. However, Egypt's grand mufti Sayyid Tantawi argued that circumcising women is not part of Islamic teaching and is a matter best evaluated by medical professionals.

Three different forms of circumcision are recognized: (1) clitoridectomy, or the excision of the tip of the clitoris only; (2) modified excision, or the removal of the clitoris and parts of the *labia majora* and *minora;* (3) infibulation, or excision of the clitoris and all of the *labia majora* and *minora,* leaving a smooth vulva and a small opening for the common flow of urine and menses. The latter (called Pharaonic circumcision in Sudan) is most widely practiced in Somalia and parts of East Africa. The less severe forms of the operation are more commonly found in West Africa. Female circumcision is not practiced in some of the most patriarchal of Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan, or in Jordan, where killings of allegedly unchaste women are believed to protect family honor.

The global women's rights movement has asserted that female circumcision is in a category with other human rights violations, such as domestic abuse and honor killings. An international human rights campaign against FGM has advocated banning it, or at least some amelioration of the practice, as a violation of girls' and women's rights. The Vienna Human Rights Conference in 1993 and the Beijing International Women's Conference in 1995 passed resolutions against FGM and called for state-supported and international educational and public health campaigns to end or ameliorate the various practices associated with it.

See also CIRCUMCISION; HADITH; *SHARIʿA.*

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CAROLYN FLUEHR-LOBBAN

FERAOUN, MOULOUD

[1913–1962]

Algerian writer.

Mouloud Feraoun was born to an impoverished Kabyle family. He received a French education and

a teaching degree. Feraoun's publications dealt with Kabyle life as viewed in the novels *Le fils du pauvre* (1950); *La terre et le sang* (1953); *Les chemins qui montent* (1957); and the essays, *Jours de Kabyle* (1954). Feraoun also translated the poetry of the renown Kabyle, Si Mohand. Feraoun's posthumous *Journal, 1955–1962* (1962) chronicled the Algerian war of independence. He was murdered by the colonialist Secret Army Organization (Organisation de l'Armée Secrète; OAS). Feraoun belonged to the famous "Generation of 1954" literary figures (composed also of Mohammed Dib, Yacine Kateb, Moulaoud Mammeri, and Malek Haddad).

See also ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; DIB, MOHAMMED; HADDAD, MALEK; KATEB, YACINE; ORGANISATION ARMÉE SECRÈTE (OAS).

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

FERIT, DAMAT MEHMET

[1853–1923]

Ottoman politician and grand vizier.

Damat Mehmet Ferit Paşa rose to prominence first by marrying the sister of future sultan Vahideddin and then by founding the Freedom and Accord Party in November 1911. As a revival of the Liberal Union Party, the Freedom and Accord Party opposed the Committee for Union and Progress government and demanded an investigation of the Ottoman defeat at Tripoli the same year.

In two terms as grand vizier in 1919 and 1920, Damat Ferit Paşa allied with Sultan Vahideddin and Allied occupiers against the emerging Kemalist national movement, obtaining *fatwas* condemning nationalist leaders to death and inciting the Kurds against Kemalist forces in eastern Anatolia. On 17 October 1920, he resigned under Allied pressure and fled to Yugoslavia. In 1921, the Ankara national assembly condemned him to death in absentia for treason. He died of natural causes on 6 October 1923, the same day the Allies evacuated Istanbul under the Treaty of Lausanne.

See also COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS; LAUSANNE, TREATY OF (1923).

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

FERMAN

An imperial edict carrying the Ottoman sultan's tughra, *or signature.*

Fermans were regulations or communiqués issued on a wide variety of topics in response to appeals from government officials and subjects throughout the empire. They were issued after discussion by top officials at the sultan's palace, or Sublime Porte, often but not necessarily including the sultan himself. The grand vizier handled appeals of a general administrative nature, while the *defterdar* considered fiscal matters and the *kadi-asker* matters of *shariʿa*, or religious law. The sultan's *tughra* would be affixed near the top of the document, which would then be placed in a small bag and sent by courier to the appellant.

With the expansion of government and the increasingly autonomous responsibility of the grand vizier in the nineteenth century, *fermans* were replaced by *irade,* which means "the sultan's will." The *irade* was an inscription expressing the sultan's approval that was affixed at the bottom of a document drawn up by the grand vizier. Documents originating personally with the sultan were then called *hatt-i hümayun,* literally "imperial documents."

See also SUBLIME PORTE.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

FERTILE CRESCENT

Term used by historians and prehistorians to describe the ancient Near East's agricultural heartland, which produced the Neolithic revolution and the rise of the world's first civilizations.

The Fertile Crescent stretches from the Mediterranean coast north across the Syrian Desert to Mesopotamia and then south to the Persian/Arabian Gulf. Parts of Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran are within it.

The first civilization of Sumer and the civilizations of the Bible—Assyria, Akkad, Persia, and ancient Egypt, as well as the Jewish kingdoms of Judah and Israel—all developed in the Fertile Crescent, with cities, agricultural towns and villages, and herders of domesticated sheep and goats. Both ancient Greece and Rome invaded to control the richness of the region, and the Roman Empire continued through the Islamic conquests of the 700s, its Byzantine emperors ruling from Constantinople until the Ottoman Turks conquered the capital in 1453, making it their own capital of Istanbul.

Under the Ottoman Empire, the crescent had districts or provinces *(vilayets)* and subdistricts *(sanjaks)*. After World War I, with the defeat of the Ottomans, Britain and France administered most of it under League of Nations mandates. Beginning in the 1920s, Arab leaders developed various plans for unifying it, and the Hashimites were especially eager to see it ruled by one of their amirs. After World War II, the concept of pan-Arabism was championed by Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser and by the Baʿthist political parties of Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Today, Fertile Crescent unity is little talked about, but the Islamist political resurgence and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) remind many that common interests and common heritage may yet serve to unite the Arab world, much of which now exists in the Fertile Crescent.

See also Hashimite House (House of Hashim); Istanbul; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Pan-Arabism; Persian (Arabian) Gulf.

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Zachary Karabell

FERTILE CRESCENT UNITY PLANS

Post–World War I plans to unify the Arab lands in Asia of the former Ottoman Empire.

After World War I, various plans, differing in source and motivation, were advanced for the unification of that area of Arab Asia known as the Fertile Crescent. This followed the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the sanctioning by the League of Nations of mandates for France and Britain in 1922, to become effective in 1923, covering Mesopotamia and geohistorical or Greater Syria (which included Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan). The Fertile Crescent was a conceptual broad arc from Basra to Beersheba, embracing all the mandated territory; it was moderately fertile and, in addition to Arabs, included Kurds, the Druze people, Alawites, and other ethnic minorities.

Well before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, its Arab provinces in Asia had been edging toward regional autonomy. Such separatist aspirations were submerged in the expectation of a single independent Arab state, ostensibly promised during the World War I undertakings of Britain and France. By 1919, however, the Syrian national congress urged upon the investigating U.S. King–Crane Commission the reunification of geohistorical Syria as a separate entity. (In March 1920, Faisal, eldest son of Sharif Husayn of Hijaz—who had cooperated with T. E. Lawrence [of Arabia] and British General E. H. Allenby in uniting Arab forces to take Jerusalem and Damascus—was proclaimed king of Syria by the Syrian national congress; he was deposed by the French in July 1920.) The Anglo–French repudiation of the congress's resolution and Britain's granting of the throne of Iraq to Faisal after his brief rule in Syria set in motion the first major effort—promoted by Faisal—for the unification of the crescent. Faisal recognized, however, that the sanction of Britain and France was essential. From neither was it forthcoming. France suspected the project of being inspired by Britain to undermine French influence; for Britain, main-

taining the Entente Cordiale outweighed other considerations. Later, the French were to give Faisal momentary encouragement on his visit to Paris in 1931, since, following the signing of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which looked forward to the termination of Britain's mandate, the French saw possible advantage in Fertile Crescent unity. The project also drew support from the Aleppine People's Party and the Syrian monarchists; but the dominant National Bloc in Damascus favored the unification of Greater Syria on its own as a republic. One permanent obstacle to Northern Arab unification, whether under Hashimite auspices or not, was the rooted objection of Ibn Saʿud, king of Saudi Arabia (1932–1953).

Faisal's final plea for British support in 1933 had received no answer before he died three months later; Nuri al-Saʿid, his prime minister, pursued the cause, but in Iraq and elsewhere, Arab nationalism, which sought the union of all Arabs, exerted a more potent appeal for political theorists, such as the Iraqi Sati al-Husari. Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, Faisal's brother, was meanwhile brooding on his grand design for the unification of Greater Syria with himself as king, while in Syria itself a quite different movement for the cohesion of the "Syrian" people, on a wider interpretation, was being canvassed by the charismatic Antun Saʿada, a Lebanese-born Christian convinced that "natural" Syria, embracing in his view the whole crescent (if not more), enjoyed a particularism owed neither to Islam nor to the Arabs but to the ethnic mix within the region's distinctive environment. The aim of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), which he founded, was to unify this Syrian people and defend its separatism. His appeal expectedly attracted non-Muslims; more remarkable was the number of influential Syrian Muslims who gravitated into his orbit. In 1938, after arrests by the French for inciting disorder, he fled to South America, returning to the fray in 1947. Before his departure, membership of the SSNP was alleged (improbably) to have reached 50,000. All these movements for Arab Federation, as the British authorities called it, were regarded in 1939 by London as subject to insurmountable obstacles—internal rivalries as well as French, Saudi, and Zionist opposition. London's conclusion was to let natural forces take their course.

In July 1940, Amir Abdullah formally launched his Greater Syria plan, finding some support from Syrian ethnic minorities and even from Arab tribal and army factions; but the response of the British government, preoccupied with World War II, was unfavorable. In 1941, the emergence in Iraq of the anti-British Rashid Ali al-Kayani, with the exiled mufti of Jerusalem at his side, and the encouragement of the Axis powers, led to a new call for Fertile Crescent unity; but his briefly successful coup d'état in April was suppressed by British army intervention with Jordanian support. The expected military backing of the Axis had failed to materialize.

Britain's search for a posture that might strengthen its wartime position in the Middle East led in May 1941 to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden declaring his nation's "full support for any scheme of [Arab] unity which commanded general approval." Britain's high commissioner in Jerusalem, Lord Samuel, prompted by his Arab adviser, George Antonius, urged active support for Fertile Crescent unity and the abolition of the artificial frontiers imposed on Greater Syria after World War I. The authorities in London remained unmoved.

In December 1942, Amir Abdullah presented a new version of his Greater Syria scheme, in which "cultural union" with Iraq would lead to confederation of the two. The response of the rival Hashimite court in Baghdad was the launching by Prime Minister Nuri al-Saʿid of his so-called Blue Book, an elaborate scheme for solving all Middle East problems, in which a reunified historic Syria would join with Iraq to form the core of an Arab league open to all—the whole scheme resting on an international guarantee. Opposition from Ibn Saʿud and Amir Abdullah was instant; and Nuri's bid for wider Arab unity was trumped in Cairo where Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahhas announced in March 1943 his intention of consulting all Arab governments with the object of reconciling ideas on Arab unity—a ploy that gathered strength and led eighteen months later to the foundation of the Arab League on Egyptian terms. This was to forebode an end to all Fertile Crescent models, although their proponents by no means yet admitted defeat. Both Amir Abdullah and Nuri continued to propagate their respective schemes, Nuri now

toying with a plan for Iraq's merger with Syria, where a number of old-guard politicians and transient strongmen gave him encouragement. Antun Saʿada, too, returning from exile in 1947, relaunched his own Fertile Crescent vision by organizing from Syria, with undercover support from its President Husni al-Zaʿim, a coup in Lebanon as a starting point. Zaʿim betrayed him, and Saʿada was executed in Lebanon. The zealotry of his SSNP partisans was to survive unabated and lead to a final futile coup attempt in Lebanon in 1963.

Further efforts by Iraq to revive its Fertile Crescent project in other modes were made in 1954 by Fadhil al-Jamali, the then prime minister, and again the following year by Nuri al-Saʿid on the basis of the ill-fated Baghdad Pact of 1955. Both were resisted by Syria; and the emergence of Gamal Abdel Nasser as the potent manipulator of Arab resistance to what he saw as continuing British imperialism ended any general Arab acceptance of Iraqi aspirations in the crescent. In response to Nasser's unification of Egypt and Syria in February 1958, the two Hashimite monarchies laid their jealousies aside and declared the Federal Union of Iraq and Jordan, seeking at the same time to revive the Fertile Crescent concept by detaching Syria from Nasser's embrace. Both initiatives failed, Hashimite rule in Iraq being violently overthrown in the July revolution.

Whether there was ever serious popular enthusiasm anywhere for the Fertile Crescent maneuvers of political leaders is questionable. What mostly animated vocal commoners was independence from the West; political configuration took second place. By the time independence was finally vouchsafed, national particularisms had begun to entrench themselves, as the provisions of the Arab League wisely recognized. Nonetheless, and despite the self-seeking ambitions of rival leaders, Fertile Crescent unity may be seen as a genuine cause, even if the facts made it a lost one. Its revival in the 1990s cannot be excluded in the light of such possible developments as a reconciliation between Syria and Iraq, the disintegration of Lebanon, the weakening of Hashimite control in Jordan, and the ending of superpower confrontation with its divisive effects. Nevertheless, many of the original obstacles remain.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Allenby, Edmund Henry; Anglo–Iraqi Treaties; Antonius, George; Eden, Anthony; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Fertile Crescent; Hashimite House (House of Hashim); Husari, Sati al-; Jamali, Muhammad Fadhil al-; Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-; Lawrence, T. E.; League of Arab States; Nahhas, Mustafa al-; Ottoman Empire: Overview; Saʿada, Antun; Syrian Social Nationalist Party; Zaʿim, Husni al-.

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FES, TREATY OF (1912)

Document providing for the establishment of the French protectorate over Morocco, initialed in Fez, 30 March 1912.

The signers to the Treaty of Fes (also known as the Treaty of Fez) met in Morocco—Eugene Regnault, France's representative in Tangier had negotiated the treaty with the sultan, Mulay Abd al-Hafid. In addition to clauses that accorded Spain control over

the Atlantic coastal zone plus the enclaves of Melilla, Ceuta, and Ifni and that established Tangier as an international city, the treaty spoke of "a new regime" in Morocco based on those "administrative, judicial, educational, financial and military reforms which the French Government judged were necessary to introduce into the territory of Morocco." The treaty also provided for the safeguarding of the "traditional prestige of the sultan [and] the exercise of the Muslim faith."

Only a few weeks later, Abd al-Hafid was forced to abdicate by the new French colonial governor Louis-Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey—in favor of his more malleable brother Mulay Yusuf.

The signing of the treaty was the culmination of at least a half century of diplomatic maneuvering to take over Morocco by France, Britain, Spain, and Germany, with other nations including the United States standing by. Since the eighteenth century, systematic piracy and kidnapping had occurred in the Mediterranean, sponsored by corsairs and rulers of the so-called Barbary coast; European and American ships and cargoes were taken and Christian sailors and passengers sold into slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Africa. In the early nineteenth century, the almost unassailable Barbary States were subdued and opened to European concessions. The lure in Morocco became important mineral resources (mainly phosphates). Within Morocco, decades of political fragmentation had left the Alawi sultanate all the more vulnerable to European pressures. By the late nineteenth century, in fact, the rivalry between the Western nations was probably all that allowed Morocco to remain independent.

The first of several crises leading to the Treaty of Fes erupted with the signing of the Franco–British agreement of 1904 in which, in effect, France was given free rein in Morocco in exchange for its support of British imperialism in Egypt. The agreement met with opposition from Germany, which had important commercial interests in Morocco. Tensions between the three nations led to the convening of the Algeciras Conference in January 1906 and the Act of Algeciras in April of that year. The act provided for international supervision over Morocco and, specifically, for French and Spanish control over Moroccan ports, police, and commercial affairs; it sparked off acts of protest and

Representatives of France and Spain sign the Treaty of Fes, which established Morocco as a protectorate of Spain. The treaty ended many years of contention among European countries over the territory. **© HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

violence against Europeans and European interests within Morocco. French and Spanish troops were sent in on the pretext of preserving order, and through 1907 the French gradually extended their military presence. The reigning Moroccan ruler Abd al-Aziz was forced out of office by his brother Abd al-Hafid, who was recognized in 1909 by the French after his acceptance of the Act of Algeciras.

From 1909 to 1911, French forces in the center and west of Morocco and the Spanish in the north expanded their areas of control. In protest, Moroccan tribal forces marched on the city of Fez against Abd al-Hafid, giving the French an excuse to seize both Meknes and Fez following their defeat of the tribes. German opposition, which peaked in a symbolic show of force off the Moroccan Atlantic coast in 1911, was defused with an agreement to cede portions of French-controlled Congo to German authority. The signing of the Treaty of Fes followed shortly thereafter. Insofar as French control over Morocco was concerned, however, the treaty was only the first step in a long and difficult campaign for consolidation and colonialism. Moroccan nationalism

eventually prevailed, however, when independence was declared in 1956.

See also Alawite Dynasty; Algeciras Conference (1906); Barbary States; Corsairs; Fez, Morocco; Lyautey, Louis-Hubert Gonzalve; Phosphates.

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Matthew S. Gordon

FEZ

See Clothing

FEZ ARAB SUMMIT

See Arab League Summits

FEZ, MOROCCO

Historical capital of Morocco.

Fez (Arabic, *Fas*), one of four Moroccan imperial cities, was a historical capital and the economic and cultural center. It declined under the French protectorate of 1912, when Rabat became the administrative capital; after World War II, French economic interests were shifted to Casablanca. Fez's prominence is partially due to its location at the juncture of two geographical axes—an East–West route from the Atlantic coast toward Algeria and points east; and the North–South route from the Mediterranean to the Sahara. The plenitude of water from the Fez River as well as numerous nearby springs, rich resources, and productive surrounding plains has encouraged settlement.

Fez was founded in 789 (172 A.H.) on the right bank of the Fez River by Idris ibn Abdallah, who died before his town could be developed. Twenty years later, Idris's son, Idris II, founded another town, al-Aliya, on the left bank of the river. The Berber and Arab population of Fez received a vital population infusion in the early ninth century when refugees from Andalusia (now Spain) arrived in 818 and settled the right bank. Families from Kairouan (Tunisia) settled the left bank around 825. The two rival sides of the city were united under the Almoravid dynasty, which, however, made Marrakech its capital. When the Marinids (c. 1258–1465) took power, Fez became their capital and remained the center of Moroccan political life even when Mulay Isma^cil made Meknes his capital and then under the French protectorate. The post–World War II shift from traditional products, leather, textiles, and handicrafts to the mining of phosphates and the export of agricultural produce lessened Fez's economic importance. It must be noted that the transshipment and trade city of Casablanca was developed by Fassi entrepreneurs who moved there with the shift of economic emphasis.

The modern city of Fez had two predecessors: Fas al-Bali, the old Arab city *(madina)* in the river valley; and Fas al-Jadid, the administrative complex built by the Marinids, which encompassed the royal palace, a military complex, the Jewish quarter *(mellah),* and a commercial district located on hills outside the ramparts to the west. The third city, modern Fez (Nouvelle Ville), was built in European style to the southwest of Fas al-Jadid, and its suburbs stretch out into the surrounding farmland. Fez traditionally housed an array of social and ethnic forces—Berbers, Arabs, Jews, *shurafa, murabits,* artisans, merchants, notables, and the poor. These groups often disputed among themselves and with the governments in power, which often made the city of Fez an independent political entity.

The historical monuments of Fez include the shrine of Idris I, the tomb complex of Idris II, the Qarawiyyin mosque, the Andalusian mosque, the Madrasa of the Attarin, Bou Inaniya Madrasa, and the monumental gates and city ramparts. The Qarawiyyin mosque and university, established in the tenth century by the Fatimids and enlarged by the Alamoravid Sultan Ali ibn Yusuf, became a center of Islamic science and one of the earliest universities ever established. Fez also houses the Sidi Muhammad ibn Abdullah University, established in 1974. Fez's narrow streets forced builders to accent vertical facades of public structures and private dwellings. The result in Fas al-Bali is a unique pub-

The Green Mosque sits centered in the city of Fez (Fes), in North Morocco. An important center for business and industry, Fez is located on the commercial roads, which join the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea with the South of Sahara. Fez, the famous felt hat, is named after this native city. © Karen Huntt Mason/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

lic architecture. Time and neglect have, however, taken a predictable toll. UNESCO has developed a project to renovate the rapidly decaying Fas al-Bali as an international historic site, but the project has, to date, been halted through lack of funds. Morocco's rapid population growth and the rural migration to urban centers has forced Fez's expansion into suburban residential areas and bidonvilles. According to 2002 figures, the province of Fez had a population of 1.5 million people.

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Donna Lee Bowen

FEZZAN

Former province of southwest Libya, with an area of about 213,000 square miles (340,800 sq km).

Fezzan was located south of the former province of Tripolitania, which bordered it approximately along the 30th parallel. The southern part of the former province of Cyrenaica lay to the east. Fezzan had international frontiers with Algeria to the west and with Chad and Niger to the south. The region's chief town and administrative center is Sebha, largely a twentieth-century creation; most other settlements have developed around small but long-established

Neolithic cave paintings of giraffes found on walls in Fezzan, Libya. Paintings resembling animal life that once lived in the Sahara can still be found in this area. © ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

oasis villages. Fezzan is now divided into Sebha, al-Shati, Awbari, Murzuq, Ghat, and al-Jufrah; combined population (1984 census) is some 214,000.

Fezzan is characterized by a series of east-west depressions over artesian waters and oases, some extensive. Widely scattered in the surrounding desert, these oases are the only settled areas. Along the southern and southwestern borders, the land rises toward the Ahaggar and Tibesti massifs of the central Sahara.

Fezzan is approximately one-third the distance from Tripoli to Lake Chad and, historically, has been a main artery for caravans between the Mediterranean Sea and central Africa. It has always had a certain Sudanic ethnic and cultural character. Its oases have traditionally provided shade, water, camels, and dates for caravans and, in the past—despite intermittent domination by Tripoli—derived modest prosperity as transshipment centers of the northbound slave trade and the southbound traffic in manufactured goods. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire imposed direct rule from Tripoli, and the Saharan trade prospered intermittently until its terminal decline at the century's end. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Fezzan became one of several centers of the Sanusi order.

Italy invaded Libya in 1911 and in 1914 briefly occupied Fezzan's main oases. The province was reconquered by Italy in 1929 and 1930 and was designated Territorio Militare del Sud (Southern Military Territory), administered from Hon. It had by then become a social and economic backwater, cut off from most traditional trade contacts. During World War II, Free French forces advancing from Chad in 1942 and 1943 expelled the Italians and set up a military administration closely linked with Algeria and Tunisia. Fezzan became one of the three constituent provinces of the United Kingdom of Libya declared independent in December 1951.

Although the poorest and least populous of Libya's three regions, Fezzan gained a certain cachet after the 1969 revolution, because the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, had been educated and conceived his revolution there. Since 1969, the infrastructure has been developed and attempts made to promote agriculture with abundant newly discovered water reserves, which are also being piped to northwest Libya. Crude oil has been found in the Murzuq Basin and large quantities of iron ore in the Wadi Shati, but commercial exploitation has been slow. The region still relies on northern Libya for most of its economic and social needs.

See also QADDAFI, MUAMMAR AL-; SANUSI ORDER.

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JOHN L. WRIGHT

FIDA'IYYUN

Guerrillas or commandos.

Although the Arabic term *fidaʾiyyun* or *fidaʾiyyin* ("those who sacrifice themselves") is usually associated with modern military operations, it has its roots in me-

dieval Islamic concepts. The Hashashiyyun (Assassin) sects of Ismaʿili Shiʿism, a branch of Islam, were early fighters who conducted guerrilla warfare and developed a clandestine organizational structure. More recently, various groups have referred to themselves as *fidaʾiyyun.* Examples include the Young Turk revolutionaries of the early twentieth century and Iranian groups such as the Feda'iyan-e Islam.

Since the 1960s, the term has come to refer to Palestinian guerrillas conducting sabotage, terrorism, and other military operations against Israeli, and sometimes Arab, targets. After the Arabs' defeat in the Arab–Israel War of 1967, the Palestinian commando groups took charge of the movement to liberate Palestine. The fidaʾiyyun first came to prominence after their participation in the defeat of Israel's troops at the battle of Karama in Jordan in 1968, despite the fact that they were vastly outnumbered. Other events, such as Jordan's civil war (1970–1971), dubbed Black September by the Palestinians, along with a series of Palestinian attacks in Israel, the Arab world, and Europe, established the fidaʾiyyun as actors on the international political stage.

Although most factions in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) have moved away from commando activities, the term fidaʾiyyun is still used. Radical followers of Islamic groups such as the Islamic Resistance Movement, HAMAS, and Islamic Jihad, operating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, consider themselves fidaʾiyyun. HAMAS's military components are called the Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades, named after the man whom many Palestinians consider the first Palestinian guerrilla. Qassam was killed in 1935, during a battle with British forces in Palestine. In the 1990s and early 2000s, both groups conducted guerrilla operations and terrorism (including suicide bombings) against Israeli military targets and civilians in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel, killing hundreds of Israelis.

See also Black September; Fedaʾiyan-e Islam; Fedaʾiyan-e Khalq; Hamas; Islamic Jihad; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

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FILASTIN

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

FILM

Film industry of the Middle East.

The film industry of the Middle East has flourished and prospered over the past century, producing a number of world-renowned auteurs despite internal opposition, political strife, strong government control of the industry in various Middle Eastern countries, and often a lack of decent equipment. Middle Eastern films have become some of the leading artistic influences in world cinema.

The ruling classes in Iran and Turkey early on were curious about the moving image. Moving pictures were viewed in the Turkish sultan's court soon

Iranian director Abbas Kiarostami and actress Mania Akbari attend a film screening at the Cannes Film Festival in 2002. Kiarostami, one of the country's most well-known directors, first garnered notice in the 1970s as he battled political censorship to produce skillful, thought-provoking films. **© AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.**

A movie theatre in Baghdad. Iraq's film industry, which flourished until the country's 1958 revolution, was severely inhibited under the Baʿth Party. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

after the Lumière brothers' first public showing of a film in France, in 1895, followed by a public screening in 1897. Iran followed suit in 1900 when Mirza Ebrahim Akkas-Bashi, a photographer in the court of Mozaffar al-Din Qajar, the fifth Qajar ruler, purchased film equipment in France, shot footage, and projected it for the Iranian royal court. Film was introduced to the public shortly after with the opening of the first public cinema, only to be met with disfavor by the religious clergy. In 1931 the first Iranian feature film, *Abi o Rabi* (Abi and Rabi), was shot. In 1933 the first Persian talkie, *Dokhtar-e Lor* (The Lor girl), was also the first non-Western commercial success.

Meanwhile, in Turkey, film production was introduced during World War I and was the near-exclusive domain of the Turkish army from that period until just before the founding of the Turkish republic in 1923. The country's first features, *Pene* (The claw) and *Casus* (The spy), were made under the aegis of the Association for National Defense. In 1932 the government sought some control over the medium with the issuance of "Instructions Concerning the Control of Cinema." Censorship was thus institutionalized and has survived in various degrees since.

The first Arab film, *Gazelle Eye,* was shot in Tunis by a Tunisian, Shemama Chicly. In 1927 the stage actress Aziza Amir and the writer Wadad Orfy set up the first Arab Film Company in Cairo. Their first film, *Layla* (1927), made with an Egyptian producer, director, and cast, is the first Egyptian film. By the 1950s the Egyptian film industry was the most prolific in the region. The director Yusef Chahine, an innovator working in Cairo, began making films as early as 1953 and continues to this day.

By the 1950s the Middle East had many well-established film centers creating both entertainment films—especially musicals, such as Chahine's popular *Cairo Station* and others produced by Film Farsi in Iran—and more artistic, sociopolitical films highly influenced by the work of the Italian Neo-realists (such as Vittorio DeSica). The first real foray into social realism in Turkey was signaled by *Strike the Whore* (1949). In 1969 the Iranian director Daryush Mehrjui's *The Cow* critiqued the shah's modernization project through the tale of a villager and his only cow. The film was banned and not released in Iran until it won international recognition in foreign film festivals. Despite increased political censorship in Iran during the 1970s, a number of highly critical documentaries like Furugh Farokhzad's *The House Is Black,* and the works of Kamran Shirdel, Bahram Bayzai, Sohrab Shahid Saless, Parviz Kimiavi, Parviz Sayyad, Abbas Kiarostami, Amir Naderi, and Bahman Farmanara arrived on the scene.

In Turkey the military coup of May 1960 resulted in a new constitution and an era of free political and artistic expression that revitalized the film industry. Directors began to tackle the issues of women's rights, labor rights, and social injustice, and respected writers began to be drawn to scriptwriting. In 1974 Turkey entered the international award circuit with *The Bus.* Most recently Turkish directors, both those living in Turkey and in other countries, have been pioneers in the exploration of gender and sexuality with films like Ferzan Ozpetek's *Steam: The Turkish Bath* and Kutlug Ataman's film *Lola and Billy the Kid.*

The post-Revolutionary Iranian government placed a strong emphasis on film, initially to promote Islamic values and lifestyle. Today Iran has become one of the leading world cinemas. Despite censorship, Iran's most famous directors—Mohsen Makhmalbaf, Abbas Kiarostami, Rakshan Bani-Etemad, and Jafr Panahi—have created artistically beautiful and intellectually challenging films. They work mainly in a social realist vein, adapting elements of the French New Wave (as in the films of François Truffaut and Jean-Luc Godard) and Italian Neorealism. Collectively, they have created a genre known as the Iranian New Wave.

Arab cinema continues to gain international success. In the 1990s many Arab films reached world audiences, such as Moufida Tlatli's *Silences of the Palace,* Mohamed Khan's *The Dreams of Hind and Camilla* and *Supermarket,* Ziad Dowaitir's *West Beirut,* and Yusef Chahine's *Destiny.*

The first Israeli feature films were made in 1932–1933. After statehood in 1948, Israeli directors worked mainly in the genre of documentary films, dealing with the challenges faced by the new state. Baruch Dienar's *Tent City* dealt with the absorption of the massive number of immigrants from Europe and the Arab countries. Others examined the establishment of an army, reclamation of the desert, and kibbutz life; they depended on financing by the government, public institutions, and organizations. The earliest Israeli feature films accentuated the values of Zionism. Since the 1980s, many Israeli films have penetratingly faced the dilemmas raised by the Arab–Israel conflict.

Since the 1990s the work of a number of Palestinian directors has become internationally known. These films include Hany Abu-Assad's *Rana's Wedding,* Elia Suleiman's *Chronicle of a Disappearance* and *Divine Intervention,* and Michel Khleifi's *Wedding in Galilee.*

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FILS

See GLOSSARY

FIQH

Islamic jurisprudence.

Literally, *fiqh* means understanding; it refers to the study of the law in Islam and is usually defined in jurisprudence textbooks as the knowledge of the rights and duties whereby human beings are enabled to observe right conduct in this life and to prepare themselves for the world to come. Whereas *shariʿa* refers to the divine law itself, *fiqh* denotes the human interpretation of the divine commands; it constitutes the discipline of deriving and formulating positive law in a number of branches *(furu),* including worship *(ibadat),* contractual law *(muʿamalat),* criminal law *(taʿzir* and *hudud),* and family and personal law *(ahwal shakhsiyya).*

The discipline of *fiqh* relies on the process of interpreting positive law within a systematic body of rules and principles elaborated by the discipline of *usul al-fiqh* (principles of *fiqh*), which constitutes as such the methodology of the law. *Usul al-fiqh* identifies the legal indicators or sources from which the

law can be derived: the *nass* (textual sources; the Qurʾan and Sunna); *aql* or reason (expressed in *ijtihad,* individual reasoning); and *ijma,* (consensus.) The hierarchy and rules governing each of these are developed by *usul al-fiqh* along with the linguistic principles applicable in the legal criticism of the textual sources. *Usul al-fiqh* also categorizes the applicable legal norms (obligatory, recommended, permissible, reprehensible, and prohibited) and the declarative rules, as well as the principles regulating these. It defines the general legal principles that govern the goals and intent of the law *(maqasid al-shariʿa),* globally referred to as *maslaha* and defined as the promotion of public interest and exclusion of harm.

Although there is general agreement among the schools of law on the main principles of *usul al-fiqh,* differences exist on the legitimacy of some legal methods or sources, as for instance *istislah,* or *maslaha mursala,* in which law can be derived without reference to textual sources. Eventually, however, restrictions were introduced to reduce the possibility of arbitrariness and to legitimize these legal procedures.

The reform movements of the eighteenth century emphasized textual sources and turned away from consensus, which was considered to be the cause for the eventual lack of development in the law. The call by some contemporary jurists for the use of unrestricted *ijtihad* to resolve modern issues has caused tension and stalled attempts at reforming Islamic law. With the adoption of secular constitutions, most Muslim countries have stopped using *fiqh* except in the matter of family law.

See also SHARIʿA; SUNNA.

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MAYSAM J. AL-FARUQI

FISH AND FISHING

Fishing and fish consumption is found throughout the Middle East.

Fish is consumed locally throughout the Middle East in those areas that border bodies of water. The primary fishing sources are the Aegean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, and the Red Sea, as well as the Nile and other major rivers. Most fishing is done near the coasts or shore using small boats, although several governments have supported programs since the late 1980s to upgrade local fisheries. The only Middle East country with a major commercial fishing industry is Morocco, whose fishermen landed an average of 400,000 to 500,000 metric tons of fish annually during the 1990s. At least one-half of this catch is sardines, a fish that is canned, mainly for export. In fact, canned sardines constitute 50 percent of Morocco's food exports (primarily to the European Union) and up to 11 percent of its total overall exports in years when fish stocks are good and the annual catch high. But overfishing is a problem, as well as competition from foreign fishing vessels, especially those of Spain.

Iran and Tunisia also export small quantities of fish. Iran's main fish product export is the roe of the Caspian sturgeon, or caviar. Throughout the 1990s, the sturgeon catch annually declined due to overfishing by poachers in the Republic of Azerbaijan and Russia who were taking advantage of the lax enforcement of quotas in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Better sea patrols since 2000 have halted much of the poaching and helped fish stocks recover. In countries such as Oman, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, marine fishing contributes significantly to the local diet. In Egypt, the Nile River, rather than the nearby Mediterranean, is the major source of fish, providing two-thirds of the average annual 300,000 metric tons of fish caught in that country.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

FLAPAN, SIMHA

[1911–1987]

Israeli writer and peace activist.

Simha Flapan was a writer and peace activist who emigrated from Poland during the 1930s and be-

came national secretary of the leftist MAPAM Party and the director of its Arab Affairs department. MAPAM was the second largest party in the Knesset after the 1949 election. Flapan was one of a few Israeli writers who challenged the accepted interpretation of Israel's past. In books such as *Zionism and the Palestinians* (1979) and *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities* (1987), Flapan sought to challenge what he perceived to be historical myths, including that the Palestinian Arabs left their homes in 1948 on the urging of Arab leaders. In *The Birth of Israel,* Flapan wrote: "like most Israelis, I had always been under the influence of certain myths that had become accepted as historical truth" (p. 8). He concluded that it was Israeli policy in 1948 to force the Palestinians to flee. Israel saw itself as a victim of inhumane enemies, justifying unacceptable policies as policies of self-defense. Flapan was a critic of Israel's treatment of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and he served as editor of *New Outlook,* an Israeli publication that explored paths to peace in the Middle East.

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ZACHARY KARABELL
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FLY WHISK INCIDENT (1827)

Diplomatic cause célèbre of 1827 in which the Algerian ruler, Husayn Dey, struck the French consul, Pierre Deval, with a fly whisk.

The Fly Whisk Incident was caused by friction over Franco–Algerian business transactions dating from the late eighteenth century. In the 1790s, the French government customarily purchased Algerian wheat, most of it through two Jewish commercial families by the names of Busnach and Baqri. By the turn of the century, France owed these Algerian suppliers several million francs.

This debt remained outstanding at the time of Husayn's accession in 1818. It attracted his attention because both the Busnachs and the Baqris owed money to the Algerian government but insisted they could not afford to pay until they had recovered what was owed to them by France. When the French government arranged a financial settlement in 1820 that ignored the claims put forward by successive deys since 1802, Husayn concluded that France and his Jewish debtors had colluded to keep the money from him. In a further irritant to Franco–Algerian relations, the vice-consul at Bône fortified several French trading posts in eastern Algeria in 1825, in direct contravention of existing treaties. Despite Husayn's complaints, the French government took no steps to reprimand its officials.

These tensions exploded in a meeting between Deval and Husayn on 29 April 1827. In the consul's version of the event, the session rapidly degenerated into an exchange of insults culminating with the dey striking Deval three times with his fly whisk and ordering him from the room—an accusation Husayn did not refute but justified on the basis of crude comments made by the consul about Islam and Muslims. Enraged by Deval's behavior, the dey rejected the French government's demand for an apology.

In retaliation, French warships instituted a blockade of Algiers, which Husayn countered by ordering the destruction of French trading posts in the country. The confrontation dragged on for more than two years, but the dey, backed by the Ottoman sultan and encouraged by Great Britain's consul in Algiers, refused to yield. His own corsair captains proved adept at running the blockade, which proved far more damaging to the Marseilles merchants engaged in trans-Mediterranean commerce than to Algerians. By 1828, businessmen from the south of France had begun urging the government to undertake a campaign against Algiers that would restore trade to its previous level. When the dey responded to a French invitation to send a negotiating delegation to Paris in the summer of 1829 by firing on a French vessel, the pressures on the French government to mount an expedition to Algiers peaked. With liberal deputies challenging his power, King Charles X viewed such an undertaking as a means of reasserting royal prerogatives and providing a distraction from domestic issues. The decision to invade Algeria was announced in March; the fleet sailed in May; and Algiers fell in July.

Although the need to avenge the dey's insult gave the monarchy a dramatic issue upon which it seized

to rally popular support for an attack against Algeria, this contretemps was not as crucial a cause of the French invasion of Algeria as it has sometimes been portrayed. French commercial interests in North Africa and a last-ditch effort to shore up the monarchy by diverting public attention to an overseas adventure suggest that the encounter between Deval and Husayn was an excuse for, rather than the cause of, the events that followed.

See also ALGERIA: OVERVIEW; BAQRI FAMILY; BUSNACH FAMILY; CORSAIRS.

KENNETH J. PERKINS

FOOD

This entry consists of the following articles:

ASH
BAKLAVA
BOREK
BULGUR
CHELOW
COFFEE
COUSCOUS
DOLMA
FELAFEL
FUL
HUMMUS
KUFTA
MANSAF
MAZZA
MUHAMMARA
MUJADDARA
MULUKHIYYA
OLIVES
PILAF
SHASHILIK
SHAWARMA
SHISH KEBAB
TABBULA
TAHINA
TAJIN

ASH

Term for a traditional Persian stew.

Ash (thick soup) is made from different combinations of noodles, rice, vegetables, meat, and fruits, as well as yogurt and vinegar. Usually served hot, each specific ash derives its name from its main ingredient. Persian tradition has ascribed a specific ash for different occasions; for example, ash-e posht-e pa, which marks farewell ceremonies, is cooked to shorten the duration of the sojourn. According to Islamic ritual, acts of charity alleviate illness, and these acts are also accompanied by the preparation of some type of ash for distribution among the needy.

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NEGUIN YAVARI

BAKLAVA

A sweet pastry found throughout the Middle East.

Baklava is made with a filling of ground almond, pistachio, or walnut mixture bound with an egg white and sugar. The nut stuffing is layered with butter and wrapped in phyllo pastry. It is soaked in sugar syrup or honey flavored with rose water. Baklava is baked in several rows on large baking trays, then cut into triangles, quadrangles, or rhomboids. Baklava comes from the Turkish word for lozenge, originally a diamond shape.

CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT

BOREK

The name of a specialty pastry of Turkish or Balkan origin, served fried or baked.

The paper-thin pastry is rolled, then filled with savory flavored meat or cheese. The most popular boreks are usually thin and long, shaped like a cigarette, or square, resembling a cushion. Boreks are best taken with cocktails or as an appetizer.

CYRUS MOSHAVER

BULGUR

Cracked hard-wheat.

Bulgur is a parched and cracked hard-wheat (Triticum durum) food product, high in nutritional

value. The wheat kernels are boiled until soft and about to crack, then drained, sun-dried, and finally ground into fine or coarse particles. This process dissolves some of the vitamins and minerals in the bran; the water soaks into the endosperm, bringing the dissolved nutrients with it to the inside of the grain. Coarse bulgur is used in stews and pilaf, while fine bulgur is used in kibbeh and tabbouleh.

CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT

CHELOW

Chelow is a Persian-style steamed rice preparation.

Long-grain rice is soaked in cold water and drained. The rice is poured into boiling water and cooked for a few minutes, drained, and rinsed. The rice is then sauteed in butter and steamed in small amounts of water until done. Some cooks add saffron and yogurt.

CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT

COFFEE

A drink popular in the Middle East and worldwide.

The first mention of coffee appears to be from a tenth-century pharmacological work by the Persian physician Rhazes (Muhammad ibn Zakariyya al-Razi). The coffee bean (the seed from pods of the Coffea arabica tree) is believed to have originated in Ethiopia, traveling to Yemen by way of Arab trade routes. The Yemeni town of Maqha gave its name to a type of coffee, mocha. It had arrived in Mecca by 1511 when it was forbidden by the authorities, and by 1615 it had reached Venice. The popularity of coffee spread throughout the Islamic world, where it gave rise to the coffee houses that have enduring popularity in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Arabic or Turkish-style coffee is always prepared to order. The coffee beans are roasted in large frying pans and ground very fine. The ground coffee and water are brought to a gentle boil in small long-handled pots called rakweh. The coffee is poured into demitasse cups without handles. After the grounds have settled, the coffee is drunk without being stirred. Sugar, cardamom, orange-blossom water, rose water, or saffron may be added to the coffee during the brewing process. Coffee is always served as part of social interactions in the Middle East.

CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT

A young boy sells olives and canned goods in the market. Green and black olives are present in many Middle Eastern dishes, and olive oil is most frequently used in food preparation. **© OWEN FRANKEN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

COUSCOUS

A staple food of North Africa.

Couscous is the husked and crushed, but unground, semolina of hard wheat (Triticum durum), although the preparation of the same name can be made with barley, millet, sorghum, or corn. Semolina is the hard part of the grain of hard-wheat, which resists the grinding of the millstone. The word "couscous" derives from the Arabic word kaskasa, to pound small, but the word is also thought to derive from the Arabic name for the perforated earthenware steamer pot used in steaming the couscous, called a keskes in Arabic (couscousière in French). Another theory is based on onomatopoeia—from the sound of the steam rising in the couscousière. In any case, the Arabic word derives from a non-Arabic, probably Berber, word. Couscous is also the general name for all prepared dishes made from hard-wheat

Middle Eastern women prepare rice for their families. Some form of wheat or rice usually accompanies each meal. © DAVID TURNLEY/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

or other cereals. In fact, it would not be incorrect to call couscous a kind of pasta.

Couscous is a staple food in the Maghrib (North Africa). Hard-wheat couscous was probably invented by Arabs or Berbers in the twelfth century based on techniques possibly learned from Saharan Africans. This is suggested by Ibn Battuta's description of a millet couscous he ate in Mali in 1352. One of the first written references to couscous is in an anonymous thirteenth-century Hispano-Muslim cookery book, *Kitab al-Tabikh fi al-Maghrib wa al-Andalus*.

The Berbers call this food sekrou (or seksou), while it is known as maftul or mughrabiyya in the countries of the eastern Mediterranean and suksukaniyya in the Sudan. In Algeria it is called tha'am or kesksou. In Tunisia it is called keskesi. Very large couscous grains are called m'hammas, and very fine grains, usually used for sweet couscous dishes, are called mesfouf.

Couscous is processed from a fine and coarse grade of semolina. The fine grain affixes to the coarse grain by sprinkling water and salt by hand (although mechanization is used for mass production). The grains are rolled and rubbed with the palms and fingers until the desired size is formed. The couscous may be dried and stored, or it may be steamed over water or broth in a couscousière. Couscous is served in a pile on a large platter with meat, chicken, or fish and vegetables and spices. It is also served in bowls as a loose stew with similar ingredients included.

CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT

DOLMA

Stuffed vegetables.

Dolma are rice, meat, herb, and spice-stuffed vegetables found especially in Turkish cuisine but common to many Middle Eastern cuisines. The most popular vegetables for stuffing are zucchini, eggplant, peppers, tomatoes, and grape leaves.

CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT

FELAFEL

Ground beans with spices, fried.

Originally an Egyptian dish, felafel is today popular in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel as well. Traditionally, it is prepared with chickpeas ground into a paste and fried in oil, which is then served in pita bread with salad. Local variations include the use of other beans. In Egypt, felafel is also known as tamiyya.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

FUL

Fava-bean mash.

Ful mudammis, a mash of fava beans (the broad bean, a vetch, Vicia faba) is considered the Egypt-

ian national dish. There, it is often eaten with bread for breakfast. The peeled fava beans are soaked in water for a day, then covered with fresh water and simmered overnight with onion, some tomatoes, and red lentils, to control the color. Once the ful is cooked, it is salted and eaten plain or accompanied by olive oil, corn oil, butter, smen (clarified butter), buffalo milk, béchamel sauce, basturma (dried beef), fried eggs, tomato sauce, tahini (sesame-seed paste), or other ingredients.

CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT

HUMMUS

Middle Eastern dish of chickpeas, sesame seeds, and spices.

A staple food of Syria, hummus has become popular in Jordan and Israel as well as throughout America and Europe. It is a pureé of tahini, chickpeas, garlic, cumin, and lemon, often garnished with parsley and paprika. It is served with pita bread as an appetizer or a course unto itself.

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KUFTA

A meatball.

Kufta (also Kifta) is a ground meat, onion, parsley, and spice mixture popular in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and among Palestinians. The meat is molded around a skewer and then grilled. Kufta can also be baked or braised.

CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT

MANSAF

Popular Middle Eastern lamb dish.

A bedouin dish particularly popular in Jordan and Saudi Arabia. It is a combination of lamb and yogurt served with rice. Mansaf is often prepared at festivals or in honor of guests.

Spices, dried fruits, nuts, and seeds fill the bowls in Misir Carsisi (Egyptian, or Spice Market) in Istanbul. **© ROYALTY-FREE/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

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ZACHARY KARABELL

MAZZA

An assortment of foods served as appetizers, accompaniments to main dishes, or a complete meal.

A feature of Middle Eastern cuisine from Morocco to Persia, mazza is usually served with a beverage, and may be simple or elaborate. Typically, it consists of nuts, fresh vegetables and herbs, cheeses, salads and dips, savory pastries, and "miniature foods" (smaller versions of main dishes, including grilled meats, vegetable dishes, and beans).

JENAB TUTUNJI

MUHAMMARA

A Middle Eastern dip.

Made with walnuts and concentrated pomegranate juice, muhammara is seasoned with hot red pepper and cumin. It is a Syrian specialty commonly associated with the cuisine of Aleppo. It is served as an

appetizer, as part of a mazza, or as a condiment with a meat dish.

JENAB TUTUNJI

MUJADDARA

A lentil and rice dish.

Mujaddara, which traces its origins to medieval times, is considered the food of the poor because the ingredients are cheap and plentiful, and it does not contain meat. It is nevertheless a great favorite and occurs in many variations throughout the Middle East.

JENAB TUTUNJI

MULUKHIYYA

Arabic name for the plant called jew's mallow, the main ingredient of a popular Arab dish by the same name.

Mulukhiyya is prepared in two ways: the Lebanese, where the leaves are left whole and are cooked with stew meat, garlic, and dried coriander; and the Egyptian style, in which the finely chopped leaves are cooked with chicken, rice, vinegar, and finely chopped onion. Eating mulukhiyya is prohibited within the Druze community.

TAYEB EL-HIBRI

OLIVES

A staple of Middle Eastern cuisine.

Olives have been cultivated since ancient times, and both olives and olive oil constitute an important part of the diet in the Middle East. Olive trees grow in nonirrigated, rain-fed areas and bear fruit for generations. Green olives are cured in brine to extract the bitter taste, whereas black olives are cured by packing them in sea salt. Olive oil, pressed from green olives, is a staple in the Mediterranean area. In Arab cuisines, it is favored for frying vegetables and fish.

JENAB TUTUNJI

PILAF

A seasoned rice preparation.

Pilaf is a Persian and Turkish word denoting a rice dish boiled with meat and vegetables, seasoned with spices. But pilaf also means a way of cooking rice—knowing exactly the water-absorption capacity of the rice. In Turkish cuisine, pilaf is usually a side dish. In Persian cuisine, pilaf (pilow) is a main dish with other ingredients added to it. Pilaf is also made with bulgur in Turkey.

CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT

SHASHLIK

Grilled lamb on a skewer.

Shashlik is a Turkish dish of marinated lamb. The marinade usually consists of onions, olive oil, and paprika. The lamb is skewered and grilled and served with scallions.

CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT

SHAWARMA

A lamb-based meatloaf sold by street vendors and in restaurants.

Shawarma is a popular Levantine Arab specialty. A combination of lean and fatty sliced or ground lamb is seasoned with onion, garlic, allspice, cinnamon, coriander, or other ingredients and molded in conical form around a large skewer that is adjusted to a vertical rotisserie. The outside becomes crusty brown as it cooks, is sliced off and wrapped in flat bread and served with chopped onions, tomatoes, and cucumber-yogurt sauce. Shawarma is also popular in Greece and Turkey where it is called gyro and döner kebab, respectively. Shawarma is sold by street vendors and restaurants but rarely made at home.

CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT

SHISH KEBAB

Meat roasted over open fires on skewers.

The origin of shish kebab is lost in antiquity, but given the swordlike skewers so common in the Middle East, it probably originated with Turkish horsemen cooking wild game over open fires. In Turkish, shish kebab means "gobbets of meat roasted on a

spit or skewer"; the Arabs call it lahm mishwi, grilled lamb.

The threading of vegetables—onions, mushrooms, tomatoes, and peppers—onto the skewer, interspersed with meat, appears to be a modern restaurant introduction.

CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT

TABBULA

Salad made with bulgur (cracked wheat), chopped fresh parsley, scallions, mint, and tomatoes, and dressed with salt, pepper, olive oil, and lemon.

Since tabbula is always made with fresh, in-season vegetables, it is commonly served as part of mazza during the summer or is eaten with fresh lettuce, cabbage, or vine leaves. Although the Lebanese are credited with perfecting the most popular version of tabbula, the idea for incorporating bulgur in a salad may have originated with the Turks.

JENAB TUTUNJI

TAHINA

Sesame seed paste.

One of the basic ingredients of Middle Eastern food, tahina is an oily paste made from crushed sesame seeds. It is used in a variety of foods such as hummus and babaghanush as well as on its own as a condiment. Tahina is also popular in Israel.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

TAJIN

Moroccan earthenware casserole pot; Tunisian stuffed omelette.

Tajin is the name of an earthenware casserole with a conical top lid used in Morocco to make a variety of stews known by the same name. Meat and vegetables are simmered for a long time until the meat is soft and the stew aromatic. Touajen (plural of

A young boy balances a tray of simit bread on his head. This delicious bagel-like bread is coated with sesame seeds. **© OWEN FRANKEN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

tajin) are flavored with cumin, harissa, coriander, caraway, paprika, and other spices.

In Tunisia, a tajin is an entirely different dish, a variety of stuffed omelette similar to the Spanish (but not the Mexican) tortilla.

CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT

FOREIGN OFFICE, GREAT BRITAIN

The Foreign Office leads the conduct of British international relations.

Occupying a palatial building in London since the mid-nineteenth century, the Foreign Office is linked with the world by modern communications technologies. The Foreign Office is led by a British

politician whose power depends on the prime minister, cabinet, and party. The foreign secretary relies on the information and advice he receives from the permanent undersecretary and his staff. The foreign secretary must sell British policy to parliament and the media at home as well as to diverse regimes and public opinions abroad.

Foreign policy has pivoted less upon events and relations in the Middle East and North Africa than upon maintaining Britain's ties to the great powers of Europe and, since World War II, the United States. As foreign secretary and prime minister for over two decades, from the 1830s to the 1860s, Lord Palmerston (Henry John Temple) saw the Ottoman and Qajar Empires as buffers against the Asiatic expansion of Russia, while the defense of India concerned him less than maintaining the balance of power in Europe. Benjamin Disraeli backed the "good ol' Turk" but increased the British presence in the eastern Mediterranean, particularly at the Suez Canal. To counter Germany, Edward Grey's concessions to France in North Africa and Russia in Persia alienated the Young Turks, who joined Germany in World War I. A. J. Balfour's declaration to the Zionists late in 1917 put the Jews of America, Europe, and Russia before the Arabs of the Middle East. George Nathaniel Curzon limited his Middle Eastern ambitions because of diplomatic pressures and Turkish nationalism. Anthony Eden, the only foreign secretary trained as an Orientalist, relied on Arab collaborative regimes before and during World War II, after which Ernest Bevin tried to put people before pashas. Since the Suez Crisis in 1956, when Britain's secret alliance with France and Israel against Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser infuriated the United States, the British Foreign Office has mostly followed the U.S. lead in the Middle East and North Africa.

See also BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917); BEVIN, ERNEST; EDEN, ANTHONY; PALMERSTON, LORD HENRY JOHN TEMPLE.

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ROGER ADELSON

FORQAN

A secret religious group responsible for the deaths in early 1979 of a number of prominent figures in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

This group took its name from its journal *Forqan* (Sacred Book), published intermittently from 1977 until 1979. Describing itself as the "true followers" of the Qurʾan and Ali Shariʿati, Forqan called for an "Islam without mollahs" and denounced the regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as a reactionary and clerical dictatorship that had betrayed the principles of egalitarian Islam. The group's leaders, former seminary students, also denounced liberals, such as Premier Mahdi Bazargan, as "bazaar intellectuals." In addition to being a radical and anticlerical group, Forqan was also highly antileftist, denouncing Marxism as an international atheistic conspiracy that was engaged in scheming to dominate the Muslim world. A series of executions in mid-1979 decimated the group.

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN

FORUGHI, MIRZA MOHAMMAD ALI KHAN ZAKA AL-MOLK

[1877–1942]

Iranian politician.

Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan Zaka al-Molk Foroughi was the son of Mirza Mohammad Hoseyn Khan Zaka al-Molk. Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan inherited the title Zaka al-Molk from his father upon the latter's death in 1908. Originally Iraqi Jews, his family had migrated to Iran and settled in the old quarter of Isfahan. He was elected to the parliament several times, and in 1911 was appointed minister of finance, then head of the supreme court. In 1915, he was named minister of justice and after that served four times as prime minister, finally resigning in 1935. His last appointment as minister of court came in 1942, the same year that he died.

See also ISFAHAN.

NEGUIN YAVARI

FORUM

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

FOUCAULD, CHARLES EUGÈNE DE

[1858–1916]

French soldier, explorer, and ascetic.

Born in Strasbourg, France, to a famous aristocratic family, Charles Eugène de Foucauld was a graduate of Saint-Cyr (1876) who led a frivolous life until his assignment to North Africa. Fascinated by the Maghrib (North Africa), Foucauld left his army career and explored Morocco and the Sahara disguised as the servant of a rabbi. This resulted in his book titled *Reconnaissance au Maroc, 1883–84.* Foucauld gained a deep appreciation of Islam, asceticism, and spirituality, which led to his entering a Trappist monastery (Christian) to begin a life of contemplation. He later left the Trappists but was ordained a priest in 1901.

Returning to North Africa, Foucauld set up a hermitage in Béni Abbès, Algeria, and in 1905 moved to what became his famous retreat at Assekrem in the desolate Ahaggar (Hoggar) mountains near Tamanrasset. While he failed to convert Twareg tribesmen to Christianity, he produced a significant ethnographic contribution—a dictionary of their language, Tamahak. Although respected by neighboring Twareg, marauders murdered the priest who had pursued an inspiring spiritual mission while symbolizing a French presence in the deep Sahara.

See also TWAREG.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

FOURTH SHORE, THE

Italy's Fourth Shore (Quarta Sponda) became a key element in the propaganda of Italy's colonialist opinion formers at the start of twentieth century.

The term *Fourth Shore* implied that Italy needed an overseas colonial extension along the North African Mediterranean that would partner its other three—the Adriatic, Tyrrhenian, and Sicilian. It also reflected the growing concern in Italy, in the wake of the Risorgimento of the 1860s, to re-create the splendor of the classical Roman Empire, with Libya as its jewel (after Italy was prevented from annexing Tunisia by France's occupation of that country in 1881).

Once Libya had been conquered—officially by January 1932—Mussolini's Fascist policy toward Libya put the concepts of the Fourth Shore into practice. Libya's supposed agricultural potential was to be realized by the immigration of Italy's excess peasant population from the *mezzogiorno* (the South). After an effective infrastructure would be created, Libya was to become an extension of the Italian mainland itself. This would guarantee Italy's strategic security and make it into a power in North Africa, alongside France and Spain.

Fascist ideology promoted individual family farm units through state-sponsored schemes. Libyans were to become economic collaborators and coparticipants in this process; they were to be transformed into Muslim Italians, as Italy, after 1937, sought to become "Protector of Islam," in Mussolini's words.

See also ITALY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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GEORGE JOFFE

FRANCE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The centuries-old relations between the French and the peoples of the Middle East have been replete with confrontations and contradictions.

Constituents of a Mediterranean world encompassing the Mashriq and the Maghrib, the geographic proximity of the French and the peoples of the Middle East has helped sustain both their affinities and their animosities. In war as in peace, they have had to deal with the problems, as well as the opportunities, of economic life. Some of the ambiguous features of their relationship have derived from their collective links to frequently discordant Greco-Roman, biblical, and Islamic traditions and to no less problematic modern ideologies of social change and nation building. In whatever combination of identities—whether religious, as, for example, Roman Catholic on the one hand, and Muslim, Eastern Christian, or Jewish on the other, or secular, as, for example, French on the one hand, and

French soldiers on a ship set for Gallipoli (ca. 1914) to participate in the Allies' disastrous military campaign—the battle between Allied and Turkish forces for access to the Sea of Marmora at the Gallipoli Peninsula. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Ottoman, Turkish, Arab, or Israeli on the other—their encounters have been marked by a bittersweet interaction of words and deeds. Negative images of the "other" have been more often in evidence, particularly on the part of the French, than mutual displays of consideration or acknowledgements of collective achievement.

France's contentious presence in the modern Middle East was shaped in part by distinctive percolations of change among the Western powers. The forces of modernity, which advantaged the West before other parts of the world, enabled the French, as one of Europe's great powers, to exercise an intrusive, frequently aggressive imperialist presence in various parts of the Middle East from Syria to Morocco. France itself, however, suffered from constraining imbalances in the modern reconfigurations of power that left it at a disadvantage when confronting rival intrusive presences in the region—Britain's for much of the period, Germany's before and during the two world wars, and that of the United States during and after World War II.

The history of France's involvement with the peoples of the Middle East was also determined by the different ways in which they responded to the challenges of modernization. In some cases, the peoples of the Middle East sought to remove the intrusive features of French influence, as was the case with the Ottoman Empire and Turkey by 1923 and with Egypt by 1956; in others, they sought to secure their independence from French occupation, as in Syria and Lebanon by 1945–1946, in the North African states of Tunisia and Morocco by 1956, and in Algeria by 1962. Their national movements and modernizing administrative polities were shaped by internally developed and externally induced changes. The character of French relations with the relatively unconstrained nineteenth-century Ottoman reformers and their twentieth-century Turkish successors thus differed significantly from their relations with the more dependent mid-nineteenth-century viceroys of Egypt. These, in turn, differed from France's relations with the disfranchised Arab politicians of French-mandated Syria during the 1920s and 1930s and with Algeria's revolutionary leaders struggling for independence in the 1950s and early 1960s.

French Entry into the Middle East

Antithetical undercurrents were never far below the surface in the modern history of Franco–Middle Eastern relations. While the Franks of the Middle Ages had vigorously embraced Europe's Roman Catholic Crusades against the Muslims, sixteenth-century France recognized the strategic usefulness of friendly relations with the Ottomans as a counterweight to the Hapsburgs. The French subsequently developed a commercial preeminence in the Mediterranean over much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the Ottomans were increasingly drawn into the European-dominated world economy. Expatriate French merchant communities in the Mashriq, the region they called the Levant, traded under the umbrella of the capitulations, France having been among the first to enjoy this Ottoman assignment of extraterritorial juridical status to resident foreigners. Yet, the French offset the Muslim policy that had brought them closer to former enemies with a preclusive Roman Catholic policy that harnessed their good relations with the Ottomans to the development of a religious protectorate in the empire, favoring the work of proselytizing Roman Catholic missionaries. By the nineteenth century, the most important corollary to this policy

A French military convoy moves through a street in Algiers, the capital of Algeria. © MARC GARANGER/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

had become their informal, but nevertheless real, support for the political autonomy of the Roman Catholic community of Maronites in Ottoman Lebanon.

The Ottomans, for their part, had assigned less importance to these contacts with France until the eighteenth century when modernizing changes began to attract the interest of reformers concerned with the fate of the receding empire. Sultan Selim III, the beginning of whose reign in 1789 coincided with the outbreak of the French Revolution, did not allow the problem of regicide in Europe to distract him unduly from applying, with the help of French advisers, the lessons of the French military sciences to some of the reforms he attempted to introduce. The sultan's friendship with the French, however, failed to prevent Napoléon Bonaparte from trying in 1798 to gain an advantage in Europe's revolutionary wars by means of a grandiose and abortive scheme pegged to the occupation of the Ottoman province of Egypt, which came to be considered a strategic key to hegemony in the East. In the same vein, by the time the occupation ended in 1802, France had alienated the Egyptians. Their experience was such that French administration, development projects, and scientific advances did not outweigh the adverse effects of the military invasion, or of the political opportunism, cultural arrogance, and colonial aims underlying the occupation. This proved to be an early example of the kind of power relationship that undermined French claims to the exercise of a civilizing mission.

The antithetical features of French interaction with the peoples of the Middle East remained generally pervasive. On the one hand, the history of France's contribution to the betterment of the human condition ensured that accounts of its progressive ideas and sociopolitical experiences received frequent and attentive hearings in the debates on reform that engaged the leading Middle Eastern ad-

vocates of change, to many of whom French became a second language. On the other hand, France's imperial interests frequently ran counter to reforms based on the very principles to which the French so eloquently laid claim. The French were not above combining sound investments in Middle Eastern economies with political support for speculative cupidity. As self-interested players in the so-called nineteenth-century Eastern Question, they not only helped to petrify the extraterritorial privileges they enjoyed, and to encourage continued foreign administration of the public debts in which they had invested, but they also participated in the consolidation of imperial spheres of influence in the Middle East.

British Influence on French Policy

The history of French influence in the Middle East was further complicated by unrelenting Anglo–French rivalries. Britain's industrial advantages, combined with the naval superiority it had acquired in the Mediterranean during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, limited France's strategic options and commercial opportunities. Overtaken by Britain at the Sublime Porte, the French tried to refocus their interest during the 1820s and 1830s on links with Muhammad Ali Pasha, the independent-minded and expansionist Ottoman governor of Egypt. They were unwilling, however, to risk a European conflagration by coming to the pasha's assistance in 1840, when Britain and the concert of Europe curtailed his power during the second Syrian war. They reconciled themselves instead to falling back for influence in the Levant on their links with the Maronites of Mount Lebanon, who continued to respond best, though to a narrowly focused Roman Catholic policy. During the nearly two decades of Napoléon III's second empire, and in the aftermath of France's participation in the Crimean War on the side of the Ottomans, French influence among the Maronites equaled that of Britain. During this period the two powers cooperated in an imaginative resolution to the civil strife that had broken out in Lebanon in 1860. In Egypt, France even won an advantage at this time by working for the construction of the Suez Canal. Thereafter, however, three debilitating wars with Germany between 1870 and 1945 left the French at a lasting disadvantage. They had their eyes firmly fixed across the Rhine in 1882 when they failed to act with the British in Egypt, thereby forfeiting to Britain the base from which it was better able to develop its lead.

The French, having once more returned to reinforcing their links with the Maronites after 1870, were subsequently able to use Mount Lebanon as a stepping-stone to a sphere of influence in the Ottoman Empire's Syrian regions. Nevertheless, they secured only a Pyrrhic victory there in the aftermath of World War I and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. For one thing, partitioning the empire ran counter to the not inconsiderable capital investments they had made during the later part of the nineteenth century in its overall development. For another, their Roman Catholic policy limited the influence they were able to exercise in Syria and Lebanon over Muslim and non-Roman Catholic Christian constituencies upon whose acquiescence they were dependent. Franco–British alliances in the two world wars did not substantially affect this unfavorable equation. After World War I, Britain limited the imperial expansion of the French to the Lebanese and Syrian mandates, denying them the role in Palestine and the Mosul region that they had been led to expect from the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916. By the end of World War II, Britain, backed by the United States, which was even less tolerant of French imperial claims, helped the Lebanese and the Syrians to exclude France altogether from the Levant.

Waning French Influence in the Twentieth Century

In the aftermath of the war, the French were peripherally involved in the question of Palestine and the Zionists as this problem developed into the Arab–Israel conflict that more directly affected Britain and the United States. Frequently criticized for their failings in the Middle East, the French rarely denied themselves the opportunity to embarrass their "allies" by taking the high ground in their assessments of the problem. French involvement with Zionism, however, reflected their ambiguous relationship to the Jew as "other." This relationship had traversed the spectrum from the offer of assimilation and French citizenship at the time of the French Revolution, to threats of rejection in the turn-of-the-century Dreyfus Affair, to denial of protection against Nazi Germany by Vichy France during World War II. French opportunism, how-

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) offers pardon to the leaders of the resisting Arabs in Cairo, Egypt, during the Egyptian Campaign.
© BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ever, was such that France secretly armed and courted Israel for assistance when, for the last time, it joined Britain as a principal actor in the Middle East in the ill-conceived Suez expedition of 1956, a century after the two had concluded the Crimean War as equal partners. Together they made a futile attempt not only to turn the clock back and humiliate Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser, the symbol of changes in an Arab world they could no longer control, but also to belie the lesser roles assigned them in the new global superpower rivalries of the cold war.

The French had embraced the Suez adventure primarily in the hope of stemming the tide of Arab independence, which had surfaced with revolutionary ardor in 1954 in Algeria, their only remaining North African possession. Their occupation of that region of the Maghrib had begun in 1830 when an opportunist French government swept away the autonomous Ottoman administration of the city of Algiers, whose tradition of privateering had alienated what was then international opinion, and with whom commercial cupidity had brought the French in dispute. Sometime after they completed the conquest of Algeria, a combination of imperialist pressures and the nineteenth-century scramble for African territories encouraged the French to flank it with a protectorate over Tunisia in 1881 and another over Morocco in 1912.

Collapse of French Imperialism and Its Aftermath

France's more pervasive domination of North Africa, and the colonization that accompanied it, particularly in Algeria, meant that the French encounter

with the peoples of the Middle East was more deeply experienced in the Maghrib than in the Levant. The conquest of the Algerian interior spanned four decades of intermittent campaigning against the resistance of its Muslim Arab and Berber inhabitants. They underwent a more painful and less rewarding experience than that of the Egyptians earlier in the century. The extensive destabilization of their traditional societies eased the way for colonists who were as repressive of the rights of the indigenous majority as they were determined to safeguard their own exclusive rights as French citizens by attaching the most productive region of Algeria to metropolitan France. Always active in French politics, the colons resisted a number of imaginative projects that might have helped them build up a working relationship with their Arab and Berber neighbors. Not surprisingly, after Charles de Gaulle's Fifth Republic wound up the Algerian War in 1962, the whole colon community beat a headlong retreat to France.

The idea of carrying on a bilingual cultural dialogue to find ways of accommodating Islamic and French sociopolitical conduct was more welcome to Tunisian and Moroccan reformers, both before and after the French occupation. They were attracted to accommodation as a way of both assimilating modernizing changes on their own terms and equipping themselves to deal with the French in their midst. The antithetical features of French influence were such, though, that the latter, belittling the validity of compromises with the "other," were generally reluctant to make the necessary concessions in terms of either association or assimilation. The differences between what the French imperialists practiced and what France's social conscience preached did little to smooth the way for modernizing changes in the Maghrib and France; rather, they overburdened the process. In order to move forward and to overcome the impeding French presence, the North Africans pursued costly struggles for independence, while France only recognized their independence in the 1950s and early 1960s after suffering the consequences of its own failures, first in the Indo–Chinese War and then in the Algerian War.

French influence and the problems of working out an accommodation with the "other" did not disappear with the demise of the French empire in the Middle East and North Africa. France and the peoples of these regions continue as long-standing neighbors in the coalescing global village of the twenty-first century, where the management of changes has become an even greater challenge, and where socioeconomic and political developments have a more immediate ripple effect. France's cultural and socioeconomic experiences have been directed toward European union, while those of the Middle East and North Africa have been directed toward revolution, dictatorship, reexamination of fundamental beliefs, and, in the case of Lebanon, which has been overcome by the magnitude of the problems facing it, civil war. In a world of permeable frontiers, differences in the felicity of these two experiences have resulted in the reverse flow of a substantial number of Middle Eastern and North African immigrants to France. Their communal presence there—the result of France's encounter with the people of those regions—has brought home to French society, as never before, the problem of accommodating the "other," a challenge that has been carried over to twenty-first-century France, as much as the problem of reconciling French-inspired changes to their own traditions has been carried over to the twenty-first-century Middle East and North Africa.

See also Algerian War of Independence; Bonaparte, Napoléon; Capitulations; Colons; Crimean War; De Gaulle, Charles; Dreyfus Affair; Eastern Question; Maghrib; Maronites; Muhammad Ali; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Selim III; Sublime Porte; Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916).

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JOHN P. SPAGNOLO

FRANCO–TUNISIAN CONVENTIONS

Agreements in which France stipulated the nature of autonomy it was granting Tunisia.

Spurred by the Neo-Destour Party of Habib Bourguiba, the Tunisian independence movement gathered steam in the early 1950s. After initial resistance, the French finally conceded Tunisia's right to autonomy in July 1954 when Premier Pierre Mendès-France made a historic announcement to that effect in Carthage, Tunisia. Toward the end of that year, Bourguiba was released from prison and entered into negotiations with the French. On 3 June 1955 the Franco–Tunisian Conventions were signed between Bourguiba and the French, stipulating the nature of Tunisian autonomy. Bourguiba's opponents, however, most notably Salah Ben Yousouf, denounced the conventions for not granting independence to Tunisia. Though the Neo-Destour-controlled Congress endorsed the conventions, when France announced its intent to allow Morocco to become independent in the November 1955 Declaration of La Celle St. Cloud, the conventions came under renewed fire in Tunisia. After considerable pressure, France conceded, and Tunisia became independent in March 1956.

See also BEN YOUSOUF, SALAH; BOURGUIBA, HABIB; DECLARATION OF LA CELLE ST. CLOUD.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

FRANJIYYA FAMILY

Prominent political family of Lebanon.

The Franjiyyas (also Frangiehs) are Maronite Christians from Zgharta, in northern Lebanon, who have dominated the region politically. Several of their members became important politicians in the twentieth century. Hamid (1907/1908?–1981), the elder brother of Sulayman Franjiyya, was the family's initial political leader who became a longtime parliamentarian and government minister, beginning in the late 1930s, until he suffered a stroke in 1957. Tony (Antoine; 1942–1978) was the only son and heir apparent of Sulayman. He headed the family's al-Marada militia and served as a government minister from 1973 to 1975. The Franjiyyas opposed the Phalange party's Bashir Jumayyil and his attempt to control all Christian militias in Lebanon. As a result, Jumayyil's forces attacked Tony's home in Ihdin in May 1978, killing him, his wife, his infant daughter, and over two dozen other people. Sulayman (1964–). Tony's son first expressed political ambitions as a youth in the mid-1980s. In 1990, he took control of the al-Marada from his uncle Robert. He became the family's political patriarch upon his grandfather's death in 1992. Sulayman first served in the parliament in 1991 and has served in several cabinet positions beginning in 1990.

See also FRANJIYYA, SULAYMAN; JUMAYYIL, BASHIR; PHALANGE.

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

FRANJIYYA, SULAYMAN

[1910–1992]

President of Lebanon, 1970–1976.

Sulayman Franjiyya (also Frangieh), born in 1910, was the political leader of to the Franjiyyas, an influential Maronite family of northern Lebanon. His presidential term is associated with the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war of 1975. He was not initially slated to represent the Franjiyya family in politics. His brother, Hamid Franjiyya, was the political leader of the family; after Hamid suffered a stroke in 1957, Sulayman was chosen as his successor. Unlike his brother, Sulayman was an uneducated

"tough guy" who resorted to violence when it served his family's political interests. He was associated with bloodshed in northern Lebanon that targeted supporters of rival families. To avoid arrest, he fled to Syria where he established contacts with the Asad family that he later utilized.

Franjiyya served in Parliament throughout the 1960s and was active in the centrist (Wasat) bloc, which comprised opponents of the Chehab era. He also held various ministerial positions. He was elected president in 1970 by a one-vote margin. During his administration the Middle East was radicalized, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) relocated from Jordan to Lebanon after the 1970 Black September clash between Jordanian troops and PLO forces. Franjiyya strongly opposed the presence of armed Palestinians in Lebanon and authorized Lebanon's army to train and give weapons to members of right-wing militias. He aligned himself with the government of Syria for the duration of the Lebanese civil war. He broke off his alliance with Maronite-oriented parties and groups in 1978, when his son, Tony Franjiyya, was killed by gunmen loyal to the Lebanese Forces.

See also Franjiyya Family; Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanese Forces.

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As'ad AbuKhalil
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

FREEDOM MOVEMENT (NEZHAT-E AZADI IRAN)

Islamic nationalist party.

The Freedom Movement of Iran, a splinter group of the Second National Front, was formed in 1961 by Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, Mehdi Bazargan, and Yadollah Sahabi. The new group's primary appeal was to religious technocrats and modernists, and it had strong ties to the bazaar. The founders had been active in the National Front since the late 1940s, but they sought a plausible Islamic alternative to that movement's secular nationalism. After the June 1963 uprisings in Qom and other cities in response to the arrest of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Freedom Movement leaders were imprisoned by the government of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. However, their cooperation with Khomeini continued even after the shah sent the ayatollah into foreign exile. This history of working together contributed to the effectiveness with which the Freedom Movement and Khomeini's network of former seminary students jointly organized mass anti-shah demonstrations during the Iranian Revolution of 1978 through 1979. Even before the final victory of the revolution, Khomeini used his authority as its leader to designate the Freedom Movement's head, Bazargan, to lead a provisional government, which assumed office when the shah's regime collapsed in February 1979.

The Freedom Movement espoused a philosophy that can be termed Islamic modernism. Members were pious Muslims who felt comfortable with modern education; they disliked political extremism and policies of economic and social engineering. Thus they soon fell out with the radical clerics with whom they had to share power. The November 1979 takeover of the American embassy by Students in the Line of the Imam was the last straw for Bazargan; he resigned with his entire cabinet after Khomeini endorsed the embassy seizure. Thereafter, the Freedom Movement became part of the loyal opposition to the government of the nascent Islamic Republic. However, the party's relations with officials became increasingly tense, and by 1981 its newspaper had been banned; subsequently, its members were disqualified from running in elections for the Majles al-Shura or for the presidency. Although the Freedom Movement continued to act as a conscience for the Islamic government, and throughout the 1980s and 1990s periodically circulated pamphlets and issued press statements critical of government policies, lack of access to the government-controlled media effectively silenced its voice. The greater tolerance for dissenting views that prevailed after Mohammad Khatami was elected president in 1997 provided the Freedom Movement an opportunity to publicize its views. However, its greater visibility proved a liability when the judiciary cracked down on reformers and dissidents beginning in April 2000. Subsequently, most Freedom Movement ac-

tivists were arrested and charged with attempting to overthrow the government. Trials in 2001 and 2002 resulted in prison sentences for many; the trial for Freedom Movement leader Ibrahim Yazdi (who became head of the party in 1995, after Bazargan's death) continued sporadically throughout 2003.

See also Bazargan, Mehdi; Iranian Revolution (1979); Khatami, Mohammad; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Majles al-Shura; National Front, Iran; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Students in the Line of the Imam; Yazdi, Ibrahim.

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Neguin Yavari
Updated by Eric Hooglund

FREEDOM PARTY

Turkish political party, 1955–1958.

Established late in 1955 by a group of dissident members of the ruling Democrat Party, the Freedom Party signified rising opposition to the undisciplined economic policies and authoritarian tendencies of the regime of Adnan Menderes. Prime Minister Menderes reacted to intensifying criticism in the aftermath of destructive riots in Istanbul and other cities in September 1955 by forcing the resignation of the entire government while retaining office himself, thus violating the cardinal principle of collective cabinet responsibility. Composed of some of the most cosmopolitan and intellectual elements of the dominant party, the Freedom Party called for effective constitutional guarantees against arbitrary government and greater freedom of association and expression. Ironically, the departure of the dissidents from the Democrat Party strengthened Menderes and paved the way for even more dictatorial policies. The Freedom Party garnered only 4 out of a total of 610 seats in the election of 1957, while the main opposition Republican People's Party (RPP) polled 40 percent of the vote and gained 178 seats. Consequently, the Freedom Party merged with the RPP in November 1958.

See also Menderes, Adnan; Republican People's Party (RPP).

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Frank Tachau

FREE FRENCH MANDATE

Attempt by France to control Lebanon and Syria.

In June 1941, Free French troops joined British imperial forces in overthrowing the Vichy administration in Damascus. General Charles de Gaulle's envoy to Cairo, General Georges Catroux, initially offered Syria and Lebanon independence if they would accept Free French rule. But de Gaulle then made independence conditional upon the conclusion of treaties ensuring continued French predominance over the two countries' economic, military, and cultural affairs. Catroux became delegate-general for Syria and Lebanon, a post virtually identical to the earlier office of high commissioner.

Free French officials could not block the integration of Syria and Lebanon into either the sterling area or the Anglo–American Middle East Supply Center. In addition, London pressured the Free French to meet local nationalists' demands, resulting in the restoration of the two countries' prewar constitutions. Elections in July 1943 gave the National Bloc control of Syria's national assembly; nationalists captured Lebanon's parliament two months later and immediately took steps to dismantle the mandate. Free French authorities responded by arresting the Lebanese leadership, but massive popular demonstrations forced the prisoners' release. When the government in Damascus adopted a similar program, the Free French first tried to suppress the Syrian nationalist movement but then agreed to a series of negotiations, which culminated in the dual evacuations of April and August 1946.

See also Catroux, Georges; De Gaulle, Charles.

Fred H. Lawson

FREEMASONS

A secret fraternal order.

Drawing on guild practices of the masons and deriving its "oriental" origins from the period of Solomon's temple in Jerusalem, the order of Free and Accepted Masons recognizes some six million members worldwide. The order's first Grand Lodge was organized in London in 1717. Incorporating a complex system of secret rituals, rites, and decrees, the society admits members who profess a belief in God, but keep the particulars of their faith private. Members include Muslims, Christians, and Jews. There is no central authority. Freemasonry advocates religious toleration, fellowship, and political compromise, and members work for peace and harmony between peoples.

Freemasonry in the Middle East is traced initially to individuals, most notably Iranians who, serving as diplomats, were invited to join lodges by Europeans and upon their return disseminated the ideology. Masonic lodges in the region were established by Europeans in areas they influenced and were used by the French and the British to cultivate local individuals. Lodges in Calcutta (founded in 1730) attracted Hindus and Muslims, and the philosophy probably entered Iran at this time with Iranian merchants who lived in India.

The establishment in the Middle East of masonic lodges affiliated with the European movement, however, dates from Napoléon's invasion of Egypt, when French soldiers established chapters in Cairo (1798) and in Alexandria (1802). Italian émigrés, after their abortive revolution in Italy (1830), set up Italian lodges, and the British and the Germans became active in the 1860s. In Iran, the first lodge (a nonaffiliated one) was set up in 1858 by an Armenian convert to Islam, Mirza Malkom Khan, and was short lived. The French masonic lodge in Istanbul, L'Union d'Orient, dates from 1865. During the Ottoman period, there were lodges in Beirut and Jerusalem, and the society flourished under the Palestine mandate. Jewish, Christian, and Muslim members support a mutual insurance fund, an old-age home, a library, and masonic temples in Israel. There have been lodges in most Middle Eastern countries at one time or another, depending upon the regime in power.

Although it never attracted many members on the popular level, freemasonry in the Middle East was a significant component of Middle Eastern reform politics during the latter part of the nineteenth century until World War I. Because it incorporated unique rites, a clandestine apparatus, and a select membership—features familiar in Sufi, *futuwwa,* and other Islamic movements—and was a convenient vehicle for the dissemination of European ideas, it drew Islamic modernists and political activists such as the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh, the Iranian Jamal al-din al-Afghani, and the Algerian Abd al-Qadir.

Masonic lodges were convenient covers for clandestine activities. Because they were, by and large, Western institutions protected under the capitulations, governments could not penetrate them or monitor their activities. Members were also able to draw upon the support of European masons in defense of local members. During the 1870s, the movement was used as a tool by Prince Halim of Egypt who was denied succession and conspired to rule. Khedive Ismaʿil and his successor, Tawfiq, banished a number of prominent members who were also active in reformist political activities—Yaʿqub Sanu and Afghani, among others. Ottoman modernists of the Tanzimat period were responsible for Ottoman Sultan Murat V's brief rule in 1876. In Iran, lodges existed sporadically in the nineteenth century and were allowed under Mohammad Ali Shah until 1911 and the end of the constitutional movement. Iranians, Egyptians, and Ottomans met at lodges throughout the Middle East when they traveled, but there is no evidence that any unified political actions emerged.

For the Young Turks, exposed to freemasonry largely in the Balkans and Constantinople (now Istanbul), the lodges were convenient meeting places to bring together Christians and Muslims, and to plan the overthrow of the regime of Sultan Abdülhamit II. The existence of so many Freemasons in the large secular leadership of the Committee for Union and Progress generated polemical literature of a conspiratorial nature against the regime just before Turkey's entry into World War I on the side of Germany.

See also Abd al-Qadir; Abduh, Muhammad; Abdülhamit II; Afghani, Jamal al-Din

al-; Capitulations; Committee for Union and Progress; Malkom Khan, Mirza; Sanu, Yaʿqub; Tanzimat; Young Turks.

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Reeva S. Simon

FREE OFFICERS, EGYPT

Clandestine military organization that engineered and executed the coup of 23 July 1952, which began a new chapter in the history of modern Egypt.

The genesis of the Free Officers is much disputed among historians and specialists. Some argue that the group was formed in 1942 after the British ultimatum to King Farouk. Others take the Arab–Israel War (1948) as the starting point. Notwithstanding these differences, general agreement exists on four major points. First, Gamal Abdel Nasser was the undisputed leader of the group from its inception, and his position was never challenged. This fact laid down the foundation of his prominence as the strongman and president of Egypt until his death in 1970. Second, the group did not have an organized file or registry of its membership. It was organized into cells and sections, each with a specific function. The overall command and supervision was provided by a revolutionary committee headed by Nasser.

The organization of the Free Officers reflected a high degree of flexibility that was demonstrated in the frequent movements of individuals into and outside the group. Actually, the first attempt to develop a form of registry was under President Anwar al-Sadat (1970–1981) when he decided to provide a special pension for the Free Officers. Third, the group did not represent an ideologically homogeneous group. Among its members were officers with Islamist inclinations, such as Kamal al-Din Husayn and Abd al-Munʿim Amin; others were more or less leftists, such as Khalid Muhyi al-Din and Yusuf Sadiq. Lacking a clear ideology, all that the group had was the "six principles," which were their guiding directives after assuming power. The existence of ideological differences within the group was one of the factors that explains the power struggle among the Free Officers after 1952. Fourth, the group, under Nasser, was conscious of retaining its organizational autonomy, resolving not to be absorbed in any other political movement.

As individuals, the Free Officers had contacts with the Young Egypt party, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Democratic Movement for National Liberation, and other communist groups; while, as a group, they maintained a high degree of independence. Nasser believed that they could succeed only if they established a firm independent base within the army. One of the distinct features of the Free Officers is that they were purely military; the group had no civilian members and this has come to affect the nature of the post-1952 political ruling elite.

In the mid-1940s, the voice of the Free Officers was heard for the first time. They began to distribute leaflets, the first of them in 1945 was titled "The Army Gives Warning." The first open clash with the king took place in the early summer of

Members of the Revolutionary Council on 4 January 1955 in Cairo, Egypt. **© Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

1952, when the officers' club in Cairo elected as president General Muhammad Naguib, who was the Free Officers' nominee, turning down the king's own candidate.

Between 1949 and July 1952, the Free Officers worked to recruit other sympathetic officers and strengthened their ties with civilians and politicians opposed to the monarchy. During this period too, because most of them were in their early thirties, they looked for a senior officer who could be presented to the public as their leading figure. Finally, they chose Naguib, who was a well-known infantry division commander and had been popular, especially since the Arab–Israel War, among the troops and young officers.

The actual seizure of power took place in the early hours of 23 July 1952, when troops commanded by Free Officers and their supporters occupied and controlled army headquarters, airports, the broadcasting station, telecommunication center, and major roads and bridges in Cairo. The details of what happened on that day show that the plan for seizing power was neither well thought out nor were its parts tightly integrated. Indeed, a combination of coincidence and luck made the operation successful. Within three days, the king abdicated the throne to his infant son and left the country. From then on, the Free Officers became the new rulers of Egypt.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Farouk; Muhyi al-Din, Khalid; Muslim Brotherhood; Naguib, Muhammad; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Sadat, Anwar al-; Young Egypt.

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Ali E. Hillal Dessouki

FREE OFFICERS, YEMEN

Junior officers who led North Yemen's 1962 revolution.

These fifteen or so junior officers were at the center of the planning and execution of the 1962 revolution that overthrew the Zaydi imamate in North Yemen. Inspired by the Egyptian revolution and the revolutionary Arab nationalism of Gamal Abdel Nasser, they recruited the more prominent senior officers who participated in the successful revolt, only to be upstaged or shunted aside by some of these older figures in the sharp political struggles that followed.

See also Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Zaydism.

Robert D. Burrowes

FREE REPUBLICAN PARTY

Turkish political party, 1930.

This short-lived party was founded in August 1930 by associates of Turkey's president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, at his behest, possibly to siphon off discontent spawned by economic problems and the government's radical reform program. Fethi Okyar, former prime minister and close associate of Kemal, returned from his post of ambassador to France to assume the leadership of the party. It opposed the government's *dirigiste* (paternalistic, state directed) economic policy and emphasized individual rights and freedoms, including freedom of (religious) conscience. It rapidly gained enthusiastic support, especially in the Aegean region. Among its adherents was Adnan Menderes, leader of the Democrat Party of the 1950s, indicating that the Free Republican Party was a harbinger of things to come. Contrary to Kemal's image of gentlemanly debates between parties, relations between the new party and the governing People's Party were bitter. The latter feared that it might in fact lose power in a free election and accused the Free Republican Party of stirring up reaction against Kemal's nationalist reform program. Consequently, the Free Republican Party voluntarily dissolved itself after only ninety-nine days, in November 1930.

See also Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Menderes, Adnan.

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Frank Tachau

FREE YEMENIS

Political party of North Yemen in the 1940s.

Founded in Aden in 1944 by such fathers of the modern Yemeni nation-state as Qaʾid Muhammad Mahmud al-Zubayri and Shaykh Ahmad Muhammad Nuʿman, the Free Yemeni party (al-Ahrar) was the first major modern expression of constitutional reform and political opposition to the Hamid al-Din imamate in North Yemen. Although their party existed only for a few years, the Free Yemenis led the way from reformism and a constitutional imamate to new, more advanced political ideas (republicanism and revolution), organization (such as the Yemeni Unionists), and action. It could be said that a Free Yemeni movement, more than the party itself, traces an unbroken line from 1944 to the 1962 revolution. The Free Yemenis, however, far from being radical political modernists, were initially the mid-twentieth-century equivalents of the Turkish reformers of the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat period in the nineteenth century. This did not prevent them from playing a major role in the failed 1948 revolution and in laying a big part of the foundation for the successful 1962 revolution.

See also Tanzimat; Zubayri, Qaʾid Muhammad Mahmud al-.

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Robert D. Burrowes

FREIER, RECHA

[1892–1984]

Founder of Youth Aliyah, writer, musician.

Born in Norden, Ostfriesland (Germany), Recha Freier studied philology at Breslau and Munich universities, worked as a teacher and pianist, and began research on children's tales, moving with her rabbi-husband to Sofia (Bulgaria) and then Berlin. In 1932 Freier, disturbed by discrimination against Jewish jobseekers in Germany, conceived the idea of settling groups of young Jews on kibbutzim in Palestine. The head of the Jewish Agency's Social Welfare Department, Henrietta Szold, initially rejected the idea, so, in 1933, Freier raised funds to establish Youth Aliyah, sent a first group to Bet Shemen, and established an office in Berlin. That year she persuaded Szold, the Zionist Organization, and the main representative body of German Jews, to take on the program, and she spent the next eight years helping young Jews across Europe to emigrate. In 1941 she fled Germany and settled in Palestine, remaining active in children's welfare activities and founding an agricultural training school. After the establishment of the state of Israel, she founded the Israel Composers Fund (1958) and Testimonium (1966), a fund sponsoring accounts of events in Jewish history set to music. Freier published one such composition, a book of poetry (*On the Steps,* 1976), and a novel (*Shutters,* 1979). In 1954 Albert Einstein nominated her for a Nobel Peace Prize, and in 1981 she was awarded the Israel Prize. Freier saved more than 5,600 children—some say 10,000—and Youth Aliyah has to date given support to more than 300,000 impoverished refugee and Israeli children.

See also Kibbutz; Szold, Henrietta; Yishuv; Youth Aliyah; Zionism.

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George R. Wilkes

FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION

French military unit created by Louis Philippe in 1831 and made up of foreign volunteers.

Deployed only outside metropolitan France, the French foreign legion saw combat first in Algeria. It played a decisive role in the capture of Constantine in 1837 and fought in numerous engagements as the conquest proceeded. Although the legion served in the Crimea, Italy, and Mexico in the 1850s and 1860s, and throughout the French Empire later in the century, an encampment established in 1843 at Sidi-bel-Abbès, southwest of Oran, remained its headquarters.

The legion helped check the insurrection of the Walad Sidi Shaykh in western Algeria in 1881 and 1882, but much of its work in that country in the last quarter of the nineteenth century involved efforts to expand French influence into the Sahara as a prelude to linking North Africa with France's possessions south of the desert.

Legionnaires participated in many of the military operations that resulted in the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco. They formed part of the forces that consolidated French power along the ill-defined southern Morocco–Algeria border during the first several years of the twentieth century and were involved in occupations of the Moroccan cities of Oujda and Casablanca in 1907. Thereafter, they helped maintain security in the areas around both cities. In 1911, a company of the legion was among the troops that lifted a rebel siege of Fez, the sultan's capital, thus paving the way for the inauguration of the protectorate the following year. During the pacification of Morocco's mountainous and desert regions in the 1920s and 1930s, French commanders relied heavily on the legion. Its men also took part in the fighting that ended the rebellion of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi in 1925 and 1926.

During World War I, a battalion of legionnaires landed with other Allied soldiers at Gallipoli. After the war, legionnaires were dispatched to the French mandates of Syria and Lebanon. They saw action in the Druze uprising of 1925 and remained on garrison duty in the Levant in the 1930s.

In World War II, units of the legion made up part of the Free French contingent that seized Syria and Lebanon from the Vichy government in 1941. Subsequently attached to the British army in Egypt's Western Desert, they fought in the battle of Bir Hakeim in 1942 and advanced westward with the British following the battle of al-Alamayn. Other legionnaires from Sidi-bel-Abbès worked with American and British forces upon their arrival in Morocco and Algeria late in 1942 until the defeat of the Axis in Tunisia the following spring.

After 1954, the legion was heavily involved in French efforts to end the Algerian rebellion. Paratroopers, who had been added to the legion in the late 1940s, were instrumental in breaking up Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) cells during the 1957 Battle of Algiers. A legion paratroop battalion also formed part of the French expeditionary at Suez in 1956. When Algeria acquired independence in 1962, the headquarters of the legion were transferred from Sidi-bel-Abbès to France.

See also ALGIERS, BATTLE OF (1956–1957); FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE; KHATTABI, MUHAMMAD IBN ABD AL-KARIM AL-.

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KENNETH J. PERKINS

FRENCH REPORT (1931)

See PALESTINE

FRISCHMANN, DAVID

[1859–1922]

Pioneer of modern Hebrew literature.

David Frischmann was born in Poland and died in Berlin. As a writer he was versatile and created an enormous body of work—short stories, essays, literary criticism, poetry, translations, and news stories. He was also an editor and publisher. An innovative writer, he is credited with introducing Western standards of aesthetics into Hebrew literature—which he considered provincial at that time.

His stories manifest a sympathy for and portray European Jewish characters who are in conflict with tradition; they often abandon it. His poems express the futility of adapting Judaism to modern European life. He shunned public office and remained apolitical to retain artistic and literary integrity; as a result, he was accused of being against Zionism. Deeply affected by a visit to Palestine in 1911 and 1912, however, he recorded his impressions in a book, *Ba-Aretz* (1913). His collected works appear in the seventeen-volume *Kol Kitvei David Frischmann u-Mivhar Tirgumav* (Warsaw, 1922).

See also LITERATURE: HEBREW.

ANN KAHN

FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE (FLN)

The organizing group behind the Algerian War of Independence; later became the dominant single party of independent Algeria.

The instigators of the Algerian revolution created the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front) in October 1954 as a vehicle for mobilizing Algerians behind the war of independence. As the war went on, the movement spun off various deliberative, executive, and military institutions, creating by September 1958 a Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. By January 1960 the revolutionary parliament—Conseil National de la Revolution Algerienne (CNRA)—declared the FLN a single party responsible for carrying out a deeper social and economic revolution.

The Algerian constitutions of 1963 and 1976 confirmed this decision, declaring the FLN the people's monitor of government and the avant-garde of the revolution. By the late 1970s, however, it had grown into a bureaucratized organization of more than 300,000 members, whose principal function was the recruitment and indoctrination of members for support of the government it ostensibly monitored.

The constitution of February 1989 ended the FLN's single-party status, but before newer parties could unseat it, the army seized control of the government.

See also Algerian War of Independence; Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne (CNRA).

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John Ruedy

FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH YEMEN

South Yemeni independence movement.

The Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY) was a political party established in January 1966 in Britain's Aden Crown Colony and the Protectorate States. The party was forged under heavy Egyptian pressure from a combination of the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS) in an effort by Egypt to sustain its influence over the course of the campaign against the continued British presence in southern Arabia. When the NLF quickly backed out, FLOSY became nothing more than a renamed OLOS and the political property of Abdullah Ali Asnaj and Abd al-Qawi Makawi. The NLF successfully fought FLOSY to succeed the British in an independent South Yemen in 1967. FLOSY then became a vehicle for opposition from abroad to the regime, and it remained so with decreasing relevance from the late 1960s through the 1970s.

See also Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South.

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Robert D. Burrowes

FRONT ISLAMIQUE DU SALUT (FIS)

Algerian Islamic political party.

The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front) is Algeria's largest Islamic political party. Founded in February 1989 by a large group of Algerian religious leaders, the FIS calls for the establishment of an Islamic state based on the Sunna and the Qurʾan. It is headed by Abassi al-Madani, a university professor, and Ali Belhadj, a radical imam. Since their imprisonment in June 1991, Abdelkader Hachani has served as the provisional leader. The principle structures of the party are the Majlis al-Shura, a consultative body of some forty religious leaders, and the National Executive Bureau.

The FIS has been Algeria's most highly mobilized party. It has gained substantial financing from

local businessmen and Saudi Arabian sources. With solid support from the young, urban unemployed, it won the most votes in Algeria's last two elections. In the June 1990 elections for regional and municipal assemblies, it garnered 55 percent of the vote and an absolute majority of the seats. In the first round of National Assembly elections in December 1991, the FIS won 188 of the 430 seats and was poised to win an absolute majority in the second round. The Algerian army staged a coup d'état in January 1992, arrested thousands of FIS members, and declared the party illegal. Since then, the party has been in a state of disarray, its entire leadership imprisoned, and its activities repressed.

See also Belhadj, Ali; Madani, Abassi al-; Qurʾan; Sunna.

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Bradford Dillman

FRONT POUR LA DÉFENSE DES INSTITUTIONS CONSTITUTIONELLES (FDIC)

Moroccan political group.

Founded in 1963 by Ahmad Rida Gudeira, a close confidant of King Hassan, the Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionelles (FDIC) attempted to unite pro-monarchy groups in parliament against Istiqlal and the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP) during a time of social and economic tensions. Having failed to win a majority in the 1963 parliamentary elections, it split in 1964 into Gudeira's Parti Socialiste Démocratique and the Mouvement Populaire (MP)—the latter had been part of the original FDIC. The failure of the FDIC led the king to assume emergency governing powers in June 1965.

See also Istiqlal Party: Morocco; Morocco: Political Parties in; Mouvement Populaire (MP); Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP).

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

FUʾAD

[1868–1936]

Sultan of Egypt, 1917–1922; king, 1922–1936.

Fuʾad was born in Giza, Egypt, on 26 March 1868, the youngest child of Khedive Ismaʿil Pasha, who ruled Egypt from 1863 until 1879. Fuʾad left Egypt for Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 1879 at the time of his father's exile. Subsequently, he studied at Geneva, Turin, and the Italian Military Academy, returning to Egypt in 1892. His eligibility for the Egyptian throne was enhanced when the British deposed Abbas Hilmi II as khedive of Egypt in 1914 at the beginning of World War I. At the time of Abbas's removal, Britain severed the juridical ties that bound Egypt to the Ottoman Empire, proclaimed a protectorate over the country, and named Fuʾad's elder brother, Husayn Kamil, as the first sultan of Egypt. When Husayn Kamil died on 9 October 1917, Fuʾad succeeded him to the throne.

Fuʾad reigned in Egypt from 1917 until his death in 1936. He aspired to be a powerful ruler and did much to enlarge the powers of the monarchy. Following the conclusion of the war, Egypt's elite, including Sultan Fuʾad, pressed the British to end the protectorate and to increase the political autonomy of their country. Britain's failure to respond to these overtures set off a powerful protest movement, led by Saʿd Zaghlul and his new political party, the Wafd. The political turmoil led to Britain's unilateral proclamation of Egypt's independence on 28 February 1922, subject to the exclusion of a wide range of powers reserved to the British. In the wake of the altered political status of the country, Fuʾad became king of Egypt on 15 March 1922. In 1923 an appointed committee drafted a new constitution for the country. Through the intervention of Fuʾad and the British, the constitution gave far-reaching authority to the monarch. Under its provisions, the crown had the power to designate the prime minister, dissolve the parliament, and postpone sessions of parliament. Additionally, the king controlled charitable and educational institutions and decided upon diplomatic appointments and military commissions.

Armed with its formal, albeit restricted, political independence and a new, sophisticated constitution, Egypt embarked upon an experiment in liberal democracy. Unfortunately, civilian parliamentary government, which lasted until the military ousted the politicians from office in 1952, tended to degenerate into a three-cornered struggle among Egypt's most popular party, the Wafd, the palace, and the British. During these years, the Wafd invariably won any fair electoral contest, but was kept from office through the political manipulations of the palace and the British. Monarchical power reached its apex between 1930 and 1935, after Fuʾad removed the Wafd from office and appointed Ismaʿil Sidqi as prime minister. Immediately upon assuming power, Sidqi replaced the 1923 constitution with a new one and enacted a new, more restrictive electoral law. Both changes enhanced royal authority. Jealous of the power that Sidqi wielded, Fuʾad removed him from office in 1933 and ruled Egypt through a set of palace appointees. In 1935, under pressure from the British and responding to fears of an impending world war, Fuʾad agreed to restore the 1923 constitution and to hold new elections. Predictably, the Wafd won the 1936 elections. Fuʾad died on 28 April 1936, just months before the signing of the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty, which gave greater political autonomy to Egypt.

Although he was an autocrat and did much to impede the development of parliamentary democracy, Fuʾad was a noteworthy patron of Egyptian education. He played a role in reviving the Egyptian University, which had been founded in 1908 but languished until Fuʾad and others gave it their support. It was named Fuʾad I University in 1940 and became today's Cairo University in 1954.

See also Abbas Hilmi II; Cairo University; Sidqi, Ismaʿil; Wafd; Zaghlul, Saʿd.

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Robert L. Tignor

FUJAYRA

One of the seven emirates making up the United Arab Emirates; also the city of the same name.

Occupying a slender strip of land along the Gulf of Oman side of the Musandam Peninsula, Fujayra was under the sovereignty of the al-Qawasim rulers of Sharjah and Raʾs al-Khayma for most of the modern era. Lingering ill feelings between Fujayra and its former overlords have manifested themselves in minor border disputes. Fujayra was only recognized as a distinct emirate by the British in 1952. It is ruled by Hamad ibn Muhammad al-Sharqi, and because it has no oil reserves or other significant resources, it must rely financially on Abu Dhabi. Some extractive industries exploit materials from the Hajar Mountains, including cement and asbestos. Like Dubai, Fujayra has a port and free zone for industry and trade, but on a much smaller scale. However, the port's petrochemicals storage and loading facilities are among the region's most heavily used. In 1997 the emirate's population was estimated to be 83,000, on an area of 715 square miles.

See also Sharqi Family, al-; Umm al-Qaywayn; United Arab Emirates.

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Malcolm C. Peck
Updated by Anthony B. Toth

FUJAYRA–SHARJAH CONFLICT

Clash over land ownership in the United Arab Emirates (1972).

A few months after establishment of the United Arab Emirates, these two members of the federation clashed over ownership of a tiny parcel of land with a well that had traditionally been used by tribesmen from both. Some twenty lives were lost before federal intervention ended the conflict. The incident underscored the disruptive potential of numerous

unresolved border disputes, and the federal government's response reflected its determination to keep them in check.

See also UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.

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MALCOLM C. PECK

FUL

See FOOD

FUNDAMENTAL PACT

An 1857 Tunisian law that increased freedoms for non-Tunisians.

The law was issued by Muhammad Bey (1855–1859) of Tunisia on 10 September 1857. Entitled Ahd al-Aman (Pledge of Security), the Fundamental Pact resulted from an incident involving a Tunisian Jew, Batto (Samuel) Sfez, who was executed on orders of the bey for having blasphemed Islam. The French and British consuls saw in the episode an opportunity to intervene in Tunisian affairs. The two men—Richard Wood of Britain and Leon Roches of France—pressed for the promulgation of reforms that would ensure the security of both Tunisians and foreigners; that would establish mixed courts to handle matters concerning Europeans; and, importantly, that would allow non-Tunisians to conduct business and own property in Tunisia more easily. On the one hand, the law opened the way to greater European economic activity and, on the other, spurred a group of Tunisian notables, led by Khayr al-Din Pasha, to pressure the bey to enact structural reforms that would, in part, place limits upon the powers of the bey's office. The campaign of these notables, backed by the foreign consuls who continued to press for enforcement of the new laws, led Muhammad Bey and his successor Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey (1859–1882) to draw up a formal constitution.

See also KHAYR AL-DIN; MIXED COURTS; MUHAMMAD AL-SADIQ.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON

FUTUWWA

Associations of young men who claimed to embody certain virtues and who tried to maintain the distinct identities of their quarters in Cairo. Also, paramilitary youth organizations in Iraq.

In medieval times, the term *futuwwa* (plural, *futuwwat*) referred to either a specific body of virtues—courage, manliness, chivalry, generosity, truth, honor, self-reliance, altruism—or to informal urban associations of young men who claimed to promote these values. By the early nineteenth century, the word was used in Cairo (Egypt) to refer to a few influential men who acted as informal leaders of their quarters. Their primary function was to protect their quarters against outside threats, other *futuwwat,* and the government. While they performed good deeds, they also quarreled and were violent among themselves and with police. Some were thugs who preyed on the local populace instead of furthering its welfare.

In Egypt, between Muhammad Ali Pasha's accession to power in 1805 and World War II, their influence declined, mainly as a result of government efforts to centralize authority. After the war, their number and role diminished further, under the combined effects of rapid urbanization, industrialization, expansion of the role of the bureaucracy in the daily life of the people, and the increasing religious and socioeconomic heterogeneity of neighborhoods. The few remaining *futuwwat* in the older, medieval quarters of Cairo now include a large proportion of toughs engaged in various semilegal and illegal activities.

In another context, the term has been used in Iraq, first in the 1930s and again since the Baʿth party takeover in 1968, to refer to paramilitary youth groups strongly reminiscent of the Hitler Youth of Nazi Germany. In Baʿthist Iraq, the *futuwwa* is one of three paramilitary youth organizations that be-

long to the state-run General Federation of Iraqi Youth. It brings together Iraqis aged fifteen to twenty, is strongly hierarchical, and is patterned after the Baʿth party itself. Its members wear uniforms, undergo military training, and participate in various activities and rituals aimed at strengthening the new generation's loyalty to the regime.

See also BAʿTH, AL-; MUHAMMAD ALI; YOUTH MOVEMENTS.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX

G

GAFSA INCIDENT (1980)

Confrontation between Tunisia and Libya.

In January 1980, during a period of heightened tension between Libya under Muammar al-Qaddafi and Tunisia under Habib Bourguiba, Tunisian guerrillas (trained by the Libyan military) crossed into Tunisia and attacked the south-central city of Gafsa. Tunisia responded by severing ties with Libya; in turn, Libya ordered some 10,000 Tunisian workers in Libya to return home.

See also BOURGUIBA, HABIB; QADDAFI, MUAMMAR AL-.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON

GAILANI, AHMAD

[1932–]

Afghan resistance leader; Sufi pir *(spiritual leader).*

Ahmad Gailani played an important role in Afghan resistance politics of the 1980s and in the political events of the early 1990s. Gailani is the spiritual leader of the Qadiriyya Sufi order in Afghanistan and well connected to the former royal family through marriage. Gailani assumed the leadership of the Qadiriyya order upon the death of his older brother Sayyid Ali in 1964. He was educated at Abu Hanifa College.

A member of the Kabul elite before 1978, Gailani fled Kabul after the Marxist revolution in April 1978 and founded the resistance group Mahaz-e Milli-e Islami-e Afghanistan (National Islamic Front) in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1979. This group had a strong following among Gilzai Pushtun tribes and among supporters of the ex-king Zahir Shah. After the collapse of the communist government in 1992 Gailani returned to Kabul and participated in the transitional government of Sabghatullah Mujaddidi. He was first offered the position of foreign minister, but refused to serve. Later he accepted the post of supreme justice.

When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 Gailani was forced from his leadership role and again fled to Pakistan. After the events of 11 September 2001 Gailani returned to Kabul to play a role in the formation of the government of Hamid Karzai and to support Zahir Shah, although he held no official position in the Afghan government.

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GRANT FARR

GALATA

District of Istanbul on the north bank of the Golden Horn.

A Genoese settlement in the Byzantine era, Galata was officially incorporated into the city of Constantinople (now Istanbul) only in 1840. It continued through the nineteenth century to be the section of Constantinople where Europeans resided. Long the center of international trade and banking in the capital, the district's population and business activity boomed beginning in the Crimean War (1853–1856). Galata and its neighboring district Beyoğlu (formerly Pera) became the modernized center of the city, with many theaters and hotels and the city's first tramway and telephone lines. The famous Galatasaray Lycée, established in 1868, was actually located in Beyoğlu.

See also CRIMEAN WAR; GALATASARAY LYCÉE.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

GALATASARAY LYCÉE

One of the oldest and most prestigious educational institutions in Turkey.

The Galatasaray Lycée opened in 1481 as a palace school to train young men for service in the Ottoman court or in cavalry regiments. The most accomplished students were selected to continue their education and service at the emperor's Topkapi Palace. As a result of educational reforms on a Western model during the nineteenth century, the Galatasaray buildings were first converted to a medical school, then to a military preparatory school. In 1868, the institution began its modern incarnation as the Imperial Lycée (Mekteb-i Sultani), with support from the French government. Modeled after the grand French *lycées* (schools), it was designed to offer a European-style secondary education using French as the primary language of instruction. While similar schools in the empire catered to non-Muslim subjects, Galatasaray was open to both Muslim and non-Muslim boys. The school continued to function after the Ottoman Empire became the Turkish Republic, and many of its graduates went on to study at the School of Government (Mekteb-i Mülkiye) and then took up positions in government.

During the 1960s, a primary school was opened on a separate campus to prepare students for the *lycée.* The admission of girls began in 1965, and by the late 1990s the student body was approximately 40 percent female. English language instruction was offered starting in 1990, bringing to three the number of languages used in the school. In 1992, during a visit by French president François Mitterrand to Turkey, it was announced that the school would be reorganized as the Galatasaray Educational Institution and that it would also become an institution of higher education. Accordingly, Galatasaray University was founded in 1994, with faculties of law, engineering and technology, administration, communication, and arts and sciences. Because the institution historically has attracted an ambitious and able body of students, the Galatasaray has been an important factor in the history of the Ottoman Empire, its successor states, and modern Turkey. Galatasaray graduates include many prominent political leaders, diplomats, government officials, artists, writers, and educators.

See also OTTOMAN EMPIRE.

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I. METIN KUNT
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

GALILEE

In Hebrew, ha-Galil, *probably meaning "the circle"; in Arabic,* al-Jalil; *mountainous and comparatively fertile region of northern Israel.*

The Galilee region is bounded by the Mediterranean Sea on the west, the river Jordan on the east, the Lebanese border in the north, and the Jezreel Valley to the south. A line running from Acre on the coast to the northwest shore of the Kinneret (Sea of Galilee or Lake Tiberias) divides Lower Galilee, reaching an elevation of 1,500 feet (458 m) above sea level, from Upper Galilee, which attains altitudes of 4,000 feet (1,220 m).

Joshua and Deborah conquered the entirety of this area, which in biblical times was allotted to four Israelite tribes and later to the northern kingdom of Israel. Controlled by a series of empires, Galilee became a preeminent Judaic stronghold for some five centuries after the destruction of the Second Temple, and a center of Christianity especially after the sixth century C.E. The region became part of the province of al-Urdunn (Jordan) following the Arab conquest (c. 640), then formed a crusader principality, and was later ruled successively by Ayyubids, Mamluks, Ottomans, and intermittently by local potentates such as Zahir al-Umar, Ahmad al-Jazzar, and Muhammad Ali of Egypt. Zionist settlement activity, both before and after Britain's General Edmund Allenby's conquest of the area from the Ottoman Turks in September 1918, was slow in penetrating Galilee itself, whose overwhelming Arab majority caused it to be apportioned to the Arab state under partition. Conquered in its entirety by Israel in the 1948 Arab–Israel War, Galilee witnessed a smaller scale Arab displacement than other parts of the country, most of those leaving being Muslim. Since the 1960s the area has been the target of many government settlement and development projects.

See also AHMAD AL-JAZZAR; ALLENBY, EDMUND HENRY; ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1948); GALILEE, SEA OF; JEZREEL VALLEY; MUHAMMAD ALI.



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ZEV MAGHEN

GALILEE, SEA OF

Freshwater lake located in northeast Israel.

Measuring 64 square miles (166 sq km) in area, the Sea of Galilee (also Lake Tiberias or Kinneret) is located 680 feet (207 m) below sea level and is formed by waters flowing down from the Jordan River. The lake was the source of a thriving fishing industry in the time of Christ, but today only small numbers of fish (called "St. Peter's fish") are caught for local consumption. Deganya, the first Israeli kibbutz, is located on the shore. From the beginning of the British mandate in 1920, the Sea of Galilee was located within the borders of Palestine

and, after 1948, the state of Israel. It acts as the principal freshwater source for Israel and supplies the National Water System.

See also National Water System (Israel); Water.

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Bryan Daves

GALLEI TZAHAL

Israel's army radio station, created in 1951 to entertain the troops and to bring information on army life to civilians.

The range and level of Gallei Tzahal's programs expanded markedly following the Arab–Israel War of 1967. The nonmilitary programs are controlled by the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Many productions have been aimed at young people who are approaching National Service age in the Israel Defense Force.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967).

Ann Kahn

GALLIPOLI

Peninsula between the Dardanelles and the Aegean Sea on the European side of the Turkish Straits.

Gallipoli was the site of an unsuccessful World War I Allied campaign (1915 and 1916) aimed at defeating the Ottoman Empire, opening up a second front against Austria–Hungary and Germany, and opening a supply route to Russia. Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill proposed this plan, expecting secretary of war Lord Kitchener to supply the necessary land troops, but Kitchener did not fully support Churchill's plan.

An Anglo–French force (mostly ANZAC [Australia and New Zealand Army Corps]) landed at Gallipoli in April 1915, after four unsuccessful naval attacks; they met a stubborn land defense by the Ottoman Turks. Although suffering enormous losses, the Allies—including Italy by August—nearly succeeded in a breakthrough. Lack of Russian cooperation, faulty intelligence, and skillful tactics on the part of the Ottomans and Germans, however, led to a stalemate, then to Allied withdrawal in January 1916. Churchill became the scapegoat and lost his position.

See also Austria-Hungary and the Middle East; Churchill, Winston S.; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Ottoman Empire; World War I.

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Sara Reguer

GAMAL, SAMIYAH

[1924–1994]

Egyptian dancer and actress on stage and screen.

Born Zaynab Khalil Ibrahim Mahfuz, Samiyah Gamal (also Samiyya Jamal) changed her name to conceal her identity from her family after becoming a dancer at Badiʿa Masabni's famous Cairo casino. At her debut in the late 1930s, she was paralyzed by stage fright until she thought of kicking off her brand-new high-heeled shoes. She danced in comfort and earned the nickname "the barefoot dancer." Among her fellow dancers at the Casino was Tahiya Kariyuka, another accomplished dancer and actress. The two women remained rivals until Gamal's death.

Gamal's dancing and acting led to appearances in some fifty-five films. After bit parts in the early 1940s, her first starring role was with actor Najib al-Rihani, "the Molière of Egypt," in *Ahmar shafayif* in 1946. She is best known for a series of charming musical films she made with costar Farid al-Atrash between 1947 and 1952. Her hopes for marriage to al-Atrash were disappointed and their extremely successful artistic partnership came to an end; her husbands included Sheppard W. King, a Texas cotton and oil baron, and Rushdi Abaza, an Egyptian actor. Gamal retired in 1972 but returned to the stage briefly in the early 1990s.

See also Art; Kariyuka, Tahiya.

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Zuqaq al-Midaqq (Midaq Alley). Directed by Hasan al-Imam. 1963.

Roberta L. Dougherty

GANIM, HALIL

Ottoman opposition politician and newspaper publisher.

A Lebanese Maronite by birth, Halil Ganim (also Khalil Ghanim) served in the Ottoman parliament in 1877 and 1878. When the parliament was closed, he took up exile in Paris, where his prominent opposition newsletter, *La jeune Turquie,* soon gave its name to the emerging Young Turk movement. In 1895, Ganim collaborated with Young Turk leader Ahmet Riza, also in Paris, in publishing the first major organ of the cause, *Meşveret.* In 1901, he published a book against despotism, *Les sultans ottomans* (The Ottoman sultans). Ganim was one of a very few Arabs prominent in the Young Turk movement. He lived in Paris for the remainder of his life.

See also Ahmet Riza; Young Turks.

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Elizabeth Thompson

GANJI, AKBAR

[1959–]

Iranian journalist, and writer.

Akbar Ganji was born and raised in Tehran, where he became a leading investigative journalist and the editor of the journal *Rah-e Now* (The new path), and newspaper *Sobhe Emruz* (Today's morning), and one of the most prominent and outspoken figures of the 23 May movement after the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997. Ganji actively participated in the Iranian Revolution of 1979. After the revolution, he joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and from 1985 to 1989 he served as a cultural staff member of the Islamic Republic at the Iranian embassy in Turkey. In 1989 he was appointed to the media department of the publicity and press affairs of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. He published a collection of newspaper articles in early 2000, *Dungeon of Ghosts,* in which he described a secret group affiliated with powerful, high-level officials whom he claimed had masterminded the serial killings of writers and political figures in 1998. He cited murders as part of a policy of state terror designed to subdue dissidents, and identified Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as the chief architect of the serial assassinations. The book was sensational and made a major contribution to the defeat of conservative candidates in the parliamentary elections of February 2000. In April 2000 Ganji was arrested for his participation in an international conference in Berlin on the future of democracy in Iran. At the subsequent trial he was convicted of antistate activities and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment.

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Babak Rahimi

GARANG, JOHN

[1945–]

Sudanese advocate for the Bor Dinka people.

Born in Wagkulei, John Garang is from the Bor Dinka people in the southern Sudan and the most influential advocate on their behalf in the face of the Khartoum government. He was educated at Catholic mission schools in southern Sudan and graduated from high school in Tanzania. In 1970 he joined the southern resistance movement, Any-Nya, which was later incorporated into the Sudanese

Dr. John Garang (left), chairman of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, shakes hands with Sudanese president Umar al-Bashir during April 2003 negotiations to end the Sudanese civil war. The negotiations continued throughout the year, and an agreement was hammered out that provided some degree of self-rule in Sudan's southern regions. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

armed forces (after the Addis Ababa negotiated peace in 1972). He rose to the rank of colonel in the Sudanese army.

Garang received his bachelor of science degree from Grinnell College in Iowa in 1971 and later returned to the United States for military training at Fort Benning, Georgia. In 1981 he earned a Ph.D. in economics from Iowa State University, focusing on economic development of the southern Sudan. Garang taught at the University of Khartoum and the Khartoum military academy.

The Addis Ababa peace accords broke down after Islamic law was made state law in Sudan. Garang was sent to the south in 1983 to put down the mutinies of southern officers led by Kerubino Kwanyin and William Bany. Instead he joined the revolt and he and a group of other officers and civilians founded the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), of which he became chairman, and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), of which he became commander. Garang was responding to attempts by the Sudanese government under Muhammad Jaʿfar Numeiri to eliminate local autonomy in southern Sudan, which had been agreed to in Addis Ababa in 1972. Garang favored a federal relationship between the southern regions and the government in Khartoum, and also objected to Khartoum's decision to divide the previously united southern region along ethnic lines. He opposed the imposition in September 1983 of *shariʿa,* or Islamic law, on the non-Muslim south. Garang wrote later that in founding the SPLM his aim was "to create a socialist system that affords democratic and human rights to all nationalities and guarantees freedom of religion, beliefs and outlooks." His movement was quickly categorized as being communist and secessionist, although he denied the validity of both labels.

At various times Garang received support from Libya (until 1985), from Ethiopia (until the fall of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991), and newly independent Eritrea on Sudan's eastern border, especially under the rule of Isaias Afwerki. Garang found it difficult to attain political unity among his followers because of their diverse ethnic loyalties; for example, he sought to divide the Nuer from the Dinka but in doing so intensified the war. He has also had personal conflicts with his commanders. In the protracted civil war against the Sudan government in Khartoum, neither side has been able to win in this war of attrition, nor has peace been successfully negotiated.

In 1989 an Islamist military regime backed by the National Islamic Front and its leader, Hasan al-Turabi, became intransigent on the issue of removing *shariʿa* as state law. Still not seeking secession, Garang tried to make southern Sudan a world political issue. In this effort he was helped by U.S. Congressperson Mickey Leland, who welcomed him to congressional hearings on Sudan in July 1989. But Leland died in a plane accident shortly afterward. During the 1990s southern Sudan was in the international limelight because of severe food shortages and famine; displacement of humans and loss of life estimated at one to two million persons; the "lost boys," young refugees resettled in the United States; and allegations about the revival of slavery. Since 1995 Garang has been military commander of the opposition National Democratic Alliance forces in Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as remaining head of the SPLM.

See also Nuer; Numeiri, Muhammad Jaʿfar; Sudan; Sudanese Civil Wars; Turabi, Hasan al-.

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PAUL MARTIN
UPDATED BY CAROLYN FLUEHR-LOBBAN

GARDANNE MISSION

French military mission to Persia, 1807–1808.

The Gardanne Mission's purpose was to train the Persian army along European lines. It consisted of seventy officers and sergeants, led by General Claude-Matthew Gardanne. The mission was a result of the Finkenstein Treaty of May 1807, in which Iran sought help from France against Russia—while France had visions of using Iran as a stepping stone to British India. The Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807 temporarily ended hostilities between France and Russia, so support of Persia against Russia was no longer a French priority. Persia then negotiated with Britain, agreed to dismiss Gardanne, and signed a preliminary treaty in March 1809 that provided British officers to train the Persian army.

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR

GASPIRALI, ISMAIL BEY

[1851–1914]

Turkish journalist, educator, and reformer.

Born in the Crimea into a noble family (the Russian form of his name was Gasprinskii), Ismail Bey Gaspirali was a reformer who introduced a new educational method *(usul-i cedid).* He also advocated a single shared identity for all Muslim Turkic peoples of Imperial Russia, hoping to unite them with the motto "unity in language, thought, and action." In 1883, he founded the newspaper *Tercüman,* which was influential throughout the Turkic world; it ceased publication in 1918. Gaspirali intended the language of this newspaper, based on Ottoman Turkish, to serve as a common literary language for all Muslim Turkic speakers.

See also TURKISH LANGUAGE.

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ULI SCHAMILOGLU

GAZA (CITY)

Principal city of the Gaza Strip.

Gaza City is located in the northern part of the Gaza Strip, on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Along with the rest of the Gaza Strip, it was inhabited by Philistines in ancient times and subsequently conquered by many peoples due to its strategic location As part of the British Mandate, it came under Egyptian administration after the 1948 Arab–Israel War. The city contains a small port that serves local fisherman. Gaza's population consists of 400,000 mostly Muslim Palestinians. After the 1948 war, Gaza experienced an influx of refugees (approximately 190,000) and was six times larger by 1967. Today, about half the city's population are refugees.

Since the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, Gaza has been occupied by Israel. At the beginning of the first Palestinian uprising (intifada) in 1987, Gaza became a center for political unrest. In May 1994 the city became the first provincial headquarters for the Palestinian National Authority, which administers Palestinian areas in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

Gaza is the economic center for citrus fruits and other crops and contains small industries, such as textiles. Gaza's economy has been weakened due to closures by the Israeli military, implemented in the wake of the first intifada, and its dependency on wage labor in Israel. As a result of the al-Aqsa intifada (which began in 2000), more than half of the city's population are unemployed and living below the poverty line.

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MALLIKA GOOD

GAZA STRIP

Region bordering Israel and Egypt on the Mediterranean Sea.

The inhabitants of the Gaza Strip are almost all Palestinians with a population estimated at 1,100,000 (2003). Some 65 percent of these are refugees, descendants of the 250,000 refugees who flooded into the territory in 1948 during the first Arab–Israel War. Few carry passports and everyone is stateless. Arabic is the primary language; Islam is the primary religion, but Christians are also in residence. Eight UN-sponsored Palestinian refugee camps are located in the Gaza Strip.

The boundaries of the Gaza Strip have not changed since 1948; with only one-fifteenth the area of the West Bank, it has one of the highest population densities in the world. The Strip is almost rectangular, bordered by Israel on the north and east and by Egypt on the south. It has no capital, but its largest cities are Gaza City, Khan Yunis, and Rafah. It measures some 28 miles (45 km) by about 5 miles (8 km).



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The northern third belongs to the red sands of the Philistian plain; the southern two-thirds (south of the main watercourse, the Wadi Gaza) belong to the more fertile sandy loess of the northern Negev Desert coast. It is hot and humid in the summer, cooler and humid in the winter, with limited rainfall.

Gaza's economy is small, underdeveloped, and weak, historically generating close to 50 percent of its national product from external sources. Under Israeli control, its economy became heavily dependent on wage labor in Israel, where over half of Gaza's labor force was traditionally employed. Israeli military law undermined local economic development, and the combined impact of the first (1987–1993) and second (2000–) Palestinian uprisings and the Israeli government's harsh response has seriously weakened the local economy. Natural resources, notably land and water, are very limited and diminishing, and no mineral resources exist. Agriculture historically played a large role in the local economy, with citrus the primary agricultural export. Industry is largely traditional and rudimentary. Small factories manufacture beverages, tobacco, textiles, clothing, wood products, and plastics.

In ancient times the area was inhabited by the Philistines. It is mentioned in the Bible as the place of Samson's death and as the burial place of one of the great-grandfathers of the Prophet Muhammad. The Gaza area was conquered by many peoples, including the Jews (Hebrews), Romans, and Arabs, before it became part of the Ottoman Empire. After World War I, when the Ottoman Empire was dismembered, the Gaza region became part of the British mandate over Palestine. In 1947 the mandate disintegrated and resulted in a call for the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. Following the Arab–Israel War of 1948, the Egypt–Israel General Armistice Agreement of February 1949 left Egypt ruling the Gaza Strip under a mil-

itary administration. During the Arab–Israel War of 1956, Israel controlled the Gaza Strip from November until March of 1957, when it reverted to Egypt.

Since the Arab–Israel War of 1967, Gaza has been under Israeli military rule. The Palestinian uprising (or intifada) started in Gaza in 1987. In 1993 the Oslo peace process began with an agreement between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to implement limited autonomy in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank town of Jericho. The failure of the Camp David Summit (July 2000) effectively ended this process. The second Palestinian uprising, known as the al-Aqsa Intifada, has created unprecedented hardship for Palestinians, especially those living in the more impoverished Gaza Strip.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab–Israel War (1948); Camp David Summit (2000); Gaza (City); Intifada (1987–1991); Muhammad; Negev; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palestinians; West Bank.

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Sara M. Roy

GEAGEA, SAMIR

[1952–]

Lebanese politician and leader of the Lebanese Forces.

A Maronite from Bsharra in northern Lebanon, Samir Geagea studied medicine at the American University of Beirut, but did not complete his studies due to his early participation in the Lebanese Civil War. He fought during the 1975 to 1976 phase of the war in the militia of the Lebanese Phalange Party. By the late 1970s, he had become a senior commander of the Lebanese Forces (LF) and was committed to using force to restore Christian hegemony over Lebanon. He was very loyal to Bashir Jumayyil, who used him for the most vicious and brutal operations. Thus, he was dispatched by Bashir in 1978 to aid in the attack on the home of Tony Franjiyya that resulted in the deaths of Franjiyya and several members of his family. When LF leader Elie Hubeika signed the Tripartite Accord on behalf of the Christian community in December 1985, Geagea denounced it as a surrender to Syria. In January 1986, as chairman of the executive committee of the LF, he challenged President Amin Jumayyil and the Phalangist leadership and consolidated his ties with Israel.

After Jumayyil stepped down, Geagea clashed with General Michel Aoun when he attempted to curb the militias. Tensions between them culminated in devastating fighting for control of East Beirut's Christian enclave in the first half of 1990. In April 1990 Geagea endorsed the Ta'if Accord, largely to neutralize Aoun. After the defeat of Aoun in October 1990 and the normalization of political and security conditions in the country, Geagea became one of the most vocal critics of Syria's power in Lebanon.

By late 1993, Geagea had become a marginal figure in Lebanon's politics because of his past association with Israel, Syria's animosity toward him, and the de facto political neutralization of his militia. More fundamentally, he was the target of deep popular resentment against the warlords. Even among Christians, he was blamed for the loss of lives and property in East Beirut, and his reputation was tainted by his participation in the mass killing of Christian rivals, including Tony Franjiyya. Geagea was put on trial for the killing of Dany Chamoun and Rashid Karame, and was found guilty of dispatching a car bomb to a rival church. He has been in jail since 1994; right-wing forces continue to demand his release.

See also American University of Beirut (AUB); Aoun, Michel; Chamoun, Dany; Franjiyya Family; Jumayyil, Amin; Jumayyil, Bashir; Karame, Rashid; Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanese Forces; Phalange; Ta'if Accord.

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Guilain P. Denoeux
Updated by As'ad AbuKhalil

GEBEYLI, CLAIRE

[1935–]

Greek/Lebanese writer.

Of Greek origin, Claire Gebeyli was born and raised in Alexandria, Egypt, where she studied the humanities and social sciences. Steeped in ethics and philosophy, she is fluent in classical and modern Greek, French, English, and Arabic. She left Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser's rule and came to Lebanon, where she presently resides and which she has fully adopted as her own. Poet, novelist, journalist, professor of francophone literature at the Jesuit University of Beirut, national officer of the United Nation Program for Development throughout the Lebanese war (1975–1990), and member of the prestigious Academy of Science in New York, Gebeyli also has contributed articles in medicine, culture, fashion, literature, and women's profiles to the daily francophone newspaper *L'Orient–Le jour* since 1967. A pioneer in journalism, her *Billets* (Notes) on the dramatic events of the Lebanese war were collected in a volume of prose poems. She is the author of several other volumes of poetry in French and a novel titled *Cantate pour l'oiseau mort* (Cantata for a dead bird), which was awarded the Albert Camus Prize in 1996.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; LEBANON; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES.

MONA TAKIEDDINE AMYUNI

GECEKONDU

Literally, homes "built up at night" without permits in slum areas of Turkish cities.

The low-income neighborhoods lacking many urban amenities that surround Turkey's large cities are known as *gecekondu*s because the houses are built during the night on vacant land and without construction permits. Once the exterior walls and roof are in place, owners of the land—often the government—are not permitted to tear the houses down without going through a lengthy court process. Thus, for the squatters who build these homes, their overnight construction work becomes a fait accompli. In this way, extensive *gecekondu*s have been established on the outskirts of Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Diyarbakir, Istanbul, and İzmir. Houses in *gecekondu* neighborhoods often make illegal connections to urban water and electricity lines. Long-established *gecekondu*s have been successful in pressuring municipalities to provide legal urban services such as piped water, sewers, electricity, and transportation.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

GENCER, LEYLA

[1928–]

Turkish operatic soprano.

Leyla Gencer is revered by fans all over the world as the "regina" of the Donizetti operas. Her timing and perfection of theatrical gesture onstage, her deep chest tones, and perfectly pitched and executed coloratura are legendary.

Gencer was born in Istanbul on 10 October 1928. Her Polish Catholic mother, Alexandra Angela Minakovska—who later converted to Islam—was from Adampol, a village on the outskirts of Istanbul that was a colony for Polish refugees fleeing from the invading Russians during the mid-nineteenth century. Her father, Hasanzade Ibrahim Ceyrekgil, was from a prominent Safranbolu family with lucrative business interests in Istanbul. While attending the Italian High School in Istanbul, Leyla met and married a young banker, Ibrahim Gencer. She persuaded her husband and his family to allow her to attend the Istanbul Conservatory where she began pursuing voice lessons.

During the summer of 1949 she met Giannina Arangi Lombardi and followed her to Ankara, where Lombardi had an engagement as a voice coach at the Ankara State Opera. Lombardi died a year later, and Gencer continued her voice studies with Apollo Granforte; Italian repertoire with Di Ferdinando, Adolfo Camozzo, and Domenico Trizzio; and German opera with Georg Reinwald. She debuted at the Ankara State Opera in 1950 as Santuzza in

Mascagni's *Cavalleria rusticana,* followed by *Tosca* in 1952 and *Cosi fan tutte* in 1953. Her Italian debut was in 1954 at the Teatro San Carlo in Naples, where she performed *Madama Butterfly* and *Eugene Onegin.* In September 1956 she was invited to the San Francisco Opera to perform *Francesca da Rimini* by Zandonai, but her breakthrough came when Francis Poulenc chose her as his Madame Lidoine in his opera *Dialogues des Carmélites,* which was produced at the Teatro La Scala in Milan on 26 January 1957. Her career took flight from 1957 to 1980 with a great variety of roles. She had an immense repertoire which included all of Verdi, Puccini, Donizetti, and Bellini operas and a great variety of works by other major composers.

Gencer retired from the stage in 1987, but continued giving concerts. She is the director of La Scala Singing School in Milan and received the Puccini Honorary Award from the Licia Albanese Puccini Foundation at the New York City Lincoln Center on 2 November 2002.

See also Gender: Gender and Education; Music; Theater.

Filiz Ali

GENÇ KALEMLER

A Turkish nationalist group and its journal.

Genç Kalemler was founded in 1910–1911 in Salonika, bringing together a group of writers and poets under the leadership of famous nationalists Ömer Sayfettin and Ziya Gökalp. Theirs was the first organized attempt at Turkish language reform, born of reaction to the ornate linguistic excesses of the Servet-i Fünun group of the 1890s. They sought to bring written Turkish closer to its spoken form, without the Arabic and Persian grammar and vocabulary of the elite of the Ottoman Empire.

The group also sought to bring realism to what they felt was artificial Ottoman literature—by producing numerous critical essays in its journal and by publishing new stories and poems. Genç Kalemler's pursuit of simple direct language also had a political aim, because it was felt that to rescue the empire, a language understandable to the common people was needed. Genç Kalemler had close ties to the Turkish nationalist Committee for Union and Progress. The journal was published until the Turkish war of independence after World War I.

See also Committee for Union and Progress; Gökalp, Ziya; Salonika; Turkish Language.

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Elizabeth Thompson

GENDER

This entry consists of the following articles:

Gender and the Economy
Gender and Education
Gender and Law
Gender and Politics
Gender: Study of

Gender and the Economy

Women's economic participation in developing countries includes issues such as the invisibility of women's economic activities and their concentration mainly in low-wage and menial jobs in farming activities due to the lack of equal education and training, as well as limited access to productive assets, land and property, and credit.

Despite variations in woman's status in the Middle East and North Africa, gender bias in this region remains the highest in the world, thereby obstructing social and political development. Gender bias therefore limits the economic potential of half of the society. In contrast with other parts of the world, Middle Eastern women's economic participation in the labor force and in decision-making sectors is notably among the lowest in the world. Historically, a wide range of cultural, ideological, legislative, and political constraints have hindered women's economic roles and advancement. Moreover, political and economic instability caused by weak states, ongoing conflicts, and the repercussions of chronic war have had a negative impact on women's opportunities for economic advancement.

Restrictive Environment

Ideologically, the inferior status of women in Middle Eastern and North African societies stems from

patriarchal interpretations of the religious rulings of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Such interpretations have stressed women's family roles as wives, daughters, and mothers. Therefore, women remained "jural minors," economically, legally, and socially dependent on fathers, brothers, and, after marriage, husbands. Given this historical and ideological context, an autonomous public life for a woman was outside the norm and was often perceived as a threat to her family's honor and reputation.

Following the end of the colonial era, the attaining of independence, and the creation of national governments in the region, gender-biased regulations have been institutionalized in legislation, with the result that women are often deprived of basic rights and privileges enjoyed elsewhere. Personal status laws and other legal codes have limited women's full integration into society. For example, women in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt must obtain the permission of their fathers, brothers, or husbands to attain a passport or travel outside of their country. In certain cases this authorization is required to open a business, receive a bank loan, or get married. A Saudi newspaper reported in November 2002 that Saudi women's bank accounts contained more than $26 billion in unutilized funds because of the laws that prevent women from conducting business autonomously.

Furthermore, women who marry foreigners are denied the right to extend their citizenship to their husbands or any children they may bear, unlike men married to foreign wives. The combination of these new codes and regulations affects the economic rights of women negatively and systematically.

Low female participation in the work force is also the result of limited industrialization in the region. Middle Eastern and North African economies are mainly dependent on oil exports. Therefore, governments chose development strategies that relied on oil and finance. In return, this strategy minimized the use of labor and offered scant employment opportunities for women. In fact, the reliance of Gulf economies on oil and the associated economic boom has affected labor market trends throughout the region, not just women's participation. The oil boom has contributed to the preservation of a patriarchal family structure, according to which men act as breadwinners and women as homemakers, the former having a public role, the latter a private one. High income in oil-producing countries and associated increased remittance to labor-exporting countries in the region make it unnecessary for women to seek paid employment outside the home.

In non–oil exporting economies that adopted import-substitution industrial strategies, such as Egypt, both private and public sectors established industrial projects and opened work opportunities that favored male workers but also created new spaces for female workers. In other countries, such as Morocco and Tunisia, export-led development strategies and associated flows of foreign capital into both countries has enabled active female participation in the work force. Nevertheless, reports revealed that female workers in garment subcontracting workshops in Morocco are exploited, and owners will not hire married women.

Lagging female integration in the region's economy also has political dimensions. During the Cold War, Western countries, mainly the United States, supported the rise of political Islam, including Islamic armed groups, thus limiting women's chances for emancipation. Many of the oppressive governments in the region survived only because of Western military or economic support. In Afghanistan, Taliban rule, originally stemming from the *mojahedin* movements supported by the United States in its proxy war against the Soviet Union, confined Afghan women to their homes and banned them from education and work for years. Furthermore, the concept no less than the practice of gender equality is opposed by many groups in the region, who view the idea as a manifestation of colonization, since colonial authorities supported women's rights primarily to denigrate and thereby dominate the cultures of the region.

Gender and Socioeconomic Transformation

Until recently, rural women comprised the majority of women in the region. Thus women's traditional economic roles included household labor, farming, and livestock breeding. However, exposure to Western culture in the nineteenth century through increased integration of the region into the world economy, colonization, missionary activities,

Moroccan girls embroider a tapestry. Women in Morocco comprise 35 percent of a labor force that totals 11 million and have an unemployment rate of 27.6 percent. © Scheufler Collection/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

and male students' scholarships to study in Europe generated forces within Middle Eastern and North African societies that favored changes in the conditions of women. Egpyt's Qasim Amin, considered the father of feminism in the region, published his influential book *The Liberation of Women* in 1889.

Unlike Egypt and Turkey, where elites and upper classes partook early in modernity, and where women's status improved notably, in Lebanon, the emigration of peasants to the United States engaged entire, far-reaching networks of Lebanese in modernization processes at home and abroad. According to Khater, this early contact with American society and economy created a new "mobile middle class" that put considerable pressures on the prevailing social and economic arrangements in communities of origin, resulting in changed patterns of marriage and other gender relations.

In the early twentieth century, modernization and urbanization further improved the conditions of women, including access to education and health care. Education has enabled women with skills to enter the non-agricultural work force and to practice extra-domestic income-generating activities. Thanks to accelerated modernization, combined with widespread gender advocacy led by women's organizations, many societies in the region have witnessed an unprecedented rise in woman's literacy rates. This has resulted in women's increasing engagement in public life. In countries such as Israel, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Turkey, women have become heads of government. Furthermore, groups of highly educated and professional women have become significant agents of reform and change, such as Hanan Ashrawi of Palestine, Nawwal as-Saʿdawi of Egypt, and Shirin Ebadi of Iran.

Women in North Africa learn to weave rugs. The Arab world has one of the lowest proportions of women in the work force due to numerous factors, including cultural emphases stressing women's place in the home, lack of training and education for women in some professions, low levels of industrialization throughout the region, and economic instability, as well as the reliance on migrant laborers in wealthy states in the region. © Scheufler Collection/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Increased rates of urbanization, literacy, and employment have changed attitudes, practices, and perceptions. Women in the region are trying to move toward egalitarian ideas and the reconstruction of modern life, especially the family structure and its associated gender roles and relations. Growing access to the Internet and other communication technologies in recent years is expected to enhance such reforms.

Women's Economic Status

Official statistics for the region indicate that women's empowerment policies have effectively targeted female education and health services, which have improved significantly over the last few decades. These improvements are essentially due to increased public spending on education and health care and the spread of mass media. In the year 2000, average spending on education reached 5.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)—the highest in the world—and 2.9 percent on health care. As a result, the welfare of women has improved significantly. Female life expectancy has increased by ten years since 1980 and the female literacy rate increased from less than 17 percent in 1970 to more than 52 percent in 2000.

Yet, as the UN's Human Development Report for 2003 has noted, the region has the lowest gender empowerment ratings, which reflects the participation of women in economic, professional, and political activities using indicators of per capita income, women's percentage share for professional and technical positions, and women's percentage share of parliamentary seats. More specifically, Israel is rated highest at 61.2 percent, followed by the

United Arab Emirates (31.5%), Turkey (29%), and Egypt (25.3%). Yemen is the lowest on the list, with a rate of 12.7 percent. By contrast, the measure for countries in Latin America exceeded 50 percent and 75 percent of rates for specific European and North American countries. No data was available for Sub-Saharan Africa and other Middle Eastern and North African countries. The Arab Human Development Report (2002) explained that the lack of such data is an index of official disregard for women's empowerment in the region.

The report also reveals that women's economic participation remains lower than prevailing rates elsewhere. Similarly, female participation in the labor market remains among the lowest rates in the world, despite an evident increase over the last three decades from less than 23 percent in 1970 to 32 percent in 2000. Official statistics suggests that female participation in work force rates varies significantly among individual countries in the region. In Israel, female participation is around 41 percent compared with only 16 percent in Saudi Arabia (see table 1). International comparisons suggest that the highest recorded rate was in East Asia and the Pacific (76%), followed by Europe and Central Africa (67%), and sub-Saharan Africa (62%). Thus, the gender gap in labor force participation remains profound in the Middle East and North Africa.

In addition to the lower work force participation rate, the distribution of men and women workers among economic sectors presents a continuation of traditional trends. In countries such as Turkey and Yemen, the largest share of women is employed in agriculture as unpaid family workers. Women's employment in other countries has increased mainly in the traditionally accepted public services such as health and education, which channels traditional female skills into paid forms of care giving. In contrast, female employment remains low in manufacturing and minimal in communication, trade, and tourism activities. In Israel, the most dynamic and diversified economy in the region, women's work is also mostly concentrated in lower-paying jobs, services, education, health, welfare, and clerical positions. Israeli women are significantly less represented in prestigious occupations such as technology, management, government, the military, and engineering.

In 2002 a study conducted by the United Nation Development Fund on women's participation in the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in Jordan found that women make up only 28 percent of the ICT labor force. The larger proportion of Jordanian women is employed in the low-skilled jobs, such as data entry and support jobs. The findings also suggested that only 7 percent of the female ICT workers are decision

Gender and the economy

Country	Population (in millions)	Female population (% total)	Total labor force (in millions)	Female labor force (% total)	Unemployment rate	
					Total	Female
Algeria	30.4	49.4	10	28	n.a.	n.a.
Egypt	64	49.1	24	30	8.2	19.9
Iran	63.7	49.8	20	27	n.a.	n.a.
Iraq	23.3	49.2	6	20	n.a.	n.a.
Israel	6.2	50.4	3	41	8.2	8.1
Jordan	4.9	48.3	1	25	13.2	20.7
Kuwait	2	46.8	1	31	n.a.	n.a.
Lebanon*	4.3	50.8	2	30	8.6	7.2
Morocco	28.7	50	11	35	22	27.6
Saudi Arabia	20.7	45.7	7	16	n.a.	n.a.
Syria	16.2	49.5	5	27	n.a.	n.a.
Tunisia	9.6	49.5	4	32	n.a.	n.a.
Turkey	67.4	49.5	31	38	8.3	6.6
Yemen	17.5	49	6	28	11.5	8.2

*unemployment data for Lebanon refers to 1995. n.a.: not available.

SOURCE: World Bank online Database of Gender Statistics

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

makers and only 2 percent are project mangers and team leaders. Equivalent estimates for other Arab countries in the region are expected to be much lower, since Jordan is considered one of the ICT hubs of the Arab *mashriq* region.

Clearly, the public sector is the preferred employment venue for female workers throughout the region. Government jobs assure women of more equal treatment and benefits. Conversely, women employed in private enterprises suffer gender discrimination, including lower wages and limited professional prospects. In the case of Egypt, an employed woman in the private sector receives only 50 percent of a male coworker's wage despite having equal qualifications. This phenomenon might be attributed to non-wage benefits, including shorter working hours, lengthy maternity leaves, and early access to pension.

However, ongoing economic restructuring strategies in the region have a significant impact on women and have reduced female job opportunities in public institutions. This trend has pushed women workers into the informal employment sector, with low remuneration and no social protection, as suggested by the Moroccan case.

Women's low participation in the labor market has serious economic implications. At the individual level, it is costly for women and their families. The welfare of the family—including consumption of food, housing, healthcare, and other goods and services—is determined by the available income for the entire family. Logically, two workers in the household earn more income. During the oil boom in the 1970s and early 1980s, higher real wages made it possible for the small number of workers to support large number of dependents within their families while still enjoying high standards of living. Since the mid-1980s, real wages stagnated or declined. Consequently, fewer workers were able to support their families and maintain the same living standards. Nationally, lower participation rates for women in Middle Eastern and North African economies mean that almost half of the available human resources remain unutilized. Research has revealed that lower female participation in the labor market in the region has negatively affected successful structural adjustment reforms and competitiveness in the context of the global economy.

No Access to Assets

In addition to the significant gap in the labor market, limited access to assets and opportunities further restrict overall female economic participation in the region. For example, women's entitlement to land is minimal. Traditionally, sons are entitled to inherit the father's properties while women are discouraged to claim inheritance rights. In Egypt, the overall share of female landholders is less than 6 percent of all holders, although female labor is concentrated in agriculture activities.

Women's access to credit services is also restricted because formal credit institutions offer loans to those who have collateral such as land. Hence, women are almost excluded from such services since they do not have the required collateral. Moreover, females' access to new information and communication technologies is minimal.

Despite the quantitative improvement in female education, a closer look at female enrollment rates by subject suggests significant difference relative to males. For example, in the academic year 1995/1996 around 64.4 percent of female students in Jordan were enrolled in humanities and only 17.7 percent in engineering and physical and technical sciences. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) estimates this gap is more severe in other Arab countries. In the Arab world, the number of male students enrolled in fields of study such as engineering, commercial studies, and law is four times higher than that of female students. As a result, male students will have better career prospects and greater economic potential compared to that of their female colleagues.

Living in Poverty

The overall economic imbalance is also reflected in income and wages earned by female workers compared to those of their male counterparts. Wage discrimination against female workers is significant in the region compared to other countries. On average, a woman is paid only 73 percent of a man holding similar qualifications. According to the World Bank, if women in the region were paid for their qualifications in a manner equivalent to men, women's earnings would increase by an average of 32 percent, so they would earn 93 cents for every dollar earned by men, instead of 73 cents. Wage and

income discrimination have increased the vulnerability of women and of female-headed households.

Based on the patriarchal notions according to which the man is the income earner, family benefits and non-wage allowances are usually channeled only through men. This practice increases discrimination against female workers and hinders female participation in general. Women's vulnerability also increased in recent years because of rising unemployment and poverty rates in the region due to increased political instability and associated economic decline. At the same time, war and conflicts have increased the number of households headed by women in the region.

Addressing the Imbalance

In order to reduce gender imbalance and empower women in the region, various initiatives are currently being implemented in the region by civil organizations, governments, and international organizations, including the United Nations and the World Bank. In 2002 the first Arab Human Development Report urged enhancing women's roles in Arab society and economy.

This approach implies legal education as well as training and infrastructure components. The legal component requires the review of legislative regulations to amend legal provisions that fail to recognize gender equality and women's rights. The legal component also requires the reform of the labor market law to reflect the emerging development model based mainly on the private sector in job creation.

The report also calls for continued attention to education to provide women with better market skills through vocational and lifelong learning opportunities. Female supportive infrastructure is needed to allow women to combine work and family roles easily and with minimum sacrifice. Nevertheless, the successful implementation of this approach requires a profound change at all levels of society, from top-level government to local communities and individual households.

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KHALED ISLAIH

GENDER AND EDUCATION

Formal schooling, informal education, and gender socialization have historically been strong factors in the development of women, societies, and states in the Middle East, reflecting social, political, and religious trends and tensions within the region.

The education of girls and women in the Middle East is a complex and contentious subject. What knowledge women should acquire, relative to that of men, and how they should use that knowledge are matters of great debate, both among educators and among the public throughout the region and beyond. Indeed, discussions of gender and education often serve as markers of political or religious dissent and have become a key factor in the debate around women's status in the region. These debates reveal the complexity of gender socialization for Middle Eastern women and men, and the ways in which formal and informal educational structures and opportunities have variously, and often simultaneously, served as sources of empowerment and control. This complexity is best understood through a historical analysis of the role of education in the

development of gender role identity among different populations in the modern Middle East.

Participation and Content

Formal schooling for women and girls in the Middle East is characterized by both progress and regression. The region's states have accepted education as a basic right and, when compared to developing countries generally, over the last fifty years have made significant quantitative gains in female schooling. The enrollment of girls has increased notably, particularly following the introduction of nondiscriminatory compulsory public education laws in most states, and in many Middle Eastern countries girls and boys now have equal access to schooling and similar levels of participation. In the Middle East as a whole, girls are more likely to be attending school than their counterparts in West Africa or South Asia, and academically they usually outperform their male peers, both on assessments and in terms of grade repetition.

However, there are indications that these gains may be slowing, if not reversing. Nearly one girl in four of primary school age in the Arab states is not in school, and the ratio is far higher in Afghanistan. In addition, enrollment rates for girls drop noticeably beginning in middle school and continue to decline through secondary and tertiary schooling. Although Turkey, Iran, and Israel all boast high levels of both primary and secondary enrollment for girls, in the Arab states slightly less than 47 percent of the 60 percent of all students in the secondary age group enrolled in school are girls. High dropout rates among girls and high numbers of girls who never enroll contribute to the high overall levels of female illiteracy in the region (an average of 50% for women in the Arab states).

Gender bias in curricula varies from country to country within the region, but instructional programs and texts generally reinforce subordinate or domestic roles for women. However, the effects of these messages on student choices and participation are unpredictable. Secondary schools across the region, which typically track students into arts and humanities or sciences, generally sort females into the arts and humanities tracks and, in vocational programs, into such fields as nursing, typing, home economics, and simple bookkeeping. Tertiary programs reflect similar imbalances of women in social sciences, humanities, and education, as opposed to more technical fields. However, an increasing proportion of Middle Eastern women (indeed, a larger proportion than their Western counterparts) are choosing science and mathematics as specializations, and (as noted above), their performance has outpaced that of male students in these fields, even in more traditional societies.

Social Context

Such contradictory data indicate a need to view education within a broader framework than that of simple formal schooling. Social forces affect academic performance and gendered life choices. For Middle Eastern girls and women, as for women elsewhere, informal training and upbringing, popular discourses, and media engagement are as important to their overall education as any formal schooling they receive. Gender roles are conveyed, modeled, and reinforced in these venues in ways that interact with schooling to shape students' expectations, desires, and performance, thus exerting a profound influence on the future of the region's women and girls.

Historically, this interaction has been part of a larger tension between Middle Eastern cultures and educational reforms largely developed in or modeled on those of Western Europe and North America. Although traditional forms of education, including the *kuttab* and *madrasa* (Islamic schools focusing on religious instruction), have remained important throughout the region, colonialism, modernization campaigns, and now globalization have layered external influences over indigenous institutions and concerns. State school systems in the contemporary Middle East are heavily dependent on funding from international sources to maintain their capacity, and thus typically reflect an understanding of education that is based on external models (although content and pedagogy are typically at least one step behind efforts in the countries on which they are based). This dependence on the West has resulted both in greater Middle Eastern interest in and acceptance of Western norms and in rejection of those norms in favor of local or regional efforts grounded in religion and culture.

Islamic Influence

Religion has played a central role in the education of Middle Eastern girls and boys, and in the shap-

Students learn the art of embroidery during vocational training. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ing of their gender identity. Islam, the dominant religion for most of the region's countries, strongly emphasizes learning as an obligation of faith, and has in most cases been used historically as a support for education, including that of girls and women. Muslim women across the region have studied and continue to study in traditional Islamic schools and colleges; in schools operated by Christian missionaries; in public, state-sponsored schools; and in overseas institutions of higher learning. Local custom and beliefs, however, have affected the enrollment of girls and women and have strongly influenced both men's and women's fields of study. Formal secular education for women, as opposed to religious instruction, is seen across the region on a continuum ranging from necessity to nuisance, and there are notable differences of opinion about where the line between benefit and drawback occurs. Some extreme interpretations, such as that of Afghanistan's Taliban, have opposed women's education altogether, but these represent the exception rather than the rule. Most stances value female schooling's contribution to family and social development.

The influence of Islam has not been limited only to the formal schools. Family norms, social and political projects, and economic activities in the Middle East are all shaped by understandings of religious text and practice (even aggressively secular Turkey's rejection of Islam in the public sphere indicates the importance of the faith's influence). Islamic understandings of appropriate roles and activities for girls and women, and the training required for them to achieve those roles, are important subjects for

Two female students study in Iran. The segregation of the sexes in Iran has had a major effect on medical education. Iran will begin training female doctors to ensure that there are enough female physicians to treat the country's female population.
© Paul Almasy/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

debate across the region's states and are prominently argued in the media, in public discourse, and in law. Interpretations range from liberal to conservative extremes, but have in general favored domestic roles for women, or public service roles (such as teaching and nursing) that parallel and do not overwhelm their domestic responsibilities, with related limitations on the necessity of advanced formal training. Correspondingly, men are expected to provide income and support for families and to serve in public positions with parallel powers of provision and oversight that in theory benefit from more advanced education. Arguments in favor of extending women's service role to government and other forms of public leadership (with greater education as a prerequisite) are varyingly received: Highly educated women hold positions as government officials and are important religious figures in countries as varied as Palestine, Egypt, Iran, and Qatar but their formal participation in political life is much more limited in other states in the region.

Christian Influence

Islam is not the only religious tradition exerting influence on schooling and gendered identity in the Middle East, however. Christian missionaries have also contributed, largely through the establishment, beginning in the late nineteenth century, of formal schools for girls and of universities. Both in areas with larger indigenous Christian populations, such as Palestine, Lebanon, and Egypt, and in areas where Christian minority presence is nearly negligible, missionary schools provided an educational option for Middle Eastern students before the establishment of public education, and they continue to offer an alternative educational venue today. Some of these schools are indigenously governed and run and are closely connected to local Christian communities; others remain service arms of foreign missionary organizations. The latter, in particular, have tended to hold an outsider's perspective on the appropriate forms and functions of education for their students, and in many cases these closely paralleled the positions of the colonial regimes of Britain and France.

Many of the Christian schools and universities catered to an elite population (both Muslim and Christian) that has been at the center of political and cultural debates across the region, both in support of increased Westernization and in opposition to foreign influence. Together with institutions sponsored by colonial governments to train local administrators, these schools produced a new class of Middle Eastern intellectuals and political actors in the late nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century. Their graduates, fluent in the languages and cultures of their educational hosts, were intended to serve as bridges between societies, or facilitators of external influence, but their exposure to Western norms often had unintended consequences. Although many have been key to the processes of internationalization that have occurred in Middle Eastern states through their roles in government, cultural institutions, and social leadership, others—well informed and critical of Western approaches to and interests in the developing world—have formed a base of intellectual and material support for nationalist and regionalist movements and opposition to globalization.

Women graduates of these institutions have often taken positions on women's roles and rights that lean toward the liberal end of the political and cultural continuum, although not all would welcome being classified as feminists. These women have contributed to debates about women's roles and identity locally and internationally and challenge

both internal and external stereotypes of Middle Eastern women as unquestioning, submissive, or oppressed. Some do this from positions of comparative Westernization, others from a nationalist or Islamist stance, but all argue the importance of women's active contributions to the health of their respective societies.

Women's Role in Society

Whether such contributions should be instrumental, strategic, or intrinsically valuable is, however, a matter of debate. In throwing off colonial regimes and pursuing development agendas, many Middle Eastern states have framed women as important but temporary contributors to efforts at liberation and nation-building, only to relegate them to subordinate status once the national struggle has been resolved. Others have viewed women only as economic drivers whose contributions as physical laborers, wage earners, or child-rearers are essential to modernization and development. Both perspectives necessitate a rethinking of gender roles, and both support the increased education of women across the region, but neither values women for themselves, viewing them instead as instruments for achieving national goals that are determined mostly by men.

Modernization and related human capital models of development, which draw on an understanding of individual and population-group contributions to the economy as a form of investment capital, have emerged as the dominant framework across the Middle East, largely through pressure from institutions such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and other Euro-American development agencies determined to bring the region into line with international market norms. Research in this tradition argues that higher levels of education increase women's direct and indirect contribution to the market by increasing their productive skills, delaying marriage, increasing their average number of years in the formal labor pool, and reducing their fertility rates, thus increasing the health and education (and therefore the future productivity) of those children that they do bear.

Adopting this approach has led to broad public campaigns for girls' education in the Middle East and corresponding efforts to increase the quality of schooling for girls, particularly in those fields believed to most directly support technical and scientific development. Arguments for educated women's participation in public economic roles have created opportunities for many, but these positions tend to add to rather than replace women's unpaid labor in reproduction, and they have not been paralleled by legal changes to reduce their generally subordinate status.

Linking education first and foremost to economic development relegates learning to an instrumental role in the lives of women (and men) across the region and implies that it has no meaning or value apart from its connection to marketable skills or services. The intrinsic benefits and less measurable outcomes of education are devalued in an approach to development that many in the Middle East argue impoverishes culture and community. Recent regional attempts to articulate strategies for education drawing on the rich culture and history of the Middle East focus on humanistic and critical strains in early Islam and on socio-cultural structures that support socially engaged educational practice. Both approaches offer opportunities for the exploration of gender roles and expectations in ways that do not simply mimic Western feminist or neoliberal arguments for the improvement of women's status. Rather, they challenge societies to reexamine the roots of the social and moral order governing their lives and to develop indigenous strategies through which all members are able to flourish without sacrificing cultural heritage and communal dignity.

See also BAʿTH, AL-; KUTTAB; MADRASA; TALIBAN; WORLD BANK.

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RACHEL CHRISTINA

GENDER AND LAW

The modern Middle East and North Africa contain diverse political structures and a variety of legal regimes, yet the way that law constructs and shapes gender roles, hierarchies, and relationships evidences more similarities than differences throughout the region.

Among the most significant transformations of modernity to have influenced Middle Eastern societies over the last 200 years were far-reaching reforms of administrative structures, processes, and practices. Institutions of governance changed dramatically throughout the region, especially after the mid-nineteenth century, eventually giving rise to the different political entities and the diversity of legal regimes embodied by the present-day states of the contemporary Middle East. The region today is home to monarchies, constitutional democracies, secular republics, religiously based states, and, in the case of Lebanon's eighteen different legally recognized ethnoconfessional sects, a living remnant of the Ottoman millet system. Yet despite the diversity of politicolegal institutions, gendered aspects of the law are more alike than different throughout the region today.

Factors and forces catalyzing the political and legal transformations in the Middle East were indigenous as well as external. From within the region, the Qajar and Ottoman states decided to introduce parliamentary systems while also improving and centralizing their administrative structures. From outside, particularly after the Ottoman defeat in 1918, European colonial powers and private institutions such as missionary aid societies and Western educational institutions left a profound mark on the legal regimes of the Middle East. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, whether Ottoman, Qajar, colonial, or postcolonial, there were limited progressive transformations or advances in women's rights and duties under the law. Middle Eastern women's participation in the labor force as well as in decision-making bodies remains among the lowest in the world. Women cannot vote or stand for election in Kuwait; neither men nor women can vote or be elected in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In most of the Persian Gulf countries, women still cannot travel alone. Women in Saudi Arabia are forbidden by law to drive, and, until the early 1990s, Lebanese laws prevented women from owning their own businesses without obtaining permission from a male relative.

A leading issue of feminist legal activism in many countries is that of women's equal citizenship rights: Women who marry foreigners usually do not enjoy the legal right to extend their citizenship to their husbands or their children, unlike men, who can extend their citizenship to foreign wives and any children they bear. Lebanon and Israel have witnessed very similar public debates and political reactions concerning civil marriage between individuals of differing religions. Both states forbid secular marriage ceremonies but do recognize civil marriage certificates from other states. As a result, Israelis and Lebanese who wish to marry outside their faith traditions must either convert to the religion of their intended spouse or travel outside their countries (usually to Cyprus or Europe) to be married in a civil ceremony.

Despite legislation that in theory protects women and girls from harm and ensures respect for their

rights, customary practices continue in many countries of the modern Middle East that violate international laws and conventions safeguarding the rights of women, girls, and sexual minorities: female genital mutilation, early marriage, denial of schooling, crimes of "honor," domestic violence, and the arrest, imprisonment, and torture of lesbians, gays, and transgendered persons. Many of these problems are present in other regions of the world as well, but a particular combination of historical, ideological, and geopolitical factors has rendered issues related to gender and the law particularly sensitive in the contemporary Middle East. Legal and educational responses to violations of the rights of women, children, and sexual minorities in the Middle East are complicated by some Western attempts to demonize or pillory the peoples and cultures of the Middle East by highlighting these very practices as evidence of the inferiority or barbarity of the region in comparison with the West. A notable repercussion of the tense geopolitical confrontation between the Arab-Islamic world and the West over the last two centuries has been the depiction of Arab and Islamic woman either as icons of cultural purity, moral righteousness, authenticity, and inviolability, or as symbols of Middle Eastern backwardness and a general failure to modernize. Hence, issues related to gender, the law, and women's rights and duties in the region are among the most controversial topics of public discussion, media coverage, and academic inquiry.

Nineteenth-Century Reform: The Gendered Repercussions of State-Building and Colonialism

The Ottoman *Tanzimat* (reorganization or reordering) reforms of the mid-nineteenth century encompassed civil, legal, educational, economic, and political decrees. Though designed to stave off European influences in the region, attempts at reorganizing the Empire were also responses to growing internal pressures for legal reform and greater respect for human rights, particularly in large multiethnic cities. The Gühane Imperial Edict of 1839 guaranteed equal rights before the law for all persons regardless of ethnicity or religious confession (though not, however, gender). By establishing principles that enabled executive and legislative powers to pass from monarchs to representative bodies, the Gühane Edict echoed U.S. and French revolutionary political discourses and ideals, and revealed indigenous attempts to reconceptualize and modernize the theory and practice of citizenship in the Ottoman Empire.

One of the aims of the Tanzimat was to create a nondenominational, secular judicial system. The Hatt-i hümayun (Imperial Edict) of 1956, often referred to as the "Ottoman Bill of Rights," reiterated the Gühane Edict's legal designation and political embrace of non-Muslim groups as full citizens. With this declaration, Christians as well as Jews could serve on the Ottoman Council of State and act as judges in the Supreme Court. These and other reforms of the Tanzimat helped to lay the groundwork for the introduction into the region of the quintessentially Western political institution of modernity: the nation-state.

Some of the Tanzimat's economic reforms resulted, unintentionally, in the undermining of traditional communal support systems that had protected women, widows, orphans, the poor, and the disabled. Without the benefit of legally codified frameworks to safeguard their needs and interests during a period of rapid change, such vulnerable groups were among the hardest hit as the Ottoman Empire began to disintegrate. In particular, the Land Reform Law of 1858 attempted to secure and clarify land-tenure systems by reaffirming state ownership of land, and granted deeds of usufruct in the names of individuals to those in occupation and possession of productive tracts of land. The aim was to encourage settled and productive agriculture and thus to produce state revenues. Land reforms led, in effect, to an institution similar to private property, thereby transforming traditional tribal and village social structures into more formally institutionalized and legally codified landed feudal structures. Tribal shaykhs (leaders) and rural nobles became wealthy landlords, while their kinsmen and followers became tenant farmers. The prohibition on collective rights to land resulted in a new, profoundly hierarchical and asymmetrical social structure that created a new elite class of wealthy land-owners and a new—and much larger—class of impoverished farming families and landless individuals. Traditional moral structures emphasizing rights and responsibilities rooted in a pastoral nomadic or a rural agricultural lifestyle based on solidarity, honor, mutual assistance, and dignity began to break down as populations throughout the region

became increasingly integrated into legally codified relations with centralized administrative authorities (usually major cities such as Baghdad, Damascus, and Istanbul), as well as increasingly integrated into an international capitalist order.

Socioeconomic transformations of modernity generated new social roles and relationships, altered age-old solidarities, and created new hierarchies and inequities. The Ottoman legal system could not meet these rapidly emerging challenges by codifying new rights, duties, and requirements. It was left primarily to the European colonial powers to reconfigure Middle Eastern societies and to address pressing needs for legislation in fields as diverse as commercial, property, and criminal law. In so doing, they usually introduced versions of British or French legal systems, complete with their underlying frames of meaning and values. As a result, states throughout the contemporary Middle East have hybrid legal systems and constitutional structures that reflect the colonial era's legacy. Syria and Lebanon have French-influenced systems, whereas Jordanian and Iraqi laws were influenced by the British. Palestine, never having achieved sovereignty as a state, has a particularly hybrid legal legacy: Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip live under an overlapping mélange of Ottoman, British Mandatory, and Jordanian law, all of which are framed and affected by the current decisive legal system: Israeli military law.

Throughout the region, and regardless of the European power that had been in place in each country after the end of World War I, family law and laws related to "personal-status affairs" (i.e., laws related to birth, marriage, inheritance, burial, adoption, child custody, alimony, and divorce) remained largely beyond the reach of colonial powers. With the exception of Turkey, which under Atatürk had secularized its legal system, and Tunisia, which under Bourguiba had modernized personal-status laws, family law and laws related to gender issues throughout most of the remaining states of the Middle East remain conservative.

Gender and the Law in the Contemporary Middle East

Whereas the basic political unit in the Western liberal state was the individual citizen, the basic unit of society and politics throughout much of the Ottoman Empire remained the extended family, the faith community, or the confessional sect *(millet)*. Hence, the subject of legal rights and duties was not always or primarily the abstract, free-agent individual, but rather the individual as embedded in and tied to family, community, or sect. This relational conception of the subject of the law has had a profound impact on the interplay between gender and the law throughout the Middle East, because the family, community, and sect in the region are profoundly hierarchical and patriarchal structures in which males and seniors are accorded more privileges than females and juniors. Patriarchy, not Islam, Christianity, or Judaism, accounts for the differential legal status and political roles of women and men throughout the Middle East.

Regardless of laws ensuring equal treatment in theory, patriarchal roles, ideologies, and practices continue to hold sway not only in formal institutions of governance, but even more so through informal, daily structures of resource allocation, decision making and power brokering. One such structure is the informal social network, which can link neighborhoods, families, villages, and cities, and can even transcend state borders through the manipulation or invocation of kin and ethnic ties. Much of everyday life, public and private, is shaped by the dynamics of informal networks that operate according to custom, not codified laws. Given the challenges of administrative centralization and national integration that have confronted the largely artificial and externally imposed states of the region, monitoring, legislating, and policing gender-related practices in these informal social networks has been difficult.

Personal Status Laws

Given that the Middle East is comprised of new states founded on ancient informal civilizational structures, national identity in most countries of the region is fraught with competing tensions. In most cases citizenship, citizens' rights and their sense of national and supra-local identities, collective membership, and political belonging are not as clear or as compelling as are local kinship, religious or ethnic modes of identification, and political action. This has far-reaching implications for women's legal rights and their participation in national politics, given that the cultural construction of kinship and the social and political organization of local-level confessional communities in most countries of

the Middle East are profoundly patriarchal. Following the end of the colonial era, the attaining of independence, and the creation of national governments throughout the region, gender-biased customs and procedures attained a more formal status in legislation. As a result, women in many countries of the Middle East do not enjoy all of the basic rights and privileges enjoyed elsewhere. In theory, women in most countries in the region are allowed to vote and to run for any office in the land. The constitutions of most countries uphold the equality of women and men. However, actual practices do not reflect constitutional writ, largely because of the maintenance of personal status laws.

Personal-status laws not only give religious authorities and conservative political actors extensive powers over women's lives in situations of marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance, but they also emphasize women's roles as wives, mothers, and daughters at the expense of their roles as citizens. Personal-status laws can and do reduce women to the status of "legal minors" requiring the agency of male relatives or male religious specialists to maneuver in society outside the domains of family and home. This is a primary hindrance to women's ability to initiate legal or political action as agents on their own. Considerable grassroots political and legal activism has been focused on this problem for several years, particularly by transnational organizations such as Women Living Under Muslim Laws and Equality Now (neither of which is based in the Middle East). Personal status laws limit women's legal recourse in the event of divorce to the archaic rulings of religious authorities. In Lebanon, home to eighteen legally recognized confessional sects, this is a particularly complex and vexing issue. Orthodox Jewish women in Israel and Christian women in Arab countries have a much more difficult time obtaining a divorce than do their Muslim counterparts in the Arab world or in Iran.

Throughout the Arab-Islamic world, regardless of confessional membership, child custody in the event of divorce always favors the father. Patriarchal values and institutions dictate, in practice and in law, that the father's family has ultimate custody of all children because they are legally defined as members of his patriline under personal status laws. While they are young, children may stay with their mother following a divorce, but by adolescence, children of both genders are expected to live with their father's family. Inheritance presents a variety of legal rulings depending on one's confessional membership. Sunni religious courts grant daughters less than sons: In the event that a Sunni man has fathered only daughters, they usually will inherit less from their father than will their male paternal cousins and uncles. Shiʿite religious rulings on daughters' inheritance are much more equitable. In Lebanon more than a few Sunni men having only daughters, no sons, have become Shiʿite in order to pass their wealth and property directly to their daughters. Having a confessional membership is part and parcel of being a Lebanese citizen and profoundly shapes one's legal identity, status, and role. Atheism and secularism are not, legally and administratively speaking, options for anyone, male or female.

Although most countries in the region have signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), most have also entered strong reservations concerning issues related to personal-status laws. For example, in Lebanon (having had a French colonial influence) and Jordan (which had a British colonial influence), women married to non-nationals cannot pass their citizenship on to their children. Soon after the cessation of the war in Lebanon in 1990, Lebanese women won the right to travel abroad without the permission of their male relatives. Jordanian women are still pressing for this same right more than a decade later. A primary demand of Jordanian feminists, the rescinding of Article 340 of the Penal Code, which effectively permits men to kill female relatives to avenge "crimes of honor," has yet to be realized. A Jordanian forensic doctor recently estimated that a quarter of all murders committed annually in Jordan are "honor killings" (U.S. Department of State Annual Human Rights Report—Jordan 2000). Yet, to appease a political opposition that utilizes the rhetorical discourses of Islamic authenticity and family inviolability, the Jordanian government has not been able to halt such killings.

Although "honor crimes" have yet to be criminalized in Lebanon either, avid public discussions and debates about these crimes (as well as other controversial issues such as domestic violence, homosexuality, mixed marriages, civil marriage, and abortion) are standard fare on Lebanese public tele-

vision and in Lebanese magazines. Though laws may be slow to change, public debate over legal and gender issues is hastening thanks to the mass media.

Gay, Lesbian, and Transgendered Rights

In recent years, public debates concerning sexuality, gender, and sexual preference have become more common in most major cities of the Middle East. Although calls for gay, lesbian, and transgendered rights are still more controversial in the Middle East than they are in Europe or North America, annual gay-pride events take place publicly in Tel Aviv and in semipublic clubs in Beirut. Films, magazines, and web sites that address the special concerns and interests of gay, lesbian, and transgendered communities in the Middle East also allow members of the Jewish, Arab, Iranian, and Turkish diasporas to share information and build alliances that transcend national as well as confessional dividing lines in the region. Key among the concerns of gays, lesbians, and transgendered persons in the Middle East have been the invocations of religious discourse and religious teachings to criminalize homosexual activities. Activism in opposition to such human-rights abuses has included efforts by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, whose spokespersons have decried the targeting of gay men in Egypt and lesbians in Lebanon as part of wider repressions of human-rights activists, religious minority groups, political opponents, journalists, and many others who question the legal and political status quo in the region. Defending the rights of gays, lesbians, and transgendered persons also affords opportunities to address wider human-rights abuses and legal deficiencies related to gender issues, enabling activists to reiterate and redefine the spaces and subjects of the law, as seen in this 26 August 2002 communiqué by the director of a Lebanese legal rights institute protesting the arrest, imprisonment, and mistreatment of two lesbians in Lebanon: "We are aware of the conservative social settings of Lebanon and the negative societal attitude toward the homosexual community. However, this does not entitle the Lebanese government to deprive the liberty of homosexuals, nor does it warrant the torture and abuse sanctioned by the Lebanese police. Through this system of human rights abuses, Lebanon is breaching many international covenants and human rights conventions of which it is a member, not to mention basic human integrity" (Mouhrab, Arz).

Gender and the Law in the Middle East: Regional and International Perspectives

Regional and international developments, particularly the 1995 Beijing International Woman's Conference, Jordan's participation in the Euro-Med partnership, and the Reform Movement in Iran, have already had a noticeable impact on the official framing and treatment of women's issues and concerns not only within, but also beyond, the Middle East. International laws, movements, discourses, and conventions have had a growing impact on the way gender and the law are perceived and discussed, and how they interact and develop in the region.

One example of Middle Eastern women coming together to voice concerns about laws and rights in order to build political alliances was the Women's Tribunal, first held in Beirut in 1995. The Women's Tribunal was an international event, not a strictly Lebanese affair, but its convening in Beirut caused a public stir and generated fruitful and lively discussions about the psychological dynamics, legal consequences, and ideological underpinnings of women's domination in patriarchal societies. The tribunal, the first event of its kind ever to be held in the Middle East, dramatically broke through the silences that isolate women behind walls of shame, fear, and despair. It provided a rare opportunity for Arab women from different countries and various backgrounds to join together, share experiences, and form networks to confront the issue of violence against women in all of its forms: domestic, political, economic, and military.

Throughout the region, the primary obstacles to the attainment of full legal and political rights by women and sexual minorities are: cultural and psychological obstacles that hinder the transformation of personal experiences, attitudes, and stances into political agenda; women's continuing pronounced economic dependence on men; and legal and political structures that do not respect the human rights of either men or women, as well as the continuing enforcement of personal-status laws. Regional and international activists cite a crucial need for broad social movements based on grassroots networks that transcend class, ethnic, confessional, ideological, and gender divisions to surmount these obstacles, which are interrelated and interlocking. The past decade has witnessed increasing attempts to link national, regional, and international human-rights

monitoring agencies in order to advance women's rights as well as the rights of gays and lesbians. Largely through the medium of the internet, groups and individuals have been able to join forces in new ways to expose violations of women's rights and to protest the draconian treatment of gays and lesbians.

Yet, given the overall poor socioeconomic and human-rights situation throughout the region, a focus solely on women's rights or gay rights strikes some as narrow. One of the best-known human-rights activists in the region, the late Laure Mughaizel, a Lebanese human-rights activist, feminist, and lawyer, noted shortly before her death: "What will it serve us to fight for women to have rights equal to those of men if men's rights are also deficient?" (Mughaizel, public speech in 1996 in Lebanon). Ultimately, any analysis of gender and law in the Middle East must take into consideration the political economy of the region, as well as ongoing debates over universal human rights and their definition in the evolving body of international laws and conventions.

See also CRIMES OF HONOR; FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION; GÜLHANE IMPERIAL EDICT (1839); TANZIMAT; TUNISIA: PERSONAL STATUS CODE.

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LAURIE KING-IRANI

GENDER AND POLITICS

Gender consciousness, feminist goals, and gender itself have all affected citizenship politics throughout the history of the Middle East.

Formal, or institutional, politics in the Middle East has been dominated by men. An awareness of gender—the identification and comparison of continuously changing men's and women's roles and differences—is essential to an understanding of women's political experiences in the region. By focusing on women, one sees the struggles of the sex that is otherwise invisible in Middle Eastern politics and the challenges women face in attaining full citizenship.

Female voters cast their ballots in an Iranian election. Voting restrictions were lifted for Iranian women in 1980. **© WEBISTAN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

While literature on the Middle East often tends to relate women as a broad category, women in fact belong to diverse groups and pursue various interests. Women have habitually formed alliances across the lines of class, ethnicity, race, religion, family, or nation in their struggles against the oppressions they faced. Moreover, women live in a context of national, religious, state-sponsored, and consciously feminist political struggles. The following sections will outline the roots of gender consciousness, forms of feminist goals typical to the Middle East, and challenges to gender imbalance in their historical context.

The Roots of Gender Consciousness

Around the 1900s, the figures who facilitated the participation of women in the public sphere were mainly male Islamic scholars in Egypt, Iran, and Turkey. In Egypt, reformist thought traces back to Rifaʿa al-Rafi al-Tahtawi (1801–1873), an Azhari scholar educated in France who became the first major figure to call for the liberation and education of Egyptian women.

Qasim Amin (1863–1908) is considered the father of women's reform in the Muslim Middle East. His book *Liberation of Women* (1899) initiated women's liberation literature in the Arab world. He raised the issues of patriarchal oppression, polygamy, and the *hijab,* calling for an end to veiling and arguing for the education of women. The sections of his book that were based on Islamic law are believed to have been authored anonymously by Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), the *mufti* of Egypt at that time. Muhammad Abduh, a disciple of the father of the modern Islamic reform, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), called for the elevation of women as a way to end foreign domination. Abdu's ideas significantly influenced the Muslim world.

Some Egyptian women had publicly challenged gender biases before these male figures appeared, including Maryam al-Nahhas (1856–1886), Zaynab Fawwaz (1860–1894), and Aʾisha al-Taymuriyya (1840–1902). Women feminists had campaigned for education, done charitable work, and challenged colonialism. Huda al-Shaʿrawi became the acknowledged leader of Egyptian feminism, playing an essential role against British occupation through the women's wing of the Wafd Party and forming the Egyptian Feminist Union in 1923. Doria Shafik led

the struggle for voting rights, which were granted in 1956.

Reformers emerged in Iran in the late nineteenth century, starting with Mirza Agha Khan Kirmani and Shaykh Ahmad Ruhi, who wrote about women's equality with men in pleasure, benefits, marriage rights, and education. Historically, however, women's education did not receive full attention in Iran until Amin's book was translated into Persian in 1900. Ahmad Kasravi, a historian, reformer, and jurist, argued for women's education in the 1940s but opposed women's involvement in politics. He emphasized, however, that women could participate for national causes.

Reza Shah Pahlavi and his son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, combined enforced modernization with the crushing of any opposition. Acknowledging Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's influence, Reza Shah Pahlavi banned the veil *(chador)* in 1936, in an enforced program for emancipating women, and set about improving education. The veil was later chosen as a symbol of revolutionary protest by women who marched against the Pahlavi regime during the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Several prominent women helped shape Iranian history. Writer, poet, teacher, and religious rebel Qurrat al-Ayn (born in 1814, executed in 1852) preached Babism (a religious sect founded in 1844 by the Bab out of Shiʿi Islam and which gave birth to the Bahaʾi faith) for women's emancipation. The doctrines forbid polygamy, concubinage, and trading in slaves, among many things. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Taj Saltaneh and Bibi Khanoum Astarabadi publicly criticized the status of women in Iran. Siddiqeh Dowlatabadi started the first girls' school, in Isfahan in 1917, and the first major woman's magazine, *Zaban-i Zanan* (Women's tongue), which was both feminist and nationalist, in 1919.

By the time of the Islamic Revolution, Iranian women had already experienced nearly a century of political success unparalleled in the Middle East, including participation in the Tobacco Revolt of 1890. Iranian women were active in the Constitutional Revolution in 1906 and by 1963 had gained the right to vote. Iranian women held high political positions and had gained laws that gave them priority in child custody and equal rights to divorce.

Princess Aʿisha Bint al-Hussein (center) on a visit to Israel to learn about the women's service in the army, 1 June 1997. **© AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.**

In Turkey, after the collapse of the autocratic regime in 1908, women formed organizations, participated in political demonstrations, and wrote for the press. Atatürk abrogated *shariʿa* (Islamic law) and secularized personal status law, which he modeled on the Swiss legal code. Turkish new-wave feminists entered the political arena in the 1980s, waging campaigns against domestic violence and sexual harassment and petitioning the government to sign the 1985 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Turkey is one of two Middle Eastern countries to have had a female head of state, Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, who took office in 1993 (Israel is the other; Golda Meir was prime minister from 1969 through 1974).

Islamic Feminism

Feminism is political action against the oppression of women. In the Middle East, both secular feminism (invoking the UN Declaration of Human Rights) and religious feminism (invoking Islamic or Jewish

A member of the women's army demonstrates the handling of a Sten gun on 15 June 1948 at the Hen women's corps camp near Tel Aviv. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

scripture) are active. Both categories include a wide range of ideas, beliefs, and actions.

Egypt is the epicenter of Islamist feminist activism, which has rested on the involvement of middle-class professional women. Nazira Zayn ad-Din in the 1930s and Aʾisha Abd al-Rahman (Bint al-Shatti) in the 1980s called for *ijtihad* (Islamic legal deliberation) to solve gender problems such as polygamy and the assumption of male superiority. In the 1930s, following the Institute for the Mothers of the Believers model established by Hasan al-Banna (founder of the Muslim Brotherhood), Zaynab al-Ghazali formed the Muslim Women's Association. In 1964, when Gamal Abdel Nasser banned the Brotherhood and al-Ghazali was arrested, it had over a hundred branches in Egypt. Heba Rauf Ezzat (also Hiba Raʿuf Izzat), a political science professor, invoked al-Ghazali's discourse on women and politics through alternative interpretations of the Islamic scripture. Similarly, beginning the 1990s, Iranian women began to press for equality using the argument that religious literature is tainted by misogynist interpretations.

Islamist groups have recognized women's potential to serve Islamist interests. In Algeria, for example, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) did not object to women voting but sought to limit their employment. These groups generally encourage women activists to undertake community work through which Islamist political ideologies may infiltrate into society. Most contemporary Islamic scholars view feminism as something that originated in the West and that is a form of cultural imperialism. Islamists seek to counter by preaching veiling as a symbol of morality, authenticity, and cultural independence. Some Middle Eastern feminists also assert that much of the feminist discourse originated with and mirrors the concerns of white, middle-class Western women.

Nationalism and State Feminism

Since the 1800s, the development of women's political and social movements was intertwined with broader movements for national independence and state-building. Many Middle Eastern regimes have practiced state feminism in order to secure their legitimacy, creating programs designed to raise the levels of education, literacy, or employment; revive imagined or real traditional practices; modify personal status laws; and establish state-sponsored women's organizations.

Under regimes as diverse as those of Atatürk, Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Iraqi Baʿthists, and Nasser, women were mobilized in order to achieve national consolidation and an appearance of modernization. Any call for women's rights outside those on the state's agenda was perceived as antinationalist and thus divisive. After the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini crushed all women's protests and nullified the Family Protection Law. In North Africa, many women lost their lives fighting for independence, but once independence was gained women were told to return to their proper place in the home. Tunisian and Moroccan women have experienced some state-directed expansion of their freedoms, but the freedom of Algerian women has been severely constrained, particularly since the early 1990s.

The Israeli women's organizations that formed in the 1950s, such as Naʿamat (the women's branch of the labor union and the women's division of the Labor Party), the Women's International Zionist Organization or WIZO (the women's division of the Likud Party), and Emunah (affiliated with the National Religious Party), did not have a feminist mission and still do not. The General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW), formed in 1965, is the chief women's organization in Palestinian communities and legitimized by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). However, it has never challenged the male-dominated leadership of the PLO or its attitudes toward women. Held up as symbols of cultural integrity, women in both Israel and the Palestinian Authority are often valorized as biological reproducers of the nation.

Women have taken advantage of their abilities as mobilizers to advance women's activism and increase their decision-making roles. Samiha al-Khalil (c. 1940–1999) was a member of the Palestine National Council starting in 1965; president of the Women's Federation Society, al-Bira, the Union for Voluntary Women's societies, and the GUPW; and the founder of the Inʿash al-Usra Society beginning in 1967. Hanan al-Ashrawi (1946–), a human rights activist and professor of literature, became a minister in the Palestinian Authority government and since the 1990s has served as an articulate, internationally renowned spokesperson for the Palestinians.

Nationalist issues have created openings for other shared interests. After the first intifada (Palestinian uprising), many Israeli and Palestinian women demanded peace. The international movement Women in Black began in Jerusalem in 1988 when Israeli women dressed in black spoke out publicly for peace. This organization and others have included Palestinians. Shulamit Aloni (1929–), a teacher and attorney, was a Knesset member for many years and headed the Meretz Party; she has spoken on behalf of peace and justice, particularly criticizing policies that endanger Israelis and Palestinians.

Governments in the rapidly developing Persian Gulf consider the integration of women into the labor force a necessity if they are to reduce their dependence on foreign labor, which they see as a security threat. This has led to the formation of state-sponsored organizations with state appointment of members. The Arab Women's Development Society, a feminist organization campaigning for the vote in Kuwait, was disbanded after members refused to cooperate with a government-imposed director. Unlike the Princess Basma Center for Women and Development in Jordan, which is also state sponsored, AWDS does not address violence against women, such as honor killings. Even though the Women's Union of Syria operates under a republic, it follows preset national strategies.

Hanan Ashrawi, Palestinian Legislative Council member, is removed by Israeli police from a site in Jerusalem, 27 May 1999. The police charged into the crowd of protesters, preventing them from entering the Jewish neighborhood of Ras al-Amud in east Jerusalem under construction. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

In the Persian Gulf, women have been struggling for basic rights, as North African women were at the beginning of the twentieth century. Kuwaiti women are still fighting for their voting rights while Bahraini women won their voting rights in 2002 predominantly through informal Shiʿite *Maʾtam/Husayniyya* religious-social gatherings. Yet, Saudi women are demanding more civic freedoms. However, some Gulf leaders are supporting the participation of women within the framework of the development process, specifically Shaykh Zayid of United Arab Emirates and Sultan Qabus of Oman.

Challenges to the Gender Imbalance

Women have sought to improve their status through numerous campaigns. These include strategies to re-

spond to extremist Islamist movements. In 1990, when the FIS was gaining political clout, Algerian feminists led by Khalida Toumi (Messaoudi), a founding member of the Independent Association for the Triumph of Women's Rights, were notably outspoken. Sudanese writer and speaker Fatima Ahmed Ibrahim, president of the Sudanese Women's Union, has risked her life speaking out against National Islamic Front extremists in southern Sudan. Mehrangiz Kar, a former political prisoner and human rights lawyer, has published widely on the status of women in pre- and postrevolutionary Iran; her publications include a work coauthored with Shahla Lahiji, Iran's first woman publisher, who was also detained. In 2003, Shirin Ebadi received a Nobel Prize for her human rights activism. These women, along with Islamic feminist Shahla Sherkat, editor of *Zanan,* lead the debate on women's rights in Iran.

Tojan Faysal, the first woman to be elected to the Jordanian parliament (1993–1997), has been a staunch critic of human rights abuses and was detained in 2001. Asma Khader (also Khadir), a Jordanian lawyer, led the campaign to outlaw honor killings and received the 2003 Poverty Eradication Award from the UN Development Program. Laure Moghaizel, a founding member of numerous Lebanese women's organizations, worked locally, regionally, and internationally for the advancement of women's rights.

Nawwal al-Saʿdawi, an Egyptian doctor and writer and a particularly prominent feminist, formed and headed the Arab Women's Solidarity Association in 1985. Even though fervently secular, she attributes her awareness of women's rights to the teachings of Muhammad Abduh, who taught her father in al-Azhar. Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi, another leading feminist in the Arab world, critiques and analyzes Islamic law from a secular perspective.

In Turkey, Women for Women's Human Rights has worked since 1993 to raise feminist consciousness and confront domestic violence, as have the Purple Roof Foundation and Altindag Women's Solidarity Foundation. In Afghanistan under the Taliban, women and girls were banished to seclusion in the home and thousands were raped, tortured, killed, or forced into prostitution. Since 1977, the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan has struggled for women's human rights as an independent political and social organization, also undertaking social and relief work.

Numerous research centers have developed across the Middle East. These include the New Woman Research and Study Centre in Egypt, the Women's Library and Information Centre in Istanbul, the Lebanese American University's Institute for Women's Studies in the Arab World, and the Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche et le Développement. Although some are purely research oriented, some also engage in advocacy for gender equity.

Regional organizations include the Arab Women's Federation, the Women's Committee of the Arab League, the Center for Arab Women for Training and Research, and the Arab Women's Forum (AISHA), a regional nongovernmental organization made up of fourteen Arab women's organizations. International organizations include the World Federation for Women, Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era, and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). Conferences, such as UN conferences on women, are important forms of global support for Middle Eastern women.

Conclusion

Middle Eastern women have proven resourceful and dynamic participants in the political processes that shaped recent Middle Eastern history. Feminism in the Middle East cannot be separated from nationalist and anticolonial movements, or from issues such as poverty and illiteracy that Middle Eastern women have faced. However, the interventionist measures of postindependence states have been primarily geared toward national development, treating women's rights as a secondary concern.

See also Abduh, Muhammad; Afghani, Jamal al-Din al-; Amin, Qasim; Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche et le Développement (AFTURD); Çiller, Tansu; Front Islamique du Salut (FIS); Ibrahim, Fatima Ahmed; Iranian Revolution (1979); Kar, Mehrangiz; Khalil, Samiha Salama; Meir, Golda; Mernissi, Fatema; Muslim Brotherhood; Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA); Saadawi, Nawal al-;

SHAʿRAWI, HUDA AL-; TAHTAWI, RIFAʿA AL-RAFI AL-; TOBACCO REVOLT; TOUMI, KHALIDA; WOMEN AND FAMILY AFFAIRS CENTER; WOMEN IN BLACK; WOMEN'S AFFAIRS CENTER (GAZA); WOMEN'S CENTRE FOR LEGAL AID AND COUNSELING; WOMEN'S FORUM FOR RESEARCH AND TRAINING (YEMEN).

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WANDA C. KRAUSE

GENDER: STUDY OF

A theoretical approach to Middle Eastern issues that considers assumptions made about sex roles and the impact of those assumptions.

Contemporary scholars see gender as the social, cultural, politico-legal, and ideological construction of male and female roles, relations, and rights on the basis of perceived gender differences. Scholars also view gender as a system of social relations and ideologies that influences other social relations, institutions, and processes. The common, overarching frameworks within which gender has been studied, interpreted, and taught in the context of the modern Middle East are Islam, patriarchy, and the construction of the nation-state. Scholars often divide the evolution of women's struggles for social, economic, and political rights in the Middle East and North Africa into three historical periods: the period of anticolonial struggles from the mid-nineteenth century through the early twentieth century; the era of nationalist movements of the mid-twentieth century; and the era of globalization from the 1980s into the twenty-first century. Academic approaches to the study of gender shifted from the study of texts, interpretations, and structures to the analysis of social practices, identity construction, and the language and rules concerning gender in various fields. In the process, the binary divisions that defined gender studies in the earlier periods (male/female, public/private, state/civil society, global/local, East/West) became problematic. The understanding of gender turned away from such categories and descriptions and focused instead on the dynamics of the construction, change, and transformation of social roles. Gender studies became institutionalized through the creation of women's studies departments, institutes, and transnational organizations and Web sites. Simultaneously, international conferences and international conventions concerning women's civil and human rights made women's status a global issue. In these contexts, Western discourses concerning identity formation, citizenship, and human rights began to be challenged.

Development of Gender Studies

Although the global nature of ideas is now generally accepted, systematic attempts to analyze areas of dialogue and confrontation between approaches from

distinct socio-historical settings have been rare until recently. Scholarship on gender in the Middle East did not escape interpretations that tended to trap women between the grand narratives of the West and local narratives of resistance, be they modernist-nationalist or fundamentalist, in which real women are replaced by woman-as-symbol. In the West, feminists have often enough looked through the lens of a universalized Western concept in which citizen-subjects were seen as autonomous individuals who owned themselves and entered into social contracts with other autonomous individuals. Feminists grounded in this perspective strove to illuminate the ways in which these social contracts were not gender blind; they argued for equality based on gender-neutral categories. In the Middle East, the viewpoints generally envisioned subject-citizens as deeply embedded in communities, families, ethnic, racial, or other social groupings. Their members were seen as relational selves whose identities were developed interdependently rather than independently from one another. Men's and women's roles and identities were seen as complementary. As in the West, patriarchy has been universal, but the particular ways that gender is altered and affected by inequalities of power is site specific. In the Middle East and North Africa, both liberal modernist-nationalists and conservative fundamentalists put the defense of Islamic/Arab culture in the foreground, rendering women's rights secondary to women's symbolic value as the embodiment of the nation or the image of the moral community. Contemporary women's studies challenges this tendency to reduce the richness and complexities of women's actual lives to one-dimensional symbols or stereotypes.

Contemporary Debates

At least three common paradigms have obstructed more complex understandings of women's lives in the Middle East and North Africa. One is the religious paradigm, in which the existence of gender inequality is attributed to Islam's influence upon the lives of women and men in North Africa and the Middle East. The unstated assumption here is that religion is at once the cause of and the solution to gender inequality: If the religion is done away with, equality between men and women will ensue. The second is what Cooke calls the rescue paradigm—or, "white men saving brown women from brown men." This gendered logic of empire not only provides a pretext for global superpower interventions but may at times reveal the neocolonial underpinnings of international sisterhood. The third is the passivity paradigm, in which women are seen as objects rather than agents, living apolitically, in the private sphere. Recent scholarship has revealed how porous the boundary is between the public and private spheres in societies where kinship, family, and community have primacy over individuals. To understand women's roles in society, it helps to examine what counts as political in a given place and time, how individuals are encouraged to become agents (to act rather than merely be acted upon), and what forums and institutions give access to power. These questions are crucial to current academic and policy debates concerning civil society, political reform, and economic development.

Institutionalization of the Study of Gender

In recent decades, women's and gender studies have become institutionalized on a number of levels. Meetings such as the UN-sponsored International Women's Conferences, held periodically since 1975, and the signing of international conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women have brought women's status into the international arena, putting pressure on nation-states to safeguard women's human rights. On a national level, the spread of nongovernmental organizations focusing on women's status in countries across the Middle East and North Africa is linked to the fact that development projects which include grass-roots gender perspectives are more likely to succeed. On a local level, the spread of women's and gender studies centers, programs in academic institutions such as Birzeit University or the American University in Cairo, and women's social service centers in areas plagued by violence and war have made visible the gendered nature of social decision-making. On a virtual level, the creation of Web sites such as the Machreq/Maghreb Gender Linking and Information Project, sponsored by Oxfam GB and the European Union; the International Women's Tribune Center, associated with the UN-sponsored conferences; the Web site of the Women's Environment and Development Organization; and the newer H-Gender-Mideast have provided forums for ongoing international discussion of the centrality of gender to all areas of social life.

The discipline of gender studies is not merely an addition to the other disciplines that make up Middle Eastern area studies. Gender studies has reconstituted the field itself. Its perspective from the margin has revealed the ways in which power—gender privilege among males and Western constructions of the Middle East (orientalism)—shaped the approach to the object of study. Putting women in the center, valorizing their experiences and contributions as half the population in any society, meant reexamining areas of social practice that had previously been rendered secondary, misrepresented, or silenced. These include oral literature, domesticity, complex communication patterns based on indirection, informal work, the intersection of public and private worlds. As Lila Abu-Lughod has pointed out, the most important contribution of this theorizing has been the way it has revealed that analytical categories often conceal Western cultural notions. The study of gender in the Middle East, framed as it has been by the violence of colonization and of postcolonial wars, the struggle for women's rights as human rights, and the responsibility to address global injustice and inequality, has challenged scholarly inquiry to move beyond ethnocentric, binary categories that have reduced, objectified, and stereotyped the subjects in question.

See also ORIENTALISM.

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LAURA RICE

GENERAL DIRECTORATE ON THE STATUS AND PROBLEMS OF WOMEN

An institution that serves as a liaison between the Turkish state and society on the issue of women's rights and problems.

The General Directorate on the Status and Problems of Women was founded in 1990 in line with the requirements of the United Nations Convention on Elimination of All Kinds of Discrimination against Women. Attached to the Turkish Prime Ministry, its activities are supervised by the State Ministry responsible for women and the family. The directorate is comprised of four main departments: Educational and Social Affairs; Economic Affairs; Documentation, Publications, and Statistics; and Foreign Affairs.

Its major objectives are to protect and to promote women's rights; to improve women's social, economic, cultural, and political status; and to ensure that women enjoy equal rights and opportunities in all walks of life. To these ends, it conducts and finances research projects with a policy orientation; collaborates with other public institutions,

local administrations, and women's associations; and raises consciousness through the mass media about women's issues.

During its first years, the directorate raised serious suspicions among nongovernmental women's organizations, most of which believed that its aim was to control and co-opt women's independent activism. These perceptions greatly diminished with the appointment of a former nongovernmental leader as its director and with the success of its collaborative projects and campaigns.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; TURKEY.

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BURÇAK KESKIN-KOZAT

GENERAL FEDERATION OF IRAQI WOMEN

The strongest women's organization in Iraq during the Baʿthist regime, and an effective arm of the Baʿthist Party.

The General Federation of Iraqi Women was established in the early 1970s, after Saddam Hussein and the Baʿthist Party assumed political power. Its stated goals were to improve the situation of Iraqi women and to marshal their skills in the task of building an Arab socialist state. Campaigns were launched to promote literacy, better childcare, maternity leave, improve wages, and promote women within the economic sector and in politics. An arts committee was established later. By all accounts, the federation was responsible, at least in part, for the many gains made by Iraq's women in the last quarter of the twentieth century and for Iraq's record on women's rights, which, before the U.S. invasion in 2003, were often cited as the best in the Arab world. As of 2004, literacy rates for women are close to 50 percent but were much higher before the 1991 Gulf War. According to federation officials, before the Gulf War all women received one full year of maternity leave: six months with full pay and six months with half pay, plus six weeks at the time of the baby's birth. (This was independently confirmed by the author in 1996 interviews in Iraq.)

As of 1996, the federation had 1,500,000 members in twenty-two branches throughout the country. Each branch had a clubhouse, where women gathered freely. Women who were interviewed by the author in both city and countryside in Iraq stated that the federation's greatest contributions were its record in family law and its campaign for equal pay for women. Officials stated that secular law had replaced Islamic family law *(shariʿa)* The secular code guaranteed women their rights to inheritance and prohibited polygamy unless the first wife was ill and could not bear children; even then, the first wife had to agree. (These claims were confirmed in author interviews.) The federation was involved in the creation of a Women's Museum in Baghdad, financed by the Baʿthist Party, the only such museum in the Arab world.

Since the 2003 U.S. invasion, and the fall of Saddam Hussein, little or no mention has been made of the federation. As it was an official arm of the Baʿthist party, its future remains in doubt.

See also BAʿTH, AL-; IRAQ; *SHARIʿA.*

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ELIZABETH FERNEA

GENERAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES

Libya's ruling cabinet.

The General People's Committees were established in March 1978 in Libya when Muammar al-Qaddafi and the other members of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council formally renounced their government positions. Exercising executive powers,

the General People's Committees have a function equivalent to ministerial cabinets.

See also Qaddafi, Muammar al-; Revolutionary Command Council (Libya).

Lisa Anderson

GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (GPC)

Ostensibly, Libya's governing body.

Formally the preeminent governing body of Libya, the General People's Congress (GPC) was formed after the March 1977 declaration of the era of the *jamahiriyya.* Delegates are selected from among district-level basic people's congresses, people's committees, and professional associations. Charged with debating reports from government agencies, the GPC meets infrequently and serves primarily as a sounding board for the head of state, Muammar al-Qaddafi.

See also Jamahiriyya; Qaddafi, Muammar al.

Lisa Anderson

GENERAL TUNISIAN UNION OF STUDENTS (UGTE)

Tunisian student union.

The Union Générale Tunisienne des Etudiants (UGTE) was Tunisia's major student group until the government banned it in early 1991 because of its association with the Islamist movement. Beginning in the 1980s, the Islamic Tendency Movement (Mouvement de Tendance Islamique; MTI) actively sought to take over the UGTE. It charged its University Bureau's Mokhtar Bedri with securing Islamist domination at the University of Tunis and provincial colleges through control of the UGTE.

The UGTE Islamist leadership was decimated by numerous arrests, trials, and imprisonments from 1991 to 1992. The government then infiltrated cadres of RCD (government party) candidates into leadership positions in the UGTE. As a result, the UGTE is more nonactivist and pro-government.

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Larry A. Barrie

GENERAL UNION OF PALESTINIAN WOMEN'S COMMITTEES (GUPWC)

Organization that provides opportunities for women, undertakes family assistance, and organizes kindergartens.

The General Union of Palestinian Women's Committees (GUPWC) was established in 1965 under the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization. As such, it is the official representative body for Palestinian women around the world and encompasses all Palestinian women's organizations. The main goal of the union is to mobilize women to participate in social, economic, and political processes that will contribute to their development. The union is also politically active, supporting women in all aspects of the struggle for a Palestinian state, and at the nationalistic and social levels by providing leadership programs.

The GUPWC maintains a number of activities for women in order to integrate them into the labor force and raise cultural and health standards. Branches of the union are active throughout the Middle East and also in the United States, the Netherlands, and England. It has established vocational training centers and educational institutions in Palestinian refugee camps and holds classes to eradicate illiteracy. It also maintains nurseries and kindergartens so that women are able to partake in the union's activities and programs. Local specialized committees handle various activities and programs sponsored by the union.

See also Palestine; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

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Mallika Good

GENERAL WOMEN'S UNION OF SYRIA

Also called the GWU, the General Women's Union is the major women's political organization in Syria.

The GWU was founded in 1967 by a consortium of women's groups. The organization is funded by the government and has developed projects focusing on children and education. The union is divided into fourteen branches throughout Syria, which assist

associations and centers that deal with women's and children's issues and promote the active participation of women working in and outside the home.

The main focus of the GWU is to promote women's rights, to involve women effectively in the public sphere, and to end the exclusion of women and their marginalization in Syrian society. It has established child care centers, kindergartens, and vocational training and income-generating centers that train adult women in various skills and then sell the resulting products.

Internationally, the union has forged close ties with women's organizations throughout the Arab world. These groups meet, exchange ideas, share experiences, and prepare new strategies to improve women's lives in the region and allow them fuller participation. The union also works closely with the United Nations and international nongovernmental organizations. The GWU put together the National Syrian Women's Strategy, whose guidelines are based on the platform of the 1995 Beijing Conference for Women. The program is a plan of action, dealing with the implementation of various proposals from 1995 to 2005, when the next international conference on women is scheduled to convene.

Members of the union also participate in political debates about the Israeli occupation, the Palestinian situation, and the war in South Lebanon. Some of the GWU's strategies include: researching laws and legislation that deal with women, their citizenship rights and responsibilities, and any discrepancies between the ideals of equality and the current realities; working to ensure that laws are in place to protect and promote women and their human rights, and that they are enforced at all levels of government; helping women understand their rights and responsibilities and providing them with the knowledge and support they need to make the most of their opportunities; addressing social issues as poverty, health care, education, and family planning and their effect on women; enhancing women's ability to participate in decision-making at the national level and at home; and eradicating gender-related stereotypes that place women at a disadvantage.

See also Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Syria.

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Mirna Lattouf

GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE (1973)

Conference called by the United Nations after the Arab–Israel War of 1973.

The 22 December 1973 conference was convened in Geneva, Switzerland, in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 338. Its purpose was to settle issues that led to or arose from the Arab–Israel War of 1973. Of the Arab states, Egypt and Jordan participated, but Syria did not. Palestinian representatives were not invited to the opening session. After the opening speeches and ceremony, the conference adjourned and never reconvened. Israel had been reluctant to participate in multiparty conferences where pressures might be exerted for withdrawal from occupied territories and other steps it opposes. Disengagement agreements were signed in 1974 ending the war between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Syria.

See also Arab–Israel War (1973).

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Benjamin Joseph

GEOGRAPHY

The topography and geography of the Middle East are closely related to the geology and climate of the region.

A zone of mountainous terrain in the north in combination with higher latitudes, lower temperatures, and increased precipitation gives a distinctive char-

acter to Turkey, Iran, and parts of the Levantine (eastern Mediterranean) coast. To the south, in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, tilted fault-block mountains and volcanoes provide intermittent physical relief to an area largely consisting of plateaus and plains. Unremitting aridity and high temperatures typify the desert that dominates this southern part of the region.

The geology of the Middle East is determined by the movement of continental plates in a northwesterly direction. This movement, in turn, deforms masses of sedimentary strata deposited in Paleozoic times in the ancient Tethyan Sea, which once separated Eurasia and Africa. The African plate is the largest and consists of ancient igneous materials overlain, in part, by a relatively thin layer of more recent sedimentary rocks. With the exception of the folded strata that make up the Atlas and Anti-Atlas Mountains in the west of the Maghrib (North Africa), the Ahaggar and Tibesti Mountains of Algeria and Libya, as well as the highlands of the Ethiopian plateau, are volcanic in nature. The Arabian plate to the east consists of tilted Mesozoic sedimentary strata dipping beneath the Persian/Arabian Gulf: These strata overlie pre-Cambrian igneous basement rock exposed by erosion in the Asir Mountains along the western shores of the peninsula. The Red Sea, which the uptilted edge of the Asir overlooks, is a continuation of the East African rift valley system and is formed by the moving apart of the African and Arabian blocks. This rift system continues north through the Gulf of Aqaba and forms the valley of the Dead Sea and the Jordan River. It eventually disappears in the down-folded strata of the Biqa (Bekaa) Valley of Lebanon.

The heavily folded Zagros Mountains bordering the Gulf on its eastern side result from the collision and subduction of the Arabian plate under the Iranian plate. The Persian/Arabian Gulf, which is an inlet of the Indian Ocean along the axis of the subduction zone, has accumulated huge quantities of sediments from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the Karun River, and numerous intermittent streams draining the lands on either side. Within these Tertiary sedimentary strata are found the largest petroleum fields in the world, with deposits in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman, in descending order of importance. To the northwest, the Turkish plate is sliding westward along a transform fault and colliding with the Aegean plate. These areas of movement create major fault zones subject to severe earthquakes. In Turkey, the Erzincan earthquake of 1992 was typical. Faulting and recent volcanism terminate the northward extension of the rich petroleum fields of the Gulf beyond a few poor deposits near Batman, Turkey.



Aerial view of the Gulf of Aqaba (also known as the Gulf of Elat) on the Red Sea. It stretches 120 miles north from the Straits of Tiran, ending where the southern border of Israel meets the borders of Egypt and Jordan. **© Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

The northern part of the Middle East is a mountainous extension of the Alpine orogeny. The Pontic Mountains paralleling Turkey's Black Sea coast merge with the eastern highlands notable for volcanic Mount Ararat of biblical fame. The Taurus Mountains along Turkey's south shore extend eastward as the Anti-Taurus Mountains, joining the Zagros Mountains running southeast between Iran and Iraq. Another extension forms the Elburz Mountains bordering the Caspian Sea in Iran. Mount Damavand (18,934 ft [5775 m]), the highest peak in the Middle East and North Africa, is part of this range. Still farther east, the Kopet Mountains merge with those in Afghanistan and the Hindu Kush.

Great rivers have played their part in the history and development of the Middle East. The White

Most of Iraq consists of mountains surrounding a central plain. Iraq is located in western Asia, between the Middle and the Far East. © Paul Almasy/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Nile, which rises in equatorial Africa, is joined at Khartoum in Sudan by the Blue Nile, flowing from the highlands of Ethiopia. No precipitation sufficient for human survival occurs from that juncture north to the Mediterranean Sea, and all life in Egypt depends on the use of the combined waters of the two Niles. The Euphrates River and its companion the Tigris both rise in Turkey and join in southern Iraq to form the Shatt al-Arab, which empties into the Persian/Arabian Gulf. The area between the two streams, ancient Mesopotamia, was the site of the earliest civilization, Sumer (3500 B.C.E.), and other ancient civilizations based on irrigation farming.

The Mediterranean Sea also has influenced many of the cultural and geographical characteristics of the Middle East. It has served as a major link between Europe, Africa, and southwest Asia since ancient times. The Turkish Straits, composed from north to south of the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles, are an important waterway joining the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean. Bronze Age ships plied these straits and sailed along the coast of Turkey as well as among the Aegean Islands. Early Phoenician traders established sea routes leading to the Straits of Gibraltar and beyond. Ancient Greek ships traveled through the Bosporus to bring grain from the shores of the Black Sea, and Roman triremes linked Italy and Africa. During the Middle Ages, some Arab navigational skills were conveyed to Europeans as Islam was spread. In the nineteenth century, the Mediterranean route was enhanced when the French and Egyptians completed the Suez Canal, joining the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea and thus reducing the trip from Europe to India (originally by way of the Cape of Good Hope) by thousands of miles.

The Middle East is composed of four environments, expressed by climate, vegetation, and traditional lifestyle. Well-watered humid and subhumid lands border the Black Sea in Turkey and extend along the Caspian shore of Iran. In these well-populated places, maize (corn), tea, hazelnuts, and rice are important crops.

Mountainous terrain, with remnant forests of pine, cedar, and juniper, rims the Anatolian plateau of Turkey and extends southward into coastal Syria and Lebanon. Similar but drier environments are found in the Zagros and Elburz Mountains of Iran. These areas once supported dense growths of mature trees, but with the exception of more remote places in the Taurus Mountains, the logger's ax and the charcoal burners' ovens have depleted the forests while nomads' goats have prevented regrowth through overgrazing. The result is either disturbed and impoverished woodlands (French, *maquis*) or barren and rocky ground supporting low herbaceous shrubs (French, *garrigue*).

The interior plateau of Turkey, the foothills of the Anti-Taurus and Zagros Mountains, and the northern portions of Jordan and Israel are semiarid, with grazing or grain production depending on the amount of each year's precipitation. The variance of rainfall on the drier margins of these areas makes permanent rain-fed agriculture difficult. As a result, ancient peoples developed pastoral nomadism as a lifestyle that met this challenge. Herds and flocks were moved seasonally to new pastures to avoid overgrazing of sparse vegetation as well as to seek out water sources. Once an important means of livelihood, nomadism has largely been abandoned.

The semiarid steppes merge gradually into true deserts, which dominate southern Israel, Jordan, and Iraq as well as the Arabian Peninsula and North

Africa west to the Atlas Mountains. Saharan conditions extend to the Mediterranean shore of North Africa from Gaza to Sfax in Tunisia, the only exception being a small outlier of Mediterranean climate on the Jabal al-Akhdar (Green Mountain) of Libya. Under desert conditions, agriculture is possible only in scattered oases and along the banks of rivers like the Euphrates in Iraq and the Nile in Egypt.

The narrow rim of Mediterranean climate, which extends north from Gaza through Israel, along the coasts of Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey, is the fourth environment. This same climate is also found from Tunis west to the Atlantic shores of Morocco. The Mediterranean environment is typified by winter rains and hot dry summers, which allow for the production of irrigated vegetables and citrus fruits, as well as various winter grains.

See also Aegean Sea; Aqaba, Gulf of; Arabian Peninsula; Ararat, Mount; Atlas Mountains; Biqa Valley; Black Sea; Climate; Dead Sea; Hindu Kush Mountains; Levantine; Maghrib; Mediterranean Sea; Nile River; Persian (Arabian) Gulf; Petroleum, Oil, and Natural Gas; Shatt al-Arab; Straits, Turkish; Suez Canal; Taurus Mountains; Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.

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GERMANY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

German involvement in the Middle East in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Brief contacts between Prussia and the Ottoman Empire occurred before the 1880s. In 1760 Frederick the Great sought an alliance with the Ottomans during the Seven Years' War; and in the 1830s Helmuth von Moltke, later chief of the Prussian General Staff, served as adviser to the Ottoman military in Constantinople (now Istanbul).

Nineteenth Century

After 1870, the new Germany was not concerned with the Eastern Question. German prime minister Otto von Bismarck, acting as the "honest broker" at the Berlin Congress in 1878, wished to avoid conflict with Austria, Hungary, Britain, and Russia—countries that already had imperialist stakes in the area. German intellectual interest in Iranian culture, language, and poetry had led to a treaty of friendship and commerce between Prussia and Persia (Iran) that was renewed in 1873; the relationship was cautious, however, because Bismarck understood that the area was under the domination of Russia and Britain. He agreed to open a German legation at Tehran in 1885 but would not meet with Naser al-Din Shah when the Iranian ruler visited Berlin in 1889. Similarly, in 1882 Bismarck reluctantly agreed to send military officers to the Sublime Porte after Abdülhamit II decided to replace France's military advisers with military personnel from Germany.

In this case, Germany's military mission inaugurated a more active political and economic policy toward Turkey that was advocated by Kaiser Wilhelm II, who ascended the throne in 1888 and replaced Bismarck in 1890. Germany's "drive to the East" *(Drang nach Osten)* was the means by which it would achieve imperialist parity with France and Britain through cultural and economic penetration of the declining Ottoman Empire. Advocated by Baron Hatzfeld, Germany's ambassador to Turkey from 1879 to 1881, the policy took into account the possibilities for Germany that resulted from the vacuum created by Britain's loss of prestige in the area after they assumed control of Cyprus (1878), occupied Egypt (1882), and became involved in Ottoman affairs because of the Ottoman public debt. Wilhelm II's visit to the Middle East in 1898, during which he advocated friendship with Islamic peoples, solidified ties between Germany and Abdülhamit II (called by some the Bloody Sultan because of his treatment of the Armenians). Acquiesence to Ottoman sensibilities resulted in lack of official

Emperor Wilhelm II of Germany (1859–1941) boards a ship in Turkey with Enver Paşa (1881–1922). Enver Paşa, War Minister during World War I, was instrumental in bringing Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers. © HULTON/ARCHIVE BY GETTY IMAGES.

support by Germany for Zionism, in spite of an initial favorable reaction to discussions with Theodor Herzl, and for the German Templars, Protestants from southern Germany who were seeking to establish ideal communities, began settling in Palestine in 1868.

From 1885, Germany's military mission, now under the command of Kolmar Freiherr von der Goltz, was responsible for instituting a network of military preparatory schools and reorganizing the Ottoman officer corps on the Prussian model. German advisers worked with Ottoman troops throughout the crises that beset the Sublime Porte before World War I. By that time, despite Germany's diplomatic failures in the Moroccan crises (1905–1906, 1911) and Ottoman defeats in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), German officers were teaching and working in Turkey, and Turkish officers were sent to Berlin for advanced training.

Germany's ambassadors to Turkey, Marschall von Bieberstein (1897–1912) and Hans von Wangenheim (1912–1915), worked assiduously to open markets for their nation's products. Concessions were granted to a German bank (Deutsche Bank) and an arms merchant (Mauser) to build the Berlin-Baghdad Railway and the Hijaz Railroad; and in 1906 the Hamburg Amerika steamship line sailed the Persian Gulf in competition with ships from Britain. By 1914, Germany's share in the Ottoman public debt reached 22 percent (it had been 4.7% in 1888), and it had a 67.5 percent share in Ottoman railway investment. The Deutsche Bank played a major role in the Turkish economy, as did the Deutsche Palästina Bank in Palestine.

World War I

Despite Britain's presence in Turkey, Germany's influence, especially in the army, increased throughout the Young Turk period. Disunity in the approach of the Committee of Union and Progress to foreign policy led some to seek different allies as Europe headed toward war. The negotiations of Enver Paşa and Mehmet Talat with Germany resulted in a secret alliance on 1 August 1914. The Ottoman Empire entered World War I in November 1914.

Once the lines of communication between Germany and Turkey were secure, hundreds of German military officers were transferred to Turkey, some in command of Turkish troops, but not as decision-makers regarding policy and strategy. As head of the military mission since 1913, General Otto Liman von Sanders advised the Turks to invade the Ukraine from Odessa; Enver, however, insisted upon the ill-fated Caucasus campaign. Liman von Sanders commanded the defense of Gallipoli in 1915 and intervened successfully in the Armenian deportations at İzmir. Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein, a restraining influence on Cemal Paşa, served in Palestine. Field Marshal Kolmar Freiherr von der Goltz was called back to defend Baghdad in 1915; Lieutenant General Hans von Seeckt (chief of the Turkish General Staff in 1917), General Erich von Falkenhayn, and Franz von Papen (who was ambassador to Turkey during World War II) also fought with the Turkish army.

German Middle East academic specialists were utilized in the war effort. Influenced by predecessors who had been engaged in philological and archaeological research in the Middle East since the latter part of the nineteenth century, some claimed German-Turkish racial affinities. Orientalist Max

Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Sultan of Constantinople riding in a carriage through a cobbled street during World War I. © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis.

von Oppenheim directed an information service for the East that advocated fomenting Islamic uprisings in Persia, Afghanistan, and Egypt in order to dislodge the British.

In Iran, Germany had no coordinated policy, and as Russia's army moved toward Tehran in 1915, only Wilhelm Wassmuss fought against the British in the south. Germany's competition with Britain in support of Zionist aspirations in order to gain Jewish support became inactive after the United States entered the war.

The defeat of Germany in 1918 and the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles altered Germany's approach to the Middle East. From the Weimar Republic through the early 1930s, official German policy was inherently cautious, more concerned with revising the Treaty of Versailles and not alienating Britain than with taking an active role abroad. Although sympathetic to Zionism, once Germany became a member of the League of Nations (1926), it supported Britain's policy in Palestine and did not take a position on local Arab-Zionist issues. The low-key diplomatic approach, however, did not lessen Germany's economic interest in Turkey, Egypt, and Iran; Iran, due to Reza Shah Pahlavi's pro-German sympathies, was supplied by German companies with arms, machinery, and regular air service through the 1920s.

Third Reich and World War II

Germany's official policy toward the Middle East remained inconsistent through the Third Reich because it was predicated upon ideological, diplomatic, and economic factors that contradicted one another. The Nazi doctrine of racial purity and the search for markets in the Middle East lent themselves to support of the Zionist movement through the ha-Avarah (transfer) agreements as useful tools to rid Germany of Jews. When, after 1937, it was understood that Jewish sovereignty was possible, and that a large population of Jews (a circumstance noted after the war in eastern Europe began) might be a base for activity against Germany, Hitler opposed Jewish immigration to Palestine.

Also opposed to Jewish Palestinian immigration were German nationals, including archaeologists, scholars, members of the Palestine Templars, and diplomatic personnel who worked in the area. Both German nationalists looking back to imperial glory and Nazis became disseminators of German propaganda, finding allies in some pan-Arab groups and the military in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Max von Oppenheim and German Ambassador to Iraq Fritz Grobba advocated financial and military support for local anti-British pan-Arab movements as early as 1937. Meetings between pan-Arab nationalists such as Shakib Arslan, Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, and Aziz Ali al-Misri and German diplomatic officials took place, resulting in a declaration of support in December 1940 but no real aid.

Officially, Germany remained uninvolved in the Middle East, initially leaving the area to Britain. After 1939 and the outbreak of World War II, Germany left the area to Italy, which sought hegemony in North Africa and in the eastern Mediterranean. Italy's losses to the Allies in Greece and in Libya in 1941 sparked a belated interest by Germany, which had planned to turn to the Middle East only after anticipated successes in Russia (Operation Barbarossa).

Last-minute German arms deliveries to the pro-Axis Rashid Ali al-Kaylani government did not prevent Britain's victories in Iraq in June 1941 and in Vichy-ruled Syria in July. Fear that Iran was a potential fifth column because of its economic dependence on Germany—because of the large numbers of German nationals working there, and because it offered a haven for those fleeing the British in Iraq—resulted in Pahlavi's abdication and control of Iran by Russia and Britain. A planned pro-Axis Free Officers' revolt involving Aziz Ali al-Misri and Anwar al-Sadat, among others, together with Abwehr (German military intelligence) agents infiltrated into Cairo, failed to coordinate with Erwin Rommel's advance toward Egypt in the summer of 1942. Berlin provided sanctuary for some pro-Axis Arabs, among them the Jerusalem *mufti,* who left the Middle East during the war and worked for the German propaganda machine in return for Germany's promise to support Arab independence. After the war, a number of Nazis immigrated to the Arab world.

Two Germanys emerged from the war: East Germany, the German Democratic Republic (GDR); and West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (they united in 1991). The GDR followed the

policy of the Soviet Union and never established diplomatic relations with Israel.

1950 to the Present

From the early 1950s, the Cold War and political obligations to the United States dominated German foreign policy. While blocking international, especially developing nations', recognition of the GDR, the Federal Republic strove to balance its economic interests in the Arab world with a commitment to Israel and the Jewish people forged in reaction to Germany's Nazi past and the Holocaust. Restitution and reparations agreements were signed in 1952, clandestine arms deals were negotiated throughout the 1960s, and diplomatic relations were established in 1965. All Arab states except Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya severed diplomatic ties with Germany, but had restored them by 1974.

Germany's economic ties in the Persian Gulf grew dramatically in the 1970s through the export of manufactured goods, the recycling of petrodollars through German banks, and the import of almost 50 percent of its oil needs from the region. As the price of oil fell in the 1980s, so did German dependence on Gulf markets. Germany's share in the arms market during the Iran-Iraq War represented only 1 percent of the total market (by comparison, France's participation amounted to some 15 percent). German companies' significant but illegal involvement in technology transfers contributed to the development of weapons of mass destruction in Libya and Iraq.

West Germany expressed support for the Palestinians' right to self-determination and, although its relations with Israel remained intact, it increasingly became critical of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Working through the European Union, Germany supported the 2003 U.S.-led peace plan, Road Map, that called for an independent state in Palestine within three years.

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Germany supported United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 660, which condemned the Iraqi occupation, and Resolution 678, which authorized military measures to expel Iraq from Kuwait. It joined the U.S.-led coalition of twenty-eight states by sending air units to Turkey, contributed mine sweepers, and pledged $5.5 billion to the war effort. But Germany offered no such support to the United States as it planned with Britain in 2003 to invade Iraq. The United States and Britain claimed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and was an imminent danger to world security. Together with France and Russia, Germany—now a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council—opposed a draft resolution supported by the United States, Britain, and Spain that authorized the use of force. Instead, it sought the return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq to investigate whether Iraq had WMD. Although Germany helped defeat the resolution, it was unable to deter the invasion of Iraq by mainly the United States and Britain. The Gulf crises and war that followed damaged Germany's generally friendly relations with the United States and Britain.

See also Abdülhamit II; Arslan, Shakib; Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Banking; Berlin–Baghdad Railway; Eastern Question; Enver Paşa; Free Officers, Egypt; Gallipoli; Grobba, Fritz Konrad Ferdinand; Ha-avarah Agreement; Herzl, Theodor; Hijaz Railroad; Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-; Istanbul; Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-; Misri, Aziz Ali al-; Ottoman Empire: Overview; Rommel, Erwin; Sadat, Anwar al-; Sublime Porte; Talat, Mehmet; Templars; West German Reparations Agreement; Young Turks; Zionism.

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Reeva S. Simon
Updated by Philip Mattar

GEZIRA SCHEME

A Sudanese agricultural project established by the British.

The Gezira Scheme, located in the plains between the Blue Nile and White Nile of the central Sudan, was the first large-scale irrigated agricultural project established by the British government under the Anglo–Egyptian condominium. When it opened in 1926, it covered 300,000 *feddans* (ca. 300,000 acres), of which a third grew cotton. In the 1950s, Sudanese managers replaced the British officials, and the Gezira Board invested a greater share of the profits for social development projects among the tenants. Later extensions quadrupled the area of the scheme, but costs escalated, cotton prices dropped in the world markets, and the tenants and Gezira Board became increasingly indebted. International loans have helped, but they have also increased the country's overall debt burden.

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Ann M. Lesch

Two women jog along the running path at the Gezira Sporting Club. The athletic club in Zamalek, Cairo, is exclusive to members only. **© Peter Turnley/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

GEZIRA SPORTING CLUB

Country club in Cairo.

Long a symbol of British imperialism and insularity in Egypt, the Gezira, as it is usually called, was founded in 1882 and originally limited its membership to high-ranking British civil servants in the Egyptian government and officers of the army of occupation. Between the two world wars, the club's rosters also listed the names of titled European aristocrats wintering in Cairo, members of the diplomatic corps, prominent Levantine Jews and Christians, and Egyptian Muslims and Copts, many of whom were close to the palace. The flavor of the club during its British heyday has been admirably transmitted in memoirs written by former foreign residents of the city, in travel literature, and in such works of fiction as Olivia Manning's *Levant Trilogy,* which is set in Egypt's capital.

The exclusive and exclusionary character of the club was maintained until after World War II, when the tide of nationalism and a rising indigenous bourgeoisie forced its Egyptianization in January 1952. The ethos and structure of the club were further altered during the anti-Western years of the Nasser regime. In the early 1960s, the Gezira was both figuratively and literally truncated when the government, in a tactic calculated as a humiliation, forced it to permanently yield half of its grounds to a politicized athletic institution established to promote sports among the masses called the Ahli, or National Sports Club. Insult was added to injury when the Sadat regime built a suspended highway over the remaining nine-hole golf course and six-furlong racetrack to commemorate its performance in the 1973 Arab-Israel War.

Despite its contraction and urbanization, the Gezira still offers most of the sports and games practiced by its founders: golf, squash, bowls, croquet, riding, and even cricket. The last is played almost exclusively by Indian and Pakistani residents of Cairo. Horse racing, one of the club's original *raisons d'être*, takes place during the winter season. Polo, however, which led to the founding of the Gezira as

a gift from Egypt's viceroy to the officers of the British army of occupation, is no longer played for lack of grounds, players, and schooled ponies.

With the passing of Nasserism, the Gezira regained a small measure of its colonial grandeur, catering mostly to nouveau-riche Egyptians and a few foreign technocrats.

See also NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; SADAT, ANWAR AL-.

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JEAN-MARC R. OPPENHEIM

GHAB, AL-

In Syria, the largest plain of a large trough which also includes the low plains of al-Asharina, al-Ruj, and al-Amq.

Al-Ghab is located between the mountains Jabal al-Ansariyya (al-Alawiyyin) in the west and Jabal al-Zawiya in the east. Its length from south to north is about 56 miles (90 km), its width between 5 and 7.5 miles (8 to 12 km), and its elevation above sea level is between 558 and 656 feet (170 and 200 m). It slightly slopes toward the north like the Orontes River that traverses it to the northeast of Hama. Its yearly rainfall averages 19.5 to 27 inches (500 to 700 mm), but it receives other sources of water, notably from the Orontes River, which is rejected back into it by the basaltic bedrock of Qarqar in the north. Before 1954, al-Ghab was intersected by swampland, infested by malaria, and covered by reeds used for catching its celebrated catfish.

Within two decades after 1954, the landscape of al-Ghab changed dramatically as a result of the drainage of its swamps, the building of dams, such as the ones at al-Rastan, Maharda, and notably al-Asharina, to regulate its irrigation, and the creation by the Syrian government of a number of projects in it. Of its total area of 136,000 acres (55,000 ha), 42,000 acres (17,000 ha) are irrigated by river flooding and dam water, 74,000 acres (30,000 ha) depend on rainfall, and the remaining parts are turned into farms. In 1969, land in al-Ghab was distributed by the government to 11,000 beneficiaries according to the decrees of agricultural reform. To encourage the cultivation of land, fifty-two cooperatives were established there. Other projects include a cattle farm, fisheries, and a sugar factory at the village of Salhab.

ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

GHALI, BOUTROS

[1846–1910]

Egyptian diplomat and cabinet minister.

Born in a village near Bani Suwayf in Egypt, Boutros Ghali went to the reformist Coptic school at Harat al-Saqqayin and the princes' school of Mustafa Fadil. He later studied at the School of Languages, learning Arabic, French, English, Turkish, and Persian, but never earned a *license* or any other degree. He became a clerk for the Alexandria Chamber of Commerce and in 1873 was appointed by the sharif to the head clerkship of the justice ministry. At this time he also helped to organize the Coptic (Lay) Council. When the mixed courts were being established, Ghali helped the justice minister write an Arabic translation of their (mainly French) law code, even though he lacked any legal training.

His work brought him to the attention of Prime Minister Boghos Nubar Pasha, who made him Egypt's representative to the Caisse de la Dette Publique, thus mediating frequently between the Egyptian government and its European creditors. Named deputy justice minister in 1879, he held various responsible posts during the Urabi revolution. Afterward, he mediated between Khedive Tawfiq and the nationalists, saving many from execution.

Ghali received his first ministerial appointment in 1893 when Khedive Abbas Hilmi II challenged the British occupation by appointing his own cabinet under Husayn Fakhri (without consulting Lord Cromer). He remained finance minister under the compromise cabinet of Mustafa al-Riyad. He served as foreign minister from 1894 to 1910 and continued to mediate between power centers, signing the 1899 Sudan Convention that set up the Anglo–Egyptian Condominium Agreement. He represented the cabinet on the bench at the 1906 trial in the Dinshaway Incident, concurring in the death

sentences on four of the accused peasants and angering Egypt's nationalists.

Khedive Abbas and Sir Eldon Gorst concurred in naming him prime minister in 1908, despite misgivings about having a Copt as the head of Egypt's government. He further angered the nationalists by reviving the 1881 press law and publicly advocating the extension of the Suez Canal Company's concession, policies that he reportedly opposed privately. His assassination by Ibrahim Nasif al-Wardani, a nationalist, in February 1910, set off a wave of Coptic–Muslim confrontations and led to a more repressive government policy against the nationalists.

See also Abbas Hilmi II; Baring, Evelyn; Condominium Agreement (1899); Dinshaway Incident (1906); Gorst, John Eldon; Mixed Courts; Nubar Pasha; Riyad, Mustafa al-; Urabi, Ahmad.

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Arthur Goldschmidt

GHALLAB, ABD AL-KARIM

[1919–]

Moroccan novelist, short-story writer, and journalist.

Abd al-Karim Ghallab was born in Fez. He studied at the mosque college of al-Qarawiyyin in Fez, then obtained his B.A. in Arabic literature from Cairo University. He is editor in chief and director of the daily *Al-Alam.*

Ghallab is a prolific writer whose publications cover a wide range of topics and interests, some purely literary and others dealing with political and cultural issues. Through his writings he seeks to promote nationalist feelings and a deep attachment to Arabic-Islamic culture, counteracting the French education that was particularly threatening to Moroccans during the years of French colonialism.

Some of Ghallab's short stories in the collection *Wa Akhrajaha min al-Janna* (1977; He led her out of paradise) criticize the tendency of the upper middle class to communicate in French. Similar concerns are expressed in his novel *Sabahun wa Yazhafu al-Layl* (1984; Morning, then the night creeps in). Ghallab's fiction works illustrate and defend his beliefs and values. An active nationalist, he was often at odds with the French colonial power and was imprisoned, an experience depicted in his novel *Sabʿat Abwab* (1965; Seven gates). Some of his other fiction works, such as *Dafanna al-Madi* (1966; We buried the past), reveal his patriotic feelings. Ghallab fervently preaches attachment to the land and its safeguard by Moroccan farmers, as illustrated in his collection of short stories *Al-Ard Habibati* (1971; The land, my beloved), his novel *Al-Muʿallim Ali* (1971; Master Ali), and his essay "Fi al-Islah al-Qarawi" (1961; Of rural reform).

Ghallab's nationalist positions date back to his student years in Egypt, where he agitated for the independence of the three Maghribi countries, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Back in Morocco, he joined the Istiqlal Party and became deeply involved in politics. He was appointed a minister plenipotentiary for the Middle East (1956–1959) and a minister in the Moroccan government (1983–1985). His nonfiction writings also reflect his political views, ranging from his preoccupation with political governance to Arab unity. These works include *Hadha Huwa al-Dustur* (1962; This is the constitution), *Al-Tatawwur al-Dusturi wa al-Niyabi bi al-Maghrib min sanat 1908 ila sanat 1978* (1988; The Constitutional and the legal development in the Maghrib from 1908 to 1978, 2 vols.), *Maʿrakatuna al-Arabiyya fi Muwajahat al-Istiʿmar wa al-Sahyuniyya* (coauthor, 1967; Our Arab battle with colonialism and Zionism), *Nabadat Fikr* (1961; The beat of a thinking mind), *Thaqafa wa al-Fikr fi Muwajahat al-Tahaddi* (1976; Culture and thought in the face of challenge), and *Risalatu Fikr* (1968; The message of a thinking mind).

Religious feelings and a pious way of life are also of concern to Ghallab; they are implicit in his fiction and explicitly expressed in his book *Sira al-Madhhab wa al-Aqida fi al-Qurʾan* (1973; The struggle of ideology and faith in the Qurʾan). In his collection of short stories, *Hadha al-Wajh Aʿrafuhu!* (1997; I know this face) he sheds some of the didactic tone of his fiction writings.

See also Literature: Arabic, North African; Maghrib.

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AIDA A. BAMIA

GHANIM, AL-

Merchant family in Kuwait.

The al-Ghanim family, together with the Al Sabah, the Al Saqr, and the al-Qatami, were among the original Anaza settlers in Kuwait in the eighteenth century. The family made money first in shipping and trade, but a disaster at sea in 1925 encouraged them to diversify their interests. Ahmad al-Ghanim became an agent of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) during its negotiations for the Kuwait oil concession and the family did business with both APOC and the concessionaire, the Kuwait Oil Company. During the 1930s, al-Ghanim family income provided the government of Kuwait with two-thirds of its revenues. Ahmad's son Yusuf, along with other family members, fled Kuwait after the failure of the 1938 Majlis movement, returning in 1944 under a general amnesty. By the end of World War II the al-Ghanim employed 7,000 men, about half the workforce of Kuwait. The family became the top labor and supply contractor for the Kuwait Oil Company and Faysal al-Ghanim served as one of its managing directors. The al-Ghanim also acquired agencies and distributorships, including a lucrative arrangement with General Motors. Thunayan Faysal al-Ghanim served with the small contingent of Kuwaiti troops among the forces liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991. The family owns al-Ghanim Industries, a holding company that ranks among the top companies in the world.

See also PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS.

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MARY ANN TÉTREAULT

GHANIM, FATHI

[1924–1999]

Egyptian novelist and political writer.

Born in Cairo to middle-class background, Fathi Ghanim studied law at the Cairo University. After serving until the early 1950s at the ministry of education, he devoted himself to political and fictional writing. He served as the editor for Rose al-Yusif and a number of Egyptian newspapers and other periodicals, including *Akhar Saʿa* (The last hour) and *Sabah al-Khayr* (Good morning). In 1966 the government made *al-Jumhuriyya* (The republic) the sole official organ of the Arab Socialist Union, and Ghanim was appointed editor in chief. A strong partisan of pan-Arab socialist and nationalist ideology, in "The Crisis between Islam and Politics" (1998) he denounced the political involvement of Muslim movements and blamed the Islamic regime of Iran for invading Iraq in the 1980s. He portrayed Islam as a religion of reason that in his view calls for secularism, and he saw the Islamic state as an expression of fanaticism and backwardness.

In 1959 he published *al-Jabal* (The mountain), a satirical portrayal of the Egyptian government's attempts to resettle peasants. His most famous literary work, *The Man Who Lost His Shadow* (1966), describes the social and political evolution of Egypt from the 1920s to the 1950s through the lives of four main characters. This theme was continued in *Zaynab and the Throne* (1976). Both novels were made into television series. He also wrote *The Story of Tou* in 1987, which described in fictional terms the political oppression and torture carried out by the government. His fluid style and dynamic plots allowed him to write engaging novels that served as realistic portrayals and criticisms of Egyptian society while exploring the wider themes of oppression, fanaticism, violence, and injustice. Ghanim received the State Merit Award for Literature in 1994.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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MAYSAM J. AL-FARUQI

GHANMI, AZZA

Tunisian feminist activist.

In 1978–1979, Azza Ghanmi joined other feminist activists to found the Club d'Etude de la Condition de la Femme at the Club Tahar Haddad. Restricted to women only, the group debated the condition of women in Tunisian society. The institution of the Tunisian Code of Personal Status, promulgated in 1956 as part of Habib Bourguiba's modernization program, had granted women a number of rights making them equal citizens (for example, the stipulation of minimum marriage ages, requirement of personal consent to marriage, prohibition of polygamy, the right to vote, women's full legal capacity to enter contracts, and women's right to education and work). However, everyday social practices remained patriarchal.

In the early 1980s Ghanmi, along with other activists, participated in the group Femmes Démocrates, which emerged in response to political events such as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the massacres at Sabra and Shatila. She contributed to its feminist journal *Nissa,* and eventually became the secretary general of the Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (AFTD), instituted in1989. Ghanmi has been an outspoken advocate of the rights of the child and of women's human rights, especially in the context of compliance with the international Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to which Tunisia is a signatory.

See also Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Human Rights; Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries; Tunisia; Tunisia: Political Parties in.

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Laura Rice

GHANNOUCHI, RACHED

[1941–]

Islamist politician; founding member and head of the Islamic Tendency Movement, an offshoot of the Islamic Revival Movement formed in Tunisia in 1979.

Rached Ghannouchi entered politics in the 1970s as a member of the Society for the Preservation of the Qurʾan. Along with other leaders of the Islamist movement in Tunisia, he argues for a reintegration of Islam and Islamic law *(shariʿa)* in all aspects of national life, including politics. He has been fiercely critical of Westernizing trends in Tunisia and of the secular character of the ruling party, the Destour Socialist Party (PSD). To him, the decline of Islamic values and the reliance on Western ideologies and economic-development models have led to social corruption and economic decline in Tunisia and throughout the Islamic world.

In June 1981, his Islamic Tendency Movement (Mouvement de Tendance Islamique; MTI) filed, without success, for formal recognition. Ghannouchi and his party, renamed al-Nahda (Reawakening) in 1989, attracted a growing number of, in particular, young followers during the 1980s. For his antigovernment activism, he was arrested in 1981 and remained in prison until 1984; he was rearrested in 1987. The issue of his trial and execution, sought by Tunisia's President Habib Bourguiba in the fall of 1987, precipitated Bourguiba's overthrow by Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali. Pardoned by Ben Ali in May 1988, Ghannouchi left Tunisia in April 1989 to begin what he described as a self-imposed exile.

See also Ben Ali, Zayn al-Abidine; Bourguiba, Habib; Nahda, al-; Qurʾan; *Shariʿa.*

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Matthew S. Gordon

GHARB

Moroccan plain.

The Gharb, inhabited by Arab tribes (Banu Malik, Sufiyan, Khlut, and Tliq), is located between Wadi Lukkus, Wadi Sabu, and the Middle Atlas Mountains in Morocco. Before colonization, the tribes lived by limited agriculture and pastoralism. Under the French protectorate, the Gharb became a rich region where colons settled and developed different types of agriculture for export.

After independence, the Gharb was subject to intensive development through allocation of irrigated plots of land to peasants and the creation of small exploitation units of industrial agriculture. During this period, the Gharb witnessed an intensive intervention by state agencies, such as national offices of rural modernization and of irrigation and the division of water and forests.

The cities of the Gharb are Mechra Bel Ksiri, Sidi Sliman, Sidi Yahya, and Kenitra. Except for Kenitra, which is located on the margin of the region, the Gharb has not experienced the development of any major urban agglomeration because of its closeness to big cities such as Rabat, Casablanca, and Meknes.

See also COLONS.

RAHMA BOURQIA

GHARBZADEGI

Persian term meaning "Weststruck."

Coined in the late 1940s and made a household term in Iran's intellectual circles by writer and social critic Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923–1969) in a clandestinely published book by the same name (1962, 1964), *gharbzadegi* signals a chief sociological notion and concern among many Iranians in the post–World War II era.

As Al-e Ahmad describes it, throughout the twentieth century Iran has resorted to "Weststruck" behavior—adopting and imitating Western models and using Western criteria in education, the arts, and culture in general—while serving passively as a market for Western goods and also as a pawn in Western geopolitics. Consequently threatened with loss of cultural, if not Iranian, identity, Al-e Ahmad argues that Iran must gain control over machines and become a producer rather than a consumer, even though once having overcome Weststruckness it will still face that desperate situation, he argues, that remains in the West—that of "machinestruckness."

See also AL-E AHMAD, JALAL; IRAN.

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MICHAEL C. HILLMANN

GHASHMI, AHMAD HUSAYN

[c. 1923–1978]

Yemeni president and soldier.

Ahmad Husayn Ghashmi was a career soldier of limited education and of deeply rooted tribal origins. Born in Dhula, an area just northwest of Sanʿa, he came from a family of tribal leaders, his brother being the paramount shaykh of the strategically located, but otherwise not very important or powerful, Hamdan tribe. As a commander of armored forces, he provided crucial support to President Ibrahim al-Hamdi in his struggle to consolidate his power against strong opposition in the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) after the 1974 coup. Despite occupying the number-two post of armed forces chief-of-staff for three years, Ghashmi was directly involved in the assassination of al-Hamdi and his brother in 1977; he then became YAR president, only to be assassinated himself (blown up by a bomb carried in a briefcase of an emissary from South Yemen) in June 1978 after only eight months in office. The fears of his modernist critics notwithstanding, Ghashmi as president seemed inclined to protect the weak Yemeni state from its tribal challengers and Saudi Arabia. His assassination had less to do with North Yemeni politics than with a power struggle in South Yemen; he was succeeded by the much younger, much longer serving Ali Abdullah Salih.

See also HAMDI, IBRAHIM AL-; HATIM SULTANS OF HAMDAN; SALIH, ALI ABDULLAH; YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

GHASSEMLOU, ABDUL RAHMAN
[1930–1989]

Leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran.

Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was born in Urumia, West Azerbaijan province, Iran, and became engaged in Kurdish nationalist struggles in the mid-1940s. He left his native city in 1947 and continued his education and political activism in both the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Tudeh Party in Tehran. In 1948 he moved to Paris, and then went to Prague, Czechoslovakia, where he lived until his return to Iran in 1952. Forced into exile in Czechoslovakia in 1958, he earned a doctoral degree there in 1962 and taught at the Prague School of Economics. In 1973 he reorganized the KDPI in its third congress, held clandestinely in Baghdad, Iraq. He returned to Iran on the verge of the fall of Pahlavi monarchy in early 1979 and pursued a policy of negotiating Kurdish autonomy within the evolving Islamic regime. However, the government mobilized the army against the autonomist movement in August 1979. The KDPI and other opposition groups were forced out of Kurdistan in the mid-1980s. In July 1989 Islamic government officials assassinated Ghassemlou in Vienna, Austria, where he was negotiating with them a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question.

See also IRAN; KURDISH REVOLTS.

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AMIR HASSANPOUR

GHAZALI, MUHAMMAD AL-
[1917–1996]

Leading proponent of a centrist Islamism, renowned for opposition to secularism and anti-intellectual extremism.

Muhammad al-Ghazali graduated from al-Azhar in 1941 and became a leading political radical in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood before his dismissal from the Brotherhood's constituent body in December 1953, reportedly after involvement in an attempt to oust the movement's leader. His subsequent rise in the Egyptian Muslim jurisprudential system was accompanied by the publication of more than fifty books, ensuring popularity for his approaches to Qurʾanic exegesis and Islamic responses to modernity across the Muslim world. In 1989 he won the King Faisal International Prize for Islamic Studies, but his subsequent books, *The Sunna of the Prophet* and the influential *Journey through the Qurʾan,* drew fierce attacks from Saudis for his outspoken attack on the simplistic methods of antimodernist extremists. In the 1980s he headed Islamic university academies in Mecca, Qatar, and Constantine (Algeria), where President Chadli Bendjedid sought to use him as a mediator with more radical Islamists. After publicly debating leading secularists in Egypt, Ghazali drew fire for justifying the killing of Farag Foda as an apostate in 1992. In favor of taking ideas from the non-Muslim world, Ghazali was moderate in supporting women's rights and a gradualist approach to Islamic democracy.

See also AZHAR, AL-; BENDJEDID, CHADLI; MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD.

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GEORGE R. WILKES

GHAZALI, ZAYNAB AL-
[1917–]

Egyptian Islamist writer and activist.

Zaynab al-Ghazali al-Jabili was born in the Egyptian Delta and educated in religious schools. She is a Muslim activist associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and was the founding president of the Jamʿiyyat al-Sayyidat al-Muslimat (Muslim Women's Association, 1936), with which al-Ghazali sought to counter the secularist Egyptian Feminist Union. Al-Ghazali refused to subsume her association into the Muslim Brotherhood, as its leader Hasan al-Banna suggested, and she led the association in its charity and educational activities until the Nasser regime closed it down in 1964. In 1950, she founded the

Majallat al-Sayyidat al-Muslimat (Muslim women's journal) while also writing regular columns in the Muslim Brotherhood's journal. Active in Islamic politics and associated with the Brotherhood at least since 1949, she is famous for having put *al-daʿwa* (the call to propagate the faith) before conjugal demands in her own life while admonishing Muslim women that in an ideal Muslim society women's energies would center on home and family.

Al-Ghazali's best-known work is her prison memoir, *Ayyam min hayati* (Days of my life), first published in 1972 and republished many times. Incarcerated along with many other Islamist activists in 1965, she was transferred in 1967 to the women's prison and released in 1971. The memoir prefaces its account of solitary confinement, torture, and ultimate triumph with a narrative of her earlier work; the text operates not only as an individual memoir but also as a collective autobiography of Brotherhood activists and as a testimony to spiritual struggle under extreme conditions and thus serves as an exemplary text for other contemporary Muslims. Prison becomes a microcosm of society, exemplifying "the swamps, brackish with depravities" that Muslim activism is to tackle. Although the book shows the gender-specific treatment of imprisoned women and although al-Ghazali's biographies of early Muslim women, published in *al-Daʿwa* from 1979 until it was banned late in 1981, claim female exemplars for contemporary activism, to characterize her as a feminist, as some have done, is a debatable move.

See also Gender: Gender and Education; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Muslim Brotherhood; *Shariʿa.*

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Marilyn Booth

GHAZEL

See Glossary

GHAZI IBN FAISAL

[1912–1939]

King of Iraq from 1933 to 1939.

The son of King Faisal I, Ghazi ibn Faisal inherited little of his father's sophistication and political understanding. As his father's popularity began to wane at the end of the 1920s, Ghazi began to court a following of his own by identifying himself more or less openly with the opposition politicians and associating with the leaders of the Iraqi army. This continued after his accession, and as the army high command began to exert an increasing influence on the country's political life (especially after the coup organized by Bakr Sidqi in 1936). Ghazi's relations with the British Embassy, and with Britain's protégé Nuri al-Saʿid, became increasingly strained. While there was no direct evidence linking Nuri to the car accident in which Ghazi was killed, the circumstances surrounding his death always remained obscure. Nuri, Ghazi's cousin Abd al-Ilah, and Ghazi's estranged wife, Abd al-Ilah's sister Aliya, were long suspected of some form of involvement in it.

See also Abd al-Ilah ibn Ali; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Hashimite House (House of Hashim); Sidqi, Bakr.

Peter Sluglett

GHORBAL, ASHRAF

[1925–]

Egyptian diplomat.

Educated at universities in the United States, Ashraf Ghorbal (also Ghurbal) was the first secretary to the United Nations in Geneva from 1958 to 1962, and an adviser to the Egyptian delegation in New York from 1962 to 1964. When Egypt's embassy in Washington, D.C., was closed following the 1967 Arab–Israel War, Ghorbal became head of the Egyptian/United Arab Republic interests section of the Indian embassy, where he served until 1973.

During the October 1973 war—after having served nearly a year as assistant security adviser to President Anwar al-Sadat—he was placed in charge

of Egypt's information and public relations. In November 1973 Ghorbal was appointed ambassador to the reopened Egyptian embassy. He earned the gratitude of many Americans after playing a key role in negotiating the release of hostages held by a terrorist in the B'nai B'rith building in Washington, D.C., in 1977. Ghorbal took part in the Camp David meetings of 1978, and the subsequent isolation of Egypt from the Arab League in the years that followed meant that he was excluded from meetings of the Arab ambassadors in Washington. Nevertheless, he maintained relations with individual ambassadors privately, ultimately also working with key Arab states as dean of the African diplomatic corps. He reached compulsory retirement age in 1985.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Camp David Accords (1978); Sadat, Anwar al-.

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David Waldner
Updated by George R. Wilkes

GHORFA

See Glossary

GHOUSSOUB, MAI

[1952–]

A London-based multimedia artist, writer, and publisher of Lebanese descent.

Born in Lebanon, Mai Ghoussoub (also Ghussup) is a sculptor, installation and performance artist, writer, editor, and publisher who has lived in Britain since she moved there from Lebanon in 1979. She was educated at the American University of Beirut and at Morley College in London. Ghoussoub is the founder of the Saqi Books, a London publishing house known for its translations of contemporary Arabic writing. Like other artists of Arab descent living in exile, she has explored issues of the body in Orientalist images and paintings as well as in advertisements from the Arab world. She has also written extensively on diasporic identities, masculinity and politics, and feminism as it relates to the Arab world. Ghoussoub is the author of a short-story collection, *Leaving Beirut: Women and the Wars Within* (1998). She also co-edits *Abwab,* an Arabic cultural magazine.

In her visual art, Ghoussoub has worked in clay, metals, and resin. Her work from the late 1990s focuses on female divas, whom she finds inspiring because of their ability to connect with everyday people and the unreachability that comes from their iconic status. She has made metal sculptures that deconstruct divas to show this contradictory aspect of their presence in popular culture. For example, her sculptures based on the Egyptian singer Umm Kulthum and the African-American performer Josephine Baker both highlight the outline of their figures and their famous accoutrements (e.g., the handkerchief of Umm Kulthum) as iconic symbols of their work. This focus on musicians reflects her interest in remembering the vitality of her native Lebanon, in contrast to the overwhelming focus in much art and media on its destruction. Like other artists living in exile, her Arab background serves as a source for her art, but she resists strict categorization of her work as Middle Eastern.

See also Art; Gender: Gender and Education; Lebanese Civil War (1958); Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanon; Literature, Arabic; Umm Kulthum.

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Jessica Winegar

GHOZALI, AHMED

[1937–]

Algerian prime minister; ambassador; technocrat.

Ahmed Ghozali studied at the prestigious Ecole des Ponts et Chausées, in Paris. From 1966 to 1977 he was the director-general of SONATRACH, Algeria's na-

tional hydrocarbons enterprise, and then minister of energy from 1977 to 1979. Charged with mismanagement, he quietly returned to prominence as ambassador to Belgium and to the European Community (EC) from 1984 to 1988. After the October 1988 riots, he served as finance minister in the Kasdi Merbah government and concluded Algeria's first agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche then selected Ghozali as foreign minister in 1989. President Chadli Bendjedid replaced Hamrouche with Ghozali in June 1991 as violent protests wracked the country as it prepared for parliamentary elections. Ghozali rescheduled the elections, which resulted in the stunning first-round success of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) in December. With the second round inevitably ensuring a new Islamist FIS government, alarmed civilian and military elites deposed President Bendjedid and set up the Haut Comité d'Etat (HCE). Ghozali kept his position, which strongly suggested his complicity with the coup. The assassination in June 1992 of Mohamed Boudiaf, the HCE president, was a severe blow to the country and to Ghozali personally. Belaid Abdesselam replaced Ghozali as prime minister in July. Ghozali then briefly served as ambassador to France. In 1999 he founded the Front Démocratique Algérien (FDA). He supported Khaled Nezzar and the army's reputation at the libel trial in Paris in 2002. Nevertheless, Ghozali is critical of the Pouvoir—the dominant governing power establishment—for its lack of attention to social affairs. Ghozali may run for the presidency in 2004.

See also ALGERIA: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; SONATRACH.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

GHURI, EMILE AL-

[1907–1984]

Greek Orthodox Palestinian activist.

Emile al-Ghuri was born in Jerusalem and studied at Saint George's School. He went to the United States in 1929 to study at the University of Cincinnati, where he received his M.A. in political science in 1933. Upon his return to Jerusalem, he published the *Arab Federation,* an English-language weekly which was later closed down by the British authorities in Palestine because of the political line it had adopted. In 1933, he was elected a member of the Arab Executive. Al-Ghuri published the weekly *al-Shabab* (Youth) in 1934 and was later on the staff of the pro-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, mufti of Jerusalem, English-language weekly *Palestine and Transjordan.* Between 1936 and 1939, he was sent on propaganda and fundraising missions to England, the United States, and the Balkans. He quickly joined the ranks of his country's political elite, becoming in 1935 the secretary-general of the Husayni-led Palestine Arab Party. He later joined al-Husayni in Iraq after the outbreak of World War II. As an active mufti supporter, al-Ghuri was pursued and captured by the British in Iran in September 1941 but was allowed to return to Palestine the next year. Until 1944, the British authorities in Palestine prohibited him from engaging in politics. In 1944, he reorganized the Palestine Arab Party, which was replaced two years later by a reconstituted Arab Higher Committee. He joined this body of Palestinian politicians and represented it at the London Conference on Palestine (1946–1947) and at several United Nations conferences between 1948 and 1950. Throughout his political career, al-Ghuri enjoyed the support of the mufti and some of his closest associates. He served for many years on the Arab Higher Committee and after 1948 represented it in various Arab and international forums. He also occupied a number of senior positions in the Jordanian government between 1966 and 1971 and wrote several books on the Palestinian cause, including *Filastin,* and on Arab nationalism, including *Harakat al-Qawmiyya al-Arabiyya.* He also wrote a memoir, *Filastin Ibr Sittin Aman.*

See also ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE (PALESTINE).

MUHAMMAD MUSLIH
UPDATED BY PHILIP MATTAR

GIA (ARMED ISLAMIC GROUPS)

Algerian terrorist group.

Among the many terrorist groups in the Algerian civil war, the Armed Islamic Groups (Groupes islamiques armés, or GIA) were the most radical and

The Groupes Islamiques Armés, or GIA, is an Algerian terrorist organization formed in 1991 in response to the government's repression of a strike protesting electoral laws that favored the National Liberation Front. Although in the early 1990s the GIA contained as many as seventy groups, by 1997 its numbers had fallen considerably. © AFP/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

destructive. According to a report of French secret services in 1993, the GIA was comprised of seventy groups leading noncoordinated actions in northern Algeria. The appearance of these autonomous groups goes back to the Algerian government's repression of the unlimited general strike announced by the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) in May-June 1991 to protest against the enactment of an uninominal electoral law with two rounds and an electoral redistricting putatively designed to favor the FLN (National Liberation Front). The most active and publicized group of the GIA was led by Mohamed Allel; it became famous in the working-class districts of Algiers for attacking police and regime representatives.

After the cancellation of the 1991 elections and the arrest of at least 4,000 Islamist activists, the radicalization of the movement became irreversible. An important leader was Mansouri Miliani, former brother-in-arms of Mustapha Bouyali, the founder of the Armed Islamic Movement (Mouvement islamique armé, or MIA) in 1982 who was killed in 1987. According to the testimony of a former Algerian fighter in Afghanistan, Slimane Rahmani, the armed movement was launched in military training camps in Pishawar, Pakistan, by two Algerian mercenaries in the Afghanistan war against the Soviets, Nourredine Seddiki and Sid Ahmed Lahrani. Miliani, the head of this group of about 100 fighters, was assisted by Abdelhak Layada, Moh Leveilly, and Omar Chikhi.

Upon the arrest of Miliani in July 1992, Moh Leveilly became for a short time amir (leader) of the GIA, which by that time was composed of several cells of ten to twenty terrorists each. He was neutralized quickly by the Algerian army during a secret meet-

ing with Abdelkader Chabouti, chief of the Islamic State Movement (MEI), who wanted to federate all armed groups under the banner of a united Islamic army. Leveilly's first lieutenant, Abdelhak Layada, proclaimed himself national chief of the GIA in September 1992. He gave the movement greater structure and led it to spread its fighting beyond the Algiers region. According to the investigation led by the journalist Hassane Zerrouky, Layada divided the Algerian territory into nine military areas under the authority of a national amir who presided over a consultative assembly of lieutenants and regional chiefs. At the head of every area, he named a regional amir who commanded several operational units (katibate) and was assisted by an officer legislator (thabit char'i). To assist himself, Layada named two lieutenants, Mourad Sid Ahmed and Cherif Gousmi, and two spiritual guides (mounther) empowered to enact fatwas to legitimize their actions, Omar Eulmi and Ikhlef Cherati. According to the Algerian authorities, the Islamic Armed Groups remained in contact with one another by means of "links agents" living abroad, particularly in London, and by communicating via satellite telephones.

With this new organization in place, the GIA began broadcasting every Wednesday via clandestine radio (Wafa) information on their groups' activities. In addition to attacking regime representatives and the security forces, it formulated new aims: the elimination of the French-speaking elite by the murder of intellectuals and journalists; the destabilization of the economic potential of Algeria by attacks against infrastructure; and the diplomatic isolation of the country by the murder of foreign workers and attacks against foreign interests. In response, the Algerian army intensively targeted Islamist bases, killing many activists including Mourad Sid Ahmed, and struck hard blows against urban guerrilla warfare. Thereafter, the GIA chiefs announced the union of Islamic Armed Groups and published a bulletin in which they presented the new program of the unified GIA: institution of a caliphate in Algeria and the creation of a government which would include some influential members of the FIS. At the same time, the group intensified its campaign against civilians and foreigners, killing several Algerian intellectuals and attacking the residential neighborhoods of Aïn Allah, where five employees of the French consulate at Algiers were killed. In retaliation, the French government arrested and expelled twenty Islamist activists who had been living in France since 1992.

Jamel Zitouni, amir from October 1994 to July 1996, spread the Algerian civil war to France, where several bombings were perpetrated in August 1995 by his sleeping terrorists cells in Europe. He also organized an attempt on the life of Shaykh Sahraoui, a historic member of the FIS, the hijacking of an Air France plane on 24 December 1994, and, three days later, the murder of four Catholic clerics at Tizi Ouzou. From January 1995 the GIA multiplied their attacks against security forces and set up road blocks to kill car and bus passengers, and the number of their victims reached 200 per week. In March 1996 they killed seven monks at Tibéhirine. Djamel Zitouni, among the most bloodthirsty of the GIA chiefs, took credit for this action, but according to some sources he may have been a double agent controlled and manipulated by the Algerian security forces. He reigned as a king in the Islamist bases of Algiers, Sidi-Bel-Abbes, Bejaïa, and Djijel, and he commanded 4,000 men (600, according to the Algerian authorities). His brutal methods earned him the nickname "Green Pol Pot." When he died in July 1996, Antar Zouabri became head of the GIA. Zouabri, who was as violent as his predecessor, organized collective massacres in Mitidja villages that caused more than 1,500 civilian deaths. These crimes were denounced by most Islamist groups throughout the world and and damaged the cohesion of the GIA, which fell apart into small autonomous groups. Most of these groups rallied around the cease-fire initiated by the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) in October 1997. After Zoubri's death in September 1997, Ouakali Rachid proclaimed himself amir of what remained of the GIA, but it progressively weakened. During their decline from 1998 onward, the Islamic Armed Groups, weakened greatly by the vigorous campaign of the Algerian army and deprived of their support network in Europe and in the Arab world, took refuge in mountain area, from which they launched raids and depredations against travelers and isolated villages.

See also Front Islamique du Salut (FIS); Islamic Salvation Army (AIS).

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AZZEDINE G. MANSOUR

GIADO CONCENTRATION CAMP

An internment camp for Libyan Jews.

During World War II, Giado was built by the Italian fascist authorities on the Tripolitanian plateau, about 150 miles (240 km) south of Tripoli. It was established after the second British occupation of Cyrenaica, which ended 27 January 1942. The Italians, who had colonized Libya, decided on a "cleaning out" *(sfollamento)* of all Jews from the province. Over 3,000 Jews were taken to internment and labor camps in Tripolitania between May and October. About 75 percent of these were sent to Giado. The camp was administered by Italian officers. The guards included both Italians and Arabs. Rations and sanitary conditions in Giado were very poor, and a typhus epidemic broke out in December 1942.

By the time the British liberated the camp during the North Africa campaign, in late January 1943, 526 of the inmates had died. Others had been shot trying to escape as the Axis forces retreated westward.

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NORMAN STILLMAN

GIBRAN, KHALIL

[1883–1931]

Lebanese author of prose and poetry.

Gibran (Jubran Khalil Jubran) was born at Bshirri in northern Lebanon and in the late 1880s moved to the United States with his sisters. He is known in the West for his book *The Prophet,* and in the Arab world for his contributions to the reformation of the modern usage of the Arabic language. He wrote in prose and poetry, and excelled in both. He ignored the rigid, traditional forms and called for free artistic expressions. Gibran was nonconformist: He opposed the dominance of the clerical establishment and called for the modernization of the Middle East without copying Western models.

Gibran's works in Arabic and in English celebrate individual freedoms and warn against sectarianism and class oppression. His attacks on the religious establishment made him enemies among leaders of the Lebanese church. After his death, however, Lebanese revered his memory and treated him as a cultural icon. Gibran never viewed himself as a Lebanese nationalist, however, but wrote as a Syrian Arab. His experience in the United States led him and other Arab writers and poets to form a literary society, Al-Rabita al-Qalamiyya (Pen's League), which played an important role in the cultural revival in the Middle East in the first two decades of the twentieth century.

See also FILM; LITERATURE: ARABIC.

AS'AD ABUKHALIL

GILBOA, AMIR

[1917–1984]

Israeli poet.

Amir Gilboa was born in the Ukraine and arrived in Palestine in 1937 as an illegal immigrant. Until 1942, when he joined the Jewish brigade of the British army, he worked in agricultural settlements, stone quarries, and orange groves. As a member of the Eighth Army, he participated in its activities in Egypt, North Africa, Malta, and Italy. At the end of World War II he was active in the transfer of Jewish Holocaust survivors from Europe to Palestine. Gilboa fought in the Israeli War of Independence of 1948 and his experiences play a major role in his poetry. He served as the editor of Massada Publishing in Tel Aviv, published nine volumes of his own poetry and received numerous literary awards, including the Israel Prize for Poetry and the New York

University Newman Prize. A collection of his poetry in English translation, *The Light of Lost Suns,* was published in 1979.

Gilboa's early poetry is marked for its figurative expressionism, its prophetic voice, and intense tonality. Repetition, imagination, and colorful carnivalism are characteristic devices. His later poetry combines lyrical expression with nationalistic statements through references to biblical personae and events. The narrative voice often speaks from the excited and naive viewpoint of a child, creating poetic irony and ambiguity.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Holocaust; Literature: Hebrew.

Zvia Ginor

GIRGIR

See Newspapers and Print Media: Turkey

GIZA

A middle Egyptian province (governorate).

West of Cairo, Giza (also Jiza) has an area of 32,878 square miles (85,153 sq km) and a 1986 population estimated at 3.7 million. Famous for its three large pyramids and Sphinx, Giza lagged behind other parts of Egypt in converting to Christianity and then in embracing Islam. Its capital and main city, also called Giza, had some 1.9 million inhabitants, according to the 1986 census estimate. Several of the other towns and villages of Giza province—Duqqi and Imbaba—are suburbs of Cairo, and it has grown rapidly since World War II.

See also Pyramids; Sphinx.

Arthur Goldschmidt

GLAWI FAMILY, AL-

Powerful Moroccan family of the late nineteenth century.

Originating from the Glawa tribe in the High Atlas mountains in Morocco, the al-Glawi family played an important role in the nineteenth century in linking the tribes of the High Atlas to the Makhzen. Two members of the family contributed to Morocco's recent history.

Madani Glawi (1863?–1918) inherited the chiefdom of Tlwat from his father Mohamed Ibabat, who was an *amghar* (tribal leader). He built a close relationship with the sultan Mulay Hassan, whom he received in Tlwat in 1893 in the High Atlas. After the sultan gave him the title of caliph (Islamic leader) of Tafilalt, he became a *qaʾid* (chief) of the Atlas. His power grew and his authority became widespread when he supported Mulay Hafid against his brother Mulay Abd al-Aziz and became the prime minister of the Cherifian government. Glawi ultimately built a powerful chiefdom in the High Atlas after 1913, when the sultan Mulay Youssef came to the throne under the French protectorate of Morocco.

Thami Glawi (?–1957), Madani's youngest brother, became pasha of Marrakech in 1909. With French intervention in Morocco, his authority grew even more. After the death of his brother, he inherited his power over the surrounding tribes of Marrakech. He stayed faithful to the French. When Sultan Sidi Muhammad Ben Yussef (later King Muhammad V) returned from exile in 1956, he gave him the *aman* (forgiveness). He died 23 January 1957.

See also Muhammad V; Youssef, Mulay.

Rahma Bourqia

GLUBB, JOHN BAGOT

[1897–1986]

British officer who served the Arabs in Iraq and Transjordan during the British mandate, and later in Jordan.

Known as Glubb Pasha, chief of staff of the Arab Legion (1939–1956), John Bagot Glubb belonged to a West Country British family with a long tradition of service to the crown. He followed his father, Major General Sir Frederick Glubb, into the military. Educated at Cheltenham and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, Glubb served in France during World War I. He was sent to Iraq in 1920 and served there during Faisal's monarchy for ten years, first in the army and, after resigning his commission in 1926, as a member of the administration of the British mandated territory.

As administrative inspector in Iraq's southern desert, Glubb's main task was to organize the defenses of the bedouin tribes against raids by the Wahabi troops of King Ibn Saʿud of Saudi Arabia. During this assignment, Glubb acquired his excel-



Sir John Bagot Glubb (1897–1986), or Glubb Pasha, rides through the deserts of Jordan with his young son Godfrey Faris on 20 October 1951. © HULTON/ARCHIVE BY GETTY IMAGES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

lent command of Arabic, an intimate knowledge of the bedouin tribes, and a profound understanding of Arab history, culture, and traditions.

In 1930, as Captain Glubb, he was sent to Transjordan to pacify the bedouin tribes, who were also being attacked by the Wahhabi raiders from Saudi Arabia and here, too, he achieved remarkable success. When Glubb joined the Arab Legion—Transjordan's army—it was a tiny force with almost no bedouin in its ranks and was under the command of another Englishman, Frederick Peake, called Peake Pasha by the legion. As Peake's second-in-command and from 1939 as commander, Glubb developed the Arab Legion from little more than a gendarmerie into the best-trained, most disciplined, and most efficient of all the Arab armies. His most distinctive contribution, however, was the recruitment of bedouins and their transformation from unruly nomads into disciplined soldiers and loyal citizens. Although recruits from the settled areas of Transjordan continued to predominate, the bedouin became the hard core of the Arab Legion and infused it with the fighting spirit for which it became renowned.

A good soldier and organizer, Glubb was also a very subtle politician. As chief of staff of the Arab Legion he needed to be a good politician, because the legion was the mainstay of the Hashimite regime in Amman. Unlike the officers who were posted to the Arab Legion by the British army, Glubb served under contract to the Transjordan government and therefore owed his allegiance to Amir Abdullah. The British government, however, continued to finance the Arab Legion even after Transjordan became independent in 1946; so Glubb had to serve two very different masters; because of his skill as a politician, he managed to sustain this dual loyalty.

In 1948, Glubb commanded the Arab Legion against the new State of Israel, alongside the other regular and irregular Arab armies. Although the Arab Legion was the only Arab army to distinguish itself on the battlefield, Glubb was blamed for the fall of the cities of Lydda and Ramla and for the failure to capture West Jerusalem. Arab nationalists accused him of deliberately curtailing the operations of the Arab Legion in line with a British plan to partition Palestine between Transjordan and the Jews.

Sir John Bagot Glubb, British soldier and commander in chief of the Arab Legion (1939–1956) sits in a chair, feeling his *mesbah,* or Muslim prayer beads. © HULTON/ARCHIVE BY GETTY IMAGES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

After the Arab–Israel War of 1948 and the incorporation of the West Bank into the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, Glubb prepared the plans for the defense of the enlarged kingdom. He also played a key role in curbing Palestinian infiltration into Israel, because it generated perpetual tension along the border and provoked military reprisals from Israel. Glubb's aim was to keep the border quiet and avoid clashes with Israel's powerful army.

Arab nationalists, inside and outside Jordan, continued to view Glubb as both the symbol and instrument of British imperial domination over the Middle East. Therefore, having a British chief of staff became an increasing liability for the Hashimite rulers of Jordan as the tides of nationalism swept through the Middle East. In March 1956, Jordan's King Hussein abruptly dismissed Glubb and replaced him with a Jordanian chief of staff. Glubb's dismissal temporarily strained the relations between Britain and Jordan, but it also constituted a turning point on Jordan's path to real independence.

Upon his dismissal, Glubb returned to Britain and became a political writer. Of his many books, the most important is his 1957 autobiography, *A Soldier with the Arabs.* A British officer who had served under Glubb in the Arab Legion, James Lunt, wrote a biography of Glubb.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Arab–Israel War (1948); Faisal I ibn Hussein; Hussein ibn Talal; Peake, Frederick Gerard.

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Avi Shlaim

GÖKALP, ZIYA

[1876–1924]

Turkish social and political thinker.

Ziya Gökalp was born in the province of Diyarbekir. At the time of his birth, Diyarbekir contained ethnic groups of Kurdish origin, leading some of Gökalp's political opponents to assert that he was of Kurdish lineage. His father, Tevfik, was director of the provincial archives and editor of the official gazette. Gökalp's education incorporated both Western and Islamic values. Along with religious instruction by family elders, he received a secular education in a military junior high school and a state

senior high school in Diyarbekir. He then entered the veterinary college in Constantinople (now Istanbul), but was expelled in his second year for his membership in the secret Society for Union and Progress. After a brief imprisonment he was exiled to Diyarbekir, where he continued his avid reading in the natural sciences, philosophy, sociology, politics, and pedagogy, and resumed his study of Islamic philosophy, especially Sufism.

Gökalp became secretary of the Chamber of Commerce (1902) and the assistant secretary general of the Provincial Council (1904) of Diyarbekir. In 1908 the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) appointed Gökalp inspector of its organizations in Diyarbekir, Van, and Bitlis while he continued to serve as inspector of elementary education for the provincial government. In 1910, he became a member of the Central Committee (CC) of the Union and Progress Party and went to Salonika, where he taught sociology at the party school, directed the party's youth department, and continued writing and lecturing. In 1912, after the removal of the CC headquarters to Constantinople, Gökalp was named the first professor of sociology at Darülfünün (now Istanbul University). He was exiled to Malta following dissolution of the last Ottoman parliament in 1919. There he conducted a "one-man university" for the distinguished exiles, many of whom joined the Kemalist nationalist resistance in Anatolia. Upon his release from Malta in 1921, Gökalp returned to Diyarbekir, taught at the secondary school and the teachers' seminary, and continued to publish. He was elected to the Second Grand National Assembly (1923–1927) as a deputy from Diyarbekir, served on the parliamentary committee on national education, and participated in the preparation of the 1924 constitution.

Gökalp did not participate in practical politics in the narrow sense. He was a thinker and writer with a profound sense of responsibility for the public good. He was foremost a social and political theoretician, a public educator, and a formulator of Unionist and Kemalist modernizing reforms. Gökalp was the intellectual leader of modern Turkish nationalism in the transition from the multiethnic Ottoman Empire to the nation-state of the Turkish republic, despite the distance between his thinking and that of the Ottomanist Unionists and the Republican Kemalists. He was the acknowledged mentor of these two movements, although both developed into authoritarian, one-party regimes.

Gökalp's "social idealism" was an attempt at a reconciliation of cultural Turkism, ethical Islam, and European corporatism. His nationalism was based on language, subjective self-identification, socialization, and acculturation in a distinct Turkish culture that was to interact peacefully with other Western cultures. Gökalp called for modernizing reforms in Islamic thought and institutions, the essence of which was a reduction of Islam—for centuries the state religion of the Ottoman Turkish society—into a body of moral norms and codes of social behavior based on the nonorthodox Sufi (mystic) form of Islam. As a follower of Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim, Gökalp took a lay attitude toward Islam, both in the narrow sense of separation of state and religion and in the wider sense of primacy of rational, scientific thought over nonsecular thought.

Perhaps the more important influence of European corporatist thought on Gökalp's own thinking was the rejection of the individualism of liberal capitalism (without rejecting capitalism in general) and of the Marxist categories of class struggle and classless society. Gökalp followed Durkheim in believing that society is composed not of egoistic individuals or warring classes, but of interdependent occupational groups working harmoniously for the public good. This approach enabled him to take both a sociological view of society and an ideological stand against liberal and socialist politics. His form of "populism" viewed society as an organic whole and called for political representation of interests through occupational corporations, in which capital and labor were integrated and the social being of the individual was realized.

The racist-fascist Kemalist movement of the 1940s, the fascist Nationalist Action Party (1960s–1980), and the Nationalist Work Party tried to interpret Gökalp's thought in a fascist manner. Meanwhile, mainstream Kemalism remained within the confines of Gökalp's corporatism, and his thought continues to dominate Turkish social and political thinking via Kemalism, which remains the official ideology and hegemonic public philosophy of contemporary Turkey.

See also Committee for Union and Progress; Kemalism; Sufism and the Sufi Orders.

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TAHA PARLA

GOLAN HEIGHTS

A mountainous plateau important militarily as well as for its water resources.

Situated between south Lebanon, south Syria, and northern Israel, the Golan Heights (in Arabic, *al Jawlan*) have an average altitude of 3,300 feet (1,000 m) and they cover an area of approximately 700 square miles (1,800 sq km). Their north-south length is 40 miles (65 km) and their east-west dimension varies between 7 to 15 miles (12 to 25 km). Elevations range from 6,500 feet (2,000 m) in the north, to below sea level along the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) and the Yarmuk River in the south.

The word *Golan* seems to be related to the Arabic verb *jala* (to circulate or wander about) and to the word *ajwal,* meaning an area that is exposed to dusty winds. After the death of Herod the Great in 4 B.C.E., the Golan must have been given to his son Herod Antipas (died after 39 C.E.), governor of Galilee and Peraea (land east of the Jordan River). The Golan flourished during this period. A large number of towns emerged, including Seleucia, Sogane, and Gamla.

After the defeat of the Byzantine Empire, at the Yarmuk River, all of Syria, including the Golan, ultimately fell into the hands of Muslim Arabs (633–640). After the Umayyads (661–750), the area fell to the Seljuk Turks, Saladin, the Mongols, the Mamluks, and the Crusaders. It was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 until the end of World War I, and, in 1920, France received a League of Nations mandate over modern Syria including the Golan.

Between 1948 and 1967, the struggle between Israel and Syria over their demilitarized border zone

MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

was a principal reason behind the Arab–Israel (Six-Day) War of 1967, which ended in Israel capturing the Golan Heights. At the end of the war, the Israeli army was stationed about 22 miles (35 km) from Damascus, while the Syrian army was stationed about 150 miles (250 km) from Tel Aviv. As a result of the Israel–Syria disengagement agreement of the following year, Israel returned to Syria about 40 square miles (100 sq km) of the Golan.

In December 1981, the Likud-led government of Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin extended Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration to the Golan, an action criticized by the Reagan administration and considered "null and void" by resolution 497, unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 17 December 1981.

Prior to its seizure by Israel, the Golan had a population of approximately 130,000 Syrians living in 139 villages and on 61 farms. By 2003 about 16,000 people remained in five Arab villages. The

The Golan Heights region is a hilly plateau with a predominately rocky terrain located in southwestern Syria. It possesses elevations as high as 6,500 feet and commanding views of Lebanon and Syria to the south and Israel to the west, making it an area of great military importance. **© David Rubinger/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

Druze constitute the overwhelming majority of the remaining Syrian population. According to some observers, one reason that the Druze community was allowed to remain was the initial assumption by the Israeli government that the Syrian Druze would cooperate with Israel, along with their coreligionists in the Galilee. Efforts were made to encourage the Golanis to acquire Israeli-citizenship identification cards. By 2003 there were more than thirty-five Jewish settlements, with an estimated population of 15,000, in the Golan. Many of these settlements are on the southern approaches above the Sea of Galilee.

In terms of military significance, the Mount Hermon massif (7,300 ft; 2,224 m) in the north is of exceptional geostrategic value because it offers a commanding position overlooking southern Lebanon, the Golan plateau, and much of southern Syria and northern Israel. To the east, a range of volcanic hills offers downhill access to Galilee in the west and to Damascus in the east. To the west, the Golan plateau overlooks Israeli metropolitan centers.

The Golan is also important for its regional water sources. This is particularly true of the area of Mount Hermon, where the headwaters of the Jordan River lie. Additionally, the Baniyas spring, a major Jordan River source, is located on the lower slopes of the Golan, thus enhancing the latter's importance. To the south, the Sea of Galilee and the Yarmuk River constitute two more important regional water sources.

Peace-negotiations, in which the Golan Heights were a crucial component, have been ongoing intermittently between Israel and the regime of the late Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad beginning in 1991 (with representatives of the Likud government in Israel) and later, in 1992, when the late Yitzhak Rabin assumed the Israeli premiership. In 1994 negotiations were held between the Israeli ambassador to the United States, Itamar Rabinovitch, and Walid Mualem, his Syrian counterpart in Washington. In 1994 and in 1995 meetings took place in the United States between General Ehud Barak, the Israeli chief of staff and General Hikmat Shihabi, his Syrian counterpart. The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin created a vacuum, which interrupted any further discussions for some time. Subsequent attempts at renewing the negotiations remained futile.

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MUHAMMAD MUSLIH
UPDATED BY YEHUDA GRADUS

GOLDBERG, LEAH

[1911–1970]

Hebrew poet, literary critic, translator, educator, and children's author.

Born in Kovno (now Kaunas, Lithuania), Leah Goldberg studied at the universities of Kovno, Berlin,

and Bonn. In 1933, she received a doctorate in philosophy and Semitic languages. In 1935, she arrived in Tel Aviv, in British-mandated Palestine, where she published her first volume of poetry, *Tabbe ot Ashan* (1935, Smokerings).

She served on the editorial boards of *Davar* and *ha-Mishmar* and, from 1952, taught literature at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In 1963, she became chair of its department of comparative literature, a position she held until her death.

Goldberg wrote numerous volumes of poetry—unpretentious, delicate, and lyric. Except for the Holocaust, her themes are universal rather than Jewish: childhood, love (especially unrequited), aging, and death. She excelled as a translator into Hebrew of classical European authors—Tolstoy, Gorky, Chekhov, Mann, and Ibsen. She was also a successful children's author of twenty books; in later years she took up art and illustrated her own works.

See also Holocaust; Literature: Hebrew; Newspapers and Print Media: Israel.

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Ann Kahn

GOLDEN SQUARE

Name given to the four ex-sharifian, pan-Arab Iraqi army officers whose anti-British, pro-Axis politics led to the Rashid Ali coup of 1941 and the war with Britain that followed.

The original "Four" included the leader, Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh, and Kamil Shabib, Fahmi Saʿid, and Mahmud Salman. They organized after the 1936 Bakr Sidqi coup and then joined with three other officers, Aziz Yamulki, Husayn Fawzi, and Amin al-Umari, to form a military opposition bloc to the government. Jamil al-Midfaʿi's government in 1938 tried to transfer the officers out of Baghdad, but succeeded only in making them more politically active.

The officers supported the goals of the Jerusalem *mufti* (chief Muslim jurist), Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who arrived in Baghdad and solicited Germany's help to achieve total Iraqi independence from Britain and the pan-Arab goal of Arab unity of the Fertile Crescent. They opposed Prime Minister Nuri al-Saʿid's severance of relations with Germany in 1939. In 1940 and 1941, the officers and the mufti were in contact with the Japanese and the Italians through their missions in Baghdad and supported Rashid Ali al-Kaylani's government (31 March 1940 to 31 January 1941) as the British pressured Iraq to declare war on Germany. When Rashid Ali resigned, the pro-British regent, Abd al-Ilah, asked General Taha al-Hashimi, who had worked with the Four, to form a government, thinking that he could control the generals. But Taha's weakness and the attempt by the regent to transfer Kamil Shabib out of the capital led them, in collusion with the mufti, to take control of the government in April 1941, with Rashid Ali again as the prime minister.

At the end of the abortive war against Britain in May 1941, the Four fled but were later caught and executed.

See also Abd al-Ilah ibn Ali; Fertile Crescent; Hashimi, Taha al-; Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-; Midfaʿi, Jamil al-; Sabbagh, Salah al-Din al-.

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Reeva S. Simon

GOLDMANN, NAHUM

[1895–1982]

Zionist leader.

Born in Lithuania, Nahum Goldmann spent most of his formative years in Germany, where he obtained a Ph.D. from Heidelberg University and was active in the Radical Zionist faction—a student group on campus at the time. During World War I, he worked at the propaganda division of the German Foreign Ministry and in the 1920s was one of the originators of the German-language *Encyclopedia Judaica,* and later of its English-language edition.

In 1934, Goldmann was appointed the Jewish Agency's representative to the League of Nations in

Geneva. He was a cofounder in 1936 of the World Jewish Congress, of which h e was president from 1949 to 1977. From 1956 to 1968, he was also president of the World Zionist Organization.

In 1940, he moved to New York. During 1947 and 1948, Goldmann was active in London and Washington, soliciting international support for the plan to partition Palestine. He was offered a seat in Israel's provisional government in 1948 but declined. During the early 1950s, he played a key role in negotiating the reparations agreement involving West German payments to Israel. In 1962, he became a citizen of Israel, living his remaining years alternately there and in Switzerland.

After the Arab–Israel War of 1967, Goldmann became increasingly critical of the Israeli government and advocated mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which most Jewish and Israeli leaders reviled at the time as a terrorist organization. In early 1970, he offered to visit Cairo on a mission of peace in response to an invitation from Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser, but the Israeli government vetoed the idea.

Goldmann was instrumental in the planning of Bet ha-Tefutsot (Museum of the Jewish diaspora) in Tel Aviv, which bears his name in its official title.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Palestine; Partition Plans (Palestine); World Zionist Organization (WZO); Zionism.

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Gregory S. Mahler
Neil Caplan

GOLESTAN, EBRAHIM

[1922–]

Iranian writer, photographer, translator, publisher, and filmmaker.

Ebrahim Golestan was born in Shiraz. He went to Tehran to attend the University of Tehran, then the only secular college in Iran. He studied law at the university but was attracted to socialist ideas. In 1944 he joined the Tudeh, Iran's most important Marxist political party. In the ideological debates that splintered the party following the Azerbaijan Crisis, Golestan sided with the reformists led by Khalil Maleki and joined him and other dissidents in resigning from the Tudeh in early 1948. That same year his first collection of short stories, *Azar, mah-e akhar-e payiz* (Azar, the last month of autumn), was published. Although he continued to write stories, in the early 1950s his main occupation became filmmaking. During a twenty-year period, Golestan wrote the scripts for, directed, and produced several films. His movie *A Fire* was the first Iranian film to receive an international award, winning a bronze medal at the 1961 Venice Film Festival.

In 1958 Golestan met and hired for his film studio the poet Forugh Farrokhzad. Because he was married and a father, his eight-year relationship with her was controversial. In the mid-1970s Golestan moved to Britain, where he resettled permanently. He continued to write short stories in the 1980s and 1990s. In 2003 his son, photojournalist Kaveh Golestan, was killed by a land mine while covering the U.S. war in Iraq.

See also Azerbaijan Crisis; Farrokhzad, Forugh; Tudeh Party.

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Eric Hooglund

GOLESTAN PALACE

A museum built in Tehran, Iran, in 1894, for the Peacock Throne and other royal jewels.

Built in the last years of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar's reign (1831–1896), the Golestan palace, or Rose Garden palace, was a museum for the royal jewels, including the famous Peacock Throne brought by Nadir Shah Afshar (1688–1747) from his expeditions to In-

dia. The construction of the palace took five years, with the personal supervision of the shah. In the upheavals of the tobacco revolt (1891–1892) people resorted to the Golestan Palace demanding justice. Subsequently, fearing for the safety of the jewels, the shah moved them to the royal palace, donating, instead, other precious items to the Golestan. The Golestan Palace also includes other chambers, collectively known as Talar-i Berelian (or Diamond Chamber). The Golestan is still a museum.

See also Naser al-Din Shah; Tobacco Revolt.

Parvaneh Pourshariati

GOLPAYAGANI, MOHAMMAD REZA

[1899–1993]

Iranian religious scholar; the most senior in Qom.

Mohammad Reza Golpayagani began his religious studies in his birthplace of Golpayagan, in central Iran, where his father, Seyyed Mohammad Baqer, was a highly respected cleric of Islam. In 1917, he moved to Arak to join the circle of Shaykh Abd al-Karim Haʾeri, one of the most prominent legal authorities of his day within Shiʿism. When Haʾeri left for Qom in 1922, to reestablish the religious institution in that city, Golpayagani followed him at his invitation and was entrusted by him with the teaching of elementary courses. After the death of Haʾeri in 1937, he graduated to the teaching of jurisprudence, and his lectures, held in the Masjed-e Aʿzam, would often attract as many as 800 students. He attained still greater influence after the death in 1962 of Hosayn Borujerdi, Haʾeri's successor, and assumed the major responsibility for administering the complex of colleges and mosques that make up the religious institution in Qom. By then, he had also attained the position of *marja al-taqlid* (source of imitation), an authoritative guide in matters of religious law.

Unbending and rigorous in his understanding of Shiʿite law, he entered the political arena in 1962 with a denunciation of the redistribution of land by the state as contrary to Islam. Despite the conservatism that this implied, he was supportive of the movement inaugurated in 1963 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and in 1978, when the Iranian Revolution erupted, numerous proclamations condemning the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi were issued over his signature. He consistently refrained from taking a position on the controversies that plagued postrevolutionary Iran, both because of advancing years and because of a fundamentally apolitical disposition. He died on 2 December 1993 and was eulogized by all the leading figures of the Islamic republic.

See also Borujerdi, Hosayn; Iranian Revolution (1979); Khomeini, Ruhollah; Marja al-Taqlid; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Shiʿism.

Hamid Algar

GOLSHIRI, HOUSHANG

[1937–2000]

Iranian fiction writer, poet, essayist, and editor.

Houshang Golshiri was born in Isfahan to a working-class family. When he still was a child, the family moved to Abadan, where his father had found work in the oil industry. The family moved back to Isfahan when Golshiri was in high school, and he completed his secondary education in his native city. He attended college and earned B.A. and M.A. degrees while working to help support his family. His first essays, poems, and short stories were published in literary journals in the early 1960s. In 1965, he and two other Isfahan writers founded *Jong-e Isfahan* (Isfahan anthology), a semiannual short-story magazine that brought Golshiri national attention. In 1969, his novella *Shazdeh Ehtejab* (Prince Ehtejab) was published. It was made into a popular Iranian movie and was translated into English and other languages.

Golshiri wrote against political oppression and censorship, and his efforts on behalf of freedom of expression resulted in his arrest by the SAVAK on three occasions during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. After the Iranian Revolution, the government forbade the publication of many of his works. In 1989, one collection of short stories was published in Persian in Sweden. His novel about repression under the Islamic Republic, *Shah-e siyah pushan,* was published in 1990 in English translation as *King of the Benighted.* In 1999, Germany awarded him the prestigious Erich Maria Remarque Peace Prize.

See also Iranian Revolution (1979); Isfahan; Literature: Persian; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza.

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PARDIS MINUCHEHR
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

GOLSORKHI, KHOSROW

[1943–1972]

Leftist Iranian poet and advocate of revolutionary commitment in literature, who was executed after a political show trial.

Born in Rasht, Khosrow Golsorkhi became a journalist by profession. In 1972 he was arrested and accused of plotting against the royal family. In fact, the plot was concocted by SAVAK, which used agents provocateurs to string together a dozen leftist intellectuals, some of whom had discussed plans to kidnap members of the royal family and swap them for political prisoners.

Contrary to the usual procedure for closed political tribunals, highlights of the so-called Golsorkhi group's trial were broadcast on Iran's network television. The defendants were expected to recant publicly and appeal to the shah, who would then commute the court's harsh sentences. Tortured and facing the gallows, most recanted and received lesser punishments. However, Golsorkhi, along with the filmmaker Karamat Daneshian, denounced the regime. They were both executed and immediately became heroes to the opposition as well as to the general public. University and high school students went on strike and the defiant duo's names (especially Golsorkhi's, evoking the leftist symbol of the red flower) were commemorated in numerous literary references and popular songs.

See also LITERATURE, PERSIAN.

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AFSHIN MATIN-ASGARI

GORDON, AARON DAVID

[1856–1922]

Jewish pioneer in Palestine; philosopher of Labor Zionism.

A. D. Gordon was born in Tryano, Russia, and died in Palestine. He was educated in both Jewish studies and Russian secular subjects and spent his early adult life as financial manager of the Guenzburg estate. In 1904, when the estate was sold, he went to Palestine. He had been influenced by the secular Hebrew language and literary movement, particularly by the essays of Ahad Ha-Am. In Palestine he worked as a farm laborer, and then he and his family participated in a model cooperative agricultural community, Degania, forerunner of the kibbutz.

Although Gordon never affiliated with any of the political parties of Labor Zionism, he published essays that influenced their activities and ideologies. Extolling the virtues of working on the land, Gordon reflected on the distortions in Jewish society caused by the Diaspora. Jews had not simply been dispersed to many lands but had been denied the opportunities to work in all occupations, especially those that might sustain communal vitality. Gordon argued that only through the ideal of physical farm labor, cooperation, and mutual aid, in a return to the soil on their own land in their own country, would Jews individually and collectively be revitalized.

He was opposed to socialism in its Marxist form and was uninterested in politics, but he viewed humanity as part of the cosmos, with national communities forming and embodying a living cosmic relationship. He rejected urban culture as alienated from nature and from creativity. Just as the exile could be ended by bringing Jews to Palestine, so could the exile be banished from the Jewish soul through agricultural labor. The establishment of an agricultural base would provide the possibility for the creation of a just, humane Jewish society, especially with respect to the Arabs. He has said: "Their hostility is all the more reason for our humanity."

See also AHAD HA-AM; DIASPORA; LABOR ZIONISM.

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DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

GORDON, CHARLES
[1833–1885]

British army engineer, explorer, and empire builder active in the Crimea, China, and Africa.

Born into a military family on 28 January 1833, Charles Gordon was commissioned in the Royal Engineers in 1852 and two years later fought in the Crimean War. In 1863 he became commander of the Ever Victorious Army, a Chinese ragtag mercenary outfit, which defeated the Taiping rebellion against the Manchu emperor. The popularity he subsequently won in the British press earned him the nickname Chinese Gordon.

It is, however, through his service in Africa that Gordon attained both lasting fame and martyrdom. In 1874 the viceroy of Egypt sent him to the Sudan and equatorial Africa to suppress the slave trade and extend, through exploration, the southern boundaries of Egypt's African dominions. In 1877 he continued his antislavery crusade as governor general of the Sudan; frustrated in his efforts, he resigned three years later.

When Muhammad Ahmad, claiming to be the Mahdi (the Muslim messiah), led a revolt in the Sudan that threatened Egypt's and Britain's African interests, Gordon was appointed to lead the evacuation of Khartoum's garrison. Disobeying his instructions, he tried to crush the rebellion but failed in the face of overwhelming odds. Besieged in Khartoum, he chose to make a suicidal stand. The Mahdi's troops stormed the city on 26 January 1885, killing Gordon and most of his soldiers.

See also AHMAD, MUHAMMAD; CRIMEAN WAR.

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JEAN-MARC R. OPPENHEIM

GORST, JOHN ELDON
[1861–1911]

Anglo–Egyptian and Foreign Office official, 1886–1907; British agent and consul-general in Egypt, 1907–1911.

The family of John Eldon Gorst was mainly from Lancashire, England; it had prospered under Queen Victoria's reign. Gorst (known as Jack to his friends) was born in New Zealand but was raised in London. His father and namesake, Sir John, returned to England from New Zealand after the last Maori War, where he embarked on an erratic career in Conservative Party politics. Gorst suffered a painful and unhappy childhood, because an abscess in his pelvis kept him bedridden or wearing a brace for almost seven years. Educated in day schools, at home by tutors, then at Eton and at Trinity College, Cambridge, he earned a degree in mathematics in 1882 and was called to the bar in 1885. Rather than face exclusion, like his father, from the largely aristocratic Tory Party inner circle, Gorst entered the diplomatic service in 1885; he was sent to Egypt.

Egypt was still formally under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, but Muhammad Ali Pasha had managed to make it a virtually independent state from 1805 until 1842, when the Ottoman sultan recognized his right to pass the control of Egypt on to his descendants. Because of the building of the Suez Canal and European greed, Egypt became burdened with financial debts. Both France and Britain intervened and, in 1882, British troops occupied Egypt. By 1886, when Gorst arrived, Sir Evelyn Baring, later the Earl of Cromer, was consolidating his power as Egypt's de facto ruler. Gorst learned Arabic well enough to bypass an interpreter and cultivate friendships among the Egyptian Ottoman elite, including Khedive Abbas Hilmi II. Between 1890 and 1904, Gorst distinguished himself at Egypt's ministries of finance and interior. He helped organize and recruit Englishmen to extend British control in Egypt and the Sudan. In 1898 he succeeded Sir Elwin Palmer as financial adviser in Egypt—the most influential post after Cromer's. In 1904, Gorst, now Cromer's heir-apparent, returned to the Foreign Office, especially to act as Cromer's agent there.

In 1907, the Liberal cabinet sent Gorst back to Egypt to reduce Cromer's autocracy and to give selected Egyptians limited responsibility for their

internal affairs. This "new policy" of "conciliation" and "moderation" would, the cabinet hoped, diminish Egyptian nationalism and appease hostile critics in Britain and Egypt. By working with the Egyptian ministers and the khedive, Gorst quickly and successfully undermined the nationalists. Unlike Cromer, he did not usually bully the Egyptian Ottoman elite.

Gorst, however, made three major mistakes. First, he alienated the Anglo–Egyptian officials and influential circles in Britain by reducing their influence on the veiled protectorate over Egypt. Second, in 1908, he appointed Boutros Ghali, a Coptic Christian, as prime minister to replace the elderly time server, Mustafa Fahmi. Ghali was able but hated by the nationalists for his record and distrusted by many Muslims for his faith. Third, Gorst sought in 1909 and 1910 to extend the Suez Canal Company's concession, mainly to provide development funds for the Sudan. He lost Ghali and the experiment in limited self-rule to a nationalist assassin, and a defiant Egyptian General Assembly rejected the concession extension.

Gorst's last year as British agent had an element of anticlimax. Despite alarmists who predicted further trouble for the British in Egypt, little or nothing occurred. Although his health deteriorated rapidly, Gorst's control and British influence in Egypt did not. It was enough for the agency to warn, bribe, or deport certain nationalists, suppress so-called seditious periodicals, and indulge in a limited amount of counterpropaganda.

Gorst died of cancer in July 1911, in Castle Combe, England. The khedive, whom he had befriended, rushed to comfort him on his deathbed.

See also Abbas Hilmi II; Baring, Evelyn; Ghali, Boutros; Muhammad Ali.

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Peter Mellini

GOVERNMENT

Exercise of authority over and the performance of functions for a political unit; usually classified by the distribution of power within it.

The modern Middle East is a large and diverse region, the differences well illustrated by the structures and dynamics of governments in the area. There are nearly as many types of government as there are states, and many of the systems undergo almost constant change as the need to accommodate domestic and international pressures emerges. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 some states are seen by the United States and other nations as failed or rogue states that pose an imminent threat to world security, and international forces have compelled "regime changes" in the region (Afghanistan, Iraq).

Constitutional government is not deeply rooted or widespread in the Middle East. Israel's democracy rests in part on a series of basic laws that provide a framework for governmental action rather than on a formal written constitution, but this does not affect its role as a parliamentary democracy. Syria has a constitution with the trappings of constitutional government, yet hardly qualifies as a democratic regime. Other states have written constitutions, but these rarely provide a clear guide to governmental action. The Republic of Turkey, however, is a significant exception.

The legislative institutions of Middle East states generally are limited in number and power. In much of the Middle East, the legislatures are rarely representative bodies, although when present they often perform useful functions. In some of the Persian Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, there exist consultative bodies that generally serve at the pleasure of the ruler but also tend to legitimate the ruler's actions. This function has proven particularly critical in times of crisis and challenge to the regime. In some instances elected (although not in wholly unfettered processes) legislatures are involved in lawmaking and engage in criticism of the regime despite regime-imposing limitations. Such legislatures have existed in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Syria, and Yemen. Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait experiment with such systems, whereby the democratization process in Kuwait after the lib-

eration from Iraqi occupation was slow. The form of legislative dynamic most familiar to Western observers exists in Israel and Turkey (and did exist in Lebanon until the 1975 civil war). In Israel the parliament has antecedents in the British model. The Turkish government has been subjected to periodic military interference, but parliament has been empowered to bolster Turkey's membership plea for the European Union. In both countries legislatures are freely elected, real political opposition exists, and multiparty competition is the norm.

Throughout most countries of the Middle East, political opposition is still controlled, as are elections. Morocco is undergoing a constitutional reform since the coming into power of King Mohammed VI in 1999. The recent dramatic change in the foreign policy of Libya has not yet changed the autocratic regime within. Algeria is still in a process of reconstruction of civil society, and the reform process in Tunisia is still slow as of early 2004. As in Morocco the key to democratization in all these countries is an approach to give human rights (not at least the rights of women) a prominent place on the reform agenda.

The politics of the Middle East are dominated mostly by the individuals of the executive branches of government who control a country's system and its decisions. More often than not, this is a single authoritarian individual, whether his title is king, prince, general, or president. Most Middle Eastern governments can be classified as authoritarian; the autonomy of their political institutions is limited, and there are serious constraints on personal political freedoms. Individuals' political rights and personal freedoms are not accorded considerable attention in most of the region's systems, and are rarely guaranteed. Nevertheless, despite the range and extent of government control over the public sector and formal governmental activity, totalitarian regimes are not a conspicuous regional feature, as there is often a clear separation between the public and private sectors, with the private sector insulated from governmental interference.

Forms of Government

Authoritarian systems include several major forms of government, including monarchy (absolute or constitutional) with a king, prince, or sultan at its head. The monarchic principle is firmly rooted in Middle Eastern tradition and history. Such leaders—caliphs, sultans, shahs, khedives, shaykhs, and amirs—have held the reins of government in some areas for centuries, often sustaining control through hereditary succession. Monarchies have been seen as legitimate forms of government, even if individual monarchs were given to excesses in the assumption or exercise of power. Monarchies were established by the British, or at least with their acquiescence, in Iraq and in Transjordan during their respective mandates. The coup in Iran after World War I shifted dynasties, but monarchy was retained until the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Egypt retained its monarchy until 1952 and Libya until 1969; Morocco, Jordan, and the Persian Gulf states still maintain the tradition of monarchical rule. Turkey's caliphate-sultanate was terminated after World War I; the imamate of Yemen survived until the 1950s. The formal change from monarchy to republic does not, however, assure an end to personal control of the affairs of state. On the contrary, often the deposed monarch has been succeeded by a popular leader or dictator, such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, or Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

A republican form of government was formally established during the French mandate over Syria and Lebanon, and these two states emerged from French control after World War II as republics. Nevertheless, they soon moved in very different directions, with Lebanon retaining at least the form of a republic and Syria establishing a single-person system, which has been dominated by the al-Asad family since the early 1970s.

Political pluralism is a rare feature in the Middle East, restricted to Israel and Turkey and, arguably, Lebanon and some minor Gulf states. In Israel, the tradition of proportional representation and coalition government, which originated in the British model for the prestate Zionist structures in Palestine, has helped to generate party pluralism. In Lebanon, the National Pact of 1943 divided elected and appointive government positions proportionately among the various religious denominational groups. Although it has survived since the French mandate and has been modified various times since, its premise of proportional ethnic and religious representation remains a central feature of Lebanese politics, albeit buffeted by civil war. Turkey is a

prominent example of a state that has moved from a one-party to a multiparty system since 1945.

Periodically, suggestions have been advanced for political change and reform as well as for further democratization of the states in the region, but these have rarely advanced beyond the stage of pronouncement, thereby allowing the retention of existing structures and types of government. As part of its "War on Terror," the administration of U.S. president George W. Bush has argued for a democratization of the region, whereby the use of foreign force for such regime changes is seen as a legitimate tool. The transitional constitution in Iraq may pave the way for such approaches, as it is a consensus of major ethnic and religious factions under U.S. guidance.

Islamic governments (theocracies) have been the exception, not the rule, in the Arab world—Israel is a Jewish state but not a theocracy, and Turkey abolished the caliphate in the 1920s and proclaimed itself a secular state. An Islamic government was installed in Iran only after the Iranian Revolution and the ouster of the shah in 1979. The role of Islam in government has varied. Most Islamic states are so described because the majority of their populations are Muslims and they utilize elements of Islam to guide their activities. Many of their constitutions include provisions that the state is Islamic, that Islam is the established religion, or that certain officials (generally, the head of state) must be Muslim, but in most states some of the elements of Islam coexist with extensive borrowings from Western and secular conceptions of government and political life. In some states, Islam has been used as a mechanism for achieving and sustaining the legitimacy of the regime; in others it has been a mobilizing force to generate popular opposition to government policies. The Iranian revolution (1979) established a regime in which Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the clerics who supported him dominated the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government as well as the military, the media, and the Revolutionary Guards, and traditional Islamic law was enshrined as the law of the land. The structure of government was one peculiar to the Shiʿite system of Iran as molded and guided by Khomeini; it achieved its form only after significant internal discord among varying interpreters of the legacy of Shiʿism. The Iranian model has not been emulated in other states, and it is under pressure in Iran itself. No Arab country has yet formally established an Islamic government, although Saudi Arabia has many of the trappings, including a *shariʿa*-based legal system and the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques (king) as head of state (king).

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BERNARD REICH
UPDATED BY OLIVER BENJAMIN HEMMERLE

GOZANSKI, TAMAR

[1940–]

Knesset member; leading figure in the Israeli Communist Party.

Born in Petah Tikvah, Israel, Tamar Gozanski received her master of science in economics at the State University of Leningrad. She served in the twelfth through fifteenth Knessets (during most of the 1980s and 1990s) as a member of RAKAH (the Israeli Communist Party). While a member of the Knesset, she played key roles on the following committees: Labor and Welfare, Early Childhood, Advancement of the Status of Women, Foreign Workers, Special Committee for School Dropout Rates, and Parliamentary Inquiry Committee on Trafficking in Women.

Gozanski's public activities include membership on the Political Bureau of the Israeli Communist Party and serving as deputy chairperson of the Council of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, the membership of which is predominantly Arab. Her publications include *Economic Independence: How?* (1969) and *The Development of Capitalism in Palestine* (1988). She is a frequent contributor to the newspapers *Ha'aretz, Yediot Aharanot,* and *Zu Haderekh.*

Gozanski has been a consistent supporter of Arab civil liberties and has long advocated full Israeli withdrawal from all Palestinian territories. She sponsored numerous bills in the Knesset to assist workers, the poor, and those living below the poverty line—Jews and well as Arabs—in Israeli society. She is fluent in Hebrew, Russian, and English. Gozansky, a veteran member of RAKAH as well as HADASH/DFPE, the Jewish-Arab Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, was the last Communist to hold a Knesset seat.

See also COMMUNISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST; ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL.

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LAURIE KING-IRANI

GRADY–MORRISON PLAN (1946)

See MORRISON–GRADY PLAN (1946)

GRAND MOSQUE

The most important mosque in Islam and destination for Muslim pilgrims from around the world.

The Grand Mosque is located in Mecca and known in Arabic as *al-Masjid al-Haram* (the Mosque of the Holy Sanctuary). Around the year 622 (the year 8 hijri in the Muslim calendar) the prophet Muhammad made into a mosque the sacred precinct around the Kaʿba, the well of Zamzam, and the Maqam of Abraham. In keeping with the needs of the growing community of worshipers, the mosque was enlarged and embellished with collonades and minarets. In its large courtyard with the Kaʿba in the center were constructed four shelters *(maqams),* to be used during prayer times by the prayer leader (imam) for each of the main schools in Sunni Islam (Hanbali, Maliki, Shafiʿi, and Hanafi). It was probably the first monumental mosque in Islam, constructed before the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

Major modifications were made from 1572 to 1577, including the construction of a series of small domes to replace the flat roof covering the mosque's interior spaces. The most recent extensions and improvements were begun in 1991. The Grand Mosque is the devotional focal point for Muslims around the world, who face in its direction whenever they pray. Historically a center for intellectual life, the mosque is still used for teaching and research.

See also KAʿBA; UTAYBI, JUHAYMAN AL-.

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MALCOLM C. PECK
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

GRAZIANI, RODOLFO

[1882–1955]

Italian military officer.

Rodolfo Graziani first came to prominence as the conqueror of Tripolitania in 1925, during the second Italo–Sanusi War. In 1929, under the direction of the new governor of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, he completed the conquest of the Fezzan. In 1930, General Graziani was made vice-governor of Libya and military governor of Cyrenaica, and during the next year, he completed its pacification using brutal and ruthless tactics. The nomadic population of northern Cyrenaica was herded into detention camps; a wire fence was constructed along the northern Cyrenaican–Egyptian border and the Sanusi *zawiyas* (Islamic religious centers) were destroyed. Graziani's tactics reached their peak with the public execution of the veteran resistance leader, Umar al-Mukhtar, at Soluk on 16 September 1930. Graziani went on to succeed Marshal Balbo as governor of Libya on the latter's death in action in Tobruk in June 1940.

See also BALBO, ITALO; FEZZAN; ITALY IN THE MIDDLE EAST; MUKHTAR, UMAR AL-.

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GEORGE JOFFE

GREATER ISRAEL

See ERETZ YISRAEL

GREATER SYRIA

Pre-1914 name for present-day Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan.

Until World War I the name Syria generally referred to Greater or geographical Syria, which extends from the Taurus Mountains in the north to the Sinai in the south, and between the Mediterranean in the west and the desert in the east. The name was first given by the Greeks to the city of Tyrus (now Tyre)—Sur in Arabic—and then applied by them to the whole of the province.

The early Arabs referred to Greater Syria as Bilad al-Sham; in Arabic *al-Sham* means left or north. Bilad al-Sham is so called because it lies to the left of the holy Kaʿba in Mecca, and also because those who journey thither from the Hijaz bear to the left or north. Another explanation is that Syria has many beauty spots—fields and gardens—held to resemble the moles *(shamat)* on a beauty's face.

The term *Syria,* referring to greater or geographical Syria, began to be used again in the political and administrative literature of the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire then established a province of Syria, and more than one newspaper using the term *Suriyya* in its name was published at the time. In 1920, Greater Syria was partitioned by the Allies of World War I into present-day Syria, Greater Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan.

See also Sinai Peninsula; Taurus Mountains; Tyre.

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Abdul-Karim Rafeq

GREATER SYRIA PLAN

Plan for unification of the central regions of the Middle East.

Championed by King Abdullah of Transjordan, the Greater Syria plan was the expression of an old dream to unify Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan. After Faisal's kingdom in Syria collapsed in 1920, Abdullah tried to unite Transjordan and Syria under his rule, and throughout the 1930s, he kept the dream alive for the Hashimites. Although he received little encouragement from British officials, his ideas revived after World War II and met with the approval of Nuri al-Saʿid of Iraq; certain aspects of the program were incorporated into the Arab League charter in 1945. Most Syrian leaders, however, not to mention those of Lebanon and Palestine, were against a Hashimite-led Greater Syria and distrusted Abdullah accordingly. Although the Syrian Social Nationalist Party of Antun Saʿada supported the scheme, the rest of the Syrian leadership rejected it, including the first president of independent Syria, Shukri al-Quwatli, and his successor, Husni al-Zaʿim. With the assassination of Abdullah in 1951, the Greater Syria plan lay in ruins, though it was kept alive by Nuri al-Saʿid until his untimely death in 1958.

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Fertile Crescent Unity Plans; Hashimite House (House of Hashim); League of Arab States; Quwatli, Shukri al-; Saʿada, Antun; Syrian Social Nationalist Party; Zaʿim, Husni al-.

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Zachary Karabell

GREAT GAME, THE

Phrase coined at the beginning of the nineteenth century, referring to the imperial competition between Britain and Russia over control of southern central Asia.

Thanks in part to Rudyard Kipling, mention of "The Great Game" conjured up images of dashing heroism in the wilds of the Afghanistan mountains. While this romanticism was certainly a part of the game, it was more often played by politicians in London and St. Petersburg than by adventurers in the steppe.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

GRECO–TURKISH WAR (1897)

Brief war won by Turkey but also benefiting Greece due to the intervention of major European powers.

The Greco–Turkish War of 1897 ended in an easy victory for Turkey. It began in April 1897 with clashes across the Greco–Turkish border, which at the time ran between Thessaly and Ottoman-held Macedonia. The hostilities ended in May 1897 when the Turkish army drove the Greeks back deep into Greek territory.

The war grew out of tension between Greece and Turkey that was fueled by a Greek uprising on the Ottoman-controlled island of Crete. Calling for a more dynamic stance by Greece toward Turkey, the Greek nationalist organization Ethniké Hetairia (National Association) orchestrated an incursion into Turkish territory by Greek irregular troops (March 1897), apparently with the knowledge of the Greek government. Although Turkish forces repulsed the irregulars, the incident led to a break in diplomatic relations between Greece and Turkey and a massing of their respective armies on the mountainous frontier between Greek Thessaly and Ottoman Epirus and Macedonia.

The Greek army, consisting of two divisions, was unable to capitalize on its early incursions across the Macedonia–Thessaly border and suffered defeats in several battles around the mountain passes between Macedonia and Thessaly south of Mount Olympus. The Greek front collapsed on 12 April 1897, and the Greek forces began to retreat into the Thessalian plain. Within two weeks and with little resistance, the Turkish army controlled all of Thessaly, including its major towns of Larissa and Volos. There was relatively little activity on the western front in Epirus, where the Turkish army successfully repulsed the Greek offensive.

The war came to an end when the advancing Turkish army scored another two victories in battles on the mountains that divide the Thessalian plain from the rest of Greece, thus consolidating its control over Thessaly. The danger that further Greek territories would fall to the Ottomans prompted Russia's Czar Nicholas II, with the support of other European governments, to intervene and persuade Sultan Abdülhamit to agree to a cease-fire; it was signed by the combatants on 7 May 1897, although the end of the war was not formally agreed upon by the Greek and Turkish governments until November 1897. Because of the involvement of Russia and the other European powers in the resolution of the conflict, the Ottoman Empire gained very little from its victory except monetary compensation and slight changes to its borderline that it considered strategically advantageous. In an important gesture that served to acknowledge Greece's original grievances, the European powers prevailed upon Abdühamit to accept previously Ottoman-ruled Crete as an autonomous region.

Greek troops in Thessaly. The inadequately prepared Greek combat forces numbered around 100,000 men, of which approximately 500 were lost. In comparison, Turkish forces numbered around 400,000, with 1,500 losses. **© CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

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ALEXANDER KITROEFF
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

GREEKS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Greek communities in the Middle East, especially in Egypt, once played a vital economic role.

Once significant, the Greek presence in the Middle East is currently limited to about 6,000 persons in Egypt (primarily in Cairo and Alexandria), and it is much smaller in the Sudan, the Arabian Peninsula, and elsewhere in the region. (No official statistics are available to provide reliable figures.)

The geographical proximity of the Middle East to the Greek islands and mainland, the development of Greek maritime trade in the seventeenth century, and the existence of Greek Orthodox patriarchates in Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem ensured that there would be small numbers of Greek merchants and clerics in the Middle East around 1800. Their numbers began increasing substantially in the nineteenth century, after Muhammad Ali, Egypt's ruler, invited foreign entrepreneurs, including Greeks, to Alexandria to help modernize Egypt. The greatest number of resident Greeks in Egypt's history—99,793 persons, of whom 76,264 were Greek citizens—was recorded in Egypt's annual census of 1927. Constituting the largest of the numerous foreign communities inhabiting Egypt from the mid-nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century, the Greeks were a socially diverse group that ranged in occupation from wealthy bankers and exporters to employees in the service sector and even factory workers. Smaller Greek communities of a few thousand also could be found in Sudan, Palestine, and in cities along the North African coast. The end of the capitulations in Egypt (1937) signaled the onset of the decline in numbers of Greeks in Egypt, and the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 accelerated this decrease. The Suez Crisis of 1956 reinforced the trend, although a large part of the Greek community supported Egypt in its claim on the canal. The nationalization measures taken by the Egyptian government in 1963 caused the numbers of Greeks remaining in Egypt to fall to a few thousand.

Greek Orthodox clergy perform the annual Holy Week reenactment of Christ's "Washing of the Feet" of His apostles. A priest humbly washes the feet of twelve church members. **© Hanan Isachar/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

Spread out across the country, the Greeks in Egypt were formerly to be found even in small towns in the Nile delta and in upper Egypt, and they formed the largest foreign communities in Alexandria, Cairo, Port Saʿid, and Suez. In 1927, out of 99,605 foreign citizens residing in Alexandria, over a third (37,106) were Greek citizens, and the same proportion held for the other major cities. As they had been in Greece, the Greeks in Egypt were Greek Orthodox, and they continued to use their native tongue. With a number of important Greek journals and literary societies based there, Alexandria became a very important Greek literary center in the first three decades of the twentieth century. The Alexandrian Greek poet C. P. Cavafy (1863–1933) gained an international reputation and Alexandrian writer Stratis Tsirkas (d. 1979) enjoys a good reputation in Greece. Like most of the foreigners in Egypt, the Greeks were noted for their cosmopolitanism. Many Greeks were fluent in either French or English, and the wealthier strata of Greek society in Egypt had very close ties with Europe. Several Greeks sat on company boards whose members came from mixed European backgrounds. In the 1930s, more and more Greeks began to acquire a knowledge of Arabic.

As did all the foreign residents, the Greeks benefited from the broad-ranging privileges Egypt provided to the citizens of other countries. Capitulation rights were extended to the Greeks the year after Greece signed a capitulations treaty with the Ottoman Empire (1855); previously, some Greeks had been under the protection of European con-

suls. Greece agreed to participate in the mixed courts system in 1876. The Egyptian uprising and the British occupation of 1882 that followed it did not affect the status of the Greeks, nor did the outbreak signaling the beginning of the Egyptian nationalist movement (1919), with which many Greeks sympathized. The Greek government was unable to offer the Greeks in Egypt any help in the diplomatic negotiations preceding the end of the capitulations (1937) or the abolition of the mixed courts (1949); the Greeks had hoped that in regard to these arrangements their traditionally close relationship with the Egyptians would have earned them more favorable treatment than they received.

The Greeks made their greatest impact in Egypt via their role in the banking and cotton sectors. The first group of Greeks brought to Alexandria by Muhammad Ali in the early 1800s were merchants, shipbuilders, and sailors whose activities helped increase commerce and building of the merchant marine in Egypt. The Greek community in Alexandria was unaffected by Egypt's involvement on the side of the Ottomans during the Greek War of Independence (1821–1830), and the number of Greeks in Egypt gradually increased in the following decades, as did their economic strength. The boom in Egyptian cotton production and export in the 1860s, which catapulted the Egyptian economy to new levels and integrated it into the world economy, also further increased the role and economic power of the Greek merchants and financiers, who remained central to the financing, production, and exporting of cotton in Egypt until the eve of World War II. In the 1920s, Greek exporting houses were responsible for 25 percent of all Egyptian cotton exports. The largest of the Greek exporting companies of that period was Choremi, Benachi & Co.; in the banking sector, Greeks such as the Salvago family were well known and influential.

The Greeks in Egypt remained closely identified with issues of Greek nationalism and with Greek party politics. The early settlers had supported the Greek War of Independence and subsequent efforts to incorporate Greek-populated areas within the Greek state. With time, increasing numbers of Greeks returned to Greece to fight as volunteers in the Greek army, especially during the 1912–1913 Balkan War. The wealthiest financed the building of schools or philanthropical institutions in their hometowns or villages, and others made contributions that went toward developing the Greek state. For example, the donations of George Averoff helped complete the marble stadium in Athens where the first Olympic games were held in 1896 and made it possible to purchase the battleship *Averoff,* which proved a factor in Greece's victories in the Balkan War.

The Greeks in Egypt created a broad network of communal institutions: schools, hospitals, churches, orphanages, nursing homes, and a variety of leisure and athletic societies, most of them run by the city-based Greek community organizations, which were themselves administered by prominent Greeks in the community. A small and weak institution in the 1800s, the Greek Orthodox patriarchate of Alexandria gradually grew in stature and importance as the numbers of Greeks in Egypt increased.

See also Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Capitulations; Greek War of Independence; Levantine; Mixed Courts; Muhammad Ali; Suez Crisis (1956–1957).

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Alexander Kitroeff

GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

Aided by the great powers, Greece broke away from the Ottoman Empire to establish a modern state.

The Greek War of Independence began with two uprisings in March 1821. The first was led by Alexander Ipsilanti, a Greek officer in the Russian army, who led an ill-fated attack of Greek rebels into Moldavia from Russian territory. The second uprising took place in southern Greece, in the Peloponnese, and was to lead eventually to the establishment of the modern Greek state. The uprising in the Peloponnese, launched by Greek military chieftains, spread northward to parts of Rumelia and to the maritime islands off the eastern coast of the Peloponnese. In their clashes with the local Ottoman garrisons, the Greek rebels' object was to capture

the fortified towns of the region; Greek vessels proved important in assisting the rebels to lay siege to the coastal forts. By the end of 1821, the Greeks controlled enough territory to be able to convene a meeting of representatives that proclaimed Greece's independence.

The rebels could not, however, sustain the successes they had scored in the first year of the revolt and were soon facing serious military, financial, and political difficulties. Ottoman army units stationed farther north marched southward into Rumelia and the Peloponnese and eventually recaptured some of the forts the Greeks had taken. The presence of European philhellenes fighting for the Greek cause did not serve to make less urgent the Greeks' need for more funds and equipment. Although the Greek leaders were able to obtain two loans in London for the purpose of acquiring armaments and equipment, they did so under unfavorable terms. By late 1924, the Greeks had managed to contain the Ottoman counterattack and controlled about half the Peloponnese and parts of Rumelia, but they encountered political dissent within their own ranks. Longstanding regional and personal ties stood in the way of forming an effective, centralized leadership, and the vision of a liberal, democratic constitution was not shared by all the diverse elements who made up the Greek leadership—that is, the military chieftains, the notables, and the Greeks of the diaspora.

The landing of an Egyptian army in the Peloponnese (1925) in response to the sultan's request for help in suppressing the Greek uprising threatened to put an end to the Greek War of Independence. After two more years of hostilities, in which the Greeks had to deal with the Egyptian army's attempt to sweep the Peloponnese and with an Ottoman offensive on the Greek strongholds in Rumelia, the areas under Greek control were considerably contracted, especially after the fall of Athens to the Ottomans in May 1927. At the same time, Britain, France, and Russia had agreed upon a plan to end the war and to grant independence to Greece (i.e., the Peloponnese, Rumelia, and the islands involved in the war, which were to be ruled by a governor appointed by the great powers and acceptable to the Greek leadership). The agreement, formalized by the signing of the Treaty of London (1827), was rejected by the Sublime Porte and by Ibrahim ibn Muhammad Ali Pasha, the leader of the Egyptian army and navy. As diplomatic initiatives were being examined, a combined British, French, and Russian fleet that had sailed to the Peloponnese to blockade the Egyptian and Turkish navies engaged them in the Battle of Navarino (October 1927) and destroyed them completely. This development cleared the way for the implementation of the Treaty of London, and Count Ioannes Kapodistrias, a Greek in the Russian diplomatic service, became Greece's first governor.

Kapodistrias set about building a modern state and dealing with the devastation the war had inflicted. The formerly privileged class of military chieftains and notables resisted the centralization inherent in state building, however, and this resistance was to culminate in Kapodistrias's assassination by one of the military chieftains (1832). The work of establishing the modern Greek state had nevertheless progressed, both domestically and diplomatically. The Treaty of Adrianople (1829) ending the Russian–Ottoman War (1828–1829) included an article that proclaimed Greece to be an independent state, and the ambassadors of the great powers delineated the Greek state's boundaries in a document communicated to the Porte in the same year (1829). After the Porte had recognized both the Treaty of Adrianople and the Treaty of London as well as the Greek boundaries, the great powers formally proclaimed Greece to be an independent state in 1830.

See also Ibrahim ibn Muhammad Ali; Rumelia; Russian–Ottoman Wars; Sublime Porte.

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Alexander Kitroeff

GREENBERG, URI ZVI

[1894–1981]

Hebrew poet.

Born in Bialykamien in eastern Galicia, Poland, Uri Zvi Greenberg was a descendant of prominent Hasidic families both from his mother's and father's side. While he was still very young, his parents

moved to Lvov where he received a traditional Hasidic education.

Greenberg's earliest poems, written in Yiddish and Hebrew, were published in 1912. Drafted into the Austrian army in 1915, he served on the Serbian front, which he deserted in 1917. The Polish pogroms against the Jews in 1918 made a lasting impression on him. Following World War I, he continued to publish in the same two languages as before; upon his emigration to Eretz Yisrael (Palestine), however, in 1924, he wrote exclusively in Hebrew. For a number of years after his arrival, Greenberg was a dedicated Laborite and became a regular contributor to the Labor daily, *Davar,* when it was founded in 1925.

Subsequent to the Arab riots in 1929, he abandoned the Labor Party and joined the ultranationalist Zionist Revisionist Party, which he represented as a delegate to several Zionist Congresses. From 1931 to 1934 Greenberg served as emissary of the Revisionist movement in Warsaw where he edited its Yiddish weekly, *Di Velt.* He returned to Eretz Yisrael in 1936. In his poetry and articles of the period, he harshly criticized moderate Zionists and warned of the impending doom destined for European Jewry.

During Israel's struggle for independence, Greenberg was a sympathizer of the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi, pre-Israel's underground resistance movement. Following the establishment of the State of Israel, he was elected to the Knesset as a representative of the Herut Party. He served from 1949 to 1951.

Unlike secularist writers, Greenberg viewed Zionism from a religio-mystical perspective. He saw Jewish existence as outside the pale of history and the Jews' return to Zion as nothing less than the fulfillment of their destiny. In his pre-Eretz Yisrael poetry, Greenberg manifests an inordinate preoccupation with what he correctly foresaw as the horrors of the Holocaust, which he interpreted as the culmination of the struggle between Christians and Jews. His poetry is strongly ideological and his sources are almost exclusively Jewish and rooted in the Jewish past.

Among Greenberg's works in Yiddish are: *In Malkhus fun Tselem* (In the kingdom of the cross, 1922) which deals with the Holocaust and *Krig oyf der Erd* (War in the land, 1921). His Hebrew works include *Eimah Gedolah ve-Yareʾah* (1925); *Sefer ha-Kitrug ve-ha-Emunah* (1937); *Min ha-Hakhlil ve-el ha-Kakhol* (1949); *Rehovot ha-Nahar—Sefer ha-Ilyot ve-ha-Koʾah* (1951); and *Be-Fisat ha-Ariq u-ve-Helkat ha-Hevel* (1965). Greenberg was awarded the Israel Prize for Hebrew Literature in 1957.

See also Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi (IZL); Knesset; Literature: Hebrew.

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Ann Kahn

GREEN BOOK

The governing philosophy of Libya's ruler, Muammar al-Qaddafi.

The Green Book contains the brief, three-part statement of the Third International Theory, the governing philosophy of Muammar al-Qaddafi, ruler of Libya. Designed to be an alternative to both capitalism and communism, the Third International Theory is the theoretical basis for the institutions and policies of the Jamahiriyya. The first part, issued in 1976 and titled, "The Solution of the Problem of Democracy: The Authority of the People," discusses the dilemmas of just and wise government and declares the solution to be the rule of the people through popular congresses and committees. Part 2, "The Solution of the Economic Problem: Socialism," which appeared in 1978, calls for the end of exploitation implied by wages and rent, in favor of economic partnership and self-employment. Part 3, "The Social Basis of the Third International Theory," treats social issues, including the importance of family and tribe and the status of women and minorities.

See also Jamahiriyya; Qaddafi, Muammar al-.

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Lisa Anderson

GREEN LINE

The 1949 armistice lines between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

The Green Line designates Israel's borders as demarcated during the 1949 armistice negotiations following the establishment of the state of Israel and the first Arab–Israeli war. Among other things, the creation of this boundary brought into being the separate territory known as the West Bank. Following the Arab–Israeli war in June 1967, the Green Line boundary remained *in situ* as an administrative line of separation between the sovereign state of Israel and the Occupied Territories. The line was removed from all official Israeli maps in the post-1967 era and was opened up to movement of Palestinian workers who commuted into Israel for work. Following the onset of the first intifada in 1987, the Green Line was again closed, by road blocks and curfews, reverting to its former role as a boundary between the two peoples and their respective territories. In 2002 the Israeli government began to construct a wall along, or close to, parts of the Green Line, arguing that this was a necessary security measure. All negotiations aimed at bringing about the establishment of a Palestinian state have considered the Green Line to be the default boundary, to which only minor territorial changes could be made.

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BRYAN DAVES
UPDATED BY DAVID NEWMAN

MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

GREEN MARCH

March of 350,000 volunteers to demonstrate Morocco's claim on Western Sahara.

The background to the Green March was a twofold struggle in the mid-1970s: (1) the sophisticated POLISARIO Front movement for nationalism by the Sahrawi people in the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara, and (2) a series of challenges against King Hassan II of Morocco, which culminated in two attempted coups in 1971 and 1972. Seeking to claim Western Sahara's mineral resources (mainly phosphates) and spurred by the ideology of a "Greater Morocco," Hassan succeeded in signing the Madrid Accords of 14 November 1975, which ceded the territory from Spain to Mauritania and Morocco.

A month earlier, however, a United Nations report had rejected Morocco's claims. In response, Hassan announced that he would seek volunteers to march into Western Sahara, in what his state-run press described as a demonstration of the will of the Moroccan people to reclaim its territory. By early November, some 350,000 volunteers had signed up—mostly poor and unemployed, rural and urban, they were organized by regional quota. An enormous effort was launched to provide food and med-

ical care for them. Amid intense diplomatic efforts over Western Sahara's future, and just after initial clashes between Moroccan and POLISARIO troops, the marchers crossed the border at Tarfaya. Tens of thousands reached Umm Deboa, where they halted.

On 14 November the Madrid Accords were signed. The march was recalled on 18 November; it had been a successful gamble by Hassan to pressure Spain into reaching an accord with him—and to rally support within Morocco for his claim.

See also Hassan II; POLISARIO.

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Matthew S. Gordon

GRIBOYEDOV INCIDENT

One of the first major anti-Western incidents that was religiously inspired.

The Griboyedov Incident took place when a Russian mission led by the well-known author Aleksandr Sergeyevich Griboyedov was sent to Iran in 1829. The purpose of the mission was to force the Iranian government to pay the indemnity for its defeat in the recent Russian–Iranian war and abide by the humiliating provisions of the Treaty of Turkmanchai. The mission heard that two or more Georgian or Armenian women had been forcibly converted to Islam and brought to the harems of Iranian nobility. In flagrant opposition to Iranian norms, the mission forced its way into the harems and took all the women away, allegedly keeping some overnight. The Iranian *ulama* (religious leaders) reacted by issuing a *fatwa* (legal decree) allowing people to rescue the Muslim women from the unbelievers. The crowd of people then entered the mission and became uncontrollable. When the Russian Cossacks shot an Iranian boy, the crowd retaliated by killing the whole mission, including Griboyedov, with one exception.

See also Turkmanchai, Treaty of (1828).

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Parvaneh Pourshariati

GRIVAS, GEORGIOS THEODOROS

[1898–1974]

Greek Cypriot political and military leader.

Born in Greece, Georgios Theodoros Grivas served in the Greek army from 1920; he was the organizer of the Greek resistance to the Nazi occupation of Athens in 1944 and 1945. In 1951, he went to Cyprus at the invitation of Archbishop Makarios II to help in the fight for Cypriot independence from Britain.

In 1954, Grivas founded EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kipriakou Agonos), a covert nationalist group that used political violence to combat the British. In 1959, he was the general, then commander (1964–1967) of the Greek Cypriot National Guard. After the independence of Cyprus in 1960, Grivas broke with Makarios and supported *enosis* (union) with Greece, founding EOKA B in 1971 toward that end.

See also Cyprus.

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Zachary Karabell

GROBBA, FRITZ KONRAD FERDINAND

[1886–1973]

German diplomat, orientalist, and specialist in Middle Eastern affairs during the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich; one of the more important and most controversial European diplomats in the Middle East between the two world wars.

Fritz Konrad Ferdinand Grobba was born in Gartz/Oder, Germany, where he attended elementary and high school. He studied law, economics, and Oriental languages at the University of Berlin, from which he received his doctorate in law in 1913. Before World War I, he worked briefly as a dragoman trainee in the German consulate in Jerusalem; during the war, he served as a lieutenant in the German army in France and in Palestine.

Grobba joined the legal affairs department of the German foreign ministry in September 1922.

In January 1923, he was transferred to Abteilung III, the department responsible for the Middle East. When diplomatic relations were established between Germany and Afghanistan in October 1923, Grobba was named Germany's representative in Kabul with the rank of consul. In 1925, the Afghan government accused him of attempting to help a visiting German geographer escape from Afghanistan shortly after the geographer had shot and killed an Afghan citizen near Kabul. Grobba denied the charge. A diplomatic crisis between Germany and Afghanistan over Grobba's role ensued, and he was recalled to Berlin in April 1926. From 1926 to 1932, he served again in Abteilung III, where he was in charge of the section for Persia, Afghanistan, and India.

In February 1932, Grobba was named German ambassador to Iraq, a post he held until September 1939, when war caused the break in diplomatic relations between Germany and Iraq. He was also Germany's ambassador to Saudi Arabia from November 1938 until September 1939. From October 1939 until May 1941, Grobba served in the German foreign ministry in Berlin. In May 1941, the foreign ministry dispatched him to Baghdad as German special representative to the pro-Axis government of Rashid Ali al-Kaylani; but he left Baghdad later that month, since the Rashid Ali coup collapsed. In February 1942, Grobba was named foreign ministry plenipotentiary for the Arab States, a job that entailed liaison between the German government and Arab exiles in Berlin, such as Rashid Ali and the mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. In December 1942, Grobba was named to the Paris branch of the German archives commission, a post he held until his brief return to the foreign ministry in April 1944. He was officially retired from the foreign ministry in June 1944, although he continued to work there until the end of the year. In 1945, he worked briefly in the economics department of the government of Saxony, in Dresden.

Grobba published the following books: *Die Getreidewirtschaft Syriens und Palästinas seit Beginn des Weltkrieges* (Hanover, 1923); *Irak* (Berlin, 1941); and *Männer und Mächte im Orient: 25 Jahre diplomatischer Tätigkeit im Orient* (Göttingen, 1967). The latter constitutes his memoirs of his work and experience in Middle Eastern affairs.

Grobba was the most influential German diplomat in the Middle East after World War I. He worked for the restoration of Germany's pre–World War I economic and political position in the region, within the context of peaceful coexistence with England. The governments of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich did not, however, entirely share his ambition for the region. Moreover, lingering wartime animosity coupled with bitter and violent Middle East opposition to Anglo–French imperialism, against the backdrop of Nazi expansionism during the 1930s, created Anglo–French distrust of Grobba. This made him one of the more controversial figures in Middle East diplomacy between the world wars.

See also Germany and the Middle East; Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-; Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-.

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Francis R. Nicosia

GROSSMAN, HAIKA

[1919–1993]

Leading resistance fighter during the Holocaust; senior politician in the Israeli Knesset.

Born in Bialystok (Poland), Haika Grossman joined the Zionist youth movement ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir and became a member of its central committee. The Nazis invaded in 1941, and Grossman moved secretly between ghettos across Poland, smuggling weapons, organizing hiding places, and liaising with the Polish resistance groups and Soviet partisans. After the war, she was awarded the Gruenwald Cross for valor, and moved to Warsaw, where she was elected to the Central Committee of Polish Jews.

At the beginning of the Arab–Israeli War of 1948, Grossman emigrated to a kibbutz in Israel and became head of the Gaʾaton Regional Council, con-

centrating on refugee relief. Elected four times to the Knesset, she served first for the Maʿarach Party and later chaired the MAPAM faction. Grossman turned the Public Services Committee into one of the most important Knesset committees, introducing legislation across a spectrum of social issues, and was a forthright critic of Israeli government policy towards the Palestinians. She supported cooperation between Arabs and Jews in Israel throughout her career, and in the 1980s she founded the dialogue and education center Givʿat Haviva. Grossman was also a member of the unofficial international war crimes tribunal established in protest against the Vietnam War in 1967.

See also Aloni, Shulamit; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzaʿir; Israel: Military and Politics; Israel: Political Parties in; Namir, Orah.

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George R. Wilkes

GRUENBAUM, YIZHAK

[1879–1970]

Polish Zionist.

Active in the early Zionism movement at the start of the twentieth century, Yizhak Gruenbaum participated in several Zionist congresses before World War I. He was elected to the Polish Sejm (parliament) from 1919 to 1932, when he immigrated to Palestine. He soon became a leader of the Jewish Agency, but he resigned after Lord Moyne's assassination in November 1944. He was Israel's minister of interior in the 1948–1949 provisional government, but he failed to win a Knesset (parliament) seat in the 1949 election. He was a MAPAI (labor party) supporter and an ardent champion of a secular Israeli state.

See also Guinness, Walter Edward; Israel: Political Parties in; Jewish Agency for Palestine; Knesset; Zionism.

Zachary Karabell

GUEST WORKERS

Term used in Germany and other European countries for migrant workers from Mediterranean countries, especially Turkey.

The migration of Turks to Europe in search of work started in the late 1950s and accelerated after the first bilateral agreement was signed between Turkey and West Germany in October 1961. A series of treaties widened the field of host countries—Austria (May 1964), France (April 1966), Sweden (March 1967), and Australia (October 1967). Between 1961 and 1973, almost a million workers went from Turkey to Western Europe. The program was phased out following the oil crisis and economic recession

In 1955, as its economy began booming, West Germany signed treaties with several countries suffering from underemployment and brought foreign workers under limited-term contracts to its cities. When the boom subsided in the 1970s, many of these workers chose to stay in the country instead of returning to their homelands, causing the population to swell. © Reuters NewMedia Inc./Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

A clothing shop in Berlin's "Little Istanbul" section. A flood of Turkish immigrants poured into West Germany in the 1960s as its expanding economy demanded a larger labor force. Some 2.5 million Turks still live in Germany today, making them the largest ethnic minority in the country. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

that hit Europe beginning in late 1973. The majority of guest workers, however, resisted repatriation programs and remained in Germany and other countries. By 2000, the guest workers and their dependents from Turkey constituted Germany's largest ethnic minority community, numbering about 2 million Turks, with about one-third under age 18. They owned over 30,000 small businesses, providing more than 100,000 jobs.

In France, the majority of foreign workers—the term *guest workers* is not used in France—are Arab migrants from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. They constitute France's largest ethnic minority, numbering with dependents over 2 million in 2000. During the 1990s, several thousand people, mostly young men, began to enter the European Union countries illegally from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon in hopes to finding jobs; some "disappeared" in the wide community of foreign workers while others claimed political refugee status.

In the Middle East, the oil-producing monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula hosted more than four million foreign workers throughout the 1990s. Prior to 1990, the majority of these guest workers were Arabs from Egypt and Yemen and Palestinians. During the 1990s, the majority of foreign workers gradually became non-Arab Asians such as Afghans, Pakistanis, Indians, Filipinos, and Thais.

Through the years, migrant workers have sent substantial remittances home to their native countries, and for Egypt and Turkey in particular, these remittances have helped to ease balance of trade deficits. The foreign migrants, especially Turks in Germany and Arabs in France, generally are not well integrated into their host countries, a situation that has affected their children more keenly than the parents. By the early 2000s, a generation of migrant worker children had matured to adulthood in Europe; a majority of these young adults have cited their experiences with various subtle and overt forms of discrimination.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

GUILDS

Organizations of skilled workers or artisans.

The earliest evidence for workers in Middle Eastern urban trades and crafts associating in guilds for their common economic and social benefit dates from the fourteenth century, though there are hints of looser groupings before that time. The Ottoman and Safavid Empires and the kingdom of Morocco developed extensive guild systems with each guild being self-governing through a hierarchy of ranks. Government approval or oversight, variously expressed, kept them from being totally independent, however. The goal of the guilds was to ensure a stable level of production and an equitable distribution of work among guild members. The guilds thus constituted a generally conservative force disinclined to change with evolving economic conditions. Nevertheless, they were often important foci of communal and religious life for their members, as in annual guild-organized commemorations of the

martyrdom of Imam Husayn by Shiʿites in Iran. The terms used for guilds include *sinf* (category), *taʾifa* (group), *jamaʿa* (society), and *hirfa* (craft). Guilds were commonly subjected to collective taxation administered by the market inspector *(muhtasib)* or other government official. Jews and Christians were members of guilds in some cities, but exclusively Christian or Jewish guilds, like that of the kosher butchers of Aleppo, were rare.

Records of the city of Aleppo mention 157 guilds in the middle of the eighteenth century. Cairo had 106 in 1814. The survival of guilds in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries varied according to country and rate of Westernization. In northern Egypt, for example, guilds had virtually disappeared by the end of the nineteenth century because of the influx of mass-produced European goods and the growing market for labor created by European investment. By contrast, the guilds of Fez in Morocco escaped severe crisis until the worldwide depression of the 1930s. Even so, municipal statistics of 1938 show the continued domination of small-scale craftwork. The largest guild, that of the slipper-makers, counted 7,100 members, 2,840 of them employers. There were also 800 tanners, 280 of them employers; and 1,700 weavers, of whom 520 were employers. Altogether the guilds numbered 11,000 members.

The potential for guild political activity had manifested itself from time to time over the centuries, as in occasional revolts by workers in the food trades in Cairo at the end of the eighteenth century. By the time modern political life focused on constitutions and participatory government developed, however, economic forces had diminished the importance of guilds in most areas. Iran, where guilds survive to the present day, provides an exception because of its comparatively late exposure to economic and political influences from Europe. The guilds formed the most cohesive group in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. In Tehran, separate guilds formed seventy political societies *(anjoman).* The guild leaders lacked a sophisticated understanding of politics, however, so the guilds found themselves barred from political power by the electoral law of 1909. With the advent of the Pahlavi regime in 1926, 230 guilds lost government recognition as corporate entities in an effort to dissipate the coalescence of popular feeling around them; but because the new system of individual taxation proved unworkable, they regained their status in 1948. Many guild members were drawn to the communist Tudeh Party or to the movements led by Mohammad Mossadegh, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and other critics of the monarchy. In 1969 the 110 guilds of Tehran had a membership of about 120,000. Guild members played an important role in the demonstrations that led to the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

Potters handcraft items in a Fez workshop. Production of traditional ceramic tiles and pottery continue to thrive as a craft industry in Morocco. **© Carmen Redondo/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

See also ANJOMAN; CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION; KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH; MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD; PAHLAVI, REZA; TUDEH PARTY.

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RICHARD W. BULLIET

GUINNESS, WALTER EDWARD

[1880–1944]

British deputy minister of state for the Middle East (1942–1944) and minister resident in the Middle East (1944).

Walter Edward Guinness was known as Lord Moyne. In Cairo, while deputy minister of state, he argued

that a partition plan for Palestine would not succeed unless both the Jewish and Arab areas were made part of Greater Syria. He proposed creating four states: Greater Syria (comprising Syria, Muslim Lebanon, Transjordan, and the Arab part of Palestine after partition), Christian Lebanon, a Jewish state, and a "Jerusalem state" that would remain under British control. He urged postponement of plans for a Jewish army, favored by Chaim Weizmann and Winston Churchill, but agreed to enlarge Jewish settlement police and give them military training.

Lord Moyne presided over a conference of Britain's representatives in the Middle East in the fall of 1944 that did not favor his four-state plan, recommending instead that a southern Syria be created out of Transjordan and the Arab part of Palestine. He was assassinated at Cairo by Jewish terrorists, members of the Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Stern Gang), on 6 November 1944.

See also Churchill, Winston S.; Greater Syria; Lohamei Herut Yisrael; Weizmann, Chaim.

Jenab Tutunji

GUISH TRIBES

See Tribes and Tribalism: Guish Tribes

GÜLBENKIAN, CALOUSTE

[1869–1955]

Armenian businessman and philanthropist.

Born in Istanbul, Calouste Gülbenkian was educated in France and England. In 1902, he acquired British citizenship, to be eligible for the concession for petroleum fields in Mosul. Later, he transferred this concession to the Iraq Consortium established in 1920 by the United States, France, Britain, and the Netherlands. Because he retained a 5 percent stake in the property and profits of the consortium, he was given the nickname "Mr. Five Percent." Gülbenkian, an enthusiastic art collector, bequeathed his valuable collection to the Gülbenkian Foundation in Lisbon, Portugal, the city in which he died.

See also Red Line Agreement.

David Waldner

GÜLEN, FETULLAH

[1938–]

Founder of Turkey's largest Islamic movement and an important Muslim thinker.

Fetullah Gülen was born in the village of Korucuk near Erzurum in eastern Anatolia. He was educated in religious schools and in 1958 was appointed as a mosque preacher in Edirne. He moved to İzmir in 1966 to become an official preacher for the Directorate of Religious Affairs. During the next seventeen years, he developed study circles, or *dershanes,* and summer camps in which students were trained in Islam and encouraged to engage in purposeful civic action. The writings of Said Nursi, especially his ideas about the reconciliation of Islam and modern science, had a deep influence on Gülen. In 1983 Gülen moved to Istanbul, where he expanded his network of *dershanes* into a nationwide movement. His goal is the construction of a Turkified Islam, and he also stresses dialogue and knowledge as core Muslim precepts. His thinking is very much informed by his understanding of the classical period of the Ottoman state. His hundreds of thousands of followers constitute the Gülen movement, and its presence is organized in media, education, and finance. The educational goal of the Gülen movement is to raise up the "golden generation" imbued with the ethical values of Islam and capable of leading Turks to a restoration of "greater Turkey" (i.e., Turkey plus the Turkic-speaking republics of Central Asia). The Gülen movement consists of loosely organized horizontal networks for the realization of its goals. During the early 2000s it controlled more than two hundred educational institutions, both inside and outside Turkey.

See also Anatolia; Edirne; Istanbul; İzmir; Nursi, Said.

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M. Hakan Yavuz

GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

An organization of six Arab states in the Persian Gulf region, formed to promote joint military, economic, and political endeavors.

The Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War were among the major reasons that the leaders of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates decided to establish the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Because the member countries had at the outset much in common regarding economic matters, these could be agreed upon and implemented more easily than matters of defense. Thus, six months after its founding in May 1981, the GCC announced a Unified Economic Agreement that provided for the free movement of people and capital among member states, abolished customs duties, made banking and financial systems more compatible, and improved technical cooperation among the states. During the 1980s and 1990s many of the provisions of the agreement were implemented, and the GCC moved slowly forward in dealing with security matters. In 1984 members agreed to establish a rapid deployment unit called the Peninsula Shield Force. In 2000 the member states formally committed to a policy of mutual defense against foreign attack, and expansion of the Peninsula Shield Force from 5,000 to 22,000. The GCC also has been involved in mediating territorial disputes between members (for example, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain) and between member states and other countries (such as the United Arab Emirates and Iran).

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EMILE A. NAKHLEH
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

GULF CRISIS (1990–1991)

A critical international situation that began on 2 August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, and that officially ended on 28 February 1991, after a U.S.-led military coalition defeated Iraq and liberated Kuwait.

The reasons for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait were primarily financial and geopolitical. Iraq emerged from the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War financially exhausted, with a debt of about $80 billion. Its president, Saddam Hussein, tried to service the debt—and fund Iraq's high-technology defense industry, reconstruction, and food imports—with oil revenue. But oil prices fell between January and June 1990 from $20 to $14 a barrel. Saddam Hussein charged, with merit, that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had exceeded their Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas, therefore keeping the price of oil low. He claimed that overproduction was encouraged by the United States in order to weaken Iraq, and he considered the Kuwaiti action an act of war. He demanded that the price of a barrel of oil be raised to US$25, that Kuwait "forgive" $10 billion in debt incurred during his war with Iran and pay $2.4 billion for Iraqi oil it "illegally" pumped from the Rumayla oil field (the southern tip of which is under Kuwait), and that the Gulf states give Iraq financial aid amounting to $30 billion. Saddam Hussein based these demands on the claim that Iraq's war with Iran and sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of lives protected the Gulf states from revolutionary Iran.

Saddam Hussein also wanted to lease two uninhabited islands, Warba and Bubiyan, to provide Iraq secure access to the Persian/Arabian Gulf and as possible bases for a blue-water navy. Kuwait was reluctant to negotiate with Iraq, a country of seventeen million with vast potential, because Bubiyan was very close to Kuwait City and because of concerns that the demand was a precursor to Iraqi claims to disputed border territories and, indeed, to all of Kuwait, which Iraq historically considered a part of itself. Kuwait's reluctance to negotiate and its continuing demand for loan repayment were seen as arrogant by Saddam Hussein and shortsighted by others in the region.

Paradoxically, the end of the Iran–Iraq War had left Iraq militarily strong, strong enough to aspire to leadership of the Arab world. Iraq had 1 million experienced soldiers, 500 planes and 5,500 tanks, and was developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Officials in the West and Israel voiced alarm, and Western media criticism of human rights violations, especially against the Kurds in Iraq, made Saddam Hussein suspicious. Fearing an action similar to Israel's destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, he issued a sensational threat on 2 April 1990 to burn half of Israel with chemical weapons if it should

U.S. warplanes hit targets in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, early on the morning of 18 January 1991. The Gulf War (1990–1991), also known as Desert Storm, was fought to expel Iraq from Kuwait and restore Kuwait's independence. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

attack Iraq. The threat produced an outpouring of support throughout the Arab world, where he was viewed as a blood-and-guts Arab Bismarck ready to take on Israel, which had annexed Jerusalem and the Golan, had invaded Lebanon, had bombed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Tunis, and since 1987, had been suppressing a civilian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza, all without an Arab response. By August Saddam Hussein had used a potent mixture of themes—Western imperialism, Arab impotence, the Palestinian cause, and Islam (later, the poor against the rich)—to tap Arab anger and alienation and to rally the Arab masses.

On the eve of the invasion, the United States gave Saddam Hussein mixed signals. On 25 July, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie assured him that U.S. President George H. W. Bush wanted better relations with Iraq and that the United States had no opinion on "Arab–Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait," but she cautioned him against the use of force. There is no evidence that the United States deliberately misled him, but Saddam Hussein ignored a fundamental element of U.S. foreign policy: Oil is a vital U.S. interest, one for which it would go to war.

Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, to the surprise of most observers. His army occupied the country in a few hours with little resistance, killing hundreds of Kuwaitis and jailing and torturing hundreds more. Soldiers looted schools and hospitals of their equipment and banks of their deposits and bullion.

At the government level, Arab reaction split into two camps. The anti-Iraq group consisted of the Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman), as

well as Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Lebanon, Djibouti, and Somalia. The neutral or pro-Iraq group included Jordan, the PLO, Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Mauritania. The split was reflected in the first voting at a 3 August Arab League meeting of foreign ministers, the majority of whom voted to condemn both Iraqi aggression and foreign intervention. With each passing day, the crisis slipped from Arab League hands, becoming an international confrontation between Iraq and a U.S.-led coalition of twenty-eight countries.

President Bush moved swiftly to galvanize opposition to Iraq. The United Nations (UN) Security Council condemned the invasion on 2 August—the day it occurred—and demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal. During the following few days, the Soviet Union and the Islamic Conference Organization joined in the condemnation, and the UN placed economic sanctions on Iraq. Most significant was Saudi Arabia's agreement on 6 August to allow U.S. troops and aircraft on its soil, under the code name Operation Desert Shield, after being shown U.S. satellite photographs of Iraqi troops close to Saudi borders. On 8 August Saddam Hussein formally annexed Kuwait, and the UN reacted by declaring the annexation "null and void." On 10 August the Arab League summit passed resolutions authorizing the use of foreign troops to reverse the annexation. Thus, most nations, willingly or under U.S. pressure, condemned the invasion and demanded Iraq's withdrawal.

Saddam Hussein's response on 12 August was to link the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait to Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon. The linkage idea generated support in the Arab world, particularly among Palestinians and their organization, the PLO.

The United States rejected linkage, insisting on unconditional withdrawal and on denying Saddam Hussein any fruits of his invasion. Nevertheless, Bush declared on 1 October at the UN that an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait might provide an opportunity "to settle the conflicts that divide the Arabs from Israel." Despite numerous diplomatic missions by world leaders, Saddam Hussein remained intransigent. In November the United States declared that it would double its troop strength in the Gulf from about 200,000 to 400,000—an action that guaranteed an offensive military option—and the UN authorized the use of force to liberate Kuwait. Bush gave Saddam Hussein until 15 January 1991 to vacate Kuwait. When he did not, U.S. and allied forces began air attacks on 16 January on Iraq and on Iraqi positions in Kuwait under the code name Operation Desert Storm. Some of the air strikes were conducted from Turkey, which had supported the coalition, even though most Turks were against a military confrontation with Iraq. Iraq in turn fired Scud missiles at Tel Aviv, damaging hundreds of buildings and killing several people. Israel uncharacteristically did not retaliate, in deference to U.S. concerns that Israeli involvement in the war would risk the continued cooperation of the Arab partners in the coalition. Instead, the United States sent the Patriot antimissile system to Israel to intercept the Scuds, and a number of nations compensated Israel for the damage. Iraq also fired missiles at Saudi Arabia, and Iraqi troops crossed its borders in late January. In an attempt to break out of its isolation, Iraq offered Iran major concessions regarding the Shatt al-Arab waterway, but fearing Saddam Hussein's ambition, Iran stayed neutral throughout the crisis, even though it exchanged prisoners with Iraq and gave sanctuary to 122 Iraqi combat aircraft.

After another ultimatum from Bush and a number of unsuccessful diplomatic attempts, the coalition launched ground forces into Iraq on 23 February, led by U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf. Kuwait was liberated four days later, and Iraq, after accepting the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, agreed to a cease-fire on 28 February, but not before setting fire to some 600 or 700 Kuwaiti oil wells.

The Gulf crisis, including the war, had enormous consequences for the region. Iraq's infrastructure was destroyed. Middle East Watch charged that the United States and its allies may have deliberately targeted the infrastructure, costing $200 billion according to an Iraqi estimate, and, in addition, may have bombed civilian residences to encourage Saddam's overthrow, even though such actions are in violation of international law. Neither the United States nor Iraq have been forthcoming about Iraq's casualties, which numbered in the tens of thousands.

Kuwait, of course, suffered the ravages of invasion, occupation, and war. Hundreds of Kuwaitis were killed and tortured. The looting, destruction, sabotage, and liberation cost $65 billion, with another $25 billion earmarked for reconstruction. Kuwaitis exacted revenge on the thriving community of about 350,000 Palestinians in Kuwait, some of whom had publicly supported the Iraq army. (Others, however, had fought with the Kuwaiti resistance, while most had gone about their daily life.) After liberation, hundreds of Palestinians were tortured and killed. The community lost $8 billion and was reduced to about 30,000, most of the remainder having resettled in Jordan.

The Gulf crisis produced political divisions—especially involving Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and Iraq, Jordan, and the PLO, on the other—between not just the governments but also the peoples of the Arab world. These divisions will take a long time to heal.

See also Bubiyan Island; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Hussein, Saddam; Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Iraq; Kuwait; League of Arab States; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Palestine Liberation Organization; Persian (Arabian) Gulf; Shatt al-Arab.

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Philip Mattar

GULF OF OMAN

The northwest arm of the Arabian Sea, measuring 350 miles (560 km) in length.

The Gulf of Oman forms the only entrance to the Persian Gulf from the Indian Ocean. It is bounded by Iran on the north, Oman on the south, and the United Arab Emirates on the west. The gulf is relatively shallow because of its origin as a fissure in the mountain spine now divided between Iran and Oman. Two hundred miles (320 km) wide at its outer limit, it narrows to 35 miles (56 km) at the Strait of Hormuz. Roughly one-third of the world's oil is exported via the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. Iran's Revolutionary Guards attacked oil tankers in the waterway during the Iran–Iraq War but were never able to disrupt shipping. Environmental concerns have grown in recent years because of an increase in oil spills and the emptying of ballast by oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman before entering the strait.

See also Persian (Arabian) Gulf; Revolutionary Guards.

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J. E. Peterson

GULF OF SUEZ

Maritime inlet that connects the Isthmus of Suez to the Red Sea and, with the Suez Canal, separates the Sinai Peninsula from the rest of Egypt.

Almost 200 miles (320 km) long and 12 to 20 miles (20–32 km) wide, the Gulf of Suez is 210 feet (65 m) deep at its deepest point. It is an important passageway for shipping between Egypt and the lands of the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, and for ships using the Suez Canal. It contains rich petroleum deposits, which have been used on a large scale since the 1960s.

See also Sinai Peninsula; Suez Canal.

Arthur Goldschmidt

GULF WAR (1991)

The military expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait after the August 1990 invasion.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 evoked a quick response from the United States. Within hours, two U.S. Navy carrier groups were steaming towards the Persian Gulf. Military planners began reviewing U.S. Central Command plans for operations in the Persian Gulf, while other officials consulted with Saudi Arabia about defense of that nation. Thus began a two-phase operation to counter the Iraqi moves. The first phase was Operation Desert Shield, designed to shield Gulf states. The second was Operation Desert Storm, the United Nations–sanctioned action to drive Iraq from Kuwait.

Military actions for Desert Shield proceeded rapidly. By 7 August, elements of the Eighty-second Airborne Division and U.S. Air Force fighter planes were en route to the Gulf. Britain, France, Egypt, and Syria launched parallel actions, while other nations sent small forces to the area.

Original plans envisioned a force of 200,000 to defend Saudi Arabia. Within less than ninety days the U.S. had 184,000 troops in the Gulf, backed by thousands of armored vehicles, helicopters, heavy artillery, and aircraft, as well as a substantial naval force. The scope of the effort was demonstrated by the fact that it took a year to reach such numbers in the Vietnam War.

Although sufficient for the defense of Saudi Arabia, U.S. and allied forces were not sufficient to expel Iraq from Kuwait, which soon became the objective of the United Nations. The U.S. response was to order additional forces to the Gulf. In effect, the U.S. commitment was doubled in just over two months. The result was a U.S. force of over 500,000 in the theater, plus substantial allied forces, by the time Desert Shield gave way to Desert Storm. The U.S. commitment was two Army corps, two Marine divisions, six Navy carrier groups, two battleships (the last time World War II Iowa Class battleships were deployed), and over a thousand airplanes. Included were substantial numbers of National Guard and Reserve personnel.

The transition from Desert Shield to Desert Storm began with a spectacular air offensive on 17 January 1991, viewed worldwide on television. Air operations continued until 24 February, when a massive ground offensive succeeded in driving Iraqi forces out of Kuwait in one hundred hours. The temporary cease-fire on 28 February led to Iraqi acceptance of UN resolutions on April 7.

At the time, Iraq had one of the world's largest military forces—over one million, half of whom were in Kuwait—plus 4,300 tanks. Iraq, however, did not have much of a navy. Its air arm was 660 aircraft. Allied strength was 800,000, 1,800 combat aircraft, and 3,000-plus tanks, in addition to a formidable naval force. Moreover, Iraq had to defend the entire nation. The allies could focus on evicting Iraq from Kuwait.

The five-week air offensive destroyed the Iraqi ability to use its air forces, neutralized air defense and command and control capabilities, struck at transportation systems, and attacked war production facilities, especially those suspected of being related to weapons of mass destruction. The allies attacked Scud missile sites and effectively isolated Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The air offensive weakened Iraqi ground forces for a successful ground offensive.

The plan for the ground attack envisioned fixing Iraqi attention on an amphibious attack on the coast of Kuwait coupled with a direct assault across the Saudi-Kuwait border. The real attack, however, would be from the west, across the Saudi-Iraqi border. That attack would aim toward the Euphrates River to cut off the Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

The hundred-hour ground campaign was a total success. Iraqi forces retreated in disarray from Kuwait. The allies also gained control of 30,000 square miles of Iraq. Allied losses were about 240 killed and 775 wounded. Original estimates of Iraqi losses were as high as 100,000, but later estimates varied from 10,000 to 50,000. They were probably closer to the lower end. The media images of Iraqi soldiers surrendering to helicopters in the air and to reporters suggests the totality of the defeat.

It was the subject of considerable concern that Iraq might use chemical weapons, as it had in the war with Iran. The allies also feared that Iraq might have biological weapons as well. Neither fear was realized.

See also GULF CRISIS (1990–1991); IRAN–IRAQ WAR (1980–1988); IRAQ; KUWAIT.

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR

GÜLHANE IMPERIAL EDICT (1839)

Ottoman edict initiating an era of diplomacy and Western-inspired reforms.

The Gülhane Imperial Edict (Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu) of 1839 declared a set of legal, administrative, and fiscal reforms in order to strengthen the Ottoman state and make it a member of the new European diplomatic order. The edict was proclaimed on the accession of the new sultan, Abdülmecit I (1839–1861), on 3 November 1839. It was read by Prime Minister Mustafa Reşid Paşa to an audience that included the sultan, ministers, top civilian and military administrators, religious leaders of the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish communities, and the ambassadors of foreign countries. After its proclamation, the edict was published in the official state newspaper and its French translation was sent to various European states and the embassies in Istanbul.

The ideas in the edict originated in the tradition of Ottoman reform during the second half of the eighteenth century, when Ottoman bureaucrats were already experiencing a paradigm shift in their vision of the ideal political order and their relations with the European states. Mahmud II implemented an intense series of reforms during the two decades before the Gülhane Imperial Edict, centralizing the government, restructuring the military and administration, establishing new educational institutions, and introducing European-style dress and head coverings. Thus there is a strong line of continuity of reform before and after the Gülhane Imperial Edict. The rupture, however, lies in the way the edict was designed to enhance the central government's control by empowering the bureaucracy while changing and reshaping the relationship between the sultan and his subjects. The promised new legal system of the edict was intended to gradually reduce the arbitrary powers of the sultan and assure full rights and equality to non-Muslims under the reinterpreted rule of *shariʿa* (Islamic law plus customary and useful law endorsed by *shariʿa*).

The content of the Gülhane Imperial Edict reflects the agenda of the reformist bureaucrats led by Sadik Rifat Paşa and Mustafa Reşit Paşa, both of whom had experience as ambassadors in European capitals. The bureaucrats wanted to institutionalize and rationalize the reforms, strengthening the scope and legality of their powers. They believed in the necessity of declaring a long-term commitment to "self-civilizing" reforms in harmony with the standards of Europe as a basis for peaceful relations with the European powers. Diplomatically, the image of the Ottoman state as a reformed and civilized polity would allow the Ottomans to receive the support of England and France against external and internal challenges exemplified by Russian pressures on behalf of Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire and the Egyptian province's demands for autonomy.

In the Imperial Edict of Gülhane, the Abdülmecit I guaranteed the rule of law and an end to arbitrary decisions as well as safety of life, property, and honor for all of his subjects, regardless of religious affiliation. He also pledged himself to a just system of tax collection and military conscription. The edict's persistent reference to *shariʿa* is commonly interpreted as a tool for preventing negative reactions from conservative elements. It could, however, be read as an indication that, in the mind of the Ottoman reformist group, certain aspects of the European standard, such as the rule of law, equality of religious minorities, and protection of property, did not contradict the traditions of Islamic legal thinking. Although the edict's emphasis on *shariʿa* might imply a notion that the basic rights guaranteed in the edict were natural rights, an instrumen-

tal state-interest rationale is also provided in the edict, since if the people are happy and safe, they will work better for the welfare and the power of the state. Moreover, implicitly, if the Ottoman state carried out "civilizing" reforms, it would benefit from becoming a part of the European state system.

Although the Gülhane Imperial Edict gave full legitimacy to the reformist bureaucrats and inspired further acts of reform, its implementation involved a gradual process during which the old institutions and customs were allowed to reach extinction naturally rather than immediately being eradicated. Thus, though legal equality of all subjects was declared, different religious communities continued to have separate religious laws and privileges. Traditional Islamic courts or educational institutions were not abolished but left to become the weaker part of the dichotomous Ottoman legal and social structure. More importantly, interventions by the European powers to protect the privileges of the Christian minorities prevented the process of their full equality, since they became more privileged than the empire's Muslim subjects. Hence, the edict's implementation for the next three decades fell short of its intended goals. However, as a foundational text, the Gülhane Imperial Edict continued to provide inspiration and legitimacy to the Ottoman reforms throughout the rest of the nineteenth century.

See also ABDÜLMECIT I; MAHMUD II; OTTOMAN EMPIRE: OVERVIEW; *SHARIʿA.*

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CEMIL AYDIN

GÜNEY, YILMAZ

[1931–1984]

Turkish film actor, writer, and director.

Born the son of a peasant in Siverek, a village near Adana, Yilmaz Güney earned his keep as a boy toting water, caring for horses, and selling *simits* (pretzels) and soda. He attended law school at Ankara University and returned to Adana, where he got a job with Dar Film. He began scriptwriting and acting in 1958, and moved to Istanbul, becoming a popular star by the mid-1960s. Güney directed his first film in 1966, and went on to become the preeminent filmmaker of the era, with more than a dozen more films. His 1970 film *Hope,* about the mystical adventures of a poor carriage driver from Adana, was a turning point in Turkish film, marking the beginning of an era of neorealism. His 1982 *Yol* (The road) shared the Palme d'Or award at Cannes with Costa-Gavras's *Missing.*

Güney wrote the script for *Yol* while serving a nineteen-year prison sentence for killing a judge in 1974, over a question of honor. The film was directed by Şerif Gören, but Güney escaped from prison in time to finish editing it in France. The film, about five prisoners on hometown leaves, has never been shown publicly in Turkey. Since his death, numerous books have been written about him, and the scripts for all his important films have been published. His films, short stories, and novels reflect his own outspoken Marxism and his preference for outlawed figures on the fringes of society.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

GURI, CHAIM

[1923–]

Israeli poet, writer, and journalist.

Guri was born in Tel Aviv and educated at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Sorbonne in Paris. A principal representative of Dor ha-Palmah (the Palmah generation), he fought against the British in Mandatory Palestine and in the Arab–Israel Wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973. As a Haganah member sent to rescue survivors of the Holocaust, Guri had his first encounter with diaspora Jews, which profoundly affected him and his identity as a Jew. From that time on, the question of "who is a Jew" has significantly influenced his works.

Guri's songs and poems, written during the 1948 Arab–Israel War, portray the experiences of the Palmah fighters and the battlefield. From 1953 to 1970, Guri was a reporter and an essayist for the paper *la-Merhav,* for which he covered the trial of Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann (1961–1962). His notes of the trial were published in the book *Mul Ta ha-Zekhukhit* (Facing the glass booth). After the June 1967 Arab–Israel War, Guri, along with other members of Israel's literary elite such as Natan Alterman, Moshe Shamir, S. Y. Agnon, Yitzhak Tabenkin, and Naomi Shemer, was among the founders of the Movement for Greater Israel.

From 1970 to 1980, Guri was on the editorial staff of the *Davar.* From 1972 to 1984, he made several documentaries dealing with the Holocaust *(The 81st Blow),* Jewish resistance against the Nazis *(Flame in the Ashes),* and the illegal immigration to Palestine *(The Last Sea).* An anthology of his poems, *Heshbon Over* (1988), won him the Israel prize for literature. His novella, *Iskat ha-Shokolada* (1965; The chocolate deal, 1968), takes place in an anonymous European city with a flourishing black market and deals with the state of anarchy among the refugees of the Holocaust after World War II. In 2002 he published (in Hebrew) a compilation of poems entitled *Me'uharim* (Late poems). As of 2003, Guri has published nineteen books, nine of them poetry.

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ANN KAHN
UPDATED BY ADINA FRIEDMAN

GUR, MORDECHAI

[1930–1995]

Israeli general and politician.

Mordechai (also Mordekhai) Gur completed his undergraduate education in political science and Middle East studies at Hebrew University of Jerusalem and went on to a more specialized program at the École Militaire–École de Guerre in Paris.

Gur served in the Haganah forces after 1943 and was a hero of the 1967 Arab–Israel War (commanding a division that took Jerusalem). He served with the Northern Command from 1970 to 1972 and then as the Israel Defense Force (IDF) chief of staff from 1974 to 1978. He coordinated the rescue at Entebbe (1976) and the Litani Operation in southern Lebanon (1978). During his tenure, he tried to reshape the general staff to be more responsive to field conditions. Following his discharge from the IDF in 1978, he attended Harvard Business School. From 1979 to 1984 he held a position with Koor Mechanics.

Gur was elected as a Labor member of Knesset in the Tenth Knesset in 1981; after being re-elected to the Eleventh Knesset he served as minister of health (1984–1986). In the Twelfth Knesset he served as minister without portfolio. In 1992 he was appointed acting defense minister by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin; he held that position until his death in 1995.

See also ENTEBBE OPERATION.

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ZACHARY KARABELL
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GÜRPINAR, HÜSEYIN RAHMI

[1864–1944]

Turkish novelist, journalist, and translator.

Born in Istanbul, Hüseyin Rahmi Gürpinar studied political science and worked as a freelance journalist and translator in a government office of the Ottoman Empire, until he turned to writing in his forties. During World War I, he became famous for his entertaining and realistic novels and short stories. After the war, he moved to an island near Istanbul, where he lived alone with his dog, Kahraman Findik (Hazelnut Hero). He emerged from seclusion to be elected to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, serving between 1936 and 1943.

Although Gürpinar was associated with Turkey's elitist Servet-i Fünun (Wealth of Knowledge) literary movement, he eschewed their ornate style and wrote popular novels influenced by French naturalism. He often wrote about the contradictions between tradition and modernity, modern sexuality, adventures, and current events, such as the 1910 panic at Halley's comet and the devastating 1918 worldwide influenza epidemic. Gürpinar often employed humor and caricature, portraying fanatics, charlatans, and gossiping women with wit and psychological insight.

See also TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

GÜRSEL, CEMAL

[1895–1966]

Turkish military officer, fourth president of the Turkish republic.

Cemal Gürsel was born in Erzurum, the son of a police officer. World War I broke out while he was studying at the military college in Constantinople (now Istanbul), and he was sent to the front at Çanakkale. After the war, he joined the independence movement led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In 1959 Gürsel was appointed commander of the Turkish land forces. In May 1960, he wrote a letter to the minister of defense protesting Prime Minister Adnan Menderes's use of the army to suppress dissent; in response, he was stripped of his command and placed under house arrest in İzmir. At this point, a group of junior officers invited Gürsel to lead their movement. Gürsel accepted, and on 27 May 1960 he headed a group of thirty-eight officers in a coup that overthrew the civilian government. Gürsel became head of the newly established National Unity Committee, as well as prime minister, president, and commander of the armed forces. An advocate of returning to civilian rule as quickly as possible, Gürsel expelled from the country fourteen younger officers, led by Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, who called for continued military rule. In 1961, following the promulgation of a new constitution and election of a new parliament, Gürsel was elected fourth president of the Turkish republic. In 1966, his failing health forced him to resign his office, and he died shortly thereafter.

See also ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; MENDERES, ADNAN; NATIONAL UNITY COMMITTEE (TURKEY); TÜRKEŞ, ALPARSLAN.

DAVID WALDNER

GUSH EMUNIM

Movement dedicated to the establishment and strengthening of Jewish settlements throughout the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and the Gaza Strip.

Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) has played a significant role in Israeli political life since its inception in the mid-1970s. The movement is concerned with establishing and strengthening Jewish settlement throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which its members believe belong to the Jewish people and the State of Israel by divine promise. Gush members are opposed to any territorial compromise or Israeli withdrawal from these regions, even as part of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

The movement was formed in 1974 by a group of national religious activists associated with the Young Guard of the National Religious Party (now Mafdal). They opposed the minimalist policies of the Allon settlement plan and, in the light of the limited withdrawal on the Golan Heights after the October 1973 war, set out to create the conditions that would prevent any similar withdrawals taking place in the West Bank and Gaza.

Opposed by the Labor Party governments of the time, Gush Emunim underwent a process of legitimization following the election of the right-wing Likud Party of Menachem Begin in 1977. It created a settlement movement, known as Amanah, that undertook the logistics of establishing settlements throughout the region. Its settlement blueprint envisaged no less than 2 million Jews throughout the West Bank and Gaza by the year 2000, but this translated into a more realistic policy aimed at creating twelve new settlements in the first year of the Begin administration, thus laying the foundations for future settlement activities.

Armed Jews clash with Palestinians in the West Bank in December 1993. The Gush Emunim movement advocates the Jewish settlement of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and its members react to any encroachment on what they consider their territory with sometimes violent opposition. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

The ideology of the movement stems from its belief that God promised Abraham the whole of the land of Israel (from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River and even further east) for the Jewish people as their exclusive territory, as stated in the Old Testament. Gush Emunim draws much of its support from the ranks of the Bnei Akiva youth movement, whose slogan is, "The land of Israel, for the people of Israel, according to the Torah of Israel." They view Eretz Yisrael (the land of Israel) as holy territory, parts of which were liberated (not occupied) by divine intervention in the June 1967 war and which is never to be relinquished by any human decision, not even by a democratically elected government of the state of Israel.

In the early 1980s, Gush activists were implicated in the Jewish underground movement Terror-Neged-Terror (Terror against Terror), which undertook attacks against Palestinians in revenge for Palestinian killings of Jewish settlers. Its targets included mayors Bassam Shakʿa (Nablus), Karim Khalif (Ramallah), and Ibrahim Tawil (al-Bira), and the Islamic College in Hebron. Plots to blow up Arab buses in Jerusalem and, more sensationally, the Dome of the Rock, were thwarted by Israeli intelligence.

During its first almost twenty-eight years of existence, Gush Emunim transformed itself from a grassroots extra-parliamentary movement to one that provided the ideological underpinnings for a number of political parties, municipal organizations, and settlements (villages and townships) throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Its representatives have been active in right-wing political parties in successive Israeli governments since 1977, in some cases achieving cabinet positions. Two leading ministers in Ariel Sharon's government of January 2003, Infrastructure Minister Rafael Eitan (National Religious Party) and Tourism Minister Benny Elon (National Israel Party), were staunch supporters of the Gush and the West Bank settlements.

Gush Emunim does not have any formal membership; it is difficult to estimate its size or support, but it has become the most visible ideological force for active and, in some cases violent, opposition to all attempts to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians involving any form of territorial withdrawal.

Leading Gush Emunim activists have also become administrators of the regional and local councils set up to administer the settlement network and provide a conduit for the transfer of public resources from the central government to the settlements. The major political lobby for the West Bank settlement network, the Yesha (an acronym for Yehuda ve-Shomron, Judaea, and Samaria) Council, is made up of leading Gush personalities. This organization also serves as an umbrella group for West Bank municipal councils in the face of political threats to remove any settlements.

The original leaders of the Gush Emunim movement, notably Rabbis Moshe Levinger of Hebron and Hanan Porat from Gush Etzion, have stepped aside to make way for a younger generation of leaders, although none of the new generation has achieved their prominence. Some of the younger activists have attempted to set up new settlement outposts not approved by the government and have been called "the hilltop youth." They are perceived by many as constituting the contemporary equivalent of the earlier Gush activists of the mid-1970s, who attempted to establish the first settlements despite government opposition of the time.

Gush Emunim's Greater Israel and prosettlement ideology has had a major impact on Israeli society in general and on the peace process in particular. Its opposition to any form of territorial withdrawal or settlement evacuation added to the obstacles that faced the post-Oslo negotiation process.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab–Israel War (1973); Begin, Menachem; Gaza Strip; Levinger, Moshe; Oslo Accord (1993); Sharon, Ariel; West Bank.

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David Newman

H

HAARETZ

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ISRAEL

HA-AVARAH AGREEMENT

Agreement that allowed Jews to transfer limited assets from Nazi Germany to Palestine.

In August 1933 the German Ministry of the Economy concluded the so-called Ha-avarah (transfer) Agreement with Jewish officials in Palestine and representatives of the German Zionist Federation. Violently antisemitic and eager to rid Germany of its Jews, the new government of Adolf Hitler shared with Zionists the goal of facilitating Jewish departures to Palestine. The Ha-avarah Agreement permitted Jews whose assets were held in blocked accounts in Germany to transfer part of their savings to Palestine, where the money was to be used to purchase German products. For the new Nazi government, Ha-avarah had the advantage of promoting both Jewish emigration and German exports; for beleaguered German Jews, the agreement was a way of salvaging some Jewish assets and escaping persecution. Although pleased at the way in which Ha-avarah undercut those Jews championing a boycott of Germany, Nazi policymakers also came to oppose an independent Jewish state in Palestine, believing that this would strengthen the Jews' hand against Germany internationally. Nevertheless, Hitler himself refused to reject Ha-avarah, and so his subordinates maintained the policy until shortly after the outbreak of war in 1939. In the end, about 60,000 Jews may have benefited from its provisions, and some 100 million reichsmarks were transferred from Germany to Palestine.

See also HOLOCAUST.

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MICHAEL R. MARRUS

HABASH, GEORGE

[1925–]

Leading Palestinian activist; former secretary-general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

George Habash (also known as al-Hakim, the sage) was born into a prosperous Greek Orthodox Palestinian family in Lydda in Mandate Palestine. After completing his education in Jerusalem, he worked as a teacher and then attended the Faculty of Medicine at the American University of Beirut (AUB), graduating with distinction in 1951.

Habash witnessed the expulsion of Lydda's population on 13 July 1948 and saw his sister die through lack of medical care. Although some sources indicate that he immediately volunteered with Arab forces active in Palestine, all agree that in 1949 he helped establish the Partisans of Arab Sacrifice (Kata'ib al-Fida al-Arabi), which attacked Western targets in Beirut and Damascus until it was dissolved by the Syrian authorities in mid-1950. Back at the AUB, Habash joined the Society of the Firm Tie (Jamʿiyyat al-Urwa al-Wuthqa), a student literary club inspired by Arab nationalist writers such as Constantine Zurayk and Sati al-Husari. An eloquent and forceful personality, in 1950 he was elected president of the group's executive committee. In 1951, this committee became the nucleus of a new, clandestine pan-Arab movement, the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM; Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-Arab). Habash emerged as ANM's leader.

In 1952, Habash left for Amman to develop ANM's Jordanian branch. He opened a clinic for the poor and established the Arab Club to combat illiteracy and serve as a discussion and recruitment center. He was forced underground in 1954, remained in Jordan until the nationalist Nabulsi government fell in 1958, then fled to Damascus, and again to Beirut when the Bʿath Party took over in Syria in 1961.

At this stage, the ANM viewed Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser as the best hope for Arab unity and the restoration of Palestinian rights. When specifically Palestinian nationalist organizations began to emerge in the 1960s, Habash condemned them as regionalists who had abandoned general Arab interests and whose guerrilla activities would provide an excuse for Israel to attack the Arab states before they were ready for the challenge. However, in 1964, confronted with the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Habash established the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine within the ANM, and in 1967 Nasser's stunning defeat prompted him to dissolve the ANM and create the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, of which he became secretary general. The Popular Front adopted a radical Marxist-Leninism, an approach Habash had fought against in the ANM when pressed by a Marxist-Leninist faction led by Nayif Hawatma and Muhsin Ibrahim.

The Popular Front nearly disintegrated in 1968 while Habash was imprisoned in Syria for sabotaging the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, although after his escape to Amman and later to Beirut it developed into the most important Palestinian rival to al-Fatah. Its uncompromising stance toward Israel, the West, and conservative Arab regimes was based on an insistence that the Palestinian revolution could succeed only as part of a regional and international struggle committed to radical social and political change. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Popular Front's willingness to pursue its agenda through military strikes—and until 1973 through the hijacking of civilian airliners—won it wide support among frustrated Palestinian refugees but unleashed harsh responses from Jordan (notably in Black September); from Lebanese opponents, provoking the civil war of 1975 through 1976; and from Israel until the 1980s, when Habash fled to Damascus.

Habash called a halt to many of the Popular Front's military and terrorist tactics at the behest of the Palestinian National Council in 1973, but he remained convinced that such actions were both legitimate and necessary. Believing Israel to be unprepared to reciprocate Palestinian concessions, the Popular Front has launched armed and terrorist attacks on Israelis during both intifadas.

Once the leading radical rival to PLO chairman Yasir Arafat, Habash appeared poised at several critical junctures to displace him. Habash has suffered from heart trouble since the 1970s and was increasingly marginalized by both the rise of Islamist movements and the Oslo peace process, of which he has been a consistent critic. In the late 1990s, he appeared prepared to consider flexibility toward the Western powers, but brief hopes of a reconciliation with Arafat in 1999, which were supported by the Popular Front majority, proved illusory, and he resigned from the declining organization to establish a research center.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arafat, Yasir; Black September; Fatah, al-; Hawatma,

NAYIF; HUSARI, SATI AL-; INTIFADA (1987–1991); NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; OSLO ACCORD (1993); PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; REFUGEES: PALESTINIAN; ZURAYK, CONSTANTINE.

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MOUIN RABBANI
UPDATED BY GEORGE R. WILKES

HABIBI, EMILE

[1922–1996]

Noted Palestinian writer and politician.

Born in Haifa to a Protestant family, Emile Habibi worked in an oil refinery and later as a radio announcer. In 1940, he joined the Palestine Communist Party and helped form the Israeli Communist Party (ICP) in 1948. Habibi became one of leading Arab communists in Israel. He represented first the ICP in the Knesset (Israeli legislature) from 1952 to 1965 and later the New Communist List (also called RAKAH) from 1965 to 1972. He was also the longtime editor of the communist newspaper *al-Ittihad.* He left RAKAH in 1991 in the wake of disagreements about how the party should deal with the reforms of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Throughout his career, he was one of most important leaders of the Arab community that remained in Israel in 1948, after the first Arab–Israeli war displaced over 725,000 Palestinians.

Habibi was also a leading Arabic-language writer whose works, which included plays, novels, and short stories, were read throughout the Arab world even though he was an Israeli citizen. His 1974 novel, translated as *The Secret Life of Saeed, the Ill-Fated Pessoptimist: A Palestinian Who Became a Citizen of Israel,* rose to become a classic work of modern Arabic fiction and provided political insight into the challenges of being a Palestinian Arab citizen of a Jewish state. He was awarded the Jerusalem Medal of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1990 and the Israel Prize in 1992.

Habibi died in May 1996 and was buried in Haifa. He instructed that his epitaph simply read, "Emile Habibi—Remained in Haifa."

See also COMMUNISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST; LITERATURE: ARABIC; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO).

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

HABIBOLLAH KHAN

[1871–1919]

Amir of Afghanistan, 1901–1919.

Born in Samarkand, Habibollah Khan was the son of Amir Abd al-Rahman and an Uzbek woman. After being active in his father's administration (1880–1901), he succeeded him to the throne in 1901. He was a successful and well-liked monarch, especially in comparison to his autocratic father. He released prisoners, increased the pay of the army, and invited back political exiles his father had forced out of the country.

His reign has been credited with two accomplishments. A great modernizer who was attracted to Western ideas and technology, he traveled to Europe, brought the first automobiles into Afghanistan, and introduced Western secular education there. He also drew Afghanistan away from British control; for example, he kept Afghanistan neutral during World War I.

He was assassinated on 20 February 1919 while hunting at Kala Gosh in Laghman.

See also ABD AL-RAHMAN KHAN.

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GRANT FARR

HABIB, PHILIP CHARLES

[1920–1994]

U.S. diplomat.

Philip Charles Habib was U.S. president Ronald Reagan's special envoy to the Middle East, 1981–1983. In the summer of 1981, he negotiated with Syria for the removal of ground-to-air missiles in Lebanon; in August, he brokered a cease-fire agreement between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel that lasted until June 1982.

After Israel invaded Lebanon on 6 June (the 1982 Arab–Israel War), Habib negotiated another series of cease-fires but none lasted. In late 1982, Habib, ignoring Syria, supervised formal negotiations between Israel and the Lebanese government of President Amin Jumayyil, which resulted in the May 1983 agreement ending the war. Implementation of the agreement was contingent on Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, however, and following Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad's refusal to withdraw, Habib lost favor with President Reagan and, in July 1983, was replaced by Robert McFarlane.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1982); ASAD, HAFIZ AL-; JUMAYYIL, AMIN; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); REAGAN, RONALD.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

HABL AL-MATIN

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: IRAN

HABOUS

In North Africa, a family endowment whose usufruct is destined for charitable purposes.

According to Maliki jurisprudence, a family endowment, or *habous,* can be established over property "whose utilization will not result in its dissipation or consumption" (Powers, p. 382). The terms under which the endowment will work must be stipulated in an endowment deed. Public *habous* were created for the benefit of religious organizations or public institutions such as schools, mosques, hospitals, the shrines of *marabouts,* orphanages, or public foundations. Private or family *habous* were created for the benefit of the constituent's descendants. *Habous* properties—known as *waqf,* or *awqaf* outside the Maghrib—are inalienable. Traditionally, the *nadhir* (administrator) who controlled the collection and distribution of the revenues was under the supervision of the chief *qadi* (judge). The French colonial administration nationalized public *habous* during the mid-nineteenth century.

After independence, Morocco and Tunisia enacted legislation transforming the role of the *habous.* With the introduction of national welfare policies, the *habous* lost its importance as a guarantor of social services. During the nineteenth century, one-third of Tunisia's land was *habous.* Tunisian urban aristocrats (known as *baldi,* who were closely related to prominent religious families) administered most of the *habous* land and were severely affected by its nationalization after the Habib Bourguiba government instituted a sweeping agrarian reform. Public *habous* was abolished in 1956; family *habous* was abolished a year later. In 1971, a new program of economic liberalization scheduled the redistribution of 300,000 hectares of collectivized farmland, and *habous* land that had been appropriated by the state was returned to the original benefactors. The simultaneous dismemberment of the *habous* system

and collective land has partially contributed to an increase in the number of farmers. A law promulgated in 2000 reactivated the *habous* liquidation procedure, but auditing of *habous* lands remains incomplete.

In Morocco, the administration of *habous* land depends on the Islamic Affairs and *Habous* Ministry (Ministère des *Habous* et des Affaires Islamiques). Although technically inalienable, during the protectorate period *habous* land could be exchanged or sold. After independence, the state has consistently encouraged the registration of *habous* land. A royal edict *(dahir)* in 1977 allowed for the liquidation of family *habous* by the authorities in charge of its administration for reasons of public interest.

See also MARABOUT.

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VANESA CASANOVA-FERNANDEZ

HACENE, FAROUK ZEHAR

[1939–]

Algerian novelist and short-story writer.

Farouk Zehar Hacene, born in Ksar el-Boukhari, Algeria, left for Europe in 1956 and studied in Switzerland while working at various odd jobs. He considers himself to be the one who ended the trend of committed literature among Algerian writers, freeing himself from the stronghold of tradition without denying his national identity. He published a collection of short stories, *Peloton de tête* (Paris, 1965; The winning regiment) and a novel, *Le miroir d'un fou* (Paris, 1979; The crazy man's mirror), that deal with subjects totally removed from the events of the Algerian war of independence. Hacene's short stories are preoccupied with the psychological condition of humans and the search for an aim and a meaning to life.

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AIDA A. BAMIA

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY

Public university in Ankara.

Hacettepe University was founded in 1954, when an academic unit on children's health was established under the supervision of Ankara University. In 1957, it was transformed into a research institute with an affiliated hospital dedicated to instruction and public service. The institute grew gradually in the following years, with the establishment of academic units on dentistry, medical technology, nursing, physiotherapy-rehabilitation, and home economics. It was eventually accredited as a university in 1967.

Hacettepe University comprises nine faculties (dentistry; economics and administrative sciences; education; engineering; fine arts; letters; natural sciences; medicine; and pharmacology), fourteen vocational schools, twelve institutes, and twenty-seven research centers. It also administers the Ankara State Conservatory of Turkish Music. It has five major campuses in Ankara (Sihhiye, Beytepe, Beşevler, Keçiören, Polatli, and Kaman), and one of its vocational schools is located in neighboring Zonguldak province. Turkish constitutes the main medium of instruction, but half of the medical school classes are conducted in English. Some of the vocational programs are conducted in German and French. In the 2002–2003 academic year, the university had about 3,148 faculty members and 24,415 students. Its budget for that year amounted to 187,332 billion Turkish liras, 99 percent of which came directly from state funds.

Hacettepe's origins as a medical school explain the variety of health-related programs that are administered by the university. Its founder, Prof. Ihsan Doğramaci, is a medical doctor. His innovative approach to medical education and research has been a major contributor to the prestige that Hacettepe currently enjoys among other Turkish universities with a medical concentration. With Ankara University, Hacettepe has promoted re-

search and development in nuclear physics, computer engineering, and electronics.

See also Ankara; Ankara University.

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I. Metin Kunt
Updated by Burçak Keskin-Kozat

HA-COHEN, MORDECHAI

[1856–1929]

Zionist activist in Tripoli, Libya; teacher, author, educational reformer, and rabbinical court judge.

Although Mordechai Ha-Cohen was born in Tripoli, his family had come from Genoa, Italy. His father, Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Cohen, died in 1861. His mother worked as a seamstress, supported her children, and had Mordechai assist by giving instruction in Bible and Talmud. On his own, he studied arithmetic and the literature of the Hebrew Enlightenment (Haskalah). He married in 1883, worked as a Hebrew teacher, and when his income was insufficient, taught himself to repair clocks. As his family grew (four boys and nine girls), he studied rabbinic law and worked as a clerk in the court. His major work was a manuscript titled *Highid Mordechai,* in which he describes the history, customs, and institutions of Tripolitanian Jewry.

As a reformer, he advocated changes in the educational system that were eventually adopted against the will of the establishment. He supported young Zionists and joined the Zionist club, Circolo Sion, when the community leaders opposed it. He contributed news items to the Italian Jewish paper *Israel* and to Hebrew papers in Warsaw, London, and Palestine.

As a jurist in Tripoli, Ha-Cohen was in conflict with lay and religious leaders on matters of rabbinic law. In 1920, he was appointed magistrate in the rabbinic court of Benghazi, Libya, where he served until his death on 22 August 1929.

See also Haskalah.

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Maurice M. Roumani

HADASSAH

Jewish women's philanthropic organization.

The largest Jewish women's organization in the United States, Hadassah was founded by Henrietta Szold and fifteen other women on 24 February 1912. Its stated purpose was to foster Zionist ideals through education in America and to begin public-health and nursing training in Palestine. In Hebrew, the word *hadassah* means myrtle, a hardy plant used to bind and enrich the soil.

In 1913, Hadassah sent two nurses to Jerusalem to set up a maternity and eye clinic. This was the beginning of its continuing involvement in the medical care of the people of Palestine. In 1939, the Rothschild–Hadassah University Hospital, the first teaching hospital in Palestine, opened atop Mount Scopus in Jerusalem. During the Arab–Israel War of 1948, Mount Scopus was designated a demilitarized zone. The hospital was evacuated, and a new center was built in Jewish Jerusalem. After the Arab–Israel War of 1967, the Mount Scopus center reverted to Jewish control.

Hadassah has more than 1,500 chapters, with over 385,000 members and 22,000 associates (male members). Its activities support the Hadassah medical center in Jerusalem and other philanthropic activities in Israel.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Szold, Henrietta.

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Mia Bloom

HADDAD, MALEK

[1927–1978]

Algerian novelist, poet, and journalist.

Malek Haddad was born in Constantine and later attended the University of Aix-en-Provence in France. After working as a journalist, he began a literary career that merited inclusion in the distinguished "Generation of 1954" (with Mohammed Dib, Yacine Kateb, Moulaoud Mammeri, and Mouloud Feraoun). Themes of exile and engagement characterized his works. He wrote four novels (*La dernière impression,* 1958; *Je t'offrirai une gazelle,* 1959; *L'elève et la leçon,* 1960; *Le quai aux fleurs ne répond plus,* 1961) and published two collections of poetry (*Le malheur en danger,* 1956; *Ecoute et je t'appelle,* 1961). He regretted his inability to compose in Arabic and reflected: "The French language is my exile." During the war of independence, he served on diplomatic missions for the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front). He edited the newspaper, *al-Nasr* in Constantine from 1965 to 1968 and became secretary of the reorganized Union of Algerian Writers in 1974.

See also Dib, Mohammed; Feraoun, Mouloud; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Kateb, Yacine.

Phillip C. Naylor

HADDAD, SAʿD

[1937–1984]

Lebanese military officer and militia leader.

Saʿd Haddad was born in the town of Marjʿayun to a Maronite Christian mother and a Greek Orthodox father. His father was a farmer and a corporal in the Troupes Speciales du Levant during the French mandate (1920–1941). Haddad was graduated from the Patriarchal College in Beirut in 1957, and the military academy at Fayadiyya. After the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, Major Haddad assumed command of the southern sectors of Lebanon, ostensibly on the orders of the army command in Beirut, though in fact, Haddad's fifteen hundred–strong, predominantly Christian, militia was financed by and under the orders of Israel. In February 1979, Haddad openly broke with the Lebanese government and declared the land under his control "Free Lebanon."

See also Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); South Lebanon Army.

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David Waldner

HADDAD, WADI

[1927–1978]

Palestinian militant.

A member of a prosperous Greek Orthodox family from Safed, Wadi Haddad joined George Habash in establishing a medical clinic for Palestinian refugees in Jordan after completing medical studies at the American University of Beirut in 1952. He later worked in United Nations–administered refugee clinics in 1956.

Haddad and Habash also helped establish both the influential Arab National Movement in Beirut after 1948, as well as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) later in 1967. Haddad became the main figure behind the airplane hijackings and other spectacular terrorist acts during the late 1960s and early 1970s that made the PFLP, and the Palestinian national movement generally, infamous. He planned the July 1968 hijacking of an Israeli passenger jet, the first instance of Palestinians seizing a plane. He was also involved in the September 1970 hijacking of four aircraft that were flown to Jordan and blown up after the passengers had been evacuated. That incident triggered the bloody Black September crisis (the Jordanian civil war) between Palestinian guerrillas and the Jordanian army. When the PFLP decided to cease such actions in 1971, Haddad split from the group to form the PFLP–External Operations and continued terrorist activities. That group was noted for the June 1976 hijacking of a French plane carrying Israeli passengers that was flown to Entebbe, Uganda, where Israeli forces staged a dramatic rescue operation.

Haddad died in East Germany in March 1978 and was buried in Baghdad.

See also Arab National Movement; Black September; Entebbe Operation; Habash,

George; Jordanian Civil War (1970–1971); Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

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Lawrence Tal
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

HADITH

Reports (also known as khabar, *pl.* akhbar*) transmitting the sayings and actions of the prophet Muhammad.*

Hadith (sing. and pl.) consists of a body (the report) and the *isnad* (chain of reporters). It can be *qawli* (reporting the sayings of the Prophet), *fiʿli* (reporting his deeds), or *qudsi* (reporting divinely inspired sayings). Because the Qurʾan explicitly mandates Muslim obedience to the Prophet in legal and ritual matters, the *hadith* became in Islamic law *(shariʿa)* a source of legislation second only to the Qurʾan.

The classification and authentication of the *hadith* is then of crucial importance to the *shariʿa.* As most reports were collected about 150 years after the death of the Prophet, a number of disciplines collectively known as the sciences of the *hadith* were developed, specializing in external criticism (investigation of the *isnad,* biographical studies of the reporters and of their characters, historical context of each report and each subsequent transmission) and internal criticism (consistency with the Qurʾan, consistency with other *hadith,* historical consistency). Depending on the findings of these various studies, a *hadith* would be classified as *sahih* (authentic), *hasan* (good), *daʿif* (weak), and *mawdu* or *batil* (forged). Six main collections of the *hadith* gained wide acceptance, and of these the *Sahih* of Muhammad ibn Ismaʿil al-Bukhari (d. 869) and the *Sahih* of Abu al-Husayn Muslim (d. 875) are the most authoritative.

If the *hadith* is authentic or good, it is admissible as legal proof in the *shariʿa.* It will constitute a definite legal basis if it is *mutawatir* (one following after another). However, if *ahad* (solitary *hadith,* with only one transmission chain), it will not constitute, according to most jurists, legal proof without further qualification from other legal indicators. Most controversial issues and conflicts with the Qurʾanic text arise from *hadith ahad.*

Though much effort went into the collection of the *hadith,* the sheer volume of circulating reports (al-Bukhari is said to have accepted 7,275 out of more than 600,000 reports) and the fact that the Shiʿite and the Sufi schools have their own distinct collections indicate that the field could greatly benefit from the use of newly refined methods in textual and historical criticism as used for instance in biblical studies. But while the *shariʿa* admits of analytical methods to evaluate the *hadith,* the traditionally accepted collections are seen in popular religion and by some jurists and theologians almost as "sacred" sources that may not suffer any scrutiny. This defensive position is in part due to the controversial rejection by some Muslim reformers and modernists, such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), of *hadith* as a source of law and has so far precluded new studies and evaluations of the historicity of the *hadith.*

See also Shariʿa.

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Wael B. Hallaq
Updated by Maysam J. al Faruqi

HADJ, MESSALI AL-

[1898–1974]

Renowned Algerian nationalist.

Messali al-Hadj was born in Tlemcen and was the son of a cobbler. He received a religious education influenced by the Darqawa sect of Islam and later, in France, enrolled in Arabic language university courses. While serving in the French army from 1918 to 1921, Messali was disturbed by discrimination within the ranks and distressed by the demise

of the Ottoman Empire during the post–World War I years. He was attracted by labor politics, which drew him to a French Communist party–affiliated movement known as the Etoile Nord-Africaine (ENA; Star of North Africa). He became its leader in 1926, but the ENA disbanded in 1929. Messali reorganized it in 1933 and distanced it from the French Communists as a new Algerian nationalist organization called the Glorieuse Etoile (Glorious Star—then renamed the Union Nationale des Musulmans Nord-Africans [National Union of North African Muslims] in 1935). It was dedicated to achieving an Arab Muslim independent state of Algeria. After a sojourn in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1935 with the cultural and political nationalist Chekib Arslan (a Druze leader), Messali placed greater emphasis on Arabism within his movement.

Messali supported the Popular Front (France) but did not endorse its proposed assimilationist Blum–Viollette legislation (which, anyway, never passed in Parliament in 1936). His criticism of France's colonial policy and his agitation in Algeria led to the official dissolution of his movement in January 1937, although Messali responded quickly by forming the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA; Algerian People's Party) in March. He was arrested several months later, freed in August 1939, only to be incarcerated again in November. Messali was tried by a Vichy (pro-German French government during World War II) court in March 1941 and sentenced to sixteen years of hard labor. He remained under arrest after the Allied forces landed in North Africa during World War II (late 1942). Messali did not concur with Ferhat Abbas's "Manifesto of the Algerian People" of 1943 but in 1944 agreed to head the Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté (AML; Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty), an organization that briefly (1944–1945) united nationalist movements and called for Algerian autonomy. The announcement in April 1945 of Messali's impending deportation to exile in France heightened tensions but, by that time, Messali's PPA had infiltrated the AML, directing it toward a confrontation with the French colonialists. This was dramatically disclosed in the Sétif Revolt in May when, during the parade celebrating victory in Europe, nationalist placards provoked violence that resulted in 103 European deaths and thousands of retributive Muslim fatalities. The AML disintegrated and the nationalists resumed their separate paths.

In 1946, Messali organized the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD; Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties). The younger elite, tempered by the Sétif riots, wanted direct action and formed the Organisation Spéciale (OS; Special Organization), which was still linked to the MTLD. The OS paramilitary operations (1947–1950) led to the arrest of its leaders and its demise. The MTLD concurrently faced a Berber crisis, as the Berbers (or Kabylia) believed that the organization was too Arabized, and they questioned Messali's authoritarianism. In 1953, the MTLD split between the centralists and the Messalists over the role of immediate and violent attacks against French colonialism. At first, Messali rejected the centralist position, which soon transmuted into the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front). The FLN's attacks, from 31 October to 1 November 1954, convinced Messali that he had to organize his own military group; it appeared in December as the Mouvement National Algérien (MNA; Algerian National Movement).

During the Algerian War of Independence, the MNA and the FLN's Armée de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Army) campaigned against each other. This fratricide was underscored by the MNA's highly publicized and grievous losses at Mélouza (south of Kabylia) in 1957. Messali's movement lost its credibility (i.e., the Bellounis affair) and its predominant influence over the emigrant community. France intimated a willingness to initiate discussions with the MNA before the Evian negotiations in 1961, but this was generally viewed as a stratagem challenging the FLN's legitimacy.

Even after the war of independence was won by Algeria, Messali remained in exile in France until his death in 1974. He was returned for burial in Tlemcen, the place of his birth. He and his ideas were always viewed as a threat—even after the October 1988 riots and the political liberalization they inspired, a regenerated PPA was denied legal status. Nevertheless, the extensive historical section of Algeria's revised National Charter (1986) could not ignore Messali's commitment and contribution to Algeria's independence.

See also Abbas, Ferhat; Algerian War of Independence; Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté; Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN); Arslan, Shakib; Bellounis,

MUHAMMAD; BLUM–VIOLLETTE PLAN; FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE (FLN); MOUVEMENT NATIONAL ALGÉRIEN; MOUVEMENT POUR LE TRIOMPHE DES LIBERTÉS DÉMOCRATIQUES; PARTI DU PEUPLE ALGÉRIEN (PPA); POPULAR FRONT; SETIF REVOLT (1945); STAR OF NORTH AFRICA.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

HADRAMAWT

Region of the Arabian Peninsula bordered by the Rub al-Khali desert on the north and the Arabian Sea on the south.

The Hadramawt is a mountainous land traversed by a valley and a narrow coastal strip with a hot, arid climate. In 1986 there were 686,000 people living in an area of 62,150 square miles (155,376 sq km). Mukalla is the capital, and Shabwa, Hurayda, Shibam, Saywun, Tarim, Inat, and Kabr Hud are important towns.

Agriculture is largely confined to the upper valley, where there is alluvial soil and water from intermittent flooding; the lower valley that runs to the ocean on the east is largely uninhabited. Newly introduced irrigation and flood control methods are increasing agricultural production. Although dates have typically formed the main crop because of their hardiness, cotton has become an important commodity in recent times. Corn, wheat, and oats are the local grain crops, and tobacco is grown along the coast.

The inhabitants of the Hadramawt have sought their fortunes abroad for centuries. In the modern period, they have been economic middlemen in the European colonial domains spanning littoral East Africa, India, and Southeast Asia—so much so that the economy of the Hadramawt has been heavily dependent on foreign remittances. Indonesia had the most important Hadrami colony until World War II; now it is in the Hadramawt's oil-rich neighbors. The discovery of gold deposits in the 1980s was an important development.

The language of the Hadramawt is Arabic. Outside of literate circles, where modern standard or classical Arabic is the norm, a Hadrami dialect that is close to the former is in general usage. The languages and cultures of the Hadrami diaspora have influenced life in the Hadramawt. Besides its fame as a center for Islamic scholarship, the Hadramawt is noted for its social structure, in which descendants of the Prophet (known as *sayyids)* have occupied a position of politico-religious and economic paramountcy.

Although the Ottoman government historically claimed the Hadramawt as part of its empire, it did not maintain garrisons or levy taxes in the area. The imam of Yemen exerted some authority, but it is the Kuwaiti and Kathiri ruling houses that have competed for political control over the area in its modern history. The Hadramawt was a British protectorate from the late nineteenth century until 1967, when it became independent under the leadership of the National Liberation Front. It was one of the six governorates of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen until 1991, when it became part of the Republic of Yemen.

See also RUB AL-KHALI.

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SUMIT MANDAL

HAFID, MULAY

See ABD AL-HAFID IBN AL-HASSAN

HAFIZ, ABD AL-HALIM

[1929–1977]

Egyptian singer and film actor.

Abd al-Halim Hafiz was a singer known for his work in romantic films. He appeared in more than a dozen films, including *Lahn al-Wafa, Dalila, Banat al-Yawm* (which included Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab's famous song "Ahwak"), the autobiographical *Hikayat al-Hubb,* and *Maʿbudat al-Jamahir.*

He was born Abd al-Halim Ali Ismaʿil Shabana on 21 June 1929 to Ali Shabana and Zaynab Amasha

in a village near Zaqaziq in the Egyptian delta province of Sharqiyya. Upon the deaths of his parents shortly thereafter, his maternal uncle took him and his three siblings into his home in Zaqaziq, where Abd al-Halim attended *kuttab* (Qurʾan school) and later primary school.

At the age of eighteen, Abd al-Halim followed his brother Ismaʿil to Cairo and enrolled in the Institute of Arabic Music. He wanted to study voice and *ud* (oud; a short-necked lute); he soon moved, however, to the Higher Institute for Theater Music where he took up the oboe. Upon leaving the institute, he worked as a music teacher in several primary schools for girls and played oboe in the Egyptian Radio orchestra. The oboe, however, was considered a Western instrument and not part of Arabic tradition. Disenchanted, Abd al-Halim returned to his previous ambition of becoming a professional singer.

Among his colleagues at the institute were two young composers, Kamal al-Tawil and Muhammad al-Muji, and the conductor Ahmad Fuʾad Hasan who later established an accomplished and prestigious instrumental ensemble. All three became lifelong colleagues. In 1951, Abd al-Halim performed his first successful song, "Liqa" by Kamal al-Tawil; he also began singing for radio. Shortly thereafter, he signed a two-year contract with Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab to record Abd al-Wahhab's songs and appear in his films.

Along with works by numerous popular lyricists, Abd al-Halim sang the poetry of Abd al-Rahman al-Abnudi, beginning in the early 1960s. At this time, Abd al-Halim sought to change his style from that of ordinary love songs *(al-aghani al-atifiyya)* to one closer to that of popular folk song. He sought colloquial poetry more colorful and meaningful than the common romantic song lyric. Together, Abd al-Halim and al-Abnudi produced "al-Hawa Hawaya," "Ahdan al-Habayib," and other works that had significant impact on popular song.

Like many other commercial performers, Abd al-Halim was eager for artistic and financial control over his work. In 1959, he and cinematographer Wahid Farid formed their own film company, Aflam al-Alam al-Arabi, and produced, among other works, *Al-Banat wa al-Sayf,* based on three short stories by the well-known writer Ihsan Abd al-Quddus. In 1961, Abd al-Halim and Abd al-Wahhab formed the record company Sawt al-Fann and, in 1963, Aflam al-Alam al-Arabi became Aflam Sawt al-Fann, with Abd al-Wahhab as the third partner.

The beginning of Abd al-Halim's singing career coincided with Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab's shift away from singing to composition. Abd al-Halim's voice differed considerably from that of his famous predecessor: It was mellow and resonant, and his distinctive vocal style was characterized as subtle, with meticulous intonation. He left the impression of extended, almost endless musical phrases. He sang the songs of numerous composers, such as Abd al-Wahhab, Baligh Hamdi, Kamal al-Tawil, and Muhammad al-Muji, all in his own style, in his "confined and fertile vocal space" (al-Najmi, 142). Among his most famous songs are "Safini Marra" (by al-Muji), "Ala qadd al-Shuq" (by al-Tawil), "Ahwak" (by Abd al-Wahhab), and "Qariʾat al-Finjan" (by al-Muji, with poetry by Nizar Qabbani).

Abd al-Halim was diagnosed as having schistosomiasis (bilharzia, a parasitic disease of the tropics) in 1939. Debilitating attacks resulting from the disease began in 1955 and ended with his death in 1977.

See also ABD AL-QUDDUS, IHSAN; ABD AL-WAHHAB, MUHAMMAD IBN; QABBANI, NIZAR.

VIRGINIA DANIELSON

HAFIZ, AMIN AL-

[1920–]

Syrian politician and veteran member of the Baʿth party.

When the Baʿth started to consolidate its hold on power in the coup of March 1963, al-Hafiz emerged as a prominent Syrian politician. After serving as deputy prime minister and minister of the interior in the government of Salah al-Din al-Bitar, al-Hafiz became chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council in July 1963, after which he served as prime minister from November 1963 to May 1964. He also held the post of president of Syria from 1963 to 1966. In the internal political fighting that became the hallmark of Syrian domestic politics in the 1960s, al-Hafiz took the side of the rural-based regionalist group led by General Salah

Jadid and Dr. Yusuf Zuʿayyin. As early as January 1965, the regionalists launched a sweeping nationalization program that attacked the entrenched interests of the urban bourgeoisie and put nearly all industry in the hands of the Syrian state. This left-wing group of regionalists was far from being united. In the summer and fall of 1965, internal party strife was brewing. The strife ended with the ouster of al-Hafiz's wing of the Baʿth Party in February 1966, and the ascendance of the neo-leftist Salah al-Jadid faction. Having lost out to al-Jadid, al-Hafiz went into exile in Lebanon in June 1967. From there he moved with Michel Aflaq and other Syrian politicians to Iraq and aligned himself with the orthodox Baʿthists who seized power in Baghdad in July 1968. His embrace of the pro-Iraqi Baʿth wing made his return to Syria a virtual impossibility. In August 1971, he was sentenced to death in absentia. The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in November of the same year. Al-Hafiz and his Syrian associates formed a loose coalition of politicians who opposed Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad and who were involved in anti-Syrian activities on behalf of the rival Baʿth wing in Iraq.

See also Aflaq, Michel; Asad, Hafiz al-; Baʿth, al-; Jadid, Salah.

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Muhammad Muslih
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

HAGANAH

Underground military defense organization for Jewish community in Palestine, 1920–1948.

The Haganah ("defense") was founded in June 1920 by the Labor Zionist Party Ahdut ha-Avodah in response to Arab riots in April. Its military and organizational complexity increased as the conflict with the Palestinian Arabs intensified during the Mandate era. By the time full scale Arab–Jewish warfare erupted in Palestine following the November 1947 United Nations partition resolution, the Haganah was well positioned to serve as the Yishuv's main armed force and to become the core element of the Israel Defense Force (IDF).

In December 1920 the Haganah was placed under the direct control of the newly created Histadrut, headed by David Ben-Gurion. After the 1929 riots, the Haganah expanded into a Yishuv-wide defense force, and a six-member civilian National Command council was established, led by Eliyahu Golomb. The 1936–1939 Arab Revolt was a watershed event in the development of the Haganah. In the process of responding to the rebellion it developed new doctrines and structures and became an army capable of taking offensive military actions. The Haganah mobilized Jewish youth for military training, established officers' courses, and set up arms depots and underground small arms factories. Elite units were formed under the command of Yitzhak Sadeh, who would also become a major figure in the Palmah and the IDF.

The military doctrine of the Haganah during the 1920s and 1930s was based on self-restraint *(havlagah).* As the Arab Revolt intensified, those most opposed to *havlagah* split off and in 1937 formed the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi, which committed retaliatory acts of terrorism against Arab civilians. In 1940 some Irgun members, led by Abraham Stern, rejected the Irgun's wartime truce with Britain and founded the "Stern Gang," also known as LEHI.

In 1938 the British created a Jewish military unit for counterinsurgency missions against the Arabs, the Special Night Squads. They were trained and commanded by Orde Wingate and drew volunteers from the Haganah, even though the Haganah was technically illegal according to the Mandatory government. Wingate's commando tactics greatly influenced the Haganah and later the IDF. Yigal Allon (Palmah commander) and Moshe Dayan were Wingate protégés.

In 1939 control over the Haganah was transferred to the MAPAI-dominated Jewish Agency, which was headed by Ben-Gurion. A professional Military General Staff was established and Yaʿakov Dori became the Haganah's first chief of staff. The Haganah ran illegal immigration operations (Aliyah Bet) during and after World War II to circumvent the 1939 White Paper restrictions. At the same time, Britain supported the creation of an elite strike force, the Palmah (Plugot Mahatz, or "shock companies") in May 1941, and Haganah members enlisted in the British Army's Jewish Brigade. When Britain refused to lift the White Paper restrictions

after the war, the Haganah and Palmah joined with the Irgun and LEHI to form the Hebrew Resistance Movement (1945–1946). The undergrounds coordinated military operations against British targets in Palestine. The harsh British crackdown on the Yishuv in June 1946 convinced Ben-Gurion to end the Haganah's participation.

By 1947 the Haganah had evolved into a cohesive military organization with British Army professionalism and combat experience. The original Palmah battalions had expanded to three full brigades, and the Haganah grew to twelve brigades. On the eve of the first Arab–Israel war, the Haganah had a nascent air force, medical and signal corps, and intelligence units, with membership totaling 60,000. The bulk of Jewish fighters during the Arab–Israel War of 1948 came from Haganah ranks.

On 28 May 1948 Order Number 4 of the Provisional Government declared the establishment of a single national army with a unified national command, to be called the Israel Defense Force (Zva Haganah le-Yisrael, or ZAHAL). All independent military organizations were to be dismantled and absorbed into the IDF. The Haganah's personnel and command structure became the main elements of the new Israeli army and Dori became the IDF's first chief of staff. Many Haganah veterans would later become generals in the IDF, including Dayan, Yigael Yadin, Mordechai Gur, and Ariel Sharon.

See also Irgun Zva'i Le'umi (IZL); Lohamei Herut Yisrael; White Papers on Palestine; Yishuv.

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Pierre M. Atlas

HAGGIAG FAMILY

Prominent North African Jewish family.

The Haggiag family name has several probable origins. According to Mordechai Ha-Cohen, the family originated in Oran, Algeria. In 1555, the family fled to Gharian in south Tripolitania. Others claim the family to be of Berber origin, cave dwellers who inhabited the area of Jabal Nafusa and Gharian. The name may have derived from their pilgrimage to Jerusalem, Safed, and Tiberias, hence the Arabic *haj,* plural *hujjaj,* related to *hajjaj* or *haggiag,* meaning pilgrims. Once the Haggiag settled on the coast of Tripoli, they maintained the name as it is but added surnames, such as Pagani and Liluf: One finds, for example, Isacco and David Haggiag Liluf and Abramo Haggiag Pagani.

Hmani (Rahmin) Haggiag was head of the Jewish community of Gharian in 1837 and was a physician. Better known was Rabbi Khalifa Haggiag (died c. 1915). He presided over the Jewish community of Gharian in 1880, served as its spiritual leader, and was a poet and physician-surgeon. He is known to have written poems that appeared in the books of Nahum Slouschz.

Another branch may have come from Tunisia, where they lived as subjects of the bey of Tunis and held French citizenship. Notable were Rabbi Nessim and his son Simeone (born 1882). After the Italian occupation, Simeone's life became intertwined with the destiny of the Jewish community and the economic development of Tripoli. He acquired his education at the Italian school of the Franciscans, in addition to his Jewish studies. He went to the Italian advanced business school and upon graduation joined the company Vadala, which specialized in import/export and banking. He remained until 1911, when the company liquidated assets in Libya.

Simeone assumed the presidency of the Jewish community of Tripoli in the by-elections of 1924, replacing Halfallah Nahum. He was by then a prominent private banker. His tenure lasted until 1926, when disagreements among the council members brought about his resignation. He was then appointed by Italian authorities as commissioner; when in 1929 elections were called and the Haggiags' faction was defeated amid irregularities

of voting procedure, the community grew tense and incidents erupted. This led the governor of Libya, Pietro Badoglio, to appoint a non-Jewish Italian, Dr. Alberto Monastero, as administrator of the community in 1929. Until 1938, the eve of World War II, the community was left leaderless.

See also NAHUM, HALFALLAH.

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MAURICE M. ROUMANI

HA-HALUTZ

Umbrella group for various Zionist youth movements throughout Europe and the United States.

Beginning in the 1880s in Eastern Europe, various groups of young Jews began to prepare themselves for eventual resettlement in Palestine to create a Jewish community. They stressed manual labor, agricultural proficiency, self-defense, and the speaking of modern Hebrew; they called themselves *halutzim* (pioneers). Branches differed over political issues, but all encouraged physical fitness and horticultural studies. Nurtured by Yosef Trumpeldor and Menahem Ussishkin, ha-Halutz became the organizational framework for preparing young men and women for pioneering work in Palestine, particularly on the land. The organization's many branches also emphasized the role of Jewish youth in transforming and secularizing Jewish society. The movement reached its high point in 1935 with some 90,000 members, but the Holocaust virtually annihilated it. During World War II the group assisted in the illegal settlement of Jews in Palestine.

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DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

HAIFA

Major city in northwestern historic Palestine and, after May 1948, Israel.

Established in the late Bronze Age on the edge of the Bay of Haifa on the Mediterranean coast, Haifa was part of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled Palestine from 1516 until the winter of 1917/18. Haifa's population was predominantly made up of Muslim and Christian Palestinians until Jews began to settle in the city in the late nineteenth century. A number of factors contributed to its economic revival: the Egyptian conquest and reforms of the mid-nineteenth century, which inaugurated modernization in Palestine; the arrival of European steamboats, which began to visit Haifa as their port of call; the immigration in 1868 of German Templars and, after 1880, of European Jews, both of whom introduced modern economic practices and machinery; and the extension of the Hejaz Railway to Haifa in 1905.

The British ruled Palestine from 1917 to 1948. During these thirty years, Haifa experienced expansion and population growth, especially after a deep-water port was opened in 1933. The 1922 census recorded 25,000 people, of whom 6,000 were Jews and 18,000 were Palestinians. As a result of growth and increased Jewish immigration, by 1944 Haifa had about 66,000 Jews and 62,000 Palestinians. It also had a small community of Bahais, who established their religious center at Mount Carmel. During the Arab–Israel War of 1948, Arab and Jewish forces fought for control of Haifa. Of the city's Palestinian population, only 3,000 remained after the war; the rest were expelled by Jewish forces or fled to Lebanon.

Haifa is now Israel's third largest city as well as its principal port and industrial and commercial center. The city's industries include oil refining, cement, chemicals, electronics, and steel. The city is composed of three sections: port facilities and ware-

houses at the bottom of Mount Carmel; the business district at the slopes of the mountain; and houses, apartment buildings, and parks on top of the mountain. It also has a maritime museum and two universities. Its 2001 population was over 270,000, of whom 10 percent were Palestinian.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1948); HAIFA UNIVERSITY; ISRAEL; MANDATE SYSTEM; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; PALESTINE; PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL.

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PHILIP MATTAR

HAIFA UNIVERSITY

Public university in Haifa, Israel.

Opened in 1963, Haifa University did not become firmly established until the 1970s. With help from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Haifa University solidified its place as one of the top institutions of higher learning in Israel. It has nurtured a disproportionate number of original and often controversial figures, particularly in the humanities and the social sciences. In general, the faculty tends toward the left, and the university has been the seat of innovative studies on such topics as the attitudes of Arabs toward Israelis and of Israelis toward Arabs. A total of 13,000 students are enrolled in the university's undergraduate and graduate divisions.

See also HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

HAIGAZIAN COLLEGE

Armenian academic institution established in Lebanon in 1955 by the Union of Evangelical Armenian Churches and the Armenian Mission Delegation.

Haigazian is a liberal arts college catering mostly to the needs of the Armenian community in Lebanon. Arabic, English, and Armenian literature are taught, as well as political science, economics, sociology, psychology, computer science, and business administration. There are also professors who teach chemistry, physics, and religious studies.

In 1975, Haigazian College had an enrollment of 650 students; by the mid-1990s there were 312 students and 50 faculty. All courses are taught in English and students are required to take a course on religion. Most of Haigazian's faculty also teach at the American University of Beirut and Beirut University College.

GEORGE E. IRANI

HAIK

Woman's draped, concealing garment.

A *haik* (pl. *hiyak*) is a simple, traditional outdoor costume of Moroccan townswomen, worn at the turn of the twentieth century, made of either fine white or coarse lumpy wool, a mixture of silk and wool, or simply cotton. *Hiyak* are white, with the exception of the black *haik* of Taroudant, and measure about 5 by 1.6 meters. The *haik* drapes the woman from head to foot with only the eyes showing.

See also CLOTHING.

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RHIMOU BERNIKHO-CANIN

HAJIR, ABD AL-HOSEYN

[1900–1949]

Iranian politician.

Abd al-Hoseyn Hajir began his political career in the ministry of foreign affairs and then became a clerk at the Russian embassy in Tehran. After holding several ministerial positions, he was appointed prime minister in 1947. In 1949, he was elected to the parliament and also acted as minister of court. Opposed by the popular National Front, his appointments caused mass demonstrations. Hajir was

assassinated in Tehran as he was praying in the Sepahsalar Mosque (1949). The murder was attributed to Sayyid Hoseyn Emami of the Feda'iyan-e Islam, a militant Islamic group that accused Hajir of being an Anglophile and having Baha'i affiliations.

See also BAHA'I FAITH; FEDA'IYAN-E ISLAM; NATIONAL FRONT, IRAN.

NEGUIN YAVARI

HAJJI BABA OF ISPAHAN

Title of the first and most famous of four travel novels about Persia by an Englishman who had spent time there in the British diplomatic corps.

Hajji Baba of Ispahan (1824) by James Justinian Morier (c. 1780–1849) appealed to contemporary interest in things oriental and gave readers a satirical look into Persian society of the early Qajar period (the Qajar dynasty, ruled 1795–1925). Its title character and picaresque narrator is a barber whose desire to get ahead, and cleverness in so doing, leads him from his hometown of Ispahan (now Isfahan) to Mashhad, to life with a band of Torkamans (Turkmen), Tehran, Qom, Karbala, Baghdad, Constantinople (Istanbul), and finally back to Ispahan as a wealthy representative of the shah. In these places and situations—in the bazaar and the royal court and among dervishes and clerics—Hajji Baba satirically depicts Iranian ways and offers entertaining observations on human nature.

Hajji Baba of Ispahan has played a role in modern Persian literature insofar as its Persian translation in 1905 became a popular model for a type of narrative for which indigenous precedents did not exist. Readers in Iran have even given Morier the ultimate tribute, by alleging that the Persian version was the original and Morier's the translation. They thought the book was so accurate and detailed in its depiction of culture-specific situations and behavior that only an Iranian could have written it.

See also LITERATURE: PERSIAN; QAJAR DYNASTY.

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MICHAEL C. HILLMANN

HAJRI, ABDULLAH AL-
[?–1977]

Yemeni judge and government official.

A religious, traditional *qadi* or judge, Abdullah al-Hajri sided with the royalists in the Yemen civil war in the 1960s. He then helped pave the way for the republican-royalist reconciliation by switching sides and working to give the republican regime a more conservative cast. As prime minister in 1973, he both secured from his Saudi friends large amounts of state-to-state aid on a regular, annual basis and cracked down harshly on Yemeni leftists. Adviser to the younger, much less conservative President Ibrahim al-Hamdi in the mid-1970s, he was assassinated in 1977.

See also HAMDI, IBRAHIM AL-; YEMEN CIVIL WAR.

ROBERT D. BURROWES

HAKIM, ADNAN AL-
[?–1991]

Lebanese politician.

A Sunni Muslim from Beirut who played a leading role in the Lebanese Civil War of 1958, Adnan al-Hakim won a parliamentary seat from Beirut in 1960 and 1968. He is considered an extremist who mobilized the masses following sectarian lines and did not get along with other Sunni politicians, whom he accused of compromising Muslim demands in dealing with the Maronite (Christian) political establishment.

His political career is closely tied to that of the al-Najjada party, which was founded as a paramilitary organization in 1946. It emerged from the structure of the Muslim Scouts in Syria and Lebanon. Hakim served as the commander of the Beirut section and a vice-president. In the wake of the dissolution of paramilitary organizations in 1949, he revived the organization and became its head in 1951.

The party sought the "propagation of the Islamic heritage" and called for the union of the Arab

lands. It cooperated closely with Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1960s and led a campaign against the pro-Western foreign policies of Lebanon's President Camille Chamoun. The motto of the party is "the Lands of the Arabs are for the Arabs," and it called for the elimination of Western influence and interests from the Middle East.

Al-Najjada's role in the Lebanese civil war of 1975–1976 was insignificant because most Muslims were attracted to parties with a more revolutionary agenda. The party was seen as belonging to the past, and Hakim was too old to energize party recruitment as he had done in the late 1950s. His political role in the 1970s and 1980s was limited to his ownership of the Beirut daily *Sawt al-Uruba.*

See also CHAMOUN, CAMILLE; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1958); LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); NAJJADA, AL-; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; SCOUTS.

AS'AD ABUKHALIL

HAKIM FAMILY

Prominent Iraqi family of Shiʿite religious scholars.

The Najaf-based Hakim family of *ulama* call themselves Tabatabaʾi Sayyids, or "descendants of the Prophet." In the family were Ali ibn Abi Talib and his elder son, al-Husayn, the second imam of Shiʿism. In the twentieth century the most prominent scholar in the family was Ayatullah al-Uzma Muhsin ibn Mahdi (1889–1970). He was educated at the *hawza* of Najaf by some of the greatest *mujtahids* of his time—Akhund Khurasani, Muhammad Kazim Yazdi, Muhammad Husayn Naʾini, and others.

Following the death in 1962 of Marja al-Taqlid Husayn ibn Ali Tabatabaʾi Burujirdi in Iran, Muhsin al-Hakim became the most widely followed *marja* in the world, but he never managed to acquire sufficient influence in Qom and thus never became supreme *marja al-taqlid.* Under the monarchy Hakim was regarded as a political quietist, but under the revolutionary regime of general Abd al-Karim Qasim (1958–1963) he became very active against the rising influence of the Communist Party, which was felt in the Shiʿite south as well as in Baghdad. This brought about a number of clashes between the Iraqi Communist Party and Hakim's followers. He

Ayatollah Mohammad Bager al-Hakim, a Shiʿite leader, is shown praying with other Muslims. **© REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

also openly criticized Qasim for introducing a secular law of personal status and called upon him to abolish it. At the same time, however, he maintained cordial personal relations with Qasim himself. This is also when he started to sponsor a young and ingenious activist mujtahid, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1933–1980) who, in 1957, established the clandestine Daʿwa Party. Its purpose was to fight atheism and bring people, and in particular the Shiʿa masses, back to Islam. As a result of strong criticism leveled by conservative Shiʿite *ulama* against this Western innovation, however, in 1962 Hakim forced Sadr to distance himself from the Daʿwa, at least in appearance. But Hakim continued to sponsor similar activities performed through traditional channels. He sent some of his and Sadr's disciples as agents *(wukala)* to various parts of Iraq, as well as to Lebanon, to spread the message, and he dedicated great resources to the establishment of libraries, schools, mosques, and other educational activities in and outside of Iraq. Under the first Baʿth rule (1963) of the Arif brothers (1963–1968) relations with the regimes were frosty. The Arifs were regarded by the Shiʿites as extreme Sunni bigots, and Hakim considered their Arab Socialism a deviation from Islam's social teachings. Finally, he had strong reservations about their Nasserist pan-Arabism.

In June 1969, less than a year after it came to power for the second time in Baghdad, the Baʿth regime initiated an unprecedented confrontation

with the Shiʿite religious establishment. This came as reprisal for Hakim's reluctance to support the regime against the shah of Iran. The Baʿth decided to draft the students of religion, to eliminate the educational autonomy of the *hawzat* (the Shiʿite religious universities), and to control the huge funds donated to the Shiʿite holy shrines. They also accused Hakim's son Mahdi of espionage and forced him to flee the country. Hundreds of students and teachers had to escape to Iran, and the religious centers of Najaf, Karbala, and Kazimayn quickly deteriorated. Hakim led the doomed struggle and died brokenhearted in June 1970.

Mahdi al-Hakim eventually settled down in London, where he established a Shiʿite European political movement, Harakat al-Afwaj al-Islamiyya, and a cultural center, Markaz Ahl al-Bayt. In January 1988 he was assassinated by Saddam Hussein's agents at an Islamic conference in Sudan. His brother, Hujjat al-Islam (later Ayatullah) Muhammad Baqir, established in Iran in November 1981 the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), the largest Iraqi Shiʿite opposition movement to the Baʿth regime. Supported by Iran, his movement's 4,000-strong military wing, the Badr Forces, participated in operations against the Iraqi armed forces during the Iran–Iraq War. Following the August 1988 cease-fire SAIRI's position in Iran became more precarious, but as long as there is no Iranian–Iraqi peace Hakim can still rely on his hosts for some support. In May 1983 Saddam Hussein imprisoned many members of the al-Hakim family, threatening that unless Muhammad Baqir stopped his opposition activities from Tehran his relatives would be executed. Between 1983 and March 1985 at least eight *ulama* members of the family, including sons, grandsons, and nephews of the late *marja,* as well as many other Shiʿite *ulama,* were executed by Iraq.

See also Arif, Abd al-Rahman; Arif, Abd al-Salam; Baʿth, al-; Marja al-Taqlid; Qasim, Abd al-Karim; Sadr, Muhammad Baqir al-.

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Amatzia Baram

HAKIM, TAWFIQ AL-

[1898–1987]

Egyptian dramatist, novelist, and man of letters.

Tawfiq al-Hakim was born in Alexandria, and his early life was shaped by his father's frequent moves from job to job and by his ambition that his son should become a lawyer. Al-Hakim's real interests, however, lay elsewhere; while still a student at the School of Law in Cairo, he wrote some plays (published under a pseudonym) for the Ukasha troupe. When he failed in his legal studies, his father sent him to France to study for a doctorate. Al-Hakim traveled to Paris in 1925, an event that was to be a turning point in his life. Instead of studying law, he immersed himself in European culture, particularly drama, and was strongly influenced by the works of Shaw, Pirandello, Ibsen, and Maeterlinck. Upon returning to Egypt in 1928, he prepared for publication a number of literary projects begun in Paris but also worked for a time as a deputy public prosecutor *(naʾib)* in the Nile delta area and, later, as an official in the ministry of social affairs. In 1943 he resigned his position as a civil servant to devote himself to his writing. Later in life, and particularly during the presidency of Anwar al-Sadat, he became somewhat controversial, partly because of his book *Awdat al-Waʿy* (1974; published in 1985 in English as *The Return of Consciousness*), in which the course of the Egyptian revolution and the status of Egypt's former president Gamal Abdel Nasser was critically reexamined. Only a short time before his death in 1987, he published a series of articles under the title "Hiwar maʿ Allah" (Conversation with God), which aroused the ire of the religious establishment.

The inspiration that al-Hakim had found in France bore fruit when two of his works were published in 1933 to immediate critical acclaim: the play *Ahl al-Kahf* (People of the cave) and the novel *Awdat al-Ruh* (Return of the spirit). The latter was to be the first of a series of partially autobiographical contributions to fiction to be published in the 1930s. While it deals with the life of an Egyptian family during the turbulent years surrounding the revolution of 1919, *Yawmiyyat Naʾib fi al-Aryaf* (Diary of a provincial public prosecutor, 1937; published in English as *The Maze of Justice,* 1989) is a most successful portrait of the dilemma faced by Egyptian rural society in its confrontation with the laws and imported values of Europe, and *Usfur min al-Sharq* (1938;

published in English as *A Bird from the East,* 1966) takes Muhsin, the main character in *Awdat al-Ruh,* to Paris.

Ahl al-Kahf was to mark the official beginning of the most notable career in Arabic drama to date. Along with several other plays written in the 1930s and 1940s (such as *Shahrazad* [1934; in English, 1981], *Pygmalion* [1942], and *Al-Malik Udib* [1949; in English, *King Oedipus,* 1981]), it dealt with historical and philosophical themes culled from a wide variety of sources and thus was seen as providing the dramatic genre with a cultural status that it had not enjoyed previously. Al-Hakim's dramatic output is vast and extends over five decades. It includes other plays with philosophical themes, two collections of shorter plays addressing social issues, and a number of works that experiment with dramatic technique (such as *Ya Tali al-Shajara* [Oh, tree climber, 1962; in English, *The Tree Climber,* 1966] and varying levels of language (such as *Al-Safqa* [The deal, 1956]).

Tawfiq al-Hakim is the major pioneer figure in the development of a dramatic tradition in modern Arabic literature, and he has attained the status of one of the greatest Arab litterateurs of the twentieth century.

See also Literature: Arabic; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Sadat, Anwar al-; Theater.

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Roger Allen

HALAKHAH

The Jewish religious system indicating the "path" that Jews are to follow.

Biblically derived and elaborated upon by oral tradition (especially in the Mishna, from 50 C.E. and Talmud, from 220 C.E.), Halakhah regulates a wide range of personal and communal behavior, from dress codes, dietary rules, and daily religious prayers and rituals to requirements concerning life cycle events, such as marriage and divorce, and the determination of Jewish identity and procedures for conversion. An orderly, topical presentation of the rabbinic tradition appears in *Mishne Torah* (Repetition of the law) by Maimonides (also known as Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon, or Rambam, 1135–1204). The essential guide for the commandments to be followed in daily life is the *Shulkhan Arukh* (Prepared table) by Joseph Karo (1488–1575).

The attitude toward Halakhah is a major determinant affecting Jewish denominationalism. Orthodox Judaism basically accepts Halakhah as an unchanging corpus of law. Minor differences of interpretation are tolerated in accordance with the historical customs that have evolved in local communities. Noteworthy are Ashkenazic and Sephardic customs that inadvertently perpetuate Jewish ethnicity. Conservative Judaism is more flexible in introducing religious change, while the Reform and Reconstructionist movements reject Halakhah as a mandatory system dictating contemporary behavior.

Only a minority of world Jews adheres strictly to Halakhah, with Israel having the highest percentage—between 20 and 25 percent. But the institutionalization of some aspects of Halakhah in Israel's state rabbinate and in the political sphere (inter alia, defining who is Jewish according to Halakhic standards) affects the entire Israeli population. This has resulted, in Israel, in tension between religiously observant Jews, nonobservant Jews, and persons who are not considered Jews by Halakhah (for example, patrilineal descendants of Jews who are accepted as such by the North American Reform movement, or persons converted to Judaism by non-Orthodox rabbis).

The conflict over the acceptance of Halakhic Judaism as the sole legitimate manifestation of contemporary Judaism and the consequent implications for the acceptance of other denominations' rabbis and religious rulings carries over to world Jewry, in part because of the central role of Israel in world Jewish life.

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SAMUEL C. HEILMAN
UPDATED BY EPHRAIM TABORY

HALAL

See GLOSSARY

HALUKKA

Financial support of Palestinian Jews by Jews living outside Palestine.

Halukka is the Hebrew term for "distribution." The system, which dates back to the Second Temple period (536 B.C.E.–70 C.E.), enabled those not living in the Holy Land, Eretz Yisrael, to assist those who were. Throughout the centuries, emissaries from Palestine travelled to diaspora nations to solicit donations. Periodically, Ashkenazi and Sephardic communities in Eretz Yisrael clashed over the proportion of funds to be distributed in their respective communities. The system became a source of contention between the traditional Orthodox, who wished to preserve it and their communal autonomy, and the Zionists, who viewed it as parasitical—claiming it hindered incentive—and a barrier to national regeneration and growth. As the "New Yishuv" grew, the segment of Palestine Jewry supported by halukka contributions steadily shrank and became a very small minority.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

HALUTZ

See HA-HALUTZ

HAMA

Ancient town built on the banks of the Orontes River in central Syria (Sem., Hamath; Gk. Epiphania).

Hama, located on the main road between Damascus and Aleppo, is about 130 miles (210 km) north of Damascus, the capital of Syria, and about 94 miles (152 km) south of Aleppo. Like Homs, Hama lies close to the frontier of settlement facing the Syrian Desert, making it a flourishing market for the nomadic people and villagers in the countryside.

Agriculture in the Hama region profits from the water of the Orontes River. Water wheels *(nawriyas),* which raise the river water up into canals, help irrigate large stretches of land. Of the 100 water wheels in Hama province, only twenty are in use. Grains and fruits abound in the countryside.

The U.S. Department of State estimated the city's population in 2002 at 1.6 million. In the 1980 census, the inhabitants of the city of Hama numbered 177,208 out of a total of 475,582 inhabitants for the whole province. In the 1922 census, the inhabitants of Hama numbered 40,437 out of a total of 69,745 inhabitants for the whole province. The bedouin in the countryside of Hama are not accounted for.

The city of Hama prides itself on a number of ancient monuments. It has many mosques (the most important of which is the Umayyad Mosque), khans (caravansaries), and luxurious palaces belonging to the Azm family, which governed in Syria in the eighteenth century. Important archaeological sites in the countryside include Crusader castles and those built by Saladin, such as those of Shayzar, al-Madiq, and Misyaf.

Hama was a center of resistance to the French during the 1925–1927 Syrian rebellion and to Col. Adib Shishakli's government in 1954. After the Baʿth seizure of power in 1963, the city remained resistant to Damascus's edicts, driven largely by the popularity of the Islamist movement among the Sunni majority and by the merchant community's antagonism to the Baʿth's socialist strictures.

This opposition was first expressed in the spring 1964 rebellion in Hama, led by the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan), but reached its peak during the

countrywide Ikhwan-led underground movement (1976–1982), sparked in part by the government's Alawi sectarian composition and by its intervention in the Lebanese civil war. In April 1981 government forces, responding to an Ikhwan-led ambush of an Alawi village on Hama's outskirts, entered the city, killing hundreds. The next year, a government attempt to suppress the Ikhwan led to a month-long rebellion in Hama (2 February–5 March 1982). In putting down the revolt the government massacred an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 civilians and destroyed large parts of the city.

See also Alawi; Aleppo; Damascus; Hama Massacre; Homs; Muslim Brotherhood.

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Abdul-Karim Rafeq
Updated by Geoffrey D. Schad

HAMADAN

An ancient and important city in western Iran.

Hamadan, located at an elevation of 5,732 feet, occupies a fertile agricultural plain. It is associated with the ancient Median city of Ecbatana, built in the seventh century B.C.E., and it was an important capital of successive pre-Islamic dynasties, being situated on the trade route that linked Mesopotamia with the East. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the city was occupied by the Ottoman Empire several times, but in 1732 it finally reverted to Iran.

Hamadan retained its role as a large commercial city in the modern period. In the nineteenth century it functioned as a transshipment center for the trade of southwestern Iran with the West. Goods destined for Tabriz, Trebizond (now Trabzon), and the Black Sea were brought to Hamadan. After the development of the Anglo-Indian trade, Hamadan prospered as a result of its location on the trade route via Basra and Baghdad to the east. During the twentieth century the city continued to serve as a regional transshipment center and also developed diverse manufacturing industries. A shrine popularly believed to contain the remains of the biblical Esther is a major Jewish pilgrimage site in the city. There is also a monument for Ibn Sina (Avicenna). The population of Hamadan in 1996 was 401,281.

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Parvaneh Pourshariati

HAMADI, SABRI

Lebanese politician.

Sabri Hamadi, a member of one of the most influential Shiʿite families in Lebanon, was born in Hirmil. He received no formal education beyond some elementary schooling in Juniya. He was first elected to parliament in 1925 and was its speaker for much of the 1960s. With Bishara al-Khuri, Hamadi was one of the founders of the Constitutional Bloc. He was a shrewd politician who knew how to exploit the differences among his enemies.

Under Hamadi, the parliament was chaotically structured; appointments within it were made on the basis of total loyalty to him. His cronies from Baʿlabak-Hirmil, including some who rarely came to Beirut, where the parliament is located, were on the payroll in key administrative positions. His rule was closely associated with the ascendancy of Chehabism in Lebanon; Hamadi believed that Fuʾad Chehab was the best leader in the Arab world.

As a speaker of parliament in the summer of 1970, Hamadi played a crucial role in the presidential election of that year. When Sulayman Franjiyya defeated the Chehabi candidate, Ilyas Sarkis, Hamadi initially refused to accept the results. He changed his mind after his advisers and Fuʾad Chehab personally warned him of the dire consequences if Franjiyya's

election was not ratified. Franjiyya's armed gunmen were waiting outside the parliamentary hall. Hamadi lost the speakership position that year but served as minister of agriculture under Franjiyya.

See also Chehab, Fuʾad; Constitutional Bloc; Franjiyya, Sulayman; Khuri, Bishara al-; Sarkis, Ilyas.

As'ad AbuKhalil

HAMAMA, FATEN

[1931–]

Egyptian film actress.

Born in Cairo in 1931, Faten (also Fatin) Hamama made her film debut as a young girl in *A Happy Day* (1940), directed by industry pioneer Muhammad Karim. By the 1950s, Hamama was considered to be the leading star of the Egyptian cinema. Her marriage to Omar Sharif in 1953 increased his popularity, and they made several films together. Best known for her melodramatic roles, she played in more than one hundred movies over five decades. Notable films featuring Hamama include some of director Henri Barakat's best work, such as *Call of the Curlew* (1959), *The Open Door* (1963), *The Sin* (1965), and *The Thin Thread* (1971).

See also Sharif, Omar.

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HAMA MASSACRE

Islamist uprising against Syrian regime.

In February 1982, Syrian security forces entered the densely populated old city of Hama, situated on the Orontes River south of Aleppo, to search for weapons hidden by Islamist militants. Local residents, urged on by alarms from neighborhood mosques, attacked the troops and pushed them out of the central city. Armed militants then seized control of the provincial headquarters of the ruling Baʿth Party and other key government installations. Elite military and security units commanded by the president's brother, Colonel Rifʿat al-Asad, rushed to the area and, from the heights of the nearby citadel, rained artillery and tank fire into the town, leveling its major commercial and residential districts. Estimates of the dead range from 10,000 to 30,000.

Although Hama had long been a center of Islamist political activism and the location of frequent outbreaks of popular challenge to successive Baʿthist regimes after the 1963 revolution, the 1982 uprising was notable for its massive scale, the broad range of social forces that took part, the high degree of organization evidenced by its leaders, and the ruthlessness with which it was crushed. The most militant Islamist organization in north-central Syria, the Fighting Vanguard, led by Adnan Uqla, never recovered. Even more moderate Islamists scaled back their activities sharply, while some prominent figures, to avoid being harassed, tortured, and killed, initiated overtures to the authorities. For almost a decade the government refused to allocate funds to rebuild the city, whose ruins stood as a stark warning to other dissidents.

See also Hama.

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Fred H. Lawson

HAMAS

Palestinian Islamic resistance movement.

HAMAS was created in Israeli-occupied Gaza in December 1987 as the resistance wing of the Islamic revivalist organization, the Association of the Muslim Brotherhood. *HAMAS* (zeal, in Arabic) is an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic resistance movement).

Prior to the outbreak of the anti-Israeli uprising in the West Bank and Gaza known as the In-

tifada in December 1987, the Brotherhood's agenda focused on proselytizing and social purification as the basis for Palestinian socio-spiritual renewal. Hostile to secular nationalist groups within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Brotherhood shunned overt acts of anti-Israeli resistance. Israeli authorities quietly assisted the Brotherhood in hopes that it might provide a quieter political alternative to the PLO. The leading figure in the Brotherhood was Shaykh Ahmad Yasin.

Massive popular participation in the intifada prompted the Brotherhood to change tactics and establish HAMAS; its August 1988 charter clearly noted the group's connection with the Brotherhood. Brotherhood leaders argued that the time for vigorous jihad (holy war) had arrived. The move was political as well as religious—secular groups and another militant religious group, Islamic Jihad, were already resisting the Israeli occupation.

The charter called for the total liberation of Palestine from Israeli rule, declaring that Palestine is Islamic *waqf* (religious trust) land that must never be surrendered to non-Muslim rule. HAMAS supported the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state in all of Palestine, in contrast to the PLO's vision of a secular state in the occupied territories. Israeli authorities struck hard at the HAMAS leadership during the intifada. Shaykh Yasin was arrested in May 1989 and sentenced two years later to life imprisonment. Other important HAMAS figures, such as Shaykh Ibrahim Qawqa, were deported. In December 1992 Israel deported 418 members from HAMAS and Islamic Jihad to Lebanon, including HAMAS leader Abd al-Aziz Rantisi.

HAMAS has maintained a difficult relationship with the PLO. It refused to join the PLO-led Unified National Command of the Uprising (UNCU) that emerged to coordinate resistance activity during the intifada. According to an October 1988 agreement between HAMAS and the UNCU, HAMAS operated alongside of but separate from the UNCU. By 1991 HAMAS was pushing for elections to the Palestine National Council, the PLO's parliament-in-exile, which would be held both in exile and in the territories, where its own strength lay. HAMAS also resolutely opposed the Arab-Israeli peace talks that began in late 1991, and HAMAS activists from its armed wing, the Martyr Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, increased the number of attacks against Israeli targets. HAMAS joined nine other Palestinian groups opposed to the talks in the National Democratic and Islamic Front and denounced the resulting Oslo Accord (September 1993).

HAMAS accelerated its resistance to the accords after establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994. In 1995, as serious intra-Palestinian disputes continued, the al-Qassam Brigades carried out a number of deadly suicide bombings against Jewish civilians in Israel proper, not against troops in the West Bank and Gaza; this prompted the PA to crack down on HAMAS. The following year, HAMAS bus bombings directly led to the election of hardliner Benjamin Netanyahu as Israeli prime minister and the virtual collapse of the peace process. King Hussein ibn Talal demanded Shaykh Yasin's release in October 1997 in return for the release of two Israeli intelligence operatives who had been captured after their failed attempt to assassinate HAMAS leader Khalid Mashʿal in Amman. HAMAS maintains offices in several countries, including Syria, the current home of exiled senior leader Musa Abu Marzuq.

The al-Aqsa Intifada, which started in 2000, saw the al-Qassam Brigades increase their suicide attacks against Israeli civilian targets. In addition, HAMAS and Islamic Jihad put aside their rivalry and began working in tandem. Israel, in return, assassinated more than 100 militants from the al-Qassam Brigades, Islamic Jihad, and al-Fatah's al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Among them was senior HAMAS spokesman Ismaʿil Abu Shanab. Israel tried but failed to assassinate several other senior figures, such as Abd al-Aziz Rantisi (who returned to Gaza in 1993), in June 2003, and Shaykh Yasin, in September 2003. Israel repeated its assassination attempt on Shaykh Yasin on 22 March 2004, this time killing him.

Polls consistently show that Palestinians approve of HAMAS's suicide bombings, although that public support began to wane because of their deleterious effect on global support for the Palestinian cause. By late 2003 the future of the peace process seemed to depend upon the PA's ability to halt attacks by HAMAS.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Fatah, al-; Gaza (City); Hussein ibn Talal; Intifada (1987–1991); Islamic Jihad; Jihad; Muslim Brotherhood; Netanyahu, Benjamin; Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palestine National Council; Palestinian Authority; West Bank; Yasin, Ahmad Isma'il.

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Michael R. Fischbach

HAMAS (MOVEMENT FOR A PEACEFUL SOCIETY)

A moderate Islamic party in Algeria.

Hamas is Algeria's second most popular Islamic party, after the Islamic Salvation Front. It was established in 1990 by Shaykh Mahfoud Nahnah (1942–2003), after constitutional amendments allowed for political pluralism, as the Movement of the Islamic Society, with the Arabic acronym HAMAS. To conform to a law requiring that the name make no reference to Islam, in 1991 the party changed its name to the Movement for a Peaceful Society. Influenced by the teachings and methods of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the party's origins go back to the 1970s, when Shaykh Nahnah was arrested for opposing the state's socialist orientation. In 1989, he formed a social and cultural society, Jam'iyyat al-Irshad wa al-Islah (Association of Guidance and Reform), which became Hamas in 1990 and drew its following from among students, teachers, and professionals. In the 1991 legislative elections, the party garnered over 450,000 votes. Since the cancellation of these elections, Hamas has maintained a moderate and nonviolent stance and advocated national reconciliation and the preservation of the republic and the institutions of the state. It has been criticized by some for taking a conciliatory position toward the military-backed regime. Others see its program as realistic and pragmatic. Shaykh Nahnah ran as a candidate during the presidential elections of 1995 and came in second, winning over three million votes. In the 1999 presidential elections, the party supported the candidacy of Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Since the 1997 legislative elections, Hamas has participated in several ministerial cabinets and placed representatives in the Algerian parliament. It has advocated a moderate Islamic position; adherence to the country's fundamental cultural components (Islamic, Arab, and Amazegh [the indigenous population]); the restoration of order and national peace; pluralism; the peaceful transfer of power; women's participation in society; and respect for human rights. In 2003 Shaykh Nahnah died of leukemia, leaving behind a movement that is expected to survive its founder.

See also Algeria: Political Parties in; Front Islamique du Salut (FIS); Nahnah, Mahfoud.

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Emad Eldin Shahin

HAMDI, IBRAHIM AL-

[1943–1977]

President of Yemen Arab Republic (1973–1977).

Ibrahim al-Hamdi was born to a *qadi* family in North Yemen. After the revolution that overthrew Imam Yahya in 1962, he entered the army of the newly formed Yemen Arab Republic. He rose rapidly through the ranks, and during the civil war, he became increasingly involved in politics. In the early 1970s al-Hamdi became commander of the Reserves, an elite army unit; in 1972 he was appointed deputy prime minister, and in 1973, deputy commander in chief of the armed forces.

In 1973, al-Hamdi led a military coup against the civilian government of Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, which was widely perceived as ineffective. His first government included technocrats and was supported by some of the more conservative tribal elements, including leaders of the Hashid and Bakil confederations.

Upon assuming office, al-Hamdi consolidated his power by methodically reducing the independence of other forces in the country through his "Correction Movement," a nationwide effort to reform the administration, staffing, and operations of all government institutions.

Eventually, the tribal leaders and the more progressive elements (the latter organized into the National Democratic Front) began to oppose al-Hamdi's modernization programs. Political unrest increased in early 1977, amid signs that al-Hamdi desired closer relations with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. In October, despite signs that his political situation was improving, he was assassinated.

Al-Hamdi is regarded today as one of the most dynamic and progressive of Yemen's leaders after the civil war of the 1960s, and his role is compared, in meaning and importance, with that of John F. Kennedy in American political history.

See also Bakil Tribal Confederation; Iryani, Abd al-Rahman al-; National Democratic Front (NDF); Yemen Civil War.

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HAMID AL-DIN FAMILY

A ruling dynasty of North Yemen.

This Sayyid family provided the last dynasty of Zaydi imams in North Yemen and produced a late, brilliant flowering of the traditional authoritarian political system that had been an important part of Yemeni politics for over one thousand years. Founded by Imam Muhammad ibn Yahya Hamid al-Din in 1891, the dynasty was consolidated and reached its zenith during the long reign of his son, Imam Yahya ibn Muhammad Hamid al-Din (1867–1948), a reign that began in 1904 and ended with his assassination in 1948. Imam Yahya's son, Imam Ahmad ibn Yahya, long the crown prince, quickly overturned the 1948 revolution and went on to restore and develop further the institutions and practices of his father until his death in 1962. Imam Ahmad, however, was less successful than his father in insulating traditional Yemen from the outside world and modernity. Imam Muhammad al-Badr succeeded his father, only to be overthrown a week later by the 1962 revolution that created the Yemen Arab Republic. More than a generation later, the Hamid al-Din family remains officially banned from Yemen.

See also Ahmad ibn Yahya Hamid al-Din; Badr, Muhammad al-; Yahya ibn Muhammad Hamid al-Din; Zaydism.

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HAMINA, MOHAMMED LAKHDAR

[1934–]

Algerian filmmaker.

Mohammed Lakhdar Hamina is one of the world's most distinguished directors. Three of his motion pictures have been honored at the Cannes Film Festival: *Le vent des Aurès* (The Wind from the Aurès, 1966); winner of the grand award, Palme d'Or, *Chronique des années de braise* (Chronicle of the years of embers, 1975); and *Vent de sable* (Desert wind, 1982). Like other postcolonial Algerian directors, Hamina's films explore the promise and paradox resulting from the revolution (1954–1962) and independence.

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Phillip C. Naylor

HAMMARSKJÖLD, DAG

[1905–1961]

United Nations secretary-general, 1953–1961.

Born in Uppsala, Sweden, Dag Hammarskjöld was successively a professor of economics, permanent under-secretary of the Finance Ministry and chairman of the board of the Swedish National Bank, Swedish representative in negotiations on the Mar-

shall Plan and on European institutions, and minister in the Swedish Foreign Office. Elected United Nations secretary-general in 1953, he revitalized the world organization.

Hammarskjöld's brilliant personal diplomacy was a new factor in international affairs. In 1955, in talks with Chou En-Lai, he secured the release of seventeen U.S. airmen imprisoned in China, resolving a serious potential threat to international peace. In 1956 he shored up the crumbling Arab–Israeli armistice agreements. In talks in New York he tried to resolve the crisis that followed Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, an effort aborted by the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt.

Hammarskjöld persuaded the invaders to accept a cease-fire on the condition that a UN force arrive in the area immediately. The first UN peacekeeping force (UNEF I) arrived in the Suez Canal area eight days later. Early in 1957 UNEF replaced the Israelis in Sinai and Gaza.

Hammarskjöld's friendship with both Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion and Mahmud Fawzi, Nasser's foreign minister, facilitated his efforts. He failed however, to get Egypt to agree to navigation for Israeli ships or Israel-bound cargoes in the Suez Canal. In 1958 Hammarskjöld played a crucial role in containing, negotiating, and finally resolving the Lebanese crisis, during which, under mistaken premises, U.S. Marines landed in Beirut and British troops in Jordan.

In 1960 Hammarskjöld organized the UN's largest and most difficult peacekeeping operation in the newly independent and chaotic Congo. In the absence of directives from a paralyzed Security Council, his independent actions led to his rejection by both Nikita S. Khrushchev and Charles de Gaulle, who also furiously resented Hammarskjöld's visit to Tunisia when French forces violently reoccupied Bizerte in the summer of 1961.

Hammarskjöld died on 17 September 1961 while on a mission to end fighting in Katanga, when his aircraft crashed at Ndola, Northern Rhodesia.

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Brian Urquhart

HAMMER, ZEVULUN

[1936–1998]

Member of Israel's Knesset and cabinet minister.

Zevulun Hammer was born in Haifa and was educated in the Israeli national religious school system, concentrating on biblical and Judaic studies at Bar-Ilan University. He did his military service working on a kibbutz. He was a leader of the National Religious Party and was instrumental in getting the party involved in security issues and foreign policy and supporting the Gush Emunim program to settle the Occupied Territories. During the 1980s Hammer moderated his views on the West Bank, arguing that domestic unity was more important than holding onto a vision of Greater Israel.

First elected to the Knesset in 1969, he served as minister of welfare in 1975 and 1976 and was minister of education and culture from 1977 to 1984. He served as minister of religious affairs from 1986 until 1990. In 1990 he again became minister of education, and served until 1992. From 1992 to 1996, he served on the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee but did not hold ministerial position. In June of 1996 he was again appointed minister of education and culture as well as deputy prime minister. In August of 1997 he also became minister of religious affairs.

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HAMRA RIOTS

Muslim–Christian riots in Egypt.

In June 1981 continuing intercommunal tensions between Muslims and Coptic Christians in Egypt

erupted into violence in Zawiyat al-Hamra, in the Shurabiyya district of Cairo. Seventeen people died and fifty-four were injured. The violence contributed to the government's September 1981 dismissal of the Coptic pope, Shenouda III, and banning of the Muslim Brotherhood movement.

See also Muslim Brotherhood; Shenouda III.

Michael R. Fischbach

HAMROUCHE, MOULOUD

[1943–]

Prime minister of Algeria, 1989–1992.

Mouloud Hamrouche was born into a family imbued with Algerian nationalism; his father was killed during the War of Independence. At the age of fifteen Hamrouche joined the the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). He rose within the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) to serve in the protocol service under Colonel Houari Boumédienne, who encouraged him to return to his studies. Hamrouche holds a law degree and a master's degree obtained in the United Kingdom. He was appointed chief of protocol in President Chadli Bendjedid's government and served until 1984. He then served as secretary-general of the government and then of the presidency. He replaced Kasdi Merbah as prime minister in September 1989 and was charged with accelerarating political, economic, and social reforms. This required reimagining the FLN, but Hamrouche's efforts were stymied by party factions, and he also confronted emerging populist Islamism, exemplified by the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). Although Hamrouche is credited with liberalizing Algeria and creating a more open society, regional and local elections in June 1990 resulted in the stunning success of the FIS. Hamrouche permitted gerrymandering by the FLN-controlled Assemblée Populaire Nationale (APN) before the scheduled June 1992 parliamentary elections, provoking FIS protests. Subsequent violence forced President Bendjedid to sack Hamrouche, whom he replaced with Sid Ahmed Ghozali. Hamrouche led the reformist bloc of the FLN until he was forced out of the party. He ran as an independent for president in 1999 but withdrew, along with six other candidates, because of irregularities. Hamrouche remains an independent appealing for political and economic transparency. He hopes to see the Pouvoir—the ruling civilian and military elite that has dominated Algerian politics since independence—replaced in order to have genuine democratic reform. Hamrouche appears poised for another presidential campaign in 2004.

See also Algeria: Political Parties in; Bendjedid, Chadli; Boumédienne, Houari; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Front Islamique du Salut (FIS).

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HAMZAWI, RASHID AL-

[1934–]

Tunisian novelist, playwright, and linguist.

Rashid al-Hamzawi was born in Thala, Tunisia. He received his doctorate from the University of Paris and wrote his dissertation on the Arabic language academy in Cairo. He worked in the Office of Arabization and Translation in Rabat and is presently a professor at the University of Tunis. In addition to his novels, al-Hamzawi has published works on language and translation, particularly in relation to the efforts of the Arab academies to unify Arabic terminology.

Hamzawi's novel *Bududa mat* (Tunis, 1962; Boudouda died), which won the Ali al-Bahlawan Prize, relates the hardships experienced by Tunisians after World War II. Boudouda symbolizes the suffering Tunisian people. The novel also describes rural emigration and the resulting social changes in the cities. Whereas a feeling of optimism pervades the novel, Hamzawi's collection of short stories, *Tarnannu* (Tunis, 1975), is pessimistic; the poor and socially disadvantaged seem trapped by their problems. Hamzawi's plays deal with the corrupt world of politics. In *al-Shayatin fi al-qariya* and *al-Sarikhun fi al-sahra* (Tunis, 1976; The devils in the village; Those who shout in the desert) he searches for the most suitable ideology for developing countries but refrains from choosing one, preferring to leave the doors

open. A recent publication is a novel titled *Safar wa Hadhar* (1998; Travel and prattle), which is concerned with the issue of freedom of expression.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN.

AIDA A. BAMIA

HANAFI, HASAN

[1935–]

Egyptian scholar of the Islamic left.

Hasan Hanafi, a prolific professor of philosophy at Cairo University, is identified with his project for the creation of an Islamic left within the context of the Islamic reform movement of al-Afghani and Abduh (although he faults that old movement for confining its message to the elite). Hanafi calls for the recognition of class differences, and believes that the Islamic left should always side with the poor against the rich, the powerless against the powerful, and the downtrodden against the elite. He has also called for the unity of Muslims, especially among Persians and Arabs. Although he is not a secular, the moderateness of his views has earned him the enmity of Islamic fundamentalists, and some militants called him an "apostate" in 1997, prompting him to ask for police protection. Hanafi has published widely in the field of Islamic philosophy and jurisprudence, and has a book on Western political philosophy.

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AS'AD ABUKHALIL

HANAFI SCHOOL OF LAW

One of the four approaches to Sunni Muslim law, often called schools.

Though it bears the name of Abu Hanifa al-Nuʿman ibn Thabit (died 767), the Hanafi School of Law in fact owes its doctrine to his two disciples Abu Yusuf (died 798) and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani (died 805). They laid down the systematic foundations for the work of later Hanafis. In the eighth and ninth centuries, the law school *(madhhab)* was associated with the rationalists *(ahl al-raʾy),* who advocated free legal reasoning not strictly bound by the revealed texts. Although by the eighth century *raʾy,* a form of free reasoning, was largely abandoned in favor of a more disciplined and text-bound reasoning, the Hanafis continued to resort to similar methods of legal argument, notably *istihsan* (juristic preference). After the ninth century, and certainly by the beginning of the eleventh, even *istihsan* was restructured so as to render it subsidiary to the imperatives of the religious texts.

Though the Hanafi school finally came to adopt the mainstream legal methodology and philosophy, it did maintain peculiar characteristics such as its emphasis on the practical aspects of the law. Particularly in the first three centuries of Islam, its followers, more than any other school, were the chief authors and experts on formularies *(shurut),* notarial documents, and the profession and conduct of judgeship *(adab al-qada).*

Among the most important Hanafi authors on positive law after Abu Yusuf and Shaybani are Abu al-Hasan al-Karkhi (died 951), Abu al-Layth al-Samarqandi (died 985), al-Quduri (died 1036), Shams al-Aʾimma al-Sarakhsi (died 1096), al-Kasani (died 1191), al-Marghinani (died 1196), Abu al-Barakat al-Nasafi (died 1310), and Ibn Nujaym (died 1563). For these authors, the works of Shaybani, known collectively as *zahir al-riwaya,* remained authoritative; they are *al-Mabsut, al-Jami al-Kabir, al-Jami al-Saghir, al-Siyar al-Kabir, al-Siyar al-Saghir,* and *al-Ziyadat.* The most prominent legal theorists *(usuliyyun)* of the school are Pazdawi (died 1089), Sarakhsi, Nasafi, Sadr al-Shariʿa al-Thani al-Mahbubi (died 1346), and Mulla Khusraw (died 1480).

In 1876, the Hanafi law of contracts, obligations, and procedure was codified in the Ottoman law code of Mecelle, in an effort to modernize the law and to achieve uniformity in its application. The primary source on which the Committee of the Mecelle based its work was Shaybani's collected works, *zahir al-riwaya,* with the commentary on it by Sarakhsi, an eleventh-century Hanafi. In the first few decades of the twentieth century, however, the Mecelle was superseded by civil codes in all the countries that fell previously under Ottoman jurisdiction, with the notable exception of Jordan.

In medieval times, the school had a large following in its birthplace, Iraq, as well as in Syria, Transoxania (now Uzbekistan, a former Soviet Republic), the Indian subcontinent, the Mediterranean island of Sicily, and to a lesser extent in North Africa. Later on, the Ottoman Empire declared Hanafism the official doctrine of the state, thus rendering it dominant in all areas that fell under its sway. In modern times, Hanafism still prevails in these regions as well as in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Pakistan, Turkistan, the Caucasus (between the Black and Caspian Seas), India, and China.

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WAEL B. HALLAQ

HANANU, IBRAHIM

[1869–1935]

Syrian nationalist.

Ibrahim Hananu was born in Kafr Takharim, a fertile olive-growing area west of Aleppo, to a wealthy rural family of Kurdish extraction. He studied at the prestigious Mülkiye school of public administration in Istanbul. Later he joined the bureaucracy of the Ottoman Empire, only to retire and manage his estates. Having embraced nationalism when the Arab Revolt broke out in 1916, Hananu joined the Arab army of Faisal I ibn Hussein and entered Aleppo with the Allies in 1918. He also joined the secret nationalist society al-Fatat and, with the support of prominent merchants in Aleppo, he founded the League of National Defense and the Arab Club of Aleppo.

Under the influence of Hananu, the Muslim elite of Aleppo gradually assumed an Arab national identity, which was reinforced by the Hananu revolt. Breaking out in the autumn of 1919 in the countryside surrounding Aleppo, the months before French forces occupied the city, the Hananu revolt received aid from the Turkish nationalist movement of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which was battling the French army of the Levant for control of Cilicia and southern Anatolia. With the withdrawal of Turkish military assistance following the signing of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement in October 1921, Hananu and his men could no longer sustain a revolt, and their struggle collapsed.

Hananu continued to play an active role in the Syrian national movement. He was one of the founding fathers of the National Bloc, which emerged from the Beirut conference of October 1927, and which steered the course of the independence struggle in Syria until its completion nineteen years later. After his death, Hananu's house in Aleppo was used by Syrian nationalists as a "house of the nation."

See also ALEPPO; ARAB REVOLT (1916); FATAT, AL-; NATIONAL BLOC.

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MUHAMMAD MUSLIH
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

HANBALI SCHOOL OF LAW

One of the four approaches to Sunni Muslim law, called schools.

The Hanbali School of Law takes its name from Ahmad ibn Hanbal (died 854), a major theologian of the ninth century. He was a fierce opponent of the Muʿtazila, a school of religious thought that flourished under the Abbasids. Ibn Hanbal emerged victorious in the *mihna* (inquisition), led by the Abbasid caliph al-Maʾmun and the rationalist theologians against the traditionalists who upheld the doctrine that the Qurʾan is not the created but the eternal word of God. Ibn Hanbal's career as a dogmatic theologian, coupled with the fact that he did not elaborate a complete system of law, gave him and his immediate followers the reputation of being a theological rather than a legal school *(madhhab).* Indeed, the school's first complete work on positive law, *al-Mukhtasar,* appeared as late as the beginning of the tenth century, at the hands of Abu Qasim al-Khiraqi (died 946).

Being strict traditionalists, the Hanbalis of the ninth century rejected the rationalist elements of

what had by the end of the century become the mainstream legal theory *(usul al-fiqh).* Later Hanbalis, however, gradually adopted the main elements of this theory, and by the eleventh century, their legal theory finally came to accept *usul al-fiqh* as elaborated by the Shafiʿi School of Law and Hanafi School of Law. Thus, it took the Hanbali school nearly two centuries after ibn Hanbal's demise to develop into a full-fledged school of law.

Two centuries later, the celebrated Hanbali jurist and theologian Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya (died 1328) even subscribed to a theory of *istihsan* (juristic preference), advocated by later Hanafis and vehemently opposed by early traditionalist Shafiʿis and Hanbalis.

There were several figures who dominated the history of Hanbalism. Among the prominent names are al-Khiraqi, Ibn al-Farra, Ibn Aqil, Abd al-Qadir al-Jili (died 1166), Abu al-Faraj ibn al-Jawzi (died 1200), Ibn Taymiyya, and his disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (died 1351), to name only a few. Distinguished as a major figure in Islamic religious history, Ibn Taymiyya was involved in the study of law, theology, philosophy, and mysticism and was engaged in the politics of the Mamluk state. He wrote at length against the Shiʿa, the philosophers, the logicians, and the pantheistic Sufis, though he himself belonged to the mystical school of Abd al-Qadir al-Jili.

Ibn Taymiyya's thought exercised significant influence on Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (died 1792), who, with the assistance of Ibn Saʿud, founded Wahhabism, an ideology that has sustained the Saudi state during the last two centuries. Saudi Arabia remains the principal country that applies Hanbali law. Nevertheless, the writings of ibn Taymiyya and ibn Abd al-Wahhab still continue to influence the Muslim reform and religious movements in the Middle East, from Rashid Rida (died 1935) to the Muslim Brotherhood.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad ibn; Hanafi School of Law; Muslim Brotherhood; Rida, Rashid; Shafiʿi School of Law.

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Wael B. Hallaq

HAND OF FATIMA

A folk motif.

European name for the *khamsa* (from Arabic, "five"), the hand with five fingers extended. It can be found today throughout the Middle East in women's jewelry, flat-weaving, embroidery, door-knockers, automobile ornamentation, and so on. Precursors include the Punic "Hand of Baal" and the Roman V-shaped amulets (possibly representing the Roman numeral five), all for protection from the evil eye.

Laurence Michalak

HANOUNE, LOUISA

[1954–]

Leader of the radical Workers Party, deputy in the national assembly, and women's and human rights advocate in Algeria.

Born to a poor peasant family, Louisa Hanoune was the first girl in her family to go to school. Overcoming considerable hardship, she earned a law degree at the University of Annaba in 1979. She entered politics by joining the clandestine Socialist Workers Organization (Organisation Socialiste des Travailleurs; OST), a Trotskyist party. Arrested in December 1983 for her political activities, she was released in May 1984 and became the first secretary-general of the Association for Equality before the Law of Men and Women as well as a founding member of the Algerian Human Rights League.

Once a multiparty system was instituted, OST became the Workers Party (PT) with Hanoune serving as its spokesperson. She opposed the army's cancellation of the 1991 elections, and in 1995 signed the Platform of Rome, urging negotiations with the Islamist movement as a way to end the civil war. An outspoken advocate of democracy in Algeria, Hanoune won election to parliament in 1997, one of four PT deputies. In 2002, she led her party to a stronger showing, winning twenty-one seats while continuing her vehement criticism of the Bouteflika government. Her political ideas are spelled out in her book *Une autre voix pour l'Algérie* (1996). A feminist and social critic, she is the first woman to lead an Algerian political party.

See also Algeria; Arab Socialism; GIA (Armed Islamic Groups).

Robert Mortimer

HAQ, AL-

A Palestinian human rights organization.

Al-Haq was established in 1979 in Ramallah, the West Bank, by two prominent lawyers, Raja Shehadeh and Jonathan Kuttab. Initially it was known as Law in the Service of Man. For at least a decade, it became the leading human rights and legal services organization in the Occupied Territories, on which many in the Western media and human rights organizations relied on for information—found in its numerous publications—on Israeli violations of international law and human rights during Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, through its staff and library, al-Haq is a legal resource center for the Palestinian community. It is affiliated with the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva, Switzerland.

See also HUMAN RIGHTS.

MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

HARAM

See GLOSSARY

HARAM AL-SHARIF

Third holiest site in Islam.



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Al-Haram al-Sharif (the noble sanctuary), also known as the Temple Mount, is the third holiest site in Islam. It is located in the southeastern part of the Old City of Jerusalem. Built between 685 and 709 C.E., it is an enclosure on a raised platform that includes two renowned holy sites: the Qubbat al-Sakhra (the Dome of the Rock) and al-Aqsa mosque. The Dome of the Rock is where Jews believe that Abraham attempted to sacrifice his son, Isaac, to God, and where Muslims believe that the prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven. He is believed to have tethered his "fabulous steed," al-Buraq, in an area located in the interior portion of the Western Wall of the Temple Mount. Close by is al-Aqsa mosque, which is regarded as the place in the Qurʾan where Muhammad prayed following his "night journey," and it was the direction for prayer *(qibla)* for Muslims before it was changed to Mecca. The subterranean areas of the Haram include a large vault, known as Solomon's Stables, now a mosque. Although much repaired and restored by the Romans and in the Middle Ages, the vault is a Herodian creation and is thought to be part of the original Jewish Temple, built in 970 B.C.E. The exterior wall of the enclosure to the west, the Western or Wailing Wall (in Hebrew, *ha-Kotel ha-Maʿaravi*), is the holiest site in Judaism.

The Haram played a significant role in the history of Jerusalem. As a site of veneration it attracted pilgrims, scholars, and benefactors from all parts of the Islamic world. Much real estate and arable land was endowed for the upkeep of schools, orphanages, mosques, prayer-rooms, and hostels, either inside the enclosure itself or nearby, creating an Islamic center for learning, ritual devotions, and good works. During the early twentieth century, tensions in the city between the predominantly Muslim and growing Jewish populations erupted into rioting over access and use of these holy places; the most notorious were the Western Wall Disturbances in 1929. Since

the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, activities emanating from the Haram have played a pivotal role in preserving an Islamic and Palestinian presence in the Old City in the face of attempts by Israeli settler groups and government agencies to transfer ownership of the site to Israel. During the negotiations that followed the 1993 Oslo Accords, the future of the Haram was left unresolved. In September 2000 a visit to the Haram by the Likud Party leader, Ariel Sharon, provoked a violent clash that led to an uprising, since dubbed the al-Aqsa Intifada, that contributed to the collapse of negotiations.

See also AQSA INTIFADA, AL-; JERUSALEM; WESTERN WALL; WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES.

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MICHAEL DUMPER

HAREL, ISSER

[1912–2003]

"Little Isser," the second and most powerful head of Israeli Mossad, considered to be the founder of the country's intelligence community.

Born Isser Halperin in Russia, Harel emigrated in 1931 with his family to Palestine, where he was among the founders of Kibbutz Shefayim. He served in the Haganah and with the British coast guard during World War II. In 1944 Harel was appointed secretary of the "Jewish Department" of the Haganah's intelligence service (Shai), and was responsible for counterespionage and for operations against "dissident" Jewish underground groups, the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi and LEHI. His ruthless successes endeared Harel to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, and he rose from Tel Aviv district commander of the Shai (1947) to head the newly formed General Security Service (Shin Bet, or Shabak, 1948–1952), replacing Reuven Shiloah as head of the Mossad and becoming *memuneh* ("the one in charge") of all Israeli intelligence agencies (1953–1963).

While maintaining extensive (and often criticized) internal surveillance, primarily of the pro-Soviet left, the fiercely anticommunist Harel also developed a powerful international intelligence operations network. He was credited with the exposure of several Soviet spies, including Yisrael Beer. He orchestrated the capture of Adolf Eichmann in Argentina in 1960, and he oversaw the beginnings of Israel's "periphery doctrine," forging ties with non-Arab Middle Eastern regimes such Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia.

Harel left office in April 1963 following a bitter dispute with Ben-Gurion and the Israel Defense Force (IDF) and with military intelligence chief Meir Amit over operations against the German rocket scientists in Egypt and elsewhere. He briefly coordinated Levi Eshkol's intelligence apparatus in 1965 and 1966, when he was accused of working to undermine Amit, his successor as Mossad chief. He later won a seat in the eighth Knesset (parliament) on the Rafi Party list. He authored several books on episodes of his career and Israeli security.

See also BEN-GURION, DAVID; MOSSAD; SHILOAH, REUVEN.

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ZEV MAGHEN
UPDATED BY IAN BLACK

HAREM

The women's section of a home.

In Arabic, the word *haram* refers to that which is forbidden, and *harim,* or *harem,* means the women's sec-

tion of a home, which is forbidden to males who are not unrelated to the household. This prohibition is maintained in order to protect female kin and family honor. Veiling and the seclusion of women are part of an ancient Middle Eastern social pattern that predates Islam and originated in antiquity with the rise of classes, cities, and states. The wives of the prophet Muhammad were secluded, yet played important public roles during and after his life. In Muslim societies where sexual segregation is practiced, women may form their closest bonds in the harem. Women who are relatives, friends, or neighbors visit in the secluded section of each other's homes. The streets in the traditional Arab-Muslim city are generally the province of men.

It is within the social setting of the harem where important family-related decisions are made informally. For example, marriages may be arranged first among women before they are negotiated by male kin. Within the harem, it would be determined whether a young woman is interested in and consents to a suggested marriage before any public announcement would occur.

See also Clothing; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; *Hijab*.

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Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban

HAREVEN, SHULAMIT

[c. 1931–]

Hebrew novelist, poet, essayist, journalist, and activist.

Shulamit Hareven was born in Warsaw, Poland. When World War II broke out, her family was smuggled through Europe and in 1940 settled in Jerusalem, where Hareven still lived in 2004. The memory of this escape was responsible for Hareven's belief in self-defense. She served in the Haganah underground and was a combat medic during the siege of Jerusalem in Israel's War of Independence; later she took part in founding the Israel Defense Force radio. In the fifties, she became an officer and worked in the Jewish refugee camps, especially those with Jews from Arab countries. She was a military correspondent before and during the Yom Kippur War. Hareven was the first woman member of the Academy of the Hebrew Language. She was also a longtime member of the spokesteam of the Peace Now movement, and during the first Palestinian Intifada entered Arab refugee camps and reported to the Israeli press. She worked as a columnist on current social, cultural, and political events.

Hareven published seventeen books of poetry, fiction, and essays, in addition to her latest autobiography, *Yamim Rabim* (Many days), published in Hebrew in 2002. Her first novel, *City of Many Days* (1972), depicts Jerusalem of the British mandate with great compassion, intimate understanding, and poetic richness. Hareven's Jerusalem is a detailed, colorful, and intricate tapestry woven of Arab, British, Sephardic, and European Jewish characters. The novel is also a "coming of age" story of a strong, autonomous woman. Its feminist sensibilities, although ambivalent, represent a first in Israeli literature. The novel, largely dismissed when it first appeared, was ahead of its time in terms of both its feminism and its implicit critique of Zionist ideology. Hareven wrote two novellas set in biblical times, *The Miracle Hater* (1983) and *Prophet* (1989), employing a concise, laconic, biblical style. An avid advocate of human rights, she writes in her essays and articles about Jews and Arabs, new immigrants and Israelis, and declares herself a "selective feminist." In 1995, the French magazine *L'express* elected Hareven as one of the one hundred women "who move the world."

See also Intifada (1987–1991); Peace Now.

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Nili Gold
Updated by Adina Friedman

Lebanon's wealthy prime minister, Rafiq Baha'uddin al Hariri, built his financial empire from scratch, founding a small construction company in the 1970s that frequently garnered work from the Saudi royal family. Hariri served as prime minister from 1989–1998 and was selected for the post again in the 2000 parliamentary elections. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

HARIRI, RAFIQ BAHA'UDDIN AL-

[1945–]

Saudi businessman, philanthropist, and prime minister of Lebanon from 1989 to 1998.

Rafiq Baha'uddin al-Hariri was born in Sidon, Lebanon. At an early age, he helped support his family by working in the orchards. He graduated from the Arab University of Beirut in 1965 and found work as a mathematics teacher in Jidda, Saudi Arabia. He soon joined a Saudi engineering firm as an accountant and in 1970 founded a small construction company.

His relationship with the Saudi royal family began in 1977, when he completed a palace project in al-Ta'if for King Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud within the low bid originally proposed and in record time. Henceforth, Hariri was sought for most of the Ministry of Finance's contracting bids. He became a naturalized Saudi citizen and expanded his global business to include ownership of Paris's Entreprise Oger and the Luxembourg-based Mediterranée Investors Group.

From the early days of his financial success, Hariri assisted his native Sidon by offering educational grants and building a hospital and university in nearby Kafr Falus, although his critics have always believed that his philanthropy was politically motivated as it helped propel him to the highest post occupied by Sunnis in the government. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, he provided some aid for reconstruction while also providing financial support for divergent militias in the country. He also enjoyed direct Saudi political backing and established a close relationship with the Syrian political and military elite. He played an active political role in Lebanon, helping to bring about the 1989 Ta'if Accord under Saudi auspices, after which he became prime minister. His foundation, which had supplied loans and grants to needy students, ceased to exist after his election. He continued as prime minister until 1998, when the new president, Emile Lahhud, selected Salim al-Hoss for the post. Hariri stayed out of office for two years but won a landslide election to the Lebanese parliament in 2000, after which he was again named prime minister. He is associated with Lebanon's burgeoning foreign debt, which reached $32 billion on his watch, and with the privatization efforts he championed.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1982); HOSS, SALIM AL-; KHALID IBN ABD AL-AZIZ AL SAʿUD; LEBANON.

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BASSAM NAMANI
UPDATED BY AS'AD ABUKHALIL

HARKABI, YEHOSHAFAT

[1921–1994]

Senior Israeli intelligence officer; professor.

Harkabi Yehoshafat was born in Haifa in 1921. He studied philosophy, history, and Arabic at the He-

brew University of Jerusalem, interrupting his studies to volunteer in the British Army. After demobilization in 1946, he attended a school to prepare future diplomats for the Jewish state. During the 1948 war, Harkabi fought in Jerusalem as commander of a students' company. In 1949, he participated in the negotiations that led to the signing of armistice agreements with Egypt and Jordan, and twice met personally with King Abdullah. After a short stint in the ministry of foreign affairs, he returned to military service and spent a year studying in Paris. In 1955, he was named chief of the intelligence division of the Israel Defense Force General Staff with the rank of major general. During this period, Fati, as he was nicknamed, enjoyed the confidence of important personalities like David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett, and Moshe Dayan. He was instrumental in weaving secret relations with the French military and intelligence services during the 1956 Suez War. In 1959, he was forced to retire from active service in the wake of an ill-advised public reserve call-up exercise.

Harkabi then spent several years in the United States and earned a Ph.D. from Harvard University. As a professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, he became a renowned expert in Middle Eastern studies, strategic studies, and international relations theory. His first book, written before the June 1967 Arab–Israel War and published shortly afterwards (in Hebrew and English), was titled *Arab Attitudes to Israel.* In it, he analyzed the growing hatred in the Arab world of Israel and of Jews, and presented a pessimistic view of the intractability of the conflict because of those hostile attitudes.

Soon after the June 1967 war, Harkabi changed his views and considered the situation created by the war as an opportunity for peace. In numerous publications, he advocated a dovish stance, recommending a full withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967. He became a sort of a guru for the Israeli peace movement but nevertheless remained on good terms with the Labor Party elite and especially with Yitzhak Rabin, who sought his advice on many occasions. Harkabi died of cancer on 26 August 1994.

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Arab–Israel War (1967); Ben-Gurion, David; Dayan, Moshe; Rabin, Yitzhak; Sharett, Moshe; Suez Crisis (1956–1957).

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Harkabi, Yehoshafat. *Israel's Fateful Hour,* translated by Lenn Schramm. New York: Harper and Row, 1988.

Mordechai Bar-On

HARKIS

Pro-French Algerians during the war of independence (1954–1962); also known as French Muslims.

Harkis is derived from the Arabic *harakat,* meaning "military movement" or "operation." Since the beginning of French colonialism in Algeria in July 1830, local people served as military auxiliaries. During the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), approximately 100,000 *harkis* served France in various capacities (e.g., regular French army, militia self-defense units, police, and paramilitary self-defense units). Their most prominent leader was the Benaïssa Boulam. After the war, many *harkis* left for France, but the majority remained in Algeria and faced brutal retributions.

Those in France found inadequate housing conditions (often in isolated relocation camps) and a lack of educational and economic opportunities. This provoked a variety of protests by these forgotten French citizens, ranging from hunger strikes and kidnappings in the 1970s to violence in the 1990s. The French government issued a stamp in 1990 to honor the *harkis*' contribution, which elicited official protest from Algeria. The population of the French–Muslim community is about 475,000. In France, they remain second-class citizens, are victims of discrimination, and are often confused with the emigrant worker community. It is still unsafe for *harki* veterans to visit Algeria, but their children and descendants are welcome.

See also Algerian War of Independence.

Phillip C. Naylor

HARRATIN

A group of people in northwest Africa generally of low social status.

In Arabic, *hartani* (singular); in Berber, *ahardan* (singular) and *ihardanan* (plural); in the Twareg dialect, *ashardan.* The *harratin* inhabit the oases of the Saharan regions. Ethnically, this population is a mixture of people originating from sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa; they were formerly slaves before being freed. Although they are no longer slaves, they constitute a sort of caste considered by other populations as inferior, below the status of *bidan* and *shorfa* groups in Mauritania. Because of their low status, the *harratin* seek protection among powerful families for which they work and show respect.

Since land and water are owned by white *shorfa* and because *harratin* occupy the lowest position on the social scale, the *harratin* do not witness any social mobility. They work in less prestigious occupations: When they are sedentaries, they work in agriculture; when they emigrate to the cities, they work as carriers of water, diggers of wells, and ironworkers; and among the nomads they work as shepherds.

In Morocco, the Sultan Mulay Isma^cil (eighteenth century) recruited his famous army of *bukhari* from the *harratin* population of Mauritania. This group had also provided the traditional Moroccan state (Makhzen) with secretaries and functionaries. Families in imperial cities in Morocco such as Fez, Marrakech, and Meknes used to have *hartani* women under their protection working as servants.

In vernacular language, after the progressive disappearance of slavery, the words *harratin* and *hartani* have replaced the word *abd* (slave) to mean "black" and have acquired a pejorative meaning.

See also SHORFA.

RAHMA BOURQIA

HARRIMAN, W. AVERELL

[1891–1986]

U.S. diplomat.

While ambassador in Moscow (1943–1946) during World War II (1939–1945), W. Averell Harriman became concerned with the USSR's involvement in Iran and advocated U.S. support for Iran's shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. In July 1951, Harriman was U.S. President Harry S. Truman's special envoy to Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, and Harriman tried unsuccessfully to persuade Mossadegh to compromise with Britain over nationalization of the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company. Harriman respected Mossadegh as a genuine nationalist and counseled against intervention by Britain or the United States to remove him.

Harriman was elected governor of New York (1955–1958) but returned to national politics in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. In 1965, as undersecretary of state, he was sent to Jerusalem to inform the government of Israel that the United States intended to sell arms to Jordan. Harriman was later one of the chief negotiators in ending the Vietnam War.

See also ANGLO–IRANIAN OIL COMPANY; MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD; PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

HASA, AL-

An area in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province noted for agriculture and oil resources.

Originally, al-Hasa was the name given to a series of oases about 40 miles inland from the Persian Gulf in eastern Arabia; its largest town and capital was al-Hufuf. It later denoted a province of Saudi Arabia stretching from Kuwait in the north to Qatar in the south, separated from Najd by the al-Dahna sand belt, and including the other important oasis region on the coast around Qatif. Today the region is called the Eastern Province.

As the largest groundwater-fed oasis in the world, al-Hasa historically has been an important agricultural region, noted for dates, grains, fruits,

vegetables, and its famous white donkeys. It also has been a center for administration and trade, with a population divided evenly between Sunnis and Shiʿa. One of the region's few strategic and economic prizes even before the oil era, al-Hasa has been controlled from al-Hufuf in the past two centuries by Ottomans, Egyptians, the Bani Khalid tribe, and the Al Saʿud family.

With the discovery of massive oil fields in the region, large-scale economic development and dislocations followed, sometimes resulting in labor unrest. Although agriculture suffered when field workers left to work in the oil industry, new revenues eventually were used to improve irrigation systems, prevent sand encroachment, and improve technology.

See also Al Saʿud Family; Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO).

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Malcolm C. Peck
Updated by Anthony B. Toth

HASAN, FA'IQ

[1919–]

Iraqi artist.

One of Iraq's leading and most influential visual artists during the second half of the twentieth century, Faʾiq Hasan was born in Baghdad and educated in its Institute of Fine Art (which, after 1939, added painting and sculpture to music). He later spent a few years studying art in Paris. In 1950 he established Jamaʿat al-Ruwwad (the avant-garde group), also called Société Primitive. This was the first art circle in Iraq to be inspired by ancient Mesopotamian and Iraqi themes and that adopted modern styles. Hasan started off with impressionist landscapes but since the 1950s has changed both subject matter and style. While the subject matter of his paintings is local, describing bedouin and other country life, or still life, the style is cubist with strong French influences. Some of his paintings are in the primitive style. He and his group experimented with color planes, and many of his later works are abstract.

Amatzia Baram

HASAN, HANI AL-

[1937–2003]

Palestinian politician.

Born in Haifa like his brother Khalid, Hani al-Hasan was educated at the University of Darmstadt, West Germany, after the family fled as refugees in 1948. He graduated with a degree in construction engineering. While studying, he led the General Union of Palestine Students. He joined al-Fatah in 1963, became a member of its central committee, and rose to become one of its leading figures. By 1967 he was Fatah's leader in Europe, and he became the group's chief contact with China. Al-Hasan also was appointed deputy to Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) in Fatah's powerful intelligence service.

Although he became a senior advisor to Yasir Arafat, head of both Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization, al-Hasan criticized both Arafat's handling of the Gulf Crisis of 1990–1991 and the 1993 Oslo Accord. He moved to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1995 and continued his dissent, although he later served in the PA cabinet and became embroiled in the rivalry between Arafat and PA Prime Minister Mahmud Abbas during the spring and summer of 2003.

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Lawrence Tal
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

HASANI, TAJ AL-DIN AL-

[1890–1943]

President of Syria under French mandate.

Taj al-Din al-Hasani was born in Damascus to a North African family. In 1912, he was appointed instructor of religion at the Sultaniyya school in Damascus. Al-Hasani was a member of the Council for School Reform and the General Assembly for the *vilayet* of Syria. He was also an owner of the newspaper *al-Sharq,* which was first published in 1916 with support from the Fourth Ottoman Army. Under the rule of King Faisal I, he was appointed member of the council of state *(majlis shura),* the court of appeal, and then judge in Damascus. Al-Hasani taught principles of Islamic jurisprudence *(fiqh)* at the Institute of Arab Law in Damascus. Under the French mandate, al-Hasani was prime minister from 1928 to 1931 and from 1934 to 1936. He then resigned and traveled to France where he remained until the French appointed him head of the Syrian republic in 1941. He stayed in power until his death in 1943.

See also Faisal I ibn Hussein; Fiqh.

George E. Irani

HASAN, KHALID AL-

[1928–1994]

Palestinian politician.

The brother of Hani al-Hasan, Khalid al-Hasan was born in Haifa and fled with his family as refugees in 1948. Thereafter he was active in the Islamic political party Hizb al-Tahrir in Syria, but he moved to Kuwait in 1952 and remained there most of his life. He helped Yasir Arafat and others found al-Fatah during the late 1950s and served in the group's leadership bodies for the rest of his life. Al-Hasan also sat on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Executive Committee and its Political Department from 1969 to 1973. A noted diplomat, he later directed the Palestine National Council's foreign relations committee until 1994.

Al-Hasan was often at odds with Arafat during their long association and definitively parted company with him in 1990 in opposition to the PLO's support of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. His opposition to Arafat, and to the latter's handling of the 1993 Oslo Accord, was cut short by his death in October 1994.

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Lawrence Tal
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

HASAN SALIM

See Salim Hasan

HASHEMI, FAEZEH

[1962–]

Iranian advocate for women's rights.

Faezeh Hashemi, the younger daughter of former Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, was born in 1962. She has a B.A. in political science and physical science and is the founder and president of the Islamic Countries' Solidarity Sport Council, vice president of Iran's National Olympic Committee, and a member of the Islamic Republic's High Council for Women's Sport. Because of her advocacy of women's sports, especially outdoor cycling, against condemnation by traditionalists, Hashemi became tremendously popular with women and young people, and she received the second highest number of votes in Tehran's 1996 legislative elections for the Fifth Majles (parliament). During the electoral campaign she criticized discriminatory laws, which she argued hinder women's progress, but did not advocate a quota system for women. In 1997 she played an important role in Mohammad Khatami's electoral campaign. In the summer of 1998 she launched a newspaper called *Zan* (Woman) that paid particular attention to women's and youths' issues and grievances. It was closed down in March 1999 by the Revolutionary Court for publishing a message from Iran's former empress, Farah Diba, on the occasion of the Iranian New Year, and for printing a cartoon that ridiculed the law on blood money. (The law on blood money permits one who has caused loss of life to avoid capital punishment by providing monetary compensation to the family of the victim. The blood money for women is half of that of men.) She was

a candidate for the 2000 legislative elections, but because she sided with her father against the reformers, she lost popular support and was not elected.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; RAFSANJANI, ALI AKBAR HASHEMI.

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AZADEH KIAN-THIÉBAUT

HASHIM, IBRAHIM

[1888–1958]

Head of the Executive Council and prime minister of Jordan several times, starting in 1933.

Ibrahim Hashim accompanied Amir Abdullah I ibn Hussein to the 1946 negotiations in London to abolish the mandate and renegotiate the Anglo–Jordanian treaty. Thus he was the first prime minister of the newly independent kingdom when the Legislative Assembly (precursor to the parliament) proclaimed King Abdullah a constitutional monarch on 25 May 1946. Hashim was also a leading member of the three-man Crown Council, then the Regency Council, which ruled Jordan briefly between May and August 1952 following the abdication of King Talal. He was in Baghdad as the deputy prime minister of the joint Jordanian–Iraqi cabinet of the newly formed Arab Federation—a short-lived union between Jordan and Iraq that was formed on 14 February 1958 in response to rising pan-Arab sentiment and to forestall pressures on the conservative monarchies that were likely to result after the planned merger of Egypt and Syria. Hashim was killed during mob violence in Baghdad at the outbreak of the Iraqi revolution in May 1958.

See also ABDULLAH I IBN HUSSEIN; TALAL IBN ABDULLAH.

JENAB TUTUNJI

HASHIMI, TAHA AL-

[1888–1961]

Iraqi officer, politician, teacher, and author.

Taha al-Hashimi was born into a Sunni Arab Muslim family of limited means. He attended school in Baghdad and was graduated from military college in Constantinople (now Istanbul). He served in the Ottoman army in various capacities and reached the rank of lieutenant colonel. He joined the al-Ahd society, formed in 1913 by Aziz al-Misri. Although the members of Ahd were mostly Ottoman officers of Iraqi origin, Hashimi remained loyal to the Ottomans and did not undertake any activities against them during World War I. He worked with the Faisal government in Syria (1919–1920) as director of defense, then returned to Iraq at the urging of his brother, Yasin al-Hashimi, who played a leading role in Iraq's politics in the 1920s and 1930s. Hashimi held various civilian posts in the newly established government, including director of the Census Bureau, director of education, and tutor to Prince Ghazi ibn Faisal. In 1930, he returned to the army, was appointed commander in chief, and then promoted to the rank of general. In 1936 the acting chief of staff, General Bakr Sidqi, executed a military coup against Prime Minister Yasin al-Hashimi. This marked the first military interference in Iraq's modern history.

Hashimi returned to Iraq following a coup launched in 1937. As minister of defense in 1938 and 1939, he acted as an intermediary among the nationalist elements of the army, in particular among the four colonels known as the Golden Square, who played an important role in Iraq's army politics from 1937 to 1941. They espoused the ideas of Arab nationalism, objected to Britain's constant interference in Iraq's affairs, and wanted to expand and modernize the army. In February 1941, Hashimi became prime minister of Iraq, this time for two months. Having been a compromise candidate, he hoped to resolve the dispute between the regent, who wanted to implement the British government's desire for Iraq to break off diplomatic relations with Italy, and Rashid Ali and the nationalist Golden Square officers, who wanted to pursue a course of absolute neutrality toward the Axis powers and the Allies. On 1 April 1941, Hashimi was forced to resign under pressure from the Golden Square.

In 1941 Iraq experienced its seventh coup since 1936, which led to Rashid Ali's uprising against the British. The failed uprising led to what the Iraqis called the second British occupation of Iraq (the first was during World War I). Hashimi fled to Turkey af-

ter the failure of the coup and remained there until the end of World War II. He was permitted to return to Iraq in 1946. In 1951, with a group of politicians, he formed the Nationalist Bloc Party, which did not last long because of intense differences among its members. In 1953, Hashimi was appointed vice chair of the Board of Development. He held this position until the board was dissolved after the revolution of 14 July 1958. The board was responsible for preparing and executing general economic and financial plans for the development of Iraq's resources. Among its many accomplishments was the Tharthar Project, which was primarily designed as a flood control system. Hashimi died in London.

Hashimi is considered a centrist and nationalist in Iraq's politics. He was well liked by young military officers disgruntled with Britain's constant interference in Iraq's affairs; they saw him as defender and protector of their interests. Hashimi taught courses at the military college and at al-Bayt University in Baghdad. He wrote books on such subjects as ancient history, Muslim military leaders, Iraq's geography (including an atlas of Iraq), war in Iraq, and the rebirth of Japan. His two-volume memoirs, published posthumously, are filled with insight, opinions, and information about his role in Iraq's history, as well as the roles of other Iraqi politicians during the monarchy.

See also Ahd, al-; Arab Nationalism; Ghazi ibn Faisal; Golden Square; Hashimi, Yasin al-; Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-; Misri, Aziz Ali al-; Sidqi, Bakr; Tharthar Project.

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Ayad al-Qazzaz

HASHIMITE HOUSE (HOUSE OF HASHIM)

Notable family from Hijaz whose members are Sharifs (descendants of the prophet Muhammad through his grandson Hasan) and who have occupied leadership positions in the twentieth-century Arab world.

The Hashimites are a family whose origins lie in Quraysh family in the Hijaz. Husayn ibn Ali (1852–1931) was appointed Ottoman governor of Hijaz in 1908, later breaking with the Ottomans and leading the Arab Revolt in coordination with the British and with urban Arab nationalists in Syria. Members of the Hashimite family went on to establish three monarchical lines after World War I. The first was the short-lived Kingdom of Hijaz. Husayn was proclaimed king of Hijaz in 1924. He abdicated in favor of his eldest son, Ali (1879–1935), but Hashimite rule in their native Hijaz ended when Ali was defeated in 1925 by their archrival, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud.

The other two Hashimite dynasties were creations of British imperial policies. The British established Husayn's second son, Abdullah I ibn Hussein (1882–1951), as amir (prince) of Transjordan in 1920. He headed an autonomous government within the rubric of the Palestine Mandate. Transjordan was renamed the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946. Abdullah was succeeded by his son, Talal ibn Abdullah (1909–1972), his grandson, Hussein ibn Talal (1935–1999), and his great-grandson, Abdullah II ibn Hussein (1962–).

Husayn ibn Ali's third son, Faisal I ibn Hussein (1889–1933), was proclaimed king of Syria by a gathering of Arab nationalists in 1920, but saw his rule end with a French occupation that same year. The British then installed him as king of Iraq in 1921. He was succeeded by his son, Ghazi ibn Faisal (1912–1939). Upon Ghazi's death, Abd al-Ilah (son of Ali ibn Husayn) served as regent until Ghazi's son Faisal II ibn Ghazi (1935–1958) was old enough to serve as king. The Hashimite monarchy in Iraq was violently overthrown in a military coup in July 1958. Husayn ibn Ali's fourth and youngest son, Zayd (1898–1970), occupied no leadership positions.

The family always has stressed its Arab nationalist credentials, as well as its sharifian lineage, attempting to turn these into important sources of legitimacy.

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Abdullah II ibn Hussein; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Husayn ibn Ali; Hussein ibn Talal; Jordan.

Michael R. Fischbach

HASHIMI, YASIN AL-

[1884–1937]

Iraqi politician.

Born in Baghdad in the Barudiyya district, Yasin al-Hashimi began life with the name Yasin Hilmi Salman. His father was Sayyid Salman Mukhtar of the Barudiyya district. After graduating from the Military Academy of Istanbul and attaining the rank of major general, he joined the al-Ahd organization along with other young officers who sought to serve the interest of the Arabs with the Ottoman Empire. He acquired the name al-Hashimi to emphasize his relation with the royal Hashimite family and as an indication of his loyalty to King Faisal I ibn Hussein. He became chief of staff of Faisal's army in 1919. Profoundly influenced by Kemal Atatürk, he established the National Brotherhood party. He started his political career as minister of transportation and became a deputy of Baghdad in the Constitutional Assembly in 1924. He held numerous cabinet positions and was prime minister several times. During his tenure as prime minister in 1936, General Bakr Sidqi's militant activities caused the government to fall, and Yasin al-Hashimi was deported to Damascus, where he died in 1937.

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MAMOON A. ZAKI
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

HA-SHOMER

Early Jewish defense organization in Palestine.

Ha-Shomer ("the watchman") was established in 1909 in Jaffa, Palestine, by Russian immigrants including Yizhak Ben-Zvi to replace Arab guards hired by Jewish landowners. Imitating Arab dress and horsemanship, Ha-Shomer in 1914 grew to 40 official members employing up to 300 guards. During World War I, many joined the Jewish Legion. Ha-Shomer established the linkage of soldier and settler identities that has persisted in later Jewish defense forces and military organizations. It disbanded when the Haganah was formed in 1920.

See also BEN-ZVI, YIZHAK; HAGANAH; JEWISH LEGION.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

HA-SHOMER HA-TZAʿIR

Socialist-Zionist youth movement.

This movement was founded in 1913, when Zionist youth organizations in Poland and Galicia united under the name ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir, meaning "Young Guardian" or "Young Watchman." "Ha-Shomer" was both the name of the largest of the youth organizations that made up the new group and the name of a Jewish self-defense militia organization in Palestine. Ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir was heavily influenced by both. It emphasized the values of nature, pioneering, and settlement on kibbutzim in Palestine, and in 1919 it sent its first group of settlers to Eretz Yisrael. Ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir did not have a very unique ideological stance; indeed, most, if not all of its ideology could be found in existing groups and was rooted in such philosophies as that of Aaron David Gordon (1856–1922) and Martin Buber (1878–1965). It apparently had an esprit-de-corps that enabled it to survive and grow even though it did not espouse anything altogether unique. The movement grew to more than 10,000 members by 1924, when it held its first international conference in Danzig. During the late 1920s and early 1930s ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir developed a strong Marxist-Zionist ideology and many of its leaders referred to the Soviet Union as their "second homeland." They envisioned a socialist Palestine working in conjunction with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to bring about a global workers' revolution. By the eve of World War II, ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir had more than 70,000 members worldwide and thirty-nine kibbutzim in Palestine.

Some of the members who were trapped in Europe when WWII erupted played prominent roles in Jewish armed rebellions against the Nazis, including the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. One of the most famous among these was Mordecai Anielewicz (c. 1919–1943), who commanded the Warsaw Ghetto uprising.

As a result of its stance in favor of the creation of a binational Arab-Jewish state in Palestine prior to 1948, ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir was somewhat marginalized and exercised little influence on the political decision-making of the yishuv and the Zionist movement. Early in 1948, when a group of socialist factions united to found MAPAM, a socialist-Zionist party to the left of the Labor Party, ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir became its youth movement. With the decline of the Labor alignment as well as the decline of the kibbutz movement, it remains active primarily as an educational movement.

See also LABOR ZIONISM.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

HASIDIM

Followers of an ultra-Orthodox Jewish movement.

In the modern era, *Hasidim* (literally, "pious ones") has come to mean those who identify with a movement founded by Rabbi Israel ben Eliezer (c. 1700–1760), the "Baʿal Shem Tov" or "Besht" (the acronym). Originally, it was a mass movement that emphasized mysticism and personal piety rather than the legalistic learning of elite Judaism. Contemporary Hasidim are generally viewed as ultra-Orthodox, and are composed of hundreds of groups, the most widely known of which are the Lubavitcher (Habad) and Satmar Hasidim. The Lubavitcher is the largest group, and their organizational world center is in Brooklyn, New York, to which they immigrated from the Soviet Union after World War II. In Israel the movement's center is in Kfar Habad, a community of Lubavitcher Hasidim approximately eight miles southeast of Tel Aviv. Kfar Habad has several schools, including a higher yeshiva, and a replica of the red brick building that is the home of the world headquarters in Brooklyn. Although Habad-Lubavitch Hasidim officially reject secular Zionism, they are a highly nationalistic group and exert great effort in outreach to non-observant Jews. By contrast, Satmar Hasidim have traditionally been adamantly anti-Zionist and anti-nationalist, and they eschew all but purely formal contacts with outsiders.

In recent decades there have been significant shifts in the activities of both groups. The Satmar group has toned down its anti-Zionism and now avoids overt anti-Zionist activity. The Lubavitcher Hasidim, on the other hand, have become highly active in Israeli politics and were staunch supporters of Benjamin Netanyahu in his successful bid for the office of prime minister in 1996. Since the death of the movement's leader, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneersohn, in 1994, the movement has struggled, internally as well as with some other Orthodox groups, because of its increasing proclamations of Rabbi Schneersohn as the Messiah, a notion that others view as antithetical to Judaism.

Although there are no official figures on the number of Hasidim either in Israel or in the United States, a rough estimate suggests that there are approximately 125,000 Hasidim in Israel and a similar number in the United States.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

HASKALAH

Hebrew term for enlightenment.

Haskalah is the name of the movement for the dissemination of modern European culture among the Jews. The movement began in the mid-1700s in Berlin with the work of the German Jewish philosopher Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786). Advocates argued that to achieve emancipation, the Jews must adopt the modern values and social customs of the countries in which they lived. In the mid-1800s, modern European culture for the Jews generally meant German and French culture and secular ed-

ucation, although efforts were made in this period by groups of Jews throughout Europe.

One consequence of this process was the secular use of the Hebrew language to spread the new ideas, leading to an eventual revitalization of the language. Another effect was the creation of a stratum of Jews versed in both the intellectual traditions of modern Europe and traditional Judaism. It was from subsequent generations of these Jews that the ideas of modern Zionism originated. Finally, for many Jews, acquiring modern European culture meant the abandonment of traditional Jewish customs, resulting in assimilation.

See also HEBREW; ZIONISM.

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MARTIN MALIN

HASS, AMIRA

[1956–]

Israeli Journalist.

Hass was born in 1956 in Jerusalem to European-Jewish parents who had survived the Holocaust. She studied history at the Hebrew and Tel Aviv universities. Hass joined Israel's most respected daily, *Haaretz,* as staff editor after the outbreak of the first uprising (Intifada) of 1987. In addition to her editing position, she started to write daily reports on and from Gaza in 1991.

Hass subsequently decided to move to Gaza Strip and lived there for four years, becoming the only Israeli journalist who lived in the occupied territories in order to cover Palestinian life under Israeli occupation. In Gaza, she wrote her book *Drinking the Sea at Gaza: Days and Nights in a Land under Siege.* The book contains a detailed description of Israeli occupation policies toward the Palestinians, and also includes a thorough analysis of the Israeli closure regime implemented since 1991 to restrict Palestinians' freedom of movement on the grounds of Israeli security concerns.

In January 1997, Hass moved to the West Bank to continue her coverage of occupation and the Oslo process from the city of Ramallah. In late 2002, she stopped writing daily news to focus on writing features and op-eds. In 2003, she published her second book, *Reporting from Ramallah: An Israeli Journalist in an Occupied Land.* The book is a collection of articles and features focused on Israel's repressive measure against Palestinians in the second intifada.

Hass's engaged and courageous reporting has won her numerous awards, including the UNESCO/Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize in 2003.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; HUMAN RIGHTS; ISRAEL; ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ISRAEL.

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KHALED ISLAIH

HASSANA TRIBE

See TRIBES AND TRIBALISM: HASSANA TRIBE

HASSAN I

[?–1894]

Sultan of Morocco, 1873–1894.

The favorite son of Sultan Sidi Muhammad, Hassan I was regarded as the last great ruler of precolonial Morocco. As ruler, he resisted foreign influence through control of the local tribes, using both the permanent military units trained by British and French forces and his own status as a political leader of Islam. Through military interventions in the mountains and in the south, he was able to collect taxes and, above all, to prevent the establishment of any potential rival. To reinforce his military power, he created the first military equipment industry in Marrakech and Fez. He was interested in

the reforms (Tanzimat) launched by the Ottoman Empire as long as they were not forced on him.

In 1880, he sought to limit the rights of protection and jurisdiction exerted by foreigners on Moroccan nationals. With British support, he held out against both the French and the Spanish, although neither was pleased that he might remain outside their control. That year he convened the Madrid Conference, but the meeting failed to resolve diplomatic tensions. Throughout his reign, Hassan I resisted all external pressure, well aware that his forces were not equal to the European forces, and he gave no pretext for military intervention by limiting his contacts with foreigners. His military reforms and his strategy of defending Morocco by playing one tribe against the other while similarly using existing rivalries between the Europeans did not survive long after his death in 1894.

See also TANZIMAT.

RÉMY LEVEAU

HASSAN II

[1929–2000]

King of Morocco, 1961–2000.

Hassan II was the son of Muhammad V, king of Morocco. As Crown Prince Mulay Hassan, he graduated from the University of Bordeaux in France. In 1961, when his father died unexpectedly, the thirty-two-year-old playboy prince came to power. The heir of the Alawite Dynasty, which has governed Morocco since the sixteenth century, Mulay Hassan had been well prepared by his father—as early as World War II—to assume the throne. He had also attended the 1942 meeting between Muhammad V and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt.

When the French entered North Africa in the nineteenth century they established a policy of colonization and protectorates. Hassan had therefore been trained in both Arabic and French and had studied law and economics at the university; he was at ease in both cultures. He was also acutely aware of the ideas and changes that might come to Morocco from outside. Since his adolescence he was known to favor nationalism, as did many Moroccans of his age. He was said to have some influence on his father, who was more cautious and less brilliant than Hassan. When in 1948 there was a conflict with France's resident general that had to do with the signing of legal texts presented by French colonial authorities, Hassan was among those who favored a break with France. The consequence was Muhammad V's exile to the French-controlled island of Madagascar. Supporting his father, Hassan participated in the negotiations through intermediaries to reestablish links with the French government and effect Muhammad V's return, which was accomplished in 1955.

In contrast with Muhammad V, who was careful not to offend the parties who had joined the struggle for independence—especially the Istiqlal Party—Hassan wanted to preserve the autonomy of the monarchy. Designated chief of staff of the Royal Armed Forces, Hassan II appeared as the main guarantor of his peoples' destiny. He gathered around himself the former Moroccan officers who had served in the French army, and he ended rebellions in al-Rif, Tafilalt, and Beni-Mellal that had been provoked by various dissident movements. He also reduced the size of the Liberation Army, born of the Moroccan resistance, because it was almost autonomous in the south; it pretended to be fighting the French and Spanish colonial powers, but could easily have offered armed and organized support to any given opposition.

France and Spain recognized Morocco's independence in 1956; by 1958, Hassan II's forces prevailed throughout the country and dissidents were no longer a threat to the monarchy. Thus Muhammad V was able to incorporate the various splinter groups of the former nationalist movement within the government. Hassan was sometimes irritated by his father's caution and he tried to convince him to take back direct control. A change began in May 1960, when Hassan was appointed prime minister. When his father died in March 1961 Hassan II had both the experience and the means to put his theories into practice.

The independence of Algeria (5 July 1962) appeared to be a potential threat to Hassan II's monarchy. Algeria bordered Morocco to the east and south, and Algeria's National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale) was known to support the Moroccan left (socialists) against the monarchy. Hassan sought a new legitimacy by mobilizing universal suffrage, which was largely supported by the

rural populace. The December 1962 referendum guaranteed Hassan's success with 80 percent approval of his new constitution.

The results of the March 1963 election did not give him similar support. The old Istiqlal had lost its governmental majority and the king's followers were not able to form a political coalition quickly enough. Most of the ministers were defeated, and it seemed that the parliament could not easily be governed despite a promonarchy majority. In the meantime, the danger posed by Algeria had faded. The October 1963 border war and rivalry related to Tindouf had revived in Morocco a strong nationalist feeling that produced support for the monarchy.

Hassan II dismissed the parliament in 1965 and relied mainly on his army for legitimacy. He protected those in the military who had served French and Spanish colonialism, although some of the young officers were not as loyal or as committed as he had expected. Tempted by populist idealism, some succeeded in convincing former officers of the French colonial army (who controlled the military organization) to join their project. In July 1971 and September 1972 General Medboh and General Muhammad Oufkir, among others, faced death after their rebellion failed.

Paradoxically, Hassan succeeded in restoring faith in his monarchy in 1975 when a dispute with Spain (at the time of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco's death) led to the defense of Morocco's position in the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara. A local nationalistic movement, POLISARIO, which was supported mainly by Algeria and Libya, emerged to challenge Morocco. Both Algeria and Libya saw opportunities in the situation; Algeria, especially, under President Houari Boumédienne, wanted to demonstrate its control over the Maghrib before the new European Community. Bolstered by petroleum revenues, the growing power of Algeria had the effect of reuniting Morocco under Hassan.

Although Hassan had plans for political pluralism (albeit pluralism controlled by the monarchy), his army had been reequipped for possible conflict with Algeria. Many officers disagreed with that policy, and they attempted another coup. General Ahmed Dlimi was to be their leader, but the plot was discovered by the home secretary and Dlimi disappeared in an accident. In the long run, Morocco benefited from its tactical building of the wall (fortified sand barriers in Western Sahara), and Algeria succeeded in having seventy-five countries recognize POLISARIO and make it a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Shown speaking at the United Nations in New York on 27 September 1983 is King Hassan II of Morocco. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Hassan managed Moroccan nationalism cautiously to establish national unity. He found external financial resources by getting Western countries as well as the Arab oil monarchies to support his military efforts and to launch economic development based on a private sector far larger than those of neighboring countries. For that reason, as the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran did before the Islamist Iranian Revolution of 1979, Hassan's monarchy became a major economic actor through the All North Africa association (Omnium Nord-Africain; ONA), not only to find resources, but also to prevent other entrepreneurs from obtaining power and becoming politically influential. Because Morocco had no oil, Hassan encouraged and often provided an example of an economic-development policy based on modern agriculture, launching a program to irrigate 2.47 million acres. He also encouraged small and medium-sized manufacturing industries.

In 1984 Hassan signed a treaty of unity with Libya after Libya withdrew its support for POLISARIO in the Western Sahara and Morocco agreed to refrain from sending troops to aid the French in Chad. In 1986, Libya abrogated the treaty when Hassan became the second North African leader to meet with an Israeli leader during Prime Minister Shimon Peres's visit to Morocco.

In 1988 international factors continued to prevail over those within Morocco. After Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba was replaced by General Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali in November 1987, a process of realignment occurred among the North African countries. A consequence was the reintegration of Morocco, first at a meeting in Algiers (August 1988), then when the Union of the Maghrib (Union du Maghreb; UMA) treaty was signed in Marrakech, Morocco (March 1989). The treaty marked the end of the Algerian/Moroccan rivalry related to the Western Sahara, but at the same time, it deprived Morocco of a compelling reason for internal unity.

The UMA had another, hidden agenda: to constitute a united front against strengthening political movements in North Africa that aimed to establish Islamic religious regimes. Tunisia appeared to be the weak link at the time, and it needed support. Political changes in Algeria, too, had ramifications for Morocco. After the October 1988 riots in Algiers, President Chadli Bendjedid controlled the situation by creating a pluralistic political system open to Islamists; this led to competitive elections. Algerian pluralism looked attractive in comparison to the established Moroccan political system, where the same actors repeated their opposition to the existing power year after year. At a time when the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq (1990) became a military crisis and thus reduced the possibilities of action, Algeria was seen as a model rather than a threat by Moroccans.

In Morocco, the riots that took place in provincial cities by the end of 1990, the important demonstrations in the capital city at the beginning of 1991, and the reports of deserters leaving the Moroccan army to go to Iraq (by way of Algeria) indicated the public's disapproval of Hassan's cautious move in sending a limited contingent to help the United Nations coalition forces to defend the oil monarchy of Kuwait. Moroccan public opinion favored Iraq's President Saddam Hussein, and the Gulf War made visible the differing factions in Morocco.

In the last ten years of his reign Hassan's main preoccupation was to build a national consensus that would support the monarchy for the next century. He incorporated opposition parties into his government, but he was not ready to give up his power to rule directly public affairs without sharing decisions. In 1997 he compromised with socialist leader Alederrhamane Youssouf, dividing government departments into sovereign departments (Interior, Foreign Affairs, Army) that were under the control of the king and the members of the royal house, and ordinary ministries (Education, Finances, Social Affairs, Agriculture, etc.) that were under the direct control of the prime minister. But the minister of the interior, Driss Basri, appeared as a deputy prime minister exercising a global control of public activities on behalf of the king. More attention was given to human rights, and political prisoners were released, but sometimes they were expelled from the country for fallacious reasons. In spite of the limited scope of the changes, they helped to produce a political climate that progressively excluded violence from the functioning of Moroccan political life. The illness of the king and the presumed frailty of the heir apparent, Prince Mohamed, increased public desire for a broad national consensus that would include even moderate Islamist parties to build a more liberal political system after the king's death. Hassan II died in July 2000.

See also Alawite Dynasty; Algeria: Overview; Algerian War of Independence; Ben Ali, Zayn al-Abidine; Dlimi, Ahmed; Istiqlal Party: Morocco; Maghrib; Moroccan–Algerian War; Morocco: Overview; Muhammad V; Organization of African Unity (OAU); Oufkir, Muhammad; POLISARIO; Tindouf; Western Sahara.

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Rémy Leveau

"HA-TIKVA"

The Zionist anthem, unofficial national anthem of the State of Israel.

"Ha-Tikva"—based on a poem written in Jassy, Romania, by Naphtali Herz Imber (1856–1909)—was formally declared the Zionist anthem at the Eighteenth Zionist Congress in 1933, and it was sung at the opening and closing of the ceremonial Declaration of the State of Israel in 1948. It is sung at communal events across the Jewish diaspora, generally alongside the local national anthem. By contrast, its status in Israel has been more debated, particularly with the increasing recognition that Arab citizens do not necessarily identify with the hope of "the Jewish soul" referred to in the words.

The original poem, entitled "Our Hope" (Tikvatenu), was inspired by the founding of the Petah Tikvah settlement in 1878. Closely echoing Psalm 126 (a feature of the Sabbath liturgy expressing the Jewish desire to return to Zion), the words were revised, set to music, and then adapted by the Zionist movement. In 1882 Samuel Cohen, a settler of Rishon le-Zion originally from Moldavia, composed the melody, based on a Moldavian-Romanian folk song—"Carul cu Boi" (Cart and oxen)—also used in Bedrich Smetana's opera *Moldau.*

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George R. Wilkes

HATIM SULTANS OF HAMDAN

Early tribal leaders of North Yemen.

The Hatim sultans were leaders of the Yam tribe, a section of the Hamdan tribal grouping. Control of Sanʿa and much of the north passed into their hands with the loosening of the grip of Queen Arwa and the Sulayhids on that area at the end of the eleventh century. The twelfth century witnessed much competition, from intrigue to warfare, as well as truces and alliances, between the Hatim sultans in Sanʿa and the relatively new Zaydi imams based to the north in Saʾda. Previously loyal to the Ismaʿili faith of the Sulayhids, the Hatim sultans and their followers gradually shifted from opposition to Zaydism to accepting the suzerainty of the Zaydi imams. Despite the ebb and flow of the power, and at times even the absence, of Zaydi imams over subsequent centuries, Zaydism from this time forward was firmly established in the Sanʿa region and the northern highlands of Yemen. However, the legacy of the Ismaʿili period explains how the family of President Ahmad Husayn Ghashmi could be and is Ismaʿili.

See also Ghashmi, Ahmad Husayn; Sanʿa; Yemen Arab Republic.

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Robert D. Burrowes

HATM (MOVEMENT FOR REFORM AND RENEWAL IN MOROCCO)

See Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR)

HATOUM, MONA

[1952–]

London-based Palestinian multimedia artist.

Mona Hatoum (also Muna Hatum) is arguably the best-known female artist of Arab descent living and working in the West. Born in Beirut to Palestinian parents, she left Lebanon in the 1970s, trained at the Byam Shaw and Slade schools of art in London, and has resided there ever since. Widely regarded for her conceptual art, which is primarily executed in performance, video, objects, and installation, Hatoum has worked primarily with the issue of power relationships—especially as they are manifested, manipulated, and subverted in class, gender, and race relationships, and in processes of cultural difference and displacement. Her early works were direct political statements about the body, feminism, and surveillance. Her performances challenged audiences to engage with issues of power and difference. Beginning in the 1990s, her work became more conceptual and subtle, containing implied, complex, and multilayered explorations of these same issues. Her work is increasingly mini-

malist, and Hatoum is keen to explore the sensuous properties of materials in eliciting contradictory responses—attraction and repulsion, for example, or welcoming and danger—thus creating works that are more complicated than her earlier, more direct, political statements. Although her experience of exile shapes some of her work and she has done pieces critical of Israel's treatment of the Palestinians, she resists interpretations of her art as stemming only from her Middle Eastern background. She insists that her works do not have fixed meanings that relate solely to her background but rather have multiple interpretations that are often paradoxical. Hatoum has exhibited widely in major venues around the world and is the recipient of numerous awards.

See also ART; PALESTINE.

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JESSICA WINEGAR

HATT-I HÜMAYUN

See TANZIMAT

HATT-I SERIF OF GÜLHANE

See TANZIMAT

HAWATMA, NAYIF

[1935–]

Jordanian activist and leader in the Palestinian resistance movement.

Born into a Greek Catholic family in al-Salt, Jordan, Nayif Hawatma (also Nayef Hawatmeh, Hawatima) obtained degrees in both politics and economics from Zarqa College and Hussein College in Jordan, from Cairo University, and from the Beirut Arab University. He joined the pan-Arab Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM) while in Beirut in 1954, and he fled Jordan in 1957 following King Hussein ibn Talal's crackdown on leftist activism. His activities on behalf of the ANM in Iraq landed him in prison between 1959 and 1963. Back in Lebanon in the mid-1960s, Hawatma was one of several ANM activists who began pushing for a more rigidly Marxist-Leninist line within the movement. Hawatma also formed a group dedicated to armed action in the service of Palestinian liberation, the Vengeance Youth. Although this group was one of several that merged to form the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine under the leadership of George Habash in early 1968, ideological disputes between Habash and Hawatma's leftist faction led the latter to break away and form his own new group in February 1969. He named the new organization the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (later shortened to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DFLP]) and brought the group within the rubric of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Hawatma's historical imprint on the PLO has been strong despite the DFLP's small numbers. He has been one of the most ideologically sophisticated leaders in the Palestinian movement, carefully analyzing both the relationship between the Palestinian resistance movement and Israel (and Israeli Jews) and, given his Jordanian nationality and pan-Arab and Marxist internationalist background, the relationship between the resistance movement and the wider Arab world. Hawatma was one of the first leaders of the Palestinian resistance to call for dialogue with certain leftist elements in Israel and to deal ideologically with a Jewish presence in Palestine. He and the DFLP also advanced a series of precisely argued theories about the goals of the Palestinian resistance movement. Initially, Hawatma argued that when Palestine was liberated from Israeli control it should become not a separate state, but a part of a larger, federated socialist Arab state. In particular, Hawatma believed that the struggle of the Palestinian people against Israeli rule and that of the Jordanian people against the pro-Western regime of King Hussein were inseparable. The DFLP's provocative actions in Hawatma's homeland helped to precipitate a disastrous confrontation between the PLO and the Jordanian army in September 1970 that resulted in Hawatma becoming persona non grata in his homeland until 1990.

Always a champion of ideological flexibility, by 1973 Hawatma began was calling for a phased ap-

proach to Palestinian liberation. Although he was still opposed to a separate Palestinian state, he argued for establishing a "national authority" in the West Bank and Gaza in the event of an Israeli withdrawal. The PLO committed itself to this idea in 1974. Hawatma later spoke of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories, once again before this became official PLO policy. Hawatma has also stood out because of his steadfast rejection of violence directed against targets outside of Israeli-controlled territory. Although committed to armed struggle against Israel, the DFLP eschewed the spectacular airline hijackings and similar acts of international violence carried out by other Palestinian groups. The DFLP did carry out actions, including terrorist attacks inside Israel, however. Among them was the terrorist attack at the Israeli town of Maʿalot in 1974, when DFLP fighters invaded a school and held the students hostage; twenty-two were killed and dozens injured during the incident, which ended when Israeli forces stormed the school.

Hawatma long served as a voice of loyal opposition to Yasir Arafat's leadership of the PLO. This has been particularly true since the early 1980s, when Arafat began to pursue diplomatic ventures that Hawatma and others felt compromised cherished Palestinian goals and subsumed them to U.S.-led imperialist domination of the region. Hawatma opposed the 1991 Madrid Conference and subsequent talks. This helped to precipitate a crisis with Yasir Abd Rabbo and others in the DFLP who supported the peace process, and Abd Rabbo left the organization in 1991. By 1993 the split was institutionalized when Abd Rabbo created the Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA). Hawatma later played an important role in the "Damascus Ten," a group of Palestinian organizations formed in 1992 in opposition to the peace talks, which began calling itself the National Democratic and Islamic Front the following year. He also criticized the 1993 Israeli–PLO Oslo Accord. However, he always upheld the goal of PLO unity and, despite his opposition to the peace accords, never broke with the PLO. In the late 1990s he softened his stance and engaged in dialogue with Arafat in August 1999 about ways to involve the DFLP in the negotiations.

Hawatma made headlines in February 1999 when he shook the hand of Israeli president Ezer Weizman in Amman during the funeral of Jordan's King Hussein. Israel agreed to allow Hawatma to enter the territory of the Palestinian Authority later that year, but soon reneged on its decision. He operates from Damascus, where he has lived for years.

See also Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM); Arafat, Yasir; Habash, George; Hussein ibn Talal; Madrid Conference (1991); Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palestinian Authority; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Weizman, Ezer; West Bank.

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Michael R. Fischbach

HAWI, GEORGE

[1938–]

Former general secretary of the Lebanese Communist Party, 1979–1992.

A Greek Orthodox, George Hawi has been a leading figure in the Lebanese Communist Party since the early 1970s. He became its general secretary in 1979 and retained that position until 1992. Calls for Hawi's resignation grew from the mid-1980s onward, as a result of personal rivalries, rising confessional tensions between Greek Orthodox and Shiʿa members of the party, and criticism of his pro-Syrian policies and lavish lifestyle. Strong Syrian support nevertheless enabled him to withstand several challenges to his leadership. His position became increasingly precarious following the collapse of communism in eastern Europe in 1989, when the party was split between reformers and backers of Hawi's traditional policies. In June 1992, during the Lebanese Communist Party's Seventh Party Congress, Hawi failed to win reelection as general secretary and was replaced by Faruq Dahruj.

See also Communism in the Middle East.

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Guilain P. Denoeux

HAWI, KHALIL

[1919–1982]

One of Lebanon's best-known twentieth-century poets.

Born in Huwaya, Syria, where his Greek Orthodox Lebanese father was working, Khalil Hawi grew up in Shwayr, Lebanon. He studied philosophy and Arabic at the American University of Beirut, where he received a bachelor of arts in 1951 and a master of arts in 1955. After teaching for a few years, he obtained a scholarship to enroll at Cambridge University, in England, where he was awarded his Ph.D. in 1959. He then became a professor of Arabic literature at the American University in Beirut. Within a few years, he established himself as one of the leading avant-garde poets in the Arab world. His poetry relies heavily on symbols and metaphors and images, and it frequently has political and social overtones.

An Arab nationalist at heart, he repeatedly expressed his sense of shame and rage at the loss of Palestine in 1948 and at subsequent Arab defeats at the hands of Israel. He was very critical of Arab regimes for their demonstrated lack of pan-Arab solidarity, and he denounced the hedonism, materialism, and corruption that prevailed in Beirut before the civil war broke out. More generally, he lamented what he saw as the Arab world's political and cultural decay, and he expressed deep pessimism about the possibility of a true Arab cultural and political revival. His deeply felt feelings of frustration and powerlessness at the decline of Arab society and culture and at the Arab world's impotence on the international scene are shared by an entire generation of Arab intellectuals confronted with political authoritarianism and the failure of attempts at Arab unity, as well as persistent and costly inter-Arab rivalries.

After 1975, Khalil Hawi experienced the desperation felt by all Lebanese who had to watch their country's slow descent into chaos, internal disintegration, and manipulation by outside powers. He was outraged by Lebanon's inability to stand up to the Israeli army when the latter invaded on 3 June 1982, and he deeply resented the other Arab governments' silence about the Israeli invasion. He committed suicide on 6 June 1982.

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Guilain P. Denoeux

HAWRANI, AKRAM AL-

[1914–]

Syrian politician and political activist.

Akram al-Hawrani was born in Hama, an ancient city in the central plain of Syria and a citadel of landed power and rural oppression. In the 1930s, during the French mandate, he tried to mobilize the landless peasants against their feudal lords. When World War II broke out, he went to Iraq, where he joined Rashid Ali al-Kaylani's 1941 revolt against the British. Having established himself as a champion of agrarian reform, Hawrani was elected to the parliament in 1943, 1947, and 1949. In 1945 he and his *shabiba* (young men) group seized Hama's garrison from the French, and in early 1948 he fought in the Palestine war on the side of Fawzi al-Qawuqji's Army of Deliverance *(jaysh al-inqadh).* Hawrani held ministerial portfolios in the governments of Hashim al-Atasi and Adib Shishakli. In 1950 he mobilized his followers in the Arab Socialist party, with headquarters in Hama and branches in other centers. Three years later, Hawrani's party merged with Baʿth to form the Arab Socialist Baʿth party, a coalition of the urban middle class (mainly schoolteachers and government employees) and politicized peasants.

Shishakli's heavy-handedness sent Hawrani into exile in Lebanon. In 1954, after Shishakli's fall, Hawrani returned to Syria, and in 1957 he became president of the parliament. He was a strong advo-

cate of the United Arab Republic (1958–1961); in the central cabinet that Gamal Abdel Nasser created for the union government, Hawrani served as vice president and minister of justice. In 1959 he resigned his cabinet posts, disenchanted with the authoritarianism of Nasser and the unstable structure that he created in Syria. After Syria's secession from the union in 1961, Hawrani opposed subsequent Baʿth efforts to re-create the union and tried to reestablish his Arab Socialist party. The Baʿth officers who engineered the coup of March 1963 (Hafiz al-Asad, Salah Jadid, and others) ordered the arrest of Hawrani. When he was released, he went to Lebanon, where he tried to mobilize Syrians opposed to the Asad regime in the National Progressive Front. In many respects, Hawrani was an agent of social change, an energetic activist who roused the peasants, politicized the army, and shook the foundations of the old order.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Asad, Hafiz al-; Atasi, Hashim al-; Baʿth, al-; Jadid, Salah; Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; National Progressive Front (Syria); Qawuqji, Fawzi al-; United Arab Republic (UAR).

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Muhammad Muslih

HAYAT

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

HAYCRAFT COMMISSION (1921)

A British commission that investigated Palestinian anti-Zionist violence in May 1921.

Palestinians attacked the Jewish inhabitants of Jaffa and five Jewish colonies on 1 May 1921, resulting in 47 Jewish deaths and 146 injured, mostly by Palestinians, and 48 Palestinian deaths and 73 wounded, mostly by the military and police. The British high commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, appointed a commission, headed by the chief justice of Palestine, Sir Thomas Haycraft, to determine the causes of the Arab violence. The commission reported in October 1921 that what triggered the violence was a May Day clash between rival Jewish Communists and Jewish Socialists in nearby Tel Aviv. The fundamental cause, however, was Palestinian "discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents." The report stated that the Palestinians feared that Jewish immigration would lead to unemployment in the short run and to political and economic subjugation in the long run.

After the report was issued, the British took some steps to meet Palestinian demands. In December, Samuel established the Supreme Muslim Council to administer the *awqaf* (religious endowments) and to appoint and dismiss officials and judges of the *shariʿa* courts. In January 1922, he allowed the election of Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, a popular Palestinian nationalist, as president of the council. In June 1922, Sir Winston Churchill, secretary of state for the colonies, issued a white paper which, while reconfirming continued British support for the Zionists, reassured the Palestinians that they need not fear the "imposition of Jewish nationality" on them, rejected the idea that Palestine would become "as Jewish as England is English," limited Jewish immigration to the "economic capacity of the country," and proposed a legislative council with limited powers. The Palestinians rejected the new policy because it was based on the Balfour Declaration. The Zionists accepted it but criticized the British for backing away from the Balfour Declaration.

See also Balfour Declaration (1917); Churchill White Paper (1922); Churchill, Winston S.; Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-; Samuel, Herbert Louis; Supreme Muslim Council.

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PHILIP MATTAR

HAYIM, YUSEF

[c. 1833–1909]

Rabbi of Baghdad.

Born in Baghdad during the Ottoman Empire, Yusef Hayim attended the Midrash Bet Zilkha from 1848 to 1853. He became the student of Hakham Abdullah Somikh and his most promising disciple; he married the daughter of Yehuda Somikh, Rahel, and they had children. Hayim belonged to a family of wealthy merchants, which came to be known as Bet al-Hakham. As he became well known to the world of Jewish scholars, especially those in the Middle East, his opinions on religious matters were routinely sought. He left a large number of writings *(responsa),* some of which have been published.

When Hayim's father died in 1859, he inherited the place of chief preacher *(darshan),* which he maintained throughout his life. He also wrote poems *(piyyutim)* and hymns *(pizmonim),* some of which are included in the Baghdad prayer book. His principal work, known as *Ben Ish Hai* (a name by which he came to be known) had the status for Baghdad Jewry as the *Shulhan Arukh* had for all Judaism. Philosophically and practically, he was a moderate traditionalist who assumed that modern Western teachings entering the Middle East by way of the Alliance Israélite Universelle might be adapted and accommodated.

See also ALLIANCE ISRAÉLITE UNIVERSELLE (AIU); SOMIKH, ABDULLAH.

SYLVIA G. HAIM

HAYKAL, MUHAMMAD HASANAYN

[1923–]

Egyptian journalist, author, and politician.

Born to a middle-class Cairo family, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal (also Heikal) went to government schools and attended both Cairo University and the American University in Cairo. He began working as an unpaid reporter for the *Egyptian Gazette* and *Rose al-Yusuf,* covering the battle of al-Alamayn and the debates in Egypt's parliament. He then became a reporter for *Akhir Saʿa,* winning the King Farouk Prize for investigative journalism for his coverage of the 1947 cholera epidemic. Between 1946 and 1949 he covered the Palestine struggle, interviewing David Ben-Gurion (head of Israel's provisional government and then prime minister) and Jordan's King Abdullah, and also meeting Gamal Abdel Nasser, an Egyptian army major who later led a coup and became Egypt's leader. Haykal's assignments were wide-ranging; he also covered the civil war in Greece, the Mossaddegh crisis in Iran, and (supported by a U.S. State Department "Leader Grant") the 1952 U.S. presidential campaign.

Haykal claims to have been on intimate terms with Egypt's Free Officers before the 1952 revolution; certainly he became closer to Nasser while he was in power than did any other journalist. Editor of *Akhir Saʿa* in the early 1950s, he became editor in chief of *al-Akhbar* in 1956 and of the prestigious but fading *al-Ahram* in 1957, rebuilding it into the most influential newspaper in the Arab world. He became Nasser's adviser, confidant, and spokesman, and is widely credited with ghostwriting Nasser's *Falsafat al-thawra.* A strong believer in press freedom and scientific management, Haykal made *al-Ahram*'s facilities among the most modern in the world and founded periodicals ranging from the Marxist *al-Taliʿa* to the business-oriented *al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi.* He also founded a Center for Strategic Studies and a well-stocked research library. His weekly column, "Bi al-saraha" (Speaking frankly), was widely assumed to indicate the direction of Nasser's thinking.

After serving briefly as minister of culture and national guidance in 1970, Haykal broke with Anwar al-Sadat, who succeeded Nasser as Egypt's president, because of Sadat's willingness to seek peace with Israel. Dismissed as editor of *al-Ahram* in 1974, Haykal was barred from publishing articles in the Egyptian press. He went on writing for Lebanese Arabic newspapers and published books in English. Interrogated by the Egyptian police and state prosecutor in 1977 and 1978, he was forbidden to travel abroad, then imprisoned during Sadat's 1981 purge. Although under President Husni Mubarak Haykal has not regained his former influence on policy decisions, he is respected as an intellectual, writer, and possible mediator with other Arab states, such as Libya. He asked President Mubarak to launch a new project for the revival of Arab civilization based on

enlightenment, modernization, free expression, rule of law, and social justice. Haykal divides the achievements of Egypt during the twentieth century into four generations: the first generation, which ended in 1919, achieved intellectual enlightenment and cultural structure; the second generation, which ended in 1949, developed the constitutional and national movement, and its best symbol was the revolution of 1952; the third generation, which ended in 1979, achieved Arab nationalism and socialism; and the fourth generation, which will end in 2009, is achieving compromise, peace, capitalist companies, and pluralism.

Haykal's memoirs of events in which he took part should be read with caution. They include *Cairo Documents* (1973), *Road to Ramadan* (1975), *The Sphinx and the Commissar* (1978), *Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat* (1983), *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes* (1986), and *1967: The Explosion* (1990).

Haykal today is still a very controversial figure, especially since the 1990s, after the publication of numerous books on hot topics. Many books have attempted to analyze his life and to ascertain the claims he made about historical figures and events during the twentieth century. His latest books, which have focused mostly on historical events and biographies, include *The Spring of Anger* (1990), *The Gulf War* (1993), *October 73* (1993), *Power Game* (1995), *Egypt's Gate to the Twenty-First Century* (1995), *The Secret Negotiations between Arabs and Israel* (1996), *Arabs' Crisis and the Future* (1997), *Japanese Articles* (1998), *Crowns and Armies* (1998), and *The Arabian Gulf* (1998). His latest book is *From New York to Kabul* (2001). In 1995 the Egyptian government demanded that Haykal surrender the documents that he has been using in his writings about Nasser's period or face imprisonment. He has kept the secret documents at European banks. In the last three decades Haykal has refused any award to honor his work or life.

See also FREE OFFICERS, EGYPT; MOSSADDEGH, MOHAMMAD; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; NEWSPAPERS AND MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT
UPDATED BY AHMAD S. MOUSSALLI

HAYKAL, MUHAMMAD HUSAYN

[1888–1956]

Egyptian author, political leader, and lawyer.

Born to a landowning family in Daqahliyya, Muhammad Husayn Haykal was educated at the Cairo School of Law and at the University of Paris, where he wrote his doctoral thesis on the Egyptian public debt (1912). Homesick for his native village, he also wrote a bucolic fiction, called *Zaynab* (Cairo, 1914), which is usually described as the first modern Arabic novel.

Upon returning to Egypt, he practiced law, wrote for *al-Jarida* of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (with whom he remained close throughout his life), published a magazine called *al-Sufur* during World War I, and taught at the School of Law. Egypt had become a British protectorate in 1914, and when the nationwide revolution for independence broke out in 1919, he backed the Wafd and Saʿd Zaghlul, one of its leaders, but broke with them in 1921 over negotiations with Britain. At this time, Prime Minister Adli Yakan, Haykal, and other educated Egyptians formed the Constitutional Liberal Party (Hizb al-Ahrar al-Dusturiyyin), calling for parliamentary democracy. In 1922, Haykal became editor of its newspaper, *al-Siyasa,* and he later founded an influential weekly edition, *al-Siyasa al-Usbuʿiyya.* He continued his literary production with the books *Fi awqat al-faragh* (Cairo, 1925), *Tarajim misriyya wa gharbiyya* (Cairo, 1929), and a touching eulogy of his son who died in childhood, called *Waladi* (Cairo, 1931).

In 1934, when the Constitutional Liberals were competing for popular favor with the Wafd, the palace, and rising Muslim groups, he published *Hayat Muhammad* (Cairo, 1934), an attempt to apply modern scholarship to the biography of the prophet Muhammad and to reconcile the principles of personal freedom with the teachings of Islam. Increasingly pious, he made the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) in 1936, and published *Fi manzal al-wahy* (Cairo, 1937), relating his experience as a pilgrim. He served as Egypt's minister in seven cabinets in the late 1930s and the 1940s and as president of the Senate from 1945 to 1950. He published his last novel *Hakadha khuliqat* (Cairo, 1955) and also his memoirs, *Mudhakkirat fi al-siyasa al-misriyya* (Cairo, 1951–1978, 3 vols.), of which two volumes appeared in his lifetime and the third posthumously. An ambitious man with

many talents, he often felt a conflict between secularism and Islam and between the democratic principles of his party and his belief that Egypt should be governed by its most educated citizens.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES; WAFD; ZAGHLUL, SAʿD.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

HAZA, OFRA

[1957–2000]

Israeli singer who revitalized and popularized traditional Yemeni songs for a world audience.

Ofra Haza's singing style was characterized by powerful, artistically rendered emotionality, whether she was interpreting traditional or popular songs. She personified Israeli popular music from the early 1980s until the late 1990s. A nominee for a Grammy Award, she took second place in the 1983 Eurovision Song Contest with "Chai," launching a singing career that would earn her sixteen gold and platinum records.

The ninth and final child born to Yemenite immigrants in the impoverished ha-Tikva neighborhood of south Tel Aviv, Haza joined the ha-Tikva Theater group at the age of twelve and began a rags-to-riches ascent in the Israeli popular imagination. With the encouragement of ha-Tikva Theater founder Bezalel Aloni, who later became her manager, Haza took leading roles within the ha-Tikva group, and by the time she was nineteen, her solo career was launched.

In 1985, Haza released her first internationally acclaimed album, *Yemenite Songs,* a collection of interpretations of devotional poetry written by Shalom Shabazi, a seventeenth-century rabbi. Haza's music appealed to Ashkenazic as well as Mizrahi audiences, and her performances bridged ethnic, class, and generational dividing lines in Israeli society. She was chosen to sing in Oslo when Yitzhak Rabin, Yasir Arafat, and Shimon Peres received the Nobel Prize, and was chosen again to sing at the memorial concert following Rabin's assassination.

Shaday (1988) was Haza's second international album. It contained "Im Nin'alu," Haza's signature song, which was featured on MTV, a first for an Israeli singer. A striking beauty, she attempted, unsuccessfully, to pursue a film career in California before returning to Israel in the mid-1990s. Religiously devout and noted for remaining humble despite her fame, Haza married in 1998. She died in 2000 from complications resulting from AIDS, possibly contracted from her husband, who committed suicide a year later. The medical panel investigating Haza's death said in a published report that, had Haza admitted herself to hospital earlier, her life could have been saved. Fearful of the negative publicity that could result if her condition were to become known, Haza refused to seek proper medical care until it was too late. Former Prime Minister Shimon Peres delivered a eulogy at her graveside, and Israeli attitudes about AIDS came under critical discussion following her death.

See also ADOT HA-MIZRAH; ASHKENAZIM; MUSIC.

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LAURIE KING-IRANI

HAZARA

Ethnolinguistic group in Afghanistan.

The Hazara live in the high central mountains of Afghanistan in a region called the Hazarajat, and they number between one and two million. The Hazara are racially distinct from the rest of the Afghans, with Mongoloid physical features, including the epicanthic fold of the upper eyelid commonly seen in the people of central Asia. Although Hazara legend has it that they are the descendants

of the army of the great Mongol conqueror Genghis Khan, scholars now believe them to be descendants of Chaghatai from Transoxiana, who entered the area as soldiers under Timur and his son Shah Rukh in the fifteenth century. Originally Sunni Moslems, the Hazara were converted to Shiʿism during the time of the Safavid King Abbas I (1588–1692), when this part of Afghanistan was controlled by Iran. The Hazara speak a dialect of Persian known as *Hazaragi,* which contains some Turkic and Mongol words.

The Hazara lived a relatively independent existence in Afghanistan until the 1890s, when they were brought under the control of Kabul in a series of wars during the reign of Abd al-Rahman (1880–1901). Looked down upon by other Afghans, the Hazara are the poorest of the Afghan ethnolinguistic groups. Some have migrated to Kabul and the other major cities, where they work in menial jobs. During the Afghan war of resistance, the Hazara were able to expel the government representatives from the Hazarajat, and in 1979 they established a quasi-independent government under a council led by Sayyid Ali Beheshti. By the mid-1980s, however, the Hazarajat came under the control of the Iranian-backed Shiʿite groups of Nasr and Pasdaran. In the early 1990s the Hazara political groups united in an organization called *Hezb-e Wahadat* (Unity Party), led by Mohammed Karim Khalili. This group played a major role in the formation of the Mojahedin government in 1992.

The Hazara, through Hezb-e Wahadat, fought against the Taliban movement, which captured Kabul in 1996, and joined the United Front in the fight against the Taliban government. As a result, the Taliban government carried out a number of massacres against Hazara civilians, both in the Hazarajat and in the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif, between 1998 and 2000. When the Taliban government was driven from Kabul in December of 2001 the Hazara played an active role in the formation of the interim government of Hamid Karzai, and held several important seats in the interim government.

See also AFGHANISTAN; BAMYAN; SHIʿISM.

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GRANT FARR

HAZAZ, HAYYIM

[1898–1973]

Hebrew writer.

Hazaz was born in Sidorvichi, a province of Kiev. His secular and religious education included the study of Russian and Hebrew literature. Hazaz left home at sixteen, and for seven years traveled from one Russian city to another. While in Moscow, during and after the Russian Revolution, he worked at the Hebrew daily *Haʿam.* In 1921, Hazaz settled in Constantinople (now Istanbul) for a year and a half, and subsequently moved to Western Europe. He spent nine years in Paris and Berlin, which replaced pre-Revolutionary Russia as the capital of Hebrew literary activity.

In early 1931, Hazaz left for Palestine and settled in Jerusalem. A political activist, he was president of the Israel–Africa Friendship Association from 1965 to 1969. After the Six-Day War (1967), he became an advocate for the Land of Israel Movement, which called for settling the lands captured during the war and permanently incorporating them into the state of Israel.

Hazaz began his writing career while still in Russia publishing a sketch, *Ke-Vo ha-Shemesh* (1918), in *Ha-Shiloʾah* under a pseudonym. Thereafter he published under his own name. The dominant theme of his Russian-period stories is the fate of the shtetl in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution. The old world had been turned on its head and its generation became disoriented. Among these stories are *Mi-Zeh u-mi-Zeh* (From this and that, 1924) and *Pirke Mahpekhah* (Chapters of the revolution, 1924). Another Hazaz story of the revolution is *Shemuʾel Frankfurter* (1925), which has as its protagonist the title character, a revolutionary, whose idealism and integrity doom him. Hazaz's first novel, *Be-Yishuv Shel Yaʿar* (In a forest settlement, 1930), is set during the Russian–Japanese War and depicts a Jewish family

among gentiles. As the story evolves, it becomes clear that while the latter are firmly anchored in their land, the former are manifestly rootless.

His Eretz Yisrael (Hebrew: "The Land of Israel," i.e., Palestine) phase began with *Rehayim Shevurim* (Broken millstones, 1942). While some of his stories continue to recount shtetl life, others are located in Palestine. One of his major works, *Ha-Yoshevet ba-Gannim* (Thou that dwellest in the gardens, 1944), recounts the story of three generations of Yemenite Jews in Eretz Ysrael. *Harat Olam* and *Havit Akhurah* describe the life of German-Jewish immigrants. *Esh Boʿeret* and *Drabkin* are studies of immigrants from Eastern Europe. The first describes the idealism of the *halutzim* (pioneers) who fled Russia and suffered immeasurable hardships to reach Palestine; while the second narrative tells of its title hero's disillusionment with Zionism when it fails to fulfill his dreams. Several of Hazaz's protagonists struggle to narrow the gap between their ideals and reality. In *Ha-Derashah* (The lesson) Yudke, the story's hero, questions the commonly accepted premises of Zionism.

Yaʾish, Hazaz's most elaborate work (4 vols., 1947–1952), recounts the life of Yaʾish, a young Yemenite Jew who abandons his mystical beliefs upon arriving in Eretz Yisrael while experiencing external and internal conflicts. In this four-volume opus, Hazaz evinces intimate familiarity with Yemenite culture. *Be-Kolar Ehad* (In the one collar, 1963) deals with the struggle against the British in Palestine. The heroes, young resistance fighters condemned to death by the British, opt to commit suicide. The story is based on historical fact and raises issues of the Diaspora such as redemption and *Kiddush ha-Shem,* Sanctification of the name, i.e., sacrificing one's life for the sake of God.

Since Hazaz's linguistic style is rooted in ancient Jewish texts, reflecting a profound knowledge of the Talmud and Midrash, he is not easily understood by the modern Hebrew reader. To overcome this obstacle, a revised edition of all his works was published in 1968, in which Hazaz deleted many archaic words and allusions.

Hazaz was awarded the Israel Prize for Literature in 1953.

See also LITERATURE: HEBREW.

ANN KAHN

HAZZAN, ELIJAH BEKHOR

[1847–1908]

An important Sephardic scholar, intellectual, and communal leader.

Born in İzmir and raised in Jerusalem, Elijah Bekhor Hazzan traveled to Europe and French North Africa in the early 1870s. He published a philosophical dialogue, *Zikhron Yerushalayim* (Livorno, Italy, 1874), on questions of modernity and Jewish identity.

Appointed Hakham Bashi (chief rabbi) of Tripolitania in 1874, he was a leading, but controversial advocate of reforms. He was more successful as the modernizing chief rabbi of Alexandria, where he served from 1888 until his death. He published four volumes of *responsa* (interpretations), *Taʿalumot Lev* (Livorno/Alexandria, 1879–1902), and a work on Alexandrian Jewish customs, *Neveh Shalom* (Alexandria, 1894).

See also ADOT HA-MIZRAH.

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NORMAN STILLMAN

HEBREW

Major official language of the State of Israel.

Hebrew is the national language of the Jewish population of Israel (about 5 million) and the mother tongue of Jews born in the country. For world Jewry (about 14 million) it is the traditional liturgical language and a link to daily life in contemporary Israel.

Hebrew is the original language of the Bible. It has played a central role in the cultural history of the Jewish people for the past three millennia, and has had an important impact on Western culture. Ancient Hebrew names such as Jacob, Joseph, Sarah, and Mary, and old Hebrew words or concepts such as "amen," "hallelujah," "hosanna," "Sabbath," and "Messiah" have survived, resisting translation in many languages and cultures.

Hebrew belongs to the Canaanite group of the Northwestern Semitic or Afro–Asiatic family of lan-

guages. During its long history (which follows the historical course of the Jewish people), it has undergone diverse changes and has developed several different layers, from biblical Hebrew to modern Israeli Hebrew.

Biblical Hebrew (BH) is believed to have crystallized over 3,000 years ago, when the Israelite tribes coalesced into a homogeneous political unit under the monarchy in Jerusalem (eleventh–tenth centuries B.C.E.). It emerged as a fully formed literary language whose poetic grandeur is attested by the oldest portions of the Bible, written about that time.

In its early, classical form BH functioned as a living language until the end of the First Temple Period (586 B.C.E.). Due to its prestigious status as the language of the early books of the Bible, it survived as a literary language until the second century B.C.E., as seen in the late books of the Bible, in the Apocrypha, and in the Dead Sea Scrolls. BH was employed centuries later, mainly by the Hebrew poets of medieval Spain (eleventh to thirteenth centuries) and the writers of the Jewish Enlightenment movement in Eastern Europe (late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). Most important, because praying and reciting the Bible in the original Hebrew have always been central to synagogue worship, contact with BH has never ceased. The preservation throughout the ages of the morphological structure of BH accounts for the relative uniformity in the various historical layers of the language.

The Second Temple Period (516 B.C.E.–70 C.E.) saw the beginning of Jewish bilingualism. Aramaic, another Northwestern Semitic language, closely akin to Hebrew and a lingua franca in the ancient Middle East, became the second language of the Jewish people. The contact between BH and Aramaic (and, to a certain degree, Greek and Latin) gradually resulted in an enriched and quite different kind of spoken Hebrew with a literary counterpart, known as Rabbinic Hebrew (RH). A change in script occurred at that time, the ancient Canaanite alphabet of BH being replaced by the Assyrian square script used in Aramaic.

Well adapted to deal with everyday practical matters, RH was employed in writing down the Mishna (the oral law, 220 C.E.), and for several hundred years it continued to be used together with Aramaic in the Rabbinic literature (the Talmud and the Midrash). Its role as a spoken language, however, declined at the end of the second century C.E., following the destruction of Jerusalem and the Judaean state by the Romans (70 C.E.).

Hebrew Alphabet

Name	Letter
alef	א
bet/vet	בּ/ב
gimel	גּ and ג
dalet	דּ and ד
hey	ה
vav	ו
zayin	ז
chet	ח
tet	ט
yud	י
kaf/khaf	כּ (final ךְ)
kaf sofit/khaf sofit	כ (final ך or ךּ)
lamed	ל
mem	מ (final ם)
nun	נ (final ן)
samekh	ס
ayin	ע
pey/fey	פּ/פ (final ף)
tzade	צ (final ץ)
kof	ק
resh	ר
sin/shin	שׂ/שׁ
tav	תּ and ת

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For the following 1,700 years, Hebrew fell into disuse as a spoken language in daily use because the diaspora Jews used the vernaculars of their host countries for communication. Nevertheless, Hebrew was by no means a dead language. In their dispersed communities the Jewish people continued to use it as their written language in their liturgical, scholarly, literary, and even practical activities. Writing and copying were greatly aided in the Middle Ages by the introduction of the Rashi script (which survives among Middle Eastern Jews). In addition to the vast, multifaceted religious and secular literature written in Hebrew at that period, hundreds of books were translated into Hebrew, primarily from Arabic and Latin. Each of these literary activities contributed to the growth of the language by enriching its vocabulary and by introducing new syntactic patterns. At the same time, many He-

brew words and expressions were incorporated into the Jewish languages that developed alongside the vernaculars, such as Judeo–Arabic, Judeo–Spanish, and Yiddish.

The search for a new Hebrew idiom, suitable for a realistic literary expression in the modern era, followed the revival of Hebrew culture by the Jewish Enlightment Movement. Mendele Mokher Seforim (1835–1917) is considered the first modern writer who integrated in his style varied elements from all the periods of Hebrew as well as from Yiddish. His work contributed to the transformation of Hebrew into a flexible modern literary vehicle and helped pave the way for the rise of modern Hebrew literature.

The renaissance of Hebrew as a spoken language in the twentieth century was closely linked to the national revival of the Jewish people in their forefathers' land. Hebrew was revived thanks to the efforts of a small group of devoted people, led by Eliezer Ben-Yehuda (1857–1922), who in 1881 settled in Jerusalem and pioneered Hebrew usage at home and in school. He published a Hebrew periodical, promoted the coining of new words, and cofounded the Language Committee (1890–1953), which began dealing with language planning issues and set normative measures. Above all, Ben-Yehuda compiled several volumes of the first modern dictionary of ancient and modern Hebrew.

Ben-Yehuda's work gained increasing support from the waves of Jewish immigrants and refugees returning to Zion. When the state of Israel was proclaimed in 1948, Hebrew was a functioning modern language, fully established as the living language of the growing Jewish community in the country. Supervision of its continuous growth was assigned in 1953 to the Academy of the Hebrew Language in Jerusalem.

Since the first days of its rebirth, thousands of new words have been created in Hebrew from its own roots and many of its ancient words have been given new meanings. Influence from other languages on vocabulary and syntax may be discerned as well. Encompassing all areas of life and gaining ever greater flexibility, Hebrew has become the dynamic, vibrant language of modern Israel.

See also Ben-Yehuda, Eliezer; Dead Sea Scrolls.

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RUTH RAPHAELI

HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM

Israeli university.

The creation of a Jewish university in Jerusalem that would teach subjects in Hebrew was a major cultural goal of Zionism. In 1914 land was purchased on Mount Scopus, and the cornerstone for the university was laid in 1918 by Chaim Weizmann. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem opened on 1 April 1925 in a ceremony attended by major Jewish figures and British officials. Chaim Weizmann is considered its founding father; the first chancellor was Judah Magnes. By 1947 the campus had more than 1,000 students and 200 faculty.

The 1948 Arab–Israel War left the Mount Scopus campus on the Jordanian side of divided Jerusalem. A new campus was established at Givʿat Ram in western Jerusalem. Additional campuses include the Hadassah medical school at Ein Kerem in southwest Jerusalem and an agricultural school in Rehovot. After the 1967 Arab–Israel War the Mount Scopus campus was rebuilt and expanded as the university's main campus. A full range of advanced degree programs is offered, and in 2003 nearly 23,000 students—including Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel as well as international students—attended the four campuses, taught by 1,200 tenured faculty. The multicultural makeup of the Mount Scopus campus was evidenced in the casualties from the bombing of the student cafeteria on 31 July 2002, which killed nine and wounded several dozen. Approximately 40 percent of all civilian scientific research in Israel is conducted at Hebrew University.

See also Magnes, Judah; Weizmann, Chaim.

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PIERRE M. ATLAS

HEBRON

West Bank city, south of Jerusalem.

Hebron (in Arabic, *al-Khalil;* in Hebrew, *Hevron*) is an ancient city, holy to both Judaism and Islam, because it is the site of the Machpelah burial cave of the Biblical and Qurʾanic figures Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and their respective wives Sarah, Rebekah, and Leah. Later, in the tenth century B.C.E., David was proclaimed king in Hebron when Saul died, and it became his first capital. Above the Machpelah cave is a mosque complex known as the al-Haram al-Ibrahimi.

Although predominantly a town inhabited by Palestinian Arab Muslims, a small Jewish community lived in Hebron throughout the centuries. During British rule, the Jews left after the Arab-Jewish disturbances of August 1929 when sixty-four Jews were massacred. Hebron was annexed by Jordan in 1950 in the aftermath of the Arab-Israel War of 1948, and it was occupied by Israel during the Arab–Israel War of 1967. As a result, Jews were allowed to pray in the al-Haram, something formerly forbidden to them. A civilian Jewish settlement called Kiryat Arba was established nearby in 1968, and militant nationalist settlers also began moving into the heart of Hebron itself. Formation of the Gush Emunim movement furthered this development. Long a flashpoint for Israeli-Palestinian violence, Hebron's worst violence in decades occurred in February 1994 when Baruch Goldstein, a U.S.-born Jewish settler, entered the al-Haram al-Ibrahimi mosque and massacred twenty-nine Palestinian worshippers before he himself was killed.

Because of the presence of approximately 400 Jewish settlers in Hebron, it was the only major West Bank town (besides Jerusalem) from which Israeli forces did not withdraw in 1994 as a result of the Oslo Accord. The troops later withdrew from 80 percent of Hebron in January 1997 in accordance with the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, leaving the 120,000 Palestinian residents under Palestinian rule. Yet, Israel retained control of the remaining 20 percent of the city, which included the downtown Palestinian market and the al-Haram al-Ibrahimi, to protect the remaining Jewish settlers.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1948); ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967); GUSH EMUNIM; KIRYAT ARBA; OSLO ACCORD (1993).

BENJAMIN JOSEPH
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

HEDAYAT, SADEGH
[1903–1951]

Iran's most famous and controversial writer.

Sadegh Hedayat was born into a prominent Tehran family. Having received a European-style education in Iran, he traveled to Europe in 1926 to begin his university studies. He returned to Tehran in 1930 without a degree and proceeded to write four collections of short stories and a novella, along with other books and essays on Persian culture and history, in a remarkably productive period that lasted until 1942. He became the most famous and controversial writer in Persian literature and the only Iranian writer of fiction with an appreciable audience outside Iran.

Hedayat wrote story after story about alienated, maladjusted protagonists, all with tragic endings. His writings exude nostalgia for an Indo-European Iranian past; they are filled with nationalism, strident anti-Arab sentiments, antipathy toward his fellow countrymen, disgust with the local social and political milieu, and familiarity with contemporary European literature. His masterwork is the novella *Buf-e Kur* (1937; The blind owl); it is Iran's most famous piece of fiction, a much translated, enigmatic, surrealistic narrative of a character out of tune with his times and perhaps deranged.

See also LITERATURE: PERSIAN.

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MICHAEL C. HILLMANN
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

HEKMATYAR, GOLBUDDIN
[1940–]

Afghan resistance leader; prime minister of Afghanistan from 1993–1994.

Born in 1940 in the city of Baghlan in northern Afghanistan to a Kharoti Gilzai Pushtun family, Hekmatyar attended college at Kabul University's faculty of engineering in the 1960s and became active in campus politics. In 1970 he joined the Muslim Youth movement and was imprisoned in Kabul (1972–1973) because of his political activities. He was released after the Daud coup (1973) and fled to Pakistan, where he began his antigovernment activities. In Pakistan, he became a leader in the Jami'at-e Islami (1975) but left this group to form his own party, Hezb-e Islami (1978). After gaining the support of Pakistan and other Islamic countries, he turned his party into an effective force in Afghanistan, and by the 1980s Hekmatyar's guerrilla fighters controlled large parts of Afghanistan.

In 1992, after the collapse of the Najibullah government, he returned to Afghanistan to take part in the Islamic government in Kabul. He attempted unsuccessfully to seize control of the government by forming a coalition with Dustom, an Uzbek warlord. The effort was eventually defeated by the troops of Ahmad Shah Masʿud. He later accepted the post of prime minister in the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani (1993), but never fully occupied that position; instead, he joined other leaders in the attempt to form an alternative government and continued to attack Masʿud's troops in Kabul. When the Taliban drove the Rabbani government from Kabul in 1996, Hekmatyar fled to Tehran, where he continued his activities in exile. In 2002, after the Taliban had been driven from Kabul, Hekmatyar was expelled by Iran and was thought to have returned to Jabal Saraj, his former stronghold. He has been strongly anti-American and hostile to the interim government of Hamid Karzai.

See also HEZB-E ISLAMI; KARZAI, HAMID; RABBANI, BURHANUDDIN; TALIBAN.

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GRANT FARR

HELMAND RIVER

Major river system in Afghanistan.

The Helmand River originates in the high mountains of the Hindu Kush range in central Afghanistan and flows to the Hamun-e Helmand (Lake Helmand) in Iran. The longest river in Afghanistan (more than 2,000 miles), the Helmand River drains 40 percent of the Afghan watershed. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Helmand Valley Project was initiated as a cooperative venture between the United States and Afghanistan. A series of dams and canals was constructed to irrigate the arid Helmand valley. Despite problems of salination and poor drainage in some areas, as well as massive corruption, the project produced beneficial effects, since thousands of farmers were relocated from other areas of Afghanistan and given land in this area.

Since 1979, war and drought have had an impact on the Helmand River. The drought that lasted from 1997 through 2002 dramatically reduced stream flow and led to increased desertification in much of the Helmand basin. Twenty years of war diverted attention and manpower, so canals and equipment vital to maintaining the irrigation were not maintained. In addition, with no governmental control, the cultivation of opium poppies replaced many of the traditional crops and has led to warlordism and lawlessness.

See also AFGHANISTAN.

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GRANT FARR

HERAT

Province and city in western Afghanistan.

Herat is both a province in northwestern Afghanistan and the name of the provincial capital of that

province. In 2003 the population of the city of Herat was generally held to number about 180,000, although some estimates have the population much higher. Even using the lower figure, Herat is the third largest city in Afghanistan and the major city in the country's western region. Close to the Iranian border, the people in the province are largely Persian speakers, although some Turkomans live in the northern area.

Because of its strategic location, Herat has been a fortified town for several thousand years. Mention of it first appears in the Avesta, the holy book of the Zoroastrians (1500 B.C.E.), and scholars have conjectured that the name *Herat* may be a derivative of Aria, a province in the ancient Persian empire. Alexander the Great built Alexandria Ariorum on the site (330 B.C.E.). During the Afghan war of resistance (1978–1992), the city of Herat saw considerable fighting and suffered significant destruction. When the Najibullah government fell in 1992, Isma^cil Khan, a commander in the Jami^cat-e Islami, took control of the area.

The Taliban captured Herat in 1995, and Ismail Khan and his fighters fled to Iran. The Taliban installed an administration imposing strict Islamic rule. When the Taliban fell in 2001, Isma^cil Khan returned to Herat and was appointed governor of the province by the Hamid Karzai government. Herat now serves as a major smuggling route for foreign goods coming into Afghanistan, and for the export of Afghan opium.

See also AFGHANISTAN.

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GRANT FARR

HERUT PARTY

See ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

HERZL, THEODOR

[1860–1904]

Herzl is considered the founder of political Zionism.

A secular Jew, Theodor Herzl earned a doctorate in law in 1884, and worked in the courts of Vienna and Salzburg. After only a year he left the legal profession and began a successful career as a writer and journalist.

As Paris correspondent for the liberal Vienna newspaper *Neue Freie Presse,* Herzl observed and reported on emerging French antisemitism. He was court correspondent at the court-martial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus and witnessed the anti-Jewish disturbances by Parisian mobs during the ceremony expelling Dreyfus from the military. Herzl's interest in Jewish affairs was roused by these firsthand observations of French antisemitism. Herzl articulated his beliefs in his book, *Der Judenstaat* (The Jews' State), which was published in Vienna in 1896.

In order to translate his vision into reality, Herzl had to convince both the international Jewish community and leaders of the great powers. In June 1896, he submitted a proposal to the Grand Vizier whereby the Jews would manage the empire's deteriorating financial affairs. When this proposal was rejected, Herzl requested permission to establish a Jewish state in Palestine that would remain under the suzerainty of the sultan. This too was rejected.

Initial Jewish responses to *Der Judenstaat* were mixed. The Baron Edmond de Rothschild of London rejected Herzl's appeals for support because of his belief that the Jewish masses could not be organized to implement Herzl's scheme of mass resettlement. In 1897, Herzl established news a weekly, *Die Welt,* in which he lobbied for the convening of a congress of Jewish representatives from around the world. At the First Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland, on 29 to 31 August 1897, the Zionist program was adopted by the representatives of world Jewry. The Basle Program, as it came to be known, called for the establishment of "a home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law." It proposed the promotion of Jewish settlement in Palestine, the organization of world Jewry by appropriate institutions, the strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment, and preparatory steps toward gaining the consent of the relevant governments. The World Zionist Organization was established as the institutional framework for the

Zionist program, and Herzl served as its president until his death.

See also Dreyfus Affair; Rothschild, Edmond de; World Zionist Organization (WZO); Zionism.

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Shimon Avish

HERZOG, CHAIM

[1918–1997]

Israeli statesman and general.

Chaim Herzog was born in Dublin, the son of Izhak Halevi Herzog, who was chief rabbi of Ireland and, from 1936 to 1959, of Palestine and later Israel. Chaim studied in Hebron Yeshiva in Israel (1935), at Wesley College in Dublin, and at Cambridge University in England. In World War II he served with the British army, attaining the rank of major. From 1945 to 1947 he was with the British army of occupation in Germany. During the Arab–Israel War of 1948 he served as an intelligence officer in Jerusalem and was promoted to head the Israel Defense Force (IDF) Intelligence Corps (1948–1950). From 1950 to 1954 he was the defense attaché at the Israeli Embassy in Washington. Upon his return to Israel, he once again commanded the Intelligence Branch (1959–1962). After retiring from the IDF, he practiced law in Tel Aviv. On the eve of the Arab–Israel War of 1967, his reputation was enhanced when, in a series of broadcasts to an anxious Israeli populace, he lifted the national morale. He was the first military governor of Jerusalem and the West Bank after that war.

From 1968 to 1975 he practiced law, wrote books on history, and contributed many articles to publictions in Israel and abroad. From 1975 to 1978 he was Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. He will be remembered as the Israeli who on the podium of the General Assembly tore up UN Resolution 3379 (10 November 1975), which equated Zionism with racism. Elected to the Knesset on Labor's ticket in 1981, two years later he was chosen as Israel's sixth president and served two terms until 1993.

See also Herzog, Izhak Halevi.

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Meron Medzini

HERZOG, IZHAK HALEVI

[1888–1959]

First Ashkenazic chief rabbi of Israel.

Izhak Halevi Herzog was born in Lomza, Poland. His family moved to England, where his father served as a rabbi in Leeds. In addition to his religious learning, the younger Herzog studied at the University of Paris and University of London, where he completed his doctorate. After serving as a congregational rabbi in Belfast and Dublin for nine years, Herzog became chief rabbi of Ireland in 1925. He helped found the religious Zionist Mizrahi movement in England and testified before the Anglo–American Committee of Inquiry and the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. Following the death of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Hacohen Kook, Herzog was elected Ashkenazic chief rabbi of Palestine in 1936. He continued as Ashkenazic chief rabbi after the establishment of the State of Israel until his death. As Israel's first Ashkenazic chief rabbi, he handled many new and delicate issues in Halakhah, Jewish religious law. He was the father of Chaim Herzog and Yaʿacov David Herzog.

See also Halakhah; Herzog, Chaim; Herzog, Yaʿacov David; Kook, Abraham Isaac Hacohen.

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Chaim I. Waxman

HERZOG, YAʿACOV DAVID

[1921–1972]

Israeli scholar and diplomat.

Born in Dublin, Yaʿacov Herzog was the son of Rabbi Izhak Halevi Herzog, who was chief rabbi of Ireland and, from 1936 to 1959, of Palestine and later Israel. Herzog grew up in a home imbued with learning and tradition. From an early age he excelled in his studies in yeshivot in Jerusalem and fulfilled a number of official missions aiding his father. In 1949 his scholarship and erudition attracted the attention of both Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett and Premier David Ben-Gurion. Herzog joined the Foreign Ministry in 1949 and headed the Jerusalem and Christian Affairs Department, later heading the North America Division. During the 1956 Arab–Israel War he served as Ben-Gurion's principal political adviser. From 1957 to 1960 he was minister plenipotentiary at the Israeli Embassy in Washington and from 1960 to 1963 ambassador to Canada. His reputation was enhanced due to a much-publicized public debate with British scholar Arnold Toynbee, who had argued that Jews were fossils with no right to a national homeland. Herzog's soaring reputation brought an offer to serve as chief rabbi of Great Britain and the Commonwealth, which he declined. From 1965 until his premature death he was director general of the Prime Minister's Office under Premiers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir. As their key political adviser, he was the first senior Israeli official to meet King Hussein ibn Talal of Jordan in 1963 and establish this diplomatic channel. Many other secret meetings, mainly in London, followed.

See also HERZOG, IZHAK HALEVI.

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MERON MEDZINI

HESKAYL, SASSON

[1860–1932]

Iraqi Jewish statesman and economist.

Sasson Heskayl was born in Baghdad where his father, Hakam Heskayl, was the leading rabbinical authority. After graduating from the Alliance Israélite Universelle, he went to Vienna to study economics and law. His knowledge of foreign languages (French, German, English, Turkish, Persian, Arabic, and Hebrew) enabled him to become chief translator for the *vilayet* of Baghdad upon his return from Europe. In 1908, Heskayl was elected a representative of Baghdad to the Chamber of Deputies in Constantinople (now Istanbul). He spent several years there and was adviser to the ministry of commerce and agriculture. Upon returning to Baghdad in 1920, he was appointed minister of finance in the first government headed by Abd al-Rahman al-Naqib, retaining that post (with a short interruption) for the next five years. In 1925 he was elected to parliament and was chairman of its finance committee. He died in Paris while undergoing medical treatment.

At the 1921 Cairo Conference, which was convened by Winston Churchill, the British colonial secretary, and decided upon the election of Amir Faisal I as king of Iraq, Heskayl was one of two representatives of the government of Iraq, the other one being Jaʿfar al-Askari. Heskayl was knighted in 1923.

During negotiations with the British Petroleum Company, Heskayl demanded that oil revenue be calculated on the basis of gold. His demand was reluctantly accepted. This concession benefited Iraq's treasury during World War II, when the pound sterling plummeted. Some historians maintain that Heskayl's confrontation with the British eventually caused his removal as minister of finance.

See also ASKARI, JAʿFAR AL-; CAIRO CONFERENCE (1921); CHURCHILL, WINSTON S.; FAISAL I IBN HUSSEIN; JEWS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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SASSON SOMEKH

HESS, MOSES

[1812–1875]

German Zionist writer.

A committed German Jewish Socialist and a contemporary of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Moses Hess spent much of his life in Paris and is sometimes thought of as the first Zionist Communist. He collaborated with Marx and Engels in 1830s and the 1840s, but he rejected their economic determinism and broke with them after 1848. In 1862 Hess wrote *Rome and Jerusalem,* in which he argued that the Jews, like the Italians, should establish their own state. This book later influenced such proponents of Zionism as Theodor Herzl. Hess believed that antisemitism and German nationalism went hand in hand and that with the growth of the latter, a Jewish state was imperative. A firm adherent of peaceful change rather than violent revolution, in *Rome and Jerusalem* Hess extolled the ethics of love, harmony, and cooperation. Once in their own country, Hess claimed, the duty of the Jews was to prepare themselves for a Socialist "Sabbath of History," which would mark the liberation not just of the Jews but of all mankind.

See also Herzl, Theodor; Labor Zionism.

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Zachary Karabell

HEZB-E ISLAMI

Afghan Islamist political party.

The Hezb-e Islami, or Party of Islam, formed as an Afghan paramilitary resistance organization in Pakistan in 1977, splitting from the Islamist Jamiʿat-e Islami. The organization evolved into two branches, the larger led by Golbuddin Hekmatyar and the smaller by Maulawi Yunis Khalis. The party follows fundamentalist Islamic principles and is strongly anti-Western and anti-American.

Hezb-e Islami was one the best organized, most successful organizations in the Afghan war of resistance (1978–1992). In 1992 the Hezb-e Islami and its leader Hekmatyar returned to Kabul to participate in the government formed by the resistance groups after the fall of the Najibullah government. Hezb-e Islami soon turned against that government and was driven from Kabul when the Taliban came to power in 1996. Exiled to Iran, the party had little role in the formation in 2002 of the interim government of Hamid Karzai. Remnants of the party still exist in some parts of Afghanistan.

See also Hekmatyar, Golbuddin; Jamiʿat-e Islami.

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Grant Farr

HEZBOLLAHI

See Glossary

HIBBAT ZION

First international Zionist organization to be founded; established in the aftermath of the Russian pogroms of 1881 and 1882.

Hibbat Zion was formed in 1884 by Dr. Leo Pinsker, a Russian physician who practiced in Odessa. Its membership combined European Jewish traditionalists—long committed to support the growing scholarly Jewish community in Palestine—with newly recruited secular nationalists from Eastern Europe. Dr. Pinsker had been appalled by the pogroms and realized that even assimilated Jews could not consider themselves safe in their adopted lands. In his pamphlet *Auto-Emancipation,* Pinsker argued that Jews in the diaspora could not afford to remain passive in the hopes of either divine redemption or some voluntary ending of antisemitism. Instead Jews had to liberate themselves by reconstituting themselves as a nation in a land of their own.

Orthodox rabbis joined Hibbat Zion assuming that secular nationalists could be won back to piety.

These assumptions were translated into policies: Those who wished to settle as farmers in Palestine and who received financial aid from Hibbat Zion had to observe Judaism and its traditions. For secular nationalists, like Dr. Pinsker, this was a troublesome policy. The enthusiasm initially engendered by the creation of Hibbat Zion waned as the uneasy alliance experienced financial crises and internal disputes. Nevertheless, a few colonies were established and aided in Palestine, such as Petah Tikvah (founded in 1878), and the educational aspect of the movement resulted in the Zionist thought and actions of other individuals and groups in Eastern Europe.

See also ANTISEMITISM; DIASPORA; PETAH TIKVAH; PINSKER, LEO; POGROM.

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DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

HIGH COMMISSIONERS (PALESTINE)

Heads of the Palestine government during British civilian rule (1 July 1920–14 May 1948).

Except for a short period (December 1917–June 1920) of British military government, Palestine under the British mandate was run by a civilian administration headed by a high commissioner, who reported directly to London. Though entrusted by the League of Nations to Great Britain as a mandate, which entailed the "development of self-governing institutions," Palestine was governed as a British crown colony; that is, full power and authority were vested in the high commissioner. His powers included censorship, deportation, detention without trial, demolition of the homes of suspects, and collective punishment—powers that were used against both Palestinian and Jewish communities.

The high commissioner was assisted by an executive council consisting of a chief secretary, attorney general, and treasurer and by an advisory council consisting, from 1920 to 1922, of British officials and prominent Arab and Jewish appointees; after 1922 its members were all British officials. In 1922 and 1923, the high commissioner proposed to the Arab and Jewish communities the establishment of self-governing institutions for Palestine, in particular a legislative council, but due to the conflicting political goals of the two communities and to Britain's Balfour Declaration, which favored a Jewish national home in Palestine, such institutions were never agreed to or established and the high commissioner continued to exercise sole authority over Palestine until the end of the mandate.

The Palestine government was headed by seven high commissioners, whose names and dates of appointments were as follows:

Sir Herbert Samuel, 1 July 1920

Lord Herbert Plumer, 14 August 1925

Sir John Chancellor, 1 November 1928

Sir Arthur Wauchope, 20 November 1931

Sir Harold MacMichael, March 3, 1938

Viscount John Gort, 31 October 1944

Sir Alan Gordan Cunningham, 21 November 1945

See also BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917); LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (PALESTINE); MANDATE SYSTEM; PALESTINE; PLUMER, HERBERT CHARLES ONSLOW.

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PHILIP MATTAR

HIGH STATE COUNCIL (ALGERIA)

Algerian interim executive, 1992–1994.

When the first round of parliamentary elections on 26 December 1991 made it clear that the Islamist

FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) would gain majority control of the Algerian parliament if the second round of elections were to proceed as scheduled on 16 January 1992, a bitter dispute broke out within the government of President Chadli Bendjedid. The president favored continuing the electoral process whereas the military and other ardent secularists wanted the process terminated. The military forced Chadli to dissolve the sitting parliament, where the speaker—his constitutional successor—sat, and then forced the president himself to resign on 11 January, leaving the Algerian state without an executive branch. Three days later a five-man Haut Comité d'État (High State Council; HCE) was appointed to serve as a collective transitional executive until the end of 1993 when Chadli's term would officially expire. The most powerful member of the council was Defense Minister Khaled Nezzar. Others included Ali Kafi, the influential head of the Moudjahidine organization, Tedjini Haddam, Mohamed Ali Haroun, and Mohamed Boudiaf. Boudiaf, one of the few surviving *chefs historiques* of the War of Independence, was invited to return from twenty-eight years of exile to chair the council.

From the outset the HCE moved aggressively to dismantle the FIS and other Islamist organizations, rounding up and imprisoning many of their leaders and members. The result was escalating violence against security forces and governmental institutions. Boudiaf, an ardent secularist, announced a program for authentic democratization, major economic reform, and thorough investigation of alleged corruption within the ruling establishment. On 29 June 1991, while giving a speech at Annaba, he was assassinated. Many assume the murder was orchestrated by the military because of its unease with Boudiaf's priorities, though some in the establishment blame Islamists offended by Boudiaf's secularism.

Ali Kafi was named chair of the HCE after Boudiaf's assassination. He appointed as prime minister Belaïd Abdessalam who, because of dissent over economic policies, was subsequently replaced by Redha Malek in August 1993. While Kafi in May 1993 announced a forthcoming constitutional referendum to determine what institution was to succeed the HCE when its mandate expired, security and political considerations prohibited such a solution. Ultimately the military, coming together in January 1994 as the High Security Commission, appointed Liamine Zeroual head of state. He had succeeded the ailing Nezzar as defense minister the preceding summer. The Haut Comité d'État was dissolved.

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John Ruedy

HIJAB

The practice of veiling, covering either the entire face and body or only the hair and neck.

Islam—a religion of balance, moderation, and modesty—places a strong emphasis on the maintenance of proper boundaries, whether social or moral. The practice of *hijab* among Muslim women is grounded in religious doctrine, yet the Qurʾan does not require it. Support for veiling is found in the *hadith* of Sahih Bukhari: "My Lord agreed with me (Umar) in three things. . . . (2) And as regards the veiling of women, I said 'O Allah's Apostle! I wish you ordered your wives to cover themselves from men because good and bad ones talk to them.' So the verse of the veiling of the women was revealed" (Bukhari, volume 1, book 8, *sunnah* 395).

Display of the self in public, for men as well as women, is a subject of considerable concern in Islamic teachings and practices. The care, treatment, and presentation of the human body are influenced by Qurʾanic teachings, as well as by *hadith,* and codified in the *shariʿa.* In examining Islamic teachings about bodily presentation, the issue of boundaries (*hudud,* in Arabic) is of primary importance, particularly gender boundaries and spatial boundaries, which usually overlap in daily practice. Islam draws a clear distinction between the public and the private. Men's and women's roles in these domains are complementary, not equal. Since Islam views the family as central to and crucial for the survival of society and the continuation of proper human life, boundaries that specify men's and women's roles, and boundaries that mark off the private realm of familial space from wider public spaces are elabo-

rated and crucial for the preservation of an Islamic social order. Concerns with literal and figurative boundaries are evident in everyday practices, including dress, bodily ornamentation, architecture, and contact between men and women.

The practice of veiling is a visible recognition of the maintenance of proper boundaries. It is a way of keeping proper distance and ensuring respect and moral behavior between men and women in public space. In private, women do not veil, and in public women may well be wearing attractive clothing and elaborate jewelry under their *abayas* or *chadors.* The Qurʾan and *hadith* stipulate that a woman should not display her personal adornments or physical charms to anyone but her husband (Sura 24:31 and Sura 33:59). There are, however, a wide variety of views on how much of a woman's body should be covered from public view. Islam is not an ascetic religion preaching the negation of the flesh. The veils and headscarves worn by observant Muslim women in public are often used to aesthetic effect to accentuate the eyes or the curve of the face, emphasizing, though modestly, a woman's best features. Scarves and veils are often embroidered and edged with subtle lace designs for added aesthetic impact within the bounds of Islamic propriety.

Veiling as a social practice predates Islam. Depending on the wider social and political contexts, *hijab*'s meanings, for Muslims as well as non-Muslims, have changed, sometimes dramatically. In the nineteenth century, upper-class urban women were more likely to veil than were working-class or peasant women. By the 1960s, the reverse was the case. The veil has been a charged political, cultural, and moral issue, as well as a site of misunderstanding and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims, or even between observant and nonobservant Muslims. Turkey, an overwhelmingly Muslim country, has witnessed some of the fiercest debates on the meaning of *hijab*; veiling is perceived as a threat to the secular political order established by Atatürk in the 1920s.

In the early twentieth century, many leading Arab women activists and intellectuals displayed their modernity by removing the veil, as did Huda al-Shaʿrawi upon her return to Egypt from a women's conference in Europe. Yet the veil is also a potent symbol of resistance to the West and its political and economic agenda in the Middle East and North Africa. From the late 1970s until today, many young women throughout the Arab and Islamic world have voluntarily adopted *hijab* and conservative dress in general in order to make a political as much as a religious statement of identity and ideological commitment. Many women assert that the veil guarantees them freedom, dignity, and greater scope for movement in a world that sexualizes women. According to this argument, the *hijab* deflects and neutralizes the objectifying male gaze, enabling women to emerge as autonomous subjects in the public realm. In Iran, the *hijab* became obligatory for all adolescent girls and women shortly after the Islamic revolution (1979). The changing balance of forces between conservatives and reformists in Iran is often read in the degree to which women comply with *hijab* and how much hair they reveal.

See also Clothing; Hadith; Qurʾan; Shaʿrawi, Huda al-.

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Laurie King-Irani

HIJAZ

An arid, mountainous region in western Saudi Arabia, and site of Mecca and Medina.

The Hijaz region is the cradle of Islam and home to the faith's two Holy Cities. Hijaz reached the peak of its political importance after the rise of Islam, when Mecca was the seat of the first four caliphs (rulers) of the Muslim community. Since that time, the ebb and flow of the annual Muslim pilgrimage *(hajj)* has dictated the region's economic viability. Lack of water and arable land severely limited human settlement before the oil era. Dates were cultivated in several oases, such as al-Ula and Tayma, and other crops were grown where conditions permitted, most notably in the elevated regions around al-Ta'if. Nomadism was also important, but declined after the creation of the Saudi state. Fishing and trade permitted the growth of settlement on the Red Sea coast, with the port city of Jidda serving as way station for pilgrims to the Holy Cities as well as for commercial traffic. Hijaz regained a degree of political prominence after it became an Ottoman province in 1517, ruled by sharifs, descendents of the prophet Muhammad. After World War I the region attained brief independence, but was conquered by the forces of the Al Saʿud in 1926 and subsequently incorporated into Saudi Arabia.

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KHALID Y. BLANKINSHIP
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

HIJAZ RAILROAD

Railroad connecting Damascus and Medina.

Built during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II, the Hijaz Railroad is 811 miles (1,308 km) long. It is so named because Medina, its eastern terminus, is located in a western region of the Arabian Peninsula called the Hijaz. Abdülhamit built the railroad to facilitate the movement of the Ottoman army, thus allowing for closer Ottoman control of southern Syria and the Hijaz. In addition, easier movement of religious pilgrims to Mecca would buttress his claim to be caliph of the Muslims. Additional branches were built connecting the main line to

The Hijaz Railway was built in the early 1900s to transport pilgrims from Damascus to Medina and Mecca, a trip that had previously been undertaken by camel. The railway was heavily damaged during World War I and, despite sporadic attempts at revival, remains abandoned. © JAMES SPARSHATT/CORBIS.

Haifa, Basra, Lydda, and Ajwa, bringing total trackage to 1,023 miles (1,650 km) in 1918.

The railroad, which cost 4 million Turkish liras (equivalent to about 15 percent of the Ottoman budget), was financed without foreign loans. Arguing that the railroad was essential to the protection of Mecca and Medina, and that it should be financed and operated by Muslims, the Ottoman government raised between one-third and one-fourth of the total cost through contributions from its subjects and donations from Muslims around the world. The remainder was financed by the state.

As the Ottomans began to design and construct the railroad in 1900, they wanted to build the railroad without foreign assistance. Yet because all previous railroads and public utilities had been built and managed by foreigners, their experience was limited. Thus, the goals of speeding construction and limiting costs dictated the use of foreign assistance. Ottoman military officers, led by Mehmet Ali Paşa, supervised the initial engineering and construction, assisted by an Italian engineer, La Bella. But incompetent surveying, maltreatment of workers, and financial problems limited progress in the first six months of construction to the preparation of 12.5 miles (20 km) of earthwork for tracks. As pressure from Constantinople (now Istanbul) to

speed up construction increased, Mehmet Ali Paşa was removed and court-martialed.

His successor, Kazim Paşa, de facto ceded Ottoman control over the technical aspects of construction to a German engineer, Heinrich Meissner. Meissner supplemented his largely foreign staff with Ottoman engineers trained in Europe. Ottoman soldiers pressed into service provided most of the labor force, though foreign workmen also were employed. The railroad reached Medina in August 1908. Over the next six years, facilities including storehouses, switching yards, and repair facilities were constructed.

Passenger service for the pilgrimage began in 1908. In 1914, operations included three weekly passenger trains from Damascus to Medina, and seven weekly trips from Damascus to Haifa. The run to Medina was scheduled to take fifty-six hours, although three days was average; the shorter run to Haifa was scheduled for eleven and a half hours.

During World War I, the Hijaz Railroad was central to the strategy of both the Ottoman army and the Arab army of Sharif Husayn ibn Ali that launched the Arab Revolt in 1916. For the Ottomans, a planned invasion of Egypt, defense of the Hijaz, and defense of southern Syria depended on control and extension of the railroad. Unable to confront 25,000 Ottoman troops directly, the Arab army directed raids against the railroad, disrupting service and wresting control of sections from the Ottomans. On 1 October 1918 the Ottoman Hijaz Railroad administration was replaced by an Arab general directorate.

See also Abdülhamit II; Arab Revolt (1916); Husayn ibn Ali.

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David Waldner

HIKMA UNIVERSITY, AL-

University founded by American Jesuits in Iraq in 1956.

Al-Hikma University was built in Zaʿfraniyya, on the southern edge of Baghdad, by American Jesuits. They have been engaged in education in that city since 1932, when they were invited by the Christian hierarchy to open a secondary school—Baghdad College.

Al-Hikma offered degrees in business administration, civil engineering, and literature; instruction was mainly in English. The student body was coeducational, with 95 percent Iraqis; the faculty was about 50 percent Iraqi. Enrollment grew slowly and was approaching 1,000 when the Baʿthist government seized the university and expelled the Jesuits in 1968. The students enrolled at the time of nationalization continued their studies until graduation, then the university ceased to exist. The site was transformed into a technical institute.

In 1969, the Jesuits were also expelled from Baghdad College, which continued in existence as a secondary school attached to the Iraqi ministry of education.

John J. Donohue

HILAL, AL-

Monthly magazine founded in 1892 in Cairo by Jurji Zaydan.

Probably the oldest magazine in Arabic, until World War I *al-Hilal* was the most important journalistic forum of the Arab Nahda (Renaissance) in all its aspects. Later it became a platform for progressive Egyptian literature; after nationalization under Gamal Abdel Nasser, it adapted, increasingly, the *Reader's Digest* model in format and content.

See also Literature: Arabic; Nahda, al-; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Zaydan, Jurji.

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THOMAS PHILIPP

HILLEL, SHLOMO

[1923–]

Israeli politician.

Born in Baghdad, Shlomo Hillel immigrated to Palestine in 1930 and graduated from the prestigious Herzliyya High School in Tel Aviv. A member of the Haganah underground from his teens, he was a founder of Kibbutz Maʿagan Mikhaʾel in 1945 and managed the Ayalon Institute, a clandestine Haganah munitions factory. In 1947 he was recruited by Mossad le-Aliyah Bet (the clandestine Haganah immigration arm) and brought a planeload of Iraqi Jews to Palestine. From 1948 to 1951 he ran immigration operations in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Iran and masterminded Operation Ezra and Nehemia, which airlifted 124,000 Iraqi Jews to Israel in 1950 and 1951. His best-selling book *Operation Babylon,* which appeared in 1987, recounts his experiences in immigration operations.

Elected to the Knesset on the Labor Party ticket in 1951, Hillel resigned in 1959 to join the foreign service. He was Israel's first ambassador to the Ivory Coast and Guinea. Later he headed the Africa Department of the Foreign Ministry and until 1967 served on the Israel Delegation to the United Nations. From 1967 to 1969 he was assistant director general of the Foreign Ministry, dealing with contacts with Palestinian Arab leadership in the occupied territories. Hillel was minister of police in the Golda Meir cabinet (1969–1974) and in the first Yitzhak Rabin cabinet (1974–1977). He also served briefly as minister of the interior. Re-elected to the Knesset in 1977, he served as its speaker from 1984 to 1988.

From 1989 to 1998 Hillel served as world chairman of Keren ha-Yesod–United Israel Appeal, responsible for fund-raising worldwide, with the exception of the United States. He was awarded the Israel prize in 1998 for lifetime achievement. He heads the Shazar Center for the Study of History and the Association for the Preservation of Historic Sites in Israel.

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MERON MEDZINI

HILMI, AHMAD

[1882–1963]

Palestinian politician during British mandate.

Born Ahmad Hilmi Abd al-Baqi in Palestine, Hilmi was active in banking and used his financial leverage for nationalist ends, founding the Arab National Bank in 1930 and later purchasing the newspaper *Filastin.* He used wartime profits from deposits held in the Arab National Bank to invest in Palestine's industry and commerce. Ownership of *Filastin* provided him with a platform from which to air his anti-Zionist, Palestinian nationalist views.

Throughout his life, Hilmi was associated with the Istiqlal (Independence) Party. This strongly nationalist party was ideologically rooted in Arab nationalism of the World War I era. In April 1936, the general strike in Palestine led to the formation of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), of which Hilmi became an independent member. In October 1938, the AHC was outlawed, and Hilmi was arrested and deported to the Seychelles. In 1939, he and Awni Abd al-Hadi urged the AHC to accept the British white paper, which signaled a change in British policy by restricting the levels of Jewish immigration to Palestine. This display of moderation caused the mandate authorities to allow Hilmi to return to Palestine.

In July 1948, the Administrative Council for Palestine was founded in Gaza under the auspices of the Arab League. It was replaced by the All-Palestine government claiming authority over the newly founded state of Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the Jordanian-held West Bank. Hilmi was appointed to head the all-Palestine government, which included Jamal al-Husayni as foreign minister. Although this government was recognized by all the Arab states except Jordan, Hilmi had no authority, and the government was weak and powerless. It was officially laid to rest with Hilmi's death.

See also ABD AL-HADI FAMILY; ALL-PALESTINE GOVERNMENT; ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE

(PALESTINE); HUSAYNI, JAMAL AL-; ISTIQLAL PARTY: PALESTINE; LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES; MANDATE SYSTEM; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES; WHITE PAPERS ON PALESTINE.

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LAWRENCE TAL

HILU, CHARLES

[1911–2001]

President of Lebanon, 1964–1969.

Charles Hilu was born in Beirut to a Maronite (Christian) family. He received a French education, earning law degrees from the Jesuit St. Joseph University and the French School of Law in Beirut. He founded the newspaper *L'eclair du nord* in Aleppo (1932) and *Le jour* in Beirut (1934). In the 1930s, Hilu was sympathetic to the ideology of the Phalange party and was one of its founding members. He later realized that despite his reluctance to cooperate with the Arab world, the narrow sectarian base of the party would thwart his political ambitions. He later presented himself as a moderate Maronite politician who did not oppose good ties with the Arab world.

Hilu was Lebanese minister to the Vatican in 1947 and headed Catholic Action of Lebanon. He held several ministerial positions in the 1950s and 1960s, and he was serving as minister of education in 1964 when he was elected president. His election was made possible because of his close association with Chehabism; when Fuʾad Chehab could not be persuaded to run for another term, Hilu emerged as a candidate who could carry forward the legacy of Chehabism. Chehab later said that his selection of Hilu was one of his biggest mistakes.

Hilu's administration is remembered for allowing the military-intelligence apparatus to control the affairs of the state. Some army officers in the military intelligence bureau had more power than some elected representatives. Hilu is blamed for the increasingly dangerous situation in Lebanon caused by the unwillingness of the state to respond to Israel's attacks and to Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) activities. Many Lebanese, particularly those living in south Lebanon, thought that he forfeited the sovereignty of southern Lebanese territory. To protect himself against Maronite critics, he solidified his alliance with such conservative Maronite organizations as the Phalange party and the National Liberal Party of Camille Chamoun.

The worst crisis of Hilu's administration occurred in 1969, when Lebanese army troops fought with the PLO and its Lebanese allies (in the wake of attacks on them by Israel within Lebanon). Hilu wanted to use heavy-handed methods in dealing with the PLO, but his Sunni prime minister, Rashid Karame, refused to deal with the PLO, which at the time was the best hope for the restoration of Palestinian rights after the Arabs' humiliating defeat in the Arab–Israel War of 1967. The failures of Hilu's administration discredited Chehabism, thereby causing the Chehabi candidate, Ilyas Sarkis, to lose the presidential election of 1970.

After his retirement, Hilu lived a quiet life. He continued to make political statements but refrained from taking provocative or extremist stands. He was respected within the Maronite community.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967); CHAMOUN, CAMILLE; CHEHAB, FUʾAD; KARAME, RASHID; MARONITES; NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); PHALANGE; SARKIS, ILYAS.

ASʿAD ABUKHALIL

HILU, PIERRE

[1928–2003]

Maronite politician in Lebanon.

Pierre Hilu, a wealthy industrialist born in Beirut, was a deputy representing the district of Alay. He was first elected in 1972, and became a cabinet minister for the first time in 1973. He was mentioned as a possible presidential candidate in 1988, but he refused to succeed Amin Jumayyil without Muslim support. Hilu was still considered a potential pres-

idential candidate, especially because his ties with Syria were good over the years, although he was not seen as a pawn. He was one of the few credible Maronite deputies to seek reelection in 1992 when many right-wing Christians boycotted the election. He was also again elected in the election in 2000, and had served as head of the Maronite League. In 2003, Hilu suffered a heart attack while participating in a television talk show, and was succeeded in his parliamentary seat by his eldest son Henri in the same year.

See also JUMAYYIL, AMIN; LEBANON.

AS'AD ABUKHALIL

HINDU KUSH MOUNTAINS

Main mountain chain in Afghanistan, extending to China; part of the great chain of central Asian mountains.

Beginning west of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, the Hindu Kush Mountains stretch some 600 miles (965 km) east across the northern tip of Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir to the Pamir and Karakoram Mountains on the border of China. The highest peak is Tirich Mir at 25,260 feet (7,700 m). Both the Indus and Amu Darya Rivers spring from the Hindu Kush. It is the main mountain chain in Afghanistan, and during the nineteenth century, it marked the limits of British expansion north of India and the unofficial and often-contested boundary between Russia and Britain in their struggle for hegemony in Central Asia. After World War II, the Hindu Kush divided American from Russian influence in Afghanistan, with the bulk of U.S. aid flowing south and the bulk of Russian aid going to the north. After the 1979 Soviet intervention and invasion of Afghanistan, the Hindu Kush became one of the main refuges of Afghan guerrillas in their struggle to force the Soviets out of the country. The mountains were a major battle area during the United States's 2001 campaign to oust the Taliban government and break the al-Qaʿida terrorist network.

See also AMU DARYA.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

HINNAWI, SAMI AL-

[1898–1950]

A Syrian colonel who, on 14 August 1949, overthrew his predecessor, Husni al-Zaʿim, as military dictator of Syria and had him shot.

Sami al-Hinnawi's coup came barely four and a half months after Zaʿim had staged his military coup, the first in Syria's modern history. Hinnawi collaborated with the People's Party, which was disposed toward Iraq. He invited Hashim al-Atasi to form a government. A constituent assembly to draw a new constitution was elected, women voted for the first time, and all the political parties were legalized, with the exception of the Communist Party and the rightist Socialist Cooperative Party. Atasi then became president of the republic. Discussions with Iraqi officials to bring about a union between Syria and royalist Iraq were then in full sway. But Syrian republicanists and the army were not happy with the proposed union. On 19 December 1949, Colonel Adib Shishakli overthrew Hinnawi, whom he charged with treason and conspiracy with a foreign power, a reference to the proposed union with Iraq.

See also ATASI, HASHIM AL-; ZAʿIM, HUSNI AL-.

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ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

HIRAWI, ILYAS AL-

[1926–]

President of Lebanon, 1989–1998.

Born in Hawsh al-Umara near Zahla, al-Hirawi was born to a politically active Maronite family and attended Saint Joseph University. He was in charge of the family's agricultural estates while his broth-

ers served in government. Ilyas was elected to parliament in 1972, and he established a reputation of moderation and blunt talk. He was not part of the right-wing Maronite militia establishment during the war; he was a founding member of the Independent Maronite Bloc in the Lebanese parliament, which tried to promote moderation but became famous for comprising presidential candidates among its members. Al-Hirawi maintained good relations with the Syrian government and with the right-wing Phalange militia of Bashir Jumayyil during the war, which allowed him to play a mediating role between the two sides, especially during the Zahla crisis of 1981. He served as minister in the administration of Ilyas Sarkis (1976–1982) and was elected president in 1989, after the assassination of president-elect René Muʿawwad. Al-Hirawi's administration witnessed the rise of billionaire prime minister Rafiq Hariri, who first became prime minister in 1992. His relationship with Hariri was close, although al-Hirawi and his sons were accused of corruption during his administration. Al-Hirawi established the juridically based "distinctive relations" with the Syrian government, and he was one of the closest allies of Syria in Lebanon. After leaving office, al-Hirawi published his memoirs, in which he attacked most of his political rivals and former political allies. During his administration, he promoted civil marriage, but clerics on all sides objected. Al-Hirawi retired from politics after leaving the presidency.

See also Hariri, Rafiq Bahaʾuddin al-; Jumayyil, Bashir; Phalange; Sarkis, Ilyas; Zahla.

As'ad AbuKhalil

HISTADRUT

Israeli federation of labor.

The Histadrut—full name in Hebrew, ha-Histadrut ha-Kelalit shel ha-Oevdim ha-Ivriʾim be-Eretz-Yisrael (The General Organization of the Jewish Workers in Eretz-Yisrael)—was founded in 1920, with a membership of 5,000. In 1930 it had 28,000 members; in 1940, 112,000; in 1950, 352,000; in 1960, 689,000; in 1970, 1,038,000; and in 1980, 1,417,000. By 1992 it had approximately 1.6 million members.

Politician Golda Meir (1898–1978) (center standing) speaks at the Histradrut headquarters. Founded in 1920 at the Haifa Technion, the Histradrut was started as a trade union to organize economic activities of Jewish workers. © Photograph by Zoltan Kluger. Government Press Office (GPO) of Israel. Reproduced by permission.

The Histadrut, which has often been called a state within the state, acts as an umbrella organization for trade unions. It has also played an important role in the development of agriculture, wholesale and retail marketing of food and other products, rural settlement, industry, construction and housing, industry, banking, insurance, transportation, water, health, and social services.

Following the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the Histadrut handed some of its educational functions as well as its employment exchanges to the government. In recent years, it has sold a number of commercial concerns to the private sector.

In the 1920s, under the British mandate, the Histadrut's role was to help develop the Jewish economy in Palestine. To this end, in 1921 it set up Bank Hapoalim (The Workers' Bank), and in 1923, Hevrat Ovdim (The Workers' Company or Cooperative Federation) was founded. This was to be-

come a holding company for most of the Histadrut's wide range of economic enterprises.

By 1927, when the Solel Boneh construction and industrial group first went bankrupt, the importance of reinvesting profits and maintaining an independent capital base was understood. From the late 1920s onward, economic enterprises were directed toward capital accumulation so as to avoid reliance on outside sources of finance. Solel Boneh, as well as being the largest construction company in the pre-independence period, had investments in industry. Its subsidiary, Koor, owned the Phoenicia glass works, the Vulcan foundry, and other industrial companies. The policy of financial independence was successful until the 1980s, when a number of Histadrut bodies got into serious financial difficulties.

By 1930 the retail cooperative, Hamashbir; the insurance company, Hasneh; and other groups were incorporated into Hevrat Ovdim. The Histadrut had become both a large employer as well as a trade union body. The basic structure has remained unchanged since the 1920s, but attitudes toward profits and dismissing workers have become more pragmatic and less socialist since the late 1980s.

Although about three-quarters of all wage earners in Israel are members of the Histadrut, this includes many who do no more than pay dues to its health fund, Kupat Holim Kelalit, the largest fund in the country. A share of the membership fee is passed on to the Histadrut by the health fund. Members of kibbutzim and other cooperatives are also automatically enrolled, as are those working in Histadrut enterprises. Although far fewer are, therefore, voluntary members, about 85 percent of the labor force is covered by collective labor agreements negotiated by the Histadrut. About forty trade unions, representing a wide range of blue- and white-collar workers in the public and private sectors, are affiliated. While the Histadrut is highly centralized, professional workers' unions have a high degree of autonomy.

Elections are held every four years on a political party base, and the Labor Party and its allies have had a majority since the Histadrut's foundation. Each party, in proportion to its share of the votes cast, nominates delegates to a forum that elects the central committee. The latter consists of members of the ruling coalition alone. Workers' committees at plant level are elected annually or biannually.

The Histadrut and its affiliated organizations (such as the kibbutzim) in 1991 were responsible for about 16 percent of industrial output, and 14 percent of industrial investment in Israel. Exports of these industries came to US$1.4 billion.

In that year, it was also responsible for 80 percent of agricultural output and exports, about 38 percent of the assets of the banking system (through Bank Hapoalim), 9 percent of insurance companies' assets (through Hasneh), the construction of 8 percent of homes being built, as well as large shares of retailing and wholesaling through its producer cooperatives and marketing organizations. It operated most of the country's buses through two large cooperatives and, both directly and through the kibbutzim, had a range of hotels and guest houses. About 70 percent of the population were members of Kupat Holim Kelalit, which provides medical insurance and services through clinics and hospitals. The Histadrut owns the *Davar* daily newspaper and a publishing company and has interests in the shipping and airline industries. Finally through Bank Hapoalim, it has large shareholdings in joint ventures with private sector industry.

During the 1980s, many of the Histadrut's companies and affiliates ran into serious financial difficulties. These included Koor, the kibbutzim, Kupat Holim Kelalit, and Bank Hapoalim. In all these cases, the government provided financial assistance and forced management changes. It remains to be seen if the Histadrut can regain control of these groups by buying shares back from the government or by other means.

The Histadrut's position in Israel has weakened both politically and economically. It has been weakened by grassroots alienation, by the dominance of right-wing parties in the Knesset between 1977 and 1992, and by its own lack of a clear socioeconomic message. It has faced serious financial difficulties in many of its economic enterprises and has had to be bailed out by Likud and Labor governments. The Labor Party has distanced itself from the bureaucracy of the Histadrut, which it considers an electoral hindrance. This would have been inconceivable in the first half of the twentieth century.

See also Israel: Political Parties in; Knesset; Koor Industries; Labor Zionism; Likud.

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Paul Rivlin

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Trends in historical writing about the Middle East.

Academic history-writing about the Middle East took shape during the first half of the twentieth century. European-style universities were founded in the early 1900s in Istanbul and Cairo, and state education, museums, historical associations, and journals expanded between the wars, alongside state-building. History-writing became a profession. Long-established forms—dynastic chronicles, political biographies, and historical topographies—were slowly displaced. History (ta'rikh) took on its ambivalent, modern meaning, referring not just to a form of knowledge, but also to the actual course of past events. In Europe, scholars working in Oriental Studies and trained in language, philology, and the study of Islam increasingly produced work recognizable as modern historiography. The amateur histories of colonial officials and travelers became much-trawled primary source material to complement chronicles and literary texts.

Civilization and Nationalism

Before 1945, historians from Europe and the Middle East formulated the past in terms of the flowering of an Islamic civilization that achieved its zenith at some point during the Middle Ages and subsequently entered a lengthy decline. The last centuries of Ottoman rule in particular were depicted as years of decay and oppression. Exemplary historians in this period were the prolific and popular Ottoman-Syrian Christian Jurji Zaydan (1861–1914), who wrote *Ta'rikh al-Tamaddun al-Islami* (1902–1906; History of Islamic civilization), and the British Orientalists Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bowen, who did more than anyone else in English to set afoot the historical study of the modern Middle East, particularly in *Islamic Society and the West* (1950). Such work measured civilization by great men and their battles, politics, and high cultural production. Nationalist historians such as the Egyptian Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i (1889–1966) and Palestinian George Antonius, author of *The Arab Awakening* (1938), chronicled the recent past in terms of the triumphant rise of the new nation, led by a new elite, who disseminated enlightened ideas in a backward land, and thus drew their fellow citizens toward freedom.

Modernization

With the beginning of the Cold War, national independence in the region, and the emergence of Area Studies, academics trained as historians started to multiply in and outside the region. They added to the older sources colonial reports, state correspondence and statistics, and the tracts of modernizing elites. Borrowing from conventional currents in Europe, the field divided into political, intellectual, economic, and social history. Bernard Lewis, Stanford Shaw, and others wrote political histories of the Ottoman Empire, European colonial rule, and the high politics of nationalism. Albert Hourani wrote a seminal work of intellectual history, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age,* 1798–1939 (1962). Charles Issawi did most to chart what he saw as the decline and rise of Middle Eastern economies. Influenced by the Annales School, Ömer Lutfi Barkan and Halil Inalcik pioneered Ottoman socioeconomic history, which was taken up also at Cairo University by students of Muhammad Anis. Gabriel Baer studied guilds, town and country, and André Raymond transformed historians' understanding of socioeconomic change in eighteenth-century Egypt.

The achievements of these decades were very real, but assumptions left over from Oriental Studies, entrenched by bourgeois-nationalism and introduced by modernization theory, were pervasive. The object of study was often Islamic society, which

was still often assumed to be in long-term decay. Many judged the region according to a linear and idealized notion of European modernization, seeing the Middle East as laggard mainly as a result of local failings that were often linked to psychology. Europe's impact, typically marked off as commencing with Napoléon Bonaparte's brief occupation of Egypt (1798–1801), still signified the beginnings of progress in the region.

The drastically limited success of state-led projects of modernization and development, underlined by the Arab defeat in the Arab–Israel War of 1967 and the rise of more radical currents in Third World socialism and nationalism, gave increasing currency—inside and outside the region—to more critical scholarship. Rigid boundaries dividing politics, economics, and society started to blur, and history drew increasingly on other disciplines.

Marxism

Particularly influential during the 1970s was the broad current of Marxism: dependencia, world systems theory, and analysis based on social class. These ideas gave rise to numerous groundbreaking studies. Samir Amin, Resat Kasaba, and Roger Owen situated the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East within the world economy. Hanna Batatu's monumental study, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq,* remains without peer. Ervand Abrahamian's seminal history of twentieth-century Iran, *Iran Between Two Revolutions,* owed much to notions of uneven development and social class. Anwar Abd al-Malik, Mahmud Hussein, and Eric Davis understood Egyptian history in terms of different fractions within the bourgeoisie in interaction with the state. Amin Izz al-Din, Ra'uf Abbas, Joel Beinin, and Zachary Lockman chronicled the rise of the working class in Egypt from the late nineteenth century until the 1960s.

Instead of depicting an Islamic society in decline, these scholars detailed the incorporation of a part of the periphery into a world economy with its core in Europe. Instead of seeing backwardness as the result of local cultural and political failings, backwardness was seen as the systemic result of a process of world capitalist development. Instead of viewing transformation as a process of elite-driven, ideas-based modernization that remained laggard, society and change were freshly understood as internally structured by state and class.

Social History

Critiques of Marxist determinism, not least from Edward Said, who depicted Karl Marx as an Orientalist in *Orientalism* (1978), formed the background to increased interest in more grounded social history, which took a critical distance from grand metanarratives of modernity. Social history particularly benefited from increasingly accessible national archives, especially the use of Islamic court records. Kenneth Cuno, Beshara Doumani, Suraiya Faroqhi, André Raymond, and others transformed understandings of the period 1600 to 1800, showing dynamism, market forms, urban change, social stratification, and changing patterns of social reproduction instead of backwardness and decline. Their work, along with that of Juan Cole, Zachary Lockman, Donald Quataert, and others has greatly diversified understandings of socioeconomic change and popular protest in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: The deindustrialization thesis has been challenged; the end of the guilds appears to be far more complicated than it did; and the rise of the working class is no longer seen econometrically, and workers outside the factory, from artisans to migrants, are also seen as playing active roles in popular politics and world economic incorporation. F. Robert Hunter, Eugene Rogan, and others have given a far more embedded sense of state formation in Egypt and Jordan, respectively. Edmund Burke's *Struggle and Survival in the Middle East* (1993) made groundbreaking use of popular social biography.

Such work has opened the door to new forms of cultural history, in which culture is no longer an elite preserve, and constitutes (rather than simply reflects) the social process. Exemplary here are Abbas Amanat on the beginnings of the Baha'i movement in Iran, Ussama Makdisi on the modernity of sectarianism in Lebanon, and Ella Shohat on Israeli cinema. Work by historically minded anthropologists such as Michael Gilsenan, who studies violence and narrative in rural Lebanon, is highly suggestive for new directions.

Nationalism

Another important body of work has challenged the verities of idealist, elite-centered, and teleological

nationalism. Rashid Khalidi, C. Ernest Dawn, James Gelvin, and others have given more heterogeneous and less emancipatory histories of the rise of Arab and regional nationalism, and have pointed to the agency of previously ignored social groups. Avi Shlaim, Ilan Pappé, Benny Morris, and others, working with newly released archival material, have presented a dramatic and far-reaching challenge to the conventional Zionist account of the events of 1948.

Women and Gender

Feminist historiographical influence, and growing criticism of male-centered history, gave impetus from the 1970s onward to research on women and gender. Leila Ahmed, Lila Abu-Lughod, Judith Tucker, and others have paid systematic attention to the place of women in society and to constructions of gender, and they write the social, cultural, and political histories of women. Patriarchy, seclusion, and veiling are no longer understood as simply vestigial backwardness or as the expression of some essential Islamic essence, but as cultural practices grounded in processes of political and cultural contestation. The hypocrisy of colonial feminism has been exposed, as well as the pitfalls of simple nationalist assertion as an unwitting defense of patriarchy. After 1990 scholars successfully made the social construction of gender—masculinity as well as femininity—an integral part of larger accounts of social change. Elizabeth Thompson's work on Mandate Syria, for example, has argued that forms of colonial citizenship were forged in part from an interwar crisis of paternity, which had much to do with changing gender practices and norms.

Foucault

A number of historians have been inspired by the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault, whose oeuvre suggests a radically critical genealogy of modernity. Timothy Mitchell's groundbreaking work sees Egypt's nineteenth-century history in terms of the inscription of modern disciplinary practices, which gave rise to and were ordered by a new metaphysics of modern representation—the "world-as-exhibition." Khaled Fahmy on nineteenth-century Egyptian state-building and Joseph Massad on Jordanian national identity have undertaken rich archival research to pursue such insights in productive ways.

Overall, the historiography of the region has become less vulnerable to the charge of being outmoded. It presents a diversity of approaches, a more developed theoretical awareness than before, and an increasingly rich resource for those trying to understand the past, present, and future of the region.

See also ANTONIUS, GEORGE; BARKAN, ÖMER LUTFI; BONAPARTE, NAPOLÉON; HOURANI, ALBERT; ZAYDAN, JURJI.

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JOHN T. CHALCRAFT

HIZBULLAH

Shiʿite political party in Lebanon.

Hizbullah (also known as Party of God) was established in 1982 at the initiative of a group of Shiʿite clerics and former AMAL movement supporters, some of whom were adherents of Shaykh Husayn Fadlallah. By 1987 the party was the second most important Shiʿite organization in Lebanon, after AMAL. It was a reaction to the perceived moderation of the AMAL movement under the leadership of Nabi Berri, and partly a reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It has consistently followed the political and theological lines of the government of Iran and called

Iranian president Mohammad Khatami (left) with Secretary General Shaykh Hasan Nasrallah of Hizbullah. Born in Beirut, Nasrallah joined Hizbullah shortly after its conception in 1982 and was chosen to be its secretary general by the Consultative Council in 1992 after Abbas al-Musawi was killed by Israeli troops. © AFP/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

(with various degrees of explicitness) for the creation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon. In pursuit of this goal, Hizbullah has coordinated its activities closely with the government of Iran and its representatives in the region. For years the party rejected any compromise with the Christians of Lebanon, Israel, and the United States. This hard-line approach appealed to many Shiʿa, who abandoned the AMAL movement to join the Party of God. Those who left AMAL tended to be young, radical, and poor.

Hizbullah is headed by the Consultative Council (Majles al-Shura), which consists of the highest-ranking party officials, some of whom are clerics. Its members' responsibilities include financial, military, judicial, social, and political affairs. The party's operations were geographically organized, with branches in the Biqa Valley, the South, and the southern suburbs of Beirut. In the late 1980s the Politburo was created to handle day-to-day operations.

Hizbullah gained international attention in 1983 when press reports linked it to attacks against U.S., French, and Israeli targets in Lebanon, and to the abduction of Western hostages in Lebanon. The party continues to deny responsibility for some of those acts. Syria let Hizbullah keep its arms because it considered the party to be pursuing a legitimate struggle against Israel's occupation of South Lebanon. The party's armed opposition to Israel's presence resulted in significant confrontations, and Israel's forces killed the party's leader, Abbas al-Musawi, in 1992. In the 1992 election, Hizbullah won eight seats in the parliament; it now participates in the legitimate political arena after years of underground existence. The party has been trying to change its image since 1992 and has entered into dialogue with many of its former enemies, both leftists and Christians. It is now headed by Shaykh Hasan Nasrallah, who has become one of the most popular leaders in Lebanon and in the larger Arab world. The party's standing was dramatically boosted after the withdrawal of Israeli troops from most of South Lebanon in 2000, for the party had led the resistance movement against the Israeli occupation. The party has been identified as "the A-team of terrorism" by the deputy secretary of state in the administration of U.S. president George W. Bush. The party insists that although it supports armed struggle against Israeli occupation, it opposes the terrorism of Osama bin Ladin.

See also AMAL; Berri, Nabi; bin Ladin, Osama; Biqa Valley; Bush, George W.; Fadlallah, Husayn; Majles al-Shura; Nasrallah, Hasan.

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As'ad AbuKhalil

HOBEIKA, ELIE

[1956–2002]

A leader of the Lebanese Forces.

Elie Hobeika (also Hubayqa) was a close aide to Bashir Jumayyil, leader of the Maronite Catholic-dominated militias the Lebanese Forces. Hobeika became prominent following Israel's siege of West Beirut in 1982. On 16 September 1982, with other

militiamen, Hobeika is known to have entered the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, where he participated in the massacre of at least one thousand Palestinians. In 1984, internecine battles erupted between the followers of President Amin Jumayyil, who was also head of the Phalange party, and the Lebanese Forces led by Hobeika. In December 1985, Hobeika and the heads of two other militias, Walid Jumblatt of the Druze-dominated Progressive Socialist party and Nabi Berri of the Shiʿite militia AMAL, signed the Damascus Tripartite Agreement. The agreement, engineered by Syria, established strategic, educational, economic, and political cooperation between Lebanon and Syria. This accord placed Lebanon virtually under a Syrian protectorate.

Heavy opposition faced the Damascus agreement, especially in the Maronite and Sunni Muslim communities of Lebanon. President Jumayyil called for the support of Samir Geagea, who had replaced Hobeika as head of the Lebanese Forces in the course of their internal conflicts. Early in January 1986, Hobeika and his followers were defeated and Hobeika escaped to Paris. He then went to Damascus. Hobeika became a favored ally of Damascus and was elected to parliament in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections. He formed the Promise Party but failed to attract a popular following beyond a small band of followers from his militia days. He served as minister in the 1990s; accusations of rampant corruption accompanied his service. He was killed in a massive car bomb in January 2002. It was widely believed that Israel was behind his assassination, since he was about to travel to Belgium to testify in a case against Ariel Sharon for his role in the Sabra and Shatila massacres. Hobeika's wife succeeded him as leader of the Promise Party.

See also AMAL; BERRI, NABI; DRUZE; GEAGEA, SAMIR; JUMAYYIL, AMIN; JUMAYYIL, BASHIR; JUMBLATT, WALID; LEBANESE FORCES; MARONITES; PHALANGE; SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRES; SHARON, ARIEL.

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GEORGE E. IRANI
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HOCA

See GLOSSARY

HODEIDA

The major Red Sea port of Yemen since about 1849.

In 1849, the Ottoman Empire, during its second occupation of Yemen, selected Hodeida (also Hudayda) as its major base and point of entry from the Red Sea. In fact, Hodeida is not a natural deep-water port, and years of ballast dumping have made it incapable of accepting anything but small local ships. The major port activity now takes place at Raʾs Khatib, a short distance north of Hodeida; this is a modern facility with wharves, unloading equipment, warehouses, and a transportation infrastructure that can accommodate modern freighters.

Raʾs Khatib was constructed by the Soviet Union as part of its foreign aid program during the 1960s. It remained the key access point to Yemen until 1990, when the Yemen Arab Republic merged with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Then, Aden, one of the world's best natural harbors, became the primary port and economic capital of the new republic.

See also ADEN; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN; YEMEN; YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC.

MANFRED W. WENNER

HOFFMAN, YOEL

[1937–]

Israeli writer and scholar.

Yoel Hoffman was brought to Palestine as an infant by his Austro-Hungarian Jewish parents. His mother died a couple of years later and his father entrusted him to a day-care home, whose owner became Hoffman's beloved stepmother when he was seven.

As a college student, Hoffman studied Hebrew literature and Western philosophy but wrote his thesis on Far Eastern philosophy. He had lived in a Japanese Buddhist temple where he studied Chinese and Japanese texts with Zen monks. His academic work ranged from comparative philosophy to interpretations of haiku and Zen koans. A professor at

Haifa University, Hoffman began to write fiction in his late forties. Although chronologically a member of the sixties "generation of the State," his writing is in the forefront of the Israeli avant-garde of the nineties.

With his first collection of stories, *The Book of Joseph* (1988), Hoffman began his lyrical, experimental literary journey. But only with *Bernhardt* (1989) and *Christ of Fishes* (1991) did his mature creative voice emerge. In atomistic texts of unusual typography and poetic rhythms, Hoffman blended Far Eastern with Western philosophy, minimalist aesthetics with unbridled imagination, murmuring of the heart with rationalism, and educated awareness with Nirvana-like trance. Hoffmann's personae—middle-aged widowers, orphaned children, lonely aunts—often speak or remember in their German mother tongue, transliterated phonetically into Hebrew and glossed in the margins. Reconstructing a culturally and psychologically complex metabolism of loss, Hoffman's work negates boundaries between life and death, self and other, man and woman, human and animal.

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NILI GOLD
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HOLOCAUST

Term commonly used in English (Hebrew, Shoah*) to denote anti-Jewish policies conducted by the Third Reich (Nazi Germany, 1933–1945), resulting in the systematic and bureaucratically organized genocide of approximately 6 million Jews.*

Exploiting anti-Jewish themes present in Christian theology and culture, but going far beyond them by incorporating them onto a racist worldview, Nazi ideology presented the Jews as a satanic and corrupting element and demanded their "total removal" (the formulation of Germany's dictator, Adolf Hitler: *"Entfernung der Juden überhaupt"*) from human society. They held a special place among a variety of undesirable elements (Gypsies, homosexuals, people deemed genetically defective or incurable) that had to be eliminated.

History

During the 1930s, Nazi policies gradually crystallized: German Jews were legally defined, humiliated through propaganda and education, and disenfranchised. Many were deprived of their livelihoods and property and openly encouraged to emigrate. These policies became harsher and more brutal after Nazi Germany's annexations and conquests of 1938 and 1939. After September 1939, the more than 2 million Jews living in Nazi-occupied Poland were herded into ghettos, where they were exposed to death by hunger and disease on a massive scale. The occupation of western, central, and southern Europe resulted in the legal, political, economic, and social disempowerment of the Jews, causing harsh living conditions, followed by their deportation to camps in eastern Europe beginning in 1942.

In January 1939, Hitler foreshadowed a more radical policy when announcing that, if the nations would be plunged "once more into a world war, then the result will not be the bolshevization of the earth, and thus the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation *(Vernichtung)* of the Jewish race in Europe." It took, however, more than two years for this vision to begin to be implemented. Germany's mass murder of Jews began in mid-1941 with mass executions, led by special death squads (Einsatzgruppen) accompanying the advancing troops that invaded the Soviet Union; it was supported and aided by other German units, including the German army; by local collaborators; as well as by Germany's ally, Romania. During the summer and fall of 1941, the shape of a Europe-wide "Final Solution" crystallized both in theory and practice, and in November and December Hitler's final decision became known to his entourage. On 20 January 1942, a meeting of senior Nazi bureaucrats in Berlin (the Wannsee Conference) coordinated plans for the systematic murder of the rest of European Jewry, stage by stage. The method of choice was gassing, administered in specially designed or adapted annihilation camps in Poland: Chelmno, Belzec, Majdanek, Sobibor, and Treblinka. By far the greatest number of Jews and Gypsies perished at a

sixth location: the Auschwitz-Birkenau complex, to which Jews from all over Europe were shipped aboard freight trains for immediate death in gas chambers. Many Jews also died while on the way to the annihilation camps or as a result of being worked to death in forced labor camps.

The Holocaust cast its shadow over the Middle East and North Africa as well as over Europe. For several months during 1942, the Jews of Palestine feared the prospect of annihilation at the hands of the German armies under the command of General Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, which threatened to overrun Palestine. The threat was lifted following the Allied victory at the battle of al-Alamayn (23 October–2 November 1942) in Egypt. Jews in German-occupied Tunisia and Libya were not so fortunate. They suffered humiliation and persecution—some were deported to Italy and others were brought to the Bergen-Belsen camp—but they were spared the full force of the Final Solution.

From the end of 1944, when the Allied advance moved toward Germany and Poland, hundreds of thousands of Jewish and non-Jewish inmates of concentration camps were marched away from the front lines; more than half of the evacuated inmates died in these death marches. Some 200,000 European Jews probably survived the camps; a smaller number survived in hiding or as partisan fighters against the Germans.

The Jews of Europe received little help from the Allied powers or from the local population of the countries where they lived. Yet a small number of non-Jews, subsequently honored as "righteous Gentiles," endangered their lives to hide or help rescue Jews. The most significant example of Jewish armed resistance, lasting several weeks, took place in the Warsaw Ghetto in 1943. Elsewhere, there were instances of Jewish escape, rebellion, and participation in underground and partisan resistance, but with little tangible result against overwhelming odds and in inauspicious conditions. Prominent among the resisters were Jewish youth who had been members of various Zionist and non-Zionist youth movements.

Repercussions for the Middle East

The impact of the Holocaust on the Middle East has been felt in several ways. German-Jewish emigration to Palestine increased shortly after the Nazi rise to power, aided by the August 1933 ha-Avara (property transfer) agreement between the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the German government. The desperation of European Jews also contributed to illegal immigration to Palestine (Aliyah Bet) in the late 1930s, during World War II, and in the wake of the Holocaust (1945–1948).

Holocaust survivors and refugees arrive at Haifa Port. Haifa is one of the deepest and best-protected ports in the Mediterranean. © PHOTOGRAPH BY ZOLTAN KLUGER. GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE (GPO) OF ISRAEL. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

The responses of the Yishuv (the organized Jewish community in Palestine) and Zionist leadership toward Nazi policies were the cause of much controversy within Jewish circles. Did the leadership emphasize the building up of a Jewish national home in Palestine at the expense of wider international efforts to rescue European Jewry? After the outbreak of World War II, the plight of the European Jews was used, unsuccessfully, as a major argument against the 1939 White Paper's limitations on Jewish immigration. Arab and Palestinian spokesmen countered that the two issues should not be linked. Later on, the Holocaust served as a motive for establishing the Jewish Brigade within, and the recruitment of Jews from Palestine into, the British army.

The real extent of the mass murder campaign in Europe penetrated only in November 1942. Af-

terwards, Zionist and Yishuv organizations contributed moral and financial aid to European Jews, some of it via a delegation based in Istanbul. In a few cases, missions were sent out (e.g., the dropping of some Palestine Jewish paratroopers into Slovakia and Hungary in 1944, in cooperation with the Royal Air Force) in attempts to rescue and support European Jews.

On the Palestinian side, the mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni, tried to establish contacts with the Italians and the Germans in the mid-1930s, viewing them as potential allies for his goal of removing British and Zionist influence from Palestine. Cooperation on several issues lasted until the downfall of Nazi Germany. The peak was on 28 November 1941, when the mufti met with Adolf Hitler; Hitler alluded to the Nazi Final Solution, while al-Husayni emphasized common German-Arab interests. There is no evidence to support claims that it was the mufti who inspired Hitler to initiate the Final Solution.

The extent to which the Holocaust was a factor in the establishment of the state of Israel remains a question in both historiography and nonacademic polemics. One stream of Zionist historiographers and religious Zionist thinkers, along with many Arab and post-Zionist commentators, view the Holocaust as the single decisive factor in the creation of Israel. Careful historical research, however, undermines such a simple causal connection.

On the other hand, it is undeniable that the Holocaust helped Zionism become the dominant political stream within world Jewry. The immediate post-Holocaust trauma and disillusion of Jews everywhere were so extreme that many Jews in the United States and Western Europe became committed to promoting a Jewish state. Yet the Holocaust had decimated European Jewry so drastically that the very foundations of the Zionist solution for the so-called Jewish problem in Europe were undermined.

From 1944 onwards, many Holocaust survivors made their way to Palestine on their own initiative, even before Yishuv emissaries came to convince them to do so. The Zionist movement became active in directing people to Palestine, and the struggle of the ha Apala (overcrowded illegal immigration boats crossing the Mediterranean Sea) served as a major tool in Zionist propaganda for open immigration and an end to British restrictions. The link between the plight of the Holocaust survivors in the Displaced Persons (DP) camps in Germany and the creation of a Jewish state was accepted by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (1947), thereby strengthening the Zionist case.

Recent research suggests that guilt about the Holocaust had little effect on the UN decision to partition Palestine. Britain wanted the Jews to stay in Europe, and the United States considered the direction of DPs to Palestine a humanitarian issue and did not at first see it leading to adverse political consequences. Latin American states supported the 1947 partition plan because of Christian pro-Zionist feelings, while communist states cast their vote with the intention of weakening Britain and advancing the decolonization process.

After the establishment of Israel, the Holocaust became a central issue in the building of national identity. An annual Holocaust Remembrance Day, memorials, the trial of Rudolph Kasztner (1954) and its repercussions, the kidnapping and trial of Adolf Eichmann (1960–1961), literature and theater, and more recently journeys of youngsters to extermination sites in Europe all contributed to keeping this topic center stage. Holocaust imagery also deeply penetrates Israeli discourse. On several occasions, it has been politically linked to the Israeli–Arab conflict. For example, Prime Minister Menachem Begin justified the Israeli bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear facility in 1981 by vowing that Israel would not allow anyone to prepare a "second Holocaust" in his lifetime.

The Arab world has done little or nothing to deal directly with the issue of the Holocaust dissociated from the conflict with Israel. Arabs often claim that the establishment of Israel would not have occurred without the Holocaust to justify it; they accuse Jews and Israelis of manipulating the Holocaust to bolster Zionist claims to Palestine. Since the mid-1990s a few Arab and Palestinian intellectuals have displayed greater awareness of the gravity of the Holocaust, partially disconnecting it from the polemics of the Arab–Israel conflict. Reconciliation groups among Israeli Arabs (and Jews) have created courses and activities to sensitize Arab educators to

the impact of the Holocaust on Jewish and Israeli thinking; one such activity was a joint Arab–Jewish pilgrimage to Auschwitz in summer 2003, led by a Palestinian priest from Nazareth. Yet, hardened by their own feelings of victimization and defeat at the hands of Israel's army, many Arabs find it difficult to empathize with Jewish suffering. A number of Arab authors and politicians have gone so far as to openly associate themselves with Holocaust deniers, while others downplay the extent of the Nazi genocide.

See also Alamayn, Al-; Jewish Agency for Palestine; Kasztner Affair; Rommel, Erwin; United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 1947 (UNSCOP); World War II; Yishuv.

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Dan Michman

HOLY LAND

An overall characterization of the area in the Middle East connected with biblical and New Testament narratives.

References to the Holy Land are found in Jewish biblical and rabbinic literature and later in Christian tradition. The area is centered at Jerusalem, and it extends from modern Israel to Egypt, which is associated with Jesus' family in the Gospels, and to Asia Minor, which is associated with the Virgin Mary and Saint John. As the dwelling place of the divine presence, the Holy Land has been the location of pilgrimage sites since the era of the Roman emperor Constantine in the fourth century. It began to take on distinct borders with the resurgence of Christian interest in the holy sites and the development of archaeology during the nineteenth century. The area is also holy to Muslims because it is home to important shrines associated with the prophet Muhammad and the early days of Islam, including Islam's third holiest mosque, in Jerusalem.

See also Jerusalem.

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HOLY SEPULCHRE, CHURCH OF THE

Christian church in Jerusalem said to contain the tomb of Jesus.

The Church of the Holy Sepulchre is in the Old City of Jerusalem. Originally a group of separate churches in a single enclosure, in the fourth century (starting in 325 C.E.), Emperor Constantine sought to turn it into an architectural monument. The Crusaders gave it its present form in 1149, combining its structures into one Romanesque church with a two-story facade. The interior has two principal sections: the rotunda—modeled on the Pantheon—which contains a shrine covering the tomb of Christ, and an Orthodox cathedral. Several Christian sects have appointed chapels and zealously guard their rights within the structure ac-

cording to the Ottoman-era "Status Quo" agreement of 1852. The keys to the church have been kept by the Muslim Nusayba family for generations, so that no one Christian sect might control it.

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HOMS

Syrian city and religious center.

Homs, strategically situated on the Orontes River at the eastern gateway of a pass connecting Syria's central plains to the Mediterranean coast, traces its history back to at least Greco–Roman times. Along with Baʿalbak, it was a center of sun worship from the first to the third century C.E. Arab Muslim armies led by Khalid ibn al-Walid captured the city in 637 and converted its massive church of St. John into a mosque. Homs was designated headquarters of one of five Syrian military districts under Muʿawiya. Its inhabitants repeatedly rebelled against the Abbasids before falling under the control of the Tulunids of Egypt (878–944) and Hamdanids of Aleppo (944–1016). Byzantine commanders raided the city throughout the tenth and eleventh centuries, but by the late eleventh century rivalry among competing Saljuq client states shaped politics in the region. Duqaq ibn Tutush turned Homs into a major base of operations against the Crusaders at the beginning of the twelfth century, bringing the city under the direct control of Damascus for the first time. It suffered a series of ferocious attacks from the Zangids of Aleppo in the early twelfth century and provided the linchpin for Nur al-Din Mahmud's defense of Damascus against the Second Crusade.

Salah al-Din ibn Ayyubi captured Homs in 1175, retaining the local Asadi dynasty to block incursions into central Syria from the Crusader strongholds of Tripoli and Krak de Chevaliers (Qalʿat al-Husn). After siding with the Mongols at Ayn Jalut, the Asadi ruler al-Ashraf Musa was pardoned by Qutuz, the Mamluk sultan whose successor, Baybars, rebuilt the city's citadel. In 1260, al-Ashraf Musa joined the rulers of Aleppo and Hama to defeat a second Mongol invasion force on the outskirts of the city. With the death of al-Ashraf Musa two years later, Homs vanished under the shadow of the rulers of Hamah and Damascus and continued to be dominated by the Mamluks of Egypt, by Timur, and by a succession of bedouin chieftains before becoming a subdivision *(pashalik)* of the Ottoman governorate of Damascus. The city's inhabitants revolted against the 1831 Egyptian occupation of Syria, prompting Ibrahim Pasha to raze the citadel.

Contemporary Homs is known for being the site of Syria's main oil refinery, as well as of the country's military academy. Several important public sector industrial enterprises, including a massive sugar factory, are located in and around the city. Syria's newest university, al-Baʿth, opened in the southern suburbs in 1979.

See also BAʿALBAK; IBRAHIM IBN MUHAMMAD ALI.

FRED H. LAWSON

HOPE-SIMPSON COMMISSION (1930)

British commission of inquiry into economic conditions in Palestine.

The Hope-Simpson Commission was established in the wake of the August 1929 Western (Wailing) Wall disturbances. A previous commission, the Shaw Commission, had concluded in March 1930 that the causes for the 1929 disturbances were Palestinian fear of Jewish immigration and land purchases. Because the commission recommended the curtailment of both, the Labor government of Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald appointed a commission of inquiry under Sir John Hope-Simpson to investigate land settlement, immigration, and development. The Hope-Simpson Report (Command 3686), issued on 30 August 1930, found that almost 30 percent of Palestinians were landless, presumably because of Jewish land purchases, and that Palestinian unemployment was exacerbated by a Jewish boycott of Arab labor.

The assumptions and recommendations of Hope-Simpson were incorporated in a policy paper called the Passfield White Paper of 1930 (Command 3692),

which recommended restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchases consistent with the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine. The recommendations caused a political furor in Great Britain. Under pressure from the Zionists and their supporters, MacDonald issued a February 1931 letter, known as the MacDonald Letter, or to Arabs as the Black Letter, which in effect reversed the policy of the White Paper of 1930. Consequently, the Hope-Simpson Commission resulted in no permanent change in British policy toward Palestine.

See also MacDonald, Ramsay; Shaw Commission; Western Wall Disturbances; White Papers on Palestine.

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Philip Mattar

HOSAYNIYEH

See Glossary

HOSS, SALIM AL-

[1929–]

The most important Sunni politician in Lebanon.

Salim al-Hoss was born in Beirut. He attended the International College and the American University of Beirut, where he excelled in economics. He earned a Ph.D. in economics from Indiana University. Hoss taught at the American University of Beirut for years and did consulting work for the government of Kuwait during the 1960s. Although he was aloof from the political scene in Lebanon, in 1967 he was appointed chair of the state council that monitors banking activities. As a result he became a friend of Ilyas Sarkis, then governor of the Central Bank.

When Sarkis was elected president in 1976, he appointed Hoss prime minister. Hoss held that position in the next two administrations, under Amin Jumayyil and briefly under Ilyas al-Hirawi. Although he was considered a political moderate, he was criticized by some Maronite leaders for opposing the president of the republic. In general, however, Hoss remains one of the most widely respected figures in Lebanon; he is seen as one of the few politicians who resisted the temptations of corruption and unprincipled compromises. His views tend to conform to the moderate views of the Sunni political establishment, although he is far less prone to sectarian agitation and mobilization. Hoss ran for parliament in the 1992 election on a platform of "salvation and reform." He was critical of Israel's occupation of Lebanon and maintained close ties with Syria, although he is regarded as less deferential to the latter's wishes than most political leaders in Lebanon.

Hoss has published two books on his experience in government and remains active on the political scene. His integrity and relative independence allow him a degree of political power that other politicians can only envy. Although his power base has been centered in Beirut, he has been popular in most parts of Lebanon. Although committed to a free economic system, in the early years of the twenty-first century Hoss was critical of Western governmental policies toward the Arab-Israel conflict and the situation in Lebanon. In 1988, Hoss served as de facto president in a large part of Lebanon when Jumayyil decided to name the commander in chief of Lebanon's army as president. Hoss, supported by many Lebanese and by Syria, served as acting president until the election of René Muʿawwad. In 1998, after the election of President Emile Lahhud, Hoss served as prime minister for two years, and he was seen as the key rival to powerful Sunni billionaire Rafiq Bahaʾuddin al-Hariri. To the surprise of many, and thanks to lavish campaign spending and sectarian mobilization by Hariri, Hoss lost his parliamentary seat in 2000. He remains active in politics, although as an outside critic of the Hariri government. Hoss is known for his independent views, and in 2003, despite his staunch support for the Palestinian cause, spoke out against Palestinian suicide bombings and urged a struggle of civil disobedience.

See also American University of Beirut (AUB); Hariri, Rafiq Bahaʾuddin al-; Hirawi, Ilyas al-; Jumayyil, Amin; Lahhud, Emile; Sarkis, Ilyas.

As'ad AbuKhalil

HOSTAGE CRISES

International crises intertwined with domestic politics in Iran and Lebanon.

In Tehran on 4 November 1979, a mob led by radical college students overran the U.S. embassy and took its personnel hostage. They announced that they would not free the diplomats until the United States agreed to extradite the country's former ruler, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941–1979). The shah, overthrown nine months earlier, had been admitted to the United States for cancer treatment two weeks before seizure of the embassy. Within days of the incident, Iran's revolutionary leaders endorsed the demands of the students and supported their claim that the U.S. embassy was a "den of espionage." U.S. efforts to exert pressure on Iran through diplomatic means (UN resolutions), economic sanctions (freezing Iran's assets in U.S. banks), and military actions (an abortive helicopter rescue attempt) proved unsuccessful in getting the hostages freed. Even the death of the shah, in July 1980, had no apparent effect. Only after Iraq invaded Iran in the fall of 1980 did Tehran indicate a serious interest in resolving the hostage issue. Iran and the United States subsequently accepted Algerian mediation, an accord that freed the hostages and established a tribunal to settle outstanding claims was signed in January 1981.

The kidnapping of Europeans and Americans in Lebanon that began in 1984 created a new, albeit less dramatic, hostage crisis. The militias that carried out the kidnappings wanted the governments of the hostages to pressure Israel to release Lebanese nationals that were detained in a special prison for those suspected of organizing resistance to Israel's occupation of south Lebanon. Because Iran supported these same militias, the United States was convinced that Iran could exert influence to get the hostages released. Some U.S. officials undertook secret negotiations with Iran that included covert arrangements to sell Iran weapons in exchange for the release of hostages in Lebanon. The weapons sales led to the freeing of only two hostages over the course of a year during which more Westerners in Lebanon were abducted. In October 1986, revelations of the arms-for-hostages deals caused grave embarrassment to the administration of U.S. president Ronald Reagan and resulted in the resignation of several senior aides. The scandal was compounded by revelations that profits from the secret arms sales to Iran had been diverted to secret accounts used to buy weapons for U.S.-backed forces (contras) trying to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. The fallout from the scandal put hostage negotiations on hold for several months. The last U.S. and other Western hostages in Lebanon were not released until 1991.

See also IRAN–CONTRA AFFAIR; PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA; REAGAN, RONALD.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

HOURANI, ALBERT

[1915–1993]

Leading twentieth-century historian of the modern Middle East.

Albert Habib Hourani was born in Manchester of Lebanese parents. From 1933 to 1936 he studied politics, philosophy, and economics at Magdalen College, Oxford. He then taught for two years at the American University of Beirut, and then held a position at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in London until 1943. From 1943 to 1945 he was attached to the office of the British minister of state in Cairo. From 1945 to 1947 he was a researcher for the Arab Office in Jerusalem and London, during which time he gave evidence to the Anglo-American committee of inquiry on Palestine. In 1946 the RIIA published his *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay* and in 1947 *Minorities in the Arab World,* two works that have stood the test of time.

In 1948 Hourani returned permanently to Oxford, where he became the first director of the Middle East Centre at St. Antony's College in 1953. In 1962 he published *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939,* which deals with the reception of European political philosophy, particularly the ideas of the Enlightenment and of liberalism, in the Arab world during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the various intellectual movements (the

Arab literary revival, national self-consciousness, Islamic modernism, Arab nationalism) of the period. Hourani published three volumes of collected essays, *Europe and the Middle East* (1980), *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (1981), and *Islam in European Thought* (1991). In 1991 he published his last and best-known work, *A History of the Arab Peoples,* which became a runaway success. The book emphasizes the variety and heterogeneity at the heart of Arab and Islamic civilization; it is beautifully written, with a finely modulated appreciation and mastery of an enormous range of subject matter. It is especially notable for its nuanced and intuitive understanding both of historical processes and of the intricate and complex relationships within Arab society.

PETER SLUGLETT

HOVEYDA, AMIR ABBAS

Iranian politician, and prime minister continuously from 1965 to 1977.

Amir Abbas Hoveyda was born in Tehran in 1919 and attended high school in Beirut. With a bachelor's degree in political science from Brussels, he returned to Iran in 1942 and was hired at the ministry of foreign affairs. In the 1950s he became a high administrator in the National Iranian Oil Company. In the early 1960s Hoveyda joined Hasan-Ali Mansur's Iran-e Novin Party, a new political grouping charged with implementing the shah's reform program known as the White Revolution. When Mansur was assassinated in 1965, Hoveyda replaced him as prime minister. As Iran's second most powerful man during the two prerevolutionary decades, he presided over a crucial period marked by rising oil income and various development projects, as well as widespread corruption and repression. In 1977, facing mounting economic and political problems, the shah demoted Hoveyda to court minister and later placed him under house arrest, as a scapegoat, when revolution loomed on the horizon in 1978. Left behind after the shah's January 1979 departure from Iran, Hoveyda was captured by Ayatollah Khomeini's provisional revolutionary government and executed quickly following a show trial in April 1979.

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NEGUIN YAVARI
UPDATED BY AFSHIN MATIN-ASGARI

HULA SWAMPS

Valley and former lake in the upper eastern Galilee region of Israel, known for its marshlands.

The Hula swamps, once a breeding ground for malaria mosquitoes, became the site for displaying Zionism's determination to transform marshes into fertile soil by marshaling economic resources and deploying technological forces. Earlier attempts to drain the swamps and develop the land, initiated by the Ottoman Empire, were never implemented. In 1934 the Palestine Land Development Company acquired the Hula concession and began to drain the land, a project completed in the 1950s by the state of Israel. As the number of Jewish settlements in the reclaimed region increased, the new fertile lands were stripped of their natural foliage, compromising the quality of the water in Lake Kinneret (Sea of Galilee), the country's only natural reservoir, and disrupting the flow of water in the Jordan River. To restore water quality and currents, the Jewish National Fund reintroduced the wetlands by constructing an artificial lake and digging a network of canals, creating a new and important nature reserve and tourist site in Israel.

See also JEWISH NATIONAL FUND; PALESTINE LAND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY.

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DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

HUMAN RIGHTS

Middle East states and international human rights conventions.

Special envoy of the President of the Palestinian National Authority, Hanan Ashrawi speaks to the 58th session of the Commission on Human rights in 2002. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

The term *human rights* refers herein to the human rights norms established in the international system in and following from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR). The poor (indeed, often critical) state of the protection of these rights is one of the major features of the human rights debate in the region, which continues to challenge the regional human rights movement, despite recent progress toward reform in certain states; the contestation of the universality of certain of these rights is another feature.

All states in the region are party to two or more of the United Nations human rights treaties. A number are not yet parties (as of 2004) to either the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights which, together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), make up the International Bill of Human Rights; these include Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). All are parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), but Iran, Iraq, Oman, Syria, and the U.A.E. have yet to sign the Convention Against Torture. A similar number of states (Iran, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, and the U.A.E.) have not yet become parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Many Middle Eastern states that have signed CEDAW, along with many states elsewhere in the world, have attached reservations to their ratification of this treaty. Certain of these reservations have attracted attention because of their broad nature; they purport to subject compliance with the Convention to the principles of Islamic *shariʿa;*. Arguments continue at the UN over the compatibility of such reservations with the intentions of CEDAW, and arguments continue in the region as to the universality of the norms provided in this particular treaty. There have been a few ratifications of the Optional Protocols to the ICCPR, CEDAW, and the CRC, enabling the appropriate monitoring committee to hear complaints from individual citizens against the state party.

Domestically, it is rare that individuals realize human rights protections through directly invoking international human rights instruments in the national courts, even though there may be constitutional provision for the incorporation in national legislation of international instruments to which the state is party. Furthermore, in many states in the region, weak and unempowered national judiciaries are unable to assert their independent will against the executive to secure effective judicial protection of human rights, even though the rights enshrined in the international instruments are also guaranteed in the texts of most of the constitutions of the region.

A number of states in the region are also party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and Turkey has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights. There is also the Arab Charter on Human Rights, which was adopted in 1994 by the members of the League of Arab States. The original text has been criticized by the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists as "a fatally flawed instrument, containing significant gaps and elements which run contrary to fundamental human rights principles." In the years following its adoption, no member state ratified the charter, and in 2003 a process of review for the "modernization" of its contents was initiated.

Another set of standards proclaimed by all states in the region (except for Israel) is contained in the

Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam. The declaration was adopted in 1990 by member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to serve "as a general guidance for member states in the field of human rights." The rights elucidated in the declaration differ in certain significant respects from those set out in the international human rights treaties to which many of the states in the region are parties, and resolutions from OIC summits have consistently asserted the significance of cultural relativity in response to the demands of the international human rights norm of universality. Thus, a 2003 resolution from the OIC foreign ministers recognizes "the obligations and endeavours of the member states to promote and protect the internationally recognized human rights while taking into account the significance of their religious, national, and regional specificities and various historical and cultural backgrounds, and with due regard to the 'Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.'" The arguments over universality versus cultural relativity of human rights norms revolve particularly around the rights of women and minorities, and freedom of religion.

Concern is articulated by many states and citizens in the region over the exploitation of the international human rights discourse for political ends. There are evocations of a larger context of colonial and neocolonial agendas, cultural imperialism, and hostility to Islam. Although these states have political interests in seeking to divert and undermine criticism of their human rights records in international forums (as, in a different discourse, does Israel), among civil society these evocations have a popular resonance, and there is widespread criticism of selectivity in the application of human rights discourse and principles by powerful Western states. This criticism has traditionally centered on the question of Palestine in light of the absence of enforcement action against Israel for its violations of the human rights of Palestinians. It has expanded to include a perception of a lack of attention to the human rights of all Muslims by the major Western powers. These issues have been heightened in the aftermath of the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001.

These real political issues have immediate impact on the work of nongovernmental domestic, regional, and diasporic human rights organizations (NGOs) established since the late 1970s to challenge widespread, egregious, and systemic human rights violations. These organizations have had critical influence in establishing and maintaining the human rights debate and discourse in the region. Regional networking has increased significantly over the last ten years, with a number of formal regional programs and less formal networks established. The NGO human rights movement in the region is also critical of selectivity in the approach of powerful Western states (and in some cases, international human rights organizations), and of Western influence over the agenda of the international human rights movement. Activists may find themselves caught between hostility at home and indifference to regional concerns in the international arena. Regionally, there is general consensus on the need to increase the popular resonance of universal human rights norms and discourse, as well as focusing on national and international state law and policy in order to increase the prospects for implementation of international human rights.

See also ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

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PAUL MARTIN
UPDATED BY LYNN WELCHMAN

HUMMUS

See FOOD: HUMMUS

HUMPHREYS, FRANCIS

[1879–1971]

British diplomat.

Francis Humphreys was the last British high commissioner in Iraq (1929–1932) before Iraqi independence in 1932. In that capacity, he played a central role in negotiating the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which paved the way for independence. Humphreys then served as the first British ambassador to Iraq (1932–1935).

See also ANGLO–IRAQI TREATIES.

ZACHARY KARABELL

HUNCHAK PARTY

Armenian-oriented Lebanese political party.

The Hunchak Party, organized in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1887, has promoted the dual objective of liberating Turkish Armenia and establishing a socialist regime in a unified Armenian homeland. In Lebanon, the party has advocated a planned economy and a just distribution of national income. In 1972, for the first time in its history, the party fielded a joint slate of candidates for parliament with the Dashnak Party. In the world of Armenian politics in Lebanon, ties of Armenian national solidarity supersede ideological considerations that might divide Armenians. During the Lebanese Civil War, the differences between the Hunchak and the Dashnak became insignificant.

The Hunchak Party achieved a victory in the 1992 election when Yeghya Djerijian, an Armenian (Greek Orthodox, born in 1957) was elected to parliament. He chairs the executive committee of the party.

See also ARMENIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; DASHNAK PARTY; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990).

AS'AD ABUKHALIL

HUNKAR-ISKELESI, TREATY OF (1833)

Mutual defense agreement between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

In February 1833, the Egyptian army of Ibrahim Pasha reached Kutahya in Ottoman Turkey, less than 200 miles (322 km) from Constantinople (now Istanbul), seat of the Ottoman Empire. With few options short of capitulation, the Ottoman sultan Mahmud II sought help from his former enemy, Czar Nicholas I of Russia. Nicholas complied, and Russian troops and ships were dispatched to the Bosporus (Turkish straits). Though the Russian presence did not save the sultan from severe concessions to Ibrahim and his father Muhammad Ali, viceroy of Egypt, it did force Ibrahim to temper his demands and depart from Kutahya. Having helped the sultan, Nicholas demanded payment in the form of a defensive alliance. The Treaty of Hunkar-Iskelesi, named after the Russian camp, was concluded on 8 July 1833. Concluded for eight years, it bound the sultan to close the Turkish straits to warships in times of war, and it provided for Russian aid if the Ottoman Empire was attacked. Though defensive, the treaty greatly alarmed the other European powers, who believed that it gave the Russians preponderant influence in Constantinople. Britain protested against the treaty and over the next years worked assiduously to reverse this setback to British interests in the Ottoman Empire.

See also IBRAHIM IBN MUHAMMAD ALI; MAHMUD II; MUHAMMAD ALI; STRAITS, TURKISH.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

HÜRRIYET

Daily newspaper in Turkey.

Hürriyet (Freedom) is a politically centrist newspaper known for its ardent antifundamentalist stand. In 1990, its managing editor, Cetin Emeç, was allegedly assassinated by Muslim fundamentalist terrorists.

Hürriyet has a circulation of 600,000, with 150,000 copies distributed in Western Europe, making it the most widely read Turkish newspaper outside the country. In Turkey, *Hürriyet*'s readers are typically middle class and high school educated.

Hürriyet was founded in 1948 by journalist and publisher Sedat Simavi, in the early years of Turkey's multiparty politics. It quickly became the top-selling daily in Turkey and remained in that position for about forty years, making it the country's most influential newspaper. Once a gossip paper, it gradually improved its serious news coverage. By the end of the 1970s, the paper maintained an extensive network of domestic bureaus and about a dozen international ones. For three years, until 1991, *Hürriyet* copublished with Bağimsiz Basin Ajansi an English-language weekly, *Dateline Turkey.*

Hürriyet remained in the Simavi family following the death of the founder in 1953, with his son, Erol, eventually taking sole control. In 1994, the Dogan Group, owner of *Milliyet,* took a controlling share of the newspaper with the purchase of 70 percent of Hürriyet Holding. Of the remaining stake, 15 percent stayed in the Simavi family and another 15 percent was held by various investors.

See also Newspapers and Print Media: Turkey; Simavi, Sedat.

Stephanie Capparell

HUSARI, SATI AL-

[1880–1968]

Social philosopher, political activist, and pioneer theorist of Arab nationalism.

Sati al-Husari (also spelled Sate al-Husri) was born in Aleppo, Syria, in 1880 and moved to the Balkans in his early youth. He joined the Committee for Union and Progress formed by Young Turks and Young Ottomans in 1907. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Husari left Istanbul and joined the movement for Arab nationalism. He assumed the position of minister of education in the reign of King Faisal I Ibn Hussein. When Faisal was ousted from Syria by the French in 1920, Husari followed him to Iraq, where he became the most important theoretician of modern Arab nationalism.

Al-Husari was fluent in many languages and had learned nationalist conceptions from nineteenth-century European thinkers such as Ernst Moritz Arndt, Johann Gottfried Herder, Georg W. F. Hegel, and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. He developed a theory of nationalism that identified the nation not as a voluntary association but as a living organism that develops through common language and history. He pinned all his hopes on the educated youth, to whom he hoped to teach the proper nationalist values by establishing schools, training teachers, and delivering lectures. He considered every person who spoke Arabic or who was affiliated with those who did to be an Arab. Hence, his conception of pan-Arabism was founded on secular values like language and history, but nonetheless integrated Islam as an important component of Arab cultural identity. He believed in Ibn Khaldun's concept of *asabiyya* (solidarity based on blood ties) as well as the notions of *le lien social* (social bonds) and *esprit de corps* (common feeling of purpose). To him, unity had spiritual and physical depths.

For al-Husari, freedom did not mean democracy or constitutionalism; it meant national unity. A nation *(umma)* denoted a secular group of people bound together by mutually recognized ties of language and history. This was distinct in his mind from state *(dawla),* a sovereign and independent people living on common land within fixed borders. He identified several challenges to nationalism, including imperialism, regionalism, communist internationalism, and the pursuit of Islamic political unity. He argued that the Muslim nations possessed many linguistic and cultural differences, which prevented their unity. Instead, he campaigned for an Arab unity based on the Arabic language, because Arabic preceded Islam and possessed many cultural traits that Islam did not have.

Even though al-Husari was willing to borrow from Western civilizations, he distinguished between civilization and culture. The former included sciences, technologies, and the means of production, and by its very nature it was internationalist. The latter included literatures and languages, and by nature it was nationalist. Thus, al-Husari instituted "the rule of separation" in the nationalist reasoning. His writings include: *Abhath Mukhtara fi al-Qawmiyya al-Arabiyya* (Selected studies in Arabic nationalism), *Thawrat 14 Tammuz* (The July 14 revolution), *Ara wa*

Ahadith fi al-Wataniyya wa al-Qawmiyya (Opinions and conversations in Arab nationalism), and *al-Amal al-Qawmiyya* (National aspirations).

See also Committee for Union and Progress; Faisal I Ibn Hussein; Young Turks.

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Rita Stephan

HUSAYNI, ABD AL-QADIR AL-

[1908–1948]

Palestinian nationalist and military leader.

Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni was born in Jerusalem to a notable family. He was the son of Musa Kazim, a major leader of the Palestinian struggle against Zionism. Abd al-Qadir saw military service during the Palestinian rebellion between 1936 and 1939. During World War II, he took part in the Iraqi revolt of Rashid Ali al-Kaylani, a pro-Axis Iraqi politician who replaced Nuri al-Saʿid as prime minister of Iraq in March 1940. After the British crushed al-Kaylani's revolt in 1941, Abd al-Qadir was imprisoned; following his release he went to Egypt.

In 1947, Abd al-Qadir managed to return to Palestine where he commanded, together with Fawzi al-Qawuqji, the Arab Liberation Army, a poorly equipped force of some 2,000 volunteers who crossed the Israeli border from Syria in January 1948, under the sponsorship of the Arab League. At the battle of Jabal al-Qastl (April 1948) on the Jaffa–Jerusalem highway, the better-trained and better-armed Haganah forces dealt the Arab forces a decisive blow, reopening the Jerusalem highway, killing Abd al-Qadir, and routing al-Qawuqji's troops. Soon thereafter, the Jewish forces took possession of most of the important Palestinian towns, including the major part of Jerusalem. For the Palestinians, their resistance at al-Qastil remains one of the proudest moments in their modern history, and Abd al-Qadir one of their most honored national heroes.

See also Arab Liberation Army; Haganah; Husayni Family, al-; Husayni, Musa Kazim al-; Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-; League of Arab States; Qawuqji, Fawzi al-.

Muhammad Muslih

HUSAYN IBN ALI

[1852–1931]

Arab leader from the Hashimite family.

Descended from the Hashimite family of Mecca, Husayn was the amir of Mecca (1908–1916), king of the Hijaz (1916–1924), and the father of Ali, Zayd, and of King Faisal I ibn Hussein of Iraq and Amir Abdullah I ibn Hussein of Transjordan, later king of Jordan.

In 1893, Husayn moved to Constantinople (Istanbul), seat of the Ottoman Empire, at the bidding of Sultan Abdülhamit II, and remained there for the next fifteen years. During these years of "gilded captivity," Husayn established himself as the leading candidate for the Meccan emirate, and in 1908, the sultan appointed him to that position. Once in Mecca, Husayn found himself at odds with the Young Turk government in Istanbul. While he sought autonomy for himself and the hereditary office of amir for his sons, the Young Turks and the Committee for Union and Progress attempted to extend their control over the Hijaz through the construction of the Hijaz Railroad.

Husayn's attitude toward Arab nationalism before World War I has been the subject of some dispute. In 1911, he was approached by Arab deputies in the Ottoman parliament as a possible leader of a

pan-Arab independence movement. He declined to take active part in their movement. Yet, by 1914, his sons Faisal and Abdullah were actively involved in various secret societies, and in the spring and summer of 1914, Abdullah met with British officials in Cairo. After the outbreak of World War I, Husayn entered into discussions with Britain about the possibility of an Arab revolt led by him against the Ottomans, but he continued to assure the Young Turks of his loyalty. In 1915, he began a correspondence with Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Cairo. The Husayn–McMahon Correspondence established the terms for a British-sponsored Arab revolt, with several critical ambiguities surrounding the status of Palestine.

In June 1916, Husayn launched the Arab Revolt, during which active military leadership passed to his four sons and the British. After the war, he refused to endorse the Versailles Treaty on the grounds that the British had reneged on the Husayn–McMahon correspondence and other wartime promises. At the same time, he came under increasing pressure from Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud of the Najd in central Arabia. Estranged from the British, who terminated aid to Husayn after 1920, and bitter about the mandate system, Husayn declared himself caliph (head of Islam) after Turkey abolished the caliphate in 1924. This ill-advised move alienated Husayn from many of his remaining supporters, and in August 1924, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud launched a major assault on the Hijaz. Husayn abdicated, went into exile on Cyprus, and died in 1931 in Amman. He was buried in the al-Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem.

See also Arab Revolt (1916); Committee for Union and Progress; Hashimite House (House of Hashim); Husayn–McMahon Correspondence; Young Turks.

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ZACHARY KARABELL
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

HUSAYNI FAMILY, AL-

Prominent Palestinian Arab family in Jerusalem.

By the late nineteenth century, the Husayni family had become extremely wealthy. They owned vast tracts of land amounting to about 50,000 *dunums,* including extensive areas and plantations in Jericho district. The social and political influence of members of the Husayni family was rooted in their ancient status as descendants of the prophet Muhammad, landowners, delegates to the Ottoman parliament, mayors and district governors, religious leaders, jurists, and educators. The family's influence also grew from a style of politics based on a delicate balance between the central authority of the Ottoman state and dominance in local Palestinian society. This balancing created a partnership between the central government in Constantinople (now Istanbul) and the urban upper class of the Arab provinces from the mid-nineteenth century until the demise of the Ottoman state in 1917 and 1918. Such partnership contributed to the further ascendance of the Husayni family since it enabled senior members of the family to act as intermediaries between the Ottoman government and local Palestinian society. The British, like the Ottomans before them, had to depend on the Husaynis and other locally influential notables to administer the local affairs of Palestine.

The senior members of the family include the following: Musa Kazim al-Husayni (1853–1934) was president of the Arab Executive from 1920 to 1934. Muhammad Amin al-Husayni (1895–1974) was a founder of Palestinian nationalism and the leader of the Palestine national movement until the *nakba* of 1948. Munif al-Husayni (1899–1983) was a close associate of al-Hajj Amin and editor of the Husayni camp's newspaper, *al-Jamiʿa al-Arabiyya.* Jamal al-Husayni (1892–1982), born in Jerusalem, served as secretary of the Arab Executive and the Supreme Muslim Council, as well as foreign minister for the All-Palestine government. Rajaʾi al-Husayni (1902–?) was active from 1945 in the Arab Information Offices, which were organized by Musa al-Alami under the auspices of the League of Arab States, served as minister in the All-Palestine government, and later went to Saudi Arabia to work as a senior official in the government. Ishaq Musa al-Husayni (1904–1990), a writer who at-

A portrait taken in 1938 of the mufti of Jerusalem and president of the Supreme Muslim Council of Palestine (1921–1936), Al-Haji Amin al-Husayni (1893–1974). Husayni opposed British rule and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. **© Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

tained literary prominence on a pan-Arab level, studied Arabic language and literature at the American University in Cairo (1923–1926), Cairo University (1927–1930), and the University of London (1930–1934) where he received a doctoral degree in Semitic languages and literature under the guidance of H. A. R. Gibb, an English expert on Arab culture and literature. Ishaq taught Arabic literature at the American University of Beirut, McGill University in Canada, the American University in Cairo, and the Arab League's Institute for Arab Studies in Cairo. He wrote numerous articles and books, the most widely acclaimed being *Memoirs of a Hen* (1943), which won the prize of Dar al-Maʿarif, one of Egypt's most prestigious publishing houses.

Dr. Daʾud al-Husayni (1903–1994), political activist, played an active role in the Palestine Arab Revolt, 1936–1939. He was captured by the British in Iraq in 1941 and detained in Rhodesia. Allegedly a coconspirator in the assassination of King Abdullah ibn Hussein (July 1951) he then served as a member of the Jordanian Parliament (1956, 1962), reportedly as a member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). He stayed in East Jerusalem after the Arab–Israel War of 1967 but was expelled to Jordan by the Israeli authorities in 1968 on charges of hostile political activities. Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni (1908–1948) was a son of Musa Kazim. Unlike most politicians who hailed from notable families, he actually joined the Palestinian commando groups both in the revolt of 1936–1939 and in the Arab–Israel War of 1948. He died in action (April 1948) at al-Qastal, a mountain along the Jerusalem–Jaffa highway. His son Faysal (1940–2001) established the Arab Studies Center in East Jerusalem in the 1980s. A senior figure in Fatah, he emerged as a local leader of the Palestinian Arabs in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and served on the advisory committee of the Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference. Faysal was a pragmatist who advocated coexistence between Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

After 1948, the Husayni family was no longer able to retain its dominance over the field of Palestinian politics. This was due to a combination of changes: the dispersal of the Palestinians, the loosening of family ties, the spread of new ideologies, the emergence of new political elites in many parts of the Arab world, as well as the orientation of Palestinian politics and the general weakening of the landowning, scholarly, and mercantile families that constituted a fairly cohesive social class from the second half of the nineteenth century until the end of the British mandate in 1948.

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Alami Family, al-; All-Palestine Government; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Fatah, al-; Husayni, Abd al-Qadir al-; Husayni, Jamal al-; Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-; Husayni, Musa Kazim al-; League of Arab States; Palestine Arab Revolt (1936–1939); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Supreme Muslim Council.

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Muhammad Muslih

HUSAYNI, HIND AL-

[1916–1994]

Palestinian philanthropist.

Hind al-Husayni was the daughter of Tahir Shuqri al-Husayni, a member of the prominent Jerusalem family that has dominated the city's politics and society for centuries. He died in 1918, leaving a family of six. Hind attended the Jerusalem Girls College (JGC) in the 1930s and was a member of a private girls' school strike committee during the 1936–1939 Strike and Revolt. Husayni became interested in social work through her studies with Victoria and Elizabeth Nasir, aunts of Palestinian academic Hanna Nasir. After finishing her training at the JGC, she taught at the Islamic Girls School in Jerusalem until 1946. During the 1940s Husayni was president of the Women's Solidarity Society, whose work focused on child care for the children of working mothers. On 14 April 1948, after the massacre of Palestinians by the Irgun in the village of Dayr Yasin, many orphaned children were deposited in Jerusalem, where Husseini found them. In order to care for them, she founded an orphanage named Dar al-Tifl al-Arabi (House of the Arab Child), which was located in her family home in Jerusalem. From then until the present, the institution developed and expanded its philanthropic activities, which included a nursery, kindergarten, and school; vocational and computer training; and a farm. Hind al-Husayni died in 1994.

See also DAYR YASIN; HUSAYNI FAMILY, AL-.

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ELLEN L. FLEISCHMANN

HUSAYNI, HUSAYN AL-

[1937–]

Shiʿite politician in Lebanon.

Husayn al-Husayni was born to a prominent family in Shmistar, near Baʿalbak. He first ran for public office in 1964 and was elected to parliament in 1972, when his close association with Imam Musa al-Sadr paid off. His political role in the political life of Lebanon was minimal until 1978, when Musa al-Sadr "disappeared" and Husayni assumed the leadership of the AMAL movement. His conflict with other militant factions within the movement began in 1980, when Nabih Berri (his archrival) took control of AMAL.

With strong backing from Syria, Husayni was elected speaker of parliament in 1984, and he held the position until 1992, when Berri succeeded him. Husayni's showing in the 1992 election was poor, and the candidates of the Hizbullah (Party of God) in his district of Baʿalbak achieved great success. The election results weakened his ties with the government of Lebanon, and he became one of the most bitter opposition figures. He directs his attacks against Prime Minister Rafiq Bahaʾuddin al-Hariri, whom he accuses of corrupting Lebanon and of profiting from his high office. Husayni has been marginalized in the Shiʿite community by Berri and by Hizbullah. In 2003 Husayni joined deputies Naʾila Muʿawwad and Umar Karami to form an opposition front. He has been criticized for refusing to release the minutes of the parliamentary deliberations in Taʾif that produced the Taʾif Accord.

See also AMAL; BERRI, NABI; HARIRI, RAFIQ BAHAʾUDDIN AL-; TAʾIF ACCORD.

ASʿAD ABUKHALIL

HUSAYNI, JAMAL AL-

[1892–1982]

Palestinian nationalist leader.

Jerusalem-born Jamal al-Husayni was secretary of the Arab Executive and the Supreme Muslim Council. In 1935 he was elected president of the Palestine Arab Party, and one year later he became a member of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC). A firm believer in public relations and political lobbying as well as a relative and close aide to al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, the *mufti* of Jerusalem, he participated as member (1930) and as president (1939) of the Palestinian delegations dispatched to London to discuss Palestinian demands with the British government. He also served on the AHC's delegations to the League of Arab States and the United Nations. He was briefly detained by the British authorities in Palestine for his role in the Jerusalem and Jaffa demonstrations of October

1933. Following the *mufti*'s escape to Beirut in 1937, Jamal secretly joined him and from there he fled to Iraq, then to Iran where he was arrested by the British in 1942 and deported to Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. Four years later, he returned to Palestine and, after 1947, he served as foreign minister for the All-Palestine Government and later settled in Saudi Arabia where he was adviser to King Saʿud (1953–1964). Jamal died in Beirut and was buried there.

On behalf of the political bodies on which he served during the mandate period, Jamal submitted compromise ideas to the Palestine government and to Jewish representatives concerning a new basis for relations between the government and the Jewish community on the one hand and the Palestinian Arabs on the other hand. The unpublished autobiography of Jamal reveals a feeling of apathy toward the *mufti*, partly because of the rift between the *mufti* and Musa al-Alami, whose sister Jamal had married.

See also Alami Family, al-; Al Saʿud, Saʿud ibn Abd al-Aziz; League of Arab States; Supreme Muslim Council.

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Muhammad Muslih

HUSAYNI, MUHAMMAD AMIN AL-

[1895–1974]

Palestinian leader during the British mandate.

Born in Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni (later often referred to as Hajj Amin) was the scion of a prominent Palestinian Muslim family, which included landed notables and religious officeholders such as the mufti (Islamic legal expert). He studied in Cairo briefly at al-Azhar University and at the Dar al-Daʿwa wa al-Irshad of Rashid Rida, the Muslim reformer and precursor of Arab nationalism, and at the military academy in Istanbul. He served in the Ottoman army in 1916, but his loyalty to the Ottoman Empire was shaken by Turkish attempts to impose their language and culture on their Arab subjects. Upon returning to Palestine in 1916, he participated in the British-supported Arab Revolt of 1916 against the Turks and worked for the establishment of an independent Arab nation. In 1918, he was elected president of al-Nadi al-Arabi (the Arab Club), a literary and nationalist organization opposed to Zionist claims on Palestine. After participating in a violent anti-Zionist demonstration in 1920, he escaped to Damascus, Syria, where he worked for the short-lived Arab nationalist government of Amir (later King) Faisal. The first high commissioner of Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, pardoned him from a ten-year sentence in absentia for his role in the 1920 demonstration, and appointed him to succeed his brother as mufti of Jerusalem in 1921.

Al-Husayni's political career can be divided into two distinct phases: the Palestine years of 1917 to 1936, when he cooperated with the British while opposing Zionism, and the exile period after 1936, when he became intransigent and cooperated with Nazi Germany.

Palestinian Phase

The fundamental explanation for al-Husayni's cooperation with the British can be traced to the politics of the class from which he emerged. The notables were defenders of the status quo and worked with the imperial government to guarantee or enforce stability while representing their society's interests and demands to the ruling power—first the Ottomans, then after 1917 the British. Before being appointed mufti, al-Husayni assured Samuel that he and his family would maintain tranquility in Jerusalem. In early 1922, he was appointed president of the Supreme Muslim Council, which gave him control over Muslim courts, schools, and mosques, and an annual budget. During the 1920s al-Husayni used his office to extend his influence in religious and political affairs within and beyond Palestine. His rise to power coincided with the decline of the Palestine Arab Executive, which led the Palestinian national struggle from 1920 to 1934, and with the perception that he had stood up to the Zionists during the 1928 through 1929 Western (Wailing)Wall controversy and riots. In fact, he neither organized nor led the riots, according to the

British Shaw Commission, which investigated the disturbances.

From 1929 to 1936, al-Husayni cooperated with the British while attempting to change British policy. He opposed militant activities against British rule and sent his secretary to London to propose a representative government. For their part, the British proposed, in the Passfield White Papers of 1931, restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchase but withdrew the proposal because of Zionist pressure. The mufti convened a general Islamic Congress in December 1931 to galvanize Arab and Muslim opposition to Zionism and to caution Britain that support for Zionism would jeopardize her interests in the Arab and Muslim world.

British policy did not change, however. Jewish immigration rose in 1935 to a record annual high of 61,854, which helped radicalize the Palestinian community. The British killing of an insurgent, Izz al-Din al-Qassam, further embittered Palestinians, who began to challenge the mufti's ineffective methods. Until 1936, al-Husayni was able to serve two masters: his British employers and his people. But in April 1936, a general strike was declared and violence spread. The public urged him to assume the leadership of the strike, which protested Jewish immigration and land purchase and demanded a national government. His acceptance put him on a collision course with the British.

Exile Phase

Over the next few years, several events radicalized al-Husayni. When the British proposed, in the 1937 Peel Commission Report, to partition Palestine, he rejected the proposal because the Jews, who owned 5.6 percent of the land, would receive many times that area and in the most fertile region, from which most Palestinians would be expelled; the British would remain in control of the third holiest city of Islam, Jerusalem; and the rest would be attached to Amir Abdullah's Transjordan. Faced with the mufti's refusal to cooperate, the British stripped him of his offices and sought to arrest him.

He escaped to Lebanon in 1937, continued to lead the revolt, and most likely acquiesced in the assassination of his Palestinian opponents. The revolt was finally suppressed in 1939, after more than three thousand Palestinians had been killed, their leaders exiled, and the Palestinian economy shattered. Al-Husayni became bitter and uncompromising, rejecting the 1939 White Paper even though its terms were favorable to the Palestinians: It proposed a limitation on Jewish immigration and land purchases and a Palestine state with a representative government based on ratio of two Arabs to one Jew. He again escaped, this time from Lebanon to Iraq, where he encouraged a pan-Arab revolt against British rule in 1941. British prime minister Winston Churchill approved his assassination, but a British and Zionist mission to assassinate him in Baghdad failed.

Al-Husayni fled to the Axis countries, where he conferred with Mussolini and Hitler. He cooperated with the Nazis in exchange for German promises that the Arab nations would be liberated and given their independence after the war, and he assisted in anti-British and antisemitic propaganda campaigns and in recruiting Muslims for the war effort. The mufti, fearing that Jewish immigration to Palestine would lead to the domination or dispossession of his people, tried unsuccessfully to persuade Nazi officials not to allow Jews to leave Axis countries for Palestine. By doing so, he endangered the lives of thousands of Jews, mostly children, who probably would have been sent to concentration camps. Israeli writers and their supporters were so eager to indict him as a war criminal who participated in the Holocaust that they exaggerated his activities, whereas Arab writers, especially Palestinians, were so intent on justifying his actions in Axis countries that they ignored his cooperation with a barbaric regime. What is certain is that his association with the Nazis tainted his career and his cause and limited his effectiveness during the critical period from 1946 to 1948.

In 1946, al-Husayni returned to the Arab world with the aim of continuing his struggle against the Zionists and establishing an Arab Palestine. But he misjudged the balance of forces. He rejected the UN General Assembly's partition resolution (181) of November 1947 largely because it gave the Jews 55 percent of Palestine when they owned only 7 percent of the land. In the civil strife and war that followed, about 725,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled by Israel forces. After the Arab–Israel War of 1948, al-Husayni gradually lost political influence and became a religious leader, settling first in Cairo and then in Beirut.

Assessment

Although astute, incorruptible, and dedicated to the welfare of his people, al-Husayni's policies during both phases of his career were a failure. From 1917 to 1936, despite his rhetoric about the ominous threat of Zionism to Palestinian national existence, he cooperated with the British and rejected an overt struggle, preferring petitions, delegations, and personal appeals. In the meantime, the Zionists' numbers increased from 50,000 in 1917 to 384,000 in 1936. It was only after 1936 that al-Husayni participated in active measures to stop Jewish immigration, which if unchecked, the Palestinians felt, would result in their expulsion or domination. But by then it was too late: The Zionists had become too powerful, and the British had lost their discretionary authority in the country. Conversely, the Palestinians, especially after the suppression of the Arab Revolt, were too weak.

Al-Husayni did not adjust his demands to the realities and made little effort to reach an accommodation with the British and the Zionists. His rejection of the 1947 UN resolution was a missed opportunity that contributed to Palestinian dispossession. However, even had he accepted the resolution, it is uncertain that a Palestinian state would have been established because of a 1946 and 1947 agreement, supported by the British, between Amir Abdullah ibn Hussein and the Jewish Agency to divide Palestine between them.

The overriding factors that frustrated Palestinian nationalists have as much to do with al-Husayni's intransigence as with the balance of forces. The 1897 Basel Zionist program and the 1917 Balfour Declaration policy, backed by the British military and by Western support, gave Palestine's Jewish community time to grow through immigration and land purchases and to establish modern quasigovernmental and military institutions. The Palestinians were a weak, divided, and traditional society and never a match for the British and the Zionists.

See also Arab Club; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab Revolt (1916); Balfour Declaration (1917); Haycraft Commission (1921); Islamic Congresses; Jewish Agency for Palestine; Peel Commission Report (1937); Qassam, Izz al-Din al-; Rida, Rashid; Samuel, Herbert Louis; Shaw Commission; Supreme Muslim Council; United Nations and the Middle East; Western Wall Disturbances; White Papers on Palestine.

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Philip Mattar

HUSAYNI, MUSA KAZIM AL-

[1853–1934]

Palestinian nationalist leader.

Musa Kazim al-Husayni played a major role in the early phase of the Palestinian national movement. Born in Jerusalem to a socially and politically prominent family, he acquired senior positions in the Ottoman imperial bureaucracy in Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. After the British occupied Palestine, he was appointed mayor of Jerusalem in March 1918, succeeding his deceased predecessor and brother, Husayn al-Husayni. Throughout his political career, Musa Kazim followed a policy of cautious engagement in politics and discreet opposition to the British, who sponsored and supported the Zionist movement. In 1918 he refrained from demonstrating against Zionism after the Jerusalem governor, Ronald Storrs, told him that he must make a choice between political activism and the mayoralty. His circumspect behavior, which was typical of a generation of Palestinian politicians whose political style was shaped by their

experience in the Ottoman system of government, did not stop him from fighting for Palestinian nationalism. In 1920 he was removed from his post as mayor of Jerusalem by the British for participating in a demonstration against the Jewish National Home policy of the British government.

Husayni was elected president of the third Palestinian Arab Congress (held in Haifa in December 1920) and the Arab Executive, a loosely-structured political body formed in 1920 to coordinate the Palestinian national struggle. Husayni led the Palestinian Arab delegations that were dispatched to London to present the Palestinian point of view to the British authorities. During the 1929 Western (Wailing) Wall Disturbances, Husayni signed a manifesto urging his fellow Palestinians not to engage in violence and to arm themselves instead with mercy, wisdom, and patience.

Partly as a result of his disappointment with the British pro-Zionist policy, and partly because of the pressure of the action-oriented Palestinian groups that emerged during the late 1920s, he led the October 1933 Palestinian demonstrations against Zionist immigration in Jerusalem. A product of Ottoman times with a penchant for discretion and a love for senior political posts, Husayni was unable to devise a strategy that would alter the British pro-Zionist policy. The balance of power, which was overwhelmingly in favor of the Zionists and their British supporters, together with internal Palestinian bickering—epitomized by the Husayni-Nashashibi rivalry—put Husayni and his generation of Palestinian nationalists at a decisive disadvantage.

Beaten by British security forces during the October 1933 demonstration, he never fully recovered. He died the "venerable father" *(al-ab al-jalil)* of the Palestine national movement.

See also Husayni Family, al-; Zionism.

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Muhammad Muslih
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

HUSAYN–MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE (1915–1916)

Correspondence between Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca and the British high commissioner in Egypt, who promised independence to Arab countries.

Ten letters, written between 14 July 1915 and 30 March 1916 but unpublished until 1939, constitute an understanding of the terms by which the sharif would ally himself to Britain and revolt against the Ottoman Turks in return for Britain's support of Arab independence. Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca asked Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt, to support independence of the Arab countries in an area that included the Arabian Peninsula (except Aden), and all of Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, and Syria up to Turkey in the north and Persia in the east. He also asked Britain to support the restoration of the caliphate.

McMahon's reply on 24 October 1915 accepted these principles but excluded certain areas in the sharif's proposed boundaries: coastal regions along the Perisan Gulf area of Arabia; the Iraqi province of Baghdad, which would be placed under British supervision; areas "where Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France"; and, in Syria, "the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo." The Arabs assumed that at least Arabia, northern Iraq, central Syria, and Palestine—which was regarded as southern, not western, Syria—were part of the area that was to be independent. They started the Arab Revolt of 1916, which helped the British to defeat the Turks and to occupy the region. After the war, Arabs felt betrayed because Britain conceded Syria to France and promised to help in the establishment of the Jewish national home in Palestine. The British claimed that they intended to exclude Palestine from McMahon's pledges.

The interpretations of the letters have been disputed ever since, in part because of official oversight, and because of deliberate vagueness by the British who—to obtain French, Arab, and Jewish support during the war—made conflicting promises they could not keep. Contributing to the confusion are partisan scholars who read into the correspondence interpretations that fit their ideological positions.

See also Arab Revolt (1916); Husayn ibn Ali; McMahon, Henry.

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Philip Mattar

HUSAYN, TAHA

[1889–1973]

Egyptian critic and writer of fiction; Egypt's minister of education, 1950–1952.

Taha Husayn was born in an Egyptian village in the Nile delta. His life was transformed at the age of two, when he was blinded by the village barber's attempt to treat ophthalmia. The course of his early education, with its many frustrations and occasional triumphs, is recorded in one of the major monuments of modern Arabic literature, *Al-Ayyam* (1925; published in English as *An Egyptian Childhood,* 1932). In two later volumes under the same title, Taha Husayn traces his transition from the village Qurʾan school to the Azhar mosque-university in Cairo (*Al-Ayyam,* 1939; *The Stream of Days,* 1948) and his sense of acute frustration at the kind of education being offered there. The third volume (*Al-Ayyam,* 1967; *A Passage to France,* 1976) describes his transfer to the new secular Egyptian University (now the University of Cairo) from which he obtained the first Ph.D., with a dissertation on the renowned classical Arabic poet, Abu al-Ala al-Maʿarri, whose blindness clearly led to feelings of close affinity between author and subject. In 1915, Taha Husayn traveled to France. Arriving at the University of Montpelier, he hired a young French woman to read to him. The two fell in love and were married in 1917. Husayn moved to Paris in 1915 where he became a student at the Sorbonne and, in 1918, completed a second doctoral dissertation, this one on the famous historian Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406).

Upon his return home, Husayn set himself, both as author and teacher, the task of introducing to his fellow countrymen and, by extension, to the Arab world as a whole, many of the ideas and ideals he had encountered in Europe. Appointed professor of ancient history immediately following his return from France, he assumed the chair of Arabic literature in 1925. It was at this time that he contributed to the newspaper *al-Siyasa* a series of articles on early Arabic poetry, which were to be published later in three volumes as *Hadith al-Arbaʿa* (1954, n.d., 1957). His lecture references on the debt of Islam to Hellenistic ideas were already controversial, but when in 1926 he published in book form *Fi al-Shiʿr al-Jahili,* his views on the authenticity of pre-Islamic poetry, and suggested that certain stories recorded in the text of the Qurʾan might be fables, he was accused of heresy. He offered to resign but was vigorously defended by the president of the university, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (1872–1963). Eventually a compromise was reached whereby the work was withdrawn. A revised version, *Fi al-Adab al-Jahili,* was published in 1927, with the offending passages removed but the remainder of his argument expanded.

Taha Husayn was not afraid to provoke and confront controversy during the remainder of his career. Appointed dean of the faculty of arts in 1929, he soon clashed with governmental authorities and was dismissed from that position in 1932 amid strikes and resignations. He now became more active in both journalism and politics while continuing his career as a university teacher, administrator, and writer. In 1938 he published another controversial work, *Mustaqbal al-Thaqafa fi Misr,* laying out a broad and ambitious program of educational reform that involved a process of modernization on the model of Europe. During the 1940s he was accorded increasing recognition as a scholar and writer both in Egypt and abroad; in 1950 he was appointed minister of education in the Wafd government. He was in the process of implementing his

reforms when a series of events began that were to culminate in the Egyptian revolution of July 1952.

During the final decades of his life, as the pace of development in the literary tradition that he loved began to accelerate, he became a more conservative figure, bent on preserving the great heritage from what he came to regard as the wilder excesses of some of its contemporary inheritors—not least in the call for literature of commitment that so predominated in the critical environment of the 1950s.

Taha Husayn made several contributions to modern Arabic fiction, of which the novels *Duʿa al-Karawan* (1932) and *Shajarat al-Buʾs* (1944) and the short-story collection *Al-Muʿadhdhibun fi al-Ard* (1949) are the most notable. It is, however, in the realm of literary criticism that his contribution to modern Arabic cultural life is most significant. He played a major role in the formulation of a modern approach to the issues of Arabic literary history; he applied critical methods to the canon of both poetry and artistic prose through a series of studies on genres and various writers. From his early study of al-Maʿarri, mentioned above, via his work on Abu al-Tayyib al-Mutanabbi (died 965), generally acknowledged as the greatest of the classical poets, to contemporary poets such as Ahmad Shawqi (1868–1932) and Hafiz Ibrahim (1871–1932), it is possible to detect a determined effort to introduce into the world of Arabic literature a critical approach based on a recognizable methodology. In so doing, he laid the groundwork for subsequent generations of critics, most notably his own student, Muhammad Mandur (1907–1965).

Taha Husayn was known during his lifetime as the dean of Arabic literature—the title is appropriate. Not only did he write creative works and critical studies, but his sense of mission led him to play a major role in the difficult process of cultural adjustment and change that the Arab world had to face during the course of the twentieth century.

See also Ibrahim, Muhammad Hafiz; Islam; Literature: Arabic; Qurʾan; Shawqi, Ahmad; Wafd.

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Roger Allen

HUSSEIN IBN TALAL

[1935–1999]

King of Jordan, 1952–1999.

Hussein's rule indelibly stamped the fabric of socio-economic and political life in Jordan, to the point that in some people's eyes Hussein and Jordan were inseparable and almost synonymous for over four decades. Hussein ibn Talal was born in Amman on 14 November 1935, to Prince Talal ibn Abdullah and his wife, Zayn al-Sharaf. Talal was the son of Amir (Prince) Abdullah I ibn Hussein of Transjordan, and grandson of Husayn ibn Ali (Sharif) of the Hashimite family of Mecca. Hussein was a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, representing the forty-second generation after the Prophet. His grandfather Abdullah started instructing the young prince in statecraft at an early age. Following then-King Abdullah's assassination in July 1951, Talal, who suffered from schizophrenia, reigned only thirteen months before being replaced by seventeen-year-old Hussein in August 1952. Only after reaching his eighteenth year (according to the Islamic calendar) in 1953 did Hussein formally begin his rule.

Despite the family's lack of worldly goods—they could not even buy him a bicycle—Hussein enjoyed a broad but abbreviated education. In Amman, he successively attended a religious school and Kulliyat al-Matran (the Bishop's School); this instruction was supplemented by special tutorials in Arabic and Islam. For his middle preparatory years, he was enrolled in the prestigious Victoria College in Alexandria, Egypt, where he broadened his world view. During this period, the Middle East and Jordan were experiencing momentous events. In 1948, when Prince Hussein was thirteen, Israel was created, and the Arab armies attacked, fighting until 1949. They were defeated, but Transjordan gained possession of the West Bank and absorbed a major

King Hussein (center) with his wife, Queen Noor (second row, second from left) and their twelve children. Hussein, a direct descendent of the prophet Muhammad, the founder of Islam, became king at the age of seventeen when his father, Talal ibn Abdullah, was declared mentally unfit to rule. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

wave of Palestinian refugees. In 1950, when Prince Hussein was fifteen, the West Bank was formally joined to the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.

In 1951, this succession of events began to directly affect the young prince; on 20 July, King Abdullah was assassinated by a disgruntled Palestinian. While his father, Talal, temporarily ascended the throne, Prince Hussein was moved to England to join his cousin, Crown Prince Faisal II ibn Ghazi of Iraq, at Harrow, an elite school for future leaders of Britain and the British Empire. On 11 August 1952, King Talal was constitutionally removed from the Jordanian throne due to illness, and the crown was passed to his eldest son, Prince Hussein. Since he had not yet reached his majority, the young King Hussein was transferred to Sandhurst, the British military academy, while a regent ruled in Amman. In May 1953, King Hussein returned to Jordan and assumed the throne. Despite dire predictions for his political survival—the young king ruled a small country in the midst of a turbulent Middle East—he ended up ruling far longer than any other king of Jordan. By the time of his death in 1999, he had come to symbolize modern Jordan.

Hussein was married four times during his long reign. His first wife was Dina bint Abd al-Hamid (1929–), a distant and older cousin from Cairo. They married in April 1955 but divorced eighteen months later. In May 1961, Hussein married the daughter of a British military attachè, Antoinette Avril Gardiner (1943–), who assumed the name Princess Muna. This union too ended in divorce in 1972. In the following year, the king married a third time, this time to a Palestinian named Alia Baha

al-Din Tuqan (1948–1977), from the prominent Tuqan family of Nablus. In February 1977, Queen Alia (also Aliya) died in a helicopter crash. In June 1978, the king married Elizabeth Najeeb Halaby (1951–), an Arab-American who became Queen Noor (also Nur). He had a number of children by his marriages. His marriage to Dina produced a daughter, Aliya (1956–). His two sons by Princess Muna are Abdullah (1962–) and Faysal (1963–), along with two girls, Ayisha (1968–) and Zayn (1968–). Hussein and Queen Alia produced a girl, Haya (1974–), and a son, Ali (1975–). Finally, his children with Queen Noor were two boys, Hamza (1980–) and Hashim (1981–), and two girls, Iman (1983–) and Rayya (1986–). In 1976 he also adopted a daughter with Queen Alia, Abir (1972–).

Hussein's rule may be divided into three major historical periods. The first twenty years were marked by crises and threats to the throne originating from inside and outside the country: street riots stimulated by radical Arab nationalism; challenges from his own prime minister in 1956 and 1957; destabilization by larger and stronger Arab states; and the devastating loss of the West Bank to Israel in the Arab–Israel War of June 1967. Soon after, in 1970, the Palestinian guerrilla organizations challenged Jordan in a bloody civil war known as Black September. Nonetheless, while relying on his loyal military to survive, the king helped put in place the bases for development.

The second phase, starting after the Arab–Israel War of October 1973, is distinguished by quieter internal political conditions, more rapid development fueled by funds (direct grants, loans, individual remittances) derived from the petroleum boom in neighboring states, and improved relations with most of Jordan's Arab neighbors. It was a relatively less radical, regional atmosphere. Despite his problems with the Palestinians and his frequently strained relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its leader, Yasir Arafat, the king came to be a respected leader in most Arab capitals. Indeed, he hosted two Arab summits—1980 and 1987—in Jordan.

The third phase is dominated by the end of the Cold War and the alteration of regional relationships. In a sense, Hussein's historical July 1988 decision to disengage Jordan politically and administratively from the West Bank, in response to the pressures from the first Palestinian Intifada (uprising) that started in 1987 and the clear lack of Palestinian support for continued Jordanian rule, was a precursor to these changes. More important was the withdrawal of the Soviet Union as an active player in the region (1989–1990), and the United States's dominance in areas of its perceived interests. The resulting polarization of the Arab world and the Gulf Crisis of 1990 and 1991 and ensuing war left Jordan (at the time allied politically with Saddam Hussein's Iraq) and a few other poor Arab states politically, economically, and regionally isolated. Finally, following significant anti-government protests in April 1989 in areas that comprised the "Hashimite heartland" that were so important to his rule, Hussein initiated a significant democratization process and called for the first general parliamentary elections in the country since 1967. Political parties were legalized, political exiles allowed to return, and press freedoms were expanded. Leaders from all political streams wrote a national charter, which defined the general principles for the country's political life. A special general congress made up of 2,000 representatives ratified the document on 9 June 1991.

Israeli prime minister Yitzak Rabin (left) with King Hussein of Jordan. The two men signed a peace treaty in 1994 that ended forty-six years of hostile relations between their countries. Major points of the agreement included the resolution of disputes over land and water rights and a pledge of cooperation regarding trade and tourism. © Photograph by Sa'ar Ya'acov. Government Press Office (GPO) of Israel. Reproduced by permission.

A long-term trend in the king's rule was his moderation and centrism. After times of internal threat

to the regime, he did not execute the challengers. Some were sent to prison or exiled, but in time many were brought back and given positions of some authority. Nor did Hussein follow radical or overly conservative social, economic, or cultural policies. His relations with the Arab world follow a similar pattern. As the leader of a small state, Hussein followed a strategic policy for the survival of his country by consistently trying to maintain acceptable ties with some of the strong Arab states; this policy has not always met with success as, for example, during the post–Gulf War period, when his Iraq policy was considered ill advised. Throughout his rule, Hussein was resolutely pro-Western, even when that stance cost him dearly. Finally, he was long convinced of the need to reach a diplomatic resolution of the conflict with Israel. Drawing upon a history of good Hashimite relations with Zionist and Israeli leaders, and as a result of the disastrous loss of the West Bank in the 1967 Arab–Israeli war, Hussein tried to keep Jordan out of the ongoing Arab struggle against Israel. Jordan became the second Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel, in October 1994. Throughout the mid and late 1990s, Hussein remained involved in the faltering yet ongoing peace process between Israel and the PLO. He even left his cancer treatment in the United States (see below) in October 1998 to participate in the Wye River conference convened by U.S. president Bill Clinton.

Hussein took one of the most dramatic political moves in his long reign literally just two weeks before he died. A heavy smoker, Hussein was diagnosed with renal cell cancer (of the kidney) in August 1992. After successful surgery, he returned to Jordan the following month to a tumultuous hero's welcome. In July 1998, Hussein was again diagnosed with cancer, this time non-Hodgkins lymphoma, a cancer of the lymph glands. After seeking treatment in the United States on 14 July, he returned to Jordan on 19 January 1999, announcing that he had been cured. He then made a decision that stunned his country: He replaced his brother, Prince Hassan (also Hasan), with his eldest son, Abdullah II ibn Hussein, for the post as crown prince and heir apparent. Hassan (1947–) had been the crown prince and close confidant of the king since April 1965, yet he and Hussein eventually disagreed over who Hassan's successor should be: one of his sons, as the constitution states, or one of Hussein's own sons. This and other problems caused a rift between the two brothers, something magnified (so reports stated) by the political maneuverings of some of the royal wives. Hussein's sudden and dramatic decision was also surprising given that Abdullah was not one of the king's sons who openly had been groomed for leadership. In the early 1990s, Hussein's choice seemed to be Prince Ali, eldest son of the late Queen Alia, whereas by the late 1990s the king's attentions seemed focused on Prince Hamza, the first son born to him and the reigning Queen Noor. The move also carried significant political import both domestically and internationally, given that Abdullah had no practical political or diplomatic experience, whereas Hassan's resumè was extensive.

Hussein suffered a relapse and returned to the United States on 26 January, the day after the dramatic announcement that Abdullah was the new crown prince. When treatment failed, he flew back to Jordan in a critical state, and died on 7 February. Jordanians were devastated. His funeral was a huge diplomatic gathering attended by a host of world leaders and fellow monarchs, including U.S. president Bill Clinton, former presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George H.W. Bush, Russian president Boris Yeltsin, French president Jacques Chirac, and Prince Charles and Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom, among others. The funeral also brought together a host of Middle Eastern leaders, including those from countries not having diplomatic relations with one another. Among these were Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Ezer Weizman of Israel, President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria, President Husni Mubarak of Egypt, and Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. Hussein was buried at the royal palace cemetery in Amman, next to the tombs of his father and grandfather.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Gulf Crisis (1990–1991); Gulf War (1991); Hashimite House (House of Hashim); Intifada (1987–1991); Jordan; Noor al-Hussein (Queen Noor).

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PETER GUBSER
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

HUSSEINI, RANA

[1967–]

Jordanian journalist and women's rights activist.

Rana Husseini (also Husayni) was born in Jordan, and she received a bachelor's degree in 1990 in communications and a master's degree in 1993 in liberal arts from Oklahoma City University. She has been working since 1993 as a reporter and photographer for the *Jordan Times.* Her coverage focuses on crime, women's and children's issues, and the role of the media in advancing women's rights. Throughout her pioneering and persistent reporting on "honor crimes" in Jordan, Husseini drew national, regional, and international attention to the issue. She was a founding member of the Jordanian Campaign Committee to Eliminate So-Called Crimes of Honor in Jordan in 1999. Within a period of four months, the committee collected over 15,000 signatures demanding the cancellation of laws that provide leniency for perpetrators of such crimes. The committee was granted the Human Rights Watch Award in 2000. Husseini served in 1998 as a regional coordinator for the United Nation's Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) campaign to eliminate violence against women. She received the Ida B. Wells Award for Bravery in Journalism in 2003. She also received the Reebok Human Rights Award for reporting on violence against women in Jordan in 1998, and the MEDNEWS (Med-Media Program, European Union) award in 1995 for best article, "Murder in the Name of Honor."

ISIS NUSAIR

HUSSEIN, SADDAM

[1937–]

President of Iraq from 1979 to 2003.

Saddam Hussein (also Husayn, Hussain) al-Tikriti was born on 28 April 1937 to a Sunni Arab family in Tikrit, Iraq, on the northern bank of the Tigris River. His family was from the village of al-Awja, near Tikrit, and was of poor peasant stock; his father reportedly died before his birth. His stepfather denied him permission to go to school, so Saddam ran away, seeking refuge in Tikrit, in his mother's brother's home.

Early History

Saddam Hussein's maternal uncle, Adnan Khayr Allah Talfa, raised him through adolescence; he was a retired army officer and an advocate of Arab nationalism—a sentiment he imparted to Saddam—and he had participated in the short-lived anti-British revolt in 1941, known as the Rashid Ali Coup.

In 1956, Saddam moved to Baghdad, where he was impressed by the nationalism that swept Iraq in the wake of Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal and the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt. In 1957, he joined the Baʿth Arab socialist party, which had been founded in Syria in 1947. Dedicated to Arab unity, the party had been popular among students in Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon since the early 1950s. From 1957 on, his life was inextricably bound up with Baʿth.

In 1959, during the presidency of the Iraqi dictator General Abd al-Karim Qasim, Saddam was a member of a Baʿth team assigned to assassinate Qasim. The attempt failed, and Saddam was wounded in the leg during an exchange of gunfire. He fled Baghdad and later staged a daring escape to Syria, and from there to Egypt, where he joined a number of other exiled Iraqis. He is believed to have become a full member of Baʿth while he was in Egypt.

Qasim's regime ended in February 1963, when a group of Iraqi nationalists and Baʿthist officers brought it down in a violent coup. Qasim was killed, and Saddam returned to Iraq with other exiled Iraqis, although he played only a minor role in the



Baʿathist president Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq from 1979 until the U.S.-led invasion into the country unseated him in 2003. Hussein came to power when President Hasan al-Bakr was forced to resign, and he quickly moved to eliminate any possible challengers to his authority. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

Baʿth government that took power. The new regime did not last.

In November 1963, General Abd al-Salam Arif staged a successful anti-Baʿthist coup and Saddam went underground again. From 1963 to 1968, he worked in clandestine party activities, and he was captured and jailed, although he managed to escape. In 1966, while still underground, he became a member of the regional command of the Iraqi branch of the Baʿth Party and played a major role in reorganizing the party to prepare for a second attempt at seizing power. He worked closely with General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, a fellow Tikriti and a distant relative, who had been prime minister under the Baʿth and was respected by the military. In this period, Saddam was known as a tough partisan and a political enforcer, willing to liquidate enemies of the party.

In July 1968, the Baʿth Party returned to power after two successful coups that took place in rapid succession. Saddam played an important part in both. Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr became president of the republic; Saddam became vice president of the Revolutionary Command Council after some maneuvers to eliminate competitors for the position.

Al-Bakr and Saddam

From 1969 through 1979, Iraq was ruled by al-Bakr, the respected army officer, and Saddam, the young, dynamic manipulator and survivor. No major decisions were made without Saddam's consent, and he gradually built the organs of a police state that spread an aura of fear over the country and of invincibility around himself.

In the 1970s, Saddam had helped shepherd Iraq through major social and economic development, made possible by an increase in petroleum revenues. The changes brought by this expansion of social programs included compulsory primary education, a noticeable increase in women's participation in the workforce, the founding of new universities, and the availability of medical services. An ambitious industrial program in petrochemicals, steel, and other heavy industry began. The Baʿth Party also implemented policies that brought all the social and economic sectors under its control, including the foreign-owned Iraq Petroleum Company, which was nationalized in 1972.

Saddam and the Baʿth Party distanced themselves from the West in the 1970s, instead building strong ties with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. In 1972, an important treaty of friendship was signed between Iraq and the Soviet Union. France was the only Western European country with which Iraq maintained good political and economic relations. Iraq took a hard stand against Israel, attempting to isolate Egypt after the 1978 Camp David Accords.

The Baʿth Party inherited a problem with the Iraqi Kurds, who were struggling for self-determination. After a major revolt that lasted two years, the Kurds had been given special status in 1970, allowing self-rule in Kurdish areas. The Kurds revolted again in 1974 and 1975. Unable to put an end to their revolt, mainly because the Kurds had help from Iran, Saddam demonstrated his daring style by signing the 1975 Algiers Agreement with the shah of Iran, putting an end to Iranian support for the Kurds in return for

some modifications of the Iran–Iraq border along the Shatt al-Arab in the south.

Saddam married his cousin Sajida Khayr Allah Tulfa and had five children. His two sons, Uday and Qusay, held high security positions in the mid-1990s.

War with Iran

The health of President al-Bakr had been deteriorating, reportedly due to cancer. Saddam felt that the moment had come for him to assume total power. On 16 July 1979, al-Bakr was forced to resign and Saddam was elected president of the Iraqi republic. Followed a ruthless purge of suspected challengers, he executed five members of the Revolutionary Command Council and some twenty Baʿth Party members. This cleared the way for him to establish personal rule and a total monopoly of power.

Also in 1979, the Iranian Revolution established a Shiʿite Islamic republic. Iran's new government soon became a political threat to Iraq, calling for an uprising among Iraq's Shiʿite population and the establishment of a regime similar to Iran's. Soon border clashes and claims of border violations by troops from both sides were weekly events. Some pro-Iranian Shiʿite elements in opposition to Saddam, mainly the al-Daʿwa al-Islamiyya (Religious Call) Party, aggravated this situation with internal violence, including two assassination attempts on top Iraqi government members.

Saddam took advantage of Iran's weakness to settle previous scores. In September 1980, he declared that the 1975 Algiers Accord with Iran was null and void. The Iraqi army then crossed the Iranian border and seized Iranian territories, which were evacuated later in the war. The result was a bitter and costly war that lasted eight years.

Islamic, Arab, and international mediation efforts to end the war were unsuccessful. Both countries used long-range missiles against cities, and Iraq used chemical weapons to ward off Iran's human-wave attacks. Casualties—both military and civilian—mounted on both sides. As the war continued, Saddam adopted a pragmatic stance in international affairs, and the oil-rich Gulf states provided funds to finance the Iraqi military effort. Diplomatic relations with the United States—severed since 1967—were reestablished in November 1984.

In July 1988, Iran unexpectedly announced that it had agreed to a cease-fire after repeated attempts to defeat the Iraqi army near Basra. Peace negotiations continued for months; in the fall of 1990 (after Iraq's August invasion of Kuwait), in a dramatic action, Iraq accepted the reinstitution of the 1975 Algiers Accord and a rectification of borders between the two countries, as demanded by Iran. However, no peace treaty was signed.

Kuwait

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The invasion was swift and met little resistance, and the Kuwaiti ruling family fled to Saudi Arabia. Iraq had longstanding claims to Kuwait, which went back to the days of the Ottoman Empire, but Kuwait's independence had been recognized by Iraq's Baʿthist regime, which had come to power in 1963.

Just before the invasion, relations between Iraq and Kuwait had been tense. Differences existed over loan repayments, oil pricing, and the border. Iraq accused Kuwait of stealing oil by slant drilling under the border into Iraqi oil fields, and of economic warfare because of Kuwait's oil policy. Saddam annexed Kuwait a few days after the invasion, declaring that country a province of Iraq. The Kuwaiti government called for help to force Iraq's withdrawal. The UN Security Council repeatedly convened to debate several resolutions asking Iraq to withdraw and restore Kuwait's legitimate government. The United Nations agreed to impose an economic blockade on Iraq and, if that did not succeed, to use military force. The role of the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union was pivotal in passing these measures.

Mediation efforts and economic pressures proved unsuccessful, but an international coalition of military forces, led by the United States (in accord with the newly cooperative Soviet Union), was deployed to eastern Saudia Arabia. After several months of troop buildup in Saudi Arabia and Saddam's failure to accede to a deadline for withdrawal, the attack began, on 16 and 17 January 1991, with a five-week campaign of air strikes on Iraq, followed by a four-day land campaign. Saddam ordered a retreat from Kuwait when coalition forces entered

southern Iraq. A cease-fire was declared on 27 February 1991, and anti-Saddam uprisings began in some southern Iraqi cities—mainly Basra, Amara, al-Najaf, and Karbala, spreading throughout the south. Separatist uprisings took place soon after in Iraq's northern Kurdish cities. The United States had called for Saddam's overthrow but did not aid the rebellion.

Saddam used the army to crush these revolts, and he was successful, but only after fierce fighting with insurgents in southern Iraq, which resulted in major destruction in the Shiʿite cities of the south. The Kurds in the north, faced with Saddam's tanks, left the cities they had occupied and retreated to more secure positions in the mountains. Many retreated to Turkey and Iran.

The plight of the Kurds was dramatized by the international media, especially in the United States and Europe. As a result, public opinion allowed Western leaders to order military penetration of northern Iraq to establish secure zones guarded by coalition forces. Safe havens were established to entice Kurdish refugees back. Saddam invited a top-level Kurdish delegation to negotiate with his government in April 1991, but it failed and Saddam pulled his forces back from Kurdish areas and established a trade embargo on the north. Inside the Kurdish zone, under the protection of UN forces (mainly U.S., British, and French), the Kurds began to establish genuine self-rule and in 1992 elected a Kurdish government.

During his presidency, Saddam established an extreme cult of personality. Photos of him were everywhere; his speeches were printed and widely distributed; schools, towns, and the Baghdad airport were named for him. Any criticism of him as head of state was severely punished. Despite a military defeat, destruction of large parts of the Iraqi economy, and the most widespread rebellion Iraq had experienced since 1920, he remained in control. By the end of 1991, although weakened by these events, his presence was ubiquitous in Baghdad.

Sanctions

Between 1991 and 2003, Saddam Hussein adopted a siege mentality, making rare public appearances, and his whereabouts were a state secret. He received few foreign visitors and never left the country.

Under continuing UN sanctions, the population of Iraq suffered enormously. A rationing system provided basic food items and enabled the population to purchase necessities at nominal prices. However, the health and education systems rapidly deteriorated. Many students dropped out of school to work at menial jobs in order to help their needy families. Malnutrition created a dramatic rise in the number of deaths among children under five. Faced not only faced with economic difficulties but also the pressures of a police state, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fled the country. The number of Iraqis living abroad was estimated to be at least 3 million. As inflation soared, the value of the national currency, the dinar, dropped sharply without any concomitant increase in salaries.

Since Iraq was unable to sell its oil, its economic situation worsened. By the mid-1990s, the deterioration of social and economic conditions had helped generate a religious revival, which received the regime's blessings. The new Islamic movement did not adhere to any internal or external political group or party.

Saddam's complex and difficult relationship with his family affected the political situation. His three half-brothers, Barzan, Watban, and Sabawi, served in key security posts, but their status deteriorated and by the mid-1990s they had disappeared from public view. Both the regime and Saddam's personal prestige suffered a serious shock in August 1995 when two key relatives and aides defected with their wives, who were Saddam's daughters. They went to Jordan, where they received the protection of King Hussein. The two men, however, were convinced by Saddam's emissaries to return to Baghdad and receive a pardon. When they arrived, they were divorced from their wives and three days later it was announced that they had died in a shootout with members of the extended family. The family declared that they were avenging the dishonor brought on their clan by these defectors.

On 12 December 1996, Saddam's elder son, Uday, was wounded in an assassination attempt in Baghdad. His wound left him partially paralyzed, which excluded him from becoming the eventual successor to his father. This position was taken by his younger brother, Qusay (born in 1968), who slowly assumed all the important security responsibilities in the state.

As part of the 1991 cease-fire accord with the UN coalition forces, Iraq accepted the elimination of its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs. The United Nations charged two bodies with overseeing Iraq's disarmament operations, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. When these two agencies started inspections in Iraq, they were expected to disarm Iraq within a few weeks. Instead, the regime challenged the inspectors constantly, refusing to submit documents and materials and withholding information; the inspections dragged on for over a decade.

In the aftermath of the Kurdish revolt against the regime and the flight of Kurds toward neighboring Turkey and Iran, the United States led the coalition countries in imposing a no-fly zone over northern Iraq. This allowed the Kurds to return home. A similar no-fly zone was imposed in 1992 in southern Iraq in order to protect the Shiʿa. It was also used as a punitive measure against a possible attempt to mass Iraqi armed forces on or near the Kuwaiti border. In 1996, this zone was extended to the outskirts of Baghdad.

The imposition of these no-fly zones curtailed the sovereignty of the Iraqi state over its territory. This was particularly true in northern Iraq, where the two main Kurdish parties, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (Iraq) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, started to build state institutions and rule over northern Iraq.

In April 1995, responding to the deterioration of the economic situation in Iraq, the UN Security Council passed the Oil-for-Food resolution (Resolution 986), which allowed Iraq to sell some of its oil to buy food and medicine for its population. Iraq initially rejected the resolution, but accepted it in December 1996 due to the worsening economic situation.

U.S. and British war planes continued to patrol the no-fly zones, firing missiles on Iraqi military targets when they were challenged. Tensions increased over weapons inspections. On more than one occasion, Iraq threatened to expel the UN inspectors.

The deterioration of relations between UNSCOM and the Iraqis reached its climax in December 1998, when Richard Butler, head of UNSCOM, presented a negative report to the UN Security Council and withdrew his inspectors. Three days later, U.S. and British airplanes staged air raids on Iraq military installations in Operation Desert Fox. The Iraqis responded by declaring that they would never allow UN inspectors to return.

Military Intervention

Since 1997, faced with the difficulties of disarming Iraq, the U.S. government had considered overthrowing the Saddam regime. The U.S. began to openly encourage Iraqi opposition groups abroad (mainly in London) to cooperate and organize their efforts to topple the Iraqi ruler. The war of words between Iraq and the United States rose in tone. When the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 occurred in New York and Washington D.C., Saddam's regime was one of the very few to declare its public satisfaction over what had happened.

Internally, Saddam became more oppressive toward his opponents, putting a brutal end to unrest, especially among the Shiʿa, and assassinating well-known Shiʿite clerics. In a State of the Union address delivered after the 11 September attacks, President George W. Bush labeled Iraq a member of the "axis of evil" and called for "regime change." In 2002, after months of UN discussions and U.S. threats, Saddam finally allowed the UN inspectors to return to Iraq. A new inspection agency, the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, headed by Hans Blix, was created to oversee this operation. On 27 January 2003, after inspecting suspected sites for several weeks, the team handed in a report that was inconclusive on the question of whether illegal arms or arms programs existed. Meanwhile, the United States and Britain continued to demand regime change in Baghdad and undertook a massive military buildup around Iraq, preparing for military intervention, preferably with the blessing of the UN Security Council. Objections to intervention, however, came from countries such as France, Germany, and Russia, which called for continued inspections, and from individual citizens in many countries. The Security Council did not back intervention.

On 17 March 2003, the United States issued an ultimatum demanding that President Saddam Hus-

sein leave the country within twenty-four hours. He rejected it, and UN inspectors left Iraq. On 20 March, the first air attacks on Baghdad began, followed by U.S. and British troops entering Iraq from Kuwait. Despite some resistance, U.S. troops pushed north toward Baghdad and occupied it on 9 April. Saddam Hussein and his top aides went underground. By 18 April, most of the country was under the control of U.S. and British forces.

The United States issued a list of fifty-five of the most wanted persons in the old regime, including Saddam, his two sons, and his half-brothers. Uday and Qusay were killed in Mosul on July 22 during a firefight with U.S. forces. Two of his half-brothers, Barzan and Watban, were captured but the third, Sabawi, was still at large in 2004. Saddam Hussein himself was captured on 13 December 2003, hiding underground in Dur, a small town south of Tikrit.

After Saddam's capture, the United States declared him a prisoner of war. Several suggestions were made by Iraq's transitional authority (put in place by the Americans) and others on how to bring Saddam to justice. Iraqis insisted that he be held in Iraq and tried by an Iraqi court.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq became a theater of violence, with widespread looting, attacks on American troops and the newly installed Iraqi police, and suicide bombings of key targets, including UN personnel and Shiʿite leaders and mosques. These acts were blamed on Iraqi groups resisting foreign occupation. The perpetrators were believed to consist of remnants of the old Baʿthist regime in addition to Muslim fundamentalists, some of whom were believed to have ties to al-Qaʿida. Saddam himself was believed to have directed some of the resistance before his capture. Despite efforts by the Americans to discover them, no hidden weapons of mass destructions were found. David Kay, a former weapons inspector appointed by President Bush to investigate the situation, reported in 2004 that none were likely to be found.

See also Algiers Agreement (1975); Arab Nationalism; Arif, Abd al-Salam; Bakr, Ahmad Hasan al-; Baʿth, al-; Camp David Accords (1978); Daʿwa al-Islamiyya, al-; Gulf Crisis (1990–1991); Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC); Kurds; Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); Sanctions, Iraqi; Shatt al-Arab; Talfah, Adnan Khayr Allah; United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM); War in Iraq (2003).

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Louay Bahry

HUT, SHAFIQ AL-

[1932–]

Palestinian leader, journalist, and intellectual.

The son of a wealthy Sunni landowner and citrus merchant in the Manshiyya quarter of Jaffa in British Mandate Palestine, Shafiq al-Hut graduated from Jaffa's elite al-Amiriyya School in 1948. When war broke out, he fled with his family to Beirut, where his paternal grandfather had emigrated from.

Al-Hut cut his political teeth in the radical pan-Arabist environment of the American University of Beirut, graduating in 1953 with a bachelor's degree in biology. Initially a schoolmaster, he subsequently worked as a correspondent and as editor of the weeklies *al-Hawadith* (Events) and *al-Muharrir* (The editor).

Al-Hut was a leading figure in the Palestinian Liberation Front–Path of Return (PLF–PR), which was established in 1961, and he took part in the 1964 Palestine National Council, which founded the Pales-

tine Liberation Organization (PLO). Appointed PLO representative to Lebanon in 1964 (a position he held until 1993), from 1965 to 1967 al-Hut led the internal opposition to PLO president Ahmad Shuqayri, who attempted to exile al-Hut to New Delhi in May 1967. Al-Hut was also linked to the Heroes of the Return guerrilla group established in 1966.

In 1968, al-Hut renounced the PLF–PR leadership and the group disbanded. He was increasingly associated with the PLO's al-Fatah mainstream, served on the PLO's executive committee, and survived various attempted assassinations by other Palestinian factions, notably by the Syrian-backed al-Saʿiqa force in 1976 in Lebanon, after the outbreak of armed conflict among Palestinian, Christian, and Muslim communities there. In 1978, he supported Arafat's decision to offer a guarantee of Israeli security in return for Palestinian statehood, but in August 1993, mindful of the interests of Palestinians in Lebanon, he left the PLO in protest against the Oslo Accord. He has since been prominent in the Palestinian opposition to the direction taken by Palestinian, American, and Israeli diplomats and negotiators. A secularist inspired by Gamal Abdel Nasser's pan-Arabism, al-Hut is the author of several books on Palestinian and Arab politics and has written an autobiography. He married the Palestinian writer Bayan Nuwayhid in 1962 and has three children.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Fatah, al-; Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Shuqayri, Ahmad.

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Mouin Rabbani
Updated by George R. Wilkes

I

IBADIYYA

The only surviving branch today of the Kharijite schismatic rebels of the seventh century.

The Kharijite movement broke with the fourth caliph Ali in 657 after he agreed to submit his conflict with the governor of Syria, Muʿawiya ibn Abi Sufyan, to arbitration. This action, the Kharijites argued, undermined both the religious and political leadership of Ali. Equally hostile to Umayyad rule by hereditary succession, the Kharijites espoused an ideology of absolute egalitarianism, social austerity, and militant puritanism. The two major Kharijite factions were the Azariqa, who waged a relentless war to overthrow the existing social and political order, and the Ibadiyya, who took a politically quiescent position *(kitman)* during the civil wars of the seventh century.

The Ibadiyya, who derive their name from their founder Abdallah ibn Ibad al-Murri al-Tamimi (died c. 720), were originally based in Basra. Under the early Abbasids in the eighth and ninth centuries, the Ibadiyya took an activist missionary approach *(zuhur)* and spread in the desert frontier regions of north Africa (Tahert), and eastern and southern Arabia (Hadramawt) among tribal social segments. The Ibadiyya developed an elaborate political theory that emphasizes the primacy of religious leadership (imamate), but allows the coexistence of various imams (unlike in Shiʿism). Notwithstanding their acceptance of the Muʿtazilite doctrine of the createdness of the Qurʾan, the Ibadiyya largely concur with Sunni Islam, particularly the Maliki school on matters of law. The sect survives today in Oman, eastern Africa (Zanzibar), Libya (Jabal Nafusa and Zuagha), the island of Djerba (Tunisia), and southern Algeria (Wargla and Mzab).

See also Maliki School of Law; Sunni Islam.

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Tayeb El-Hibri

IBN

See Glossary

IBN MUSA, AHMAD

Regent of Morocco, 1894–1900.

Sultan Mulai Hassan I was succeeded by his youngest son, Abd al-Aziz ibn al-Hassan, aged fourteen. As regent, Ibn Musa (known as Ba Ahmad) maintained stability through the control of dissident tribes and counseled cautious diplomacy toward the European powers. Some scholars believe that this caution undermined the sultanate's legitimacy in the eyes of many Moroccans. Ba Ahmad died during a cholera epidemic, leaving the sultanate ruled by a young, untried sultan.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn al-Hassan.

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

IBN SAʿUD

See Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud

IBN TULUN MOSQUE

Ancient mosque in Cairo.

Constructed from 876 to 879 C.E. by Ahmad ibn Tulun, semiautonomous governor of Egypt for the Abbasid caliphs, this is not only one of Cairo's best-known monuments but is also the best surviving example of religious architecture from that period of Islam. The mosque was erected along with a palace and a government house in a new district known as al-Qataʿi (the Allotments), to the northeast of the oldest parts of the city.

Built of brick and rendered with a fine and hard layer of plaster, the mosque comprises a courtyard about 300 feet (92 m) square, with a fountain-house in the center. The court is surrounded by hypostyle halls covered with a flat wooden roof supported by arcades resting on piers. The prayer hall, on the southeast, is five aisles deep; those on the other three sides are two aisles deep. The mosque, 400 by 460 feet (122 by 140 m) is enclosed in an outer wall 33 feet (10 m) high, with an elaborate cresting adding some 10 feet (3 m) to its height. Beyond the wall on three sides is an outer court *(ziyada),* approximately 62 feet (19 m) broad, enclosed in a somewhat lower wall. In this outer court, opposite the prayer hall, stands the minaret (tower), the mosque's most distinctive feature. In its present state this tower consists of a square stone base supporting a cylindrical shaft and an elaborate finial; an external staircase winds around the tower. The interior of the mosque is relatively plain, although the arcades are decorated with nook-shafts at the corners of the piers, carved capitals, and bands of geometricized vegetal ornament around and on the underside of the arches and at the top of the walls. Beneath the roof are long wooden planks carved with verses from the Qurʾan written in an angular script.

Most of the architectural and decorative features of the mosque are foreign to Egyptian architecture in the ninth century, although they were common in the religious architecture of Iraq, the Abbasid heartland, and can be seen there in such buildings as the congregational mosques at Samarra, the Abbasid capital where Ahmad ibn Tulun received his training. It is therefore believed that workmen trained in these techniques came to Egypt in the retinue of Ibn Tulun.

The mosque was repeatedly restored and its functions changed. In 1077, the Fatimid vizier Badr al-Jamali restored the mosque and, in 1094, his son al-Afdal added a beautiful stucco mihrab (a niche indicating the direction of Mecca) to one of the piers. Under the Ayyubids, who believed that Cairo needed only one congregational mosque, the building fell into disrepair and served as a shelter for North African pilgrims to Mecca and also as a bakery. In 1296, the Mamluk sultan Lagin, who had taken refuge in the mosque during one of the struggles that eventually brought him to power, restored it extensively; he added a new mihrab, replaced the fountain-house that had stood in the court with the present domed edifice, and reconstructed the minaret, which had also fallen into disrepair.

By the early nineteenth century, the mosque was again deteriorated and, by the middle of that century, it was used as an insane asylum and poorhouse. In 1884, the newly formed Comité de Conservation des Monuments de l'Art Arabe recommended the restoration of the building, and work was soon begun.

See also *Mihrab;* Minaret; Mosque; Qurʾan.

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JONATHAN M. BLOOM

IBRAHIM, ABDULLAH

[1918–]

Moroccan socialist political leader.

Ibrahim was educated at the Université Ben Youssef in Marrakech and the Sorbonne in Paris. He was a founding member of the Istiqlal party (1944–1959) and served on the editorial committee of *Al-Alam,* the party newspaper, (1950–1952). He was imprisoned for nationalist activities (1952–1954).

After independence from France, Ibrahim served as secretary of state for information (1955–1956); minister of labor and social affairs (1956–1958); and prime minister and minister of foreign affairs (1958–1960). In 1959 he helped form Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (National Union of Popular Forces; UNFP) from the left wing of the Istiqlal and became leader of the UNFP in July 1972 when its Rabat section became the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (Socialist Union of Popular Forces; USFP). Since then, the UNFP has reportedly become increasingly subordinated to the Moroccan Labor Union (UMT) and has waned in influence.

See also UNION NATIONALE DES FORCES POPULAIRES (UNFP); UNION SOCIALISTE DES FORCES POPULAIRES (USFP).

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C. R. PENNELL
UPDATED BY ANA TORRES-GARCIA

IBRAHIM, FATIMA AHMED

[early 1930s–]

Sudan's best-known woman politician.

Fatima Ahmed (also Ahmad) Ibrahim was born into a liberal middle-class family in Omdurman in the early 1930s. Upon graduating from Omdurman Girls Secondary School, where she was a student leader and activist, she became a teacher. In the course of her nationalist activities in the 1940s and 1950s in opposition to British rule, she was influenced by Communism and by Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub, secretary-general of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), which she joined. She became one of the early leaders of the Sudanese Women's Union (SWU), formed in 1952 under the wing of the SCP, and soon after the editor of the SWU organ, *The Woman's Voice.* In the decades that followed she was arrested and imprisoned many times for her activism. In 1964 she helped to organize the civilian overthrow of the Ibrahim Abbud military regime (1957–1964). In 1965, as the first woman ever elected to parliament, she headed the SWU as it fought for a number of rights for women. Among these were suffrage, equal pay for equal work, and maternity leave. She was active again in the 1985 civilian overthrow of the military regime of Muhammad Ja῾far Numeiri (1969–1985). Following the Islamist military coup d'état in 1989, the SWU was banned and Ibrahim was again imprisoned. She went into exile in England in the early 1990s, where she continued her SWU activism. Although her increasing conservatism and stress on religion has alienated some younger feminist and leftist activists, Ibrahim remains a member of the Central Committee of the SCP, president of the SWU, and editor of *The Woman's Voice,* as well as being active in the National Democratic Alliance (an umbrella opposition coalition in exile). In the 1990s, on behalf of the SWU, she accepted human-rights awards from Amnesty International and the United Nations.

See also COMMUNISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; SUDAN; SUDANESE CIVIL WARS.

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Rural Women in Sudan." In *Women and Politics Worldwide,* edited by Barbara Nelson and Najma Chowdhury. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.

SONDRA HALE

IBRAHIMI, AHMED TALEB

[1932–]

Algerian minister; political party leader.

A medical doctor and son of Bashir Ibrahimi, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi was imprisoned during the Algerian War of Independence after serving in the Fédération de France du Front de Libératon Nationale (FFFLN). After being released in 1961, he joined the FLN's Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA) diplomatic team at the United Nations (UN). He opposed the Ahmed Ben Bella government and was detained from June 1964 to January 1965. After Colonel Houari Boumédienne deposed Ben Bella in June 1965, he appointed Taleb Ibrahimi minister of national education. In July 1970 Taleb Ibrahimi became minister of information and culture; in that capacity he supervised the inauguration of Algeria's cultural revolution.

After Boumédienne's death in December 1978, Taleb Ibrahimi served his successor, President Chadli Bendjedid, as a counselor minister and then, after the death of Mohamed Benyahia, as foreign minister from May 1982 until the formation of the Kasdi Merbah cabinet in November 1988. Taleb Ibrahimi became disaffected and associated with the anti-Bendjedid "Islamist" faction within the FLN. After the establishment of the Haut Comité d'Etat (HCE) in January 1992, the Pouvoir—the ruling military and civilian elite—considered Taleb Ibrahimi for the prime ministership before selecting Belaid Abdesselam in July 1992. As the civil war raged, Taleb Ibrahimi became more alienated from the Pouvoir and its attitude toward Islamism. He ran for president in April 1999 but withdrew with the six other candidates because of electoral irregularities. Nevertheless, he still came in second to the expected winner, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Taleb Ibrahimi organized the Wafa (Trust/Loyalty) Party, but the government refused to recognize it because it had in its ranks former members of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). Nevertheless, he is expected to run for president again in 2004. Taleb Ibrahimi is the author of *Lettres de prison* (1966; Letters from prison), *De la décolonisation à la révolution culturelle* (1973; From decolonization to the cultural revolution), and *Le drame algérien: La voie de la réconciliation* (1996; The Algerian drama: The way to reconciliation).

See also ALGERIA: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; IBRAHIMI, BASHIR.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

IBRAHIMI, BASHIR

[1889–1965]

Islamic religious leader in Algeria.

Born in Béjaïa in northeastern Algeria, Bashir Ibrahimi became a leading companion to Shaykh Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis. Ibrahimi was renowned as an orator for the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (Reformist Ulama) and served as its vice president and then its president after the death of Ben Badis. Through his studies in Damascus, he also achieved a great reputation as a scholar of Arabic and Islam while contributing numerous articles to the association's various journals. Ibrahimi was an opponent of French colonialism, as symbolized by the association's support of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front). After the Algerian War of Independence, 1954–1962, he questioned the political leadership's use of foreign ideologies and called for the new nation to identify instead with its Arab Islamic traditions. His son Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi became a government official under presidents Houari Boumédienne and Chadli Bendjedid.

See also ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; ASSOCIATION OF ALGERIAN MUSLIM ULAMA (AUMA); BEN BADIS, ABD AL-HAMID; BENDJEDID, CHADLI; BOUMÉDIENNE, HOUARI; FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE (FLN); IBRAHIMI, AHMED TALEB.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

IBRAHIM IBN MUHAMMAD ALI

[1789–1848]

Nineteenth-century Egyptian general; son of Muhammad Ali Pasha.

Ibrahim ibn Muhammad Ali was the elder son of Muhammad Ali Pasha, the founder of modern Egypt. Born in Kavala, Anatolia, Ibrahim Pasha and his brother Tusun accompanied their father when he assumed power as Egypt's viceroy for the Ottoman Empire in 1805. Ibrahim was assigned various responsibilities that ranged from national finance to the governing of Upper Egypt. Starting his military career in 1816, Ibrahim commanded the expedition sent by Muhammad Ali, at the request of the Ottoman sultan, to Arabia to crush the Wahhabi rebellion. In 1818, Ibrahim Pasha succeeded in what came to be known as the Wahhabi war, destroying their capital (al-Darʾiya, now Riyadh) capturing their leaders, and restoring Ottoman control over Islam's holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Gratified by this success, the Ottoman government (Sublime Porte) named Ibrahim to be *wali* (provincial governor) of the provinces of Hijaz and Abyssinia (today Ethiopia).

In 1822, Ibrahim assisted his brother Ismaʿil in the invasion of the Sudan and then, in 1824, led the Egyptian army in the name of the Ottoman Empire against a revolt in Greece. By 1826, Ibrahim Pasha was able to capture the Morea (Peloponnesus) and Athens. The European powers, however, despite Muhammad Ali's attempts to reach an agreement with Great Britain, decided to intervene and enforced a blockade on the Morea by the joint naval forces of France, Russia, and Great Britain. In October 1827, the European forces destroyed the whole Egyptian and Ottoman fleet in the battle of Navarino, and Ibrahim Pasha was forced to withdraw.

After the Greek war, Muhammad Ali demanded the governorship of Morea and Syria. Denied by the sultan, he declared war on the Porte in 1831 and sent an Egyptian force to Syria under Ibrahim's command. The troops progressed victoriously through Syria, entered Anatolia, and defeated the Ottoman army in the Battle of Konya in 1832. The Egyptian victory forced the sultan to sign the treaty of Kütahya in which the Porte granted Muhammad Ali the government of Syria and Adana, in what is today southern Turkey. Ibrahim was appointed governor of Syria. During his rule, he attempted to develop the irrigation system and introduced modern industry to the region. His enforcement of military service on the Syrians, however, and his strict discipline, led to the emergence of anti-Egyptian feelings among the population.

In 1839, the war between the Porte and Egypt was renewed and for the second time Ibrahim Pasha achieved a victory over the Ottomans at the battle of Nisib, and the road to Constantinople (now Istanbul) became virtually open. The European powers intervened, however, demanding the withdrawal of Egyptian troops. Muhammad Ali was forced to ask his son to turn back. The European intervention, headed by Britain, was followed by the London Convention of 1840 in which the European powers forced Muhammad Ali to return Syria and Adana to the Porte.

In 1845, Ibrahim Pasha visited France and England. In April 1848, due to the illness of Muhammad Ali and his inability to rule, Ibrahim Pasha proclaimed himself ruler of Egypt and informed the sultan of this change. In October of that year, the Porte conferred on him the government of Egypt. A few weeks later in November, however, Ibrahim Pasha died—even before the death of his father.

See also ISLAM; KONYA, BATTLE OF; KÜTAHYA, PEACE OF; LONDON CONVENTION; MUHAMMAD ALI; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; SUBLIME PORTE.

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ALI E. HILLAL DESSOUKI

IBRAHIMI, LAKHDAR AL-

[1934–]

Algerian diplomat.

Lakhdar al-Ibrahimi studied law and political science in Algiers and in Paris. He was independent

Algeria's first minister of external affairs in 1962 and 1963. He then served as Algeria's ambassador to Egypt, Sudan, and the United Kingdom. From 1963 to 1970 Ibrahimi was Algeria's permanent representative to the Arab League, where he has also acted as assistant secretary-general. In the 1980s Ibrahimi headed the league's efforts to end the Lebanese civil war (1975–1991). From 1991 to 1993 he was Algeria's foreign minister. Between 1994 and 1996, Ibrahimi served as United Nations special representative to countries such as Haiti, South Africa (leading the United Nations observer mission until the 1994 democratic elections of post-apartheid South Africa), Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Yemen, and Liberia. As of 2003, he is the special representative of the United Nations secretary general for Afghanistan (1997–1999; 2001–).

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Elizabeth Thompson
Updated by Ana Torres-Garcia

IBRAHIM, IZZAT

[1942–]

Baʿthist politician in Iraq.

Izzat Ibrahim was born into an Arab Sunni family, rumored to be of Sabean origin, in al-Dur district of Samarra. His father was an ice vendor. Ibrahim joined the Baʿth party in the late 1950s and was in prison during the 1960s for his political activities. He held several important positions following the Baʿth coup of 1968, including: minister of land reform (1969–1974) and minister of the interior (1974–1979). In 1979 he became deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Ibrahim was the constitutional successor to the president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein. His daughter is married to the president's oldest son, Uday.

In 1973, he headed a special court trying the conspirators who were behind an unsuccessful coup. As deputy chair of the RCC, he was put in charge of several task forces and special commissions in the Baʿth government. Prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Ibrahim headed the delegation to negotiate the problems between the two countries. Following the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, he went underground, and was rumored to be organizing anti-American resistance activities.

See also Baʿth, al-; Hussein, Saddam.

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Ayad al-Qazzaz

IBRAHIM, MUHAMMAD HAFIZ

[1871–1932]

Egyptian poet and writer; one of the best-known Arab neoclassicists.

Whereas Ahmad Shawqi was known as a poet of the court, the "prince of poets," Muhammad Hafiz Ibrahim was the "people's poet." He was also known as the "poet of the Nile"—an appropriate epithet, since he was born on a houseboat on the Nile River near the town of Dayrut.

Hafiz Ibrahim had a somewhat lonely childhood followed by a long struggle to find a vocation. He went to a modern secular school in Cairo, then to a more traditional Qurʾanic school in Tanta. Hafiz also served as an apprentice to several lawyers and later was graduated from the Military Academy in Cairo. His military service in the Sudan ended abruptly with a court-martial because of his involvement in an army rebellion. Returning to Cairo, he was unable to find work. This was the beginning of his most difficult years of poverty and unemployment, which lasted until 1911, when he was nominated to head the literary section of the National Library. During these years, Hafiz came into contact with prominent Egyptian nationalists and was popular among them because of his winning balance of earnestness and conversational wit.

Hafiz Ibrahim employed a generally simple, direct, yet fluent poetic diction, adapting traditional forms to speak to new audiences living in a changing world. He reached his audience in two ways:

First, he was a master of "platform poetry," reciting his poetry publicly to large groups of listeners; second, he actively contributed poetry to prominent Egyptian newspapers and periodicals. Hafiz Ibrahim was able to address social and political events in verse, giving voice to common Egyptian opinions. His most successful works were his elegies and his occasional poems.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC; SHAWQI, AHMAD.

KENNETH S. MAYERS

IBRAHIM, SAʿAD AL-DIN

[1938–]

Renowned human rights activist and professor of sociology at the American University of Cairo.

Saʿd al-Din (also Saʿad Eddih) Ibrahim is an Egyptian American born in Mansura, Egypt, in 1938. He received his bachelor's degree with honors from Cairo University in 1960 and his doctorate in sociology from the University of Washington in 1968. Ibrahim founded in 1988 the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in Cairo, as an independent research institute for advancing democratization and development. Ibrahim has directed the center's activities in monitoring elections, conducting voter education projects, and training students in social science research methods.

Ibrahim has served as secretary-general of the Independent Commission for Electoral Review, which had monitored the 1990 and 1995 elections in Egypt. He was preparing to monitor the 2000 elections and was producing a documentary film about Egyptian election irregularities when he was arrested. The center's activities came under surveillance; in January 2000 authorities banned its publication *Civil Society* and the center was closed in June. Meanwhile, Ibrahim and twenty-seven of his colleagues were tried and found guilty on charges such as "collecting funds without a permit from the official authorities, misappropriation of funds in a fraudulent manner to prepare forged voting lists and cards, preparing public media containing false phrases and rumors and disseminating provocative propaganda damaging to the public interest, and accepting funds from a foreign country with the purpose of carrying out work harmful to the national interest by producing a film that damages Egypt's reputation abroad." Though Ibrahim was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment with hard labor, three years later, on 18 March 2003, Egypt's highest court acquitted him of all charges brought against him by the Egyptian government in response to international pressure.

Ibrahim teaches at American University of Cairo (AUC) and has taught at several universities in the United States and Egypt. He has published over thirty books in English and Arabic, including *Sociology of the Arab–Israel Conflict, American Presidential Elections and the Middle East, The New Arab Social Order,* and *Society and State in the Arab World.* He has served as the president of Cairo's Union of Social Professions, a board member and head of Arab Affairs of al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, secretary-general of the Arab Organization for Human Rights, the founder and a core member of the Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East, the chairman of the Board of Egyptian Enlightenment Association, and the president of the Egyptian Sociologists Association. A champion of democracy and human rights, Ibrahim is considered a leading proponent of democratic reforms and an advocate of minority rights. He has received several awards since his imprisonment, including a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize for 2002.

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RITA STEPHAN

İDADI SCHOOLS

Ottoman middle or secondary schools.

In the late nineteenth century, İdadi schools provided three years of intermediate and low secondary-level education. Instruction was in Turkish and French. The curriculum included logic, economics, geogra-

phy, world and Ottoman history, algebra and arithmetic, the physical sciences, and engineering.

In the 1850s the military opened the first provincial Idadi schools in Baghdad, Erzurum, and Sarajevo. The first nonmilitary, state-run İdadi school opened in Constantinople (now Istanbul) in the 1870s. Under the 1869 Regulation for Public Instruction, towns and cities were required to provide one İdadi school for every thousand households. By 1895, about one-third of a total of thirty thousand students attending intermediate school in the Ottoman Empire were enrolled in the fifty-five state and military İdadi schools, the latter being found in every province. The other two-thirds of students attended the seventy millet system–run İdadi schools or the sixty-three foreign ones, such as American-run Robert College in Constantinople. State-run İdadi schools were financed by taxes. The term *İdadi schools* was changed in 1908 to *sultani schools,* and in 1925 in Turkey, to *orta* or middle schools.

See also MILLET SYSTEM; SULTANI SCHOOLS.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

IDLIBI, ULFAT AL-

[b. 1912 or 1913]

Syrian novelist and short-story writer.

A native of Damascus, Ulfat Idlibi is known for fiction that realistically portrays middle-class urban Syrian women—her own social milieu—during a period of transition when women were becoming visibly active in nationalist politics, were moving into the public workforce, and were earning higher degrees in greater numbers. Idlibi herself, married at 17, participated in nationalist demonstrations and has worked in various areas of national culture. She began writing short stories in 1947; some were published in a Damascus women's cultural journal, and her first collection, *Qisas shamiyya* (Syrian stories, 1954), received the recognition of an introduction by eminent Egyptian writer Mahmoud Taymur. In addition to four further volumes of stories (the latest published in 1993), three collections of lectures and essays, and a study on Arabic popular literature (*Nazra fi adabina al-shaʿbi,* 1974), Idlibi has published two novels, both translated into English by Peter Clark: *Dimashq ya basmat al-huzn* (1980; in English, Sabriya: Damascus Bittersweet, 1995) and *Hikayat jaddi: riwaya* (1991; in English, Grandfather's Tales). Her fictions experiment with techniques of embedded narrative, and while gently portraying Damascene society, they also satirize social usage and constraining expectations. Although the focus is on the domestic site where women's daily lives unfold, she blends coming-of-age narratives *(bildungsroman)* with national stories of liberation from European imperial rule.

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MARILYN BOOTH

IDLIB PROVINCE

Province in northwest Syria, named after its principal town, Idlib, where the governor resides.

Idlib is north of the mountain Jabal al-Zawiya and east of the al-Ruj plain. There were two Idlib's in the past: Lesser Idlib and Greater Idlib. The last was the most ancient, superseded by Lesser Idlib, the present-day town. The region of Idlib is famed for its olive groves and vineyards. Pistachio and cherry trees have recently proven very productive in its hilly countryside. Cotton of high quality and grains are also among the major crops there. Soap making using olive oil and alkaline burnt herb was the most prosperous industry in Idlib in the past, as evidenced by the presence of three hills in the town made up of accumulating ash from soap furnaces. The soap industry moved to Aleppo, and the hills have been removed.

In the 1952 administrative divisions in Syria, Idlib was part of Aleppo province. Later it became the center of a separate province because of its vast countryside and also because the Aleppo province had become too large. In the administrative divisions of 1982, the province of Idlib had 5 *mintaqas*

or *qadas* (sections), 15 *nahiyas* (administrative subdivisions), 6 towns, 16 smaller towns, 411 villages, and 481 farms. The total population of the province, according to the 1980 census, was 352,619 inhabitants, including 51,682 in the town. The province has a number of so-called dead cities dating back to Byzantine times. It also has the well-preserved church of Qalb Lawza and the famous church of Saint Simeon Stylite. The site of historical Ebla has been discovered a few miles from Idlib.

See also ALEPPO.

ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

IDRIS AL-SAYYID MUHAMMAD AL-SANUSI

[1890–1983]

Head of the Sanusi order; king of Libya, 1951–1969.

Born in Jaghbub, Cyrenaica, the eastern province of Libya, Idris al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sanusi was the grandson of Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanusi, founder of the Sanusi order of Islam, and the son of al-Sayyid al-Mahdi al-Sanusi, the leader of the Sanusis in 1890.

During World War I, while the Sanusis were on the Ottoman side fighting the Italians, Idris was training a Sanusi force to fight with the British. In 1916, the British recognized Idris as the leader of the Sanusi order, and in 1920, Italy recognized him as the amir of Cyrenaica. Despite Italy's wishes, Idris also accepted the title of amir of Tripolitania, offered to him by the people of the province. That same year, however, a Sanusi rebellion forced Idris into exile. He fled to Cairo and remained there for twenty years.

When World War II broke out, Idris called all Libyans to fight on the side of the Allies in order to drive out the Italians. He began a Sanusi unit to fight alongside the Allies in their desert campaign. The British recognized Idris's claim to be the head of an independent Cyrenaica, and later he proclaimed himself the region's amir. When Libya became fully independent in 1951, Idris was offered the crown of a united Libya, and he ascended to the throne on 24 December 1951.

The conservative nature of Idris's rule caused a great deal of friction between him and those in Tripolitania, who were more nationalist. In 1963, when the province system was abolished, a unitary regime was established. In 1969, while Idris was abroad, the nationalists, led by Muammar al-Qaddafi, took over the country in a military coup. Idris did not challenge their power and lived out the rest of his days in Greece and Egypt.

See also QADDAFI, MUAMMAR AL-; SANUSI, MUHAMMAD IBN ALI AL-; SANUSI ORDER.

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Wright, John L. *Libya: A Modern History.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

JULIE ZUCKERMAN

IDRISIDS

Descendants of Sayyid Muhammad ibn Ali al-Idrisi living in southwestern Arabia.

The principality of Asir has been important in the politics of southwestern Arabia. It was incorporated into the new state of Saudi Arabia in 1926 when Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud established a protectorate over the realms of the Idrisi sultanate, as it was known at the time.

In the past, the two major towns of Asir, Abu Arish and Abha, have been the capitals of different families, or clans, accurately reflecting the fact that Asir is really two distinct areas. Geographically, economically, and culturally, much of Asir is a continuation of Yemen and, for most of its history, has been considered a part of Yemen. Nevertheless, when the imams of Sanʿa or of other towns, such as Saʿda, were weak and ineffectual, local Asiri notables declared their independence and carried on their own domestic and foreign policies. The most recent of these independent notables was Sayyid Muhammad ibn Ali al-Idrisi, a grandson of Sayyid Ahmad al-Idrisi, the native of Fez who founded the religious sect to which the founder of the Sanusi belonged. Idrisi immigrated to Arabia and made his base at Abha; he wrested control of most of Asir from the Ottoman authorities in the early years of the twentieth century. He was able to obtain the support of the Italians in their campaigns for influence in the Red Sea region precisely because of his connection to the Sanusi, then established in the Italian areas in North Africa.

Idrisi attempted to expand his influence and territory at the expense of the imams of Sanʿa in

the period before World War I. Specifically, he attempted to take Shaykh Saʿid, Luhayya, and Hodeida—Tihama port cities that would have enabled him to add the Yemeni Tihama to his realm. In this effort, he was at times assisted by Italian naval contingents in the Red Sea. During World War I, the British signed an agreement with him in an effort to limit the influence of Yemen, which refused to ally itself against the Ottomans. In return, the British gave him the Yemeni Tihama and other areas, which had to be wrested from Idrisi control by Imam Yahya in the 1920s. After his death, at Sabya, his descendants expanded the influence of the family by taking control of Abu Arish, which had been in the hands of a separate family of sharifs since the eighteenth century. The gradual takeover of Asir by Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud, however, ended the separate existence of the Idrisi state, which was reconfirmed in 1930.

Imam Yahya, however, continued to maintain that Asir, and especially its Zaydi and Ismaʿili populations, had been illegitimately removed from Yemeni sovereignty; this led, eventually, to a brief war between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, in which the latter emerged the victor. In the treaty of Taʾif (1934) the Yemenis recognized, albeit grudgingly, Saudi sovereignty over Asir, as well as over the Najran oasis. The treaty was renewed every twenty years until the United Republic of Yemen handed Asir over permanently to Saudi Arabia in 1995.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Taʾif, Treaty of al-; Yahya ibn Muhammad Hamid al-Din.

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Manfred W. Wenner

IDRIS, YUSUF

[1927–1991]

Egyptian author of short stories, plays, and novels.

After a childhood spent in the Nile delta region, Yusuf Idris moved to Cairo in 1945 to study medicine at Cairo University. He began writing short stories while a student and published several in newspapers before his graduation in 1951. He began to practice medicine but continued his involvement in both political causes and fiction; his first collection of short stories, *Arkhas Layali* (The cheapest nights), was published to great acclaim in 1954. In the same year he was imprisoned for his involvement in political activities. Following his release in September 1955, he began writing articles for the newspaper *al-Jumhuriyya.* The late 1950s and the 1960s, until the 1967 Arab–Israel War, became Idris's most productive period—in an amazing outpouring of creativity, he published several short-story collections as well as a number of plays and novels. He gave up medical practice in 1967 and assumed an administrative post in the ministry of culture. As was the case with many Arab authors, the Arab–Israel War had a profound effect on his literary career. Until his death in 1991, poor health, depression, and the demands and distractions of a weekly column in the Cairo daily *al-Ahram* combined to reduce his creative output.

Of the literary genres to which Idris made contributions, it is undoubtedly in the development of the Arabic short story that his key role is most obvious. His mastery of the genre was instinctive, and the brilliance of his contributions was recognized by critics from the outset. From the realistic vignettes of provincial and urban life to be found in the earliest collections, such as *Arkhas Layali* and *Hadithat Sharaf* (An affair of honor, 1958), he gradually shifted to more symbolic and surrealistic narratives in such collections as *Akhir al-Dunya* (The world's end, 1961) and *Lughat al-Ay-Ay* (Language of screams, 1965)—many of the stories essentially parables about the alienation of human beings in contemporary society. In these later collections, we still encounter scenes from country life, but the focus has shifted from realistic detail to the symbolic portrait of the inner workings of the mind. Several also show his virtuoso ability to manipulate narrative point-of-view and to incorporate us into the storytelling process. Above all, his command of narrative structure and his use of allusive language has given his contributions to this genre a stature unmatched by any other Egyptian writer—and by very few other Arab litterateurs.

Idris often admitted to writing on impulse, something that may well contribute to his great success in the realm of the short story. This same impulsiveness may explain why his essays in other

genres have, for the most part, not met with similar success. While many of Idris's plays have been performed to great popular acclaim, even his most popular and accomplished play, *Al-Farafir* (The Farfoors, 1964), loses cohesion in its lengthy second act. Of his novels, only *Al-Haram* (The taboo, 1959), with its realistic portrayal of migrant communities in the provinces, manages to sustain a narrative focus through the longer fictional mode.

Idris's craft shows the greatest development and made the greatest contribution in the much-discussed area of language. Coupled to a great storyteller's ability in creating scenes and moods with an allusiveness and economy akin to that of poetry, Idris's narrative style co-opted the riches of the colloquial dialect to create a multitextured descriptive instrument of tremendous subtlety and variety. This colloquial level was his natural choice for dialogue in both plays and fiction, but aspects of the colloquial's lexicon and syntax are also to be found in narrative passages of his fiction. This stylistic feature has not endeared him to conservative critics, but it lent his stories an element of spontaneity and authenticity that contributed in no small part to their popularity. Idris's storytelling style, his lively imagination, sardonic sense of humor, and tremendous concern for the plight of modern life, are at their best in his short stories—many of which rival the very best in that most elusive and self-conscious of literary genres.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Literature: Arabic; Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries; Theater.

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Roger Allen

IFNI

Area on Morocco's coast ceded to Morocco by Spain.

Formerly Santa Cruz de Mar Pequena, Ifni was a 675-square-mile Spanish enclave on the coast of southern Morocco. The population of the area was about 40,000, made up mainly of seven predominantly sedentary Berber-speaking tribes. The Spanish held a trading post in the area from 1476 to 1524. Under the 1860 treaty of Tetuan, the area was designated as Spanish, and permission was given to build a fishing harbor. However, an exploratory expedition to the area in 1879 ended in failure. The Spanish–French treaty of 1912 recognized Spain's sovereign right to the Ifni enclave, distinct from the protectorate zones, and similar to Spain's rights over Ceuta and Melilla. Spanish general Osvaldo Capaz finally occupied the area in March 1934. In 1946 the coastal town of Sidi Ifni, the capital of the enclave, was made the seat of a single centralized administration for Spanish West Africa. The 1956 Spanish–Moroccan treaty restored to Morocco 15,000 square miles of Spanish Sahara, now known as the province of Tarfaya. But the Ifni enclave remained in Spanish hands, with Spain insisting that Ifni had been ceded in perpetuity by the 1860 treaty. In November 1957 fighting broke out between Morocco's irregular Army for the Liberation of the Sahara and Spanish forces. In December 6,000 Spanish troops took up positions around Sidi Ifni and held on for twelve years. The area was made a Spanish province under the authority of the military commander of the Canary Islands. Morocco first raised the issue of Spain's control of Ifni at the UN General Assembly session in 1957. In 1965 the General Assembly resolved that Ifni should be liberated from colonial domination. On 4 January 1969 Spain and Morocco signed an agreement to turn the area over to Morocco. The actual transfer was made on 30 June. In return, Spain was awarded fishing rights off Morocco's Atlantic coast. Today, Sidi Ifni has a population of 17,000.

See also Morocco.

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

IGNATIEV, NIKOLAS PAVLOVICH

[1832–1908]

Russian diplomat.

Born in St. Petersburg, Nikolas Pavlovich Ignatiev entered the diplomatic service in 1856 and served as ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in Constantinople (1864–1878). He was a zealous pan-Slavist,

described by one writer as "brilliant and none-too-scrupulous." In contrast to the Russian foreign minister, Aleksandr Gorchakov, Ignatiev worked for the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. He was active in inciting the 1877–1878 Russian–Ottoman War, and is credited with framing the Treaty of San Stefano (1878), which laid the foundation for "Big Bulgaria." In the interest of good relations with Britain and Austria, however, the treaty and Ignatiev's "Big Bulgaria" were jettisoned by Gorchakov at the Congress of Berlin (1878), and with them Ignatiev's career. At the height of his power, Ignatiev influenced the Ottoman government to such an extent that he was referred to as "Sultan Ignatiev."

See also BERLIN, CONGRESS AND TREATY OF; RUSSIAN–OTTOMAN WARS; SAN STEFANO, TREATY OF (1878).

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ZACHARY KARABELL

IKHA AL-WATANI PARTY

Iraqi political party of the 1930s.

Ikha al-Watani (National Brotherhood) was formed to oppose the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty of 1930. Its principal members were Yasin al-Hashimi, Rashid Ali al-Kaylani, and Hikmat Sulayman. In 1933 some of its members accepted the 1930 treaty and participated in a government under Rashid Ali (March–October 1933). A second Ikha cabinet under Yasin al-Hashimi was formed in March 1935, but the group disbanded itself shortly afterward.

See also ANGLO–IRAQI TREATIES; HASHIMI, YASIN AL-; KAYLANI, RASHID ALI AL-; SULAYMAN, HIKMAT.

PETER SLUGLETT

IKHLASSI, WALID

[1935–]

Syrian novelist, short-story writer, and dramatist.

Walid Ikhlassi was born in Alexandretta. After the cession of Alexandretta to Turkey in 1939, his family moved to Aleppo. He received his education in agricultural engineering at the University of Alexandria in Egypt. He later became a lecturer at the College of Agriculture at the University of Aleppo.

Ikhlassi was raised in a family preoccupied with religious and national issues. Imbued with nationalistic aspirations during the French mandate, Ikhlassi's writings deal mainly with democracy, freedom, responsibility, alienation, the loss of the self, and the failure of human ideals. The Palestinian diaspora is also a significant theme in his work; he tackled it throughout an entire collection of short stories, *The Time of Short Migrations,* 1970. Although Ikhlassi's first short story, "The Cock," appeared in 1954, his first collection, *Stories,* had to wait until 1963. Since then, he has published eight more collections. Some stories have been translated into English, French, Russian, and Persian.

Ikhlassi was the first Syrian novelist to experiment with the nouveau roman. While his first novel, *A Winter of the Dry Sea,* published in 1965, divided the literary critics into conservatives and liberals, his second novel, *The Lap of the Beautiful Lady,* in 1969, pleased the conservative camp for it adhered to traditional rules and practices of fiction. Ikhlassi has published nine more novels. The latest to date is *The Minor Epic of Death* in 1993.

Ikhlassi not only feels comfortable manipulating narrative techniques but also alternating among narrative genres. He believes that the subject matter dictates both the form and the genre to be employed in a certain artistic work. Like his novels and short stories, Ikhlassi's plays show innovation in literary devices and a break with the then dominant realistic mode of expression in favor of a more symbolic, surrealistic, and allegorical mode.

See also DIASPORA; THEATER.

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SABAH GHANDOUR

IKHWAN

A militant religious movement drawn from Bedouin tribes in northern and central Arabia.

After Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman Al Saʿud reconquered Riyadh from the Al Rashid dynasty in 1901, religious authorities began to spread Wahhabism aggressively. One of the main intellectual forces behind the movement was Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn Abd al-Latif, a scholar and religious leader in Riyadh. After about 1906, he oversaw the dispersion of his message among the Bedouin by activist-preachers called *mutawwaʿin.* The Bedouin converts and their religious mentors developed a variation on Wahhabism that incorporated the military tendencies of tribal society and the extreme literalist zeal sometimes characteristic of new religious converts. Those Bedouin who espoused this version of Wahhabism were known as *Ikhwan* (brethren, in Arabic). In addition to being called to accept the tenets of Wahhabism, they were encouraged to give up nomadism, obey the amir/imam (Abd al-Aziz), to help other Ikhwan, and to avoid contact with Europeans and other "nonbelievers." Because the movement developed in a society that attempted to retain its tribal prerogatives, the political agenda of its leaders often clashed with those of Abd al-Aziz and his town-oriented allies.

The first Ikhwan settlement, or *hijra* (plural, *hujjar*), was established around 1913 mainly by members of the Mutayr tribe led by Faysal al-Darwish in al-Artawiyya, north of Riyadh. The use of the term *hijra* was a conscious attempt to invoke the first Islamic community under the prophet Muhammad. The *hujar* were located in tribal lands near water sources, and numbered around 120 by 1929.

Abd-al Aziz saw the spread of religion and the sedentarizing imperatives of the Ikhwan movement as a way to "debedouinize" the nomads, to build stronger ties between them and the ruler, and to use their young men as a reliable fighting force. However, from the start, important segments of the Ikhwan movement chafed at the policies of Abd al-Aziz. For example, because by 1914 a *hijra*-versus-town mentality had developed, and victims of Ikhwan intolerance and violence had complained to the ruler of Najd, Abd al-Aziz was forced to issue an edict, backed by his *ulama* allies, that undercut Ikhwan pretensions as arbiters and enforcers of Islamic belief and practice.

Material incentives encouraged some to join the movement. Abd al-Aziz encouraged sedentarization by providing funds, agricultural supplies, and materials to build schools and mosques. In addition, although Abd al-Aziz discouraged intertribal raiding (a major activity of the Bedouin for centuries), he permitted Ikhwan leaders to carry out violent attacks against opponents, which provided a significant source of plunder: animals, tents, weapons, and household items. After World War I, several Ikhwan leaders became strong advocates of military expansion, and beginning around 1919, Ikhwan forces carried out numerous attacks on Muslim populations (some of them Shiʿite) not only in al-Hasa, Najd, and Jabal Shammar, but also in Kuwait, Iraq, and Transjordan.

Among the Ikhwan's most notorious conquests were those in Hijaz, beginning with the sack of al-Taʾif in 1924 and the massacre of hundreds of the town's men, women, and children. Despite repeated efforts by Abd al-Aziz to curb such excesses, the Ikhwan continued to perpetrate acts of untrammeled violence and destruction, including the "purification" of Mecca and Medina through the destruction of many historic religious monuments and shrines, and an attack in 1926 against an Egyptian pilgrimage procession, which resulted in the Ikhwan's banishment from Hijaz. These episodes, as well as the bitter disappointment of al-Darwish and other Ikhwan leaders that their military conquests had not been rewarded by expected political appointments over the newly conquered territories, precipitated a revolt against Abd al-Aziz in 1927. The revolt—and the movement itself—eventually was crushed by the forces of Abd al-Aziz in March 1929 at the battle of Sibila.

The ideology and aims of the Ikhwan movement persisted beneath the surface of official Saudi politics and resurfaced during the attack in November 1979 on the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The leader of the siege, Juhayman al-Utaybi, came from the *hijra* of Sajir, and his followers adopted the dress and violent and doctrinaire methods of the Ikhwan. Like their predecessors, these "neo-Ikhwan" were motivated by a sense that Islam was being perverted, that the Al Saʿud ruling family were corrupt, and that

they alone held the key to a pure and true renewal of the Muslim community.

See also UTAYBI, JUHAYMAN AL-

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MALCOLM C. PECK
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

ILAYSH, MUHAMMAD

[1802–1882]

Egyptian religious leader and writer.

Muhammad Ilaysh was an important conservative religious figure and a prolific writer of traditional religious texts. He was first a student at al-Azhar University, then a professor there, eventually rising to become the mufti and head shaykh of the Maliki Law School (1854–1882). Of a stern ascetic tendency, Ilaysh also was a shaykh in the sober Shadhili Sufi order, where he upheld the tradition of the earlier Maliki al-Amir al-Kabir (1742–1817). Ilaysh's asceticism extended to his dealings with the government, from which he became increasingly aloof, even though the khedive Ismaʿil provided him with 42 hectares of land as an emolument, apparently to placate him. Ilaysh opposed the introduction of examinations at al-Azhar in 1872, opposed the increasing European influence in the late 1870s, and participated in the Urabi movement of 1881 and 1882. During this time, he supported the removal of the khedive Tawfiq's supporter, Muhammad al-Abbasi al-Mahdi, as the shaykh of al-Azhar; was appointed to advise the new shaykh, Muhammad al-Imbabi; sought to declare a jihad (holy war) to fight the British invasion; and signed a *fatwa* (legal opinion) declaring the khedive an apostate from Islam—an act of open rebellion. As a result, when the British conquered Cairo for the khedive, Ilaysh was arrested and roughly handled, and died in detention.

Ilaysh's writings amount to over 12,000 pages, mostly dealing with fiqh, although some deal with grammar and *aqida.* Some remain unpublished, but others have had an abiding influence. One of the most influential is his enormous commentary on Khalil titled *Minah al-Jalil,* published in 1877, which may be the last work of fiqh composed in Egypt that is free of modern influence and thus represents a final summation of the Maliki school. Another work of lasting influence is his collection of fatwas, *Fath al-Ali al-Malik,* published in 1883, immediately after his death.

See also MALIKI SCHOOL OF LAW; SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS; URABI, AHMAD.

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KHALID BLANKINSHIP

İLMIYYE

The Learned Institution, or hierarchy of religious officials in the Ottoman Empire.

From the early sixteenth century, the İlmiyye became a distinct hierarchy in the Ottoman government. It was headed by the grand *mufti,* called the Shaykh al-Islam, in Constantinople (now Istanbul) and extended to the lowest provincial *qadi* (judge) and religious schoolteacher. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the İlmiyye's top posts were dominated by elite families of Constantinople.

In the nineteenth century, Ottoman reforms undermined the İlmiyye's autonomy and influence by organizing the Ministry of Waqfs in 1834 and, in the Tanzimat period, introducing secular courts, law codes, and school systems that competed with religious institutions. While Abdülhamit II increased funding for the İlmiyye, he also furthered its bureaucratization and state control. During World War I, the Young Turks incorporated all re-

ligious courts into the secular Ministry of Justice and religious schools into the secular Ministry of Education. The Shaykh al-Islam was reduced to a consultant. The final blow to the İlmiyye institution was the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 and the ensuing secularization of public institutions by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk).

See also ABDÜLHAMIT II; ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; CALIPHATE; SHAYKH AL-ISLAM; TANZIMAT; YOUNG TURKS.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

ILTIZAM

See GLOSSARY

IMAM

See GLOSSARY

IMAMZADEH

See GLOSSARY

IMPERIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Direct or indirect control exerted by one nation over the political life or economic life (or both) of other nations.

Imperialism is generally defined as a phenomenon that began with the overseas expansion of Europe in the fifteenth century. That expansion did not seri-

French troops in 1941. The French colonial empire reached its peak in the early 1900s, with its empire extending to 4.5 million square miles. After World War II, France saw widespread revolts in its North African colonies, and was forced to withdraw from them completely by the late 1960s. **© BETTMAN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

ously affect the Maghreb or Egypt, however, until the nineteenth century, and, except economically, it did not affect the most populous areas of southwest Asia until the early twentieth century. The major reason for this delay was the power and durability of the Ottoman Empire.

Originating around 1300, the Ottoman Empire eventually expanded to include most of the Balkans and the Black Sea area, Anatolia, the Fertile Crescent, and northern Africa as far west as the borders of Morocco. It was for centuries the primary empire in the Middle East and North Africa. (An empire is a singular political unit—not necessarily based on territorial contiguity—that incorporates different peoples who were previously self-governing and who retain some institutional autonomy.) In taking over so many regions, the Turkish-speaking armies of the sultans created an empire that included many different linguistic, religious, and ethnic groups, in which Turks were always a minority. The Ottomans engaged in imperial rivalry to expand their territory. Their rivals were the Holy Roman Empire (later Austria-Hungary), the Russian Empire, and the Iranian state of the Safavids and their succes-

Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill (center) with British officials at the 1921 Cairo Conference to discuss the future of the Arab nations. The conference delegates sought to find a way to maintain political control over the areas mandated to Britain in the Sykes–Picot agreement while cutting costs and reducing British overseas military presence. **© Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

sors, which was sometimes called an empire despite its much smaller size because it was multilingual, multiethnic, and periodically expansive.

This description of the Ottoman Empire does not differ substantially from the description that could be applied to the Christian European empires established from the sixteenth century onward, except that the Europeans were normally less willing to admit non-Europeans into the ranks of officials. The sultans, like the Russian tsars, were primarily motivated by the desire to acquire land and wealth, whereas the overseas European empire builders sought raw materials and markets. Thus the Europeans had a greater impact on the international division of labor than did the Ottomans, although this analytical distinction was not necessarily reflected in the attitudes of the imperialists and their subjects.

Despite the substantial similarities between European and Middle Eastern empires, the term *imperialism* is rarely used to describe the underlying principles of the Ottoman Empire. More often, imperialism is defined as a peculiarly European phenomenon embodying military or political control of non-European peoples; unrestrained exploitation of their economies for the disproportionate benefit of the European home country; feelings of racial, religious, and cultural superiority over the dominated peoples; and, in some regions, the implantation of European colonies or importation of nonindigenous laborers, often as slaves.

Historians in the Marxist tradition have considered economic exploitation by such means as joint-stock companies, forced labor on plantations, and suppression of indigenous manufactures to be

the most important aspect of European imperialism. Imperialism, according to this view, is an inevitable stage of a capitalist system that needs to expand in order to survive. Immanuel Wallerstein, whose theories have been particularly influential, portrays imperialism as the imposition upon the entire world of a system through which capitalist Europe made the rest of the world economically dependent and imposed economic underdevelopment by monopolizing resources, reorienting self-sustaining regions toward extraction of primary goods for European manufacturers, and preventing the emergence of viable mixed economies in non-European areas.

Some clear distinctions between the way the Ottomans and the Europeans ran their empires may be noted. The Islamic religion provided a bond for most people under Ottoman rule, whereas European Christianity remained a culturally elitist, minority faith in the parts of the European empires that did not have large colonies of European settlers or where religions of comparable sophistication, such as Islam, impeded religious conversion. Ottoman lands remained comparatively open to trade by foreigners (though not to land acquisition), and the Ottoman government rarely took action to protect its own merchants, as the Europeans commonly did. Finally, the Ottomans generally administered their territories with a lighter hand than did the Europeans.

In 1800 most subjects of the Ottoman sultan considered it normal to be ruled from a distant capital by means of a rotation of officials and military forces sent from afar and often speaking a foreign language. Napoléon Bonaparte's propaganda effort in 1798 to convince the Egyptians that they were victims of imperial oppression by foreigners fell on deaf ears. Soon thereafter, however, the Christian peoples of the Balkans, stimulated in part by the exposure of community members to European ideas as a consequence of educational or personal contacts outside Ottoman territories, did begin to see themselves as victims of Ottoman domination. Through a series of wars and militant movements—often encouraged by European powers with strategic or ideological agendas—they endeavored to gain their freedom and establish independent states with comparative ethnic and religious homogeneity. The anti-imperialism of the Balkan secessionists eventually affected the Armenian Christians of Anatolia and more slowly gained headway in Arab nationalist circles after 1900.

Persian, Arab, and Kurd prisoners in a Mesopotamian prison camp in 1916. In that year the Sykes–Picot agreement divided the Arab Middle East between Britain and France, with Russia giving its assent. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

European imperialism took three forms in the early nineteenth century: direct occupation and colonization of Algeria by France from 1830 onward, diplomatic pressure on the Ottoman sultans to grant economic and legal privileges to Europeans and non-Muslim minorities, and treaties with rulers and chiefs controlling seaports in the Persian Gulf and southern Arabia designed to ensure British military control of the sea route to India in return for maintaining the rulers and chiefs in power. In the second half of the century, new forms of European imperialism emerged. Rulers granted concessions to European entrepreneurs for the building of canals, railroads, and telegraph lines; operation of banks; and marketing of primary products. They also sought loans from private European bankers. When Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, Tunisia, and Iran were successively unable to repay these loans, Europeans assumed financial control over customs and other sources of state revenue. In Egypt, fear that Colonel Ahmad Urabi's military rebellion would interrupt these financial controls prompted Britain to suppress the rebellion militarily and commence

an occupation in 1882 that would last for seventy years. In 1881 France occupied Tunisia and subsequently imposed a protectorate upon its Husaynid beys. In 1900, primarily for strategic reasons, France began the occupation of the territory that subsequently became Mauritania, and in 1912, in partnership with Spain, it imposed a protectorate on the sultanate of Morocco. France had already recognized Spain's sovereignty over certain "presidios" in the Spanish Sahara.

Growing European imperialism gave rise to anti-imperialist sentiments that were vented in popular opposition to concessions, as in the Tobacco Revolt in Iran in 1891 and in the mobilization of political action around religious symbols and leaders (e.g., in Libya, where the Sanusi Sufi brotherhood spearheaded opposition to Italian occupation after 1911). Anti-imperialism also sparked political movements, most notably the Wafd in Egypt, whose members saw the end of World War I as a possible opportunity to escape British rule. Farther west, the Young Tunisian and Young Algerian movements began demanding reform and greater rights for natives. Armenians and Kurds looked to the peace negotiators to grant them independence from outside control, even if it meant accepting some measure of European protection.

The mandate system established at San Remo in 1920 to resolve the problems caused by the defeat of the Ottoman Empire extended European imperialism by giving France control of Lebanon and Syria and Britain control of Palestine and Iraq. Legally, the mandate from the League of Nations to France and Britain required them to nurture these territories toward total independence, but these countries' motivation to do so (strongest in Iraq and weakest in Lebanon and western Palestine) was often adversely affected by issues of national interest. In Palestine, in particular, Britain was committed in the terms of the Balfour Declaration (1917) to fostering the establishment of a Jewish national home. In the eyes of many Arabs and Muslims, the migration of tens of thousands of Jews from Europe to Palestine represented a form of settler colonialism similar to that in Algeria. Between the two world wars France and Great Britain had to deal with extremely determined and sometimes violent resistance by both Syrians and Palestinians, while nationalist movements in the Maghreb also mobilized increasing support.

Unlike parts of the world rich in raw materials or agricultural products that could not be grown in Europe, most parts of the Middle East and North Africa did not offer great rewards to their imperial masters. Egyptian cotton, Algerian wine, and Iranian oil flowed into international markets, and the Suez Canal was profitable, but the cost of military occupation in the face of rising nationalist hostility, and the cost of infrastructure investment, limited though it was in most areas, brought the economic value of imperialism into question. After World War II, the greatly depleted European powers were no longer able to bear the cost, either in money or manpower. One by one, the countries of the Middle East became free of direct imperial control. Only in the most profitable or politically contested countries was the withdrawal of empire accompanied by significant bloodshed. British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948 brought on Israel's declaration of independence and the first Arab–Israel War. The army coup that terminated British control of Egypt in 1952 was followed by the Suez War in 1956 in which Britain, in alliance with France and Israel, attempted to regain control of the Suez Canal. Through effective political activism that was largely but not totally peaceful, Tunisians and Moroccans were able to terminate the French protectorates by 1956. In 1960, as part of a broader de-colonization process, France's president Charles de Gaulle granted independence to Mauritania. In Algeria, colonists' refusal to permit meaningful reform led the Front de Libération Nationale to launch a revolution in 1954; France's attempt to repress it cost roughly 500,000 Algerian lives and ended in independence for Algeria in July 1962. Francisco Franco granted the Western (formerly Spanish) Sahara independence in 1975, but this led to conflict with Morocco that had not been resolved by the early twenty-first century.

As direct imperial control waned and overt indirect control in the form of military bases and foreign ownership of oil companies diminished in the 1950s and 1960s, cultural imperialism came to be looked upon as a pervasive remnant of the imperialist era. Cultural imperialism was considered to have several components: imposition of Euro-American cultural values and lifestyles through market domination by imported consumer goods, motion pictures, and television shows; ideological subversion in the form of secular nationalist political movements

philosophically rooted in Western thought; and intellectual domination through the distorted writings and pejorative imaginative constructions of European Orientalists and their successors in the American academic field of Middle East studies.

Direct imperial domination had evoked a fairly uniform nationalist reaction throughout the region, but the more nebulous concept of cultural imperialism led its proponents in different directions. In Iran, Jalal Al-e Ahmad's concept of *gharbzadegi* or "Westoxication" contributed to the explicitly anti-Western character of the 1979 revolution. Other Islamic activist movements have, to varying degrees, shared hostility or suspicion of the West as an imperialist force. The Islamist insurgency that erupted in Algeria in the 1990s was viewed as principally if not totally cultural in nature. The discourse of al-Qaʿida, which also emerged in the 1990s, is primarily cultural. Secular intellectuals, on the other hand, have refused to accept Islam as the only alternative to cultural domination by the West. Calls for a decolonization of history and exposure of Orientalist fantasies have come mainly from secularists such as Morocco's Abdallah Laroui and the Palestinian Edward Said.

Further stimulus for resistance to Western imperialism came in 1993 from Samuel Huntington's article "The Clash of Civilizations" in the influential journal *Foreign Affairs.* Huntington visualized a future in which an undefined Islamic civilization was destined to conflict with a similarly undefined Western civilization, and he called for the formulation of a strategy that would assure Western victory in such a confrontation. Middle Eastern religious and secular thinkers alike viewed this projection as a portent of continued Western imperial ambition in the post–Cold War era.

See also Algerian War of Independence; Arab–Israel War (1948); Balfour Declaration (1917); Bonaparte, Napoléon; Gharbzadegi; Iranian Revolution (1979); Mandate System; Ottoman Empire; Qaʿida, al-; Said, Edward; Tobacco Revolt; Urabi, Ahmad; Wafd; Young Algerians; Young Tunisians.

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INCENSE

Aromatic gum resins.

Frankincense and myrrh are taken from trees that grow in Dhufar, Oman, and in Hadramawt, Yemen. Recent archaeological discoveries confirm their export from about 3000 B.C.E. through an extensive commercial network. The trade, reaching as far as Rome and India, helped create considerable prosperity and interstate rivalry in southwest Arabia. Exports and prosperity declined when Rome made Christianity its official religion and the use of incense at funerals largely ceased.

See also Dhufar; Hadramawt.

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Malcolm C. Peck

INDUSTRIALIZATION

Manufacturing in the Middle East, with a legacy of state-led industrialization, remains underdeveloped and ill prepared for the challenges of globalization.

The countries of the Middle East and North Africa have failed to develop viable manufacturing sectors and industrialize in a way comparable to more dynamic countries in Southeast Asia and Latin America. After decades of state-led industrialization efforts, most economies of the region remain dependent on primary produce exports, labor remittances, and foreign aid, while few manufacture

A cotton mill in Egypt. Cotton, Egypt's second largest export, became a major factor in the country's economy after the Alexandria–Cairo railway was completed in the mid-1800s, creating lines to important cotton manufacturing centers such as Samannud and Zaqaziq.
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goods that are competitive in international markets. Indeed, without tariff and quota protection and subsidies, most of the existing industries that have been established would fail to compete successfully in their own domestic markets. As a result, the economies of the region remain unprepared to meet the challenges posed by economic globalization and will be hard-pressed to provide sufficient employment and wealth generation for the growing populations of the region.

Overview

From the perspective of global economic history, the Middle East would appear to have the necessary prerequisites for successful industrialization given its manufacturing inheritance, artisan skills, and availability of finance. In the early postwar period, expectations for industrial modernization were high, yet half a century later the region's industrial sectors appear to be mismanaged and technologically deficient. Although conditioned by the experience of colonialism, this fate was not predetermined by geography, religion, or culture. For most economies of the region, it has rather been the result of authoritarian regimes failing to overcome the legacies of inward-oriented, state-led industrialization efforts through market reform and technological innovation. Meanwhile, economies across the region have been sustained by oil incomes, labor remittances, and strategic aid flows while suffering the strains of regional insecurity, leading to high spending on imported military equipment and diverting investment away from the region.

The Middle East has a strong preindustrial manufacturing tradition, for the ancient cities of the region served not only as centers of commerce but also as bases for handicraft manufacturing. The skills of Arab and Jewish craftsmen from Andalusia to Bagh-

dad were renowned throughout the medieval world. Later in the sixteenth century, cities such as Isfahan in Iran had more skilled artisans than Paris, with more than half a million workers engaged in manufacturing.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, European capitalist penetration and various forms of direct and indirect colonialism led to the dislocation of indigenous economic patterns, while defensive modernization efforts, such as that of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, failed to sustain local industrialization. With the inability to protect local markets, European industrialization resulted in the relative deindustrialization of the Middle East. Small-scale artisan and domestic manufacturing for local consumption, however, continued and in some cases expanded in isolated markets. By the early twentieth century intense economic interaction with Europe did bring access to investment and technology, resulting in establishment of mechanized factories often owned by Europeans as well as ethnic and religious minorities.

These possible foundations for industrial development, however, were disrupted by the rise of nationalist movements that led to the evacuation and expropriation of the assets of much of the existing bourgeoisie. Postcolonial states led by a new class of reform-oriented elites took over the drive toward import substitution industrialization (ISI). With a heavy urban bias, these regimes viewed large-scale factory production as a marker of modernity and national independence. These projects, however, were often driven more by an interest in expanding state power and employment generation than long-range development goals. As a result, most industrial sectors remained dominated by state-owned enterprises and/or supported by tariff and quota protection and subsidies that have proved politically difficult to remove ever since.

Although state-led ISI efforts made impressive early gains, their inward-oriented development models soon faced crises. In the 1970s states such as Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia adopted "open door" policies to attract investment, but only in the 1980s and 1990s did they implement substantial price liberalization and the privatization of state-owned assets. Economic liberalization spurred smaller scale, private sector investments in light manufacturing, textiles, and food processing.

Meanwhile, in the wake of the 1973 oil embargo the region witnessed a massive inflow of capital with the soaring price of oil. This income allowed the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf to expand their modern infrastructure and oil-related sectors. Many would also later seek to diversify their economies.

Regional oil dependency, however, has resulted in "rentier" economies marked by excessive state expenditures, unproductive investments, and unsustainable import levels. At the same time, investment in turnkey projects rapidly increased industrial capacity but failed to sustain technological advancement or encourage local innovation. Moreover, oil incomes gave these states the ability to provide extensive educational and social welfare benefits for their populations while eliminating the need for taxation, reducing pressures for administrative accountability and political representation. The bulk of the excess capital generated by the oil boom was invested in the advanced industrial economies, and regional investment was mostly limited to tourism, real estate, and construction. The oil boom also produced rentier effects in the oil-poor states by generating flows of aid and private remittances.

Throughout the post-1945 era, some of the greatest negative factors inhibiting industrialization have been the successive wars, continuous political hostilities, and military authoritarian regimes in the region. In many states, more effort and finance has gone into building military might than into developing civilian industry. In fact, the Middle East devotes a greater share of income to arms purchases than any other region.

The wars and political tensions in the Middle East, caused by regional insecurity and external intervention, have also resulted in investors being put off by the risks and uncertainties. As investment flooded the "emerging markets" in the post–Cold War era, there has been little foreign direct investment in the Middle East, and major multinational companies are still reluctant to establish substantial production facilities in the region.

While economic fortunes vary considerably across the region, in general, Arab states have failed to encourage knowledge-intensive fields and make investments in research and development. And in the last two decades of the twentieth century, encom-

passing both the oil boom and the decline of oil prices in the late 1980s, per capita growth in the Arab states was on average 0.5 percent, which is well below the global average of 1.3 percent. As a result, most states remain ill prepared to face the challenges of economic globalization. In many states, large sections of the population view globalization as an externally driven threat to their well-being and way of life.

Country Experiences

Not surprisingly, Turkey has experienced the most success with industrialization in the region. The regional paradigm for state-led ISI was set by Turkey, which under Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) established heavy industries in the 1920s and 1930s such as steelmaking and modern textile plants. These were planned on the Soviet model, primarily to serve a protected domestic market. These plants provided the inputs for more consumer-oriented industries such as clothing and household fabrics, and eventually consumer durable manufacturing was developed, including vehicle assembly using domestically produced sheet steel.

Despite the substantial size of the domestic market in Turkey, the import substitution process was running out of steam by the 1960s, and most of the state-owned industries were sustaining heavy losses. Change finally came in 1980, when economic liberalization measures were introduced, liberalizing prices, reducing subsidies, removing import restrictions, and, most importantly, letting the exchange rate find its own level in the market. An export boom resulted, encompassing a range of manufacturing sectors, and Turkey moved into balance of payments surplus as a result of flourishing trade with Europe and exports of manufactured goods to neighboring Middle Eastern countries.

Egypt's state-led industrialization drive under Gamal Abdel Nasser had also faltered by the 1970s, although it was the Arab–Israel War of 1967 that led to the end of development planning and economic policies based on Arab socialism. In the wake of the 1973 Arab–Israel War President Anwar al-Sadat initiated the *infitah* (open door policy) to attract foreign investment. Husni Mubarak followed up by introducing a partial liberalization of the economy, but it was much less sweeping than Turkey's changes. Egypt's subsidies have been reduced at the behest of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), some price controls removed, and the exchange rate floated.

There has been some privatization, but Egypt's industries are not yet internationally competitive, due as much to lack of quality control as to price. Although the large state-owned firms still provide substantial employment, the most dynamic firms are the privately owned export-oriented ones engaged in light manufacturing for international franchises. Much of Egypt's private capital, however, has been invested in real estate and service-sector businesses such as tourism.

Although oil was discovered in the Middle East before World War II, it was the development of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the 1973 oil embargo that led to the rapid rise of oil prices, which in turn led to massive revenue increases in the oil-rich states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran.

In Saudi Arabia, the state-owned Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) has become a major petrochemical producer working in collaboration with leading multinational oil and chemical companies. Jabal Ali has risen from the desert sands to become the leading industrial complex in the Persian Gulf and the largest in the Arab world. It produces not only a large variety of petroleum derivatives, but also fertilizers and steel. The petrochemicals are the feedstocks for plastics, and Saudi Arabia already has a range of downstream manufacturing, producing everything from transparent bags and other disposables to heavy durable plastic products.

Apart from Turkey, Saudi Arabia is the only Middle Eastern country to have experienced a considerable degree of industrial success. The Riyadh government took the lead because of the substantial scale of the financing involved, but Saudi Arabia, like Turkey, has a vigorous and growing private manufacturing sector. In Turkey, the comparative advantage lies in its modest labor costs and the adaptability and skills of its people. In Saudi Arabia, where much of the labor is foreign, the advantage is the abundance of energy and a tradition of trade and commerce.

With oil resources, abundant human capital, and an agricultural base, Iraq could have been expected

to develop into a regional economic powerhouse. After an emphasis on agricultural development and decentralized food-processing factories in the early republican (post-1958) era, during the oil boom Iraq came to focus on its oil and gas sector. By the late 1970s Iraq had shifted toward heavy industry and armament manufacturing. In the wake of two wars and a decade of sanctions, however, its oil sector and industrial base became dilapidated, and it will be difficult to rebuild it in the wake of the U.S.-led toppling of the Baʿathist regime.

Iran saw its industrial output in steel and petrochemical production decline throughout the 1980s following the disruption of the Islamic Revolution and the Iran–Iraq War. Many industrialists and managers left after the overthrow of the shah, and the war resulted in severe shortages that made it difficult for industries to obtain necessary raw materials and imported inputs. After the war the Tehran government engaged in a "construction jihad" to develop the country's infrastructure and educational system, but political isolation has continued to limit its industrial prospects.

Israel is the most industrialized country in the region and one of the few with a highly skilled workforce and a commitment to supporting research and development. Industrial development, however, has been hampered by isolation and continuing regional conflict. The Oslo peace process of the mid-1990s led to short period of exaggerated hopes in Israel and across the region for economic cooperation in inward investment, but these expectations fell with the decline of the peace process in the late 1990s. As a small state trying to diversify with a limited domestic market, Israel has suffered from its exclusion from regional markets, despite post-Oslo efforts towards regional normalization. Israel's trade with Egypt and Jordan has been minimal, though some low-skilled labor-intensive production has been outsourced to these states, which have peace treaties with Israel. Trade relations with the European Union have been difficult despite a cooperation agreement, and the United States is a somewhat distant market.

Cut diamonds remain a major industrial export for Israel, but earnings are static and the industry provides direct employment for only a few hundred skilled workers. Much of the country's industry is defense related and is dependent on the financial injections from the United States, which sustain the country's high level of military expenditure. Defense equipment, including aircraft, is exported to a number of countries.

In the 1990s Israel made considerable efforts to build up its civilian high technology industries, including electronics and software development. But Israel is a relatively high-cost producer and faces cutthroat international competition. Export growth in its high-technology sector came to a halt in 2000 with the high-tech bust in the United States and with the collapse of the peace process.

The peace treaty between Israel and Jordan failed to generate extensive economic cooperation, but Jordan has sought to diversify and liberalize its economy. With a small domestic market, Jordan had relied on mineral exports and trade with Iraq during its oil-boom phase, but since the mid-1990s has sought to promote tourism development, as well as export-oriented light manufacturing by granting incentives to firms located in qualified industrial zones (QIZ) and through its free trade agreement with the United States. Jordan has also developed a relatively successful pharmaceuticals sector, but its generic drug production might run into trouble with intellectual property rights.

In North Africa, Algeria's industrialization drive, supported by oil and gas revenues, was anchored by heavy-industry plans that failed to act as growth poles. Socialist planning has been disastrous, in particular, for truck and tractor assembly plants. Most consumer durables industries were established to serve the domestic market and have been protected from competition by tariffs and foreign exchange rationing. This also applies to Morocco, which never adopted socialist controls over its economy, as Algeria and Tunisia did. In fact, in Morocco, small-scale craft-based activities such as ceramics, woodcarving, metalworking, and clothing remain a source of strength, providing employment and output possibly equal to that of the country's industrial plants.

Tunisia and Morocco have pursued outward-oriented industrialization policies by promoting tourism development and building private-sector textile plants that carry out subcontracting work for

European garment producers. These firms expanded during the 1980s and early 1990s, but have suffered from lower-cost Asian producers. Despite investment incentives and liberal laws on foreign capital, they have failed to attract considerable industrial investment from overseas. Both states have signed association agreements with the European Union that will gradually reduce tariff barriers on industrial products. In the meantime, Tunisia and Morocco have benefited from preferential access and have sought to promote an innovative industrial modernization program (*mise à niveau*) for small- and medium-sized firms in order to meet the challenges of integration into European and global markets.

See also Algeria: Overview; Economics; Egypt; International Monetary Fund; Iran; Iraq; Israel: Overview; Jordan; Manufactures; Morocco: Overview; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Petroleum Reserves and Production; Saudi Arabia; Tunisia: Overview; Turkey.

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INFITAH

Anwar al-Sadat's program to encourage private investment in Egypt, often called the Open Door policy.

Officially launched with the 1974 "October Paper," which called for relaxing some of the government controls applied under the Arab Socialism of Gamal Abdel Nasser, this policy actually started in 1971 as an effort to attract investment by other Arab countries to rescue Egypt's faltering economy. This policy was accelerated after the Arab–Israel War of 1973 because Egypt needed foreign exchange to finance the importation of materials and parts that would bring its economy back to full production. Egypt hoped also to convert its short-term debt to longer indebtedness under less onerous terms and to attract private investments to increase future income, jobs, and foreign exchange.

Law 43 (1974) activated *infitah* by giving incentives, such as reduced taxes and import tariffs and guarantees against nationalization, to Arab and foreign investors in Egyptian industry, land reclamation, tourism, and banking. Some of the advisers to Anwar al-Sadat wanted to limit *infitah* to encouraging foreign investment in Egypt's economy; others hoped to apply capitalist norms to all domestic firms, whether owned by the government or by private investors. Sadat adopted the latter view, causing a deterioration of state planning and labor laws.

Corruption increased under a rising entrepreneurial class of *munfatihin* (those who operate the open door), whose profiteering and conspicuous consumption antagonized many poor and middle-class Egyptians. Their strikes and protest demonstrations erupted almost as soon as the policy was implemented. Sadat's attempt, under World Bank urging, to remove exchange controls and reduce government subsidies on basic foodstuffs led to the January 1977 food riots, but *infitah* continued. Under Husni Mubarak, the *munfatihin* have become a distinct interest group that has resisted his efforts to reduce their opportunities for enrichment or to trim their level of consumption. The *infitah* policy has made Egypt economically dependent on richer Arab countries, Europe, and the United States. It has also widened the economic and social gap between rich and poor, with potentially explosive implications for Egypt's future.

See also Arab–Israel War (1973); Mubarak, Husni; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Sadat, Anwar al-.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

İNÖNÜ, ERDAL

[1926–]

Founder of Turkey's Social Democratic Party.

Erdal İnönü is the oldest son of İsmet İnönü, a hero of the Turkish War of Independence and the second president of the Turkish Republic. He graduated from the physics department of Ankara University in 1947 and received a Ph.D. from the University of California in 1951. He taught at Princeton University, the Oak Ridge Laboratory in Tennessee, and Middle East Technical University in Ankara. By 1983, when he founded the Social Democratic Party (SDP), İnönü was considered to be one of Turkey's leading scientists. In spite of İnönü's prominence, President Kenan Evren banned the SDP (as well as ten other newly formed political parties) from participating in parliamentary elections on the grounds that it was a front for the disbanded Republican People's Party. However, the SDP was allowed to participate in the 1984 local elections, and it won 23 percent of the vote. In the following year İnönü merged his SDP with Necdet Calp's left-of center Populist Party to form the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP). In 1991 İnönü became deputy prime minister as leader of the junior partner in the coalition government formed by Süleyman Demirel. İnönü is credited with unifying the center-left, but his detractors contend that he lacks vision and is not adept at mass mobilization. After the SHP merged with the Republican People's Party in the early 2000s, İnönü retired from active politics.

See also DEMIREL, SÜLEYMAN; EVREN, KENAN; İNÖNÜ, İSMET; REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY.

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İNÖNÜ, İSMET

[1884–1974]

Turkish politician and statesman; several times prime minister and the second president of Turkey.

İsmet İnönü was born in İzmir, where his father was a judge, and educated in military schools, including the Artillery School in Istanbul and the General Staff College (where he finished first in the class two years behind that of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk). In 1912, he became chief of the Ottoman general staff in Yemen and later held the same position in Istanbul. During World War I, the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers to fight the Allies; İnönü was sent to fight the British in Palestine and then to the Russian front in eastern Turkey, as chief of staff to Atatürk. In the Turkish war of independence, he continued working with Atatürk. His most distinguished action was in twice defeating the Greeks near the village of İnönü (from which he later took his surname, in the Western style).

In 1922, Atatürk made İnönü foreign minister, so that he could head the Turkish delegation to the Lausanne peace conference. There he gained recognition for his intense and successful work in winning almost all Turkey's demands. He was then made prime minister, an office he held until 1937. He was one of President Atatürk's closest associates, although his views were generally more moderate with regard to the intensity of projected reforms. He fully supported their direction and their basic philosophy, however, and as head of government he vigorously enforced all the reform laws. For this he acquired a reputation as Atatürk's ruthless henchman, the ideal second man.

İnönü was replaced as prime minister in 1937 by Celal Bayar for reasons not fully clear; a personal rivalry then continued for many years. When Atatürk died in 1938, however, İnönü became his successor, Turkey's second president. After the strains of World War II, İnönü was faced with demands for multiparty politics; until that time

During his long political career, İsmet İnönü (1884–1973) did much to help Turkey establish itself as an independent republic. In 1938, he became the country's second president and in 1946 he helped put in place a pluralistic governmental system.
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Turkey had been a de facto one-party state under the aegis of the Republican People's Party (RPP). Based on implicit promises of eventual multiparty democracy, a second party was formed by four RPP rebels, the Democrat Party (DP), in 1946. An early election was called, which the RPP won, partly because the opposition had little time to prepare, but in İnönü's famous declaration of 12 July 1947, he took the statesmanlike position that both parties should have the same privileges. When the Democrats won the 1950 election, rumors surfaced that they would not be allowed to take power, but İnönü stayed true to his word and quietly assumed the role as leader of the opposition, an act for which he won worldwide acclaim. During the 1950s, İnönü led the RPP in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, strongly defending Atatürk's policies of secular Western-style government in the face of Democrat policies that many RPP militants saw as a betrayal of Kemalism.

İnönü's political history made him a target for many Democrats, particularly his rival Celal Bayar, who had become Turkey's third president. As a result of the Democrat government's repressive measures and political shortcomings, the Bayar–Menderes regime was ousted by the armed forces on 27 May 1960. The belief that the military coup was to enable the RPP to return to govern was confirmed for many people when President Cemal Gürsel invited İnönü to form a government despite the RPP having won only a small plurality in the assembly and having run a poor second to the moderate right-wing Justice Party (JP) in the Senate. He formed a coalition with the grudging participation of the Justice party, but it fell in May over the issue of amnesty for the ousted Democrats (which the RPP and the military opposed but which the JP supported on behalf of the former Democrats, to whom they considered themselves successors). In June, the commanders again called on İnönü, and his second coalition was formed, with the New Turkey and Republican Peasants Nation party plus some independents.

İnönü's party had little in common with them in terms of programs, and he was faced with strong dissatisfaction within the RPP as well, because of concessions made to his right-wing coalition partners. He also faced criticism because of the RPP's poor vote-getting record since the transition to multiparty politics; this was attributed to a combination of too moderate centrist policies plus his failure to rejuvenate the party with younger successors and those not as closely identified with Atatürk's militant methods. The RPP's poor performance in the 1963 election led to his resignation as prime minister once more, but when other parties could not form cabinets, he was called on a third time, in December 1963, and he formed his third coalition. In the 1964 Cyprus crisis, İnönü spoke out against the letter sent him by U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson, which threatened not to defend Turkey from a Soviet attack should Turkey invade Cyprus. Even this did not strengthen his domestic position, and he resigned for the last time early in 1965. Nevertheless, he remained as RPP leader until mid-1972, when the party elected the younger and more leftist Bülent Ecevit as chairman.

One of İnönü's three children, Erdal, became a politician—the leader of the Social Democratic

Populist Party, starting in the late 1980s, and deputy prime minister in the coalition government in 1992.

See also Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Bayar, Celal; Cyprus; Democrat Party; Ecevit, Bülent; Gürsel, Cemal; İnönü, Erdal; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Justice Party; Kemalism; Lausanne, Treaty of (1923); Republican People's Party (RPP); Social Democratic Populist Party; Turkish Grand National Assembly.

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Walter F. Weiker

INQUILAB

See Glossary

INSTITUT D'ÉGYPTE

Institute in Cairo, Egypt, for study and promotion of Egyptian culture.

Napoléon Bonaparte founded the Institut d'Égypte (al-Majma al-Ilmi al-Misri) in Cairo in 1798. Its members were the elite of the French expedition's Commission des Sciences et Arts, whose massive *Déscription de l'Égypte* (1809–1826) surveyed all aspects of the Egyptian scene. The institute disappeared when the French evacuated Egypt in 1801.

Inspired by the original institute, Europeans founded the Institut Egyptien in Alexandria in 1859 with Saʿid Pasha's approval. Egyptologist Auguste Mariette was among the forty-odd European founders. The Egyptian scholar Rifaʿa al-Rafi al-Tahtawi and Egypt's future prime minister Nubar Pasha were among the seven Middle Eastern founders. The institute maintained a library, sponsored lectures, and published a bulletin and scholarly memoirs. The institute was moved to Cairo in 1880, and resumed the Napoleonic name *Institut d'Égypte* in 1918. When most European residents left Egypt during Gamal Abdel Nasser's tenure in office, the membership became mostly Egyptian. Neglected by the government since 1952 when Nasser's coup took place, the institute struggles to find funds to keep up its publications, its building just off Cairo's central square, and its once impressive library.

See also Mariette, Auguste; Nubar Pasha; Tahtawi, Rifaʿa al-Rafi al-.

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Donald Malcolm Reid

INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES

Palestinian research and publishing center.

The Institute for Palestine Studies was established in Beirut in December 1963 as the first nonprofit, independent research and publishing center focusing exclusively on the Palestinian problem and the Arab–Israeli conflict. Financed primarily by an endowment, the institute is independent of governments, parties, organizations, and political affiliations. It is not affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization in any way.

With branches currently in Beirut, Paris, Washington, D.C., and Jerusalem, the institute has striven to accomplish several academic goals over the decades. These have included collecting documents, manuscripts, maps, photographs, newspapers, and books for its library and archives in Beirut, the largest of its kind in the Arab world. The institute was also the first Arab institution to promote the study of the Hebrew language and to translate important Hebrew-language documents into Arabic. The institute continues to publish books and documents relating to the Palestinians and the Arab–Israeli conflict, as well as research journals such as *al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya, Revue d'études palestiniennes,* and *Journal of Palestine Studies.*

Michael R. Fischbach

INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN'S STUDIES IN THE ARAB WORLD (LEBANON)

Institute in Lebanon that offers innovative activities and outreach programs pertaining to Arab women and children.

In 1973, the newly coeducational Beirut University College (BUC), which later became the Lebanese American University, founded the Institute for Women's Studies in the Arab World (IWSAW) through a grant from the Ford Foundation. The dean of BUC, Riyad Nassar, was one of the founding members of the institute. Julinda Abu Nasr, who was the first director of IWSAW and a faculty member at the university, was another founding member.

The main objectives of the institute are to "engage in academic research aimed at the study and support of women's issues and conditions in the Arab world, serve as a data bank and resource center on such subjects, serve as a catalyst for policy changes regarding the human rights of women in the region, and facilitate networking among individuals, groups, institutions and governments concerned with such topics." The institute has embarked on many projects, including research and publication about education, employment, the legal and social status of women, child rearing, literature, art, history, labor conditions, the environment, and the documentation of published and unpublished material about women's issues.

In addition to hosting an annual lecture series, conferences, and workshops, the institute publishes a quarterly journal, *al-Raʾida,* meaning 'the female pioneer.' Since 1976, *al-Raʾida* has focused on recording the social, economic, and legal conditions of women in the Arab world. The journal promotes educational outreach efforts to the community and facilitates dialogue on the issues. The institute also produces books, monographs, and studies in English and Arabic.

IWSAW has several outreach programs dealing with academic activities and advocacy. Academic activities offered by the institute include conferences, research, and targeted courses. The institute also houses a library, with a collection of over 6,000 documents, all in the process of being placed on the Internet. Advocacy and action programs include rural development and income-generating projects, basic living skills programs that target illiterate and semiliterate women, and educational lectures on such topics as family planning, child care, rights, nutrition, health, and civic education.

The Institute for Women's Studies in the Arab World entered the twenty-first century as an active educational center under the direction of Muna Khalaf, who teaches economics at the university. It has established strong relationships with the community, works with the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs, and initiates projects with nongovernmental agencies, local and international.

See also Beirut College for Women (BCW); Gender: Gender and Education; Lebanese Civil War (1958); Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanese University; Lebanon.

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Mirna Lattouf

INSTITUTE OF WOMEN'S STUDIES OF BIR ZEIT UNIVERSITY

Palestinian research center on women and gender.

The Institute of Women's Studies (IWS) at Bir Zeit University was established in 1994 by a group of female academics. The principal researchers affailiated with the institute include: Lamis Abu Nahleh, Rema Hammami, Islah Jad, Penny Johnson, Eileen Kuttab, and Lisa Taraki. Founded initially as the Women's Studies Program in the university's faculty of arts, it became an institute in 1997 with a full-time staff and graduate studies program. Its overall goals are to develop women's studies as an academic discipline, to conduct scholarly research on women and gender relations in Palestinian society, and to facilitate more equitable policies and legislation.

The IWS is involved in teaching, research, training, and advocacy. It offers an undergraduate cur-

riculum of core courses leading to a minor in women's studies. In partnership with the Institute of Law at Bir Zeit, it offers an interdisciplinary master's program in gender, law, and development to increase awareness of the cultural and practical implications of gender divisions and inequalities.

Broad political and economic trends in the West Bank and Gaza Strip influence the institute's research priorities. Between 1994 and 1999 IWS research comprised a series of studies concerning health, education, law, the labor market, and other sectors during a period when institution and capacity-building of governmental and nongovernmental agencies dominated development activities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. With the collapse of the Oslo Accord, the advent of the second Palestinian uprising of September 2000, and an economic downturn, IWS research began to center on poverty, political violence, and militarism.

IWS faculty members participate in regional research projects contributing to the discourse and scholarship on women and gender in Arab society. Members also engage in consulting and gender training in order to influence policy and increase the institute's sustainability.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Bir Zeit University; Gaza Strip; Gender: Gender and Education; Gender: Study of; Intifada (1987–1991); Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine; Palestinian Authority; West Bank.

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Mona Ghali

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

Modern information-gathering techniques, as first effected by European colonial powers in the Middle East, and later, those implemented by the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II.

Intelligence services in the Middle East originated with European imperialism and colonialism during the nineteenth century. Spies and informers were not new to the region—the Ottoman Empire had monitored the activities of their officials—but the systematic collecting, organizing, and evaluating of political and strategic data for decision making from both open (overt) and confidential (covert) sources was an innovation.

By the late nineteenth century, European governments saw political and military intelligence as a more effective means of advancing colonial interests than military force alone. In Algeria, interest in political and ethnographic intelligence peaked during periods of resistance to French colonial rule, but when France perceived no further threat, interest in intelligence waned. In contrast, since 1904, Morocco's political and social institutions—including its tribal and religious leadership—had been systematically cataloged by the Mission Scientifique au Maroc (the Scientific Mission to Morocco), with the explicit goal of facilitating political intervention. After France established its Protectorate regime in Morocco in 1912, the head of the mission became the director of native affairs.

Most Western intelligence services compartmentalize their activities: the clandestine collection of data; the analysis of overt and covert sources; counterintelligence blocking an enemy's sources, deceiving an enemy, and reporting against hostile penetration; and covert action. In both the colonial bureaucracies and their postindependence successors in the region, the lines between these activities are blurred. The collection of intelligence data sometimes becomes confounded with the supervision, control, and intimidation of populations; and the analysis and reporting of domestic and external threats become subordinate to reassuring insecure rulers or manipulating the information they receive to further individual political careers or factional interests.

The framework of intelligence activities in the colonial era often continued into the initial years of independent Middle Eastern states, and former colonial powers established arrangements for the training of local intelligence specialists. Thus military and civilian intelligence personnel in Jordan and the Persian/Arabian Gulf area receive training in Britain, and the French have provided equivalent training for Morocco and Tunisia.

Military and intelligence organizations were profoundly shaped by foreign advice and training,

Career military officer Danny Yatom was appointed to the leadership of the Mossad in 1996 by Israel's prime minister Shimon Peres, marking the first time the identity of the intelligence agency's director was publicly announced. Yatom resigned his position in 1998 after his actions regarding a failed Mossad attempt to assassinate a top HAMAS leader were brought into question. © CORBIS SYGMA. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

even in countries that did not experience colonialism. Iran's SAVAK was created in 1957 with advice from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose role was supplemented in the 1960s by Israel's counterpart, Mossad. Following Egypt's 1952 revolution, the CIA assisted in restructuring the intelligence apparatus; and Soviet-bloc technical assistance stepped in after 1956 during Gamal Abdel Nasser's socialist government. By the 1960s, Soviets and East Germans had begun to play important advisory and training roles in Iraq, Syria, the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Libya. The Cold War's players were right in the midst of the petroleum-rich Middle East.

Formal training from foreign services notwithstanding, subtle changes occur as intelligence methods and techniques are adapted to local circumstances. First, rival and overlapping services are created to check authority and autonomy, and the result is factionalism. Some rulers—those of Syria and Iraq provide examples—appoint close relatives to key intelligence posts. For instance, in Syria, Rifʿat al-Asad, brother of President Hafiz al-Asad, was head of the Syrian intelligence service and was linked to the Red Knights.

In contrast to U.S. intelligence, which has traditionally placed more emphasis on international rather than domestic threats, the principal task in the region is the surveillance, control, and frequently the intimidation of their own populations—both domestically and abroad. In some states, such as Iraq and Syria, such surveillance is pervasive and unchecked. Intelligence services in other Middle Eastern countries may be more restrained, although human-rights organizations report abuses in all states of the region, as is the case with Tunisia, whose president Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali received military training in France and the United States. Governments do little to mitigate people's percep-

The head of Egyptian intelligence, Omar Sulayman (second from right), meets with Palestinian president Yasir Arafat (second from left) in Ramallah in July 2002. Sulayman held discussions with both Israeli and Palestinian officials in an attempt to improve relations between the two. © AFP/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

tion of the power of intelligence organizations because such notions help to suppress public dissent. The secretiveness of such services provides formal (diplomatic) deniability for countries' actions against regional rivals—providing arms or refuge to opponents of a neighboring regime, for example—which, if publicly acknowledged, might lead to a major confrontation. Domestic factions can also receive discreet assistance in the same manner. Regional intelligence services opportunistically cooperate with foreign services; for example, during the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, the United States provided both sides with intelligence data from the database it was amassing for its own purposes.

The political intelligence activities of the superpowers in the Middle East have been primarily concerned with their own rivalries, protecting oil supplies, and—for the United States—guaranteeing the security of Israel. For Arab historians, the arch example of foreign intervention is the role of the British, including T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) during World War I, in instigating the Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule. The British abandoned the Arab cause once their objectives were accomplished. Other examples include U.S.–British cooperation in overthrowing Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953; and covert U.S. operations against suspected leftist groups in Syria from the late 1940s through 1958. A converse example in 1978 is the Phalange Party and the South Lebanese Army's acceptance of help from Israel during the Lebanese civil war; later, after the head of the party, Bashir Jumayyil, became president of Lebanon, he refused to sign peace accords with Israel. Testimony during the 1987 Iran-Contra hearings in the United States demonstrates how covert intelligence activities can work against formal state control and declared public policy.

Understanding intelligence organizations and their activities is difficult, because information on them is uneven. The history of Israel's intelligence service is better known than those of other Middle

Eastern countries, since many agents have published memoirs and relevant political archives (subject to a thirty-year delay for state papers) are available to scholars. Thus historians can trace the development of Israeli intelligence operations from the early Zionist monitoring of Arab nationalist movements at the beginning of the British mandate in Palestine (1922), to professionalization in the mid-1930s as an element of Haganah (the Zionist military underground), to its bureaucratic separation into military, domestic, and foreign units following the 1948 establishment of the state of Israel. While Israel's security forces are well articulated, so too is its opposition, apparent in the many Palestinian liberation groups. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), once considered little more than a terrorist organization although greatly hindered after the restriction of movement placed on Yasir Arafat during the Intifada in 2000, was viewed by many as the voice of the Palestinian people. One country's terrorists are another's security.

Other intelligence services of the region are known primarily through information provided by defectors (Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Egypt, Libya); deliberate leaks; the release of documents during major domestic crises (the trial in Egypt following Anwar al-Sadat's assassination in 1981) or changes of regime (the release of security files on the Iraqi Communist party following the monarchy's overthrow in 1958); and the capture of documents from foreign security services—such as Israel's publication of Jordanian documents seized during the Arab–Israel War of 1967 or the publication of U.S. intelligence documents and diplomatic reports taken from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

Much speculation has emerged after 11 September 2001 as to the changing nature of security in the Middle East. It is apparent that some Middle Eastern governments' security and overall governmental structures will be thoroughly reorganized in line with U.S. security demands. Afghanistan and Iraq are two cases in point. Some governments, like Tunisia, have managed to turn the 11 September attacks into an argument to defend their own internal struggles. Some countries, like Morocco, have adopted profiling techniques similar to those used in the United States after the creation of the Homeland Security Council. Others may argue, however, that there is now a cross-pollination of security strategies between the United States and other countries, and that in fact the United States is borrowing tactics—from the Middle East and elsewhere—that limit domestic civil liberties. Just as colonial intervention shaped intelligence in the Middle East at the time of the Ottoman Empire and after, so too will the United States and other powerful countries continue to influence the evolution of security measures in the region.

Middle Eastern states have historically been more concerned with their own domestic threats than with those involving their neighbors; this most probably will not change in the future, as their own national security is linked to wider international security priorities. These governments have traditionally placed strict limits on civil liberties and have focused surveillance in domains of the public sphere, such as the press. As domestic public spheres are projected into international spheres via satellite television and the Internet, internal security too will invariably evolve. More than ever, citizens in the Middle East are aware that what may be seen domestically as a legitimate action to defend national sovereignty by limiting civil liberties can very quickly become a case for defending human rights within international headlines.

All countries have intelligence services within either the domestic police at various levels, the armed forces, or in some cases private security companies. This list reflects national security institutions that stand on their own as semi-independent organizations working in collaboration with national governments.

Intelligence organizations:

D4 Israeli Navy Shayetet 13 (maritime countermeasures unit)

IAF Israeli Air Force

IDF Israeli Defense Force

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)

MOIS Iranian intelligence service (post-Islamic revolution)

OAS Secret Army Organization (France/Algeria)

SANG Saudi Arabian National Guard

SAVAK Iranian secret police (during reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi)

SSF Special Security Force (Saudi Arabia)

SSG Special Service Group (Pakistan)

Unit 269 Counter-terrorist unit of Sayeret Matkal (Israel)

The following are some groups that have engaged in movements of reclaiming land, resources, and political sovereignty.

Armed/revolutionary/independence/antigovernment groups:

ALF Arab Liberation Front

ARGK Military wing of Kurdistan Worker's Party (Turkey)

ASALA Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia

DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

DRMLA Democratic Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Arabistan

FIS Islamic Salvation Front (Algeria)

GIA Islamic Armed Group (Algeria)

GIA-CG Islamic Armed Group, General Command

HAMAS Islamic Resistance Movement

MAK Service Office of the Mujahideen (Afghanistan)

MAN Movement of Arab Nationalists

PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PFLP-GC Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command

PFLP-SC Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Special Command

PFLP-SOG Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Special Operations Group

PIJ Palestinian Islamic Jihad

PIO Palestinian Islamic Organization

PKK Kurdistan Worker's Party (Turkey)

PLA Palestine Liberation Army

PLF Palestine Liberation Front

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

PPSF Palestinian Popular Struggle Front

See also Arab Liberation Front; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Front Islamique du Salut (FIS); Haganah; Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK); Mossad; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

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Dale F. Eickelman
Updated by Maria F. Curtis

INTERNATIONAL, DANA

[1972–]

Israeli singer.

Born Yaron Cohen to a poor Jewish family of Yemenite descent in Tel Aviv, Dana International became one of Israel's most prominent singers in the late 1990s and the country's first renowned transsexual artist. Her career began in drag shows at Tel Aviv gay clubs, and between her first album in 1993 and the late 1990s, her dance music mixed styles, intermingled languages, and emphasized multiculturalism grounded in the Middle East. Jewish tradition, U.S. music, and Israeli and Arab cultures have inspired her songs. As Israel's representative, she won the 1998 Eurovision song contest. Her records were banned in Egypt, yet her popularity expanded to the Arab world. An advocate of gay and transsexual rights, International offered a positive model of transsexuality and posed in an Amnesty International advertisement captioned "Gay rights are human rights." In 2001 Israel's Foreign Ministry booked her performance at the San Francisco Gay Pride celebration to promote Israeli diversity in the face of increasing criticism of state policies. International's songs became more conventional as the demise of the Oslo peace process

and the rise of the second intifada altered the cultural landscape in which she had previously offered a multicultural model of transnational Middle Eastern art.

See also ART; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; HUMAN RIGHTS; MINORITIES; MUSIC; THEATER.

YAEL BEN-ZVI

INTERNATIONAL DEBT COMMISSION

Established in 1876 to defend the interests of European creditors when Khedive Ismaʿil's Egypt went bankrupt.

Britain, France, Austria–Hungary, Italy, and later Russia and Germany had seats on the International Debt Commission, which was usually called La Caisse de la Dette Publique. The Caisse's insistence on putting the interests of European creditors first was a major cause of the deposition of Ismaʿil ibn Ibrahim and of the Urabist resistance of 1881 and 1882. After the British occupied the country in 1882, their administrators came to see the Caisse as an impediment to necessary financial and agricultural reforms. Britain's entente cordiale with France in 1904, however, removed most of the friction. The weight of external debt on the Egyptian economy lightened between the two world wars, with the importance of the Caisse declining accordingly. During World War II, sterling balances accumulated from Allied expenditures in Egypt essentially eliminated the problem of external debt until the 1960s.

See also ISMAʿIL IBN IBRAHIM; URABI, AHMAD.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

An international institution charged with maintaining international monetary stability.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization that provides temporary financial assistance to any of its 184 member countries in order to correct their payment imbalances. The IMF was established during the conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944 because the Allies wanted to avoid the competitive currency devaluations, exchange controls, and bilateral agreements that the world had witnessed prior to World War II. The IMF's main goal was to promote stable currencies in order to enhance international commerce.

Originally, the IMF's position was that restoring payments equilibrium could be achieved within a year by eliminating excess demand. It was not until 1974 that the IMF established the external fund facility to provide its members with up to three years of financial assistance and also introduced a long-term approach, termed the enhanced structural adjustment facility. In exchange for this financing, the IMF demands that borrowers make fundamental changes in their economies to prevent future balance of payments problems. These changes range from stabilization of the exchange rate and of government deficits to structural adjustment of the economy through privatization of state enterprises and liberalization of trade.

By article IV of its charter, the IMF was given the right to monitor on a yearly basis the exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policies, structural policies, and financial and banking policies of every member. It has been heavily involved in many Middle Eastern countries. It has been involved in Egypt and other North African countries since the 1970s. It became involved in Lebanon during the 1990s and finally in Sudan and Yemen through its Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). One Middle Eastern country, Saudi Arabia, enjoys a permanent voting position on the IMF board of governors.

See also ECONOMICS.

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DAVID WALDNER
UPDATED BY KHALIL GEBARA

INTIFADA (1987–1991)

Palestinian uprising.

The Intifada erupted in Israeli-occupied Gaza and the West Bank in December 1987. In broad perspective, it was a continuation of the century-old Arab–Israel conflict. The immediate cause was opposition to Israel's twenty-year occupation and military rule of Gaza, the West Bank, and Arab East Jerusalem. Under Israeli military government, there was censorship of school texts and other publications; punitive demolition of Arab homes; and the institution of a permit system for travel outside the territories and for constructing new buildings, opening businesses, digging wells, and conducting other routine daily activities. Civilian courts were replaced by Israeli military tribunals without habeas corpus and the imprisonment of Palestinians for lengthy periods without trial. Often torture was used by Israeli security services.

Israeli plans for integration of the occupied territories included control and allocation of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza and integration of the electricity grid and road network with those in Israel. Approximately half the Palestinian workforce of the territories was employed at the bottom of the Israeli wage scale, in jobs such as construction and agriculture. Many highly educated and skilled Palestinians were forced to accept such employment bcause of deteriorating economic conditions.

Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip in 1989. The 1993 Oslo Accord returned a degree of Palestinian self rule to the Gaza territory, but a comprehensive peace agreement was never reached, and after the second Intifada began in 2000 the Israelis again established dominance in the region. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Israeli soldiers with a Palestinian POW during the first Intifada. When it began, the first Intifada was loosely organized and generally comprised of acts of civil disobedience. As it continued, however, the violence increased, and popular participation decreased. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

During the twenty years of occupation prior to the Intifada, about half the land in the West Bank was taken over by Israeli authorities and much of it allocated to Jewish settlers. The substantial increase in the number of Jewish settlers and settlements aroused growing apprehension among Palestinians who feared that Israel would absorb or annex the territories.

By December 1987 Palestinian dissatisfaction reached a crisis. The spark that ignited the Intifada was a road accident on 8 December, in which an Israeli-driven vehicle killed or seriously wounded several Palestinians returning to Gaza from work in Israel. Reports of the incident spread quickly, resulting in protest demonstrations, first throughout Gaza and, within a few days, throughout the West Bank. When Israeli troops arrived to quell the unrest, they were pelted with stones and iron bars by hundreds of demonstrators. Children throwing stones at Israeli soldiers soon became a global symbol of the Intifada.

A man in the West Bank gathers stones to throw at Israeli soldiers during the first Intifada. Not all of the resistance was violent, however, and many Palestinians instead showed their displeasure at Israeli occupation by demonstrating, organizing strikes, boycotting Israeli goods, and creating independent schools and political institutions. © Peter Turnley/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

The extent and intensity of the uprising caught Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab leaders by surprise. Shortly after the first spontaneous demonstrations in December, the uprising began to be organized by young representatives of several Palestinian factions in the territories, many of them from the refugee camps and the working class. The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) was an underground organization with delegates representing al-Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DPFLP), and the Palestine Communist Organization, all banned by Israeli authorities. Representatives of Islamic Jihad at times cooperated with the UNLU, although Islamic fundamentalist factions maintained their freedom of action. Membership in the UNLU frequently rotated, making it difficult for the occupation authorities to apprehend the leaders.

Because of the overwhelming power of the Israeli military, the Intifada avoided the use of firearms. Instead, tactics included strikes and demonstrations; extensive posting of illegal slogans, flags, and symbols; boycotting Israeli-made products; resigning from posts in the military government; withholding labor from Israel; and refusing to use Israeli official documents. The UNLU and the fundamentalist factions issued instructions and political pronouncements to the Palestinian population through posters and leaflets called *bayanat* and through broadcasts from underground radio stations that moved from place to place.

By 1990 more than 600 Palestinians had been killed by Israelis since the beginning of the Intifada, and over 1,000 injured. Arrests and imprisonments associated with the Intifada totaled about 50,000. During this period the uprising resulted in 20 Israeli deaths.

Initial objectives of the Intifada included releasing Palestinian prisoners, ending the policy of expulsion, ceasing Jewish settlement, and removing restrictions on Palestinian political activity and contacts between those in the territories and the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) abroad. Later demands were the ending of Israeli occupation and Palestinian self-determination.

Whereas the Intifada galvanized Palestinian society, overcoming divisions among regions, religious groups, political factions, sexes, and social classes, it polarized Israel between those who called for a political solution to the Palestine problem and those who demanded greater use of force to suppress the uprising. The Intifada had a detrimental impact on Israel's economy because it required a great increase in military manpower in the territories and entailed the loss of cheap Arab labor in important sectors of the economy.

The Intifada brought the Palestine question to the forefront of international attention, leading to renewed attempts by the United States and Western Europe to find a solution. As a result, the PLO gave greater consideration to the views of Palestinians resident in the territories, and declared in December 1988 that it would accept the coexistence of Israel and a Palestinian state within the West Bank and Gaza. The Intifada and the 1990 Gulf War were catalysts that led to the Middle East peace conference that opened in Madrid in 1991.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab–Israel Conflict; Fatah, al-; Gulf War (1991); Islamic Jihad; Israel; Israeli Settlements; Palestine; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Popular Front

for the Liberation of Palestine; West Bank.

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Don Peretz

INTIFADA 2000

See Aqsa Intifada, al-

İPEKCI, ABDI

[1929–1979]

Turkish newspaper editor.

Born in Istanbul, Abdi İpekci attended Galatasaray High School and studied law at Istanbul University while beginning his journalism career as a sportswriter, cartoonist, and reporter. At twenty-one, he became editor of the daily *Express,* and four years later took the job that gained him nearly universal respect for the next twenty-five years, editor at *Milliyet,* one of Istanbul's leading dailies. İpekci was assassinated in 1979 by Mehmet Ali Ağa, who shot Pope John Paul II two years later.

In İpekci's hands, *Milliyet* became a popular paper that combined slick, attractive presentation with serious news coverage. He was known for maintaining a neutral, but perceptive and reasoned stance in his editorials, although the paper was known to be left-of-center politically. For example, in 1967 İpekci presciently warned against the myth of a communist menace, which he saw as a prelude to a military takeover. As president of the Istanbul Journalists Association (1958–1960) and later, he played a leading role in unionizing journalists and developing a professional code of ethics.

See also Newspapers and Print Media: Turkey.

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Elizabeth Thompson

IQBAL, MUHAMMAD

[1877–1938]

Muslim Indian poet, philosopher, and political thinker.

Muhammad Iqbal contributed greatly to Islamic revivalism and to the establishment of Pakistan as an Islamic state. He may be considered the most important Muslim thinker of the twentieth century. His most influential work is *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.*

Born in Sialkot, India, under British colonial rule, Iqbal studied literature, law, and philosophy at the Government College at Lahore, Cambridge University, and the University of Munich. He wrote originally in Urdu, then in Farsi in order to reach a wider Muslim audience, and was (and still is) celebrated for his poetry. Iqbal's conceptual goal was to analyze the reasons for the decay of Muslim culture and provide the tools by which Muslims may reclaim their faith. In his view, *taqlid* (imitation) on the part of the theologians and the spread of pantheistic and ascetic Sufism eventually led to the reification of Muslim thought and concealed the dynamism and activism of the Qurʾanic vision. He called for the renewal of Muslim thought and Muslim institutions through the exercise of *ijtihad* and the establishment of democratic societies through the process of *ijma* (consensus). The necessity for Muslims to live by Islamic law led him to call for a separate jurisdiction for Muslim Indians, a concept that the Muslim League in India adopted and that eventually led to the creation of Pakistan. Though Iqbal did not live to see the birth of Pakistan, he is considered by the Pakistanis as the father of their country. The purpose of the Islamic state was to allow the Muslims to create the social and political ideals that the true understanding of the Qurʾanic spirit would lead them to actualize.

In methodology and content, Iqbal draws in his writings on his encyclopedic knowledge of both Islamic and Western thought. A true humanist, he rebuts the claims of Orientalists on the backwardness of Islam without reverting to similar attacks on Christian and Western thought. As he criticizes the Muslims for failing to live up to the ideals of Islam, he also condemns various aspects of Western thought, especially the secularism of the West and its materialist and nationalist ideology that led to colonialism and racism. He rejects the culturally centered views of Western thinkers such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Auguste Comte on the basis that they lead to a fatalistic and deterministic understanding of man's evolution, denying human freedom and creativity. Instead, he insists on the unity of a humanity derived from a single creator expressed in the diversity of human societies engaged in similar attempts at actualizing their divine gifts; thus, he regards all cultures as genuine and equal contributors to human civilization when they try to remain in touch with the divine inspiration that lies at their heart.

Although Iqbal strongly condemns the practices of Sufism, he retains a powerful spirituality that cannot be separated from action in his vision of the complete human being. His writings are a modern rendition of Muslim thought but stand in the same line as the great works of classical Muslim thinkers.

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Maysam J. al Faruqi

IRADEH-YE MELLI PARTY

Pro-British political party in Iran, formed in 1943 and dismantled in 1946.

Initially called the Fatherland Party, the Iradeh-ye Melli Party was formed in September 1943 in Iran by Sayyed Ziya Tabataba'i. He was a pro-British journalist who had helped Reza Khan's rise to power in his youth and was made premier in 1921 but was subsequently exiled by Reza Shah Pahlavi, the title assumed by Reza Khan as king of Iran. In 1943 Sayyed Ziya revived his old paper *Raʿd* (Thunder) and called on the *bazaaris* (merchants), *ulama* (clerics), and the tribes to revolt against the military dictatorship of the shah, the "atheistic communism" of Iran's communist-leaning party, the Tudeh, and the corruption of the landed aristocracy. Five months later, Sayyed Ziya renamed the party Iradeh-ye Melli (the National Will). The party had a strong reputation for being pro-British. Included in its program were designs for repeal of all anti-constitutional laws, convening of provincial assemblies, protection of handicraft industries, distribution of state land among peasantry, and formation of a volunteer army. In 1946, the party was dismantled and Sayyed Ziya was arrested by premier Ahmad Qavam as part of the premier's plan for dismantling British influence in the country.

See also Pahlavi, Reza; Tabataba'i, Ziya.

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Parvaneh Pourshariati

IRAN

Country in southwestern Asia between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf.

Iran has an area of 636,290 square miles and an estimated population of 67 million (2004). It is bounded on the north by the Caspian Sea and the republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan; on the east by Afghanistan and Pakistan; on the south by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman; and on the west by Turkey and Iraq.

Land and Climate

Iran lies on a high plateau with an average altitude of around 4,000 feet, surrounded by the Zagros Mountains, running from the Armenian border to the shores of the Gulf of Oman, and in the north by the Elburz Mountains. An extensive salt desert in the interior is separated from a sand desert by two mountain ranges in the east. Temperatures reach a low of -15°F in the harsh winters of the northwest and a high of about 123°F in the south during the summer, with most of the country enjoying a temperate climate. Average rainfall ranges from 80

A mosque in Tehran, capital and largest city of Iran. The Tehran area was first settled as early as the fourth century B.C.E., but for centuries the major city was Ray, which was destroyed by the Mongols in the thirteenth century. Tehran developed after the destruction of Ray, initially as a village and small market town until Agha Muhammad Khan, the founder of the Qajar dynasty, chose it as his capital in 1788. Tehran now covers an area of 240 square miles and boasts a population of approximately 8 million, with over 3 million more in the suburbs. MOSQUE IN TEHRAN, IRAN, PHOTOGRAPH BY CORY LANGLEY. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

inches along the Caspian coast to less than 2 inches in the southeast.

Population

With an estimated population of 67 million in 2004, Iran is one of the most populous countries in the Middle East. It had grown at over 3 percent per annum from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s. However, the successful family-planning campaign begun in the late 1980s has decreased the rate to about 1.6 percent. Iran's population is comparatively young; 45.5 percent of the population was under 15 years old in 1986, but that percentage fell to 40 percent in 1996 due to the sharp decline in population growth rate. Approximately two-thirds of Iran's people live in the cities: In 1996 the capital, Tehran, accounted for 7 million; Mashhad for more than 1.9 million; and Tabriz, Isfahan, and Shiraz for more than 1 million each.

About 80 percent of Iran's population is of Iranian origin, of whom the ethnic Persians are predominant. According to the 1986 census 82.7 percent of the population (90.9% in the urban areas and 73.1% in the rural areas) could both comprehend and speak Persian, and another 2.7 percent could understand it. Persians are overwhelmingly Shiʿite Muslims. Azeris, or Azerbaijanis, are Iran's largest linguistic minority. Estimated at 25 percent of the population, they are concentrated in the provinces of East and West Azerbaijan, Ardabil, and Zanjan, as well as in and around the cities of Qazvin, Saveh, Hamadan, and Tehran. Iran's second largest ethnolinguistic minority, the Kurds, make up an estimated 5 percent of the

Map by XNR Productions, Inc. The Gale Group.

country's population and reside in the provinces of Kerman and Kurdistan as well as in parts of West Azerbaijan and Ilam. Kurds in Iran are divided along religious lines as Sunni, Shiʿite, or Ahl-e Haqq. The predominantly Sunni Baluchis reside mainly in the Sistan/Baluchistan province and make up 2 percent of Iran's population. Other ethnic minorities include the Shiʿite Arabs (5%) and the Sunni Turkmen (2%). Also residing in Iran are nomadic and tribal groups, including the Qashqaʾis, Bakhtiaris, Shahsevans, Afshars, Boyer Ahmadis, and smaller tribes.

According to the 1996 census, 99.5 percent of the population was Muslim. Followers of the other three officially recognized religions included 279,000 Christians, 28,000 Zoroastrians, and 13,000 Jews. An additional 56,000 were listed as followers of other religions, and 90,000 did not state their religion. The majority of the latter two groups are presumed to be Bahaʾis, followers of a religion that has not been officially recognized by the government and has been subjected to persecution since the 1979 revolution.

Education

The modern national education system emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, when the influence of the religious establishment was repressed and the control

In November 1979 Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took sixty-six Americans hostage. Despite a rescue attempt by the military and the freezing of Iranian assets and oil imports, the majority of the hostages remained in captivity until Iran and the United States signed the Algiers Accord in January 1981. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

of the rising nation-state over the school system was established. The period from 1956 to 2002 saw the rapid expansion of modern education. The number of students at all levels rose from 1.1 million in 1956 to 7.5 million in 1976, 16 million in 1992, and 18.3 million in 2000 (nearly 30% of the total population). The percentage of girls in elementary schools rose from 21 percent of total enrollment in 1926 to 38 percent in 1976 and 47 percent in 1996; girls in secondary schools increased from 6 percent to 35 percent and then to 47 percent in the same years; and the number in universities leaped from almost none in 1926 to 28 percent in 1976, 57 percent in 1996, and more than 61 percent in 2001. As a result of the adult literacy campaign and the expansion of primary education, the literate population age six and over increased from about 15 percent in 1956 to approximately 62 percent in 1976 and 80 percent in 1996.

The educational reforms of 1966 to 1978 marked the transformation of Iran's school system from the French model to one similar to that of the United States. The structure and organization remained virtually intact after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, but the focus of educators became shaping pupils' behavior according to Islamic values through curriculum and textbooks. Other measures included converting all coeducational schools into single-sex institutions and imposing Islamic dress codes. In 1992 secondary education was reduced from four years to three years and divided into general education (including academic and technical-vocational divisions) and professional education (focusing on

Iranian schoolgirls. Education is compulsory in Iran for children of primary and middle school age. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the number of girls attending public schools, incuding non-mandatory high schools, has incresed from less than 50 percent nationwide to more than 80 percent, and girls comprise over 60 percent of undergraduate college students. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

specific, practical work-related skills). The twelfth year of high school became a college preparatory program accepting only high school graduates who pass the entrance examination.

In May 1980 the government closed all universities and appointed a panel, the Cultural Revolution Headquarters, to provide a program of reform for higher education in accordance with Islamic values. When the universities were reopened in October 1981, the University Jihad and other militant groups took control and purged 8,000 faculty members (about half). Following disputes between these groups and the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education over reform issues, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution was founded in 1984 to supervise the reconstruction of universities. In 2000 government-sponsored colleges and universities accredited by the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and technical, vocational, and teacher training schools (primarily two-year junior colleges) administered by the Ministry of Education and other government agencies enrolled 413,000 students. In addition, the Open Islamic University (836,000 enrollment in 2000) is open to any student upon the payment of fairly steep tuition and fees.

The Economy

Iran's economy is a mixture of large state and semipublic enterprises, small-scale private manufacturing, trade and service ventures, and village agriculture. State enterprises have expanded substantially since the revolution, and market-reform plans set in motion in the 1990s have made little progress toward privatization of large public enterprises. As noted by the International Monetary Fund in 2003, the "Iranian economy continues to face important challenges: employment creation has not been sufficient

to meet the rapid increase in the labor force; inflation is high and rising again; and price subsidies and control continues to hinder economic efficiency; and structural impediments for private sector development remain" (International Monetary Fund, p. 1).

The Iranian economy is heavily dependent on oil, which accounted for 15 percent of the total value of gross domestic product (GDP), 50 percent of state revenue, and 75 percent of total exports from 1996 to 2001. It is estimated that Iran's oil reserves are about 93 billion barrels, or 10 percent of the world's total. Iran also possesses the second largest natural gas reserve in the world, estimated at about 20 trillion cubic meters, or 15 percent of the world's reserves. Hydropower, coal, and solar energy resources are also significant, and there are substantial deposits of copper, zinc, chromium, iron ore, and gemstones.

From 1963 to 1976, Iran's GDP grew by an average annual rate of around 10.5 percent in real terms, and per capita income leaped from some US$170 to over $2,060. The 1978–1980 period of revolutionary crisis saw the flight of skilled workers and entrepreneurs, the transfer of large sums of capital abroad, and the abandonment of many productive establishments. Under these circumstances, the GDP in constant 1974 prices fell from 3.7 trillion rials in 1977 to 2.5 trillion in 1980, and per capita GDP declined from 108,000 rials to 63,000 rials. Following a short period of increase in oil revenues and financial recovery, the period of 1985 to 1988 saw an annual GDP decline of 4 percent due to the fall in oil revenues, negative fixed capital formation, and the heightening of the "tanker war" in the Persian Gulf. In the postwar period and between 1988 and 1992 the rise of oil revenues led to an average annual growth rate of 8 percent in the GDP. The annual growth rate of the GDP fluctuated considerably for the next eight years, but averaged about 4 percent. In 2001 agriculture accounted for 19 percent of Iran's GDP, industry for 26 percent, and services for 55 percent. The state together with semipublic organizations created after the revolution own all heavy industries, many other large industrial establishments, and all major transportation networks and agroindustries. Nationalization of large enterprises and confiscation by the revolutionary government considerably expanded the public sector. As a result, all banks (and insurance companies) were owned by the state until 2000, when a more liberal interpretation of the revolutionary constitution led to the enactment of a new law permitting the establishment of privately owned banks and, later, insurance companies. Four newly established private banks compete with state-owned banks.

Modern industry made its appearance in Iran in the early twentieth century, but it was not until the late 1950s that the government adopted a clear industrialization policy. By the early 1970s the average annual growth rate of the industrial sector was more than 10 percent. From the early 2000s, Iran has had an industrial base consisting mainly of import-substituting industries that are subsidized and heavily protected, and dependent on imported materials. Steel, petrochemicals, and copper ore remain Iran's three basic industries.

Only about one-fourth of Iran is potentially suitable for agricultural production—the other three-fourths receives less than 10 inches of rainfall per year—and less than half of the crops grown are irrigated. In 2001 wheat production amounted to 9.5 million, sugar beets 4.6, potatoes 3.6, barley 2.4, rice 2, and onions 1.3 million tons. In 1998 livestock and dairy products included 763,000 tons of red meat, 5 million tons of milk, 720 tons of poultry, and 625 tons of eggs.

After the revolution, imports fell from $14.6 billion in 1977 to $10.8 billion in 1980 and $8.2 billion in 1988. In 1991 imports rose to $25 billion, then declined between 1993 and 1995 due to the fall of oil revenues, reaching an annual average of $14 billion in the late 1990s. Non-oil exports rose from $2.9 billion in 1992 to $4.2 billion in 2000. In 1999 Iran's total exports (including oil) amounted to $21 billion and its imports amounted to $14.3 billion. Iran's main export markets for both oil and non-oil goods are Japan and United Kingdom; together they accounted for nearly one-third of Iran's total exports in 1999. Germany, with an annual export of $1 to $2 billion goods in the postrevolution period, is the main exporter to Iran.

Government

Iran is a theocratic republic that combines the absolute authority of the ruling Shiʿite jurist combined with an elected president and parliament and an ap-

pointed chief of the judicial branch. The sovereignty of Shiʿite clerical authority (velayat-e faqih), the supreme spiritual guide, is the deputy of the twelfth Shiʿite imam, the Lord of the Age. He appoints the head of the judiciary branch and the theologians of the Council of Guardians of the Constitution, and as commander in chief of the armed forces, he appoints and dismisses all commanders of the armed forces, Revolutionary Guards Corps, and security forces and is empowered to declare war. The president, elected for four years, is the head of the cabinet and the civilian wing of the government's executive branch.

The legislature comprises two institutions: the parliament (Majles) and the Council of Guardians. Under the provisions of the constitution all bills must be approved by the Majles and then be ratified by the Council of Guardians before they are signed into law by the president. The Majles is a body of 290 legislators elected to four-year terms. The twelve members of the Council of Guardians, consisting of six clerics and six lay judges appointed by the supreme guide, review legislation passed by the Majles and are empowered by the constitution to veto laws considered to violate Islamic or constitutional principles. The appointed Expediency Council, created in February 1988 and formally recognized in an amendment to the constitution in July 1989, rules on legal and theological disputes between the Majles and the Council of Guardians. It is charged with ruling in the best interest of the community, even when such rulings go beyond a strict interpretation of the tenets of Islamic law. The elected Assembly of Experts determines succession to the supreme guide.

The judicial branch consists of regular civil and criminal courts, as well as a special clerical court and revolutionary tribunals that hear civil and criminal suits concerning counterrevolutionary offenses. The head of the judiciary is appointed by the supreme guide. The minister of justice functions as a liaison among the judicial, executive, and legislative branches. The Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution has legislative powers over educational matters.

Iran is divided into twenty-eight provinces *(ostans)* administered by governors *(ostandars)* who are nominated by the minister of the interior and appointed by the president. The second level of local government consists of 195 counties *(shahrestans)* under junior governors *(farmandars).* At the third level, 500 districts *(bakhshs)* are under executives *(bakhshdars),* and at the fourth level, 1,581 clusters of villages *(dehestans)* are under headmen *(dehdars).* Villages, the base level, are administered by elected councils. Towns and cities have municipal governments with mayors and councils.

The armed forces and Revolutionary Guards Corps are responsible for defending Iran against foreign aggression. The 300,000-man army is organized into ten divisions and six brigades. The air force consists of about 35,000 men, with more than 400 pilots on active duty and 100 combat aircraft. The 15,000-man navy operates in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the Caspian Sea. It includes two fleets, three marine battalions, and two Russian-made submarines. The 180,000-member Revolutionary Guard Corps is organized into eleven regional commands with four armored divisions and twenty-four infantry divisions, as well as air and naval capacities. Iran's police force incorporates revolutionary committees and the rural police force into the urban police force. The suppression of opposition to the regime is the responsibility of the Ministry of Information and a 100,000-man mobilization corps *(basij)* recruited from veterans of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988). Ideological-political bureaus have been established in government agencies and in the armed forces to ensure conformity to the regime's rules of conduct. The armed forces and security organizations are under the command of the supreme spiritual guide.

Since the 1979 revolution various groups, organizations, and factions within the ruling party have fallen into four main political camps. First, those who support the interests of the religious groups *(ulama)* and the bazaar merchants, and who advocate the traditional Islamic jurisprudence, are referred to as conservatives, traditionalists, or rightists. The conservatives fear the cultural penetration of Western lifestyles and are zealous on cultural issues such as women's rights, Islamic dress codes, music, and the media. In the early post-Khomeini era, a major political shift to the right occurred and the conservative camp prevailed. Second, those who support the cause of the economically deprived *(mostazʾafan)* and advocate a progressive Islamic jurisprudence, distributive justice, and tighter

state control of the private sector are called radicals, leftists, or followers of Imam Ruhollah Khomeini's line. Receptive to Western progressive ideas and more tolerant on cultural issues, the radicals are nevertheless highly suspicious of Western imperialism and Iran's dependency on the world capitalist system. The Bureau for Promotion of Unity (Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat), major student unions, and the young Combatant Clerics (Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez) are among the radical organizations. In much of the 1980s the radicals dominated the regime. Third, those who advocate a pragmatic approach—the new middle-class professional and bureaucratic groups—and are concerned with peaceful coexistence in the modern world under a mixed economy are called pragmatists, centrists, or moderates. Former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has led the centrist camp since its inception in the late 1980s. In the fourth Majles (1992–1996) conservatives controlled more than two-thirds of the seats, pragmatists around one-fifth, and radicals about one-tenth.

In the mid 1990s a popular, reformist movement emerged when there was a major shift in the ideological orientation of the leftist faction from a radical to a relatively moderate and liberal interpretation of Islam. The roots of this ideological shift can be traced to a series of political developments since the revolution, including various failures of the revolutionary regime to fulfill its populist and egalitarian promises; a considerable erosion in the legitimacy of the ruling clerics; the successful (though largely silent) resistance by youth and women to the culturally restrictive policies of the Islamic Republic; the rise of a distinctly antifundamentalist, liberal-reformist interpretation of Islam by a number of Iranian theologians and religious intellectuals; and the precipitous decline in the popularity of revolutionary ideas in the 1990s.

The main Islamic opposition to the regime inside the country includes the liberal Iran Freedom Movement (Nahzat-e Azadi-ye Iran), established in the early 1960s under the leadership of Mehdi Bazargan, who was prime minister in the provisional revolutionary government of 1979. Also organized by Bazargan to fight against frequent violations of human rights in Iran was the Society for the Defense of Liberty and National Sovereignty of the Iranian Nation. Another organization active in Iran is the nationalist Nation of Iran Party (Hezb-e Mellat-e Iran). These groups have been outlawed and systematically suppressed by the government. Absence of opportunities for genuine political participation, imposition of a strict Islamic code of conduct, and, above all, shrinking opportunities for employment have led to increasing alienation of young intellectuals and students.

There are several opposition groups among the one million Iranian political and cultural exiles in Europe and the United States, including liberal nationalists such as the National Front, whose origin can be traced to the period of Mohammad Mossadegh, and a number of small groups that advocate the establishment of a secular, Western-style parliamentary system in Iran. Also active are monarchists seeking to resurrect Pahlavi rule through the former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. A few small leftist groups conduct a propaganda campaign against the regime through newspapers and magazines. The most active, militant opposition force has been the People's Mojahedin of Iran (Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran). Between 1987 and 2003 it waged guerrilla operations and a military offensive against Iran from its camps across the border in Iraq.

History since 1800

Iran began the nineteenth century under the Qajar Dynasty (1796–1925) and the political and economic influence of Russia and Great Britain. Two wars with Russia were ended by the treaties of Golestan (1813) and Turkmanchai (1828), and Russia took over the area north of the Araks River. Following a futile attempt by Iran to reclaim Herat, its former territory in western Afghanistan, the British waged war in 1857 and forced Iran to give up all claims to British-controlled Afghanistan. To resist the European expansionist schemes, Crown Prince Abbas Mirza initiated a series of military reforms in the 1820s that were continued by more comprehensive reforms of the grand vizier Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir in the mid-nineteenth century. Mirza Hosayn Khan Sepahsalar continued the reforms of his predecessor in the early 1870s.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Russia and Britain increased their economic and political domination over Iran. European companies were granted trade concessions that often were disadvantageous to nascent Iranian industries and local merchants. Meanwhile, new ideas of political

freedom were introduced by intellectuals and others who had come in contact with the West. The 1890 grant of a tobacco concession by Naser al-Din Shah to a British citizen provoked the local tobacco merchants and the *ulama* to instigate riots that eventually forced cancellation of the concession. Many intellectuals and popular religious leaders believed that by reforming the government they could improve the country's economic and social conditions and ensure its political independence. Antigovernment protests were led by a broad alliance of Islamic clergymen, intellectuals, and merchants. On 30 December 1906 the ailing monarch, Mozaffar al-Din Qajar, finally yielded to demands for a constitution. In 1907 Great Britain and Russia divided Iran into two spheres of influence and a neutral zone. With the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Iran declared its neutrality; nevertheless, Britain and Russia occupied the country, spying on each other and engaging in hostilities on Iran's territory.

In February 1921 a pro-British journalist, Sayyed Ziya al-Din Tabataba'i, and Brigadier Reza Pahlavi staged a bloodless coup and took control of the government in Tehran. With the army as his power base, Reza became the country's monarch in 1925 and founded the Pahlavi Dynasty. After establishing the authority of the central government throughout the country in the 1920s, he tried to Westernize Iran's economic and social institutions in the 1930s. He replaced the traditional religious schools and courts with a secular system of education and a judicial system based on European legal patterns. He created a modern army and national police force and established a number of state-owned industrial enterprises and a modern transport system. The period of his rule (1925–1941), however, was marked by suppression of individual freedoms and political activities.

In August 1941 troops from the Soviet Union and Britain invaded Iran and forced Pahlavi to abdicate his throne to his son, Mohammad Reza. After the conclusion of World War II, the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its forces from Iran. Through a combination of international pressure and internal maneuverings by Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam, Russia's forces finally left in late 1946, and the pro-Soviet autonomous government of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Kurdistan collapsed. For much of this period, the young shah and his cabinets were forced to conform to the will of the parliament, which was dominated by the old-guard politicians and propertied classes. Following an attempted assassination of the shah on 4 February 1949, the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party was outlawed. The Constitutional Assembly that convened on 21 April granted the shah the right to dissolve the Majles.

At the beginning of the 1950s the National Front, a loose coalition of liberal nationalists under the leadership of Mohammad Mossadegh, demanded greater control over the British-dominated Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The oil industry was nationalized, and Mossadegh became prime minister in April 1951. The Soviet-backed Tudeh Party strongly opposed the nationalization and the Mossadegh government. In a struggle with the shah over control of the armed forces, Mossadegh resigned, and Ahmad Qavam was appointed premier on 18 July 1952. Three days later, riots broke out in Tehran and major cities; Qavam was forced to resign and Mossadegh was reinstated.

In August 1953 a coup conceived by the British MI6 and delivered by the U.S. CIA ousted Mossadegh; Fazlollah Zahedi became prime minister. The new regime ordered the arrest of supporters of the National Front and the Tudeh Party and placed severe restrictions on all forms of opposition to the government. Between 1953 and 1959 the shah's power gradually increased, and the government signed an agreement with a consortium of major Western oil companies in August 1954, joined the Baghdad Pact in October 1955, and with CIA assistance established an effective intelligence agency (SAVAK) in 1957.

In the early 1960s, under increasing pressure from the U.S. Kennedy administration, the shah appointed Ali Amini as prime minister and Hassan Arsanjani as minister of agriculture, and the government initiated a series of social and economic reforms later called the White Revolution. In January 1963 a national referendum supported six reform measures including land reform, women's suffrage, workers' sharing up to 20 percent of industrial profits, and the nationalization of the forests. Major urban uprisings protested the referendum and the government's arrest of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in June 1963. After cracking

down on rioters, the shah emerged as an autocratic ruler. He allocated oil revenues among state agencies and projects, and he directly supervised the armed forces and security organizations, foreign policy and oil negotiations, nuclear power plants, and huge development projects. The latter half of the 1960s was marked by relative political stability and economic development, and Iran emerged as the regional power in the Persian Gulf after the withdrawal of British forces in 1971. Following border clashes between Iran and Iraq in the early 1970s, an agreement between the two nations was signed in Algeria in 1975. By the mid-1970s Iran had established close ties not only with the United States and Western Europe but also with the Communist Bloc countries, South Africa, and Israel.

Meanwhile, land reform and the rise of a modern bureaucracy eliminated the traditional foundation of the regime—the *ulama,* the bazaar merchants, and the landowning classes. They were replaced by entrepreneurs, young Western-educated bureaucratic elites, and new middle classes discontented with the shah and his policies. The entrepreneurial and bureaucratic elites were unhappy with their lack of political power, the intelligentsia resented violations of human rights, and the *ulama* and the bazaar merchants resented the Western lifestyles, promoted by the state's modernization policies, that contravened Islamic traditions. Under these circumstances, the nucleus of a revolutionary coalition was formed by leaders with ready access to the extensive human, financial, and spatial resources of the bazaar, the mosque, and the school-university networks. They saw an opportunity to challenge the shah after the victory of human-rights champion Jimmy Carter in the U.S. presidential race of November 1976.

In the summer of 1977 a series of open letters written by intellectuals, liberal figures, and professional groups demanded observance of human rights. An article published in the daily *Ettelaʾat* on 7 January 1978 attacked Khomeini, and violent clashes between religious opposition groups and security forces took place in Qom on 9 January. This conflict marked the beginning of a series of religious commemorations of the fortieth day of mourning (a Shiʿite rite) for those who had been martyred in various cities. In July and August, riots erupted in Mashhad, Isfahan, and Shiraz. September 1978 began with the first mass demonstrations against the shah's regime. Striking government employees brought the oil industry to a standstill on 31 October. Mass strikes continued through early November, when a military government was installed by the shah, and in December hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated in Tehran. In all, approximately 2,500 persons were killed in clashes between demonstrators and the security forces from January 1978 to February 1979. The shah left Iran for Egypt on 16 January 1979, and Khomeini returned to Tehran on 1 February. Four days later, he appointed Mehdi Bazargan prime minister of a provisional government. On 11 February the army's Supreme Council ordered the troops back to their barracks. Military installations were occupied by the people, and major army commanders were arrested.

The April 1979 national referendum sanctioned the declaration of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the December 1979 national referendum approved the constitution, and in January 1980 Abolhasan Bani Sadr was elected the republic's first president. He was impeached by the Majles for opposing the ruling clerical establishment and dismissed from office by Khomeini in June 1981. In July Mohammad Ali Rajaʾi was elected president; in August a bomb exploded in the prime minister's office, killing the new president and Mohammad Javad Bahonar, the new prime minister. In October Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenehi was elected the third president of the Islamic Republic, and the Majles endorsed the radical prime minister, Mir-Hosain Musavi.

On 4 November 1979 the U.S. embassy in Tehran was occupied by a group of militant students, and sixty-six Americans were taken hostage. The seizure was in response to alleged U.S. interference in Iran's internal affairs and to the U.S. decision in October to admit the shah for medical treatment. President Carter ordered the freezing of some $12 billion of Iran's assets in the United States on 14 November. After 444 days in captivity, the last of the hostages were released on 20 January 1981 as Ronald Reagan was inaugurated U.S. president. Five years later, in September 1986, it was reported that Iran had secretly received 508 U.S.-built missiles in a clandestine "arms-for-hostages" deal with the United States to intercede for the release of American hostages in Lebanon; this episode became known as the Iran–Contra Affair.

Frustrated by an imposed 1975 border agreement and heartened by Iran's military weakness after the 1979 revolution, Iraq invaded Iran on 22 September 1980. After rapidly occupying large areas of southwestern Iran and destroying the oil refinery at Abadan, Iraq's forces became bogged down in siege warfare. In an offensive in May 1982 Iran recaptured the strategic town of Khorramshahr, and its forces entered Iraq. Initiating the "war of the cities," Iraq's forces launched air attacks on Iran's cities in 1984. In May 1987 the United States began direct intervention in Persian Gulf affairs by escorting eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers under the U.S. flag. This action led to increased attacks against oil tankers and merchant ships. After a long pause, the war of the cities resumed in early 1988, when Iraq launched missile attacks against Tehran and other cities, and both Tehran and Baghdad came under fire from ground-to-ground missiles. On 3 July 1988 the U.S. warship *Vincennes,* stationed in the Strait of Hormuz near Bandar Abbas, shot down a civilian Iranian airliner over the Persian Gulf, killing all 290 people aboard. On 18 July Iran accepted UN Security Council cease-fire Resolution 598. The eight-year Iran–Iraq War left about one million casualties and cost several hundred billion dollars in damages and military expenditures.

On 3 June 1989 Ayatollah Khomeini died, and the Assembly of Experts elected President Ali Khamenehi as the supreme spiritual guide of the Islamic Republic; the change of leadership marked the beginning of a major shift of power from the radical left to the conservative right. In July Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected president, and he was re-elected for a second term in 1993. Rafsanjani's policies for economic, sociocultural, and political reforms were obstructed by the radical faction of the left between 1989 and 1993, and then by the rising conservatives on the right. At this juncture, a new coalition was formed between the moderate, pragmatist group that followed Rafsanjani and the radical, leftist faction within the regime who were excluded from power by the conservative and fundamentalist forces.

Mohammad Khatami's 1997 presidential campaign platform emphasized the rule of law, building a civil society, a moderate foreign policy, and the protection of civil liberties guaranteed by the Islamic constitution. His victory was as much a manifestation of the voters' rejection of the extremist politics of the left in the 1980s and the right in the 1990s as it was an affirmation of Khatami's moderate, well-reasoned, and liberal campaign statements. His 1997 electoral triumph over Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri would not have been possible, furthermore, without the vast human and financial resources that were contributed to his campaign by members of the pragmatist camp of the incumbent president, Rafsanjani, as well as the many formerly radical elements within the regime. During much of Khatami's first presidential term (1997–2001), his supporters rallied behind the slogans of civil society and the rule of law, but they were besieged by the conservatives, who had gained effective control over key positions within the Islamic state. These included positions in the judiciary and the Council of Guardians, the armed forces and the militia, the intelligence services and vigilante groups working in tandem with them, the broadcast media, and the para-statal foundations. The latter, putatively philanthropic foundations that are not subject to the fiscal and regulatory agencies of the state, form a massive network of patronage and corruption and "an economy within the economy" that effectively controls as much as one-third of the country's domestic production.

Khatami's election victory in 1997 was followed by two other sweeping wins by reformist candidates in the municipal elections of 1999 and the Majles elections of 2000. In the 2000 election the reformists won some 200 of the 290 seats in parliament, thus giving the pro-Khatami candidates a decisive majority in the legislative body, but the conservatives, on the defensive against a formidable majority of the people, resorted to tactics of intimidation and vigilantism against their political rivals. Through their control of the judiciary they started a systematic crackdown of the press, intellectuals, and other outspoken critics of the regime.

In July 1999 *Salam,* a popular pro-reform newspaper, was closed by the order of the Press Court. Following peaceful demonstrations on the campus of Tehran University against the closure, militia forces entered the student dormitories and brutally attacked students, killing one of them in the assault, and injuring and arresting hundreds. The dormitory assault ignited a series of protests over the next several days that escalated into full-scale riots when

the demonstrators were attacked by vigilante partisans of the Party of God (Ansar-e Hezbollah). In April 2000 the conservative-dominated judiciary continued the campaign of intimidation against the press. More than forty pro-reform newspapers and magazines were forcibly closed because of their alleged "denigration of Islam and the religious elements of the Islamic revolution." Over the next several months, journalists and editors were the primary targets of the conservatives' attacks against the print media. Iran's best-known investigative journalist and the editor of the newspaper *Fath,* Akbar Ganji, was sentenced to ten years in prison (later reduced to six years) for his writings that implicated several senior officials in the 1998 murders of five intellectuals and political activists. This and the imprisonment of another two dozen well-known journalists prompted the Paris-based Reporters sans Frontiers to dub Iran "the largest prison for journalists in the world."

In April 2000 several prominent Iranian intellectuals, journalists, publishers, and women's rights activists traveled to Berlin to attend an international conference on the future of reform in Iran. Upon their return to Iran many of the participants were brought to trial before the Revolutionary Court in Tehran on charges of conspiring to overthrow the Islamic Republic. In March 2001 the judiciary ordered the closure of the religious-nationalist Iran Freedom Movement (the only tolerated opposition group in the country since the revolution) on charges of attempting to overthrow the Islamic Republic, arresting and detaining twenty-one of its leading members. Khatami's failure to implement his promised political reforms and the lack of any significant improvement in the economy during his first four-year term did not prevent him winning the June 2001 presidential election with 77 percent of the vote. In spite of two mandates for change that he has been given by an overwhelming majority of his countrymen, and even though pro-reform candidates are in control of the Majles as well, Khatami faces the same constitutional constraints and political obstacles from his conservative opponents that stymied his first presidential term.

The catastrophic attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 September 2001 brought a new phase in United States–Iran relations. Iranian authorities promptly condemned the terrorist attacks, and the mayor of Tehran sent a message of sympathy to the mayor of New York City. The Iranian people showed their sympathy by organizing gatherings in commemoration of the victims of 9/11. In response to the terrorist attacks, the U.S. government put together what it called a coalition against terrorism. As part of this approach, it lent aid to the Northern Alliance, the forces that Iran had supported from their formation in 1996 to fight against the Taliban regime and Osama bin Ladin's forces in Afghanistan. Following 9/11, Iranian and U.S. military advisors worked side by side with Afghan opposition forces to bring down the Taliban. After dismantling the Taliban network and creating a new regime in Afghanistan in Fall 2001, neoconservatives in the Bush administration supported regime change in a number of other countries. This policy unfolded on 29 January 2002 when in his State of the Union address President Bush labeled Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an "Axis of Evil." On 13 December 2002 the United States accused Iran of launching a secret nuclear weapons program and published satellite images of two sites under construction in the towns of Natanz and Arak. Iran denied any military purpose behind its nuclear activities and agreed to inspections by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but refrained from "full cooperation." Despite Iran's insistence that its nuclear program—which included uranium-enrichment activities—was designed to meet its energy needs only, the IAEA gave Iran until 31 October 2003 to provide evidence that it was not trying to build nuclear weapons. Persuaded by the foreign ministers of Great Britain, France, and Germany, Tehran agreed to "total transparency" over its nuclear activities, promising full cooperation with the UN's nuclear agency and agreeing to suspend uranium enrichment, while reserving the right to resume the process if it deemed necessary.

The 2003 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Iranian human-rights activist and ardent reformist Shirin Ebadi, boosting Iranian hopes for the rule of law, justice, and democracy. Yet, in spite of the appeal of liberal-democratic ideas of individual freedom, pluralism, and political tolerance, and the overwhelming endorsement of these ideas in four national elections, the reform movement has had

but a limited influence on Iran's political conditions. The willingness of the conservative forces to heed the popular mandate for greater political and cultural freedoms, economic reform, and respect for law—and, above all, for an end to the use of violence—will determine whether a gradualist course of reform will succeed.

See also Ahl-e Haqq; Ahvaz; Azerbaijan; Azerbaijan Crisis; Baghdad Pact (1955); Baha'i Faith; Baluchis; Bani Sadr, Abolhasan; Bazargan, Mehdi; Ebadi, Shirin; Ganji, Akbar; Hamadan; Iran–Contra Affair; Iranian Languages; Iranian Revolution (1979); Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Isfahan; Kerman; Khamenehi, Ali; Khatami, Mohammad; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Kurdistan; Kurds; Mashhad; Mojahedin-e Khalq; Mossadegh, Mohammad; Mozaffar al-Din Qajar; Musavi, Mir-Hosain; Naser al-Din Shah; Nateq-Nuri, Ali Akbar; National Front, Iran; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Pahlavi, Reza; Persian; Qajar Dynasty; Qom; Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi; Shi'ism; Shiraz; Sistan and Baluchistan; Sunni Islam; Tabataba'i, Ziya; Tabriz; Tehran; Tobacco Revolt; Tudeh Party; Turkmanchai, Treaty of (1828); United States of America and the Middle East; Velayat-e Faqih; White Revolution (1961–1963); Zahedan.

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Ahmad Ashraf

IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

U.S. political scandal involving Iran, Israel, and Nicaragua.

There were no official relations between the United States and Iran after the long U.S. embassy hostage crisis during the Iranian revolution from 1979 to 1981. Beginning in 1984, Shi'ite groups in Lebanon began kidnapping U.S. citizens and other Westerners. The hostage crisis involved the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when William Buckley, station chief in Beirut, was seized in March 1984. Out of concern for the release of Buckley, who could potentially reveal U.S. intelligence information, and in the belief that Iran had influence over the kidnappers, the U.S. administration launched an operation whereby missiles and military spare parts were sent to Iran via Israel. This shipment resulted in the release of one U.S. hostage, but not of Buckley, who was already dead. U.S. officials traveled to Iran to establish contacts, and further arms shipments were made.

At the same time and in a completely unrelated effort, the U.S. administration tried to figure out

ways to bypass a congressional prohibition of U.S. assistance to the Contra rebels who were attempting to overthrow the leftist Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Lt. Col. Oliver North of the National Security Council devised a plan in which the proceeds from the Iranian sales would fund the Contras. This policy violated both the U.S. commitment not to negotiate with terrorists and the prohibition on aiding the Contra rebels (the two Boland Amendments).

In late 1986 a Beirut-based magazine reported that there were secret negotiations between U.S. officials and Iranians. This led to investigations in the United States and exposure of the operations. U.S. president Ronald Reagan appointed a special commission under the direction of former senator John Tower to investigate. Later, there was a joint congressional committee formed and a special prosecutor appointed. In the end, only some of those involved (North and the two successive National Security Advisers: Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter) were tried and even fewer convicted of any wrongdoing, but it was a political scandal that compromised U.S. credibility with its allies for having violated its pledge not to negotiate with terrorists, and for having sent arms to Iran and having violated a legal ban on providing assistance to the Contras. The actual involvement of President Reagan and of Vice President George H. W. Bush was never clearly established as far as illegal activities were concerned.

See also BUSH, GEORGE HERBERT WALKER; REAGAN, RONALD.

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BRYAN DAVES
UPDATED BY OLIVER BENJAMIN HEMMERLE

IRANIAN ART

See ART

IRANIAN BUREAU OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS

A bureau created to improve conditions for women through education, training, and the reform of laws affecting women's status.

The Iranian Bureau of Women's Affairs was created in December 1991. The idea for its founding came from Marziyeh Seddiqi, an American-educated Iranian engineer who later became the bureau's head of planning and research and a member of the Fifth Parliament (1996–2000), and from Shahla Habibi, whom President Hashemi Rafsanjani later appointed director of the bureau and his adviser on women's affairs. These two women had worked closely together, organizing a seminar on the issue, calling for the cooperation of cabinet ministers, and submitting the project of creating the bureau to the president. An offshoot of the presidential office, the bureau's goal was to identify and ameliorate problems in the condition of women and to propose solutions that would elevate women's status and promote their economic, social, cultural, and political participation. Its projects included work on women's education and training, women's managerial skills, reform of the civil code and divorce law, sending female students abroad for higher education, and creating a center for women's employment and a center to provide women with legal advice. Maʿsoumeh Ebtekar, a university professor and the editor of a woman's journal, *Farzaneh,* who in 1997 became vice president in charge of the protection of the environment, was in charge of the bureau's education and training program. The bureau worked closely with the High Council of the Cultural Revolution, which determines general policies of the state, with the Social and Cultural Council of Women (created in 1987), with cabinet ministers, and with members of parliament. As a result of this collaboration, women's commissions or bureaus were created in various ministries, cabinet ministers appointed advisers on women's affairs, and several motions were presented by women members of parliament to ameliorate the status of women. Following President Mohammad Khatami's election in 1997, the bureau changed its name and became the Center for Women's Participation, chaired by Zahra Shojaie.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS.

AZADEH KIAN-THIÉBAUT

IRANIAN FILM

See FILM

IRANIAN LANGUAGES

Family of languages spoken in Iran and adjacent countries.

The Iranian languages are closely related to those of the Indo–Aryan family, such as Sanskrit, Hindi, and Urdu; both families (the Indo–Iranian and Indo–Aryan languages) are part of the Indo–European language family, which also contains the Germanic, Slavic, Celtic, Romance, and Greek languages. The principal Iranian languages and groups of languages or dialects are discussed below.

The Southern and Southwestern Languages

Modern Persian is the official language of Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. There are numerous local variants, the most important being the spoken Persian of Afghanistan (Dari) and of Tajikistan (Tajik). The differences between standard Persian and Dari are not great; but the grammar of Tajik, especially the verbal system, has long been influenced by the neighboring Turkic languages and contains constructions that are foreign to standard Persian. Some of the earliest major Modern Persian texts, written by Persian Jews in the Hebrew alphabet, are in several variants of Persian and contain many archaic features.

Modern Persian is descended from Middle Persian, which is known through documents from the late Parthian and Sassanian periods (from c. 200 C.E.). The earliest examples are on coins from the rulers of Fars and inscriptions from the early Sassanian kings that are written in a local variant of the Aramaic alphabet. The Middle Persian Zoroastrian scriptures were written in a more developed variant of the same script, the Pahlavi alphabet, in which many letters are not distinguished. There is also a large Manichaean literature written in a Syriac script, and a few fragments of Christian texts.

Middle Persian is descended from Old Persian, the language of the Achaemenid inscriptions composed by Darius and Xerxes and their successors (c. 520–340 B.C.E.). It is written in a simple cuneiform script invented by the Persians, rather than the complex cuneiform systems of the Babylonians and Elamites in use at the time.

The languages (dialects) spoken in southern and southwestern Iran in the areas of Bakhtiar, Lorestan, and Fars are all more closely related to Persian than to other Iranian languages.

Kurdish is spoken mainly in western Iran, eastern Iraq, Turkey, and in the southern areas of the former Soviet Union. There are several dialect groups: southern (e.g., Kermanshahi), central (e.g., Sorani, Mokri), and northern (e.g., Kurmanji).

West and east-northeast of Tehran, in Mazandaran, and along the southwestern coast of the Caspian Sea a group of related languages is spoken: Tati, Taleshi, Gilaki, Mazandarani, Semnani, and others. Probably also a member of this group is Zaza or Dimili, spoken in eastern Turkey. All of these languages may be ultimately related to the Parthian language, known through documents and Manichaean texts (c. 1st century B.C.E.–3rd century C.E.).

South of the Central Desert, Dasht-e Kavir, a group of languages referred to as the Central Dialects is spoken: Khuri, Naʿini, the dialect of the Zoroastrians of Yazd and Kerman, and others. These may be related to the ancient Median language, the official language of the Median state (c. 700–560 B.C.E.).

In southeastern Iran there are three related languages in several dialects: Larestani and North and South Bashkardi.

Baluchi is spoken mainly in eastern Iran and Pakistan. It has several dialects.

The Northern or Northeastern Languages

North and northeast of Iran, descendants of the various Scythian or Saka languages are still spoken.

Ossetic, in three dialects, is spoken in the Caucasus. It is the descendant of the old Alanic language(s), of which fragments are known.

Pakhtun is spoken in Afghanistan, where it is official language, and in northwest Pakistan.

Numerous languages are spoken in Afghanistan, north of the Afghan border with the central Asian republics, and east of the border with Pakistan; none of them has a written tradition. The most important are the Shughni group (Shughni, Sarikoli,

Yazghulami, Roshani, etc.), Yidgha and Munji (Munjani), Yaghnobi, and Wakhi.

Yaghnobi is descended from a dialect of Sogdian, a Middle Iranian language known from a large corpus of Buddhist, Manichaean, and Christian texts, as well as secular documents (4th–10th centuries, C.E.).

Wakhi is related to the Middle Iranian language Khotanese, spoken in Chinese Turkistan and known from a rich Buddhist literature and secular documents (c. 5th–10th centuries C.E.).

Two other Middle Iranian languages, Bactrian (c. 1st century B.C.E.–c. 4th century C.E.) and Chorasmian (Khwarazmian; c. 3rd–14th centuries C.E.), have no known descendants.

Avestan is the language of the holy scriptures of the Zoroastrians. Old Avestan is very similar to the language of the Indian *Rigveda* and may have been spoken about the middle of the second millennium B.C.E. Young Avestan is similar to Old Persian and may have been spoken throughout the first half of the first millennium B.C.E.

Among the many grammatical features that distinguish the Iranian languages from one another three can be mentioned.

Gender

The distinction between grammatical masculine and feminine has been lost in Modern Persian and Balochi but exists in Kurdish and Pakhtun. For example: Persian, *īn mard/zan āmad*; Pakhtun, *dā saṛay rāyay* (this man came) but *dā ṣ̌əja rāyla* (this woman came).

Cases

In many Iranian languages two or more cases are distinguished (in Ossetic, nine). For example: Mazandarani, *per ume* (my father came), *pére sere* ([my] father's house), Baluchi, *ē ā mardē gis int* (this is that man's house), *gisā int* (it is in the house), Pakhtun, *da de saṛī kitāb* (this man's book).

Ergative Constructions

In many Iranian languages the past tense of transitive verbs is expressed by a construction that resembles the English passive. This construction was originally used for the perfect tenses, corresponding to the English "I have done." For example: Old Persian, *adam akunavam* (I did) but *manā kr̥tam* (I have done); Pakhtun *z rasedəm* (I arrived) but *dā saṛray me wúlid* (I saw this man).

See also PUSHTUN.

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P. OKTOR SKJAERVO

IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979)

Mass, nationwide uprising lasting several months and culminating in the overthrow of the monarchy.

In February 1979, the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi collapsed in the face of an organized popular revolution. This event marked the end of over 450 years of monarchical rule that had begun with the establishment of the Safavid dynasty in 1501; a republican form of government replaced the deposed monarchy. Some scholars trace the origins of the Iranian Revolution to the 1953 coup d'état against the prime minister and National Front leader Mohammad Mossadegh or to the abortive 1963 uprisings sparked by the arrest of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The more immediate cause of the revolution, however, was the failure of the shah's government to address the multifaceted cultural, economic, political, and social grievances that had been building up in Iranian society during the 1970s. The shah not only ignored these grievances but used his secret police agency, the SAVAK, to repress expressions of discontent and both real and suspected opposition activities.

During 1978, Khomeini was the person who succeeded in uniting the diverse currents of discontent into a unified anti-shah movement. He was a senior clergyman of Shiʿism living in exile in Iraq since 1965. Khomeini effectively used popular Shiʿite themes, such as the moral and religious righteousness of struggling against oppression and for jus-

tice, to appeal broadly to both religious and secular Iranians. By 1977, his network of former students had begun circulating tapes of his sermons at religious gatherings; these sermons denounced the shah's injustice and called for strict adherence to the 1906 constitution, which had established a constitutional monarchy, with the shah subordinate to the elected Majles, or parliament. (The shah, like his father before him, had asserted his authority over the Majles by controlling parliamentary elections and creating what in practice amounted to a royal dictatorship.) The government tried to counteract Khomeini's growing popularity by placing in a pro-regime newspaper an article that defamed the ayatollah's character. Its publication provoked major protest demonstrations in Qom (January 1978), which resulted in several deaths and the closure of the city's bazaars. The incident galvanized opposition to the shah and set in motion a cycle of protest demonstrations—and brutal repression—every forty days, the fortieth day after a death being a traditional Iranian commemoration of the deceased.

By August 1978, it had become obvious that the repressive tactics that had worked in the past no longer were effective in containing the ever-growing protest movement. The shah sought to defuse the opposition by appointing a new government of royalist politicians who had maintained ties to the clergy, by freeing some political prisoners, and by relaxing press censorship. This led to a major demonstration in Tehran, where more than 100,000 people marched through the city carrying photos of Khomeini and handing out flowers to the soldiers and police; the latter were asked to join the call for free elections. Similar peaceful but smaller-scale demonstrations took place in many other cities. Apparently frightened by the strength of the movement and the evident solidarity among religious and secular groups, the shah declared martial law in Tehran and eleven other cities and ordered the arrest of National Front and Freedom Movement leaders. The first day of martial law, 8 September 1978, became known as Black Friday because several hundred people were killed in Tehran as troops forced thousands of demonstrators to leave the area of the parliament building, where they had gathered to demand free elections.

Black Friday first stunned and then enraged the people. In response to urging from Khomeini, strikes spread throughout the country, affecting factories, shops, schools, the oil industry, utilities, and the press. By the end of October, Iran's economy was paralyzed. The shah appointed a military government with authority to force oil workers and others back to their jobs. He also freed imprisoned National Front, Freedom Movement, and clerical leaders in hopes that they would go to Paris, where Khomeini had moved, and convince the ayatollah to moderate his views. These tactics failed. Many army conscripts were refusing to shoot at unarmed civilians and even deserting their units, and the strikes continued. Khomeini announced he would accept nothing less than the removal of the shah, and the main secular and religious opposition leaders supported his position. Despite the military government, demonstrations continued throughout November, and each day produced more martyrs as people were killed in cities and towns when the army tried to suppress protest marches. It was clear that the shah's government had lost control of the streets. Fearful of more bloodshed during the Shiʿite religious month of Muharram (the religious calendar is a lunar one, and Muharram began on 1 December in 1978), the government agreed to allow traditional mourning processions if religious leaders promised to keep order. Millions of Iranians participated in peaceful marches throughout the country, but instead of mourning the martyrdom of the saint Imam Hosain, they called for the downfall of the shah. The popular slogan chanted everywhere became "*Azadi, Istiqlal, Jomhuri Islami*" (freedom, independence, Islamic republic). These terms meant political freedom from the oppression of the secret police, independence from the shah's alliance with the United States, and a republican government based on Islamic principles of justice.

The popular message of Muharram was clear, even to the shah, who now sought a dignified way to leave Iran and preserve the throne for his eighteen-year-old son. He persuaded longtime National Front opponent Shapur Bakhtiar to form a government. On 16 January 1979, the shah left Iran on a trip officially described as a medical rest. On 1 February 1979, Khomeini, triumphantly returned from exile, refused to recognize the legitimacy of Bakhtiar's government and appointed a provisional government headed by Freedom Movement leader Mehdi Bazargan. Demonstrations against Bakhtiar and in favor of Bazargan took place throughout the coun-

try. On 11 February 1979, military leaders ordered their forces back to their barracks and to remain neutral in the civilian political struggle. This announcement led to the collapse of the Bakhtiar government and the victory of the revolutionary movement.

See also Bakhtiar, Shapur; Bazaars and Bazaar Merchants; Bazargan, Mehdi; Freedom Movement (Nezhat-e Azadi Iran); Khomeini, Ruhollah; Mossadegh, Mohammad; Muharram; National Front, Iran; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Qom; Shiʿism; Tehran.

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Eric Hooglund

IRAN–IRAQ WAR (1980–1988)

War between Iran and Iraq, 1980–1988.

On 22 September 1980, Iraq launched a surprise military attack on Iran, thereby igniting a war that would last for eight years, ending only when both countries agreed to accept the terms of a United Nations (UN) cease-fire resolution. Iraq's stated reason for initiating the war was defensive: The government in Baghdad claimed that Iranian forces were staging raids across their common border and that Iran's leaders were using the media to incite Iraqis to revolt. But Iraq had experienced more serious "border incidents" with Iran in the past, most notably in the years 1971–1975, when the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi had provided well-publicized "covert" assistance for a rebellion among Iraq's Kurdish minority. The same Iraqi leaders who were determined to avoid major conflict with Iran in 1975 had become, only five years later, confident of defeating Iran in battle. The Iraqi perception of changes in international, regional, and domestic politics contributed importantly to the decision to invade a larger and more powerful neighbor.

In the fall of 1980, Iran was isolated internationally as a result of the hostage crisis with the United States. Iran's relations with the other superpower, the Soviet Union, also were problematic because Tehran opposed the Soviet role in Afghanistan. In addition, all the Arab neighbors of Iran shared Iraq's apprehensions about the Iranian rhetoric of "exporting Islamic revolution." Within Iraq, Iran's revolution had emboldened an antigovernment movement among some Shiʿite Muslims, although the actual extent of this opposition may have been exaggerated in the minds of officials. Finally, intelligence about Iran supplied by Iranian military officers who had fled their country in the wake of the 1979 revolution was replete with information about serious factional rivalries among the political leaders and disarray and demoralization within the armed forces. The combined weight of all these factors persuaded Iraqi leaders that war against Iran could be undertaken with minimal costs and major potential benefits, such as seriously weakening or even causing the downfall of a much distrusted regime.

Initially the war went well for Iraq. Iranian forces were surprised by and unprepared for the attack. Iraqis captured Iranian border towns in all four provinces adjacent to Iraq, as well as Iran's major port, Khorramshahr. The Iraqis also besieged Abadan, one of Iran's largest cities and the site of its largest oil refinery, and several smaller cities located 12 to 20 miles removed from the border. After several weeks, however, the Iranians recovered from the shock of invasion and mobilized a large volunteer army that stopped the Iraqi advance. Iraq offered a cease-fire in place, which Iran rejected on grounds that part of its territory was under enemy occupation. For the next six months, the two armies fought intermittent battles along the front line in the western part of the Iranian province of Khuzestan, with neither side achieving any significant victory. Beginning in mid-1981, however, the Iranians gradually gained an advantage, breaking the Iraqi siege of several cities, including Abadan in September. A major victory for Iran came in May 1982, when it recaptured Khorramshahr. Several weeks later, in response to Israel's invasion of Lebanon, Iraq announced its forces would withdraw from all Iranian territory.

Iranian soldiers celebrate the taking of Iraqi territory near Basra in 1987. The Iran–Iraq War was one of the more destructive of the twentieth century, and although hostilities ended with a UN-mediated cease-fire agreement in 1988, the countries still have not signed a formal peace treaty. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

The summer of 1982 seemed an appropriate time to end the war, but Iran's leaders were beginning to feel victorious and wanted revenge. Thus, in July they decided to continue the war by taking it into Iraq. During the next five years, the advantage in the land battles on the Iraqi front remained with Iran, although it was an advantage that gained Iran only a few miles of ground, notably the Majnun Islands in 1984 and the Fao Peninsula in 1986. Strategy in this period may be described as a war of attrition; thousands of men, especially on the Iranian side, which used human wave assaults as a tactic, died in battles that ended as stalemates. In the air, the advantage was on Iraq's side, and the latter used its superiority in aircraft and missiles to strike at Iran's oil installations, industrial plants, shipping, and cities. Iraq also began to use chemical weapons against Iranian forces. Baghdad even authorized the use of chemical weapons against its own Kurdish minority in northeastern Iraq after some of them rebelled and provided logistical support to Iran.

Iraqi missile and aerial bombing of Iranian oil shipping led Iran to retaliate against the shipping of neutral Arab states such as Kuwait, which Iran accused of collaborating with Iraq by providing billions of dollars in loans. The result was the "tanker war" in the Persian Gulf, a phase that added an international dimension to the war when major countries intervened during 1987 to assert the freedom of the seas by sending armed naval ships to escort neutral vessels through Gulf waters. The situation prompted the UN Security Council to pass a cease-fire resolution (1987). Iran initially was reluctant to accept this resolution, but a combination of factors finally secured its acceptance: Iraq's extensive use of chemical weapons in battles during early 1988; a renewed wave of Iraqi missile strikes on Iranian cities, including the capital, Tehran; an increasing war-weariness among the general population; and uncertainty about the intentions of the United States and other countries that had intervened to suppress the tanker war. The UN-mediated cease-fire came

into effect in August 1988. By that time, Iran had lost 150,000 men in battle, and about 40,000 more were listed as missing in action; 2,000 Iranian civilians also had been killed in Iraqi bomb and missile strikes. Iraq had lost more than 60,000 men in battle, and at least 6,000 Iraqi Kurdish civilians had been killed by chemical weapons unleashed on them by their own government.

See also Hostage Crises.

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Efraim Karsh
Updated by Eric Hooglund

IRAN NOVIN PARTY

Political party created in Iran in 1963 to support government's reform program.

Iran Novin (New Iran) Party was created as a "majority" or government party in 1963 by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in place of the Melliyun (National) Party, a royalist party, in order to maintain the semblance of a two-party system. The other was the Mardom or People's Party. The establishment of the Iran Novin Party coincided with the period of a government-sponsored modernization and reform program known as the White Revolution or the "Revolution of the Shah and the People" (1963–1979).

The party platform represented the shah's program of reform, which included land reform, sale of state-owned factories in order to implement the land reform, enfranchisement of women, nationalization of forests and pastures, formation of literacy corps, and implementation of profit-sharing schemes for industry workers. The party chairman, Hasan Ali Mansur, a royalist from a rich landowning family, was at the same time appointed as prime minister. After Mansur's assassination in 1965, the chairmanship, as well as the premiership, was given to Amir Abbas Hoveyda, who served until 1975, the longest tenure in the post. Some of the party leaders, including Hoveyda, were suspected of having Freemasonic ties, often associated with the British in Iran. Hoveyda controlled the party thoroughly.

In the late 1960s, the Women's Party of Iran Novin was created in order to enroll women in the political process. The official organ of the Iran Novin Party was the daily *Neda-ye Iran-e Novin* (Voice of new Iran) with an approximate circulation rate of five thousand in 1970. The New Iran Party was dissolved in March 1975 when the shah decided to create a single-party system with the establishment of the Rastakhiz (or Resurgence) Party, with Hoveyda as secretary-general of the new party.

See also Hoveyda, Amir Abbas; Mardom Party; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; White Revolution (1961–1963).

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Parvaneh Pourshariati

IRAQ

Major country of the Middle East.

Iraq, with its current political boundaries, is a new country. It is a product of the twentieth century, formed in the aftermath of World War I. The term *Iraq* was adopted by the government in 1921. Historians disagree about the origin of the word. The most common interpretation is that it is derived from *al-Raq al-Arabi,* a term used in the Middle Ages to designate the southern delta region of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers from the al-Raq al-Ajami, the Persian Mountains. Before Iraq was established as a state, the Europeans referred to the area as Mesopotamia, a name that was given to the area by the

An Iraqi family gathers for a late evening meal during Ramadan, the holy month of fasting. Fasting, one of the five pillars of Islam, is thought to foster piety, and during Ramadan adult Muslims must abstain from food or drink from sunrise until sunset. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ancient Greeks which means the land between two rivers. It corresponds roughly to the Ottomans' provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul.

Geography and Population

Iraq covers about 169,000 square miles and is surrounded by six countries—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, and Syria. It is essentially a landlocked country. The country's access to the high seas is through two major ports, Umm Qasr on the Persian Gulf and Basra, which is located at the Shatt al-Arab, the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Geographically, the country is divided into four areas: the Syrian Desert in the west and southwest; the river valleys of the central and southeast areas, which contain the most fertile agricultural soil; the upland between the Upper Tigris and Euphrates Rivers; and the mountains of the north and northeast. The climate is subtropical, with long dry summers and a wide difference in temperatures between summer and winter. Rain falls mostly between the months of October and April, but not heavily.

Iraq's population of about 24 million is a mixture of ethnic and religious communities. About 95 percent is Muslim, of which 60 percent are Shiʿite. Four percent are Christians of various denominations. There are a few other small religious communities of Yazidis, Sabeans, and Jews. About 80 percent of the population is Arab. They live in an area that stretches from Basra to Mosul including the western part of the country. The Kurds represent 18 percent of the population, and they live mainly in the mountains of the northern and eastern areas of the country. The majority of the Kurds are Sunni; a small minority are Kurdish Shiʿa called *Fiyliaya.* The Kurds of Iraq speak two different dialects of the Kurdish language—Sorani and Karmanji. Other small ethnic communities include the

Turkomen, Assyrians, Yazidis, and Armenians. Arabic is the official language of Iraq; Kurdish is used in the Kurdish area in addition to Arabic.

Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, is the largest city in the country, with a population of five million. Basra, the second largest city, has a population of more than a million and half, and is the gateway to the Persian Gulf. Mosul, in the north, is the third largest city, and has a population of more than a million. Kirkuk City, also in the north, has more than half a million people. It is situated among major oil reserves. In addition to these cities, Iraq is the site of several Shiʿite holy cities, including al-Najaf, where Imam Ali is buried, and Karbala, where Imam Husayn is buried. Both cities are located on the Euphrates River southwest of Baghdad.

Oil was discovered in large quantities in 1927 near Kirkuk City. The Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), a consortium of the British Petroleum Company, Shell, Mobil, Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon), and the French Petroleum Company, was formed to manage oil production. IPC and its subsidiaries obtained concessions from the Iraqi government and had total control over oil production. The concessions covered practically the entire land area of Iraq, and they lasted for many decades. For all intents and purposes, Iraq played no role in oil development from the time it was first discovered until the 1950s. Oil production was very limited before 1950, but it began to rise in the 1950s when the Iraqi government slowly but steadily gained control over it. The production increased significantly after Iraq nationalized its oil industry in 1972. Oil production reached its peak in 1979, reaching 3.5 million barrels a day, twice the amount produced in 1971, a year before the nationalization. Since then, the production has decreased as a result of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Gulf Crisis and War of 1991, and the invasion of Iraq by U.S. forces in March 2003. Iraq has a proven oil reserve of more than 112 billion barrels, second only to the reserve in Saudi Arabia. Since the 1950s, oil has been the mainstay of the Iraqi economy and the major source of funds for social and economic development.



The al-Husayn Mosque in the Shiʿite holy city of Karbala. The mosque commemorates the murder of the prophet Muhammad's grandson in 680 C.E., and pilgrims from across the Muslim world travel to worship beneath its golden dome. © CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Pre-Twentieth-Century History

Although Iraq is a new country, it has an extraordinarily rich and complex history. Historians and archaeologists consider Iraq to be the cradle of civilization. It is associated with many ancient civilizations such as the Sumerians, the Akkadians, the Babylonians, the Chaldeans, and the Assyrians. It is the land of the biblical Garden of Eden and of the Hanging Garden of Babylon, the site of the first farming settlements and urban settlements and of the invention of writing and the wheel, and the home of Hammurabi (1800–1760 B.C.E.), the great lawgiver (author of the Code of Hammurabi).

In 637 C.E. Islam poured into Iraq. In 750 C.E. the Abbasids triumphed and the center of the Islamic empire shifted from Damascus to Iraq. In 762 C.E. the second caliph Abu Jaʿfar al-Mansur (754–775 C.E.) founded the new city of Baghdad as the

Statue of Abu Jaʿfar al-Mansur in Baghdad. Al-Mansur, the second caliph of the Abbasid Dynasty, ruled Iraq from 745 to 775 C.E. In 762, after founding Baghdad on the western bank of the Tigris River, he shifted the seat of government to the new city. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

new capital of the empire. During the reign of Harun al-Rashid (786–810 C.E.) and his son Maʾmun (813–833 C.E.), the Abbasid Empire reached its peak in material splendor and intellectual advances. Baghdad enjoyed grand glory and prosperity as the center of Islamic culture. The city became an international trade center for textiles, leather, paper, and other goods from areas ranging from the Baltic to China. Baghdad also became a magnet for scientific and intellectual achievements. The famous Bayt al-Hikma Academy was established in 830 C.E. by the great patron of scholarship, Caliph al-Maʾmun. The academy included several schools, astrological observatories, libraries, and facilities for the translation of scientific and philosophical works from Greek, Aramaic, and Persian into Arabic.

The empire began to disintegrate gradually, and in 1256 Baghdad and the Abbasid caliphs were destroyed by the Mongols. The Ottoman sultan, Süleiman the Magnificent, incorporated Iraq into his empire in 1534. Thereafter, except for a period of Persian control in the seventeenth century, Iraq remained under Ottoman rule until the Ottoman Empire came to an end at the end of World War I.

Administratively, during the Ottoman rule, Iraq was divided into three provinces: Mosul, where most of the Kurds lived; Baghdad; and Basra, where most of the Arabs lived. During that period, Iraq was totally neglected and the economy was in a state of disarray and confusion. In the second half of the nineteenth century a few Turkish governors, such as the reform-minded Midhat Paşa, introduced a few modern improvements such as the establishment of modern secular schools, reorganization of the army, creation of codes of criminal and commercial law, improvement of provincial administration, and a new system of transportation.

The British occupied Iraq during World War I. After the war, the Treaty of Sèvres placed Iraq under a British mandate. In 1921 the British established a constitutional monarchy headed by Faisal I ibn Hussein, a member of the Hashimite House (House of Hashim) of Arabia and one of the leaders of the anti-Turk Arab Revolt of 1916.

Early Nationhood

On 13 October 1932 Iraq became independent and joined the League of Nations. Between 1932 and 1941 Iraq's political situation was unstable, marked by tribal and ethnic revolts, military coups, and countercoups. In 1941 a nationalistic government assumed power, angering the British and prompting them to reoccupy Iraq and to install a pro-British government.

Between 1941 and 1958 Iraq was basically ruled by two British-oriented rulers: Nuri al-Saʿid, who assumed the office of prime minister several times; and Abd al-Ilah, the regent. From 1932 to 1958, Britain exercised significant influence over the ruling elite. During this time, modern secular education was expanded and became accessible to the general public in a limited way. Economic development was slow but gained some steam in the early 1950s when oil revenue increased. Political life was



Map by XNR Productions, Inc. The Gale Group.

marred by corruption and manipulation of the election process and domination by a few personalities.

After World War II, Iraq, like many other developing nations, experienced a rise in anti-imperial sentiment that demanded the reduction of British domination and the introduction of social and economic reform. These trends culminated in the nationalistic military coup of 14 July 1958. The coup was executed by the Free Officers, led by General Abd al-Karim al-Qasim, who stayed in power until February 1963. During the coup the king, the regent, and Nuri al-Saʿid were killed. This coup brought significant changes in Iraq's domestic and foreign policies. The Hashimite monarchy was replaced with a republican regime, and Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and began a foreign policy of nonalliance. The new regime initiated land reform and expanded education on all levels. It also challenged the existing profit-sharing arrangement with oil companies, and in December 1961 it enacted Public Law No. 80, which resulted in the expropriation of 99.5 percent of the IPC group's concession area that was not in production. This was also a period of political turmoil: There was an attempted coup in Mosul in 1959 and an attempted

assassination of Qasim, and the Kurds launched armed rebellion against the government.

The Rise of Saddam Hussein

In February 1963 the Baʿth Party, along with nationalistic officers, seized power in a bloody coup. Nine months later, the Baʿth Party was kicked out of power by a coup led by Abd al-Salam Arif, one of the original Free Officers of the 1958 coup. On 17 July 1968 the Baʿth Party came back to power through a bloodless coup. This marked the ascendance to power of Saddam Hussein, which lasted until the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. From 1968 to 2003 Hussein dominated the political scene, even when he was vice president from 1968 to 1979. He was the undisputed leader, ruling Iraq with an "iron fist" and discouraging opposition through elimination, imprisonment, and the use of multiple security forces. For all practical purposes, all political activities outside of the Baʿth Party were outlawed.

In the 1970s Iraq nationalized its oil industry. As the price of crude oil went up, the government invested a lot of money in improving the infrastructure of the country, its education system, and social services. The Kurdish revolt reached its peak in the mid-1970s due to the support it had received from Iran, Israel, and the United States. These countries viewed Iraq as a threat. During this period, Iraq advocated Arab nationalism, adopted anti-imperialism policies, and allied itself more with Soviet Union. Also, Iraq adopted a policy against the so-called reactionary regimes of the Gulf who were allies of the United States. Therefore, Iran, Israel, and the United States were interested in destabilizing the regime through the Kurdish revolt.The attempt to quell the Kurdish rebellion in the north was unsuccessful, and in 1975 Saddam signed a treaty with the shah of Iran in which Iraq agreed to share the Shatt al-Arab with Iran in return for the ending of Iran's support of the Kurds. Within a few weeks of concluding the agreement, the Kurdish revolt was quashed, and for more than a decade, the Kurdish region was relatively quiet.

On 16 July 1979 Saddam formally assumed the presidency of Iraq. He began his presidency by eliminating a number of high-ranking members of the Baʿth Party, accusing them of plotting against him. Soon his relationship with Iran began to deteriorate in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution (1979). A border skirmish between the two countries was used by Saddam to justify the invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980. Saddam erred in his assumption that the war was going to be quick; it lasted for eight years. Iraq was left with hundreds of thousands dead and wounded and a seriously damaged economy. Iranian bombardments of oil facilities in Iraq's south significantly impaired the oil industry, which was the mainstay of the Iraqi economy. The government shifted spending from projects of modern development to spending on the military to meet the requirements of the war. The Kurds resumed their revolt against the Iraqi government with the support of the Iranian government. By the time the Iran-Iraq War ended in July 1988, Iraq was $80 billion in debt to several countries, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, France, the Soviet Union, and Japan.

Between 1988 and 1990, Saddam's government struggled to put the country back in order. After the war, Saddam turned against the Kurds. His forces savaged their villages for siding with Iran during the war, forcing many of the Kurds to leave the mountains for detention centers in other parts of the country. The drop in oil prices on the international front led to serious tensions between Iraq and Kuwait. Saddam accused both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of conducting an economic war against Iraq by intentionally flooding the oil market by exceeding their export quotas within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). According to Saddam, the high output of these two countries kept prices low, leading to a big reduction in Iraqi oil revenue that was sorely needed to rebuild the country.

The Kuwaiti government stubbornly refused to yield, and the U.S. ambassador to Iraq gave mixed messages—on the one hand declaring that any dispute between Arab countries was not a U.S. matter, and on the other joining Britain in encouraging Kuwait not to accommodate Iraq. Saddam's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 ultimately led to the first Gulf War, which was executed by the United States and its coalition on 17 January 1991. The war's code name was Operation Desert Storm, and it lasted for forty-three days. The United States and its allies flew more than 110,000 sorties that

dropped a total of 99,000 to 140,000 tons of explosives on Iraqi targets—the firepower equivalent of five to seven of the nuclear bombs that were dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima during World War II. The war destroyed the infrastructure of Iraq, knocking out electricity grids, roads, bridges, communication systems, sewage and water purification systems, factories, and telephone systems. A United Nations (UN) report written shortly after the war stated that the destruction caused by the war returned Iraq to a preindustrial state.

In the aftermath, both the Kurdish ethnic community in the north and the Shiʿite Muslim community in the south revolted against Saddam's regime. The Kurds hoped to establish an independent state in the north, and the Shiʿa hoped to topple Saddam's regime and replace it with a more sympathetic government. Despite Saddam's recent defeat in the war, he was able to muster enough power to crush both rebellions. He dealt with the rebels harshly, killing thousands of people and wounding many more. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled Iraq to the neighboring countries of Turkey and Iran. This massive flight prompted the United States, along with Britain and France, to impose a no-fly zone for Iraqi aircraft in the north. Also, the United States, Britain, and France established a Kurdish Autonomous Zone in Iraq, which Iraqi forces were not allowed to enter, and where Kurds ruled themselves. This new arrangement allowed hundreds of thousand of refugees to return to their homes and villages. The Kurdish zone, for all practical purposes, was independent. It had its own currency, taxes, and educational system. In this area, Kurdish was the primary language and Arabic was waning as the official language.

On 6 August 1990, four days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 661, imposing on Iraq the most repressive sanctions and embargo in the history of the organization. When the Gulf War ended, the United Nations Security Council passed several new resolutions concerning Iraq. Resolution 687, passed on 3 April 1991, continued the sanctions and the embargo on Iraq until it dismantled its weapons program, including all long- and medium-range missiles, and all chemical, biological, and nuclear facilities. The dismantling was to have been implemented by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which had been inspecting Iraq for any possible military use of its nuclear facilities since the 1970s, and the newly established UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) under the chairmanship of Rolf Ekeus, a Swedish diplomat. Resolution 713 established a permanent UN monitoring system for all missile test sites and nuclear installations in the Iraq. Resolution 986, passed in 1992, allowed Iraq to sell $1.6 billion worth of oil every six months, subject to renewal, for the purchase of food and medicine. About one third of the money raised through the sale of oil was designated for war reparations for Kuwait and payments to the UN for its operations in Iraq. Iraq agreed in principle to the first two resolutions, but it rejected the third one on the grounds that it did not allow Iraq to control the funds realized from the sale. But by 1996 the life of the Iraqi people was approaching destitution, and the government was forced to accept the terms of Resolution 986. In 1998 the sale limit was raised to $5.52 billion worth of oil every six months, and in 1999 to $8.3 billion.

Iraq was not happy with UNSCOM's intrusive inspections, and there were confrontations between Iraqis and the inspection teams. The United States, the driving force behind the inspections, used these confrontations as grounds for bombing Iraq in 1993, 1996, and 1998. The last bombardment, codenamed Operation Desert Fox, lasted for four days. Before it began, Richard Butler, the second head of UNSCOM, withdrew the inspections teams without the authorization of the UN Security Council. The bombardment put the future of UNSCOM in doubt, and the inspectors did not return until 2002, and then under a different name. By the time of the 1998 confrontation, the UN had destroyed more than 95 percent of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (Iraq claimed that it had destroyed the last 5 percent, but could not account for it). There were two reasons for the difficulties that the inspection teams faced: Iraq's concern that the inspection teams violated its sovereignty, and the U.S. government's misuse of some members of the inspection teams as spies.

The sanctions and the embargo begun in 1990 had a dreadful impact on Iraqi society. They hit the sanitation and health-care systems hard, and also led to the breakdown of the electric system, which contributed to chronic problems with sewage and water

treatment. The sanctions also contributed to inadequate diets, resulting in malnutrition and a proliferation of diseases, which led to a high mortality rate among children. Furthermore, the sanctions led to many social ills such as homelessness of children, increased crime rates, high divorce rates, a drop in the marriage rate, and the virtual destruction of the educational system. Thousands of schools were left in a state of disrepair. The sanctions weakened the oil industry, the mainstay of the Iraqi economy, because of a lack of spare parts and a lack of investment to update oil facilities. The sanctions lasted for almost thirteen years and contributed to the deaths of more than one million people, many of them children, women, and elderly people. Two UN chief relief coordinators—Denis Halliday in 1998 and Han von Sponeck in 2000—resigned their posts in protest of the continuation of the sanctions.

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 marked a turning point in U.S. policy toward Iraq. The foreign policy of the Republican administration of George W. Bush was controlled by neoconservatives who advocated a regime change in Iraq. Some of the planners of the new policy were behind the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, in which the Congress allocated $100 million to help Iraqi opposition groups in their quest to remove Saddam from power. After 11 September, the neoconservatives pushed for the removal of Saddam by military means. The UN adopted Resolution 1441, which demanded that Iraq allow the weapons inspections teams to return. There were two teams—one from the International Atomic Energy Agency, headed by Muhammad El-Baradei from Egypt, and another from the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), headed by Hans Blix from Sweden. The new resolution gave the inspectors more freedom to operate and conduct their activities inside Iraq, and it imposed more restrictions on Saddam's regime than previous resolutions had. Iraq agreed to the resolution and emphatically denied having any weapons of mass destruction, stating that it had destroyed all of them. However, the Iraqi government could not give a full accounting of the missing items. Both heads of the inspection teams asked for more time to finish their job.

The United States and Britain refused to wait for UN consensus on the issue. The United States government continued to claim that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction and that he was a threat to U.S. and world security, and on 17 March 2003 the United States, along with Britain, initiated a military invasion against Iraq, defying world opinion. On 9 April 2003 Baghdad fell, and the occupation of Iraq began. The claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, including biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, turned out to be questionable. In May, under pressure from the United States, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1483, which legalized the result of the invasion (though most UN member nations had considered it to be illegal). On 16 October 2003 the UN adopted Resolution 1511, again under U.S. pressure, which authorized a multinational force under U.S. leadership to replace and reduce the burden on the U.S. occupying forces.

See also Arab Revolt (1916); Arif, Abd al-Salam; Baghdad; Baghdad Pact (1955); Basra; Baʿth, al-; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Gulf War (1991); Hashimite House (House of Hashim); Hussein, Saddam; Iranian Revolution (1979); Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC); Karbala; Kirkuk; Kurdish Autonomous Zone; Kurdish Revolts; Kurds; Midhat Paşa; Mosul; Najaf, al-; Sèvres, Treaty of (1920); Shatt al-Arab; Tigris and Euphrates Rivers; United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM); War in Iraq (2003).

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Ayad Al-Qazzaz

IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS

An Iraqi opposition group.

The Iraqi National Congress (INC) is an umbrella Iraqi opposition group founded in 1992. It was

formed with the aid of and under the direction of the United States government following the 1991 Gulf War, for the purpose of fomenting the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Selected to chair the executive council was Ahmad Chalabi, a secular Iraqi Shiʿite Muslim and mathematician by training. The INC represented the first major attempt by opponents of Hussein to join forces, bringing together not only Sunni and Shiʿa Arabs (both Islamic fundamentalist and secular) and Kurds, but also varying political tendencies, including democrats, nationalists, ex-military officers, and others.

In June 1992 nearly 200 delegates from dozens of opposition groups met in Vienna, along with Iraq's two main Kurdish militias, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (Iraq) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). In October 1992 the major Shiʿite groups joined the coalition and the INC held a pivotal meeting in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, in which it chose a three-person Leadership Council and a twenty-six-member Executive Council. A number of opposition groups continue to belong to the INC, but most have since gone their own ways, leaving the INC primarily a vehicle for Chalabi and his supporters.

The INC's political platform promised human rights and rule of law within a constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic Iraq; preservation of Iraq's territorial integrity; and complete compliance with international law, including United Nations resolutions relating to Iraq. Like the majority of other Iraqi opposition groups, its stated goal was to topple Saddam's regime and its replacement with a democratic form of government with federalism and decentralization at its basis. The INC received $12 million of covert CIA funding between 1992 and 1996. After several years of nonfunding, the administration of George W. Bush agreed to give $8 million of the $25 million that the INC requested in January of 2002.

The INC was subsequently plagued by the dissociation of many of its constituent groups from the INC umbrella, a cutoff of funds from its international backers (including the United States), and continued pressure from Iraqi intelligence services. A major problem the INC faced after the American occupation of Iraq starting in 2003 was the limited degree of support it commands inside the country.

See also Bush, George W.; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Chalabi, Ahmad; Hussein, Saddam; Iraq.

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Kristian P. Alexander

IRAQI WOMEN'S FEDERATION

See General Federation of Iraqi Women

IRAQI WOMEN'S UNION

Umbrella organization of Iraqi women's groups.

The Iraqi Women's Union was an umbrella organization created in 1945 by progressive, upper-class women to unite all legally sanctioned women's associations and clubs. The union's aims were "to assist women to improve family conditions in the service of society" by raising their "health, social, civil, legal, and economic standards" through civil, constitutional, and peaceful means; and to unify all women's associations in Iraq and initiate cultural, social, and national contacts with Arab and international organizations committed to advancing women's issues. One of their first major social projects in Iraq was the abolition of brothels as degrading to women. In addition, they mobilized women as volunteers during national disasters. In the civil sphere, they campaigned for greater women's rights, particularly in relation to child custody after a divorce, and for an amendment of the legal code in regard to inheritance. In the economic sphere, they campaigned for the improvement of working conditions for nurses, who were mainly women. In addition, they were active in the cultural sphere in promoting awareness of women's issues by organizing a biweekly series of literary, political, and social lectures and debates, which were held at their headquarters in Baghdad. They also sponsored biweekly movies and documentaries of a social and cultural nature. In 1954 the union organized a "Women's Week" in which lectures by legal personalities and political figures were presented in support of women's issues. At the height of its political activities between

1951 and 1958, the union demanded amendments to Iraq's constitution guaranteeing women's equality, right to vote, and right to stand for political office.

See also Gender: Gender and Law.

Jacqueline Ismael

IRAQ PETROLEUM COMPANY (IPC)

Successor to Turkish Petroleum Company.

The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) was organized in 1928 from the remains of the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC). In 1927, TPC discovered the large Kirkuk field in the Kurdish Mosul region of Iraq. Seven years later, IPC completed a crude oil pipeline with termini in Tripoli, Lebanon, and in Haifa, then in the British mandate of Palestine. Its oil exports reached 1 million tons per year by the end of 1934, but revenues remained modest until the 1950s.

Iraq's militant oil policy can be explained by the country's dependence on pipelines to move crude oil to market, and by its history of bitter conflicts with IPC. The IPC pipeline to Haifa, vulnerable to sabotage, was severed during the Arab–Israel War (1948), and the pipeline through Syria was blown up during the Arab–Israel War (1956). Shipments of crude through the IPC pipeline in Syria were halted for three months in 1966 and 1967 because of a dispute over transit fees between IPC and the government of Syria. This was a preview of the relative ease with which transit countries were able to halt the flow of crude oil through IPC-owned pipelines following the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

Iraq's conflicts with IPC began during the negotiations over the original TPC concession. The government had demanded a 20 percent equity share in the company to give it some influence on management policies, including production levels. The TPC partners resisted giving a share to Iraq and called upon their home governments, then engaged in carving the Ottoman Empire into mandates for themselves, to help them. Needing British support to prevent the Mosul *vilayet* from being lost to Turkey, the government of Iraq reluctantly signed an agreement giving TPC a concession until 2000 and omitting the provision for an equity share for itself.

The most serious dispute between Iraq and IPC was over the laggardly development of Iraq's oil resources. IPC concentrated on developing its fields in Mosul, which depended upon the limited capacity of vulnerable pipelines to transport crude to markets. Development of the southern oil fields, close to the gulf where export via tanker was possible, did not occur until the 1950s. Iraq was convinced that IPC's foreign ownership was responsible for this delay, although other factors, such as the Red Line Agreement, are also likely explanations. IPC's foreign owners agreed to revise their concession agreement in 1952 to conform to the new industry standard of 50–50 profit sharing without the rancor that accompanied these negotiations in Iran. IPC also went along with another industry standard in 1959 and 1960, unilaterally reducing the prices paid to host governments for crude oil. This prompted Iraq to join four other oil-exporting countries to found the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960.

Negotiations between the government of Iraq and IPC in the early 1960s were beset by the inability of each side to understand the reasons behind the positions taken by the other. In December 1962 Iraq's Public Law 80 (PL 80) called for repossession of more than 99 percent of IPC's landholdings, including its share of the southern oil fields. The law also established the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC). PL 80 allowed Iraq to preserve its income stream from IPC, which retained its producing properties in Kirkuk, but also initiated a protracted struggle with IPC over the law's legitimacy. After intensive negotiations, IPC regained control of the southern oil fields in a new agreement initialed in 1965 but lost these rights after passage of Public Law 97 in August 1967, which gave INOC exclusive rights to develop all the territory expropriated under PL 80. IPC threatened to sue purchasers of oil from the disputed fields. INOC developed the disputed fields by itself and disposed of production through barter agreements, in order to circumvent the IPC ban on crude sales.

Following the 1968 coup and the installation of the al-Baʿth party, the government of Iraq moved

rapidly toward nationalization. Continued conflicts over IPC's production rates, and company demands to be compensated for losses it had sustained as the result of PL 80, led to Public Law 69 (1 June 1972). This law nationalized IPC and established a state-owned company to take over its operations in Kirkuk. In response, IPC extended its embargo to cover oil from Kirkuk. The immediate impasse between Iraq and IPC was resolved in an agreement reached in February 1973, in which substantial concessions were made by both sides. By the end of the year, however, Iraq had nationalized all foreign oil holdings, including all of the remaining properties of IPC.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1956); Baʿth, al-; Kirkuk; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; Red Line Agreement.

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Mary Ann Tétreault

IRAQ WAR (2003)

See War in Iraq (2003)

IRBID

Largest city in northern Jordan.

Located 53 miles (85 km) north of the capital city, Amman, Irbid is the third-largest city in Jordan (population 267,200 in 2003) and the traditional administrative capital for the northern province.

Known during the Roman Empire as Arbila, Irbid was counted among the ten towns of the Decapolis—a commercial federation of towns in Judea, Jordan, and Syria during the first century B.C.E.

When reconsolidating their rule over Jordan in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire's representatives in Damascus made Irbid the seat of the subgovernorate of Ajlun, the first district in Jordan to be ruled directly by the Ottomans. As such, Irbid became the home of some of Jordan's first public institutions. Irbid continued to serve as the capital of Ajlun during the emirate of Transjordan and of today's governorate of Irbid.

As an administrative and commercial center, Irbid has undergone considerable population growth, particularly since the 1950s. Irbid is also home to Yarmuk University, one of Jordan's three public universities.

See also Jordan; Yarmuk University.

Michael R. Fischbach

IRGUN ZVA'I LE'UMI (IZL)

Militant Jewish underground organization in pre-state Israel.

A revisionist group of militants broke from the Haganah in 1931 and formed the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi (Etzel). In 1937, the Irgun signed an agreement with Vladimir Zeʾev Jabotinsky, the president of the Revisionist New Zionist Organization, and became the defense organization of the Revisionist movement. During and after the Arab uprising of 1936–1939 and the British White Paper of May 1939, the Irgun embarked on a series of terrorist attacks on British and Palestinian targets. With the eruption of World War II, however, the Irgun suspended attacks and many members joined the British forces to be trained and to fight against Nazi Germany. Irgun commander in chief David Raziel was killed in Iraq while leading a group of volunteers on behalf of the British army. A small group of dissident Irgun members, led by Abraham Stern, broke with the Irgun, formed LEHI (the "Stern Gang"), and continued to carry out violent actions against the Mandatory forces.

In 1942 Menachem Begin assumed command of the Irgun and, in early 1944, formally embarked on armed revolt against the British in Mandatory Palestine. Though comprised of a small group of poorly equipped Jewish guerrillas, the Irgun inflicted damage on the British forces through a combination of factors, including successful use of the element of surprise, intimate familiarity with the topography and terrain, broad local Jewish sympathy, and a campaign of public relations abroad that built on sympathy for the victims of Nazi genocide.

In 1945, after the British Labour government refused to alter its Palestine policies, the Jewish Agency arranged an alliance of Haganah, Irgun, and LEHI forces, the United Hebrew Resistance Movement, which carried out violent actions against the Mandatory forces. In mid-1946, however, the Jewish Agency reinstituted its policy of self-restraint and disbanded the alliance, but by then the Irgun was sufficiently large to independently escalate attacks on British targets.

The Haganah and mainstream Zionists consistently opposed the Irgun and its terrorist actions. In July 1946, when the Irgun blew up the British army headquarters and the Secretariat of the Mandate government in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, it was strongly denounced. Less than a month after the British executed four Irgun members in the Acre Prison, in April 1947, an Irgun force of thirty-four men dynamited their way into the prison and freed 250 Jewish and Arab prisoners. The following day, the daring action was widely reported in the world media. On 14 May 1948, with the proclamation of the State of Israel, the Irgun agreed to disband and join the new Israel Defense Force; they continued, however, to carry out a number of independent actions, the most serious of which led to the Altalena affair.

The Irgun did not achieve official recognition until 1968, when President Zalman Shazar formally recognized its efforts, along with those of the Haganah and all groups, including NILI, the Jewish Legion, and LEHI, in the struggle for independence and defense of the State of Israel.

See also Aaronsohn Family; *Altalena;* Shazar, Shneour Zalman.

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Chaim I. Waxman

IRSHAD AN-NISWAAN

The first Afghan women's journal.

Irshad An-Niswaan (Lady's guide), the first Afghan women's journal, was established in March 1921 as a weekly in Kabul under the direction of three people: Asma Rasmiyya; the famous Afghan journalist Mahmud Tarzi; and the mother of Queen Surraya. Ruhafza, the editor of *Irshad An-Niswaan,* was related to Mahmud Tarzi. In addition to national and international news, *Irshad An-Niswaan* published articles of particular interest to women. Its mission was to inform women of important national and international issues and make them aware of their rights and responsibilities as mothers and citizens. The journal also provided an opportunity for young women writers to contribute articles for publication. *Irshad An-Niswaan* was published in Persian and was intended primarily for upper-class, educated women readers and female students. It ceased publication after the fall of King Amanullah in 1929.

In 1994, during the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, a short-lived monthly bilingual women's magazine, in Persian and Pashtun, took the same name and was published in Kabul under the editorship of Laila Sarahat Rushani. It focused primarily on the social life and traditional activities of women but included articles on literature and politics as well.

See also Afghanistan: Overview; Gender: Gender and Education; Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries; Queen Surraya.

Senzil Nawid

IRYANI, ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-

[1909–1998]

Second president of the Yemen Arab Republic.

Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani served as head of state of the Yemen Arab Republic from the overthrow of President Abdullah al-Sallal in late 1967 until the bloodless coup led by Ibrahim al-Hamdi in mid-1974. Born in 1909 in the Iryan region of North Yemen, al-Iryani hailed from a famous family of Sunni jurists and teachers; he was the head of that family for five decades. His pre-1962 political activities qualify him as a father of the modern Yemeni republic, and his tenure as head of state was most notable for the republican-royalist reconciliation that ended the Yemen Civil War, for the drafting and adoption of the 1970 constitution, and for holding Yemen's first parliamentary elections in 1971.

A traditionally trained *qadi* (judge) who held to some modern ideas, he bridged the gap between the imamate of the past and the new republic. Indeed, some called him the "republican imam," and claimed that this was the key to the successful transitional role he played; many Yemenis referred to him simply as "the Qadi." After 1974 he spent most of his exile in Damascus, was invited by the regime to return to Yemen in 1982, and made almost annual visits to his native land thereafter. Upon his death in 1998, he was returned to Yemen for a hero's burial.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

ISA FAMILY, AL-

Prominent Palestinian family from Jaffa.

A Greek Orthodox family of landowners, businessmen, and politicians, the al-Isas became most known in the twentieth century as publishers of the long-lived newspaper *Filastin.* Brothers Yusuf and Isa Daʾud Isa, who both attended the American University of Beirut, Lebanon, founded the newspaper in 1911. Leaders of the Nahda al-Urthuduksiyya (Orthodox Renaissance) before World War I, they were also active in the anti-Zionist movement. Isa's son Raja became editor of *Filastin* in 1951 and of the *Jerusalem Star* in the 1960s. He is now a publisher and owner of the Jordan Distribution Agency in Amman, Jordan. Another member of the family, Michel al-Isa, headed a battalion in defense of Jaffa against the Israelis in the 1948 Arab–Israel War.

A second prominent branch of the al-Isa family is based in Beirut, Lebanon. Elias al-Isa was a wealthy contractor in the early twentieth century from Bsous. His son Emile is a retired banker, and his son Raymond is an architect and engineer.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1948); NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

ISAWIYYA BROTHERHOOD

Religious brotherhood.

The Isawiyya brotherhood, or Isawa, was founded in Meknes, Morocco, in the sixteenth century by Shaykh Muhammad bin Isa al-Sufyani al-Mukhtari, known as Shaykh al-Kamil (the perfect master). The brotherhood is found all over Morocco and Algeria and has extended its influence to other Muslim countries such as Libya, Syria, and Egypt. Each year during the three days following the Mulud, members hold a celebration in Meknes where music, ecstatic dances, and extravagant rituals are collectively performed. Because it preaches renouncement, Isawa recruit their disciples mostly among poor social categories.

RAHMA BOURQIA

ISFAHAN

Former capital of Iran and major industrial center.

Isfahan is located in west central Iran along both banks of the Zayandeh River. Its origins date back to the Achaemenid era (c. 550–330 B.C.E.), but it did not emerge as an important city until 1150, when Toghril Beg, founder of the Seljuk dynasty, chose it as his capital. The city's golden age coincided with its status as the capital of the Safavi dynasty (1598–1722). Shah Abbas I (r. 1587–1629) and several of his successors embellished the city with bridges, mosques, *madrasehs,* and palaces, many of which are extant and are considered among the finest examples of Islamic architecture. In 1722, an army of invading Afghans besieged Isfahan for several months before finally capturing and looting it and deposing the shah. These events ushered in more than two decades of steady economic and political decline interspersed with several brutal massacres of prominent citizens of the city.

Isfahan at the beginning of the nineteenth century was no longer a major city; it had ceased to be Iran's capital, and its population was only 25 percent of what it had been during the height of Safavi power. Its role as a regional commercial center recovered during the reign of Nasir ed-Din Shah Qajar (1848–1896). In the 1920s entrepreneurs began developing modern factories, especially textile mills, which by the early 1960s employed nearly 20,000 workers and produced one-half of Iran's total output of textiles. The renewed prosperity stimulated greater and more diversified industrialization, and the city became the center of the country's steel industry during the 1970s. Isfahan has experienced considerable immigration, growing at an average annual rate of 4 percent during the last seventy years of the twentieth century. In the 1996 census, its population had reached 1,266,000, making it the third-largest city in Iran. The city also remains the country's premier tourist center, drawing thousands to see such famous Safavi-era architectural landmarks as the Meydan-e Imam, Masjid-e Imam, Masjid-e Shaykh Lotfollah, and the covered bazaar.

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FARHAD ARSHAD
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

ISFAHAN UNIVERSITY

Public university in Isfahan, Iran.

Founded in Isfahan in 1949 as part of an effort to establish public institutions of higher education in the provinces of Iran, Isfahan University had 3,654 students by 1970. It had faculties of administrative sciences and economics, educational sciences, engineering, foreign languages, letters and humanities, and pure sciences, with 450 teachers and 12,000 students, as of 2002. The Isfahan University of Medical Sciences, with faculties of medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy, and a school of nursing, had 300 teachers and 6,321 students as of 2002.

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PARVANEH POURSHARIATI

ISHAAQ, KAMALA IBRAHIM
[1939–]

Sudanese painter.

Kamala Ibrahim Ishaaq (also Ishaq) was born in Sudan, and trained at the Faculty of Fine Arts in Khartoum and at the Royal College of Art in London. She taught at the Khartoum School of Fine and Applied Art and was a pioneering member of the group known as the Khartoum School, which is widely regarded as responsible for developing the modern art movement in the Sudan. Like many other artists from Arab and African countries, Ishaaq conducted extensive field research on local cultural practices as a basis for her own work. Her early paintings drew on her intensive study of and participation in *zars,* primarily female rituals of spirit possession and purification in northeast Africa. This exploration of local themes was in keeping with the Khartoum School's interest in articulating a distinct Sudanese cultural identity, which they believed consisted of a mixture of African and Islamic traditions. In the 1970s, Ishaaq departed from her earlier work when she joined with two of her students to create the Crystal Manifesto, which some argue was an implicit critique of the Khartoum School. Opposed to the heavy values placed on skill and craftsmanship and an empirical view of the world, the Crystalists argued that humankind was trapped in a crystal-like prism, whose nature looked different depending on the observer's angle, thus providing a source of possibility within the entrapment. This existentialist perspective shaped her later work, which explored women's oppression and possession more broadly, most notably in paintings of grossly distorted female subjects, some imprisoned in crystal cubes.

See also ART; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION.

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JESSICA WINEGAR

ISHAQ, ADIB

[1856–1885]

Arab intellectual.

A Syrian Christian by birth, Adib Ishaq was educated in French schools in Damascus and Beirut. Emigrating to Egypt, Ishaq became the editor of the noted journal *Misr.* While he has been described as an early promoter of Arab nationalism, Ishaq avidly supported the Ottoman Empire as a viable political community. Inspired by liberal thought of France, Ishaq wrote extensively about the nature of freedom and society. In his view, there were several layers of social organization in the Middle East, each of which defined itself differently. There was an "Arab" identity shared by those who spoke Arabic, an "Ottoman" identity shared by those who acknowledged the sultan as sovereign, and even an "Eastern" identity shared by those who felt besieged by the West. These layers were not mutually exclusive; they overlapped, and it was possible for one individual to hold to more than one of these identities.

See also ARAB NATIONALISM; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

ISLAH PARTY

Yemeni political party.

The Islah Party (or Reform Grouping) was formed in 1990, soon after the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic united to form the Republic of Yemen (ROY). Although widely characterized as Islamist, Islah is actually a coalition of the Hashid Tribal Confederation, the Muslim Brotherhood, some prominent businesspeople, and a few other small groups; among the latter are militant Islamists, some allegedly with connections with al-Qaʿida. In April 1993 the party won the second-largest bloc in the ROY's first democratic parliamentary elections, gaining about half the seats won by the General People's Congress (GPC) but several more than those won by the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), the two parties that unified Yemen in 1990 and then shared power from 1990 to 1993. Although Islah then joined with the GPC and the YSP to form a grand coalition, the party nevertheless remained marginalized until 1994, when civil war brought about the demise of the GPC–YSP partnership and the exile of most YSP leaders. After the war, a new government was formed by the GPC and Islah, providing the latter with key cabinet posts and increased political strength. After the 1997 elections, in which it made a slightly poorer showing than in 1993, Islah declined an invitation to join the government and went into the opposition; after the 2003 elections, it continued to play the role of opposition to the GPC government. Whether in the government or in the opposition, Islah has been an important player in Yemeni politics. For one thing, there are strong tribal ties between President Ali Abdullah Salih, the head of the GPC, and Abdullah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar, the head of Islah. For another, when not in the government, Islah has often acted and been treated as if it were; and, when in the government, it has often behaved as the opposition.

See also MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD; QAʿIDA, AL-; YEMEN.

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JILLIAN SCHWEDLER
UPDATED BY ROBERT D. BURROWES

ISLAH TALEBAN PARTY

A conservative political party in Iran that supported Reza Khan's coming to power as shah and helped support his policies.

An heir to the Moderate Party (or *Firqeh-ye Iʿtidal*), a conservative party that supported the aristocracy and the traditional middle class, the Islah Taleban (Reformers) Party was established in 1910. Like its predecessor, the Islah Taleban was a conservative party led by prominent clerics, merchants, and landed aristocracy. The party was instrumental in paving the way for Reza Khan's assumption of power as the king of Iran. Almost unanimously, the party supported a bill introduced by the Revival Party that deposed the Qajar dynasty and proclaimed Reza Pahlavi the king (shah) of Iran. With three other political parties, the Reformers formed the alliance system that Reza Shah used for implementing his policies. The leading members of the party were instrumental in passing a new law in the parliament calling for universal adult male suffrage. But in the semifeudal conditions of the country in the early twentieth century, this law extending the vote to the uneducated rural masses helped only to strengthen the elite. The famous Iranian poet Mohammad Taqi Bahar wrote of the law in 1944 that "it continues to plague the country even today."

See also Bahar, Mohammad Taqi; Pahlavi, Reza; Qajar Dynasty.

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Parvaneh Pourshariati

ISLAM

A strictly monotheistic faith, Islam is the religion of more than 1.2 billion people, or a fifth of the world population. Muslims can be found mostly in Western and Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Only about 350 million live in the Arab world.

Pre-Islamic Arabia and the Rise of Islam

Islam appeared in the seventh century at a time of social and religious decay in the Arabian Peninsula. Arabian society was essentially tribal and the supremacy of tribal law encouraged warfare, raiding, and vendettas. Usurious economic practices led to the impoverishment and enslavement of a number of weaker tribes, and social ills such as alcoholism and prostitution were rampant. Associationism (or *shirk,* as the pre-Islamic religious tradition was referred to at the time) was the main faith, and it acknowledged a number of intercessory gods associated with the Creator, Allah. The representations of these gods were housed in an important shrine (the Kaʿba) in Mecca and attracted most Arabian tribes at the time of the annual pilgrimage (hajj). But Associationism was losing its appeal, as can be seen from the spread of Judaism, Christianity, and especially Hanifism, a local monotheism that took Abraham as its central figure and maintained a simple ethical doctrine and the inevitability of a Day of Judgment.

Islam arose claiming to be the embodiment of Hanifism and the continuation of earlier monotheistic traditions. Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam, started preaching in Mecca in 611 C.E. and quickly gained a strong following. Worried that it might lose its profitable control over the pilgrimage, the leadership of Mecca launched a merciless war on the new faith, forcing the Prophet to seek refuge in 622 C.E. in a neighboring town, Medina, in an event known as *hijra* (migration) that marks the beginning of the lunar calendar of Islam. Having prohibited alcohol, gambling, prostitution, raiding, and usury, and prescribed *zakah* (alms-tax) to restore economic equality, replaced the tribal bond with the bond of faith, and instituted Islamic law as the sole reference in settling disputes, Islam spread rapidly throughout Arabia, despite the continuing hostility of Mecca. But since half of Mecca's population had already converted to the new faith, the surrender of the city was only a matter of time, and when the Prophet died in 632 C.E., most of Arabia was Muslim.

Under the first four *rashidun* (rightly guided) caliphs, the Islamic state spread quickly in the Near East, where it was welcomed by a local Semitic and Arab population that was only too pleased to be rid of the ethnically foreign and abusive rule of the Byzantines, as well as in Persia, where the Sassanid Empire had already started to crumble. Later, the Umayyad dynasty (661–750), which followed the *rashidun* caliphs, spread the frontiers of the new empire from Spain to India.

Theology and Beliefs

Tawhid, the concept of the absolute unity and transcendence of God, forms the cornerstone of Islamic theology as expressed in the Qurʾan, the holy book of Islam, which the Muslims believe to be the verbatim word of God, revealed to the Prophet in successive revelations over the span of his prophetic career. *Tawhid* forms the content of the *shahada* (literally, "witnessing," the profession of faith that states that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is His messenger) which therefore constitutes the only requirement for conversion to Islam. The *shahada* and the four main rituals compulsory on the faithful (worshipping *salah* five times a day, fasting from dawn to sunset through the month of Ramadan, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca once in a lifetime, and paying the *zakah,* or alms-tax, annually) eventually became known as the five pillars of Islam.

Young Egyptian Sunni Muslims attend class in a school affiliated with the famed Islamic al-Azhar University. In the Shubra suburb of Cairo alone, there are thirteen such schools that instruct pupils between the ages of ten and eighteen. Students of al-Azhar are taught a traditional school curriculum focused primarily on Islamic subjects. © AFP/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

The Qurʾan represents God as an omnipotent, all-powerful Creator, Master of the Day of Judgment. All of creation is created to worship God; humanity, which received lordship over creation when it accepted God's vice-regency *(khilafa)* on earth, is to account on the Day of Judgment for "what [they] did with the boon of life" (Qurʾan 102:8). All human beings are under the same obligation to obey the divine law ("Noblest among you is the most righteous" Qurʾan 49:13), and this equality is further expressed in the universality of the messages that God sends to His creatures throughout time and place, starting with Adam and concluding with Muhammad ("There is not one community wherein a warner has not been sent" Qurʾan 35:24). Other religions are therefore considered to be based on divine revelations that had been somewhat altered by oral transmission over time, but their followers (the People of the Book) can be ensured reward in paradise given belief in God and good deeds: "The Muslims, the Sabeans, the Christians, the Jews, anyone who believes in God . . . and does good deeds shall find their reward with God and will not come to fear or grief" (Qurʾan 2:62). Although the Qurʾan only mentions Semitic prophets (including Jesus, whom it celebrates as a human messenger of God, and local Arabian prophets), the designation of "the People of the Book" was later extended by the Muslims to all other main religious traditions they encountered, on the basis of the Qurʾanic affirmation of the universality of prophecy. Muslims and followers of other traditions are exhorted to cooperate in establishing a moral society and prohibiting evil and mischief.

Ethics

The Qurʾan exhibits a firmly actionalist system of ethics based on individual responsibility in the realization of the optimal social, economic, and political structure of the *umma,* the universal community of believers. Mutual consultation *(shura)* for the ideal political system, just and fair business practices in the economic system, and financial and moral responsibility to one's extended family members in the social system are to be supplemented by various safety nets for the more vulnerable segments of society, such as *zakah* (poor-tax) and *mahr* (the inalien-



The Haram or Great Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Mecca is the birthplace of the prophet Muhammad and the most sacred of the Muslim holy cities. Pilgrimage to Mecca is one of the five pillars of Islam, and more than one million Muslims make the journey, or hajj, every year. © AFP/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

able dowry due the bride). Though no self-denial is advocated, the individual is urged to exercise restraint over his and her natural appetites and to show *rahma* (compassion, forgiveness) in all dealings with one's fellow human beings. Pride and greed are especially condemned, as they lead to injustice to others and hence to oneself *(zulm al-nafs),* ultimately leading to the path of self-destruction. There is no concept of sinful nature, but recurrent sin leads to the hardening of the soul and the eventual silencing of one's conscience. The partial rewards and opportunities provided in this life are considered to be just as much a test to the individual as the difficulties and hardships, and one is exhorted to exercise *sabr* (steadfastness) in the face of life's challenges.

The difficulty of the task is acknowledged by the Qurʾan, which expresses faith in humanity's ultimate success in carrying out God's trusteeship. The individual is urged to remain focused on his or her relationship with God and to never fail to seek Him, for He "hears the prayers of everyone who calls on Him" (Qurʾan 2:186). This intensely personal and spiritual relationship, which the Qurʾan tries to integrate in the individual's life through the five daily prayers, also expresses the human need for the presence and support of one's Creator and Sustainer, for only "with the remembrance of God do human hearts find peace and come to rest" (Qurʾan 13:30). Thus the Qurʾan postulates a direct and intimate relationship between the individual and God (hence the absence of clergy in Islam) and God is said to be closer to His creatures than their jugular vein.

Paradise and Hell are in the Qurʾanic view the consummation of the individual's life on earth. What is to come is therefore not "another world," but the response to what one has done in this life. This world is to be recreated in a different form at

The Shrine of Hazrat Imam Ali stands in the Iraqi holy city of Najaf. Hazrat Ali, the first imam and a close companion of the prophet Muhammad, was assassinated with a poisoned sword while at prayer and buried in Najaf. © Shepard Sherbell/Corbis Saba. Reproduced by permission.

the end of its time span, ushering in the Day of Judgment that will inaugurate punishment and reward; these are set along an absolute scale of justice tempered only by God's infinite mercy, which is assured to all those who genuinely seek it.

Political and Cultural Developments

Islam as a faith spread first in the Near East and Egypt, where in the first few centuries Arab Islamic civilization flourished. The caliphate split after the Abbassid takeover of the Near East and Egypt, while Spain remained under Umayyad rule until 1492. The Abbassid dynasty ruled until 1258, though in the latter part of their rule only nominal allegiance was given to the caliphs in Baghdad by the amirs and sultans who, in effect, governed the various provinces of the empire and fought each other over territory. The internecine war, partly caused by Sunni-Shiʿite conflict, allowed the invading Crusaders (eleventh through thirteenth centuries) to establish a state in Palestine. It was not until Salah al-Din (Saladin, d. 1193) that Egypt and the Near East were united under Sunni rule, which in turn helped to defeat the Crusaders and later to repulse the Mongols who had sacked Baghdad in 1258. But as the Arab world fell into decline, the Sunni Ottoman Turks swept through Byzantium and extended their rule over the Near East and most of North Africa, ushering in Ottoman Islamic civilization. In the East, the Shiʿite Safavid dynasty took over Iran at the end of the sixteenth century, helping to spread a highly sophisticated Persian culture throughout Central Asia and into Northern India, where a brilliant Indian Islamic civilization climaxed under the Great Moghuls between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.

During this period Islamic arts, science, and technology flourished throughout the Muslim world, with contributions in astronomy (al-Biruni, d. 1048; Ibn al-Shatir, d. 1375), algebra and trigonometry (al-Khawarizmi, d. 850; Umar al-Khayyam, d. 1131;

Sharaf al-Din al-Tusi, d. 1213), physics and chemistry (Ibn Hayyan, d. 815; Ibn al-Haytham, d. 1250), and biology and medicine (Abu Bakr al-Razi, d. 925; Ibn Sina, d. 1037, also known as Avicenna, whose *Canon of Medicine* remained the definitive reference book in the field until the seventeenth century in both East and West.)

Islamic Law

The emphasis on submitting to the divine will (the literal meaning of *Islam*) and fulfilling the main Qurʾanic injunction, "to enjoin the good and prohibit evil" led to the rapid development of Islamic law *(fiqh)*. In terms of legal sources, the Qurʾan was the first and absolute reference; and since it had mandated obedience to the Prophet, his *sunna* (example), which was provided in the reports of his sayings and deeds, naturally came second. Much of the law, however, had to be inferred, and the jurists turned to their own intellectual effort *(ijtihad)* expressed in the methodology of *qiyas* ("analogical reasoning," that is, finding a *ratio legis* parallel to one already identified in the Qurʾan or *sunna*). Such individual opinions, however, did not become binding until they submitted to *ijma,* or consensus of the schools of law, though all parties acknowledged to the others the right to dissent *(ikhtilaf).* Eventually, the schools of law coalesced into four main schools. The processes by which laws may be derived became the subject of an extensive and separate discipline, *usul al-fiqh* (literally, the principles of *fiqh*). Islamic law developed rapidly into an extensive field in the first few centuries of Muslim history, but innovation subsided considerably as a result of the reliance on precedents and past consensus.

Religious Schisms

The most important schism in the Muslim community occurred over a political split in the early community. After the Prophet's death, most Muslims supported the election of Abu Bakr and later of Umar ibn al-Khattab, the Prophet's closest companions. However, a small number known as the Shiʿat Ali (the party of Ali), insisted on keeping the caliphate within the Prophet's family and championed his cousin Ali. Eventually, the Shiʿa became a religious movement, basing their position on the claim that God would not leave His community without guidance, and justifying it through prophetic sayings and esoteric interpretation of the Qurʾan. The belief in the authority of the imams (the leaders who were entitled to rule) was made part of the Islamic creed and gave rise to a clerical structure in Shiʿite Islam. In all other matters of *fiqh* and dogma, the Shiʿa are similar to the Sunnis, though this applies only to the Ithnaʿashariyya ("Twelvers," who believe in a line of twelve imams), and the Zaydis (who recognize only five imams) and not to the other groups (the Ismaʿilis, the Alawis, the Druze, etc.) that split from them and whose beliefs ran contrary to the doctrines of *tawhid* and the finality of Muhammad's prophecy. Thus the main difference between the Sunnis and the Shiʿa lies more in the political issue of the community leadership (with the beliefs and practices that the latter entails) than in doctrinal difference of dogma.

Philosophical Developments

The philosophical developments in the Muslim world expressed the tension between the Islamic (Semitic) worldview and the Hellenistic heritage, which to some extent had become part of the Near East's cultural makeup. At one end stood the heirs of Hellenistic thought (called *falasifa*) such as al- Kindi (d. 870), al-Farabi (d. 950), and Ibn Rushd (d. 1198, also known as Averroes) who used Greek logic and incorporated into their works Greek notions such as the eternity of the world, the distinction between essence and existence, and Hellenistic angelology.

At the other end stood the traditionists, staunch defenders of Islamic dogma and method, generally represented by the Hanbalis. Their greatest proponent was Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), who delivered devastating blows to the Greek logic used by the *falasifa* in his *al-Radd ala al-Mantiqiyyin.* In between the two groups were two theological Kalam schools; the earlier one, known as the Muʿtazila, was closer to the philosophers and upheld the independence of reason from revelation, the necessity for God to abide by justice, and the creation of the Qurʾan; such views prompted the rise of the later school, the Ashʿariyya, which restored the pre-eminence of revelation, the absolute omnipotence of God, and the uncreated nature of the word of God (making use of a somewhat revised Greek logic). Their greatest representative was Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali (d. 1111), who used his incisive analysis of causality to undermine the philosophers.

Mysticism

Mystical thought, which had a basis in the spiritual worldview of the Qurʾan and the simple and intense piety of early Muslims, became more formalized through the gradual absorption of Hellenistic, Persian, and Indian thought, and became known as Sufism. The main architect of the Sufi theosophy was Ibn Arabi (d. 1240). Sufi poetical expression of the divine love, articulated by Rabiʿa al-Adawiyya (d. 801) and Jalal al-Din al-Rumi (d. 1273), became very popular throughout the Muslim world. But its foreign elements led to opposition by the orthodox jurists and theologians, especially those whose strictly legalistic and ritualistic interpretation of the faith found no place for spiritual expression. Ironically, their opposition encouraged the spread of Sufism as a reaction to their impoverished representation of the personal relationship to God—as did the increase in worldliness and materialism spreading in the Muslim world as the empire expanded. However, most great theologians and jurists (e.g., al-Ghazzali, who silenced the critics of Sufism; Ibn Taymiyya; Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab) defended and indeed practiced the Sufi way, though all of them condemned in strong terms the philosophical expression of Sufism, which advocated a form of pantheism (*wahdat al-wujud,* the unity of being) and extreme asceticism. But Sufism spread widely, and the *tariqas* (Sufi orders, such as the Qadiriyya in the Near East, the Mawlawiyya (Mev levis and the Naqshbandiyya in Central Asia and Turkey, and the Shadhiliyya in North Africa) were the main impetus behind the spread of Islam in Africa and East Asia.

Reform Movements

The insistence on the importance of spiritualism over and above the law led on one hand to asceticism and withdrawal but also, on the other, to libertarianism, a trend that was accentuated in popular religion by the belief in miracles, superstition, and cultic practices into which the veneration of Sufi saints had slowly degenerated. In North Africa and India, the Sufi movements had also absorbed the cultural and religious heritage of their new converts, a syncretism that included at times non-Islamic beliefs and practices. Meanwhile, the law had become more and more reified as the need for innovation subsided and *taqlid* (imitation or reliance on past tradition) became the norm. The jurists' inability to respond to new needs became a problem as new challenges arose with the industrialization of Europe, which forced the Ottomans to adopt Western laws and institutions. All these problems set the stage for the reform movements of the eighteenth century.

The reform movements rejected consensus as a source of law as it had become a hindrance to change, and they advocated *ijtihad* instead. At the same time, they emphasized a strict interpretation of *tawhid* and repudiated the syncretic beliefs adopted by the Sufi movements as well as the morally lax social practices and the popular beliefs in magic, superstition, and saints' intercession. Building on the philosophical and political thought of Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) started in Arabia the reform movement of Wahhabism, which then spread in the Near East as the Salafiyya movement. At same time, separate but similar movements spread in Africa under the leadership of Ibn Idris (d.1837) and al-Sanusi order (d. 1859), and in India under Sirhindi (d. 1624). These were Sufi masters who criticized the former excesses of the Sufi movements and used the *tariqas* to restore orthodoxy of belief and practice and to purge the movements of syncretic accretions.

However, the colonial ambitions of the European powers quickly changed the Muslim scene from one of reform to one of confrontation with a greater power that soon overcame most of the Muslim world and won from the ailing Ottoman Empire significant concessions. Instead of internal social change, the reform movements turned to armed resistance, and instead of focusing on doctrinal purity and legal tools, the new discourse centered on the necessity of resisting the West and on apologetics for Islam, for the defeat of the Muslims was contemptuously blamed by Western Orientalists on the backwardness and inferiority of Islam.

Islamic Modernist Movements

Islamic modern thought is considered to start with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), a man with encyclopedic knowledge of both Western and Eastern disciplines who traveled throughout the Muslim world in hope of uniting it in the fight against Western colonization. He advocated reform of education

and law and was followed in Egypt by one of his most famous students, Muhammad Abduh (d.1905), a jurist who became the head of the famed al-Azhar *fiqh* university. But few practical solutions were offered, and the problem was compounded by the call by some of his students like Rashid Rida (d. 1935) for compromise with Western institutions, such as interest and the creation of national entities separate from the Islamic Ottoman rule. In India, Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) called for a return to the original ethos of Islam and the establishment of the independent state of Pakistan, while Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) called for more drastic changes in Islamic thought and cooperation with the British colonial power. The compromises advocated by some led then to an attitude of general rejection of change on the part of most jurists and theologians, and although all had agreed on the necessity of reforming law and education and of adopting Western advances in science and technology, the discourse remained general and did not offer specific and coherent suggestions. In effect, the colonial powers, which by now had also taken over the Near East after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, had imposed their legal, political, and educational systems on their colonies. After independence, the local governments maintained the Western institutions they had inherited, leading to the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and giving rise, throughout the Muslim world, to opposition movements (such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, the Jamiʿat-e Islami in Pakistan, the Front Islamique du Salut in Algeria and the Rafah Party in Turkey) that called for the restoration of Islamic law and fought the adoption by Muslim elites of the Western ideologies of secularism, socialism, and nationalism. These ideological conflicts, which have led to tensions or all-out civil war in many countries, are exacerbated by the policies of autocratic regimes that do not tolerate opposition or democratic rule and by Western intervention (directly or in support of such regimes) to preserve Western interests in oil and to protect Israel. These interventions have become the focus of Muslim resentment and radicalism throughout the Muslim world.

See also Abduh, Muhammad; Afghani, Jamal al-Din al-; Alawi; Allah; Azhar, al-; Druze; Front Islamique du Salut (FIS); Hadith; Iqbal, Muhammad; Iranian Revolution (1979); Ismaʿili Shiʿism; Jamiʿat-e Islami; Kaʿba; Mecca; Medina; Muhammad; Muslim Brotherhood; Naqshbandi; Qadiriyya Order; Qurʾan; Rida, Rashid; Salafiyya Movement; Shiʿism; Sufism and the Sufi Orders; Sunni Islam; Zaydism.

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Tayeb El-Hibri
Updated by Maysam J. al Faruqi

ISLAMIC ACTION FRONT

Jordanian Islamist political party.

Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami (Islamic Action Front, IAF) grew out of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood. The two overlap in membership and outlook but are not synonymous. The IAF has maintained a strategy of loyal opposition, emphasizing reformist rather than militant tactics, and is by far the largest and best-organized political party in the kingdom.

The Muslim Brotherhood operated with tacit state approval for decades but was technically registered as a charity. After Jordan's political liberalization process began in 1989, the Brotherhood was the best-organized movement in the country. Its candidates won twenty-two out of a total of eighty

seats in the new parliament, with twelve more going to independent Islamists. The IAF was founded in 1992, immediately following the legalization of political parties in Jordan for the first time since the 1950s.

The IAF is known for its regressive social views regarding the rights of women but is also active in charitable work for the poor. The party has been a vocal opponent of U.S. policy in the region, especially regarding Palestine and Iraq, and opposed the Jordanian peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Following the treaty, the IAF organized an ongoing campaign to prevent normalization of relations with Israel at any level.

The IAF has developed increasing levels of support among the lower classes and especially among urban Palestinians of various classes. Hence the IAF sees its electoral strengths in urban, Palestinian-majority communities such as Irbid, al-Zarqa, and most districts of Amman. Yet Jordan's electoral laws favor rural areas and traditional sources of support for Jordan's ruling Hashimite family. To the surprise of the regime, however, Islamists dominated the 1989 elections and Islamist leader Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat even served as the elected speaker of the parliament from 1990 to 1993.

Before the 1993 elections, changes in the elections laws and the unpopular performances of Islamist leaders as cabinet ministers led to a decrease in IAF electoral success. The IAF took sixteen seats and six more went to independent Islamists. IAF secretary general Ishaq Farhan did manage to keep his parliamentary seat, but Arabiyyat lost his reelection bid. In recognition of his importance and influence in the Islamist movement, however, the king appointed Arabiyyat to the upper house of parliament.

The IAF and most opposition parties, from the secular left through the religious right, demanded a revision of the electoral law. When no changes were made, the IAF led a coalition of eleven opposition parties from across the political spectrum in an electoral boycott. As a result, no IAF members were seated in the 1997–2001 parliament, but six independent Islamists did secure seats, including former IAF members Abdullah Akayla and Bassam Ammush. Since IAF figures had been successful within Jordan's professional associations, winning key leadership posts, these associations took the lead, in the absence of the IAF from the 1997–2001 parliament, in maintaining IAF activism on such issues as the antinormalization campaign.

The IAF returned to full electoral participation in 2003, despite a new electoral law that increased the number of deputies to 110 (including a minimum of six seats for women) and maintained uneven electoral districts. The party negotiated its participation with the palace, fielding only thirty candidates. Secretary General Hamza Mansur and Shura Council president Arabiyyat (president of the party's Shura or consultative council) decided not to run themselves, and also excluded controversial IAF figures such as Abd al-Munʿim Abu Zant. Abu Zant, who shortly thereafter won a seat as an independent, was expelled from the IAF for running anyway. The party gained eighteen seats in the election, including one for Haya al-Musaymi, the only woman candidate in the IAF, who won the largest vote of any woman candidate. An additional six seats went to independent Islamists, many of whom, like Abu Zant, were former IAF members. Having returned to parliament, and with a solid base in the professional associations, the IAF pursued its agenda: abrogating the 1994 peace treaty; preventing normalization of relations with Israel; supporting Palestinian aspirations; countering U.S. dominance in the region; and establishing *shariʿa* and more traditional roles for men and women in Jordanian society.

See also Amman; Hashimite House (House of Hashim); Irbid; Muslim Brotherhood; *Shariʿa*.

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Curtis R. Ryan

ISLAMIC CONGRESSES

Muslims, either of a certain faction or in general, convening to promote solidarity and interaction among Muslim peoples and states.

Although the concept of Muslim solidarity is intrinsic to the faith of Islam, it took no organized form until modern times. In the course of the twentieth century, Islamic congresses have emerged as the structured expression of that concept. Some of these congresses have evolved into international Islamic organizations that promote political, economic, and cultural interaction among Muslim peoples and states.

The idea of Muslims convening in congresses first gained currency in the late nineteenth century, in the Ottoman Empire. The advent of easy and regular steamer transport accelerated the exchange of ideas among Muslims and made possible the periodic assembling of representatives. The idea also appealed to Muslim reformists, who sought a forum to promote and sanction the internal reform of Islam. Such an assembly, they believed, would strengthen the ability of Muslims to resist the encroachments of Western imperialism.

A number of émigré intellectuals in Cairo first popularized the idea in the Muslim world. In 1900, one of them, the Syrian Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, published an influential book entitled *Umm al-Qura* (that is, Mecca), which purported to be the secret protocol of an Islamic congress convened in Mecca during the pilgrimage of 1899. The fictional congress culminated in a call for a restored Arab caliphate, an idea then in vogue in reformist circles. Support for such a congress also became a staple of the reformist journal *al-Manar,* published in Cairo by Rashid Rida. The Crimean Tatar reformist Ismail Bey Gaspirali (in Russian, Gasprinski) launched the first concrete initiative in Cairo in 1907, when he unsuccessfully worked to convene a general Islamic congress.

Al-Kawakibi's book, Rida's appeals, and Gaspirali's initiative all excited the suspicion of Ottoman authorities. The Ottoman Turks believed that a well-attended Islamic congress would fatally undermine the religious authority claimed by the theocratic Ottoman sultan-caliph and, in particular, it feared the possible transformation of any such congress into an electoral college for choosing an Arab caliph. Steadfast Ottoman opposition thwarted all the early initiatives of the reformers.

With the final dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, some Muslim leaders and activists moved to convene general Islamic congresses. In each instance, they sought to mark their causes or their ambitions with the stamp of Islamic consensus. In 1919, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk convened an Islamic congress in Anatolia to mobilize pan-Islamic support for his military campaigns. During the *hajj* (pilgrimage) season of 1924, Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of the Hijaz summoned a pilgrimage congress in Mecca to support his claim to the caliphate—a maneuver that failed to stall the relentless advance of Ibn Saʿud (Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud). Following Ibn Saʿud's occupation of Mecca, he convened his own world congress during the pilgrimage season of 1926. The leading clerics of al-Azhar in Cairo convened a caliphate congress there in 1926 to consider the effects of the abolition of the caliphate by Turkey two years earlier. The congress was supported by King Fuʾad, who reputedly coveted the title of caliph, but no decision issued from the gathering. In 1931, Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, the mufti of Jerusalem, convened a general congress of Muslims in Jerusalem to secure pan-Islamic support for the Arab struggle against the British mandate and Zionism. In 1935, pan-Islamic activist Shakib Arslan convened a congress of Europe's Muslims in Geneva to carry the protest against imperialism and colonialism to the heart of Europe. Each of these congresses resolved to create a permanent organization and convene additional congresses, but all such efforts were foiled by internal rivalries and the intervention of the European powers.

As more and more countries in the Middle East achieved political independence following World War II, Muslim leaders increasingly offered new plans for the creation of a permanent organization of Muslim states. After the partition of India, Pakistan took a number of initiatives in the late 1940s and early 1950s but soon encountered stiff opposition from Egypt, which gave primacy of place to pan-Arabism and the Arab League. When Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser transformed pan-Arabism into a revolutionary doctrine, Saudi Arabia sought to counter him by promoting a rival pan-Islamism, as-

sembling congresses of Muslim activists and *ulama* (Islamic clergy) from abroad. In 1962, the Saudi government sponsored the establishment of the Mecca-based Muslim World League, which built a worldwide network of Muslim clients. Beginning in 1964, Egypt responded by organizing large congresses of Egyptian and foreign *ulama* under the auspices of al-Azhar's Academy of Islamic Research in Cairo. These rival bodies then convened a succession of dueling congresses in Mecca and Cairo, each claiming the sole prerogative of defining Islam. In 1965 and 1966, Saudi Arabia's new king, Faisal (son of Ibn Saʿud), launched a campaign for an Islamic summit conference that would have balanced the Arab summits dominated by President Nasser, however, had sufficient influence to thwart the initiative, which he denounced as a foreign-inspired Islamic pact, designed to defend the interests of Western imperialism.

Israel's 1967 devastating pre-emptive attack on Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, along with its annexation of Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai, eroded faith in the brand of Arabism championed by Nasser, inspiring a return to Islam. This set the scene for a renewed Saudi initiative. In September 1969, following an arsonist's attack against the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, Muslim heads of state set aside their differences and met in Rabat, Morocco, in the first Islamic summit conference. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia took this opportunity to press for the creation of a permanent organization of Muslim states. The effort succeeded, and, in May 1971, the participating states established the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC; *Munazzamat al-muʾtamar al-Islami*). The new organization, headquartered in Jidda, Saudi Arabia (pending the liberation of Jerusalem), adopted its charter in March 1972.

The OIC eventually earned a place of some prominence in regional diplomacy, principally through the organization of triennial Islamic summit conferences and annual conferences of the foreign ministers of member states. The OIC's activities fell into three broad categories. First, it sought to promote solidarity with Muslim states and peoples that were locked in conflict with non-Muslims. Most of its efforts were devoted to the cause of establishing a state of Palestine and recapturing Jerusalem. Nonetheless, it supported the movement



Abdullah O. Nasseef, the Saudi Arabian president of the World Muslim Congress. An international, nongovernmental organization, the Congress was established in 1926 and is based in Karachi, Pakistan. The organization's motto is "Verily, all Muslims are brethren," and its members strive towards unity between Muslim nations and world peace on the basis of justice. **© AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.**

of Muslims from Eritrea—incorporated into Ethiopia in 1962—to the Philippines. Second, the organization offered mediation in disputes and wars among its own members, although its effectiveness was greatly limited by the lack of any force for truce supervision or peacekeeping. Lastly, the OIC sponsored an array of subsidiary and affiliated institutions to promote political, economic, and cultural cooperation among its members. The most influential of these institutions was the Islamic Development Bank, established in December 1973 and formally opened in October 1975. The bank, funded by the wealthier OIC states, financed development projects while adhering to Islamic banking practices.

The OIC represents an ingenious attempt by various Arab governments to organize Muslim states. But it has not put an end to instances of individual states to summoning international congresses of *ulama,* activists, and intellectuals. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, realigned on the conservative end of the Islamic spectrum, have cooperated increasingly in mounting large-scale Islamic congresses. Their rivals—Iran, Libya, and Iraq—have done the same. Divisive events, such as the war between Iran

and Iraq (1980–1988), the lethal attack upon several hundred Iranians in Mecca during the pilgrimage season of 1987, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, produced congresses and countercongresses, each claiming to express the verdict of a united Islam. Leaders of Muslim opposition movements have also met in periodic congresses, sometimes in Europe. Less than a century after al-Kawakibi's book, a crowded calendar of congresses now bind Muslim states together more than ever before. On the whole, to the extent that healthy and heated discussion of alternatives between friends is salutary, such efforts—however confusing to the outsider—appear most salutary and indicative of a new political awareness among Muslim states and their peoples.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Arab League; Arslan, Shakib; Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Azhar, al-; Gaspirali, Ismail Bey; Husayn ibn Ali; Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-; Muslim World League; Organization of the Islamic Conference; Pan-Arabism; Rida, Rashid.

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Updated by Charles E. Butterworth

ISLAMIC COUNTRIES WOMEN SPORT SOLIDARITY GAMES (1992 AND 1997)

International sporting event for women from Islamic countries.

The Islamic Countries Women Sport Solidarity Games, reserved for women from Islamic countries, were held in 1992 and 1997 in Tehran, Iran. Athletes from eleven countries participated in 1992 and from sixteen countries in 1997. Women competed in events including badminton, basketball, volleyball, swimming, archery, and handball. Kyrgyzstan won in 1992; Iran won in 1997. The games had two aims: to provide a venue for Islamic women to participate in sports in an international arena while remaining faithful to Islamic dress codes; and to strengthen solidarity between Islamic countries and express cultural unity.

Principally sponsored and organized by the Islamic Women Sport Solidarity Council, which was headed by Faezeh Hashemi, former parliamentarian and editor of the journal *Zanan* (Women), the games were also internationally sponsored by the IOC, reinforcing Islamic cultural unity.

The games aroused interest both nationally and internationally due to the focus on women and the idea of an Islamic alternative to international sporting events. The 1992 event marked the first time an Iranian woman participated in an international sporting event. The games were particularly controversial in 1997 because they coincided with the football World Cup qualifier match between Iran and Australia in Tehran, which Iranian women attended in defiance of government orders. The third Islamic Countries Women Sport Solidarity Games were scheduled for December 2004.

See also Hashemi, Faezeh.

Cherie Taraghi

ISLAMIC JIHAD

Palestinian Islamic fundamentalist resistance movement.

Islamic Jihad emerged from the Islamic revivalist tradition of the association of Muslim Brotherhood in Israeli-occupied Gaza and was formed by Palestinians studying in Egypt. Rather than pursue the Brotherhood's policy of the gradual Islamization of Palestinian society as the basis for future liberation from Israeli occupation, certain militants in the late 1970s began arguing for a more active, armed, Islamic response to the occupation much as secular groups associated with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had undertaken. Sources of inspiration included such militant historical figures as Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam in Palestine and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, as well as the revolutionary movements spawned by Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj in Egypt (the Jihad Organization) and the Ay-

atollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran. What tied these traditions together was their belief in active struggle (jihad) in the service of Islam as opposed to mere preaching.

It is believed that Islamic Jihad emerged as an actual organization in 1980. Two early leaders were Abd al-Aziz Awda, deported by Israeli authorities in November 1987, and his successor, Fathi Abd al-Aziz Shiqaqi, himself deported in August 1988. Shiqaqi operated in Lebanon thereafter until his assassination in Malta in October 1995. Jihad's new head became Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, who moved to Damascus in the mid-1990s. The group has always maintained close relations with Iran. One of Islamic Jihad's first dramatic acts against the Israeli occupation was an attack on a group of soldiers in Jerusalem in October 1986, followed by a series of well-planned attacks on Israeli targets in late 1987. These helped to precipitate the Palestinian uprising, known as the Infidada, against Israeli rule in the occupied territories, which erupted in December 1987. Islamic Jihad has operated as a small, clandestine group of militants who seek the total liberation of all of Palestine through armed struggle rather than a mass-based organization like the Muslim Brotherhood or HAMAS. Its activities were severely hampered by Israeli repression during the Intifada. Jihad operated alongside but separate from the PLO's Unified National Command of the Uprising during the Intifada. Jihad activists were among the 418 Palestinians from the territories deported by Israel in December 1992.

Jihad opposed the Israeli–Palestinian peace talks, which began in 1991, as well as the subsequent 1993 Oslo Accord. In 1992 it joined the "Damascus Ten," a grouping of Palestinian organizations opposed to the peace talks, which changed its name to the National Democratic and Islamic Front in 1993. Jihad continued to attack Israeli targets even after establishment of a Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza and the West Bank in 1994, promoting considerable friction between it and the PA leadership. Jihad figures were arrested; Abdullah al-Shami, the group's spokesman and spiritual leader in Gaza, was arrested by the PA on six different occasions for Friday sermons that criticized the PA and its president, Yasir Arafat. Eschewing any compromise with Israel, Jihad activists have resorted to suicide bombings against Israelis during the 1990s.

Jihad and HAMAS were rivals until the al-Aqsa Intifada tended to bring them together in their activities. Jihad also has undergone some internal problems. Abd al-Aziz Awda eventually left Jihad and returned to the PA from his Israel-imposed exile with Arafat's approval. In 2003 al-Shami was pushed out of his positions and quit the movement as well.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; HAMAS; Intifada (1987–1991); Muslim Brotherhood; Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

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Michael R. Fischbach

ISLAMIC SALVATION ARMY (AIS)

Armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Front, which fought the Algerian regime from 1994 until its disbanding in October 1997.

The Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), or Armée islamique du salut, was founded in Algeria on 18 July 1994 as the "fighting wing" of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Madani Mezrag, who eventually became the national amir (commander) of the organization, and Ahmed Benaïcha (future commander of the western region), were among its founders. The AIS wished to distance itself from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which had emerged in 1993 to fight the regime and anyone opposed to the Islamist movement; at the same time, the AIS was fearful of the marginalization of the FIS because many FIS members—including Abderrezak Redjam, Mohamed Saïd, Saïd Makhloufi, and the political refugee Anouar Haddam (all Jazʾarists, the so-called Algerianists as opposed to the *salafists*)— had joined the GIA in May 1994. In their communiqué announcing the creation of the AIS, Mezrag and Benaïcha advocated "recourse to jihad, in the path of God, as a means of establishing an Islamic state in Algeria, prelude to the establishment of the Caliphate." The AIS proclaimed allegiance to imprisoned FIS leaders Abassi al-Madani and Ali Benhadj.



FIGURE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Unlike the GIA, the AIS conducted, unsuccessfully, classic guerrilla warfare modeled on that which the National Liberation Army (ALN) fought against colonial France from 1954 to 1962. The AIS tried, in vain, to control major portions of the territory, but did garner some support in rural areas. As early as 1995, the AIS sought to negotiate a political solution with the regime. Unlike the GIA, which used horrific methods against its opponents, the AIS, despite recurring alliances with the GIA, advertised its opposition to bombings and indiscriminate massacres of civilians. Its forces were allegedly fighting security forces, not civilians. In 1995 and 1996 the AIS fought gruesome wars against GIA forces. Those wars, which had repercussions on the families of AIS fighters, worked to the advantage of the regime. Negotiations between the Algerian military and the AIS resulted in a unilateral truce proclaimed by Mezrag on 1 October 1997. Thousands of AIS fighters surrendered and handed over their weapons to the authorities. In January 2000 those fighters obtained amnesty under the terms of the "Civil Concord" decreed by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika after his election in April 1999. Both Mezrag and Benaïcha offered their services to the authorities to fight the GIA and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which has links to al-Qaʿida.

See also FRONT ISLAMIQUE DU SALUT; QAʿIDA, AL-.

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YAHIA ZOUBIR

ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT

See FRONT ISLAMIQUE DU SALUT

ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY OF MEDINA

Institute of religious higher education in Saudi Arabia.

Medina has been a center of religious education in the Islamic world for hundreds of years. The Islamic

University of Medina was founded in 1961, according to Saudi sources, to spread the teachings of Islam in the world; by 1995 it had 3,058 students and 378 staff. About 80 percent of the students are Saudis, and the remainder foreigners. Tuition is paid by the government, and applicants must be Muslims of "good moral character" and be able to read the Qurʾan. The university has faculties in *shariʿa* (Islamic law), Qurʾan, *daʿwa* (proselytizing), *hadith* (traditions of the prophet Muhammad), and Arabic. Because the university reflects the influence of the country's powerful and conservative religious establishment, its mission and curriculum reflect the same restrictive view of Islam.

See also MEDINA.

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ANTHONY B. TOTH

ISMAʿIL, ABD AL-FATTAH

[?–1986]

Yemeni government official.

From North Yemen, Abd al-Fattah Ismaʿil emigrated to Aden for work as a young man. He became coruler of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) with his rival Salim Rabiyya Ali from mid-1969 to mid-1978. Ismaʿil served during this period as head of the regime's evolving political machine. He was an insistent, dogmatic proponent of "scientific socialism" and is regarded as the father of what became a well-developed ruling party, the Yemeni Socialist Party. He ousted Rabiyya Ali in 1978 and led the PDRY until his own ouster in 1980. He returned from his Moscow exile in 1984, only to die in Aden in the intraparty blood bath of January 1986.

See also PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN; RABIYYA ALI, SALIM; YEMENI SOCIALIST PARTY.

ROBERT D. BURROWES

ISMAʿIL IBN IBRAHIM

[1830–1895]

Modernizing viceroy of Egypt, reigning from 1863 until his deposition in July 1879.

Ismaʿil ibn Ibrahim (1830–1895), pictured with his son, Tewfik, assumed the leadership of Egypt in 1863. Throughout his reign, he spent enormous amounts of money on his dream of a modern Egypt, and borrowed heavily from foreign nations. These debts would lead to British occupation three years after his son replaced him in 1879.

Born in Cairo, Ismaʿil ibn Ibrahim was educated at the Qasr al-Ayni Princes' School established by his grandfather, Muhammad Ali Pasha, and at the Saint-Cyr Military Academy in France. He served briefly on the council for the sultan of the Ottoman Empire in Istanbul and then chaired the corresponding vice-regal council in Cairo.

Upon succeeding his uncle, Muhammad Saʿid Pasha, in 1863, he started a policy of national modernization in Egypt by ordering the construction of factories, irrigation works, public buildings, and palaces. Many traditional Cairo and Alexandria

neighborhoods and buildings were razed to facilitate the Europeanization of these cities. His reign marked the inauguration of many Egyptian cultural institutions, including the Cairo Opera House, the National Library (Dar al-Kutub), the Egyptian Museum, the Geographical Society, and various primary, secondary, and higher schools, such as Dar al-Ulum. The Suez Canal was completed during his reign; its 1869 inauguration occasioned a gala celebration attended by many European leaders.

Ismaʿil also established Egypt's system of provincial and local administration and convened the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab, the country's first representative assembly. He reorganized the national and *shariʿa* (Islamic law) courts, established the mixed courts, created the postal service, and extended railroads and telegraph lines throughout Egypt. He sent explorers to the African interior and armies to complete Egypt's conquest of the Sudan. Egypt became more independent of the Ottoman Empire. Since Ismaʿil obtained the title of *khedive* (Persian for "little lord"), he gained permission to pass down his khedivate according to the European rules of succession and the right to contract loans without first obtaining permission from Istanbul. His industrial, military, and construction projects proved costly, and he indulged in other extravagances having no long-term value to Egypt, such as his many palaces and extensive luxuries that he bought for his wives and mistresses or bestowed upon Europeans he wished to impress.

At first, Ismaʿil paid for his program with revenues derived from the expanded output of Egyptian cotton, for which demand boomed during the American Civil War. Later, when European industrialists could buy cotton from other sources, Ismaʿil raised taxes and took loans from European bankers at increasingly unfavorable terms. Unable to repay them, he resorted to unorthodox financial measures—such as the 1871 Muqabala loan and the sale of his government's Suez Canal shares in 1875—finally conceding to European control over Egyptian state revenues and disbursements through the 1876 Caisse de la Dette Publique.

In 1878 he surrendered much of his power to the dual control of a "European cabinet" that included English and French ministers. Financial stringencies ensued, leading to an uprising by Egyptian army officers who had been put on half-pay, causing the European cabinet to resign. European creditors and their governments suspected Ismaʿil of engineering the uprising to regain his absolute rule. In July 1879, their envoys in Constantinople persuaded the sultan to replace him with his eldest son, Tawfiq. Ismaʿil left Egypt and lived out his life in exile. Although ambitious for Egypt's development and his own reputation, his achievements were eclipsed by his fiscal misrule, which led in 1882 to the British occupation.

See also COTTON; DAR AL-ULUM; DUAL CONTROL; MAJLIS SHURA AL-NUWWAB; MIXED COURTS; MUHAMMAD ALI; *SHARIʿA;* SUEZ CANAL.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

ISMAʿILI SHIʿISM

Islamic movement that split from the Twelver Shiʿa over the successor of the sixth imam, Jaʿfar al-Sadiq (d. 765).

Some believed that Jaʿfar had appointed his son, Ismaʿil as his successor, but Ismaʿil predeceased Jaʿfar, thus making his brother, Musa, their father's successor. Supporters of Ismaʿil, however, maintained that his son, Muhammad, should become imam.

The Ismaʿili movement, whose followers are generally known as seveners of Ismaʿilis, spawned several subdivisions, including the Fatimids, the Assassins, the Tayyibis, and the Nizaris. The Fatimids developed from a group of Ismaʿilis who had maintained their movement in secret from the time of Jaʿfar's death until about the mid-ninth century. This group believed that Ismaʿil had not really died but had gone into occlusion, and that Muhammad, the seventh imam, would reappear as the *Mahdi.* The Fatimids founded Cairo in 969 C.E. and were wiped out in 1021 after their sixth caliph, al-Hakim, died. Al-Hakim's followers consolidated in the mountains of Syria and are known as Druze.

Outside Egypt, the Ismaʿili movement was propagated by Hasan-i-Sabbah, from his mountain fortress of Alamut in northern Iran in 1090 C.E. The movement he founded was known as the Assassins because of their use of hashish (users of hashish are called *hashshashin* in Arabic. Hasan's followers were notorious for murdering their enemies as a form of intimidation, from whence *assassin* was coined. After Hasan's death, the followers of the movement came to be known as Nizari Ismaʿilis, named for Nizar, an heir to the Fatimid caliphate whose claim was usurped in a palace coup, and whose namesake succeeded Hasan, claiming descent from the Fatimid Nizar. The Nizar Ismaʿili rule at Alamut ended with the Mongol conquest of 1256. Survivors kept the movement alive, however, settling in Azerbaijan and India. In 1840, their imam took the title Agha Khan, which continues until today. His followers, known as Khojas, are located mainly in Gujarat, Bombay, and East Africa, with others scattered around the world, including a small group based at Salamiyya, Syria.

See also DRUZE; *MAHDI;* SHIʿISM.

JENAB TUTUNJI

ISRAEL

This entry consists of the following articles:

OVERVIEW
MILITARY AND POLITICS
OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL PARTIES
POLITICAL PARTIES

OVERVIEW

Officially, the State of Israel, a democratic republic established by proclamation 15 May 1948.

Israel (in Hebrew, Medinat Yisrael) is a small state in both population—estimated at 6.7 million in September 2003—and size—encompassing some 8,019 square miles. It is located on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, bordered on the north by Lebanon and on the east by Syria and Jordan. In the south, from a short coastline on the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel's border runs northwestward to the Mediterranean along the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt. The West Bank and Gaza Strip territories have been under Israel's administration since the 1967 Arab–Israel

MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

Tel Aviv is Israel's second largest city, boasting a population of over 400,000. Founded in 1909, Tel Aviv merged with the much older city of Jaffa in 1950, becoming Tel Aviv–Jaffa. This dynamic city along the Mediterranean Sea is a popular cultural center and tourist destination. © ROYALTY-FREE/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

War. In 1981 Israel extended its law and jurisdiction to the Golan Heights, taken from Syria in 1967.

Israel extends 260 miles south from the northern border with Lebanon and Syria to Elat on the Gulf of Aqaba, and east from the Mediterranean for 60 miles to the Rift Valley, through which the Jordan River flows. The southern half of Israel, mostly desert, is known as the Negev—an area of arid flatlands and mountains. North of the Negev is a highland region with a series of mountain ranges that run from the Sea of Galilee in the north to Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) in the south, divided by the Plain of Esdraelon (some 300 feet below sea level). A narrow but fertile coastal plain 3 to 9 miles wide along the Mediterranean shore is where most Israelis live and most of the industry and agriculture are located, including the citrus crop.

About 90 percent of Israel's people live in urban areas; the three largest cities are Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa. Jerusalem is Israel's capital and largest city; it is the spiritual center of Judaism (the Jewish religion) and also a holy city for Christianity and Islam. West Jerusalem, the newer part of the city, is inhabited mainly by Jews. East Jerusalem—captured by Israel from Jordan in 1967—is inhabited mainly by Arabs.

Tel Aviv serves as the country's commercial, financial, and industrial center, and houses some government agencies. Haifa, on the Mediterranean, is a major port city, the administrative and industrial center of northern Israel. Beersheba is considered the capital of the Negev region. In the 1950s Israel's government began creating "development towns," to attract industry to lightly populated areas and to provide homes for new immigrants.

Israel has hot dry summers and cool mild winters, although the climate varies from region to region, partly because of elevation. In August, the

While agriculture is not one of the larger factors in Israel's economy, the country produces almost enough crops to satisfy its yearly domestic need, and also exports significant quantities of citrus fruits, eggs, and processed foods. A sizeable portion of Israel's crops are produced by kibbutzim and moshavim on land leased to them by the Israeli Land Authority. © Ted Spiegel/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

hottest month, the temperatures may reach 98°F in the hilly regions and as high as 120°F near the Dead Sea. In January, the coldest month, temperatures average 48°F in Jerusalem and 57°F in Tel Aviv. Israel has almost continuous sunshine from May through mid-October. The *khamsin,* a hot dry dusty wind, sometimes blows in from deserts in the east. Almost all the rainfall occurs between November and March, and great regional variations exist. In the driest area, the southern Negev, the average yearly rainfall is only 1 inch. In the wettest area, the hilly parts of upper Galilee, average annual rainfall is 42 inches. Snow also falls sometimes in the hills.

Israel has six administrative districts—Central, Haifa, Jerusalem, Northern, Southern, and Tel Aviv. Elected councils are the units of local government, responsible for such services as education, water, and road maintenance.

Economy

At its independence in 1948 Israel was a poor country with only a little agricultural or industrial production. The economy has grown substantially, and today Israel enjoys a relatively high standard of living, despite limited water and mineral resources. Human resources (large numbers of educated immigrants) plus financial assistance from Western nations (especially the United States and Germany) contribute to Israel's economic well-being. The nation's main trading partners are the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy.

Israel is poor in energy sources, having no coal deposits or hydroelectric power resources and only small amounts of crude oil and natural gas. In 2004 Israel had a technologically advanced market economy with substantial government participation. It imports crude oil, raw materials, and

Beginning in the 1970s, Israel's manufacturing sector began to move away from traditional products such as textiles, chemicals, and metal products into more high-technology fields such as electronics and computer products. Manufacturing employs the second largest percentage of the country's workforce. © Ricki Rosen/Corbis Saba. Reproduced by permission.

military equipment. It has intensively developed its agricultural and industrial sectors. Israel imports significant quantities of grain but is largely self-sufficient in other agricultural products. Cut diamonds, high-technology equipment, and agricultural products (fruit and vegetables) are the leading exports. The influx of Jewish immigrants from the former U.S.S.R. during the period 1989 to 1999, coupled with the opening of new markets at the end of the Cold War, energized Israel's economy, which grew rapidly in the early 1990s; growth slowed in 1996 when Israel imposed tighter fiscal and monetary policies and the immigration bonus declined. Growth was 7.2 percent in 2000, but the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada, difficulties in the high-technology, construction, and tourist sectors, and fiscal austerity in the face of growing inflation, led to small declines in GDP in 2001 and 2002. These rebounded by the end of 2003.

Population

When Israel was established in 1948 it had about 800,000 people. In 2003 Israel's population numbered about 6.7 million; about 81 percent are Jews. Between 1948 and the 1990s more than 2 million Jews migrated to Israel, many to escape persecution in their home countries. In 1950 and 1952 respectively, the Knesset (parliament) passed the Law of Return and the Nationality Law, which together grant the right to every Jew to immigrate to the country and, with minor exceptions, to be granted automatic citizenship. Israel's Jewish population shares a common spiritual heritage but comes from diverse ethnic backgrounds—each group has its own cultural, political, and recent historical roots. The two main groups are the Ashkenazim—who came from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe—and the Mizrahim and Sephardim—who came from the countries of the Middle East and around the Mediterranean. At the time of independence, most

of Israel's Jews were Ashkenazim; as a result, the political, educational, and economic systems are primarily Western in orientation. The massive migration of Jews from the former U.S.S.R., which began in the glasnost era of Mikhail S. Gorbachev (late 1980s), brought more than 185,000 in 1990 and hundreds of thousands in subsequent years, and Soviet Jews became the largest ethnic group in Israel in the twenty-first century.

Arabs make up nearly all the remaining 19 percent of Israel's population. Most are Palestinians whose families remained after the independence of Israel and the 1948 Arab–Israel War. Arab and Jewish Israelis generally have limited contact, live in separate areas, attend separate schools, speak different languages, and follow different cultural traditions.

Israel has two official languages—Hebrew and Arabic. Many Israelis also speak English or Russian, and many Ashkenazic Jews speak Yiddish, a Germanic language spoken since the Middle Ages by Jews in Central and Eastern Europe. Because of their diverse diaspora origins, Israelis also speak a great many other languages, reflecting their diverse histories.

On 14 May 1948, when the British Mandate over Palestine expired, Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion signed the new Jewish state of Israel into being. This action had immediate consequences, as the new nation was promptly invaded by five Arab states, initiating Israel's War of Independence, which lasted until early 1949. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Religion

About 20 percent of Israeli Jews observe the religious principles of Judaism and are classified as Orthodox; an additional 50 percent observe some of the principles some of the time, and the rest (30%) tend to be secular. Orthodox Israelis hold that Jewish religious values should play an important role in the shaping of government policy, but secular Israeli Jews seek to limit the role of religion in the state.

Of Israel's non-Jewish population, about 73 percent are Muslims, the largest group of which are Sunni. Another 11 percent of the non-Jews are Christians, mostly Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox. Of the remaining 16 percent, the majority are Druze, but there are also some Baha'i and other small religious communities. All faiths are guaranteed religious freedom by law.

Education

Education has a high priority in Israel. One of the first laws passed there established free education and required school attendance for all children between the ages of five and fourteen. Attendance is now required to age sixteen. Adult literacy is estimated to be in excess of 97 percent. The Jewish school system instructs in Hebrew, and the Arab/Druze school system in Arabic; both are government-funded systems.

Israel has a number of internationally recognized institutions of higher education—the Technion, Haifa University, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv University, Ben-Gurion University, Bar-Ilan University, and the Weizmann Institute of Science.

The Arts

With a population drawn from more than one hundred countries, Israel is rich in cultural diversity and artistic creativity. In music, dance, theater, films, literature, painting, and sculpture, many artists work within the traditions of their own ethnic groups. Others have blended various cultural forms

Israel's population, in thousands, by religion

	Druze	Christians[1]	Muslims	Jews	Total
1950	15,000	36,000	116,100	1,203,000	1,370,100
1960	23,300	49,600	166,300	1,911,300	2,150,400
1970	35,900	75,500	328,600	2,582,000	3,022,100
1980	50,700	89,900	498,300	3,282,700	3,921,700
1990	82,600	114,700	677,700	3,946,700	4,821,700
2000	102,500	133,400	952,000	4,914,100	6,102,000[2]

[1]Until 1994, included those not classified by religion by Ministry of Interior.
[2]Does not include Lebanese not classified by religion by Ministry of Interior.

SOURCE: Adapted from *Statistical Abstract of Israel* 53, Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2002, Table 2.1.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

to create a uniquely Israeli tradition. The arts not only reflect Israel's immigrant diversity, they also draw upon Jewish history and religion and address the social and political problems of modern Israel. The arts are actively encouraged and supported by the government.

Publishing is a major industry—the number of books published per person in Israel is among the highest in the world. Most Israeli authors write in Hebrew, and some have achieved international fame; the novelist and short-story writer Shmuel Yosef Agnon shared the 1966 Nobel Prize for literature. Other renowned authors include Hayyim Nahman Bialik, Saul Tchernichovsky, Amos Oz, and Avraham B. Yehoshua. Israel's newspapers are published daily in Hebrew, with others available in Arabic, Russian, English, French, Polish, Yiddish, Hungarian, and German.

The Israel Philharmonic Orchestra performs throughout the country and on frequent international tours, as does the Jerusalem Symphony, the orchestra of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Israeli and international artists tour as well, and almost every municipality and small agricultural settlement has a chamber orchestra or jazz ensemble. Folk music and folk dancing, drawing from the cultural heritage of the many immigrant groups, are very popular, as is the theater. Among the museums are the Israel Museum in Jerusalem, which houses the Dead Sea Scrolls and an extensive collection of Jewish religious and folk art; and the Museum of the Diaspora, which is located on the campus of Tel Aviv University. Archaeology is an important pursuit, and archaeological remains are on display throughout the country.

Government

Israel has no written constitution; instead, it follows "basic laws" passed by the Knesset (parliament) that deal with subjects such as the president, the Knesset, the judiciary, and other matters generally found in a written constitution. Legislative powers are vested in this unicameral body of 120 members, elected for a term not to exceed four years, in a national, general, equal, secret, direct, and proportional election. The Knesset passes legislation, participates in the formation of national policy, and approves budgets and taxes. All Israeli citizens eighteen years or older may vote. Voters do not cast ballots for individual candidates in Knesset elections, but instead vote for a party list, which includes all the candidates of the political party. The list may range from a single candidate to a full slate of 120 names. A party's seats in parliament are approximately proportional to the share of the votes it receives in the national election.

The prime minister—the head of government—is normally the leader of the party that controls the most seats in the Knesset and must maintain the support of a majority of the Knesset to stay in office. He or she selects, forms, and heads the cabinet, which is Israel's senior policymaking body, composed of the heads of each government ministry as well as other ministers; appointments to the cabinet must be approved by the Knesset. The president—the head of state—is elected by the Knesset to a seven-

year term. The powers and functions are primarily formal and ceremonial; actual political power is limited. The president's most important task is selecting a member of the Knesset to form a government, although political composition of the Knesset has, so far, essentially determined this selection.

Since 1948, Israel's governments have been coalitions of several political parties—the result of several factors: the intensity with which political views are held; the proportional representation of the voting system; and the multiplicity of parties. These factors have made it all but impossible for a party to win an absolute majority of seats. Despite the constant need for coalition governments, they have proven remarkably stable. Political life in Israel was dominated during the period of the British Mandate by a small and relatively cohesive elite that held positions in government and other major institutions. The strength of the Israel Labor Party until 1977 helped to stabilize the political situation. Between 1977 and 1983 Prime Minister Menachem Begin's political skills had the same effect. Rigorous party discipline exists in the Knesset.

The judiciary comprises both secular and religious court systems.

Political History

The independence of the State of Israel in 1948 was preceded by more than a half century of efforts by Zionist leaders to establish a sovereign state as a homeland for dispersed Jews. The desire of Jews to return to their biblical home was voiced continuously and repeatedly after the Romans destroyed Jerusalem in 70 C.E. and dispersed the population of Roman Palestine. Attachment to the land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael) became a recurring theme in Jewish scripture and literature. Despite the ancient connection, it was not until the founding of the World Zionist Organization by Theodor Herzl near the end of the nineteenth century that practical steps were taken toward securing international sanction for large-scale Jewish resettlement in Palestine. Small numbers of Jews had remained in the area or had returned to it throughout the centuries, mostly (but not only) Orthodox scribes and scholars residing mainly in the four holy cities of Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed, and Tiberias. Modern Zionism was given added weight by the Balfour Declaration in 1917, which declared the British government's support for the creation of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, and Britain was granted a League of Nations mandate for Palestine after World War I that lasted until after World War II.

In November 1947 international support for establishing a Jewish state led to the adoption of the United Nations (UN) partition plan, which called for dividing mandated Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state and for establishing Jerusalem as an international city under UN administration. Violence between Palestinian Arabs and Jews erupted almost immediately. On 15 May 1948 the State of Israel proclaimed its independence. Armies from neighboring Arab states entered the former Mandate lands to fight Israel in the Arab–Israel War of 1948. In 1949 four armistice agreements were negotiated and signed between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. No peace treaties were signed, however, and the new Israeli state maintained a shaky UN-supervised armistice with its Arab neighbors.

After Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and formed a unified military command with Syria, Israel invaded the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula in October 1956, in concert with French and British operations against Egyptian forces concentrated near the canal. At the conclusion of the 1956 Arab–Israel War Israel's forces withdrew (March 1957) after the United Nations established an Emergency Force (UNEF) and stationed it along the Egyptian side of the 1949 armistice line and on the Strait of Tiran to ensure passage of Israel-bound ships. In 1966 and 1967 terrorist incidents and retaliatory acts across the armistice demarcation lines increased. In May 1967, after tension had developed between Syria and Israel, Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser moved armaments and troops into the Sinai and ordered withdrawal of UNEF troops from the armistice line and from Sharm al-Shaykh at the Strait of Tiran. Nasser then closed the strait to Israel's ships, blockading the Israeli port of Elat at the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba. On 30 May Jordan and Egypt signed a mutual-defense treaty.

In response to these and related events, Israel's forces attacked Egypt on 5 June 1967. Subsequently, Jordan and Syria joined in the hostilities of the 1967 Arab–Israel War. After six days of fighting, Israel

controlled the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. At Khartoum on 1 September an Arab summit meeting resolved to have "no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, [and] no negotiations with it." On 22 November 1967 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242, which called for the establishment of a just and lasting peace; Israel's withdrawal from territories occupied in June 1967; the end of all states of belligerency; respect for the sovereignty of all states in the area; and the right to live in peace within secure recognized boundaries. Swedish ambassador Gunnar Jarring was given the task of implementing the resolution. In the spring of 1969 Nasser initiated the War of Attrition between Egypt and Israel along the Suez Canal. The United States helped to end these hostilities and achieved a cease-fire in August 1970, but subsequent efforts to negotiate an interim agreement to open the Suez Canal, achieve disengagement of forces, and move toward peace were unsuccessful.

On 6 October 1973, Yom Kippur (the holiest day of the Jewish year), Syrian and Egyptian forces attacked Israeli positions along the Suez Canal and in the Golan. Initially, Syria and Egypt made significant advances, but Israel recovered on both fronts, pushing the Syrians back beyond the 1967 cease-fire lines and crossing the Suez Canal to take a position on its west bank. This war was followed by renewed and intensive efforts toward peace. The United States and the Soviet Union helped to achieve a cease-fire based on Security Council Resolution 338, which reaffirmed UN Security Council Resolution 242 as the framework for peace and for the first time called for negotiations between the parties to establish "a just and durable peace in the Middle East."

The United States actively helped Israel and Egypt to reach agreement on cease-fire stabilization and military disengagement. On 5 March 1974 Israel's forces withdrew from the Suez Canal, and Egypt assumed control. Syria and Israel signed a disengagement agreement on 31 May 1974, and the United Nations Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF) was established as a peacekeeping force in the Golan. Further U.S. efforts resulted in an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel in September 1975, which provided for another withdrawal by Israel from the Sinai, a limitation of Egypt's forces therein, and stations staffed by U.S. civilians in a UN-maintained buffer zone between Egypt's and Israel's forces.

In November 1977 Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat launched an initiative for peace. Sadat recognized Israel's right to exist and established the basis for direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel. This led to meetings at the presidential retreat of Camp David, Maryland, when U.S. president Jimmy Carter helped to negotiate a framework for peace between Israel and Egypt and for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East (known as the Camp David Accords)—with broad principles to guide negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. An Egypt–Israel peace treaty was signed in Washington, D.C., on 26 March 1979 by Prime Minister Menachem Begin and President Sadat, with President Carter signing as witness. This was the first peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state, and it effectively ended the conflict between them. They agreed that negotiations on a transitional regime of autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza would begin one month after ratification. Under the peace treaty, Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt in April 1982. In 1989 the governments of Israel and Egypt concluded an agreement that resolved the status of Taba, a disputed resort area in the Gulf of Aqaba.

Since the 1948 war Israel's border with Lebanon had been quiet compared to its borders with other neighbors. After the Jordanian Civil War (1970–1971), many Palestinians were expelled from Jordan and most eventually went to southern Lebanon, so hostilities against Israel's northern border increased. In March 1978, after a series of terrorist attacks on Israel originating in Lebanon, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) were sent into Lebanon. Israel withdrew its troops after the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 425, which called for the creation of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a peacekeeping force.

In July 1981, after additional fighting between Israel and the Palestinians in Lebanon, U.S. president Ronald Reagan's special envoy, Philip Charles Habib, helped to secure a cease-fire. In June 1982, in response to attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets and the attempted assassination of Israel's ambassador in London, Israel invaded Lebanon with the objective of removing the Palestine Liberation Or-

ganization (PLO)'s military and terrorist threat to Israel. In August 1982, after the siege of Beirut and an evacuation plan mediated by several states, the PLO withdrew its headquarters and some forces from Lebanon, relocating in Tunisia. With U.S. assistance in May 1983, Israel and Lebanon reached an accord to withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon; however, in March 1984, Lebanon, under pressure from Syria, abrogated the agreement. In June 1985 Israel withdrew most of its troops from Lebanon. A small residual Israeli force and an Israeli-supported Lebanese militia remained in southern Lebanon in a "security zone," regarded by Israel as a necessary buffer against attacks on its northern territory.

Until the election of May 1977, Israel had been governed by a coalition led by the Labor alignment or its constituent parties. After the 1977 election, the Likud (Union) bloc came to power, forming a coalition with Menachem Begin as prime minister. Likud retained power in the election in June 1981, and Begin remained prime minister. In 1983 Begin resigned and was succeeded by his foreign minister, Yitzhak Shamir. New elections were held in 1984. The vote was split among numerous parties, and neither Labor nor Likud was able to attract enough small-party support to form a coalition. They agreed to establish a broadly based government of national unity. The agreement provided for the rotation of the office of prime minister and the combined office of deputy prime minister and foreign minister midway through the government's fifty-month term. During the first twenty-five months of the unity government's rule, Labor's Shimon Peres served as prime minister, while Likud's Shamir held the posts of deputy prime minister and foreign minister. Peres and Shamir exchanged positions in October 1986.

The November 1988 elections resulted in a similar coalition government. Likud and Labor formed another national unity government in January 1989, without providing for rotation. Again Shamir became prime minister and Peres deputy prime minister and finance minister. That government fell in March 1990 after a no-confidence vote precipitated by disagreement over the government's response to a U.S. peace initiative. Labor Party leader Peres was unable to attract sufficient support to form a government, and Shamir then formed a Likud-led coalition government, which included members from religious and right-wing parties; it took office in June 1990. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990 and the Gulf War of 1991, a new peace initiative by the United States led to a major Arab–Israel peace conference, the Madrid Conference (1991).

Soon after Madrid, right-wing parties resigned from Shamir's government over the issue of Palestinian self-rule. Yitzhak Rabin's victory as the new head of the Labor Party in the 1992 Knesset elections brought a clear shift from right to left-of-center, and toward a more pragmatic approach on Arab–Israeli issues. The new government began to alter the nature and direction of Israeli policy, seeking to restore the concepts of Labor Zionism to the center of Israeli politics.

The Madrid Peace Conference was followed by a series of multilateral discussions focusing on functional issues such as refugees, arms control and regional security, water, economic development, and the environment, as well as bilateral negotiations that convened in Washington, D.C. In spring and summer 1993, even as official negotiations continued with little progress in Washington, Israeli and PLO representatives conducted secret negotiations in Norway that led to an exchange of letters and the signing in September 1993 of an historic Declaration of Principles (DOP).

The exchange of letters and DOP, also known as the Oslo Accord, contained the PLO's recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace and security and Israel's recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO renounced the use of terrorism and other forms of violence, and committed itself to resolve the conflict with Israel through peaceful negotiations. The accord provided for Palestinian autonomy, starting in Jericho (a city of the West Bank) and the Gaza Strip, and for continued negotiations between the two sides to establish the basis for the future relationship between Israel and the Palestinians.

The lengthy and at times acrimonious negotiations known as "the Middle East peace process" saw Israel and the PLO attempting to negotiate interim agreements for a phased Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian population centers and the creation of a Palestine (National) Authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Delays, outbreaks of Palestinian and

Israeli violent opposition, and recriminations about the process soon began to wear down the initial euphoria of the 1993 signing ceremony. The most serious incidents of violence included the massacre of Muslim worshipers in Hebron in February 1994 by Baruch Goldstein; the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in Tel Aviv in November 1995; and suicide bombings of Israeli buses and terrorist attacks on shopping areas in spring 1996 by members of the Islamic resistance movement HAMAS.

The signing of the DOP allowed Israel and Jordan to publicly continue their decades-long secret negotiations, which culminated in the signing of a peace treaty between the two countries on 26 October 1994. This treaty led to a relatively "warm peace" (compared to its Israeli–Egyptian predecessor) that included a wide range of relationships in numerous sectors.

The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by Yigal Amir was unexpected and unprecedented, and reflected sharp differences within the Israeli polity on the peace process. Shimon Peres was chosen to lead the government, and he attempted to pursue the Israeli–Syria peace track, but was stymied by the lack of Syrian response and by suicide bombings and Katyusha rocket attacks into northern Israel from southern Lebanon. Peres responded with Operation Grapes of Wrath, directed against Hizbullah bases in Lebanon.

In May 1996 Israelis participated in their first-ever election under a new electoral law requiring them to cast two ballots—one for the Knesset and the other for prime minister. The elections saw the victory of Likud's Benjamin ("Bibi") Netanyahu over Labor's Peres by a margin of less than 1 percent of the votes cast. Netanyahu's victory was attributed to support from the political right and the religious parties, to the failure of the sympathy vote for Rabin to materialize, to Peres's diminished stature among Jewish voters because of his ineffective reactions to terrorism, and to the Arab community's failure to provide Peres with strong support partly because of extensive IDF military operations against the PLO in Lebanon. The election permitted Netanyahu to create a right-of-center coalition government. Netanyahu's tenure was marked by slow progress on the peace process, highlighted by the U.S.-brokered signing of a Hebron redeployment agreement in January 1997 and the Wye Plantation Accord of 1998.

In the May 1999 elections Israelis were again offered two ballots. This time Labor's new leader, Ehud Barak, running as head of the "One Israel" ticket, defeated Netanyahu by a wide margin (56% to 44%) and then formed a broadly based coalition government. Barak was widely seen in Israel and abroad as a true successor to Rabin—an individual with strong security credentials who sought a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. Hope was generated for a reinvigorated peace process, especially because of the substantial involvement of U.S. president Bill Clinton. Barak also moved ahead on other issues. In keeping with a campaign pledge he ordered a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in March 2000. The withdrawal was carried out swiftly, ending Israel's eighteen-year presence in Lebanon and resulting in the United Nations declaring Israel to be in full compliance with UNSC Resolution 425. The withdrawal also seemed to offer a prospect for further negotiations with Syria on outstanding bilateral issues and on the Israel-Lebanon relationship.

The Syrian track became a focal point for Barak's policy, and in January 2000 Clinton, Barak, and Syrian foreign minister Faruk al-Shara joined in an inconclusive meeting in Shepherdstown, West Virginia. Clinton followed up with a summit meeting with Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad in Geneva in March, but the two leaders failed to close the gap between the Israeli and Syrian positions, primarily over the line to which Israel would withdraw from the Golan Heights. Asad's death in June 2000 put an end to Syrian-track negotiations during Barak's tenure.

In summer 2000 President Clinton sought to achieve an Israeli–Palestinian breakthrough with an invitation to Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat to attend a summit meeting. But the Camp David Summit failed to achieve an agreement, with all parties blaming the others for the failure—especially Barak and Clinton pointing to Arafat's refusal to consider Barak's offer as the basis for future negotiations. This effectively marked the end of the Middle East peace process. In late September 2000 the al-Aqsa Intifada erupted, sending Israelis and Palestinians into a deadly cycle of bloodshed and violence.

Domestic Issues and Electoral Politics since 2000

The decade of the 1990s was marked by a significant immigration of some one million people from the former Soviet Union—the largest single migration to Israel from any one country. This profoundly altered the nature of Israel's society, economics, and politics. At the same time, the economy continued to grow and prosperity became more widespread as Israel's GDP grew beyond the $100 billion level, although there was negative growth when the violence of the al-Aqsa Intifada severely affected the flow of tourism. The economy was also affected by the worldwide economic downturn and by recessions in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Nevertheless, by 2004 the economy began to recoup some of the losses of the previous few years, and positive GDP growth was again recorded.

In January 2003 Israel's first astronaut, Ilan Ramon, was launched into space aboard the U.S. space shuttle *Columbia,* generating pride and elation across Israel and among Jews worldwide. Tragically, Ramon was killed along with his fellow astronauts when the craft disintegrated upon its return to earth in early February after a successful mission in space.

The outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada and the protracted failure to achieve a cease-fire and restart the peace process contributed to the disintegration of Ehud Barak's governing coalition. His resignation in December 2000 without the dissolution of the Knesset led to the first-ever election in Israel for prime minister only. That election was marked by the lowest turnout of eligible voters in Israel's history—about 62 percent—and signaled some uncertainty in the body politic. Ariel Sharon's landslide victory (62.6% to Barak's 37.2%) in February 2001 was attributed to Barak's failure to make peace with either Syria or the Palestinians, and to the heightened insecurity and substantial violence caused by the intifada. Sharon was elected as the candidate more likely to bring about the security Israelis were seeking. His election brought Likud back to power, and he formed a government coalition in March 2001 with Labor participation based on the Knesset that was elected in 1999.

Security and the resurrection of the peace process were the dominant themes of Sharon's tenure. Suicide bombings and other violence (such as the assassination of Tourism Minister Rehavam Zeʾevi) continued to remind Israelis of their vulnerability and of the failure of the peace process. The inability or unwillingness of the Palestinian Authority to put an effective halt to terrorist acts led the Israeli government in December 2001 to declare Yasir Arafat "irrelevant" in the struggle against terrorism and to seek alternative leadership among the Palestinians to foster the moribund peace process. Subsequently, Israel began to isolate Arafat and labeled him "an enemy of the entire free world."

Arms continued to flow to the Palestinians (as evidenced by the January 2002 Israeli interception and capture of the ship *Karine-A,* which was carrying arms from Iranian sources to Gaza) and violence escalated. In response to the March 2002 massacre of mostly elderly Passover celebrants at the Park Hotel in the resort town of Netanya, the IDF launched major raids into the West Bank against terrorist targets in Operations Defensive Shield and Determined Path, in effect reoccupying for several months Jenin, Hebron, Bethlehem, and other population centers it had previously ceded to the Palestinian Authority.

The increasing use of Palestinian suicide bombers claimed hundreds of Israeli civilian lives and led to severe retaliations by the IDF in the form of increased surveillance at checkpoints, destruction of the homes of suicide bombers' families, closures, targeted assassinations of militants, and the building of a security fence. Although it was widely supported by an Israeli population traumatized by suicide bombers infiltrating Jewish population centers and soft targets from the West Bank, the planned 450-mile security barrier (more than 95 percent of which was to be chain-link fence, with the remainder concrete walls) was criticized for being built beyond the Green Line (1949 armistice lines) and for causing hardship by disrupting the daily movements of the Palestinian population. The decision to proceed with this measure despite international criticism and sharp Palestinian denunciation reflected a growing unilateralist tendency among Israel's leaders to consider disengagement and separation from the Palestinians.

The failure of the peace process and the climate of despair and insecurity created a new watershed for Israeli foreign and security policy, and for do-

mestic politics within Israel. It is against this background that the United States and its fellow "Quartet" members (Russia, the UN, and the European Union) pursued their efforts to have the parties agree to halt the violence as a prelude to resuming negotiations. In April 2003 the U.S. State Department made public the Quartet's "Road Map," which incorporated President George W. Bush's June 2002 vision of a two-state solution for the Israel-Palestinian impasse. Diplomatic activity on this front included shuttle diplomacy and high-level meetings, and the selection of two successive Palestinian prime ministers to negotiate with Israel.

In October 2002 Labor quit Sharon's national unity coalition government. Elections were held for the Sixteenth Knesset in January 2003, based on a revised electoral law that abandoned the separate ballot for prime minister used since 1996. The focus of the campaign was peace and security, and Labor's new leader, Amram Mitzna, led his party to its worst electoral defeat, in which its respresentation declined to only nineteen seats in the Knesset, compared to thirty-eight seats for Sharon's Likud. In February 2003 Sharon presented his new coalition government to the Knesset for its approval. The coalition was a narrower one in which Likud was clearly the dominant party, with a reinvigorated militantly secular Shinui Party as the major partner. Sharon's new government seemed poised for domestic changes on religion-society issues and for a continuing tough stand on the matter of security and peace for Israel. In 2004 the peace process was moribund, and a continuing intifada with its climate of insecurity was the main determinant of Israeli foreign and security policy, with strong implications also for domestic politics within Israel.

See also Adot ha-Mizrah; Agnon, Shmuel Yosef; Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab–Israel Conflict; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1956); Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab–Israel War (1973); Arab–Israel War (1982); Archaeology; Ashkenazim; Balfour Declaration (1917); Barak, Ehud; Beersheba; Begin, Menachem; Ben-Gurion, David; Bialik, Hayyim Nahman; Camp David Accords (1978); Dayan, Moshe; Dead Sea; Dead Sea Scrolls; Diaspora; Eretz Yisrael; Gaza Strip; Golan Heights; Habib, Philip Charles; Haifa; HAMAS; Hebron; Herzl, Theodor; Hizbullah; Holocaust; Intifada (1987–1991); Israeli Settlements; Jarring, Gunnar; Jericho; Jerusalem; Jews in the Middle East; Labor Zionism; Law of Return; Literature: Hebrew; Madrid Conference (1991); Negev; Netanyahu, Benjamin; Oslo Accord (1993); Oz, Amos; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palestinian Citizens of Israel; Peres, Shimon; Rabin, Yitzhak; Sadat, Anwar al-; Shamir, Yitzhak; Sharon, Ariel; Sinai Peninsula; Taba; Tchernichovsky, Saul; Tel Aviv; Tiran, Strait of; United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon; War of Attrition (1969–1970); West Bank; World Zionist Organization (WZO); Yehoshua, Avraham B.; Zionism.

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Bernard Reich

Military and Politics

The heavy involvement of the Israeli military in Israel's society, economy, and politics and the occasional politicization of the armed forces.

Over the last decade of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries, issues of military-civilian relations and the role the army (Israel Defense Force, IDF) plays in Israeli society have been intensively studied and analyzed by historians, social scientists, journalists, and others in a plethora of published books and articles. The subject is, however, not new to public awareness, having been on the national agenda since Israel's founding and even earlier. The problem is usually addressed on one or more of three levels: the impact of the military on civilian life; the extent of civil control of the military; and the extent of politicization of the military and its involvement in political decision making.

During his tenure as the Israeli prime minister, David Ben-Gurion meshed several existing defense organizations into the single national military known as the Israel Defense Force (IDF), then strove to keep it free from political entanglements. Referring to the IDF as a "nation builder," Ben-Gurion also greatly expanded the role of the military in society, frequently using it to accomplish civilian tasks. © PHOTOGRAPH BY HANS PINN. GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE (GPO) OF ISRAEL. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Impact of the Military on Civilian Life

Israeli society has been marked by the central and pervasive role of the military in Israeli politics, daily life, and culture. Three out of eight politicians who served as prime ministers since 1983 were ex-generals (Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak, and Ariel Sharon), one was elected president (Ezer Weizman), and Shimon Peres, although not formally a military person, grew out of the ranks of the Ministry of Defense. During the same period at least a dozen other ex-generals served in the cabinet as ministers. Most of those who served as IDF chiefs of staff ended their careers in politics (Haim Bar-Lev, Mordechai Gur, Rafael Eitan, and Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, for example). In the economic sphere, many ex-generals became corporate heads; others became mayors of large towns. Some generals were nominated as chancellors of universities and others have become headmasters of prestigious high schools.

Almost universal military conscription brings entire cohorts of young men and women to serve in the military for long periods. The large participation of civilians in military reserve duty *(miluʾim)* introduces the military experience into almost all Jewish, and many Druze, households. Military affairs are central in every news broadcast from early morning to late at night, and military jargon permeates modern Hebrew vernacular. Many domestic issues are viewed by Israelis as being essentially security issues. Security considerations prevail in the planning and execution of many civilian projects, such as road construction, land tenure, and housing designs. A pledge to give security considerations first priority is a central part of the political platform of all parties when candidates run for parliament (the Knesset) and when leaders negotiate to form government coalitions. Security considerations are routinely used to stifle criticism raised against harsh measures taken by the authorities.

Obviously, the salience of the military in Israel's political culture is a result of the prolonged conflict between Israel and the Arabs and the recurrent flare-ups of violence engendered since the early 1920s (some count at least a dozen major violent outbreaks). However, critics of Israeli society have in recent years also observed self-propelling dynamics that cannot always be explained away as inevitable outcomes of the contingencies of conflict with the Arabs. Some moderate critics tend to characterize Israel as a "garrison state" or a "nation in uniform." More strident observers speak of the total "militarization" of Israeli society and politics. Most would admit, however, that, despite the dangers brought by such tendencies to the country's sometimes flawed political system, Israel has managed to maintain its essentially democratic, pluralistic, and liberal political system.

Young Palestinians hurl stones at approaching Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip. In 2002 Israeli tanks moved into the village of Beit Lahiya, and soldiers conducted house-to-house searches, arresting three men they claimed were wanted militants.
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Civil Control of the Military

Concerns of defense and security preoccupied the Zionist settlers in Palestine from the outset. But only in the early 1920s, when Palestinian resistance to the Zionist project took on more violent and institutionalized forms, was the small, self-appointed secret group ha-Shomer (The Watchman, founded in 1907) replaced by a larger and more popular organization called the Haganah (Defense). From its inception it was clear that the military arm of the movement had to be supervised and directed by the political leadership. After a short period in which it was controlled by the Histadrut (the General Federation of Jewish Labor), it came under the supervision of a broadly based political committee, drawing its power from the elected executives of the Jewish Agency (representing the World Zionist Organization) and the Vaʿad Leʾumi (representing the Yishuv, i.e., the Jews of Palestine). The establishment in 1937 of the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi (ETZEL, or IZL) and three years later the further secession of Abraham (Yaʿir) Stern to form Lohamei Herut Yisrael (LEHI, or the Stern Gang) challenged the authority of the democratically elected political leadership of the Yishuv and gave rise to ten years of strife. One result of this dissidence was to eventually fortify the principle— to which the majority of the Jews and the much larger Haganah would adhere—that military organizations and movements must yield to their civilian leaders.

The outbreak of the Palestinian Revolt of 1936 to 1939 dispelled earlier Zionist hopes that they might eventually convince the Palestinians of the blessing that Jewish colonization of Palestine would bring them. From this point on, few Jews in Palestine doubted the need for a strong military organi-

zation. The Haganah was expanded, weapons were purchased, military training became universal, and units of permanent obligatory service were introduced. Most historians view this period as the turning point at which Zionists recognized the need to resort to force.

David Ben-Gurion was a strong proponent of the principle of civilian supremacy over the military. In the mid-1940s he emerged as the undisputed leader of the Zionist movement and became the first prime minister and minister of defense of the State of Israel in May 1948. With the transformation of Menachem Begin's Irgun into a civilian political party in the summer of 1948, the IDF's showdown with (and attack on) the Irgun ship *Altalena,* and the final crushing of the Stern Gang and the Irgun military squads in Jerusalem following the murder of Count Folke Bernadotte in September, civilian control over the military establishment was assured and was never seriously challenged from the right.

Ben-Gurion was also concerned that most of the command positions in the strongest and most prestigious elite corps of the IDF, the Palmah, were under the ideological influence of MAPAM, a left-wing party that questioned his own authority. Ben-Gurion saw in this situation a dangerous politicization of the military and ordered the disbanding of the Palmah. As soon as the war was over, he dismissed many high-ranking officers affiliated with MAPAM. During the fifteen years of his premiership, he nominated two chiefs of staff who were active members of his own party (Moshe Dayan and Zvi Tzur). But he also nominated to this position three generals who were strictly professional soldiers and did not belong to any party (Yigael Yadin, Mordehai Makleff, and Haim Laskov) and promoted to the rank of general many ex-Palmah battalion commanders. He also assured, before his own resignation, that Yitzhak Rabin, ex-chief of operations of the Palmah, would be nominated as IDF chief of staff in 1964.

Along with his resolve to depoliticize the officer corps, Ben-Gurion never saw a problem in expanding the role of the military in society and using its efficient and disciplined mechanisms to accomplish strictly civilian tasks. Military engineers were often utilized for road and bridge construction. Army instructors were involved in the establishment of agricultural settlements (NAHAL, an acronym for Noʿar Halutzi Lohem, Fighting Pioneer Youth) for new immigrants. When heavy rains or floods threatened to destroy the tent towns used as temporary housing for new immigrants, the military was called in to manage entire civilian communities.

Moreover, Ben-Gurion saw the IDF as the great "nation builder." The compulsory universal service, which included tens of thousands of young immigrants who were inducted soon after their arrival in the country, was designed not only as a security measure but also as an educational endeavor in which Hebrew and elementary schooling were taught and patriotic ideals inculcated. This rationale was also used to justify the establishment of a special military radio station (Galei-Tzahal), a weekly magazine for soldiers (*ba-Mahaneh,* In the camp) and a monthly journal for officers (*Skira Hodshit,* Monthly review). Many of these functions were later discontinued when the IDF became overburdened with military assignments and defense budgets became strained. Nevertheless, the recruitment and army training of young immigrants from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s may well account for the rapid socialization of those young men and women into Israeli society.

Politicization of the Military

In the mid 1950s, during the brief tenure of Moshe Sharett as prime minister (1954–1955), the boundaries between the civilian authority and the military leadership were sharply perforated, especially around the controversial role played by the politically minded chief of staff, Moshe Dayan; the chief of military intelligence, Binyamin Givli; and even the minister of defense, Pinhas Lavon (who replaced Ben-Gurion during 1954). What Sharett wrote in the intimacy of his private diary—that many of the military offensives were either taken without proper cabinet authorization or were expanded beyond the scope authorized—was hardly a secret to the public. Several events gave rise to the widespread impression that the army was acting beyond political control, including the foolhardy activation of a Jewish espionage ring in Egypt in June 1954, the order for which has remained a controversial mystery; the cruel massacre of sixty-five Palestinian civilians in

the village of Qibya in October 1953; the unwarranted scope of the attack on Syrian positions on the Sea of Galilee in December 1955; and the murder of five Bedouins in the Judean Desert by a group of paratroopers. The return of Ben-Gurion (toward whom the personal loyalty of Dayan was impeccable) to head the ministry of defense at the end of February 1955 stabilized the situation. After that, the legacy of a strict separation of the military command from active politics remained more or less intact for many years. According to the military norm, soldiers, including career officers, were permitted to sign up as members of a political party, vote in elections, and even attend party meetings as observers; but they were not permitted to be active in party life in any mode or form.

In recent years, however, the likelihood that high-ranking officers may become active politicians after retirement (after a half-year "cooling-off" period) has given rise to recurrent suspicions that those officers may be trying to pave their way into politics well ahead of their retirement, compromising their professionalism by acting and expressing themselves in ways aimed at helping them in their future political careers. During the first two decades of statehood the majority of senior officers tended to sympathize with center and left-of-center parties close to the Labor-Zionist movement. In recent years, however, a right-wing swing may have penetrated IDF's high command. Many retired generals have found their place in the ranks of the Likud and even parties to its right (such as Generals Rehavam Zeʾevi and Rafael Eitan).

The nomination of ex-military men to leading political positions has blurred the boundaries between the military and the civil authorities from another perspective as well. Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan were the first military figures to occupy important ministerial posts, but both were already political figures during their military service and both managed, as ministers, to faithfully uphold civil authority vis-à-vis the military. But later, when officers who spent a large part of their lives as professional soldiers entered the government, a shift in civil-military boundaries could be clearly observed. The 1982 war in Lebanon is a case in point. Ariel Sharon, as minister of defense, prosecuted the war effort primarily out of military considerations, clearly exceeding the goals set for him by Prime Minister Begin and his cabinet. Likewise, responses to the second Palestinian Intifada (September 2000–), which were handled by three generals (Sharon as prime minister, Shaʾul Mofaz as minister of defense, and Moshe Yaʿalon as chief of staff), reflected more a military perspective than a civil-political one.

The intensification of Palestinian resistance since the fall of 2000 and the ensuing attempts to defuse tensions and put the peace process back on track have demanded of the IDF higher levels of confrontation with civilians, both Arabs and Jews. The wide diffusion of warfare and the localization of operational management have given to the military command—even to commanders of lower levels—greater autonomy and ability to influence major political outcomes. On the other hand, scenes of Israeli soldiers battling against Jewish settlers, while not unprecedented, have introduced a new dimension in civil-military relations. The resurgence of a refusal to serve in the Occupied Territories, on the one hand, and the repeated guidance that religious leaders of the settlers' movement give their followers to refuse orders to evacuate settlements, on the other, are still marginal phenomena, but they do point to new cracks in Ben-Gurion's legacy of total depoliticization of the military.

See also Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi (IZL).

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Mordechai Bar-On

OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN

Political parties played an important role in Israel's achieving statehood; many parties operated as organized structures for decades prior to independence.

Among the factors accounting for the central role of political parties in Israeli politics are: (1) the electoral system, (2) the breadth of party influence in all levels of government during much of the early statehood period, (3) the complexity of major political issues, (4) the intensity of Israeli democracy, and (5) social, economic, and political modernization. The combination of these factors has often resulted in considerable political immobility—a governmental inability to take decisive action in specific policy areas for fear of generating a no-confidence vote and losing its political legitimacy.

Electoral System

Israel's electoral system has led to both centralization of control within many parties and frequently to extreme fragmentation of the party system. Structurally, the country is a single constituency, with proportional representation. Voters cast their ballots for a single party list, and parties receive a number of seats in the Knesset in proportion to the votes they receive. A party that receives 10 percent of the vote will receive 12 seats in the Knesset (10 percent of 120 seats); individual winners are determined by their position on the formal electoral lists that parties file with the Central Elections Commission prior to the vote; if a party wins 10 seats, the top ten names on its list are elected, but the eleventh is not. Names lower on the list may move up if vacancies occur in the party's Knesset delegation between elections. The position of candidates on each party's list is determined by the party organization; some parties use primary elections, some use conventions, and some lists are simply determined by party leadership.

Electoral behavior has been affected in recent years by several phenomena. One is the arrival of modern campaign techniques, including television, which have made it possible for charismatic entrants to affect a party's electoral fortunes. Another is the emergence of hitherto underrepresented groups like the Sephardim who have used arenas such as local mayoralty campaigns to challenge a party's central leadership. The two major parties, the Labor Party and the Likud, have responded by broadening their process of selecting party leaders and Knesset candidates through a series of primary elections involving all of their members. Some parties represent very specific constituencies, for example Russian immigrants. Others focus on a single ideological position.

Electoral reform has been an issue in Israel for decades, and after every election proponents of reform have used that election as further proof that reform was necessary. After many years of active debate, in 1992 the Knesset approved a major change in the Israeli electoral system, allowing the prime minister to be elected directly rather than being chosen from among members of the Knesset. Voters would have two ballots, a vote for prime minister and a separate proportional representation vote for a political party for the Knesset. The new electoral system affected three Israeli prime ministerial elections: May 1996, May 1999, and the special election of February 2001. Rather than creating more stable coalition governments—which was the intent of the change—the new system resulted in increased support for small parties in the Knesset and decreased support for the parties of the prime ministerial candidates. In March 2001, the Knesset voted to bring back the electoral system that had operated from independence until 1992, under which voters would cast a single ballot for a political party to represent them in the Knesset and the prime minister would be selected from Knesset members. The first election under the re-established electoral system took place in January 2003.

The fragmented party system is the result of another feature of the electoral system: one of the world's lowest thresholds for winning a legislative seat. Until 1992, a party needed only 1 percent of the vote to win a seat in a Knesset election, which brought many small parties to the Knesset. This meant that no party has ever received a majority in the Knesset, so it has always been necessary for prime minister–designates to form complex and fragile coalitions, making it exceptionally difficult for their governments to survive if they propose bold initiatives. When the threshold was raised to 1.5 percent in the 1992 election, it had some effect: Only

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (center) at headquarters for the Likud Party. The Likud is a right-wing political party established in 1973 by members of several smaller parties, including the Herut and the Israeli Liberal Party. In 1977, the party was elected to power, ending twenty-nine years of rule by the Israeli Labor Party. © AFP/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ten of the twenty-six parties that ran candidates won Knesset seats.

Breadth of Party Influence

Another aspect of party activity is the legacy and breadth of party influence in the early years of statehood. In the prestate period and the early years of statehood, the importance of political parties was enhanced by their role in various quasi-governmental activities, including employment, education, housing, medical care, immigrant absorption, publishing, and even sports. Although many of these functions were later taken over by the government, elections in nongovernmental organizations like the Histadrut (General Confederation of Trade Unions) and the Jewish Agency continue to be contested within the framework of candidate lists submitted by the major political parties.

Political Issues

The importance of small parties has also been magnified by the complexity of Israeli political issues. The political parties can be divided into five major groups, but the groups are not at all homogeneous, and many parties fit only partially into any group. These groups are (1) the left, which is generally socialist in domestic politics and conciliatory on the Palestinian issue; (2) the center and right, which generally is less sympathetic to socialist ideology, takes a hard line on the Palestinian issue and Greater Israel, and would give up none of the territories won during the Arab-Israel War (1967); (3) the religious parties, which have held

the balance of power in every government in Israel's history and some of whose members have made coalitions with both Labor and Likud in exchange for the furtherance of Orthodox religious interests; (4) reform parties, which have pressed for changes beyond those advocated by any of the larger, more entrenched parties; and (5) the far left, Communist, and Arab parties, which provide choices for voters but whose members have traditionally been outside of the mainstream of political decision making.

The proliferation and survival of the many parties is encouraged by the ideological and issue-oriented setting within which Israeli parties operate. Israeli parties cluster around many major issues, including at least one dealing with government activity in the domestic economy, one dealing with policy in relation to Arab states and the Palestinians, one dealing with government and religion, one dealing with government and Zionism (which is distinct from religion), and one dealing with national security (which is distinct from Arab relations). Many issues touch more than one of these dimensions. Given the number of central issues in the polity—and this list of issues does not include the problems of immigrants, gender-related issues, ethnicity and politics, and many other highly contentious issues around which a political party might be created—it is no wonder that literally dozens of political parties compete in each election.

Intensity of Israeli Democracy

Each of the larger groupings of parties is made up of several subgroups, and each of these at one time or another has been a separate political party that ran candidates for the Knesset; many of them still consider themselves to be distinct. The result is what seems a never-ending series of political marriages and divorces, and even though both Labor and Likud have been fairly well established for some time, most of the numerous factions within each insist on keeping their own names.

Modernization

The role of political parties has been diminished by aspects of social, political, and economic modernization. These include an electorate increasingly likely to scrutinize the parties, a large increase in the number of Israelis who consider themselves independents, and dissatisfaction with all of the traditional political parties. The result is that many new parties and movements have frequently received sizable votes, even in their initial ventures into the electoral fray.

Political parties continue to be the vehicle of political activity in Israel, and even with recent structural changes in the political system, no pattern of increased nonpartisan activity has emerged in the polity that would suggest a diminution of the role of political parties in the future.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Eretz Yisrael; Histadrut; Likud.

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Political Parties in

Major or significant political parties in Israel, including pre-state forerunners.

Agudat Israel ("Society of Israel")

Agudat Israel is political party founded in Poland in 1912, created by the ultraorthodox Agudat Israel Jewish organization, and established in Palestine in the early 1920s. Agudat Israel moderated its antisecular worldview by indicating its willingness to participate in the 1948 government-in-formation and the initial 1949 to 1951 government coalition by the terms of an agreement known as the "status quo letter," which avoided making key decisions about the relationship of the new state and organized religion. In 1949 the party formed part of the United Religious Front; in the elections of 1955 and 1959 it formed part of the Torah Religious Front with Poʿalei Agudat Israel. The party left the governing coalition in 1951 and remained in opposition until 1977, when it supported Menahem Begin's Likud-led coalition. In 1984 Agudat Israel joined the Begin-Peres national unity government and has since remained part of it, although it has refused a ministry.

Agudat Israel was originally anti-Zionist and messianic, although it has been willing to cooperate with Zionists in areas of immigration, settlement, and defense. In the 1980s this non-Zionist party, directed by a Council of Torah Sages (a panel of rabbis to whom both religious and secular decisions are referred), continued to advocate a theocracy and increased state financial support for its religious institutions. It is generally considered to be pragmatic on foreign-policy issues, including the future of the territories occupied since 1967. It is also concerned with all matters of domestic policy, matters it perceives to affect religion in general, and especially its own educational institutions.

In preparation for the 1984 Knesset elections many of the party's Sephardic members left Agudat Israel and started a new party, SHAS, resulting in a decline in Agudat Israel's Knesset representation from four to two seats.

Ahdut ha-Avodah ("Unity of Labor")

This socialist party was founded in 1919 by veterans of the Jewish Legion and other Palestine pioneers. With strong support in the Kibbutz ha-Meʾuhad movement, Ahdut ha-Avodah (or Achdut ha-Avodah) worked for the unification of Jewish labor movements and the development of new forms of settlement and labor units. It rejected Marxist doctrines of class warfare in favor of social democracy. In 1930 it joined with others in founding the MAPAI Party. After becoming independent from that party in 1944, Ahdut ha-Avodah joined with ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʾir, a Zionist socialist youth movement, to found the more radical left-wing MAPAM in 1948. It split with MAPAM in 1954, formed an alignment with MAPAI in 1965, and in 1968 merged again with MAPAI and the RAFI parties to form the Israel Labor Party.

Alignment (Maʾarakh)

From 1969 to 1984 the Alignment existed as a combination of the Israel Labor Party, MAPAI, and the United Worker's Party, MAPAM. Although the two parties retained their organizational independence, they shared a common slate in elections to the Knesset, the Histadrut, and local-government offices.

Am Ehad ("One Nation") (Received 2.8% of the vote, 3 seats, in 2003 election)

The Am Ehad Party is a labor-oriented organization with leadership that overlaps with the leadership of the Histadrut, the national labor union. Its focus is on social welfare issues, workers' rights, and collective agreements. The party's goals in the 2003 election were to keep in front of the public the debates over employment, unionization, the right to strike, and the ability to live with dignity; to reduce social gaps in income; and to have the government take an active role against unemployment. It focused its political platform on workers' rights. It also pursued "citizenship issues," ensuring a pension for every citizen and working for salary equality for women, and pressed several social issues, including free education from nursery school to university, equal rights in the health system, and adequate housing for each citizen.

Arab Democratic Party

The Arab Democratic Party was founded in early 1988 by Abdul Wahab Darawshe, a former Labor Party Knesset member. In 1988 it received about 12 percent of the total Arab vote and one seat in the Knesset elections. In a March 1988 interview, Darawshe acknowledged that his resignation from the Labor Party resulted from the Palestinian in-

Election results 1949–2003

	Left/ Socialist	Non-Socialist	Religious	Other
First Knesset (1949)	65 (MAPAI 46) (MAPAM 19)	21 (Herut 14) (Liberals 7)	16 (single-list)	18 (Communist 4) (Arab 2) (Other 12)
Second Knesset (1951)	60 (MAPAI 45) (MAPAM 15)	28 (Herut 8) (Liberals 20)	15 (NRP 10) (Aguda 5)	17 (Communist 5) (Arab 1) (Other 11)
Third Knesset (1955)	59 (MAPAI 40) (MAPAM 9) (Ahdut Ha'Avodah 10)	28 (Herut 15) (Liberals 13)	17 (NRP 11) (Aguda 6)	16 (Communist 6) (Arab 4) (Other 6)
Fourth Knesset (1959)	63 (MAPAI 47) (MAPAM 9) (Ahdut Ha'Avodah 10)	25 (Herut 17) (Liberals 8)	18 (NRP 12) (Aguda 6)	14 (Communist 3) (Arab 5) (Other 6)
Fifth Knesset (1961)	59 (MAPAI 42) (MAPAM 9) (Ahdut Ha'Avodah 8)	34 (Herut 17) (Liberals 17)	18 (NRP 12) (Aguda 6)	9 (Communist 5) (Arab 4)
Sixth Knesset (1965)	63 (MAPAI 45) (MAPAM 8) (Rafi 10)	26 Likud (single-list)	17 (NRP 11) (Aguda 6)	14 (Communist 4) (Arab 4) (Other 6)
Seventh Knesset (1969)	56 Israel Labor party (single-list)	26 Likud (single-list)	18 (NRP 12) (Aguda 6)	20 (Communist 4) (Arab 4) (Other 12)
Eighth Knesset (1973)	51 Israel Labor party (single-list)	39 Likud (single-list)	15 (NRP 10) (Aguda 5)	15 (Communist 5) (Arab 3) (Other 7)
Ninth Knesset (1977)	32 Israel Labor party (single-list)	43 Likud (single-list)	17 (NRP 12) (Aguda 5)	28 (Communist 5) (Arab 1) (DMC 15) (Other 7)
Tenth Knesset (1981)	47 Israel Labor party (single-list)	48 Likud (single-list)	10 (NRP 6) (Aguda 4)	15 (Communist 4) (Tehiya 3) (Tami 3) (Other 5)
Eleventh Knesset (1984)	44 Israel Labor party (single-list)	41 Likud (single-list)	12 (NRP 4) (Shas 4) (Aguda 2) (Morasha 2)	23 (Communist 4) (Arab 2) (Tehiya 2) (Shinui 2) (Civil Rights Movement 3) (Other 6)
Twelfth Knesset (1988	39 Israel Labor party (single-list)	40 Likud (single-list)	18 (Shas 6) (NRP 5) (Aguda 5) (Other 2)	23 (Communist 5) (Arab 3) (Civil Rights Movement 5) (Tehiya 3) (Shinui 2) (Other 5)
Thirteenth Knesset (1992)	56 (Israel Labor party 44)	32 Likud (single-list) (Meretz 12)	16 (Shas 6) (NRP 6) (United Torah Judaism 4)	16 (Communist 3) (Arab 2) (Tzomet 8) (Other 3)

[continued]

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Election results 1949–2003 [CONTINUED]

	Left/ Socialist	Non-Socialist	Religious	Other
Fourteenth Knesset (1996)	43 (Labor 34) (Meretz 9)	45 (Likud 32) (Yisrael B'Aliyah 7) (Third Way 4) (Moledet 2)	23 (Shas 10) (National Religious Party 9) (Yahdut HaTorah 4)	9 (United Arab List 4) (Hadash 5)
Fifteenth Knesset (1999)	44 (One Israel 26) (Meretz 10) (Shinui 6) (One Nation 2)	39 (Likud 19) (Yisrael B'Aliyah 6) (National Unity 4) (Center 6) (Israel Our Home 4)	27 (Shas 17) (National Religious Party 5) (United Torah Judaism 5)	10 (United Arab List 5) (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality 3) (Balad 2)
Sixteenth Knesset (2003)	44 (Labor 19) (Shinui 15) (Meretz 6) (Am Ehad 4)	46 (Likud 37) (National Union 7) (Yisrael B'Aliyah 2)	21 (Shas 11) (United Torah Judaism 5) (National Religious Party 5)	9 (Arab Parties 9)

tifada in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the "diminishing choices" open to Israeli Arab politicians affiliated with the government and yet tied to the Arab community by a sense of shared ethnic identity. Echoing the sentiments of other Israeli Arabs, Darawshe has stated that "the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians" living outside Israel's pre-1967 borders. The party won seats in the twelfth (1988), thirteenth (1992), and fourteenth (1996) Knesset elections, after which its membership merged with other Arab parties.

Balad *(See National Democratic Assembly)*

Citizens' Rights Movement (CRM, "Ratz")

The Citizens' Rights Movement (CRM) was founded in 1973 by Shulamit Aloni, a former Labor Party Knesset member. The CRM was founded as an expression of dissatisfaction with the conduct of the 1973 Arab–Israel War, and its primary issues involved strengthening civil rights in Israel and greater compromise on Israeli-Palestinian issues; the idea of the separation of religion and government has been particularly important to the party's platform. Its most prominent leader was the leftist, social-liberal activist Aloni. The party won three seats in the Knesset election of 1973 and briefly joined the Labor Party government in 1974, but left when Yitzhak Rabin accepted the National Religious Party as a coalition member. The CRM was reduced to one seat in 1977 by the popularity of the Democratic Movement for Change. At various times it negotiated with other left-wing groups (such as Shinui) about multiparty mergers, but no mergers resulted. In 1984 the CRM rebounded to win three Knesset seats and grew to five seats in 1988. It refused to join the 1984 National Unity government on matters of principle regarding cooperation with Likud. The CRM's platform centered on freedom of religion and culture; complete equality of all Israelis without regard to religion, nationality, race, or gender; full opposition to religious coercion; and negotiation with representatives of Palestinians and recognition of their right to self-determination. In 1992 many of its members joined the combined left-wing Meretz Party, which became a coalition partner of Labor.

Degel ha-Torah ("Torah Flag") *(See United Torah Judaism)*

Formed in 1988, the clericalist party is a SHAS-led Ashkenazi spinoff among the ultraorthodox community.

Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (HADASH) (Received 3.0% of the vote, 3 seats in 2003 election)

The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE) is considered to be on the "far left" of the political spectrum, and is made up of both Arabs and Jews. It is strongly in favor of the peace process, putting a just, comprehensive, and stable Israeli-Arab peace as a high priority, and it wants to see a Palestinian state established as soon as possible. It supports the State of Israel as a state of all of its cit-

izens rather than simply as a "Jewish state." It also strongly advocates the civil and national rights of Arabs in Israel, including the right of Palestinian refugees of 1948 to either return to their land or to be compensated for property that was abandoned at the time. Related to the issue of Arab rights, it seeks to act on behalf of the Arab working class to raise the standard of living of Israeli Arabs.

Democratic Movement for Change

The Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) was founded in 1976 by several groups, including the Shinui Party, to consolidate movements of dissatisfaction in the aftermath of the Arab–Israel War of 1973. The best-known figures of the DMC were Yigael Yadin, former IDF chief of staff and archaeology professor, and Amnon Rubinstein, Tel Aviv University law professor. Dissidents in the Labor Party helped the DMC to win fifteen seats in the Knesset of 1977. The DMC's program included electoral reform, decentralization of government, reorganization of the educational system, increased emphasis on social integration, and simplification of the bureaucracy. In foreign policy, the DMC stressed the preservation of the Jewish character of the state and territorial compromise on the West Bank, but opposed establishment of an independent Palestinian state there. Divided over the issue of cooperation with the Likud, DMC members decided to join the Likud-led government in 1977 without winning any of the major concessions they had insisted upon. It broke up in 1979 when the Shinui Party left over the issue of the DMC's cooperating with the Likud. The party did not put forward any candidates in the 1981 election.

Free Center

The Free Center was a faction that splintered from the Herut Party in 1967. From 1967 to 1973, through the Seventh Knesset, the Free Center was a party in its own right. It became a faction within Likud from 1973 to 1977, and joined the Democratic Movement for Change in 1977.

GAHAL (Acronym for Gush Herut-Liberalim, "the Freedom-Liberal Bloc," also known as the Herut-Liberal Bloc)

GAHAL is a political coalition list created in 1965 by an electoral combination of the Liberal Party and the Herut Party to compete against the 1965 and 1969 MAPAI-led electoral alignments. In 1967, on the eve of the outbreak of the Arab–Israeli War, GAHAL joined a National Unity Government with Labor; in 1973 GAHAL became part of the Likud Bloc.

General Zionist

A centrist Zionist party during the prestate period, in the 1940s General Zionist split into two factions, A and B, over the issues of attitudes towards the mandatory government and its policies on one hand, and the socialist-dominated Histadrut on the other. In the elections for the First Knesset, group A constituted the Progressive Party; group B, the General Zionists. United for a number of years after 1961 under the name of Liberal Party, they split again when one part (basically former group B) joined Herut in 1965 to form a joint list (GAHAL). The former Progressives continued as Independent Liberals.

Gesher ("Bridge")

Gesher was a splinter party founded in 1996 by a number of former Members of Knesset from the Likud, led by Likud MK David Levy (a former foreign minister known for his support for the Moroccan community in Israel). It was seen by many as a centrist-right party focusing on the social and economic problems of the population in Israel's periphery and development towns, populated initially by immigrants from North Africa.

HADASH *(See Democratic Front for Peace and Equality)*

Herut Party ("Freedom")

The Herut (Freedom) Party was founded in 1948, and until 1983 was led by Menachem Begin, a protégé of the Revisionist Zionist Vladimir Ze᾽ev Jabotinsky. Herut was a right-wing party founded by people who had been active in the Irgun in the prestate years, and had an ideology based on Revisionist Zionism. One of the key characteristics of the Revisionist movement was an emphasis on Jewish control of the territory of *Eretz Yisrael.* In 1973 Herut became the senior member of the Likud bloc, which included the Free Center Party, and which Begin led to victory in 1977. Prior to 1977, Herut

was identified as a party of opposition, one that would never control a plurality of the national vote (despite a brief appearance in a government of national unity from 1967 to 1970). Since 1977 the Herut, as the major partner of Likud, has been a successful alternative to the Labor Party coalition, and the Herut/Likud bloc has formed the basis of most Israeli governments.

Herut was traditionally associated with the idea of a Greater Israel, which includes the West Bank and Gaza, and many of its leaders favor annexation of those areas. It is committed to a diminution of government regulation in the economy, fewer concessions to the Palestinians, and strong security. It relies heavily on the Sephardic community to stay in power as part of the Likud coalition, which it joined in 1973.

Ihud Le'umi *(See National Union)*

Israel be-Aliyah ("Israel on the Increase") (Received 2.2% of the vote, 2 seats, in 2003 election)

One of the key issues of this party refers to the importance of *aliyah* (immigration) to the state. The party was founded in 1996 by Natan Sharansky, a well-known "refusnik" from the former Soviet Union. It is the only single-issue party that has been successful in recent years. It seeks to advance the rights of all immigrants, not just immigrants from Russia and the former Soviet Union, but Sharansky's background related to the former Soviet Union has made his appeal to that group especially strong.

The party seeks to make progress on the peace process by supporting a democratized Palestinian Authority. It also seeks to support the ingathering of most of the Jewish people in *Eretz Yisrael* (the land of Israel), and to expand the conditions necessary for the absorption of the Jewish people in the land of Israel.

Israel Beiteinu ("Israel Our Home")

Israel Beiteinu is an immigrants' rights party formed in 1999 by former prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu's Russian-born former chief of staff, Avigdor Lieberman. It seeks to curb what Lieberman says are the excessive powers of the police force, justice ministry, and court system. Its platform includes a commitment to work for tolerance, mutual respect, and respect for the rights of the individual; to work in the social and economic fields to assist weak population groups and young couples in the field of subsidized housing; and to work to advance rehabilitation projects for development towns on the basis of land reform.

The party supports the creation of a presidential system of government in Israel, and the entrenching of a fully written constitution and an active constitutional court. It supports a more vigorous separation of government and religion and the adoption of the recommendations of the Neeman Commission on orthodoxy of Judaism in Israel, and wants an expansion of the openness of the civil service. The party also seeks to transfer the authority for dealing with new immigrants from the Ministry of Immigration Absorption to local government.

Israel Communist Party ("Miflagah Komunistit Yisraelit," creating the acronym MAKI)

Under the general name Miflagah Komunistit Yisraelit (MAKI), communist parties in Palestine and Israel date back to at least 1919 and have undergone many metamorphoses. MAKI's membership recognized the new state of Israel and its flag and anthem, but denied linkages between the state and Jews overseas. One of its primary issues involved insisting upon the right of Arabs to establish a state in the territory recommended by the 1947 United Nations Partition Resolution. Ideology of class warfare and affiliation with international communist movements resulted in the party being seen by some Jews as anti-Zionist, and therefore it was excluded from participation in Yishuv affairs. After the establishment of the State of Israel, there were attempts by MAKI, the mainly Jewish communist party, to unify Jewish and Arab communists.

In 1964 an irreconcilable split over policy toward Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism resulted in a split and the formation of an Israeli Arab communist party, which took the name RAKAH (an acronym for Reshima Komunistit Hadashah, "New Communist List") as an alternative to the overwhelmingly Jewish MAKI. In the 1973 election the two communist parties, RAKAH and MAKI, ran together as Moked ("Focus"), but since 1973, only

RAKAH has borne the name *communist.* Jewish communists have carried on their activity in other structures, such as the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality or SHELI (an acronym for Shalom l'Israel, or "Peace for Israel"). One or more communist parties have had seats in every Israeli Knesset, but they have never been included in the coalition governments by which Israel has always been governed.

Israel Labor Party (With Meimad, received 14.5% of the vote, 19 seats, in 2003 election)

The Israel Labor Party (ILP, Mifleget ha-Avodah) has been the major social-democratic party of Israel since its formation in 1968 through a merger of MAPAI, RAFI, and Ahdut ha-Avodah Poʿalei Zion. It has never stood for election on its own, but rather has been the major partner in the Alignment, which was formed in 1969 with MAPAM. Labor, in various manifestations, was in power from the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948 until its defeat by the Likud under Menachem Begin in 1977, with the exception of two periods (1967–1969 and 1984–1988), when it shared power with the Likud in a National Unity government. It returned to full power in the election of 1992. As the senior member of the Labor Alignment in each Knesset since the ILP's formation, it received 80 to 85 percent of the Alignment's seats. Its leaders, Israel's most prominent Labor-Zionist figures, were also prime ministers when the Alignment was in power: Levi Eshkol (1968–1969), Golda Meir (1969–1973), Yitzhak Rabin (1974–1977 and 1992–1995), Shimon Peres (1995–96), and Ehud Barak (1999–2001).

The ILP's programs are broadly pragmatic in foreign policy and moderately socialist in domestic policy. In regard to the Palestinians, it has been willing to negotiate with only minimal preconditions, generally preferring a settlement through a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. It has sought to restart negotiations with the Palestinians based upon a "land for peace" formula, and is willing to consider unilateral withdrawal from certain parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip—within the framework of the Oslo Accords—if that will bring secure borders. Its public goal has been to "pursue peace as if there were no terror and fight terror as if there were no peace process." But Labor has also joined other Israeli parties in insisting that Israeli security be the first priority. It rejects the idea of annexation of the West Bank and Gaza but insists that the status of Jerusalem is not negotiable: Jerusalem is the indivisible capital of Israel, under Israeli sovereignty, including eastern neighborhoods, with special status accorded to places holy to Islam and Christianity. The party supports continuing all peace talks with nations of the region. Specifically, it wants to continue talks with Syria, and has indicated that it would be willing to make compromises on the issue of the Golan Heights if sufficient security concerns are met.

Party platforms have also stressed equality for Arab citizens of Israel. On domestic affairs, the ILP stands for a mixed economy, central economic planning, an extensive network of government-run social services, and close cooperation with the Histadrut, but also a large role for the private sector. On the role of religion, it accepts the "status quo agreement," under which religious affairs will be under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox rabbinate and rules about such matters as public transportation on the Sabbath will remain as they were at the time of the founding of the state. However, the party would also like to see Jewish religious pluralism and more rights for the Reform and Conservative movements.

The history of the ILP has often been stormy, providing an arena for conflicts among its strong leading personalities. Among these conflicts was the rivalry between Rabin and Peres, often over questions of who was responsible for ILP election setbacks and for the failures of some government policies. In 1977 Rabin's difficulties over an allegedly illegal bank account belonging to his wife were considered by some to be one of the causes of the Alignment's defeat by the Likud under Begin. In turn, many attribute subsequent electoral defeats to the "colorless" Peres, citing his replacement by Rabin as an important factor in the Alignment's decisive electoral victory in 1992. In an important reform of internal Israeli political party organization in 1968, the ILP broadened the selection process for Knesset candidates through primary elections, a practice that has since then been adopted by some other Israeli parties as well. Following the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in November 1995, Shimon Peres was elected Labor Party leader.

Kach ("Thus")

Kach, an ultranationalist party, came into being around Rabbi Meir Kahane, a U.S.-born right-wing Orthodox extremist. Kach advocated the forcible expulsion of Arabs from Israel and the Occupied Territories, followed by Israeli sovereignty there. A number of other party leaders have been implicated in Kach-supported terrorist activities. In 1988 the Likud and the Citizens' Rights Movement succeeded in having the Knesset pass a Basic Law empowering the Central Elections Board to prohibit any party advocating racism from contesting parliamentary elections in Israel; Kach, which had gained one seat in the 1984 elections after several earlier unsuccessful attempts to enter the Knesset, was outlawed from participating in the 1988 elections.

Liberal Party

The Liberal Party is a centrist party formed in 1961 by members of the General Zionist and Progressive parties. It is primarily interested in furthering the cause of a strong private sector in the economy with minimal government interference. In 1965 it joined the Herut Party in forming an electoral list called GAHAL, causing one of its wings to split off to become the Independent Liberals. The Liberal Party continues to exist as an independent entity within the Likud. In the Begin cabinet of 1977 one of Liberal's leaders, Simha Ehrlich, served as finance minister; two other Liberals, Yitzhak Modaʾi and Moshe Nissim, held the same post in the National Unity government of 1984. Another Liberal leader, Arie Dulzin, served for some time as chairman of the World Zionist Organization (WZO).

Likud ("Union") (Received 29.4% of the vote, 38 seats, in 2003 election)

An Israeli electoral bloc established in 1973, the Likud consisted originally of several independent parties: the Herut Party, the Liberal Party, the Free Center, State List, and part of the Land of Israel Movement. Much of the emphasis of its program has been on extension of Israeli sovereignty to the territories conquered in the Arab–Israel War of 1967. In large part, Likud was the direct ideological descendant of the Revisionist Party, established by Vladimir Jabotinsky in 1925. The Revisionist Party, so named to underscore the urgency of revision in the policies of the WZO's Executive, advocated militancy and ultranationalism as the primary political imperatives of the Zionist struggle for Jewish statehood. The Revisionist Party demanded that the entire mandated territory of historical Palestine on both sides of the Jordan River, including Transjordan, immediately become a Jewish state with a Jewish majority.

Taking advantage of public disenchantment with the Labor Party in 1977, Likud won forty-three Knesset seats and formed a coalition government led by Menachem Begin, which continued until 1984. In that year, neither Likud nor the Labor Alignment bloc won enough to form a coalition without the other. The two joined in a National Unity government in which Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir held the office of prime minister for half of the electoral period, and the blocs divided other government offices. In 1988 Likud and other right-wing and religious parties improved their showing, and Shamir again led the government until the Labor victory of 1992. During its years in power, Likud strongly resisted surrendering sovereignty over the Palestinian territories and made little progress in reducing the role of the government in the economy. One of Likud's problems has been the presence in it of several strong individuals and their factions, including Shamir, former chief of staff Ariel Sharon, and Moroccan leader David Levy, all of whom have tried vigorously to become dominant. In 1993 the Likud chairmanship was won by Benjamin Netanyahu, former ambassador to the United Nations and brother to the hero of the Israeli raid on Entebbe. He defeated his former rivals, Moroccan-born David Levy and Ariel Sharon, as well as younger figures such as Zeʾev Begin, with a spirited campaign based on American-style politics and effective use of the media, even though it was an election confined to party members.

The Likud has indicated that it is willing to negotiate peace with a Palestinian leadership "not compromised by terror," but it has also stated that it is opposed to the dismantling of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. It advocates increasing the population of the settlements in the West Bank, to which it believes Israel has a right, and calls for improvement of the social and economic conditions of Israel's disadvantaged communities, which consisted largely of Jews originating from Middle Eastern and Arabic lands, and the maintaining of the

current status quo in government-religious relations. The Likud campaigned heavily against the Oslo Accords. Allthough it claims that it will not "go back" on what has been done, the Likud has been extremely cautious.

MAPAI (Acronym for Mifleget Poʿalei Eretz Yisrael,or "Israel Workers' Party")

MAPAI is the principal Zionist and Israeli socialist party (1930–1968). Founded upon the merger of Ahdut Ha-Avodah and Ha-Poʿel Ha-Tzaʿir in 1930, it constituted the central and dominant political force in the labor movement, in the Yishuv (Jewish community of Palestine under the British Mandate), in the Zionist movement, and later in the State of Israel. Under the spiritual inspiration of Berl Katznelson, the party became the main ideological and political vehicle for the Jewish labor movement during the Yishuv period. Its central program focus was uniting socialist and national goals. To do that, however, it was necessary to work with nonsocialist parties and to accede to some of their premises.

MAPAI's chief political leader from the mid-1930s to 1963 was David Ben-Gurion. A leading pragmatist, he was frequently criticized by party elements who were more ideological. In 1963 Ben-Gurion resigned from MAPAI over the Lavon Affair. In 1965 MAPAI became a partner in the formation of the Labor Alignment, and in 1968 that organization in turn joined with the RAFI Party to form the Israel Labor Party. The 1965 election was the last one in which MAPAI ran candidates under its own name. During its existence, MAPAI's membership supplied all but one of Israel's prime ministers, all but one of the state's presidents and Knesset speakers, and all secretaries-general of the Histadrut.

MAPAM (Acronym of Mifleget Poʿalim Meʾuhedet, or "United Workers Party")

Founded in 1948, MAPAM was a Marxist-Zionist party that followed a Moscow-led policy until the death of Josef Stalin, when it disavowed that orientation. MAPAM split in 1954; former members of Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzaʿir remained with MAPAM, while former members of Ahdut Ha-Avodah-Poʿalei-Tziyon left MAPAM to form Ahdut Ha-Avodah. Thereafter, MAPAM concentrated much more on local matters. Combining the goals of Labor Zionism with a refusal to dispossess Israeli-Arabs, it received considerable criticism when it accepted Arab members. It advocated greater neutrality in foreign policy and a greater restraint in defense. Immediately after 1967, MAPAM opposed the establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank and strongly urged negotiations with the Palestinians. It was also among the quickest and most vigorous objectors to the Arab–Israeli War of 1982.

After 1969 MAPAM became a member of the Labor Alignment with MAPAI and other parties. There were forceful arguments within MAPAM over whether the Alignment's ideology was so mild that MAPAM's very principles were being violated, but those favoring continued membership prevailed until 1984, when the Alignment took part in the formation of the National Unity government in which Likud was a partner. MAPAM broke away from the Alignment and resumed its independent existence in the fall of 1984, when the Labor Party decided to join Likud in forming the National Unity government. In 1992 MAPAM joined with Shinui and the Citizen's Rights Movement to form Meretz, which became Labor's main coalition partner.

MAPAM's socioeconomic program was the most socialist of any Israeli party. It was also one of the strongest proponents of equality for Israeli Arabs. It did not, however, advocate class struggle in orthodox Marxist terms. MAPAM has advocated a strong national security and defense posture, with many of its members playing leading roles in the IDF. At the same time, it has urged continuing peace initiatives and territorial compromise, and has opposed the permanent annexation of the territories occupied in the Arab–Israel War of 1967 beyond minimal border changes designed to provide Israel with secure and defensible boundaries. MAPAM has long believed in Jewish-Arab coexistence and friendship as a means of hastening peace between Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab states.

Meimad ("Dimensions—Movements of the Religious Center") (With Labor Party, received 14.5% of the vote, 19 seats, in 2003 election)

Meimad was established in 1988 as a religious Zionist alternative to the National Religious Party. Meimad's goal was to represent, to cultivate, to

strengthen, and to disseminate the values of religious Zionism in Israel and abroad, and to incorporate Orthodox religious practice in Israeli public life, but it did not want to do so by restrictive legislation. Its platform called for working for the development of the State of Israel and influencing its social, economic, political, and spiritual life on the basis of the Torah. Meimad maintained that peace between Israelis and Arabs was possible and that Israel could negotiate land for peace. In 1999 Meimad joined Ehud Barak's One Israel Party.

Meretz ("Energy") (Received 5.2% of the vote, 6 seats, in 2003 election)

Meretz is seen as a left-wing, social-democratic secular party. Comprising MAPAM, Shinui, and the Citizens' Rights Movement, Meretz won twelve seats in the 1992 Knesset elections and became the most important coalition partner in Israel's Labor Party. Its most widely publicized program includes advocating for more conciliatory policies on negotiations with the Palestinians, supporting an accelerated peace process and a just and comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors, and dismantling settlements and withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Many young Israelis are also attracted to its reformist views on education, economic, human rights, and environmental issues. Meretz is a democratic, peace-seeking party in which Jews and Arabs work in complete equality. Meretz is committed to human rights, to equality of citizens of the country, to social justice, to Israel's security, and to the values of humanistic Zionism. Its concern with social justice has led it to take some activist positions in relation to economic policy. It has promoted more state funding for education because since education is the cornerstone of a democratic society. It has also advocated freedom of religion and greater separation between religion and the state, arguing for equal status for all branches of Judaism.

Mizrahi

Mizrahi consists of offshoots of the Orthodox Jewish world Mizrahi movement, established in 1902 with the aim of securing "Eretz Yisrael for the people of Israel according to the Torah of Israel." The Mizrahi and Ha-Poʿel Ha-Mizrahi ran as separate political parties in the elections to the first Israeli Knesset (1949), joining together to form the National Religious Party (NRP) in 1956. From 1951 to 1977, Mizrahi candidates occupied ten to twelve seats in the Knesset. Although the Mizrahi-Ha-Poʿel Ha-Mizrahi movement played a major role in establishing the public religious character of Israel in its initial decades of nationhood, the party's power and prestige had declined by the 1980s. The party continued to struggle to establish mandatory recognition of the Sabbath as the national day of rest and of the practice of *kashrut* (strict observance of dietary laws) in all national institutions, settlements, and organizations, so that the state's constitution would be based on *halakhah* (Jewish religious law). Mizrahi envisages, in the ultimate stage, a Jewish state governed according to *halakhah,* and it considers the present-day secular state to be a precursor of that state.

Since 1981 the number of NRP Knesset seats declined by more than 50 percent. This has been attributed to a number of causes, including the perceived stance of the majority party, Likud, to religious tradition; to ideological confusion, stagnation, and an absence of NRP leadership development; to an empowerment of Sephardic Jews and the creation of parties dominated by Sephardic Jews; and to a move by NRP to the religious right, which led many former Mizrahi loyalists into the more sectarian religious parties, such as Agudat Israel and SHAS.

Moledet ("Homeland")

The Moledet Party ran in 1988 on an extremist platform advocating the forcible "transfer" of Palestinian Arabs from the West Bank to Arab states. It argued that population transfer should be a precondition for peace negotiations with any Arab country. It also advocated the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza into Israel and the continuation of settlements in the areas. The party actively opposed the idea of a binational State of Israel. Led by retired IDF General Rehavam ("Gandhi") Zeʾevi, the party won two seats in the 1988 Knesset elections.

Morashah ("Heritage")

Morashah is a nationalist-religious party led by Rabbi Chaim Druckman that broke away from the National Religious Party in 1984. In 1986 it was reincorporated into the National Religious Party.

National Democratic Assembly (Balad) (Received 2.3% of the vote, 3 seats, in 2003 election)

The National Democratic Assembly is an Israeli Arab party that argues that Israel should be a democratic state for all of its citizens. It advocates the right of return for all Arab refugees from the 1948 Arab–Israel War, full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, and sthe creation of a Palestinian state in the territories conquered in 1967, the capital of which should be eastern Jerusalem. It promotes economic and social advancement of a national Arab minority, and advocates cooperation with Jewish elements that are willing to support its major goals.

National Religious Party (NRP, Mafdal) (Received 4.2% of the vote, 6 seats, in 2003 election)

The National Religious Party, founded in 1956, was the largest and most influential component of the religious bloc, and a member of every Israeli government up to 1992. It had the reputation of being less militant and more pragmatic than some of the others in the religious bloc. At times this image led to its being overshadowed by parties such as TAMI and SHAS, both of which charged that the NRP failed to give adequate representation to Oriental Jews. It advocates a religious Jewish lifestyle as well as full participation in Israeli society for Orthodox Jews, and legislation based on the legal system of the Torah and Jewish tradition. Its central goals are to preserve the religious character of the country, and to ensure the provision of all religious services to the public and to individuals by means of state, local, and other public institutions. It supports the retention of the Occupied Territories based on national security considerations as well as Biblical and Zionistic beliefs, and promotes the expansion of settlements in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, as well as in other territories that it sees as the Land of Israel. During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the NRP always had ten to twelve seats in the Knesset, and usually controlled the Ministry of Religious Affairs as well as the Ministry of the Interior. After 1981 it fell to a consistent level of four to six seats. The losses led it to move further to the right on domestic issues and to a somewhat more moderate position in regard to the territories occupied by Israel.

National Union (Ihud Leʾumi, received 5.5% of the vote, 7 seats, in 2003 election)

The National Union is a coalition of three right-wing secular parties—Moledet, Tekumah, and Israel Beiteinu—that came into existence in February 2000. The three parties advocate the voluntary transfer of Arabs from the West Bank and Gaza to other Arab countries, and are against concessions to the Palestinian Authority and the creation of a Palestinian state.

One Nation *(See Am Ehad)*

Poʿalei Agudat Israel ("Agudat Workers' Organization")

Poʿalei Agudat Israel was an organization originally established in Poland in 1922 that initiated activities in Palestine in 1925. The PAI identified with Agudat Israel on religious matters, and advocated cooperation with secular workers' organizations and service in the Israel Defense Forces. In most elections the PAI ran on a joint electoral list with Agudat candidates. In 1960 PAI joined the government coalition against the advice of the Agudat Council of Sages.

Poʿalei Mizrahi ("Spiritual Center Workers")

An Orthodox religious workers' movement founded in Palestine in 1922 by a left-wing faction of Mizrahi, in 1956 it joined Mizrahi to form the National Religious Party.

Progressive List for Peace

Also known as the Progressive National Movement, this non-Zionist party was one of the strongest challengers to the Israeli Arab community's RAKAH Party. The movement came into being in 1984, advocating recognition of the PLO and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip alongside Israel. It won two seats in 1984 elections, for Muhammad Miʾari and Mattityahu Peled, who along with Uri Avnery and Yaacov Arnon met with Yasir Arafat in 1984 and 1984, challenging the Israeli law banning contacts with the PLO.

RAFI (Acronym for Reshimat Poʿalei Israel, or "Israel Labor List")

In 1965 MAPAI members who were dissatisfied with the formation of the Labor Alignment split off to

form the RAFI Party. Their grievances included resentment over the alleged inflexibility of MAPAI and its failure to give opportunities to young leaders, and their displeasure with the handling of the Lavon Affair (a bitter dispute over government handling of a 1954 espionage and sabotage operation gone awry). The leading dissident was David Ben-Gurion, who was joined by others, including Moshe Dayan, Shimon Peres, and Yizhak Navon. Among the programs that RAFI advocated were regional elections, personal election of mayors, government financing of elections, overhaul of much of the systems of health and unemployment insurance, and free compulsory education between the ages of 1 and 16. RAFI won ten seats in the Knesset in 1965. In 1968 Dayan and most other RAFI leaders, with the exception of Ben-Gurion, rejoined MAPAI and were among those who (along with Ahdut Ha-Avodah) founded the Israel Labor Party.

RAKAH (Acronym for Reshima Komunistit Hadash, or "New Communist List.")

In 1965 a group of former supporters of the Communist Party of Israel—MAKI—broke away from the main group to form RAKAH. RAKAH consisted primarily of Arab communists, and it participated in the 1988 elections. In the 1973 elections RAKAH and MAKI created a joint electoral list called Moked ("Focus").

SHAS (Acronym for Sephardi Torah Guardians) (Received 8.2% of the vote, 11 seats, in 2003 election)

SHAS is an ultraorthodox Sephardic religious movement led by spiritual mentor Rabbi Ovadia Yosef. Due to long-simmering anger over the absence of Sephardic leadership in the party, and specifically over inadequate representation of ultraorthodox Sephardim in the Council of Torah Sages, the Jerusalem Sephardic members of Agudat Israel broke away and established the Sephardi Torah Guardians Party (SHAS) in the early1970s. It was so successful in the October 1983 municipal elections in Jerusalem that it ran a national slate of candidates in 1984 and became an impressive force. SHAS has continued to win seats since 1984, becoming increasingly successful and powerful.

The key issues with which SHAS has been associated all relate to the relationship between government and religion. Most fundamentally, SHAS seeks to develop the traditional values of religion and orthodox Judaism in Israel—specifically, Sephardic Jewry. SHAS says that it supports the Talmudic precept of the supreme value of preserving life, and is therefore amenable to territorial compromise if it would bring true peace. It says that it supports autonomy for Palestinians, but it has opposed a Palestinian state. On explicitly religious issues it says that it supports the religious status quo, but would like to see a "Jewish state in every way." The core belief of the party is that governmental policies should be based on strict Jewish law. In the past, the party has been prepared to relinquish land in return for peace, but in recent years has been increasingly uncomfortable with this policy given increased terror.

SHELI (Acronym for Shalom l'Israel, or "Peace for Israel")

SHELI was created in 1977 by MAKI and several other groups. It disbanded before the 1984 elections.

Shinui ("Change") (Received 12.3% of the vote, 15 seats, in the 2003 election)

Shinui was established as a liberal, secular Zionist party in 1973 after splitting from the Democratic Movement for Change in protest against the Arab–Israel War of 1973. It became an ally of the Labor Party and a strong voice for electoral and constitutional reform and for a more flexible policy in the Arab–Israel dispute. It stood for a secular state, and advocated separating religion and the state; it announced that it would not sit in a government coalition with ultraorthodox religious parties. In relation to the Palestinian issue Shinui indicated that it was in favor of a territorial compromise for peace, but that it would be tough on security issues. In economic issues it supported a free-market economy and privatization of government-owned businesses.

In 1992 Shinui, MAPAM, and the Citizens' Rights Movement joined to form Meretz, which won twelve seats and became the main coalition partner of the Labor Party.

State List

In June 1963 Ben-Gurion resigned as Israel's prime minister, citing "personal reasons," and Levi Eshkol

took over the posts of prime minister and defense minister. But Ben-Gurion remained active politically, and a rivalry developed between him and Eshkol. In June 1965 the MAPAI Party split, and Ben-Gurion established RAFI ("Israel Labor List"), which won ten Knesset seats in the following election. In 1968 RAFI rejoined MAPAI and Ahdut Ha-Avodah to form the Israel Labor Party, and Ben-Gurion formed a new party, the State List (Ha-Reshima Ha-Mamlachtit), which won four Knesset seats in the 1969 elections.

TAMI (Acronym for Tnuʾat Masoret Israel, or "Tradition of Israel Movement")

TAMI was formed from a faction within the National Religious Party in 1981, primarily to increase attention to the problems of Sephardi (Oriental) Jews, especially those from North Africa. It won three seats in the tenth Knesset of 1982 and was part of the second Begin coalition government, but fell to only one seat in 1984. Its program was Zionist and traditional, with emphasis on equality of opportunity for members of all ethnic groups. It was one of only a few essentially ethnic parties in Israeli history. In 1988 it became a faction of the Likud.

Tehiyah ("Renaissance")

Tehiyah, or Ha-Tehiyah, was founded in 1979 by former supporters of the National Religious Party to oppose the return of Sinai land to Egypt as provided by the Camp David Accords. A radical right-wing party, it won three seats in the Knesset of 1981 and five in 1984. It did not join the 1984 National Unity government, in protest against the latter's policy limiting new settlements. In the 1988 election Tehiyah fell back to three seats, and it failed to win any in 1992. Tehiyah advocated the eventual imposition of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and supported the transfer of Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank to other Arab countries. It included among its main successes the 1980 Jerusalem Law and the extension of Israeli law to the Golan Heights.

Third Way (Ha-Derekh Ha-Shlishit)

The Third Way was founded in 1995 as a political movement, and it became a party in 1996. The Third Way was founded by Members of Knesset who broke away from the Labor Party, claiming that Labor was making compromises that were dangerous to Israel's security, particularly with regard to withdrawals on or from the Golan Heights. The Third Way saw itself as a centrist party, and claimed to be the only reasonable alternative to Labor and Likud (hence the "third way," if Labor was one choice and Likud the other). It was, essentially, a one-issue party, dealing with concessions to the Arabs over policies governing the Occupied Territories.

Torah Religious Front

The Torah Religious Front was formed by the Agudat Israel and Poʿalei Agudat Israel parties to campaign in the 1955 and 1959 elections. The front excluded the two Mizrahi religious parties, claiming that they were insufficiently committed to the concept of a Torah state. The Torah Religious Front was dissolved prior to the 1961 elections.

Tzomet ("Crossroads")

Tzomet, a right-wing party, was formed in 1983 to 1984 as a splinter within the Tehiyah Party, and it won two seats as an independent party in the 1988 Knesset election. In the 1992 election it won eight seats. It joined the Likud in 1996.

Tzomet was designed as a secular party. The basis of its platform was a hard line on the Palestinian issue, but it also advocated populist positions on many quality-of-life issues. It opposed the Oslo Accords, and supported Israel's retention of the West Bank. Although its members called for an active pursuit of peace with the Palestinians and Israel's neighbors, it was opposed to territorial compromise and suggested that Arab refugees in and from the Occupied Territories should be resettled in Arab countries. It promoted Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

United Arab List (Received 2.1% of the vote, 2 seats in the 2003 election)

The United Arab List is a union of three Israeli-Arab parties—the United Arab Party, the Arab National Party, and the Islamic Movement. Under the leadership of, it calls for Israel to have a not overtly Jewish character, saying that Israel should be a state for all of its inhabitants. The party advocates a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, and seeks the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its cap-

ital It also calls for the right of return for Palestinian refugees from the 1948 Arab–Israel War.

The party seeks full equality in Israeli society for both Jews and non-Jews, and a just and durable peace between Israel and its neighbors based on the principle of two states for two peoples, the Israeli and the Palestinian.

United Religious Front

The United Religious Front was an electoral alliance created in 1949 composed of the four religious parties: Mizrahi, ha-Poʿel ha-Mizrahi, Poʿalei Agudat Israel, and Agudat Israel. In 1951 the four parties campaigned separately.

United Torah Judaism (Received 4.3% of the vote, 5 seats, in the 2003 election)

United Torah Judaism is a coalition of two ultra-orthodox parties—Agudat Israel and Degel Ha-Torah—representing religious factions in Israel, Europe, and the United States. It is predominantly Ashkenazi. Its basic premise is that governmental policies should be based on Jewish law, and it believes that the Land of Israel was given by God to the Jewish People.

It calls for all domestic and foreign policies to be based in Torah law. Different members of the party support either the religious status quo or the passing of more religious legislation, primarily in the areas of the Law of Return and personal status (the "Who is a Jew?" question). While not active in the political debate over peace, United Torah Judaism is seen as slightly further to the right than SHAS.

The Agudat Israel membership calls for an for and increased role for the Torah in the spiritual, economic, and political life of the Land of Israel. Degel Ha-Torah's concerns focus upon representing the Torah-observant public in Israel in the institutions of government—in the government, the Knesset, and the local authorities—in order to protect and fulfill the special needs of this public in all areas of life, and to prevent discrimination against the Orthodox religious *(haredi)* public. It also seeks to influence Israeli society to observe a Jewish way of life in accordance with the Torah.

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ISRAEL, ARABS IN

See PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

ISRAELI ART

See ART

ISRAELI DANCE

See DANCE

ISRAELI FILM

See FILM

ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

Towns and villages built since the 1967 Arab–Israel war on lands captured and occupied by Israel.

Since the 1967 Arab–Israel War, successive Israeli governments have promoted the settlement (colonization) of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by Israeli citizens. By 2003, there were in excess of 200,000 settlers residing in a number of villages and townships throughout those areas and at least the same number in the suburbs of east Jerusalem.

The first phase in West Bank settlement activity took place under the Labor governments that remained in power until 1977. Known as the Allon Plan, after its initiator Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, the settlement blueprint was a minimalist one aimed at constructing a line of agricultural settlements along the new eastern border in the Jordan valley. This was part of a concept that assumed that civilian settlements contributed to the defensive posture of the country and that it was necessary to ensure defensible borders between Israel and Jordan. The Allon Plan also proposed the establishment of additional settlements around Jerusalem and in close proximity to the Green Line border as a means of ensuring future territorial changes in favor of Israel. The rest of the West Bank region was deemed unsuitable for settlement because of the dense concentration of Palestinian population, unlike the Jordan valley, which was sparsely populated. Allon envisaged a situation in which the rest of the West Bank would eventually be part of an autonomous area under Jordanian administration and linked to the Kingdom of Jordan by means of a territorial corridor running from Ramallah via Jericho (the only major Palestinian population center in the Jordan Valley) to the border crossings on the Jordan River.

Israeli soldiers stand guard in the West Bank. The West Bank, which had been annexed by Jordan in 1950, came under the control of the Israeli military after the War of 1967. The area was home to many Palestinians, and clashes arose when Israeli settlers began to move into the territory. © MIKI KRATSMAN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Settlement localities and population, 2001

Settlement type	Number of settlements (West Bank and Gaza Strip)	Population
Rural	10	9,700
Rural communal	69	41,700
Rural Kibbutzim	9	1,800
Rural Moshavim	32	8,800
Total rural population	**120**	**62,000**
Urban 2,000–9,999	14	57,500
Urban 10,000–19,999	4	63,000
Urban 20,000–49,999	1	25,800
Total urban population	**19**	**146,300**
Grand total	**139**	**208,300**

SOURCE: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel,* 2002, Table 2.9.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Following the Arab–Israel War of October 1973, a new religious nationalist movement, Gush Emunim ("Bloc of the Faithful"), was established with the objective of promoting settlement throughout the West Bank and Gaza. They saw this as a means of extending Israeli control over the whole of the historic Greater Israel ("Eretz Yisrael ha-Shelemah").



Map by XNR Productions, Inc. The Gale Group.

They criticized the Allon plan for being minimalist and too compromising in its territorial claims. Their settlement blueprint was rejected by the Rabin government of the time, but was later accepted in 1977 following the rise to power of Israel's first right-wing Likud government under the leadership of Menachem Begin.

Settlement activity took off vigorously in the early 1980s when the planning regulations and restrictions were lifted to make it easier to create suburban communities as an alternative to agricultural and socially controlled small settlements. Under the slogan of "five minutes from Kfar Saba," Israelis were now able to build detached houses on large land plots which they received at a low cost and, at the same time, retain their places of employment in the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem metropolitan centers. During the 1980s and 1990s, the road and transportation infrastructure linking Israel to the West Bank was improved, thus enhancing the appeal of the region for many Israelis who were attracted to settle there for economic rather than ideological or political reasons.

Following the first National Unity government of 1984, the Israeli cabinet announced a freeze on all new settlement activity. But, despite this and similar announcements by subsequent governments, settlement activity continued unabated, even under the pro-peace administrations of Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak. At the most, there were periods in which no new settlements were constructed, but the expansion and consolidation of existing communities to allow for "natural growth" never ceased. Under the Ariel Sharon administration after February 2001, militant settlers constructed new settlement outposts on their own initiative. These were deemed illegal by the government as a means to differentiate them from the so-called "legal" settlements and were forcibly removed in an attempt to appease international criticism of settlement activity.

The settlements are organized in a system of small towns (some of them, such as Ariel, Emanuel, and Maʿaleh Adumim, consist of over 20,000 inhabitants each) and villages. A system of municipal regional and local councils, similar to that in operation inside Israel itself, caters to their daily needs in the areas of public services, schools, health clinics, and welfare services. This system of local government operates totally independently and separately from the parallel, but much poorer, system that continued to function for the majority Palestinian population of the region.

The establishment of the settlements has resulted in the expropriation of much Palestinian land in both the public and private domain. Israeli high court rulings at the end of the 1970s warned against the use of private land for such purposes, but there are differences of opinion concerning just what is private and what is public land. Under international law, even the use of public land in occupied territories can only be justified for bona fide defensive purposes, not for the sake of civilian settlement activity. Security problems during the Al-Aqsa intifada that broke out in September 2000 led Israel to destroy Palestinian olive groves, orchards, and other agricultural assets in attempts to enhance the safety of the settlers and their families. Similar con-

cerns have also resulted in the construction of bypass and controlled-access roads throughout the region, enabling settlers to reach their homes without having to drive through the Palestinian towns and villages while causing disruptions to the normal movement of Palestinians.

The issue of settlements has been a major point for discussion in all negotiations aimed at bringing an end to the conflict. Most observers agree that any future peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians based on territorial compromise will necessitate the evacuation and removal of most, if not all, of these settlements. The inconclusive territorial negotiations that accompanied the Oslo Accords either ignored the settlement issue altogether or attempted to redraw the borders in such a way as to include as many settlements on the Israeli side of the border—whether in exchange for territory elsewhere or as out-and-out annexation. The building of a unilaterally imposed security wall begun in 2002 in effect implemented this policy on the ground.

See also Allon, Yigal; Gush Emunim.

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David Newman

ISRAEL LABOR PARTY

See Israel: Political Parties in

ISTANBUL

Largest city of Turkey; capital of the Byzantine and Ottoman empires.

Istanbul is the only city in the world straddling two continents (Europe and Asia). Its situation at the southern end of the Bosporus Strait and on the Golden Horn (an inlet of the Bosporus bisecting the European side) provides the city with excellent harbors. When the Ottoman sultan Mehmet II conquered the city in 1453, he took the title "Master of the Two Seas and Lord of Two Lands," glorifying his new capital at the junction of land routes from Asia and Europe, and of sea routes from the Black Sea and the Mediterranean (through the Dardanelles Strait).

Istanbul's roots date to a short-lived Mycenean settlement in the second millennium B.C.E. and the foundation of Byzantium as a Megaran colony in the seventh century B.C.E. The city rose to greatness when the Roman emperor Constantine I chose this "New Rome" as his capital in 324 C.E., renaming it Constantinopolis and extending its area over seven hills on the peninsula between the Golden Horn and the Sea of Marmara. The most imposing Byzantine monuments of the city date from the reigns of early emperors who followed Constantine, and throughout its eleven centuries as capital, the city continuously was adorned by fine examples of Byzantine architecture. By the mid-fifteenth century, however, the once mighty Byzantine Empire had shrunk to such an extent that it held only the city and its immediate environs, surrounded on all sides by the rising Ottoman state. Mehmet II conquered the city in 1453 and set about to rebuild and repopulate his new capital. Within a century, Istanbul had a cosmopolitan population that reflected its international status and the multiethnic character of the empire. Of the two Greek names of the city, Kustantaniyye remained an official designation, but the colloquial eis ten polein, Turkified as Istanbul, was firmly established as the city's name.

In the seventeenth century Pera, located on the heights above Galata, became the site of European embassies and merchants' mansions, leading to the Europeanization of the city's municipal administration, architecture, banking, and trading. Greater Istanbul covered a large area beyond the walled city. However, the population was concentrated in the walled city and across the Golden Horn in Galata; fishing villages along the Bosporus became fashionable summering suburbs, expanding with the advent of steam ferry service. Railway lines constructed late in the nineteenth century led to the further development of European and Asian suburbs along the Sea of Marmara. In the last days of the Ottoman Empire, the city and its suburbs had a total population

Istanbul's impressive Blue Mosque was completed in 1616 during the reign of Sultan Ahmet I. The architecture is classic Ottoman, with a perfect proportion of domes and semidomes, and the interior is covered by twenty thousand blue ceramic tiles that give the landmark its nickname. © Rose Hartman/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

of about 900,000: 560,000 Muslims, 205,000 Greeks, 73,000 Armenians, 52,000 Jews, and several thousand Europeans, according to a 1914 census.

During World War I, the Ottoman capital was defended successfully at the Dardanelles (Gelibolu/Gallipoli). Despite this victory, the city suffered typical wartime deprivations, and after the armistice it was occupied by the Allied powers. It was the only defeated capital to be subjected to occupation, primarily because of its strategic position and the international importance of the Turkish Straits. The Turkish nationalist movement that defeated the occupation was directed from Ankara, then a secondary city on the Anatolian plateau. After victory, the sultanate and the caliphate were abolished (in 1922 and 1924, respectively), and the Turkish republic (founded in 1923) chose Ankara as its capital, because it was both easier to defend against foreign powers and untainted by the Ottoman past. During the occupation, Istanbul experienced an influx of White Russians fleeing Bolshevik rule. Most of these Russians, along with many of the local Greeks and Armenians, left in the early years of the republic. Istanbul became much more Turkish, albeit at the cost of a reduced population. The prewar population level was regained only after 1950, when an explosive rate of growth began. Much of this new growth was due to the migration of the rural poor to the industrializing urban areas. By the 2000 census, Istanbul's population had reached 9,119,135.

With the population explosion, the city has suffered the breakdown of transport, electricity, gas, and water supply. Temporary shantytowns, or *gecekondu*s, gradually have transformed into permanent tenements. In older quarters of the city, graceful wooden houses have given way to blocks of characterless

Istanbul boasts many forms of public transportation, including trams. The tram line, managed by the Istanbul Municipality, was renovated in the early 1990s, and tickets between the tram system and bus system are conveniently interchangeable.
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apartments. Nevertheless, this ancient capital of two great empires retains a rich architectural heritage and extraordinary setting, so that Istanbul remains one of the great cities of the world. Two bridges across the Bosporus connect the European and Asian suburbs, and a new business center has developed further to the north. Istanbul has regained its historical role as the region's international trading and financial capital.

See also GECEKONDU.

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I. METIN KUNT
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

Oldest engineering college in Turkey.

Istanbul Technical University (ITU) is one of the oldest engineering colleges in the world; it traces its origins to 1773, when the Ottoman Empire established a military engineering school in Constantinople as part of a modernization effort. In 1884 a separate department in the school was set up for civilian students. That department was transferred to the Ministry of Public Works in 1909 and was spread over several campuses in Istanbul until 1920, when its present campus was established on a hill overlooking the Turkish Straits. After Turkey was proclaimed a republic in 1923, additional departments were added to provide training in railroad construction, electro-mechanics, civil engineering, and architecture. In 1944 the school was reorganized and named Istanbul Technical University. Its eleven faculties offer instruction in thirty-three departments, including engineering, architecture, management, and the sciences. The university has also expanded its programs in research and development.

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NIYAZI DALYANCI

ISTANBUL UNIVERSITY

Largest and oldest public university in Turkey.

Founded in 1900 and reorganized in its present form in 1933, Istanbul University comprises the faculties of letters, science, law, economics, forestry, pharmacy, dentistry, political science, business administration, veterinary science, engineering, and two faculties of medicine, as well as schools of fisheries, journalism, paralegal studies, and tobacco

specialist education. With 3,500 teaching staff and 60,000 students (46 percent female) in 2002, it is Turkey's biggest university.

Istanbul University sometimes claims descent from the complex of eight madrasa colleges (religious schools) endowed by Mehmet II soon after the conquest of Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 1453. However, a university in the European sense was first proposed in the era of Tanzimat, the Ottoman Empire's reform period in the 1860s. After some abortive attempts, the university was launched in 1900, incorporating newly established faculties and colleges founded in the previous two decades. After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the staff as well as the programs of Istanbul University were suspected in Ankara, the new capital, of resistance to republican reform. Finally, in 1933 a complete overhaul of the academic programs and a purge of the staff brought it in line with republican thinking. This era of reestablishment was facilitated by the influx of large numbers of German and other European scholars, many of them Jewish, fleeing Nazi intimidation or persecution. The refugee scholars were especially active in the fields of law and economics, but other programs, including Islamic studies, benefited from a substantial European presence.

In spite of the government's attempts to promote Ankara University during the 1950s, Istanbul University remained the country's biggest and most prestigious academic establishment. Its academic staff and students were in the forefront of political protests in the late 1950s and during the 1970s. Its legal experts were influential in the preparation of the 1961 constitution, promulgated after the 1960 military coup. Its economists have been champions of Turkish membership in the European Union since the mid-1980s.

See also ANKARA UNIVERSITY; MADRASA.

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ISTIQLAL PARTY

This entry consists of the following articles:

ISTIQLAL PARTY: LIBYA
ISTIQLAL PARTY: MOROCCO
ISTIQLAL PARTY: PALESTINE
ISTIQLAL PARTY: SYRIA

ISTIQLAL PARTY: LIBYA

Political party of Tripolitania, Libya, 1948–1952.

Istiqlal (Independence party) was founded in 1948 by Salim al-Muntasir, former leader of the United National Front of Libya, from which many members were drawn. One of several political parties that briefly flourished under the British military administration at a time of intense debate about the future of Libya, the Istiqlal's influence belied a small following. It came under the patronage of a powerful lobby advocating renewed Italian rule in Tripolitania, activity the British authorities eventually suppressed. The party was a divisive element in Tripolitanian politics at a time when most of the province's leaders were trying to make a coherent case for Libyan unity and independence. It was one of four Tripolitanian political groups whose views on Libyan independence were heard by the United Nations in 1949. Like all other officially sanctioned parties, the Istiqlal was suppressed as a result of the disturbances that followed the first postindependence elections of February 1952.

See also LIBYA; TRIPOLITANIA.

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JOHN L. WRIGHT

ISTIQLAL PARTY: MOROCCO

Leading party in the Moroccan nationalist movement, 1946–1956, and chief competitor of the monarchy during the first postindependence decades.

Istiqlal was founded in 1943 by the core leadership of the banned Parti National. Headed by Ahmed Balafrej and Allal al-Fasi, it drew its strength from the traditional bourgeois elites of the northern cities, particularly Fez, the emerging national bour-

geoisie, and more leftist urban professionals. Its charter, issued on 11 January 1944, demanded independence from France with a constitutional monarchy under the sultan. The publication of the charter and the resulting arrest of Balafrej provoked serious urban unrest in January and February 1944. Fasi returned to Morocco in 1946 after nine years in Gabon and assumed undisputed leadership of the party. By 1950 Istiqlal's membership was 100,000. After 1951 Istiqlal supported the sultan against the French authorities. In 1952 the party was suppressed following riots in Casablanca, but it played an important role in the negotiations for independence (1953–1956).

Istiqlal assumed a dominant position in the initial postindependence Moroccan governments, but internal splits and competition from the palace prevented it from establishing lasting dominance. In 1959 Istiqlal was weakened by the secession of some of its more dynamic leaders (for example, Prime Minister Abdullah Ibrahim, Mehdi Ben Barka, Mahjoub Ben Seddiq, and Muhammad al-Basri), who formed the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP), which favored far-reaching social reforms and vigorous development programs through nationalization of key economic sectors.

The monarchy refused to acquiesce to Istiqlal's efforts to reduce its powers. From the end of 1962 to 1977, King Hassan II repelled challenges to his rule and consolidated his political supremacy. Like the other opposition parties, Istiqlal was harnessed into service by Hassan during the mid-1970s in support of his Western Sahara policy. In Istiqlal's case, that was hardly unexpected, since it had been the original standard-bearer of the claim of historical rights to "Greater Morocco," which in the doctrine's purest form included all of Mauritania and parts of Algeria, Senegal, and Mali, as well as the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.

Fasi died in 1974 while in Romania to explain the king's Western Saharan policy; Muhammad Boucetta replaced him as secretary-general. Boucetta and other Istiqlal leaders were co-opted into the government in 1977, but following the 1984 elections, Istiqlal returned to opposition ranks. Although no longer the leader of the nationalist movement, Istiqlal maintained a significant place in the political landscape, thanks in part to its affiliated labor confederation, the Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains (UGTM), and its influential daily newspapers, *Al-Alam* and *L'opinion.* In May 1992, with the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), the Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme (PPS), the rump UNFP, and the tiny Organisation pour l'Action Démocratique et Populaire (OADP), Istiqlal formed the "Democratic Bloc" *(al-kutla)* to press for constitutional and electoral reform. Istiqlal won forty-three seats in Parliament in the direct balloting portion of the 1993 elections, a gain of nineteen seats from 1984, but only eight seats in the indirect portion of the vote, a decline of nine seats. Along with the USFP, Istiqlal was now roughly equal in size to the pro-palace Union Constitutionelle and the Mouvement Populaire as the largest parliamentary factions. They refused the terms offered to them for joining a new government, and thus remained in opposition. In the 1997 elections the Istiqlal received nearly the same number of votes as the leading vote-getter, the USFP, but owing to the vagaries of the system, declined to thirty-two seats. Charging widespread fraud, the party's congress

The Istiqlal Party was formed by Moroccan nationalists in 1943 and supported Sultan Muhammad V in his quest to bring self-rule to the country. The sultan was deposed in 1953, but the French allowed him to return to power in 1955, and the Istiqlal Party was able to hold its first public meeting in Rabat two months later. © Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

called for the election's annulment and rejected participation in any new government. Two months later, however, the USFP was chosen to lead the new government, and the Istiqlal, under the newly elected secretary-general, Abbas al-Fasi, joined the forty-one-member cabinet, receiving six posts, with Fassi becoming minister of health. The USFP-Istiqlal relationship in government was frequently rocky. In the 2002 elections, the party increased its strength in parliament to forty-eight seats, and eight cabinet seats in the new government headed by the king's loyalist Driss Jettou. Fasi's new position was minister of state without portfolio. However, many in the party were disappointed with the party's junior status in the government, and unhappy with Fasi's leadership. One focal point of internal opposition was led by Abd al-Razzak Afilal, the leader of the UGTM.

See also Balafrej, Ahmed; Ben Barka, Mehdi; Ben Seddiq, Mahjoub; Boucetta, Muhammad; Ceuta; Fasi, Allal al-; Fez, Morocco; Hassan II; Ibrahim, Abdullah; Melilla; Mouvement Populaire (MP); Parti National; Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains (UGTM); Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP); Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP).

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

Istiqlal Party: Palestine

Important political party established in Palestine, August 1932.

The party's creation was spurred by the Husayni–Nashashibi split, which had almost paralyzed the Palestinian national movement. Its founders, most of whom hailed from the Nablus area, called for the adoption of new methods of political action, including noncooperation with the British Mandate authorities and nonpayment of taxes. The party also called for total Arab independence, pan-Arab unity, the abrogation of the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration, and the establishment of Arab parliamentary rule in Palestine.

After reaching its maximum degree of influence, especially among the young and the educated, in the first half of 1933, the party began to decline very rapidly. Among the factors responsible for its decline were the active hostility of the Husayni camp, the lack of financial resources, and the differences between the pro-Hashimite and pro-Saʿudi elements within the party. A distinctive mark of the party was its espousal of the idea that British imperialism was the principal enemy of the Palestinians; thus the party urged them to focus their struggle not simply on Zionism, but on British colonialism as well.

See also Balfour Declaration (1917); Husayni Family, al-; Husayni, Musa Kazim al-; Nashashibi Family; Zionism.

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Muhammad Muslih

Istiqlal Party: Syria

The Independence party, officially founded in Damascus on 5 February 1919.

Also known as Hizb al-Istiqlal al-Arabi (Arab Independence party), the party was established after the demise of the Ottoman Empire and during the Arab kingdom of Syria under Faisal I ibn Hussein. Its core members were drawn from the committee of the secret Arab society al-Fatat (Young Arab Society). The founding members of the Istiqlal were Saʿid Haydar, Asʿad Daghir, Fawzi al-Bakri, Abd al-Qadir al-Azm, Salim Abd al-Rahman, Faʾiz al-Shihabi, and Muhammad Izzat Darwaza, its secretary who was at the same time the secretary of al-Fatat. They decided to come into the open and form a political party under a new name. Al-Fatat continued to exist as the mother party of the Istiqlal, which was considered its spokesman. Members from the other Arab secret so-

ciety, al-Ahd (the Covenant), also joined the Istiqlal. Party adherents, known as al-Istiqlaliyyun (the Independentists), were active in the towns of Syria, where the party had branches during the early years of the French Mandate. Istiqlal also included Palestinian members, who were active against the British Mandate authority in Palestine, 1923–1948.

Istiqlal called for Arab unity and independence; it was secular rather than religious. Faisal had supported it financially and politically while he ruled Syria (1918–1920). The party supported the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 and party members supported the Palestine Arab Revolt of 1936–1939. It is not known whether the Syrian party was still functioning in 1936.

See also AHD, AL-; DARWAZA, MUHAMMAD IZZAT; FAISAL I IBN HUSSEIN; FATAT, AL-; PALESTINE ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939).

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ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

Italian dictator Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) holds the Sword of Islam, given to him by Muslims as a sign of allegiance.
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ITALY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Italian presence in North Africa loomed large in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Modern Italian dreams of an empire along the southern rim of the Mediterranean long predated the achievement of Italian reunification. As early as 1838, Giuseppe Mazzini, the great theoretician of the *Risorgimento,* had argued that Tunisia, the key to the central Mediterranean, would have to belong to Italy. By 1861, with the first achievement of the *Risorgimento* of an independent Italian kingdom, some were already looking toward the recovery of former territory from the Roman Empire and for a Mediterranean role for the new nation. By the mid-1860s, there were public expressions of concern over the danger of Italy being excluded from the region altogether by powers such as France and Great Britain.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the recovery of Papal Rome the following year spurred Italian mercantilist and classical dreams. On the one hand, they wished to benefit from the commercial advantages offered by empire, on the other, many Italians wished to re-create the greatness of classical Rome. The latter sentiment was particularly acute as far as Tunisia was concerned, where there were already 25,000 Italians in the Regency by 1881. Furthermore, Italian aspirations had been lulled into a false sense of security by a twenty-year-long treaty with the Beylik after 1868. The French annexation of Tunisia as a protectorate in 1881 came, therefore, as a very unpleasant surprise.

As a result, Italy rushed to join other European powers in trying to carve out a colonial empire in Africa during 1882, as part of the scramble for Africa. Italian troops landed at Assab, on the Red Sea coast, and in 1882 began the process of creating a colony in Eritrea—an attempt that was to last fourteen years—and of establishing its presence in Somalia. Italian attempts to occupy Ethiopia, however, were to be unsuccessful, culminating in the catastrophic Italian defeat at Adwa in 1896.

By the start of the twentieth century, however, Italian self-confidence had been restored and attention was being directed toward North Africa once again. The new wave of Italian colonial interest was signaled by the Italian–French agreement of December 1902, which recognized Italian interests in Libya. Peaceful penetration began thereafter, as Italian commercial houses and banks began to appear along the Libyan coast. In 1911, Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire in Libya and invaded the coastal regions.

A concerted intellectual and journalistic effort conducted in Italy persuaded public opinion that a colony in Libya would be a worthwhile endeavor: Not only would it re-create the dream of imperial Rome (frustrated by France's annexation of Tunisia in 1881) but it was believed that Libya was potentially very fertile. It was argued as well that Tripoli was still the crucial endpoint of trans-Saharan trade and, thus, a source of immense wealth. Such arguments were opposed by the socialists, who saw the national crusade for Libya as a diversion from the essential task of revivifying Italy itself.

In reality, however, there were immense pressures building up inside Italy for the development of settler colonies as demographic growth threw into stark relief the problems faced by poverty-stricken regions. Only Libya was left as a potential destination for Italy's excess population, apart from migration to the Americas. As a result, the illusory claims of journalists over the potential offered by Libya were reinforced by the hard realities of domestic economic crises.

The difficulties of establishing a firm grasp on Libya, after the 1911 invasion, were revealed by the two Italo–Sanusi wars, and it was only in 1932 that the new colony was declared pacified. Italy soon discovered that Libya's agricultural potential was a myth, and the new colony turned out to be a constant drain on the metropole's resources. By 1942, 110,000 Italians resided in Libya, of whom 40,000 were involved directly in agriculture; the development of an infrastructure and of colonial settlement had cost the vast sum of 1.8 billion Italian lire, and Italy had little to show for its colonial experiment.

Nonetheless, Libya had been molded into the Fascist vision, which, during the 1930s, had in addition sought to avenge the defeat of Aduwa in Ethiopia. The definitive military pacification of Libya had occurred directly after the Fascists had come to power in Rome, in October 1922. Libya was also seen by the Fascist Party as an ideal testing ground for their ideas of racial development, where Libyans were to become Italian Muslims and Italy, under Mussolini, would become the protector of the Muslim world. All these ambitions were to be destroyed by Allied victory in Libya in 1943.

The one other major Fascist experience in Africa was to be the Italian attempt, once again, to conquer Ethiopia. Despite Italian military superiority, the conquest was never completed. It also led to Italy's ostracism by the League of Nations. Finally, the Italian presence there was ended during World War II by British troops, who restored the emperor, Haile Selassie Miriam, to his throne.

Italy's African experiences have, however, left some traces on the modern scene. In 1935, France offered concessions over Libya's southern international border as part of a complex attempt to satisfy Italian claims in Tunisia and in Nice—as well as trying to prevent Italy from joining Nazi Germany as an ally. Although the proposal was never realized, it still remains to bedevil modern international relations, as a result of the competing claims between Libya and Chad to the Aozou Strip.

See also FOURTH SHORE, THE; LIBYA; TURKISH–ITALIAN WAR (1911–1912).

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GEORGE JOFFE

IZLANE

See GLOSSARY

İZMIR

Third largest city in Turkey and seaport on the Aegean Sea.

İzmir (formerly known in English as Smyrna) is situated at the head of a long bay. With mountains in the Aegean region of western Anatolia stretching east to west, the river valleys from the Anatolian plateau leading to the Aegean Sea allow easy communication with a considerable hinterland. Due to these advantages, the city has been an important trading center over a long period of time: Its origins go back to the third millennium B.C.E., and it maintained its prominence during Hittite, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine domination. During the fourteenth century, İzmir was held by the Turkish Aydin *Beyliği* (emirate), and when Aydin—like other Anatolian Turkish emirates—was incorporated into the rising Ottoman state around 1400, İzmir became an Ottoman city.

During the early nineteenth century, İzmir's European trade was disrupted first by the Napoleonic Wars and then, in the 1820s, by the war of Greek independence. However, beginning in the 1830s, industrializing Europe's demand for Anatolian raw cotton and wool soon restored trade. Dried fruits (raisins and figs), tobacco, olive oil, and animal hides were also exported at unprecedented levels. Its population increased considerably, as the city attracted not only foreigners but also an influx of population from both Anatolia and the Aegean islands. The first railroad to be built in Anatolia was laid between İzmir and Aydin to facilitate the exports of its rich hinterland. Just before World War I, İzmir and its vicinity had a total population of 210,000, of which 100,000 were Muslims, 74,000 Greeks, 10,000 Armenians, 24,000 Jews, and 2,000 Europeans.

Turkey's port city of İzmir, known before 1923 as Smyrna, a name derived from an ancient myth involving Aphrodite and the daughter of the king of Cyprus. Excavations in 1948 uncovered mudbrick defense walls that suggest İzmir was already a city-state as early as the eighth century B.C.E. © YANN ARTHUS-BERTRAND/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the victorious allies allowed Greek occupation of the city and its hinterland. But Greek occupation sparked a nascent Anatolian resistance, and the Turkish war of independence ended with the recapture of İzmir in September 1922. The city was devastated by a huge conflagration as the Greek forces and population withdrew to the Aegean; its burgeoning industry was wrecked and its foreign trade sharply declined. The new Turkish Republic, however, was determined to restore İzmir's prominent commercial role and held its first national congress there in 1923 to set economic policy. Although İzmir became a much more Turkish city than it had been in Ottoman times, Muslims immigrating from Crete, the Aegean islands, and Salonika replaced the Greek population and helped preserve a relatively cosmopolitan atmosphere; the city quickly regained its historic role as Turkey's leading exporter and it was second only to Istanbul in imports.

Since the 1950s, İzmir has experienced a significant degree of industrialization, establishing strong automotive and food processing sectors and modernizing its traditional textile production. In 2002, it produced 13.5 percent of Turkey's gross domestic product and employed 9.7 percent of the coun-

try's total labor force. İzmir has grown faster than any other Turkish city except Istanbul; its population reached 3,370,866 in 2000. In addition to its commercial importance, İzmir serves as the focus of a hinterland rich in classical and Turkish cultural heritage. Among the nearby sites of importance are Ephesus, Pergamum, and Sardis.

See also AEGEAN SEA; ANATOLIA; OTTOMAN EMPIRE.

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I. METIN KUNT
UPDATE BY BURÇAK KESKIN-KOZAT

İZMIR ECONOMIC CONGRESS

Turkish economic summit meeting, 1923.

Convened in February 1923 during a recess in the Lausanne Peace Conference, the İzmir Economic Congress consisted of more than 1,100 Turkish delegates representing agriculture, trade, artisans, and labor, as well as top political leaders, including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The resolutions adopted were referred to as the Economic Pact *(Misak-i Iktisadi),* signifying that the government considered them as important as the previously promulgated Turkish National Pact *(Misak-i Milli),* which enunciated the goal of political independence. These resolutions proclaimed the intention of developing the nation's economy by relying on the free activity of Turkish entrepreneurs. Foreign capital was to be welcome provided it adhered to Turkish law. Monopolies were opposed. Thus, the congress inaugurated a phase of reliance on private enterprise. This phase ended after the consolidation of the republican regime and the onset of the worldwide depression in the late 1920s. It was replaced by a concerted policy of state initiatives on the economy, including ownership and operation of major enterprises.

See also ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; TURKISH NATIONAL PACT.

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FRANK TACHAU

J

JABABDI, LATIFA

[1955–]

Moroccan women's rights advocate; founder of L'Union de L'Action Feminine (FUA).

Latifa Jababdi was born in Tiznit of Berber heritage. She received a degree in sociology and feminist studies from Mohammed V University in Rabat, and in 2003 was preparing a doctorate in sociology at the Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada, on the integration of women in development.

At the age of fourteen Jababdi joined the Party of Liberation and Socialism (PLS) and took part in the student movement in the 1960s that campaigned for greater democracy in Morocco. This group was associated with the New Left, and Jababdi herself became a member of the PLS, the Communist Party of Progress. She was condemned in 1977 for threatening state security and spent two-and-a-half years in prison with other well-known Moroccan feminists such as Fatna el-Bouih because of her participation in the illegal Marxist-Leninist group "March 23."

In 1984 Jababdi ran for office, but no women were elected. Disappointed, she went on to serve as editor of the *8 Mars* newspaper, named after International Women's Day (8 March, or *Thamaniya Mars*) and written by and for Moroccan women interested in feminist issues. She later founded L'Union de L'Action Feminine (FUA) in 1987. The FUA has seventeen offices throughout Morocco and one in Paris. It offers literacy classes and workshops, seminars, festivals, and publications such as *8 Mars.*

In 1993 Jababdi launched a campaign to change the *mudawana,* the female-status code of Moroccan family law that reduces all women to legal minors. She collected one million signatures for a petition given to King Hassan II requesting the abolition of marital tutorship and polygamy, recognition of women's full maturity at age twenty-one, gender equality in marriage, and judicial divorce. The king convened a committee of women to examine these issues further. Revisions to the *mudawana* concluded that women could no longer be repudiated by their husbands without their knowledge. No sweeping changes to the *mudawana* have been made, but

Moroccans hope that Muhammad VI will soon do so.

See also Bouih, Fatna el-; *8 Mars* Newspaper; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Morocco: Political Parties in.

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Maria F. Curtis

JABAL AL-AKHDAR, LIBYA

Eastern "green mountain" region.

An area of Libya in the hinterland of the eastern city of Benghazi, with mountains of nearly 3,300 feet (1,000 m). It is one of the few parts of Libya with relatively good rainfall (98–118 in/yr; 250–300 cm/yr) but with difficult terrain and soil conditions, characterized by grain cultivation with modest yields and livestock grazing.

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Laurence Michalak

JABAL AL-AKHDAR, OMAN

The highest and best-watered region in the western Hajar Mountains of Oman.

About ninety-five miles southwest of Muscat, the highest peak of the Jabal al-Akhdar ("green mountain" in Arabic) region is Jabal Shams, which rises to nearly 10,000 feet. The region received its name from the relatively abundant vegetation found on its slopes and valleys. Because it receives up to twenty-eight inches of rain per year, and portions of it have suitable soil in its valleys, plateaus, and man-made terraces, a variety of agricultural products can be grown in Jabal al-Akhdar, including wheat, legumes, and a variety of fruits such as grapes, pomegranates, and peaches. Irrigation is provided by the *falaj* system, an ancient technique using channels to direct water from sources underground to crops some distance away. The main region of habitation is the Sayq plateau. The seaward side of Jabal al-Akhdar faces the Gulf of Oman, and the main towns are al-Rustaq, al-Awabi, and Nakhl. On the interior-facing slopes lie Nizwa, Manah, and Izki. Jabal al-Akhdar is part of the once nearly inaccessible area of Oman proper to which Muslim minority groups such as the Ibadi sect fled as a result of conflicts in Arabia during the late seventh and early eighth centuries C.E. After converting much of the local population, Ibadi imams rose to power in 751 C.E., and Jabal al-Akhdar remained a stronghold of the Ibadi imamate until 1959.

See also Oman.

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Anthony B. Toth

JABAL AL-KHALIL

Group of mountains constituting the southernmost part of the Judean mountains, surrounding the town of Hebron (Khalil), about twenty miles south of Jerusalem.

Jabal al-Khalil forms the tallest part of the mountain ridge extending north to Tiberias. The ridge was where most villages of Palestine were concentrated during the nineteenth century. While agricultural cultivation increased under Jordan's rule, between 1948 and 1967, many villagers of the relatively congested and unindustrialized Jabal al-Khalil migrated for work to the east bank of the Jordan River. Since the 1967 Arab-Israel War, Ja-

bal al-Khalil has been part of the Israeli-occupied West Bank and the site of a growing number of Israeli settlements, such as Kiryat Arba.

The Oslo Accords, signed on 13 September 1993, provided for a transitional period not exceeding five years to Palestinian interim self-government in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. On 15 January 1997 a joint protocol provided for the redeployment of Israeli troops and the handing over of 80 percent of the Hebron area to the Palestinian Authority. The area remained, however, in continuous strife and instability.

ELIZABETH THOMPSON
UPDATED BY YEHUDA GRADUS

JABAL, BADAWI AL-

[1905–1981]

Pen name of Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad, a Syrian poet of high reputation in the Arab world.

Badawi al-Jabal was born in the village of Difa in the district of al-Haffa, in Latakia province, to Sulayman al-Ahmad, the head of a distinguished Alawite family. His pen name was given to him, according to the compiler of his poetry, Midhat Akkash, by the editor of the Damascus newspaper *Alif Ba,* apparently in 1920. The editor liked the poetry, but because the poet was not well known, the editor agreed to publish the poetry under the pseudonym of Badawi al-Jabal, a reference to the cloak *(aba'a)* and the headband *(iqal)* the poet wore at the time—like a *badawi* (bedouin) coming from al-Jabal (the Alawite mountain).

Badawi al-Jabal practiced politics and poetry at an early age. As a nationalist, he joined the National Bloc, and later on the National Party. He was imprisoned by the French mandatory authorities in Syria, and in 1939 he sought refuge in Baghdad. While there, he taught Arabic at the University of Baghdad and also supported the revolt of Rashid Ali al-Kaylani against the British in 1941. Upon returning to Syria, he was apprehended by the French authorities in 1942. Later on, he was twice elected to parliament, in 1943 and 1947. In the 1950s, he became minister of health. The defeat of the Arabs in the 1967 Arab–Israel War was a great shock to him; he wrote much poetry inspired by it. He adhered to the old school of Arabic literature and poetry, which upholds the classical mode. His poetry was also influenced by a mystical orientation. Selections from his poetry were published in Damascus in 1968 by Midhat Akkash. A full anthology appeared in Beirut in 1978 with an introduction by Akram Zuʿaytir.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967); KAYLANI, RASHID ALI AL-; LITERATURE: ARABIC; NATIONAL PARTY (SYRIA).

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ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

JABAL DRUZE

A volcanic massif in southern Syria, between the plain of Hawran and the Eastern desert.

This mountain region has a curved, conelike surface, its highest peak rising to 5,915 feet (1,803 m). On the west, the basalt upland is surrounded by lava, which tapers into the fertile plains of Hawran and Jawlan, famed since Roman times for their abundance in grain. The western slopes of the mountain receive an average annual rainfall of about 11.7 inches (300 mm). The soil is especially suitable for vine and fruit trees.

The term *Jabal Druze* was first applied to the Shuf region of Mount Lebanon where the people of the Druze community predominate. Under the Mamluk sultanate (1260–1517), some Druze, suffering from Mamluk punitive expeditions against them, took refuge in Jabal Hawran. After the Qaysi–Yamani war at Ayn Dara in Lebanon in 1711, the Yamanis, most of whom were Druze, who were overpowered in the fighting, fled to Jabal Hawran, where they formed the bulk of the Druze community. Later on, more Druze fled from Mount Lebanon to the Hawran in the wake of the 1860 events, when punitive measures were taken against them. Others went there during World War I to avoid Ottoman Empire conscription and the famine. Because of this considerable Druze settlement in Jabal Hawran, it became known in the latter part of the nineteenth century as Jabal Druze. In the 1930s, Jabal Druze was also referred to as Jabal al-Arab to avoid the sectarian term of *Druze* and also in recognition of the

nationalist role played by the Druze, headed by Sultan al-Atrash, in leading the Great Syrian Revolt against the French (1925–1927).

See also ATRASH, SULTAN PASHA AL-; DRUZE; LEBANON, MOUNT; MAMLUKS; SHUF.

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ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

JABAL NABLUS

Group of low mountains in the Nablus region.

Located about 30 miles (48.3 km) north of Jerusalem, Jabal Nablus forms the northern edge of the Central Highlands that extend south to Hebron (Arabic: al-Khalil). The region, dotted with hillside agricultural villages, has been known particularly for its olives and olive oil soap. For much of the Ottoman era, Jabal Nablus was ruled as part of Damascus province, and dominated for centuries by the Tuqan family. The area became known in Palestinian folklore as Jabal al-Nar (Mountain of Fire) for its resistance to Britain's rule in the mandate period (1922–1948).

See also TUQAN FAMILY.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

JABAL SHAMMAR

A mountainous region in northwestern Saudi Arabia.

Named for the Shammar tribal confederation, Jabal Shammar consists of the Aja Mountains, which are mainly granite; the basaltic Salma Mountains; the high sand dunes of al-Nafud; and scattered oases. A mixed economy of pastoral nomadism, oasis agriculture, and urban crafts and trade prevailed until the modern era. The region's principal city, the oasis of Haʾil, has been for centuries an important stopping place for persons traveling between the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and the towns and cities of Iraq and Iran. Hail continues to be an important regional center of transportation, commerce, and administration, as well as one of the principal agricultural areas in Saudi Arabia.

See also SAUDI ARABIA.

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ELEANOR ABDELLA DOUMATO
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

JAʿBARI FAMILY

Prominent Palestinian family from Hebron.

The Jaʿbari family dominated political posts in the Hebron district from the 1940s to the 1970s. They rose to prominence in Palestinian politics through their support of Jordanian rule in the West Bank. In the 1970s and 1980s, the family's political support declined as their cooperation with the governments of Israel and Jordan came under increasing criticism.

See also WEST BANK.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

JABARTI, ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-
[1753–1825]

Egyptian historian and scholar.

Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti is best known as the foremost Egyptian Muslim chronicler of Napoléon

Bonaparte's invasion and occupation of Egypt from 1798 to 1801. His family was originally from the village of Jabart on the Red Sea coast, but al-Jabarti himself was born in Cairo to a wealthy family whose economic base included *iltizams* (tax farms) and a *waqf* (religious endowment). Both he and his father were educated at al-Azhar University.

Al-Jabarti's studies included medicine and arithmetic, but his main scholarly activity was writing histories of Egypt. His principal works were *Ajaʾib al-Athar fi al-Tarajim wa al-Akhbar* (Wondrous seeds of men and their deeds), *Muzhir al-Taqdis bi Dhahab Dawlat al-Faransis* (The demonstration of piety in the demise of French society), and *Tʾarikh Muddat al-Faransis bi Misr* (History of the French presence in Egypt).

There is debate over whether *Tʾarikh Muddat al-Faransis* is an earlier version of *Muzhir al-Taqdis.* Both are short works dealing only with the period of French occupation. *Tʾarikh Muddat al-Faransis* appears to be an eyewitness account of the events, probably written in 1798; *Muzhir al-Taqdis* was probably completed in 1801. *Ajaʾib* is a longer work covering Egyptian history from 1688 to 1821 in four volumes. There are also questions about the relative dating of the first three volumes of *Ajaʾib,* which include the events of the French occupation, and *Muzhir al-Taqdis.* The parts of *Ajaʾib* relevant to the French occupation are now thought to have been completed in 1805 or 1806, after *Muzhir al-Taqdis.* The issue of the relative dating of the two works is considered important because *Muzhir al-Taqdis* is more critical of the French than *Ajaʾib,* which, if it were indeed written after *Muzhir al-Taqdis,* suggests that it could have been a "revisionist" work reflecting the real opinions of al-Jabarti, as opposed to "official" versions of the events related in the other works.

Although al-Jabarti is a key figure in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Egyptian history, historians have reevaluated the period itself. In particular, they question the idea that the French invasion marked the definitive onset of modernity in the Middle East. Both historians Peter Gran and Kenneth Cuno argue, from otherwise different perspectives, that the French invasion is best understood as an event in the larger processes of Egyptian history. In the same vein, the nature of al-Jabarti's histories has been reexamined. Jack Crabbs, for example, argues that al-Jabarti was an outstanding, but typical, medieval Egyptian historian who happened to have recorded extraordinary events. In contrast, Gran claims that al-Jabarti's accounts of the French invasion, and his historiography in general, were cultural manifestations of a nascent capitalist transformation already underway before the first European attempts to colonize the region. But aside from such issues, there is general consensus that al-Jabarti's histories were the best account of the French invasion from an Egyptian or Arab perspective, and generally above the standards for accuracy and detail common in late Ottoman historical writing. Al-Jabarti remains one of the principal sources for historians interested in early modern Egypt.

See also BONAPARTE, NAPOLÉON.

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WALTER ARMBRUST

JABHA AL-WATANIYYA, AL-

Tripolitanian nationalist movement.

The political movement, al-Jabha al-Wataniyya (United National Front), was established by Tripolitanian notables during the British military administration of Tripolitania after World War II to oppose the return of Tripolitania to Italian trusteeship. Instead they advocated the resolution that eventually prevailed: the independence of all the provinces of Libya together under the leadership of the amir of the Sanusi order.

See also SANUSI ORDER.

LISA ANDERSON

JABOTINSKY, VLADIMIR ZE'EV
[1880–1940]

Founder and leader of Zionism's Revisionist movement.

Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky was a man whose talents, charismatic personality, and Revisionist movement attracted a large and passionate following and polarized Zionism. Born in Odessa on 18 October 1880, he studied law in Switzerland and Italy. He became a journalist at a young age, serving as a correspondent for Russian dailies writing under the pseudonym "Altalena." He was a prolific writer and essayist in several languages. He wrote the historical novel *Samson the Nazarite* (1926) as well as numerous short stories, poems, songs, plays, and political and autobiographical tracts. He translated Hebrew poetry into Russian and translated Dante Alighieri's *Inferno* into Hebrew, and he was the author of Hebrew dictionaries and textbooks. He continued his literary work even as he became a major political leader.

Zionist leader Jabotinsky promoted an assertive and nationalistic approach to the rebuilding of the Jewish homeland. In 1925, Jabotinsky formed the Union of Zionist Revisionists, which advocated massive immigration to form a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan River. © Government Press Office (GPO) of Israel. Reproduced by permission.

Following the Kishinev pogroms of 1903, Jabotinsky became a leading figure in Russian Zionism and a strong advocate of Jewish self-defense. With the onset of World War I, he sided with Britain and lobbied for the creation of a Jewish Legion within the British Army. He saw the Legion as a means for furthering the Zionist cause by linking it to British aspirations in the Middle East. The creation of the Legion was announced in 1917, and in 1918, Lieutenant Jabotinsky entered Jerusalem with his Legionnaires as part of General Edmund Allenby's army. To his dismay, Britain disbanded the Jewish Legion at war's end. Jabotinsky helped lead the Yishuv's resistance to Arab rioters in Jerusalem in April 1920, and following the riots he was arrested by the British and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. After intense lobbying by the Zionist leadership, High Commissioner Herbert Samuel granted amnesty, and upon Jabotinsky's release from jail he received a hero's welcome in the Yishuv.

From 1921 to 1923, Jabotinsky served as an increasingly controversial member of the Zionist Executive. He publicly criticized official Zionist policy for being overly moderate in pursuit of Zionist goals. In January 1923, he resigned from the Executive. From this point onward he would be a polarizing figure, adored by his followers and despised by his detractors. Jabotinsky had long demanded that the World Zionist Organization (WZO) openly declare the final aim of Zionism to be the establishment of a Jewish state with a Jewish majority on both sides of the Jordan River, to be facilitated by massive, unlimited immigration. According to Jabotinsky, Zionism should return to the grand political vision of Theodor Herzl and reject the incremental Zionism embraced by Chaim Weizmann and the socialism of the Labor movement. He also wanted the Mandate to be "revised" to its original, pre-1922 status that included Transjordan as part of Palestine. These demands became the platform of Revisionist Zionism.

The Revisionist movement was composed of three main organizations, all headed—at least symbolically—

by Jabotinsky: a political party, a youth movement, and an underground military organization. Jabotinsky founded the party, the Union of Zionist Revisionists (ha-Histadrut ha-Zionit ha-Revisionistit, or ha-Zohar), on 25 April 1925 in Paris. He led the party until his death. Betar (Brit Trumpeldor) was Jabotinsky's youth movement. It began its activities in Riga in 1923. Betar's primary emphasis was on formal military training and discipline. Jabotinsky defined Betar's values and structure to the smallest details, wrote its charter and anthem, designed its brown-shirt uniform, and served as its spiritual and organizational leader. Many Betarim, including Menachem Begin, eventually made their way into the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi, the militant underground founded in 1937 and inspired by Jabotinsky's ideas and positions. Although Jabotinsky was technically its "supreme commander," he was able to exert only limited control over the Irgun from its inception.

Jabotinsky believed that the Arabs would never accept the Zionist project, and he proposed that an "iron wall" be constructed to drive home to them the inevitability of the Jewish state. The British accused the Revisionists of provoking the Arab riots of 1929, and Jabotinsky was barred from reentering Palestine. From 1929 until his death in 1940, he would never again set foot in the country, a fact that greatly hindered the success of his movement in the Yishuv. But despite his strong criticism of British anti-Zionist policies, Jabotinsky maintained a pro-British orientation. He believed that Zionist goals meshed with Britain's own interests and that once the British were convinced of this they would live up to the promises of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate.

Jabotinsky tried but failed to get the WZO to adopt the Revisionist program at the biannual Zionist Congresses. He denounced Labor's call for class struggle and argued that Zionism should focus on the needs of the Jewish nation in its entirety, and everything else, including class and the individual, should be subordinated to the nation. His rhetoric was often similar to Benito Mussolini's and his followers were denounced by Laborites as "Jewish fascists." The animosity between Revisionists and Labor Zionists occasionally led to physical clashes, and in October 1934, Jabotinsky and David Ben-Gurion met in London to discuss a rapprochement. The resulting accords were angrily rejected in a Labor referendum in March 1935. In April, Jabotinsky and his party withdrew from the WZO and founded the New Zionist Organization (NZO). Following this act, support for Revisionism declined within the broader Zionist movement.

Jabotinsky died on 4 August 1940 while visiting a Betar camp in New York. Many of his positions that were rejected as "extremist" during the 1920s and 1930s became part of mainstream Zionism by the 1940s, including the open demand for a Jewish state with a Jewish majority and unlimited immigration. Jabotinsky was the intellectual and political father of the Zionist right. Begin called himself "Jabotinsky's disciple," although the two men openly disagreed on tactics. Jabotinsky's territorial maximalism and rejection of any partition of Eretz Yisrael can be found in several contemporary Israeli parties and movements.

See also BEGIN, MENACHAM; IRGUN ZVAʾI LEʾUMI (IZL); ZIONIST REVISIONIST MOVEMENT.

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PIERRE M. ATLAS

JABR, SALIH

[c.1896–1957]

Iraqi politician.

Salih Jabr was born in al-Nasiryya, in southern Iraq, to a Shiʿite Muslim family of limited means. He learned to speak Turkish early in life. During the

British occupation of al-Nasiryya, he worked for the British revenue officers as a petty clerk and learned to speak English. In the early 1920s, Jabr graduated from Baghdad Law College. He was appointed judge shortly after graduation because the government of Iraq was dominated by Sunni Muslims and the demand for educated Shiʿa was great. His professional and public career advanced rapidly. He was elected a deputy senator; appointed governor of several provinces; and served as minister of education, justice, finance, social work, the interior, and foreign affairs numerous times. During the Rashid Ali al-Kaylani uprising, Jabr was governor of Basra. Because he sided with the regent and helped him to escape from Iraq, he was dismissed as governor, arrested, released a short time later, and allowed to go to Iran. With the collapse of the uprising, he returned to Iraq and was appointed minister of the interior.

On 29 March 1947 the regent invited Jabr to form a new government and appointed him prime minister, the first Shiʿite to hold this post. The regent hoped that Jabr, being a Shiʿite, would secure support for the revision of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty of 1930. The treaty gave Britain numerous privileges, including the right to have two military bases in Iraq over the next twenty-five years. Many Iraqis were not enthusiastic about Jabr and did not welcome him. The nationalists resented him for his support of the British during the Rashid Ali uprising and for sending hundreds of people to prisons and detention camps when he became minister of the interior after the uprising. The leftists disliked him for marrying the daughter of al-Jaryan, one of the largest landlords in southern Iraq.

Jabr announced a sweeping and ambitious program for his government. On the domestic scene, he called for social, economic, and cultural development. On the international scene, he called for a revision of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty of 1930, ratification of the Iraq–Transjordan Treaty, and the signing of the Turkish–Iraqi Agreement. As prime minister, Jabr proved to be less liberal than his predecessors. His term in office was marred by violent demonstrations. In less than six months in office, he banned the two moderately Left parties and put their leaders, Kamil Chadirchi and Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, on trial. Three leaders of the Communist Party were sentenced to death. The Portsmouth Treaty—the revision of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty of 1930—was signed in January 1947. Public dissatisfaction and resentment among the masses led to what came to be known as the Wathba uprising. Violent demonstration erupted against Jabr for several weeks in Baghdad and across Iraq. Virtually every element of Iraq's society—students, teachers, lawyers, doctors, artisans, members of parliament and of political parties—demanded his resignation. Several people lost their lives.

The Wathba uprising underlined the people's resentment of and dissatisfaction with the government and its foreign connections. Several factors contributed: the nationalist resentment over the continuous British interference in Iraq's affairs; the British role in creating the problems in Palestine by the establishment of Israel; and the high cost of living and inflation aggravated by a bad crop year. The Wathba forced Jabr to resign on 27 January 1947. He fled to his home on the Euphrates, then later to Jordan and England. The succeeding government repudiated the treaty.

Jabr was rehabilitated and became minister of the interior in the government of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi in 1950. During his term in office, he introduced a law permitting Iraqi Jews to leave the country, provided they gave up their nationality and property. Over 130,000 Jews left the country.

In 1951, Jabr formed a conservative party, Hizb al-Umma al-Ishtiraki (National Socialist party), to challenge Nuri al-Saʿid. The principles of the party were democracy and nationalism. But in reality, the party was neither democratic nor nationalist, drawing its members largely from tribal and feudal elements. Most of the support came from the Middle Euphrates—Jabr's birthplace—and from the Shiʿite community.

Jabr died of a heart attack while giving a speech opposing Prime Minister Nuri al-Saʿid.

See also ANGLO–IRAQI TREATIES; EZRA AND NEHEMIAH OPERATIONS; KAYLANI, RASHID ALI AL-; SUWAYDI, TAWFIQ AL-.

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AYAD AL-QAZZAZ

JACIR, EMILY

[1970–]

Palestinian multimedia artist.

Emily Jacir is a multimedia artist whose work represents the Palestinian contribution to the international avant-garde trend, at the turn of the twenty-first century, of exploring issues of borders and displacement. Dividing her time between Ramallah and New York, Jacir uses her personal experience and that of many displaced and exiled Palestinians to explore the voluntary and forced movement of people, and its relationship to real or imagined borders between places. She works in a variety of media, including photography, installation, performance, video, and sculpture. Two noteworthy examples of her work include a refugee tent stitched with the names of the Palestinian villages destroyed by Israel in 1948, executed by a large number of Palestinian-rights supporters. For another piece, she asked Palestinian exiles around the world what they would like her to do for them upon arrival, with her U.S. passport, in their native land. Jacir documented the various requests and her attempts to fulfill them, and then exhibited these testimonies to the pain of displacement and memory. Jacir received her M.F.A. from the Memphis College of Art and studied at the Whitney Independent Study Program. She has exhibited widely in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East, and maintains especially active ties with the art scene in Palestine.

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JESSICA WINEGAR

JADID, SALAH

[1926–1993]

Syrian army officer and politician.

Salah Jadid was an Alawi Muslim born in the village of Duwayr Baʿabda. After attending the Syrian military academy at Homs, he rose to be director of Officers' Affairs at the army's General Staff in 1963 and, from 1963 to 1965, chief of staff of the army. Jadid jointed the Syrian Social Nationalist Party as a youth, along with his brother Ghassan, but later became a member of the Baʿth party. Along with air force officer and fellow Baʿthist Hafiz al-Asad, Jadid was a key member of the secret Military Committee of Baʿthist officers formed in 1959 when Syria was part of the United Arab Republic (UAR) along with Egypt. Jadid served as chair of the committee on two occasions until it was superseded by the Baʿth Regional (Syrian) Command's Military Bureau in August 1965.

Jadid rose to become assistant secretary-general of the party from 1965 to 1970, but this modest title belied the fact that he was really the leader of the Baʿth in Syria, particularly its military wing. While not a deeply ideological man, Jadid headed the party during the period of the "radical Baʿth" from February 1966 to November 1970. He increasingly came into rivalry with Asad, who was close to the "pragmatic" civilian wing of the party. Asad eventually seized power in 1970 and threw Jadid into prison, where he died in August 1993.

See also ASAD, HAFIZ AL-; BAʿTH, AL-; SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONALIST PARTY; UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (UAR).

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

JAFFA

An ancient port on the central coast of the eastern Mediterranean, south of modern Tel Aviv, Israel.

Jaffa, known as Joppa in biblical times, became an important entrepôt in the nineteenth century when the local rulers constructed walls, planned markets,

established a central mosque, and built a road leading to Jerusalem. Occupied by the Egyptian Ibrahim Pasha in 1831, Jaffa prospered because the Egyptians encouraged trade, immigrated to the city, and relaxed restrictions against minorities. With the return of Ottoman rule after 1840, the port became a stop for steamships plying the eastern Mediterranean and, after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, for oceangoing liners. The port was expanded to accommodate grain, olive, and citrus exports. Jaffa was linked to Jerusalem by road and rail to serve pilgrims and tourists. German Templar and American colonies were established near the city.

The population expanded from 5,000 in the mid-nineteenth century to nearly 40,000 in 1914, of whom 15,000 were Jews. They made Jaffa the center for the first and second *aliya* until the development of Tel Aviv just to the north of Jaffa. The city was deserted during World War I because the port was closed, citizens were conscripted into the Ottoman army, and the Turks forced many of the inhabitants to leave the city. Under the British mandate, as Tel Aviv developed into an almost exclusively Jewish city, Jaffa expanded. Its population, the majority of whom were Palestinians, reached more than 30,000 in 1922.

A center of opposition to Zionism, Jaffa suffered during the strike called during the 1936 to 1939 Arab rebellion. The rebellion paralyzed the port; it did not recover, and the port of Tel Aviv replaced it. Most of the Jews left Jaffa at that time.

Riots broke out after the United Nations decision to partition Palestine in 1947 and, in the fighting that ensued, the Jews took the city (May 1948). Most of the 65,000 Palestinians abandoned the city—only 4,000 remained. A large number of Jewish immigrants were housed in the city, and in 1950, Jaffa was incorporated into the Tel Aviv municipality, officially called Tel Aviv-Yafo. Jaffa remains a religiously mixed section of the larger metropolitan area.

In 1968, a plan to reconstruct Jaffa and renovate its old buildings was undertaken. The city is noted for its gardens, artists' studios and galleries, the old fishing harbor and ancient site of the original port, and modern boat docks. The city is also known for its export of oranges.

See also Aliyah; Ibrahim ibn Muhammad Ali.

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Reeva S. Simon

JALLUD, ABD AL-SALAM

[1941 or 1944–]

Libya's former second in command.

A childhood friend of Muammar al-Qaddafi, Abd al-Salam Jallud became the second most powerful figure in Libya after the military coup that brought Qaddafi to power on 1 September 1969. Born into a nomadic tribe of the Fezzan region, he is, like Qaddafi, a graduate of the Libyan military academy. Jallud was a captain when he joined in planning the coup against the Libyan monarchy; after its success, he was promoted to major and made the de facto deputy chair of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council. He was the country's prime minister from 1972 to 1977, when the establishment of the *jamahiriya* was proclaimed; in 1979, both he and Qaddafi resigned their formal government positions but they remained in full control of the affairs of state. Jallud also occupied, sometimes simultaneously, the posts of interior minister, minister of economy, and minister of finance. He held the post of prime minister during the abduction in Tripoli of the Lebanese Shiʿite leader Imam Musa al-Sadr. Jallud is considered more pragmatic, less ideological, and a more skilled negotiator than Qaddafi. His loyalty to the Libyan regime was the subject of speculation. Despite his allegiance to a radical revolutionary ideology, Jallud occasionally criticized the "demagogic" tone of Qaddafi's discourse. The latter's reorganization of the Libyan security services in 1993 partially confirmed the fall from grace of Jallud and his family tribe, the Migariha. In 1994 he was temporarily placed under house arrest. Since then, and particularly after the Libyan regime entered into negotiations with the United Kingdom and the United States over resolution of the Lockerbie case and the lifting of the United Nations–imposed economic embargo over Libya, Jallud has occupied a marginal place in Libyan politics.

See also Qaddafi, Muammar al-.

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Lisa Anderson
Updated by Vanesa Casanova-Fernandez

JALLULI FAMILY

A family important in the commercial elite of nineteenth-century Tunisia.

The Jalluli family was influential at the bey's court, and thus secured *iltizam* (tax farms), monopolies, and supply contracts. They were also *qa'ids* of Sfax, and thereby responsible for the collection of taxes and security in that city.

Important members of the family in the nineteenth century were Mahmud (d. 1839), Muhammad (d. 1849), and Hassuna. In the 1830s Mahmud made his fortune as a corsair. Between 1805 and 1808, he had been chief customs collector, one of the most lucrative concessionary posts; he was also a prominent figure at the bey's court under Hammuda Pasha (ruler of Tunisia, 1777–1814). Muhammad ran the *qiyada* of Sfax for a number of years. In 1829, the Jallulis saved the government of Husayn Bey from bankruptcy. In 1864, Hassuna gained the *qiyada* of Sfax. Following the insurrection of 1864, the family was regarded by Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey as a stabilizing force.

The Jallulis' tradition of state service continued into the twentieth century. Many Jallulis are prominent in Tunisia's commercial and political elite.

See also Muhammad al-Sadiq; Sfax.

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Larry A. Barrie

JAMAHIRIYYA

In Libya, "rule of the masses."

This new word was coined by Muammar al-Qaddafi and adopted by the Libyan General People's Congress in 1977 as part of the country's official name: the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya. It is designed to convey the abolition of "government" and the beginning of the "era of people's authority" in Libya.

See also General People's Congress (GPC); Qaddafi, Muammar al-.

Lisa Anderson

JAMALI, MUHAMMAD FADHIL AL-
[1903–1997]

Iraqi educator, diplomat, and prime minister.

A Shiʿite born in the al-Kazimiyya quarter of Baghdad to a lower-middle-class family, Muhammad Fadhil (also Fadil) al-Jamali received a religious education at al-Najaf. He attended the newly established Teachers Training College in Baghdad, and then was sent to the American University of Beirut, receiving a B.A. in 1927. He did postgraduate work at Teachers College, Columbia University, in New York, where he wrote on the problems of bedouin education. He returned to Iraq in 1932 and served in the ministry of education until 1942.

Touring Europe in 1937, Jamali made arrangements for an Iraqi delegation to attend the Nuremburg rally the following year. His admiration of Germany was expressed in a published comparative study of education, *Ittijahat al-Tarbiyya wa al-Taʿlim fi Almaniya wa Inkiltira wa Faransa* (Modern ways of training and culture in Germany, England, and France). When later asked about his support for Germany, he replied that he was not a socialist, not a capitalist, but a Muslim Arab. In the late 1930s, he also invited teachers from Syria and Palestine to write textbooks and to teach in Iraq.

Jamali encouraged Shiʿa to attend the Teachers College and he used his position as director-general in the ministry of education to establish schools in Iraq's rural south and to provide scholarships for Shiʿa to study abroad. Because he was not directly involved in Prime Minister Rashid Ali

al-Kaylani's government, Jamali retained his post in the ministry of education after the government was brought down in 1941. From 1942 until the end of the monarchy in 1958, he held various posts for the ministry of foreign affairs, including in Washington, D.C., in the United Nations, and in the Arab League, except during his brief tenure as prime minister from September 1953 to April 1954. Jamali served during a period of disastrous floods. Dissatisfaction with his flood-relief program and his involvement in the regent's intervention in Syrian politics led to a change of government.

After the violent overthrow of the monarchy in the revolution of 1958, Jamali was tried by a revolutionary military tribunal and sentenced to death. This was commuted to a fifty-five-year sentence, but he only spent three years in prisons. After he was pardoned in 1961 he moved to Tunis, Tunisia, and taught at Tunis University. He died there in 1997.

See also American University of Beirut (AUB); *Futuwwa*; Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-; Najaf, al-.

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Reeva S. Simon
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

JAMALZADEH, MOHAMMAD ALI

[1892–1997]

Iranian short story writer.

Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh was born in Isfahan, Iran, and studied in Tehran, Beirut, and Paris. From 1916 to 1930, he worked for the Iranian embassy in Berlin and participated with a group of Iranian intellectuals there to publish the journal *Kaveh.* Jamalzadeh is known as the pioneer of Iranian short stories in the Western style. In 1921, he published *Yeki bud yeki nabud* (Once upon a time), a collection of six stories with a simple and flowing narrative style characteristically distinct from classic Iranian written prose. Later, Jamalzadeh moved to Switzerland as the representative for the International Employment Agency in Geneva. His autobiographical work, *Sar-o tah yek karbas* (Cut from the same cloth), was published in English as *Isfahan Is Half the World: Memories of a Persian Boyhood* in 1983. Jamalzadeh died in 1997 in Geneva, Switzerland.

See also Literature: Persian.

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Pardis Minuchehr

JAMIʿA AL-ARABIYYA, AL-

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

JAMIʿA AL-ISLAMIYYA, AL-

Loosely organized network of neofundamentalist Islamist groups in Egypt.

When Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954, some of its members formed splinter groups and adopted more radical tactics to achieve their goal of an Islamic state. The Brotherhood developed its own secret armed wing during its most violent period, between 1945 and 1965, and was associated with numerous assassinations. Under presidents Anwar Sadat and Husni Mubarak, it was revitalized and brought back into the mainstream, and its ideology and objectives are now different from those of al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya. It has undertaken a policy of nonviolence and formed coalitions with the secular Wafd Party in 1984 and the Socialist Labor Party and the Liberal Party in 1987 to form the Islamic Alliance (al-Tahaluf al-Islami).

Al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya (also al-Gamaʿa al-Islamiyya, Islamic Society) was established as a faction of al-Jihad (holy war) by a local leader (amir), Gamal Farghali Haridi. It is a network of approximately twenty small groups whose members sometimes cross-participate. The groups emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as branches of the Muslim Brotherhood's youth movement; the most notorious, al-Jihad, led by Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, claimed responsibility for Sadat's assassination in 1981. This group has been linked to various violent incidents and Muslim–Christian confrontations in Upper

Egyptian towns such as Asyut, Minya, and Bani Suwayf.

Other affiliate groups are the Islamic Liberation Organization (also known as the Technical Military Academy Group, TMA), the Samawiyya, Saved from the Inferno (al-Najun min an-Nar), the Islamic Vanguard, the New Islamic Jihad, Excommunication and Emigration (al-Tafkir wa al-Hijra), and Muhammad's Youth (Shabab Muhammad). Although it is no longer thought to exist, Muhammad's Youth dates back to 1965, when some of its members wanted a gradual creation of an Islamic state and others supported immediate confrontation. Its leader, an agriculture student from Asyut, Shukri Mustafa, was sentenced to death in 1977 for kidnapping and murder. Its members were absorbed into Saved from the Inferno and Repose and Meditation (al-Tawaqqufwa al-Tabayyun). Another group, the al-Qutbiyyan, was influenced by the teachings of Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood, who was sentenced to death in 1965. In 1990 members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs of the World Islamic Front for Liberation assassinated the speaker of the National Assembly, Rifʿat al-Mahjub. In 1992 al-Jamiʿa attacked tourists, prompting the government to enact strict antiterrorism measures. In 1995 Husni Mubarak accused Sudan of having ties to the Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya after an assassination attempt on his life in Ethiopia.

Research from around the Middle East indicates that instances of neofundamentalist terrorism are increasingly a youth phenomenon. Islamists recruit among high school students and teachers. Between 1970 and 1990 the average age of young Islamists caught in police sweeps dropped from 27 to 21. Leaders in southern Egypt are often university students, while those in Cairo and the delta region are generally professionals. Recognizing the lack of opportunity among disenfranchised youth, the government has promised to expand resources in youth and sporting centers throughout the country.

See also JIHAD; MUBARAK, HUSNI; QUTB, SAYYID; SADAT, ANWAR AL-; WAFD.

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MARIA CURTIS

JAMIʿAT-E ISLAMI

Afghan Islamist political party.

Jamiʿat-e Islami (Islamic Society) was formed in Kabul in 1971 in reaction to the increasing secular and leftist trends in Afghanistan at the time. In 1975, after the government of Muhammad Daud came to power, the organization moved its headquarters to Peshawar, Pakistan, and became a political and guerrilla resistance organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Afghan government. In 1978, Burhanuddin Rabbani became its leader. Advocating the establishment of an Islamic government in Afghanistan and strict adherence to *shariʿa* (Islamic law), Jamiʿat-e Islami has connections with other international Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamiʿat-e Islami of Pakistan.

Jamiʿat-e Islami's greatest following has been among Afghanistan's northern ethnolinguistic groups, particularly the Tajiks, in part because the leader, Rabbani, is a Tajik. Jamiʿat-e Islami commanders have included the martyred Ahmad Shah Masʿud (1953–2001) and Ismaʿil Khan, who controls Herat province. In 1992, the Jamiʿat-e Islami returned to Kabul along with the other resistance groups to form an Islamic government, and in 1993 Rabbani became president of Afghanistan. Forced from power when the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, the remnants of Jamiʿat-e Islami, including Rabbani and Masʿud, fled to the north of Afghanistan, where they formed the United Front to resist Taliban control. When, in turn, the Taliban were forced from Kabul in December 2001, the United Front was the first group into Kabul. As a result, the leaders of the Jamiʿat-e Islami now hold most of the key positions in the interim government of Hamid Karzai.

See also RABBANI, BURHANUDDIN; *SHARIʿA*.

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GRANT FARR

JANGALI

A nationalist and reformist movement in Iran in the early twentieth century.

The Jangali movement was formed in the forests *(jangal)* of northwestern Iran. Its members, under the leadership of Mirza Kuchek Khan and Ehsan Allah Khan, were intent on eradicating foreign influence in the country.

The Jangalis were active in the constitutional revolution of 1905–1911, and their aim was to restore the sovereignty and autonomy of Iran under a broad Islamic framework. They established a revolutionary council, Ettehad-e Eslam (Islamic unity), published a newspaper called *Jangal,* and enlisted the help of Ottoman and German military advisers. The Jangalis stole from the rich landowners of Gilan to give to the poor and to support their movement. The 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia enhanced their standing in Iran. The movement spread to Mazandaran, another Caspian province, and in 1918 the Jangalis nearly took Qazvin. In that year, the British signed an agreement with Mirza Kuchek Khan, in which Britain would recognize Jangali autonomy in Gilan in return for a cessation of hostilities between the two camps and the expulsion of all German and Ottoman Jangali advisers. The agreement was seen as a compromise by the more radical faction of the movement under the leadership of Ehsan Allah Khan, and their split enabled the Cossack Brigade, dispatched from Tehran, to temporarily quell the uprising. Following the Russian revolution of 1917, Russian troops invaded Rasht, the capital of the province of Gilan, in 1920, and Mirza Kuchek Khan proclaimed the Socialists Republic of Gilan. The Soviet–Iranian treaty of 1921 stopped Soviet aggression in the country; the Soviets withdrew their troops and Reza Khan, later to become the first Pahlavi monarch, obliterated the Jangalis by October 1921. Mirza Kuchek Khan was executed, and Ehsan Allah Khan fled to the USSR.

See also COSSACK BRIGADE; KUCHEK KHAN-E JANGALI; PAHLAVI, REZA.

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NEGUIN YAVARI

JANISSARIES

Military corps in the Ottoman Empire's army from the late fourteenth century to 1826.

The term *janissary* is the anglicized form of the Turkish *yeni çeri* (new troops). The Janissary corps was established in the late fourteenth century. The Janissaries' first recruits were from the ranks of young Christian prisoners of war; they were converted to Islam, taught Turkish, and given a rigorous military training. At the end of the sixteenth century, the Janissary corps began to admit untrained, mostly Muslim-born, recruits. The admission of untrained recruits marked the beginning of the janissaries' decline as a fighting force and their growing corruption. The basic regulations that had preserved the special character of the corps for some two centuries were treated with growing laxity, until they were abandoned altogether. The janissaries were allowed to marry and have families; then, in order to support their dependents, they were permitted to engage in gainful activities. Over the years, an ever-increasing number of janissaries gave up the practice of living at the barracks and training regularly, and the corps became largely a poorly trained and undisciplined militia. Commissions were sold to the highest bidders, and numerous civilians seeking to enjoy tax exemptions and other privileges bought their way into the corps. Consequently, the number of janissaries steadily increased from 12,000 in the early sixteenth century to 140,000 around 1820. The great majority of these men were not soldiers, but shopkeepers, artisans, porters, and followers of other trades, who rarely performed any military duties but zealously defended their privileged position. Identified with large segments of the urban population, they became a powerful caste resisting change.

The janissaries consistently opposed attempts to introduce military reforms because those required training and submission to discipline. They also objected to any attempts to create a new military force

that might replace them or threaten their privileged position. In the last decade of the eighteenth century, Selim III (r. 1789–1807) hesitatingly introduced a new infantry corps known as the *Nizam-i Cedit.* The janissaries objected to the new force, and they eventually led a coalition of conservative forces that overthrew Selim and abolished his reforms (May 1807). An attempt by the grand vizier, Bayrakdar (Alemdar) Mustafa Paşa, to reintroduce the Nizam-i Cedit also was foiled by the janissaries, and Bayrakdar himself was killed (November 1808).

Following Bayrakdar's death, Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839) concluded a pact with the janissaries, known as *Sened-i Ita'at* (Deed of Obedience), promising not to introduce military reforms in return for a janissary commitment not to intervene in political affairs. However, the Greek war of independence that broke out in 1821 (and lasted until 1830) confronted the Ottoman Empire with new and dangerous challenges, including the possibility of European intervention. The janissaries proved ineffective against the Greek insurgents, and the sultan was forced to enlist the support of his governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha, who had a new, European-style, modern army. The contrast between the ineffectual janissaries and the disciplined, successful Egyptian troops softened public opinion toward military reform. Capitalizing on this new mood, early in 1826 Mahmud proposed a plan (the Eşkinci/Eşkenci project) to reform a small segment of the Janissary corps, transforming it into a regular, modern, European-style force. Although most of the senior officers approved the plan, soon after its implementation the janissaries once again rose in rebellion. The sultan, however, had taken precautions against such a threat. With the support of the *ulama* (body of Islamic scholars) and the general public, loyal forces including artillery and naval units quickly suppressed the rebellion with considerable bloodshed (15 June 1826). Mahmud seized the opportunity to abolish completely the Janissary corps and the Bektashi sufi order affiliated with it.

Thus ended an institution that had existed for almost five centuries and that had become a hallmark of Ottoman power, in both its greatness and decline. The suppression of the janissaries, which became known in Ottoman history as the Beneficial Event (Vaka-i Hayriye), made a great impression on contemporaries in the Ottoman Empire and abroad. It also cleared the way for comprehensive, European-style military and administrative reforms that, in the long run, affected every aspect of society, and extended the life of the Ottoman Empire into the twentieth century.



The janissaries were the standing army of the Ottoman empire, formed in the late fourteenth century. The corps began as an elite and highly disciplined fighting force, but lax recruitment policy, an overabundance of privileges, and an aversion to reform led to a severe decline in its effectiveness by the early nineteenth century. © HISTORICAL PICTURE ARCHIVE/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

See also BAYRAKDAR, MUSTAFA; VAKA-I HAYRIYE.

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York and Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

AVIGDOR LEVY
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

JARALLAH FAMILY

Prominent Palestinian family from Jerusalem.

The Jarallahs belonged to Jerusalem's old Muslim elite, and were counted among the city's *ashraf* or descendants of the prophet Muhammad. Family members held religious posts in Jerusalem for hundreds of years and emerged at the end of the nineteenth century among the local Ottoman bureaucratic-landowning class, although less influential than the Husaynis and Nashashibis.

In 1921, Husam al-Din Jarallah (1884–1954), a graduate of al-Azhar, received the highest number of votes in an election for mufti (canon lawyer) of Jerusalem. But the rival Husaynis organized a petition campaign and succeeded in placing their candidate, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, in the post. Husam nonetheless served as chief justice of the religious courts, and in 1948 was finally appointed mufti by Jordan's King Abdullah, to replace the anti-Hashimite Husayni. While Husam al-Din was a pro-Hashimite moderate, other family members took stronger stands against Zionism. Hasan Jarallah, for example, in 1918 helped found an organization that took violent action against Arabs who sold land to Jews, called Jamʿiyyat al-Ikha wa al-Afaf (Association of Brotherhood and Purity).

See also ABDULLAH I IBN HUSSEIN; HUSAYNI, MUHAMMAD AMIN AL-.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

JARASH

Jordanian town and archaeological site.

Lying 29 miles (47 km) north of Jordan's capital city, Amman, the ruins at Jarash are some of the most famous in the Middle East and, along with Petra, one of Jordan's two main tourist attractions.

Founded as part of Alexander the Great's empire (c. 334 B.C.E.), Jarash became a thriving Roman provincial city during the first to third centuries C.E. It was one of the ten cities of the Decapolis, a commercial federation in Roman Syria. After its decline from shifting trade routes, Jarash lay in ruins until about 1884, when the Ottoman Empire introduced Circassians (Muslims from the Caucasus mountains fleeing Russian rule) as settlers. The town later grew to incorporate Arabs as well. By 1994, the population stood at 21,300; 2002 estimates put it at 26,300.

The first European to report on Jarash's Roman ruins was the German Ulrich J. Seetzen in 1806. Serious restoration and archaeological work were undertaken by the Transjordanian government in the 1920s on the city's amphitheater, forum, colonnaded road, temples, churches, and other buildings. The ruins now offer one of the best examples of provincial architecture from the Roman Empire, and serve as the backdrop for Jordan's most celebrated cultural event, the internationally known Jarash Festival for music and dance.

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

JARIDA, AL-

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES

JARRING, GUNNAR

[1907–2002]

Swedish diplomat; UN special envoy to the Middle East (1967–1971).

After studying linguistics at Lund University, Gunnar Jarring joined the Swedish foreign ministry and served in Asia. He was Sweden's UN ambassador (1956–1958) and ambassador to the United States

(1958–1964). In November 1967, when he was serving as Sweden's ambassador to Moscow, he was appointed by UN Secretary-General U Thant as special envoy to promote an Arab-Israel peace settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242. In 1968 he embarked on shuttle diplomacy and addressed a series of notes to the parties. But they displayed little trust in his judgment and ability to promote peace, and turned elsewhere. Jarring's mission was suspended temporarily when UN representatives of the four powers began talks. It resumed briefly after the August 1970 cease-fire agreement ended the war of attrition along the Suez Canal, and again was suspended because of Egyptian violations of that agreement. It was restarted in December 1970. In February 1971 Jarring presented Israel and Egypt identical notes proposing a peace settlement. Egypt expressed readiness to consider peace in return for total Israeli withdrawal and a resolution of the Palestinian problem. Israel said it was ready to enter into peace talks but would not return to the 4 June 1967 lines. Israel felt Jarring had exceeded his mandate and role by conducting negotiations instead of letting the parties negotiate directly. His mission effectively lapsed and was not formally terminated until 1990.

See also UNITED NATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

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MERON MEDZINI

JAWAHIRI, MUHAMMAD MAHDI AL-
[1900–1997]

The leading neoclassical poet of modern Iraq.

Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, born in al-Najaf, became a teacher in the 1920s. His poetry brought him to the notice of King Faisal I, who became his patron and protector. Closely associated with the Communist Party, al-Jawahiri became president of the Journalists' Association after the Revolution of 1958, and was Iraq's ambassador to Czechoslovakia until 1963. He returned to Iraq in the early 1970s but went into exile in Damascus a few years later. He was famous for his forceful revolutionary poetry.

See also FAISAL I IBN HUSSEIN.

PETER SLUGLETT

JAZEERA, AL-

Arab satellite television based in Qatar.

Al-Jazeera is a pan-Arab satellite television station founded in 1996, shortly after the failure of the Arabic British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) experiment, with funding from the amir of Qatar. On 1 November 1996, al-Jazeera started broadcasting six hours a day. It expanded to twelve hours in 1999, and to twenty-four hours in 2001. In 2003 it had 500 employees, twenty-seven bureaus worldwide, and 35 million viewers. Only 40 percent of its revenue comes from advertising; the rest comes from selling programs, footage, and other services. Al-Jazeera is a leader in providing news. Its self-proclaimed ethic is "independence, objectivity, and freedom of expression." In 1999 it won the Ibn Rushd Prize for Freedom of Thought. Al-Jazeera's independent programming has angered many Arab governments, especially its news, commentary, and call-in and debate shows such as "The Opposing View" that are critical of Arab regimes.

Al-Jazeera scooped all competition, including Cable News Network and BBC, with exclusive interviews and videos of the bombing of Kabul in October 2001. During the war on Iraq in 2003, al-Jazeera angered the U.S. government by airing pictures of U.S. prisoners of war as well as reports critical of the occupation. Its web site occasionally has been hacked. Al-Jazeera is both praised and vilified. Arab viewers clamor for al-Jazeera when governments shut down its signal, while critics denounce it as a "sinister salad of sex, religion and politics, topped with sensationalist seasoning." With

its commanding viewer following, however, al-Jazeera has become a major media player in the Arab region.

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LES ORDEMAN
UPDATED BY KARIM HAMDY

JAZIRA, AL-

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES

JAZRAWI, TAHA AL-

See RAMADAN, TAHA YASIN

JEHAD-E SAZANDEGI

Postrevolutionary organization in Iran for developing rural areas of the country.

The leaders of the Iranian Revolution believed that the deposed monarchy of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi had neglected both agriculture and rural economic development in its program to create an urban and industrialized society. Therefore, government attention to the "deprived" rural sector became an ideological pillar of the Islamic Republic. A special government organization, the Jehad-e Sazandegi (literally, the Construction Crusade), was set up with the mandate to provide basic infrastructure to all of the country's 70,000 villages. The Jehad's projects included road construction, rural electrification, provision of piped potable water, building waste water systems, and implementing numerous programs to enhance agricultural productivity. The philosophy of Jehad stressed local participation in development projects, and its trained cadres mobilized thousands of villagers in cooperative efforts that eventually brought modern amenities to and transformed the appearance of most villages. Its achievements included the construction of 60,000 kilometers of rural roads between 1979 and 1999 and the extension of piped water to 850,000 rural households in the same period.

Jehad's successes raised its profile and it became a cabinet-level ministry in the mid-1980s. As a ministry, its hands-on approach to agricultural productivity problems sometimes clashed with the more bureaucratically inclined approach of the ministry of agriculture. Rivalry between Jehad and the ministry of agriculture prompted the government of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–1997) to streamline state rural development programs by merging the two ministries, a policy that both resisted. Eventually, Jehad was incorporated as an organization within the ministry of agriculture, but it has maintained a separate identity and its focus on rural development.

See also AGRICULTURE; IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA; RAFSANJANI, ALI AKBAR HASHEMI.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

JELLABA

See CLOTHING

JENIN

Palestinian city in the West Bank.

Jenin (also Janin) is one of three Palestinian towns (the others being Nablus and Tulkarm) that formed the "Triangle" region of north-central Palestine. The city was noted in history for the bounty of its agriculture, particularly fruits and vegetables. Both the Ottomans and the British made Jenin the administrative center of an administrative sub-governorate bearing its name as well.

The Arab–Israel War (1948) changed the town's fortunes drastically. It was noteworthy for the fact that, although the Haganah captured Jenin briefly in June 1948, it quickly withdrew after fighting with Palestinian and Iraqi forces. The eventual cease-fire

lines left the city within the Jordanian-controlled West Bank, and cut it off from the traditional markets for its agricultural exports to the north and west, in what now had become Israel. Beyond this, the war caused the population to increase from 3,990 in 1945 to 10,000 as Palestinian refugees swelled the town's ranks. From June 1967 until November 1995, Jenin lay under Israeli military occupation until it came under the control of the Palestinian Authority. By 1997, Jenin's population stood at 26,650.

During the al-Aqsa Intifada that began in 2000, the Israeli army reoccupied parts of the city on several occasions. The eleven-day Israeli assault on the nearby Jenin refugee camp in April 2002, populated by some 10,000 refugees, devastated the camp. The destruction prompted international outrage, and "Jenin" became a symbol of the violence of the second Intifada.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab–Israel War (1948); West Bank.

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Michael R. Fischbach

JERICHO

Modern Palestinian oasis town, resting on the ruins of the ancient city.

Jericho dates archaeologically to about 9000 B.C.E. It is best known from the Bible as the city conquered by Joshua (c. 1400 B.C.E.) leading the Hebrew tribes and as the site where Zacchaeus spoke with Jesus from a tree.

Jericho is about 15 miles (22.5 km) northeast of Jerusalem, and some 825 feet (250 m) below sea level. The 2003 population estimate was 19,140 (not counting the Palestinian refugee camps). After the Ottoman Empire was defeated and dismembered in World War I, Jericho became part of the British mandate over Palestine, which began in 1922. The town became a winter resort. When Israel became a state in 1948, Jericho fell under Jordanian rule after the first Arab–Israel War. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency built three large Palestinian refugee camps near it and, shortly before the Arab–Israel War of 1967, the population of the city and the camps was estimated at 80,000. Almost all the inhabitants of those refugee camps became refugees yet again in 1967, crossing the Jordan River into Jordan. On 13 September 1993, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed an agreement under which Jericho, along with the Gaza Strip, became an area of Palestinian autonomy beginning in 1994.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Palestine; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Benjamin Joseph

JERICHO CONGRESS (1948)

Conference of Palestinians organized by King Abdullah.

Held in Jericho on 1 December 1948, the Jericho Congress was convened in response to the establishment of the State of Israel and the corresponding loss to the Arabs of most of Palestine. This provided the legal basis for the union of central Palestine (the West Bank and East Jerusalem) with Transjordan (East Bank). The conference was presided over by Shaykh Muhammad Ali Jaʿbari, mayor of Hebron, and included leaders from Jerusalem, Hebron, Bethlehem, Nablus, and Ramallah, as well as representatives of refugees from Israeli-occupied cities and towns. It was attended by 1,000 delegates, including mayors, tribal chiefs, *mukhtars,* and military governors from all over Palestine. The conferees voted unanimously to request unity with Jordan; proclaimed Abdullah I ibn Hussein to be king of all Palestine; affirmed faith in the unity of Palestine; called for the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes; called on Arab states to continue the fight to save Palestine; and asked King Abdullah to hold elections for legitimate Palestinian representatives for consultations on affairs of Palestine. It was understood that the union would not compromise Arab rights to Palestine. The conference also repudiated the All-Palestine Government in Gaza sponsored by the Arab Higher Committee. On 7 December, the Jordanian cabinet under Tawfiq Abu al-Huda approved the resolutions, and parliament ratified them 13 December.

The Jordanian election law was amended, doubling the number of seats in the lower house of parliament to forty, designating half for representatives from the West Bank and Jerusalem and the other half from Jordan. Elections to the new, expanded parliament were held in 1950, and unity was ratified unanimously on 24 April 1950.

Egypt strongly opposed the union. Syria criticized it but did not oppose it outright. Britain approved of the congress and its resolutions. Israel's recognition of the union was implicit in the armistice agreement between the two countries. The United States granted *de jure* recognition on 31 January 1949.

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Abu al-Huda, Tawfiq; All-Palestine Government; Arab Higher Committee (Palestine).

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Jenab Tutunji

JERUSALEM

City that is sacred to Jews, Christians, and Muslims, and that has become embroiled in the politics of the Arab–Israel conflict.

Located in the Judaean mountains, on the watershed between the Judaean hills and the Judaean desert, Jerusalem (in Hebrew, *Yerushalayim;* in Arabic, *Bayt al-Maqdis* or *al-Quds al-Sharif*) overlooks the Dead Sea to the east and faces Israel's coastal plain to the west. It has warm, dry summers and cool, rainy winters. Jerusalem was inhabited as far back as the fourth millennium B.C.E. By the late Bronze Age, it was occupied by the Jebusites. The city became the Jewish national and religious center after its conquest by King David (c. 1000 B.C.E.) from the Jebusites until the destruction of the second Jewish temple (70 C.E.) and the rebellions against Roman occupation, which resulted in the Jews' exile from the city and their dispersion. The Western Wall of the temple complex was the only remnant to survive destruction and over the course of time became the focus of Jewish veneration. As the scene of the last ministry, death, and resurrection of Jesus, Jerusalem emerged as one of the five original Christian patriarchates and has remained a center of Christian pilgrimage since the reign of the Roman emperor Constantine, when it was rebuilt as a Christian city. After the Muslim conquest (638 C.E.), the construction of the al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock (part of the complex known as al-Haram al-Sharif) to commemorate the Night Journey of the prophet Muhammad focused Muslim attention on the city. It became the first *qibla* (direction of prayer), and is the third holiest city of Islam.

Nineteenth-Century Jerusalem

Conquered by the Ottomans in 1517, Jerusalem remained a backwater town in the province of Syria until the nineteenth century, when Europeans and Ottomans refocused on its religious significance. During the brief reign of Ibrahim ibn Muhammad Ali (1832-1840), relaxed restrictions against the *dhimmi* (non-Muslim) population and renewed interest by Western Christians in the Holy Land resulted in an increase in tourism, the installation of European consulates, the beginnings of biblical archaeology, and the establishment of Protestant institutions adjoining those of the Roman Catholic (Latin), Greek Orthodox, Coptic, Armenian, and other Christian denominations. Communal conflicts over the religious jurisdiction of the Christian holy places led to the Crimean War (1854–1856), after which the keys to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre were entrusted to the Muslim Nusayba family.

The city plan at the time remained as it was when it was rebuilt by the Romans as Aelia Capitolina. Walled, with a system of principal streets, it was dominated by the holy sites and divided into Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and Armenian residential quarters with maze-like streets, bazaars, churches,

synagogues, and mosques. It was the residence of Muslim Arab notables and, later, members of the Ottoman official class. The Khalidi, Nashashibi, and Husayni families played important roles in local politics and Muslim religious administration. The Jewish population included the Mizrahi Jews (Jews from the Middle East, North Africa, and Western Asia) who had lived there since ancient times or who had migrated after the expulsion of Spanish (Sephardic) Jewry in 1492. Some of their leading families included the Navon, Amzalak, Antebi, and Valero families, who became important as translators, bankers, and merchants. Ashkenazic (European) Jews began to immigrate to Jerusalem during the early nineteenth century, including Hasidim (called *haredim* in the late twentieth century), who were dependent upon philanthropy from abroad to support them while they lived a life of full-time study. In the 1860s, at the invitation of British consul James Finn and philanthropist Sir Moses Montefiore, who donated money for the construction of residential areas outside the walls, Jews, some Muslims, and the Russian Orthodox Church began to build new neighborhoods along the roads to the Old City. By 1860 the city's population stood at approximately 40,000, which grew to 55,000 by 1900.

In 1873 Jerusalem was placed under direct Ottoman rule from Constantinople (now Istanbul), and during the reign of Abdülhamit II, who championed its Islamic significance, it underwent major expansion. A municipal council, dominated by Muslim Arabs, was established. Jerusalem became a major provincial city with new courts, a modern water system, mosques, and public offices. New residential and commercial construction, both inside and outside the walls, was undertaken by the local population and by Europeans who established banks and built schools, hospitals, and hospices. Roads were paved, the city was linked by rail to Jaffa on the Mediterranean coast, and Ottoman secondary schools were set up close to new Muslim neighborhoods. The visit to Jerusalem by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany (1898) heralded the city's emerging importance in the Ottoman Empire. In 1917 Jerusalem was occupied by the British army under the command of General Edmund Allenby; it later became the capital of what the British called Palestine. The British ruled Palestine within the rubric of the mandate system from 1922 to 1948. The New City expanded with the development of additional Palestinian Arab and Jewish neighborhoods. The British improved the water-supply system, paved roads, planted gardens, and encouraged the repair and construction of buildings. More significantly, they allowed large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine. Indeed, the terms of the mandate included the Balfour Declaration (1917), which obligated Britain to foster Jewish immigration, land purchases, and institution building. This quickly led to a growth in the population in the city from just over 91,000 in 1922 to almost 133,000 in 1931. By 1944, according to the American Committee of Inquiry, the Jewish population in the city was 97,000, with 30,630



The Christian Quarter of Jerusalem is situated in the northwest section of the city and has a population of around five thousand people. The area is home to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which is built over the remains of Golgatha, where Christ was crucified, and the tomb he rose from. Pilgrims from across the world journey to worship at this holy site. © Richard T. Nowitz/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Muslims and 29,350 Christians (the overwhelming majority of Muslims and Christians were Palestinians).

Zionism and Palestinian Nationalism under British Mandate

Jerusalem became the center of both Zionist and Palestinian nationalist institutions and aspirations during the British mandate. The Supreme Muslim Council was located in Jerusalem, headed by the Jerusalem mufti, Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni (who then also controlled the considerable *waqf* income that under Ottoman rule had gone directly to Constantinople). Palestinian political life was complicated by the bitter rivalry between the Husaynis and the Nashashibis for control of the Palestinian nationalist movement. Jerusalem's mayors were Arab notables active in the nascent Palestinian nationalist movement, and once again included members from the Husayni and Nashashibi families, including Musa Kazim al-Husayni, Raghib al-Nashashibi, Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi, and Mustafa al-Khalidi. The Arab Executive was also headed by Musa Kazim al-Husayni. With the Arab and Jewish populations governed by the British under separate systems, the Zionists developed economic, social, educational, and political institutions of their own, including the Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Jewish Agency was headquartered in the city as well. Nationalist passions, and Palestinian fears of political and demographic displacement in the face of continued Zionist immigration, led to violence as early as April 1920. The more serious Western (Wailing) Wall Disturbances of 1929 were a result of the politicization of religious shrines. During the Palestine Arab Revolt (1936–1939) Palestinian guerrillas actually occupied the Old City for a time. Both incidents were suppressed by overwhelming British police and military force.

The Arab–Israel Wars and Aftermath

During the Arab–Israel War of 1948, Jerusalem was the scene of bitter fighting. Fighting between Palestinians and the Jewish Haganah began in late November 1947, and by late April 1948, 1most Palestinian neighborhoods in West Jerusalem had been captured by Jewish forces and depopulated, and the vacant houses handed over to Jews. Jordan and other Arab states entered the fray on 15 May 1948. Although the Jordanian Arab Legion waited three days to enter Jerusalem, it ended up engaging in fierce fighting with Jewish forces for control of the Old City. The surrender of the Jewish Quarter after ten days' fighting, and the expulsion of its remaining Jewish population, left the city divided into Israeli-controlled West Jerusalem and Jordanian-controlled East Jerusalem, including the Old City. Despite United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, that called for the city to be controlled neither by Jews nor Arabs, as well as later proposals for its internationalization supervised by the United Nations Trusteeship Council, the city remained divided between Jordan and Israel. Access between the two sectors was via the Mandelbaum gate. Both sectors of the city had been emptied of inhabitants belonging to the other side, and both the Jordanian and Israeli governments neglected, destroyed, and/or allowed the desecration of captured cemeteries and religious sites.

East Jerusalem was officially incorporated into Jordan in 1950 and remained subordinate to Amman throughout the period of Jordanian rule, despite protestations by mayors Arif al-Arif and Ruhi al-Khatib. Requests to establish an Arab university in Jerusalem were denied. Many of the Palestinian elite left the city; they were replaced by notables from Hebron invited to the city by Jordan. Though the city expanded northward, plans to incorporate the neighboring villages in the direction of Ramallah into the city never crystallized. Hotels were built, and construction began on a royal palace at Tall al-Full.

In 1950 Israel proclaimed Jerusalem as its capital even though almost all governments maintained embassies in Tel Aviv, where the real work of the state was done. Institutions such as the Hebrew University and Hadassah Hospital, which had come under Jordan's rule, were rebuilt in West Jerusalem. Christians, including Palestinian Christian citizens of Israel, were allowed to cross through the gate to visit the shrines in East Jerusalem on Christmas. Jews, however, were denied access to their holy places. In general, Jerusalem became a backwater for both Palestinians and Israelis alike.

In the Arab–Israel War of June 1967 another round of fierce fighting broke out. Jordanian forces

shelled West Jerusalem on 5 June and two days later Israeli paratroopers assaulted East Jerusalem, including the Old City. The Arab Legion and local Palestinians put up a stiff resistance, but were defeated. Israelis were jubilant at being able to pray at the Western Wall for the first time since 1948; Palestinians were mortified to see Muslim and Christian holy sites under Jewish control. Israel immediately began effecting significant changes to the newly unified city. It placed East Jerusalem under its legal and administrative jurisdiction on 28 June, thereby effectively annexing it and uniting it with West Jerusalem. Following on Jordanian procedure, Israel dramatically expanded the municipal city limits into the West Bank. On 30 July 1980 the Israeli Knesset declared the newly expanded city to be the "eternal" capital of Israel. Israeli authorities also confiscated Palestinian land in the Old City to rebuild the destroyed Jewish Quarter, and destroyed 135 Palestinian homes and two historic mosques to build an expansive pilgrims' plaza facing the Western Wall. Finally, new Jewish settlements like Pisgat Zeʾev were constructed in East Jerusalem surrounding the Old City. The acceleration of settlement building for Jews under the Likud governments starting in 1977 resulted, by the mid-1980s, in 12 percent of the Jewish population of Jerusalem residing in East Jerusalem beyond the 1948 armistice line (Green Line). By contrast, the Palestinian neighborhoods in West Jerusalem that were captured in 1967 were not resettled, and remain inhabited by Jews. By 2000, the city's population stood at 670,500 in the expanded city: 454,600 Jews and 215,400 Palestinians. Under the administration of Jewish mayor Teddy Kollek (1965–1992), all barriers dividing the city were removed. The city underwent a major beautification program that included the construction of a ring of parks around the Old City. Other green spaces, combined with zoning regulations, also served to prevent the expansion of Palestinian built-up areas while Jewish settlement construction continued and, in general, Kollek neglected development of the Palestinian parts of the city.

The Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem was heavily damaged during the Arab–Israel War of 1948. Restoration began after the Israeli conquest of the city in 1967. Located in the southeast section of the city, with a population of approximately 2,300, the Jewish Quarter contains the Western Wall (once Wailing Wall) of the Temple Mount, the holiest site in Judaism. © Daniel Laine/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Unified Jerusalem

Jerusalem is the seat of the government of the state of Israel, and the site of the Knesset, Supreme Court, Chief Rabbinate, and the offices of many Jewish institutions. Most countries of the world, however, maintain their embassies in Tel Aviv, in deference to United Nations General Assembly Resolultion 181 (II) of 1947 and the unsettled international legal status of the city. Since 1967, Muslim and Christian holy places have been under the jurisdiction of their respective religious authorities, with the al-Haram al-Sharif under the administration of the *waqf* and *shariʿa* courts. Jerusalem Palestinians were also granted Israeli permanent residency cards, and thus treated differently from West Bank Palestinians.

The unification of Jerusalem in 1967 revived the religious and political competition for control of the city. Some of the new Israeli neighborhoods in

East Jerusalem have been settled by *haredi* (ultra-orthodox) Jews, for whom Jerusalem is the center of their religious worldview that calls for strict observance of the Sabbath rest. Their opposition, at times violent, to secular vehicular traffic through these neighborhoods has renewed the religious-secular conflict among Jews in Israel. *Haredi* votes enabled the Likud candidate, Ehud Olmert, to become mayor of Jerusalem in 1993 and to place *haredi* members on the Municipal Council. In 2003 the city voted in its first *haredi* mayor, Uri Lupolianski. Through immigration and natural increase, the *haredi* population will soon exceed that of the secular Jewish residents of the city. For the Jewish religious nationalist settlers, who also have a presence in these neighborhoods and have bought or leased housing in Palestinian neighborhoods in the Old City or in villages such as Silwan that have Jewish historic significance, Jerusalem is holy land never to be relinquished.

For the Palestinians, Jerusalem remains their spiritual and national capital. They have viewed these political and demographic changes with great alarm, and have been angered by violent threats to their shrines. In August 1969 an Australian Christian set fire to the al-Aqsa mosque, destroying a twelfth-century pulpit. Israeli police thwarted several Jewish attempts to blow up the shrines in al-Haram al-Sharif in the early 1980s. In April 1982 a U.S.-born Israeli began shooting inside the Dome of the Rock, killing two Palestinians.

To bolster the Arab-Islamic nature of East Jerusalem, the Jordanian and Saudi governments have helped to fund the more than 2,000 Muslim endowments in the city—Islamic schools, colleges, mosques, welfare services, and commercial enterprises, as well as the repair of Islamic holy sites. Archaeological excavations also carry political ramifications in Jerusalem and have led to violence. Palestinian disturbances broke out in September 1996, prompted by Israel's opening of an ancient tunnel running adjacent to al-Haram al-Sharif. Intra-Jewish confrontations sometimes occur over archaeological digs that *haredi* Jews claim desecrate ancient Hebrew burial grounds.

The signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993 has accelerated the political struggle over the city as both Israel and the Palestinians prepare for the "final status talks" that were slated to determine the future of the city. Despite Israel's insistence that the unified city is its eternal capital, Palestinians continue to maintain that it (or at least East Jerusalem) is the capital of a future Palestinian state, as stated in the 1988 declaration of independence by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Indeed, the city has become the Palestinian religious, cultural, and intellectual center, and, through the establishment of the Arab Studies Society (1979) by Faysal al-Husayni at Orient House, the site of Palestinian archives collected to build and transmit Palestinian nationalism. After the onset of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process after 1993, the PLO gave al-Husayni responsibility for assessing municipal functions of a Palestinian part of the city, and the Orient House began to play the de facto role of a municipal institution with national functions. For their part, Israeli authorities in the 1990s began tightening residency requirements for Palestinians in East Jerusalem, a process that led to hundreds of them losing their residency rights. Israel's decision to build a Jewish settlement at Har Homa (in Arabic, *Jabal Abu Ghunaym*) in Jerusalem's southern suburbs angered Palestinians and threatened the peace process. Even Arab-Arab friction grew in 1994 when Israel's peace treaty with Jordan maintained Jordan's role in Islamic religious affairs in the city, to the outrage of Palestinians.

These political struggles witnessed the intensification of the level and degree of violence in the city. In October 1990 Israeli security forces opened fire on Palestinians in al-Haram al-Sharif who were stoning Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall below, killing seventeen. The violent opposition to the peace process by Islamic fundamentalist groups such as HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, who operated within the Palestinian Authority, led to numerous terrorist attacks on Jewish civilian targets that killed dozens. An unnerving development in this regard was the beginning of suicide bombings by members of the two groups. These suicide bombings on buses in Jerusalem led directly to the election victory of the Likud in 1996, and soured many Israelis to the idea of the peace process. The visit of the controversial Likud politician Ariel Sharon to al-Haram al-Sharif in September 2000 led to a particularly intense outbreak of the violence of the al-Aqsa Intifada, which has prompted Israeli authorities to

close Orient House and restrict non-Jerusalem resident Palestinians from entering the city, while HAMAS and Islamic Jihad carry out more suicide bombings, including in non-Zionist religious Jewish neighborhoods. In response, Israel began constructing a barrier cutting off Palestinian population centers from Jewish areas. In January 2004, Israeli authorities began extending the wall so that it cut off the Palestinian suburb of Abu Dis from the city proper. Jerusalem remained a city on the edge by early 2004.

See also Abdülhamit II; Allenby, Edmund Henry; Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab Legion; Arif, Arif al-; Ashkenazim; Balfour Declaration (1917); Crimean War; Dead Sea; Haganah; HAMAS; Haram al-Sharif; Hasidim; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Holy Sepulchre, Church of the; Husayni Family, al-; Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-; Husayni, Musa Kazim al-; Ibrahim ibn Muhammad Ali; Islamic Jihad; Israel; Jewish Agency for Palestine; Khalidi, Husayn Fakhri al-; Kollek, Teddy; Likud; Mandate System; Montefiore, Moses; Nashashibi Family; Nusayba Family; Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine Arab Revolt (1936-1939); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palestinian Authority; Sharon, Ariel; Supreme Muslim Council; West Bank; Western Wall; Western Wall Disturbances.

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JERUSALEM POST

See Newspapers and Print Media: Israel

JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

Established in 1929 to enlist non-Zionist Jewish support for the national home in Palestine.

The League of Nations mandate for Palestine, awarded in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), called for a Jewish agency that would be expected to provide Britain with advice and aid in discharging its duties in the establishment of a Jewish nation. Chaim Weizmann insisted that this agency be used to broaden Jewish support for economic development in Palestine, particularly among those ambivalent about Zionism's political aims. To mobilize that kind of support, Weizmann offered non-Zionists a measure of power over the development of Palestine's Jewish national home. Eastern European Zionists were reluctant to share power with those not fully committed to the Zionist political cause, so the founding of the Jewish Agency was delayed until 1929, when the World Zionist Organization (WZO) faced a severe financial crisis.

When the sixteenth congress of the WZO created the Jewish Agency, it accepted the principle of parity in membership between Zionists and non-Zionists on its three governing bodies—the 224-member council, the administrative committee, and the executive. The president of the WZO was to serve as Jewish Agency head unless opposed by 75 percent of the council. Of the non-Zionists on the council, 40 percent were Americans, and many had international reputations. The nature of the agency's

David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and Israel's future prime minister, with Israeli troops at Haganah. After World War II, Ben-Gurion was a supporter of the 1947 United Nations partition plan, which proposed separate Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

economic and social mission allowed both non-Zionists and Zionists to participate without compromising or altering their divergent principles: Economic aid could be provided to Palestinian Jewry either on the grounds that it was a community in distress or as a means to building the infrastructure of a Jewish state. Parity in the agency was not sustained. Because the agency never created effective links with non-Zionist philanthropic organizations, non-Zionists continually lost positions to Zionists and the balance of political alignment shifted in favor of the Zionists.

The Jewish Agency initially opened offices in Jerusalem, London, and Geneva. During World War II, it opened an office in New York City. Its political department conducted negotiations with Britain, particularly over annual immigration quotas. Functioning as the equivalent of a foreign office, the political department established contacts with a number of Palestinian leaders and organizations. The agency supervised the transfer of Jewish capital from Germany to Palestine during the 1930s, as well as the emigration—legal and illegal—of thousands of Jews from Nazi-dominated Europe. The agency also assumed partial control over the Yishuv's defense forces.

At the end of World War II, the agency helped prepare Palestine's Jewish population for war (the Arab-Israel War of 1948) by uniting, at least for a short period, the Haganah, Irgun, and Lohamei Herut Yisrael (LEHI). During that time, members of the agency's executive served in the central ministries of what became Israel's government—as prime minister and treasurer, and in the departments of Foreign Affairs and Defense. In the first years of statehood, the agency undertook primary responsibility for the settlement of Israel's immigrants from Europe and Islamic countries, and it later supervised the mass immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia into Israel.

Although a government ministry was eventually created to manage the process of immigrant absorption, the Jewish Agency retains significant control over organizing the rescue of diaspora Jews in danger. While some authority pertinent to agricultural settlement still resides with its offices, the agency's major tasks are now cultural and charitable. The agency expends a major portion of its budget on Jewish education and serves as the main fund-raising organization linking Israel to diaspora Jewry.

See also SÈVRES, TREATY OF (1920); WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO).

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DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

JEWISH BRIGADE

Established by the British war cabinet in 1944 as the only Jewish military unit to fight the Axis powers.

The Jewish Brigade represented the culmination of efforts by Jews in both Palestine and the United States to create an independent Jewish fighting force. In 1939, Jews in Palestine began to volunteer for military service, and after repeated pressure from the Jewish Agency and other Jewish organizations, in 1942 the British agreed to form a Palestine Regiment. The Palestine Regiment was sent to serve in the Middle East, although its responsibilities there were primarily restricted to guard duty.

Finally, in September 1944, the British created the Jewish Brigade (in Hebrew, *Ha-Hayil*) out of the Palestine Regiment, a field artillery regiment, and other auxiliary service units. The men, numbering approximately 5,000, were placed under the command of a Canadian-born Jew, Brigadier Ernest Frank Benjamin of the Royal Engineers, and they continued their training with the Eighth Army in Italy. In early 1945, the soldiers of the Jewish Brigade saw their first fighting at Alfonsine, and in April 1945 they led the offensive across the Senio River.

As they moved into northern Italy, the Jewish soldiers met Holocaust survivors for the first time; thereafter they provided them with food, clothing, and assistance immigrating to Palestine. They continued these activities in Belgium, Austria, Germany, and Holland and also assisted the Allied authorities in searching for Holocaust survivors.

In 1946, the Jewish Brigade was disbanded, partly because of increasing tension between the Yishuv and the mandatory authorities.

See also Jewish Agency for Palestine; Yishuv.

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Bryan Daves

JEWISH COLONIAL TRUST

Financial organ of the Zionist movement.

The Jewish Colonial Trust (JCT) was established in England in 1899. The first Zionist Congress (1897) had created the World Zionist Organization; the JCT was one of two subsidiaries subsequently set up in order to promote Jewish settlement in Palestine. The JCT was in charge of banking operations and of colonization projects in Palestine. It set up the Anglo–Palestine Bank, which virtually became the official bank of the Jewish national home, as a subsidiary. By 1936 it was the second largest bank in Palestine (after Barclay's). The other subsidiary, the Jewish National Fund, was responsible for the purchase of land that was to become the inalienable property of the Jewish people.

See also Banking; Jewish National Fund; World Zionist Organization (WZO).

Jenab Tutunji

JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION

Philanthropic organization (also known as the ICA and the PICA, or Palestine Jewish Colonization Association) founded in 1891.

Baron Maurice de Hirsch founded the ICA to assist Jews in Europe and Asia to flee persecution and go to countries in the Western Hemisphere. He initially endowed it with $10 million as a joint stock company, and the amount was eventually increased fourfold. The ICA assisted Jews by establishing agricultural settlements; most of these were in Argentina but there were also some in Brazil. It also helped Jewish farmers in Canada and the United States and provided assistance to Jews who were still living in Russia and the newly created states of Eastern Europe after World War I. In Palestine, the ICA took over the support and consolidation of colonies Baron Edmond de Rothschild had created.

Since Israeli statehood, the ICA has helped support settlements as well as research and training in agriculture. It also works with the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society and the Joint Distribution Committee in providing relief aid.

See also Joint Distribution Committee.

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Bryan Daves

JEWISH LEGION

Four battalions of Jewish volunteers in the British army during World War I.

On the urging of Russian Zionist Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky, Jewish units were formed to serve in the British army during World War I. The "Zion Mule Corps" consisted of 650 Palestinian Jews; it served in Gallipoli and was disbanded in 1916. The Thirty-eighth Battalion Royal Fusiliers (800 men) was recruited in England mainly from Russian immigrants, and was sent to Egypt and then Palestine in February 1918. The Thirty-ninth Battalion Royal Fusiliers enlisted some 2,000 men in the United States under the leadership of David Ben-Gurion, Yizhak Ben-Zvi, and Pinhas Rutenberg. It arrived in Egypt in August 1918 and was sent to Palestine. The Fortieth Battalion Royal Fusiliers was recruited from Palestinian Jews in British-controlled southern Palestine in July 1918. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Henry Patterson, these units of the Jewish Legion participated in Edmund Allenby's campaigns in Palestine and Syria in 1918. At the end of the war, the Thirty-eighth and Thirty-ninth battalions were disbanded, but the 1,000 men of the Fortieth Battalion remained in active service as part of the British forces in Palestine until after the riots of May 1921.

Proponents of Zionism believed that if their volunteers supported Britain in World War I, it would reflect favorably on their aspirations for a national home in Palestine. A decidedly practical result was that members of the Jewish Legion—including Berl Katznelson, Shmuel Yavnieli, Dov Hos, Eliahu Golomb, and Levi Eshkol—gained valuable organizational and military experience and later formed the nucleus of the future Jewish army in Palestine, the Haganah.

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Zachary Karabell
Updated by Neil Caplan

JEWISH NATIONAL FUND

Land-purchase and development fund of the World Zionist Organization.

The Jewish National Fund (JNF), or Keren Kayemet le-Yisrael in Hebrew, was set up in 1901. Its primary aim was to buy land in Palestine for the "eternal possession" of the Jewish people. The concept of public ownership was based on the biblical injunction that the land of Israel belongs to God and that it may be leased for forty-nine years.

Funds raised by Jews all over the world were used to buy land in Palestine for Jewish settlements. The first land was bought in 1904 at Kfar Hittim in lower Galilee. The first forest was planted by the JNF in 1908; this became a major activity of the JNF after the establishment of the State of Israel. By 1960 the JNF had 637,000 acres of land, and control of these was passed to a body set up by the government of Israel. This constituted 10 percent of the area of Israel. Since the 1990s the JNF has built reservoirs and has become involved in river rehabilitation in addition to its traditional functions of afforestation and the creation of parks. In 1997, the JNF opposed proposals set forth in a government-sponsored report to privatize the ownership of its land, on which hundreds of thousands of Israelis live.

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Paul Rivlin

JEWISH SETTLEMENTS

See Israeli Settlements

JEWS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

History of Jewish presence in the area from 2000 B.C.E.

The origins of the Jewish people are in the Middle East. Earliest Jewish history dates from the second millennium B.C.E.and its echoes appear in the Hebrew Bible. The Bible also recounts the vicissitudes of national life in ancient Israel and the evolution of Judaism. By the time of the Romans' expansion and their destruction of the Second Jewish Commonwealth in 70 C.E., Jews were living in much of the Middle East and some had moved into the western Roman Empire—Europe. The foundations of post–Second Temple Judaism were then laid by rabbis in Roman Palestine and in Parthian and Sassanian Babylonia. They canonized the Scripture, redacted the liturgy, and created the Talmud and Midrash.

After World War II, many Jewish emigrants fled to Israel to escape physical and religious persecution. Between 1948 and 1951, over 650,000 Jews immigrated to Israel, many, such as these Yemenite Jews, from other Middle Eastern countries. **© PHOTOGRAPH BY DAVID ELDAN. GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE (GPO) OF ISRAEL. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

Beginnings of Muslim Rule

With the conquests of Islam from the seventh century on, the majority of world Jewry came under Muslim rule. The demographic centers of world Jewry were located in the Middle East and the Maghrib, which included North Africa and Muslim regions of the Iberian Peninsula. Jewish merchants kept records in Arabic rendered in Hebrew script, and major rabbinic works in Judeo-Arabic were written by luminaries such as Saʿadyah Gaon in Iraq or Maimonides in Egypt. Jews in Persia also developed a Judeo-Persian literature.

In the later Middle Ages, the quality of Jewish life in the Middle East declined following transformed economic, social, and intellectual climates in the region. Native Christianity disappeared from the Maghrib and general attitudes toward non-Muslims hardened both there and further east. The laws of differentiation (in Arabic, *ghiyar*) were enforced with greater vigor and consistency than in earlier periods. Over time, Jews were increasingly confined by law or custom to restricted quarters, called *mellah* in Morocco, *qa ʿat al-Yahud* in Yemen, *mahallat* in Iran, and *harat al-Yahud* elsewhere.

The arrival, beginning in the fifteenth century, of Sephardim—Jewish refugees from Christian Spain, Portugal, and Sicily—and the Ottoman conquest of much of the region in the early sixteenth century breathed new demographic, economic, and cultural life into Middle Eastern Jewry. Jews in many eastern Mediterranean cities continued to speak Judeo-Spanish (Ladino). Some wealthy Sephardic families were intermediaries linking European commerce with local economies, but in time this niche was lost to Armenians, Greeks, and Levantine Christians. Most Jews, artisans and petty merchants, were poor. Culturally, Sephardic rabbinic codification and mystical exploration continued to evolve.

In the nineteenth century expanding European economies in the area enabled Jewish and Christian merchants to link up with European consular interests or seek foreign protection that became available under the Capitulations (in Turkish, *imtiyazat*). At the same time, many came to enjoy improved civil status in the Ottoman Empire under the Tanzimat reforms. They also availed themselves of Western education provided by foreign cultural and religious missionaries. From 1862 on, the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) was the main propagator of the French language and European-style education among Jews from Morocco to Iran. By 1900 more than 100,000 students had studied

Jews attend a synagogue in Baghdad. Until 1947, over one hundred thousand Jews lived in Iraq, but after Arab-Jewish hostilities mounted over the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, most fled to Israel. © FANCOISE DE MULDER/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

in AIU schools. The AIU stressed Enlightenment values, created new expectations, and aroused feelings of international Jewish solidarity. It produced cadres of Westernized Jews with a social advantage over Muslims who lacked such education, as the Middle East was drawn into world capitalism. Educational mobility led to geographical mobility as Jews in the region moved from areas of lesser economic opportunity such as Morocco, Syria, and the Turkish Aegean isles to areas of European economic concentration such as Algeria and Egypt. Others emigrated to Europe and South America. Jews from Iraq settled in ports in India, Burma, Malaysia, and China.

Against the backdrop of these trends, Jews were incorporated into different political frameworks during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In Algeria they were French citizens from 1870; in Tunisia, after the French Protectorate in 1883, some could apply for citizenship, and eventually about one-third of them did so; Syrian Jews lived under a French mandate after World War I; in Iraq, they were citizens of an independent Arab state from 1932; and in Yemen, Jews retained the status of *dhimmi* in a Muslim polity until they began to migrate to Israel after 1948. Within these diverse conditions Jews exhibited a range of cultural and political responses.

AIU education partially separated Jews from local Muslims and heightened their receptivity to French colonialism in the Maghrib, Syria, and Lebanon. With some exceptions, such as Yaʿqub Sanu, the father of modern Arab theater and political journalism in Egypt, and Albert Carasso, active in the Young Turk movement, Jews were not prominent in the intellectual and political currents developing in the Islamic world. In Iraq, only a handful of Jewish writers wrote in literary Arabic.

Rise of Zionism

A small number of Jews were touched by the Haskala, the Hebrew-language Enlightenment of mid- to late-nineteenth-century Europe. Books and newspapers in Hebrew circulated throughout Middle Eastern communities. A Judeo-Arabic press was active in some countries, notably Tunisia. Newspapers made Jews of the region aware of currents sweeping others parts of the Jewish world, including migration, religious reform, and Zionism.

From its very earliest days, Zionism made modest inroads into major urban centers in the Middle East. Sympathy for the movement was often philanthropic rather than political. Zionism did arouse popular enthusiasm in the wake of the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the Allied victory in World War I, and the San Remo Conference in 1920. In 1917 thousands of Jews gathered in Cairo and Alexandria in support of the Balfour Declaration, and similar scenes greeted Chaim Weizmann and the Zionist Commission for Palestine when they passed through Egypt the following year. Several hundred Jewish families emigrated from Morocco to mandatory Palestine between 1919 and 1923, to the chagrin of French colonial authorities. About 1,000 Jews from Iraq and smaller numbers from Syria settled in Palestine at this time.Others arrived from Libya in the 1930s as part of sports events, and stayed in the country. There had been a stream of Jews from Yemen to Palestine, totaling several thousand from 1880 to 1929, when the imam of Yemen ordered an end to the emigration.

The initial enthusiasm for Zionism subsided due to opposition from colonial authorities, members of the Jewish upper classes, and, most importantly, growing Arab and pan-Islamic nationalist movements. With rare exceptions, such as Sasson Heskayl, who served as Iraq's first finance minister; Joseph Aslan Cattaoui, who was Egypt's minister of finance in 1923 and minister of communications in 1925; or Léon Castro, editor of the Egyptian Wafd Party's French-language daily *La Liberté,* Jews in the Muslim world were studiously apolitical, especially in Arab countries. From the time of the Western Wall riots in Jerusalem in 1929, Arab nationalism became increasingly anti-Zionist, and, despite frequent disclaimers, both nationalist leaders and followers often merged anti-Zionism with antisemitism.

A Jewish wedding ceremony in Syria in 1988. Syrian Jews, referred to by the government as "follows of Moses" rather than "Jews," were treated as a suspicious religious community and are under constant surveillance by the police. © Corbis Sygma. Reproduced by permission.

In the 1930s and 1940s the growing admiration among Arabs for German national socialism and Italian fascism, which stood in opposition to the colonial powers of Great Britain and France, discouraged Jews from finding a place in the societies that Arab nationalists wanted to create. In Turkey, too, some Jews were affected by the Axis sympathies of the government that at times was paralleled by discrimination against nonethnic Turks.

World War II affected Jews in the Muslim world in various ways. In June 1941, at the end of the short-lived pro-Axis regime of Rashid Ali a-Kaylani, Iraqi Jewry suffered a pogrom called the Farhud; Jews in Libya became subject to racial laws enacted in Italy;

and Vichy, France, rescinded the citizenship of Jews in Algeria. Jews in Egypt and Mandatory Palestine felt deeply threatened by the German Afrika Korps advancing into western Egypt. Throughout the Middle East, Jews had heard the mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, broadcast in Arabic from Berlin, calling upon listeners to "kill the Jews wherever you find them, for the love of God, history, and religion." Many Jews began to ponder their future in the region both in relation to European colonial powers and to the local Muslim societies.

Post–World War II

The postwar years witnessed a renewal of pan-Islam and pan-Arabism on the one hand and Jewish nationalism on the other. A rapid chain of events undermined the weakened underpinnings of Jewish life in the Arab countries. Anti-Jewish riots occurred in Egypt and Libya in November 1945. In December 1947, following the United Nations partition vote on Palestine, riots rocked Jewish communities in Aden, Bahrain, and Aleppo. With the establishment of the state of Israel in May 1948, restrictive administrative measures were imposed on Jews in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, both during and after the Arab–Israel War of 1948. From May 1948 through 1951 more than 650,000 Jews migrated to Israel, half of them from the Middle East. Major migrations from Morocco and Tunisia arrived in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. By 1967 the majority of the 800,000 Jews in Arab countries at mid-twentieth century had left. During this period, half of Turkey's 80,000 Jews and about one third of Iran's 100,000 Jews departed for Israel, but others, including nearly half of Maghribi Jewry, went to France and elsewhere.

By the 1980s Jews of Middle Eastern origin—*adot ha-mizrah*—comprised well over half of Israel's Jewish population. Migration to Israel by Jews from the former Soviet Union made the percentages of Middle Eastern and European origin groups equal in the 1990s. By 2000 the Jewish community in Turkey stood at about 20,000. Iranian Jewry functioned actively until the revolution of 1979 that established the Islamic republic. Jews then immigrated to Israel, Europe, and the United States, and in 1989 about 22,000 remained in Iran. Very few Jews now reside in the Arab world; the largest group—about 3,500—lives in Morocco. Since the 1980s Morocco has encouraged Jewish tourists from Israel and elsewhere, and Tunisia has done the same since the 1990s.

See also ADOT HA-MIZRAH; ALLIANCE ISRAÉLITE UNIVERSELLE (AIU); ANTISEMITISM; ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1948); BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917); CAPITULATIONS; DHIMMA; FARHUD; HASKALAH; HESKAYL, SASSON; JUDAISM; LADINO; MIZRAHI MOVEMENT; SAN REMO CONFERENCE (1920); SANU, YAʿQUB; TALMUD; UNITED NATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST; WEIZMANN, CHAIM; ZIONISM; ZIONIST COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE.

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NORMAN STILLMAN
UPDATED BY HARVEY E. GOLDBERG

JEZREEL VALLEY

A major internal plain stretching almost 30 miles (48 kilometers) across northern Israel, from the northwestern base of Mount Carmel to the Jordan Valley.

The Jezreel Valley is called, in Hebrew, *Emek Yizreʿel*; in Arabic, *Marj ibn Amir*; and in English, the Plain of Esdraelon. Its larger, western portion is based on the westward flowing Kishon (Muqatta) River, while its smaller, eastern portion is based on the eastward flowing Harod (Jalud) River. Separating the hills of the lower Galilee in the north from the Carmel

ridge and Samarian hills (Jabal Nablus) in the south, the valley has been a natural route for travelers, merchants, nomads, and armies for thousands of years. Its agricultural land has consistently been cultivated by surrounding hill settlements.

Named for the ancient Israelite city of Yizreʿel (Hebrew for "may god sow"), the valley has supported varying levels of population throughout history. The dense habitation of pre-Crusader times later gave way to a thinner population and the emergence of marshland, both of which fluctuated historically and seasonally. During British rule in Palestine, Zionist organizations purchased parts of the valley and undertook Jewish settlement and marshland drainage, resulting in the rapid increase of its predominantly European-born Jewish population alongside the local Arab population. The events surrounding the 1948 war and the establishment of Israel resulted in a sharp decrease in the valley's Arab population and another increase in its Jewish population. The 1949 Israeli-Jordanian armistice lines cut across the southeastern valley just north of Jenin, leaving most of the valley within the borders of Israel and a small portion in the West Bank.

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GEREMY FORMAN

JIBRIL, AHMAD

[1935–]

Palestinian militant.

Born in Ramla, Ahmad Jibril found himself in Syria after the Palestinian refugee exodus of 1948. He served in the Syrian army and was the national chess champion of Syria in 1956. He left the army in 1958 and formed the Palestinian Liberation Front in 1961. The organization began military operations in 1965, and merged with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in December 1967. Jibril left the PFLP in November 1968 out of frustration at the group's preoccupation with ideological debates, and formed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command, a nonpolitical, armed organization dedicated to fighting Israel. Jibril helped form the Rejectionist Front in 1974 along with the PFLP and several other groups.

Jibril's PFLP–GC was responsible for the April 1974 terrorist attack against the Israeli town of Kiryat Shmona, in which eighteen Israelis died. A 1987 operation in which a fighter flew into Israel on a hang-glider and killed six Israeli soldiers helped spark the first Intifada. Jibril's group also fought against Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) loyalists in Lebanon in 1983 in support of a Syrian-backed mutiny, and has consistently opposed PLO policy ever since from his headquarters in Damascus.

See also PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND.

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LAWRENCE TAL
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

JIDDA

Saudi Arabian port on the Red Sea.

Jidda is the second largest city of Saudi Arabia, with a population of some two million. It is also the largest city of the Hijaz, located in the country's western region, along the Red Sea. Its prosperity dates from its designation by the early Islamic state as the port of nearby Mecca. Jidda was occupied by the first Saudi state at the beginning of the nineteenth century, then Muhammad Ali of Egypt restored it to nominal Ottoman authority in 1811. It was the last city in the short-lived Hashimite kingdom of Hijaz to resist the Al Saʿud, finally surrendering after a long siege in 1925. Jidda is important as the commercial and banking center of the country, the site of the Islamic Port of Jidda (Saudi Arabia's largest port) and King Abd al-Aziz Airport, through which most of the pilgrims pass during the

annual *hajj* (pilgrimage). The centuries-old immigration of Muslims from around the world makes Jidda one of the most cosmopolitan of Saudi Arabia's cities.

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J. E. PETERSON

JIHAD

A term that derives from the Arabic word jahada, *meaning "to strive."*

The Arabic nouns *juhd, mujahid, jihad,* and *ijtihad* mean endeavor, training, exertion, effort, diligence, and fighting. "Traditionally jihad was understood to be justified for three reasons: to repel invasion or its threat, to punish those who had violated treaties, and to guarantee freedom for the propagation of Islam" (Abedi). According to Iranian ayatollah Morteza Mutahhari, Jihad as a defensive act is explained in the *Hajj sura* 22:38–41, where it is said that God gives permission (for warfare) to those who have been attacked. In an Islamic legal context, the term *jihad* is most often used to refer to a martial campaign in the cause of religion and is therefore frequently translated as "holy war." Many now would argue that there is no such thing as a holy war, and that Islam does not sanction war but rather defense of Islamic values (this is certainly the case in the longest conventional war between two Muslim nations, Iran and Iraq, 1980–1988). Iran called the war a sacred defense rather than a jihad.

According to classical Muslim legal theory, the only kind of lawful military conflict is jihad, and a jihad can only be used to fulfill at least one of two main objectives. The first is the effective spread of Muslim ideals and values into a region of society unmoved by the call to Islam. The second is defense of the Muslim community from external threats. In addition to discussing the conditions necessary to establish these objectives, Muslim teachings on jihad also deal with important related issues such as the immunity of noncombatants, ethical restrictions on the applications of destructive force, and the circumstances warranting armistice. In fact, the doctrine of jihad is probably best understood as being similar to the "just war" theory in Western Christian contexts. Over the course of the twentieth century, jihad discourse was polarized by modernists like Muhammad Shaltut (died 1963) who argue that, in the modern era, offensive jihad should only take the form of a peaceful propagation of Islam, and revolutionary Islamist groups such as Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and Hizbullah, which maintain that Muslims around the world are obliged to use any available means to fight against the forces of Western imperialism.

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SCOTT ALEXANDER
UPDATED BY ROXANNE VARZI

JINNAH, MUHAMMAD ALI
[1876–1948]

Founder and first governor-general of Pakistan.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah was born in Karachi in 1876 and died in the same city in 1948, while serving as governor-general of Pakistan. Originally, Jinnah had stood for a united India, but when Muhammad Iqbal, the poet-philosopher, articulated the two-nation theory in 1930, Jinnah adopted the theory as his own political ideology. He helped to achieve the foundation of the state of Pakistan in 1947 through negotiations with the All-India National Congress and the British government.

Jinnah went to London in 1893, studied law at Lincoln's Inn, and qualified as a barrister (attorney) on 11 May 1896. He settled in Bombay, India, actively practicing law through the 1930s. His political career can be divided into phases. In the first phase, from 1906 to 1937, Jinnah was a member of the National Congress and called himself "an Indian first, and a Muslim afterwards." He was opposed initially to the Muslim demand for separate electorates, but in 1926 he shifted his support to the principle of separate electorates that guaranteed fixed proportional representation for Hindus and

Muslims in legislatures. Despite this shift, Jinnah asserted that Muslims' rights and interests would be protected in a united India. In the second phase, from 1937 to 1947, Jinnah's position reversed completely. His dissatisfaction started with Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi's position at the London Roundtable Conference (1939) and spread to frustration with the Muslim League, the British government's communal award based on the principle of separate electorates, the ultimatum to the Muslim League to merge with the National Congress in order to participate in provincial governments in 1937, and the suggestion of majority rule to the neglect of the Muslims, which probably convinced Jinnah that the National Congress was determined to establish majority Hindu rule in a united India.

In the second phase of his career Jinnah endeavored to create a separate Pakistani state with the approval of the British and the National Congress. In March 1942 at Lahore the Muslim League adopted the Pakistan Resolution, which demanded the partitioning of India into two states. In February 1942 the British government sent to India a prominent minister, Sir Stafford Cripps, to secure the cooperation of the Indian leaders for the defense of India. Muslims were assured that "dissident provinces" would be free to leave an independent and united India. Cripps's mission failed, but Jinnah saw Pakistan in Cripps's proposals.

In May 1946 the British sent the cabinet mission to India to negotiate a constitutional formula for the transfer of power to India. The cabinet mission plan divided India into three zones: Hindu majority provinces (present-day India); Muslim provinces in the Northwest (Pakistan); and Bengal and Assam, where Muslims would have a slim majority. Provinces could opt out of the plan to form a new federation after ten years. Jinnah accepted the proposal, and so did the congress. When the congress president publicly expressed reservations in implementing the plan, Jinnah rejected the plan, making the state of Pakistan a reality on 14 August 1947.

See also IQBAL, MUHAMMAD; PAKISTAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

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HAFEEZ MALIK

JIZYA

A poll tax.

Several poll taxes were levied throughout the Middle East from the time of the Muslim conquests (seventh century). Caliph Umar II (717–720 C.E.) established the principle that they should be levied only on non-Muslims. Islam exempted women, children, and the disabled or unemployed from the tax.

In 1855, the Ottoman Empire abolished the tax, as part of reforms to equalize the status of Muslims and non-Muslims. It was replaced, however, by a military-exemption tax on non-Muslims, the Bedel-i Askeri.

See also BEDEL-I ASKERI.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

JMA'A TRIBAL COUNCIL

North African Berber political unit.

In precolonial North Africa, Jmaʾa represented the highest political authority in the tribe, led by an *amghar* (chief). During periods of war, the *amghar* became the chief of war *(amghar n-l-baroud).* Each subtribe had its representative in the Jmaʾa. In the contemporary period, although some villages still have a Jmaʾa, its functions have been, however, reconciled to the management of collective social events.

RAHMA BOURQIA

JOHNSON–CROSBIE COMMITTEE REPORT (1930)

A survey in Palestine.

The Johnson–Crosbie committee collected data from 25,573 Palestinian Arab families in 104 villages. The report calculated that Arab peasant debt per family averaged 27 Palestinian pounds, the equivalent of a year's income. It also found that the average cultivator held a mere 56 *dunums* (14 acres; 6 ha) whereas 75 *dunums* (18.5 acres; 7.5 ha) were required for basic economic maintenance. The survey was conducted by William Johnson and Robert Crosbie, officials in the British administration in Palestine.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

JOHNSON, LYNDON BAINES [1908–1973]

U.S. president, 1963–1969.

Lyndon Baines Johnson succeeded to the presidency after the assassination of John F. Kennedy in November 1963. Although a long-time member of the U.S. House of Representatives (1937–1949) and U.S. Senate (1949–1961), and a most effective legislative leader, he had little experience in foreign affairs. With an escalating war in Vietnam, the Middle East had low priority for him.

He was unable to persuade Egypt to limit its armament program; to balance U.S.S.R. arms sales to Egypt, Syria, Iraq and elsewhere, Johnson authorized increased military sales to Israel and to conservative Arab regimes, particularly to King Hussein ibn Talal of Jordan. When Egypt blocked the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping in May 1967, Johnson denounced the act as illegal. During the Arab–Israel War of June 1967, Johnson kept the United States neutral, although American sympathies were clearly with Israel. Through his ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, Johnson gave crucial support to UN Resolution 242, passed in November 1967, which has been the keystone of Arab–Israeli diplomacy since then. In 1968, Johnson declined renomination for another term.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967); HUSSEIN IBN TALAL.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

JOHNSTON PLAN (1953)

Development plan for the Jordan River.

This comprehensive plan was drawn up by U.S. Special Ambassador Eric Johnston in 1953, for regional development of the Jordan River system. The hope was that it would reduce regional conflicts by promoting cooperation and economic stability. The two major riparians—Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan—had their own plans for water development, but each objected to the other's plan. Eric Johnston attempted to reach a unified plan through negotiations that dealt with water quotas, use of Jordan water for outside the water-basin area, use of the Sea of Galilee (also called Lake Tiberias or Lake Kinneret) as a storage area, incorporating the Litani River into the Jordan system, and international supervision.

Negotiations lasted from 1953 to 1955 and the Unified Plan was negotiated, with Johnston playing the key role in pushing the compromises along. The Unified Plan was accepted by the technical committees of the League of Arab States (Arab League) and Israel. Israel's government informed the United States that it would accept the plan, but in October 1955, the Arabs decided not to ratify it. In fact, there has been implementation of the Johnston Plan on the part of Israel and separately by Jordan.

See also GALILEE, SEA OF; LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES.

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SARA REGUER

JOHN XIX

113th Coptic patriarch of Egypt, 1928–1942.

The successor of Cyril V (1874–1927), John XIX had an uneventful patriarchate. He had been chosen by Cyril to be the *abuna* (archbishop) of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church but declined the offer. For many years metropolitan (chief bishop) of the Egyptian provinces of Behariya and Minufiyya, in 1892 he went into exile after a dispute with the Coptic Community Council but eventually regained its favor for his part in reforming the church's handling of bequests and administration of educational institutions. As patriarch, John established near Cairo a theological college to improve their education. He appointed the *abuna* and several bishops of the church in Ethiopia.

See also COPTS; CYRIL V.

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DONALD SPANEL

JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE

Charitable organization that assists Jews in distress.

The Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) was established in 1914 by a committee of relief agencies, including the American Jewish Relief Committee (affiliated with the American Jewish Committee), the Central Relief Committee (part of the Orthodox movement), and the People's Relief Committee (affiliated with American labor groups). Initially, the JDC assisted Jews in central and eastern Europe before, during, and after World War I, and later it helped reconstruct the Jewish communities in those regions. Before and during World War II, the JDC worked to rescue Jews from Nazi-occupied Europe; after the war, it assisted in the resettlement of displaced persons. Thereafter, the JDC focused its attention on helping the Jews of central and eastern Europe and those in Muslim countries. In 1991 it helped the Israeli government airlift nearly 15,000 Ethiopian Jews from Ethiopia to Israel.

In the early years of the twenty-first century the JDC, in response to a rising level of terrorist attacks in Israeli cities, funded activities for Israeli children who were left alone in the afternoon while their parents worked. It also became active in helping the Jewish community in Argentina, hit by the economic crisis there, setting up a soup kitchen for Jewish and non-Jewish children.

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BRYAN DAVES
UPDATED BY PAUL RIVLIN

JORDAN

A small Arab kingdom east of the Mediterranean Sea.

Jordan is bordered on the north by Syria, on the east by Iraq, on the south by Saudi Arabia, and on the west by Israel and the West Bank. The Gulf of Aqaba, an extension of the Red Sea, abuts its southernmost tip. To the west, it shares the Dead Sea (an inland salt lake) with Israel and the West Bank. Jordan is a crossroads in the region: The hajj (Islamic pilgrimage) route from Turkey and Syria passed through Jordan to the Hijaz and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. A major trunk road runs from Iraq to Jordan's only port, Aqaba. Oil pipelines, now nonfunctioning, were built from Iraq and Saudi Arabia across Jordan to Mediterranean ports. Prior to the establishment of the State of Israel (1948), Jordan (called Transjordan from 1920–1946) was the transit route from Palestinian ports to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian/Arabian Gulf. With a population that is about 50 percent Jordanian Arabs and 50 percent Palestinian (most refugees from the first Arab–Israel War of 1948), and a location between Israel and the powerful Arab states, Jordan is frequently buffeted by Middle Eastern and international political currents.

The site of Petra, the ancient city of Arabia, in southwestern Jordan. Once the stronghold city of the Nabataens, Petra was conquered successively by the Romans, the Muslims, and the Crusaders before it fell into ruins after the twelfth century. The fortress was rediscovered in 1812 by the Swiss explorer Johan Burckhardt. Redondo, Carmen, photographer. From a photograph in The Atlas of People & Places, by Philip Steele. Aladdin Books Ltd., 2002. Photograph © Carmen Redondo/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Geography and Climate

Jordan's landmass, almost 90,649 square kilometers (38,000 square miles), is marked by three distinct geological systems: the Jordan rift valley, the Transjordan plateau, and the Arabian/Syrian desert. At 397 meters (1,302 feet) below the level of the Mediterranean Sea, the Jordan valley contains the Dead Sea, the lowest surface point on the planet (the lowest actual point being beneath the ocean). Since the 1960s, the Jordanians have developed a sophisticated irrigation system in the valley, because it receives little rain. Given the topography and low rainfall, most of Jordan is a classic desert, with only 3 percent arable (partly under irrigation) and 1 percent forested. The Jordan valley is, however, warm in winter, so off-season fruits and vegetables can be produced for temperate markets. To the east of the rift valley, the Transjordan plateau runs like a wedge from the Syrian border to Maʿan in the south of the country. The plateau is composed of broad rolling plains, cut by precipitous valleys or wadis (streambeds that have water only during the rainy season). Rain-fed agriculture and animal husbandry are practiced here. To the east and south of the plateau, lies the Arabian/Syrian desert, a wasteland only sparsely populated by Bedouin.

Jordan possesses few natural resources; its only significant mineral deposits consist of phosphates, which are mined, and potash, which is extracted from evaporation of Dead Sea water. Jordan has very few petroleum deposits and no coal. Its important rivers are the Yarmuk River (shared with Syria and Israel), the Jordan River, (shared with Israel and the West Bank), and the Zarqa. Except for the small oasis of Azraq in the northeastern desert, Jordan has no natural freshwater lakes. An artificial lake was established behind the King Talal dam on the Zarqa River.

Jordan has a pleasant warm climate with little humidity, but also little precipitation. In the winter in the capital of Amman, the average high temperature is 11 degrees C (52 degrees F) and the average low is 4.4 degrees C (40 degrees F); in the summer they are 30 degrees C (86 degrees F) and 18 degrees C (64 degrees F). In the northern part of the Transjordan plateau, precipitation averages



MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

64 centimeters (25 inches), but in the southern part it falls to an erratic 25 to 35 centimeters (10 to 14 inches)—barely enough to raise a wheat crop. The desert and the Jordan valley receive 0 to 25 centimeters (0–10 inches) of rain. Typical of the eastern Mediterranean, the precipitation falls only during the late autumn, winter, and early spring—the rainy season.

The People, Language, and Religion

Jordan's population of 5,460,265 (mid-2003 estimate), lives largely in the fertile highlands of the Transjordan plateau. Smaller numbers live in the Jordan valley, where they practice agriculture or mining, and in the desert, where they herd sheep, goats, and camels or enlist in the military. About 50 percent of the population are Jordanians who originate from the land east of the Jordan river. Most of the balance have their origins in Palestine. Many arrived as refugees in Jordan following the establishment of the State of Israel and the Arab–Israel Wars of 1948 and 1967. Other Palestinians moved to Jordan beginning in the 1950s. As a result of the Gulf Crisis and war, about 300,000 Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship moved from Kuwait back to Jordan, where they increased the population by 9 percent. While relations between the refugees and other Jordanians are relatively amicable today, Palestinian guerrilla organizations did conduct an unsuccessful civil war against the Jor-

A semidesert region in southern Jordan, Wadi Rum boasts sweeping vistas, spectacular rock formations, and towering granite and sandstone cliffs. Once a holy place for Nabataens, Wadi Rum is now inhabited by several Bedouin tribes. © PETER M. WILSON/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

danian regime in 1970 ("Black September"). Both groups are of Arab stock and think of themselves as part of the larger Arab nation.

In terms of minorities, about 5 percent of the population are Arab Christians, mostly Greek Orthodox. They have positive relations with the Muslim majority and hold responsible and high-level positions in business, industry, commerce, banking, and government. Ethnic minority groups are even smaller; among these are Armenian Christians, Chechen Muslims, and Circassian Muslims. Some Circassians are royal palace guards.

The official language of Jordan is Arabic. Throughout the Arab world, although the written language is virtually the same, spoken dialects have developed. The Arabic spoken in Jordan conforms to the general eastern Mediterranean dialect; however, one finds some variations in the spoken language between the rural and urban regions, the older and younger generations, and the Jordanians and Palestinians. The influence of modern communications and education is causing many of these differences to be tempered or to disappear. Among the ethnic minority groups, Arabic is spoken in public but their mother tongue is often spoken at home.

Islam is Jordan's official religion. Ninety-five percent of the population are of that faith and almost all are Sunni Muslims. The government supports the established religion through its ministry of Awqaf (Waqf) and Islamic affairs. (Religious pluralism is also officially countenanced; the state recognizes and respects the rights of religious minorities.) Islam deeply affects the lives and behavior of many Jordanians. Praying five times a day, attendance at mosque on Fridays, tithing, fasting during Ramadan, and the Hajj to Mecca are aspired

to and practiced by many. The wave of popular Islamic fundamentalism that has affected the Middle East since the 1970s has had its influence in Jordan. Some practice their religion more diligently and demonstrably. Islamic classes and discussions, including informal and formal organizational activities, are popular; some women follow the religious dress code characterized by modest long coats and head scarves.

Jordan is a highly urbanized country. Seven out of every ten Jordanians live in towns of 5,000 or more; the balance resides in villages and encampments. With the return of the Palestinian Jordanians from Kuwait in 1990 and 1991, many of whom settled in Amman, 1,864,500 people lived in that city by 1999. In the 1970s, there was a great contrast between urban and rural living standards. Urbanites enjoyed basic services, such as drinking water and electricity in their homes, with schools and clinics in close proximity to their residences. By the late 1980s, those differences had substantially, but not entirely, disappeared. In urban areas, 99 percent have electricity in their residences; in the rural areas, the figure is 81 percent. For drinking water, the figures are 92 percent and 78 percent respectively. In terms of living space, while there are certainly some crowded quarters in the urban regions, they do not approach the crowded conditions often associated with developing countries. About 10 percent of the people reside in Palestinian refugee camps, where living conditions are congested. In rural areas, around 25 percent live in stone and mud houses; a diminishing number (less than 5 percent) follow the traditional life of the Arab Bedouin, living in tents and tending camels, sheep, and goats.

Jordan is substantially overpopulated, given its limited natural resources, because of the influx of Palestinian refugees and the very high birth rate. This overpopulation is a major reason for the degree of urbanization in the country. Low rainfall and a growing population put pressure on the very limited water supply. Some significant cuts in irrigation have already occurred and more are expected. In addition, as of the early twenty-first century, some 52 percent of the population is below 20 years of age—a heavy burden on the economy and service sector, especially in education.

Economy

Jordan's economy is highly skewed by its growing population and its dependence on the economies and politics of the Middle East. From the period of its gradual independence from Great Britain in the late 1940s and early 1950s, development has been the watchword of Jordan's economy. Beginning from a modest base, it grew by 11 percent per year from 1954 to 1967. During this period, Jordan received considerable economic and financial assistance first from Britain and later from the United States. After a period of decline caused by wars, civil strife, and international and regional constraints, it recommenced steady growth in 1974. This was stimulated by substantial aid and remittances from the oil-rich states of the region, plus a period of relative stability in Jordan and the region. By the mid-1980s, along with the Middle East economy generally, growth slowed to the point of stagnation. In 1988, the Jordanian currency, the dinar, was considered to be overvalued by international financial circles and devalued by 40 percent. This economic decline was exacerbated by the Gulf Crisis and war (1990–1991). Among other things, Jordan lost most of the remittances from the returned Jordanians who had been working in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf states as well as the direct financial aid from those countries.

In terms of both labor force and share of gross national product (GNP), Jordan's economy is dominated by the service sector (over 60 percent in both categories), followed by mining and manufacturing, construction, and agriculture. The service sector overshadows the economy because of the country's relatively large population, high birth rate, number of government employees in both the civilian and military sectors, and the government's successful efforts at extending essential services throughout the country. The mining and manufacturing sector is composed of five large companies—phosphate mining, potash extraction, fertilizer and cement facilities, and an oil refinery (that refines imported oil)—as well as many small factories and artisans. Agriculture, which is usually important in developing countries, claims less than 10 percent of both GNP and the labor force in Jordan.

In the 1990s, Jordan started moving in another economic direction: free trade. After the 1994 peace

treaty with Israel, the United States and Jordan established "Qualified Industrial Zones" (QIZs) in the country. Under this system, manufacturers in the twelve QIZs use a combination of Israeli, Jordanian, and West Bank–Gaza materials to manufacture goods that are then exported to the United States duty free. Jordan's exports to the United States grew from $20 million in 1999 to $200 million in 2002. However, only 20 percent of these manufacturers are Jordanian firms, and only one-half of the 20,000 work force in the QIZs are Jordanians. Then in 2000, Jordan signed a Free Trade Agreement with the United States, according to which the two nations pledged to phase out their respective import tariffs over ten years. Jordan's commitment to U.S.–led free trade was symbolized by Jordan's hosting of the World Economic Forum meeting in June 2003. There has been another side of these close economic ties: The United States has provided $3 billion in financial and military aid since 1993, including $700 million as payment for Jordan's role in the 2003 Iraq war. Still, unemployment was about 20 percent in 2003.

History

Throughout most of recorded history, Jordan (formerly Transjordan) was not a distinct geographical or political entity. Rather it was usually just a provincial area of a larger state or empire. The exceptions might be the biblical Moabite kingdom centered in what is now Karak, the Nabatean trading state ruled from its unique capital carved out of the rose-colored stone cliffs of Petra, and the Crusader state led by Renard de Châtillon, who built a large citadel in Karak. Otherwise, the area was ruled successively by the Hittites, Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Israelites, Greeks, Seleucids, Ptolemies, Romans, Byzantines, and the Muslim dynasties (Umayyads, Abbasids, Fatimids, Ayyubids, and Mamluks). In 1517 the Ottoman Empire established control in the region that would endure until the last days of World War I.

After World War I, Transjordan came under the British-sponsored rule of King Faisal I ibn Hussein and the short-lived United Syrian Kingdom. In July 1920, France drove Faisal out of Syria and took control of most of the Arab kingdom, while Britain continued to claim Transjordan, as prescribed in the secret French-British Sykes-Picot Agreement. In the meantime, Faisal's brother, Amir Abdullah I ibn Hussein, arrived in Maʿan with an entourage of followers in the fall of 1920. In 1921, British colonial secretary Winston Churchill accepted Abdullah as the ruler of Transjordan under the League of Nations Mandate System for Britain (while Faisal was made ruler of Iraq). Amir Abdullah, with the crucial cooperation and financial help of Britain, established the basic institutions of the state—a government, parliament (Council of Notables, later replaced by the Legislative Council in 1928), a constitution (the Organic Law in 1928), and a security force (the Arab Legion). After World War II, in 1946, an Anglo-Jordanian treaty was signed, to be revised in 1948—after which the emirate of Transjordan became the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and Abdullah was crowned king.

In May 1948, Jordan, along with several other Arab states, entered Palestine and joined the Arab–Israel War of 1948 six months after fighting first broke out between Jewish forces and local Palestinians. In 1949, at the end of the war, Jordan was in military possession of that portion of central Palestine that came to be called the West Bank. Following considerable political maneuvering and parliamentary elections on the East Bank (of the Jordan river—the old Transjordan) and the West Bank, the two entities were coupled via a parliamentary vote as a unitary kingdom. On 20 July 1951, angered by Jordan's secret negotiations with Israel, a Palestinian assassinated King Abdullah in Jerusalem's al-Haram al-Sharif, whose shrines are the third holiest Islamic sites in the world. He was succeeded by his son Talal ibn Abdullah. By constitutional means, Talal was removed from the throne in 1952 due to mental illness. He was succeeded that year by his son, Hussein ibn Talal, who was then a minor. King Hussein did not officially take up his duties until he reached the age of eighteen in 1953.

Jordan's history during King Hussein's long reign (1952–1999) may be divided into three major periods. The first two decades were marked by internally and externally generated crises and threats to Hashimite rule and the very existence of the country: Radical Arab nationalism stimulated street riots, challenges to the regime from Jordan's Prime Minister Sulayman al-Nabulsi in 1956 and 1957, destabilization by larger and stronger Arab states, and the devastating loss of the West Bank to Israel

in the Arab–Israel War of June 1967. In addition, the Palestinian guerrilla organizations confronted Jordan in the bloody Black September civil war in 1970. Nonetheless, while relying on his loyal military to survive, King Hussein and his circle helped put in place the bases for social and economic development.

The second phase, starting after the Arab–Israel War of October 1973, is distinguished by quieter political conditions within Jordan, rapid development fueled by funds (direct grants, loans, individual remittances) derived from the oil boom in neighboring states, and improved relations with most of Jordan's Arab neighbors in a relatively less radical regional atmosphere. Despite Jordan's problems with the Palestinians and its frequently strained relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the country became an accepted player and the king came to be a respected leader in most Arab capitals. Indeed, Jordan hosted two Arab summits—1980 and 1987—in Amman.

The third phase was dominated by the end of the Cold War and the alteration of regional relationships. In a sense, as a precursor to these changes, King Hussein decided to disengage Jordan politically and administratively from the West Bank in July 1988, in response to the pressures from the Palestinian Intifada (uprising), which began in late 1987. More important was the withdrawal of the Soviet Union as an active player in the region (1989–1990), the United States's ensuing dominance in areas of its perceived interests, and the resulting polarization of the Arab world. The 1990–1991 Gulf Crisis and war left Jordan (then diplomatically allied with Saddam Hussein's Iraq) and a few other poor Arab states politically, economically, and regionally isolated.

On the domestic level, though, Jordan began a gradual democratization process; its parliament had been recalled in 1984 after a hiatus that began in 1970, and in 1989, elections (generally considered to be the freest in the Arab Middle East) were held. Subsequently, under a mandate from King Hussein, leaders from all political streams wrote a national charter defining the general principles for political life in the country. They include democracy, pluralism, and the recognition of the legitimacy of the Hashimite throne. A special general



Fourteen miles from Jordan's capital city of Amman lies Baqʿa, the country's largest refugee camp. Some 120,000 Palestinians left the West Bank and flooded into Baqʿa after the Arab–Israel War of 1967. Approximately 10 percent of Jordan's population lives in camps such as this, and the influx of refugees has contributed to the country's severe overcrowding problem.
© Owen Franken/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

congress, of 2,000 representatives, ratified the document on 9 June 1991. Democratization initially led to significant parliamentary gains by opposition Islamic candidates and parties, although nonideological, pro-regime politicians dominated the parliament by the early 2000s.

Jordan fully embraced the United States–sponsored Middle East peace process and, along with other Arab states and the Palestinians, participated in direct negotiations with Israel beginning at the October 1991 Madrid Conference. In the wake of the September 1993 Oslo Accord between Israel and the PLO, Jordan signed its own peace treaty

with Israel in October 1994, the second Arab state to do so. In November 1995, King Hussein traveled to Jerusalem for the first time since 1967 to attend the funeral of assassinated Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Hussein's own death in January 1999 from cancer devastated Jordanians, many of whom had never known any leader but him, and who had come to associate him with the very existence of Jordan. Two weeks prior to his death, Hussein had shocked the nation by ousting his brother, Hassan, from the post of crown prince that he had held since 1965, and replacing him with his eldest son, Abdullah II ibn Hussein. The young king quickly assumed the throne upon his father's death, and faced monumentally large shoes to fill. Since then, he has pulled Jordan even closer to the United States and its vision of the Middle East. In addition to developing bilateral free trade agreements, Jordan also allowed the United States to station troops in the country before and during the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003. With the Jordanian economy still in trouble, the Israeli–Palestinian peace process stalled, and a new regional balance of power given the direct intervention of the United States in Iraq, King Abdullah faced some serious challenges by late 2003.

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Abdullah II ibn Hussein; Amman; Aqaba; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab–Israel War (1973); Black September; Hussein ibn Talal; Intifada (1987–1991); Jordinian Civil War (1970–1971); Refugees: Palestinian.

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Peter Gubser
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

JORDANIAN CIVIL WAR (1970–1971)

Fighting between the Jordanian army and Palestinian guerrillas in 1970 and 1971.

Between 1967 and 1970, Palestinian guerrilla groups associated with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) established a strong presence in Jordan. By the summer of 1970, their attacks against Israel, which prompted Israeli counterattacks, and their activities within Jordan posed a significant threat to the stability, if not the existence, of the Jordanian monarchy. As a complicating factor, in the aftermath of the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab–Israel War, Iraqi troops were stationed in Jordan. They, along with a strong Syrian military presence just north of Jordan's border, constituted an additional security threat to the regime of King Hussein ibn Talal.

In June 1970, guerrillas and the Jordanian army clashed in the capital, Amman, but fighting ceased after an agreement was struck allowing Palestinian fighters to continue their presence. In early September, another round of clashes erupted, with serious new complications. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), led by George Habash, hijacked four international airplanes, forcing three to land in Jordan with their hostages. After Jordanian authorities negotiated an evacuation of the passengers and an end to the standoff, the PFLP blew up the empty planes. This spectacle, in the full glare of the international media, drove King Hussein to appoint a military cabinet, signaling his intent to confront the guerrillas once and for all. Jordanian troops began a major assault against PLO

targets on 17 September. Iraqi troops, by minor repositioning, indicated they would not interfere; but on 19 September as many as 200 Syrian tanks, along with Syrian-controlled Palestine Liberation Army forces, invaded to assist PLO forces. Jordan requested help from the United States, and Israel made moves indicating it might intervene. Because of internal Syrian politics and direct communications between King Hussein and Hafiz al-Asad, then Syrian air force commander, Syrian planes did not join the battle. Bereft of air cover, the Syrian force was driven back by Jordanian planes and tanks on 22 September. Subsequently, Jordan's army defeated the Palestinian guerrillas on the ground after ten days' fighting and thousands of casualties, including heavy civilian losses in Palestinian refugee camps.

With considerable assistance from Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser, King Hussein and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat (who had escaped from Jordan) signed a peace accord in Cairo dated 27 September, which called for the withdrawal of the Palestinian forces from Amman. In July 1971, the army undertook extensive and harsh mopping-up operations in northern Jordan, driving the PLO completely out of Jordan. As punishment for its actions against the Palestinians, Kuwait and Libya ended financial aid to Jordan, and Syria closed its border and airspace to Jordanian traffic. Although Jordan suffered economically and politically for its defeat of the guerrillas, it eventually renormalized relations with the Arab world, especially after the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War.

See also Arafat, Yasir; Habash, George; Hussein ibn Talal; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

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Peter Gubser
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

JORDANIAN OPTION

A term used to describe the foreign policy of the Israeli Labor Party; a preference for reaching a settlement with the Hashimite rulers of Jordan rather than with the Palestinians.

The origins of the Jordanian Option can be traced to the contacts between the Jewish Agency (the official link between the Jews in Palestine and the British mandate authorities) and King Abdullah I ibn Hussein of Jordan, which culminated in a secret agreement to partition Palestine between themselves in 1947. After the attainment of Israel's independence, on 15 May 1948, Israeli leaders saw the survival of the Hashimite monarchy in Jordan as essential to their own nation's security.

After Israel captured the West Bank of the Jordan River during the 1967 Arab–Israel War, Labor Party leaders opposed the creation of a Palestinian state and strove, unsuccessfully, for a territorial compromise with Jordan. The Jordanian Option ceased to be Israel's official policy following the rise to power of the Likud Party in 1977. Later, whether in opposition or as the Likud's coalition partner, the Labor Party continued to advocate the Jordanian Option. By cutting the links between Jordan and the West Bank in July 1988, Jordan's King Hussein announced, in effect, that a Jordanian Option no longer exists—if it ever did.

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Arab–Israel War (1967); Hussein ibn Talal; Jewish Agency for Palestine.

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Avi Shlaim

JORDANIAN PRESS AGENCY

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

JORDAN RIVER

River that forms the boundary between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Jordan; it flows south from Syria to the Dead Sea.

The Jordan River rises from the confluence of three major springs and streams located on the southern and western slopes of Mount Hermon (Arabic, *Jabal al-Shaykh*). The largest is the Dan and the other two are the Hasbani (Hebrew, *Nahal Senir*) and the Baniyas (Hebrew, *Nahal Hermon*) streams. The streams unite about 4 miles south of the Lebanon-Israel border. These springs usually provide 50 percent of the water of the upper Jordan, the rest coming from surface runoff in the rainy winter months. The discharge flows into the northern end of the Ghawr, which is the valley of the Dead Sea and the northern extremity of the Great Rift Valley that runs south to Africa, ending at Mozambique.

The upper Jordan River flows swiftly through the Hula Valley, additional water coming to it from minor springs and Wadi Barayghit (Hebrew, *Nahal Iyyon*). Four miles south of the Jordan's outlet from Lake Hula, the water course deepens and the river runs for 10 miles, plunging 850 feet. The central Jordan river begins north of the Sea of Galilee (also called Lake Tiberias or Lake Kinneret), leaving the southern exit of the lake, where it meets up with a few more streams and most importantly with its main tributary, the Yarmuk River. The Yarmuk originates in the eastern rift and forms the border between Syria and the Kingdom of Jordan as it flows westward to enter the Jordan River 6 miles south of the Sea of Galilee at 985 feet below sea level. The lower Jordan River flows southward, dropping to 1,310 feet below sea level, emptying into the Dead Sea, a great salt lake whose surface level is the lowest point on Earth's surface.

The Jordan and Agriculture

The water of the Jordan is freshest at the headwaters and becomes more saline as it enters the Sea of Galilee; the salinity rises rapidly as it moves south to the Dead Sea. Agriculture depends in part on water quality (freshness) and in part on soil quality (organic matter and minerals). Over the years, and after much intensive study and advice, during the British Mandate (1922–1948) the Zionists in Palestine determined that the northern Negev Desert had fertile soil and that all it needed was a good supply of water. At that time, the only large-scale development plan for the Jordan River was carried out by the Zionist leader and hydroelectric engineer Pinhas Rutenberg; even that was limited by the British Mandate administration to the construction of one power station to supply hydroelectric power to Palestine west of the Jordan. All Rutenberg's plans for irrigation and electrification of the area east of the Jordan River came to nothing.

When the state of Israel came into existence in 1948, plans were drawn for the diversion of water from Jisr Banat Yaʿqub, on the upper Jordan, to be taken via massive pipelines across the Jezreel Valley and south along the coastal plain, terminating in Beersheba, where it could be used most effectively. When work began on this diversion scheme in 1952, Syria complained to the United Nations that it violated the demilitarized zone agreement of the 1949 armistice (which ended the 1948 Arab–Israel War). Israel was ordered to cease construction, and U.S. Special Ambassador Eric Johnston was appointed to devise a scheme for regional development of the Jordan River system. Johnston's Unified Plan, worked out from 1953 to 1955, was never formally ratified by the League of Arab States but has been implemented by Israel and by the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan in separate schemes.

Israel has constructed the Cross Israel Water Carrier, which was its original idea, but the carrier was started at the northern end of the Sea of Galilee—a costly modification, considering that the water had to be pumped up to the level of the Jezreel Valley. Across Israel, the government built smaller pipelines radiating out over the farmland to bring water for irrigation. The entire system forms a water grid, easily controlled and measured; it was completed in 1964.

The Kingdom of Jordan has constructed the East Ghawr Project, hooking up a pipeline to the Yarmuk above Adassiya, which parallels the flow of the Jordan River. The pipeline is on a much higher level than the river, just below the high ridges, and the radiating smaller pipelines flow by gravity to the rich Jordan Valley soil, irrigating the farms. The final stage of the project, under Jordan Valley Authority control (created in 1973), was completed in 1980 when the pipeline reached the Dead Sea.

Hydropolitics

After the 1967 Arab–Israel War, new issues complicated an already complex situation, since Israel took

and occupied Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Jordan. Discovering the existence of the huge aquifer under the spine of the mountains of the West Bank, Israel began to pump winter floodwaters into the aquifer to use it as a better water storage area than the Sea of Galilee. Israel refuses to allow the Palestinians in the West Bank to drill deeply for new wells lest they tap this vital storage area. By taking the Golan Heights from Syria, Israel also gained complete control over the Galilee, the upper Jordan River, and even part of the Yarmuk River. This gave Israel effective control over the Jordan River, preventing water diversion downstream by either Jordanians or Palestinians. Indeed, securing control over the water supply was one of several Israeli motivations in launching the 1967 war in the first place.

Throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, Israel continued to build settlements in the West Bank, diverting surface water from the Jordan and more groundwater from underground aquifers, in each case lessening the amount of water available for Palestinian towns and cities. The 1973 Arab–Israeli War did nothing to change this situation, nor did the wars of the 1980s in Lebanon and in the Persian Gulf. The situation for Palestinians and Jordanians, suffering from chronic water shortages, grew steadily more desperate.

The post–Gulf War atmosphere included a return to the regional peace process, beginning in 1991 with meetings in Madrid. These were followed by specialized rounds of multilateral talks, including negotiations over water and environmental issues. By 1993, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization began direct negotiations at Oslo. This was followed by the 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, in which water rights loomed large. The treaty returned the Wadi Araba (a major source of groundwater) to Jordanian control, while leasing the same land back to an Israeli kibbutz for twenty-five years. It is not accidental that the treaty was signed at the Wadi Araba. The two states agreed that Jordan could build a dam and divert water from the Yarmuk River, while Israel would consider Jordan's water needs when releasing waters from the Galilee to the lower Jordan. Since Jordan had no capacity for storing Yarmuk floodwaters, Israel agreed to pump winter water from the Yarmuk for storage in the Sea of Galilee, which would then be sent back to Jordan in the summer.

In practice, however, repeated summer droughts and overuse of water resources together have depleted the regional water supplies, even lowering the water level of the Galilee. As a consequence, Israel has tended to send Jordan less water than expected. This has led Jordan to obtain supplemental and emergency supplies from Syria and has also led Jordan and Syria to finally begin construction of a decades-old project: the Wihda, or Unity, Dam (also called the Maqarin Dam) on the Yarmuk River. In the West Bank, Israeli reoccupation, the Palestinian uprising (since September 2000), and the collapse of much of the regional peace process has at least delayed any hope of more equitable access to surface or groundwater supplies. Hence the water situation for the Palestinian Authority remains dire and will be a vital point of negotiation with Israel.

Hydropolitics are vitally important to Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinian Authority as they approach the point when they will be using all their available water and yet have rapidly growing populations. Unless there is a major technological breakthrough, and unless greater levels of cooperation can be arranged between these riparian peoples, hydropolitics may precipitate ecological disaster and possibly the next war.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab–Israel War (1973); Beersheba; Dead Sea; Golan Heights; Jezreel Valley; Johnston Plan (1953); League of Arab States; Maqarin Dam; National Water System (Israel); Negev; Oslo Accord (1993); Palestinian Authority; Rutenberg, Pinhas; West Bank; Yarmuk River.

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SARA REGUER
UPDATED BY CURTIS R. RYAN

JORDAN TIMES

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES

JOSEPH, DOV

[1899–1980]

Israeli lawyer and cabinet member.

Dov (Bernard) Joseph was born in Montreal, where he began his Zionist activity as a teen. In 1917 he became the first editor of the *Judaean,* a prominent Canadian Zionist publication. In 1918 he joined the Jewish Legion. He emigrated to Palestine in 1921 and became a lawyer. He received a doctorate from the University of London in 1929. From 1936 to 1945 he was a legal adviser in the political department of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. This brought him into close contact with the department's head, Moshe Sharett. In 1945 he was appointed to the Jewish Agency Executive, where he continued his leadership of the political department. During the fall of 1947 he was dispatched by the World Zionist Organization to the United States to push for a United Nations vote in support of partition. During Israel's War of Independence he was military governor of Jerusalem. On 17 September 1948 the United Nations mediator Count Folke Bernadotte was assassinated by Lohamei Herut Yisrael (LEHI)—the "Stern Gang," led by Abraham Stern—on his way to an appointment with Joseph. Joseph took the lead in the arrest of the responsible LEHI members.

Joseph served in various ministerial capacities between 1949 and 1955, and was a member of Knesset (MAPAI) until 1956. From 1957 to 1961 Joseph served as treasurer of the Jewish Agency, and as Israel's minister of justice from 1961 to 1965. He died in Jerusalem in 1980.

See also BERNADOTTE, FOLKE; LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL; SHARETT, MOSHE; STERN, ABRAHAM.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

JUBAYL, AL-

A small port on the Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia.

Al-Jubayl traditionally served the Najdi hinterland, especially al-Qasim district. The kingdom's Second Five-Year Development Plan (1975–1980) teamed al-Jubayl with Yanbu on the Red Sea coast in an ambitious industrial development scheme involving crude oil refining, petrochemical complexes, and steel-manufacturing industries, linked by trans—Saudi Arabian oil and gas pipelines. The development of the two sites was expected to take ten years and cost in excess of $70 billion. Al-Jubayl was to be the bigger of the two, with three petroleum refineries, six petrochemical plants, an aluminum smelter, and a steel mill, as well as support industries and an industrial seaport. By 1999, seventeen basic industrial plants had been established and the city had an estimated population of 101,000, projected to grow to 290,000 by 2010. It also had acquired an industrial college and an airport.

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J. E. PETERSON

JUDAISM

The religion of the Jewish people.

Judaism developed out of scripture (the Torah) and an oral tradition of legal and ethical conduct as inscribed in the Talmud, codes, mystical literature, and rabbinic commentaries. Although traditional

Jews assume that Judaism has remained unchanged from the revelation at Sinai to the present, most scholars agree that it has been transformed by the vicissitudes of Jewish history since the days of the Bible.

A significant turning point in Judaism occurred when the wandering Israelites entered into the Promised Land and later when they built their Holy Temple in Jerusalem. For much of this time, the religion was essentially a temple cult, organized around regular ritual sacrifices and a series of three pilgrimages to Jerusalem, and practiced by a people ruled by kings, guided by prophets, and ministered to by priests.

After the Babylonian destruction of the First Temple in 586 B.C.E. and even more so following the Roman destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C.E., Judaism became a religion of exile. Replacing the temple and temple rites were synagogues, regular prayer, and an emphasis on the lifelong study of sacred texts in the Torah. Rabbis and teachers replaced the priests and prophets, and Jewish community leaders, the kings. This new Judaism was a more portable religion, appropriate to a wandering people. Moral and ethical laws became central, but ritual praxis, governed by strict codes and guided by rabbinic interpretation of the law, was also crucial. The Torah became the focus of Judaism, the yeshiva its most important sanctuary, and a return to the Promised Land Zion and a rebuilding of the temple in Jerusalem remained abiding hopes and part of the promise of messianic redemption.

The Diaspora has led to a nuancing of Jewish tradition into distinct customs. Among the most outstanding have been the custom variations between Sephardic Jews, whose expatriation occurred in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Iberian Peninsula, and Ashkenazic Jews, who trace their origins to France and the German-speaking countries but who emigrated ultimately to almost all of Europe and later to the Americas. Sephardic Jews and Ashkenazic Jews share a belief in Scripture and a dependence on the Talmud, but they have evolved variations in custom and ritual praxis based upon their varying ethnic experiences and the disparate rabbinic authorities by whom they have been guided over the years. Nevertheless, many of the rabbis and their commentaries have, through time, acquired a religious legitimacy that supersedes these differences. Thus, for example, Rashi, an eleventh-century Ashkenazic exegete, and Maimonides, a twelfth-century Sephardic rabbinic codifier, are recognized by all Jewish traditions to be authoritative interpreters of Judaism.

By and large, Judaism defines a Jew as someone born of a Jewish mother or someone who has submitted to religious conversion. Although there is debate about what constitute the minimal requirements of conversion, the *halakhic* (Judeo–legal) minimum requirement consists of circumcision for males, immersion in the waters of a ritual bath *(mikveh),* a period of Torah study, and a commitment to be bound by all the laws of Judaism. During the twentieth century, some non-Orthodox Jews expanded this religious definition to include children of either a Jewish father or mother and do not require a commitment to keep all the laws. The definition is a crucial one in Israel, which guarantees full citizenship rights to all Jews.

Through most of the period of the Diaspora, Judaism has tended to focus on matters of praxis more than on principles of faith, because, it was argued, the former better guaranteed the religion's continuity while ensuring the integrity of belief. Since the eighteenth century and especially in the twentieth century, however, a large-scale move away from praxis has occurred. A result of religious reform and social changes that brought Jews out of their status as pariahs and into the mainstream of Western societies, this development has led to a Judaism that focuses more on its moral and ethical principles and on some vague notions of ethnicity than it does on ritual praxis. Accordingly, in contemporary Judaism, those who strictly maintain traditions, ritual praxis, and time-honored Jewish codes of conduct now constitute a growing minority.

Although the principles of Jewish faith have been the subject of much discussion and debate among Jewish philosophers and rabbinic commentators, among the most commonly cited essentials are thirteen principles listed by Maimonides. These include a belief in a single Creator, a unique and everlasting God, who is incorporeal, who existed before time began and will last after it has passed, and who alone is worthy of worship. It also includes a belief in the utterances of the prophets, and especially

the words of Moses; a conviction that the entire Torah was divinely revealed to Moses at Sinai and passed on intact to the Jewish people, who may not replace it with another set of teachings; and a belief that God is omniscient and that He creates all life, rewards the good, and punishes the bad. Finally, it includes a faith in the promise of messianic redemption. In the same way that only a minority of Jews today abide by all the rules of Jewish law and praxis, so is it likely that only a few Jews today hold all of the thirteen beliefs.

Although Judaism has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to survive the vicissitudes of Jewish history and the vagaries of existence in the Diaspora, including persecution and pogrom (most recently during the European Holocaust), some observers are anxious about its future in the context of an open society like America's and that of a secular state like Israel, the two largest population centers of Jewry today. Pointing to a decline in numbers of Jews in America as well as a diminution of Jewish education, practice, and faith, these observers argue that Judaism's days as a vital religion are numbered in America and throughout the Diaspora. On the other hand, looking at Israel's large-scale redefinition of Jews as secular Israelis, other observers worry no less about the future of the religion in the Jewish homeland. To some of these observers, the answer to these anxieties is to press for the coming of the Messiah. To others, the answer is a revitalization of Jewish education and a return to Jewish tradition.

See also DIASPORA; HOLOCAUST; POGROM; YESHIVA.

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SAMUEL C. HEILMAN

JUDEO-ARABIC

The various forms of Arabic spoken or written by Jews from before the rise of Islam to modern times.

Like all Diaspora Jewish languages, Judeo-Arabic is distinguished from its non-Jewish cognate, Arabic, in the use of the Hebrew alphabet, a significant number of Hebrew and Aramaic loanwords and elements, and its own distinguishing grammatical, syntactical, and phonological forms.

In the Middle Ages, written Judeo-Arabic, which depending upon the subject matter ranged from Classical to Middle Arabic in style, became a primary medium of Jewish intellectual creativity for theologians, philosophers, grammarians, lexicographers, and legal scholars, and was also the primary medium of correspondence. Only for poetry (which in Islamic society is considered the supreme national art form) was Hebrew the principal language of expression. Owing to the decline of Hellenistic humanism after the High Middle Ages and the increased social isolation of Jews within the context of a larger Arab world after the thirteenth century, the regional varieties of modern Judeo-Arabic that emerged in the late fifteenth century were characterized by their vernacular nature.

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Judeo-Arabic books and newspapers were published from Morocco to India (where there was an Iraqi Jewish mercantile colony). Many of the books were translations or adaptations of European popular literature and, in some instances, works of Haskalah Hebrew writers. By the 1920s, Judeo-Arabic publication was declining in many places as French became the main language of high culture for many Jews, because of the Alliance Israélite Universelle schools. Nevertheless, it remained the spoken language for the great majority of Jews until their mass exodus to Israel in the mid-1950s. Judeo-Arabic is dying out among the second and third generations born in Israel, France, and the Americas, who tend to speak their national languages (Hebrew, French, and English, Spanish, or Portuguese).

See also ALLIANCE ISRAÉLITE UNIVERSELLE (AIU); HASKALAH.

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NORMAN STILLMAN

JUMAYYIL, AMIN

[1942–]

President of Lebanon, 1982–1988.

Amin Jumayyil (or Gemayel) studied law at St. Joseph University in Beirut, and is noted for his oratorical skills in Arabic. A moderate who was not active in the Phalange party, founded by his father, Pierre Jumayyil, he concentrated on his political career after being elected to parliament in 1970, the youngest deputy in the body. Jumayyil was named president on 23 September 1982 after the assassination of his brother Bashir Jumayyil, through consensus among the various political factions, key Arab states, and Western powers. He based his policies on his alliance with the United States, which ultimately led to the unraveling of his presidency. Under pressure from Syria, he abrogated the U.S.–brokered 1983 security agreement with Israel. On 17 February 1984, the last of the multinational force withdrew from Beirut. Without support, Jumayyil was a lame-duck president. He remained in office until the end of his term in 1988. Minutes before leaving office, he violated the terms of the 1943 National Pact (which required a Sunni Muslim serve as prime minister) by appointing fellow Maronite Christian Gen. Michel Aoun to the post. Given his poor relations with Syria, he left Lebanon and went into exile.

Jumayyil taught at Harvard University, wrote, and lectured. The death of Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad in June 1990 paved the way for his return to Lebanon. Jumayyil found an ally in Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who forsook his traditionally pro-Syrian line to join what had been the Maronite campaign against Syria.

See also AOUN, MICHEL; JUMAYYIL, BASHIR; JUMAYYIL, PIERRE; JUMBLATT, WALID; NATIONAL PACT (LEBANON); PHALANGE.

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MAJED HALAWI
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JUMAYYIL, BASHIR

[1947–1982]

Militia leader; later president of Lebanon.

Bashir Jumayyil (also Gemayel) was the son of Pierre Jumayyil, a right-wing, militant Maronite leader who founded the fascist Phalange party. Bashir Jumayyil grew up in Beirut and joined the Phalange early in his youth. He studied law at Saint Joseph University and was very active in the militarized youth branch of the Phalange. He supervised the anti-Palestinian armed branch of the movement and provoked clashes with Palestinian organizations in Lebanon after forming the BG (his initials, using the French spelling of his name) militia in 1974, a year before the eruption of the Lebanese Civil War. Jumayyil became a key militia leader in the Civil War. He rose to prominence in the battle against the Palestinian refugee camp in Tall al-Zaʿtar in 1976 and was appointed president of the Military Council after the mysterious death of William Hawi. He formed the Lebanese Forces in 1976 as an umbrella group for the right-wing Christian militias under his command. He ruthlessly eliminated his rivals in 1980 and expelled fighters belonging to the National Liberal Party, his former allies. His name is associated with the bloodiest day of the Civil War, Black Saturday, when he and his followers massacred hundreds of innocent Muslim civilians to avenge the death of four members of the party. He led the fight against Syrian forces in 1978 and struck a close alliance with Israel, which propelled him to the presidency after Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. He was assassinated in a massive car bomb in September 1982, weeks after assuming the presidency. His son Nadim has become active in Lebanese politics in alliance with the forces loyal to General Michel Aown.

See also JUMAYYIL, PIERRE; LEBANESE FORCES; NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY; PHALANGE.

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ASʿAD ABUKHALIL

JUMAYYIL, PIERRE

[1905–1984]

Lebanese nationalist; founder of al-Kataʾib (Phalange) party.

Pierre Jumayyil was born in Bikfayya, Mount Lebanon, into a Maronite family. He completed his education at Jesuit schools and obtained a degree in pharmacy. In 1936 Jumayyil attended the Berlin Olympics, where he was impressed by the youth movement of the National Socialist (Nazi) Party. He decided, upon his return to Lebanon, to form a similar group, al-Kataʾib (the Phalange). Initially, al-Kataʾib stood at the divide between the two main currents of Christian public opinion: that of Emile Eddé, which favored the consolidation of France's hegemony in Lebanon, and that of Bishara al-Khuri, which called for Lebanon's independence with close ties to the Arab world.

After a failed attempt in 1951, Jumayyil was elected deputy from Beirut in 1960. He had led the opposition to President-elect Fuʾad Chehab, the candidate of the consensus between President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and the United States that ended the 1958 civil war; nevertheless, he joined a four-member national reconciliation cabinet that was formed on 24 September 1958. He subsequently participated in most cabinets formed by Chehab and by his protégé successor, Charles Hilu.

In 1968, Jumayyil entered into al-Hilf al-Thulathi (Tripartite Alliance) with former President Camille Chamoun and Deputy Raymond Eddé, gradually distancing himself from Chehab. In 1970, the Hilf candidate, Sulayman Franjiyya, was elected president.

Jumayyil staunchly opposed Nasserism and Arab nationalism. He was particularly hostile to the armed Palestinian fighters in Lebanon. The Kataʾib repeatedly clashed with Palestinian fighters in the early 1970s. In January 1975, Jumayyil denounced the Palestine Liberation Organization for sowing anarchy in Lebanon, and the following month demanded a referendum on Palestinian presence in the country. The Ayn al-Rimmani incident of 13 April 1975, which ignited Lebanon's civil war, occurred between Kataʾib members and Palestinian fighters.

During the Lebanese Civil War, with the Kataʾib as his base, Jumayyil was at the center of the Christian right camp. He played a key role in obtaining the introduction into Lebanon of troops from Syria, who initially helped the Christians to achieve a reversal of the successes of the Palestinian–leftist alliance. His relations with Syria, however, deteriorated as the Kataʾib's military cooperation with Israel, which culminated in Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, grew ever stronger.

During the civil war, Jumayyil worked with the traditional Muslim leadership to create a right-wing Christian–Muslim alliance. With the failure of these efforts, he began advocating political decentralization, which many considered a call for the de facto partition of Lebanon. At the time of his death, Jumayyil was a minister in the National Unity government of Rashid Karame.

See also Chamoun, Camille; Chehab, Fuʾad; Eddé, Emile; Eddé, Raymond; Franjiyya, Sulayman; Hilu, Charles; Karame, Rashid; Khuri, Bishara al-; Lebanese Civil War (1958); Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Phalange.

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Majed Halawi

JUMBLATT FAMILY

Prominent Druze family in Lebanon.

The Jumblatts are one of two rival Druze family confederations in Lebanon (the other being the Yazbaki). The family traces back to a Kurdish family from Janbulad, Syria, and to the chieftain Ali Janbulad, from Aleppo. They came to Lebanon in the seventeenth century after a failed rebellion against the Ottomans. With the support of Prince Fakhr al-Din II al-Maʿhi, the family was invited to settle in the Shuf, establishing itself in Mukhtara. After their conversion to the Druze religion, the extinction of the Maʿnid dynasty enabled them to become shaykhs of the Shuf. They extended their feudal domain south of the Shuf, coming to rival in power, and later forming the opposition to, the Chehab dynasty. In the nineteenth century, the Jumblatt family became one of the most prominent political (zuʿama) families in Lebanon. In the twentieth century, the his-

tory of the family is indistinguishable from the history of the Druze in Lebanon. In the 1920s, during the French mandate, the political leadership of the family was assumed by Nazira Jumblatt, who succeeded her husband Fuʾad after his assassination in 1921. She cooperated with the French authorities to prevent the Druze from defying the mandate government.

The political prominence of the family was boosted by the emergence of Kamal Jumblatt (Nazira's son), who until his death in 1977 dominated Lebanon's political life. The nature of the Jumblatt leadership changed when Kamal promoted progressive and socialist policies that extended his leadership beyond the confines of the Druze family confederation. He also succeeded in marginalizing, perhaps more than at any other time in the modern history of the Druze in Lebanon, the role of the Yazbaki Arslan family. This was especially true under the leadership of the highly ineffective Prince Majid, whose close association with Maronite Christian leader Camille Chamoun discredited him, particularly after the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War of 1975. Kamal emerged as the spokesperson of the leftist/Muslim coalition that he had helped found before the outbreak of civil war. The death of the Yazbaki *shaykh al-aql* (the highest religious authority among the Druze) also helped the Jumblatt family, whose *shaykh al-aql* became the Druze religious leader in Lebanon, thereby unifying, for the first time in modern times, the religious leadership of the community.

Upon Kamal's assasination, his son, Walid, assumed leadership of the family and of the Progressive Socialist Party it led. He played an important role in the Lebanese Civil War of 1975 through 1990 and in postwar Lebanese politics, continuing the family's significance in that country.

See also Arslan Family; Chamoun, Camille; Druze; Jumblatt, Kamal; Jumblatt, Walid; Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Progressive Socialist Party; Shuf.

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As'ad AbuKhalil
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

JUMBLATT, KAMAL
[1917–1977]

Lebanese Druze politician.

Kamal Jumblatt was the son of Fuʾad (assassinated when Kamal was a boy) and Nazira Jumblatt. A bright young man, he showed deep interest in academic matters and distanced himself from the political affairs of the Druze community, of which his mother was the political leader. He studied at St. Joseph University and attended the Sorbonne. As a student Jumblatt was far from the radical politics with which he was later associated. He was sympathetic to the French mandate in his youth but became a supporter of Bishara al-Khuri after independence. His first prominent political role was in 1952, when he was instrumental in the formation of the opposition block that worked for the ouster of President al-Khuri.

Over the years, Jumblatt became identified with socialist and pro-Palestinian politics. He initially tried to mobilize non-Lebanese Druze, and he founded the Progressive Socialist Party in the late 1940s. The party, however, gradually lost its non-Druze leaders and became a political tool for Jumblatt political leadership. Jumblatt was inconsistent: He championed secularization of politics in Lebanon while cultivating sectarian support among Druze followers, and he promoted socialist policies while remaining a large landowner. He emerged as a prominent pan-Arabist in 1958, when he was one of the key leaders of the popular uprising against the rule of Camille Chamoun. He became a staunch supporter of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

In his political career, Jumblatt maintained the roles of both insider and outsider. He held ministerial posts in cabinets beginning in the 1940s, although he always spoke as the representative of the antiestablishment. In the 1960s, Jumblatt formed a loose coalition of leftist and Muslim organizations and parties to champion support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon and to call for major reforms of the political system in Lebanon. By 1975, Jumblatt had become one of the most effective and popular leaders in the country. He headed the Lebanese National Movement (which comprised leftist and Muslim organizations) and aligned himself with the PLO. His conflict in 1976 with the regime in Syria over the future course of

the Lebanese Civil War of 1975, which Jumblatt wanted to end with a decisive victory for his coalition, led to his death the following year at the hands of assassins believed to be working for Syria.

Although Jumblatt's critics question his motivations during the civil war (he was often accused of frustration at not being able to run for president, an office reserved for Maronites), he succeeded in playing a role that far exceeded the historical role of the Jumblatt family. Some say that he solidified the ties between the Druze and Arabism, at the same time that others within the community wanted him to focus more on the affairs of the community.

See also Chamoun, Camille; Druze; Jumblatt Family; Khuri, Bishara al-; Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanese National Movement (LNM); Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Progressive Socialist Party.

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As'ad AbuKhalil

JUMBLATT, WALID

[1949–]

Lebanese politician.

Like his father, Kamal, Walid Jumblatt did not seek the political leadership of the Druze community in Lebanon or of the Jumblatt family. It was thrust upon him in the wake of his father's assassination in 1977. Jumblatt studied at the American University of Beirut and seemed uninterested in politics. In his first years as leader, he was uncomfortable with his new role and merely followed his father's path. However, he quickly made peace with the regime in Syria. He later abandoned his father's pan-Arab vision and decided to focus more on the affairs of the community. Following Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Walid reorganized the Progressive Socialist Party, making it a purely Druze fighting force. He led the defense of the predominantly Druze mountain areas against the encroachments of the Maronite-led Lebanese Forces. His stand within the community was strengthened when he allowed his militias to fight an all-out war against the Lebanese Forces, aided by some Palestine Liberation Organization factions. The fighting, in what became known as the War of the Mountains in 1983, was accompanied by bloody massacres, committed by both sides.

Jumblatt survived a 1982 assassination attempt that soured his relationship with the regime of Amin Jumayyil. He later formed the nucleus of the opposition to Jumayyil after the agreement of 17 May 1983 between Israel and Lebanon, which was rejected by Syria. Jumblatt dissolved his militia after the election of Ilyas al-Hirawi as president in 1989. He ran in the 1992 elections and won. His party also won another seat in parliament, bringing its total to ten. Jumblatt was named minister for the affairs of the displaced peoples in 1994 and served in several other cabinet positions.

Jumblatt's close relations with Syria, dating back to the 1980s, began to change in autumn 2000, when he joined his voice to what had been a largely Christian call for a reduction of the Syrian troop presence in Lebanon. He and his political allies, including Christians, did well in parliamentary elections, indicating a shift in his long-held political strategy.

See also American University of Beirut (AUB); Druze; Hirawi, Ilyas al-; Jumayyil, Amin; Jumblatt Family; Lebanese Forces; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Progressive Socialist Party.

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JUMHURIYYAH, AL-

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY

See AKP (Justice and Development Party)

JUSTICE PARTY

Turkish political party.

The Justice Party (JP) was founded in early 1961 by the former chief of the general staff, Ragip Gümüspala and ten associates, four of whom had been active in the Democrat Party (DP). The JP was created as a continuation of the DP and absorbed the latter's provincial party organization. Three groups comprised the JP in the early years and vied for its leadership: a group of officers centered around Gümüspala; a right-wing group led by Gökhan Evliyaoğlu; and a liberal wing, which succeeded in making Süleyman Demirel head of the party in 1964. The JP received 43.8 percent of the vote in the October 1961 elections and formed a coalition government with the Republican People's Party (RPP) that lasted until May 1962. In the October 1965 general elections, the Demirel-led JP received 53 percent of the vote and 240 out of 450 seats in the National Assembly. The JP also won the 1965 and 1969 elections, but despite a rapidly growing economy, expanding political instability led the military to threaten to intervene. On 13 March 1971 the Demirel government resigned.

When civilian politics resumed in 1973, Demirel refused to form a coalition with the RPP, and the JP became the main opposition party. In 1975, Demirel formed a coalition government, known as the Nationalist Front, with three other parties and independents. Although the coalition lasted more than two years, members of the coalition seldom cooperated, preferring to work to infiltrate supporters into the bureaucracy. In addition, during these years, the JP became associated with the extremist right-wing positions of one of its partners, the Nationalist Action Party. The 1977 elections were held in the midst of increasing street violence. Following the elections, the RPP formed a minority government that lasted less than one month, and Demirel attempted to form a government. The second JP-dominated Nationalist Front government lasted only through 1977. The JP formed a third government in December 1979: It was in power at the time of the Black September coup. One of the first acts of the new military government was to close down all existing parties, putting an end to the JP. In 1983, the True Path Party was established as a continuation of the JP.

Like the DP, the Justice Party won support from peasants in the wealthier regions of the country, commercial farmers, and the business community. In addition, the party won the votes of many workers and residents of the squatter districts of the cities, but in the 1970s, the RPP began to win the loyalty of these two groups. Like the DP, the JP sought to expand the private sector but also intervened widely in the economy through the public sector, controls over trade, and other regulations. Through 1970, the JP pursued a policy of import-substituting industrialization. Beginning in 1970, the government attempted to reorient the economy toward exporting, a move resisted by many industrialists.

Despite similarities with the DP, a number of changes in Turkey prevented the JP from replicating its predecessors' electoral success. First, the proliferation of smaller parties made it necessary to form coalition governments in the 1970s. Second, the RPP made many inroads into the urban coalitions that had supported the DP in the 1950s and the JP in the 1960s. Third, in 1967, a more militant workers' union was formed, which refused to cooperate with the government. Fourth, small businessmen in the party were alienated by JP policies that favored large businessmen, particularly in Istanbul. Many small-business owners supported the National Order Party, led by Necmeddin Erbakan, which captured a portion of JP votes. Fifth, the JP continued the DP policy of closely allying with the West. But, particularly after American condemnation of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, many people criticized the JP for being too close to the West. Finally, in the 1960s, rising tensions led to escalating political violence. All of these factors combined to make it more difficult for the JP to form stable governments than it had been for the DP.

See also Demirel, Süleyman; Erbakan, Necmeddin; Nationalist Action Party; Republican People's Party (RPP); True Path Party.

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DAVID WALDNER

K

KAʿBA

The most important shrine of Islam.

The Kaʿba is a sanctuary consecrated to the worship of God. A simple cubic structure (12.6 m by 13.1 m by 11.3 m by 11.2 m with a height of 13 m), it stands at the center of Mecca. It constitutes the *qibla,* the direction to which Muslims must orient themselves in prayer, and it is at the heart of the hajj, the pilgrimage prescribed at least once in their lifetime for the faithful. The doors are situated in the northern wall and the whole structure is covered with a black cloth embroidered with golden Qurʾanic calligraphy and replaced with a new one every year.

The Kaʿba in pre-Islamic times was the main temple of Associationist Mecca and a pilgrimage site for all Arabians. Associationism, the pre-Islamic religious tradition of Arabia, and later the Qurʾan itself, attributed the construction of the Kaʿba to Abraham, to whom most Arabian tribes traced their ancestry through his son Ishmael. According to tradition, the Black Stone, which was and to this day remains encased in one of the walls of the Kaʿba, was believed to be the only remnant of the original construction; and some traditions report that it had originally fallen from the sky. The pre-Islamic temple housed symbols of the various deities worshiped in association with the creator Allah, as well as representations of Mary and Jesus and Jewish symbols. Tradition reports that when Mecca surrendered to the Prophet, the latter's first act after granting amnesty to all Meccans was to ride to the Kaʿba, empty it of all representations and re-dedicate it to the worship of the one God.

Although in principle fighting is not allowed in its vicinity, the Kaʿba was destroyed and rebuilt more than once in Muslim history, and the Black Stone stolen but eventually returned. Today, political demonstrations around the Kaʿba and during the hajj are not allowed. Over time, a large mosque (al-Masjid al-Haram) was built around it. Though neither in itself an object of worship nor considered as having a "sacred" nature, the Kaʿba remains to the Muslim the holiest place on earth.

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MAYSAM J. AL FARUQI

KABAK, AARON ABRAHAM

[1880–1944]

Hebrew novelist.

Born near Vilna (now Vilnius, Lithuania), Aaron Abraham Kabak studied at universities in Berlin and Switzerland and settled in Palestine in 1911. He left in 1914 but returned in 1921. As a teacher at Jerusalem's Rehaviah Gymnasium (secondary school), he had great influence on the literary and educational dynamics of the city.

In 1905 Kabak wrote the first Zionist novel in Hebrew, *Levaddah* (By herself). His *Shelomo Molkho* (1928–1929), a three-volume work about the sixteenth century pseudo-messiah, was the first historical novel in Hebrew. *Ba-Mish*ʿ*ol Ha-Zar* (In the narrow path), written in 1937 after his return to Orthodox Judaism, describes the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, the Jew. Although he retained its Jewish content, Kabak modernized the Hebrew novel by ridding it of its hitherto conventional protagonists, motifs, and settings.

See also LITERATURE: HEBREW.

ANN KAHN

KABUL

Afghan city and province.

Kabul is both Afghanistan's largest city and national capital and the name of the province that surrounds the city. Kabul is at nearly 1828 meters (6,000 feet) above sea level and situated near the Khyber Pass, a major route between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Strategically located on north-south and east-west trade routes, Kabul has been a major city for thousands of years; the oldest reference to it is found in the *Rig Veda,* an ancient Sanskrit text (1500 B.C.E.). The city now holds more than 2 million people; an accurate census has not been taken.

Since 1980 Kabul has suffered considerable physical, social, and economic damage. Bombs or artillery have destroyed many of the main buildings, particularly during the civil war of the early 1990s, and many of the educated elite have fled Kabul. Since the Taliban fell in December 2001, the city has been crowded with returning refugees and Afghans who are internally displaced because of fighting, the drought, or the general collapse of the rural economy. In 2003, Kabul was controlled by the Afghan interim government of Hamid Karzai, but remained without basic services. Security remained problematic and an international peacekeeping force policed Kabul.

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GRANT FARR

KABUL UNIVERSITY

Afghan university.

Founded in 1932 during the reign of Nadir Shah, Kabul University began as a medical school with Turkish and French faculty. In 1959, dormitories were built to house students from rural or outlying areas. By 1963, the university had eight faculties, including faculties of law and political science, natural sciences, economics, home economics, education, engineering, and pharmacy.

As student demand increased, a quota system was imposed in 1964 that fixed the urban-to-rural ratio at 60 to 40 percent. In the late 1960s and early 1970s Kabul University became a center of political activity, although the government officially banned such activity on campus in 1968. Many of the future leaders of Afghanistan, from both the left and the right of the political spectrum, began their political careers by engaging in campus politics during this time. When the communist government came to power in 1978 many of the faculty left Afghanistan. In the period after 1992 fighting between various militia groups destroyed many of the university buildings, the remaining faculty fled, and the university was essentially closed.

The government of Hamid Karzai reopened the university in 2002, but the lack of basic facilities created hardships and led to student demonstrations.

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GRANT FARR

KABYLIA

Berber-speaking mountainous area in northern Algeria east of Algiers.

Kabylia, derived from the French Kabylie, is based on the Arabic *qabila* (tribe; pl., *qabail*). The region is traditionally divided into two parts: the Djurdjura Mountains (highest point 7,565 ft.) separating the Great Kabylia, to the north and centering on the regional capital, Tizi-Ouzou, and the Lesser Kabylia, to the south and east. Population density in this very hilly and not very fertile region is quite high. Though the area produces much of Algeria's olive oil and dried figs, the agricultural economy cannot support the total population. Thus historically the Kabylia has been a region of emigration to the Algerian port cities and the manufacturing centers of France. Although difficult to count accurately, the current Berber (Tamazight)-speaking population of the region is estimated at roughly four million.

Kabyle participation in Algeria's war of independence (1954–1962) was strong and determined. Upon independence, however, the Arab leadership of the National Liberation Front declared Algeria to be an Arab-Muslim nation. It broke up Berberist organizations and repressed the use of Tamazight, deeming it a threat to national unity. In 1980 largely peaceful, student-led demonstrations protesting the government's suppression of Berber cultural events broke out at Tizi-Ouzou—the administrative, commercial, and cultural center of the region—and then spread to other parts of the Kabylia. Violently repressed by the regime, these events came to be known as Berber Spring. Since then, and despite the strong opposition of Muslim fundamentalists and dominant sectors of the Algerian regime, Kabyles slowly have been able to obtain limited recognition for their cultural traditions and language: Tamazight was recognized as one of the languages of the country in 1989, and a Berber culture curriculum has been developed at the University of Tizi-Ouzou. However, censorship against Berber cultural demonstrations continues at different levels. Kabyles pride themselves in their distinct cultural achievement and traditions, which include poetry, jewelry, and music.

During the events known as the Black Spring of April 2001, Kabyle youth protested the *hogra,* a Tamazight word signifying the abuse of authority and the violation of citizens' rights on the part of the authorities. Structural unemployment fueled by International Monetary Fund policies, continued Islamist and state-sponsored violence, and lack of prospects for the youth contributed to the revolt.

In March 2002 the Algerian government finally decided to include Tamazight as a national language. Nevertheless, under the slogan "no forgiveness, no vote," the Kabyle citizens' movement called for a boycott of the Algerian legislative elections of May 2002; voter turnout in Tizi-Ouzou was 2 percent. In another concession in 2003, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika agreed to include the Tamazight language in the national education system.

See also BERBER SPRING; BLACK SPRING.

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KACH

See ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

KADIVAR, MOHSEN

[1959–]

Iranian cleric who rejects the notion of political rule by the clergy.

Mohsen Kadivar was born in Fasa, a small town in the southern province of Fars, Iran. He studied electrical and electronic engineering at the University of

Shiraz prior to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. With the onset of the revolution, Kadivar started studying at the seminary in Shiraz, and in 1981 he went to Qom, where he studied *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) and the related principal sciences *(usul),* as well as Islamic philosophy under Ayatollah Hosainali Montazeri. Kadivar concurrently studied in the university system and received a Ph.D. in Islamic philosophy and theology from Tehran's Teachers' Training College.

In his writings, Kadivar has strived to reveal a harmony between reason *(aql)* and revelation by analyzing and interpreting classical Islamic and Shiʿite texts. In his two books, *Nazariyeha-ye Dulat dar Fiqh-e Shi* (1997; Theories of state in Shiʿite law) and *Hukumat-e Velayi* (1998; Government by the guardian), Kadivar has criticized the notion of *velayat-e faqih* (guardianship of the jurist) by attempting to show the lack of Qurʾanic, rational, and *fiqh* grounds for the idea of political rule by the clergy headed by a supreme jurisprudent. As a result, the Special Court for the Clergy charged Kadivar with propaganda against the Islamic Republic, dissemination of lies, and creating confusion in public opinion, for which he served a prison term of eighteen months. He was released in July 2000.

See also VELAYAT-E FAQIH.

FARZIN VAHDAT

KADRI, MUFIDE

[1889–1911]

Turkish modern artist.

Mufide Kadri was one of the earliest female modern artists in the Middle East. She was born in Turkey and trained in private lessons under Osman Hamdi Bey and Salvatore Venery of the Istanbul Fine Arts Academy, an institution that did not admit women for a number of years. Despite an early death, at the age of twenty-two, many of her works survive and are on display at the Istanbul Art Museum. They include portraits done in the impressionist style, a trend common among Middle Eastern artists at the beginning of the twentieth century.

See also ART; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION.

JESSICA WINEGAR

KAFIYYA

See CLOTHING

KAFR QASIM

Arab village in Israel, site of 1956 massacre.

On the eve of the 1956 Arab–Israel War, 29 October 1956, Israeli border police deliberately shot and killed forty-nine Israeli Arabs—workmen, women, and children—who were returning to Kafr Qasim, for the violation of a curfew of which they were not aware. A commission of inquiry was formed on 1 November 1956, which established the extent of responsibility and compensation.

Eight of the eleven military personnel brought to trial were convicted of murder and given sentences of up to seventeen years. All were released by 1960 through a partial pardon.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1956).

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

KAHAN COMMISSION (1983)

Israeli judicial commission that investigated the 1982 massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut.

The Israeli government established the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (the Kahan Commission) in response to a massive public outcry following the killing of an estimated 800 to 1,200 Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut by right-wing Christian militiamen, primarily of the Lebanese Phalange Party, on 16 and 18 September 1982. The massacres occurred in territory under the control of the Israel Defense Force in the wake of Israel's June 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and the perpetrators were Israeli allies. On 24 September 1982, some 400,000 Israelis demonstrated in Tel Aviv against their country's

continuing involvement in Lebanon and in favor of an official investigation into the massacres. The three-person commission was chaired by Yitzhak Kahan, president of the Supreme Court; the other members were Aharon Barak, a Supreme Court justice, and retired army general Yona Efrat.

The commission issued its report on 7 February 1983. It noted that the Phalange had secured the permission of Major General Amir Drori, of the Northern Command, to enter the camps. This was approved by Israel's chief of staff, Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan, and Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon. The commission found that Israel's leaders and commanders bore indirect responsibility for the massacre by not anticipating Phalange revenge attacks against the unprotected Palestinians and by not acting to halt the killings soon enough, once indications of the bloodletting began to emerge from the camps. The commission chastised Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and the (unnamed) head of the Mossad for their indifference to the events at the time, but it found particular fault with Drori, Eitan, the director of military intelligence General Yehoshua Saguy, and Division Commander General Amos Yaron. Most seriously, the commission found that Ariel Sharon bore personal responsibility for the tragedy and recommended that the prime minister consider removing him from office. On 10 February 1983, the cabinet voted to remove Sharon from his position as defense minister, although he remained as minister without portfolio.

Given the dread with which most Israelis came to regard the Lebanese quagmire in which Israel remained embroiled for the next seventeen years, Sharon's election as prime minister in February 2001 constituted a remarkable case of political rehabilitation. But the disaster in Lebanon dogged his premiership when, in June 2001, a group of Sabra and Shatila survivors filed a war-crimes complaint against him in a Belgian court under a 1993 Belgian law allowing claimants to bring cases against foreigners accused of crimes against humanity, regardless of where they occurred. One year later, however, a Belgian appeals court dismissed the case on the grounds that Sharon was not domiciled in Belgium, so the case never went to trial. No Lebanese inquiry into the massacre was ever carried through to completion.

See also Begin, Menachem; Eitan, Rafael; Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Mossad; Phalange; Sabra and Shatila Massacres; Shamir, Yitzhak; Sharon, Ariel.

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Jenab Tutunji
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KAHANE, MEIR

[1932–1990]

Rabbi, founder of U.S. Jewish Defense League and the Kach Party in Israel.

Born in New York, Meir Kahane was active in youth movements before becoming a rabbi and writer for Jewish nationalist journals. He founded the Jewish Defense League (JDL) in 1968 to combat anti-semitism. The JDL soon became known as a militant Jewish self-defense organization, and it encountered difficulties with the government because of its violent tactics.

In 1969 Kahane moved to Israel, where he began to speak out against the Black Jews in Dimona. In 1972 his Kach (also Kakh; "thus" in Hebrew) Party became a proponent of inducing Palestinians to leave the West Bank voluntarily; if they would not leave, Kahane proposed expelling them. He believed that Israel should become a theocratic state, and wanted the government to pass laws formally entrenching Orthodox Judaism as the official state religion. He ran for the Knesset unsuccessfully in 1973 and 1977. In 1980 he was sentenced to six months in prison for plotting to attack Muslim shrines on the Temple Mount (al-Haram al-Sharif). After his release he ran for the Knesset in the 1984 election and won a seat, but in 1988 Kach was outlawed on the grounds that it was a racist party. Kahane was assassinated in New York in November 1990.

Kahane's son, Binyamin Kahane, founded the organization Kahane Hai ("Kahane Lives") after his father's assassination. In March 1994 it was declared by the Israeli cabinet to be a terrorist organization

and was therefore banned, as Kach had been. Binyamin was assassinated, too, by some Palestinians in a drive-by shooting in December 2000 in the West Bank. According to a 2003 U.S. Department of State report, the group has continued organized protests against the Israeli government and has harassed Palestinians in the West Bank. Kach members have also threatened to attack Israeli government officials and have vowed revenge for the death of Binyamin Kahane and his wife. They have also been suspected of involvement in a number of attacks on Palestinians since the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada.

See also Israel: Overview of Political Parties in.

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KAID, AHMED

[1927–1978]

Algerian officer and government minister.

Ahmed Kaid was born near Tiaret. He attended the French military school at Hussein-Dey and then the Normal School for teacher training in Algiers. Before the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), he aligned with the moderate nationalist Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA) of Ferhat Abbas. He joined the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and rose to assistant chief of staff of the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). Kaid sided with the Ahmed Ben Bella–Houari Boumédienne faction after the war. He was elected to the National Assembly and served as minister of tourism (1963). He resigned in 1964, though he retained his seat on the Central Committee of the FLN. After Boumédienne's coup, he became minister of finance (1967) and then was chosen to head FLN. He resigned in 1972, critical of the party's bureaucracy and of the Agrarian Revolution. In March 1976 while in France, he publicly criticized the Boumédienne government. Given his anti-Boumédienne position, suspicion rose over his death, reportedly from a heart attack. Thousands attended his funeral in Tiaret.

See also Abbas, Ferhat; Algerian War of Independence; Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN); Ben Bella, Ahmed; Boumédienne, Houari; Front de Libération Nationale; Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA).

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Phillip C. Naylor

KALEMIYYE

Ottoman hierarchy of scribes, clerks, and accountants headed by the reis ül-küttap.

Aside from the sultan's own staff, the *kalemiyye* (scribal institution) was one of three powerful bureaucracies in the Ottoman government, the others being the *seyfiyye* (military) and *İlmiyye* (religious). From 1794, the *kalemiyye* was headquartered in the Sublime Porte, and while the grand vizier was nominally its head, the *reis ül-küttap* held the real power. In the early nineteenth century, the major Tanzimat reformers emerged from the *kalemiyye,* the most prominent of them Mustafa Reşid Paşa, who was *reis ül-küttap* in 1827–1830. In 1835, the *kalemiyye* was joined with the sultan's imperial bureaucracy. Later renamed the *mülkiyye,* it would be reformed several times during the nineteenth century, as former patronage systems were replaced with regular salaried employees and formal departments and ministries were organized. It would come to include the finance, commerce, interior, foreign affairs, and other ministries.

See also İlmiyye; Mustafa Reşid; Sublime Porte; Tanzimat.

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Elizabeth Thompson

KALISCHER, HIRSCH

[1795–1874]

Rabbi and precursor of Zionism.

Born in western Poland in a region acquired by Prussia in 1793, Hirsch Kalischer was aware of nationalist struggles from an early age, perhaps sensitizing him to the misery of European Jewry. He was engaged early in his career in a defense of traditional Judaism against the Reform movement. Subsequently, he began to argue that the redemption would only come after action was taken by the Jewish people on their own behalf. He elaborated these ideas in *Derishat Tziyon* (1862; Seeking Zion), a book about modern Jewish agricultural settlement in Palestine.

Kalischer was successful in persuading the Alliance Israélite Universelle, a French organization for the international defense of Jewish rights, to found an agricultural school in Jaffa, Palestine, in 1870. He made numerous visits to wealthy Jews in Germany to recruit their support for Jewish settlement in Palestine.

See also Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU).

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Martin Malin

KALVARYSKI, CHAIM MARGALIUT-

[1868–1947]

Land-purchase agent and adviser on Arab–Jewish relations in Palestine.

Chaim Margaliut-Kalvaryski was born in Poland and emigrated to Palestine in 1895, after completing studies in agronomy in France. Between 1900 and 1922 he served as an administrator of the Jewish Colonization Association in the Galilee, helping to acquire extensive areas for Jewish settlement. Beginning in 1913 he became involved in political discussions with Arab nationalists in Beirut and Damascus. Between 1923 and 1927 Kalvaryski was employed by the Palestine Zionist Executive as an adviser on Arab affairs. Despite controversies over his methods and doubts about his financial management, he was recalled to head the Joint Bureau of Jewish Public Bodies that was formed to coordinate relations with the Arabs following the 1929 Palestine riots.

Kalvaryski was a member of the Palestine government's first Advisory Council (1920–1923) and the Vaʿad Leʾumi (National Council of the Jews) beginning in 1920, and was active in Jewish groups promoting binationalism and rapprochement with the Arabs of Palestine and the neighboring countries. He also devised several of his own peace plans, which he discussed with Arab leaders.

Kalvaryski's articles and speeches were published in various Hebrew newspapers and periodicals and in a collection entitled *Al Parshat Darkeinu* (At the parting of our ways; Jerusalem, 1939).

See also Jewish Colonization Association.

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Neil Caplan

KAMAL, AHMAD

[1849–1923]

The first prominent Egyptian archaeologist and Egyptologist.

Ahmad Kamal Pasha studied under Heinrich K. Brugsch (1827–1894), a German archaeologist, a scholar of hieroglyphics and demotic Egyptian, and the director of the short-lived school of Egyptology in Cairo in the 1870s. Kamal made his career in the Egyptian Antiquities Service and helped open professional archaeology and Egyptology to Egyptians (they were dominated by Europeans). His long campaign succeeded when immediately after his death,

the department that evolved into today's Faculty of Archaeology of Cairo University was established.

See also ARCHAEOLOGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

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[1945–]

Palestinian activist.

Director of the Gender Department of the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation as of 2003, Zahira Kamal has represented Palestinians through her writing and activism for more than thirty years. Trained as a physics teacher, she founded and, from 1978 to 1992, led the Women's Work Committee (later the Union of Palestinian Women's Action Committees), an organization serving professional, clerical, and industrial women workers and closely affiliated with the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Originally a member of the political leadership of the DFLP, she was imprisoned in 1979 and held under town arrest in Jerusalem from 1980 to 1986. She left the party for FIDA, the Palestinian Democratic Union, when that group split from the DFLP in support of the Madrid and Oslo peace negotiations with Israel. With Yasir Abd Rabbo, who led the split from the DFLP, Kamal was a delegate to the 1991 Madrid Conference. She also headed the Women's Affairs Technical Committee, which monitored women's issues as a component of the interim peace negotiations. Kamal was appointed head of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) Gender Planning and Development Directorate in 1995. A noted writer on issues of gender and Israeli–Palestinian relationships, she has engaged in active dialogue with Israeli groups, particularly women's groups, for years, and is cofounder of the Jerusalem Link, an organization which supports women's participation, awareness-raising, and leadership development within the context of the peace process.

See also GAZA STRIP; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; INTIFADA (1987–1991); MADRID CONFERENCE (1991); OSLO ACCORD (1993); PALESTINE; WEST BANK.

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RACHEL CHRISTINA

KAMIL, KIBRISH MEHMET

[1832–1913]

Ottoman grand vizier.

The son of a military officer, Kibrish Mehmet Kamil was born in Nicosia on the island of Cyprus (in Turkish, Kibris). He was graduated from the military academy in Cairo and served as adjutant to Abbas Paşa. Between 1860 and 1879, he held various positions in the Ottoman provincial bureaucracy, rising to the position of governor of Kosovo and Aleppo. In 1879, he became a cabinet minister, serving for short periods as minister of education and of religious foundations until becoming grand vizier on 25 September 1885, replacing Küçük Sait Paşa who became a rival and regular replacement. Between 1885 and 1891, he successfully stabilized Ottoman finances while encouraging foreign investment in Ottoman railroads and industries. In 1895, at the start of a second stint as grand vizier, he fell into the sultan's disfavor and was sent into exile, serving eleven years as governor of İzmir. Although an opponent of the Committee for Union and Progress, he was appointed grand vizier for a third time on 5 August 1908, serving until 14 February 1909. During this period, when Abdülhamit II was still sultan, Kamil Paşa worked to balance the budget, reorganize the bureaucracy and armed forces, and put an end to the millet system and the privileges enjoyed by foreigners according to the capitulations.

See also Abdülhamit II; Capitulations; Committee for Union and Progress; Millet System.

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David Waldner

KAMIL, MUSTAFA

[1874–1908]

Egyptian nationalist leader, orator, and editor.

Mustafa Kamil, the son of an army officer from an ethnic Egyptian family, was educated in government schools, the French School of Law in Cairo, and the University of Toulouse, France, where he received his law degree in 1895. A strong opponent of the British occupation of Egypt, he soon became closely associated with Khedive Abbas Hilmi II and with Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamit II, both of whom supported him materially as well as morally in his campaigns to persuade European governments and peoples to demand the evacuation promised by successive British governments. He also worked closely with Muhammad Farid and other Egyptians to form a secret society, initially under the aegis of the *khedive,* to inculcate resistance to the British among the people of Egypt. This society, known from its inception as al-Hizb al-Watani (the National Party), became a public political party, open to all Egyptians, in December 1907. He also founded a popular daily newspaper, *al-Liwa* (The banner), in 1900, which became the official party organ, and a boys' school that bore his name. He wrote many articles for the French press, for *al-Muʾayyad* under Shaykh Ali Yusuf, and for *al-Liwa,* as well as a book on the Eastern Question called *al-Masʾala al-Sharqiyya,* in which he strongly supported the Ottoman Empire. He delivered many stirring speeches in French and in Arabic, of which the best remembered was translated into English as "What the National Party Wants." He died of tuberculosis (but some think he was poisoned) in the thirty-fourth year of his life, and his funeral was the occasion for a massive demonstration of popular grief. Remembered as a fervent patriot and occasional supporter of pan-Islam, he called for the British evacuation of Egypt and a constitutional government but showed little interest in economic or social issues.

See also Abbas Hilmi II; Abdülhamit II; Eastern Question; National Party (Egypt).

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Arthur Goldschmidt

KANAFANI, GHASSAN

[1936–1972]

Palestinian writer and political activist.

A native of Acre, Palestine, Ghassan Kanafani published the Arab National Movement's official organ, *al-Raʾy* (Opinion), with George Habash. Kanafani was also a prominent spokesman and ideologue for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Believed by Israel's intelligence service, Mossad, to have been involved in planning terrorist operations, Kanafani was assassinated by a hit team from Israel who detonated a car bomb outside his home in Hazmiyya, near Beirut, killing him and his seventeen-year-old niece, Lamis Najim. Kanafani's Danish wife, small son, and daughter escaped unhurt. Kanafani's successor, Bassam Abu Sharif, also was targeted by Israel's intelligence; he lost the sight in one eye and several fingers when a letter bomb exploded in his Beirut office.

At his death, Kanafani had already established himself as a prolific writer and commentator. Among his best-known works is *Rijal fi al-Shams* (1963; Men in the sun), based on his traumatic experiences as a refugee. Some of his other books include *The Middle of May, The Land of Sad Oranges,* and *That Which Is Left Over for You.*

See also Arab National Movement (ANM); Habash, George; Mossad; Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries;

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

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Lawrence Tal

KANDAHAR

Afghan city and province.

Located in southern Afghanistan, the province of Kandahar has a population of approximately 700,000, most of whom are Durrani Pushtuns. The city of Kandahar is the provincial capital and the second largest city in Afghanistan, with a population of about 200,000. It was Afghanistan's original capital. Centrally situated on trade routes between the Iranian plateau and the Indian subcontinent, Kandahar has been an important city for centuries and has played a major role in the history of Afghanistan. Most of the leaders of Afghanistan have come from the Pushtun tribes in the Kandahar area.

During the War of Resistance (1978–1992), Kandahar was the scene of intense fighting and much of the city was destroyed. Almost half of the population of the province fled to neighboring Pakistan during the war, but most subsequently returned.

Kandahar played a central role in the Taliban movement (1996–2001). Although Kabul remained the capital of Afghanistan, Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban government, kept his residence in Kandahar.

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Grant Farr

KANIUK, YORAM

[1930–]

Israeli author.

Born in Tel Aviv into a family deeply involved in the cultural life of that city (his father was one of the founders of the Tel Aviv Museum), Yoram Kaniuk served in the Haganah, the underground army of Jewish Palestine, and fought in the 1948 War. A painter, journalist, and theater critic, he is best known as a novelist. He is the author of many works of fiction, including children's books, and a few works of nonfiction. Although his works have been translated into twenty languages, only some of his books have appeared in English, and most of these are earlier works; his later ones, notably the remarkable if painful *Post-Mortem* (1992) and *Ahavat David* (1990), remain unavailable in English. Kaniuk's distinguishing trademark is the fiercely lucid—some might say cruel—literary eye he brings to bear on life in contemporary Israel. Indeed, Israel itself and the price it has exacted from the Jewish soul is the ever-present, overriding theme of all his novels. The uncompromising truths of his fiction, at times personally and nationally autobiographical, bring the reader face to face with the white-hot paradox of life and Jewish history. Kaniuk has been the recipient of the Bialik Prize, the French Prix de Droits de l'Homme, the Prix Méditerranée Etranger, and the Israel President's Prize for Literature. As of 2004, he continued to live in his native city of Tel Aviv.

See also Literature: Hebrew.

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ZEVA SHAPIRO
UPDATED BY STEPHEN SCHECTER

KAN, SUNA
[1936–]

Turkish violinist.

A born violinist, Suna Kan attracted her audiences with a stage presence of serene statuesque beauty combined with a serene beauty of tone she produced from her instrument. Kan was born in Adana, Turkey, in 1936. Her extraordinary talent was recognized when she started playing the violin at the age of five. Walter Gerhard, Gilbert Back, Licco Amar, and Izzet Albayrak were among her teachers in Ankara. She played Mozart's A major and Viotti's A minor violin concertos with the Ankara Presidential Symphony Orchestra when she was nine years old. In 1949 she was sent to France by the Turkish government to study at the Paris Conservatory, where she was a pupil of Gabriel Bouillon. She graduated in 1952, winning the first prize. Kan won first prizes at the Geneva Competition in 1954 and the Viotti Competition in 1955, second prize at the Munich Competition in 1956, and the City of Paris Prize in the Marguerite Long/Jacques Thibaud Competition in 1957.

She had a brilliant international concert career between 1958 and 1977, during which she performed with most of the world's greatest orchestras under the direction of the most famous conductors. She also performed double concertos with legendary musicians such as Yehudi Menuhin, Piérre Fournier, André Navarra, and Frederick Riddle. She toured all over Europe, Russia, Canada, Japan, China, South America, Ethiopia, United Arab Republic, Kenya, and Iran.

Kan was a founding member and principal soloist of the Turkish Radio-Television's Ankara Chamber Orchestra, with which she toured Turkey, Europe, and Russia between 1977 and 1986. Since 1986 she has devoted herself to the music education of her countrymen, conducting masterclasses and summer schools. She has not retired from the concert stage and continues to perform regularly. She has recorded all of Mozart's violin concertos and Ulvi Cemal Erkin's violin concerto. She received Chevalier dans l'ordre du Mérite from the government of France, and is also the State Artist of the Turkish Republic.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; MUSIC.

FILIZ ALI

KARACAN, ALI NACI
[1896–1955]

Turkish journalist and publisher.

Born in Istanbul, Ali Naci Karacan attended Galatasaray Lycée. He began working as a reporter at a young age, before World War I, first at *Tasvir-i Efkar* and then at the oppositional paper *Ikdam.* Later, he worked as an editor for famous newspapers such as *Vakit.* He was cofounder, in 1918, of *Akşam,* with well-known journalists Salih Rifki Atay and Kazim Şinasi Dersan. In 1935, Karacan became editor of Turkey's newly founded leftist daily *Tan.*

Karacan's greatest success was founding the daily paper *Milliyet* in 1950. Karacan and his son Ercüment quickly carved a place among a number of new newspapers of the period, including Sedat Simavi's *Hürriyet,* founded two years before. Carrying the slogan "Independent Political Newspaper" on its masthead, *Milliyet* matched *Hürriyet*'s slick style, but also managed to appeal to intellectuals with a well-respected staff of writers. Under the editorial leadership of Abdi İpekci, it became an influential player in Turkey's political arena in the 1960s and 1970s. By then, the Karacan family, including grandson Ali Naci Karacan, controlled a publishing syndicate that included printing and book and magazine publishing companies.

See also ATAY, SALIH RIFKI; GALATASARAY LYCÉE; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY; SIMAVI, SEDAT.

ELIZABETH THOMPSON

KARAGÖZ

See THEATER

KARAITES

Religious sect that was formed in Babylonia in the eighth century C.E.

The Karaites hold to a literal interpretation of scripture, rejecting Talmudic and rabbinic interpretations that are based on an oral tradition. In twentieth-century Israel, there were two small communities of several hundred persons in Galilee and Jerusalem. The Jewish status of Karaites is ambiguous; in Israel, they have the option of holding identity cards that label them either as "Karaite" or "Karaite-Jew."

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SAMUEL C. HEILMAN

KARAK, AL-

A provincial capital in the central part of Jordan.

During the Bronze Age, starting about 2400 B.C.E., the region surrounding Karak supported sedentary agriculturalists. Semitic tribes settled there in 1200 B.C.E. and, in 850 B.C.E., the great King Mesha consolidated what came to be known as the Moabite kingdom. Then, atop a small mountain, Karak was settled and fortified. Nearby on the plains of Muʾta, the first battle between the Arab Muslims and the Byzantine Empire was fought in 629 C.E. The Crusader Renauld de Châtillon ruled the broad region east of the Jordan rift from the massive fortress he built at Karak.

After World War I, Karak was a southern province of the short-lived Syrian Kingdom. Following its demise at the hands of the French in July 1920, the local tribal shaykhs declared the Karak region to be the independent Arab Government of Moab, led by Rufayfan al-Majali. In 1921, it became part of the Emirate of Transjordan. In 2003, Karak is an agricultural market town of 23,200 people and the government center for the Karak district of Jordan. The majority are Sunni Muslim, but a significant minority are Christian. One of Jordan's institutions of higher education, the University of Muʾta, is located nearby in the village of that name.

See also MAJALI FAMILY.

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PETER GUBSER
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

KARAKUL

See GLOSSARY

KARAMA, BATTLE OF (1968)

Battle (also known as Karameh) in the Jordan valley in which Yasir Arafat and his Fatah faction successfully resisted Israeli forces.

After the Arab–Israel War of 1967, although repeated artillery shelling by Israel had driven Palestinian refugees from the Jordan valley to the Biqa and Marka refugee camps outside Amman, there were still 25,000 to 35,000 refugees in Karama. In early March 1968, information on an impending attack by Israel had come from Arafat's agents in the occupied territories and Jordan's intelligence services under the command of Colonel Ghazi Arabiyyat. The Palestinians and Jordan's army decided to take a stand. President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt offered to send air power, but Jordan's King Hussein refused because he feared another disaster like that of 1967.

On 21 March about 15,000 troops began the assault from Israel in three armored brigade formations using M-48 Patton tanks. Their main columns hit the Shuna–Karama area near the King Abdullah Bridge, north of the Dead Sea and Ghawr Safi. A smaller attack took place in neighboring al-Himma, but Jordan's army command believed that the main thrust was taking place in Karama. Jordan's artillery stopped Israel's tank column at the Allenby Bridge, near the crossroads of the main road from Shuna to Karama. Palestinian commandos (*fidaʾiyyun*) were able to destroy several of Israel's tanks and armored cars, and engaged Israel's airborne troops entering the town of Karama. The town was destroyed after fierce fighting between Israel's troops and approximately 200 to 300 Palestinian commandos. Israel admitted losing 21 soldiers, but the Palestinians claimed the real figure was over 200.

The significance of the battle lay in the fact that, for the first time, Palestinian fighters had successfully engaged Israel's army, scoring a major symbolic victory. Although Jordan's military sources indicated that Jordan's troops did the bulk of the fighting, King Hussein allowed Arafat and al-Fatah to take credit for the victory, thus boosting the prestige of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). After Karama, thousands of young Palestinians flocked to the PLO's guerrilla wings and began paramilitary training.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Arafat, Yasir; Fatah, al-; Hussein ibn Talal; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

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Lawrence Tal

KARAME, ABD AL-HAMID

[1890–1947]

Lebanese politician; prime minister (1945).

Abd al-Hamid Karame was born into a prominent Sunni family of Tripoli, whose scions traditionally held the office of mufti of the city. He himself served in that post until France's mandatory power replaced him with a man more agreeable to them. A socially conservative and very devout man, he vehemently opposed the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920. During the 1920s and 1930s, Karame repeatedly clashed with the authorities, demanding the annexation of Tripoli and its hinterland to Syria. Although he was the dominant political figure in Tripoli, he never developed a national base, and thus failed to pose a real challenge to France. A pragmatic politician, he established a close relationship with Britain in the early 1940s, when he joined the movement for Lebanon's independence, reconciling himself to the concept of Lebanon as an entity separate from Syria. Although Karame initially supported President Bishara al-Khuri, under whom he served as prime minister between January and August 1945, he eventually became the leader of an opposition group first called the Independent Bloc and, after April 1946, the Reform Bloc. Following his death in 1947, his son Rashid inherited his political mantle.

See also Karame, Rashid; Khuri, Bishara al-.

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Guilain P. Denoeux

KARAME, RASHID

[1921–1987]

Lebanese politician; prime minister at various times from the 1950s through the 1980s.

Rashid Karame, the son of Abd al-Hamid Karame, received a law degree from Cairo University in 1947. He was elected deputy for Tripoli in 1951 and remained a member of parliament until his death. A staunch Arab nationalist and an advocate of political and social reforms, he gained influence through patronage and his ability to function within a confessional political system.

Karame became prime minister in 1955 but resigned in 1956 to protest President Camille Chamoun's refusal to sever diplomatic relations with France and Britain in the wake of the Suez crisis. He became a major opponent of the Chamoun regime and was a leader of the uprising against Chamoun in 1958. After the Lebanese Civil War (1958), President Fu'ad Chehab appointed him prime minister. Karame held the premiership regularly under both Chehab (1958–1964) and his successor, Charles Hilu (1964–1970).

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Karame supported the presence of armed Palestinians in Lebanon and a radical restructuring of the country's political system. Such positions brought him into conflict with key Maronite politicians, including President Sulayman Franjiyya. In June 1975, when he appeared to be the only politician who might overcome the growing polarization in the country, President Franjiyya appointed him prime minister; he resigned in June 1976.

After Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Karame emerged as a leading opponent to President Amin Jumayyil's government. With Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and former President Franjiyya, he founded the National Salvation Front in July 1983. In April 1984, Jumayyil bowed to pressures and appointed him prime minister of a government of national unity. Although he formally remained premier until he resigned in May 1987, his authority was limited. He was assassinated on 1 June 1987, when a bomb exploded aboard his helicopter.

See also CHAMOUN, CAMILLE; CHEHAB, FU'AD; FRANJIYYA, SULAYMAN; HILU, CHARLES; JUMAYYIL, AMIN; JUMBLATT, WALID; KARAME, ABD AL-HAMID; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1958); NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (LEBANON); SUEZ CRISIS (1956–1957).

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Petran, Tabitha. *The Struggle over Lebanon.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987.

GUILAIN P. DENOEUX

KARAM, YUSUF

[1822–1889]

Lebanese hero known for his opposition to Ottoman rule in Lebanon.

Born to a Maronite family in Ehden, north Lebanon, Yusuf Karam had an eclectic education. He wrote and spoke fluent Arabic, Syriac, Italian, French, and English. He also learned the art of fighting and horse riding.

In 1841, he participated in his first battle against the Ottomans to lift the siege against the town of Dayr al-Qamar. At the age of twenty-three, he succeeded his father as governor of Ehden. During the conflicts between Maronite Christians and Druze from 1840 to 1845, he was appointed by the Ottomans to become governor of the Christian district headquartered in Juniya. In 1860, Karam refused the Ottomans' offers that he lead a small contingent of Lebanese soldiers. Exiled from Lebanon by the Ottomans, Karam returned in 1864, but he was exiled again in 1867 and died in Italy in 1889.

GEORGE E. IRANI

KARBALA

Site of sanctuary honoring Husayn ibn Ali's martyrdom.

Karbala is the name of a plain located in Iraq, approximately 55 miles (88.5 km) south-southwest of modern Baghdad and close to the west bank of the Euphrates. The plain is the recorded site of the infamous mass killing, in 680 C.E. (A.H. 61), of the prophet Muhammad's grandson Husayn ibn Ali and his small band of supporters by the forces of Yazid ibn Muʿawiya, the second Umayyad caliph. According to tradition, the decapitated body of Husayn was buried in a spot not far from the battlefield. As a result, Karbala and its environs quickly became known as Mashhad al-Husayn (the tomb shrine of Husayn), and today it is still one of the principal pilgrimage centers for Twelver Shiʿite Muslims, who revere Husayn as one of the great imams, or divinely inspired leaders, of the Muslim community.

Each year, for example, beginning on the first and culminating on the tenth of the Muslim month of Muharram, large numbers of pilgrims gather at the shrine complex at Karbala and perform solemn passion plays and other commemorations of Husayn's great martyrdom (other Twelver Shiʿites around the world do the same). According to the common belief of Twelver Shiʿites, Husayn's suffering and death constitute a source of redemption for all who are sincerely devoted to Husayn and his fellow imams. Many Twelvers believe that such practices as ritual visitation to Karbala as well as to other sacred tombs are excellent means of realizing this devotion to the imams and the salvific blessings it entails.

Throughout its long history, Karbala has generally prospered as a richly endowed pilgrimage site. A few notable exceptions to this sanctuary's history of good fortune include its destruction by the Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil in 850 C.E. (A.H. 236), its storming and looting by the *muwahhidun* (wahhabis) in 1801 C.E. (A.H. 1215), and the widespread devastation it suffered as a consequence of the confrontation after the Gulf War between Iraq's Republican Guard and Shiʿite rebel forces in March 1991.

See also GULF WAR (1991); HUSAYN IBN ALI; MUHARRAM.

SCOTT ALEXANDER

KARBASCHI, GHOLAMHOSAIN

[1953–]

Governor of Isfahan and mayor of Tehran in the 1980s and 1990s.

Born in 1953 into the family of a high-ranking cleric, Gholamhosain Karbaschi attended Haqani Seminary in Qumand and was arrested in 1975 for his antishah activities. After his release from prison in 1978, he left the seminary and put himself at the service of the Iranian Revolution. He was appointed the representative of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the gendarmerie, then the Islamic Republic News Agency, and finally as the governor of Isfahan province—a position in which Karbaschi demonstrated his strong managerial capabilities. In 1989, when Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani became president, he appointed Karbaschi the mayor of Tehran—an expanding metropolitan city that had experienced years of neglect, war economy, and mismanagement.

Karbaschi transformed Tehran by planning for control of waste and air pollution and by building highways, parks, libraries, art galleries, and cultural centers. He established *Hamshahri,* a daily newspaper with a new look and the largest circulation in the country, which advocated Rafsanjani's economic-development policies. With support from Rafsanjani, Karbaschi and fifteen other pragmatic technocrats founded the Executives of Construction Party (ECP) in 1996 in order to counter the conservative candidates from the Militant Clergy Association (MCA) in the fifth parliamentary election. Karbaschi was the first secretary-general for the party, serving until 1998. In 1997 Karbaschi helped to engineer the election of Mohammad Khatami as president.

Karbaschi's policy of taxing the rich for urban public projects and building chain stores around the city earned him the nickname Robin Hood, and angered the conservative merchants in the bazaar and their clerical allies in the MCA. His efforts to block some land transfers among major players of the MCA—and his participation in Khatami's election—prompted his opponents from the MCA and the Society of Islamic Coalition to use their political influence in the judiciary to stop Karbaschi's political machine.

In April 1998 Karbaschi was arrested and tried by the conservative judiciary for alleged embezzlement and mismanagement of state funds. His controversial trial, which was broadcasted publicly, captivated the nation, generated public debate and agitation, and led to his conviction. His original sentence of five years' imprisonment, twenty lashes, and a twenty-year ban from political activities was reduced on appeal to two years' imprisonment, a cash fine, and a ten-year ban from politics. After serving nine months in prison, he was pardoned through Rafsanjani's intervention. Since his release from jail, he has been leading a quiet life with occasional public appearances and nonpolitical interviews.

See also Iranian Revolution (1979); Isfahan; Khatami, Mohammad; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi; Tehran.

Ali Akbar Mahdi

KARIYUKA, TAHIYA

[1915–1999]

Dancer and actress on stage, radio, and screen.

Born Badawiya Muhammad Karim Ali al-Sayyid, in Manzala, Egypt, Tahiya Kariyuka debuted as a carioca dancer in Badiah Masabni's famous Cairo casino. The carioca, a tango variation performed by Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers in the 1933 film *Flying Down to Rio,* had become wildly popular. Kariyuka's solo version of a dance intended for a couple can only be imagined; however the moniker stuck, although its pseudo-Brazilian/Hollywood connotations did not. Among Kariyuka's fellow dancers at the Casino was Samiya Jamal (also Gamal), another accomplished dancer and actress. The two women remained rivals until Samiya's death in 1994.

Kariyuka's first role was a small appearance in a short 1935 film; her first starring role was in 1946, with actor Najib al-Rihani, known as the Molière of Egypt, in the film *Liʿbat al-sitt* (The woman's game). She eventually appeared in over 190 films as well as numerous stage plays and radio serials. She is best known for her role as the seductress Shafaʿat in the 1956 film *Shabab imraʾa* (A woman's youth). She was also politically active, and her call for a return to democracy after the Free Officers' coup of 1952 led to her being jailed for three months in 1953. In 1981 she served as president of the Egyptian Actors Union. She allegedly married more than a dozen

times but was unmarried at the time of her death from heart failure.

See also ART; GAMAL, SAMIYAH.

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ROBERTA L. DOUGHERTY

KARMAL, BABRAK

[1929–1996]

President of Afghanistan, 1980–1986.

Babrak Karmal was a founder of the Marxist movement in Afghanistan and the president of Afghanistan and secretary-general of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) from 1980 to 1986. He was born in 1929 in Kamari, a village near Kabul, into the family of Mohammad Hossayn, an army general and one-time governor of Paktika. Karmal received his high-school education in Kabul at Nejat School, from which he graduated in 1948. He entered Kabul University in 1951 and became active in student politics and in the Afghan communist movement. Known as a gifted orator, in 1954 he adopted the name *Karmal,* which in Persian means "friend of labor."

From 1953 to 1956, Karmal was imprisoned for his political activism, but he was well treated in jail because of his family connections. In 1965 and 1969, during the period of constitutional reforms (1963–1973), he was elected to the Afghan parliament. He was a founding member of the PDPA in 1965. When the party split into two factions in 1967, he led the Parcham (flag) faction. Karmal's background in the Kabul elite put him at odds with other members of the Marxist movement in Afghanistan.

At the time of the Saur Revolution (April 1978), the two rival factions of the PDPA united and swept into power. Karmal was elected vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Council and deputy prime minister of Afghanistan. In July 1978, the Parcham members of the party were purged, and Karmal was named ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

On 27 December, 1979, Soviet troops entered Kabul and Hafizullah Amim, the president of Afghanistan at that time, was assassinated. Karmal returned to Kabul with the Soviet forces and was installed as president of Afghanistan on that date. Karmal was unable to unite Afghanistan or to win the trust of the resistance fighters, and the country spiraled into civil war during his term. Although he was a gifted orator, Karmal was never an effective leader. He was more a thinker than a doer, more an ideologue than a politician. In addition, his aristocratic urban background often worked against his Marxist rhetoric, especially in a country such as Afghanistan, which is mostly rural and largely populated by peasants.

In 1986, in part because of his failing health, Karmal was replaced by strongman Mohammed Najibullah and left Afghanistan for Moscow. He returned to Kabul in 1989, only to leave for Moscow again when the Najibullah government fell in 1992. He died of cancer in Moscow on 1 December 1996.

See also AMIN, HAFIZULLAH; COMMUNISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST; NAJIBULLAH; PARCHAM.

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GRANT FARR

KAR, MEHRANGIZ

[1944–]

Iranian lawyer, writer, and women's rights activist.

Mehrangiz Kar was born in Ahvaz, Iran, in 1944. She studied law at the School of Law and Political Science, Tehran University. After graduation, she worked for the Social Security Department and also wrote for the press, publishing more than 100 articles on current social and political issues in newspapers and magazines. She obtained her attorney's license in 1978, shortly before the Iranian Revolution, but she did not start her own practice until the early 1990s. In 1992 Kar began collaboration with *Zanan,* a monthly journal (launched the same year) with an Islamic feminist agenda. Her advocacy of

political, legal, and constitutional reform, including the promotion of civil society and democracy and the dismantling of legal barriers to women's rights, made her a target of the antireformist backlash that followed the massive reformist victory in the February 2000 parliamentary elections. In April 2000, Kar was arrested for participating in the Berlin conference on the future of reforms in Iran, charged with acting against national security and disseminating propaganda against the Islamic regime. Released after six weeks, then tried in closed hearings in January 2001, she was convicted and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. Granted bail to leave the country for medical treatment, she moved to the United States. The appeal court later reduced her sentence to a fine, but meanwhile her husband, Siyamak Pourzand, was jailed. She has published several books in Persian and has received many international awards, including the 2002 Ludovic-Trarieux Award.

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ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI

KARNOUK, LILIANE

[1944–]

Egyptian-Canadian artist, writer, and educator.

Liliane Karnouk is an Egyptian-Canadian visual artist, writer, and arts educator who has also worked in theater and furniture design. She was trained at the Academy of Fine Arts in Rome and at the University of British Columbia. She is well known as one of the few authors who have introduced modern Egyptian art to an English-speaking audience, producing two authoritative volumes on the subject. She was also instrumental in shaping the art department at the American University in Cairo. Karnouk is the recipient of prestigious Ford Foundation grants to further the knowledge of contemporary Egyptian art, and her paintings and installations have been exhibited extensively in her native Egypt and Canada, as well as in Europe. Working in a range of materials from the industrial to the organic, her conceptual works have dealt with themes related to the desert, ancient Egypt, plants and organic designs, and Islamic philosophy regarding the functional and the aesthetic. Her work is primarily concerned with exploring her own experience between East and West.

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JESSICA WINEGAR

KARP REPORT (1984)

Report into irregularities in police investigations of violence by Jewish settlers against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

The Karp Report was issued by a committee of Israeli jurists headed by Deputy Attorney General Judith Karp. The committee was appointed by Attorney General Yitzhak Shamir in 1981 in response to Israeli law professors who expressed concern over the deterioration of the rule of law in the territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 war.

The committee examined seventy cases, fifty-three of which had been left unsolved, in which Israeli settlers were charged with harassing Palestinian residents in the Hebron region who had refused to sell their land. The report found "serious shortcomings" in investigations when Arabs were victims: investigations of complaints lodged by Palestinians were inadequate. It criticized the police for failing to seriously investigate charges, noted delays in pursuing cases, and faulted the separation between the regular and military police. The report advised a reassessment of the instructions given to Israeli soldiers for opening fire on civilians, recommended an increase in the number of civilian police in the West Bank, and criticized the refusal of Jewish witnesses—especially settlers in the West Bank—to cooperate with police in investigations related to Arab victims.

The Israeli right wing charged that the investigation had failed to examine cases in which Palestinian Arabs went unpunished for attacks on Jews.

Karp resigned after the Likud-led government neglected the report's findings.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Likud; West Bank.

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Martin Malin
Updated by Gregory S. Mahler

KARZAI, HAMID

[1957–]

President of the transitional government of Afghanistan.

Hamid Karzai, born 24 December 1957 in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the fourth of seven sons of a chief of the Popalzai tribe, was a leader in efforts to reconstitute Afghanistan after the demise of the Taliban in 2001. After being educated in Kabul, he earned a postgraduate degree in political science in Shimla, India. During the war against the Communist regime in Afghanistan (1980–1992) Karzai was an active supporter of the opposition, contributing money and serving as political advisor to certain resistance leaders. In 1992 he served as deputy foreign minister in the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, but he resigned in 1994. Soon after the Taliban arose as a force in Kandahar in 1994 Karzai began to support them, donating $50,000 and a large hoard of weapons in hopes they would quell the fighting among the various commanders. The Taliban leadership wanted him to be their envoy to the United Nations (UN), but he refused. He came to believe that the Taliban were mere proxies for Pakistani and Arab radical Islamists, and in 1997 he joined family members in Quetta, where he worked for the reinstatement of the former king, Mohammad Zahir. In the next year he collaborated with other Pushtun chiefs in inciting an anti-Taliban movement; in response, in 1999 the Taliban murdered Karzai's father. Elected chief of the Popalzai tribe in his father's place, Karzai immediately defied Taliban warnings by organizing a 300-vehicle convoy of Pushtun mourners to carry his father's remains back to Kandahar, an act that won him wide respect.

Soon after the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States, Karzai began to organize a tribal militia to fight the Taliban. His request for help from the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad was refused, but he won support from the British. On 8 October 2001, one day after the United States started bombing the Taliban, he led militia into the Kandahar area. The Taliban almost captured him, but he was rescued by U.S. helicopters. The U.S. government only reluctantly came to see him as a key Pushtun leader. When a body of prominent Afghans assembled in Bonn, Germany, to constitute a new regime, the United States and representatives of the Northern Alliance, now the main political instrument of U.S. policy in Afghanistan, induced the attendees to name him leader of a provisional administration. Installed on 22 December 2001, Karzai's task was to organize a *Loya-Jirga* (national assembly) that would elect a temporary head of state who would form a permanent government. In the summer of 2002 the *Loya-Jirga* elected him president of the Afghan Transitional Authority, commissioning him to draft a new constitution, form a national army, and set up a national election by 2004. As transitional president his main achievement by the summer of 2003 was the securing of commitments from other countries of more than $4 billion for reconstruction. Early in his regime, his greatest difficulty was the incorrigibility and truculence of local commanders, many of whom paid no remittances to the Kabul government. There have been several attempts on his life, the most notable on 5 September 2002, when a gunman missed him at point-blank range.

See also Afghanistan: Political Parties in; Afghanistan: U.S. Intervention in; Taliban; Zahir Shah.

Robert L. Canfield

KASAP, TEODOR

[1835–1905]

Turkish Ottoman journalist, dramatist, and publisher.

Teodor Kasap, the son of a manufacturer, was born in Kayseri, Turkey. When he was eleven, his father died and he moved to Istanbul, where he was ap-

prenticed to a Greek merchant and studied at a Greek school. While working in the merchant's store, he met a French officer who had come to Turkey during the Crimean War. Under the patronage of this officer, he went to France in 1856 to complete his studies. Upon his return to Istanbul, Kasap gave private French lessons, through which he entered the Istanbul literary circuit.

On 24 November 1870 Kasap published the first issue of the first Ottoman humor magazine, *Diyojen*. *Diyojen* quickly became famous for its caricatures and high-quality articles; among the regular contributors were Namik Kemal and Ebüzziya Tevfik. *Diyojen* also featured translations from French literature: Kasap's translation of Alexandre Dumas's *The Count of Monte Cristo* was one of the first Turkish translations of a French novel.

The caustic humor that was featured in *Diyojen* led the government to order it temporarily closed after only four issues. Kasap eventually published 183 issues of *Diyojen* before it was ordered permanently closed in 1873. Following this, he published two other magazines, *Cingirakli Tatar* and *Hayal* (both in 1873), and a daily political newspaper, *Istikbal* (1875). In 1877, Kasap was sentenced to three years in prison for a cartoon criticizing censorship of the press that appeared in *Hayal*. He was released from prison on the condition that he cease publishing *Hayal* and *Istikbal*; upon his release, he went into exile in Europe. Following a stay in Europe of several years, he was pardoned by Sultan Abdülhamit II and allowed to return to Istanbul where he was employed in the sultan's private library.

In addition to his publishing and journalistic activities, Kasap is known for his plays. His first play, *Pinti Hamit*, was performed at the Gedikpaşa Theater in 1873; this was followed by *Iskilli Memo* in 1874 and *Para Meselesi* in 1875. The first two were based on plays written by Molière, the last, on a play written by Dumas. Kasap believed that Turkish theater had to draw upon local sources and customs; his play *Iskilli Memo* was based on Turkish folk theater (Ortaoyunu). He was opposed to unreflective adoption of Western theatrical genres, and he defended local traditions of drama: "Theater, like civilization, does not enter a country from the outside, but must come from within."

See also Abdülhamit II; Namik Kemal; Newspapers and Print Media: Turkey; Ortaoyunu.

David Waldner

KASHANI, ABU AL-QASEM

[1882–1962]

Iranian religious leader and political activist, important for his role in the events of 1945–1955, the postwar decade.

Born in Tehran, Abu al-Qasem Kashani was taken at an early age by his father to al-Najaf in Iraq, where he began his formal religious education in Islam. With his father, he fought against the British in the battle of Kut al-Amara in 1916. Hostility to British imperialism was destined to remain the chief emphasis of his political life. Kashani also participated in the anti-British uprising of 1921, as a result of which he was compelled to return to Persia (Iran). He remained politically inactive until 1941, when the British forces occupying Iran arrested him for alleged contacts with agents. Released in 1945 (after World War II), he was placed under house arrest in 1946 for opposing a new press law.

In 1948, he organized demonstrations that called for volunteers to fight the Zionists in Palestine (Israel was established in May 1948) and also began collaborating with the militant organization Fedaʾiyan-e Islam. In 1949, he was exiled to Beirut on charges of involvement in a failed attempt on the life of the shah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. He returned in triumph in 1950 and was elected to the *majles* (Iran's legislature), where he worked with Mohammad Mossadegh in bringing about the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. From the fall of 1952 on, relations between the two men declined, and Kashani stood aside when Mossadegh was overthrown by the U.S.-sponsored royalist coup of August 1953. Kashani nonetheless resumed his own oppositional activities in 1954 and was arrested anew in 1955. He was released in January 1956 and, intimidated by the death of his son under questionable circumstances, remained politically inactive until his death in March 1962.

See also Fedaʾiyan-e Islam; Kut al-Amara; Mossadegh, Mohammad; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza.

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Hamid Algar

KASHIF AL-GHITA FAMILY

A family of Shiʿite ulama *and* mujtahidun *originating in the Shiʿite holy city of al-Najaf in southern Iraq.*

The founder of the family, Jaʿfar ibn Khidr al-Najafi (1743–1812), was an *alim* (singular of *ulama*) who wrote the *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) textbook *Kashif al-Ghita* (The uncoverer of the error), from which the family surname was derived. In 1807, he led the defense of Najaf against the raiding Wahhabis, a Sunni fundamentalist and purist movement led by amirs of the house of Al Saʿud, based in Najd.

Jaʿfar's sons, Shaykh Musa ibn Jaʿfar (1766–1827), Shaykh Ali ibn Jaʿfar (d. 1837), and Shaykh Hasan ibn Jaʿfar (1776–1848), were *mujtahidun* (senior Shiʿite religious authorities empowered to issue religious decrees based on primary sources; singular *mujtahid*) in Najaf, where they were involved in political developments. Shaykh Musa ibn Jaʿfar Kashif al-Ghita mediated between the Ottoman Empire and the Persians during the 1820s.

The most prominent scion of the Kashif al-Ghita family in the twentieth century was Muhammad Husayn Kashif al-Ghita (1877–1954), who received the title and status of *marja* (supreme religious authority). He was the author of numerous books on religious topics, printed in Arabic and Persian, and had adherents throughout the Shiʿa world. In his books he showed the need for Islamic unity and expressed his views about the ideal Islamic society. He maintained a correspondence with the Maronite intellectual Amin Rihani. He traveled to Hijaz, Syria, and Egypt, and lectured at al-Azhar University in Cairo. In 1909, he published a book, *al-Din wa al-Islam aw al-Daʿwa al-Islamiyya* (Religion and Islam, or The Islamic call), which called for a revival of Islam and its purification from recent trends of extremism and superstition.

During the 1920s and 1930s, Muhammad Husayn was an active Shiʿite politician in Iraq. In the period of unrest and tribal rebellions (1934–1935), he formulated the Shiʿite demands, but refused—due to the strife among the Shiʿite tribes and politicians—to commit himself to the tribal rebellion under Abd al-Wahid Sikkar, which was backed and manipulated by Sunni Baghdadi politicians of the Ikha al-Watani Party. Starting from the late 1930s, he introduced moderate reforms and modernization in his *madrasa* (religious college) in Najaf.

In 1931, Muhammad Husayn Kashif al-Ghita attended the Muslim Congress in Jerusalem—the first Shiʿite *mujtahid* to take part in a Muslim Congress—and led the prayers at the opening ceremony at the al-Aqsa Mosque.

Following World War II Muhammad Husayn began to warn against the dangers of communism. In 1953, he held talks with the British and American ambassadors on the communist influences among young Shiʿites in Iraq.

See also Al Saʿud Family; Ikha al-Watani Party.

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Michael Eppel

KASHWAR KAMAL, MEENA
[1956–1987]

Afghan feminist, poet, and political activist.

Meena Kashwar Kamal was born in 1956 in Kabul. Her husband, Faiz Ahmad, a physician, was a member of the Afghan Maoist Communist political movement, Shoʿla-i-Jawid (Eternal flame); however, it is not clear whether Kashwar Kamal adhered to the same political ideology. Kashwar Kamal's political and feminist ideas were shaped during the late 1960s and early 1970s, a period of intense student involvement in politics in Kabul and other major cities in Afghanistan. After her husband's assassination in 1976, she abandoned her studies at Kabul University and devoted her time to social and political activities. In 1977, at age twenty-one, she or-

ganized the Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) in Kabul as an alternative platform to the Marxist-Leninist Democratic Organization of Afghan Women, to fight against the fundamentalism of radical Islamists.

After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, Kashwar Kamal shifted her focus to the liberation of Afghanistan. She declared, "To fight against the Russian aggressors is inseparable from struggle against the fundamentalists. Nevertheless, for the time being we should give priority to the former." In October 1981, she was invited to attend the congress of the anti-Soviet Socialist Party of French President François Mitterrand as a representative of the Afghan resistance. From there, she visited other European countries, speaking in support of the Afghan resistance. Her strong anti-Soviet and antifundamentalist feminist stance earned her the animosity of both radical Islamists in Pakistan and the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. She was killed in her home in Quetta, along with two close associates, on 4 February 1987, allegedly at the instigation of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the radical Islamic Party of Afghanistan. Her work, however, has continued under the banner of the Revolutionary Afghan Women's Association.

See also Afghanistan; Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (1965); Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Hezb-e Islami; Refugees: Afghan; Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA); Samar, Sima; Taliban.

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Senzil Nawid

KASRAVI, AHMAD

[1890–1946]

Iranian writer and reformer.

Born into a religious family in Tabriz, Ahmad Kasravi received a religious education and for a brief time was a preacher. As a young man, he joined the Tabriz branch of the reformist Democrat party, which had acquired a reputation in the national assembly for being anticlerical. Kasravi was expelled from the party in 1917 for his opposition to a growing trend among Tabriz Democrats to emphasize provincial concerns over national concerns. In 1921, he moved to Tehran, where he spent the remainder of his life working as a social reformer, activist, and historian. Kasravi was one of the most prolific and influential writers of early twentieth-century Iran. His important works include *History of Iran's Constitutional Revolution, An Eighteen-Year History of Iran, Shiʿigari,* and *Piramun-e Islam* (all of them in Arabic). Kasravi often criticized the Shiʿite clergy in his writings, especially in the two latter works, both of which were condemned by some clergy. He was assassinated by a member of the radical Fedaʾiyan-e Islam.

See also Fedaʾiyan-e Islam.

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Eric J. Hooglund

KASSALLAH

Commercial and agricultural center of eastern Sudan.

Founded in 1840, Kassallah grew rapidly, and within a few decades became the most important commercial and agricultural center in eastern Sudan. During the Mahdiya revolt, its Turko–Egyptian defenders withstood the siege by the Mahdists from 1883 until 1885, when the garrison surrendered after the Mahdi had captured Khartoum. In 1894 the Italians, who had occupied Eritrea, captured the town; they did so again for a few months in 1940, before Kassallah was liberated by Allied forces under British command. As the gateway to Eritrea and Ethiopia and the *entrepôt* for the rich agricultural lands in the Gash River delta of the Sudan, Kassallah became the center for road and rail traffic between Port Sudan and Khartoum. Its strategic location has made it the sanctuary for the thousands

of refugees who have fled from the Eritrean–Ethiopian war since the mid-1960s. The influx of refugees has swollen the population beyond any accurate assessment, but Kassallah has become the largest city in the Sudan after the Three Towns (Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman).

ROBERT O. COLLINS

KASZTNER AFFAIR

Dramatic and highly politicized slander trial in Israel from January 1954 to June 1955.

Gossip journalist Malkiel Grunwald stood accused of defaming Dr. Rudolf Kasztner, director of public relations for the ministry of commerce and industry and hero of Holocaust rescue efforts on behalf of Hungarian Jewry. Kasztner's role in the failed 1944 negotiations to "buy" the survival of Hungary's Jews from Adolf Eichmann was portrayed by the defense as collaboration with the Nazis in exchange for the freedom of a handpicked few of Kasztner's friends and relatives who were transported to Switzerland as an agreed-upon "good faith" gesture. According to defense counsel Shmuel Tamir, whose Herut Party's political agenda was to associate Kasztner's "war-crimes" with the Jewish Agency and by extension with MAPAI party, it was to ensure this "delivery" that Kasztner kept from Hungarian Jewry the truth about its expected fate and encouraged Palestinian Jewish parachutists to surrender to the authorities. He was also disparaged for testifying on behalf of one of his Nazi interlocutors, Kurt Becher, at the Nuremberg trials after World War II. Grunwald was acquitted. Reverberations of the trial led to the resignation of Prime Minister Moshe Sharett's government in June 1955. Kasztner was assassinated in March 1957 by three youths associated with the extreme right, ten months before Israel's Supreme Court overturned the ruling in the Grunwald case.

See also HOLOCAUST; ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE; SHARETT, MOSHE; TAMIR, SHMUEL.

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ZEV MAGHEN

KATEB, YACINE

[1929–1989]

A leading Algerian literary figure.

Born in Constantine, Algeria, Yacine Kateb was marked by the 1945 massacres that French colonial troops committed in eastern Algeria. He was imprisoned during those years of repression and then went into exile in France, where he survived by taking low-paying jobs. He joined the National Liberation Front (FLN) during the 1950s and served as FLN representative in various countries. He earned fame with *Nedjma* (1956), a love story. Three years later he published *Le cercle des représailles* in Paris. After Algeria's independence, Kateb devoted his time to writing and theater. His political views angered the regime. Kateb's position that dialectal Arabic and Berber should be the only national languages conflicted with the regime's all-out campaign to make Arabic the only national language. In response, the authorities sought to marginalize him. Modest, Kateb worked with his theater troupe and wrote plays and books, including *Le polygone étoilé* (1966) and *L'homme aux sandales de caoutchouc* (1970). Because he was spurned by the authorities who controlled the national publishing house, most of Kateb's works were published in France. Kateb also wrote plays in dialectal Arabic and French, the most famous being *Mohammed prends ta valise* (1971), *Saout Ennisa* (1972), *La guerre de 2000 ans* (1974), and *La Palestine trahie* (1972–1982). He was awarded France's Grand Prix National des Lettres in 1987. He died of leukemia on 28 October 1989 in Grenoble, France.

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YAHIA ZOUBIR

KATTANI, MUHAMMAD IBN ABD AL-KABIR AL-

[?–1909]

Idrisi sharif; head of the Kattaniya Sufi brotherhood; anticolonial leader in the period of the Moroccan Question.

As head of the Kattaniya Brotherhood, in 1904 Muhammad ibn Abd al-Kabir al-Kattani led the

notables of Fez in opposition to France's reform plan presented to Morocco's sultan Abd al-Aziz. Disappointed with the sultan's acquiescence to French pressure, in 1907–1908 he led demonstrations at Fez in favor of deposing Abd al-Aziz and proclaiming Abd al-Hafid as sultan. He also sought to impose conditions on the latter when he assumed the throne, committing him to a program of unwavering opposition to European rule.

In 1909, Kattani's unrelenting public attacks on Abd al-Hafid led to the former's arrest and execution. Subsequent generations of Moroccan nationalists have, however, viewed him as a hero for his staunch opposition to French colonial rule.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn al-Hassan; Abd al-Hafid ibn al-Hassan; Kattaniya Brotherhood.

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Edmund Burke III

KATTANIYA BROTHERHOOD

A Moroccan Sufi order, formally intended to enhance the spirituality of its adherents, which played a major political role in the early twentieth century.

The Kattaniya brotherhood (in Arabic, *tariqa*) was founded in Fez, Morocco, in 1890 by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Kabir al-Kattani—known popularly as Muhammad al-Kabir. Al-Kabir was inspired by the Sufi doctrines and practices of the established Darqawi *tariqa.*

The Kattani family, known for its scholars and jurists, claimed descent from the prophet Muhammad through Morocco's Idrisi dynasty. The Kattaniya rapidly gained adherents in Fez, Meknes, and Morocco's rural regions, but the brotherhood was condemned by reformist *ulama* (religious scholars). In 1909, Muhammad al-Kabir fled Fez to sanctuary with a neighboring tribe when the new ruler, Sultan Mulay Abd al-Hafid (ruled 1908–1912), ordered his arrest and closed all Kattaniya *zawiyas* (Islamic compounds). Pursued and beaten, he was executed soon after he was brought back to Fez.

Once the French protectorate was established (1912–1956), the Kattaniya again flourished under Shaykh Muhammad Abd al-Hayy al-Kattani—a scholar, popular religious leader, implacable foe of the Alawite dynasty, and a beneficiary of French colonial rule. In 1953, Abd al-Hayy joined other antinationalists in calling for the deposition of Sultan Muhammad V, and the Kattaniya brotherhood rapidly collapsed.

See also Alawite Dynasty; Kattani, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Kabir al-; Muhammad V.

Dale F. Eickelman

KATZNELSON, BERL

[1887–1944]

Labor Zionist leader, writer, and publisher.

Berl Katznelson was born in Belorussia and went to Palestine in 1909. He became a farm laborer and a friend of A. D. Gordon. In World War I, he was in the Jewish Legion with David Ben-Gurion and Yizhak Ben-Zvi. With them, and as a theoretician in Labor Zionism, he created the platform for bringing together the several Labor Zionist (socialist) parties into a unified framework. He was a founder of Ahdut Ha-Avodah in 1919, the Histadrut labor organization in 1920, and the MAPAI political party in 1930. In 1925, he founded the Histadrut's daily newspaper, *Davar,* which he edited until 1936, and its publishing house, Am Oved.

Central to Katznelson's outlook was the notion that Zionism would not be achieved without socialism because of the need to direct investment. He called his socialism "constructive" to signal both its preference for the interests of the workers and its priority for building the infrastructure necessary in a state. During World War II, the knowledge of the Holocaust changed his rigid stance against the Arabs and inclined him toward compromise.

See also Ahdut Ha-Avodah; Ben-Gurion, David; Ben-Zvi, Yizhak; Histadrut; Zionism.

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Donna Robinson Divine

KAWAKIBI, ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-
[1854–1902]

Central figure in the development of Arab nationalist thought.

Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi was born in Aleppo but grew up in Antioch, where he studied a variety of subjects in Arabic, Turkish, and Persian under the supervision of a prominent scholar related to his mother. He then returned to Aleppo and served as an editor of the Ottoman-sponsored newspaper *al-Furat* during the latter half of the 1870s. In 1878, he founded the city's first privately published Arabic-language newspaper, the weekly *al-Shadaba.* He played active roles in the then newly established Chamber of Commerce, the municipal administration, and the government-owned Tobacco Corporation. His outspoken advocacy of programs to help the poor won him the nickname Abu al-Duʿafa (Father of the Weak). His willingness to challenge the authorities eventually brought him into conflict with the provincial governor, who arrested him for sedition and confiscated his property. An appeals court ordered his release but refused to return his possessions, so around 1898 he emigrated to Egypt and entered the service of the Khedive Abbas Hilmi II. He died in Cairo.

Al-Kawakibi is best known for two short treatises, written in Aleppo but first published in Cairo. The first, *Umm al-Qura* (The mother of towns, i.e., Mecca), appeared in print in 1899 under the pseudonym al-Sayyid al-Furati. Structured in the form of a discussion among twenty-two Muslims planning to set up a secret society to revitalize the Islamic world, the book's thesis is that Islam will remain incapable of resisting the intellectual and political challenges emanating from Europe unless the leadership of the faith *(khalifa)* is returned to the Arabs from the (Ottoman) Turks. If a new *khalifa* were to be established in Mecca and were accorded authority only in religious matters, then the political position of all Muslims would be greatly strengthened. Despite its controversial if not explosive argument, this book went virtually unnoticed until it was serialized in Rashid Rida's journal *al-Manar* in 1902 and 1903.

The second treatise, *Tabaʾi al-Istibdad wa Masari al-Istiʿbad* (The attendants of despotism and the destruction of subjugation), is a spirited critique of tyranny in all its myriad forms: political, intellectual, economic, spiritual, and national/racial. For al-Kawakibi, each of these despotisms can be traced to earthly rulers' refusal to acknowledge the rule of Allah. Bringing an end to tyranny thus entails recognizing the supremacy and oneness of God *(tawhid).* But in order to prevent despotism from reemerging, governments must be made fully accountable to the people and wealth must be distributed equitably. Al-Kawakibi thus presents a program for social reform that is sharply at variance with that advocated by contemporaneous Islamic thinkers, who generally considered both democracy and socialism to be antithetical to Islam. There are indications that al-Kawakibi outlined several other writings during his years in Aleppo, but the notes for these works were seized and destroyed by the Ottoman police.

See also Abbas Hilmi II; Rida, Rashid.

Fred H. Lawson

KAYLANI, ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-
[1841–1927]

First prime minister of Iraq.

Scion of an ancient aristocratic family, Abd al-Rahman al-Kaylani was the head of the Qadiri (Sufi) mystical order, established by his ancestor, Abd al-Qadir al-Kaylani (or al-Jilani) (1077–1166). He was also the *naqib al-ashraf* (a noble title denoting responsibility for the genealogical records listing the descent of a city's families from the prophet Muhammad; the title conveys the status of titular head of those families) of Baghdad.

Sir Percy Cox, British civil commissioner after World War I, regarded the Kaylani family as the most aristocratic and monarchial in Baghdad, and suggested that Abd al-Rahman al-Kaylani be made amir of Iraq. In November 1920, al-Kaylani was appointed president of the Iraqi Council of Ministers, the nucleus of the future Iraqi administration. In 1921, as a candidate for the planned throne of Iraq, al-Kaylani objected to the choice of Faisal I ibn Hussein of Hijaz as king of Iraq, but gradually resigned himself to the idea, realizing that the British insisted on Faisal. Al-Kaylani resigned from the Council of Ministers on Faisal's accession in August 1921. Subsequently he was appointed by Faisal as head of the cabinet and became the first prime

minister of Iraq. Al-Kaylani conducted talks with Britain about the Anglo–Iraqi Treaties and also objected to the Mandate. In 1922, as the official representative of Iraq, al-Kaylani signed the treaty with Britain but on condition that it would be ratified by the Constituent Assembly.

See also Anglo–Iraqi Treaties; Cox, Percy; Faisal I ibn Hussein.

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Michael Eppel

KAYLANI, RASHID ALI AL-

[1892–1965]

Four-time prime minister of Iraq in the 1930s and 1940s and a symbol of Arab nationalist resistance.

Rashid Ali al-Kaylani (also al-Gilani) was born in Baghdad in 1892. Although a member of one of the oldest local families, Rashid Ali's personal circumstances were quite modest, as a family disagreement had deprived his father of the stipend from the Qadiriyya *waqf* to which he was entitled as a Kaylani family member.

In 1924 he was appointed minister of justice in the cabinet of Yasin al-Hashimi, probably his closest political colleague; they were cofounders, in 1930, of Hizb al-Ikha al-Watani (Party of National Brotherhood), which spearheaded the opposition to the Anglo–Iraqi treaty of that year. By 1933, however, when the treaty had taken effect, both men acquiesced to the new situation, and Rashid Ali accepted his first premiership (20 March–28 October).

Out of office between October 1933 and March 1935, Rashid Ali and Hashimi spent much of this period encouraging the Middle Euphrates tribes to rebel against the governments of Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi and Jamil al-Midfaʿi. By March 1935, they had succeeded to the extent that Jawdat and Midfaʿi could no longer form cabinets; Hashimi became prime minister and Rashid Ali minister of interior in a government that lasted until the coup d'état by Bakr Sidqi in October 1936.

By the late 1930s, Britain and France had become increasingly unpopular in the Arab Middle East. In addition, while pan-Arab nationalism had little following in Iraq outside the officer corps, anti-British—and to some extent pro-Axis—feeling was heightened by the combination of the general weakness of the institutions of the state after the death of King Faisal I; the existence of widely shared aspirations for independence from Britain; the arrival of al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the *mufti* of Jerusalem, in Baghdad in October 1939; and the fact that a small clique of nationalist officers, the so-called Golden Square, had come to exercise a pivotal influence on Iraqi politics.

Rashid Ali became the chief political ally of the nationalist officers of the Golden Square and became prime minister in March 1940 after the fall of Nuri al-Saʿid's fifth ministry. Saʿid, unpopular because of his staunch support for Britain, considered, somewhat overoptimistically, that Rashid Ali, who had opposed the Anglo–Iraqi treaty, was both less compromised than himself and better able to resist the Golden Square's more extreme demands.

Under the terms of the 1930 treaty, the Iraqi government agreed to allow the transit of British troops across its territory in time of war. Britain sought to take advantage of this provision in June 1940, and permission in principle was given in mid-July. However, in spite of requests from Britain, Iraq refused to break off relations with Italy when Italy declared war on Britain in June 1940, and in consequence, the Italian legation in Baghdad developed into a center of anti-British intrigue. In addition, in August 1940 Rashid Ali and the mufti entered into secret negotiations with Berlin.

Matters rapidly came to a head, since Rashid Ali, who had the support of most of the armed forces, would not yield to British pressure to resign because of his refusal to allow troops to land in Iraq and pass through the country to Palestine in November 1940. By January 1941, he had been forced to step down as prime minister, but he returned to power on 12 April. In consequence, the regent Abd al-Ilah, Saʿid, and other pro-British politicians fled to Transjordan (now Jordan).

British troops landed at Basra a few days later; while this showed that Britain meant business, it be-

came clear that Rashid Ali and his government enjoyed widespread popular support. Given the balance of forces, the defeat of the Iraqi army by British troops after the thirty days war (May 1941) was very much a foregone conclusion. The much-heralded German support never materialized, and Rashid Ali fled the country with some of his closest supporters, reaching Germany in November 1941. He stayed there until May 1945, subsequently taking refuge in Saudi Arabia, where he remained until 1954.

After the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy, Rashid Ali returned to Baghdad in September 1958, apparently hoping that his previous services to the state would be properly acclaimed. When adequate recognition was not forthcoming, he set about inciting rebellion among the tribes of the Middle Euphrates in a quixotic attempt to unseat the government of Abd al-Karim Qasim. He was arrested in December 1958, tried and condemned to death, but subsequently pardoned by Qasim. He died in Beirut on 30 August 1965.

See also Ayyubi, Ali Jawdat al-; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Golden Square; Hashimi, Yasin al-; Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-; Ikha al-Watani Party; Midfaʿi, Jamil al-; Qasim, Abd al-Karim; Sidqi, Bakr; Waqf.

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Peter Sluglett

KAZA

See Glossary

KEBAN DAM

Dam built on the Euphrates River in eastern Turkey.

In 1974, near the provincial capital city of Elaziğ (1980 population about 143,000), the Keban Dam was opened by Turkey's Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, after eight years of construction. A future prime minister, Turgut Özal, had been an engineer on the project. When it was completed, the Keban Dam was the world's eighteenth-tallest dam at 680 feet (207 m); it created Turkey's third-largest lake.

The Keban Dam is part of Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project, a long-term hydroelectric program designed to increase the country's electrical generating capacity by 45 percent. It includes two other dams—one on the Tigris River and a second, the Atatürk Dam, completed in 1990, on the Euphrates. The project is intended to increase irrigable land in the region by 700,000 acres (283,000 ha) and to stimulate the economy of the region, largely inhabited by Kurds. The project has been a source of political tension with Syria and Iraq, since both depend on the same rivers for water.

See also Ecevit, Bülent; Özal, Turgut; Southeastern Anatolia Project.

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Elizabeth Thompson

KEINAN, AMOS

[1927–]

Israeli writer and satirist.

Amos Keinan helped create Israeli culture and served as one of its severest critics. A member of the generation that fought for an independent Jewish state, he soon accused Israel of moral and political decline particularly with regard to its military actions. Influenced by the Canaanite movement, Keinan also argued that Israel lacked a genuine national identity. As a regular columnist for two of Israel's leading newspapers, *Yediot Aharonot* and *Haaretz,* Keinan was widely known for his caustic satire. Keinan's writings are pessimistic and preoccupied with the possibility of destruction. Among his works are *Shoah II* (Holocaust II; 1975); *Ba-Derekh Le-En Harod* (On the road to En Harod; 1984, recounting the destruction of Israel); *Mi-Tahat La-Perahim* (Under the flowers; 1979), an anthology of short stories describing attitudes toward death during war; and *Sefer ha-Satirot* (Book of satires; 1984). A collection of his plays appeared in 1979.

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Ann Kahn
Updated by Donna Robinson Divine

KEMALETTIN BEY

[1870–1927]

Turkish architect.

Kemalettin was born in Istanbul into a middle-class family; his father was a naval captain. After graduating from the School of Civil Engineering in 1891, he became the assistant to the German architect A. Jasmund, who designed Istanbul's Sirkeci railroad station. Kemalettin later studied at Germany's Charlottenburg Technische Hochschule. Upon returning to Istanbul in 1900, he worked as chief architect in the ministry of war and taught at the School of Civil Engineering. He was a founder of the First National Architectural Movement in the early part of the twentieth century. The style developed by him and his contemporary Vedat Bey has been termed Ottoman Revivalism, because it incorporated the architectural elements of the classical Ottoman period over basically neo-Renaissance structures. When in 1909 he was appointed to the architectural department at the ministry of religious foundations, he began to apply his ideas of a national architecture. Architects trained under his guidance at the ministry helped to spread his vision throughout the Ottoman Empire.

Kemalettin was responsible for the restoration of historical monuments and the design of new buildings, including new mosques, mausoleums, office buildings, prisons, hospitals, schools, and train stations. His buildings were characteristically symmetrical with reference to the entrance, while protrusions at the two ends and at the central axis served to highlight this symmetry. These protrusions were often towers covered with domes, in the classical Ottoman style. He emulated Renaissance architecture by dividing his facades into three sections separated by continuous molding; he used different window orders in each section to render the three sections as distinct entities. The facades had rich carvings, tile panels, and carved moldings, composed in careful symmetry.

One of Kemalettin's most important works is a complex of 124 apartment houses and 25 shops he designed in 1918, the first examples of reinforced concrete construction in Turkey. The Republic of Turkey, established in 1923, recruited Kemalettin to design the portal of the new Turkish Grand National Assembly building and to complete the design of the Ankara Palace Hotel across from the new parliament building. In addition, he designed a series of housing projects for civil servants.

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David Waldner
Updated by Eric Hooglund

KEMALISM

The official present-day political ideology of the Republic of Turkey.

Kemalism refers variously to the thought of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938); the ideology and regime of the single-party period (1920–1950) in the Republic of Turkey; the official Turkish political ideology to date (semiofficial in the 1961 constitution, fully official and imperative in the 1982 constitution); the principles of national education and citizenship training; the hegemonic public philosophy in contemporary Turkey; and finally to the name of the persistent Turkish personality cult.

Westernist Reforms in Turkey

Kemal derived his legitimacy from the commandership in chief of the successful war of independence (1919–1922), which ended up in the

foundation of the republican Turkish nation-state on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922). No less important, this legitimacy was reinforced by his extreme qualities of charismatic leadership. Kemal and his followers, after abolishing the sultanate and the caliphate, proceeded to build up an authoritarian, single-party state, with discernable totalitarian characteristics in certain ideological and institutional spheres. The Kemalists implemented, alternately gradually and forcefully, a series of radical reforms in the political, legal, educational, and cultural fields, including adoption of Western legal codes (some liberal, such as the Swiss civil code; some fascistic, such as the penal and labor codes); latinization of the Ottoman alphabet; adoption of the Western calendar and units of measurement and imposition of Western clothing and headwear; the closing down of social and associational institutions of Islamic sects; unification of education in the sense of prohibiting schools of religious instruction and creating a new system of secular national education; and disestablishment of Islam in general beyond the narrow laicist sense of separation of religion and politics, but at the same time bringing religion under the control and supervision of the state through a Directorate of Religious Affairs.

The main thrust of these reforms was Westernization and secularization of the society, based on a rejection of the Ottoman Islamic past and on a synthesis of Western values with the virtues of old, original, Turkish "national character," not excluding a tertiary element of the purified, pre-Arabic-Persian-Ottoman version of Islamic morality. Many of these reforms constituted the completion of a long process of Westernist modernization, some inaugurated by the "Re-Ordering" (Tanzimat, 1838) and the First and Second Constitutional periods (1876 and 1908), some others formulated by Ziya Gökalp and partially implemented by the Unionists (1908–1918). Whether the Kemalist reforms constitute a revolution or radical reform is the subject of an ongoing debate, but the Kemalists identified themselves as "transformist" *(inkilapi).*

Interpretation and Classification of Kemalism

Partly impressed by the Westernist reformist and laicist character of "cultural Kemalism," most interpreters—Turkish and foreign alike—have designated Kemalism as a tutelary democracy overlooking or playing down the severely antidemocratic essence of "political Kemalism" both as an ideology and as a regime. This standard interpretation of Kemalism has also been partly guided by an imputation of false causality, in the sense that the development of the single-party regime after the end of World War II into a sort of multiparty parliamentary system (1946–1950), as a result of external pressures, was attributed to the unfolding of the internal dynamics of the first thirty formative years of the Turkish republic. As a matter of fact, this rootless parliamentarianism has been thrice interrupted by military coups (1960, 1971, 1980) of varying degrees of violence—all declared to be staged, among but above all other things, in the cause of Kemalism.

Kemalism as a "Third Way" Ideology

Kemalism was an early brand of those "third way" *(tertium genus)* ideologies and regimes of the post–World War I world of late-modernizing capitalist countries which were to borrow further elements, especially in the 1930s and early 1940s, from the full fascisms of interbellum Europe. Kemalism was antisocialist and anti-Marxist, antiliberal but not anticapitalist; that is, it was corporatist capitalist. It belonged more to the solidaristic species of corporatism formulated by the Turkish social and political thinker Ziya Gökalp, only later assuming partial fascistic overtones in certain ideological and institutional spheres. The Kemalist single-party regime rested on a class alliance of civilian-military petite bourgeoisie, big landowners, a nationalistic commercial bourgeoisie, and an incipient and subordinate industrial bourgeoisie, which it was the explicit ideology of the Kemalists to create and strengthen through neomercantilist policies of economic statism (etatism). This developmentalist objective required accelerated capital accumulation through labor policies which provided a cheap and disciplined labor force for private enterprises, for state economic enterprises, and for joint ventures between the two and through fiscal policies that called for transfer of resources from the agricultural countryside to industry and the urban centers, especially after the Great Depression.

"Transformation" Becomes Repression

The Kemalist regime, aiming at the creation of a bourgeois society without liberal politics, was not a

de jure but a *de facto* dictatorial regime. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as the "greatest father" *(Ata-Türk)* of the nation, as the "eternal chief" of the single party, as the president of the republic, as the effective head of the executive branch (in breach of the 1924 Constitution that formally called for a sort of cabinet system) which governed in accordance with his directives, sat at the apex of this system. The parliamentary facade but thinly veiled the fact that the legislature (the Grand National Assembly) was regularly "packed" by Atatürk and his lieutenants, second-degree electors rubber-stamping the candidates handpicked by the former. The parliament, in Kemal Atatürk's own words, was coterminous with the parliamentary group of his Republican People's Party.

In other words, Kemalism was a plebiscitary, Bonapartist-charismatic "chief-system" in whose ideology the identity of the charismatic leader, the nation and its will, the state, and the party was emphatically expressed. Opposition, pluralism, and freedom of press and association, among others, were suppressed in the name of "transformationism" as against the overstretched category of reactionary forces. This attitude and its attendant formal and informal arrangements were to leave a durable imprint on the political culture, political-legal regime, and institutional structures of contemporary Turkey—the most recent fortification of which was to be made after the 1980 military coup in the form of the 1980 Constitution, the new Political Parties Act, the Higher Education Act, the Associations Act, and so forth. Certain liberalizations of the 1950s and 1960s had already been reversed immediately after the semicoup of 1971, restorationist reorderings and preparations of which were to culminate in the systemic overhauling executed by the 1980 coup.

The Six Arrows

The Kemalist ideology is summed up by, but cannot be reduced to, the Six Arrows: (1) Republicanism, meaning antimonarchism rather than democratic res publica; (2) Nationalism, aiming at linguistic and cultural identity-building rather than being an expansionist or irredentist political program; with a less known second face that has racist undertones; (3) "Peopleism," not in the common sense of populism but one which postulates a unified, indivisible, harmonious "whole people"; (4) Statism/etatism; (5) Laicism; and (6) "Transformism," meaning radical, especially cultural, reformism in contradistinction to both revolutionism and evolutionism—all seminally formulated by Gökalp, subsequent distortions notwithstanding.

Technically a rightist ideology, Kemalism in the Turkish context, however, proved to be very pervasive and all-embracing, thanks to characteristics typical of most "third way" ideologies, which try to "reconcile the incompatibles" in order to have a catchall appeal. Hitherto all Turkish political groups, from the extreme right to the center, and more interestingly, to many gradations of the left, have professed (and had to profess) allegiance to Kemalism. Its appeal to the right and center parties is more opaque in view of its authoritarian, "above-parties" and "above-classes," corporatist context. It has been and continues to be very functional in this sense, being the "grund-norm" of political legitimacy in Turkish politics, reproduced by the intelligentsia and forcefully guarded by the military. As for the left, most have incorrectly taken Kemalism's developmentalist statism for a form of state socialism, its anti-imperialism for a kind of anticapitalism, and some of its political reforms for a variant of bourgeois revolution (that would mechanically lead into a socialist revolution)—forgetting the profoundly antidemocratic character of political Kemalism. This consensus, surviving the 1990s despite the foregoing, excludes only a very marginal sector of academe and the nonauthoritarian left, as well as the fringes of the fundamentalist—but not the orthodox, statist-religious right. The former is excluded for obvious reasons; the latter less because of the authoritarian aspects of Kemalism than for its, in their view, excessive Westernism. It should also be noted that the much-spoken-of revival of Islam in Turkey in the 1980s was not initiated by the fundamentalist groups—certainly one of the beneficiaries—but by the military (1980–1983) and civilian (1983–) governmental policies of granting religion a far greater domain of legitimacy than hitherto seen in the history of the Republic of Turkey. The military-imposed Constitution of 1982 provided for compulsory courses on "religious culture and morality" in elementary and secondary education "under the control and supervision of the state." This constituted the first significant deviation from the otherwise intact Kemalist orthodoxy of Turkish establishment

politics. In breaking, in this instance, with the classical Kemalist principle of laicism, which has excluded religious instruction from the national education and citizenship training system, the military sought to add Islam to Kemalism in its program of depoliticization, control, and ideological manipulation of Turkey's youth and society, paralleling measures it has taken in many other spheres.

Works on Kemalism, interchangeably called Atatürkism, are legion. Attempts at differentiating the two are polemical and unfounded; Atatürk and his followers baptized their own ideology as Kemalism. A great many of these works, however, are hagiography or are based on secondary or tertiary evidence, whether they be belletristic or academic. In academe, too, Kemalism remains the social scientific official ideology—the obvious contradiction in terms notwithstanding.

See also Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Gökalp, Ziya; Republican People's Party; Tanzimat.

Taha Parla

KENAZ, YEHOSHUA

[1937–]

Israeli author.

Born in Petah Tikvah, a small town outside Tel Aviv, in 2004 Yehoshua Kenaz lived in Tel Aviv, where he worked on the editorial staff of the Hebrew daily *Haaretz.* A graduate of the Hebrew University and the Sorbonne, he translates works from French in addition to being a literary, film, and theater critic. Kenaz has authored both short stories and novels, and has had four of his works translated into English. Characterized by a harrowing beauty, his fiction captures something of the dark sadness of life, mirroring in the stories' various settings Israel's hemmed-in horizons. He skillfully turns his characters' dilemmas into situations of comic pathos and ironic heroism, thereby transforming Israeli conundrums into universal literature, much as Joyce did with his native Ireland. Kenaz has been awarded the Bialik Prize, the Prime Minister Eshkol Prize, the Alterman Prize, the Agnon Prize, and the Bar Ilan University Newman Prize. The film *On the Edge* was based on his book *After the Holidays.*

See also Literature: Hebrew.

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KENNEDY, JOHN FITZGERALD

[1917–1963]

U.S. President, 1961–1963.

Born in Brookline, Massachusetts, John Fitzgerald Kennedy was the son of Joseph P. Kennedy, first chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and ambassador to Britain from 1937 to 1940. After a Harvard University education, Kennedy served in the navy during World War II, then served as U.S. congressman (1947–1953) and senator (1953–1960) from Massachusetts.

As a senator, Kennedy supported Algeria's independence from France. After taking office as president in 1961, Kennedy's policy toward the Middle East shifted from that of previous administrations. He initially supported Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser, whom he saw as a progressive leader, favoring nationalism, who might keep the Arab world out of the Soviet Union's orbit. Nasser's conflict with Saudi Arabia over the Yemen Civil War undermined Kennedy's policy, however. At the same time that he was attempting to woo Nasser, Kennedy also strengthened U.S. ties with Israel, and he approved the sale of Hawk antiaircraft missiles to Israel in 1962—the first advanced U.S. weapons system sold to Israel. Yet he was plagued by Israel's attempts to develop nuclear weapons at its Dimona nuclear facility, and his attempts to press the Israelis on the matter damaged his relationship with Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion.

Kennedy also made some timid diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the Palestinian refugee problem. He dispatched Joseph E. Johnson to the region in

1961 and 1962 to develop a plan aimed at making progress on the issue, under the aegis of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. In the end, however, he failed to support Johnson's recommendations after Israel objected. The "informal talks" launched in the spring and summer of 1963 similarly made no progress.

See also NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMITTEE FOR PALESTINE (UNCCP); YEMEN CIVIL WAR.

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ZACHARY KARABELL
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

KENTER, YILDIZ

[1928–]

Turkish actress and director.

Yidiz Kenter, born in Istanbul, is the older sister of Musfik Kenter. After graduating from the Ankara State Conservatory in 1948, she won recognition for her work in small theaters in Ankara and soon began to perform in Turkey's State Theater. In 1959/60, she and her brother left the State Theater to form their own performance company, the Kent Actors. She has twice won the prestigious İlhan İskender award—for her role in the play *Salincakta İki Kişi* (Two people on a wwing) in the 1959/60 season, and for her play *Nalinlar* (Clogs) in the 1961/62 season.

DAVID WALDNER

KEREN HAYESOD

Fundraising division of the World Zionist Organization.

Keren Hayesod (also Keren ha-Yesod), the Palestine Foundation Fund, was established by the London Zionist Conference in 1920 to serve as the major fundraising division and financial institution of the World Zionist Organization (WZO), administered by a board of trustees appointed by the Zionist Executive and Jewish Agency. Its main office was moved in 1926 to Jerusalem, where it has been ever since.

During its inception, Keren Hayesod was the subject of a disagreement between the U.S. and European branches of the WZO. The former, headed by Louis Brandeis, argued for an economic approach in which the Keren Hayesod would raise funds for specific, economically practical projects. The Europeans, headed by Chaim Weizmann, argued for a broader approach in terms of participants and projects that would encourage the support of the Jewish masses and include a range of settlement activity. In the end, the European faction prevailed and the fund had the dual goals of settlement and fostering private-enterprise ventures. Until the establishment of Israel, Keren Hayesod was the major agency involved in financing immigration, absorption, housing, and rural settlement in the *yishuv.* It also purchased arms and paid for other expenses involved in Israel's War of Independence (1948). Since then, Keren Hayesod has encouraged business development in partnership with the private sector. In the United States, it functions as part of the United Jewish Appeal, raising funds for immigration and absorption and for services to the underprivileged in Israel.

See also JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE; JEWISH NATIONAL FUND; UNITED JEWISH APPEAL (UJA).

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

KERMAN

A province and its capital city in south-central Iran.

The province of Kerman is in south-central Iran. The construction of the town of Kerman probably

began in pre-Islamic times. When Marco Polo visited the city in 1271 it had become a major trade emporium linking the Persian Gulf with Khorasan and Central Asia. Subsequently, however, the city was sacked many times by various invaders. The present city of Kerman, 661 miles southeast of Tehran, and the capital of the modern province of Kerman, was rebuilt in the nineteenth century to the northwest of the old city, but it did not recover until the twentieth century. Carpet weaving is one of the main industries of the city, and the carpets produced there are renowned internationally. A number of modern establishments such as textile mills and brickworks also have been constructed. The province's mineral wealth includes copper and coal. The population of the city in 1996 was 385,000. The total population of the province in 1996 was 2,004,328.

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Parvaneh Pourshariati

KESSAR, ISRAEL

[1931–]

Israeli trade union leader; member of the Knesset.

Israel Kessar was born in Yemen and immigrated to Mandatory Palestine in 1933. His education focused on sociology and economics; he received a master's degree from Tel Aviv University. Employed first as a teacher of new immigrants, Kessar then worked in the Ministry of Labor. His work in the Histadrut, Israel's trade union, began in 1966, and he held many positions: treasurer from 1973 to 1977, chairman of the Trade Union Department and deputy secretary-general from 1977 to 1984, and secretary-general from 1984 to 1992. He was elected to the Knesset in the same year and served in the Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Knessets (serving as minister of transportation from 1992 to 1996). His cooperation with the government while he was secretary-general of the Histadrut was important to the ultimate success of the emergency economic stabilization plan, which while fighting to keep real wages from falling too steeply also guarded against policies that would increase unemployment.

See also Histadrut.

Martin Malin
Updated by Gregory S. Mahler

KGB

Soviet espionage organization.

KGB, or Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security), was the Soviet Union's state security and political police agency, serving as the main internal and external intelligence and counterintelligence bureau, and external espionage and counterespionage organization from 1954 to 1991. It was somewhat similar to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and British MI-6. Under Communist Party control, it was the world's largest secret police and espionage organization, with seven directorates including foreign operations; internal political control; military counterintelligence; surveillance; and border guards. The latter included 300,000 personnel dispersed in Eastern Europe and the Central Asian Republics. Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan were special targets.

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Charles C. Kolb

KHADDAM, ABD AL-HALIM

[1932–]

Syrian politician.

Born in 1932 to a Sunni family of modest means from the coastal town of Jabla, just north of Banyas, Abd al-Halim Khaddam became active in Baʿth party politics while attending secondary school in Latakia in the late 1940s. During his student days, he forged a fast friendship with another young firebrand, Hafiz al-Asad. After graduating from the Faculty of Law at Damascus University, he practiced law and taught school before devoting himself to a career inside the party apparatus. He married into a prominent Alawi family in 1954.

By 1964 Khaddam had become governor of the troubled city of Hama, whose citizenry rose in rebellion against the Baʿth-dominated regime that April. He was governor of Qunaytra when the Israelis overran the Golan three years later. He then served as governor of Damascus city, before assuming the post of minister of the economy and foreign trade during the turbulent final years of the Salah Jadid period (1966–1970). When his old friend Hafiz al-Asad seized power in November 1970, Khaddam was promoted to the post of foreign minister. President al-Asad entrusted him with the thankless duty of negotiating the May 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel and with the difficult task of mediating among rival Lebanese factions during the tense period between the outbreak of the civil war in April 1975 and Syria's intervention in the conflict the following June. He was also given the delicate assignment of lobbying Arab leaders to reject the Egyptian–Israeli peace initiative of 1977–1978 and the tricky role of emissary between Damascus and Tehran during the uncertain months immediately following the 1978–1979 Iranian revolution.

When President al-Asad fell ill at the end of November 1983, Khaddam was appointed to the six-person committee charged with keeping affairs of state in order. Four months later, in a move clearly intended to counterbalance the influence of the president's ambitious brother Rifʿat, al-Asad named Khaddam as one of Syria's first three vice presidents, forcing him to relinquish the foreign ministership. Shortly thereafter, one of his sons married a daughter of the venerable al-Atasi clan in a lavish ceremony at the Damascus Sheraton Hotel. By the mid-1990s, some felt that his evident astuteness and longevity made him the most likely candidate to succeed Hafiz al-Asad as president of the republic. Yet al-Asad began grooming his youngest son Bashshar al-Asad for the job, and Bashshar assumed the presidency when his father died in June 2000. Khaddam remained a vice president, but not being a protegé of the younger al-Asad, slipped into a largely ceremonial role in Syrian politics.

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FRED H. LAWSON
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

KHADER, ASMA

[1952–]

Jordanian lawyer, human-rights activist, and a founder of Sisterhood Is Global Institute in Jordan.

Asma Khader (also Khadr), a Jordanian lawyer and human-rights activist, is founder and president of Mizan: The Law Group for Human Rights in Jordan and a founding member of the Arab Association for Human Rights. She served for two terms as president of the Jordanian Women's Union. Khader is a member of the Jordanian and Arab Lawyers' Unions and was recently appointed to the Executive Committee of the International Commission of Jurists.

Khader played an instrumental role in developing a legal literacy program for Jordanian women, as well as establishing the Jordanian Children's Parliament. She was instrumental in conducting human-rights education workshops in 1984 in different areas of Jordan and launched a program to integrate human-rights education within the school curricula. Khader is the founder and reporter of the National Network for Poverty Alleviation. Sponsored by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Poverty Strategy Initiative, the network was established in October 2000 in cooperation with the Families Development Association. Encompassing more than ninety participants from governmental and nongovernmental organizations as well as independent individuals, the network focuses on tackling poverty in Jordan and is also involved in the preparation of the Millennium Development Goals Report in Jordan. In 2003, Khader was the recipient of the UNDP's Poverty Eradication Award in the Arab states.

Khader served in 1999 as legal counsel to the Jordanian National Campaign Committee to Eliminate So-called Crimes of Honor in Jordan. She also served as a counsel to the Permanent Arab Court on Violence against Women in 1996 and as a judge in the Court's public hearings in Lebanon in 1997. She serves on the advisory committee of

various national and international women's and human-rights organizations, including the Advisory Committee of the Women's Rights Division of Human Rights Watch and Equality Now. In addition, and at the request of prominent international and regional human-rights organizations such as Amnesty International, she has monitored trials and served on various human-rights fact-finding missions. Khader has maintained a private legal practice for over twenty-three years and was recently appointed minister of state and spokesperson for the Jordanian government.

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ISIS NUSAIR

KHALAF, ABDULHADI

[1945–]

Bahraini political activist and academic who has lived in Sweden since 1990.

Abdulhadi (also Abd al-Hadi) Khalaf was born in Bahrain in 1945. He received his primary and secondary education there, then went abroad for college. He obtained a doctorate in sociology from Sweden's University of Lund in 1972. Returning to Bahrain, he became a candidate for the country's first National Assembly and was elected in December 1973. The assembly was an advisory body with limited powers to approve laws drawn up by the government. Several months after the National Assembly convened, Khalaf was expelled and arrested on charges of supporting one of several banned political groups that called for a constitutional monarchy. He was released from prison in 1975, then rearrested in 1976, again because of his political activities on behalf of democratic government.

Between 1975 and 1990, Khalaf was among the small group of Bahraini intellectuals who developed the country's fledgling system of higher education. In 1990, he accepted an appointment to teach sociology at the University of Lund and moved to Sweden. He continues to write articles about Bahrain's politics and society for Arabic and English publications.

See also BAHRAIN.

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EMILE A. NAKHLEH
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

KHALAF, SALAH

[1933–1991]

Palestine Liberation Organization leader, also known as Abu Iyad.

Born in Jaffa to a religious Muslim family, Salah Khalaf fled to Gaza during the 1948 Arab–Israel War. After 1951, he attended the University of Cairo, where he joined Yasir Arafat's Palestinian Students Union. He and Arafat founded the al-Fatah organization in Kuwait, where Khalaf was working as a schoolmaster in the 1960s. Khalaf played a leading role in the fighting of Black September in 1970, participated in the Lebanese Civil War in the late 1970s, and was linked to several violent and terrorist incidents in the 1970s and 1980s. By the late 1980s he had emerged as the second most powerful leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in charge of intelligence and security.

Khalaf was killed 14 January 1991 in the Tunis suburb of Carthage at the villa of Abd al-Hamid Ha'il (Abu al-Hawl) (the Fatah security chief). The gunman was Hamza Abu Zayd, a guard stationed at the villa. Khalaf had married the daughter of a wealthy Palestinian businessman, with whom he had six children. He was author of a widely read memoir, *My Home, My Land,* written with Eric Rouleau.

See also ARAFAT, YASIR; BLACK SEPTEMBER; FATAH, AL-; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO).

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

KHALDUNNIYYA

Tunisian educational society.

Khaldunniyya was founded by the Young Tunisians in 1896 and named in honor of the fourteenth-century Tunisian intellectual Ibn Khaldun. Intended to acquaint Tunisians who were illiterate in European languages with the contemporary European world, it offered instruction in Arabic in a wide variety of subjects. The organizers of the Khaldunniyya especially sought to reach Zaytuna University students in order to enhance their still largely traditional curriculum.

See also ZAYTUNA UNIVERSITY.

KENNETH J. PERKINS

KHALED, LEILA

[1948–]

Palestinian hijacker, feminist, and activist.

Leila Khaled (also Layla Khalid), long-time activist and Central Committee member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), was born on 9 April 1944 in Haifa, Palestine. Her family left Haifa as refugees to Lebanon on 13 April 1948, just before the State of Israel was established. Khaled joined a Lebanese cell of the Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM) in 1958. She was a student and activist at the American University of Beirut (AUB) in 1962 to 1963, but left because of financial difficulties and was employed as a teacher in Kuwait for a number of years. In Kuwait she became active with al-Fatah, which did not grant her request to join its military wing. In 1968 Khaled made contacts with PFLP cadres in Kuwait, and in 1969 she was accepted for military training in its Special Operations Squad. She left Kuwait for Amman, Jordan in 1969 in order to undertake resistance activities. Khaled became infamous when she and a male colleague hijacked a TWA airplane headed for Tel Aviv on 29 August 1969, forcing the flight to land in Damascus, where they blew it up after emptying it of passengers. Khaled underwent a number of clandestine plastic-surgery operations in Lebanon to transform her world-renowned face. In 1970 she commandeered another flight with a male colleague (who was killed in the operation) on behalf of the PFLP. This hijacking, of an Israeli El Al airplane, was thwarted, and the plane was forced to land in England, where Khaled was held by the British government and eventually released in a prisoner exchange. Khaled repeatedly stated that the aim of the hijackings was to gain international recognition of the plight of Palestinians as an issue of national dislocation and desire for self-determination rather than a refugee problem to be resolved through charity. Her well-known biography, *My People Shall Live* (1971), demonstrates a combined feminist and nationalist orientation, and provides a leftist analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Khaled survived a number of assassination attempts—in one, Israeli forces killed her sister. She attended university in the Soviet Union in the early 1980s, married her second husband in 1982, and worked with the PFLP-affiliated Palestinian Popular Women's Committees in Damascus following its establishment in the mid-1980s. She is a member of the Palestine National Council and a high-ranking leader in the General Union of Palestinian Women. Khaled's stances have not softened with age. In the 1990s she denounced the Oslo Accords, calling them fundamentally flawed because they did not address the status of Jerusalem, the ending of the Israeli occupation of territories occupied in June 1967, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, or Palestinian sovereignty. Although her actions are considered terrorism by many in the West, she has achieved the status of political icon throughout much of the Arab world.

See also PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL; POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE.

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FRANCES HASSO

KHAL, HELEN
[1923–]

Lebanese painter.

Born in the United States to Lebanese parents, Helen Khal studied at the Lebanese Academy of Fine Arts and returned to study at the Art Students League in New York. She returned to Lebanon to live and work, and in the 1960s she opened and directed the first permanent art gallery in that country, Gallery One. She continues to paint and write art criticism for Lebanese journals and newspapers. She is also the author of *The Woman Artist in Lebanon* (1987). Khal's paintings are primarily an exploration and expression of the emotive capacities of color, a theme inspired by the intense light of Lebanon. A notable portion of her work examines the relationship between color and the human figure. Her later work plays with relationships between fields of color in a way similar to Rothko and the New York color field painters. Khal's work was part of the major *Forces of Change* exhibit of Arab women artists in the United States and has also been included in the biennials of Sao Paulo and Alexandria.

See also Gender: Gender and Education; Lebanese Civil War (1958); Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanon.

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Jessica Winegar

KHALIDI, AHMAD AL-SAMIH AL-
[1896–1951]

Palestinian educator, writer, and social reformer.

Ahmad al-Samih al-Khalidi studied pharmacy at the American University of Beirut until 1917. After a brief stint in the Ottoman military, he worked for the education department of the British Palestine Government between 1919 and 1925. From 1925 until 1948 he headed a teacher-training school in Jerusalem, which was renamed the Arab College. It was the best secondary school in the country. He was appointed in 1941 assistant director of education for the British Mandate in Palestine. While he was director of the Arab College he issued one of the earliest proposals for the partition of Palestine, which called for dividing the country into Arab and Jewish cantons.

Khalidi wrote works on education, psychology, and history, some of which became textbooks in a number of Arab countries, including *Anzimat al-Taʿlim wa al-Hukm fi rif Filastin* (Systems of learning and leadership in the rural areas of Palestine, 1968). In addition, he translated a number of foreign works into Arabic, including those of Viennese psychoanalyst Wilhelm Stekel and American psychologist Robert Sessions Woodworth. In the early 1940s Khalidi became interested in Palestinian orphans. He established the General Arab Committee for Orphans and opened a school in Dayr Amr, Jerusalem, for sons whose fathers were killed in the Palestine Arab Revolt of 1936 to 1939. Later he added a girls' school nearby. After the 1948 Arab–Israel War, Khalidi established a school for orphaned Palestinian refugees in Hinniyya, southern Lebanon.

See also Arab College of Jerusalem.

Michael R. Fischbach

KHALID IBN ABD AL-AZIZ AL SAʿUD
[1912–1982]

King of Saudi Arabia, 1975–1982.

Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud was born in 1912 in Riyadh, the seventh son of King Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud (known as Ibn Saʿud in the West), the founder of Saudi Arabia. Khalid's only full brother was Muhammad ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud, two years his elder.

Khalid was educated in the royal court, studying the Qurʾan, Islamic history, and a limited range of several practical subjects, together with firsthand observation of court politics. He did not pursue an overtly political career. Nonetheless, from early adulthood he played an important part in family councils and by his thirties had become part of the small circle of princes that would guide Saudi Arabia's affairs. Of all his brothers he was, perhaps, the closest to the aloof Faisal. When only nineteen, Khalid acted as viceroy in Hijaz during Faisal's absences, and he later accompanied Faisal to the United States

in 1943 and was deputy prime minister in the cabinet that Faisal, acting as the Saudi prime minister, appointed in October 1962. Following Faisal's accession as king in November 1964, the senior princes and he pressed the reluctant Khalid to become crown prince. After several months of resistance, Khalid yielded to their pressure.

Khalid rose to the throne three days after the assassination of Faisal in 1975. Although the period of his rule was characterized by tremendous economic wealth generated by oil exports, and rapid development in nearly all sectors of the economy and society, Khalid's reign included some of the most turbulent episodes in recent Saudi history. Contradictions in Saudi society that had begun to develop during the reign of Faisal broke to the surface during the Khalid years. For example, although Khalid's regime supported the spread of religious education and encouraged a conservative Islamic worldview, many members of the ruling family espoused or at least tolerated Western values and lived a lavish lifestyle untrammeled by religious restrictions. This and other factors led to deep resentments among segments of the population and open opposition, which broke out most dramatically in the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979 and uprisings in the Eastern Province among the Shiʿite population.

Khalid acknowledged the legitimacy of some complaints that those who seized the Grand Mosque had raised and sought to address them. Following the disturbances among the long-mistreated Shiʿia of the Eastern Province (al-Hasa) in 1979 and 1980, he launched a major new development project in the principal Shiʿite area and made a personal visit—the first time a reigning Saudi monarch had done so. His 1976 tour of the other conservative Arab Gulf states to discuss common security concerns initiated the process that led to creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981.

See also Al Saʿud Family; Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud; Gulf Cooperation Council.

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Malcolm C. Peck
Updated by Anthony B. Toth

KHALIDI, HUSAYN FAKHRI AL-
[1894–1962]

Palestinian politician who hailed from a prominent Jerusalem family.

Born in Jerusalem, Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi studied medicine at the American University of Beirut and Istanbul University. After service in the Ottoman army, he joined the Arab Revolt and later worked for the department of health in Aleppo during the short-lived rule (1918–1920) of King Faisal I ibn Hussein in Syria. He was mayor of Jerusalem from 1934 to 1937, the last time that the city's mayor was elected by the entire population. In 1935 he founded the Reform Party (Hizb al-Islah). He was elected member of the Arab Higher Committee, a Palestinian political body formed in 1936 to direct the Palestinian national struggle. Al-Khalidi was then exiled by British authorities to the Seychelles islands from 1937 to 1942 along with other nationalist leaders. In 1946 he was a member of the reconstituted Arab Higher Committee. As a senior politician, al-Khalidi participated in the London Roundtable Conference (St. James Conference) of 1939.

After 1948 he served as Jordan's foreign minister in the cabinets of Fawzi al-Mulqi (1953) and Samir Rifaʿi (1955). In April 1957 al-Khalidi was appointed prime minister of Jordan during the political crisis brought on by the dismissal of Prime Minister Sulayman al-Nabulsi, but his cabinet lasted only one week. Al-Khalidi spent the rest of his life in Jericho where he wrote articles for the Jerusalem daily *al-Jihad* and authored a book entitled *al-Khuruj al-Arabi* (The Arab exodus). Al-Khalidi's unpublished autobiography illuminates many aspects of Arab and Palestinian politics.

See also Arab Higher Committee (Palestine); London (Roundtable) Conference (1939); Nabulsi, Sulayman al-.

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MUHAMMAD MUSLIH
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

KHALIDI, WAHIDA AL-

[1900–?]

First president of the Arab Women's Executive Committee, the coordinating committee of the women's movement in Palestine during the British Mandate.

Wahida al-Khalidi completed her high school education in a school run by nuns and spoke six languages. She married Dr. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi, who was active in the Palestinian national movement during the British Mandate. He served as mayor of Jerusalem in 1934 and as a member of the Islah (Reform) Party. Wahida al-Khalidi was a founding member and president of the Arab Women's Executive Committee (AWE) in the late 1920s and early 1930s. She was active in demanding a political role for women and in distributing aid to the revolutionaries in the 1936 through 1939 revolt. She was a member of the Palestinian delegation to the Eastern Women's Conference on Palestine, held in Cairo in 1938. In 1939 she stopped working with the AWE, possibly due to her husband's deportation to the Seychelles islands in 1937.

See also ARAB WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINE; ARAB WOMEN'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE; JERUSALEM.

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ELLEN L. FLEISCHMANN

KHALIDI, WALID

[1925–]

Palestinian intellectual and strategist.

Walid Khalidi has devoted much of his life to research and writing on the Palestine question. In 1963 he cofounded the Institute for Palestine Studies, an independent nonprofit Arab research and publication center. He has taught at the American University in Beirut, as well as at Oxford and Harvard, and has been a research associate at the Center for International Affairs and the Center for Middle East Studies at Harvard University. He has written and edited several articles and books including *From Haven to Conquest* (1970); *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East* (1979); *Before Their Diaspora, A Photographic History of the Palestinians 1876–1948* (1984); and *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948* (1992). A consummate expert on the Palestinian question and the Arab–Israeli conflict, he played an important role in shaping the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) peace strategy toward Israel, and was a member of the Jordanian delegation to the peace talks with Israel (1991–1992). Despite Khalidi's role in developing PLO policy, he has never been affiliated with the PLO.

See also INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO).

MUHAMMAD MUSLIH

KHALID, KHALID MUHAMMAD

[1920–1996]

Egyptian political and religious thinker and writer.

Born to a modest family, Khalid Muhammad Khalid studied Islamic law at al-Azhar University. He was influenced greatly by the liberal ideology of the Wafd Party as championed by authors such as Ahmad Amin and Taha Husayn. He joined the opposition group al-Hayʾa al-Saʿdiyya, founded by Ahmad Mahir and Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi, who had split from the Wafd Party, and he wrote critically of the government of Mustafa al-Nahhas, whom his party opposed. He was jailed and released, but imprisoned again in 1950 after the publication of his widely successful book *From Here We Start,* which was banned by the government. The book advocated a representative government and socialist economic policies such as nationalization of means of production and limited private property, and it is said to have greatly influenced Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose government Khalid strongly supported. His opposition to the role of religion in the state and

his call for the suspension of *shariʿa* led to a strong condemnation from al-Azhar theologians and to a rebuttal by Muhammad al-Ghazali in a book entitled *From Here We Know.* Khalid also opposed the Muslim Brotherhood, and especially the violent policies followed by one of the Brotherhood's branches. But his disenchantment with the failed economic policies of Nasser's government—and the transformation of the government into a totalitarian regime—gradually led Khalid to join the Islamic revivalist movement. In 1989 he published *Islam and the State,* in which he declared that he had misrepresented the historical and political role of Islam, and advocated political solutions closer to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. He wrote more than thirty books and his writings remain influential in Egypt.

See also AZHAR, AL-; GHAZALI, MUHAMMAD AL-; MAHIR, AHMAD; NAHHAS, MUSTAFA AL-; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; NUQRASHI, MAHMUD FAHMI AL-; WAFD.

MAYSAM AL FARUQI

KHALIFA, SAHAR
[1941–]

Palestinian novelist and short-story writer.

Sahar Khalifa (also Khalifeh), a leading Palestinian author of novels, short stories, and plays, was born in Nablus, where most of her stories are set. Khalifa attended high school in Amman and, shortly after graduating, entered into an arranged marriage at the age of eighteen. Thirteen years and two daughters later, Khalifa divorced her husband, began working, and pursued a post-secondary education. She received her bachelor's degree in English and American literature at Bir Zeit University in the West Bank, and then traveled to the United States for her graduate studies. She received her doctorate in American Studies at the University of Iowa. Khalifa is best known in the English-speaking world for her 1984 novel *Wild Thorns* (first published in Arabic in 1976), which portrays the conflict between occupied Palestinians and the Israeli army from a variety of perspectives and in different voices, both male and female, young and old, Arab and Israeli. Khalifa's other works include *We Are Not Your Slave Girls Anymore* (1974), which was serialized and made into a radio program; *The Sunflower* (1980); *Memoirs of an Unrealistic Woman* (1986), a novel said to be based on her own bitter experience of a loveless, arranged marriage; *The Door of the Courtyard* (1990); and *The Inheritance* (1997). Khalifa's works have been translated into Hebrew, Dutch, Russian, and Swedish, in addition to English. She has taught literature at the University of Iowa and Bir Zeit University, and founded the Women's Affairs Center in Nablus, an organization focusing on women's economic and political empowerment, which now has additional branches in Gaza City and Amman.

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Nazareth, Peter. "An Interview with Sahar Khalifeh." *Iowa Review* 11, no. 1 (1980): 67–86.

LAURIE KING-IRANI

KHALIL, SAMIHA SALAMA
[1923–1999]

Founder of the Palestinian charitable society Inʿash al-Usra (Rejuvenation of the Family).

Samiha Salama Khalil (Umm Khalil) was born in Anabta, near Tulkarm. A strong, resourceful, and proactive natural leader, she is best known as the founder of the Palestinian charitable society Inʿash al-Usra (Rejuvenation of the Family), as well as for her bold though unsuccessful attempt to stand for election for the presidency of Palestine, running against Yasir Arafat in 1996. Khalil mounted a presidential campaign centering on democratization, justice, and equality for all, and received nearly 10 percent of the vote. A firm believer in empowerment and self-sufficiency in the face of the adversities that history had visited upon Palestinians, Khalil inspired many others, primarily women, through her life of community and national service. In 1948 Khalil became a refugee, fleeing to the Gaza Strip, where she remained until sailing to Beirut in 1952. Soon thereafter, she returned to Palestine, this time to the West Bank, where, in 1965, she became president of the Women's Federation Society, al-Bira, as well as of the Union for Voluntary Women's Societies and the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW). That year she also founded,

with the help of many local women volunteers, the Inʿash al-Usra Society in a garage in Ramallah. The society's empowering message of self-sufficiency and communal dignity became indispensable as the Israeli occupation became increasingly oppressive in the 1970s and 1980s. At the time of Khalil's death, Inʿash al-Usra had a monthly operating budget of $500,000 and successfully administered vocational embroidery, nursing, and beauty programs, as well as offering nursery facilities and residential child care. Inʿash al-Usra was closed down several times by the Israeli military during the 1970s until the early 1990s, and Khalil was arrested on a number of occasions. She died on 26 February 1999 at the age of 76.

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Laurie King-Irani

KHALIS, MOHAMMAD UNIS

[1919–]

Afghan resistance leader.

The leader of one branch of the Hezb-e Islami party, Mohammad Unis Khalis was born in 1919 in Gandamak among the Khugiani Pushtun and studied Islamic law and theology. He fled Afghanistan in 1973 at the time of the coup led by Muhammad Daud. At first he joined the Hezb-e Islami party led by Golbuddin Hekmatyar, but he left to form his own party of the same name in 1978. During the war of resistance (1978–1992), his men fought in the Khugiani area, and Khalis, despite his advanced age, often accompanied them.

In 1992, he returned to Kabul with the other Islamic leaders to play a role in the attempt to form an Islamic government. He is strongly Muslim and anti-Western and opposes universal suffrage as well as the participation of the Shiʿa in Afghanistan politics.

See also Daud, Muhammad; Hekmatyar, Golbuddin; Hezb-e Islami.

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Grant Farr

KHAL, YUSUF AL-

[1917–1987]

Lebanese poet; founder of the poetry review Shiʿr.

A Protestant born in Tripoli, Lebanon, Yusuf al-Khal was educated in literature and philosophy at the American University at Beirut (AUB). After World War II, he spent several years in the United States, where he worked as publishing director at *al-Huda,* a New York–based magazine catering to Lebanese emigrants. The years spent at AUB and in the United States provided him with a great familiarity with Western (particularly Anglo-Saxon) literature, and he even edited an anthology of American poetry.

Back in Lebanon, he became a leading figure in an emerging group of young modernist Lebanese poets who were determined to break away from the traditional poetic forms that had prevailed in the Arab world since al-Nahda, the cultural awakening of the late nineteenth century. In January 1957, drawing on his experience as a journalist and publisher, he founded the poetry review *Shiʿr,* which remained a rallying point for avant-garde Arab poets—including Khalil Hawi, Adonis, and Badr Shakir al-Sayyab—until it ceased to exist in the early 1970s.

In *Shiʿr,* al-Khal pressed for the opening up of Arab poetry to the influence of the new poetic current emanating from the West. He advocated making colloquial Arabic the basis of literature as a way of reviving and widening the appeal of Arabic poetry, which, he thought, would otherwise be condemned to die out slowly. His own poetry was written in a language that approached that of everyday conversation. Its rhythm and skillful manipulation of images and sounds established him as the most prominent Lebanese member of the group of poets belonging to the free verse movement. Unlike many of his contemporaries, however, he always refrained from mixing poetry and politics; he even

condemned "engagement literature," which he saw as a source of cultural decay.

See also ADONIS; HAWI, KHALIL; NAHDA, AL-; SAYYAB, BADR SHAKIR AL-.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX

KHAMENEHI, ALI

[1939–]

Leader (rahbar) *of the Islamic Republic of Iran and successor to the constitutional functions of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.*

Ali Khamenehi was elected president of Iran for two successive terms, in 1981 and 1985. Following the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, an elected council of religious law experts chose Khamenehi to succeed Khomieni as Iran's chief faqih (religious jurist). © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Born in the northeastern Iranian city of Mashhad, Khamenehi began his advanced studies in Islam in 1958, with a year's attendance at courses on Islamic jurisprudence in al-Najaf, Iraq. He received most of his training in Qom, where he studied with ayatollahs Damad, Haeri, Tabatabai, and most importantly Khomeini.

During the uprising in Iran of June 1963, inspired by Khomeini, Khamenehi acted as liaison between Qom and his native city of Mashhad; he was jailed twice for this in 1964. Released in 1965, he resumed propagating the revolutionary vision of Khomeini in Mashhad while teaching the Qurʾan and Islamic law. These activities earned him further periods of imprisonment as well as banishment in 1968, 1971, 1972, 1975, and 1978. After the Iranian Revolution in February 1979, Khamenehi emerged as a key figure in the elite of clerical activists who founded the Islamic Republican Party and came to dominate the Iranian parliament during its first postrevolutionary term. In July 1979 he was appointed undersecretary for defense in the Mehdi Bazargan cabinet, becoming acting minister of defense after Bazargan's resignation.

Among the most determined opponents of Abolhasan Bani Sadr, the first president of the Islamic republic, Khamenehi played an important role in the events leading to his dismissal in June 1981. On 27 June, while delivering the Friday sermon at Tehran University, Khamenehi was injured in one of the numerous assassinations of leading government figures that followed the disgracing of Bani Sadr. When Mohammad Ali Rajai, the next president, was assassinated in August 1981, Khamenehi was appointed head of the Islamic Republican Party. On 2 October 1981, he was elected president of the Islamic Republic. He also served as deputy minister of defense and commander of the Revolutionary Guards. Khomeini appointed him in 1980 to be the leader of the Friday congregational prayers in Tehran. He was also elected as a deputy of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles) in the same year. He was elected for a second term as president, with an overwhelming majority, on 16 August 1985.

After the death of Khomeini on 4 June 1989, Khamenehi was swiftly chosen as his successor, despite his lack of seniority in the learned hierarchy of Iranian Shiʿism; this choice received popular ratification in August 1989, when the modifications to the constitution were approved. For example, because of Khamenehi's policies regarding the freedom of the press (he has approved the judiciary's shutdown of more than 100 reformist newspapers) he and the conservatives have come to be known as "hard-liners" in most Western political writings. Khamenehi continues to hold an important place in the leadership of the Islamic Republic and has followers outside Iran, as witnessed in the many Web sites dedicated to his teachings and speeches.

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HAMID ALGAR
UPDATED BY ROXANNE VARZI

KHAN

See GLOSSARY

KHANJAR

See GLOSSARY

KHANOUM

See GLOSSARY

KHARG ISLAND

Island off the coast of Iran in the Persian Gulf.

Kharg Island, located about 30 miles from the Iranian mainland, historically has been associated with Iran, although the British occupied it briefly in 1838. The discovery of an offshore oil field in the waters around Kharg in the early 1960s stimulated the development of the island as a site for major petroleum and petrochemical installations. Connection by pipelines to the underwater oil fields, as well to the oil fields in Khuzistan, transformed Kharg into Iran's largest oil-loading terminal by the early 1970s. During the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988), Kharg repeatedly was bombed, and its oil facilities suffered extensive damage, but they were reconstructed in the early 1990s.

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NEGUIN YAVARI
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

KHARRAZI, KAMAL

[1944–]

Iranian foreign minister.

Kamal Kharrazi was born into a clerical family in Tehran in 1944. He attended Alavi high school in Tehran, where he met many of his future political colleagues in the Islamic Republic. He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in Persian language and literature from Tehran University. He studied in the United States and received his Ph.D. in education from the University of Houston, where he joined the first generation of Iranian Moslems, such as Ibrahim Yazdi and Mostafa Chamran (1932–1981), who had established the Islamic Student Association in the United States. Kharrazi also maintained an active profile in the Muslim Students Association in Canada and the Islamic Research Institute in London.

Returning to Iran after the Iranian Revolution (1979), he was appointed by his Houston colleague and the then foreign minister, Ibrahim Yazdi, as deputy foreign minister for political affairs. Given his close association with clerics, he was assigned to several other positions: vice president for planning at the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (1979), director of the Islamic Republic News Agency (1980–1989), member of the Supreme Defense Council of Iran, head of the War Information Headquarters (1980–1988), and ambassador and permanent representative of the Islamic Republic at the United Nations (1989–1997). In 1997 President Mohammad Khatami appointed him minister of foreign affairs.

Kharrazi's tenure has been marked by Khatami's efforts to de-ideologize Iranian foreign policy, improve relationships with Iran's neighbors, and develop constructive relationships with Western countries. Despite conservative objections, he divorced his government from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's 1989 *fatua* condoning Salman Rushdie's death for writing *The Satanic Verses,* made an official visit to Iraq in 2000, and made many conciliatory gestures toward the United States. There have been a number of contacts between delegations from Iran and the United States since the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001.

In the absence of any real power associated with his position, Kharrazi has been a moderate pragmatist. He has tried to promote the interest of his country while minimizing the negative international reactions to policies of the Islamic Republic at home and abroad. His appointment as foreign minister was a compromise. Although he attracts criticisms

from both reformists and conservatives on issues dear to each camp, his pragmatic moderation has saved his long career in the foreign ministry. In 2003, shortly before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, he was summoned to a closed session of the parliament by reformist deputies and asked to explain his policies toward Iraq and his passive policy on the division of Caspian Sea resources among the five shoreline states. He was also criticized for his hiring practices in the ministry, especially the employment of several family members.

See also CHAMRAN, MOSTAFA; KHATAMI, MOHAMMAD; KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH; YAZDI, IBRAHIM.

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ALI AKBAR MAHDI

KHARTOUM

Capital of Sudan.

The Three Towns—Khartoum, Omdurman, and Khartoum North—together comprise the political, commercial, and administrative center for Sudan. Located where the Blue Nile and White Nile join to flow north toward Egypt, the capital city is the largest urban complex in the country. Its population of 850,000 in 1980 swelled to nearly 4 million by 2002, as the result of the influx of migrants from drought areas in the west and displaced persons from the war-torn south. Their immigration has transformed the character of the Three Towns from largely Arab, with Nubian enclaves, into a polyglot mix of peoples and cultures.

Khartoum, the political capital, means "elephant trunk" in Arabic. It was a small village called al-Jirayf, on the south shore of the Blue Nile, before the Turko-Egyptian conquest of 1821. The invading force established a small garrison near Mogren village, which became the government center in 1826. The government provided free building materials to encourage the residents to replace their straw huts with permanent brick houses; built a dockyard, military storehouse, barracks, and large mosque; and encouraged commerce by steamer on the Nile and overland to the west and east. A telegraph line linked Khartoum to Egypt by 1874 and, later, to the Red Sea coast and the west. The town remained relatively small, however, peaking at 30,000. The Mahdiyya forces captured Khartoum on 26 January 1885, which signaled the demise of Turko-Egyptian rule and was dramatized by the death of the British officer Charles Gordon on the steps of the Turkish governor-general's palace.

Khartoum was sacked by the Mahdists (1885–1898), but was restored as the capital after the British forces seized Omdurman and Khartoum on 1 September 1898. During the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1898–1956), the British rebuilt Khartoum and constructed a series of stone government buildings along the Nile waterfront, flanking the imposing governor-general's house. They planned the city streets to resemble Union Jacks, built distinct residential quarters for Europeans and Sudanese, opened Gordon Memorial College in 1903, and established an industrial zone. A railway bridge across the Blue Nile was opened in 1909. The population grew rapidly from 30,000 in 1930 to 96,000 at the time of independence.

Since independence the principal government offices, embassies, European-style hotels, airport, offices, shops, and villas have been located in Khartoum; so has the University of Khartoum (known until independence on 1 January 1956 as Gordon Memorial College). By 1973, a third of a million people lived in Khartoum; in 2003 the total exceeded two million. Wealthy merchants live in palatial houses in al-Riyadh district, just across the highway from impoverished slums and squatter housing.

Omdurman, located on the southern side of the junction of the White and Blue Niles, served as the capital of the Sudan during the Mahdist period. As many as a quarter million people lived there during the 1890s. As the place where the Mahdi died, it had a special sanctity. The British initially emptied the city, but it grew to a sprawling residential area with some one million inhabitants. It has traditional-style housing: The wealthier areas have stone and brick villas with courtyards and gardens hidden from the street by high walls, and the poorer

Sudan's capital city, Khartoum, was founded in 1821 as an Egyptian army camp and quickly grew to become a trade center and slave market. Today Khartoum is one of the country's largest cities and is Sudan's chief administrative and transportation center. © NEEMA FREDERIC/CORBIS SYGMA. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

areas consist of mud-brick huts in walled-off compounds along dirt roads. Different ethnic groups tend to live in distinct quarters, with a large public market serving the entire city. The government periodically razes districts filled with migrants from the west and internally displaced people from the south, in an attempt to force them out of the city. The parliament building, television and radio stations, and major academic institutions such as Omdurman Islamic University and al-Ahfad College for Women are located there. The headquarters of the leading political parties and religious movements, notably the Ansar and its Umma party and the Khatmiyya brotherhood and its Democratic Unionist party, are in Omdurman. The skyline is dominated by the silver-colored dome of the Mahdi's tomb and its adjacent great mosque, destroyed by British gunboats in 1898 but rebuilt in the 1940s.

Khartoum North (Halfaya, Khartoum Bahri), located on the north bank of the Blue Nile, was the site of two small villages before the Turko-Egyptian occupation. It contained the encampment of the Khatmiyya sufi order during that period. Destroyed by the Mahdists, it was completely rebuilt by the British and contained the terminus for the railway from Egypt, which reached the capital in 1899. Spurs to Port Sudan in the east and to Sennar, farther south, opened in 1909. The railway was extended west to al-Ubayd in 1911. Today, two bridges link Khartoum North to Khartoum and Omdurman. Khartoum North's location at the junction of those lines provided a base for the rapid growth of industry and residential areas. The main manufacturing industries are located there as well as extensive middle-class and squatter housing areas. By 2002, about a half million people lived in Khartoum North, as against 40,000 in 1956 and 151,000 in 1973.

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ANN M. LESCH

KHARTOUM ARAB SUMMIT

See ARAB LEAGUE SUMMITS

KHATAMI, MOHAMMAD

[1943–]

President of Iran, elected in 1997 and re-elected in 2001.

Mohammad Khatami was born in Ardakan, central Iran, in 1943. His father was a widely respected Shiʿite cleric and raised his children in a religious household. Khatami attended the University of Tehran and obtained a B.A. in philosophy before going to the seminary to study Shiʿite theology. In the late 1970s, he went to Hamburg as manager of the Islamic Center, which served the large number of Iranian students in West Germany. Following the Iranian Revolution, he was appointed supervisor of the newly nationalized Keyhan Publishing Company. In 1980, he was elected to the First Majles al-Shura (parliament) as a deputy from Ardakan. Khatami was associated with the progressive faction of clergy, which advocated a liberal interpretation of Islam and the implementation of economic and social polices that would promote the welfare of middle- and low-income groups. As minister of culture and Islamic guidance from 1989 to 1992, he angered conservatives by relaxing censorship on the press and cinema. After resigning under pressure, he became director of the National Library and participated in several academic seminars where he called for democratization of the political system.

Khatami entered the 1997 presidential election and won nearly 70 percent of the popular vote on the strength of his promises to initiate social reforms, create a civil society, and promote a dialogue of civilizations. His victory launched the reform movement, the most notable characteristic of which was the proliferation of newspapers that championed accountable government and launched investigations of political institutions and politicians suspected of abusing civil rights. The activities of the reformists prompted a backlash from conservatives, who felt threatened by the reforms. By 2000, the conservatives had proven adept at using the judicial system to stymie many reform policies and even to send some reform politicians to prison on charges of slander. Khatami, who disliked confrontations, publicly expressed frustration with his office's limited authority to counteract judicial decisions. Nevertheless, he agreed to run for a second term in 2001 and was reelected with 70 percent of the vote. During his second term, although Khatami remained the titular head of the reform movement, many reformist politicians openly criticized him for failing to actively support them and for effectively allowing the opponents of reform to gain the political initiative.

See also IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); MAJLES AL-SHURA.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

KHATIBI, ABDELKABIR

[1938–]

Moroccan sociologist, literary critic, and writer.

Abdelkabir Khatibi, born in al-Jadida, Morocco, received a doctorate in sociology from the Sorbonne in 1965. He is both a professor of sociology at Muhammad V University in Rabat and a researcher at the Centre de Recherche Scientifique de Rabat.

Khatibi writes in French. One of his early works is a play titled *La mort des artistes* (The death of the artists), which was staged in Paris in 1963. Khatibi's work is distinguished by a double identity that results from his double culture, which he perceives positively, as revealed in his book *Amour bilingue* (1983), translated by Richard Howard and published in the United States as *Love in Two Languages* (1990). The diversity of the Maghrib is studied and analyzed with lucidity and realism in *Maghreb pluriel* (1983; Plurality of the Maghrib). Khatibi's first

work of fiction was *La memoire tatotée* (1971; Tattooed memory), a highly autobiographical novel. Another of his novels, *Un été à Stockholm* (1990; A summer in Stockholm), explores human relations within the context of love. This theme is also the subject of a collection of poetry, *Dédicace à l'année qui vient* (1986; Dedication to the upcoming year).

Khatibi's well-known *La blessure du nom propre* (1974; The wound of the proper name) reveals his interest in the popular culture of Morocco. No matter how removed his philosophical thinking is from his culture, he almost unfailingly links it to his Arab Islamic roots and elevates it to a universal precept. This is obvious in *Le livre de sang* (1979; The book of blood) and *Ombres japonaises* (1988; Japanese shadows), where he studies the seductive power of the narrative based on the *Arabian Nights.* His study of the concept of the false prophet in his play *Le prophète voilé* (1979; The veiled prophet) uses examples from Arab Islamic history.

Some of Khatibi's writings reveal his interest in the political situation of the contemporary Arab world, particularly the Palestinian problem. Although he criticizes Zionism in *Vomito blanco* (1974; White vomit), his *Le même livre* (1985; The same book) stresses the similarities between Arabs and Jews in a correspondence with his Jewish friend Jacques Hassoun.

Khatibi's production is prolific as well as varied. His writings cover a wide range of topics, some purely literary, such as *Le roman maghrébin* (1958; The Maghribi novel), *Ecrivains Marocains, du protectorat à 1965. Anthologie* (1974; Moroccan writers, from the protectorate to 1965, an anthology), and *Figures de l'étranger* (1987; Faces of the foreigner). Khatibi is also interested in art and has written on calligraphy (with Mohammed Sijilmassi) in *L'art calligraphique arabe* (1976; Art of Arabic calligraphy) and painting (with M. el-Maleh Maraini) in *La peinture de Ahmed Cherkaoui* (1976; The painting of Ahmed Cherkaoui). His book *Le livre de l'aimance* (1995; The book of love) explores love and passion among women and men. Khatibi returns to his native Morocco in *Triptyque de Rabat* (1993; A Rabat triptych) after having expanded the limits of territoriality in *Un été à Stockholm* (A summer in Stockholm). He tackles political restrictions, women's emancipation, and a critical look at the self.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN.

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AIDA A. BAMIA

KHATTABI, MUHAMMAD IBN ABD AL-KARIM AL-

[c. 1880–1963]

Moroccan leader of resistance to Spanish and French colonial conquest.

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi was born in the Rif mountains, a Berber region of northern Morocco, sometime in the 1880s. His father was appointed *qadi* of the largest and most powerful tribe of the central Rif, the Banu Waryaghal (Aith Waryaghar in Berber) by sultans Hassan I and Mulay Abd al-Aziz, although neither had much influence over day-to-day affairs in the region. His father, like many other people in the area, also had an association with the Spanish military in the enclaves of Melilla and Alhucemas island, the latter immediately offshore from the village of Ajdir, where the Khattabi family lived. The Spanish authorities hoped to use their influence with him, and with other local notables, to ease their path in occupying the northern zone of Morocco.

Abd al-Karim's early life was a mixture of Moroccan and Spanish influences. He studied at the Qarawiyyin University in Fez, where he was influenced by teachers of the Salafiyya movement. In 1907 he went to Melilla where he became, in rapid succession, teacher, military interpreter, and *qadi,* and finally *qadi qudat* (chief judge) of the Moroccan community in the Spanish enclave. He also wrote and translated articles for *El Telegrama del Rif,* the local newspaper. In 1913, the year after the joint Franco–Spanish protectorate was declared over Morocco, he was decorated for his services to Spain.

During World War I, this relationship with the Spanish authorities broke down because of Abd al-Karim's impatience with Spanish cooperation with France and his corresponding sympathy for Germany, despite his desire to marry the benefits of European technical modernization with Islamic re-

form. In 1915 he was arrested and imprisoned in Melilla on suspicion that his German sympathies had taken the form of subversive activities. Although he was released quite quickly, the Spanish authorities never regained his trust or sympathy.

In 1919, as the Spanish army began a slow march westward from Melilla toward the central Rif, his father broke relations with the Spanish garrison in Alhucemas island and joined a slowly growing resistance movement centered in the Banu Waryaghal. At the same time, Abd al-Karim left Melilla and returned to Ajdir. This resistance movement was based upon an unstable unity between the various tribal subdivisions and depended on the continued functioning of customary legal and political systems. When his father died—or was murdered—in 1920, Abd al-Karim succeeded in taking the leadership of the resistance and secured a more stable unity by insisting on the imposition of the *shariʿa.* At the same time he trained a military nucleus using European methods and weapons.

This military nucleus enabled him to defeat the Spanish forces in the eastern part of the Spanish protectorate in July 1921. He went on to set up a government in the central Rif that united his two aims of modernization and Islamic reform. In February 1923 he received *bayʿas* (formal declarations of allegiance) from various central Rifi tribes that justified his leadership in terms of fulfilling requirements for the caliphate—justice, unity, order, and the preservation of *shariʿa*—and referred to him as imam. On other occasions he referred to himself as *amir al-muʾminin,* a title that, despite its caliphal connotations, reflected not so much a claim to universal leadership as a statement of the religious nature of his movement. The official title of the Rif state was al-Dawla al-Jumhuriyya al-Rifiyya (State of the Rifi Republic), although the Rifis themselves referred to it as *al-jabha al-rifiyya* (the Rifi front) reflecting its temporary nature. The confusion of titles reflected the fluidity of the political structures in the Rif. Nevertheless, they were strong enough for Rifi forces to again defeat the Spanish in northwestern Morocco in 1924 and the French in 1925, before the combined strength of the two European armies put an end to his state.

After his surrender in May 1926, Abd al-Karim was exiled on the French island of Réunion, where

Moroccan leader Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi (ca. 1880–1963) spent much of his life building resistance to French and Spanish colonialism in Morocco. He and his followers fought many successful battles until his forced surrender during Franco-Spanish retaliation in 1927. **© BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

he stayed until 1947. In that year he escaped from a ship taking him back to France while it was traveling through the Suez Canal. He spent the rest of his life in Egypt, where he became the titular leader of the North African Defense League, the umbrella organization for Maghribi nationalists. He refused to return to Morocco at independence in 1956 saying that, since there were still foreign (American) troops on Moroccan soil, the country was not truly independent. He died in Cairo in 1963.

Abd al-Karim has been described by both French colonialist and modern Moroccan nationalist writers as a typical example of Berber resistance to outside authority. But others have seen him as a great guerrilla leader, part of a tradition including China's Mao Tse-tung and North Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh. Abd al-Karim himself situated his ideological stance in religious and nationalist terms. Despite the clear religious feeling of his followers, he told Léon Gabrielli, a French intelligence officer, that he specifically rejected the label of a jihad, saying that such medieval concepts were not relevant to the modern world. In an interview in the Egyptian Islamic journal *al-Manar* after the war, however, he admitted that he had made use of religious sensibilities as a rallying cry, although he pre-

sented himself in the context of the Salafiyya movement and modern Moroccan and Arab nationalism, and blamed his defeat on the opposition of the *tariqas* (Sufi religious brotherhoods), particularly the Darqawiyya, which was one of the biggest in the Rif, and on the failure of many of his supporters to accept his long-term political objective of replacing tribal systems with central government control and the absolute rule of the *shariʿa*. It is true, however, that other *tariqas* did support him, and in fact, the Rif was too small and too poor to resist the combined force of two European armies.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn al-Hassan; Fez, Morocco; Hassan I; Jihad; Qadi; Rif; Salafiyya Movement; *Shariʿa*.

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C. R. Pennell

KHAWAJA

See Glossary

KHAWR

See Glossary

KHAYR AL-DIN

[c. 1822–1890]

Prime minister of Tunisia (1873–1877) and grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire (1878–1879).

Khayr al-Din, a Circassian from the Caucasus Mountains, was sold as a slave in Constantinople at a young age; he was then resold to an agent of the bey of Tunis. As a teenager he arrived as a Mamluk at the court of Ahmad Bey. After receiving an education at the military school established by Ahmad Bey, Khayr al-Din rose through the military ranks to cavalry commander *(fariq)*. He spent the years 1853–1857 in Paris arguing Tunisia's position against Mahmud ibn Ayad, who had defrauded the government of millions of dinars. Under Ahmad Bey's successor, Muhammad Bey, Khayr al-Din served as minister of marine *(wazir al-bahr)* from 1857 to 1859. He later presided over the Majlis al-Akbar (Great Council), a parliamentary body established in 1860.

In conflict with Prime Minister Mustafa Khaznader (his father-in-law), whose ruinous policy of incurring foreign loans was just beginning, Khayr al-Din resigned in 1862 and spent the next seven years in Europe. In response to his European experience, and in hopes of reforming the political system in Tunisia, he wrote *The Surest Path to Knowledge Concerning the Condition of Countries* (1868). In it he discussed the economic superiority of the West and offered a practical guide for improving the political system in Tunisia. He saw the *ulama* as the key guarantors of the political system who would ensure that the *shura* ideal of Islam would be upheld, and urged them to fulfill this role.

Khayr al-Din returned to Tunisia in 1869 in order to preside over the International Debt Commission. In his new political capacity, he conspired to discredit and replace Khaznader as prime minister. Faced with mounting pressures from foreign consuls and the disastrous state of Tunisia's finances, the bey retired Khaznader in 1873 and made Khayr al-Din prime minister. As prime minister, Khayr al-Din had to contend with the machinations of foreign consuls (particularly those of France, Britain, and Italy), the press campaign of his father-in-law to discredit him, his Mamluk rivals, and the economic downturn of the mid-1870s. Furthermore, he had lost faith in the pact of security of 1857 and the constitution of 1861. He realized that these liberal reforms were merely camouflage behind which Khaznader had been able to hide his ambition to become the wealthiest and most powerful member of the bey's government, and that they had been implemented to enhance foreign influence in Tunisia. Having witnessed firsthand Europe's aggressive intentions toward Africa, as well as the machinations of the foreign consuls in Tunis, Khayr al-Din had come to perceive that Europe was the paramount threat to Tunisia's existence and that the reincorporation of Tunisia into the Ottoman Empire was perhaps the country's one hope to avoid being occupied.

Khayr al-Din's disillusionment with constitutionalism led him to conclude that reforms should

be directed to a wise elite in cooperation with an enlightened *ulama.* These two groups could limit the arbitrariness of absolutist rule and implement principles of justice and freedom according to the *shariʿa* (Islamic religious law). He then advocated a selective incorporation of those elements of Western civilization compatible with Islam. His final goal was the implementation of the Islamic concept of *maslaha* (the public good).

To help him introduce his reforms, Khayr al-Din appointed his Circassian and military school colleagues to positions of authority. He was also supported by Muhammad Bayram V, whom he appointed to direct the Hubus Administration, the government press, and *al-Raʾid al-Tunisi,* the official gazette of the government.

Khayr al-Din tackled administrative, financial, and tax reform, and ended the expensive *mahalla* military taxation expeditions against the tribes. To improve the country's economy, he expanded land under cultivation from 60,000 to 1 million hectares (132,000–2.2 million acres), reformed the customs system to protect Tunisia's handicraft and other industries, and launched public works projects such as paving the streets of Tunis. He founded Sadiqi College in 1875, and established a public library (al-Abdaliya). He briefly instituted a complaint box for citizens and sought to introduce a mixed judicial system to prevent foreign efforts to protect minorities in Tunisian courts. In his attempts to limit tyranny, he tried to persuade the bey to acquiesce to Ottoman claims of sovereignty and to restrictions on his arbitrary rule.

Khayr al-Din's efforts turned Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey against his reformist minister. Khayr al-Din's support of the Ottomans in the Russian–Turkish War of 1877 provided the bey with an excuse to dismiss him. Complicating his pro-Ottoman stance and loss of the bey's confidence were economic and financial difficulties, intrigues of foreign consuls and of the bey's favorite, Mustafa ibn Ismaʿil, and Khaznader's vilification campaign. All of these factors finally forced Khayr al-Din to resign on 2 July 1877. He went into self-imposed exile in Constantinople, where, because of his pro-Ottoman viewpoint, he was rewarded with a brief appointment as Ottoman grand vizier in 1878 and 1879. After his removal as grand vizier, Khayr al-Din retired to private life and spent his final years in Constantinople, where he died.

Khayr al-Din's legacy in Tunisia proved an inspiration for later reformers such as the Young Tunisians. Sadiqi College was the most enduring of his accomplishments. Young Tunisians and later Tunisian nationalists, including Habib Bourguiba, were educated there.

See also Ahmad Bey Husayn; Bayram V, Muhammad; Bourguiba, Habib; Khaznader, Mustafa; Muhammad al-Sadiq; Sadiqi College; *Shura; Ulama;* Young Tunisians.

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Larry A. Barrie

KHAZʿAL KHAN

[c. 1880–1936]

Shaykh of Muhammara, independent tribal chieftain in Iran.

In 1897, Khazʿal became chief to the Muhaysin, a powerful Arab tribe whose territory, mostly in Persia (now Iran), extended into Iraq. Confirmed as march-warden by the weak Qajar shah, he expanded his sway over the Kaʿb and other local tribes. As de facto ruler of Khuzistan, with a potential army of 20,000 tribesmen, he was courted as a strategic ally by the British; when oil was discovered at Masjed Soleyman in 1908, Khazʿal granted them the necessary rights of way for a pipeline to the Persian/Arabian Gulf and port facilities at Abadan. In the 1920s, however, after Reza Shah Pahlavi came to the throne and began centralization—which was also seen to be in Britain's interest—Khazʿal's British patrons were unwilling to support him and defy the shah. The Iranian army, having subjugated neighboring Luristan, advanced on Khuzistan; in 1925, Khazʿal was arrested at Muhammara (now Khor-

ramshahr) and kept in Iran's capital, Tehran, until his death.

See also PAHLAVI, REZA.

JOHN R. PERRY

KHAZNADER, MUSTAFA

[1817–1878]

State treasurer (1837–1861) and prime minister (1861–1873) of Tunisia.

Mustafa Khaznader was born Georges Kalkias Stravelakis, on the island of Chios. In 1821, during the Greek rebellion against the Turks, he was seized, taken to Constantinople, and sold into slavery. In 1827 he was sent to Tunis, where he was sold again. He converted to Islam and took the name Mustafa.

Mustafa became a close friend of Ahmad ibn Mustafa, future bey of Tunis. When Ahmad became bey in 1837, he named Mustafa *khaznader* (state treasurer). (His long tenure in this office led to the use of Khaznader as his surname.) The centralization of governmental authority under Ahmad Bey and the combination of an increasingly complex tax structure and a rudimentary tax collection apparatus obliged the government to farm out the various taxes in *iltizam.*

Mahmud ibn Ayad, the top tax farmer, conspired with Khaznader to fleece the government of millions of dinars by transferring funds to France and acquiring French citizenship. In 1852, having transferred the equivalent of 50 million francs, he fled to France and acquired French citizenship; he was unable to secure citizenship for Khaznader. The latter's involvement in the affair apparently did not lessen the bey's ultimate faith in his finance minister.

Khaznader built up a powerful patronage network through his own marriage into the bey's family and marriage of his children into prominent political and business families. He encouraged Ahmad Bey in his reforms because these enabled him to profit from new tax farms and other financial ventures. Under Muhammad Bey (1855–1859) and Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey (1859–1882), Khaznader supported the reforms of the Fundamental Pact (1857) and the constitution of 1861 because these sought to restrict the power of the bey and increase the power of his ministers.

Between 1859 and 1869, Khaznader and his associates virtually ran and ruined the Tunisian state. The Grand Council, established as a kind of Parliament to implement the 1861 Constitution, was staffed with his cronies. Beginning in 1863, Khaznader floated a series of foreign loans that bankrupted the government by 1868. To pay for these loans, he authorized the doubling of the personal income tax, the *majba.* When this went into effect in 1864, there arose a widespread tribal revolt. It was severely repressed, the constitution was suspended, and Khaznader ran the state even more firmly. But in the long term, his financial policies destroyed the state's financial viability. Bad harvests, famines, and epidemics compounded Tunisia's financial plight and led to the International Finance Commission of 1869, set up by foreign creditors to ensure that Tunisia paid its debts.

Khaznader's son-in-law Khayr al-Din used his position on this commission to discredit Khaznader and to force the bey to dismiss him. In 1873, Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey reluctantly agreed to retire Khaznader and confiscate some of his wealth. In his place, the bey appointed Khayr al-Din prime minister. During the latter's tenure of office (1873–1877) Khaznader continually attacked him and sought his removal. Finally, in 1877, the bey discharged him. Khaznader's triumph was short-lived, however; he died the following year.

See also AHMAD BEY HUSAYN; FUNDAMENTAL PACT; KHAYR AL-DIN; MUHAMMAD AL-SADIQ.

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LARRY A. BARRIE

KHEMIR, SABIHA

[1959–]

Tunisian painter, illustrator, and writer.

Sabiha Khemir was born in Tunisia. She is a painter, illustrator, writer, and historian of Islamic art, based in London. She studied at the University of Tunis and received a Ph.D. from the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. Most of her works are highly detailed pieces, exe-

cuted in pen and ink, and often explore legendary figures and events from Islamic history. They appear on the covers of some important translations of Arabic novels, especially by Naguib Mahfouz and Alifa Rifaat. Khemir has described her illustrations as rooted in the history of Islamic book illustration, especially miniatures. She sees the simplicity, purity, and precision of black-and-white pointillism as reflecting the ethos of Islamic art. Like many Arab artists of her generation, Khemir recreates the past treasures of art from her part of the world as a way to transform the present. In her essay "Mobile Identity and the Focal Distance of Memory," she described this practice as an attempt to "animate our present reality with the timeless values of our civilisation" (p. 46). In this essay and others, Khemir writes about issues of identity, history, and memory in the Arab world and the Arab diaspora, drawing on her personal experience. She has also written and presented two documentaries on Islamic art for British television. She published her first novel, *Waiting in the Future for the Past to Come,* in 1993.

See also ART; TUNISIA.

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JESSICA WINEGAR

KHIDER, MOHAMED

[1912–1967]

Algerian revolutionary.

The son of a poor family from Biskra, Mohamed Khider was born in Algiers, the capital of Algeria, and became a bus driver/fare collector. He joined the Etoile Nord Africaine (ENA; Star of North Africa) of Messali al-Hadj and the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA; Algerian People's Party). He favored armed rebellion against the French, although he tried to reconcile Messalists and centralists of the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD; Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties). As a cofounder, Khider was known as an historic chief of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front). During the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), he served with the "external" FLN and in 1956 was involved with initial French government contacts. He was seized along with other historic chiefs (Ahmed Ben Bella, Hocine ait Ahmed, Mohamed Boudiaf, and Rabah Bitat) in the infamous skyjacking of an Air Maroc airplane in October 1956.

After the war, he became secretary-general of the FLN but later disagreed with Ben Bella concerning the relationship between the party and the army in independent Algeria. Thereupon, he resigned and went into exile but kept a substantial sum of the party funds (to be used by the Algerian opposition), which was invested in a Swiss account. Khider was assassinated in Madrid in 1967, but the Algerian government failed to recover the funds. Khider's reputation was later officially rehabilitated in 1984.

See also AIT AHMED, HOCINE; ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; BEN BELLA, AHMED; BITAT, RABAH; BOUDIAF, MOHAMED; FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE; HADJ, MESSALI AL-; MOUVEMENT POUR LE TRIOMPHE DES LIBERTÉS DÉMOCRATIQUES; PARTI DU PEUPLE ALGÉRIEN (PPA).

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

KHIDHIR, ZAHRA

[1895–1955]

Pioneer of women's rights and education in Iraq.

Zahra Khidhir was born in Baghdad to a prominent scholarly and religious family, and was the eldest daughter. Her father, Mullah Khidhir al-Kutubchi, was a scholar at one of the most prestigious Sunni educational centers in Baghdad, Abu Hanifa's Mosque. After his retirement in 1870, he established the first bookshop in Baghdad, al-Zawra, which pioneered the publication of Iraqi literary and political works and the distribution of Arab literary and political journals. The bookshop became a hub of Iraqi intellectual and nationalist discourse in the early twen-

tieth century. The tradition was carried on by his youngest son, Abd al-Karim, who took over the bookshop in 1920 and changed its name to Maktabat al-Sharq. Abd al-Karim was assassinated in the nationalist uprising of 1941. All of Mullah Khidhir's five children played important roles in Iraq's emergence as a modern nation state.

In 1918, Zahra opened a private school for girls in Iraq and enrolled forty students in three classes—Qurʾanic studies, mathematics, and home economics. As the first school for girls in Iraq, it was applauded by progressives and opposed by conservatives who sought to forestall change. After the First World War, she took an active part in Iraqi resistance to British occupation, and following Iraq's independence in 1921 was one of the first women appointed to head a public school for girls. She continued her struggle for women's rights and was one of the founders of the Young Women's Muslim Association (YWMA) of Iraq in the early 1950s. She remained active for the rest of her life.

See also Colonialism in the Middle East; Gender: Gender and Education; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Iraq.

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Interview by author with a relative of Zahra Khifhir, Dr. Ghazi A. Karim. 27 October 2002.

Jacqueline Ismael

KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH

[1902–1989]

Leader of the Iranian revolution of 1979.

Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini was born in Khomein, central Iran, in 1902. His early religious education was in Khomein as a student of Akhund Molla Abolqasem, Aqa Shaykh Jaʿfar, Mirza Mahmud Eftekhar al-Olama, Mirza Mehdi Daʿi, Aqa Najafi, his brother-in-law, and Ayatollah Morteza Pasandideh, his older brother. Khomeini left for Arak, a religious center in central Iran, in 1920. In 1922, when Ayatollah Abd al-Karim Haʿeri left Arak for Qom and founded the Feyziyeh religious seminary, Khomeini accompanied him to study there. In 1929, Khomeini went to Tehran to marry Khadijeh Saqafi, the daughter of a prominent ayatollah. Their first son, Mostafa, was born in 1930 and died under mysterious circumstances in 1977 in Iraq; three daughters, Sediqeh, Farideh, and Fahimeh, and another son, Ahmad, who died in 1995, followed.

Ayatollah Haʿeri died in 1937, and by that time Khomeini, who had completed his formal education in 1928, had established himself as one of the more active and prominent religious scholars of Qom. Haʿeri was succeeded by Ayatollah Hosayn Borujerdi. Khomeini also studied with Borujerdi, serving as his special assistant. Borujerdi's primary preoccupation, however, was the expansion and strengthening of the Feyziyeh and preserving its autonomy from governmental supervision. To do so, Borujerdi generally assumed an apolitical and quietist stance throughout his tenure as director. In deference to his mentor, Khomeini did not openly participate in the political movement over oil nationalization in the early 1950s. Following the death of Borujerdi in 1962, however, activist *ulama* at the Feyziyeh openly pursued an oppositional stance regarding Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's policy of alliance with Western countries, secularization, and centralization of the state.

Khomeini's first direct involvement with the country's political affairs took place in October 1962, when the government drafted a law that would grant diplomatic immunity to U.S. military personnel stationed in Iran. Khomeini expressed his opposition in sermons that became increasing strident in their criticism of the shah's foreign policies, including his tacit support of Israel, which pious Muslims opposed because of the way it had been created out of Palestine. Khomeini's criticisms increased after the shah launched the White Revolution in January 1963. Khomeini was arrested, along with several other prominent clergymen, on 5 June 1963 after delivering a fiery sermon denouncing the shah for taking a pro-Zionist, pro-U.S., and anti-Islamic stance. His arrest sparked several days of demonstrations in Qom and several other cities, which were suppressed forcibly and with scores of deaths. Khomeini was incarcerated in Tehran and released under pressure from other prominent clerics in early 1964. That July, he again was in the vanguard of the religious opposition decrying final passage of

the bill granting diplomatic immunity to all U.S. military representatives and their families. Khomeini was imprisoned and subsequently exiled to Turkey. In 1965, he was allowed to take up residence in al-Najaf, Iraq, a Shiʿite shrine city with Shiʿite Islam's most important religious seminary. In exile, Khomeini continued to draw supporters from among Iranian clerics and the bazaar middle class, and he continued to criticize the shah's policies, notably in 1971 when the shah lavishly celebrated the 2,500th anniversary of monarchy and in 1975 when the shah inaugurated Iran's single party, the Rastakhiz.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, while in al-Najaf, Khomeini formulated his concept of *velayat-e faqih,* or the governance of the religious jurist. Essentially, the doctrine called for an Islamic government supervised by the clergy to ensure that it did not violate Islamic principles. Khomeini already had a network of supporters inside Iran, including Mehdi Bazargan, Mortaza Motahhari, and Mahmud Taleqani, and he spent these years fostering his ties with Iranian oppositional groups abroad, including the Islamic student associations. Leaders of the latter included Ibrahim Yazdi, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, Abolhasan Bani Sadr, and Mostafa Chamran, all of whom rose to prominence after the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

In January 1978, when the first antigovernment protests occurred in Iran as a direct response to official media efforts to slander Khomeini, the ayatollah had access to a well-established and influential infrastructure inside the country. As the demonstrations intensified during the spring and summer, Khomeini rejected all pleas for compromise and instead heightened his anti-shah declarations. In October 1978, under pressure from the Iranian government, the then vice president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, expelled Khomeini. The ayatollah obtained political asylum in Paris, where he not only enjoyed attention from the Western media but also gained access to wider communication with Iran. In January 1979, the shah, failing to quell the strikes and demonstrations, left Iran after having installed National Front leader Shapur Bakhtiar as prime minister. Khomeini returned to Iran amid widespread celebrations on 1 February 1979 but refused to acknowledge legitimacy of Bakhtiar's government. On 11 February 1979, Bakhtiar's government,



Khomeini was expelled from Iran in 1964 and and given refuge first in Turkey and then in al-Najaf, Iraq, where he continued to criticize the shah and spread his political ideas through a network of students. Due to pressure from the Iranian government, Saddam Hussein, then the vice president of Iraq, expelled Khomeini from the country in October 1978.
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the last royalist cabinet in Iran, fell, marking the success of the Iranian Revolution. Bazargan, appointed by Khomeini, assumed office as leader of the provisional government.

After the revolution, the new constitution incorporated the concept of *velayat-e faqih* and named Khomeini as the first *faqih* and leader of the revolution *(rahbar-e enqelab).* But Khomeini did not exercise a direct role in the operation of the government. Rather, his domestic policies in the initial postrevolutionary period were marked by subtle compromises undertaken to consolidate the revolution. Political opposition was tolerated, and a noncleric, Abolhasan Bani Sadr, emerged as his choice for Iran's first president. However, his break with Bani Sadr, the eight-year war with Iraq (1980–1988), the severing of diplomatic ties with the United States, international isolation, the armed uprising by the internal opposition (1981–1982), and factional strife within Islamic circles combined to radicalize his political views.

An Iranian student gives a speech during the occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, backed by posters of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini criticized the West's political influence on his country and staunchly opposed Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's alliance with the United States. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED WITH PERMISSION.

Khomeini died on 5 June 1989. Although his former student and revolutionary ally Ayatollah Hosayn Ali Montazeri had been designated as his successor in 1983, the two men increasingly differed over policies after 1985. Montazeri's open criticisms in 1988 about the lack of human rights protections for opponents of the regime led Khomeini to demand his resignation in early 1989. Thus when Khomeini died several weeks later there was no designated successor. However, before his death, he had authorized the formation of a committee to revise the constitution, especially the articles pertaining to *velayat-e faqih.* The amendments made it possible to consider for the position of paramount *faqih* a person with appropriate political qualifications even if he lacked superior religious credentials. It seems that Khomeini had concluded near the end of his life that a proper political perspective was more critical for ensuring the long-term viability of the Islamic state than expertise in the nuances of Islamic law.

See also BAKHTIAR, SHAPUR; BANI SADR, ABOLHASAN; BAZARGAN, MEHDI; BORUJERDI, HOSAYN; CHAMRAN, MOSTAFA; IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); MONTAZERI, HOSAYN ALI; MOTAHHARI, MORTAZA; NAJAF, AL-; PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA; QOM; QOTBZADEH, SADEQ; SHIʿISM; VELAYAT-E FAQIH; WHITE REVOLUTION (1961–1963); YAZDI, IBRAHIM.

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NEGUIN YAVARI
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

KHORASAN

Province in northeastern Iran.

The northeasternmost province *(ostan)* of Iran, with its capital at Mashhad, Khorasan is dominated by a zone of mountain ranges, a continuation of the Alborz Mountains in northern Iran, running roughly northwest to southeast. It is the longest province in the country, covering 194,700 square miles. Khorasan is bounded on the north by the steppes and deserts of Turkmenistan and on the east by Afghanistan; to the west and south lie extensive landlocked deserts such as the Dasht-e Kavir and Dasht-e Lut. Khorasan receives adequate rainfall only in the more northerly mountain zone, where there is a relatively flourishing agricultural and pastoral economy and the population is quite dense. The southern region typically has an oasis pattern of life sustained by wells and irrigation systems called *qanats* (underground canals).

Khorasan's strategic position as a corridor between the steppe and the settled parts of the Middle East endowed it with a rich cultural and political history up until the modern period. Through Khorasan, armies of Alexander the Great of Macedonia (356–323 B.C.E.) passed to Central Asia and India, and Turkish people moved into the Middle East. In

Built in 1418, the Shrine of Imam Reza stands in Mashhad, the capital city of the Khorasan province. Reza was an early ninth century Shiʿite religious leader, and his shrine is considered by Shiʿa as the holiest one in Iran. © CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

the pre-Islamic times Khorasan was one of the four great provinces of Iran. In the early Islamic period Tus was one of the great cities of Central Asia. The seventh Shiʿa Imam, Reza, came to Tus in the early ninth century. He died in a nearby village, and his tomb then developed into a pilgrimage site. The village eventually developed into the city of Mashhad.

During the second half of the eighteenth century, parts of Khorasan passed into the hands of the Durrani Afghan chief Ahmad Shah for a short period of time. But in the late eighteenth century, Khorasan was fully restored to the newly established Qajar dynasty. As a result of continuous wars with the Uzbeks (Ozbegs) and Turkmens, however, life in the northern regions of Khorasan continued to be precarious. Commerce and agriculture declined, and many Iranians were captured as slaves by the central Asian emirates. Only Russian intervention and annexation of Khiva in 1873 and the crushing of the Turkmens in 1881, actions motivated by Russian political ambitions, finally ended the insecurity.

Meanwhile, relations with the amirs of Afghanistan continued to deteriorate. Yet another superpower intervention, this time British, put a halt to this hostility. Herat, also a part of Khorasan, was ceded to Afghanistan after a brief war between the Qajar ruler Naser al-Din Shah and the British in 1856 and 1857. The boundary dispute between Iran and Afghanistan was not settled until 1934 to 1935.

Variegated political and cultural influences on Khorasan have created a heterogeneous population in the region, including tribes such as Turkmens, Kurds, Baluchi, Arabs, and others. The population of Khorasan in 2002 was over 6 million, with over 1.8 million people living in Mashhad.

See also MASHHAD.

PARVANEH POURSHARIATI

KHRAIEF, BECHIR

[1917–1983]

Tunisian novelist and short story writer.

Bechir Khraief, born in Nefta, is considered the father of fiction writing in Tunisia. He first worked in trade, selling fabrics during the day while attending night school. His occupation gave him an excellent insight into the life of the Tunisian people and enhanced the realism of his writings. When Khraief went into teaching, he looked back on those years as the best of his life. His writings reveal his strong attachment to his Tunisian roots. Like other writers of his generation, Khraief published his writings first in the journal *Al-Fikr* (founded in 1955).

Khraief, noted for his realistic approach, simple style, and use of dialect in dialogue, gives a truthful and interesting depiction of Tunisian life while shying away from philosophical themes. His efforts to endow his short story "Al-murawwid wa al-thawr" (The trainer and the bull), in his collection *Mashmum al-full* (Smelling the Arabian jasmine [Tunis, 1971]), with a specific theme failed. Another story in the same collection, "Khalifa al-aqraʾ" (Khalifa the bald), reveals his skill as a fiction writer.

Khraief's writings provided a panorama of Tunisian life in its different settings. His novel *Al-dajla fi arajiniha* (Dates on the branch [Tunis, 1969]) reveals various aspects of desert life, although he often uses too many details, a weakness that characterizes some of his other works. *Iflas aw hubbak darbani* (Being penniless or your love hit me [Tunis, 1959]),

on the other hand, paints a picture of the Zaytuna University circles as well as of the middle class when Tunisia was undergoing the social transition from a traditional to a modern society.

Motivated by the same nationalist feeling that influenced his fiction, Khraief wrote two historical novels, *Barq al-layl* (Night's lightning [Tunis, 1961]) and *Ballara* (Tunis, 1992), which was published posthumously.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN; ZAYTUNA UNIVERSITY.

AIDA A. BAMIA

KHRIMIAN, MKRTICH

[1820–1907]

Patriarch of Constantinople, 1869–1873; catholicos of all Armenians, 1892–1907.

Born in the city of Van, Mkrtich Khrimian joined the church in 1845, after the death of his wife and child. He was ordained a *vardapet* (celibate priest) in 1854. He began publishing the periodical *Ardsvi Vaspurakan* (The eagle of Vaspurakan) in 1855 and a year later returned to Van as the prior of the monastery of Varak. In 1858 he resumed publication of *Ardsvi Vaspurakan.* In 1862 he became prelate of Daron and prior of the monastery of Surp Karapet.

Khrimian was ordained a bishop in 1868 and elected Armenian patriarch of Istanbul in 1869. Because of his efforts to document the exploitation of the Armenian populace and to register official complaints with the Sublime Porte, he was forced to resign in 1873. Five years later, he led an Armenian delegation that hoped to appeal to the conferring powers at the Congress of Berlin. Unsuccessful, Khrimian returned to Istanbul and delivered the homily for which he is most remembered, the "Sermon of the Iron Ladle," in which he stated that each power at Berlin took a share of the contents of a great soup bowl with an iron ladle, whereas he had only a paper petition and thus could bring nothing back to the Armenian people. It marked a turning point in Armenian political consciousness.

In 1879 Khrimian was elected prelate of the Armenians in Van. Suspected of associating with Armenian resistance groups, he was recalled to Istanbul and in 1890 was exiled to Jerusalem. In 1892 he was elected catholicos (supreme patriarch) of all Armenians at Echmiadzin. Khrimian's refusal to obey the Russian imperial edict of 1903, which authorized seizing the properties of the Armenian church, galvanized the Armenian communities of Russia to protest the decision, resulting in the eventual rescinding of the edict in an effort to reduce the turmoil in the Transcaucasus.

See also SUBLIME PORTE.

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ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA S.

[1894–1971]

Soviet politician; premier of the USSR, 1958–1964.

Before the Communist revolution, Nikita S. Khrushchev, son of a Russian villager, worked in the Ukrainian coal region of Donbas. He joined the Communist Party (CPSU) in 1918 and rose rapidly through its ranks. After Josef Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev became first secretary of the CPSU, retaining this position until 1964, when he was ousted by opponents led by Leonid Brezhnev.

In contrast to Stalin, Khrushchev adopted the policy of peaceful coexistence with the West. In the Middle East, however, he engaged in political competition with the United States. Arguing the advantages of "scientific socialism" and offering military and economic assistance, Khrushchev hoped to persuade the neutralist leaders of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria to join the USSR in an anti-Western "zone of peace," as he called it. While several accepted Soviet assistance, no Arab leader took seriously Khrushchev's ideological arguments. Consequently, Moscow established relatively close relations with several Arab states and supported them in the 1956 war with Israel but was not able to sway them from their independent course.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1956).

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OLES M. SMOLANSKY

KHUBAR, AL-

Port of Saudi Arabia.

Located in the Eastern Province, on the Persian Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia, al-Khubar (also al-Khobar) was founded in 1923 as a fishing and pearling village by members of the Dawasir tribe fleeing from Bahrain. It thrived as a terminal for the first crude oil that was shipped from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain for refining, until a deep-water port was constructed at nearby al-Dammam. A causeway and four-lane highway link Bahrain and Saudi Arabia at al-Khubar. In June 1996 an explosive device attached to a vehicle was detonated outside an al-Khubar apartment complex in which U.S military personnel lived; nineteen U.S. servicemen were killed and 400 persons (including 109 Americans and 147 Saudis) were injured. No group or person claimed responsibility for the attack, but by 1998 it was widely assumed to be the work of operatives affiliated with Osama bin Ladin's al-Qaʿida group.

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LES ORDEMAN
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

KHURI, BISHARA AL-

[1890–1964]

Prime minister of Lebanon under the French mandate; first president of independent Lebanon (1943–1952).

Bishara al-Khuri (also Khoury, Khouri) was born into a Maronite family and studied law in Paris. After spending World War I in Egypt, he returned to Lebanon and in 1922 was appointed secretary of Mount Lebanon. He served as prime minister in 1927–1928 and 1929. During the 1930s, his rivalry with Emile Eddé dominated Maronite politics. Al-Khuri strove to develop good relations with moderate Sunni circles, gambling that since they had opposed the establishment of Greater Lebanon, they would abandon their demand for unity with Syria if the Christians asserted their independence from France. He created the Constitutional Bloc Party in 1934 and cooperated closely with a group of Sunni politicians, led by Riyad al-Sulh.

After being elected president of the republic in 1943, al-Khuri chose Sulh as prime minister, and they concluded the oral agreement known as the National Pact. It defined the terms of the Maronite–Sunni partnership that provided the framework of Lebanon's politics until the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975. In 1947, al-Khuri rigged the parliamentary elections in an effort to obtain passage of a constitutional amendment that would allow him to run for reelection in 1949. After 1949, he faced a powerful coalition including the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt and the Maronite politicians Pierre Jumayyil, Camille Chamoun, and Raymond Eddé. In September 1952 a general strike compelled al-Khuri to step down.

See also CHAMOUN, CAMILLE; CONSTITUTIONAL BLOC; EDDÉ, EMILE; EDDÉ, RAYMOND; JUMAYYIL, PIERRE; JUMBLATT, KAMAL; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); NATIONAL PACT (LEBANON); SULH, RIYAD AL-; SUNNI ISLAM.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX

KHUTBA

Sermon delivered from an elevated pulpit (minbar) *by a* khatib, *or Muslim preacher, at Friday prayers and at special celebrations.*

The Friday *khutba* precedes the noon prayers that bring local Muslim communities together at the mosque. The *khatib* usually follows a formula in which he admonishes those present to be pious, conducts a prayer on behalf of the faithful, and recites part of the Qurʾan.

The *khutba* has also traditionally included an expression of loyalty to the sovereign. This practice has at times carried political significance, as in 1953, when the French deposed the Moroccan sultan Muhammad V. Many *khatibs* refused to invoke the name of his French-appointed replacement and even suspended prayers, a protest that ultimately led to his return and the independence of Morocco in 1956.

Khatibs also address public issues, and many governments today circulate suggested themes on public health, political issues, and other topics for the weekly *khutba.* In recent years, the *khutbas* of famous religious leaders have been distributed directly to the faithful on cassette tape, thereby reaching a wide audience, often across national boundaries.

See also MOROCCO; MUHAMMAD V.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

KHUZISTAN

A province in southwestern Iran with its capital at Ahvaz.

The Iranian province of Khuzistan is in a fertile southwestern region of alluvial plains made by two rivers, the Karkheh and Karun. It is situated between the Zagros Mountains and the sea. On the north Khuzistan borders Lorestan (Luristan) province; on the south, the Persian Gulf. The Iran-Iraq border forms the western part of its boundaries, and on the east lies the Hindiya or Hindijan River.



Completed in 1962, the Diz River Dam has provided water for both irrigation and electricity in this southwestern Iranian province for more than 40 years. © ROGER WOOD/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Khuzistan's climate is hot and very humid in the summer due to a lack of altitude—averaging only 10 meters (33 feet) and in the south and 100 meters (328 feet) in the central parts of the region; the southerly inclination of the land (which makes it susceptible to maximum effects of the sun); the hot winds from the Syrian Desert and Saudi Arabia; and the lack of snow-covered mountains, forests, or open water to ease the effect of these winds. In spite of its heat and humidity, Khuzistan has always been amply provided with water by the Karkheh, Diz, and Karun rivers, and noted from earliest times for its prosperity. Thriving agriculture produces plentiful grain, rice, sugarcane, citrus fruits, melons, and dates, as well as cotton. The Persian Gulf provides abundant seafood.

Arabs form a substantial portion of the Khuzistani population. The local Arab Shiʿite dynasty of the Mushaʿsha (who established their rule in the region for a short period in the fifteenth century and acted as powerful governors of the region until the nineteenth century), and other Arab tribes such as the Banu Kaʿb and Banu Lam (who immigrated from Arabia and the lower course of the Tigris in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), generally referred to the region as Arabistan, especially the western parts of the province. In 1925, under Reza Shah Pahlavi, the ancient name of the region, Khuzistan, was established as the official, legal name.

The prosperity of Khuzistan declined after the eighteenth century primarily beause of Iranian–Arab hostility, damage to agriculture by migrations and nomadism, raiding of trade caravans (especially by the Banu Lam), and lack of central authority. Prosperity returned to Khuzistan in the twentieth century because of various factors: the discovery of oil at Masjed Soleyman in 1908; the construction and growth of the Abadan oil refinery by the 1950s; the construction of the Trans-Iranian railway in 1938; the 1962 construction of the Muhammad Reza Pahlavi Dam on the Diz River (which provided the

MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

region not only with hydroelectricity but also with water for market gardening and other agricultural projects on a large scale); the development of the natural-gas industry (which exported 28 billion cubic feet of natural gas to the U.S.S.R. in 1973); and the development of Khorramshahr as one of the major ports of entry on the Persian Gulf. The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) was largely fought in Khuzistan, causing extensive damage. According to the 1996 census, the population of the province was 3,746,772.

PARVANEH POURSHARIATI

KHYBER, MIR AKBAR

[1925–1978]

Afghan Marxist leader.

Mir Akbar Khyber was an Afghan poet and a cofounder of the Marxist movement in Afghanistan. He was born in Logar Province in 1925 and graduated from military high school in 1947. He was imprisoned for his political activities in 1950 and spent the next five years in jail, where he met other leftist inmates including Babrak Karmal, later president of Afghanistan. Although he became a career police officer, he also was a leading member of the Parcham faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the editor of its newspaper, *Parcham.*

By the late 1970s he found himself at odds with other Marxist leaders, in part because he believed that the Marxist movement could not rule Afghanistan even if it took power. In addition, he had strong nationalist beliefs that were unpopular with his Marxist comrades. Khyber was killed by an unknown assassin who shot from a passing Jeep on 17 April 1978. Ironically, it was his assassination that sparked a major demonstration that led to the Saur Revolution and the Marxist takeover of Afghanistan.

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GRANT FARR

KHYBER PASS

Pakistani pass into Afghanistan.

The Khyber Pass begins about 10 miles outside the Pakistani city of Peshawar in the northwest frontier province and ends on the Afghan border at Torkham. Because it is the main connection between Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent, the route through the Khyber Pass constitutes one of the major means of access to Central Asia. The pass, which narrows at one point to 200 yards, reaches an altitude of 3,500 feet. The pass is situated in the Afridi tribal areas, where the government has little authority; as a result, kidnapping and smuggling are common occurrences along the route. The British built a narrow-gauge railroad that passes from Peshawar to Torkham.

After 1980 the pass became a major route for refugees leaving, or later returning to, Afghanistan, and for guerrilla fighters entering Afghanistan. Pakistan has periodically closed the border crossing at the Afghan side of the pass in an attempt to control the movement of unwanted refugees.

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GRANT FARR

KIANURI, NUR AL-DIN

[1916–1999]

First secretary of Iran's Tudeh Party, 1978 to 1983.

Nur al-Din Kianuri was born in the village of Nur in Mazandaran. His grandfather was Ayatollah Fazlollah Nuri, the famous archconservative clerical leader executed during the Constitutional Revolution. Kianuri's father, however, was a prominent proconstitutionalist, later killed in a street shootout. Kianuri received his schooling in Tehran, studied architecture in Germany during the late 1930s, and joined the faculty of Tehran University in 1941. He became a member of the Tudeh Party, Iran's communist organization, in 1942 and was elected to its central committee in 1948. In the mid-1940s, he married Maryam Firuz, the head of the Tudeh women's organization. Maryam Firuz is the daughter of Prince Nasrat al-Dowleh (Farmanfarmayan), a well-known Qajar dynasty aristocrat killed by Reza Shah Pahlavi.

Kianuri fled Iran after the 1953 coup and spent over twenty-six years in exile—mostly in East Germany. He was elected first secretary of the Tudeh Party in late 1978, because he headed the wing of the party that supported the Iranian Revolution—a policy favored by the then Soviet Union. In 1983, however, when the Tudeh criticized the Islamic Republic of Iran for prolonging the war against Iraq, much of their leadership, including Kianuri, were arrested and tortured into "confessing" that they were spies and traitors plotting to overthrow Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Although most of his colleagues were executed, Kianuri and Maryam Firuz were not. Kianuri died in 1999 while still under house detention.

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN

KIAROSTAMI, ABBAS

[1940–]

Internationally acclaimed Iranian film director and screenplay author.

Abbas Kiarostami was born in Tehran and educated in fine arts. He is best known for his Kokar film trilogy *(Where's the Friend's House, Life Goes On,* and *Under the Olive Trees),* which documents daily life in a mountain village in the Caspian. The trilogy is credited as the apex of the Iranian new wave, a form of cinema with which Kiarostami is closely identified. The Iranian new wave came about in the 1960 when directors such as Kamran Shirdel and Forugh Farokhzad, influenced by Italian neorealism, the French new wave, and the poetics of surrealism, began to blur the line of documentary and fiction. The struggle of children is the central theme of many of Kiarostami's films (and he was the founder of the film department at the Institute for Intellectual Development of Children and Young Adults, which he ran during the first years after the Iranian Revolution of 1979), but it is his films *Close-Up* (1990), about an adult who impersonates fellow director Mohsen Makhmalbaf, and *Taste of Cherry* (1998), about a middle-class Tehrani man on the verge of suicide (for which he won the Palm d'Or at Cannes), to which most film critics refer when labeling him an auteur. His most recent films, *ABC Africa* and *Ten,* have moved away from his signature style of deep landscape photography, long takes, little plot, and lush photography, toward the digital medium and women characters (until the movie *Ten,* the only women in Kiarostami's films were village mothers and off-camera workers, never leading roles).

See also FILM; MAKHMALBAF, MOHSEN.

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ROXANNE VARZI

KIBBUTZ

A collective community in Israel.

The kibbutz (also *kevutza*; pl. kibbutzim, *kevutzot*) has long been the symbol and embodiment of socialist Zionism, which defined it as the most effective way to settle the land and build a new society. Never in-

volving more than a small minority of the Israeli population, kibbutz members were promoted as the elite of Israeli society and the kibbutz was presented as the model of the new, egalitarian society. It became one of most effective fund-raising symbols among diaspora communities and has always been a priority sightseeing attraction for visitors from abroad. A prominent American Jewish social scientist once quipped that there were probably many more books and articles written about the kibbutz than there were actual kibbutzim. This is in large measure true and indicates the exalted status of the kibbutz and its members in a society whose political elite viewed it as beneficial to the country's development.

The first kibbutz, Deganya, was founded by a group of pioneers from Russia in December 1909, in the Jordan River Valley just off the southern shore of the Sea of Galilee. By the end of 1948 there were 177 kibbutzim whose population of 54,200 comprised 6 percent of the Israeli population. By 2000, only about 2 percent of the Israeli population, or 118,000 individuals, lived on its 270 kibbutzim.

The various streams of socialist Zionism devised different types of kibbutzim but at least originally all adhered to the basic tenets of collectivism, namely that all property was communal and the kibbutz provided for the needs of all of its members. Everyone worked in and for the kibbutz and all jobs were, ostensibly, of equal status. Members shared in the goods and services according to their needs as defined by democratically decided criteria. The kibbutz functioned as a populist democracy, with all members having equal voice in the operation of the community. Until the 1970s, kibbutzim were overwhelmingly involved in agricultural production.

The more ideologically socialist kibbutzim practiced strong age segregation, with adults and children—even young infants—living separately, not only during the daytime hours but at night as well. An original motivating factor for this type of living arrangement was to foster the notion that the kibbutz was more important than the family. Over time, commitment to this ideology dwindled and traditional family patterns, including that of children living with their parents, reasserted themselves in the overwhelming majority of kibbutzim.

Agriculture is the second largest branch of employment on kibbutzim. Advanced farming methods and hard work help kibbutz members coax remarkable crop yields from what is often dismissed as nonarable land. © Paul A. Souders/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Each kibbutz is essentially autonomous, both socially and economically. They do, however, belong to movements with political affiliations, which provide a wide range of services to them. In principle, the kibbutz is committed to accepting the decisions of its political movement, but there have been a number of exceptions.

The kibbutz movements themselves have undergone a variety of transformations. The vast majority are secular socialist movements. The Hashomer Hatzair kibbutzim federated into the Kibbutz Artzi movement in 1927. Two other kibbutz federations, representing somewhat different ideological commitments, were ha-Kibbutz ha-Me'uhad and Ihud ha-Kibbutzim. In 1980, these latter two merged into the United Kibbutz Movement *(Takam).* In October 2000, a decision was taken to merge the United Kibbutz Movement and Kibbutz Artzi into the Kibbutz Movement, a movement which, in mid-2003, represented 244 of the existing 267 kibbutzim. Another, much smaller, secular federation contains the five kibbutzim that belong to the Zionist Workers *(ha-Oved ha-Zioni)* movement.

Eighteen religious Zionist kibbutzim also exist. Of these, sixteen are affiliated with the Religious

Kibbutz members weave a fishing net. Members rotate job assignments, and all jobs are open to everyone, regardless of gender, though women typically choose to work in education and health services rather than agriculture and industry. © PHOTOGRAPH BY ZOLTAN KLUGER. GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE (GPO) OF ISRAEL. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Kibbutz *(ha-Kibbutz ha-Dati)* movement, and two national-haredi (ultra-orthodox) kibbutzim belong to the Poalei Agudat Israel movement.

Since the 1980s, many of the basic tenets of the kibbutzim have undergone radical transformation, such as the commitment to agricultural production and the ban on employing non-kibbutz members. Kibbutzim are now heavily engaged in manufacturing, and some have opened large shopping centers.

The kibbutz population is aging. This is due both to declining birth rates and to the greater rate of younger people leaving the kibbutz. Between 1988 and 1998, kibbutzim witnessed a 30 percent decrease in the number of children below the age of four and a 10 percent increase in the number of members sixty-five and older.

The educational level of the kibbutz population continues to be higher than that of the larger Jewish population in Israel. In 1998, 47 percent of kibbutz residents above the age of fifteen had more than thirteen years of formal education, as compared to 39 percent of the Jewish population of Israeli society as a whole. Likewise, 20 percent of the kibbutz population have post–high school certificates, as compared to 12 percent of those in the Jewish population of Israeli society as a whole.

By 1990, industry replaced agriculture as the largest branch of employment on kibbutzim; agriculture is now the second largest branch and education the third.

A variety of factors lie at the root of the transformation and decline of the kibbutz. These include a growing desire on the part of parents to be the primary socializers of their children, increased educational aspirations for youth, and the increased industrialization of the larger Israeli society. Most significantly, as a result of the end of Labor hegemony within Israel with the election of Menachem Begin and the Likud alliance in 1977, the kibbutzim no longer retain the elite status they once enjoyed in the political economy of the country. This has forced them to become much more self-sufficient. Some of those that were not successful were forced to disband or reorganize in a noncommunal form.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT

Association representing agricultural collectives.

The kibbutz movement (Ha-Tnu'ah Ha-Kibbutzit Ha-Meuhedet; acronym, TAKAM) is an association comprising three of the four federations of agricultural collectives in Israel that operated in Palestine before independence, including Hever Ha-Kvutzot, Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Meuhad, and Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Artzi. The consolidation of the separate kibbutz federations, to an extent, reflected both bureaucratic realignments since the 1948 independence of Israel and the changing balance of political party power in the election arena.

The kibbutz is a socialist community without private ownership and was first improvised in 1909 at Degania, in Ottoman Palestine, by young Jewish immigrants devoted to the establishment of a highly egalitarian society. Theirs was a small agricultural community, concentrating on a single crop. After World War I, immigrants from Europe and Russia

brought ambitious schemes for an organization based on the Bolshevik Revolution, postulating that Palestine might only be developed by an all-embracing commune of Jewish workers. In 1921, they founded the first large kibbutz in the Jezreel valley at Ein Harod, with a diversified crop base and, eventually, with industries.

In 1924, a third form of collective was founded at Beit Alpha, by Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzaʿir (Young Guard), rooted in egalitarian principles and the possibilities for self-fulfillment in a small community. An association of religious (Orthodox Jewish) kibbutzim, Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati, has not affiliated with the all-embracing kibbutz movement federation.

See also Jezreel Valley; Kibbutz.

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Donna Robinson Divine

KIKHYA FAMILY

Political family of Cyrenaica (Libya).

Umar Mansur al-Kikhya was educated at the Ottoman Empire's capital, Constantinople. His first official post under the Turkish administration of Cyrenaica was as *qaʾimmaqam* (district officer) of Gialo oasis. In 1905, the sultan gave him the title of pasha, and in 1908 he was one of three Cyrenaican representatives in the Ottoman parliament. After the 1911 Italian invasion of Libya, he went into exile in Egypt and practiced law in Alexandria to raise funds for the resistance in Libya. In 1920, he returned to Cyrenaica and became native-affairs adviser to Governor Giacomo di Martino. At a time when Italy was trying to put a Cyrenaican constitution and an elected parliament into effect, Umar Mansur acted as liaison between the Italian authorities and the head of the Sanusi order, Sayyid (Amir) Idris. He was particularly active in the negotiations leading to the accord of al-Rajma in October 1920. When, however, these arrangements broke down in 1923 and Amir Idris al-Sanusi went into exile, Umar Mansur was tried on charges of misleading the Italian government and spent many years in prison and in exile.

After the Allies liberated most of North Africa during World War II, the British brought Umar Mansur back to Benghazi, where he began to campaign for the recognition of Idris as ruler of a self-governing Cyrenaican emirate, assisted by and formally allied to Great Britain. His was an important voice in keeping international public opinion aware of the Cyrenaican case at a time when it could easily have been ignored. On the declaration of Cyrenaican autonomy in July 1949, Umar Mansur was appointed head of the amir's *diwan* (royal court). In November 1949, he became prime minister of the first Cyrenaican government after his son, Fathi, had resigned as the designated prime minister. He also held the interior, foreign affairs, defense, and education portfolios. Although he initiated a vigorous program, he came into increasing conflict with the younger opposition leaders grouped around the Omar Mukhtar Club, largely on the emotive issue of a purely Cyrenaican independence (which Umar Mansur and others of his generation favored) or the independence of a united Libya. Opposition to his administration also grew within the sole legal political organization, the Cyrenaican National Congress, and in March 1950 he was forced to resign. He was appointed president of the upper house of the all-Libyan parliament, the Senate, in March 1952, but was dismissed in October 1954 for his public criticism of the new base-leasing agreement with the United States.

Omar Mansur's son Fathi first entered public service as justice secretary in the new British military administration in Cyrenaica in 1943. In July 1949, Fathi had been named prime minister of the first Cyrenaican government, which took office in September, during his absence abroad. Fathi never took office, however, resigning on the grounds that his powers would have been too restricted. He returned to his law practice in Egypt.

In 1949, Hajj Rashid al-Kikhya was president of the Cyrenaican Legislative Assembly and was one of seven Cyrenaican representatives on the preparatory committee of twenty-one Libyan members, set up in July 1950, to decide the composition of the Libyan National Assembly and to draft the constitution.

See also Cyrenaica; Idris al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sanusi; Omar Mukhtar Club.

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John L. Wright

KIKHYA, RUSHDI AL-

[1900–1988]

Syrian politician and founder of the People's Party.

Rushdi al-Kikhya was born in Aleppo, where he was elected deputy in 1936, 1943, 1947, 1949, and 1954. In 1948, together with other Aleppo leaders such as Nazim al-Qudsi and Mustafa Barmada, al-Kikhya formed the People's Party. This party represented the interests of the business community in Aleppo and northern Syria. It won the support of the prominent Atasi family of Homs against the head of the National Bloc headed by Shukri al-Quwatli and other notables from Damascus. In August 1949, al-Kikhya was appointed minister of interior in the cabinet headed by Hashim al-Atasi. In December 1949, he was elected speaker of the Syrian parliament. In September 1954, following the overthrow of the Shishakli dictatorship, the People's Party participated in the first free elections in post-independence Syria. Al-Kikhya firmly believed in the union of Iraq and Syria under Hashimite rule.

See also Atasi, Hashim al-; Hashimite House (House of Hashim); National Bloc; Quwatli, Shukri al-.

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George E. Irani

KIMCHE, DAVID

[1928–]

Israeli intelligence officer, diplomat, and writer.

"Dave" Kimche was born in London in 1928, and emigrated to Israel in 1948 and fought in the Arab–Israel War of 1948. He attended the Hebrew University in Jerusalem (where he earned a Ph.D.) and the Sorbonne in Paris. He was employed as a journalist by the *Jerusalem Post* before joining Israel's foreign intelligence service, the Mossad, in 1953, and worked under journalistic "cover" in Paris, specializing in clandestine links with countries such as Morocco and Iran, and from 1976, with Lebanon's Christians. He rose in the ranks of the Mossad to be deputy head (for external relations) under Yitzhak Hofi.

In 1980 Kimche left the Mossad because of disagreements with Hofi over Lebanon policy. He was appointed director-general of the Foreign Ministry under Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and was the chief Israeli delegate at Khalda, outside Beirut, in the December 1982 talks with Lebanon and the United States discussing Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon following the 1982 invasion. In 1985 he played a key early role in the Iran-Contra Affair, in which Israel worked secretly with the United States to supply antitank missiles to Iran as part of an effort to free U.S. hostages held by Iranian-inspired Islamic militants in Lebanon.

Following retirement from government service in 1987 Kimche was a guest lecturer at Tel Aviv and Bar-Ilan universities and president of the Israel Council on Foreign Relations. Kimche authored several books, among them *The Secret Roads, Both Sides of the Hill* (with his brother Jon), *The Afro-Asian Movement,* and *The Last Option.*

See also Arab–Israel War (1982); Iran-Contra Affair.

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Ann Kahn
Updated by Ian Black

KING–CRANE COMMISSION (1919)

A U.S. commission of inquiry sent to Syria and Palestine in 1919 to investigate the wishes of the populace regarding the political future of the territories.

U.S. president Woodrow Wilson opposed British and French plans to annex territories conquered from the Ottomans during World War I. The proposed League of Nations provided a formula, the mandate system, that would allow these territories to be taken over temporarily, until they were guided to self-determination, by the power to whom the mandate was awarded. The covenant of the league stipulated that "the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of a mandatory power." At the Council of Four, the United States proposed an Allied commission consisting of representatives from France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of Syria, Palestine, and Iraq. The British and French, at odds with each other and interested in dividing up the spoils of war, declined to join. President Wilson then sent two U.S. representatives, Henry C. King and Charles R. Crane, to interview Syrians and Lebanese regarding Syria and Palestinians and Jews regarding Palestine. The two envoys spent June and July 1919 in the region but did not go to Iraq.

The King–Crane Commission found that the inhabitants of Syria and Palestine opposed being placed under a mandate, which they perceived as a disguised form of colonial rule. They wanted independence for a united Greater Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine, with Faisal I ibn Hussein as king; but if they had to accept tutelage, their first choice of guardian would be the United States, which had no history of imperialism, and their second would be Great Britain. The Syrians were opposed to any French rule.

The King–Crane Commission also looked into Zionist claims and demands, which it had initially supported. It concluded that Zionist leaders anticipated "complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase." General opposition to Zionism led the King–Crane Commission to recommend limiting Jewish immigration, reducing the Zionist program, and giving up on the project of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.

The British and French ignored the report and occupied and divided up the territories between themselves. As the British historian Elizabeth Monroe points out: The "report came to nothing because of Wilson's failure to grasp that consultation is a virtue only if the consulting authority has the will and the ability to act on what it finds."

See also CRANE, CHARLES R.; FAISAL I IBN HUSSEIN; WILSON, WOODROW.

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PHILIP MATTAR

KING DAVID HOTEL

Famous hotel and landmark in Jerusalem.

The "King David," the most prestigious hotel in Israel, was established by Ezra Mosseri, an Egyptian Jewish banker, in the late 1920s. It was opened to the public in January 1931, and over the years became the site of many important historical events. It is located in the center of Jerusalem overlooking the ramparts of the 3,000-year-old city and an impressive landscape of the Judean Desert, the Dead Sea, and the mountains of Moab in Jordan. The simple symmetric rectangular edifice, clad in reddish stone, was designed by Emile Vogt, with interior decoration by G. H. Hufschmidt, both Swiss architects. While the exterior, with its roof crenellations, echoes the old city walls, the interior is an eclectic mix of motifs from Ancient Near Eastern and Islamic art, meant to evoke the atmosphere of a biblical palace.

During its first two decades it hosted myriad international dignitaries such as Winston Churchill, Haile Selassie (then exiled emperor of Ethiopia), King George II of Greece, Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, King Faisal of Iraq, and many other kings, princes, artists, generals, and diplomats. In 1938,

with a world war on the horizon, the British sequestered more then half of the space to house the Military Area Command and the Secretariat of the Mandatory administration. On 22 July 1946 the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi (IZL), a Zionist extremist underground organization, blew up the entire southern part of the hotel's six stories, which housed the Secretariat, killing ninety-one people—British, Arabs, and Jews. This bloody operation put an end to the loose coalition of the three Zionist underground movements and triggered severe repressive measures by the British authorities. The entire hotel was then put to the use by the British and remained so until their departure from Palestine on 14 May 1948.

During the Arab–Israel War of 1948 the King David Hotel briefly housed various officials of the Red Cross and the United Nations, including Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator, and eventually the Israeli army, which used it as a front-line stronghold. After that war the hotel, which remained on the Israeli side of the divided city, was rebuilt and once again became a luxury residence that hosted many state guests of Israel, UN and U.S. peace mediators (such as U.S. secretaries of state Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, and James Baker), and prominent writers and journalists. In 1977 it played host to President Anwar al-Sadat and many of the diplomatic meetings that led to peace between Israel and Egypt.

See also Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi; Terrorism.

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Mordechai Bar-On

KING SAʿUD UNIVERSITY

The oldest and largest university in Saudi Arabia.

Established in 1957 as the University of Riyadh and renamed in 1982, King Saʿud University has about 31,000 students, one-fourth of the country's total. In addition, it has some 2,700 instructors working in thirteen colleges, most on the large and modern Riyadh campus and others on smaller campuses in al-Qasim and Abha. The language of instruction for most subjects is Arabic, except for engineering and medicine, which are taught in English. During the 1961–1962 academic year, women were permitted to enroll as external students (taking correspondence courses from their homes) in the colleges of arts and administrative sciences for the first time. On-campus instruction became available to them beginning with the 1975–1976 academic year. As in other areas of Saudi society, women in higher education were given separate facilities and unequal access to areas of study. In the 1990s the university offered majors in sixty-one subjects and doctoral programs in Arabic, geography, and history.

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Anthony B. Toth

KIRKBRIDE, ALEC SEATH

[1897–1978]

British army officer, colonial administrator, and diplomat.

Alec Seath Kirkbride was born in Leeds and moved with his parents to Egypt in 1906. In 1916 he enlisted in the Royal Engineers and was commissioned in the same year. In early 1918 he was posted to the Arab army, which was commanded by Amir Faisal bin Hussein of the Meccan Hashimite family. This put him in touch with a number of experts who would help shape British policy in the Middle East, including Wyndham Deedes, T. E. Lawrence, and David G. Hogarth.

After World War I Kirkbride was sent to Transjordan with some other British political officers (including his brother, Alan Logan Kirkbride) to assist the local chiefs in administering their territories, which the British in Palestine were reluctant to control directly. He was posted to al-Karak (the biblical Wall of Moab) and, with a sense of history, he called his administration the National Govern-

ment of Moab. He was the first British official to meet the amir, Abdullah I ibn Hussein (Faisal's brother) upon the latter's arrival in Transjordan in March 1921.

Between 1921 and 1939 Kirkbride served in various posts in the administration of Palestine and Transjordan. Until 1927 he was a member of the high commissioner's secretariat in Jerusalem. From 1927 to 1937 he was assistant British resident in Amman. Between 1937 and 1939 he served as district commissioner of Galilee and Acre. In 1939 he was nominated British resident in Transjordan, and when the country won its independence in 1946 he was upgraded to become the first British minister in Amman. Kirkbride was a lifelong friend of Amir (later king) Abdullah and became one of his closest advisers and confidants. Abdullah's assassination in 1951 had a traumatic impact on Kirkbride, and he asked to be transferred to another post. In late 1951 he was appointed the first British minister to Libya, a position he held until his retirement in 1954.

See also ABDULLAH I IBN HUSSEIN; DEEDES, WYNDHAM; JORDAN; KARAK, AL-; LAWRENCE, T. E.

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JENAB TUTUNJI
UPDATED BY JOSEPH NEVO

KIRKUK

A city in northeastern Iraq at the foot of the Zagros Mountains.

Historically a Kurdish city, Kirkuk today has an Arab plurality. According to the 1977 census, the population was 535,000; in 2004, it was estimated to be 784,100. The city is in the heartland of the Kurdish region; the Kirkuk oil field, the largest oil field in Iraq, is also the center of the Iraqi petroleum industry. Refineries and major oil pipelines lead from Kirkuk to Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey.

See also ZAGROS.

REEVA S. SIMON

KIRYAT ARBA

Jewish settlement outside of Hebron (Khalil).

The name of Kiryat Arba is taken from the biblical description of the place where Abraham is reputed to have purchased a plot of land to bury his wife, Sarah. One of the oldest and largest Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank, Kiryat Arba was established in 1968, after Rabbi Moshe Levinger and his followers checked into a Hebron hotel and refused to leave. By 2002, the population of Kiryat Arba numbered 6,000, with an industrial area and a number of educational—mostly religious—institutions.

Although many settlers came to Kiryat Arba for purely economic reasons, the community is particularly known for its militant leadership, committed to an ideology of extending Jewish sovereignty over the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and provoking Arabs to emigrate. Many of the leaders of the Kach movement are residents of Kiryat Arba. Violent encounters with Palestinians in Hebron have continued through the years. Jewish settlers have been killed while on their way to worship at the Tomb of the Patriarchs (Machpelah Cave), and in 1994 a resident of Kiryat Arba, Dr. Baruch Goldstein, massacred Muslim worshipers in the al-Ibrahimi Mosque. Residents of Kiryat Arba formed the core of the Jewish settlers who took up residence in the city of Hebron itself, concentrating around a former Jewish property known as Bet Hadassah.

Under the terms of the 1997 Hebron Agreement negotiated by then prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Kiryat Arba retained a territorial link to the site of the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, although the rest of the city was transferred to the Palestinian Authority as part of the Oslo Accord.

See also HEBRON; KACH; LEVINGER, MOSHE; OSLO ACCORD (1993).

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON
UPDATED BY DAVID NEWMAN

KISAKÜREK, NECIP FAZIL

[1905–1983]

Turkish Islamist publisher and writer.

Born in Istanbul, Necip Fazil Kisakürek began his writing career at a Kemalist monthly youth magazine in the late 1920s. He wrote for other magazines, like Sedat Simavi's *Yedigün* (Seven days), and in 1936 started his own arts and ideas journal, *Ağaç,* which he published for one year. Kisakürek also published three volumes of poetry in those years and began writing plays about materialism and despair in modern life. Although his works in this period expressed the mystical turn of mind that would later inform his Islamist politics, in the 1930s, he joined Western-influenced artistic movements like the D-Group.

In 1945, he became editor of *Büyük Doğu* (Great east), an Islamist magazine whose anti-Westernization message carried influence particularly in rural areas. From 1950, the ruling Democrat party provided financial support to the magazine, but in a twist of politics, Kisakürek was jailed in 1952 in a crackdown on politically oriented Islamist publications. He resumed publication of *Büyük Doğu* and turned it into a daily paper in 1957. In the 1960s and 1970s, he alternatively lent his influence in religious circles to the National Salvation Party and to the neofascist National Movement Party of Colonel Alparslan Türkes. Kisakürek continued writing plays (several of which were made into films), poetry, and political memoirs in the 1960s and 1970s.

See also SIMAVI, SEDAT; TÜRKES, ALPARSLAN.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

KISCH, FREDERICK HERMANN

[1888–1943]

British career officer; director of the Political Department and chairman of the Palestine Zionist Executive (PZE), 1923–1931.

Frederick Hermann Kisch was born in India, the son of a British civil servant. He served in military intelligence in Paris during and after the World War I peace conference (1919–1922). In 1923, Kisch's Anglo–Jewish background was put to use in efforts at improving the tense relations in Palestine between the Yishuv (Palestine's Jewish community) and the British mandate administration. Another of his priorities as PZE chairman was to convince both his superiors and local Jewish leaders of the importance of devoting more attention and funds to dealing with Arab–Jewish relations. He cultivated contacts with Amir Abdullah of Transjordan and others; supported C. M. Kalvaryski's attempts to organize a pro-Zionist Arab movement in Palestine; and sought to influence Arab opinion through press subsidies. He frequently criticized the British attitude of encouraging "extremist" Arab leaders while discouraging those who might have taken a more "moderate" view of Zionism. Throughout his tenure, he enjoyed the complete confidence of Dr. Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, and was seen by many as "Weizmann's man" in Palestine.

After leaving his Zionist post in 1931, Kisch resided and worked in Haifa and continued to advise the Yishuv on security matters. In 1938, he published an edited version of the extensive diaries that he had kept during his period as political secretary and chairman of the PZE. In addition to detailing the day-to-day complexities of Anglo–Zionist and Arab–Jewish relations, his *Palestine Diary* offers a colorful portrait of the political parties and personalities of the Yishuv during a formative period of its development.

Kisch returned to active military service in World War II as an army engineer with the rank of brigadier. He was killed while inspecting a minefield in Tunisia.

See also ABDULLAH I IBN HUSSEIN; KALVARYSKI, CHAIM MARGALIUT-; WEIZMANN, CHAIM; WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO); YISHUV.

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NEIL CAPLAN

KISSINGER, HENRY

[1923–]

American diplomat.

Born in Fürth, Germany, Henry Alfred Kissinger moved with his Jewish middle-class family to the United States in 1938 trying to escape from Hitler's antisemitic regime. They settled in New York and were naturalized U.S. citizens in June 1943. Kissinger studied at City College, joining the U.S. Army in 1943, serving as an interpreter and intelligence officer in Europe. Once back in the United States in 1947, he received a bachelor of arts degree, summa cum laude, at Harvard in 1950, a master of arts degree in 1952, and a doctorate in 1954, both at Harvard, where in 1957 he became a professor of government and international affairs. As a scholar, Kissinger contributed to the realist school of international relations, which argued that foreign policy should be based on rational calculations of state interests, not on ideals of freedom and democracy.

During the administrations of presidents John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson, Kissinger played the role of part-time consultant, and he was the main intellectual force in engineering Kennedy's "flexible response" strategy, which aimed at maintaining both conventional and nuclear forces to react against Communist aggression, instead of using massive nuclear retaliation. As his biographer Robert Schulzinger has pointed out, Kissinger "engineered the most significant turning point in United States foreign policy since the beginning of the cold war." Kissinger founded his foreign policy on two ideas: the raison d'état, in which the national interest justified any means to pursue a country's aim; and the balance of power, in which no country is dominant, and in its independence can choose to align or oppose other nations, always according to its national interest. During the Cold War, Kissinger criticized the U.S. view that "the Soviet Union was an ideological rather than a geopolitical threat." Considering that the world's trend was competition instead of cooperation, it was necessary for the United States to continue to be present in two critical theatres, Europe and Asia, but in a moderate role.

U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger, left, speaks with Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat. **© CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

From 1969 to 1975, Kissinger served as national security adviser. He completely changed the role of the secretary of state and the professional foreign service, transferring their power to the White House. This decentralization led him to personally conduct secret negotiations with North Vietnam, negotiating the Paris agreements of 1973 that ended the U.S. involvement in Vietnam; with the Soviet Union, designing the first détente; and with China, reviving their relations, first with his secret trip to Beijing in July 1971, followed by President Richard Nixon's visit in February 1972. Unfortunately, in the short run Kissinger's diplomacy, based on force and realism, did not see the results of its efforts. The Communist victory in Vietnam in 1975 and the end of détente with the Soviet Union diminished Kissinger's previous foreign policy achievements. Moreover, the role that he played in the bombing of Cambodia in 1969 and in Chile's coup d'état backed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which led to the death of President Salvador Allende in 1973, still overshadow his reputation as a statesman.

As secretary of state from 1973 to 1977, he was the chief architect of the so-called "shuttle diplomacy" to the Middle East. For much of Nixon's first

Henry Kissinger (b. 1923) served as secretary of state under both Gerald Ford and Richard Nixon. Although his actions in the Cambodian and Vietnam wars have been heavily debated, he commanded a great deal of respect, and in 1973 was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, along with Vietnamese leader Le Duc Tho. Kissinger, right, is pictured with Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin. © MOSHE MILNER. GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE (GPO) OF ISRAEL. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

term, the Middle East was a marginal area; in fact Kissinger, as national security adviser, did not support Secretary of State William P. Rogers's 1969 Middle East peace plan, even after Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser accepted it as a framework for negotiations. Kissinger suggested that a prolonged stalemate "would move the Arabs toward moderation and the Soviets to the fringes of Middle East diplomacy." But in 1973 the Arab–Israeli conflict moved from the periphery to center stage of American strategic interests. Kissinger, appointed secretary of state that September, was determined to use the war to start a peace process. He immediately realized that if either Israel or the Arabs achieved a decisive victory, it would be difficult to reach a compromise solution during peace negotiations. His strategy was therefore to seek a return to the prewar situation, thereby preventing either side from winning the war while creating momentum for a peace process. His gradualist approach lasted a good twenty-three months, in the course of which five agreements were concluded. Negotiations commenced immediately following the cease-fire of 22 October 1973, on 23 October at Kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez road. Kissinger believed it would be a mistake to seek a comprehensive settlement that could not be attained and that, by leading to frustrated expectations, would result in an enhanced role for the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Instead, he elected to pursue a step-by-step approach: achieving more modest goals that, by producing results, would create the momentum needed to tackle the bigger issues. This strategy led to the formal signing of the so-called Six-Point Agreement, signed by Egyptian and Israeli military representatives at Kilometer 101 on 11 November 1973, when the two countries exchanged prisoners of war. The second agreement was to convene a conference in Geneva under joint American-Soviet auspices with the participation of Israel and the Arab States. The conference lasted two days (21–22 December 1973) and was attended by the United States, the Soviet Union, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, and the secretary-general of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim; it turned out to be nothing more than a symbolic event. In January 1974 Kissinger began the third episode of his shuttle diplomacy: a series of flights between Aswan, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem, during which he hammered out the terms of Sinai I, a disengagement agreement separating the armies of Israel and Egypt, signed on 18 January at Kilometer 101. In May 1974 Kissinger undertook a fourth round of shuttle diplomacy, this time between Damascus and Tel Aviv, to reach a disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel. The armistice was signed on 31 May. After negotiations between Jordan and Israel, and between Israel and Egypt, failed in March 1975, Kissinger, as President Gerald Ford's secretary of state, embarked on the fifth and last round of shuttle diplomacy; he negotiated Sinai II, signed on 1 September, which called for further withdrawal of Israel's troops into the Sinai desert.

See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

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DAVID WALDNER
UPDATED BY PAOLA OLIMPO

KITCHENER, HORATIO HERBERT

[1850–1916]

First earl of Khartoum, British field marshal, and colonial administrator in the Sudan, 1899–1900, and in Egypt, 1911–1914.

Horatio Herbert Kitchener was born in Ireland, the second son of Henry Horatio Kitchener, an eccentric Anglo–Irish landowner. Educated at home, then in Switzerland (where he became fluent in French), and at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, England, Kitchener was commissioned in 1871 into the Royal Engineers. He devoted most of the rest of his life to sustaining the British Empire in Egypt, the Sudan, South Africa, and India. He never married.

While working on land surveys in Palestine, Cyprus, and the Sinai Peninsula between 1874 and 1883, he learned Arabic and acquired a passion for porcelain and old furniture. He joined the reconstituted Anglo–Egyptian army in 1883, after Britain had occupied the country in 1882 because of Suez Canal debts and the Urabi revolt. He participated in Lord Wolseley's tardy expedition of 1885 that failed to rescue the hapless British General Charles ("Chinese") Gordon at the siege of Khartoum in the Egyptian Sudan. He also helped delimit the territory of the sultan of Zanzibar and served as governor-general of the Eastern Sudan before returning to the Anglo–Egyptian army as adjutant general in 1888.

Kitchener's exploits in battle against the Mahdi and his followers and his reputation as a methodical and penurious military organizer captured the attention of the British public and ruling elite. He was promoted to *sirdar* (commander in chief) of the Anglo–Egyptian army in 1892. Under control of the Foreign Office and Lord Cromer, Kitchener brilliantly organized the River War campaigns of 1896–1898, which ousted the followers of the Mahdi from the Sudan. His desecration of the Mahdi's remains failed to harm his extraordinary popularity in England, and the mustachioed Kitchener of Khartoum became the symbol of Great Britain at her imperial zenith.

At Fashoda, in 1898, he repulsed France's efforts to control the Nile's headwaters. In South Africa, he organized the ruthless crushing of the Boers. Then, while commanding the Indian Army, he deviously wrecked the political career of India's viceroy, Lord Curzon. When Sir Eldon Gorst (the former British foreign office agent and consul-general in Egypt) died in 1911, the Liberal government sent Kitchener back to Egypt as agent and consul-general, with instructions to keep Egypt quiet while seeing to its economic health.

Kitchener was regal in style, where Gorst had been self-effacing. Egypt was relatively quiet politically during Kitchener's tenure, and he worked to improve the lot of the Egyptian *fellah* (peasant) and extended the irrigation system. He banned nationalist newspapers and excluded certain Egyptian leaders, including Saʿd Zaghlul, from office. At least two attempts by nationalists to assassinate him failed. He cut Khedive Abbas Hilmi II's finances, trying, unsuccessfully, to force him to abdicate. As the Ottoman Empire waned, he kept Egypt "neutral." Hoping to bring it and the Sudan under formal British control, he sought to end the Capitulations and opened anti-Ottoman discussions with various Arab leaders, especially the son of Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca.

When World War I began, British Prime Minister Herbert H. Asquith insisted Kitchener join the British cabinet as war minister. He grasped the nature of modern war, but his popularity and prestige were not enough to compensate for his deficiencies as a politician, administrator, and organizer. He died midway through the war.

See also ABBAS HILMI II; AHMAD, MUHAMMAD; BARING, EVELYN; CAPITULATIONS; GORDON, CHARLES; GORST, JOHN ELDON; ZAGHLUL, SAʿD.

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PETER MELLINI

KLÉBER, JEAN-BAPTISTE

[1753–1800]

French general.

Jean-Baptiste Kléber accompanied General Napoléon Bonaparte to Egypt in 1798, and was placed in command of the expeditionary force of France after Napoléon's departure in 1799. Kléber then negotiated the terms of the French evacuation with Britain's Admiral Sidney Smith, but when the British government refused the terms, Kléber attempted to reconquer Egypt. He defeated an Anglo–Turkish army at Heliopolis in 1800 and took Cairo, but was then assassinated by an Egyptian.

See also BONAPARTE, NAPOLÉON.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

KNESSET

The parliament of Israel.

The Knesset is unicameral, with 120 members who are elected for a term of four years. A majority may call for early elections. The Knesset's power of judicial review is limited, but it can, with special majorities (that is, fixed numerical requirements that may be more than a majority of those present and voting on a given occasion), change the Basic Laws—the constitution. (Only simple majorities—more than half of those present in the Knesset at any given time, which could be less than half of the 120 Members of Knesset—are necessary to make ordinary legislation.) The Knesset chooses the prime minister, the cabinet, and the symbolically important president of the state, and it can dismiss the government through a no-confidence vote. In addition to legislative duties, it has broad investigative powers. It must be in session for at least eight months of each year. Members enjoy wide legislative immunity.

Most of the Knesset's work is done by standing committees. The legislative process is similar to those of most other countries. After a first reading, a bill is sent to committee where it may be studied and amended, after which it returns to the full Knesset for second and third readings. Israel has a classical parliamentary system; the Knesset has relatively little political independence. Committee membership corresponds to party strength in the Knesset, and deputies are restrained by their parties under tight discipline. Knesset members may introduce private bills, question members of the government, and present motions for debate of subjects not on the government's agenda. However, these rarely have a significant impact.

Knesset members are subordinate to political parties because of the electoral system, a single national constituency in a proportional representation system. Voting is by party lists. Until 1992 parties needed only 1 percent of the votes to win a seat, and the result of this system was the presence of numerous small parties. There has never been a time when a single party had a majority in the Knesset; coalitions have always been necessary. When the threshold was raised to 1.5 percent in 1992, the number of parties dropped markedly.

Structural characteristics strengthen the role of the executive at the expense of parliamentary independence. It has been estimated that 95 percent of the bills are introduced into the Knesset by the government. Knesset debate on them, both in committees and on the floor, seldom leads to any outcome other than that desired by the coalition members.

See also ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN.

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WALTER F. WEIKER
UPDATED BY GREGORY S. MAHLER

KOCHI

See GLOSSARY

KOÇ, VEHBI

[1901–1996]

Turkish businessman.

Born in Ankara, Vehbi Koç entered trade in 1917 at a grocery store in Karaoğlan. In the 1920s he founded his own company and accumulated businesses steadily, emphasizing assembly industries for import substitution, including cars and trucks. By the 1970s he was called the wealthiest man in Turkey. Koç's group sales doubled in the 1970s to $1.1 billion, profiting particularly from increased demand for consumer goods. In 1987, he controlled 117 firms. Koç Holding A.S. remained in the early 1990s the largest of an elite group of conglomerates that dominate Turkey's private economy. These companies have benefited from government ties and foreign capital.

Koç remained a member of the original state Republican People's Party through the 1950s, when many businessmen were attracted to the new Democrat Party and its call for free enterprise. But he resigned from his party in 1960, opposing the growing violence between the two, which harmed the business environment. After the military coup of 1960, Koç advocated strong government against anarchy, although in the 1970s he opposed efforts by the employers' union to allow government to intervene in collective bargaining. As a leading member of the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (Tüsiad), he advocated social reform in conjunction with promoting Turkey's entrance into the European Economic Community. His son Rehmi M. Koç took over as chairman of the vast Koç Holding A.S., which in 2001 employed some 39,800 people.

See also REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

KOLLEK, TEDDY

[1911–]

Israeli politician; mayor of Jerusalem, 1965–1993.

Teddy Kollek was born in Hungary and moved to Mandatory Palestine in 1934. In 1935 he became a founding member of Kibbutz En Gev. In 1942 he was recruited by the Jewish Agency to serve as an intelligence officer in Istanbul, where he maintained contact with Jewish communities in Europe. After returning from Istanbul in 1943, Kollek worked for the intelligence branch of the Jewish Agency and was frequently sent to Cairo, where he arranged for stolen British weaponry to be smuggled to Palestine for the Haganah.

During the 1940s his principal contribution to the Zionist movement was the acquisition of armaments, primarily in the United States. After returning to Jerusalem following World War II, Kollek supported David Ben-Gurion in the formative years of Israel's independence. He was sent back to the United States to work with Abba Eban in the Israeli embassy and was responsible for liaison with Jewish groups and the U.S. State Department. In 1949 he was made head of the United States desk of Israel's Foreign Ministry and from 1952 to 1964 served as director general of the prime minister's office.

Shimon Peres first recommended that Kollek run for mayor of Jerusalem in 1965. He wanted Kollek to represent his new party, Rafi, which was primarily made up of Ben-Gurion supporters who were unhappy with MAPAI. Although Kollek did not want the position, he accepted the assignment to support Ben-Gurion. Kollek won, and soon afterward began working for the social, political, and geographical unification of Jerusalem after the eastern part of the city was conquered from Jordan in the June 1967 war. He made overtures to the city's Palestinian population and strove to make all religious groups, orthodox as well as secular, feel that they had a place in the city. One of Kollek's initiatives involved establishing the Jerusalem Foundation, the goal of which was to raise money for the beautification and cultural enhancement of the city. The foundation was an enormous success and was instrumental in a great number of cultural and recreational initiatives.

During his later years in office Kollek was criticized by many, including his deputy mayor, Meron Benvenisti, for paying much more attention to the development of Jewish Jerusalem than he did to Palestinian (East) Jerusalem. Palestinians were

especially frustrated by bureaucratic hurdles placed in the way of their building and developing their land, while Jewish developers received government encouragement.

Although Kollek was offered other positions over the years, including the ministry of tourism, the Weizmann Institute of Science, and the Jewish Agency, he remained as mayor of Jerusalem. In 1988 he was awarded the Israel Prize for his accomplishments. Five years later, after serving as mayor for more than twenty-five years, he was defeated by Likud candidate Ehud Olmert.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967); BEN-GURION, DAVID; EBAN, ABBA (AUBREY); HAGANAH; ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; JERUSALEM; PERES, SHIMON; ZIONISM.

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GREGORY S. MAHLER

KOL, MOSHE

[1911–1989]

Israeli cabinet minister and political leader.

Moshe Kol was one of the signers of Israel's Declaration of Independence and a member of the provisional government. He was born on 28 May 1911 in Pinsk, Belorussia. He attended a Hebrew secondary school, founded a local Zionist youth movement, edited a Hebrew newspaper, and was one of the founders of the World General Zionist Organization.

Kol arrived in Palestine in 1932 and was active in many Zionist organizations. He became a member of the Histadrut's Executive, a post which he held until 1947. He was active in youth *aliyah* (immigration) activities, and in 1948, just before the formation of the state of Israel, he was elected world head of Youth Aliyah.

Kol was elected to the First Knesset and chaired its Education Committee. He headed the Progressive Party from 1949 and was chairman of the Liberal Party from 1961 to 1965, when the Progressives joined the Liberals. After the 1965 split in the Liberal Party, Kol founded and led the Independent Liberal Party. He held many Jewish Agency and cabinet posts during his lifetime, and served as minister of development and tourism (1965) and minister of tourism (1969). He died on 7 July 1989.

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Information about Moshe Kol can be found at the Knesset Web page: <http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/exmk_eng.asp?id=593>.

MARTIN MALIN
UPDATED BY GREGORY S. MAHLER

KOMITEH

See GLOSSARY

KONYA

Large city in central Turkey and capital of Konya province.

Konya is located in a large fertile plain in Anatolia. A town has existed on its site since at least 1200 B.C.E. When the area was part of the Roman Empire, the town was known as Iconium. Konya was the capital of the Seljuk Turks' kingdom in Anatolia between 1081 and 1334 and contains several historical monuments dating from that period, most notably the monastery and tomb of Celaleddin Rumi (d. 1273), a leading founder of Sufism and Sufi Orders. Modern Konya is a major industrial center and one of Turkey's largest cities, with a population of approximately 1.3 million. Konya province ranks as the country's major grain-producing region. The total population of the province (including the city of Konya) was 2,192,166, according to the census of 2000.

See also SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS.

ERIC HOOGLUND

KONYA, BATTLE OF

Victory of Egyptian forces over the Ottoman army in December 1832.

An army sent by Egypt's Muhammad Ali and led by his son Ibrahim Paşa occupied Konya on 21 November 1832 after sweeping through Palestine and Syria during the previous year. On 21 December, outside of Konya, Ibrahim Pasha defeated the army sent by Sultan Mahmud II and led by Mehmet V Reşat, opening the way for conquest of all of Anatolia. Russian, British, and French intervention forced an Egyptian retreat to Syria and Cilicia, which was formalized in an agreement in March 1833.

See also IBRAHIM IBN MUHAMMAD ALI; MAHMUD II; MEHMET V REŞAT; MUHAMMAD ALI.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

KOOK, ABRAHAM ISAAC HACOHEN

[1865–1935]

Religious Zionist theoretician.

Born in Latvia, Abraham Isaac Hacohen Kook received his early education was in the local *cheder* (Jewish day school). His father was a scholar who gave him a great love for Eretz Yisrael, the Land of Israel. He then studied privately with several well-known Jewish scholars and, later, in the yeshiva in Volozhin. In addition to the traditional Talmud, he studied literature, philosophy, and kabbalah (Jewish mysticism), during his young adult years; he also began writing on Talmudic literature, philosophy, and poetry. He served as a rabbi in Lithuania from 1888 to 1904 and immigrated to Palestine in 1904, where he was appointed rabbi of Jaffa. His enthusiastic support of Zionism, which he perceived as part of messianic redemption, antagonized much of the rabbinic leadership, whose members opposed, on religious grounds, both the notion and the movement. In 1914, he traveled to Europe and, prevented from returning by the outbreak of World War I, assumed the temporary position of rabbi in a London congregation; there he also attempted to establish a movement for spiritual renewal, Degel Yerushalayim (Flag of Jerusalem), which was to supplement the secular Zionist movement. He returned to Palestine after the war, was appointed chief rabbi of Jerusalem and, when Palestine's rabbinate was established in 1921, he was selected as the Ashkenazic chief rabbi.

Kook's personal warmth and his interaction with all Jews, regardless of their degree of religiosity, as well as his attribution of holiness to all participants in the Zionist endeavor, became legendary and won him admiration even among the most secular Zionists; they mistook his individual acceptance of them as acceptance of their secularism in principle, however. Although firmly entrenched in traditional learning, he was also well versed in modern Western thought. He manifested simultaneously the sensitivity of the mystic and the intellectual sharpness that took cognizance of the rational. As a communal rabbi, he was attuned to contemporary difficulties and attempted to accommodate his rabbinic decisions to both his interpretation of religio-legal decision making and the contemporary situation. This was, at times, another source of tension in his relations with various Orthodox Jewish sects. Another manifestation of his relatively modern perspective was his view of higher Jewish education. He established a school, the yeshiva Merkaz ha-Rav, which was unique in its incorporation of Bible studies and Jewish thought with traditional Talmudic studies, to promote a deep commitment to Zionism. The yeshiva was small and remained so after his death, when it was headed by his son, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, and his son-in-law, Rabbi Shalom Natan Raʿanan. It became a major institution only after the Arab–Israel War of June 1967.

Kook's voluminous writings are available in Hebrew, but only a few have been translated into English.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967); KOOK, ZVI YEHUDA.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

KOOK, ZVI YEHUDA

[1891–1982]

Lithuanian-born rabbi, teacher, and leader of Gush Emunim, the religious Zionist settlement movement.

Zvi Yehuda Kook was born in Kovno, Lithuania, the son of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Hacohen Kook. The family immigrated to Palestine in 1904, and Zvi studied in yeshiva (Jewish religious school) in Jerusalem. Later, he administered his father's yeshiva, Merkaz ha-Rav. When his father died, in 1935, he began editing his father's extensive writings. He retained his father's mystical tradition and devotion to Zionism.

After the Arab–Israel War of June 1967, Kook's messianic approach to Zionism attained new levels of political significance. He advocated that Israel keep all the territories captured in that war, which made him a nationally known figure instead of the relatively quiet scholar he had been. He became the spiritual leader of the dominant nationalist wing of the religious Zionist movement. Following the October 1973 Arab–Israel War, he led the settlement movement called Gush Emunim into the new administered territories and opposed the evacuation of settlers from the Sinai, as was agreed by Israel and Egypt in the Camp David Accords.

Most of his writings, which include traditional essays on the Talmud and volumes on contemporary public issues, were edited by students and published posthumously.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab–Israel War (1973); Camp David Accords (1978); Gush Emunim; Kook, Abraham Isaac Hacohen.

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Chaim I. Waxman

KOOR INDUSTRIES

Major Israeli industrial conglomerate.

Koor Industries was founded by the Histadrut in 1944, and until 1958 it was part of the Solel Boneh group. Its main areas of activity are building materials, electronics, telecommunications, and chemicals.

Koor's biggest component is Tadiran, one of Israel's largest companies, a producer of electrical, electronic, and telecommunication equipment. It also owns Telrad, another major telecommunications producer. Other large companies in the group include the Nesher cement company and Soltam, an armaments firm, which has incurred financial losses as a result of declining military purchases. Among the older companies in the group are Phoenicia, a glassmaking company, and Koor's metal production subsidiary.

Between 1987 and 1989, Koor suffered a major financial crisis and accumulated losses of US$845 million. In 1989 alone, its losses came to US$303 million. After protracted negotiations between Hevrat Ovdim, the government, and the banks of Israel and abroad to whom Koor was in debt, the company was rescued by a government loan, made on condition that it implement a radical restructuring program. This involved reducing the labor force, selling subsidiaries, and closing unprofitable production lines. Koor's workforce fell from 31,000 in 1987 to about 17,000 in 1992. It has shares in 35 companies, compared with 130 in 1989.

In 1991 and 1992, Koor's financial position improved and its net profits in 1992 came to 375 million shekels. It has raised funds on the stock exchange and has been able to repay debts owed to the banks.

Given that the company was owned by the Histadrut, this posed serious ideological problems, but reforms were implemented. Koor's admission to the manufacturers' association of private sector employers in 1992 was an indication of the extent of these changes. It remains one of the largest industrial groups in the economy, although its share in total industrial output declined sharply from about 25 percent in the early 1980s to about 8 percent in 1992. In that year, Koor's sales came to 6.1 billion shekels ($2.5 billion), of which 1.8 billion shekels ($725 million) were exports. Its operating profits equaled 630 million shekels. Koor is now considering investments in the tourist and retailing sectors.

Koor's shares are owned by the Israeli bank, Hevrat Ovdim, the government of Israel, and others. In 1993 the government sold shares that it acquired in exchange for loans made to Koor.

See also HISTADRUT.

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PAUL RIVLIN

KOPRÜLÜ, MEHMET FUAT

[1890–1966]

Turkish literary scholar, historian, and statesman.

Born in Istanbul during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, Mehmet Fuat Koprülü was descended from a family of viziers and taught at the Ottoman University (reorganized as Istanbul University) from 1913 to 1943. He was a prolific scholar, best known for his many fundamental contributions to the study of Turkish and Ottoman classical and folk literature, religion and political and institutional history. Koprülü was also prominent in public life. He was elected to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1935, representing Kars and, later, Istanbul until 1957. He was a cofounder of Turkey's new opposition Democrat Party in 1946; following the party's 1950 electoral victory, he served as foreign minister (1950–1956), except for a brief period as a minister of state and deputy prime minister (1955).

See also DEMOCRAT PARTY; TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

ULI SCHAMILOGLU

KORDOFAN

Region and administrative province of Sudan.

Kordofan (Kurdufan) is bounded by the White Nile on the east, Darfur in the west, the Bahr al-Arab River in the south, and desert in the north. In the southeast corner of the plain the Nuba Mountains (2,000–4,000 feet; 610–1220 meters) rise dramatically from the surrounding plain inhabited by the Nuba people (unrelated to the Nubians of the Nile Valley in northern Sudan). The Nuba are farmers who have crafted complex terraces on their hillsides and cultivated fields on the plains below. Known for their complex body decoration, musical performance, and wrestling (which is an obsessive pastime), each hill community has its own culture. They speak more than a dozen Kordofanian languages and the Arabic of the Baggara Arabs, with whom they have an historic and hostile relationship. The Baggara are cattle-owning nomads who roam widely over the plains surrounding the Nuba Mountains. They were the first and most fervent followers *(al-Ansar)* of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi and remain firm supporters of the Mahdi's great-grandson, the leader of the Umma Party, Sadiq al-Mahdi. Since the 1980s the Baggara Arabs, supported by the Sudanese government, have seized the opportunity presented by the civil war to drive the insurgent Nuba from the plains and destroy their sanctuaries in the hills in the name of Islam. This has aroused the concern and intervention of the international community, which aims to preserve the Nuba and their culture.

See also ANSAR, AL-; *MAHDI;* SUDAN; SUDANESE CIVIL WARS.

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ROBERT O. COLLINS

KOSHER

In Judaism, refers to dietary regulations for daily life.

Kosher is a Yiddish word, from Hebrew *kasher,* "proper" or "fit." The laws of *kashrut* (dietary laws) define foods fit for use, those that are kosher for Jews. They are mentioned in numerous verses of the Bible (especially in Deuteronomy), but they were interpreted for daily use by the sages of the Talmud (in the commentaries called the Mishnah, c. 200 C.E., and in the Gemarah, commentaries on the Mishnah). They went into effect, for the most part, during the early Diaspora, and they helped establish both a religious and a folk sense of community among a dispersed nation. Those who traveled, who were engaged in international trade, or who were dispossessed from century to century could seek others who shared a sense of proper food handling.

The laws of kashrut define how to kill, handle, and prepare meat and dairy products. They define which animals may be considered food at all, and which parts of kosher animals may be used. For example, fish without fins and scales may not be eaten, and animals without horns and cloven hooves may not be eaten. Animals that eat carrion are unfit, as is the eating of meat with dairy products. Vegetables, fruits, and grains are never unfit. Thus, out of necessity, many Jews who travel without kosher food available become vegetarians in order to keep the kashrut tradition.

See also DIASPORA; TALMUD.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

KOVNER, ABBA

[1918–1987]

Organizer of Vilna ghetto revolt, World War II partisan leader, and acclaimed Hebrew poet.

Born in Sevastopol, Russia, and raised in Vilna, Poland. Kovner joined ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir and planned immigration to Eretz Yisrael (Palestine) but was prevented by the German invasion of 1941. His wartime resistance activities—notably in founding an umbrella resistance force in the Vilna ghetto, the United Partisans Organization—made him a symbol of the heroism of Jewish fighters in the Holocaust to generations of Israelis. Kovner cofounded the Jewish Museum in Vilna in 1944, then helped to organize clandestine Jewish immigration to Eretz Yisrael, cofounding the Brichah, and was briefly imprisoned by the British in Egypt. On his release, he joined the Givʿati brigade and fought in the Arab–Israel War of 1948. Books of Kovner's poetry, which focuses on the Holocaust and Zionism, were published in Israel in the 1940s (reprinted from partisan newsletters), 1950s and 1960s. At the Eichmann trial in 1961, Kovner testified to the brutality of Germans and their collaborators in the Vilna ghetto, as well as to reprisals meted out by Jewish partisans against captured German soldiers. Kovner's poetry, mimicking the epics of the Russian symbolists, focused on his experience of the Holocaust in Vilna and his sense of isolation as a survivor thereafter. For Kovner, postwar Jewish and Israeli experience was also part of the ongoing experience of the Holocaust. His work thus traced reflections of the Holocaust in the present and was not solely a lament of the losses and pain of the past—for example, his 1970 poem "Huppa bamidbar"' (A canopy in the desert," Kovner, 1973).

Kovner cofounded the Holocaust journal *Yalkut Moreshet* in 1963, and was awarded the coveted Israel Prize for literature in 1970, though few of his Israeli contemporaries shared his focus on Jewish resistance, viewing European Jews instead as predominantly passive victims of the Nazis.

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ZEV MAGHEN
UPDATED BY GEORGE R. WILKES

KRIM, BELKACEM

[1922–1970]

Algerian revolutionary leader.

A Kabyle (a Berber group), Belkacem Krim was born near Dra-el-Mizan and was an employee of the Mirabeau mixed commune. In 1945 he joined Messali al-Hadj's Parti du Peuple Algérien and then the Organisation Spéciale. Following the assassination of a forest ranger in 1947, Krim was always on the run from French authorities. In 1954 he assisted in the organization of the Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action, which led to the formation of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and became one of the nine "historic chiefs" of the revolution (the Algerian War of Independence,

1954–1962). During the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne years, he served as war minister (1958), vice president of the Council of Ministers (1958), foreign minister (1960), and minister of the interior (1961). He was the chief FLN negotiator with the French, resulting in the Evian agreement (March 1962). He opposed Ahmed Ben Bella and was eventually forced to leave Algeria, given his opposition to Houari Boumédienne, who took over the government in June 1965. In 1969 he organized in opposition the Mouvement Démocratique de Renouveau Algérien. He was assassinated, probably by Boumédiennist agents, in Frankfurt in 1970. Krim was officially rehabilitated in 1984.

See also Algerian War of Independence; Ben Bella, Ahmed; Berber; Boumédienne, Houari; Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA); Evian Accords (1962); Front de Libération Nationale; Hadj, Messali al-; Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA).

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Phillip C. Naylor

KUCHEK KHAN-E JANGALI

[1888–1921]

Iranian revolutionary fighter.

Mirza Kuchek Khan-e Jangali was born in Rasht, Iran. He attended religious school in Tehran and was in contact with Russian revolutionaries in Baku and Tbilisi. He cooperated with the constitutional revolution of 1905–1911 but he espoused a religious pan-Islamist worldview. From 1909 to 1911, he collaborated with the constitutionalists in fighting the despotic Qajar monarch, Mohammad Ali Qajar. In 1913, Mirza Kuchek Khan was exiled to Tehran, where he frequented political and pan-Islamist religious meetings. In 1914 he returned to his native Gilan and rose in rebellion against the central government with the help of Ottoman and German military advisers. The movement's official organ, *Jangal,* was published in 1917. Following the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and the Anglo–Iranian Agreement of 1919, Mirza Kuchek Khan sided with the Russian Bolshevik regime and, in 1920, proclaimed the Socialist Republic of Gilan. The Soviet–Persian Agreement of 1921 reversed all czarist policy in Persia, and Mirza Kuchek Khan was hence deprived of Soviet support. He was executed in 1921. During the lifetime of the Gilan republic, he initiated a land-reform policy and was intent on eradicating foreign influence, even that of the Russians, in Iran. Mirza Kuchek Khan was also a poet and wrote under the pen name of "Gomnam," which means "unknown."

See also Anglo–Iranian Agreement (1919); Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar.

Neguin Yavari

KUDSI, NAZIM AL-

[1906–1998]

Syrian lawyer-politician, born in Aleppo, from landowning, scholarly Sunni family.

During the French mandate, Nazim al-Kudsi (or al-Qudsi) was one of the leaders of the Nationalist Youth (al-Shabab al-Watani), an elitist organization that began to take shape in Damascus at the encouragement of Fakhri Bey al-Barudi, a Damascene notable. Al-Kudsi's class origin and the advanced Western education he received in Beirut and Geneva enabled him to acquire a number of political positions: leader of the Aleppo-based People's party; member of the Syrian parliament; foreign minister and prime minister for brief intervals in 1949, 1950, and 1951; president of the Syrian parliament from 1951 to 1953 and from 1954 to 1957; and president of Syria following the dissolution of the Egyptian-Syrian union in 1961. Following the Baʿth party coup of March 1963, al-Kudsi withdrew from political life and left Syria to live in Lebanon from 1963 to 1986, later taking up residence in France. He died in Jordan in February 1998.

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Muhammad Muslih
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

KUFTA

See Food: Kufta

KURD ALI, MUHAMMAD

[1876–1953]

Syrian historian, literary critic, and educator.

Muhammad Kurd Ali was a man of letters who began his career during the Ottoman Empire as a pioneer journalist and then devoted his mature years to scholarship as a historian, literary critic, and memoirist. His writings embraced a wide range of subjects, but he paid special attention to the historical achievements of Arab–Islamic civilization and to a comparison of those achievements with the ascendancy of Western Europe.

Kurd Ali's father was from a long-established Damascene (Syria) family of Kurdish ancestry, while his mother's family was Circassian (from the Caucasus region of Russia). The family was of modest means. Kurd Ali's upbringing took place during a period of intellectual ferment in Damascus. Therefore, he was the beneficiary of a considerable range of educational opportunities, both formal and informal. After completing his secondary studies at a standard government school, he spent two years at the Lazarist school in Damascus where he acquired fluent French and began a lifelong appreciation of French literature and culture. He was also profoundly influenced by his personal contact with the Damascus circle of religious reformers and studied under their most prominent member, Tahir al-Jazaʾiri. In addition, he was a friend of Rashid Rida and an admirer of Muhammad Abduh, whose lectures he attended at Cairo's venerable institution of Islamic learning, al-Azhar University. Kurd Ali's outlook was further shaped by two lengthy visits to Europe (1908 and 1913), which convinced him that Western society possessed certain attributes that were worth emulating.

In 1901, Kurd Ali took up residence in Cairo, where he honed his journalistic skills in the lively Egyptian press, writing and editing for such well-known publications as *al-Muqtataf* and *al-Muʾayyad.* He founded his own journal, *al-Muqtabas,* in 1906 and transferred it to Damascus in 1909. It was as the publisher, editor, and principal correspondent of *al-Muqtabas* that Kurd Ali rose to prominence in Damascene society. *Al-Muqtabas* was an outspoken reformist journal that addressed such sensitive issues as Ottoman misrule, the stagnation of the Islamic world, and the special role the Arabs had to play in the revival of Islam. Despite his criticism of the Ottoman government, Kurd Ali favored Syria's continued affiliation with the empire. During World War I, he supported the government by serving on the editorial board of an Ottoman-sponsored newspaper, *al-Sharq.*

Following the Ottoman defeat and the establishment of a separate Syrian state, Kurd Ali abandoned political journalism. Although he served two terms as Syrian minister of education (1920–1922 and 1928–1931), he generally eschewed politics and devoted his energies to scholarship. He played a leading role in the establishment of the Arab Academy of Damascus in 1919 and served as its director until his death. Modeled on the Académie Française, the Arab Academy facilitated the publication of classical and contemporary works in Arabic and generally sought to encourage a public interest in literature. Kurd Ali's personal contributions to this endeavor were substantial. He edited several classical texts, compiled a six-volume history of Syria *(Khitat al-Sham),* and wrote other works on literature and on the achievements of Arab–Islamic civilization. He also published four volumes of memoirs.

Kurd Ali's historical studies were intended not only to inform readers about the past but also to demonstrate the positive achievements of Arab–Islamic civilization. He believed that European progress was generated by the rediscovery of ancient knowledge during the Renaissance, and he argued that Arab Muslims must become aware of the achievements of their ancestors in order to experience their own awakening and renewal.

See also Abduh, Muhammad; Arab Academy of Damascus; Rida, Rashid.

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William L. Cleveland

KURDISH AUTONOMOUS ZONE

Region of northern Iraq where Iraqi Kurds have been living under de facto autonomy since 1991.

At the instigation of France, on 5 April 1988 the United Nations Security Council produced Resolution 688 condemning "the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas" and demanding "an immediate end to this repression" and immediate access to all parts of Iraq for humanitarian organizations. Given this international awareness of the plight of the Kurds, the collapse of the Kurdish uprising in March 1991 that followed the Gulf War and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Kurds to the borders of Turkey and Iran shocked Westerners. On 10 April, under pressure from his own constituents, U.S. president George Bush prohibited Iraqi planes from flying north of the 36th parallel, creating the so-called No-Fly Zone, and on 17 April he announced the creation of a "safe haven" inside Iraqi Kurdistan. At first, the Allies created three protection zones: around Zakho, Amadia, and Shila Diza. The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and the Iraqi government on 18 April 1991 allowed the repatriation of thousands of Kurdish refugees within the framework of Operation Provide Comfort.

While Masʿud Barzani, Jalal Talabani, and the other leaders of the Kurdistan Front, a coalition of Kurdish parties, were negotiating with Iraq's President Saddam Hussein in Baghdad, an uneasy military situation prevailed in Kurdistan. The Kurdish *peshmergas* ("those who face death," i.e., fighters) were able to enter the cities of Erbil and Sulaymaniyya, which were theoretically still controlled by the Iraqi army. On 20 August 2002 Barzani returned to Kurdistan with a draft agreement that was rejected by the other parties, ending the negotiations. In October 2002 the Iraqi armed forces and the Iraqi administration evacuated Irbil and Sulaymaniyya, maintaining their presence in what is called the "useful Kurdistan": Kirkuk, Khanakin, and Sinjar.

For the first time in their history, the Kurds controlled a large area of Kurdistan—more than 15,400 square miles—in which they planned to set up their own institutions, organizing elections in May 1992 and forming a Kurdish government in July 1992.

But in May 1994 fighting resumed between the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, Iraq (DPK) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and in spite of the diplomatic efforts of the French and British governments, this fratricidal war continued until the U.S. government imposed the Washington Agreement in September 1998. The Kurdish Autonomous Zone remains divided into two regions, each ruled by a Kurdish regional government, based in Irbil (DKP) and Sulaymaniyya (PUK). In spite of these problems, the Kurdish Autonomous Zone has made tremendous progress since 1996 thanks to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 986—the Oil for Food resolution—and the injection of hundreds of million of dollars in the region. On 8 September 2002 Barzani and Talabani reached an agreement in Sari Rash on the normalization of relations between the two warring parties, which led to meetings of the Kurdish parliament in full session in Irbil and Sulaymaniyya in October 2002 and the adoption of a draft federal constitution.

During the Iraq War (2003), Kurdish forces placed themselves under the authority of the invading American-led coalition forces, and constituted a major part of the coalition's northern front. They also helped capture Mosul and Kirkuk from Iraqi forces.

See also Barzani, Family; Democratic Party of Kurdistan (Iraq); Gulf War (1991); Hussein, Saddam; Kurdish Revolts; Kurdistan; Kurds; Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); Talabani, Jalal.

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Chris Kutschera

KURDISH REVOLTS

The organized efforts of stateless Kurds to form a Kurdish state or achieve autonomy.

Since the late nineteenth century, the Kurds have made ceaseless efforts to achieve statehood or self-

Iraqi Kurdish refugees relocate to Iran after the failure of their 1991 uprising against the government of Iraq. During the rule of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi government often sought to suppress the Kurds, most notably in 1988 when he authorized a poison gas attack on Halabja, Iraq, which killed five thousand Kurds. © THIERRY ORBAN/CORBIS SYGMA. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

rule. These efforts have been identified, from a state-centered perspective, as "rebellion," "revolt," "insurrection," "insurgency," "sabotage," "treason," "turmoil," "religious fanaticism," "subversion," "banditry," "tribal feud," "secessionism," "sedition," "conspiracy," "unrest," "foreign agitation," "plot," or "intrigue," and, more recently, "terrorism." By contrast, the Kurds themselves and a body of less partisan literature use terms such as "resistance," "revolution," "patriotism," "national liberation," "independence movement" or "nationalist movement," "autonomy movement," "emancipation," "uprising," "(armed) struggle," and "self-determination." Western powers, such as Russia, Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, as well as states in the region have intervened in these revolts either as supporters or adversaries of the Kurds.

Although labeled as the world's largest "stateless nation," most Kurds lived under the direct rule of independent and autonomous Kurdish principalities, often nominally dependent on the overlord states of Ottoman Turkey and Iran. As part of their administrative-military modernization and centralization projects, the two states overthrew the last remaining principalities in the mid-nineteenth century.

The fall of the principalities brought the extension of state power to all parts of Kurdistan. The leadership of revolts then transferred, according to some historians, to the sheikhs, or leaders of religious orders, although tribal and feudal lords continued to rebel. The most important revolt, occurring in 1879–1880 against Turkey and Iran, was undertaken by Shaykh Ubaydullah. Some scholars see this revolt as the first stage of Kurdish nationalism because Ubaydullah tried to unite the Kurds in an independent Kurdish state. However, he and many other leading sheikhs were part of the landed feudal aristocracy motivated by class and clan interests.

Modernist nationalist ideas were first expressed by the Kurdish poet Hajji Qadiri Koyi (1818–1897). However, the modernist nation-building and state-building projects of Iran and Turkey, powerfully expressed in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906–1911 and the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, denied the Kurds any degree of self-rule.

World War I led to the redivision of Ottoman Kurdistan among the new states of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. Together with Iran, they emerged as centralized nationalist regimes that used violence to assimilate autonomy-seeking minority groups such as the Kurds. Kurdish nationalist resistance emerged, in part, as a reaction to modernist state violence.

A series of revolts shocked republican Turkey soon after its formation in 1923: the Shaykh Saʿid revolt (1925), the Ararat revolt (1927–1931, led by Khoybun, a nationalist party), and the Dersim revolt (led by religious leader Sayyid Riza). Some historians see the Shaykh Saʿid revolt as a new stage in the history of Kurdish nationalism because it was planned by a nationalist party although led by a religious leader. In Iran a series of tribal revolts in the 1920s and early 1930s reacted to Reza Shah Pahlavi's harsh centralization project. The most serious (1918–1930) was led by tribal leader Ismaʿil Agha Simko. In the unstable post–World War I Iraq, the British occupying administration allowed religious leader Shaykh Mahmud autonomous rule as a

bulwark against Turkish military incursions. He revolted and declared himself "King of Kurdistan" in 1922, only to be removed after a series of battles in 1923–1924.

During World War II and soon after, the hegemonic rule of tribal, feudal, and religious leaders gradually gave way to modern-style, secular, nationalist, party-centered politics of urban intellectuals and activists, while the peasantry remained the main fighting force, now called *peshmarga,* "those who face death." In the absence of civil society, political parties often had to work clandestinely and were forced into armed confrontation in mountainous countryside, but urban civil forms of dissidence began to emerge. The most important party, Komeley J. K (Society for the Revival of Kurdistan, 1942), aimed at the creation of a greater Kurdistan, reorganized as the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, Iran, and established the first modern Kurdish government, the Kurdish Republic of 1946, in northwestern Iran.

The longest Kurdish revolt in Iraq (1961–1975) was launched by Mulla Mustafa Barzani, leader of both the Barzani tribe and the Kurdish Democratic Party, Iraq (KDP; also known as the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, DPK). It resumed in 1976 under the newly formed Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the reorganized KDP, which in the wake of the 1991 U.S.-led war against Iraq formed the Kurdish Regional Government in the "Safe Haven" created and protected by the United States and the United Kingdom. Both parties participated in the 2003 U.S.-led war against the Baʿthist regime of Saddam Hussein.

In Turkey dissidence resumed in the 1960s with the participation and leadership of students, urban intellectuals, and political activists, who were, as of the 1970s, part of the leftist social movements of the country. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, in Kurdish acronym) launched an armed struggle for Kurdish independence in 1984. It gradually shifted to political struggle, especially after the abduction in Kenya of its leader Abdullah Öcalan by Turkish commandos in 1998, and reorganized into the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan (KADEK, in Kurdish acronym) in 2002.

In Iran the Kurds demanded autonomy during the Iranian Revolution and after the Islamic Re-

The Kurds are a non-Arabic people, who speak a language closely related to Persian. Kurds are Muslims but adhere to different Islamic sects, and include Sunni, Shiʿa, Alevi, and Ahl-e Haqq Kurds. There are eight to ten million million Kurds living in the border areas of Armenia, Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq (an area known as Kurdistan), with another eight million living in southwest Turkey. **© Hulton|Archive by Getty Images. Reproduced by permisison.**

public assumed power in 1979. Faced with Tehran's large-scale military offensive, the traditional nationalist KDP of Iran and the newly formed radical Komele (the Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan), together with other groups, engaged in armed resistance, which continues to this day.

The transition from patriarchal-tribal-feudal to democratic politics has been going on since the 1890s. The nationalist movement has become increasingly urbanized, has embraced secularism, socialism, and liberalism, and has allowed the more visible participation of women. Nevertheless, a radical rupture between tribal-feudal and democratic politics—especially in Iraqi Kurdistan—has not yet occurred.

See also Constitutional Revolution; Democratic Party of Kurdistan (Iran; KDP); Democratic Party of Kurdistan (Iraq); Iranian Revolution (1979); Kurdish Autonomous Zone; Kurdistan; Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK); Kurds; Pahlavi, Reza; Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); Young Turks.

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AMIR HASSANPOUR

KURDISTAN

The land of the Kurds.

Kurdistan does not have boundaries on any map, but it extends over five Middle Eastern states: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and parts of the former Soviet Armenia. It is a 620-mile (1,000 km) strip of land that, stretching from the southeast to the northwest, extends from Kermanshah (Iran) to the Gulf of Iskenderun (or Alexandretta, Turkey). Its width varies from about 150 miles (250 km) to 250 miles (400 km) between Mosul and Mount Ararat. The heart of Kurdistan is two long chains of mountains, the Taurus and the Zagros, which have many summits towering over 9,800 feet (3,000 m), while Mount Ararat reaches 16,900 feet (5,157 m).

Two long rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, have their sources in Kurdistan, which is also watered by two huge lakes—Van in Turkey and Urmia in Iran. Despite its harsh climate, Kurdistan is very fertile and rich in natural resources, particularly petroleum (especially in Kirkuk). Sulaymaniya, Diyarbakir, and Sanandaj have long been considered the "capitals" of Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkish Kurdistan, and Iranian Kurdistan, respectively. Iran is the only country where the word *Kurdistan* officially appears on the map, as a province.

There are no official statistics, but it is estimated that the Kurds number more than 25 million. Sharing a common culture (although they speak three different Kurdish dialects—Kurmanji, Sorani, and Zaza) and artifically divided by international borders that were imposed on them after World War I, the Kurds have not been able to develop a single and unified Kurdish national movement. They have fought separately in Turkey (Öcalan's Kurdistan Workers Party), in Iraq (KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan), and in Iran (KDPI, Iran), sometimes even allowing the neighboring countries to play upon their divisions. Long considered an obscure minority problem, the Kurdish issue has become an international question since the invasion of Kuwait (1990), the Gulf War (1991), and the creation in northern Iraq of a Kurdish Autonomous Zone, which is now shown on all maps of the Middle East.

See also DIYARBAKIR; GULF CRISIS (1990–1991); KURDISH AUTONOMOUS ZONE; KURDISH REVOLT; KURDS; SULAYMANIYA.

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CHRIS KUTSCHERA

KURDISTAN WORKERS PARTY (PKK)

Kurdish party in Turkey that fought a guerrilla war for Kurdish independence, 1984–1998.

The PKK (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan,* or Workers' Party of Kurdistan) has been, both ideologically and in its emphasis on violence, the most radical Kurdish political movement ever. During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the PKK was the most formidable opposition force in Turkey, where it was established, waging a bloody guerrilla war from 1984 to 1999 that cost perhaps 35,000 lives. It was and still is also active among the Kurds in the neighboring states, and it became a prominent factor in the Kurdish diaspora.

The PKK came out of one of the radical left tendencies in the Turkish student movement of the

early 1970s, when a handful of students at Ankara University, including some Turks as well as Kurds, decided to take up the Kurdish issue and to devote themselves, as they claimed, to the liberation of the oppressed Kurdish people from both national and class oppression. Seeking proximity to the masses they left the university and went to eastern Turkey, where they attempted to mobilize disaffected Kurdish youth against tribal and feudal leaders as well as against the state. In 1978 they formally organized the party, of which they became the political bureau. Abdullah Öcalan (c. 1946–), himself born in the village of Omerli to a poor Kurdish peasant family, became the chairman and soon assumed dictatorial powers in the organization.

At the time of the 1980 military coup in Turkey, the PKK was one of about a dozen Kurdish nationalist organizations and had become notorious through a series of violent conflicts with several of these rival organizations as well as with tribal chieftains. It was the only one of these organizations that was not virtually wiped out in the wake of the coup. The largest mass trials and the heaviest sentences concerned PKK activists, but small armed groups kept resisting arrest and clashing with army and police. Öcalan himself earlier had escaped to Syria; with Palestinian and Syrian support he began organizing proper guerrilla training for his followers, in camps in the Biqa Valley in Lebanon and later in northern Iraq.

In 1984 PKK bands, probably operating from Iraq, carried out their first raids on military positions inside Turkey. In spite of massive counterinsurgency operations, including air raids on suspected PKK camps and repeated invasions of Iraq by ground troops, the PKK managed to expand its area of operations and strike increasingly forcefully deep inside Turkey. Guerrilla bands stayed inside the country for extended periods and locally recruited numerous young fighters. The government mobilized Kurdish militia forces—mostly tribesmen under their own leaders—to fight the PKK; these ultimately numbered over 65,000. The countryside became polarized as both the PKK and the government pressured villagers to take sides and responded brutally to suspected disloyalty.

The 1990s brought great ideological and strategic changes, in part as a result of the PKK's military successes, in part in response to changes in the environment. The party, which had found new supporters and sympathizers among broader strata of Kurdish society, shed its Marxism and adopted a more accommodating attitude toward Islam. It renounced the struggle for a united and independent Kurdistan and aimed instead at a far more modest compromise with the Turkish authorities. It strongly supported such civil society initiatives as human-rights associations, legal pro-Kurdish parties, and village or neighborhood committees, and it attempted, without complete success, to bring them under its control. Realizing that Turkey never would give in to Kurdish demands without pressure from Europe, the PKK gave up its earlier violent protest demonstrations abroad and concentrated on developing an effective international lobby instead. A satellite television station (MED-TV, later Medya-TV) with studios in Belgium that broadcast to the Middle East and Europe provided the PKK with an effective modern means of propaganda and nation-building.

The PKK made various unsuccessful efforts to engage the Turkish authorities in negotiations and several times declared a unilateral cease-fire, but it failed to make a transition from military to political struggle. Counterinsurgency operations in the mid-1990s targeted especially the civilian wing of the Kurdish movement and forced a separation of the PKK from its potential supporters through massive village evacuations. Turkey put increasing political and military pressure on Syria, which had continued supporting the PKK, and secured in 1998 the expulsion of Öcalan. After unsuccessful efforts to find asylum in various European countries, he was hunted down in Kenya in 1999 by Western intelligence services (and according to some accounts, Israeli agents as well) and handed over to Turkish commandos, who flew him to Turkey, which put him on trial for high treason.

During the trial Öcalan renounced most of the ideas the PKK had stood for and ordered the PKK guerrilla fighters to lay down arms. Some disappointed followers turned their back on him, but the remaining political bureau members continued to consider him to be the supreme leader and to follow his orders. Most guerrilla units withdrew from Turkey into northern Iraq; significant numbers later gave themselves up to the Turkish authorities.

Öcalan was convicted and sentenced to death in 1999, but this was commuted to life imprisonment in 2002. At a party congress in 2002 the PKK was formally dissolved and transformed into a new organization, KADEK (Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan), which vowed to be non-violent and democratic. The congress duly elected Öcalan again as its president. In early 2003 the party still had several thousand armed men and women in Iraqi Kurdistan and at least tens of thousands of active supporters in Kurdistan and the diaspora.

See also Kurdish Revolts; Kurdistan; Kurds.

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Martin van Bruinessen

KURDS

People of Aryan origin who live in an area that embraces the highlands of eastern Anatolia and the northwest Zagros Mountains.

Kurds have been living for millennia in the region they call Kurdistan, which is divided today among five countries: Turkey (15 million), Iraq (5 million), Iran (8 million), Syria (1.5 million), and the Caucasus of the former Soviet Armenia (500,000).

History

Scholars debate whether the Kurds originally belonged to a group of Iranian (Indo-European–speaking) populations living around Lake Urmia who migrated westward during the seventh century B.C.E.; others emphasize the indigenous character of the Kurds living in the Taurus and Zagros mountain ranges since antiquity. Clearly, they have always been seen by their neighbors as a people apart, as documented by the medieval geographer Abu Ishaq al-Farsi some thousand years ago.

Their history becomes clear after the conquest of Tikrit by Islam, when Caliph Omar's troops prevailed in 637 C.E. Arab chronicles detail Kurdish revolts against their successive masters; they also tell of the rise of Kurdish dynasties—the Shahdids, the Hasanwayhids, and the Merwanids.

Playing upon the rivalry between the Ottoman Turks and the Iranians, the Kurds managed a measure of autonomy in the nineteenth century, and Amir Bedir Khan (1805–1870) ruled as the "uncrowned king of Kurdistan" over a large portion of Ottoman Kurdistan in the 1840s. After World War I and the demise of the Ottoman Empire, Kurdistan was apportioned to Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey (the Caucasus region had been within Russia since the beginning of the early 1800s). There were numerous Kurdish revolts led by religious or tribal leaders including Simko in Iran, Shaykh Mahmud Barzinji in Iraq, and Shaykh Said Piran in Turkey.

Kurdish Culture

Despite the influence of the neighboring cultures and the displacements of populations, and despite the campaigns of open or covert assimilation, Kurdish identity asserted itself by use of the Kurdish language, although the majority of the population is illiterate. Kurdish is not a dialect of Persian as some writers have claimed, but an Indo-European language of the western Indo-Iranian branch. Kurdish (or Kurdi) is characterized by a distinct grammar and syntax and by its own rich vocabulary.

Linguists working in France at the Paris-based Institut Kurde have been editing a dictionary of 50,000 words. There are three main Kurdish dialects: the Kurmandji, spoken in Turkey and in the northern part of Iraqi Kurdistan; the Sorani, used in Iran and in southern Iraqi Kurdistan; and the Zaza, also spoken in Turkey. Since the Kurdish people are subjected to national borders, the Kurdish language is written in three different types of characters: the Latin, or Roman, alphabet in Turkey and Syria; the Arabic alphabet in Iraq and Persia; and the Cyrillic alphabet in the former Soviet Union. Although, or because, Kurds are forbidden by many governments of the region to study their own language at school, they demonstrate a passion for their own idiom. There is a Kurdish proverb or saying for every situation, and daily life inspires popular songs (often about love and death, but also about war and hunting). Stirred by the feats of their

leaders, poets have written epics that are memorized and transmitted from generation to generation; one of these is Ahmad Khani's *Mem o Zin,* the Kurdish *Romeo and Juliet.*

Religion

Most of the Kurds adhere to Sunni Islam, save for some districts of Turkey where they are Alevis and the southern part of Iranian Kurdistan where they are Shiʿa and Ahl-e Haqq (which, both in Turkey and in Iran, negatively affects their relationship to the Kurdish national movement). Sufism is traditionally very strong in Kurdistan. After the demise of the principal Kurdish feudal leaders, the Kurdish revolts of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century were led by religious shaykhs belonging to one or another of the great dervish orders, particularly the Qadiriyya order or the Naqshbandi.

Observing a tolerant Islam that is marked by holdovers from Zoroastrianism such as the celebration of the new year *(Nowruz)* on 21 March, Sunni Kurds have coexisted for centuries with a number of Kurdish minorities, including Yazidis, who live around Jabal Sinjar; Ahl-e Haqq in the region straddling the border between Iraq and Iran; Shiʿa in the Kermanshah region of Iran; Jews in Badinan, Iraq (until the 1950s) and Kermanshah Iran; and Nestorians—Christian Assyrians, by far the largest group. This coexistence is mostly peaceful, but it has been marred by some conflicts that contributed to a negative opinion of the Kurds in the West. In 1846, Amir Badr Khan invaded the Nestorian districts, provoking a violent reaction in Europe and a punitive Ottoman expedition that led to his capture. At the end of the nineteenth century and during World War I, the Kurds participated in the Turks' mass killing of Armenians. In February 1918 Simko, the leader of the Kurdish revolt in Iran, assassinated the Mar Shamʿun, the Nestorian patriarch—an act that was condemned by other Kurdish leaders such as the Barzani family.

Anthropology, Ethnography, Sociology

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Kurdish society was not very different from the Kurdistan depicted in eighteenth- or nineteenth-century European travelers' narratives: Feudal chiefs were living in castles in relative luxury while peasants lived in natural caves or in mud huts, cultivating wheat and barley, tobacco and rice; most Kurds were nomads or seminomads, spending the summers with their herds of sheep and goats in the mountains and migrating back with them to the lowlands in the winters. The big tribes—the Herki, the Jaf, and the Shikak—were known by their number of tents (1,600 tents for such a tribe, and so many guns for one tent). The Kurds lived outside the towns, which were inhabited mainly by Turkish soldiers, officials, and merchants, as well as by Jews, Armenians, and other Christian minorities.

There were a few historical cities that served as trade centers for many centuries. These included Diyarbakir, Sulaymaniyya, and Bitlis in Ottoman Kurdistan, and Kermanshah and Sanandaj in Iranian Kurdistan. In Kurdish villages land tenure was conservative, with aghas owning the land—sometimes several villages—on which the poor peasants were working and paying a rent of as much as half their annual crop. Traditional Kurdish society has been seriously eroded by the exploitation of petroleum in Kirkuk and by Saddam Hussein's wars in Iraqi Kurdistan; by the policy of systematic destruction of the tribal system by the Pahlavi shahs of Iran; and by Turkey's policy of repression and assimilation, in particular during the fifteen-year-long war against the Kurdistan Workers Party (1984–1999). Most Kurds live now in the villages and in the big cities of Kurdistan, although a number of them have looked for refuge in Istanbul, Tehran, Baghdad, or Western Europe, where the Kurdish diaspora (over half a million Kurds in Germany alone) has prompted calls for a political solution to the Kurdish issue.

See also ALEVI; DIYARBAKIR; KURDISH REVOLTS; KURDISTAN; NAQSHBANDI; QADIRIYYA ORDER; SHIʿISM; SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS; SULAYMANIYA; SUNNI ISLAM; ZOROASTRIANISM.

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CHRIS KUTSCHERA

KÜTAHYA, PEACE OF

An 1833 pact granting Ottoman Empire territories, including Egypt, to Muhammad Ali Pasha and his son, Ibrahim Pasha.

In 1831, Muhammad Ali Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Egypt, attacked Syria, also part of the Ottoman Empire. Commanded by his son Ibrahim Pasha, Muhammad Ali's forces were successful. The empire's sultan, Mahmud II, responded to this rebellion, only to be soundly defeated by Ibrahim near Konya on 21 December 1832. Ibrahim continued his advance through Anatolia and occupied Kütahya in early February 1833. With Ibrahim so near Constantinople (now Istanbul), seat of the empire, Mahmud turned in desperation to Russia. Czar Nicholas I sent Russian ships to the Bosporus in late February, and Russian troops encamped at Hunkâr–Iskelesi soon after. At this point, the other European powers intervened. Egypt's ally France pressured Ibrahim to settle with the sultan, and Britain wished to defuse the crisis before Russian troops became involved in hostilities. On orders from his father, Ibrahim demanded the provinces of Syria and Cilicia, as well as Crete and Egypt for his father. At the end of March 1833, an agreement was concluded between Ibrahim and the sultan's representative, Mustafa Raşit Paşa. Ibrahim and Muhammad Ali were granted the aforementioned territories, and the Egyptian army then withdrew from Kütahya. The Peace of Kütahya was not an official treaty, but rather a pact between the sultan and his vassal. It concluded the First Egyptian Crisis and left Muhammad Ali in an extremely strong position, so strong that Britain's foreign minister, Lord Palmerston, was determined that he would not be allowed to maintain that position permanently. Eight years later, in the Second Egyptian Crisis, Muhammad Ali lost much of what was gained at Kütahya. After the First Crisis, Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed a mutual-defense agreement, the Treaty of Hunkâr–Iskelesi.

See also HUNKÂR–ISKELESI, TREATY OF (1833); IBRAHIM IBN MUHAMMAD ALI; KONYA, BATTLE OF; MAHMUD II; MUHAMMAD ALI; PALMERSTON, LORD HENRY JOHN TEMPLE.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

KUT AL-AMARA

Town in Iraq.

Kut al-Amara is approximately 100 miles (160 km) southeast of Baghdad on the left bank of the Tigris, opposite the mouth of the Shatt al-Hayy, the old canal connecting the Tigris with the Euphrates. The name Kut al-Amara, often shortened to Kut, derives from the Hindi word *kot,* meaning fortress.

Kut al-Amara's main claim to fame—or rather notoriety—is the decimation of several thousand British and Indian Allied forces stranded there during World War I by the advancing Turkish forces on 29 April 1916, after a five-month-long siege. The whole affair boiled down to a miscalculation on the part of the British commander, Major General Charles Townshend, who thought he could take Baghdad. Repulsed at Ctesiphon by the Turkish forces in late November 1915, Townshend was forced to retreat to Kut. In the end, after all attempts to redeem the situation failed, the Allied forces surrendered. According to the records, approximately 2,000 Allied soldiers lost their lives during the siege, and almost 12,000 were taken as prisoners of war.

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KAREN PINTO

KUTTAB

Basic school in Islamic education.

The *kuttab* was originally attached to a mosque, and the school taught children and new converts to be true believers of Islam. In the morning, students

would recite and memorize passages from the Qur'an. In the afternoon, they would learn to write, study Islamic prayers and rituals, and, particularly in the Arab East, study Arabic grammar and poetry.

Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, secular studies were introduced in many *kuttabs,* especially in cities, where they faced competition from new Western-style primary schools. In 1926, the Republic of Turkey abolished the *kuttabs* and instituted secular education and society.

Throughout the Middle East, most religious education is now taught in government schools, but *kuttabs* have remained an important vehicle of rural education, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

See also QUR'AN.

ELIZABETH THOMPSON

KUWAIT

Arab country situated at the northern end of the Persian/Arabian Gulf.

The state of Kuwait *(dawlat al-Kuwayt)* is located at the northern tip of the Persian Gulf. Its name in Arabic means "small fort," perhaps referring to an outpost left by sixteenth-century Portuguese sailors. Kuwait borders Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

Land and People

Kuwait's 7,800 square miles of territory are mostly flat except for a ridge in the north overlooking the Bay of Kuwait and a hill about 300 meters high in the southwest. The bay is Kuwait's most distinctive geographic feature, providing a sheltered harbor that many regard as the best port in the Persian Gulf. Kuwait has little available freshwater but, with 96.5 billion barrels of proven petroleum reserves, it produces most of its freshwater supplies from seawater in conjunction with electricity generation.

Summers are hot, with temperatures regularly topping 45 °C (113 °F) and sometimes exceeding 50 °C (122 °F). During other times of year, temperatures are moderate, especially at night, and, occasionally in winter may dip below freezing. Annual rainfall is about three inches per year, but varies locally from mere traces to downpours averaging several inches at a time. There is frequent wind and dust storms are common, especially during the spring and summer.

Before Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Kuwaiti citizens made up about 28 percent of the population of 2.1 million. Palestinians, peaking at about 400,000 persons, constituted the largest immigrant community, many having come to Kuwait after the 1948 and 1967 Arab–Israel wars. Kuwait also hosted an estimated quarter-million stateless Arabs, the *bidun* ("without"—for without citizenship). *Bidun* worked primarily as police and military personnel and were treated almost as citizens. When oil prices collapsed in 1986, the government tried to curb guest-worker immigration and encouraged *bidun* to emigrate. Following liberation in February 1991, most Palestinians were deported in retaliation for Yasir Arafat's support of Saddam Hussein's invasion, while *bidun* continued to suffer discrimination. Guest workers came increasingly from Egypt and South Asia. By 2003 the population had returned to 2.1 million but the proportion of citizens was approximately 40 percent. Nearly all native

Triumphant citizens of Kuwait City celebrate the liberation of the country from Iraqi forces in 1991. The invasion began in August 1990 with Iraq shelling the main bases of the Kuwati Army and Air Force. The United Nations issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to withdraw his troops, and when he refused, U.S.-led coalition forces were deployed. © PATRICK DURAND/CORBIS SYGMA. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Kuwaitis are Muslim; approximately 15 to 20 percent are Shiʿite and the rest Sunni. Most guest workers also are Muslim.

Few nomads remain in Kuwait. Most of the population is urban, concentrated in Kuwait City and its closely adjoining suburbs. Suburbs also are burgeoning in what formerly were called "outlying areas" farther from the city center. Building is booming south of the city, inland as well as along the coast; in Ahmadi, home of the Kuwait Oil Company; and in the rapidly urbanizing zone between Kuwait City and Jahra.

History

During the third millennium B.C.E., what is now Kuwait was part of a highly developed culture based on maritime commerce and linked to ancient Sumer. Kuwait's modern history began in the early eighteenth century when several clans of the al-Utub tribal grouping (part of the Aniza tribal confederation to which the Al Saʿud belong), left drought- and famine-stricken central Arabia and settled on the northern Gulf coast. The Al Sabah were formally established as rulers in 1756. They directed Kuwait's affairs in consultation with members of other paramount clans who, like them, had become merchants.

Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Al Sabah proved adept at the maneuvering necessary for a small state to survive next to powerful Saudi and Rashidi neighbors. They were especially successful in capitalizing on the rivalry between the imperialist Ottomans and British. In 1899 Mubarak Al Sabah (Mubarak the Great) reached the first in a series of secret agreements with the British relinquishing authority over Kuwait's foreign relations and potential oil reserves to Britain in exchange for protective services and secret subventions. The

Kuwaiti-British bond remained in effect until 1961. It ensured that the succession to the rulership would remain with Mubarak's direct descendants. The British helped to set up and run the state's administration but neglected to demarcate Kuwait's borders when states in its region were created by the victors of World War I. A general agreement on Kuwait's boundaries was reached by British, Saudi, and Iraqi representatives at the Uqayr Conference (1922), shrinking Kuwait's territory. But the ambiguity of Kuwait's borders invited attempts by both the Saudis and Iraqis to shrink Kuwait further and, with the 1990 Iraqi invasion, to extinguish its independent existence altogether.

Economics

Nineteenth-century Kuwait enjoyed enviable prosperity from maritime trade, pearling, and fishing. Its economy was devastated by World War I, Saudi raids, and the introduction of Japanese cultured pearls in the late 1920s. The Great Depression in the United States also affected Kuwait, but oil was discovered in 1938, promising a new prosperity. Amir Ahmad al-Jabir had granted the concession to develop Kuwait's oil to the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), a joint venture between British Petroleum (formerly the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) and the American-owned Gulf Oil Corporation. Kuwait's oil production expanded rapidly following the nationalization of Iranian oil by Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1951. Conflicts with KOC's operators underlay Kuwait's decision to become a founding member of OPEC in 1960. It nationalized foreign oil properties in the 1970s and, in 1980, established a holding company, the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC), for all its hydrocarbon assets, including those located abroad. In the 1990s Kuwaitis began debating the wisdom of inviting foreign oil companies back to produce oil in Kuwait on a contract basis and, by the turn of the century, debate over oil privatization had become a staple of parliamentary politics.

The government invested Kuwait's oil income directly, by expanding domestic and foreign oil holdings through KPC and its various subsidiaries; indirectly, it made large purchases of foreign blue-chip securities. Most of the latter are held by the Reserve Fund for Future Generations (RFFG), established in 1976 to ensure Kuwait's post-hydrocarbon prosperity. By law, the RFFG receives 10 percent of annual government revenue; it is the only reserve of its kind anywhere in the Gulf. By the early 1980s, Kuwait's portfolio income exceeded its income from oil and gas.

This changed following the 1990 Iraqi invasion. RFFG funds were tapped to provide approximately $26 billion toward liberation efforts. Billions more were spent during the war to support Kuwaitis in and outside the country and, after the war, to extinguish 732 oil well fires, to repair or replace industrial and civilian infrastructure, and to indemnify Kuwaitis through direct payments and large salary increases. Even before the invasion, financial misappropriations through insider trading, sweetheart contracts, and alleged embezzlement had eaten into Kuwait's financial reserves. This continued following liberation despite parliamentary oversight and a strengthened audit bureau. Whereas before the invasion Kuwait held approximately $100 billion in the RFFG and in the state's General Reserve Fund, its postliberation assets were estimated at only $30 to $35 billion. Owing to these financial reversals, Kuwait today is more dependent on oil revenues than it was twenty years ago.

Other investments had equally ambiguous results. Kuwait has made extensive indirect investments in human capital, offering citizens generous social services, medical benefits, and free education from kindergarten through postgraduate school. Literacy rates grew rapidly, and life expectancy in 2003 reached seventy-seven years. Full employment was a government goal but, like social services, became harder to provide after liberation because of straitened capital availability and soft oil markets. Kuwaiti economic policy also is affected by changing attitudes toward personal responsibility, including policies affecting the private sector, curtailing subsidies, and imposing user fees.

Kuwait's foreign aid history has undergone a similar transition over the past four-plus decades since the 1960s. Oil-rich Kuwait invested in projects in other Muslim countries, but few were profitable. It also pioneered direct assistance through foreign-aid programs. It hosts university students from abroad and was the first developing country to establish its own international aid organization, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. Yet



Kuwait's National Assembly Building was designed by Jørn Utzon, the man responsible for the iconic Sydney Opera House. Construction on the massive edifice was completed in 1985. The building sustained heavy damage during the Iraqi invasion in 1990 and extensive renovations were needed. © YANN ARTHUS-BERTRAND/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

as with direct investment projects, Kuwait (along with its OPEC peers) found itself criticized by aid recipients for demanding that they adhere to international standards of compliance with loan and grant requirements. Even before Kuwait incurred large economic liabilities from the Iraqi invasion and occupation, Kuwaitis had begun to reconsider their foreign aid policies.

Government and Politics

Kuwait's dynastic, patriarchal system of government remains firmly in the hands of the Al Sabah, strengthened first by British support and then by Kuwait's oil wealth. Merchant attempts to recover their authority continue to be stymied. Although the 1962 constitution established an elected National Assembly, the parliament's ability to curb the rulers' power was undermined by two multiyear amiri suspensions of civil liberties guarantees. The parliament's power is diluted in several other ways: The amir's cabinet appointments are ex officio members; and an informal tradition gave a monopoly on the prime ministry to the crown prince until 2003. Elections are enthusiastically contested. Native-born Kuwaitis and sons of naturalized Kuwaiti citizens who are twenty-one years of age or older may vote in parliamentary elections but, despite an equal rights provision in the constitution, women are forbidden by law to vote or run for parliamentary office.

The two constitutional suspensions provided opportunities for the amir to manipulate the voter base. Elections held in 1981 after a five-year parliamentary hiatus were run in redrawn districts incorporating thousands of newly naturalized bedouin. Four years into the second suspension, the amir tried to quash the parliament altogether, holding new elections in June 1990 for an extraconstitutional "National Council" lacking the National Assembly's legislative powers. The Iraqi invasion ended this experiment; a new National Assembly was elected in October 1992.

The 1992 election marked a significant political watershed for Kuwait. Antigovernment candidates, about half of them Islamists, won thirty-five of the fifty seats. The ideological balance between Islamist and secularist parliamentarians (there are no legal parties in Kuwait, although a minority of candidates associate themselves with political clubs whose stands on issues they share) brought policy making to a virtual halt through much of the 1992 parliament's four-year term. Its successor, the 1996 parliament, was equally deadlocked on major issues, prompting the amir to dismiss the body in 1999 and call for new elections within sixty days, the first constitutional transition of this kind. The 1999 parliament also reflected a close balance between liberal and Islamist forces, but members of both coalitions were notably more flexible than their predecessors. Cross-coalitions centered mainly on economic issues were occasionally able to mobilize parliamentary majorities.

The most serious domestic political problem faced by Kuwait and other Gulf monarchies is uncertainty over ruler succession. Rulers and heirs apparent are mostly old and ailing, and the size of ruling families, along with evidence of clashing personal ambitions, heightens insecurity about future governance.

Foreign Relations

Kuwait's foreign relations reflect its changing economic circumstances and the resumption of direct intervention by major powers from outside the region. Prior to the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait used "checkbook diplomacy," hoping to buy off enemies and

win friends among its neighbors. The 1990–1991 Iraqi invasion and widespread Arab popular support for it illustrated the failure of that strategy. Kuwait's long-standing nonaligned policy was undermined by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kuwait's current strategic dependence on the United States, which spearheaded the coalition of forces liberating Kuwait in 1991, leaves it vulnerable to direct pressure to conform to U.S. policy wishes. Since then, Kuwait has since faced pressure to increase arms purchases and provide access to more than a third of its territory as a platform for the 2003 U.S. and British invasion of Iraq. Given rising prospects for violent conflict in the Middle East, should the absence of regionally based security arrangements continue, Kuwaiti near-term foreign policy autonomy is, for all practical purposes, foreclosed.

See also Al Sabah Family; Al Sabah, Mubarak; Gulf Crisis (1990–1991); Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development; Kuwait Petroleum Corporation; Mossadegh, Mohammad.

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KUWAIT CITY

Capital of Kuwait.

The origins of modern Kuwait appear to date to a settlement generally identified on early maps as *Grane,* a phonetic spelling of of *Qurayn* (Arabic for either "hillock" or "little horn," both describing features of the coast). By the last third of the eighteenth century, the name *Kuwait* ("little fort") also was used by the migrating clans from central Arabia who had settled there. In the nineteenth century, Kuwait developed into a significant entrepôt, the home port of large trading vessels. Shipbuilding was a major industry, along with pearl fishing, which employed some 700 ships and 15,000 men by the early twentieth century. The town was walled in 1920 during four months of furious preparation to defend it against bedouin marauders, an event laying the groundwork for the state's current definition of citizenship. Residents of the town in 1920 and their descendants became "first category" citizens under the nationality law of 1959.

With the influx of oil wealth in the 1950s, the town was transformed. Under a master plan drawn up by a British firm, most of the old city was razed and rebuilt to contemporary Western tastes. Between 1960 and 1964 the Palestinian-American architect and city planner Saba George Shiber sought to reincorporate elements of Kuwait's past into the city's urban landscape. His influence is visible in the National Assembly building and the seafront water towers.

The 1990 to 1991 Iraqi occupation and war inflicted extensive damage on buildings and infrastructure in the city. Remnants of the wall and its gates were almost totally lost, the Dasman and Sief Palaces were damaged extensively, and the old suq was destroyed. Much of the new Kuwait was trashed as well. Public and private buildings, including homes, were filled with broken furniture, damaged books and papers, and occasional strategic deposits of human waste. An appalling wreckage was left in the Kuwait Museum, a complex housing a notable collection of Islamic art whose courtyard on the seafront had been home to a now-missing old Kuwaiti dhow.

Postwar rehabilitation proceeded rapidly and has been overtaken by new construction. The city center has acquired new high-rises. There is an explosion of growth in the suburbs, especially in Salmiya, which now sports American-style malls and a seafront aquarium. Prior to the invasion, urban sprawl spilled primarily southward, along the coast beyond Salmiya and inland to suburbs such as Jabriya and Rumaythiya. Now the city is spreading north and west as well, past the health and science

complexes lying beyond the university's Shuwaykh campus, and inland, toward Jahra.

What has not changed is the traffic. The city hub is surrounded by a series of concentric arcs—the Ring Roads—connected by major thoroughfare and highway "spokes." On and off the highways, the city is beset by traffic congestion with its associated noise, pollution, accidents, and parking problems. The population of Kuwait in 2004 was 2,257,549 residents.

See also KUWAIT.

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KUWAIT FUND FOR ARAB ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Organization set up in 1961 to extend foreign aid to Arab, Islamic, and Third World countries, primarily in Asia and Africa.

The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) was the first foreign-aid vehicle entirely financed by a developing state. Established to aid other Arab countries, KFAED's recipient list grew following the rapid rise in world oil prices in the early 1970s to include developing countries around the world. KFAED supplies project aid, mostly in the form of concessional loans, technical assistance, and training. Its capitalization reached KD 2 billion in 1981 and, since then, it has been self-financing: repayments serve as the source of funds for subsequent loans and grants. Kuwait's foreign assistance effort through KFAED and other agencies averaged more than 5 percent of GDP per year from the mid-1960s until oil prices collapsed in the mid-1980s.

Between January 1962 and March 2003, KFAED made 631 loans to 99 countries for a total of KD 3.345 billion, and it supplied KD 73 million in grants and technical assistance to 163 countries. Slightly more than one-half of the commitments in each category went to other Arab states. KFAED also contributed KD 335 million to eight development institutions.

The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait exposed the ineffectiveness of foreign aid as a generator of diplomatic support for Kuwait among its neighbors and peers. Since then, Kuwait's economic circumstances have become more straitened and Kuwaitis have grown cynical about the utility of foreign aid either to themselves or to populations in recipient countries. In April 2003, responding to sharp criticism and political pressure from other Arab governments and mass publics regarding Kuwait's position on the U.S.-led war in Iraq, several proposals were made in parliament to limit KFAED's autonomy. One sought to amend KFAED's charter to require its awards to support Kuwait's foreign policy goals; another to forbid KFAED to award assistance to any country whose government had attacked Kuwait's support for the 2003 U.S.-led attack on Iraq; a third to require that every new KFAED loan be approved by a parliamentary vote. Despite support for KFAED from the government and liberal elites, and the budget autonomy which offers KFAED fiscal independence from domestic critics in and outside of parliament, the lack of correspondence between the national interests of Kuwait and those of the recipients of its foreign aid leave KFAED vulnerable to a reevaluation of foreign policy tools that could diminish its future role.

See also KUWAIT.

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KUWAIT PETROLEUM CORPORATION

National oil company of the State of Kuwait.

The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) was formed in 1980 as a holding company for most of the state's hydrocarbon assets. These had been acquired through the nationalization of foreign-owned equities in the 1970s and through the purchase of domestic investors' shares of state-private joint ventures. Major subsidiaries include the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), which develops and produces domestic oil and gas; the Kuwait National Petroleum Company, which refines and exports oil and gas products and markets them directly domestically; the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company, which operates crude, product, and gas carriers; the Petrochemical Industries Company, which produces, distributes, and markets petrochemicals; and the Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Company, which engages in exploration, development, and production of hydrocarbons outside of Kuwait, mostly through joint ventures. Among KPC's foreign subsidiaries are KPC International, parent of Kuwait Petroleum International (KPI), which supervises overseas refining and marketing operations.

KPC acquired refining, storage, and marketing assets in Europe during the 1980s to extend its vertical integration. It also acquired a U.S.-based firm, Santa Fe Braun, with drilling, construction, and production assets, but KPC gradually sold most of these operations as incompatible with its long-term corporate goals. The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait demonstrated the usefulness of KPC. Its character as the parent of European subsidiaries and affiliates attracted support from host governments; KPI's London offices ran operations outside of Iraqi control and coordinated planning for reentry and reconstruction following liberation. Reconstruction was made more difficult by Iraqi sabotage, which left 727 oil wells damaged, most of them on fire. The fires were extinguished and all the wells capped within nine months by nearly forty teams of firefighters from around the world, including from KOC.

In recent years, KPC has been planning for the privatization of some of its assets. Deciding what should be privatized and how has been contentious. Kuwait's constitution vests ownership of mineral assets in the state but does not prohibit foreign ownership of other than production assets. One model was worked out when Equate, a subsidiary of Petroleum Industries Company, itself a subsidiary of KPC, was established. Equate is owned 45 percent each by the government and Union Carbide and 10 percent by local shareholders, who have very little say in how the company is run. Other models include the direct sale of selected operations to a group of investors and the sale of a portion of equity in existing companies through an initial public offering, with or without restrictions on the nature and number of buyers. International oil companies are eager to acquire production interests in countries with high reserves, like Kuwait, which faces competition for their investment dollars from Russia, the central Asian republics, and Africa. With the privatization of Iraqi oil a likely legacy of the 2003 U.S.-British invasion, additional privatization of KPC's operations is highly likely, too.

See also KUWAIT.

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KUWAIT UNIVERSITY

Kuwait's principal institution of higher education, established in 1966 and geared to prepare Kuwaitis for professional careers in a variety of fields.

When it opened in 1966, Kuwait University consisted of colleges of science, art, and education, and a college for women. It had 31 faculty members and 418 students. During the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, occupation forces looted and damaged the university and used some of its buildings to hold prisoners. Much of the war's damage was repaired within a year of the country's liberation, and by the mid-1990s enrollments had attained prewar levels. The student body has always had a Kuwaiti majority, and in the late 1990s there were 13,261 Kuwaitis and 1,397 non-Kuwaitis enrolled. The student body consists of about twice as many women as men.

By the early twenty-first century, the number of colleges had expanded from the original four to twelve, including colleges of dentistry, engineering,

law, medicine, and *shariʿa* and Islamic studies. The number of students reached 19,000, with 1,297 teaching staff. In mid-2003, plans were being implemented to establish a college of marine science. Most of the colleges are coeducational; the college of women provides a same-sex environment and courses of study in nutrition, food and family studies, information science, and communication science and languages.

See also KUWAIT; *SHARIʿA.*

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L

LAABI, ABDELLATIF

[1942–]

Moroccan poet and novelist.

Abdellatif Laabi was born in Fez, Morocco, to a Muslim family. He obtained a B.A. in French literature and taught French at the Lycée Mulay Idris. He founded the journal *Souffles* (Breaths) with Mohammed Khair-Eddine and Mustafa Nissaboury in 1966; the Arabic version of this journal was called *Anfas.* Laabi was imprisoned in 1972 and released on 18 July 1980. He has lived in France since 1985.

Laabi received strong support from friends and intellectuals all over the world while in prison. He continued to write poetry during this period and received many literary prizes. He describes his prison years in a series of poems and letters titled *Chroniques de la citadelle d'exil* (1983; Chronicles of the citadel of banishment).

Laabi seeks to eliminate the dividing lines between literary genres, but he is primarily a poet with an impressive number of poetry collections, including *Le règne de barbarie, et d'autres poèmes* (1980; The cruel rule and other poems), which marks the beginning of his poetic and literary writings. His most recent publications are *Le spleen de Casablanca* (1997; The spleen of Casablanca) and the illustrated collection *Petit musé portatif* (2002; A small portable museum). Laabi's success with poetry led him to write plays, including *Le baptême chacaliste* (1987; Jackalian baptism), *Exercices de tolérance* (1993; Drills in tolerance), and *Rimbaud et Shéhérazade* (2000; Rimbaud and Scheherazade). He also published four novels. *L'oeil de la nuit* (1969; The eye of the night), *Les rides du lion* (1989; The wrinkles of the lion), and *Le chemin des ordalies* (1982; The road of ordeals), re-edited in 2000 as *Le fou d'espoir* (Crazy with hope), relate his painful years in prison. His *Le fond de la jarre* (2002; The bottom of the jug) evokes the traditional life in Fez during the colonial period.

Laabi has translated extensively from Arabic into French: the poems of the Moroccan Abdallah Zrika, published as *Rires de l'arbre à palabre* (1982; Laughter of the palaver tree); an anthology of Palestinian poetry, *La poésie palestinienne de combat* (1970;

Palestinian struggle poetry); Mahmud Darwish's poetry, as *Rien qu'une autre année* (1983; It is only another year); *Soleil en instance* (1986; Sun in process), by the Syrian novelist Hanna Mina; a collection of poetry by the Iraqi Abd al-Wahhab al-Bayati, *Autobiographie du voleur de feu* (1987; Autobiography of the fire thief); and a collection of poems by the Palestinian Samih al-Qassim, *Je t'aime au gré de la mort* (1988; I love you at the pleasure of death).

Laabi's works reveal an interest in the human being and a strong commitment to the Palestinian cause. Much of his writing can be described as revolutionary. His long-term goal was to sever the strong link to Western culture in order to end the cultural alienation of the Maghribi writer. Yet he also sought renewal through the elimination of antiquated and unsuitable traditions. His pre-prison poetry was characterized by a violent anger provoked by the repressive policy of the time. The writings published in *Souffles* reflect a similar attitude. His post-prison poetry shows signs of greater wisdom, maturity, and depth of reflection.

Laabi explained his positions, ideology, and prison experience in a series of conversations with Jacques Alessandra published under the title *La brûlure des interrogations* (1985; The scald of interrogations). He provided in the same book a useful assessment of the literary scene in Morocco and an insight into his writings and thought.

See also Literature: Arabic, North African.

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LAAYOUNE

The largest city in Western Sahara.

Laayoune (also El-Aaiun, El-Ayoun, al-Ayun) is both the largest city in Western Sahara and the capital of one of the three provinces that Morocco established in the territory. The discovery of potable water at the site resulted in the establishment of a Spanish military garrison in 1938, marking the beginning of the town. It was made the capital of Spain's new Sahara province in 1958. The Spanish authorities subsequently established a port on the Atlantic coast 18 miles from the town, along with facilities for the export of newly discovered phosphates. The European population when the Spanish withdrew in 1976 was approximately 10,000; the local Sahrawi population was around 30,000, a considerable number of whom were living in tents or makeshift structures on the edge of town. Many of the Sahrawis fled to Algeria with Polisario forces in 1975 and 1976. Since then, the population has grown to 175,000. Morocco has sought to consolidate its control of the territory by launching large-scale infrastructure projects such as the construction of hospitals, schools, and a football stadium and the expansion of drinking water facilities, and it has given incentives to Moroccan professionals to work there.

In 1991 Morocco orchestrated the entry of around 35,000 persons of Sahrawi origin in order to expand the list of eligible voters for the proposed UN referendum on the future of the western Sahara. Most of them were housed in tents in so-called unity camps. Fall 1999 witnessed major socioeconomic protests, with Sahrawis complaining of poor employment and housing conditions and discrimination in favor of Moroccans from the north. The unrest occasioned a harsh police crackdown in the city, aided by vigilante action by "northerners." The events shook the Moroccan regime headed by newly installed King Muhammad VI and contributed to the deposal of longtime interior minister Driss Basri. The government declared a new policy emphasizing regional development in order to win the hearts and minds of the population in advance of the proposed UN referendum. This new strategy was highlighted by three visits to the region by the king between October 2001 and February 2002, when he presided over a mass ceremony of allegiance to the throne.

See also Green March; Hassan II; Morocco; Muhammad VI; Tindouf; Western Sahara.

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LABOR AND LABOR UNIONS

Depending on the country, trade unions in the Middle East are nonexistent (in some cases, illegal), state-controlled, or independent, but they rarely represent many workers effectively.

There are also an increasing number of socioeconomic problems (from child labor to the situation of migrant labor to widespread adult unemployment) that they can do little to address although these problems have been worsened by the impact of globalization on much of the region.

Formal trade-union structures in the Middle East grew out of European imperialism and colonialism—especially from the extension of capitalist markets and the introduction of mechanized production. From a relatively undeveloped division of labor with a guild form of collective action, the labor force now comprises a clearly articulated division of labor, new means of production, and workers who own nothing but their labor power. This process occurred relatively quickly in each locality but at very different times. The critical period was from the beginning of the twentieth century until shortly before World War I. After World War II, Middle Eastern economies became relatively closed, socialist, or quasi-socialist. Trade unions played secondary roles and have often been subordinated to state policies.

During the late years of the Ottoman Empire (in Anatolia and the Arab provinces) and the Qajar dynasty (in Iran), peasant production predominated. Urban areas accounted for little more than 15 percent of the economy. Industry was largely artisanal (skilled manual labor), based on simple instruments of production. The division of labor within productive enterprises was slight. Competition from European production often forced domestic artisanal and craft producers out of old sectors and into new ones and new government structures reduced the effective support of the state for their associations. In Iran and Egypt, integration into the world capitalist market reduced the role of artisans and craftsmen in textile production and animal transport even as it opened up some new sectors of the economy. Something similar occurred in Tunisia, although there foreign domination began in the late 1800s.

Direct colonial control, where it existed, transformed property rights to allow the creation of capitalist corporations and also the political power European and local entrepreneurs needed to affect tariff regulations and local costs to ensure their success. Trade unions arose in the context of European colonial domination and thus invariably engaged not only in local social conflict but in the political struggles over control of the various states.

Foreign capitalists used access to political power and to external sources of capital to take advantage of cheap local raw materials and labor in most of the Arab world (but this was somewhat less true of the relatively more independent states of Turkey and Iran). In Palestine, the Arabs were gradually dominated by the European-backed Jewish settlers. In Tunisia, French control allowed the Europeans to command both the agricultural and the mineral sectors. In Iran and Iraq, foreigners (Europeans and Americans) provided the capital for developing the petroleum industry, and intense conflict over the role of the state occurred repeatedly.

European capitalists often introduced foreign (European) labor into the region at higher wages than local laborers could command. They also brought in local workers from various sections of the countryside to work in factories; their employees thus had little in common and were easily manipulated. In Palestine, this interplay of nationalist politics and social conflict was particularly acute because the socialist institutions of the Zionist labor movement often acted to exclude Palestinian Arabs from particular labor markets; the General Federation of Labor in Eretz Yisrael (Histadrut)—unlike Arab, Turkish, or Persian trade unions—created the foundations of a labor economy to support Zionist nationalism as well as to protect the rights of workers. Exceptionally, Histadrut thus had a dual role, as investor as well as trade union, insofar as Histadrut controls the Hevrat ha-Ovedim firm with its many subordinate companies. Elsewhere, the struggle of workers against capital was often perceived as a national struggle and was co-opted into the struggle of nationalist politicians.

Two important political currents guided the early labor movement. Marxist intellectuals from outside the working class brought the ideas of class struggle and "scientific socialism" into the working class and often (but not always) also recruited workers into Leninist political parties. Workers hostile to the

dominance of the liberal professionals in their movement also created their own independent unions.

In the Maghrib (North Africa), and especially in Tunis, the struggle for independence reached a heroic climax with the creation of a separate labor-union structure, the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (General Union of Tunisian Workers; UGTT). It was led by Ferhat Hached rather than French communists in 1946. Elsewhere in the Arab world, leaders of the trade-union movement associated with the nationalist left allied themselves with political elites. After gaining independence, they extended the power of the state over the economy by nationalizing firms and creating a corporate trade-union structure. State investments created large public sectors in most countries, and it is the workers in the public sector who usually make up the bulk of trade-union members.

Those countries in the Middle East with unions generally have a single, often compulsory, trade-union structure. Countries with single-, state-, or ruling-party–controlled federations are Djibouti, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. Iraq's public-sector employees were part of the state-controlled union federation until 1987, when the law was changed to exclude them so the state could cut its public-sector wage bill. Foreign nationals there, mainly Egyptians, are reported to be underpaid and mistreated. In these countries and in Egypt (where the Egyptian Trade Union Federation is formally separate from the state and the ruling National Democratic party), strikes by public-sector employees are illegal, and collective bargaining between workers and employers as equals is absent. The mid-1980s saw a renewal of protests and strikes in Egypt, especially in the public sector, as the government retreated from its social-welfare commitments. In many countries in the region, strikes are illegal and workers have few ways of challenging the power of the state or private employers.

The bulk of child labor in the region remains in agriculture but these children often work in export-intensive agriculture. By some estimates, there may be as many as two million children who work in Egypt. Most of them work in the fields, but they also play a role in urban small-scale production. Child labor is a problem on its own but it also inhibits the acquisition of literacy by substantial sections of the population.

Israel's Histadrut, although founded in 1920 in British-mandated Palestine, now controls significant economic resources through its associate institutions—thus remaining the state's sole trade union. Since 1953, Israeli Arabs have been accepted as members. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip lack strong unions; both the Israeli government and the Palestinian nationalist movement are uncertain about the long-term effects of unions, and, in the pre-1993 Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) accord atmosphere, union creation was difficult. In Lebanon and Jordan, autonomous and plural trade-union federations exist—in Lebanon, they continued to operate during the civil war.

In Tunisia, an independent trade-union federation with historic links to the ruling Neo-Destour party has operated independently and sometimes in antagonism to the state. The union federation was engaged in a massive wave of strikes in January 1977. In Morocco and Algeria, multiple trade-union federations exist independently of the state, and high unemployment coupled with low economic growth has produced labor unrest.

In Bahrain (where worker arbitration committees exist), Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, trade unions are illegal. Persistent reports exist of the arrests and executions of workers attempting to form unions in the eastern oil-rich provinces of Saudi Arabia, which also have large Shiʿite populations. Because a large part of the workforce in many of the countries of the Arabian peninsula are migrant laborers from elsewhere in the Arab world or from non-Arab Muslim countries, the absence of unions intensifies their liability to mistreatment. These workers, who in some cases make up a majority of the workforce, have no political rights and can be easily deported if they appear troublesome to their employers.

In Turkey, the trade-union movement was not integrated into the state, and plural union movements remained, the most important of which is the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türk Iş). Although dominant, Türk Iş faces competition from

several other trade unions, notably DISK (The Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions, which was banned after the 1980 coup) and Islamic and Turkish nationalist confederations (Haqq Iş and MISK, respectively).

Trade unions in Iran have infrequently functioned freely since the 1950s. Between the 1953 coup and the 1979 Iranian revolution, the state actively intervened in trade-union affairs. After the revolution, there was (in addition to unions) an experiment in a broader form of workers' councils, known as *shura.* In 1983, the labor minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to win passage of a restrictive new law. Most unions and the *shura* system were dissolved in 1985, and the government appears to have accepted the principle that workers and owners enter into individual contracts rather than collective agreements.

In the precolonial period, unions were often weak but provided workers with some independent voice in regard to the state and firm owners; in the post-colonial period, the material conditions of workers and their families have been more profoundly affected by decisions of central political authorities than by union struggles. If privatization continues to increase in Middle Eastern economies, "wildcat" struggles by workers are likely to increase. Privatized industries frequently attempt to increase profits by decreasing the size of the work force, thereby setting the stage for conflicts with unions (where they exist) and with sections of government that fear the impact of growing unemployment.

See also Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions; Histadrut; Labor Zionism; Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT).

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Ellis Goldberg

LABOR ZIONISM

One of the main ideologies and political currents within the Zionist movement.

From the beginning of the twentieth century, Labor Zionism dominated the political philosophy of the Jews who went to resettle in Palestine, both during the British Mandate and then as the philosophical banner of the dominant political party in the new State of Israel until the parliamentary elections of 1977. Its leaders are considered the founding fathers of the Jewish state, the architects of its most distinctive social and economic institutions.

Origins of Labor Zionism

Two powerful ideologies of the nineteenth century—nationalism and socialism—were synthesized into several Labor Zionist expressions. Even before the establishment of the first Zionist organizations, Moses Hess published in 1862 *Rome and Jerusalem,* which advocated a socialist Jewish commonwealth in Palestine as the only solution to the plight of the Jewish masses in the diaspora, especially those of Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. As a member of the League of Communists, along with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Hess became one of the first Jewish writers to discuss the collective existence of the dispersed Jews in terms of the socioeconomic conditions of capitalism and to put forth the idea of a political and economic revolution as the solution to the so-called Jewish problem.

For Labor Zionists, the core of the Jewish problem was not that Jews existed in Christian and Islamic host countries, but that only a small proportion of Jews were farmers or workers in the mainstream of their adopted societies. Most were scholars and teachers of Jewish studies or merchants and traders

In the early 1900s, over forty thousand Jews fled to Palestine to escape brutal Russian pogroms. The first Labor Zionist leader to actually reside in Palestine, Aaron David Gordon, believed that only through physical labor and a return to the land could the Jews truly form their own nation. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

on a small or large scale. The explanation for this distorted occupational structure was rooted in modern European history, with its legislation that excluded Jews in most countries from joining guild-dominated trades or from owning land (the Austro-Hungarian Empire was an exception). According to Labor Zionist views, most Jews had been denied the opportunity of engaging in productive labor, and therefore their socioeconomic structure was fatally distorted. Although there were Jewish artisans, merchants, and farmers throughout the diaspora, Labor Zionism assumed there were too few to create an agricultural and craft base for a new Jewish society. For that reason, the framework of ordinary class analysis had to be reworked to account for the plight of European Jewry. In socialist doctrine, class struggle arises from the relations of production, but Jewish socialists saw that most Jews needed to gain access to "the conditions of production,"—to land, natural resources, and channels of trade.

Without a country of their own, Jews had to acquiesce to those with economic and political power; consequently, they were also forced to discharge functions that other groups refused. In Russia, for example, Jews were routinely called upon to fill pioneering roles in new territories of the Pale and to develop economies there, but they were evicted by edict when the economies matured and competitors for their positions emerged from the national majority. Not only did such circumstances produce uncertainty, they also posed enormous dangers. Each expulsion was accompanied by an ideology of degradation that justified the destruction of Jewish property and lives. The ideology of Jew hatred became so internalized that Jews in these circumstances came to accept their powerlessness as natural and unchangeable. Antisemitism thus affected their economic options, political position, social status, and self-conception. Since socialism postulated class struggle as the means to final and full human liberation, Jews, who were unable to participate in the process, could not expect to benefit from the outcome.

Labor Zionism in Palestine

In the nineteenth century the educated youth of Russia and Eastern Europe proved a receptive audience for socialism. Educated and assimilated Jewish youth also became socialists, but some were Jewish nationalists as well, and they became Labor Zionists. In 1905 two small Zionist labor parties were founded by Eastern European Jewish youths who went to Palestine. They both advanced the idea of socioeconomic normalization and emphasized that in their own national society Jews would assume all economic roles, not just the restricted and vulnerable occupations of the diaspora. Although the ultimate aim was to create in Palestine a Jewish working class, the immediate concern was to find or create employment in a land that had no industrial base. The only jobs at first were on farms owned by Jews—earlier immigrants or those from the religious community of Jerusalem—whose own economic base was insecure, sustained by philanthropic external financial aid. On these farms Jews had to compete with local Palestinians who were willing to work for low wages. Jewish farmers first had to be convinced to employ Jews instead of Palestinians, even if costs were higher and profits lower. The immigrant Jews themselves had to be persuaded to work for lower wages than they might have expected.

One of the political parties, Poʿalei Zion (Workers of Zion), tried to organize craftsmen into unions and initiated strikes in protest against the conditions of employment in the Jewish farming colonies. A small group from this party also turned its energies toward self-defense. Some Labor Zionists had founded guard units in Eastern Europe to protect Jewish communities there during pogroms. They and their defense concepts were transported to Palestine and expanded; their members were hired as guards on Jewish farms.

The second labor party, ha-Poʿel ha-Tzaʿir (The Young Worker), was formed just weeks before Poʿalei Zion. Assuming a capitalist development in Palestine, ha-Poʿel ha-Tzaʿir nevertheless traced its intellectual roots to Russian populism (rather than Marxism), rejected most of the socialist doctrine, and shunned the very word socialism. It had no ties to the international workers' movement, opposed strike actions, and rejected the utility of class struggle. It romanticized the idea of labor, but called on Jews to return to the soil, to drain swamps, to build roads. It also established the first kibbutz, Deganya, and was involved with the founding of the first *moshav* (agricultural cooperative), Nahalal.

The political changes triggered by the Russian Revolution and the end of World War I facilitated the spread of Labor Zionism from 1917 to the early 1920s. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the changed boundaries of Austria-Hungary and Russia stimulated many Jews to leave for the new British Mandate territory of Palestine, where the Labor Zionists pressed for the rapid immigration and settlement of Jewish workers. Many adherents, taking matters into their own hands, crossed war-torn borders to enter Palestine without regard to the established policies of either the World Zionist Organization (WZO) or Palestine's Mandate government. Coming of age in the midst of the traumatic conditions of war, revolution, and counterrevolution in Eastern Europe, these Labor Zionists also experienced the postwar pogroms that were unleashed by the Ukrainians and the Poles.

Economic and political circumstances in Palestine forced both political parties to readjust their strategies and activities. The proposals for cooperative settlement on the land that were advanced by

One of the biggest stumbling blocks the Labor Zionism movement faced was the fact that Jews had little experience with physical labor, since in most countries they were banned from owning land or seeking certain guild-dominated occupations. **© HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

the leadership of the WZO provided plans for employment, but the new agricultural settlements challenged the socialist emphasis on industrial development. Both parties also had to find ways to justify their cooperation with the bourgeois Zionist leadership and their policies. After World War I, there were powerful incentives to unify the labor movement. In 1920 the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) was founded, bringing into a unified framework all Labor Zionist political parties and undertaking, on their behalf, a broad range of political, economic, and cultural activities. One segment of the Labor Zionist movement founded in Vienna (1916) was ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir (The Young Guard). Its members were youths educated for kibbutz life in Palestine, and it retained its distinctive structure and ideology, although it also joined the Histadrut. It founded agricultural collectives, and its vision of liberation owed as much to Sigmund Freud as to Marx.

For the settlers in Palestine, the careful balancing between Labor Zionist ideology and practicality—the need to revise policies because of changing circumstances—often involved a deviation from socialist principles. Many Labor Zionists, concluding

that such adjustments foreclosed all hope for realizing socialism in their time, left their political parties, and some even left Palestine. The evolving political parties were sometimes fractured by the strains of accommodating political reality. Sometimes, however, circumstances generated strong impulses to unity. In 1930, the MAPAI political party was founded, unifying Ahdut ha-Avodah and ha-Poʿel ha-Tzaʿir. MAPAI led the labor movement in Palestine on a course of constructive socialism, seeking class goals plus a democratic Jewish nation. It also cooperated with the nonsocialist movements that accepted some social-democratic principles. These principles had been promoted by Berl Katznelson, but their implementation was executed by the party's pragmatic leader, David Ben-Gurion. Those who did not accept Ben-Gurion's pragmatism in dealing with the British Mandate authorities in 1935 joined Vladimir Zeʾev Jabotinsky and formed the Revisionist movement. Other disagreements led to the formation of other parties, but Ben-Gurion of MAPAI proclaimed the new State of Israel in 1948, and MAPAI provided all but one of the early prime ministers, Histadrut secretaries-general, and Knesset (legislature) speakers, and presidents.

See also Ahdut ha-Avodah; Diaspora; Histadrut; Kibbutz; Moshav; Nationalism; World Zionist Organization (WZO); Zionist Revisionist Movement.

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Donna Robinson Divine

LACHERAF, MOSTEFA

[1917–]

Algerian intellectual, minister, and ambassador.

Mostefa Lacheraf was born in Sidi Aissa in northern Algeria. His father was a Muslim magistrate. Lacheraf was educated at the lycée in Mostaganem and then at Paris's prestigious Lycée Louis-le-Grand. He joined Messali Hadj's Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD) but left it in 1952. Subsequently, as a member of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), he was seized along with the "historic chiefs" of the Algerian War of Independence—Ahmed Ben Bella, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Khider, and Mohamed Boudiaf—in the infamous French skyjacking of an Air Maroc airplane in October 1956. Lacheraf was imprisoned from 1956 to 1961. After Algeria's independence, he helped to draft the Tripoli Programme (1962). He later served as ambassador to Argentina and Mexico. He was an adviser to Colonel Houari Boumédienne, who appointed Lacheraf as minister of national education (April 1977). Lacheraf's ministry was very controversial because he questioned the pragmatism of official Arabization policies—he urged a bilingual approach. In 1982 Lacheraf became Algeria's permanent delegate to UNESCO. He was appointed to the Conseil Consultatif National in 1992. He is an opponent of Islamism and has defended the army against its critics—notably in a petition that he signed with other intellectuals in March 2001. His most famous works are *L'Algérie, nation et société* (1965, 1978; Algeria: Nation and society) and, coauthored with Abdelkader Djeghloul, *Histoire, culture et société* (1986; History, culture, and society).

See also Algerian War of Independence; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques.

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Phillip C. Naylor

LACOSTE, ROBERT

[1898–1989]

Resident minister of Algeria from 1956 to 1958.

Robert Lacoste was a socialist who served as resident minister during the Algerian War of Independence under the Mollet, Bourgès-Maunoury, and Gaillard Fourth Republic governments. He supported repression, which included torture, thereby eroding civilian control, in order to keep Algeria under French control. Lacoste also promoted accelerated social and economic programs, highlighted by his efforts to "Algerianize" the administration. He increased Algeria's departments (to twelve) and drafted the Loi Cadre (enabling or framework law) designed to enhance internal autonomy and Muslim representation. He was a fervent advocate of France's involvement in the Suez War of October 1956. Lacoste later served in the French senate from 1971 to 1980.

See also ALGERIA: OVERVIEW; ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; LOI CADRE.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

LADINO

Various forms of Judeo-Spanish spoken and written by the Sephardim—Jews who came to the Ottoman Empire and the Maghrib (North Africa) after their expulsion from Spain in 1492.

Ladino is also called Spanyol or Judezmo; in Northern Morocco, it is called Haketía. It is at base Old Castilian (Spanish, a Romance language). Like all Diaspora Jewish languages, it is written in Hebrew characters and has a significant Hebrew and Aramaic vocabulary. It also—depending upon the region—has assimilated loanwords from Arabic, Greek, Turkish, Italian, and French.

Ladino was the language of Jewish merchants throughout much of the Islamic Mediterranean region from the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries. Except for folk songs and ballads *(cantígas* and *romances)* and some rabbinical writings, there was only a limited Ladino literature until 1730, when Jacob Culi published his popular encyclopedic *Me'am Lo'ez* in Istanbul. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ladino became the primary medium of modern learning among Jews in the Ottoman Empire. Hundreds of novels and plays were translated from French, Hebrew, and Yiddish writers. There was a flourishing Ladino press in Turkey, Greece, the Balkans, Palestine, and Egypt.

The language policies of the post–World War I Republic of Turkey, the destruction of much of Balkan Jewry during World War II, and the migration of most of North African and Levantine Jews to Spain, South America, France, and Israel has led to the near disappearance of Ladino as a living language.

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NORMAN STILLMAN

LADO ENCLAVE

Colonial territory in Sudan, connecting the Congo and Nile rivers.

The Lado Enclave was a remnant of the ambitions of King Leopold of Belgium to link his personal empire (the Congro Free State) with the Nile, whose waters flowed to the Mediterranean Sea. He appeared to have achieved his goal in 1894 when Great Britain ceded to him the Bahr al-Ghazal, which gave access to the Nile, in a futile attempt to prevent French encroachment on the vital Nile waters. Leopold yielded to French pressure to abandon the Bahr al-Ghazal but demanded his rights under a treaty with Great Britain to retain a small enclave called Lado, which would connect the two great waterways of Africa, the Congo and Nile rivers. Because the Congo Free State and the Lado Enclave were the personal fiefs of King Leopold and not of Belgium, whose government had no desire to acquire the enclave at the expense of Britain's hostility, they passed into history upon the death of Leopold on 17 December 1909. By a treaty signed between Belgium and Great Britain in 1906, the enclave was incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.

See also BAHR AL-GHAZAL.

ROBERT O. COLLINS

LAHAD, ANTOINE

[1929–]

Lebanese leader of the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army.

A Christian from Dayr al-Qamar, Antoine Lahad graduated from the Lebanese Military Academy in 1952. He eventually reached the rank of major general in the Lebanese army. In January 1984, following the death of Saʿd Haddad, the founder and leader of the Israeli-funded, -equipped, and -trained South Lebanon Army, Lahad was enticed by Israel out of retirement to become the new head of the militia. Under his leadership, the militia was expanded and upgraded, and its dependence upon Israeli support intensified. Lahad and his "army," which had a negative reputation in South Lebanon, ended their role in 2000 when Israel withdrew from South Lebanon due to the escalation of the resistance movement against its troops. Lahad and his associates sought asylum in Israel. In 2003 the Israeli press reported that Lahad had opened a Middle Eastern restaurant called Byblos, and he was nicknamed "General Hummus" by journalists.

See also Haddad, Saʿd; South Lebanon Army.

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Guilain P. Denoeux
Updated by As'ad AbuKhalil

LAHHUD, EMILE

[1936–]

President of Lebanon, 1998–.

Emile Lahhud was born in 1936 to a Maronite family that had a long tradition of serving in the Lebanese army. Lahhud joined the military academy in 1956 and rose through the ranks thereafter. His family was known for avoiding sectarian politics, and Lahhud did not side with any of the warring factions during his military career. His father was one of the founders of the Lebanese army, and later served in the Lebanese parliament as a moderate, pro-Arab parliamentarian. Emile attended military courses and received training in the United States and Britain; he became a symbol of the new nonsectarian Lebanese army that was reformed after the end of the Lebanese Civil War in 1989.

Lahhud was appointed commander in chief of the Lebanese Army in 1989, and he was credited with infusing the new army with ideas of national unity and Arab identity. Lahhud worked very closely with the Syrian government, and was one of Syria's allies in Lebanon. He insisted on a very large budget for the new Lebanese army, which reinstituted compulsory military service for Lebanese males. The role of the army and the intelligence apparatus increased with the expansion of the ranks and size of the military-intelligence apparatus of the government, which reduced the heavy-handed involvement of the Syrian military in Lebanese affairs, although the Syrian government still exercised great political influence in Lebanon thereafter. As commander in chief, Lahhud closely coordinated with the Hizbullah-led Lebanese resistance in south Lebanon (during the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon from 1982–2000), providing logistical and political support for Hizbullah.

Lahhud was elected president in 1998, and his inaugural speech promised wide-ranging political and economic reforms. His blueprint for government included a promise to fight corruption, but his administration has so far avoided attacking the powerful symbols of corruption in government. His administration was also marred by an acute conflict with prime minister Rafiq Hariri.

See also Hariri, Rafiq Bahaʾuddin al-; Hizbullah.

As'ad AbuKhalil

LAHIJI, SHAHLA

[1942–]

Women's rights activist and publisher in Iran.

Shahla Lahijistarted writing for newspapers at age fifteen and was admitted to the Association of Women Writers and Journalists at age sixteen. The first female publisher in Iran, she founded in 1984 and is director of Roshangaran Publishing, a prominent publishing house of women's books. She also established the Women's Studies Center, a private research institute devoted to women's issues.

Lahiji has written several books, including *Portraits of Women in the Work of Bahram Beizaie, Filmmaker and*

Scriptwriter in 1989 and *The Quest for Identity: The Image of Iranian Women in Prehistory and History* with Mehrangiz Kar in 1992.

In 2000 she was arrested with eighteen other Iranians who had participated in a conference in Germany on the future of Iran. She was charged with acting against internal security of the state and sentenced to four years' imprisonment, but she was released after two months. Over the years she has maintained her critical, secular stance, always promoting the right to free speech and advocating equality between men and women in Iranian culture, law, and society. She received the Women in Publishing Award in 2000, after which she continued to live and work in Iran.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW.

CHERIE TARAGHI

LAHOUEL, HOCINE

[1917–]

Algerian nationalist.

Born in the Constantine region, Hocine Lahouel joined Messali al-Hadj's Etoile Nord-Africaine (North African Star) in 1930. He was a leader in the Parti du Peuple Algérien (Algerian People's Party) and an editor of *El Ouma.* Together with al-Hadj, he was imprisoned by the French in 1937. In 1946, Lahouel participated in the Oran elections as a candidate for the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (Movement of the Triumph of Democratic Liberties), becoming its secretary-general in 1950. A leading centrist within the movement, Lahouel was torn between supporting the paramilitary operations of the Organisation Spéciale (Special Organization) or the imperfect electoral process after World War II. In the late 1940s, Lahouel took a harsh stance against the Berberist members within the nationalist movement. Together with A. Kiouane, he founded La Nation Algérienne (The Algerian Nation), an organization opposed to L'Algérie Libre (Free Algeria). He joined the Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front) in 1955 and represented it in Indonesia and Pakistan. In 1965, he became president of the National Textile Society. Together with Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, Ferhat Abbas, and Mohamed Kheireddine, Lahouel was placed under house arrest from 1976 until 1977 after cosigning an antigovernment manifesto entitled "New Appeal to the Algerian People." They were deemed "reactionary elements" by the Algerian government, and Lahouel lost his post in the National Textile Society.

See also BEN KHEDDA, BEN YOUSSEF; FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE (FLN); HADJ, MESSALI AL-; MOUVEMENT POUR LE TRIOMPHE DES LIBERTÉS DÉMOCRATIQUES; PARTI DU PEUPLE ALGÉRIEN (PPA).

PHILLIP C. NAYLOR
UPDATED BY VANESA CASANOVA-FERNANDEZ

LAMARI, MOHAMED

[1939–]

Lieutenant-general and chief of staff of Algeria's People's National Army.

Born in 1939 in Algiers, Mohamed Lamari is the strongman of the Algerian army and security services. He has a reputation as an absolute opponent of the armed Islamist movement. Trained in the cavalry at Saumur War School in France, he joined the National Liberation Army in 1961. After independence, he studied at the military academy in Moscow and then at the war school in Paris.

After holding several positions in the Algerian military hierarchy, he commanded the regional military staff (1970–1976) and was attached to the operations office of the national military staff until 1988, after which he became head of the fifth military region and was then promoted to the rank of land forces commander.

In January 1992, along with other generals, he demanded the resignation of President Chadli Bendjedid. In mid-1992 Lamari was appointed head of the special antiterrorist units at the Defense Ministry. Ten months later he was promoted to chief of staff of the armed forces when Liamine Zeroual replaced General Khaled Nezzar as defense minister. Lamari vigorously opposed the plan for reconciliation with the opposition parties, including the Islamists, proposed by Zeroual and his supporters. His promotion in 1994 to the rank of lieutenant-general at the moment when President Zeroual announced the failure of the dialogue with the opposition parties signaled that the eradicators were

in the ascendant and that Lamari had become the most powerful man in Algeria. From mid-1994 on, he ordered a vigorous military campaign against the armed groups and intensive bombardments of Islamists. He was delegated by President Zeroual to sign all acts and decisions, including decrees on mobilizing reservists, the creation of popular militias, the treatment of security information addressed to the national press, and the creation of areas in southern Algeria to preserve gas sites and oil fields.

In addition to his determination to eradicate Islamism, Lamari is known for initiating the army's professionalization project and for being the architect of military cooperation agreements between Algeria and its foreign partners, including the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Turkey.

See also ALGERIA; BENDJEDID, CHADLI.

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AZZEDINE G. MANSOUR

LA MARSA CONVENTION

The document that formally established the French protectorate over Tunisia.

The La Marsa Convention was signed in June 1883 and ratified by the French Chamber of Deputies in April 1884. The force behind the convention was Paul Cambon, resident general in Tunisia from 1882 to 1886. The convention provided for a French loan to the bey, allowing him to settle his debts to other European states and thereby bringing an end to the International Financial Commission. With these measures, France won control over the Tunisian economy and, with the protectorate in place, the political affairs of Tunis as well.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON

LAMRANI, MUHAMMAD KARIM

[1919–]

Moroccan politician and business leader.

Educated in Morocco and France with a degree in economics, Muhammad Karim Lamrani served as an economic adviser to Hassan II in the 1960s. Lamrani went on to various prominent offices, including vice chairman, then president, of the Casablanca Chamber of Commerce; director of the national airline, Royal Air Maroc; and director general of the Sharifian Office of Phosphates. Hassan II appointed Lamrani as prime minister on six occasions—in 1971, 1972, 1983, 1985, 1992, and 1993. Unaffiliated with any major political group, Lamrani effectively served as a mediator between the crown and opposition parties. As prime minister, Lamrani was a champion of the private sector of the Moroccan economy.

In the early 1990s Lamrani led a government formed mainly by technocrats to guide the country through a difficult period of economic liberalization reforms. Renewed activism by Moroccan labor unions and Lamrani's failure to rally the opposition parties' support proved to be a major obstacle for the prime minister's policies in an atmosphere of social discontent. King Hassan II replaced him with Abdellatif Filali in 1994. Lamrani remains one of the wealthiest and most influential businessmen in Morocco.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON
UPDATED BY ANA TORRES-GARCIA

LAND CODE OF 1858

Extension of Tanzimat reforms to agricultural property and taxation.

The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 (Turkish, *Arazi Kanunnamesi*) was an extension of the Tanzimat reforms to the areas of agricultural property and taxation. Aimed at increasing tax revenues while replacing local rule by notables with centralized administration, the code reaffirmed prior laws pertaining to land, updated some old terminology, and

introduced two major innovations that, by permitting individuals to possess large areas of land, completely transformed the relationship of people to land in many parts of the Ottoman Empire during the last half of the nineteenth century.

Land Ownership and Taxation prior to 1858

Classical Ottoman land-tenure legislation made a fundamental distinction between the right to cultivate land *(tasarruf)* and the absolute ownership of land *(raqaba).* The two main categories of land were *mülk* and *miri.* The owners of *mülk* land combined the right to cultivate with absolute ownership; this land was largely confined to orchards adjacent to villages and constituted a small proportion of land in the empire. *Mülk* land comes closest to private property as understood in the West. *Miri* land was owned by the state; the actual cultivators of the land were essentially tenants of the state, although they were entitled to pass on the right of cultivation to their heirs. *Miri* land consisted of arable land upon which crops were sown and constituted the vast majority of agricultural land in the empire.

Taxes on agricultural lands were a primary source of income for the Ottoman state. By the late fourteenth century, a system of revenue collection was established called the *timar* system. Large grants of land were given to military officers who collected the land tax and used it to procure and equip military forces to fight the empire's wars. Until the 1800s, this system was gradually replaced by one called *iltizam* (tax farming). Wealthy individuals, often government officials, would bid at open auction for the right to collect taxes. An agreed-upon proportion of taxes would be transferred to the government, and the tax farmer could keep the rest. While initially tax farms were granted for limited periods of time, in a further development, they were granted for life, and even became inheritable. These grants were known as *malikane.* A consequence of *malikane* was that tax farmers increased their autonomy from the state and often became local rulers *(ayan).* The *ayan* did not challenge the state's claim to ownership of land, but they did prevent the state from collecting taxes, enhancing their own power. In the early nineteenth century, *ayan* from the western provinces of the empire were briefly able to impose their will on the sultan. But this supremacy was short-lived, and by 1815, Sultan Mahmud II had reestablished the dominant position of the central state.

Mahmud II's successful campaign to reassert state control over the *ayan* created a need for a new system to administer the state's vast tracts of land while preventing reemergence of the *ayan* political challenge. Land Reform was taking place throughout the Middle East. The distinguished historian Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, who served on the commission that drafted the code, stated that the radical administrative and financial changes created by the Tanzimat reforms of the first half of the century produced the need for new regulations of landed property. In addition, the growing need of the state for revenue demanded new forms of land tenure and taxation that would enhance cultivation of existing lands and encourage the reclamation of dead lands, while guaranteeing state collection of tax revenues. Finally, both merchants and farmers inside the empire and European countries were pressuring the sultan to pass reforms that would rationalize the government. Part of this rationalization would be accomplished by guaranteeing the property rights of the sultan's subjects. The 1858 Land Code was a response to these multiple needs.

The passage of the code was preceded by several reforms. In 1846, a ministry of agriculture was established to stimulate agricultural production. Efforts were made to sedentarize nomadic tribes, both to provide laborers for the cultivation of cotton and to subject them to taxation. Tax exemptions offered villages for performing public services such as road building were abolished; new state agencies would perform these services. The agricultural tax, which previously had fluctuated between 10 and 50 percent of the product was fixed at 10 percent; this tax was called the *üşür.* In 1847, the government prepared a system of land registration; land would be registered in a centralized government office, the *defterhane,* and owners would be given deeds of ownership.

Land Ownership and Taxation following the 1858 Land Code

The Land Code was characterized by marked continuity with the classical fifteenth- and sixteenth-century *qanuns* regulating agrarian property rights. The fundamental distinction between *tasarruf* and

raqaba was retained, and land continued to be divided into five categories: *mülk, miri,* waqf (tax-exempt land devoted to supporting religious establishments), *metruk* (land designated for the public activities of villages, such as the village threshing floor), and *mevat* (dead and unclaimed land). The preponderance of land continued to be owned by the state. The Land Code reiterated basic legal doctrine on the means of acquiring land through possession and cultivation of land for a ten-year period, the condition that land uncultivated for a three-year period became *mahlul* (lapsed ownership), and the means of inheriting land. The code liberalized the right of bequeathing land, in the hope that keeping land within one family would lead to greater efforts to improve land.

Despite its conservative nature, the Land Code did contain two crucial innovations that would alter the nature of land ownership in much of the Middle East. The first innovation was the obligation of landowners to register their land with the government and receive formal deed to the land. This measure was not designed to prevent absentee ownership; indeed, the code specifically stated that legal ownership of land took precedence over actual occupation and cultivation. Thus, whereas previously the *ayan* had possessed the right to collect taxes, now those who did not cultivate land could still possess land and become taxpayers. The code was thus concerned with determining the legal status of the taxpayer, suggesting that the drafters of the code perceived the new legislation as a revenue-raising instrument. The code did, however, prohibit any individual or several individuals from gaining title to occupied villages in their entirety. Nevertheless, the second innovation found in the code permitted individuals to own vast tracts of land; beginning in 1858, the state could issue deeds to formerly unoccupied lands. This was designed to increase the area of land under cultivation. When these two innovations were combined, it meant that individuals could now on paper own very large tracts of land.

The major consequence of the 1858 Land Code was the separation of the taxpayer/owner from the cultivator in many parts of the empire. Before the code's passage, peasants had leased land from the state, and powerful individuals had acted as intermediaries who collected taxes from the actual cultivator; after the code's passage, powerful individuals could legally own land that they leased to peasants. It is frequently asserted that this outcome was precisely the opposite of what was intended by the Ottoman government. Inefficient administration of the law, it is contended, allowed powerful individuals to register in their own names lands previously held by peasants. This occurred because peasants depended on local notables for protection; because peasants were afraid that registration of land would be followed by conscription or increased tax burdens; because peasant indebtedness to moneylenders led to forfeiture of deeds to land; because peasants were too ignorant to comprehend land registration; or because bedouin *shaykhs* used their authority within the tribe to usurp all the land of their tribesmen.

More recent scholarship has contested this view, arguing that the consequences of the Land Code differed from region to region in the empire and that peasants were willing to participate in and benefit from the new system. In Palestine, for example, in the hilly country surrounding Jerusalem, peasants did register land in their own names, and a survey of property records did not find a single case of a city notable or moneylender registering land. On the coastal plains, however, city notables were able to take advantage of the government's new policy of selling deeds to unclaimed lands. Large-scale landlords took possession of vast tracts of land, still mostly unoccupied or unclaimed. Similarly, in Anatolia large estates were formed on wasteland, often located in swampy plains and in the Kurds' tribal lands to the east. In areas of established peasant settlements in central Anatolia and on the coasts, peasant ownership continued to be the predominant form of land tenure.

In other regions, large estates were created. In Mesopotamia (now Iraq), Ottoman governors, seeking the cooperation of tribal shaykhs, permitted them to register tribal lands as their personal property, creating large estates. In Syria, powerful local families had obtained *malikane* grants and ruled almost unchecked from the eighteenth century. By 1858, the distinction between *mülk* and *miri* land had been considerably blurred. Thus, the Land Code seems to have accelerated, not caused, the creation of large estates. The major mechanism for estate formation in Syria seems to have been peasant indebtedness and default to moneylenders. As a re-

sult, by the start of the twentieth century, large landholdings had been created and many peasants reduced to the status of tenant farmer or sharecropper. In Syria, as in other regions of the empire where peasants lost ownership of land, estate formation did not mean the creation of unified, plantation-like farms; instead, absentee landowners negotiated arrangements with individual peasants, who continued to farm small plots of land.

Although a great deal of research remains to be done, these divergent consequences of the Land Code mitigate against drawing any overly generalized conclusions about its results. If in Syria and Iraq urban notables and tribal *shaykhs* were able to wrest ownership of land from peasants, in Palestine and Anatolia large estates were created primarily through the sale by the state of wasteland that needed to be reclaimed. The capacity of peasants in parts of Palestine and Anatolia to obtain legal possession of their land suggests that peasants were not automatically unwilling to register their land; it would seem to be the case that in many regions, they were unable to do so.

It is not clear that the creation of large estates constitutes the failure of the 1858 Land Code. If a primary purpose of the code was to raise state revenues, it was a success: Between 1887 and 1910, a period when the territory of the empire was shrinking, the revenue collected from the agricultural tax increased from 426 million to 718 million piastres.

See also Land Reform; Mahmud II; Qanun; Tanzimat; Waqf.

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David Waldner

LAND DAY

Strike by Palestinians to protest confiscation of Arab land in Israel (30 March 1976).

After Israel's government announced plans to confiscate Arab land in February 1976, the National Committee for the Defense of Arab Lands, the first political organization claiming to represent the entire Palestinian population of Israel, called for a strike and named it Land Day. In the Galilee region, where the appropriations were to take place, villagers clashed with Israel's troops, leading to six Arab deaths, and numerous arrests and injuries. These incidents were similar to demonstrations at Kafr Qasim twenty years before.

The strike demonstrated the political strength of Rakah, the Communist party of Israel, which had organized the demonstrations and had created the committee. Land Day was declared a Palestinian national holiday in 1992 and is celebrated annually with demonstrations and a general strike by Palestinians residing in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.

See also Kafr Qasim.

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Lawrence Tal

LAND REFORM

Land tenure refers to the relationships, rules, and institutions that define rights of ownership in, and access to, landed property.

Officials in Egypt survey land in the Fayum oasis. A land reform program in the country during the 1950s limited ownership size, controlled rents, and ceded property rights to tenants. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Land reform generally denotes government measures designed for a relatively equitable redistribution of agricultural land, but actual reform measures can reflect a range of ideological positions. The political nature of reform is difficult to avoid given the effect of changes in land tenure arrangements on the social relations and hierarchies they embody.

The distribution of property rights is a key indicator of the relationship between state and society, as well as a fundamental determinant of production and distribution. While a wide range of land tenure systems have worked themselves out across the modern Middle East, three phases in the changing relationship between state and society can usefully be highlighted where landed property is concerned. The early phase begins during the nineteenth century when centralizing state structures, colonial rule, and the emergence of global capitalism and market forces often concentrated property rights in relatively few hands. A second phase emerged in the post–World War II period when governments, often coming to power as anticolonial national independence movements, implemented ambitious programs to develop agriculture, redistribute land to middle-class or smaller farmers, and substitute state-supervised cooperatives and monopolies for private marketing networks. A third phase may be discerned in which states have, since the 1980s, repositioned themselves in the economy and, under local and international pressure, retreated to various degrees from direct intervention in agriculture.

In pursuit of fiscal and administrative goals toward which modern states typically aspire, the Ottoman state and its successors, the European-dominated colonial administrations in the Middle East, were determined to make more legible the complexity of local, often communal, landholding patterns and to pursue the standardization and individualization of title to land. The land register and the cadastral map were the instruments that best reflected the new centralized, unmediated reality officially sought by the state. Utilitarian arguments in favor of private property were commonly put forth. For example, in societies that were overwhelmingly agricultural and where land was the principal factor of production, tax collection could be facilitated by the individualization of rights. Further, it was widely assumed that unless individual users knew they would capture the benefits of investment and conservation, degradation and overuse of resources would ensue. As a wealth-creating institution, the promise of individualized property rights, particularly in the colonial period, was that resources would naturally find their way through the market into the hands of those individuals who value them most. In colonies of settlement—Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Palestine—a market in land also obviously facilitated the transfer of native property to European immigrants who mainly accumulated large estates. Moreover, by asserting in philosophical terms that private property constituted the basis of civilization, European colonial officials could point to the evidence of communally or tribally held property in a colonized territory as demonstration of the necessity of imperial rule.

Subject to such pressures and interests, a variety of landholding patterns emerged. The critical variables appear to have been the considerable ecological diversity and the will or the capacity of the state to control relations at the local level. For example, in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century, in Thrace and those areas of Anatolia close to

Istanbul, small-scale farming became the norm. By contrast, in the more remote areas of the empire, such as Eastern Anatolia or Syria, the need to rely on local intermediaries for administration created a highly skewed distribution of land. In some cases, the local governor played a central role: Across the provinces of Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra, Midhat Paşa initiated a process whereby cultivators of land were granted title deeds that secured virtually complete rights of ownership (although, in tribal areas, cultivators were often turned into tenant farmers when the name of the most powerful individual was placed on the title deed). In Ottoman Palestine large estates came into being once new land laws and modern registration procedures created the opportunity to benefit from the increasing foreign demand for agricultural products by purchasing vast tracts of land on paper.

European colonialism could have a profound impact on land tenure patterns. In Algeria, the best farmland was seized by French colonists, who forced the indigenous population onto marginal land or dispossessed them. This pattern of concentration under colonialism prevailed elsewhere. In Egypt a highly unequal distribution of ownership placed tremendous political and economic power into the hands of those few families who dominated rural areas. During the British mandate over Iraq, the administration came to rely heavily on intermediaries and, rather than seek direct contacts with all landowners, in fact strengthened the position of large landowners vis-à-vis small owners and tenant farmers: By 1932 only 10 percent of government revenues were derived from land taxes (as compared to 25 percent in 1921). In Iraq one of the region's (and the world's) most unequal land distributions was thereby created: By 1953, 1.7 percent of the landholders had 63 percent of the land; 75 percent of the population was landless. The impact of European imperialism on land tenure relationships varied, however, across the Middle East, the transformation often being dependent on the role played by local power structures and interests. In Transjordan British efforts to settle individual title to land overlapped with patterns on the ground.

Sharecropping was the most common method of farming, though estates in Egypt and the Maghrib relied on more direct management by the landowner or his representative. During the first half of the twentieth century, rural conditions deteriorated and landlessness was implicated in a number of problems: urbanization, high birth rates, low productivity, and lack of purchasing power. Meanwhile, large landlords enjoyed wide powers under the direct or indirect influence of European powers. In the post–World War II period, land reform—responding generally to the widespread call, "land to the tiller"—was adopted by newly independent governments to tackle socioeconomic inequities. While improvements flowing from land reform have been difficult to measure, the political goal of eliminating the power of large landowners has generally been regarded as successful. Countries experiencing significant land reforms during this phase include Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Tunisia, Iran, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran grants a land deed to a grateful new owner. Beginning in 1962, Iran went through a series of land reform measures, many of which were unpopular with clerical leaders and the poorer classes. © Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Egypt

The pioneering attempts at land reform here progressively lowered the legal limitation of ownership size from 200 feddans (1.038 acres) in 1952 to 50 in 1969. Those who received land, whether through reform or "distress sales" of the wealthy, were rarely the poorest rural people. Direct beneficiaries were either the year-round workers of the estates—not the

landless seasonal workers—or members of the rural middle class who could afford to purchase land made available. The reforms also controlled rents and, by making it nearly impossible to evict tenants, ceded property rights to them. Remarkably, output did not fall: The government created a system of supervised agricultural cooperatives that allowed for economies of scale, took over marketing functions, and facilitated the application of inputs such as improved seed and credit. These cooperatives were also used by government to extract part of the agricultural surplus by manipulating the terms of trade. Egypt was in this way transformed into a country of predominantly small farms. Farms under five feddans covered roughly 66 percent of the land area in 1975, but by the early 1980s the share of small farms had fallen to 52 percent, largely as a result of the consolidation of the very smallest farms.

Syria and Iraq

Both countries attempted to follow the Egyptian model despite the very different conditions prevailing. Much larger areas of land were appropriated than in Egypt, the agroecologies were enormously varied (again, in contrast to Egypt where virtually all land was irrigated), stronger resistance was met, and there were far fewer trained officials. Output fell considerably. Although the Syrian and Iraqi governments found it relatively easy to expropriate land, they found it difficult to redistribute it and to take over the marketing functions. Only in the 1970s were Baʿthist governments able to redistribute land and to create fully functioning cooperatives.

Algeria

When European colonial farmers hastily abandoned large farms at the time of independence (1962), employees on many estates tried to manage them collectively. So-called *autogestion* was immediately championed by politicians, but eventually proved economically counterproductive. Pressure grew and in 1972 the government began attempts to expropriate all private farmland that exceeded the area a family could directly exploit. Agrarian reform encountered considerable resistance and evasion. By 1980, about 13 percent of the arable land had moved into the reform sector, but economic growth was disappointing compared to private farm production.

Tunisia

Reform here went through three stages. From 1956 to 1960 holders of usufruct rights (legal rights to use and profit from property owned by another) were transformed into owners. In 1961 the state began to acquire land formerly held by European colonialists, and a "cooperativization" program was launched, aimed at incorporating the surrounding small farms. Local resistance, poor investment policies, the cessation of World Bank funding, social conflict, and uncertainty about property rights all took their toll on agricultural production. By the end of 1969, cooperativization was abandoned, and the private sector was increasingly relied upon.

Iran

Beginning in 1962 landlords were required to sell to the government any land in excess of "one village." A second phase gave landlords options, such as forming "corporations" with their former tenants and distributing shares rather than land, leasing land for cash, and so on. The "farm corporation" concept, however, was unpopular with peasants; it often led to small farmers selling out to larger ones. Further, landless agricultural workers were excluded from the reform, and many, perhaps most, of the recipients of land received too little to support a family. The reforms also adversely affected the land and water rights of Islamic charities. During the 1970s the shah's government became increasingly obsessed with promoting large farms and agribusinesses. These were mostly unsuccessful and survived only thanks to massive state subsidies. After the Iranian Revolution (1979), in the early days of the Islamic republic, considerable amounts of land changed hands as Pahlavi officials were expropriated, peasants occupied land, and local religious officials took advantage of opportunities. A long debate in the *majles* (legislature) has since ensued about the legality and the desirability of further land reform, but Muslim jurists have reached competing conclusions regarding the compatibility of such measures with the basic principles of *shariʿa.*

(Former) People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

In 1968 land reform was implemented after independence. Previously, most farmers were tenants; the rulers, merchants, and religious institutions

owned most of the land. Land was redistributed to private farmers, some 65 percent of whom were organized into cooperatives. About 23 percent of all cropped land was held as state farms.

Since the 1980s governments have increasingly withdrawn from direct management of agriculture. Expanding reliance on the private sector in both farm production and marketing, as well as on reduced regulation of farm prices, is visible today in many of the countries in the region. In Egypt, for example, landowners are for the first time since 1952 permitted to evict tenants. In large part, such liberalization measures have resulted from unhappiness with the sluggish performance of state farming and from the prevailing conventional wisdom in favor of foreign direct investment and international trade. However, social inequities can be expected to grow, at least in the short run, and free-market reforms will likely require various forms of political repression as increased levels of popular opposition are confronted.

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ALAN R. RICHARDS
UPDATED BY MARTIN BUNTON

LANDSMANNSCHAFTEN

Jewish immigrant benevolent associations.

These groups were formed by Jews in North and South America and Israel according to place of origin of members, to assist their persecuted *landsleit* (hometown brethren) overseas and to ease their emigration and immigration. In the New World, such groups multiplied exponentially until World War I, began to decline after 1930, and largely disappeared by the 1960s. In Israel such organizations developed welfare institutions, mutual aid societies, and even several short-lived political parties.

ZEV MAGHEN

LANGER, FELICIA

[1930–]

Israeli human rights attorney; defender of Palestinian rights.

Born in Poland in 1930, Felicia Langer emigrated to Israel with her husband, Moshe Langer, a Holocaust survivor, in 1950 to be with her mother. Langer became a member of the anti-Zionist Israeli Communist Party. She became disenchanted with the new state of Israel for its treatment of Palestinians. Trained as a lawyer, after the 1967 war she devoted her entire practice to assisting Palestinian political prisoners. She worked for more than two decades in defense of Palestinian rights, often taking her cases to the Supreme Court, charging violations of the Geneva Convention, to which Israel is a signatory.

Langer faced social ostracism, physical assaults, and death threats for her defense of Palestinians. During the first Palestinian *intifada* (uprising) of 1987 through 1991, she was overwhelmed by the impossibility of adequately representing her clients in the Israeli courts. "I felt I could not address the judge as 'your honor' as a gesture of protest I closed my Jerusalem office and left the country."

Langer resettled in Tübingen, Germany, and continued to criticize the Israeli treatment of Palestinians in Israel and the Occupied Territories. She is a member of the Israeli League for Human Rights and received the Right Livelihood Award for human rights in 1990. She is the author of several books

documenting human rights violations in Palestine, including her best-known work *With My Own Eyes* (1975), *These Are My Brothers* (1979), *An Age of Stone* (1987), and an autobiography, *The Epoch of Stones, and Rage, and Hope.*

See also Communism in the Middle East; Intifada (1987–1991); Palestinian Citizens of Israel.

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Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban

LANSDOWNE, HENRY CHARLES KEITH PETTY FITZMAURICE

[1845–1927]

British politician.

Becoming fifth marquess in 1866, Henry Charles Keith Petty Fitzmaurice Lansdowne, or Lord Lansdowne, held posts in various Liberal administrations in Britain and was governor-general in Canada (1883–1888) and viceroy in India (1888–1894). As war secretary (1895–1900) and foreign secretary (1900–1905) under prime ministers Lord Salisbury, Arthur Balfour, and Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Lansdowne negotiated the Anglo-French Entente of 1904, which, among other things, settled Anglo-French differences over Egypt and Morocco. In Morocco's crisis of 1905, Lansdowne acknowledged French supremacy in that country and supported France against Germany. Involved in the diplomatic intrigues surrounding the proposed Baghdad Railway, Lansdowne, Balfour, and many Cabinet members were in favor of supplying funding for the project, but in the face of anti-German public opinion, they were forced to drop the proposal.

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Zachary Karabell

LARAKI, AHMAD

[1931–]

Moroccan diplomat and minister.

Ahmad Laraki earned a medical degree in Paris and in 1957/58 joined the ministry of foreign affairs in Morocco. He served as permanent representative to the United Nations from 1957 to 1959 and as ambassador to Spain, Switzerland, and the United States from 1962 to 1967. Appointed as prime minister in 1969, Laraki weathered rising discontent in Morocco, particularly over economic problems and government corruption, as well as an attempt on the life of Hassan II in 1971. In August 1971, Laraki was replaced by Muhammad Karim Lamrani. From 1971 to 1974, he headed the ministry in charge of medical affairs. In 1974 Laraki was appointed to head the ministry of foreign affairs, an office he held until 1977.

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Matthew S. Gordon

LATA'IF AL-MUSAWWARA MAGAZINE

Trendsetting Egyptian weekly magazine.

Al-Lata'if al-Musawwara (Illustrated witticisms) was a pictorial compilation of current events, politics, famous people, social organizations, sporting events, fashion, and social criticism. It was founded by Iskandar Shahin Makarius, whose family was also involved with the publication of *al-Lata'if, al-Muqtataf,* and *al-Muqattam.* The journal began in 1915, at a time when pictures of any sort were rare in Egyptian publications. Nevertheless, by the final year of its publication in 1941, many other journals began to copy and surpass its style, and its original readership was drained perhaps by its own offshoots: *al-Awlad* (Children), *al-Arusa* (Bride), and *al-Fan al-Sinema'i* (Cinematic art).

Since early twentieth century, Egypt was a place in which even urban literacy rates were low, a journal with large pictures and easy-to-read text was a welcome innovation. Makarius invited readers to

submit their own photographs of unusual occurrences, crimes, sporting events, celebrities, oddities, and children, as well as political cartoons or caricatures. Promoting photography was typical of the magazine's support of new styles of consumption, as was its advanced advertising. Advertisements promoted local (non-Western) products, stores, and industries, often utilizing nationalist iconography. Ads appealed to women through the use of indigenous models, feminine forms of address, and products for the modern Egyptian home. Although these techniques became common in the early 1920s, in 1915 they were innovative. The emphasis on advertising demonstrated a shift from the limited press of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which had depended upon subventions and subscriptions. Makarius promoted his advertising department, boasting immediate results in a 1920 advertisement and claiming a circulation of 40,000. While this figure is probably close to double the true circulation, the magazine had appeal to readers of Arabic as far away as Brazil.

See also ART; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES.

MONA RUSSELL

LATAKIA

Major Syrian seaport.

On the Mediterranean Sea, Latakia was known in Greek as Laodicea after the name of the mother of Seleucus Nicator (301–281 C.E.), who built it. A fertile coastal plain stretches around Latakia (Arabic, *al-Ladhaqiyya*). According to the 1982 administrative divisions of Syria, the province of Latakia included 4 *mintaqas* (sections) based on Latakia, Jabala, al-Haffa, and al-Qardaha, 13 *nahiyas* (subdivisions) based on 13 towns, 501 villages, and 590 farms. The population of Latakia province in 2002 was 1 million; the city population was about 345,000.

ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

LATIFE

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

LA TUNISIE MARTYRE

Manifesto of the Tunisian nationalist movement.

Written by two leading Tunisian nationalists, Abd al-Aziz Thaalbi, the founder of the Destour political party, and Ahmad Sakkah, this manifesto was published in Paris in 1921. It presented the key demands and premises of the fledgling Tunisian movement for nationalism. At its heart was the claim that, prior to the French occupation (1881), a viable Tunisian state had been in place, complete with its own constitution, representative assembly, open press, and healthy economy. On the basis of those earlier institutions, a new and independent Tunisia would be established.

See also THAALBI, ABD AL-AZIZ.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON

LAUSANNE CONFERENCE (1949)

United Nations–sponsored international conference to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict.

The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) was created by UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of December 1948 with the lofty goal of mediating among the warring parties after the Arab–Israel War of 1948. The UNCCP's first major initiative in this direction was to hold a conference in Lausanne, Switzerland, from 27 April to 12 September 1949, at which it hoped to bridge the differences among Arabs and Israelis.

Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria sent delegations; Iraq refused. Various delegations claiming to represent Palestinian refugees were also present. Among these were the Arab Higher Committee and the General Refugee Congress, represented by Muhammad Nimr al-Hawwari and Aziz Shehadeh. Other Palestinians representing large landowners like Shukri al-Taji al-Faruqi and Saʿid Baydas arrived later to work with al-Hawwari.

The conferees never met in a general session. Rather, the UNCCP held separate meetings with the

Arabs and Israelis over many months. Informal meetings were held, but the formal procedures produced little. One document that emerged was the Lausanne Protocol that dealt with territorial and boundary issues. Almost immediately after signing it, the warring parties sparred over its implementation.

The conference discussed other issues as well, especially relating to Palestinian refugees. Israel offered to repatriate 100,000 of them in the context of a final settlement. The refugees' abandoned property also emerged as a major issue. In June 1949 the UNCCP created its first subcommittee, the Technical Committee, to investigate practical ways of resolving refugee issues. The conference also produced the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (the Clapp Mission), established by the UNCCP in late August to explore economic solutions to the refugee problem.

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

LAUSANNE, TREATY OF (1923)

Renegotiation of treaties ending World War I resulting in more favorable treatment of Turkey.

Defeat in World War I resulted in a harsh peace treaty for the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) stripped Turkey of all its European territory except for a small area around Constantinople (now Istanbul); demilitarized the straits between the Black and Mediterranean seas, opened them to ships of all nations, and placed them under an international commission; established an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan in eastern Anatolia; turned over the region around İzmir to the Greeks; restored the capitulations; and placed Turkish finances under foreign control. By separate agreement, some parts of Turkey left to the Turks were assigned to France and Italy as spheres of influence.

Unlike the other nations on the losing side in World War I, Turkey was able to renegotiate its treaty terms. This was the result of the decline of the sultan's power, the rise of the nationalists under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the defeat of the Greeks' attempt to expand their power in Turkey. The latter development placed Turkish forces near British troops in the area of the straits and led to an armistice at Mudanya in October 1922 at which the Allied powers restored Constantinople and the straits to Turkish authority and called for a peace convention to renegotiate the terms laid down at Sèvres. The Allies invited both of the contesting powers in Turkey—the sultan's government and the nationalists under Kemal—to a conference at Lausanne, Switzerland. This precipitated Kemal's decision to separate the positions of sultan and caliph, abolishing the former, exiling Mehmet VI and giving the residual powers of caliph to his cousin, Abdülmecit II. Thus, when the conference at Lausanne began in November 1922, Kemal's Ankara government was the sole representative of Turkey.

İsmet Paşa, later İsmet İnönü in honor of his two victories over the Greeks at İnönü, led the Turkish delegation as the newly appointed foreign minister. He was determined to reestablish Turkish sovereignty and negotiate as an equal with the British, French, and Italians at the conference. However, İsmet found himself treated as a supplicant rather than the representative of a government with recent victories. Unable to compete with the sophisticated debate of the Allied diplomats, İsmet responded with his own unique tactics. He feigned deafness, contested every point however minor, read long prepared statements, delayed debate by consultations with his colleagues, and periodically insisted on deferring discussion pending instructions from Ankara. These tactics led to a break of negotiations for two months beginning in February 1923.

The Lausanne conference resulted in seventeen diplomatic instruments. Turkey recognized the loss of its Arab provinces, but plans for an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan were abandoned. The European powers no longer demanded capitulation, and although Turkey agreed to minor financial burdens and tariff restrictions, there were to be no war reparations. The Greeks lost their zone around İzmir, and no other powers retained zones

of influence. Turkish territory in Europe expanded, but control over Mosul in Iraq and Alexandretta in Syria remained with the British and French respectively. Finally, the conference recognized Turkish sovereignty over the straits, although there were some concessions in the form of a demilitarized zone and an international commission to supervise transit through the straits. In short, İsmet achieved virtually all that nationalist Turkey under Kemal's leadership desired.

See also SÈVRES, TREATY OF (1920).

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

LAVON AFFAIR

1960s political crisis in Israel sparked by the security "mishap" of 1954.

The Lavon Affair was a dramatic and divisive political crisis that shook the entire Israeli political system, led to the resignation of prime minister David Ben-Gurion in July 1963, and caused major shifts in political alignments in the state. Its roots lay in what the Israeli press nicknamed *Esek ha-Bish* (the "Mishap"). A dormant group of Israeli-trained Egyptian Jews who were prepared for missions of espionage and sabotage in the event of war were ill-advisedly activated in June 1954 under orders from Colonel Benjamin Gibli (Givly), the head of the Intelligence Division of the Israeli Defense Forces. They were instructed to detonate firebombs in a few U.S. and British cultural institutions in Cairo and Alexandria in order to disrupt the negotiations, which were nearing conclusion, on the evacuation of British troops from bases along the Suez Canal. The group was captured by Egyptian security services. Two of the leading saboteurs were sentenced and hanged, an Israeli spy committed suicide in prison, and the others were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

Colonel Gibli maintained that he had received orders from Pinhas Lavon, who at the time was replacing Ben-Gurion as minister of defense. A secret inquiry committee appointed by the government of Moshe Sharett could not reach a clear judgment, and both Gibli and Lavon were obliged to resign their respective posts.

Four years later the commander of the special unit in charge of the operation in Egypt disclosed that one of the documents presented to the 1954 cabinet inquiry committee was forged. The attorney general was asked by Ben-Gurion to look into these allegations. Colonel Gibli admitted the forgery but continued to claim that he had received the order orally from Lavon, and that he had been compelled to forge the document when he realized that Lavon was trying to put all the blame on him. Lavon, who was then serving as secretary-general of the Histadrut, Israel's powerful trade-union umbrella organization, demanded a public exoneration from Ben-Gurion, who declined to give it, insisting that the affair had to be subjected to a judicial investigation.

Despite strict censorship, the incident became known under different euphemisms and code names to the general public, stirring up a political crisis within and outside of the Labor Party. The entire country was divided between those who supported Ben-Gurion's position and those who opposed him. The aging prime minister had angered the second generation of party leaders by promoting a group of still younger people such as Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres to important posts in the government, jumping over the heads of his erstwhile loyal lieutenants. For his part, Ben-Gurion was enraged that Lavon had brought his grievances to different forums outside of the party and had mobilized pressure by parties and newspapers that sought to weaken Labor's long-standing political dominance.

In order to quiet things down, the minister of finance, Levi Eshkol, by then the most powerful political figure besides Ben-Gurion, asked the minister of justice, Pinhas Rosen, to lead a ministerial committee of seven to determine how to deal with Lavon's demand for exhonoration and to bring the crisis to an end. This committee ruled that Lavon had not given the order for the sabotage action and that the document was indeed a forgery. But Ben-Gurion was indignant and threatened to resign

if Lavon did not quit his post at the Histadrut. Ben-Gurion, the "Old Man," was still powerful enough to impose his will on the party's central committee, but the entire affair weakened his standing among most of his party's elite. Eshkol refused to retract the committee's exonerating verdict and Ben-Gurion continued to demand a judicial inquiry. Additional friction ensued between Ben-Gurion and the party elite, led by Golda Meir, minister of foreign affairs, who until then had been a long-time loyal supporter of Ben-Gurion. These frictions included a bitter controversy over Israel's relations with West Germany and over the development of the Israeli nuclear option.

The tired and embittered seventy-seven-year-old Ben-Gurion resigned in June 1963. Levi Eshkol replaced him as prime minister and minister of defense. In the 1965 elections Ben-Gurion and some of his supporters in the Lavon Affair split from the Labor Party and formed a new party, Rafi (List of Israeli Workers). This effectively marked the end of Ben-Gurion's political career.

See also BEN-GURION, DAVID; ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; LAVON, PINHAS.

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MORDECHAI BAR-ON

LAVON, PINHAS

[1904–1976]

Israeli labor leader and politician.

Born in Galicia, Poland, Pinhas Lavon was active in a Zionist socialist youth movement and was one of the founders of the Gordonia-Pioneer Youth Movement. After immigrating to Mandatory Palestine in 1929, he was active in the Kibbutz movement and became one of the ideologists of MAPAI, whose secretary-general he was in 1938 and 1939. Elected to the Histadrut Executive Committee, he became its secretary-general from 1948 to 1951. Elected to the Knesset in 1949, a year later he joined the cabinet as minister without portfolio, minister of agriculture, and from 1954 to 1955, minister of defense. In that position Lavon sought to reform the Defense Ministry, thereby angering many of its top officials and senior echelons of the Israel Defense Force (IDF). In 1954 his name was linked to a failed operation in Egypt, in which a cell of young Egyptian Jews, activated by the IDF, placed explosives in American facilities in Cairo, with the intent of souring relations between Egypt and the West in order to delay the British withdrawal from Egypt, thus removing a buffer between Egypt and Israel. Lavon argued that he did not give the order to carry out these operations. The director of Military Intelligence claimed he had.

Lavon was forced to resign his post as defense minister when the leadership of MAPAI felt his erratic behavior and hawkish policies were not acceptable. They persuaded David Ben-Gurion to return from his self-imposed retirement. Lavon was reappointed secretary-general of the Histadrut (1956–1961). In 1959, with new evidence in his hands, Lavon demanded the re-opening of the investigation of the 1954 affair in order to clear his name. In the process he accused senior IDF officers and Defense Ministry officials of perjury. Ben-Gurion demanded Lavon's ouster from the Histadrut. In 1964 he left the MAPAI party. The Lavon Affair led to a split in the ruling MAPAI Party and to Ben-Gurion's resignation in 1963. To his dying day Lavon continued to demand that his name be cleared. New research suggests that he knew of the operation but did not necessarily sanction it.

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REEVA S. SIMON
UPDATED BY MERON MEDZINI

LAW IN THE SERVICE OF MAN

See HAQ, AL-

LAW, MODERN

Varieties of legal systems in Middle Eastern countries.

Modernization of law in the Middle East has entailed converting to civil law systems (generally based directly or indirectly on the French model) and, in the process, restricting and transforming the heritage of Islamic law *(shariʿa)* as set forth in juristic treatises.

Centralized legal systems, in which lawmaking is monopolized by governments of nation-states and uniform law applies throughout the national territory, are now in place throughout the Middle East, though the process remains incomplete in parts of the Arabian Peninsula. The adoption of modern legal systems has led to the marginalization or suppression of formerly vital local and customary legal systems. Modernization of legal systems has also eliminated special, extraterritorial status for members of powerful foreign communities who had succeeded in getting exemptions from the premodern legal systems of Middle Eastern countries.

The Role of *Shariʿa*

In its early stages, modernization of Middle Eastern law involved a large degree of Westernization, since the models for the new laws were European and the lawyers and other legal professionals who staffed the modernized legal systems were trained either in Europe or along European lines. Westernizing reforms were most often imposed from above by members of ruling elites or under the auspices of European powers. The process was initially slow and involved establishing new systems that operated alongside of—rather than replaced—the older, *shariʿa*-based systems. Gradually, the scope of the new legal systems widened, and the *shariʿa*-based system was increasingly confined (generally to matters of personal status, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance). Over time, many states reined in the autonomy of this remnant of the *shariʿa*-based system, sometimes even folding its courts into the newer structures. However, only Turkey completely secularized its law.

The reaction against these trends was slow in coming. In the middle of the twentieth century, some outside of the systems of religious law and education began to complain that Middle Eastern societies were abandoning their Islamic nature. In the 1960s and 1970s, this argument took a particularly radical turn, as movements arose claiming that the failure of existing governments to implement Islamic law rendered them un-Islamic and therefore illegitimate. Although in most countries those calling for revolution in the name of defending Islamic law were a minority, the denunciation of the marginalization of the *shariʿa* had great resonance.

Some countries therefore worked to move their legal system in an Islamic direction, and many pledged in their constitutions to make the principles of the *shariʿa* a (or even the) main source of law. Yet this vague promise provoked new problems. The *shariʿa* as traditionally understood was not a legal code with easily identifiable rules but a broad intellectual tradition. Introducing elements of Islamic law into the legal system raised questions of what interpretation should be used and who had the authority to interpret law. Further, training in Islamic legal sciences had atrophied in some locations. The result was that secularly trained legal personnel often bore primary responsibility for applying the law. This did not stop attempts to integrate elements of the Islamic legal tradition in various fields of law. This solution has proved controversial in many societies, but only a few countries have resisted the general trend.

Political and Other Pressures on Legal Development

Besides the conflict over the role of Islamic law, three other conflicting pressures have operated over time. First, many Middle Eastern states attempted to build socialist economic systems through law in the 1950s through the 1970s. This effort often led them to use law as a means to restructure property rights (through measures like land reform and rent controls). Since the 1980s these states have faced international pressure to liberalize their economic and legal frameworks.

Second, the general political environment has deeply affected legal development, most obviously (but not exclusively) in constitutional law. Early constitutional efforts in the nineteenth century seem fairly modest in retrospect, focusing on establishing clear political structures and chains of command. Some tried but failed to constrain the authority of the ruler. In the twentieth century,

constitutions became markers of sovereignty and were generally issued after independence. After midcentury, with the rise of revolutionary ideologies, Middle Eastern governments often experimented with attempts to transform the social order through the constitutional and legal order. In addition, the spread of authoritarianism made it common to construct special court systems and emergency laws to solidify existing regimes. But Middle Eastern governments have faced demands for political liberalization and enhanced guarantees for the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and respect for international human rights principles.

Finally, international factors have fluctuated in importance over time. Middle Eastern countries have varied in the degree to which they sought integration in the increasingly internationalized post–World War II legal environment. For example, they followed differing policies regarding submission to dispute-resolution institutions such as the International Court of Justice and international arbitration, and they also have disparate records of ratifying major international treaties. In general, however, the trend has been in favor of closer integration in the internationalized legal order.

As a result of these pressures, modernization of law—which started as a top-down reform process in the nineteenth century—had become an extremely sensitive and highly politicized topic by the beginning of the twenty-first.

British and French Influences

Leaving aside their occasional Islamic components, modern laws in the Middle East have been shaped by the same forces that led to the adoption of the civil law systems of continental Europe in almost all countries around the world. The primary, and partial, exceptions are those that were dominated by Britain. British colonization or the exercise of British mandatory or protectorate authority in the Middle East led to some transplants from the common law in areas like Aden (later part of South Yemen), Bahrain, Sudan, and Oman. Nevertheless, the common law had little long-term impact on the legal systems of many countries that fell under British rule, such as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait. Thus civil law, mostly of French derivation, now predominates throughout the Middle East, and the occasional remnants of common law seem unlikely to survive. For example, in 1987 Bahrain broke from British tradition, choosing to enact a commercial code derived from Egyptian and Kuwaiti models, which were themselves French in inspiration.

The contemporary legal systems of Middle Eastern countries thus share the basic features of French law, such as relying on comprehensive and systematic statements of the law in codes as formal sources of law, maintaining a sharp distinction between public and private law and between commercial and private law, and using the inquisitorial mode of procedure in criminal cases. Characteristics of the French judicial system such as separate administrative court hierarchies and the parquet/prosecutor's office are also found. French law codes have also been influential, sometimes directly and sometimes through the intervening influence of Egyptian law (which adopted and adapted much French law). However, parts of the substantive legal provisions in Middle Eastern codes often have no counterparts in continental European law, corresponding instead to governmental policies, local custom, or Islamic principles. Various codifications of *shariʿa* law were enacted into law, especially in matters of personal status, and many secular codes refer to principles of Islamic law or custom as supplementary sources of law.

The Progress of Reform

Although a few states substantially reformed their legal and judicial systems in the nineteenth century, in most areas of the Middle East change did not begin in earnest until the early twentieth century. It was delayed in countries like Afghanistan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the states comprising the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen until the middle of the twentieth century. Newer legal systems generally initially focused on constitutions, criminal law, procedural rules, and matters involving contracts and commerce. The longest-enduring control of *shariʿa* law was over personal status matters, although even in this area it was for the most part ultimately reformed or systemized in codes. Saudi Arabia has remained the most resistant to this trend, never having made a formal break with the preexisting Islamic system of jurists' law but instead following a steady course of supplementing juristic

Merve Kavakci, a newly elected member of Turkey's Parliament, was asked to leave the swearing-in session when she arrived for the ceremony wearing an Islamic head scarf. The scarves are a controversial issue in Turkey, seen as representing an Islamic threat to the secular constitution, and public servants are forbidden to wear them. **© AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.**

treatises by gradually introducing governmental "regulations" in areas important for administration and economic development.

The Ottoman Empire began comprehensive legal reform in the mid-1800s, undertaking many codification projects, some of which remained influential long after its collapse. Modernization began with attempts to codify Islamic criminal laws in 1840 and 1851, which were followed by the adoption of two French-inspired codes, a penal code in 1858 and a penal procedure code in 1879. An Ottoman constitution was adopted in 1876 (though it was quickly suspended); it was amended and restored in 1909. Inspired by French models, a commercial code (later borrowed by Saudi Arabia in 1931) was enacted in 1850, and commercial procedure codes were enacted in 1861 and 1880. The most famous monument of the Ottoman legal modernization process was the Majalla (Mecelle), issued between 1869 and 1876. This was an attempt to develop a codified version of Islamic law by relying on principles found in treatises of jurists of the Hanafi school, the official school of law in the Ottoman domains. In addition to substantive rules on civil and commercial transactions and on procedures and evidence, the Majalla was composed of statements and general principles of law designed to guide the application and interpretation of its provisions.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Majalla survived in some of its former territories, though most eventually turned to French-based codes, as occurred in Iraq in 1951, in Jordan in 1966,

Ehud Barak, former prime minister of Israel, prepares to testify in front of Israel's Supreme Court. The Supreme Court interprets the law, as well as the statutes of the Knesset, Israel's parliament. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

in Kuwait in 1980, in Lebanon in 1932, in Libya in 1954, and in Syria in 1949. The substantive provisions of the Majalla still exert an influence, inspiring many provisions of the 1951 Civil Code of Iraq and the 1985 Code of Civil Transactions of the United Arab Emirates. The Ottoman Family Law of 1917 was another historical experiment with crafting a modern statute out of *shariʿa* rules, using the innovative technique of combining principles of family law from different Sunni schools of law.

Egypt, which during the nineteenth century became largely independent of Ottoman control, began legal reform in the mid-nineteenth century. Initially, legal reform proceeded on two tracks. For cases involving Egyptians, Ottoman models were initially used before the legal system converted to a French model in the 1880s. For cases in which a foreigner was involved, Egypt constructed Mixed Courts that were more purely French from the beginning. In 1937, however, Egypt secured international agreement for the unification of its legal system and began to draw up a new set of comprehensive codes. Much of this work was overseen by the Egyptian jurist Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri (1895–1971). An expert in European and Islamic law, he played a major role in drafting the influential Egyptian Civil Code of 1948 (effective in 1949). This essentially French code, which allowed the *shariʿa* to be used as a supplementary source of law, provided the model for the civil codes subsequently adopted in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, and Syria and indirectly influenced the 1984 Sudanese Civil Transactions Act. Italian law shaped Egypt's 1937 criminal code.

As a result of long-standing French political domination of North Africa, French legal culture spread through the region. During the time that Algeria was a French colony, from 1830 to 1962, it was integrated into the French legal system. Algeria enacted new codes after independence in which

French influence persisted. In 1984 it adopted a code of family law reinstating *shari*ʿ*a* rules and reinforcing the patriarchal structure of the family. Faced with popular pressures for legal reform, in 1989 Algeria adopted a new constitution that diluted the militant socialist character of the 1976 constitution and reflected demands both for strengthened human rights guarantees and for changes that would give the constitution a more Islamic character. In 1861 Tunisia had become the first Middle Eastern country to enact a constitution. As a French protectorate, from 1881 to 1956, Tunisia enacted in 1906 a code of obligations and contracts that combined elements of French and Islamic law, and in 1913 it adopted a penal code. After independence Tunisia amended old codes and enacted new ones, the most significant being its 1956 Personal Status Code, constituting the most progressive interpretation in Arab law of Islamic legal requirements in the area of family law. Morocco, a French protectorate from 1912 to 1956, enacted in 1913 its Code of Obligations and Contracts, which was similar to the 1906 Tunisian code. Morocco enacted some French-inspired codes after independence, but it retained many rules of traditional *shari*ʿ*a* law in its 1958 Personal Status Code and incorporated aspects of Islamic criminal law in provisions of its 1962 Penal Code.

Distinctive Paths of Legal Development

Some Middle Eastern countries followed distinctive paths of legal development. For example, Iran adopted a constitution in 1906 and 1907. An Iranian Civil Code was enacted in the period from 1927 to 1937 that combined elements of Twelver Shiʿi law with French and Swiss law. French law provided the models for other codifications undertaken by Iran in the 1930s. The progressive Iranian Family Protection Act of 1967, amended in 1975, was abrogated after the Islamic revolution of 1978–1979. Since the revolution, Iran has officially endorsed Islamization, adopting a constitution in 1979 that placed an Islamic jurist at the apex of the scheme of government and established Islamic principles as the supreme law of the land. Westernized legal professionals and Western-style legal training were replaced; Shiʿa clerics and Shiʿi jurisprudence were given a preeminent role in the legal system. However, there was no return to the old system of jurists' law: Iran's parliament retained its lawmaking authority, and French legal influences were not obliterated.

Turkey was reconstituted in 1921 as a nation-state after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Under Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), the military leader who became the first president, Turkey pursued a program of complete secularization of law, which led to the abandonment of Islamic law even in personal status matters. In 1928 Islam lost its status as the state religion. Turkey imported European codes in the 1920s that were variously taken from German, Italian, and Swiss sources. The Turkish constitutions of 1921, 1924, 1961, and 1982 have differed in many respects, but Turkey's governments have continued to uphold the principle of secularism.

Israel emerged in 1948 as a Jewish state with a legal system in which there coexisted elements deriving from the Ottoman law of prepartition Palestine, Jewish law, and Western law, the latter being an unusual hybrid of common law and civil law elements. As with almost all other Middle Eastern countries, however, personal status law retains a religious basis.

Upon achieving independence in 1951, Libya largely divested itself of Italian law, which had been imposed after it was colonized by Italy in 1912. Egyptian influences on the new legal system were initially strong, but after the 1969 revolution Libya pursued a separate course of radical legal changes that were dictated by the theories of its leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi.

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ANN E. MAYER
UPDATED BY NATHAN J. BROWN

LAW OF RETURN

Law that allows Jews to immigrate to Israel and become Israeli citizens.

The Law of Return *(Hok ha-Shvut)* was passed by the Knesset on 5 July 1950. In accordance with the notion that Israel is a Jewish state and the state of the Jews, the law provides that any Jew is entitled to immigrate to Israel and acquire a certificate and status of *oleh,* an immigrant with automatic citizenship. The law was amended in 1954 to exclude individuals with a criminal past that might endanger public welfare. An amendment in 1970 extended citizenship rights to non-Jewish spouses and children of Jews.

Some Orthodox leaders have called for an amendment to the law that would narrowly define a Jew as one born of a Jewish mother or one who converted according to Orthodox tradition. To many, this proposed amendment makes the debate over Jewish identity so volatile that it threatens the fabric of worldwide Jewish unity. It has sparked passionate debate both in Israel and the Diaspora over definitions of Jewish identity, and has aroused strong opposition from the Jewish Reform and Conservative movements. There have been periodic calls for repeal of the law by some non-Zionists and others who view it as discriminatory. From their perspective, Israel should be a state like any other modern state, without laws that discriminate on the basis of religion or ethnicity.

See also ISRAEL: OVERVIEW.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

LAWRENCE, T. E.

[1888–1935]

British soldier and adventurer, known as Lawrence of Arabia.

Thomas Edward Lawrence was born on 15 August 1888 in Tremadoc, Wales, and was educated at the University of Oxford, where he graduated with a thesis on the military architecture of the Crusades. Having developed an interest in archaeology and Arab culture, he toured the Crusader castles in Greater Syria when the region was in its last years under Ottoman rule. At the outbreak of World War I, disgusted by the hypocrisy of his own society's values, Lawrence turned from an adventurer into a secret agent, becoming the famed Lawrence of Arabia. From the British Military Intelligence Service in Cairo, which he joined in 1914, he was dispatched to the Hijaz, where the Hashimites acted as the Ottoman sultan's representatives of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Lawrence's mission was to help organize the Arab tribes into a national movement that ultimately was to serve British imperialism. The Arab national movement, in which Lawrence himself came to believe, turned into a military success, and in 1918 Lawrence and Hashimite prince Faisal (later King Faisal I ibn Hussein of Iraq) entered Damascus before the arrival of the British army so as to avoid a Muslim backlash.

In spite of the success of the so-called Arab Revolt of 1916 to 1918, Lawrence, who narrated his adventures in *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1926), thought that his battle for an "Arab cause" was "lost" because "the old men came out again and took from us our victory" in order to "re-make [the world] in the likeness of the former world they knew" (Introduction to the first edition, 1926; passage omitted from later editions). Unable to cope with his fractured self and with the historical necessities of British imperialism, Lawrence ultimately stopped believing in a meaningful Arab national movement, which he thought was only "necessary in its time and place" (*Letters,* in

1930, p. 693). He rejoined the air force in 1925 and served as an enlisted man until 1935. On 19 May of that year, shortly after his discharge, he was killed in a motorbike accident in Dorset.

See also Arab Revolt (1916); Hashimite House (House of Hashim).

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Benjamin Braude
Updated by Zouhair Ghazzal

LAZ

See Glossary

LAZMA

See Glossary

LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

This foremost pan-Arab organization provides the institutional expression for the aspiration of Arab unity.

The League of Arab States, also known as the Arab League, is composed of twenty-two independent Arab states that have signed the Pact of the League of Arab States. Palestine, represented by the Palestinian Authority, is included as an independent state. The multipurpose League of Arab States seeks to promote Arab interests in general, but especially economic and security interests. It also works to resolve disputes among members and between member states and nonmember states. It has the image of unity in the protection of Arab independence and sovereignty. It promotes political, military, economic, social, cultural, and developmental cooperation among its members.

The league is an international governmental organization with permanent headquarters in Cairo, Egypt. From 1979 to 1990 its headquarters were in Tunis. It maintains delegations at United Nations

Secretary-General Amr Mousa of the League of Arab States speaks at the United Nations in 2003. Mousa, a career diplomat, also served as the foreign minister of Egypt after 1991.
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facilities in New York and Geneva, and at the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It also has offices in such key cities as Washington, D.C., London, Moscow, Paris, Bonn, Beijing, Brussels, Vienna, Madrid, Rome, and New Delhi. The league has not realized the perfect Arab unity desired by some Arab nationalists. From its inception some states emphasized state sovereignty in accordance with the league's pact and rejected federalist or unionist proposals. The league not only serves the mutual interests of its members, but also reflects the differences. The league members agreed to an Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994 and to the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism in 1998.

History

The League of Arab States was founded on 22 March 1945 with the signing of the pact by seven Arab states. Sixteen additional states joined, but in 1990 Yemen (Aden) and Yemen (Sanʿa) merged to form the Republic of Yemen, bringing the total to twenty-two.

Although the league was formed after World War II, the process that led to its creation is a function of the development of Arab nationalism, which predated the twentieth century but grew dramatically after World War II. Egyptian prime minister

The League of Arab States meets in Bludan in 1946. Formed in 1945, the league is a voluntary association of independent countries whose main purposes are to strengthen ties among member and nonmember states, coordinate their policies, and promote their common interests. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Mustafa al-Nahhas, Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Saʿid, and Transjordan's King Abdullah I ibn Hussein are credited with being early architects of the league in the 1940s. The British initiated, in part, the preparatory talks leading to its creation. In the fall of 1944, seven Arab states met in Alexandria, Egypt, to discuss the creation of a "Commonwealth of Arab States." On 7 October 1944 Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan signed the Alexandria Protocol, which envisioned a league of independent states, rather than a union or federation. The main points of the protocol were subsequently incorporated into the league, as was an appendix stressing Palestinian independence. The league's initial members were Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan (now Jordan), and Yemen (Sanaa).

The league's general structure has remained intact since its formation, but the scope of its activities has expanded dramatically, especially in nonpolitical fields. The organization consists of a council, special committees, and a secretariat-general. In addition, the league has become an umbrella organization responsible for the numerous specialized agencies, unions, and other institutions created to promote Arab interests.

Organization

The pact established a council as the league's principal organ. It is composed of representatives of each member state, with each state having one vote. Unanimous decisions of the council are binding on all members. Majority decisions are binding only on those members that accepted them, except that majority decisions are enforceable on all members for certain specific matters relating to personnel, the budget, administrative regulations, and adjournment. The council implements league policies and pursues league goals. It meets twice a year, in March and September, but extraordinary meetings can be called at the request of two members.

Special committees have been established to support and represent the council. The league's committees have included the Political Committee, Culture Committee, Communications Committee, Social Committee, Legal Committee, Arab Oil Experts Committee, Information Committee, Health Committee, Human Rights Committee, Permanent Committee for Administration and Financial Affairs, Permanent Committee for Meteorology, Committee of Arab Experts on Cooperation, Arab Women's Committee, Organization of Youth Welfare, and Conference of Liaison Officers.

The secretariat-general consists of the secretary-general, assistant secretaries-general, and other principal officials of the league. It is responsible for administrative and financial activities. The council, with the approval of a two-thirds majority of the league's members, appoints the secretary-general to a renewable five-year term. The secretary-general has the rank of ambassador.

The office of the secretary-general was held by Egyptians during the first three decades of the league: Abd al-Rahman al-Azzam (1945–1952); Abd al-Khaliq Hassuna (1952–1972); and Mahmud Riyad (1972–1979). A Tunisian, Chadli Klibi, held the post from 1979 until 1990. He resigned during the controversy surrounding the Gulf Crisis. Ahmad Ismat Abd al-Majid, an Egyptian, served as secretary-general from May 1991 to 2001. He was followed in 2001 by the popular Egyptian foreign minister Amr Moussa (also Musa).

In 1950 the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation complemented the league pact

and provided for the establishment of the Joint Defense Council and the Permanent Military Commission. An Economic Council was set up under the treaty in 1953. An Arab Unified Military Command was formed in 1964. In 1976 an Arab Deterrent Force was sent to Lebanon under league auspices.

Financing

The League of Arab States is financed by an assessment of charges made to each member. The secretary-general prepares a draft budget and submits it to the council for approval before the beginning of each fiscal year. The council then fixes the share of the expenses or dues to be paid by each member state. This share may be reconsidered if necessary.

The league experienced significant difficulties in the collection of member-state dues in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis (1990–1991) and subsequently. Its 1991 budget was over $27 million, with the largest share being assessed to Saudi Arabia (14%), Kuwait (14%), Libya (12%), Iraq (10%), Egypt (8.5%), Algeria (8%), the United Arab Emirates (6.5%), and Morocco (5%). Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, and Yemen had reservations concerning their share of the league budget. The 1999 budget was set at $26.5 million, but when Amr Moussa took office in 2001, it was estimated at $50 million. Also, late dues reportedly had reached $100 million, with some states more than a decade in arrears. According to Article 15 of the league's bylaws, approved in 1973, members can be denied

Issues at Arab League summits

No.	Date and location	Resolutions, outcomes
1st	January 1964, Cairo	Agreed to oppose "the robbery of the waters of Jordan by Israel."
2nd	September 1964, Alexandria	Supported the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in its effort to liberate Palestine from the Zionists.
3rd	September 1965, Casablanca	Opposed "intra-Arab hostile propaganda."
4th	29 August–1 September 1967, Khartoum	Held post-1967 Arab-Israeli War, which ended with crushing Israeli victory; declared three "no's": "no negotiation with Israel, no treaty, no recognition of Israel."
5th	December 1969, Rabat	Called for the mobilization of member countries against Israel.
6th	November 1973, Algiers	Held in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, it set strict guidelines for dialogue with Israel.
7th	30 October–2 November 1974, Rabat	Declared the PLO to be "the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," who had "the right to establish the independent state of Palestine on any liberated territory."
8th	October 1976, Cairo	Approved the establishment of a peacekeeping force (Arab Deterrent Force) for the Lebanese Civil War.
9th	November 1978, Baghdad	Condemned the Camp David Peace Accords between Egypt and Israel, and threatened Egypt with sanctions, including the suspension of its membership if Egypt signed a treaty with Israel.
10th	November 1979, Tunis	Held in the wake of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1978, it discussed Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon.
11th	November 1980, Amman	Formulated a strategy for economic development among League members until 2000.
12th	November 1981/September 1982, Fez	Meeting was suspended due to resistance to a peace plan drafted by Saudi crown prince Fahd, which implied de facto recognition of the Jewish state. In September 1982 at Fez, the meeting reconvened to adopt a modified version of the Fahd Plan, called the Fez Plan.
13th	August 1985, Casablanca	Failed to back a PLO- Jordanian agreement that envisaged talks with Israel about Palestinian rights. Summit boycotted by five member states.
14th	November 1987, Amman	Supported UN Security Council Resolution 598 regarding cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War. Also declared that individual member states could decide to resume diplomatic ties with Egypt.
15th	June 1988, Casablanca	Decided to financially support the PLO in sustaining the Intifada in the occupied territories.
16th	May 1989, Casablanca	Readmitted Egypt into Arab League, and set up Tripartite Committee to secure a cease-fire in the Lebanese Civil War and re-establish a constitutional government in Lebanon.
17th	May 1990, Baghdad	Denounced recent increase of Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel.
18th	August 1990, Cairo	12 out of 20 members present condemned Iraq for invading and annexing Kuwait. Agreed to deploy troops to assist Saudi and other Gulf states' armed forces.
19th	June 1995, Cairo	Held after a hiatus of five years. Iraq not invited.
20th	October 2000, Cairo	Set up funds to help the Palestinians' Second Intifada against the Israeli occupation, and called on its members to freeze their relations with Israel. Iraq was invited.
21st	March 2001, Amman	Held after the election of Ariel Sharon as Israel's prime minister, it appointed Egypt's Amr Mousa as the Arab League's new secretary-general.
22nd	March 2002, Beirut	Adopted the Saudi Peace Plan of Crown Prince Abdullah, which offered Israel total peace in exchange for total Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories conquered in the 1967 war. Opposed the use of force against Iraq.
23rd	March 2003, Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt	Agreed not to participate in the U.S.-led attack on Iraq, but allowed the United States to use military bases in some of their countries.

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voting rights if their delinquent dues total more than their total assessment of the current year and the two preceding years.

Policy

The League of Arab States has had a significant impact on the Middle East and on its members. Although it has not been a stepping-stone to Arab political unity, it has fostered Arab cooperation in many fields. Cooperation on political questions, however, has been difficult. In fact, political conflicts in the Arab world are frequently reflected in the league. Governmental diversity is protected in the league pact, which requires each member to respect the systems of government of other members. The pact also requires states to abstain from action calculated to change the systems of government in other members.

The Cold War served to draw political lines within the league between clients of the United States and those of the Soviet Union. Despite the wealth of some of its members, the league is more closely aligned to the South in the North-South conflict, sometimes acting as a bloc for the South in the United Nations.

The league has actively sought to bolster Arab security, but its efforts are limited by inter-Arab rivalries. It has facilitated the peaceful settlement of disputes between its members, as between Morocco and Mauritania; between groups within member states, as in Lebanon or Somalia; and between members and outside parties, as between Libya and the United States. The league has acted as a regional alternative to the United Nations in this regard.

The league has been united in its support for Palestine vis-à-vis Israel, but has come under increasing criticism in recent years for failing to do enough for the Palestinians and for Iraq. Egypt's treaty with Israel (the 1978 Camp David Accords) resulted in its suspension from the league from 1979 to 1989. Members were also divided over the Fahd Plan (1981); over the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); and over the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the first Gulf War (1991) prompted additional controversy. The U.S. move against Iraq in 2003 brought strong and united condemnation of "American-British aggression against Iraq." The league also emphasized its cooperation with the United Nations.

Membership

League members are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. In November 2002 Libya asked to withdraw its membership. Any independent Arab state is theoretically entitled to become a member, but a request for membership must be made through the permanent secretariat-general of the league and submitted to the council. Eritrea assumed an observer status in January 2003.

Satellite Organizations

Numerous specialized organizations and other institutions that promote Arab cooperation and protect Arab interests in a wide array of fields fall under the league umbrella. These include, among others: the Academy of Arab Music; Administrative Tribunal of the Arab League; Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa; Arab Bureau of Narcotics; Arab Bureau for Prevention of Crime; Arab Bureau of Criminal Police; Arab Center for the Study of Arid Zones and Dry Lands; Arab Civil Aviation Council; Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development; Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to Africa and Arab Countries; Arab Industrial Development Organization; Arab Labour Organization; Arab League Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization; Arab Maritime Transport Academy; Arab Monetary Fund; Arab Organization for Agricultural Development; Arab Organization for Standardization and Metrology; Arab Organization of Administrative Sciences; Arab Postal Union; Arab Satellite Communications Organization; Arab States Broadcasting Union; Arab Telecommunications Union; Council of Arab Economic Unity; Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior; Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation; Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries; and the Special Bureau for Boycotting Israel.

Prospects

After the second Persian Gulf war in 2003, relations between member states of the league remained uncertain. Amr Moussa moved to reunify the Arab

ranks and worked through the United Nations. The uncertainties unleashed in the gulf spawned new dangers aimed at regimes friendly to the United States. The crisis offers new challenges to Arab leadership that could enhance the role of the Arab League. The league's aspiration of Arab unity will be central to the creation of a new world order, as will the inevitable divisions in the Arab ranks. Arab cooperation in nonpolitical areas will continue under the league's aegis and will promote not only improved relations among Arabs, but also between Arabs and outside states and organizations.

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Arab Boycott; Camp David Accords (1978); Fahd Plan (1981); Gulf Crisis (1990–1991); Nahhas, Mustafa al-; Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

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Charles G. MacDonald

LEBANESE ARAB ARMY

Muslim military group in Lebanon.

The Lebanese Arab Army was formed in 1975 by a group of Muslim officers and soldiers who defected from the army of Lebanon and accused its Maronite leadership of collaboration with Maronite right-wing militias. Supported by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO; the al-Fatah movement in particular), it succeeded in overrunning military barracks controlled by the army of Lebanon. The Lebanese Arab Army's role came to an end in the spring and early summer of 1976, when its forces (along with PLO forces and forces loyal to the Lebanese National Movement) clashed with the army of Syria, which was supporting the coalition of Maronite-oriented right-wing militias.

See also Fatah, al-; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

As'ad AbuKhalil

LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1958)

Uprising against the government.

Fifteen years after Lebanon became officially free of French mandatory control, it assumed its role as an independent republic on the basis of an unwritten national pact, whose symbolic and practical importance is difficult to exaggerate. In May 1958, the nation of 1.1 million people, whose political institutions reflected the balance of power between its confessional communities, exploded in civil war.

Rooted in a series of interlocking factors of domestic, regional, and international origin, the primary causes of the war were domestic in nature. They were shaped by the policies of the presidential regime of Camille Chamoun (1952–1958), whose personal ambitions capped a domestic politics and foreign policy that greatly exacerbated existing divisions in a state whose civil and national consciousness were less developed than its successful mercantile character.

President Chamoun's ambition to succeed himself in office contributed to the existing political tensions and was widely viewed as one of the major catalysts of civil strife. The Lebanese government claimed that civil insurrection was a function of external intervention organized by Egypt and Syria, in the United Arab Republic (UAR). But the war that

Women belonging to the Phalanges Libanaises party demonstrate during the Lebanese civil war. © Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

was sparked by the assassination of the journalist Nasib Matni, on 8 May 1958, was rooted in preexisting grievances that involved questions of political access; confessionalism and class; group identity and national consensus; and the major discontent of political elites displaced by corrupt elections in 1957, as well as the dissatisfaction of those constituencies deprived of significant representation.

Opposition groups that included an array of established political figures, some of whom would come to office in the post-Chamoun regime for the first time, opposed the president's perpetuation in office, and, in some instances, his foreign policy as well.

Under the Chamoun regime, Lebanon threw its support to the conservative Arab coalition and became a staunch advocate of U.S. policy and the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. That stance identified Lebanon with the anti-Nasserist and anti-Arab nationalist forces in the region. The intensification of domestic tensions exploded with the Nasib Matni assassination, and President Chamoun was challenged by the opposition. The Lebanese government's response was to blame civil strife on interference by the UAR and to charge it with the

attempt to undermine Chamoun regime and state. These charges came before the League of Arab States (Arab League) and the United Nations, which assigned a task force to investigate charges of massive infiltration by foreign forces in Lebanon. It was on the basis of this same charge that President Chamoun had requested assistance from the United States. With the military coup in Iraq on 14 July, an event that shook the Western powers, the United States responded on 15 July with military intervention in Lebanon, while Great Britain gave protective cover to the Jordanian regime. The United States remained in Lebanon overseeing the election of a new president, Fuʾad Chehab, an event which marked the beginning of a new phase in the nation's development. Many would argue, however, that the fundamental roots of this first civil war had not been satisfactorily resolved.

See also Chamoun, Camille; Chehab, Fuʾad; United Arab Republic (UAR).

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Irene Gendzier

LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990)

Domestic conflict in Lebanon.

There is no consensus among scholars and researchers on what triggered the Lebanese Civil War. The strike of fishermen at Sidon in February 1975 could be considered the first important episode that set off the outbreak of hostilities. That event involved a specific issue: the attempt of former President Camille Chamoun (also head of the Maronite-oriented National Liberal Party) to monopolize fishing along the coast of Lebanon. The injustices perceived by the fishermen evoked sympathy from many Lebanese and reinforced the resentment and antipathy that were widely felt against the state and the economic monopolies. The demonstrations against the fishing company were quickly transformed into a political action supported by the political left and their allies in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The state tried to suppress the demonstrators, and a government sniper reportedly killed a popular figure in the city, Maʿruf Saʿd, who was known for his opposition to the government and his support for the Palestinians.

The events in Sidon were not contained for long. The government began to lose control of the situation in April 1975, when a bus carrying Palestinians was ambushed by gunmen belonging to the Phalange party. The party claimed that earlier its headquarters had been targeted by unknown gunmen. The attack against the bus in Ayn al-Rummana marked the official beginning of the Lebanese Civil War. Initially, the war pitted Maronite-oriented right-wing militias (most notably the Phalange party and the National Liberal party) against leftist and Muslim-oriented militias (grouped together in the Lebanese National Movement) supported by the PLO. The eruption of military hostilities produced a heated political debate on whether the army of Lebanon, led by a right-wing Maronite commander, should be deployed to end the fighting. Most Muslims and leftists opposed any use of the army, which was seen as anti-Palestinian; most right-wingers called for its immediate deployment.

The characterizations of the combatants in the civil war often obscure the nature of the conflict. Many Lebanese still see the civil war as the product of a conspiracy hatched by outsiders who were jealous of "Lebanese democracy and prosperity." The civil war should be viewed as a multidimensional conflict that at its roots is a classical civil strife with the domestic parties determining the course but rarely the outcome of the fighting. Over the course of Lebanese history external parties have insisted on preventing the Lebanese from proceeding unrestrained in their civil strife. Had the Lebanese been allowed to continue fighting without external restraints, some sects in Lebanon would have been eliminated long ago. This is not to say that the external parties—notably Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Israel—have not contributed to the intensification of the conflict whenever it suited their interests. All of these states have had proxy militias operating in Lebanon.

The roots of the civil war are a set of issues, some having to do with domestic politics and others with foreign policy. It is fair to say that the system of sectarian distribution of power that had been

The controversial military figure Ariel Sharon (b. 1928), pictured left, has served as both defense minister and prime minister of Israel. Sharon is most widely known for his lengthy occupation of Lebanon from 1982 to 1985, and for his continuing conflict with Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

sponsored by France since 1920 led to the increasing frustration of Muslims, who grew demographically but not politically. In 1975 the political system continued to assume that the figures of the 1932 census—the only census in Lebanon's history—which showed the Maronites to be the single largest sect in the country, had not changed. However, it was widely known that the Shiʿa had long been the single largest sect, although their political representation was small. The ceremonial post of speaker of Parliament was reserved for the Shiʿa, whereas the presidency was reserved for Maronites, and the prime ministership for Sunnis. The Shiʿa included a disproportionate number of poor people, and, to add to their misery, predominated in the area of southern Lebanon that in the 1960s became an arena for Israel-Palestinian conflict. The state of Lebanon, which always avoided provoking Israel, simply abandoned southern Lebanon. Many of the people there migrated to the suburbs of Beirut which are known as "poverty belts." The young Shiʿite migrants, who had not participated in the prosperity of prewar Beirut, joined many Lebanese and Palestinian organizations.

The Sunnis had grievances, too. The office of the prime minister was marginalized by the strong presidency of Sulayman Franjiyya, who was elected in 1970. In 1973, when Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam could not fire the commander in chief of the army after a commando raid launched from Israel that targeted three high-ranking PLO leaders, the issue of the powers of the prime minister emerged as a symbol of the sectarian/political imbalance in the country. Socioeconomic dissatisfaction plus political resentment produced an unstable political system.

The presence of Palestinians in Lebanon was another thorny issue. The state decided to crack down on their armed presence in Lebanon while right-wing militias were being armed and financed by the army. Many leftists and Muslims wanted the state to support the Palestinians and to send the army to protect southern Lebanon against raids from Israel. The PLO, on the other hand, was tempted to take advantage of the domestic turmoil to shore up support for its cause and to undermine the military power of the Army, which had long harassed Palestinians.

The first phase of the Lebanese Civil War did not end; it merely came to a temporary halt as a result of regional and international consensus. When it was becoming clear that the PLO and its Lebanese allies were about to overrun predominantly Christian areas, Syria intervened militarily in Lebanon and, with support from Israel, the United States, and France, fought the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies. The fighting stopped for a while, although southern Lebanon continued to be an arena for the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as the armed militias, who were present throughout Lebanon. By 1978, Syria's relations with Maronite-oriented parties had worsened, and the rise of Bashir Jumayyil as head of the Lebanese Forces—the coalition of right-wing fighting groups—caused a change in the course of the civil war. Israel became a close ally of the Lebanese Forces, and Syria's regime decided to sponsor the leftist-Palestinian coalition. In the spring of 1978, Israel's army invaded Lebanon in order to end any military presence in southern Lebanon, except that of the pro-Israel militia. Although international opprobium forced Israel southward, and although UN forces were deployed in southern Lebanon to pacify the region, Israel continued to occupy part of southern Lebanon, calling the strip of land "the security zone."

The civil war took another turn in 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon again; this time Israeli's forces reached Beirut. Israel took advantage of the deteriorating security situation throughout the country and expected that popular frustration with the misconduct of members of the PLO, and Syrian and Lebanese troops, would provide positive climate for its all-out military intervention. The invasion claimed the lives of some 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinians. Israel also wanted to influence the 1982 presidential election; Bashir Jumayyil was elected president but was assassinated a few days later. His assassination was the pretext that the Lebanese Forces gave for their mass killing of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.

Amin Jumayyil, the next president, supported the signing of an Israel-Lebanon peace treaty in May 1983. Lebanon's opposition, coupled with Syria's rejection on the pro-Israel, pro-United States orientation of Jumayyil, resulted in the eruption of hostilities throughout the latter's administration. When Jamayyil's term ended in the summer of 1988, he appointed the Maronite commander in chief of the army, Gen. Michel Aoun, as interim president. His appointment was rejected by many Lebanese, and Aoun launched a "war of national liberation" against Syria's army in Lebanon. His shells, however, fell on innocent Lebanese living in areas under Syria's control.

The beginning of the end of the civil war came in October 1989, when Lebanese deputies gathered in the city of Ta'if in Saudi Arabia. The meeting produced a document of national accord. It was impossible to implement, however, until General Aoun's forces were defeated in October 1990, when Syria's troops attacked his headquarters and he was forced to seek refuge in France. President Ilyas al-Hirawi was elected in 1989, and the territorial integrity of Lebanon has been partially restored.

See also Aoun, Michel; Chamoun, Camille; Franjiyya, Sulayman; Jumayyil, Bashir; Lebanese Forces; Phalange; Sabra and Shatila Massacres; Salam Family.

As 'ad AbuKhalil

LEBANESE CRISES OF THE 1840s

Druze versus Christian sectarian violence.

The London Treaty of 1840 ended the Egyptian occupation of Mount Lebanon (1831–1840). Soon afterwards the Ottomans dismissed the local governor, Bashir II, whose collusion with the Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali had discredited him with the local population. The years of Egyptian manipulation of sectarian politics produced a backlash under

the Ottomans in the Druze versus Christian conflicts at Dayr al-Qamar in 1841. Bashir III, the last Chehab amir, was replaced in 1842 by a direct governor, Umar Pasha al-Nimsawi (the Austrian). Continued civil strife and European pressure led the Ottomans to establish a system of two subgovernorates in Mount Lebanon *(qa'im maqamiyatayn)* divided on religious lines. Despite further sectarian clashes in 1845 at Mukhtara, Jazzin, and Dayr al-Qamar, the tottering new system survived until 1860 when the mutasarrif system finally ended Mount Lebanon's autonomy.

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TAYEB EL-HIBRI

LEBANESE FORCES

Lebanese political-military organization.

The Lebanese Forces (LF) emerged in 1976 under the leadership of Bashir Jumayyil. At that time various Lebanese Christian militias had joined forces to destroy the Palestinian Tall al-Zaʿtar Refugee Camp. In August 1976 a joint command council was established to integrate those militias formally and to achieve a degree of political independence from the traditional Maronite Catholic (Christian) political leaders. Jumayyil took control of the military wing of his father's Phalange Party and then proceeded to incorporate other Christian militias. Those that resisted were forcibly integrated. In 1978 Jumayyil subjugated the Marada Brigade, the militia of the Franjiyya family and former president Sulayman Franjiyya, killing his son Tony Franjiyya in the process. In 1980 the Tigers militia of Camille Chamoun was absorbed.

By the early 1980s, the LF controlled East Beirut and parts of Mount Lebanon, and Jumayyil became its "commander." He did not confine the LF to combat; he also created committees within its structure responsible for health, information, foreign policy, education, and other matters of public concern. Jumayyil established links with Israel, and he consistently battled with Syrian forces. The LF began to decline in 1982, when President-elect Bashir Jumayyil was assassinated. After numerous succession struggles, including the brief tenure of Fuʾad Abu Nadir as head of the forces, Elie Hobeyka—notorious for his role in the 1982 bloodshed in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps—assumed the leadership of the LF. After Hobeyka signed the Syrian-sponsored Tripartite Declaration in December 1985, against the wishes of president Amin Jumayyil, LF chief of staff Samir Geagea launched an attack on Hobeyka early in 1986 and took over the LF. Although Geagea was able to take advantage of the mood of frustration and despair among the Christian masses, Israel, his chief backer, was less interested in his cause than it had been—although it continued to supply his forces with money and arms.

After the appointment of General Michel Aoun as interim president by Amin Jumayyil, Lebanon's army tried to disarm the LF but failed to eliminate its political and military power. The defeat of Aoun by Syrian troops in 1990 led Geagea to try to impose himself as the overall Maronite leader. His attempt to become president of the Phalange Party failed, and George Saade remained the head of that predominantly Maronite party.

Geagea promised to allow Lebanon's army to confiscate weapons and ammunition belonging to his militia, according to the terms of the Taʾif accord. He promised to transform his militia into a political party and obtained a license toward that end. Lebanon's army, however, accused his forces of obstruction and discovered large amounts of hidden supplies and weapons. In early 1994, when a bomb exploded in a church in East Beirut, Lebanese authorities uncovered a terrorist ring that answered to Geagea personally. The government found evidence linking him to a series of bombs, car bombs, and assassinations. He was arrested and has been in prison since 1994.

See also AOUN, MICHEL; CHAMOUN, CAMILLE; FRANJIYYA FAMILY; GEAGEA, SAMIR; HOBEIKA, ELIE; JUMAYYIL, AMIN; JUMAYYIL, BASHIR; PHALANGE.

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As'ad AbuKhalil
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

LEBANESE FRONT

A coalition of major Christian conservative parties, which became an important player in the 1975 civil war in Lebanon.

Established in 1976, the Lebanese Front included the National Liberal Party of the former president, Camille Chamoun; Sulayman Franjiyya, the president of Lebanon when the Lebanese Civil War began in 1975; Pierre Jumayyil, head of the Phalange—the front's major military power; the Guardians of Cedars; the Permanent Congress of the Lebanese Orders of Monks; al-Tanzim of Dr. Fuad Shemali; the Maronite League headed by Shakir Abu Sulayman; and other independent personalities such as Dr. Charles Malik, Fu'ad Bustani, and Edward Honein.

In August 1976, the coalition established a military branch, known as the Lebanese Forces, which could mobilize 30,000 troops. At the beginning of 1978, Franjiyya became critical of the open collaboration between Israeli government officials and front leaders Chamoun and Jumayyil. Franjiyya was also against the Camp David peace accord negotiations between Egypt and Israel (approved by other front members) but championed a close relationship with Syria. In May 1978, Franjiyya resigned from the front. It was subsequently wracked with dissent and disintegrated.

The Lebanese Front charter had stressed the need to maintain the unity of Lebanon, to reestablish the authority of the law, and to respect private enterprise in the economic sector.

See also Franjiyya, Sulayman; Jumayyil, Pierre; Lebanese Forces; National Liberal Party.

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George E. Irani

LEBANESE NATIONAL MOVEMENT (LNM)

A coalition of Islamic and leftist Lebanese parties and groups.

Established in 1975, the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) advocated, among other objectives, the solidarity of Lebanon with the Palestinians, the adoption of a proportional system of elections, and the elimination of political and administrative sectarianism. During the Lebanese Civil War, the LNM joined forces with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and was headed by Kamal Jumblatt. After his assassination in 1977, his son Walid Jumblatt took over and, in October 1982, announced the dissolution of the LNM.

See also Jumblatt, Kamal; Jumblatt, Walid.

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George E. Irani

LEBANESE UNIVERSITY

University located in Beirut.

The Lebanese University, established in 1952, is under the jurisdiction of the ministry of education. It was founded to allow Lebanese from lower-income groups to receive a university education, which for decades had been the monopoly of those who could afford private universities. It has two branches—one in East Beirut and the other in West Beirut—and smaller branches in the provinces of the north, the south, and the Biqa valley. University faculties (departments) include law, political science and management, engineering, literature and humanities, education, social sciences, fine arts, journalism and advertising, business administration, and agriculture. The language of instruction is Arabic; study of one foreign language is required by all faculties.

Although the Lebanese University has filled a gap and has catered to a sector of the population that had been virtually left out of the private educational system, holders of degrees from the Lebanese

University are regarded as inferior job applicants, compared with holders of degrees from the American University of Beirut or Saint Joseph University. The state apparatus also favors graduates of the two private universities. The Lebanese University's lack of endowment forces it to be totally dependent on state funding, which is not always forthcoming. Classes are overcrowded, and there are no admissions standards. Staff and faculty are underpaid, which forces many of them to seek outside employment as well. Furthermore, the large student body enables some students to show up only for final exams.

Like other institutions, the university was affected by the Lebanese Civil War of 1975. Many professors were forced to take a political stance, and some were pressured by armed students to change their grades. Some of the buildings of the university were occupied by militias, and others were heavily damaged.

See also American University of Beirut (AUB); Saint Joseph University.

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LEBANESE WOMEN'S COUNCIL

Association of Lebanese women's and human rights organizations.

The Lebanese Women's Council (LWC), or Lebanese Council of Women, is an umbrella association encompassing over 140 women's and human rights organizations, including welfare, religious, academic, political, and feminist organizations. It has been a key advocate for women's rights in Lebanon since its establishment in 1952 by Lebanese feminists Ibtihaj Qaddurah and Laure Moghaizel. At its inception, the LWC focused on furthering political rights for Lebanese women and on encouraging women to run for public office.

Today the goals of the LWC have broadened to include supporting women's rights in education, health, and employment. The organization also advocates for women's legal rights (for example, the right of women to pass citizenship to their children). In addition, it continues to work to support women political candidates; in 2003 there were only three women in the Lebanese parliament.

The LWC participates in numerous local and international coalitions. Most notably, it took part in the 1995 UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing as well as in Beijing +5, the five-year assessment of the Beijing Conference, held during a special session of the UN General Assembly in New York City in 2000. The LWC was one of the drafters of the subsequent report of the Non-Governmental Committee for the Follow-Up of Woman Issues. It also was instrumental in attaining Lebanon's ratification (with reservations) of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1996. CEDAW is a human-rights treaty focused on women's rights that was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979. As one of the major women's rights organizations in Lebanon, The LWC continues to work toward the institutional and legal implementation of CEDAW.

See also Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Lebanese Civil War (1958); Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanon; Moghaizel, Laure.

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Lara Z. Deeb

LEBANON

Independent Arab country located on the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea.

A small country of 10,632 square kilometers (4,105 square miles), with a maximum length (north to south) of 217 kilometers (135 miles), Lebanon is bordered by Syria and Israel. There is no current

A mountain range in Aqura, Lebanon. © ROGER WOOD/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

reliable census of Lebanon's population (the last official census was conducted in 1932); in 1994 the country's population was estimated to be around 3 million. The sectarian composition of the population remains a contentious issue because political power has been distributed according to a formula that favors the Maronites (Catholic Christians), who in the 1932 census reportedly constituted the largest religious group in the country. The demographic profile of the population has changed dramatically since 1932, with the Shiʿite Muslims becoming more prominent because of their high birth rate. Some estimates put the Shiʿa at 45 percent of the population, and most authorities agree that Muslims (including all sects) are now the majority, constituting some 70 percent of the overall population.

The historical myth of Lebanon, which has been challenged by the Lebanese historian Kamal Salibi, among others, is predicated on the belief that Lebanon has always been a haven for persecuted minorities, its rugged mountains providing shelter for heterodox groups from throughout the Middle East. Lebanese ultranationalists claim that Lebanon has been in existence since before Phoenician times. The late Princeton University historian Philip Hitti suggested that people have been residing in what is today Lebanon for thousands of years. Lebanon as a political entity is a twentieth-century phenomenon, the product of the division between Britain and France of the spoils of World War I. Central Lebanon, known as Mount Lebanon, was occupied by Maronites, Druze, and Shiʿa. Those groups have lived together yet apart, separated by geographic lines of demarcation and by fear and suspicion. Lebanon cannot, and may not, continue to exist as a political entity in the absence of the minimum degree of social-national cohesion.

Lebanon under the Ottoman Empire

For much of the period between 1516 and 1918, Lebanon was only quasi-independent. This relative autonomy is exaggerated by those who claim that the

MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

Lebanese state has been in continuous existence for thousands of years. The region in question, Mount Lebanon, was governed by a local prince (from the Maʿnid and, later, from the Chehab dynasties) who was in turn under the jurisdiction of a sultan of the Ottoman Empire. The political independence of the local ruler depended on the relative power of the government in Istanbul at a given time, and on the degree of external intervention in Lebanese affairs. During the earlier part of the period in question, the Druzes were the politically ascendant group. In the nineteenth century, however, the ruling Chehabi dynasty converted (originally secretively) to Maronite Christianity, and the Maronites began moving into areas that had been exclusively Druze-inhabited. The power of the Maronite Church, which was taking advantage of the consequences of Tanzimat, was also increasing.

In 1840 Mount Lebanon was divided into a southern district (Druze) and a northern district (Maronite). Druze–Maronite clashes occurred throughout the century, and a major conflict in 1860 left the Druzes militarily victorious and the Maronites politically victorious (due to support by European powers). The war resulted in the establishment of a European commission to oversee the situation. After negotiation with the Ottoman government, it was decided that Lebanon should be ruled by a non-Maronite, non-Lebanese Christian citizen of the Ottoman Empire. The governor (*mutasarrif* in Turkish, and later in Arabic too) would be assisted by a council of representatives from the various sects, with the Maronites constituting the largest group. The regime established in 1861 continued until World War I.

Lebanon Under French Mandate

During World War I, Lebanese and Syrians of all religions were executed for anti-Turkish activities. After the war, France would not allow the "protected" Maronites, who called France al-Umm al-Hanun (the Tender Mother), to be placed in an inferior position in Lebanon. Before the beginning of the French mandate system, Lebanese Maronites launched a strong propaganda campaign, characterized by Christian evangelical zeal, in Egypt (where members of the Maronite elite resided) and in France. The campaign led to the creation of Greater Lebanon, which included Mount Lebanon, southern Lebanon, Tripoli and the North, the Biqa region, and the Beirut region. The addition of those areas was motivated not by considerations of national harmony but by calculations of economic viability and French calculations. The predominantly Muslim population of the annexed areas was not consulted, and many staunchly opposed what appeared to be a Western-engineered attempt to sever ties between Lebanon and the larger, surrounding Muslim Arab nations.

In 1926 the French mandate authorities urged the elected Lebanese representatives to draft a new constitution. The constitution affirmed the political, diplomatic, economic, and legal supremacy of the French government and their ally the president, who was to be a Christian. Article 95 confirmed the sectarian foundation of Lebanese politics by stipulating that governmental posts shall be distributed "equitably" between the sects. This in effect established a system that had as its basic unit not the individual citizen but the sect. The highly controversial 1932 census revealed that the Maronites were the

most numerous sect; consequently, the highest government posts were reserved for them.

Independence and Nationhood, 1943–1975

Although official and quasi-official Lebanese historiography claims there was an "independence movement" in the country, British–French rivalries in the Levant helped to bring about the independence of Lebanon in 1943. Bishara al-Khuri, the foremost Maronite politician and first president after independence, and Riyad al-Sulh, the foremost Sunni politician and first prime minister after independence, were the architects of Lebanon's National Pact. This unwritten document became, in the words of Maronite Phalange leader Pierre Jumayyil, more important than the written laws of the country. It stipulated that the Christians (for whom the Maronites spoke, according to the agreement) would not seek protection or alliance with France, and the Muslims (for whom the Sunnis spoke) would respect the sovereignty of Lebanon and renounce dreams of unity with Syria or any other Arab country. The National Pact also decreed that the presidency of Lebanon would be held by a Maronite, the weak speakership of parliament by a Shiʿite, and the prime ministership by a Sunni. It is still regarded as a social contract, though most Lebanese were not consulted about its provisions.

The country was governed by a small group of wealthy politicians who monopolized power within their sects. Political competition, when it occurred, was between members of the economic/political elite and not between average citizens. The first president, Bishara al-Khuri (1943–1952), disregarded the minimum standards of honesty and integrity. His cronies and relatives enriched themselves, and he had the parliament (which was chosen in the scandalously fraudulent 1947 election) amend the constitution so that he could have a second term as president. In 1952 a large bloc of parties and politicians formed a front to force his ouster. After his resignation, Camille Chamoun was elected president.

The rule of Chamoun was marked by what many considered to be violations of the National Pact. Although early in his career he had been identified with pan-Arab politics, he closely aligned Lebanon with the West during his presidency, particularly on anticommunism and anti-Nasserism. His opposition to Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt, provoked many Lebanese who admired the Egyptian leader. Following the example of his predecessor, Chamoun flagrantly rigged the 1957 elections to ensure a subservient parliament that would allow him a second term, and thus ousted most of his rivals from parliament. In 1958 the Lebanese civil war (still known in Lebanon as the "1958 Revolution") broke out, and the United States dispatched the marines to protect the Chamoun regime.

The Roman Temple of Bacchus stands in ruins in Baʿalbak, Lebanon. **© Carmen Redondo/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

The most important politician in contemporary Lebanese history was president Fuʿad Chehab (1958–1964). This former commander in chief of the Lebanese army remains the only politician in the history of Lebanon to have an "ism" associated with his name. Chehabism, the ideology of limited political and economic reforms, was based on the realization that the social and political unrest in Lebanon had socioeconomic roots. Chehab worked to reorganize the Lebanese administrative structure in an attempt to stem the corruption that had been rampant since independence. His regime, however, did not go far enough in its reforms, and Chehab, who distrusted the politicians, ruled through his trusted military aides and his ruthless Intelligence Apparatus (Deuxième Bureau). Rule by the military establishment was inconsistent with the constitution's promises of freedom; the army used heavy-handed tactics against all who opposed the regime.

Chehab was succeeded by his follower Charles Hilu (1964–1970). Hilu quickly disillusioned his

former mentor and associated himself with the right-wing factions such as the Phalange Party, of which he was a founder. He preserved the rule of the Deuxième Bureau (military intelligence) because he lacked a political power base. His weak response to internal instability led to the election of Sulayman Franjiyya (1970–1976), a semiliterate ultranationalist who favored strong support for the army in light of the growing power of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon. Franjiyya sought to use the army to crush the PLO as King Hussein did in Jordan. The army was too weak to succeed, and Israel was increasingly exposing Lebanon's impotence against their continued military actions in Lebanon, which did not distinguish between Lebanese and Palestinian targets, or between civilian and military targets. Franjiyya urged the army to arm and train members of the right-wing Maronite militias in Lebanon, which he wanted to use in his war against the Palestinians. During his presidency there were numerous clashes between the PLO and the Lebanese army aided by right-wing militias. Franjiyya's autocratic rule brought calls for a more meaningful partnership between the president and the prime minister.

Civil War, 1975–1990

Much has been written about the civil war, but there is no consensus about its origins. Lebanese often emphasize the external causes of what befell the country; they seem reluctant to place any blame for the protracted conflict on themselves. The civil war allowed various external forces to intervene openly in Lebanese affairs. Syria and Israel both exploited the conflict for their own purposes. In 1976 Syria intervened in the war to save the right-wing militias from what seemed an inevitable defeat by the leftist-PLO alliance. It did not want Lebanon to turn into a radical arena that could drag Syria into an unwanted confrontation with Israel.

The presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon made possible the election of Ilyas Sarkis as president in 1976, and Israel began its de facto occupation of part of southern Lebanon. The relationship of the PLO and its Lebanese allies with Syria began to improve as soon as right-wing militia leader Bashir Jumayyil (then commander of the Lebanese Forces) solidified his alliance with Israel and initiated a campaign against Syria's forces in Lebanon. The latter responded with heavy bombardment of East Beirut, the site of Lebanese Forces' headquarters. In the south, Israel formed a surrogate militia to further its goals. In 1978 Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, and was later forced to withdraw to a narrow strip that it called its Security Zone. The United Nations dispatched troops to serve as a buffer between the PLO forces and Israel's forces.

In 1982 Israel launched its biggest invasion ever. Its forces advanced all the way to Beirut and brought about the election of Bashir Jumayyil as president. The invasion resulted in the deaths of some 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinians, mostly civilians. The PLO came under pressure to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Jumayyil was assassinated before he officially assumed his responsibilities, and pro-Israel forces killed the Palestinians and Lebanese in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in revenge for Jumayyil's assassination. Amin Jumayyil (1982–1988) succeeded his brother Bashir as president and began a rule by the Phalange Party. In 1983 the security situation deteriorated further when Druze and Maronite militias engaged in one of the most ferocious battles of the Lebanese civil war. The Druze militia was able to evict Christians from areas under its control.

The rule of Amin Jumayyil divided the country more sharply than ever before, and most Muslims boycotted his government. In 1988, minutes before the expiration of his term, he appointed General Michel Aoun (the Maronite commander in chief of the army) as interim president. Aoun cracked down on the Lebanese Forces and declared a war of "national liberation" against Syria's forces in Lebanon. The war did not bear political fruits for him, although it did generate enthusiasm among the Maronite masses. In 1990, when world attention was focused on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Syria's forces entered Lebanon and destroyed the force commanded by Aoun, who fled to France.

The civil war theoretically ended with the defeat of Aoun and the establishment of the authority of the government of President Ilyas al-Hirawi. The support of Syria and Saudi Arabia for the new administration revived hopes for badly needed financial aid to wartorn Lebanon. President Hirawi and Prime Minister Rafiq Bahaʾuddin al-Hariri solidi-

fied the rule of the Lebanese government and disarmed the militias in the country except for the Party of God, which continues to wage a war of national resistance against Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon. Whether the war has ended completely or whether a truce at last prevails in Lebanon is a question that requires knowledge of the future. Hirawi was succeeded in 1998 by commander in chief Emile Lahhud, who—like his predecessor—enjoyed strong Syrian support. Lahhud's relationship with Hariri was tense, and he preferred Salim al-Hoss as his prime minister. But Hariri was able to utilize his enormous financial powers, and his regional connection, to replace Hoss after a two-year term as prime minister. Hariri and Lahhud continue to express disagreements on a range of issues, from privatization to election laws.

See also Aoun, Michel; Beirut; Chamoun, Camille; Chehab, Fuʾad; Druze; Franjiyya, Sulayman; Hariri, Rafiq Bahaʾuddin al-; Hilu, Charles; Jumayyil, Amin; Jumayyil, Bashir; Jumayyil, Pierre; Khuri, Bishara al-; Lebanese Arab Army; Lebanese Civil War (1958); Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanese Crises of the 1840s; Lebanese Forces; Lebanese Front; Lebanese National Movement (LNM); Lebanon, Mount; Mandate System; Maronites; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Phalange; Sabra and Shatila Massacres; Sarkis, Ilyas; Shiʿism; Sulh, Riyad al-; Tanzimat.

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As'ad AbuKhalil

LEBANON, MOUNT

A rugged mountain range that constitutes the geographical core around which modern-day Lebanon was established in 1920.

Mount Lebanon extends from the hinterland of Tripoli in the north to that of Sidon in the south. Because of its geographical isolation and rugged landscape, it historically attracted minorities in search of a haven from persecution. Maronites moved into the area in the seventh century, and they continue to this day to form the majority of its population. South of the Beirut-Damascus highway, Mount Lebanon is predominantly populated by Druze. Smaller Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic communities also inhabit the area.

Over the centuries, Mount Lebanon developed its own traditions and a distinct identity. Under Ottoman rule (1516–1916), it enjoyed considerable political autonomy. Governance of the area was in the hands of an indigenous amir, who paid nominal allegiance to the Ottoman sultan and oversaw a political structure dominated by a few powerful local families. Following intercommunal hostilities and the mass killing of Christians by Druze in 1860, European countries, particularly France, pressured the authorities in Istanbul to formally grant the area autonomous status in the Ottoman Empire. The so-called Règlement Organique of 1861, guaranteed by the Great Powers, thus established Mount Lebanon as a self-governing province headed by a Christian governor. This development paved the way for the subsequent creation of the modern state of Lebanon in 1920, when the French mandatory power added parts of Greater Syria to Mount Lebanon. Today Mount Lebanon refers to one of the five administrative provinces (governorates) into which Lebanon is divided.

See also Druze; Greater Syria; Maronites.

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Guilain P. Denoeux

LEBANON NEWS AGENCY

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

LEFF

See GLOSSARY

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (PALESTINE)

A 1922–1923 British proposal, never implemented, for a limited form of self-government in Palestine.

The League of Nations entrusted Palestine to Great Britain—which conquered the territory in December 1917—as a mandate, one of whose terms called for the "development of self-governing institutions." As a first step in that direction, the high commissioner of Palestine, Sir Herbert Louis Samuel, formally proposed in August 1922 to the country's Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities the establishment of a legislative council. The council was to be composed of twenty-three members: the high commissioner, ten appointed British members; and twelve elected members—ten Palestinians (eight Muslims and two Christians) and two Jews. However, the British denied the council legislative authority over such central issues as Jewish immigration and land purchases in order to safeguard its Balfour policy of support for the Jewish national home. To allay Palestinian concerns regarding Jewish immigration, the elected members were to form a standing committee to advise the Palestine government on immigration issues.

Palestinian leaders argued that participation in the council would be tantamount to acceptance of the British mandate and Balfour policy, which they opposed. They considered unfair the allocation of only 43 percent of the seats to Palestinians, who constituted 88 percent of the population. And they objected to the limitations placed on the power of the council. A campaign against the proposed council by the Palestine Arab Executive and the Supreme Muslim Council was a potent factor in the Palestinian boycott of the council elections in February 1923. The Jews accepted the proposal despite their objections to the allocation of only two seats to Jews, which, they argued, would have reduced them to a minority role and would have meant that the concerns of the Jewish people as a whole would have been ignored. The poor election turnout caused the high commissioner to shelve the proposal.

The idea was revived repeatedly from 1923 until 1936. It was discussed, for example, in 1928 when a new high commissioner, Sir John Chancellor, took over, but it was derailed by the Western (or Wailing) Wall disturbances of 1929, only to reemerge as a proposal in the Passfield White Papers of 1930. Although the new proposal was similar to the 1922 proposal, the Palestinians this time did not oppose it, but the Jews rejected their minority role in the council and sought a parity formula that would recognize the numbers and the economic role of world Jewry. Intermittent discussions continued until 1935. By then the proposed composition of the council had expanded to twenty-eight, of whom fourteen were to be Muslims and Christians (five nominated), eight Jews (five nominated), five British officials, and one a nominee representing commercial interests. The Palestinians were divided over the proposal, and the Jews were strongly opposed to it. This opposition prompted the British government to once again suspend its implementation, and the concept finally died with the start of the Arab Revolt of 1936 to 1939.

The Legislative Council was probably a missed opportunity for the Palestinians because it could have improved their political and socioeconomic conditions. It could have given them an opportunity to help draft legislation and to participate in formulating expenditure allocations and Jewish immigration quotas. It could have also provided them with a platform to criticize British policy and to appeal for the support of the British public and the League of Nations. Most of all, it could have put them in a position to ask for more.

See also BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917); MANDATE SYSTEM; SAMUEL, HERBERT LOUIS; WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES; WHITE PAPERS ON PALESTINE.

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Philip Mattar

LEIBOWITZ, YESHAYAHU

[1903–1994]

Israeli chemist, philosopher, and social critic.

Yeshayahu Leibowitz was born in Riga, Latvia, and educated at the University of Berlin and Basel University. He was professor of biochemistry at Hebrew University and editor of the *Hebrew Encyclopedia,* and was widely known for his iconoclastic views and outspoken opinions. As a philosopher, he is best known as an interpreter of Maimonides, whom Leibowitz staunchly portrayed as an ardent theocentrist. As a rationalist and an opponent of mysticism, Leibowitz denied any sacred character to the State of Israel and its agencies. He was a religiously observant Jew who adamantly insisted on the separation of religion and state, including the dissolution of the government-supported rabbinate. He believed that Halakhah, Jewish religious law, developed before there was a Jewish state and has become so firmly set that it cannot be adapted to the new circumstance of statehood. He was loudly critical of the tendency to mystify the 1967 Arab-Israel War, and he totally opposed Israel's occupation and administration policies in Palestine. His rationalism also served as the basis of his opposition to viewing the Western Wall as a holy Jewish shrine.

Leibowitz wrote more than a dozen books (in Hebrew). At least eight books of conversations with him have been published, and more than a half-dozen books about him and his thought have been published.

See also Halakhah.

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Chaim I. Waxman

LE JOURNAL D'ÉGYPTE

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

LEMSINE, AICHA

[1942–]

Pseudonym for Aicha Laidi, an Algerian novelist and essay writer.

Aicha Lemsine was born in the Nemencha, Algeria, to a Muslim family. As of 2004 she was living in Algeria and was active in women's literary organizations, in addition to contributing newspaper articles on the political and ethnic situation in her country. Her first novel, *La chrysalide* (1976; The chrysalis), is a romantic account of women of two generations; the elder battles polygamy and the younger displays her emancipation by becoming pregnant out of wedlock. *Ciel de porphyre* (1978; Porphyry sky), set during the Algerian War of Independence, tells the story of the initiation of a young woman into the Resistance. Lemsine's third book, *Ordalie des voix* (1983; Voices of tribulations), consists of interviews with Arab women on their role in society and their struggle to achieve emancipation.

See also Literature: Arabic, North African.

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Aida A. Bamia

LEND-LEASE PROGRAM

Provided U.S. military aid to the Allies in World War II.

Lend-lease was a program that, from 1940, enabled President Franklin D. Roosevelt to extend aid to any country whose fate he felt was vital to U.S. defense—for the sake of national security. Not until March 1941 did the U.S. Congress pass the Lend-Lease Act. It provided for military aid to the World War II Allies, under the condition that equipment extended would be returned or paid for after the war. In practice, lend-lease became the main wartime U.S. aid program of the Roosevelt administration.

Little was returned, and even less was paid for. Coordinated first by Harry Hopkins and then by Edward Stettinius, the lend-lease programs conveyed the equivalent of some $3 billion in aid to the Middle East and the countries of the Mediterranean.

Lend-lease for the Middle East was administered primarily through Cairo, Egypt, and Tehran, Iran. Both Egypt and Iran were occupied by the Allies—Iran from the autumn of 1941 to 1945. In 1942, the United States supplied its ally, the U.S.S.R., via the Persian/Arabian Gulf and Iran; therefore, Iran became eligible for lend-lease. Although lend-lease was supposed to aid only democratic countries in the struggle against the Axis, petroleum-rich Saudi Arabia was also included in the program by February 1943. The lend-lease program was terminated in August 1945.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

LESKOFCALI GALIP

[1829–1867]

Ottoman poet.

Born in Nicosia (Levkosia), Cyprus, Leskofcali Galip was the son of an exiled Rumelian *ayan.* He came to Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 1846 and by 1851 had entered the civil service. He composed in a classical style similar to his contemporaries, Naili and Fehim. A collection of his works, *Divan,* was published in 1916.

DAVID WALDNER

LESSEPS, FERDINAND DE

[1805–1894]

French entrepreneur and promoter of building a canal to connect the Mediterranean and the Red seas.

After consular service for France at Lisbon and Tunis, Ferdinand de Lesseps became the French consul in Alexandria, Egypt, where he befriended Muhammad Ali Pasha's son, Saʿid. De Lesseps was appointed consul at Cairo from 1833 to 1837 and, after serving in other countries, resigned from diplomatic service in opposition to the Second Republic of France. In 1854, when Saʿid became *khedive* (ruler), de Lesseps returned to Egypt. Despite the findings of scientists who accompanied Napoléon Bonaparte during his occupation of Egypt (1798–1801) that a canal could not be built from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, de Lesseps (not an engineer) had become convinced of the feasibility of the project. He hoped to use his friendship with Saʿid to promote his plan. De Lesseps quickly convinced Saʿid to back him, in part by persuading Saʿid that his name would be immortalized as the builder of the Suez Canal. In 1856, de Lesseps organized an international commission to study the technical aspects of the project. He also set up a company that would be financed by selling shares to the Egyptian and European governments. The Egyptian government provided labor through conscription, and construction took from 1859 to 1869. De Lesseps is remembered as the inspired leader who did whatever was necessary to get the canal built.

See also SAʿID PASHA; SUEZ CANAL.

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DAVID WALDNER

LE TUNISIEN

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES

LEVANTINE

Noun or adjective that defines the non-Muslim populations and cultures of the modern Middle East.

The term *levantine* is French in origin—*levantin*—and implies a geographic reference to the sun rising—*soleil levant*—in the east, or *levant.* The French coined the term because France, in the sixteenth century,

was the first Christian national state to exchange diplomatic recognition with the Ottoman Empire located in the eastern Mediterranean littoral. By the early 1800s, English travel literature referred to the lands of the Ottoman Empire as the Levant. Indeed, in the 1990s the London-published international business weekly the *Economist* still refers to their reporters based in Cyprus as their Levant correspondents.

The Rise of a Levantine Bourgeoisie

From the 1500s to the 1850s, Levantine traditionally meant a European resident of the Levant involved in European–Ottoman trade. By the end of the nineteenth century, the label was significantly broadened to include a European born in the Levant whose parentage included Greek or Armenian blood. Moreover, Levantine was by then applied to Syro-Lebanese Christians, Sephardic Jews, Maltese, Cypriots, Armenians, and Greeks, all minorities in the Muslim East living and doing business in the large trading centers of the Ottoman Empire. The term almost always indicated an urbanized commercial bourgeoisie whose members were usually rich and influential merchants and who were different, due to their Westernized education and culture, from the petit bourgeoisie in the provincial towns and the villages of the hinterland.

Historically, the development of a Levantine bourgeoisie was the result of significant trade with Europe and reflected the growing cultural interaction that both preceded and paralleled imperial ties between Europe and the lands of the Ottoman Empire. The Westernization of Levantines was the result of commerce, travel, emigration, and attendance at the foreign missions' schools that dotted the eastern Mediterranean by the mid-1800s. Believing in progress, Levantines saw Europe as the leader of a progressive world, and easily accepted its values. They formed a mercantile elite whose cultural anchors transcended local and regional boundaries, and whose perspective was fixed on Europe. Consequently, there arose a natural affinity between these modernizing groups, regardless of their ethnonational backgrounds, in different parts of the Middle East. Levantines were individuals who were never Muslims nor usually Arab Christians, whose origins were somewhere in the eastern Mediterranean, and whose primary language and culture, except for Syro-Lebanese Christians, were not Arabic. Because Levantines were conversant in a number of foreign languages and local dialects, many became the indispensable interpreters and translators of the foreign consulates throughout the Levant.

As non-Muslims, members of these minorities usually acquired the protection of European powers in order to benefit from the privileges afforded foreigners under the Capitulations. Centuries of insecurity under Mamluk or Ottoman rule had conditioned them to try to obtain the protection of European powers who, in most cases, were only too willing to extend it. This phenomenon had begun as early as the seventeenth century in Lebanon with the Maronite Christians, who received French protection inside the Ottoman Empire.

Twentieth-Century Evolution of the Term

By the 1900s *Levantine* had acquired a negative moral coloration. Sir Evelyn Baring, British agent and consul-general in Egypt from 1883 to 1907, adhered to the traditional definition, but emphasized the southern European origin of those to whom the term applied. He further included a pejorative nuance that had recently been attached to the term: "Levantines . . . suffer in reputation by reason of qualities which are displayed by only a small minority of their class . . . among this minority are to be found individuals who are tainted with a remarkable degree of moral obliquity." Other writers were more specific and referred to Greek or Armenian money lenders or to "sellers of strong waters to Muslims in most cities of Western Asia."

The pejorative implication gained ground. An impressive publication that served as a guide to British investors in Egypt, in discussing Alexandria as a summer resort, informed its readers that the city became the temporary home of "businessmen from the capital unable to get over to Europe and a certain class of Levantines who invariably return to Cairo richer than they left." Thus, the term *Levantine* evolved to encompass both ethnocultural identity as well as moral judgment. From applying to a European born and living in the eastern Mediterranean, it came to include either an Eastern Christian or another member of a non-Arab minority whose business dealings were ethically tainted to the

point of implementing the profit motive even while on vacation.

The metamorphosis of the term probably reflected a change in the attitudes of Europeans toward the East. By the end of the nineteenth century, European Arabists believed that Eastern civilization was "purer, more spiritual and more wholesome" than Western civilization, and that European greed and viciousness were destroying the Arab East. To such Europeans, Levantines were the carriers of Western and European greed and viciousness, since it was through them—Christian brothers of the Europeans and, to a lesser extent, Jews—that it flowed into Eastern and Arab society.

By the 1920s *Levantine* and *Levantinism* had also acquired political nuances commensurate with the seismic effects of World War I on the region. Various authors used the terms to describe the political crisis affecting Turkish society; the expression ascribed Turkey's defeat in World War I to the fact that Turks from Istanbul had "become Levantiny." Writing in the postcolonial mid-1950s, Elie Kedourie, an Iraqi Jew by birth and an incisive student of Middle Eastern politics and society, maintained that by the 1940s the Levant was perceived as much a region of the spirit as a region of the globe, and that the spread of Levantinism was the characteristic malady of Islamic and Arab society.

Albert Hourani, an Arab Christian and a perceptive student of Middle East history, writing shortly after World War II, maintained that Levantinism was a symbol of national and ethnocultural dispossession. He further ascribed to it philosophical aspects of the human condition, a sort of postwar mal de siècle, by stating: ". . . to be a Levantine is to live in two worlds or more at once without belonging to either; to be able to go through the external forms which indicate the possession of a certain nationality, religion or culture without actually possessing it. It is no longer to have a standard of one's own, not to be able to create but only able to imitate. . . . It is to belong to no community and to possess nothing of one's own. It reveals itself in lostness, pretentiousness, cynicism and Despair" (Hourani, 1947). Undoubtedly affected by the postwar atmosphere of frustrated nationalist self-assertion, Hourani cast Levantines as a group adrift without the contemporary concerns of national self-realization. However, his alarm underlines the concerns of Arab Christian minorities caught in the dilemma of decolonization: the fear of rejection by the Arab Muslim majority.

The twentieth-century political definitions of Levantinism encompass the notion that people and cultures can be divided into genuine and hybrid, with the implication that the former are clearly superior to and more desirable than the latter. They present an arbitrary division of historical phenomena driven by ideology and containing ahistorical value judgments. To apply this perspective to the Middle East overlooks the fact that the area has historically absorbed a number of vastly diverse cultures, languages, customs, and values. Although some of these cultures had a stronger influence than others, they all contributed to the region's heterogeneity. Thus, an understanding of Middle East history must include an assessment untainted by ideological prisms, but comprising a perspective that includes the experience and the contributions of its diverse populations.

See also CAPITULATIONS; MARONITES; OTTOMAN EMPIRE: OVERVIEW.

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JEAN-MARC R. OPPENHEIM

LEVINGER, MOSHE

[1935–]

Spiritual leader of Gush Emunim and Hebron settlers.

Moshe Levinger was born in Jerusalem in 1935 to highly educated German-Jewish immigrant parents. After completing his army service, he studied in Yeshivat Merkas ha-Rav, where he was strongly in-

fluenced by its head, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, who is widely viewed as the spiritual father of Gush Emunim. It was, apparently, there that Levinger developed his strong belief that he is obligated by the Torah to help re-establish the kingdom of Israel in all of Eretz Yisrael. After his ordination, he lived in a kibbutz in the Upper Galilee. He married an American immigrant, Miriam, who was a nurse.

In April 1968 Levinger led a group of Jews who rented a hotel in Hebron to celebrate the Passover and subsequently refused to leave. They were supported by the Eretz Yisrael ha-Shelema (Whole Land of Israel) movement, and several weeks later they moved to an Israeli military compound nearby. Within a few months, they began the construction of Kiryat Arba on confiscated land. Levinger was the ideological leader of Gush Emunim and, in a 1987 poll undertaken by an Israeli weekly, was voted, along with Menachem Begin, as the "person . . . who has [had] the greatest effect on Israeli society in the last twenty years." On the other hand, he was named "Israel's foremost religious fascist" by *The New Republic.*

Levinger and his family live in the Jewish quarter of Hebron. Along with his wife, he asserted that Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) cannot again be left *Judenrein,* and he announced his intention to live with the local Arab community, to work with them to provide education and health, but to remove those who would harm Jews. He was arrested and imprisoned for killing a Palestinian after his car was attacked in 1989. His rigid personality has lost him many followers even among supporters of the ideology of Gush Emunim, but he still remains the spiritual leader of the Jewish community in Hebron.

See also GUSH EMUNIM; HEBRON; ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS; KOOK, ZVI YEHUDA.

DAVID NEWMAN

LEVIN, HANOCH

[1943–1999]

Israeli playwright and storyteller.

Hanoch Levin was born and grew up in a poor section of Tel Aviv. He began writing satirical plays while still a student. Levin's work is avant-garde, minimalist, and controversial. His *Malkat ha-Ambatya* (Queen of the bathtub, 1970), a satire on Israeli society after the Arab–Israel War of 1967, created an uproar, and performances had to be canceled.

Levin's plays ridicule many of Israel's national myths: the ideals of its youth culture, family life, and the exuberance following the military victory in 1967. His work stresses the dull parochialism of people's lives. His plays include *Solomon Grup* (1969), *Hefetz* (1972), and *Yaʿakobi ve-Ledental* (1972). The latter was widely performed both in Israel and abroad. Many of his plays were first staged at the Cameri, Tel Aviv's municipal theater, and in 1988 Levin was appointed its in-house playwright.

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ANN KAHN
UPDATED BY DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

LEVIN, SHMARYAHU

[1867–1935]

Zionist orator, propagandist, and advocate.

After serving in the Duma (Russian parliament), in 1906, Shmaryahu Levin left Russia. In Germany, he gained support for founding the Haifa Technion (1908). During World War I he mobilized the support of American Jews for the Zionist cause. A strong supporter of Chaim Weizmann within the Zionist movement, Levin settled in Palestine in 1924.

MARTIN MALIN

LEVIN, YIZHAK MEIR

[1894–1971]

Merchant, banker, Jewish leader, and communal activist.

Yizhak Meir Levin was born in Poland and descended from a family of Gerer Hasidim. He was a leader of and active participant in Agudat Israel, a worldwide Orthodox Jewish organization and a political party

in Israel, from its inception in Poland following World War I. Levin was elected to the organization's world presidium in 1929 and headed its delegation to Palestine in 1935.

Escaping Nazi-occupied Poland, he reached Palestine in 1940, where he worked for the rescue of Jews stranded in Europe. In 1947, he was placed in charge of the Israeli branch of Agudat Israel. As a party member, he was elected to the first Knesset (parliament), serving as minister of social welfare until 1952, when he resigned over the issue of drafting women into the army, to which he was thoroughly opposed. He remained a member of the Knesset until his death.

See also AGUDAT ISRAEL.

ANN KAHN

LEVONTIN, ZALMAN

[1856–1940]

Zionist leader.

Born and educated in Russia, Zalman Levontin later became a businessman and banker. Levontin was a close associate of Theodor Herzl and a founding member of the Zionist settlement of Rishon le-Zion. Levontin was the director of the Jewish Colonial Trust in 1901; he moved to Palestine, where he founded the Anglo-Palestine Bank (which later became the Bank Leumi L'Yisrael).

See also BANKING.

BRYAN DAVES

LEVY, DAVID

[1937–]

Israeli political leader.

Born in Morocco, David Levy has held either an elected or an appointed office in Israel's government since 1965. He was one of the first North African immigrants to rise to national political prominence. Since 1969 he has been a member of the Israeli Knesset. From 1977 to 1998 he served as a government minister—as minister of immigration and absorption (1977–1979), minister of housing and construction (1979–1980; 1981–1984), and minister of foreign affairs (1990–1992; 1996–1998). He made a bid for the Likud leadership in the 1992 election, suggesting that the leadership of the party was guilty of anti-Sephardic racism, but he eventually lost to Benjamin (Binyamin, or Bibi) Netanyahu. Afterwards, he left the Likud Party and helped form the Gesher ("Bridge") Party, only to realign with Netanyahu just before the 1996 election. Although Levy joined the coalition of Prime Minister Ehud Barak following the election of 1999, serving as foreign minister, he resigned from the coalition in August of 2000 in protest to Barak's willingness to make concessions to the Palestinians in the peace negotiations. In April 2002, in the government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Levy was appointed minister without portfolio—a member of the Cabinet with the right to attend Cabinet meetings and advise the prime minister but without responsibility for a division of government bureaucracy (as are the Ministry of Housing, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.). Levy resigned from this position in July of the same year.

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BRYAN DAVES
UPDATED BY GREGORY MAHLER

LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALIST PARTY

Egyptian political party founded by former Prime Minister Adli Yakan (October 1922).

Members of the party, mainly landowners and intellectuals, were former members of the Wafd who came to oppose Saʿd Zaghlul because of his intransigence and demagogery. The program of the party, written by Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, called for an independent Egypt, constitutional rule, the protection of civil rights and free speech, and social justice. The party defended the 1922 declaration of

independence granted by Britain, which many nationalists considered inadequate, and supported the 1923 constitution, which it had helped to draft. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the party alternated between allying with the Wafd against Britain and joining with Britain in forming anti-Wafd governments. The newspaper of the party was *al-Siyasa* (Politics). The party was banned by the Revolutionary Command Council in 1953.

See also WAFD.

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DAVID WALDNER

LIBERATION RALLY

Political party formed by Egypt's Revolutionary Command Council following the January 1953 ban on all existing political parties.

The Liberation Rally was intended to mobilize popular support for the new regime—the Free Officers who had overthrown the government of King Farouk in a military coup in 1952—by co-opting student leaders and workers. The Liberation Rally called for the unconditional withdrawal of the British from the Suez Canal zone, self-determination for Sudan, the establishment of a socialist welfare state, pan-Arabism, and the installation of a constitution guaranteeing civic liberties. The rally became associated with Gamal Abdel Nasser in his struggle for supremacy with General Muhammad Naguib, who was supported by the Muslim Brotherhood. Following a clash between the Liberation Rally and the Muslim Brotherhood on the campus of Cairo University in January 1954, Nasser began to mobilize his support in the Rally against Naguib. After Naguib and his supporters were purged from the government, the Liberation Rally was dissolved.

See also FAROUK; FREE OFFICERS, EGYPT; MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD; NAGUIB, MUHAMMAD; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; PAN-ARABISM.

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DAVID WALDNER

LIBERTY, USS

U.S. ship attacked by Israel.

On 8 June 1967 the electronic surveillance ship USS *Liberty* was 14 nautical miles north of al-Arish, Egypt, gathering intelligence data when it was attacked by three Israeli combat aircraft, and later by three torpedo boats, one of which launched a torpedo that demolished the *Liberty*'s communications room and killed twenty-five technicians. A Mayday message from the ship drew rescue aircraft from the carrier USS *America,* and Israel halted the attack. In all, 34 crew members were killed and 171 wounded.

Israel's attack has never been satisfactorily explained. The *Liberty* was displaying the U.S. flag very prominently and the attack continued after the ship had been identified by Israeli pilots whose conversations were monitored by a U.S. surveillance aircraft. Israel swiftly apologized for what it called "a tragic error." Although a U.S. inquiry found no evidence that the attack was premeditated, military experts concluded that it could not reasonably be attributed to error, and that Israel must have felt that the information being gathered by the *Liberty* could be so damaging that it accepted the risk of incurring the anger of the United States. Two possible explanations are (a) that Israel was "cooking" (intercepting and altering) messages between Egypt and Jordan in hopes of drawing Jordan into the war so that Israel could occupy the West Bank, and (b) that Israel wanted to conceal the true extent of its dramatic victory over Egypt in order to delay the imposition of a cease-fire. Israel paid $7 million in damages to the families of the U.S. crewmen but never admitted culpability. Controversy about the incident, which was frequently cited in the propaganda war between Israel and its critics, continued to rage for decades afterwards.

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JENAB TUTUNJI
UPDATED BY IAN BLACK

LIBYA

In theory, a jamahiriyya *(state governed by the masses); in reality, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya is ruled by Muammar al-Qaddafi.*

In 2002 Libya's population was about 5.4 million, distributed over 686,000 square miles on the northern coast of Africa, bordered to the north by the Mediterranean Sea, to the west by Tunisia and Algeria, to the south by Niger and Chad, and to the east by Sudan and Egypt. The capital city, Tripoli, and the other principal urban centers, Misurata, Benghazi, and Derna (or Darnah) are on the coast; several large oases, including Sabha (or Sebha), provincial capital of the southern region of Fezzan, and Kufrah, in the southeast, were major trading centers of the trans-Saharan caravan trade, but they are now principally administrative centers. The population clusters along the coast, where two ranges of hills—Jabal al-Gharb in the western province, Tripolitania, and Jabal al-Akhdar in Cyrenaica, the eastern region—divide the narrow coastal plain from the arid plateaus and deserts to the south.

Climate and Resources

Except along the coast, Libya's climate is severe, with wide extremes of temperature, particularly in the mountains and deserts. There is scanty rainfall; even along the coast, the timing of the annual average of 8 inches of rain is unpredictable. As a result, less than 2 percent of the country's surface is arable, and only another 4 to 5 percent is suitable for raising livestock. Historically, much of the country's wealth derived from animal husbandry and from trans-Saharan and coastal trade rather than from agriculture. During the late 1950s, large quantities of petroleum were discovered and by 1968 oil exports accounted for more than 50 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Since then, oil revenues have generally represented one-half to one-third of GDP. In 2002, Libya had one of the highest per capita incomes in Africa, $7,600, and a relatively high population growth rate at 2.4 percent. Thanks to oil, the government provides generous welfare benefits to Libyan citizens and the economy relies heavily on foreign workers; in the 1980s and 1990s, more than half a million foreign nationals, mostly Africans, have found employment there.

Population and Culture

Libya has a largely homogeneous population, both ethnically and religiously. Virtually all the citizens are Arabs practicing Sunni Islam. Small communities of Berbers, many of whom are followers of Ibadi Islam, still reside in the western hill villages, but nothing remains of the once substantial Jewish community, most of which moved to Israel. Libya is not home to any major educational or cultural institutions; apart from some locally venerated saintly families, the people of the area traditionally looked to Tunisia and Egypt for their religious teachers and legal authorities. Despite the contemporary urbanization of the country—over two-thirds of the population live in Tripoli and Benghazi alone—the importance of pastoral nomadism in recent history is evident in the continued social and political significance of kinship and tribal ties. Although women are being educated in increasingly large numbers, they ordinarily marry while in their late teens and are not expected to work outside the home.

Government

The Libyan government structure was designed by Muammar al-Qaddafi (also Muʿammar al-Qadhdhafi), who holds no formal position of authority but serves as head of state. As he conceives it, Libyans rule themselves, without the intervention of elections, politicians, or political parties, through a system of local and national committees and congresses that deliberate, administer, and supervise the affairs of the country on their behalf. By most accounts, the basic people's congresses and committees do fulfill governmental functions at local levels, but in national, particularly foreign, policymaking, Qaddafi and his immediate advisers are believed to make virtually all important decisions.

History

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, today's Libya was three loosely administered provinces of

An oil rig in the Libyan desert. Large deposits of petroleum were discovered in the late 1950s, and oil is now the country's principle resource, accounting for 95 percent of Libya's export trade. © Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

the Ottoman Empire, ruled by the local Qaramanli dynasty in Tripoli. In 1835, disturbed by local unrest, the Ottoman central government overthrew the dynasty and thereafter Libya was ruled directly from Istanbul.

Although never a rich province, Libya prospered during the second Ottoman era. As the Ottoman order spread throughout the territory, many nomads settled in coastal villages; local agricultural production and trade increased. The Sanusiyya, a religious brotherhood with political aspirations, saw its substantial trading interests flourish in Cyrenaica and the Sahara.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Italy had established Libya as a sphere of influence, and in 1911 Rome launched its long-anticipated invasion. The Ottoman government mounted a major war effort to oppose the Italian encroachment but was soon forced to withdraw, preoccupied by unrest and nationalism in the Balkans. Local Libyan leaders took up the cause of resistance, however, and the Italians faced an armed insurgency until well into the 1930s, only to lose the province a decade later in the North African campaigns of World War II. Libya was then governed by British and French military administrations until the country was granted independence by the United Nations at the end of 1951.

The upheavals occasioned by the precipitous withdrawal of the Ottoman administration, the protracted Italian conquest, and the devastating battles

Residents in Tripoli celebrate as drinking water reaches their city as part of the Great Man-Made River project. Conceived to ease the country's water shortage, the GMMR is a vast pipeline that draws water from the aquifers of oases in the Sahara and transports it to Libyan cities and agricultural regions along the Mediterranean coast. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

for control during World War II left Libya one of the poorest countries in the Middle East. The population had been nearly halved by famine, war casualties, and emigration. At independence, illiteracy rates were well over 80 percent, and the per capita income was no more than $25 a year; the country's major export was scrap metal scavenged from World War II battlefields.

The leader of the Sanusiyya brotherhood, Idris al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sanusi, had spent the years between the world wars in exile in Cairo, where he came to know the British authorities, who sponsored him as the king of the new country. Despite qualms in Tripoli about Idris's partiality for Cyrenaica, provincial leaders acquiesced in his accession to ensure the country's unity and independence. In the early years, the British subsidized Libya's operating budget while the king's clientele and local tribesmen staffed the administration.

The export of commercial quantities of oil during the early 1960s coincided with the heyday of Arab nationalism. A new generation of politically active Libyans argued that the monarchy's close ties with Britain and the United States were now both economically unnecessary and politically undesirable. Moreover, the administration proved unequal to the task of allocating the new wealth, and the government foundered in corruption and mismanagement. On 1 September 1969, a twenty-seven-year-old captain, Muammar al-Qaddafi, and a small group of his friends and fellow military officers engineered a bloodless coup; the king abdicated as his government collapsed.

At the outset, the new regime appeared to be a typical Arab nationalist military government, with an additional Islamic coloring, reflecting both Qaddafi's personal piety and the regime's efforts to appeal to the followers of the deposed Sanusi leader.

Map by XNR Productions, Inc. The Gale Group.

The British and U.S. military bases were closed, the remaining Italian residents were expelled, alcohol was forbidden, nightclubs and churches were closed, and Qaddafi called his fellow rulers to join him in establishing a unified Arab state.

By the mid-1970s, however, with the publication of the first volume of Qaddafi's Green Book, the Libyan regime began to develop its distinctive profile. Disappointed with the failure of other Arab rulers to heed his calls for immediate and unconditional unity and with the average Libyan's apparent lack of revolutionary fervor, Qaddafi concentrated on domestic affairs, proclaiming a cultural revolution at home. The Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority, issued on 2 March 1977, stated that direct popular authority would now be the basis for the Libyan political system. It also changed the official name of the country from Libya to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya. A newly coined Arabic word, *jamahiriyya* was translated unofficially as "state of the masses." Under the new system, the people exercised authority through people's committees, people's congresses, unions, and the General People's Congress (GPC). Qaddafi was designated GPC general secretary and the remaining members of the now defunct Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) composed the GPC general secretariat.

In part because of accompanying economic reforms—retail trade was abolished as exploitative;

In 1977, eight years after seizing power in a bloodless coup, Libyan head of state Muammar al-Qaddafi declared the country's political system would be based on direct popular authority, declaring Libya a "state of the masses." In 1979 he relinquished all formal administrative posts, but remained the country's unquestioned leader. © UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

wage earners were declared partners in their enterprises; rent was outlawed and houses given to their occupants—opposition to the new edicts grew quickly. The regime reacted harshly. During the early 1980s, "revolutionary committees" were established to ensure the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Libyan people, and it was these committees that carried out the assassination of Libyan opposition figures abroad.

By then the regime had grown disenchanted with Arab leaders and devoted itself to exporting the Libyan revolution throughout the world. As a result, Qaddafi found himself in disputes not only with his neighbors but with the Western powers, particularly the United States. Accusing Qaddafi of having harbored terrorists and sponsored terrorism throughout the world, the administration of Ronald Reagan bombed Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986 in hopes of reforming (if not removing) the Libyan leader. Despite its international isolation and the economic difficulties precipitated by the fall of oil prices during the mid-1980s, it was not until the implosion of its international patron, the Soviet Union, at the end of the decade, that the Qaddafi regime began to show signs of moderating its opposition to the international status quo.

Domestically, a period of economic and political liberalization, called green perestroika by some observers, marked the late 1980s. Often molding economic and political decisions into a single package, the liberalization program implemented by Qaddafi initially proved popular with the Libyan people. An increased emphasis on human rights and political reform accompanied some liberalization of the economy. The merger of economic and political reforms rolled necessary but painful austerity measures into a generally popular reform package, including curbs on the revolutionary committees, amnesty for political prisoners, and increased tolerance of the exiles constituting the bulk of regime's opposition. Economic components of green perestroika included the legalization of private ownership of shops, small businesses, and farms, together with increased private retail trade incentives. Unfortunately, the program failed to attract long-anticipated, and much desired, foreign investment, largely because modest attempts to create an internal market were not accompanied by the reversal of the political experiments begun in 1969.

Accused of complicity in the December 1988 terrorist bombing of a transatlantic flight, Pan Am 103, Libya was subjected to United Nations (UN)-sponsored economic sanctions in 1991 for failing to extradite the two men indicted for the action. Alleged Libyan involvement in the terrorist bombing of UTA flight 772 over Niger in September 1989 further complicated Libyan external relations in this period. Libya remained under the yoke of UN-sponsored sanctions until 1998, when it accepted a proposal to try the suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing in the Netherlands under Scottish law. Successful in thwarting opposition on several fronts in the second half of the 1990s, Qaddafi enjoyed a strengthened domestic position at the time, enabling him to remand the two suspects with minimal concern for domestic repercussions.

Following suspension of the UN sanctions, Libya initiated an aggressive international campaign to end its commercial and diplomatic isolation. Initially focused on Africa, Qaddafi launched a series of bilateral and multilateral initiatives, beginning in February 1998 with the creation of the Community

of Sahel-Saharan States (COMESSA), which linked poor, land-locked African states with oil-rich Libya. In August 1999, he called for the creation of a United States of Africa, including an African central bank. He later added the goal of a pan-African parliament with lawmaking powers. A measure of Libya's improved standing in Africa was the support it received, in the face of determined opposition from the United States and human rights groups, for chairing the UN Human Rights Commission in 2002. In addition to regional initiatives, the Qaddafi regime also aggressively pursued expanded bilateral ties with a number of African states.

At the same time, Libya moved to strengthen economic and political relations with key European states like Britain, Italy, and Russia. The Libyan economy, adversely affected by low oil prices throughout much of the previous decade, stood to benefit from the expanded European trade and investment essential to the revitalization of the petroleum sector. The Qaddafi regime also worked to expand its political options in Europe, increasing its dialogue with bodies like the European Union and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and promoting Libya as a natural bridge between Europe and Africa.

After the special court sitting in the Netherlands found one of the two Pan Am 103 defendants guilty in January 2001, the Qaddafi regime expanded its efforts at global rehabilitation to include the U.S. government. In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, Libya actively cooperated with the United States and its allies in the war on terrorism. In return, Qaddafi sought Washington's support for a permanent lifting of the UN sanctions, together with the bilateral sanctions progressively imposed by the United States after 1986.

In the longer term, the Qaddafi regime hoped to achieve a restoration of full commercial and diplomatic ties with the United States. Libya took several steps that affected its relations with the United States and the world. In September 2003 Libya agreed to pay $2.7 billion to the families of the victims of Pan Am 103, after which the UN Security Council permanently lifted its sanctions regime. In December 2003 Libya renounced its unconventional weapons programs, agreeing to international inspections to verify compliance. And in January 2004 Libya also reached a final settlement in the UTA 772 case, in which it agreed to pay the families of victims $170 million.

See also Basic People's Congresses; Benghazi; Fezzan; Green Book; Idris al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sanusi; Jabal al-Akhdar, Libya; Qaddafi, Muammar al-; Qaramanli Dynasty; Tripoli.

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Lisa Anderson
Updated by Ronald Bruce St John

LICA

The abbreviation for the League against German Anti-Semitism, Association Formed by all Jewish Works and Institutions in Egypt.

LICA (Ligue contre l'Antisémitisme Allemand, Association Formée par Toutes les Oeuvres et Institutions Juives en Egypte) was founded in April 1933 as part of the mass protests organized by the Cairo B'nai B'rith against rising German antisemitism.

Among the leading founders was Léon Castro, lawyer, journalist, and Wafd party activist. In September 1933, the organization joined the International League against German Anti-Semitism (also abbreviated as LICA), which had recently been formed in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, with Castro as its vice-president. About the same time, a youth section, LISCA (Ligue Internationale Scolaire contre l'Antisémitisme; International Student League against Anti-Semitism) was founded in Egypt. By 1935, LICA counted about 1,500 members, and LISCA had about 650.

LICA organized an active campaign in Egypt's Hebrew- and European-language press. It also undertook a boycott of German goods and films. The boycott was most successful in barring German films from Egyptian theaters and in affecting the sale of a number of German products. Egyptian and British officials fearing possible disorders and financial repercussions, however, intervened to halt the boycott, which continued unofficially thereafter on an individual level.

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NORMAN STILLMAN

LIGUE TUNISIENNE POUR LA DÉFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME (LTDH)

Tunisian human rights organization.

The Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LTDH) was officially recognized in May 1977, thus being the oldest politically independent human rights organization in North Africa. All major political groups were represented on its executive committee, with most being dissidents of the Parti Socialiste Destourien (Destourian Socialist Party; PSD). During its first decade of existence the league proved to be an active and independent organization that increasingly gained popular support. By 1982 the LTDH had 1,000 members in 24 local chapters. By 1985 it had 3,000 members in 33 chapters, and four years later it had 4,000 members in 40 chapters.

In 1985 the LTDH elaborated a charter to define precisely what it stood for. Members decided that the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) would be adopted as the model but modified to fit Tunisian conditions. Internal debates focused on adaptations of the articles on the rights to change one's religion and to marry a non-Muslim, and the rights of illegitimate children.

After President Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali came to power in 1987, part of its leadership joined ranks with the government. Controversial statements made by the league's president, Moncef Marzouki, during the Gulf War, against adopting an unconditional pro-Iraqi stance, further eroded popular support and deepened dissent within the organization. In June 1991 the league issued a critical statement on arrest and detention procedures that eventually attracted international attention. This incident aggravated the league's relations with the government.

In March 1992 the National Assembly passed a law that sought to tame the LTDH and bring it under Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) control or effect its dissolution by 15 June. Refusing to comply, the LTDH dissolved itself. The ensuing international outcry led the regime to reconsider the law. On 26 March 1993, under pressure from President Ben Ali, the court authorized temporary resumption of the league's operations.

In 2000, at the league's fifth national congress, Mokhtar Trifi was elected its new president. Since then, the new outspoken leadership of the organization has faced strained relations with the regime, even enduring the suspension of its new executive and the disruption of its activities.

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LARRY A. BARRIE
UPDATED BY ANA TORRES-GARCIA

LIKUD

An Israeli electoral bloc established in 1973.

Originally, Likud consisted of several independent parties: the Herut Party, the Liberal Party, the Free

Center, State List, and part of the Land of Israel Movement. Much of the emphasis of its program has been on extension of Israeli sovereignty to the territories conquered in the Arab–Israel War of 1967. It also called for improvement of the social and economic conditions of disadvantaged communities known as Oriental Jews (Edot ha-Mizrah).

Taking advantage of public disenchantment with the Labor Party in 1977, Likud won forty-three Knesset seats and formed a coalition government led by Menachem Begin, which continued until 1984. In that year, neither Likud nor the Labor Alignment bloc won enough to form a coalition without the other. The two joined in a National Unity Government in which Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir held the office of prime minister for half of the electoral period, and the blocs divided other government offices. In 1988, Likud and other right-wing and religious parties improved their showing, and Shamir again led the government until the Labor victory of 1992.

During its years in power, Likud strongly resisted surrendering sovereignty over the Palestinian territories and made little progress in reducing the role of the government in the economy. One of Likud's problems has been the presence in it of several strong individuals and their factions, including Shamir, former Chief of Staff Ariel Sharon, and Moroccan leader David Levy—all of whom have tried vigorously to become dominant. In 1993, the Likud chairmanship was won by Benjamin Netanyahu, former ambassador to the United Nations and brother to the hero of the Israeli raid on Entebbe. He defeated his former rivals as well as younger figures like Ze'ev Begin, with a spirited campaign based on American-style politics and effective use of the media, even though it was an election confined to party members.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Israel: Political Parties in; Mizrahi Movement.

Walter F. Weiker

LILIENBLUM, MOSES LEIB
[1843–1910]

Russian Zionist writer and philosopher.

Moses Leib Lilienblum received an Orthodox education and was a recognized scholar of the Talmud. His major activity was as a publicist and social critic. For most of his early career, he advocated normalization of Jewish life in Russia and closer association with that country's non-Jews, as well as an evolutionary concept of religious practice, in the spirit of Haskalah (enlightenment). As political difficulties increased in Russia, he also demanded equal rights. After the pogroms in the late 1870s, however, he became an ardent Zionist and one of the first Russian writers to campaign for the return of Jews to Palestine. One of his main associations was the Hibbat Zion movement. In addition to these political activities, Lilienblum was a renowned literary critic. His approach has been described as anti-aesthetic pragmatism, stressing the usefulness of art to society and that "the Jewish people wanted to live for the sake of life and not for any purpose beyond life." His influence was based on the great simplicity as well as the logic of his writings.

See also Haskalah; Hibbat Zion.

Walter F. Weiker

LIRA

See Glossary

LISAN AL-HAL

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

LITANI OPERATION (1978)

Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978.

Following a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) assault on a civilian bus traveling Israel's Haifa–Tel Aviv highway that killed thirty-seven Israelis, in March 1978 20,000 troops of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) invaded Lebanon to the Litani River. The operation's goal was to destroy PLO bases and staging areas south of the Litani and to drive PLO guerrillas beyond the range of the Israeli-Lebanese border. The invasion caused an estimated 1,000 Lebanese and Palestinian casualties and prompted UN Security Council Resolution 425, which called for a cease-fire, an Israeli withdrawal, the dispatch of Lebanese army units to the area, and the creation of a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeeping force. Israel objected to the

resolution's failure to censure anti-Israeli PLO activity in and stemming from Lebanon. The IDF occupied a stretch of Lebanese territory 37 miles long and 3 to 6 miles deep, ceding it after three months as a buffer zone to UNIFIL and to an Israeli-supported local Lebanese militia headed by Saʿd Haddad. Over the next four years the PLO reinfiltrated south Lebanon, and the Litani Operation's failure to secure Israel's northern border figured in the larger scope of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

See also HADDAD, SAʿD; UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON
UPDATED BY LAURIE Z. EISENBERG

LITANI RIVER

River in Lebanon.

MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

Flowing entirely within Lebanon, the Litani rises in the Biqa valley and flows south between the Lebanon mountains to the west and the anti-Lebanon mountains to the east until Nabatiya, where it turns sharply to the west crosses Lebanon and empties into the Mediterranean Sea.

The major Litani development plan, initiated in the 1950s, was concluded in 1966; it includes the Qar'un reservoir and the Awali hydroelectric power station, which utilizes the water diverted via a tunnel. Hydropower and domestic use receive priority over irrigation, and Shiʿa farmers in the south resent this, fearing diversion of all the water to the north.

After 1971, the growth in southern Lebanon of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—by refugees from the Jordanian Civil War—resulted in a rise in hostilities in that border area with Israel. These led in 1978 to Operation Litani by Israel and the 1982 Arab–Israel War. The fear exists in Lebanon that Israel will divert the Litani to join the Jordan River system, but Israel has replied that this is politically unfeasible.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1982).

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SARA RIGUER

LITERARY SOCIETY

See MUNTADA AL-ADABI, AL-

LITERATURE

This entry consists of the following articles:

LITERATURE: ARABIC
LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN
LITERATURE: HEBREW
LITERATURE: PERSIAN
LITERATURE: TURKISH

LITERATURE: ARABIC

Arabic literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries diverged substantially from inherited practices.

Arabic literature has its roots in pre-Islamic odes, enshrining prosodic and thematic conventions that remained unchallenged centuries after the ethos of desert life had ceased to be widely applicable. The emergence of historic Islam in the seventh century C.E., together with the dogma that the Qurʾan is the actual word of God and that its superhuman eloquence is the miracle that proves the genuineness of the Prophet's mission, gave the language of that period an all but hallowed character that was perpetuated in formal writing but displaced by local uninflected vernaculars in everyday Arabic speech.

The literary tradition was therefore tinged with a conservative and puristic quality that gave it uncommon homogeneity and continuity. Its conservativeness also insulated it from daily concerns, so that the uneducated majority turned instead to regional folk literatures that were ignored or even despised by the establishment. Nevertheless, changes did occur. One was a growing taste for verbal ornaments, such as the pun and the double entendre. What modern Arabs inherited from the immediate past, therefore, was the literature of a conservative elite in which correctness, convention, and linguistic virtuosity were prized above content or originality.

By the 1800s, the encroachments of Europe brought new perceptions to Arab intellectuals, who came to admire the very power that the colonialists used against them and sought the knowledge that made it possible. By the 1870s, especially in Egypt and the Levant, a new westward-looking elite had emerged. From it came the producers and consumers of the new literature.

New Direction

The conscious adaptation of literary standards to changed conditions was gradual. The earliest Arab intellectuals with extensive opportunity to get to know Europe, such as the perceptive Rifaʿa Rafi al-Tahtawi (1801–1871) and the more mercurial Faris (later, Ahmad Faris) al-Shidyaq (1804–1887), were aware that Europeans had different concepts of literature than Arabs did, but they deemed them inferior. And yet a new form of writing was coming into being, which was evident wherever there was a need to convey information (as in the books of Shidyaq and Tahtawi). It was fostered in translations, even nonliterary ones, where Arabic had to accommodate notions never before expressed; and it was important to a new Middle Eastern profession born of an imported technology: journalism.

The new direction was strikingly illustrated in the career of Abdullah al-Nadim (1845–1896), the fiery orator of the Urabi rebellion. He was well established as a master of finely bejeweled rhymed prose, but when he took to journalism, he faced up to the need to reach a wide public. He experimented, briefly, with writing an occasional piece entirely in the vernacular, but the choice he deliberately made was to use a vocabulary as close as possible to that of everyday speech without deviating from the rules of classical Arabic grammar. Others have since wrestled with the strains and anomalies of writing in the Arabic idiom that no one speaks and, indeed, the colloquial has gained a large measure of acceptance in the theater and a more grudging one in the dialogue of novels and short stories. But al-Nadim's practice has prevailed among prose writers for at least eighty years, with only a few in the last generation allowing themselves liberties with the syntax as well.

The transformation was not merely stylistic; by the 1870s, admiration of Europe's successes in science and technology was extended, by a loose association, to political, social, and philosophic endeavors as well. The adoption of European aesthetic norms could not lag far behind. By the turn of the twentieth century, direct and unadorned prose was widely recognized as not only functional but also literarily desirable. Because the learned were few, the principal medium of dissemination was the periodical press, so some major literary works were serialized before appearing in book form.

With little to encourage specialization in any one genre, the recognized stylists found their main vehicle in short prose pieces, such as the moralistic essays and tearful narratives of Mustafa Lutfi al-Manfaluti (1876–1924). Indeed, the first half of the twentieth century was dominated by immensely prolific and versatile writers, among whom were Taha Husayn (1889–1973) and Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad (1889–1964). They were virtually all secularist and liberal sociopolitically, and romantic in their literary inclinations. Although few set out their aesthetic

The 1988 Nobel Prize for literature went to Najib Mahfuz of Egypt. Mahfuz is the author of over thirty novels and thirty-two books of poetry, many of which have been adapted for theatre, film, and television. **© Vernier Jean Bernard/Corbis Sygma. Reproduced by permission.**

principles systematically, they accustomed their generation to seek neither formalism nor virtuosity in literature but sincerity and emotion. Experience and maturity, the events of World War II, the subsequent decline of Britain and France, and above all, the challenges of independence in tandem with the turmoil of the Palestinians caused the next generation to turn away from romanticism. The keynote of postwar Arabic writing has been political commitment and realism, strongly tinged with socialism.

Prose

The prose style of the West fostered genres previously unknown in Arabic literature. In particular, narratives were discredited as no more than folk art, and the only form to have gained the critics' acceptance as serious literature was the *maqama,* pioneered by Badi al-Zaman al-Hamadhani (968–1008). It was a short piece that usually recounted, in highly ornate prose, some petty fraud perpetrated by an amiable rogue. By the end of the nineteenth century there was growing public demand for short stories and novels of the European type. The demand was readily met by translations, adaptations, or imitations. The short story proved particularly suitable to the needs of journals and an excellent medium for the piecemeal propagation of new ideas and perceptions. In its Arabic garb, it was brought to a high level of sophistication as early as the 1920s by such authors as Mahmud Taymur (1894–1973).

The novel was a more difficult form, especially in the absence of an Arabic tradition. Translations and adaptations aside, a pioneering attempt at a long narrative was made by Muhammad al-Muwaylihi (1858–1930) in *Hadith Isa ibn Hisham* (The Discourse of Isa ibn Hisham), in which a resurrected pasha had a series of adventures that offered opportunities to comment on social changes. The fact that it borrowed the name of the narrator and, in places, the style of (al-Hamadhani), caused it to be labeled an extended *maqama,* but the purpose it served was different, and its link to the novel form was tenuous.

Jurji Zaydan (1861–1914), the indefatigable owner and editor of the journal *al-Hilal,* published more than a score of romances, each twined around some episode of Islamic history—but invention in them is minimal. The first novel of recognized merit rooted in contemporary Arab life was *Zaynab,* the story of a village girl married against her will; it was written by Muhammad Husayn Haykal (1888–1956) in 1910/11 and first published anonymously. No others of consequence were published until the 1930s, when several writers with already established reputations, such as Taha Husayn, Mahmud Taymur, and Ibrahim Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini (1890–1949), turned to the novel. Greater progress was made under the banner of realism, notably by Najib Mahfuz (b. 1911), the first Arab to devote most of his energies to one genre. His abundant, varied, and highly competent production earned him the Nobel Prize for literature in 1988.

Theater

Even more than the novel, dramatic literature was hindered by the absence of any regional precedent, except as folk art, and by resistance to the use of the Arabic colloquial—even between unlearned characters and before mixed audiences. Yet drama made a comparatively early start; the first performance was *The Miser,* a play which, although not a translation of Molière's play, owed a great deal to the great French comedic playwright (1622–1673). It was produced in Beirut (Lebanon) in 1847 by Marun al-Naqqash (1818–1855). His company, and several others that branched out of it or imitated it, found acceptance in Egypt, but their activities were looked upon as mere entertainment. In fact, although some writers established in other genres also tried to write plays, no Arab acquired a reputation as a playwright until the 1930s, when Tawfiq al-Hakim (1898–1987), who had had experience as a hack writer for a theatrical company, returned from a period of study in Paris determined to give drama a recognized place among literary arts. His long career, marked by productivity and versatility even into old age, brought him fame and inspired an impressive group of new playwrights.



Kahlil Gibran was a Lebanese poet, philosopher, and artist who immigrated to the United States. *The Prophet*, perhaps his most famous work, is a book of twenty-six poetic essays which has been translated into over twenty languages. © E.O. Hoppe/ Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Poetry

In contrast to the newly imported genres, Arabic poetry has a long and rich tradition. In the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, poets perpetuated the highly ornate style of their immediate predecessors. When the times called for a less ornamental and more purposeful poetry, the practice of the most talented turned not to European models but to the example of early poets from an equally dynamic age. By the turn of the century, a school now known as the neoclassical quickly attained a high level of accomplishment, emulating the grandiloquent odes of Abbasid poets but addressing the public issues of the day. Its leading exponents were Ahmad Shawqi (1868–1932) and Muhammad Hafiz Ibrahim (c. 1872–1932).

Resonant as they were, their voices were not the only ones to be heard. Others favored more radical initiatives and the expression of more personal emotions. From outside the Arab heartlands, Syrian Christian émigrés to the Americas headed by Kahlil Gibran (1883–1931) echoed a type of poetry long accepted in the West. Not least influential were the leading critics al-Aqqad and Taha Husayn, who harried the neoclassicists for not equaling the subtleties of the British poet Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822) or the French poet Alphonse de Lamartine (1790–1869). The leanings of these various groups were unmistakable, and after the death of Ahmad Shawqi and Hafiz Ibrahim, the romanticism already evident in prose became evident in poetry as well.

Another new note was sounded in 1949 when two Iraqis, Badr Shakir al-Sayyab (1926–1964) and Nazik al-Malaʾika (b. 1923), almost simultaneously published their first experiments with free verse. The adoption of lines of uneven length with muted

rhymes irregularly arranged, or with no rhymes at all, was the most radical departure ever from classical Arabic poetry. No less significant is that the movement grew—and has continued to grow—out of perceptions shared with Western poets of international stature, especially T. S. Eliot (1888–1965). Most revolutionary of all has been its purpose; for it has given rise to a host of committed poets often able to give voice to their predicaments as individuals and, at the same time, as Arabs and as humanists.

All Genres

All along, Arab writers have given expression to the fervor and then to the disappointments and antagonisms generated by the succession of Western ideologies embraced by the elite. This expression has to some extent been tinged by the prestige of the world power most closely associated with each ism. In the second half of the twentieth century, following growing disappointment in the way the liberalism and secularism associated with Western Europe had worked out, the dominant doctrine has been socialism, but the collapse of the Soviet Union undermined confidence in its forthcoming triumph. Very few carry their disillusion to the extent implied in a short story by Mahmud al-Rimawi (b. 1948) titled "The Train" and included in his *Liqa lam yatimm* (2002). In it, a train running to an unknown destination and stopping only at deserted stations is packed with people who have been on it long enough for a baby girl to be born to one of them, and the name she is given is Palestine. More confidently, contributors to all literary genres view themselves as individuals sharing a distinctive experience but informed by a universal consciousness, and dealing with issues that have a humanistic as well as an Arab dimension.

See also Gibran, Kahlil; Hakim, Tawfiq al-; Husayn, Taha; Ibrahim, Muhammad Hafiz; Mahfuz, Najib; Malaʾika, Nazik al-; Sayyab, Badr Shakir al-; Shawqi, Ahmad; Shidyaq, Ahmad Faris al-; Tahtawi, Rifaʿa al-Rafi al-; Zaydan, Jurji.

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Pierre Cachia

Literature: Arabic, North African

North African writers convey their ideas in French and Arabic in a variety of literary genres.

The three countries of the Maghrib—Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia—share more than common geographic boundaries. They all succumbed to foreign invasions in the past and fell victim to the same colonial power: France. Colonial rule in the countries of the Maghrib differed only in its strength and its duration, Algeria having endured the longest and most traumatizing occupation. The French army landed on the coast of Algeria in 1830 and completed its occupation of the country in 1881. Tunisia was conquered in 1880, and in 1912 Morocco was colonized. Algeria was a French province from 1848 until it achieved independence in 1962; the other two countries remained French protectorates until 1956.

In Algeria, Arabic lost its efficacy long before it was declared a foreign language in 1938. Algerians conceded the fact that the language of the colonizer was the language of bread, but because it is the language of Islam, Arabic maintained its place in the lives of the people, even the Berbers, who spoke various Berber dialects. It became primarily the language of religious teaching and practice. Culturally, Morocco and Tunisia experienced French colonialism in a more subdued manner because they had centers of Arabic learning—the two mosque universities, al-Qarawiyyin in Fez and the Zaytuna in Tunis—that safeguarded and continued an existing cultural tradition. Many schools opted for bilingual instruction, so Arabic was on a par with French. The linguistic situation in the Maghrib has provoked heated polemics between the partisans of French and those of Arabic, particularly in Algeria. Although it remains an issue to the present day due to the growing number of writers expressing themselves in French, it has lost its political connotation.

The three countries of the Maghrib are similar in the role assumed by traditional Muslim centers,

Abdelwahhab Meddeb, a Tunisian poet and scholar, often draws upon his Arab Islamic history and heritage in his writings, which include novels, poetry volumes, translations, and essays. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

the *zawiyas.* Jealous of their power over the population and intent on playing a role in the political arena, some Zawiya leaders placed themselves in an ambiguous position when they cooperated with French colonial authorities The French used them to legitimize their presence and gain the support of the local population. Aided by widespread illiteracy, the *zawiyas* maintained their control until they were challenged by the reformists of the Salafiyya movement, who were increasingly alarmed by the interference of the colonial administration in the religious affairs of their countries. The Algerian Reda Huhu ridiculed the official imams appointed by the colonial authorities and even spoke of an "official Islam," in contrast to the "people's Islam" in his *Ma Himar al-Hakim* (Conversations with al-Hakim's donkey).

Following in the footsteps of the Salafiyya of the Mashreq, Maghribi intellectuals such as Allal al-Fasi (1910–1974) in Morocco, Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis (1889–1940) in Algeria, and Mohammad al-Fadel Ben Ashour (1909–1970) and Mohammad al-Taher Ben Ashour (1879–1973) in Tunisia confronted the leaders of the *zawiyas.* Their aim was to prove the compatibility of Islam and modernity, and the absence of a contradiction between progress, even in a Western context, and Islam. Their position appealed to the Maghribi youth. Opening up to the West, however, did not occur without a price, even for the French-educated Maghribis. The clash of the two civilizations was successfully dramatized by the Moroccan Driss Chraibi in *Succession ouverte* (1962; Heirs to the past) and *Le passe simple* (1983; The simple past), the Algerian Mouloud Mammeri (1917–1989) in his novel *Le sommeil du juste* (1955; The sleep of the just), and the Tunisian Albert Memmi (b. 1920). Memmi endured hardships as a Tunisian Jew caught between family traditions, colonial policy, and Nazi ideology, which he related in his novel *La statue de sel* (1953; The statue of salt).



Moroccan author Mubarak Rabi belongs to the country's first generation of contemporary writers. His works include short stories, plays, novels, children's books, and psychological studies of childhood socialization processes. COURTESY OF AIDA BAMIA.

Maghribi writers writing in French are finally reconciled with their native culture and at ease in their setting. Some, such as the Algerian Habib Tengour (b. 1947), the Tunisian Abdelwahhab Meddeb (b. 1946), and the Moroccan Taher Ben Jelloun (b. 1944), dug into their Arab Islamic history and their folk heritage in search of subject matter for their works. Independence has, in a certain way, liberated the writers from guilt vis-à-vis their adoption of the French language.

The 1980s witnessed an explosion of production in the Maghrib in various literary genres, in prose and in verse, and in Arabic and French. Particularly prominent in this trend are the women writers. They are slowly filling a space that for many years was dominated by the lone presence of the Algerian novelist Assia Djebar (b. 1936). Approaching the women's world from a feminist angle, her writings shed much of their traditionally romantic outlook on gender relations and with *L'amour, la fantasia* (1985; Fantasia: An Algerian Cavalcade) and *Ombre sultane* (1987; A sister to Scheherazade), she achieved a new depth by mixing history and fiction. Although Djebar has given a voice to Algerian women through films and plays, her greatest contribution is in fiction. Her latest novel, *La femme sans sepulture* (2002; Woman without a shroud) is a somewhat fictionalized biography of an Algerian woman who fought during the war of independence. Algeria's now long list of other women writing in French includes established names such as Leila Sebbar (b. 1941), Aicha Lemsine (b. 1942), and Anna Greki (1931–1966), and new names such as Hawa Djabali (b. 1949), Miriam Ben (b. 1928) and, more recently, Nina Bouraoui (b. 1967).

Women writing in Arabic, on the other hand, have relied more on poetry to express themselves. One of the early poets, Ahlam Mustaghanmi (b. 1953), has recently turned to fiction, publishing two novels, *Dhakirat al-jasad* (1996; Memory of the flesh) and its sequel *Fawda al-Hawas* (1998; The chaos of the senses). In Tunisia, Hélé Béji (b. 1948) contrasted traditional and modern cultures in her first novel, *L'oeil du jour* (1985; The eye of day). Women writing in Arabic who preceded her include Hind Azzouz (b. 1926), Nadjia Thamer (b. 1926), Arusiyya Naluti (b. 1950), and the poet Zoubeida Béchir (b. 1938). Contributing to the feminist debate in the Arab world, Zahra al-Jlasi (b. 1950) published *al-Nas al-Mu'annath* (2000; The feminine text). In Morocco, Khanatha Bannounah (b. 1940) has contributed four collections of short stories and two novels, *al-Nar wa al-Ikhtiyar* (1968; Fire and choice) and *al-Ghad wa al-Ghadab* (1981; The future and the fury). A new generation of women novelists is slowly making headway but many have not published more than a single novel.

The boundaries of the Maghribi writers have expanded tremendously, both geographically and culturally. Consequently, it is impossible to ignore the growing presence of Maghribi literature outside the countries of the Maghrib, both in Europe and in the Americas. Many writers live and work outside the Maghrib, and come into contact with various cultures. The Tunisian Mustafa Tlili brings his experience in the United States to his novels, and the writings of a Tunisian residing in Canada, Hédi Bouraoui (b. 1932), reveal a rich canvas on which multiple Western cultures intertwine with Maghribi folklore. Majid el-Houssi bridges Italian and Tunisian cultures in his poetry and fiction.

It is important to mention the role that private publishing houses in the Maghrib have played in the promotion of Maghribi literature. Although they impose a financial burden on aspiring young writers who publish their works at their own expense, they nevertheless provide them with greater freedom of expression and accelerate the publication process with the elimination of bureaucracy.

The writings of the Maghribis have echoed during the last two decades the concerns of the population and the social ills in Morocco that contribute to clandestine immigration, as dramatized in Youssouf Amin Elalamy's *Les clandestins* (2000; The clandestines). The rejection of both the Islamists and the government in power in Algeria has fallen on the shoulders of women novelists struggling to secure their rights in a society where they are constantly victimized. Many of the more political writers have so far been the authors of a single work, so it is difficult to assess their literary future.

Whereas more writers in Algeria are resorting to the French language as their medium of expression, the scene in Morocco seems well balanced between Arabic and French, with the scale tilting in favor of Arabic. New fiction works of great literary value are being published, among them Ahmad al-Tawfiq's novels in which he reconciles Arab and Berber traditions, Izz ed-dine Tazi's huge literary production, and the numerous works of Mohammad Shukri, Mubarak Rabi, and Bensalem Himmish. The change in leadership in Morocco after 1999 led to the release of many prisoners who published books describing their experiences in what came to be called prison literature. In contrast, francophone literature in present-day Tunisia is not a strong trend and offers no clear direction. Except for Hélé Béji (b.1948) and to a lesser extent Moncef Ghachem (b. 1947), few have established a reputation beyond Tunisia's borders.

Algerian author Assia Djebar is one of North Africa's most acclaimed writers. Djebar is best known for her fictional works, which frequently address feminist issues and focus on themes of social emancipation. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Algeria

To counteract the impact of French culture, the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (AUMA) was founded in 1931 by Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis (1889–1940). Its motto was "Algeria is my country, Islam is my religion, and Arabic is my language." The AUMA contributed to the revival of the Arabic language and the launching of a significant literary movement through its schools and its press. Well-known literary figures such as Ahmad Reda Huhu (1911–1956) and Zuhur Wanisi (b. 1936) either taught in the schools of the AUMA or studied there. Both fiction and poetry were published in the AUMA's two papers, *al-Shihab* (1925–1939) and *al-Basaʾir* (1935–1956). It is fair to say that modern Arabic literature in Algeria was born in the shadow of the AUMA.

While fiction in Arabic was in an early stage and limited to short stories, Algerian fiction in French made its first appearance in the period between the two world wars. However, the most significant novel, *Le fils du pauvre* (The pauper's son), by Mouloud Feraoun (1913–1962), was not published until 1950. Its author stated that his motivation to write it was his desire to present a true portrait of the Algerian people, in reaction to Albert Camus's novels dealing with life in Algeria. Algeria's earlier novels were mostly ethnographic, but they became

increasingly political as most writers set out to define and defend their national cause. They voiced the people's aspiration to freedom, described social ills, and condemned France's repressive colonial policy. The nascent literary movement coincided with the political consciousness of the Algerians heightened by their participation in the Etoile Nord Africaine, a party established in 1925 by Maghribis in France.

The Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962) was another literary catalyst. It became the topic of choice for novelists, short-story writers, poets, and playwrights, especially after independence. Few, however, succeeded in reproducing the tragic and momentous events of the struggle without writing documentary-type works. The most original novel on the subject is Mohammed Dib's (1920–2003) *Qui se souvient de la mer* (1962; Who remembers the sea). Writers dwelt on the war years, using incidents mainly to incriminate the parasites and the false nationalists who exploited the ideals of the revolution and the memory of the martyrs. Rachid Boudjedra (b. 1941) pointed the finger at the new leadership and their coconspirators, the religious authorities, in his novel *La fépudiation* (1969; Repudiation). Al-Taher Wattar's *al-laz* (1974; The ace) stresses the tragic fate of the martyrs of the war who were quickly forgotten after independence.

The French Algerian literature gained momentum following independence while Arabic writing lagged behind for more than a decade. In view of Algeria's Arabization policy, the French language was not expected to survive for long in postindependence Algeria; although the prediction did not materialize, the advocates of the two languages engaged in heated polemics on the merits of one over the other. The debates subsided in virulence, and the linguistic choice of the Maghribi writers is still a subject of contention. The only writer to cross the language barrier in Algeria is, so far, Rachid Boudjedra. With his novel *al-Tafakkuk* (1982; The dismantling) he began the trend of writing novels in Arabic and translating them into French, a process that continues to the present day. It is doubtful, however, that readers view Boudjedra as an Arab-language writer.

After the war of independence, writers' interests shifted to other social, personal, and philosophical themes. Minority groups such as the Berbers used their writings to promote their heritage. The most committed writer of the postindependence period was Mouloud Mammeri (1917–1989). Meaningful works also were published by the novelist Nabile Farès (b. 1940). Before them, the Amrouche family—Jean el-Mouhouv (1906–1962); his mother, Fadhma At Mansour (1882–1967); and his sister, Mary Louise Amrouche (1913–1976)—endeavored to safeguard the Berber folk heritage.

One of Algeria's most prolific and greatest writers, Mohammed Dib, shifted his attention from politics to other topics following independence. Between his well-known trilogy, Algeria, which included *La grande maison,* (1952; The big house), *L'incendie* (1954; The fire), and *Le métier à tisser* (1957; The loom), and his latest novel, *L'Infante maure* (1994; The Moorish Infanta), the author traversed a path that led him from a direct approach and straightforward style to the depths of abstraction. He remains attuned to events in Algeria in his collection of short stories, *La nuit sauvage* (1995; The savage night), which depicts violence in his country and in the rest of the world. Dib was among those who believed that the role of the writer as an advocate for the national cause was finished when their country achieved independence. Another who began writing in the colonial period and continued long after independence is the poet Noureddine Aba (1921–1996). After Algeria's independence he dedicated his efforts to other Arab causes, particularly to the Palestinian problem, which figures in two of his poetic plays, *Montjoie Palestine* (1970; Palestine, my joy) and *Tel El-Zaatar s'est tu à la tombée de la nuit* (1981; Tel El-Zaatar fell silent at night). Many younger poets writing in Arabic have also expressed a great affinity with the ordeal of the Palestinian people.

The younger generation of writers who did not experience the war years have manifested a particular concern with their leadership's handling of the political, financial, and social affairs of the country. Writers such as Taher Djaout (1954–1993), Rachid Mimouni (1945–1995), and the poet Hamid Skif (b. 1951) have not minced their words in criticizing the government. In the 1990s the dissent was aimed at the government and the Muslim fundamentalists, in Boudjedra's *FIS de la Haine* (1992), Mimouni's *La malediction* (1993; The malediction), and

Djebar's *Le blanc de l'Algérie* (1995; The white of Algeria) and *Oran, langue morte* (1997; Oran, a dead language), in which the author mourns the assassinations of Algerian writers and intellectuals, including Taher Djaout. Most of the works dealing with violence in Algeria reveal the difficulty of reproducing the magnitude of the tragedy in fiction. Unable to distance themselves from events they endured daily, writers provided testimonies rather than fictional accounts of reality, a trend observed in Leila Aslawi's *Survivre comme l'espoir* (1994; To survive like hope), Latifa Ben Mansour's *La prière de la peur* (1997; The prayer of fear), and Nina Hayat's *La nuit tombe sur Alger la blanche* (1995; Night falls on white Algiers). In Arabic, Laraj Wasini wrote *Sayyidat al-Maqam* (The mistress of the abode), relating the events in the framework of a love story, while Wattar used his traditional Sufi approach in *al-Wali al-Tahir yaʿudu ila makamihi al-zaki* (2000; The chaste Wali returns to pure his tomb).

Other angry voices heard around the Mediterranean in the mid-1980s were those of the second generation of Maghribi immigrants, mainly Algerians living in France (and in Belgium), known as Beurs. They decried their feelings of loss and their search for identity in violent texts that reflected deep frustration, some of which have achieved notoriety: Farida Belghoul's (b. 1958) *Georgette* (1986), Sakina Boukhedenna's (b. 1959) *Journal and "nationalité: immigré(e)"* (1987; Nationality: Immigrant), and Mehdi Charef's (b. 1952) *Le thé au harem d'Archi Ahmed* (1983; Tea in the harem). Their movement is significant for its global nature. One writer, Azouz Begag, who attracted the attention of the critics with his first novel, *Le gone du chaâba* (1986; The lad of the alley), has established himself as a spokesperson for the Beur with a prolific literary production. Begag shows the human face of the immigrant in quietly humorous works such as *Dis Oualla* (1997; Say, by God) and *Le passport* (200; The passport) where Arabic terms abound.

Morocco

Morocco's modern literary history is in many aspects similar to Tunisia's, but its proximity to the Iberian Peninsula has added an extra dimension to its culture. The Arab Islamic heritage of Andalusia and the flight of many Muslims and Jewish Andalusians to Morocco upon the reconquest of Spain has linked Morocco to Europe historically and culturally. Because French occupation came late to Morocco and as a result of the political organization of the territory, French culture did not deeply or easily infiltrate the educational foundations of the country. It was also counteracted by the Arab Islamic cultural activities centered in Fez.



Tahar Ben Jelloun, one of North Africa's most successful post-colonial authors, was born in Morocco in 1944 but immigrated to France in 1971. A practicing psychologist as well as a writer, Ben Jelloun produced many works of poetry, prose, and criticism, frequently touching on themes of racism and alienation. © RUSSELL CHRISTOPHE/CORBIS KIYA. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

The two writers who dominated the colonial period and wrote in French, Driss Chraibi and Ahmed Sefrioui, did not promote French ideals. Chraibi denounced the traumatic impact of Western civilization and the hardships of the emigrant workers in France, and in his latest novels has become an advocate of the Berber cause. Sefrioui, on the other hand, revived the folk literature of his country, thus drawing the line between his world and the Western world. Another writer, Mohammad Khair Eddine (b. 1941–1995), has shown strong connections with

his country in spite of his vagabond life and the many years he spent outside Morocco. A younger novelist, Taher Benjelloun (Taher ben Jelloun; b. 1944), well known for his innovative style and form, won the Prix Goncourt for *La nuit sacrée* (1987; The sacred night).

Parallel to an important literary movement in French, Morocco counts an impressive array of distinguished writers expressing themselves in Arabic, including Mohammad Ezzeddine Tazi (b. 1948) and Mohammad Zafzaf (1946–2001). Many among them, such as al-Miloudi Shaghmoum (b. 1947) and Abdessalam al-Boqqali (b. 1932), are bilingual and have used their multiculturalism to produce original works reflecting new trends in the European novel. A few, such as Mohammad Aziz al-Habbabi (1922–1993), write in both Arabic and French. Many of the Moroccan novels written in the middle of the twentieth century were historical, stressing the authors' pride in the country's past. Bensalem Himmish's (b. 1949) *Majnun al-Hukm* (1990; Power crazy) and Lotfi Akaley's (b. 1943) *Ibn Battuta* (1998; Ibn Battuta, the well-known Arab traveler) found in Arab culture and history a rich source of material for their fiction works.

Poetry is a particularly popular genre in Morocco among those writing in Arabic and in French. The imprisonment of Abdellatif Laabi for his daring critical works shows the efficacy of this literary genre. Poety is celebrated on a national and official level in Morocco. It occupies a major place in the yearly Rabat cultural festival. Moroccan poetry has a permanent center known as Bayt al-shiʿr (The house of poetry), under the presidency of the poet Muhammad Bannis. Among Moroccan women poets, Malika al-Asimi is exceptionally outspoken, discussing intimate topics and contesting society's restrictions, in her two collections *Kitabat Kharij Aswar al-Alam* (1988; Writings outside the walls of the world) and *Aswat Hanjara Mayyita* (1988; Voices from a dead throat). An equally bold attitude can be observed in Siham Benchkroun's *A toi* (2000; To you).

Traditional in form and patriotic in content at the beginning of the twentieth century, Moroccan literature has taken a more personal and philosophical trend since the mid-1970s, with a tendency for renewal and experimentation in form and style.

Tunisia

Tunisia's cultural history is quite different from that of its neighbor, Algeria. Tunisia benefited from the activities of the *Zaytuna* mosque-university and the Sadiqi college; both were instrumental in preserving and promoting Arabic culture. The country's close contacts with the Mashriq in opposition to the term *maghrib* (referring to North Africa) designates the Egypt and the Levant were another asset in its rich literary activities. As Tunisian writers contributed to the *nahda,* the literary revival in the Arab world, the most significant input came from the poet Abu al-Qasim al-Shabbi (1909–1934).

Most Tunisian writers expressed themselves in Arabic. Between the two world wars the journal *al-Alam al-Adabi* (1930–1952; The literary world) encouraged writers of the young generation, including members of the most famous literary group of this period, Jamaʿat Taht al-Sur (Below the wall group), which counted such established authors as Ali al-Duʿaji (1909–1949) and Mahmoud al-Mesʿadi (b. 1911). A similar role was assumed by the journal *Al-Fikr* (1955–1986; The thinking, or The thought) in the second half of the twentieth century.

Tunisia had very few writers in French during the colonial period. The best known among them was Albert Memmi, who now lives in France. Surprisingly, their numbers have soared in the last two decades. Although they write in French, they borrow heavily from their Arab Islamic heritage. A few, such as Salah Garmadi (1933–1982) and Taher Bakri (b. 1951), are bilingual poets.

Arabic literature in Tunisia, especially fiction, continues to flourish. It is a field for innovation and experimentation both in style and in form. The nationalist and patriotic works of the early period, the period of the French protectorate, gave way to a broader variety of subjects; the tone also became less moralizing. It is not unusual to find writers contributing to more than one literary genre, producing novels, short stories, and plays. The theater, too, has had a revival in Tunisia thanks to the efforts of Izziddin al-Madani (b. 1938). Because of the numerous cultural festivals held in Tunisia, many plays are performed.

Of the three countries of the Maghrib, Tunisia has the largest number of women writing in Arabic.

Although the mere fact of their writing is a reflection of change in society, the women do not always promote complete emancipation. Slowly but progressively their tone has become more daring. Raising certain questions is in itself a revolutionary stance: Subjects such as birth control and abortion, discussed by Hind Azzouz (b. 1926) in *Fi al-Darb al-Tawil* (1969; On the long road), are a novelty. Some, such as Fatima Slim (b. 1942), observe the loss of the old values in a changing society. The most uninhibited is Laila Ben Mami (b. 1944), author of *Sawmaʿa Tahtariq* (1968; The burning hermitage), who believes in sexual freedom for the artist.

The image of the modern woman also is defined by male writers. Generally, most novelists of the late 1960s and the 1970s called for a bigger role for women in society. In the novel *Wa Nasibi min al-Ufuq* (1970; My share of the horizon), Abdel Qader Ben Shaikh (b. 1929) calls for the emancipation of women, the easing of parents' control, and the relaxing of social traditions. Mustafa al-Farsi (b. 1931) takes a similar position in *al-Munʿaraj* (1969; The curve). As reflected in literature, Tunisian women suffered from a changing society and the consequences of their efforts to balance the claims of a traditional upbringing with those of the modern world in which they wanted to prove themselves. The situation claimed some victims in the period of transition—for example, the characters drawn by Natila al-Tabayniyy (b. 1949) in *Shayʾun fi Nafsika* (1970; Something within yourself)—but an irreversible trend was set for future generations.

Some contemporary writers have achieved recognition for their innovative techniques and timely topics while remaining close to the people's problems. Such is the case of Mohammad al-Hadi Ben Saleh (b. 1945), who portrayed the bread riots in his novel *Sifr al-Naqla wa al-Tasawwur* (1988; The book of transfer and imagination). Poetry, too, responded to the people's concerns, as shown in the work of Mohammad al-Habib al-Zanad (b. 1946) in his collection *al-Majzum bi lam* (1970; The form tense). Fadila al-Shabi (b. 1946) believes in the free expression of the poet in her work, without outside guidance. Another poet, Samira al-Kasrawi (b. 1957), is preoccupied with the political situation in the Arab world, as is obvious in her books *Balagha Shiʿriyya fi al-Rafd wa al-Huriyya wa al-Rasas* (1982; Poetic eloquence in rejection, freedom, and bullets) and *Malhamat al-Mawt wa al-Milad fi Shaʿbi* (1983; The epic of death and life for my people). Tunisian poetry maintains a constant connection with the problems of the Arab world and especially those of Palestine. Writers reacted to the Gulf War of 1991 in a spirit of Arab solidarity; one example is Aroussia Nalouti (b. 1950), who incorporates the war into her novel *Tamas* (1995; Tengance).

Some writers, poets, and novelists seek an escape from life's constraints in love, sexual adventures, and exile, but few find solace, which explains Ridha Kéfi's (b.1955) pessimism in his poetic collection *Mariya al-Mayyita* (1981; Dead Mary) and his novel *al-Qina Taht al-jild* (1990; The masque under the skin). Similar sentiments prevail in Nefla Dahab's (b. 1947) third novella, *Samt* (1993; Silence).

Though many writers have authored only a single book or are still searching for the most suitable form for their ideas, it is possible to trace a general trend in Tunisian literature: There is a growing sense of melancholy and disappointment in the most recent writings, which has led to introversion. This is manifested in a fashion for autobiographical novels, an example of which is Hassouna Misbahi's (b. 1950) *Kitab al-Tih* (1997; The book of the maze).

See also Amrouche, Fadhma At Mansour; Amrouche, Jean; Amrouche, Mary Louise (a.k.a. Marguerite Taos); Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (AUMA); Ben Badis, Abd al-Hamid; Boudjedra, Rachid; Chraibi, Driss; Dib, Mohammed; Djaout, Taher; Djebar, Assia; Farès, Nabile; Fasi, Allal al-; Feraoun, Mouloud; Laabi, Abdellatif; Lemsine, Aicha; Maghrib; Meddeb, Abdelwahhab; Memmi, Albert; Mimouni, Rachid; Rabi, Mubarak; Sebbar, Leila; Sefrioui, Ahmed; Shukri, Mohammad; Tlili, Mustafa; Wattar, al-Taher.

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AIDA A. BAMIA

LITERATURE: HEBREW

A long and varied tradition that includes innovative techniques and more conventional approaches, a focus on the individual as well as on nationalist concerns.

Modern Hebrew literature began in late eighteenth-century Prussia, surrounded by Yiddish and German. It developed and came of age in central and eastern Europe, centuries after Hebrew ceased being a spoken language. Only after World War I and the destruction of many Jewish cultural centers in Europe did Palestine and later Israel become the focus for Hebrew *belles lettres*, this time in a Hebrew-speaking milieu.

Haskalah Era

The year 1784, when *Ha-Me'asef*, the first Hebrew periodical, appeared, serves as a period marker for the beginning of modern Hebrew literature. Its founder, Moses Mendelssohn, a German Enlightenment philosopher, was the leader of the Jewish Enlightenment, or Haskalah, which advocated the modernization of Jewish religious and social life. The writers of the Haskalah chose to write in Hebrew not only because it was known to many readers, but also because Hebrew was the only remnant of Jewish independence.

For almost a century, Hebrew literature was committed to the Haskalah movement. From Germany, it spread to Polish Galicia and later to Russia. Poetry was the dominant genre until the mid-nineteenth century. While romanticism was raging in Europe, Hebrew poetry was neoclassical, universalistic, and mimetic. It didactically reinterpreted biblical stories, failing to develop a genuinely poetic idiom. Nevertheless, Haskalah literature revolutionized culture by extracting the literary creation from its religious and communal framework and revived, despite its limitations, the poetic language and universal themes of the Hebrew Bible.

This poetry's most powerful voice was Judah Leib Gordon, who retold biblical and historical stories with dramatic intensity, satirized Jewish life with wit, and empathized with the plight of Jewish women. Micah Joseph Lebensohn's highly charged romantic poems were more individualistic.

The first popular novel was *Ahabat Zion* (Love of Zion; 1853) by Abraham Mapu. Its pastoral view of nature and biblical theme and language reflect Haskalash taste. In 1865, Mapu attempted to depict contemporary life, but not until the work of Mendele Mokher Sefarim later in the century did the form mature and acquire new literary and linguistic models. Mendele stands at the crossroads between Haskalah and the period of nationalism and social realism. He manipulated postbiblical materials—Mishnah, the Talmud, and prayer—to create an innovative prose style.

Hibbat Zion Era

The year 1881, with its wave of pogroms in Russia, marks the shift from Haskalah assimilationism to the Zionist credo of auto-emancipation. The newly established school of Hibbat Zion (Love of Zion) produced national poetry, replete with sentimental and hyperbolical avowals of love for mother Zion and her miserable children, the Jewish people, as well as romantic poetry.

The philosopher of the new nationalist movement and the editor of its periodical, *Ha-Shiloach,* was Ahad Ha-Am, who saw Zion as the future spiritual and cultural center of the Jewish people. He believed that the nonspoken Hebrew of his time could articulate concepts, not emotions, and that the literature should concentrate on Jewish issues exclusively. The challenge to both Ahad Ha-Am's stifling prescription and Mendele's realism and style came from Isaac Leib Peretz, David Frischmann, and the neoromantic Micah Joseph Berdyczewski who all maintained that Hebrew literature was like all others. The individual's subterranean energies motivate Berdyczewski's works of lyrical prose and his style. He believed that national renaissance and vitality would come only with releasing the irrational creative spark and rejecting the restraint of traditional Judaism's intellectualism.

Bialik, Agnon, and the Modernist Era

Modern consciousness burst into Hebrew literature in the 1890s through Berdyczewski's fiction and Hayyim Nahman Bialik's verse. Writers began experimenting with modernist techniques. With Bia-

lik, for the first time in Hebrew literature, the "I" of the individual became the central entity, and poetry became the arena of the self. Bialik's verse, like that of the Bible, is both a powerful lyrical expression and a rich essence of the Jewish culture that produced it. From 1892 to 1917, Bialik was dedicated to the idea of national revival. He searched for a meaningful Jewish identity while anguished by a loss of faith.

Saul Tchernichovsky expanded the horizons of Hebrew poetry through his admiration of Hellenic beauty and mastery of classical form. Like Berdyczewski, he broke the constricting bounds of Hebrew literature and the Jewish framework and aspired to express the totality of existence.

Many of the writers of this period started in Europe and continued in Ottoman-ruled Eretz Yisrael, or Palestine. Works of this second Aliyah period (1904–1914) were often dominated by questions of identity and by the pendulum of despair and hope reflecting the crisis of immigration. Yosef Hayyim Brenner's seemingly fragmented, unrefined prose reflects the tortured inner worlds of his intellectual, uprooted, antiheroes and their existential struggles. In his quest for truth and realism, he improvised a semblance of spoken Hebrew and slang. Uri Nissan Gnessin's novellas of alienation and uprootedness, written in a lyrical, figurative prose, are among the first stream-of-consciousness narratives in world literature.

But the towering figure of Hebrew fiction was Shmuel Yosef Agnon, the 1966 Nobel laureate. Zionist philosophy was only one component of Agnon's complex artistic and spiritual oeuvre, which merges Jewish sources with European traditions. Agnon tells the story of the Jews in the modern age: faith and heresy, exile and redemption, Holocaust, uprootedness and belonging. But the Jewish condition is also a reflection of the human condition: tragic fate; nightmarish, at times surrealistic existence; social disintegration; and loss of identity. Like Agnon, Hayyim Hazaz, the expressionist, wrote in a style different from the spoken language about Jewish life in Europe and Eretz Yisrael.

Shlonsky Era

At the heart of Hebrew literary activity at the time of the British mandate was poetry. With Bialik's hegemony challenged in the 1920s, minor, deviant voices were heard: Rachel, whose lean, intimate diction, musical lyricism, and unfulfilled pioneer and personal dreams won her the public's unmatched love; Esther Raab, the poetically untamed individualist; David Vogel, the lyrical minimalist; and Avraham Ben Yizhak.



Famed Hebrew poet Avraham Shlonsky (1900–1973). Best known for his contributions to modern Hebrew poetry, Shlonsky is also credited with translating many classic works, including *Hamlet* and *King Lear*, into Hebrew. © PHOTOGRAPH BY ZOLTAN KLUGER. GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE (GPO) OF ISRAEL. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

The most vocal revolutionary was Avraham Shlonsky, the editor of *Ktubim* and later *Turim.* Classicist style, layered language, and nationalist preoccupations were overthrown by Russian and French symbolism and postsymbolism, futurism, and German neoromanticism and expressionism as modernism swept through Hebrew verse. Shlonsky's symbolist poetics, subconsciously motivated images and *melos* (tune) abound with intellectual insight. With linguistic virtuosity, he articulated his war-weary generation's despair, exposing urban alienation or

describing, like his fellow pioneers Isaac Lamdan, Rachel, and Uri Zvi Greenberg, the struggle and infatuation with a new landscape.

In Shlonsky's close leftist circle were Natan Alterman and Leah Goldberg. Alterman's maiden collection, *Stars Outside* (1938), nourished more than a generation of poets with its captivating rhythms, carnivalesque imagist world, and oxymoronic metaphors. He later wrote engaged poetry but strictly separated his lyrical and public verse. An unofficial national spokesman, Alterman wrote a column in the labor daily *Davar* in which he took active part in the struggle for independence and for Jewish immigration against British rule. Goldberg refused to write ideological poetry. Well versed in world literature, she often used complex traditional forms to create her own modernist verse.

In his poetics of form, Yonatan Ratosh favored Shlonsky's school, but ideologically he belonged to Vladimir Zeʾev Jabotinsky's nationalist camp. Believing in a shared cultural heritage for the entire Middle East, Ratosh founded the Canaanite movement and created idiosyncratic verse suffused with prebiblical mythology and vocabulary.

Expressionism shone through the poetry of Greenberg, the ultranationalist who prophesied the Holocaust and Jewish sovereignty. Drawing from personal and national landscapes and vocabularies, his Whitman-like verse captures raw feeling and pain, messianic and historical visions.

Dor Ba-Arez

While European Jewry was approaching its demise, the first generation of native Hebrew speakers was coming of age in Eretz Yisrael. Its writers, nicknamed Dor Ba-Arez (A Generation in the Land), made their debut in 1938 with a story by S. Yizhar. They were associated with Zionist socialism and its aspirations, and their realist-positivist works reflect the collective experiences of the new Jew: kibbutz, youth movement, Haganah, and the War of Independence in 1948. The individual character and inner turmoil and the shadow side of society are often neglected or suppressed in short stories and novels by Nathan Shaham, Aharon Meged, Moshe Shamin, and Yigal Mossinsohn. But their readers, awed with heroism and struck by the idea of national redemption, received them warmly. Yizhar's introspective, lyrical prose is distinguished in its depiction of mood and contemplation, its renditions of sensory impressions and landscape, and its narrator's wartime ethics and empathy for the Arabs.

Poets of the time, such as Haim Guri, Ayin Hillel, and Nathan Yonathan, expressed an intimate, physical attachment to their local space. They adopted Alterman's poetics, and the values landed in his poems—loyalty, friendship, and the eternal bond between the dead and the living—helped them integrate the traumas of the 1948 battles. Poems from Guri's *Flowers of Fire* became sacred texts, read alongside Alterman's in memorials for the fallen in war. Somewhat different from this generation's unified voice were Abba Kovner and Amir Gilboa who lamented their destroyed European homes.

With the establishment of the state and the waves of immigrants changing the land's character, some writers wrestled with their disillusion through historical novels with reference to present discontent. Others, like Benyamin Tammuz and David Schachar, nostalgically depicted childhood and bygone days.

Generation of the State poets of the 1950s and 1960s unbridled the nationalist agenda's long hold on Hebrew literature. Free, ironic poetics, influenced by modernist English, American, and German works usurped symbolist poetics and nationalist norms. This group believed that poetry ought to focus on the individual's experience not the collective; it rejected pathos and transcendentalism in favor of the concrete and existential and lowered the diction in favor of everyday discourse and freer form. Natan Zach, the spokesman of this school, attacked Alterman and his disciples and foregrounded previously marginalized poets like Vogel and the American Hebrew imagist Gabriel Preil. With poetic genius and originality, Zach's critically acclaimed free verse realized the new principles. Yet, his friend Yehuda Amichai's poetry was more easily accepted, due in part to Amichai's ability to merge poetic and linguistic traditions. Amichai's antiwar lines such as "I want to die in my bed" expressed this generation's yearnings, while his conceitlike metaphors and whimsical combinations of colloquial and classical Hebrew revolutionized Hebrew verse. David Avidan's linguistic inventiveness was at the forefront of this school. Dan Pagis,

who survived a concentration camp, conveyed a sense of horror in his enigmatic verse. Dahlia Ravikovitch delved into the psyche's depths. Her intense, at times desperate, verse elegantly reintroduced archaisms and myths to the poetry without surrendering spoken language and syntax.

Fiction of the 1950s and 1960s followed poetry's lead in its challenge to Zionist prescriptions. It focused on the individual's psychological world or on universal, existential themes. The confessional, erotic novel *Life as a Fable* (1958) by Pinhas Sadeh reflected the turn inward and away from realism. Early stories by Amos Oz and Avraham B. Yehoshua are metaphorical and allegorical. Amichai's surrealist novel, *Not of This Time, Not of This Place,* uncovers suppressed wishes for an alternative existence. Amalia Kahana-Carmon's works explore life's mysteries and delve into intense, personal analysis reminiscent of Virginia Woolf. Aharon Appelfeld's characters wander through inner and outer nightmares of the Holocaust.

Post–1973 Era

After the Arab–Israel War of 1973, the myth of the new Jew was shattered. Hebrew literature's role as the arena for examining the national state of affairs was partly reinstated: Collective tensions were again realized through individual destinies. Post-1973 literature depicts the Israeli condition in relation to changes in social values, the Arabs, immigration and absorption, Jewish roots, the Diaspora, and the Holocaust. Questions of Jewish and Israeli existence occupy late works of veteran 1948 authors, but also others. The Generation of the State abandoned its abstract, schematic universalism and returned to concrete Israeli life, understanding symbolic layers of its texts. Yehoshua's late family novels, for example, are rich with realistic detail and make original and unpopular political, national, and historical philosophical statements. Oz lowered his diction and substituted fantasy with realistic, semiautobiographical works. The renewed interest in the tangible brought late blooming to Yizhak Ben Ner, Yeshayahu Koren, Yehudit Hendel, Shulamit Hareven, Yaacov Shabtai, and Yehoshua Kenaz. Shabtai painstakingly forges the decline of his pioneer parents' Tel Aviv milieu. His *Past Continuous* follows the protagonist's stream of associations in a style unprecedented in Hebrew literature. Kenaz's

Natan Alterman (1910–1970), an Israeli writer known for his poetry lamenting the themes of life and independence, won the Israel Prize in 1968. Because of his Jewish nationalistic views, some of his early writings were seen as contentious and were censored by the British colonizers of Palestine. Aside from his poetry, he has also written both children's books and journalistic contributions. © Photograph by Moshe Milner. Government Press Office (GPO) of Israel. Reproduced by permission.

patient, almost painful realism depicts social and psychological states with authenticity and linguistic mastery. Longing for a declining Eretz Yisrael translates into a bittersweet return to childhood for Ben Ner, Shabtai, and Meir Shalev. Others, like Kenaz, Ruth Almog, and David Grossman, look back with anger. In many of their works, however, the pained personal story is loaded with social and national meaning.

The many writers active in the 1970s and 1980s belong, then, to a number of literary generations. But despite the supposed centrality of male-authored works wrestling with the Zionist undertaking and all its reverberations, subversive narratives crystallized. Although only a few novels and short stories by women had been published previously, in the 1980s

there was a proliferation of woman authors. Kahana-Carmon argued that mainstream Hebrew literature, an offspring of synagogue culture, indoctrinated Jewish readers to expect a male national spokesman, while intimate matters of the soul were relegated to the women's gallery of the synagogue, or rather the margins of literature. Dvora Baron was the only woman whose prose won critical acclaim before the 1950s. Hendel, Hareven, Naomi Frenkel, Rachel Eytan, Kahana-Carmon, and later Almog broke through in the interim. But the female voice, often undermining conventional conceptions of women and family institutions, conquered a well-deserved place only in the 1980s.

Prose fiction of the late 1980s and early 1990s was characterized by postmodernist pluralism. Opposing styles coexisted: conventional artistic measures; buds of religious or mystical writing; self-referential experiments with genre, language, theme, and typography. Orli Castel-Bloom's stories and novels shatter myth, reality, and text with lean language as she undermines any existence of truth. Yuval Shimoni internalized fiction and the connections between signifier and signified, while Yoel Hoffman's unpaged works in numbered paragraphs, surrounded by empty spaces or miniature pictures, are dotted with German, translated in the margins. He blends Far Eastern with Western philosophy and blurs the boundaries between languages, sexes, the self, and the universe.

Unlike prose, poetry opened itself to a wide prism of possibilities in the 1970s, but its public role was diminished. In the spirit of poststructuralism, this generation of poets had no use for common poetics. Yair Hurvitz wrote romantic symbolist verse, with high diction, and strove to unite opposites. Meir Wieseltier's modernist poetry is biting, almost vulgar, with social, political, and existential emphases. Yona Wallach smashed all borders of psyche and language, theme and form. Her poetry "unravels the unconscious like a fan" and allows words to flow without social, cultural, or literary inhibitions or taboos. Older poets who became central were Zelda and Avoth Yeshurun, whose poetry dismembers reality. Aharon Shabtai created a personal mythology drawn from Greek classics. In her "Data Processing" series, Maya Bejerano drowns chaos in a psychic, rhythmical associative stream.

The war in Lebanon and the Intifada in the late 1980s led to a reawakened interest in political and protest poems. Various contemporary issues—including erotic and homosexual themes, and imagery drawn from the modern media—came to prominence in the 1990s.

See also AGNON, SHMUEL YOSEF; AHAD HA-AM; ALTERMAN, NATAN; AMICHAI, YEHUDA; APPELFELD, AHARON; BARON, DVORA; BEJERANO, MAYA; BIALIK, HAYYIM NAHMAN; BRENNER, YOSEF HAYYIM; FRISCHMANN, DAVID; GOLDBERG, LEAH; GREENBERG, URI ZVI; GURI, CHAIM; HAREVEN, SHULAMIT; HASKALAH; HAZAZ, HAYYIM; HOFFMAN, YOEL; JABOTINSKY, VLADIMIR ZE'EV; KENAZ, YEHOSHUA; KOVNER, ABBA; MEGED, AHARON; OZ, AMOS; PAGIS, DAN; RAAB, ESTHER; RATOSH, YONATAN; SHLONSKY, AVRAHAM; TAMMUZ, BENYAMIN; TCHERNICHOVSKY, SAUL; WALLACH, YONA; YEHOSHUA, AVRAHAM B.; YIZHAR, S.; ZACH, NATAN.

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NILI GOLD

LITERATURE: PERSIAN

Since the Iranian Revolution, Persian literature has become more and more relevant to contemporary politics, society, and day-to-day living.

The first nine centuries of imaginative literature in the Persian language constituted an aesthetically rich tradition. Modern Persian literature emerged

at the beginning of the twentieth century and arguably has constituted an equally exciting chapter in the development of the Persian literary tradition. Modern imaginative literature emerged from a history of court patronage, Sufi brotherhoods, and Twelver Shiʿite environs to address a general Iranian audience. Iranian writers began to comprise a new class of intellectuals, independent of crown or turban.

Prose

Prose developed more quickly than verse during the twentieth century, starting with journalistic writing by leaders of the Constitutional Revolution, such as that by Ali Akbar Dehkhoda (1879–1956). In a preface to *Once upon a Time* (1922), the first collection of Persian short stories ever, Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh argued that literature in straightforward, living prose was a key to education and enlightenment for Iranians. His six stories in that volume introduced realism, local color, and popular language into one genre of Persian writing.

During the 1920s, Nima Yushij (1895–1960) began experimenting with traditional forms and content in Persian poetry. He experimented with individuating the lyric speaker and eschewed didactic intent; his quatrain-sequence poem "Legend" (1922) and other poems in the 1920s heralded the new sensibility.

The 1930s marked the first age of the preeminence of prose in Persian literature, a situation that held true to the end of the century. Sadegh Hedayat (1903–1951) played the chief role in this development. His four collections of short stories from 1930 to 1942 and his enigmatic, surrealistic novella, *The Blind Owl* (1937, 1941), demonstrated how a new Persian literary language could create atmosphere and voice surrealism.

The Short Story and the Novel

The Iranian short story grew to maturity in the 1940s and thereafter. During the period beginning with the 1941 Allied occupation of Iran and the abdication and exile of Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1925–1941) and ending with the American-orchestrated coup d'état that brought down the short-lived government of Mohammad Mossadegh (1882–1967) in August 1953, no government censorship interfered with or controlled literary expression. However, beginning in 1885, when Naser al-Din Shah Qajar (r. 1848–1896) established an office of censorship, and throughout most of the twentieth century, Persian literary artists labored under the constraints of censorship. There were exceptions: the first two years of the constitution (1906–1908); the so-called "Twelve Years of Freedom" (1941–1953); and the revolution years (1977–1979). This has meant that, except during the period from 1941 to 1953 period, Iranian prose fiction, lyric verse, and drama have had to resort to indirection and symbolism when dealing critically with the Iranian present.

During the 1940s, Sadeq Chubak (1916–1995), Ebrahim Golestan (1922–), Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923–1969), and others joined Hedayat and Bozorg Alavi (1904–), who had published his first collection of short stories in 1934, providing Iranian audiences with fiction written in various styles, including realist, naturalist, and social realist, paving the way for later generations of short-story writers who contributed to magazines and collections of stories to the end of the century. Chief among them was the prolific Gholamhossein Saʿedi (1935–1985).

During the 1950s the Iranian novel likewise gained a foothold and led to mature works in the 1960s and after. Alavi's *Her Eyes* (1952), Beh'azin's *The Serf's Daughter* (1952), and Al-e Ahmad's *The School Principal* (1958) dealt critically with the Reza Shah Pahlavi and early Mohammad Reza Pahlavi eras.

From the 1960s on, Iranian novels became central to Iranian literary life. Chubak published *Tangsir* (1963) and *The Patient Stone* (1966). Houshang Golshiri (1937–2000) published *Prince Ehtejab* (1969), with a stream-of-consciousness narration and a condemnation of monarchy and aristocracy, which some critics think is Iran's best novel. In 1969, Simin Daneshvar (1921–), who in 1948 became the first Iranian woman to publish a collection of short stories with the *The Extinguished Fire,* published *Savushun* (The mourners of Siyavosh), which became Iran's best-selling novel of all time, reportedly selling more than 150,000 copies by the 1990s.

Poetry

The 1940s and 1950s also witnessed the blossoming of new or modernist Persian verse. Nima began

publishing verse again in 1938, and his experiments and achievements with untraditional verse forms attracted the attention of Ahmad Shamlu (1925–), Mehdi Akhavan-Saless (1928–1990), and other major figures in the next generation of modernist poets. In response, traditionalists maintained their devotion to classical forms, diction, and didacticism, but used them to write about contemporary issues. Conservative readers still outnumbered those receptive to modernist verse; they pointed to the achievements of traditional poets Mohammad Taqi Bahar (1886–1955) and Parvin E'tesami (1907–1941), or accepted the moderate modernism of Faridun Tavallali (1919–1985) and others who maintained quatrain sequence forms and traditional imagery and figures of speech while hinting at modern issues. By the 1970s, however, the traditionalists were in retreat or in the minority, although the debate over traditionalism and change in Persian poetry remains alive in Iranian literary circles.

In the 1950s and 1960s, modernist Persian poetry achieved great things. Shamlu approached free verse in forceful works supporting his causes. Akhavan-Saless breathed fresh air into traditional meters, using Iranian myths and history as texture for his poetry. From the mid-1950s to the end of 1966, Forugh Farrokhzad (c. 1934–1967) added a dimension and voice to modern Persian poetry that Persian literature previously had lacked: a female speaker and female concerns. Her verse, dealing with a lyric speaker's growth and concerns as an individual, as a poet, and as a woman, represents a culmination of Nima's modernism. Another trend appears in the poetry of Sohrab Sepehri (1928–1980), that of the nature poet with, in his case, neo-Sufic or pantheistic implications.

By the mid-1970s, modernist Persian poetry had come to a standstill. Although a new generation of poets had begun to publish and modernist poetry was produced in abundance into the 2000s, no new poets joined the highest ranks or fully replaced the earlier poets. Nader Naderpur (1929–), a popular poet from the mid-1950s and the most prominent moderate modernist, crossed the moderate line in the 1980s after opting for self-exile in Paris and then Los Angeles. Voicing the alienation and anger of Iranians abroad who opposed the Islamic Republic, Naderpur's characterizations of life in Iran of the 1980s and 1990s, and of the Iranian exile's lack of integration in the life of the West, strike familiar chords for many Iranians. Another poet in exile, Esmaʿil Khoʾi (1938–), who had been an almost first-rank modernist before the revolution, seemed to gain poetic timbre through his suffering in exile in London.

Censorship and Writers Abroad

Circumstances and censorship during the Pahlavi era muted or silenced literary voices. During the first two decades of the Islamic Republic, establishment pressure and censorship seemed designed merely to coerce writers to avoid sexual imagery and direct questioning of Islam but not to silence them. In consequence, and also because of a decrease in other entertainment after the revolution and an increase in the reading public due to a mass literacy campaign in the early 1980s, Persian literary activity, especially in prose fiction, became a profession for self-employed writers for the first time in Iranian history. Novelists, short-story writers, and some essayists became able to support themselves through writing as of the 1980s. Moreover, Iranian novels began to compete for readership for the first time with Western novels in translation.

Among landmark works in Iranian prose fiction after the revolution are: Esmaʿil Fasih's *Sorayya in a Coma* (1984), Shahnush Parsipur's *Tuba and the Meaning of Night* (1989) and *Women without Men* (1990), and Reza Baraheni's *Song of the Slain* (1983) and *Secrets of My Land* (1987). With their negative depictions of Iranian SAVAK (secret police) and American intelligence and military figures, Baraheni's fictions signal a post-Pahlavi literary trend denouncing life under the U.S.-supported Pahlavi regime. Fiction that presented similarly negative depictions of life under the Islamic Republic, such as Golshiri's *King of the Benighted* (1990), were banned in Iran, although in the case of Golshiri, manuscripts of his explicitly critical novels and short stories were smuggled out of the country and published in Europe and the United States.

One novel stands by itself: Mahmoud Dowlatabadi's *Klidar* (1983), a tragic saga of mid-twentieth century tribal and village life in 3,700 pages, which brought its author recognition as the leading writer of fiction in the Islamic Republic period. Just as Ali Mohammad Afghani's *Ahu Khanom's Husband* (1961)

earlier had encouraged Iranians to think that the Persian language had the resources to serve as the vehicle for any sort or length of prose fiction, Dowlatabadi's *Klidar*—the title refers to a Kurdish village area in Khorasan—convinced readers of the richness of the everyday rural Iranian experience and of descriptive Persian prose, even though Dowlatabadi attempts nothing experimental in his story.

Of all pre-revolution genres, Iranian drama suffered most in the 1980s. Although it was still a new medium in the late Pahlavi period, or a medium to which few Iranians had direct exposure, it had grown by leaps and bounds, with the prolific Saʿedi the best-known playwright. Stage dramas been had turned into television dramas and became screen-plays for the New Wave cinema of the 1970s, as had several important short stories and novels. By the mid-1980s Iranian cinema was thriving again, but without the plots, themes, and texture that romantic love stories and women in anything other than traditional Islamic garb would provide. Iranian stage drama began to regain status in the 1990s, with the government supporting theaters in provincial cities. Persian drama also flourished in the West, where local Iranian communities in major cities enthusiastically supported touring companies. Prominent among them was that of Parviz Sayyad in Los Angeles. Through the 1980s, Sayyad staged plays featuring his earlier folk character Samad, who first went to the Iran–Iraq war and then came back from the front. Another play presented an imaginary trial stemming from the 1978 torching of Abadan's Rex Cinema, which killed hundreds of patrons who were locked inside. Sayyad's one-man show in the early 1990s, presenting himself and Samad in witty conversation, one on video and the other live, provided sophisticated, culture-specific entertainment and introspection into the nature of modern Iranian artistic expression.

The Persian literary essay survived the revolution, both at home and abroad. Originally Western in inspiration, it is socially and politically involved. It came of age in the first four decades of the twentieth century. Writers exhibited signature styles and concerns that were a far cry from those at the beginning of the century, when a florid, Arabic-laden style and a rhetorical eye to the past prevailed. Shahrokh Meskoob's conversational style in *Iranian Nationality and the Persian Language* (1981) and Al-e Ahmad's brusque and sometimes angry voice in *Weststruckness* (1962, 1964), *Lost in the Crowd* (1966), and *A Stone on a Grave* (1964, not published until 1981) are more recent examples.

See also Akhavan-Saless, Mehdi; Alavi, Bozorg; Bahar, Mohammad Taqi; Baraheni, Reza; Chubak, Sadeq; Constitutional Revolution; Daneshvar, Simin; Dehkhoda, Ali Akbar; Dowlatabadi, Mahmoud; Farrokhzad, Forugh; Golestan, Ebrahim; Golshiri, Houshang; Hedayat, Sadegh; Jamalzadeh, Mohammad Ali; Mossadegh, Mohammad; Naser al-Din Shah; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Pahlavi, Reza; Parsipur, Shahrnush; Sepehri, Sohrab; Shamlu, Ahmad.

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Michael C. Hillmann
Updated by Eric Hooglund

Literature: Turkish

National literature that began during the Tanzimat period of the Ottoman Empire.

Halide Edip Adivar, Nazim Hikmet, Sait Faik Abasiyanik, Fazil Hüsnü Dağlarca, Nüsret Aziz Nesin, Yaşar Kemal, and, more recently, Orhan Pamuk are writers whose works are known outside of Turkey.



Orhan Pamuk, one of Turkey's most famous novelists, at his home in Istanbul, December 1998. This photograph was taken just days before Pamuk rejected the title of "State Artist," one of Turkey's most coveted prizes, in protest against the country's restrictive policies on freedom of the press. © AFP/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

As more translations appear—the latest is a postmodernist novel titled *Gece* (Night), by Bilge Karasu—an increasing number of works are being recognized as having universal appeal. The literature represented evolved in the second half of the nineteenth century with a group of writers who were members of the bureaucratic intelligentsia. Committed to the Tanzimat reforms, they sought to bring change to literature as well, making it a vehicle for influencing sociopolitical thinking and culture in general. At its inception, therefore, modern Turkish literature has set both didactic and aesthetic goals: to be an art form and source of enjoyment, but also to be engaged.

The pioneers of modernism—İbrahim Şinasi (1826–1871), Namik Kemal (1840–1888), and Ziya Paşa (1825–1880)—were familiar with European literatures and had lived in Europe. They witnessed the central role literature played there, a role lacking in Turkey, where two distinct literary traditions (elitist and popular) split society. The first, following Arab-Persian classical Islamic tradition and seeking artistic perfection rather than social reality, gave priority to poetry *(divan şiiri);* was rigid in verse form, meter, and rhyme patterns, highly sophisticated in rhetoric and imagery; and employed language saturated with Arabic and Persian loanwords largely unintelligible to the masses. The second was based on Turkish folk traditions of form, content, and style in both poetry and prose, and linked the Turks to their Central Asian heritage. In general it was denigrated by the small, educated class. Religiously inspired works, many of them mystic, were important in both traditions.

In the 1860s the Şinasi-Namik Kemal-Ziya Paşa school took the first steps toward modernity. Through translation and adaptation (primarily from French), then original composition, they introduced Western-style poetry and fiction, and wrote the first Turkish plays designed for the modern stage. They also turned to journalism—the *Tasvir-i Efkar* (Description of ideas) was the principal forum for introducing their works—and accustomed readers to editorials, essays, and literary criticism propagating such concepts as fatherland, patriotism, nation, justice, freedom, and constitutional government. They did not completely reject the past, but gave old poetic forms new elements of content and style, using language more comprehensible to the expanding, middle-class reading public. This movement surged again under the republic, resulting in the romanization of the alphabet and measures to produce an *öz türkçe* (pure Turkish), both of which had a great effect on literature.

These writers lauded proreform statesmen and satirized traditionalists. They targeted social customs like arranged marriages and moralized against the harem system, marital infidelity, prostitution, and inhuman treatment of slaves. Namik Kemal's play *Vatan yahut Silistre* (Fatherland or Silistria, 1873) caused antiregime demonstrations, and he spent many years in exile as a result. He and his colleagues put reform before creative art, and in articles and prefaces to their works stressed the didactic and social role of literature. Abdülhak Hamit Tarhan (1852–1939) and Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem (1847–1914), in contrast, showed increasing concern with aesthetics. Ekrem, a teacher, published his lectures,

which displayed his knowledge of Western literature and concern for liberating Ottoman poetic style, and was led into a literary battle with Muallim Naci, represented (somewhat unjustly) as the prime defender of the old style. Ekrem also influenced the literary school that flourished in the 1890s, the Edebiyat-i Cedide (New Literature) or Servet-i Fünun (Wealth of Sciences), the latter the title of the journal serving as its main platform. Its leading poets, Tevfik Fikret (1867–1916) and Cenap Sehabettin (1870–1934), spoke lyrically of love and nature in a Turkish inspired by the language of the *divan* poets. Fikret also wrote very provocative antiregime poems.

In fiction, building on the pioneer efforts of Ahmet (1844–1912), the leading prose writer, Halit Ziya Uşhakliğil (1866–1945), brought to his novels a more developed literary realism and psychological analysis. His two collections of prose poems show an inclination for artistry that set a trend followed by his contemporary Mehmet Rauf (1875–1931), and still finds the occasional follower today.

Although the 1908 constitutional period brought hope to writers after the repressive control of Abdülhamit II, further Ottoman decline and Europe's antagonism engendered permission and anti-Western outbursts among writers of the Fecr-i Ati (Dawn of the Future) group that formed in 1909. Meanwhile, a current of Nationalism gained strength, poets such as Mehmet Emin Yurdakul (1869–1944) proclaiming pride in being a Turk and turning to the folk tradition for verse form, meter, and language. The presence in the empire of émigré Turks from Russia fanned consciousness of belonging to a wider "Turanian" nation, and groups of scholars and writers, including Yusuf Akçuroğlu (1876–1935), Mehmet Fuat Köprülü (1890–1966), and Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), promoted study of the early history and culture of the Turks. The most important group was Genç Kalemler (Young Pens), formed in 1910, which stressed language reform. Despite strong romanticism, the short stories of its leader, Ömer Seyfettin, represent a breakthrough in the strongest in modern Turkish literature.

World War I and the War of Independence, culminating in the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the founding of the Turkish Republic, presented writers with a fresh panorama of people, places, and events to observe and depict, even greater possibilities for artistic choice through emphasis on Westernization, and an ever-increasing array of readers. Novelists of the older generation, such as Halide Edip Adivar (1884–1964), the first important activist woman writer; Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu (1889–1974) and Reşat Nuri Güntekin (1889–1956), represent an important advance in both narrative and character analysis, their works depicting the weaknesses of late Ottoman society, the inner conflicts of its people, the surge of patriotism during the War of Independence, and the new roles of women.

In poetry, three prominent poets adhered to the classical meter and verse form: Yahya Kemal Beyath (1884–1958), a neoclassicist who expressed his nationalism by nostalgically recalling Ottoman splendors; Ahmet Haşim (1885–1933), a symbolist steadfast in an art for art's sake approach, painting dreamlike vignettes of nature in its most tranquil moments; and Mehmet Akif Ersoy (1873–1936), who, although also choosing the classical traditions, wrote in a language very close to prose and spoken Turkish.

Of the many ideologies to which the Turks were exposed from the early days of the Republic, communism captivated Nazim Hikmet (1902–1963), the major poet of the century. Having been imprisoned for many years, he fled Turkey in 1951 and spent his remaining years behind the Iron Curtain. He fashioned Turkish free verse, and his works (prison poetry, love lyrics, social or political declamation, long narrative verse) display a striking fluidity of language and a new depth of human understanding. Only Fazil Hüsnü Dağlarca (b. 1914), with the breadth of his aesthetic view and intellectual delving into the metaphysical, approaches his stature.

Of prime importance has been the development of realist village literature. Urban-born nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century writers seldom focused on Anatolia and its rural population. With the center of government moved to Anatolia, and especially after the introduction of a two-party system, the villager became a focus of attention for fiction writers, who now included those born in villages or closely familar with village life. Yaşar Kemal writes of the plight of the peasants in the Taurus Mountains and Çukurova Plain. Other writers have

followed the villagers in their migration to country towns or big cities. In recent years an increasing number of works have drawn attention to the problems facing Turks who have migrated to Germany and other European countries since the late 1960s. Among other writers who depict the "little man" with deep understanding are Nüsret Aziz Nesin (b. 1915) and Sait Faik Abasiyanik, who has over 100 short stories set in Istanbul, nearly half of them on the island of Burgaz, revealing the life of the fisherfolk on the Sea of Marmara.

Poets also turned to the "common man." In 1941, Ornan Veli (1914–1950), Oktay Rifat (1914–1988), and Melih Cevdet Anday (b. 1915) published a collection of poems, *Garip* (Strange), calling for poetic realism untrammeled by rules and dictates, unadorned and in colloquial speech, concerned with and attempting to communicate with the man in the street. In the mid-1950s Anday joined the Second New Movement, a group including Ilhan Berk (b. 1916), Cemal Süreya (1931–1990), and Edip Cansever (1928–1986), who turned to obscurantism, writing poetry that was abstract and abtruse, in some cases almost totally incomprehensible.

Women were rarely mentioned among the writers of the Ottoman Empire before the nineteenth century. Their number increased after the Tanzimat, when a new generation of well-educated women emerged who understood French and were familiar with the works of both the French Romantics and the new Ottoman writers. Best known is Fatma Aliye Hanim (1862–1936), elder daughter of Ahmed Cevdet Paşa. The first Turkish woman novelist, her publications also included translations of French, articles, works on history, and a newspaper for women. Halide Edip Adivar served as a model for women from the early days of the Republic, both as a writer and as an activist. Women have turned to fiction rather than poetry. Güiten Akin (b. 1933), for example, a poet who has won many awards, is the only women represented in *The Penguin Book of Turkish Verse.* In contrast, the surge of enthusiasm for the short story in the 1970s, the Füruzan phenomenon, is credited to the stories published by Füruzan (Selçuk; b. 1935), a young writer of village background who deals especially with the exploitation of villagers in the cities.

In the 1990s women continue to participate fully on the Turkish literary scene. Both male and female writers continue to explore the wealth of their heritage and new avenues of expression.

See also Abasiyanik, Sait Saik; Adivar, Halide Edip; Dağlarca, Fazil Hüsnü; Ersoy, Mehmet Akif; Gökalp, Ziya; Koprülü, Mehmet Fuat; Namik Kemal; Nesin, Nüsret Aziz; Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem; Şinasi, İbrahim; Tevfik Fikret; Uşakliğil, Halit Ziya; Yurdakul, Mehmet Emin.

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Kathleen R. F. Burrill

LIVNAT, LIMOR

[1950–]

Israeli politician and government minister.

Born in Haifa, and after graduating from high school, Limor Livnat served in the Israeli army's 7th Armoured Brigade as an education and welfare sergeant. Later she studied Hebrew literature at Tel Aviv University. During her student days she became active in Likud student politics and was also involved in women's rights as a member of the Women's Lobby. Her views accorded with the hawkish side of Likud. Livnat vehemently opposed the Oslo Peace Process and campaigned for the rights of Jews to live anywhere in the State of Israel. She also consistently opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state and later the Road Map, a three-part phased peace plan

presented to Israel and the Palestinian Authority in March 2003 by the Quartet (United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russia) that calls for a two-state solution, or a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

First elected to the Knesset in 1992, she attracted attention by diligence, quick grasp of issues, and close attention to detail. In the 1996 elections she headed the Likud's Information Office and actively supported the candidacy of Benjamin Netanyahu. He rewarded her with the post of communications minister in his cabinet (1996–1999). Livnat was responsible for the growing communications market in Israel, supervising the licensing of cable television channels, and administering the Broadcasting Law. Between 1999 and 2001 she served on the Knesset's Education and Culture Committee and the Committee for the Advancement of Women. In 2001 Prime Minister Ariel Sharon appointed her as minister of education, and reappointed her two years later. In this post she paid special attention to educational programs instilling nationalist values and Jewish themes, arguing that Israeli school children were not sufficiently exposed to Jewish history and heritage.

See also Israel: Political Parties in; Knesset.

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Meron Medzini

LIWA

See Glossary

LIWA, AL-

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

LLOYD GEORGE, DAVID

[1863–1945]

British statesman; prime minister of Great Britain during World War I.

Of Welsh ancestry, David Lloyd George, first earl of Dwyfor, was born in Manchester, England, and became a solicitor. He was a Liberal member of parliament from 1890, and during World War I served as minister of munitions (1915–1916) and secretary of state for war (1916). In December 1916 he replaced H. H. Asquith as prime minister. As head of a coalition government from 1916 to 1922, he directed Britain's war policies to victory in 1918 and played a leading role in the peace settlements.

Lloyd George's governments made a number of fateful decisions regarding the Middle East. The most momentous was the Balfour Declaration (November 1917), which promised British support for a Jewish national home in Palestine. Lloyd George strongly supported Zionism; he later said that his intention had been to lay the foundation for a future Jewish state. In December 1917 British troops entered Jerusalem—this was Lloyd George's "Christmas present to the British nation." His government issued a number of statements designed to reassure Arab nationalists, France, and others apprehensive about British intentions in Palestine. But as he put it: "We shall be there by conquest and shall remain, we being of no particular faith and the only Power fit to rule Mohammedans, Jews, Roman Catholics, and all religions."

At the 1919 Paris peace conference he secured agreement on a partition of the former Ottoman territories of the central Middle East between Britain and France. France was to be granted mandates over Syria and Lebanon, Britain over Mesopotamia (henceforth known as Iraq) and Palestine (subsequently expanded to include Transjordan). In Palestine Lloyd George appointed Sir Herbert Samuel as the first high commissioner, charged with implementing the Balfour Declaration. He also approved the decision by Samuel, supported by the colonial secretary, Winston Churchill, to annex Transjordan to Palestine—without, however, extending the Jewish national home east of the Jordan. Following the French ouster in July 1920 of the amir Faisal from Damascus, where his supporters had declared him king of Syria, the British arranged for Faisal's accession to the throne of Iraq.

Lloyd George's downfall came as a result of his ill-judged support for Greece in its attempt to conquer western Anatolia. The military defeat of the Greeks by Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) doomed this effort. The Chanak crisis of October 1922,

when British occupation forces in Constantinople were threatened by advancing Turkish troops, led the Conservative Party, on whom Lloyd George depended for his majority in the House of Commons, to withdraw their support. In the ensuing general election, he suffered a humiliating defeat. Lloyd George never held office again.

See also ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917); CHURCHILL, WINSTON S.; PALESTINE; PARIS PEACE SETTLEMENTS (1918–1923); SAMUEL, HERBERT LOUIS; VERSAILLES, TREATY OF (1920).

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BERNARD WASSERSTEIN

LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL

Zionist underground militia whose name translates as "fighters for the freedom of Israel," abbreviated as LEHI.

Lohamei Herut Yisrael, or LEHI, also known as the Stern Gang, was founded on 26 June 1940 by Abraham (Yaʿir) Stern in a split with the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi (IZL) over ideology and tactics. It would always remain small, ranging from 200 to 800 members. Stern and his followers viewed Britain as the foremost enemy of the Jewish people and of Zionism and rejected the Irgun's declared truce with Britain for the duration of the Second World War. LEHI's ideology was an evolving blend of fascist, Bolshevik, and messianic nationalist elements, which led the organization in its early years to see Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, and later the Soviet Union, as potential allies in the "anti-imperialist" armed struggle against Britain.

In 1941 the group tried to reach an agreement with Nazi Germany in the hope of ousting Britain from Palestine. From 1940 to 1944, while the other Zionist underground groups, including the Irgun, were cooperating with Britain in the war effort, LEHI carried out an anti-British campaign of propaganda and terror attacks, setting off bombs, killing soldiers and police officers, and robbing banks to fund their activities. On 9 January 1942, LEHI members accidentally killed two Jewish bystanders in an attempted robbery of a Histadrut bank in Tel Aviv. The Zionist leadership and the majority in the Yishuv opposed LEHI's methods; LEHI was widely regarded by both Jews and the British as a terrorist underground and was often ostracized and persecuted as such. In the early months of 1942, members of Haganah intelligence and the Palmah began kidnapping LEHI fighters, a policy that would continue on and off until the group's final demise in 1948.



Abraham Stern (1907–1942), a native of Poland, emigrated to Palestine in 1925, where he later joined the militant organization Irgun to fight for Jewish independence. He saw the British presence in Palestine to be more of a threat to Jewish nationalism than the Arabs. COURTESY OF THE JABOSTINSKY INSTITUTE IN ISRAEL.

LEHI entered a crisis period when Stern was killed by members of the British Criminal Investigation Division (CID) on 12 February 1942. By 1943 the organization had been reconstructed under the leadership of Natan Yellin-Mor, Israel Eldad, and Yitzhak Shamir. Ideologically, LEHI moved to the left after Stern's death, openly embracing the Soviet Union and class struggle in addition to anti-imperialism. It would always remain marginal ideologically but at various times would cooperate organizationally with the other underground groups. When the Irgun began its armed revolt against Britain in February 1944, LEHI joined in. In coordination with the Irgun, LEHI attacked or bombed British military and administrative sites in Palestine, including police and radio stations and CID headquarters.

On 6 November 1944, LEHI members assassinated Walter Edward Guinness, Lord Moyne, the senior British minister in Cairo. The assassination led the Yishuv leadership to initiate operations known as "the Saison" to liquidate the dissident underground organizations. In 1945 and 1946, LEHI was an active member of the Hebrew Resistance Movement, an ad hoc framework that coordinated anti-British operations among all the Jewish undergrounds. In April 1948 LEHI participated with the Irgun in the attack on the Arab village Dayr Yasin. On 17 September 1948 LEHI members assassinated the United Nations mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, in Jerusalem. Following this incident David Ben-Gurion declared the organization illegal and it was forcibly dismantled. Its members established a political party, the Fighters Party, which won only one seat (and 1.22 percent of the vote) in the elections for the first Knesset in 1949.

LEHI members became divided along ideological lines, with Yellin-Mor taking a strong leftist position advocating class struggle, a pro-Soviet foreign policy, and support for proletarian movements in Arab countries. Eldad led the right-wing faction that embraced positions in line with Revisionist maximalism, while Shamir took a less ideological and more pragmatic stance. The split ultimately proved irreconcilable, and the Fighters Party did not survive to the second Knesset elections in 1951. Some members drifted to MAPAM or the Israeli Communist Party, while others joined Menachem Begin's Herut.

See also Bernadotte, Folke; Dayr Yasin; Guinness, Walter Edward; Irgun Zva'i Le'umi (IZL); Shamir, Yitzhak; Stern, Abraham; Yellin-Mor, Natan.

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Pierre M. Atlas

LOI CADRE

French legislative initiative (1957–1958) during Algerian war of independence (1954–1962).

Premier Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury staked his government's political life on the Loi Cadre, which attempted to resolve the contradiction of acknowledging Algeria's "personality" while keeping it integral to France. The French government charged Resident Minister Robert Lacoste with the task of drafting the document for administrative reform. Its provisions divided Algeria into eight to ten autonomous territories linked by a federal organ. The single electoral college increased Muslim political participation but also recognized ethnic interests (e.g., the Kabylia). The Loi Cadre aimed to sap the strength of Algerian nationalism. The *pieds-noirs* (European settlers in Algeria) viewed it suspiciously. The National Assembly repudiated the reform and Bourgès-Maunoury's ministry. Though a redrafted Loi Cadre eventually passed during Félix Gaillard's ministry, the extension of *pied-noir* power in the planned territorial assemblies impaired its reforming intent. When Charles de Gaulle came to power, his government discarded this initiative, though it supported the concept of a single electoral college before eventually pursuing an agonizing decolonization.

See also De Gaulle, Charles; Kabylia; Lacoste, Robert.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

LONDON CONFERENCE (1956)

Two conferences convened in August and September 1956 in London to handle the crisis triggered by President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.

In response to Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in late July 1956, the United States, Britain, and France convened two conferences to which certain maritime states were invited to consider the proper reaction to the crisis. The first London Conference met from 18 to 23 August 1956. The invitation was sent to all states signatory to the 1888 Constantinople Convention, which regulated the administration and supervision of the Suez Canal, plus states that shipped considerable cargo through the Canal. Egypt declined to attend but the Soviet Union and the representative of India tried to represent the views and the rights of Egypt. During the conference Selwyn Lloyd, Britain's minister of foreign affairs, managed to induce eighteen states, including the United States, to sign a formal declaration demanding the establishment of a new international agency, representing the interests of the Canal users, to take over the administration of the Canal affairs.

The expected failure of a delegation, headed by Australian prime minister Robert Menzies, to convince Nasser to accept the London Conference decisions and the growing signs of an imminent Franco-British military operation moved John Foster Dulles, the U.S. secretary of state, to call for a second conference, which convened in London on 19 September. The eighteen states that had signed the first declaration adopted Dulles's proposal to establish a Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA), which was mandated to deal with matters of finance and administration of the Canal on a practical level and thus enforce the users' rights. But, as Anthony Eden later said, the new association was "stillborn." The new Egyptian management continued to operate the Canal successfully, leaving the SCUA unable to enforce its own agenda.

There was nothing illegal in Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal, but the British and French governments considered it a severe blow to their standing in the Middle East and North Africa. The London conferences were part of a larger campaign to mobilize international pressure to make Nasser revoke his action. As it later became clear, these two Western powers were less interested in annulment of the nationalization as in a clear rebuff to the Egyptian president and perhaps his ouster as leader of both Egypt and the Arab world. Indeed, even while they were drumming up international diplomatic support, their chiefs of staff were busy planning and preparing a military attack on Egypt, code-named "Musketeer." To a large degree the London conferences were little more than an attempt to go through the motions in order to prove that only a military response could solve the problem. Following a last-minute failed attempt by UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld to mediate a compromise, the British and French, in collusion with Israel, decided to opt for a military solution, leading to the Suez war (Israel's "Sinai Campaign") in late October 1956.

See also SUEZ CANAL; SUEZ CRISIS (1956–1957).

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MORDECHAI BAR-ON

LONDON CONVENTION

International agreement to keep warships out of the Bosporus.

On 15 July 1840, British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston obtained the adherence of the Ottoman Empire, Prussia, Russia, and Austria to a treaty redefining the international status of the Straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Under its terms, no foreign warships, except small vessels on diplomatic missions, were to pass the straits while the Ottoman Empire was at peace.

In a separate protocol, a graduated series of penalties was laid out if Muhammad Ali, viceroy of Egypt, and his son, Ibrahim Pasha, refused to retreat from Syria. Consequently, Britain's navy bombarded Beirut and Acre, landing troops. This threat to cut off Egyptian supply lines forced the Egyptians to retreat south of the Sinai. On 13 July 1841, the 1840 London Convention was reaffirmed, this time with French adherence. As France had been Muhammad Ali's patron, this second London Convention was a clear defeat for France. Muhammad Ali lost everything for which he had gambled, retaining only the hereditary viceroyship of Egypt, south of the Sinai desert.

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ARNOLD BLUMBERG

LONDON (ROUNDTABLE) CONFERENCE (1939)

Conference convened at St. James's Palace (London) to consider the future of Palestine.

In late 1938, as fears of a European war loomed, Britain sought ways of pacifying growing Arab displeasure over her pro-Zionist policy in Palestine. On 7 November 1938 the British Cabinet proposed convening a conference that would bring together Jews and Arabs in "separate parallel discussions between His Majesty's Government and the Arabs, and His Majesty's Government and the Jews."

The Palestinian position heading into the conference called for the establishment of an Arab national government in Palestine; the cessation of all Jewish immigration; the prohibition of further land sales to Jews; and the granting of minority rights to Jews. Representatives of several Arab states met in Cairo in January 1939 and agreed on a joint position. During the days leading up to the opening session, Jewish Agency Chairman David Ben-Gurion advocated the following four guidelines for the Zionist negotiation strategy: no concessions on immigration; no Arab state, but a regime based on parity in Palestine; cantonization might be acceptable if the Jewish area was not less than that recommended by the Peel Report and if control over immigration were in Jewish hands; and a Jewish state would be willing to belong to a future Middle Eastern confederation.

The conference opened at St. James's Palace on 7 February 1939. Representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Yemen, and the Palestinians (led by Jamal al-Husayni, George Antonius, and Musa al-Alami) met with British officials, who held parallel discussions with members of the Jewish delegation. Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald served as host and go-between. Because of the Arab refusal to meet directly with the Jewish delegation, the British managed to convene only two informal meetings between several representatives from the Arab states and Jewish delegates.

During the lengthy discussions, the Arabs presented their position as formulated in Cairo, demanding an end to the Mandate and insisting on the creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine. They also argued that the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence (1915–1916), which they interpreted as including Palestine within the areas of promised Arab independence, took precedence over the 1917 Balfour Declaration, which committed Britain to promote a Jewish national home in Palestine. The Jews, for their part, would not budge from their insistence on large-scale immigration into Palestine, becoming even more adamant in light of Adolf Hitler's escalating anti-Jewish policies and the recent annexation of Austria.

Faced with no prospect of mutual agreement after some three dozen sessions with the parties, on 15 March 1939 Malcolm MacDonald outlined Britain's proposals: After ten years, a Palestinian state would be created, possibly a federation with Arab and Jewish cantons. Since the Arabs would have a majority in the assembly, legal guarantees would be included for the Jewish minority and its national home. During the coming five years, 75,000 Jewish immigrants (of whom 25,000 would be refugees) would be admitted into Palestine. Subsequent immigration would depend on Arab consent.

The conference officially ended on 17 March. Chaim Weizmann informed MacDonald that the Zionists were unable to accept Britain's terms. British

officials in Cairo resumed contact with representatives of the Arab states, leading to some modifications of MacDonald's provisions in an effort to gain fuller Arab acceptance of the proposed new British policy. Finally, on 17 May 1939, Britain published the MacDonald White Paper, the end result of the London conference's failure to reach an Arab-Zionist agreement. Its terms—admittedly "disappointing to both Jews and Arabs"—would govern Britain's official Palestine policy for the coming war years, although little was implemented on the ground, with both Arab and Zionist leaders continuing their efforts to obtain changes favorable to their respective causes.

See also Balfour Declaration (1917); Husayn–McMahon Correspondence (1915–1916); MacDonald, Malcolm; White Papers on Palestine.

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Neil Caplan

LONDON, TREATY OF (1871)

Pact restoring Russian access to the Black Sea.

Articles XI–XIII of the 1856 Peace of Paris restricted Russian access to the Turkish Straits and forced a demilitarization of the Black Sea. Czar Alexander II (1855–1881) never accepted this defeat of Russian interests, and in 1870, he finally found an opportunity to amend the galling Black Sea clauses. With the French faring badly in the Franco-Prussian War, in October 1870 Alexander instructed his foreign minister, Prince Aleksandr Gorchakov, to announce that Russia no longer wished to abide by Articles XI–XIII. The French agreed to an international conference to discuss the proposed Russian revision. The conference opened in London in January 1871, and an agreement was reached by March. The Treaty of London annulled the Black Sea naval rearmament. However, in compensation, the sultan of the Ottoman Empire was given greater latitude to close the straits in times of war.

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Zachary Karabell

LONDON, TREATY OF (1913)

Pact securing Italian claims in the Middle East.

Signed on 26 April, this treaty paved the way for Italy's entry into World War I on the side of the Entente (France and Britain). In return for its support, Italy was promised territory in the Balkans and Anatolia as well as the right to annex Libya, which it had occupied in 1914, and the Dodecanese Islands, part of Greece and formerly, when taken by Italy in 1912, part of the Ottoman Empire.

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Zachary Karabell

L'ORIENT

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

LOTZ, WOLFGANG

[1921–1993]

Israeli espionage agent in Egypt, 1960–1965; dubbed "the champagne spy" for his extravagance.

Born in Mannheim, Germany, Wolfgang Lotz moved with his mother to Palestine after Hitler's

rise to power, changed his name to Ze'ev Gur-Aryeh, and fought in the Haganah and Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Sent to infiltrate Egypt's military and political circles posing as an ex-Nazi and race-horse breeder, Lotz befriended high-echelon officers and transmitted invaluable information, until caught in 1965 and sentenced to life in prison. Freed in a POW exchange after the Arab–Israel War (1967), Lotz eventually tired of civilian life in Israel and moved to West Germany, then to California.

ZEV MAGHEN

LUKE, HARRY

[1884–1969]

British civil servant in the Middle East.

Harry Luke was British chief commissioner in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, then assistant governor of Jerusalem (1920–1924). He served on the commission investigating the Jaffa Riots in 1921 and was chief secretary in Palestine (1928–1930). In August 1929, as acting high commissioner, Luke permitted activist Jewish youth to march to the Western Wall. Jews were attacked, and riots broke out a few days later. Unable to restore order, Luke asked for reinforcements from Jordan and Egypt and turned public security over to the Royal Air Force. He served as lieutenant governor of Malta (1930–1938), then as governor of Fiji and high commissioner of the western Pacific (1938–1942). Among his published books are *A Handbook of Palestine* (1922) and *The Handbook of Palestine and Trans-Jordan* (1934).

JENAB TUTUNJI

LURS

Luri-speaking people of western Iran.

Lurs are found primarily in three provinces in and adjoining the Zagros Mountains of western Iran: Luristan in the west, Chahar Mahall Bakhtiari in the center, and Boir Ahmad/Kuhgiluyeh in the south. Lurs also comprise a majority of the population of Ilam, to the west of Luristan, and many Lurs live in northern Khuzistan province. Lurs speak Luri, a nonwritten language closely related to Persian. During the nineteenth century, most Lurs were organized as tribal groups and practiced pastoral nomadism, although there were some Luri agricultural villages in the fertile plains of Luristan. The largest Luri tribe was the Bakhtiari. Other important tribes included the Boir Ahmadi, the Kuhgiluyeh, and the Mamasani. During the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Luri tribes, as well as others, were forcibly disarmed and settled. Although many tribal groups returned to pastoral nomadism after 1941, the economic changes in Iran before and since that date have made this way of life less and less appealing. By the early 2000s, the majority of Lurs lived in cities, including the major industrial centers of Borujerd and Khorramabad in Luristan, and did not identify with any tribal group. About one-third of Lurs lived in villages, and only 10 percent continued to practice seasonal migrations organized by livestock-herding tribes. The overwhelming majority of Lurs are Shiʿa Muslims, although a small number are Ahl-e Haqq.

See also PERSIAN.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

LUTI

See GLOSSARY

LUXOR

Upper Egyptian commercial and tourist center.

This town on the east bank of the Nile in Upper Egypt is called al-Uqsur in Arabic. It is noted for its ancient temple and its proximity to Karnak, Thebes, and the tombs of the pharaohs, queens, and nobles on the opposite (west) bank of the Nile. It is the site of numerous Coptic churches and monasteries. With the coming of Islam, it became the site of mosques, notably that of al-Hajjaj, built above the Temple of Luxor. After the discovery of King Tut's tomb in 1922, the area became one of Egypt's premiere tourist attractions, and to this day the local economy is strongly dependent on tourism.

See also NILE RIVER.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT
UPDATED BY PAUL S. ROWE

LUZ, KADISH

[1895–1972]

Israeli labor leader and third speaker of the Knesset.

Born in Bobruisk, Byelorussia, Kadish Luz studied economics, agriculture, and sciences at Russian and Estonian universities. Luz served in the Russian army during World War I. After the Bolshevik revolution, he assisted Joseph Trumpeldor in founding the Hehalutz Zionist youth movement, then immigrated to Palestine where he worked at land reclamation and road building. He became a leader of the kibbutz movement and the Histadrut, and from 1951 was a MAPAI member of the Knesset, Israel's parliament. Luz was minister of agriculture (1955–1959) and speaker of the Knesset (1959–1969).

ZEV MAGHEN

LYAUTEY, LOUIS-HUBERT GONZALVE

[1854–1934]

French officer and colonial governor of Morocco during the French protectorate, 1912–1925.

Born in Nancy, France, Louis-Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey was one of the generation of army officers who had been affected by Germany's defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871). As did many others, he tried to compensate through the colonial adventure. First in Tonkin (French Indochina), then in Madagascar, under General Joseph S. Gallieni's command, he experimented with a doctrine of colonization after the British model—which respected the culture and institutions of the colonized populations more than the French system had.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, when he served in Algeria, first in the southern territories and then as chief of the division based in Oran, he drew a negative image from the colonial system as it was instituted there. Above all, he wanted to keep the original Algerian model from extending into Morocco when that country came under French control. Since the conquest of Morocco was not easy, his theses became attractive to the French government at the beginning of the French protectorate in 1912; they were already preparing for the oncoming conflict with Germany, now called World War I (1914–1918), and wanted to maintain their resources and troops in Europe.

After Lyautey's appointment to Morocco in 1912, he succeeded in freeing the commercial and religious center of Fez from the *makhzen* (mercenary) system of the tribal peoples. He regained the lowlands and the main cities, which traditionally were under their control. Then he had to get Sultan Mulay Hafid, who would not cooperate, to abdicate and put his brother Mulay Youssef on the throne.

Lyautey was a monarchist, and he admired Napoléon Bonaparte's methods of administration in early nineteenth-century Egypt. He wanted to follow them and to get the support of a legitimizing authority, which would help him subdue Morocco without his own submission to strict controls from Paris. Therefore he tried to maintain the Moroccan monarchy while making sure that it would not present a source of future problems. Under such conditions, the new sultan was allowed to keep the major Islamic prerogatives of Moroccan sovereignty: to be a caliph and an imam.

On 30 March 1912, when Lyautey signed the Fes Treaty, establishing the French protectorate over Morocco, which was going to define the relationships between the two countries until 1956, he was given the mission to reform the structure of the colonial administration. He would succeed in doing so by joining to the traditional services of the makhzen at the central and local levels a parallel French hierarchy. Without any resistance on the part of the sultan, Lyautey would create the laws and regulations by edict, which would guarantee the "administrative legal, educational, economic, financial and military reforms the French government will judge have to be introduced on Moroccan territory" (Article 1 of the Fes Treaty). Lyautey would then be able to establish a quick modernization, using only a few competent civil servants. At the beginning, this plan was widely accepted. He would also be able to place most of the country under the formal author-

Resident general of Morocco Louis-Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey (1854–1934; seated, third from left) dining at the table of Sultan Mulai Yussef, Morocco, ca. 1925. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ity of the *makhzen* by using traditional ways of negotiating with the tribes and by limiting his need for force.

His opposition to both parliamentary and political control by France led him to preserve the autonomy of Morocco so that, in the long run, he might exert a larger hidden power. The romantic idea of a feudal system constituted the basis for his debatable policy. As a tolerant Roman Catholic, he was open toward and respectful of Islam; since he was attracted to marginal people (those living neither within one system nor the other), he thought they might help him understand this country's essence—outside official circles. Adept at understanding cultural differences and hierarchical controls, he came to consider the possible development of two distinct but parallel societies that might save old cities and architecture but also lead in education. It was a separated system (akin to a "mild" apartheid) because he refused to introduce into Morocco the French system that prevailed in Algeria, based on colonization by poor whites. He then had to turn to private bankers, especially the Banque de Paris et des Pay-Bas, but he was unable or unwilling to avoid the expropriation of the richest, most fertile lands for the benefit of French settlers. Although he cared about the sultan's interests, he did not or could not prevent the basic elements of a future berber policy to take root.

Under the authority of the protectorate, Lyautey practiced a direct administration policy and benefited from it, because of the fiction of Moroccan sovereignty. In keeping the sultan, he confined him to an outdated traditionalism. Meanwhile, Lyautey's colonial *officiers des affaires indigènes* (officers in charge of native affairs) had been taught his ruling philosophy, and they used the pashas and the Arab shaykhs as intermediaries, to keep things under control. His system did not leave much space for the development of a Moroccan elite, which he became aware of toward the end of his mission. From 1920, he worried about the future of the country and considered

formulas that would allow an easy withdrawal of French control.

His authority was shaken by the beginning of the rebellion of Rif leader Abd al-Karim, who in 1921 began fighting against the Spanish in their sector of Morocco. By April of 1925, Abd al-Karim had turned to fight the French. A French-Spanish force was organized against him in July and in September, under World War I hero French Marshal Henri-Philippe Pétain; the Rifians were driven back. Toward the end of September, Lyautey resigned, and he left Morocco for France in October. He was replaced by a civilian resident and by Marshal Pétain as the military leader. Lyautey left as the legendary leader who had safeguarded the sultan's monarchy, the reputation of the country in international affairs, and its resources and finances through development of its phosphate mining company. He left as the launcher of its modernization.

He ended his life in France as an anti-republican, supporting the extreme right—an admirer of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. He was suspected, not long before his death, to have encouraged the aborted coup against the French parliament on 6 February 1934, launched by the Croix de Feu (Cross of Fire, a French fascist organization).

See also Fes, Treaty of (1912).

Rémy Leveau

LYDDA

Town in Israel (*in Hebrew,* Lod; *in Arabic,* al-Lidd).

An ancient biblical town, Lydda was known through the nineteenth century as an intermediate center for caravans and for its magnificent Byzantine basilica over the tomb of St. George. Under Ottoman rule, it was an Arab town that was part of the Jerusalem *sanjak* (district) and an important center for soap and olive oil manufacture. During the 1930s, it became one of the most important railroad junctions in the Middle East, with lines connecting Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Cairo. Lydda sustained human and material losses in the 1927 earthquake. During the bloody events of 1936 to 1939, the Jews left the town and it became a base of operations for Palestinian Arabs who were attacking Jewish towns. Most of the town's more than ten thousand Palestinian Arabs escaped or were forcibly evacuated by the Israel Defense Force during the 1948 Arab–Israel War.

Lydda is located northeast of Ramla, south of Ben Gurion Airport (originally opened in 1937). It is also the center of Israel's aircraft industry. Both the airport and the industry constitute important sources of income for the town's population. At the end of 2002 the population numbered 66,500, including more than 4,000 Muslim and Christian Palestinian citizens.

Elizabeth Thompson
Updated by Yehuda Gradus

M

MA AL-AYNAYN

[1840–1910]

Important figure in the religio-political history of Mauritania and southern Morocco.

Ma al-Aynayn (also known as Shaykh Muhammad Mustafa ibn Muhammad Fadil al-Qalqami) was the son of Muhammad Fadil, founder of the Fadiliyya Sufi brotherhood, a religious scholar and leader among the nomadic populations of northern Mauritania. Like his father, Ma al-Aynayn was head of the Fadiliyya, a noted scholar, and political leader. A prolific author, he is credited with over 140 books on a wide variety of topics.

A close ally and adviser of the sultans of Morocco from 1859, Ma al-Aynayn cooperated in the extension of Moroccan authority into the Western Sahara. Under Sultan Hassan I and his successor Abd al-Aziz, he organized resistance to imperialist incursions into the western Sahara by France and Spain.

At his death in 1910 he was succeeded by his son Ahmad Hibat Allah, known as "El Hiba."

See also AHMAD HIBAT ALLAH; HASSAN I; MAURITANIA.

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EDMUND BURKE III

MAʿALOT

Urban community in Upper Galilee, Israel.

Founded in 1956 to replace two *maʿabarot* (temporary housing communities) of mostly North African Jewish immigrants, Maʿalot is situated some 6 miles south of the Lebanese border, in the heart of the Western Galilee, on hilly terrain at an elevation of 1,970 feet, with a commanding view of Wadi Koren. In 1963 the town united with the nearby Palestinian village of Tarshiha. The town's population,

totaling some 20,000 in 2002, works mainly in industry.

On 15 May 1974 three Arab terrorists from Nayif Hawatma's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, disguised in Israeli uniforms, entered Maʿalot, overpowered and killed a guard posted outside, and took control of a school building, where a group of ninety children on a field trip slept on the floor. Some of the children were killed on the spot, but others escaped by jumping out of a window on the second floor. The terrorists demanded the release of Arab guerrillas from Israeli prisons by 6:00 P.M. and threatened to kill the hostage children if the demands were not met. At 5:45 P.M. a unit of the Israeli army's elite Golani Brigade stormed the building, killing the three terrorists, but not before the terrorists killed sixteen children and wounded seventy.

See also HAWATMA, NAYIF.

ZEV MAGHEN
UPDATED BY YEHUDA GRADUS

MAʿARIV

Daily newspaper published in Tel Aviv.

Maʿariv was founded in 1948 by a group of journalists as an afternoon paper, following their departure from another newspaper, *Yedi'ot Aharonot.* The splinter group was headed by Ezriel Carlebach, who became the paper's first editor.

For many years, *Maʿariv* garnered the largest readership of any paper in Israel. Over the years its fortunes have waned considerably. Under its editor, Dan Margalit, *Maʿariv* defines itself as broad based, apolitical, and with an appeal to both secular and religious Israelis.

ANN KAHN

MAʿBARAH

Residential transit camps for immigrants in Israel established in the early 1950s.

In the years 1950 to 1952, when Israel was unprepared for mass immigration, about 250,000 immigrants (many of them from Iraq and Romania) lived in about 110 *maʿbarot* (plural of *maʿbarah*). Conditions were dismal: Housing was in canvas shacks and tents, or at best in tin huts; infrastructure, sanitation, and water supply were deplorable; health and education facilities were inadequate. But in comparison with the immigrant camps of 1948 to 1949, people were less dependent upon public officials, and there were more employment opportunities. *Maʿbarot* were spread throughout the country, particularly near agricultural locations, and the government undertook massive relief-work projects. Many *maʿbarot* residents put down roots in their localities and stayed on to live in permanent housing that was eventually erected nearby by the government. Most residents obtained housing within two to three years, but some remained in temporary housing for close to ten years. Beginning in 1953 immigrants were moved to newly built houses, ending the *maʾabarot* stage of absorption.

The bitterness of the *maʿbarot* experience, particularly among *adot ha-mizrah* (Israeli Middle-Easterners), had wide ramifications in Israeli politics and culture. It figures in Israeli literature, particularly in the writings of major authors of Iraqi origin such as Sami Michael, Shimon Balas, and Eli Amir. In their earlier writings the authors presented realistic descriptions of the assertiveness of *maʿbarot* residents striving to become established Israelis. In their later writings some of the authors depicted social uprootedness and alienation, and some evinced nostalgia for the Jewish life of their countries of origin.

See also ADOT HA-MIZRAH; REFUGEES: JEWISH.

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SHLOMO DESHEN

MABARRAT MUHAMMAD ALI

Egyptian women's organization.

The Mabarrat Muhammad Ali, or the Muhammad Ali Benevolent Society, was founded in 1909 by

Princess Ayn al-Hayat Ahmad, a member of Egypt's royal family and a noted philanthropist. She called on other members of the royal family to donate funds to establish a small clinic in one of the poor quarters of Cairo. The Mabarrat was formed to run the clinic and quickly expanded into an organization of women from prominent political families. Hidaya Afifi Barakat (1899–1969), an Egyptian Muslim, and Mary Kahil (1889–1979), a Syrian Christian, were for many years the driving forces in the organization.

In subsequent decades members of the Mabarrat held concerts and other fund-raising events to support medical relief for Egypt's poor. Eventually it established and administered a network of hospitals and outpatient clinics throughout Egypt. During the severe malaria and cholera epidemics of the 1940s, the Mabarrat distributed emergency relief and administered vaccination programs.

The Wafdist Ministry of Health, which was locked in a power struggle with the palace, saw the Mabarrat as a rival. Following the Free Officers' coup of 1952, all independent charitable societies came under direct governmental supervision. In its first half-century, the Mabarrat hospitals and clinics had served hundreds of thousands of people. Barakat continued to volunteer under the new regime. In 1969, on the last day of her life, the state awarded her its First Class Order of Merit for public service. Kahil was similarly recognized in 1972.

NANCY GALLAGHER

MACCABI

International Jewish sports organizations.

Named for the Judean heroes who fought Antiochus in the second century B.C.E., the Maccabi World Union began in 1895 with the formation of clubs like the Israel Gymnastics Club in Istanbul and others in Bucharest, Berlin, and Saint Petersburg. By World War I, membership in the Turkish Maccabi was two thousand.

Although not ideologically a Zionist movement, the Maccabi was part of the phenomenon of a rising Jewish national consciousness during the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. Maccabi clubs became important institutions in British-mandated Palestine, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Libya. There was a popular Maccabi club in Baghdad during the late 1920s, but it ceased to be officially active as anti-Zionist Arab nationalism turned virulent. Along with groups such as the Union Universelle de la Jeunesse Juive (Universal Union of Jewish Youth), Jewish Scouts, cultural associations, and modern Hebrew-language schools, the Maccabi helped to foster a feeling of solidarity among Middle Eastern and North African Jewry with their coreligionists worldwide, as well as sympathy for Zionism.

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NORMAN STILLMAN

MACDONALD LETTER

See MACDONALD, RAMSAY

MACDONALD, MALCOLM

[1901–1981]

British politician who played a central role in the decolonization of the British Empire.

The son of the first British socialist prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, Malcolm MacDonald was the link between the Jewish Agency and Britain's cabinet following the publication of Passfield's White Paper of 1930 that restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine. Between 1931 and 1935 he was parliamentary undersecretary of state for dominion affairs. In the first months of 1935 and from 1938 to 1940 he served as colonial secretary, and between 1935 and 1938, as secretary of state for dominion affairs.

When MacDonald became colonial secretary for the second time, in view of the deterioration of law and order due to the rebellion of Palestinian Arabs (1936–1939) and the looming threat of a world war, he tried to stabilize the situation by placating the Arab states. Opposing the proposed partition of Palestine, he envisaged, initiated, and organized the London (Roundtable) Conference of early 1939, in which representatives of Arab states participated along with the Palestinian Arabs, and a Jewish delegation from abroad joined the Palestinian Jewish

delegation. The failure of the conference resulted in the formulation of a new British policy on Palestine embodied in MacDonald's White Paper of May 1939. This document set limits on Jewish immigration and land sales, and held out the promise of an independent state in Palestine.

See also London (Roundtable) Conference (1939); MacDonald, Ramsay; White Papers on Palestine.

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Jenab Tutunji
Updated by Joseph Nevo

MACDONALD, RAMSAY

[1866–1937]

Prime minister of Great Britain (1924, 1929–1935).

Ramsay MacDonald is best known in connection with the Middle East as the author of the MacDonald Letter (1931), sent to Chaim Weizmann, which overrode the white paper of 1930 and served as the legal basis for administering Palestine until the white paper of 1939.

From January to October 1924, MacDonald was Britain's first Labour prime minister. He again became prime minister in 1929. The onset of the Great Depression precipitated a crisis in 1931, and MacDonald was persuaded to head an all-party national government until 1935. In that year he was replaced by Stanley Baldwin.

The white paper of October 1930 presented the findings of two commissions. The Shaw Commission report of 1930 concerned the investigation of an outbreak of violence between Arabs and Jews in 1929, and the mass killing of Jews in Hebron and Safed. It found that the deeper cause of the violence was the uprooting of Arab villagers from the lands they had cultivated for generations, as a result of land sales to Jews.

The Hope-Simpson Commission was appointed to study the matter. Its report, completed in October 1930, found that a significant portion of the Arab rural population was on the verge of destitution. It recommended that the immigration of Jews should be assessed not only in terms of the absorptive capacity of the Yishuv but also in terms of its economic impact on the Arab rural population. It recommended a land development scheme primarily to aid displaced Arab farmers and suggested greater controls on immigration.

The Zionists were outraged, perceiving this as undermining the terms of the mandate. Weizmann maintained that the obligation of the mandatory power was to the Jewish people as a whole, not just the 170,000 Jews already in Palestine. To protest, on 20 October, Weizmann resigned the presidency of the Jewish Agency, which served as a liaison with Britain's government.

The government came under very strong pressure from Zionists, as well as from established British political figures and political parties. To placate Weizmann, MacDonald issued a letter addressed to him as head of the Jewish Agency, and submitted it to the Council of the League of Nations. The letter was also recorded as an official document and dispatched to the high commissioner of Palestine as an instruction of the cabinet.

While reiterating the principle that Britain's mandate involved a double undertaking to the Jewish as well as the non-Jewish population of Palestine, the letter reaffirmed responsibility for establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. It spoke in positive terms of the obligations of the government to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable terms, subject to the abstract proviso that "no prejudice should result to the rights and position of the non-Jewish community." The negative impact of immigration on Arab farmers was displaced from the central position it had occupied. No reference was made to the proposed development scheme or to another proposal for the creation of a Legislative Council.

MacDonald's letter also precipitated an Arab rebellion during the years 1936 to 1939, an outcome the authors of the Shaw and Hope-Simpson reports had been trying to avoid.

See also Hope-Simpson Commission (1930); Jewish Agency for Palestine; Shaw Com-

mission; Weizmann, Chaim; White Papers on Palestine; Yishuv.

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Jenab Tutunji

MACMICHAEL, HAROLD

[1882–1969]

High commissioner of Palestine (1938–1944).

Harold MacMichael favored abandoning the Peel Commission's partition plan, temporary suspension of land sales to Jews, and limiting immigration of Jews for a few years. He initially opposed implementing the provisions of the White Paper for gradual Palestinian Arab self-government, then shifted his position.

MacMichael recommended that Britain terminate the mandate and the Jewish Agency, and under various scenarios, set up either a small, independent Jewish state or one with dominion status, and allowing local autonomy for an Arab state while Britain retained control over the holy places. His recommendations were not accepted.

When there was a controversy about establishing a Jewish army, MacMichael recommended that the recruitment program for the Jewish settlement police and special constabulary be expanded; he feared, however, that a Jewish army in Palestine could be turned against the mandate or used to back up postwar Zionist demands. In August 1944, MacMichael was the target of an unsuccessful assassination attempt by Jewish extremists.

See also Jewish Agency for Palestine; Peel Commission Report (1937); White Papers on Palestine.

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Jenab Tutunji

MADANI, ABASSI AL-

[1931–]

Algerian founder and president of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut; FIS), a major opposition political movement.

Born in Sidi Okba in southeast Algeria, son of a rural imam, Abassi (often referred to by his last name, Madani) had a dual education in Qurʾanic and French schools. An early recruit to the nationalist movement, he was arrested by the French authorities in 1955 for placing a bomb at Radio Algiers. He spent the remainder of the Algerian War of Independence in prison.

Upon the country's independence, Madani became a schoolteacher while simultaneously pursuing a *licence* degree in philosophy at the University of Algiers. Influenced by the Islamic philosopher Malek Bennabi, he became active in *Al-Qiyam* (Values), an association that popularized the ideas of Middle Eastern fundamentalist thinkers. Yet he remained within the conservative "Arabist" wing of the National Liberation Front (FLN), and was elected to the Algiers departmental assembly in 1971. While studying for a doctorate in London in the mid-1970s, he became acquainted with international Islamist circles. Appointed professor of education at the University of Algiers, he began preaching in various mosques around the city. For his participation in violent anti-regime demonstrations, he returned to prison in December 1982, serving sixteen months of a two-year sentence.

Madani quickly capitalized upon the liberalization of the regime after the October 1988 riots by founding the FIS in February 1989. In this he worked closely with a younger firebrand preacher, Ali Ben Hadj. Emerging as the strategist of the Algerian Islamist movement, he organized an effective electoral machine, which rode to an unanticipated victory in the municipal elections of June 1990. The FIS captured 54 percent of the popular vote and won control of some 850 city councils including

those of Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Annaba. Heady with victory, Madani called for national parliamentary elections, then declared a general strike in May 1991 to protest the gerrymandering electoral law under which the government proposed to hold the election. The strike led to violence, Madani was reported to have threatened jihad against the army, and once again—on 30 June 1991—the Islamist militant was arrested on charges of conspiracy against the state.

Imprisoned once again and his party officially dissolved, Madani nevertheless remained a significant interlocutor for the government during the civil war of the 1990s. In 1997, he was released from jail but kept under house arrest. In July 2003, he completed his twelve-year sentence; in failing health and his party still banned, he remained a controversial symbol of political protest in Algeria.

ROBERT MORTIMER

MADANI, ABDULLAH AL-

Journalist and member of both the Constitutional Assembly and the National Assembly in Bahrain.

A religiously trained Shiʿite, Abdullah al-Madani represented a rural district in Bahrain. He was elected to the Constitutional Assembly in 1972 and 1973. In both assemblies, he was the leader of the conservative (Shiʿa) religious bloc—the other two blocs being the bourgeois nationalists and the reformists (leftists). During his service, he started a weekly magazine, *al-Mawaqif,* which he edited and published. He was conservative on social-Islamic issues but liberal on political issues. His editorials in *al-Mawaqif* probably made him some enemies; he was assassinated in the late 1970s.

See also BAHRAIN.

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EMILE A. NAKHLEH

MADANI, TAWFIQ AL-

[1899–1983]

Secretary-general of the Algerian Association of Reformist Ulama, ambassador, and historian.

Born in Tunis, Tawfiq al-Madani studied at Zaytuna University and became a cofounder of the Destour Party. His pro-nationalism activities provoked his expulsion from Tunisia to Algeria where he contributed profoundly toward reviving Arabic study and a national identity. His works include *Book of Algeria* (1931), an introduction to the country for youth that was implicitly nationalist, and *The War of Three Hundred Years Between Algeria and Spain* (1968). He wrote the play *Hannibal* and was editor-in-chief of *al-Basa'ir.*

Besides his cultural role, Madani also played an important political role. In 1952 he became secretary general of the Algerian Association of Reformist Ulama (body of *mullahs*) and integrated that organization within the revolutionary Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). He was later chosen minister of cultural affairs (1958) in the *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA).* He became minister for *habous* (religious foundations) in Ahmed Ben Bella's first two governments. He later served as ambassador to Iraq and Pakistan. He retired in order to devote time to his scholarship, which included editorial work for the Centre National D'Etudes Historiques (National Center for Historic Studies) and its journal *al-Tarikh* (History).

See also FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE.

PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

MADKOUR, IBRAHIM

[1902–1995]

Egyptian scholar.

Born in Abu al-Numrus, Giza, Ibrahim Madkour gained worldwide recognition for his efforts to promote the recovery and publication of the texts fundamental to Arabic and Islamic culture. Following studies at Dar al-Ulum, Madkour was sent to Paris, where he received a Ph.D. in 1934. The two required dissertations, "La place d'al-Farabi dans l'école philosophique musulmane" (Al-Farabi's place in the Muslim philosophical school) and "L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe" (Aristotle's organon in the Arab world), both published in the same year, remain fundamental texts for the history of Islam. Returning to Egypt, he was appointed professor of philosophy at the Fuʾad I University (later, University of Cairo) in 1934. Named minister of social affairs prior to the 1952 revolution, Madkour had his

greatest influence on Arabic culture through his work with the Academy of Arabic Language (member 1946–1959, general secretary 1959–1974, and president 1974–1995), the Union of Academies of Arabic Language, and the Supreme Council of Culture in Egypt.

He launched the projects of editing Avicenna's great multivolume work the *Kitab al-Shifa* (Healing) in 1949; the Muʿtazilite theological summa of Abd al-Jabbar, *al-Mughn* (Sufficer); and Ibn al-Arabi's massive *al-Futuhat al-Makiyya* (Mekkan contributions). In addition, he facilitated the publication of several of Averroes's works and encouraged Georges Chehata Anawati in his translation of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* as well as Daniel Gimaret, Jean Jolivet, and Georges Monnot in their translation of al-Shahrastani's *Kitab al-Milal wa al-Nihal* (Book of religious communities and of sects).

In his constant encouragement of scholars to recover the rich medieval Arabic and Islamic patrimony, then to present it in critical, scientific editions and sound translations, Ibrahim Madkour made this heritage known throughout the world. He died in Cairo in 1995.

See also ANAWATI, GEORGES CHEHATA.

CHARLES BUTTERWORTH

MADRASA

Arabic word for an Islamic college and, more specifically, a center for religious and legal studies.

The madrasa originated in Eastern Iran in the tenth century and spread to major urban centers throughout the Middle East by the late eleventh century. The architect of the madrasa as a state-sponsored institution of higher education was Nizam al-Mulk (died 1092 C.E.), the prime minister of the Seljuk empire. These residential colleges were designed by the ruling elite both as a training ground for state bureaucrats and as a Sunni Islam response to the propaganda of Ismaili Shiʿism already being generated at al-Azhar, the theological learning center founded by the Fatimid dynasty in Cairo in 969 C.E. As part of a Sunni Muslim religio-political agenda, the madrasa spread throughout the Islamic world. The madrasa system augmented already extant mosque-centered training sites for the study of religion and law. Unlike these centers, the madrasa forged links between the *ulama,* the religious scholars who directed Islamic education, and the ruling government authorities whose financial support made their control of the madrasa possible.

The madrasa system of education was linked to the mosque, which traditionally had been the place of instruction for Muslims in the Qurʾan and in the Hadith—the traditions that preserved the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. The madrasa combined the site for education with student residences. Libraries and sometimes hospitals would adjoin the madrasa. Financial support for the educational institution was generated by the state in the form of a charitable endowment called *waqf.* The revenue on these endowments paid for the maintenance of the buildings, student stipends, and instructors' fees.

The course of instruction at a madrasa included the Qurʾan, tradition, Arabic language, theology, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and, often, medicine; however, the study of Islamic law *(shariʿa)* provided the core of the madrasa's rigorous curriculum. Initially, madrasas were founded to provide specialized instruction in one of the four Sunni legal schools. In time, legal instruction in one or more of the Sunni legal schools might be offered in a single madrasa.

The method of instruction relied heavily on memorization—of the Qurʾan and as many traditions as possible. Once these preliminaries were accomplished, students were trained in the technicalities of the law, divergent legal opinions, and the disputed questions that distinguished their law school from the other Sunni legal schools. After four or more years of study, an instructor determined whether an individual student could be licensed to teach law and given a diploma, a signed certificate called an *ijaza.* Any Muslim male could join a madrasa, but the number of students per teacher was usually limited to twenty. Only male students studied at madrasas; Muslim women were not allowed to study Islamic law. Major Sunni madrasas were founded at Medina, Cairo, Tunis, and Fez. Al-Azhar remains the most famous Sunni theological center in the Arab world; it underwent a series of curriculum reforms in the early twentieth century that made the director of that institution the

prime link between the Egyptian government and the country's traditional religious elite. Shiʿite madrasas in Iran include those of Mashhad and Qom and, in Iraq, al-Najaf, and Karbala.

In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire founded schools influenced by European models to train their military officers, bureaucrats, and doctors. Similar professional schools were also created in Egypt and Tunisia during this period to offer instruction to those Muslims in government service forced to contend with the European colonial presence in the Middle East. These non-Islamic educational institutions created new urban nationalist elites. In the twentieth century, the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of Arab states hastened educational reform; secular schools of higher education undermined the madrasa system in the Sunni Muslim world. State-sponsored higher education throughout the Middle East promoted new secular avenues of social mobility and professional prestige for male and female Muslim students in areas such as medicine and engineering. Shiʿite madrasas flourish in Iran since the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's Iranian Revolution of 1979 reestablished Islamic rule.

See also Arabic; Azhar, al-; Hadith; Iranian Revolution (1979); Mosque; Qurʾan; *Shariʿa;* Shiʿism; Sunni Islam; *Ulama;* Waqf.

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Denise A. Spellberg

MADRID CONFERENCE (1991)

Middle East peace conference, 30 October–1 November 1991.

Convened in 1991, the three-day Madrid Middle East Peace Conference was a historic breakthrough in Arab–Israeli diplomacy. It became a link between the end of the 1991 Gulf War and the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accord. It broke the taboo against Arab states, Palestinians, and Israelis meeting in public. In the years after the conference, bilateral and multilateral talks ensued, agreements were reached, and countries other than the United States became overtly engaged in managing the conflict.

A series of factors made the Madrid Conference possible. With the end of the Cold War, no patron could provide military assistance to sustain support for an Arab military option against Israel. Otherwise reluctant Arab states that had vilified Egypt for her separate peace with Israel during the 1970s were willing to accept Israel as a fact, primarily because the United States had, in defeating Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait, secured the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Arab Gulf states. Extensive pre-negotiations over several years had outlined the conference's procedures, content, and representation issues. Since the conference validated its earlier peace treaty with Israel, Egypt warmly endorsed the conference's convocation. Tirelessly, after the Gulf War's conclusion, in eight diplomatic shuttle missions, U.S. secretary of state James A. Baker III persevered in convincing reluctant Israeli and Arab neighbors to meet in Madrid on 30 October 1991.

Historically, Israel had shunned conference diplomacy, where it feared that Arab states could align themselves uniformly against it and impose unwanted solutions. Israel accepted this conference's format because bilateral talks were to emerge immediately from the ceremonial opening, with a U.S. assurance that the conference would not dictate solutions. While Moscow and Washington officially convened the conference, both Israel and the Arab world again placed their faith almost exclusively in U.S. diplomacy to push negotiations forward. For Israel, the United States remained its most dependable ally. After much hesitation, the Syrian leadership attended the Madrid Conference because it was conceptually based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which called for an exchange of territory for peace through direct negotiations between the parties. The Palestinian representation issue, which bedeviled the conference's preparations, was solved with creation of a

Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Israel refused to attend a conference with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a separate negotiating entity. While Yasir Arafat's PLO was not seated at the conference, indirect PLO participation ensured his containment of, if not control over, Palestinian leaders in the West Bank and Gaza who were emerging as a political alternative to the PLO's leadership. Grudging support for the conference also helped refurbish the Palestinians' tarnished international image due to their earlier ringing endorsement of Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.

No real negotiations were carried out at the conference; each delegation head used the podium to make political points to audiences listening at home. Political and regional issues, not military matters, were the main items on the negotiating agendas that flowed from the conference's opening. In the years that followed the conference, Palestinian–Israeli and Syrian–Israeli negotiations evolved, some of which led to detailed discussions and agreements during the 1990s. For several years after Madrid, multilateral talks were conducted in different world venues where issues of arms control, economic development, the environment, refugees, and water were discussed. While the United States continued to catalyze the diplomatic process in the 1990s, the Madrid Conference officially made the conflict's resolution and management a multilateral undertaking, thereafter engaging advocacy and financial support from individual European states, the European Union, Canada, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and others.

See also Baker, James A.; Oslo Accord (1993).

Kenneth W. Stein

MAGEN DAVID ADOM (MDA)

The national emergency medical, ambulance, blood, and disaster service of Israel.

Magen David Adom (MDA; "red shield of David" in Hebrew) was founded on 7 June 1930 as a first-aid society for the city of Tel Aviv with about twenty volunteers, an ambulance, and a first-aid hut. Seventy years later, MDA served the entire population of Israel with 9,000 volunteers, 1,000 paid employees (including physicians, medics and paramedics, ambulance emergency medical technicians, and blood bank and fractionation experts and technicians), and 600 ambulances.

MDA supplies all of the blood used for transfusions by Israel's armed forces and more than 85 percent of the country's blood requirements. It also provides first-aid instruction.

In 1950 MDA's duties and responsibilities were legally defined in the Magen David Adom Law, in which MDA was recognized as the organization entrusted to carry out in Israel the functions assigned to a National Red Cross Society under the Geneva Conventions. MDA failed, however, to gain recognition from the League of Red Cross Societies (which accepts the Red Crescent Society based in Muslim countries and the Red Lion and Sun Society based in Iran) because of Arab and Communist-bloc objections. The issue remains unresolved despite support from the American Red Cross for MDA's inclusion. Some progress was evident in mid-2003 with the signing of the first bilateral cooperation agreement between the MDA and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

See also Medicine and Public Health; Red Crescent Society.

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Magen David Adom U.S.A. web site. Available from <http://www.magendavidadom.org/>.

Miriam Simon
Updated by Neil Caplan

MAGHRIB

Arabic term for northwest Africa in general, and for Morocco in particular.

In its broadest meaning, the Maghrib (also Maghreb) refers to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripolitania, and, occasionally, Libya. The region is characterized by fertile plains and the Atlas mountain range near the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts, and sweeping desert in its hinterland.

The term *maghrib* comes from the Arabic word meaning "west" or "place of sunset." The Arabs conquered the region between 643 and 711 C.E., and ruled it through semiautonomous kingdoms

and tribes. From the ninth to the fourteenth century, the Maghrib produced impressive Islamic realms with robust trade economies tied to Saharan caravan routes. In the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire conquered the coasts of present-day Tunisia and Algeria, while the interior desert regions and Morocco remained autonomous, free from imperial rule.

France colonized the Maghrib between 1830 and 1912, and from that period, French was commonly spoken in addition to Berber and Arabic. Morocco and Tunisia achieved independence with little violence in 1956, while Algeria fought the bitter Algerian War of Independence from 1954 until 1962 to achieve its freedom. Libya, once a colony of Italy, was next governed by France and Britain, and became independent in 1951.

See also ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

MAGIC CARPET OPERATION

Airlift of Jews to the new State of Israel from the southern Arabian Peninsula.

Operation Magic Carpet was the popular name given to Operation on Wings of Eagles, the airlift that, between 16 December 1948 and 24 September 1950, brought most of the ancient Jewish communities of the southern Arabian peninsula to the new State of Israel. The evacuees included about 43,000 Yemenites, more than 3,000 Adenis, and nearly 1,000 Habbanis (from Hadramawt).

This dramatic operation was run by the Jewish Agency with assistance from the American Joint Distribution Committee. The planes for the airlift came from a specially formed U.S. charter airline, the Near East Air Transport Company. During the height of this exodus, in the fall of 1949, as many as eleven planes flying around the clock carried people from the departure point in the British protectorate of Aden to Lod Airport in Israel. Many of the Yemenite refugees trekked hundreds of miles over rough terrain, in many cases entirely on foot, to reach the Hashid transit camp in Aden to await evacuation.

See also HADRAMAWT; JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE.

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NORMAN STILLMAN

MAGNES, JUDAH

[1877–1948]

U.S. Reform rabbi, founder and first president of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Judah Magnes was born in San Francisco, and received rabbinic ordination at Hebrew Union College in 1900 and a doctorate in philosophy at the University of Berlin and University of Heidelberg. He served as rabbi of New York's Temple Emanuel from 1906 to 1910, when he was forced to resign because he was viewed as too traditional. He then served as rabbi of New York's Conservative Congregation B'nai Jeshurun from 1911 to 1912. He was one of the founders of the American Jewish Committee and president of New York's organized Jewish community (the *Kehilla*) from 1908 to 1922, and he helped to found the Yiddish daily newspaper *Der Tag,* the American Civil Liberties Union, and the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. He was a delegate to the Zionist Congress in 1905, and served as secretary of the Federation of American Zionists from 1905 to 1908.

Magnes immigrated to Palestine in 1922 and became the first president of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1925. He rejected the dominant Zionist notion of "the negation of the Diaspora" and continued to believe that both Zion and the diaspora were of equal importance in Jewish life. His personal contacts and political discussions with Harry St. John Philby, Musa al-Alami, George An-

tonius, and Nuri Saʿid periodically put him at loggerheads with the official Zionist leadership. He was one of the leaders of the Ihud (unity) movement, a small group of intellectuals who opposed the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and argued instead for a binational state. Among his colleagues were such notables as Martin Buber, Hans Kohn, Arthur Ruppin, Samuel Hugo Bergman, and Gershom Scholem. A confirmed pacifist for much of his life, Magnes modified his views after Hitler's rise to power. Following the creation of the Jewish state and the outbreak of war in early 1948, Magnes continued to lobby, during the few remaining months of his life, for a confederation of Middle Eastern states and for a conciliatory and humanitarian approach to the conflict.

See also American Jewish Committee; Antonius, George; Buber, Martin; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Philby, Harry St. John; Ruppin, Arthur.

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Bryan Daves
Updated by Neil Caplan
Updated by Chaim I. Waxman

MAHALLA AL-KUBRA, AL-

Egyptian city in the Nile delta.

Mahalla al-Kubra is a city (pop. 395,000 in 1996) located near the center of the Nile delta, some sixty miles (96.5 km) north of Cairo, in the province of Gharbiya. The climate is, like much of Egypt along the Mediterranean, relatively wetter than that of Cairo, with humidity averaging about 60 percent. Winter temperatures range from 43–66F° (6–19C°), while summer ranges from 63–88F° (17–31C°).

The delta is the great cotton-growing area of Egypt, and the principal industry of Mahalla is cotton-textile production, as it was for much of the twentieth century. Mahalla is, in fact, the center of the Egyptian textile industry, but rice and flour mills are also important. The area has been associated with textiles for a long time, since silk weaving became important there in the Middle Ages. In 1927, Egypt's Bank Misr created the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company there—a giant modern industrial plant and one of the three largest industrial undertakings in Egypt (the other two being a sugar refinery in Giza province and a textile firm in Alexandria). As of 2002, textile production accounted for about a quarter of Egypt's industrial revenues.

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Ellis Goldberg

MAHALLE SCHOOLS

Provincial schools in the Ottoman Empire.

Most of the public schools in the Ottoman Empire were built and funded by local governments. These governments often organized councils to build the schools, hoping that they would stimulate economic development. Most *mahalle* schools offered elementary-level education, although curricula varied. With the 1869 Regulation for Public Instruction, the central government organized provincial councils to distribute state funds and encourage standardization of curricula and examinations at the local schools.

The number of students in mahalle schools rose from 242,017 boys and 126,454 girls in 1867 to 640,721 boys and 253,349 girls in 1895, roughly one-third of all children of elementary school age. There were only 35,731 students in the Ruşdiye schools (funded by the central government), and nearly 400,000 in foreign and Millet System elementary schools.

See also Millet System; Ottoman Empire; Ruşdiye Schools.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

MAHDAWI, FADIL ABBAS AL-

[1915–1963]

Iraqi army colonel with a bachelor's degree in law; a cousin of Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim.

Fadil Abbas al-Mahdawi was born in Baghdad to a poor family. He became known for his role as head of the special military court, commonly called the people's court. Established by Abd al-Karim Qasim, the court was infamous for its unorthodox and demagogic procedures. From 1958 to 1962, the court tried leaders of Iraq's monarchical regime (1958–1959), members of the Baʿth party who had tried to assassinate Qasim (1959), and army officers who attempted a coup against Qasim (1959). Mahdawi was executed, along with Qasim, by the officers who staged a successful coup against his regime in February 1963.

See also BAʿTH, AL-; QASIM, ABD AL-KARIM.

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LOUAY BAHRY

MAHD-E ULYA, MALEK JAHAN KHANUM

[1805–1873]

Wife of Mohammad Shah Qajar, third monarch of Persia's Qajar dynasty, and mother of Naser al-Din Shah, the fourth monarch. She became known as Mahd-e Ulya upon her son's accession to the throne in 1848.

Malek Jahan Khanum Mahd-e Ulya was the daughter of Soleyman Khan E'tezad al-Dowleh Qajar Qovanlu; her mother was the daughter of Fath Ali Shah, second monarch of Persia's Qajar Dynasty. Her marriage to Mohammad Shah, third monarch of the Qajar dynasty, in 1819 united the two branches of the Qajar tribe, as decreed by Agha Mohammad Qajar, the founder of the dynasty. In addition to her son, she had a daughter, Malekzadeh Khanum, who married Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir, who later became premier for her brother the shah. Mahd-e Ulya was well educated, knew Arabic, was an accomplished calligraphist, and was well versed in literature.

Mahd-e Ulya was entrusted with the affairs of state at the end of her husband's life, until the crown prince could reach the palace in Tehran from Tabriz, the traditional seat of the heir to the throne. She had ruled successfully and continued to be involved in politics after her son became shah but was displeased by her daughter's husband, Amir Kabir, who was trying to enact modern reforms as premier. Court intrigues caused Amir Kabir to lose the trust of the young shah, and he was dismissed, then exiled, and later put to death.

Mahd-e Ulya has been blamed for this action and remains an unpopular historical figure because of her association with the death of one of Persia's most remarkable ministers.

See also AMIR KABIR, MIRZA TAQI KHAN; FATH ALI SHAH QAJAR; QAJAR, AGHA MOHAMMAD; QAJAR DYNASTY.

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MANSOUREH ETTEHADIEH

MAHDI

Arabic term for the redeemer or messiah.

In Arabic, the term *al-mahdi* means "the guided one." For Islam, the term developed through medieval Shiʿite thought into a concept charged with genealogical, eschatological (referring to the end of the world), and political significance. By the eighth century, the *mahdi* would be characterized as a descendant of the prophet Muhammad, whose appearance as the redeemer, or messiah (from Hebrew *mashiah,* the anointed), presaged the end of the world and all earthly political and religious corruption.

Today, in Iraq and Iran, and in portions of Arabia and the gulf, the Shiʿa branch of Islam is represented by Twelver Shiʿites, who believe in the return of the hidden twelfth descendant of Muhammad as the *mahdi.* Until he reappears, Twelver Shiʿites believe that only their *mujtahids* (an elite group among their religious learned) have the power as the *mahdi*'s intermediaries to interpret the faith.

The concept of the *mahdi* is not central to the beliefs of Sunni Islam, but it has popular appeal. In 1881, Muhammad Ahmad (d. 1885) claimed to be the *mahdi* and led an uprising in the Sudan that outlasted him and was not put down by the British until 1898. *Mahdism* inspired unrest during the nineteenth century in both West and North Africa. In 1849, Bu Zian led a revolt in Algeria against taxation and the French occupation in the name of the *mahdi.*

See also AHMAD, MUHAMMAD; SHIʿISM; SUNNI ISLAM.

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DENISE A. SPELLBERG

MAHDIST STATE

Independent government formed in the northern Sudan from 1885 to 1898.

The Mahdist state was established in the Sudan in January 1885 by Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abdullah, the self-declared *mahdi* (the expected divine leader of Islam), after he routed the Turko-Egyptian government and armed forces. He died 22 June 1885 and was succeeded by Muhammad Turshain Abdullahi, who ruled as Khalifat al-Mahdi (successor of the Mahdi) until 1898. Abdullahi, the Mahdi's closest lieutenant since 1881, commanded the army, treasury, and daily administration during the rebellion. A member of the Taʿaysha tribe, he led the troops of the *baqqara* (cattle-herding) nomads of the western provinces of Kordofan and Darfur.

Khalifa Abdullahi transformed a tribally based, religious-nationalist uprising into a centralized bureaucratic state that controlled most of the northern Sudan. From 1885 to 1891, his rule was contested by the Ashraf (relatives of the Mahdi) and their supporters in the tribes that originated in the Nile valley *(awlad al-balad).* The Khalifa, whose troops controlled the capital of Omdurman and the corn-growing Gezira, prevented the Mahdi's kinsman Khalifa Muhammad Sharif ibn Hamid from being named ruler and deposed most of the military and administrative leaders of the awlad al-balad army. The Khalifa also feared losing control over the baqqara forces and even his Taʿaysha tribe and therefore, in March 1888, ordered them to march to the capital and serve as his standing army. There, the Taʿaysha had to be placated by massive supplies of food and gold, and their presence exacerbated the Khalifa's rift with the *awlad al-balad*. When the Ashraf attempted a final rebellion in November 1891, the Khalifa destroyed their military and bureaucratic power.

Natural calamities in 1889/90 led to famine and epidemics, which were exacerbated by the limited administrative capacities of the government and the food requirements of the troops. The exodus of the tribal forces also reduced grain and cattle production in the west while overburdening the Nile valley. Meanwhile, the Khalifa regularized the operations of the state treasury and reintroduced the taxes and administrative methods of the Turko-Egyptian period. Moreover, he organized a 9,000-person bodyguard, commanded by his son Uthman Shaykh al-Din. Called the Mulazimiyya, that half-slave force superseded the Taʿaysha tribe as the principal military support for the regime. The Khalifa thus isolated and destroyed any alternative power centers and consolidated his control over the state apparatus.

The territorial limits of the Mahdist state encompassed most of today's northern Sudan. Its control of the Nile river route through the south was tenuous: it only ruled Bahr al-Ghazal in 1885/86, and Belgian and French expeditions began to penetrate the south in the mid-1890s. The Khalifa controlled Darfur from 1887 to 1889, but the border region with Ethiopia remained contested and British troops controlled Suwakin port on the Red Sea. Seesaw battles with Ethiopia helped to open the way for Italy to consolidate control over Eritrea and

to capture grain-rich Kassallah, and for Britain to capture the Tukar region south of Suwakin.

The Mahdi had envisioned that his revolution would spread throughout the Muslim world. But the Khalifa's effort to march on Egypt was crushed at the battle near Tushki on the Egyptian frontier, 3 August 1889. (The Khalifa had sent messages inviting Britain's Queen Victoria, the sultan of the Ottoman Empire, and the khedive of Egypt to submit to the Mahdiyya.) The Khalifa then focused on consolidating his administration at home, rather than attempting to spread the message abroad.

The Mahdist state fell in 1898, not as a result of internal disintegration, but at the hands of the superior power of the Anglo-Egyptian army led by Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener. His forces entered the Sudan in early 1896 from Egypt and constructed a railway system as they moved south. In April 1898, three thousand Sudanese died in the battle at Atbara; eleven thousand died in the battle of Karari, north of Omdurman, on 2 September 1898, which marked the end of the Mahdist state. The Khalifa escaped to the west, dying in the battle of Umma Diwaykarat, near Kosti, 24 November 1899.

The Mahdist movement was based on a blend of religion, social discontent, and antiforeign sentiment. In its short time span, the Mahdist state became bureaucratized and lost its religious aura. Although the tribes resented taxes and the controls imposed by government, the increasingly complex administration and judiciary stabilized the regime and enabled it to rule over wide expanses for its thirteen years.

See also ABDULLAHI, MUHAMMAD TURSHAIN; AHMAD, MUHAMMAD; ANSAR, AL-; KASSALLAH; KHARTOUM; KITCHENER, HORATIO HERBERT; SUDAN.

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ANN M. LESCH

MAHFUZ, NAJIB

[1911–]

Egyptian author; winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature, 1988.

Najib Mahfuz (also Naguib Mahfouz) was born in the Jamaliyya district of Cairo in 1911 and began writing at the age of seventeen. He studied philosophy at Cairo University, and is said to have been influenced by Balzac, Zola, Camus, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Proust. He has written nearly forty novels as well as some fourteen volumes of short stories, many of which have been translated and published in English. The first Arab writer to have devoted most of his energies to one literary genre, he excels at the experimental novel, most notably in *al-Liss wa al-Kilab* (1961; *The Thief and the Dogs*), in which he employs modern techniques such as stream-of-consciousness. He has freely acknowledged his indebtedness to the early Fabian socialist Salama Musa, and although he later showed some skepticism about the sufficiency of reason as the arbiter of human affairs, there are no indications that he favors the revival of the traditional values of Islam, or that he has ever departed from a broad humanism. Mahfuz is as much a social historian or anthropologist as a writer who, like a fly on the wall, captures an unadulterated picture of daily life among Cairo's urban masses. He recreates a world he is intimately familiar with, lending a story of his creation to a space that is ethnographic. His novels are also highly political and historic. In *Miramar* to the *Cairo Trilogy,* he weaves a political history of Egypt between the wars, and yet his objective narration and use of a polyphonic narrative (in *Miramar*) prevents them from being one-sided. However, after translating James Baikie's *Ancient Egypt* into Arabic in 1932, Mahfuz was inspired to write a series of historical novels set in pharaonic times. One of them, *Radubis* (1943), which concerned a young pharaoh who loses the support of his people, was interpreted as an attack on Egypt's King Farouk. It was not until 1959, when he published *Children of Gebalawi* (also known as *Children of the Alley*), that his work was denounced—by religious leaders as blasphemous. It was banned in Egypt, and later published in Beirut. In 1994 Mahfuz was stabbed in the neck, presumably by religious extremists angered by his unorthodox depictions of religious prophets. Najib Mahfuz has more than fifty titles to his credit, more than a dozen of which

are available in translation. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1988.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC; MUSA, SALAMA.

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PIERRE CACHIA
UPDATED BY ROXANNE VARZI

MAHIR, AHMAD

[c. 1886–1945]

Egyptian politician; prime minister, 1944–1945.

Ahmad Mahir was one of the most important figures in the early history of the Wafd party in Egypt, which under the leadership of Saʿd Zaghlul came to prominence in Egyptian politics after World War I and the Egyptian Revolution of 1919. Son of Muhammad Mahir, Egypt's under-secretary of state for war, and brother of Ali Pasha Mahir, he attended Cairo University for a doctoral degree in law and economics.

Implicated in the November 1924 assassination of Sir Lee Stack, the British governor-general of the Sudan, but acquitted of all charges, Mahir occupied several ministerial positions in Wafd governments before being expelled from the party in January 1938, along with Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi, as a result of an internal party dispute. The two then founded the Saʿdist party (named for Saʿd Zaghlul). Mahir served as prime minister of Egypt from October 1944 to February 1945. During the preliminaries to the San Francisco conference at which the United Nations was to be founded, Mahir, believing that Egypt's future interests lay in participation, advocated a declaration of war against the Axis. On 24 February 1945 he was assassinated while presenting this proposal to the Egyptian parliament.

See also STACK, LEE; WAFD; ZAGHLUL, SAʿD.

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ROGER ALLEN

MAHIR, ALI

[1882–1960]

Egyptian politician.

While Ali Mahir and his younger brother, Ahmad Mahir, were both prominently involved in the politics of Egypt during the turbulent years between the two world wars, their careers took quite different paths. Ali was educated in the law and an early associate of Saʿd Zaghlul and the Wafd (Egyptian independence party) in the years following Egypt's anticolonial uprising in 1919 (Egypt had become a British protectorate). Following the squabble between Zaghlul and Adli Pasha in 1921, Mahir dissociated himself from the Wafd. In 1922, Britain had been forced to declare Egypt a sovereign state but reserved rights to the Suez Canal and to defend Egypt. With a Machiavellian instinct for political intrigue and survival, Mahir managed to occupy a large number of political positions in the ensuing decades, including service on three occasions as prime minister of Egypt.

Mahir was closely associated with the palace, being appointed chief of the royal cabinet in 1935. His services were always at the king's disposal whenever there was a need to express royal displeasure at outside pressure, most especially when the British were involved. Mahir's terms as prime minister were short. He served in the post for a few months in 1936 but was dismissed during the constitutional discussions that followed the death of King Fuʾad and the succession of King Farouk. Equally brief was his premiership from 1939 until June 1940, when his palace affiliations and King Farouk's preference for the Axis powers (Germany and its allies) led to British demands that Mahir be dismissed.

Following World War II, Ali Mahir continued to play his role as one of the éminences grises of Egyptian political life. It was hardly surprising that, following the uprisings in Cairo in January 1952, Mahir was one of several politicians asked to serve as prime minister in the period leading up to the July Revolution. It was Mahir who conveyed to King Farouk the command of the Revolutionary Council (chaired by General Muhammad Naguib) that the king abdicate. Following Farouk's abdication and departure for Italy in June 1953, Mahir continued to play a role as chairman of a constitutional commission. Its work was never completed, being

overtaken by the rapid developments of the ensuing months—the abolition of the monarchy and the proclamation of a republic under General Naguib, who turned it over to Gamal Abdel Nasser.

See also Adli; Farouk; Fuʾad; Mahir, Ahmad; Naguib, Muhammad; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Wafd; Zaghlul, Saʿd.

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Roger Allen

MAHMUD II

[1785–1839]

Ottoman sultan, 1808–1839.

Mahmud, the youngest of twelve sons of Sultan Abdülhamit I, ascended the throne of the Ottoman Empire on 28 July 1808. Demonstrating strong leadership and dedication to traditional values, he gradually assembled a coalition of religious and political leaders who desired to reestablish orderly government. During Mahmud's reign, the Ottoman Empire continued its decline in relation to the West: Its dependence on Europe increased, and it suffered military humiliation and territorial losses. But within the reduced confines of his realm, Mahmud's achievements were considerable. He resurrected the sultan's office and reformed and rejuvenated the central government. He arrested the disintegration of the state and initiated a process of consolidation. In spite of his intensive reform activities, Mahmud did not attempt to alter the basic fabric of Ottoman society, rather to strengthen it through modern means, and generally he succeeded in integrating the old elite into the new institutions. This was in keeping with his strong attachment to the ideal of justice in the traditional Ottoman sense. The sobriquet he selected for himself, "Adli" (Just, or Lawful), is an indication of the cast of his mind. Although he may not have intended it, Mahmud's reforms produced basic change and launched Ottoman society on the course of modernization in a final and irrevocable manner.

Wars with Russia (1806–1812, 1828–1829) resulted in the Ottomans ceding to Russia the area of Bessarabia (Treaty of Bucharest, 28 May 1812) and subsequently the Danube delta in Europe and the province of Akhaltsikhe (Ahisha) in Asia (Treaty of Adrianople, 14 September 1829). The latter treaty also required the Ottomans to pay Russia a sizable indemnity and to recognize the autonomy of Serbia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Greece under Russian protection. Later, as a result of negotiations among the European powers, Greece became an independent monarchy (July 1832).

During his efforts to quell the rebellion in Greece (1821–1828), Mahmud appealed to Muhammad Ali, his governor of Egypt, for assistance. Although Egypt's newly formed, European-style army initially was successful (1825–1827), the plight of the Greeks elicited European intervention. Britain, France, and Russia sent their fleets to Greece, and on 20 October 1827, inside the harbor of Navarino, they destroyed an Ottoman-Egyptian fleet. Muhammad Ali sought compensation for his losses in Greece and demanded that Mahmud cede to him the governorship of Syria. When this request was rejected, Egypt's army invaded Syria (October 1831), defeated three Ottoman armies, marched into Anatolia, occupied Kütahya (2 February 1833), and was poised to march on Constantinople. Mahmud sought help from the great powers, but only Russia dispatched a naval force to defend Constantinople (February 1833). This induced Britain and France to offer mediation that resulted in the Peace of Kütahya (8 April), which conferred on Muhammad Ali the governorship of Syria and the province of Adana.

Despite military disasters, Mahmud proceeded with his reform measures, continuing to focus on centralization of government and greater efficiency in its work. Since early in his reign, he had introduced significant improvements in the military, especially in the artillery and the navy. In the spring of 1826, with his authority restored at the capital and in many provinces, Mahmud decided to reorganize part of the janissary corps as an elite unit of active soldiers called Eşkinciyan. Mahmud enlisted the support of the religious and bureaucratic elite as well as the janissary officers themselves. Nevertheless, on the night of 14 June the janissaries rose up in arms. Mahmud mustered loyal troops, and on 15 June the rebellion was crushed with considerable

bloodshed. Two days later an imperial decree abolished the janissary corps.

The suppression of the janissaries had an enormous impact on Ottoman society and also in Europe, where the Janissary Corps had been viewed for five centuries as the military strength of the Ottoman Empire. In an effort to gain universal approval, the regime called the incident "the Beneficial Affair" *(Vaka-i Hayriye).* The Eşkinciyan project was abandoned in favor of a more ambitious plan calling for the formation of an entirely new army organized and trained according to Western models. Military defeats and the apparent failure of the government's attempts to reform the army rekindled unrest and rebellion in far-flung provinces, especially in Bosnia, Albania, eastern Anatolia, and Baghdad. The government was generally successful in suppressing these uprisings by employing the newly disciplined troops, who proved effective at coercion and centralization.

In 1835 Mahmud reconstituted the entire government into three independent branches: the civil bureaucracy, the religious-judicial hierarchy, and the military. Their respective heads were considered equal and were responsible directly to the sultan. The aggrandizement of the court, now the seat of all power, was mainly at the expense of the grand vizier's office. To underscore the reduction of his authority, in 1838 the grand vizier's title officially was changed to prime minister. At the same time, his chief assistants were given the title of minister. Consultative councils were established to supervise military and civil matters and to propose new legislation. The highest of these, the Supreme Council for Judicial Ordinances *(Meclis-i Vala-yi Ahkam-i Adliye),* established in 1838, acted as an advisory council to the sultan.

The military, which during Mahmud's last years was allocated about 70 percent of the state's revenues, continued to be the focal point of reform. Most significant was the gradual extension of the authority of the commander-in-chief. His office came to combine the roles of a ministry of war and general staff, and was in charge of all land forces. The navy continued to operate independently under the grand admiral, whose administration comprised a separate ministry.

Mahmud II came to power in 1808, after the deposition and murder of his brother, Mustafa IV. His most notable achievement was the destruction of the janissaries, an elite Ottoman fighting corps that had become inefficient and rebellious. **© GETTY IMAGES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

In May 1835 an Ottoman expeditionary force occupied Tripoli in Africa, claiming it back for the sultan. In the following years, Ottoman fleets appeared several times before Tunis, but were turned back by the French navy. In the spring of 1839, believing that his army had sufficiently recovered and that a general uprising in Syria against Egypt's rule was imminent, Mahmud precipitated another crisis. On 24 June the Egyptians decisively routed the Ottoman army at Nizip. Mahmud died on 1 July, probably before learning of his army's defeat.

See also JANISSARIES; MUHAMMAD ALI; VAKA-I HAYRIYE.

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AVIGDOR LEVY
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

MAHMUD DURRANI

[1765–1829]

Amir of Afghanistan, 1800–1803, 1809–1818.

Mahmud Durrani was one of twenty-one sons of Afghan Amir Timur Shah (1773–1793) and the second oldest. Mahmud was governor of Herat, and in 1800 he successfully fought his half brother Zaman Shah for the Kabul throne. Content to leave the governing to Barakzai ministers, Mahmud was ousted by another half brother, Shah Shuja, the seventh son of Timur. Mahmud was imprisoned but escaped to Kandahar in 1809 and regained the Kabul throne in 1813. Once again driven from power in 1819, he retired to Herat, where he died in 1829; according to some reports the cause of death was malaria, but others suggest that he was poisoned by his ambitious son Kamran.

Mahmud's reign marked the beginning of internal conflict and civil war, which was to continue throughout the nineteenth century, until the reign of Abdur Rahman (1880–1901). During this period, much of the territory originally belonging to Afghanistan was lost. Mahmud was a weak leader who preferred to enjoy the perquisites of royalty rather than tending to affairs of state.

See also BARAKZAI DYNASTY.

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GRANT FARR

MAHMUDIYYA CANAL

Artificial waterway in Egypt.

Built between 1817 and 1820 at the command of Muhammad Ali, viceroy of Egypt, this navigation canal connected Alexandria with the delta village of al-Atf and hence with Bulaq, the port city of Cairo. Its construction cost 35,000 purses (7.5 million French francs). Possibly as many as 300,000 peasants were conscripted to dig it during the period of concentrated work in 1819, costing between 12,000 and 100,000 casualties. Owing to the Nile floods, the canal has been dredged often, and annual improvements have been made since its construction. It also provided some summer irrigation and some of Alexandria's drinking water supply.

See also MUHAMMAD ALI.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

MAHMUD, MUHAMMAD

[1877–1941]

Egyptian politician and prime minister.

Born into a family of wealthy landowners in Upper Egypt and educated at Oxford University in England, Muhammad Mahmud was one of the original members of the Wafd. Along with Saʿd Zaghlul and two other Egyptian leaders, he was banished by the British to Malta during the anticolonial uprising in March 1919. In 1922, after Britain declared Egypt's independence, he split from the Wafd and became a leader in the Liberal Constitutionalist Party. King Fuad appointed him prime minister in June 1928, and he ruled without a parliament for eighteen months under a "law and order" slogan. During the 1930s he and his party steered a middle course between the royalist government of Ismaʿil Sidqi and the popular Wafd Party.

In 1937, when young King Farouk dismissed the Wafdist cabinet of Mustafa al-Nahhas, Mahmud again became prime minister, heading a cabinet made up of minority parties that excluded the Wafd. His res-

ignation in August 1939 was attributed to ill health but was, in fact, due to Ali Mahir's political intrigues and the king's partiality toward Germany at the onset of World War II.

See also Liberal Constitutionalist Party; Mahir, Ali; Nahhas, Mustafa al-; Sidqi, Isma'il; Wafd; Zaghlul, Sa'd.

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Roger Allen
Updated by Arthur Goldschmidt

MAHMUD, MUSTAFA

[1921–]

Muslim physician, author, philanthropist, and television personality.

Born and raised in Tanta, Mustafa Mahmud studied at the Faculty of Medicine at Cairo University. He practiced medicine from 1952 to 1966 and wrote a book, *Allah wa al-insan* (God and the human being), that was banned by a state court during the Nasser era for its materialism. After several years of adherence to leftist, secular, and materialistic values, he gave up his medical practice to write books, including a commentary on the Qur'an, and he gradually became a convinced Muslim, as described in his autobiography, *Rihlati min al-shakk ila al-iman* (My journey from doubt to belief), first published in 1972. Concurrently he began to host a television series called *Al-Ilm wa al-Iman* (Science and faith), portraying the phenomena and the creatures of the natural world and proving God to be their primary cause. The series became immensely popular with Egypt's educated middle class. Dissatisfied with the efficacy of doctors and hospitals in caring for sick people, he raised the funds necessary to build a mosque in the upscale Muhandisin district of Cairo with an attached charitable association, including a hospital and polyclinic, in 1975. This organization now includes an aquarium, library, observatory, geological museum, and seminar hall. While managing this complex of religious institutions, he has continued to write and to speak on television. Among his publications are two books that have been translated into English, *Marxism and Islam* and *Dialogue with an Atheist.* Drawing on charitable contributions by Egyptians and by Arabs from the Gulf states, he has successfully provided generous benefits to a large professional staff and low-cost health care for thousands of patients, independent of the Egyptian government. He has successfully avoided any involvement in revolutionary Islamist movements and forthrightly condemns terrorism. Although not a member of the *ulama,* Mustafa Mahmud has become one of Egypt's most influential and respected authorities on Islamic beliefs and institutions because of his reconciliation of science and faith in terms understandable to modernized Egyptians.

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Arthur Goldschmidt

MAHMUD OF SULAYMANIYA

[1878–1956]

Kurdish leader.

Born to a prestigious family of Islamic shaykhs in Barzinja (Ottoman Kurdistan, later Iraq), Mahmud Barzinji became the main adversary of Britain's efforts to integrate the Kurds of the *vilayet* (province)

of Mosul into Iraq. Proclaiming himself king of Kurdistan in the city of Sulaymaniya, he led several revolts from 1918 to 1930—first against the British then against the new Iraqi monarchy.

See also KURDS.

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CHRIS KUTSCHERA

MAIMON, YEHUDAH LEIB HACOHEN
[1875–1962]

Religious Zionist leader, author, and first Israeli minister of religious affairs.

Yehudah Leib Hacohen Maimon was born in Markuleshti, Bessarabia, Russia. His parents supported the Lovers of Zion (Horevei Zion; also Hibbat Zion) movement and he was exposed to classic religious Zionist writing from an early age. He studied in the yeshivas (Jewish religious schools) of Lithuania, developing extensive ties with other religious Zionists. One of his associations was with Rabbi Isaac Jacob Reines, founder of the Mizrahi party within the World Zionist Organization, and Maimon rose to leadership there. He immigrated to Palestine in 1913, was arrested and imprisoned, then expelled by the Turks in 1915. He returned to Palestine in 1919, by permission of the British, after spending some years in the United States.

Along with Rabbi A. I. Kook, Maimon established the chief rabbinate in Palestine. In 1935, he was elected Mizrahi representative to the executive of the Jewish Agency. Maimon then founded the Mossad Harav Kook educational institute and publishing house, where he edited the periodical *Sinai.* As Israel's first minister of religious affairs, 1948–1951, he set policy regarding a number of major public religious issues. Maimon also authored many books on religious Zionism and major rabbinic figures.

See also HIBBAT ZION; KOOK, ABRAHAM ISAAC HACOHEN; MIZRAHI MOVEMENT.

CHAIM I. WAXMAN

MAJALI FAMILY

Prominent Jordanian political family.

The Majali family has been one of two leading Sunni Muslim families in the town of al-Karak in south-central Jordan (the other being the al-Tarawina family). Family members have long served both the Ottoman Turks and the Hashimite family that has ruled Jordan since 1921 and have occupied senior positions in the government and military.

Rufayfan (d. 1945) was decorated by the Ottomans during World War I. He later headed the self-described "Arab Government of Moab" in al-Karak, with British assistance, from 1920 to 1921. After the establishment of Transjordan, he became a significant figure in the socioeconomic and political life of south-central Jordan. He founded the Moderate Liberal Party in 1930 and sat in the Transjordanian legislative council from 1931 until his death in 1945.

Habis (1910–2001) joined the Jordanian Arab Legion in 1932. In the Arab–Israel War of 1948, he commanded the legion's fourth battalion, which defeated the Israelis at Latrun. Thereafter, Majali headed the Royal Guards unit of the army and was aide-de-camp to King Abdullah I ibn Hussein from 1949 to 1951. In 1956 he was appointed assistant chief of staff of the army following the failed coup led by Ali Abu Nuwwar. Majali was chief of staff from 1957 to 1965 and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff from 1965 to 1967. He was appointed defense minister after the Arab–Israel War of 1967, but returned to his post as chief of staff during the Black September crisis of 1970. He was later appointed to the Jordanian senate, and died in April 2001.

Hazza (1916–1960) served as minister of agriculture (1950–1951), justice (1951 and 1954–1955), and interior (1953–1954 and 1955). A rising young star on the political scene, he first served as prime minister in 1955 when King Hussein tried to join the Baghdad Pact, but quickly resigned following popular protests. He served both as prime minister and foreign minister starting in May 1959, but was assassinated in August 1960 in a bomb attack generally believed to have been carried out by agents of the Egyptian-Syrian United Arab Republic. His daughter, Taghrid (1950–), married Prince Muhammad ibn Talal, brother of King Hussein, in 1981.

Abd al-Salam (1925–) received his medical degree from the Syrian University in 1949. He was director of medical services for the Jordanian armed forces, president of Jordan University (1971–1976), and minister of health (1969–1970 and 1970–1971). He served as advisor to King Hussein starting in the late 1980s. Majali was prime minister from 1993 to 1995, during which time he signed the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. He later was prime minister from 1997 to 1998, after which he was appointed to the Jordanian senate.

Abd al-Hadi (1934–) was chief of staff of the Jordanian army from 1979 to 1981, after which he served as ambassador to the United States from 1981 to 1983. Al-Majali returned to Jordan to direct the Public Security Directorate (police) from 1985 to 1989. In 1990 al-Majali formed the Jordanian Covenant Party (Hizb al-Ahd al-Urdunni) to express pro-regime, East Bank nationalist feeling in opposition to leftist and Palestinian-oriented parties. He served in parliament from 1993 to 1997 and was minister of public works from 1996 to 1997. In 1997 his party merged with eight other centrist parties to form the National Constitutional Party. Al-Majali was speaker of the house of delegates in 1997.

See also KARAK, AL-; MAJALI, HAZZA AL-.

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

MAJALI, HAZZA AL-

[1918–1960]

Jordanian prime minister.

As a member of a very influential clan from the Karak area of southern Jordan, Hazza al-Majali had a strong popular base in Jordan but was viewed as a threat by Palestinians. He was asked by King Hussein ibn Talal to form a government in December 1955 that would push through Jordan's participation in the Baghdad Pact. He was forced to resign, however, a few days later as a consequence of violent demonstrations against joining. He was known to be strongly pro-regime and encouraged cooperation with the West, particularly the United States, Britain, and Germany, who were supporting Jordan at the time both financially and technically. Yet Majali was considered to be progressive for his times because of his activism in parliament. As a member of parliament in 1953, he helped found the National Socialist Party, consisting of thirteen members of parliament. He led them in lively opposition to then Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, forcing him to call for new elections in 1954 rather than face a no confidence vote. He quit the party, however, after Sulayman al-Nabulsi had joined and transformed it into a left-leaning, pro-Nasser party. Majali was assassinated on 29 August 1960, fifteen months into his term as prime minister. During his term, he had earned a reputation for taking firm measures against communism and subversive activities. He was killed by a bomb placed in his office; it was widely assumed to have been the work of agents of the United Arab Republic.

See also ABU AL-HUDA, TAWFIQ; BAGHDAD PACT (1955); HUSSEIN IBN TALAL; NABULSI, SULAYMAN AL-; UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.

JENAB TUTUNJI

MAJLES

See GLOSSARY

MAJLES AL-SHURA

National assembly of Iran.

The history of a representative, elected assembly in Iran dates to the Constitutional Revolution, when the Majles was stipulated as the legislative branch of government in the constitution. The first elections were held in the summer of 1906, and the new Majles convened in October. Except for a brief period from its inception to the end of World War I, and again from 1941 to 1953, the Majles in monarchical Iran did not enjoy a significant degree of autonomy, and it exercised little initiative in the nation's political life. Women gained suffrage in 1963, and twenty-four assemblies met from 1906 to 1978.

After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Majles al-Shura-ye Melli (National Assembly) was

renamed the Majles al-Shura-ye Islami (Islamic Assembly), and it has played a prominent role in political affairs. The first postrevolutionary Majles opened on 28 May 1980 and elected Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as its speaker. Its most significant act was the impeachment of the Islamic Republic's first president, Abolhasan Bani Sadr, in June 1981. After Rafsanjani became president in 1989, Mehdi Karrubi succeeded him as speaker of the Majles, a position he held until 1992, when he failed to win a seat in that year's elections. Ali Akbar Nateq-e Nuri then served as speaker until he was defeated in the 2000 Majles elections. Karrubi returned to the Majles in those elections and again was elected as speaker.

See also Bani Sadr, Abolhasan; Constitutional Revolution; Iranian Revolution (1979); Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi.

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Neguin Yavari
Updated by Eric Hooglund

MAJLIS SHURA AL-NUWWAB

Egypt's first quasi-representative assembly.

Established in 1866 by a decree from Khedive Isma^cil of Egypt, the *majlis* was intended to be a consultative council that would advise him on administrative matters. But he may have been driven by his growing financial straits to co-opt the landowning notables to raise taxes. Its seventy-five members, barred from government posts while they held office, were elected for three-year terms. Timid at first, they grew more assertive as they gained experience and often passed resolutions for administrative reforms. Nevertheless, they met for only three months at a time and were not even convened in 1872, 1874, and 1875.

While its role was subordinated to the other deliberative bodies, the Privy Council and the Council of Justice, which were smaller and made up of powerful government officials, the *majlis* emerged as one of the standard-bearers of Egyptian nationalism in the era of the Urabi revolution. In part, this happened because the Egyptian landowners were, along with the peasants, victims of Isma^cil's mismanagement and the financial stringencies adopted by Khedive Tawfiq and the Dual Control.

See also Dual Control; Isma^cil ibn Ibrahim; Urabi, Ahmad.

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Arthur Goldschmidt

MAKDASHI, HESNA

Lebanese publisher and activist.

Originally from Lebanon, Hesna Makdashi has been active in the Egyptian publishing world since the late 1970s. In Cairo in 1992, together with four other Arab women, Makdashi founded Nour, the first publishing house to specialize in works by and about Arab women. In a publication issued by Nour in 1996, Makdashi reviewed the aims of the publishing house. She stated that the magazine should encourage women's literary and critical production, and also serve as a venue for the announcement of books by women and what is written about them. According to Makdashi, a third aim of the Nour publishing house was to organize an Arab women's book fair every two years that would serve as a platform for discussing the situation of Arab women and featuring their intellectual and creative achievement. Nour publishing house raised the funds to sponsor the first such exhibition in November 1995. The exhibit was held in the prominent Hanager Cultural Center in Cairo and attracted publishers from all over the Middle East. Makdashi served as managing editor of the magazine *Nour,* which featured articles on women writers, announcements and reviews of their literary and scholarly work, and published papers and responses emanating from the book fairs it sponsored.

See also Egypt; Gender: Gender and Education; Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries.

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Caroline Seymour-Jorn

MAKHMALBAF FAMILY

An Iranian family of film directors, screenplay writers, and producers.

One of Iran's internationally acclaimed film directors in the post-revolutionary period is Mohsen Makhmalbaf. His films are deeply social and deal with issues as diverse as an attack on police in the autobiographical *Bread and the Alley,* where he introduced innovations to the neorealist genre by having the original police officer play himself; to jail in *Boycott*; to the aftermath of war in *The Marriage of the Blessed*; to the situation of Afghan refugees in Iran in *The Bicycle Run*; to film itself in *Saalam Cinema.* He has also made art-house films, including *Once upon a Time Cinema.* He was the subject of a film by a fellow film director, Abbas Kiarostami; *Close-up* is the true story of an ordinary man who impersonated Makhmalbaf to gain access to a wealthy Tehran family. Makhmalbaf caught international attention with his colorful film *Gabbeh,* after which he took a break from filmmaking (in 1996) to start the Makhmalbaf film house, where his wife and children have learned the arts of filmmaking, photography, and writing, and excelled in them. Samira Makhmalbaf, his oldest daughter, became at eighteen the youngest filmmaker ever to enter a film in the Cannes Film Festival with *The Apple.* His wife Marziyeh Meshkini won international acclaim for her film, *The Day I Became Woman.* His son, Maysem, is a photographer and has produced the stills for the family's films as well as a book on his father's film *Silence* and a documentary on Samira's film *The Blackboards.* Makhmalbaf's youngest daughter, Hana, born in 1988, has already made two films and published poetry. Her documentary on Afghanistan debuted at the Cannes Film Festival in 2003.

See also Iranian Revolution (1979).

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Stardust Striken. Directed by Houshang Golmakani. 1996.

Roxanne Varzi

MAKHMALBAF, MOHSEN
[1957–]

Major Iranian filmmaker of the post-1979 era.

Mohsen Makhmalbaf's career as a filmmaker has never veered far from his career as a political activist and writer—only the genres and the political ideologies have changed over time. Born in Tehran, at the age of fifteen he began an Islamic militia organization. Later, he wounded a police officer in the shah's regime, for which he was imprisoned in 1974 and released with the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Many of his films blur the lines of social realism, fiction, and his own life story: *Boycott* (1985) is based on his experience in prison; *Moment of Innocence* (1995), on the wounding of a police officer (the real police officer plays a role in the film). Makhmalbaf is an innovator of the Iranian new wave, as seen in his films *Gabbeh* (1995) and *Salaam Cinema* (1994). He is also a visual activist concerned with domestic social issues such as the failing economy, as seen in *The Peddler* (1986); Afghans in Iran and abroad, as seen in *The Cyclist* (1987), *Kandehar* (2000), and *Afghan Alphabet* (2002) (as well as in his writings about and activism in Afghanistan); and the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, as seen in *Marriage of the Blessed* (1988). He is also an innovator of art-house cinema, as evidenced in films such as *Images from the Qajar Dynasty* (1992). In 1996 he began the Makhmalbaf Film House in Tehran, where he is educating his two daughters, son, and wife in the art of filmmaking and social awareness.

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Stardust Striken. Directed by Houshang Golmakani. 1996.

Roxanne Varzi

MAKKI, HASAN MUHAMMAD

[c. 1935–]

Yemeni government official.

Born in the mid-1930s, Hasan Muhammad Makki came from a prominent merchant family from the port of Hodeida on the Red Sea; he was a member of the Famous Forty—the boys sent abroad for education by Imam Yahya in 1947—and received his secondary and university education in Egypt and Italy, respectively. Makki held high government office in the Yemen Arab Republic, in each of its five regimes after the 1962 revolution, as well as in the Republic of Yemen after the unification of the two Yemens in 1990; he did so despite his relatively advanced and leftist political views and reputation. In the Yemen Arab Republic he was prime minister during a turbulent time in 1974, president of Sanʿa University from 1975 to 1976, and deputy prime minister or foreign minister on several occasions between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s. He was first deputy prime minister during the first years of the Republic of Yemen, after Yemeni unification in mid-1990; and in 1994, after the brief civil war, he was appointed adviser to the president. Seriously wounded in the Siege of Sanʿa in 1968 and the victim an assassination attempt during the politically tumultuous spring of 1994, he has been in ill health much of the time since the mid-1990s.

See also SANʿA UNIVERSITY; YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

MAKSOUD, CLOVIS

[1928–]

Lebanese lawyer, journalist, and diplomat.

Clovis Maksoud (also Maqsud) was born in 1928 into a Christian family. He completed his graduate studies at the American University of Beirut. Afterwards, he obtained a J.D. from George Washington University and did postgraduate studies at Oxford University. Between 1961 and 1966 Maksoud was the League of Arab States' chief representative in India. Following his diplomatic stint Maksoud went back to journalism, and from 1967 to 1979 he served as the senior editor of the Egyptian newspaper *al-Ahram* and chief editor of the Lebanon-based *al-Nahar Weekly.* Maksoud has authored several articles and books on the Middle East, including: "The Meaning of Non-Alignment," "The Crisis of the Arab Left," "Reflections on Afro-Asianism," and the "Arab Image." Currently, Maksoud is professor of international relations at American University in Washington, D.C., where he also is director of the Center for the Global South. He is also a member of the advisory group of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

See also SALAM FAMILY.

GEORGE IRANI

MAKTUM FAMILY, AL-

Head of Al Bu Falasa tribe and a member of the Banu Yas federation, the ruling family of the Dubai emirate.

The founder, Maktum ibn Buti, seceded from Abu Dhabi in 1833 and established himself independently in Dubai. The rulers of the family were well known for their skill in diplomacy and their interest in trade. The most prominent of them were Rashid ibn Maktum (1886–1894) and Maktum ibn Hashr (1894–1906), during whose reign the Dubai port flourished, particularly in 1902, after the British-Indian Steam Navigation Company made it a port of call. As a result of his encouragement, the rich immigrant merchants from the Lingeh port on the Persian coast came to reside in Dubai. In 1938, because of a reform movement in the emirate, the Dubai municipality was established during the rule of Saʿid ibn Maktum (1912–1958). His son Rashid created and ruled (1958–1990) modern Dubai, becoming vice-president of the United Arab Emirates when it was formed in 1971 and prime minister in 1979.

See also DUBAI; UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.

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M. MORSY ABDULLAH

MALAʾIKA, NAZIK AL-
[1923–]

Iraqi poet and critic.

Nazik al-Malaʾika was born in 1923 in Baghdad, and is one of the greatest Arab poets of the twentieth century. One of the earliest creators and advocates of what is known in the Arab world as modern free poetry, this Iraqi woman influenced the course of contemporary Arabic poetry. Al-Malaʾika's mother was a poet, and her father wrote a twenty-volume encyclopedia on Arabic grammar and literature. In her youth, al-Malaʾika was influenced by the modern poetry of Mahmud Hasan Ismaʿil, Badawi al-Jabal, Amjad al-Tarabulsi, Umar Abu Risha, and Bishara al-Kuli, and also by the contemporary music of Umm Kulthum and Mohammed Abdul Wahab. In 1947 she broke free from the constraints of traditional Arabic poetry and composed the poem "Cholera" in lines of unequal length. Only in this new nonclassical form, she would write, could her emotions be expressed.

Al-Malaʾika has been primarily a poet of blank verse, although she has not strayed entirely from traditional poetic forms. In 1949, her second collection of poems, *Sparks of Ashes,* was published, including a controversial introduction explaining her new poetic theories. Her work was widely read and criticized across the Arab world, altering the debate on Arabic poetry. She became a regular contributor to leading poetry and critical journals in Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, and soon numerous poems using the same form were in print, many dedicated to al-Malaʾika herself. In 1954 she wrote one of many essays dealing with the repression of women in Arab patriarchal society. Her essay, "Women between the Extremes of Passivity and Ethical Choice," is considered a feminist classic.

A significant event in al-Malaʾika's life was the 1958 Iraqi revolution, which she commemorated with joyous poetry comparing Iraq to an orphan now in a "paternal embrace." The revolution, however, did not yield what it promised, and al-Malaʾika fled to Beirut. When she later returned to Iraq, she and her husband founded a university in Basra where she taught and wrote. She continued to publish for decades, living in Iraq, Kuwait, and Egypt. Her poetry continued to evolve, securing her a place in the canon of Arabic literature.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; LITERATURE: ARABIC; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES.

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ELISE SALEM

MALIK

See GLOSSARY

MALIK, CHARLES HABIB
[1906–1987]

Lebanese academic, philosopher, and diplomat.

Born 11 February 1906 to a Greek Orthodox family from Kura in Lebanon, Malik was schooled at the American Tripoli Boys' High School, then attended the American University of Beirut (AUB), Harvard University, and the University of Freiburg. Throughout his academic career, Malik taught philosophy, mathematics, and physics at AUB, where he was also dean. During the 1958 Lebanese Civil War, Malik was president of the 13th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Foreign minister (1956–1958) during the presidency of Camille Chamoun, Malik alienated many Lebanese politicians because of his pro–United States and pro-Western stands. He accused Egypt, Syria, and the Palestinians of fomenting trouble in the Land of Cedars.

During the Lebanese Civil War of 1975–76, Malik joined a coalition of conservative Christian leaders known as the Lebanese Front. In several statements and publications, Malik expressed his full awareness of the tragedy of the Palestinian people, but he was very distrustful of the intentions of Muslim leaders in Lebanon. Malik feared that

Lebanon as a land of Christian-Muslim coexistence was bound to be destroyed by outside interference, mainly from Syria and radical Palestinian forces. Malik authored several books and publications and was awarded honorific titles and degrees.

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GEORGE E. IRANI
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

MALIKI SCHOOL OF LAW

One of the four approaches (called schools) to Sunni Muslim law.

The Maliki school of law was named after the traditionalist and lawyer Malik ibn Anas (died 795) of Medina (in today's Saudi Arabia). Malik's active career fell at a time when the prophetic sunna (record of the utterances and deeds of the Prophet) had not yet become a material source of the law on equal footing with the Qurʾan and when *hadith* (prophetic traditions) were still relatively limited in number. In his legal reasoning, therefore, Malik made little reference to prophetic traditions and more often resorted to the *amal* (normative practice) of Medina in justification of his doctrines. As expressed in his *Muwatta,* in which he recorded the customary Medinese doctrine, Malik's reliance on traditions as well as his technical legal thought lagged behind those of the Iraqis.

Once the transition from the geographical to the personal schools took place, Malik became the eponym of the former Hijazi or Medinan school. This may be explained by the fact that Malik's writings represented the average doctrine of that geographical area, coupled perhaps with the high esteem in which he was held as a scholar.

Like the namesake of the Hanafi school of law, but unlike the founder of the Shafiʿi school of law, Malik did not provide his school with a developed body of legal doctrine. It was left for his successors, chiefly in the ninth and tenth centuries, to articulate a legal system particular to the school. Among the most important positive law works of the school are: *al-Mudawwana al-Kubra* by Sahnun (died 854); *al-Risala* by Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (died 996); al-Tahdhib, an authoritative synopsis of *al-Mudawwana,* by Abu Saʿid al-Baradhi'i (died probably after 1039); *al-Bayan,* a commentary by Ibn Rushd (died 1126) on *al-Utbiyya* of al-Utbi (died 869); *Bidaya al-Mujtahid wa Nihaya al-Muqtasid* by Ibn Rushd al-Hafid (died 1189); *al-Mukhtasar* by Sidi Khalil (died 1365); *al-Mi'yar al-Mughrib wa al-Jami al-Mu'rib* by al-Wansharisi (died 1508), one of the most important *fatwa* collections in the school. Further, in writing on legal theory *(usul al-fiqh),* the Malikis were not as prolific as their Hanafi and Shafiʿi counterparts. Three of their most distinguished legal theoreticians are: Ibn Khalaf al-Baji (died 1081), the author of *Ihkam al-Fusul*; al-Qarafi (died 1285), whose main work on the subject is *Sharh Tanqih al-Fusul,* a commentary on the work of the Shafiʿi jurist and theologian Fakhr al-Din al-Razi; and Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (died 1388), who elaborated in his *Muwafaqat* one of the most innovative legal theories that is highly regarded by modern legal reformers.

Since early medieval Islam, Malikism succeeded in spreading mainly in the Maghrib (North Africa) and Muslim Spain, being now the dominant doctrine in all Muslim African countries. In Egypt, it has traditionally shared influence with Shafiʿism. Maliki presence may also be found today in Bahrain and Kuwait.

See also FATWA; HANAFI SCHOOL OF LAW; HANBALI SCHOOL OF LAW; SHAFIʿI SCHOOL OF LAW.

WAEL B. HALLAQ

MALKOM KHAN, MIRZA

[1833–1908]

Persian diplomat, political philosopher, and advocate of modernization.

The son of Mirza Yaʿqub, an Armenian from Jolfa who had converted to Islam, Mirza Malkom (also Malkam, Malkum) Khan studied in Paris, where he became familiar with French social and political theories, especially those of Auguste Comte. On his

return to Persia, he was employed as a translator for the European teachers of the Dar al-Fonun, the modern school of higher learning inaugurated in 1851 by Persia's modernizing premier, Amir Kabir.

In 1857, Malkom wrote the first of his many pamphlets, entitled *Ketabcheh-ye Ghaybi* (The invisible booklet), in which he discussed the urgent need for modern reforms for Persia, if it were to survive as an independent nation. He also organized the Faramush-Khaneh (House of oblivion), a pseudomasonic (secret) organization, which incurred the suspicion of the Naser al-Din Shah. Malkom was exiled in 1861 and went to Baghdad. There he was befriended by Mirza Hoseyn Khan, the Persian ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, who agreed with him about modernization and reforms and who obtained his pardon from the shah. Malkom was then made a counselor in the Persian embassy in Istanbul in 1864, during the early modernization period of Ottoman Turkey, called the Tanzimat. In 1871, Mirza Hoseyn was recalled to Tehran and appointed minister of justice, then prime minister. Malkom was appointed minister to Britain.

From London, Malkom continually addressed the shah and his ministers about the need for modernization reforms. His arguments were not always original, but they were simply argued, easily understood, and effective—he criticized the government, but spared the shah. Some of his suggestions were attempted, but the experiment did not last, since the shah grew tired of the complications of change and the ongoing rivalry at court. He lost interest in all this and became more tyrannical toward the end of his reign.

While Malkom was in London, the shah took three trips to Europe, visiting London each time, where several important concessions were granted to European and British companies. Malkom was involved in their transactions and had the opportunity to benefit financially each time. In 1889, the shah granted a lottery concession to an English company, which came under attack when he returned to Persia, and the concession was canceled. Malkom, however, who knew this, did not reveal the cancellation until he had sold out his own shares.

This unethical situation cost him his position, his title, and his salary. In 1890, he began to publish a pamphlet entitled *Qanun* (The law) in London. In it his arguments turned to criticism, then outright attack, not even sparing the shah. He also mentioned secret societies that were working for reform and suggested that the natural leaders of the people were by right the *ulama* (body of mollas), and that they should lead the movement. It has since been suggested that these secret societies were not actually organized but that Malkom was saying they should be. *Qanun* was smuggled into the country and enjoyed a widespread popularity, making its mark on a generation that was soon to become involved in the Constitutional Revolution.

After the assassination of Naser al-Din Shah in 1896, Malkom was restored to favor and was appointed minister to Italy. He lived to see the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution in 1906. Despite a lifetime of argument in favor of reform, his role in the lottery concession continues to sully his name. Notwithstanding such criticism, his influence on the shah, the politicians of his day, and the modernization of Persia cannot be denied.

See also Amir Kabir, Mirza Taqi Khan; Constitutional Revolution; Tanzimat.

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Mansoureh Ettehadieh

MAʿLOUF, AMIN

[1949–]

Prominent Lebanese novelist and journalist now living in and a citizen of France.

Amin Maʿlouf (also Maʿluf) was born in Beirut in a Catholic family of journalists and writers. His father, Rushdi Maʿlouf, was and is still considered one of Lebanon's major publicists. Following his schooling, Maʿlouf joined *al-Nahar,* a major Lebanese daily, and traveled to several countries. In 1977, because of the violence brought by the Lebanese Civil War, Maʿlouf fled with his family to Paris. Maʿlouf is a prolific novelist and writer, and most of his fiction is based on historical events. His books have been

translated into more than twenty languages. His first book, *The Crusades through Arab Eyes,* has become an important reference, especially after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Among his other novels are *The Gardens of Light* (1991) and *Leo the African* (1986), a narrative of the life and travels of a geographer who lived in sixteenth-century Spain and who, after roaming Africa and the Mediterranean, ended by living in Fez, Morocco. In 1993, Maʿlouf was awarded the prestigious French literary award Le Prix Goncourt for *The Rock of Tanios.* In this book, based in nineteenth-century Lebanon, Maʿlouf details the lives of a Lebanese *shaykh* and his out-of-wedlock son. The novel is filled with local myths, romance, international intrigues, and political games. His more recent novels include *The First Century after Beatrice* (1992) and *Balthasar's Odyssey* (2000). In 1998, Maʿlouf published an essay entitled *Les identités meutrieres* (translated as *On Identity*), which draws on his multilayered identity to explain how fluid identities have become in the age of globalization. In 2000, he wrote an opera libretto, *L'amour de loin (Love from Afar)* based on a twelfth-century love story set in Tripoli (Lebanon) during the Crusades. The opera was performed in Salzburg (2000) and Paris (2001); the music was composed by the Finnish composer Kaija Saariaho.

See also LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990).

GEORGE IRANI

MAMLUKS

Rulers in Baghdad from 1749 to 1831.

The Mamluks emerged under Hasan Pasha (1704–1724) and his son Ahmad Pasha (1724–1747), both *wali* (provincial governor) of Baghdad. Hasan Pasha's intent was to strengthen his personal base of power by creating a group of disciplined military and civil functionaries committed uniquely to him and not to the government at Istanbul or the Arabs of Baghdad. A page corps was formed, originally recruited from local families but later composed almost exclusively of slaves (mamluks) imported from the Caucasus and Georgia. These slaves were instructed in reading and writing, but also horsemanship and swimming, a combination of martial and bureaucratic virtues making them superior to Turks and Iraqis as civil servants. Their training emphasized a sense of interdependence and "esprit de corps." They were made to feel that they owed their privilege to their master and to the Mamluk institution. They dominated the power elite, but as an alien force, and were merciless to any suspected rival to their authority. A close disciplined fraternity, and the only effective civil and military organization within the country, the Mamluks provided their pashas with the power of an independent monarch. Nevertheless, Mamluk pashas at no time renounced allegiance to the sultan of the Ottoman Empire. They defended Iraq from the Wahhabis and Persians but did not war on neighbors within the empire.

The first Mamluk pasha, Sulayman Abu Layla (1750–1762), came to power two years after the death of Ahmad Pasha, following an unsuccessful attempt by the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman government) to check Mamluk power by naming nonlocal candidates as pasha of Baghdad. He was followed by Ali Agha (1762–1764) whose obscure Persian birth may have contributed to his fall. The reign of Umar Pasha (1764–1775), while peaceful, was feeble and characterized by ever-lessening authority. His deposition by the sultan introduced in interregnum (1775–1780) during which a number of mostly alien pashas (Abdi Pasha, 1775; Abdullah Pasha, 1775–1777; Hasan Pasha 1778–1780) reigned briefly and without much influence. Sulayman Agha (1780–1802), known as "the Great," restored the dominance and institutions of the Mamluks with such success that his period is known as the zenith of the Mamluk era. His immediate successors, Ali Pasha (1802–1807), Sulayman the Little (1808–1810), Abdallah Pasha (1810–1813), and Saʿid Pasha (1813–1817), all died violently after brief reigns. The last of the Mamluk rulers, Da'ud Pasha (1817–1831), confronted Ottoman resolve, ignited by his failure to provide suitable remissions in the desperate circumstances of the sultan's war with Russia, to end the century-long independence of Iraq and to bring the province once again firmly into the imperial fold. Plague and flooding helped weaken the Mamluk regime and Da'ud ultimately capitulated to the sultan in 1831. He and his family were exiled to Bursa. He was subsequently recalled to service and held a number of important posts throughout the empire before dying in 1851.

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ALBERTINE JWAIDEH

MANAMA

Capital and largest city of the State of Bahrain.

Located on the north coast of Bahrain's main island and connected by causeway to Muharraq, Manama was a commercial and pearling center coveted by the Sassanids, Omanis, and Safavids. In 1782, it fell to the Al Khalifa family, under whose control it grew into a key transshipment point for trade between India and the Persian Gulf. After the 1820 General Treaty of Peace with Britain, the city's merchants flourished. By the early twentieth century, Manama was a cosmopolitan center, with large Iranian, Indian, and Gulf Arab communities; in 1946, it became home to the British Resident in the Gulf. Greater Manama houses more than 50 percent of Bahrain's inhabitants. The city's population in 2001 was about 156,000—some 70 percent larger than at independence in 1971. Bahrain's largest port, Mina Sulman, lies at the southern end of the city, next to the former British naval base at al-Jufayr, which now serves as headquarters for the United States Navy's Fifth Fleet.

See also AL KHALIFA FAMILY; BAHRAIN.

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FRED H. LAWSON

MANDAEANS

Gnostic baptist community based in Iraq and Iran.

The Mandaeans of today live as their ancestors did, along the rivers and waterways of southern Iraq and Khuzistan, Iran. The Mandaeans (from *manda,* knowledge) practice a religion that has affinities with Judaism and Christianity. Known by their neighbors as *Subbi* (baptizers), they perform repeated baptism *(masbuta)* on Sundays and special festival days. Two small rites of ablution that require no priest, *rishama* and *tamasha,* are performed by individual Mandaeans. All rituals take place on the riverbank.

MAMOON A. ZAKI

MANDATE SYSTEM

The system established after World War I to administer former territories of the German and Ottoman empires.

Until World War I, the victors of most European wars took control of conquered territories as the spoils of victory. This was especially true of the colonial territories of defeated European powers, as the victors sought to expand their own empires. World War I marked a significant break in this tradition. While Britain, France, Italy, and Japan still retained imperial aspirations, other forces tempered these goals. The United States emerged as a world power committed to an anti-imperial policy, one that sought to consider the national aspirations of indigenous peoples as well as the imperial agendas of the victors. The 5 November 1918 pre-armistice statement of the Allies, moreover, affirmed that annexation of territory was not their aim for ending the war.

The result was the mandate system of the League of Nations, established by the treaties ending World War I. Under this system, the victors of World War I were given responsibility for governing former German and Ottoman territories as mandates from the League. The ultimate goal was development of each mandate toward eventual independence. This goal was tempered, some would argue, by the fact that mandates were awarded with full consideration of both public and secret agreements made during the war. For the Middle East, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and the Balfour Declaration of 1917 helped structure the division of Ottoman territories between France and Britain.

Article 22 of the League's covenant required that the conditions of mandates vary with the character of each territory. This resulted in the establishment of three classes of mandate. Class A mandates were those to be provisionally recognized as independent until they proved able to stand on their own. Class B mandates were those further from qualifying for independence and for which the mandatory powers took on full responsibility for administration and promotion of the material and

moral welfare of the inhabitants. Class C mandates were those whose best interests were to be served by integration into the territories of the mandatory power, with due consideration being given to the interests of the inhabitants.

The Ottoman territories in the Middle East became Class A mandates. Based on World War I agreements, Britain was given responsibility for Iraq and Palestine (later Palestine and Transjordan); France got Syria (later Syria and Lebanon). These were to be supervised by the Permanent Mandates Commission consisting originally of members from Belgium, Britain, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden, to which representatives from Switzerland and Germany were later added, and a representative from Norway took the place of the Swedish representative. Although the non-mandatory powers constituted a majority, the commission never followed an aggressive policy against the interests of the mandatory powers. This was manifest by the fact that Britain and France restructured their mandates by the time the formal system came into place in 1924. Britain split the Palestinian mandate into Palestine and Transjordan, giving a special role in the latter to Sharif Husayn's son, Abdullah, as amir of Transjordan to deter his further pursuit of territorial goals in Syria. France split its mandate in Syria into Syria and Lebanon to enhance the position of Uniate Christians in Lebanon and as part of its overall strategy of sponsoring communal differences to solidify its position of eventual arbiter of all disputes in the area. The British mandate for Iraq remained intact, despite the fact that its population diversity invited similar divisions.

Although few would have predicted it in the early 1920s, all of the Class A mandates achieved independence as provided under the conditions of the mandates. The first was Iraq in 1932, although Britain retained significant diplomatic and military concessions. Syria and Lebanon followed in 1941 as World War II was getting under way. In March 1946, just before the formal dissolution of the League of Nations and transfer of its assets to the United Nations, the Treaty of London granted independence to Transjordan as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Only Palestine was left to the United Nations under its trusteeship program, and in 1947, Britain presented this thorny problem to the UN General Assembly for resolution. The result was approval of a plan for the partition of Palestine into two Arab and Jewish states and an international city of Jerusalem. Subsequent events precluded implementation of this plan, but since 1949, Israel has been a member of the United Nations.

See also Balfour Declaration (1917); Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916).

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Daniel E. Spector

MANIFESTO OF THE ALGERIAN MUSLIM PEOPLE

Document that urged Algerian autonomy within the French Union.

Ferhat Abbas, in collaboration with other Algerian leaders, drafted the Manifesto of the Algerian Muslim People during February and March 1943. It contains an analysis of the Algerian condition followed by a program of reform that marks a major stage in the progression of Algerian protest from assimilationism to separatism.

See also Abbas, Ferhat.

John Ruedy

MANSAF

See Food: Mansaf

MANSURA, AL-

Egyptian delta city.

Al-Mansura is located near Damietta, Egypt, in the delta. Founded by the Ayyubid dynasty as a fortified camp in 1219, it served as a buttress against Crusader expansion in 1221 and again in 1250, when the Mamluks scored a significant victory over Louis IX of France. It has been the administrative capital of Daqhaliyya province since 1526. Although predominantly Muslim, there have been some Copts in

the city since the seventeenth century. Its population was estimated at 441,700 in 2004.

ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

MANSURE ARMY

Ottoman army organized in 1826.

Established by the same proclamation that abolished the Janissary Corps, the new army's formal name translated as the Trained Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad. It soon recruited 12,000 troops, initially organized largely along the lines of the former Nizam-i Cedit and headed by a commander called serasker. The Mansure army was headquartered at a palace in Bayezit (Istanbul), combining the functions of military headquarters and war ministry until the end of the empire. As serasker, Mehmet Paşa Koja Husrev introduced French military organization into the Mansure and by 1830 expanded it to 27,000 troops, including the former cavalry. All remaining Ottoman fighting corps were incorporated into the Mansure in 1838, when the army's name was changed to the Ordered Troops.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

MANUFACTURES

Goods made from raw materials, originally by hand; also those made by machinery.

In antiquity and into the Byzantine Empire, the Middle East was the center of Western civilization and the region from which a wide variety of goods were first made and traded. The settled farming society allowed time for handicrafts, between crop work, and for market days and market towns. Regional trade became established by land caravan, by riverboats, and by coastal vessels that sailed the Mediterranean, the east coast of Africa, and beyond Arabia, into the Indian Ocean.

Pre-1900

The ancient Near East was the seat of civilizations that traded with one another—luxury goods for the urban elite and utilitarian items for both urban dwellers and for rural agricultural, herding, and artisan folk. Specialty products included textiles, metals, glassware, pottery, chemicals, and, later, sugar and paper. By the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, however, Europe had progressed to the point that it was exporting to the Middle East not only high technology goods, such as clocks and spectacles, but refined types of textiles, glassware, and metals. During the following centuries the flow from Europe to the Middle East increased; by the nineteenth century, Europe overwhelmed the region with goods produced cheaply and abundantly by the machinery of the Industrial Revolution, including the railroads and steamships that transported them. The Anglo–Ottoman treaty of 1838 (called the Convention of Balta Liman) fixed import duties to the Ottoman Empire at a low 8 percent. These factors drove thousands of Middle Eastern craftsmen and artisans out of business, but some managed to retain their shops and others found employment in the new textile factories of the late nineteenth century.

1900–1945

World War I exposed the region's lack of industry and, with the achievement of total or partial independence, the various governments began to take measures to encourage development. Around 1930, the Commercial and Navigation Treaties regulating tariffs lapsed, and most countries regained full fiscal autonomy. They immediately raised tariffs to favor local industry. They also promoted manufacturing in various other ways, such as encouraging people to buy national goods and giving such goods preference for government purchases. Moreover, they set up special banking, such as the Sümer and Eti banks in Turkey and the Agricultural and Industrial banks of Iran and Iraq, to promote manufacturing and mining; they also channeled credit through existing banks, such as Bank Misr in Egypt. Local entrepreneurs also became more active in the economic field, including manufacturing. In Egypt, the Misr and Abboud groups set up various industries, and in Turkey, the Iş Bank promoted development. In Palestine, where some European and Russian

A Mercedes-Benz plant in Egypt, 1990s. The car manufacturer's origins in Egypt date back to the 1950s, but it was not until 1997 that the company started manufacturing vehicles there, at its 6th of October City factory. © BOJAN BRECELJ/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Jewish immigrants brought with them both capital and skills, some set up factories or workshops in a wide variety of fields.

It is difficult to estimate the rate of industrial growth: In Turkey, between 1929 and 1938, net manufacturing production increased at 7.5 percent a year and mining advanced at about the same pace. In Egypt, the rate of growth was slightly lower and in the Jewish sector of Palestine distinctly higher. In Iran, between 1926 and 1940, some 150 factories were established with a paid-up capital of about US$150 million and employing 35,000 persons. Nevertheless, industry still played a minor role in the basically agricultural Middle Eastern economy. By 1939, employment in manufacturing and mining was everywhere less than 10 percent of the labor force, and in most of the countries it was closer to 5 percent. Industry's contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) was put at 8 percent in Egypt, 12 in Turkey, and 20 in the Jewish sector of Palestine; in the other countries it was lower. Industry still depended on imports of machinery, spare parts, raw materials, and technicians—and there were no exports of manufactured goods. A wide range of light industries, including textiles, food processing, building materials, and simple chemicals, had developed in Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Palestine, and, to a smaller extent, in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. In addition, Turkey had the beginnings of heavy industry—iron, steel, and coal. Petroleum production and refining had become important to Iran, Bahrain, and Iraq. Several countries were meeting most of their requirements of such basic consumer goods as textiles, refined sugar, shoes, matches, and cement.

Post–1945

World War II gave great stimulus to Middle Eastern industry. Imports were drastically reduced and Al-

lied troops provided a huge market for many goods. The Anglo–American Middle East Supply Center helped by providing parts, materials, and technical assistance. By 1945, total output had increased by some 50 percent. With the resumption of trade, from 1946 to 1950, many firms were hit by foreign competition, but the governments gave them tariff and other protection, so output continued to grow at about 10 percent per annum from 1946 to 1953. This rate was maintained, and in some countries (like Iran) exceeded through the 1970s, but in the 1980s it fell off sharply because of such factors as the Iran–Iraq War, the Sudanese and Lebanese civil wars, and the 1980s fall in oil prices.

Table 1 shows a breakdown of the structure of Middle Eastern industry. The main industries are still textiles (including garments); food processing (sugar refining, dough products, confectionery, soft drinks, beer); tobacco; building materials (cement, bricks, glass, sanitary ware); and assembly plants for automobiles, refrigerators, radio and television sets, and so forth, with some of the components produced locally. Important new industries have also developed—notably chemicals—including basic products, fertilizers, and various kinds of plastics; basic metals and metal products; and many types of machinery. A particularly rapidly growing branch is petrochemicals, using gases produced in the oil fields or in refineries. Only in petrochemicals, textiles, and food processing does the region's share approach or exceed 5 percent of world output. Similarly, only in phosphates and chromium is the region's share of mineral production significant.

Israel, however, has a large diamond-cutting industry and is a significant exporter of precision instruments. It is also a large exporter of arms, as is Egypt; in the late 1980s each country exported more than US$1 billion worth of weapons; they ranked third and fourth, respectively, among exporters from developing countries, and twelfth and fifteenth, among world exporters of arms. The Arab boycott has, of course, restricted some of Israel's economic pursuits within the region as well as with some international trade.

Today, manufacturing plays an important part in the Middle East's economy, accounting in many countries for 15 to 20 percent of GDP. Industry, in the broader sense, which includes mining (and therefore oil), construction, electricity, water, and gas as well as manufacturing, generally constitutes over 30 percent of GDP. In the major oil nations it is 60 percent or more, usually employing 20 to

Manufacturing Industry in 1970, 1983, 1987

Value Added (millions of U.S. dollars)

	1970	1983	1987
Egypt	—	8,950	—
Iran	1,501	11,596	—
Iraq	325	—	—
Israel	—	—	—
Jordan	32	—	552
Kuwait	120	—	1,902
Oman	—	—	464
Saudi Arabia	372	—	6,068
Syria	—	—	2,341
Turkey	1,930	—	15,863
United Arab Emirates	—	—	2,155
North Yemen	10	—	578

Distribution of Value Added (percent)

	Food Beverages Tobacco	Textiles Clothing	Machinery & Transport Equipment
Egypt	20	26	13
Iran	12	21	15
Iraq	14	9	10
Israel	12	8	32
Jordan	22	3	1
Kuwait	10	7	4
Oman	—	—	—
Saudi Arabia	—	—	—
Syria	24	10	3
Turkey	17	15	15
United Arab Emirates	14	1	—
North Yemen	—	—	—

Distribution of Value Added (percent)

	Chemicals	Other
Egypt	9	32
Iran	4	48
Iraq	16	50
Isreal	8	39
Jordan	7	67
Kuwait	6	73
Oman	—	—
Saudi Arabia	—	—
Syria	15	48
Turkey	11	43
United Arab Emirates	—	84
North Yemen	—	—

SOURCE: World Bank. *World Development Report*, 1990, Table 6. *World Development Report*, 1986, Table 7.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

30 percent of the labor force (including immigrant labor).

Factors for Low Productivity

With rare exceptions, industries still export very little and survive through government protection. Productivity is low; for example, gross annual value added in 1974 was only worth US$4,000 to US$5,000 in most countries (compared to $20,000 in West Germany). This is particularly marked in the more capital-intensive industries, such as steel, automobiles, and aircraft. In the late 1970s, in the Turkish state-owned steel mill in Iskenderun, a ton of steel took 72 worker-hours, compared with 5 in the United States and 7 in Europe; in Egypt, annual output per worker in the automobile industry was one car, compared with 30 to 50 in leading Japanese firms. In the more labor intensive industries, such as textiles, however, physical output per worker is about 30 to 50 percent of European output. Here, very low wages offset low productivity and enable the Middle East to compete. In 1980, hourly wages in the textile industry were equal to US$1 in Syria and Turkey and 40 cents in Egypt, compared to US$8.25 in Western Europe.

Low productivity in the Middle East is caused by many factors. First, capital investment per employee is low, although governments have poured large amounts into industry; in the late 1970s the share of manufacturing, mining (including oil), and energy was over 40 percent of total investment in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, and 30 percent in Iran. In the Gulf region's petrochemical industry, however, capital intensity is high and up-to-date machinery is used. Second, industry is greatly overstaffed; many governments compel firms to take on more workers—to relieve unemployment or for other political purposes. Third, the poor health, education, and housing of workers adversely affect their productivity—but conditions are improving. Fourth, there has been much bad planning, with factories being located far from suitable raw materials or good transport.

General conditions are also unfavorable for industrial development. The region is, on the whole, poor in raw materials. Wood and water have become very scarce. Minerals are generally sparse, remote, and often low grade. Most agricultural raw materials are of poor quality, lacking the uniformity required for industrial processes. The protection given to manufacturers of producers' goods (e.g., metals, chemicals, sugar) creates a handicap for industries that use their products. The main exceptions are natural and refinery gas, which are available almost free of cost, and raw cotton, which is of fine quality. The small size of the local market makes it impossible to set up factories of optimum size and the general underdevelopment of industries prevents profitable linkages among industries; both factors raise unit costs. Although the infrastructure has greatly improved, it still does not serve manufacturing adequately; for example, the frequency of power failures led many firms to install their own generators and transport costs remain high. A dependence on imported machinery, spare parts, and raw materials, although declining, is still great—hence, when a shortage of foreign exchange curtails imports, factories work below capacity, further raising unit costs.

Middle East industry also suffers from a lack of competition. Because of the small size of the local market and the high degree of protection, firms often enjoy a quasi monopoly—and behave accordingly. Finally, a great shortage of industrial skills exists at both the supervisory and foreperson levels. Even more serious is the shortage of managers; this is compounded where the government has nationalized the bulk of industry—as in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria. Here market discipline has been replaced by bureaucratic control, so efficiency has been sharply reduced.

On the whole, then, manufacturing does not make the contribution to the Middle East's economy commensurate with either the efforts or the capital invested in it. Conditions may be expected to improve, however, as the society and the economy continue to develop and as some measure of peace takes hold.

See also ARAB BOYCOTT; BALTA LIMAN, CONVENTION OF (1838); COMMERCIAL AND NAVIGATION TREATIES; TRADE.

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CHARLES ISSAWI

MAPAI

See ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

MAPAM

See ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

MAʿPILIM

See GLOSSARY

MAQARIN DAM

Dam on the Yarmuk river.

Proposed in 1953, the Maqarin (colloquially, Magarin) dam was to span the Yarmuk River between Syria and Jordan. No action was taken toward its construction, however, until 1988, when the two governments decided upon a joint project. Renamed Sadd al-Wahda (the Unity Dam), it will hold some 300 million cubic yards (225 million cu. m) of water. Jordan will pay for construction while Syria will gain use of much of the resulting electricity that is generated. In 1988, when Israel and Jordan held discussions on partitioning the waters of the Yarmuk, Syria refused to participate. Jordan and Syria finally agreed, in April 2003, to go forward with the project. A scheduled inauguration of the project in November 2003 was postponed, however.

See also YARMUK RIVER.

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

MARABOUT

A Muslim saint or holy person in North Africa.

Marabout (Arabic *murabit,* literally, "the tied one") refers in North Africa to saints or holy persons, living or dead, reputed to serve as intermediaries in securing Allah's blessings (Arabic *baraka*) for their clients and supporters. The term also refers to their shrines. In earlier centuries, marabouts "tied" tribes to Islam and mediated disputes. Although *marabout* remains current in French usage, most North Africans today use the term *salih,* "the pious one," which does not imply that Allah has intermediaries, a notion at odds with Qurʾanic doctrine. Unlike Roman Catholicism, Muslims have no formal procedures for recognizing saints, although North African Muslims associate specific "pious ones" with particular regions, towns, tribes, and descent groups. Many shrines are the site for local pilgrimages and annual festivals. Jewish communities in Morocco and Israel have similar practices, calling such a holy person *tzaddik* (or *saddiq*).

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DALE F. EICKELMAN

MARATGHI, MUSTAFA AL-

[1881–1945]

Egyptian religious leader and politician.

Mustafa al-Maratghi served as head of al-Azhar in 1928/29 and from 1935 until his death in 1945. A supporter of the Muslim reformer Muhammad Abduh, al-Maratghi used his post at al-Azhar to defend the political institutions of Islam and fight against secular nationalist leaders.

Al-Maratghi had played a pivotal role in the Cairo Caliphate Congress of May 1926. The congress discussed the restoration of the caliphate, the

office of political and spiritual leader of the Muslim world, which had been abolished by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in 1924. Al-Maratghi supported the candidacy of Egypt's King Farouk for the caliphate but was opposed by forty teachers from al-Azhar, who argued that the caliphate could not be brought to Egypt as long as the country was occupied by Britain. Meanwhile, Egyptian public opinion was more concerned with the parliamentary elections taking place that month. The congress produced no results. In 1930, al-Maratghi participated in efforts to forge a coalition between the Wafd and the Liberal Constitutionalist parties in opposition to the government of Ismaʿil Sidqi, the prime minister.

See also ABDUH, MUHAMMAD; SIDQI, ISMAʿIL.

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DAVID WALDNER

MARDAM, JAMIL

[1894–1960]

Syrian politician.

Born in Damascus to a landowning bureaucratic Sunni Muslim family, Jamil Mardam was active in the Arab national movement from its beginnings in late Ottoman days. He helped to organize al-Fatat and the first Arab Nationalist Congress and was a member of a Syrian Arab delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. When the Great Syrian Revolt (1925–1927) erupted, Mardam took part in it, seeking, like other Damascene and Druze leaders, not the overturn of the French-controlled system of rule but the modification and relaxation of that rule in a manner that would restore the influence of Syrian notables over local politics. The French had already undercut that influence in various towns as well as in the Jabal Druze. In this regard, Mardam was the principal strategist of the policy of "honorable cooperation" with the French, which stated that popular opposition to French presence should not be allowed to disrupt the delicate negotiations between the French and the leadership of Syria's independence movements.

This policy tarnished the reputation of Mardam and his supporters and forced them to look beyond Syria's frontiers for political support. In an attempt to rehabilitate their reputation and Pan-Arabism, they turned their attention to Palestine, creating in 1934 the Bureau for National Propaganda, a political body devoted to the dissemination of information on Palestine and other critical Arab issues.

Mardam was a founder of the National Bloc, a broad-based group established in 1927 to spearhead the independence struggle in Syria. He also was one of its most active members at the leadership level in Damascus, where the Bloc's headquarters were based. During the French mandate, Mardam was elected a deputy in Syria's National Assembly in 1932, 1936, and 1943 and served as minister from 1932 to 1933, 1936 to 1939, and 1943 to 1945. After full independence was achieved, he served as prime minister from December 1946 to December 1948, as well as minister of the interior in 1947 and minister of defense in 1948.

The growth of action-oriented political organizations in Syria after the Arab-Israel War of 1948 (the Communists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Baʿth), damaged the prospects of the National Bloc (renamed the National Party in 1943) in the new local and inter-Arab rivalries that governed political life in Syria throughout the 1950s. In the end, the discrediting of the old guard who led the National Bloc rendered the political fortunes of Mardam bleaker and bleaker, thus forcing him out of politics.

See also ARAB-ISRAEL WAR (1948); BAʿTH, AL-; FATAT, AL-; JABAL DRUZE; MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD; NATIONAL BLOC; NATIONAL PARTY (SYRIA); PALESTINE; PAN-ARABISM.

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MUHAMMAD MUSLIH

MARDOM PARTY

A government-sponsored political party, created in Iran in 1957 as an opposition party.

As a result of pressure for democracy and in the hope of giving the appearance of a two-party system, the Mardom party was established as an "opposition" party under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's rule in Iran in 1957. Its founder, Amir Asadollah Alam, was a large landlord, a former prime minister, and a close associate and confidant of the shah. The party's official platform included such issues as raising the standard of living for farmers, workers, and government officials, as well as facilitating the acquisition of land by the farmers. Together with the "official" government party, the Nationalist party or Hezb-e Melliyun, however, the Mardom party came to have a reputation for being a government organ, the Nationalist being known as the "yes" party and the Mardom as the "yes, sir" party. In 1975, the Mardom party was dissolved when the shah decided to revert to a one-party system and started the Rastakhiz party. Many people point to the establishment and dissolution of the Mardom party, both government-inspired, as indications of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's failure in developing Iran's political system.

See also ALAM, AMIR ASADOLLAH.

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PARVANEH POURSHARIATI

MARETH LINE

A defensive position in Tunisia.

The Mareth Line was designed by the French to protect Tunisia's southeastern flank against an Italian invasion from Libya. Twenty-two miles (35 km) long, it was named for Mareth, a small town southeast of Gabès. In November 1942, following the defeat of Gen. Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps at al-Alamayn by British forces under Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, the Germans rushed reinforcements and equipment to Tunisia. The Mareth Line was the southern key to German defenses.

Breaking through the Mareth Line became a major objective of Allied forces. In March 1943, the British Eighth Army—together with forces from France and New Zealand—assaulted the Mareth Line. An outflanking maneuver by New Zealand troops forced General Jürgen von Armin to withdraw his forces to Enfidaville, near the Cape Bon peninsula.

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LARRY A. BARRIE

MARGUERITE TAOS KABYLE

See AMROUCHE, MARY LOUISE

MA'RIB

Ancient town of North Yemen, enjoying new life because of oil.

Maʾrib was, until the 1980s, the small government center and garrison of the large, sparsely populated Yemeni province of the same name. The town is located about a hundred miles east of Sanʿa, on the edge of the desert. For centuries before the Common Era, Maʾrib was the capital of the trading kingdom of Saba, once ruled by Bilqis, the Queen of Saba (or Sheba). The fabled Maʾrib dam is nearby, and its monumental remains and those of the vast associated irrigation system are still in evidence. The gradual collapse of these works early in the Common Era forced the depopulation of the region; in the 1960s, the sleepy town that remained was all but abandoned after bombardment during the Yemen Civil War. Since the mid-1980s, however, the town has undergone a major renewal as the center closest to the important oil operations in the Maʾrib/al-Jawf basin; major natural gas reserves also have been discovered. The construction of a new dam in the 1980s, financed by Abu Dhabi, made possible the revival of major irrigated agriculture. All this

has also given the area new military significance, especially since much of the province is tribal and beyond the effective control of the state.

See also SANʿA; YEMEN CIVIL WAR.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

MARIETTE, AUGUSTE

[1821–1881]

French Egyptologist.

Auguste Mariette founded the Egyptian Antiquities Service in 1858 and the Egyptian Museum, thereby slowing the indiscriminate destruction and export of pharaonic antiquities to Europe. His workers in archaeology excavated scores of monuments: the Serapeum of the Apis bulls at Saqqara was his most famous discovery. French control of the Antiquities Service was to last until 1952, when the Egyptian monarchy and colonialism ended and a republic was declared.

See also EGYPTIAN MUSEUM.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

MARʿI, MARIAM

[1945–]

Palestinian activist; a founder of Dar al-Tifl al-Arabi.

Mariam (also Maryam) Marʿi was born in Acre (now in northern Israel but then in the British Mandate of Palestine). She received a bachelor of arts degree in counseling education and art from Haifa University in 1975 and a master of arts degree in counseling education from Michigan State University in 1977. She received her doctorate in international education from Michigan State University in 1983. Marʿi worked as an elementary school teacher in Acre from 1966 to 1967 and as an instructor in the Arab Teacher Training College in Haifa from 1973 to 1977. She also directed the Acre branch of the Arab Teacher Training College from 1993 to 1997. She was the founder and director general of Dar al-Tifl al-Arabi (Early Childhood Educational Center) in Acre between 1984 and 1997. She was also the founder and first president of the Acre Arab Women's Association in 1975, and the founder and first president of the Galilee Social Research Center in Nazareth in 1987. Marʿi's activities and publications focus on early childhood education and development, the status of Palestinian women in Israel, and dialogue between Arab and Jewish peace groups. Marʿi received the Rotfield Prize for Education for Peace in 1989, and she serves on the boards of various national and international organizations.

ISIS NUSAIR

MARINE BARRACKS BOMBING (LEBANON)

A bombing that caused the deaths of 241 U.S. Marines in the Lebanese Civil War.

Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the massacre by the Phalange militia of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut, the administration of President Ronald Reagan dispatched peacekeeping troops to Lebanon in the framework of the Multinational Force (MNF). The MNF was composed of U.S., French, British, and Italian contingents tasked with shoring up the regime of President Amin Jumayyil, brother of the assassinated Bashir Jumayyil. The presence of U.S. Marines in West Beirut polarized animosities between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, and the American contingent became the target of hatred and distrust.

Lebanese Muslims, especially Shiʿites living in the slums of West Beirut and around the airport—where the marines were headquartered—saw the MNF not as a peacekeeping force but as another faction in the Lebanese war. U.S. troops particularly were seen as perpetuating Maronite Catholic rule

over Lebanon. Muslim feelings against the American presence were exacerbated when missiles lobbed by the U.S. Sixth Fleet hit innocent by-standers in the Druze-dominated Shuf mountains. On 20 October 1983, a Shiʿite Islamic Jihad member drove a truck loaded with 12,000 pounds of TNT into the lobby where the U.S. contingent was stationed and blew himself up, thereby killing 241 servicemen. In 1984, the Reagan administration withdrew the U.S. contingent from Lebanon.

See also REAGAN, RONALD.

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GEORGE E. IRANI

MARITIME PEACE IN PERPETUITY, TREATY OF (1853)

Treaty between Great Britain and the rulers of the lower Persian Gulf shaykhdoms.

After crushing local opposition to its claim of hegemony over the Persian Gulf portion of its economically important route to India, Britain sought to maintain its prerogatives and influence over the region's rulers and their subjects through a number of general treaties. The first of these was signed in 1820 and called for general disarmament and an end to attacks on British shipping. The treaty did not prohibit declared maritime warfare among local tribes, so this continued unabated, often disrupting the harvesting of pearls, an important source of income for merchants and rulers. In order to prevent attacks during the six-month pearling season, the ruler of Sharjah and Raʾs al-Khaymah suggested to the British that they oversee a truce. The British did so reluctantly, and a maritime truce was signed in 1835 and renewed annually until 1843, when a ten-year truce was signed. Reflecting Britain's willingness to expand its military and political commitments in the Persian Gulf, the 1853 Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity was meant to make the provisions of the 1843 treaty "lasting and inviolable," and called on the rulers to bring about a complete cessation of hostilities, to punish any of their subjects who attacked subjects of another treaty signatory, and to refrain from retaliating if they were victims of aggression and instead inform the British authorities, who promised to obtain reparations for any injury or damage. The emirates whose rulers signed the treaty were known afterward by English speakers as the Trucial States.

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ANTHONY B. TOTH

MARJA AL-TAQLID

Senior clergy of Shiʿism whom faithful are supposed to follow in religious matters.

Marja al-taqlid, or authority appointed to be emulated by believers, is one of the main pillars of Twelve Imam Shiʿism during the period of the occultation of the twelfth imam, the last of the faith's infallible leaders. Twelver Shiʿism holds that the Twelfth Imam, Hasan al-Askari, left earth in 873 C.E., beginning a period of occultation in which Shiʿites are left without a member of the progeny of the first imam, Ali ibn Abi Talib, son-in-law and nephew of the prophet Muhammad, to rule over them. Before his major occultation, the Twelfth Imam appointed four special assistants, the last of whom died in 939 C.E. Shiʿite biographical compilations generally take Abu Jaʿfar Mohammad Koleyni (d. 940), one of the first compilers of Shiʿite traditions, to be the first *marja al-taqlid* after the occultation. In the medieval period, however, the office was not well defined. That task was undertaken by Shaykh Mohammad Hasan Esfahani Najafi, known as Sahb al-Javaher (d. 1849). In all, seventy-seven *marja al-taqlid* were recognized from 940 to 1995 (different sources

provide slightly different tabulations), forty-nine of whom were Iranians and the rest Arabs.

The *marja al-taqlid* is regarded as one of the highest *ulama* (clergy) in Shiʿism; his words and deeds serve as a guide for those members of the community unable to exert independent judgment *(ijtihad).* As such, holders of the position have come to enjoy substantial political clout in the modern period, especially because believers throughout the world provide the *marja al-taqlid* with considerable donations in the form of religious tithes. In fact, one of the qualifications of a *marja* is his ability to attract donations and raise enough money to finance the education of religious students. There are six conditions for the *marja al-taqlid* that are accepted unanimously by Shiʿite theologians, namely maturity *(bulugh),* reasonableness *(aql),* being of the male sex *(dhukurrat),* faith *(iman),* justice *(edalat),* and legitimacy of birth. (These are general principles for the selection of a *marja al-taqlid,* and no specific process has ever been formalized.) Except for a brief period of centralization in nineteenth-century Iran engineered by Shaykh Morteza Ansari (d. 1864), clerical decentralization is an integral part of the Shiʿite hierarchy. Another defining characteristic of the *marja al-taqlid,* which again distances it from the papacy, is that designation to the position is entirely at the discretion of the believers themselves. The *marja al-taqlid* is not appointed by an official body resembling a council of *ulama.*

The sanctity of the office has increased in political clout in the modern period. In 1963, when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was arrested by the government of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the entire Shiʿite world rallied behind him and pressured the shah into releasing him. With the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the establishment of the governance of the jurist *(velayat-e faqih),* which designates a single leader *(vali-ye faqih)* for Shiʿites, the office of *marja al-taqlid* has acquired an ambiguous position, somewhat rivaling that of the *vali-ye faqih.* Since the death of Khomeini, no single ayatollah has emerged as a sole, authoritative *marja al-taqlid*; rather, several ayatollahs are recognized as sharing relatively equal status as *marja al-taqlids.*

See also IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH; PAHLAVI, REZA; SHIʿISM; VELAYAT-E FAQIH.

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NEGUIN YAVARI
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

MARK VIII

108th Coptic patriarch of Egypt serving from 1796 to 1809.

The papacy of Mark VIII is remembered more for the great historic event that occurred during his tenure—the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt (1798–1801)—than for his accomplishments. The prosperity enjoyed by the Coptic laity throughout Mark's career resulted from individual ambition not from the patriarch's initiative. Even construction of the Cathedral of St. Mark (dedicated to the archbishop's namesake) at al-Azbakiyya was the work of two influential citizens, not the patriarch.

Likewise, a Coptic military unit was more effective than Mark in dealing with Muslim tensions. Under the French, many Copts held high political and military positions and were handsomely rewarded for their loyalty. The Islamic majority could not tolerate the double disgrace of so many European Christians descending upon Egypt and their subsequent favoritism shown not only to the Copts but also to all other non-Muslims living in Cairo (Syrians, Greeks, and Jews). Several brutal assaults on the Copts in Cairo occurred during the French occupation and even thereafter. The famous Coptic Legion commanded by the illustrious General Yaʿqub was created to counter this persecution.

In spiritual matters Mark achieved some distinction. He maintained an active correspondence with the Coptic parishes throughout Egypt and sent an important pastoral letter to Ethiopia. Because the church of St. Mark in "Babylon," the Coptic quarter of Cairo, had been destroyed during the Islamic rampages, the patriarch built a new church dedicated to his namesake.

See also COPTS.

DONALD SPANEL

MARMARA UNIVERSITY

Public university in Istanbul, Turkey.

Marmara University was founded as a vocational school in 1883 under the name of Hamidiye Higher School of Business. Until the 1960s, it comprised three separate divisions (secondary, high school, and college). Its title was changed first to Istanbul Academy of Economics and Business Administration in 1959 and later, in 1982, to Marmara University, after the Sea of Marmara, on which it is located. Today, the university has thirteen faculties (education; communications; dentistry; divinity; economics and administrative sciences; engineering; fine arts; health education; law; medicine; pharmacology; science and letters; and technical education), nine vocational schools, and eleven research institutes. It has twelve separate campuses and is one of the most prestigious universities in Turkey.

English is the language of instruction in medicine and in some branches of engineering and social sciences, whereas French is used in the program of public administration. Turkish constitutes the medium of instruction in the rest of the academic units. During the 1998–1999 academic year, the university had 2,539 faculty members and 51,024 students. Its 2003 budget amounted to 93,747 billion Turkish lire, 99 percent of which came directly from state funds.

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I. Metin Kunt
Updated by Burçak Keskin-Kozat

MARONITES

An indigenous church of Lebanon and Lebanon's largest Eastern-rite church.

The communion between the Maronite church and the Roman Catholic church was established in 1182, broken thereafter, and then reestablished in the sixteenth century. The union allowed the Maronites to retain their own rites and canon laws and to use Arabic and Aramaic in their liturgy, as well as the Karashuni script with old Syriac letters. The origins of the Maronites are a subject of continuing debate. Some historians trace them to Yuhanna Marun of Antioch in the seventh century; others trace them to the Yuhanna Marun who was a monk of Homs in the late fourth and early fifth centuries. In Syriac, the word *maron,* or *marun,* means small lord.

In the late seventh century, following persecution by other Christians for their heterodox views and rituals, the Maronites migrated from the coastal regions into the mountainous areas of Lebanon and Syria. During the Ottoman era, the Maronites remained isolated and relatively autonomous in these areas, although in recent times this autonomy has been greatly exaggerated for ideological and national reasons and made into a national myth. The Maronite community underwent socioeconomic changes in the nineteenth century, when the Maronite Church wielded tremendous economic and political power and the peasants within the community grew increasingly dissatisfied with the uneven distribution of the community's wealth and with the rigid social hierarchy that placed the patriarchate at the top. In 1858, the peasants revolted against the large landowning families, but the church quickly engaged them in sectarian agitation. The revolt soon degenerated into a communal war between Druze and Maronites. This conflict came to characterize much of the history of nineteenth-century Lebanon, as the ruling families of the two communities split over the credibility of the Chehabi dynasty and over other political and economic issues. Land ownership, distribution of political power, and the question of safe passage of one community's members in the territory of the other remained thorny issues in their relationship. The conflict was internationalized in 1860, when France, historically the ostensible protector of the Maronites, sent a military expedition to the area.

The relationship of the two groups was not decisively settled in 1920 with the establishment of the mandate system, but the carnage of the previous century seemed to have ended. The Druze, however, despite their apparent military victory, only seemed to accept the political dominance of the Maronites, who were favored by the French authorities. Their dissatisfaction centered on their desire for a continuous, albeit inferior, political representation.

The Maronite sect has been directed and administered by the Patriarch of Antioch and the East. Bishops are generally nominated by a church synod from among the graduates of the Maronite College in Rome. In 2004, Mar Nasrallah Butrus Sfeir (also Sufayr) was the Maronite patriarch.

In addition to the Beirut archdiocese, nine other archdioceses and dioceses are located in the Middle East: Aleppo, Baʿalbak, Cairo, Cyprus, Damascus, the Jubayl al-Batrun area, Sidon, Tripoli, and Tyre. Parishes and independent dioceses are also found wherever Maronites reside in large enough numbers: in Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, the United States, Canada, Mexico, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal. Lebanon has four minor seminaries (al-Batrun, Ghazir, Ayn Saʿada, and Tripoli) and a faculty of theology at Holy Spirit University at al-Kaslik, which is run by the Maronite monastic order. The patriarch is elected in a secret ceremony by a synod of bishops and confirmed by the pope in Rome.

An estimated 416,000 Maronites live in Lebanon, although the number is exaggerated by Lebanese ultranationalists, including an unknown number abroad. Maronites make up 16 percent of Lebanon's population. Historically, most Maronites have been rural people, like the Druze, although, unlike the Druze, they are scattered throughout the country, with a heavy concentration in Mount Lebanon. Urbanized Maronites reside in East Beirut and its suburbs. The Maronite sect has been traditionally awarded—thanks to French support—the highest posts in government, and its status within the socioeconomic hierarchy of Lebanon has been, in general, higher than that of other sects. Lebanese nationalism has been associated over the years with Maronite sectarian ideologies, so much so that most non-Maronite Lebanese tend to feel uneasy with the notion of Lebanese nationalism because it has come to signify the Lebanese political system with its Maronite dominance.

The Maronites, like other sects in Lebanon, have suffered from the civil war and its consequences. Although many Maronites were combatants, much of the Maronite civilian population paid a price—as did all civilians in Lebanon—for the recklessness of the warring factions. Many Maronites were displaced, especially from the Shuf Mountains, as a result of battles and forced expulsions. Many (no reliable figures exist) chose to emigrate, going to Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia in search of peace and prosperity. Maronite leaders continue to warn of the dangers of diminishing Maronite demographic weight due to immigration. The Lebanese political reforms of Taʾif in 1989 did not necessarily undermine the political dominance of the Maronite community, since the presidency, the Central Bank, and command of the Lebanese Army remained in Maronite hands. In fact, the sectarian designation of governmental seats was solidified by the reforms, and the presidency was kept exclusively for Maronites. Nevertheless, the increased powers of the council of ministers curtailed some of the previous arbitrary powers of the president. But the implementation depended, and will continue to depend, on the personal and political impact of politicians, in terms of both their popularity within their own communities and the external support they receive from various regional and international powers. The political nervousness of the Maronite community in 2004, due to the exile of General Michel Aoun and the imprisonment of former Lebanese Forces commander Samir Geagea, has propelled the Maronite patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir into a position of unprecedented political and religious authority.

See also Druze; Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanon; Lebanon, Mount; Mandate System; Sfeir, Nasrallah.

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As'ad AbuKhalil

MARRAKECH

Second largest city in Morocco; one of the four imperial cities of precolonial Morocco, established about 1060 C.E.

Located in the Hawz, an agricultural plain bounded to the south and east by the High Atlas mountains, and watered by the Tansift river, Marrakech is situated in a natural site of great potential. In oppo-

sition to Fez, the Arab capital of Morocco, Marrakech is a Berber metropolis, which drew population from the Berber-speaking groups of the nearby central High Altas mountains. The city was founded by Yusuf ibn Tashfin (1060–1106), first ruler of the Almoravid dynasty (1055–1157), under whom Marrakech became the base for the conquest of Morocco, portions of the Maghrib, and Andalusia. Extensive irrigation works were undertaken at this time, but little remains of the architecture of the Almoravid period.

Conquered by the Almohads (1130–1269) in 1147, Marrakech became the capital of an empire that at its height extended from Tunisia to the Atlantic, and from the Sahara to Andalusia. The Almohads were the effective builders of the city, constructing the Kutubiya mosque, one of the finest examples of Hispano-Moorish architecture, together with the ramparts, a fortress complex, and extensive bazaars and gardens. The celebrated philosopher, doctor, and savant Ibn Rushd (known in the West as Averroes, 1126–1198) lived in Marrakech, where he wrote several of his best-known works.

Marrakech went into a prolonged decline during the reign of the Marinids (1244–1578), whose capital was at Fez. Under the Saʿdians (1510–1603), who made it their capital in 1554, Marrakech once again became an imperial city. Numerous important palaces were constructed at this time, and the irrigation system of the surrounding Hawz plain was revived. The Alawi dynasty (1603-present) has continued this tradition. The city continued to benefit from its position as a crossroad of trade between the mountains, the pre-Saharan steppe, and the fertile plains of central Morocco. Under Sultan Hassan I and his successors Abd al-Aziz ibn al-Hassan and Abd al-Hafid, Marrakech was drawn increasingly into the world capitalist market. In the period of the Moroccan question (1900–1912), European business interests in collaboration with local urban notables and Berber lords based in the city began to acquire substantial holdings in the Hawz plain and the surrounding area.

Under the French protectorate (1912–1956), effective authority was conceded to Madani and Tuhami al-Glawi, who ruled much of southern Morocco as pashas of Marrakech and imperial viceroys. In this period, the city became a major agricultural entrepôt and center of light manufacturing. There was considerable investment in irrigation technologies and agriculture, and the population of the city increased from 70,000 in 1912 to 145,000 in 1921 to 215,000 in 1952.

Since Moroccan independence in 1956, Marrakech has continued to grow. Its population in 1994 was about 673,000 people. It is a center of tourism and an agricultural marketplace for southern Morocco, with a university and important cultural installations.

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EDMUND BURKE III

MARRIAGE AND FAMILY

The institutions, patterns, and practices of marriage and the family play a key role in Middle Eastern society.

Marriage and family form the heart of Middle Eastern society, which is structured around the extended family system. Familial loyalty takes precedence over loyalty to work, friends, the law, and the nation. The institutions and practices of marriage are enforced by kinship networks to form reliable alliances. Hence, marriages between families serve important social, economic, and political functions by bringing together families in an expanding network of relationships, which extends membership rights and duties to relatives and their spouses. Each nuclear or extended family arranges different kinds of marriage alliances to accomplish both general and specific purposes. Membership in an influential family may be the only necessary criterion for success.

The Middle Eastern family is unequivocally patriarchal. The male is recognized as the head of his family, and his role is overt, whereas the female's

A Yemenite bride and groom sit in ceremonial attire in front of the traditional feast. In Yemen, marriages are arranged, then finalized with a contract. Islam permits a man to marry as many as four wives, but only if he can treat all as equals. In practice, polygamy is rare. © Richard T. Nowitz/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

role is more covert. Patriarchy also connotes obeying and respecting the decisions of elders. Respect for elders is held as the highest family duty, and disagreements with patriarchs are considered sinful. Hence, age and bearing children increase an individual's status in the family.

Bonds of obligation and trust unite people, and relationships within families are often multidimensional and intense. Families and kin groups are brought together to witness births, marriages, deaths, religious and other rituals, and the affairs of daily life. In-group cohesion is a sign of a strong family, and individuals may count on family members for unconditional support. Even at times of antipathy among relatives, they defend each other's honor and display group cohesion. Religion plays an important role in dictating family life and law; it is an integral part of the inherited social identity, rather than a matter of choice or personal conviction.

Most family relations, however, are constrained by tradition rather than religion. While traditions provide support for family members, they also constrain their personal freedom and privacy. For instance, it is a common practice for single adults (male and female) to live with their family until marriage. They are governed by their elders and seek their permission regarding personal decisions. Traditions also play an important role in selecting a spouse, proposing a marriage and deciding its various logistics. Marriages are built based on financial security, social status, and child-bearing potentials rather than on love and romance.

Marriages are often arranged by women and are initiated with an official request from an elder in the groom's family to an elder in the bride's family. And elaborate engagement celebration is then held as a public announcement permitting the groom and bride to appear in public together prior to marriage. Engagements usually are short unless economic hardships prevent the couple from securing a residence. Marriage ceremonies are almost always large, expensive, and joyous affairs involving the groom and bride's wider kinship and residential groups.

Children are important elements of a successful marriage. No marriage is considered complete unless it produces many children. The average family size in the Middle East is over six members, including the parents. Desiring large families is common, but sons are often preferred to daughters because sons carry the name of the family, and remain with their parents after marriage in this patrilineal society. Nonetheless, daughters are desired as caregivers of aging parents, while sons are obliged to provide financial security.

Boys' education and work begin at a very early age and are usually mediated by various adult male relatives. Girls' domestic training starts early as well and is transmitted by various female relatives. Overall, relatives, neighbors, and friends participate in raising children and teaching them family values and morals. Young adults are given duties and responsibilities within the family setting, against which they rarely rebel. They are also encouraged to maintain and pass on social values from one generation to another. Disciplining children is an acceptable practice that may be carried out by any relative, neighbor, or friend.

The Middle Eastern family is neither unique nor constant nor uniform. Changes happen at all levels at all times. For instance, while, the bride and the

groom often live with the groom's family in more traditional and rural settings, the trend for the urban middle and upper classes is for a new, separate residence to be established. The groom and bride's families remain in close contact and visit frequently. Similarly, more rural and traditional settings tend to favor marriage at a very young age for both males and females as a tool of social control. However, in modern urban settings, new marriage laws and new opportunities in education and employment have raised the age of marriage for both sexes.

Although polygamy is accepted as a lesser evil than divorce, it is outlawed in Tunisia, Turkey, Israel, and Iraq and is subject to court approval in Morocco, Syria, Jordan, and Yemen. Moreover, polygamy rates have always been low, and they are decreasing rapidly almost everywhere, primarily for economic and social reasons. Alternatively, while divorce is considered a social stigma for both men and women, its rates vary widely across the region and are increasing overall, in tune with rapid social change and economic pressures. In the case of divorce or widowhood, Islamic laws grant women the custody of children until age seven for boys and nine for girls. Divorce is much more difficult for Jews and Christians in the region. Among the Druze, a husband and wife who divorce are forbidden from remarrying, unlike in Islam.

Familial honor is another social asset and stigma. The reputation of any family member influences the reputation of the entire family. However, women who bring dishonor to their families because of presumed sexual indiscretions are forced to pay a terrible price at the hands of male family members. The problem of "honor killings" throughout the Middle East is manifested in the legal safeguards protecting men by granting them special legal exemptions and reduced sentences in cases of conviction.

The Middle East experienced rapid changes and challenges in the twentieth century. While women continue gaining access to formal education and careers, they continue to face societal restrictions concerning their contacts outside the home and beyond their kinship groups. Widespread economic change, especially trends toward modernization and Westernization vis-à-vis reactionary and Islamist movements, have affected customary notions of marriage and the family.

A Palestinian family in the West Bank. © PETER TURNLEY/ CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

See also POLYGAMY.

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RITA STEPHAN

MARSH ARABS

Inhabitants of the vast marshlands in southern Iraq.

The Marsh Arabs lived in one of the great marsh areas of the world, a 20,000-square-mile (52,000 sq. km) area triangulated by Kut on the Tigris, al-Kifl on the Euphrates, and Basra on the Shatt al-Arab. A significant number may be non-Semitic in origin, perhaps descendants of the ancient Sumerians, although they have mixed with other peoples through time. Called Marsh Arabs by some owing to their language, social structures, and religion, others designate them Ma'dan to reflect that their way of life is dependent on the water buffalo. Nomads of the marshes, relying on a variety of canoes for transport, they follow buffalo herds as their desert counterparts follow camels or sheep. Most are cultivators, reed gatherers, or buffalo breeders. Traditionally they lived in villages in island settlements, on floating platforms, or on man-made reed islands. Today, their structures are of brick and concrete. Roads and causeways connect major settlements facilitating social improvements, especially in education and health.

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ALBERTINE JWAIDEH

MAʿRUFI, ABBAS

[1957–]

Iranian writer and editor.

Abbas Maʿrufi was born in Tehran and graduated from Tehran University's Faculty of Fine Arts with a degree in dramatic arts. His novels and short stories experiment with psychoanalytic techniques, incorporating them into a clear and flowing narrative style. He published several collections of short stories in the 1980s and his first and most famous novel, *Samfoni-ye Mordegan* (Symphony of the dead), in 1989. Subsequent novels include *Sal-e Bala* (Year of catastrophes, 1992) and *Peykar-e Farhad* (Statute of Farhad, 1995). Maʿrufi edited the literary journal *Gardoon* in Tehran, but after the publication was closed by the government for "offending religious sensibilities," he left Iran for exile abroad. Since 1996, he has edited *Gardoon* in Europe.

See also LITERATURE: PERSIAN.

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PARDIS MINUCHEHR
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

MARZOUKI, MONCEF

[1945–]

Tunisian opposition leader, human-rights activist, writer, physician.

Moncef Marzouki, a Tunisian neurological and public-health specialist trained in France (1973), became a human-rights advocate after observing medical experiments on patients. He returned to Tunisia in 1979 and founded the Center for Community Medicine in the slums of Sousse, south of Tunis. Marzouki cofounded the African Network for Prevention of Child Abuse (1981) and joined the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH), becoming its vice president (1987) and president (1989–1994).

In 1991 his opposition to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait drew Western praise, but the Tunisian government retaliated by neutering the LTDH in 1992. In 1993 Marzouki and seventeen others launched the National Committee for the Defense of Prisoners of Conscience. They were arrested, and he resigned after it was taken over by supporters of the regime.

In 1994 he ran for the presidency even though there was no provision for unapproved candidates, accusing the regime of human-rights violations and

arguing that its experiment with democracy and the anti-Islamist crackdown were excuses for deposing Habib Bourguiba. Without human rights, the ideological vacuum in which secularist and Islamist extremisms flourished would persist. He was imprisoned for propagating false news.

Released after four months, Marzouki was thrice rearrested (in 1996 following a LTDH human-rights report, in 1999 at election time, and in 2000 after allying with exiled Islamists) and twice imprisoned. In 1998 he was founding spokesperson for the National Committee for Liberties (CNLT) and president of the Arab Commission of Human Rights. He subsequently established the Congress for the Republic (CPR), uniting democratic secularists and Islamists against President Ben Ali's "constitutional putsch." From 2002, he ran the CPR from France.

See also Ben Ali, Zayn al-Abidine; Human Rights; Tunisia: Political Parties in.

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George R. Wilkes

MASADA

Site of Jewish revolt and martyrdom, 74 C.E.

An isolated mountain on the western shore of the Dead Sea, Masada was turned by King Herod the Great of Judea (37–34 B.C.E.) into a major stronghold. In 66 C.E., at the onset of the Jewish revolt against Rome, the extremist *Sicarii* ("dagger-men") captured Masada; after the revolt's suppression, it remained the last Jewish fortress to hold out. When the Romans were about to storm its walls in the spring of 74 C.E., the defenders, preferring death to slavery, decided to commit collective suicide. Men slew their women and children, then killed one another—thus relates Flavius Josephus, the only historian to describe these events. The story of the mass suicide is supported by comparable occurrences in the Greco-Roman world.

In traditional Judaism, Masada went largely unmentioned for centuries. Only with the advent of Zionism did it gain prominence, with the defenders portrayed as freedom-loving heroes and their stance hailed as an example to live by. In Yitzhak Lamdan's influential poem of 1927, Masada came to symbolize the entire Zionist enterprise, with the most famous line announcing, "Masada shall not fall again." From the 1940s, Masada became the goal of ritual treks organized by Zionist youth movements; from the 1950s, recruits of Israel's army swore their oath of allegiance in ceremonies atop Masada. The excavation of the fortress in the 1960s enhanced still further its salience in Israeli consciousness.

The veneration of Masada was never total; for instance, in 1946 David Ben-Gurion coined the slogan "Neither Masada nor Vichy." From the 1970s onward, the Masada myth repeatedly came under attack. The credibility of Josephus's account was questioned; the cruelty of Masada's "dagger-men" toward other Jews was emphasized; and the portrayal of the perpetrators of a group suicide as national heroes was decried as incongruent with Judaism's teachings and educationally misguided. Hard-line Israeli leaders were accused of being possessed by a "Masada complex"—that is, of so identifying with Masada's desperate situation that they were no longer reacting to the reality of their own times.

In 2002 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) proclamation of Masada as a World Heritage Site entailed another round of exchanges between Masada's admirers and detractors.

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Benjamin Kedar

MASʿADI, MAHMOUD AL-

[1911–]

Tunisian essayist, playwright, and politician.

Mahmoud al-Masʿadi was born in Tazerka, Tunisia. He obtained his *agrégation* in Arabic literature from the Sorbonne in 1947, and was a teacher and educational administrator until 1958. He subsequently held various posts in Tunisia's cabinet and was named the nation's representative to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). He was editor of the journal *al-Mabahith* from 1944 to 1947. In 1979 he published his editorials from *al-Mabahith* in a book titled *Taʾsilan likayan* (The grounding of the human being).

Although he is bilingual in Arabic and French, al-Masʿadi writes only in Arabic. He occupies a unique place in modern Tunisian literature. His writings are characterized by a hermetic style that is strongly reminiscent of the language of the Qurʾan. He is deeply influenced by European existentialism and culture as well as by Arab Islamic culture. According to him, existentialism and commitment are strongly linked. His deeply philosophical writings are primarily concerned with a person's role in life and the significance of existence. His play *al-Sudd* (1955; The dam) is an expression of his philosophical outlook on man and his destiny, whereas his novel *Haddatha Abu Hurayra, Qala . . .* (1923; Abu Hurayra said . . .) transposes this philosophical inclination into an Islamic framework. The collection of short stories titled *Mawlid al-Nisyan* (1974; The birth of forgetfulness) portrays the struggle between good and evil in the human being.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN.

AIDA A. BAMIA

MASHHAD

Major city of northeast Iran and capital of Khorasan Province.

Mashhad originally developed as a pilgrimage center after the eighth Shiʿite Islamic imam, Reza, died and was buried (ninth century C.E.) in what then was a small village containing the tomb of Caliph Harun al-Rashid. The village began to develop as a trade center renamed *Mashhad,* or "place of the martyr," during the fourteenth century, after the Mongols had destroyed the ancient city of Tus, located 15 miles to the northwest of what is now central Mashhad. Its growth was slowed, however, by the general insecurity that prevailed in this region until the nineteenth century. After 1850, Mashhad developed as a major transshipment center for the overland trade between Iran and Russia and Iran and British India. The Qajar dynasty shahs expended funds on the embellishment and expansion of the shrine to Imam Reza (originally built during the early fifteenth century), including its affiliated seminary and other religious institutions. During the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi the city was rebuilt with a ring road around the shrine and wide avenues.

Mashhad began to develop as an important industrial center during the 1930s, initially with carpet and textile manufacturing; by the end of the 1990s, food processing, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals also were significant industries. Its importance as a transportation center is enhanced by air, rail, and road connections to Tehran and the rest of Iran. In 1996 the railway to Turkmenistan was inaugurated; this connected to the main railroad system through the Central Asian republics. Ferdowsi University, established in 1947, provides undergraduate and graduate education in agriculture, art, economics, law, medicine, social sciences, and technology. The Imam Reza shrine continues to be the major tourist site in Iran, attracting several hundred thousand visitors annually. Mashhad is now the second largest city in the country, having grown from a medium-sized city of 147,000 in 1947 to a metropolis of 1,887,405 in 1996.

See also PAHLAVI, REZA; QAJAR DYNASTY.

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CYRUS MOSHAVER
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

MASIRA ISLAND

A strategically important island in the Arabian Sea off the south coast of Oman.

Masira Island's rocky hills have made it inhospitable for agriculture, and historically its small population has subsisted on the sea, exporting such products as fish, turtle shells, and shark fins. During World War

II, the British built an air base and a powerful radio transmitter on the island. When Oman attained independence, Sultan Qabus, the ruler, funded the construction of modern housing, schools, and a clinic. The United States signed a ten-year lease for the military facilities on the island in 1980. It was from here that the abortive mission to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran was launched. The island's facilities also were used by coalition forces during the 1990–1991 Gulf War. The United States has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on its military facilities on the island. In the late 1990s the island had about 8,000 inhabitants and hosted one of the largest group of nesting loggerhead turtles in the world.

See also OMAN.

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ROBERT G. LANDEN
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

MASMOUDI, MUHAMMAD

[1925–]

Tunisian diplomat.

Muhammad Masmoudi was educated in Tunis and at the law faculty in Paris. As representative of the Neo-Destour Party in France, Masmoudi was one of the party leaders who headed the official talks with France between September 1954 and May 1955 that led to independence. In 1956, he took part in the Tunisian delegation that signed the protocols formalizing independence from France (which had held a protectorate from 1881). Despite uneven relations with President Habib Bourguiba, he held various government posts, including ambassador to France (1965–1969). As minister of foreign affairs (1970–1974), he led an effort to forge ties with Libya, which culminated in a short-lived merger in 1974. With its collapse, Masmoudi was removed from office; shortly thereafter he went into exile, returning in 1977. His ties to Libya put him at the center of controversy in 1984, when he briefly accepted a United Nations post from Libya, from which Bourguiba forced him to withdraw. Masmoudi has also been an important diplomatic mediator between Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. Following his withdrawal from the diplomatic scene, Masmoudi has participated in numerous conferences throughout the Arab world, working for the promotion of scientific research, and has collaborated with the Temimi Foundation for Scientific Research and Information (Tunisia).

See also BOURGUIBA, HABIB; TUNISIA.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON
UPDATED BY VANESA CASANOVA-FERNANDEZ

MASPÉRO, GASTON

[1846–1916]

French Egyptologist.

Gaston Maspéro studied at the École Normale, Paris. He succeeded Auguste Mariette as professor of Egyptian Philology and Archaeology at the Collège de France. Upon Mariette's death in 1881, Maspéro followed him as director of the Egyptian Antiquities Service and the Egyptian Museum in Cairo. Maspéro served as director from 1881 to 1886 and from 1899 to 1914, overseeing archaeology throughout Egypt. He published the pyramid texts he discovered at Saqqara, initiated the systematic clearing of the temple of Karnak, and coordinated the publication of the immense catalog of the Egyptian Museum. Maspéro may have published more than any other Egyptologist.

See also ARCHAEOLOGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST; EGYPTIAN MUSEUM; MARIETTE, AUGUSTE.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

MASRI, MAI

[1959–]

Filmmaker, director, and producer.

Mai Masri was born in Jordan in 1959 to an American mother from Texas and a Palestinian father

from the Masri family of Nablus. She developed an interest in film and photography during her high school years in Beirut, traveling to the United States to pursue her university education in 1977, where she received her bachelor's degree in film from San Francisco State University in 1981. Masri has directed and produced several award-winning films that provide a fine-grained view of women's and children's lives in situations marked by conflict, uncertainty, and crisis. Her films have been broadcast in the Arab world, Europe, the United Kingdom, and North America and have received ten international awards, including Best Documentary at the Institut du Monde Arabe Film Festival in Paris. She has also directed *Children of Fire* (1990) and *Children of Shatila* (1998), which won Best Director and Best Camera awards at the Arab Screen Festival in London.

During the later years of the Lebanese Civil War, Masri and her husband, Lebanese filmmaker and producer Jean Khalil Chamoun, filmed Lebanese and Palestinian civilians attempting to live and work under bombardments in Beirut and in South Lebanon, turning their copious footage of the war years into award-winning films such as *Under the Rubble* (1983), *Wild Flowers* (1987), *War Generation-Beirut* (1989), and *Suspended Dreams* (1992). All of these films show the costs of war and displacement, but also the strength of the human spirit and the importance of creative expression in the midst of large-scale destruction. In 1995 Masri directed a portrait of Hanan Ashrawi for BBC television, entitled *A Woman of Her Time.* She has also produced *Hostage of Time* (1994) and the feature film *In the Shadows of the City* (2000), which won the Cannes Junior Award. Masri currently lives in Beirut with her husband and their two daughters.

LAURIE KING-IRANI

MATAWIRAH TRIBE

See TRIBES AND TRIBALISM: MATAWIRAH TRIBE

MATRAH

Port city of Oman.

Originally a fishing village, after the sixteenth century Matrah became the hub of Oman's domestic commerce and home of a cosmopolitan merchant community. Today the site of Oman's largest port, Matrah lies adjacent to Muscat, the sultanate's capital. It is essentially being absorbed into the burgeoning capital urban complex.

See also MUSCAT.

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ROBERT G. LANDEN

MATZPEN

Israeli leftist, anti-Zionist group.

Israel's most vilified anti-Zionist group from 1967 to 1972, Matzpen (Hebrew, "compass," also known as the Israeli Socialist Organization) was the first leftist organization to identify Jewish colonization and Palestinian dispossession as the basis of the Arab–Israel conflict. The group, formed by students in 1962, broke with the Communist Party over its acceptance of the Israeli state. Harassed and often hounded out of jobs, a number of members moved abroad, created a European support network, and established contacts with Palestinian leftists there.

Never more than a few dozen strong, Matzpen came to public attention for protesting Israel's occupation of the West Bank in 1967; this was viewed as treachery by those who saw the occupation as a defensive necessity. Most Matzpen members favored a binational state. In their first dialogues at Bir Zeit University, and in subsequent dialogues with the Palestine Liberation Organization and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine representatives, they argued that Jews should enjoy national rights in a future Palestinian state, whereas their Palestinian interlocutors insisted that Jews should have simply cultural and religious rights.

Matzpen attracted further hostility in Israel in the early 1970s, when it encouraged Black Panther protests in Israel and supported Palestinian resistance in the Territories. Its members were accused of supporting foreign espionage, and in 1972 one of them, Ehud "Udi" Adiv, was arrested and later imprisioned, for contacting Syrian authorities. The group split over ideological affiliation in 1972

and nearly dissolved after the Oslo Accord (1993). But the influence of former members—including Moshe Machover, Akiva Orr, Haim Hanegbi, Michel Warschawski, and Leah Tsemel—among leftists engaged in Israeli–Palestinian dialogue and opposed to human rights abuses in the occupied territories grew enormously. By the 1990s, its assertion that Jewish colonization was the primary cause of the Israel–Arab conflict was also a common feature of post-Zionism.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL CONFLICT; ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967); ISRAEL: MILITARY AND POLITICS; OSLO ACCORD (1993); PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); TSEMEL, LEAH; WEST BANK.

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GEORGE R. WILKES

MAUDE, FREDERICK STANLEY

[1864–1917]

British soldier.

Frederick Stanley Maude entered the military in 1884, fought in the South African wars (1899–1902), and became commander of the 13th Division at the Dardanelles in 1915 after the outbreak of World War I. He was ordered to take his troops to Mesopotamia (the area between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers) to relieve the Anglo-Indian forces in the Mesopotamia Campaign besieged at Kut al-Amara. On 22 February 1917 he drove the Ottoman army from the town and then planned the advance that culminated in the fall of Baghdad on 11 March 1917. Shortly after this, the so-called Maude Declaration (actually written by Sir Mark Sykes) announced to the people of Baghdad that Britain intended to grant them self-determination. Maude died of cholera in 1917.

See also MESOPOTAMIA CAMPAIGN (1914–1918); SYKES, MARK.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

MAURITANIA

Constitutional republic located in northwest Africa.

The Islamic Republic of Mauritania covers an area of 398,000 square miles and is bordered by Western Sahara and Algeria on the north, Mali on the east, Mali and Senegal on the south, and the Atlantic Ocean on the west. The population in 2002 was about 2.6 million people (United Nations estimate). Nouakchott, the capital and largest city, has more than 800,000 people. The second largest city is Nouadhibou, a maritime commercial center in the northwest, with a population of about 100,000.



Due to endemic drought in Mauritania, some 500,000 displaced nomads and oasis dwellers were forced into sprawling shanty towns that surround the capital city of Nouakchott. © YANN ARTHUS-BERTRAND/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

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Mauritania has twelve administrative regions plus the district of Nouakchott.

Climate and Resources

Mauritania has three major geographic and climatic areas. The northern Sahara region is more than 65 percent of the country. Covered by arid plains, plateaus, and sand dunes, it receives almost no rainfall and is subject to severe fluctuations in temperature. To its south is the Sahel, a wide area consisting of steppes and meadows. On Mauritania's southern border is the Senegal River region, a narrow strip of cooler temperatures and higher rainfall that supports considerable plant life.

The national economy has suffered from a lack of natural resources. Climatic conditions limit agriculture to the Senegal River region, where millet, sorghum, rice, and dates are grown. In the Sahel, livestock raising supports much of the rural population. Oil was discovered in 2001 56 miles southwest off the coast of Nouakchott, and although findings were modest, Mauritania's economy can expect a large boost when it acquires the means to extract and export its oil.

To date, however, iron ore, gypsum, and copper constitute the only major mineral exports. Mauritanian waters are considered to be among the richest fishing areas in the world. In the 1980s offshore fishing grew rapidly, making fish the country's chief export. The small manufacturing sector is based largely on fish processing. Food and capital goods account for the bulk of imports.

Population and Culture

Mauritania boasts a unique mixture of North African and West African culture, and it struggles to unite them. Approximately 66 percent of the population are Maures of Arab, Berber, and black African descent who speak Hassaniya, a dialect of Arabic and one of the two official languages of Mauritania. The remaining population is ethnically black African, composed of Halpulaar, Fulbe, Soninké, and Wolof (speakers of Pulaar, Soninké, and Wolof). French is the other official language of Mauritania, spoken in the marketplace as a common second language. Almost all Mauritanians are Sunni Muslims.

History

In the early 1800s amirs and Islamic religious leaders controlled the area that is now Mauritania. France gradually expanded its military and economic presence from Senegal into Maure areas. Between 1901 and 1912 France gained control of all major regions of Mauritania and declared it a protectorate, ruling indirectly through traditional leaders. After World War II, nationalist parties became active. Under the leadership of Mokhtar Ould Daddah and his Mauritanian Regroupment Party, Mauritania declared its independence from France in 1960. Since independence, Mauritania has faced severe problems with national unity, desertification (enlargement of desert areas), and economic stability. In 2000 the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative qualified Mauritania for debt relief programs. In 2002 Mauritanians wrestled with a severe drought that led to food shortages and the slaughtering of livestock.

Mauritania also faced disputes with its neighbors to the north and south at the end of the twentieth century. In August 1976 the armed POLISARIO Front of Western Sahara invaded Mauritania and forced it to give up its claims to one-third of Western Saharan territory. Morocco quickly took over the land as Mauritanian forces withdrew.

A conflict between Senegal and Mauritania in 1989 intensified to a near-war situation as tens of thousands of Senegalese in Mauritania were expelled or killed, and more than 200,000 white Mauritanians in Senegal were forced to return to Mauritania. In 1991 Senegal and Mauritania resolved their differences and resumed their diplomatic relationship.

In 2000 Mauritania withdrew from ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West Africa) and aligned itself more with the Arab Maghreb Union.

Based on the 1991 constitution, the government is headed by a president elected by universal suffrage, who appoints a prime minister and a constitutional council. The legislature is composed of the National Assembly with seventy-nine members and the Senate with fifty-six members. The constitution guarantees the right of political parties to form. The government is controlled by the Parti Républicain Démocratique et Social (PRDS), whose leader Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya has been the president since his self-appointment in 1984. Amid claims of election fraud Taya was elected to the presidency in 1992 and again in 1997. Mauritania's 2001 legislative elections were internationally recognized as free and open.

See also ARAB MAGHREB UNION; DADDAH, MOKHTAR OULD; OULD SIDʾAHMED TAYA, MAʿOUIYA; POLISARIO; WESTERN SAHARA WAR.

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BRADFORD DILLMAN
UPDATED BY NAOMI ZEFF

MAWDUDI, ABU AL-Aʿ LA, AL-

[1903–1979]

Founder and leader of Jamaʿat-i-Islami, one of the most important Muslim parties in Pakistan.

Abu al-Aʿla al-Mawdudi was born in India under British colonial rule. A journalist by profession, he was mostly self-taught although very well read in Islamic sciences and Western thought. He devoted himself first to founding the state of Pakistan and then to the Jamaʿat, which advocated the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan. Mawdudi's stance is similar to that of the founders of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and was shaped by the same forces: the violent disruption of the traditional economic, social, and political structures in the Muslim world by colonial powers. Their goal was to fight Western intervention and adapt Islamic thought to the needs of the modern world. Mawdudi responded to orientalists' contemptuous descriptions of Islam as a backward and inferior religion with an equally contemptuous denunciation of the self-serving colonialism, nationalism, materialism, atheism, and moral laxity of Western culture.

A prolific writer, Mawdudi attempted to show that Islam is a comprehensive system that encompasses all aspects of life, whether social, political, or economic. He did not advocate a mindless return to the Prophet's time but rather urged Muslims to restore the true Islamic spirit that had been overshadowed by cultural traditions, the *taqlid* (imitation) practice of the theologians, as well as the passive otherworldliness of Sufism. His own commentary on the Qurʾan, which is his best-known work, is such an attempt. His followers tend to be well-educated professionals dedicated to freeing their country from Western political institutions and cultural encroachment and to the restoration of Islamic law. The Jamaʿat is politically active and was suppressed at times because of its opposition to government policies. Shunned as a reformer by conservatives and criticized as too conservative by liberals, Mawdudi can be faulted mostly for calling for new institutions without being able to produce a blueprint for a modern Islamic state.

See also Pakistan and the Middle East.

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Maysam J. al Faruqi

MAYSALUN

Site of armed combat between French and Arab forces immediately prior to the French mandate over Syria.

Khan Maysalun, a quiet market town on the highway between Beirut and Damascus just east of Alayh, won notoriety as the site of the 24 July 1920 clash between French troops and the armed forces of the Arab government in Damascus. The outcome eventuated in France's taking control of Syria for the ensuing quarter century.

British imperial troops occupied the cities of central Syria as soon as the Ottoman garrisons evacuated them in September 1918. With British acquiescence, an Arab government quickly established itself in Damascus, and Arab nationalists announced the creation of a similar administration in Beirut on 1 October. But when British forces entered Beirut a week later, the nationalist government was disbanded and French military governors took charge of Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre in the name of implementing the League of Nations mandate. The Arab leader in Damascus, Faisal I ibn Hussein, nevertheless toured Lebanon the following month and received an enthusiastic welcome from the populace in each city he visited. On 21 November, he returned to Beirut on his way to the Versailles peace conference.

While Faisal was in Europe, Britain and France negotiated the boundaries separating their respective zones of control in Syria, according to the terms of the wartime Sykes-Picot agreement. The division of Syria into British and French zones was confirmed at Versailles, over strenuous objections from the United States. By the next summer, it was clear that Britain intended to withdraw its troops from central Syria, prompting Faisal to press the British government to take over the mandate for the region. Britain refused to do this, and on 1 November 1919, while the amir was once again in Europe, British commanders in the Syrian interior turned over their positions to forces loyal to Faisal, while those in Lebanon relinquished their garrisons to French units. In the Biqa valley, Lebanese Christians attacked Syrian outposts, providing French commanders with a pretext to move into the area in force at the end of the month.

Faisal returned to Syria in mid-January 1920 and attempted to salvage his reputation, which had

been badly tarnished during the months of fruitless negotiations with the French. He acquiesced in the General Syrian Congress's decision to declare Syria independent that March and accepted the title of monarch of the new unified kingdom of Syria. Not only did Britain, France, and the United States refuse to recognize Syrian sovereignty, but the authorities in Beirut responded to the declaration by proclaiming Lebanese independence under the mandatory authority of the French. Syria then set up a ministry of war under the leadership of Yusuf al-Azma, and King Faisal delivered a series of strongly worded speeches reaffirming the country's independence. Meanwhile, French troops pulled out of Cilicia and took up positions along the Lebanon-Syria border.

On 9 July 1920, the French military command in Beirut issued an ultimatum to the Arab government in Damascus, demanding immediate acceptance of the mandate throughout central Syria. Publication of the ultimatum sparked rioting in Damascus and Aleppo, but the Syrian cabinet reluctantly agreed to its terms on 20 July and dispatched a telegram to inform the French of its decision. The next morning, the Third Division of the Armée du Levant, made up of Senegalese, Moroccan, and Algerian battalions, advanced from Shtura and Zahiya toward Damascus and on 23 July encamped outside Khan Maysalun. An Arab force of some six hundred regular troops and two thousand volunteers led by al-Azma attacked the encampment at dawn the following day and were routed before noon. The Third Division pursued the retreating Arabs and marched into Damascus unopposed on 25 July. Three days later, the French commander ordered Faisal to leave for British-controlled Palestine, and the mandate era began. Maysalun became a symbol of heroic Arab resistance, in the face of insurmountable odds, to European domination.

See also Faisal I ibn Hussein; Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916).

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Fred H. Lawson

MAZAR-E SHARIF

Northern Afghan city.

Mazar-e Sharif is a city in northern Afghanistan and the provincial capital of Balkh Province. *Mazar-e Sharif* means "holy tomb"; locals believe that Caliph Ali (656–661) is buried there, although al-Najaf, Iraq, is generally accepted as Ali's actual burial place. Mazar-e Sharif is Afghanistan's largest northern city and a major marketing and trading center for the northern area. The official population taken in 1988 was about 150,000, but with an influx of internally displaced persons, the population in 2003 was thought to be over 600,000. The people in the area are largely Uzbek, but the city contains major Tajik, Turkoman, and Hazara populations as well. During the resistance war (1978–1992) the city was a major stronghold of the Marxist government because of its close proximity to the Soviet Union and its flat terrain, which made it easy to defend against guerrilla activities. After the Marxist government fell in 1992, the city saw fighting between the Tajiks led by Ahmad Shah Masʿud and the Uzbeks under the command of General Abd al-Rashid Doestam.

Mazar-e Sharif became an important city in the resistance against the Taliban. The city changed hands several times between 1997 and 1998, resulting in the killing of several thousand civilians. After the ouster of the Taliban, the forces of General Doestam and General Ata Mohammad fought for control of Mazar-e Sharif.

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Grant Farr

MAZIQ, HUSAYN

[1916–?]

Libyan politician, prime minister.

With a limited formal education, Husayn Maziq acquired his political skills through extensive practical experience. Head of the Barassa tribe and a long-time Cyrenaican politician, he began his extensive government service in 1943 when the British

administration named him secretary of the interior. He became *wali* (governor) of Cyrenaica in 1953 and also served as foreign minister under the premiership of Mahmud Bey Muntasir (1951–1954). Appointed prime minister in March 1965, his administration focused on maintaining order and stability in Libya. Maziq was forced to resign in 1967 when his government proved unable to cope with public disorder in the aftermath of the June 1967 Arab–Israel War. With the overthrow of the monarchy in September 1969, Maziq was eventually forced into exile by the Muammar al-Qaddafi regime, accused of participating in an abortive July 1970 coup attempt against the new government.

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RONALD BRUCE ST JOHN

MAZZA

See FOOD: MAZZA

MCMAHON, HENRY

[1862–1949]

Britain's high commissioner in Egypt, 1914–1916.

During Sir Henry McMahon's tenure as high commissioner, he was responsible for mobilizing war matériel from Egypt for Britain's efforts in World War I. McMahon is best known for his role in the negotiations with Sharif Husayn of Mecca that led to the 1916 Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. These negotiations are contained in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. The extent of the territorial concessions that McMahon pledged for an independent Arab state continues to be a subject of debate.

See also HUSAYN–MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE (1915–1916).

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DAVID WALDNER

MEAH SHEʿARIM

A section of Jerusalem established in 1874 as an Orthodox quarter outside the Old City.

Inhabited almost exclusively by ultra-Orthodox Jews, Meah Sheʿarim is one of the most densely populated neighborhoods in Jerusalem and is characterized by a very high birth rate. In 1995 its population numbered 29,214. It houses hundreds of yeshivas and synagogues, and is also the center of Orthodox anti-Zionist ideology and activity. The neighborhood is highly picturesque, and upon crossing into it, one senses having entered the domain of an almost autonomous ethnoreligious culture. Many of its inhabitants view the neighborhood as their own turf, and some view all strangers with suspicion. Its streets are closed to vehicular traffic on the Jewish Sabbath; breaches of that closure are occasionally met with violent reactions. Women are enjoined to dress modestly.

See also JERUSALEM.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

MECCA

Islam's holiest city and the third largest city in Saudi Arabia.

Situated about 45 miles east of the Red Sea port of Jeddah in the rocky foothills of the Hijaz Mountains, Mecca has a hot, arid climate, and lack of water and other resources have kept its population and economic fortunes heavily dependent on outside factors. The estimated two million pilgrims who visit the city each year during the hajj season have a vital impact on the local economy. Many of Mecca's inhabitants work in the large service industry that caters to the hajjis, providing transport, security, food, lodging, medical care, and other services. Because many pilgrims from around the world have settled in the city, its population is the most ethnically varied in Saudi Arabia. According to a 2000 estimate there were 1.3 million inhabitants. Non-Muslims are not permitted to enter the city and its environs.

In the sixth century C.E. Mecca became an important market town and stopping point along the caravan routes connecting Yemen with Syria. A square stone structure called the Kaʿba, believed to have been built by Ibrahim (Abraham), also gave the city religious importance. The city is paramount in the history of Islam because it was the birthplace of the prophet Muhammad, the site of many of his revelations from God, the focal point of daily prayer and the main center of pilgrimage. The Kaʿba became the center of the Islamic pilgrimage ritual, and the Grand Mosque eventually was built up around it. The sacred precinct of Mecca extends as far as 14 miles outward from the Kaʿba in an irregular circle. Inside it, a number of prohibitions apply, including bans on fighting, cursing, hunting, and uprooting plants.

Despite its continuing religious significance, Mecca lost its political importance in the seventh century (the first century of Islam) when the capital of the caliphate moved first to Medina and later outside Arabia altogether. Thus Mecca became a provincial backwater ruled by governors appointed from afar. But as central authority weakened, local sharifs claiming descent from the prophet Muhammad were able to assert their control and remain substantially in power from about 965 to 1924, but never with full independence. From 1517, the sharifs fell under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire but remained effective local rulers, sharing power with the Turkish governors of Jidda. From 1916 to 1924, Mecca was part of the short-lived Kingdom of the Hijaz proclaimed by the last sharif, but then was conquered and incorporated into Saudi Arabia.

See also Hijaz; Islam; Kaʿba; Muhammad; Qurʾan.

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MEDDEB, ABDELWAHHAB

[1946–]

Tunisian novelist and poet.

Abdelwahhab Meddeb was born in Tunis and studied literature, art history, and archaeology in Tunisia and Paris. He subsequently taught history of architecture at the École des Beaux Arts in Paris. Although he writes in French, his books are rich with references to Arabic texts and contain many quotations in Arabic, revealing not only his knowledge of the language but also his familiarity with Arabic literature and civilization. Meddeb's first novel, *Talismano* (1979), shows his constant concern with the past and his reaction to his Arab-Islamic culture.

The interest of Meddeb's writings lies, to a large extent, in his original handling of language and his experimentation with words. His point of departure is the bilingual situation in the Maghrib, which gives the writer access to two cultures and languages and an opportunity to juggle them and, possibly, combine them. The starting point in his novel *Phantasia* (1989; Fantasia) is the human body. Meddeb conceives of writing as an act of perpetual creation, the result of an inner inspiration. The book revolves around the Muslim mystic Ibn al-Arabi, about whom Meddeb later wrote a collection of poems, *Tombeau d'ibn Arabi* (1988; The tomb of Ibn Arabi). The classical Arabic religious and cultural heritage inspired Meddeb's latest book, *Suhrawardi, Chihab al-Din Yahya: Récits de l'exil occidental* (1993; Suhrawardi Shihab al-Din Yahya: narratives of western exile).

See also Literature: Arabic, North African.

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Aida A. Bamia

MEDIA

See Newspapers and Print Media

MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH

An improving field based on a combination of traditional and modern practices.

The largest populations, comprising 52 percent of the Middle East, are in Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. About half of the Middle East population is urban. Because of public health advances, a Middle Eastern child born in 1990 can expect to live for seventy years, thirteen years longer than his or her parents. Death rates have fallen faster than birthrates, and at the current pace the population will double in twenty-nine years. Cultural traditions, including Islam, shape some curative options, but socioeconomic factors prevail. Local beliefs in breast feeding and birth spacing enhance maternal and child health. Access to health services, quality of environment, and labor opportunities remain uneven. Israel's comprehensive, Western-style healthcare system and developed economy exclude it from many generalizations here.

Typhoid fever, cholera (on the decrease because of better sanitation and improved water sources), typhus, leishmaniasis, trachoma, and gastroenteritis are characteristic of the area. Increased irrigation has raised the incidence of malaria and schistosomiasis. Smallpox was eliminated by the 1970s through systematic vaccination, but measles remains a problem in some countries. Tuberculosis, which replaced smallpox as the illness of crowded cities, decreased after a 1950s World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF immunization program but could resurge if AIDS expands. Ministries of health have combated AIDS, which is seen as the scourge of Western decadence, with frank public health campaigns.

Curative Options: Humoral, Prophetic, Local, and Cosmopolitan

Health care resonates with curative resources and one's life situation. Most people self-prescribe for mild symptoms, whether by taking vitamin C or consulting the local herbalist. Middle Easterners pick eclectically from a repertoire that includes humoral, prophetic, local-practice, and cosmopolitan (modern or Western) cures. Western medicine was introduced in the nineteenth century in medical schools in Cairo, Tunis, and Istanbul, and by the 1920s most governments required practitioners to be licensed.

Humoral medicine, predicated on the balance of the four humors, as in the allopathic, Galenic tradition, is important for herbal pharmacists *(attarin)* who provide such household remedies as ginger for sore throats.

Prophetic medicine *(al-tibb al-nabawi)* is based on sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, such as the *Sahih* by al-Bukhari (d. 870). The *Sahih* contains eighty paragraphs (2.3% of the entire collection) concerned with medical issues, including the ever-popular "God did not send down an illness without also sending down a cure."

In the twentieth century, prophetic medicine has assumed two forms: popular literature, which intermingles standard collections of prophetic sayings with local wisdom, including humoral principles of balanced, normal bodily functions; and formal medical practice, or Islamic medicine, advocated by such groups as the Islamic Medical Organization (IMO). Founded in Kuwait in the 1970s, the IMO administers a hospital that treats patients by the tenets of Islamic medicine and tests Prophetic cures under controlled, laboratory conditions. The experiments concentrate on symptoms ambiguous in etiology and cure, such as renal failure and eczema. The IMO ethical code critiques Western medicine's origin in a "spiritualess" civilization and adjures the Islamic physician to include the patient's therapy managers in the treatment. Other Middle Eastern physicians who consider themselves Islamic practice cosmopolitan medicine but within an Islamic-medicine moral context, such as Islamic benevolent association clinics.

Local and Cosmopolitan medicine frequently overlap. Local practitioners, a trusted first recourse, cooperate with cosmopolitan practitioners. For instance, the traditional birth attendant may encourage the mother through delivery but call the licensed midwife to cut the umbilical cord and provide postnatal care. Training by the ministries of health targets socially accepted but technically inadequate midwives, herbalists, and self-made nurses.

Such local practices as amulets against the evil eye or shrine visitation to enhance fertility, which is forbidden by official Islam, are part of a complex

A child receives immunization shots, Tehran, Iran, 1995. Led by organizations such as WHO and UNICEF, massive immunization campaigns have helped protect thousands of children throughout the world from contracting easily preventable diseases such as polio and measles. **© SHEPARD SHERBELL/CORBIS SABA. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

curative strategy. Caretakers calibrate symptom severity: They make a vow for a sickly child but rush a fevered child to the hospital. Western, cosmopolitan medicine may be construed in local terms. Traditional Egyptian physiology speaks of circulation of microbes that bombard a patient, much as black magic does, and are neutralized by the injection of a powerful agent, or exorciser. Western medicine may be well understood but not used. For instance, agriculturalists will return to snail-infested irrigation canals to cultivate, though they know doing so means reinfection with schistosomiasis.

Public Health: Child Survival and Maternal Health

Major public health problems among infants and children are dehydration from diarrhea; malaria and immunizable diseases; acute respiratory infections; and injuries from war. Among women, maternal mortality and morbidity from inadequate prenatal, delivery, and postpartum care are often problems. Infant mortality rates (deaths per one thousand live births) dropped in the period 1960–1995 from 214 to 109 in Yemen, 139 to 62 in Iraq, and 89 to 12 in Kuwait.

With oral rehydration solution widely available to parents, mortality from dehydration is no longer a major threat to infants. Nevertheless, early childhood acute diarrhea—exacerbated by nonpotable water, poor sanitation, and malnutrition—may cause more than fifty deaths per one thousand per year in pre-school children. Public health programs consider local perceptions of diarrhea and dehydration and teach mothers the warning signs of dehydration and home recipes for oral rehydration solutions in case mothers cannot obtain commercial packets. Given the synergy between malnutrition and diarrhea, these programs have promoted supplements

based on such local dietary practices as Egypt's seven grains, which has been marketed as Supramin.

The percentage of children who are fully vaccinated ranges from 88 percent in Jordan and 85 percent in Morocco, to 45 percent in Yemen. Full-immunization rates have fallen in recent years, most notably in Iraq, after a decline in support from UN agencies previously leading this worldwide effort. While tuberculosis has subsided, acute respiratory infection remains a significant problem, in part because there is no vaccine to prevent it. In most Middle Eastern countries, it has replaced acute diarrhea as the number-one cause of infant mortality.

War exerts a heavy price on women and children, including death from military operations; starvation; orphaning; disruption of services that protect health, such as water, sewer, irrigation works, and health services; rape and sodomy; and separation of children from their families. For political reasons, there are no accurate data on children killed or maimed in Middle Eastern wars. Estimates are as high as two million killed and five million disabled.

The long conflict in Lebanon severely damaged the quantity and quality of drinking water. One 1990 study found that 66 percent of urban Lebanese water sources were contaminated and that one-third of urban communities were using cesspools for sewage disposal. It is more difficult to assess war's psychic trauma for children than its physical wounds. Civil strife in the Levant, West Bank, Gaza, and Israel has created a generation of children with dead parents and siblings, lost limbs, and nightmares of bombs and mines. Women and children pay much of the human price after several years of sanctions against Iraq. The food-rationing system provides less than 60 percent of the required daily calorie intake, and the water and sanitation systems are in a state of collapse. During the Gulf War, Iraq laid multitudes of mines; the allies also laid some one million land mines along the Iraq–Kuwait border. These pose serious threats to life and limb.

Countries are just beginning to recognize at the policy level the importance of maternal health to the health of a nation. Very few have as yet provided adequate resources. Reproductive morbidity—illness related to the reproductive process—remains relatively unstudied but critical. Over half of a sample of rural Egyptian women had such gynecological morbidities as reproductive-tract infections and anemia. Maternal mortality—fewer than 30 per 100,000 births in developed countries—remains high. Morocco averaged 332 in the late 1980s; an Egyptian province, 126 in the 1990s.

Poor maternal health and nutrition, too-short birth intervals, prematurity, and low birth weight underlie 40 to 60 percent of all infant and child deaths. In 1992, Egypt reported 26 percent of children from zero to thirty-five months with stunted growth, while Jordan and Tunisia reported 18 percent.

Public Health: The Politics of Population, Body, and Food

Women have always sought to control their fertility, first with folk remedies, such as aspirin vaginal suppositories, and now with largely safer, modern technology. Women obtain abortions in private clinics and also try such folk remedies as drinking boiled onion leaves. While birth-control pills, and more recently implants, have been widely used, IUDs (intrauterine device) have been popular in places such as Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. In 1994, 63 percent of Turkish, 47 percent of Egyptian, and 50 percent of Tunisian married women used contraceptives. Side effects or a pregnancy history with at least one infant death often prompt a woman to abandon the birth-control pill.

With population (as with all public health), local custom and socioeconomic context play a more critical role than what Islamic culture allows. For example, fertility rates have dropped in poor Islamic countries, such as Tunisia and Morocco, and remained higher in oil-rich Islamic countries where governments have until recently subsidized child rearing and de-emphasized female education, which is often associated with smaller families.

The Egyptian shaykh al-Azhar has in the past given *fatwas* (religious pronouncements) in support of family planning. The Qurʾan is silent on birth control, but jurisprudence texts record the use of *azl* (coitus interruptus). Muslim promotion of population control waxes and wanes for political and economic, more than religious, reasons. In Pahlavi

Iran, the regime legalized abortion, but the Islamic revolution promptly condemned family planning as a Western imperialist plot. Population skyrocketed and threatened economic growth. In the mid-1980s, Friday sermons in Iran took a 180-degree turn and began to advocate family planning.

Child-survival and maternal-health programs are an integral part of family planning. While the population of the Middle East is growing at 2.7 percent a year, the labor force is growing at 3.3 percent. Jobs for forty-seven million new entrants to the labor force must be found by 2011. The Cairo conference on population in 1994 and the Beijing women's conference in 1995 hotly debated such issues as gender equity, employment and economic development, and a woman's right to control her body. Some Muslim *ulama* (theologians) united with Roman Catholics to oppose a platform seen as threatening family values.

Female excision—a non-Islamic custom practiced locally in Egypt, Sudan, and parts of Africa—is vehemently critiqued by Western feminists. In the Middle East, folk beliefs link excision and fertility; in traditional areas of Egypt, a recently excised girl who crosses before another woman is believed able to strike that woman with infertility. While Egypt outlawed female excision in the mid-1950s, the practice, referred to in the Western press as "female genital mutilation," continues in traditional areas. Middle Easterners criticize Western feminists for seeking to impose their standards cross-culturally.

The politics of medicine includes not only issues of population and cross-cultural judgments, but also such issues as access to food and health facilities. The Sudanese famine of the late 1980s was not a problem of food, because the harvests had been ample; rather, it was an issue of the logistics of food placement during civil strive. Finally a quick review of public health cannot cover specialized treatment and scientific advances in Middle Eastern hospitals and research centers in such fields as oncology and cardiology.

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EVELYN A. EARLY

MEDINA

City in Saudi Arabia, second to Mecca as a holy site to Muslims.

Located in Hijaz, about 100 miles from the Red Sea and 215 miles north of Mecca, Medina is revered by Muslims as the prophet Muhammad's destination after his emigration (*hijra* in Arabic) from Mecca in 622 C.E., and as the site of his tomb. Although it is not mandatory, many pilgrims to Mecca also visit Medina. The city became the southern terminus of the Ottomans' Hijaz Railway upon its completion in 1908. The site of a major Ottoman garrison during World War I, Medina and the rest of Hijaz came under Hashimite rule after the empire's defeat. The city's high walls were the last refuge of the Hashimites, and Medina was the last city in Hijaz to fall to the attacking forces of Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman Al Saʿud in 1926, after which many of the city's historical monuments and tombs were destroyed because the conservative religious allies of Abd al-Aziz found them offensive.

Relatively abundant water has enabled Medina to have an important agricultural hinterland, with dates the main crop. However, the growth of the city during the oil era and diversion of water to other uses has caused agriculture to suffer. The annual pilgrimage provides an important source of income, as do trade and the provision of services. Long a center of Islamic learning, the city now hosts the Islamic University of Medina. A 2000 estimate put the city's population at 891,000.

See also ISLAM; MECCA; MUHAMMAD.

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ANTHONY B. TOTH

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Sea between Europe, Africa, and Asia.

The Mediterranean Sea is about 2,400 miles long, covers an area of about 965,000 square miles, and is ringed by a winding coastline of peninsulas and mountains. The sea opens to the Atlantic Ocean through the Strait of Gibraltar, to the Black Sea through the Dardanelles, and to the Red Sea through the Suez Canal.

Since antiquity, the Mediterranean has been an important waterway for trade and has fostered great civilizations on its shores. The sea's strategic significance declined after the sixteenth century as trade routes shifted to the Atlantic but increased again with the 1869 opening of the Suez Canal and its subsequent use for oil shipping. The 1995 Declaration of Barcelona marked the beginning of political and economic collaboration between the European Union and countries on all shores of the Mediterranean.

The pollution of the sea remains a cause of concern for governments in the region, as reflected in the signing of two protocols for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution in 1980 and 1982. Land-based sources of pollution account for 80 percent of the total pollution. Participant countries in the convention for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea have made periodic commitments to reducing pollution, with mixed results.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON
UPDATED BY VANESA CASANOVA-FERNANDEZ

MEGED, AHARON

[1920–]

Israeli writer and dramatist.

Born in Włocławek (Poland), Meged emigrated to Palestine in 1926. A member of kibbutz Sedot Yom from 1938, Meged left in 1950 for Tel Aviv. He was an editor of the journal *ba-Shaʿar,* founded the literary biweekly *Massa,* and was literary editor of the *Lamerhav* newspaper before becoming a columnist for *Davar* in 1971. From 1960 to 1971, he was Israel's cultural attaché to London.

Because his writing spans such a long period, it is difficult to class him simply—as he often is classed—as a writer of the "1948 generation." Over the years, his works have been increasingly critical of patriotic exuberance while at the same time firmly focused on a faithful expression of the highest Zionist ideals. Meged's prize-winning works often have autobiographical content, and the anti-hero, as an outsider, is prominent in his writings. In his most notable opus, *ha-Hai Al ha-Met* (1965, translated as *The Living on the Dead,* 1970), he criticizes Israeli society for abandoning the Zionist ideals of the early *halutzim* (pioneers). Among his plays are *Hannah Szenes, Genesis,* and *I Like Mike,* a comedy. Meged's works have been translated into several languages, including English.

A former member of the Peace Now movement, Meged took issue with what he saw as the movement's focus on criticizing Israeli governments, rather than reaching out to Arabs. By 2000, Meged was a leading figure in the left-wing reaction against post-Zionist or revisionist intellectuals, contending that they mounted a fundamental attack on Judaism and Israeli morality and identity, and that their work was based on a fundamental misreading of the readiness of Israel's Arab neighbors for peace.

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Ann Kahn
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MEHMET RAUF

[1874–1932]

Ottoman Turkish writer.

Mehmet Rauf was born and died in Constantinople (now Istanbul). He graduated from the Naval Academy and became an officer. In the 1890s, he was a member of the group that published *Servet-i Fünün.* In 1901, he published his most famous novel, *Eylul* (September), which is considered the first Turkish example of the psychological novel. Among the ten novels Mehmet Rauf wrote are *Genç Kiz Kalbi* (1914; A young girl's heart), *Karanfil ve Yasemen* (1924), *Son Yildiz* (1927; The last star), and *Halas* (1929). In addition to his novels, he wrote poetry, some of which was collected in a volume entitled *Siyah Inciler* (1900; Black pearls); plays, including *Cidal* (1922), *Sansar* (1920), and *Ceriha* (1923); and dozens of short stories. Mehmet Rauf also published two women's magazines, *Mehasin* (1909) and *Süs* (1923).

David Waldner

MEHMET V REŞAT

[1844–1918]

Ottoman sultan, 1909–1918.

A brother of Sultan Abdülhamit II, Mehmet V was sixty-five years old in April 1909 when he was chosen by the Young Turks to succeed his deposed sibling as sultan of the Ottoman Empire. Mehmet V is usually seen as a weak ruler who functioned mostly as a figurehead for the Young Turks and the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP). His powers were severely circumscribed by the constitution, which had been restored in 1908. He could not nominate his own ministers without the approval of parliament and the CUP. He remained sultan during World War I, but his influence on policy was negligible, as the war was conducted by the Young Turk triumvirate headed by Enver Paşa. Mehmet V did not command an independent base of support. He died of natural causes on 28 June 1918, before Istanbul was occupied by the Allies, and was succeeded by his younger brother Mehmet VI Vahidettin.

See also Abdülhamit II; Committee for Union and Progress; Enver Paşa; Young Turks.

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Zachary Karabell
Updated by Eric Hooglund

MEIR, GOLDA

[1898–1978]

Labor-Zionist politician; fourth prime minister of Israel, 1969–1974.

Golda Meir, née Goldie Mabovitch, was born in Kiev, Russia. Her family moved in 1906 to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where she spent her early years and became active in the Milwaukee Labor Zionist Party, later serving as its leader. In 1921 she and her husband, Morris Myerson, emigrated to Palestine and joined Kibbutz Merhavia. Goldie Myerson represented the kibbutz movement in the Histadrut (Labor Federation) and served as secretary of Histadrut's Women's Labor Council (1928–1932). In 1934 she was elected to the Histadrut's Executive Committee. In the years prior to Israel's independence, Myerson was the acting director of the Jewish Agency's Political Department under Moshe Sharett. In this capacity she took an active part in the negotiations with King Abdullah that resulted in long-term, strategic understandings between Israel and Jordan.

When the State of Israel was declared on 14 May 1948, Myerson was one of the signatories to the Declaration of Independence, and she subsequently became Israel's first ambassador to the Soviet Union. Elected to the first Knesset in 1949, Myerson remained a Knesset member until her resignation from the office of prime minister in 1974. As minister of labor (1949–1956) she was credited with initiating major housing and road programs. During

Once described by former Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion as "the only man in the cabinet," the tenacious Golda Meir served as foreign minister of the country from 1956 to 1965 on Ben-Gurion's appointment, and herself held the prime ministry from 1969 to 1974. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

the crisis that led to the Sinai–Suez war of 1956, Myerson, a Ben-Gurion loyalist, replaced Sharett as foreign minister and Hebraicized her name to Meir. In the aftermath of the war, Meir played a major role in formulating the framework of relations between Israel, Egypt, the United States, and the United Nations. This framework called for Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza under U.S. and UN pressure; the stationing of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Sinai; and negotiating U.S. assurances of Israel's right of free passage through the Strait of Tiran.

During the early 1960s Meir's main focus as foreign minister was the building of close ties between Israel and newly independent African states. At the same time, Meir energetically consolidated her political power base. Together with other leaders in MAPAI (Labor Party), she led an opposition front against several of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's policies, especially Israel's relations with Germany. Ben-Gurion gradually found himself in political isolation within his party and consequently was forced to resign from office in June 1963. Under Levi Eshkol's premiership, Meir strengthened her political position. During Eshkol's tenure, she served as foreign minister, and from 1966 to 1968 as MAPAI's secretary-general. In this role she strove to unite Israel's socialist parties and establish the Israel Labor Party. Prior to the 1967 war, Meir strongly opposed the popular demand for a national unity government that would include the right-wing party and Ben-Gurion's faction. In particular, she rejected the call to appoint Moshe Dayan defense minister in place of Levi Eshkol. Eventually, she was compelled to yield on both counts.

Following Eshkol's death in February 1969, Meir became prime minister. During her tenure she had to deal with growing military tension in the region, especially the war of attrition being fought along the Suez Canal. Increasingly faced with severe internal and external criticism for her "uncompromising positions," Meir refused to accept the authenticity of any specifically Palestinian national attachment to the land that became Israel. Furthermore, her government turned down some offers for partial settlements with Egypt that might have prevented the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. Her policy as prime minister was based on the following principles: Israel's goal was to conclude formal peace treaties with the Arab states; Israel would make territorial concessions only within the framework of comprehensive peace treaties; and as long as no peace treaties existed, Israel was fully justified in building and fortifying Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.

The Arab–Israel War that erupted on 6 October 1973 caught Israel in a strategic surprise that resulted in heavy losses and forced Israel to ask the United States for emergency military equipment and financial aid. Though broadly admired for her self-restraint during the fighting, Meir could not withstand the accusations that she bore the overall responsibility for the war and its consequences.

Thus, she was obliged to resign from office, though not before laying the foundations for interim agreements between Israel and Egypt, which eventually led to the formal peace treaty between the two countries. Golda Meir died in Jerusalem on 8 December 1978.

See also BEN-GURION, DAVID; ESHKOL, LEVI; ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN.

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GREGORY S. MAHLER
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MEKNES

A city of northern Morocco.

Meknes is situated 40 miles (60 km) west of Fez and 90 miles (140 km) east of Rabat and is surrounded by Arab and Berber tribes. Its population was estimated in 1994 as 460,000 inhabitants. Close to the fertile plain of Sais, Meknes benefits from its rich agriculture.

Meknes (or Miknas al-Zaytun) is one of the oldest Moroccan cities. The gathering of one faction of the Miknasa tribes (tenth century) seems to be the beginning of the founding of the city, which flourished later under different dynasties that ruled the Maghrib. Meknes gained prestige in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries when it became a *makhzaniya* city. Sultan Mulay Ismaʿil built palaces and made this city the capital of his kingdom.

Numerous religious groups—such as the Hamadish Brotherhood and the Isawiyya Brotherhood—consider Meknes to be sacred and hold celebrations there. The most important occurs in the month of Mulud and honors Shaykh al-Kamil.

RAHMA BOURQIA

MEKNES, TREATY OF (1836)

The second treaty between Morocco and the United States, signed at Meknes on 16 September 1836.

With two exceptions (a final clause continuing the treaty beyond its fifty years validity until it was actually cancelled by one of the parties and an addendum concerning protection of U.S. ships in Moroccan ports against third-party enemies), the Meknes treaty precisely mirrored the first U.S.-Moroccan treaty, signed in Marrakech on 28 June 1786. Both treaties focused on two concerns: the protection of U.S. shipping against pirate attacks by Moroccan ships and the enhancement of commercial relations. The question of pirates, or corsairs, was indeed an important issue in 1786, but by 1836 it was no longer relevant: the Moroccan corsairing fleet existed only on paper. Moreover, U.S. commerce with Morocco was insubstantial, and U.S. interest in the country minimal. The consul who signed the treaty, James Leib, left the conduct of negotiations to the vice consul and his interpreter.

The importance of the treaty lay in its symbolic value: it deeply worried the British consul general, E. W. A. Drummond-Hay, and the authorities in London. They believed, quite unjustifiably, that it marked the beginnings of an attempt by the United States to occupy physically a position on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco that would be used to expand U.S. influence. At this time Britain was easily Morocco's largest trading partner, particularly through the garrison colony of Gibraltar, and dominated Morocco's foreign relations. Drummond-Hay tried to steer a path that would open Morocco to foreign—especially British—commerce, while ensuring that other powers—especially France—would not extend their influence too much. The supposed agreement about a U.S. base on the coast would undercut British predominance. In fact nothing of the sort happened; British predominance was sealed by the Moroccan-British treaty of 1856, which paved the way for the real opening of Morocco to international commerce.

See also CORSAIRS.

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C. R. PENNELL

MELILLA

Spanish enclave on Morocco's northeast coast.

One of Spain's two remaining footholds on the African continent, the enclave of Mellila occupies approximately 7 square miles on the Guelaia Peninsula, near the city of Nador on Morocco's northeast Mediterranean coast. In addition to the town, there are also two groups of adjacent islands. A majority of the population of 69,000 are ethnically Spanish and Catholic; a substantial minority—about 40 percent—are Berber Muslims, most of whom have Spanish citizenship. In recent years, Melilla, like its companion Spanish enclave Ceuta, has attracted both Moroccans and black Africans seeking to immigrate illegally into Europe.

Founded by the Phoenecians in the third century B.C.E., Melilla was occupied by Spain in 1497, one of several presidios established to protect the Spanish mainland. More territory was added to it after the 1860 war, and in 1861 it was made a free port. Morocco has never ceased to insist on the return of Melilla and Ceuta, but the two countries agreed in 1976 to shelve the dispute as part of their agreement on Western Sahara. In the mid-1990s, as Moroccan political life slowly revived, the status of Mellila and Ceuta became a prime national issue for the country's political parties. The Spanish parliament's approval of statutes of autonomy for the two enclaves in 1995 irked the Moroccans considerably.

The five hundredth anniversary of Spain's control of Melilla was marked in September 1997 in a low-key manner, as Muslim residents complained of socioeconomic difficulties and discrimination. One outcome of the difficulties was the election of a Muslim mayor in 1999. While Morocco's prime minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi suggested in 1999 that Macao and Hong Kong could serve as possible models for a resolution of the dispute, Spain reiterated that no foreign sovereignty claims would be considered, and Spanish prime minister Jose Maria Aznar visited Melilla and Ceuta in January 2000, stressing the "Spanishness" of the two cities. By the end of the century, both cities had become jumping-off points for illegal immigration into Europe and for smugglers of European goods, with potential immigrants from all over the African continent seeking entry. Morocco's assertion of authority over an unoccupied rock outcropping off the Moroccan coast in the summer of 2002 nearly boiled over into an international crisis, as Spain treated it as a Moroccan test of its intentions. Spanish troops evicted the small Moroccan contingent, the status quo was restored, and Spain reinforced its presence in both Melilla and Ceuta and tightened its borders. Moroccans from the neighboring areas are allowed into the towns for work.

See also CEUTA; MOROCCO; SPAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST; SPANISH MOROCCO.

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BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMAN

MELLAH

See GLOSSARY

MEMMI, ALBERT

[1920–]

Tunisian Jew; émigré; French novelist and sociologist.

Albert Memmi was raised in a poor Jewish quarter in Tunis; however, his evident abilities enabled him to be educated at an elite French colonial secondary school. After university studies in Algiers and Paris, he returned to Tunis, where he taught philosophy at a lycée. Following Tunisia's independence in 1956, he emigrated to France, where he became a professor of sociology at the University of Paris in 1970. The alienation he felt growing up—belonging to neither the Muslim nor European cultures and removed from his traditional Jewish background through French education, yet snubbed by his wealthier Eu-

ropean classmates—was a powerful influence on the themes of his work. Memmi is best known for two types of works: his largely autobiographical novels of alienation and his essays exploring the social psychology of colonization and Jewish identity. These works include his first novel, *La statue de sel* (1953; published as *Pillar of Salt* in 1955), and the influential essay "Portrait du colonisé;" (1957; published as the "Colonizer and the Colonized" in 1965). Racism and the various forms of dependency are significant themes in his later works. Memmi has also edited anthologies of North African francophone literature and in 1990 he published a poetry collection, *Le mirliton du ciel.*

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WILL D. SWEARINGEN
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MENDERES, ADNAN

[1899–1961]

Turkish politician.

Adnan Menderes was born in İzmir and educated at the American College in İzmir and the Law Faculty of Ankara University. He was elected to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1930 as a member of the Republican People's Party (RPP), which had been founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In 1945, he was one of the deputies who introduced a bill calling for the introduction of multiparty politics and other political rights specified in the United Nations Charter. In 1946 he resigned from the RPP and with Celal Bayar cofounded the Democrat Party, which subsequently challenged RPP policies. In 1950, after the Democrat Party won a majority of seats in the assembly, Menderes became prime minister, a position he held for ten years. His policies aroused considerable opposition on the part of the RPP, and in May 1960 Menderes was ousted by a military coup d'état, charged with corruption and abuse of power, and, along with 600 other former government officials, tried on the island of Yassiada. Menderes and fourteen colleagues were convicted and sentenced to death; he was executed by hanging in 1961.

See also ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; BAYAR, CELAL; DEMOCRAT PARTY.

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MENOU, JACQUES FRANÇOIS

[1750–1810]

French military officer; governor of Egypt, 1800–1801.

The last leader of the French forces that occupied Egypt from 1798 to 1801, Jacques François Menou succeeded General Kléber as Napoléon Bonaparte's governor of Egypt in July of 1800. He converted to Islam in order to marry an Egyptian and changed his name to Abdullah. Believing that French occupation of Egypt would continue for a long time, Menou drafted proposals to encourage Egyptian agriculture, commerce, and industry. When Menou began to survey land-holdings in preparation for the assessment of new land taxes to pay for these reforms, Egyptians of all social classes, already alienated by Menou's declaration of Egypt as a colony of France, opposed him.

In March of 1801, a joint Anglo-Ottoman force occupied the Nile river delta. Leaving the defense of Cairo, the capital, to General Belliard, Menou led his troops to Alexandria. When Belliard surrendered, Menou, isolated in Alexandria, was forced to surrender. French forces left Egypt in October of 1801.

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DAVID WALDNER

MENZIES MISSION

See SUEZ CRISIS (1956–1957)

MERETZ

See Israel: Political Parties in

MERNISSI, FATEMA

[1940–]

Moroccan sociologist, author, and feminist Qur'anic scholar.

Born in Fez, Morocco, Fatema Mernissi studied at Muhammad V University in Rabat, where she received a degree in political science. She continued her studies at the Sorbonne in Paris, where she earned a degree in sociology. Her doctorate in sociology is from Brandeis University (1973). She is currently professor of sociology with a research appointment at the Institut Universitaire de Recherche Scientifique, Muhammad V University in Rabat.

Working at the intersection of gender, religion, and sociopolitical organization, Mernissi has taken on some of the most contentious issues of her time, such as pointing out the inconsistencies inherent in basing Morocco's *moudawana* (code of personal status) on religious law while the constitution and penal code are based on civil law, or claiming to establish a democratic polity while denying Moroccan women full and equal political rights. Mernissi has entered difficult religious debates, attributing the betrayal of women's political agency, for example, to misogynistic, patriarchal interpretations of the *hadith.* Mernissi envisions a pluralist, Islamic civil society in which women and the poor would exercise their full rights as citizens.

Widely translated, her work has moved from the study of sexual dynamics in Muslim society in *The Veil and the Male Elite* (1975), to examinations of sexual inequality as experienced by marginalized and silenced women in *Doing Daily Battle* (1983), to the recovery of women's Islamic history in *Forgotten Queens of Islam* (1990). Mernissi next turned her attention to contemporary Islam, looking at the question of fundamentalism in *Islam and Democracy* (1992), at the role of the state and Islamic thought in setting the parameters of women's position in *Women's Rebellion and Islamic Memory* (1993), and at her own memories of growing up Muslim, Moroccan, and female in *Dreams of Trespass* (1994) and *Harem Days* (1999).

Her description of the empowerment of remote villagers in the High Atlas as they worked through a nongovernmental organization (NGO) to solve their own problems concerning water in *Les Aït-Débrouille* (1997) marked Mernissi's shift in focus. She introduced a cross-cultural examination of the production and reception of representations of Middle Eastern women in *Scheherazade Goes West* (2001), and began to invest her energies in local action and democratization through two projects. In Civic Synergy, begun in 1995, Mernissi facilitates writing workshops to enhance the communication skills of NGO members, and in return they provide material for her research on the connection between access to new technologies and growing membership in NGOs. The Civic Caravan is a series of workshops designed to teach young NGO members the arts of dialogue and networking. The thread that runs through all Mernissi's work is the belief in the power of communication to create agency. The female storyteller Scheherazade embodies the intellect, humor, wisdom, and wit that Mernissi associates with active community building, be it in the harem of her childhood where women dream of far horizons, or in the workshops where activists work to build a better community with their own energies and ideas.

See also Moudawana, al-.

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Laura Rice

MESOPOTAMIA CAMPAIGN (1914–1918)

World War I British military campaign in part of the Ottoman Empire.

In November 1914, within days of the British declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire (which was allied with Germany in World War I), the British landed an Indian Expeditionary Force (IEP) at Basra in Mesopotamia (present-day Iraq). Meeting scant resistance from the Ottoman Turks, the IEF moved north and, in April 1915, Sir John Nixon took command. Nixon ordered his lieutenant, Sir Charles Townshend, to advance north—up the river

Tigris toward Baghdad. By November 1915, Townshend succeeded in advancing to Ctesiphon, just south of Baghdad, but his supply lines were stretched thin, and he was repulsed by the newly invigorated Ottoman armies under the command of German General Kolmar von der Goltz. Townshend retreated south to Kut al-Amara, where he was trapped by the Ottoman Turks.

The British failed to reinforce Townshend, and after a 146-day siege, he surrendered his entire force on 29 April 1916. Lacking men and matériel, the Turks were unable to take advantage of the victory. Under the command of Sir Frederick Maude, the British again advanced north, retook Kut on 22 February 1917 and entered Baghdad on 11 March. By September, the British were in control of central Iraq, and by the war's end in 1918, they had occupied all of Mesopotamia south of the city of Mosul.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

MESSAOUDI, KHALIDA

See TOUMI, KHALIDA

MESSIANISM

The expectation that a prophet will arrive at the end of time to usher in the divine kingdom.

Messianism is common to all three of the major Middle Eastern religions. The word *messiah* is derived from the Hebrew Old Testament, where it was used to refer to actual kings who were anointed *(mashiah)* with oil. In the intertestamental period, the term was applied to the future king who would restore the Kingdom of Israel and deliver the people from evil. In Christianity, Jewish ideas about the *messiah* were applied to Jesus. The word messiah was translated into Greek as *Christos,* or Christ, thereby identifying Jesus with Jewish messianic expectations. Though Christianity builds on Jewish messianic precedents, it adds the idea that Christ has already fulfilled messianic expectations in person and that he will return to bring these expectations to their final fulfillment. Comparable ideas are found in Islam in the person of the *Mahdi* (the rightly guided one), a person who will come at the end of time to defeat the enemies of Islam and thus create a just world. Islamic messianism does not, however, deal strictly or solely with the end of the world; it has played a role in various reformist and revivalist movements.

See also MAHDI.

DAVID WALDNER

MESTIRI, AHMAD

[1925–]

Tunisian political opposition leader, formerly an important figure in the Neo-Destour (later the Socialist Destour) Party (PSD).

Ahmad Mestiri, from an upper-middle-class family, was trained as a lawyer and achieved prominence within the Neo-Destour Party in the early 1950s. While the party was outlawed (1952–1954), he served on its clandestine Political Bureau. Mestiri was rewarded for his party services by being appointed minister of justice in 1956 and minister of finance and commerce in 1959. In the meantime, Neo-Destour leader Habib Bourguiba had appointed Mestiri to the Political Bureau in 1957; he was elected to it in 1959. Mestiri also was elected a National Assembly deputy. Additionally, from 1960 to 1966 he was ambassador to Moscow, Cairo, and Algiers.

During the 1960s Mestiri became disenchanted with the unrestrained power exercised by Bourguiba as both president and party leader. He and other opponents of the economic strategies of planning minister Ahmed Ben Salah were particularly critical of Bourguiba for refusing to remove Ben Salah from his post, even when the weight of evidence

indicated the failure of his policies. As a result, Mestiri broke with the PSD in 1968. Following Ben Salah's disgrace in 1969, Mestiri resumed his affiliation with the party. Although widely acknowledged as the leader of a liberal current within the PSD, he was appointed minister of the interior and, in 1971, was elected to the party's Central Committee. Mestiri initiated a campaign to open important party business to broader participation by advocating the direct election of Political Bureau members. He also called for the establishment of institutional constraints on the president. Bourguiba responded by dismissing Mestiri and, in 1972, ordering his expulsion from the party.

By the mid-1970s, Bourguiba became president for life, and opposition elements within the PSD were pushed outside the party, later originating the Mouvement des Démocrates Sociales (MDS) led by Mestiri. The MDS was denied official acceptance as a political party, but he was recognized as the leader of a loyal opposition and was permitted to publish a newspaper, *al-Ra'i.*

The appointment of Mohammed Mzali as prime minister in 1980 inaugurated a more open political era. The PSD again rehabilitated Mestiri, even giving him a minor cabinet post. He accepted the government's invitation to opposition political groups to participate in the 1981 National Assembly elections, but the MDS list failed to gain the 5 percent of the total vote needed to be sanctioned as a political party. During the 1980s, however, the regime moved closer toward the secular opposition to counter emerging Islamist tendencies. Finally, in 1983 Mestiri's MDS was granted formal recognition.

Prior to the 1986 elections, Mestiri was imprisoned for organizing a demonstration protesting the U.S. bombing of Tripoli in April. The MDS therefore boycotted the elections. Relations with the government remained poor until the removal of Bourguiba from the presidency in 1987. Thereafter, Mestiri consulted with President Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali about implementing an effective system of political pluralism. Nevertheless, the MDS repeated poor results in the 1989 elections. Disappointed with what he considered a fraudulent scrutiny, Mestiri resigned and retired from political life in 1989. His successor at the head of the MDS was Mohamed Moadda.

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KENNETH J. PERKINS
UPDATED BY ANA TORRES-GARCIA

MEUSHI, PAUL PETER

[1894–1975]

Maronite patriarch who worked to preserve peaceful Christian–Muslim relations in Lebanon.

Paul Peter Meushi was born 1 April 1894 in the town of Jazzin (southern Lebanon) to a Maronite Christian family. He completed his elementary and secondary education in Lebanon, then left for Rome to join the Gregorian University, where he completed a degree in philosophy and theology. In 1917, Meushi was ordained a priest in Rome and, at the end of World War I, he came back to Lebanon. From then until 1934, when he was nominated to be bishop for the city of Tyre, Meushi served as a priest for two Maronite parishes in the United States (New Bedford, Massachusetts, and Los Angeles, California). In May 1955, by papal decree, Meushi was appointed Maronite patriarch of Antioch and all the East.

In 1958, Lebanon plunged into civil war, the partisans of then-President Camille Chamoun pitted against the opposition—led mostly by Muslims and Christians. Meushi opposed the Chamoun policy of aligning Lebanon with the West, thus alienating the country's Muslim population. Chamoun, however, suspected the patriarch of wanting to reassert religious authority in Lebanon's political affairs, but Meushi was concerned about the fate of Christianity in the Middle East and the preservation of Christian–Muslim coexistence in Lebanon. Cardinal Meushi died 11 January 1975.

See also CHAMOUN, CAMILLE; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1958).

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GEORGE E. IRANI

MEVLEVI BROTHERHOOD

A Sufi order.

The Mevlevi Brotherhood is a style of Anatolian Sufism founded by Mevlana Celalledina (also Jalal al-Din) Rumi (1207–1273), a Central Asian mystic and poet. He developed the *samaʿa,* a rite of communal recitation, which consists of a call to Allah, performance of the *zikr* (the divine ceremony of remembrance that signifies an attempt to connect and give thanks for the primordial moment of creation),—dancing, and meditating. The *sama'a* evokes a dialogue with nature; members methodically join in an individual, synchronized, whirling dance that emulates the movement of the planets on their journey of spiritual fulfillment. Rumi's son and grandson developed the order into a community of followers, which flourished during the Ottoman era.

The Mevlevis played an important role in Turkey's social and intellectual development, and the order served as a conduit for the common people. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his secular colleagues who established the Republic of Turkey distrusted the Mevelvis on account of their influence among the masses and forcibly disbanded the order in 1925. The Mevlevi monastery in Konya was converted into a museum in 1927 and the members were banned from using it. Even though the monastery remains a museum, it serves de facto as a shrine that thousands of pilgrims visit each year. Despite its suppression in Turkey, the Mevlevis spread to other countries and today their centers exist in more than seventy-five cities worldwide.

See also ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; KONYA; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS.

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TAYEB EL-HIBRI
UPDATED BY RITA STEPHAN

MI-6

Branch of the British government responsible for the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence.

The function of this government service is primarily espionage, the obtaining of accurate information from the enemy by means of spies or agents; double agents generally work for MI-5, the British internal security agency. Cooperation between both services was necessary when working with enemy spies who were uncovered in Great Britain and persuaded to work for the British from then on, thus double-crossing their original masters. Other agencies included primarily the Admiralty, the Air Force, the Home Office, and the Foreign Office; in both World War I and World War II, university faculty members and special professions were inducted into the intelligence services. After the last war, MI-6 continued to work in the Middle East, as did the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

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ZACHARY KARABELL

MICHAEL, SAMI

[1926–]

Israeli author.

Michael Sami was born in Baghdad, Iraq. Due to his involvement in the communist underground, he was forced to leave his homeland in 1947 and arrived in Israel in 1948. He has published numerous novels for adults and young adults. He is best

known for his literary representation of women, Middle Eastern Jews, and Arabs, and their political and ethnic struggles and cultural systems.

His first novel, published in English as *Equal and More Equal* (1974), depicts the socioeconomic and cultural frustrations of Jewish immigrants from Arab countries as they arrive in Israel. In *Refuge* (1977), also translated into English, Sami shows the personal and political strife of a group of young Jews and Arabs in the Israeli Communist Party during the 1973 Arab-Israel War. His writing reached its height in his later books and eventually brought him both popular and literary acclaim with the best-selling *Victoria* (1993), a novel based on his mother's life. It shows the traditions and customs of the Baghdad Jewish quarter in great detail, focusing particularly on its male domination, its lack of privacy, and the intensity of sexual motivation. It ends in Israel, where the men are disempowered by their cultural clash with a new reality and hierarchy. Victoria, as her name implies, is the ultimate winner, seasoned by her experience of self-denial and accommodation. Michael's novel *Water Kissing Water* (2001) draws on his background in hydrology, revisiting Little Israel of the 1950s.

See also ADOT HA-MIZRAH.

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ZVIA GINOR
UPDATED BY NANCY BERG

MIDDLE EAST

Regional name with various usages and meanings.

The usage and meaning of "Middle East" have been a source of heated debate. As early as 1949, when other terms, particularly "Near East," were still used, Winston Churchill said: "I had always felt that the name 'Middle East' for Egypt, the Levant, Syria, and Turkey was ill-chosen. This was the Near East. Persia and Iraq were the Middle East." Despite the tacit acceptance of the term by most scholars, journalists, and politicians, few specialists would deny a lingering discomfort with the two words.

Regional geographic names based upon directions are always problematic. They necessarily imply a perspective—in this case, obviously that of "the West." "The East" brings to mind the "Eastern Question" that had plagued Europe since the eighteenth century. Earlier, Europeans had used "the Levant," from the French *lever* (to rise), meaning the place where the sun rises: the eastern coast of the Mediterranean (or of Spain). In the Middle Ages, the favored term was *outremer* (overseas).

"The East," and its adjectival form "oriental," connoted in the European mind more than just a geographic locale. It evoked a world of strange customs, religious fanaticism, exotic sexual practices, and sybaritic culture. As travels and colonial activity made India, and then China, familiar, the need arose to define "East" further. By the late nineteenth century the Ottoman realm was the "Near East" in contradistinction to China and Japan, the "Far East."

It is generally accepted that the earliest reference to "Middle East" occurs in Alfred Thayer Mahan's "The Persian Gulf and International Relations," in the September 1902 issue of the *National Review* (London). Popularization of the new usage is credited to Valentine Chirol, Tehran correspondent for *The Times* who, in the title of the first in a series of articles, "The Middle Eastern Question," dated 14 October 1902, retrieved the term from Mahan's text. An additional factor in its popularization was the shifting balance of power from mainland Europe to the American side of the Atlantic. From an American point of view, everything on the European side of the Atlantic is, geographically, east. Thus, the further reaches occupied by Arabs, Turks, and Persians plausibly seemed more "middle" than "near."

Since the 1950s "the Middle East" has been the favored American term for newly founded academic institutes, programs, and professional associations, though use of "Near East" has persisted in archae-

ological circles and academic departments founded before World War II. The U.S. Department of State compromised with a division for "Near and Middle East" affairs.

Today "the Middle East" encompasses the lands that stretch from Egypt to Turkey and Iraq, including the Arabian peninsula, usually Iran, and, somewhat less frequently, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Sudan.

The term is in no way coterminous with "the Muslim (or Islamic) world." The majority of the world's Muslims live outside "the Middle East," by any definition. It has been suggested that "the Middle East" is best considered a purely geographical term that encompasses roughly the area of the earliest wave of Muslim conquests, stretching from Morocco to Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the later inclusion of Anatolia (modern Turkey). Others disagree, saying that such a historical definition would also include parts of Europe (such as Spain and Sicily) and central Asia.

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KAREN PINTO

MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE ORGANIZATION (MEDO)

U.S.-proposed group for military security in the Middle East; never formed.

The beginning of 1952 saw riots in Egypt and a continuing erosion of Britain's position in the Middle East. The U.S. foreign policy establishment considered plans to replace Britain as the preeminent power in the Middle East. Paul Nitze, then head of the U.S. Policy Planning Staff, proposed the creation of a Middle East Defense Organization that would protect the Suez Canal and provide military security to the petroleum-producing regions and to the Northern Tier countries of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. Cosponsored by Turkey, MEDO was not endorsed by Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who viewed MEDO as a tool of American imperialism.

Although both U.S. President Harry Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson were committed to MEDO, Egypt's resistance and the generally lukewarm reaction of other Arab states made the realization of MEDO impossible. In 1953, Truman left the White House, and MEDO became defunct. The ideal of a NATO-like security arrangement for the Middle East remained alive, however, and aspects of MEDO were included in the Baghdad Pact.

See also BAGHDAD PACT (1955).

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ZACHARY KARABELL

MIDDLE EAST SUPPLY CENTER (MESC)

World War II agency in Cairo set up to coordinate supply and transport problems of the Middle East.

The economic strength of the Middle Eastern countries was necessary to the success of the Allied war effort. A multitude of agencies—British and American, military and civilian—had roles in ensuring that Middle Eastern economies remained viable and strong. In April 1941, the British established the Middle East Supply Center (MESC) as a clearinghouse for all matters of civilian supply in the Middle East; it reported directly to the ministry of war transport in London. The goal was to regulate and control shipping and commerce among the countries of the Middle East, to eliminate nonessential shipping and trade, and to avoid the political and military hazards posed by populations made hostile because of hunger, unemployment, and the other problems of disorganized economies.

The U.S. Lend-Lease Act of 1941 sent massive amounts of American-made matériel, and after May 1942, the United States joined the British in the MESC, using it to coordinate the American war effort in the Middle East.

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR

MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

Public university in Ankara, Turkey.

Founded in 1959 as a joint project between the Turkish government and the United Nations, Middle East Technical University (METU) was the first English-language university in Turkey. It comprises faculties of economics and administrative sciences, architecture, education, engineering, and arts and sciences; it also has the School of Foreign Languages and the Institute of Marine Sciences. In 2002 it had a teaching staff of 1,600 and 19,154 students (about 37 percent female).

METU was envisaged as bringing to Turkey American methods of education and organization rather than the European methods practiced at the older Istanbul University and Ankara University. Instruction in English was expected to provide excellent language training for local students and also to enable students from other countries of the region to attend the university. In its early development, it received considerable financial support from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Ford Foundation, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Central Treaty Organization. Its governance, too, resembled that of an American state university, unlike the other universities where a board of trustees, appointed by the Turkish government, appointed the university president and the deans.

See also ANKARA UNIVERSITY; ISTANBUL UNIVERSITY.

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I. METIN KUNT
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

MIDFAʿI, JAMIL AL-

[1890–1959]

Iraqi soldier, politician, and businessman.

Jamil al-Midfaʿi was born in Mosul in what is today northern Iraq. He fought in the Ottoman army in World War I but subsequently joined the Arab Revolt. He became minister of interior in the first cabinet of Nuri al-Saʿid in 1930, holding the post until November 1933. He was prime minister of Iraq seven times between 1933 and 1953.

See also ARAB REVOLT (1916).

PETER SLUGLETT

MIDHAT PAŞA

[1822–1884]

Ottoman provincial governor, grand vizier, and father of the first written Ottoman constitution.

Midhat Paşa (also called Ahmet Şefik) was born into an Ottoman Turkish family in Istanbul. His father, a native of Rusçuk on the Danube, held judgeships in Muslim courts. In his youth, Midhat studied Arabic and Persian in mosque schools, while employed from the age of twelve in offices of the Ottoman Empire's central government at the Sublime Porte. He began to learn French when he was about thirty-five; in 1858, he spent six months on leave in Europe, improving his French.

Midhat was on the payroll of the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances from the 1840s to 1861, but was often sent out of Istanbul as inspector or trouble-shooter on short-term missions that took him to Damascus, Konya, Kastamonu, Edirne, Bursa, Silistre, and Vidin. In 1861 he achieved the rank of vizier when appointed governor of the *eyalet* (province) of Niş, where he proved successful as a provincial administrator. In 1864 he was brought back to Istanbul to help the grand vizier, Mehmet Fuad Paşa, draft a law recasting provincial government in larger units (the *vilayet*). Midhat then became governor of the Tuna (Danube) *vilayet,* the first one created, a Bulgarian area with its capital at Rusçuk. Midhat's reputation as an effective provincial governor continued to grow as he built roads and bridges, curbed banditry, settled refugees, and started small factories. He established the first official provincial newspaper in the empire, and cre-

ated agricultural credit cooperatives that evolved into modern Turkey's Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankasi). He tried to incorporate Bulgarians into the government councils, but he repressed Bulgarian nationalists.

In 1868 Midhat was appointed head of the new Council of State, created to draft laws, in Istanbul. But friction with Grand Vizier Mehmed Emin Ali Paşa led to his transfer in 1869 to the governorship of the Baghdad *vilayet,* together with command of the Sixth Army. Midhat used his civil and military powers with partial success to settle tribes, to collect taxes, and to institute conscription. Thereafter, Iraqi nomads declined in numbers, and cultivators increased. Midhat's application of the 1858 Ottoman land code furnished tapu (title) deeds to individual cultivators, but principally tribal *shaykhs,* city merchants, and former tax farmers took advantage of the law. In the city of Baghdad, Midhat introduced municipal improvements including street lighting and paving, a bridge over the Tigris, schools, and a horse-car tramway line to a suburb. Here also he established the first Iraqi newspaper, the *Zawra,* a semi-weekly in Turkish and Arabic. In the Baghdad *vilayet,* he established government schools—a technical school and two secondary schools, one preparing students for the military and one for the civil service, with free tuition. Disagreements with the grand vizier, Mahmud Nedim Paşa, caused Midhat's resignation in 1872.

Returning to Istanbul, Midhat persuaded Sultan Abdülaziz to appoint him grand vizier, on 31 July 1872. But political opponents, backed by the Khedive Isma^cil of Egypt and the Russian ambassador, managed his dismissal on 18 October. He had been impolitic, too outspoken. During this time, Midhat had begun to think about a constitution for the empire. Such thoughts occupied him during the next three years, when he had two brief terms as minister of justice, one as governor of Salonika, and periods out of office. By the spring of 1876, Midhat was a key member of a group that sought to bring change to an Ottoman government perceived as ineffectual in the face of financial bankruptcy and of revolts in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Midhat and others used popular discontent to force the dismissal of Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim, and then engineered the bloodless deposition of Sultan Abdülaziz on 30 May. Sultan Murat V succeeded. Midhat became president of the Council of State again, and began pressing for a constitution. When Murat V suffered a nervous breakdown, following the deposed Abdülaziz's suicide, Midhat and the ministers deposed Murat in turn for his younger brother. Abdülhamit II succeeded on 31 August 1876 after promising Midhat that he would speedily promulgate a constitution.

Midhat chaired a commission in the fall of 1876 that drafted a constitution providing for an elected chamber of deputies. The sultan accepted it only after his own powers were augmented to include the power of exiling. On 19 December Abdülhamit appointed Midhat grand vizier, and on 23 December promulgated the constitution. At the same time, representatives of the European great powers were meeting in Istanbul to devise reformed administration for the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Midhat's hopes that Europe would accept the constitution as the fundamental reform were deceived. An Ottoman consultative council, convened by Midhat, in turn rejected the powers' proposals. The stand-off eventually led to Russia's invasion in April 1877 and the Russian-Ottoman Wars of 1877/78.

Meanwhile, Midhat seemed to act less like a grand vizier responsible to the sultan, and more like a prime minister responsible to the nation. Abdülhamit, who feared Midhat also as a sultan-deposer, exiled him to Europe on 5 February 1877. In late 1878, Midhat was allowed to return, but not to Istanbul. He became governor of the Syrian *vilayet.* In Damascus he was almost as vigorous as in Rusçuk and Baghdad but was refused the broader military power he requested. Abdülhamit transferred Midhat in August 1880 to İzmir as governor, apparently to keep a closer eye on him. There Midhat was arrested on 18 May 1881, taken to Istanbul, tried on trumped-up charges of having participated in the murder of former Sultan Abdülaziz, and convicted. Abdülhamit converted his death sentence to life banishment. Midhat was transported to a prison in al-Ta'if in Arabia. On 8 May 1884 he was strangled by soldiers, presumably on Abdülhamit's order.

As administrator, especially as provincial governor, Midhat achieved much, although some of his innovations were superficial. He was known for his energy, his fairness, his honesty, his Ottoman

patriotism, his secular-mindedness, and his zeal for borrowing Western techniques and institutions. Midhat was also known for his blunt speech and his haste to act, qualities that helped terminate his two short grand vizierates. But without him, there would have been no 1876 constitution.

See also Abdülaziz; Abdülhamit II; Russian–Ottoman Wars.

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Roderic H. Davison

MIHRAB

An indicator of the direction toward which Muslims face in prayer.

While the etymology of the word is the subject of some debate, *mihrab* (pl. *maharib*) is the Arabic term used to refer to any object, marking, or architectural feature that indicates the direction Muslims must face (that is, toward Mecca) in the performance of the five daily prayers. Since the *mihrab* commonly takes the form of a distinctive recess in the wall of a mosque, the word is often translated as "prayer niche." Traditionally crafted in stucco, marble, or tile and adorned with calligraphic scriptural inscriptions, the *mihrab* is usually the most elaborately decorated piece of architecture in a mosque and in some simpler settings may be the only ornamented part of a mosque's interior.

Scott Alexander

MILANI, TAHMINEH

[1960–]

Iranian filmmaker.

Tahmineh Milani was born in Tabriz in 1960 and educated as an architect in Tehran. In 1989, after attending a screenwriting workshop and assisting in making films, she wrote and directed her first feature film, *Children of Divorce.* This marked the beginning of her career as a writer and director concerned with social issues, such as the effects of divorce, in middle-class Tehran. Her films focus on strong women protagonists. Her works gained momentum in the 1990s, culminating in two films that address the universal issue of women's rights through the specific problems of women in Islamic Iran. With *Two Women* (1999) Milani earned international recognition and a reputation as a feminist activist in Iran. Her next film, *The Hidden Half* (2001), deals with more personal material from her own past as a left-wing college student opposed to the shah's regime. She was jailed for a short period for suggesting in this film that those like her who were active in the Islamic Revolution were later suppressed by the very regime they helped to bring to power.

See also Art; Gender: Gender and Education; Iran; Iranian Revolution (1979).

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Roxanne Varzi

MILITARY AND POLITICS

See Military in the Middle East

MILITARY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Internal security and external conflict have heightened the importance of the military in most Middle Eastern countries.

The use of force and weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction, continues to play a large role in the Middle East. Aggravated by conflicts between and among Middle Eastern nations and their populations, military considerations are paramount in diverse situations ranging from the Israeli–Palestinian conflict to various international terrorist threats, such as that posed by the al-Qaʿida movement, to the fear that various "rogue" states will either use weapons of mass destruction to further their goals or provide them to terrorist movements.

Iraqi deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces Izzat Ibrahim (sixth from left) with his staff on Army Day in 1991. During the Gulf War, the Iraqi military was composed of three divisions: the Special Republican Guard (responsible for internal defense), the Republican Guard, and a regular army. **© Francoise de Mulder/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

The history of the military and the quest for security in the modern Middle East can be examined on three often interlocking levels: internal, regional, and international. The history of each nation reveals a variety of religious, ethnic, tribal, ideological, social, and economic conflicts that often result in violence and therefore also result in a prominent role for the military in internal security. At the regional level, the quest for hegemony by one state has often led to wars among Middle Eastern states, as well as to the exploitation of the internal problems of rival nations. Finally, the Middle East has been an important arena in the international rivalries of the great powers.

Military Organization

European nations and the United States have had a great impact on the training, organizing, and equipping of the military in the Middle East. This accelerated during the nineteenth century, largely due to rivalries among European countries. The result has been a tendency for Middle Eastern nations to organize their militaries along Western lines. More traditional tribal armies, such as that led by Amir Faisal (Faisal I, who later became King of Iraq) and T. E. Lawrence in World War I, continued to play a role but decreasingly so as they were eclipsed by modern forces. For instance, the Ottoman army had significant successes, including the decisive defeat of 200,000 Allied troops at Gallipoli in 1915, the surrender of an entire British army in Mesopotamia in 1916, and continued occupation of Medina throughout the war. The legacy of the Ottomans continued long after the end of the empire in the contributions of trained officers, Arab as well as Turkish, to the emerging nations of the Middle East. Foremost among these was Atatürk, but many Arab leaders, such as Iraq's Nuri al-Saʿid, were graduates of Ottoman military colleges and learned from Ottoman officers.

Active force levels

Country	1955 or 1956			1965			1969			1975		
	Population in million	Force level in thousands	Force as percentage of population	Population in millions	Force level in thousands	Force as percentage of population	Population in millions	Force level in thousands	Force as percentage of population	Population in millions	Force level in thousands	Force as percentage of population
Afghanistan	—	—	—	12	90	0.75	15.8	110	0.70	19.1	88	0.46
Algeria	—	—	—	11.7	65	0.55	12.6	66.5	0.53	16.9	63	0.37
Bahrain	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Egypt	22.9	80	0.35	29.6	180	0.61	31.5	216	0.68	37.5	322.5	0.86
Iran	18.5	135	0.73	23.4	185	0.79	26.3	236	0.90	33.1	250	0.75
Iraq	6	40	0.68	7.4	82	1.11	8.5	92	1.08	11.1	135	1.21
Israel	1.8	250	13.88	2.6	375	14.42	2.8	280	10.18	3.4	156	4.59
Jordan	1.4	23	1.64	2	45	2.25	2.1	55	2.62	2.7	80.3	2.97
Kuwait	—	—	—	0.4	7	1.50	0.6	7.5	1.37	1.2	10.2	0.84
Lebanon	1.7	6.2	0.35	2.4	13	0.54	2.6	15.5	0.60	3.2	15.3	0.47
Libya	—	—	—	1.6	18.2	1.13	1.8	7	0.40	2.3	32	1.39
Morocco	10.6	30	0.28	13	42	0.32	14.2	78.3	0.55	17.3	61	0.35
Oman	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.8	2.8	0.37	0.8	14.1	1.85
Qatar	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Saudi Arabia	—	—	—	3.2	45	1.41	6	56	0.93	8.9	63	0.71
Sudan	10.2	5	0.05	13.5	18.5	1.37	14.4	30	0.21	17.9	48.6	0.27
Syria	5.8	40	0.69	5.6	60	1.07	5.7	67.9	1.20	7.4	177.5	2.40
Tunisia	3.8	1.3	0.03	4.6	17.5	0.38	4.7	23	0.49	5.8	24	0.42
Turkey	24.8	400	1.61	31.4	480	1.52	33	534	1.62	39.9	453	1.14
United Arab Emirates	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	6	1.50	—	—	—
Yemen, North	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	60	1.20	6.5	32	0.49
Yemen, South	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.3	10.5	0.84	1.7	18	0.23

[continued]

TABLE 1 BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

This trend toward Westernization of the military has continued to the point that most Middle Eastern militaries are mirror images of one or more Western models. The model chosen is normally a function of which of the great powers has provided the most support to a nation. Turkey, as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), organizes its forces along American lines, with doctrine, training, and equipment closely paralleling that of the U.S. military. Iraq, since the 1958 revolution, has traditionally looked to the Soviet Union for support, and its military has reflected this. It has often been said that the success of the United States and its European allies in the 1991 Gulf War stemmed from their fighting an enemy they had been training to fight for decades: the Soviet military organization. Political alliances with Cold War rivals have changed, often rapidly, but change in the military comes more slowly. The result was often a hybrid military.

Israel presents a unique case. At first glance, its military appears to be much like those of the NATO nations from which much of its equipment comes. Some factors, however, make Israel different. Much of its equipment is captured, and imported equipment is often dramatically modified; how else could World War II–vintage Sherman tanks have been successful in the Arab–Israel War of 1973? The successes of the Israeli military affect doctrine and organization, not only in Israel but in other nations whose militaries study those successes and in turn contribute to the Israeli military. Finally, the organization of the Israeli military is more reminiscent of the Swiss citizen army than of the armies of other countries. While most militaries have a reserve system, few have one as extensive as Israel's. Almost all males and many females of military age are in the reserves, on active duty at least thirty consecutive days annually, and available for mobilization in seventy-two hours.

Active force levels [CONTINUED]

Country	1979			1991			1995/1996			2000/2001		
	Population in million	Force level in thousands	Force as percentage of population	Population in millions	Force level in thousands	Force as percentage of population	Population in millions	Force level in thousands	Force as percentage of population	Population in millions	Force level in thousands	Force as percentage of population
Afghanistan[a,b]	21.3	90	0.42	20.8	45	0.22	[a]	[a]	[a]	[b]	[b]	[b]
Algeria	19.1	88.8	0.46	26.3	125.5	0.48	28.8	123.7	0.43	32.1	124.0	0.39
Bahrain	0.4	2.3	0.65	0.5	7.5	1.49	.588	11	1.88	.626	11.0	1.76
Egypt	40.5	395	0.98	56	420	0.75	58.7	440	0.75	70.6	443.0	0.63
Iran	39.3	415	1.05	53.8	528	0.98	66.8	513	0.79	68.3	513.0	0.76
Iraq	12.7	22.2	0.17	19.9	382.5	1.93	21.7	382.5	1.76	22.3	424.0	1.90
Israel	3.8	165.6	4.33	4.8	141	2.92	5.7	175	3.07	6.3	163.5	2.6
Jordan	3	67.2	2.20	4.3	101.3	2.36	4.6	98.6	2.14	6.9	100.2	1.45
Kuwait	1.2	11.1	0.92	2.1	8.2	0.39	1.6	15.3	0.96	2.1	15.5	0.74
Lebanon	2.7	8.8	0.33	2.7	17.5	0.65	4.1	48.9	1.19	3.1	71.8	2.32
Libya	2.9	42	1.46	4.8	55	1.15	5.6	65	1.16	5.6	76.0	1.36
Morocco	19.3	98	0.51	25.4	195.5	0.77	28.3	194	0.69	28.5	198.5	0.70
Oman	0.9	19.2	2.21	1.5	34.1	2.21	2.0	43.5	2.18	2.7	43.4	1.61
Qatar	0.2	4.7	2.23	0.4	7.5	1.71	0.55	11.8	2.15	.610	12.3	2.01
Saudi Arabia	8	64.5	0.81	10.6	131.5	1.24	19.3	162.5	0.84	22.2	201.5	0.91
Sudan	20.9	62.9	0.30	26.1	71.5	0.27	29.6	89.0	0.30	29.6	117.0	0.40
Syria	8.4	227.5	2.72	12.8	404	3.16	14.8	421.0	2.84	16.5	321.0	1.95
Tunisia	6.4	22.3	0.35	8.2	35	0.43	9.23	35.0	0.38	9.7	35.0	0.36
Turkey	44.4	566	1.27	57	579.2	1.02	62.3	639.0	1.02	67.7	515.1	0.76
United Arab Emirates	0.9	25.1	2.78	1.7	44	2.57	1.86	64.5	3.47	2.6	65.0	2.50
Yemen, North	7.5	36.6	0.49	11.5	65	0.56	14.8	42.0	0.28	18.9	54.0	0.29
Yemen, South	1.9	20.8	1.11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

[a]Numbers very problematic because of revolution and refugees
[b]Numbers very problematic because of overthrow of the Taliban by U.S. and Afghan forces
Note: Figures for Yemen after unification of North and South Yemen are reported in the line item for Yemen, North.

SOURCE: J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (1969); T. N. Dupuy, *The Almanac of World Military Power* (1970); and annual issues of *The Military Balance,* published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press).

Table 1 on active-force levels shows the impact of the military in the Middle East since the Sinai/Suez war of 1956. These figures reflect the many conflicts with which nations in the area have been involved. The figures for Israel are illustrative. In excess of 10 percent of the population was in the military through the 1960s because the military included citizen-armies. The figures after 1969 reflect only those reservists on active duty, but even here Israel has maintained the highest percentage of the population in the military of any Middle Eastern nation. This is a heavy burden but reflects the price that Israel has had to pay for the protracted Arab–Israel conflict. Arab nations around Israel have also maintained large military establishments. Egypt, for example, had almost 1 percent of its population in the military at the end of the 1970s, and both Jordan and Syria had more than 2 percent. By comparison, in 1990 the United States had 0.68 percent of its population on active military duty, with global force projection objectives far greater than any Middle Eastern nation.

Any reduction of force levels would have long-term benefits, including the minimization of the potential for conflict and of the destruction of lives and property that results from conflict. It would also free manpower for more productive activities. Table 2 on defense costs as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) or gross domestic product (GDP) illustrates the amount of fiscal resources that could be put to other uses. An example of this may be seen in the figures for Iran. As war with Iraq loomed, and as a carryover of the shah's perceived role as policeman of the Persian Gulf, Iran spent 13.24 percent of its GNP on defense in 1979. After the end

Defense costs as percentage of Gross National or Gross Domestic Product

	1965		1969		1975		1979		1991		1995/1996		2000/2001	
Country	GNP (billions of U.S. $)	Defense (% of GNP)	GNP (billions of U.S. $)	Defense (% of GNP)	GNP (billions of U.S. $)	Defense (% of GNP)	GDP (billions of U.S. $)	Defense (% of GNP)	GDP (billions of U.S. $)	Defense (% of GDP)	GDP (billions of U.S. $)	Defense (% of GDP)	GDP (billions of U.S. $)	Defense (% of GDP)
Afghanistan[a]	1.25	1.8	1.50	1	1.6	2.81	2.30	2.65	3.70	7.74	[a]	[a]	[a]	[a]
Algeria	2.63	3.8	2.80	6.20	8.8	3.24	15.90	3.81	45.43	1.99	49.0	2.8	44.2	6.79
Bahrain	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.70	5.76	4.01	5.04	5.0	5.3	6.9	6.43
Egypt	5.06	9.1	5.10	13.50	17.9	34.10	18.10	11.99	39.45	3.98	56	4.29	90	3.22
Iran	5.83	5.4	7.60	6.44	35.6	29.20	75.10	13.24	59.49	6.34	62.5	4.0	99	7.58
Iraq	1.92	12.7	2.30	10.90	5.6	14.30	15.50	13.03	40.78	21.11	18.3	14.75	15.4	9.91
Israel	3.40	9.3	3.93	16	11.7	29.90	10.50	15.43	51.22	12.03	78	9.23	107	8.88
Jordan	0.50	12	0.50	16.20	1	15.50	1.85	20.59	3.87	14.76	6.6	6.67	7.6	6.84
Kuwait	1.71	4.2	1.87	2.94	5.4	3	11.90	2.82	25.31	5.94	26.7	11.6	33.4	9.88
Lebanon	0.89	3.3	1.20	3.70	3.7	3.90	3.40	6.91	3.37	4.15	7.7	5.3	16	3.53
Libya	1.20	5.1	1.73	1.62	5.9	3.44	19	2.36	24.38	6.19	25	5.6	38	3.16
Morocco	2.60	3.9	2.90	5.17	6	3.17	9.50	9.64	25.36	5.28	31.5	4.13	33	5.15
Oman	—	—	0.16	—	—	—	2.55	26.98	8.40	16.55	12.2	14.75	17.7	9.60
Qatar	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	6.10	7.05	13.25	7.4	4.41	12.4	11.29
Saudi Arabia	1.52	8.6	2.40	13.40	12	52.90	64.20	22.09	87.97	36.22	125	10.56	185	10.11
Sudan	1.35	4.4	1.63	3.30	2.8	3.46	6.15	3.97	11.03	4.18	9.1	4.27	9.5	6.11
Syria	1.08	8.8	1.35	10.20	2.9	23.03	7.10	28.73	17.41	9.30	30	6.67	13.8	5.62
Tunisia	0.88	1.6	0.94	1.50	3.6	1.56	5.83	2.49	12.42	3.23	18.2	2.03	21	1.70
Turkey	8.78	5	10.60	4.45	31.9	6.82	45.30	5.72	80.93	2.59	—	—	—	—
United Arab Emirates	—	—	0.49	—	—	—	12	6.25	33.67	7.69	39	4.87	58	5.86
Yemen, North	—	—	0.52	2.70	—	—	1.50	5.27	7.98	12.53	9	3.83	6.4	7.78
Yemen, South	—	—	0.23	14.60	0.5	5.20	0.50	11.20	—	—	—	—	—	—

[a]Because of the revolution, the ascendancy of the Taliban, its subsequent overthrow by U.S. Forces and Northern Alliance and the difficulties in establishing national control, any figures for Afghanistan are very problematic.

Note: Figures for Yemen after unification of North and South Yemen are reported in the line item for Yemen, North.

SOURCE: J.C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (1969); T. N. Dupuy, *The Almanac of World Military Power* (1970); and annual issues of *The Military Balance*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. (London: Oxford University Press).

TABLE 2 BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

of the war with Iraq and the subsequent weakening of Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, that percentage went down to 6.34.

The high force levels in the Middle East reflect more than the conflict between Israel and its neighbors. Internal conflicts tend to drive up the levels as well. The figures for Iraq illustrate this tendency. The Kurdish minority in the north was in a state of rebellion when the Baʿth came to power in 1968, forcing a growth in the force level from 0.68 percent of the population in 1955 to more than 1 percent in 1965, 1969, and 1975. The temporary end of the revolt in 1975 may have contributed to the force level reduction in 1979.

However, the relatively low force levels for strife-torn Lebanon may be deceptive since they do not reflect sectarian militias or the presence of Israeli and Syrian troops; if these were factored in, the Lebanese force levels would probably be much higher and more reflective of the level of civil unrest. The same could be said of any number of Middle Eastern conflicts, from the internal unrest in Iraq as it relates to Kurdish populations outside Iraq, who may look toward Iraqi Kurds as the vanguard of a Kurdish nation incorporating Kurdish populations in neighboring countries—a source of Middle Eastern tension that may well rival that between Arabs and Israelis—to the desires of Shiʿite Muslims in Iraq and elsewhere who resent domina-

Syrian president Bashshar al-Assad (right) attends military training games with his army chief of staff Ali Aslan. Syria's armed forces have suffered a decline since the days of former president Hafez al-Assad's and his goal of military parity with Israel, but Bashshar has undertaken a program to modernize and revitalize the system since taking office in 2000. **© AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

tion by Sunni minorities. These conflicts, and others, although perhaps not as well known in the West, will probably continue to foster an elevated level of military and paramilitary investment on the part of Middle Eastern nations.

Military involvement in the internal affairs of other nations also requires an increase in the force level; Egypt's dispatching almost 70,000 troops to Yemen by 1965 to support the military revolt there partially accounts for the increase in Egypt's level from 0.35 percent in 1955 to 0.61 percent in 1965. Conflicts among nations in the Middle East also tend to drive up force levels. This can be seen not only in the figures for Israel and its immediate neighbors but also for Iran and Iraq. After the fall of the shah in 1979, and before the long war between Iraq and Iran and the Gulf War of 1991, the force levels for Iraq increased dramatically.

Finally, the potential for conflict outside the Middle East has an impact on force levels. Turkey has maintained relatively high force levels because of its commitments to NATO and because of the dispute between the Greek and Turkish populations in Cyprus. The NATO commitment dates to the Cold War and the end of that conflict may change the force level requirements. Any change will, however, depend on the role of NATO in the future, and the troop levels that role requires. The conflict

Force structure: active and reserve troops in thousands (Army, Air Force, and Navy only)

	1969						1975						1979					
	Army		Air Force		Navy		Army		Air Force		Navy		Army		Air Force		Navy	
Country	**Active**	**Reserves**	**Active**	**Reserves**	**Active**	**Reserves**	**Active**	**Reserves**	**Active**	**Reserves**	**Active**	**Reserves**	**Active**	**Reserves**	**Active**	**Reserves**	**Active**	**Reserves**
Afghanistan	84	200	5	—	—	—	80	150	8	12	—	—	80	150	10	12	—	—
Algeria	55	100	2	—	1.5	—	55	50	4.5	—	3.5	—	7.8	100	7	—	3.8	—
Bahrain	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.3	—	—	—	0.2	—
Egypt	180	70	20	4	12	5	275	500	30	20	17.5	15	350	500	25	—	20	15
Iran	175	—	15	—	6	—	175	300	60		15	—	285	300	100	—	30	—
Iraq	70	—	10	—	2	—	120	250	12	—	3	—	190	250	28	—	4	—
Israel	60	200	8	6	3	3	135	240	16	4	4	2	138	267	21	6	6.6	3.4
Jordan	55	35	0.2	—	0.25	—	75	30	5	—	0.25	—	60	30	7	—	0.2	—
Kuwait	4.5	2.5	0.5		0.035	—	8	—	2	—	0.2	—	9	—	1.9	—	0.2	—
Lebanon	11	—	0.8	—	0.20	—	14	—	1	—	0.3	—	8	—	0.5	—	0.25	—
Libya	6	—	0.8	—	0.20	—	25	—	5	—	2	—	35	—	4	—	3	—
Morocco	50	—	3	—	1	—	55	—	4	—	2	—	90	—	6	—	2	—
Oman	2.8	—	—	—	—	—	12.9	—	1	—	0.2	—	16.2	3.3	2.1	—	0.9	—
Qatar	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	0.3	—	0.4	—
Saudi Arabia	30	20	5	—	1	—	40	16	5.5	—	1.5	—	35	20	8	—	1.5	—
Sudan	24	—	0.5	—	0.50	—	45	3.5	3	—	0.6	—	60	3.5	1.5	—	1.4	—
Syria	50	40	9	—	1.5	—	150	100	25	—	2.5	2.5	200	100	25	—	2.5	2.5
Tunisia	17	—	0.5	—	0.50	—	20	9	2	—	2	—	18	2.5	1.7	—	2.6	—
Turkey	425	500	5	—	39	70	365	750	48	—	40	25	470	400	51	—	45	25
United Arab Emirates	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	23.5	—	0.75	—	0.9	—
Yemen, North	10	20	—	—	—	—	30	20	1.7	—	0.3	—	35	20	1	—	0.6	—
Yemen, South	10	—	0.35	—	0.15	—	15.2	—	2.5	—	0.3	—	19	—	1.3	—	0.5	—

[continued]

TABLE 3 BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Force structure: active and reserve troops in thousands (Army, Air Force, and Navy only) [CONTINUED]

	1991						1995/1996						2000/2001					
	Army		Air Force		Navy		Army		Air Force		Navy		Army		Air Force		Navy	
Country	Active	Reserves	Active	Reserves	Active	Reserves	Active	Reserves	Active	Reserves	Active	Reserves	Active	Reserves	Active	Reserves	Active	Reserves
Afghanistan[a]	40	—	5	—	—	—	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Algeria	107	150	12	—	6.5	—	123.7	150.0	10.0	—	6.7	—	107.0	150.0	10.0	—	7.0	—
Bahrain	6	—	0.45	—	1	—	8.5	—	1.5	—	1.0	—	8.5	—	1.5	—	1.0	—
Egypt	290	500	30	20	20	14	310.0	150.0	30.0	20.0	20.0	14.0	320.0	150.0	29.0	20.0	19.0	14.0
Iran	305	350	35	—	18	—	345.0	350.0	30.0	—	18.0	—	325.0	350.0	45.0	—	18.0	—
Iraq	350	—	30	—	2.5	—	350.0	650.0	30.0	—	2.5	—	375.0	650.0	30.0	—	30.0	—
Israel	104	494	28	9	9	1	134.0	365.0	32.0	55.0	9.0	10.0	120.0	400.0	37.0	20.0	6.5	5.0
Jordan	90	30	11	—	0.3	—	90.0	30.0	8.0	—	0.7	—	84.7	30.0	15.0	—	0.54	—
Kuwait	7	—	1	—	0.2	—	11.0	23.7	2.5	—	1.8	—	11.0	23.7	2.5	—	2.0	—
Lebanon	17.5	—	0.8	—	0.5	—	47.5	—	0.8	—	0.6	—	70.0	—	1.0	—	0.83	—
Libya	55	40	22	—	8	—	35.0	40.0	22.0	—	8.0	—	45.0	40.0	23.0	—	8.0	—
Morocco	175	100	13.5	—	7	—	175.0	150.0	13.0	—	6.0	—	175.0	150.0	13.5	—	10.0	—
Oman	20	4	3	—	3.4	—	25.0	—	4.1	—	4.2	—	25.0	—	4.1	—	4.2	—
Qatar	6	—	0.8	—	0.7	—	8.5	—	1.5	—	1.8	—	8.5	—	2.1	—	1.7	—
Saudi Arabia	45	55	18	—	9.5	—	70.0	—	18.0	—	13.5	—	75.0	—	20.0	—	15.5	—
Sudan	65	—	6	—	0.5	—	85.0	—	3.0	—	1.0	—	112.5	—	3.0	—	1.5	—
Syria	300	392	40	—	4	8	315.0	400.0	40.00	92.0	6.0	8.0	215.0	280.0	40.0	4.0	6.0	4.0
Tunisia	27	—	3.5	—	4.5	—	27.0	—	3.5	—	4.5	—	27.0	—	3.5	—	4.5	—
Turkey	—	—	—	—	—	—	525.0	260.0	63.0	65.0	51.0	55.0	402.0	258.7	60.1	65.0	53.0	55.0
United Arab Emirates	40	—	2.5	—	1.5	—	59.0	—	4.0	—	1.5	—	59.0	—	4.0	—	2.0	—
Yemen, North	60	40	2	—	3	—	37.0	40.0	3.5	—	1.5	—	49.0	40.0	3.5	—	1.5	—
Yemen, South	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

[a]Due to instability in the area reliable figures are not available

Note: Figures for Yemen after unification of North and South Yemen are reported in the line item for Yemen, North. Force totals may not match Table 1 because of differences in force structures regarding air defense, marines, coast guard, paramilitary forces, etc.

SOURCE: T. N. Dupuy, *The Almanac of World Military Power* (1970); and annual issues of *The Military Balance,* published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press).

Defense equipment

	1969			1975			1979			1991			1995/1996			2000/2001		
Country	Medium and Heavy Tanks	Combat Aircraft	Navel Vessels	Medium and Heavy Tanks	Combat Aircraft	Navel Vessels	Medium and Heavy Tanks	Combat Aircraft	Navel Vessels	Medium and Heavy Tanks	Combat Aircraft	Navel Vessels	Medium and Heavy Tanks	Combat Aircraft	Navel Vessels	Medium and Heavy Tanks	Combat Aircraft	Navel Vessels
Afghanistan[a]	200	130	0	150	160	0	800	169	0	800	253	0	[a]	[a]	[a]	[a]	[a]	[a]
Algeria	400	150	25	400	186	26	500	260	47	960	241	35	960	180	76	1,087	239	28
Bahrain	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	81	24	13	106	48	14	106	74	20
Egypt	630	450	159	1,945	500	96	1,600	563	109	3,190	495	94	3,650	670	91	3,860	709	104
Iran	—	186	28	1,160	238	52	1,735	447	47	700	213	63	1,520	295	95	1,645	283	100
Iraq	535	213	30	1,290	247	29	1,800	339	49	2,300	261	13	2,700	316	15	2,200	316	11
Israel	975	295	32	2,700	461	66	3,050	576	63	4,488	591	120	4,300	815	58	3,930	829	52
Jordan	230	36	5	440	42	12	500	73	9	1,131	113	1	1,069	121	5	1,077	121	6
Kuwait	—	16	2	100	32	29	280	50	31	36	34	2	215	92	2	385	102	10
Lebanon	40	37	6	85	24	6	—	16	5	175	3	17	330	7	16	363	—	9
Libya	—	10	7	345	92	17	2,000	201	21	2,150	409	109	2,210	472	65	2,025	413	38
Morocco	130	46	6	145	60	5	140	72	19	284	90	34	624	136	35	844	119	36
Oman	—	12	1	—	47	6	—	35	18	82	57	17	128	46	17	154	40	18
Qatar	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	4	35	24	18	10	24	32	8	35	37	7
Saudi Arabia	18	44	23	175	95	4	350	178	134	700	253	43	1,055	313	59	1,255	348	56
Sudan	—	35	4	130	43	15	160	36	18	230	51	4	350	65	14	300	45	8
Syria	400	150	30	2,100	400	16	3,600	389	26	4,350	651	42	4,600	679	45	4,700	676	32
Tunisia	0	14	8	30	24	18	30	14	22	84	53	21	139	51	24	138	58	21
Turkey	—	520	202	1,500	292	183	3,500	303	187	3,783	530	152	4,280	434	145	4,205	505	144
United Arab Emirates	—	—	3	—	—	—	0	52	9	131	100	21	201	141	26	486	150	25
Yemen, North	30	24	—	30	12	5	232	11	10	1,275	101	39	1,125	111	22	910	119	18
Yemen, South	—	18	3	50	27	9	260	109	16	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

[a]We need the same generic statement for all tables to the effect that Civil War, brief Taliban control, US/Northern Alliance control, continued disruptions, etc., make numbers unreliable

SOURCE: T.N. Dupuy, *The Almanac of World Military Power* (1960); and annual issues of *The Military Balance*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press).

TABLE 4 BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

in Cyprus remains a stalemate, with no progress being made in United Nations–led talks between the two sides since January 2002.

Tables 3 and 4 on force structure and defense equipment reflect the increasing modernization of the military in the Middle East. With the exception of Turkey, naval forces are modest. Turkey's commitment to NATO has resulted in the largest navy in the area by far, not only in the number of ships but in their size. Egypt, Israel, and Libya have large numbers of naval vessels, but most of these are small and include patrol craft, which are more defensive than offensive.

Most area nations rely heavily on ground and air forces. For example, Israel in 2000 had 120,000 in its active army, 37,000 active air force, and only 6,500 active navy; Syria's figures were 280,000, 40,000, and 6,000, respectively. The equipment of the ground and air forces reflects modern force structures. Ground forces are heavily mechanized, as the figures for heavy and medium tanks show. Accompanying these tanks are large numbers of tracked armored personnel carriers for mechanized infantry, tracked artillery pieces, and modern rocket artillery. Most of this is imported, but an increasing amount is available from local industries. The Israelis have displayed ingenuity in weapons development with the Merkava main battle tank; reactive armor; small-arms weaponry, such as the Uzi submachine gun and Galil assault rifle; and a purported nuclear capability. Other nations have vigorous domestic programs aimed at producing weapons or upgrading imported weapons. Iraq not only tried to develop nuclear weapons, a program set back by the pre-emptive Israeli strike on the Osirak reactor in 1981, but also had a program for an ultra-long-range artillery tube. Iraq also was developing range improvements for its ballistic missiles before the invasion in 2003. Iran's nuclear program aroused alarm in the United States, fueled by its reticence to allow international inspection of its programs. Both Iran and Iraq have had vigorous chemical and biological weapons programs, and it is likely that other nations have done the same.

The Middle East has developed a modern, lethal military capability to wage war on the ground, including sophisticated air defense forces. Matching this modern capability to wage war on the ground is an equally modern air capability. A number of Middle Eastern air forces have fielded the latest American and Soviet aircraft and avionics, all of which are capable of destroying opposing aircraft and supporting ground forces.

A wide variety of weapons systems from an equally wide variety of sources gives the forces in the Middle East, at least theoretically. highly lethal capabilities. Training, maintenance, and supply issues do, however, temper that capability. Some examples of the weapons systems proliferating in the Middle East provide an illustration of the potential effectiveness of the forces. In 1996, well after the Gulf War, Iraq reportedly retained significant numbers of Soviet-bloc surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), ranging from the heavy SA 2, 3, and 6 to the lighter SA 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, and 16, giving it a capability of air defense from fixed-site SAMs, mobile SAMs, and hand-held SAMs. A wide variety also exists in surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missile capability. Iran used about 100 Scud B missiles in its war with Iraq. This missile, which is also in the inventories of Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and possibly Iraq and Yemen, has a payload of 1,760 pounds (800 kg) of high explosives and a range of 186 miles (300 km). Saudi Arabia has the Chinese-produced CSS-2 missile, which has a range of 1,740 miles (2,800 km) and a payload of 4,730 pounds (2,150 km).

One must also factor in nontraditional military forces when evaluating this aspect of the Middle East. These include the role of terrorist groups and paramilitary organizations that have no parallel in Western militaries. Tribal and ethnic organizations with military arms can also have a great impact. The recent conflict against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, in which the United States allied itself with tribal paramilitaries normally called the Northern Alliance, illustrates that conflict in the Middle East does not necessarily follow patterns familiar to the Western military. Because of this, the numbers in the various tables of this article cannot adequately reflect the role of nontraditional military forces; they can only roughly measure the order of magnitude of forces from a Western point of view and offer calculations that are useful mainly in estimating the results of conventional conflict.



SOURCE: Amos Perlmutter, *Egypt, the Praetorian State* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1974), p. 133.

FIGURE 1 BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Internal Conflicts

Middle Eastern military forces have been often been involved in internal conflicts such as domestic unrest, revolutions, and coups d'état. All Middle Eastern countries have police forces dedicated to internal security. Civil strife, however, has often overwhelmed the police forces of many nations. In such cases, the military has assisted in maintaining internal security. Success has been mixed. In Lebanon, the weak state-run army has usually been unable to guarantee domestic peace. This has led to the creation of militias by sectarian rivals, which have the role of maintaining order in their respective areas. Israeli (1982–2000) and Syrian armed forces have also assumed a role in maintaining internal security in parts of Lebanon, with mixed results.

Turkish, Iranian, and Iraqi Kurdish groups seeking increased autonomy or independence have presented internal security problems for those regimes, resulting in the use of the military to restore order. Turkey and Iran have usually been able to achieve a modicum of order through normal police powers and the occasional use of the military. Iraq, by the mid-1970s, had also restored order through military force, but this broke down during the war with Iran and again after the Gulf War (1991).

During its first months of independence, the newly consolidated Israel Defense Force (IDF) under David Ben-Gurion resorted to force to disarm rival Revisionist Zionist terrorist groups such as the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi and the Stern Gang and to ensure their loyalty to a single command. From 1948 to 1965, the army was responsible for administering security and other restrictions on the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel. After the 1967 war, the IDF used military force to maintain security in the occupied territories, but the Israeli police forces have that responsibility within Israel proper. One branch of the Israel National Police is the border guard, which is deployed throughout Israel and the occupied territories. This branch, called the Mishmar ha-Gvul, is organized along IDF military lines and is available to augment the IDF as necessary. This organization is staffed by significant numbers of Druze, Circassians, Bedouin, and other minorities and is open to eighteen-year-old recruits who can choose service with the border guard instead of the IDF. Many commentators predict that military force may have to be used in the event of a peace settlement to control Jewish militants who oppose returning any territory to Arab authority, as was the case during the evacuation of the Jewish settlement of Yamit during the 1982 Israeli evacuation of Sinai, in conformity with the Israeli–Egyptian peace treaty of 1979.

Since World War II, Middle Eastern military establishments have differed from those of Europe and North America in the extent of their participation in revolutions and coups d'état. Some countries have experienced relatively few military coups. Iran has faced two changes of power since World War II—the temporary assumption of power by Mohammad Mossadegh in the early 1950s and the overthrow of the shah in 1979—but the military did not play a major role in either. In Lebanon, the central government has never been strong enough to develop a powerful military, and no coup by a government military has been feasible. Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Jordan, and Morocco are monarchies

that have shown remarkable stability in a tumultuous area, and none has faced a serious political threat from its military. The use of tribal levies loyal to the monarch to form large parts of the military may explain this. Tunisia also has not faced a military revolt, although its president, Habib Bourguiba, was deposed by a general serving as prime minister in 1987. Presumably, the military approved.

The experience of other Middle Eastern states has been different. Turkey, long viewed as a paragon of stability in the area, has had three military coups since World War II: in 1960, 1971, and 1980. In all three cases, however, power was eventually returned to civilian politicians. Elsewhere, military coups have resulted in governments run by military leaders, some retaining their uniforms, some shedding them for civilian garb but still relying on the military for their power. King Farouk of Egypt was overthrown in 1952 by a group of military officers led by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser. Since that time, Egypt has been ruled by a succession of former military officers: Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat, and Husni Mubarak. Algeria achieved independence from France through military revolt in 1962, and the Algerian military has played a primary role in governing the nation since that time. In 1965, led by Colonel Houari Boumédienne, it overthrew the government of Ahmed Ben Bella; in 1991 it obtained the resignation of President Chadli Bendjedid after elections appeared to presage a turn to Islamic fundamentalism. Syria, Iraq, and Libya have all had similar experiences with their militaries taking control of the government.

Conflict between States

Violence between countries is not uncommon in the Middle East. The Israeli declaration of independence in May 1948 triggered an invasion of Palestine by armies from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, with volunteers from elsewhere. These were repulsed by an Israeli military that was at the time, and has been since, underrated in terms of numbers and equipment. Since 1948, Israel and its Arab neighbors have fought a succession of wars. The first, in 1956, was fought in collusion with two aging empires—Britain and France—and began with an Israeli quasi-blitzkrieg campaign in the Sinai. The 1967 war followed the pattern of the 1956 Sinai campaign, with a surprise attack and dramatic gains by Israel on three fronts, but without the collusion of European powers or the subsequent international pressure to withdraw from territories Israel won from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.

After 1967, Israeli military successes were not nearly so spectacular. Caught by surprise in the war of 1973, the Israelis fell victim to their 1967 success. Ignoring some of the lessons of combined-arms warfare that led to a quick victory in the earlier war, particularly the need for infantry support of armor and the critical role artillery plays, Israel was eventually able to repulse the Egyptians and Syrians. The humbling of the Israeli military and the aura of Arab success created conditions that helped produce a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979. The lesson might be that a military force does not have to win to achieve political success, but the problem is how to engineer a loss that leads to success.

The Israeli experience in Lebanon in 1982 is also instructive. Israel has not faced a military coup since it was established, but the role of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon in this operation came close to being a coup. Sharon directed operations far beyond those envisioned by the cabinet headed by Menachem Begin, but was restrained by both international and domestic pressures. Given the potential power of the Israeli right, one cannot exclude the possibility that a militant general might one day become a threat to an elected Israeli government, much like the majors and colonels who have overthrown numerous Arab governments since World War II.

While Arab–Israel wars have captured international headlines over the years, they were not the only wars fought between nations in the Middle East. There have been several mini-wars, mostly border skirmishes between Egypt and Libya, Syria and Jordan, Morocco and the former Spanish Sahara, and others. During the 1960s, Egypt became involved in a protracted campaign in Yemen in support of a revolutionary regime against a royal counterrevolution. This involved thousands of troops, the use of chemical weapons, and the weakening of the Egyptian military to the point that it could not cope with the Israeli surprise attack in June 1967.

The most protracted military encounter was that between Iraq and Iran from 1980 to 1988. The causes of this war included disputes over the border between Iran and Iraq, exploitation of minority and sectarian unrest, particularly among the Kurds and Shiʿa, and the question of which nation would be the primary force in the Persian Gulf. The border dispute centered on the Shatt al-Arab and dated back to Ottoman times. The fall of the shah of Iran in 1979 gave Iraq an opportunity to assert primacy in the Gulf. This, along with the threat that Iran would export its Islamic revolution and the continued subversion of dissident groups in each country, led to an escalation of fighting along the border, and on 17 September 1980 Iraq declared the Shatt al-Arab to be a totally Iraqi waterway. The war that followed was costly. The cost to Iran was about $206 billion, while Iraqi costs were around $147 billion. Firm casualty figures may never be established, but Iranian casualties are estimated at between 1 million and 2 million and Iraqi casualties at between 500,000 and 1 million. Of these, the number of dead ranges from 450,000 to 730,000 for Iran and 150,000 to 340,000 for Iraq. The failure of both sides to force a decision may have been as much political as ideological in nature. In both countries, loyalty to the regime is a valued commodity for the leadership, and military promotions depend as much on loyalty as on military skill. In Iran, the fall of the shah was followed by the decimation of the officer corps and a reliance on religious fanaticism, which led to mass attacks by poorly trained soldiers and militia, with horrendous casualties. Finally, the war was controlled from Baghdad and Tehran with relatively little freedom of action for the commanders on the scene. It may be that victory was associated with a higher level of discretion by local commanders and defeat with strategic and tactical decisions made by the political or ideological leadership in the capitals.

The high cost of the Iran–Iraq War, and the failure of either side to win a decisive victory in spite of the extensive use of chemical weapons, led to the cease-fire of 8 August 1988, brokered by the United Nations with heavy pressure from the United States, European nations, and Iraq's Arab neighbors. Both sides set about rebuilding their military establishments, embarking on ambitious programs to increase their chemical warfare potential and to develop nuclear weapons. There were also efforts to improve artillery and missile-delivery capabilities to provide a more accurate means of projecting munitions.

It was not long before one side felt strong enough to again challenge its neighbors. Less than two years after the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, on 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, precipitating American and international involvement in the form of operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm—the Gulf War of 1991. Within hours, an Iraqi force that eventually numbered 140,000, with 1,800 tanks, dispatched a Kuwaiti military of 16,000 troops and occupied the nation. Iraq began the invasion able to field an army of 1 million, seasoned by eight hard years of fighting with Iran. Iraq's potential enemies were initially not well situated. Kuwait's ability to fight had been destroyed. Saudi Arabia, viewed by many as Iraq's next target, had a force of only 70,000 troops, 550 tanks, and 850 artillery pieces, far smaller than Iraq's force. The Saudis did have a credible air-defense capability and 155 F-15 and F-5 fighter aircraft. The other Gulf states had some forces but not nearly enough to match Iraq's. Without outside intervention, Iraq had every expectation of retaining Kuwait and possibly threatening Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

Contrary to Iraqi expectations, the building of that outside force began within hours of the invasion. The United States decided to implement Plan 1002–90, designed to defend Saudi Arabia. Within a week, the United States deployed 122 F-15s and F-16s to augment the air cover available to the Saudis. By the middle of September, almost 700 aircraft were in place. As the weeks rolled by, the United States, operating under the authority of the United Nations, set about building a coalition force to defend Saudi Arabia and expel Iraq from Kuwait. By January 1991, the coalition force included contingents from the Persian Gulf states, Egypt, Syria, the United States, and several European countries, including some from the old Warsaw Pact bloc. The numbers deployed were impressive—almost 800,000.

At the beginning of the ground war, Iraq had about 250,000 troops in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. These were backed by 4,000 tanks, 3,000 pieces of artillery, and 3,000 armored personnel carriers. Iraq also had Scud missiles capable of reaching Israel and chemical warfare capability. The

Iraqi navy, however, was negligible, and the air force, although sizable, was not a factor after substantial numbers of American aircraft arrived in the area.

On 16 January 1991 (Washington time; 17 January in Iraq), Operation Desert Storm began with an intensive air campaign of four phases. The land war began on 24 February and lasted only 100 hours. The success of the air campaign may be seen in the numbers of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces remaining on 24 February. Of an estimated 4,280 tanks, 1,772 were out of operation. Iraq had only 53 percent of its prewar artillery and just 67 percent of its armored vehicles. The ground campaign was even more brutal. Total Iraqi losses in January and February were 3,847 tanks, 1,450 armored vehicles, and 2,917 artillery pieces. Although no firm numbers exist on Iraqi casualties and the original estimates of 100,000 killed were exaggerated, a total of 35,000 is not unlikely. This compares with 240 deaths for coalition forces.

Arab states, which had heretofore been notably weak in coalition warfare (as shown by their wars with Israel), were able to derive satisfaction from their successful performance against Iraq, under the tutelage of the United States, in 1991. The experience of the Gulf War may instill a confidence that can be transferred via the noncommissioned officer corps and the officer corps to younger soldiers. The status of the military in those Arab countries, especially the mechanized ground forces and the air forces, has been enhanced. As these are the most modern components of the forces, this may result in a more favorable view of modernization in Arab nations. If the prospects for peace in the area improve and the numbers in the military decrease, then more military personnel with this modern experience will return to civilian life.

Operation Desert Storm ended with the total military defeat of Iraq and its ejection from Kuwait. It left Saddam Hussein in power with considerable military forces at his command. In 2000 he had over 400,000 in his active force structure, with 600,000 reserves, over 2,000 tanks, and 300 aircraft. There were no-fly zones in southern and northern Iraq, enforced by coalition forces, but only for fixed-wing flights. Saddam was able to suppress revolts by Iraqi Kurds and Shiʿa with ground forces and rotary-wing aircraft.



SOURCE: Amos Perlmutter, *Egypt, the Praetorian State* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1974), p. 136.

FIGURE 2 BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

The defeat of Iraq did lead to the destruction of large amounts of chemical weapons and for several years UN inspections precluded the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—chemical, biological, and nuclear. These inspections were suspended for a time but resumed in 2002 because of pressure from the United States, which believed that Iraq had an active program to develop WMD, had secreted significant amounts of such weapons, and was improving its missiles for delivery of such weapons.

The inspection regime was cut short in 2003 when the United States and the United Kingdom attacked, acting on intelligence indicating the possession of chemical and biological weapons and a vigorous program to develop and field nuclear weapons. The United Nations withdrew its inspectors, and the United States and United Kingdom formed a coalition outside the aegis of the United Nations to topple Saddam's regime and destroy its WMD capability.

The coalition consisted of fifty-seven nations, but the United States and United Kingdom provided the overwhelming bulk of forces. The scope of the coalition can be assessed by the fact that it included Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau, but did not include China, France, Germany, or Russia.

The coalition launched military action against Iraq on 19 March 2003 and declared victory on 1 May. The campaign included simultaneous operations by special operations units, mobile land forces, and air strikes. By 5 April, U.S. forces were in Baghdad, and Saddam's home base of Tikrit fell on 14 April. For the most part, the Iraqi military surrendered en masse or went home. Hussein and his top leadership went underground; several surrendered or were caught or killed over the next few months. Hussein was finally captured by American troops in December 2003.

The military campaign resulted in minimal coalition casualties: fewer than 400 coalition deaths during the campaign and the six months of occupation after 1 May. Use of precision weapons, the surrender of large numbers of the Iraqi military, and the defection of thousands more minimized Iraqi military and civilian casualties, although precise figures were not available at the time of publication.

The successful military campaign gave way to a torturous period of occupation and reconstruction after 1 May. Many of Saddam's military continued to resist the coalition through guerrilla warfare that included attacks on coalition personnel and sabotage of reconstruction efforts. These guerrilla activities were reportedly augmented by terrorist groups from outside Iraq, encouraged by al-Qaʿida and other groups. The failure of the coalition to find WMD or verify the WMD programs that prewar intelligence had indicated presented problems in gaining broader international support and eroded public support in the United States and United Kingdom.

Considerable criticism has been leveled at the intelligence upon which the coalition attack was based. The intelligence does appear to have led to a quick military victory. The criticism, however, centers on the actual threat Iraq posed with its alleged WMD, the ability of the Iraqi military and paramilitary forces to wage guerrilla war after coalition victory, and what would be necessary and actually available to reconstruct the country.

Conflicts with and among the Great Powers

In addition to internal conflicts and wars among area nations, the military in the Middle East has also been involved in conflicts with and among the great powers. In some cases, the local military has had to repulse the incursions of the great powers. They were not generally successful, but there are notable exceptions. The Afghans were formidable foes of the British during the nineteenth century and of the Soviets after 1979. Such success enhanced the status of those under arms and led to greater participation of the military in political decision making. The numerous conflicts in which the Ottoman Empire was involved until the end of World War I led to the increased power of the military in political life and effective control of the government by such military leaders as Enver Paşa. This pattern continued after World War I, with political leadership in the Middle East often devolving on military heroes. During both world wars, the military in the Middle East gained a great deal of experience. Many Arabs remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire and fought in its armies, while others joined forces with Britain against the Turks. French North African divisions fought in the trenches of the western front in World War I. Other European nations had levies of colonial troops in both world wars, and Jews from Palestine served with the Jewish Mule Corps at Gallipoli in World War I and with the Jewish Brigade in Italy in World War II. The experiences of these veterans were critical to the revolutionary movements that ousted Europeans from the Middle East after World War II, and many assumed leadership roles in the new governments.

The Role of the Military

Because of the level of conflict in the Middle East, the role of the military looms large. This is because large portions of the population and much of the national wealth are devoted to military establishments. One way of understanding the Middle Eastern military is in terms of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the state. In a homogeneous state, such as Egypt, the military serves as a mechanism of upward mobility for the lower middle classes, as is

seen in the careers of Nasser and Sadat. In a heterogeneous state, such as Iraq or Syria, the military serves as a way for a minority, such as the Syrian Alawites or Iraqi Sunnis, to achieve power.

Much as been made of the function of the military as the school of the nation. The military has been increasingly a modern segment of Middle Eastern society, and many believe that this modernization carries over into societies in general. This may be true, but it should not be exaggerated. As the military becomes more career oriented, fewer officers return to civilian life to influence society with their modern skills. Enlisted personnel may learn to operate sophisticated equipment, but if they do not have such devices when they return to their villages, that skill may be of little use. The experience of Israel—a heterogeneous society populated by peoples from all over the world, speaking different languages—is instructive. From 1948 on, the formative common experience of Israelis was their military training and service, during which they learned to share a common language and common values, emphasizing the need to unite in defending the existence of their state. This model could be instructive for other Middle Eastern nations with diverse populations. Whether it is, however, will depend on internal developments within the societies of the Arab, Turkish, and Iranian nations of the area. Whether it will continue to be the pattern in Israel is also questionable. In recent years, Israel has incorporated a large number of graduates from religious Zionist military academies into its military establishment. Not sharing the common experience of other, secularized Israelis in the military, these recruits may cause the military to become less of a school of the nation than it traditionally has been.

The Future

What does the future hold for the role of the military in the Middle East? As long as internal and international strife continue in the area, the military will continue to play a large role. National resources will be devoted to military affairs, and a large portion of the populations will serve. Economic and technological spin-offs will continue, sometimes beneficial but not without negative aspects. The end of the Cold War during the early 1990s seemed to hold out some hope for greater stability and a reduced role for the military in this volatile area. Yet, although there is no longer the intense rivalry between the United States and its allies and one hand the Soviet Union and its allies on the other, the economic resources of the region, not the least of which is oil, continue to result in nations outside the region pursuing their own economic goals and using the continuing regional conflicts to enhance their positions.

Other factors also point to a continuing preeminent role for the military in the Middle East: the eruption and duration of the al-Aqsa Intifada since September 2000, the American destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan following the al-Qaʿida terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, continuing sectarian strife throughout the area, and the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism, with violent terrorist acts extending far from the borders of the Middle East. All these serve to remind us that the region remains one with more than its fair share of unresolved, protracted conflict and instability—and one in which we may expect a continuing prominent role for the military.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1956); Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab–Israel War (1973); Arab–Israel War (1982); Gulf War (1991); Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Kurdish Revolts; Ottoman Military; War in Iraq (2003); Yemen Civil War.

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR

MILLET SYSTEM

The term commonly used to describe the institutional framework governing relations between the Ottoman state and its large and varied non-Muslim population.

Although recent research has challenged both the systemic quality and the traditional origins of the arrangements under the millet system, the term, for want of a better one, remains in use.

Fifteen–Seventeenth Century

According to the traditional accounts, the Ottoman sultan. Mehmet II, upon his conquest of Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 1453, granted extensive autonomy to the Greek, Jewish, and Armenian millets—that is, religiously defined communities of the empire—through, respectively, Gennadios Scholarios, the then-reigning patriarch of the Greek Orthodox church in the capital; Moses Capsali, a leading rabbi: and Joachim, a bishop of the Armenian church. They and their successors thereby became titular heads of their coreligionists throughout the land. The traditional accounts, furthermore, claim that the state did not deal with Christians and Jews as individuals, but only as members of their respective communities. Correspondingly, non-Muslims dealt with the state only through the titular heads of their community. Lastly, in matters of taxation—specifically the *jizya*, the poll tax required of non-Muslim heads of household—once the state determined the amount, its apportionment between individuals was left to the community leader, who supervised its collection and was responsible for its payment. Subsequent research has challenged these claims by noting that they are in no way confirmed by contemporary Ottoman sources and that the non-Muslim chronicles on which they were based were compiled centuries after the events they claim to describe.

What the traditional story does accurately represent, however, is the Ottomans' relative indifference to (and to that degree, tolerance of) much of the activities of their non-Muslim subjects before the nineteenth century. They allowed them much autonomy, particularly in matters of religious observance, education, and personal status (birth, marriage, death and inheritance). The sphere of internal communal control, however, was far more limited than that claimed by the traditional accounts, and the opportunities for direct contact between the individual non-Muslim and the Ottoman Muslim state and society were far greater, extending even into the realm of personal status. Thus recent research in Ottoman records has revealed that Christians and Jews regularly had recourse to Muslim courts, in addition to their own courts, even in questions of divorce, inheritance, and other supposedly internal communal matters. Furthermore, the claim by the traditional accounts of hierarchical centralization under the patriarch or chief rabbi in Constantinople is contradicted by the abundant evidence of local arrangements, often under lay control, and often independent of the capital, as well as by the differing structural traditions of each community. Jewish communal organization, unlike that of the Orthodox church, was not pyramidal, and even the Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople (unlike the bishop of Rome) was merely first among equals. As for the Armenian church, it had long been divided by competing centers of hierarchical authority. Certainly no empirewide fiscal administrative systems existed under the control of the so-called millets, and the term itself was not consistently used to designate the communities. Thus in the classical age of Ottoman rule, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there were neither millets nor a millet system, although there was a considerable, but by no means absolute, degree of local communal autonomy. In this age, from time to time the clerical leaders in Constantinople did assert claims of empirewide authority, but they were rarely successful.

This complex Ottoman practice was by no means an innovation but reflected ancient Near Eastern and Islamic administrative practices (*dhimma*), as well as contemporary reality and communal traditions. In the aftermath of war, conquest, and dynastic turmoil, religious institutions often were the only institutions to survive. Individuals were most comfortable identifying and organizing themselves

according to religion, so the state, even a new one, had no interest in defying them.

Eighteenth–Nineteenth Century

The situation began to change, however, late in the seventeenth century. The Ottoman state's indifference to its non-Muslim subjects diminished when the great powers made their status a stick with which to beat the Turks. As the empire became weaker, European rivals started to vigorously push claims for the protection of the rights and privileges of their coreligionists and other non-Muslims. The Hapsburgs protected the Catholics, particularly those strategically located in what is now Slovenia and Croatia. More aggressive were the Romanovs, who laid claim to the huge Orthodox population conveniently concentrated in provinces adjacent to Russia's frontier. The French asserted an interest in the welfare of the Catholics of the Levant, particularly those in Syria and Lebanon. The British, who had few coreligionists in the region, opposed the claims of their rivals while they protected the few Protestants there and, at times, the Jews. The process of protection was often the first stage of invasion and territorial annexation. The Ottomans proved too weak on the battlefield to confront these challenges directly, and so they were forced to respond with diplomatic maneuverings, administrative accommodation, and, ultimately, commitments to reform. This program for reform in the nineteenth century (the Tanzimat) formally defined and, to a large degree, created the millet system, as it has conventionally come to be understood. For the first time, an attempt was made to impose uniform administrative systems upon all non-Muslim communities throughout the empire. The attempt was consistent with a guiding element of the Tanzimat, the drive toward centralization of all spheres of governance.

The creation of the formal millet system and the consequent abandonment of local autonomy, noninterference, and flexibility, which were the hallmarks of the traditional nonsystem, forced the communities themselves and the Ottoman government to become increasingly embroiled in religious-diplomatic entanglements, which in turn were resolved by the creation of yet more millets. The religious imperialism of Catholic and Protestant missions, which sought to win souls from the indigenous Orthodox and Monophysite churches, as well as other, smaller, churches of the East, complicated the process further. Since these missions were fully supported by the Western powers (i.e., by France, the Hapsburgs, and Great Britain respectively), religious quarrels easily escalated into international crises. The pattern was repeated throughout the nineteenth century.

The Armenian community was the first to succumb to these difficulties. Catholic missions had been very successful in winning converts to Rome from among Monophysite Armenians. Accustomed to the formal hierarchical structure of the Roman church, Catholics repeatedly pressed to replace the traditional lack of system in the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims with a formalized set of institutions. During the late 1820s, they got their opportunity when the Ottomans, desperately in need of foreign support with which to resist the Greek revolt and a Russian invasion, acceded to French pressure to improve the conditions of these converts by establishing a Catholic millet, which was formally recognized in 1831. Since the Ottoman and Roman criteria and procedures for selecting the head of the millet were at odds, however, the millet itself became a source of tension. Furthermore, many important communities within the Ottoman Empire that supposedly came under the jurisdiction of this new institution—notably the wealthy Armenian Catholics of Aleppo, the influential Melkite Catholics (converts from Eastern Orthodoxy), and the numerous Maronites of Mount Lebanon—either resented or ignored it. In 1848 the Melkites obtained their own millet status. In 1850 Protestants followed suit. Other millets were formed: the Bulgarian Uniates in 1861 and the Bulgarian exarchate in 1870. Despite the proliferation of these communal-religious structures, many of the oldest and most deeply rooted Christian churches in the East—the Copts (the indigenous Monophysite church in Egypt), the Jacobites (the indigenous Monophysite church in Syria), and the Nestorians (based in Iraq and southeastern Anatolia) never sought millet status.

The major communities of the empire—Greek Orthodox, Armenian Gregorian, and Jewish—never sought formal millet status in the nineteenth century, since by accepted tradition (the complex historical reality notwithstanding), they had always had it. The reforms of this era nevertheless had a dras-

tic effect upon them as well. The most far-reaching effect derived from the Reform Decree of 1856, which laid the foundation for formal constitutional arrangements reducing the power of the clergy and increasing lay influence. Although Ottoman leaders sponsored these changes in the hope that they might lead to a greater, supracommunal sense of Ottoman patriotic loyalty, the result was often the opposite. Lay leaders, stirred to political activity by the new opportunities that the constitutions now offered, devoted their energies to agitation on behalf of their communities, which increasingly defined themselves as nation-states in the making.

See also Dhimma; Jizya; Tanzimat.

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Benjamin Braude

MILLI GÖRÜS HAREKETI

Movement in Turkey that advocated religious education and industrialization.

Milli Görüs Hareketi (National Outlook Movement) was founded by Necmeddin Erbakan and his supporters in the early 1970s. The movement promoted a program of cultural renewal, industrialization, social justice, and moral development as a remedy to social problems caused by secularization and Westernization. It reconstructed Ottoman history to demonstrate the major contribution of the Turks to Islamic civilization and attributed its decline to Westernization. It called for the restoration of Muslim and Turkish national values. The movement stressed religious education and became the defender of Imam Hatip schools, in which religious courses are taught along with other topics. Under the leadership of Erbakan, the National Outlook Movement formed a succession of political parties and participated in three coalition governments in the 1970s; it was the senior partner in the coalition government formed by Erbakan in 1996. The National Outlook Movement also maintains close contacts with Turkish workers in Germany.

See also Erbakan, Necmeddin.

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Nermin Abadan-Unat
Updated by M. Hakan Yavuz

MILLI İSTIHBARAT TEŞKILATI

The Turkish government's intelligence bureau, referred to as MIT.

MIT was organized in 1965, as the reformulation of the older National Security Organization of Turkey. At the time, its 4,000 personnel, linked directly to the prime minister, were to track conspiracies within the armed forces and among radical leftist groups. In later years, officials of the Turkish National Security Council sat on MIT's board.

In the 1970s, MIT was criticized for inefficient intelligence on urban guerrilla groups and for subversive infiltration of leftist and Kurdish groups. It did not inform the government, intentionally or out of ignorance, of secret meetings among generals before the 1980 coup. Officials blamed MIT's inefficiency on understaffing—it had only 390 officers in 1979—and a small budget (equivalent to about $30 million in 1983).

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Elizabeth Thompson

MILLIYET

See Newspapers and Print Media

MILLSPAUGH, ARTHUR

[1883–1955]

American political scientist.

Arthur Chester Millspaugh was born in Augusta, Michigan, on 1 March 1883. He received degrees

from Albion College in 1908, the University of Illinois in 1910, and Johns Hopkins University in 1916. After teaching political science at Johns Hopkins in 1917 and 1918, Millspaugh joined the U.S. State Department in 1918, serving as a petroleum specialist from 1920 to 1922.

In 1922, he was appointed financial adviser to the Persian government, then dominated by Reza Khan Pahlavi (Reza Shah after 1925) and just after that government had annulled the Anglo-Persian Agreement and canceled all debts due to Russia. Millspaugh set about increasing revenues and affecting economies, improving the credit of the Persian government, and balancing the budget by requiring that the *Majles* (legislature) increase taxes when increasing expenditures. His measures, although initially supported by Reza Khan, met some opposition toward the end of his tenure in 1927.

As his contract neared its end, the Persian government tried to reduce his authority by insisting that any difference between Millspaugh and the minister of finance would be referred to the Council of Ministers or the Majles. Millspaugh argued that his contract left it to the Majles to resolve any problems, a position the government refused to honor. At this point, the government decided to employ German and Swiss financial advisers whose powers were more limited. Millspaugh then went on to work with the government of Haiti with its financial problems and with the Brookings Institute.

During World War II, he returned to Iran in 1942 as an economic adviser, virtually the country's economic czar. Iran had matured and developed a technical bureaucracy that resented the more rigid Millspaugh and his assistants. This mission was not a success, and Millspaugh found himself at odds with both the Iranian government and press as well as the American embassy. In 1945 he returned to the United States to work with the Brookings Institute. He died 24 September 1955.

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR

MILNER MISSION

Official British Foreign Office commission sent to Egypt to ascertain Egypt's political aspirations "within the framework of the Protectorate" during the 1919 revolution.

Formation of the commission, headed by Colonial Secretary Alfred Milner, was announced eight months before its arrival in Egypt, weakening its effectiveness. The Wafd organized a nationwide boycott of the Milner Mission to show that the Egyptian people would oppose any extension of Britain's rule. Muslim *ulama* (religious scholars), Coptic priests, students, and women aided the boycott. The Mission was able to meet only King Fu'ad, the ministers, and a few notables. Milner's final report admitted that most Egyptians wanted independence and greatly influenced later British thinking on Egypt. Milner resigned his post in 1921, when the British Cabinet rejected his proposal for giving modified independence to Egypt.

See also WAFD.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

MIMOUNA FESTIVAL

Moroccan and Jewish celebration of spring.

Mimouna is a springtime celebration marked by Jews in Morocco and elsewhere in North Africa. It begins on the evening that Passover ends and continues into the next day. Women set tables adorned with green stalks and filled with dried fruits and nuts, fava beans, wheat, honey, sweets, milk, a fish, and a crêpe prepared after Passover ended. Families visit each other throughout the night, with greetings expressing the beginning of a year full of merit and blessing. The following day, they go outdoors, picnicking in fields or near water.

In North Africa Mimouna entailed the cooperation of local Muslims who gave or sold green stalks and wheat to the Jews in the evening, sometimes loaned clothes to young people who would dress up

in Muslim garb, and invited Jews to picnic on their land. From the mid-1960s, Moroccan Jews in Israel began celebrating the Mimouna picnic in mass gatherings that grew as large as 100,000 people by the end of the decade. The celebration expressed a desire to recognize their integration into the society, and the value of their traditions within it. It became a symbolic bridge between Moroccan Jews, by then the largest country-of-origin group in Israel, and other sectors of the country's population. Mimouna is now a standard part of Israeli society's standard cycle of festivals.

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HARVEY E. GOLDBERG

MIMOUNI, RACHID
[1945–1995]

Algerian writer.

Rachid Mimouni was born in the small village of Boudouaou, near Setif, into a poor peasant family. A professor of economics in Algiers, he has, more than other writers of his generation, expressed his disappointment with Algeria's evolution since independence. Among his ten novels, the most acclaimed are *Le fleuve détourné* (1982), *Tombéza* (1984), *L'honneur de la Tribu* (1989, translated as *Honor of the Tribe*), and *La malédiction* (1993, Académie Française Award, 1994). After an essay, *De la barbarie en général et de l'intégrisme en particulier* (1992), violently criticizing the Islamist movement, he had to leave Algeria and settled in Tangier, Morocco.

See also ALGERIA: OVERVIEW.

PHILLIP C. NAYLOR
UPDATED BY RABIA BEKKAR

MINARET

Tower associated with a mosque.

The minaret has been used for centuries by *muezzins* (Arabic *mu'adhdhinun,* Muslim criers) for the call to daily prayers, but its original use is unclear. The earliest mosques in Arabia had no minaret, and the first towers in seventh-century Cairo (Egypt) and Damascus (Syria) may not have been built expressly for the call.

Minarets have been designed in many styles over time and space. Early ones were often square or octagonal, some with winding exterior staircases, while the sixteenth-century Ottomans built needle-thin, cylindrical minarets with conical peaks. Today, the muezzin does not always climb the minaret to call for prayers; minarets are often outfitted with loudspeakers.

ELIZABETH THOMPSON

MINORITIES

Subdominant or subordinate groups.

The term minorities is misleading and inappropriate when discussing subdominant or subordinate groups in Middle Eastern history and society. It is a term rooted in the naive assumption of Western social scientists that minor demographic groups can wield only minor political and economic power. In the states of the Middle East, demographic minorities have exercised considerable—even dominant—political and economic power. In the past, an ethnically distinctive minority, Muslims from the Caucasus, ruled the Arabic-speaking majority for centuries (the Mamluk dynasty of Syria [1250–1516] and Egypt [1250–1517]). During the twentieth century, in Iraq and Lebanon, the only two Arab states where Sunni Muslim Arabs are a minority, the traditional dominance of Sunni Islam has given its adherents disproportionate—in Iraq, dominant—power. The internal disorders that have torn these polities apart are due in no small part to the contradiction between the majoritarian democratic principles to which all pay lip service and the very different realpolitik.

Furthermore, the bases—religious, ethnic, or linguistic—by which one defines such groups are inconsistent over time and place. In addition, the very existence of such groups and the markers that define them have become a controversial political and intellectual issue. A given group might be considered part of the majority by one criterion in one century; in the next, by very different criteria, it

might be considered or—more significantly—might consider itself an oppressed minority. The process also may be reversed so that an oppressed minority may attempt to join the formerly oppressing majority.

Religion

Groups in the Islamic Middle East have been defined largely by religion. The traditional minorities—or, more accurately, subdominant groups—have been Christian and Jewish. Within these there have been further divisions by virtue of dogma, rite, and ethnic-linguistic identity. The Ottoman Empire, which dominated the Middle East and North Africa into the twentieth century, recognized most such groups as components of the so-called Millet System. The traditional states of Morocco and Iran followed practices that reflected their different social and religious needs. Because in Morocco, unlike the Ottoman Empire, the Jews were the only significant indigenous non-Muslim group, the institutional arrangements governing them were less elaborate, and their status tended to vary with the reigning Alawite dynasty (1654–). The most significant Christian and Jewish groups in Iran under Qajar rule (1795–1925) were the Armenians, with small groups of Jews and Nestorians, as well as Zoroastrians. Because of the hostile attitude of Iranian Twelver Shiʿism toward non-Muslims, the opportunities of such groups have been much more restricted than in the Sunni world. However, because of their larger number and economic importance, Armenians in Iran on the whole have fared better than other non-Muslims.

In addition to Christians and Jews, there was another religiously defined subdominant category, Muslim sectarians. For the Ottomans these were Shiʿites. In Iran, in addition to Sunni Muslims, there arose a messianic syncretistic offshoot of Shiʿism, the Baha'i faith. Such groups, unlike Christians and Jews, presented a unique threat to Muslim states because they articulated claims to power based on a similar religious discourse. Unlike Christians and Jews, who had been conditioned by more than a millennium of Muslim rule to accept the principle of status quo, religiously dissenting Muslims had to be retaught that principle from time to time.

Shiʿism represented a significant challenge to Ottoman authority in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the rival Safavid dynasty in Iran attempted to use its Shiʿa coreligionists in eastern Anatolia as a fifth column in the Persian-Turkish wars. As this conflict diminished, both Ottoman Sunni rulers and Shiʿite subjects pretended that their differences did not really exist. This process was hastened by the Shiʿite application of the Islamic principle of *taqiyya* (caution), a doctrine of dispensation that justifies concealing one's true beliefs lest they antagonize the authorities. In the mid-nineteenth century an offshoot of Shiʿism, the Druze of Syria and Lebanon, emerged as a short-lived irritant to Ottoman rule in the region when they helped precipitate a conflict with a rival sectarian group, the Christian Maronites. However, it was only in the last quarter of the twentieth century, decades after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, that Shiʿa became a force in the Arab world. In Lebanon, as a result of the urbanization of previously rural populations and emigration of the Christian elite brought on by years of civil war and foreign invasions, the poor and ignored Shiʿite community of southern Lebanon became a majority that could no longer be ignored. In Iraq, despite comparable upheaval, a Shiʿite community nearly as large, in relative terms, failed to gain comparable influence.

By the nineteenth century in Iran, as a result of the Safavids' successful campaign to convert the country to Twelver Shiʿism centuries earlier, Sunni Islam was reduced to the unaccustomed status of a statistically insignificant religion largely limited to the rural Kurdish community, and thus trebly marginalized. There was also a smaller Sevener Shiʿite community. A far more dangerous religious challenge arose from within Twelver Shiʿism. At first it manifested itself in the Bab movement, which arose in open rebellion to proclaim a new scripture superseding the Qurʾan. Once defeated, it reemerged nonviolently as the Bahaʾi religion, whose tolerant outlook proved attractive in the twentieth century. However, Shiʿite religious authorities regard it as heresy.

Ethnicity and Linguistics

In the twentieth century, recognized markers of group identity became newly significant in political

terms, with extremely disruptive consequences. Ethno-linguistic-regional identity, as it was called, tried to superimpose itself on strong religious affiliations. The quality of being Aleppine, Arab, Azeri, Berber, Cairene, Damascene, Egyptian, Hijazi, Khorasani, Kurdish, Jerusalemite, Najdi, Persian, Syrian, Turkish, and so forth had always existed. Traditionally such identities had been sources of group feeling, of ethnic pride and humor, of poetry, of distinctive cuisine and speech; but they had not been the basis for political organization, power, and sovereignty. Muslims (whether Arabic-speaking or Turkish-speaking or whatever) ruled non-Muslims (whether Arabic-speaking or Turkish-speaking or whatever). Although the latter might on occasion have wealth and exercise political influence, it was always behind the scenes and under the table. Modeling themselves on the newly dominant European notions of national political sovereignty, in the wake of the collapse of the traditional Islamic polities during and after World War I, Middle Eastern peoples attempted to fit the round peg of their traditional religious communal identities into the square hole of ethno-linguistic politics. This seemed to change the basis for determining dominant versus subdominant roles. And it required a number of uneasily and inconsistently reached decisions, none of which were—or are—self-evident. What were the new identities to be? Egyptian, Syrian, or Arab? Turkish or Turanian? Azeri, Turcoman, or Persian? These are merely samples of the host of complex questions that had to be answered for new nations and states to emerge.

In the new nation-states of the Arab world all speakers of Arabic—Christian, Jew, and Muslim (both Sunnis and Shiʿa)—were to be equal; there no longer were to be religious minorities. But that theory hardly described the far more complex and tortured reality. Different Christian groups chose different responses to these opportunities. By and large the Orthodox of Syria and Lebanon identified themselves with their traditional allies, Sunni Muslims, and attempted to support the cause of Arab nationalism. The Maronites, by contrast, preferred the independence of Lebanese identity. Although individual Copts had played a notable role in the rise of Egyptian nationalism, they grew marginalized as it increasingly transformed into Arab nationalism. Even less than Christians, some individual Jews participated in the early stage of Egyptian and Syrian nationalism; but the rise of Zionism and the conflict over Palestine, along with strong religious discrimination, excluded them from any lasting role. There has, however, been one political success story in the politics of religious minorities: the Alawites who dominate Syria's ruling elite, a small Shiʿite sect so extreme that some Muslims deny they are part of Islam. Two factors explain their unique achievement. During the colonial period the French recruited them for military service, so that by the 1960s they were overrepresented in the Syrian officer corps, the country's only electorate. They also denied their sectarian traditions and flocked to the Baʿth party, a bastion of secular Arab nationalism.

The smaller ethnic groups of the Muslim world that lost in the game of national musical chairs—notably the Kurds of western Asia and the Berbers of North Africa, who previously had some claim to power and dominant status by virtue of their Sunni identity—are now ignored and suppressed minorities within new political boundaries. During the 1920s Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his Turkish Republic, through war and diplomacy, rid Anatolia of most of its Armenians and Greeks—though a large proportion of them in fact spoke Turkish as their first language—and then tried to redefine the only non-Turkish group remaining, the Kurds, as Mountain Turks. Iran has been more successful than most states in the Middle East in welding its varied subdominant groups—Turkic-speaking Azeris, Turcomans, Qashqaʾis, as well as the Arabs of Khuzistan and the Sunnis—into a relatively coherent polity. Although Persian speakers constitute a bare majority—if that—they have successfully used the appeal of Shiʿite Islam, to which 90 percent of the population adheres, to maintain the country's unity.

The redrawing of the map of the Middle East and North Africa after World War I created new sub-dominant groups without abolishing the old. In short, the region suffers from the worst of both worlds: it is riven both by the old confessional loyalties and by the new political demands of ethnic nationalism.

See also BAHAʾI FAITH; CHRISTIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; DRUZE; JEWS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; MARONITES; MILLET SYSTEM; SHIʿISM; SUNNI ISLAM; ZIONISM.

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BENJAMIN BRAUDE

MINZ, BENJAMIN

[1903–1961]

A leader and founder of the Poʿalei Agudat Israel, a religious Zionist labor movement and political party in Israel.

Benjamin Minz was born in Lodz, Poland, and immigrated to Palestine in 1925. Under his leadership, the political party was established in Tel Aviv in 1933, and in 1946 Minz became its head. He served as chairman of the World Union of Poʿalei Agudat Israel. Unlike leaders of Agudat Israel, he advocated close cooperation with the Zionist Yishuv (Jewish community of Jerusalem) and its institutions. During World War II, he was active in rescuing Jews from the Holocaust. In 1948 Minz was a member of the Provisional State Council of Israel and served as deputy speaker of the second and third Knessets. In 1960 and 1961, he served as postmaster general. He wrote numerous books on topics relating to the beliefs and practices of the Hasidim.

See also AGUDAT ISRAEL; HASIDIM; HOLOCAUST; YISHUV.

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ANN KAHN

MISRI, AZIZ ALI AL-

[1879–1965]

Egyptian officer and Arab nationalist politician.

Born in Cairo, of mixed Arab and Circassian parentage, Aziz Ali al-Misri (also Masri) was trained at the Istanbul Military Academy and was commissioned as an Ottoman army officer in 1901. He joined the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) (Young Turks), but after the Young Turks seized power in 1908, he turned against the organization and became an Arab nationalist. It is often alleged that Misri's change of heart occurred because of a personal quarrel that erupted between him and CUP leader Enver while both were serving in the Ottoman army during the Libyan war. Misri formed secret Arab societies called al-Qahtaniyya in 1909 and al-AHD (Covenant) in 1913. He was arrested by the Ottoman government, tried for treason, and condemned to death, but the Turks let him go to Egypt instead. When the Arab Revolt broke out in 1916, he served briefly as Sharif Husayn's chief of staff. After World War I, he joined several Egyptian fringe groups committed to Arab nationalism. He directed the Cairo Police Academy from 1927 to 1936 and was inspector general of the Egyptian army in 1938. In 1939, Premier Ali Mahir named him chief of staff, but he was dismissed from that post in 1940 at Britain's insistence. He deserted the Egyptian army and tried to reach the Axis forces in the Libyan desert but was caught and court-martialed in 1941. After Aziz Ali had helped the Free Officers prepare for the revolution of 1952, they named him ambassador to Moscow in 1953 and considered making him president in place of Muhammad Naguib, but he retired in 1954. Fiercely nationalistic, Azi Ali was hampered in his career by his political idealism, which got the better of his discretion.

See also COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

MISSIONARY SCHOOLS

Primary and secondary schools, colleges, and universities established by Christians to do charitable work and promote conversion.

In the Middle East, Christian missionary schools were founded in the wake of the extension of Western power and influence in the Ottoman Empire during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. With the demise of the empire, the Eu-

A missionary school under construction. © AUB ARCHIVES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ropean domination of the region, and then the European mandates over the post–World War I successor states, a variety of motives led both lay and religious organizations to aid in the educational enterprise of modernizing the peoples of the region.

Muhammad Ali in Egypt and his son Ibrahim Pasha in Syria facilitated the entry of such groups; the Ottoman millet system—which granted limited autonomy to the various Christian communities—allowed Christians to bring in missionaries to staff new schools and train teachers in the sciences, which were considered the secret of Western power and prestige. Practically all Western nations sent missionaries at some time, but the most sustained efforts were those of the American Board of Christian Missions (ABCM) and the Arabian Mission (both U.S. Protestant), the North African Mission (French Protestant), the Church Missionary Society (British Anglican), and a variety of Roman Catholic orders and congregations.

Until almost the end of the twentieth century, the desire of Westerners to bring education and enlightenment to the peoples of the Middle East coincided with the peoples' desire for learning and was considered a service rather than a cultural intrusion. Moreover, the schools registered a presence and an influence that were not considered religious per se. Christian missionary schools were, in fact, religiously motivated, but the sensitivity of the dominant Muslim population was respected, since Islam opposed any attempts at direct conversion or proselytization. Christian religious efforts remained within the faith—with Roman Catholics trying to attract Christians separated from Rome and with Protestants trying to convert Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox Christians. Many Roman Catholic educational efforts began as seminaries that trained local clergy for the Eastern churches.

Several missionary schools developed into notable institutions and have become landmarks in the

history of the region: the American University of Beirut, Saint Joseph University of Beirut, Aleppo College, Baghdad College (now Baghdad University), Robert College of Istanbul (now Boğaziçi University), and the American University in Cairo. Undoubtedly, the widespread elementary schools in Lebanon and Syria had the broadest impact. In 1894, for example, the Jesuits (Society of Jesus) had 192 primary schools in the region with students numbering some 8,000 boys and 3,000 girls, and the American Protestant Mission had 130 primary schools with more than 7,000 students. Today, the teaching orders of men, of women, and of dedicated Christian lay teachers—all citizens of Middle Eastern countries—still direct primary and secondary schools that were formerly mission operations.

After the demise of the Ottoman Empire, during the European-dominated years of the first half of the twentieth century, only a limited opposition to these schools existed, mostly in Islamic religious circles. The national governments produced by the post-World War II revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s, however, tightened controls over all education—limiting not only missionary schools but all private education—as in Syria in 1967 and Iraq in 1969. In North Africa the new governments also limited private schools, and then in the 1970s, an Islamic religious dimension was added to the growing regional preoccupation with national cultural identities—culminating in a growing Islamist political movement and the successful Iranian Revolution of 1979, which set out to eliminate all non-Islamic cultural influences. Since that time, a new set of forces, both social and political, has been in the making throughout the region.

See also American University in Cairo (AUC); American University of Beirut (AUB); Baghdad University; Boğaziçi (Bosporus) University; Saint Joseph University.

John J. Donohue

MISSION CIVILISATRICE

French term for "civilizing mission," describing the essence of French colonial policy.

As the primary rationalization for colonialism, the "civilizing mission" signified France's attempt to convert its colonial subjects into French people. Whereas the British tended to reject the notion that an Indian, for example, might become British, the French believed that if properly taught French values and the French language, Algerians and Vietnamese alike would slowly evolve and become French. Hence the term *evolué,* which was used to refer to those who had adapted to French culture. There was also a moral component to the civilizing mission, in that some French held that it was their duty as a more enlightened race to elevate the ignorant masses of the non-Western world.

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Zachary Karabell

MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS

Four tripartite committees established in accordance with the Israel-Egypt, Israel-Jordan, Israel-Lebanon, and Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreements (GAAs) of 1949.

Equal numbers of military delegates met periodically under the chairmanship of the chief of staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) or his authorized representative. Informal civilian advisers often assisted the official military personnel. Their purpose was to provide for the implementation and supervision of the various articles of the GAAs. As hopes for political negotiations in other forums faded after 1949, the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) also became, by default, one of the last channels through which Arabs and Israelis could communicate directly with each other—although not always with the result of relieving tensions or contributing to a positive atmosphere.

In dealing with a growing number of complaints, the commissions took on quasi-judicial functions, quickly becoming (in the words of one critic) "courts and scoreboards." In the early 1950s, the MACs proved unable to meet their peacekeeping functions effectively when faced with an increase of infiltrations, expulsions, cross-border raids, and

reprisals. As time went on, both Arab and Israeli authorities made the tasks of MAC observers and investigators increasingly difficult. Offering lip service rather than true cooperation, the parties—Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria—became skilled at manipulating the MACs for the purpose of scoring political and propaganda points. The effectiveness of the MACs as organs for conflict management also suffered from periodic walkouts and boycotts, by one party or the other, and from recurring challenges to the impartiality and integrity of various UN officials who served as chairmen.

After the 1956 Arab-Israel War, the truce supervisory machinery was further weakened, with some MACs virtually inoperative. The MACs ceased to exist following the June 1967 Arab-Israel war. In 1974, Israel officially declared the four General Armistice Agreements, which had provided the legal basis for the MACs, to be null and void. During the 1970s and 1980s, the UNTSO (with a staff of 220 military observers and offices in Jerusalem, Amman, Beirut, and Gaza) continued to monitor Arab-Israeli frontier incidents.

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NEIL CAPLAN

MIXED COURTS

Egyptian courts that tried commercial and civil cases from 1875 to 1949.

Although they had analogues in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere, mixed courts achieved their classic form in Egypt between 1875 and 1949. As premier of Egypt, Nubar Pasha negotiated European treaties that approved the courts for Egypt's Khedive Ismaʿil; he promptly fell victim to their decisions in favor of his foreign creditors and was forced to sell his Suez Canal shares to Britain in 1875.

Western and Egyptian mixed court judges heard the commercial and civil cases involving Westerners, but criminal cases remained under consular courts. The mixed courts used French law codes, and their working language was French. After 1882, British administrators often saw these courts as an impediment to their own plans for reform and political control. From the 1920s on, Egyptian nationalists campaigned for the abolition of any institution that infringed on Egyptian sovereignty. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 paved the way for the Montreux Convention of 1936, which provided for ending the mixed courts and the capitulations by 1949. The example of the mixed courts' bar association, law codes, structure, and procedures had a significant influence on Egypt's other court systems—the National *(Ahliyya)* and *shariʿa* (Islamic law) courts.

See also MONTREUX CONVENTION (1936); *SHARIʿA*.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

MIZRAHI MOVEMENT

Orthodox Zionist organization, founded in Europe in early 1902.

Mizrahi was founded by Rabbi Isaac Jacob Reines as the religious Zionist organization within the World Zionist Organization (WZO), after the fifth Zionist Congress of 1901 resolved to enter the educational sphere. Since many members of the WZO believed secular nationalism to be antithetical to Judaism, they could not agree to a program of secular Zionist education.

They founded the Mizrahi organization, an acronym for *merkaz ruhani* (spiritual center), under the banner "The Land of Israel for the people of

Israel according to the Torah of Israel." In 1904, a world conference of Mizrahi was convened in Bratislava, Czechoslavakia (then Pressburg, Hungary), and the Mizrahi World Organization was founded with the objective of educating and promoting religious Zionism. The first convention of the American Mizrahi organization was convened in 1914, under the influence of Rabbi Meir Bar-Ilan, then general secretary, who had recently toured the United States.

After World War I, Ha-Poʿel Ha-Mizrahi (Mizrahi Labor) was founded, which established a group of religious kibbutz and moshav settlements in Palestine. Although Ha-Poʿel Ha-Mizrahi worked very closely with Mizrahi, the two were separate and autonomous and remained so as new political parties in the Israeli Knesset (parliament), until they merged in 1956, becoming the National Religious party (NRP). From 1951 to 1977, they occupied ten to twelve seats in the Knesset. Although the Mizrahi-Ha-Poʿel Ha-Mizrahi movement played a major role in establishing the public religious character of Israel in its initial decades of nationhood, the party's power and prestige declined by the 1980s. Always they struggled to establish the Sabbath rest and *kashrut* (dietary laws) in all national institutions, settlements, and organizations, so that a state constitution should be based on *Halakhah* (Jewish religious law).

Since 1981, the number of NRP Knesset seats declined by more than 50 percent. This has been attributed to the perceived accommodative stance of the majority party, Likud, to religious tradition; to ideological confusion, stagnation, and an absence of NRP leadership development; and to a move by NRP to the religious right, which led many former Mizrahi loyalists into the more sectarian religious parties, such as Agudat Israel and SHAS.

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Chaim I. Waxman

MOADDA, MOHAMED

[1939–]

Leader of Tunisia's main legal opposition party, the Movement of Socialist Democrats.

A university professor and a founding member of the Mouvement des Démocrates Socialistes (MDS), the first party to split from the ruling Socialist Destour Party at the end of the 1970s, Mohamed Moadda moved to the forefront of the party after 1988, when President Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali announced a restricted political liberalization for bodies that signed the National Pact. In the early 1990s Moadda led the MDS through a period of "critical support" for the regime until 1995, when opposition parties won only six of four thousand seats in the municipal elections. An open letter that he wrote to the president provoked his arrest in October, and convicted of contacts with Libyan intelligence agents, he was imprisoned in 1996. Soon released under conditions dictating that serious political activity would lead to reincarceration, he was kept under supervision and then placed under house arrest after making contact with exiles from the Islamist Nahda Party in 1997 and 1998. In 1999 he announced his candidacy for the presidency, a symbolic protest against the lack of provision for unapproved candidates, made in the knowledge that it could lead to imprisonment. He was reincarcerated in 2001 after making a televised broadcast and participating in a joint manifesto with Nahda. The object of an international human-rights campaign, Moadda went on hunger strike, was pardoned in March 2002, and was reinstated as MDS president. The price of his freedom was his agreement to moderate criticism of the regime, and to effect a difficult reunification between those MDS supporters who had remained loyal to him and those who had been recognized by the government under Ismail Boulahia.

See also Ben Ali, Zayn al-Abidine; Tunisia: Political Parties in.

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GEORGE R. WILKES

MODA'I, YITZHAK

[1926–1998]

Israeli military leader, politician.

Born in Tel Aviv, Moda'i (originally Madrovich) joined the Haganah in 1941 and the police force in 1943. He served in the Israel Defense Force, eventually becoming a lieutenant colonel. After serving as military attaché to London and heading committees for cease-fire agreements with Syria and Lebanon, he received chemical engineering and law degrees at Haifa Technion (1957) and Hebrew University (1959). From 1961 to 1977 Moda'i was chief executive officer of Revlon (Israel).

As a member of the Liberal Party's directorate (1965–1968) he advocated uniting with Menachem Begin's Herut Party to create the Likud. He was appointed military commander of Gaza after the 1967 Arab-Israel War and was elected to the Knesset in 1974. Moda'i was minister of energy and infrastructure in the Likud government of 1977 and was minister of communication and later minister without portfolio (a member of the Cabinet with the right to attend Cabinet meetings and advise the prime minister but without responsibility for a division of government bureaucracy, such as the Ministry of Housing, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.). He was finance minister in the National Unity government of 1984, working closely with Prime Minister Shimon Peres on the economic stabilization program, which was the initiative for which Moda'i was probably best known. Tension between him and Peres forced Moda'i to switch to the Ministry of Justice and finally to leave the government in 1986. When Yitzhak Shamir took over the premiership in 1986 in an arrangement for power-sharing that had been made between Peres and Shamir at the time of the 1984 election, Moda'i returned as minister without portfolio and served as minister for economy and planning.

Moda'i served as chairman of the Jubilee Celebrations Committee in 1998, celebrating Israel's fiftieth anniversary, but resigned because of disagreements with tourism minister Moshe Katsav, the minister responsible for the celebrations. In May 1998 Moda'i died at age 72.

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"Yitzhak Moda'i Dies, 72." *Jerusalem Post.* 15 May 1998.

ZEV MAGHEN
UPDATED BY GREGORY S. MAHLER

MODERNIZATION

Process of sociocultural change in the Middle East that began about 1800 with European colonial expansion into the area.

Modernization is the term commonly used to denote the process of social change that the Middle East (and other parts of the world) has been experiencing for the last two hundred years. It may be traced to the Industrial Revolution and the impact of European industrial expansion and colonialism that was continually promoted by European agents—merchants, bankers, consuls, administrators, and missionaries. This process was embraced by early modernizing monarchs such as Selim III and Mahmud II of the Ottoman Empire and Muhammad Ali of Egypt. Five aspects may be distinguished: economic, political, social, intellectual, and psychological.

Economic Aspects

The Middle East has long been integrated in the world market. The region has mainly exported primary products, agricultural goods such as cotton, tobacco, fruits, and coffee; recently, it became the prime producer and exporter of petroleum. To facilitate both export and the importation of manufactured goods, certain raw materials, and foodstuffs, a network for mechanized transport was developed (railroads, seaports, river traffic, roads [with bridges and tunnels], airports), along with a banking and finance system. This entailed vast investments of foreign and, more recently, national capital. A large manufacturing sector has been established, and the region encompasses the world's most abundant petroleum deposits—exploited by a large production and exporting industry.

Political Aspects

Modernization here constitutes the emergence of centralized nation-states. In addition to the ruling bodies, large, and usually cumbrous, civil services administer the various countries and provide social services. Taxation has risen steadily as a proportion of Gross National Product. Suffrage often excludes women, but elections are held for presidents and parliaments (although in practice many countries are under a one-party dictatorship). The prevailing political ideology is nationalism—utilizing certain elements of socialism—mainly as the outcome of working toward independence from European imperialism during the twentieth century.

Social Aspects

Many changes have occurred because of the great increase in population; the sharp fall in death rates has not been matched by a decline in birthrates, so the population has increased at about 3 percent per annum (including both immigration and emigration). Cities have grown to the point where more than 50 percent of the population is urban. Family structure has consequently shown some changes; most young middle-class couples live on their own and make their own decisions, instead of following the practices and decisions of their patriarch. Social services have been greatly expanded; those that were provided by religious or private philanthropy are now usually provided by the state. Education is available to almost all boys of school age (and to the majority of girls), and the literacy rate has risen from an average 5 percent in the early nineteenth century to an average of more than 50 percent today (in Israel, more than 90 percent).

Intellectual/Psychological Aspects

Intellectual modernization meant, originally, the absorption by a small elite of the bulk of Western science, scholarship, literature, and to a smaller extent, the arts. This was achieved primarily through the French language, but British and American sources have been increasingly used. Diffusion of Western-style culture has resulted in the establishment of a vast network of Western-style schools, which are secular and therefore distinct from the traditional Muslim/Christian/Hebrew schools. They include many universities and technical and research institutes.

Although printing was available in the eighteenth century, it became significant only during the nineteenth century, when books and pamphlets were followed by newspapers and periodicals that reached the general reading public. Concurrently, the traditional written languages—mainly, Persian, Turkish, Arabic, and Hebrew—which were highly elaborate, formal, and remote from everyday speech, have been both simplified and enriched. New and hitherto unknown literary genres have developed, notably novels and plays, based on Western models. It is perhaps in them that one sees most clearly the psychological modernization that has occurred—the growing individualism, the weakening of traditional ways, and the participation in what may be called a world culture. The expanding fundamentalist tendencies in both Islam and Judaism may be explained by sociopolitical problems that continue to need attention, not by a growing traditionalism.

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CHARLES ISSAWI

MOGANNAM, MATIEL

[c.1900–1992]

Leader of the Palestinian women's movement, 1920s–1930s.

Matiel Mogannam, a Christian, was born in Lebanon but was raised in the United States, where her family immigrated during her childhood. There, she met and married her husband, Mogannam Mogannam, a native of Jerusalem. During the early 1920s, the couple relocated to Jerusalem, where Matiel be-

came active in the Palestinian women's movement. Mogannam Mogannam was an advocate and officer of the National Defense Party. In 1929 Matiel Mogannam was one of the two secretaries of the Arab Women's Executive (AWE), which founded the Arab Women's Association (AWA) and the Arab women's movement in Palestine, in which she was extremely active. In 1933, when Sir Edmund Allenby, commander-in-chief of the Allied Forces of Palestine during World War I, came to dedicate the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) building in Jerusalem, Mogannam delivered a nationalist speech from the minbar of the Mosque of Umar at the Haram al-Sharif. In autumn of the same year, she spoke from a balcony in Jaffa during turbulent nationalist demonstrations held in the cities of Mandatory Palestine. Her book, *The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem,* and her contributions to the Palestinian press, are firsthand accounts of the Palestinian women's movement before 1948. She and her husband relocated in 1938 to Ramallah, where she was active in the women's movement for many years. She died in the United States in 1992.

See also Arab Women's Association of Palestine; Arab Women's Executive Committee; Jerusalem.

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Ellen L. Fleischmann

MOGHAIZEL, LAURE

[1929–1997]

Lebanese legal, women's, and human rights activist.

Laure Moghaizel (also Mughayzil) was a pioneer in the field of women's legal rights in Lebanon and the Arab world. Born into a middle-class Maronite family from South Lebanon, she distinguished herself early as an outspoken student and member of the Kata'ib (Phalangist) Youth Organization, which was originally established in 1936 as a Christian nationalist youth movement. Following Lebanese independence in 1943, it turned from a populist youth group into a formal political party. Moghaizel led efforts to equalize women's participation in this group as she studied for her law degree at Saint Joseph's University in Beirut. During the outbreak of confessional (civil and religious) unrest in Lebanon in 1958, Moghaizel's husband Joseph and then she herself broke with the Kata'ib, disappointed in its anti-Islamic rhetoric. From that time onward, she identified herself as a pro-democracy Lebanese woman with strong allegiances to human and family rights. In 1968 she was a founding member of the Democratic Party of Lebanon.

Moghaizel was instrumental in lobbying for basic laws that changed the lives of Lebanese women, such as a woman's right to vote (obtained in 1953) and the equalization of the law of inheritance of non-Muslims (obtained in 1959). She also fought to abolish discriminatory policies preventing a woman from leaving the country without her husband's permission. During the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) she was a founding member of Bahithat, an association of women scholars opposed to confessionalism. She also played an active role in the broader Arab region and international arena, heading committees on Arab Women and Childhood Development and serving as vice president of the International Council for Women. Beside her political activism, she published widely on women and Lebanese legislation, women during the civil war, crimes of honor, women's labor, and Arab women and political laws.

Moghaizel's activism also extended to the related area of human rights. During the mid-1980s she was a founding member of the Lebanese Association for Human Rights and the Non-Violence Movement. She represented Lebanon and the Arab world in countless forums on the rights of women, children, families, and human beings generally, and published legal guides on human and women's rights. Her work as an attorney was matched by her passion for the recognition of human rights. She believed that Lebanon had an important role to play regarding improving freedom and human rights in the Arab world. Her service to Lebanon earned her the Order of the Cedar, rank of Commander.

In 1996, the Moghaizel Foundation was founded to "enhance and disseminate the thoughts and

discipline" of Joseph and Laure Moghaizel, especially issues relating to human rights, democracy, modernization, national unity, Arabism, and secularism. As of 2003, the foundation issued publications, encouraged research, organized workshops and seminars, and maintained a public library.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1958); LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); LEBANESE WOMEN'S COUNCIL; LEBANON.

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ELISE SALEM

MOHAJERANI, ATAOLLAH

[1954–]

Iranian politician.

Born in 1954 in Arak, Ataollah Mohajerani received his degrees (B.A., M.A., and Ph.D.) in history from Isfahan, Shiraz, and the Teachers' Training universities. He was a student during the Iranian Revolution and entered politics by running for and serving in the first parliament in the Islamic Republic of Iran (1980–1984). After serving one year as the cultural ambassador to Pakistan, he became the deputy for legal and parliamentary affairs, first for the prime minister and later for the president (1985–1989). Shortly after serving as a spokesperson for the newly elected president Mohammad Khatami in 1997, Mohajerani was appointed minister of culture and Islamic guidance—a position he held until April 2000.

Mohajerani is a culturally progressive, politically pragmatic, and religiously liberal politician affiliated with the Executives of Construction Party, which was established in 1996 with the support of the president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, as a counterforce to religious conservatives. Relative to his predecessors, Mohajerani was an extremely liberal and visionary culture minister. He was one of the driving forces behind Khatami's liberal policies after 1997. During Mohajerani's tenure, Iran experienced more press freedom; increased publication of books, magazines, and newspapers; and a resurfacing of the Iranian cinema in the international arena. Previously banned artists and writers were allowed to produce their works again.

Mohajerani's policies generated conflicting reactions. When Salman Rushdie wrote *Satanic Verses* and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a *fatva [fatwa]* that absolved any Muslim who might kill him, Mohajerani wrote a book in which he defended Khomeini's verdict and declared the Rushdie affair to be part of a recurring Western plot against Islam. The conservatives adored Mohajerani, but when he advocated direct negotiations with the United States in 1989, he angered Ali Khamenehi, the leader of the Islamic Republic, who denounced him and suspended any discussion of the issue. Some conservatives viewed Mohajerani's policies as an assault on their religious values, and accused him of being a CIA agent hired to undermine the values of the Islamic Revolution. Several high-ranking clerics denounced him and demanded his impeachment by the parliament or dismissal by the leader. In 1998, radical vigilantes physically attacked Mohajerani and Hojatoleslam Abdolah Nuri, the minister of the interior, during Friday prayers in Tehran University. In 1999 conservatives tried to impeach Mohajerani in the parliament, but his eloquent defense prevented his critics from gaining enough votes for his removal.

Pressure on Mohajerani mounted from allegations of financial impropriety and legal challenges to his decisions, and rumors of his resignation continued. Finally, in April 2000 Khatami accepted his fifty-page letter of resignation. In 2001 Khatami asked him to serve as the director of the International Centre for Dialogue Among Civilizations (ICDC). As head of ICDC, Mohajerani continues to travel, give speeches and interviews, and write books and articles. He is married to Jamileh Kadivar, a parliament deputy, and they have four children.

See also KHATAMI, MOHAMMAD; KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH; RAFSANJANI, ALI AKBAR HASHEMI.

ALI AKBAR MAHDI

MOHAMMAD ALI SHAH QAJAR

[1872–1925]

Sixth ruler of the Qajar dynasty in Iran.

Mohammad Ali was the eldest son of Mozaffar al-Din Shah Qajar. His mother was the daughter of Mirza Mohammad Taqi Khan Amir Kabir, the reformist prime minister executed by Mohammad Ali's grandfather, Naser al-Din Shah, in 1852.

Mohammad Ali became commander of the troops in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan in 1892. Four years later, when his father succeeded to the throne, Mohammad Ali was proclaimed crown prince. In 1905, as he was regent while his father was visiting Europe, the merchants of Tehran closed the bazaars and took refuge in the shrine of Shah Abd al-Azim in Rayy to protest against the policies of the Belgian administrator of Iran's customs. The secret political societies that organized this incident subsequently forced his father to grant a constitution and establish a parliament (the Constitutional Revolution of 1906). Mohammad Ali believed that these measures threatened authority and even rule of the shah.

In January 1907 Mohammad Ali succeeded to the throne following the sudden death of his father. From the outset he opposed the constitutionalists, who dominated the new parliament *(majles)* and on several occasions asked him to pledge his allegiance to the constitution. In July 1908, after months of political conflict, he authorized the Russian-officered Cossack Brigade to bombard the parliament, then dissolved it, abrogated the constitution, closed down political societies, banned newspapers that had been criticizing his rule, and imposed military government in Tehran. Pro-constitution forces immediately rallied in Tabriz, where they expelled supporters of the shah and established a temporary national parliament. Pro-constitution societies organized secretly in several cities, eventually taking control of Isfahan, Mashhad, and Rasht. Leaders of the Bakhtiari tribal confederation joined the constitutionalists in 1909 and recruited a large armed force to march north on Tehran from Isfahan. A volunteer paramilitary force that marched south from Rasht joined up with the Bakhtiari contingent outside Tehran in July 1909. Mohammad Ali Shah sought refuge in the Russian legation; he was forced to abdicate in favor of his minor son, Ahmad Shah, and depart Iran.

While in exile, Mohammad Ali gathered his supporters and resources and in 1911 returned to Iran via the Caspian Sea on a chartered Russian steamer. He captured Astarabad in Mazandaran province, but the constitutionalists assembled their forces and defeated him in September 1911. Subsequently, he sailed away into permanent exile, settling initially in Russia, where his hopes of obtaining political support from the government of the tsar went unfulfilled. Mohammad Ali Shah died in April 1925.

See also BAKHTIARI; CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION; COSSACK BRIGADE; ISFAHAN; MOZAFFAR AL-DIN QAJAR; NASER AL-DIN SHAH; TABRIZ.

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NEGUIN YAVARI
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

MOHAMMADI, MAULAWI MOHAMMAD NABI

[1920–2002]

Afghan resistance leader and Muslim cleric.

Maulawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi was an Afghan resistance leader and Islamic scholar. He was a Gilzai Ahmadzai Pushtun from Logar province and had large landholdings in Helmand province. He was the head of a *madrasa* (Islamic school) in Logar province. In 1965, he was elected to the Afghan parliament representing the traditional *Ulama.* He strongly opposed the Marxist movement in Afghanistan and in 1978 fled to Peshawar, Pakistan, where he formed the Islamic resistance party Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami-e Afghanistan (Movement for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan). His followers were among the traditional Islamic clergy and Gilzai Ahmadzai tribes in the Logar regions.

Mohammadi's religious and political beliefs resembled those of the Taliban, advocating a return to strict Islamic law and Pushtun tribal values. Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, had once been a commander in Mohammadi's party. In 1994, Mohammadi aligned himself with the Taliban and largely withdrew from political life. He died at the age of eighty-one on 22 April 2002.

See also AFGHANISTAN: ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN; TALIBAN; *ULAMA.*

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GRANT FARR

MOHILEVER, SAMUEL
[1824–1898]

Rabbi, early Zionist leader.

Born in Russia, Samuel Mohilever helped to organize Jewish emigration to Palestine in the 1880s and persuaded Baron Edmond de Rothschild to support Russian families settling there. In 1882, he founded the first Hovevei Zion (also Hibbat Zion) group, in Warsaw. In 1890, he was a founder of Rehovot in Palestine. As head of Hovevei Zion in Bialystok, he helped Theodor Herzl plan the First Zionist Congress (Basel, 1897).

See also HIBBAT ZION.

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MARTIN MALIN

MOJADDEDI, SEBGHATULLAH
[1925–]

Afghan resistance leader; Sufi pir; Afghan president, 1992–1993.

Born in Kabul in 1927 to a family of hereditary leaders of the Naqshbandi Sufi order, Sebghatullah Mojaddedi was educated at al-Azhar University in Cairo and at Kabul University. He fled Kabul in the 1970s and headed the Islamic center in Denmark from 1974 to 1978. After the Saur Revolution (1978), he went to Peshawar, Pakistan, where he formed the National Liberation Front of Afghanistan (Jebhe-ye Nejat-e Milli) and began an armed insurgency in Afghanistan against the Marxist government. He was elected president of the Afghan Interim Government, a government in exile, in Pakistan in 1989, and after the Najibullah government fell in 1992, he returned to Kabul. When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, Mojaddedi returned to exile in Pakistan, although he continued to visit Kabul, where he maintained a home. With the fall of the Taliban government in 2001, Mojaddedi returned to Kabul to participate in the new government of Hamid Karzai, although he holds no official positions.

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GRANT FARR

MOJAHEDIN

Afghan Islamic resistance fighters.

The Afghan resistance groups who took up the war against the Marxist government in 1978 called themselves *mojahedin* (fighters of the holy war), a derivative from the Arabic *jihad* (holy war). By using the appellation *mojahedin,* they invoked a number of Islamic beliefs associated with the concept of jihad, particularly that a person who dies in a jihad becomes a martyr *(shahid)* whose soul goes immediately to the side of God. Fighting mostly out of Peshawar, Pakistan, Afghan mojahedin militias organized into groups that represent the sectarian and ethnic divisions of Afghanistan. Seven main parties represented Sunni Afghans; three were led by traditional and moderate clergy, and four were led by Islamist and fundamental leaders. The moderate-traditional parties were Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami (the Islamic Revolutionary Movement), led by Maulawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi; Jebhe-ye Nejat-e Milli (National Liberation Front), led by Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, a Sufi pir; and Mahaz-e Islami (Islamic Front), led by Pir Sayyed Ahmad Gailani, head of the Qadiri Sufi order. The Islamist groups were Hezb-e Islami (Islamic Party), led by Golbuddin

A mojahedin patrols a village graveyard in Achin, Afganistan, 1988. AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

Hekmatyar; Hezb-e Islami, led by Mohammad Unis Khalis; Jamiᶜat-e Islami (Islamic Society), led by Burhanuddin Rabbani; and Ittihad-e Islami (Islamic Union), led by Abd al-Rasul Sayyaf.

In addition there were a number of Shiᶜite parties (Shiᶜa Muslims constitute between 15 and 20 percent of the Afghan population). They included Shura-ye Ittifagh-e Islami (Islamic Union), led by Sayyed Beheshti; Harakat-e Islami (Islamic Movement), led by Shaykh Mohseni; and Hezb-e Wahadat (Unity Party), an alliance of eight Shiᶜite groups.

Each mojahedin party depended on followers in Afghanistan and on other governments for support. During the resistance war, the mojahedin parties with the largest following were the Jamiᶜat-e Islami, which was the only Sunni party with non-Pakhtun leadership and thus popular in the non-Pakhtun areas of Afghanistan (especially the north and west), and the Hezb-e Islami, led by Hekmatyar, which had the support of the Pakistani military and therefore received a lion's share of the weapons and arms. When the Marxist government of Najibullah fell in 1992, the mojahedin parties returned to Kabul to form a government, which was generally referred to as the mojahedin government. Their attempt at unity failed and they began fighting among themselves. As a result, much of Kabul was destroyed in the fighting, and in 1996 the Taliban captured Kabul. Several of the mojahedin parties, especially Jamiᶜat-e Islami and Hezb-e Wahadat, retreated to the north of Afghanistan to fight against the Taliban. With the arrival of the Karzai interim government in 2001 many of the original mojahedin parties returned to Kabul to take part in the new government.

See also GAILANI, AHMAD; HEKMATYAR, GOLBUDDIN; HEZB-E ISLAMI; JAMIʿAT-E ISLAMI; KHALIS, MOHAMMAD UNIS; MOHAMMADI, MAULAWI MOHAMMAD NABI; MOJADDEDI, SEBGHATULLAH; RABBANI, BURHANUDDIN; SUNNI ISLAM.

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GRANT FARR

MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ

The main armed force challenging the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Mojahedin (or the Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran; Holy Warrior Organization of the Iranian People) was formed in the mid-1960s by Tehran University students who tried to synthesize Islam with Marxism, interpreting the former to be the divine message of revolution and the latter to be the main analytical tool for understanding society, history, and politics. While influenced by these features of Marxism, they rejected the philosophy of dialectical materialism. They also adopted the strategy of guerrilla warfare from Che Guevara, the Vietminh, and Algeria's Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN). Some of their founding leaders received guerrilla training from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

From 1971 until 1979, the Mojahedin tried to destabilize the regime of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi with a series of assassinations, bank robberies, and daring armed assaults. In the process, more than eighty of their members lost their lives. Most of these were engineers, teachers, and university students. The group was further weakened by factional infighting. In 1975, one faction denounced Islam as a "conservative petty bourgeois ideology" and declared itself a pure Marxist-Leninist organization. This faction later became known as the Paykar (Combat) organization. By the time of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, little remained of the Mojahedin, and the surviving members had been imprisoned.

Despite this, the Mojahedin regrouped during the revolution and quickly grew to become a major threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Maʿsud Rajavi, one of the few survivors from the 1960s, took over the leadership. The Mojahedin grew rapidly in part because of its mystique of revolutionary martyrdom; in part because of its adherence to Shiʿism; in part because of its social radicalism; and in part because of its anticlericalism and opposition to the theocracy of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. By 1981, its publication, *Mojahed,* was one of the country's most widely read newspapers; its parliamentary candidates were winning a substantial number of votes; and its rallies were drawing hundreds of thousands. The regime reacted by ordering a major crackdown. The Mojahedin, in turn, retaliated by launching an assassination campaign against the top figures of the Islamic republic.

In the aftermath of the 1981 crackdown, the Mojahedin moved its leadership abroad, created an umbrella organization named the National Council of Resistance, and, with an army of some 9,000, waged an armed struggle, based in Iraq, against the regime. By the end of the decade, however, the Mojahedin was a mere shadow of its former self. Its overt alliance with Iraq during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) undermined its nationalistic credibility. Its stress on martyrdom had little appeal to the postrevolutionary generation of youth in Iran. Its own ranks within the country were decimated by executions and mass arrests. Moreover, its tactics and alliance with Saddam Hussein prompted both the United States and the European Union to categorize it as a "terrorist organization." What is more, the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003 eliminated the Mojahedin's main patron and placed the entire organization at the mercy of the United States. The Mojahedin hope to salvage something out of this disaster by persuading the United States that they can be a useful tool against the Islamic Republic.

See also IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); IRAN–IRAQ WAR (1980–1988).

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ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN

MOJTAHED-SHABESTARI, MOHAMMAD

[1936–]

Influential intellectual among Iran's theologians.

Mohammad Mojtahed-Shabestari was born in Shabestar, which is a rural district near Tabriz in Azerbaijan, Iran. He received a traditional seminary education in Qom, where he lived from 1950 to 1968. From 1970 until the Iranian Revolution of 1979, he was the director of the Islamic Center in Hamburg, West Germany. He is fluent in German and well-versed in German theological and philosophical traditions of scholarship. During his eighteen years of residence in Qom, Mojtahed-Shabestari served on the editorial board of the *Maktab Islam,* a Shiʿite journal that addressed many of the social and political issue of the 1960s and 1970s in Iran. After the 1979 revolution, he published a journal called *Andish-e Islami* in Tehran. He was elected to the first Islamic Consultative Assembly, but since then he has devoted most of his time to teaching and writing as a professor of theology at Tehran University.

Mojtahed-Shabestari's thought, especially since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, has evolved to address the question of modernity and Islam in his native land. He has attempted to demonstrate the compatibility of human agency and human empowerment, and the notion of Divine Sovereignty. He also has recognized, albeit implicitly, the individual as the carrier of human agency. In turn, these two principles in his thought have allowed him to posit certain modern precepts such as the freedom of consciousness, which, according to him, constitutes the foundation of other types of freedoms and lays the grounding of civil rights. Thus, Mojtahed-Shabestari's discourse can be a source of inspiration for defying the notion of *velayat-e faqih* (guardianship of the jurisprudent), although he has avoided a frontal attack on this notion.

See also VELAYAT-E FAQIH.

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FARZIN VAHDAT

MOLLA

See GLOSSARY

MOLLET, GUY

[1905–1975]

French socialist and statesman.

Head of the French Socialist party (1946–1969) and premier of France (February 1956–May 1957), Guy Alcide Mollet sought an end to the civil war in Algeria (the Algerian War of Independence, 1954–1962). In October 1956, he allowed the French military to hijack a plane carrying several Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) leaders, including Ahmad Ben Bella. Convinced that Egypt's President Nasser was aiding the FLN, Mollet authorized French participation in the Suez invasion of October-November 1956.

See also ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

MOLTKE, HELMUTH VON

[1800–1891]

Prussian military officer.

As a young lieutenant, in the 1830s Helmuth von Moltke was sent to Turkey to help train the army of the Ottoman Empire. At the battle of Nezib (1839), the Ottoman commander rejected his advice, and the Ottoman forces were then routed by the Egyptian army of Ibrahim Pasha. From 1858 to 1888, von Moltke was chief of the General Staff in Berlin.

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U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976–1977.

ZACHARY KARABELL

MONASTIR

Seaport on the northeastern coast of Tunisia; center of the governorate of the same name.

Probably a Punic port before Islam, Monastir became the site of a well-known Arab Islamic *ribat* (fortified religious center), founded by the Muslim commander Harthama ibn Aʿyan in 796. The fortress, enlarged over the centuries, is today an important tourist site. To bolster the tourist trade, a large hotel and commercial complex was begun in the late 1980s.

Never a political center, it was a religious hub for several centuries in the medieval Islamic period. Two mosques of architectural importance were built at the turn of the eleventh century. Monastir was the hometown of Tunisia's President Habib Bourguiba. Under his government, an international airport was built in Monastir, used primarily for the tourist trade. In 2002, its population was estimated at 67,730.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON

MOND, ALFRED MORITZ

[1868–1930]

British industrialist and politician.

Son of a prominent German-Jewish industrialist, the Baron Alfred Moritz Mond was a Liberal member of Parliament (1906–1928). In 1926, he was one of the founders of ICI (Imperial Chemical Industry). An ardent promoter of Zionism, he visited Palestine in 1921 and contributed an estimated 100,000 British pounds to the Jewish Colonization Corporation.

ZACHARY KARABELL

MONTAZERI, HOSAYN ALI

[1920–]

Iranian religious scholar and political activist.

Born to a peasant family in Najafabad, central Iran, Hosayn Ali Montazeri began his formal religious studies at Isfahan at the age of fifteen, moving in his early twenties to Qom to benefit from the scholars teaching there. In 1944 he joined the circle of Ayatollah Hosayn Borujerdi, the principal religious leader of the time, and before long began assisting him in his classes on Shiʿite jurisprudence. Also in Qom, Montazeri became a close associate of Ruhollah Khomeini, whose views he shared. Among the most active of Khomeini's associates in the uprising of June 1963, Montazeri was detained in its aftermath. He was rearrested several times in the following years, most notably in 1975 when he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment (cut short in October 1978), and he was banished several times to various remote parts of Iran.

After the success of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic republic, Montazeri held several important posts. He was a member of the council for reviewing the draft constitution, a consultant on the appointment of revolutionary judges, an adviser on land reform, and a leader of the Friday prayers, first in Tehran and then in Qom. His eminence among the associates of Khomeini was confirmed by his selection (in December 1983) as successor-designate to Khomeini as the paramount political-religious authority in the system of government based on *velayat-e faqih.* However, a letter from Montazeri to Khomeini in which Montazeri criticized the shortcomings of the revolutionary order led to his forced resignation as successor-designate in March 1989. Montazeri then retired to Qom, where he taught Islamic jurisprudence until 1997. An open letter in which he questioned the religious qualifications of Ali Khamenehi as a *faqih* led to his house arrest in November 1997 and to a ban on his teaching. The house arrest was politically controversial and finally lifted in January 2003; the following September, he was allowed to resume teaching theology, even though he continued to criticize the government, especially the judiciary, as un-Islamic.

See also BORUJERDI, HOSAYN; IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); KHAMENEHI, ALI; KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH; QOM; VELAYAT-E FAQIH.

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HAMID ALGAR
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

MONTEFIORE, MOSES

[1784–1885]

Philanthropist and Zionist.

Born in Italy, Sir Moses Haim Montefiore made a fortune in stockbroking in London and retired in 1824. He devoted the remainder of his life to Jewish philanthropy and the cause of Zionism. Between 1827 and 1875, he made numerous trips to Palestine to aid the Jewish community there, and in 1839 he developed a program to improve Palestine's agricultural and industrial output and sought to obtain autonomy for the Jewish community. Among his many philanthropic activities, he endowed a hospital and a school for girls in Jerusalem in 1855 and purchased land outside of the walled city. Montefiore was also involved with the plight of the Moroccan Jews, whose situation seriously deteriorated after expeditions by France to Morocco in the 1840s. At the urging of the Rothschilds, Montefiore went to Morocco in 1864 and met with Sultan Mulay Sidi Muhammad, who issued an edict easing restrictions and forbidding hostile acts against the Moroccan Jews. Montefiore traveled throughout the Mediterranean Muslim world and was treated as an important dignitary wherever he went.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

MONTGOMERY, BERNARD LAW

[1887–1976]

British soldier.

A Sandhurst graduate, Bernard Law Montgomery (first viscount of Alamein) became commander of the Eighth Army in North Africa in August 1942, after General Sir Claude Auchinleck had checked German General Erwin Rommel at the first Battle of al-Alamayn (also El Alameih). On Prime Minister Winston Churchill's urging, Montgomery attacked in late October and won a decisive victory at the second Battle of al-Alamayn, leading to a full-scale retreat of Rommel's forces. Montgomery was later commander in chief of the ground forces during the Normandy invasion.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

MONTREUX CONVENTION (1936)

Agreement of 1936 giving Turkey sovereignty over the Turkish Straits.

Under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the Turkish Straits (the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosporus) were demilitarized and placed under international control. This settlement infringed on Turkish sovereignty, and after repeated demands by Turkey to reform the relevant clauses of the Lausanne agreement, the Montreux Convention was signed on 20 July 1936. Under the terms of the convention, sovereignty of the Straits reverted to Turkey, and the Turks were permitted to remilitarize the Straits as they saw fit. Furthermore, passage of the Straits in times of war was to be restricted to nonbelligerents. All of the Lausanne powers endorsed the convention, with the exception of Italy and the addition of the USSR. Britain was represented by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Alarmed by the growing power of Nazi Germany, Eden and the other European signatories felt it expedient to mollify Turkey.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

MOPSY PARTY

See ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

MOROCCAN–ALGERIAN WAR

Conflict in October and early November 1963 along the northern frontier between the two countries.

The causes of the Moroccan-Algerian War were rooted in colonialism, decolonization, and nationalism. Morocco considered the border established by colonialists artificial. During the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), the Provisional Government of the Algerian republic (Gouvernement Provisional de la République Algérienne; GPRA) agreed in July 1961 to address the frontier question after the liberation struggle. Ahmed Ben Bella further put off this issue as he attempted to secure power in 1962–1963. A revolt in Kabylia in late September 1963 offered Morocco an opportunity to seize the contested land. This resulted in a brief conflict, with Algeria receiving the heavier blows (60 dead and 250 wounded according to the French newspaper *Le monde*). Mediation by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) produced a cease-fire in early November. In 1972 Morocco and Algeria signed conventions that delineated the frontier and agreed to the common exploitation of natural resources. Algeria ratified the agreements, but Morocco did not and subsequently engaged in its Western Sahara expansion (beginning with the Green March in 1975). The Western Sahara War included a brief engagement between Moroccan and Algerian troops in 1976. In the late 1980s, bilateral relations improved as demonstrated by Morocco's ratification of the 1972 conventions, the full restoration of diplomatic relations (1988), and the formation of the Arab Maghrib Union (1989).

See also GREEN MARCH; WESTERN SAHARA WAR.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

MOROCCAN FAMILY LEGAL CODE

See MOUDAWANA, AL-

MOROCCAN QUESTION

Name given to the final phase of European imperialist rivalries over Morocco, 1900–1912.

Morocco owed its continued independence into the twentieth century to its rugged topography and combative rural populations, as well as the ability of Moroccan diplomats to play off the European powers against one another. In 1900 the diplomatic stalemate was broken when France annexed territories claimed by Morocco.

Each of the chief European rivals for Morocco—France, Britain, Spain, Germany, and Italy—cited reasons why its claims on Morocco should be recognized. Each cited historic and material interests, as well as nationalist ones, in justification. None took any cognizance of Moroccan wishes in the matter.

Between 1900 and 1904, French Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé persuaded Spain, Italy, and Britain to renounce claims to Morocco by a series of bilateral agreements. Germany was not consulted and sought to compel France to grant it comparable territories elsewhere, which it did in 1911. By the 1912 Treaty of FES, an independent Morocco ceased to exist. The Moroccan Question is generally portrayed as a chapter in the diplomatic history of Europe. But Moroccans also played a major role in both its unfolding and its ultimate resolution. Sultans Abd al-Aziz (1884–1908) and Abd al-Hafid (1908–1912) opposed French ambitions, but ended up acquiescing to the inevitable. Moroccan official pusillanimity and European troop landings between 1902 and 1912 were opposed by various popular rebellions, peasant revolts, and millenarian movements.

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EDMUND BURKE III

MOROCCO

This entry consists of the following articles:

- MOROCCO: OVERVIEW
- MOROCCO: CONSTITUTION
- MOROCCO: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

MOROCCO: OVERVIEW

Arab kingdom in the extreme northwest corner of Africa.

Morocco is bounded on the west by the Atlantic Ocean, on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, on the east and southeast by Algeria, and on the south by Western Sahara (claimed by Morocco). Spain administers two urban enclaves in northern Morocco—Ceuta and Melilla—and the offshore islands of Alhucemas, Penon de Velez de la Gomera, and Chafarinas. Most of Morocco was a protectorate of France from 1912 until 1956; northern Morocco was administered by Spain during that period. An 1860 war between Spain and Morocco established Spain's claim to Ifni, a small strip of land on the Atlantic coast of southern Morocco. The district of Tarfaya, near Western Sahara, became Spanish with the 1912 Treaty of Fes. Spain ceded Tarfaya to Morocco in 1958 and returned Ifni in 1969. Muhammad VI has ruled Morocco since 1999.

Geography and Climate

Morocco has an area of 178,620 square miles (446,550 sq km). It is dominated by the Atlas Mountains, which run through the center of the country from southwest to northeast, and the Sahara Desert, which dominates its frontier with Algeria, Western Sahara, and Mauritania. The Atlas chain comprises the High, Middle, and Saharan ranges, as well as the Rif Mountains along Morocco's Mediterranean coast. The northern Atlantic coastal plains of the Gharb constitute the chief agricultural area. Others include the Tadla plain of the Oum al-Rbi'a (Mother of spring) River south of Casablanca, the Haouz plain of the Tensift River near Marrakech, and the Sous River valley in southwestern Morocco. These rivers, navigable only by small boats, provide water for irrigation. The Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts have relatively moist, mild winter, and hot, dry summers. Eastern and southern Morocco have semiarid climates governed by the Sahara's heat and winds. Higher elevations of the Atlas Mountains, particularly the High Atlas between Marrakech and Ouarzazate, can be bitterly cold, and remain snow-covered year round. Morocco's highest peak, Mount Tubkal, is easily accessible from Marrakech and is a popular skiing area.

People, Language, and Religion

Morocco has 26 million people according to the last available census (1994), but later estimates place the population at about 30 million. About 55 percent of Moroccans live in urban areas, primarily in Casablanca (2,941,000), Rabat (1,386,000; the nation's capital), and Fez (775,000). Other major towns include Marrakech (746,000), Oujda (679,000), Agadir (550,000) Meknes (530,000), Tangiers (526,000), Kenitra (449,000), Beni-Mellal (387,000) and Safi (376,000). The population growth rate is 1.9 percent. Nearly 48 percent of the population is under twenty-one. Life expectancy for males is sixty-six; for females, seventy. Morocco's illiteracy rates are among the highest in North Africa: 34.4 percent for men and 62.8 percent for women. Most Moroccans are engaged in agriculture and fisheries, but an increasingly large number are in tourism, the liberal professions, commerce, industry, and government.

Morocco's ethnic groups are Arabs, mixed Arab-Berbers who identify as Arabs, and Berbers. "Berber," primarily a linguistic term, applies to about 35 percent of the population. The three primary Berber dialects are Tarrifit (spoken in the Rif), Tamazight (spoken in the Middle Atlas and the east), and Tachelhit (also called Chleuh, spoken in the High Atlas and the south). The Moroccan constitution does not recognize any of these dialects.

Morocco's national language is Arabic, but French is widespread in the media, commerce, education, diplomacy, and most government ministries. Moroccan Arabic differs from the Arabic of Algeria. It is characterized by an intense clipping of vowels and some vocabulary that is not understood outside of Morocco. Many Moroccans have a rudimentary understanding of the Egyptian dialect because films and television shows produced in Egypt are widely popular.

Islam is the state religion. Progovernment imams are appointed to all mosques under the direction of

Map by XNR Productions, Inc. The Gale Group.

the ministry of religion. Important mosques, such as the Qarawiyin in Fez and the Kutubiyya in Marrakech, receive substantial endowments from the state. Most Moroccans profess Sunni Islam. A small Jewish community (estimates vary from 5,000 to 20,000) exists in Morocco and enjoys religious freedom and civil liberties. Following historical precedents, the monarch continues to include Jews within his circle of personal advisors. King Muhammad VI, as the symbol of Moroccan Islam, maintains the title *Amir al-Mu'minin* (Commander of the Faithful). He endeavors to buttress his religious legitimacy through ostensible piety, simplicity, and generosity. Closer to the masses than his father was, Muhammad VI is often referred to as the "king of the poor." His donations as well as his publicized visits to hospitals and crowded medinas have had a strong impact on the Moroccan population.

Islamism generally appears to be a growing force in Morocco. The Party of Justice and Development (PJD), a political party of Islamist base that gained legal status in 1997, is currently the third most powerful in the Chamber of Representatives. The most popular Islamic movement of the country—though still considered illegal—is al-Adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Benevolence). Its leader, Abdessalam Yacine, spent eleven years under house arrest until King Muhammad VI freed him in 2000. Events in the first years of the twenty-first century revealed the existence of Islamist armed groups in Morocco and their possible link to transnational Islamism. The terrorist attacks that killed forty-four people in Casablanca in May 2003 were attributed to al-Sirat al-Mustaqim (the Straight Path), a small Islamist group suspected of being loosely connected to al-Qaʿida.

Economy

Since 1992 Morocco has been dealing with recurrent droughts that have deeply affected the agricultural industry and, ultimately, the country's overall economic performance. About 40 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture (especially citrus and cereals), fishing, and raising livestock. These sectors of the economy contribute over 15 percent of gross domestic product. The decreasing fish stock in the Atlantic Ocean has led to diplomatic tensions with Spain and the European Union regarding the renewal of licenses to fish in Moroccan waters. Manufacturing is geared to phosphate production, but higher fuel costs have sparked inflation, and phosphate price declines have reduced export earnings. Tourism has been steadily growing since the 1980s and has become an important source of jobs and hard currency. Emigration is Morocco's safety valve for its unemployed population. About half a million to one million Moroccans reside in Europe as expatriate workers; their remittances are an important source of foreign exchange for Morocco. Among the country's most pressing economic problems are urban unemployment (which reached 20.2 percent in 2001) and the increasing foreign debt, which amounts to nearly eighteen billion dollars. In 1995 the privatization program supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank was extended to key state firms such as the Office Chérifien des Phosphates and Royal Air Maroc. These privatizations were intended to attract foreign investment and to cover budget deficits. Yet the results are not fully satisfactory to the IMF because the Moroccan government maintains its expensive program of food subsidy.

History

Between 4000 and 2000 B.C.E., Berber peoples arrived from the Sahara and Southwest Asia. Most lowland Berber peoples eventually Arabized and Islamized. Beginning in the twelfth century B.C.E., Phoenicians began to explore the North African coastline. Their early coastal enclaves have been found in northern Morocco. By the late first century B.C.E., Rome's power had reached northern Morocco, and by the middle of the first century C.E., Morocco was the province of Mauretania Tingitana. The Vandals moved into North Africa in the 420s and ended Rome's presence. The Arabs' invasion of the late seventh and early eighth centuries transformed Morocco into an Islamic society with a powerful Arabic-speaking ruling class. Ruling dynasties were the Idrisids of Fez (early ninth century), the Almoravids and the Almohads of Marrakech (eleventh to thirteenth centuries), the Saʿadis (sixteenth century), and the Alawite dynasty (seventeenth century to the present).

Throughout the nineteenth century, Morocco integrated into the capitalist world economy on mostly unfavorable terms. The country also became the object of diplomatic rivalries among European powers. Britain pressured the sultans to open Morocco to commerce and free trade but preferred to keep a weak sultanate south of the Strait of Gibraltar. Military and administrative reforms failed to reinforce Morocco's position vis-à-vis European countries. Defeated by the Spanish armies in 1860 after a border conflict, Sultan Muhammad IV (r. 1859–1873) signed treaties that led his country to bankruptcy, financial subservience to Europe, and increasing foreign occupation.

France secured its preponderance in Morocco between 1900 and 1904 through various bilateral agreements with Italy, Spain, and Britain. Most of Morocco became a French unofficial protectorate until indigenous protests provided Paris with a

In the fourteenth century, the Marinid dynasty began construction of the Chella fortifications within the city of Rabat. The complex contains a mosque, zawiya (religious quarters), and numerous royal tombs. **© Robert Holmes/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

pretext for further intervention. The 1912 Treaty of Fes officially divided Morocco into a protectorate under France over most of the country and a protectorate under Spain over the north, including the Rif Mountains. The country, however, was not yet conquered. Once the protectorates were established, the military forces of Spain and France became preoccupied with suppressing rebellion primarily among the highland Berbers of the Rif and the Atlas mountains. The troops of France began a long and systematic campaign of subjugating Atlas Berber rebels. Spanish troops, with assistance from France, finally broke the Rif rebellion of Abd al-Karim in the late 1920s and consolidated Spain's rule from the capital of Spanish Morocco at Tetuan. France's painstaking campaign, named "pacification," ended in 1934.

Moroccan nationalism gained momentum when both religious reformists and Westernized elites united to oppose the Berber *dahir* (decree) of 1930. This divide-and-rule legislation intended to marginalize Berber Muslims by placing them under the jurisdiction of French rather than Islamic law. The nationalists founded the Istiqlal Party in 1944 and began asking for formal independence. Sultan Muhammad V tacitly supported their efforts, and as a result was exiled from 1953 to 1955. Morocco gained its independence in 1956, and the following year Muhammad V changed the Sultanate of Morocco to the Kingdom of Morocco. In the nationalist fervor that accompanied the first few years of independence, the king was able to push through a law making a one-party state illegal. This enabled the monarchy to break the power of Istiqlal by encouraging leftist elements to splinter off and create the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). The monarchy supported the fractionalization of political parties and the emergence of new ones in order to split the opposition. When Muhammad V died in 1961, Hassan II became king. Opposition to his personal rule and to the corruption within the

Morocco's port city of Tangiers is a popular tourist destination, due partly to its close proximity to Europe. The sunny city, with its large port, has always been an important commercial and strategic site. © PATRICK WARD/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

system peaked in 1971 and 1972 with two failed coup attempts, one by army cadets and a second by air force personnel.

King Hassan's resolve to recover Western Sahara—a project that also aimed at bolstering his own position—led to a crisis with Spain when he ordered a Green March of 300,000 Moroccans in October 1975. His strategy bore almost immediate fruit, for in November Spain negotiated a withdrawal of its forces and the reversion of the area to Morocco and Mauritania. In February 1976 Morocco received the northern two-thirds and Mauritania gained the southern third.

In the meantime, indigenous inhabitants of Western Sahara (who call themselves Sahrawis, "Saharans") had undertaken a war of national liberation from Spain, establishing the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiya al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO), with a national government in exile (Saharan Arab Democratic Republic; SADR) in Algeria. As Morocco's forces replaced those of Spain in 1976, POLISARIO irregulars began a guerrilla war against Morocco that lasted until 1991. The long-delayed referendum on Saharan self-determination has still not taken place because of discrepancies concerning voter identification.

From 1992 onward, Hassan II embarked on a series of political reforms that gave opposition parties (including the Islamists) more participation in the government. After the legislative elections of 1997, the king invited the leader of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), Abderrahmane Youssoufi, to become prime minister. The accession of Muhammad VI to the throne in July 1999 occurred peacefully. Although he continued to enforce the centrality and the inviolability of kingship, Muhammad VI furthered the political reforms. He removed several of his father's clients from office and freed more political prisoners.

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LARRY A. BARRIE
UPDATED BY HENRI LAUZIÈRE

MOROCCO: CONSTITUTION

A series of constitutions, drafted in 1962, 1970, 1972, 1992, and 1996, that preserve the monarchical nature of the Moroccan regime.

The constitutional history of independent Morocco originated in a tug-of-war between the increasingly strong monarch and a heterogeneous group of nationalists. From 1956 onward, the once-united nationalists began to voice divergent views regarding the expected nature of the independent Moroccan polity. Amid their rivalries, King Muhammad V consolidated the monarchy and gradually reduced the hopes for parliamentary democracy. In return, he promised a written constitution and in 1960 appointed a constituent council to carry out this task. The first Moroccan constitution, however, did not originate from this body. King Hassan II, who succeeded his father in 1961, bypassed the council and asked French constitutional jurists to draft the constitution. Boycotted by the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP), the first constitution was adopted by a majority of 97.86 percent in a national referendum in 1962. The secretive and unilateral origins of this document still constitute a thorny issue in Moroccan politics. The core of the 1962 constitution has remained unadulterated. The provisions concerning the monarchical nature of the regime and the basic prerogatives of the king have been carried over to the constitutions of 1970, 1972, 1992, and 1996. Therefore, legal analysts refer to these dates interchangeably as either the promulgation of new constitutions or mere constitutional revisions.

The constitution of 1962 was modeled after the French constitution of 1958 but granted even greater powers to the head of state. The document instituted hereditary monarchy (art. 20) and specified that the nature of the state could not be subject to constitutional revision (art. 108). The king was acknowledged as "commander of the faithful" *(amir al-muʾminin)* while his person was declared sacred and inviolable (art. 23). Among other prerogatives, the monarch gained the power to nominate and dismiss the prime minister and the ministers. The king also obtained the right to declare a state of emergency through the famous article 35, which he used in 1965 to dismiss representative institutions. Indeed, the constitution had created a bicameral parliament consisting of a chamber of representatives (two-thirds of which were directly elected) and a senatelike chamber of councillors nominated through electoral colleges. Theoretically, this parliament was relatively strong insofar as both chambers were to be consulted prior to the implementation of any royal legislative decree (art. 72). Yet the king had the capacity to dissolve the chamber of representatives (art. 27) and thus to paralyze the parliament. Hassan II held the upper hand at all levels.

The second constitution of 1970 was promulgated after a long hiatus of five years during which the king enforced a state of emergency. Repeatedly confronted by student strikes and protests, Hassan II attempted to solve the crisis by reviving the constitutional legitimacy of the kingdom. The new constitution was an authoritarian compromise. The bicameral system was abandoned and replaced by the creation of a single chamber of representatives whose composition was left unspecified (art. 43). In reality, only one-third of this new chamber would be directly elected by universal suffrage. Because the new constitution no longer specified a deadline for

the establishment of the chamber, the elections could be postponed indefinitely. The reduced parliament was less powerful. Hassan II no longer needed to obtain the approbation of the chamber before issuing royal legislative decrees. He also became the sole person (art. 97) capable of initiating constitutional revisions—a privilege he had previously shared with the prime minister and the parliament.

After the attempted coup of 1971, however, it seemed unwise for the regime to base its legitimacy on constitutional monarchism while significantly undermining the role of the government and the chamber. To correct this flaw, a third constitution was submitted in 1972. It was less authoritarian than the second one, though less generous than the first one. The 1972 constitution granted more legislative powers to the chamber and the prime minister in the economic, social, and cultural realms. Also, the council of ministers was to be consulted on key issues such as a declaration of war, a declaration of the state of emergency, or a project of constitutional revision (art. 65). In principle, the new constitution allowed for more participatory democracy. Two-thirds of the chamber would be elected by universal suffrage (art. 43), as it was in 1962. Yet the elections expected for 1972 were delayed until 1976.

Besides two amendments voted in 1980 with respect to the regency council and the postponement of the elections, there was no major constitutional change until the early 1990s. Subject to increasing criticism from both Moroccan politicians and European human-rights activists, the king undertook a process of political liberalization. The fourth constitution of 1992 acquiesced to some of the opposition's demands. The preamble, for instance, addressed the kingdom's commitment to human rights. A constitutional council was created (title VI) to supervise the constitutionality of Moroccan politics and elections. In addition, both the king and the chamber were allowed to create temporary courts of inquiry (art. 40). The new constitution balanced the relationship between the government and the assembly. The prime minister obtained the right to nominate ministers, and the chamber gained the power to debate and vote the government's platform.

Morocco's last constitution was adopted by referendum in 1996. Hassan II, whose health was declining, wished to hasten the process of political reform. New compromises were intended to convince the opposition parties (mainly the USFP and the Istiqlal) to participate in government. Thus the 1996 constitution reinstated the bicameral system of 1962 but changed the system of representation. All of the members of the chamber of representatives must now be elected by direct universal suffrage. The revived chamber of councillors is modeled after the German system of *länders*; its members, who are still indirectly elected, are supposed to represent the various regions of Morocco and the most important socioeconomic groups. Even though the king did not relinquish his key prerogatives (he can still dissolve both chambers separately), some new constitutional clauses are meant to reinvigorate parliamentary democracy. An important one states, for the first time, that sovereignty belongs to the nation (art. 2).

See also Hassan II; Istiqlal Party: Morocco; Muhammad V; Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP).

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Henri Lauzière

Morocco: Political Parties in

Political parties have been an integral part of Morocco since the early 1930s.

The severe constraints under which the parties have had to operate, the parliament's lack of real power vis-à-vis the monarch, and the fragmented nature of Morocco's society have combined to prevent political parties from establishing a basis of support beyond particularist, sectoral interests, and personal ties and have rendered them vulnerable to both manipulation and repression. Overall, Morocco's political parties have served a significant, albeit adjunct, function in what has been essentially a monarchy-dominated, traditional, patrimonial system of rule. This continued to be the case at the beginning of the twenty-first century, notwithstanding the increasing liberalization of public life during the

For the 1997 parlimentary elections in Morocco, vote turnout was higher than expected, with over 50 percent of the population casting ballots. © PARROT PASCAL/CORBIS SYGMA. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

1990s, and particularly the establishment, with the king's blessing, of the *alternance* government in 1998, which was headed by longtime left-wing opposition leader Abderrahmane Youssoufi.

The Comité d'Action Marocaine (CAM) was established during the early 1930s to promote nationalist demands. A later incarnation, the Istiqlal Party, played a central role in the nationalist struggle during the decade before Morocco's independence in 1956. The Istiqlal and its offshoot, the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP), led a vigorous challenge during the first decade of independence to the king's efforts to rule as well as reign. The result was an unmitigated triumph for the king. Opposition political parties were coopted and repressed. Methods of repression included bannings, arrests, imprisonments, and, in the case of the UNFP's Mehdi Ben Barka, assassination. In addition, the monarchy supported the establishment of the Mouvement Populaire (MP), the short-lived Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionelles (FDIC), the Rassemblement National des Indépendants (RNI), and, in the 1980s, the Union Constitutionelle (UC), in order to counter the opposition.

From the mid-1960s until his death in 1999, King Hassan II governed with the assistance of the promonarchy groupings and parties. From the mid-1970s, he had considerable success in controlling the pace of political change, including the holding of general elections at intervals suitable to his political requirements (1977, 1984, and 1993 and 1997), pushing through cosmetic constitutional reforms, and mobilizing nearly the entire political spectrum on behalf of his Western Sahara policies. Prior to the electoral reform of 1997, two-thirds of the members of parliament were elected by popular vote, and one-third indirectly, by various corporate and professional bodies. The system was heavily subject to manipulation.

The Istiqlal, the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (which had split in the early 1970s from the UNFP), and the Parti du Progres et du Socialisme (PPS) played the political game, to a large degree, according to the king's rules: Between 1977 and 1984, Istiqlal even participated in the ruling coalition. At the end of the 1980s Morocco's diplomatic and military successes in regard to Western Sahara, sustained macroeconomic gains, and successful restructuring of the external debt strengthened the regime's confidence in its ability to loosen its grip a bit. On the other hand, widespread poverty, Western pressure regarding human-rights issues, and the specter of increasing radical Islamic activism compelled the regime to broaden political participation. The most important Islamic grouping, Jamiʿat al-Adl wa al-Ihsan (the "Justice and Charity Group") is officially banned from political life but is tolerated by the regime. Its supreme guide, Shaykh Abdsalem Yasine, was held in custody for most of the last quarter of the twentieth century, and finally released in 2000 by King Muhammad VI.

In May 1992 the Istiqlal, the USFP, the PPS, the rump UNFP, and the splinter Marxist-Leninist Organisation pour l'Action Democratique et Populaire (OADP) formed the Democratic Bloc *(al-kutla),* a parliamentary group pressing for constitutional and electoral reform, and especially for enhancing the powers of parliament. Three of the center-right parties—the UC, the MP, and the Parti National Démocratique (PND)—formed the Entente Nationale. Both the Istiqlal and the USFP achieved gains in the 1993 parliamentary elections. Istiqlal won 43 seats in the direct balloting and the USFP won 48. Both suffered drops in the indirect balloting. Each had achieved 52 seats, making them roughly equal in size to the UC and MP as the largest parliamentary fac-

tions. King Hassan offered the *kutla* opposition a total of 19 ministerial positions in his proposed new cabinet, but reserved the key posts of prime minister and the interior, foreign, finance, and justice portfolios for his close associates. Both the Istiqlal and the USFP refused the terms and remained in the opposition. At first, the king established a government of nonparty technocrats. In early 1995 Hassan offered the prime ministership to Istiqlal head Muhammad Boucetta, but the continued presence of interior minister and regime strongman Driss Basri was the primary sticking point, and the offer was rejected. Subsequently, a new government was formed that included 20 representatives from the Entente "loyalist" parties.

The 1997 elections marked a watershed in Moroccan political life. Constitutional reform had resulted in the establishment of a second house of parliament, and the existing chamber of deputies would now be elected entirely by popular vote. Morocco's system of "authoritarian pluralism" was clearly modified, and the *kutla* parties had chosen to accept the path of incremental reform. In the 1997 elections the USFP won the most seats (56 out of 325) and the most votes (just under 14 percent) of any single party. The Istiqlal dropped to 32 seats, occasioning charges of voter fraud. Other leading parties in the election were the UC with 50 seats, the RNI with 46 seats, and the MP with 40. A primarily Islamist party, the Mouvement Populaire Démocratique et Constitutionnel (MPDC) won 10 seats. The regime's sanctioning of Islamist political activities was part of its time-honored efforts to divide and control the fragmented political system. The results of the elections allowed King Hassan to realize his program of democratic *alternance,* namely the rotation of political power between two major blocs. The new government, headed by the USFP's Abderrahmane Youssoufi, was formed in 1998, and included representatives from the Istiqlal, the centrist RNI, the Mouvement National Populaire, and smaller parties. A number of cabinet posts remained in the hands of the "king's men," including Interior Minister Driss Basri.

The Youssoufi *alternance* government began with high hopes for the genuine democratization and liberalization of political life and the promotion of greater equality and economic prosperity. By the end of its more than four years in office, the glow had worn off; the pace of change remained slow, and public affairs were still dominated by the palace, with parliament having little influence. In the 2002 parliamentary elections the USFP dropped 7 seats, to 50, the Istiqlal gained 16 seats, to 48, the UC lost 34 seats, to 16, the RNI dropped 5 seats, to 41, and the MP lost 13 seats, to 27. Most noticeable was the leap forward by the moderate Islamist party, now called the Parti de la Justice et du Developpement (PJD), which became the third-largest party with 42 seats. King Muhammad VI designated his confidant and interior minister Driss Jettou (Basri had been removed in November 1999) as prime minister, and he formed a broad cabinet that included representatives from seven parties. The decision to appoint a prime minister who was not an elected party official confirmed anew the secondary status of Morocco's political parties, notwithstanding the regime's expressed commitment to liberalization.

See also Ben Barka, Mehdi; Boucetta, Muhammad; Comité d'Action Marocaine (CAM); Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionelles (FDIC); Hassan II; Istiqlal Party: Morocco; Mouvement Populaire (MP); Parti National Démocratique (PND); Rassemblement National des Indépendants (RNI); Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP); Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP); Western Sahara; Youssoufi, Abderrahmane.

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

MORRISON–GRADY PLAN (1946)

An Anglo-American report calling for the division of Palestine into semi-autonomous Arab and Jewish regions.

At the end of World War II, the British position in Palestine, its mandate, was becoming untenable.

With thousands of European Jewish refugees needing to immigrate to Palestine, Britain and the United States dispatched a commission of inquiry to that territory in April 1946. In July, headed by Herbert Morrison, representing Britain's Labour government, and Henry Grady, representing the United States, the commission drew up its report in London.

Called the Morrison-Grady Plan, the report suggested a division of Palestine into semi-autonomous Arab and Jewish regions, while the British high commissioner would remain in control of defense, foreign relations, customs, and immigration. The plan also called for a one-year quota of 100,000 Jewish refugees to enter Palestine, after which time the immigration quotas would be set by the British. Morrison-Grady would have meant an increase of British control over Palestine and was rejected by both the Arabs and the Jews.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

MOSHAV

Collective village, based on agriculture, in Israel.

The moshav (plural, moshavim) is a collective village, of which there were 410 in 1991 with a combined population of 152,500. The collective provides agricultural inputs and marketing services to the families living there and the various moshav movements have national and regional organizations to provide these services. Land on the moshav is divided between the member families. In the early years, hired labor was banned and communal cultivation of some land prevailed. This changed in the 1960s and 1970s when Arab labor became an important part of the economy of many moshavim. The moshavim have their own bank, savings and pension schemes, insurance company, and regional purchasing organizations.

The foundations of the moshav go back to 1919, when Eliezer Yaffe published a pamphlet suggesting the creation of moshavim on nationally owned land, with mutual aid, cooperative purchasing and marketing, and the family as the basic unit. Like the kibbutz, the moshav was to be a pioneering institution, emphasizing national and social rejuvenation for the Jewish people and the Land of Israel. The first moshav was founded at Merhavia in the Galilee. Yaffe's ideas were influential in the founding of the second moshav, Nahalal, in 1921, the model for future settlements of this kind. Between 1949 and 1956, 250 moshavim were set up to house and provide employment for immigrants mainly from North Africa and Asia, who were not attracted to the communal life of the kibbutz, but for whom agriculture was the only possible basis for employment. By 1970 the moshavim had a population of 100,000. They had, in terms of numbers of settlements and total population, become more important than the kibbutzim.

During the 1980s, many of the moshav movement's economic organizations, responsible for marketing and purchasing inputs, went bankrupt as a result of overexpansion and high interest rates. Many moshavim were badly affected, and the mutual guarantee, by which each member or family supported other members, fell into disfavor. During the 1980s, an increasing number of urban families moved to moshavim; they commute to towns and are not involved in agriculture.

Members of each moshav elect a management committee that organizes the provision of economic services as well as education and health services to the community. The moshavim are also affiliated with different political parties, the largest moshav is affiliated with the Labor Party. Others are affiliated to religious parties.

The *moshav shitufi* is a moshav with many of the characteristics of the kibbutz. In 1991 there were 46 *moshav shitufi* with a total population of 12,600. Production is organized communally and members' work is determined by an elected committee. Consumption is private, with families eating at home

and providing their own domestic services, as on other moshavim and in contrast to the kibbutzim.

See also Israel: Political Parties in; Kibbutz; Nahalal.

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Paul Rivlin

MOSQUE

Islamic place of worship.

Mosque is an anglicized French cognate for the Arabic word *masjid,* which literally means "place of prostration." In the most abstract sense, any private or public space properly prepared for the purposes of performing the five obligatory prayers of Islam *(salat)* constitutes a mosque. The term *mosque,* however, is most commonly used to refer to a space which has been permanently or semipermanently demarcated as a place of public Muslim worship.

While many mosques share such common features as a prayer niche *(mihrab),* pulpit *(minbar),* and area for performing ritual ablutions, the size, layout, and architecture of any given mosque is usually particular to its own specific historical, social, and cultural context. In many well-established Muslim communities, the largest and most centrally located mosque will often function as the *masjid al-jami,* or central mosque, where a large number of worshippers gather for the Friday noon congregational prayer *(salat al-jumʿa)* and sermon *(khutba).* Not unlike their counterparts in other religious traditions, mosques and larger mosque complexes often serve as a primary locus for a variety of communal gatherings and activities, ranging from social-service programs and political rallies to Qurʾan study groups and scholarly lectures.

See also Islam; Qurʾan.

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Scott Alexander

MOSSAD

Israel's Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks.

The Mossad is Israel's central intelligence agency, responsible for intelligence collection, covert action, and counterterrorism outside the borders of the state. It was founded in 1951, under orders from Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, by Reuven Shiloah, a senior member of Israel's diplomatic corps. It replaced a number of organizations, including the SHAI (Sherut Yediʿot), the intelligence service of the Haganah, and the political department of the Jewish Agency, which had been created by the political leadership of the Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine).

Responsibilities and Leadership

The division of functions and the boundaries between the various intelligence agencies had for many years been unclear. The founding of the Mossad left all official and overt diplomatic activities to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; military intelligence, intelligence analysis, and information assessment to the Intelligence Division (Aman) of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF); counterinsurgency and counterespionage inside the country to the Security Service (Shin Bet); and counter-criminal intelligence to the police. All covert activities and espionage abroad were assigned to the Mossad.

The head of the Mossad, whose identity was for many years kept secret, was directly responsible to the prime minister and served as chairman of the coordinating committee of all heads of Israel's intelligence services. In 1952, Shiloah was replaced by Isser Harel, until then the head of the Shin Bet, who went on to serve as director of the Mossad for more than a decade.

Despite formal definitions of the respective realms of activities, it took some years and some internecine struggles among the various services for the exact boundaries to be established. Thus, for example, military intelligence continued to keep a special unit that operated agents across the borders and was responsible for the ill-advised activation, in

Israel prime minister Ariel Sharon (center) toasts with recently appointed head of the Mossad spy agency Meir Dagan (left) and former head Ephraim Halevy, 30 October 2002. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

the summer of 1954, of its espionage ring in Egypt, which ended in a fiasco that later became known as the Lavon Affair. A public scandal erupted when it was discovered that Harel had ordered the planting of recording devices in the office of the leaders of the left-wing MAPAM Party, which followed a pro-Soviet line, under the false suspicion that MAPAM was implicated in subversive activities. On the other hand, Mossad agents managed in 1956 to obtain the full record of Nikita Khrushchev's famous speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, in which some of the horrors of Stalin's rule were disclosed. This was shared with a grateful CIA in Washington.

Over the years Harel gained great personal influence over some key political leaders. He was also called upon to execute some unconventional and dramatic operations abroad. One such was the discovery and rescue of a boy who had been kidnapped by his ultra-orthodox grandfather, who hid the boy in France in order to bring him up according to strict Orthodox traditions. Harel's most famous operation was the kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann, the high-ranking Nazi SS commander who was responsible for organizing the extermination of many hundreds of thousands of European Jews during World War II. Eichmann was captured in his home in Buenos Aires, smuggled to Israel, tried in Jerusalem, and sentenced to death in 1962.

In 1963, Harel came under severe criticism by David Ben-Gurion for his disproportionate response to the involvement of some ex-Nazi officers in unsuccessful Egyptian attempts to develop long-range missiles and unconventional weapons. He was obliged to resign in the spring of 1963.

Many subsequent heads of the Mossad were army generals who came from the ranks of the IDF. The man who replaced Harel was general Meir Amit, previously the director of military intelligence. Amit served as Mossad's chief from 1963 to 1968. Among his noteworthy activities was a trip to Washington to secure a cautious go-ahead from the Johnson administration before Israel launched its offensive in the June 1967 Arab–Israel War. Subsequent heads of the Mossad were Zvi Zamir (1968–1974), Yitzhak Hofi (1974–1982), Nahum Admoni (1982–1990), Shabtai Shavit (1990–1996), Dani Yatom (1996–1998), and Ephraim Halevy (1998–2003).

International Relationships and Operations

During the 1960s, the Mossad developed close relations with SAVAK, the intelligence service of Iran under the shah, and supported the Kurds in their rebellion against the officers' regime of Baghdad. Over the years, the Mossad managed to capitalize on its widespread image as one of the world's most efficient intelligence agencies and created close relationships with many other national agencies, not the least important of which was that with the CIA.

After the June 1967 war, the Mossad concentrated much of its resources on countering Palestinian terrorist activities. Thus, for example, it assassinated most of the al-Fatah operatives involved in the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Mossad agents also killed Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), Yasir Arafat's deputy in charge of military affairs, in his home in Tunis. Over the years, the Mossad also succeeded in placing its spies in a number of high positions in Arab capitals. Some of its successes may not be revealed for many years to come, but the spies who were eventually caught prove the point. The most important such was Eli Cohen, who established himself in Damascus, developed close relations with the Syrian elite, and reported invaluable information back to Israel before he was apprehended and hanged in 1965. Two more outstanding successes added to the towering prestige of the Mossad: the landing of a MiG-21 advanced Soviet combat plane from the Iraqi air force at an Israeli airport in 1966, and the January

1969 whisking away of three missile boats from the French port of Cherbourg, where they had been built for Israel but were being detained under an embargo declared by President Charles de Gaulle after the outbreak of the June 1967 Arab–Israel War.

The Mossad has also been involved in many nonintelligence operations, in particular with regard to clandestine political relations and endangered Jewish communities. Mossad agents undertook secret negotiations with Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, and other Arab leaders long before the first peace treaty was concluded with Egypt in 1979. The Mossad also helped diaspora Jewish communities organize self-defense and was instrumental in the exodus of Ethiopian Jews via Sudan to Israel. It was also responsible for Israel's relations with Lebanese politicians and with Maronite militias, eventually paving the way for the IDF invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

On the eve of the October 1973 war, the Mossad gave the government an early warning of an imminent Egyptian offensive against the Bar-Lev Line, but military intelligence did not take the warning seriously. The failure of military intelligence to make the correct assessment during that war brought about changes in the mandate of Israel's various intelligence agencies. A unit for research and information assessment was added to the Mossad and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the purpose of cross-assessment and verification.

The Mossad's main functions, and apparently also its main departments, are:

- information collection, utilizing a network of spies and other agents operating in stations around the world
- political action and intelligence liaison
- psychological warfare, propaganda, and disinformation
- research and assessment
- special operations, such as sabotage, assassination, and other activities, especially beyond Israel's borders.

A well-known example of special operations was the failed attempt to assassinate Khalid al-Mashʿal, head of the political bureau of HAMAS in Amman, Jordan. On 4 October 1997, Mossad agents injected Mashʿal with a toxic substance, but his life was saved when, in response to heavy Jordanian and U.S. pressure, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sent a physician to administer an antidote to the poison. The affair caused not only a sharp deterioration in Israeli–Jordanian relations but also an uproar in Israeli political circles.

In what may signal a decline in its mythical infallibility, the Mossad has been faulted for failing to anticipate the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000. On the other hand, in recent years senior Mossad officials have been intensively involved in the evolving peace process with the Palestinians. Mossad chiefs Ephraim Halevy and General Dani Yatom (along with Shin Bet's Israel Hasson) began to appear in the media in the unusual roles of unofficial peace negotiators. Since these activities exposed the head of the Mossad to public view, the government decided to make the names of past and future directors public. In 2002, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon nominated his longtime friend General Meir Dagan, who had served in the IDF under him, to replace Ephraim Halevy as Mossad's director.

See also Amit, Meir; Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab–Israel War (1973); Ben-Gurion, David; Haganah; HAMAS; Harel, Isser; Jewish Agency for Palestine; Lavon Affair; Shiloah, Reuven; Shin Bet.

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Mordechai Bar-On

MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD

[1882–1967]

Iranian politician and leading speaker for the nationalist-democratic movement; prime minister, 1951–1953.

Mirza Mohammad Khan, later called Mossadegh (also Mosaddeq, Musaddiq) al-Saltaneh, was born in Tehran in 1882, into a wealthy family connected to the bureaucracy of the Qajar dynasty. His father, Mirza Hedayatollah Vazir Daftar, belonged to the Ashtiyani family, many of whom, such as Qavam and Vosuq, became important public figures in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Persia, now Iran. His mother Najm al-Saltaneh (known as Shahzadeh Khanom), was Prince Regent Abbas Mirza's granddaughter. Mossadegh married at age nineteen Khanom Zia al-Saltaneh, from an Islamic clerical family.

When Mossadegh's father died, he inherited his position as a chief *mostowfi* (representative of the state treasury) in the province of Khurasan. In support of the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911), Mossadegh joined, briefly, the Adamiyat and Insaniyat societies. In 1909, he went to Europe but returned because of an illness. On recovery, he returned to Europe in 1911, studied law at Neuchâtel University in Switzerland, and completed his doctoral dissertation on the jurisprudence of Islam. He returned home in 1914 and became known as Dr. Mohammad Khan Mossadegh al-Saltaneh. During World War I, from 1914 to 1918, he wrote essays on legal and political matters, was active in the Democratic party (Hizb-i Iʿtidal), taught at the Tehran School of Law and Political Science, and became the deputy *(moʿavin)* of the ministry of finance.

Iranian premier Mohammed Mossadegh (1882–1967) speaks before a UN Security Council hearing in New York, 13 October 1951. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

In 1920, Mossadegh was appointed governor of Fars, but he soon resigned when he refused to recognize the new government of Sayyed Zia Tabatabaʾi that was formed following his and Reza Khan's coup of February 1921. When Ahmad Qavam became prime minister, Mossadegh was appointed minister of finance. His attempts to reform the ministry were blocked by the *majles* (parliament) and the royal court, which led to the downfall of the cabinet. In 1922, Mossadegh was appointed governor of Azerbaijan and, in 1923, became foreign minister for about four months—his last office until he became prime minister in 1951.

Mossadegh's parliamentary activities began when he was elected Tehran representative to the fifth Majles. During his political career, Mossadegh increasingly personified Persia's nationalist and democratic aspirations. His first major move for nationalism was opposition to the Anglo–Persian Agreement of 1919. His commitment to democracy was reflected in his vehement opposition to Reza Khan's move to dethrone the Qajar dynasty to found his own, the Pahlavi.

After Reza Khan became Reza Shah Pahlavi, in 1925, Mossadegh remained a major critic of the regime, despite the shah's frequent efforts to co-opt him. With the rise of Pahlavi's despotism, many of Mossadegh's associates were exiled, jailed, or killed. Being very cautious, he withdrew from politics, shutting himself away at his rural estate in Ahmadabad, west of Tehran. (Meanwhile, in 1935, Persia was renamed Iran.) In 1940, he was arrested and imprisoned in Birjand. He was soon released, because Reza Shah was ousted by the Allies (Britain and the Soviet Union) in 1941 for being pro-Nazi; the shah was succeeded by his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Mossadegh then returned to politics. In October 1949, he led a crowd of politicians, university students, and *bazaaris* into the shah's palace to protest voting fraud in Iran's fifteenth parliamentary elections. Once inside, the demonstrators elected a committee of twenty, headed by Mossadegh, which soon became the nucleus of the National Front. Under his leadership, the front was instrumental in pressuring the parliament to nationalize the British-run petroleum industry. On 30 April 1951, Mossadegh was elected prime minister by a large margin. The shah had no option but to ratify the oil-nationalization bill and, on 1 May the law went into effect. Although the United States initially supported the oil nationalization movement, it soon joined Britain in engineering the coup that overthrew Mossadegh in August 1953.

An aborted coup took place several days before the successful one. The shah fled the country after hearing that the coup had failed, but Mossadegh refused to have the shah arrested. Following the referendum that had given him the mandate in 1951, Mossadegh dissolved the parliament and had several military officers arrested for their roles in plotting against him. He continued to act constitutionally until he was removed by Fazlollah Zahedi, whom the shah named premier.

Mossadegh was subsequently tried and imprisoned by the shah's government. Mossadegh lived to age eighty-five and died while under house arrest on 5 March 1967.

See also Constitutional Revolution; National Front, Iran; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Pahlavi, Reza; Qajar Dynasty.

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Mansoor Moaddel

MOSTAGHANEMI, AHLAM

[1953–]

Algerian writer.

Ahlam Mostaghanemi is acknowledged as the first woman writer of Arabic in Algeria, where she was born and raised and where she received a university education. Her first collection of poetry, *Ala marfa al-ayyam* (On the haven of days), was published in Algeria in 1973, and two more poetry collections followed. Before emigrating to France, Mostaghanemi also presented radio programs about poetry. In Paris, she completed her Ph.D. in sociology at the Sorbonne under the direction of Jacques Berque (1982). Her doctoral dissertation was published in 1985 as a book, *Algérie: Femmes et écritures* (Algeria: Women and writing). Mostaghanemi's novels brought her fame, especially *Dhakirat al-jasad* (1993). A first, quite literal, translation into English, *Memory in the Flesh* (2000), was revised and reissued in 2003 with the same title. Her second and third novels, *Fawda al-hawwass* (Chaos of the senses, 1998) and *Abir sarir* (Passing by a bed, 2003) have also attracted critical attention. *Memory in the Flesh* has won major literary prizes, including the Nur award for best literary work by a woman in Arabic (1996) and the Naguib Mahfouz medal for fiction (1998). The novel's insistence on the Arabic language—in its dedication to Malek Haddad and the author's father, who could neither read nor write Arabic—is central to its message and role as a postcolonial Algerian novel. *Memory in the Flesh* treats not only the ravages colonialism has exacted on its characters and country, but also Algeria's current problems. It is narrated by a man and poses questions about gender roles. Mostaghanemi's second novel uses characters from the first but replaces the male voice with a female narrator. Critics have commented extensively on the interplay between gender, language, and nation in these novels. Mostaghanemi lives in Beirut, where all of her novels have been published to consistent critical acclaim.

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Michelle Hartman

MOSTAʿZAFIN

See GLOSSARY

MOSUL

City in northern Iraq (Mesopotamia).

Mosul (also spelled Mawsil) is located on the west bank of the Tigris river opposite the ancient city of Nineveh. It was a significant center during the early Islamic period with a sizable Christian population. Destroyed by the Mongols, Mosul regained importance under the Ottoman Turks. Some of the older mosques and churches survived.

Located on the trade routes that led to eastern Anatolia and thence to the Black Sea, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran to the south, goods from Mosul were shipped by raft down the Tigris to Baghdad or overland to Aleppo and Damascus or points north. The city was a center for regional and international trade: Grain export, the manufacture of cotton thread and fabric (whence the term *muslin*), and trafficking in sheep hides and wool were important activities.

The government at Istanbul regained administrative control of the city from local rulers in 1834; in 1879 it became a separate Ottoman province that included Kirkuk, Arbil, and Sulaymaniya, but real power remained in the hands of local families—Mustafa Çelebi Sabunci was virtual dictator from 1895 to 1911. The population of the mud-brick-walled city in the later nineteenth century was estimated at forty thousand, including seven thousand Christians and fifteen hundred Jews. By World War I the population of Mosul had risen to seventy thousand, and the city became the economic and administrative capital of the Ottoman province of Mosul, one of three (Baghdad, Basra, Mosul) that would make up modern Iraq.

With the breakup of the Ottoman Empire after World War I and the consequent protracted negotiations between Britain and Turkey for sovereignty over the city, Mosul became part of Iraq rather than Turkey. Though its stature as a center of trade waned as Baghdad became Iraq's capital, the city continued to expand. During the 1940s and 1950s many of the traditional families came to own much of the land and were instrumental, together with local Arab nationalists, in fomenting a rebellion against Abd al-Karim Qasim in 1959. With the discovery of oil nearby and the construction of a refinery, Mosul has retained its importance. It has rail links to Baghdad, Syria, and Turkey, a university, an airport, and a religiously diverse population. The population (estimated at 1,846,500 in 2004) is mainly Kurdish with a significant Christian minority and a Yazidi population that lives in the Sinjar mountains to the west of Mosul.

See also QASIM, ABD AL-KARIM.

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REEVA S. SIMON

MOSUL, ANGLO-TURKISH DISPUTE OVER

Dispute over oil deposits in Iraq, c. 1920–1928.

Mosul, a province in northern Iraq, is rich in oil deposits and serves as a transit center for trade with Turkey and Syria. Its population consists of Arab Sunni Muslims, a sizable Kurdish minority, and various Christian sects. In 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement between England and France designated Mosul as a French zone. In 1920, the San Remo Conference transferred Mosul to the British, with the stipulation that France would have a share in the Turkish Petroleum Company.

Mosul became a point of contention between Turkey and Britain in the early 1920s. Turkey claimed that Mosul was part of its territory because the majority of inhabitants were Ottoman non-Arabs and because Mosul had not been in the hands of Britain when the Mudros armistice pact was signed in 1918. Britain wanted Mosul to be part of Iraq for myriad reasons. It believed Mosul had substantial oil deposits and could be used as a bargaining chip with the newly established government of Iraq to extend Britain's mandated power over that country. Faisal I, the newly crowned king of Iraq, wanted Mosul to be part of his country in order to strengthen his authority and influence over nationalistic elements who opposed Britain's continued interference in Iraq's domestic affairs.

The dispute between Turkey and Britain continued for several years. The two countries failed to resolve their conflict when the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 was signed by the Allies and Turkey, and again at the special conference convened at Istanbul in 1924. They finally agreed to settle the dispute through the League of Nations. The League appointed a fact-finding commission to visit Iraq, survey public opinion in Mosul, and meet with officials on both sides. On 16 July 1924, the commission's report to the League called for the inclusion of Mosul in Iraq, retaining the Brussels line as the border between the two countries. Additional conditions attached to the recommendation included (1) allowing Iraq to remain under the British mandate for twenty-five years; (2) recognizing the rights of the Kurds to use their language in educational institutions and administration of justice, and (3) encouraging the hiring of Kurds as administrators, judges, and teachers. Iraq welcomed the decision. Mosul was one of the few issues that united the full spectrum of public opinion.

Turkey rejected the recommendation of the League of Nations and vowed to use any means necessary, including military action, to stop the implementation of the resolution. On 5 June 1926, however, Turkey signed a tripartite agreement with Britain and Iraq confirming Mosul's inclusion in Iraq. Iraq agreed to give a 10 percent royalty on Mosul's oil deposits to Turkey for twenty-five years. On 19 January 1926, Iraq had signed a new treaty with Britain, despite opposition from nationalist elements, to extend the mandate period for twenty-five years, as stipulated by the League's resolution. This treaty was ratified in January 1928, on the condition that Britain would recommend Iraq for membership in the League of Nations at four-year intervals for the next twenty-five years. If admission was approved, the British mandate would end.

See also San Remo Conference (1920); Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916).

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Ayad al-Qazzaz

MOTAHHARI, MORTAZA

[1920–1979]

Iranian religious scholar and writer; a close associate of Ayatollah Khomeini, he fostered the intellectual developments that contributed to the Islamic revolution of 1978/79.

Born to a religious scholar who was also his first teacher, Motahhari (also Mutahhari) began his formal schooling in Mashhad at the age of twelve, swiftly discovering his fascination with philosophy and mysticism, which remained with him throughout his life. In 1937, he moved to Qom where he studied law and philosophy under teachers that came to include Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In 1952 he left for Tehran where, in addition to teaching philosophy at a traditional seminary, he accepted a position at the Faculty of Theology of Tehran University. He also collaborated with religiously inclined laymen in popularizing a view of Islam as a comprehensive and socially applicable ideology.

Briefly imprisoned after the uprising of June 1963, Motahhari remained in contact with Khomeini throughout the years of his exile in Iraq and participated in a series of clandestine religio-political organizations. Named to the Revolutionary Council established by Khomeini in the early weeks of 1979, after the success of the Iranian Revolution, he was assassinated on 1 May of the same year by members of Furqan, a group holding a radically modernist view of Shiʿism that saw Motahhari as its chief intellectual opponent.

Motahhari's literary legacy is important, including works that express his passionate devotion to mysticism and philosophy as the ultimate core of Islam, as well as other works designed to present Islam as a fully coherent ideology, superior to all its numerous competitors.

See also Iranian Revolution (1979); Khomeini, Ruhollah.

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Hamid Algar

MOTHERLAND PARTY

Political party in Turkey formed in 1983 by Turgut Özal.

The Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, or ANAP) stood in the center-right of the political spectrum and governed Turkey from 1983 to 1991. The personality and worldview of Turgut Özal were instrumental to the party's success. Rejecting from the start the dichotomy between the state and society and Islam and modernity, the party tried to formulate a new synthesis. Its economic policies transformed Turkey during the 1980s, introducing free-market reforms and downsizing the public sector. The ANAP government also applied to join the European Union in 1987. Although Özal's policies produced an economic development boom, they also led to high inflation and charges of corruption.

Özal officially resigned as ANAP leader in 1989 to become president, but his influence—and that of his wife and brothers—continued in party affairs. For example, Özal handpicked his successor, Yildirim Akbulut. After Akbulut proved ineffective, both as party chair and as prime minister, Özal pressured him to resign in June 1991; in anticipation of the forthcoming parliamentary elections, Özal approved the younger and more dynamic Mesut Yilmaz as Akbulut's successor. Yilmaz faced the challenge of developing a new party identity that would appeal to a broader constituency; otherwise, ANAP would expend all its energies competing with the ideologically similar True Path Party. Although ANAP's policies and constituency were similar to those of the True Path Party, the intense personal rivalry between Süleyman Demirel and Özal precluded political cooperation between the two parties prior to Özal's death in 1993.

Since the 1991 elections, ANAP's position has declined steadily (in the 1987 elections it reached its peak by obtaining 65 percent of seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly). It was forced to enter into a brief coalition government with the True Path Party in 1995, and then it supported the government of Bülent Ecevit from 1997 to 1998. ANAP was one of the big losers in the 1999 elections, declining to fourth place among Turkey's political parties when it won only 14 percent of total votes. Nevertheless, the proportional representation system that awarded parliamentary seats to parties that received at least 10 percent of the vote enabled ANAP to obtain 86 of the 450 seats in the parliament. In the 2002 general elections, however, ANAP won only 5.12 percent of the votes and thus could not qualify for any seats. While in opposition, ANAP has criticized the customs union with the European Union, arguing that its terms conflict with Turkey's interests.

See also Demirel, Süleyman; Ecevit, Bülent; Özal, Turgut; True Path Party; Turkish Grand National Assembly.

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Frank Tachau
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MOUʿAWWAD, NAILA

[?–]

Lebanese female politician and advocate.

A member of parliament from the district of Zgharta in North Lebanon, Naʾila Mouʿawwad (also Naʾila Muʿawwad) has been an important oppositional voice and a leader on issues relating to women and the disenfranchised. After the 1989 assassination of President René Muʿawwad, her husband, she took over his parliamentary seat, and since then has been one of a handful of women in the 128-seat Lebanese legislature.

In postwar Lebanon, Mouʿawwad has been a constant voice for political reform and hence often in the opposition. She has defended Lebanese independence and cautioned against excessive Syrian control. She has actively argued for electoral reform, freedom of the press, and anticorruption policies.

Mouʿawwad chairs the Parliamentary Committee for Women and Children's Affairs and has been active in social development. In 1996, she led efforts to raise the age of working children from eight to fourteen, and spearheaded legislation on compulsory education in 1998. She has argued for improved conditions in women's prisons. Indeed, Mouʿawwad has lobbied consistently for women's rights in parliament, and has been trying to pass legislation allowing Lebanese women to bequeath their citizenship to their children.

In 1990, she established the René Muʿawwad Foundation with the objective to "create a dynam-

ics of sustainable development and make social justice and education accessible to all. These two factors are crucial for the emergence of true democracy in Lebanon." As a result of her leadership, countless projects on health, agriculture, literacy, and employment have been conducted, especially in North Lebanon.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1958); LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); LEBANON.

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ELISE SALEM

MOUDAWANA, AL-

The set of laws dealing with personal status, family, and inheritance in Morocco.

The Moudawana, or Mudawanat al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya, is made up of six books issued in five *dahir* (decrees) between 22 November 1957 and 3 March 1958. The Moudawana refers back to one of the most important texts of Maliki law, al-Mudawana al-Kubra by Sahnun ben Saʿid (776/7–854) of Qairawan, although it follows French patterns of codification. Addressing those charged with promulgating the Code of Personal Status following Morocco's independence from France in 1956, King Muhammad V stated that Morocco's rich history meant that it did not need to have recourse to the legal codes of foreign powers. All that was needed to reveal this glorious heritage was to rid it of the sterile commentaries and aberrant customs that over time had become mixed in with the *shariʿa* (religious law) and had retarded the state's evolution and progress. The Moudawana today is influenced by three juridical sources: in addition to the legislation inspired by Islamic law (Fiqh) and the legislation inspired by French law, the Moudawana is affected by trends in comparative law and international conventions. Beyond these written texts, women's status in Morocco is also regulated by unwritten sources such as traditions and inherited customs. When laws are in conflict with normative traditions concerning family customs, women may find their lived experience does not equate with their constitutional rights and civil status.

In Morocco, as in the other states of the Middle East and North Africa, the family lies at the core of society, and women at the core of the family. The processes of modernization, the creation of Western-style nation-states following independence, and globalization and internationalization have constructed women as citizens in contradictory ways: women are at one and the same time universal subjects as reflected in state constitutions and international conventions, special subjects as reflected in family law codes such as the Moudawana where they are legal minors, and privileged bearers of national and cultural authenticity in the symbolic imaginary of nations.

While other legal texts promulgated after independence reflected a shift in emphasis from the extended to the nuclear family, and thus from collective to individual identities and rights, the Moudawana reinscribed principles of Islamic law and posited a patriarchal family model. Civil status, as embodied in the various Moroccan constitutions dating from 1962, is founded on the principle of equality between men and women: the Moroccan Constitution states "All Moroccans are equal before the law" (Article 5); men and women enjoy equally their political and civil rights (Article 8); and, the sexes are equal in exercise of public employment and in the conditions required (Article 12). These statements of equality for women contradicted the Moudawana, which constructed female citizens as minors unable to enter into marriage contracts on their own and needing to be represented by a *wali* (guardian or tutor) until their husbands take over. Women had no say in the event the husband decided to marry additional wives. Lacking autonomy, women had little control over their own lives or those of their children. These contradictions led to periodic movements to bring the Moudawana into harmony with other laws. A 1972 royal commission drafted some proposed changes, but this effort was soon halted. In 1979, two drafts for changing the Moudawana were submitted, but the Ministry of Justice went outside the Constitution, giving them to a group of *ulama* (religious scholars), and only a few initiatives passed. That same year, a royal commission of three magistrates proposed many minor

changes and some major changes to the Moudawana, but they also met intense religious opposition.

Another campaign to liberalize the Moudawana began during the mid-1980s when Morocco suffered severe financial crises and underwent a process of structural adjustment. A series of economic reforms and human rights reforms followed as Parliament discussed a new constitution. Women at this time renewed their fight for equality, holding meetings and workshops, and sharing research on women's rights according to the Qurʾan. In October 1990, the Union de l'Action Féminine (Union for Feminine Action), a group founded by professional and middle-class women, launched a campaign to gather a million signatures on a petition to reform the Moudawana. They came into increasingly bitter conflict with conservative religious groups. On 20 August 1992, in a national broadcast, Hassan II intervened, stating that the Moudawana was his responsibility as Commander of the Faithful (Amir al-Muʾminin) and that only he had the authority to amend it.

After meeting with the women to discuss the proposed reforms, Hassan II brought their suggestions before the Council of the Ulama, and in 1991 some reforms were passed, opening the door to change: a man now needed his wife's permission to take other wives; a religious judge's permission was required for a divorce; and a mother who is more than eighteen years of age would receive custody of their children if the father died. In 1999, pressure from various sources forced the government to create a National Plan of Action to integrate women into the economy. High on the agenda was protecting women from violence and raising levels of female literacy. Supporters of women's equality argued that the participation of women was essential to any process of modernization and to democracy, that there could be no true development without women, and that it was the women's movement that had opened space for a civil, democratic society.

See also AICHA, LALLA; HASSAN II; MERNISSI, FATEMA; MOROCCO; MUHAMMAD V; MUHAMMAD VI.

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LAURA RICE

MOUROU, ABDELFATTAH

[1942–]

A cofounder of the Islamic Tendency Movement in Tunisia.

Born in 1942, Abdelfattah Mourou is a cofounder of the Tunisian Islamic Tendency Movement, which adopted the name Harakat al-Nahda (Renaissance Movement) in 1989, and he was one of its influential leaders up to the early 1990s. A son of a small merchant, Mourou received his primary education at the celebrated Sadiki College, a bilingual high school established by Khayr Eddin Pasha in the nineteenth century to synthesize religious and modern education. Mourou then studied law and graduated from the University of Tunis in 1971. At an early stage of his life, he joined one of the esoteric Sufi orders, al-Madaniyya, a small order established in the beginning of the century and characterized by its rejection of any foreign presence in the country. He started his Islamist activities in the 1960s by delivering religious lectures and forming educational circles for secondary school and university students at the country's mosques.

Mourou, along with Rashid al-Ghannoushi, Hemida al-Naifar, and Salah Eddin al-Jurshi, founded the Islamic Tendency Movement in 1981. The regime denied legal recognition to the movement and engaged in a series of confrontations with its members. Mourou was arrested for his his part and spent two years in prison. The movement

nonetheless grew during the 1980s and 1990s to be the main Islamic opposition force to the Tunisian secular regime. Following an attack in 1991 on the state party's office, which was attributed to members of al-Nahda, Mourou was briefly detained. Following his release, he began to adopt a conciliatory approach and issued a statement in which he denounced violence, announced the suspension of his membership in the movement, and expressed his desire to form a legal political party. The regime, however, turned against Mourou and engineered a defamation campaign aiming to discredit his personal conduct. Mourou has resigned political activism and practices law in Tunis.

See also Ben Ali, Zayn al-Abidine; Bourguiba, Habib; Ghannouchi, Rached.

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Emad Eldin Shahin

MOUVEMENT DE L'UNITÉ POPULAIRE (MUP)

Tunisian political party in exile.

The Popular Unity Movement, formed by Ahmed Ben Salah in 1973, is ideologically socialist and personally hostile to former Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba. In the 1960s Ben Salah developed socialist planning as Tunisia's economic system. Disastrous attempts to collectivize agriculture led to his fall in 1969. Tried and imprisoned, he escaped from the country in 1973 and remains in exile. Little support exists for the party within Tunisia; most supporters are Tunisian expatriates living in Europe. The party still adheres to a staunchly socialist, state-managed economic program.

MUP attitudes toward the Bourguiba regime were highly personalized as a result of a contest of wills between Bourguiba and Ben Salah. The latter's refusal to participate in Tunisia's elections (which became somewhat more liberal after 1980) disillusioned many of the party's members, who consequently condoned a split in the party in 1981. A more flexible MUP emerged and renamed itself the Parti d'Unité Populaire (Popular Unity Party [PUP]). Under Mohamed Belhaj Amor, the PUP retained its earlier socialist and nationalist orientation but ended Ben Salah's personal vendetta against Bourguiba. The party adopted a more flexible approach to participation in the political process. Following the 1988 political liberalization under President Zayn al-Abdine Ben Ali, PUP became one of seven legal parties in Tunisia.

From 1983 on the MUP had been trying to obtain legal recognition, but without success, given the regime's refusal to reintegrate Ben Salah into the Tunisian political scene. In 1990 some members of the party participated in the legislative elections as independent candidates.

See also Ben Salah, Ahmed; Bourguiba, Habib; Parti d'Unité Populaire (PUP).

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MOUVEMENT NATIONAL ALGÉRIEN

An Algerian nationalist organization that rivaled, and eventually lost to, the FLN.

The Mouvement National Algérien (MNA; Algerian National Movement) was founded in Paris in December 1954 by Messali al-Hadj in reaction to the launching of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front) by his revolutionary rivals in Algeria. It was a continuation of his branch of the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD; Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties) established at Hornu, Belgium, during the summer.

One element after another of the Algerian political spectrum rallied to the FLN during 1955 and 1956. Claiming that this demonstrated that the FLN contained too many moderates and reformists, Messali's MNA was, by June 1956, the only major party remaining outside the nationalist coalition.

Polarization led to bloody fighting between MNA and FLN factions within Algeria. Also, the FLN waged a concerted effort to win over the loyalties of the Algerian community in France, long commanded by Messali, and to tap its financial resources. Intracommunal fighting in France took many lives. The MNA lost in both arenas and, from 1958 onward, was of little political consequence, going formally out of existence on 19 June 1962.

See also Front de Libération Nationale; Hadj, Messali al-; Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques.

JOHN RUEDY

MOUVEMENT POPULAIRE (MP)

Pro-monarchy, overwhelmingly Berber political party in Morocco.

The Mouvement Populaire (MP) was organized in 1956–1957 in the Rif. Its supporters were Berber notables and tribesmen, some of whom belonged to the Army of Liberation, and small landholders. It was founded to oppose the political domination of newly independent Morocco by the Istiqlal Party and to serve as a mechanism for Berber political participation in cooperation with the monarchy. At the same time, the MP sought to avoid being cast as a purely Berber party, and so became the voice of the rural masses neglected by the Istiqlal. Its founders were Abdelkarim Khatib, a former head of the Arab Liberation Army (and ethnically an Arab), and Majoub Ahardane, the governor of Rabat province. The Istiqlal-dominated government arrested its leaders in April 1958 and blocked its legalization. The MP was finally registered as a legal political party in February 1959.

The relationship between the monarchy and the MP was strengthened during the early 1960s, following the ascension to power of Hassan II and the split in the Istiqlal. In 1962–1963, the MP was the only organized group within the monarchist coalition, which ran in the 1963 elections under the banner of the Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionelles (FDIC). It thus was able to take advantage of the boycott of the 1963 elections by Istiqlal and the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP) and to fill many of the positions in provincial assemblies, chambers of commerce, and communal councils. Its base of economic and political power was strengthened by the regime's policy of Moroccanizing large tracts of land that had been controlled by the French administration and settlers.

In 1965 the defection from the ruling coalition of a single MP member deprived the government of its majority, sparking a constitutional crisis that led to King Hassan's assumption of emergency powers. In 1967 the MP split over personality differences between Ahardane and Khatib; the latter's breakaway faction took the name Mouvement Populaire Démocratique et Constitutionelle (MPDC), which in the 1990s served as the legal basis for a primarily Islamist party sanctioned by the authorities. Ahardane was expelled from the MP in 1985 for "authoritarian practices," and the party was taken over by Mohand Laenser. In July 1991 Ahardane cofounded the rival Mouvement National Populaire (MNP). In the 1993 parliamentary elections the MP, competing as part of the loyalist Entente/Wifaq bloc, won a total of fifty-one seats, a gain of four from the 1984 elections, and in the government reshuffle of January 1995, it attained three cabinet seats. In the 1997 elections the MP dropped to forty seats and was left out of the new, left-of-center government. In the 2002 elections there was a further drop, with the party winning twenty-seven seats. Still, the party did attain three cabinet posts in the newly formed government, with party head Laenser receiving the agriculture and rural development portfolio. How the MP and other Berber-based parties would be affected by the emergence of a more assertive Berber culture movement remained an open question.

See also Ahardane, Majoub; Arab Liberation Army; Berber; Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionelles (FDIC); Istiqlal Party: Morocco; Morocco: Political Parties in; Rif; Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP).

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

MOUVEMENT POUR LE TRIOMPHE DES LIBERTÉS DÉMOCRATIQUES

Algerian organization that sought to attain national rights through electoral participation.

The Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD; Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties) was created in 1946 by Messali al-Hadj, leader of Algeria's clandestine Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA; Party of the Algerian People), which colonial authorities had banned in 1939. Under French detention almost continuously since 1937, Messali urged his followers after World War II to boycott French elections. Released in 1946, he hastily organized the MTLD, however, to enter candidates in the elections to the first National Assembly of the Fourth Republic held in November. In spite of harassment by the authorities, the MTLD won five of the fifteen parliamentary seats reserved for Muslim Algerians. Major business of the National Assembly included drafting what became the 1947 Organic Law of Algeria. MTLD deputies regularly denied the competence of a French legislature to determine Algeria's status in any way. In the meantime, the MTLD became by far the most popular party in Algeria. But colonial authorities, fearful of a nationalist victory, openly rigged the Algerian legislative elections of 1948, and they tampered again with the elections of 1949, 1951, 1953, and 1954.

After years of urging Algerians to spurn the process, Messali's abrupt decision to present slates of candidates in 1946 confused many Algerians. They did not know whether the party was seeking national rights by direct action or through electoral participation. In fact, it was doing both. At a clandestine party congress in February 1947, delegates determined that the MTLD would pursue political strategies within the existing colonial framework, while a secret PPA would continue to press for independence by whatever means necessary. By the end of 1947, the PPA–MTLD leadership had, in fact, approved the creation of an Organisation Spéciale (OS), which conducted armed robberies and other acts of violence until broken up by the authorities in March 1950.

It appears that MTLD cohesiveness was constantly torn through these years by the partisans of direct action and those of political participation. The decision to pursue both strategies simultaneously reflected irreconcilable internal contradictions more than rationally chosen strategy. This fundamental conflict lay at the heart of a series of internal disputes that progressively sapped the party's effectiveness in the early 1950s. The weakening of the party was hastened by conflicts between the Central Committee and Messali Hadj, widely accused of authoritarianism and of attempting to establish a cult of personality. Banned from Algerian soil in 1952, Messali in 1954 called a party congress at Hornu, Belgium, that declared the Central Committee dissolved and elected him president for life. Since the Central Committee failed to recognize the authority of the Hornu Congress, the party was split down the middle.

In the spring of 1954, a group of militants—mainly veterans of or sympathizers with the OS—formed the Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'action (CRUA; Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action). Disillusioned with the "politicals" and their failure to produce, they determined to launch an insurrection. By 1956, most of the MTLD centralists had rallied to the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front), which the CRUA had created. Messali, in Europe surrounded by the émigré loyalists who were his original base, refused to join. His wing of the MTLD became the Mouvement National Algérien (MNA; Algerian National Movement) entering into often violent conflict with the FLN both at home and in France.

See also Algeria; Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA); Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Hadj, Messali al-; Mouvement National Algérien; Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA).

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JOHN RUEDY

MOVEMENT FOR UNITY AND REFORM (MUR)

Moroccan Islamic movement.

The Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR) is the second largest Islamic movement in Morocco, after Abdelsalam Yassin's al-Adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Benevolence). Formerly the Movement of Reform and Renewal (HATM), the MUR was established in Morocco in 1996 following a merger of HATM and the Association of the Islamic Future. Though the MUR is not legally recognized, the Moroccan regime has tolerated the movement's activities since the 1980s.

Led by a group of moderate Islamists, the MUR has branches throughout the country and has issued newspapers and other publications (notably the daily *al-Tajdid* [Renewal] and the quarterly *al-Furqan* [Proof]), held general conferences, and participated in popular marches. The main objectives of the movement are reforming the conditions of Muslims at the individual and societal levels and renewing their understanding and commitment to Islam. On several occasions the leaders of the movement have expressed their commitment to the fundamental basis of the Moroccan regime: Islam, the constitutional monarchy, and the territorial integrity of the country. They also reconfirmed their willingness to participate in political life through legal means and to cooperate with other political groups.

A major transformation took place within the movement when a large number of its leaders and cadres joined the historic yet moribund Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement (MPCD) in 1996. This federation revived the MPCD and provided the MUR with the opportunity to participate in politics through formal channels. Under the umbrella of the MPCD (which in 1998 changed its name to the Party of Justice and Development), the MUR contested the legislative elections of 1997 and 2002 and won 14 and 44 seats, respectively, of the parliament's 325 seats. The movement is popular among Morocco's youth, university students, secondary-school teachers, and middle-class professionals.

See also ADL WA AL-IHSAN, AL-; HASSAN II; MOROCCO: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; MUHAMMAD VI.

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EMAD ELDIN SHAHIN

MOVEMENT OF RENEWAL

Formerly the Tunisian Communist Party.

Founded as an offshoot of the French Communist party in 1920, the Parti Communiste Tunisien (Tunisian Communist Party, PCT) broke with the French party in 1934. It remained legal after Tunisia gained its independence in 1956 but was banned by President Habib Bourguiba in 1963. In 1981, however, Bourguiba legalized the PCT in order to offset the growing influence of the Islamist movement, and in 1988 the party signed Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali's National Pact. PCT influence remained marginal, and the party has never succeeded in capturing the imagination of Tunisia's young people.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 dealt the PCT a heavy blow. General Secretary Mohammed Harmel (head of the party since 1981) sought to capitalize on the Ben Ali "regime of change" by renaming the PCT the Mouvement Ettajdid (Movement of Renewal; in Arabic, Harakat al-Tajdid) and emphasizing the party's reformist credentials during its tenth national congress on 23 April 1993. The publication of the party's tabloid, *al-Tariq al-Jadid* (The new path), was suspended between 1989 and 1993, when it re-emerged as a monthly magazine.

Currently, Ettajdid is one of the five opposition parties represented in the Tunisian parliament. In the 1999 elections, the party obtained 2.74 percent of the vote and five seats. That same year, Ettajdid supported Ben Ali's candidacy in the presidential

elections. However, in 2002 it abstained from voting on a proposed referendum on constitutional reform, initially calling for nonparticipation and later asking for a "cleaning up of the political climate" and a general amnesty for political prisoners before the referendum. The February–March 2003 issue of *al-Tariq al-Jadid* was seized by authorities because it contained articles critical of the proposed constitutional reforms.

See also Ben Ali, Zayn al-Abidine; Bourguiba, Habib; Communism in the Middle East; Tunisia: Overview.

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Larry A. Barrie
Updated by Vanesa Casanova-Fernandez

MOYNE, LORD

See Guinness, Walter Edward

MOZAFFAR AL-DIN QAJAR

[1853–1907]

Fifth monarch of Persia's Qajar dynasty.

Mozaffar al-Din became shah in 1897, after his father Naser al-Din Shah was slain by an assassin's bullet. Mozaffar had lived in Tabriz in Azerbaijan, the traditional seat of the heir to the throne. He was of a timid but kindly nature and had been overshadowed and humiliated by forceful *pishkars* (ministers of Azerbaijan), appointed by his father, so he had little experience of statecraft upon his accession. His father had radiated an aura of royalty, although he had become despotic and unpopular toward the end of his reign.

The courtiers who came with the new shah to Tehran were greedy for the spoils of office they had long awaited; politics and court intrigues undermined the shah's authority and prestige. Mozaffar al-Din Shah's reign began badly, since Anglo-Russian rivalry was at its worst, compromising Persia's independence both financially and politically. A deep dissatisfaction among all the classes gave rise to widespread nationalism. The shah allowed some freedom of political discussion and activity, which soon resulted in the formation of political societies *(anjomans),* where reforms were discussed and contacts between various leaders were established. The printing and distribution of political tracts caused politics to be discussed and the government criticized.

Mozaffar al-Din Shah dismissed his father's unpopular minister, Amin al-Soltan, and appointed the liberal-minded Amin al-Dowleh, whose efforts to negotiate a much-needed loan from a neutral country failed. The shah recalled him and negotiated instead two loans from Russia at onerous terms. The monies were soon spent on trivialities during the shah's European trips in 1900, 1902, and 1905. These journeys were criticized and made him unpopular with the merchants, who resented the concessions granted to non-Persians; with the *ulama* (body of *mollas*), who were afraid of Western cultural influence; and with the liberals who feared a threat to Persia's independence. All the while, growing inflation and lawlessness weakened the central government. The dismissal of Amin al-Soltan and the appointment of the more autocratic Ayn al-Dowleh only exacerbated the situation.

Another cause of great resentment was the employment of Belgian customs officials at the borders, the proceeds of which were pledged as a guarantee against the loans from Russia and Britain. Naus, the director, was particularly hated; it was no coincidence that a photo of him, wearing the habit of a religious man to a costume party, was distributed with other propaganda by the opponents of the regime, to show the disrespect that foreigners had for the religious class. This was the spark that triggered the revolution in 1904. The first demands were for law and a House of Justice (Adalat-Khaneh), formulated by those merchants and *ulama* who took *bast* (sanctuary) in the Shrine of Shah Abd al-Azim in 1904. The shah agreed to their demands but took no real action; therefore a protest began that took the life of a religious student. As a result the *ulama* left Tehran in a body for Qom, and 14,000 merchants gathered at the British embassy. Their demands included the granting of a constitution and a national constituent assembly *(a majles-e shura-ye melli).* The shah reluctantly agreed, and the

preparation of the constitutional laws and the promulgation of electoral laws were accomplished quickly. The elections were rushed since the shah was ill, and it was feared that his successor, Mohammad Ali Mirza, might not continue his father's new policies. The electoral law was so devised that Tehran was purposely to receive half the 120 seats. In fact, Mozaffar al-Din Shah died a few months after he made the October 1906 inaugural speech in the *majles.*

Since the events of the succeeding reign confirmed the fears of the people, Persia was to face a long period of political turmoil. Mozaffar al-Din is therefore remembered with reverence, and those who built the entrance to the majles adorned it with the motto: *"Adl-e Mozaffar"* (The justice of Mozaffar), which was left untouched even after the change of dynasty in 1925.

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Mansoureh Ettehadieh

M'RABET, FADELA

[?–]

Pseudonym of Fatma Abda, an Algerian journalist and essayist.

Fadela M'Rabet was born in Constantine, Algeria. She was a high-school teacher after Algeria gained its independence in 1962, then joined the staff of the newspaper *Alger-Républicain* and was in charge of a women's program on the radio. As of 2004 she lived in France.

M'Rabet's first book, *La femme algérienne* (Paris, 1964; The Algerian woman) was inspired by the correspondence she received while working as a journalist and radio commentator. Its tone is defiant, meant to shake the apathy of the reader and focus attention on women's suppressed rights. M'Rabet was critical of Islamic law, which granted a Muslim man the right to marry a non-Muslim woman while denying a Muslim woman the right to marry a non-Muslim man. Her second book, *Les Algériennes* (1967; Algerian women) is optimistic about the future as a result of women's greater access to education. M'Rabet echoes the concerns of a growing number of women to protect their rights, newly acquired as a result of their participation in the Algerian War of Independence.

A long period of silence followed the author's publication of *L'Algérie des illusions* (The Algeria of illusions), which she cowrote in 1972 with her husband Maurice T. Maschino, a French journalist. In 2003 she published an autobiographical novel, *Une enfance singulière* (An unusual childhood). The book is a nostalgic evocation of her childhood in Algeria during the colonial period and a reaction to the racism she experienced in France, where she lives and works.

See also Algerian War of Independence; Gender: Gender and Politics; Literature: Arabic, North African; Radio and Television: Arab Countries.

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Aida A. Bamia

MUʿALLA FAMILY, AL-

Ruling family of the emirate of Umm al-Qaywayn in the United Arab Emirates.

The first member of the Muʿalla dynasty was Majid Al Ali, who rose to power in 1775 as leader of the area's largest tribe, the Al Ali. During the early years of the twentieth century the emirate was ruled by Rashid ibn Ahmad (r. 1904–1922), a reputedly forceful leader who was successful in encouraging some tribes to seek his protection, thus expanding the territories of his emirate. His son, Ahmad bin Rashid al-Muʿalla, ruled from 1929 to 1981 and was known for his piety, support for modern education, and his membership in the Trucial States Rulers' Council in 1952. He also was honored as a Member of the British Empire. He was succeed by his son Rashid (b. 1930) in 1981.

See also Umm al-Qaywayn; United Arab Emirates.

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ANTHONY B. TOTH

MUASHER, MARWAN

[1956–]

Jordanian diplomat.

Marwan Muasher (also Muʿashshir) has remained one of the most important Jordanian diplomats working on the Jordanian–Israeli peace process since the inception of public bilateral talks in 1991. Born in Amman, he studied at the American University of Beirut from 1972 until 1975. He completed his B.A. at Purdue University in Indiana, eventually also receiving a doctorate in computer engineering from Purdue. After returning to Jordan, he worked in the private sector and wrote political columns for Jordan's English-language newspaper. Muasher first began working with the Jordanian government in 1985 in the ministry of planning, where he eventually directed the Socio-Economic Information Centre. In 1989, he was appointed press advisor for the prime minister.

Muasher's career advanced with the onset of Jordanian–Israeli peace talks in 1991. From 1991 to 1994, he utilized his fluent American-accented English as the spokesperson for the Jordanian delegation to the talks. He also served as head of the Jordanian embassy's Jordan Information Bureau in Washington. From April to November 1995, Muasher held the important post of Jordan's first ambassador to Israel, becoming the public face of the Jordanian government in that country. He was minister of information from February 1996 through March 1997, after which he held the important post of ambassador to the U.S. from September 1997 to January 2002. During Muasher's tenure as ambassador, Jordan and the U.S. signed the U.S.–Jordan Free Trade Agreement. He returned to Jordan to serve as foreign minister, serving at a time of tremendous change in the region as a result of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the resumption of Israeli–Palestinian peace talks.

MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

MUBARAK, HUSNI

[1928–]

Egyptian officer and politician; president of Egypt since 1981.

Born in Minufiyya province to a middle-class family, Muhammad Husni Mubarak graduated from the Military Academy in 1949 and from the Air Force Academy the next year. After a brief stint as a fighter pilot, he served as an instructor at the Air Force Academy from 1954 to 1961. He spent the following academic year at the Soviet General Staff Academy. He was the commandant of the Air Force Academy from 1967 to 1969, air force chief of staff from 1969 to 1971, and then commander in chief from 1971 to 1974. He took charge of Egypt's aerial preparations for the Arab–Israel War in 1973. Because of his outstanding performance in the war, he was promoted to the rank of air marshal in 1974. President Anwar al-Sadat appointed him vice president in 1975, and Mubarak served him loyally for the next six years.

After Sadat was assassinated in October 1981, Mubarak quickly assumed the presidency, was officially nominated within a week by the National Democratic Party, and was confirmed without any opposition by a nationwide referendum. Upon taking over, he promised to address Egypt's economic and social problems, tried to curb the favoritism and corruption that had marred Sadat's final days, and released many of the political and religious leaders whom Sadat had sent to prison. Many of Sadat's henchmen were quietly removed from office.

Mubarak maintained Egypt's ties with the U.S. government, on whose economic aid it had become increasingly dependent. He did not break diplomatic relations with Israel (although he did recall Egypt's ambassador from Tel Aviv during Israel's invasion of Lebanon), and he slowly restored good relations with the other Arab governments and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had withdrawn their ambassadors from Cairo upon Sadat's signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord

Husni Mubarak became president of Egypt after the 1981 assassination of Anwar al-Sadat. Present during the attack, Mubarak himself was shot in the hand. A political moderate, Mubarak has worked hard to reestablish favorable relations with other Arab nations and curb extremist groups within his own country. © GETTY IMAGES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

in 1979. He hosts visits from Israeli leaders, but has seldom visited Israel since he became president. His government has played a prominent role in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

Although Mubarak's government encouraged Western and Arab investment in Egypt's economy, he curbed the operation of foreign multinational corporations within the country. He instituted a program of economic reform following a severe fiscal crisis in the late 1980s and also tried to form an economic union with Iraq, Yemen, and Jordan. His efforts to mediate the 1990 dispute between Iraq and Kuwait failed and instead became a precipitating factor in Saddam Hussein's decision to invade and occupy Kuwait. Although Mubarak initially hoped for an Arab solution to the problem, his government soon rallied behind Operation Desert Shield, sending 40,000 troops to join the allied coalition in Saudi Arabia. Egypt was later rewarded by the cancellation of some $14 billion worth of accumulated foreign debt. Egypt's economy made impressive gains during the 1990s. He has been elected president, without opposition, for four six-year terms, making him the longest-serving Egyptian head of state since Muhammad Ali. He has not yet designated a successor.

The Mubarak government has been challenged by Islamist political movements, which attacked prominent government officials, secularists, Copts, and foreigners between 1992 and 1997, but has curbed such violence through arrests, detention, trials, and occasional executions. Mubarak himself was nearly assassinated while attending a meeting of the Organization of African Unity in 1995, an incident that increased his popularity within Egypt. The gap between rich and poor remains wide—a potential threat to the stability and survival of his regime. More self-effacing than either Nasser or Sadat, he inspires neither strong loyalty nor aversion among most Egyptians.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1973); CAMP DAVID ACCORDS (1978); GULF WAR (1991); PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); SADAT, ANWAR AL-.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

MUFIDE KADRI

[1889–1911]

One of the first modern Turkish women painters.

Although she had no formal art education, Mufide Kadri took lessons from Osman Hamdi Bey and Salvatore Velery, teachers at the Istanbul Fine Arts Academy, which for many years did not admit women. She was a prolific painter, and despite her death at an early age, forty of her works remain in existence today. Her oil paintings can be seen in the Istanbul Art Museum.

DAVID WALDNER

MUHAMMAD

[570–632]

The Prophet of Islam.

Muhammad is referred to by Muslims as *rasul allah* (the messenger of God) or *al-nabi* (the Prophet), an appellation that they always follow with the invocation *salla allah alayhi wa sallam* (May God's peace and blessing be upon him).

Early Life

He was born in Mecca in 570, the year of the Elephant, a fortuitous year in tradition, since Mecca in that year survived an Abyssinian invasion directed through Yemen. Although one of various pagan centers in Arabia, Mecca was considered the most important one on account of the Kaʿba, a cubical religious sanctuary revered since ancient times. A spiritual focal point for devotees, who came to it as pilgrims with sacrifices, Mecca provided a convenient meeting point for merchants who exchanged goods there and poets who displayed their literary talents and competed for the attention of its wealthy guests and residents. Authority over the city rested in a loose confederation of tribal groups largely dominated by the tribe of Quraysh. Muhammad was born to the clan of Banu Hashim (Hashimites), a branch within Quraysh that was known less for its wealth than for its religious prestige. The patriarch of the clan was traditionally entrusted with caring for the Kaʿba and maintenance of the pilgrimage facilities, such as the renowned well of *zamzam,* where Islamic tradition states that in ancient times Ismaʿil, abandoned with his mother Hagar by Abraham (Ibrahim), struck water in the desert and thereby attracted settlement in that spot. Because Mecca is situated on the overland route between Yemen and Syria, its importance as a station, market, and religious center grew with the increasing caravan trade in the region.

Muhammad grew up as an orphan, having lost both of his parents by the age of six. He was then cared for briefly by his grandfather, Abd al-Muttalib, the patriarch of his clan, and afterward by his uncle Abu Talib. In his adolescent years, Muhammad joined his uncle on trade journeys, the most notable of which were to Syria, and he noticed the effects of this commercial boom on his city. The growth of excessive competition in Mecca was gradually undermining traditional Arab tribal values that emphasized principles of solidarity, mutual help, and magnanimity *(muru'a),* and leaving a pool of destitute and disenfranchised Meccans who were abandoned by a new, wealth-driven generation. In this troubled Arab milieu, Muhammad, who attracted attention in Mecca because of his fair dealing, honesty, and moral sensitivity, was commissioned by a wealthy widow, Khadija, to take charge of her caravan trade. Aged twenty-five, Muhammad married Khadija, fifteen years his senior; she bore him two sons (al-Qasim and Abdullah), who died in infancy, and four daughters (Zaynab, Ruqiyya, Umm Kulthum, and Fatima).

Beyond his distress about the social malaise in Mecca, Muhammad was dissatisfied with the pagan beliefs of the Meccans. The Kaʿba, surrounded by idols that catered to various pagan cults, had become a platform for profit making and opportunism.

Beginning of Islamic Religion

Seeking a full break with this society, Muhammad found solace in spiritual retreats that he undertook in a mountain cave, Hira, on the outskirts of Mecca. According to tradition, Muhammad spent long stretches of time alone in the cave, and it was on one of these occasions, in the year 610, that the angel Gabriel (Jabril) appeared to him and presented him with the words, "Recite in the name of thy Lord, the Creator" (Sura 96:1). Gabriel announced to Muhammad that he was to be the messenger of God and called on him to warn his people against polytheism and to lead them to the worship of the one God. The first words of the Qurʾan came to light

in the month of Ramadan—hence the religious importance of that month—and other verses followed in later years in various contexts over the course of Muhammad's life. Those closest to Muhammad—his wife, Khadija, his cousin Ali, his companion Abu Bakr, and his servant Zayd—were the first to hear the words of the Qurʾan and to embrace the new message, Islam (meaning literally surrendering oneself to the will of God). After overcoming some initial hesitation, Muhammad grew confident in his sense of mission and took the message to the public arena of Mecca.

The earliest Qurʾanic recitations of Muhammad emphasized the belief in absolute monotheism. Meccans were called on to cast aside all polytheism and to worship the one God, Allah, the creator of the universe. The Qurʾan described the omniscience and omnipotence of God and invited the people *(al-nas)* to ponder the signs of creation. The Qurʾan also admonished the Meccans for their exploitative business practices, involving usurious transactions and unfairness, and warned them of the existence of Judgment Day, when all would be rewarded or punished according to their deeds. This admonishment, together with Muhammad's public denigration of paganism, elicited the hostility of the leading Meccan merchants, who, in addition to feeling their pride offended, feared that the Islamic concept of one God would undermine the status of Mecca as a pagan center and an economic hub. Recognizing the significance of Hashimite solidarity, the Meccans at first attempted to make Muhammad abandon his attack on paganism by such methods as offering to make him king of Mecca, but when all failed, they declared a boycott against him and tried to extend it to all his clan.

In Mecca, Muhammad gained few Islamic converts (primarily young men, some from affluent families), and his attempt to preach in the neighboring town of Taʾif elicited even greater hostility than in Mecca. Finally, in 620, the prospects of the new religion began to change when Muhammad met six men from Medina who were visiting Mecca. This Medinese group, from the tribe of Khazraj, had long been familiar with messianic expectations that circulated in the discourse of Jews and Christians living in the region and proved receptive to the Islamic prophecy. The next year, this group held a larger meeting between Muhammad and seventy residents of Medina who pledged loyalty to the Prophet and invited him to their town. After years of rivalry in Medina between its two leading tribes, the Aws and the Khazraj, Muhammad's leadership offered the possibility of a neutral authority that could mediate disputes, administer the affairs of a diverse community, and contribute to its social recovery. As the hostility of the Meccans to the new religion and its adherents mounted, Muhammad finally decided to migrate, with Abu Bakr, to Medina in a secret journey that took place on 17 September 622. The trip, known in Arabic as *hijra* (migration), would later mark the beginning of the Islamic lunar calendar.

Rise of Islamic State

Once established in Medina, Muhammad set about organizing the nascent Islamic community and strengthening fraternalist ties between the Meccan emigrants *(al-muhajirun)* and the Medinese, known as the helpers *(al-ansar)*. In a document referred to by scholars today as the Constitution of Medina, Muhammad declared the unity of the community (*umma*) of Medina under his leadership and stipulated that all matters of legal and political concern were to be referred to him. Medina's hosting of the new religion soon made it the target of Meccan hostility. In 624, mounting tension between the two cities finally led to the first military confrontation at the battle of Badr, where a small Muslim force succeeded in beating back a larger Meccan army. The significance of Badr was not so much military as political. Muhammad's victory strengthened his support in Medina, attracted the admiration of tribal leaders from around the Arabian peninsula, and undermined the prestige of the Meccan order. Between the years 624 and 628, Mecca engaged the Medinese in numerous military skirmishes and battles, the most famous of which was the battle of al-Khandaq (the Trench) in 626. In that year, Mecca assembled a massive confederation of neighboring tribes to invade Medina, but the campaign was forestalled by the Medinese strategy of digging a trench around Medina. The Meccan army, unprepared for a siege and composed of tribal groups that had united for a quick battle only, soon dispersed and retreated.

This last confrontation definitively turned Muhammad into the central leadership figure, and

it was then only a matter of time before Mecca would itself become vulnerable to conquest. In 628, Muhammad set out to Mecca on pilgrimage with the new community, only to find his way blocked by the Meccans. At the peace of al-Hudaybiyya in that year, the Meccans called for a long-term truce, after which Muslims would be allowed access to Mecca for pilgrimage. Two years later, the treaty was violated by confederate tribesmen of Mecca, and this opened the way for the Islamic conquest of Mecca, which took place peacefully in 630. A year later, various Arab tribal chiefs from around the peninsula converged on Medina to pay homage or pledge allegiance to the Prophet. Whether nominal or effective, Muhammad's political authority had extended over the greater part of the peninsula, and texts of letters can be obtained from Islamic sources that Muhammad sent to neighboring kings of Persia and Byzantium, as well as various regional princes, inviting them to embrace Islam.

Medina continued its role as the capital of the Islamic state, although Mecca, after the destruction of the idols around the Kaʿba, became the spiritual center of Islam. In 632, soon after completing pilgrimage at Mecca and setting out again for Medina, Muhammad fell mortally ill from a fever. In his final days, he made no specific arrangements for succession. With illness preventing him from leading the prayers, the Prophet asked Abu Bakr to lead the community in prayers, and this gesture would later be interpreted in Sunni Islam as a recommendation for political succession. Shiʿite Islam, in contrast, turns toother traditions describing Muhammad's praise for Ali as a reflection of the Prophet's general designation of Ali as his successor. Ali was also, through his marriage to Fatima, the father of Muhammad's two grandchildren, al-Hasan and al-Husayn.

The life of Muhammad has long captivated the attention of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Muslims look on him not only as a spiritual guide but also as an exemplar in social, ethical, and political terms. Islamic law grew not only from Qurʾanic edicts but also from the Islamic understanding of Muhammad's day-to-day manner of handling all sorts of temporal issues. Oral tradition *(hadith)* transmitted through Muhammad's companions recounts in detail his instructions and how he lived. Outside observers, on the other hand, continue to weigh Muhammad's achievements in comparison with those of other spiritual masters. In his confrontation with polytheism and his experience of migration, he is compared to Abraham, whereas as promulgator of the rudiments of Islamic law, he evokes a connection with Moses; in his political leadership of the community, he evokes a connection with David. In the vast desert on the fringes of the urban and sophisticated empires of the time—those of the Byzantines and the Sassanians, each with long traditions of structured governmental institutions—Muhammad united both the nomadic and sedentary Arabs into a coherent social unit that would later conquer these powers. Although this political expansion took place under his successors, Muhammad had laid the foundation for an Islamic universalist social vision that was rooted in a unifying monotheistic belief. The memory of the prophetic experience of *hijra* between cities henceforth inspired its emulation on a grander scale outside Arabia.

See also KAʿBA; MECCA; QURʾAN.

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TAYEB EL-HIBRI

MUHAMMAD V

[1910–1961]

Sultan and king of Morocco from 1927 to 1961.

Sidi Muhammad Ben Yusuf was the third son of Mulay Yusuf, a colorless prince and brother of the

King Muhammad of Morocco (1910–1961; right) discusses state matters with his son, Mulay Hassan, 27 February 1961. **© HULTON/ARCHIVE BY GETTY IMAGES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

sultan of Morocco, Mulay Hafid. Muhammad was born in Fez in 1910, at the beginning of the protectorate period; it seemed unlikely he would reign. Two years later, the French nominated his father to succeed the sultan, whom they had deposed because he refused to rule as they wanted. Muhammad V came to power after his father's death in 1927, because French authorities considered him to be more flexible and less ambitious than his brothers. Nevertheless, he used his popularity and his skills in international diplomacy to involve himself in a struggle, at first unequal, with the protectorate's authorities.

After the Berber *dahir* in 1930, which relieved Berber tribes from submitting to *shariʿa* (Islamic law), Muhammad became more sensitive to Moroccan nationalism, which was just beginning to awaken. Without breaking off from the protectorate, he supported demonstrations by young traditional and modern intellectuals, such as Allal al-Fasi, Hassan El Ouezzani, and Ahmed Balafrej, which, in 1944, gave birth to the Istiqlal (Independence) Party. World War II presented the opportunity to persuade the protectorate to move toward a cooperative regime more faithful to the spirit of the original agreement between France and Morocco.

Muhammad opposed the French attempt to protect Moroccan Jews from persecution while he helped rebuild military forces to fight again with the Allies. The 1942 Casablanca meeting with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Britain's Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill strengthened his resistance. From then on, he used a strategy of promoting gradual change to regain the sovereignty his country had lost in 1912. He approached French authorities directly to avoid the obstacles set up by both settlers and French civil servants, who opposed any change. But he did not succeed despite his good relationship with General Charles de Gaulle. At the local level, opposition to the French became more and more violent and led to the sultan's deposition and exile in Madagascar on 20 August 1953.

But France could not depose Muhammad in 1953 in the same way it deposed his uncle Mulay Hafid in 1912. The international environment was unfavorable to France, French public opinion accepted unwillingly the pro-consuls' plots, and, above all, Muhammad was the symbol of a very deep opposition movement, which mobilized Moroccan cities as well as the countryside. The nation could no longer be governed, and the French administration collapsed within two years in the face of the uprisings. Muhammad was called back to preserve the French economic and military presence, which, otherwise, could have been swept out by nationalistic currents far more radical than those represented by the king and the Moroccan bourgeoisie.

Once he regained his throne, in November 1955, Muhammad took on the role of spokesman for nationalism. He let the Istiqlal Party exert power without, however, becoming a prisoner of the nationalist movement. He continued to defend the monarchy's privileges. Muhammad kept his country out of the confrontation between France and the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), which he supported. But, profoundly hurt by the 1956 hijacking of a Moroccan plane with FLN leaders on board, he then attempted to play an intermediary role in the Algerian conflict, hoping, in vain, that de Gaulle's return to power in 1958 would facilitate his reconciliation with France. The king would die without witnessing success. But, he was careful not to jeopardize his country's position within a new Maghrib that, already, some perceived as dominated by a revolutionary Algeria, the main heir of the former colonial power.

Having succeeded in reestablishing his country's independence on the international stage, Muhammad also consolidated the position of the monarchy within an institutional system, which was shaken by the 1953–1955 crisis. Some among the nationalists welcomed a king who reigned without governing. But Muhammad did not share that philosophy for himself or his son, Prince Mulay Hassan, his heir, whom he had gradually introduced to power since the end of World War II.

The support he gained by fighting with the Istiqlal against the protectorate helped him keep his authority over an important part of the nationalist movement. In that struggle, the monarchy recovered its powers that the Treaty of Fes (1912) had alienated and, added to that, the administrative means set up by the protectorate. The military and police forces were placed under monarchical authority, but other administrative sectors depended upon a government dominated by the Istiqlal. Without the help of the monarchy, it was not possible to ensure either the control of the resistance movement or the settlement of rural uprisings. A pluralist text related to public freedom rights allowed, in April 1958, the legalization of new political parties and soon favored the split of the Istiqlal Party, with a right wing remaining close to the king and a left wing following a moderate line. In May 1960, Muhammad took the reins of power by naming Mulay Hassan prime minister. The prince had been, at the beginning of independence, chief of staff in the Royal Armed Forces.

As Algeria's independence approached, the more anxious Muhammad became to grant his country a constitution and to organize its democratization under the monarchy's control. He died suddenly in March 1961 after surgery and left the country to the authority of his son, Hassan II.

During this thirty-two-year reign, Muhammad V listened to his country and took part in its evolution, which allowed it to recover its independence and to project itself into modernity. Chosen because of his apparent docility, he proved, in the long run, to be a cautious opponent, capable of appreciating the modernizing actions of such French resident generals as Auguste Nogues or Eric Labonne. They reciprocated by respecting his dignity. In extreme circumstances, he displayed firmness and intuitively anticipated the reactions of common Moroccan people. As far as the rivalry with the nationalist movement, which gradually replaced the common fight against the protectorate, is concerned, he knew how to take advantage of time, how to safeguard his best cards; he went on being attentive to the rural world and sometimes contributed to undermining the credit modern leaders were already losing. Thus, four years after his return, he regained all the power without having to share it. While favoring Algeria's independence, he feared Nasserist or Marxist influences, which could have come from that neighboring country and be exerted upon Morocco.

A man of tradition, Muhammad V was the symbol both of independence and modernity. That symbol continues today to stamp the monarchy's image and to give Morocco a strong identity highly differentiated from that of its neighbor countries.

See also Abd al-Hafid ibn al-Hassan; Balafrej, Ahmed; Churchill, Winston S.; De Gaulle, Charles; Fes, Treaty of (1912); Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Hassan II; Istiqlal Party: Morocco; Maghrib; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano.

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Rémy Leveau

MUHAMMAD VI

[1963–]

King of Morocco since 1999.

Sidi Muhammad, the oldest son of King Hassan II, was born in Rabat on 21 August 1963. In 1985 he obtained a bachelor of arts degree in law from Muhammad V University, followed in 1987 by a master of arts degree in political science. In 1993 he earned a doctor in law degree from the Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis. Upon his father's death, on 23 July 1999, Sidi Muhammad ascended to the throne under the name Muhammad VI. He became the eighteenth king of the Alawite dynasty

Moroccan king Muhammad VI succeeded to the throne after the death of his father, Hassan II, in 1999. Muhammad VI's reign was initially quite popular with the public, but a slowdown in reforms lowered his support. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

bearing the title of Amir al-Muʾminin ("commander of the faithful"), befitting a monarch who claims descent from the Prophet.

From the outset, Muhammad VI distinguished himself by advocating religious tolerance, democracy, and human rights reforms. On religion and the state, he echoed his father's position when he asserted in 2000 that, although Islam is the state's official religion, there are also Jews who are an integral part of the Moroccan social fabric. The Amir al-Muʾminin is the leader of the Muslims but also of the Jewish minority still dwelling in the kingdom.

On democracy and human rights, Muhammad VI contended that his country must cultivate specific "homemade" democratic features and avoid blind emulation of Western political systems and advocacy organizations, which often seem irrelevant to the local milieu. He soon released several thousand prisoners and reduced the prison terms of another 38,000, many of the latter affiliated with the Islamist Jamaʿat al-Adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Charity).

On 20 August 1999 the king broke a taboo by giving a speech in which he mentioned the "disappeared" and the victims of "arbitrary arrest." Simultaneously, emblematic political exiles, or their families, were permitted to return home. Such was the case with the Marxist activist Abraham Serfaty and the family of Mehdi Ben Barka, who had been eliminated in 1965 by the Moroccan secret service upon his arrival in Paris. On 12 November 1999 Muhammad VI dismissed Driss Basri, minister of the interior since 1979. Basri had been regarded as Hassan II's powerful right-hand man who, since the late 1970s, had exiled numerous political opponents or incarcerated them at the infamous Tazmamart prison colony. During the early and mid-1990s King Hassan II had himself set the stage for the reforms undertaken by his son, fearing that the suffering of his people could lead to chaos.

The new king faced major challenges. The population has expanded, despite an infant mortality rate of 57 per 1,000, from ten million in 1956 to thirty-one million in 2003 (an annual growth rate of 2.1 percent). The nation suffers from water scarcity. Unemployment, based on official figures, has reached 20 to 25 percent, but may well be much higher. An estimated 5.9 million people live at or near the poverty level. A major problem is the low access to education, mainly in rural areas. Some 53 percent of the population are illiterate (70 percent among women), while 93 percent receive no medical care.

Of further concern is the Sahara crisis. During the 1970s Hassan II captured large areas of the Western Sahara evacuated by Spain. With Algerian support, the POLISARIO, a Saharawi national liberation movement, sprang up in the Sahara and engaged in guerrilla activity against Morocco. The movement formed a phantom Saharan State in Algiers. Hassan ignored demands for territorial concessions. Muhammad VI pursued this policy despite international pressure to revise it. The policy has caused tensions between Morocco and Algeria.

Despite the proliferation of political parties, nongovernmental human rights organizations, and women's organizations, the struggle for democracy and the uprooting of bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency continues. His most significant effort to date in a drive toward democracy was his decision to convene legislative elections on 27 September 2002. These elections were a step toward a modern civil society. Until these elections, women were excluded from the political decision-making process. In parliament women's representation was only 0.6 percent of the 325 seats in the Moroccan house of representatives (lower house). Only one woman held a government position, that of minister-delegate, which was not a full-fledged portfolio. Since the convening of the newly elected lower house, there are thirty-five women MPs, or 10.8 percent of the total. However, the elections also enabled the Islamists and other opposition parties to fortify their position within Morocco's parliament.

Despite increased women's representation in politics, serious problems continue for the majority of women not represented in the political elite. Muhammad VI's endorsement of revising the religious *madawana* (family code pertaining to women's personal status) toward greater equality between men and women is progressing well but remains thus far in the embryonic stage. The king's "Plan of Action" includes the lifting of legal discrimination in marriage and divorce, the abolition of polygamy, and economic equality between the sexes. The Islamists vehemently oppose the Plan, having forced the government in past years to postpone reforms.

Whereas the Jamaʿat al-Adl wa al-Ihsan retained outsider status, because it questions the legitimacy of Muhammad VI's status as commander of the faithful, the legal Islamist party, al-Adala wa al-Tanmiya (Justice and Development), made vital electoral strides. It reached third place in the legislative elections, with forty-two seats as compared to the fifty seats won by the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) and forty-eight of the Istiqlal Party.

The attempt to form a new government in October 2002 revealed the shortcomings of Moroccan democracy. Neither the USFP nor Istiqlal, the dominant governmental partners, nor Muhammad VI wanted the Islamists to hold ministerial posts. Committed to the concept of a global economy and determined to privatize the public sector, the king feared that involving Islamists in government could stymie reforms and draw sharp criticism from the Moroccan business community as well as the European Union (EU). Moreover, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the king thought such a move might irritate Washington. According to the 1996 constitution, the king appoints key members of the government and may, at his discretion, terminate the tenure of any minister or prevent any political party from participating in the ruling cabinet.

Owing to the more liberal atmosphere in Morocco after the death of Hassan II, both conservative Islamists and secular leftists leveled serious criticisms at the new king. They claimed that while Muhammad VI had placed, early in his reign, priority on technological advances aimed at supplying Morocco's rural areas with potable water, electricity, Internet access, and cellular phone service, it had soon became evident that the son was not all that different from the father. Thus the Islamists stepped in to provide some education and welfare services to communities as yet not benefiting from promised reforms and to organize effective mass protests against the government.

Also having grown more vocal, the Berber population demanded greater cultural recognition of their heritage. Berber leaders claim that 60 percent of the Moroccan population is of Berber heritage. It is almost impossible to verify the population figures; leading experts on Berber culture note that Morocco's Berber speakers (there are three Berber dialects as well as literary Berber) constitute 40 percent of the population, mostly in rural areas. The Berber associations protest against their youth being exposed generation after generation to the idea that Morocco is part of the Arab nation, making them Arabs in spite of themselves. Although Berbers were converted to Islam, their ethnic and linguistic purity has remained intact. Morocco, the Berbers argue, is Berber, Arab, and African. In March 2000 Berber leaders drafted a manifesto calling on the kingdom to recognize Berber as a national language, teach it in schools, license a Berber television station, and end restrictions on registering Berber names for their children. In a concession to the Berbers, in 2001 Muhammad VI created by royal

decree an institute devoted to the conservation, dissemination, and teaching of the Berber language and culture of Morocco.

Until 2003 Muhammad VI had shown little interest in the Middle East. He declined a U.S.-Egyptian invitation to attend the June 2003 Sharm al-Shaykh meeting that preceded the U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian summit in Aqaba, and only grudgingly accepted his father's role as chairman of the al-Quds Committee, a body formulating Arab policies on Jerusalem. Unlike their political predecessors, Muhammad VI and the presidents of Tunisia and Algeria have chosen thus far to immerse themselves in domestic issues and ties with the EU.

See also HASSAN II; MAGHRIB; MOROCCO; POLISARIO.

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MUHAMMAD ALI
[1770–1849]

Ruler (pasha) of Egypt, 1805–1849.

Muhammad (also Mehmet) Ali Pasha was born to a military family in the Macedonian port city of Kavalla (in what is today Greece). He was apprenticed to the tobacco trade by his father, Ibrahim Agha, and took over the family business upon Ibrahim's death in 1790. He also succeeded his father as commander of the local militia, in which post he came to the attention of the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul, who assigned him a warship to protect the surrounding waters against pirates. He married a well-to-do widow, Amina, who bore him three sons, Ibrahim, Ahmad Tusun, and Ismaʿil, and two daughters, Tevhide and Nazli.

In 1801, Muhammad Ali was appointed second in command of the 300 troops from Kavalla ordered to take part in the Ottoman Empire's expedition to drive Napoléon's army from Egypt. Muhammad Ali took over the regiment when its commander hastily returned to Macedonia; his skill on the battlefield prompted the Ottoman general to promote him to the rank of *binbashi* during the first weeks of the campaign. After the evacuation of the French, the Kavallan regiment stayed on to assist the Ottomans in subduing the Mamluk commanders. When the new governor let their pay slide into arrears, Muhammad Ali led these irregulars in a demonstration demanding it and then collaborated with the Mamluks to overthrow Egypt's Ottoman governor, taking control of Cairo in 1804 with the support of the religious notability and rich merchants. In June 1805, he was confirmed as governor-general *(wali)* of Egypt by the Ottoman Porte (government).

During the next six years, he suppressed the Mamluks and confiscated their lands, disarmed the urban population, and established a regular fiscal administration. These steps set the stage for military campaigns in the Sudan and the Hijaz (Arabia) in 1810 and 1811, which were followed by expeditions to Crete and the Peloponnese (Greece) from 1820 to 1824 and an invasion of Palestine and Syria in 1831.

After reaching the gates of Istanbul at the end of 1832, his armies were gradually forced out of Anatolia through the intervention of the British and Russians. Repeated attempts to conciliate Britain failed, and in 1840 the London Convention was effected, with the Ottomans supported by Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. British warships then bombarded Beirut and appeared off Alexandria (Egypt), forcing Muhammad Ali to agree to give up his empire in Syria, Arabia, and the Aegean in exchange for the hereditary right to rule Egypt. He traveled to the Ottoman capital in 1846 to confirm his family's succession, but he succumbed to dysentery and dementia on 2 August 1849. His descendants continued to rule Egypt, taking the titles of wali and khedive until 1952, when Farouk was ousted by a revolutionary government.

See also LONDON CONVENTION.

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MUHAMMAD ALI MOSQUE

Mosque commissioned by Muhammad Ali for Cairo's Citadel.

By its size and hilltop location, the Muhammad Ali Mosque at the Citadel dominates the Cairo skyline. As early as 1820, Muhammad Ali of Egypt asked French architect Pascal Coste to draw up plans for mosques in the Citadel and at Alexandria. Coste's plan was not used, however, when construction began in the early 1830s, just as Muhammad Ali was challenging his Ottoman overlord by invading Syria. Turning his back on local Mamluk-influenced architectural styles that had persisted through three centuries of rule by the Ottoman Empire, Muhammad Ali symbolized his ambitions by appropriating the style of great Ottoman mosques of Constantinople (now Istanbul). Sultan Ahmet's Blue Mosque, the Nuru Osmaniye, and the Yeni mosques have all been cited as influencing Yusuf Bushnaq, the Greek architect brought from Constantinople to construct the mosque. Its embellishments are in the baroque-rococo style in vogue in Constantinople in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

The mosque also symbolized Muhammad Ali's victory over the Mamluks, whom he had murdered in the Citadel in 1811. Dominating the citadel founded by Salah al-Din (known as Saladin [1137–1193]), it rose on the leveled ruins of the Qasr al-Ablaq (Striped Palace) of al-Nasir Muhammad, the Mamluk sultan whose mosque stands nearby.

The mosque is built of local Muqattam limestone, with columns and sheathing of alabaster—a stone softer than marble previously used mainly for vases and other small objects—from a quarry near Bani Suwayf. The mosque was completed in 1857 under Saʿid Pasha. Colonnades topped with small domes bound its open courtyard. The side opposite the great dome has a clock tower with an ornate timepiece presented by King Louis-Philippe of France; Muhammad Ali returned the favor with the obelisk now standing in the Place de la Concorde in Paris. Two slender Ottoman minarets rise 270 feet (82 m) on square bases only 10 feet (3 m) on a side. The great Byzantine Ottoman dome rests on four arches with four massive piers. Four half-domes lead out of the arches, four smaller domes fill in the corners, and a lower half-dome tops the *mihrab* (the niche at the east end of the mosque pointing to Mecca). Above the alabaster sheathing, the interior walls and domes are ornately painted. Muhammad Ali is buried beneath a marble monument to the right of the entrance, behind a bronze grill. Hundreds of lights hang from the ceiling on great chandeliers. Muhammad Ali's Jawhara (Bijou) Palace stands nearby.

The Muhammad Ali Mosque lacked local successors as well as local antecedents. In the second half of the nineteenth century, either Western or eclectic Mamluk-revival styles were preferred for major Egyptian buildings.

See also MUHAMMAD ALI; SULTAN AHMET MOSQUE.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

MUHAMMAD AL-SADIQ

[1814–1882]

Ruler of Tunisia, 1859–1882.

Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey was the son of Husayn Bey (ruler of Tunisia, 1824–1835) and the third Husaynid *mushir* (marshal). His reign saw Tunisia's first experiment with constitutionalism, parliamentary rule, and restrictions on the bey's authority; the unbridled control of Prime Minister Mustafa Khaznader; disastrous foreign loans; increased taxes; a bitter revolt; Europe's economic control; the reformist ministry of Khayr al-Din (1873–1877); and the imposition of a protectorate by France (1881).

From all reports, Muhammad al-Sadiq was a weak ruler who was easily influenced by his political entourage of Mamluks, especially Khaznader. Like his predecessor, Ahmad Bey, al-Sadiq evinced an early fascination with the military and showed

some talent in that area. Soon after his accession, he sought to reconstitute the army and introduced a military code that provided for conscription of all able-bodied male adults for a period of eight years. An individual could send a proxy if he chose not to enter the army.

Upon assuming the throne in 1859, al-Sadiq declared that he would uphold the principles of the Fundamental Pact of 1857. He proclaimed a new constitution in April 1861. It included the principle of ministerial responsibility, financial control vested in the Grand Council, a strict budget controlled by the Grand Council, and a secular court system. Also provided was a "bill of rights" that included provisions for religious freedom and conversion from Islam.

Although the document appeared to guarantee constitutionalism and individual rights, it actually provided for a system that perpetuated the Turkish-Mamluk political elite and increased their power at the bey's expense. It was not, therefore, a parliamentary democracy that emerged, but a traditional elitist oligarchy. The limitations placed on the bey's authority by the constitution increased Khaznader's confidence and freedom of action. He used the constitution to eliminate his enemies on the Grand Council and install his close associates. He increased his financial exactions from the state treasury and more than doubled the national debt within one year. For this reason, he floated his first foreign loan in 1863. To pay for that loan, Khaznader increased the unpopular personal *majba* tax twofold. This led to the revolt of 1864.

From 1865 to 1869, Khaznader ran the state. In the latter year, after poor harvests, famines, and epidemics, al-Sadiq accepted the International Finance Commission, which aimed to ensure Tunisia's payment of its financial obligations. Khayr al-Din, Khaznader's son-in-law, represented Tunisia on the commission. In 1873 he persuaded the bey to remove Khaznader and install himself as prime minister.

Under Khayr al-Din's prime ministry, a number of reforms were instituted: regulation of the education at Zaytuna University, the founding of Sadiqi College, elimination of abuses in the administration of *hubus* (religious trust) properties, reformation of the tax system, abolition of the *mahallas,* improvements in administrative accountability, introduction of protective tariffs on imports, and numerous public works projects. Sharp curtailment of public spending by the bey and support for Ottoman claims to sovereignty over Tunisia forced Khayr al-Din to resign in July 1877. Constraints on the bey's powers were lifted, and the weak Mustafa ibn Isma'il became prime minister.

Using the excuse of Tunisia's violations of its border with Algeria, France invaded Tunisia in 1881. On 12 May 1881, Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey signed the treaty, known as the Treaty of Bardo, officially establishing France's protectorate, which lasted until 1956. It was later repudiated by the bey, an action that forced the signature of a second treaty in July. Although this second treaty was never ratified, the La Marsa Convention of June 1883 (signed by Ali Bey, ruler of Tunisia from 1882 to 1900) confirmed the provisions of the Bardo treaty and France's imposition of a protectorate.

See also Fundamental Pact; Khayr al-Din; Khaznader, Mustafa; La Marsa Convention; Mahalle Schools; Mamluks.

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Larry A. Barrie

MUHAMMAD, AZIZ

[1933–]

First secretary of the Communist Party of Iraq, 1963–1978.

A Kurd, born in Sulaymaniyya, Aziz Muhammad al-Hajj joined the Iraqi Communist Party in 1948. He was arrested the same year and jailed until the end of the monarchy in 1958. Soon after his release, he entered the Central Committee of the party and was appointed head of the Central Organizational Committee. From February 1963 to August 1965,

he resided in Moscow, and in 1963 was elected first secretary of the party (in exile). Starting in 1978, following the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the Baʿth regime in Iraq, Muhammad led the party to cooperation with the Baʿth. On 17 July 1978, Muhammad signed the National Action Charter with the president of Iraq and the secretary of the Baʿth party, which became a basis for strategic alliance between the communists and the Baʿth. By the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, real power in the party lay in the hands of Hamid Majid Musa.

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MICHAEL EPPEL
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

MUHAMMARA

See FOOD: MUHAMMARA

MUHARRAM

First month of the Islamic lunar calendar, containing thirty days.

The events that took place on the tenth of Muharram in the year 680 changed forever the character of this month by making it a month of mourning, at least for the Shiʿa. On that date, Husayn—the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and the third Imam of Shiʿite Islam—was brutally killed on the battlefield of Karbala. In this battle Husayn's sons, male relatives, and followers also perished. The women of his encampment were taken as captives to Caliph Yazid in Damascus. This tragic event overshadows any other event in that month. Husayn's ordeal started on the first of Muharram, when he and his party were intercepted by Yazid's troops, and continued even after his death, with the captivity of the Karbala survivors. Although the tenth of Muharram (known as *Ashura*), is the actual date of Husayn's death, the mourning has been extended to cover the whole month.

For the Shiʿa, the Muharram tragedy of Husayn is the greatest act of suffering and redemption in history. It acquired a timeless quality, and, therefore, apart from the yearly Muharram observances, the Shiʿa continually try to measure themselves against the principle of the paradigm of Husayn whenever they regard themselves as deprived, humiliated, or abused. In fact, one of the main slogans during the Islamic revolution in Iran (1978/79) chanted by the crowds or scribbled as graffiti on town and village walls was "Every day is Ashura; every place is Karbala; every month is Muharram." This same slogan was intoned on radio and television and was graphically depicted on posters and even postage stamps during Iran's eight-year (1980–1988) war against Iraq.

The Muharram commemoration of Husayn's passion and martyrdom is charged with unusual emotions throughout the world's Shiʿa communities. Even the followers of Sunni Islam and the members of other religions who live among the Shiʿa are greatly affected by these commemorative rituals. That participation in the annual observance of Husayn's suffering and death is considered an aid to salvation on the day of judgment provides an additional incentive for Shiʿa to engage in the many mourning rituals. Elaborate Muharram observances were already carried out in the fourth Islamic century in Baghdad during the reign of Muʿizz al-Dawla of the Shiʿite Buyid dynasty. Many Muharram rituals have developed since, and although they may differ in form from one locality to another, passionate participation in them is universal.

These rituals may be divided into two categories, the ambulatory and the stationary. They are primarily performed during the first ten days of Muharram, with the greatest discharge of emotions and the greatest number of rituals occurring on the day of Ashura. The most common ambulatory rite is a procession, and the participants are divided into different groups of self-mortifiers—those who beat their chests with the palms of their hands; those who beat their backs with chains; and those who wound their foreheads with swords or knives. Some mortify themselves with stones, and others carry the *alam,* which signify the standard of Husayn at Karbala. In Iran, in some processions, floats with live tableaux representing the scenes from the Karbala tragedy can be seen, as well as Husayn's symbolic bier, called *nakhl* (date palm). Nakhl is carried because, according to tradition, Husayn's beheaded corpse was

carried on a stretcher made of date palm branches. Some nakhl are so large that they require more than 150 people to carry them. Processions are accompanied by bands of martial and mournful music. The most characteristic features of Muharram on the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent are the huge artistic interpretations of Husayn's mausoleum carried or wheeled in the procession. At the end of Ashura day, these structures, called *taʿziya,* are either cremated or buried at the local cemetery, called Karbala, or are immersed in water.

The Muharram observances were brought as far as the Caribbean basin in the years 1845 to 1917, when indentured laborers from India went there. Muharram is still, after carnival, the most important event in Trinidad. Although the Muharram rituals in Trinidad have more of a festive than a mourning character, the main features continue to be processions. In this case, the processions are parades of colorful cenotaphs for Husayn, called *tadja.* In India, the Sunni and even the Hindus actively participate in many Muharram rituals. In Trinidad as well, this is a true ecumenical event.

To the stationary rituals belong *majalis al-aza,* recitation and singing of the story of Husayn at the Battle of Karbala. In Iran, this ritual is called *rawda khwani.* The storyteller (called *rawda khwan*) of the Shiʿite martyrology sits above the assembled crowd on a *minbar* (pulpit) in a black tent, under an awning, or in a special edifice (*Husayniyya* or *takiya* in Iran; *ashurkhanah* or *imambarah* in India) and brings the audience to a state of frenzy with recitation, chanting, crying, sobbing, and body language. The most unusual stationary ritual is the taʿziya of Iran—the only serious drama and theater developed in the Islamic world depicting the martyrdom of Husayn and other Shiʿite martyrs. Originally, it was performed in the month of Muharram, but now it is staged year round.

The Muharram processions actually served as prototypes for the massive demonstrations in Tehran and other Iranian cities during the 1978/79 revolutionary upheavals. The mixing of Muharram mourning slogans with political ones has been an old Muharram tradition. The Iranian Revolution utilized the Husayn Muharram paradigm and was carried out in accordance with the Islamic calendar. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolution started in Muharram on Ashura, 3 June 1963, when he delivered a speech at the Fayziya Madrasa in Qom, criticizing the internal and external policies of the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and his government. In the article "Islamic Government," written while he taught in exile in Najaf, Khomeini states: "Make Islam known to the people, then . . . create something akin to Ashura and create out of it a wave of protest against the state of the government" (*Islam and Revolution,* p. 131). A few days before Muharram on 23 November 1978, in order to accelerate the revolution, Khomeini issued from Neauphle-le-Château, France, a declaration called "Muharram: The triumph of blood over the sword," which was recorded in France and distributed in Iran through its network of mosques. The opening paragraph of the declaration reads as follows:

> With the approach of Muharram, we are about to begin the month of epic heroism and self sacrifice—the month in which blood triumphed over the sword, the month in which truth condemned falsehood for all eternity and branded the mark of disgrace upon the forehead of all oppressors and satanic governments; the month that has taught successive generations throughout history the path of victory over the bayonet. (*Islam and Revolution,* p. 242)

Less than two months later, the shah left Iran, enabling Khomeini to return from fourteen years of exile.

Muharram affects the entire Islamic community; however, it is primarily felt among Shiʿa. Muharram could be expressed both as a mourning depression and an exuberant agitation and will to act. These expressions of Muharram can be and have been converted into political actions.

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PETER CHELKOWSKI

MUHARRAQ

The second-largest city in the Kingdom of Bahrain and the second-largest island of the archipelago in the Persian/Arabian Gulf.

During the early nineteenth century, Muharraq (also Moharek, al-Muharraq) was ruled by leaders of the Abdullah branch of the al-Khalifa (who rule Bahrain). They used it as a base for their long-standing rivalry with the Sulman branch, centered in Manama (the capital, on the main island of Bahrain, now across a short channel-bridge). More homogeneous in population than Manama, Muharraq has mainly Sunni Arabs and only two predominantly Shiʿite residential districts. During the 1950s and 1960s, both radical and Arab nationalist movements appealed to the city's people in an effort to remove the British. Muharraq was the site of the British air force and army bases during the later years of the British protectorate (1880–1971). It is also the site of the country's international airport. In 2001, the city's population was estimated at 74,000.

See also AL KHALIFA FAMILY.

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FRED H. LAWSON

MUHSIN, ZUHAYR

[1936–1979]

Palestinian politician and guerrilla leader.

Born in Tulkarm in mandatory Palestine, Zuhayr Muhsin joined the Baʿth party at age seventeen and later became a teacher in Jordan. He was accused in 1957 of pro-Nasser subversion, and left to live briefly in Qatar and Kuwait, before finally settling in Damascus, Syria. In 1970, he became leader of Saʿiqa (Thunderbolt), the Syrian Baʿth party's Palestinian guerrilla organization. The following year, he was appointed to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) executive committee as Saʿiqa's representative. Later, he became head of the PLO's military department.

Muhsin is believed to have led a battalion that attacked the Lebanese town of Damur in January 1976, where 582 people were killed. Saʿiqa also played a role in defending the Tal al-Zaʿtar Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon under siege by the Phalange the following summer. At the 1977 Palestinian National Council meeting, Muhsin argued against partial, negotiated settlements on the Palestine question. He was assassinated by an unknown assailant on 15 July 1979 on a street in Cannes, France.

See also BAʿTH, AL-; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); PHALANGE; SAʿIQA, AL-; TALL AL-ZAʿTAR REFUGEE CAMP.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

MUHTAR, GAZI AHMET

[1839–1918]

Ottoman soldier and grand vizier.

One of the great Ottoman war heroes of the late nineteenth century, Gazi Ahmet Muhtar's first notable victory was his halt of Russian advances on the eastern front in the Turkish-Russian War (1877/78). In appreciation, Sultan Abdülhamit II awarded him

the title of *gazi* and appointed him to head an imperial military inspection commission. From 1895 to 1906, Ahmet Muhtar served as the sultan's representative, or high commissioner, to Egypt.

During this time, Ahmet Muhtar became a prominent advocate of modernization and westernization and was loosely affiliated with the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) and other groups. In July 1912, liberal officers opposed to the CUP's autocratic rule used military threats to bring down its grand vizier. They chose Ahmet Muhtar, then an elderly statesman considered above politics, to replace him. His government, known as "the great cabinet," consisted of several former grand viziers chosen to unite the empire in face of the Balkan crisis and Italian war. But Muhtar's government fell after only a few months, with the grave Ottoman losses at the outbreak of the Balkan War in October.

See also COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS.

ELIZABETH THOMPSON

MUHYI AL-DIN, KHALID

[1923–]

Egyptian politician.

A military officer from a well-to-do family, Khalid Muhyi al-Din received a degree in economics from the University of Cairo and the rank of major in the Egyptian army after graduating from the Royal Military Academy. He joined the clandestine Free Officers who toppled King Farouk in 1952. Although Muhyi al-Din was a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, he was eventually marginalized by Gamal Abdel Nasser, first for backing President Muhammad Naguib and later for being a communist in an Arab context that did not favor communism. He did, however, retain a position in the government overseeing the press. He opposed Anwar Sadat's pro-Western and pro-Israeli policies and in 1977 formed the National Progressive Unionist Party, over which he presided and which advocated a pan-Arab socialist ideology. He was elected to parliament in 1990.

See also ARAB SOCIALISM; FAROUK; FREE OFFICERS, EGYPT; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE UNIONIST PARTY; SADAT, ANWAR AL-.

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MAYSAM J. AL-FARUQI

MUHYI AL-DIN, ZAKARIYYA

[1918–]

Egyptian military officer and politician.

Zakariyya Muhyi al-Din (or Mohieddin) came from a wealthy landowning family outside Mansura, Egypt. He was educated at the Military College and the Staff Officers College in Cairo, served in the Palestine War, and was an Army Staff College lecturer at the time of the revolution. An original member of the Free Officers and a key figure in the overthrow of King Farouk in 1952, he was appointed to the Revolutionary Command Council established to support Gamal Abdel Nasser in government. Muhyi al-Din subsequently served as interior minister (1953–1962), founded the General Intelligence Service, and then served as prime minister (1965–1966) and vice president (1967). After the 1967 war with Israel, Nasser resigned and named Muhyi al-Din his successor, a fact widely interpreted as acquiescence to U.S. influence, particularly since Muhyi al-Din supported economic liberalization throughout the 1960s. Public demonstrations encouraged Nasser to withdraw his decision, and Muhyi al-Din left public life in March 1968.

After Nasser's death in 1970, it was thought that conservatives were plotting to ensure that Muhyi al-Din succeeded as president, leading to a wave of "corrective" trials when Anwar al-Sadat secured the support of centrist and leftist camps. In 1972 Muhyi al-Din was again linked to a petition to Sadat by ministers and ex-officers opposed to Soviet influence, and in 1978 he publicly opposed Sadat's rapprochement with the United States and Israel. He has since refrained from making public interventions.

See also FREE OFFICERS, EGYPT; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL (EGYPT).

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David Waldner
Updated by George R. Wilkes

MUJADDARA

See Food: Mujaddara

MUKHABARAT

See Glossary

MUKHTAR

See Glossary

MUKHTAR, UMAR AL-

[c. 1862–1931]

Preindependence Libyan guerrilla leader.

Umar al-Mukhtar was born into the Minifa tribe, which lives along the eastern Cyrenaican coast, otherwise known as Marmarica. His family was part of the Farhan lineage, itself part of the Braidan fraction. The Minifa were a client tribe of the al-Abaydat *saʿadi* tribe, to whom they paid dues as *marabtin al-sadqan* (clients for protection). Most of the tribe were seminomads, but some lineages were camel-herding nomads. The tribe had long been under Sanusi influence, with the closest *zawiya* (Islamic religious center) being located at Janzur, on the coast.

Umar al-Mukhtar's early education was provided at the Janzur *zawiya.* He then moved to the Sanusi order's headquarters at Jaghbub, 100 miles (160 km) inland, near the modern border between Libya and Egypt. He proved an adept pupil and a committed member of the Sanusi *ikhwan* (brotherhood), with the result that he was nominated shaykh of the al-Qasur *zawiya,* in the Abid tribe, just to the south of al-Marj in the Jabal al-Akhdar.

At the turn of the century, after only two years at al-Qasur, Umar al-Mukhtar was sent southward to the new Sanusi headquarters at al-Kufra, which had been created in 1895. From there he was sent to Wadai, to participate in the Sanusi resistance to French penetration into what today is central Chad. He returned to al-Qasur in 1906 and took a prominent role in the first Italo–Sanusi War, which followed on the Italian invasion and occupation of Darna and Tripoli in September 1911.

The war was brought to an end by the Treaty of Akrama in January 1917. The treaty was, in effect, a truce, enforced on the Sanusi by British pressure, which left the Italians in charge of the coastal areas, while the Sanusi controlled the hinterland. Sanusi armed forces were gathered into a series of camps running eastward along the southern slopes of the Jabal al-Akhdar from Ajidabiya to Akrama. The *badu* (bedouin) forces in these camps were controlled by Sanusi *ikhwan* and shaykhs. Umar al-Mukhtar was responsible for the camps at al-Abyar, due east of Banghazi and south of al-Marj, and Taknis, just southeast of al-Marj.

In November 1921, in accordance with the terms of the Accord of Bu Mariyam, four of these camps were transformed into *campi misti* (mixed camps), in which Italian and Sanusi units, under their own independent commands, were garrisoned side by side. Both the camps controlled by Umar al-Mukhtar were included in this bizarre experiment, which was designed to promote joint policing and security arrangements. The fascist march on Rome at the end of 1922 also marked the beginning of the end of this experiment in joint policing and, on 6 March 1923, Italian forces attacked the campi misti, thus ushering in the second Italo–Sanusi War.

Although the Sanusi family did not take direct charge of the new war—most of its members fled to Egypt for British protection—Sanusi *ikhwan* played a prominent role, alongside some of the younger members of the Sanusi family. Umar al-Mukhtar was to take charge of operations against the Italians. He took charge of all the guerrilla bands *(adwar)* on the plateau formed along the southern slopes of the Jabal al-Akhdar in Cyrenaica, as the *al-Naʾib al-Amm* (general representative) of the Sanusi.

According to E. E. Evans-Pritchard, the *adwar* were usually between 100 and 300 men, and each was the nominal responsibility of a particular tribe.

Its membership, however, was often heterogeneous, including members of other tribes, *ikhwan,* and sympathizers from the Sudan and Tripolitania. The overall numbers involved in the fighting were very small—around 600 to 700 toward the end of the war—simply because the terrain did not permit major movements of personnel. Umar al-Mukhtar's responsibilities were to determine strategy, to arrange logistics and to ensure discipline, particularly in terms of pillage and vendettas.

The guerrilla war obeyed few of the rules to which the Italians were accustomed. In a telling passage, Teruzzi, when governor of Cyrenaica, pointed out to the authorities in Rome that superiority in men and arms was "a vain illusion, because the struggle was not against an organized enemy, but against an enemy who had no consistency of form." It was difficult, for example, for the Italians to distinguish between friend and foe, because those tribes that were apparently submitted to Italian rule still provided material support to the guerrillas.

The strategy of al-Mukhtar was to hold the southern slopes of the plateau formed by the Jabal al-Akhdar to the south of the littoral escarpment. Although the Italian forces were able to establish themselves on the coast and to control the immediate hinterland of their major bases at Ajidabiya and al-Marj, they found it very difficult to ensure control of the land between. They were able to use air power to attack *badu* camps in the flatlands of the plateau, but could do little about the plateau itself. Even a line of permanent forts and outposts along the plateau of the Jabal did little to increase the effectiveness of Italian units, while an attempt to divert guerrilla activity by the capture of Jaghbub in 1926 proved to be irrelevant to the struggle.

Nonetheless, the constant military pressure severely depleted al-Mukhtar's forces; in 1928, both provinces of Libya were placed under a single administration. An offer of negotiations persuaded al-Mukhtar, his companion guerrilla leader, Sidi Fadil Bu Umar, and a young scion of the Sanusi family, Sayyid al-Hasan al-Rida, to accept a five-month truce. The negotiations broke up in disorder, however, with al-Mukhtar and his supporters rejecting the arrangements agreed to by Sayyid al-Hasan al-Rida. By late January 1930, al-Mukhtar was forced to back into his last redoubt, after his forces were severely beaten at Wadi Mahajja; 800 men and 2,000 camels were lost during 1929, compared with Italian losses of only 114 men.

Command of the Italian campaign in Cyrenaica was then taken over by General Rodolfo Graziani, who applied a ruthless policy—providing Italian troops with great mobility, isolating the guerrilla bands from their logistics support base by herding the nomadic population of Cyrenaica into concentration camps, and cutting the guerrillas off from their Egyptian bases by a barbed-wire barricade.

On 11 September 1931, Sidi Umar al-Mukhtar was captured at Suluq and, five days later, was hanged before 20,000 Libyans in a demonstration of Italian power. The war was effectively over, even though 700 guerrillas had remained on the plateau. The last engagement was fought on 19 December 1931. The death of al-Mukhtar had destroyed the spirit of the Libyan resistance.

See also SANUSI ORDER.

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GEORGE JOFFE

MUKRANI FAMILY

Prominent family in preindependence Algeria.

During the late Ottoman period (c. 1800–1830), the Mukranis controlled a key section of the route between Algiers and Constantine. Under the French, Muhammad al-Mukrani was a regional commander until the military regime was weakened by Prussia's defeat of France in 1870. His revolt of 1871/72, supported by the Rahmaniyya brotherhood of Kabylia, was the largest and most harshly suppressed indigenous uprising prior to the War of Independence.

PETER VON SIVERS

MULAI

See GLOSSARY

MULUKHIYYA

See FOOD: MULUKHIYYA

MUNICH OLYMPICS

See TERRORISM

MUNIF, ABDEL RAHMAN

[1933–]

Saudi Arabian writer.

Abdel Rahman (also Abd al-Rahman) Munif, a prolific writer of novels and of autobiographical and political essays, was born in 1933 in Amman, Jordan, to a Saudi father and an Iraqi mother. He attended university in Baghdad and Cairo and earned a Ph.D. in oil economics from the University of Belgrade. Munif continued to visit Saudi Arabia until 1963, when the Saudi government stripped him of his citizenship because of his political activism. Munif held prominent positions in the oil industry and was editor in chief of the periodical *Oil and Development* in Baghdad. He published his first novel, *Al-ashjar wa ightiyal Marzuq* (The trees and Marzuq's assassination), in 1973. His 1978 novel, *Endings,* is distinguished from the many Arabic novels focused on urban life by its detailed portrayal of the culture and the harsh conditions of village life at the edge of the desert. His description of life, culture, and politics in the Arabian peninsula reaches its most elaborate expression in the five-book *Cities of Salt* series. The first volume, originally published as *Al-Tih* (The wilderness, 1984), presents a critical view of the development of a fictional Gulf emirate in the 1930s and explores the disruption of an oasis community as a result of the interaction between Americans and the local Bedouin community following the discovery of oil. Munif's devastating portrayal of government corruption and oppression in *Cities of Salt* and other novels has inspired censors in Saudi Arabia and Egypt to ban his books.

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CAROLINE SEYMOUR-JORN

MUNTADA AL-ADABI, AL-

A pro-Arab club founded in Istanbul in 1909; centered in Jerusalem after 1918.

Al-Muntada al-Adabi (Literary Society) was originally founded in Istanbul in 1909 by Abd al-Karim al-Khalil of Tyre, Lebanon, to act as a meeting place for Arab visitors and residents in the capital of the Ottoman Empire. The club played a role in the prewar reformist Arab movement in late Ottoman times. Membership of the club included politically conscious Lebanese, Palestinians, and Syrians. After the dissolution of the Ottoman state, the club reemerged in Jerusalem in November 1918 with new members and a new political program. It was largely dominated by prominent members of the Nashashibi family, most notably Isʿaf, a man of letters. Adopting a stance in favor of Arab nationalism, the club demanded complete Arab independence and Palestinian-Syrian unity. From its major center in Jerusalem, the club helped organize an anti-Zionist movement whose activities spread in Lebanon and Syria, where the club had branches. With the fall of the Syrian Arab government of Faisal I ibn Hussein (1920), the club lost a major source of support and was eclipsed by the emergence of the Arab Executive in 1920.

See also NASHASHIBI FAMILY.

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MUHAMMAD MUSLIH

MUNTAFIQ TRIBE

See TRIBES AND TRIBALISM: MUNTAFIQ TRIBE

MUNTASIR FAMILY

Prominent Tripolitanian Arab family in Libya.

The Muntasir family resided in the coastal town of Misurata. It collaborated with the Turkish administrators of Libya during the second Ottoman occupation, after 1835, but fell out with the Young Turk revolution of 1908, since one of its leading members was murdered, allegedly, at Young Turk instigation.

The Muntasirs switched support to Italy during Italy's entry into Libya, before the military occupation of 1911, and cautious support continued during the first Italo-Sanusi War that ensued.

When the United Nations took charge of Libya's transition to independence in 1950, Mahmud Bey Muntasir was made premier of the provisional government, a position that was confirmed upon independence until his resignation in 1954. As an intimate of the royal family, he became premier and interior minister again in 1964, during pro-Arab nationalist agitation in Tripoli. Since the Great September Revolution (1969), members of the family have acted in a ministerial capacity and Umar Muntasir has been seen as the leading light of the technocrat faction within the Jamahiriya.

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GEORGE JOFFE

MURABITUN

Military arm of Harakat al-Nasiriyyin al-Mustaqillin (Independent Nasserite Movement); largest Sunni Muslim militia in west Beirut from the beginning of Lebanon's civil war of 1975 until the Arab–Israel War of 1982.

Founded by Ibrahim Qulaylat in early 1972, the Murabitun (Arabic for sentinels) of Lebanon maintained a close alliance with al-Fatah (of the Palestine Liberation Organization, PLO) and continuously replenished its arms stockpiles through the largesse of Libya. Qulaylat was a veteran of the Lebanese Civil War of 1958 and had cultivated a personal relationship with his hero, Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

During the early stages of the Lebanese Civil War of 1975, the Murabitun expelled the Maronite Christian militias from the hotel district of downtown Beirut, and they maintained a sizable presence in the capital from then on. The dispersal of the PLO and the Murabitun's disarmament by Israel in 1982 greatly weakened the movement; in 1984, Syria's allies, the Shiʿite Amal and the Druze militias of the Progressive Socialist Party conducted a series of multiple strikes against Qulaylat, who increasingly advanced himself as the protector of the Sunni community. Qulaylat now lives in exile in France.

See also FATAH, AL-; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1958); NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY.

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BASSAM NAMANI

MURRAH, AL

See TRIBES AND TRIBALISM: MURRAH, AL

MUSA DAGH

Mountain site of Armenian resistance to 1915 deportation orders in the Ottoman Empire.

Of the hundreds of villages, towns, and cities across the Ottoman Empire whose Armenian population was ordered removed to the Syrian desert, Musa Dagh was one of only four sites where Armenians organized a defense of their community against the deportation edicts issued by the Young Turk regime beginning in April 1915. By the time the Armenians of the six villages at the base of Musa Dagh were instructed to evict their homes, the inhabitants had grown suspicious of the government's ultimate intentions and chose instead to retreat up the mountain and to defy the evacuation order. Musa Dagh, or the Mountain of Moses, stood on the Mediterranean Sea south of the port city of Alexandretta and west of ancient Antioch.

With a few hundred rifles and the entire store of provisions from their villages, the Armenians on

Musa Dagh put up a fierce resistance against a number of attempts by the regular Turkish army to flush them out. Outnumbered and outgunned, the Armenians had little expectations of surviving the siege of the mountain when food stocks were depleted after a month. Their only hope was a chance rescue by an Allied vessel that might be roaming the coast of the Mediterranean. When two large banners hoisted by the Armenians were sighted by a passing French warship, swimmers went out to meet it. Eventually five Allied ships moved in to transport the entire population, more than four thousand in all.

The Armenians of Musa Dagh had endured for fifty-three days: from 21 July to 12 September 1915. They were disembarked at Port Saʿid in Egypt and remained in Allied refugee camps until the end of World War I when they returned to their homes. As part of the district of Alexandretta, or Hatay, Musa Dagh remained under French mandate until 1939. The Musa Dagh Armenians abandoned their villages for a second, and final, time when the area was incorporated in the Republic of Turkey.

In the face of the complete decimation of the Armenian communities of the Ottoman Empire, Musa Dagh became a symbol of the Armenian will to survive in the postwar years. Of the three other sites where Armenians defied the deportation orders, Shabin Karahissar, Urfa, and Van, only the Armenians of Van were rescued when the siege of their city was lifted by an advancing Russian army. The Armenians of Urfa and Shabin Karahissar were either murdered or deported to face starvation in the Syrian desert much as the rest of the Armenians of the Turkish empire. In what became known as the Armenian genocide, Musa Dagh stood as the sole instance where the Allies averted the death of an Armenian community. That story inspired the Prague-born Austrian writer, Franz Werfel, to write a novelized version of the events as *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh.* Published in 1933, the book became an instant best-seller, but with the rise of Hitler, Werfel himself fled Vienna that same year. *Forty Days of Musa Dagh* was eventually translated into eighteen languages, and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer bought the rights to the book and announced plans for the production of a film version of the novel. The Turkish ambassador's protestations to the Department of State resulted in the intervention of the U.S. government in the matter. With a veiled threat to ban U.S.-made films from Turkey, MGM studios permanently shelved plans to produce the movie.

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ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

MUSA KAZIM

[1858–1919]

Ottoman Turkish religious leader.

Musa Kazim was the Shaykh al-Islam of the Ottoman Empire after the deposition of Sultan Abdülhamit II in 1909. He was also a member of Talat's cabinet in 1917. Musa Kazim Efendi called for a return to the foundations of Islam as the only way to restore the empire to its former glory. He believed in an orthodox Islam based on the Qurʾan and the *shariʿa* (Islamic law) and not open to what he perceived to be the liberal interpretations of the educated elite. Though he urged the adoption of Western technology, he claimed that Western culture was incompatible with the *shariʿa*, and cultural Westernization was therefore forbidden to Muslims. He was a staunch defender of the institution of the caliphate, and he championed reforms in the teaching of religion. Musa Kazim was a Sufi (a Muslim mystic) though there is some dispute as to whether he was of the Naqshabandi or the Bektashi order.

See also SHAYKH AL-ISLAM.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

MUSA, NABAWIYYA
[1890–1951]

Early Egyptian feminist.

Nabawiyya Musa, often referred to as one of Egypt's first Muslim feminists, was a pioneer of girls' schooling, women's rights, women's journalism, and nationalist education. Musa graduated from, and then taught at, al-Saniyya teacher training institute for girls. She gained fame in 1907 as the first woman to sit for and pass the secondary-school certificate exam despite there being no secondary girls' school at the time. Consequently, she became the first female teacher to earn pay equal with that of her male counterparts, setting a precedent for postindependence Egypt. An outspoken critic of foreign education because of what she considered its dubious political and cultural influence, Musa stressed the importance of indigenous teachers and a nationalist curriculum. She advanced girls' schooling as teacher, administrator, inspector, author of a popular grammar text, and founder and director of two private girls' schools. Also an avid writer and public intellectual, she founded the journal *Majallat al-Fata* and in 1920 authored the groundbreaking feminist work *al-Maraʾa wa al-Amal* (The woman and work). An honorary founder of the Egyptian Feminist Union (established in 1923) and a staunch nationalist, Musa believed that spreading women's education was an essential nationalist act with the greatest potential impact.

See also EGYPTIAN FEMINIST UNION; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES.

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LINDA HERRERA

MUSA, SALAMA
[1887–1958]

Egyptian socialist essayist.

Salama Musa was born into a Coptic, well-to-do, landed family in Zaqaziq, a town in Egypt's Nile delta. While still in high school, Musa left Egypt for Europe, where he studied in France and England. In England, he met and was influenced by several prominent members of the Fabian Society, including H. G. Wells and George Bernard Shaw. Fabianism was a doctrine that combined economic socialism with an emphasis on social and moral regeneration through the cultivation of traditional moral values such as culture, decency, and order.

Returning to Egypt, Musa sought to spread this doctrine, urging his readers to leave behind Asian civilization and to embrace European—specifically, British—civilization. Other themes he dealt with were the scientific spirit, the theory of evolution, and social democracy. He founded Egypt's Socialist Party in 1920 and established a journal, *al-Majalla al-Jadida* (The new magazine), a forum for radical critiques. In several of his works, Musa also developed the theme that the Coptic period was the apex of Egyptian civilization and that the Copts were the true present-day descendants of the ancient Egyptians.

See also COPTS.

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DAVID WALDNER

MUSAVI-ARDEBILI, ABDOLKARIM
[1926–]

Politically active Iranian cleric.

Born in Ardebil in 1926, AbdolKarim Musavi-Ardebili began his religious career in 1942 in Qom, where he was a student of Ayatollahs Ruhollah Khomeini and Hosain Borujerdi. In 1948 he went to Najaf, Iraq, to pursue his education further, and he stayed there for nineteen months. In the 1960s in Qom he copublished the journal *Maktab-e Islam* (School of Islam), and also pursued political activ-

ities in his hometown of Ardebil. In 1971 he moved to Tehran to conduct sermons at a mosque. A founder, after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, of the now defunct Islamic Republican Party, Musavi-Ardebili also established the Bonyad-e Mostazʾafan (Foundation of the Oppressed). He was the prosecutor general from 1980 to 1981 and head of the supreme judicial council and the Supreme Court from 1981 to 1989. In 1988 he was appointed to the Expediency Council. Other positions held by Musavi-Ardebili include his appointment by Khomeini to the constitutional review panel in 1989 and his membership in the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. Generally he has adopted moderate positions in the factional disputes among politicians since the early 1990s and has devoted his attention to a private high school that he founded.

See also Borujerdi, Hosayn; Iranian Revolution (1979); Khomeini, Ruhollah.

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Neguin Yavari
Updated by Eric Hooglund

MUSAVI, MIR-HOSAIN
[1941–]

Prime minister of Iran, 1981 to 1989.

Born in Khameneh in 1941, Mir-Hosain Musavi received a degree in architecture from the National University of Iran (now called Shahid Beheshti) in 1969. He was jailed in 1973 for anti-shah activities. Upon his release he left Iran for graduate studies in the United States, where he joined the Organization of Iranian Moslem Students. After the Iranian Revolution he joined the Islamic Republic Party and served as first deputy to the party's founder, Ayatollah Seyed Mohammad Hossein Beheshti (1929–1981).

A revolutionary favored by the left, he served as foreign minister in President Muhammad Ali Rajai's cabinet (1981). In October 1981, after a bomb attack had killed the president and the prime minister and a new election had resulted in the election of Hojatoleslam Seyed Ali Khamenehi as president, Musavi was appointed prime minister. He served in this position until 1989, when a constitutional amendment abolished the post of prime minister in favor of a stronger presidential system. His departure from the office marked a change in both the international and domestic policies of the Islamic Republic.

Musavi's tenure involved major national and international challenges: the Islamization of the society, the consolidation of clerical power and elimination of secular opposition, the debilitating Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), and economic sanctions imposed by the United States. During the 1980s Musavi tilted Iran toward the socialist bloc aligned with the former Soviet Union. When reelected in 1985, President Khamenehi considered replacing him but was opposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, who saw Musavi as a counterbalance to the conservative faction. Musavi's premiership was overshadowed by a strong parliament presided over by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and a president who did not favor his radical policies.

Musavi is a radical Islamic intellectual who supports a centralized and regulated economy, opposes the concentration of capital and land in private hands, and supports self-reliance over foreign investment and rapprochement with the United States. Despite his economic radicalism, he holds a relatively liberal attitude toward cultural policies.

After his premiership, he had a quiet life and assumed several nominal positions. Although both presidents Rafsanjani (1989–1997) and Mohammad Khatami (1997–present) appointed him as an adviser, he is rarely sought out. In 1987 Ayatollah Khomeini appointed him to the Expediency Council, but he has not been an active participant in recent years. Although he has a good relationship with the reformers, he is viewed as a radical member of the old guard. He remains a viable candidate for radical forces in the Islamic Republic. and during presidential elections his name often surfaces as a possible candidate.

He teaches at the Tarbiyat Modares University and is the chair of the Academy of Arts, the highest national institution overseeing national production of artistic works. He spends a good deal of his time on his own artistic works, which were shown in a 2003 exhibition in Tehran. He is married to Zahra Rahnavard, a sculptor and writer who is the

chancellor of the all-women university, Al-Zahra, in Tehran. They have three daughters.

See also Beheshti, Mohammad; Iranian Revolution (1979); Khamenehi, Ali; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi; Rahnavard, Zahra.

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Ali Akbar Mahdi

MUSCAT

Capital of Oman; formerly a Portuguese and later a British stronghold on the Oman coast.

Muscat's fine natural harbor has for centuries attracted local and foreign maritime powers. Otherwise, the city's location offers more challenges than benefits. Its climate is hot and humid most of the year, and the narrow, rocky strip of land upon which it lies is wedged tightly between the Indian Ocean and the steep flanks of the Hajjar Mountains. It is not known when Muscat was established, but the name first appears in written sources during the thirteenth century.

The port came into regional prominence during the sixteenth century, after Portugal seized control and built two massive forts that overlook the harbor to this day. Portugal ruled until the Ya˒ariba imamate restored Omani rule in 1649. Although not Oman's capital, Muscat thrived under Ya˒ariba patronage as a leading Indian Ocean emporium and shipping center and the hub of an expanding maritime empire. After a period of decline and Iranian rule, Muscat became one of the main ports and trading centers on the western Indian Ocean from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, controlled by the Al Bu Saʿid dynasty.

Muscat's prosperity began to decline in the 1830s, as Zanzibar became the region's premier commercial center. During the nineteenth century, British influence grew in Muscat, and the port became an important coaling station for ships plying routes between the empire's Indian possessions and the Middle East. By the early twentieth century, despite some arms smuggling, Muscat had become a sleepy steamer port. Its faltering business was conducted mainly by British-protected Indian merchants. Economic depression reduced the population in the early years of the twentieth century to just above 4,000 from about 30,000 in the mid-eighteenth century, before a revival began after the 1970 coup that installed Sultan Qabus ibn Saʿid al Bu Saʿid's modernizing regime.

As in other places on the Arabian Peninsula, oil revenues have been used to develop once-poor towns in Oman. Although lack of space has limited Muscat's growth, post-1970 improvements have included a sumptuous royal palace, restoration of historic structures, and a modern infrastructure. More extensive development has been possible in nearby towns because of the greater availability of land along the coastal strip between the capital and the international airport at Sib. Thus while Muscat had an estimated population of 55,000 in 2003, the nearby city of Ruwi had 112,000 inhabitants as well as much of the capital region's commercial, government, and residential development. Other towns in this region include Matrah, famous for its traditional *souk,* or market, Darsayt, Qurum, Mandinat Qabus, Ghubra, and Khuwayr.

See also Al Bu Saʿid, Qabus ibn Saʿid; Oman.

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Robert G. Landen
Updated by Anthony B. Toth

MUSIC

Musicians in the Middle East have, over the centuries, produced a great classical tradition in a variety of regional forms.

Historically, Middle Eastern music has been predominantly melodic, drawing from a complicated system of modes called *maqam* in Arabic, *makam* in Turkish, and *mugam* in Azerbaijani. The melodic system of Iran is based on *dastgaha,* similar in principle if not in practice. These systems and their repertoires frequently have written histories—music theories that date back to the time of al-Farabi and earlier.

Sung poetry is fundamental to the musical art of the region. The elegant or clever text and the performance that highlights the affective phrase or the play on words often are highly valued by listeners.

Instrument types include long- and short-neck lutes, plucked and hammered dulcimers, end-blown reed flutes, hourglass drums, frame drums, and several sizes of double-reed wind instruments often played in concert with large field drums. These instruments have different names, shapes, and playing styles.

Overarching genres of performance occur throughout the region, often consisting of suites of instrumental and vocal music, both improvised and formally composed. They occur in devotional rituals, dance, neoclassical performance, and performances by folk musicians. Despite the disparate sounds, contexts, and audiences, these performances are often linked by listeners with their Arabic musical-poetic heritage *(turath),* which encompasses a broad range of religious, classical, and folk musics. Typologies common in the West that separate the religious and the secular, or the classical, the folk, and the popular, do not always apply to Middle Eastern repertoires. For instance, in Iran the classical *radif* stands in stark contrast to Kurdish folk songs but is colored by Iranian Sufi performance. By contrast, the Azerbaijani *mugam,* a classical genre, includes and arguably depends on Azeri folk music in its structure.

Regional Distinctions

Over the years these historic materials and aesthetics have yielded distinct styles, genres, and practices in different times and places. For example, the governments of Morocco and Tunisia and private agencies in Algeria have participated in the revitalization of local forms of *nawba,* a suite-like genre. It is believed to have originated in Andalusia and to have been carried from there to North Africa. What results, in the twentieth century, is "classical" music so emblematic of a particular region that it is really not possible to speak of "Algerian" classical music, let alone "Arab" classical music but rather the repertories of Tlemcen, Constantine, Algiers, Fez, Tunis, and so on. However in general, revitalization of these genes serves to mark cultures as "Arab" rather than Berber.

On the other hand, styles drawn from the peoples of southern Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya have created distinctly North African popular genres exemplified by the Moroccan group Nas al-Ghiwan. Similiarly, Algerian *raʾi* offers an excellent example of a style rooted in local musical practice, transformed with imported electronic instruments and modern texts. These styles draw the historic aesthetic of the clever, sometimes stinging colloquial text and favorite local instruments into contact with the electronics, and sometimes the staging, of rock music. The result may or may not be considered "westernized" by local listeners.

Regional distinctions have long been part of *mashriq* performances. Microtonal intervals tend to be tuned slightly higher in Turkey and Syria than in Egypt and North Africa. The *buzuq* is an important part of Lebanese folk culture. The resurgence of "classical" repertoires has been discouraged in Turkey since the establishment of the republic (1923). The governments of Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon have sponsored neoclassical ensembles that often give concerts in opera houses, with musicians in evening dress performing without the extemporization that is historically part of Middle Eastern traditions. In other words, Arab pieces of music are presented in the context of a Western concert.

Transformed classical and folk traditions have emerged in nongovernmental venues as well. Perhaps the best known are the plays by Fayruz and the Rahbani brothers, articulating local pride and local concerns by using distinctly Lebanese styles and a combination of local and Western instruments. The Western models of the musical play and film,

Kurdish folk dancers and musicians, eastern Turkey, ca. 1990–1996. © CHRIS HELLIER/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

popular in the Arab world, serve local purposes well. The best-known recent exponent of music from the *turath* is the Syrian Sabah Fakhri, who travels internationally, performing *muwashshahat, taqasim,* classical instrumental pieces, and newer songs in suite-like arrangements. Umm Kulthum and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab are well-known performers of "new" or "popular" music that has attracted a large audience throughout the Arab world. Abd al-Wahhab's style is the more innovative, creating a pastiche of Western and Arab musical styles in a single composition and establishing the free-form instrumental piece *(al-qitʿa al-musiqiyya)* as an important independent genre. Although both Umm Kulthum and Abd al-Wahhab sing complicated neoclassical works, Umm Kulthum has claimed this area as her own.

Instrumental improvisations *(taqasim)* and a historic suite-like genre, the Iraqi *maqam,* have persisted throughout the twentieth century, partly supported by the Arab diaspora. The performances of Munir Bashir, Nazim al-Ghazali, and Muhammad al-Qubbanji have been rereleased by firms in Paris and Baghdad. Iraq and the countries of the Arabian peninsula support rich traditions of singing and dancing that have been documented by local musicologists and by folklore institutes such as that established in Oman.

Teaching and performing classical Persian music have formed part of musical life in Tehran throughout the twentieth century, especially among elites. The musical culture of Iran encompasses a range of folk and religious musics as well. Cabaret music also has become popular. Following the Iranian Revolution, the new government moved to suppress musical performance, including music at weddings. In the long run, the primary target was cabaret music, often associated with consumption of alcohol and prostitution. In recent years, *radif* recordings have become readily available, and performance of traditional music persists.

Israel presents a unique musical culture, consisting of a patchwork of musics from Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Arab world, and Africa, brought together in a small space over a relatively short period of time. A few syncretic repertoires have emerged, but musics more often persist as individual emblems of the immigrant communities.

Musical Occasions

Weddings and special occasions, often religious in nature, have long offered venues for musical performance. Starting the pilgrimage to Mecca, celebrating the birthday of Muhammad, remembering the martyrdom of Husayn, and the ceremonies of Sufi *dhikrs* have all involved music. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, urban nightclubs and cabarets often featured musical entertainment and dancing, as did tourist hotels. Generally speaking, there is a long history of professionalism in Middle Eastern music. In some areas, notably Iran, professional musicians tend to belong to minority groups; musical performance in the majority culture tends to be amateur.

These tendencies have persisted in the twentieth century. Often they have been transformed through the mass media, which quickly took hold throughout the Middle East and became very popular. Many would argue that the mass media have become primary patrons of musicians.

Commercial recording took hold in the first decade of the twentieth century, mainly in Algiers, Cairo, Beirut, Constantinople (now Istanbul), and Tehran. Radio became more popular than the phonograph in the 1930s. Television, beginning in the 1960s, and videocassettes in the 1970s, proliferated, especially among the middle and upper classes. This development is significant particularly because cassettes, which are inexpensive and portable, gave control over production to local artists, or at least to agencies that were closer to the artists than a national radio company or a European-based recording company. Artists were able to produce their own recordings and market them locally, circumventing those who select music for radio and television stations and the requirements of international production firms. In the 1990s, despite the opportunities for Middle Eastern artists to produce internationally marketed videos and compact disks, some of the most interesting performances are locally released cassettes.

Musical Processes and Issues

As a constituent of social life, musical performances in the Middle East have engaged local histories with the flow of new materials from other societies. Unsurprisingly, this engagement has fed debates on

Munir Bashir (1930–1997). Iraq's best-known musician, Bashir was famous for his mastery of the oud, a musical instrument of the lute family. **© Shepard Sherbell/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

authenticity, music and sociocultural identity, modernity, and the proper nature of culture in the late twentieth century.

The development of mass media centered in urban areas has tended to promote the musics of those areas over others. Local musics from Morocco to Iraq have been dominated in the mass media by musics produced in Cairo and Beirut, for instance. Only in recent years, with the less expensive cassette and a recent interest in the musics of southern Morocco, Nubia, and the Gulf states, has this situation changed.

Contact with Europe and the United States has led some musicians to borrow, adapt, and integrate new sounds into local music. The accordion, cello, string bass, and electronic instruments have become widely popular and virtually consolidated with some local musics. Latin rhythms, disco, and nineteenth-century orchestral music (especially for film scores) have been borrowed outright. This vast array of sounds—ranging from religious chanting by a solo voice to improvisations on lutes, dueling songs, formally composed orchestral pieces, and special electronic effects—is being employed by musicians and their listeners to identify themselves and to suggest directions and affinities within their societies.

Boundaries are not always clear. The process of musical creation transforms past practices to contribute to the lively culture of Middle Eastern societies

intent on maintaining an identity while responding to the challenges of the present.

See also ABD AL-WAHHAB, MUHAMMAD IBN; FAYRUZ; UMM KULTHUM.

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VIRGINIA DANIELSON

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Religious political organization that started in Egypt in 1928 and subsequently spread throughout most Muslim countries.

The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (*Jamʿiyyat al-ikhwan al-muslimin,* or the Society of Muslim Brothers) was Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), the son of a modest but learned religious teacher, who received traditional as well as modern training at Dar al-Ulum in Cairo, where he was exposed to the prevailing Salafiyya ideology of Islamic revivalism preached in Egypt by Muhammad Abduh. It was in Ismaʿiliyya, a showcase of Egyptian poverty and European colonialist wealth and power where he was posted to teach Arabic in a primary school, that he founded the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1934 Banna moved back to Cairo, where his organization merged with the Society for Islamic Culture, which was headed by his brother, and the combined organization quickly became the largest grass-roots movement in Egypt. With more than half a million members drawn from the middle class as well as from labor groups, peasants, and the student population, and with an efficient structure, hundreds of mosques and clubs throughout the country, and a printing press, in the 1940s the Brotherhood became a powerful organization intent on affecting the government's social policies and ridding Egypt of British occupation. Partly because of its mass power, and partly in order to play it against the other political parties, the Egyptian government in turn compromised with and fought the organization, jailing Banna intermittently on various charges and releasing him for fear of mass insurrection.

From the start, the Muslim Brotherhood exhibited the dual characteristics of an internal reform movement operating within the context of foreign occupation. Banna's early and primary concern, which molded the movement and provided it with its lasting method and policy, had been to bring about a return to the pristine sources of the faith and away from the distortions of popular religion. In that, it was the continuation of the powerful reform movement that spread throughout the Muslim world in the eighteenth century and became known in Egypt as the Salafiyya movement, although unlike the latter (but similar to earlier reform movements), the Muslim Brotherhood showed Banna's strong attachment to Sufi spirituality. Consistent with the pattern of Islamic reform movements in history, its ideology was translated into a praxis that sought to establish *shariʿa* and to use Islam to combat corruption, moral laxity, economic exploitation, and oppression through the creation of a strong civil network centered around the mosque and providing for employment, education, welfare, clubs, health clinics, and other social services. In harmony with earlier reform movements and with orthodox Islamic doctrine, it advocated dialogue, preaching, and gradual reform rather than revolt.

But the Muslim Brotherhood was also operating in the context of Egypt's occupation by the British, who dictated government policy. Moving away from the Salafiyya, which had become concerned solely with a strict interpretation of the faith, the Brotherhood looked to fulfill popular aspirations such as Egyptian independence, and it used anti-imperialist rhetoric from the start. In order to keep its legal status and remain operational, the Brotherhood maintained a policy of nonconfrontation, but this was challenged by its followers. A ma-

jor turning point came in 1936 with the eruption of riots in Palestine against the Zionist implantation. The Brotherhood, which already had offices in Palestine, helped to raise funds for the insurrection. In 1938 a meeting with the Palestinian mufti Muhammad Amin al-Husayni produced the decision that a military wing was needed to push back the territorial ambitions of the Zionists, and a secret order was created within the Brotherhood to repel Western colonialism. Thus, as part of the organization remained focused on reform and dialogue with a Muslim government, the other part took on jihad against the foreigners, and preachers and organizers were sent to Palestine to help in the Palestinian insurrection.

In 1939 Brotherhood members defected from the organization, claiming that its lack of action against British occupation was inconsistent with its stated ideology, and they started *Shabab Sayyiduna Muhammad,* the first of a number of radical Muslim political movements that advocated the use of force against a government that cooperates with Western occupation or with policies against the interests of the Muslim community. Banna had always opposed engaging in jihad against fellow Muslims. But to the military wing, largely formed in response to the defection of the disgruntled members, fighting the British occupation of Palestine was the same as fighting the occupation of Egypt. The partition of Palestine in 1948 led to uncontrollable riots and acts of violence against British and Jewish interests. The Muslim Brotherhood organized on the issue of partition, a major conference that was attended by foreign dignitaries and heads of state. This show of force led the Egyptian government to outlaw the Brotherhood, and to a wave of repression against its members. Although Banna tried to rein in his followers, some of them carried out assassinations of public figures, and as a result, Banna was assassinated by government officials in February 1949.

The Brotherhood after Banna

Under a new *murshid amm* ("supreme guide") and with the promise not to get involved in political activity, the Brotherhood was allowed to operate again in 1951. It had a large number of followers in the army, and it had even supplied arms to the stranded Egyptian soldiers in Palestine during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. A liaison was established between the Brotherhood and the movement of the Free Officers who, in 1952, seized power in a coup that benefited from the mass support provided by the Brotherhood. As a result, the Brotherhood was the only organization not dissolved by the new regime dominated by Gamal Abdel Nasser, which quickly became a secular nationalist-socialist autocracy that banned any opposition to the state. An assassination attempt on Nasser in 1956 led to the dissolution of the movement, the jailing of hundreds of its members, and the execution of many of its leaders, including its chief ideologue, Sayyid Qutb.

Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, head of the Muslim Brotherhood from 2002–2004, speaks during an interview at the Brotherhood's headquarters in Cairo, 7 May 2003. Al-Hudaybi called for a jihad to expel foreign forces from Iraq. © Reuters NewMedia Inc./Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Anwar al-Sadat became Egypt's president in 1970. Hoping to defuse the power of the followers of Nasser who opposed his policies of reconciliation with Israel, Sadat released from jail Umar al-Tilimsani, the leader of the Brotherhood, and allowed the Brotherhood to operate again (though without a legal status). The loss of the charismatic leadership of Nasser and the failure of the government's socialist policies helped the Brotherhood to regain its membership. Sadat promised to restore legal status to the Brotherhood if it supported his policy toward Israel, but it refused, and the leadership and hundreds of members were again thrown in jail. After the assassination of Sadat in 1981 by a member of

one of the radical Muslim movements, the new president, Husni Mubarak, granted more freedom to the Brotherhood, which saw its membership soar. Because it had no legal status, it could not participate in political elections, so its members ran for parliamentary election by forming an alliance with the Wafd Party in 1984, and they won the majority of opposition seats. The same success was achieved in 1987, when the Brotherhood allied itself with the Socialist Labor Party and the Liberal Party, and included Coptic representatives. The Brotherhood's victories led to a massive crackdown by the government of Mubarak during the 1990s and an attempt to counter its ideology with strong government propaganda. But the Brotherhood retained its power, and in the parliamentary elections of November 2000, a majority of members of the Brotherhood were independently elected to parliament, thus making the Brotherhood, though officially banned, the largest holder of opposition seats in the parliament. The sixth leader of the Brotherhood, Maʾmun al-Hudaybi, who had assumed the leadership in 2002, died in January 2004, and Muhammad Mahdi Akif was elected the new guide-general for the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood has offices throughout the Arab world, and a number of organizations emulating it have emerged in almost all Muslim countries. Its membership tends to be middle-class professionals and university graduates for whom the main goals are to oppose Western policies in the Muslim world in general and in Palestine in particular, and to bring about a social, economic, and political order in line with Islamic ideals. By avoiding theological discussion on the nature of law and state that could lead to divisiveness, taking a progressive stand on the rights of women (as demonstrated in the writings of Muhammad al-Ghazali), focusing on eliminating Western secular influences and ideologies (though accepting Western advances in technology, science, and education), and providing badly needed civic institutions, the Brotherhood has become the most important representative of the Egyptian masses.

See also Banna, Hasan al-; Free Officers, Egypt; Ghazali, Muhammad al-; Mubarak, Husni; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Qutb, Sayyid; Sadat, Anwar al-; Salafiyya Movement.

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Maysam J. al Faruqi

MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION

See Palestine

MUSLIM SISTERS ORGANIZATION

Muslim women's group in Sudan.

The first woman recruited to the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Sudan was Fatima Talib, who joined the organization in 1949. Women from the al-Mahdi family joined her, and they formed the Society for Women's Development mainly to provide an alternative to the leftist Sudanese Women's Union. After the October 1964 popular revolution, the Muslim Brothers, which supported woman suffrage, launched a new women's organization called the Patriotic Women's Front. The small band of Muslim women's activists broke new ground in Sudanese politics by supporting the idea that women have a voice in religion as well as in politics.

The strength of the Muslim Brotherhood grew during the latter years of the military regime of Jaʿfar Numeiri, who moved the Sudan toward Islamization and Islamism. In 1983 *shariʿa* was made the sole law in force in the nation. Hasan al-Turabi guided this process as attorney general under Numeiri; after Numeiri's popular overthrow in 1985, Turabi reinvented the Muslim Brotherhood as the National Islamic Front (NIF).

In 1973 Turabi had presented his ideas about the emancipation of women in Islamic societies in a pamphlet, *The Woman in Islamic Teachings.* The formation of the Muslim Sisters Organization was inspired by this pamphlet. Turabi's view states that women are equally responsible for heeding the call of God. Oppression of women in Muslim lands is not a proper reflection of Islamic principles, which

should accept the full participation of women in public life. Islamists in all Muslim societies should seek to reform this situation, rejecting traditionalism, promoting the renaissance of women, and shielding them from exploitation by misguided Western groups. The acceptance of Turabi's arguments by the Muslim Brotherhood permitted the movement to adapt, making it part of the process of social modernization.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD; NUMEIRI, JAʿFAR; *SHARIʿA;* SUDAN; SUDANESE CIVIL WARS; SUDANESE WOMEN'S UNION; TURABI, HASAN AL-.

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CAROLYN FLUEHR-LOBBAN

MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE

International Muslim organization.

The Muslim World League (in Arabic, Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami), headquartered in Mecca and funded by the government of Saudi Arabia, was founded under the auspices of King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud in 1966. The league promotes the cause of Islam throughout the world by holding conferences, distributing classical Islamic texts and modern religious publications, and paying the salaries of mosque preachers and missionaries.

KHALID Y. BLANKINSHIP

MUSTAFA FAZIL

[1829–1875]

Egyptian prince and supporter of Young Ottomans.

Prince Mustafa Fazil was the son of Ibrahim Pasha ibn Muhammad Ali and brother of the Egyptian Khedive Ismaʿil. In 1845, Mustafa Fazil traveled from Egypt to Constantinople (now Istanbul), where he took up politics. He served on the Council of Tanzimat from 1857 to 1862, and as minister of education in 1862 and 1863. In 1866, Ismaʿil secured a change in succession from Sultan Abdülaziz, thereby excluding Mustafa Fazil from the Egyptian throne. Mustafa Fazil, apparently in revenge, bankrolled the movement of Young Ottomans, first in Constantinople, and later from Paris. His 1867 open letter to the sultan was widely reproduced for forty years as a manifesto for political reform.

See also YOUNG OTTOMANS.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

MUSTAFA REŞID

[1800–1858]

Ottoman foreign minister, grand vizier, and reformer.

Mustafa Reşid is considered one of the major forces promoting the Tanzimat reforms that modernized the Ottoman Empire in the mid-nineteenth century. He was born in Constantinople (now Istanbul), the son of Mustafa Efendi, an administrator of religious foundations. Intending a career as a religious scholar, he studied at the *ilmiyye,* but at the age of ten his father died and he was forced to withdraw from school and live with his uncle, Ispartali Ali Paşa, a court chamberlain of Sultan Mahmud II. In 1816, Reşid accompanied Ali Paşa to the province of Morea, where the latter had been appointed governor. It was during Ali Paşa's second term as governor (1820–1821), that Reşid witnessed the rout of Ottoman forces by the European-supported Greek rebels and by the modernized army of Muhammad Ali, governor of Egypt, in the Greek War of Independence. Reşid learned two lessons from this experience: first, that reform of the basic institutions of the Empire was needed, and second, that diplomacy aimed at acquiring European support for the empire was as crucial as modernization of the army.

In 1826, with the help of an influential family friend, Mustafa Reşid entered the civil service as a clerk in the scribes bureau of the foreign minister, where he quickly rose to become assistant to the minister in charge of foreign affairs. From this position, Mustafa Reşid participated in negotiations with Muhammad Ali in 1830; the latter was so impressed with his talents that he offered him a high position in the Egyptian administration. In 1832, Reşid was appointed amedçi in the foreign ministry.

Between 1834 and 1836, he was ambassador to France, where he became acquainted with European statesmen, including the famous Austrian foreign minister, Prince Klemens von Metternich. In 1836, he was transferred to Britain as ambassador to the Court of Saint James, where he discussed reforms with Lord Palmerston. In 1837, Sultan Mahmud II, seeking a counterweight to Mehmet Koja Husrev, the leader of the conservative opposition to reform, appointed Mustafa Reşid, now a leading advocate of reform, foreign minister, giving him the title Paşa. For the next eighteen months, Reşid Paşa remained in London and Paris, while attempting to bolster Mahmud II's reform program and to convince the sultan to place his trust in the British. He returned to Constantinople only upon receiving news of the death of the sultan and of the ascension to the throne of his son, Abdülmecit I.

In 1839, Mustafa Reşid Paşa skillfully blended his mastery of domestic and foreign affairs to deter military disaster while advancing reform. As foreign minister and representative of the Sublime Porte in London, he had been unable to prevent his conservative rival Mehmet Koja Husrev Paşa from becoming grand vizier. But when Muhammad Ali, governor of Egypt, sent an army commanded by his son Ibrahim into Syria, Husrev Paşa responded by attempting to appease Muhammad Ali, offering to appoint him life-time governor not only of Egypt, but of Syria and Adana. Recognizing that this would result in a virtual dismemberment of the empire that would guarantee Russian domination, Mustafa Reşid Paşa negotiated with British foreign minister Lord Palmerston for the European support needed to counter the Egyptian advance. European, particularly British, military and diplomatic support, which was crucial in defusing the crisis, was linked to a commitment to support internal reform. Sultan Abdülmecit recognized the key role played by Reşid Paşa and rewarded him with a promise to advance the program of the reformers. On 3 November 1839 Sultan Abdülmecit initiated this reform program with the proclamation of the Imperial Rescript of Gülhane, a document which was composed by Mustafa Reşid and which is considered the opening salvo of the Tanzimat. Though the Tanzimat was initiated at a time of increased European involvement in the empire, it was promoted by Ottomans like Mustafa Reşid Paşa who recognized the need for continued reforms to remedy defects in the administration of the empire. Mustafa Reşid sought British support, but he was not acting under British pressure.

Mustafa Reşid Paşa's importance did not cease with the proclamation of the Tanzimat. He was one of the architects of a new commercial code, promulgated in 1841, that was based on French commercial law. When asked whether the new law was in comformity with Islamic law, he reportedly replied, "the Holy Law has nothing to do with it." Vociferous reaction from Islamic scholars led to suspension of the law and Mustafa Reşid's Paşa's dismissal. He served as ambassador to France until 1845, when he began a second period as leader of the reform movement. Over the next fifteen years, he served six times as grand vizier (28 September 1846 to 28 April 1848; 12 August 1848 to 26 January 1852; 5 March to 5 August 1852; 23 November 1854 to 2 May 1855; 1 November 1856 to 6 August 1857; and 22 October 1857 to 7 January 1858) and three times as foreign minister.

In addition, Reşid played a crucial role in recruiting and training a cadre of reform-minded bureaucrats who, under his leadership, became known as the "men of the Tanzimat" *(tanzimatcilar)*. In order to learn more about Islamic law, he retained Ahmet Cevdet as a tutor, subsequently hiring him as his personal scribe, and then appointing him to educational positions in the administration. The most well-known of his protégés were Mehmet Emin Ali Paşa, who served as Mustafa Reşid's translator and scribe in the embassy in London and later served as foreign minister and as grand vizier, and Mehmet Fuad Paşa, who became Mustafa Reşid's protégé in 1837. Mehmet Ali and Mehmet Fuad led the reform program during the last two decades of the Tanzimat. Whereas Mustafa Reşid had always sought alliance with Britain, his two protégés sought to orient empire politics toward an alliance with France. Partially as a result of this difference, the two eclipsed Mustafa Reşid Paşa in the early 1850s, though at the time of his death in 1858, Mustafa Reşid was once again grand vizier. After his death, his sons carried on the tradition of service to the empire, serving as ministers and ambassadors.

See also CEVDET, AHMET; MUHAMMAD ALI; TANZIMAT.

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DAVID WALDNER

MUSTAFA SUPHI

[1883–1921]

Turkish communist leader.

The son of a district governor, Mustafa Suphi was born in the Giresun district on the Black Sea. He studied law in Constantinople (now Istanbul) in the late 1890s and then continued his education in Paris and Rome. A leftist thinker, Mustafa Suphi fled Ottoman police shortly before World War I and took up residence in Russia where he organized a communist movement among Turkish prisoners. He began publishing communist propaganda in Turkish, which was distributed in Anatolia. After the war, Suphi supported the nationalist movement against the sultan, although the Kemalists coldly received his small group of about two hundred communists. Suphi was arrested in January 1921, shortly after returning to Turkey. While being transported by boat to Erzurum for trial, he and several friends were assassinated by pro-Enver Paşa supporters who believed Suphi would discredit the former Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) leader.

See also COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS; ENVER PAŞA.

ELIZABETH THOMPSON

MUTASARRIF

See GLOSSARY

MUTAYR TRIBE

See TRIBES AND TRIBALISM: MUTAYR TRIBE

MUWAHHIDUN

Members of a reform movement that began in the eighteenth century to revive Orthodox Sunnism, stressing the Sunna, *or the ways of the Prophet Muhammad.*

The movement was started by a religious scholar from Najd (Saudi Arabia), Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), schooled by *ulama* (Islamic clergy) in what is now Iraq, Iran, and the Hijaz (western Arabia). He called for a return to the sources of Islam, stressing the absolute unity of Allah (*tawhid*) and strict obedience to the Qurʾan (the sacred book of Islam) and the *hadith* (sayings and traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad). His understanding of *tawhid* was somewhat unique, following the teachings of Ahmad ibn Hanbal's (780–855) school of law (*madhhab*) and its later interpretation by Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328). By 1736, his followers— often called the Muwahhidun (Unitarians), today known as Wahhabis—rejected religious innovation (*bidʿa*) that promoted polytheism (*shirk*) and unbelief (*kufar*), and the tradition of *ziyaret,* or visits to saints believed to be intercessors between humans and Allah. Muwahhidun do not necessarily consider themselves members of a sect; rather, they reject esoterism on the basis of being people of tradition (Ahl al-Hadith).

The present-day structure of the Saudi government can be traced to the religious and political alliance sealed in 1744 between Ibn al-Wahhab with his marriage to the daughter of Muhammad ibn Saʿud, ruler of the Dariyya near the modern city of Riyadh. Together they created the model of a state wherein allegiance to the *shariʿa* (Islamic law), not tribal customs, reigned supreme. The movement spread rapidly, perhaps due to Abd al-Wahhab's introduction of firearms among Bedouin tribes accustomed to wielding the sword and lance. After his death, the Wahhabi forces had by 1806 sacked the Shiʿite shrines of Karbala (in southwestern Iraq), occupied the holy cities of Mecca and Medina where they destroyed the tombs of revered saints, and raided the Syrian interior.

Ottoman Turkish and Egyptian garrisons in the Hijaz were not able to prevent the emergence of the Wahhabi state in the twentieth century by the Al Saʿud family in their capital, Riyadh. It began when their relations with the Al Rashid family, a Wahhabi clan governing the Shammar region, became strained and, in 1884, the Saudi family was forced to seek sanctuary with the Mubarak rulers of Kuwait. In 1901, Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman ibn Saʿud, son of the last Saudi governor of Riyadh, led a daring raid that restored his family's power.

By 1912 a renewal in Wahhabi doctrine led to a consolidation of various tribes, or the Ikhwan (the brothers). In 1912 Abd al-Aziz (ibn Saʿud) appealed to other Bedouins to join the Ikhwan and steadily enlarged his domains by creating militarized agricultural colonies (*hujar*) to transcend tribal loyalties. The Bedouin tribes posed a threat to the unification of the Saudi kingdom, and the colonies were an attempt to make farmers of seminomadic warriors. The *hujar* were built on the sacred principle of *hijra* (emigration or flight, referring to the Prophet Muhammad's flight to Medina when he was forced to leave Mecca). In 1921 Abd al-Aziz entered Haʾil, the capital of Shammar, overthrowing the Rashid family in the process. In 1924 he occupied the site of Islam's holiest cities and shrines and overthrew caliph Sharif Husayn ibn Ali.

An important shift occurred in the late 1920s. Abd al-Aziz deemed the ferocity of the Ikhwan and particularly their *mutawwiʿun* (enforcers of obedience), Wahhabism's religious police, unfavorable to the modern Saudi state he wished to create. The Ikhwan wished to continue their advances into other areas under British protection only to be prohibited by Abd al-Aziz, who in 1926 had been proclaimed king of the Hijaz. The Ikhwan revolted in 1927 but were crushed with difficulty in 1929. However, their defeat did not mean the end of puritanical Wahhabism.

In 1932 Hijaz and Najd became a single country, which was officially named the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and fortunes of the Wahhabis became inextricably linked to it. King Abd al-Aziz strove to consolidate his power in those areas of the Arabian peninsula where he ruled. In alliance with the *ulama,* he strictly imposed the *shariʿa* and paid careful attention to the services accorded to the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). He placated Hijazi opinion by allowing *ijtihad* (learned opinion) in the cases brought against the government before the *mazalim* courts. In dire financial straits, he signed a petroleum concession with a U.S. company in 1932, and oil was discovered in 1936. His famous 1945 meeting with U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt on the U.S. destroyer on the Suez Canal stressed the growing international importance of Saudi Arabia, and by the end of World War II, oil production began.

The Wahhabi model appealed to other Islamic reform movements, such as the Salafiyya movement in Egypt in the late nineteenth century and the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) founded by Shaykh Hasan al-Banna in 1928. Like other Arab potentates, King Abd al-Aziz was greatly preoccupied with Palestine, and he sent a military contingent to participate in the Arab–Israel War of 1948, when Israel became a state. Wary of Western influence, Saudi Arabia joined Egypt and Syria in the 1950s in resisting a regional Middle East defense organization. The threat of a Nasser-type military coup brought Saudi Arabia's defection from that alliance and placed it more in line with the Hashimites.

As oil wealth began to permeate Saudi society in the early 1960s, the Wahhabi movement retained a profound influence on the social and economic development of Saudi Arabia. The *mutawwiʿun,* a carryover from the Ikhwan, oversaw strict observance—challenging the melodious recitation of the Qurʾan, excessive veneration at saints' tombs, desegregation of the sexes, and the appearance of the full (unveiled) female form on television.

In 1953, King Abd al-Aziz died. By the 1960s, King Faisal's call for an Islamic pact politically split the Arab world. It put him in hostile ideological conflict with the Egyptian Gamel Abdel Nasser's revolutionary, socialist and secular brand of nationalism. Egypt's swift defeat by Israel in the Arab–Israel War of 1967 seemed to vindicate King Faisal's position. Conversely, he successfully coordinated with Egypt's new president, Anwar al-Sadat, to achieve more attention to Islamic symbolism in the Arab–Israel War of 1973.

The 1973 Arab oil embargo and rise in OPEC's (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil prices brought riches to Saudi Arabia. This wealth aided a Pan Islamic "revival" and the Wahhabi kingdom built mosques and provided aid throughout Muslim countries, contributing to the strengthening of Islamist fundamentalist political groups and parties worldwide. Different local varieties of Wahhabi philosophy exist today in such varied places as Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Mali, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Uzbekistan, as well as some mosques in the United States.

The Islamic revolution in Iran (1979) and Israel's pursuit of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) into Lebanon (1982), however, ushered in a new radical wave of politically motivated Islamic neo-fundamentalism that does not share either the Wahhabi doctrinal approach to Islam or Saudi Arabia's pro-American policy. In 1988, Saudi Arabia broke relations with Iran when Iranian pilgrims to Mecca rioted and the Iranian navy fired on Saudi vessels in the Gulf. Saudi aid given to anticommunist Mojahedin (holy warriors) in Afghanistan may be seen as keeping in line with the martial spirit of the early Wahhabi movement. During the Cold War, the U.S. supported the Mojahedin in an attempt to help Afghanistan overthrow Russian control. This support inadvertantly strengthened Mojahedin and Taliban forces in the area. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the ensuing Gulf Crisis caused Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to align themselves with the U.S.–led United Nations Coalition.

Wahhabism has softened a great deal since its emergence in the eighteenth century. If Islamic neo-fundamentalism and Islamist political parties are perceived as anti-Western, it will be left to see how much the Wahhabiyya will influence the direction taken by the Islamic reformist movements.

See also MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD; SAUDI ARABIA.

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BASSAM NAMANI
UPDATED BY MARIA F. CURTIS

MZAB

Berber-speaking area in the arid pre-Saharan hamada 360 miles (600 km) south of Algiers.

The five original towns—al-Ateuf, Bou Noura, Ghardaïa, Melika, and Beni Isguen—were founded in the eleventh century along the bed of the Wadi Mzab. Berriane and Guerrara were added outside the wadi in the seventeenth century. The people are mainly Kharidjite Ibadites, a sect of Islam dating from the schism at the time of the fourth caliph, Ali, that adheres to a doctrine of puritanical and egalitarian religious and social obligations. The Mzab is noted for its highly developed, essentially theocratic organization and the economic maintenance of strong communities through the extraordinary commitment and success of its people as tradesmen throughout Algeria.

THOMAS G. PENCHOEN

MZALI, MOHAMMED

[1925–]

Prime minister of Tunisia from 1980 to 1986.

Born in Monastir, the home village of Tunisia's first president, Habib Bourguiba, Mohammed Mzali began his professional life as a university professor of Arabic and Islamic philosophy. In 1980 he was named by Bourguiba to succeed Hedi Nouira, who had suffered a stroke, as Tunisia's prime minister and the president for life's designated successor. Mzali's accession was heralded at the time as marking a relaxation of the political authoritarianism associated with Nouira's tenure; he was younger, in closer contact with the country's young people, and associated with support for political liberalization. Under his aegis, in fact, the first contested elections for the national assembly were held in 1981. Although the results were widely believed to have been falsified in favor of the ruling party, several independents took seats, establishing that party membership was not necessary for assembly membership. Soon thereafter, some opposition political parties, including the Tunisian Communist Party and several social democratic parties, were legalized, and the decades-long monopoly on Tunisian political life held by the ruling Neo-Destour Party was broken.

Despite his success at initiating political reform, Mzali proved unable to solve the country's

pressing economic problems, nor could he control the increasingly virulent political infighting among the Tunisian political elite. Even though Mzali had been designated by Bourguiba as his official successor, the Tunisian ruling elite openly jockeyed for position as the aging president's health began to deteriorate. In 1984 government-dictated consumer price increases touched off widespread rioting, prompting rescission of the increases. Mzali accused his rivals of deliberately encouraging the rioters to embarrass him.

In July 1986, worried that Mzali had lost the confidence of the government and the people, Bourguiba dismissed him in favor of the economist Rachid Sfar. A year and a half later, Bourguiba himself would be removed from the presidency by a Mzali appointment, General Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali, the first military officer ever to sit in a Tunisian cabinet. Mzali himself was later accused of malfeasance and took exile in France, where he wrote a book, *Lettre ouverte à Habib Bourguiba* (1987), accusing many of his former political collaborators of corruption, mismanagement, and disloyalty. He remained an opposition leader in exile until he was allowed to return to Tunisia in 2002.

Additionally, since 1973 Mzali has held various positions at the International Olympic Committee; as of 2003 he is a member of the Commission for Culture and Olympic Education.

See also Ben Ali, Zayn al-Abidine.

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Lisa Anderson
Updated by Ana Torres-Garcia

N

NAʿAMAT

A Zionist women's organization active in Israel and the diaspora.

Naʿamat (the Hebrew acronym for the Movement of Working Women and Volunteers) was founded in 1921 by Rahel Yanait Ben-Zvi and a group of women in the United States who raised $500 to plant trees. Naʿamat U.S.A. was formed at the same time. Ben-Zvi and others founded Naʿamat in protest against a society in which women were relegated to the kitchens while men worked the land and built the country. It was the first feminist movement in Palestine and was affiliated with the Histadrut (General Confederation of Labor). Its work began with agricultural training schools and expanded into providing child care for children of working women and vocational training for women who wanted to work.

During the 1960s, Naʿamat established a fund enabling Israeli women to pursue higher education. The organization set up legal aid bureaus during the 1970s, and Status of Women departments were established in Israel. Since 1990 Naʿamat's agenda has grown to include working with immigrants, a support program for single-parent families, centers for the treatment and prevention of violence in the family, and a shelter for battered women.

The Naʿamat Israel elects a president and management every four years, along with the leadership of the Histadrut. The president elected in 2002 was Talia Livni.

See also Ben-Zvi, Rahel Yanait; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Gender: Gender and the Economy; Histadrut; Israel: Military and Politics; Israel: Political Parties in; Zionism.

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Paul Rivlin

NABAVI, BEHZAD

[1942–]

Iranian politician.

Born in Tehran in 1942, Behzad Nabavi has had a roller-coaster career in politics. A son of a historian closely affiliated with the shah's regime, he joined the secular National Front (NF) and participated in antishah activities at Tehran Polytechnic University (now Amir Kabir University), where he received a masters degree in electronics in 1964. In the late 1960s he left the NF and joined the new underground Organization of People's Mujahedin of Iran (OPMI), which mixed Marxism and Islam and advocated armed struggle against the Pahlavi regime. In 1971 he was arrested and jailed for his antigovernment activities. In 1975 the OPMI splintered and Nabavi joined a group of Muslim activists working closely with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini against the shah's regime. When released from prison in 1978, he joined revolutionaries surrounding Khomeini and was assigned to oversee the transformation of the Iranian broadcasting system. He also founded the Organization of the Mujahedin of Islamic Revolution (OMIR), a semiclandestine paramilitary counterforce against the OPMI. With the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War, internal disputes led to the closure of the OMIR; it re-emerged in 1994.

When the Iran–Iraq War began in 1980, Nabavi established the National Economic Mobilization Headquarters for rationing foods. In the government of Mohammad Ali Rajai, he was a spokesperson and a minister without portfolio for executive affairs. He was appointed minister of heavy industry in 1982—a post he held until 1989. He was also the government representative in the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal in the Hague, the Netherlands, a forum for dispute resolution set up in accordance with the Algiers Agreement of 1981 that ended the hostage crisis between Iran and the United States. Nabavi was one of the Iranian negotiators of that agreement. He had a major role in the centralized policies of Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi's administration (1981–1989).

After the death of Khomeini in 1989, the conservative camp gained ascendancy and individuals such as Nabavi were pushed out of power. Nabavi and his associates restarted the OPMI and began the publication of the biweekly *Asre Ma* (Our times). This paper, along with the journal *Kian,* which was published by the supporters of Abdolkarim Soroush, transformed the religious discourse and kindled a reformist movement that culminated in the election of Mohammad Khatami as Iran's president in 1997. This election brought the left back to power. In 2000 Nabavi was elected first deputy speaker of the sixth parliament.

This "old guerrilla," as his colleagues call Nabavi, is the most controversial revolutionary and political strategist in Iranian politics. The conservative faction views him with suspicion and has tried to bring him down politically, accusing him of embezzlement and financial corruption several times without any legal success. While a minister, he survived ten motions of no confidence initiated by the conservatives in the parliament. Nabavi's politics and economic views have changed tremendously. His current attitudes toward moderate privatization of markets and a rapprochement with the United States are the opposite of his views in the early 1980s.

ALI AKBAR MAHDI

NABI MUSA PILGRIMAGE

Annual Muslim pilgrimage to a shrine situated in the desert between Jerusalem and Jericho where, according to Muslim tradition, Moses is buried.

The Nabi Musa pilgrimage starts a week before the Greek Orthodox Good Friday. According to a widespread legend (not sustained by primary sources), it was established by Saladin after the conquest of Jerusalem in 1187 in order to outnumber Christian pilgrims during Easter. At the beginning of the twentieth century, especially during the British Mandate, the pilgrimage became a political event. In 1920, a crowd of pilgrims protesting for self-determination and against Zionism erupted into violence against Jews in Jerusalem. From 1921 to 1936 the pilgrimage was headed by Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the leader of the national movement. After the war of 1948 the pilgrimage was banned by the government of Jordan, which aimed to undermine the political influence of Hajj Amin in the West Bank. But worshipers, especially women, continued to go spontaneously to the shrine in order to perform rituals at the tomb. Between 1997 and 2000 the Palestinian Authority was closely involved in the organization of the pilgrimage, which once again became a great occasion for national celebration. Since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in 2000 the Israeli army has forbidden the celebrations.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-.

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Benjamin Joseph
Updated by Emma Aubin Boltanski

NABI SALIH, AL-

Uninhabited island in the Bahrain archipelago of the Persian/Arabian Gulf.

Lying some two and one half miles (4 km) to the southeast of Bahrain's capital, Manama, al-Nabi Salih is situated midway between the island of al-Awal and the island of Sitra. Extensive date-palm gardens covered al-Nabi Salih in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Sizable groves remain along the western and northern shores, watered by several natural springs. Bahraini Shiʿa revere the large pool at the center of the island, as well as the tomb of the local saint, Salih, from whom the island takes its name.

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Fred H. Lawson

NABIZADE NAZIM

[1862–1893]

Ottoman Turkish writer.

Nabizade Nazim was born in Istanbul, where he graduated from military school. He served as an army officer, attaining the rank of captain. In the 1880s, his poetry appeared in a number of journals, but his reputation as a writer dates to the stories he published in *Servet-i Fünün* beginning in 1891; the first issue of the journal included his story "Seyyire-i Tesamüh." With his novel *Zehra* and his story "Kara Bibik," he established himself in the vanguard of Turkish literary realism; his later work was focused largely on the depiction of life in the villages of rural Turkey. His 1886 story "Yadigarlarım" told the story of his alcoholic father.

David Waldner

NABLUS

The largest West Bank city.

Nablus is 30 miles north of Jerusalem in a valley between Mount Ebal and Mount Gerizim. Known in the Bible as Shechem, it was the home of Jacob, Jacob's well, and the tomb of Joseph; it was the place of Jeroboam's rebellion and, as chief city of Samaria, became his capital of the kingdom of Israel. It was rebuilt and renamed Neapolis (from which the name Nablus derives) by the Roman emperor Vespasian, suffered damage in the Crusades, and became part of the Ottoman Empire. After the defeat and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, it became part of the British Mandate territory of Palestine. It became part of the Jordanian-occupied West Bank following the Arab–Israel War in 1948 and then part of the Israeli-occupied West Bank after June 1967. Israeli troops withdrew from the city in December 1995, after which it passed under the control of the Palestinian Authority. It was reoccupied by Israeli forces on several occasions since the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in late 2000.

Nablus has been a major economic, political, and cultural center for Palestinians. Several leading families in Palestinian history stem from Nablus, including the Tuqan Family and the Abd al-Hadi Family. It was long an important manufacturing city, particularly for textiles, food products, and olive oil soap. It has played an important role in Palestinian political history as well, especially as a center for Palestinian nationalism outside the family rivalries of Jerusalem. Home to al-Najah University (which obtained university status in 1977), the city has produced numerous writers, poets, and academicians. The population stood at 100,034 during the last official census in 1997.

See also Abd al-Hadi Family; Arab–Israel War (1948); Aqsa Intifada, al-; Palestinian Authority; Tuqan Family; West Bank.

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BENJAMIN JOSEPH
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

NABULSI, SULAYMAN AL-

[c. 1908–1976]

Prime minister of Jordan, 1956–1957.

Sulayman al-Nabulsi was the only prime minister in Jordan's history to be invited to form a government by virtue of his support in parliament and despite major policy differences with the king. He was prime minister of Jordan from October 1956 to April 1957 when he was suspected of participation in a conspiracy led by the chief of staff, General Ali Abu Nuwwar, to overthrow King Hussein ibn Talal.

Nabulsi was born in al-Salt in Jordan of a modest farming family, originally from the Nablus area in Palestine. He was an outspoken Arab nationalist, ideologically pro-Nasser, and a pan-Arabist. Active in politics since gaining a seat in parliament in 1948, he was constantly critical of the government. He published an article opposing Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda's negotiations on the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, for which he was arrested and sent to prison for nine months.

Nabulsi then established the National Front party but was unable to obtain a license for it. Ironically, he ended up leading another political party, the National Socialist party, whose chairman had been Hazza al-Majali, a political rival and ideological adversary. Despite its name, analysts describe the party as principally Arab nationalist, social reformist, and pro-democracy. As with most political parties at the time in Jordan, this one would be more correctly described as a parliamentary bloc. The party won eleven seats out of a total of forty in the October 1956 elections and was able to form a coalition government with Nabulsi as prime minister. It was comprised of seven National Socialists, one Baʿthist, one Communist, and two independents. This was the first "popular front" government of the Arab world and as such was dedicated to the struggle against domestic conservatism and Western influence.

Nabulsi negotiated with Britain to abrogate the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1948 and carried out negotiations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria for financial aid to substitute for British subsidies. An agreement signed on 19 January 1957 included a promise from the three Arab states to pay Jordan 12.5 million Egyptian pounds over the next few years. An accord with Britain abrogating the Anglo-Jordanian treaty was signed on 13 February 1957. Both these moves had popular support, particularly as they came in the wake of the Suez Canal crisis and the anti-Western feelings it had created. In the meantime, King Hussein had negotiated with the United States for aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine (proclaimed in January 1957) to make up for the budgetary loss expected when Britain withdrew its subsidy. To ensure U.S. support, King Hussein played up his anti-communism position, while Nabulsi's government was purging government officials loyal to the monarch. King Hussein broadcast a message directed at Nabulsi on 2 February 1957, in which he claimed that communist doctrine had infiltrated the government. Nabulsi reacted indignantly, repudiating "alien creeds" and reasserting his Arab nationalism.

On 7 April 1957 a coup attempt was mounted by a group of Baʿthist and pro-Nasser officers, but it was foiled by loyal army troops who rallied to the king. By 13 April it had become clear that the coup attempt had been led by Abu Nuwwar, and the simultaneous antiroyalist purges and discordant relations between Nabulsi and the king led many to believe that Nabulsi was implicated. The government was asked to resign, but Nabulsi was asked to be a minister in a new cabinet headed by a conservative premier.

Despite Nabulsi's participation in the new cabinet, a wave of strikes and protests demanded the resignation of the government, the return of the

"popular front" government, and the repudiation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. King Hussein responded by replacing the government with a cabinet made up entirely of ministers loyal to him, proclaiming martial law, abolishing political parties, suspending parliament, imposing a curfew, and placing security forces under army control. Nabulsi was placed under house arrest for the next four years. He never resumed political activity, although he was eventually pardoned by King Hussein and appointed to the Senate in 1971. Until his death, he remained virtually out of the public eye.

See also ABU NUWWAR, ALI; HUSSEIN IBN TALAL.

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JENAB TUTUNJI

NADIR BARAKZAI, MOHAMMAD

[1883–1933]

King of Afghanistan, 1923–1933; known as Nadir Shah.

Mohammad Nadir Barazkai, known as Nadir Shah, was born to Sardar Mohammad Yusuf Khan from the Yahya Khel lineage of the Mohammadzai clan of the Barakzai branch of the Durrani Pushtun tribe. He was active in the court of Habibollah Khan but was arrested as a murder suspect when Habibollah was assassinated in 1919. He was freed by Amir Amanollah (reigned 1919–1929) and served briefly in his court. He left Afghanistan and spent some time in Paris before returning to India. In 1923, he led a revolt against Habibollah Kalakani and became king in 1929 but was assassinated in 1933 by a Hazara student who was the adopted son of Kalakani.

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GRANT FARR

NADI, YUNUS

[1880–1945]

Turkish nationalist, journalist, and publisher.

Yunus Nadi was born in Istanbul to the Abalioğlu family, although he dropped the use of the family name in later life. He studied at the Medrese-i Süleymaniye and Galatasaray and attended law school before taking his first newspaper job at the age of twenty. He became editor in 1910 of the Committee for Union and Progress newspaper in Salonika, *Rumeli,* and in 1918 established the *Yeni Gün* paper in Istanbul. During Turkey's war of independence, he moved the paper to Ankara and there befriended Atatürk. Returning to Istanbul after the war, in 1924 Nadi founded *Cumhuriyet,* known today as the *New York Times* of Turkey.

Nadi was a fervent nationalist. During the war of independence, he printed the headline "Greece must be destroyed" in his paper daily. He joined the Green Army, the most famous of the private armies in that war, but it was disbanded in 1921 by Atatürk because of its radical politics. Nadi wrote four books about the independence war, which were published post-humously in 1955. Nadir Nadi became publisher of *Cumhuriyet* when his father died.

See also COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

NAFUD DESERT

A desert in northern Saudi Arabia.

The Great Nafud desert of the Arabian peninsula extends over some 2,500 square miles (6,500 sq. km) of sand dunes, with elevations rising to 3,000 feet (915 m). Iron oxide in the sand gives the Nafud a unique reddish color. Winter rain produces grasses sufficient to support grazing in the winter and spring. The southeast portion of the Nafud is considered to be part of the tribal territory of the

Shammar bedouin, who make use of its wells and pastures.

ELEANOR ABDELLA DOUMATO

NAGUIB, MUHAMMAD

[1901–1984]

Egyptian military officer and politician.

Born in the Sudan to a professional family, Muhammad Naguib (also spelled Najib) was a graduate of Egypt's military academy. He served on the general staff during World War II and won respect from junior officers for his distinguished service in Palestine during the Arab-Israel War of 1948.

The Free Officers who overthrew King Farouk in 1952 decided to present Naguib as the head of the Revolutionary Command Council, to endow the revolution with his legitimacy. The monarchy was abolished in 1953 and Naguib took the posts of provisional president and premier, but he refused to be satisfied with a titular role. He favored a return to parliamentary government and, after a protracted struggle with Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, leader of the ruling military *junta*, Naguib was ousted in 1954. In 1955, Naguib published *Egypt's Destiny.* In 1956, Nasser was confirmed as president of Egypt by referendum.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1948); REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL (EGYPT).

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DAVID WALDNER

NAHAL

Acronym for Noar Halutzi Lohem (Fighting Pioneer Youth), a division of the Israel Defense Force integrating military training with agricultural labor and settlement.

Nahal was founded in 1948 at the urging of a delegation of kibbutz and youth-group representatives to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Zionism's ideological notions of national redemption through work on the land coupled with the nascent state of Israel's pressing need for massive cultivation led to the institution of these units of "warrior-farmers." Nahal recruits entered the army in groups, under the joint command of a youth-movement instructor and Israel Defense Force (IDF) officer, and either reinforced existing kibbutzim and moshavim or, more significantly, established new "holding settlements" *(heakhzuyot)* on the country's vulnerable borders. Nahal paratroopers have been heavily involved in Israeli military operations since the 1950s.

The perception of Nahal as a restructured continuation of the recently defunct Palmah (dissolved in 1948), where informality, egalitarianism, and individual daring were the rule, led to persistent tension as military discipline was imposed on the rank and file. Nahal was opposed by much of the military establishment for attracting some of the most highly qualified recruits away from active combat duty. As the necessity for prolonged professional and specialized military training became more apparent to the IDF, increasing numbers of troops were diverted from Nahal, and agriculture figures less than previously in the unit's activities.

See also PALMAH.

ZEV MAGHEN

NAHALAL

First moshav, founded in the Jezreel valley in 1920.

Nahalal was a unique form of agricultural settlement in Palestine; called a moshav, it was based on cooperatively owned land, individual family farms, and homesteads with family labor—but mutual aid and a cooperative framework for purchasing and marketing. The majority of Nahalal's founders had been members of a kibbutz (an agricultural collective), who disagreed with the arrangements made for family life, child care, and education. They wished to preserve the integrity of the nuclear family within a cooperative community. The parents of Israeli soldier and statesman Moshe Dayan—who were among the founders of the first kibbutz, Degania—also helped establish Nahalal.

See also KIBBUTZ; MOSHAV.

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DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

NAHAR, AL-

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA

NAHDA, AL-

Algerian political party.

Al-Nahda party was at one time the third most popular Islamic party in Algeria, after the Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front, FIS) and Hamas (Party for a Peaceful Society). It was founded in 1989 by Shaykh Abdallah Jaballah (b. 1956), following constitutional amendments that allowed for pluralism and the formation of political parties. Al-Nahda's origins go back to the mid-1970s, when Jaballah, then a law student at the university in Constantine, formed a student group, al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya. Due to the group's secret nature, it had limited influence until the mid-1980s and was concentrated in the eastern region of the country. Al-Nahda was influenced by the teachings and methods of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and advocated education and gradualism as a means of social change. In 1987, as the political system in Algeria opened up, al-Jamaʿa became public, calling itself the Nahda Association for Social and Cultural Reform. In 1990 it became a political party that drew support from students, teachers, and professionals. Following the cancellation of the 1991 legislative elections, al-Nahda opposed the military takeover, called for the government to respect the people's choice, and boycotted the 1995 presidential elections. During the legislative elections of 1997, it won 34 seats out of 389 but refused to participate in a coalition government. The party experienced a major split in 1999, when its secretary general, Lahbib Admi, supported the presidential candidacy of Abdelaziz Bouteflika instead of Jaballah's. Jaballah formed a new party, the National Reform Movement (MRN), which most of al-Nahda's members joined. In the May 2002 legislative elections, MRN came third, with 43 seats, after the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the Democratic National Rally (RND); al-Nahda lost all but one seat, probably ushering in the demise of that party. Shaykh Jaballah and the MRN have advocated reform, pluralism, national reconciliation, and the preservation of the country's cultural identity.

See also ALGERIA: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; FRONT ISLAMIQUE DU SALUT (FIS); HAMAS (MOVEMENT FOR A PEACEFUL SOCIETY).

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EMAD ELDIN SHAHIN

NAHHAS, MUSTAFA AL-
[1879–1965]

Egyptian politician.

After graduating from the Khedivial law school in 1900, Mustafa al-Nahhas worked as a lawyer and judge. He entered politics in 1919, joining the nationalist Wafd movement. British authorities exiled him to the Seychelles (1921–1923) in the wake of the 1919 revolution and anti-British nationalist agitation.

Nahhas became one of the most important and popular Egyptian politicians from the 1920s until the Free Officers' coup d'état in 1952. He was elected to the chamber of deputies in 1923 and assumed leadership of the Wafd following the death of Saʿd Zaghlul in 1927. As head of the most popular party in Egypt, Nahhas served as prime minister, interior minister, and foreign minister on numerous occasions. His acceptance of the prime minister's portfolio in February 1942 after an armed ultimatum delivered by the British to King Farouk, however, discredited the Wafd's nationalist credentials in the eyes of many Egyptians.

Nahhas exerted tremendous influence over Anglo-Egyptian relations. As prime minister, he represented Egypt in failed negotiations with the British in May 1930 over a proposed bilateral treaty. He headed the Egyptian delegation in talks that produced the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, though he abrogated the treaty in October 1951 after negotia-

tions over the future of British military bases in Egypt failed. Nahhas was also instrumental in the West's decision to abandon the capitulations at the 1939 Montreux Convention.

On the inter-Arab level, Nahhas brought together Arab leaders in October 1944 to sign the Alexandria Protocol, which laid the basis for formation of the League of Arab States. He was prime minister when the Free Officers' coup deposed Egypt's civilian government in July 1952. He was attacked for corruption afterward, though not imprisoned.

See also League of Arab States; Montreux Convention (1936); Wafd.

Michael R. Fischbach

NAHNAH, MAHFOUD

[1942–2003]

Moderate Algerian Islamic leader and founder of Hamas (Movement for a Peaceful Society).

Born in 1942, Mahfoud Nahnah was the leader of the Movement for a Peaceful Society in Algeria. He was born in the city of Blida, southwest of Algiers, to a conservative family, and received his early education at one of the schools established by the nationalist movement. He graduated from the Algerian University in 1970 with a degree in Arabic language and literature and then worked at the university as a professor.

Nahnah was influenced by the ideas of the Muslim Brothers. In the mid-1960s he formed the organization al-Muwahhidun (Believers in One God) with the objective of establishing an Islamic state in Algeria. He opposed the socialist orientation of the regime and publicly criticized President Houari Boumédienne's proposed charter of 1976 as overemphasizing socialism at the expense of Islam. Nahnah was arrested for his political agitation in 1976 and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment, but was released in 1980.

Nahnah remained politically active and focused on expanding his constituency. In 1989 he formed a social and cultural society, Jamʿiyyat al-Irshad wa al-Islah (Association of Guidance and Reform), which after the adoption of a new constitution in 1989 permitting the formation of political associations became a party in November 1990 called Harakat al-Mujtama al-Islami (Movement of the Islamic Society) with the Arabic acronym HAMAS. The results of the 1991 legislative elections demonstrated that Nahnah's party enjoyed some degree of popularity, as it secured 450,000 votes. Nahnah ran as a candidate against President Liamine Zeroual in the 1995 elections and came in second with over 3 million votes. Nahnah is viewed as a moderate Islamic leader who on several occasions has condemned the escalation of violence in Algeria and defended the state and the military institutions. His critics charge him of exploiting the crackdown against the more popular Islamic party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and its leaders, to increase his own popularity. Under President Abdelaziz Boutefleka, Nahnah's party has participated in the cabinet with several ministerial positions. In June 2003, Shaykh Nahnah died of leukemia.

See also Algeria; Bouteflika, Abdelaziz; Front Islamique du Salut (FIS); HAMAS; Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND); Zeroual, Liamine.

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Emad Eldin Shahin

NAHUM, HALFALLAH

[1880–1963]

President of the Jewish community in Tripoli, Libya; industrialist and philanthropist.

Halfallah Nahum was born in Tripoli to a prominent, affluent Jewish family. He received his primary and advanced technical-business education in Italian schools in Tripoli and Manchester, England, where his uncle lived.

In 1917, after renouncing the Dutch citizenship held for generations by his family and becoming a naturalized Italian, he was elected the first president of the newly reconstituted Jewish community of Tripoli under the Italian occupation. Soon, his leadership was challenged by the young Zionists headed by E. Nhaisi. A power struggle ensued, but Nahum was reelected president from 1919 to 1924.

In 1943, after the Allies took Tripoli, Nahum was asked to head the Jewish community until 1945, when a British subject, Zachino Habib, took over. With the English branch of the family, Nahum built a commercial and industrial empire. He was known for his modesty and for aiding the needy. He was ambushed and killed one night by ten Arabs and one Maltese.

Maurice M. Roumani

NAHUM, HAYYIM

[1873–1960]

Chief rabbi of Istanbul, 1901, and of Egypt, 1925–1960; Turkish representative to the post–World War I peace conferences and to Washington in the early 1920s; Egyptian senator, 1931.

Hayyim Nahum (called Nahum Effendi) was born in Manisa, Turkey, and studied law in Istanbul and at the Rabbinical College of Paris, where he also learned Oriental languages. He had ties with the Young Turks and their Committee for Union and Progress, and when he returned to Turkey following the Young Turks revolution, he was made chief rabbi *(haham bashi)* of Istanbul. In 1918/19, he joined the Turkish delegation for the armistice negotiations at The Hague and also served, unofficially, as Turkey's representative in Washington, D.C., during the early 1920s. In 1923, Nahum served as adviser to the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Peace Conference.

When he moved to Egypt, King Fuʾad I made Nahum chief rabbi of Egypt in 1925, a position he held until his death in November 1960. Not only was he the most powerful figure of Egyptian Jewry vis-à-vis the Egyptian government, but in June 1931 the king appointed him a senator and in 1933 a member of the Egyptian Academy.

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Michael M. Laskier

NAJAF, AL-

The capital of the Najaf Muhafaza (governorate) in central Iraq.

One of Iraq's two holy cities (the other is Karbala), al-Najaf (2003 pop. 500,000) lies on a ridge just west of the Euphrates River. The caliph Harun al-Rashid is reputed to have founded the city, whose growth occurred mostly in the tenth century, in 791 C.E. In the center of al-Najaf is one of Shiʿism's greatest shrines, the mosque containing the tomb of Ali ibn Abi Talib (c. 600–661), cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad, who was the fourth Muslim caliph (leader) and the spiritual founder of the Shiʿite sect. Al-Najaf also has schools and libraries that are valuable repositories of Islamic theology, especially Shiʿite jurisprudence.

Al-Najaf Muhafaza is a flat region extending over 10,615 square miles from the Euphrates River in the northeast to the Saudi Arabian border in the southeast. The governorate's population is concentrated near the river; the rest of the region is sparsely populated. Established in 1976, al-Najaf Muhafaza was formed from areas of the governorate of Qadisiyya in the east and the governorate of Karbala in the west.

Al-Najaf has long been a hotbed of Shiʿite resistance against the Sunni rulers in Baghdad, and in the twentieth century this resistance has been a source of tension between the Sunni-dominated government of Iraq and the Shiʿite government in Iran. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein by invading U.S. forces in April 2003 led to the return of open Shiʿite worship in the city, but the assassination of some of Iraqi Shiʿism's most important clerics, including the returned exile Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (1939–2003), who was killed by a bomb in August 2003, marred the new era.

See also Hussein, Saddam; Karbala; Shiʿism; Sunni Islam.

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Mamoon A. Zaki
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

NAJD

The central plateau region of Saudi Arabia.

A geographically isolated region of the Arabian peninsula, Najd (the Arabic word for plateau or

highland) is bounded in the south by the great sand desert, the Rub al-Khali, and on the east by a long, narrow strip of sand desert known as al-Dahna. To the north lies another sand desert, the Nafud, and to the west, Najd is separated from the Red Sea coast by the mountains of Hijaz and Asir. The plateau is divided into three regions: southern Najd, the home of the eighteenth-century Wahhabi movement and the original home of the ruling Al Saʿud family (main city, Riyadh); Qasim, an agricultural district in the center of Najd (main city, Unayza); and Jabal Shammar in the north (main city, Ha'il). Because of its geographic isolation, Najd, unlike other areas of the Gulf and Arabian Sea, was not subject to European colonialism. Most of the great camel-herding bedouin ranged at least part of the year in Najd, but the bulk of its permanent population were town dwellers and semi-nomadic oasis gardeners. Najd is today the central administrative district and home to the capital city of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh.

Eleanor Abdella Doumato

NAJIBULLAH

[1947–1996]

President of Afghanistan from 1986 to 1992.

Najibullah was born in Kabul in 1947 into an Ahmadzai family of the Gilzai Pushtuns. He was educated at Habibia High School and studied medicine at Kabul University, graduating in 1975. He was active in politics at a young age and was a founding member of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1965. When the PDPA split in 1967, he and Babrak Karmal became the leaders of the Parcham faction. After the Saur Revolution in 1978 Najibullah was named ambassador to Iran in an effort by the Khalq faction to send the Parchamis out of the country. He returned to Kabul in 1980, when Babrak Karmal was named president, and was made president of the Afghan secret police, Khad. In 1986 he became secretary-general of the PDPA and president of Afghanistan.

Najibullah was a powerful and ruthless leader, the strongest and most capable of the four PDPA presidents. He made a number of attempts to reunite the country and to subdue the Islamic resistance by modifying the Marxist ideology of the PDPA, by moving the country away from socialism, and by restoring the role of religion. However, he was unable to overcome the PDPA's initial mistakes or to make himself acceptable to the mojahedin. In 1992, three years after the departure of the Soviet military, his government collapsed, and he fled to the United Nations compound in Kabul, where he sought sanctuary.

In September 1996 the Taliban captured Kabul. One of their first acts was to storm the United Nations compound, where they shot and killed Najibullah and his brother. His body was hung on a lamppost on the streets of Kabul.

See also Mojahedin; Parcham; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

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Grant Farr

NAJJADA, AL-

Name of several Arab paramilitary youth organizations.

A group called al-Najjada (Helpers) was formed in 1936 in Beirut by journalist Muhieddine Nsouli as a Sunni Muslim counterpart to the Christian Phalange party. In the 1950s, it emerged as a pro-Nasser party with about 10,000 members under the new leadership of Adnan al-Hakim; it clashed with the Phalangists in the 1958 Lebanese Civil War. It has since adopted an Islamist ideology.

Another group of the same name was established at Jaffa, Palestine, in 1945 by a Muslim lawyer, Muhammad Nimr al-Hawari, as a counterpart to the Jewish Haganah. The Palestinian group quickly grew to an estimated 6,000 members in at least ten cities. It played a prominent role in the 1947 Palestinian protests and the 1948 Arab–Israel War.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Haganah; Hakim, Adnan al-; Lebanese Civil War (1958); Phalange.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

NAKBA, AL-

Arabic term for the devastating consequences of the 1948 Arab–Israel War on the Palestinians.

Al-Nakba (in Arabic, disaster or catastrophe) refers to the flight and expulsion of the Palestinians during the 1947 to 1948 War, the confiscation of their property, massacres committed by Zionist (after 14 May 1948, Israeli) forces, the collapse of their society and, ultimately, the loss of their homeland. The term *al-Nakba* was widely used after a prominent Arab intellectual, Constantine Zurayk, wrote *Ma'na al-Nakba* (The meaning of the disaster) in 1948.

Of about 1,358,000 Palestinians living in Palestine in 1948, the United Nations (UN) estimated that some 726,000 became refugees during the two phases of the war: civil war after 29 November 1947, and the Arab–Israeli War after 14 May 1948. The exact number of Palestinians forced out is uncertain, but some scholars have estimated that about half of the refugees were expelled. Some of those who left did so after hearing of Zionist (later Israeli) attacks on Palestinians; according to one Israeli scholar, Benny Morris, there were about two dozen massacres in which 800 Palestinians were killed. More than 350 villages were abandoned or emptied, and most of these villages were destroyed—their homes were bulldozed or dynamited, their land was used to build Jewish settlements and house new Jewish immigrants, and the villages' names were removed from Israeli maps. A study by an American scholar, Michael R. Fischbach, of the archives of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine reveals that, in all, Palestinians lost some 6 to 8 million *dunums* (1.5 to 2 million acres), not including communal land farmed by villagers or state land. A Palestinian writer, Fayez Sayigh, estimated that 150,000 urban and rural homes were lost, as well as 23,000 shops, offices, and other buildings. To these losses must be added the human-capital losses of farmers, shopkeepers, laborers, and professionals and others who, within days, found themselves unemployed and destitute mostly in refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

Of the estimated 860,000 Palestinians who resided within the area that became Israel (which encompassed 78% of historic Palestine, about 23% more than the 1947 UN partition resolution allotted to the Jewish state), some 84 percent of the Palestinians were uprooted and displaced. In addition, about 20 percent of the 150,000 Palestinians who remained and became citizens of the Jewish state, were internally displaced persons, that is, refugees. There are many examples in modern times of mass transfer and human migration, but very few instances when most of the population has been substantially dispossessed and replaced by another, with its lands, homes and possession confiscated.

There are a number of long-term or fundamental causes of al-Nakba. Many Jews, seeking to escape antisemitic persecution and murderous pogroms in late-nineteenth-century Eastern Europe and Russia, became Zionists, dedicating themselves to establishing a state in their biblical homeland, Palestine, which they called Eretz-Yisrael. In 1917 the Balfour Declaration committed Great Britain to supporting the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, where, at the time, less than 10 percent of the population was Jewish. After conquering Palestine in late 1917, Britain—with the backing of the European powers and later the United States—gave the Jewish community time to grow, through Jewish immigration and land purchases, and to establish a quasi-government and military forces. The genocide of six million Jews during World War II generated considerable sympathy in the West for the Jews and their need for a state. In short, European antisemitism, Zionism, the Holocaust, and Western support for a Jewish state made the conflict, leading to al-Nakba, more likely.

An immediate cause of the disaster was Palestinian and Arab rejection of the 29 November 1947 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (the partition resolution), which awarded the Zionists (who were one-third of the population and owned about 7% of the land) roughly 55 percent of Palestine. Inter-communal violence had preceded the UN resolution, and the Palestinians followed their rejection of it with more violent attacks, including massacres, on the Jewish community. Fol-

lowing the defeat of Palestinian and Arab irregular forces, and Israel's declaration of independence on 15 May 1948, five Arab armies entered Palestine. Three of these militaries invaded the nascent state of Israel, triggering the first Arab–Israeli War which produced more Palestinian refugees and cost the lives of 6,000 Jews, or 1 percent of the population, and approximately 13,000 to 16,000 Palestinians and 2,000 and 2,500 other Arabs.

Another immediate contributory cause of al-Nakba was a Zionist (later Israeli) policy of *cleansing,* a term used at the time, along with *transfer.* Many Zionist leaders believed, even before 1948, that in order to establish an ethnically Jewish state, and for the Palestinians to avoid becoming a fifth column within that state, it would be necessary to remove them. David Ben-Gurion, founding father of Israel and its first prime minister and defense minister, created a "consensus of transfer," according to Morris, and gave "transfer" instructions to his commanders who related them to their officers, sometimes in writing.

The legacy of al-Nakba—especially the nonresolution of the Palestinian refugee problem—has figured among the major causes of every Arab–Israeli war since 1948. Israel denies responsibility for the expulsion, claims that Arab leaders urged the Palestinians to leave, and looks to the Arab and the Western world to resolve the problem; Palestinians and other Arabs insist that Israel recognize its culpability and bear the burden of repatriating the refugees to their homes inside Israel or compensating them for their losses, consistent with international law.

The Israeli–Palestinian negotiators at Taba in January 2001 came close to resolving their conflict. The talks addressed Palestinian rights—including return and compensation—and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They also addressed Israel's security requirements and demographic fears. But time ran out on the negotiations and no serious effort has been made to resume them. Until Israel, the West (especially the United States), and the Arabs all take responsibility for failing to deal with the consequences of al-Nakba—particularly the continued dispossession and statelessness of the Palestinians—and until they are determined to solve the problem, the Arab-Israeli conflict is unlikely to end.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Balfour Declaration (1917); Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine; Palestinians; Refugees: Palestinian; Taba Negotiations (1995, 2001).

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Philip Mattar

NAMIK KEMAL

[1840–1888]

Turkish intellectual and a founder of the Young Ottoman movement.

The son of an Ottoman aristocrat, Namik Kemal was born in Tekirdağ. He entered the civil service in Istanbul when he was seventeen and began working with Ibrahim Şinasi on the Young Ottoman journal *Tasvir-i Efkar,* which among other things championed constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy. Namik Kemal's essays were read widely, and he left

for Europe in 1867 to avoid persecution by the Ottoman authorities. He returned to Istanbul in 1871, and in 1873 he wrote *Vatan,* a play that dealt with the issue of fatherland and Ottomanism. After Sultan Abdülaziz was deposed in 1876, Kemal was one of the many framers of Midhat Paşa's 1876 constitution. After Sultan Abdülhamit II assumed power, Namik Kemal again went into exile and died on Chios in 1888. Kemal was one of the most important nineteenth-century Ottoman Turkish thinkers and reformers and a founder of the Young Ottoman movement. He wrote extensively about the meanings of *vatan* (fatherland), democracy, liberalism, and freedom in an Ottoman context. Although he was influenced by French philosophers, Kemal looked to Islam as the root of his ideas.

See also Midhat Paşa; Young Ottomans.

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Zachary Karabell
Updated by Eric Hooglund

NAMIR, MORDEKHAI

[1897–1969]

Israeli Labor Party official and Knesset member.

Born in the Ukraine, Mordekhai Namir (originally Nemirovsky) settled in Palestine in 1924 after graduating from the University of Odessa. Beginning his political career as secretary of the Ahdut Ha-Avodah party, he served in the administrations of the Histadrut and the World Zionist Organization both before and after Israel's statehood. Namir joined the Haganah command from 1933 to 1948, and filled many foreign ministry positions in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. He was elected to the Knesset (parliament) and appointed general secretary of the Histadrut in 1951, until becoming minister of labor and housing in 1956. From 1956 to 1969 he was mayor of Tel Aviv.

Zev Maghen

NAMIR, ORAH

[1930–]

Israeli politician.

Born in Hadera, Israel, Orah Namir served in the Israel Defense Force as an officer during the 1948 Arab-Israel War. During the late 1950s she lived in New York, working for the Israeli delegation to the United Nations and attending Hunter College, from which she earned a B.A. in English literature and European civilization. Upon returning to Israel, she married Mordekhai Namir (1897–1975), a veteran Labor Party leader and a long-time mayor of Tel Aviv. After his death, she entered politics and served as secretary general of Naʿamat. Elected to the Knesset on the Labor ticket in 1973, she specialized in social affairs and chaired the Education and Culture Committee (1974–1977) and the Labor and Social Affairs Committee (1977–1992). She also chaired the Committee on the Status of Women.

In 1992 Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin appointed her minister for the environment and a year later minister of labor and social affairs. She held this latter position until 1996, when Prime Minister Shimon Peres appointed her Israel's ambassador to the People's Republic of China, a position she held until 2000. Her term of office in Beijing witnessed a strengthening of Israel-China relations, which was translated into a series of agreements on cultural, scientific, and economic matters.

See also Aloni, Shulamit; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Grossman, Haika; Israel; Naʿamat.

Meron Medzini

NAQSHBANDI

One of the major Sufi orders in the Islamic world.

The most distinctive characteristics of the Naqshbandi order are the tracing of the *silsila,* or initiatic chain, from the Prophet Muhammad to Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, a companion of the Prophet Muhammad; use of the silent invocation of God (*dhikr*); and a strong adherence to the *shariʿa* or Islamic law. The first figure of importance in the history of the Naqshbandiya is Yusuf Hamadani (born 1048). In addition to providing four successors, he set down eight principles, or "sacred words," that provided the doctrinal framework of the order.

Although it is not possible to conclude that all branches or members of the Naqshbandiya were po-

Masʿud al-Barzani, general secretary of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The KDP was formed in 1946 under the leadership of Barzani's father, Mustafa. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

litically active throughout the history of the order, the fervent belief in the adherence to the *shariʿa* and the Sunna and a worldly attitude toward the role of Sufis in Islamic society contributed to the political participation of some Naqshbandi leaders. In the late medieval and premodern periods, it was not uncommon for Naqshbandi leaders to mediate in political disputes, pay taxes on behalf of a population, act in defense of popular sentiment, influence administrative policy, or control large tracts of land. In the regions of Khorasan and Transoxiana, in which Turko-Mongols ruled over predominantly Persian populations, Naqshbandi leaders at times played the role of defending Sunni Islam against Shiʿism and of thwarting the influence of Turko-Mongol nomadic customary law in favor of Islamic law. The Naqshbandi order gained adherents among both the Turkic and Persian populations of Central Asia and was prevalent in both urban and rural areas. However, at the height of its power in Khorasan, the Naqshbandiya was firmly entrenched in the intellectual and cultural milieu of the capital city of Herat, enjoying great renown under the leadership of Saʿd al-Din Kashgari (died 1462) and then Abd al-Rahman Jami (died 1492).

Several separate branches of the Naqshbandi order developed, the main ones being the Yasavi, begun by Ahmad Yasavi (died 1167); the Mujaddidi, established first in India by one of the four successors of Hamadani, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (born 1563); and the Khalidi, established by Mawlana Khalid Baghdadi (born 1776), the last branch of the Naqshbandi to achieve strong adherence throughout the Islamic world. There was an extraordinary diffusion of the different branches into regions as widespread as Ottoman Turkey, Kurdistan, Eastern Turkistan, Syria, Palestine, India, central Asia, and the Indonesian-Malaysian world.

A major renewal of the Naqshbandiya came through the leadership of Mawlana Khalid Baghdadi (died 1827), who founded the Khalidi branch that became particularly strong in Turkey and spread as far as Malaysia. His concern with the preservation of the *shariʿa* was especially significant during a time when the Ottoman state was facing increasing challenges from the West. The Khalidi Sufi network spread throughout the Turkish, central Asian, and Arab world but was strongest in Anatolia and Kurdistan. The legacy of Naqshbandi activity is reflected today in the eminent position of established Naqshbandi families within Kurdish society, although over time most of those assumed political rather than spiritual leadership, one of the most well-known examples being that of the Barzani family.

In the modern period, particularly the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Naqshbandis played a role in reformist and anticolonial resistance movements. Among the numerous examples are Shaykh Shamil's resistance to Russian imperialism in Daghestan in the nineteenth century, the active role of the Naqshbandiya in the mojahedin in the Soviet-Afghan war, the role of Shah Abd al-Aziz (died 1826) in the legal reform movement in India under British rule, and the role of Naqshbandi-led

rebellions in China. Although it is difficult to ascertain the true extent of Naqshbandi activity in the new central Asian states today, there is particularly strong adherence in the regions of Dagestan and the Fergana valley, and Naqshbandi shrines continue to be popular places of pilgrimage. In other regions of the Islamic world, the Naqshbandiya maintains a following, particularly in Turkey, but also in Afghanistan, the Kurdish regions of Syria and Turkey, India, Indonesia, and China.

See also BARZANI FAMILY; *SHARIʿA*; SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS; SUNNA.

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JOANN GROSS

NARGHILA

See GLOSSARY

NASER AL-DIN SHAH

[1831–1896]

Fourth ruler of the Qajar dynasty in Iran.

Naser al-Din Shah of Iran began his rule displaying an interest in reform, but became wary of the potential of reforms to undermine his political authority and turned to conservatism. **© BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

Naser al-Din Shah was the son of Mohammad Shah Qajar (r. 1834–1848) and Malik Jahan Khanom (d. 1873). His father designated him crown prince in 1835, when Naser al-Din Shah was four. His accession to the throne upon the death of his father in 1848 was resisted, especially by a cousin in Khorasan, but by 1850 the new monarch had subdued all challenges to his authority.

Naser al-Din Shah's reign marked the beginning of national reforms that became known as modernization. His interest in modernization seems to have originated in the stories he had heard about the reforms his grandfather, Abbas Mirza, had undertaken while governor of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan during the 1820s and early 1830s. After his father sent him to Azerbaijan as governor in 1847, Naser al-Din Shah allied himself with Mirza Taqi Khan Farahani Amir Kabir, whom Abbas Mirza had sent as an envoy to Turkey. Amir Kabir was impressed by the Ottoman's Tanzimat reforms. Back in Iran, after Naser al-Din Shah appointed him chief of the army in 1848, Amir Kabir initiated, with the shah's support, wide-ranging reforms, including the establishment in 1851 of Iran's first secular school, the Dar al-Fonun. Amir Kabir's reforms, especially those related to rationalizing the tax system, alienated diverse Iranian interest groups and even disturbed Britain and Russia, which were trying to consolidate their own influence over Iran. The opponents of reform allied with Naser al-Din Shah's mother, who eventually persuaded Naser al-Din Shah to dismiss Amir Kabir in 1851.

Although Naser al-Din Shah did not support any major reform programs after the experience with Amir Kabir, he did not oppose all reforms and took a leading role in special projects such as the reconstruction of public areas in Tehran and the introduction of modern urban infrastructure for the capital. His interest in at least minimal reforms was encouraged by a foreign pilgrimage to the holy sites of Shiʿism in Iraq and by three extended tours of Europe.

Meanwhile, Iran's increasing economic and political involvement with Europe exposed an ever-larger percentage of the urban political elite to European ideas, especially those about representative government. A new intellectual class, dominated by such figures as Mirza Malkom Khan and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, emerged and began to advocate wide-ranging reforms to protect Iran from foreign encroachment. Naser al-Din Shah initially was interested in their ideas and patronized both men, but when he perceived that their views about political reforms potentially threatened his rule he dismissed Malkom Khan as Iran's ambassador to London and banished al-Afghani to exile in Turkey.

Iran's strategic weakness relative to Europe was the main impetus for interest in reform. In 1856 and 1857, Naser al-Din Shah's efforts to restore Herat to Iranian sovereignty were blocked by Britain. Thereafter, both British and Russian influence in Iran increased yearly. The shah sought to counter their influence by granting them competitive economic concessions and by trying to involve third countries, such as France, in Iran. These economic concessions, however, angered the traditional bazaar merchants, who believed that manufactured imports were destroying local production and foreign monopolies were denying them profits. The merchants tended to be closely allied with the *ulama,* and their joint opposition (as well as that of Russia) to the Reuter Concession induced Naser al-Din Shah to cancel it in 1873. More serious politically, however, was his granting of a foreign monopoly concession for tobacco in 1890. This move led to Iran's first national political protest movement in 1891 and 1892. With a mass consumer boycott, bazaar strikes in all the major cities, and even members of the court and royal family refusing to smoke tobacco, Naser al-Din Shah was forced to cancel the concession. The experience apparently was upsetting for the shah, because he became increasingly autocratic, tried to repress any expressions of dissent, and ceased to support any type of reforms. Naser al-Din Shah was assassinated by a bankrupt merchant in 1896.

See also Abbas Mirza, Naʾeb al-Saltaneh; Afghani, Jamal al-Din al-; Amir Kabir, Mirza Taqi Khan; Azerbaijan; Bazaars and Bazaar Merchants; Herat; Khorasan; Malkom Khan, Mirza; Qajar Dynasty; Shiʿism; Tanzimat; Tehran; *Ulama.*

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Eric Hooglund

NASHASHIBI FAMILY

Notable Muslim Palestinian family that established itself in Jerusalem during the fifteenth century.

The Nashashibi family is said to be of Circassian or Kurdish origin It gained prominence during the late nineteenth century when some of its senior members served in the administration of the Ottoman Empire. Uthman al-Nashashibi was elected to the Ottoman parliament as deputy of the Jerusalem *sanjak* (province) in 1912. Throughout the mandate years, the name Nashashibi denoted opposition to al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, a founder of Palestinian nationalism and the leader of the Palestine national movement until 1948. The leadership of the Nashashibi family was also well known for its advocacy of a policy of compromise with the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the British Mandate authorities. This position did not receive the same degree of support enjoyed by the Husayni program, which was based on the total rejection of the British government's Balfour policy. After 1948 the political influence of the Nashashibi family sharply declined, as did the influence of some other notable Palestinian families.

Raghib Nashashibi (1883–1951) was elected to the Ottoman parliament in 1914. During the British Mandate, Raghib became the most influential figure in the family and head of the anti-Husayni ("Opposition") camp. Ronald Storrs, governor of the Jerusalem district, appointed Raghib mayor of Jerusalem in 1920 as a reward for not participating in the anti-British demonstrations during the al-Nabi Musa celebrations in Jerusalem on 4 April 1920. Since the post had been occupied by Musa Kazim al-Husayni, who was dismissed for allegedly inciting the al-Nabi Musa celebrants, Raghib's acceptance of the mayoralty raised questions about his nationalism and exacerbated the Husayni-Nashashibi rivalry. Raghib helped form the Literary Society in 1918 and the Palestinian Arab National Party in 1928. In 1934, after he had lost his position as mayor to Dr. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi, Raghib formed the National Defense Party. Although the party's main source of support was the mayors and elites of the larger towns in Palestine, it was also able to reach the peasantry through the network of prominent families that supported the Nashashibi camp. He also served on the Arab Higher Committee from 1936 to 1937. After Israel became a state in 1948, Raghib served as minister in the Jordanian government, governor of the West Bank, and member of the Jordanian senate.

Raghib's nephew Fakhri Nashashibi (1899–1941) was a colorful and controversial political organizer and, from late 1920 until his assassination in Baghdad, the family's strong-arm man. After holding a number of posts in the mandate government, including aide-de-camp to High Commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel, he became Raghib's chief aide. Fakhri was a principal organizer of opposition to al-Hajj Amin and, at the peak of the Palestine Arab Revolt of 1936–1939, he organized the "Peace Bands," with help from the British military and the Zionist movement, to protect the Nashashibi camp from the campaign of intimidation launched against it at al-Hajj Amin's bidding. Fakhri favored a compromise settlement with the British and the Zionists.

Isʿaf Nashashibi (1882–1948), son of Uthman and a writer known throughout the Arab world, was described by contemporaries as an "Arabic dictionary that walks on two feet." Ali Nashashibi cofounded in 1912 a decentralization party for the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire; in 1916, Cemal Paşa executed him on charges of treasonable political activities. Nasir al-Din Nashashibi (1924–), a journalist and political writer living mostly in Egypt, served for some time as League of Arab States representative in Europe. Muhammad Zuhdi Nashashibi (1925–), a politician, started his political career as a Baʿth party figure in Syria after 1960. He has occupied senior positions in the Palestine Liberation Organization, including membership on its Executive Committee, head of the Economics Department, and chair of the Palestine National Fund. He has also served the Palestinian Authority through membership in its Higher Council for Refugee Camps and as finance minister.

Muhammad Zuhdi Nashashibi (center) with other Palestinian officials attending the Syrian Trade Fair in 2001. Nashashibi, a senior political adviser to Yasir Arafat, also served as finance minister for several years. **© AFP/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

See also HUSAYNI, MUHAMMAD AMIN AL-; KHALIDI, HUSAYN FAKHRI AL-; PALESTINE ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939); PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY.

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MUHAMMAD MUSLIH
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

NASIR, AHMED SAYF AL-

[c. 1880–1960]

Libyan tribal and political leader.

Ahmed Sayf al-Nasir was a member of the Sayf al-Nasir family, hereditary shaykhs of the Awlad Slaiman tribe of the Sirtica and Fezzan regions of Libya. Ahmed Bey fought the Italian conquest of Libya from 1915, seeking exile in French Equatorial Africa (now Chad) toward its end in 1930. During World War II, he returned to Fezzan with Free French Forces advancing from Chad (1943) and became the chief instrument through which the French administered the territory. In February 1950, the French authorities set up a Fezzanese Representative Assembly that elected Ahmed Bey as *chef du territoire,* unopposed, and he headed a local administration under French supervision. Although associated with often unpopular French decisions, he promoted Fezzan's incorporation into a federal Libyan kingdom under Muhammad Idris al-Sanusi and thereby strengthened the hands of those who sought that form of independent Libyan state. After independence in 1951, Ahmed Bey became *wali* of Fezzan, the head of its provincial administration.

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JOHN L. WRIGHT

NASIR, HANNA

[1936–]

Founding president of Bir Zeit University in the West Bank.

Born in Jaffa, Palestine, Nasir is a graduate of the American University of Beirut. In 1972 he became the founding president of Bir Zeit University, the leading Palestinian university in the West Bank. He was expelled by Israel to Lebanon in November 1974, charged with supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). He remained in exile until May 1993. While in exile, Nasir remained president of Bir Zeit University. He was also an elected member of the Executive Committee of the PLO from 1981 to 1984.

JENAB TUTUNJI
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

NASIR, NAJIB

[1865–1948]

Palestinian newspaper publisher and early anti-Zionist writer.

Born to a Greek Orthodox family in Tiberias, Najib al-Khuri Nasir converted to Protestantism while working for fifteen years in a hospital run by missionaries. He then worked briefly as a land sales agent for the Jewish Colonization Association before founding the daily newspaper *al-Karmil* in 1908 in Haifa. Nasir used his knowledge of land sales to Jews to write articles against Zionism and the first history of the Zionist movement in Arabic, *Zionism: Its History, Object and Importance.* Also, before World War I, he founded several activist organizations to limit Jewish immigration and land sales. *Al-Karmil* was closed permanently by court order in 1944. Nasir died in Nazareth.

See also JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

NASRALLAH, EMILY

[1931–]

Lebanese fiction writer.

Emily (Abi Rashid) Nasrallah was born in South Lebanon in 1931 and writes popular Lebanese fiction, beginning with her award-winning 1962 *Tuyur Aylul* (Birds of September). The heroine, dismayed by village ignorance, moves to the city to study at the university. Her choices are difficult and not always liberating, and the novel ends on a sad and nostalgic note. For decades, Nasrallah has written novels and short fiction for adults and young readers and she is among the most regularly anthologized writers in the Lebanese educational curriculum. Her stories are usually set in a rural past and have served a role in recording and promoting folk culture.

Nasrallah has consistently centered her fiction on female characters and concerns, thereby serving

as a pioneer in Arab women's literature. From her first novel to *al-Jamr al-Ghafi* (Sleeping embers; 1995), Nasrallah has focused on women's struggles for independence and self-expression. Repeatedly, she shows that access to knowledge should be the right of every human being. She has been a vocal and visible women's-rights activist.

Nasrallah remained prolific during the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) and wrote about the incomprehensible violence and the sudden fragmentation that leads to death, division, and forced emigration. Her 1981 *al-Ikla Aks al-Zaman* (Flight against time) is a haunting tale set during the war years. Nasrallah is the recipient of numerous awards, and many of her novels and short story collections have been translated into German, Danish, and English.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1958); LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); LEBANON; LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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ELISE SALEM

NASRALLAH, HASAN

[1960–]

Lebanese Hizbullah leader.

Hasan Nasrallah was born in 1960 in Qarantina, the eastern suburbs of Beirut, to a Shiʿite Muslim family. Hasan was religious at an early age. Because of the persecution of Shiʿa in East Beirut by right-wing militias, the family moved to the Tyre region. In his village of Bazuriyya, Nasrallah joined the ranks of the AMAL movement (founded by Imam Musa al-Sadr).

In the late 1970s Nasrallah moved to Najaf in Iraq to receive religious training at the renowned Shiʿite school. There he met and befriended Abbas al-Musawi, who would later lead Hizbullah. In 1978 the Iraqi government began harassing and persecuting Shiʿite religious students and leaders, and Nasrallah returned to Lebanon, where he continued his religious training at a school established by his friend al-Musawi in Baʿalbak. In 1982 Nasrallah was elected to the leadership of the AMAL movement in the Biqa region. After the Israeli invasion, AMAL leader Nabih Berri accepted the invitation of Lebanese president Ilyas Sarkis to join a "salvation committee" that included among its members the pro-Israeli right-wing militia leader Bashir Jumayyil. That decision by Berri alienated large segments of the movement and led to the creation of a splinter movement by Husayn al-Musawi, who founded the Islamic AMAL movement. Others gravitated toward a new group that would later become Hizbullah, or the Party of God. The group included people who formerly were leaders and members of the Iraqi Daʿwa Party.

Nasrallah rose quickly in the Hizbullah ranks and became the leader of the Beirut region. In 1989, amid rumors of differences of opinion in party leadership, Nasrallah left Lebanon for Qom to complete his religious studies and training. In 1992 Israel assassinated Abbas al-Musawi, and Nasrallah was elected secretary-general of the party, even though he had not served as a deputy secretary-general. He was the youngest member of the Shura Council (the highest executive body of the party). Nasrallah quickly rose to become one of the most charismatic, most popular leaders in Lebanon and in the Arab world. His pictures are seen in demonstrations in places like Morocco and Gaza. Nasrallah's eldest son was killed by the Israelis in 1997, and his handling of the personal tragedy (refusing a special deal with Israel to receive his body) only increased his popularity. Nasrallah's popularity was boosted further in 2000, when Israeli troops withdrew from south Lebanon after years of Hizbullah resistance, managed in its last years by Nasrallah. Nasrallah led Hizbullah's transformation into a parliamentary party with extensive media and social services in Lebanon. The party also retained its security-military force, calling for Israel to withdraw from the Shabʿa Farms, which are still occupied by Israel (which claims that they belong to Syria).

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ASʿAD ABUKHALIL

NASRUDDIN HOCA

A well-loved character in the Turkish oral prose tradition; protagonist of humorous anecdotes told from the Balkans to central Asia.

Known as Nasr al-Din in Iran and as Juha in Arabia, Nasruddin Hoca appears in some stories as a wise folk philosopher or a witty if unconventional preacher. In others, he is naive and uninformed, the butt of youngsters' pranks, a figure of gentle ridicule who shows great resilience. However foolish he may seem, he survives all disasters and, having the last word, often turns the tables on those wielding power over or making fun of him. Although a village near Sivrihisar in central Anatolia is claimed as Nasruddin's birthplace and a mausoleum in Akşehir is said to be his 1284 burial place, a connection between the stories and any historical person is questionable.

The earliest Ottoman manuscript collections about Nasruddin Hoca are dated to the early sixteenth century and contain fewer than 100 stories. The first printed edition of 125 stories appeared in 1837; later publications present a body of several hundred items, and translations have appeared in many Western and Asian languages.

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NASSAR, SADHIJ

[c.1900–c.1970]

Palestinian women's activist.

Sadhij Nassar, of Iranian origin, grew up in Haifa, where she lived until 1948. She married Najib Nassar, editor of the newspaper *al-Karmil.* It was one of the few interfaith marriages during this period, and not without controversy. Najib Nassar, who was an Orthodox Christian, was also considerably older than his wife, who was the granddaughter of the founder of the Baha'i faith. Beginning in the 1920s, Sadhij Nassar contributed articles to the newspaper, translated articles from the foreign press, and was editor from 1941 to 1944, when the Mandate authorities refused to grant her a permit under the Emergency Defense Regulations. In 1930 she was a founding member and secretary of the Arab Women's Union in Haifa, which was one of the more militant branches of the women's movement during the Mandate period. In 1939 the British detained her for political reasons and held her without charges under the Emergency Defense Regulations in the women's prison in Bethlehem. She was released after an eleven-month imprisonment. She continued her activities in the women's movement until 1948. After 1948, when she became a refugee, she wrote for various publications in London and in Damascus, where she tried to open a branch of the Arab Women's Union. She is believed to have died in Damascus sometime during the 1970s.

See also Baha'i Faith; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Haifa; Palestine.

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Ellen L. Fleischmann

NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL

[1918–1970]

President of Egypt, 1956–1970.

Few Arab politicians rivaled the impact of Gamal Abdel Nasser (also known as Jamal Abd al-Nasir) on the Arab world in the twentieth century. His mid-century revolution and his rule of Egypt followed the corrupt monarchy of King Farouk and was fueled by nationalism. It held out the promise of socialism and Arab unity, stirring the imaginations of Arabic-speaking intellectuals and common people.

Born in Alexandria into the Muslim family of a modest postal clerk, Nasser received his primary education in the small Nile delta village of al-Khatatiba, to which his father had been assigned. After completing his secondary education in Cairo,

where he lived with an uncle, Nasser attended law school for several months before gaining entry to the Royal Military Academy in 1936.

The military provided the vehicle for Nasser's rise to power. His historical role began as the leader of a military conspiracy, the Free Officers, who launched a coup d'état and seized power in July 1952, overthrowing King Farouk. A republic was proclaimed, 18 June 1953, under General Muhammad Naguib as both provisional president and premier; he gave up the premiership in 1954 to Nasser, then the leader of the ruling military junta. Naguib was deposed and Nasser was confirmed as president by referendum on 23 June 1956.

In the eyes of a trusted minister, "the Nasir revolution cohered around the ideas and principles of pan-Arabism, positive neutrality, and the social revolution." Nasser, as his ex-minister put it, "took the side of the poor, just as he took the side of development, democracy, Arab unity, and non-alignment." Such admirers believe that even with the changed conditions after Nasser's death, "these principles will undoubtedly take new forms; yet, the ideas are still alive and they still move people" (Baker 1990, p. 80).

Nasser's critics have emphasized his authoritarianism and his bitter defeats. Anwar al-Sadat, his successor as president, charged that Nasser's vaunted social revolution degenerated into "a huge, dark, and terrible pit, inspiring fear and hatred" and that Nasser's relentless hostility toward Israel had given Egypt only "years of defeat and pain," undermining prospects of achieving peace and prosperity while accomplishing little to realize Arab goals (Sadat, p. 20; and *al-Ahram,* 27 June 1977).

Early Domestic Affairs

Debate about the ultimate meaning of Nasser's rule does not preclude identification of key turning points that both supporters and detractors accept as decisive. A domestic power struggle and the necessity of coming to terms with the former British colonial power, which retained its base at Suez, gave early definition to the new regime. General Naguib, the figurehead for the Free Officers' movement, challenged Nasser's leadership from February to April 1954 by drawing support from the small middle class, the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the former political parties who all opposed the authoritarian and plebeian thrust of the military regime. Rallying urban mass support through a newly created party called the Liberation Rally, Nasser relied on the military and police to defeat the middle- and upper-class political forces arrayed against him. The formula worked, and the newly consolidated regime immediately launched an agrarian reform program that added peasant support and undermined the powerful landowning families that had backed the monarchy.

Former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970). Hailed by many Arabs as a champion of Arab interests, Nasser took power following a 1952 coup by the Free Officers revolutionary organization. **© United Nations. Reproduced by permission.**

Early Foreign Relations

Regime priorities of power consolidation and domestic reform were reflected in moderation on the three major foreign-policy issues confronting Egypt—the Sudan, the British, and Israel. While an activist foreign policy later became the hallmark of

Nasserism, as a new ruler Nasser established himself as a moderate in foreign affairs. In 1954, Egypt signed a conciliatory agreement for a transitional period of self-government for the Sudan, which became an independent republic in 1956. Negotiations also produced an Anglo–Egyptian agreement in 1954 that provided for the gradual withdrawal of the British from their remaining Suez Canal zone base. Opponents, including the Muslim Brotherhood, charged that Nasser had compromised the national interest. An assassination attempt against Nasser in October 1954 justified the crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood; in fact, throughout Nasser's rule, the brotherhood suffered severe repression.

Nasser emerged only reluctantly as the champion of the Arab struggle against Israel. A few dangerous paramilitary actions had drawn Egypt into the conflict in the early to mid-1950s. Small bands of Palestinians, including some operating from the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip, launched raids against Israel. Israel immediately developed a policy of massive reprisal against the Arab states sheltering the raiders.

When the West failed to respond to Nasser's need for arms, he announced an arms agreement with Czechoslovakia (an intermediary for the Soviet Union). A dispute with the United States and Britain over their financing of a high dam project at Aswan accelerated the radicalization of Egypt's foreign policy in 1955 and 1956. The Egyptians looked to the electricity that the dam would provide to fulfill their dreams of industrialization. The Western powers, alarmed by Nasser's flirtation with the East, denied funds previously promised. In defiance, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956. The response came swiftly.

In 1956, Egypt was invaded by Israel in October and by France and Great Britain in November. Militarily, the invading armies triumphed, but the Egyptians resisted fiercely under Nasser's inspiring leadership. They fought just long and well enough to give international opinion time to force the invaders to withdraw. Most dramatic were the Soviet missile threats against Europe and Israel, but U.S. diplomatic pressure actually proved effective in securing a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the invaders. Defeated militarily, Nasser triumphed politically; he remained in power with the Suez Canal Company in Egyptian hands.

Union with Syria and Socialist Agenda

Buoyed by obtaining Suez, Nasser launched a bold bid for Egyptian leadership of the Arab world and laid the groundwork for an ambitious program of domestic change. On 1 February 1958, Syria voluntarily united with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic (UAR), which was later joined by Yemen. Although the union lasted only until 1961, it gave substance to the rhetoric of pan-Arabism. Nasser blamed the breakup of the UAR on reactionaries and responded by intensifying the revolution at home. A Charter of National Action then committed Egypt to socialism and announced the formation of a new mass political organization, the Arab Socialist Union.

Before he was forced to retreat, Nasser tried to realize a socialism for Egypt that had industrialization and improvement of mass welfare at its heart. The long-range goal was the creation of a heavy industrial base. Aziz Sidqi, Nasser's minister of industry, presided over a remarkable expansion of the nationalized public sector. Unfortunately, advances in agriculture did not match the industrial gains registered in the decade after Suez, which were diluted further by a rapidly expanding population. Still, Nasser did create the public sector and improvements in health and education reached even the rural countryside in limited ways. The issue of rural transformation was put on the national agenda.

The collapse of the union with Syria dealt a blow to Nasser's pan-Arab standing. He sought to regain momentum in the Arab arena by intervening in the Yemen Civil War in 1962, hoping that a victory by the republican side would give Egypt leverage on the strategic Arabian Peninsula. Instead, the intervention merely provoked conflict with the Saudi regime that supported the Yemeni royalists and with the Americans who stood behind the Saudis. Fearing Nasser's pan-Arabism as a destabilizing force, the Americans turned against the regime. Until this point, republican Egypt had earned impressive aid for its development effort from both the United States and the Soviet Union. After the intervention in Yemen, the United States cut off its aid to Egypt.

The period of growth and expansion at home and abroad was over by the mid-1960s.

1967 War with Israel

These reversals created a mood of desperation that culminated in Nasser's abandoning the heretofore cautious policy that he had pursued with Israel. In the Arab summit conferences of the 1960s, Nasser had consistently urged restraint. For ten years after Suez, Egypt lived in relative peace with Israel because the presence of a United Nations Emergency Force stationed on the Egyptian side of the border. Pressures mounted, however, as the Palestinians launched raids from Lebanon, Jordan, and especially Syria. Israel responded with deadly force. An outcry provoked by the response forced a weakened Nasser to act. Chided for hiding behind the United Nations (UN), Nasser requested the withdrawal of UN forces from the Sinai peninsula in 1967. The UN commander interpreted the order to mean the removal of his forces at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. Egyptian troop replacements there meant closing the gulf to Israeli ships.

Israel viewed the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba as a cause for war. On 5 June 1967, Israel launched an attack, destroying the entire Egyptian air force in a matter of hours. In the course of the 1967 Arab–Israel War, Israel seized Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria, sweeping across Sinai and the Gaza Strip and routing the Egyptian army to leave an estimated ten thousand dead. On 9 June, Israel's forces reached the Suez Canal. On 10 June, a cease-fire was called by the UN; Egypt had lost the war, and Nasser then resigned.

In Cairo, Egyptians took to the streets to urge Nasser to remain as leader. For three more years Nasser ruled, refusing to accept an Israeli-dictated peace. In April 1969, he launched the so-called War of Attrition (1969–1970) in the canal zone that prolonged the Egyptian struggle against the Jewish state. At home, he announced a program that promised to revitalize the revolution. But Nasser's revolution never regained momentum. The exhausted Egyptian leader died on 28 September 1970 and was replaced by Anwar al-Sadat.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab Socialist Union; Farouk; Free Officers, Egypt; Liberation Rally; Muslim Brotherhood; Naguib, Muhammad; Pan-Arabism; Sadat, Anwar al-; United Arab Republic (UAR); War of Attrition (1969–1970); Yemen Civil War.

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Raymond William Baker

NASSER, LAKE

A reservoir of the Nile located in southern Egypt and northern Sudan, created by the Aswan High Dam after 1971.

Lake Nasser, created by the construction of the High Dam at Aswan, is 298 miles long and 10 miles wide at its widest point, with a water capacity of 130 million acre-feet, of which 24 million acre-feet serve as dead storage for sediment and 73 million acre-feet as live storage. About one-quarter of all the Nile waters entering Lake Nasser are lost to evaporation and seepage. The largest man-made lake in the world, Lake Nasser has a major role in Egypt's fishing in-

dustry, yielding 15,000 to 25,000 tons per annum. Original hopes that Lake Nasser would also support agriculture in its vicinity, however, have yet to be realized.

In 1978 the Ministry of Irrigation authorized construction of the Tushka canal to carry away surplus water from Lake Nasser to the New Valley Project in the western desert in case a high flood upstream caused Lake Nasser's waters to pass over the spillway, leading to damage to barrages and bridge abutments downstream. This emergency canal was used for the first time in the late 1990s, at a time of unusually high Nile flows. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Tushka diversion was a source of international controversy in that the Egyptian government announced plans for routine diversions of lake water into the western desert to reclaim land. This came at a time when the ten riparian states of the Nile Basin were attempting to reach an accord on future uses of the limited waters of the river.

The lake is named for Egypt's president who held office at the time of the building of the dam, Gamal Abdel Nasser. The rising lake displaced over 100,000 Nubian inhabitants, and flooded sites of ancient Egyptian buildings such as Abu Simbel. Creation of the lake in the early 1970s led to an international rescue effort to save dynastic-era antiquities of the valley behind the dam.

See also ASWAN HIGH DAM; NILE RIVER.

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NASSIF, MALAK HIFNI

[1886–1918]

Egyptian writer.

An Egyptian Muslim, Malak Hifni Nassif (pseudonym, Bahithat al-Badiya) publicly advocated women's advancement in the early twentieth century during the *al-nahda al-nisaʾiyya* (women's awakening). This was a period in which women were increasingly able to publish essays, stories, and letters in the nascent women's press and also in the general press. The women's press and the writers who contributed to it played an important role in the development of feminism and the reform of social institutions in a number of Middle Eastern countries. Nassif, along with other prominent figures such as May Ziadeh, were active in literary and social groups through which they contributed to the intellectual and public debate about nationalism and how to define Egyptian and Arab political and cultural identity under the British colonial government.

Nassif articulated one of the founding discourses of feminism that emerged in Egypt during the first third of the twentieth century. Her strain of feminism remained secondary to that embodied in the work of Huda al-Shaʿrawi (1882–1947) until the final decades of the twentieth century. In contrast to Shaʿrawi's secular and Western-oriented feminism, Nassif's feminism, expressed in her collection of talks and essays, *Al-nisaʾiyyat* (Women's affairs, 1910), de-emphasized Western values as it attempted to affirm and improve women's lives and experience through increased educational and work opportunities within a reformed Islamic context.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; SHAʿRAWI, HUDA AL-; ZIADEH, MAY.

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CAROLINE SEYMOUR-JORN

NATEQ-NURI, ALI AKBAR

[1943–]

Iranian cleric; speaker of the majles.

Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri was born in Nur Mazandaran. His political activities before the revolution are said to have begun in 1963, against the Pahlavi regime. He lived briefly in Lebanon and Syria, and after the revolution in 1979, became Ayatollah Khomeini's representative in the Construction Crusade (Jihad-e Sazandegi). Nuri served as minister of the interior between December 1981 and August 1985. As of 1996, he was the speaker of Iran's parliament (majles).

FARHAD ARSHAD

NATIONAL BLOC

Lebanese political party headed by Emile and Raymond Eddé.

Established in 1934, the National Bloc became the political vehicle for Emile Eddé and his son Raymond Eddé. Originally from Jubayl (Byblos), the Eddé family played an important role in the history of Lebanon. Elected president of Lebanon in 1936, Emile Eddé was the first Maronite Catholic president to appoint a Muslim prime minister—thus establishing the tradition. In 1949 Emile Eddé died and was replaced as chairman of the National Bloc by Raymond.

As a member of the Lebanese parliament from 1953, Raymond, a firm believer in the free-enterprise system, introduced several important pieces of legislation—notably the 1956 law on bank secrecy, the law introducing the death penalty in 1959, and the joint banking account law in 1961. With the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, Raymond Eddé kept the National Bloc from becoming a party of warlords. He was the first Lebanese politician to warn of the dangers of Lebanon becoming a hostage to her two neighbors: Syria and Israel. In 1969 Raymond Eddé and the National Bloc were the only group to vote down the Cairo Agreement between Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In 1976, as a result of seven assassination attempts, Raymond Eddé opted for the relative safety of exile in Paris.

Since Raymond's death in May 2000, the bloc has been led by his nephew, Carlos Eddé, a businessman who had spent most of his life abroad. The National Bloc is no longer a major player on the Lebanese political scene.

See also EDDÉ, RAYMOND.

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GEORGE E. IRANI
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NATIONAL CONGRESS PARTY

The principal opposition political party in Libya immediately after independence.

Government tampering in national assembly elections in 1952 deprived the National Congress party of its victory. Party stalwarts reacted violently, leading, first, to the expulsion of its founder, Libyan nationalist Bashir Bey Sadawi, from the country and then, soon thereafter, to the demise of party politics in Libya.

See also SADAWI, BASHIR.

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LISA ANDERSON

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT (NDF)

Leftist movement in the Yemen Arab Republic.

The National Democratic Front (NDF) was an umbrella organization created in 1976 by six leftist opposition groups in the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), which sought to move the YAR in a more radical direction and away from the republican-royalist reconciliation that ended the civil war in 1970. The roots of the NDF can be traced to the expulsion of the left from the YAR polity following the Sanʿa Mutiny in 1968. In addition to an increasingly radical program of socioeconomic reform along socialist lines, the NDF sought to unify the YAR with the revolutionary South Yemen; to loosen ties of political dependency with Saudi Arabia; to curb the influence of tribal leaders; and to open up the closed political system of the YAR to popular participation. The NDF first sought through political means to pressure the government to accept it and

its goals. Frustrated in this effort, during the late 1970s and early 1980s the NDF waged an armed rebellion against the YAR regime with the support of Marxist South Yemen; it played an important role in the 1979 border war between the two Yemens. The NDF rebellion was largely put down by force in 1982, and many NDF members accepted the regime's terms for reconciliation; almost all of the others reconciled on the occasion of Yemeni unification in 1990, effectively ending the NDF as an organized force in Yemeni politics. Many former NDF leaders ended up playing important political roles in unified Yemen, some in the ruling party of the president and most in the opposition. The NDF was virtually nonexistent by the time of the brief War of Secession in 1994 and hence played no role in it.

See also Yemen; Yemen Arab Republic.

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Robert D. Burrowes

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF OMAN AND THE ARAB GULF

Radical antigovernment organization (1970–1971), known as NDFLOAG.

NDFLOAG was formed in June 1970 by the merger of several small groups of foreign-educated Omanis. The front's members, fewer than a hundred, were united by shared antipathy for the reactionary sultan, Saʿid bin Taymur Al Bu Saʿid. Their aim was to carry out attacks on the government in northern Oman paralleling those that had been launched by the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) in Dhufar in the south. Mortar assaults on garrisons at Nizwa and Izki failed, and most of the perpetrators were captured. The attacks, however, caused Omani supporters of the government, as well as its British protectors, to fear that rebellion could spread throughout the country. This fear led them to work with Saʿid's son, Qabus ibn Saʿid Al Bu Saʿid, to overthrow his father in July 1970. In December 1971 NDFLOAG, reduced to impotence, was absorbed by PFLOAG, which changed its name (but not its acronym) and became the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf.

See also Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf.

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NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (IRAQ)

A political party in Iraq, known as the NDP (Arabic, al-Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati); licensed in 1946 under the leadership of Kamil Chadirchi.

An outgrowth of the old Ahali group, (People's Group) the party had semi-socialist views and attracted supporters from the wealthy, well-established families as well as from Shiʿa and left-leaning middle-class people who believed in gradual change. In 1949 the party was banned along with the Iraqi Communist party. Even so, its members were involved in the strikes and riots that occurred in the early 1950s in opposition to the Anglo-Iraqi treaties. When free elections were held in 1954, the NDP won six seats but lost them when Prime Minister Nuri al-Saʿid suspended parliament and banned opposition parties. In 1956 the NDP applied for permission to form a party with Istiqlal (Independence party) the supported neutrality, an Arab federation, the liberation of Palestine, and political freedom. Denied, the Istiqlal, NDP, the Communist party, and the Baʿth party formed the United National Front, or United Popular Front.

Supporting the opposition to the monarchy, Chadirchi initially backed Abd al-Karim Qasim in his coup that overthrew the monarchy in June 1958. By 1961, Chadirchi opposed Qasim, even though Muhammad Hadid, second-in-command of the NDP, accepted the post of minister of finance in Qasim's government. As a protest to the antidemocratic nature of the regime, in October 1961

Chadirchi closed the NDP and ceased publishing *al-Ahali.*

See also AHALI GROUP.

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REEVA S. SIMON

NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH YEMEN

An association opposed to Britain's role in South Yemen in the 1960s.

The National Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (NLF), an association of seven organizations, first met in Sanʿa (capital of North Yemen) in 1963 to discuss strategies against the British position in South Yemen; three additional groupings joined later. Its intellectual and ideological origins lie primarily with the Arab national movement. It differed from other groups in two respects: its members agreed on the necessity of military action, and its primary popular base lay in the Protectorates rather than Aden. In 1967 the British turned over South Yemen to the NLF. In 1978 the NLF was recast as the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) and governed South Yemen (PDRY) until the merger with North Yemen in 1990. At that point, it became the second-most important party in the united state, and the major alternative and opposition party to the government of Ali Abdullah Salih. The frictions between the two constituent "regions" continue to be represented in the policies and personalities of their respective leaders and parties in the united state; the YSP continues to have its primary base of support in the old South.

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MANFRED W. WENNER

NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE SALVATION OF LIBYA

The principal opposition to Qaddafi's regime in Libya.

The National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL) was established in 1981. Illegal in Libya, it operates in exile under the leadership of its secretary-general, Muhammad Yusuf al-Magarief, a former Libyan ambassador to India. Encompasing opponents of Muammar al-Qaddafi of a variety of political persuasions, many of whom served in early Qaddafi governments, the NFSL has broadcast radio programming into Libya, published several newspapers and magazines abroad, and is credited with having organized a 1984 attack on the military barracks at Bab al-Aziziyya, where Qaddafi often stayed. During the mid-1980s, at the height of the American confrontation with Libya, the NFSL denied widespread allegations that it received assistance from the United States. By the 1990s, leadership positions in the NFSL were being assumed by younger Libyans who had grown up in exile and lived most of their lives outside the country.

LISA ANDERSON

NATIONAL FRONT, IRAN

Coalition of nationalist parties and groups that became prominent in the early 1950s and advocated a constitutional regime and Iran's control of its oil resources.

The National Front was responsible for the nationalization of the British-owned Iranian oil industry in 1951. Its influence declined after the Anglo-American coup of 1953, which overthrew Mohammad Mossadegh and reinstalled Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as shah. The rise of the National Front was

triggered by opposition to parliamentary election fraud. In October 1949 Mossadegh led a delegation to the shah's palace to protest the lack of free elections. A committee of twenty members was then formed to negotiate with the court minister, who promised to end electoral problems. The same committee later met at Mossadegh's house to form the National Front as a parliamentary faction. The front's diverse wings included social democrats, constitutional monarchists, and Islamists (led by clerics). Its social base consisted of bazaar merchants and craft guilds, members of the small industrial bourgeoisie, and urban professional middle classes. The front tried to enhance its political position by using the postwar rivalry between Britain and the United States for influence in Iran.

With opposition to foreign domination as its main goal, the National Front focused on ending British control of Iran's oil industry. The British rejected its demand for total Iranian control and equal profit-sharing with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. When the parliament nationalized Iranian oil, the shah delayed signing the bill, finally doing so in April 1950 when Mossadegh was elected prime minister.

Facing a British boycott of Iranian oil and increasing American hostility, Mossadegh's government encountered serious difficulties. The National Front's initial strength was its unification of disparate ideological and political currents under the banner of oil nationalization. But with the rapid polarization of Iranian politics in the early 1950s and under intense foreign pressure, the front began to unravel. Most significantly, its conservative and religious factions began opposing Mossadegh's defiant secular nationalism and defected to the monarchist and Anglo-American camp.

In August 1953, after a showdown with Mossadegh, the shah fled the country but was quickly returned to power through a CIA-engineered military coup. Mossadegh was overthrown and, along with many National Front leaders, ended up in prison. Some of his followers formed the National Resistance Movement but were unable to challenge the new regime effectively. In the early 1960s a Second National Front was organized by Mossadegh's former allies and played a leading role in another round of struggle for reform, but, like the Third National Front formed in 1965, was crushed by the regime.

Key personalities of the National Front emerged to lead the revival of popular opposition in 1977, but they soon were overtaken by Islamist forces. Still, the front's religious wing, led by Mehdi Bazargan, continued to be prominent. Following the fall of the monarchy in 1979, Bazargan became the prime minister of the provisional government. A few National Front old guards served in his cabinet; but they, along with Bazargan himself, were purged by the clerical Islamist forces close to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Under the Islamic Republic, Bazargan continued to function as a loyal opposition figure, whereas most other National Front leaders were forced into exile.

See also Bazargan, Mehdi; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Mossadegh, Mohammad; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza.

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Afshin Matin-asgari

NATIONAL FRONT, LEBANON

Coalition of left-wing Lebanese and Arab political parties and forces formed in 1984.

In 1984 in Lebanon, the leftist-nationalist coalition known as the Lebanese National Movement was dissolved as a result of internecine battles. In Israel, elections led to the victory of the Likud under Yitzhak Shamir. In the United States, Ronald Reagan was on the brink of being reelected for a second term.

The National Front was created as a result of these events. This coalition included representatives of the Progressive Socialist Party, the Lebanese Communist Party, the Baʿth party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Arab Democratic Party, and the Arab Socialist Union. The platform of the National Front contained six principles: (1) consolidate the resistance to the Israeli occupation in south Lebanon, (2) stress the unity and integrity of

Lebanon in the struggle against partition plans, (3) emphasize the Arab identity of Lebanon, (4) adopt an independent foreign policy, (5) call for political reforms and the abolition of the confessional system, and (6) call for economic and social reform. The mainstream Shiʿite AMAL movement was later invited to join the coalition.

See also AMAL; ARAB SOCIALIST UNION; BAʿTH, AL-; COMMUNISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST; LIKUD; PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY; REAGAN, RONALD; SHAMIR, YITZHAK; SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONALIST PARTY.

GEORGE E. IRANI

NATIONALISM

A people's sense of its political identity or a movement to achieve such identity.

The word *nationalism* refers to the feeling of political unity or of identity and patriotic sympathy that a people usually focuses on its own language or culture or on a land that it regards as its own. It also refers to that component of various political ideologies according to which this feeling is held to be essential to the existence of a state or to a political movement's aspirations to statehood. Finally, it is used in the arguments advanced by historians, ideologues, and politicians to justify actual or proposed actions on behalf of the people they see as embodying the nation.

Evidence of nationalism, in any of these related senses, is difficult to discern in the Middle East prior to the nineteenth century. Individuals often felt affinity with their coreligionists, but it was assumed that whatever the religion of the ruler might be, the state was not exclusively defined by religion. Tolerance of religious plurality was the norm, even though the ruler's coreligionists usually enjoyed greater official favor than people of a different religion. Language similarly served as a bond between people and as a dividing line between groups, but no state was linguistically homogeneous or disposed to regard language as the defining quality of a ruler's subjects. As for territory, strong feelings of identity with places of origin, particularly cities and their environs, were much in evidence in such guises as folk sayings, humor, and local traditions, but they were seldom accorded a political valuation.

As in most other parts of the world, the appearance of elements of national feeling in the Middle East preceded formal nationalist statements or political manifestos. Historians have debated the degree of indebtedness (certainly heavy) that various Middle Eastern nationalist writers and political leaders owed to European models in seeking to express their nationalism, but it would be an oversimplification to consider these models the sole source of nationalism in the region.

Greek Nationalism

The earliest nationalist movement manifested itself in the Greeks' war to obtain independence from the Ottoman Empire (between 1821 and 1832). The earlier revolt of the south Slavs (between 1804 and 1830) that culminated in the creation of an autonomous principality of Serbia had been a manifestation of widespread discontent with Ottoman maladministration and military disorder. Its leaders did not articulate nationalist positions, however, and the Slavs would presumably have been content with a return to competent Ottoman rule.

In Greece, however, despite a patchwork leadership ranging from bandit chiefs to Greek intellectuals educated in western Europe, a distinctly nationalist ideology came in time to be accepted as the best expression of the people's will. This ideology, however, was associated with a revolutionary organization called the Philike Hetairia that was based in Greek communities outside Greece (the most important one was in Odessa). Nationalist ideology followed rather than preceded the Greek rebellion, and many Greeks fought to escape Ottoman rule without being aware of any ideology. Many of the ideologues were more familiar with conditions and ideas in western Europe than in the Peloponnesus. Rhigas Pheraios, for example (who wrote in his immensely popular "War Hymn": "How long, my heroes, shall we live in bondage,/alone like lions on ridges, on peaks?/ . . . Better an hour of life that is free/than forty years in slavery!"), had a personal history of involvement with numerous revolutionary groups in western Europe dedicated to the ideals of the French Revolution.

Independent Greece not only fostered a revival of classical language and a glorification of ancient greatness—both common practices in later examples

The Shah of Iran places a crown on his wife, Queen Farah, after crowning himself in a lavish ceremony, Tehran, Iran, 26 October 1967. The Shah delayed his coronation for more than 25 years because he did not want to be crowned until he had accomplished a social revolution in Iran. © Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

of Middle Eastern nationalism—but also developed the Megali Idea, an ideology that harked back to the Byzantine Empire and whose proponents visualized a broad Balkan realm extending to Istanbul (then Constantinople) in which people of various languages and ethnic groups would be led by Greeks. This approach to nationalism, manifesting a vision of the Greek people as a political entity rather than a geographical entity, reflects the thinking of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and other French ideologues rather than the German vision of complete identity of people and land. The concept of one people dominating others within a specified territory later becomes commonplace in Middle Eastern nationalism.

Turkish and Arab Nationalism

Although other nationalist stirrings in the nineteenth century were not consciously patterned on the Greek example, they had some common features. Many advocates of Turkish and Arab political and linguistic distinctiveness, for example, were educated in Europe or were familiar with European ideas. Namik Kemal, whose Turkish drama *Vatan* (Fatherland) helped establish that word (*watan* in Arabic) as an element of nationalism, spent three years in exile in Europe; and the Lebanese Christian Butrus al-Bustani, one of the most industrious advocates of a revived Arabic literary language, worked closely with American Protestant missionaries. Like the Greeks, the Turks and Arabs encountered difficulty in harmonizing their particularist views with a history of pluralistic empire. Just as adherents to the Megali Idea could visualize, on the Byzantine model, an ethnically plural state dominated by Greeks, the Arabs and Turks aspired mostly to a revival or assertion of ethno-linguistic identity within the pluralistic Ottoman Empire.

One difference between Greeks and other nineteenth-century nationalists was the association of religion with a people's identity. All Greeks were orthodox Christians, even though not all orthodox Christians were Greek, nor all Greek clergy nationalist in sympathy. By contrast, Christian Arabs were prominent in the protonationalist Arab literary revival, and the Turkish protonationalists supported the religiously plural Ottoman system. Therefore, even though the great majority of Turks and Arabs were Muslims, Islam did not from the outset become an integral element of nationalist thought.

Written expressions of nationalist views among Turks and Arabs circulated during the last decades of the nineteenth century. Religion, however, remained a problem. The foremost Turkish ideologue, Ziya Gökalp, concentrated his analysis of Turkish identity on language and folk customs and dismissed Islam as a transitory civilizational attribute that should not stand in the way of the adoption of European customs. The Arab Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, on the other hand, called for a revival of the caliphate under an Arab of the prophet Muhammad's tribe, the Quraysh, instead of under the despotic Ottoman sultan Abdülhamit II.

Rise of Nationalism

The Committee for Union and Progress, a group of military officers that took control of the Ottoman Empire through a coup d'état in 1908, espoused Turkish nationalism and mandated the use of the Turkish language in certain administrative offices that had previously used local languages. Resentment against such Turkizing measures contributed to the formation of small Arab nationalist groups in Syria and Istanbul. Most of these Arab nationalists remained wedded to the concept of an Ottoman Empire, however, until the outbreak of World War I.

Ottoman defeat and the publicizing of Woodrow Wilson's advocacy of self-determination of peoples encouraged an outpouring of nationalist expressions throughout the Middle East. Kurds and Armenians, as well as Arabs whom Britain had encouraged in a nationalist revolt against the Ottomans during the war, tried to influence the peace negotiations in their favor. The most successful nationalist movement of the period, however, was that of an Ottoman army officer, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who established a Turkish republic that was ideologically rooted in the ideas of Gökalp. The new Turkish state expelled a Greek expeditionary force from western Anatolia; it also abolished the offices of sultan and caliph, and legislated the most strenuously secular form of nationalism known in the region.

Nationalism dominated Middle East politics from the end of World War II until the Iranian revolution of 1979. Arab nationalism flourished once the collapse of the Ottoman Empire resolved the question of whether or not to remain loyal to an ethnically plural state. Although some Muslims pushed for reestablishment of the caliphate, most nationalists were caught up in the tide of secularism, actually anticlericalism, that had engulfed Turkey. The Baʿth Party was founded in 1947 on a platform of Arab national unity and separation of religion from public affairs. Some other groups, such as the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, espoused an Arab nationalism based on a single country. The Arabic term *qawmiyya* (from *qawm,* group of people) distinguishes this type of nationalism from *wataniyya,* which calls for political unity of all the Arab peoples. Gamal Abdel Nasser, considered by many the most popular and effective Arab nationalist leader, strove for Arab unity but also inspired Egyptians with the feeling that Egypt was the center of the Arab world.

Zionism, a Jewish nationalist movement that originated in Europe and embodied many European ideas, came into bitter conflict with Arab nationalism, whose leaders viewed the Zionist community in Palestine as a manifestation of European colonialism. The basic elements important to Zionism—language, religion, land, and identity as a people—differed little from those that are important to Arab nationalism.

Being farther removed geographically from European cultural influence, Iran did not manifest a strong nationalist identity until the post–World War I period. Earlier anti-imperialist actions, such as the Tobacco Revolt of 1891 to 1893, engaged religious feelings as much as they did patriotic feelings. When the military commander Reza Khan assumed the throne as Reza Shah in 1925, he took the surname Pahlavi to indicate continuity with the pre-

Islamic imperial past, since the word is normally used to designate the form of the Persian language spoken at that time. The Pahlavi dynasty promoted a nationalist ideology focused on the person of the ruler and the historical sequence of imperial Iranian dynasties. It emphasized the dominant role of Persians and of the Persian language in a multiethnic kingdom.

In 1950, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh became the focus of a strong nonroyal nationalist movement. Suppression of this movement on the shah's behalf by U.S. and British intelligence agencies detoured nationalist feelings in an antiroyal revolutionary direction. Thus the revolution that overthrew the monarchy in 1979 had a strong nationalist coloring along with its dominant religious ideology.

Some modern Muslim theorists maintain that nationalism can have no place in Islam because of the seamless unity of the *umma,* the community of Muslims. Observers of Middle Eastern politics often use the term *religious nationalism* to describe politically active Islamic movements. Proponents of current theories of nationalism often speak of the "peoples" for whom nationalist movements speak and act as "imagined communities." Rather than accepting nationalist myths proclaiming the unity of a particular tribal, ethnic, linguistic, or territorial group of people from time immemorial, these theorists emphasize that each factor adduced to explain or describe a group's national character is partly an invention of ideologues, a deliberate emphasis upon one or another characteristic that had not previously been considered so important. A new nationalism can thus develop whenever a community imagines itself as a unified entity deserving of special recognition. From this perspective, nationalism appears less as an immutable division of the human population into natural units than it does as an instrument for shaping and reshaping community identities and politics along varying lines. Consequently, the frequently posed question as to whether the new Middle Eastern states created after World War I would ever become genuine national communities (a question often answered in the affirmative in light of the loyal participation of Iraqi Shiʿa in Iraq's war with Shiʿite Iran) may be of little relevance in an unsettled region where communities of people may well reimagine their identities in future decades.

See also Abdülhamit II; Arab Nationalism; Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Baʿth, al-; Committee for Union and Progress; Gökalp, Ziya; Greek War of Independence; Iranian Revolution (1979); Kawakibi, Abd al-Rahman al-; Mossadegh, Mohammad; Namik Kemal; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Pahlavi, Reza; Pan-Turkism; Syrian Social Nationalist Party; Tobacco Revolt; Wilson, Woodrow; Zionism.

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NATIONALIST ACTION PARTY

Ultranationalist political party in Turkey in the 1970s and again in the 1990s.

The Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, or MHP) was originally known as the Republican Peasants Nation Party, but it adopted its current name in 1969. It developed during the 1970s under the leadership of Alparslan Türkes, a former military colonel. The party had a strong social and ideological base, combining militant nationalism and anticommunism with a strong em-

phasis on interventionist economic policies and the use of militia-style youth organizations. The Nine Lights of Türkes (nationalism, idealism, morality, corporatism, science, populism, progressivism, technology, and the defense of peasantry) became the ideological basis of the party. Popular support for the MHP was not widespread, but it was stable: The party won 12 percent of the parliamentary seats in 1961, 2 percent in 1965, 1 percent in 1973, and 4 percent in 1977. Throughout the 1970s the party was involved in right-wing violence against leftist groups. Following the 1980 military coup the government closed the MHP, but it reemerged in the 1990s, demonstrating its strength in the 1999 parliamentary elections by securing the second largest number of votes, after the Democratic Left Party of Bülent Ecevit. MHP's legislative representation rose to 23 percent of seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly and its new leader, Devlet Bahçeli, became deputy prime minister in a coalition government formed by Ecevit. Since 1999 MHP has shifted its understanding of nationalism from ethnic to cultural nationalism.

See also Ecevit, Bülent; Türkes, Alparslan; Turkish Grand National Assembly.

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NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY

Lebanese political party established by and in support of the Chamoun family.

The National Liberal Party (NLP) was established by Camille Chamoun when he left the presidency of Lebanon in 1958. The NLP is a political vehicle used by the Chamoun family to reward its followers and partisans. While not having a defined political ideology, the NLP favored free enterprise and strong ties between Lebanon and the West, while at the same time it championed Maronite authority over Lebanon's politics. In the 1970s, the NLP claimed some 60,000 to 70,000 members, most of them from the Maronite Christian community, with some Shiʿite, Druze, and Greek Orthodox followers.

During the Lebanese Civil War of 1975, the NLP's militia, the Tigers (al-Numur), fought alongside the Phalange militias against the Islamic-Leftist coalition. In 1980, the Tigers were defeated, following an attack by the Lebanese Forces headed by Bashir Jumayyil. Following their defeat, the Tigers joined the Lebanese Forces and recognized Jumayyil as their leader. The NLP remains the party of Camille Chamoun, who used it to maintain his political power after leaving the presidency of Lebanon. Under his mandate, Lebanon was engulfed in a short civil war that ended with the 1982–1984 intervention of a multinational force composed of U.S. Marines and British, French, and Italian troops.

During the Cold War, Chamoun chose the anticommunist camp but created many enemies in Lebanon and the Arab world. In 1987, Camille Chamoun died and was replaced by his son Dany as the chair of the NLP. In 1990, Dany was assassinated and was replaced by his brother Dori.

See also Chamoun, Camille; Jumayyil, Bashir.

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NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (BAHRAIN)

Organization advocating political reform in Bahrain.

Following a general strike in Bahrain in the summer of 1954, liberal reformers from both the Shiʿite and Sunni communities organized a Higher Executive Committee (HEC) to press demands for an elected popular assembly, an appellate court, and the right to form trade unions. Protracted negotiations between the ruler, Shaykh Sulman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, and the HEC led to the official recognition of a Committee of National Unity in return for the HEC's agreement to stop calling for a parliament. Radical activists based in the industrial labor force responded by forming a succession of clandestine organizations, which called for more fun-

damental changes in Bahrain's political and economic structure.

Out of these groupings in the late 1960s emerged the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf, from which the Popular Front in Bahrain split off in 1974. More militant workers then formed the National Liberation Front (Bahrain) to press for the creation of a nonexploitative, egalitarian social order. Police cracked down on the organization after the National Assembly was dissolved in 1975. The National Liberation Front (Bahrain) was subsequently overshadowed by Bahrain's heterogeneous Islamist movement, although it continued to enjoy support among young professionals and intellectuals unsympathetic to the Islamists.

See also Bahrain; National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf.

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NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION (LIBYA)

The state oil holdings of Libya.

In 1970, the government of Libya enacted Law 24, reorganizing its oil holdings as the Libyan National Petroleum Corporation, now the National Oil Corporation (NOC). This law directed future foreign investment in Libyan oil to be organized as a partnership with NOC. It also transferred to NOC concessions relinquished by foreign oil companies and oil properties acquired by nationalization. By September 1973, NOC owned a minimum of 51 percent of every oil operation in Libya.

Since then, NOC has expanded its operations, negotiating directly with foreign oil companies to set up new joint ventures. In response to the imposition of economic sanctions by the United States in 1986, NOC devised model exploration and production-sharing agreements (EPSAs) featuring terms highly favorable to foreign partners. These model EPSA contracts have allowed NOC to continue to attract new partners based outside the United States, despite the additional risks to foreign investors that U.S. and UN economic sanctions against Libya impose. Today NOC operates refineries, a petrochemical complex, and a tanker fleet.

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NATIONAL PACT (LEBANON)

Agreement between Christian and Muslim communities in Lebanon.

The National Pact (al-Mithaq al-Watani), an unwritten agreement, came into being in the summer of 1943 as a result of numerous meetings between Bishara al-Khuri (a Maronite Christian), Lebanon's first president after independence, and the first prime minister, Riyad al-Sulh (a Sunni Muslim). At the heart of the negotiations was the Christians' fear of being dominated by the Muslim communities in Lebanon and the region, and the Muslims' fear of Western hegemony. In return for the Christians' promise not to seek foreign (i.e., French) protection and to accept the "Arab face of Lebanon," the Muslims agreed to recognize the country's independence and to accept the legitimacy of the 1920 boundaries. Muslims also were expected to renounce demands for unity with Syria. The National Pact was intended to reinforce the sectarian system of government by formalizing the confessional distribution of high-level posts in the government based on the results of the 1932 census, with Christians outnumbering Muslims by a ratio of six to five. Although some historians dispute the point, the terms of the National Pact are believed to have been incorporated in the statement of the first cabinet after independence (October 1943).

Specifically, the National Pact decreed that the presidency shall be reserved for a Maronite Christian, the prime ministership for a Sunni Muslim, and the speakership of parliament for a Shiʿite Muslim. Other top government posts—commander

in chief of the army, head of military intelligence, head of internal security, and some important ambassadorships—were reserved for Maronites. It was agreed that the deputy prime minister should be a Greek Orthodox and that "minorities" (not one of the six major religious sects) should be occasionally represented in the cabinet and always in the parliament.

The confessional system outlined in the National Pact was a matter of expediency, an interim measure to overcome philosophical differences between Christian and Muslim leaders. It was hoped that once the business of governance got under way, and as national spirit grew, the importance of confessionalism in the political structure would diminish. Over the years, the frequent political disputes—the most notable of which were manifested in the Lebanese Civil Wars of 1958 and 1975, and the Palestinian controversies in the 1960s and 1970s have borne clear testimony to the failure of the National Pact to produce societal integration. Moreover, along with the system of *zuʿama* ("bosses") clientelism, it has guaranteed the maintenance of the status quo and the continuation of privilege for the sectarian elites.

The National Pact was affected by the Taʾif accord of 1989. Its weakness stems from the sectarian representation that was allowed to prevail in the 1940s. The Maronites were accepted as representatives of all Christians. Furthermore, nobody within either religious community assigned Khuri and al-Sulh the task of dividing the national government along sectarian lines. The Taʾif accord juridically legitimized the basic provisions of the National Pact but changed the representational formula. Muslims and Christians are now represented equally in parliament, although the top government posts will continue to be divided along the lines of the pact. The Taʾif accord constituted the first revision of the pact.

See also KHURI, BISHARA AL-; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1958); LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); SULH, RIYAD AL-; TAʾIF ACCORD.

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AS'AD ABUKHALIL

NATIONAL PARTY (EGYPT)

Egyptian nationalist movement and political party.

The National Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) is the name of two successive movements of Egyptian resistance against foreign economic or political control. The first emerged in November 1879, after Khedive Ismaʿil ibn Ibrahim's deposition. Although purportedly an Egyptian protest movement against the privileges of Turks and Circassians and against the Anglo-French Dual Financial Control, its initial patron was probably Prince Halim, who claimed that Ismaʿil had deprived him of the khedivate. Former Premier Muhammad Sharif, a constitutionalist, also claimed to have formed the party. During the Urabi revolt (1881–1882), it became associated with the most radical elements in the National Assembly and the officer corps, but it lacked a formal organization, and it is not easy to determine its role in the revolt. When British troops occupied Egypt in September 1882 to restore order, the party vanished.

The National Party was revived in 1893 as a secret society, under the aegis of Khedive Abbas Hilmi II and with strong ties to the government of the Ottoman Empire. Its leaders were Mustafa Kamil, Muhammad Farid, and several other professional men educated in Egyptian and European schools. In the 1890s the party disseminated propaganda in Europe against the British occupation of Egypt and among Egyptians to back the khedive against the British agent and consul general, Lord Cromer (Evelyn Baring). In 1900 Mustafa Kamil founded a daily newspaper, *al-Liwa* (The banner), which became the National Party's organ. The Nationalists broke with Abbas in 1904, but they became reconciled after the 1906 Dinshaway Incident. Mustafa Kamil publicized the party's existence in his long speech of 22 October 1907 and convened the first Nationalist assembly in December. Its main goals were to persuade the British by peaceful means to

withdraw their occupying army from Egypt and to obtain a democratic constitution from Khedive Abbas.

Mustafa Kamil died two months later, and the Nationalists chose Muhammad Farid to succeed him. Farid tried to widen the party's appeal by circulating petitions demanding a constitution and by supporting the Young Turk revolution in Constantinople. It split, however, over whether to cooperate with the khedive in spite of his reconciliation with the British, whether to espouse pan-Islam even if doing so would alienate the Copts (Egyptian Orthodox Christians), and whether to seek Egypt's liberation by legal or by revolutionary means. Cromer's successors, Sir Eldon Gorst and Lord Herbert Horatio Kitchener, encouraged the khedive and his ministers to muzzle the press and, after a Nationalist killed Premier Butros Ghali in February 1910, passed special laws, banned or suspended newspapers, and jailed editors—even Farid—to intimidate and weaken the party. Farid's departure from Egypt in 1912 left the party leaderless and divided. During World War I, its emigré leaders sided against the British—that is, with the Ottoman Empire and Germany—but British security measures prevented them from inspiring an Egyptian uprising. The Nationalists aided the Wafd in the 1919 revolution and, when parliamentary rule was established in 1923, ran candidates for election. Led by Hafiz Ramadan, the National Party remained a small but vocal element in the fabric of Egyptian politics until the 1952 revolution, after which all political parties were abolished. Its name was incorporated by Anwar al-Sadat into his National Democratic Party, but the party itself was never revived.

See also Abbas Hilmi II; Baring, Evelyn; Dinshaway Incident (1906); Gorst, John Eldon; Ismaʿil ibn Ibrahim; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Wafd; Young Turks.

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Arthur Goldschmidt

NATIONAL PARTY (SYRIA)

Alliance of Syrian urban upper-class notables and politicians, formed in 1947 with Damascus as its center.

During the French mandate period in Syria (1920–1946), this alliance of notables and politicians had formed the Damascus branch of the National Bloc (al-Kutla al-Wataniyya), which had led Syria's nationalist political struggle against the French. The most prominent leaders of the National party (al-Hizb al-Watani) were Shukri al-Quwatli, Jamil Mardam, Faris al-Khuri, Lutfi al-Haffar, and Sabri al-Asali.

The National party did not have a modern political party structure—rather, it depended on its leaders, their loosely organized followings, and their extended family relations. Socially, the party represented industrial and merchant interests, which favored independence from France, in contrast to the largely more conservative landowning milieu, which was luke-warm toward such a prospect. The position of the National party together with the position of its Aleppo-based rival, the People's Party (Hizb al-Shaʿb), was undermined in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This took place through the rise of more radical political parties like the Baʿth party and by the increased role of the military in Syria's politics during that period.

See also Baʿth, al-; Mardam, Jamil; National Bloc; Quwatli, Shukri al-.

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Mahmoud Haddad

NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE FRONT (SYRIA)

Coalition of left-wing and progressive parties in Syria.

The National Progressive Front is a coalition of Syrian political parties established on 7 March 1972 after the Correction Movement led by President Hafiz al-Asad. It consists of six parties under the leadership of al-Baʿth Arab Socialist Party. The other parties are the Syrian Communist Party, the Arab Socialist Union, the Socialist Unionist Party, the Arab Socialists Party, and the Socialist Unionist Democratic Party. The charter of the coalition states that its central leadership is formed from a chairman (who is at the same time the president of the Republic and the secretary-general of the Baʿth Party), nine members of al-Baʿth, and two members of each of the other parties. With the exception of al-Baʿth, the parties that comprise the Front are not allowed to canvass for supporters in the army or the student unions. In December 2000 the Baʿth Party command allowed the six coalition parties to open provincial offices and issue newspapers publicly.

See also ASAD, HAFIZ AL-.

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KHALIL GEBARA

NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE UNIONIST PARTY

Originated as the left faction of the official Arab Socialist Union (ASU).

When Anwar al-Sadat dissolved the ASU in 1976, the National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) emerged as the official left opposition party. A coalition of leftist forces, including Nasserists and Marxists, the NPUP under the leadership of Khalid Muhyi al-Din, formerly a member of the Free Officers, has played the role of active and vocal opposition in the People's Assembly.

See also FREE OFFICERS, EGYPT.

RAYMOND WILLIAM BAKER

NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY

See ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (LEBANON)

Lebanese nationalist group.

After the signing of the agreement between Amin Jumayyil's government and Israel on 17 May 1983, opposition groups and politicians met to commit themselves to aborting the accord. The three founders of the National Salvation Front were Sulayman Franjiyya, Rashid Karame, and Walid Jumblatt. Minor members of the Front were the Lebanese Communist Party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. All of these groups were loyal to the Syrian regime and opposed Jumayyil's government, which was then, with U.S. support, launching a war against the opposition. The Front wanted to annul the agreement with Israel, which amounted to a peace treaty, and to oppose the Phalangist takeover of the Lebanese government and administration under Jumayyil. The Front cooperated with Nabih Berri of the AMAL movement, and as a result of direct Syrian military and political support was able to pressure Jumayyil to nullify the agreement.

See also AMAL; BERRI, NABI; FRANJIYYA, SULAYMAN; JUMAYYIL, AMIN; JUMBLATT, WALID; KARAME, RASHID; SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONALIST PARTY.

AS'AD ABUKHALIL

NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY

Political party in Turkey during the 1970s.

The National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, or NSP) was formed in October 1972 as a successor to the National Order Party (NOP), which had been dissolved by Turkey's Constitutional Court following the March 1971 military coup d'état. Like the NOP, the NSP represented itself as a modern party inspired by and reflecting traditional Sunni Islamic ethical values. A key figure behind the formation of both parties was the Naqshbandi (Sufi order) leader Mehmet Zahid Kotku. The most prominent NOP/NSP politician, however, was Necmeddin Erbakan, who fled temporarily to Switzerland in 1971 to avoid arrest. In the election of 1973, the NSP received 11.8 percent of the vote and obtained eighty seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, thus becoming its third largest party. Erbakan returned to

Necmeddin Erbakan served as the prime minister of Turkey from 1996 to 1998 before being forced out of office for pursuing antisecularist policies. After Erbakan was banned from politics, his supporters founded the Islamic Virtue Party, which the government outlawed in 2001 on the grounds it was a center of fundamentalist activity and a threat to constitutional order. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Turkey and became the NSP's leader in October, one week after the 1973 election.

In February 1974 the NSP joined the first coalition government formed by Bülent Ecevit of the Republican People's Party. The NSP held six cabinet positions during the seven-month tenure of this government. The most significant development in the period was the crisis in Cyprus, to which the coalition government dispatched troops to protect the Turkish minority living in the northern part of the island. The military intervention resulted in both Erbakan and Ecevit acquiring reputations as heroes, although this did not translate into electoral support for either man's party. Ecevit resigned in October 1974, thus ending the coalition.

The NSP next agreed to participate in the first National Front government under Süleyman Demirel of the Justice Party (April 1975 to July 1977). In the 1977 elections, however, the NSP's share of the national vote declined to 8.6 percent, and it lost half of its seats in the assembly. It participated in Demirel's brief second National Front government (July to December 1977) and in the minority government from November 1979 until the September 1980 military coup. All political parties were disbanded after the coup. The successor to the NSP was the Refah Partisi, founded in July 1983. After the September 1987 referendum that reestablished the right of prominent former politicians to pursue political activities, Erbakan became chairman of Refah.

The strength of the NSP was in the small towns and rural areas of Anatolia. Religious groups such as the Naqshbandi, other Sufi orders, and the Nurcu generally supported the party. The NSP embraced industrialization and technological advancement but criticized what it termed blind imitation of European culture and lifestyles. Its main program was embodied in a document called the National Outlook *(Milli Görüş),* which called for the strengthening of culture, industrialization, social justice, and education. It was, in practice, a populist agenda based on respect for Turkey's Ottoman-Islamic heritage, conservative social values, and equal opportunities for the nonelite middle and lower classes.

See also ERBAKAN, NECMEDDIN; NAQSHBANDI; NURSI, SAID.

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NERMIN ABADAN-UNAT
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (TURKEY)

Political/military body that oversees the Turkish government.

Turkey's National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, or NSC), formed after the 1960 military coup d'état, consists of the president (the chair of the NSC); the prime minister; ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and the interior; the chief of the general staff; and commanders of the army, navy, air force, and gendarmerie. Its composition and duties are stipulated in Turkey's 1961 constitution. The function of the NSC is to maintain the military's position as guardian of the principles of Kemalism

within the institutions of the state. Following the 1980 military coup, the new 1982 constitution not only retained the NSC but also enhanced its powers, stipulating, for example, that the cabinet must give priority to NSC recommendations. The military's influence on government has proved to be an impediment to Turkey's efforts to become a member of the European Union; in order to comply with criteria set forth by the European Union, constitutional amendments in 2001 curtailed the role of the military within the NSC. For example, the civilian members of the NSC have been increased, and the NSC no longer recommends policies to the cabinet, but rather conveys its views informally.

See also KEMALISM.

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M. HAKAN YAVUZ

NATIONAL UNION (EGYPT)

Founded in 1956 to succeed the Liberation Rally.

The National Union was the second of Egypt's official mobilization bodies, to be followed in its turn by the Arab Socialist Union. The National Union was an indirect outgrowth of the Tripartite Aggression of 1956, when Egypt was invaded by the colluding forces of the British, the French, and the Israelis. The Free Officers regime sought to consolidate the internal political front by creating a more effective mobilization vehicle for the solidification of patriotic sentiment behind the military regime.

The National Union structured a network of quasi-governmental intermediary organizations, such as a youth movement and women's organizations, that aimed to absorb and canalize popular energies in the service of regime goals. Though officially labeled a political party, the National Union, like its predecessors and successor, proved merely a bureaucratic extension of the authoritarian regime, failing to provide effective means of mass political participation.

See also ARAB SOCIALIST UNION; FREE OFFICERS, EGYPT; LIBERATION RALLY.

RAYMOND WILLIAM BAKER

NATIONAL UNITY COMMITTEE (TURKEY)

A group of military officers, commonly referred to as the NUC, who seized control of Turkey's government on 27 May 1960.

The National Unity Committee (in Turkish, Milli Birlik Komitesi) was a group of military officers, led by General Cemal Gürsel, that staged the revolution of 27 May 1960 and subsequently ruled Turkey through 20 November 1961. Although the coup was prepared by officers of middle and junior rank, it was the senior officers who took control of the National Unity Committee and the government. Serious divisions separated the two groups: junior members favored radical reform requiring longer-term retention of power by the military. Senior members supported an early return of elected civilian government. One of the first acts of the NUC was to convene a constitutional commission to draft a new constitution. On 12 June 1960 a provisional constitution granted sovereignty to the NUC until new elections could be held. The NUC exercised legislative power directly and executive power indirectly through a civilian council of ministers appointed and controlled by the NUC.

On 13 November 1960, in a move to rid the group of its more radical elements, thirteen of the original thirty-eight members of the committee were purged, including the ultranationalist Colonel Alparslan Türkes, paving the way for convocation of a civilian constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. The constitution was approved in a popular referendum on 8 July 1961, though a large negative vote was cast. On 15 October 1961 parliamentary elections produced indecisive results, leading to the election of the NUC leader, Cemal Gürsel, as president of the republic, and to the necessity of organizing coalition governments for the first time.

The NUC implemented some social and economic reforms designed to stabilize politics in Turkey. In addition, it abolished the Demokrat Parti and brought almost six hundred of its members to trial, three of whom were subsequently executed.

See also GÜRSEL, CEMAL.

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FRANK TACHAU

NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT (ISRAEL)

See ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

NATIONAL WATER SYSTEM (ISRAEL)

Agency that oversees the planning and development of Israel's water resources.

With the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, much effort was expended on drawing up an inventory of national water resources, defining growth objectives for the country, and planning methods of development. The first comprehensive water-development plan was adopted in 1950, stressing the maximum conservation of water. In 1952, Tahal, the Israel Water Planning Corporation, was set up to plan the water, sewage, and drainage systems and to supervise development. In 1959, Israel's Knesset (parliament) passed the Water Law, vesting all water rights in the state and giving the water commissioner in the ministry of agriculture the sole authority to fix tariffs, allocate water, and issue licenses for exploiting water resources.

All water development schemes are closely integrated with plans for agriculture and the realities of the scarcity of both land and water. The development plans must also take into account shortages of capital. The price of water is therefore high and, until recently, farmers paid the least, since preference was given to irrigation installations that facilitated control of the amounts of water used, minimized conveyance losses, and were economical in the use of labor.

Israel's climate is typically Mediterranean, with rainfall occurring only in the winter and decreasing from north to south. Rainfall in the north averages 39 inches (1,000 mm) yearly; in the central

A sweet-water reservoir flanks the Ruler road to Afula, in northern Israel. © HANAN ISACHAR/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

coastal plain 19 inches (500 mm); in the extreme south only 1 inch (30 mm)—but there are yearly fluctuations. Its only major river running from north to south is the Jordan River. Its smaller rivers include the Yarkon, the Kishon, and the Sorek. They all empty into the Mediterranean Sea, along with more than a dozen major streams. National development projects aim at using groundwater, springs, storm runoff, and reclaimed wastewater. The largest project predated the Johnston Plan and was completed in the 1960s—the National Water Carrier—which conveys water from the northeast to the center and, at the same time, integrates all local and regional waterworks into one national water "grid," operated according to a national plan.

Israel claims that the integrated water sources available for the nation amount to about 370 million gallons (1,400 million cu m) per year. The majority of this water comes from the upper Jordan River and includes water from the springs around the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias or Lake Kinneret), from the lake itself, and from coastal and foothill groundwater sources. A smaller amount of this water comes from the groundwater of the Galilee mountains, the Kishon river system, the Yarkon river system and the springs, storm runoff, and reclaimed waste of Israel's cities of Haifa and Tel Aviv.

Regulation is aided by the use of two main storage facilities: (1) the Sea of Galilee in the north, which is used for excess Jordan River waters during the rainy season, and (2) the aquifer under the cen-

tral hills, which was integrated into the grid system after the 1967 Arab–Israel War.

A major priority in Israel's early decades was the expansion of irrigation, with domestic and industrial water supply taking second place. Priorities have now changed, and irrigation is being cut back as both population and industrialization have grown.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967); GALILEE, SEA OF; JOHNSTON PLAN (1953); JORDAN RIVER; KNESSET; WATER.

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SARA REGUER

NATIONAL WOMEN'S COMMITTEE (YEMEN)

The official women's organization of Yemen.

The National Women's Committee (NWC) is the official women's organization of the Yemen Republic, established in 1996 by a prime minister's act. Initially, the committee was established in 1993 to coordinate the official preparations for the Fourth World Conference of Women. In 2000 the committee was restructured to function under the Supreme Council for Women's Affairs headed by the prime minister. The NWC has consultative status with the Council of Ministers. The chairperson of the committee is nominated by presidential decree. NWC leaders have included such prominent women as Amat al-Alim al-Suswa, Rashida al-Hamdani, and Huriya Mashhur. The members of the committee include directors of women's departments in ministries and state institutions and coordinators in selected organizations and women's sections of political parties. The NWC has branches in all governorates with heads nominated by the governor of each province. The committee monitors state policies in regard to women's issues, carries out surveys (for example, *The Status of Woman in Yemen,* published in Sanʿa in 1996), and launches campaigns for women's rights. Its branches organize seminars and training courses devoted to local leaders and grass roots activists. Women's participation in elections and nomination in state offices have increased during the 1990s due to the joint activities of women's organizations. The NWC publishes the monthly newspaper *al-Yamaniyya* (Yemeni woman) and has a web page at <www.yemeni-women.org.ye>.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; YEMEN.

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SUSANNE DAHLGREN

NATURAL GAS

This entry consists of the following articles:

ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL GAS
MIDDLE EAST RESERVES OF NATURAL GAS

ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL GAS

A mixture of hydrocarbons that are vapors at normal temperatures and below-normal pressures.

Methane (CH_4) is the primary component of natural gas; other components are ethane (C_2H_6), propane (C_3H_8), butane (C_4H_{10}) and pentane (C_5H_{12}); nonhydrocarbons, such as nitrogen, hydrogen, and water vapor; and traces of rare gases, such as helium. The heavier-than-methane hydrocarbons are collectively termed *natural gas liquids.*

Associated gas is gas dissolved in petroleum; it sometimes also appears as a gas cap over an oil-bearing formation. Associated gas is the primary source of the pressure forcing oil to the surface during production and also is a byproduct of this process. An estimated one-quarter of the world's natural gas reserves occurs as associated gas.

Natural gas is highly flammable, and the complexity and cost of the technology needed to recover and exploit it prompted oil companies at first to flare (burn) most of the natural gas they produced. During the 1920s, research into the production of

petrochemicals led to the development of a number of commercial processes utilizing natural gas as a feedstock, but most of the natural gas produced as a byproduct of mining oil continued to be flared. At that time, the American Petroleum Institute commissioned a major study of the role of natural gas in oil production. Published in 1929—when industry leaders and government officials were worried about imminent fossil fuel depletion—the study produced the first empirical evidence of the relationship between gas pressure and recovery of oil reserves. In response to the study, the large, vertically integrated oil firms took the lead in changing traditional methods of oil production and processing so as to conserve natural gas.

Other modern uses of natural gas date back to the nineteenth century, when it was substituted for coal and wood in boilers located near oil fields. During the mid-nineteenth century, gas synthesized from coal was the chief source of illumination in urban areas, until it was displaced by the incandescent light bulb. During the first half of the twentieth century, gas gained a share of the home heating market and was used as a fuel in manufacturing. But the high cost of gas infrastructure, coupled with the larger profits from petroleum, made natural gas the stepchild of the oil industry.

The economic exploitation of natural gas depends on its commercial value, which in turn is a function of the size, quality, and location of the gas deposit; the projected rate of production; the price of natural gas; and the price of alternative fuels. The dependence of gas collection, transmission, and distribution on expensive infrastructure has historically been the biggest factor limiting the use of natural gas as a fuel. Oil-exporting countries in the Middle East have long protested the waste of their natural gas by flaring, but it was not until they could assume at least some of the cost of providing infrastructure that other than limited local uses for their natural gas became common.

Internationally, gas exporters have encountered resistance from importers with respect to the sharing of costs, particularly for pipeline construction and the expensive cryogenic facilities needed to liquefy and transport liquid natural gas. As long as the preponderance of natural gas is used for heating, demand is highly cyclical. As natural gas displaces other fuels, however, the load factor or average rate of capacity usage rises, making it more attractive.

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—which includes gas exporters such as Algeria, Qatar, Iran, and Libya—has had sharp pricing disputes with gas customers. Some led to interrupted deliveries, canceled contracts, and even the scrapping of entire projects. OPEC aspires to achieve a unified organizational position on natural gas pricing by developing formulas that link gas prices to crude oil prices. However, its efforts have been stymied by consumer resistance, by competition from non-OPEC gas sources (such as Russia) and nongas fuels (such as petroleum, which guarantees a built-in conflict of interest within OPEC itself), and by a long period of weakness in oil prices, which reduced producer incentives to link natural gas prices to crude oil prices.

Countering these drawbacks, improvements in transmission and storage technology and the growing global market for natural gas are positive economic signs. Although demand for natural gas in key industrial markets weakened in the 1980s as a result of recession, warmer winters, and conservation, the gas market has improved steadily for some years thanks to expansions in reserves (in 2000, proven reserves exceeded sixty times the rate of production); technical improvements in transmission, which is the most costly segment of the industry; marked improvements in load factors; and shifting priorities that make burning natural gas more attractive than oil and especially coal because gas produces lower levels of greenhouse gases and virtually no toxic pollutants.

Some OPEC countries see expanding internal consumption and manufacture of petrochemicals as superior alternatives to natural gas exports. However, neither the market for petrochemicals nor the domestic economies of most gas-rich members of OPEC can absorb the quantities of natural gas available. At the same time, antipollution regulations in fuel-importing countries make natural gas more attractive to developed-country consumers and lower its relative cost. Demand for natural gas is expected to top demand for coal by 2005, and it may approach demand for oil by 2025. Ongoing financial and regulatory changes in national and international markets support the continuation of these

trends by improving security guarantees for producers as well as consumers.

See also ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC); PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS.

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MARY ANN TÉTREAULT

MIDDLE EAST RESERVES OF NATURAL GAS

The Middle East holds 36 percent of the world reserves of natural gas but generates only 9.3 percent of world production.

Natural gas must be transported by pipeline or liquefied by refrigeration in the form of liquid natural gas and transported on specially built ships. The liquefaction process is substantially more expensive. But since the main demand for gas from the Gulf has come from users in the Far East, Europe, and the United States, liquefaction has been the only option and has made the production of the main Gulf gas fields less competitive. Gas from Algeria—because it can be piped under the Mediterranean—has been extensively used in Europe.

Natural gas has become the major feedstock for petrochemicals. The development of the petrochemical industry in the Gulf region has given impetus to the development of the fields. Saudi Arabia uses most of its produced natural gas for firing desalination plants, running power plants, and producing 35 million tons per year of petrochemicals and fertilizers, which are exported worldwide.

In the mid-1990s some major projects were undertaken to develop fields and liquefaction plants for exports, mainly in Qatar and Oman. Because of this expansion of Qatari and Omani liquefied natural gas exports, the Middle East was the fastest-growing gas production region in 2001.

2001 Gas production and reserves in the Middle East and select African countries

Country	Gas Production*	Gas Reserves**
Bahrain	8.9	3.2
Iran	60.6	812.3
Iraq	—	109.8
Kuwait	9.5	52.7
Oman	13.4	29.3
Qatar	32.5	393.8
Saudia Arabia	53.7	213.8
United Arab Emirates	41.3	212.1
Yemen	—	16.9
Other Middle East	8.1	10.2
Total Middle East	228	1,974.6
% of World Total	9.3	36.1
Algeria	78.2	159.7
Egypt	21.0	35.2
Libya	5.4	46.4
Total	104.6	241.3
% of World Total	**4.3**	**4.3**

*In billion cubic meters
**In trillion cubic feet

SOURCE: British Petroleum Review of World Gas; United States Energy Information Administration.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

See also PETROCHEMICALS; PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS.

JEAN-FRANÇOIS SEZNEC

NAVON, YIZHAK

[1921–]

Fifth president of Israel.

Yizhak Navon was born to a Jerusalem Sephardic family. Educated in religious schools and at the Hebrew University, from 1949 to 1950 he was a diplomat in Argentina and Uruguay, and served as political secretary first to Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett and then to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion from 1951 to 1963. From 1963 to 1965, he was director of the Division of Culture and the Ministry of Education and Culture.

Navon was a member of the Knesset, first in the Rafi Party and later in the Labor Party. He chaired the important Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense

Committee. From 1978 to 1983 Navon served as the fifth president of Israel, nominated by the opposition Labor Party and chosen over the Likud candidate. He was Israel's first "modern" president, departing from the "nonpolitical" role to take positions on controversial issues, most pointedly calling for an inquiry on the events in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon, which were under Israeli control when Christian Phalangist forces massacred Palestinian refugees there. In 1984 he was reelected to the Knesset, serving as the minister of education and culture and as deputy prime minister in the government of Shimon Peres. Throughout his life, Navon has been a spokesman for the Sephardic community, serving as chairman of the National Authority for Ladino and as honorary chairman of the Abraham Fund promoting coexistence between Jews and Arabs.

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MIRIAM SIMON
UPDATED BY GREGORY S. MAHLER

NAWFAL, HIND

[c. 1860–1920]

Writer and Lebanese immigrant to Egypt.

Nawfal Hind was the founder and editor of *al-Fatat* (1892–1894), the first Arabic-language periodical for and about women that published primarily female authors. She was the daughter of writers. Her mother, Maryam Nahhas Nawfal, was the author of what scholars assume to be the first Arabic-language biographical dictionary of women to be authored by an Arab woman. Her father, Nasim Nawfal, was a writer-publisher who helped launch *al-Fatat* in November 1892, as did Hind's sister Sara. Nawfal's family was Christian and from Tripoli (in present-day Lebanon) and was part of the nineteenth-century wave of writers emigrating to Egypt in search of opportunity and a freer publishing climate. She lived in Alexandria and published *al-Fatat* there until her marriage to Habib Dabanam in March 1894, when the magazine published its fourteenth and final issue.

See also *ANIS AL-JALIS* MAGAZINE; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; *LATA'IF AL-MUSAWWARA* MAGAZINE.

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MARILYN BOOTH

NAZARETH

Historic market city and pilgrimage site in the Galilee region of Israel; the only all-Arab city in the State of Israel.

Nazareth (2001 population, 68,700) is located on the southernmost ridge of the hilly Galilee region of northern Israel, approximately 18 miles (30 km) southeast of the coastal city of Haifa. Its name in Arabic is al-Nasira, meaning "the one who grants victory." The city was conquered by Crusaders in 1099, taken by Saladin in 1187, and then retaken by Frederick II in 1229. Muslim forces led by Baybars, the Mamluk sultan of Egypt (1233–1277), recaptured Nazareth in 1263, massacring its Christian population. The city was virtually uninhabited for nearly three hundred years before being incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in 1517. The town gradually grew under the sponsorship of local and foreign Christian missions, attracting Christian Arab families from southern and coastal Palestine, the Hawran region of Syria, and what is now southern Lebanon.

Nazareth was an important administrative center during the British Mandate period (1922–1948) and was captured by Israel's pre-state military forces on 18 July 1948. Unlike in other Palestinian towns and cities, Nazareth's population was not displaced after 1948. The conscious policy of the Israeli military commanders in 1948 was to avoid violence and large-scale population displacements from this particular city. Immediately after the war, Nazareth's

predominantly Christian population of 12,000 suddenly jumped to 18,000 with the arrival of more than 5,000 refugees, mostly Muslims, from neighboring Arab villages that had been destroyed during the hostilities. Overnight, Nazareth was transformed into the largest, densest, and most diverse concentration of Palestinians within the new state of Israel. Fifty-five years later, Nazareth's population had more than quintupled and Muslims greatly outnumbered Christians because of a higher Muslim birth rate and increasing Christian emigration.

The core of old Nazareth is situated in a long, bowl-like valley surrounded by several hills. Newer buildings and dense neighborhoods cover the hillsides above the old city, the elevation of which is approximately 1,200 feet (400 meters) above sea level. Well known throughout the Christian world as the home of Jesus, Mary, and Joseph, and as the scene of the Annunciation, Nazareth is a popular destination for tourists and pilgrims. The city boasts several churches, most notably the Roman Catholic Church of the Annunciation, completed in 1966, which is the largest church in the Middle East; the Greek Orthodox Church of the Annunciation (Gabriel's Church), constructed in the eighteenth century; and the Greek Catholic (Melkite) Synagogue Church. Nazareth is also a market town, a site of Arabic print media production, and home to several respected private primary and secondary schools administered by churches. It is known informally as the capital of the Arabs in Israel.

The municipality of Nazareth was founded in 1875. Until the mid-1990s, Nazareth housed the regional offices of state ministries and agencies, and the town's political life was dominated by a progressive political coalition, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (al-Jabba al-Dimuqratiyya lil-Salam wa al-Musawa), made up of the Nazareth branch of the Communist Party, the Committee of Merchants and Professionals, and the Association of Arab University Graduates. From the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s, Nazareth was a political base for left-wing, secularist, and Arab nationalist political currents among Palestinian citizens of Israel. Natzerat Illit, a Jewish development town founded on lands expropriated from Nazareth and other surrounding Arab localities in 1957 as part of a government campaign to Judaize the Galilee, has a population of 47,900, of whom approximately 11 percent are Arab. Since the mid-1990s, government offices formerly located in Nazareth have been relocated to the administratively separate although geographically adjacent Natzerat Illit. In the late 1990s, as Nazareth's municipality was undertaking Nazareth 2000, a multifaceted urban renewal program, with help from the Israeli government and Israeli businesses, to prepare the city for the millennial festivities and a tourism boom, hostilities erupted in the old city of Nazareth when a Muslim shrine was obstructed by construction crews. The ensuing conflict resulted in rioting and violence, polarized Muslims and Christians in Nazareth, halted the urban renewal project, paralyzed municipal governance, and involved the Vatican, the Israeli Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the Palestinian Authority. In October 2000, Nazareth was again the site of violence, this time occasioned by pogrom-like raids into Nazareth by Jewish mobs from Natzerat Illit one week after the outbreak of the second Intifada. Three Palestinian citizens of Israel were killed by police forces in the melée.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Palestine; Palestinian Citizens of Israel.

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Benjamin Joseph
Updated by Laurie King-Irani

NAZIF, SÜLEYMAN

[1869–1927]

Ottoman Turkish poet and writer.

The son of a historian, Süleyman Nazif was born and educated in Diyarbekir. While employed in the civil service, he began to write for the provincial press and, in 1897, was forced into exile in Paris. While in Paris, he contributed articles to Ahmet Riza's Meşveret. During the Constitutional period, he joined Ebüzziya Tevfik in producing *Tasvir-i Efkar.*

Süleyman Nazif's poetry, which was published in *Servet-i Fünun* under the name Ibrahim Cehdi, was strongly influenced by Namik Kemal. He published four volumes of poetry and numerous other literary and academic works.

DAVID WALDNER

NAZMI, ZIYA

[1881–1937]

Turkish painter.

The son of a financial official in the Ottoman Empire, Ziya Nazmi was born in the Aksaray quarter of Istanbul. Under the conservative influence of his father, he studied at the School of Political Science; but when his father died, he entered the Imperial Academy to study art and later went to France. While in France, Nazmi was influenced by Impressionism, and his landscapes depict people, buildings, and trees with pinks, greens, and yellows bathed in soft, diffuse light.

Upon his return to Istanbul, he taught art and held several exhibitions of his Impressionistic work. Nazmi and his generation of painters replaced the formal realism of nineteenth-century painters with informal and natural depictions of everyday life in cities and villages, including nude portraits. Nazmi was an enthusiastic follower of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's cultural reforms, and he painted one of the best portraits of Atatürk, who was president of Turkey from 1923 to 1938.

See also ART; ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL.

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DAVID WALDNER

NE'EMAN, YUVAL

[1925–]

Israeli scientist and military and political leader.

Yuval Neʾeman was born in Palestine to an industrialist family in 1925. After early education in Egypt, he entered Herzeliya High School in Tel Aviv at the young age of eleven, matriculated at the age of fifteen, and entered the Technicion Institute in Haifa, from which he graduated as an engineer. From an early age he was a member of the Haganah, the Jewish clandestine paramilitary organization, and participated in several command courses. During the 1948 Arab–Israel War Neʾeman served as operation officer of the famous Givʿati brigade; by the end of the war he was second in command. He remained in professional service to the Israel Defense Force (IDF) until 1961. After a year studying in the École d'État Major in Paris (1952), he fulfilled prominent positions in the IDF's General Staff, reaching the rank of colonel. In 1954 and 1955 he stood at the head of the strategic planning department, in which capacity he authored the "Lavie File," a comprehensive analysis of Israel's security problems and strategic and operative doctrines. The Lavie File was adopted by the IDF under the leadership of General Moshe Dayan as Chief of Staff (CoS), and it totally changed Israel's security policy from defensive to offensive. This strategy included options of pre-emptive strikes, which were implemented in 1956 and 1967. In 1955 Neʾeman was nominated deputy chief of the intelligence service, a post that involved him in the coordination of Israel's secret relations with the French military and intelligence services during the Suez War (1956).

While serving as Israel's military attaché in London from 1958 to 1960 he resumed his studies in nuclear physics, a field of research that he later pursued in the United States, where he developed the theory that explained the system of elementary particles and established theoretically the existence of a new particle, Omega Minus, which was later verified in laboratory experiments. These achievements gained him international recognition as a leading nuclear scientist. In the early 1970s he served as a professor at Tel Aviv University; from 1971 to 1975 he served as the university's president. In 1975 he was nominated as chief scientist of Israel's security system, but he resigned from this position in protest of the withdrawal from the western part of the Sinai. A superhawk, Neʾeman entered politics and with several colleagues founded ha-Tehiya, an extreme right-wing party that advocated full annexation and settlement of all territories conquered by Israel in 1967. He served three terms as a member of the Knesset (1981–1990) and was twice a member of the government, holding the portfolio of Science and

Technology from 1982 to 1984 and a double portfolio of Science and Technology and Energy and Infrastructure from 1990 to 1992. His party was defeated in the elections of 1992, and Neʾeman finally retired from politics and returned to his academic activities.

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MORDECHAI BAR-ON

NEGEV

Desert region in southern half of Israel; northeastern extension of the Sinai Desert.

The Negev is a triangular area with a maximum elevation of 3,300 feet and includes more than half of Israel's land area. The Negev Hills are a series of ranges with gentle northwesterly and steep southeasterly slopes. Some craters were formed by the erosion of upward-folded strata; they are 6 to 19 miles long, up to 3 miles wide, and surrounded on all sides by precipitous slopes. On their eastern side is an opening through which they drain into the Aravah Valley. August temperatures average 79°F, but they reach 90°F in the southern area and in Aravah. January temperatures average 52°F, reaching 59°F in the south and in Elat. The gateway from the north is the Negev's largest city, Beersheba, with a population estimated at 181,500 in 2002. To the south, the Negev opens onto the Gulf of Aqaba at Elat. The Negev has been irrigated in the northwest for agriculture; it contains some mineral resources, such as copper, phosphates, bromine, and potash, as well as natural gas and petroleum.

Under the British Mandate (1922–1948), the Negev was inhabited mainly by Bedouin. A few Jewish settlements were established by 1946. Control of the desert was contested by Arabs and Jews in the various partition plans. In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly's partition recommendation assigned parts of the Negev to the proposed Jewish state. In May 1948, Egyptian forces entered Gaza and the Negev in the opening days of the Arab-Israel War. With the conclusion of that war by armistice agreement in 1949, the Negev remained part of Israel. The late 1940s and early 1950s brought hundreds of thousands of immigrants to Israel. With an aggressive settlement program, by 2000 the Negev reached a population of more than 300,000.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1948).

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON
UPDATED BY YEHUDA GRADUS

NERVAL, GÉRARD DE

[1808–1855]

A French romantic poet and novelist known for his writing about the Orient.

Gérard Nerval was born in Paris with the name Gérard Labrunie. His delicate, musical poetry (e.g., *Les chimères,* 1854) and prose (of which the short story "Sylvie" is the best known) earned him a respected place in French literature. His treatment of dreamlike topics and visions influenced the development of surrealism and his translation of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's *Faust* (1828) was widely acclaimed. Like many of his contemporaries, he was swept by romantic depictions of the Orient. In 1842, he left for a trip to the Orient in search of the sources of religion and spirituality as well as the exotic horizons of the Arab and Muslim world. His travel account *Voyage en Orient* is considered among his finest works. His depiction of the Orient is more an occasion for introspective meditation on religious issues and criticism of his own culture and society than an objective social study. His friendly account, extolling the tolerance and openness of the cultures and religions he encountered, caused critics to accuse him of skepticism. The use of the Orient as a cover for self-criticism had been well established in literature, as seen in Montesquieu's *Lettres persanes* and Voltaire's *Zadig.* Like others before and after him

(Chateaubriand, Alphonse de Lamartine, Lord Byron, Thomas Moore, etc.), Nerval contributed to the movement of orientalism, which depicted the Orient in a romantic light, at times projecting onto it the negative characteristics and fears of Western culture. The distortion of reality in subjective arts was a normal cultural phenomenon; however, it contributed to the pseudoscientific discipline of orientalism, which was closely associated with colonialism and has in contemporary times been denounced for its lack of objectivity and its political motivations. Beset by mental illness, Nerval committed suicide in 1855.

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MAYSAM J. AL FARUQI

NESHAT, SHIRIN

[1957–]

Iranian multimedia artist.

Shirin Neshat is a New York–based artist who works in the fields of video, video installation, and photography. She received her M.F.A. from the University of California in 1982 and did not return to Iran for some years because of the Islamic Revolution. In the 1990s Neshat became one of the most sought-after woman artists from the Middle East. She has won many awards and participated in major exhibitions in the United States and Europe. The majority of her work explores the male-female dynamic in Islam, as exemplified in the split-screen video installation *Rapture.* Later works, such as the trilogy *Passage, Pulse,* and *Possessed,* focus more specifically on both the limits and possibilities of women's experiences in Muslim societies. Neshat makes heavy use of allegory, mythic scenes, the imagery of the veil, and hypnotic music. Her work reflects her sense of displacement from her native Iran, the experience of living in an in-between state of self-imposed exile, and her attempts to come to terms with the massive social and religious changes in modern Iran.

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JESSICA WINEGAR

NESIN, NÜSRET AZIZ

[1915–]

Turkish playwright, novelist, short-story writer, and journalist.

Nesin was born in Istanbul, where he attended military high school and college until 1939. He worked as a journalist in Turkey in the 1940s, joining the leftist daily *Tan* in 1945, just before it was closed down by an anticommunist mob. He began writing novels and plays in the 1950s and quickly became known for his satirical style. He is considered by many the best Turkish humorist of recent years. He cofounded *Karikatür,* a humor magazine, in 1958. Since then, this prolific author has written dozens of short stories, several novels, and volumes of poetry, memoirs, and travel accounts. In the late 1980s, he served as chairman of the Turkish Writers Syndicate.

Nesin was an innovative playwright and was among the few to experiment with the theater of the absurd in the 1950s; he went on to write the leading plays of the 1970s. These included the antiwar play *The War between the Whistlers, Brushers,* and *Yasar, Neither Dead nor Alive.*

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

NETANYAHU, BENJAMIN

[1949–]

Israeli politician; prime minister, 1996–1999.

Benjamin ("Bibi") Netanyahu was born in Tel Aviv in 1949 and spent his early childhood in Jerusalem. He graduated from high school in Philadelphia, where his father, Professor Benzion Netanyahu, taught history. Benzion, a major ideological influ-

ence, was a disciple of Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the founder of the right-wing Zionist Revisionist movement. Netanyahu served in the elite Sayeret Matkal commandos from 1967 to 1972, reaching the rank of captain. Alongside another future prime minister, Ehud Barak, he stormed a hijacked Sabena airliner at Tel Aviv international airport in May 1972. After the army, he studied business administration at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he received his master's degree in 1976. That same year, Netanyahu's older brother, Yonatan, was killed while participating in the rescue of 98 Israeli and diaspora Jewish passengers aboard a hijacked Air France airplane in Entebbe, Uganda. Netanyahu worked as a management consultant in Boston from 1976 to 1978, then returned to Israel as marketing manager of a furniture company. In 1980 he founded the Jonathan Institute on terrorism, named after his brother. It established him as a public figure.

From 1982 to 1984 Netanyahu served as deputy to the Israeli ambassador in Washington, D.C., and then as the Israeli ambassador to the United Nations. He made his name as an eloquent advocate of Israel's cause. In 1988 he was elected to the Knesset on the Likud list and served as deputy foreign minister. In 1990 he was appointed deputy minister in the prime minister's office under Yitzhak Shamir. He was Israel's principal spokesman at the 1991 Madrid peace conference.

Netanyahu championed direct election of the prime minister. He was to become its first beneficiary, although the two-tier system was abolished for the 2003 elections after it failed to produce the stable governance he had promised. In March 1993 he succeeded Shamir as Likud leader, and he was an outspoken critic of the Oslo accords with the Palestinians. He was elected prime minister in May 1996 by barely 30,000 votes after a wave of bombings in Israeli cities undermined Shimon Peres's Labor administration. Under the new system, the electorate seized the chance to vote for a prime minister from a major party, but for the Knesset lists of special-interest parties (ethnic, religious, ideological). Netanyahu presided over a coalition of eight rightist and religious parties, each with its own agenda. The Oslo process had gone too far to be turned back, though Netanyahu insisted on Palestinian "reciprocity." In January 1997 he withdrew Israeli troops from 80 percent of Hebron, and at the Wye River conference in October 1998 he agreed to evacuate a further 13 percent of the West Bank. Within a year, he had lost the confidence of his own ministers, who accused him of manipulation and deceit. In May 1999 Ehud Barak defeated him in a bitterly fought election, and Netanyahu resigned the Likud leadership and his Knesset seat. He returned to parliament in January 2003. Ariel Sharon appointed him finance minister, and Netanyahu set out to implement the neoconservative economics he had learned at MIT.

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JULIE ZUCKERMAN
UPDATED BY ERIC SILVER

NETUREI KARTA

Group of ultra-Orthodox Jews living in Jerusalem and elsewhere who oppose Zionism prior to divine redemption.

Neturei Karta is Aramaic for "Guardians of the City." They are so named because their ideology rejects not only secular Zionism but all forms of Jewish sovereignty in Palestine prior to divine redemption. They deny all forms of cooperation with political Zionism, which they view as the hand-maiden of Satan. The Neturei Karta left the Orthodox political party, Agudat Israel, in 1938. They opposed the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and Israeli jurisdiction over Jerusalem.

Centered in the Meah She'arim district of Jerusalem, they do not recognize the validity of Israel's existence or participate in its political process. They maintain their own autonomous communal, religious, and educational structures and view themselves as the protectors of the religious nature of the city. The much larger Satmar Hassidic sect is highly supportive of Neturei Karta and often serves as its voice in Jewish communities outside Israel. Both groups have undertaken numerous public demonstrations against Zionism and the State of Israel.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

NEUTRAL ZONE

An area shared by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

The neutral zone was originally devised because the boundary between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, demarcated by the Anglo–Turkish Convention of 1913, was not ratified due to the outbreak of World War I. When the British government recognized the sovereignty of Ibn Saʿud in 1915, a compromise was reached on the disputed boundary that involved the establishment of a 2,000-square-mile (5,180 sq. km) neutral zone. This was incorporated in the Uqayr Conference in 1922, which set up a similar neutral zone between Saudi Arabia and Iraq that abuts the Kuwaiti-Saudi neutral zone. The convention allowed the parties to explore, on an equal basis, the natural resources (presumably petroleum—oil and gas) of the neutral zone but did not address the question of sovereignty ("sharing equal economic rights" in the neutral zone does not necessarily mean that the two parties are co-sovereign in the zone). In fact, each of the two countries administers its part of the zone as if it were a part of its state, but both states share in the oil exploration in the zone. For years political sovereignty was not an issue, because the zone remained isolated and uninhabited. With the expansion of oil and gas exploration, both onshore and offshore, divergent claims propelled the neutral zone to the forefront of regional politics.

Accepted practice has been that either Kuwait or Saudi Arabia could grant separate oil concessions to foreign companies for exploration in the neutral zone without prior approval from the other. Neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia can sign any binding agreement, however, regarding the entire zone without the other's approval. In July 1965, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia agreed to partition the neutral zone equally, with each state annexing its own part of the zone; however, the two states retained a shared sovereignty arrangement regarding the exploitation of natural resources. The status of the neutral zone did not change after the 1990 Gulf Crisis.

See also GULF CRISIS (1990–1991).

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EMILE A. NAKHLEH

NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA

This entry consists of the following articles:

ARAB COUNTRIES
IRAN
ISRAEL
TURKEY

ARAB COUNTRIES

Arab mass circulation print media, that is, newspapers and magazines that are intended for audiences in the Arab world.

Historical Development

The first printed periodical publication carrying news written by and for Arabs was *Jurnal al-Iraq,* which began appearing in Baghdad in Arabic and Turkish in the year 1816. Two Arab newspapers began publishing in Cairo in the 1820s, and these were followed by newspapers in Algeria in 1847, Beirut in 1858, Tunis, Damascus, and Tripoli Libya in the 1860s, Sanʾa in 1879, Casablanca in 1889, and Mecca in 1908.

Lebanon and Egypt have been leading centers of print media, publishing important newspapers earlier than most Arab countries; they continue to hold leading positions in journalism into the twenty-first century. The first Arab daily newspaper appeared in Beirut in 1873, and *al-Ahram,* which still appears as a leading daily, started in Egypt in 1875. By the twenty-first century only Egypt had dailies with circulations over half a million copies. Its two leading "national" dailies, *al-Ahram* and *al-Akhbar,* each distributed over seven hundred thousand, and *al-Jumhuriyya* sold about four hundred thousand copies. During the last decades of the twentieth century, the oil-rich Arab states of the Persian Gulf quickly expanded their print media, to some extent benefiting from Arab talent they hired from such countries as Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine, and quality daily newspapers proliferated. Circula-

Palestinian and Israeli newspapers display coverage of an Israeli air raid in Gaza in 2002. The loyalist Palestinian press is frequently subjected to various kinds of controls by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. © AFP/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

tions there remained small, however; for example, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman have had successful dailies only since the 1970s, and their circulations have never exceeded a few tens of thousands.

Among the smaller Arab states on the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has the oldest newspaper traditions, and some of its leading newspapers have relatively long traditions. In the Western region of Saudi Arabia, such newspapers as *al-Bilad* and *al-Madina* were flourishing as early as the 1930s, and the dailies *Ukaz* and *al-Nadwa* had appeared there by the 1960s. In the early 1960s, *Al-Jazira* and *al-Riyadh* dailies started in Riyadh, and *al Yawm* started in Dammam; as of 2003, all seven of these newspapers still existed. In Yemen, governments in the south and the north have published daily papers since the 1960s, but they were of limited circulation and generally of poor quality.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has established a minimum standard of one hundred copies of daily newspapers per one thousand inhabitants, but by the year 1966 only Lebanon and four Gulf states, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, had passed it (worldbank.org, March 2003). By the twenty-first century, five Arab countries had dailies with more than one hundred thousand in circulation. Assuming multiple readers of each copy, an estimated thirty million Arabs, or more than 10 percent of the total Arab population, are regular readers of dailies.

Common Characteristics

There are significant differences among Arab countries in the use and structure of print media, reflecting underlying differences in wealth, population, literacy, political systems, and cultural conditions. The following characteristics generally prevail, although variations and exceptions occur throughout the region.

First, most Arab print media exist on a relatively weak economic base. They suffer from small literate populations and, in most places, limited incomes. Sales are therefore limited and, in addition, the practice of advertising in the media has not developed very extensively. Even as some Arab states and individuals became wealthy during the second half of the twentieth century, advertising remained modest and businesspeople did not see media as a lucrative investment. Although newspapers were no longer an expensive luxury for the middle classes, as they were during the middle of the twentieth century, price and literacy still limited circulations.

Second, Arab media tend to be closely tied to politics in a number of ways. The first newspapers were published by governments with the intent of informing bureaucrats and the public. The first indigenous Egyptian newspapers, *Jurnal al-Khadyu* and *al-Waqaʾi al-Misriyya,* appeared in the 1820s as government publications. The practice also emerged elsewhere. In Algeria the government started publishing *al-Mubashir* in 1847; in Tunisia the government started *al-Raʾid al-Tunis* in 1861, and in Damascus the government started *Suriya* in 1865. In Iraq the government began issuing *Jurnal al-Iraq* in 1816. Private individuals and families did begin to publish newspapers, but in the nineteenth century they appeared only in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Morocco. More private papers emerged later, but after World War II, in the era of Arab nationalism and anticolonialism, Arab governments tended to want to control their own newspapers; government-owned papers still exist in most parts of the region, where they are still seen as important political instruments.

Some newspaper owners have tended to seek financial patronage from domestic and foreign governments or from local political parties. The Arab political parties that emerged after World War II sought to disseminate their views through the press, and party newspapers still exist in a number of Arab countries, although many of them are relatively small circulation weeklies.

Third, from the beginning, Arab newspapers have tended to include a significant amount of cultural content, traditionally publishing short stories, poetry, and serialized novels. Scholars and literary figures often write in the newspapers. At the same time, the profession of journalism, including the habit of aggressive reporting and the presentation of objective, unbiased news, has not been as fully developed in the Arab world as it has in some other parts of the world.

Finally, the structure of Arab print media tends to be fragmented, with most of the readership of individual newspapers confined to the paper's country of origin; many papers have small, specialized audiences. Most newspapers are published in one or two cities in each country because of the concentration of literate readers and because of barriers to distribution.

Organization

Arab print media can be divided for purposes of analysis into four separate organizational categories. One type can be called the "mobilization press." This type of media is under the tightest government control and supervision. Newspapers of this type never criticize or print negative information about senior officials. They avoid criticism of basic government policy, and only occasionally complain about the way lower-level individual government employees manage their responsibilities. There is no significant diversity among newspapers, all of which are owned by the government or by its political agents. The regime in fact controls all essential levers of power in the country, including the press. It sees itself as the vanguard of the people and regards the press as a tool of political mobilization of the public; it is not content with passive acquiescence but expects active editorial support for its policies. This type of print media is found in Syria, Sudan, and Libya. Before 2003 the press structure in Iraq was the clearest example of a mobilization press. The 2003 war in Iraq and the collapse of the regime of Saddam Hussein changed the Iraqi media scene, as genuinely private newspapers emerged for the first time in decades. As of 2003 the Iraqi system was still in transition.

A second press type can be called "loyalist," because although most newspapers are privately owned, their news and commentary loyally support the government in power. They eschew criticism of the top leadership, although they do complain about shortcomings of the government bureaucracy and express occasional mild criticism of govern-

ment ministers. There is little diversity among the daily papers except in style. This type of print media is found in the conservative monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as in Palestine. From the final years of the 1990s, however, a more liberal trend began to appear in these countries, initiated by some of the younger leaders who have gained more influence.

The Palestinian press, however, has some unique characteristics. Palestine was ruled by the Ottomans until 1917, then for thirty years by the British, then by Israel and Jordan until 1967, when Israel also occupied the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian journalism found outlets in several Arab countries, but not in Palestine itself until the middle of the 1990s, when the Palestinian Authority assumed responsibility for some of the territory, and government-sponsored and private print media emerged there. Palestinian publications as of 2003 remained subject to controls of various kinds not only by the Palestinian Authority but also by Israel, since Palestine has not yet achieved independent statehood.

A third type of print media can be called "diverse," because its most distinguishing characteristic is that newspapers represent a considerable diversity in content, style, and political orientation. Essentially all are privately owned, and many but not all are quite critical of the government. The clearest example of this type of press is found in Lebanon, but during the twenty-first century it is found also in Morocco, Kuwait, and Yemen. Behind the press is a political system that includes active political parties and an environment of freer speech than in most other parts of the Arab world.

A fourth type of print media can be called "transitional," because its structure has been undergoing change in recent years; it is the subject of debate and discussion in the country and may change further. Some print media are owned by the government, some by private individuals, and some by political parties. Some freedom of expression exists, but a variety of governmental controls and economic pressures restrict that freedom. Laws on the books allow the government authorities to take action against journalists and editors, and court cases are relatively frequent. This type of press is found in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Algeria.

Offshore Publishing

Finally, there is an additional and separate category of important Arab newspapers that are primarily based in Europe but published for readers throughout the Arab world. This phenomenon began during the 1970s when the Lebanese civil war forced some Lebanese publishers and journalists to leave their country and set up "offshore" operations in London, Paris, and Rome. Some did not survive, but others did. When the civil war ended, some moved back to Beirut, such as the weekly *al-Hawadith*; others kept their bases in Europe. The improvements in satellite and computer technology during the 1990s made it possible for these offshore publications to overcome distribution obstacles because they could do the editorial work in Europe and print the paper in various cities in the Arab world for local distribution. Editors were concerned about local censorship and taboos, but they were nevertheless somewhat freer than locally published papers, and some of them varied their content depending on the target country.

By 2003, three major Arab publishing houses in London were producing newspapers and magazines for distribution throughout the Arab world. All were owned by wealthy Saudi nationals. The Saudi Research and Marketing Group, chaired by a Saudi prince, has produced the daily *al-Sharq al-Awsat* since 1977, and it also produces more than a dozen other publications, including the popular weekly magazine *al-Majalla.* Another publishing house, founded originally by a Lebanese family but now owned by another Saudi prince, produces the daily *al-Hayat* plus a weekly magazine, and it has a joint venture with a satellite television company. A third Arab daily that appears in London and is aimed at a pan-Arab audience is *al-Quds al-Arabi*; it is edited by Palestinians and tends to focus on Palestinian issues.

Non-Arabic and Specialized Publications

Most Arabs read newspapers in Arabic, but there are some important publications that appear in French or English. On the Persian Gulf, where thousands of English-speaking South Asians reside, there are many daily newspapers published in English, aimed primarily at those expatriates. Two of Kuwait's seven dailies are in English. In North Africa, where the French colonial legacy can still be seen, and French

is still spoken by many people, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria all have important newspapers in French. By 2003, of the eighteen dailies appearing in Algeria, eleven were in French, including five with circulations of more than one hundred thousand. Seven of the nineteen dailies in Morocco were in French. Of the sixteen leading dailies in Lebanon, one was in English and one in French. Even in Egypt, where most readers prefer Arabic, *The Egyptian Gazette* in English (which began publication in 1880) and *Le progrès Egyptien* in French (which started in 1893), are still appearing, although with limited circulations.

Every Arab country produces its own weekly and monthly magazines. Some have political agendas but most are special-interest publications that have no particular political agenda, but rather deal with specialized subjects such as sports or women's issues. The most common type is the weekly pictorial variety and current-events magazine, such as Egypt's *al-Musawwar* and Lebanon's *al-Hawadith.* Scholarly journals such as Egypt's *al-Siyasa al-Dawliyya,* religious magazines such as the Saudi *al-Daʿwa,* and literary and intellectual publications such as Kuwait's *al-Arabi* appeal to specialized readers.

Conclusion

In short, print media vary across the Arab world. Government, generally quite strong, influences the media in different ways. In one country there may be uniformity among publications, and the media play an advocacy role in support of the government. In another country, government influence will be more subtle and indirect. In some Arab countries, publications exist that express views in clear opposition to the government. The fundamental factor explaining these differences is the prevailing political system of the particular country in which the media are published.

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William A. Rugh

Iran

Newspapers have been active in Iran since 1850.

The first Iranian government newspaper, *Ruznameh-e vaqa-ye ittifaqiyeh* (Newpaper of current affairs), was founded by the reform-promoting prime minister Amir Kabir (Mirza Mohammad Taqi Khan Farahani) in 1850, and it continued after his downfall (in 1851) as a chronicle of official information. No other newspapers were permitted during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah (1848–1896). Consequently, the most important early Iranian newspapers were published outside the country: *Akhtar,* founded in Istanbul in 1875; *Qanun,* founded in London in 1890; and *Habl al-Matin,* founded in Calcutta in 1893. Following the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, numerous newspapers were published inside Iran. Most papers supported the various ideological factions that emerged after 1906. By 1909 Tehran's largest circulation paper was *Iran-e now* (New Iran), a paper that openly espoused European socialist ideas. Ziya Tabatabaʾi founded a paper in Shiraz, *Islam,* that backed the constitutional movement. During World War I he moved to Tehran, where his paper *Raʿad* supported the British. In 1921 he joined with the future shah, Reza Khan (subsequently Reza Shah Pahlavi), in organizing the coup d'état that led less than five years later to the deposition of the Qajar Dynasty. As Reza Shah consolidated his power throughout the 1920s, the independent press was subject to increasing censorship. Press freedom was restored after Britain and the Soviet Union forced Reza Shah's abdication and exile following their joint invasion of Iran in August 1941. During the next twelve years newspapers represented every ideological tendency found in Iran, and papers in Armenian, Azeri, Turkish, Kurdish, and other ethnic minority languages also were founded.

The 1953 coup d'état that enabled Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to assert his authority over the Majles and effectively establish a royal dictatorship ushered in another period of strict press censorship that lasted for twenty-five years. Just after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, there was a new and rapid

development of newspapers that reflected a diverse range of opinions and views, but after six months, press restrictions of increasing severity began to be introduced. By the early 1980s censorship prevented publication of material deemed contrary to the official ideology. After 1989 censorship regulations gradually relaxed, and the number of publications again increased. In 1997 the Ministry of Culture began to issue licenses to virtually anyone who applied for a publishing permit, and within a year more than one hundred new dailies—more than one-fifth of them in Tehran—were being printed throughout the country. Many of these newspapers proclaimed their commitment to democracy and criticized political leaders and policies they identified as antidemocratic. The objects of these political barbs used the court system to get several papers banned on grounds of slander and incitement, and in several cases journalists were fined or given prison sentences. Despite these setbacks, many editors and publishers subsequently brought out their former papers under new names. Since April 2000, what could be termed the reformist press has been more careful in its political reporting to minimize conflict with a generally hostile judiciary. Nevertheless, Iran's newspapers and print media in the early 2000s had a larger readership and offered a broader spectrum of views on political ideas than at any other time in the country's modern history.

See also Iranian Revolution (1979); Naser al-Din Shah; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Pahlavi, Reza; Tabataba'i, Ziya.

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Eric Hooglund

Israel

Historical, political and sociological overview of the Israeli printed press.

The Israeli press is a combined product of a nation-building ideology, an elitist-colonial concept of the media, and a more recent industrial market-oriented climate. The Zionist ideology has steered the Hebrew press since its emergence in Palestine in 1863. When the State of Israel was established in 1948, the press was vibrantly partisan. Most newspapers belonged to political parties, and only a few were privately owned. They included sixteen dailies—thirteen in Hebrew, one in English, and two in German—serving a population of 650,000. Newspapers owned by political parties include *Davar* (The Word; labor party MAPAI); *ha-Tzofeh* (The Seer; national religious party), *Kol ha-Am* (Communist party), and others. Private newspapers include *Haaretz* (The Land) and *Yediot Aharonot* (Last News) in Hebrew, *Jerusalem Post* (formerly *Palestine Post*) in English, *Yediot Hadashot* (Recent News) in German, and others. Seven years later, when Israel's population reached 1.7 million, the number of dailies had risen to twenty-five: sixteen in Hebrew, two in German, and one each in English, Arabic, French, Yiddish, Hungarian, Romanian, and Polish, all aimed at the Arabic and new immigrant populations.

The Israeli press inherited from the British Mandate an elitist role of social and cultural educator. Also, the colonial rule determined the legal status of the press, for the Press Ordinance of 1933 has remained the major press-licensing instrument in Israel, and the Emergency Measures of 1945 are still the legal basis of military censorship.

After 1948, due to a general decline in ideology and to political and economic processes, particularly since the 1970s, the large number of nationwide dailies published mostly in Tel Aviv and catering to a politically segmented population became a smaller number of wide-circulation newspapers. In 2003 there were twenty dailies in Israel, but only eight in Hebrew. The remaining twelve were English (one); Russian (seven), aimed mostly at new immigrants from the former Soviet Union; Arabic (one), also read in the areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority; and Romanian (two) and Polish (one), aimed at Israel's foreign workers. Since the 1960s a dynamic local press published mostly by the leading nationwide press groups has accompanied the decentralization of the population and the emergence of local leaderships. Also a large number of general-interest and specialized magazines are published.

The replacement of ideological zeal and party subsidies with privatization and industrial professionalism has been expressed in a bolder critical and investigative journalism, professional training

and hiring policies, and improved ethics. Concentration and cross-ownership, particularly since the 1980s, have allowed a few Israeli and powerful foreign groups and family enterprises to control the press. In 2003 they included four groups—Yediot Aharonot, Maʿariv, Haaretz, and Jerusalem Post—and one financial paper, *Globes,* and some low-circulation party newspapers, mostly religious.

Newspapers have always been an integral part of the political process in Israel, first as mouthpieces of the political parties to which they belonged, and later as independent critics and challengers on issues such as war and peace, occupation, socioeconomic justice, democracy, and globalization.

British Mandatory emergency measures that stipulated that all publications must be cleared by a military censor remain part of Israeli law. An agreement among the government, the army, and the press has eased this measure: A list of security-related topics issued by the censor defines the press items that must be cleared, and only a fraction of articles fall under it. Newspapers that refuse or are not allowed to join the agreement, including the Arabic press, are subject to full censorship. Foreign correspondents work under strict control, particularly in the occupied territories.

The Press Council, established in 1963 on a voluntary basis, brings together the National Association of Journalists, publishers, editors, and members of the public. The council aims to protect the freedom of the press, free access to information, and professional ethics.

See also RADIO AND TELEVISION: ISRAEL.

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DOV SHINAR

Turkey's first newspapers originated in the mid-eighteenth century. Though the Turkish press has long struggled under government restrictions, many of those restrictions have been lifted, and critical and investigative journalism have flourished. © DAVE BARTRUFF/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

TURKEY

Newspapers in Turkey emerged during the Ottoman Empire.

The emergence of newspapers and print media in the later Ottoman Empire had a profound impact on sociocultural and political life. Turkish-language works were first printed in Istanbul in 1727 by Ibrahim Müteferrika, following earlier presses established by Jewish, Armenian, Greek Orthodox, and expatriate Western European communities. The first newspaper, *Takvim-i Vekayi* (1831; Calendar of events), was an official organ, primarily a means for the state to communicate with provinces. In 1840 *Ceride-i Havadis* (Journal of news) was established by Englishman William Churchill, and under Ottoman editors and writers it played a pioneering role in creating an appetite for news of current events. With *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl* (1861; Interpreter of events), edited by Ibrahim Sinasi, and *Tasvir-i Efkâr* (1862; Mirror of opinion), newspapers became instrumental in the appearance of new types of journalism and lit-

erary writing (e.g., novels and new poetry). Writers discussed a newspaper's role in the formation of public opinion and educating the citizenry, and contributed to the emergence of a style of written Turkish simpler and more direct than that typical of official discourse and letters.

Following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, many restrictions on the press were lifted, and there followed a short-lived explosion of periodical publications in Istanbul and regional centers such as Salonika and Izmir, by and for communities and interests that had come to think of themselves in corporate terms (e.g., ethnic and religious minorities, women, professionals). With the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 under Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), the press became subject to the same dramatic centralization as other institutions, and essentially it became an organ of mass mobilization for the Republican People's Party's state. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (National sovereignty) in Ankara and *Cumhuriyet* (Republic) in Istanbul were left as the only national papers in 1925, and most regional papers were under government control by the time of a press law in 1931. By 1935 there were thirty-eight dailies in the country (twenty-two in Istanbul, six in Izmir, and two in Ankara). Journals and reviews such as *Ülkü* (Ideal) also tended to reflect the developmentalist-populist nature of the state, presenting articles in a direct language on regional and national culture, folklore, history, social conditions, and new technological developments, with little discussion of "political" topics.

With multiparty politics in 1946 came liberalizing measures, including easing of the press laws, and the emergence of real mass circulation newspapers such as *Vatan, Milliyet,* and *Hürriyet,* which saw themselves less as instruments of political mobilization and more as means of information for citizens in a democratic system. Under the Democrat Party a more liberal press law was passed, but by 1953 the ruling party tried to silence political opposition and the press, resorting to closures and jailing critics. The coup of 1960 was followed by a liberalization of the press, and journalists themselves drew up a Code of Ethics that was signed by all the major papers. These liberties were restricted after the coup of 1971, and again after that of 1980, but the public's expectation of an independent press was irreversible. Through the 1990s Turkey was criticized by several human-rights organizations for imprisoning journalists. With the winding down of the Kurdish separatist insurgency in 1999 and new legislation in line with European Union requirements press restrictions have been lifted gradually, and critical and investigative journalism has become characteristic of some newspapers.

See also Radio and Television: Turkey.

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Brian Silverstein

NEW WAFD

Egyptian political party.

The Wafd, outlawed by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1953, was relaunched in 1977 by its former secretary-general, Fuʾad Sarraj al-Din, as the New Wafd. The New Wafd, again the party of constitutional nationalism, liberalization, and landed and professional interests, was seen as a spent force by President Anwar al-Sadat, who therefore made it the first legal opposition party in 1978. It quickly developed a mass membership and outspoken opposition to his domestic and foreign policies, and alleged the unconstitutionality of presidential rule by referenda rather than regulated election. The government then banned the participation of politicians active before 1952, and the New Wafd disbanded in protest.

The party re-emerged in 1983 after Husni Mubarak's renewed liberalization. In 1984 it contested the elections in alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood and won 15 percent of the vote (58 seats), making it the largest opposition party. The alliance collapsed, and in 1987 the New Wafd fought alone and won 35 seats. In 1990 the New Wafd initiated an election boycott widely credited with de-

fending the political system in the face of emergency laws. Throughout its existence, however, the party has carefully moderated its opposition to the regime, leading to accusations of clientalism and to continuing internal tensions over the legitimate extent of opposition. In the 1995 elections the party turned broadside against the Muslim Brotherhood, and again received criticism for supporting the government line. By contrast, the strengthening of New Wafd opposition to Islamism has also been seen as a product of a deepening secularist-Islamist cleavage. New Wafd secularism also is underpinned by support from Coptic voters.

Serageddin died in 2000 and was replaced as party leader by his deputy, Nuʿman Jumaʿa.

See also Egypt; Wafd.

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Raymond William Baker
Updated by George R. Wilkes

NEZZAR, KHALED

[1937–]

Algerian general and defense minister.

Born near Biskra, Khaled Nezzar served in the French Army before deserting to join the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) in 1958, and from that point he pursued a military career. He was stationed along the Moroccan frontier during the border war of 1963 and commanded a battalion sent to Egypt to demonstrate Algerian solidarity after the Arab–Israel War of 1967. Nezzar's military education included studies in the Soviet Union and France. He was appointed to the central committee of the ruling Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in 1979 and was promoted to general and assistant chief of staff in 1984. He quelled the destabilizing October 1988 riots, resulting in hundreds of casualties. In 1990 Nezzar received particular publicity when he was appointed Algeria's first minister of defense since 1965—a portfolio usually held by Algeria's authoritarian presidents. Faced with the prospect of a Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) government, Nezzar and others deposed President Chadli Bendjedid in January 1992 and established the Haut Comité d'Etat (HCE). Nezzar continued to serve as minister of defense as the civil war broke out, escaping assassination in February 1993. He retired in 1994 but continued to play a dominant role in the Pouvoir—the ruling establishment of military and civilian elites. While he was visiting France in 2001, Algerians filed charges against him for crimes of repression, including torture. The lawsuits were eventually dropped because of the duress placed upon the plaintiffs. Concurrently, Nezzar sued Habib Souaidia, a former Algerian officer and author of *La sale guerre* (2001; The dirty war), who had made televised comments accusing the military of massacres and tortures. Nezzar returned to Paris to defend the army, but his defamation suit against Souaidia was dismissed in September 2002.

Nezzar has authored *Mémoires du général Khaled Nezzar* (2000; Memoirs of General Khaled Nezzar) and *Algérie: Échec à une régression programmée* (2001; Algeria: defeat of a regressive program). He is also an entrepreneur, cofounding an Internet company called Soft Link Com. Nezzar remains a most powerful member of the Pouvoir.

See also Algeria: Political Parties in; Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN); Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).

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Philip C. Naylor

NHAISI, ELIA

[1890–1918]

Zionist pioneer who mobilized the Libyan Jews in Tripoli.

Elia Nhaisi was born in Tripoli, Libya, to a poor Jewish family. He earned his living as a photographer, sold photographic postcards, and was the Tripolitanian correspondent for the Florentine Jewish weekly, *La Settimana Israelitica,* later known as *Israel.* In 1913, he established the Jewish Cultural Club and, in 1914, the Talmud Torah evening school for modern Hebrew. In 1916, he founded the Zionist Club, *Circolo Sion,* which by 1923 evolved into a

Libyan Zionist organization. His movement was supported by the community rabbis but opposed by the "Italianized" president and community council members, who championed Italianized assimilation for the Jews. The Italian Jewish press was his staunch supporter, and his Zionist group prevailed. Nhaisi died after a short illness at the age of twenty-eight.

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MAURICE M. ROUMANI

NIATI, HOURIA

[1948–]

Algerian painter, installation and performance artist, singer, and poet.

Houria Niati was trained in Algeria as well as at the Camden and Croyden art schools in England, where she has lived since the late 1970s. She is best known for her paintings/installations *No to Torture* (1983–1996) and *Bringing Water from the Fountain Has Nothing Romantic about It* (1991). These works critique the romanticized and stereotypical portrayals of Arab women in colonial postcards and orientalist paintings, particularly those of Eugène Delacroix, whose subject was the women of Niati's native Algeria. Through a series of visual commentaries upon those earlier paintings, and through the creation of other pieces that manipulate the imagery and ideas in them, Niati interrogates the objectified orientalist images of the sensuous and secluded Arab/Muslim woman that were propagated through colonialism. For example, she imprisons, mutilates, and disfigures the women in her version of Delacroix's painting, thereby calling specific attention to how the female body was the site of violence under French colonialism and how the romanticism of the orientalists provided a cover for this "torture." In her work, she subverts the male perspective that was central to the colonial project and re-authors the subjectivity of Algerian women, thereby transforming her own experience of being arrested by the colonial authorities for protesting as a young girl. She also critiques the violence against women in contemporary Algeria. Her influences have included post-Impressionism, ancient Algerian rock paintings, and children's art. Niati is a trained singer in the Andalusian *shaʿbi* and *rai* traditions and often does performances to accompany her exhibitions, singing songs and reciting poetry inspired by those musical genres.

See also ART; ALGERIA.

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JESSICA WINEGAR

NILE RIVER

The longest river in Africa and, arguably, the world.

The Nile *(Bahr al-Nil)* dominates the landscape of eastern and northern Africa as well as the lives and livelihood of its people. The Nile traverses 35 degrees of latitude and 4,200 miles in its flow from Burundi in the East African rift valleys through ten riparian countries to Egypt on the Mediterranean. Within this 1.25-million-square-mile drainage area, the Nile Basin encompasses unique wildlife habitats and broad biodiversity. At the same time, Nile Basin countries are home to 300 million people, a number projected to double by 2025.

The Nile Basin is environmentally sensitive. Stretching from the equator to the Mediterranean, the Nile is a principal flyway for migrating birds that nest along its many marshes, lakes, and tributaries. Its wetlands, forests, and open lands are home to a broad array of flora and fauna. Its natural beauty has attracted tourists for centuries. But increasing population and limited water supply have put stress on the people of the basin as well as on the environment. Total water and water availability per capita in the Nile Basin remain low.

Compared to other major river basins, the Nile's disparity in water availability differs sharply among

sub-basins. Arid portions (perhaps one-third of the basin) yield negligible flows; in contrast, the highlands of Ethiopia, comprising 10 to 20 percent of the land area of the overall basin, and draining through the Blue Nile and Atbara, yield approximately 120 billion cubic yards, or 60 to 80 percent of the annual flow at Aswan. Flows from the White Nile originating in the region of Lake Victoria are buffered by the great Sudd swamps of southern Sudan, and thus are approximately constant through the year. Flows from the Blue Nile are concentrated in a three-month period of late summer, creating the famous annual inundation of Egypt.

Twelve miles south of Cairo, the Nile divides into the Rosetta and Damietta branches and enters the delta. For Egypt and Sudan, the river is almost the sole source of water, and their inhabitants have always been intensely concerned with the utilization of its waters. The valley of the lower Nile and delta has among the most fertile soils in the world, created by millennia of sediment deposition during the annual inundation. Since the building of the High Dam at Aswan in the 1960s, this felicitous natural process has been much curtailed. As population and industrialization grow along its banks, the quality of Nile waters has become degraded by pollution.

See also Aswan High Dam; Egypt.

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Arthur Goldschmidt
Updated by Gregory B. Baecher

NIMR, FARIS

[1856–1951]

Lebanese Christian intellectual, publisher, and journalist who played an important role in popularizing modern science and Western ideas in the Arab East in the late nineteenth century.

A Greek Orthodox from Hasbeya, Lebanon, Faris Nimr was among the first Lebanese to study at the Syrian Protestant College (later renamed the American University of Beirut). He graduated at eighteen and became a tutor in astronomy and mathematics at the college. In 1876, he and fellow Syrian Protestant College graduate Yaʿqub Sarruf (1852–1927) began publishing in Beirut a scientific-literary journal called *al-Muqtataf* (The selection). In 1882, the two editors became embroiled in a fierce controversy over Darwinism that shook the college, where they were still teaching. Their support of Darwinism, articulated in *al-Muqtataf,* put them at odds with the college authorities, and they were dismissed in 1884. They then moved to Egypt, taking their periodical with them. In Cairo, *al-Muqtataf* rapidly developed into a leading opinion maker. Spurred by their success, the two Lebanese expatriates decided in 1889 to found *al-Muqattam,* a pro-British newspaper that promoted free enterprise. Sarruf retained primary responsibility for *al-Muqtataf,* and Nimr concentrated on *al-Muqattam,* which soon became one of the most influential dailies in Egypt.

Faris Nimr is remembered as one of the most prominent members of the early wave of Western-educated Lebanese intellectuals who played a leading role in introducing modern scientific knowledge and positivist ideas into the Arab East. What distinguished Nimr from most of his peers was his wide range of interests (which cut across the scientific-literary divide), his dual career as an intellectual and a publisher, and the remarkable sense of initiative and entrepreneurship that he demonstrated throughout his life, from his creation of *al-Muqtataf* when he was only twenty to his decision to relocate his business to Egypt and create a newspaper there. His writings and activities as a publisher in Cairo ensured that the impact of his ideas was felt much beyond his country of origin. Through *al-Muqattam* in particular, he inspired an entire generation of Arab intellectuals attracted to Western notions of individualism and laissez-faire economic ideas.

See also Newspapers and Print Media.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX

NISSIM, ISAAC

[1895–1981]

Controversial Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel.

Born in Baghdad, Isaac Nissim moved to Jerusalem in 1926. Nissim was elected Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel in 1955, a position he held until 1972, although not without controversy. In 1964, he overcame a challenge by those Sephardim who sought to elect Rabbi Yaʿacov Moshe Toledano, the politically unaffiliated Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv. At the time, Nissim was the candidate of the National Religious party.

CHAIM I. WAXMAN

NIXON, RICHARD MILHOUS

[1913–1994]

U.S. president, 1969–1974.

Born in Yorba Linda, California, Richard Milhous Nixon attended Whittier College and Duke University Law School. After serving in World War II, he was elected to Congress (1946–1950), where he was a member of the House Un-American Activities Committee during the McCarthy era of anti-Communism, then to the U.S. Senate (1950–1952), where he continued his strongly anti-Communist stance. He was selected to run as vice president on the Republican ticket with Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952 and again in 1956. During the Eisenhower administration, Nixon was given substantive foreign policy missions to fifty-six countries, including the USSR. In 1960, he ran for president but lost to John F. Kennedy. Nixon won the presidency in the 1968 election.

Nixon's Middle East policy was marked by crisis abroad and conflict at home. Abroad, the War of Attrition and the Arab-Israel War of 1973 demanded the full attention of the State Department while the U.S. government was still trying to repel the Communists in Vietnam. Nixon's secretary of state, William Rogers, and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, pursued separate and often contradictory Middle East policies. With the collapse of the Rogers Plan for Arab-Israeli peace, Kissinger emerged as the dominant adviser, and this was consolidated when he was made secretary of state in 1973.

Under Nixon, the United States sold both Israel and Iran large amounts of miliary equipment, including Phantom jets to Israel. In May 1972, during a visit to Iran, Nixon promised that the United States would sell them an unlimited supply of non-nuclear weapons, and by the end of the Nixon administration, Israel and Iran emerged as the "two pillars" of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

The major crisis of Nixon's administration began with the 1973 Arab-Israel War and the resulting Arab oil embargo by OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). This began an escalating spiral of price gouging and inflation that continued into the 1980s in the United States. Nixon attempted to placate the Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. Until August 1974—when Nixon resigned the presidency—he and Kissinger had to negotiate numerous cease-fires and armistice lines between Israel, Egypt, and Syria. They also visited both Communist China and the USSR, improving relations with both.

In his desire for another term in office, Nixon and his White House staff became involved in a cover-up of their actions involving a break-in at Democratic national headquarters at the Watergate complex. The escalating investigation over this impeachable set of offenses resulted in Nixon's resignation.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1973); WAR OF ATTRITION (1969–1970).

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ZACHARY KARABELL

NIZAM AL-JADID, AL-

Regular Egyptian army of the early nineteenth century, established by Muhammad Ali Pasha, consisting of conscripted men trained in the European style.

In 1805, as soon as Muhammad Ali Pasha gained some independence from the Ottoman Empire and consolidated his position as *wali* (provincial governor) in Cairo, he began conscripting skilled laborers to work on government projects. His model was the conscript armed force instituted by Ottoman Sultan Selim III. The existing Egyptian military force, to which the Mamluks (powerful landlords) sent their own retainers for use by the state, was then replaced by 1822 with a new, drafted, regular army called *al-nizam al-jadid.*

The first four thousand men called up came from Upper Egypt. Those from the region between Manfalut and Qina were assembled at a training camp near Farshut, and those from the region between Qina and Aswan were gathered in Aswan. Their initial tour of duty was set at three years. Their replacements were selected from lists of prospective draftees drawn up by the officers in charge of the training camps as part of a comprehensive system of village census taking. Conscripts were drilled according to European procedures and organized into defined regiments, with a centralized command structure to supervise the distribution of arms, clothing, and other equipment. State officials even orchestrated a propaganda campaign in support of the new army, urging prominent religious scholars to write treatises sanctioning these innovative practices.

Regular infantry and artillery units were complemented by a flotilla of warships built along European lines in government yards. Both the new army and navy played major roles in the Egyptian campaigns in the Aegean Sea and Syria after 1824. Both were also strictly limited by Britain after Muhammad Ali's capitulation to the European powers in 1838. Thus ended this army.

See also MUHAMMAD ALI.

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FRED H. LAWSON

NIZAMIYE COURTS

Secular Ottoman courts.

The Nizamiye (or Nizami, meaning regulation) courts were organized in 1869 by Minister of Justice Ahmet Cevdet to decide cases under new criminal and commercial law codes. The new court system extended from the lowest regional level, the *nahiye,* through the *kaza, sanjak,* and *vilayet,* or provincial levels. It was capped by the Council of Judicial Regulations (Divan-i Ahkam-i Adliye) in Constantinople (now Istanbul), which was the final court of appeal. After 1876, the courts were administered by the Court of Cassation (Temyiz Mahkemesi) in the ministry of justice. Under Abdülhamit II, Minister of Justice Küçük Sait Paşa introduced the institution of public defender in the Nizamiye courts and revised the commercial and criminal codes. A law school founded in 1878 produced one hundred graduates a year who staffed the expanding Nizamiye system.

Despite underfunding and overcrowding, the court system was generally considered efficient. Because of this, and the fact that the new law codes were prepared with the counsel of religious legal scholars, the *ulama*'s opposition to the Nizamiye was diminished, even though the new courts challenged the jurisdiction of *shariʿa*, or religious, courts.

See also ABDÜLHAMIT II; CEVDET, AHMET.

ELIZABETH THOMPSON

NIZIP, BATTLE OF (1839)

Town, now in southern Turkey, where Egyptian forces defeated the Ottoman army on 24 June 1839, prompting the European powers to take steps to push Egypt out of Syria.

Throughout the spring of 1839, the Ottoman Empire encouraged unrest along the border between Anatolia and its former Syrian provinces, which had been captured in 1831 by the armies of Egypt's

Muhammad Ali Pasha—who named his son Ibrahim Pasha to govern them. Ibrahim at first refrained from responding to Ottoman activities, but was forced to mobilize when the Ottomans struck south across the Euphrates river in June. The two armies clashed at the town of Nizip, resulting in a crushing defeat of the Ottomans. Ibrahim immediately advanced north toward Konya, halting only when his father, who was worried about the impact that this move might have on regional diplomacy, ordered him not to go beyond the Taurus mountains. Meanwhile, an Ottoman fleet that had been sent to attack Alexandria in Egypt voluntarily surrendered to Muhammad Ali.

At the height of the crisis, the Ottoman sultan died. His successor had little choice but to enter negotiations with the victorious Egyptians. Egypt demanded control of the southern Turkish districts of Diyarbakir and Urfa—which commanded the primary trade routes between Syria and northern Iraq. The British government interpreted these demands as a direct threat to British interests in the region. France, on the other hand, signaled that it supported Egypt. Britain eventually persuaded Russia, Austria, and Prussia to agree to cooperate in expelling the Egyptian army from Syria, a commitment which was codified in the London Convention of July 1840. British warships then bombarded the Mediterranean ports of Beirut and Acre, forcing Ibrahim to withdraw his troops from all of Syria. Muhammad Ali returned the captured Ottoman fleet in exchange for recognition as the hereditary ruler of Egypt, which the Ottoman sultan granted on February 13, 1841. France returned to the European concert in July 1841, signing the Straits Convention with the other great powers.

See also London Convention; Muhammad Ali; Straits Convention.

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Fred H. Lawson

NOOR AL-HUSSEIN (QUEEN NOOR)

[1951–]

Queen of Jordan and wife of King Hussein ibn Talal.

Noor al-Hussein became queen of Jordan in 1978, after her marriage to King Hussein Ibn Talal, who ruled the Hashimite kingdom from 1953 to 1999. Born Elizabeth Najeeb Halaby, she changed her name to Noor al-Hussein (light of Hussein) in the context of her engagement to the king and her conversion to Islam.

Queen Noor grew up in the United States in a prominent Arab-American family. She was part of the first coeducational class to enter Princeton University, graduating in 1974 with a bachelor of arts in architecture and urban planning. After graduation, she worked on a series of international development projects before concentrating on the design and development of aviation training centers and airports. It was in this capacity that she joined Royal Jordanian Airlines and met King Hussein, himself an avid pilot with a deep personal interest in the kingdom's national airline.

Following her marriage to Hussein in 1978 and her coronation, Noor began work on a series of philanthropic endeavors, with particular emphasis on child welfare and women's empowerment. In 1981, she worked with Yarmuk University to create the now annual Jarash international festival for culture and the arts. The festival has grown annually and become a major tourist attraction for the kingdom. Queen Noor is perhaps best known for the work of her Noor al-Hussein Foundation, which includes many programs supporting education, cultural preservation, health care, and the rights of and opportunities for women and children; however, her patronage extends to many programs across a wide range of activities, including archaeology, business development, environmental conservation, child welfare, and even tennis. During the late 1990s, Noor also added her support to the national campaign to prevent honor crimes (that is, the killing of women by male family members who suspect them of adultery or of otherwise offending "family honor"). Queen Noor pressed for the repeal of legislation that allowed for leniency in sentencing. She also became a high-profile spokesperson for the international campaign to ban land mines.

Her role in Jordan and on the international stage continued after the death of King Hussein in 1999. After a change in the royal succession and the accession of King Abdullah II ibn Hussein, the new king appointed Noor's eldest son, Hamza, crown prince and designated successor to the throne.

See also HUSSEIN IBN TALAL.

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CURTIS R. RYAN

NORDAU, MAX

[1849–1923]

Author and Zionist leader.

One of Theodor Herzl's earliest supporters, it was Max Nordau who formulated the goal for the Zionist movement in Basle Program at the First Zionist Congress in 1897: "The creation for the Jewish people of a publicly recognized, legally secured Home in Palestine." Following Herzl's death, Nordau became a close adviser to David Wolffsohn, the second president of the World Zionist Organization. Nordau was a staunch advocate of Herzl's brand of political Zionism and was opposed to Ahad Ha-Am's cultural Zionism and Chaim Weizmann's practical Zionism.

See also AHAD HA-AM; HERZL, THEODOR; WEIZMANN, CHAIM; WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO).

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MARTIN MALIN

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

Post–World War II alliance for the defense of its members against the Soviet Union.

On 4 April 1949 twelve countries—including the United States, France, Great Britain, and Canada—signed the North Atlantic Treaty, establishing the basis for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO was designed to defend Western Europe in the face of a perceived threat from the Soviet Union and its Communist satellite states, which formed the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1955.

Turkey applied for NATO membership in 1950, occupying a key strategic position between Europe and the Middle East. Admitted on 18 February 1952, Turkey agreed to provide NATO with secure access to the Straits at Istanbul and to the Black Sea.

With the end of the Cold War, NATO membership was expanded to include the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (1999), and seven more states are due to accede in 2004. In September 2001 NATO invoked Article 5 of the treaty for the first time, declaring the terrorist attacks against the United States an attack against all members. NATO played no formal role in the American war in Iraq in 2003, though it agreed to assure Turkey's security under Article 4 of the treaty.

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ZACHARY KARABELL
UPDATED BY ANDREW FLIBBERT

NORTHERN TIER

The region comprising the countries of Iran and Turkey in the Middle East and Afghanistan and Pakistan in central Asia; its location on the border of the Soviet Union made it an area of high interest for U.S. defense planners and their allies during the Cold War.

In the early 1950s the Northern Tier assumed strategic significance in Anglo-American plans for defense of the Middle East against an attack that the Western powers assumed the Soviets would launch in a drive toward the Suez Canal. The Western allies intended to arm Turkey and also to prepare Iraq and Syria, neither of which was contiguous with the Soviet Union, to resist invasion. The United States and Britain planned to defer Iran's participation but attempted to convince Egypt to join Western

planning for the Middle East Command (1951) and the Middle East Defense Organization (1952).

Egypt's refusal to participate in such regional defense plans brought the schemes to an end; nevertheless, the Western powers still believed that a "Middle East NATO" was possible. In April 1954 the United States signed an arms deal with Iraq and hoped that the bilateral treaty that Turkey and Pakistan signed that month could be expanded to include several Arab states. In 1955 Britain arranged and then joined with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey in the Baghdad Pact, which had the support of the United States.

See also Baghdad Pact (1955); Central Treaty Organization (CENTO); Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO).

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Zach Levey

NOUAKCHOTT

Capital of Mauritania.

Nouakchott is located 4 miles inland from the Atlantic Ocean, just south of central Mauritania. Three years before Mauritania's independence from France in 1960, Nouakchott, then just a village, was selected as the capital of the future independent Mauritania. City architects planned for a potential 15,000 inhabitants. By 1967, 20,000 people had moved to Nouakchott. As a result of Saharan droughts in recent decades, hordes of people have moved to the city, and as of the early twenty-first century more than 800,000 people inhabited Nouakchott, around 25 percent of the Mauritanian population.

Nouakchott, Mauritania's administrative and economic center, is home to all ethnicities. North of Nouakchott, Nouadhibou, a city of 100,000 people, also is a center of trade. Fishing, light industry, and handicraft manufacturing centers are located in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou. Foreign investment remains crucial for increased economic growth as population size and skilled labor are limited.

From any point in Nouakchott, Islamic prayer calls can be heard emanating from the mosques five times a day. Nouakchott has two large markets with men and women vendors lined up selling items such as fabric, electronics, Qurʾans, meats, vegetables, and rice. One of the markets is located in the Cinquième district, where more of the Pulaar population live and sell their products. The other large market, in the Capitale district, is mainly populated with black and white Maure vendors and shoppers. Nouakchott has restaurants of all types, a movie theater, internet cafés, beautiful mosques, a university, and an international airport.

Naomi Zeff

NOUIRA, HEDI

[1911–1993]

Tunisian nationalist and politician.

Educated in Tunis and Paris, Hedi Nouira played an important role in shaping and publicizing the nationalism of Habib Bourguiba in the early days of the Neo-Destour political party, largely through his work on the party's French-language newspaper. Following several periods of imprisonment by the French colonial administration (France held a protectorate over Tunisia from 1881), and participation in the negotiations toward independence in the 1950s, Nouira became a leading member of Bourguiba's inner circle.

With independence in 1955–1956, he was appointed minister of finance (1955–1958), then head of the Central Bank of Tunisia (1958–1970). In November 1970, he was appointed to be the new prime minister by Bourguiba, a post he held for seven years; in 1974, during a party congress, he was named heir apparent by Bourguiba. As prime minister, Nouira initiated a period of economic liberalization—by placing new emphasis on the private sector, encouraging trade and foreign invest-

ment, and distributing large parts of state farms to small landholders. When these policies led to social and economic dislocation, Nouira (with Bourguiba's support) met the ensuing political turmoil with repression. In early 1980, shortly after the Gafsa Incident (a clash between Libya and Tunisia), Nouira was reported to have fallen seriously ill and was replaced.

See also Bourguiba, Habib; Gafsa Incident (1980).

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Matthew S. Gordon

NUʿAYMI FAMILY, AL-

The ruling family of the emirate of Ajman in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The rulers of Ajman are members of the Nuʿaym tribe, one of the largest in southeastern Arabia, with members spread from Oman to Bahrain. The first ruler of Ajman was Rashid ibn Humayd al-Nuʿaymi (r. 1816–1838), one of the Persian Gulf rulers who signed a peace treaty with the British in 1820. A small emirate with few economic resources, Ajman has been a recipient of financial aid from the ruler of Abu Dhabi, but it has not always followed the larger emirate's political lead. Due to his strong personality and his long tenure as amir (r. 1918–1981), Rashid bin Humayd al-Nuʿaymi, the ruler of Ajman at the time of the UAE's federation, hewed an independent line, often siding with the ruler of Dubai. The ninth and current ruler of Ajman is Humayd bin Rashid al-Nuʿaymi, born in 1931. He has ruled since 1981 and has served on the Supreme Council of the UAE since 1981. He is also the sponsor of the Shaykh Humayd bin Rashid prizes for Culture and Science.

See also Ajman; United Arab Emirates.

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Anthony B. Toth

NUBAR, BOGHOS

[1851–1930]

Armenian political leader and philanthropist.

Boghos Nubar was born in Alexandria, Egypt. He was the son of Nubar Pasha, the late-nineteenth-century prime minister of Egypt, and nephew and protégé of Boghos Bey Yusufian, his son's namesake and the great minister of Muhammad Ali, the founder of modern Egypt. Boghos Nubar received his training as a civil engineer in France and served as a director of the state railways in Egypt.

In 1906 Boghos Nubar, heir to his father's title and family fortune, took the lead, along with a group of wealthy Armenians in Egypt, to found the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) in Cairo, Egypt. Growing out of the concern for the tens of thousands of Armenians made destitute by the massive loss of life at Hamidian (1894–1896), the AGBU hoped to support the recovery of the Armenians from the brutalization suffered at the hands of the Ottoman government. Within three years of its founding, the 1909 mass killing of Armenians at Adana precipitated the AGBU to focus its resources in building orphanages, hospitals, and shelters for widows and elderly survivors in the region of Cilicia. The 1915 deportations and killings of Armenians required the AGBU to recommit significant funds to attempt a measure of relief for the entire Ottoman Armenian community now made refugees. The AGBU set up orphanages and clinics all across the Middle East wherever the Armenian refugees concentrated.

Boghos Nubar in Paris headed the Armenian National Delegation to Paris in 1918 to represent the disenfranchised Armenians of the Ottoman Empire with the hope of establishing a national home for them. In France Boghos Nubar was also instrumental in getting the French army to approve the formation under its command of the Legion d'Orient manned mostly by Armenians who saw some fighting in the Allied campaign in Palestine. Though a person of conservative political leanings, with his pedigree Boghos Nubar emerged as the leading spokesman for the Armenians at the Paris Peace Conference.

While the independent Armenian republic was too short-lived to see the AGBU extend its philan-

thropy to Russian Armenia, in the 1920s the AGBU responded to a disastrous earthquake that struck the city of Leninakan (formerly Alexandropol, currently Gyumri) and stayed to build educational and medical facilities in Soviet Armenia during that decade. Shut out of Armenia after Stalin's rise to power, the AGBU returned to Armenia in December 1988 after another devastating earthquake shattered the same city and the surrounding countryside.

Boghos Nubar died in Paris. Before his death, he had already set the AGBU in a new direction. After the immediate minimum physical needs of the Armenian refugees had been met, he donated funds to the AGBU, and in so doing set an example emulated since by other well-to-do Armenians, for the establishment of educational programs and institutions to begin the moral and intellectual recovery of a generation of Armenians which had known nothing but exile, hunger, and privation. Over the decades the organization founded by Boghos Nubar Pasha grew to become the largest in the Armenian diaspora with chapters around the world supporting schools, orphanages, clinics, libraries, youth centers, theaters, publications, and a host of other activities designed to sustain Armenian culture and identity in diaspora communities.

See also ARMENIAN GENOCIDE; MUHAMMAD ALI; NUBAR PASHA; ORMANIAN, MAGHAKIA; YUSUFIAN, BOGHOS.

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ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

NUBAR PASHA

[1825–1899]

Legal reformer, cabinet minister, and three-time prime minister of Egypt.

An Armenian born in İzmir, educated in France and Switzerland, Nubar was brought to Egypt by his uncle, who was a translator for Muhammad Ali. Nubar worked for his uncle and his successors. Having learned eleven languages and spent his youth in Europe, he knew how to charm Europeans and often mediated with them on Egypt's behalf, meanwhile making his own fortune. He successfully negotiated with the European powers to gain their consent to set up the mixed courts to try cases between Egyptian and foreign nationals. He presided over the short-lived "European cabinet" set up by Khedive Ismaʿil in 1878.

Not involved in the Urabi revolution, Nubar returned to power in 1884, at a time when Britain obliged Egypt to give up the Sudan, and led a third cabinet in 1894 and 1895. Clever and subtle as an intermediary between Egypt and Europe, he was both admired and resented by most Egyptians, who accused him (not unjustly) of enriching himself by exploiting his power.

See also ISMAʿIL IBN IBRAHIM; MIXED COURTS; MUHAMMAD ALI; URABI, AHMAD.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

NUBIANS

People of the Nile Valley south of Aswan, at the first cataract extending into the northern Sudan.

Nubia is the land of ancient kingdoms, such as Kush and Meroe, and Christian kingdoms before Islam that rivaled, were controlled by, or entered into peace treaties with Egypt. *Nab* is the ancient Egyptian word for gold, and Nubia was the source of gold for the region. Nubians have been active in trade and politics along the Nile since ancient times. They are renowned boatmen of the Nile River, and were enslavers of people farther south during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as well as victims of

slavery. Although culturally and linguistically distinct, Nubians' complex history reflects contact with many peoples, including Africans farther south along the Nile, Arabs who conquered North Africa, and Europeans, especially the Greeks who in their early encounter described them as "Aethiopian," or "the people of the burnt faces."

Nubians and their subgroups have a long history linked to the rise of Nile Valley agriculture, states, and urbanism. Nubians straddle the borders of contemporary Egypt and Sudan. Although they speak Arabic, the Nubian language of Rotana and various dialects, such as Kenuz, Sukot, Fadija, Halfawi, and Donglowai, have been retained. Estimates of the number of Nubian speakers range from two hundred thousand to one million; one-quarter live in Egypt and the rest in Sudan. Nubian is generally considered an Eastern Sudanic language, a branch of Nilo-Saharan.

The social status of Nubians varies markedly. In Egypt they are generally identified as Sa'eedi (from the south) and are unskilled laborers, or often doormen, and are considered honest but simple. In Sudan, Arabized Nubians of the north were favored by the British colonialists and are concentrated among the elites. They have held state power since independence in 1956. When the Aswan High Dam was constructed in the 1960s, much of Nubia was flooded, destroying archaeological sites and displacing most Egyptian Nubians, resulting either in their resettlement—in some cases at sites far removed from their historical villages along the Nile—or by moving their homes to higher elevations.

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ALEYA ROUCHDY
UPDATED BY CAROLYN FLUEHR-LOBBAN

NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND NUCLEAR ENERGY

Nuclear proliferation in the greater Middle East is a central issue in international affairs.

In the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, the issue of nuclear weapons in the Greater Middle East came to the fore as never before. Several developments played a role in this change: In 1998 nearby India and Pakistan almost simultaneously tested several nuclear weapons each. In 2002 these nations' ongoing conflict over Kashmir brought them close to the nuclear brink. Then came reports of the transfer of nuclear technology and materials from Pakistan to North Korea and perhaps also Iran. Other reports suggested that Pakistan considered its nuclear program to be an "Islamic bomb" enterprise that could provide extended deterrence to Israel's nuclear threat to the Arabs. Israel implied that it would use nuclear weapons if attacked by Iraq with chemical or biological weapons. Also of great concern was the proliferation of various delivery systems—ballistic and cruise missiles, long-range aircraft abetted by aerial refueling—by several states in the region that might be joined to nuclear weapons arsenals. Around the world fears grew that terrorist organizations such as al-Qaʿida might somehow acquire nuclear weapons or materials for a "dirty" nuclear weapon derived from radioactive wastes. There were also increasing fears about Iraq's acquisition of nuclear weapons—a major rationale for the U.S.-led coalition's invasion of Iraq in 2003—and Iran's seemingly imminent development of nuclear weapons.

Israel

Israel was the first of the nations in the region to cross the nuclear threshold. But despite a growing body of writings about the history of its nuclear program, vast gaps remain in what is known about the size of its arsenal, the dates of its initial deployments, and its current command-and-control structure. It appears that the initial decisions to move toward nuclear weapons status were made shortly after the Jewish state was created. Crucial to Israel's nuclear development was its nuclear cooperation with France, which grew out of the two nations' close relations at the time of the 1956 Suez War and continued until 1967–1968. Israel's nuclear development was centered on the French-supplied Dimona reactor, which went into operation around 1961, and continued to produce plutonium despite remonstrances from the Kennedy administration and some limited U.S. inspections.

Israel probably began plutonium separation and the deployment of operational nuclear weapons be-

Patriot antimissile missiles deployed near Israel's nuclear research reactor at Dimona. The Israelis refuse to allow international inspection of the facility, but satellite photographs taken by the Federation of American Scientists in 2000 confirmed that the reactor has the ability to produce 100–200 nuclear warheads. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

tween the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israel wars, with the Soviet Union's active involvement in the Suez "war of attrition" (1969–1970) perhaps serving as a final trigger. In 1973 Israel's implicit threats to use nuclear weapons after the initial military setbacks in Sinai and on the Golan Heights appear to have impelled the U.S. arms resupply airlift after initial hesitation.

In 1979 U.S. satellites detected a flash over the southern Indian Ocean that was widely, though not definitively, attributed to an Israeli or joint Israeli-South African nuclear test. In 1986 Mordechai Vanunu, a disaffected Israeli who had worked at the Dimona reactor, leaked voluminous information and photographs that revealed the scope of the Israeli nuclear program. Those disclosures, now widely considered credible, indicated a program consisting of both fission and fusion weapons, involving up to or more than 200 weapons, mounted on delivery systems that could cover the entire Middle East. The latter delivery systems included now longer-range Jericho missiles (perhaps up to 1,500 miles), F-16 fighter aircraft with aerial refueling capability, and—perhaps—three diesel submarines purchased from Germany.

Various rationales have been offered for the Israeli nuclear program. The main rationale is that the program serves as a credible deterrent against the threat of an overwhelming Arab conventional force, which some deem inevitable. The size of Israel's program appears to imply the prospective use of tactical nuclear weapons in such a scenario, backed by a threat against cities. Other rationales for the nuclear program are that it offers increased assurance of American arms resupply during crises; it may convince Arab nations of Israel's permanence, thereby nudging them along in the "peace process"; and it may deter involvement in the Arab-

Israeli conflict by powerful peripheral nations such as Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, the latter semi-allied to Israel.

Iraq

Iraq's initial efforts to become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power were thwarted by Israel's bombing of the Osirak reactor in Baghdad in 1981. During the subsequent decade, Iraq allegedly built a clandestine nuclear infrastructure with the aid of numerous Western suppliers of relevant technologies, most notably that of gas centrifuges. That operation apparently was vastly underestimated by Western intelligence services, and the full scope of the program was revealed only in the wake of Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War of 1991 and its subsequent submission to United Nations inspections, which appear to have resulted in the dismantling of part of Iraq's nuclear infrastructure. In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, however, the status of the Iraqi nuclear program was unclear. Little evidence was found. Various analysts suggested that intelligence reports had overstated the program; that it was well hidden by the Saddam regime; or that prior to the invasion it had been dismantled or the evidence moved to Syria or elsewhere outside of Iraq.

Iran, Algeria, and Libya

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and subsequent to the Gulf War, Iran is widely believed to have embarked on an energetic effort to acquire nuclear weapons. That effort is centered on its nuclear research complex at Isfahan. Reports suggest extensive outside assistance, particularly from Pakistan and perhaps from China and Russia. There are reports of work on centrifuge technology, and on plutonium production reactors. Israel in particular dreads the possible advent of an Iranian nuclear weapons program that would include long-range missiles capable of reaching Israel.

During the latter part of the shah's reign, Iran embarked on a program to build several nuclear reactors. One was nearly completed by a West German firm. In 2003 Iran was negotiating with Russia over the building of four new reactors, plans that were fiercely opposed by the United States. One reactor, at Bushehr, is apparently under construction.

Algeria has acquired a small nuclear reactor, causing anxiety in Western Europe over the threat that Islamic fundamentalism could lead to a European-Algerian conflict. Libya reportedly has made efforts to acquire nuclear weapons or technology, but to no avail. In December 2003, Libya announced the cessation of all of its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.

Conclusion

The vast oil and gas resources of the Middle East presumably render almost superfluous the acquisition of nuclear power reactors for peaceful purposes. Statements about generating electricity appear to provide rhetorical cover for intended nuclear weapons programs.

Nuclear disarmament is unlikely to be achieved in the region in the foreseeable future. Israel clearly sees nuclear deterrence as vital to its survival. It could not conceivably abandon its stockpile unless Pakistan did so as well, which would require India also to disarm, and thus also China, the United States, and Russia. That is a daunting row of dominoes.

See also DIMONA.

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ROBERT E. HARKAVY

NUER

People who live along the Nile in Sudan.

The Nuer, who call themselves the Nath, and their associated subgroup the Atuot are among the most numerous of the southern Sudanese Nilotic peoples. They live in the swamps and open savannas on both sides of the Nile south of Malakal in Sudan but have been seriously disrupted by protracted civil war in southern Sudan, waged most intensively since 1983. Culturally, they have a common origin with the Dinka, with common ties of pastoralism, intermarriage, and cultural borrowings. Periodic rivalries and conflicts have also characterized this relationship, including conflicts related to the resistance of the Sudan's People's Liberation Movement to the national government in Khartoum. The Nuer were the last of the Sudanese people to submit to British rule, and then only after a substantial military campaign in 1930, known as the Nuer Settlement. In more recent times the Nuer, some of whom have become well educated and politically active, have played an aggressive role in the southern Sudanese insurgency movement and remain the dominant military force in Nuerland.

See also DINKA; SUDANESE CIVIL WARS.

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ROBERT O. COLLINS
UPDATED BY CAROLYN FLUEHR-LOBBAN

NUMEIRI, MUHAMMAD JAʿFAR
[1930–]

Military leader; president of Sudan.

Muhammad Jaʿfar Numeiri (Nimeiri, Numairi, Numayri) was born at Wad Nubawʾi, a suburb of Omdurman, Sudan. After education at the local Qurʾanic school, El Hijra Elementary School, the Medani Government School, and the Hantoub Secondary School, he entered military college in 1949 and graduated as a second lieutenant in 1952. Thereafter, Numeiri served in the Western Command and the armored corps stationed at Shendi. He became a great admirer of Gamal Abdel Nasser's pan-Arab revolution, a view reinforced by training in Egypt and by his arrest and suspension from duty (1957–1959) after supporting the abortive coup by Abd al-Rahman Kabediya. He later served in Juba, in southern Sudan, and in Khartoum, where he proved troublesome and consequently was sent on military training courses to Cyprus, Libya, West Germany, and Egypt. Numeiri returned to play an active role in the overthrow of the government of his superior, General Ibrahim Abbud, in October 1964, which resulted in his arrest and transfer to the American Command School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Upon his return to Sudan he was implicated in another abortive coup but once again survived to be given a more sedentary position as commanding officer of the military school in Khartoum.

Stationed in the capital, Numeiri was able to plot and successfully carry out a military coup on 25 May 1969 against the government of Ismaʿil al-Azhari, whom he replaced with his Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), an imitation of Nasser's revolutionary command council of 1952. The first challenge to his regime came from the Ansar (Mahdists) in March 1970. The Sudan army assaulted the historic sanctuary of the Mahdi and his Ansar at Aba Island, 150 miles south of Khartoum, decisively defeating the rebels and killing the spiritual leader of the Ansar, the Imam al-Hadi.

The second and more serious challenge came from the Communist Party (SCP) of Sudan. The Communists had originally been represented in the RCC and, emboldened by their success, sought to seize control of the government by a coup d'état on 19 July 1971. After a bloody struggle lasting three

Muhammad Jaʿfar Numeiri (second from right) with Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi in 1970. During Numeiri's presidency, relations between Libya and the Sudan fluctuated, largely due to Sudan's improving relations with Egypt. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed for several years in the 1970s, and only began to make steady improvement after Numeiri was out of power. © Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

days, Numeiri prevailed. The Communist leaders were promptly executed, the party prorogued, and its organization in the Sudan dismantled. Having defeated his enemies on both the right and the left, he called for a plebiscite that elected him president of the Sudan, after which he dissolved the RCC and established the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) as the single ruling party.

Having consolidated his control in northern Sudan, Numeiri turned to the seventeen-year civil war with the southern Sudanese. He and the respected southerner, Abel Alier, brought the war to a conclusion after negotiations with the Anya-Nya southern insurgents at Addis Ababa on 27 February 1972. The Addis Ababa Accords granted a limited autonomy to southern Sudan, but the means of its implementation and preservation were never clear. At the time it was an extraordinary achievement whereby one of the most destructive civil wars in Africa seemed to have been peacefully resolved. Numeiri basked in an outpouring of international acclaim for his statesmanship. With Sudan at peace, he enjoyed ten years of complete authority marred, however, by his growing isolation from the Sudanese, whose frustration erupted in several abortive attempts to overthrow him. These halcyon years were accompanied by an economic boom that resulted from Numeiri's encouragement of foreign investment in Sudanese agriculture to transform Sudan into the "breadbasket" of the Middle East. Large tracts of land, much of it marginal, were seized by the state, which displaced Sudanese farmers and herdsmen for Sudanese and Middle Eastern entrepreneurs anxious to reap quick profits from large mechanized agricultural schemes. Numeiri also sought, with little success, to establish a rapprochement and national unity with Sadiq al-

Mahdi and his Ansar, whom he had savagely defeated in 1970.

These initiatives were accompanied by a change in his lifestyle and ideology. Abandoning the habits of a tough soldier, Numeiri in the late 1970s became engrossed in rigorous interpretation of Islam at a time when there were endless political disagreements with the southern Sudanese and a decline in the nation's economic prosperity. He came increasingly under the influence of the Sudanese Islamists led by Hasan al-Turabi who were determined to transform Sudan into an Islamist state from the secular one of Jaʿfar Numeiri. He misperceived that the increasingly influential National Islamic Front (NIF) were more dependable political allies than the southern Sudanese. In October 1981, after a series of strikes and demonstrations precipitated by the declining economy, he dismissed the National Assembly and the leadership of the SSU. Next, he unilaterally repudiated the Addis Ababa Agreement by dissolving the southern Regional Assembly and imposing his own Council for the Unity of the Southern Sudan.

The rapid deterioration of his popularity was hastened by the introduction in September 1983 of *shariʿa* (Islamic law), which would apply to all Sudanese, Muslim and non-Muslim, in its restrictions on individual behavior and its draconian penalties for petty offenses. This led to criticism from both Muslims and non-Muslims, dismay among the northern Sudanese, and the revival of the civil war in southern Sudan in May 1983, led by Colonel John Garang de Mabior and his Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

Numeiri declared a state of emergency. His adoption of the Islamist religious policies and stringent economic decrees produced serious riots throughout the cities of northern Sudan. He left Khartoum for the United States to seek additional financial assistance. While in Washington, D.C., on 6 April 1985, he was deposed in a bloodless coup d'état led by his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Suwar al-Dhahab, a Muslim Brother. Numeiri traveled from Washington to Cairo, where he was granted asylum and kept in house confinement for eleven years, until President Bashir allowed him to return to Sudan in May 1999. He received a spontaneous reception at the airport but has been told to live in quiet retirement.

See also Abbud, Ibrahim; Ansar, al-; Sudanese Civil Wars; Turabi, Hasan al-.

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Robert O. Collins

NUMISMATICS

The study of coins and related objects.

Numismatics is an ancillary science to history that seeks to identify coins as to place, date, and government of issue so that the inscriptions, images, and other features of the coins can be used as evidence for political, economic, social, and cultural history. For archaeologists, coins are the most consistently datable evidence. Islamic coins produced in Muslim countries and similar coins sometimes issued by non-Muslims are especially useful for historical research—nearly all were inscribed with their city and date of issue and usually (according to the tradition of Islam) did not have images. This left space for long inscriptions, including the names and titles of the rulers under whom they were issued and something of their religious beliefs.

As a field of study, numismatics began during the European Renaissance as part of the general rediscovery of the classical world. Muslim historians did not use coins as historical evidence, although occasionally an extraordinary issue might be mentioned or described. More often they noted changes in the monetary system of their countries, and some writers, notably al-Baladhuri in the ninth century and al-Maqrizi in the first half of the fifteenth century, wrote brief treatises on monetary history. A few descriptions of mint operation were written as well as a few disquisitions on monetary theory, of which the most interesting is by the great historian Ibn Khaldun of fifteenth-century Egypt.

Some Islamic coins were noted in passing in works on other subjects, but the first study of Islamic numismatics was a twenty-page article in 1759.

The first catalog of an Italian Islamic collection was published by Adler in 1782, followed by Assemani's catalog of a collection in Padua in 1787 and Tychsen's catalog of the Göttingen collection in 1787/88. Catalogs of public and private collections continued to be published throughout the nineteenth century, culminating at the end of the century in the great catalogs of the national collections of England, France, Germany, and Russia. Stanley Lane-Poole's ten-volume set of the British Museum Islamic coins (1875–1890) continues to be a standard reference, partly because of his excellent scholarship and also because it was the only complete catalog of any collection (the British Museum has acquired many more coins since that time). His introductions to the volumes, describing the history and coinage of each Muslim dynasty, are still useful. Lavoix's three massive volumes on the collection of the Bibliothèque Nationale, in Paris, and Nützel's two volumes on the collection of the Königliche Museum, in Berlin, are also standard references. Markov's catalog of the Hermitage collection, in St. Petersburg, is less used because the inscriptions are brief, the work is difficult to find in the West, and it is reproduced directly from his Russian manuscript.

A major impetus to European numismatic research on Islamic coins in the countries from Scandinavia through the Baltic states and into Russia has been the immense quantities of seventh-to-tenth-century Islamic silver coins brought to those countries and buried by the Vikings. Stockholm is one major center for this study, beginning with Tornberg's several catalogs and studies from 1846 to 1870, and culminating with the great *Corpus Nummorum Saeculorum IX–XI,* a collective project to publish (first volume 1975) all the Islamic (and English and German) silver coins of the Viking age that were found in Sweden. The other major center for such study, founded by C. M. Fraehn, was St. Petersburg. His works, beginning in 1808, were important not only for Russian numismatists but for scholars throughout Europe. In particular, he devised a scheme for the arrangement of the Islamic coin-issuing dynasties that was followed, with subsequent modifications, by most Islamic numismatists until recently. Russia's numismatic research was also impelled by Russian interest in the coinage of its newly conquered territories in the Caucasus and central Asia.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the leading Russian scholars were Markov, mentioned previously, and Tiesenhausen, who published the only general corpus of Abbasid coins produced to date (a corpus attempts to assemble all known coins of a historical period or place, whereas a catalog is limited to the coins of a single collection or several related collections). Perhaps the most brilliant scholar of the Russian school, Vasmer, was executed in 1938. Numismatic scholarship remained active in the Soviet Union, however, with major centers in Leningrad, Moscow, and the cities of Muslim central Asia.

Islamic numismatics has an early history in Spain, since the coinage of the Arabs there (the Moors) was part of that country's heritage from 711 to 1492. Vives's catalog of all Muslim Spanish issues remains a standard reference. George Miles founded Islamic numismatics at the American Numismatic Society in New York City, which remains one of the principal centers for the field. In 1989, Tübingen University, in Germany, acquired an extremely important collection of Islamic coins and has begun to develop a center for research and training.

The Turks of the Ottoman Empire were the first people of the Middle East to join in numismatic research, publishing in European journals as early as 1862. At the turn of the century, the Müzei Humayun (Imperial Museum) published a series of major catalogs in Ottoman Turkish that rank in importance with the productions of the large European museums. This promising beginning was halted by World War I and the series was never finished. Europeans living in Arab countries produced various works of significance during the first part of the twentieth century, but few Arabs contributed until the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of some Arab states.

Abd al-Rahman Fahmi produced several important catalogs and studies based on the collection of the Museum of Islamic Art, in Cairo, and Nasir al-Naqshbandi founded a school of numismatists in Baghdad, where the Iraq Museum is a major center for research with a journal devoted to Islamic coins called *al-Maskukat.* The Damascus Museum, in Syria, also has an active collection, and its late curator, Muhammad Abu al-Faraj al-Ush, produced several important works. Recently the Bank al-Maghrib of

Rabat, Morocco, has created a numismatic center and published two major corpora of Moroccan coins by Daniel Eustache. Some public collections were built in Iran in the 1970s, but little has been published there. In Jordan, a center for numismatic research has been established at Yarmuk University with private support; a journal, *Yarmouk Numismatics,* was founded there.

The real explosion in Islamic numismatics began in the 1970s as a result of the new wealth brought by Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil. Many private collectors in the Gulf countries began to bid up the price of Islamic coins, and the interest generated by rising prices led to great collector interest in Europe, the Americas, and Japan. This, as well as the expansion of Islamic studies in the West, has made the field extremely active.

See also Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

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Michael L. Bates

NUQRASHI, MAHMUD FAHMI AL-

[1888–1948]

Egyptian educator and politician.

Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi was educated in Alexandria and at Nottingham University, England. When he returned to Egypt, he taught school, then was promoted in the administration until he became director of public instruction for Asyut. A Wafd supporter, he became vice-governor of Cairo, then deputy interior minister under Saʿd Zaghlul. Implicated in Sir Lee Stack's murder, he was briefly imprisoned and then cleared.

Nuqrashi held ministerial positions in the Wafdist cabinets of 1930 and 1936 but broke with Mustafa al-Nahhas in 1937. With Ahmad Mahir, he formed the Saʿdist Party, which took part in several non-Wafdist coalition governments. After Ahmad Mahir was assassinated in 1945, Nuqrashi became the leader of the Saʿdist Party and headed cabinets in 1945 and 1946 and from 1946 to 1948. He led the 1947 Egyptian delegation to the United Nations (UN) Security Council to demand that Britain withdraw from Sudan and allow it to unite with Egypt, but he did not gain UN support. When the State of Israel was declared in May 1948 and the Arabs attacked Israel, Nuqrashi reportedly tried to delay committing Egyptian troops, but he was overridden by Egypt's King Farouk. As setbacks to the Arab forces led to rising discontent within Egypt, he tried to outlaw the Society of Muslim Brothers (the Muslim Brotherhood). He was assassinated by a student member of that society on 28 December 1948.

See also Farouk; Mahir, Ahmad; Muslim Brotherhood; Nahhas, Mustafa al-; Stack, Lee; Wafd; Zaghlul, Saʿd.

Arthur Goldschmidt

NURCU

See Nursi, Said

NURI, ABD AL-MALIK

[1921–1992?]

Iraqi author.

Abd al-Malik Nuri, one of the most gifted writers of fiction in modern Iraq, was born in Baghdad. He studied law, graduating in 1944. Concurrently he showed an interest in contemporary fiction, especially that of James Joyce. His first collection of short stories, *Rusul al-Insaniyya* (Baghdad, 1946; Messengers of humanity) contains stories in a naturalist vein, expressing sympathy with the underdogs of

Baghdad society. His second volume, *Nashid al-Ard* (1954; The song of the earth) inaugurated a new phase in the language and techniques of modern fiction in Iraq. Stream-of-consciousness is judiciously employed, and the exterior movement that characterizes earlier stories is replaced by an internal flow of thoughts and emotions.

In 1972, Nuri published a short allegorical play, *Khashab wa Mukhmal* (Wood and velvet); his third and last collection of short stories to date, *Dhuyul al-Kharif* (Autumn's tails), appeared in 1980.

Like many other Iraqi intellectuals, Nuri was attracted to leftist ideas, especially in the 1940s. In subsequent years his political commitment seems to have declined markedly. Like several other Iraqi novelists of his generation (e.g., his close friend Fu'ad Takarli), Nuri wrote the dialogue of his stories in the vernacular of Baghdad rather than in *fusha,* the literary language of Arabic writing. This gave his stories a distinctive local color but made it difficult for readers outside Iraq to understand his works fully. In his drama, however, he used *fusha.*

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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SASSON SOMEKH

NURI, FAZLOLLAH

[c. 1842–1909]

Iranian religious scholar, important for his objections to Western-style constitutionalism during the revolution of 1906–1909.

After completing his preliminary religious studies in Iran, Nuri traveled to Iraq to study with the great authorities of Shiʿite Islam, such as Mirza Hasan Shirazi. Returning to Iran in 1883, he soon established himself as the most influential religious leader of Tehran, controlling several theological colleges. When the Constitutional Revolution began in 1907, Nuri initially collaborated with his colleagues who favored the cause. He soon began to turn his weight against the movement, however, claiming that its original aim—the implementation of *shariʿa* (Islamic law)—had been subverted by the emergence of unbelievers among the constitutionalists. In protest, in July 1907, Nuri withdrew from Tehran to a nearby shrine where he began publishing broadsheets that denounced constitutionalism as a European import, incompatible with Islam, and he called for a form of constitutional government more in accord with Islam. He objected in particular to concepts such as parliament possessing the right to legislate, the legal equality of Muslims and non-Muslims, and the unqualified freedom of the press. When in June 1908 the parliament was closed down by a royalist coup, Nuri effectively sided with the shah, although he continued to advocate his own concept of an Islamic-style constitution. In July 1909, the parliamentary regime was restored, and Nuri was executed at the end of the month. His violent end caused revulsion even among the constitutionalist religious scholars and contributed heavily to a disillusion with political involvement that was to last several decades.

See also CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION.

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HAMID ALGAR

NURSI, SAID

[1876–1960]

Influential religious writer in Turkey who advocated the compatibility of Islam and modern science.

Said Nursi was born in a Kurdish village, Nurs, in Bitlis province. He had a traditional religious education with different Sufi orders but was primarily self-educated. He worked to revitalize Islamic faith and Muslim society through raising religious consciousness. In 1907 he went to Istanbul to ask Sultan Abdülhamit II to establish a university in Van that would reconcile scientific reasoning with Islam. He was disappointed in the sultan's response and critical of his use of Islam for political purposes. Nursi developed close ties with the Young Turks movement before the 1908 revolution, but its later political agenda disillusioned him, and he joined the radical Islamic Muhammad Union. He was charged with joining the April 1908 counter-

revolution but was acquitted, and then returned to eastern Anatolia. Nursi shifted his strategy from political to religious activism and focused on individual consciousness through activist piety. During the World War I occupation of eastern Anatolia he fought against Russian troops and became a prisoner of war, serving two years in Russia. He supported the War of Independence under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk), but eventually became disenchanted with Atatürk's radical secular agenda and withdrew from politics to contemplative writing. Nursi was charged with complicity in the 1925 Kurdish rebellion and sent to exile to Isparta. In the following years he was arrested many times and tried for his alleged political use of Islam. These trials led to further exiles, to Eskisehir (1935), Kastamonu (1936), Denizli (1943), and Emirdag, near Afyon (1944). Only after the Democrat Party came to power in 1950 did his exile come to an end.

Nursi's collection of essays constitute the *Risale-i Nur* (Epistle of light), which seeks to raise religious consciousness to arm Muslims with new moral and scientific ideas to preserve and expand their Islamic identity in society. His disciples are known in Turkish as *Nurcus,* the followers of Nursi. The *Risale-i Nur* initially was copied by hand for distribution because neither Nursi nor his disciples could afford the printing costs, and before the 1950s they also lacked the freedom to print religious texts. The main concern in his writings is the negative impact of positivist ideas in terms of the "moral and spiritual destruction" of Muslim believers, and of society as a whole. His goal was to rebuild the moral charter of Islamic ethics out of the Qurʾan. For Nursi, this moral charter was necessary to control the dangerous appetites of people and to provide for the higher pursuit of human perfection.

See also Abdülhamit II; Anatolia; Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Democrat Party; Qurʾan; Young Turks.

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NUSAYBA FAMILY

Prominent Palestinian family from Jerusalem that traces its roots in the Old City to ancient times.

According to tradition, the Nusayba family took its name from a woman named Nusayba, who went to the Prophet Muhammad with a delegation of women and complained to him about the unfair treatment they received. Since the Muslim conquest of Jerusalem in the seventh century, the Sunni Muslim Nusayba (also Nuseibeh) family has held the keys of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. This arrangement emerged during the days of the second Muslim caliph, Umar, who hoped to avoid clashes among rival Christian dominations for control over the church. Although symbolic, the arrangement has provided the Nusayba family a visible role in Christian activities in Jerusalem, which include pilgrimages and visits by Western Christians.

Notable members of the family have included Anwar Nusayba (1913–1986), who received a master's degree from Queen's College in Cambridge. His political career began as a member of the Arab Higher Committee in 1946 and secretary general of the All-Palestine Government in 1948. He was the chief Arab delegate on the Jordan and Israel Mixed Armistice Commission in 1951, and held ministerial posts in Jordan, including defense in 1953 and education in 1954 and 1955. He was made governor of the Jerusalem province from 1961 to 1963 and later served as Jordan's ambassador to the United Kingdom.

Hazem (also Hazim) Nusayba (1922–) studied at the American University of Beirut and later received a Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1945. He became a Jordanian diplomat, serving as foreign minister from 1962 to 1963 and again in 1965, as an ambassador, and as Jordan's longtime ambassador to the United Nations (1976–1985).

Sari Nusayba (1949–) obtained his bachelor's degree from Oxford University in 1971 and his doctorate from Harvard University in 1978. After teaching at Bir Zeit University from 1978 to 1988, he went on to serve as president of al-Quds University in Jerusalem. Sari has also been known for his outspoken and moderate political views. A supporter of al-Fatah, Nusayba helped organize secret talks in 1987 between the Israeli government and

Faysal Husayni, Fatah's leading figure in the West Bank. He has supported the peace process, serving on the steering committee to the Palestinian delegation at the Madrid Conference in 1991 and proposing joint Palestinian-Israeli plans for the future resolution of the conflict.

See also Fatah, al-; Madrid Conference.

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Lawrence Tal
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

NUSEIBEH FAMILY

See Nusayba Family

NUTEG-NURI, ALI AKBAR

See Nateq-Nuri, Ali Akbar

NUUN MAGAZINE

Arabic-language feminist quarterly magazine published in Egypt by the Arab Women's Solidarity Association.

Members of the Arab Women's Solidarity Organization (AWSA) suggested during its 1988 conference the creation of a magazine that would raise public awareness about women's issues. The first issue of *Nuun* (also *Nun*) appeared on 1 May 1989, and was originally distributed only to AWSA members due to limitations imposed by the Egyptian government on the distribution of materials published by nongovernmental organizations.

The magazine was concerned with the promotion of the general goals of AWSA: equality between the sexes, the advancement of women's rights and the promotion of cooperation between women, and the defense of democracy, development, and independence in the Arab world from a progressive feminist standpoint. *Nuun* aimed to serve as a forum in which Arab women could exchange views and experiences, and to promote a new consciousness about the liberation of Arab women. The name originated from the Arabic expression *nun al-nisa,* which refers to the formation of the feminine plural in the Arabic language. Because of its antitraditionalist, feminist, and progressive stance, the magazine confronted numerous attempts to curtail its dissemination. In 1991 the Egyptian government closed down the magazine for opposing Egypt's role as an ally of the United States during the Gulf War.

See also Arab Women's Solidarity Association International; Gender: Gender and Politics; Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries.

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Vanesa Casanova-Fernandez

O

OASIS

See Glossary

OASIS GROUP

Consortium of three U.S. oil companies in Libya.

The Oasis Group (originally the Conorada Group) is a consortium composed of three U.S. "independent" oil companies: Amerada (now Amerada Hess), Continental (now ConocoPhillips), and Marathon. Bidding independently, the companies won concessions throughout Libya during the first auction of oil rights in 1955. Following the concession awards, the Oasis companies pooled their acquisitions. By 1965, when Libya opened a second round of concession bidding, Oasis was the number two producer of oil in Libya, bringing in more than 300,000 barrels per day.

Beginning in mid-1970, Libya's militant postrevolutionary government threatened to limit or halt oil production in selected concessions unless their owners agreed to higher prices. Two weeks after Occidental Petroleum capitulated to this pressure, the Oasis Group followed suit. The government continued its pressure on foreign oil companies. It nationalized part of Oasis, amounting to 51 percent by 1973.

Meanwhile, U.S. relations with Libya deteriorated steadily, reaching a nadir in 1986 when the United States imposed economic sanctions as part of President Ronald Reagan's declaration of war against terrorism. The Oasis partners were three of only five U.S. oil companies to retain properties in Libya after sanctions were imposed, by that time amounting to only 40.8 percent of Oasis. In 1992 the addition of United Nations sanctions further dimmed prospects for U.S. oil companies hoping to resume operations in Libya.

UN sanctions ended in 1999, following the Libyan government's surrender of suspects in the Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am flight 103. The ending of sanctions brought foreign oil companies back to Libya, but continuing U.S. sanctions prevented U.S. companies from returning. Despite energetic

lobbying, Congress passed a five-year extension of U.S. sanctions in August 2001, and Libya remains on the State Department list of countries accused of sponsoring international terror. Oasis companies continue their efforts to be allowed to resume operations in Libya. They face the prospect of losing their properties if the Libyan government decides that progress in negotiations with the United States to end the sanctions is unlikely to bear fruit. A large number of foreign companies are eager to acquire concessions in Libya and could bid on the Oasis properties if and when they are re-tendered by the Libyan government.

See also LIBYA; OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM; PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS; PETROLEUM RESERVES AND PRODUCTION.

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MARY ANN TÉTREAULT

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

U.S. firm active in Libya.

Occidental Petroleum was a small, nearly bankrupt company when it was purchased in 1956 by Armand Hammer, a Russian-born American entrepreneur. Occidental won oil concessions in Libya during the 1965 bidding round and struck oil shortly afterward. Within two years, Occidental had become a major shipper of oil to Europe as a result of the abundance and quality of Libya's oil, and the closure of the Suez Canal during the Arab-Israel War of 1967.

Occidental's dependence on Libya made it a prime target for "the Libyan squeeze." The government of Muammar al-Qaddafi, who took over Libya in a bloodless coup in 1969, ordered Occidental to cut back production for refusing to agree to higher oil prices. Within three months, Hammer agreed to pay 30 cents more per barrel as well as a higher rate of taxes. Other companies followed his lead, touching off the oil price revolution of the early 1970s.

Although Occidental produced oil elsewhere, it kept its operations in Libya despite the nationalization in 1973 of 51 percent of its holdings. In 1985 Occidental sold 21 percent of its Libyan equity to the Austrian firm OMV.

In 1986 U.S. economic sanctions against Libya ordered all U.S. firms operating there to halt their activities. These sanctions were augmented in 1992 by U.N. sanctions imposed in retaliation for Libya's refusal to extradite two suspects in the December 1988 bombing of a Pan American flight over Lockerbie, Scotland. In 1999 U.N. sanctions were lifted, but two years later, the U.S. Congress voted to renew U.S. sanctions for five additional years. Despite Occidental's close ties with high-level members of the U.S. presidential administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, it was unable to have Libya removed from the State Department's list of countries supporting international terrorism. The Clinton administration did allow Occidental to survey its abandoned production facilities in 1999. Despite its success in getting the Bush administration to expand its support for the drug war in Colombia (which, incidentally, protects its operations there), Occidental has been unable to get permission to resume operating in Libya. As the prospects for the return of U.S. oil companies to Libya continue to dim, Occidental risks the loss of its Libyan holdings. Should the Libyan government ever implement its September 2001 ultimatum that Occidental and the other four U.S. companies with oil interests in Libya resume operations there, they would face the revocation of their concessions.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967); LIBYA; PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS; PETROLEUM RESERVES AND PRODUCTION; QADDAFI, MUAMMAR AL-; SUEZ CANAL.

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MARY ANN TÉTREAULT

OCTOBER

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES

OGLU

See GLOSSARY

OIL EMBARGO (1973–1974)

Arab nations' reduced oil production in response to the Arab-Israel War of 1973.

Members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) decided in late October 1973 to cut oil production by 25 percent until Israel withdrew to the 1949 armistice lines. OAPEC also decided to cut off oil to the United States and the Netherlands to protest U.S. military and Dutch political support for Israel. Exempted from the boycott were France, Spain, Muslim countries, and Great Britain (conditionally). The remaining countries divided whatever oil was left between them. The result was a fourfold increase in the price of oil. The embargo was lifted in March 1974.

See also ORGANIZATION OF ARAB PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OAPEC).

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BRYAN DAVES

OLIVES

See FOOD: OLIVES

OMAN

Arabian Peninsula sultanate formerly known as Muscat and Oman.

Oman, officially the Sultanate of Oman since 1970, extends some 1,000 miles along the southeast coast

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of the Arabian Peninsula, on the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. Approximately 118,000 square miles, it has a population of 2,018,074 (1993 census). Oman's long-disputed southern border with Yemen and its western borders with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and the maritime northern border with Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, have all been largely negotiated and demarcated.

Physically, Oman in divided into three regions: Ru'us al-Jibal, Oman Proper, and Dhufar. The Ru'us al-Jibal exclave is separated from Oman by a 50-mile corridor of United Arab Emirates territory and is the mountainous tip of the Musandam Peninsula. Oman Proper, including Masira and the Daymaniyat Islands, is characterized by a narrow coastal plain (Batina), a parallel mountain chain (Jabal Hajar) anchored by Jabal al-Akhdar, and along its western limits, a dry gravel plain (al-Dhahira) that blends into the Rub al-Khali desert. Additional

Qabus bin Said became the sultan of Oman in 1970 after ousting his father, Saʿid ibn Taymur. Upon assuming leadership of the country, Qabus instituted a program of extensive modernization, opening up the long-isolated Oman to the rest of the world and adopting a moderate, independent foreign policy. © CORBIS SYGMA. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

desert and gravel plains (Sharqiyya and Wusta) extend to the south. Dhufar, including the Halaniyat (Khuriya Muriyah) Islands, also has parallel regions of a coastal plain, the Qara Mountains, and interior desert. The overall climate is hot, with summer temperatures reaching 120° F; dry inland, the coast is extremely humid. The climate of Dhufar is moderated by summer monsoon rains.

Oman's population is 80 percent Omani Arab, plus a significant South Asian expatriate community. Arabic is the predominant language, but English is used widely. Oman is unique because Ibadi Islam, characterized by its adherence to the principle of an elected religious leader called an imam, is the majority faith. Other Muslims include large Sunni and small Shiʿite minorities, and a small Hindu community. The Muscat capital area, an amalgam of several formerly separate coastal towns adjacent to Muscat, is the major urban center, with 550,000 people. Other cities are Salala, Nizwa, and Suhar.

Oman's modern history began in 1749 when Ahmad ibn Saʿid (1749–1783), founder of its present Al Bu Saʿid dynasty, restored Omani independence from Persian invaders and gained election as imam. Ahmad successfully balanced tribal and religious support while encouraging maritime and commercial expansion, but his successors devoted greater attention to external affairs and abandoned claims to the imamate. Saʿid ibn Sultan Al Bu Saʿid (1804–1856) established the antecedent of today's sultanate by utilizing Muscat as the base for expansion in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf and East Africa to form the western Indian Ocean's leading maritime state. But this proto-sultanate was considered illegitimate by Omanis committed to the imamate ideal. Periodic interventions by the Saʿudis aggravated the internal instability, and Saʿid often ran afoul of his British allies' efforts to suppress both the slave trade and piracy, the latter a consequence of Saʿid's expansionism. With his options in Arabia thwarted, Saʿid made Zanzibar his principal residence in the 1830s. Following Saʿid's death in 1856, the British recognized separate Al Bu Saʿid sultanates in Muscat and Zanzibar. Long-simmering Omani opposition to political conditions peaked with the election of Azzan ibn Qays (1868–1871), leader of an Al Bu Saʿid cadet branch, as imam, and the unification of Oman under his rule. The British government utilized gunship diplomacy to overthrow the imamate and restore the sultanate. Muscat became a thinly veiled British protectorate. Support for the imamate remained strong and continued to grow as a consequence of the disruptive influences of economic globalization in the late nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century the imamate reappeared in Oman's interior but failed to overthrow the British-defended sultanate. In 1920 the rival Omani governments signed the so-called Treaty of Sib and regularized the conditions under which they coexisted for the next thirty-five years. Saʿid ibn Taymur Al Bu Saʿid (1932–1970) signaled Muscat's revival by diminishing British influence, suppressing the imamate, and reuniting Oman in 1957, then initiating exploitation of its oil resources. But his opposition to socioeconomic development led to widespread disaffection, a rebellion in Dhufar, and greater de-

Due to the country's 1,700 km of coastline, fishing is a fast-developing commercial industry in Oman. Since the early 1990s, the government has been investing substantially in this sector, building new harbors, granting fishermen subsidies to purchase boats, and constructing cold stores and processing facilities. © Jon Hicks/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

pendence on the British. In July 1970 Qabus (also Qaboos) ibn Saʿid deposed his father. The new sultan ended Oman's long diplomatic isolation, suppressed the insurgency in Dhufar, and launched political and economic reforms.

Oman's political system has evolved from autocracy to nascent democratic system during the past thirty years. The Basic Law of 1996 defines the political system, which has two consultative bodies—an elected Majlis al-Shura and an appointed Council of State. There are no political parties. The sultan continues to be the source of all law. An independent judiciary system was implemented in 2001. In principle, women have full political rights, and they do serve in both consultative bodies and senior government positions.

Until the early 1970s Omanis subsisted upon an agricultural and fishing economy. Oil exports began in 1967 and funded modest economic development under Saʿid ibn Taymur. Those efforts accelerated greatly under Qabus after 1970. Modernized agriculture, livestock, and fishery practices still support about 50 percent of the population, but service jobs (35%) in both the public and private sector have increased dramatically. Industry and commerce (15%) provide other livelihoods. Production of petroleum products, both crude oil and natural gas, dominates the economy, accounting for 70 percent of state revenues and 90 percent of exports, mostly to East Asia. Oman also exports copper and chromite, some industrial goods (mostly clothing), and food products, and it imports machinery, transport, and consumer goods, mainly from Japan, Britain, the United Arab Emirates, and South Asia. Since 1970 the government has developed a comprehensive communication and transportation infrastructure and provided modern education through university level and healthcare facilities for the Omani people.

See also Al Bu Saʿid Family and Tribe of Oman; Al Bu Saʿid, Qabus ibn Saʿid; Al Bu Saʿid, Saʿid ibn Taymur; Dhufar; Majles al-Shura; Muscat; Sib, Treaty of (1920); Zanzibar.

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OMAR, MUHAMMAD (MULLAH)

[1959–]

Afghani leader of the Taliban Movement that ruled most of Afghanistan between 1996 and 2002.

Muhammad Omar was born of Pashtun ethnic heritage in the village of Singesar, near Kandahar, and attended a religious school. He started teaching before finishing his degree but when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, he joined the resistance and commanded a small group of *mujahidin* (also *mojahedin*) (fighters), losing an eye in one of the confrontations with the Soviet military. After the

withdrawal of the Soviet Union, he went back to teaching in Kandahar but was driven to start in 1994 a small movement called the Taliban in order to end the crimes and abuses of local strongmen during the Afghani civil war.

Benefiting from Pakistani endorsement and help and initial Pashtun grassroots support, he managed to recruit a number of former *mujahidin* trained for the most part in the schools set up in the refugee camps in Pakistan and by 1998 had taken control of most of Afghanistan. Affected by a history of war and foreign oppression and motivated by a strong devotion to Islam, the Taliban's ideology was influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Pakistani Jamaati Islami, focusing on fighting Western occupation and intervention, and seeking to establish an Islamic State. Reclusive and autocratic, Omar directed the movement with a small number of associates and adopted an increasingly strict interpretation of his cultural and religious heritage, resorting to a repressive control of Afghan society, restricting the work and education of women, and ordering the destruction of ancient Buddhist statues deemed idolatrous.

Though at first mostly concerned with Afghani issues, the Taliban became more involved with pan-Islamism with the increased presence of non-Afghani Muslims, including Osama bin Ladin, who provided them with funds and support. After the 11 September 2001 attacks on U.S. targets, the Taliban refused U.S. demands for the extradition of bin Ladin. As a result, the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2002 and dispersed the Taliban, whose leaders went into hiding.

See also BIN LADIN, OSAMA; TALIBAN.

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MAYSAM J. AL FARUQI

OMAR MUKHTAR CLUB

Cyrenaican (Libyan) political organization.

The club was founded in 1943 by younger men advocating an independent and unitary Libya. It became increasingly critical of the British military administration and older leaders cooperating with it. By 1949, it had accepted that a federation of the provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan was an essential feature of Libyan independence.

JOHN L. WRIGHT

OMDURMAN

Historical capital of the Sudan.

Although Khartoum is the official capital of the Sudan, Omdurman is the country's historic, cultural, and spiritual capital. It is also part of a tri-city metropolitan area (with Khartoum and Khartoum North) that forms the country's political, industrial, and commercial heart. Originally an insignificant fishing village on the west bank at the confluence of the Blue Nile and the White Nile, Omdurman became a major city at the end of the nineteenth century when Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi made it his military headquarters in 1884. After the Mahdist forces destroyed Khartoum (1885), the Mahdi's successor, Khalifa Abdullah, made Omdurman his capital, and the city grew as the site of the Mahdi's tomb. The Battle of Karari (1898), which took place near Omdurman, marked the defeat of the Mahdist state in Sudan by the Anglo-Egyptian army of Lord Kitchener. Although most of the city was destroyed after the battle, the Mahdi's tomb has been restored and embellished. The Khalifa's former residence is now a museum. Recently, Omdurman has grown rapidly, and has an estimated population of well over two million. The major Sudanese political groups have their headquarters in the city, as do the television and radio networks and the famous soccer and cultural clubs. Although the official headquarters of the army is in Khartoum, the principal military installations are in Omdurman, including those of Sudan's air force.

See also AHMAD, MUHAMMAD; KHARTOUM; KITCHENER, HORATIO HERBERT; *MAHDI*.

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OPIUM

Papaver somniferum, the air-dried, milky juice obtained from incisions to the unripe seed pods of the poppy plant.

Opium is a powerful analgesic of mixed blessings. It is one of the richest sources of many useful medicinal alkaloids, such as codeine, morphine, and papaverine. But repeated and extensive use of it and its derivatives—most notoriously heroin—are known to cause severe addiction.

The poppy plant grows wild just about everywhere in the plains of Asia and the Mediterranean, and by the late medieval period there are references to opium use in various parts of the Middle East, as both a medicine and a narcotic. The escalation of opium production and trade seems to have been closely linked to burgeoning European colonial and commercial interests in Asia, and official international controls of opium trafficking, cultivation, and consumption are a twentieth-century phenomenon. The United States spearheaded this effort with an international conference convened by President Theodore Roosevelt in Singapore in 1909. This was followed by a series of conventions held in The Hague, culminating in the convention of 1912.

Despite international initiatives undertaken during the twentieth century, Middle Eastern countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey still produce a substantial portion of the world's opium supply. In Afghanistan in particular, precarious living conditions and geopolitical developments caused its production of opium to skyrocket during the 1990s, making it the world's largest opium producer. As of 2003, most of the drug of Afghan origin is reportedly distributed northward through the neighboring countries of Central Asia, with Europe as its final destination.

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ORAN

Largest urban center in western Algeria (estimated pop. 693,000, 1998).

On a bay of the Mediterranean Sea, Oran is the administrative, commercial, and educational hub of the petrochemical complex of Arzew-Bethioua (50 km [30 mi.] to the east).

Oran was founded in 903 C.E. by Muslim merchants from Andalusia searching for an alternative port to Ceuta on the West African gold route. The waters of the Ra's al-Ayn river supported the foundation of a sizable walled city with a citadel (qasaba, or Casbah). Muslim CORSAIRS succeeded the merchants at the end of the fourteenth century, then were ousted in 1509 by Christian Spaniards. The Ottomans fiercely opposed Spain's expansion and incorporated Algeria into their empire, but it was only in 1791 that Turkish troops wrested Oran from the Spanish.

The French entered western Algeria in 1831 and occupied Oran, which had some 3,000 Muslim and Jewish inhabitants. European settlers far outnumbered Muslim rural migrants prior to World War I; it was only after World War II that the indigenous population rose to about 40 percent of a total of 413,000 inhabitants.

In the 1840s a canal system and a safe port with breakwaters were constructed. Administrative, commercial, and cultural functions shifted from the Muslim city to the east, along an east-west axis. The Muslim population was forcibly removed in 1845 to its own quarter in the south, resulting in de facto segregation of European settlers and Muslims well into the twentieth century. An urban streetcar system and a main train depot were in place around the turn of the century, an airport was constructed in the 1920s, and paved streets appeared by the 1930s.

During the colonial period Oran was the leading exporter of agricultural goods (red wine, olive oil, soft wheat, citrus, artichokes, tobacco, esparto,



Oran, Algeria's second largest city, was founded in 937 C.E. and is the birthplace of Nobel prize–winning author Albert Camus. **© MARC GARANGER/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

wool, and leather). There was little interest in industrialization; apart from mostly small construction and food-processing enterprises, two steelworks were financed by foreign capital. Trade disruptions during World War II encouraged the establishment of import-substitution industries (bottles, containers, cement, and hardware), but these struggled to survive after the war. The Plan of Constantinople (1958), with which France sought to jump-start industrialization in response to the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), created jobs in public works projects but did not enlarge the industrial sector.

After independence Algeria's government embarked on a gigantic program of state industrialization. In 1967 the Oran region was selected to become the main center for the exportation of hydrocarbons and the production of industrial chemicals. These basic industries were supplemented with factories for agricultural machinery and consumer goods. Private investment went primarily into the textile, plastic, food-processing, metalworking and footwear sectors. By the early 1980s the industrial base had grown to 112 state and 284 private businesses with 10 or more employees and total workforces of 32,000 (state) and 10,000 (private).

When the European settlers left Algeria in 1962, they abandoned close to two-thirds of the housing stock of Oran. By 1970 housing was scarce, however, and during the 1970s and 1980s some 12,000 new apartments (about a quarter of what was needed) were constructed. In spite of the periodic razing of shantytowns and the forced return of the inhabitants to their villages of origin, by the mid-1980s about one-third of the rural population had permanently settled in Oran and the other cities of the industrial region. The rural migrants who flooded the city found jobs primarily in construction, low levels of administration, retail, private industry, and the informal sector. Jobs in state industries typically were open only to qualified older workers.

Given the lack of convenient housing, the commute between residence and workplace often is as far as 30 miles (50 km), mostly by public bus or company van. Nearly half of Oran's industrial workforce works outside the city. The new suburbs require additional trips for shopping and entertainment, given the continued concentration of retail shops, services, and entertainment in the city center. On the other hand, many local and regional administrative offices, a new technical university, and vocational colleges have been moved to the suburbs, evening out the distribution of traffic.

In the center of Oran there has been a proliferation of bars, most of which sell coffee and tea. During the interwar period, they were the birthplace of rai, a music of bedouin immigrants that has become Algeria's rock 'n' roll. Also, the mixture of apartment buildings and small commercial and crafts establishments, typical of European inner cities prior to World War II, is still largely intact. Traditional food, clothing, and kitchenware shops

are clustered in downtown Oran, and Medina Jadida (a kilometer to the south).

In downtown Oran, upscale residences, professional practices, airline offices, banks, restaurants, and furniture, jewelry, perfume, leather, and record shops coexist with less expensive apartment buildings, retail businesses, and bars as well as mechanical and electrical repair shops (the latter mostly on the periphery). The inner city is no longer the place where established families and rural migrants are neighbors, as was the case in the 1960s, but they still share the same neighborhoods.

The cancellation of the first national elections in 1992 and the return to de facto military rule slowed the process of devolution. In the struggle between the military and Islamists during the 1990s, Oran experienced less violence and terrorism than did Algiers; yet the paralysis was severe. Security under President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, inaugurated in 1999, has improved.

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Peter von Sivers

ORDINANCES ON VEILING

Prohibitions on women in Afghanistan.

The pamphlet *Shariʿa Ordinances on Veiling (Fatawa-i-Sharaʿi dar Mawrid-i-Hijab)* was issued in 1994 by the Afghan Supreme Court *(Stera Mahkama)* during the Islamic Government of Burhanuddin Rabbani (1992–1996). The pamphlet was signed by sixteen members of the Bureau of Jurisdiction and Deliberation *(Riyasat-i-Ifta wa al-Mutaliʿat)* of the Supreme Court. The last paragraph reads in part: "The Afghan nation fought for fourteen years and suffered enormous losses in order to free the country from the hands of the atheist [Communists] and reinstate Divine Ordinances. Now that this objective has been fulfilled by the Grace of the Almighty, . . . we urge that God's ordinances be carried out immediately, particularly those pertaining to the veiling of women. Women should be banned from working in offices and radio and television stations. Girls schools, which are in effect the hub of debauchery and adulterous practices, must be closed down. . . ." The ordinances required women to cover their face outside the home and not to leave their home without having a compelling reason and first obtaining their husband's permission. The wearing of noisy shoes, anklets, perfume, or any other embellishment that might attract a man's attention was prohibited. These ordinances were precursors to similar decrees issued later by the Taliban.

See also Afghanistan; Clothing; Gender: Gender and Law; Taliban.

Senzil Nawid

ORGANISATION ARMÉE SECRÈTE (OAS)

A movement of French colons and renegade army officers that sought to block Algeria's independence.

The Secret Army Organization (Organisation Armée Secrète; OAS) was created in February 1961 under the leadership of Colon activists Pierre Lagaillarde and Jean-Jacques Susini. Its military leadership was provided by Generals Raoul Salan, Marie-André Zeller, Edmond Jouhaud, and—for a short time—Maurice Challe.

In April 1961, under Challe's leadership, the OAS attempted a coup in Algiers that appeared for a short time to threaten the metropolitan government as well. When the coup failed, the movement adopted a policy of undermining government authority by bombings and by assassinations of officials, of liberal intellectuals, and prominent Muslim leaders. As the Evian negotiations proceeded, the organization switched to a campaign of terror against Muslims in general, and finally, after France agreed to independence, to a "scorched earth" policy of massive destruction of infrastructure. On 17 June 1962, the OAS signed a cease-fire with the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN: National Liberation Front).

See also Algerian War of Independence; Colons.

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John Ruedy

ORGANISATION MAROCAINE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME

Moroccan human rights organization.

The Moroccan Human Rights Organization (OMDH) was founded in 1988 by a group of Moroccan professionals to address the problem of human rights violations in the kingdom. Prior to the establishment of the OMDH, the Istiqlal Party had founded the Ligue Marocaine de Défense des Droits de l'Homme (Moroccan League for the Defense of Human Rights) in 1972, and the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (Socialist Union of Popular Forces, USFP) had established the Association Marocaine des Droits de l'Homme (Moroccan Association of Human Rights) in 1979. The OMDH planned its first congress for May 1988. Initially banned by the government because of its "extremist" membership, the OMDH was finally allowed to hold its inaugural assembly at Agdal (Rabat), in December 1988. The presidency has been held by Omar Azziman (1988–1989); Khalid Naciri (1990–1991); Ali Oumlil (1991–1992); Abdelaziz Bennani (1992–2000), and Abdellah Oualladi (2000–).

Among the goals of the organization are the diffusion of knowledge about individual and collective human rights at the civil, political, cultural, and socioeconomic levels; the protection of human rights; the reinforcement of the rights of the individual during the judiciary process; the consolidation of an independent judiciary and its impartiality; the consolidation of democracy and the rule of the law; and the promotion of international solidarity in the defense of human rights. The OMDH is a member of the International Federation of Human Rights, based in Paris; the International Commission of Jurists, based in Geneva; the World Organization against Torture, based in Geneva; and the Arab Organization of Human Rights, based in Cairo. The organization periodically cooperates with international and regional organizations, such as the Association Marocaine des Droits Humains, the Ligue Marocaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme, and the Comité de Défense des Droits Humaines.

The OMDH's initial focus on abuses of prisoners' rights led the government to release over one thousand prisoners by the end of 1989. In response to published OMDH reports, King Hassan II founded the Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l'Homme (Consultative Council of Human Rights). The creation of a Ministry of Human Rights in November 1993 was interpreted as a new attempt on the part of the government to neutralize the work of the existing human rights organizations. Disturbances in late 1990 sparked renewed activism on the part of OMDH in 1991, which continued into 1992 and 1993. To its earlier agenda of concern with issues of torture, the disappeared, and prison conditions, the OMDH added passport denials, violations of travel freedom, an independent judiciary, and press controls as points of contention with the government.

The OMDH publishes a magazine, *al-Karama,* and OMDH materials often appear in the publications of other organizations, such as the Rassemblement Nationale des Indépendants (National Rally of Independents), the former Communist paper *al-Bayan* (The clarion), and USFP newspapers.

In February 1993, Mohamed Mikou, secretary-general of the Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l'Homme (CCDH), recommended that the government cooperate with human rights organizations and that King Hassan ratify the U.N. Convention on Torture, to which the king agreed on 14 June 1993; the United Nations acknowledged the Moroccan ratification on 21 July 1993. Amnesty International's April 1993 report on Morocco stated that five hundred people had "disappeared" in Morocco since 1963. It named secret detention centers and provided a list of forty-eight Sahrawi prisoners who had died in detention between 1976 and 1990.

The death of King Hassan II and the enthronement of King Muhammad VI in July 1999 was received with a certain level of hope by the progressive sectors of the country. In 1999, the OMDH called on international human rights organizations to form a fact-finding mission to investigate human rights abuses in the Lahmada refugee camps of Tinduf, stronghold of POLISARIO. In 2001, the OMDH denounced governmental repression against the Moroccan Association National des Diplomés Chômeurs (Association of Unemployed College-Degree Holders). Following a month of street mobilizations, the OMDH joined other Moroccan human rights organizations in denouncing the "disappearance" of individuals suspected of having links

with al-Qaʿida in December, 2002. The OMDH has opposed the sentencing to three years of imprisonment of Moroccan journalist Ali Mrabet, director of the French language publication *Demain* and its Arabic counterpart *Duman,* for the publication in a Catalonian newspaper of several cartoons critical of the Moroccan monarch; the organization continues to demand a full investigation of the "disappearances" and during the 1990s and beyond has focused on the abuses in Moroccan prisons. It has also criticized human rights abuses in the Republic of Tunisia under the Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali government. In January 2003, the OMDH issued a statement condemning the U.S. military attack against Iraq as an action that contravened international law.

See also Ben Ali, Zayn al-Abidine; Istiqlal Party: Morocco; POLISARIO; Rassemblement National des Indépendants (RNI); Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP).

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ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE OCCUPIED SOUTH

Yemeni independence group, founded 1965.

Created through a merger of organizations and leading personalities in North and South Yemen (including Muhammad Ahmad Nuʿman, Abdullah Ali Asnaj, and Muhammad Ali Jifri), the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS) was originally a rival of the National Liberation Front (NLF) but later joined elements of the NLF to create the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY). Not long thereafter, the NLF insisted on its independence, and the two organizations were again rivals. Members of the al-Jifri family later became prominent in the operations and governance of the Yemeni Socialist Party, until exiled after the Yemeni civil war of 1994.

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Manfred W. Wenner

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)

An alliance of African states (known as OAU) formed for mutual support in economics, self-government, and security.

In May 1963, the OAU was founded at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, by thirty-two African states, including Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Libya, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, and Sudan. Devoted to issues such as colonialism, economic development, and mutual security, the OAU, like most multistate coalitions, has had limited success in transforming its ideals into reality. Although the OAU was an active supporter of liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe, it had difficulty providing more than moral and diplomatic encouragement; in intra-African conflicts, such as that over the Western Sahara, the OAU has found itself in a quandary. The Arab states of the Maghrib (North Africa) have been and continue to be its ardent members.

Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser pressured the OAU to his side in his stand against Israel, so through the 1960s, the OAU moved gradually toward the Arab camp. In 1971, the OAU issued a strong resolution criticizing Israel's handling of the Palestinian issue. By the end of 1973, all but four (Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and Mauritius) of the OAU member states had broken relations with Israel. The Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel (1979) caused a slow process of renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel—Zaire was first in 1982.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

ORGANIZATION OF ARAB PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OAPEC)

Organization formed to promote cooperation among Arab oil-producing states.

The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) is a regional organization, established in 1968 by Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait, and modeled after the older Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The other members are Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Qatar, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. Egypt was suspended between 1979 and 1987. Tunisia withdrew in 1986. The goals of OAPEC are to promote the oil interests of member countries, to enhance cooperation among them in production, marketing, and associated industries. It aims also to carry out joint ventures to diversify their economies, to participate in stabilizing the oil market, and to provide suitable circumstances for capital and experience to be invested in the member countries. Although OAPEC was not intended as a political instrument, one of the critical decisions taken by member states in 1973, at its Kuwait headquarters, was the oil embargo following the Arab-Israel War. Since that time, OAPEC oil and gas world share has been steady at about 25 percent, with significant increases mainly by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to compensate for the two-thirds reduction of Iraq's share since 1990. OAPEC proven oil reserves have not increased. By 2010 OAPEC oil production may increase by 50 percent to 30 million barrels per day, to meet about one-third of world needs. OAPEC capacity utilization, already high at 85 percent, may increase to above 90 percent. As of 2003, OAPEC share of worldwide natural gas production stood at 35 percent; it may double by 2010.

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UPDATED BY KARIM HAMDY

ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC)

Group formed in 1960 to protect economic interests of oil-exporting countries.

In the early 1950s, international oil companies (IOCs) developed the posted price system to help host governments estimate oil revenues in advance. Posted prices were accounting devices that host governments used to calculate the amount of taxes the companies would pay under industrywide fifty-fifty profit-sharing agreements. Despite normal fluctuations in the real prices at which crude oil was traded, posted prices were not adjusted, and fixed posted prices became an industry norm. When competitive pressures forced the IOCs to reduce posted prices unilaterally in February 1959, an immediate outcry arose from the affected host governments.

OPEC's Founding

The first Arab Oil Congress met later that year. Delegates from oil-exporting countries came to plan concerted action against the oil companies. Structural differences among national oil industries made coordination among these countries difficult technically. Conflicts of interest over investment and production shares made coordination difficult politically. Competition between Venezuela and Middle Eastern exporters was heightened by the 1959 posted price cuts. British Petroleum set lower prices

in parts of the Middle East than in Venezuela in hope of breaking the As-Is Agreement, a mediated connection between world oil prices and the U.S. market. Venezuelan oil thereby became even less competitive, requiring further downward price adjustments and convincing oil exporters that their responses to the companies had to be closely coordinated.

Political conflicts ended the Oil Consultation Commission, the first producer attempt to institutionalize coordination. But when the IOCs imposed yet another round of price cuts in August 1960, five oil-exporting countries set aside their political differences to salvage their economic interests. Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait formed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in September 1960. OPEC's first resolutions included calls to restore posted prices to their pre-February 1959 levels and to stabilize oil prices by regulating production.

The U.S. government refused to recognize OPEC, forbade U.S. oil companies to negotiate with it, and imposed trade sanctions on OPEC members to discourage other countries from joining. This suited the IOCs, which saw an advantage in continuing their accustomed practice of dealing with host governments one at a time. OPEC responded creatively, developing joint negotiating positions with the understanding that any member able to gain an additional advantage on its own should do so. Any gains would constitute a new floor for bargaining in the next round. During its first ten years, this "leapfrogging" earned OPEC members incremental gains in oil revenues, which both increased OPEC's international stature and attracted new members to the organization.

Perhaps OPEC's most significant contribution to the oil revolution was its support and implementation of "participation," the gradual nationalization of foreign-owned oil properties. Most members did not follow the participation strategy to the letter, but years of discussion provided an opportunity to prepare for the responsibilities that would come when they became full owners of their oil industries. This accomplishment was overshadowed, however, by OPEC's successful utilization of leapfrogging to achieve rapid oil price increases, by Libya in 1970 and afterward by alternating pressure exerted first by oil-exporting countries in the Mediterranean and then in the Persian Gulf. This set the stage for OPEC's takeover of crude oil pricing when the 1973 Arab–Israel War, with its well-designed Arab oil embargo, provided the opportunity.

Pricing Strategies

OPEC's success in taking over oil pricing created new problems for the group. Oil-importing countries, led by the United States, demonized OPEC as the primary cause of worldwide economic decline. Inside OPEC, structural differences among member industries led to disagreements over pricing strategies. Low-price-preference members such as Saudi Arabia, with small populations and huge oil reserves, favored moderate oil prices to discourage consumers from seeking alternative fuels. High-price-preference members like Algeria, with large populations, wanted high prices so they could pay for ambitious development programs, while their small reserves offered no incentive to support pricing policies that would sustain the long-term attractiveness of oil as a fuel. Some members with large reserves, like Iran and Libya, also favored high prices. Iran had a large population and an ambitious development program, but Libya's preference was politically motivated by Libya's desire to assert its autonomy among its OPEC peers as well as its independence from western domination.

Price positions could be flexible, however. In 1978, the threat of revolution pushed Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran to seek allies among his neighbors. Iran joined most of the Arab gulf countries in pushing for the adoption of a long-range moderate pricing strategy to replace what had, until then, been an ad hoc method of setting oil prices. The new system became obsolete almost before it was agreed upon, however; it was superseded by pressures that doubled oil prices in one year thanks to panic buying during the Iranian Revolution. Predictably, oil demand fell, but the availability of new, non-OPEC supplies from the North Sea and elsewhere allowed major importers to shift their purchases, making OPEC the marginal supplier of crude oil to the world market.

Market weakness in the early 1980s caused OPEC to focus on oil production sharing as a strategy for controlling oil prices by regulating crude

supply. A voluntary production-sharing plan was launched in 1982 but, as had happened to the voluntary oil import quota in the United States during the 1950s, producers ignored it. A mandatory quota system was introduced in March 1983, and crude prices were reduced for the first time since OPEC had assumed its price-setting role in the hope of stimulating consumer demand. An Austrian accounting firm was hired to monitor member production in order to discourage cheating on the quotas.

The quota system had many flaws. Even small producers were required to accept a quota, prompting Ecuador to leave OPEC in 1993 to escape its quota obligations. Saudi Arabia, OPEC's largest producer, refused to accept a formal quota that it said was an unacceptable infringement on its sovereignty. This marginalized Saudi production within OPEC as crude from many sources flooded the market and total demand for OPEC oil declined. Without a quota and its implied entitlement to produce a defined share of OPEC crude, the Saudis had to accept the informal role of swing producer, one which would vary its production to satisfy market demand remaining after other producers had supplied their quota amounts. As OPEC's swing producer, however, Saudi Arabia would have to absorb more than a proportional share of demand reduction. This already unpleasant situation would be complicated in the Saudi case by its heavy dependence on associated natural gas, which led to shortages of fuel for power generation when oil production there fell to below 3 million barrels per day in mid-1985. Shortly afterward, Saudi Arabia decided to produce oil with only its own needs in mind. Global supplies burgeoned and oil prices plummeted, dipping below $10 U.S. per barrel in June 1986. Although oil prices recovered, they have yet to return to pre-1985 highs.

Political Divisions

Political conflicts continued to divide OPEC members during this time. The first Gulf War, between Iran and Iraq (1980–1988), so split the organization that OPEC could not agree on a new secretary-general when it was Iran's turn to nominate one of its nationals. An assistant secretary-general, Fadhil al-Chalabi of Iraq, served as acting secretary-general from 1983 to 1988. Hostility among members during this period made meetings acrimonious and reduced the usefulness of OPEC as a forum for coordinating policy.

The end of the Iran–Iraq War provided an opportunity to mend intra-OPEC relations, but the second Gulf War, which began when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, brought new turmoil to oil markets and to OPEC itself. Before Iraq invaded Kuwait, world oil prices were depressed and virtually every OPEC member with excess production capacity was producing over its quota. Unfortunately for Kuwait, it was the only country small enough and close enough to suffer Iraq's wrath directly. After Kuwait was liberated in February 1991, U.N. sanctions against Iraq, imposed in retaliation for the invasion, ended legal oil exports from Iraq. Starting in December 1996, Iraqi income from smuggled oil was augmented by earnings from the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program, which supervised the marketing of some 3.4 billion barrels of Iraqi crude between the start of the program and March 2003, when the United States and Britain invaded Iraq. The United Nations also ensured that the Iraqi share of oil-for-food income was spent only to meet humanitarian needs. The rest went for war reparations (25 percent after December 2000, 30 percent before), the cost of U.N. weapons inspections (0.8 percent), and administrative and operational costs for the program (2.2 percent).

Overproduction by OPEC members remains a problem during periods of ample crude supplies, but political turmoil and consequent supply disruptions in member countries, from Venezuela and Nigeria to Iraq and Indonesia, have masked the problem of excess capacity by creating or even merely threatening war-related shortages. Yet members able to do so are expanding production capacity, which will add to conflict over production ceilings and quota allocations as growing supplies from Iraq come to the market.

Overall, OPEC's difficulties in managing and stabilizing the international oil market continue to be beyond member control. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new Central Asian countries offered attractive terms to potential investors in oil and gas exploration and development. Now rising production from this region adds to pressures on the price structure. The need for capital invest-

ment is another axis of competition pitting OPEC against Central Asian and non-OPEC African producers, leading many OPEC members to reconsider their positions on nationalization. IOC operations are expanding in virtually every OPEC nation, while the occupation of Iraq could leave a privatized Iraqi oil industry as one of its legacies.

OPEC's gravest failure has been its concentration on oil market conditions rather than on the economy as such. Consequently, it has failed to develop strategies to prepare members for a post-oil world. As long as prices are low and supplies seem secure, oil will remain a competitive fuel in global markets and the deep restructuring necessary to wean member economies from their addiction to oil revenues can be avoided. Yet whether post-Saddam Iraq will be reintegrated into OPEC or not, relying on hydrocarbon revenues as the mainstay of their economies leaves members vulnerable not only to the day-to-day vagaries of the market but also to the impact of long-term structural change. The almost exclusive concentration of governments, press, and public on oil pricing actually prevents OPEC from devoting significant intellectual and financial resources to other aspects of industry development, including research on alternative sources of energy for export and domestic use. Kuwait's early research into solar power, for example, was quickly abandoned as its oil reserves expanded and reliance on oil revenues seemed less risky than devoting substantial resources to bringing a competing energy source to markets where it already had an advantage. Yet with concerns about pollution and global climate change encouraging consumers to shift out of hydrocarbons, OPEC members' acute dependence on oil and gas revenues leaves their economic security as vulnerable to changes in market structure as they are to political conflict.

See also As-Is Agreement; Oil Embargo (1973–1974); Petroleum, Oil, and Natural Gas.

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Mary Ann Tétreault

ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

Organization founded in 1972 by Islamic states to promote their cooperation by coordinating economic, social, scientific, and cultural activities.

As a response to the August 1969 burning of the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, the first Islamic Conference of Kings an d Heads of State was convened in Rabat in September of the same year. This summit resolved that Islamic nation states should foster "close cooperation and mutual assistance in the economic, scientific, cultural, and spiritual fields." As a first step toward facilitating such cooperation, the summit established the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, which eventually ratified the charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) at its third meeting in March 1972. Membership in the OIC is based on a commitment to the United Nations and its declarations on human rights, as well as an affirmation of the fundamental principles of mutual equality, respect for sovereignty, and the peaceful settlement of disputes among member states. The charter also enumerates the following principal objectives: the promotion of global Islamic solidarity; the eradication of racial discrimination and colonialism; the liberation of Palestine; support for the struggles of oppressed Muslim peoples everywhere; and a dedication to international peace, security, and justice.

Four specialized institutions have been established within the framework of the OIC: the Islamic Development Bank; the Islamic Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Islamic States Broadcasting Organization; and the International Islamic News Agency. The general secretariat of the OIC has permanent observer status at the United Nations and maintains its headquarters in Jidda, Saudi Arabia. The Doha Declaration (November 2000) called for an end to the occupation

in Palestine and invited those member states that had established relations with the State of Israel to "put an end to all forms of normalization with Israel until it genuinely and accurately implements U.N. resolutions relevant to the issue of Palestine." The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on International Terrorism, issued during the extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in April 2002, rejected "any attempt to link Islam and Muslims to terrorism" and condemned acts of international terrorism, emphasizing "the importance of addressing the root causes of international terrorism." The following states were members of the OIC as of August 2003: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei Dar es Salaam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana (Republic of), Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Surinam, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and Zanzibar. Three countries held observer status: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, and Thailand.

See also JERUSALEM.

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SCOTT ALEXANDER
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ORIENTALISM

The study and exploration of the Orient by Occidentals.

The word *orientalism* derives from the Latin *oriens,* which means "east." The idea of a cultural division between East and West, between the Orient and the Occident (from the Latin *occidens,* which means "west"), goes back to Greco-Roman times, where in texts as diverse as Herodotus's *Histories* or Varro's *On the Latin Language* distinctions were made between Asia and Europe, which corresponded to Orient and Occident. Throughout the Middle Ages, there was a growing perception of a distinction between a civilization that was the heir of the Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman traditions (the West) and one that was the heir of the Indian and Chinese religious traditions (the East). The Islamic civilization of the Middle East fits uncomfortably into this polarity.

Even though the East and West, whatever cultural labels one may assign to them, were in contact through trade, exploration, and cultural and intellectual exchange and military activity from early Roman times, and even though they shared economic, cultural, intellectual, artistic, and religious influence, the idea of orientalism took root during the late Middle Ages, with the Portuguese voyages of discovery during the late fifteenth century, and developed through the nineteenth century. From that point on, Western explorers, scholars, writers, artists, and, ultimately, colonial administrators undertook to study, represent artistically, govern, and economically exploit the East. Traditional orientalism focused on the literary and scholarly results of that enterprise and included grammars, dictionaries, encyclopedias, texts, translations, travel accounts, novels, and paintings. The most important study of this process is that of Raymond Schwab. The artistic extension of orientalism is the school of orientalist painters, a group of nineteenth-century, mostly academic, painters, predominantly French, English, and German, who focused on real and imagined scenes of Middle Eastern exoticism in their work.

The field of orientalism changed radically with the 1978 publication of *Orientalism,* by Edward W. Said. Said, although focusing solely on the Islamic Middle East, exposed orientalism as a colonialist enterprise, "a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient" (p. 15). His work has exercised a vast influence over the field of cultural studies and has been applied by scholars in the other fields of traditional orientalist studies, including India, China, Japan and Southeast Asia.

See also NERVAL, GÉRARD DE; SAID, EDWARD.

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JOHN M. LUNDQUIST

ORIENTALISTS, INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF

A group whose meetings were devoted to the spread of learning in Oriental subjects.

Initiated in Paris in 1873, these periodic meetings of scholars—dedicated, as one scholar put it, to "the propagation of the knowledge of the History, Languages and Civilizations of Oriental people among Western Nations"—represented the academic profession of Orientalism as it was recognized in nineteenth-century Europe. Few non-Europeans attended the early meetings, and no meetings were held outside Europe until the fourteenth congress was held in Algiers in 1905. Papers on Asian and African topics of all sorts, but primarily focusing on philology and archaeology, were presented in sessions organized by geographical region or language family. The small size of the academic community concerned with Asia and Africa is indicated by the fact that the number of members, on all topics combined, remained in the hundreds throughout the nineteenth century. Some members, however, attended as representatives of national Oriental societies. Congress proceedings were normally published. The work of the International Congress of Orientalists is carried on by the International Congress of Asian and North African Studies.

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ORMANIAN, MAGHAKIA

[1841–1918]

Armenian clergyman and scholar; Armenian patriarch of Constantinople, 1896–1908.

Born in Istanbul, Ormanian was sent to seminary in Rome (1851) and was subsequently ordained a Roman Catholic priest. In 1877 he left the Roman Catholic Church to join the Armenian Apostolic Church. He was ordained a celibate priest in 1879 by Nerses Vazhapetian, Armenian patriarch of Constantinople, who employed his linguistic skills to prepare appeals to embassies and foreign governments concerning the situation of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. In 1880 Ormanian was elected primate of Erzurum, and in 1887 he became a teacher of theology at Echmiadzin in Russian Armenia. Banished by the czarist government for his political views, in 1889 Ormanian became the dean of the seminary of Armash, near İzmir.

Ormanian was appointed Armenian patriarch of Constantinople in 1896, just after a series of mass killings attributed to the policies of Sultan Abdülhamit II had been unleashed against the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire. As religious leader of the Armenians, Ormanian steered a cautious course during an era of repression. This brought him much animosity from radical elements in the Armenian community who opposed policies of the sultan. In 1908, during the Young Turk revolution, he was removed from office.

Thereafter, Ormanian devoted his time to writing one of the great works of Armenian historical scholarship. His three-volume *Azgapatum* (National history; 1912 to 1927) is an exhaustive Armenian ecclesiastical history. In 1914 Ormanian entered the Armenian monastery of St. James in Jerusalem. He was exiled to Damascus in 1917 by the Young Turk regime and died a year later in Istanbul.

ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

ORMSBY-GORE, WILLIAM GEORGE ARTHUR

[1885–1964]

British colonial official, also known as Lord Harlech.

In 1918 William George Arthur Ormsby-Gore went to Palestine as assistant political officer for the

Zionist Commission. In April of that year he defended the Balfour Declaration, but urged restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchases because of growing indigenous impoverishment. In a speech in London in August 1918, however, Ormsby-Gore asserted that the indigenous population west of the Jordan River was not Arab and that the real Arab national movement lay outside of Palestine with Prince Faisal of the Hijaz (now part of Saudi Arabia), who was soon to be named king of Syria.

Ormsby-Gore became the British member of the Permanent Mandates Commission (1921–1922). As Britain's colonial secretary from 1936 to 1938, he rebuffed advocates of the partition of Palestine, and retired from office amid the controversy.

See also Balfour Declaration (1917); Faisal I ibn Hussein; Permanent Mandates Commission; Zionist Commission for Palestine.

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Elizabeth Thompson

ORTAOYUNU

The Ottoman popular theater-in-the-round.

Sometimes described as "karagöz come to life," Ortaoyunu has frequently been compared to the commedia dell'arte because of its improvisational character. An urban entertainment, it was traditionally an open-air presentation performed by an all-male cast in a space encircled by the audience (women separated from men). Performances also were presented in taverns, palaces, and eventually theaters. Scenery was minimal: a chair or table to indicate a shop or booth, and one or two folding screens painted to represent a building, a forest, and so on.

A small group of folk musicians supplied music for dancers who appeared before the main presentation. This was followed by a burlesque dialogue between the two main characters, Pişekâr and Kavuklu, who correspond closely to the shadow play figures Hacivat and Karagöz, respectively. The play might be chosen from the special ortaoyunu repertory or, like karagöz, retell the plot of a well-known romance (Leyla and Mecnun, Ferhat and Şirin, etc.). The presentation was always open in form, however, and rather than a plot, might offer various scenes that entertained while imparting a human or political message.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the improvisational aspect of ortaoyunu inspired the tuluât theater, but attempts (including the staging of Western plays) failed to preserve the Turkish theater-in-the-round as a viable form of entertainment.

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Kathleen R. F. Burrill

OSIRAK

A French-produced nuclear reactor sold to Iraq.

Osirak was originally developed in 1964 as a material-testing reactor. The purchase contract was signed on 17 November 1975; on 13 January 1976, Iraq signed a contract with Italy to purchase "hot cells" used to separate plutonium, which would make the reactor capable of producing fissionable material for an atomic bomb. Construction began in the late 1970s on the outskirts of Baghdad and was supposed to be completed by late 1981. Osirak was destroyed by Israel's air force on 7 June 1981; part of a smaller reactor survived.

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Ronen Zeidel

OSLO ACCORD (1993)

Agreement between Israel and the PLO negotiated secretly in Oslo, Norway, and signed at the White House on 13 September 1993.

In 1993 Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreed to recognize each other, and signed a Declaration of Principles (DOP) providing for Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for five years.

Backdrop to the Accord

The agreement resulted from a convergence of events and trends that created an optimal opportunity for peace between the two parties. The first Intifada (uprising) by the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza against Israel's occupation, which began in December 1987, empowered the PLO, as the Palestinians' representative, to seek a diplomatic settlement with Israel. In 1988 PLO chairman Yasir Arafat recognized Israel, accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, and renounced terrorism. The PLO could not immediately capitalize on these concessions, however, because Israel did not reciprocate. The PLO's position deteriorated due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left the PLO without superpower support. Furthermore, the Israeli government of Yitzhak Shamir adamantly refused to deal with the PLO or to make territorial concessions for peace. Believing that Iraq could help the Palestinian cause, Arafat sided with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf Crisis (1990–1991), and thereby lost the financial support of the Gulf states.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, mass Jewish immigration to Israel, and the destruction of Iraq's army in 1991 enhanced Israel's security, but the Intifada convinced the Israeli Labor and left-of-center parties that continued occupation and repression were deemed costly in terms of international isolation and domestic discord, whereas granting self-government to the Palestinians was gradually viewed as less objectionable.

Moreover, more and more Palestinians and Israelis and their leaders concluded that there was no military solution to their conflict. The PLO had galvanized Palestinians and gained international recognition, but its armed struggle against Israel failed to liberate an inch of Palestine. Even though Israel was considered to be the fourth strongest military power in the world, it could not destroy the PLO or subdue a civilian population of two million in the occupied territories. Both sides concluded that mutual recognition and sharing historic Palestine was the only viable option.

U.S. president George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker III thus had an unprecedented opportunity to broker peace in the Middle East by arranging the Madrid Peace Conference (1991) between Israel and the Arabs, including the Palestinians. When Prime Minister Shamir appeared to be stalling, Bush and Baker withheld a guarantee for a $10 billion loan for Israel. In the next elections in Israel, the public brought to power a moderate coalition, headed by Yitzhak Rabin, with a "territory for peace" policy. But eleven sessions and twenty-two months after Madrid, the negotiations proved unproductive. The PLO regarded the framework for talks as unfair, and did not consider the United States or its middle-range officials to be "honest brokers." Israel realized that Palestinian negotiators from the occupied territories were unwilling or unable to negotiate independently from the PLO.

Norway's foreign ministry arranged for a private, secret channel in Oslo for two Israeli scholars, Yair Hirshfeld and Ron Pundak, who were in touch with Yossi Beilin, Israel's dovish deputy foreign minister, and a PLO economist and aide to Chairman Arafat, Ahmad Sulayman Qurai (Abu Ala). Negotiations began in the winter and spring of 1993. When they progressed, Israel's foreign minister, Shimon Peres, took charge, and convinced security-conscious Prime Minister Rabin to support the agreement. Israel and the PLO initialed two sets of documents in Oslo in late August: an exchange of letters of mutual recognition and the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP).

The Accord and Its Reception

On 9 September 1993 Arafat signed the PLO letter recognizing Israel's right to exist, accepted Security Council Resolution 242, renounced the use of terror and violence, and pledged to remove clauses in the Palestinian Covenant calling for the elimination of Israel. By recognizing Israel, the PLO renounced the Palestinian people's claim to 78 percent of historic Palestine, in which they had lived for centuries. The next day Rabin signed

Pictured left to right are Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, U.S. president Bill Clinton, and Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. In 1993, the three leaders met in Washington to sign the Israeli-PLO peace accord. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Israel's letter, recognizing the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and declaring Israel's intention to negotiate with the PLO. Implicit was Israel's recognition of Palestinian demands for self-determination and independence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The second document, the DOP, which was signed at the White House on 13 September 1993, outlined a five-year plan for Palestinian self-government, starting with Israel's withdrawal of troops from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho, and the transfer of authority over economic development, education and culture, taxes, social welfare, and tourism. This was followed by elections of an interim self-government council. After the second year, negotiations would begin on Jerusalem, refugees of 1948, Jewish settlements, and borders.

Most Israelis and Palestinians were initially approving. Palestinians were disappointed that the most fundamental issues were deferred, but supported the agreement because there was no credible alternative. There were, however, vocal rejectionists in both camps. In Israel, leading figures in the Likud Party such as Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu stated that should they come to power, they would not honor the agreement, and Jewish settlers warned of violent resistance to the removal of settlements. Palestinian radicals initiated deadly violence against settlers and soldiers. Negotiations over implementation of the interim agreement dragged on until another was signed in Cairo in May 1994. Then Israel's troops withdrew and Palestinian police took over in Jericho and the Gaza Strip. Violence by both sides and postponements diminished support for the Oslo Agreement, yet the parties managed to reach a number of partial agreements,

including Oslo II, signed at the White House on 28 September 1995. Oslo II set the stage for Israel's further withdrawal from the West Bank and for Palestinian elections.

With each new agreement, the opponents of a peaceful settlement intensified their violence. HAMAS and Islamic Jihad conducted a number of deadly terrorist acts against Israelis. In Israel, the Likud Party increased its inciteful rhetoric against Prime Minister Rabin, providing Jewish extremists with the climate that resulted in his assassination in November 1995. The new prime minister, Shimon Peres, moved forward with the peace process, but was defeated in May 1996 by the Likud's Benjamin Netanyahu, who capitalized on popular security anxiety caused by a series of deadly terrorist bombings in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Netanyahu initially declined to meet Arafat, and refused to implement the Rabin government's agreement on troop withdrawal. He pursued a hardline policy—much to the disappointment of the administration of U.S. president Bill Clinton—that included the construction of a controversial Jewish settlement at Har Homa (Jamal Abu Ghunaym) on the outskirts of Jerusalem. Although Netanyahu signed in October 1998 the Wye River Memorandum, which mandated further Israeli withdrawal, Oslo continued to unravel. The election of Ehud Barak of the Labor Party gave some hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but negotiations between Barak and Arafat, mediated directly by Clinton at Camp David in July 2000, and indirectly elsewhere, broke down.

The failure of diplomacy and the worsening conditions in the territories resulted in the Aqsa Intifada, which began on 29 September 2000, the day after Ariel Sharon and an Israeli security force of 1,000 visited al-Haram al-Sharif, or Temple Mount. Arafat probably acquiesced to, if not encouraged, the violence in the hope of achieving diplomatic gains he could not get at the negotiating table, but by doing so he broke his promise made at Oslo to end the attacks on Israel. Barak was voted out of office in early 2001 and replaced by Sharon, a hardline member of Likud and an opponent of Oslo. The spiral of violence that followed resulted in the collapse of the Oslo peace process.

Both sides blamed the other for the breakdown. Palestinian officials blamed Clinton and Barak, even though Clinton offered far-reaching parameters on 23 December 2000 that moved the process forward, and Barak made groundbreaking concessions to the Palestinians at Taba, Egypt, in January 2001. Israeli and some U.S. officials, especially Barak and Clinton, blamed Arafat, who had championed a two-state solution for three decades but could not accept the offer at Camp David, which would not have led to a viable, contiguous, and independent Palestine state. The media and the public in the Arab world, Israel, and the United States adopted their respective official one-sided versions of the breakdown. Balanced accounts—such as those offered by Deborah Sontag of the *New York Times,* Clinton's advisor Robert Malley, and Charles Enderlin, a French-Israeli television journalist—reveal complex causes and indicate that responsibility for the failure can be shared three ways.

Despite its detractors, the accomplishments of the Oslo Accord are considerable. For the first time in a century, most Arabs and Jews agreed on a solution—a two-state solution. And, after a decade of negotiations from Madrid to Taba, both sides had narrowed their differences on most of the key issues.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arafat, Yasir; Baker, James A.; Barak, Ehud; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Camp David Summit (2000); Clinton, William Jefferson; Likud; Madrid Conference (1991); Netanyahu, Benjamin; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Peres, Shimon; Qurai, Ahmad Sulayman; Rabin, Yitzhak.

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PHILIP MATTAR

OSMAN, HOUSE OF

The longest ruling dynasty in Islamic history, 1300–1922.

The Osmanli dynasty was named for Osman I, the Turkish leader in whose time (ruled c. 1299–1324) the foundations were laid for a state that later became the Ottoman Empire. The name was corrupted to Othoman, which became Ottoman in European usage. Succession went to the most successful son, often as a result of civil war or at least the threat of it. To prevent further strife, the new sultan was obliged to kill all his brothers and their sons. From the early 1600s, lateral succession became possible; and by the end of the 1600s, seniority had become the rule.

During the reign of the thirty-sixth sultan, Mehmet VI Vahidettin, the Ankara government abolished the sultanate (1 November 1922) and, on 3 March 1924, also the caliphate—the office of the head of Islam—which had been assumed by Ottoman sultans. Abdülmecit II, the last caliph and thirty-seventh ruler, and all members of the dynasty were immediately sent into exile, from which they were to be allowed back into the Republic of Turkey fifty years later—thirty years for female members of the family.

See also ABDÜLMECIT II.

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I. METIN KUNT

OTTOMAN AND TURKISH ART

See ART

OTTOMAN BUREAU OF TRANSLATION

See BUREAU OF TRANSLATION

OTTOMAN EMPIRE

This entry consists of the following articles:

OVERVIEW
CIVIL SERVICE
DEBT

OVERVIEW

Multiethnic, multireligious, monarchical Muslim empire founded by the Ottoman (or Osmanli) Turks in the late thirteenth century; it survived until after World War I, when, as one of the losing Central powers, it was formally dissolved by the peace treaties of 1918–1922. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) overthrew the last sultan in 1922.

In the thirteenth century, as the power of the Seljuk Turks declined, the Ottoman Turks began to absorb their small states. In the fourteenth century, the Ottomans took over some of the Byzantine Empire's territories and, late in that century, several Balkan states. Under Selim I and Süleyman I (the Magnificent), the Ottomans brought Hungary and much of the Balkan peninsula, parts of Persia (now Iran), and the Arab lands under their rule. In 1453, they conquered Constantinople (now Istanbul) and made it their capital. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire was at its peak and controlled much of southeastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, comprising some 1.2 million square miles (1.9 million sq. km) with some sixteen million people. That area would today include parts or all of the following: southeast Hungary, Albania, the six republics that were pre-1991 Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina), Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, southern and Caucasian Russia, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria.

By 1914, only about 11,000 square miles (17,700 sq. km) remained of the Ottoman Empire in Europe of the 232,000 square miles (373,000 sq. km) controlled during the sixteenth century, with 613,000 square miles (986,000 sq. km) remaining overall—about half the territory of the sixteenth century. That greatly reduced territory included only what is now Turkey, the Arab states, and Israel until the empire's official dissolution (1918–1922).

The empire's early capitals included Bursa and Edirne (formerly Adrianople), but Constantinople (Turkish, Konstantiniye) served as its capital from its capture in 1453 until 1923, when the Republic of Turkey declared its new capital at Ankara. Constantinople was by far the largest Ottoman city, with about 400,000 population in 1520 and some 1 million in 1914. Other major Ottoman cities included Belgrade, Aleppo, Cairo, and Damascus. After 1800, cities such as İzmir (Smyrna), Beirut, and Alexandria rose to prominence—products of increasing nineteenth-century economic ties with Europe.

The empire's administrative divisions changed with time. By the nineteenth century, most provinces *(vilayets)* were divided into districts *(sanjaks)* and subdistricts *(kazas),* each of which had a number of village areas *(nahiyes).*

The Sprawling Empire

Geography and climate varied greatly, since the empire ranged over three continents, including much of what is today's Middle East. Mountains of modest height cut by corridor valleys and heavy forests characterized part of the European provinces, while in Anatolia, narrow coastal plains and high interior plateaus with little vegetation rose to rugged snowcapped mountains in the eastern part of the peninsula. In the Syrian province, similarly narrow coastal plains bordering the Mediterranean rose to the mountains of Lebanon. To the east, highlands yielded to desert and, beyond, to the alluvial lowlands of Mesopotamia (now Iraq). A spine of mountains branches south from the Syrian province, just inland—with one range heading into the Sinai peninsula and the other emerging along the western edge of the Arabian peninsula, reaching the greatest height in Yemen. The great rivers of the empire included the Danube, Tigris, Euphrates, and Nile—but navigable rivers were comparatively rare in both the European and Middle Eastern areas of the empire.

Climatic conditions ranged from the cold heights of eastern Anatolia to the heat of the Egyptian, Arabian, and North African deserts, including the sweltering heat and humidity of the coast of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf. Almost everywhere rainfall was sparse—a fact of Ottoman life.

The empire had a wide base of natural resources; and much of its expansion can be understood as an effort to seize and control areas rich in various resources. For example, the Ottoman conquest of Serbia derived, in part, from an interest in its silver mines. As the empire lost territory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it also lost the rich diversity of its resource base. The Ottoman state bent the economy to meet its imperial needs before any others. Edicts directed mineral, agricultural, and industrial products to satisfy both the imperial military and the bureaucracy.

The Empire's Agricultural History

Agriculture was the basic economic activity, providing a livelihood for the majority of Ottoman subjects through the centuries—although the produce varied according to time and place. Some areas were not cultivated during periods of political disorder but were tilled again with the guarantee of political security. During the sixteenth century, the areas under cultivation were so extensive that they remained at peak production until the post-1830 period of increasing governmental recentralization. The fertility of the soil was legendary in some areas, such as the Nile delta or the Aydin river valley in western Anatolia. More commonly, however, the soil was not rich or, when fertile, lacked sufficient rainfall. In many areas, agriculture was a precarious enterprise; crop failures and famines were normal in the cycle of life. Consequently, to survive, many families mixed animal raising and handicraft production with farming. Landholdings were usually small, a pattern preferred by the state, which sought direct relations with the farming families (and fiscal and political control over them). Large estates became more common after 1750, as agriculture became increasingly commercial—particularly on new land being brought into cultivation. Hence, great estates were most common in the eastern Syrian and Iraqi regions that were settled or resettled in the later nineteenth century. Such large holdings grew cereal grains; generally, overall grain output increased because of rising market opportunities. Vineyards and olive orchards flourished in the Mediterranean provinces of the empire, and cotton grew in the Macedonian, Anatolian, Syrian, and Egyptian regions—but their yields fluctuated greatly over time. Forest products were common to the Balkan regions and

The church of Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, late 1800s. Commissioned by the emperor Justinian in the sixth century, the church was built in only five years (532–537 C.E.) and stands as one of the greatest examples of Byzantine architecture. © MICHAEL MASLAN HISTORIC PHOTOGRAPHY/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

along sections of the Anatolian Black Sea coast, while dates were harvested in the Iraqi areas.

Industrial production first served both international and domestic markets but, after about 1800, internal demand predominated. Textiles, leather making, and food processing were of great importance; urban-based enterprises were highly visible, but rural manufactories were extensive and important. Until the nineteenth century, guildlike bodies *(esnaf)* in the cities and towns played important roles in organizing and controlling production. They worked in an uneasy cooperation with the state, helping it to obtain goods in exchange for government support of esnaf privileges.

Significant economic changes in the Ottoman Empire resulted from the rising economic, political, and military power of Europe in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Until about 1750, the Ottoman economy was autarkic—that is, relatively self-sufficient—by government design. It imported comparatively little and exported a variety of textiles and other manufactured goods, both to the East and the West. Thereafter, the export of many finished products decreased, but the export of agricultural products and raw materials, such as cereal grains and raw cotton, increased—almost exclusively to Western markets. Ottoman industry received a rude shock from the competition of European manufactured goods. Ottoman textile manufacturers then restructured their enterprises along nonguild lines with unregulated production and lower wages, so most of the craft guilds lost power and ceased functioning. Using machine-made thread and other low-technology imports, many nineteenth-century local textile makers survived and even increased production for the expanding domestic market. In addition, several new international export industries emerged that employed tens of thousands of poorly paid workers, notably in raw-silk reeling and carpet making.



MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

The Challenges of Ethnic Diversity

The ethnic and religious makeup of the Ottoman Empire was diverse and intermingled. As if to lead by example, the Ottoman ruling family was truly international, counting dozens of ethnic groups among its ancestors. The relative size of the empire's ethnic groups is very difficult to determine, since the pertinent statistics were manipulated for use as weapons by nineteenth-century nationalism. Various ethnic groups sought their own states or attempted to deny the claims of competitors. In the era before territorial shrinkage, speakers of Turkish and of the Slavic languages formed the two largest groups in the empire. The largest ethnic groups were the Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Slovenians, Serbs, Albanians, Ruthenians, Wallachians, Moldavians, Croatians, Armenians, Laz, and Kurds. The official language of the empire was Ottoman Turkish, an administrative language consisting largely of Turkish grammar, with Turkish, Arabic, and some Persian vocabulary. The elite classes spoke and wrote in Ottoman Turkish, exchanging official correspondence and sharing a high culture, which gave the empire a unity that was superimposed over its diversity. The religious makeup was equally diverse. Until the nineteenth century, when districts with large Christian populations broke away, most Ottoman subjects were Christians of various denominations, usually of the Orthodox church, the descendant of the Byzantine state church. There also were Armenian and Greek Orthodox Catholics, Maronites, and those belonging to smaller Christian denominations; there was as well a diverse but small population of Jews. Within the Ottoman Islamic community, adherents of Sunni Islam slightly out-numbered adherents of Shiʿism. During the nineteenth century, Islam became the predominant religion in the empire, just as Turks became the dominant ethnic group. By 1914, about 83 percent of the population practiced Islam.

During the four centuries before 1850, the Ottoman state had sought to organize the various ethnic and religious communities into a smaller number of religious nations, called millets. Under the leadership of its own religious authority, each millet organized, funded, and administered its own religious and educational institutions. The Greek



Map by XNR Productions, Inc. The Gale Group.

Orthodox millet, for example, ran schools and churches for the lay population, as well as seminaries to train its clergy. The sultan, who had descended from Osman, the fourteenth-century founder of the dynasty, ruled the empire throughout its history. Until 1453, the sultans shared power with other important families, as the first among equals. Thereafter, they theoretically were without peer, although power passed from the sultan to members of his government after about 1640. Until the end of the seventeenth century, power rested with the central state in the capital; during the eighteenth century, power became dispersed among provincial notables. A centralized state emerged during the early 1800s—based on internal evolutionary developments, as well as borrowings from Western models. Struggles for control of the state between the reforming sultans and the reforming bureaucrats swung in favor of the bureaucracy between 1839 and 1878 and then back to the sultan until 1908. After the revolution of the Young Turks in July of 1908, the last sultans reigned rather than ruled.

During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire lost its Balkan territories to rising European nationalism and imperialism—especially pan-Slavism as instigated by Russia. Various Balkan ethnic groups—the Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians—abandoned, with great-power sponsorship, the Ottoman multicultural formula and opted for nation-statehood, which aspired to ethnic homogeneity but did not achieve it. Government efforts to create a competing Ottoman nationality foundered in the face of exclusivist nation-state identity. Efforts to eradicate differences among its remaining subjects were similarly unsuccessful. Take for example the state program to abolish the millets; fearing a loss of influence, various religious authorities—both Christian and Muslim—as well as many European statesmen opposed the move.

Increased Westernization Shapes the Empire

At the same time, ongoing domestic-reform efforts produced a revitalized, powerful Ottoman state that reasserted its presence in an unprecedented fashion. A series of reform decrees—the Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane (1839) and the Hatt-i Hümayun (1856)—presented the path that Ottoman leaders intended



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to follow. Ottoman military forces successfully adopted Western weapons, strategy, and tactics and crushed local notables, nomadic tribes, and other domestic challenges to the central regime. The state apparatus became marked by increasing centralization, specialization of function, and ever greater size. Knowledge of Western languages, administrative practices, and culture became critical to advancement in the political and, finally, social spheres. The government, for example, founded a vast network of secular, nonsectarian, Westernizing schools to inculcate the new values. In the realm of popular culture, entertainment forms of Western origin—the theater and novels—became increasingly popular, as did European-style clothing and manners. Nineteenth-century Ottoman experiences foreshadowed those of third-world states of the twentieth century in yet other ways. After increasing taxation to finance the expensive civil and military changes, the Ottoman Empire ultimately resorted to borrowing vast sums from abroad, which eventually resulted in virtual bankruptcy and a partial foreign takeover of the Ottoman economy. Toward the end, despite centuries of success, the empire could not compete with the explosion of twentieth-century European economic, military, and political power; after participating as a member of the losing Central powers in World War I, it was partitioned.

See also TANZIMAT; YOUNG TURKS.

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DONALD QUATAERT

OTTOMAN EMPIRE: CIVIL SERVICE

Government administrative service exclusive of the military.

In the sense of an administrative system that recruits and promotes officials on merit and operates by impartially applied rules, civil service is an anachronistic concept almost anywhere (except China) before the mid-nineteenth century. Even after that time, to apply the concept to the Ottoman Empire is questionable, in that the regulatory apparatus, although created, was used to thwart its impartiality.

For centuries, however, the Ottoman Turks had had a branch of the ruling elite whose functions were civil—in the sense of being neither military nor religious. Until the end of the eighteenth century, this group is best understood as scribes. Ottomans referred to them with terms like *kalem efendileri* ("men of the pen" or "of the offices"), or the corresponding abstract noun *kalemiye.* The scribes conducted the government's correspondence and kept its financial accounts and records on land tenure. Nineteenth-century reforms expanded and changed this branch of service into something like the civil services then emerging in Europe. From the late 1830s on, it also was referred to with a different term, *mülkiye,* having implications associated with land tenure and sovereignty. Particularly relevant to local administration, this term came to refer generally to civil officials, memurin-i mülkiye.

The state of the late eighteenth-century scribal service shows where this change began. It had a core of fifteen hundred men, serving in Istanbul in the Land Registry *(Defterhane-i Amire),* the grand-vizierial headquarters that Europeans called the Sublime Porte *(Bab-i Ali),* and the Treasury *(Bab-i Defteri).* Considering that scribes also served in military organizations or on provincial governors' staffs, an outside total can be estimated at two thousand. While it may seem odd that so few could suffice for a large empire, the Ottomans did not historically use scribes as administrators. In the years of conquest and through the sixteenth century, for example, local administration had been largely in cavalry officers' hands. By the eighteenth century, an able man might rise through scribal ranks to provincial governor, a kind of proto-foreign minister *(reis ül-küttab),* or grand vizier. Such careers were exceptional, and an ordinary scribe's role remained that of secretary *(katib).*

Many traits of the scribal service indicated its obscurity within the ruling elites. It had as yet no recruitment system beyond familial and patronage networks. It lacked its own form of training, other than apprenticeship. Except for those raised to heights that exposed them to elite factional politics, career patterns bore imprints of the guild tradition and the Sufi ethos that permeated it. To serve as a scribe was the chief practical application of the adab-tradition—the worldly, literary aspect of the learned Islamic culture. Building on an ancient Middle Eastern cultural elitism, Ottoman scribes had elaborated their craft to a high point in which mastery of stylistic conventions became more important than clear communication.

The shift from scribal to civil service began under sultans Selim III (1789–1807) and Mahmud II (1808–1839). In response to defeat by Russia during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Selim's "New Order" *(Nizam-i Cedit),* the first attempt at comprehensive governmental overhaul, included both reform of existing agencies and the first Ottoman attempt to create European-style systems of permanent consular and diplomatic representation. In 1821, Mahmud II created the Translation Office *(Tercüme Odasi)* at the Sublime Porte, which trained young Muslims as translators. Following his abolition of the janissary infantry (1826), administrative reform accelerated. In the 1830s, Mahmud II revived the diplomatic corps and reorganized government departments as ministries. To support his efforts at centralization, he also laid the bases of civil personnel policy by reforming conditions of service. He created a new table of civil ranks, abandoned the practice of annual reappointment *(tevcihat)* to high office, replaced old forms of compensation (such as fee collecting) with salaries, founded the first secular civil schools, and enacted laws eliminating some insecurities inherent in officials' historical status as the sultan's slaves. These reforms climaxed with the Gülhane Decree, which

proclaimed "security for life, honor, and property" and equality for all—civil officials included.

Several weak sultans followed Mahmud II. This enabled top civil officials—their position in relation to the ruler now much secured, and their importance increased by their role in negotiating with the European powers on whom the empire was becoming dependent—to run the government until another strong sultan emerged. The period so opened became known as the Tanzimat (the Reforms, 1839–c. 1871). The center of power shifted from the palace to the Sublime Porte. As civil officialdom's Westernizing diplomatic vanguard grew in power, a new line of promotion appeared, running from the Translation Office through the embassies to the post of Foreign Minister and the grand vizierate. Westernizing policy changes followed en masse, as the Ottoman government grew in size and in its impact on people's lives. Civil officials now did take responsibility for local administration. Westernizing legal reform and the creation of secular courts gave them judicial roles. Modern census and population registration systems required Ottomans to face civil officials to get identity papers and passports. The teachers in the new secular schools were civil officials. Out of the Westernist official elite a literary vanguard emerged, too; from it the region's first Western-style political protest movement, the Young Ottomans (Yeni Osmanlilar), in turn arose to exploit the tensions created by rapid change.

Between the death of Grand Vizier Ali Paşa (1871) and Sultan Abdülhamit II's accession (1876), the Tanzimat political configuration broke up. Abdülhamit shifted power back to the palace, making it the hub of a police state. Administrative reform continued along the lines charted during the Tanzimat, however. For example, Abdülhamit's reign became a growth period for education, publishing, and public works, especially railroads. In addition, his reign became the most important since Mahmud II's for the development of personnel policy for civil officials. The process began with creation of the personnel records system (*sicill-i ahval,* 1877). A decree on promotion and retirement followed, in 1880, introducing the idea of a retirement fund *(tekaüd sandiği)* financed by salary deductions. Commissions were set up to supervise the appointing of civil officials. With these, the civil personnel system assumed the general outlines of a modern, merit-based civil service, except that Abdülhamit manipulated the system, using it rather as a tool by which to control his officials. Under him, the growth of civil officialdom continued, as he pressured the politically conscious to accept office, in which they would become dependent on him. Ultimately, he had about 35,000 career officials and an equal number of hangers-on in civil service.

With the revolution of the Young Turks (Jön Türkler) in 1908 came a bold start in purging civil officialdom and streamlining administrative agencies. Despite gains like the 1913 provincial administration law, World War I and the dismemberment of the empire overcame these efforts. Still, in terms of elites, legislation, and organization, the Republic of Turkey inherited enough so that the early development of its administrative system has been described as evolutionary, rather than revolutionary.

See also Abdülhamit II; Mahmud II; Sublime Porte; Tanzimat; Young Ottomans; Young Turks.

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Carter V. Findley

Ottoman Empire: Debt

Borrowing in the Ottoman Empire by the government and within the private sector.

Throughout most of its history, from 1300 to 1922, the government of the Ottoman Empire relied on short-term loans from individual lenders as well as currency debasement and short-term notes to resolve fiscal shortfalls. On occasion, the Ottoman government just confiscated the monies needed, either from the lenders or from state officials. In the private sector, individuals, who only sometimes were professional moneylenders, lent their surplus to others. Both public and private borrowers commonly paid interest for the privilege. Both public and private borrowing persisted until the end of the empire—although confiscation became rare after

about 1825. Very important changes occurred in the forms of borrowing, within and outside the government, beginning about 1850, when foreign capital became available and assumed an unprecedented role.

In many ways, the international borrowing experiences of the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century anticipated those of today's third-world nations. The Ottoman economy was competing in a world dominated by the industrialized nations of the West, which possessed superior military technologies and political and economic power. Ottoman survival strategy required large, modern military forces and state structures. As both were exceedingly expensive, government expenditures mounted accordingly. Unlike the economies of many of the countries with which it was competing—notably Britain and France—the Ottoman economy remained essentially agrarian and incapable of generating the funds needed for increasingly complex and costly military and civilian structures. Thus, the government borrowed to modernize and survive.

Acutely aware of the dangers, Ottoman statesmen resisted international borrowing until the crisis provoked by Ottoman participation in the Crimean War, 1854–1856. International loans then quickly succeeded one another, on decreasingly favorable terms. These loans were private, the creditors being European bankers and financiers who were usually given diplomatic assistance by their own governments. By the early 1870s, Ottoman state borrowing too easily substituted for financial planning; between 1869 and 1875, the government borrowed more than its tax collectors took in. The Ottoman state suspended payments on its accumulated debt in 1875, after crop failures cut revenues between 1873 and 1875 and the global depression of 1873 dried up capital imports.

Perhaps fearing occupation by the European governments of its creditors, the Ottoman government eventually honored its obligations. Prolonged negotiations resulted in a reduction and consolidation of the total Ottoman debt and the formation, in 1881, of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration; this body took control of portions of the economy. The Ottoman Public Debt Administration supervised the collections of various tax revenues, turning the proceeds over to the European creditors—an international consortium representing bondholders of Ottoman obligations. Residents of France, Great Britain, and Germany held most of the bonds. The ceded revenues came from the richest and most lucrative in the empire—taxes imposed on tobacco, salt, silk, timber, alcohol, and postage stamps.

Although nominally a branch of the Ottoman government, the Debt Administration actually was independent and answerable only to the bondholders. Many scholars consider its founding as the beginning of Ottoman semicolonial status—when the state lost control over parts of its economy. Still worse, perhaps, the state's legitimacy and relevancy also declined in the eyes of subjects who had to pay their taxes to a foreign group rather than their own state. The Debt Administration represented a true loss of Ottoman sovereignty, but, as the government may have hoped, the consortium reassured foreign investors, who provided still more loans to the state, which needed still more cash to finance modernization.

Foreign capital invested in the Ottoman private sector became significant only after 1890. A part of the more general diffusion of European capital into the global economy, these investments also derived from the comforting presence of the Debt Administration, which was involved in many of them. Industrial or agricultural investment was nearly completely absent. Railroads, port facilities, and municipal services absorbed most of these monies, more firmly linking the Ottoman and international economies by facilitating the outward flow of raw materials and the import of finished goods. French financiers were the most important single source of funds, while the British and Germans also were significant providers. Almost all these new loans were administered by the Debt Administration.

By 1914, Ottoman public and private debts to foreign financiers consumed, in roughly equal shares, more than 30 percent of total tax revenues. In one way or another, the Debt Administration administered virtually the entire amount. This pattern of indebtedness makes clear the ongoing subordination of the late Ottoman economy to the European until the demise of the empire after World War I.

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DONALD QUATAERT

OTTOMANISM

A supranational and protonationalist political principle that stressed patriotism and the group feeling of all Ottoman citizens.

Political elites used Ottomanism to achieve consensus among different ethnic and religious communities and foster political and social unanimity in allegiance to the sultan. It originated as a response to foreign encroachments and separatist movements during the Tanzimat period and was sustained by enhanced social and political mobilization. While Ottomanism was sufficiently vague and malleable to serve different political platforms, the territorial indivisibility of Ottoman domains was its constant concern. The administrative principle of centralization was integral to Ottomanist policies.

Ottomanism germinated from the Tanzimat recognition of the notion of citizenship. The Young Ottomans infused Ottomanism with constitutionalist ideas, which Sultan Abdülhamit II supplanted with Islamic symbols and solidarity. The Young Turks subscribed to secular and constitutionalist Ottomanism but were divided about the nature of the underlying administrative framework. The centralist position prevailed after the revolution of 1908. The piecemeal dismemberment and secession of non-Muslim parts of the empire compromised the secularist thrust of Ottomanism. Ottomanism was not a coherent ideology but blunted the growth of particular nationalisms, particularly among the Muslim groups.

See also TANZIMAT; YOUNG OTTOMANS; YOUNG TURKS.

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HASAN KAYALI

OTTOMAN LIBERAL UNION PARTY

Political party opposed to the Committee for Union and Progress, also known as Osmanh Ahrar Firkasi.

The Liberal Union party was established in 1908 by Riza Nur, as the major opposition party after the 1908 revolution. Rooted in Prince Sabahettin's wing of the Young Turk movement, it espoused a platform that sympathized with the ethnic aspirations of Albanians and Armenians, and thus opposed the Committee for Union and Progress's (CUP) strongly centralist and Turkish leanings. The Liberal Union won only one seat, as against the CUP's 288 seats, in the November 1908 parliamentary elections. In 1909 the party was repressed under the martial law that followed the April counterrevolution.

The Liberal Union was revived in November 1911 as an umbrella opposition group called the Freedom and Accord party (Hürriyet ve Itilaf Firkasi). It won a Constantinople (now Istanbul) by-election in late 1911, but it lost the national elections in April 1912. It then allied with the Group of Liberating Officers who dislodged the CUP from power that summer. The coalition ruled only until January 1913, when the CUP forced Grand Vizier Mustafa Kamil Paşa to resign at gunpoint after losses in the Balkan War. The CUP government dissolved the Liberal Union in June 1913, executing and exiling its leadership after Grand Vizier Mahmut Şevket was assassinated. Damat Mehmet Ferit briefly revived the party in 1919 to replace the CUP, but the party split and its liberal wing joined the Kemalists.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

OTTOMAN MILITARY

This entry consists of the following articles:

OTTOMAN ARMY
OTTOMAN NAVY

OTTOMAN ARMY

Military organization that defended the Ottoman Empire and helped establish the Turkish republic.

The origins of the modern Ottoman army date to the destruction of the janissaries by Sultan Mahmud II (June 1826). Mahmud then laid the foundation for a new military organization based on Western models. Its centerpiece was a European-style infantry corps, the Trained Victorious Troops of Muhammad (Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-yi Muhammadiye, Mansure for short). Other military services—cavalry, artillery, and transport—were established mainly by reforming existing military units. Mahmud also created a modern corps of imperial guards out of the Bostanci corps, which had guarded imperial palaces.

There also were attempts to centralize the command structure. The authority of the commander in chief *(ser asker)* of the Mansure was gradually extended over the other services and branches. Thus his headquarters (Bab-i Ser Asker) gradually came to combine the roles of a ministry of war and general staff, and eventually was in charge of all land forces.

Under Mahmud II the military engineering schools were rejuvenated and reformed. He also established a military medical school (1827) and an officer school (1834). Russia and Britain sent military instructors. Most useful services were rendered by a Prussian military mission that grew from one officer (Helmuth von Moltke) in 1835 to twelve in 1837.

In the 1830s Mahmud sought to strengthen the army. Large permanent units with regular commanding officers and staffs were formed. In 1834 a provincial militia *(redif)* was established to provide reserve forces. However, the commissary system could not support the rapid increase of the military. Epidemics were rife, and over a quarter of all recruits succumbed to disease. Desertion was very common. Although the army had been successfully employed as an instrument of coercion and centralization, as a military force it remained relatively small and poorly organized, trained, and equipped. By the end of Mahmud's reign there were only some 90,000 men in all the services. The wars with Russia (1828–1829) and with Muhammad Ali's Egypt (1831–1833, 1839) resulted in heavy losses and the disruption of the army's development.

During the Tanzimat period (1839–1876) the army consolidated and built on the shaky foundations laid in the previous era. The Bab-i Ser Asker continued to acquire new departments. The army steadily grew, and recruitment and training improved. In 1843 the army, renamed the Regular Imperial Troops (Asakir-i Nizamiye-yi Şahane, Nizamiye for short), was organized in permanent territorial commands, each consisting of an army corps *(ordu)* under a field marshal *(müşir).* The field marshals, directly responsible to the *ser asker,* had wide jurisdiction in all military matters. This limited the provincial governors' ability to intervene in military affairs, and was intended to centralize further the military organization and strengthen the authority of the ser asker. Five territorial army corps were established, with headquarters in Istanbul, Üsküdar, Monastir, Sivas, and Damascus. In 1848 a sixth corps was established with headquarters in Baghdad. In 1849 the Nizamiye had some 120,000 men and the *redif,* 50,000. With local and semiregular organizations, the empire's land forces numbered some 250,000 men.

The horsemen of the Ottoman Empire's Imperial Calvary were considered excellent horsemen and skilled warriors, c. 1880s.
© Michael Maslan Historic Photographs/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

The reign of Abdülaziz (1861–1876) witnessed considerable increases in military appropriations and improvements in the army's equipment and

training. Modern weapons were purchased abroad, mainly from Germany, and with them came German military instructors. Since the majority of the officers were poorly educated, in 1855 the army initiated its own network of schools to prepare youths to become soldiers and officers. In 1867 over 8,000 students were enrolled in these schools.

In 1869 the army was reorganized into seven territorial corps, with headquarters in Istanbul, Shumla, Monastir, Erzurum, Damascus, Baghdad, and Sanʿa in Yemen. Each corps was required to have some 26,500 men. During the Russian war of 1877–1878 the Ottoman army had some 500,000 men, of whom some 220,000 took the field. During this period the Ottoman Empire reemerged as an important military power in southeastern Europe and the Middle East. Its army performed well during the Crimean War (1853–1856) and in the early stages of the Russian war of 1877–1878. In the latter conflict, however, the Ottomans were outclassed by the superior Russian army.

Under Abdülhamit II (1876–1909) the army benefited from ever increasing allocations, improved recruitment and training, and modern weaponry (mostly from Germany). It received assistance from a German military mission led by Kolmar von der Goltz (1883–1896). At the same time, however, Abdülhamit weakened the authority of the *ser asker* and placed military affairs under the supervision of permanent commissions staffed by his confidants. He personally approved the appointment and promotion of officers, and established networks of informers throughout the army.

By the 1890s the officer corps had become rife with discontent and sedition. The great expansion of the military had brought growing numbers of young officers from classes whose loyalty to the regime was not unconditional. Furthermore, the officers were better educated, and many espoused liberal ideals. In addition, officers and men were poorly paid, with salaries usually months in arrears. Finally, throughout most of Abdülhamit's reign the army was employed, with little success, in suppressing national and ethnic uprisings as well as lawlessness, especially in Macedonia and eastern Anatolia. Many officers, frustrated by the growing numbers of casualties, believed that the government was either unwilling or unable to provide the necessary means to restore order and protect the empire's territorial integrity. This led many officers, especially in the junior and intermediate ranks, to join the Young Turk movement, which called for the overthrow of Abdülhamit. The Young Turk Revolution (July 1908), which restored constitutional government and led, a year later, to Abdülhamid's deposition, began as a mutiny in the Third Army Corps, based in Macedonia.

In the following years, the Young Turk regime provided the army with increased allocations, modern weapons, and another German military mission, led by Gen. Otto Liman von Sanders (November 1913). At the beginning of World War I, the Ottoman army had some 640,000 men. During the war the Ottomans mobilized an estimated total of some 4 million men. Although the army was plagued by problems of logistics and command, it generally fought well and was successful, especially in Gallipoli (1915–1916) and in Iraq (1915–1916), and in defending Anatolia from foreign invasion following the war. In the end, however, the army could not save the empire from final collapse. Nevertheless, as the institution that had benefited more than any other from reform and modernization, it played a crucial role in the rise of the Turkish republic.

See also Abdülhamit II; Crimean War; Mahmud II; Mansure Army; Russian–Ottoman Wars; Tanzimat; Young Turks.

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Avigdor Levy

Ottoman Navy

Military vessels and fleets of the Ottoman Turks.

View of Constantinople Harbor, 1893. Constantinople is often considered, geographically, to link Europe with Asia and is home to the Hagia Sophia mosque. **© Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, sea power played a central role in the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, and Ottoman fleets operated on the high seas in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and east into the Indian Ocean. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Ottoman navy was generally neglected and its effectiveness declined, but it was revived at times during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The decline of the navy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was largely due to the new geostrategic realities, whereby the main challenges to the empire no longer came from the naval powers of Spain, Portugal, and Venice, but from the land powers of Austria, Poland, Russia, and Persia (now Iran).

The origins of the modern Ottoman navy can be traced to the Russian-Ottoman Wars of 1768–1774. A Russian fleet based in the Baltic circled the European continent and destroyed the Ottoman fleet at Cheshme (July 1770). This led to a massive effort to rejuvenate the navy. During the reigns of Abdülhamit I (1774–1789) and Selim III (1789–1807), scores of modern warships were constructed under the supervision of European shipwrights. The Naval Engineering School (Tersane Mühendishanesi) was founded (1776), and the navy's command structure was modernized and placed under the supervision of the newly established Ministry of the Navy (1805). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the navy was once again a formidable, though largely untested, force. In 1806, it listed 27 ships of the line and 27 frigates, as well as smaller vessels, armed with 2,156 guns and manned by some 40,000 sailors and marines.

After the fall of Selim III (1807), the navy was again neglected, and its strength declined. During the Greek War of Independence (1821–1830), it suffered many losses at the hands of the Greeks. The heaviest single blow, however, came on 20 October 1827, when a combined British-French-Russian fleet destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet inside the harbor of Navarino (now in Greece). The Ottomans alone lost thirty-seven vessels and thousands of sailors. It took the navy more than a decade to recover from the disaster at Navarino. By 1838, it had fifteen ships of the line and an equal number of frigates, as well as smaller vessels.

As of 1838, there was growing cooperation between the Ottoman and British navies: Ottoman and British squadrons conducted joint maneuvers; the navy was reorganized on British lines; Ottoman officers were sent to Britain for training; and British naval officers and engineers arrived in Constantinople (now Istanbul), the Ottoman capital, to serve as advisers from time to time.

In July 1839, the Ottoman grand admiral, Ahmet Fevzi Pasha, suddenly sailed the entire fleet to Alexandria and surrendered it to Egypt's ruler, Muhammad Ali, who was trying to become independent from the empire. This extraordinary act was the result of a power struggle within the Ottoman government following the death of Mahmud II. The fleet was returned in the following year as part of a general settlement of Ottoman-Egyptian relations, giving Egypt its autonomy.

During the Tanzimat (reform) era (1839–1876) in the empire, considerable resources were directed toward the further development and modernization of the navy, and sailing vessels were replaced with steamships. On the eve of the Crimean War (1853–1856), the Ottoman navy had 10 ships of the line and 14 frigates, as well as smaller vessels, with a total of 2,080 guns and a staff of more than 20,000 men. On 30 November 1853, Russia's Black Sea squadron, using new shell-firing guns, destroyed an Ottoman wooden fleet at Sinop. This had important political consequences, since it enraged British public opinion against Russia, leading to the Crimean War. It also marked an important milestone in naval history, resulting everywhere in the construction of iron-clad warships. The Ottoman navy also replaced most of its main wooden warships with iron-clads. By 1877, it had thirteen iron-clad frigates in addition to three wooden frigates, four corvettes, and various smaller craft.

During the reign of Abdülhamit II (1876–1909), priority was given to the development of the army, while the navy, because of financial constraints, was neglected, leading to its decline. In 1912, the navy listed four battleships, two cruisers, eight destroyers, three corvettes, and smaller craft. During the Balkan Wars (1912/13), it was outclassed by the Greek navy, which dominated the Aegean Sea.

Following the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman government, led by the Young Turks, placed great emphasis on modernizing and strengthening the navy. A British naval mission led by the Admiral Arthur H. Limpus helped reorganize the navy and its various departments. The navy was to be greatly strengthened by two modern battleships ordered from Britain whose delivery was expected in August 1914. On 3 August, however, the British government announced that with the impending European crisis (that very soon became World War I), the ships would not be delivered. On 11 August, the Ottoman government permitted two powerful German cruisers, *Goeben* and *Breslau,* to enter the Dardanelles; they subsequently announced their purchase by the Ottoman navy as replacement for the British-built warships. The cruisers were given Turkish names, but they remained under the command of their German crews. On 29 October, Ottoman warships, including the two former German cruisers, suddenly attacked Russian ports in the Black Sea, marking the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war.

See also Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Crimean War; Greek War of Independence; Russian–Ottoman Wars; Tanzimat.

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Avigdor Levy

OTTOMAN PARLIAMENT

Attempt at representative government in the empire between 1877 and 1920.

The Ottoman parliament met from 1877 to 1878 and between 1908 and 1920. The constitution of 1876 stipulated a bicameral parliament: a lower Chamber of Deputies elected popularly and a Chamber of Notables nominated by the sultan. The parliament of the First Constitutional period (1876–1878) had two terms that convened March to June, 1877, and December 1877 to 14 February 1878, when Sultan Abdülhamit II abolished parliament. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 forced Abdülhamit to re-institute it. The three parliaments of the Young Turk period met December 1908 to January 1912, May to August 1912, and May 1914 to December 1918. The last Ottoman parliament that convened in January 1920 dissolved itself after the Allied occupation of Istanbul in March 1920.

For the 1877 to 1878 parliament, previously elected provincial administrative councils selected the deputies according to quotas based on population and proportionate allocations of Muslims and non-Muslims (seventy-one Muslims and forty-eight non-Muslims in the first session; sixty-four Muslims and forty-nine non-Muslims in the second). Due to inaccurate population figures in remoter Asian and African provinces and the political exigency of catering to separatist Christian elements and their European protectors, non-Muslim communities and European provinces received higher quotas.

Abdülhamit intended to legitimate his rule by giving his consent to parliament but stripped it of the authority to legislate independently and to limit the executive. Nevertheless, the deputies, who on the whole represented the provincial elites, were vocal in their criticism of the government. Abdülhamit closed parliament indefinitely on the pretext of the national emergency engendered by the ongoing war with Russia.

Thirty years later, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 reintroduced the constitution and parliament. Constitutional amendments enhanced parliament's legislative prerogatives vis-à-vis the sultan, provided for ministerial accountability to parliament, and eliminated religious quotas. In the two-tier elections, males above the age of twenty-five voted for secondary electors, who then elected the deputies. Candidates had to be literate males who knew Turkish and were above the age of thirty. The election of one deputy for every 50,000 males produced chambers of around 250 deputies. The Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) managed to dominate the elections due to its revolutionary élan and moral authority in 1908, through electoral manipulation in 1912, and by suppressing opposition and effectively instituting a single-party regime in 1914. Electoral victory did not guarantee CUP's domination of parliament, which was the breeding ground of opposition.

From the dissolution of the body in August 1912, which followed a government crisis and anti-CUP rebellions, to May 1914, parliament remained in suspension. New elections were delayed until the winter of 1913/14 due to the extraordinary circumstances of the Balkan Wars, the forcible CUP takeover in January 1913, and the assassination of Grand Vizier Mahmut Şevket Paşa in June 1913. As World War I began, emergency powers were ceded to the cabinet, and parliament's significance diminished even though it continued to meet with interruptions.

The two-tier election system favored the election of representatives of privileged social groups: *Ulama*, officials, landowners, and professionals. However, party politics produced a more diverse Chamber of Deputies in the Second Constitutional period compared with 1877/78. Parliament always served as a forum where both local and national issues were voiced. Newspapers reported its proceedings on a daily basis. Despite the executive's attempts to control parliament, the Chamber of Deputies served as a check on the sultan, the cabinet, and occasionally on the CUP's extralegal interventions.

See also Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Committee for Union and Progress.

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Hasan Kayali

OUARY, MALEK

[1916–2001]

Algerian novelist, poet, and journalist.

A Christian born in Ighil Ali, Malek Ouary was educated in his village and became a radio journalist in Algeria. He then worked at the Office de la Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (ORTF) in Paris. A francophone writer, his works include *Par les chemins d'emigration* (investigative report); *Cahier d'epreuves* (1955); *Poèmes et chants de Kabyle* (1972); and also the novels *Le grain dans la meule* (1956), *La montagne aux chacals* (1981), and *La robe kabyle de Baya* (2000).

PHILLIP C. NAYLOR
UPDATED BY ANA TORRES-GARCIA

OUAZZANI, MOHAMED HASSAN

[1910–1978]

Moroccan nationalist.

In the early 1930s, Mohamed Hassan Ouazzani, a native of Fez, was a leader of the Comité d'Action Marocaine (CAM). He was elected secretary-general of the Bloc d'Action Nationale in October 1936, but the following year founded the Parti Démocratique Constitutionnel (PDC). Ouazzani was imprisoned for nine years (1937–1946) on political charges. Periodically, he cooperated with the Istiqlal, and from 1953 to 1954, he and his followers joined the National Front. Ouazzani was named minister of state without portfolio in King Hassan's 1961 coalition government. He was among those wounded in 1971 in the attempted coup against the king.

See also COMITÉ D'ACTION MAROCAINE (CAM); HASSAN II; ISTIQLAL PARTY: MOROCCO; PARTI DÉMOCRATIQUE CONSTITUTIONNEL (PDC).

BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMAN

OUFKIR, MUHAMMAD

[1918–1972]

Moroccan general and politician.

Muhammad Oufkir was from Middle Atlas Berber stock, from central Morocco. He served with distinction in the French army in Italy and Indochina during World War II and thereafter. When Morocco became independent of French colonialism in 1956, he was promoted to general and, in 1964, was appointed by King Hassan II as minister of the interior. In 1965, he was at the center of the Ben Barka affair and sentenced by a French court to life imprisonment (in absentia). In 1971, Oufkir led the suppression of an army coup attempt against King Hassan and was made minister of defense. In the next year, however, he helped organize a second coup attempt; following its collapse, he committed suicide.

See also BEN BARKA, MEHDI.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON

OUJDA GROUP

Algerian nationalists instrumental in winning independence and in governing the new nation.

The term *Oujda group* refers to Houari Boumédienne and a circle of colleagues that emerged in Oujda, Morocco, during the later years of the Algerian War of Independence. The best-known members of that circle included Ahmed Kaid, Ahmed Medeghri, Cherif Belkacem, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Mohamed Tayebi, and Ali Mendjli.

As French repression of Algerian guerrillas intensified during 1957 and 1958, more and more of them were forced across the borders into Tunisia and Morocco. Boumédienne, who had begun his revolutionary career fighting in Wilaya Five, the western Algeria military district, ended up in Oujda, about 7 miles (12 km) from the Algerian border. There he helped to organize the Moroccan branch of the external Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN; National Liberation Army), which he eventually rose to command. When the separate commands of the ALN were unified in December 1959, Boumédienne became chief of its general staff, bringing members of the Oujda group with him.

In 1960 and 1961, factional divisions within the political leadership of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front) began to

lessen the effectiveness of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement Provisoir de la République Algérienne; GPRA). The ALN general staff, dominated by the Oujda group, emerged as the most cohesive of the revolutionary institutions. It was frequently in conflict with the civilian leadership. Within days of independence in 1962, Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, president of the GPRA, fired Colonel Boumédienne, and Majors Kaid and Mendjli. The officers refused to recognize the GPRA's authority to take such action and instead entered Algeria to begin building internal support.

At Tlemcen, near the Moroccan border, there coalesced a group hostile to Ben Khedda and the GPRA that was headed by Ahmed Ben Bella. Support for Ben Bella, who had spent most of the war years in French prisons, came from disillusioned liberal politicians, some radical socialists, and especially from Boumédienne and the Oujda group. The latter provided the military support that enabled Ben Bella to take over Algiers and manage his election as Algeria's first president in September 1962.

Ben Bella was to remain in power until June 1965, devoting much of his time to attempts to eliminate political competitors inside the government and the party. By October 1963 he had managed to eliminate many opponents. By then, power was about equally divided between his own followers and those of Boumédienne. Thereafter, he moved gradually to eliminate the latter, until, by early 1965, only Boumédienne in the War Ministry and Bouteflika in the Foreign Ministry survived. During May and June, Ben Bella moved to undercut the authority of Bouteflika, threatening to dismiss both him and Boumédienne, but the latter intervened.

On 19 July 1965, the military overthrew Ben Bella in a bloodless coup engineered in the name of a body called Council of the Revolution. The heart of this council was the Oujda group, which also took over key posts in the cabinet (defense, interior, foreign affairs, finance). Boumédienne headed both the Council of the Revolution and the government. These allies helped him, through the remainder of the decade, to consolidate his own power. But, between 1972 and 1976, as cleavages developed in the inner circle over difficult political choices, Boumédienne eliminated one after another the members of the Oujda group from his government.

See also Algerian War of Independence; Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN); Belkacem, Cherif; Ben Bella, Ahmed; Ben Khedda, Ben Youssef; Boumédienne, Houari; Bouteflika, Abdelaziz; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); Kaid, Ahmed.

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John Ruedy

OULD SID'AHMED TAYA, MAʿOUIYA

[1941–]

President of Mauritania since 1984.

Born in 1941 in Atar, the capital of the Adrar region, Maʿouiya Sid Ahmed Taya is the fourth military leader to hold the office of the presidency in Mauritania since its independence from France in 1960.

Taya joined the military in 1961 after Mauritania gained its independence from France. During the latter half of the 1970s Taya served as a military commander in the conflict with Western Sahara. In 1984 Taya led a coup d'état, overthrowing the previous military leader, Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah, and appointed himself head of state. Still leader in 1991, Taya drafted a new constitution that legalized political parties and called for a turn toward democracy. Taya, representing the Parti Républicain Démocratique et Social (PRDS), won the January 1992 presidential election, gaining most of his support from the military, members of his Smacid tribe and other white Maure groups, and residents of his native region of the Adrar. Financial scandals and political instability overshadowed much of Taya's democratization efforts in the early 1990s.

In 1991 Mauritania broke ties with the United States and signed agreements with Iraq during the

Gulf War. As the war came to a close, Taya opted for a more moderate position in world affairs, making amends with Senegal, breaking ties with Iraq, and recommencing Mauritania's good relations with France and the United States. Despite pressure from Arab states to break ties with Israel, Taya recently accepted a visit from Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres, and he increasingly thrives from his good relationship with the United States. He also believes that Mauritania's relationships with West African states and with the Arab Maghreb Union are valuable, and he has been working to improve relations with Senegal since the conflict in 1989. Taya faces international pressure to further democratize Mauritania and end human-rights abuses. Since 1999 Taya also evolved his economic policy of central control to one that encourages more privatization of businesses.

Taya won the 1997 presidential election with 90 percent of the vote. In reaction to charges of fraudulent municipal elections in January 1999, Taya issued voting and identity cards to prevent future electoral scandals. Elections are held every five years.

As of 2003 Mauritanian exiles charged Taya with crimes against humanity, arguing that he called for a policy of "denegrification" following the border clashes and ethnic violence along the Senegal River in 1989. He is also blamed for prolonging undemocratic policies such as slavery, extrajudicial incarcerations, and press censorship.

See also MAURITANIA.

NAOMI ZEFF

OULED SIDI CHEIKH

A nineteenth-century tribal confederation/brotherhood of western Algeria.

Because of their location in western Algeria, this powerful group of tribes was often influenced by the sultan of neighboring Morroco. The Ouled (also Awlad Sidi Shaykh) had capricious relations with the authorities of French colonialism. They cooperated with Governor-General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud de la Piconnerie against the renowned Amir Abd al-Qadir. One of the chief collaborators, however, Mohammed ben Abdallah, later turned against the French. This led to conflicts at Laghaout (1852) and Touggourt (1854). Then, during this campaign, Si Hamza, of the Ouled (Cheraga), joined the French.

A basic lack of French sensibilities toward the confederation's traditions produced a major insurrection in 1864/65. During the Great Kabylia Revolt of 1871, the Ouled were generally restive rather than rebellious—then passive thereafter in relations with the French.

See also KABYLIA.

PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

OUZIEL, BEN ZION MEIR HAI

[1880–1953]

Sephardic chief rabbi.

Ben Zion Meir Hai Ouziel was born in Jerusalem and studied in various yeshivot there. He became chief rabbi of Jaffa in 1914. After serving as rabbi of Salonika from 1921 to 1923, he was selected as Sephardic chief rabbi of Tel Aviv, and in 1939 he became the Sephardic chief rabbi of Palestine, a position he occupied until his death. Ouziel was active in the Mizrahi Movement, served as a delegate to several Zionist congresses, and held several committee positions in the Jewish Agency. He testified before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. In addition to being active in the political sphere, Ouziel published extensively on practical Jewish religious law (Halakhah) and on Jewish thought.

See also HALAKHAH; JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE; MIZRAHI MOVEMENT.

CHAIM I. WAXMAN

OYAK (ORDU YARDIMLASMA KURUMU)

Turkish military pension program that became a public conglomerate with political power.

Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu Army Mutual Assistance Association was founded in Turkey in 1961 as a pension program to protect career military officers from inflation, but it soon became Turkey's largest and most diversified public conglomerate. By 1984, OYAK's assets totaled more than US$300 million, with heavy investments in the automotive,

electronics, construction, and food-processing industries, among others.

Since the late 1960s, OYAK's economic clout has enhanced its political influence. It is an example of the Turkish state's use of professional associations and social-insurance programs to implement economic policy. OYAK is nominally attached to the ministry of defense but is run autonomously by civilians and technocrats.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

ÖZAL, TURGUT

[1927–1993]

Turkish prime minister, later president.

Turgut Özal was born in Malatya, a provincial city in southeast Turkey. His father, trained as a religious teacher, taught in the secular schools of the Turkish republic and later worked as a civil servant; his mother was also a teacher. Özal attended Istanbul's Technical University, graduating in 1950 with a degree in electrical engineering. After studying economics and engineering in the United States, he worked under Süleyman Demirel at the Electric Power Survey Administration, which was responsible for several hydraulic and electrical projects. In 1961, Özal participated in the establishment of the State Planning Organization, which issued five-year development plans, and throughout the 1960s, he was an important economic adviser to Prime Minister Demirel. He was one of the architects of the 1970 stabilization program, but following the 1971 military intervention, he left the State Planning Office to work for the World Bank in Washington, D.C.

Returning to Turkey two years later, he served as managing director of two large private sector companies and, in 1977, entered politics as a candidate for the religiously oriented National Salvation Party from İzmir. Özal failed in this campaign, but in 1979, Demirel made him responsible for developing a solution to Turkey's growing economic

Former Turkish prime minister Turgut Özal, 1988. Özal is perhaps best remembered for bringing a free economy to Turkey and for envisioning the country as a modern, democratic society. **© AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

crisis. As undersecretary of the State Planning Organization, Özal proposed a series of measures to stabilize and reform the Turkish economy known as the 24 January Measures. Following the September 1980 coup, which removed Demirel from power, the military officers that ruled Turkey asked Özal to remain as deputy prime minster in charge of the economy, a position he held until July 1982, when a banking scandal led to his removal from government. In response, Özal and several close associates established, in May 1983, the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi; ANAP), which contested the elections of 1983. Despite opposition from the military leadership that supported the Nationalist Democracy party, Özal's Motherland party won an overwhelming victory.

During his years as prime minister, Özal focused on two major goals: reforming the Turkish

economy and enhancing Turkey's position in world affairs. In the economy, he sought to tame triple-digit inflation, modernize industry, increase Turkey's exports in order to put an end to persistent shortages of foreign exchange, and privatize Turkey's large public industrial sector. Under his supervision, the economy grew at a rapid rate, and exports expanded dramatically. In addition, many of his reforms have created an environment more conducive to foreign and domestic private investment. He was less successful, however, in selling off the inefficient state sector and in reducing inflation; these failures and subsequent macroeconomic instability have dampened investment.

In foreign affairs, Özal worked to integrate Turkey into the world economy, a strategy leading to his formal request for admission into the European Community in 1987. In the late 1980s, he initiated a new era in Greek-Turkish relations that would be more conducive to a settlement of their conflict. At the same time, he worked to further links with many Middle Eastern countries that were becoming important markets for Turkish exports. His desire for Turkey to play a leading role in regional affairs led him to strongly support the allied coalition against Saddam Hussein, a policy that sparked domestic opposition.

In the late 1980s, Özal faced a number of political challenges. First, Turkey's persistent economic problems, coupled with rampant rumors about his personal corruption and that of his family, led to a precipitous decline in his personal popularity as well as that of the ANAP. Second, the conservative Islamic wing of the Motherland party, which dominated the party's organization, began to challenge the policies of Özal and the more liberal wing of the party. Finally, the party faced challenges from its competitors, the True Path party on the right and the Social Democratic party on the left. In 1989, seeing the declining political fortunes of the ANAP, he engineered his election to the presidency. In doing this, Özal faced a great deal of opposition, both from his own party and from the opposition parties, and was elected only on the third ballot. As president, Özal sought to transform his office from its traditionally above-politics status to the preeminent political position in the country. As a result, he was accused, even by members of the Motherland party, of interfering in politics and forcing his will on the government. In addition, many of his policies were extremely controversial, particularly his enthusiastic support for the American-led coalition against Saddam Hussein and his calls for a conciliatory position toward the Kurdish issue. When Süleyman Demirel became prime minister in 1991, he vowed to remove his former protégé from the presidency.

One of Özal's final projects was to project Turkish influence into the newly independent Turkic countries of central Asia. Following an exhaustive tour of the republics in the spring of 1993, he died of a heart attack in Istanbul.

See also Motherland Party; National Salvation Party; State Planning Organization (SPO).

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David Waldner

OZ, AMOS

[1939–]

Israeli author.

Oz was born Amos Klausner, in Jerusalem. He studied in a religious elementary school and in a secular high school. At the age of thirteen, after the death of his mother, he went to live in kibbutz Hulda, of which he later became a member. He studied literature and philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and taught at the kibbutz high school. Oz left the kibbutz in the 1980s. In 1996 he moved to Arad and began teaching at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Beersheba, where he is a full professor and holds the Agnon Chair of Hebrew Literature. He has also been a visiting fellow at Oxford University, an author in residence at the Hebrew University, and, in 1997, a visiting writer at the New York State Writers Institute.

Oz's first short story was published in 1961 and his first collection of short stories, *Where the Jackals Howl,* in 1965. He has published eighteen books in Hebrew, including novels, novellas, books of short stories, books of essays, one volume of literary criticism, and close to 500 articles and essays in Israeli and international magazines and newspapers, which have been translated into thirty languages.

The kibbutz is the locus of several stories and novels in which Oz examines the relationship between the individual and the collective in modern Israel. The closed society of the commune may be viewed as a human laboratory where national ideals are measured against personal needs and desires. The enemy, often depicted as lurking outside the geographical enclave, proves to be internal, harbored and suppressed within the protagonist.

Closely associated with that time is Oz's study of the family unit, love and loyalty within the family, obsessions, separations, and dissatisfaction. The tension between fathers and sons as representatives of two generations of Israelis, the founders and the followers, is not resolved by oedipal revolt and independence but, rather, by compromise and surrender. This is in line with Oz's political view, which calls for dialogue and the harnessing of violence.

In *Black Box* (1987), an epistolary novel, a divorced couple is entangled in a passionate concern with their straying teenage son, who is perceived as a possible symbol of Israel's future: The broken family serves as a metaphor for political allegory. In *To Know a Woman* (1989), the hero is a former intelligence officer who withdraws from public service in order to come to terms with private emotions, a crumbling family, and a need for confronting his femininity, translated as the need for nurturing the self and the need for human compassion. Other works include *Israel, Palestine and Peace* (1994), *Don't Call It Night* (1994), *Panther in the Basement* (1995), and *But These Are Two Different Wars* (2000). The first chapter of his unfinished memoirs was published in *The New Yorker* in December 1995.

In 1991 Oz was elected a full member of the Academy of the Hebrew Language. He has received the French Prix Femina, the 1992 Frankfurt Peace Prize, the Brenner Prize, and the Israel Prize. In 1997 he was awarded the French Cross of the Knight of the Légion d'Honneur by President Jacques Chirac. A member of the Peace Now movement since its inception in 1977, Oz frequently appears in the media, voicing his opinions on Palestinian-Israeli relations, the peace process, refusal to serve in the military, and other contemporary political issues.

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Zvia Ginor
Updated by Adina Friedman

OZANIAN, ANDRANIK

See Andranik Ozanian

OZ VE SHALOM (NETIVOT SHALOM)

Israeli religious peace movement.

Some members of the National Religious Party, who opposed the tendencies of their party to support Greater Israel policies, formed in the early 1970s an ideological forum that advocated moderation, tolerance, and pluralism in matters involving religion and the state and a compromise solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1975, in reaction to the founding of Gush Emunim, the extreme settlers' movement, they established themselves as an independent "Fabian Society," seeking influence primarily through ideological, educational, and intellectual work, adopting the name "Oz ve Shalom," a famous line from the Jewish prayer book meaning "strength and peace."

In response to the 1982 Lebanon War and the intensification of the activities of Peace Now, a group of younger Zionist-Orthodox activists established a separate peace movement that aspired to appeal to a religious audience. They named themselves "Netivot Shalom" (Paths of Peace). Peace Now, the main peace movement at the time, was a secular movement, using secular terminology and organizing many of its activities on the Sabbath. To avoid duplication, in 1984 both religious peace groups merged under the name Oz ve Shalom/Netivot Shalom. The movement's main public figure was Avi Ravitzky, a professor of Jewish studies at the Hebrew University. They also gained the support of Rabbis Yehuda Amital and Aharon Lichtenstien, the heads of Yeshivat Har Etzion in Gush Etzion. Yet the movement remained limited in scope and at its peak claimed some 3,000 supporters.

See also GUSH EMUNIM; PEACE NOW.

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WALTER F. WEIKER
UPDATED BY MORDECHAI BAR-ON

P

PACHACHI, MUZAHIM AL-

[?–1987]

Iraqi statesman.

Born in the small town of Bujayla (now al-Nuʿmaniyya), Muzahim al-Pachachi was graduated from the college of Sawr in 1913. He began his active public life in 1924 as a member of the Constituent Assembly. From 1924 to 1925, he was minister of labor and communication and, from 1925 to 1927, the deputy of Hilla province. In 1931, he was appointed permanent representative of Iraq in London, minister of labor and communication, and also minister of the interior. He served as permanent representative of Iraq to the League of Nations from 1934 to 1935, minister plenipotentiary in Rome from 1935 to 1939, and minister plenipotentiary in Paris and Vichy from 1939 to 1942. He was prime minister from 26 June 1948 to 19 January 1949, and deputy prime minister and minister of the interior from 1949 to 1950. He died in Geneva on 23 September 1987. His son, Adnan [1923–], served as an Iraqi diplomat until going into exile in 1969. He returned to Iraq in 2003 and served on the American-created Iraqi Governing Council following the U.S. invasion of the country.

Mamoon A. Zak
Updated by Michael Fischbach

PAGIS, DAN

[1930–1986]

Israeli poet, professor.

Born in Bukovina, Pagis spent three years in a Ukrainian concentration camp, from which he escaped in 1944. Arriving in Palestine after the war, he learned Hebrew and taught on a kibbutz. He obtained his doctorate in medieval Hebrew literature and taught at Hebrew University, the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, and Harvard University. The Holocaust, a formative experience in Pagis's life, had a profound effect on his writings. Like many other Holocaust survivors, however, he was able to let his memory surface only after the capture of Adolf Eichmann in 1960 and the trial in

Jerusalem. It was only in Pagis's third poetry collection, *Gilgul,* published in 1970, that poems which actually turn to the Shoah were first published. Among Pagis's books of poems are *The Shadow Dial* (1959), *Late Leisure* (1964), and *Twelve Faces* (1981). Scholarly works include *Change and Tradition: Hebrew Poetry in Spain and Italy* (1976) and *The Riddle* (1986). *Last Poems* was published posthumously. As the title suggests, the poems center on dying and death.

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JULIE ZUCKERMAN
UPDATED BY ADINA FRIEDMAN

PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA

[1919–1980]

Shah of Iran, 1941–1979.

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was born in Tehran on 26 October 1919 to Brigadier Reza Khan (later Reza Shah Pahlavi). He was designated crown prince in April 1926 and graduated from a special primary military school in Tehran in 1931, from Le Rosey secondary school in Switzerland in 1936, and from Tehran Military College in 1938. In 1939, he married Princess Fawzia, the sister of King Farouk of Egypt; they had a daughter, Shahnaz, in 1940 and were divorced in 1948. In 1950, he married Soraya Esfandiari Bakhtiari; this marriage, too, ended in divorce in 1958 because she was not able to produce a male heir. In 1959, he married Farah Diba, who gave birth to Crown Prince Reza in 1961, and three other children thereafter.

Mohammad Reza Shah's thirty-seven-year reign can be divided into five distinct phases: from the 1941 occupation of Iran by the Allied forces to the 1953 coup d'état; the postcoup period (1953–1959); the period of political strife (1960–1963); the period of the shah's increasingly autocratic rule (1963–1976); and the period of revolutionary crisis that ultimately led to the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty (1977–1979).

From 1941 Occupation to 1953 Coup d'Etat

Mohammad Reza acceded to the throne on 17 September 1941, after Russian and British troops invaded Iran on 25 August, forcing Reza Shah to abdicate. A major crisis in the early years of his reign came in 1945 when the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its forces from northern Iran. Through a combination of international pressures and internal maneuverings by Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam, the Russian force finally left Iran in late 1946, and the pro-Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan collapsed. For much of this period, the shah was forced to conform to the will of the *majles* (parliament), which as a political institution dominated both the young monarch and the cabinet. Following an assassination attempt on 4 February 1949, a Constitutional Assembly was convened on 21 April; it granted him the right to dissolve the *majles.* In March 1951, the British-dominated Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was nationalized by an act of the *majles* under the initiative of Mohammad Mossadegh, the leader of the National Front, who subsequently became prime minister. Although 1951 to 1953 were "the worst years" of the shah's reign, he did not take any initiative to dismiss Mossadegh until he was urged to do so by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Dwight Eisenhower, who also urged him to appoint Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister. When Mossadegh refused to accept the shah's dismissal order on 16 August, the shah fled the country and went to Rome. On 19 August 1953, he was reinstated to power in a coup conceived by MI-6 (British Military Intelligence) and carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency. The leading *ulama,* the old-guard politicians, the propertied classes, and a core of army generals supported the shah and the coup.

Post-Coup Period

The period 1953 to 1959 began with the repression of members of the intelligentsia who had supported either the National Front or the pro-Soviet Tudeh party, and saw a gradual increase of the shah's power vis-à-vis the old-guard politicians, the propertied classes, and the *ulama.* In this period, the govern-

ment signed an agreement with a consortium of major Western oil companies in August 1954, joined the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO) in October 1955, established an effective intelligence agency (SAVAK) in 1957, and launched the 1954–1962 development plan.

Political Strife (1960–1963)

The period from 1960 to 1963 began with a reactivation of opposition groups and increasing pressures from the administration of John F. Kennedy for reforms. In May 1961, the shah appointed Dr. Ali Amini as prime minister and Hasan Arsanjani as minister of agriculture; the latter became the architect of land reform. The shah, who could not tolerate an independent-minded prime minister, dismissed Amini in July 1962 and asked Amir Asadollah Alam, his closest confidant, to form a new cabinet and continue the reform. The land reform program, which was the centerpiece of the shah's White Revolution, and women's suffrage met with strong resistance from the *ulama,* who joined the opposition forces and instigated urban riots on 5 June 1963 to protest Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's imprisonment. The shah was indecisive in responding to the situation, but Alam took command and gave the shoot-to-kill order to the security forces; more than 100 were killed, and resistance of religious groups was crushed. This event marked the suppression of all opposition forces and the beginning of increasingly autocratic rule by the shah.

Increased Autocratic Rule (1963–1976)

In the period 1963 to 1976, the shah emerged as the sole policymaker; he allocated oil revenues among various agencies and projects and directly supervised the armed forces and security organizations, foreign policy and oil negotiations, nuclear power plants, and huge development projects. In this period, Iran's gross domestic product grew in real terms by an average annual rate of around 10 percent. Meantime, public services substantially expanded and modernized, and the enrollment at all educational levels increased rapidly. The shah also dramatically expanded the military and security forces and equipped them with advanced weapon systems. In the early 1970s he played a key leadership role in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and helped the organization to raise the price of oil sharply. Meanwhile, he emerged as the leading figure in the Persian Gulf after the withdrawal of British forces in 1971. Furthermore, he signed an agreement with the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in 1975, ending the two countries' border disputes. By the mid-1970s, the shah managed to establish close ties not only with the United States, Western Europe, and Muslim countries but also with the Communist bloc countries, South Africa, and Israel.

President John F. Kennedy meets with the shah of Iran in the White House, 13 April 1962. Supported by the United States, the shah assumed absolute power after a 1953 coup that ousted Prime Minister Mohammed Mossaddeq. © Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

The many diplomatic and economic achievements of the shah led to ostentatious displays of royal hubris. For example, in October 1971 he celebrated the 2,500th anniversary of the foundation of the Persian Empire by Cyrus the Great and formed, in March 1975, a one-party system. Both acts were resented by the intelligentsia and middle classes. He also replaced powerful, independent-minded politicians with more accommodating and submissive aides, a strategy that cost him dearly at times of international and domestic crisis. Concurrently, the shah's White Revolution had undermined the traditional foundation of his authority—the *ulama,* the bazaar merchants, and the landowning classes. They were replaced by the entrepreneurs, the young

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1919–1980) ruled as king of Iran from 1941 to 1979. He implemented the "White Revolution" in 1963, the most important aspect of which was the redistribution of half of the privately owned agricultural land to the peasants who share-cropped it. He ruled as a royal dictator until 1979, when the monarchy was overthrown in a popular revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Western-educated bureaucratic elites, and new middle classes who had developed uneasy relations with the shah. The intelligentsia resented the lack of political freedom and violations of human rights, the rigged elections, corruption, and close ties with the United States. The old religious groups and the bazaar merchants and artisans resented the un-Islamic Western lifestyle promoted by the shah's modernization policies. The entrepreneurial and political elites were discontented with the shah's autocratic rule, and with the lack of their own political power and autonomous organizational base. Under these circumstances the nucleus of an anti-shah revolutionary coalition was formed by a large group of liberal and radical intelligentsia, and a small group of militant *ulama* and their important followers in the bazaar.

Pahlavi Dynasty Collapse (1977–1979)

The opportunity for the opposition to challenge the shah came after the victory of Jimmy Carter in the U.S. presidential race of November 1976 and the ensuing active support given by his administration to the cause of human rights. When the political upheavals began (1977), the shah's weak and indecisive character contributed to the collapse of the Pahlavi regime and the rise of the Islamic Republic under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a charismatic figure with a strong will to power. Despite the mass-based nature of the Iranian Revolution, however, not all sectors of the population opposed the shah. The peasantry, for example, constituting over half of the population at the time, continued to support him, though passively. Even labor and the majority of public-sector employees and the middle and lower-middle classes did not join the uprising until the last phases of the revolution, when the shah's regime was on the verge of collapse. After a series of mass demonstrations, mass strikes, and clashes between the shah's security forces and opposition groups in the latter half of 1978, the shah left the country in January 1979; he died of cancer in Cairo on 27 July 1980.

For the shah the ideal model of the imperial persona was the Persian image of the "benevolent autocrat," as exemplified by great Persian monarchs, including his father, Reza Shah. Although this model implied that he should be determined, self-confident, and brave, in reality he was gentle, timid, and indecisive. The shah's inherently fragile character became evident particularly during periods of instability and crisis, whereas his "benevolent autocrat" tendencies came up during periods of stability and success. Furthermore, he was not immune to conspiracy theories. He therefore often saw the secret hands of foreign powers, specifically those of the British, behind virtually every international and domestic incident. He believed, for example, that the Anglophobic Mohammad Mossadegh and the xenophobic Ayatollah Khomeini were British agents. Referring to an Anglo-Russian conspiracy, the shah attributed the Islamic revolution

to the "unholy alliance of Red and Black." Belief in conspiracy theories further intensified his inherent vulnerability during periods of crisis. As a result, in the critical periods of 1941 to 1953 and 1960 to 1963, Mohammad Reza showed considerable indecisiveness. On the other hand, in the post-coup period (1953–1959) he began to show more determination, and in the stable period of 1963–1976, he emerged as a "benevolent autocrat," who devoted himself, in his own way, to the welfare of his people. Finally, during the period of revolutionary crisis (1977–1979), the shah, for the third time during his reign, turned indecisive, once again embraced conspiracy theories, and displayed a mood of withdrawal—traits and reactions that may have contributed significantly to his downfall.

See also Amini, Ali; Baghdad Pact (1955); Iran; Iranian Revolution (1979); Mossadegh, Mohammad; Pahlavi, Reza; White Revolution (1961–1963).

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Ahmad Ashraf

PAHLAVI, REZA

[1878–1944]

Founder of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran.

Reza Shah Pahlavi was born into the family of a foot soldier in a small village near the Caspian Sea and given the name Reza. A few months after his birth, he lost his father, and he spent most of his childhood with his maternal uncle, an officer in the Cossack Brigade in Tehran. At the age of fifteen, at the behest of his uncle, he enlisted in the Cossack Brigade; on the strength of his personal traits and leadership qualities, he rose to officer rank. Surnames were not common in Iran in the early twentieth century, and his peers called him Reza Khan, the title *khan* being one of respect.

Reza Khan rose to prominence in the early 1920s when Iran was on the verge of economic collapse and political and territorial disintegration. The southward push of the newly established Soviet Union already threatened traditional British strategic and commercial interests in Iran and its colonial rule in India. The creation of a functioning central government capable of holding Iran intact as a buffer state became the main concern of Great Britain. Reza Khan, who aspired to save the country from disintegration, had risen to the rank of brigadier general and replaced the Russian commander of the Cossack Brigade. The commander of British forces in Iran did not oppose the coup d'etat engineered by Ziya Tabatabaʾi, with the support of Reza Khan, who marched his troops, some 2,500 men, into Tehran on 21 February 1921. The prime minister and cabinet were dismissed and Ahmad Shah, the reigning Qajar monarch, was forced to appoint Tabatabaʾi prime minister and Reza Khan army commander. Within a few months, however, Reza Khan ousted Tabatabaʾi and, having become the dominant player on the country's disarrayed political stage, virtually forced the powerless Ahmad Shah first to appoint him minister of war and then to appoint him prime minister. In 1925, Reza Khan masterminded a parliamentary act by which the Qajar dynasty was deposed. He was

entrusted with the throne as the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty.

To modernize a debilitated and backward country, Reza Shah began to reorganize and rebuild the army and the bureaucracy practically from scratch. A universal conscription law was passed in 1925 and young army officers were sent to France for military training. He ordered the purchase of a limited supply of weapons, including armored vehicles, fighter planes, and small warships. Administrative and judicial reforms began as early as 1922, when the Iranian *majles* (parliament) enacted a law calling for competitive entrance exams and specific qualifications for prospective civil servants. A new ministry of justice was established in 1925 and charged with drafting and applying a new legal code based on European judicial systems. These legal reforms helped create a secular system of justice that took away much of the clergy's traditional control over the administration of justice.

With the creation of a modern national system of education, the number of pupils in modern schools increased more than tenfold, from approximately 30,000 in 1921 to 370,000 in 1941. In 1935, the University of Tehran was founded; between 1925 and 1940, some 1,500 Iranian students were sent abroad for study in various fields. Concerted efforts were made to revive and propagate Iran's ancient cultural heritage and values in order to strengthen Iranian national identity as the indispensable foundation for a modern nation-state. Reza Shah paid considerable attention to improving the country's communications, transportation, and industrial capacities. An 850-mile-long railway, running from Bandar Shah on the Caspian to Ahvaz near the Persian Gulf, was completed in 1938. The quality of roads was improved and new highways, bridges, and tunnels were constructed. With foreign assistance, the country's postal and telegraph systems were drastically upgraded and a radio transmission system was installed in Tehran. The founding of a national bank in 1927, which replaced the British-controlled Imperial Bank of Persia and was given the right to issue legal tender in 1931, gave the government effective control over the country's financial markets. Bent on asserting Iran's economic independence, Reza Shah expanded Iran's nascent light industries. Although he relied on foreign technical assistance, especially from Germany, for his modernization program, he eliminated virtually all vestiges of foreign, and particularly British, economic and administrative tutelage in Iran.

Reza Shah's modernization policy led to the formation of new urban middle classes and, more specifically, a new professional bureaucratic intelligentsia which became the main support of his regime. He also had the support of the leaders and supporters of the 1905 through 1911 Constitutional Revolution and of the Social Democrats in his efforts to create a modern, independent nation-state. However, his political and social reforms were met with strong resistance from two major traditional forces: tribal chiefs and the clergy. The formation of a centralized bureaucracy and the unification and strengthening of the armed forces undermined the traditional privileges of tribal chiefs and eventually led to the expansion of the central government's authority over tribal areas. The secularization of Iran's judicial and educational systems greatly alarmed the clergy, who had also become concerned about some of Reza Shah's other innovations, such as public dress codes for both men and women, which they saw as undermining traditional Islamic lifestyles and values. Especially controversial was his order that women not appear in public covered in the traditional Iranian chador.

Reza Shah lived the life of a simple soldier. He was known for his parsimony and distaste for luxury. He had a great capacity for work, was often personally involved in minor administrative matters, and had a remarkable memory for the mundane details of governance. However, he also developed an obsession with acquiring large landed estates, mostly through forced gifts from private owners or through outright confiscation. A much more serious character flaw with respect to the sociopolitical development of the country was his highly autocratic and arbitrary leadership style, particularly in the latter half of his reign, in the 1930s. His method of ruling left little room for the development of personal initiative or a genuine parliamentary system of government. Furthermore, his autocratic regime also blocked the formation of a viable political elite that could guarantee the continuation of reforms undertaken during his reign. His mounting fear of disloyalty, rivalry, and sedition led to the banishing

or elimination of a number of prominent political figures, most of whom had supported him in his meteoric rise to power and helped him set the country on the path of modernization. Prominent among his victims were the court minister Abdul Hussein Teymurtash; Ali Akbar Davar, the architect of Iran's modern judicial system, state industries, and enterprises, who was driven to suicide; and the chiefs of the Qashqaʾi and Bakhtiari tribes. Taqi Arani, the leader of a group of leftist intellectuals, died in prison under suspicious circumstances. Sayyid Hasan Modarres, a leading political cleric, and Farrokhi Yazdi, an acerbic poet and journalist, were also among Reza Shah's victims. By the end of his reign, his authoritarian rule had alienated not only an important group of the professional bureaucratic intelligentsia but also a growing number of the independent intelligentsia, such as Sadeq Hedayat and Malek al-Shoara Bahar; the intelligentsia of the left; and the nationalist figures who rallied around Mohammad Mossadegh in the 1940s.

With the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Iran declared its neutrality. In 1941, after Germany invaded the Soviet Union and Moscow and London became wartime allies, Iran suddenly acquired strategic importance as a potential Allied supply route that circumvented Nazi-controlled Europe. A joint Anglo-Soviet force invaded Iran on 25 August 1941. On 16 September 1941, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favor of the crown prince, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Reza Shah left Iran on 28 September aboard a British vessel. He remained under de facto house arrest in Mauritius and later in Johannesburg, South Africa, where he died on 26 July 1944.

See also Constitutional Revolution; Cossack Brigade; Jangali; Millspaugh, Arthur; Mossadegh, Mohammad; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; South Persia Rifles; Tabatabaʾi, Ziya; Trans-Iranian Railway; University of Tehran.

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Ahmad Ashraf

PAKHTUN

See Pushtun

PAKISTAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Pakistan's ties to the Middle East are based on history, religion, security, and economics.

Pakistan's historical links with the Middle East go back to the Arab invasion of Sindh in 712 C.E. The Arab–Islamic and Iranian cultures have deeply influenced the civilization of the areas that now comprise Pakistan. Contemporary geopolitical considerations have reinforced Pakistan's interest in the Arab region. For security as well as religious reasons, Pakistan has attached great significance to its relations with the Arab Islamic states.

The perception of a security threat from India and their dispute over Kashmir have impelled Pakistan to look toward the Islamic countries as "natural allies." Nevertheless, Pakistan's use of common Islamic symbols and shared religious identity did not satisfy the countries of the Middle East. Instead, Pakistan's decision to join the U.S.-sponsored security pacts in the 1950s provoked Arab hostility, particularly from Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Archrival India found the political climate in the radical Arab states more congenial for its diplomacy. Pakistan's relationship with the West brought it closer to Iran, Turkey, and pro-West moderate Arab states.

In response to declining U.S. interest in military alliances, Pakistan's Middle East policy underwent a fundamental transformation in the early

1970s. As an alternative to dwindling Western support, Pakistan began to look toward the Arab oil-producing countries for economic assistance. Under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran became an important regional ally and also a source of much-needed foreign aid. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states showed tremendous interest in Pakistan's security and economic development.

With the manifold increase in oil revenues, the Gulf region became more attractive for Pakistan as a market for its surplus manpower. Millions of Pakistanis have worked on developmental projects in the Gulf countries. The Pakistani workers abroad not only have lessened the pressure on unemployment at home but also have earned the country tens of billions of dollars. In the peak years (1980–1988), Pakistani workers remitted about three billion U.S. dollars a year that offset the huge gap in the balance of trade.

While Pakistan has unilaterally and unconditionally supported the Arab states in their disputes with Israel, including a Palestinian homeland, it has not received unanimous political backing of all the Middle Eastern countries in its disputes with India. In pursuit of bilateralism, Pakistan has carefully avoided taking sides in conflicts between the Muslim states. In the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, Pakistan remained strictly neutral. Pakistan's participation in Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991 was a different matter. It was launched under the United Nations banner, and the coalition of Western and Arab states enjoyed broader legitimacy in forcing Iraqi invaders from Kuwait.

Over the years, Pakistan has emerged as an important regional actor in the Middle East, although it maintains a low profile. It has security protocols with a large number of Middle Eastern states. Pakistan provides training facilities to the armed forces of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Also, Libya had access to these facilities in the 1970s. Pakistani military personnel serve in various capacities as trainers and advisers for Arab armies. In the 1980s, Pakistan stationed about 10,000 of its troops in Saudi Arabia. As a quid pro quo, Saudi Arabia financed the modernization of Pakistan's air force. In the latter part of the twentieth century, among developing countries, Pakistan had the second largest military presence overseas (after Cuba)—all of it was in the Middle East.

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RASUL BAKHSH RAIS

PALESTINE

Area located on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean south of Lebanon and northeast of Egypt.

The area known as Palestine has taken on different geographic and political connotations over time. The following discussion distinguishes between (a) pre-twentieth-century history of the area; (b) Palestine as a territory under British administration from late 1917 to early 1948; and (c) Palestine as the territory administered by the Palestine National Authority since 1994, also known as the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Pre-Twentieth-Century History

Palestine has since ancient times been a crossroads between Asia, Europe, and Africa. Its climate is arid. The southern half, the Negev, is desert, but in the north there are several fertile areas. The principal water source is the Jordan River, which flows south through Lake Tiberias into the Dead Sea.

Palestine is of central importance to three monotheistic faiths: Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. For 1,300 of the past 1,400 years, the land was under Muslim rule. Most European and North American Christians and Jews consider Palestine on both sides of the Jordan to be the Holy Land of the Old Testament of the Bible. Although the British initially designated the area of the Palestine Mandate to extend eastward to Mesopotamia (Iraq), by the early twentieth century most people took the Jordan River to be the eastern border of Palestine.

The earliest inhabitants of Palestine were the Canaanites. The land was conquered by numerous invaders, including (in the fourteenth century B.C.E.) the Hebrews and the Philistines, who gave

On Christmas Day, pilgrims flood into the city of Bethlehem, the birthplace of Jesus Christ. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

the country its name. The Israelites, a confederation of Hebrew tribes, established a unified kingdom in the area under David and Solomon (c. 1000–922 B.C.E.), which subsequently split into the kingdoms of Israel in the north and Judaea in the south. From 587 B.C.E., Palestine became a province of the Persian Empire, and was later ruled by Jewish kings as part of the Roman empire. The Romans crushed the Jewish revolts of 66–73 and 132–135 C.E., killing and exiling many Jews, and renaming the area *Syria Palaestina.*

In 638 C.E. Arabian Muslim armies captured Jerusalem and replaced the Byzantine rulers of the area, which thereafter became known as *Filastin.* Arab geographers in the tenth century referred to Filastin as one of the provinces of Syria, but by the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the term was no longer used.

From the fifteenth century until the end of World War I, the region was part of the Ottoman Empire. Changing provincial and administrative boundaries within the empire blurred Palestine's separate existence. In an attempt to centralize government administration, the Ottoman Empire was divided into new administrative regions under the Vilayet Law of 1864. Under this arrangement the central and largest part of Palestine, as well as Transjordan, became part of the *vilayet* (province) of Damascus. The northern part of the country, including Acre, Haifa, Tiberias, Safed, Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarm, was part of the *vilayet* of Beirut. Jerusalem, Gaza, Hebron, and Beersheba became the *sanjak* (district) of Jerusalem, which, because of the city's special religious status and because of European interest, was established as an independent unit governed directly from Constantinople (now Istanbul).

By the mid-nineteenth century the population of Palestine was about 500,000, the vast majority of whom were Muslims. The southern half of the country, later called the Negev, was mostly desert, sparsely inhabited by bedoun tribes. Overall, only about a third of Palestine was suitable for cultivation.



Map by XNR Productions, Inc. The Gale Group.

By the end of the nineteenth century, a commercial bourgeoisie comprised of Muslims, Christians, Jews, and German Templars played an important role in the incorporation of Palestine's economy into the world economic system. There was a major increase in cultivation of export commodities that included wheat, barley, sesame, olive oil, and oranges. Small-scale industries produced textiles, soap, oil, and religious items.

Palestine as a modern political entity came into existence as a result of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. Although the Arabs of the region considered themselves to be a distinctive group, there was no serious conflict between them and the Ottoman Turkish establishment until the early twentieth century. Nineteenth-century Palestinian elites approved of and benefited from the Ottoman reform effort (Tanzimat, from 1839 to 1876), and many of them held influential posts in the ruling establishment in Constantinople. Several served in the parliament; Nablus was reputed to be especially favored by Sultan Abdülhamit II. It was against this backdrop that an Arab "decentralist" movement would emerge before World War I, and within this wider pan-Arab political sentiment the first seeds of a distinct Palestinian nationalism were sown.

Although Jews had been living in Palestine (which they call Eretz Yisrael, the Land of Israel) for millennia, the first politically motivated Jewish immigration came in 1882. At the time, the Jewish population was about 24,000, mostly comprised of Orthodox Jews unaffiliated with the Zionist movement. They were settled mainly in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed, and Tiberias. There was little friction between these Jews, the "Old Yishuv," and the indigenous Arab population. However, as the number of Zionist settlements increased, quarrels arose between them and neighboring villages over grazing, crops, and land issues. Between 1886 and World War I, there were several armed clashes that resulted from Jewish settlers purchasing land from absentee Arab owners and subsequently dispossessing the peasant cultivators.

Growing opposition to Zionism and emergence of a new pan-Turkish ideology following the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 led to a heightened sense of distinctive Palestinian patriotism. Although most of the Palestinian elite remained loyal to the Ot-

toman sultan during World War I, a few prominent intellectuals identified with the nascent pan-Arab nationalist movement. During the war, opposition to Ottoman authority increased because of economic disasters (caused by a locust plague, drought, and famine) with which the Ottoman authorities failed to cope, and because of the repressive measures imposed by the Turkish governor, Cemal Paça.

Palestine under British Rule

Before World War I the area that became Palestine was sometimes known as "southern Syria." With the retreat of the Ottoman Army, Palestine was occupied by British forces under General Sir Edmund Allenby in 1917 and 1918, and was placed under a military government administration known as Occupied Enemy Territory Administration South (OETA-S) until 1 July 1920, when the military regime was replaced by a British civil administration. During three decades of British rule, Palestinians further developed their national consciousness and were able to exercise some degree of national-communal political activity.

In London, the British foreign secretary, Arthur J. Balfour, wrote a letter on 2 November 1917 defining His Majesty's Government's new policy favoring the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. In April 1918 a Zionist Commission arrived in Jaffa with a mission (despite a local publication ban on the Balfour Declaration) to prepare the Yishuv to enjoy special status and privileges under an expected pro-Zionist British regime that would encourage Jewish immigration, settlement, land purchase, and—eventually—statehood. Rumors about the impending implementation of the Balfour policy alarmed many sectors of the Palestinian population, whose local leadership created, during the first year of the British occupation, a country-wide organization to express its opposition to Zionism. The Muslim-Christian Association (MCA) first appeared in Jaffa early in November 1918, and in Jerusalem later the same month; subsequently it set up branches in various Palestinian towns. The purpose behind creating the MCA was to organize a Palestinian national struggle against the threat of Zionism.

The top leadership of the MCA was drawn largely from the older generation of urban notables who had social standing in Ottoman times. Initially, the MCA, under former Jerusalem mayor Musa Kazim al-Husayni, did not have much political power, and its significance derived from the fact that it embodied the concept of political cooperation between Muslims and Christians in Palestine. Gradually, however, it became a group of leaders and activists who were able to mobilize important segments of Palestinian society around a program of independence and opposition to Zionism. Their main instruments of political action were petitions submitted to the Palestine government and the organizing of demonstrations and other campaigns on instructions from the Jerusalem secretariat, which was headed by Jamal al-Husayni. Yet the notables who led the MCAs were interested in maintaining friendly relations with the new British masters of the country.

Ashkenazi Jews descend from Poland, Austria, Germany, or Eastern Europe. Traditionally the Ashkenazi Jews speak Yiddish. **© Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

As part of its efforts to promote Palestinian national demands, the MCA was instrumental in convening a country-wide congress in Jerusalem from 27 January to 9 February 1919. Called the first

Palestine Arab Congress, it was followed by six more, the last of which was held in 1928. The MCA also initiated the formation of the Arab Executive (AE) Committee that tried to coordinate the national struggle in the 1920s and early 1930s.

Government of Palestine under the Mandate

Following the British takeover, Palestine acquired fixed boundaries, its own government, and a political identity separate from the surrounding countries carved from the Ottoman Empire by Great Britain and France. Its separate identity was given international recognition when Great Britain assumed the Mandate for Palestine under the League of Nations in July 1922. In 1923 the British unilaterally divided the area of the original mandate into Transjordan (east of the Jordan River) and western Palestine, with the Jewish national home provisions of the mandate applying only to the latter territory. The area east of the river became the autonomous emirate (principality) of Transjordan (later the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan) under the Amir Abdullah, son of the sharif of Mecca.

Map by XNR Productions, Inc. The Gale Group.

According to the terms of the Mandate for Palestine, Great Britain was ultimately responsible to the League of Nations for governing the country, which was ruled, in effect, like a colony, under a high commissioner (HC) appointed by the British government. The HC was responsible to the Colonial Office in London rather than to the local population and had authority to make all government appointments, laws, rules, and regulations. He was backed by British military forces and police. Most high commissioners were former British colonial officials or army generals. The government of Palestine created its own courts, postal service, police force, customs, railroad and transportation network, and currency backed by the British pound sterling. Until 1948 the inhabitants of the country, both Arabs and Jews, were legally called Palestinians and considered British subjects.

The British attempted to introduce a limited measure of self-government through establishment of advisory and legislative councils during the 1920s and 1930s. The first, set up in October 1920, was a nominated advisory council (AC) pending the establishment of a legislative body. The AC was composed of ten Palestinian officials: four Muslims, three Christians, and three Jewish members of the Yishuv.

In August 1922 the HC, Sir Herbert Louis Samuel, proposed as a first step toward self-government a constitution that called for the replacement of the AC with a legislative council (LC). The proposed LC was to be composed of twenty-three members: eleven appointed British members, including the high commissioner, and twelve elected Palestinian members, incuding eight Muslims, two Christians, and two Jews. However, in order to safeguard the Balfour policy of support for the Jewish national home, the HC would retain a veto power and the council's legislative authority would not extend to such central issues as Jewish immigration and land purchase.

The Jews reluctantly accepted, but the Palestinians rejected the proposed constitution and boycotted the elections for the LC in February 1923. Palestinian leaders argued that participation in the council would be tantamount to acceptance of the British Mandate and Balfour policy, which they feared would lead to their subjugation under a Jewish majority in an eventual state. The poor election turnout caused the HC to shelve the LC proposal and revert to the idea of an advisory council. But Samuel failed to convince Palestinian leaders to sit on a revised AC; nor was his subsequent proposal to establish an "Arab Agency" (to be parallel to the "Jewish Agency" recognized under the mandate) any more successful at winning the cooperation of local politicians. Samuel thereupon abandoned the idea of encouraging popular participation in the governing of Palestine. Although the idea of establishing a LC would be revived in 1928 and again in the early 1930s, the British were unable to win both Arab and Jewish support for their proposals. As a result, Palestine was governed, from 1923 until the end of the Mandate in 1948, by a HC in consultation with an AC composed only of British officials.

Britain's Dual Obligation and Intercommunal Rivalry. The League of Nations Mandate for Palestine incorporated provisions of the Balfour Declaration calling for "establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." It also recognized the "historical connexion of the Jewish people with Palestine," promised support of Zionist objectives, and gave preference to Jewish land acquisition and settlement. Although the mandate (like the Balfour Declaration) made no specific reference to the Arab population as possessing national rights (referring to them as the "existing non-Jewish communities"), it prohibited "discrimination of any kind . . . between the inhabitants of Palestine."

As a result of this dual obligation to both foster the establishment of the Jewish national home and ensure "that the rights and position of other sectors of the population are not prejudiced," British policy was ambivalent, and at first seemed destined to arouse unrealizable expectations on the part of both communities. Initial support for Zionist objectives was indicated in the appointment of Herbert Samuel, an Anglo-Jewish leader sympathetic to Zionism, as the first HC to Palestine (1920–1925). However, opposition by the country's Arab majority to the establishment of a Jewish homeland and to larger imperial interests became a major obstacle to full British cooperation with Zionist leaders who were eager, for their part, to proceed full speed toward their objectives of a Jewish majority and an eventual Jewish state in Palestine.

The dissatisfaction of Palestine's Arab population with Britain's pro-Zionist policy was expressed peacefully in the forms of public demonstrations, protest letters and petitions, and the dispatch of several delegations to London and Geneva. Palestinian leaders, seeking self-determination and the establishment of an Arab state in Palestine, feared Jewish domination (through increasing immigration and land purchases) and the establishment of a Jewish state. Nationalist frustrations led to periodic rioting (April 1920, May 1921, November 1922, August 1929, November 1933) and to a full-scale rebellion known as the Arab Revolt (1936–1939). Local British security forces restored law and order, and the Colonial Office in London issued several policy statements (White Papers) in attempts to redefine or clarify its Palestine policy. But all attempts to bridge the gap between the Arab and Jewish communities were unsuccessful; each community proceeded to develop itself with little, if any, contact with the other. By 1939 Great Britain had retreated from its position on implementing the Balfour provisions of the mandate.

Each community developed its own educational, health, welfare, cultural, political, and labor organizations. Arab schools supported by the Mandatory government's Education Department were conducted in Arabic with their own curriculum. The Yishuv had its own schools, where the language was Hebrew, and its own Hebrew University, founded in 1925. The two communities lived largely separately; contact was only at the peripheries, in government offices, or in a few business enterprises. The Yishuv was mainly urban, concentrated in the coastal region and in the city of Jerusalem, whereas the Arab sector was largely rural, in central Palestine.

By the end of the mandate in 1948, the Palestinian population had doubled, mostly through natural increase, from just over 650,000 (1922 census) to 1.3 million. During the same period the population of the Yishuv increased even more

dramatically, largely through immigration, from about 84,000 to approximately 650,000. The increase in the Jewish population from about a tenth to a third of the total population of Palestine was accompanied by extensive expansion of the Yishuv's socioeconomic and politicomilitary infrastructure. The number of rural collectives *(kibbutzim)*, cooperatives *(moshavim)*, and private farms increased several times; the all-Jewish city of Tel Aviv grew from an adjunct of Jaffa to the second largest municipality in the country. Jewish-owned industry dominated the economy. Despite the growth of its rural sector, the Yishuv was 85 percent urban by the end of the mandate, and Jewish-owned land comprised less than 7 percent of the total, although more than a quarter of the cultivated area was Jewish.

The Yishuv developed its own political parties and self-governing institutions that took responsibility for functions not under jurisdiction of the mandatory government, such as courts, education, and social welfare. The British recognized the World Zionist Organization as the official agency to implement establishment of the Jewish national home. Within Palestine the Yishuv elected its elected assembly *(Assefat ha-Nivharim)*, whose national council *(Vaʿad Leʾumi)* ran the day-to-day affairs of the Jewish community. More than a dozen political parties were divided into four principal categories: labor, general Zionist, Orthodox religious, and Sephardic or Oriental. The strongest political bloc was labor by virtue of its control of the Histadrut, the large labor federation that controlled much of the Yishuv's economy, and of the largest paramilitary group, the Haganah.

Palestinian Political Organization during the Mandate. The Palestinian community was much less centralized and more loosely organized than the Yishuv. The older politicians, representing the traditional elite and notable families who had been closely associated with the Ottoman establishment, had formed the MCA in 1918 and continued to lead the Palestine Arab Congresses by holding positions on the Arab Executive.

With the defeat of Faisal's Arab kingdom by the French in July 1920, Palestinian leaders who had previously been engaged in the struggle for independent "Greater Syria" focused on local problems, primarily the struggle against the British mandate and the Jewish national home. Later that year, the third Palestinian Arab Congress convened in Haifa, elected an AE committee, and sent a delegation to plead the Palestinian cause both at the Colonial Office in London and at the League of Nations headquarters in Geneva. Neither the congresses nor the AE were successful in attaining their objective, and both gradually lost credibility. When its chairman, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, died in 1934, the Arab Executive ceased to exist.

Throughout the mandate period serious rivalry for political office and government favor existed between members of the Nashashibi and Husayni families. The most influential Palestinian leader was al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, appointed by the British as mufti of Jerusalem in 1921 and elected president of the Supreme Muslim Council in 1922. By virtue of these positions he commanded extensive financial resources and influence throughout the Palestinian community. Prior to 1936 the mufti pursued a policy of cooperation that aided the High Commissioner in keeping the peace. However, following the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in 1936, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni became more militantly anti-British. His activities ultimately led the British to seek his arrest, but in mid-1937 he escaped, first to Lebanon, then to Iraq.

Supporters of the mufti, called Councilites *(al-majlisiyyun)*, were opposed by "the Opposition" *(al-muʿaridun)* led by the Nashashibi family. Both groups were supported by extensive clan *(hamula)* networks and client relationships. The Husaynis, the larger network, were considered more militant than the Nashashibis, who were willing to compromise with the British. Even though both factions rejected the Jewish national home, these internal rivalries constituted a weakness vis-à-vis the more cohesive Jewish community.

Following demise of the Arab Executive in 1934, younger and more militant elements became active in local Palestinian politics, leading to the creation of the Palestinian branch of the pan-Arab Independence (Istiqlal) Party headed by Awni Abd al-Hadi, who was joined by Akram Zuʿaytir and Muhammad Izzat Darwaza. The old MCA and AE forces also regrouped into rival Arab political parties, chiefly the Palestine Arab Party, organized by the Husaynis, and the National Defense Party, headed by the

Nashashibis. The Palestine Arab Party was founded in March 1935 by Jamal al-Husayni, a relative of al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni. Many political activists who had previously supported the AE (1920–1934) joined its ranks. Its leaders maintained close contact with the Roman Catholic community through its officers, Alfred Rock and Emile al-Ghuri, and with the activist scouts' movement and workers' societies in Jerusalem and Haifa. The party endorsed the following set of "national demands," which were later endorsed by an umbrella organization representing all major parties: (a) repudiation of the Balfour Declaration; (b) full stoppage of Jewish immigration and land purchases; and (c) the immediate establishment of Palestine as an independent state under Arab control.

The National Defense Party was formed on 2 December 1934 by the supporters of Raghib al-Nashashibi, the former mayor of Jerusalem. The leaders encompassed most Arab mayors; important politicians from large landowning families; influential middle-class Christians; and the Jaffa branch of the Palestine Arab Workers Society. The party denounced the sale of land to Zionist landholding companies and sought limitations on Jewish immigration. Nonetheless, it was tacitly more cooperative with the British authorities and Zionist leaders, and (unlike the Husaynis) maintained good relations with Amir Abdullah of Transjordan.

General Strike and Revolt, 1936–1939. By April 1936, growing Palestinian concern at the rapid influx of Jewish immigration and the accompanying frustration at British unwillingness to fulfill their national demands led to a general strike against the British authorities and the Yishuv. The strike soon became an uprising, drawing support from the whole Palestinian community and from Arab nationalist circles in the neighboring lands. The Arab Higher Committee (AHC), chaired by the mufti and representing a broad coalition of Arab political organizations, was formed to lead the uprising. Elements of the Palestine Arab Party formed an underground paramilitary force that remained active until suppressed by the British in early 1939.

During a lull in the fighting (1936–1937), the British sent a Royal Commission of Inquiry under William Robert Wellesley, the first Earl Peel, to ascertain the causes of the rebellion and to propose



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solutions. In July 1937 the Peel Commission recommended a form of radical surgery: the partition of Palestine into a small Jewish coastal state, and a larger Arab state to be joined with Transjordan. The Palestine Arab Party denounced the plan, and the revolt resumed, this time with greater support from nationalist groups in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The National Defense Party, for its part, accepted the Peel Commission concept of territorial partition and was not averse to the idea of linking the Arab portion of Mandatory Palestine to Abdullah's Transjordan. The party was criticized by other Palestinian politicians for deviating from the antipartition consensus.

The short-lived unity behind the AHC was broken when the uprising entered its second phase in 1937. The Nashashibi member of the AHC resigned, leaving leadership in the hands of the mufti and his allies. In 1937 the British outlawed the AHC and arrested and deported several of its members. The mufti and several of his associates fled to Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, from which they attempted to keep the rebellion alive. During 1937 and 1938 a number of assassinations took place as the struggle between followers of the Nashashibis and Husaynis turned violent, contributing to a leadership vacuum in the Palestinian community. By 1939 the rebellion petered out as a result of the conflict within the Palestinian community and the massive use of force by the British. In the end, the Palestinians had suffered staggering losses: more than 3,000 dead, 15,000 to 20,000 wounded, and more than 5,000 leaders and fighters in detention.

In their search for a political formula that would reestablish tranquility in Palestine in light of a looming European war, the British convened a roundtable conference of Arab and Zionist representatives at London's St. James's Palace in early 1939. Bickering over who should represent the Palestinians contributed to the ineffectiveness of the small Palestinian delegation (headed by Jamal al-Husayni and George Antonius) that sat through many meetings alongside those of Iraq, Egypt, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. When the conference broke down without reaching consensus, Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald issued a White Paper in May that retracted the Peel Commission's partition recommendation and proposed instead that, over a period of ten years, self-governing institutions would be developed for an eventual independent Palestinian state that would not be dominated by either Arabs or Jews. At the same time, the White Paper restricted Jewish immigration to 75,000 over five years, with any subsequent immigration dependent on Arab approval. Furthermore, the purchase of land by Jews would be limited in some parts of Palestine and forbidden in others. The White Paper thus limited the expansion of the Jewish community and its territorial holdings, but fell short of the Palestinians' demands for total stoppage of immigration and the immediate granting of independence.

During and after World War II. Overshadowed by the necessities of prosecuting the British war effort after 1939, local political activity in Palestine was quiescent, despite the absence of consensus in support of the new White Paper policy. Within the Yishuv, official Zionist policy was to fight the restrictions of the MacDonald White Paper as if there were no war against Germany, while helping in the fight against the Axis powers as if there were no White Paper. Britain was left to pursue its war effort without official Zionist, Arab, or Palestinian endorsement of the provisions in the White Paper.

Faced with these new directions in British policy, attempts were made to revive the AHC, but these were marred by the continuing rift between the Husaynis and Nashashibis and by the absence of many exiled leaders whom the British had prevented from returning to the country. By 1941 the National Defense Party had become inactive, although Raghib al-Nashashibi continued to issue statements in its name. Some leaders of the Palestine Arab Party were able to return to Palestine and reopen the party's offices in April 1944 and to use its connections with the Arab Bank and the local press to regain substantial influence. A Husayni-dominated AHC was organized in 1945, but it was countered by an opposition Arab Higher Front. When Jamal al-Husayni returned in February 1946 he gained control over the AHC as well as the Palestine Arab Party. Later that year the Arab League intervened, and another AHC was set up.

In the struggle following World War II the AHC rejected various British and Anglo-American compromise proposals and, ultimately, the 1947 United Nations (UN) partition proposal. Paramilitary organizations formed to oppose partition were split be-

tween the Husayni al-Futuwwa and the opposition al-Najjada. The 29 November 1947 announcement of the UN General Assembly vote recommending partition led to Palestinian attacks on Jewish quarters in Jerusalem, triggering an intermittent "civil war" that lasted from December 1947 to May 1948. The 14 May proclamation of Israel's independence, immediately upon the official termination of the mandate and the withdrawal of British forces and administration, was followed by the invasion of Palestinian territory by the armies of Transjordan, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The first Arab–Israel war, which also involved Lebanese forces and volunteers from Saudi Arabia and Yemen, ended in early 1949 with the defeat of the Arab forces and the signing of armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

The fighting of 1948 to 1949 displaced more than 700,000 Palestinians (approximately half the Arab population of Palestine) who had fled or been expelled by Jewish (later Israeli) forces. This fragmentation of Palestinian society and the creation of a huge refugee population became known as *al-Nakba*—the catastrophe. For many years, controversy has swirled around the question of responsibility for this massive defeat and for the creation and persistence of the Palestinian refugee problem. Blame has been attributed variously to a deliberate Israeli policy of expulsion; disunity, distrust, and disorganization among Palestinian leaders and their supporters in the neighboring Arab countries; and tactical or strategic errors made by the Palestinian leadership—notably their rejection of the UN partition proposal. Recent archival research has unearthed new evidence for the first explanation, and has drawn attention to a fourth contributing factor: the asymmetry or imbalance of forces—throughout the Mandate period, but especially after 1937—between the Yishuv and the Palestinian community. The former was growing, determined, better armed, and highly disciplined, and had enjoyed British protection during its formative years. The Palestinians, on the other hand, were demoralized, disunited, and without effective leaders, many of whom had been killed or exiled during and after the revolt.

Disappearance and Reemergence of Palestine

With the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel in May 1948 and the occupation of the Gaza Strip by Egypt and of the West Bank by Jordan, Palestine ceased to exist as a separate political entity. Yet, during the 1950s, Arab, British, and UN documents continued to refer to the situation "in Palestine" when dealing with Israel, the neighboring Arab states, and areas inhabited by displaced Palestinians. Even without a political territory or government, Palestinians maintained their distinctive national and historic consciousness, and were reluctant to cease identifying with their lost homeland.

Putting their hopes in UN resolutions, the declarations of their own exiled leaders, and the promised support of neighboring Arab regimes, most Palestinians continued to dream of their eventual return to their homes and the establishment of an Arab Palestinian state. As refugees, the Palestinians became the focus of international relief efforts; successive generations of Palestinians were born in exile and in refugee camps of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Yet, political solutions based on the Palestinians' right to return or compensation (UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 1948) eluded generation after generation of Middle Eastern leaders.

Some Palestinians in exile became active in seeking political and military solutions that would result in their return and the eventual creation of an independent Palestinian state. Despairing of the efforts on their behalf of members of the League of Arab States, Palestinians developed their own leadership, known as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Initially created by Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1964, the PLO's first chairman was Ahmad Shuqayri. After 1968 the PLO became an autonomous umbrella organization under the leadership of Yasir Arafat, bringing together many Palestinian groupings. For the next decade, the PLO adopted "armed struggle" as its primary mode of operation, thereafter developing a diplomatic campaign to restore Palestinians to their homeland by replacing the Jewish Israeli state. The boundaries of the future Palestinian state were declared to be those of the former British mandate.

The PLO's quest for international recognition of Palestinian rights was crowned with its first major success in 1974, when the United Nations Gen-

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eral Assembly passed Resolution 3236 in support of the "inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine" to "self-determination without external interference," to "national independence and sovereignty," and "to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted." The following year, the UN created the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. Although they provided only moral support, such declarations and activities added much-needed international legitimacy to the Palestinians' quest for recognition of their right to a homeland during a period when both Israel and the United States were defining the PLO as a terrorist organization unworthy of inclusion in diplomatic discussions.

A decade later, in a further effort to open a dialogue with the United States, and hoping to capitalize diplomatically on the intifada against Israeli occupation that had been sparked in December 1987 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, representatives at the twentieth meeting of the Palestine National Council in Algiers in November 1988 issued a symbolic declaration of Palestinian independence. At the same time, they formally endorsed the land-for-peace and mutual recognition approaches contained in UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967—a resolution whose text makes no mention of the Palestinians or their rights. Afterward, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat issued several prepared statements denouncing the use of terrorism by all parties, and implying that the future Palestinian state would exist alongside, rather than in place of, the Jewish state of Israel. Arafat's last step resulted in the opening of a PLO dialogue with the United States.

During the 1991 Madrid Conference and subsequent talks at the U.S. State Department, Palestinian leaders were invited to participate (as part of a joint delegation with Jordanians) for the first time in direct negotiations with Israel. Following the historic mutual recognition between the Israeli government and PLO and the signing of the Oslo Accord in September 1993, a process was begun to provide for phased Israeli withdrawals, beginning in Jericho, from occupied Palestinian territories on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

In early 1994 a Palestinian National Authority (or Palestine Authority) was created to administer

these areas as further interim negotiations continued for additional Israeli pull-backs and other measures toward a final settlement. The Palestine Authority (PA) thus became an embryo government of a still-to-be-created sovereign Palestinian state. Many disappointments and frustrations prevented the scheduled later stages of negotiation from taking place or bearing fruit. This resulted in an untenable situation marked by violence and repression, most dramatically exploding into the second (al-Aqsa) intifada in September 2000. In the course of suppressing this Palestinian intifada, the Israel Defense Forces reoccupied, for varying lengths of time, many parts of the territories that had come under the rule of the weakened PA.

See also Antonius, George; Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arafat, Yasir; Balfour Declaration (1917); Darwaza, Muhammad Izzat; Gaza Strip; Husayni, Jamal al-; Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-; Husayni, Musa Kazim al-; Intifada (1987–1991); Israeli Settlements; Istiqlal Party: Palestine; London (Roundtable) Conference (1939); MacDonald, Malcolm; Madrid Conference (1991); Mandate System; Najjada, al-; Nakba, al- (1948–1949); Nashashibi Family; Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine Arab Revolt (1936–1939); Palestine Economic Corporation; Palestine Exploration Fund; Palestine Land Development Company; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palestine National Charter (1968); Palestine National Council; Palestine National Covenant (1964); Palestine Research Center; Palestinian Arab Congresses; Palestinian Authority; Palestinian Citizens of Israel; Palestinians; Peel Commission Report (1937); Samuel, Herbert Louis; Shuqayri, Ahmad; Transjordan Frontier Force; United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP); United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 1947 (UNSCOP); Vaʿad Leʾumi; West Bank; White Papers on Palestine; Yishuv; Zionism; Zionist Commission for Palestine.

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PALESTINE ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939)

Arab revolt in Palestine to resist British support for a Jewish national home.

PALESTINE ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939)

The revolt in Palestine (1936–1939) was in many ways the decisive episode in the efforts of the Palestinian Arabs to resist the British mandate's support for a Jewish national home in Palestine. Although it helped force a British policy reassessment, which led to the 1939 white paper curtailing Jewish immigration to Palestine, ultimately the revolt must be judged a failure. At its conclusion in 1939, the Palestinian Arabs were exhausted by more than three years of British repression. Perhaps 5,000 had been killed and 15,000 to 20,000 wounded; 5,600 of their leaders and fighters were in British detention; and most of the rest were scattered outside the country or dead. Such losses, in a population of about 1 million Palestinian Arabs in 1939, meant that more than 10 percent of the adult males were killed, wounded, or detained by the end of the revolt.

Equally important, the Palestinians failed to benefit politically. Their already divided leadership was fragmented further by the events of 1936 to 1939; and with many of its leaders in exile from 1937 on, it was paralyzed by a division between those outside of Palestine and those inside it that persisted for decades thereafter. These divisions contributed to the failure of the Palestinians to capitalize on the potential advantages offered them in the 1939 white paper, which with its limits on immigration and promise of self-government within ten years, held out for the first time the prospect of Arab majority rule in Palestine. In any case, the government of Winston Churchill, which came into office soon after, was resolutely opposed to its implementation. After the war, the impact of the revelation of the Holocaust, the growing strength of the Yishuv in Palestine, and the rising power of the United States in the Middle East combined to render it moot. The Palestinians came out of this ordeal politically weaker than they had gone into it, and unprepared for the struggle for Palestine (1945–1948) that, attendant on the establishment of Israel, resulted in the dispossession of about half the Arab population of the country.

Economically, the revolt was a disaster for the Arabs. It had begun in April 1936 as a spontaneous strike and boycott of the British and of the Jewish economy of Palestine. Effective though it was at the outset, the result was measurably to weaken the Arab sector of the economy, which did not have the resources or the resilience to support the hardships of the revolt, and to strengthen the economy of the Yishuv, which did. The Arab labor boycott, moreover, had the paradoxical effect of furthering the Zionist policy of giving jobs only to Jews—cheaper Arab labor had heretofore been favored by many Jewish businesses—and spurred the economy of the Yishuv to greater self-reliance.

On the military level, the Palestinians lost several thousand of their best fighters and military commanders in combat or to British firing squads, which executed 112 Arabs. Many thousands of others were wounded, detained, or forced into exile. In addition, the British seized over 13,000 weapons and 350,000 rounds of ammunition from Arabs (about 500 guns were seized from Jewish groups in this period), at a time when the British were arming units like the Jewish Settlement Police and cooperating with the Haganah to repulse Arab attacks. All of these losses, particularly in combatants, military leaders, and weapons, were sorely felt when the Palestinians confronted the well-armed and organized forces of the Yishuv during the fighting that started immediately after the partition resolution was passed by the United Nations General Assembly in November 1947. This fighting grew in intensity until May 1948, by which time the Palestinians had been routed in many crucial areas, losing the cities of Jaffa, Haifa, and Tiberias, and scores of villages, towns, and strategic roads and junctions to the advancing forces of the Haganah and its allies. In some sense, the outcome of these decisive battles (1947–1948) was determined by the disastrous political, economic, and military results of the 1936–1939 revolt for the Palestinians.

The revolt was notable for its spontaneous inception, with local committees springing up in April 1936 to organize a general strike and boycott that lasted until October of that year. Among the motives for the revolt was the rapid growth in Jewish immigration to Palestine: From 1932 to 1936 there were 174,000 immigrants, more than the total Jewish population of the country in 1931. The Arab Higher Committee was formed by Palestinian notable leaders soon after the strike began, largely in response to this pressure from below, but never really gained control of events. In the sporadic fight-

ing of 1936 and in the intense battles of the second phase of the revolt, which began in September 1937, local organization was paramount, with minimal coordination between the mainly peasant military bands, which bore the brunt of the fighting. In spite of this lack of coordination, the Palestinians initially had the British on the defensive for much of 1937 and 1938 and took control of most Arab cities, towns, and villages, and much of the countryside. Only the arrival of massive British reinforcements—which brought troop strength to over 20,000 by 1938—and the intensive use of air power were able to break the back of the revolt.

In much Palestinian historiography, the revolt has been glorified as the forerunner of the modern Palestinian "armed struggle" that was launched in 1965. It is commonly linked to the attempts of Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam to organize an armed rebellion against the British, which were aborted when he and some of his comrades were hunted down and killed by British forces in 1935. Qassam's example was very influential, however: Many thousands marched in his funeral cortege, and hundreds of his followers, whom he had organized in clandestine cells in the northern part of the country, played crucial roles during the revolt; they included some of the most senior commanders. Qassam's legacy is a disputed one, however, claimed by al-Fatah and other Palestinian nationalist groups, and more recently by the radical Islamic HAMAS movement, which has named its armed wing for him.

See also Arab Higher Committee (Palestine); Arab–Israel War (1948); Churchill, Winston S.; Fatah, al-; Haganah; Haifa; HAMAS; Holocaust; Jaffa; Qassam, Izz al-Din al-; Tiberias; Yishuv.

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RASHID KHALIDI

PALESTINE ECONOMIC CORPORATION

American-funded economic aid program to Jews in Palestine.

Founded in 1926 by a group of prominent American Jews, including Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, the Palestine Economic Corporation provided material aid and technical assistance to Jewish business enterprises in Palestine. Funding was usually in the form of loans or equity investments. Subsidiaries to the corporation included the Palestine Mortgage and Savings Bank and the Central Bank of Cooperative Institutions, which provided funds for low-cost housing and credits to kibbutzim, among other social programs.

Through 1946, the corporation had funded more than ninety enterprises and played a key role in establishing such basic industries as chemicals, citrus products, paper, plastics, and tires. The corporation later changed its name to PEC Israel Economic Corporation. By 1967 it had eleven thousand stockholders, mostly in the United States, with assets of more than $28 million in Israel's industrial, construction, and citrus sectors.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

PALESTINE EXPLORATION FUND

British research group founded under the patronage of Queen Victoria for scientific study of the Holy Land.

Established in 1865 to study biblical sites, the Palestine Exploration Fund began work in Jerusalem in 1867, especially the work of Charles Warren on the Walls of Jerusalem. The fund expanded its scope in the 1870s to conduct a complete survey of the Holy Land. The fund's team of geographers, archaeologists, anthropologists, and orientalists published numerous articles that influenced British public

opinion. Its maps, drawn between 1871 and 1877, were used by Sir Edmund Allenby in his victorious cavalry campaign in Palestine in World War I and are invaluable today to historians. The maps designated the historical boundaries of Palestine as extending a few miles east of the Jordan River. Some members of the fund, particularly its director, Claude Reignier Conder, advocated British colonization of Palestine and the restoration of its Jewish population. The group funded the work of archaeologists W. M. F. Petrie and Kathleen Kenyon.

See also ALLENBY, EDMUND HENRY; HOLY LAND.

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PALESTINE LAND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

Land-purchasing company of the World Zionist Organization.

Established in 1908 by Arthur Ruppin, a German Jew, as part of the World Zionist Organization, the Palestine Land Development Company (PLDC) used Jewish National Fund and private monies to purchase and populate tracts of land with Jewish immigrants. It acquired extensive holdings in northern Palestine (Galilee), particularly in the 1920s and 1930s.

The PLDC bought nearly 90 percent of its land from large landowners, rather than individual peasants. Many of the transactions created controversy, such as the PLDC's purchase of 240,000 *dunums* (144,000 acres, 60,000 ha) of fertile land in the Jezreel valley between 1921 and 1925, its purchase of 30,000 *dunums* (18,000 acres, 7,500 ha) at Wadi Hawarith in 1929, and its assumption of the Lake Huleh concession in 1934.

See also JEZREEL VALLEY; RUPPIN, ARTHUR; WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO).

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)

The institutional structure of the Palestinian national movement and the political representative of about nine million Palestinians.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO; Arabic, *Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya*) was created at the Arab summit in January 1964 to contain and channel Palestinian nationalism and prevent Palestinian guerrilla groups from taking independent actions to liberate Palestine, from which Palestinians had fled or had been expelled by the Israel Defense Force (IDF) in 1948. The Palestine National Council (PNC), the PLO's parliament, convened with 422 members in Jerusalem in May 1964 and elected a fifteen-member Executive Committee, which chose as its chairman a lawyer, Ahmad Shuqayri. The PNC adopted a national covenant or charter *(al-mithaq al-watani),* which was revised in 1968, calling for the elimination of Israel and the restoration of Palestine to the Palestinians.

When Israel defeated Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967 and occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, both Arab and Palestinian leaders were discredited. Shuqayri was replaced by another lawyer, Yahya Hammuda. The guerrilla groups, the most significant of which was Al-Fatah, expeditiously moved to fill the political vacuum by increasing their attacks on Israel. On 21 March 1968, Israel massively retaliated at Karama, Jordan. The guerrillas'

stiff resistance resulted in the deaths of at least 21 Israelis, about 100 Palestinians, and 40 Jordanian soldiers who aided the Palestinians. The guerrillas embellished their own accomplishment, inflated Israel's casualties, and gave little credit to the Jordanians. Karama became a symbol of struggle against Israel, which many had considered invincible. Al-Fatah gained thousands of recruits, Arab admiration, and financial support, primarily from the Gulf Arab states. More important, the guerrilla groups won control over the PLO. They amended the national charter in July 1968 to underscore the rejection of Arab interference in Palestinian affairs, the total liberation of Palestine by Palestinians through armed struggle, and establishment of a democratic secular state of Arabs and Jews.

Yasir Arafat, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman, smiles at a child in a Palestinian refugee camp in west Beirut, Lebanon, 15 July 1982. During the height of Israeli occupation, Arafat made several such tours to help boost morale among Palestinians. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

Groups within the PLO

The battle at Karama propelled Yasir Arafat, head of al-Fatah, into the leadership position. An engineer educated at Cairo University, he was elected at the fourth PNC (February 1969) to replace Hammuda as chair of the Executive Committee. The PLO was transformed from an Arab-controlled organization to an umbrella of disparate military and political groups. Although these groups had a common goal, the liberation of Palestine, they differed considerably on ideology and tactics. The dominant group was al-Fatah, established in Kuwait by Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), and Arafat (Abu Ammar), who became its spokesperson. It owed its broad appeal to Arafat's charismatic personality and to its pragmatic politics, which eschewed ideology for action toward a simple national goal: the liberation of Palestine. Al-Fatah's chief rival in the PLO was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), headed by George Habash, a Christian physician educated at the American University of Beirut. The PFLP is a Marxist group dedicated to the overthrow of conservative Arab governments. Its contempt for the government of Jordan led it to challenge Jordan's sovereignty, triggering the 1970–1971 civil war that resulted in the PLO's defeat and its relocation to Lebanon. An offshoot to the left of the PFLP that espouses Marxism-Leninism is the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), led by a Jordanian Christian, Nayif Hawatma. Another offshoot is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC), led by Ahmad Jibril. Others include al-Saʿiqa, controlled by Syria, and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), controlled by Iraq.

The influence of these groups has been disproportional to their numbers, but some see them as a necessary alternative to the centrist al-Fatah. They have stimulated political debates. They have charged that the lack of a coherent ideology within al-Fatah has led to an absence of vision regarding politics and society in the diaspora and the future state of Palestine; that many of its functionaries are inept and corrupt bureaucrats tolerated by Arafat; that the PLO drifts from crisis to crisis; that Arafat manipulates Palestinian institutions such as the PNC and the Executive Council and has autocratic powers that undermine Palestinian democracy; and that Arafat flirts with almost any nation—Jordan, Egypt, the United States—without a clear policy.

PLO diversity resulted in the groups working at cross-purposes or in costly blunders. For example, the Arab-controlled Saʿiqa and ALF emphasized Arab unity while others insisted on Palestinian self-reliance. Al-Fatah denounced airplane hijackings in 1969 and 1970 by PFLP and PFLP-GC as counterproductive to the Palestinian cause. While al-Fatah sought Arab support and generally avoided Arab problems, the leftist groups involved the PLO in the

civil war in Jordan and contributed to PLO involvement in Lebanon's civil war and in the Gulf crisis. Disagreements have led groups to secede from the PLO or to leave it temporarily. These could have brought violent conflict and disunity had it not been for the dominance of al-Fatah and Arafat's mass appeal and political skills. He often appeased or reflected diverse currents and articulated vague and, at times, contradictory positions—which, while damaging his credibility abroad and creating diplomatic immobility, enabled him to maintain the coalition. His leadership allowed the PLO to develop political, military, and socioeconomic institutions in Lebanon until 1982.

Institutions

Foremost among these institutions was the PNC, the PLO parliament, whose membership varied. It represented virtually all ideological tendencies and groups, including the commando organizations and their political branches, ten unions—those, for example, of workers, women, teachers, students, writers, and engineers—and Palestinian communities. It developed a large and complex infrastructure for the estimated 360,000 Palestinians in Lebanon. Its well-trained armed forces numbered about 16,000. Its social and economic institutions served almost half a million Palestinians and poor Lebanese. The Palestine Martyrs Works Society (SAMED) operated businesses and light industry grossing $40 million annually. The Red Crescent Society supervised sixty clinics and eleven hospitals, and the Department of Social Welfare provided financial assistance for the blind, day-care centers, the wounded, and families of "martyrs." By the early 1980s the PLO had gone from an umbrella of guerrilla groups to the institutional embodiment of Palestinian nationalism and a state within a state.

The political and economic institutions enhanced the PLO's prestige and legitimacy. The Arab League recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people at the Rabat conference (October 1974). A month later, the United Nations invited Arafat to address the General Assembly and awarded the PLO observer status. In 1976 West Bank and Gaza Palestinians voted out pro-Jordan mayors, replacing them with supporters of the PLO. By 1982, over 100 countries had recognized the PLO.

Setbacks

Despite such success, however, the PLO suffered major setbacks. After its expulsion from Jordan, it established a state within a state in Lebanon, thereby undermining Lebanon's sovereignty, incurring Israel's retaliation, and embroiling it in Lebanon's civil war after 1975. In March 1979, at Camp David, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat signed a separate peace agreement with Israel that excluded PLO participation and provided for a limited Palestinian autonomy instead of full self-determination. With Egypt neutralized, Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982 to destroy the PLO but succeeded only in forcing the PLO to move to Tunis; stripped of PLO protection, between 800 and 1,500 Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps were massacred in September by the Israel-allied Phalange. The 1982 Reagan peace plan, based on the Camp David autonomy proposal, once again excluded PLO participation. The following year, dissension within al-Fatah caused a revolt by Saʿid Musa Muragha (Abu Musa), with the help of Syria, which had long sought to control the PLO. When Arafat attempted to reestablish PLO power in Lebanon in 1983, Syria unleashed the forces of Abu Musa, who drove him out of Lebanon again. Israel attempted to undermine the PLO leadership by bombing its headquarters in Tunis in October 1985 but failed to kill Arafat.

Moderation and Diplomacy

Unable to strike at Israel, the PLO relied primarily on diplomacy to achieve a compromise settlement. At the twelfth PNC in 1974 and the thirteenth in 1977, the PLO had moderated its goal of liberating all of Palestine to one of establishing a state in the West Bank and Gaza; it supported the 1982 Fahad Plan that implicitly accepted a two-state solution. Empowered by the intifada, the Palestinian uprising that began against Israel's occupation in December 1987, Arafat in November 1988 led an enlarged PNC that included the DFLP to endorse the establishment of an independent Palestine state. It also endorsed the 1947 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181. In December 1988, Arafat declared the PLO's acceptance of Israel's right to exist, recognition of Security Council Resolution 242, and the renunciation of terrorism. The United States promptly opened a dialogue with the PLO.

Israel and its supporters, however, refused to acknowledge the change.

Israel's failure to reciprocate largely convinced Arafat to support Saddam Hussein in the 1990–1991 Gulf Crisis. This was a blunder that resulted in loss of financial support from the Gulf states. Without the support of the Soviet Union, short on funds, and fearing irrelevance, the PLO accepted the U.S. peace initiative that led to the 1991 Madrid peace conference between Israel and the Arab states and the Palestinians. However, twenty-two months and ten rounds of negotiations proved fruitless. The PLO regarded the framework for the talks as unfair and did not consider middle-level U.S. officials, especially those associated with pro-Israel lobbies, as "honest brokers." Norway established a secret channel in Oslo through which the PLO and Israel agreed to recognize each other. On 13 September 1993, at the White House, they signed a Declaration of Principles for a five-year Palestinian limited autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, starting with the Gaza Strip and the town of Jericho, followed by elections for an interim council, Israel's withdrawal from other parts of the West Bank, and transfer of power. Unresolved final status issues—Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, refugees of 1948, and borders—were deferred.

Toward Establishing a State

In May 1994, the IDF withdrew from Jericho and most of the Gaza Strip, and Palestinian police and a civil administration took over. Arafat moved to Jericho in June. Despite a decline in support for the peace process due to the violence and the slow pace of the negotiations, the PLO and Israel reached a number of agreements regarding the interim period, especially Oslo II, signed on 28 September 1995, which set the stage for Israel's further withdrawal from of the West Bank and the establishment of Palestinian Authority (PA) control over this area. The PLO held two PNC meetings in April 1996 and December 1998 to rescind articles in the National Charter that called for the destruction of Israel; the latter vote took place in the presence of U.S. president Bill Clinton. Clinton invited PLO chair Arafat and Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak to Camp David to negotiate final status issues of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The negotiations took place in July 2000, but failed and were followed by the second Palestinian uprising (Aqsa Intifada) against Israeli occupation. Even though the PLO resumed the negotiations with Israel, especially at Taba in January 2001, the negotiators ran out of time when Clinton left office in January and Prime Minister Ehud Barak was replaced by Ariel Sharon in February 2001. Sharon refused to resume negotiations with the PLO until the Palestinians stopped their violence. He reoccupied Palestinian cities, including Ramallah, where the IDF attacked Arafat's headquarters and placed Arafat under virtual house arrest.

Arafat and many of the leading members of the PLO are also leaders in the PA. Arafat is both the chair of the PLO and the president of the PA. Mahmud Abbas, who was Arafat's deputy in the PLO, became the first prime minister of the PA in 2003. Ahmad Qurai, deputy director of the PLO's department of economic affairs, became the second prime minister of the PA in 2003 and 2004. The PLO still has a primary role: to negotiate with Israel over the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Yet, with the establishment of the PA, the PLO was increasingly eclipsed by an elected Legislative Council and the many "state" institutions. If a state is established, the organization is likely to decline further, because its goal of establishing a state would have been fulfilled, and its institutions would be replaced by state institutions.

See also ABBAS, MAHMUD; ARAFAT, YASIR; FATAH, AL-; GAZA STRIP; HABASH, GEORGE; PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY; QURAI, AHMAD SULAYMAN; RAMALLAH; WEST BANK.

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PHILIP MATTAR

PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER (1968)

Amended version of the Palestine National Covenant with greater emphasis on armed struggle against Israel.

The fourth Palestine National Council meeting (Cairo, July 1968) amended the 1964 Palestine National Covenant to produce the Palestine National Charter (PNC). Following the Arab defeat of June 1967, the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) passed to the more action-oriented leaders of al-Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and other commando groups. While these groups continued to strive in principle for the ideals of Arab nationalism, in practice their character and development became increasingly Palestinian. Their focus was on Palestinian nationalism and on armed struggle against Israel.

The 1968 charter incorporated new principles that were supposed to guide Palestinian political action after the 1967 defeat. The charter has thirty-three articles. Article 1 explicitly defines Palestine as the "homeland of the Palestinian Arab people," while Articles 3 and 9 in particular stress the principles of self-determination and Palestinian national sovereignty over Palestine. Reference to these principles is made eight times. Moreover, the concepts of self-determination and sovereignty are defined in explicit Palestinian terms. Although the ethno-cultural links of the Palestinians to the larger Arab homeland are emphasized, they do not predominate over the territorial connection between the Palestinians and their homeland Palestine.

The 1968 charter radicalized the instruments of political action to be employed for the liberation of Palestine. Armed struggle is posited as the "sole road" to liberation (Article 9), and the concept recurs thirteen times in an emphatic, declaratory tone. Armed struggle, however, does not exclude conventional warfare as Article 10 suggests, since the Arab countries are considered partners in the battle for liberation. In this formula, the role of commando action was given primacy and regarded as the "nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war" (Article 10).

The principles of the charter were superseded by subsequent Palestine National Council decisions. Above all, they were superseded by the Declaration of Principles concluded between Israel and the PLO in September 1993. The PNC voted in April 1996 to cancel the portions of the charter calling for the destruction of the State of Israel and to draft a new charter within six months.

See also FATAH, AL-; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL; PALESTINE NATIONAL COVENANT (1964); POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE.

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MUHAMMAD MUSLIH

PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL

Constituent assembly or parliament for the Palestinian people.

The Palestine National Council (PNC) is the highest decision-making body within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the supreme representative institution of the Palestinian people. The PNC is the forum where official policies of the PLO are debated and formulated. Its resolutions and declarations represent the evolving consensus within the Palestinian national movement on major internal, regional, and international questions. Thus, PNC resolutions are best understood by comparison to previous resolutions and in relation to their wider political context. Similarly, their interpretation by the PLO leadership is best judged by its subsequent actions.

The Palestine National Council met in 1998 to rescind the Palestinian National Charter that had previously called for the destruction of Israel. U.S. president Bill Clinton was present for the historic vote. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

The PNC, like the PLO itself, grew out of the first Arab Summit, held in Cairo in January 1964. The summit resolved to enable the Palestinian people "to play a role in the liberation of their country" and empowered the Palestine delegate to the League of Arab States, Ahmad Shuqayri, to hold consultations on the implementation of this decision. A Palestinian General Congress, convening as the National Conference of the Palestine Liberation Organization, met in East Jerusalem in May 1964 to ratify its constitution and other documents that formally established the PLO and its institutions. The 397 invited delegates represented a broad spectrum of Palestinian life. Among the proposed institutions approved was a national assembly, which in 1970s came to be known as the Palestine National Council. Its structure, powers, and procedural rules are set forth in the Fundamental Law appended to the Palestine National Covenant, which survives in amended form.

According to the Fundamental Law, the PNC is the supreme authority for formulating the policies and programs of the PLO and its institutions, and all who operate under the PLO umbrella are accountable to its decisions. It does not sit in permanent session, has no permanent committees, and by force of circumstance has no permanent location. It must convene in regular session once a year (changed from every two years in 1971) and whenever requested by the PLO Executive Committee (the executive branch of the PLO) or PNC membership. In some years the PNC has not convened due to conflict (e.g., during the 1975–1976 Lebanese civil war), but under other circumstances its failure to meet has been the subject of fierce criticism, most recently when the PNC was not called into session to debate the 1993 Israeli–Palestinian Declaration of Principles.

Candidates for the PNC must be nominated by a committee (which since 1971 consists of the PLO Executive Committee, the PNC chairman, and the commander in chief of the Palestine Liberation Army), and then elected by a majority of the entire membership at its next session. It elects its own

PLO leaders Bassam Abou Sharif, Mahmud Darwish, and Harwan Kanafi at a 1991 Palestine National Council meeting. **© Francoise de Mulder/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

presidential office, which consists of a chairman, two vice chairmen, and a secretary. The attendance of two-thirds of its delegates is required for a quorum, and its initial practice of "collective decision-making" was in 1981 defined as majority voting. The PNC met in closed session until 1981, when foreign dignitaries and Palestinian observers were first invited. With few exceptions it publishes its resolutions and other documents, and the media may observe and record most of its proceedings.

Although election procedures remain in place, they have not been practiced since the Palestinian guerrilla organizations took control of the PLO in 1968 to 1969. The PLO's constituent organizations and PLO mass unions and labor syndicates are each assigned a quota of seats, decided through negotiation in accordance with each group's respective size and importance. Representative quotas for Palestinian exile communities, other nonformally organized Palestinians, and delegates resident in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories are directly selected by the PNC nominating committee. Although the PNC is an integral PLO institution, PNC delegates do not necessarily serve as officials in the PLO or as members of its constituent factions.

The size of the PNC has varied over time. In 1968 its membership was reduced from 466 to 100 and limited to representatives of guerrilla factions (68) and political independents (32) to ensure effective deliberations and guerrilla control over the PLO. Representatives of PLO unions were admitted in 1971, and membership was expanded to 150. In 1977 the PNC again represented Palestinian exile communities and additional diasporic groups (e.g., deportees), increasing its membership to 293. Active membership has since risen to pre-1968 levels. The PNC's progressive shift from guerrilla tactics to genuine diplomacy and conditional acceptance of the state of Israel's existence is mirrored in its current delegates.

At the beginning of each session of the PNC, the PLO Executive Committee must submit a report on its activities and the status of the PLO. A new Executive Committee, whose size and membership is determined by the PNC, is elected at the end of each session. The new Executive Committee's policy guidelines and other instructions, and PLO proclamations, are set forth in resolutions adopted by the PNC typically drafted in committee.

In 1970 the PNC also established the PLO Central Committee (since 1973 known as the Central Council) as an intermediate body between itself and the Executive Committee. It possesses legislative and executive powers and meets at least once every three months to review the work of the Executive Committee, approve its decisions, clarify PNC guidelines where necessary, and issue supplementary resolutions where relevant. Because it was designed to improve coordination between various represented and nonrepresented guerrilla factions, the Central Council is neither elected by the PNC nor entirely composed of PNC members. In its current form it comprises the Executive Committee, the PNC chairman, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) commander in chief, representatives of PLO constituent organizations and institutions, and PNC members selected by the Executive Committee. It elects a general secretariat from among its own members.

The PNC also hears the report of the Palestine National Fund (the PLO treasury), approves its budget, (re-)elects its Board of Directors (which elects its own officers), and considers reports and structures of other PLO institutions. It does not, however, have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the movements that operate under the PLO umbrella.

Given that regular general elections would be difficult if not impossible to conduct under the fragmented conditions of Palestinian existence, the PNC is a genuine attempt at creating a representative body, and generally it has been very successful. The PLO leadership has encouraged pluralism within the PNC, but the PNC exhibits some clearly undemocratic tendencies. Aside from the lack of elections, criticism of the quota system (practiced in all PLO institutions) claims that it places powers of decision-making and accountability in PLO factions rather than constituencies and encourages hegemony by a dominant group. The increasing appropriation of power by the PLO leadership has also led to a lack of regard for PNC resolutions and procedures as well as its marginalization as the locus of Palestinian decision-making. The PNC is now often eclipsed by the actions of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which was created as an interim governing body in 1994 representing pre-1967 Israeli-occupied territories. The PA was created as steps were being taken to establish a Palestinian state. The PNC would have eventually resumed its function with some restructuring, but al-Aqsa Intifada has made it nearly defunct.

The following is a list of cities where sessions have occurred and highlights important PNC resolutions:

1964: Jerusalem. Establishment of the PLO and drafting of the Palestinian National Charter.

1965: Cairo. Meetings held from 20–24 May. Arab–Israel War breaks out 5 June.

1966: Gaza.

1968: Cairo. Entry of the guerrilla movement, and amendment of the Palestine Charter insisting on total liberation of Palestine through armed struggle. Half of the PNC's seats given to the PLO.

1969: Cairo. Yasir Arafat elected chairman of the Executive Committee.

1970: Cairo. Crisis between guerrilla groups and the Jordanian army.

1971: Cairo. Endorsement of a secular democratic state.

1972: Cairo. PNC rejects Jordanian King Hussein's Palestinian/Jordanian United Kingdom Plan. Most Arab countries reject this plan, and Egypt cuts diplomatic ties with Jordan.

1974: Cairo. First steps toward endorsing a two-state solution, with an independent Palestinian state.

1977: Cairo. Reiteration of previous meeting's proposals. Emergence of a more moderate, mainstream PLO as well as West Bank leadership.

1979: Damascus. Rejection of Camp David Accords.

1981: Damascus. Meetings 11–19 April. In August, Saudi Crown Prince Fahd calls for peace plan and creation of Palestinian state recognizing Israel in its pre-1947 borders.

1983: Algiers: Rejection of the Reagan Plan, which outlined a Palestinian state with central authority in Jordanian, not PLO, control. PNC agreed to a confederation between the Kingdom of Jordan and an independent Palestine led by the PLO, based on the 1982 Fez Plan (based on the Fahd Plan) that called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

1984: Amman. Resolutions give Arafat the authority to cooperate with Jordan and Egypt, and call for improving relations with Syria. First Executive Committee decides to remove PLO institutions from Damascus and transfer PNC headquarters to Amman. Call for free Palestinian state in confederation with Jordan, which leads to the 1985 Amman Agreement in 1985.

1987: Algiers. Meetings held 20–25 April after the issue of the Tunis Document (16 March), which called for a free Palestinian state, accord on the Fez Plan, and rejection of the Amman Agreement. Intifada begins 9 December.

1988: Algiers. Referred to as the "Intifada meeting." Unilateral declaration of the independence of the Arab state of

Palestine. Reconciliation between al-Fatah and other factions that had challenged Arafat's leadership. 103 countries recognize the newly created Palestinian state.

1991: Algiers. Authorized Palestinian participation in negotiations with Israel.

1993: Washington, D.C. Israeli–PLO Declaration of Principles on interim self-government signed.

1994: Establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), an autonomous entity comprising the territory of Gaza and towns and areas of the West Bank occupied by the Israeli Defense Forces in 1967, for a five-year transitional period to include Palestinian interim self-government and a gradual transfer of powers and territories.

1996: Gaza. After signing the Oslo Accords, PNC votes 504 to 54 to void parts of the Palestinian National Covenant that denied Israel's right to exist. Edward Said, scholar and activist, leaves the PNC because he believes the Oslo Accords undermine Palestinian refugees' right to return to their homes in pre-1967 Israel. Arafat elected president of the PA.

1998: Gaza. PNC meets at the insistence of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. With U.S. president Bill Clinton presiding, it reaffirms its 1996 actions. Discussion of Wye River I and II memoranda for implementation of Oslo II accords.

1999: Discussion of Middle East Peace Summit at Sharm el-Shaykh and memorandum on implementation timeline.

2000: Discussion of implications of the Camp David 2000 Summit. PA negotiations on permanent status of a Palestinian State underway until outbreak of al-Aqsa Intifada in October.

2001: Discussion of the Mitchell Report on Israeli–Palestinian violence and al-Aqsa Intifada.

2002: Discussion of Permanent Status Negotiations.

Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Arafat has been confined to highly restricted movement by the Israeli government, making it extremely difficult to carry out the Palestinian legislative processes of the PNC and the PA. To remain the supreme political institution of the Palestinian people as a whole, the PNC must replace the quota system with democratic selection and become a permanent body if it is ever to become the genuine Palestinian parliament. In 2003 the PNC was chaired by Salim Zaʿnun. It had 669 members; 88 were from the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), 98 represented the Palestinians in the occupied territories, and 483 represented people of the Palestinian diaspora.

See also Arafat, Yasir; Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palestine National Covenant (1964); Palestinian Authority; Palestinians; Said, Edward; Shuqayri, Ahmad.

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PALESTINE NATIONAL COVENANT (1964)

A 1964 document adopted by the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The Palestine National Covenant was adopted by the Palestine National Council at its first meeting (May–June 1964) after being drafted by a special charter committee. The covenant reflected the Arab political mood of the time and the political mentality of its framers, who were, on the whole, notables selected from among Palestinian public officials, professionals, and businessmen. Five interrelated ideas constitute the thrust of the covenant. First, it emphasized the total liberation of Palestine, which in effect meant the dismantling of Israel. The concept of liberation recurs sixteen times in the twenty-nine articles of the covenant; all other concepts are subordinate to it. This concept encompasses Arab nationalism, Islam, and culture.

Second, and connected with liberation, came the concept of self-determination. However, it is not clearly articulated whether, after liberation, the Palestinians would exercise self-determination within the context of an independent Palestinian state or a Palestine that is united with one or more Arab states (Articles 4 and 10). The word "state" is absent from the covenant, but the tone of the articles and the political persuasion of the majority of the members of the charter committee suggest that preference was given to a liberated Palestine that would be united to a projected unitary Arab nation.

Third, the covenant offered a definition of who was a Palestinian and whether this definition applied to Jews. In an attempt to emphasize the indissoluble link between Palestinians and their homeland, Palestinians are defined as the Arab nationals who "resided normally in Palestine until 1947," that is until the start of the Palestinian exodus following the United Nations partition resolution of November 1947. In a supplementary article the covenant stipulated that the "Jews who are of Palestinian origin will be considered Palestinians if they are willing to live loyally and peacefully in Palestine" (Article 7).

Fourth, the covenant sanctioned the status quo that existed in the West Bank (under Jordanian control) and Gaza Strip (under Egyptian control) by stipulating that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would not exercise any sovereignty over those areas (Article 24). At the time, the PLO leadership adopted this position because it lacked the desire and the ability to challenge the system of those Arab states whose political prescriptions rested more on perpetuating the status quo than on disrupting it. Moreover, the principle of territorial sovereignty was overshadowed by the dream of Arab unity, which gripped the imagination of the Palestinian and Arab masses. This explains why Article 16 vaguely linked "national sovereignty" to the abstract idea of "national freedom."

Fifth, the charter did not clearly articulate the means by which the goal of liberation should be achieved. Armed struggle and revolution, both being principles that occupied a central position in the ideology of most national liberation movements, had no place in the covenant. Given the mood of the time, it is not surprising that the framers of the covenant prescribed Arab unity as the principle instrument for liberation.

This 1964 covenant was amended in July 1968 as the Palestine National Charter, and the amended version itself was superseded by subsequent Palestine National Council decisions.

See also PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER (1968); PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL.

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MUHAMMAD MUSLIH

PALESTINE RESEARCH CENTER

Research and publication center of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The Palestine Research Center was founded in Beirut in 1965 by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to study all aspects of Palestinian life in Israel and the Arab countries, Zionism, and contemporary politics and society in Israel. Its library

includes approximately 25,000 volumes, in addition to documents, photographs, and microfilms. Among its many publications is the Arabic-language journal *Shuʾun Filastiniyya (Palestinian Affairs).* It was directed for many years, beginning in 1978, by Sabri Jiryis.

Israeli authorities confiscated the center during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. The collection was later returned in December 1983, whereupon the center moved to Cyprus.

See also Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

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Jenab Tutunji
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PALESTINIAN ARAB CONGRESSES

Seven congresses convened by Palestinian Arab politicians between 1919 and 1928 to oppose pro-Zionist British policies and gain independence.

The first Palestinian Arab congress (al-Muʾtamar al-Arabi al-Filastini) met in Jerusalem from 27 January to 9 February 1919. Organized by local Muslim and Christian associations, its thirty participants framed a national charter that demanded independence for Palestine, denounced the Balfour Declaration (and its promise of a Jewish national home), and rejected British rule over Palestine. A majority sought the incorporation of Palestine into an independent Syrian state, and the delegates strongly denounced French claims to a mandate over Syria. The congress expressed its request for independence in the language of U.S. president Woodrow Wilson's principles supporting the right of self-determination of subject peoples.

Scholars disagree about the second congress. Muhammad Muslih argues that the British prevented it from being held, but other scholars view the Arab congress held in Damascus in March 1920 as the second congress. It proclaimed Syrian independence under Amir Faisal, son of Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca.

The third congress was held in Haifa in December 1920. The forty-eight delegates elected an executive committee (the Arab Executive), with a permanent secretariat based in Jerusalem; Musa Kazim al-Husayni headed it. The scion of a leading Jerusalem family, he had been removed by the British as mayor after riots in the spring of 1920. The congress and executive committee were dominated by middle-aged men from ranking Muslim and Christian landowning and merchant families, but younger, more radical politicians also participated—those who had returned home from Damascus in July 1920, after the French had overthrown Amir Faisal and established their mandate over Syria. In Palestine, a civil administration was established under Herbert Samuel, a British Zionist. The congress's resolutions omitted references to unity with Syria, but maintained firm opposition to Zionism, insisting that Palestine gain its independence as an Arab state. The resolutions appealed to the British sense of justice and fair play, in the hope that the pro-Zionist policies could be modified.

The fourth congress met in May 1921 in the wake of widespread riots in Jaffa. It resolved to send a delegation to London, headed by Musa Kazim al-Husayni, to alter British policy. The delegation remained in London through July 1922 and had some impact on British thinking: The Churchill White Paper of June 1922 indicated that the government might place some limits on Jewish immigration and promote a degree of Palestinian self-rule.

At the same time, a special assembly was convened in June 1922. It was more militant than the previous congress, and the participants voted to hold a peaceful two-day demonstration in mid-July against the establishment of the British mandate. That militancy increased in the fifth congress, held in Nablus in August 1922, with more than seventy-five delegates attending. They rejected the Churchill White Paper and launched a boycott of elections for the legislative council. Soon afterward, a second delegation went to Istanbul, Lausanne, and London in a futile effort to persuade the Turkish government not to sign a peace agreement without taking into account the interests of its former Arab provinces, which were being ruled by British and French forces.

The sixth congress met in June 1923 at the insistence of local Muslim and Christian societies who feared that Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca would sign a treaty with London that would recognize the British mandate over Palestine, rather than demand independence for Palestine. The 115 delegates resolved to send a third delegation to London to monitor the negotiations. Moreover, the resolutions stiffened the Arabs' rejection of representative institutions that did not grant policymaking authority to the Palestinian community, and the delegates even proposed such steps toward noncooperation as withholding taxes. However, the large landowners objected to that step, fearing that the British would seize their property in retaliation, and so action on those proposals was shelved.

The British mandate became effective in 1923, and the seventh congress convened from 20 to 22 June 1928, ending five years of tension and division among the Arab politicians. In the intervening years, the Nashashibi family of Jerusalem had withheld its participation in the institutions associated with the Arab congress, founded the National Party (1923), and contested with the Husaynis and their adherents in elections for the Supreme Muslim Council (1926) and local municipal councils (1927). New groups also had emerged among young educated Muslims and pan-Arab activists. The seventh congress sought to unite such factions behind the demand for a representative council and parliamentary government, which would help them attain their national goals. Since Jewish immigration had dipped in 1926 and 1927, the delegates had become less fearful of the Zionist movement than they had been in the past, and they hoped that a gradualist approach to self-government would attain their ends. Their resolutions also emphasized socioeconomic needs such as reopening the Ottoman-period agricultural banks so that farmers could obtain loans, increasing the allotment to education in the government's budget, and reducing the authority of the Greek priests in the Orthodox Christian community. The congress elected an enlarged Arab Executive whose forty-eight members included twelve Christians. The various factions were balanced: Musa Kazim al-Husayni retained the presidency, but both vice presidents (including a Greek Orthodox) favored the Nashashibi camp. The three secretaries were the young radical Jamal al-Husayni, the pro-Nashashibi Protestant lawyer Mughannam Ilyas al-Mughannam, and the pan-Arab, independent-minded lawyer Awni Abd al-Hadi.

The new Arab Executive immediately pressed the British to grant representative institutions, but its efforts coincided with renewed Arab–Jewish tension centered on conflicting claims to the Western Wall in Jerusalem. The riots of August 1929 undermined the cautious negotiating efforts of the Arab Executive; its members were swept up in the growing militancy of the Arab community. The fourth delegation to London in the spring of 1930 presented maximalist demands, including the immediate formation of a national government in which the Arabs would have the majority. The Arab Executive also supported the demonstrations and protests launched by youthful activists in the fall of 1933, as Jewish immigration and land purchases again escalated.

Following the death of Musa Kazim al-Husayni in March 1934, the Arab Executive held its final meeting in August. That meeting permitted the formation of political parties, but resolved to convene an eighth general congress in 1935. The eighth congress never met: By then, politicians were preoccupied with forming their own parties and contesting municipal council elections. When the Arab general strike began in Palestine in April 1936, a new coordinating body—the Arab Higher Committee—was constituted from the heads of the political parties. The Arab Executive then faded away. Although the Arab Executive had limited effectiveness, it had served as an informal voice for the Palestinian community for more than a decade. The congresses had provided an essential forum for Palestinian Arab politicians to debate fundamental policies and articulate their demands.

See also Arab Higher Committee (Palestine); Balfour Declaration (1917); Churchill White Paper (1922); Husayni, Jamal al-; Husayni, Musa Kazim al-; Mandate System; Nashashibi Family.

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PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

Autonomous Palestinian government operating in parts of the West Bank and Gaza starting from 1994.

The September 1993 Oslo Accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) called for the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority (PISGA) in those parts of the West Bank and Gaza from which Israeli forces would eventually withdraw. Israel would then cede certain autonomous powers to the PISGA pending a final peace settlement. This concept was actualized by the subsequent May 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement that led to an initial Israeli withdrawal from those two areas and that created the Palestinian Authority (PA), which would exercise autonomous powers until an elected Palestinian council could replace it. PLO Chair Yasir Arafat and a body of PLO cadres were allowed to return from exile and form the 24-member council of ministers that made up the PA, which commenced functioning in July 1994.

Palestinian prime minister Ahmed Qurai (left) and leader Yasir Arafat (right) pray before a meeting of the Palestinian parliament. © AP/WORLD WIDE PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

The September 1995 Interim Agreement between Israel and the PLO laid the basis for further Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank and for an elected Palestinian Council that would wield both legislative and, through its executive authority, executive powers. Following elections, the Palestinian Council and the president of its executive authority would thereafter assume the powers of Palestinian self-government from the PA, although in fact the new governmental structure that emerged continued to use the same name. Elections for the 88-seat council and its president were held in January 1996. Arafat won the presidency decisively. Chief PLO negotiator Ahmad Sulayman Qurai (also Qurei, Quray, Abu Ala) was elected as the first speaker of the council.

After further redeployments of Israeli forces starting in late 1995, the PA exercised different levels of authority in the West Bank and Gaza. By early 1997 it exercised full control over Gaza excluding the areas in and around Israeli settlements. The situation in the West Bank was more complicated. Israeli forces had only withdrawn from about 27 percent of the territory. The PA exercised full civil and security control over Area A, which included all of the major towns except Jerusalem (which remained under total Israeli control). It controlled civil matters in Area B—most other Palestinian villages and inhabited sites—but shared security functions with Israel. Finally, Area C remained under complete Israeli authority. Not only was the total area under full or partial PA control less than a third of the West Bank, it was divided among hundreds of separate Area A and B enclaves that were cut off from one another (and from Gaza) by Israeli-controlled Area C.

A burgeoning bureaucracy grew to enable the PA to govern. By early 1997 PA ministries and departments controlled many aspects of daily life for Palestinians. The PA even issued passports and postage stamps, and dispatched a two-man team to the 1996 Olympic Games. A multitude of competing security and intelligence agencies developed. Security forces comprised former soldiers of the PLO's exile Palestine Liberation Army, other exiles, and locally recruited men. These agencies included the National

Security Forces; Civil Police; Border Police; Coastal Police; Civil Defense; University Police; and Arafat's own guard, Force 17/Presidential Guard. Intelligence agencies included the General Security Service; Military Intelligence; Special Security Force; and the powerful Preventative Security Forces, headed in Gaza by Muhammad Dahlan and in the West Bank by Jibril Rajub.

Even after the Palestinian Council began meeting, Arafat continued to rule in an authoritarian fashion through the security and intelligence services and his new twenty-two-member executive council (cabinet). The judiciary was not independent; Arafat's government sometimes simply ignored its rulings, and certain cases were decided by secret military courts. Arafat possessed the authority to veto council legislation. As calls for reform mounted, important legislators such as Haydar Abd al-Shafi resigned, and Marwan Barghuthi introduced a no-confidence motion in the council in April 1997.

Palestinian demands for change combined with outside pressures for reform. Israeli and U.S. anger over terrorist attacks by groups such as HAMAS and Islamic Jihad that were based in the PA led to mounting international pressure on Arafat to crack down on militants and to change PA governance. The second intifada saw Israel reoccupy large areas of the PA and decimate its infrastructure. Yielding to pressure, Arafat in April 2003 created the post of prime minister, which was filled by veteran PLO leader Mahmud Abbas. The PA's ability to function, however, remained hostage to rivalries and wider developments in the peace process.

See also Abbas, Mahmud; Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arafat, Yasir; Barghuthi, Marwan; Dahlan, Muhammad; Gaza (City); HAMAS; Islamic Jihad; Israel: Overview; Israeli Settlements; Jerusalem; Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Qurai, Ahmad Sulayman; Rajub, Jibril; West Bank.

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PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

A remnant of the larger Arab community living in the parts of British Mandate Palestine that became the state of Israel in 1948.

Until 1948, both Jewish and Arab residents of Palestine were called Palestinians. After 1948, both Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel were called Israelis. In recent years, many Arab citizens of Israel preferred to be called Palestinians. Of the approximately 900,000 Palestinian Arabs who lived in the area that became Israel in 1948, fewer than 170,000 (about 12.5 percent of Israel's population) remained after the Arab–Israel War of 1948: 119,000 Muslims, 35,000 Christians, and 15,000 Druze. About 32,000 were town dwellers; 120,000, villagers; and 18,000, nomads. Some 30,000 were internal refugees, having fled from one part of Israel to another during the 1948 war. Most of the community leaders and professionals had left the country (only ten Palestinian physicians remained); most institutions were in disarray; and nearly every family had some members in the surrounding enemy countries.

The Palestinian population was separated from the Jewish majority in western, central, and upper Galilee, from Nazareth north. A few thousand remained in the former Arab towns of Ramla, Acre, Jaffa, and the city of Haifa, the Negev, and several score of smaller villages—a distribution that remained basically unchanged. Initially, most areas where the Arab minority of the new Jewish state lived were under the military authorities and subject to restrictive military government emergency regulations, which limited freedom of movement, access to civil courts, and individual ownership of land. The military authorities controlled nearly all aspects of life in the Palestinian community. The military government had to approve the appointments for most positions, from teachers in village schools to mayors of Palestinian towns.

Many in Israel's government considered Palestinian Arab citizens a security risk because of the continuing state of war with the surrounding countries, although the severity of military government restrictions was gradually eased until the Knesset terminated most emergency regulations during 1966. Even so, Palestinians living in Israel continued to be mistrusted by many Israelis even though

experience demonstrated that the number who might be a security risk was minute.

From 1948 until the early 1990s, government policy regarding Palestinian citizens of Israel was coordinated by the adviser on Arab affairs, a special office in the bureau of the prime minister. Several ministries—including education, religion, minorities, agriculture, and social welfare—also had special offices for Arab affairs, usually headed by Jewish officials. In the absence of most professionals, such as doctors, after the 1948 war, the government took initial responsibility for rehabilitating the Palestinian community. A social welfare network was introduced in Arab areas and welfare offices were opened. Special courses were organized to train Palestinian personnel, and clinics were established by the ministry of health. Village rehabilitation was organized to restore agricultural production through the replanting of olive groves, the introduction of farm mechanization, and agricultural loans.

Policies emphasizing the security and development of Israel as a Jewish state often vitiated efforts to integrate Israel's Palestinian citizens. This was evident in policies regarding land and other immovable property belonging to Palestinians. Property, including homes and farms, belonging to the 30,000 internal Palestinian refugees and to several thousand other Palestinian citizens was taken over by the custodian of absentee property, who was charged with the administration of possessions belonging to those who left their homes during the 1948 war. Most of those affected by the Absentee Property Law had fled to surrounding countries. However, much of the agricultural land belonging to Israel's Palestinian citizens also was seized by the custodian. Other laws pertaining to the acquisition of land for reasons of security and for development resulted in government sequestration of about 40 percent of the land belonging to the country's Palestinian citizens.

Land requisition policies resulted in a shift in the occupational pattern of the Palestinian community, which before 1948 had been mostly rural and agricultural, to widespread employment in the Jewish urban economy. However, the rural social network, based on traditional *hamulas* (families), remained largely intact. The majority of those in the urban economy traveled from their villages or towns to work in centers of Jewish commerce and industry, where they were employed in unskilled or low-paid jobs at the bottom of the economic ladder. Government land requisition led to the depeasantization of the Palestinian community and to shortages of urban property, which resulted in greatly overcrowded villages and towns. Yet some who retained agricultural land prospered, despite the overall decline in Palestinian farmland. From 1949, with the assistance of the agriculture ministry, modern farming methods, extensive mechanization, and irrigation were introduced; Palestinian agricultural productivity increased several times over. Although the overall economy of the Palestinian community lags behind the Jewish sector, a few of those who pay the highest income tax in Israel are from the minority community.

Initially the MAPAI (Labor Party), which controlled the government from 1948 until 1977, organized Palestinian political parties headed by local notables who were co-opted by the military government. These local parties elected several members to the Knesset, where they usually voted with the MAPAI. Some were led by *hamula* or tribal or clan leaders; some identified with ethnic factions such as the Druze. Other Arab Knesset members were affiliated with the Communist Party and the MAPAM (Left Labor Party).

Government officials charged with policy for the minority communities encouraged each to develop its own institutions and organizations. Thus the system of religious courts established during the Ottoman era, and continued during the British Mandate, was maintained; these included *shariʿa* (Islamic religious) courts and separate courts for each of the several recognized Christian denominations. In 1962, the first Druze religious court, separate from the Islamic courts, was organized. The Druze were initially permitted to join Israel's military forces; later they were subject to the draft. A few Bedouin and Christian Palestinians also were permitted to join the armed or security forces, and some attained high rank. Government policy generally exempts Muslims other than Bedouins from serving, which results in the exclusion of most of Israel's Palestinians from certain family and other government allowances and increases the difficulty of finding employment, since prior military service

is required for many jobs, especially in government jobs related to national defense.

Between 1948 and the early 1990s, the Palestinian community experienced rapid economic, social, and political development. A new generation of leaders replaced those who had fled before and during the 1948 war or who had been co-opted by Israel's government. By the late 1950s, and in the 1960s and 1970s, the new generation of Israel's Palestinians included many politically active professionals, university-educated in Israel or abroad. They became increasingly dissatisfied with the position of Israel's Palestinian citizens. Many with advanced degrees were unable to find employment in jobs commensurate with their training and skills. Issues that concerned them included the government's land policies; the citizenship law, which gave preference to Jewish immigrants; the lack of Arabs in responsible government posts; the disparities between government resources allocated to the Jewish and Palestinian sectors in education, housing, and other services; and the perception that they were not accepted as full citizens of Israel. Opposition to government policies was evidenced in a shift of Palestinian voting patterns away from Labor and other Jewish parties, initially to the Communist Party of Israel. Attempts to organize Palestinian nationalist parties were blocked by government authorities or by internal dissension among potential Palestinian leaders.

By the 1960s, Palestinian nationalist sentiment had increased, and many Arabs in Israel supported Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The rise of this national consciousness was demonstrated in 1965 when Israel's Communist Party split into a Jewish faction and a largely Palestinian nationalist faction, the New Communist List (RAKAH). Although several of RAKAH's leaders were Jewish, most of its votes came from Palestinian Israelis who perceived it as the principal legal vehicle for expressing opposition to government policies. Other groups attempted to organize opposition parties but were either banned by the authorities or failed to galvanize sufficient support. By the 1970s, RAKAH was winning more votes within the Palestinian community than any of the Jewish parties, and it became the principal voice opposing government policies toward what was officially called the Arab sector. Later, RAKAH was joined by organizations, such as the Committee for Defense of Arab Lands and the Committee of Heads of Arab Local Councils, to form HADASH (the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality). Like parties in the Jewish political spectrum, Palestinian parties often split, reformed, and acquired new names and leaders. Thus in the 2003 election, the main Arab parties included BALAD (National Democratic Assembly), HADASH, TAʿAL (Arab Movement for Renewal), and the United Arab List. More radical Arab parties included the Organization for Democratic Action and the Progressive National Alliance. All advocated equal rights for Palestinian citizens inside Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state coexisting with it.

The Arab–Israel War of 1967 and Israel's occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem (formerly part of Jordan), and Gaza (formerly occupied by Egypt) constituted a watershed for Israel's Palestinian citizens. For the first time since 1948, they could establish direct contacts with Palestinians in surrounding countries. From 1948 until 1967, only a small number of Christians had been permitted to cross from Israel to Jordan once or twice a year, at Christmas and Easter. After 1967, Israel's Palestinian citizens could visit the West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinians in the occupied areas could visit Israel. Many family relationships were reestablished, Israel's Palestinians were increasingly exposed to new developments in Palestinian national consciousness, and they were no longer regarded by the Arab world at large with suspicion or mistrust. Larger numbers of Israel's Palestinians identified themselves not only as loyal citizens of Israel but also as supporters of the Palestinian national cause. Increasing numbers identified themselves as Palestinians first and as Israelis second.

Significant demographic changes characterized Israel's Palestinian community. It grew from 12.5 percent of Israel's population in 1948 to over 18 percent by 2000, mostly as a result of natural increase. By the 1990s, Sunni Muslims constituted 78 percent of the Arab population; the Druze, approximately 9 percent; and various Christian denominations, about 13 percent. Most Christians were Greek Catholic (32 percent), Greek Orthodox (42 percent), or Roman Catholic (16 percent). At the turn of the century, 1,200,000 Palestinians lived under Israel's jurisdiction, including over 200,000 residents of East Jerusalem (annexed by

Israel in 1967; most nations, including the United States, do not recognize Arab East Jerusalem as part of Israel). Few East Jerusalem residents chose to become Israeli citizens; most retain passports issued by Jordan.

Despite great improvements in infant mortality, average life span, literacy, and similar social indicators by 2002, 92 percent of Palestinian workers were in the bottom half of the country's wage scale, and a third of Palestinian children lived below the poverty line. By 2002, only 5.7 percent of civil servants were Palestinian citizens. Of these, more than half worked in health and social services; few were directly involved in policy-making or decision-making roles. Of Israel's 5,000 college and university lecturers, only about 50 were Arab citizens. These were among the factors contributing to the growing radicalization of Israel's Palestinian community. Palestinian discontent led to increasing demands for full equality, expressed in support for groups such as the Democratic Arab Party, the Progressive List for Peace, and the Islamic Movement. Tensions also grew between the country's Jewish and Arab citizens, caused by wide differences over the peace process and Israel's treatment of Palestinians in the occupied territories. Israel's Palestinian citizens were not consulted or involved in the Oslo talks or the negotiations that followed. Most supported or sympathized with the Palestinian intifadas of 1987 through 1991 and 2000. The brutal response of the Israeli police to nationalist protest demonstrations in October 2000 left thirteen Palestinian Israelis dead and scores more wounded, creating a deep wound among Israel's Palestinian citizens. These tensions were underscored in the election campaign of 2003 when the Central Election Committee attempted to strike BALAD leader Azmi Bishara and TAʿAL leader Ahmad Tibi from the ballot. Although Israel's Supreme Court overrode the decision, the key issue in dispute remained: Was Israel to be a Jewish state or a state of all its citizens?

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Communism in the Middle East; Druze; Gaza Strip; Intifada (1987–1991); Israel: Political Parties in Israel; Knesset; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Oslo Accord (1993); *Shariʿa;* West Bank.

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Don Peretz

PALESTINIANS

A people who consider themselves descendants of the Canaanites, and other peoples who have settled in Palestine since ancient times.

The name *Palestinian* applies in contemporary times to Muslim and Christian Arabs who inhabited Palestine as a consolidated community until the creation of Israel in May 1948, an event that shattered the community and dispersed about 726,000 Palestinians throughout the Middle East, primarily to Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

In 2004 the total number of Palestinians was estimated at 8.9 million. Approximately 88 percent

are Muslims, and the other 12 percent are Christians. Until the initiation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the summer of 1994, the largest concentration of Palestinians lived under Israeli occupation. In 2004 approximately 2.1 million lived in the West Bank, 200,000 in East Jerusalem, and 1.33 million in the Gaza Strip. Approximately 1.3 million lived in pre-1967 Israel as Palestinian citizens of the Jewish state. Other Palestinians lived in other Arab countries, especially Jordan, which had approximately 3 million.

Late Ottoman Period

The politics and culture of the Palestinians from the latter part of the nineteenth century until after the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on 13 September 1993 can be divided into five stages. In the first stage, from 1876 to 1917, the Palestinians shared a common cultural heritage shaped primarily by the values of the Arab and Muslim empires that had ruled the country with few interruptions from 638 C.E. to 1917. Palestinian society in this stage consisted of three major classes: peasants *(fallahin),* commercial bourgeoisie, and urban notables or patricians. The patricians were the ruling class, and their influence ran deep in the countryside and in Palestinian cities and towns.

In 1897 the Basel program of the first Zionist Congress strongly affected the Palestinians. The program fixed the Zionist goal: "To create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine, secured by public law." This ushered in the first phase of a protracted struggle between indigenous Palestinians and Jewish immigrants. Opposition to Zionism was the focus of Palestinian political activities, as well as of Palestinian historiography and other forms of writing.

British Rule

The second stage, from 1917 to 1948, was inaugurated with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. By the autumn of 1918 Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq were under British control. This development made Palestine increasingly vulnerable to Zionist colonization—first, by isolating the country from its wider Arab environment and second, by giving the British a free hand in implementing the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, in which the British promised to support a Jewish National Home in Palestine. With the Balfour Declaration, the stage was set for a long struggle between the Palestinians and the Zionist immigrants. The Palestinians, who constituted approximately 90 percent of Palestine's population by the end of World War I, saw in the Zionists a potential threat to their national existence.

In strategic terms, the Palestinian-Zionist struggle was over the status quo. The Palestinians wanted to preserve the status quo, through political and diplomatic efforts between 1917 and 1936 and through armed rebellion during the Palestine Arab Revolt of 1936 to 1939. In contrast, the Zionists sought to change the status quo through mass immigration and land acquisition. The Jewish population in Palestine rose from 9.7 percent in 1919 to 35.1 percent in 1946, and Jewish-owned land increased from 2.04 percent of the total area of Palestine in 1919 to 7 percent in 1946. Meanwhile, British policy in the military sphere was aimed at disarming the Palestinians and arming the Jews. Thus, by 1947 the overall power equation was decisively in favor of the Zionists.

Palestinian society was also affected by three other factors: Zionist settlement activity, British colonial policies, and the expansion of Palestine's economy. While dominant members of urban notable families continued to control the politics of the country, other social forces were at play. The expansion of trade and the growth of coastal cities and towns enhanced the position of the middle class. Artisans and craftsmen, as well as people engaged in the finance, construction, and service sectors, also benefited from the expansion of trade. However, the peasants, who constituted almost two-thirds of Palestinian society, did not benefit from these economic developments. Their condition worsened in great part because of Zionist settlement and the lack of capital. Although Jewish agricultural settlers had adequate land, the indigenous Palestinian peasantry lacked the space necessary for its growing population. The October 1930 report of Sir John Hope-Simpson acknowledged this problem, noting that there was not room for a substantial number of Jewish settlers on the land.

The depressed state of the peasantry, together with other developments, had produced rebellion

within Palestinian society by the mid-1930s. The most notable development was the escalating rate of Jewish immigration. The influx of Jewish immigrants had two major consequences: It produced panic and desperation among the Palestinians, reinforcing their fears of Jewish domination in the future; and it radicalized the Palestinians and convinced them that the British were unwilling or incapable of following an evenhanded policy. Against this background, a revolt erupted in May 1936 and continued unabated until the summer of 1939, with only a short lull between November 1936 and January 1937 while the Peel Commission toured Palestine to ascertain the causes of the revolt.

With the publication of the Peel Commission Report in July 1937, the rebellion exploded again in opposition to the commission's recommendation calling for a tripartite partition: a Jewish state; a Palestinian state to be incorporated by Transjordan; and a British mandate over other areas. There was a Palestinian consensus against partition because the proposed Jewish state would cover about 33 percent of the total area of the country at a time when Jewish ownership of land was roughly 5.6 percent, and because a large portion of Palestinian villages, and a high percentage of Palestinians, would fall inside the Jewish state. The British responded to the Palestinian revolt with the full force of their military power. In terms of the cost in human lives, the revolt was a national calamity for the Palestinians: More than 3,075 were killed, 110 hanged, and 6,000 jailed in 1939 alone. At the same time, the British organized, trained, and armed special Jewish forces, creating in the process a Jewish military infrastructure that gave a decisive edge to the Jewish forces ten years later during the Arab–Israel War of 1948.

When the British realized that partition was not practicable, as indicated by the Woodhead Commission report of November 1938, they convened the unsuccessful London Conference in February and March 1939 to resolve the issue of the future status of Palestine. To break the deadlock, Malcolm MacDonald, colonial secretary of state, issued a white paper on 17 May 1939. Although the white paper fell short of meeting long-standing Palestinian demands, it introduced a number of important modifications concerning immigration and the application of the Balfour Declaration.

British implementation of the white paper proved difficult, partly because of Palestinian and Zionist opposition and partly because of the burdens of World War II. In these circumstances, by the 1940s the British were unable to handle the effects of the Balfour Declaration. The military and political structures of a Jewish national home were already in place in Palestine, in great part because of Britain's generosity. In almost every respect these structures were superior to those of the Palestinians.

Against this background, the United Nations (UN) divided Palestine into Jewish and Arab states in November 1947. The Palestinians rejected partition primarily because the UN proposed to give the Jews 55 percent of Palestine when Jewish ownership in November 1947 did not exceed 7 percent of the country's land. By contrast, the Jews found it in their interest to accept partition. Thus, the door for armed conflict in Palestine was wide open. A civil war between Jews and Palestinians followed the partition resolution. After the British left Palestine in May 1948, war, interspersed with cease-fires, continued until July 1949.

Units of armies and volunteers from neighboring Arab countries came to the aid of the Palestinians, who were losing the civil war and fleeing in large numbers. However, the Arab intervention was to no avail. The Jewish immigrant population was militarily superior to all the Arab soldiers combined. The Jews were also superior in terms of leadership, organization, and institutional links to the Western powers. In the end, the Zionists prevailed. Israel seized 77 percent of Palestine; about 726,000 Palestinians became refugees, many of them forcefully expelled by the Jewish forces while others fled out of fear. The Palestinians call this event *al-Nakba,* or the catastrophe.

The politics of the national struggle left a deep imprint on the intellectual life of the Palestinians, as is clearly illustrated in Palestinian historiography, art, and literature. There were literary and artistic works written in the romantic tradition, such as those by Khalil Baydas, Khalil al-Sakakini, and Muhammad Isʿaf al-Nashashibi, that focus on the social responsibility of men of letters and the relationship between culture and civilization. Other works, written in the realist tradition, reflect the philosophies of Ibn Khaldoun, Hegel, Marx, and Darwin.

From *al-Nakba* to the 1967 War

The third stage, which lasted from 1948 to 1967, was characterized by formal armistice agreements between a number of Arab states—Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan—and Israel; the disarray among Arab states unsuccessfully attempting to achieve Arab unity; the impact of Cold War politics on the Middle East; the eclipsing of Palestinian nationalism by Arab nationalism; and Israel's refusal to accept any responsibility for what had befallen the Palestinians in 1948. Uprooted, dispersed, and with no state of their own, diaspora Palestinians (60% of the Palestinian population in 1948) came under the guardianship of the host Arab countries in which they lived. Another 30 percent lived in the West Bank and Gaza, and the remaining 10 percent lived in Israel. As a whole, the lives of Palestinians during this stage were marked by national dispersion, occupation, job insecurity, uncertain residency, discrimination, and political repression.

The post-1948 situation had serious consequences. First, it made the Palestinians totally dependent on the Arab states. Second, geographical dispersal made it difficult for the Palestinians to work together within one organizational framework. Thus, some Palestinians identified with the Arab National Movement, others with the Arab Baʿth Party or the Muslim Brotherhood; others acquired senior positions in the bureaucracies of Arab governments, particularly the Jordanian government, or formed independent Palestinian movements that advocated armed struggle against Israel. Life in the diaspora radicalized certain Palestinian groups that embarked on armed struggle against Israel in the mid-1960s in the hope of triggering an Arab–Israel war.

Against a background of inter-Arab rivalries and escalating Arab–Israel tensions, the Arab League created the PLO in 1964. The PLO's leadership was entrusted to Ahmad Shuqayri, a diaspora Palestinian of upper-class origin. In theory, the PLO was to work for the liberation of Palestine, but in practice it provided cover for Arab inaction toward Israel. The PLO charter of 1964 called for the total liberation of Palestine. Arab unity, rather than armed struggle or revolution, was posited as the instrument of liberation. Palestinian authors such as Abd al-Latif Tibawi, Fadwa Tuqan, and Fawaz Turki gave expression to this goal. Many of them romanticized this goal by infusing it with the sentiment of the Palestinian concept of return. History books, novels, and collections of poems and pictures of Palestine poured forth during this period to express the pain of exile and the overpowering desire to return.

Literary and political themes were expressed by poets such as Mahmud Darwish, Samih al-Qasim, and Tawfiq Zayyad and literary critics such as Salim Jubran, Ihsan Abbas, and Afif Salim. Palestinian and Islamic historiography was produced by Arif al-Arif, Muhammad Izzat Darwaza, and Akram Zuʿaytir. Stories of great Arab travelers were written by Iskandar al-Khuri al-Baytjali and Nicola Ziyada.

Reemergence of the Palestinian National Movement

The fourth stage of contemporary Palestinian history, from 1967 to the present, began with the Israeli conquest of the West Bank and Gaza in June 1967, a development that resulted in the displacement of more than 300,000 Palestinian refugees who fled the West Bank and the Golan area. Approximately 120,000 of these people were second-time refugees who had lived in refugee camps under Jordanian or Syrian jurisdiction. The Arab–Israel War of 1967 also resulted in the placement of the West Bank and Gaza under the jurisdiction of the Israeli military government. During its occupation of these territories, Israel undertook settlement and other activities that had a devastating impact on the Palestinians, including the formal annexation of East Jerusalem and the doubling of its surface area; the settlement of more than 120,000 Israelis in the Palestinian sector of the city; the confiscation of more than 55 percent of the West Bank and more than 40 percent of the Gaza Strip; and the deportation of some Palestinians from both areas.

Soon after the 1967 war, the Palestinians arose as an independent political force. They asserted the primacy of Palestinian nationalism and expressed themselves in the idiom of revolution and armed struggle. The PLO charter, revised in 1968 to give expression to this new trend, called for the liberation of all of Palestine, emphasizing that armed struggle was the only way. Aware at the time that the problem of Israeli Jews must be addressed, the PLO articulated the idea of a secular democratic state anchored on nonsectarian principles of coexistence

among the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim citizens of a liberated Palestine. In terms of political organizing, the Palestinians used Jordan as their early base of operations against Israel. In an attempt to attract international attention, radical Palestinian groups resorted to acts of violence, including the hijacking of civilian airliners and the murder of members of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich in September 1972.

The unprecedented coincidence between the radicalization of the Palestinians and the emergence of pragmatism and a preference for a diplomatic settlement with Israel on the part of key Arab states led to tensions between revolutionary Palestinians and the new Arab political order. The Jordanian Civil War (1970–1971) epitomized the incongruence between the romanticism of revolutionary Palestinians and the pragmatism of the leaders of Arab states. The Palestinian guerrillas were defeated in Jordan, but they moved to Lebanon, where they reemerged as a strong political force in a country deeply divided by sectarian as well as socioeconomic differences. Their presence in Lebanon served as a catalyst for the civil war that was triggered in April 1975. After the Arab–Israel War of October 1973, a new Palestinian consensus emerged with respect to a diplomatic settlement with Israel. This consensus was reflected in the PLO's political programs of June 1974 and March 1977. Both programs implicitly called for peace with Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

Momentous events affected the Palestinians between 1982 and 1990. In June 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon. Thousands of Palestinians were killed, maimed, or taken prisoner by the Israeli invading force. After nearly three months of fighting, the PLO evacuated Lebanon under the protection of a multinational force and set up its new headquarters in Tunisia. While the PLO, led by Yasir Arafat, was trying to recover from the devastating impact of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the situation of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza continued to deteriorate under the impact of massive Jewish settlements and the policies of the Likud government, which took power in Israel in 1977. The Palestinian response to this situation was the Intifada (uprising), which erupted in December 1987. The Intifada put the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians in the limelight after several years of neglect by Arab governments whose energies were focused on the Iran-Iraq War.

The Struggle for a State

The intifada also catapulted the priorities of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians to the top of the PLO agenda. Before that, the PLO catered primarily to the preferences of diaspora Palestinians. This led to the further crystallization of the pragmatic trend that had begun to emerge in the previous phase. The intifada forced the PLO to move definitively toward the peaceful pursuit of a state in the West Bank and Gaza, where the overriding priority of the Palestinians living in those territories was to end Israeli occupation. This was the crux of the PLO's political program of November 1988, when the Palestine National Council accepted the UN land for peace Resolution 242 and recognized the State of Israel. Politically and intellectually, this phase witnessed the greater salience of religious activism with the emergence of the Islamic Jihad in 1986 and the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) in January 1988.

Despite their political difficulties, the Palestinians participated in the Arab national debate over cultural and sociopolitical issues. Hisham Sharabi wrote on Arab intellectuals and their interaction with Western culture. Using anthropological and sociological concepts, he also analyzed patterns of authority in contemporary Arab society. Edward Said, a scholar-critic, wrote on Western literature and authored books and articles on the Palestine question and other Middle Eastern topics. Walid Khalidi wrote on the Palestinians in Palestine before their diaspora. Mahmoud Darwish, the Palestinians' national poet, wrote poems about the Palestine struggle and criticized PLO and Arab leaders. Palestinian women such as Fadwa Tuqan, Sahar Khalifa, and Salma al-Khadra al-Jayyusi used poetry and other genres to express the cause of women's rights in the Arab world. Other women, including Hanan Ashrawi, participated in politics and wrote on social and cultural topics.

Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 set in motion a chain of political developments that led to the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO and the signing of the historic Decla-

ration of Principles in September 1993 by PLO chairman Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin. The PLO's support for Saddam Hussein was to a significant degree responsible for the shattering of the Palestinian community in Kuwait, which totaled approximately 350,000 people working as teachers, civil servants, and industrialists. However, the tragic results of the Gulf Crisis provided a propitious occasion for resolving the cause of the Palestinians. The launching of the Madrid peace process in 1991 opened the way for the Israel-PLO accord of September 1993. This accord was followed by other agreements to implement Palestinian self-rule, including the Taba Accords of September 1995. The Oslo Accord (1993) resulted in the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza and major West Bank towns and the establishment of the Palestinian Legislative Council. With the Palestinians exercising control over some areas of the West Bank and Gaza, the realization of Palestinian self-determination seemed possible.

Yet, Palestinian hope for self-determination was dashed by a number of setbacks. One of the architects of Oslo, Yitzhak Rabin, was assassinated in 1995. The foundation for peace that he and Arafat built was undermined by the policies of a new prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, an opponent of the Oslo process, who refused to implement troop withdrawal and continued settlement activity, especially at Har Homa/Jamal Abu Ghunaym in East Jerusalem. By the time the more pragmatic Ehud Barak took over the premiership in Israel, most Palestinians had lost hope in the Oslo peace process. During the decade of the negotiations of the 1990s, confiscation of Palestinian land continued and the number of Jewish settlers doubled in the area in which the Palestinians hoped to establish a state. In addition, their economic conditions worsened. They were humiliated at checkpoints and their lives were disrupted by curfews and blockades. Finally, when the Camp David summit meeting in July 2000 failed, and Ariel Sharon provocatively visited al-Haram al-Sharif with 1,000 Israeli armed police on 28 September 2000, on the following day they initiated a second intifada, or uprising, that many considered to be their war of liberation.

Instead, it proved to be a costly rebellion. Palestinian militants attacked military and civilian Israeli targets. The violence helped to bring to power a hard-line Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon. Sharon, an enemy of Oslo, destroyed a large part of the PA's security system, administrative offices, and economic infrastructure. He placed Arafat under house arrest, assassinated Palestinian militants, and continued his confiscation of Palestinian lands for Jewish settlements. As a result of the suicide bombings by Palestinian radicals against Israeli civilians (which Arafat tolerated despite his promises in 1988 and 1993 to fight terrorism) international support for the Palestinian struggle for a state diminished, especially after 11 September 2001, when the United States and its allies declared war on "international terrorism." By early 2004 some 3,000 Palestinians, including about 500 children, and about 900 Israelis had lost their lives. More than half of those killed on both sides were civilians.

There were unexpected benefits arising from the al-Aqsa Intifada. Some reforms, such as financial accountability, were welcomed by the Palestinian public when they were instituted in the PA areas. The office of prime minister was established in 2003 in an effort to share power outside of President Arafat's narrow circle. The United States announced in a diplomatic initiative, Road Map, tosupport the creation of a democratic, sovereign state of Palestine within three years. Despite the violence and destruction, both the Palestinian and Israeli publics continued to support a two-state solution, and they seemed closer to resolving the final status issues than ever before. In early 2004 Palestinian realization of a state of Palestine was awaiting the right circumstances and leadership to make it happen.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab–Israel War (1973); Arafat, Yasir; Arif, Arif al-; Balfour Declaration (1917); Darwaza, Muhammad Izzat; Darwish, Mahmud; Gaza (City); HAMAS; Haram al-Sharif; Intifada (1987–1991); Islamic Jihad; Israel: Overview; Jordanian Civil War (1970–1971); Khalidi, Walid; Lebanese Civil War (1958); London (Roundtable) Conference (1939); Madrid Conference (1991); Nakba, al- (1948–1949); Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine; Palestine Arab Revolt (1936–1939); Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO); Peel Commission Report (1937); Sakakini, Khalil al-; Shuqayri, Ahmad; Taba Negotiations (1995, 2001); Tuqan, Fadwa; Turki, Fawaz; United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP); United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 1947 (UNSCOP); West Bank; White Papers on Palestine; Woodhead Commission (1938); Zionism.

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Muhammad Muslih
Updated by Philip Mattar

PALIN COMMISSION REPORT (1920)

British Foreign Office report on the causes of the Arab violence in Palestine, April 1920.

The Palin Commission (formally the Palin Court of Inquiry) was set up in Palestine in May 1920, in the wake of violent protests by Arab residents of Jerusalem against the growing presence and political demands of the Jewish community. In early 1920, Arab protests had been mounted against the Balfour Declaration, against privileges accorded the Zionist Commission, and against the denial of Arab independence. They culminated in violent attacks on Jews in Jerusalem during the celebration of the Muslim holiday of Nabi Musa in early April, which coincided with Passover. Five Jews and four Muslim Arabs died. At that time, Palestine was ruled by a British military administration, headed by General Louis J. Bols, who sought to reassure the Palestinian Arabs that Britain would observe the status quo in that territory.

The British Foreign Office appointed a commission composed of three military officers and headed by Major General P. C. Palin, which filed its report on 1 July 1920. The report, which was never made public, argued that the disturbances were caused by the Arabs' disappointment over unfulfilled promises of independence, which the British had made during World War I to Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca; their belief that the Balfour Declaration implied the denial of their own right of self-determination; and their fear that the establishment of a Jewish National Home would lead to such substantial Jewish immigration that the Arabs would be subject to the Jewish community. The report argued that those feelings were aggravated by the proclamation of Sharif Husayn's son

Amir Faisal ibn Hussein as king of Syria, in March 1920, with a potential claim to Palestine, too. Feelings were also aggravated by the actions of the Zionist Commission, which sought a privileged status vis-à-vis the British military administration and asserted the right of the Jewish community to statehood. The report called the Zionist Commission "arrogant, insolent and provocative" and said that its members could "easily precipitate a catastrophe" (McTague, 1983, p. 102). Nonetheless, the report concluded that the British must rule with a firm hand, proving that the policy of the Balfour Declaration would not be reversed but also that the Arabs would be treated fairly.

The report's substantive findings paralleled the views of General Bols, who wanted to reduce the authority of the Zionist Commission and reassure the Arabs. Instead, the British government decided that the Arabs would acquiesce once British pro-Zionist policy was implemented firmly. Therefore, London replaced the military administration with a civilian administration on the day before the Palin Report was submitted; that administration would be guided in its policy by the Balfour Declaration and presided over by a Jewish High Commissioner. The Palin Report's predictions proved accurate concerning mounting Arab-Jewish tension and the difficulty of reconciling their contradictory aims if Zionist aspirations were not moderated. But the report was never published or publicized and, therefore, failed to influence the public debate in London and Jerusalem at a time when British policy and the Arab-Jewish relationship might still have been modified.

See also Husayn ibn Ali.

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Ann M. Lesch

PALMAH

Labor Zionist elite military organization (1941–1948).

The Palmah (Plugot Mahatz, or "shock companies") was the Haganah's elite strike force, founded in May 1941 to help defend the Yishuv against potential German invasion. Its founders were Yitzhak Sadeh and Yigal Allon, Haganah leaders affiliated with the left-wing Kibbutz ha-Meuhad (United Kibbutz) movement. The elite force of pioneer-soldiers was largely recruited from and was based and housed at the movement's kibbutzim. Trained in commando tactics, the Palmah had a strong esprit de corps that stressed military professionalism and socialist values. It became the military vanguard of the Zionist Left, which caused tensions with the MAPAI-affiliated Haganah, to which it was ostensibly subordinate.

In its early years, the Palmah actively cooperated with the British. Palmah units served alongside the British Army in the campaign against the Vichy regime in Syria and later saw service against Iraq's pro-Nazi regime. But after 1945, the Palmah participated along with the other Jewish undergrounds in the armed struggle against the British Mandatory authorities in 1945 and 1946. Specially trained Palmah volunteers played a lead role in "the Saison" of 1944 and 1945 against the renegade Irgun and LEHI underground groups. This internecine operation took on an ideological dimension as left-wing Palmah members captured and sometimes tortured right-wing Irgunists. Political rivalries again came to the fore in June 1948, when a Palmah unit under the command of Yitzhak Rabin was used to destroy the Irgun weapons ship *Altalena,* commanded by Menachem Begin.

The Palmah produced a number of senior officers in the 1948 War, and five Palmah officers later served as chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF): Moshe Dayan (1953–1957), Yitzhak Rabin (1963–1967), Haim Bar-Lev (1968–1972), David Elazar (1972–1975), and Mordechai Gur (1975–1978). During the 1948 war, Palmah battalions fought on all fronts (Galilee, central, and south) and played a critical role in defeating the Egyptians in the Negev. Of the more than 4,000 Israeli combatants killed in the war, approximately 1,000 were from the Palmah, about one-fifth of its ranks. Because of its strong ties to the leftist MAPAM party and the United Kibbutz movement, David Ben-Gurion viewed the Palmah with suspicion, and on 7 October 1948, it was formally dissolved as a separate military structure and was blended into the newly

established IDF, which incorporated the Palmah's military tactics and professionalism.

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AMOS PERLMUTTER
UPDATED BY PIERRE M. ATLAS

PALMERSTON, LORD HENRY JOHN TEMPLE

[1784–1865]

British statesman, diplomat, and prime minister whose policies in the Middle East curtailed Ottoman power in the mid-nineteenth century.

Henry John Temple was born at Westminster and died at Brocket Hall, England. At the death of his father in 1802, he became third Viscount Palmerston at age seventeen. Palmerston entered politics in 1806 as a member of the House of Commons and served in parliament for an unbroken fifty-nine years.

During his first twenty years in Commons, he did a competent job as secretary of war but held no cabinet rank. His first cabinet appointment was in 1828, during the prime ministership of the Duke of Wellington. In his subsequent distinguished career, Lord Palmerston was foreign secretary from 1830 to 1841 and 1846 to 1852, then prime minister from 1855 to 1858 and 1859 to 1865.

In the Middle East, Palmerston pursued an aggressive policy. When Muhammad Ali, viceroy of Egypt, attempted to seize control of the entire eastern Mediterranean coast, renouncing his fealty to the Ottoman sultan, Palmerston risked war with France (1839–1841), which had supported the viceroy and his son, Ibrahim Pasha, as they concentrated Egyptian troops in Syria. In the end, the French failed to assist their client. Britain bombarded Beirut and Acre, landed troops there, and gave a series of graded ultimatums to Muhammad Ali, offering him greater rewards for immediate retreat. The Egyptians, harboring false expectations of French aid, hesitated too long. The London Conference of 1840 and its follow-up in 1841, inspired by Palmerston, ended by depriving Muhammad Ali of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and the Sinai desert, leaving him only the consolatory title Hereditary Viceroy of Egypt. At those conferences, all the great world powers supported Palmerston by declaring that warships, except for small vessels in diplomatic service, were barred from passing the Straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles while the Ottoman Empire was at peace. Even France, Muhammad Ali's former ally, supported the London Conference of 1841.

In 1850 Palmerston risked losing office when he sent the navy to bombard Piraeus after the Greek government had been desultory in paying damages to a British subject whose property had been destroyed in a riot. He emerged from the crisis enjoying the confidence of the British parliament, stronger and more popular than ever.

Even before Muhammad Ali's retreat from Syria, Palmerston had succeeded in persuading the Ottomans to allow foreign consuls to be stationed in Jerusalem and to allow foreign nationals to reside permanently in the holy city—something not previously tolerated. William Tanner Young, who opened the British consulate in 1838, had full capitulatory rights, including powers of life and death to judge British subjects in Ottoman Jerusalem who were under British law.

When Anthony Ashley Cooper, seventh earl of Shaftesbury, married Lady Palmerston's daughter by her first marriage, Palmerston found himself under personal pressure to back his stepson-in-law's evangelical Christianity. This chiefly meant giving strong support to English and German Protestant missions in Palestine. Jews were the largest single group at whom missionary efforts were directed, as it was illegal in Turkey to convert Muslims to Christianity. Thus, by 1847, Britain was prepared to extend consular protection to Russian and other stateless Jews whose visas had expired. For a brief period, Palmerston contemplated creating a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine, under British protec-

tion, but under Ottoman suzerainty. Even after abandoning that idea as premature, Palmerston continued to encourage Consul James Finn in Jerusalem to grant blanket protection not only to Jews without valid passports, but also to such native Ottoman subjects as Druze, Samaritans, and Armenians. He saw no contradiction between the acquisition of willing clients and the primary British goal of saving the Ottoman Empire from partition at the hands of the French or Russians. Because France had become the protector of Roman Catholics in the Middle East and Russia had become the protector of Orthodox Christians, Palmerston regarded it as merely an evening of the contest for Britain to become the protector of Palestinians who were not Catholic, Orthodox, or Muslim.

Palmerston was out of office in 1853 when Britain, France, and Russia blundered into the Crimean War. He became prime minister in 1855, in time to participate in the negotiation of the Treaty of Paris (1857), a settlement that ensured the total removal of all fortifications and warships from the Black Sea.

Throughout his career, Palmerston did everything possible to prevent France from sponsoring the construction of a canal at Suez because he feared that it would become still another source of conflict. He did not live to see the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, and he certainly could not have predicted that by 1874 Britain would control the waterway. By July 1860 Palmerston was sufficiently comfortable with Napoléon III that Britain became a party to a treaty, negotiated at Paris, permitting France to send 6,000 troops to Lebanon to end the endemic strife there between the religious sects in that Ottoman province.

See also BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST UP TO 1914.

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ARNOLD BLUMBERG
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

PALMYRA

Ancient city in an oasis of the northern Syrian desert at the site of present-day Tadmur.

The first mention of Tadmur (or Tamar, city of dates), Palmyra's ancient and modern name, goes back to the nineteenth century B.C.E. It was probably a Caananite town that later came under Aramaic influence. In the third century B.C.E., the city achieved international prominence when the Seleucids made it a transfer point of east-west trade. Through trade contacts, the city absorbed Hellenic culture and the Greek language, which was spoken alongside Aramaic, Arabic, Syriac, and other languages. From the time of the reign of Emperor Tiberius (14–37 C.E.), the city came under Roman control and was renamed Palmyra (city of palms). During the Pax Romana and with the benefit of paved Roman roads, the city's commercial fortunes expanded.

Palmyra's golden age was the third century C.E. Emperor Caracalla (211–217 C.E.) granted Palmyra the status of a Roman colony, exempting it from taxes. The city became the chief way station between Damascus and the Euphrates river. Goods came on caravans of camels from Rome, Egypt, India, the Persian Gulf, and from China along the silk route. Some Palmyran merchants owned ships that sailed the Indian Ocean. Palmyra's busy bazaars and ruling institutions were housed in fine Roman and Mesopotamian stone buildings with Corinthian colonnades, whose ruins remain in good condition today. Palmyra became the seat of the personal empire of Septimius Odaenathus, a member of a local Arab tribe, who gained the title Emperor of the East after saving the Roman Emperor Valerian in 260 from capture by the Sassanian king, Shahpur I.

From 267 to 272 C.E., the city was ruled by Queen Zenobia. Under her vigorous rule, Palmyra in 270 conquered Syria, Egypt, and Anatolia. Zenobia

An amphitheater that stands in the ancient Roman city of Palmyra. © Christine Osborne/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

then declared the empire of Palmyra independent of Rome, but two years later, Roman Emperor Aurelian reconquered all the territory and plundered the city of Palmyra. Zenobia tried to flee by camel toward the Euphrates, but was captured and taken to Rome, where she lived the rest of her days. Palmyra was reduced from a capital to a small frontier city after the destruction caused by Aurelian's reconquest in 273.

Ancient Palmyrenes worshiped the deity Bol (also Baal or Bel) who presided over the movements of the stars. Bol's chief sanctuary, shared with the sun and moon gods Yarhibol and Algibol, still stands. Greek and Roman deities were incorporated into the local belief system. In the second century, the worship of a single unnamed god became important, and by 325, a Palmyra bishop attended the Nicaean Council.

In 634, Khalid ibn al-Walid conquered Palmyra and assimilated it into the expanding Muslim caliphate. The city was destroyed by an earthquake in 1089 and reportedly had a mere two thousand inhabitants in the twelfth century. After the city was sacked by Tamerlane at the end of the fourteenth century, it fell into ruins. In the seventeenth century, Fakhr al-Din of Lebanon used Palmyra as a military training ground and erected a castle on a hill nearby.

The city was first excavated in 1929, and restorations have continued since then. Today, Tadmur is a city of thirty thousand inhabitants, the site of tourist facilities and a prison.

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Elizabeth Thompson

PAMIR MOUNTAINS

Afghan mountain range.

The Pamir mountains run north to south from Tajikistan to northern Pakistan, separating the Oxus drainage from the plains of Kashgar in China. In Afghanistan, the Pamirs extend through the Wakhan corridor, an area inhabited by Kirghiz nomads until the nomads were relocated to Turkey during the war of resistance (1978–1992). This area was annexed to Afghanistan in 1885 by the British, connecting Afghanistan to China so as to keep the British Empire of South Asia separate from the Russian Empire in Central Asia. Given their remote location and difficult terrain, the Pamir Mountains have been a choice place for hiding people or caches of weapons or other contraband. The area was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1980, then returned to Afghanistan when the Soviet Army withdrew a decade later. This corridor also provides a passage to China, albeit over a high and difficult terrain.

See also AFGHANISTAN: OVERVIEW.

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GRANT FARR

PAN-ARABISM

Movement and doctrine for Arab political unity.

Pan-Arabism, the desire or drive for Arab political unity, was largely, albeit not entirely, a product of World War I, when much of the former Ottoman Empire was awarded to British or French mandates by the League of Nations. Arab attention in the ensuing two decades focused on obtaining political independence from European control as opposed to broader discussions of social reform or the adoption of a particular political system. In the process, budding Arab nationalism and vague formulations of Arab unity became increasingly interwoven with support for Palestinians in their opposition to Jewish land purchase and immigration under the British Mandate.

As the Arab leadership organized to resist foreign occupation, it fostered a debate over which elements of the Arab heritage could best be employed as symbols around which to shape the image of Arab states. Some Arab writers continued to assert the primacy of Islamic bonds while others, like the Syrian educator Sati al-Husari, rejected Islamic sentiments in favor of a unified Arab nation bound by ties of Arab culture. Emphasizing the secular components of the Arab heritage, al-Husari envisioned an Arab nation, unified politically, and similar to the nations of Europe.

As late as World War II, pan-Arabism in the sense of a political movement aimed at unifying the Arab nation remained centered on Iraq, Syria, and the Arabian peninsula. The Baʿth Party in the 1940s called for comprehensive Arab unity in the form of a single Arab state stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf. Neither Egypt nor the Maghrib, the western Islamic world traditionally comprising Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and later Libya, played a significant role in pan-Arab movements until after the end of the war.

In the 1950s Gamal Abdel Nasser and the United Arab Republic (UAR) coopted the pan-Arabism of the Baʿth Party. Nasser argued that the Arab nations enjoyed a unity of language, religion, history, and culture, which they should exploit to create their own system of cooperation and defense. The peak of both Nasser's popularity and pan-Arabism as a political movement occurred between the 1956 Suez crisis and the June 1967 Arab–Israeli war. The collapse of the UAR in 1961 followed by the Arab defeat in 1967 dealt a severe psychological blow to the prestige of Arab leaders and the confidence of the Arab people; it is considered by many to constitute the Waterloo of pan-Arabism.

Over the next two decades, only a few Arab governments, notably Muammar al-Qaddafi's Libya, continued to promote pan-Arabism in terms of practical political union. As other Arab states established themselves and began to define and pursue national interests, their commitment to pan-Arabism was increasingly perfunctory. By the end of the twentieth century, its time as a widely accepted doctrine and political movement had passed; and if pan-Arabism was not dead, it was surely a spent force. By the 1990s, Islamist political movements, inspired in part by the successful Iranian Revolution of 1979, were growing in popularity and strength

throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds, often supplanting the earlier enthusiasm for pan-Arabism.

See also BAʿTH, AL-; HUSARI, SATI AL-; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; QADDAFI, MUAMMAR AL-; UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (UAR).

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RONALD BRUCE ST JOHN

PAN-SYRIANISM

See SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONALIST PARTY

PAN-TURKISM

A movement advocating the union of Turkish peoples.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Turkish-speaking Ottoman intellectuals became familiar with European cultural nationalism. The result was increased awareness of the origins of Turkish peoples, an enhanced consciousness of a distinct Turkish identity, and interest in Turks living outside the Ottoman Empire. Aided by the political interest the Ottoman sultans took in the Muslim Turks of central Asia under the onslaught of Russian imperialism, Turkish consciousness gradually became politicized and led to formulations for political unity of Turkish peoples.

Meanwhile, Eastern European scholars and nationalists fighting Russian expansionism stressed the Asian roots of their peoples and forged the notion of pan-Turanism. "Turan" refers to the Turkish-populated regions east of Iran and extending into the Ural and Altai mountains, also ancient homeland of Finns, Hungarians, and Mongolians. In strict terms "pan-Turanism" refers to a vague union of Ural-Altaic peoples. "Pan-Turkism," often used interchangeably with "Pan-Turanism," refers to a political union of Turkish peoples who in the nineteenth century lived within and beyond Turan.

Pan-Turkish ideas influenced Young Ottoman leaders (particularly Ali Suavi) and found systematic expression in a linguistic movement to simplify literary Turkish. From the 1880s on, Turks in Russia clung to pan-Turkish ideas to resist Russian cultural subjugation. The best-known propagandist was Ismail Gasprinski, a Tatar who published a journal called Interpreter. Emigrés from Russia propagated pan-Turkish ideas in the Ottoman realm. In 1904, Yusuf Akçura, a Kazan Turk educated in Constantinople (now Istanbul), wrote his influential *Three Kinds of Policy,* making a case for pan-Turkism against Ottomanism and Islamism. He also contributed to the foundation of cultural and literary Turkish societies, best known among them the Turkish Society and Turkish Hearth Association. Writers such as Halide Edip, Ömer Seyfettin, and Mehmet Emin Yurdakul joined Russian Turks (including Akçura, Ahmed Ağaoğlu, and Ali Hüseyinzade) in Turkish cultural activity.

In the Ottoman period, contrary to later nationalist contentions in the empire's successor states, pan-Turkism did not become the predominant ideology. Even in the thought of Turkists, such as Ziya Gökalp, Turkism could not be separated from Islamism or Ottomanism. As a political program pan-Turkism remained vague and marginal. Tekin Alp (Moise Cohen), a Jewish journalist, was an ardent propagandist. Pan-Turkish thought did promote nationalist consciousness among certain educated segments of Turks and, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, contributed to the crystallization of a Turkish nationalism limited in scope and restricted to Anatolia.

Pan-Turkism flourished at the end of World War I and until the consolidation of the Bolshevik state and the Turkish republic. The simultaneous collapse of the Russian and Ottoman empires stimulated fantastic, ill-conceived, and unrealistic schemes of unifying the Turks of Asia. Enver Paşa and Cemal Paça, who fled Istanbul at war's end, spent their

lives in uncoordinated attempts to establish the great Turkish state. The Soviet governments discouraged and systematically undermined pan-Turkism in Central Asia.

Pan-Turkish sentiments briefly surged in Turkey during World War II with the aid of German propaganda and with the expectation that the Soviet Union would crumble. In the Republic of Turkey, pan-Turkish racialist ideas have inspired the ultranationalist right. A pan-Turkish political framework has not emerged as a realistic or popular scheme among the Turkish republics of central Asia since the breakup of the Soviet Union, while cultural and economic interchange among them and with Turkey has intensified.

See also Ali Suavi; Cemal Paşa; Enver Paşa; Ottomanism.

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Hasan Kayali

PARCHAM

Afghan Marxist political faction; also its newspaper.

Parcham (Banner), a faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), was founded in 1965 as a worker's revolutionary party dedicated to a Marxist revolution in Afghanistan. In 1967, the PDPA split into the Khalq (People's) faction and the Parcham faction. The split was in part the result of rivalries between the two leading personalities of the PDPA. Babrak Karmal was the leader of the Parcham faction, which attracted followers from the Persian-speaking Kabul intelligentsia; the Khalq faction had a predominantly rural and Pakhtun base.

In 1968, the Parcham faction published a newspaper also called *Parcham.* Published by Sulaiman Layeq and edited by him and Mir Akbar Khaiber, it was closed by the parliament after only six editions for being "anti-Islamic."

In April 1978 the two factions of the PDPA united to stage a successful revolution and took over the government. The Parcham faction was soon purged, however, and its leaders were jailed or sent abroad as diplomats by late 1978. On 25 December 1979 a large Soviet airlift began; two days later a Parcham faction staged a coup with the help of the Soviet Union. Babrak Karmal returned to Kabul, and the Parchamis took over the government. The government of Karmal attempted to move the party toward an ideological center and denounced many of the reforms and actions of the Khalq faction. Karmal and President Najibullah, who succeeded him in 1986, attempted to undo most of the radical reforms of the Khalqis and announced a plan of national reconciliation. They even changed the name of the PDPA to the Hezb-e Watan (Homeland party) in 1989. These changes, however, were unsuccessful in convincing the Afghan mojahedin leaders to put a halt to the war of resistance. The Parcham government collapsed in 1992.

See also Karmal, Babrak; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

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Grant Farr

PARIS PEACE SETTLEMENTS (1918–1923)

Post–World War I treaties and agreements that reconfigured the Middle East.

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 led to its dissolution. In the long term the victorious Allies' partition of the Ottoman territories was less important than their introduction of a new system of political organization based on the European model of the nation-state. The modern Middle East was shaped physically and politically by the peace agreements. At the initial Paris Peace Conference

in 1919 Britain and France, the victorious allies, were more concerned with adjusting their differences and harmonizing their territorial appetites than with a just and durable final settlement. Hence they agreed at the San Remo Conference in April 1920 to divide the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire along the lines of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, with some minor modifications. France received the mandates for Syria and Lebanon, which the League of Nations confirmed in 1922. France waived its claims to Mosul in Iraq in exchange for shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company (later the Iraq Petroleum Company). Britain obtained mandates for Iraq, Transjordan (which it created in 1920), and Palestine. The Zionists succeeded at the Paris conference in convincing Britain to incorporate the Balfour Declaration into the preamble of the Palestine mandate.

To the Arab nationalists, the Paris conference was a political disaster; it sowed the seeds of future conflicts in the region. The victorious Allies initially tried to enforce a similar settlement on the defeated Ottoman government in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which was designed to partition Turkey into very small, unviable segments. But unlike their Arab counterparts, the Turkish nationalists, led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), successfully challenged the clauses of the Sèvres settlement related to Anatolia and Thrace, forcing the Allies, after a long, debilitating military campaign, to renegotiate a new settlement at Lausanne in July 1923. The Treaty of Lausanne confirmed Turkish sovereignty over the whole of Anatolia; the Sèvres clauses calling for an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan were forgotten.

See also Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Sèvres, Treaty of (1920); Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916).

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Fawaz A. Gerges
Updated by Eric Hooglund

PARIS, TREATY OF (1857)

Anglo-Iranian treaty that forced Iran out of Afghanistan and Muscat, 1857.

After Iran had tried to annex the Afghan city of Herat, British troops occupied Iran's Kharg Island and part of her mainland. Iran then signed this treaty, agreeing to withdraw from Afghanistan and relinquish Iranian claims to Herat, Afghanistan, and parts of Musqat in return for British withdrawal from Iran.

Farhad Shirzad

PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT

The members of Kamal Jumblatt's parliamentary bloc in Lebanon.

The Parliamentary Democratic Front was a powerful political group in the 1972 Lebanese election, although it did not have a clear political agenda beyond loyalty to the political leadership of Kamal Jumblatt. It included members from various sects but was predominantly Druze-oriented, given the Druze basis of Jumblatt's leadership.

See also Druze; Jumblatt, Kamal.

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As'ad AbuKhalil
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

PARSIPUR, SHAHRNUSH

[1946–]

Iranian author.

Born and raised in Tehran, Shahrnush Parsipur graduated from Tehran University. Her first short stories (she writes in Persian) were published in the early 1970s. Her first book was the novel *Dog and the Long Winter* (1976). Riots, demonstrations, and the Iranian Revolution in 1978–1979 caused the shah and his family to leave. In 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran was proclaimed, under the leadership of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

After two volumes of short stories, a second novel came out, *Tuba and the Meaning of Night* (1988), which Parsipur wrote after spending four years in prison for political reasons. In 1990, a slim volume of interconnected stories was published, *Women without Men,* which was banned by the Islamic republic, and her novel *Blue Reason* remained unavailable there as of the mid-1990s.

Parsipur, whose writings exhibit a woman-centered Iranian universe, stands as the leading figure in a fourth generation of Iranian women literary artists. The chief figure in the first generation was the traditionalist poet Parvin E'tesami (1907–1941); in the second, the prominent short-story writer and novelist Simin Daneshvar (born 1921); the third generation saw Iran's most famous woman writer, the poet Forugh Farrokhzad (c. 1934–1967).

Translations of Parsipur's stories appear in *Stories by Iranian Women since the Revolution* (1991) and *Stories from Iran: A Chicago Anthology* (1991). Her career receives treatment in Michael Hillman's *From Durham to Tehran* (1991). English translations of Parsipur's major writings were in print by 1992, when the author toured the United States and participated in the International Writer's Program at the University of Iowa.

See also LITERATURE: PERSIAN.

MICHAEL C. HILLMAN

PARTI DE L'AVANT-GARDE SOCIALISTE (PAGS)

Successor to the Algerian Communist Party.

Created in 1966, the Socialist Vanguard Party (PAGS) succeeded the Algerian Communist Party (PCA), which had been founded in 1936 and banned in November 1962. The PAGS renewed its political activities under Houari Boumédienne's regime (1965–1978). University graduates, students, unionists, and workers made up the majority of the party. PAGS provided support to Boumédienne's progressive agrarian and industrial policies and his anti-imperialist foreign policy. In the 1980s the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) banned PAGS members from participation in state institutions or in the FLN's mass organizations. PAGS officially restarted its movement following Algeria's liberalization. In 1990 PAGS elected Hachemi Chérif as national coordinator. He succeeded Sadek Hadjerès, who had led the party since the 1950s. PAGS was renamed Ettahadi and later the Social and Democratic Movement (MDS) under the charismatic Chérif, who staunchly opposed Islamist ideology. Chérif contested Abdelaziz Bouteflika's disorderly economic liberalization, which resulted in massive unemployment because many state-owned enterprises were dismantled and sold to private owners without regard to the future of the employees. Chérif also disliked Bouteflika's cozy relationship with Islamists. MDS advocates a total break with the regime and calls for a secular democratic alliance that excludes Islamists whatever their degree of moderation.

See also BOUMÉDIENNE, HOUARI; BOUTEFLIKA, ABDELAZIZ; FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE (FLN).

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YAHIA ZOUBIR

PARTI DÉMOCRATIQUE CONSTITUTIONNEL (PDC)

Moroccan political party founded in 1937.

The Parti Démocratique Constitutionnel (PDC) was founded by Muhammad Hassan al-Wazzani (Ouezzani) as the result of a split with the Bloc d'Action National owing to personal differences between Allal al-Fasi and Wazzani, as well as disagreements over negotiating strategies with the French authorities. The PDC remained a small group, more of a political club than a party, centered on Wazzani's followers and friends. After World War II, it cooperated periodically with the Istiqlal Party and in 1953 and 1954 joined the National Front, which opposed the continuation of the French protectorate. In 1958, it merged with the Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance (PDI); in 1963 it operated within the Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionnelles (FDIC).

See also Fasi, Allal al-; Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionelles (FDIC); Istiqlal Party: Morocco: Overview; Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance (PDI); Wazzani, Muhammad Hassan al-.

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

PARTI DÉMOCRATIQUE DE L'INDÉPENDANCE (PDI)

Political party in Morocco.

Formed after World War II by a splinter group originating in the Istiqlal Party and led by Muhammad Hassan al-Wazzani, the Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance (PDI) briefly joined with the Istiqlal and the two nationalist parties in the Spanish zone in 1951 to form the short-lived Moroccan National Front. On its own again, and deriving its support mainly in the predominantly Berber tribal areas, it received six portfolios in the first representative Moroccan government, established in December 1955 after the sultan had returned from exile. Its only clear idea was uniting around the person of the king, as well as opposing the hegemony of the Istiqlal. In 1959, following the defection of a number of party leaders to the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP), it renamed itself the Parti Démocratique Constitutionnel (PDC) and competed in the 1963 elections within the framework of the pro-palace Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionelles (FDIC). In recent decades, the party competed in local and national elections with little success, winning no seats in the 1977 and 1984 parliamentary elections. In the 1993 parliamentary elections, again operating under the PDI banner, and headed by one of the original PDI founding members and ex-Moroccan diplomat Thami al-Wazzani, it experienced a revival of sorts, winning nine seats. In the 1997 elections, it dropped to just one seat; in the 2002 elections, it won two seats.

See also Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionelles (FDIC); Istiqlal Party: Morocco; Morocco: Political Parties in; Parti Démocratique Constitutionnel (PDC); Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP); Wazzani, Muhammad Hassan al-.

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

PARTI D'UNITÉ POPULAIRE (PUP)

Opposition political party in Tunisia.

The Parti d'Unité Populaire (Party of Popular Unity), one of the six legal opposition parties in Tunisia, was an offshoot of the Mouvement pour l'Unité Populaire (MUP) founded in Paris in 1973 by Ahmed Ben Salah. In 1981 a rift between the Paris-based group and its Tunisian branch was formalized with the creation of a second Movement of Popular Unity (often called MUP-II). In 1985 it was renamed the Parti d'Unité Populaire (PUP). In 1999 Mohamed Bel Haj Amor, PUP secretary general, entered the first presidential elections in Tunisia to allow more than one candidate but lost. In 2000 Amor was succeeded as the head of the PUP by Mohamed Bouchiha.

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Matthew S. Gordon
Updated by Ana Torres-Garcia

PARTI DU PEUPLE ALGÉRIEN (PPA)

Algerian nationalist organization that used direct, often violent, action that led to the war of independence.

The Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA; Party of the Algerian People) was founded early in 1937 by Messali al-Hadj, widely viewed as the father of the Algerian nationalist movement. An extension onto Algerian soil of the Etoile Nord-Africaine (ENA; Star of North Africa), whose constituency was principally among the émigré community in Paris, it was remarkably successful in mobilizing urban working classes, lower middle-class Algerians, as well as the sons of some of the more affluent Algerians behind the nationalist cause. Messali al-Hadj and five of the PPA's directors were imprisoned in August 1937, and the party itself was banned in September 1939. During World War II, it functioned underground at reduced levels both in Algeria and France.

In 1943, leaders of the party approved the drafting of the Manifesto of the Algerian Muslim People and the more radical *additif* that followed it. When, in March 1944, the moderate Ferhat Abbas

decided to organize a coalition of forces called the Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté (Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty), members of the underground PPA flocked to it in such numbers that they eventually came to dominate it in all but name. It was PPA elements that helped turn the V-E Day celebrations of 8 May 1945 into a series of bloody confrontations between nationalists and the colonial authorities that are considered a direct precursor of the Algerian revolution.

When he was released from prison in 1946, Messali al-Hadj made an abrupt decision to reenter the political process by creating the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD; Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties) as a front for the outlawed PPA. From then on, until the war of independence, the MTLD ran candidates in most elections. But the PPA continued at a secret level in order to retain within the fold the growing group of militants who favored direct action. The party's detractors considered this dual approach one of its major weaknesses.

See also Hadj, Messali al-; Manifesto of the Algerian Muslim People; Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques; Star of North Africa.

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John Ruedy

PARTI NATIONAL

Moroccan political party.

Established in April 1937 by the bulk of Morocco's nationalist leadership (except Muhammad al-Wazzani and his followers) after the French authorities dissolved the Comité d'Action Marocaine (CAM), the Parti National, to show continuity with the CAM, located its headquarters in the same premises, in Fez. Organizationally, it was similar as well, consisting of an executive committee, a national council, local branches, and party cells. Its program was the implementation of a new French protectorate as a step toward full independence. It also campaigned against the power of rural chieftains, especially Glawi Pasha.

The French authorities cracked down on the party in the fall of 1937, arresting many of its leaders, most of whom were exiled. Nevertheless, clandestine party cells continued to function. Following his release in 1938, Ahmad Muhammad Lyazidi assumed leadership of the movement. In 1941, a reorganized supreme council was formed by Ahmad Maqwar and Lyazidi; the establishment of party branches followed the landing of Allied forces in 1942. Ahmad Balfarej was allowed to return from Paris in January 1943, and at the end of the year, together with the exiled Allal al-Fasi, reconstituted the party as the Istiqlal.

See also Comité d'Action Marocaine (CAM); Fasi, Allal al-; Istiqlal Party: Morocco.

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

PARTI NATIONAL DÉMOCRATIQUE (PND)

Political party in Morocco.

Originally known as the Parti des Indépendants Démocrates, the PND was founded in 1981 by a breakaway faction of the Rassemblement National des Indépendants (RNI). Led by Muhammad Arsalane al-Jadidi and Abdel Hamid Kacemi, it included fifty-seven members of parliament and three cabinet ministers. The group represented large landowning interests who opposed International Monetary Fund recommendations to reduce credit to the agricultural sector, particularly the large commercial farms. Its numbers in parliament declined by more than half in the 1984 parliamentary elections, to twenty-four; it maintained this figure in the 1993 elections, when it ran as part of the pro-palace Entente (Wifaq) bloc. In a government reshuffle in January 1995 the PND received three cabinet posts. In the 1997 elections, it dropped to only ten seats and was left out of the new government. In the 2002 elections it attained twelve seats and remained outside of the government.

See also Morocco: Political Parties in; Rassemblement National des Indépendants (RNI).

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

PARTI POPULAIRE SYRIEN (PPS)

See Syrian Social Nationalist Party

PARTITION PLANS (PALESTINE)

Plans for the territorial division of Palestine that attempted to reconcile the rival claims of the Jewish and Arab communities; first suggested in 1937 by Britain's Peel Commission.

Following the outbreak of the Arab rebellion in 1936, the British government, which had been granted the Palestinian mandate by the League of Nations, appointed Earl Peel to chair a royal commission. The commission learned that Jewish nationalism was as intense and self-centered as Arab nationalism, that both were growing forces, and that the gulf between them was widening. Partition was seen as the only method for dealing with the problem. In its final report (July 1937), the Peel Commission recommended that Palestine be partitioned into a small Jewish state; an Arab state to be united with Transjordan; and an area, including Jerusalem, to remain under a permanent British mandate. The Zionist leadership accepted the principle of partition and prepared to bargain over the details. But the Arab leadership refused to consider partition and reasserted its claims to the whole of Palestine. Although the Peel plan was not acted upon, the principle of partition guided all subsequent exercises in peacemaking (1937–1947).

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly voted in favor of a resolution (no. 181) for replacing the British mandate with two independent states, thereby suggesting that the logic of partition had become inescapable. The UN partition resolution laid down a timetable for the termination of the British mandate and for the establishment of a Jewish state and an Arab state linked by economic union, along with an international regime for Jerusalem. An exceptionally long and winding border separated the Jewish state from the Arab one, with vulnerable crossing points to link three Jewish enclaves—one in eastern Galilee, one on the coastal plain, and one in the Negev. The Jewish state would also contain a substantial Arab minority within its borders.

Despite doubts about the viability of the state as proposed, the Zionist leadership accepted the UN partition plan. Local Arab leaders and the Arab states rejected it vehemently as illegal, immoral, and unworkable. To frustrate this partition, the Palestinian Arabs resorted to arms. The UN partition plan thus provided both an international charter of legitimacy for a Jewish state as well as the signal for the outbreak of war between Arabs and Jews in Palestine.

See also Arab Nationalism; Nationalism; Palestine Arab Revolt (1936–1939); Peel Commission Report (1937).

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Avi Shlaim

PASHA

See Glossary

PATRIARCH

A leader in an Eastern Christian church.

By the fourth century C.E., the Christian church was divided into five administrative districts: Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, Constantinople (now Istanbul), and Rome. Each of these was headed by a bishop called a patriarch. Today, "patriarch" is the title for the head of an Eastern Christian church, such as the Armenian patriarch or the Greek Orthodox patriarch (who still resides in Istanbul).

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and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975. Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

ZACHARY KARABELL

PATRIARCHS, TOMB OF THE

Ancient biblical shrine.

Located in Hebron in the West Bank, the Tomb of the Patriarchs (Cave of the Machpelah) is one of the most ancient biblical shrines. Among the most authentic sites, it is purported to be the burial place of Abraham and Sarah, Isaac and Rebecca, Jacob and Leah, and according to Jewish folklore, Adam and Eve as well. Viewed as one of the holiest shrines by both Jews and Muslims, it has been the focal point of persistent struggles between Palestinian and Jewish nationalists.

See also HEBRON.

CHAIM I. WAXMAN

PATRIOTIC UNION OF KURDISTAN (PUK)

Kurdish political party.

Established in 1977, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) advocated the self-determination of Iraqi Kurds through armed struggle. Led by Jalal Talabani, the PUK claims to be more leftist than the rival Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK). In 1987 the PUK put an end to ten years of internecine fighting and joined the Kurdistan Front of Iraq with the KDP and six other smaller organizations. After the Gulf War (1991) the PUK shared power with Masʿud Barzani's DPK inside the Kurdish Autonomous Zone, in the parliament elected in May 1992, and in the Kurdish Regional Government formed in Irbil in July 1992. In May 1994 internecine fighting resumed and continued until the Washington Agreement of September 1998. The PUK formed its own government in Sulaymaniyya, and the Kurdish Autonomous Zone was de facto split into two regions. It took four more years to implement the Washington Agreement (1998) and to convene the Kurdish Parliament, which met again for the first time in full session on 4 October 2002. Both the DPK and the PUK approved a draft of Federal Constitution for the future Iraq.

See also DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN (IRAQ); KURDISH AUTONOMOUS ZONE; TALABANI, JALAL.

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CHRIS KUTSCHERA

PEACE AND AMITY, TREATY OF (1805)

Treaty concluded in 1805 between the United States and Tripoli.

This treaty ended the conflict that began in 1801 when Yusuf Karamanli, pasha of Tripoli (in present-day Libya), closed the U.S. consulate, expelled the consul, and declared war on the United States. This conflict ended an uneasy peace in which the U.S. government paid an annual tribute of $18,000 in return for Tripoli's nonbelligerence vis-à-vis U.S. shipping in the Mediterranean. U.S.-Tripoli relations deteriorated in 1801 because Karamanli demanded $250,000 and the Americans refused to pay.

The treaty was concluded on 4 June 1805 and was ratified by the U.S. Senate on 12 April 1806. It was negotiated by Karamanli and Colonel Tobias Lear. The United States agreed to a one-time payment of $60,000 to secure the treaty and to ransom American prisoners of war. It also consented to abandon Derna (a provincial capital in eastern Libya occupied during the war) and not to supply its mercenary allies, who supported the pasha's brother, Ahmad Karamanli, in his claim to be the legitimate ruler of Tripoli. In return, Yusuf Karamanli agreed to release Ahmad's wife and children, whom he was holding hostage. A secret article (dated 5 June 1805), not revealed until 1807, granted Yusuf four years to release Ahmad's family, in return for the Americans' assurance that Ahmad not challenge Yusuf's legitimacy to rule Tripoli. In 1809, Yusuf permitted Ahmad to return to Tripoli as governor of Derna. But in 1811, he again felt threatened by Ahmad, who fled to Egypt.

Under terms of the treaty, prisoners were exchanged. On the American side, they consisted primarily of the 297-man crew of the U.S.S. *Philadelphia.*

Five Americans had died in captivity, and five chose to remain in Tripoli. One week after the Americans were freed, eighty-nine Tripolitan captives were returned, along with the $60,000.

The political and economic effects of the war undermined Yusuf's government. Disorder broke out in the early 1830s, encouraging the Ottoman Empire to reestablish its presence in Tripoli in 1835, thus bringing the Karamanli dynasty to an end.

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LARRY A. BARRIE

PEACE CORPS

U.S. volunteer agency whose goal is to help developing nations share American expertise and to enhance mutual understanding.

The Peace Corps was established by U.S. President John F. Kennedy on 1 March 1961 "to promote world peace and friendship" by providing developing nations with volunteer American personnel. It was hoped that, through daily contact with Americans doing development work, developing nations would better understand the people of the United States and that in turn Americans would better understand other peoples and their situations.

Since its inception, the Peace Corps has sent more than 170,000 American volunteers to over 136 developing countries, including the following countries in the Middle East: Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Yemen Arab Republic. In all of these countries, Peace Corps volunteers were teachers, engineers, designers, and administrators of special programs.

In Iran from 1962 until 1976, Peace Corps volunteers founded kindergartens, taught English, built libraries, designed a new mosque in a Khorasan village after the old one was destroyed in a 1968 earthquake, and planned a college of dentistry in Mashhad. In Morocco, volunteers faced the challenge of learning both Arabic and French; they were employed in activities ranging from irrigation projects to teaching physical education in secondary schools. In addition to teaching, the Peace Corps in Tunisia supplied the Habib Thameur Hospital in Tunis with nurses. In Turkey, some of the over two hundred volunteers founded a home for street boys in Istanbul and others worked at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara. And in the former Yemen Arab Republic, Peace Corps volunteers helped construct a water-pumping station in Hodeida.

Though Peace Corps volunteers are sent only at the invitation of the host country, the program has not been without its critics. A problem that has plagued the Peace Corps in the Middle East and elsewhere has been the failure to train host-country counterparts to replace Peace Corps volunteers once their twenty-seven months of service have ended. Still, although the Peace Corps has not always succeeded as a development organization, its record has been more benign and its effects more beneficial than some other U.S. aid programs developed during the height of the Cold War.

The Peace Corps no longer had any volunteers in the Middle East in late 2003 but was planning to reinstate its programs in Jordan and Morocco in the spring of 2004. According to the Peace Corps Media Office, 68 volunteers served in Bahrain from 1974 to 1979; 1,748 served in Iran from 1962 to 1976; 227 served in Jordan from 1997 to 2003; 295 served in Libya from 1966 to 1969; 3,444 served in Morocco from 1963 to 2003; 160 served in Oman from 1973 to 1983; 2,130 served in Tunisia from 1962 to 1996; 1,460 served in Turkey from 1962 to 1972; and 564 served in North Yemen and, after unification in 1990, all of Yemen from 1973 to 1994.

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ZACHARY KARABELL
UPDATED BY CHRISTOPHER REED STONE

PEACE NOW

Israeli peace protest movement.

Peace Now, the oldest, largest, and at times most effective peace movement in Israel, was founded in the spring of 1978 by a group of reserve officers of the Israel Defense Forces who, in response to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's dramatic November 1977 visit to Israel, wrote a collective letter to Prime Minister Menachem Begin, imploring him not to miss this opportunity to conclude peace with Egypt. The letter was followed by a number of large demonstrations in the streets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Begin claimed that these demonstrations impressed him sufficiently to persist in his efforts to conclude the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty the following year.

The Egyptian-Israeli agreements signed at Camp David in September 1978 provided also for further negotiations on the Palestinian question. When these negotiations, which became known as the "autonomy talks," failed—and in reaction to the massive increase of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories—Peace Now decided to focus on the struggle against the occupation in general. This decision put the movement in a direct clash with the Begin government, in opposition to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and in protest against the involvement of Israeli forces in the massacre perpetrated by Lebanese Phalange militia in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in Beirut. The movement organized a number of massive demonstrations, the largest of which assembled over 250,000 demonstrators (some estimates reached 300,000 and 400,000) in the Tel Aviv Municipal Square.

The success of Peace Now in mobilizing sizable parts of the public against the war drew the attention of right-wing extremists, and Peace Now activists became targets of personal attack and abuse. On 10 February 1983, during a demonstration near the prime minister's office calling for the dismissal of Ariel Sharon as minister of defense, a hand grenade was thrown at the demonstrators, killing Peace Now activist Emil Grunzweig and wounding seven others.

Peace Now is not a membership organization. However, counting the number of signatures on recurrent petitions, financial contributions, and participation in demonstrations, the movement reached at its peak more than 200,000 supporters. In order to maintain is broad cross-party support, Peace Now has declined offers to become an established political party and run in Knesset elections. Nevertheless, a number of its leaders have become members of the Knesset and even cabinet ministers (such as Minster of Immigration Absorption Yaʿel Tamir, Minister of Industry and Commerce Ran Cohen) while belonging to other parties.

Over the years Peace Now has also been heavily involved in dialogue with Palestinians on every level, from the top leadership to meetings of youth and students, as well as in local initiatives. Peace Now was also involved in defending Palestinians whose rights were encroached on by settlers, especially in Jerusalem, where a special litigation institution called Ir Shalem was established. The well-known human-rights watch group B'Tselem was also started by activists of Peace Now.

After 1993, when the Rabin government followed, through the Oslo process, policies long advocated by Peace Now, the movement seemed to lose much of its raison d'être. But the decay of the peace process after Rabin's assassination, during the tenures of Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, revived the movement, whose activities were concentrated during this phase primarily on public monitoring of settlement activity. The outburst of the second Palestinian Intifada after the collapse of the Camp David negotiations in July 2000 left Peace Now discouraged, and reflected a general malaise of the Israeli left. Yet with the continuous financial support of its support organizations abroad it manages to continue its activities and even attract many younger people to the ranks of its leadership. Its most recent initiative was the creation of a broadly based Coalition for Peace in which a number of Palestinian activists, led by Sari Nusayba, the chancellor of al-Quds University in Jerusalem, became active as well.

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Mordechai Bar-On

PEAKE, FREDERICK GERARD

[1886–1970]

British military officer in Transjordan.

A graduate of Sandhurst, the British Royal Military Academy, Peake served in India from 1908 to 1913. In September 1920, Captain Peake was sent to Transjordan to investigate the condition of the police and gendarmerie. He subsequently received permission to raise two small forces to maintain law and order. The first, the 100-man Mobile Force, guarded the Amman–Palestine road. The other, of fifty men, helped the British official posted in Karak. In April 1921, Peake was appointed one of Amir Abdullah I ibn Hussein's advisers. During the summers of 1921 and 1923, he organized the 150-man Reserve Mobile Force, which became the nucleus of the Arab Legion.

As a result of regional skirmishes, the Reserve Mobile Force was reorganized with 750 officers and men and given additional financing. The reorganized force thwarted Wahhabi raids in 1922 and the Adwan tribal rebellion in 1923.

In September 1923, all forces in Transjordan were merged with the Reserve Mobile Force, put under Peake's command, and renamed the Arab Legion. During the first three years of his command, Peake developed the Arab Legion into a highly effective force that accepted able-bodied volunteers from any Arab country, preferably men from villages and towns. John Bagot Glubb, who arrived in 1930 as Peake's second in command, created the Desert Mobile Force, composed mainly of bedouins, to shore up the Arab Legion, which had been weakened by the creation of the Transjordan Frontier Force in 1926. Peake retired in 1939 and was succeeded by Glubb.

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Arab Legion; Glubb, John Bagot; Transjordan Frontier Force.

Jenab Tutunji

PEARL DIVING (BAHRAIN)

Before the 1930s, pearling was the major industry in the island nation of Bahrain.

Boats from Manama, Muharraq, al-Hidd, and other towns on the Bahrain coast set out for the main oyster banks in the Persian/Arabian Gulf, to the east of the islands, during a season that lasted from June through September. Representatives of the merchants who financed the operation often accompanied the pearl fishing fleet, purchasing the day's catch on the spot. Profits were distributed among the owners, pilots, divers, and crew at the end of the season according to shares drawn up in advance. Delays in payment and the vagaries of diving usually left divers and crew in perpetual debt to the merchants and captains. Since Bahrain was a British protectorate from 1880 to 1971, British officials attempted to remedy this state of affairs by promulgating a formal code for the industry in 1923, but the risks and hardships of pearling led most divers and crew to take up jobs in the new petroleum and construction sectors that opened in the early 1930s. Respectable fleets continued to set out from Bahrain as late as the mid-1940s, but by the end of World War II, the numbers dwindled so that only a handful of boats took part in the annual pearl harvest.

See also Manama; Muharraq.

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Fred H. Lawson

PEEL COMMISSION REPORT (1937)

Royal Commission Report that listed the causes of unrest between Arabs and Jews in mandated Palestine and recommended territorial partition.

During the Arab general strike, which began in April 1936, the British decided to send a high-level fact-finding commission to mandated Palestine. In May the colonial secretary stated that the Royal Commission would investigate the causes of unrest after order was restored, but it would not question the terms of the Mandate. After the strike ended in October, the commission sailed to Palestine, headed by William Robert Wellesley, the first earl Peel, for-

mer secretary of state for India. In Jerusalem the commission heard the testimony of sixty witnesses in public sessions and of fifty-three more witnesses in forty private sessions. In January 1937 the commissioners returned to London and heard two witnesses in a public session and eight witnesses (including Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann) during the course of seven *in camera* sessions.

The British government issued Command Paper 5479 on 7 July 1937. It concluded that the terms of the Mandate were unworkable and could only be enforced by repressing the Arab population. Both Arabs and Jews demanded political independence. Establishing an Arab state would violate the rights of the Jewish minority, but forming a Jewish state in the entire territory would violate the rights of the Arab majority and arouse international Arab and Muslim opposition. The only feasible solution was partition: two sovereign states? Arab and Jewish? with a British zone encompassing Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and a narrow corridor to the Mediterranean near Jaffa. Britain would temporarily control the strategic ports of Haifa and Aqaba. The Jewish state would cover about 25 percent of the country, north from Tel Aviv along the Mediterranean coast and all of Galilee. The Arab state would lie in the central mountains and the Negev, include Jaffa port, and merge with the Hashimite state in Transjordan.

The Jewish Agency accepted the principle of partition but criticized the proposed boundaries and insisted that all Palestinians be deported from the Jewish state at British expense—at that time, 300,000 Palestinians, a number equal to the Jewish residents in the area. The Palestinians' Arab Higher Committee denounced the plan and insisted that Palestine remain a unitary state because 70 percent of the population was Palestinian and 90 percent of the land was under Palestinian control. Palestinians in Galilee, whom the Jewish Agency wanted expelled, then played leading roles in the rebellion that erupted again in October 1937.

The Woodhead Commission, appointed to recommend partition borders, concluded in Command Paper 5854 (8 November 1938) that partition was not feasible and proposed limited zones of sovereignty within an economic federation. The government's Command Paper 5893 concluded "that the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish states inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable" (*A Survey of Palestine,* vol. 1, p. 47). Maintaining a unitary Palestinian state was reaffirmed in the MacDonald White Paper of May 1939. But the partition idea, first broached by the Peel Commission Report, reemerged as the basis of the majority proposal approved by the United Nations General Assembly in November 1947.

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Ann M. Lesch

PELED, MATTITYAHU

[1923–1995]

Israeli general, scholar, politician, and peace activist.

Born in Haifa, Mattityahu (Matti) Peled served in the Jewish underground military organization as a platoon commander in the Palmah (Haganah's "Crack Troops"). In 1946 he studied law in London. Peled returned to serve in the Arab-Israel War of 1948 as a company commander and was wounded while breaking through the Egyptian lines near al-Majdal. He served for more than twenty years as a career officer in the Israel Defense Force, holding different positions; among them was as the first military governor of the Gaza Strip and of Sharm al-Shaykh from 1956 to 1957. In 1957 he was appointed commander of the Jerusalem area. From 1961 to 1963 Peled studied Arabic literature and Middle East studies at Tel Aviv University. During the Arab-Israel War of June 1967 he served as quartermaster general, holding the rank of major general. In 1969 he retired from active service to complete his Ph.D. in the United States and was appointed lecturer in the Arabic Literature department of Tel Aviv University.

During the mid-1970s Peled became active in politics and joined the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace, which advocated recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the creation of a Palestinian state. During the late 1970s and early 1980s Peled was heavily involved in dialogue with Palestinian leaders, prominent among them Isam Sartawi, the PLO representative in Paris, as well as with senior European leaders (such as Bruno Kreisky, Pierre Mendès-France, and Willy Brandt). During 1983 and early 1984, together with a few colleagues from the Israel-Palestine Council, Peled met with Yasir Arafat three times in Tunis and Geneva, in defiance of Israeli law. In 1986 he was elected to the Knesset on behalf of the Progressive List for Peace, an Arab-Jewish party, and served one term (until 1986). Peled died of cancer in March 1995.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Arafat, Yasir; Haganah; Knesset; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palmah; Sartawi, Issam.

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Mordechai Bar-On

PELT, ADRIAN

[1892–1981]

United Nations commissioner for Libya.

In November 1949 the United Nations General Assembly called for the creation by January 1952 of an independent Libyan state, which would include the three historic regions of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. In December 1949 the General Assembly appointed Assistant Secretary-General Adrian Pelt UN commissioner for Libya, with a charter to assist the inhabitants of Libya in drawing up a constitution and establishing a state independent of British and French control. Pelt submitted a report to the General Assembly on 17 November 1950, calling for creation of a national assembly no later than 1 January 1951 and of a provisional government by 1 April 1951. Following the creation of the assembly and the proclamation of a Libyan constitution on 7 October 1951, the United Kingdom of Libya declared its independence on 24 December 1951. The most comprehensive and authoritative historical account of the independence of Libya under the auspices of the United Nations is found in Pelt's own book, *Libyan Independence and the United Nations.* Libya was the first African state to achieve independence from European rule and the first and only state created by the UN General Assembly.

See also Libya.

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Ronald Bruce St John

PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

Egyptian political body.

The dominance of the executive branch of Egypt's government is tempered slightly by a strong tradition of judicial independence. In contrast, the People's Assembly is constitutionally weak. Moreover, rigged elections regularly give the National Democratic Party, an extension of the government, overwhelming parliamentary majorities.

Raymond William Baker

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN

Afghan Marxist political party; also called Democratic Party of the People of Afghanistan.

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was formed in the period of constitutional reform in Afghanistan (1963–1973) during which parliamentary elections were held and political parties were allowed to organize. It officially came into being on New Year's Day, 1965, at the home of Nur Mohammad Taraki. Taraki was the first secretary-general of the party's central committee, and Babrak Karmal was its first deputy secretary-general. Although its ideology, judging by the early literature,

could be characterized as national democratic and progressive, later, after 1978, the PDPA became openly Marxist, with strong Leninist tendencies.

By 1965, the PDPA had split into two factions, each associated with the name of its newspaper: the Khalq (People) faction, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, and the Parcham (Flag) faction, led by Babrak Karmal. The Khalq faction was dominated by Pashto-speaking Afghans from outside of Kabul and had strong ties to the military, whereas the Parcham faction was dominated by Persian-speaking Afghans from Kabul.

On 27 April 1978 the two factions of the PDPA united to stage a coup and take control of Afghanistan. In 1978 and 1979, the PDPA began to institute a series of radical social reforms dealing with land tenure, education, and women's rights. These reforms, coupled with the PDPA's strong antireligious and anticlerical position, proved too progressive for Afghans accustomed to the traditional social system, and by 1979 the Islamic opposition had begun to mount an aggressive guerrilla war against the government. On 23–24 December 1979, a large contingent of Soviet military forces entered Afghanistan and did not leave until 1989.

Calling itself a party of national socialism and having changed its name to Fatherland Party, the PDPA had by 1990 largely abandoned Marxism. It ruled Afghanistan until 1992, when its last president, Najibullah, resigned and Kabul was taken over by Islamic rebels.

See also Amin, Hafizullah; Karmal, Babrak; Parcham.

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Grant Farr

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

The name of South Yemen from late 1970 to May 1990, the first two decades of independence from Britain.

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) spanned the twenty years between the constitution that ended the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen and the unification of the two Yemens in May 1990. South Yemen had been created politically on 30 November 1967, when the victorious National Liberation Front (NLF) assumed power upon Britain's departure from Aden colony and the Aden protectorates. Britain had first occupied Aden in 1839. For the next century, Britain was preoccupied with the port of Aden, while neglecting the dozens or so states in the interior with which it signed treaties of protection only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. As a consequence, no single political entity in modern times except the stillborn South Arabian Federation of the mid-1960s embraced even most of what was to become an independent South Yemen in late 1967. Instead, what existed was the 75-square-mile (194 sq km) Aden colony—a city-state, a partly modern urban enclave, and, by some measures, the world's second or third busiest port in the late 1950s—and the vast, mostly distant, politically fragmented interior states, which were, for the most part, based on subsistence agriculture and traditional sociocultural institutions. Neither the British administration nor the nationalists who first stirred in Aden in the 1940s had much knowledge of, interest in, or impact on these states, despite Britain's adoption of a new "forward policy" during the last decades of imperial rule. As a result, the people of Aden were closer, in more ways than just geographically, to the city of Taʿiz in North Yemen than to the Hadramawt, which lay far to the east of Aden and had its

Old Sultan's Palace located in Yemen's capital city, Seyun, is now a museum. **© Earl & Nazima Kowall/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

View of Shibam, Yemen, in the desert valley of Hadhramawt. Hundreds of ancient, tower-like houses of up to nine stories high and built from clay can be seen from far away. UNESCO has declared it a protected world monument. © Earl & Nazima Kowall/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

strongest business and familial ties with people in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, India, Indonesia, and East Africa.

The infrastructure barely holding together the major settlement areas of South Yemen at independence in 1967 consisted of dirt tracks, unpaved roads, a number of airstrips, and the telegraph. The country consisted of many microeconomies, most of them agriculturally based and largely self-sufficient; isolated Wadi Hadramawt was an odd case, dependent as it was upon emigration to and remittances from the Gulf and Southeast Asia. What little market economy existed during the British period mostly centered on the port of Aden and its environs, and this in turn was plugged less into the surrounding states than into the international economic system via its sea-lanes. This fragile modern sector was dealt devastating blows near the time of independence when the blockage of the Suez Canal during the Arab–Israel War of 1967 nearly brought port activities to a halt, and Britain's rapid withdrawal ended both subsidies from London and the significant economic activity tied to the large British presence.

The history of South Yemen since independence is distinguished by five major periods: (1) During the period of political takeover and consolidation (1967–1969), the NLF established control in Aden and over the interior at the same time that the party's balance of power passed from the nationalists led by Qahtan al-Shaʿbi to the party's left wing. (2) The long period of uneasy leftist coleadership of Salim Rabiyya Ali and Abd al-Fattah Ismaʿil (1969–1978) was distinguished by the efforts of these two rivals both to organize the country in terms of their versions of Marxist-Leninist "scientific socialism" and to align the country with the socialist camp and national liberation movements around the world. (3) The Ismaʿil interlude (1978–1980) began with the violent elimination of Salim Rabiyya Ali by Ismaʿil and was notable for the firm establishment of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) and bitter conflict between a militant PDRY and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), the other Yemen. (4) During the era of Ali Nasir Muhammad (1980–1986), the consolidation of power in this single leader was paralleled by increasing moderation in both domestic affairs and external relations, especially with the YAR. (5) The final period of collective leadership and political weakness (1985–1990) began with the intraparty bloodbath that ousted Ali Nasir and otherwise decapitated the YSP. It ended with the merger with the YAR to form the Republic of Yemen. During the transition period that followed formal unification in May 1990, the YSP shared power with the ruling party of the YAR, the General People's Congress, under their respective leaders, Ali Salim al-Baydh and Ali Abdallah Salih.

Despite this pattern of bitter and sometimes lethal intraparty conflict, between 1967 and 1990 the PDRY regime did maintain rule and order throughout the country, made progress in bridging the gap between Aden and the rest of the country, pursued social goals with some success, and made good use of limited resources in efforts to develop a very poor country. Despite pressures toward fragmentation, especially urgings from Saudi Arabia that the Hadramawt go its separate way, South Yemen held together during difficult political and economic times. This was largely the result of political will, agitation, and organization. The gap between city and countryside remained a constant concern of the leadership, and progress was made in extending education, medical care, and other social services beyond Aden and the other urban cen-

ters. In addition, a campaign was waged to extend women's rights and other progressive ideas and institutions to the countryside. Great differences in wealth and property were eliminated, and the economy was organized along socialist lines, most notably in terms of a variety of agricultural and fishing collectives and cooperatives. In the end, however, the socialist experiment, short of time as well as money, failed; the discovery of oil, in 1986, simply came several years too late. Moreover, there was neither time nor resources to push the modern ideas and institutions into the countryside where entrenched tradition prevailed. Nevertheless, the regime remained relatively committed, egalitarian, and free of corruption.

In many ways, the PDRY of the 1970s and 1980s, like Cuba, became both heavily dependent and a great burden upon the Soviet Union. The sudden collapse of the latter and its socialist bloc in the late 1980s left the PDRY weak and in isolation, shorn of fraternal and material support. This as much as the bloodbath that decapitated the YSP in early 1986 left South Yemen unable to resist North Yemen's call for unification in late 1989.

See also Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani; Arab–Israel War (1967); Baydh, Ali Salim al-; Isma'il, Abd al-Fattah; Salih, Ali Adullah; Rabiyya Ali, Salim; Wadi Hadramawt; Yemen Arab Republic; Yemeni Socialist Party.

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Robert D. Burrowes

PEOPLE'S HOUSES

Institution founded on Atatürk's ideas, designed to strengthen Turkish culture among Turkey's people.

In Turkey, the Republican People's Party (RPP) established the People's Houses *(Halk Evleri)* in 1932, during the single-party era. Party leaders' conceptualized the People's Houses as a multipurpose institution designed to strengthen Turkish national identity, promote Western scientific thought, and educate the masses in Kemalism—the six principles of republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and reformism—put forth by the first president of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

The People's Houses succeeded the Turkish Hearth Association *(Türk Ocaği),* having acquired the use of its property and its role as an institution of political indoctrination. But unlike the Turkish Hearth, which often promoted pan-Turkism and Islam, the People's Houses advanced secularism and confined their nationalist ideology to Turkey.

The RPP not only controlled the houses, but provided funds for their operation from the state budget. The RPP also held title in its own name to house property. The party central committee had authority to open houses in localities throughout the country. RPP by-laws required deputies to support the houses, and provincial RPP committees managed local house finances. The ministry of education strongly encouraged school administrators and teachers to join the houses and play an active role in their activities. The party provincial chairman appointed the house head; local party officials and teachers usually comprised each house's administrative board. Through direct supervision and frequent reporting requirements, national and local RPP leaders made certain that each house advanced party doctrine.

A house could have as many as nine activity sections: (1) language and literature, (2) fine arts, (3) library and publications, (4) history and museum, (5) drama, (6) sports, (7) social assistance, (8) educational classes, and (9) village development. House leaders encouraged teachers to research local Turkish history and culture and to write up their studies for the house's publication series. They also encouraged students to attend house functions and to use the house library. Hoping to make each house a focus of community activity, leaders invited local residents to utilize house facilities for their weddings, circumcision celebrations, and other special occasions. Despite these efforts, however, few houses became the friendly gathering places of the general public.

The RPP quickly established People's Houses in all of Turkey's provincial capitals and in many of its towns. In 1939, the party decided to extend the house's influence—by establishing People's Rooms *(Halk Odalari)* in small towns and villages. Each room was administratively attached to a local house. By 1950, there were 478 houses and 4,322 rooms spread over much of Turkey. Although house and room membership was open to all citizens, regardless of gender or class, most members were middle- and upper-class males. Of about 100,000 members in 1940, only 18,000 were women and some 27,000 were (male) farmers and workers. The remainder of the men and more than 17,000 of the women were government and party officials, teachers, and professionals. A majority of the workers were employed by state enterprises that encouraged their membership. Many, if not most, of the common people probably viewed the houses as alien institutions associated with the often oppressive RPP, dominated by the urban elite, and allied with antireligious forces. Some critics claimed, without solid foundation, that the People's House–concept had been inspired by the Soviet Union's *Narordi Dom* (People's House).

In the late 1940s, when the RPP allowed multiparty politics in Turkey, the opposition (Democrat Party, DP) openly resented the RPP's attempts at promoting their agendas through the People's Houses at public expense. Shortly after the Democrat Party came to power in the 1950 election, the RPP proposed to preserve the People's Houses as Atatürk's heritage, but to reorganize them in the light of Turkey's new multiparty political structure. The Democrats, who criticized the houses for closely identifying with the RPP—and for failing to serve all the people as originally intended—rejected the RPP proposal. The DP put an end to the houses in 1951 by confiscating the property they occupied, claiming it belonged to the state treasury.

Despite this ignoble end, many members of the RPP continued to regard the People's Houses as an admirable attempt by the political and intellectual elite to advance the Turkish nation along the path set by Atatürk.

See also ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; KEMALISM.

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PAUL J. MAGNARELLA

PEOPLE'S SOCIALIST PARTY

Yemeni political party.

Founded in 1962 by the Aden Trades Union Congress, the People's Socialist party (PSP) was led by Abdullah al-Asnaj (later an important participant in the politics of North Yemen as well). Modeling itself on the Labour Party, it supported political means to accomplish its goals of British withdrawal, independence, and union with North Yemen. Its unwillingness to use political violence to accomplish these objectives resulted in a loss of influence to the rival National Front.

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MANFRED W. WENNER

PERA

The most Europeanized district of Istanbul during the last century of Ottoman rule.

Pera (Beyoğlu) comprised the long ridge stretching north above Galata, and its slopes to east and west. Galata, the Genoese and Venetian port concession on the northern shore of the Golden Horn in Byzantine Constantinople, remained such in the Ottoman city but was subject to greater government control. Especially after the arrival of large numbers of western and northern European traders in the seventeenth century, Pera became the site of embassies and merchants' mansions. Its great age of prosperity, power, and prestige came in the second half of the nineteenth century, after trade liberalization and social Europeanization. With tremen-

dous expansion of European trade, the Grande Rue de Pera flourished with shops, restaurants, hotels, banks, and office buildings in the latest European styles; it was populated by foreigners, local non-Muslims, and Muslims in the vanguard of Europeanization. In republican times, though Turkified and much less cosmopolitan, the area managed to maintain, somewhat diminished, its social, cultural, and commercial importance.

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I. METIN KUNT

PERES, SHIMON

[1923–]

Israeli politician, military leader, and cabinet member; prime minister, 1984–1986, 1995–1996.

Born Shimon Perski in Belorussia in 1923, Peres migrated to Palestine in 1934. In 1947, he joined the Haganah, which was then led by David Ben-Gurion, who became Peres's political mentor. He spent several years in Kibbutz Geva and Kibbutz Alumot. In 1948 Ben-Gurion appointed Peres, then twenty-five, to head Israel's navy. Peres subsequently studied politics and economics in the United States. In 1952 he was appointed deputy director-general of the Israeli Defense Ministry and served as director-general until 1959. As a leading Defense Ministry official, he participated in secret armament negotiations with the French prior to the Sinai campaign of 1956.

Peres advocated military aid (in addition to other aid and exchange programs) for the new states of Africa to help Israel develop influence there. In 1959 he was elected for the first time to the Knesset, and he and his ally Moshe Dayan argued for a change in government policy that shifted government emphasis from pioneering to enhancing state efficiency. From 1959 to 1965 Peres served as deputy defense minister. During this period he helped to develop a "special relationship" with France; he was also responsible for Israel's nuclear program.

Although being a protégé of David Ben-Gurion was advantageous in Peres's early career, it was dis-

Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres, center, received the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to bring peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Peres shared the honor of the award with Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. **© PHOTOGRAPH BY YA'ACOV SA'AR. GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE (GPO) OF ISRAEL. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

advantageous later when Ben-Gurion's political capital within MAPAI decreased. In 1965 Peres left the Defense Ministry to help Ben-Gurion establish Rafi, a new party, and in 1967 he helped to negotiate a reconciliation between Rafi, MAPAI, and Ahdut ha-Avodah that resulted in the creation of the new Israeli Labor Party.

In 1969 Peres was appointed minister of immigrant absorption; from 1970 to 1974 he served as transport minister in the government of Golda Meir. During 1974 he was minister of information. Although he was one of the contenders to succeed Meir when she resigned in 1974, he lost the Labor leadership race to Yitzhak Rabin. The competition between Peres and Rabin for leadership of the Labor Party would continue until Rabin's assassination in 1995. In 1974 Peres was named defense minister, an office he held until the 1977 election, and he served briefly as acting prime minister in 1977 after Rabin's resignation. After gaining command of the Labor Party in 1977, he led it twice to defeats by Menachem Begin and the Likud Party (1977, 1981). According to many, his losses were due to the public's skepticism about his rapid change from defense hawk to dove in relation to dealing with the Palestinians.

In 1984 both major parties failed to win a majority of seats in the Knesset and a national unity government involving both the Labor and the Likud

parties was formed. Shimon Peres served as prime minister and Yitzhak Shamir as foreign minister until 1986, whereupon they switched roles for the remainder of the term of the Knesset.

In the Knesset elections of 1992 the Labor Party recaptured power and Peres became foreign minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister Rabin. As foreign minister he negotiated the later stages of the Oslo Agreement and convinced Rabin to support it. In recognition of his efforts to achieve peace in the region Peres shared a Nobel Peace Prize with Rabin and Yasir Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization in October 1994.

Following Rabin's assassination in November 1995 Peres became prime minister for seven months until the elections of May 1996, when he again lost to the Likud, headed by Benyamin Netanyahu. A year later Peres resigned as chair of the Labor Party, and in June 1997 Ehud Barak, former chief of staff and member of the Knesset, was elected to chair the Labor Party.

Barak was elected prime minister in 1999, and Peres served as his minister of regional cooperation from July 1999 to March 2001. After the March 2001 election in which Barak lost to the Likud's Ariel Sharon, Peres was appointed minister of foreign affairs and deputy prime minister in the national unity government led by Sharon. In October 2002 Peres and other members of the Labor Party resigned from the Sharon government.

See also Arab–Israel War (1956); Barak, Ehud; Ben-Gurion, David; Netanyahu, Benjamin; Oslo Accord (1993); Sharon, Ariel.

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Gregory S. Mahler

PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR, JAVIER

[1920–]

Peruvian diplomat; United Nations secretary-general, 1982–1991.

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar received a law degree from the Catholic University in Lima in 1943. He joined Peru's ministry of foreign affairs in 1940 and the Peruvian diplomatic service in 1944; in 1946, he was a member of the Peruvian delegation to the inaugural session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. He later served as ambassador to Switzerland, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Venezuela. A scholar as well as a diplomat, he authored the *Manual de derecho diplomático* (Manual of diplomatic law) in 1964.

In 1971 Pérez de Cuéllar was appointed the permanent representative of Peru to the UN, where he served as president of the Group of 77 (1972) and president of the UN Security Council (1973–1974). He was appointed a special representative to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim in 1975, successfully resolving the crisis in Cyprus. After a two-year stint as Peruvian ambassador to Venezuela, he returned to the UN in 1979 as an undersecretary for political affairs; in that position, he dealt with the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

In January 1982 Pérez de Cuéllar began the first of two successive terms as UN secretary-general. During his tenure, he negotiated the August 1988 cease fire that ended active hostilities in the Iran–Iraq War. He later led the UN in its confrontation with Iraq after the latter invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Under his leadership, UN peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. After retiring from the post of UN secretary-general in 1991, he continued to serve in a variety of international organizations, notably the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Inter-American Dialogue.

In 1995 Pérez de Cuéllar made an unsuccessful bid for the presidency of Peru. He later served as both prime minister and foreign minister in the interim Peruvian government of Valentín Paniagua (2000–2001). He was then appointed Peruvian

ambassador to France. In the course of his career, Pérez de Cuéllar has been decorated by thirty-four countries and honored by more than fifty colleges and universities around the world.

See also UNITED NATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

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BRYAN DAVES
UPDATED BY RONALD BRUCE ST JOHN

PERIM

Yemeni island in the Red Sea.

This small, barren volcanic island with a well-protected harbor is located in the Bab al-Mandab Straits at the lower end of the Red Sea, between Yemen and the coast of Africa at Djibouti, and theoretically should have some strategic value. Seized by the British occupiers of Aden in 1857, Perim (also Barim) Island was used as a coaling station by the British until the 1930s. The island became a part of South Yemen upon independence in 1967; with the unification of the two Yemens in 1990, it became a part of the Republic of Yemen. Despite the presence of a tiny garrison of South Yemeni troops through the 1980s and even rumors of the presence of Israeli observers, Perim was accorded no real strategic or economic significance during the late twentieth century, in contrast to Socotra Island in the Arabian Sea. A poor fishing village exists side by side with the rusting, collapsing remains of its more glorious days as a coaling station.

See also YEMEN; YEMEN CIVIL WAR.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION

Oversight body of the League of Nations.

The Geneva-based commission was established in 1919 under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to supervise the administration under the mandate system of fifteen mandated territories including four in the Middle East—France's Lebanon and Syria and Britain's Palestine and Iraq. It required annual reports from mandatory governments and advised the Council of the League of Nations on policy regarding the mandates. The Commission, however, exercised little supervisory authority, and three of the mandates in the Middle East—Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine—were generally run autonomously, much like colonies.

Most members of the commission were representatives of colonial powers: Great Britain, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Japan. Only two members were noncolonial states: Switzerland and Norway. Citizens of the mandates could appeal to the commission but only through their mandatory high commissioner. The commission repeatedly rejected Palestinian Arabs' appeals for the right to self-determination and tolerated France's delays in granting autonomy to Syria and Lebanon. However, the commission granted independence to Iraq in 1932. The commission existed until 1946, when the United Nations replaced it with its Trusteeship Council as the Mandate System became the trusteeship system.

See also MANDATE SYSTEM.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

PERSIAN

An Indo-European language related to English, Sanskrit, Kurdish, and Pashto.

Modern Persian arose about the ninth century C.E. It is the national language of Iran, Afghanistan, and

Tajikistan. It is known generally and in Iran as Farsi; in Afghanistan, as Dari; and in Tajikistan, as Tajiki. It has exerted great influence on the Indian subcontinent and in Ottoman Turkey.

Persian has twenty-three consonants and six vowels. It has two consonants lacking in English: *gh* (similar to the French *r*) and *kh* (similar to the *ch* in the German *Buch*). It lacks the *th* sounds (as in *thin* and *this*); the consonant *w;* the vowels in *bit, but,* and *put;* and syllable-initial consonant clusters (as in *strip*). It has neither gender, articles, nor number agreement.

Persian uses a slightly modified Arabic script, written from right to left (except for the numerals). There are seven diacriticals (three seldom used). Seven letters cannot join each other or any following letter. Under Soviet rule, Tajiki briefly used the Latin script, then switched to the Cyrillic. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there has been a movement for the return to the Arabic script. The Persian script's main features are inconsistent representation of certain vowels and alternative spellings of some consonants and vowels. These and other features, causing problems in reading and writing, have since the nineteenth century led some Iranians to advocate the adoption of Latin or some other script.

Persian has changed little in the last thousand years or so: a person who knows Persian can understand tenth-century Persian (except for a few words and phrases). Persian includes an extensive Arabic element, the language of Islam, and was for a time the language of science and scholarship for all Muslims. There are also a number of Turkish and Mongolian loanwords, reflecting Turkish and Mongol rule in Iran. Growing contacts with Europe since the nineteenth century have led to extensive borrowings from French and, since World War II, from English. Greek, Aramaic, and Indian languages also account for a few words. In its turn, Persian is the source of some words in Arabic, large numbers in Turkish and Urdu, and smaller numbers in Western and other languages. Most of these words have found their way into Western languages through classical Greek, Latin, Arabic, and Spanish (for example, the English *tulip, narcissus, khaki, orange, sugar, julep, jasmine, pajamas, magic, arsenic,* and *cushy,* and the names Cyrus and Roxanne).

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M. A. JAZAYERY

PERSIAN (ARABIAN) GULF

Arm of the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean.

The Persian Gulf is a shallow body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran; it is more than 500 miles long and as wide as 200 miles. Fed on the northwestern end by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (called the Shatt al-Arab), the gulf drains to the southeast through the Strait of Hormuz into the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. Its maximum depth is only 328 feet. There are numerous islands in the gulf, Bahrain and Qeshm being the largest ones.

Since antiquity the gulf has been a major trade and marine route between East Africa and South Asia. In the nineteenth century British commercial interests supported British military intervention in the gulf. Consequently, all the Arabian Peninsula coastal principalities were forced to conclude protectorate treaties with Britain, while British commercial and naval influence progressively increased in the ports along the Iranian coast of the gulf. In addition to the gulf's economic significance derived from trade and pearling, the British perceived the waterway as having strategic importance as a gateway to their imperial possessions in India. The early-twentieth-century discovery of petroleum deposits throughout the coastal region and even in the seabed of the gulf further enhanced its increasingly intertwined economic and strategic values. By the 1970s and into the twenty-first century, more than 80 percent of Middle East oil exports passed through the gulf. Inevitably, its waters became polluted by oil spills that harmed the local fishing industry and threatened rare sea mammals and other aquatic life.

See also BAHRAIN; PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS; SHATT AL-ARAB.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

PERSIAN CATS

Long-haired cats that were exported from Iran in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The Persian cat is a stocky domesticated feline with long, silky hair, a large, round face, small ears, and a bushy tail. It is called "Persian" because it was exported from Iran, or ancient Persia. The cat, known as *buraq* in Persian, was first described by European travelers, who observed that some Safavi dynasty princes and high government officials kept the cat as a house pet in seventeenth-century Isfahan, then the capital of Iran. Even though the cat has long been associated with Iran, its exact origins remain unclear. The Kurdistan region of southeastern Turkey, the central plateau area of Iran, and the Bukhara district in modern Uzbekistan all have been cited as probable places of origin. During the nineteenth century, however, the Isfahan region of Iran was the major source for the export of Persian cats to Europe and India. Wealthy Iranians kept them—as well as more common short-haired cats—as pets. Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar (r. 1848–1896) had a reputation for adoring and keeping cats, and his favorite Persian cat, Badri Khan, was assigned human attendants to care for him in royal fashion.

In Europe, the keeping of cats as house pets became common only during the eighteenth century, but by the nineteenth century Europeans who could afford to do so were purchasing cats imported from Iran and the Ottoman Empire. The Persian cat became especially popular beginning in 1871 when Britain's Queen Victoria bought a pair of imported Persian cats at London's first Oriental cat fair. Thereafter, the keeping of Persian cats as desirable—and valuable—house pets spread from England to Europe and North America. The domestic breeding of Persian cats in all the aforementioned places gradually eliminated the need to import them. Although the export of Persian cats from Iran continued during the first decade of the twentieth century, the practice ceased after 1912.

Persian cats were first exported from Iran in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Though long associated with Iran, the Persian cat's origins may actually be from elsewhere in the surrounding region. COURTESY OF PHILIP MATTAR.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

PERSIAN SCRIPT

Modified Arabic alphabet used for writing Persian.

As a result of Arab expansion, the Middle Persian, or Pahlavi, script (developed from Aramaic) was replaced by the Arabic script during the ninth century. Despite changes in vocabulary and in the script, the Persian language has remained largely intact for

centuries. The Persian script, while mainly the same as modern Arabic, contains changes, such as extra markings on the Arabic *ba* (Roman B) to create the Persian *pe* (Roman P), on the Arabic *ghayn* (Roman Gh) to create a Persian *che* (Roman Ch) and on the Arabic *ra* (Roman R) to create the Persian *zhe* (Roman Zh), none of which exist in Arabic. Arabic calligraphy, primarily used to write the Quʾran, also changed as a result of Persian influence. The Arab styles of *taliq* and *naskh* combined to form the Persian *nastaliq* style. From *nastaliq* comes *shekasteh,* broken script allowing greater speed; with *shifih* the letters are farther apart but conjoined in a "lover's embrace." Persian calligraphy was not confined to the Quʾran, and became most popular during medieval times through Persian court and mystical poetry.

See also ARABIC; ARABIC SCRIPT; PERSIAN.

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ROXANNE VARZI

PESH MERGA

See GLOSSARY

PETAH TIKVAH

First new Jewish settlement in Eretz Yisrael in the modern era.

Located several miles east of Tel Aviv, Petah Tikvah (also, Petah Tiqva) was founded in 1878 by a group of religious Jews from Jerusalem led by Rabbi Yoel Salomon, David Gutman, and Yehoshua Stampfer, who were active in the goal of redeeming land and liberating the Jewish community in Palestine from the yoke of the Halukka. Petah Tikvah was the first colony founded.

In its first decade, the community was beset with problems: malaria, insecurity, complicated disputes with Arabs living on adjacent lands, and financial shortages. Some of the settlers received financial aid from the Hibbat Zion movement and, eventually, substantial support from Baron Edmond de Rothschild.

When the State of Israel was founded in 1948, the population of Petah Tikvah was about 20,000. By 2000 its population had grown to more than 200,000. Especially because of the land shortage, the city has an increasing number of high-rise buildings.

See also HALUKKA; HIBBAT ZION; ROTHSCHILD, EDMOND DE.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

PETER VII

109th Coptic patriarch of Egypt (1809–1852).

Originally chosen by Mark VIII (1796–1809) as *abuna* (archbishop) of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, Peter instead became an important bishop close to the patriarch and eventually succeeded him. Peter was a thrifty and judicious administrator whose wise handling of accounts created a fortune that made possible the reforms of his successor, Cyril IV (1854–1861). Peter assembled part of the patriarchal library in Cairo and had new copies of important treatises made from old versions, sometimes participating in the task. He wrote theological treatises clarifying the Coptic Church's position on Communion and Christ's nature. Peter's good relations with the viceroy of Egypt became legendary. In particular, Peter won great favor with Muhammad Ali when he refused an offer from the Russian czar to put the Coptic Orthodox Church under his protection.

See also COPTS; CYRIL IV; MARK VIII.

DONALD SPANEL

PETRA

Ancient city carved from the cliffs in today's Jordan.

In about 500 B.C.E., the Nabatean Arabs established a presence in the region east of the great Jordan-Dead Sea rift. They built their capital and trading center at Petra, in southern Jordan, close

to the Wadi Araba and adjacent to the contemporary village of Wadi Musa. In its location and appearance, Petra is a unique city. The only easy access is through a half-mile-long (1 km) narrow passage called the *siq.* At its terminus is the treasury, a large edifice carved into the rock of the rose-colored cliffs. This vista is repeated with additional buildings as well as with simple houses hewed within the stone precipices of the ancient city. They include a huge monastery, a palace, tombs, and an amphitheater, most of which were crafted in a modified Greco–Roman style. For tourism, Petra is one of Jordan's most important archaeological sites and attractions.

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PETER GUBSER

PETROCHEMICALS

Chemicals isolated or derived from petroleum or natural gas.

Petrochemicals include industrial and agricultural chemicals synthesized from refinery products, gases, and natural gas. Research into manufacturing processes was stimulated by the availability of raw materials (most of which would otherwise be waste products) and by foreign demand. The global petrochemicals industry remained relatively small until World War II, when the United States concentrated government investment in petrochemicals into a few large, privately owned plants and in newly constructed state-owned facilities operated by experienced firms. This huge investment in petrochemicals during the war left the U.S. industry in a dominant position for many years, making it very difficult for the national oil companies (NOCs) of Middle Eastern countries to compete. Before the nationalization of their oil industries, the NOCs were hindered by the operating companies' reluctance to supply enough raw materials and process technology to make the NOCs' local ventures competitive internationally. Exports were necessary because Middle Eastern domestic markets for petrochemicals were small. Another disadvantage grew out of the inability of the NOCs to conduct state-of-the-art research on process technology or to fabricate locally the equipment needed to establish and retain a position on the cutting edge of the industry.

These drawbacks decreased in importance after oil prices rose in the early 1970s. Increased costs of drilling for raw material in oil fields gave the NOCs a comparative advantage. Also helpful was the rise in importance of a third class of firms involved in petrochemicals: international contracting firms such as Fluor, Foster Wheeler, and Chiyoda, which were able to design and construct state-of-the-art turnkey facilities and associated infrastructure. During the 1970s and after, Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries found it relatively easy to acquire petrochemicals facilities tailored to their needs.

Persian (Arabian) Gulf petrochemical producers have increased their market share of world petrochemicals from almost 0 percent in 1980 to about 10 percent in 2002. The cost of the feedstock (the raw material, i.e. natural gas or refined oil products) can account for between 40 percent and 70 percent of the final chemical product. Hence the Gulf producers of oil and gas with raw material costs of between $0.50 and $2.00 per barrel of oil have a natural advantage. As a consequence, the large petrochemical manufacturers in the Gulf have taken most of the increase in demand due to the growth of the Far Eastern economies. As of mid-2002, the Gulf countries—mainly Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, and Qatar—produced a total of 58 million tons of petrochemicals and had plans to start a further 57 million tons within the next five years.

See also NATURAL GAS: ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION OF; PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS; PETROLEUM RESERVES AND PRODUCTION.

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MARY ANN TÉTREAULT
UPDATED BY JEAN-FRANÇOIS SEZNEC

PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS

Naturally occurring hydrocarbon compounds.

The petroleum industry in the Middle East dates to 3000 B.C.E., when Mesopotamians exploited asphaltic bitumen obtained from seepages and rock asphalt mining to produce construction mortar, mosaic cement, road surfacing, and waterproofing materials. This form of petroleum, called pitch, is the residue left after natural gas and volatile liquid fractions have evaporated from crude oil. Ancient Bahrainis coated pottery and baskets with pitch, and in the biblical story of Noah it is used to caulk the ark. An industry distilling lamp fuel from crude oil began in Alexandria about the second century C.E. About five hundred years later, Byzantine armies began to use "Greek fire," a napalmlike substance distilled from crude oil that was poured or sprayed on enemy troops and ships, and then set afire.

The Modern Oil Industry

The modern oil industry is far more complex and integrated, a continuous process that pivots on the extraction, or production, of petroleum and natural gas from the earth. Upstream from production are exploration (the search for oil-bearing lands), and development (the construction of production infrastructure such as oil wells and natural gas separators in oil fields). Downstream from production are transportation (including pipelines, tankers, trucks, and railroads), refining (turning crude oil into usable products), and marketing (gasoline stations and other outlets). Petroleum and natural gas are both fuel sources as well as the raw material from which petrochemicals, such as fertilizers and the building blocks of plastics, are manufactured.

Looking at the oil industry as a global system lets us identify its choke points, the stages where a powerful firm or government can exert political and economic leverage on the entire process. One potential choke point concerns petroleum reserves and production. In the nations of the Middle East, as in most other nations, mineral rights belong to the state. Firms must negotiate with governments for concessions, or rights, to extract hydrocarbons on their territories. In exchange, they offer lump-sum payments, rents, taxes, and/or royalties (payments per unit of oil or gas produced).

The One Company/One Country Pattern

Before World War II, Middle Eastern countries competed for investment from international oil companies (IOCs). The largest IOCs were more fearful of an oil glut, which would depress prices, than of shortages, which would inconvenience consumers. Under the 1928 Red Line Agreement, the partners in the Iraq Petroleum Company agreed that none of them would explore for or develop new oil in the former Ottoman Empire unless every partner consented to each new project. Countries inside the Red Line had difficulty getting the IOCs to find or develop the oil that could have increased their national incomes because the largest—and richest—Red Line companies were reluctant to add to already excessive oil production capacity.

Oil partnerships and concession patterns also limited the leverage of Middle Eastern governments. Instead of one government hosting several firms that operated on various parts of its territory, the initial pattern of oil industry development in the region was to have a single operating company, often a joint venture or partnership, as the only oil producer in each country. Joint ventures are common in the oil industry because of its capital intensity and high risk. Individual parent companies like Gulf (now part of Chevron) and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, then British Petroleum, and now BP Amoco), set up jointly owned operating companies such as the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) to pool financial resources and risk. Although two separate parents invested in and profited from Kuwait's oil, their business in Kuwait was conducted by a single company, KOC. Such partnerships also offered the IOCs some control over total world oil supplies. They made sharing production information easier (especially for U.S. companies, which were constrained by antitrust laws), dampened competition among partners, and provided a protected environment in which the large IOCs could coordinate their global operations.

Kuwait's ability to choose a concession partner was limited by treaties between its ruler and the British government, which gave Britain the final authority to approve concession agreements. Britain would not allow Kuwait to contract with a non-British company, although Kuwait eventually persuaded Britain to accept a non-British firm as a partner in KOC. The concession further limited

Kuwait's autonomy by giving KOC exclusive rights for ninety years to find and produce oil over the entire land area of Kuwait. Had Kuwait sought better terms from another company during that time, that company would have faced legal challenges from KOC's parents, preventing it from selling Kuwaiti oil in the international market.

Kuwaiti autonomy also was limited by the threat of direct intervention by one or both home governments of KOC's parents, Britain and the United States. In the early 1950s, Iran found itself in exactly this situation. In 1951, the Iranian government under Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized the operations of Iran's oil company following a conflict with its managers. The owner of the oldest oil production facilities in the Middle East, Iran's operating company had only one parent, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). AIOC obtained court orders enjoining other companies from buying Iranian oil.

Afraid of the example that a successful nationalization might provide to other Middle Eastern governments, the British and American governments worked to destabilize and eventually to overthrow the Mossadegh regime. The restoration of the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in 1953, following a brief period of ouster, also reinstated foreign oil companies as managers of the nationalized Iranian oil company. Rather than restoring AIOC to its former position as sole owner, however, the Iranian government sought a "Kuwait solution" and invited non-British participation in the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). When NIOC was reorganized, American companies and the French national oil company received 60 percent of the shares, leaving AIOC with only 40 percent.

The one company/one country concession pattern allowed oil companies to treat one or more Middle Eastern host countries as marginal suppliers of oil to the international market despite the cost advantages of their oil over what could be obtained from most other sources. This balancing act was possible because all the major companies whose production holdings stretched across the Middle East were partners in two or more concessions. The way the Iranian crisis was resolved in the 1950s made the management of crude oil supply by the IOCs even easier. The reorganized NIOC was the first operating consortium in the Middle East to include all of the Seven Sisters—the IOCs dominating the industry from the end of World War II until the oil revolution. Once these companies had estimated the amount of oil needed to balance market demand, they could regulate production by increasing or decreasing offtake in countries whose governments could not retaliate easily.

An Iranian oil worker at an oil refinery in Iran's capital city, Tehran. Iran's rich petroleum reserve is a major source of revenue for the country; however, as a result, the country struggles with severe air pollution problems. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

The End of the One Company/One Country Pattern

The one company/one country pattern in the Middle East unraveled in the 1950s. Following the reorganization of the Iranian concession, which incorporated several independent companies, independents began to compete more vigorously against

the majors to win new concessions. When the government of Libya opened bidding for concessions in 1955, it divided its territory into independent parcels, eventually awarding rights covering 55 percent of its land area to fifteen operating companies whose owners included independents from France, Germany, and the United States. At about the same time, older producers with unallocated offshore properties began to auction them off. The independents were innovative bidders for all these properties, offering terms that included higher-than-average lump-sum payments and royalties along with equity shares for host governments. Better terms for new concessions encouraged host governments to demand that prior concession holders relinquish unexploited territories. The new concessions that were signed for relinquished properties included sunset provisions allowing the contracts to lapse if the companies failed to develop promising properties after a predetermined period of time. As more and more independents won concessions and then found oil, markets became glutted and prices weakened.

In what was perhaps the last straw for the IOCs, the U.S. government imposed a quota on U.S. oil imports in 1959. The U.S. market, the largest in the world, was doubly lucrative because the high cost of domestically produced oil gave sellers of lower-cost foreign oil the potential to reap high profits by selling at or slightly under high U.S. product prices. U.S.-based IOCs had long been encouraged by their government to find oil overseas, and access to the protected U.S. domestic market reinforced other incentives to invest abroad. When profits from their international operations were squeezed by higher concession costs and competition from independents, IOCs with marketing outlets in the United States looked toward U.S. oil sales as a source of deliverance. However, cheap imports threatened the domestic price structure, and firms that owned only U.S. production facilities fought oil imports, especially from the low-cost Middle East.

The U.S. government asked oil companies to limit imports voluntarily, but hard-pressed firms were unwilling to forgo profits from crude sales in the United States. Domestic producers, citing national security and the risk of becoming dependent on foreign imports, soon demanded real protection. In 1959, the voluntary quotas became mandatory. Meanwhile, the major companies had begun to consider reducing per-barrel prices paid to host governments as a way to improve their deteriorating finances. In February 1959, after consulting one another (but not their hosts), the IOCs unilaterally reduced the posted prices of crude oil used to calculate operating-company tax obligations to host countries. Despite the outcry that followed, the IOCs lowered posted prices again in August 1960. In September, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela formed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

The OPEC Era

Through OPEC, major oil exporting countries had the same opportunities to coordinate their oil policies that the IOCs had long enjoyed. They used the companies' refusal to engage in joint negotiations with an OPEC representative to ratchet oil prices up in successive negotiations, each taking the best deal made by any other member as its floor for the next round, a tactic called leapfrogging. Following a failed Arab oil embargo imposed after the 1967 Arab–Israel War, OPEC militancy in relation to the IOCs grew. In 1970, the Libyan government used its superior structural position to induce leapfrogging among its own concessionaires, enforcing production cuts on the most vulnerable to make them agree to price increases and then imposing those increases on the rest.

In 1971, OPEC moved toward participation, a concept referring to gradual nationalization, which had originated with Saudi Arabia's oil minister, Ahmad Zaki Yamani. Members that reached participation agreements with their operating companies in the early 1970s later accelerated the timetable to achieve full nationalization more rapidly. Even so, the process allowed each OPEC member to develop a strategic plan for assuming control of its oil industry. After nationalization, most national oil companies (NOCs) managed their new responsibilities far better than predicted, some with the assistance of former concession owners. A few acquired overseas holdings and most added to their hydrocarbon reserves and expanded operations, such as refining, that added value to their exports. Excessive political interference and infrastructure deterioration did not become major problems for most OPEC NOCs until after world oil prices collapsed in the mid-1980s.

As more than one energy analyst has observed, the stone age did not end because the world ran out of stones and the oil age will not end because the world runs out of oil. Middle Eastern oil and gas operations are undergoing a transition. Natural gas has become a highly desirable fuel. New resources have been discovered, including the giant Northern field in Qatar. New technologies allow natural gas to be shipped long distances and off-loaded safely, right at the time when governments in developed countries are tightening antipollution requirements and encouraging consumers to shift to cleaner fuels such as gas. Where air and water quality are high priorities, gas is the hydrocarbon fuel of choice for electrical power generation as well as for direct consumption. Countries with large gas reserves may be better placed economically than those that rely primarily on crude oil sales.

For oil exporters, the future is more ambiguous. Even if oil remains a dominant fuel for some years, supplies are increasing outside the Middle East and competition will keep prices and revenues down. As domestic industries age, new exploration and development will have to be financed out of earnings against which domestic claims are increasing or, as seems increasingly to be the case, foreign investment will make up the difference between what oil exporters can afford to pay and what they need to invest. Strategic investment in overseas oil and gas operations, recreating to varying degrees the multinational vertical integration that had underpinned the old oil regime, has been helpful. Ownership of downstream operations enables OPEC members to guarantee a minimum level of production and sales through their own refining and marketing networks, and also helps them stabilize oil profits because of the inverse relationship between price movements in crude and products—when one falls, the other generally rises.

Overall, however, strategic investment of oil revenues outside of the oil and gas industry is a more pressing need, whether this includes research on alternative energy sources or concentrates on identifying and supporting domestic industries vibrant enough to employ rising generations and satisfy key local needs. A quarter of a century ago, the economist Walter J. Levy deplored "the years that the locust hath eaten," the resources consumed rather than invested to achieve long-term, post–oil age economic security. Since then, the locusts have consumed many more resources, while Middle Eastern governments and populations remain acutely dependent on oil revenues for basic needs. Wisdom suggests anticipating the end of the oil age by adopting new investment policies, but the combination of expediency and their strong positions in hydrocarbons offer more tempting and far easier alternatives to Middle Eastern countries making choices about how to use their petroleum and natural gas resources.

See also Anglo–Iranian Oil Company; Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC); Mossadegh, Mohammad; Oil Embargo (1973–1974); Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Petroleum Reserves and Production; Red Line Agreement; Yamani, Ahmad Zaki.

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Mary Ann Tétreault

PETROLEUM RESERVES AND PRODUCTION

An industry based on the distillation of crude oil for the creation of fuel in local and world markets.

In March 2003, the Middle East and North Africa produced 29 percent of all the oil produced worldwide (22.5 million barrels/day out of a total of 76.5 mb/d), and held 69.3 percent of the total world proven crude oil reserves of 1,050 billion barrels. At this rate of production, the Middle East will exhaust its oil reserves by 2030 unless significant new

reserves are found. The inflow of cash to the region in 2003 from oil and related products can be estimated at US$215 billion.

Within the Middle East, five countries (Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates [U.A.E.] control 90.5 percent of all reserves and 67 percent of production. Should Iraq be in a position to resume its pre-war(s) production, this group of five countries would produce 74 percent of the regional production and 29 percent of the world's demand. In 2001 the United States imported an average of 2,775 barrels per day from the Middle East, about 23.8 percent of its imports (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2002).

Production and Pricing

The cost of oil production in the Gulf is the lowest in the world. Marginal increases in production cost between $0.50 and $2.00 per barrel. The lower end of this range is most common in Saudi Arabia, the higher in the United Arab Emirates, due to the higher costs of offshore drilling. (For comparison, incremental costs are $12–$15/b in the North Sea fields, $3–$5/b in Mexico, and $18–$20/b in U.S. offshore wells.)

Crude oil in the Middle East and North Africa, 2002 average

Country	Oil production (in thousands) b/d*	Population (in thousands)	Bbls/ capita	Reserves in billions of barrels at end 2001**
Saudi Arabia	7,551	21,030	0.36	261.80
Iran	3,470	64,530	0.05	89.70
Iraq	2,014	23,580	0.09	112.50
United Arab Emirates	1,952	2,650	0.74	97.80
Kuwait	1,853	1,970	0.94	96.50
Libya	1,317	5,410	0.24	29.50
Oman	950	2,620	0.36	5.50
Algeria	883	31,840	0.03	9.20
Qatar	640	700	0.91	15.20
Egypt	630	67,890	0.01	2.90
Syria	530	16,720	0.03	2.50
Yemen	470	19,110	0.02	4.00
Turkey	48	68,610	0.00	—
Bahrain	27	650	0.04	—
Tunisia	—	9,670	0.00	0.30
Jordan	—	6,850	0.00	—
Lebanon	—	6,560	0.00	—
Israel	—	6,450	0.00	—
Morocco	—	650	0.00	—
Total	**22,335**	**357,490**	**0.06**	**727.40**

*SOURCE: *Middle East Economic Survey* 46:11 3/17/03, 46:12 3/24/03.
**SOURCE: *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, 2002.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Most of the oil produced in the Middle East is sold via long-term contracts between national oil companies and direct users, such as ExxonMobil, TotalElfFina, ChevronTexaco, BP-Amoco, or AGIP. The oil producers also sell to large trading companies, such as Mark Rich in Switzerland or Phibro in the United States, which in turn resell to ultimate users. The contracts between the users and producers generally specify that prices be set (often quarterly) by the producer based on a standard benchmark, such as prices of Brent or Dubai light, and adapted to conditions such as distance, sweetness (level of sulfur), and gravity. Some producers also sell contracts to deliver oil through the main oil exchanges, primarily London and New York, but the exchanges are mostly used by the traders. Although the volume of oil traded on the exchanges represents only 20 to 30 percent of the total oil sold worldwide, the market price set on these exchanges is the main source of information used by major producers in setting their prices.

The most common price benchmarks used in long-term contracts between the Gulf state oil companies and their buyers are Dubai Light for shipments to the Far East, Dated Brent (North Sea) for shipments to Europe, and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) grade for shipments to the United States. Prices of the crude oil actually shipped are modified by adding or subtracting a certain amount per barrel to reflect the grade, the quality, the distance to the market served, and the timing of the purchase relative to the benchmark quote.

When a producer is ready to effect a shipment under a given contract, it contacts the user, who in turn arranges to have a tanker ready at the point of sale for loading within forty-eight hours. Shippers and users, who have quite precise expectations on when to expect loading orders, often have tankers waiting nearby the loading facilities. In the case of Gulf shipments, tankers wait near Khor Fakkan on the Gulf of Oman.

API Gravity and Pricing

Crude oil is graded according to gravity, measured by the American Petroleum Institute degree of grav-

ity (API): the higher the number, the lighter the grade. Heavier grades require more energy to refine than the lighter grades and are used to produce heavier and cheaper products. The region produces a large range of crudes from the newly developed Saudi ultra-light crude at API 50.4 to the Syrian Souediah Heavy at API 24. Standard light crudes in the Gulf have an average API of 34; Algerian crude is very light at API 44.

Many refineries are unable to use a wide range of API crudes. When refineries are overstocked with light crude, the discount on heavy crudes may decline and sometimes turn into a premium. In general, crudes of different API degrees from the same point of sale will be priced differently. For crude shipped out of Ra's Tanhura in 1991, the average discount on heavier grades amounted to 10.7 percent for an API difference of 7 degrees.

Prices, relative to the benchmark oils, are modified according to the sweetness of the relative crudes, the less sulfur the sweeter. In the Middle East, the light Gulf crudes tend to be relatively sweet, while the Syrian crudes are very sour. Sweet crudes are preferred by refiners because they are cheaper to process and less corrosive on equipment.

Comparison of FOB (free on board) crude oil prices for major grades in 1991*

API Type of Oil	Average $ from Origin Grade	Average $ from Northwest Europe	Average U.S. Gulf	Average from Singapore
Arab Light Saudi Arabia	34	19.8	19.42	19.33
Arab Heavy Saudi Arabia	27	17.68	17.12	16.69
Iran Light Iran	34	19.35	—	19.39
Minban U.A.E	39	20.92	—	21.58
Kirkuk Iraq	36	20.46	—	—
Kuwait Kuwait	31	17	—	17.99
Sahara Blend Algeria	44	22.01	23.06	—
Zouitina Libya	41	22.43	—	—
Oman Oman	34	20.33	—	—

* In dollars per barrel.

SOURCE: *International Crude Oil Prices, Major Time Series from the 1860s to 1991*. Middle East Petroleum & Economic Publications.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Pricing, Distance, and Timing of Sale

The distance and cost of transport between the point of sale and the place of delivery is reflected in prices. At similar API grade, Arabian Light 34 sold on an average of seven years (1988 to 1994) at a discount of about $1.73 from North Sea Brent for shipments to Europe. Arabian Light 34 for the same period sold at a discount of $3.01 from WTI for shipments to the United States. (This last difference also reflects a difference in lightness in favor of WTI.) Even within the Gulf, prices also are adjusted for distance. In 1991 similar-grade oil shipped to Europe—Oman Light 34 (shipped from Oman)—sold at a premium of 2.7 percent over the Saudi Light 34 shipped from Ra's Tanhura approximately 560 miles (900 km) north, and at a premium of 5.1 percent over Iranian Light 34 shipped from Kharg island, 683 miles (1,100 km) north.

Changes in market conditions between shipment announcement and loading is included in the computation of price. For example, Saudi Light 34 was adjusted by $1.90 per barrel on shipment to Europe ordered in December 1993 but effected only in January 1994.

Numerous other factors also affect the prices and the above-mentioned adjustments. The availability of tankers at any one time influences the cost of shipping; supply and demand for ships is arranged by numerous ship brokers worldwide. Price terms are quoted in reference to an index of total daily costs called the "Worldscale." Insurance rates also influence prices. At times of turmoil in the Gulf, insurance rates rise significantly and force the producers to absorb most of the increase to entice buyers to continue lifting crude from within the Gulf.

Main Gulf suppliers of crude oil to the United States, 2001

	In thousands of b/d
Saudi Arabia	1,600
Kuwait	275
Iraq	780
Total U.S.Imports From the Gulf	**2,700**

SOURCE: Energy Information Administration. <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.ht>

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Purchases of Saudi and most other crudes in the region by the oil companies and major traders are usually done using thirty-day sight letters of credit, confirmed by a local bank. However, the original ARAMCO partners are not required to issue such letters of credit and instead buy on open-book basis from ARAMCO. Upon loading of oil, the shipmaster signs the bill of lading. The seller then presents the bill of lading, the insurance documents, and a signed draft to the local bank for payment. Payment is then effected by the local bank within thirty days of the date of the bill of lading.

Pipelines

Pipelines allow producers to bring oil closer to the main users and thereby cut the cost of transport. The main pipelines in the region have been laid to facilitate access to the European markets. Pipelines from the Gulf fields to the Mediterranean, which provide the most efficient transport, are subject to political problems. The tapline opened in 1975 from Saudi Arabia to Lebanon was closed by Syria; the Iraq-Syria pipeline was closed by Syria in 1982, but has been partially reopened by Syria in 2001 and is being tested for use at a rate of about 200,000 barrels per day. The pipeline from Iraq to Turkey is being used for most shipments of Kirkuk oil from Iraq to the Mediteranean. Its present capacity is about 1.5 million barrels per day but could be increased with investments in pumping facilities. The Trans-Arabian pipeline from Iraq to Yanbu on the Red Sea, through Saudi Arabia, was closed in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait and has remained closed since.

The major pipeline presently used in the Gulf is the East West Arabian pipeline (Petroline), which is 745 miles (1,200 km) long and has a capacity of 4.8 million barrels per day. The other major pipeline is the Sumed pipeline in Egypt, which allows oil shipments to bypass the Suez Canal and has a capacity of 2.4 million barrels per day. Algeria exports gas to Europe by two pipelines; one through Tunisia to Italy and one through Morocco to Spain.

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JEAN-FRANÇOIS SEZNEC

PETROMIN

Catalyst for the Saudi acquisition of ARAMCO.

The General Petroleum and Mineral Organization (PETROMIN) was established by Saudi Arabia in 1962. In 1963, PETROMIN began marketing petroleum products in the kingdom. By 1980 PETROMIN was marketing all the oil produced in the kingdom that was not lifted by the ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company) partners, about 20 percent of total production. Under its president, Dr. Abdal Hadi Taher, a U.S.-trained petroleum engineer, PETROMIN developed as a fully integrated oil company. It established a vast number of subsidiaries in refining, transport, and distribution. By the mid-1970s, PETROMIN was able to show the American owners of ARAMCO that the Saudi government, in the long run, could potentially control their oil operations independently from ARAMCO. It is not known if PETROMIN was actually an important factor in the negotiations for the friendly acquisition of the U.S. oil companies' interest in ARAMCO. After ARAMCO was turned over to the Saudis, however, the role of PETROMIN started to decline. In 1994, PETROMIN and its successor company SAMAREC were merged into ARAMCO.

See also ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL COMPANY (ARAMCO).

JEAN-FRANÇOIS SEZNEC

PHALANGE

Political party in Lebanon.

The Phalange (Kata'ib) party was founded in 1936 as a Maronite Catholic paramilitary youth organi-

zation by Pierre Jumayyil, who modeled it on the fascist organizations he had observed while in Berlin as an Olympic athlete. It was authoritarian and centralized in organization, and its leader was all-powerful. The Phalange became a major political force in Mount Lebanon. After allying itself with the French Mandate authorities, the Phalange later—just before Lebanese independence—sided with those calling for independence; as a result, the party was dissolved in 1942 by the French high commissioner (it was restored after the French left Lebanon). Despite this dispute, over the years the Phalange has been closely associated with France in particular and the West in general. For many years, the party newspaper, *al-Amal*, was printed in Arabic and French.

Consistent with its authoritarian beginnings, Phalangist ideology has been on the right of the political spectrum. Although it has embraced the need to modernize, it has always favored the preservation of the status quo. The Phalange party motto is "God, the Fatherland, and the Family," and its doctrine emphasizes a free economy and private initiative. It focuses on the primacy of preserving the Lebanese nation, but with a "Phoenician" identity distinct from its Islamic Arab neighbors. Party policies have been uniformly anticommunist and anti-Palestinian, with no place for pan-Arab ideals. The Lebanese Civil War of 1958 and the intensification of sectarian conflict benefited the party; its membership increased from 300 in 1936 to 40,000 in 1958. The power of the party was reflected in parliament; from 1959 through 1968, 61 percent of its candidates were elected. In the 1972 parliament, the Phalange had seven deputies, including Pierre Jumayyil and his son Amin Jumayyil. By the start of the Lebanese Civil War that began in 1975, the party's membership had increased to 65,000, including a militia of nearly 10,000.

Throughout the civil war, the Phalange party was the most formidable Christian force, and its militia bore the brunt of the fighting on the Christian side. Because the party was part of the mostly Christian, right-wing coalition known as the Lebanese Front, the power of the Jumayyil family increased considerably. Ironically, as Pierre Jumayyil's son Bashir Jumayyil was consolidating his power through the integration of all right-wing militias into his Lebanese Forces, the role of the Phalange party diminished. Bashir, a member of the party, marginalized its traditional leadership, which he felt was too moderate.

During the 1980s, the Phalange lost much of its credibility and political stature. In 1982, under military pressure from Israel, which occupied a good deal of Lebanon, Bashir Jumayyil was elected president. He was assassinated before assuming office, and his brother Amin took his place. The corrupt and partisan rule of Amin further harmed the image of the party, and the death of Pierre Jumayyil in 1984 inaugurated a struggle for power within the party. The party was even attacked by the Lebanese Forces, the erstwhile political child of the Phalange, in 1985. George Saade, elected president of the party in 1987, tried to rejuvenate the organization, but the changing political sentiment in the country in favor of Syria did not help his cause. The Phalange was briefly led by Munir al-Hajj after Saade's death in 1998. The race to replace al-Hajj was a rivalry between Amin Jumayyil, who returned to Lebanon in July 2000, and Karim Pakradouni (who was not Maronite, but Armenian). In early 2002, Pakradouni became leader, and Jumayyil was expelled from the party in July 2002.

See also Jumayyil, Amin; Jumayyil, Bashir; Jumayyil, Pierre; Lebanese Civil War (1958); Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanese Forces; Lebanese Front; Maronites; Saade, George.

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As'ad AbuKhalil
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

PHARAONICISM

An intellectual outlook found particularly in early twentieth-century Egypt.

Intellectuals of a Pharaonicist orientation assumed the existence of a unique Egyptian national character shared by ancient and modern Egypt; their writings attempted to demonstrate the ancient Pharaonic

origins of many of the characteristics and traits of contemporary Egyptians. Expounded particularly by those Egyptians who were educated in Europe or who were Westernized intellectuals, Pharaonicism faded as Arab-Muslim nationalist sentiment grew in Egypt.

JAMES JANKOWSKI

PHARAON, RASHAD

[1912–]

Diplomat and physician in Saudi Arabia.

Rashad Pharaon, born and trained in Syria, became the private physician to a succession of Saudi monarchs from 1936 onwards. Enjoying the confidence of the Al Saʿud family, he was appointed their first ambassador to France and Europe (1947–1966); during the same period, he was also the kingdom's first minister of health (1954) and senior delegate to the United Nations (1963–1964), and he was involved in most areas of Saudi foreign relations as the closest adviser to Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz when he was foreign minister and then king.

LES ORDEMAN
UPDATED BY GEORGE R. WILKES

PHILAE

An island, now submerged, that was the site of an ancient Egyptian temple complex.

The island of Philae was located in the Nile River at the First Cataract, south of the present Aswan dam; it is now totally submerged. Between 1972 and 1980, before the island was submerged into Lake Nasser, the main temples were disassembled and reassembled on the island of Agilkia, under the aegis of the United Nations Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

From the Late Period of Egyptian history (304 B.C.E.–30 B.C.E.), Philae served as the frontier between Egypt and Nubia. Philae was approximately 460 feet by 1510 feet (140 m by 460 m) in size. It was paired with another nearby island, Biggeh, as a focal point of the worship of the Egyptian god Osiris. Biggeh housed an *abaton,* one of the purported tombs of Osiris, while Philae was home to a temple to the sister/wife of Osiris, Isis. This temple, thought to be the single most beautiful preserved ancient Egyptian temple, housed a *mammisi,* or birth house, built to celebrate the birth of Harpocrates to Isis and Osiris.

The Isis temple is of Ptolemaic date (304 B.C.E.–30 B.C.E.). The temple was laid out on the east side of the island, built along two axes, with a roughly south-northeast orientation. A long courtyard flanked by colonnades gave access to the first, 66-foot-tall (20 m) pylon, or entrance gateway. Inside this pylon was a second courtyard with a colonnade on the east and the *mammisi* on the west. A second, 43-foot-tall (13 m) pylon gave access into the Isis temple proper.

There were a number of other notable buildings and structures on the island, particularly a kiosk on the east side dating to the time of Augustus (30 B.C.E.–14 C.E.). This kiosk, perpendicular to the Isis temple, formed a second processional axis. The latest datable inscription in Egyptian hieroglyphic script (24 August 394 C.E.) was found on the island.

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DAVID WALDNER
UPDATED BY JOHN M. LUNDQUIST

PHILBY, HARRY ST. JOHN

[1885–1960]

The leading European explorer of Saudi Arabia.

Harry St. John Philby was born in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) to a family of the Raj (British administration in India) and educated at Cambridge University in England. He joined the Indian civil service after his graduation in 1908, but when his temperament stalled his career, he transferred in 1915 to the Indian expeditionary force in Mesopotamia (now Iraq). Again he ran afoul of his superiors, who sent him to central Arabia in 1917 to negotiate with an unreliable ally. In the course of this mission,

which had only limited success, Philby discovered his life's passion—exploration of Arabia—and a patron, the aforementioned unreliable ally, Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman, known in the West as Ibn Saʿud, then ruler of Najd and subsequently, founder of Saudi Arabia.

Although Philby eventually tied his fortunes to Ibn Saʿud, immediately after World War I he was posted to Iraq and Transjordan (now Jordan) where he irritated superiors with his hostility to the Hashimites, the Hijazi family to whom the British entrusted the rule of these states newly carved from the Ottoman Empire. Because the Hashimites were rivals of the Saudis, they became Philby's enemies too.

In 1925 Philby quit the colonial service to become a merchant in Jidda. However, it was not until after his conversion to Islam in 1930 that his fortunes began to improve. In 1932 his plan for a voyage through Rub al-Khali (the Empty Quarter), a feat that had long eluded Europeans, finally gained Ibn Saʿud's approval. To Philby's immense chagrin, a rival Briton, Bertram Thomas, had just preceded him, but Philby did complete a more ambitious course and his explorations of the peninsula continued throughout his life. These constitute the most enduring of his achievements, for he was a meticulous observer of the land, its flora and fauna, and archaeological remains. His precise observations drew the map of Arabia.

In 1933 Philby helped to negotiate the agreement that opened Saudi Arabia to American oil exploration, the first stage in the creation of the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). He had other business successes, including a concession to sell Ford motor cars in Arabia. His political instincts were less fortunate. Throughout much of his life he waged a constant campaign against what he considered to be the stupidity and immorality of the policies of the British government. On several occasions Philby meddled in Palestinian affairs, consulting with Jewish dissenter Judah Magnes to produce an ill-fated Arab-Zionist peace plan in 1929. In 1939 he proposed to senior Zionist officials in London a scheme under which King Ibn Saʿud might be persuaded to support the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine in exchange for Jewish political influence in London and in Washington, D.C., on behalf of the complete "unity and independence" of the remaining Arab lands, and "extensive financial help" to the Arabs, including a hefty subsidy to the Saudi ruler.

Philby's wartime harangues included praise for Adolf Hitler and disparagement of the British war effort, leading the Foreign Office to consider him a dangerous crackpot. In 1940, during a stopover in India on his way from Arabia to the United States, he was arrested, shipped to England, and imprisoned for nearly a year. After the war he was able to return to Arabia, but the death of Ibn Saʿud in 1953 and Philby's criticism of his successors brought him banishment to Beirut in 1955. He resettled in Riyadh only after abandoning politics.

The charge that Philby was a secret agent is unfounded. However, he enjoyed the company of Western diplomats, to whom he provided much gossip. And his son, Kim Philby (1912–1988), was a high-ranking official in British counterintelligence before being exposed as a Soviet mole.

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BENJAMIN BRAUDE
UPDATED BY NEIL CAPLAN

PHOENICIANISM

A Lebanese nationalist ideology.

Phoenicianism is based on the idea that Lebanon is unique in the Middle East for its location, people, and mission, and therefore should not be bound in any arrangement to neighboring countries, which are seen as inferior. The ideology of Phoenicianism flourished early in the twentieth century, when decentralization parties proliferated in the Arab region of the Ottoman Empire. Many Christians were dedicated Arab nationalists, although some Lebanese Christians believed that their nation should not be associated with the Arab region.

Phoenicianism is based on the belief that the Lebanese political entity is, contrary to historical

realities, not the product of the twentieth century. "Lebanese nationalists"—a term that has come to describe the views of the right-wing Maronite Christian establishment and its allies in other sects—believe that Lebanon, both as a political entity and as a people, has been in continuous existence since Phoenician times. The Phoenicians are seen as ancient Lebanese, and Phoenician achievements are exaggerated to the point that the Greek and Roman civilizations are perceived as inferior to the "Lebanese Phoenician civilization." Lebanese nationalists argue that the Phoenician identity defines the Lebanese political identity. Other identities, such as those based on Islam or Arabism, are regarded as alien to the Lebanese historical experience.

The dispute over Phoenicianism is at the root of the Lebanese political problem. There is no consensus on the identity of Lebanon. Although the Maronite establishment has insisted that the Lebanese identity should be defined in purely historical terms (i.e., Phoenician), Lebanese Muslims and others who support their views argue that the Lebanese identity has been shaped by the Islamic Arab legacy. Arab nationalists dismiss the Phoenician claims and compare then to Zionist claims over Palestine. The political arrangement of Lebanon since 1943 has failed to settle this thorny political issue. The National Pact of 1943, for example, tried to please both sides by declaring that Lebanon has "an Arab face," leaving the determination of the identity of the "body" unspecified. For advocates of Phoenicianism, the only linkage between Lebanon and the Arab world rests in Lebanon's membership in the League of Arab States.

Phoenicianism has developed from an ideology into a full-fledged myth. Nobody has contributed to the nourishment of the myth more than Lebanese poet and ultranationalist Saʿid Aql, who traces most of the great discoveries of civilization to the Phoenician people. Even the discovery of America is attributed by Aql—among others in Lebanon—to Phoenician travelers who preceded Columbus. The great Greek thinkers are called Phoenicians. The school curricula in Lebanon reinforce the myths about the Phoenician people among all who accept a version of history promulgated by ideologues who have dominated the Ministry of Education since independence.

See also Aql, Saʿid; League of Arab States; National Pact (Lebanon).

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As'ad AbuKhalil

PHOSPHATES

Export of these compounds is vital to the economies of Israel, Jordan, and Morocco.

Natural calcium phosphate deposits occur worldwide in the crust of Earth. Although the global phosphorous content is only 0.1 percent, in economically viable deposits it ranges between 26 percent and 38 percent, measured in phosphorous pentoxide, or P_2O_5. Many Arab countries produce phosphate rock for transformation into phosphoric acid and other complex fertilizers. These include Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan, as well as Syria, and Iraq. Some other countries in the region are minor players in phosphate production and export. In 2000, the economic reserves of the main five producers were estimated at 7 billion tons, 1.6 billion tons, 267 million tons, 600 million tons, and 1.27 billion tons, respectively. These five countries provide close to half the world's production, which is mostly processed for use as agricultural fertilizers. Morocco produces the richest phosphate (32% P_2O_5 at Khouribga). Important Moroccan sites are Khouribga, Benguerir, Youssoufia, and Bougraa-Layoune in the Western Sahara. Algeria's phosphate reserves are located in the Constantine region, in the east of the country. At 15 percent P_2O_5, they are not as rich as Moroccan deposits. They were mined early by the colonial French, during the nineteenth century. A number of Algerian sites were abandoned or exhausted, including Djebel Dekna, Djebel Dyr. Four sites are still in production: M'zaita, Tocqueville, Bordj R'dir, and Kouif. Tunisia's phosphates contain 30 percent P_2O_5. Major production in Tunisia is in various sites in the Gafsa province, in the southwest, including Mdilla, Metlaoui, and Moulares. The quality of Egypt's phosphate is similar to Tunisia's. Abu Tartur, located 31 miles (50 kilometers) west of the

Kharga Oasis in the Western Desert, is its major phosphate site. Jordan's phosphate is mined at Eshidyia, al-Hassa, al-Abyad, and al-Rusayfa. In these five countries, phosphate production, processing, and export represent an important component of economic output, and at the same time a serious source of industrial pollution. In 1998, fertilizer production accounted for $8.5 billion of the $13 billion chemical industry output in the Arab region.

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KARIM HAMDY

PICA

See JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION

PILAF

See FOOD

PINSKER, LEO

[1821–1891]

Early Zionist leader.

Born in Russia, Leo Pinsker was active in the Odessa branch of the Society for the Promotion of Enlightenment, which advocated assimilation as the solution to the problem of European Jewry. Following the pogroms of 1881, Pinsker changed his view and began calling for the resettlement of Jews in a country where they would constitute a majority and attain political independence. He proposed the establishment of a national fund based on contributions for the settlement of immigrants with financial needs. He expressed hope that those who oppressed the Jews might aid in their resettlement. He did not advocate any particular location for the Jewish center but suggested the convening of a congress to make such a decision. Pinsker published his ideas in German, in a pamphlet entitled *Autoemancipation: A Warning of a Russian Jew to His Brethren* (1882). The pamphlet made a profound impression on the Hibbat Zion movement, which adopted it as its manifesto. In 1884, he was made chair of the Central Committee of Hibbat Zion, serving as its head until 1889.

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MARTIN MALIN

PLAGUE

Epidemic disease spread by fleas that infest rats.

Plague is caused by the bacillus *Pasteurella pestis.* Bubonic plague, which affects the lymph nodes, is most commonly identified with major epidemics since the fourteenth century; it can decrease infected populations by as much as one-third. Numerous outbreaks were recorded in the Middle East in the nineteenth century. The most severe bubonic plague epidemic in the twentieth century was in Egypt, some 520 miles south of Cairo, in 1912. Some 237 deaths out of a total of 357 cases were recorded.

Pneumonic plague, which affects the lungs, occurs more commonly during the winter; it is highly infectious, with a mortality rate of almost 100 percent. It is spread through the air from person to person. Septicemic plague, which affects the bloodstream, is the rarest form. It is 100 percent fatal, because death occurs within a few hours of infection.

JENAB TUTUNJI

PLUMER, HERBERT CHARLES ONSLOW

[1857–1932]

British career officer who was High Commissioner for Palestine from 1925 to 1928.

Lord Plumer was born in Yorkshire, England, on 13 March 1857, and entered the British army in 1876. He served in the Sudan in 1884 and in South Africa during the Boer War (1899–1902), which led to his promotion to major general. He was a senior general on the European front during World War I and became a field marshal in 1919. Lord Plumer

served as governor and commander in chief of Malta from 1919 to 1924, but he is best known for his three years as British high commissioner for Palestine from 1925 through 1928.

As a career officer in the British armed forces, Lord Plumer stressed the importance of maintaining security and stability in the volatile mandated territory. During his three years' rule, Jewish immigration stagnated, and therefore the Arabs became less fearful of eventual Jewish political domination. Lord Plumer, however, resisted requests by Palestinian Arab politicians to hold elections for a legislative council; he preferred to hold elections for municipal councils that would test the feasibility of self-government and provide combined representation for Arabs and Jews. The relative quiet of his years in office persuaded him that he could reduce the number of British troops in Palestine. In reality, tension was simmering below the surface, which led to major riots at the Western (Wailing) Wall in Jerusalem, August 1929.

See also HIGH COMMISSIONERS (PALESTINE); TRANSJORDAN FRONTIER FORCE; WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES.

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ANN M. LESCH

POGROM

An armed riot by one ethnic, tribal, or religious group against another, incited by the government; usually accompanied by looting, mass property destruction, rape, and murder.

The term *pogrom* derives from the Russian *pogromit* (to destroy); Russia was the scene of the first modern pogroms, against its minority Jewish population, beginning in 1881. During the Russian Civil War (1918–1923), armed forces of all sides perpetrated atrocities against the Jews, though Vladimir Lenin's government went on record as opposing antisemitic violence.

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JON JUCOVY

POINT FOUR

U.S. aid program to the Middle East under the Truman Doctrine.

The name refers to the fourth point made in U.S. president Harry Truman's 1949 inaugural speech, wherein he cited the need to support democracy and economic stability where small nations are threatened by outside (that is, Soviet) influence.

Point Four led to unprecedented U.S. military and economic aid to the Middle East, allocated under various programs, expanding aid given to Turkey and Greece under the Marshall Plan since 1947. Of the $2.94 billion in military equipment sent to the region during the 1950s, Turkey received $1.87 billion, with Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia receiving lesser amounts. Aid also went to agricultural projects and to Palestinian refugees.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

POLISARIO

Acronym of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro), the movement struggling to establish the independent state of Western Sahara in Spain's former Spanish Sahara colony.

POLISARIO was founded on 10 May 1973 by a combined group of Moroccan students of Sahrawi background studying at Muhammad V University in Rabat, Morocco; a small number of veterans of anticolo-

nial struggles during the late 1950s residing in Mauritania; and youth from within Spanish Sahara. The group evolved out of the earlier, more informal Movement for the Liberation of the Sahara. Its first head was the charismatic Mustapha Sayed al-Ouali. POLISARIO's founding manifesto spoke of a strategy of "revolutionary violence" and "armed struggle" against Spanish colonial rule, but it was not until the second congress, more than a year later, that independence was explicitly declared as POLISARIO's goal.

The notion of a Sahrawi nation was a new one, the combined product of the sedentarization among the formerly nomadic Saharan tribes, socioeconomic changes in Spanish Sahara, and new ideological currents linked to decolonization in Africa and developing nations. POLISARIO was a reflection of these changes as it sought to transcend traditional tribal cleavages and fashion a supratribal Sahrawi national identity, although the majority of the POLISARIO leadership was Reguibat in origin, from the largest of the Sahrawi tribal confederations.

Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi was the first head of state to provide support and until the early 1980s was an important supplier of arms. Algeria was initially hesitant but by mid-1975 had become POLISARIO's main benefactor and POLISARIO was rendered almost completely dependent on Algiers. The Spanish departure in early 1976 and the entrance of Moroccan and Mauritanian troops inaugurated the Western Sahara War. (By agreement with Spain, Morocco was to occupy the northern two-thirds of the territory and Mauritania the remaining one-third.) One immediate outcome was a large-scale exodus (estimates range from one-third to two-thirds) of the Sahrawi population (about 74,000, according to the 1974 Spanish census) from Western Sahara to the Algerian side of the border, around Tindouf. POLISARIO was granted a great degree of autonomy to run the refugee camps, which served as POLISARIO's military, political, and social base. POLISARIO's military wing, the Sahrawi Popular Liberation Army, numbered between ten thousand and fifteen thousand during the early 1980s, and eight thousand to nine thousand in 1991. The POLISARIO leadership established a formal government-in-exile, SADR (Saharan Arab Democratic Republic). Al-Ouali was killed in fighting in June 1976. His replacement, Muhammad Abd al-Aziz, was chosen at the third POLISARIO congress and was still head of POLISARIO and president of SADR in 2003.

Morocco gradually gained the upper hand militarily and consolidated its control over the bulk of Western Sahara during the 1980s. Concurrently, Algerian aid decreased. Hence, POLISARIO's diplomatic gains—recognition of SADR by more than seventy countries at its peak, and full membership in the Organization of African Unity—proved to be of limited value. Morocco and POLISARIO formally agreed to a United Nations–sponsored cease-fire in 1991, which was to be followed by a UN-supervised referendum in 1992, giving Sahrawis the option of independence or incorporation into Morocco. The plan was POLISARIO's best hope, but it was also risky. Its winner-take-all formula stipulated that defeat would necessitate POLISARIO's disbanding. As it happened, the vote never took place, owing to the two parties' persistent failure to reach agreement on the list of eligible voters. In 2001, Morocco's unhappiness with the revised voter rolls, and the UN Security Council's unwillingness to impose the referendum by force, led UN mediator James A. Baker to propose delaying the referendum in favor of a five-year period of autonomy for the region, to be followed by a referendum with an expanded voter list. POLISARIO initially resisted the plan. However, in 2003, under the prodding of Algeria, it assented, and the UN Security Council endorsed the plan. Fearing that its claim to sovereignty over the territory, Morocco rejected the plan, and the matter remained unresolved.

See also Morocco; Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR); Spanish Morocco; Western Sahara; Western Sahara War.

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BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMAN

POLITI, ELIE

[1895–?]

Jewish Egyptian journalist, publisher, and banker.

Elie Politi was born in Cairo to a family of modest income. Though he obtained a rudimentary French education, he was largely self-educated. Politi turned to journalism during the 1920s. He founded and directed the daily *L'informateur financier commercial* in the late 1920s and published a number of economic directories while helping to establish *al-Misri* in Cairo, which became one of the most influential daily newspapers in the Middle East during the 1940s and early 1950s.

From 1914, Politi was also one of the leading businessmen and land developers in Egypt. He directed and managed the Commercial Bank of Egypt, transforming it into a major and respected financial institution, and helped to develop the new city of Muqattam on the eastern hills overlooking Cairo, as well as the beach and urban area of Maʾamura, east of Alexandria. *Al-Misri* was closed when Gamal Abdel Nasser took power in 1954, in spite of its nationalist stance during clashes with Britain the previous year, and the banks were nationalized at the end of the decade. Like most of the Egyptian Jewish economic elite, Politi was a committed Egyptian patriot. In 1965 he published his memoirs, *L'Egypte de 1914 à Suez,* in Paris.

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MICHAEL M. LASKIER
UPDATED BY GEORGE R. WILKES

POLLARD AFFAIR

Israeli espionage against the United States.

Jonathan Pollard, a civilian intelligence analyst with the U.S. Navy, was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in November 1985 while seeking sanctuary in the Israeli embassy in Washington. A Jew and passionate Zionist, Pollard was recruited to spy for Israel's Bureau for Scientific Liaison (Lekem), which operated independently of the Mossad (Israel's foreign intelligence agency). U.S. officials claimed that Pollard had compromised more than 1,000 classified documents, many of them top secret, during seventeen months of espionage. Material included reports on Soviet arms shipments to Arab states, on missiles, and on chemical weapons.

Pollard, who was sentenced to life imprisonment, claimed to have been motivated not by financial gain but by a desire to help Israel combat terrorism. The affair briefly rocked the most sensitive and secret elements of Israel's relationship with the United States. Pollard himself dismissed Israeli suggestions that his recruitment was a rogue operation by the Lekem chief, Rafi Eitan, and an overzealous air force officer. Two Israeli commissions of inquiry failed to establish precisely where responsibility lay.

No lasting damage was done to military and intelligence links between the two countries. Pollard's supporters, especially those in the Jewish community, continued to seek a presidential pardon, arguing that he had been treated more harshly than others who had spied for the United States's enemies, let alone for one of its most intimate allies.

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IAN BLACK

POLYGAMY

Marriage in which a spouse of either sex may have more than one mate at a time.

Polygamy for men (polygyny) is sanctioned in Islam by direct reference in the Qurʾan and is practiced to some extent in all countries with Muslim populations except where prohibited by law. Muslim men may have as many as four wives at a time but are admonished to treat all equally. The *shariʿa* warns of the unlikelihood that the wives in a polygamous marriage can, in fact, be treated equally. Therefore, monogamy is the preferred condition.

Polygamy is statistically minimal in Middle Eastern countries that uphold the *shariʿa* in family law. This is partly due to legislation that makes polygamy difficult to enter into or to maintain. Economic considerations also make polygamy virtually impossible, since there must be a separate household for each wife. Consequently, those who practice polygamy are often relatively wealthy or influential. Community and political leaders are more likely to practice polygamy as a sign of respect and as a matter of prestige.

In bedouin and tribal cultures, tribal leaders practice polygamy both to enhance their own prestige and to form or strengthen alliances with other tribes.

See also Shariʿa.

Jenab Tutunji

POPULAR FRONT

The 1930s French government that was supportive of Arab nationalism.

The Popular Front government came to power in France in June 1936, under the premiership of the socialist Léon Blum, author of the Blum–Viollette Plan. Tension between the French government and Arab nationalism was alleviated by the new government's vision of its commitment in the Middle East, particularly of the French mandate over the Levant. Stalled independence negotiations with nationalists of Syria were rejuvenated, and a Franco–Syrian treaty was signed in September 1936, in which France maintained some major supervisory powers. The treaty was never ratified by France, which by June 1937 had a new government with a more conservative colonial outlook.

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Charles U. Zenzie

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

Radical, left-wing Palestinian guerrilla organization.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (also known as the PFLP, al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin, al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya, and the Red Eagles) is a Marxist-oriented group established by George Habash, a Christian Palestinian, after the June 1967 Arab–Israel War. Habash created the PFLP after successfully uniting three groups: Heroes of the Return, the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Independent Palestine Liberation Front. In 1968 the group joined the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and was second in importance and influence among the Arab Palestinians only to Arafat's al-Fatah movement.

The group's ideology is based on three principles: Palestinian national sovereignty *(wataniyya),* Arab unity *(qawmiyya),* and Marxist-Leninist ideology. The PFLP has sought to unite Palestinian efforts within a secular governing framework, and it has modeled some of its operative activities and strategies on Cuban leader Fidel Castro's revolutionary guerrilla methods. Central to the group's understanding of *wataniyya* is a strict opposition to the State of Israel, an interest in restoring Arab unity in the region, and criticism of pro-Western Arab states.

In 1970 internal conflict split the PFLP into three separate groups: the PFLP, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC). Habash remained at the head of the PFLP and forged ties with other leftist groups outside Palestine such as the German Baader-Meinhoff group, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Japanese Red Army. The PFLP began operating in Europe and elsewhere, claiming responsibility for such events as an attack at Lod Airport in 1972 and the hijacking of an Air France airbus to Entebbe in 1976. In the Arab world, they

are associated with hijacking and the destruction of four international airplanes in Jordan in 1970. These acts of terrorism led to their being banned in Jordan, where they had originally been based. When Jordan's King Hussein expelled the organization, they relocated in Lebanon.

Although it is a member of the larger umbrella group of the PLO, the PFLP has often opposed al-Fatah's policies, forming splinter groups in opposition to Arafat's concessions in the Middle East peace process. During the first Intifada in 1987, key PFLP members formed a group called the Red Eagles that carried out attacks on Israel in the West Bank, and later formed a coalition with other opposition groups such as the DFLP and the Damascus Ten. In 1993 the group finally separated from the PLO after it signed the Declaration of Principles. At that time, the PFLP elected a new executive body: George Habash, Abu Ali Mustafa (Mustafa Zibri), Abd al-Rahim Lalluh, Abu Ahmad Fuʾad, Sabir Muhi al-Din, Taysir Kubʿa, and Umar Kutaysh.

With the decline of Soviet support after the disintegration of the former U.S.S.R., the PFLP became marginal in comparison to emerging Islamist groups such as HAMAS and Islamic Jihad. Although the group disagreed with the provisions set out in the 1993 Oslo Peace Accord, it renewed its ties with Arafat's al-Fatah group in 1999. This renewal of ties with the PLO signaled a shift in the PFLP's Marxist doctrine, which has become increasingly focused on socialist democracy. Whereas formerly the PFLP did not recognize Israel as a state, it now accepts the possibility of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital alongside a temporary Israeli state that eventually reverts to an "historic Palestine" after the right of return sees Palestinian refugees repatriated.

Habash retired in 2000 and was succeeded by Abu Ali Mustafa. Mustafa had been a founding member of the PLO and a member of its Executive Committee. After taking over in 2000, he moved PFLP headquarters from Syria to Ramallah in the West Bank and began organizing attacks on Israeli targets there. After learning that Mustafa and the PFLP intended to carry out attacks on Israeli schools and other civilian areas, Israeli authorities bombed his office, killing him and several others. Ahmad Saʿadat then became head of the PFLP; he was associated with the assassination of Rehavam Zeʾevi, Israel's tourism minister, and in April 2002 was sentenced to one year in prison for taking part in the assassination. Although the courts later ruled in favor of his release, continued PFLP attacks have prevented this.

The PFLP's funding comes from a variety of sources. Financial and military support are said to come from Syria and Libya, and in 1999, Iranian president Mohammad Khatami promised to continue Iran's support of not only the PFLP, but also the PFLP-GC, Islamic Jihad, and HAMAS. In addition to outside support, the PFLP has financed its activities from front companies as well as legitimate business activities.

During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the PFLP claimed responsibility for a number of violent incidents within Israel's pre-1967 border areas. Habash maintained his opposition to Arafat's signed accords with Israel. Saʿadat also stood in strong opposition to the Oslo Accords, although the general language of the PFLP has shifted from Marxist-Leninist revolutionary appeals to a focus on democracy and social justice.

See also Fatah, al-; Habash, George; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command.

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Mouin Rabbani
Updated by Maria F. Curtis

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND

Radical Palestinian group.

With between 500 and 1,000 members, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC) is one of the smaller Palestinian guerrilla organizations. The PFLP-GC recruits mainly from the Palestinian refugee camps of Lebanon and Syria. Its leadership, under Ahmad Jibril, served in the Syrian military before forming the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) in 1965. After briefly merging with al-Fatah, in 1967 they were founding members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), then broke away in October 1968. The PFLP-GC was admitted to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in late 1969 and acquired a seat on the PLO Executive Committee in June 1974. Based first in Amman and then in Beirut, its headquarters have been in Damascus since 1982. During the late 1960s another, unrelated PFLP splinter group, led by Ahmad Zaʿrur and eventually known as the Organization of Arab Palestine, also used the name PFLP-GC, but it was usually distinguished as PFLP-GC (B). During this period the original PFLP-GC was therefore often known as PFLP-GC (A) and occasionally operated as the al-Aqsa Fidaʾiyyun Front.

Nominally Marxist-Leninist, the PFLP-GC has been one of the most uncompromising of the Palestinian "rejectionist" groups. In October 1974 it was a founding member of the Front of Palestinian Forces Rejecting Surrenderist Solutions (the Rejection Front). In 1983 it was one of two PLO factions to rebel after Yasir Arafat hinted at making peace with Israel, and it has since boycotted all PLO institutions, supporting a series of rejectionist coalitions from Damascus.

The PFLP-GC is known for its indiscriminate military actions specializing in the use of small, highly trained units for high-profile operations. It was responsible for a suicide raid on an apartment building in the northern Israeli town of Kiryat Shmona in April 1974 that killed eighteen Israeli civilians, and for the November 1987 hang-glider attack on an army camp in northeast Israel that killed six soldiers. It is presumed to be responsible for the February 1970 midair explosion of a Swiss airliner en route to Israel that killed more than forty-five people; the 1978 bombing of a Beirut building that killed more than two hundred PLO personnel; and a series of Syrian-backed attacks in Jordan and Europe, notably the bombing of a civilian airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988. Its military positions across Lebanon face regular Israeli attacks, and Jibril's son Jihad, responsible for operations in Lebanon, was killed in 2002 by a car bomb that was widely believed to have been planted by Israel.

Ahmed Jibril, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command, a group which opposes the rule of Yasir Arafat. **© Reza/Webistan/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

The PFLP-GC's close links with Syria (as well as Libya and, more recently, Iran) have reduced its autonomy, undermining its credibility among Palestinians when its other loyalties placed the PFLP-GC in military conflict with the PLO. In 1977 a faction led by Muhammad Zaydan and Talʿat Yaʿqub split off to revive the PLF after Jibril justified Syrian military incursions into Palestinian camps in Lebanon. In 1984 Jibril was expelled from the PLO following Syria's 1983 confrontation with

the PLO. A decade later, the PFLP-GC was implicated in attempts on Arafat's life. The PFLP-GC's presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is consequently small. Nevertheless, its 1985 prisoner exchange with Israel, enabling hundreds to return to the Palestinian territories, infused valuable (if primarily non–PFLP-GC) cadres into these territories. Its 1987 hang glider operation also perceptibly emboldened the Palestinian population on the eve of the Intifada, and from the 1990s, the PFLP-GC trained and smuggled arms to Islamist groups in the territories. Its Syrian-based radio station, Idhaʾat al-Quds (Radio Jerusalem), established in 1988 to encourage rebellion in the West Bank, was popular, and often jammed by Israel. It publishes *Ila al-Amam* (Forward), first issued in 1963, and *al-Jabha* (The front), which first appeared in 1969.

See also Fatah, al-; Jibril, Ahmad; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Rejection Front.

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Mouin Rabbani
Updated by George R. Wilkes

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE OCCUPIED ARABIAN GULF

Marxist, antigovernment organization of southern Oman (1968 to 1971).

The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) was organized in 1968 as the successor to the Dhufar Liberation Front, a largely tribal group attempting to overthrow the rule of Saʿid ibn Taymur Al Bu Saʿid's dynasty in Oman's southernmost province. PFLOAG not only aimed to enlarge the scope of the rebellion, but gave it a radical, Marxist orientation and tried to impose a collectivist regime where its forces were in control. With financial support and weaponry from Iraq, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union as well as a secure base in neighboring Marxist South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), the front took most of Dhufar from the shaky regime of Sultan Saʿid. The accession of his son, Qabus ibn Saʿid Al Bu Saʿid, by coup in July 1970, turned the situation around, with the considerable foreign military assistance from Great Britain and Iran playing a key role. Well-funded civil action programs helped secure the loyalty of a population little drawn to PFLOAG's anti-Islamic ideology. In December 1971 it absorbed the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (NDFLOAG) and assumed its second identity as Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf with acronym unchanged. In May 1974, after serious reverses, those favoring continued military action formed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). By 1976 Dhufar was completely and securely in government hands.

See also Al Bu Saʿid, Qabus ibn Saʿid; Al Bu Saʿid, Saʿid ibn Taymur; National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf.

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Malcolm C. Peck

POPULATION

Demography is crucial to an understanding of economic, social, and political life in the Middle East.

Until the nineteenth century, the Middle East experienced a typical Malthusian demographic system: high fertility outpaced high mortality, but there was occasional extraordinary mortality from warfare, famine, or epidemic disease, particularly bubonic plague. The population grew slowly until one of these demographic crises occurred, dipped sharply, then

Children attend school in Baghdad, the heterogeneous capital city of Iraq. The population of Baghdad is nearly five million, accounting for approximately 25 percent of the country's total population. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

began to grow slowly once again. This pattern ended in much of the Middle East during the nineteenth century. Despite minor outbreaks, truly catastrophic epidemics ended with the cholera epidemic of 1865. The increase in central government control facilitated security, trade, and delivery of food to famine regions. Egypt's population began to grow early in the century, as did that of Anatolia and the coastal provinces of Ottoman Syria during the 1870s. Iraq, Arabia, and Iran took little part in either the improvement in civil conditions or population growth.

The period of World War I (and the wars in Anatolia that followed it) was a demographic watershed in the Middle East, a period of great mortality and forced migration unequalled in the previous millennium. After the war, the Middle East began a new period of population growth, erasing the wartime population losses within a decade. Turkey's population began to expand fairly rapidly, from 14.6 million in 1927 to 18 million in 1940. Egypt's population grew from 13 million inhabitants in 1917 to 16 million in 1937. Other countries grew less quickly, but population increased markedly across the region. Nevertheless, the Middle East can be described as underpopulated before World War II. Large areas of potentially fertile lands were uncultivated. Population density was low, due to high mortality and lack of developed resources. By modern standards, mortality had declined only slowly. In late Ottoman times, mortality had averaged more than 3.5 percent per year. This condition only gradually improved between the two world wars. However, Egypt, Palestine, and Turkey managed to lower mortality through irrigation, public sanitation, and by ending conditions of civil unrest that had diminished the distribution of crops and goods. Medical improvement was a minor factor.

Population of the Middle East, 1800 to 2025, in millions*

Year	Population	Year	Population
1800	32.8	1925	54.7
1825	33.4	1950	79.2
1850	33.8	1975	154.3
1875	36.0	2000	308.6
1900	44.1	2025	449.3

* Including the areas of today's Bahrain, Egypt, Gaza, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank, and Yemen.

SOURCE: Projections to 2000 and 2025 from United Nations, *World Population Prospects*, 2000. (medium-fertility variant)

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

After World War II, as in much of the world, the Middle Eastern population began to increase rapidly. Fertility, always high, remained so, while introduction of modern medicine greatly lowered mortality. Modern agricultural techniques and the new crops of the green revolution increased the ability of Middle Eastern economies to feed larger populations. The result was a population boom. From 1950 to 1990 the population of the Middle East increased threefold. By the 1960s the rate of population increase meant that, if the high rates continued, future populations would double every twenty-five years. These rates of increase put great strain on the economies of the region. The results have included rapid and unplanned urbanization and unemployment, as well as overuse of fertilizers and poor agricultural techniques that temporarily yield large crop increases but eventually exhaust the soil.

Life expectancy at birth*

	1950	2000		1950	2000
Bahrain	51	73	Yemen**	33	57
Egypt	42	68	Oman	36	74
Iran	46	69	Qatar	48	75
Iraq	44	61	Saudi Arabia	40	73
Israel	65	78	Syria	46	70
Jordan	43	72	Turkey	44	70
Kuwait	56	77	U.A.E.	48	76
Lebanon	56	71			

* "1950" is actually for the years 1950–1955
** 1950 is average for North and South Yemen

SOURCE: United Nations, *World Population Prospects*, 1990; World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, 2002.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Fertility

The average fertility of Middle Eastern women changed little for centuries. Women who lived through their childbearing years (many did not) could expect to have six to seven children (the total fertility rate). Since the late 1970s fertility decreased in most countries. By 1999 the average woman in Turkey had 2.4 children, in Egypt 3.3, in Iran 2.7. However, in Syria and Saudi Arabia, the average remained very high, at 4.6 per woman. Women in Yemen and Oman had 6.2 children on average. Contraceptive usage varies greatly: in 1999, more than 60 percent of Turkish women used some form of contraception at some time in their lives; in Jordan, 27 percent. In some other countries the figures were much lower. Despite recent reductions, the Middle East remains one of the highest fertility regions in the world.

The history of high fertility has strained the capacity of the Middle Eastern economies. Nearly one-half of the population in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen is children under age fifteen. Even Middle Eastern countries with lower fertility, such as Turkey, have populations in which one-third are under fifteen. (This compares with 21 percent in the United States and 20 percent in Western Europe.)

If present fertility trends continue, future Middle Eastern populations will divide into two very different patterns. Israel is already nearing a European pattern of low fertility. Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, the Emirates, and Turkey are approaching that standard. Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and others still retain high fertility. The demographics of the latter countries will in fifty years look very different from those of the former, with very large numbers of children and a fast-growing population. For example, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia taken together had a slightly smaller population than Turkey. If trends continue, in fifty years they will together have twice as many people as Turkey.

Fertility and mortality, 1980–1999

	Total fertility rates (births per woman)		Mortality rates (crude death rate/1000 people)	
	1980	1999	1980	1999
Egypt	5.1	3.3	13	7
Iran	6.7	2.7	11	6
Israel	3.2	2.9	7	6
Syria	7.4	3.7	9	5
Saudi Arabia	7.3	5.5	9	4
United Arab Emirates	5.4	3.3	5	3
Yemen	7.9	6.2	19	12

SOURCE: World Bank, *Development Indicators,* 2001.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Mortality

In the absence of extraordinary causes, fertility would have always outstripped mortality in the traditional Middle East. The population would have risen at approximately 1 percent per year. In fact, epidemics, wars, and famines meant that mortality equaled fertility. The most common causes of death were gastrointestinal diseases. Infant mortality was particularly high, with more than 40 percent of children dying before their first birthday, more than half before age five. Epidemics of plague and cholera caused temporary high mortality. In Egypt, for example, cholera took more than 100,000 lives in each of the epidemics of 1855 and 1865 and almost 200,000 in 1831. Bubonic plague took 500,000 lives in 1835 alone.

Warfare also caused great mortality in the nineteenth century. The Ottoman wars with Russia were particularly deadly for both military and civilian populations. From the beginning of the Balkan Wars in 1912 to the end of fighting in the Turkish War of Independence in 1922, the region suffered some of the worst wartime mortality in history. The highest death rates were found in eastern Anatolia—the result of war between the Ottomans and Russians and conflict between Muslims and Armenians in western Anatolia after the Greek invasion and in Palestine. In Anatolia, 3.8 million died (22 percent), and in Palestine 50,000 (6 percent). In all those conflicts, starvation and disease took a higher toll than did actual battle. Lebanon also suffered mass starvation during the war.

After World War II, the rapid introduction of modern medicine, public sanitation techniques, and agricultural improvements reduced mortality rates sharply. In 1950 the Middle East had a high crude death rate (deaths divided by total population) of more than 2.3 percent a year, but by 1999 it had fallen to less than 0.6 percent a year. Some countries, such as Egypt (0.7 percent in 1999) and Yemen (1.2 percent in 1999) lagged behind. A major part of the postwar improvement came in infant mortality. In 1950 one in five Middle Eastern children died before age five; in 1999 only one in nineteen died before age five, compared to a world average of one in thirteen.

The Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iranian and

Tenement housing in Cairo, Egypt. Estimates of Cairo's population vary from 8 to 12 million as of 2003. A population explosion that began in 1952 has resulted in overcrowding, scarce housing, unemployment, and health concerns. © TOM NEBBIA/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Istanbul is Turkey's largest city, boasting a population of over ten million as of 2000 and an annual increase of 3.45 percent due to migration from the countryside. One of every six Turks lives in Istanbul, contributing to a population density of 1,700 persons per square kilometer. **© Yann Arthus-Bertrand/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

Iraqi soldiers, with consequent effects on the size and gender structure of both populations. In addition, it is estimated that the Baʿthist regime in Iraq killed some three hundred thousand of its own citizens during campaigns against the Kurds in the north of the country and against the Shiʿa in the south.

The United Nations has lowered its projections of the region's population growth to 2025 as a result of the faster than expected decline in fertility. This has translated into slower population growth rates starting in Egypt and spreading east. The absolute increases in population are still growing in many countries because of past fast growth rates, and it will take ten to twenty years for slower growth rates to translate into smaller absolute increases.

Migration

Refugee migrations have been a major demographic factor during the past two centuries. Only the most prominent population transfers can be mentioned here: During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, great population movements took place as direct results of Russian imperial expansion in the Crimea and Caucasus and of nationalistic movements among the Christian peoples of the Ottoman Empire. Russia expelled or caused the migration of approximately 1.2 million Circassian, Abhazian, and Laz Muslims from the lands of the Eastern Black Sea. Of these, 800,000 survived and most eventually settled in what today is Turkey, as did the 300,000 Crimean Tatars forced to emigrate during the 1850s and 1860s. A sizable group of the Circassians were settled in the Arab world. Russian expansion also fostered a century-long population exchange, with much attendant mortality, between the Turks and Kurds of Russian Transcaucasia and the Armenians of Ottoman Anatolia and Iran. Between the 1820s and 1920s, 500,000 Armenians and 400,000 Muslims (not including the Circas-

sians and Abhazians) crossed the borders. During World War I, an estimated one million Muslims were internal refugees in Eastern Anatolia; an estimated 275,000 Armenians were deported to or were refugees in the Arab world, and 135,000 were refugees in Europe and the Americas.

Nearly 600,000 Turks (40 percent of its Turkish population) were surviving refugees from the new state of Bulgaria after the Russian–Ottoman Wars of 1877–1878. Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro expelled to Anatolia and Eastern Thrace 414,000 Turks during and immediately after the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. During World War I, the Turkish War of Independence, and the Greek-Turkish population exchange that followed, more than one million Greeks from Anatolia and eastern Thrace went to Greece and 360,000 Turks from Greece to Turkey. Up to 1.5 million Turks were internal refugees within Anatolia and eastern Thrace during the Greek-Turkish war.

Before World War II a major immigration of primarily European Jews swelled the Jewish population of Palestine from 60,000 in 1918 to 600,000 in 1946. More than 700,000 Palestinian Arabs were refugees in the Arab-Israel War of 1948. Between 1948 and 1975, 1.6 million Jews came to Israel. Half of these were from the Middle East and North Africa, another third from Eastern Europe, especially the Balkans. Immigration to Israel has continued recently with nearly one million Jews from Russia and successor states.

The only Middle Eastern country to be heavily affected by refugees from the Afghan War was Iran, which accepted more than two million Afghan refugees. Turkey took in 300,000 ethnic Turkish refugees from Bulgaria, as well as Iranian refugees after the Iranian revolution and Kurdish refugees after the Gulf War. Many of the refugees to Iran and Turkey have been repatriated or have moved to other countries. A significant number of the refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Bulgaria have returned home at least once, only to leave once again when economic and political conditions changed.

The quest for employment has been a major cause of migration into and from the Middle East. In Ottoman times, 175,000 Turkish emigrants went to the United States from 1869 to 1914. More recently,



Drought, hunger, and over two decades of war forced over one million Afghan refugees—mostly women and children—to seek shelter in neighboring countries. In 2002, a massive program undertaken by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, and the governments of the affected countries helped relocate some 1.8 million Afghans back to their home country. © Reuters NewMedia Inc./Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

the International Labor Organization estimated that 1.8 million Turks were working in Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium in 1988. During the same year, 20,000 Koreans, 50,000 Indonesians, and 90,000 from the Philippines worked in the Gulf states. Before the Gulf War, up to two million foreign workers, mainly Egyptians, worked in Iraq.

Urbanization has been the most significant factor in internal migration in the modern Middle East. Driven by population pressure in rural areas, the urban population increased from twenty-one million (27 percent urban) in 1950 to 185 million (60 percent urban) in 1999. There is considerable variance between countries: In 1990, Syria's population was only half urban, Egypt's less than half urban, while the populations of Iraq and Turkey were more than 60 percent urban. Istanbul was one of the twenty largest cities in the world. Smaller countries such as Israel and Lebanon were as urbanized as Europe or North America.

Censuses and Population Data

A census by definition registers the entire population at one time. Prior to 1882 no real census was taken in the Middle East. In the place of censuses,

the Ottoman and Egyptian governments made compilations of registration data. The registers were lists of inhabitants by household in each village, taken by government officials. These often produced surprisingly accurate counts of the population, especially in areas that were under close governmental control. On occasion, the central governments of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire ordered general updates and compilations of the registers. During the 1860s the Ottoman government began to publish population numbers in the *salnames* (yearbooks) of its provinces. The Ottoman compilations usually listed data by sex and religion only, even though age-specific figures were kept and are available in archives. The 1313 Istatistik-i Umumi ("1895 General Statistics") was the only Ottoman publication to include data by age group. Population data was collected sporadically in Iran, but was not published officially.

The first real census in the Middle East was taken by the khedival government in Egypt just prior to the British occupation in 1882. Under British statistical influence, Egypt published censuses in 1897, 1907, 1917, 1927, and 1937. The British also undertook a limited form of census in Aden (later People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) in 1881, then published other counts of Aden, as part of the censuses of India, in 1891, 1901, 1911, 1921, and 1931. The Turkish republic began a modern census program with censuses in 1927 and 1935, followed by censuses every five years. The British Mandate government in Palestine took fairly accurate and very detailed censuses in 1922 and 1931, and with limited success updated the census data through birth and death records and published the data in the Palestine Blue Books. The French collected data in Syria and Lebanon, but only published brief summaries that indicate poor recording. An incomplete census was taken in Lebanon in 1942–1943.

Modern Middle Eastern censuses have routinely been supplemented by publications of detailed information on marriage, divorce, birth, and death, although these often have been accurate only for urban areas. Sample surveys of the population, often supported by the United Nations or other international bodies, have also been published.

Middle Eastern censuses after World War II

Country	Census years
Bahrain	1941, 1950, 1959, 1965, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001
Egypt	1947, 1960, 1966, 1976, 1986
Iran	1956, 1966, 1976, 1986, 1996
Iraq	1947, 1957, 1965, 1977, 1987, 1997
Israel	1948, 1961, 1972, 1983, 1995
Jordan	1952, 1961, 1979, 1994
Kuwait	1957, 1961, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995
Lebanon	1970
N. Yemen	1975, 1986
Oman	1977, 1981, 1993, 2000
Qatar	1970, 1986, 1997
Saudi Arabia	1962/63, 1974, 1992
S. Yemen	1946, 1955, 1973, 1988
Syria	1947, 1960, 1970, 1981, 1994
Turkey	1927, 1935, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 2000
U.A.E.	1968, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995

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JUSTIN MCCARTHY
UPDATED BY PAUL RIVLIN

PORT SAʿID

Mediterranean port in Egypt.

Port Saʿid (Bur Saʿid), Egypt, situated on a narrow peninsula on the Mediterranean Sea coast, is located on the west side and at the northern end of the Suez

Canal, which links the Mediterranean and Red Sea. Established in conjunction with canal construction in 1859, it was named for Saʿid Pasha, viceroy of Egypt (1854–1863). Built in nineteenth-century European architectural style to accommodate Europeans working on Ferdinand de Lesseps's Suez Canal Project (1859–1869), it is complemented by a twin city, Port Fouad, located on the eastern side of the canal. The harbor became a maritime fueling station with export industries (especially chemical, tobacco, cotton, and food processing) supplementing sardine fishing and the production of salt from evaporated seawater. In 1904 a railroad link was completed between Port Saʿid and Cairo. As a major trade and business center, Port Saʿid thrived through both world wars. In July 1956 Egypt nationalized the canal after it had been an international waterway for nearly eighty-seven years. The port was strategic during the Arab–Israel wars and was attacked by Israeli forces in 1967 and 1973. The harbor was closed from 1967 to 1975, and most inhabitants evacuated the city. Egypt regained Port Saʿid in 1973, instituted major residential and commercial reconstruction, and established a tax-free industrial zone. Tourism was encouraged, and the city became an important summer resort. In 2003 Port Saʿid was the nation's fourth largest city, with 565,000 inhabitants, and second only to Alexandria as a commercial port.

See also SAʿID PASHA; SUEZ CANAL.

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DAVID WALDNER
UPDATED BY CHARLES C. KOLB

POSTAGE STAMPS

Government-issued stamps encapsulate the history and culture of the region.

The Islamic states of the Middle East had operated elaborate postal messenger systems since the seventh century, but it was Great Britain in 1840 that issued the world's first postage stamp. It depicted Queen Victoria. Postage stamps quickly spread, with the Ottoman Empire issuing its first stamp in 1863, followed by Egypt in 1866, Persia in 1868, Afghanistan in 1871, the Hijaz (now part of Saudi Arabia) in 1916, and Yemen in 1926. Elsewhere, British, French, and Italian colonial officials in the Middle East designed the first stamps for their jurisdictions.

The Ottoman Empire issued its first postage stamp in 1863. Other Middle Eastern nations followed suit. The first stamps to be issued refrained from depicting human figures, but in the late nineteenth century, some nations did begin to issue stamps with portraits of current or past leaders on them. COURTESY OF DONALD M. REID, GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY.

Early Middle Eastern stamps, like Islamic coins before them, observed conservative Islamic tradition by rarely portraying human figures. Arabesque designs, calligraphy, or a crescent and star served as symbols instead. In 1876, Persia broke with tradition by showing its ruler on a stamp; the Ottomans did the same in 1913. Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan followed during the 1920s; then Afghanistan, Syria,

and Lebanon during the 1940s. Saudi Arabia, more isolated and conservative, waited until the 1960s.

Rulers appeared variously in traditional dress, in Western coat and tie, or in military uniform. Turkey's Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who secularized Turkey after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire by, among other things, outlawing Muslim headwear, wore civilian dress on his stamps from 1926 on, but many soldiers-turned-president preferred military uniforms. After coming to power in 1979, Iraq's President Saddam Hussein appeared variously on stamps in coat and tie, army uniform, and Arab *kafiyya.* Some rulers promoted a cult of the leader on their stamps, with the hero towering above the masses he claimed to embody. Syria's Hafiz al-Asad, Egypt's Anwar al-Sadat, and Iraq's Saddam saturated stamps with their own portraits. Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser was more reticent, and Husni Mubarak followed Nasser's rather than Sadat's example in this regard.

The first stamps of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Persia, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen bore inscriptions in only Arabic script. Although they were not French colonies, they soon added French, long the main language of world diplomacy. All later switched to English as their second language on stamps—except Afghanistan, which kept French, and Turkey, whose adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928 made its Turkish-only stamps partly accessible to Westerners. French colonial possessions used French, and British possessions English. French Algeria and Italian Libya used no Arabic on their stamps until independence (1962 and 1951, respectively). Hebrew has been the main language on Israel's stamps since independence in 1948, with English and Arabic as secondary languages.

European colonial stamps presented romanticized and orientalist colonial picturesque themes—pre-Islamic ruins, old mosques, colorful landscapes, and folk scenes. European officials first selected the pyramids and sphinx as symbols for Egyptian stamps, but many Egyptians came to identify, at least partially, with these pre-Islamic symbols. Egypt often commemorates ancient pharaonic treasures on stamps; folk costumes are also shown as part of a proud national heritage. Even so, stamps with such themes are often issued with Western tourists and collectors in mind.

Revolutions drastically changed stamp designs. "The people"—symbolic soldiers, peasants, workers, professionals, and women in both traditional and Western dress—celebrate liberation, modernization, and the drive for economic development. Stamps advertise such things as petroleum pipelines, factories, and broadcasting stations. Socialist countries commemorated land reform, the spread of healthcare, and five-year plans. In addition to such symbols of material and social progress, Israel also depicts themes from biblical history, Jewish history, and Zionism.

The stamps of Israel and the Arab states also reflect their respective versions of the Arab–Israel conflict. Stamps commemorate the war dead, advertise the latest aircraft, and boast of specific victories. Most Arab countries have issued stamps deploring the Dayr Yasin massacre (as they describe the event) of 1948, mourn the plight of Palestinian refugees, and celebrate Palestinian resistance to Israel. Since Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, the Dome of the Rock (in the Haram al-Sharif) has often appeared on stamps as a symbol of Arab and Islamic claims to Jerusalem. The stamps of Arab countries that depict maps omit the name *Israel,* showing only the borders and sometimes the name of pre-1948 Palestine. With its borders still unsettled and controversial, Israel's stamp designers make it a practice to avoid showing national maps.

During the 1950s and 1960s, pan-Arab themes tended to overshadow symbols of local territorial patriotism. Beginning in the 1970s, Islamic themes became popular—mosques, Qurʾans, hegira dates, and crescents—on stamps honoring the prophet Muhammad's birthday, the Islamic New Year, and the hajj. Islamic themes stand out above all on the stamps of the Islamic Republic of Iran since the 1979 revolution, depicting deceased Shiʿite holy men, martyrs killed in the jihad (holy struggle) against Iraq, and anti-American symbols.

See also Arab–Israel Conflict; Colonialism in the Middle East; Dayr Yasin; Orientalism.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

POTASH INDUSTRY

Potash, a potassium or potassium compound, is used in industry and as a component of agricultural fertilizer.

In 1861 Adolph Frank, a German Jew, discovered the benefits of potash, and his work helped create the potash industry. In 1902 Theodor Herzl's utopian work, *Altneuland,* envisioned a modern industry based on the chemical compounds in the Dead Sea. Moshe Novomeysky (1873–1961), a mining engineer and Zionist who immigrated to Palestine from Siberia in 1920, devised a plan to extract the Dead Sea's chemical compounds for industrial use, and approached the British government for concessionary rights. Following ten years of negotiation, he established the Palestine Potash Company, which became a major enterprise in the Middle East. The first plant was established on the northwestern shore of the sea in 1931. In 1937 a second plant was established on the southwestern shore, near Sodom. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (1946) noted the Palestine Potash Works as a positive point of contact between the Arab and Jewish economies.

Much of the company was destroyed during the Arab–Israel War of 1948. Only the southwestern plant remained and, after the establishment of the State of Israel, became a government-controlled company. But production did not resume until 1954, when the road from Beersheba to Sodom was completed. Since then the company, privatized under the name Dead Sea Works Ltd., and its output have grown significantly. By 2000 Dead Sea Works was one of the world's largest producers of potash, producing almost 10 percent of the global output.

During the 1980s Jordan developed its own potash industry with technical and financial assistance from a variety of countries. But by the turn of the century sales were declining, with the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company reporting a loss of $40 million for the year 2000.

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CHAIM I. WAXMAN

POTSDAM CONVENTION

Russo–German agreement concerning their involvement in the Middle East.

From its inception, the German-dominated Berlin–Baghdad Railway project aroused the suspicion of the other European powers. On 6 through 9 August, 1911, Germany and Russia concluded an agreement at Potsdam, Germany, whereby Russia acquiesced to continued German involvement in the railway in return for a German affirmation of Russia's position in Persia (now Iran).

See also BERLIN–BAGHDAD RAILWAY.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

POWELL, COLIN L.

[1937–]

U.S. army officer, diplomat.

Born in New York City to Jamaican immigrant parents, Colin Luther Powell received his B.S. in geology from the City College of New York in 1958, and later received an M.B.A. from George Washington University in Washington, D.C. Powell was commissioned as an officer in the United States army in 1958. He was sent as an adviser to the army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in 1962,

returning for a second tour of combat in 1968 to 1969 after the U.S. military entered the conflict in force. His Vietnam service left him with eleven military decorations.

Powell rose thereafter through the army to the rank of general. From October 1989 to September 1993 he was the first African American to serve as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the highest military officer in the nation. During that period Powell oversaw the massive deployment of U.S. forces in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, during the 1991 Gulf War and the intervention in Somalia in 1992. He was the author of the Powell Doctrine, which advocates committing U.S. forces to war only if massive force is used in conjunction with carefully articulated political goals and a defined exit strategy.

After several years of retirement from the military, Powell was appointed secretary of state beginning in January 2001. During his tenure he again was involved with momentous U.S. policy decisions regarding the Middle East and Southwest Asia. While he was secretary of state U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 and Iraq in March 2003. Powell was also active in pushing Israelis and Palestinians to resume negotiations in accordance with the Road Map for peace created by the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations.

See also AFGHANISTAN: U.S. INTERVENTION IN; BUSH, GEORGE WALKER; GULF CRISIS (1990–1991); GULF WAR (1991); SEPTEMBER 11TH, 2001; WAR IN IRAQ (2003).

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

PRINCESS BASMA WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTER

Women's resource center for policy makers and women's groups in Jordan.

Prior to the 8 March 1996 celebrations of International Women's Day, the Princess Basma Women's Resource Center was opened in Amman. At the inauguration of the center Princess Basma, sister of the late Jordanian King Hussein ibn Talal, stressed that "the women's movement is undergoing a new stage in Jordan, which is that of implementing and executing strategies," adding that "both the governmental and nongovernmental organizations that deal with women's issues should co-operate, re-examine, and develop ways of implementing strategies." The center is directed by Princess Basma's daughter, Farah Daghestani, and it aims to gather and analyze information and enhance effective policies on women's issues. It also aims to increase the participation of women in development and decision-making processes in addition to organizing seminars and training workshops for women's groups. The center intends to implement mechanisms for the Platform of Action, which was agreed to at the 1995 United Nations Fourth Conference on Women in Beijing. The establishment of the center is perceived by many as an attempt by Princess Basma to take full control of women's issues in Jordan, especially because it came after the 1992 establishment of the Jordanian National Committee for Women and the 1995 establishment of the Jordanian National Women's Forum.

See also BASMA BINT TALAL; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; JORDAN.

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ISIS NUSAIR

PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY

Lebanese political party, founded in Beirut in 1949 that played an important role in Lebanon after independence.

The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) was a major vehicle for the political ambitions of its founder, Kamal Jumblatt. Born in Mukhtara in 1917, Jum-

blatt belonged to one of the major Druze families, the head of a major Druze family confederation (the Jumblatis) in Lebanon.

The party was originally formed as a multisectarian party with Christians and Muslim intellectuals comprising its leadership, but increasingly it became organized around its president and his electoral calculations and interests. Major policy decisions were undertaken by the president, who is the center of authority. Despite claims to the contrary, the PSP is widely perceived to operate according to the sectarian political interests of the Druze community, as determined by its leader.

The tenets of the party are a mixture of social democratic practices and Arab nationalist thought. Jumblatt believed that industrialization was inevitable but that it had to be reined in because of ecological concerns. The PSP has advocated the abolition of the political confessional system, the creation of civil courts for civil marriages, a unified educational system, the nationalization of important services, and a progressive inheritance taxation system. In foreign policy, the PSP has emphasized Lebanon's Arab identity and role, solidarity with the Palestinian cause, and support for major issues and concerns regarding developing countries.

During the civil war (1975–1976), the PSP under Jumblatt became the linchpin for the Lebanese National Movement and fielded 2,000 fighters. Following the assassination of Jumblatt, his son, Walid Jumblatt, became the president of the PSP in 1977. Walid Jumblatt succeeded in fending off any challenges to his leadership within the Druze community, and in the War of the Mountain (beginning in 1983) he emerged as the undisputed leader of the Druze community. The party has been continuously represented in the parliament since 1972, including in the post-Ta'if parliaments.

See also DRUZE; JUMBLATT, KAMAL; JUMBLATT, WALID; LEBANESE NATIONAL MOVEMENT (LNM).

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GEORGE E. IRANI
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PROTECTORATE STATES

Traditional southern Arabian political entities protected by British treaty from 1839 to 1967 when they united to form South Yemen.

The dozen or so protectorate states to the north and east of the Aden colony occupied a huge area relative to that of the colony. They were viewed primarily as a political-military buffer for that highly valued port and military base. Over the 125 years of British occupation of Aden since 1839, the protectorates were defined and redefined geographically as well as administratively in a largely ad hoc way. Political-military pressure first from the Ottoman Turks and then from the imamate of North Yemen caused the British to become increasingly involved in the governance of the states in Aden's immediate environs during the first six decades of the twentieth century; local political turmoil in the decades after World War I drew the British more directly into the governance of the vast Hadramawt region far to the east of Aden. Out of these "independent," amorphous protectorates, eventually in combination with Aden itself, the British in the 1960s sought to build the South Arabia Federation, the ship of state they hoped would succeed them when they withdrew in 1967. They failed, but Aden and the protectorate states went on to comprise South Yemen, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).

See also HADRAMAWT; PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

PROTESTANTISM AND PROTESTANT MISSIONS

Protestant missions were active in the Middle East from the nineteenth century.

Protestant denominations based chiefly in the United States and Britain have sponsored missionary activities in the Middle East since the opening of the nineteenth century, leaving a legacy of educational and benevolent institutions whose influence is felt

to the present day. Protestantism, one of the three major branches of Christianity, encompasses a large number of denominations with widely differing liturgical and theological structures. What they have in common is that they do not recognize the moral and doctrinal authority of the Roman pontiff, they stress the centrality of the Bible and each individual's interpretation of it, and they share the belief that in the matter of salvation, the relationship between the individual and God is unmediated.

Missions in the Nineteenth Century

The most prominent missionary organization in the United States was the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), supported by the Congregational Church, which established mission stations in Lebanon in 1823, in Constantinople in 1831, and in Urmia (Iran) in 1834. In 1870 the ABCFM turned over part of its territory of operations, including Lebanon, to the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church. The Arabian Mission, founded as a nondenominational mission under the auspices of the Dutch Reformed Church in America in 1889, established a school in Basra and hospitals in Muscat, Bahrain, and Kuwait. In Britain the leading missionary organization in the Middle East was the Church Missionary Society (CMS), which began work in Smyrna (İzmir) in 1815, in Egypt in 1825, in Julfa (Isfahan) in 1875, and in Damascus in 1860. Among many smaller or short-lived mission societies that attempted work in the Middle East were the Boston Female Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews, founded in 1816, and the London Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews.

The original goal of Protestant missions in the Middle East was to preach the Gospel to Muslims. Both goal and method met immediate obstacles: Despite Muslim respect for the prophethood of Jesus, Christ as deity was and is incompatible with Islamic monotheism; for the person to be converted, leaving one's religious community, whether Christian, Muslim, or Jewish, meant separation from family and social networks; politically, under Ottoman authority missionaries were forbidden to preach among Muslims; and finally, the price of apostasy in Islamic law is death. Lack of familiarity with indigenous languages on the part of missionaries was also a serious obstacle to successful preaching.

Consequently, in a pattern that most missionary societies were to follow, the ABCFM turned its attention to indigenous Christian communities: Nestorian, Armenian, Coptic, Greek, and Syriac. Considered by the ABCFM to be "nominal Christians," unschooled in the Bible and bankrupt of Christian virtues, these Christians were to be reformed from within so as to serve as models of emulation to their Muslim neighbors, and ultimately become the instrument of their evangelization. The method of attracting potential proselytes to the Gospel message was benevolent service, such as establishing schools for children and clinics to offer medical care. Often such evangelizing aroused the resentment and noncooperation of indigenous church leaders whose parishioners began to gravitate to the missions, and with good reason: Protestant missionaries were perceived to be well-connected politically and able to offer protection to minorities; they offered schools and medical care available nowhere else; and, after the creation of a Protestant Millet, becoming Protestant entitled converts to commercial privileges originally afforded only to Europeans.

The outcome was breaking off of separate Protestant congregations from each of the Eastern Orthodox churches, which had already been fractured by the creation of separate Catholic denominations. In Turkey, where Armenians were the primary target, there were 111 Armenian Protestant churches by 1895, and in Egypt, by 1926 there were 150 congregations of Coptic Protestant Christians with 155 Egyptian clergy. As a percentage of the total population, the number of Christians of all denominations declined precipitously in the last decades of the twentieth century, especially in Palestine, but in the mid-1970s there were altogether about 250,000 indigenous Protestants in the Middle East.

Protestant missions have been criticized for bringing about increased sectarianism in a region already fragmented by religious sectarianism. Missionary activity has also been blamed for prompting violence against religious minorities, such as the massacre of Nestorian Assyrian Christians by Kurds in 1843 and the assaults against the Alawi in eastern Turkey later in the century. On the other hand, the benevolent work of Protestant missions brought about positive and lasting change. In order to pros-

elytize, for example, missionaries imported the first printing presses into the region, prepared translations, and helped to expand literacy. Missionary health care institutions, such as the Arabian Mission hospitals in Bahrain and Kuwait, the Edinburgh Medical Mission in Damascus, the CMS medical missions in Baghdad and Mosul, and twelve missionary hospitals in Iran, offered the best medical care available for their time.

The most enduring achievement of the missions lay in founding institutions of higher education, such as the American University of Beirut, established in 1864 as the Syrian Protestant College; Robert College in Constantinople (1863); and the American University in Cairo (1920). The Presbyterian Mission's American Junior College for Women in Beirut, the American College for Girls in Cairo, and Constantinople College for Girls were the first institutions of higher education for women in the Middle East. Around the Persian Gulf and in many rural areas across the region, missionary schools were the only secondary schools offering secular subjects for girls until well after World War I. The British Syrian Mission alone opened fifty-six schools for girls, starting in 1860.

By the end of World War I, missionary work in the Middle East began to decline along with Western enthusiasm for the missionary enterprise worldwide. In the 1930s and 1940s governments of the newly independent states in the Middle East placed increasing limitations on missionary activities, by nationalizing schools, for example, so that many missionary societies consolidated their efforts or ceased operations.

Contemporary Missions

Since about 1980 globalization has brought Protestant missions back onto the world stage in a new burst of activity. Using the Internet and satellite television for fundraising and recruitment, and establishing cooperative links with international agencies, churches, and other mission organizations abroad, mission societies both old and new have a presence in almost every country in the Middle East.

In method, purpose, and constituency, these societies fall into two broadly divergent categories. On the one hand are spiritual and institutional descendants of mainline Protestant denominations who have consolidated mission projects institutionally and partnered their efforts with each other and with indigenous Christian churches. Concerned with Christian benevolent action for the benefit of all, as opposed to proselytizing on behalf of a particular religious doctrine, these mission organizations focus on building community with indigenous religious groups, promoting social justice, and alleviating human suffering. Global Ministries, for example, represents a consolidation of the Division of Overseas Ministries of the Disciples of Christ and Wider Church Ministries of the United Church of Christ, and partners with a wide network of regional and international religious organizations that share their goals and values. These links include Churches for Middle East Peace, which is itself an ecumenical advocacy group of mainline U.S. and Middle Eastern Protestant churches, the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services (CEOSS), Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center, the Young Men's Christian Association International, and the Middle East Council of Churches, which is a fellowship of local Christian communions tied to the World Council of Churches (WCC). The WCC maintains its own relief agency in the Middle East, Action of the Churches Together (ACT), which responds to emergencies by joining forces with like-minded international agencies. In anticipation of humanitarian needs resulting from the 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq, for example, ACT joined with U.K.-based Christian Aid, Norwegian Church Aid, Lutheran World Federation, and the Dutch-based Inter Church Organization for Development Cooperation.

By contrast, U.S. conservative evangelical missionary organizations targeting the Middle East are concerned primarily with evangelizing Muslims through forthright teaching that salvation comes through Jesus Christ alone. For these groups, extending humanitarian aid is a worthy task in its own right, but it is to be given in tandem with a Christian message. The International Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, for example, in anticipation of Iraqi refugees crossing into Jordan in 2003, sent food boxes carrying a quote from John 1:17 translated into Arabic: "For the Law was given through Moses; grace and truth were realized through Jesus Christ." Similarly, the evangelical

mission Samaritan's Purse (SP) supports a health clinic in Afghanistan and a hospital, schools, and agricultural and food aid in war-torn Sudan, where mission staff are bound to fulfill SP's statement of faith, which includes the belief that evangelism is a responsibility of the church and of every individual Christian. There are also evangelicals in the Middle East who encourage activities that have the effect of overt evangelism. For example, in 1995, religious associations in Lebanon and in Egypt joined a consortium of European and U.S. evangelical groups to establish a Christian satellite television station, SAT-7.

One outcome of proselytizing among Muslims has been a spate of assaults on evangelical missionaries, including the 2002 killing in southern Lebanon of a U.S. nurse working at a missionary clinic and the shooting death in Yemen two months later of three missionary medical staff and the wounding of a fourth. These assaults, in the viewpoint of mainstream clergy in the Middle East, both Catholic and Protestant, are evidence that direct evangelizing of Muslims is not only counterproductive but puts all missionaries as well as local Christians in jeopardy. Evangelicals counter that their objective is merely to expose people to the truth that Jesus is their savior, and let them decide for themselves. Franklin Graham, head of Samaritan's Purse and politically the most influential evangelical leader in the United States, equates their deaths with martyrdom, and sees them as an inspiration to others who would follow in their footsteps.

Another major source of contention between U.S. evangelical and mainline Protestant missions stems from the evangelicals' stated belief in the Bible as literal word of God, interpreted to sanctify the expansion of Jewish settlement over all of Palestine and beyond. By contrast, mainline Protestant groups seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict that accommodates all the region's peoples.

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Eleanor Abdella Doumato

PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION

One of the world's most notorious antisemitic documents, crafted at the end of the nineteenth century by the Tsarist Russian secret police, the Okhrana.

Drawing upon what was originally a German plagiarism of a French novel attacking the French emperor, Napoléon III—and which had nothing whatever to do with Jews, the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* was brimming with paranoid ruminations of a Jewish lust for world domination, and purported to be the transcript of a conspiratorial meeting of elderly Jewish plotters in the Jewish cemetery in Prague. This delirious fantasy has had the most extraordinarily long life. Intended originally to bolster the sagging fortunes of tsarist rule in Russia, the *Protocols* reached a broad public audience during the Russian Revolution and Civil War, when they were mobilized against the Bolshevik insurgents. They soon became a basic part of the antisemitic canon, helping to form part of the world view of such diverse proponents as Henry Ford and Adolf Hitler. Among many elements that attracted readers were the lurid portrayal of the plotters' mentality, the disparaging picture of modernity, and allusions to modern economic inequities. Although convincingly exposed as a forgery in England in 1921, the *Protocols* have been called the most widely circulated book on the globe, next to the Bible, and have appeared in countless editions and translations.

The *Protocols* have become an important text in anti-Israel and antisemitic propaganda, have been disseminated widely throughout the Middle East, and have benefited from periodic approbation from politicians, academics, and the mass media in the Arab and Muslim world. As recently as November 2002, during Ramadan, the *Protocols* served as a main theme of an Egyptian television series, "A Rider without a Horse," that reached millions of viewers throughout the region.

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MICHAEL R. MARRUS

PUSHTUN

Largest ethnic group in Afghanistan.

The Pushtun, sometimes also referred to as Pathans or Pakhtuns, make up between 38 and 45 percent of the population of Afghanistan, and since the beginning of the nineteenth century have comprised the ruling elite of the country. Although Pushtuns live in most parts of Afghanistan, they are concentrated in the southeast, especially along the border with Pakistan's Northwest Frontier province, where several million more Pushtun also live.

The language spoken by Pushtun, usually called Pushto, is distantly related to Persian and belongs to the Iranian family of languages. Pushto, along with Dari, the Afghan version of Persian, is an official language of Afghanistan. There are no words in Pushto that refer exclusively to a "lineage," in which descent is demonstrated, or a "clan," in which descent is merely assumed; the suffixes *-zai* and *-khel,* added to names of males to imply descent from them, can mean either "lineage" or "clan." The ambiguity is very useful in practice. Instead of allowing genealogy to dictate their behavior, the Pushtun can manipulate their tables of organization so as to change the significance of levels of segmentation, to the extent of incorporating totally alien groups within their genealogical fold. The critical variable in determining whether a group belongs is the exchange of women in marriage.

Durrani, Ghilzai, and Karlanri have been for the last two hundred years the names of the major groups of Pushtun clans. Symbolically, the unity of the Pushtun is expressed through their adherence to Pushtunwali, the ideal code of behavior, stressing honor, hospitality, and revenge; it is also a customary system of mediation that includes provisions for settling disputes ranging from theft to homicide.

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ASHRAF GHANI
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

PYRAMIDS

Burial monuments for ancient Egyptian kings.

For over a thousand years, from the Step Pyramid of King Djoser (r. 2654–2635 B.C.E.) to the beginning of the New Kingdom with the Eighteenth Dynasty (1549 B.C.E.), Egyptian kings were buried in pyramid tombs. There may be as many as one hundred; remains of some that are mentioned in texts have not yet been discovered. The ruler's pyramid was the center of a pyramid complex, which generally included a mortuary temple on the east side, a causeway leading down to a valley temple on the edge of the flood plain, and subsidiary pyramids for queens. All were plundered long ago. The three major pyramids of Giza (Fourth dynasty, c. 2547–2475 B.C.E.), the largest of which is that of Khufu (Cheops), are the most famous. Easily visible from Cairo, they are central objectives of archaeological research and tourism. Khufu's Great Pyramid is unusual in containing three burial chambers, probably reflecting changes in plan, with the king buried in the uppermost. The interior walls of the pyramid of Unas, the last ruler of the 5th Dynasty (2375–2345 B.C.E), and those of the 6th Dynasty (2345–2181 B.C.E) at Saqqara are elaborately inscribed with religious passages known as Pyramid Texts. After Egyptian rulers stopped building pyramids, nonroyal funerary chapels sometimes included small pyramid-shaped structures. Centuries later in what is now northern Sudan, the Nubian

kings of Meroe and Napata built steep-sided pyramids on a smaller scale than those of their Egyptian predecessors. First depicted on postage stamps in 1867 and giving their name to *al-Ahram* (Egypt's leading newspaper), they have become national symbols of Egypt.

See also GIZA.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

Q

QABBANI, NIZAR

[1923–1998]

Syrian poet.

Nizar Qabbani was born in Damascus on 21 March 1923. He completed his study of law at the Syrian University in 1945, and later joined the foreign ministry and served in Cairo, Ankara, London, Madrid, and Beijing, resigning in 1966 to establish in Beirut a publishing house carrying his name and devoted to printing poetry. He began writing at age sixteen and published more than thirty of his own volumes. His major themes involve physical beauty. One poem, "Bread, Hashish, and a Moon" (1954), brought upon him the wrath of the conservatives in the Syrian parliament, who called for his resignation. After the Arab defeat in the Arab–Israel War of 1967, Qabbani wrote a scathing attack on Arab mores and leadership in his poem "Marginal Notes on the Book of the Relapse" (1967), which won him wide popular acclaim. Henceforth, his writings addressed the political and social malaise of Arab society in a poetic diction that was intentionally simplified by the occasional use of Arabic vernacular. Large crowds attended his readings, attesting to his popularity in the Arab world. His works went into several editions and sold in exceptionally large numbers. He resided in London, and died there in May 1998.

Qabbani's published works include *The Brunette Said to Me* (1944), *Childhood of a Breast* (1948), *Samba* (1949), *You Are Mine* (1950), *Poems* (1956), *My Beloved* (1961), *Poetry Is a Green Lamp* (1963), *Drawing in Words* (1966), *The Diary of a Blasé Woman* (1968), *The Book of Love* (1970), *A Hundred Love Letters* (1972), *Outlawed Poems* (1972), *Love Will Remain My Master* (1989), *I Have Married You Freedom* (1989), *The Match Is in My Hand, and Your States Are of Paper* (1989), *No Winner but Love* (1990), *The Secret Papers of a Qarmati Lover* (1990), and *On Entering the Sea: Erotic and Other Poetry of Nizar Qabbani* (1998).

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BASSAM NAMANI
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QABOOS, SULTAN

See AL BU SAʿID, QABUS IBN SAʿID

QADDAFI, MUAMMAR AL-

[c. 1942–]

Ruler of Libya since 1969.

Muammar al-Qaddafi (also spelled Muʿammar al-Qadhdhafi) was born during World War II, probably in the spring of 1942, to a Bedouin family near Sirte in northern Libya. The only surviving son of a poor family, he did not attend school until he was nearly ten, when he was sent to a local mosque school. He was evidently very intelligent, for he went on to secondary school in Sabha (or Sebha), in the southern province of Fezzan, between 1956 and 1961. Like many young people in the Arab world at the time, he was an admirer of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the ruler of Egypt, whose anti-imperialist and Arab nationalist foreign policies and egalitarian domestic reforms were then widely popular.

By 1961, when he was expelled from school in Sabha, Qaddafi's political inclinations were well known. His dismissal is variously attributed to an altercation with the son of the powerful governor of the Fezzan and to demonstrations he organized against the breakup of the union of Syria and Egypt (the United Arab Republic) that year. Qaddafi finished secondary school in coastal Misurata, where he renewed contact with some of his childhood friends, several of whom joined him in entering the Libyan Military Academy. These friends subsequently became members of the group that plotted the successful overthrow of the pro-Western Libyan monarchy in 1969. This lends credence to Qaddafi's claim that he determined very early on that only through a military coup could someone with his humble family background and ambitious political goals exercise power in Libya.

A six-month signals course in Britain followed graduation from the military academy in 1965, and Qaddafi was then posted near Benghazi. From there, he readied his secret network of conspirators for 1 September 1969, when they took advantage of a vacation trip by aging King Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi to Turkey to topple the monarchy in a bloodless coup. The Free Unionist Officers, as they called themselves, initially constituted themselves as a collective Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and appointed a number of more senior military and civilian figures to government positions. By December, however, when a countercoup was said to have been foiled, the RCC was given full authority and Qaddafi was revealed as the regime's leading figure. Although he serves as head of state, to this day Qaddafi holds no formal position of authority.

The 1970s

The new regime's initial posture reflected Qaddafi's admiration of Nasser's Arab nationalism as well as his own admiration of Islam. (Indeed, although Qaddafi's politics were often controversial, his reputation for personal integrity has remained virtually untarnished through his tenure in office.) Soon alcohol was outlawed, churches and night clubs closed, the British and American military bases evacuated, foreign-owned banks seized, the remaining Italian residents expelled (Libya had been an Italian colony before World War II), and only the Arabic language permitted in all official and public communications.

By the mid-1970s, Qaddafi was not only disenchanted with Nasser's successor in Egypt, Anwar al-Sadat, but had come into his own as a political visionary. Between 1976 and 1979, he published the three slim volumes of the *Green Book,* in which he expounded his third international theory (also known as third universal theory), an attempt to develop an alternative to capitalism and communism, both of which Qaddafi found unsuitable to the Libyan environment. Disenchanted with both competitive and single-party politics, Qaddafi instituted instead a system of popular congresses and committees—composed of elected members—to run the country on all levels, including local administration, state-owned enterprises, universities, and national policy review and implementation.

Muammar al-Qaddafi (b. 1942) became the leader of Libya in 1969 when he staged a coup that successfully overthrew the country's monarchy. Qaddafi employs socialist philosophies in his dictatorship, and has been linked to various terrorist activities. Pictured are (from left to right) Qaddafi, Yasir Arafat, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Hussein I. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Contributing to the upheaval precipitated by these political innovations were Qaddafi's parallel economic reforms, which were based on his radically egalitarian precapitalist vision of economic relations. In his view, the exploitation entailed in wage labor, rent, and commerce must be replaced by equal partnerships and by nonprofit state-run distribution of goods and services. Workers were encouraged to take over the enterprises in which they were employed, landlords lost their property to their tenants, and retail trade disappeared. This immediately produced shortages and hoarding of basic commodities, halted housing construction, and increased already widespread economic inefficiency. That the country survived these disruptions was a function of its very large petroleum revenues during the 1970s and the substantial expatriate workforce they subsidized.

By the late 1970s, Qaddafi had grown dissatisfied with the performance of the committees and congresses; their lackluster record resulted partly from inexperience, partly from bad faith, and partly from unrealistic expectations on the part of their founder. To rectify the problems, he introduced watchdog "revolutionary committees." Domestically, these oversight groups did little more than further obscure the lines of authority, but they earned considerable notoriety abroad. Because Qaddafi attributed the failures of his revolution to foreign and domestic subversion, he assigned the revolutionary committees responsibility for "liquidating the enemies of the revolution"—that is, assassinating government opponents at home and abroad.

From the 1980s On

Qaddafi was soon branded one of the world's principal sponsors of terrorism by many Western nations, notably the United States, which initially viewed his coup with tolerance. By the late 1970s, his vitriolic condemnation of the Camp David Accords capped a decade of increasingly hostile relations with the West. Qaddafi's large arms purchases,

Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi attends a meeting of the New Partnership for Africa's Development. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

his support of national liberation movements—from various Palestinian factions to the Irish Republican Army—and his campaign to assassinate Libyan opponents of the regime outside the country provided justification for the U.S. campaign that culminated in the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986. Qaddafi appeared to have been targeted personally—several of his family were wounded and an adopted daughter was killed in the raid—and his high-profile involvement diminished for some time thereafter.

Severe economic problems in the second half of the 1980s and the implosion of the Soviet Union at the end of the decade also contributed to Qaddafi's quieter demeanor. In response to a fall in oil prices and the imposition of economic sanctions by the United States, Qaddafi reversed some of his domestic reforms. Small-scale retail trade was allowed to resume, and some political prisoners were released. Time and experience thus tempered Qaddafi's methods; however, there was no indication his commitment to a vision of unity, justice, and freedom for the Libyan people and their Arab compatriots had diminished.

As the twentieth century closed, Qaddafi initiated significant changes in the tone, content, and direction of Libyan foreign policy, and he accelerated this process in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Following the suspension of U.N. sanctions in 1998, he championed a number of new initiatives in Africa, signaling a major shift in emphasis from the Arab world to the African continent. For example, Libya took the lead in establishing the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (COMESSA) in 1998, called for the creation of a United States of Africa in 1999, and became the African candidate for chairman of the U.N. Human Rights Commission in 2002. In tandem with these initiatives, the Qaddafi regime strengthened long-standing commercial and diplomatic ties with key European states, including Britain, Italy, and Russia. Eager to reestablish diplomatic relations with the United States, Qaddafi was an enthusiastic, early supporter of the war on terrorism.

Internally, the Qaddafi regime, by the end of the 1990s, had successfully corralled domestic opposition on a number of fronts, including the army, tribal groups, and militant Islamists. A shopworn economy, adversely affected by low oil prices in the 1990s, was posed in the early twenty-first century to benefit from foreign investment and private enterprise. Finally, even as Libya sought political reform, including the promotion of democracy and human rights, Qaddafi's quixotic personality masked a relatively stable political system in which external policies were often linked to issues of domestic legitimacy.

Qaddafi later took several significant steps on the road to international reintegration. Libyan officials in September 2003 agreed to pay $2.7 billion in compensation to the families of the victims of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103. In December 2003, Libya renounced its unconventional weapons programs, agreeing to international inspections to verify compliance. And in January 2004, Libya cleared one of the last hurdles in its campaign to rejoin the international community, reaching a settlement in the 1989 bombing of a French airliner over Africa.

See also Camp David Accords (1978); Green Book; Libya; Revolutionary Command Council (Libya).

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LISA ANDERSON
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QADDUMI, FARUQ

[1931–]

Palestinian political activist.

Born in Jinsafut in the northern West Bank, Qaddumi studied economics and political science at Cairo University. In the late 1950s, he helped found al-Fatah, the most significant organization in what became the Palestinian national liberation movement. Known as Abu al-Lutf, Qaddumi has long been a member of al-Fatah's Central Committee. He helped to secure funding from Arab Gulf states and represented the group's aims to Syria, Iraq, and Egypt in the 1960s. Qaddumi has held important positions within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). He was elected to its Executive Committee in February 1969 and has headed the Political Department since July 1974. He was long considered a potential successor to PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat.

Qaddumi's 1967 proposal for establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza was an early step in what became official PLO policy in 1977. Qaddumi has often clashed with Arafat, questioning the wisdom of Arafat's embrace of various diplomatic solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. He opposed the Israeli-PLO Oslo Accord of 1993 and increased his attacks on Arafat and his policies thereafter. He refused even to enter the territory of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and was long an opponent of Mahmud Abbas, the Fatah leader, who helped negotiate the Oslo Accord and who served as the PA's first prime minister in 2003. Qaddumi still serves as the "foreign minister" of the PLO, most recently representing the PLO at an Arab League meeting in 2003.

See also ABBAS, MAHMUD; ARAFAT, YASIR; OSLO ACCORD (1993); PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY; WEST BANK.

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QADI

Islamic judge.

According to Muslim legal doctrine, the *qadi* or judge is a public official whose primary responsibilities entail the administration of justice on the basis of the divinely revealed law of Islam, known in Arabic as the *shariʿa*. Eligibility for this office has been traditionally restricted to male jurists of majority age who have a reasonably comprehensive knowledge of the doctrine of their particular school of law. Because Islamic law construes the qadi as an agent of the legitimate governing authority, the government usually reserves the right to appoint qadis for the towns, cities, or regions under its control. In many historical and cultural contexts, judicial hierarchies have been established with the creation of one or more "chief judges" whose responsibility is to appoint and oversee the conduct of subordinate judges. While in theory, the qadi is empowered to adjudicate cases involving every legal issue—both civil and criminal—addressed by the *shariʿa*, in practice the qadi's authority extends only as far as the *shariʿa* is actually applied as the law of a given Muslim society. In many medieval and modern contexts, government institution and application of far-reaching secular legal codes have limited the jurisdiction of the qadi to areas of personal status (i.e., marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance) and the supervision of religious endowments *(waqf).*

See also *SHARIʿA*.

SCOTT ALEXANDER

QADIRIYYA ORDER

Sufi brotherhood.

The Qadiriyya Order was named for Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (c. 1077–1166), Sufi teacher and founder

of a Hanbali *madrasa* and religious hostel. Biographies of Abd al-Qadir date from more than a century after his death, so not much is known for certain about his life. Many apocryphal stories exist, attributing miracles, sayings, and poems to him.

Adb al-Qadir was born in the Jilan district of modern-day Iran, south of the Caspian Sea. He went to Baghdad at a young age to study philosophy and law and began preaching at about age fifty. The institutions that he founded in Baghdad were perpetuated, in large part by his forty-nine sons and other associates, until Baghdad fell to the Mongols in 1258. Abd al-Qadir is buried in Baghdad, and his tomb is a pilgrimage site.

Surviving works of Abd al-Qadir include *The Resource for Seekers of the Path of Wisdom* (a guidebook to Hanbali belief and practice, with a concluding section on Sufism), *The Divine Beginning* (a collection of sixty-two sermons), and *The Revelation of the Hidden* (a collection of seventy-eight sermons). The main theme of his work is the integration of Hanbali and Sufi thought in Islam.

Some claim that the Qadiriyya was widespread during Abd al-Qadir's lifetime. Although he was unquestionably a charismatic figure with many followers, the founding and spread of a brotherhood with fully developed institutions probably date from well after his death. In any case, the Qadiriyya was one of the earliest and became the most widespread of Sufi brotherhoods, playing a significant role in the spread of Islam.

From Iraq, the Qadiriyya spread first to Syria in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, with centers in Damascus and Hama. Refugees introduced the Qadiriyya into Morocco after they were expelled from Spain in 1492. The Qadiriyya spread to other parts of the Fertile Crescent and the Maghrib (North Africa), then to central Asia, the Arabian peninsula, India, and Eastern Europe. In the nineteenth century, the Qadiriyya reached sub-Saharan Africa and the Malay Peninsula.

Through his sermons, Abd al-Qadir taught asceticism, peacefulness, generosity, humanitarianism, and submission to the will of Allah. The emphases of the Qadiriyya have varied by time and place. Some brotherhoods venerate the personage of Abd al-Qadir and suggest that he performed miracles; others stress his teachings. Many brotherhoods are also derivative of the Qadiriyya but are named for followers of Abd al-Qadir.

See also HANBALI SCHOOL OF LAW; SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS.

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LAURENCE MICHALAK

QAFIH, YIHYE BEN SOLOMON

[1850–1932]

Yemenite Jewish scholar.

Yihye ben Solomon Qafih was born in Sanʿa, capital of Yemen, orphaned as a child, and raised by his grandfather. His areas of scholarly expertise included the halakhah (the body of Jewish law supplementing scriptural law and forming the legal part of the Talmud) and the works of both medieval and Enlightenment Jewish thinkers. Unlike other Yemenite scholars, he established communication with foreign contemporaries, among them the rabbis Abraham Isaac Kook and Hillel Zeitlin, with whom he communicated regarding the essence of Kabbalah (a system of Jewish theosophy and mysticism).

Qafih's most important enterprise was the Dardaʾim movement (named for Darda, one of the four ancient Jewish sages), founded on the eve of World War I, and emulating Haskalah (the Enlightenment) as it appeared among European Jewry during the eighteenth century. Although leading to partial Jewish intellectual revival in Sanʿa, it provoked considerable controversy among local rabbis. Nevertheless, Qafih is considered the most important Jewish reformer of modern-day Yemen.

See also HALAKHAH; HASKALAH; KOOK, ABRAHAM ISAAC HACOHEN.

MICHAEL M. LASKIER

QA'ID

See GLOSSARY

QAʿIDA, AL-

Militant organization formed, not necessarily formally as a political party, sometime after 1986 by Osama bin Ladin, who settled in Afghanistan to help in the organization of Muslim Arab volunteers driven by hostility against Soviet communism.

Al-Qaʿida (also Al-Qaeda and Al Qaeda; literally, "the base") was founded by bin Ladin and his lieutenants to take advantage of the religious fundamentalist revival that was spurred by the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and has clearly left its mark on world affairs due to its practice of spectacular and largely indiscriminate violence worldwide. This small organization cannot be separated from the career and fortune, literally, of its founder, Saudi millionaire Osama bin Ladin.

Bin Ladin was born in Saudi Arabia in 1957 to a very wealthy father. He attended King Abd al-Aziz University in Riyadh, and obtained a degree in public administration and management. He fell under the spell of Palestinian fundamentalist advocate Abdullah Azzam, who popularized the cause of the "struggle against the Soviet infidels" after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Bin Ladin relocated to Pakistan to organize the efforts of Arab volunteers; he quickly distinguished himself with his organizational skills, but was not known as the overall leader. He still served more as an assistant to Azzam, and did not distinguish himself in battle. He used some of his fortune to help in the organization and recruitment efforts. After the death of Azzam, bin Ladin rose in stature, and founded in the mid-1980s (probably in 1986) the highly secretive organization that was later known as al-Qaʿida. It became a vehicle for the declaration of international military struggle against governments and Western representatives and institutions in the Muslim world. It would later carry the blood struggle worldwide. Its ideology is influenced by the fundamentalist worldview and militant piety and dogmatism of seventh-century Kharijites, Wahhabism, and contemporary extremist offshoots of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The organization benefited from the largesse of oil-rich Arab governments and the CIA during the 1980s. But when Iraq invaded Kuwait, bin Ladin broke with the Saudi royal family after years of a close alliance. He relocated in 1991 to Sudan, where he stayed until 1996. Bin Ladin continued to secretively recruit and form bases and cells in many parts of the Muslim world, and even among Muslim immigrants in Western countries.

After his expulsion from the Sudan in 1996, he sought refuge in Afghanistan, where the militant Taliban government was in power. He influenced the thinking of the Taliban, and joined ranks with the disaffected rejects of the Arab state prison systems. Fundamentalist militants who were wanted in their home countries flocked to Afghanistan to join the new movement. Ayman al-Zawahiri (1951–), a physician and militant fundamentalist from Egypt who served time after the assassination of Egyptian president Sadat, became bin Ladin's deputy; they both announced the formation in 1998 of the Islamic Front for the Combat of Jews and Crusaders. This announcement clearly showed the influence of al-Zawahiri, who was an early advocate of indiscriminate violence in the name of Jihad. Bin Ladin was an enthusiastic partner, and the two complemented one another. Al-Zawahiri was the ideologue, but since he lacked charisma, he left it to bin Ladin to inspire the thousands of young recruits who passed through the training camps of Afghanistan. The agenda of al-Qaʿida was initially centered around the expulsion of all Christians and Jews from Arabia, relying for that on a reported *Sahih* hadith of the Prophet. The organization would later develop an agenda that contained a litany of complaints about Western intervention in the Middle East.

This secretive organization remains mysterious despite the new revelations about it that came out in the Western press after 11 September 2001. It is not structured like a regular political party, and the organization seems to be more horizontal than vertical. Groups are trained in camps, where they receive military training and ideological indoctrination, and are then dispatched to faraway places to either improvise an attack or implement a plan that had been set by bin Ladin and his aides. In 1998, the organization came to international attention with twin suicide bombings against U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. This was followed by U.S. strikes on al-Qaʿida bases in Afghanistan, intended to kill bin Ladin. Bin Ladin survived, and had most likely been busy with the planning for his most spectacular and violent act yet: 11 September 2001.

Al-Qaʿida has an unusual mix of traditional ideology with an adept utilization of modern technology for its violent ways. Members communicate through e-mails, and computers were found in caves after the eviction of al-Qaʿida from Afghanistan. This technical side perhaps reflects the construction business from which the bin Ladin family came. Bin Ladin has also a very keen sense of the value of propaganda, and the audio and video tapes that are produced by al-Qaʾida (through its affiliated propaganda outfit, Muʾassasat al-Sahhab) are quite sophisticated, although the language is crudely and vulgarly hateful against Jews and Christians (all Jews and all Christians). The organization has not tried to win mass appeal, and bin Ladin's repeated calls for jihad have fallen on deaf Arab and Muslim ears.

The United States went to war against al-Qaʿida after 11 September 2001, but has not succeeded in either capturing or killing bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri, or in eliminating the organization altogether. Al-Qaʿida's chief operational figure, the Egyptian Muhammad Atif (also Alef; 1944–2001), however, was reported killed in November 2001. Bin Ladin continues to issue messages through recorded audiotapes, but the movement suffered severe blows with the overthrow of the Taliban government and the consequent loss of a base of operation and training camps. Many top and middle-rank leader have been killed or captured by U.S. forces. While bin Ladin remains at large, his ability to rejuvenate the movement, or perhaps to strike at the United States at the scale of 11 September remains impaired. Al-Qaʿida's main success, however, has probably been in its war against the House of Al-Saʿud. The Saudi royal family was embarrassed with the revelation that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers of 11 September were Saudi nationals. The image of the royal family in Western countries, which has cost millions of dollars in propaganda expenditure, was probably irreparably damaged. Inside the kingdom, al-Qaʿida clearly has some presence, especially since its fanatical fundamentalist ideology is not that inconsistent with the Wahhabi doctrine, the ruling ideology of the kingdom. The corruption and hypocrisy of the royal family, and the decline of the economic fortunes of the kingdom, have all increased the dissatisfaction of youths, who have been targeted by bin Ladin. Series of bombings in the kingdom took place in 2003, and al-Qaʿida claimed responsibility through a variety of flyers and pamphlets, often disseminated on the Internet. It is unlikely that al-Qaʿida would last without bin Ladin, which explains the efforts of U.S. government to catch him.

See also Bin Ladin, Osama; September 11, 2001.

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As'ad AbuKhalil

QA'IMMAQAM

See Glossary

QAIRAWAN

City in north central Tunisia.

Qairawan (also Kairouan, al-Qayrawan) is located some 100 miles (156 km) south of Tunis. Its population in 2002 was estimated at 162,130. Its economy is based on agriculture, arboriculture, carpets, and leatherwork. Like many North African cities, it has a walled older section and a modern quarter established during colonialism. It was initially a military camp set up by the Arab Muslim invaders spreading Islam during the late seventh century. Gradually a town emerged with the building of mosques, shops, and fortresses; its founding is often associated with Okba (Uqba ibn Nafi), a Muslim general (to whom a mosque is dedicated); others also played a role, however. The city boasts the oldest extant mosque in Africa.

Following upheaval brought on by Kharijite revolts, the town came under Aghlabid rule in the ninth century, and under their patronage it was transformed into an important regional intellectual and religious center, known for its schools and pilgrimage stops. Decline followed, however, as did the pillaging of the city by nomadic groups in the mid-eleventh century. In the early thirteenth century, the capital was moved to Tunis, which became the hub of political and intellectual life in Tunisia. Today, Qairawan is considered a Holy City of Islam, and it is the center of the governorate of the same name.

Matthew S. Gordon

QAJAR, ABDULLAH MIRZA

[1849–1908]

Pioneering Persian photographer.

Abdullah Mirza Qajar was the son of Jahangir Mirza, a member of the Qajar family—the rulers of Persia. Photography had been introduced to Persia in the 1860s, and the shah, Naser al-Din, was a keen photographer. Abdullah studied photography in Paris and Vienna and was the official photographer at the Dar al-Fonun, the modern school founded by Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir, the reform-minded minister of the shah.

Abdullah Qajar was appointed chief of the imperial printing press during the reign of the succeeding shah, Mozaffar al-Din, and in 1900, accompanied him to Europe. He photographed public personalities, common people, urban and rural scenes, and buildings, and he signed them *Special photographer to His Imperial Majesty, and His humble servant, Abdullah Qajar.* In 1896, he wrote a short account of the methods he had studied in Europe and about his career.

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MANSOUREH ETTEHADIEH

QAJAR, AGHA MOHAMMAD

[1742–1797]

Founder and first monarch of Persia's Qajar dynasty; shah in 1796.

Agha Mohammad Qajar (also Aqa Mohammad Ghadjar) was born the son of Mohammad Hoseyn Khan of the Qovanlu branch of the Qajar family, a Turkic tribe that had settled in and near Astarabad, now in northeastern Iran. The chief of the tribe, Fath Ali Khan, was killed by Nader Shah Afshar, so his son Mohammad Hoseyn Khan took refuge with other Turkomans. After Nader was killed in 1747, his successor Adel Shah took Mohammad Hoseyn Khan's six-year-old son Agha Mohammad Khan and emasculated him. When Adel Shah died, Agha Mohammad joined Karim Khan Zand, who ruled in southern and central Persia, with a capital at Shiraz. Mohammad Hoseyn was killed in battle by Karim Khan Zand in 1758; Zand then took Agha Mohammad and his family as hostages to his capital.

Agha Mohammad was treated well and was trusted by Karim Khan, but when Karim died in 1779, Agha Mohammad escaped and raised the standard of revolt against the descendants of the Zands (Persian dynasty 1750–1794). Gradually, he succeeded in conquering, pacifying, and uniting Persia. Still, he had to contend with Lotf Ali Khan Zand, Karim Khan's successor. After being defeated by Agha Mohammad in Shiraz, Lotf Ali escaped to Kerman in southeast Persia. There he was finally captured by Agha Mohammad in 1794, who proceeded to sack the city and treat the citizens with great cruelty for sheltering Lotf Ali.

In 1796, Agha Mohammad had himself crowned king (becoming Agha Mohammad Shah Qajar), in Tehran, which he chose for his capital. At the time, Tehran was a small and insignificant township selected for its proximity to the seat of Qajar power in the north. Agha Mohammad set about reconquering Georgia, once a tribute state to Persia, but transferred by its ruler, Heracleus, to Russia. During his second expedition to Georgia in 1797, the shah was assassinated outside Shusha, Georgia's capital.

Though Agha Mohammad Shah was harsh and cruel, by his courage, astuteness, and endeavor he reunited his country and founded the dynasty that ruled Persia until 1925.

See also QAJAR DYNASTY.

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MANSOUREH ETTEHADIEH

QAJAR DYNASTY

Ruling family of Iran, 1796–1925.

The Qajars were a Turkoman tribe that rose to prominence in Iran during the Safavi dynasty (1501–1722). In the turbulent civil wars that broke out after the Safavis were deposed by invading Afghans, the Qajars gradually consolidated power until Agha Mohammad Shah Qajar crowned himself shah at Tehran in 1796. He was killed a year later, and his nephew succeeded him as Fath Ali Shah (r. 1797–1834). During his reign, Russia defeated Iran in two wars (1805–1813, 1827–1828), acquiring territory in the north, while England blocked Iranian aspirations in Afghanistan. Both countries secured favorable treaty rights in Iran and acquired influence in the succession, which went in 1834 to Fath Ali's grandson Mohammad Shah, who ruled the country uneventfully until his death in 1848.

During the long reign of Naser al-Din Shah (r. 1848–1896), Iran had to confront an increasingly powerful European presence. Trade and budget deficits forced Naser al-Din Shah to grant lucrative concessions in the north to Russia for the operation of the Caspian fisheries, and in the south to Britain for telegraphs, tobacco exports, and river navigation. Believing that various economic and social reforms would help his government withstand British and Russian influence, Naser al-Din set up European-style educational institutions, brought in Russian advisers to drill his Cossack Brigade, created government printing offices, and tried to establish factories to supply the army. However, he neglected the financial and administrative requirements of the reforms, thus undermining their effectiveness. A serious challenge to his rule arose between 1890 to 1892, when the shah was forced to repeal a monopoly concession for tobacco that he had granted to an English company. In the first mass social movement of the modern period, the entire nation, including Naser al-Din's wives, boycotted tobacco in protest against European economic encroachment and the shah's acquiescence in it.

Ahmad Shah (center), the last Qajar monarch of Iran, during a visit to London in 1919. Ahmad Shah and the Qajar dynasty were formally deposed by a vote of the Majles (parliament) in 1925. **© Hulton-Deutch Collection/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

The aftermath of the Tobacco Revolt was marked by further popular unrest, which culminated in the assassination of Naser al-Din Shah on 1 May 1896. His son, Mozaffar al-Din Shah (r. 1896–1907), faced worsening economic conditions, which the bazaar merchants and *ulama* (Islamic religious leaders) increasingly attributed to the shah's helplessness in confronting foreign pressures. The less numerous Western-trained intelligentsia began to criticize European economic control and Qajar absolutism. In 1905 the beating of four sugar merchants (because of high prices) in the bazaar touched off a series of protests that soon engulfed Tehran and culminated in the summer of 1906 with the bazaar merchants closing their shops en masse and the *ulama* withdrawing from their religious services. Mozaffar al-Din Shah, unable to rely on support from Russia owing to the revolution there, was forced to agree to the formation of a national assembly (the Majles). This body set about in the fall of 1906 to write a constitution, which the shah signed on 30 December 1906, only nine days before his death.

The Constitutional Revolution brought political turmoil upon Iran between 1905 and 1911. The new king, Mohammad Ali Shah (r. 1907–1909), proved to be autocratic, and with Russian support he closed the Majles in June 1908. Constitutional resistance to the shah organized in Tabriz and other cities, and in July 1909, two proconstitution armies converged on Tehran and deposed Mohammad Ali Shah. His eleven-year-old son, Ahmad Shah Qajar, was crowned and ruled under a regent and the watchful eye of the reconstituted Second Majles.

The former shah attempted a comeback, with tribal support, in the summer of 1911, but was defeated by the constitutional forces.

The central government under the figurehead Ahmad Shah looked on helplessly during World War I as Russian and British troops fought against Turkish forces in Iran. Local movements arose in several provinces to challenge Tehran, especially in Gilan. A coup d'état in February 1921 brought to power Reza Khan, commander of the Cossack Brigade. As war minister, Reza Khan repressed the provincial opposition movements; by October 1923 he had become prime minister. Soon thereafter, Ahmad Shah left Iran for Europe on a trip of indefinite duration (in fact, he never would return). Reza Khan used his power base in the army and among the majority parties in the Fifth Majles to bring about the deposition of Ahmad Shah on 31 October 1925. Two months later the Majles vested the monarchy in Reza Khan, who adopted Pahlavi as his family surname. This "legal" transfer of royal authority formally ended the rule of the Qajar dynasty.

See also Ahmad Qajar; Bazaars and Bazaar Merchants; Constitutional Revolution; Fath Ali Shah Qajar; Mozaffar al-Din Qajar; Muhammad Ali; Naser al-Din Shah; Pahlavi, Reza; Qajar, Agha Mohammad; Tobacco Revolt.

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John Foran
Updated by Eric Hooglund

QALQILIYA

West Bank City.

Qalqiliya, whose origins extend back to Canaanite times, is situated in the northwest corner of the West Bank, close to the Green Line the (boundary with Israel) and 14 miles (23 km) from the Mediterranean Sea. The city's strategic position on the border between Palestine's coastal plain and the mountains made it an important locale in the eyes of caravan merchants and invading armies. By modern times, Qalqiliya was noted for its abundant agricultural produce. Its fertile land produced citrus fruits, vegetables, other fruits, and grain.

The town's history was affected dramatically by the Arab–Israeli conflict. As a result of the Arab–Israel War of 1948 and the subsequent 1949 Rhodes armistice between Jordan and Israel, Qalqiliya ended up as part of the Jordanian-controlled West Bank, although most of its agricultural land came to lie on the Israeli side of the cease-fire line. In October 1956, two weeks before the Arab–Israel War of 1956, the town was the scene of a bloody Israeli retaliatory raid that prompted Jordan's King Hussein ibn Talal to request assistance from the United Kingdom under the terms of his country's defense pact with the British. During the Arab–Israel War of 1967, Israeli forces occupied Qalqiliya, holding the town until they handed it over to the Palestinian Authority in December 1995. The city had a population of 31,753 in of 1997, the year of the last census.

As a result of Palestinian suicide bombings during the al-Aqsa Intifada, which began in September 2000, Israel reoccupied Qalqiliya for a time. It also began constructing a barrier between Jewish population centers and Palestinian territory in the West Bank. The wall had a particularly devastating impact on Qalqiliya, which was not only cut off from much of its remaining agricultural land but also surrounded on three sides by the wall.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1956); Arab–Israel War (1967); Hussein ibn Talal; Palestinian Authority; West Bank.

Michael R. Fischbach

QANAT

See Glossary

QANUN

Secular law promulgated by ruler's decree.

Rooted in the legal tradition of *yasa* (a royal edict) in the Turkish and Mongol empires of central Asia,

qanun was most fully developed by the sultans of the Ottoman Empire. Qanun (also Kanun) was theoretically restricted to those areas of public life not covered by *shariʿa* (Islamic law).

In the fifteenth century, Sultan Mehmed II was the first leader of the Ottoman Empire to codify his decrees into a *kanunname* (book of laws) on the rights of subjects, the organization of the state, taxes, landholding, and economic organization. Later sultans progressively extended the scope of secular law, thereby infringing on what had once been the monopoly of religious law. Qanun underwent extensive reform in the nineteenth century, when French law codes were incorporated into the Ottoman Empire's legal system.

See also *SHARIʿA*.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

QARADAWI, YUSUF AL-

[1926–]

Egyptian Sunni Muslim scholar.

Yusuf al-Qaradawi was born in Egypt into a poor family of peasants who were devout Muslims. When his father died, his uncle took over the responsibilities for his upbringing and education. Qaradawi memorized the Qurʾan when he was barely ten years old. After completing his secondary school education, he joined the famous al-Azhar University in Cairo and had a distinguished educational career in Islamic studies during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1973, at long last, he was able to defend his Ph.D. thesis after the delay caused by President Gamal Abdel Nasser's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.

It was while attending the secondary school of Tanta that he joined Imam Hassan al-Banna's revivalist Muslim Brotherhood organization. Imam al-Banna believed strongly in the virtues of prayer and discipline nurtured within an organization that was dedicated to service for socioreligious welfare and political activism. Qaradawi's al-Azhar education was interrupted several times by detentions in Egyptian jails due to his affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. He began to preach in Cairo mosques in the mid-1950s and developed a reputation as a preacher, a teacher, and a writer. In 1962 al-Azhar sent him to Qatar to head the Qatari secondary institute of religious studies. In 1977 he laid the foundation for what was to be the College of *shariʿa* and Islamic Studies and also the Center of Sunna and Sirah Studies at the University of Qatar, both of which he heads.

Qaradawi is probably the foremost scholar of the Sunni Muslim world today. Unlike the strict Salafi/Saudi-trained scholars, he is known for taking moderate positions on many religious issues pertaining to what is lawful and unlawful in Islam. He combines well the traditional knowledge of *shariʿa* that he obtained from al-Azhari with a contemporary understanding of the issues that Muslims face today. His writings (exceeding forty) are widely read and have been translated into many languages. He has also become a very popular television preacher on the al-Jazeera satellite television station, with an audience said to be in the tens of millions. In recent religious rulings, Qaradawi has been praised for his condemnation of the 11 September 2001 attacks, defense of the right of American Muslim soldiers to fight against other Muslims in Afghanistan, and critique of the October 2002 bombing of two nightclubs on the Indonesian island of Bali as a heinous crime. His account of Palestinian suicide bombers as martyrs engaged in a just struggle against an occupying force and militarized society that targets them has not been as well received.

See also AZHAR, AL-; BANNA, HASAN AL-; MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD; *SHARIʿA*; SUNNI ISLAM.

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ABDIN CHANDE

QARAMANLI DYNASTY

Dynasty of Turkish origin that attained autonomous rule of Tripolitania under Ottoman suzerainty, 1711–1835.

The Qaramanli (also Karamanli) dynasty—Ahmed (1711–1745), Mehmed (1745–1754), Ali (1754–1793,

1795/96), and Yusuf (1796–1835)—directed autonomous Tripolitanian domestic and foreign policies, including the signing of international treaties. Their economy was based on international trade and sea piracy; their pirates were the scourge of the Barbary Coast, known as the Barbary pirates. During Ali's reign the region suffered from epidemics, plague, and famine, as well as from power struggles among Ali's sons. Algerian strongman Ali Burghul (Bulghur) took advantage of the situation and with Ottoman approval ruled Tripoli between 1793 and 1795, causing the population severe hardship.

Under Yusuf, the European powers and the newly independent United States went to war against the Barbary pirates, ending the taking of ships, cargoes, and men (who were often sold into slavery). This forced Yusuf to impose high taxes, which caused a popular revolt. On 27 May 1835 an Ottoman naval force landed in Tripoli following a local request for Ottoman intervention. Its commander was proclaimed governor, and members of the Qaramanli family were arrested or exiled.

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RACHEL SIMON

QARAWIYYIN, AL-

First university in the Islamic world.

Al-Qarawiyyin was built as a mosque in Fez in 859. The building was enlarged in the tenth century and later under the respective rules of the Almoravid, Almohad, Marinid, Saʿdi, and Alawiite dynasties. Its architecture expresses the Arab-Hispanic art that makes the Qarawiyyin one of the most prestigious monuments in Fez and in North Africa.

Since the twelfth century, most of the Moroccan *ulama* (Islamic clergy) received their religious teaching at the Qarawiyyin. Students came from all regions of Morocco and from the Arab world.

Under the Alawite dynasty, the Qarawiyyin was subject to a series of reforms regulating its organization and programs of teaching. The sultan Abd al-Rahman (1822–1859) reorganized the teaching there by *dahir.* This reorganization was oriented toward communicating to students religious disciplines guided by conformism to Islam. Among topics taught were Qurʾanic exegesis, astronomy, dialectics, mysticism, lexicography, philology, geography, medicine, and divination.

The teaching was free of charge, and the student could join the university at any time of the year. However, each student had to spend five years in the university to receive an *ijaza* given by his teacher if the student showed regularity and attended courses successfully.

In the nineteenth century, the teachers constituted a body of *ulama* that gave allegiance to the sultan and were consulted by him on different matters. They enjoyed high status in Fez, and *qadis* (judges) were recruited from among them. After the French takeover, the Sultan Mulay Youssef signed a *dahir* (on 19 May 1914) creating a council charged with the task of improving the university's methods of teaching, its administration, and the status of its teachers. In 1918, the university became affiliated with the Ministry of Justice and was led by le Conseil de Direction.

The most important change occurred after two *dahirs* were promulgated by Muhammed V on 1 April 1931 and 10 May 1933. The teaching became organized in cycles: elementary, secondary, and higher. Higher education in Qarawiyyin had two sections: one specialized in religious law, hadith (legends and traditions surrounding the Prophet), and interpretation of the Qurʾan; the second specialized in literature, Arabic language, history, and geography. Exams, hours of teaching, holidays, and the status of teachers were also regulated. In 1947, the Qarawiyyin became a state university.

After independence, the Qarawiyyin became affiliated with the Ministry of National Education, having as objectives to teach religious knowledge and to promote scientific research in this field. Three other institutions became linked to the Qarawiyyin: the Faculty of Arabic Language in Marrakech, Faculty of Theology in Tetuan, and Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya in Rabat.

See also YOUSSEF, MULAY.

RAHMA BOURQIA

QASEMLU, ABD AL-RAHMAN

See GHASSEMLOU, ABDUL RAHMAN

QASHQA'I

See TRIBES AND TRIBALISM: QASHQAʾI

QASIM, ABD AL-KARIM

[1914–1963]

Leader of the leftist nationalist 1958 revolt in Iraq; president and prime minister of Iraq, 1958–1963.

Abd al-Karim Qasim (also Kassem) was born into a poor Baghdad family. His father, a carpenter, was a Sunni Arab and his mother was a Kurdish Shiʿite.

General Abd al-Karim Qasim (1914–1963) salutes a line of armed forces as they pass the reviewing stand. Qasim, an army officer, overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, and then became the leader of the Republic of Iran. **© BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

After finishing high school, he taught for one year in a primary school before changing careers and joining the military college of Iraq from which he graduated in 1934. As part of an Iraqi military unit, he participated in the first Arab–Israel War, 1948–1949. Like other officers of his generation, he retained a bitterness about the defeat, which he attributed to the weakness and corruption of the Arab monarchies.

In 1952, the Egyptian monarchy was overthrown by nationalist officers and a republic was established. Reverberations from that coup soon reached Baghdad. The Iraqi military was not only disgusted with corruption in the Baghdad regime but was still bitter over the failed anti-British military coup of 1941 and the repression of nationalists that followed.

In Iraq, after the Egyptian revolution, junior officers began to organize underground cells. Qasim joined this clandestine organization in 1955 and, because of his seniority and his respected professional reputation, soon became chairman of the Central Committee of the Free Officers, as they called themselves.

On 14 July 1958 these officers staged a successful coup, which resulted in the killing of the royal family and the Prime Minister Nuri al-Saʿid—and the proclamation of a republic. General Qasim became president and prime minister, and his fellow officer and colleague Abd al-Salam Arif became deputy prime minister. In a very short time, relations between the two men soured over differences relating to Iraq's policy toward Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Arif advocated an immediate rapprochement with Nasser and an eventual joining of the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria); Qasim wanted to keep his distance from Nasser.

As prime minister, Qasim took several anti-Western steps in foreign policy. He let Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact lapse, he restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and he signed an arms agreement with that country. In domestic policy, he began an agrarian reform program and passed progressive legislation giving women additional rights in matters of divorce and inheritance. In 1961, Qasim issued Law Number 80, which stripped the foreign-owned Iraq Petroleum Com-

pany of 99.5 percent of its concessionary territory. For a time, he allowed open activity by political parties; his lenience toward the Communist party, however, led to serious dissatisfaction among the population and the army.

Criticism of his policies toward Nasser and the Communists exacerbated the rift between him and Arif, who was arrested (on charges of attempting to kill Qasim) and imprisoned. In March 1959, Iraqi nationalist officers attempted a coup in Mosul. In response, the Communists and their allies took to the streets in Baghdad and elsewhere, which resulted in mass killings in Mosul and Kirkuk in July 1959 (that Qasim did little to prevent).

Besides facing opposition from Arab nationalists and the Baʿth party, Qasim had to confront a renewal of Kurdish revolts for separatism. After returning to Iraq in 1958, Mustafa Barzani, the renowned Kurdish leader, staged a revolt in 1960 that lasted (off and on) until 1963, further weakening Qasim and his legitimacy. Qasim also had political problems within the Middle East: In May 1961, Britain ended Kuwait's protective status, making that country independent. Relying on vague historical claims, Qasim announced that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq but sent no troops to back up his claim. British troops were, however, dispatched to Kuwait to defend it, although these were eventually replaced by forces from the League of Arab States. Thus Qasim became isolated from his Arab League neighbors.

During these events, the Arab nationalists and Baʿthists had been organizing and undertook a successful military coup in Baghdad. On 8 February 1963 Qasim was arrested and executed the following day. Arif became president of the republic, with a Baʿthist as prime minister and a civilian government, after annulling the military law that had been in force since 1958.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Arif, Abd al-Salam; Baghdad Pact (1955); Barzani Family; Baʿth, al-; Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC); Kurdish Revolts; League of Arab States; Nasser, Gamal Abdel.

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Louay Bahry

QASIMI FAMILY OF RAʾS AL-KHAYMA, AL-

Ruling family of Raʾs al-Khayma in the United Arab Emirates.

Humayd ibn Abdullah al-Qasimi ruled Raʾs al-Khayma between 1869 and 1900, when the emirate rejoined with Sharjah and was ruled by another branch of the family. In 1921 Sultan ibn Salim al-Qasimi seized control of the emirate from his nephew, Muhammad bin Salim al-Qasimi, and Raʾs al-Khayma once again separated from Sharjah, causing lingering resentment between the two branches of the family. In the 1940s Muhammad and his relatives charged that the sultan was not distributing revenues from oil companies in an equitable manner. When the sultan was out of the country, Muhammad's second-oldest son, Saqr, captured the amir's fort in the capital and was thereafter recognized by local elites and by the British as ruler. Because of his strength of will and independent-mindedness Saqr ran afoul of British officials and other rulers. In the 1960s he was a strong advocate of Arab nationalist causes and of the involvement of Egypt and other countries in the affairs of the emirates. He also was reluctant at first to bring Raʾs al-Khayma into the UAE's federation. The heir apparent is his son Khalid, who was educated in the United States.

See also Raʾs al-Khayma; Trucial Coast; United Arab Emirates.

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Anthony B. Toth

QASIMI FAMILY OF SHARJAH, AL-

Ruling family of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates.

During the seventeenth century the Qawasim tribe possessed the most powerful maritime forces in the

waters of the lower Persian Gulf, asserting control even in the face of encroachments by the British. Sharjah and Raʾs al-Khayma were the most prominent regional ports. The most notable ruler of the region from 1727 to 1777 was Rashid ibn Mattar bin Rahman al-Qasimi, who claimed descent from the prophet Muhammad. The patriarch of the current rulers of Sharjah is Sultan bin Saqr bin Rashid al-Qasimi, who ruled for fifty years starting in 1804. Sharjah is notable for the political turbulence in modern times among the members of the ruling family. Saqr bin Sultan al-Qasimi ruled from 1951 to 1965. However, he was arrested after attempting to overthrow his successor and nephew, Khalid ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi (r. 1965–1972), who was killed in the process. The current ruler is Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, who has been in power since 1972. He was born in 1939 and was educated at Cairo University, the University of Exeter, and the University of Durham. He received a doctorate in history and has published several books on the history of the lower Persian Gulf, including *The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf.*

See also SHARJAH; UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.

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ANTHONY B. TOTH

QASSAM, IZZ AL-DIN AL-

[c. 1880–1935]

Islamic militant who fought the French in Syria and the British in Palestine.

Izz al-Din al-Qassam was born in Jabla, near Latakia, Syria. He studied in Cairo at al-Azhar University and reportedly came in contact with Rashid Rida, the precursor of Arab nationalism. Following the French occupation of Syria, he participated in guerrilla activities (1919–1920) in the Alawiya region of Jabal Sahyun, for which he was sentenced to death by a French court-martial. After the French suppressed Syrian resistance, Qassam escaped to Palestine. He was hired to teach at an Islamic school in 1921, and a year later was appointed by the Supreme Muslim Council as a preacher at the new Istiqlal mosque in Haifa. He preached a puritanical way of life that alarmed some people enough to seek his dismissal. He was appointed marriage registrar in the *shariʿa* court at Haifa in 1929, which enabled him to travel throughout Palestine.

Qassam became convinced that Britain's support for Jewish immigration and land purchases, which ultimately lead to a Jewish state. He therefore began to advocate a popular uprising against the British once the Palestinians were united and organized. In 1928 he was a founder of the Young Men's Muslim association, which with the Boy Scouts, organized military drills and the stockpiling of arms, and initiated violent attacks on Jewish settlements (1931–1933). According to Subhi Yasin, his contemporary (and the source of much of our information about Qassam), Qassam sent a follower to the mufti of Jerusalem, Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, suggesting that he start a revolt in the south while he (Qassam) started one in the north. The mufti reportedly declined, stating that he was seeking a political solution. While Qassam believed that a revolt should take place, with only 200 recruits and insufficient arms and training, he felt the Palestinians were not yet ready. Two factors made him change his mind: the discovery, on 18 October 1935, of an arms shipment destined for Jewish forces, and the immigration that year of the largest number of Jews (almost 62,000) to Palestine. On 21 November he left Haifa with ten of his followers to attack a police arsenal to acquire its arms, but an unplanned clash, in which a police sergeant was killed, alerted the police. Hundreds of police chased and caught up with the group; rather than escape or surrender, Qassam and his men fought it out. He and two of his men were killed.

Qassam became a symbol of martyrdom for Palestinian youth groups such as Ikhwan al-Qassam (Qassamite Brotherhood), which formed resistance cells to take up the mantle of Qassam. The Qassamite attack in which two Jews were killed on 15 April 1936 was a catalyst for the most violent uprising against the British, the Palestine Arab Revolt (1936–1939).

Half a century later, the legacy of Qassam inspired another generation of Palestinians. Shortly

after the Intifada began in 1987, an Islamic fundamentalist group, HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement), was established to resist Israeli occupation through its military wing, Kataʾib Izz al-Din al-Qassam, which conducted terrorist attacks against Israelis.

See also HAMAS; HUSAYNI, MUHAMMAD AMIN AL-; INTIFADA (1987–1991); PALESTINE ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939); RIDA, RASHID.

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PHILIP MATTAR

QAT

See GLOSSARY

QATAR

Nation on the western shore of the Persian Gulf.

Qatar occupies a mitten-shaped peninsula that extends about 105 miles into the Persian Gulf roughly midway along its western coast. About 50 miles across at its widest point, it has an area of 4,400 square miles. Qatar shares a land border with Saudi Arabia and is separated from Bahrain to the west by about 30 miles of water. It consists largely of desert sand and gravel with occasional limestone outcrops and *sabkhas* (salt flats). A lack of water made the establishment of permanent settlements in Qatar's interior impossible until the post-oil era. Summer weather is severe, with temperatures as high as 122°F (50°C) and high humidity along the coasts; winters are pleasant, with temperatures generally around 60°F (17°C), with a continuous north wind. Scant rainfall sustains meager vegetation. Qatar's proven oil reserves were estimated to be 15.2 billion barrels in 2001. More importantly, the country's natural gas reserves amounted to an estimated 21 trillion cubic meters in 2002, most of it in the North Dome field, the world's largest deposit of nonassociated gas.

A degassing station in Dukhan, Qatar's center for oil production and the country's only onshore oil field. Dukhan, which was first drilled in 1939, contains three reservoirs which supply the majority of Qatar's oil. © CHRISTINE OSBORNE/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Qatar's population was estimated at nearly 800,000 in 2002, having grown rapidly since oil income started to flow after World War II. Even earlier, the population included significant numbers of immigrant Iranians and East Africans originally brought as slaves and freed in the first half of the twentieth century. Oil wealth and the rapid economic development it has generated have brought large numbers of expatriates to Qatar, reducing the indigenous population to about one-fifth of the total. Iranians account for about a sixth, other Arabs for a quarter, and South Asians for a third. The great majority of the population is Sunni Muslim, with Qataris subscribing to the same strict Wahhabi interpretation of Islam as the Saudis; an estimated one-sixth is Shiʿite. About three-fifths of Qatar's population lives in Doha, the capital and principal port, located on the east coast. Other major urban areas include Khawr, located north of Doha, and the industrial complex of Umm Saʿid to its south.

History

In the 1760s the Al Khalifa, one of the Utayba clans from central Arabia that had earlier settled in Kuwait, migrated to Qatar and established its base at Zubara, on the west coast. After they seized the islands of Bahrain from the Iranians in 1783, their hold on Qatar weakened and the Al Thani, a family from central Arabia, established a leading position on the east coast. An 1867 attack by the Al

MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

Khalifa and the ruling Banu Yas tribe of Abu Dhabi against Doha and other settlements led to British intervention that established Muhammad ibn Thani as de facto ruler of Qatar. In 1893 his son, Qasim ibn Muhammad Al Thani, defeated superior forces of the occupying Ottoman Turks, who had extended their suzerainty over Qatar in 1871. In 1916 Abdullah ibn Qasim signed a treaty with Great Britain that conferred British protection over the emirate, forbade Qatar to have relations with or cede territory to other states without British agreement, and gave special rights to Great Britain and its subjects in Qatar.

Like the other Persian Gulf Arab states, Qatar's pearling industry, virtually its sole source of income before oil, was devastated in the 1930s due to the influx into the world market of cultured pearls produced in Japan. In 1935 a concession was granted to a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later British Petroleum). The modest concession payments enabled Abdullah ibn Qasim to solidify his position and that of the Al Thani clan, a process completed when the ruling family began to earn oil export income after 1949. Political independence was thrust upon Qatar in 1968, when the United Kingdom decided to end its protective relationships with the lower Gulf states by the end of 1971. It declared its independence on 3 September 1971 after the failure of efforts to join Bahrain and the seven Trucial Emirates in a federation.

Economy

Earnings from oil and natural gas production have given Qataris one of the world's highest per capita incomes and have made dramatic economic development possible. In 1991 Qatar began production of gas from its vast North Field. As part of the second phase of development of the North Field, the country built a liquefied natural gas (LNG) production and export facility at Ra's Laffan, which began exports in 1996. The country's modern physical infrastructure includes excellent roads linking Qatar with the other Gulf states, an international airport, and a large, modern port at Doha. Attempts have been made to diversify the economy by building cement plants and flour mills, and expanding the shrimping industry. Modern techniques in agriculture have made possible vegetable and chicken production sufficient to meet an increasing local demand.

Government and Politics

In 1970, a year before independence, Qatar became the first of the lower Gulf states to adopt a written constitution. It provided for a council of ministers or a cabinet to be appointed by the ruler, and an elected advisory council. Members of the ruling family dominate the cabinet and the advisory council has thus far consisted only of members appointed by the ruler. With perhaps as many as 20,000 members, the Al Thani family is the largest ruling family in the region and has dominated most important areas of government. In June 1995 Shaykh Hamad ibn Khalifa overthrew his father, Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad Al Thani. Hamad has attempted to open the country's social and political environment. In

More than half the population of Qatar resides in Doha, which was founded in the nineteenth century as a fishing and pearling village. Doha grew rapidly after the country began exporting petroleum in 1949 and became Qatar's capital city in 1971. © CHRISTINE OSBORNE/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

1996 he allowed the creation of al-Jazeera, a semi-independent satellite television network that has become world famous for its groundbreaking coverage of Arab issues, including the United States's conflict with Osama bin Ladin and al- Qaʿida. In addition, the ruler oversaw Qatar's first elections, which were held in March 1999 for members of the largely consultative Municipal Council.

Foreign Relations

Apart from its wider oil interests, Qatar has focused its foreign policy largely on Persian Gulf affairs, seeking to maintain close and friendly relations with the other traditional, dynastic Arab states. Two long-standing and contentious border disputes, with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, were resolved peacefully in 2001. Hamad has pursued a more active and independent foreign policy than did his deposed father. Qatar agreed to the deployment on its soil of U.S. and other non-Arab military forces during the Gulf Crisis in 1990 and 1991, and its troops participated in the fighting to liberate Kuwait. In the wake of increased U.S. military activities in the region after 11 September 2001 and the reluctance of Saudi Arabia to accede to U.S. military requests, Qatar permitted the construction of a large airbase called al-Udayd where U.S. command and control facilities and other assets were transferred from Saudi Arabia in 2002 and 2003 during the U.S. buildup for its war on Iraq.

See also AL KHALIFA FAMILY; AL THANI FAMILY; AL THANI, HAMAD IBN KHALIFA; ANGLO–IRANIAN OIL COMPANY; BAHRAINI–QATARI WARS; DOHA; JAZEERA, AL-; MUWAHHIDUN.

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MALCOLM C. PECK
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QATAR GENERAL PETROLEUM COMPANY

See QATAR PETROLEUM

QATAR PETROLEUM

Qatar's national oil company, established in 1974, formerly known as Qatar General Petroleum Company.

As they did in other countries in the region, Western companies controlled Qatar's oil production until local leaders insisted on nationalizing this valuable resource. The Qatar General Petroleum Company (QGPC) was established in 1974, with 40 percent of the ownership held by foreign companies. The company was fully nationalized in 1977, after which it began to expand its operations from onshore and offshore oil and natural gas production to refining, petrochemical production, exploration, and development.

A major turning point came in 1991, with the opening of phase one of the North Field natural gas development project. The North Field is the largest natural gas field in the world, and its development has made Qatar a major producer. Abdullah bin Hamad al-Attiya, minister of energy and industry and the company's chairman and managing director, announced in 2001 that his company's name change to Qatar Petroleum (QP), which happened in that year, reflected in part its increased status in world energy markets. Many of QP's projects revolve around developing the field and utilizing its products in domestic and international markets while promoting the hiring of Qatari nationals in the company and maintaining a policy sensitive to the region's natural environment.

See also QATAR.

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MARY ANN TÉTREAULT
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

QAʿWAR, WIDAD

[1932–]

Scholar, collector, and conservator of traditional Palestinian and Jordanian embroidery, costumes, and textiles.

Born to a Christian Palestinian Arab family in Tulkarem, in British Mandate Palestine, Widad Qaʿwar (*née* Irani) and her brothers were sent to Lebanon for primary school. Because of heightened tensions and uncertainty in Palestine, she was brought home in the mid-1940s to complete her secondary education at the Friends Girls School in Ramallah. The shock, upheaval, and sudden transformations of Palestinian society in 1948 and 1949 initially sparked her desire to collect and preserve examples of traditional Palestinian folk culture.

Qaʿwar returned to Lebanon and continued her studies at the Beirut College for Women (now the Lebanese American University), receiving a B.A. in history in 1950. She pursued postgraduate studies at the American University of Beirut and there met Kamil Amin Qaʿwar, her future husband, with whom she settled in Jordan.

Qaʿwar's unique collection of embroidery (in Arabic, *tatriz*) preserves a fading way of life and the cultural heritage of Palestinian women and village life. Each village is characterized by its own embroidery styles, patterns, and color schemes. From two traditional embroidered dresses that she received as a gift, Qaʿwar's collection has grown to become the largest and richest collection of Palestinian, Jordanian, and Syrian costumes now extant the Hashimite kingdom of Jordan. Qaʿwar's interests extend beyond collecting. She has also conducted interviews with village women about the transmission, practice, and innovation of the ancient craft of embroidery, with a special focus on

the communal and political dimensions of embroidery from the late 1960s onward.

The June 1967 war prevented Qaʿwar from visiting the villages of her childhood. The hardships of occupation, and the creation of a new group of Palestinian refugees, strengthened her desire to collect as many examples of embroidery as possible.

After 1968, Qaʿwar focused on documenting and researching the history of Palestinian textiles, particularly on the wedding trousseaus of the women in the village of Bayt Dajan, near Jaffa, who were now living in refugee camps in and around Amman. A hand-woven wedding garment was usually part of the trousseau. Each trousseau features six to twelve embroidered garments, including accessories such as scarves and pillowcases.

Embroidery patterns and themes were drawn from daily life and natural surroundings. Trees, houses, flowers, and insects are all found in Palestinian needlework, which uses four types of stitches. *Al-madda* (stretch/extending), was found in the Galilee but also in Nablus and Tulkarm. It is characterized by its simplicity. *Falahi* (meaning "of the peasants") is a cross-stitch found in most Palestinian embroidery. *Tahrira* (to make silky) is a more complicated stitch originating in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. It is made from silk, first imported from Syria. The *wasla* (connecting) stitch is new, appearing after 1967. It depicts images of the Palestinian flag, Jerusalem, and the Dome of the Rock, and has acquired different names in different locales, knows as *swaisiya* or *sabaly* in the Jaffa area, *manaajel* in the areas between Ramallah and Hebron, *aqeedeh* in Gaza, and *tanbeeteh* in Beersheeba.

Qaʿwar's collection of embroidery and textiles has grown to include examples from other Arab countries. She has taken the collection on tour in Europe and is committed to using it as an educational resource on Palestinian culture and history. In 1990, she was a founding member of the Arab Resource Center for the Popular Arts in Beirut.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Art; Refugees: Palestinian.

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Laurie King-Irani

QAWUQJI, FAWZI AL-
[1890–1974]

Military officer who led Arab nationalist forces against the imperial powers in Palestine.

Born in the late 1880s in Tripoli, Syria (later within Lebanon), Fawzi al-Din al-Qawuqji graduated from the Ottoman military academy in Istanbul and served in the early part of World War I as a captain in the Ottoman cavalry. He switched sides to join the Arab revolt in 1916 and fought the French invasion of Amir Faisal I ibn Hussein's independent Syria in July 1920. Qawuqji commanded a cavalry company of the Syrian legion after the war and used that position to lead a revolt in October 1925, in Hama (Syria), against the French mandate forces. He coordinated with other nationalist forces in the landowning and merchant classes as well as with rural rebels. Qawuqji continued to lead a rebel band in the countryside during 1926/27 but fled to Iraq in April 1927 (where Faisal was king). Qawuqji then served in the Iraqi army, from where he hoped to launch an attack on Syria to free it from French rule. His 200-man guerrilla force was, however, diverted to Palestine from August to November 1936 to assist the Palestinian general strike against British rule and Zionism. Qawuqji's forces were better prepared militarily than the Palestinian guerrilla bands but did not cooperate effectively with the Palestinians. Qawuqji called himself Commander in Chief of the Arab Revolution in Southern Syria and failed to coordinate with Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, leader of the Palestinian guerrillas in the Hebron area.

Qawuqji spent World War II in Iraq and Axis-controlled Europe. Despite his tensions with Palestinian politicians, the League of Arab States requested Qawuqji to return to Palestine in January 1948 to head the Arab Liberation Army, which sought to prevent the partition of Palestine. Once again, Qawuqji failed to cooperate with Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni and other Palestinian guerrilla leaders. He was severely defeated in his few encounters with the Haganah (the prestate armed forces of the Zionist

movement). After Israel was established in May 1948 and the Arabs attacked, the Arab Liberation Army was forced out of central Galilee in July 1948 by Israeli forces—and from the rest of northern Galilee in October 1948. Qawuqji had taken a strong stand against the flight of Palestinian Arabs from their homes; he threatened to punish villagers who fled, and his forces even blocked roads to prevent them leaving. Nonetheless, his six-thousand-man force was too small to keep northern Palestine from being seized by Israel and many of its Arab residents being expelled by Israel's forces.

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Ann M. Lesch

QIRSH

See Glossary

QIRYAT ARBA

See Kiryat Arba

QIYOMIJIAN, OHANNES

Early-twentieth-century Ottoman official in Lebanon.

Ohannes Qiyomijian was born in Istanbul to an Armenian Catholic family. After completing his formal education, he was appointed to the Foreign Ministry. He served as a counselor for the embassy of the Ottoman Empire in Rome. He was twice asked to become a *mutasarrif* in Lebanon before he accepted the assignment in January 1912. Among his responsibilities was adding a member from Dayr al-Qamar to the Administrative Council and revising the election laws. Qiyomijian established commercial courts and opened ports in Juniya and Nabi Yunis. He enlarged the army to 1,200 and raised the salaries of the soldiers after their sit-in strike in Baʿabda. In 1913, he imported salt and tobacco directly into Lebanon in return for fees paid to the treasury of Mount Lebanon. Turkish mass killings of Armenians led Cemal Paşa to insist on his dismissal and he tendered his resignation in June 1915.

As'ad AbuKhalil

QOM

Shrine town in Iran.

The city of Qom (also Qum), 92 miles (148 km) south of Tehran, is, after Mashhad (the burial place of the eighth Shiʿite imam, Ali Reza), the second most important shrine town in Iran. The sister of Imam Reza, Hazrat-e Fatima, is buried in Qom. The city was a winter capital as well as a royal mausoleum town during medieval times and was strongly patronized when the Shiʿite Safavids came to power during the sixteenth century. In 1920 a religious center of learning *(hauzeh-ye ilmiyeh)* was established in the city by Shaykh Abd al-Karim Ha'eri Yazdi. Through its *madrasas* (religious schools) Qom is one of the main centers of Islamic studies in Iran today. With the accession to power of Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1925 and the modernization reforms undertaken, the town soon became the scene of a struggle between the monarchy and the religious establishment. The first major episode of violence that precipitated the Iranian Revolution of 1979 occurred there. When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran in 1979 as the leader of the revolution, he established his headquarters in the Madrasa-y Faiziyeh in Qom.

See also Iranian Revolution (1979).

Parvaneh Pourshariati

QOTBZADEH, SADEQ

[1937–1982]

Iranian politician.

Charged with treason and plotting to kill Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Sadeq Qotbzadeh was executed in 1982 by partisans of the Islamic Republic of Iran, after having spent his entire life bringing about the downfall of the Pahlavi regime. He was born in

Tehran in 1937 (1938 according to some accounts) to a conservative, religious merchant family. In 1958, fearful of being arrested by the government of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi because of his association with the more religious branch of the National Front, he left Iran to attend Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. While in America, he worked in the Islamic Student Association with Ibrahim Yazdi and Mostafa Chamran. His anti-shah activities in the United States led to the cancellation of his visa. He moved to Europe in 1963, where he joined an opposition movement led by Abolhasan Bani Sadr. In 1979, he returned to Iran (on the same plane that was carrying Ayatollah Khomeini back to Iran) and became a member of the Revolutionary Council. In 1980, President Bani Sadr chose him to be foreign minister, but by February 1981, Bani Sadr had fled the country and Qotbzadeh was arrested on charges of conspiracy against the state and plotting to kill Ayatollah Khomeini. Qotbzadeh was not a radical and not a cleric, and as post-1979 Iran moved in both those directions, prodigal sons of the revolutionary movement were no longer favored. Qotbzadeh was, however, by some accounts, one of the key people involved in the disappearance of Imam Musa Sadr, Lebanese Shiʿite leader, in Tripoli in 1978.

See also Bani Sadr, Abolhasan; Chamran, Mostafa; Khomeini, Ruhollah; National Front, Iran; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Yazdi, Ibrahim.

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Neguin Yavari

QUEEN SURRAYA

[1899–1968]

Afghan queen who fought for women's rights.

Surraya, wife of Amanollah Khan, king of Afghanistan (1919–1929), was the pioneer force behind women's emancipation and education in Afghanistan. She was born in 1899 in Damascus, the daughter of the famous Afghan writer and journalist Mahmud Tarzi, who returned to Afghanistan in 1905 after years of exile in Syria. She married Prince Amanollah in 1916 and used her royal position to promote change in the status of Afghan women. She was responsible for the establishment of the first schools for girls and the first association for the protection of women's rights in Afghanistan. In 1927, she accompanied her husband on an official tour of Europe and the Middle East and was the first Muslim queen to appear unveiled in public in Europe. She was also the only Afghan queen to be introduced in person to the Afghan Grand Assembly *(Loya Jirga).*

Queen Surraya's campaign for the emancipation and unveiling of women was one of the reasons for the outbreak of uprisings instigated by the clergy in 1928. After King Amanollah's abdication in 1929, the royal couple lived in exile in Europe. Surraya died in 1968 in Rome but was permitted by King Zahir Shah to be buried in Afghanistan in recognition of her service to the cause of Afghan women.

See also Amanollah Khan.

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Senzil Nawid

QURAI, AHMAD SULAYMAN

[1937–]

Palestinian economist and statesman, architect of the 1993 Oslo Accord.

Qurai (also Qurei, Quray; nom de guerre: Abu Ala) was born into a wealthy family in Abu Dis, near Jerusalem. In 1968, shortly after Israeli occupation, he left for Jordan and subsequently Saudi Arabia, gaining employment in the banking sector. He now joined the Palestine National Liberation Movement (al-Fatah) and was appointed director of Samid, the institution responsible for Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) finances in Lebanon. Relocating to Tunis after the PLO's 1982 evacuation from Beirut, he became deputy director of the PLO's Department of Economic Affairs and in 1989 was elected to the Fatah Central Committee. The architect of PLO development plans for the Palestinian territories, he was chief Palestinian delegate at the secret Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Oslo that produced the

September 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements.

In 1994, Qurai became director of the Department of Economic Affairs of the Palestinian Authority, creating the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction as a channel for international investment. He became the first speaker when the Palestinian Legislative Council was established in 1996, took part in the unsuccessful "final status" talks of 2000/01, and, in September 2003, was appointed prime minister, raising the prospect, in spite of the weakness of his popular support, of a renewed accommodation with Israel.

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MOUIN RABBANI
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QUR'AN

The sacred scripture in Islam.

The Qurʾan (literally, recitation) consists of the ensemble of revelations recited by the prophet Muhammad and considered by the Muslims to be the word of God verbatim. The Qurʾan was revealed piecemeal during the prophetic career of Muhammad, starting in 611 C.E. with a vision he experienced during a night known as the Night of Destiny *(laylat al qadr)* and ending with his death in 632. The word *Qurʾan* is coined by the revelation itself, which is also designated by other terms such as *kitab* (book), *tanzil* (literally, what is sent down), and *dhikr* (remembrance). The Qurʾan, which is shorter than the Christian New Testament, is divided into 114 chapters *(sura,* plural *suwar)* and 6,616 verses *(aya,* plural *ayat).* The word *aya* means literally "sign," and is used also in reference to any natural phenomenon as the expression or sign of God's will.

The Qurʾan is not arranged either chronologically or thematically, but rather on the basis of pre-Islamic aesthetic criteria, to which the Qurʾan implicitly refers when it challenges doubters to compete with it on literary grounds (2:23, 11:13), and which constitute the basis for the claim of the miraculous nature of the Qurʾan expressed as *iʿjaz,* or inimitability. The chapters are arranged roughly in order of length, and they all start with the *basmala* (the invocation of God's name). The prophet is reported to have rearranged the text regularly with the onset of new revelations, and Muslim tradition maintains that he made also the final ordering of the text. The first chapter is called *al-fatiha* (the opening), and consists of a prayer addressed to God. In the other chapters, some verses deal with rituals and social and economic regulations, and many others consist of didactic parables and stories about former biblical and Arabian prophets, historical figures, and communities. The largest number of verses, however, is of a hortatory nature, dealing with God's majesty and power and with the various aspects of His creation. The Qurʾan uses indifferently the terms *I, We,* and *He* when God addresses His creatures, whether directly or indirectly, through the Prophet.

Themes and Interpretation

The themes of the Qurʾan build around the central claim of *tawhid,* or the absolute unity and transcendence of God. God is an omnipotent, all-powerful deity, on whom creation is completely dependent. All of creation was offered to humanity as a trust to allow the latter to carry out its task as God's vicegerent *(khalifa)* on earth. The Qurʾan, which is written in powerful rhymed prose with striking imagery, vividly reminds human beings that they will report to God on the Day of Judgment and that the afterlife (paradise and hell) is predicated on one's actions in this life. Parables and moral didactic stories abound, as well as warnings and general advice on how to succeed as God's vicegerent and avoid the failure to which pride and greed lead. Because the Qurʾan refers to the human endowment *(fitrah)* that allows people to distinguish good from evil, it calls itself *dhikr* (reminder or remembrance); and it is repeatedly pointed out that similar messages, based on a single divine source of revelation called *umm al-kitab* (13:39), had been sent to all communities over time, and eventually gave rise to different interpretations in the form of different religions. The Qurʾan itself is the conclusion of this string of revelations that start with Adam as the first prophet and end with Muhammad.

The Qurʾan has given rise to a number of sciences, the most important of which is *asbab al-nuzul* (the study of the historical context of the verses), and to countless commentaries that range from the literalist to the mystical. Modern commentaries such as those of Muhammad Abduh, Abu al-Aʾla al-Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb have shifted from the early traditional atomist approach to a comprehensive approach that integrates the various meanings of the text.

Collection of the Qur'an

Muslim tradition holds that the Prophet relied primarily on the memorization by his disciples of the revelations he taught them, but he did have a number of secretaries transcribe the text of the Qurʾan. There is agreement that after his death, these transcriptions were collected by Zayd ibn Thabit, one of his main secretaries, but no official canon or reference was established. By the time of Uthman's reign (644–656), the spread of variant readings of the text (based on the use of synonyms, and on pronunciations found in dialects other than that of the Qurʾan), and the proliferation of manuscripts *(mushaf,* plural *masahif)* made without reference to the original recitation, caused alarm amongst the Companions of the Prophet. Consequently, Uthman ordered Zayd to establish an official canon in the Quraysh dialect based on the original collection, and to get confirmation and approval of his work from the Companions. All other existing manuscripts and personal copies (which often contained personal annotations, or omitted some passages, or followed a different order of the chapters) were ordered destroyed, and all new copies of the Qurʾan were made from the new canon. However, differences persisted. Muslim tradition identifies and accepts as part of the original text of the Qurʾan seven dialects *(ahruf)* in which the text is said to be revealed, though the standardization of the Uthman canon, which emphasized the Quraysh dialect, made these obsolete. In addition, different readings or styles of recitation *(qiraʾa)* arose based on different possible orthographic forms and pronunciations. The Qurʾan had been recited aloud from its inception; eventually, ten different readings were accepted as legitimate, based on the authenticity of the oral traditions that transmitted them and on evidence that the original reader's recitation had been tolerated by the Prophet. Further standardization came with the development of diacritical dots and marks in the written text.

Contemporary Orientalist views of the collection of the Qurʾan diverge widely, ranging from the claim that it is a late forgery to near-total endorsement of traditional Muslim claims. However, with very few exceptions, there is general agreement that the current text of the Qurʾan is in accordance with Uthman's canon (as there are no traditions referring to other canons), and that the variations that prompted codification of the Qurʾan were mostly minor divergences of pronunciation and orthography and omissions in some personal copies of some chapters or insertions of prayer formulas external to the text. More importantly, it seems that the early Muslim community accepted the Uthman canon: There were no attempts made by the early dissenting political groups (Shiʿite and Khawarij) to claim a divergent text; instead, they insisted on a divergent interpretation of it.

Place in Islam

The Qurʾan is the ultimate reference for the Muslim who reveres it as the only expression of the sacred on earth. Besides providing the central worldview from which Muslim culture and civilization springs, it directly affects a number of disciplines and arts. Thus grammar, syntax, lexicography, law, and literary criticism are all based on the Qurʾanic text. Calligraphy, the most sophisticated of Islamic art forms, was developed to celebrate the holy text, and the chanting of the Qurʾan, based on abstract modular improvisation that organizes musical motifs in complex patterns, provides the core structure of the various genres of Islamic music.

See also Abduh, Muhammad; Islam; Mawdudi, Abu al-Aʿla al-; Muhammad; Qutb, Sayyid.

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Maysam J. al-Faruqi

QURAYSH TRIBE

See Tribes and Tribalism: Quraysh Tribe

QUSAYR, AL-

Historic Egyptian port on the Red Sea.

The town al-Qusayr in Egypt on the Red Sea is located slightly north of the twenty-sixth parallel, and linked to the Nile by a trade route to Qina. The site has been in use since pharaonic times and served as a port of embarkation for Muslim pilgrims to Mecca. It was a major commercial center in Mamluk and early Ottoman Empire times and experienced a revival under Muhammad Ali, but the pilgrimage traffic was diverted to Suez after the canal was built (1859-1869), eclipsing its importance.

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Arthur Goldschmidt
Updated by Donald Malcolm Reid

QUTB, SAYYID

[1906–1966]

Radical ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Born in Asyut, south of Cairo, to a family of impoverished rural notables, Sayyid Qutb was trained as a teacher at Dar al-Ulum. Until 1942, he was an inspector in the Ministry of Public Instruction; he also wrote Wafdist political opinions in the popular press and published poetry, short stories, and literary criticism. From 1945 to 1948, he wrote a series of articles critical of Egyptian politics and several books on literary figures and issues. He was highly critical of the government in his writings, and this earned him de facto exile to the United States, where he was sent by the ministry to study the education system. During his three-year stay in the United States, disturbed by what he considered to be U.S. sexual permissiveness, materialism, and racism, he rediscovered his deep Muslim roots. Upon his return to Egypt in 1951, he was recruited by the Society of the Muslim Brethren, or Muslim Brotherhood. He became a member of the Guidance Council and head of the propaganda section. In 1953, he was appointed editor-in-chief of the society's newspaper *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (the Muslim brethren).

In the months before and after the July 1952 Egyptian revolution, Qutb and Gamal Abdel Nasser met regularly. Nonetheless, in the wake of a 1954 assassination attempt on Nasser by a Muslim Brother, Qutb was imprisoned. He was released in 1964 but was arrested again in 1965. After being tortured and tried by a military court for conspiracy against Nasser, Qutb was hanged on 29 August 1966.

In prison, Qutb converted from moderate to radical Islamism. It was there that Qutb indoctrinated some of the future radical leaders, including Shukri Mustafa. During his incarceration, from 1954 to 1964, Qutb wrote, and circulated outside prison, numerous books, including one of his most influential, *Maʿalim fi al-Tariq* (Signposts on the road). An account and interpretation of events in Nasser's concentration camps, it is a seminal work and served as the basis for the reconstituted Islamist movement in the early 1960s. *Maʿalim* describes both the words and the actions that are needed for the destruction of the secular regime and the creation of a Muslim state.

Qutb's theoretical writings, addressing the political, economic, and social organization of the Islamic state, vividly expressed the unity of *din* (religion) and *dawla* (state), in distinct contrast to the post-Enlightenment separation of church and state prevalent in the West. Focusing on the intersection of *shariʿa* (Islamic law) and modern society, he maintained that the former was imbued with an inherent sense of *tajdid* (renewal). As such, it offered the principles necessary for progress through action. Moreover, Qutb held that laws and statutes were only one of Islam's two pillars; the other was education, which alone could provide Muslims with an Islamic theory of life.

Through his writings, Qutb established the theoretical foundations for radical Islamist organizations. His books, which upheld the doctrines of divine governance *(hakimiyya)* and insisted on attacking worldly unbelief or paganism *(jahiliyya)* through violent revolutionary means, have become the gospels

of Islamic radicals, including the Arabs who during the 1980s fought the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

See also MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; WAFD.

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JEAN-MARC R. OPPENHEIM
UPDATED BY AHMAD S. MOUSSALLI

The inauguration ceremony of Syrian president Shukri al-Quwatli (1892-1967), shown seated in the House of Parliament, in Damascus. Quwatli succeeded Hashem al-Atassi (1875-1960), in 1940. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

QUWATLI, SHUKRI AL-
[1891–1967]

Three-time Syrian president; Arab nationalist.

Shukri al-Quwatli was born in Damascus to a Sunni Muslim family of prosperous landowners and bureaucrats who made their fortune through agriculture and trade with Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman Al Saʿud in the Arabian Peninsula. He was one of the most important figures in the political life of modern Syria. He received his education in the elite schools of Damascus and his public administration training in Constantinople (now Istanbul). Having no stake in the Ottoman Empire, he joined the secret Arab nationalist society al-Fatat and then the Hashimite-led Arab Revolt in 1916. His underground activities on behalf of the cause of Arab independence during World War I enabled him to emerge as a nationalist hero.

Although al-Quwatli served in the local administration of the Hashimite Prince Faisal I ibn Hussein's Arab government, which was set up in Damascus after the defeat of the Ottoman state, he belonged to a group of avowed anti-Hashimite pan-Arabists who devoted most of their time to the Istiqlal Party (Arab Independence party). Forced to flee Syria after the French invasion of July 1920, al-Quwatli spent the next ten years in exile first in Cairo, which he used as a base for his activities on behalf of the Hashimite-leaning Syrian–Palestine Congress, and then in Europe, primarily Berlin, where he collaborated with other exiled Syrians in anti-French propaganda campaigns. He was active in supporting the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925–1927.

With the French amnesty of 1930, al-Quwatli returned to Damascus. Initially he maintained a low political profile devoting much of his time and energy to business ventures, primarily the processing and exporting of fruits and vegetables. The Syrian Conserves Company, which he founded in 1932, vaulted him into the limelight as an industrialist who promoted Syria's economic interests during a critical phase of its fight for independence.

Following the election of a Syrian parliament in 1932, al-Quwatli joined the National Bloc, Syria's principal nationalist organization from 1927 until the end of the French mandate era. An uncompromising pan-Arabist devoted to the cause of Arab independence, al-Quwatli was soon disenchanted with the bloc's ineffectiveness and its policy of "honorable cooperation" with the French, and he became a leading instigator of the general strike that erupted in Syria on 27 January 1936, and brought commercial and educational life to a standstill for thirty-six days. When the all-bloc government was formed in Damascus in 1936, al-Quwatli served as minister of defense and of finance only to resign two years later. Although he was the leading nationalist politician in Syria during World War II, his anti-French

activities forced him to go into exile in Iraq. His connections with Ibn Saʿud, however, made the British apply pressure on the French to accept his return. In the Syrian elections of 1943, he was elected to the presidency of a "formally" independent Syria. His nationalist sentiment, which was beyond reproach, enabled him to remain in office despite the factionalism and scandals that plagued his administration.

In March 1949, al-Quwatli was deposed as president by Colonel Husni al-Zaʿim's successful coup and once again he went into exile, but this time in Egypt, a country on which he came to depend during the rest of his political life. Thanks to Egyptian and Saudi support, he returned to Syria in 1954 after the overthrow of the military regime of Colonel Adib Shishakli. In August 1955, he was elected president of Syria for a third time. By that time, the political landscape in Syria had changed. The class of urban notables from which he hailed and that controlled Syrian politics from the latter part of the nineteenth century through the early years of independence was under attack by new political forces, including al-Baʿth and the communists. Syria's domestic politics was also weak and unstable, and the country itself was at the heart of a struggle for dominance between Hashimite Iraq and republican Egypt on the one hand, and the big powers on the other hand.

Al-Quwatli strongly supported the ideas of an Egyptian–Syrian union in 1957 and 1958. With the consummation of the union and emergence of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, al-Quwatli's active participation in Syrian politics came to an end. He resigned his post as president to allow Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's charismatic president, to take over the presidency of the UAR. Before his death in 1967, al-Quwatli witnessed the collapse of the UAR in 1961 and the coming to power of a factionalized group of Baʿthist military officers who came in the main from rural Alawi, Druze, and Ismaʿili backgrounds significantly different from the landowning, scholarly, and mercantile Sunni families from which his generation of leaders hailed. The advent of these new groups to power brought with it the reorientation of Syrian politics, both domestically as well as in the area of foreign relations.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Arab Revolt (1916); Baʿth, al-; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Fatat, al-; Istiqlal Party: Syria; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; National Bloc; United Arab Republic (UAR); Zaʿim, Husni al-.

Muhammad Muslih

R

RAAB, ESTHER

[1894–1981]

The first Palestinian-born woman poet in the modern era to write and publish in Hebrew.

Esther Raab's childhood in the early years of the first Jewish settlement of Petah Tikvah shaped an intimate connection between her and the wild and primary landscape of Eretz Yisrael (Palestine). This emotional relationship is expressed throughout her poems. In 1923 Raab's first poem, "Ani Tahat ha-Atad" (I am underneath the bramble bush), was published in the new Hebrew literary periodical *Hedim,* but it was only in 1930 that her first book, *Kimshonim* (Thistles)—containing thirty-two poems written between 1920 and 1930—was published.

Raab was a pioneer in her poetics. As early as the 1920s, Raab's poems differed markedly from those of her mainstream male contemporaries and from those of other women poets of the time. Her early poetry is striking in its sensuous descriptions of the landscape of Eretz Yisrael and in its rebellious female voice. Moreover, this early work is notable for its rejection of the stanza and meter in favor of free verse and idiosyncratic syntax and word order. These elements of form and content, which set Raab's poetry apart from the poetic and thematic conventions of her time, may have contributed to her fate as a poet. After the cool and sometimes openly hostile reception of her book, Raab fell into a two-decade-long silence. She started to publish again in the late 1950s.

Raab died in Tiveon and was buried in the city of her birth, Petah Tikvah. She requested that a few lines from her poem be engraved on her tombstone: "Your earth-clods were sweet to me/Homeland—just as the clouds of your sky/Were sweet to me."

Among Raab's books of poetry are *The Poetry of Esther Raab* (1963), *As Last Prayer,* (1976), *Root's Sound* (an anthology; 1976), and *Esther Raab, Collected Poems* (1988). A second, enlarged edition of her collected poems was published in 1994, the one-hundredth anniversary of her birth.

See also Eretz Yisrael; Literature: Hebrew.

Shibolet Zait

RAAD, INʿAM

[1929–1998]

Lebanese politician.

Inʿam Raad (also Raʿd) was born to a Greek Orthodox family in Ayn Zhalta. His father, Tawfiq, a graduate of the American University of Beirut (AUB), was a pharmacist who emigrated for a few years to Australia. In 1949 the younger Raad obtained his degree in political science at AUB. Until 1957 he taught Arabic, English, geography, and history at Broummana High School and other schools in Lebanon. In 1944 he had joined the Parti Populaire Syrien (later called the Syrian Social Nationalist Party) and was elected several times to its politburo. Between 1958 and 1961 he was chief editor of the party's publications, *al-Bina* and *Sabah al-Khayr.* In 1961, following an attempted coup mounted by the party against the Lebanese government, Raad and his followers were condemned to death; Raad's sentence later was commuted to a life sentence. In 1969 President Charles Hilu announced an amnesty for the civilian party members implicated in the coup. In 1992 Raad was elected president of the party. He died in 1998.

See also American University of Beirut (AUB); Hilu, Charles; Syrian Social Nationalist Party.

George E. Irani
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

RABAT

One of the four imperial cities of Morocco; national capital since 1912.

Since being named capital by the French in 1912, Rabat (also Ribat al-Fath) has grown in size and prestige as the new administrative, educational, and cultural center of Morocco. It is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean and the Bou Regreg River, which separates it from its rival sister city to the north, Salé.

Rabat takes its name from a small tenth-century *ribat* (monastery-citadel) manned by Muslim holy warriors *(murabits).* The Almohad Sultan Yaʿqub al-Mansur constructed a city on the site and named it Ribat al-Fath (Monastery of Conquest), in honor of a victory over Spain in 1195. Rabat's historical significance, along with its neighboring rival, Salé, stemmed from commercial trade and piracy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Spanish Muslims expelled from Spain in 1610 formed the core of Rabat's population.

At the beginning of the French protectorate in 1912, the French decision to relocate Morocco's capital to Rabat opened it to extensive development outside the original Arab city *(madina)* to the south and west. French colonial administrator General Louis-Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, in laying out the plan for Rabat, saw it as an opportunity to design an exemplary modern city. The major national university, Muhammad V, is located in Rabat, as are various national research institutes. Rabat and Salé together form an administrative prefecture that has grown at a rate of more than 5 percent annually since the late 1960s. The population of Rabat-Salé and environs numbers 1,386,000 (1994 figures).

See also Lyautey, Louis-Hubert Gonzalve; Morocco.

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Donna Lee Bowen

RABAT ARAB SUMMIT

See Arab League Summits

RABBANI, BURHANUDDIN

[1940–]

President of Afghanistan, 1993–1996.

Burhanuddin Rabbani was the president of Afghanistan from 1992 to 1996. He was born in Faizabad, Badakhshan province, to a Tajik family and educated in Islamic studies at Kabul University and al-Azhar University in Cairo, where he received a master of arts degree (1968). He returned to Kabul to teach in the faculty of Islamic law at Kabul University (1970) and was a leader of the Islamist movement in Afghanistan. In 1971 he joined the Jamiʿat-e Islami and became its leader. In 1974 he fled Afghanistan, first traveling to Saudi Arabia and then to Pakistan, where he reorganized the Jamiʿat-e Islami as a guerrilla militia to fight against the Kabul government.

As he was Tajik, Rabbani's political party drew most of its followers from the non-Pushtun Afghans, especially in the northern and western regions of Afghanistan.

With the collapse of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government in 1992, Rabbani returned to Kabul and became president of Afghanistan. Driven from Kabul by the Taliban in 1996, Rabbani sought refuge in northern Afghanistan, where he formed the United National and Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UNIFSA), also known as the Northern Alliance, to fight against the Taliban government. When the Taliban fell in late November 2001, UNIFSA forces captured Kabul. Although Rabbani was still seen as the president of Afghanistan by some of his followers, he was forced to relinquish control to the new government of Hamid Karzai.

See also Jamiʿat-e Islami; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

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Grant Farr

RABBI

Title derived from rav, *which in Hebrew denotes a master.*

In its Talmudic origins, the mastery to which *rabbi* referred was a knowledge of both Scripture and Jewish oral tradition, including competence in interpreting law and recalling legends. Although at first the title was honorific, it evolved into something more formal. Always connected with a level of superior scholarship and familiarity with sacred Jewish texts, it has in contemporary times also come to signify general religious leadership.

Although the requirements for acquiring the title are not stipulated in Jewish law, *semikha* or ordination—in which another rabbi attests to the scholarship and learning of the initiate—has become an assumed prerequisite of being called rabbi. Throughout much of Jewish history, this process occurred in the context of yeshivas; currently, it also takes place in theological seminaries.

A rabbi holds a photograph of Jerusalem's Temple Mount, or Old City Mosque, at a gathering of Israel's chief rabbinate, August 2000. They discussed building a synagogue on the area that is thought to be the Jewish Second Temple, ruined by the Romans in 70 c.e. © AFP/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Generally, civil authorities have recognized the right of the Jews to decide for themselves who may be called rabbi. This became more complicated after Jews ceased to speak with a single communal voice in the modern period, with the consequence that different groups of Jews set various criteria for deciding who would be entitled to be called rabbi. Thus in the modern period in the United States, for example, there are four types of rabbis being ordained, to represent the four different denominations: Reformed, Reconstructionist, Conservative, and Orthodox. The Orthodox denomination, although it represents a minority of world Jewry, produces the most rabbis. Throughout Jewish history, the title has been granted only to men, but in the late twentieth century, non-Orthodox Jews began to ordain women as well. In Israel, only Orthodox rabbis are officially recognized, even though Reformed and Conservative rabbis are also there.

Two general categories of rabbis evolved in modern times: those who were primarily teachers, scholars, or issuers of legal decisions and remained in the academy of Jewish learning or sometimes served on a religious court, and those who ministered in the community and the synagogue. Rabbis

have also become ratifiers of changes in personal status by officiating at weddings, funerals, and other rites of passage.

The rabbinate in modern Israel is unique in several important respects. Because there is no strict separation of religion and state in Israel, Halakhah is the governing law in all matters of personal status. Accordingly, the Orthodox rabbinical interpretation of Jewish law is dominant. In Israel, many rabbis exert their authority as officials of the state Ministry of Religion and the office of the Chief Rabbinate. Headed by two national chief rabbis elected by a board of fellow rabbis for a term of ten years, the Chief Rabbinate is divided into Ashkenazic and Sephardic wings. Ostensibly empowered to make all ultimate religious decisions, it also provides parish rabbis and chief rabbis for major municipal regions.

There are other rabbis in Israel, particularly within Hasidic and yeshiva circles. Unlike the state rabbis whose authority is official, these rabbis dominate by virtue of their charisma or perceived scholarship. The relatively few non-Orthodox rabbis in Israel have a limited following. During the last few decades, the chief rabbis and their subordinates have steadily lost moral authority. Today the majority of secular Israelis consider them irrelevant, and the minority of ultra-Orthodox Jews guide themselves by their own sages whom they endow with greater rabbinic authority. This leaves only a narrow band of Orthodox Jews—primarily religious Zionists—who recognize the moral preeminence of the Chief Rabbinate. Nevertheless, the Chief Rabbinate is assured of influence as long as it continues to control matters of personal status and religious certification in the state.

See also HALAKHAH.

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SAMUEL C. HEILMAN

RABI, MUBARAK

[1935–]

Moroccan novelist and short-story writer.

Mubarak Rabi was born in Benmaʿashu, near Casablanca, Morocco. He received a degree in philosophy from the Faculty of Arts in Rabat and has a master's degree in psychology. He is at present dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at Ben Msik in Casablanca and teaches psychology at Mohammad V University in Rabat. Rabi is a member of the Union of Arab Writers and writes in Arabic. After unsuccessful efforts at poetry, he has concentrated on fiction. He received the Maghribi Prize for the novel and the short story in 1971.

Rabi is primarily concerned with Moroccan life and the role of magic and traditional beliefs in people's lives. This is best illustrated in his collection of short stories, *Sayyidna Qadr* (1969; Saint destiny). His books reveal a clear interest in human nature and a desire to discover the factors that shape it, producing good and bad. He is preoccupied with the loss of values in modern times and the ensuing conflicts among people. His fiction remains detached from the political turmoil in Morocco.

Rabi is also deeply interested in the education of children, as is obvious from his novel *Badr Zamanihi* (1983; The full moon of his time) and his collection of essays, *Awatif al-Tifl* (1984; The child's emotions). His later works include a novel, *Burj al-Suʿud* (1990;The lucky zodiac), a collection of short stories, *al-Balluri al-maksur* (1996; The broken crystalline), and a trilogy, *Darb al-Sultan* (1999–2000; The sultan's way). His concern remains humans evil and good inclinations seen with the eyes of a psychologist.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN.

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AIDA A. BAMIA

RABIN, YITZHAK

[1922–1995]

Israeli military leader and politician; member of the Knesset; prime minister, 1974–1977 and 1989–1995.

Born in Jerusalem, Yitzhak Rabin received part of his early education at an agricultural school; later,

he became active in the Ahdut ha-Avodah (socialist labor) movement in the Galilee. In 1941 he joined the Palmah, the Haganah's elite commando unit. Rabin's early military experience included fighting against Vichy French forces in Syria and Lebanon. In the Israeli War of Independence (1948) he fought against the Egyptians in the Negev campaign and also in Jerusalem. After the war he studied in Britain at the army staff college, from which he graduated in 1953.

Rabin, whose first career was in the military, was appointed chief of staff of Israel's armed forces in 1964; at the time of the June 1967 war he was Israel's commander in chief. In 1968 he retired from the army and became Israel's ambassador to the United States. He was very successful in that capacity, and the diplomatic experience combined with his military career gave him the leverage to start a second career, in politics, at the age of fifty-one.

Rabin returned to Israel from Washington, D.C., in March 1973; in the same year, he was elected to the Knesset for the first time and also served as minister of labor in the government of Prime Minister Golda Meir. In April 1974, when Meir resigned because of intense criticism of her government's handling of the 1973 war, the Labor Party's Central Committee sought her successor from among a field of candidates that included Shimon Peres, Moshe Dayan, Yigal Allon, Pinhas Sapir, and Abba Eban, as well as Rabin. Rabin was selected in June 1974 primarily because of his reputation as a war hero and because he was not associated with the government's unpreparedness for the Yom Kippur War.

In creating his coalition, Rabin, who was Israel's first *sabra* (native-born) prime minister, refused to give in to the extremist demands of members of the National Religious Party for greater Orthodox (Jewish) religious influence on public policy. He consequently achieved only a bare majority, with the help of the new and small Citizens' Rights movement, and this left his government vulnerable to periodic attacks in the Knesset. From 1974 to 1975 Rabin worked closely with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was involved in the shuttle diplomacy that led to disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria.

Rabin's first term as prime minister was marked by continuous intraparty bickering, primarily because Defense Minister Shimon Peres attempted to take over leadership of the party and become the prime minister. Domestic economic problems, chiefly inflation, continuing criticism of the Labor Party's performance in the Yom Kippur War, and increased ethnic tensions between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews all contributed to a gradual decline in the Labor Party's popularity and the rise of the Likud Party under Menachem Begin. Rabin resigned from the party leadership and from his post as prime minister in May 1977 because of a financial scandal involving his own and his wife's bank accounts in the United States. Shimon Peres replaced him as party leader.



Former military leader Yitzhak Rabin served as prime minister of Israel for two terms, the first beginning in 1974 and the second in 1989. Rabin made notable strides towards peace with other Middle Eastern countries and with Palestinians, which led to his assassination in 1995 by Yigal Amir, a disillusioned young Israeli who claimed he killed Rabin to halt this process.
© Photograph by Ya'acov Sa'ar. Government Press Office (GPO) of Israel. Reproduced by permission.

After twelve years, during which the Labor Party, led by Shimon Peres, was the opposition party in a shared-power arrangement with the Likud, Rabin again became party leader and prime minister in 1989. Over intense opposition from conservative forces in Israel, he pressed hard for a peace treaty with the Palestinians and Israel's Arab neighbors. In September 1993 he signed an Agreement on Principles on Interim Self-Government with Yasir Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and an Accord to Implement Self-Rule for the Palestinians was signed in May 1994. In October 1994 Rabin signed a full peace treaty with King Hussein of Jordan. In the same year, he shared a Nobel Peace Prize with Foreign Minister Peres and Chairman Arafat.

On 4 November 1995, while he was speaking at a peace rally in Tel Aviv, Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish right-wing extremist who opposed his overtures to Palestinians and other Arab leaders working toward peace in the Middle East. "The Rabin legacy" is often cited, but there is disagreement about its substance. For some it is associated specifically with the Oslo peace accords. For others it refers generally to the quest for peace. Critics have observed that those who allude to "the Rabin ideology" or "the Rabin legacy" mistake their own views for those of Rabin; these critics argue that Rabin did not have an ideology or a legacy—what he had was a sense of responsibility for the state and a willingness to pragmatically consider new ideas in order to pursue peace.

See also Ahdut ha-Avodah; Ashkenazim; Israel: Political Parties in; Kissinger, Henry; Meir, Golda; Palmah.

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Gregory S. Mahler

RABIYYA ALI, SALIM

[c.1935–1978]

Politician and government leader of South Yemen.

Salim Rabiyya Ali (or Rubiyya Salim Ali, or Salmine) came from the up-country of South Yemen, northeast of Aden, and first made his name fighting in the national liberation struggle against the British and their feudalist allies in the Radfan region during the mid-1960s. He was president of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) throughout most of the 1970s. He and his colleague and rival Abd al-Fattah Ismaʿil were founders of the National Liberation Front (NLF), early leaders of its left wing, and allies in the successful effort to rout its right wing in 1969; they were essentially co-rulers of the PDRY for the next decade, with Rabiyya Ali serving as president and Ismaʿil as secretary-general of the NLF. At the same time, they were bitter rivals and represented different perspectives on South Yemen's Marxist revolution: Rabiyya Ali, the Maoist, was identified with populist, grass-roots organizing as well as state institutions, whereas Ismaʿil, inspired by the Soviet model, was identified with the ruling party and its cadres. Their intraparty struggle for control of the revolution intensified and in mid-1978 erupted into armed conflict triggered by Rabiyya Ali's continuing efforts to improve previously hostile relations with North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the other Arab Gulf states, and more immediately by mutual accusations about responsibility for the assassination of North Yemen's president, Ahmad Husayn Ghashmi. Forces loyal to Rabiyya Ali lost the fight and he and two of his senior colleagues were summarily tried and executed.

See also Ismaʿil, Abd al-Fattah; People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

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Robert D. Burrowes

RADIO AND TELEVISION

This entry consists of the following articles:

ARAB COUNTRIES
ISRAEL
TURKEY

ARAB COUNTRIES

Origins and development of radio and television broadcasting in the Arab world.

Most Arab radio and television systems are government-owned, for several reasons. First, Arab governments regard radio and television as potent domestic political instruments because they reach most of the population regardless of literacy and income levels. Moreover, Arab broadcasting underwent its first major expansion during the period after World War II when Arab nationalism and anticolonialism were strong, and governments were very eager to use them for purposes of political nation building and national defense. Governments justified controls on the basis of the alleged need to protect the country against its enemies, old and new. By the same token, radio and television facilities have been prime targets of revolutions seeking to take power, and therefore the governments took special measures to protect them. Third, broadcasting is not a lucrative source of income for commercial investors because commercial advertising in the Arab world, and especially in the electronic media, is relatively limited, and generally advertising revenues do not cover costs. Fourth, governments are concerned about their image as conveyed in other countries through broadcasting so they want to control the programs. There are a few exceptions, especially in Lebanon and among the new satellite television companies, but the norm is government control of electronic broadcasting.

Arab Radio Broadcasting Development

Arab radio broadcasting began in the 1920s, but only a few Arab countries had their own broadcasting stations before World War II. After 1945, most Arab states began to create their own radio broadcasting systems, although it was not until 1970, when Oman opened its radio transmissions, that every one of them had its own radio station.

Egypt's Radio and Television Building in Cairo, which produces the bulk of the country's media programming, contains recording studios, hundreds of offices, an information center, a press center, and a broadcasting museum. On 31 May 2003, Egypt's annual Media Day, President Husni Mubarak inaugurated a new ten-story extension to the building which houses eight digital studios and a 1,200-seat auditorium. © DAVE BARTRUFF/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Among Arab countries, Egypt has been a leader in radio broadcasting from the beginning. Broadcasting began in Egypt in the 1920s with private commercial radio, and in 1934 the government gave the Marconi Company the exclusive right to broadcast. In 1947, however, the Egyptian government declared radio a government monopoly and began investing in its expansion.

By the 1970s, Egyptian radio had fourteen different broadcast services, including six for foreign audiences, staffed by more than 4,500 employees. With a total air time of 1,200 hours per week, Egypt

Qatar-based television network al-Jazeera has increasingly been referred to as the "Arab CNN." The network has one of the world's largest audience bases, with some 45 million subscribers. © AFP/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ranked third in the world among radio broadcasters, The programs were all government controlled, and much of the motivation for the government's investment in radio was due to the aspirations of President Gamal Abdel Nasser to be the recognized leader of the Arab world. Egypt's "Voice of the Arabs" station, which targeted other Arab countries with a constant stream of news and political features and commentaries, became the most widely heard station in the region. Only after the June 1967 war, when it was revealed that this station had misinformed the public about what was happening, did it lose some credibility; nevertheless it retained a sizable listenership.

On the Arabian Peninsula, radio was slower to develop. In Saudi Arabia, radio broadcasts started in the Jidda-Mecca area in 1948, but they did not start in the central or eastern provinces until the 1960s. Neighboring Bahrain had radio by 1955, but Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Oman did not start indigenous radio broadcasting until nearly a quarter century later.

Arab Television Development

As for television, indigenous television broadcasting in the Arab world first began during the late 1950s, in Iraq and Lebanon. Thirteen other Arab countries followed during the 1960s, but it was not until 1975, when North Yemen inaugurated its television station, that all Arab states had television stations.

Before that, some Arab audiences had begun to be exposed to television from foreign sources. In the North African countries of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, where knowledge of the French language was widespread, some of the population was able to watch television broadcast across the Mediterranean from France. In Libya, Arabs living near the U.S. military base at Wheelus were able to watch U.S. television transmitted by the U.S. armed forces, until the

base was shut down after the revolution of 1969. In eastern Saudi Arabia some Arabs were able to watch U.S. TV programs broadcast by the U.S.-run Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) located there.

Audiences

Audiences for Arab radio and television have expanded considerably over the years. All Arab countries have passed the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) minimum standard of fifty radio receivers per thousand population, and nearly all of them have passed the UNESCO minimum standard for television receivers of 100 per thousand population, as shown in the table below (worldbank.org and unesco.org, March 2003; data is for 2000, except 1997 for Oman, UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar).

When compared with other less developed areas of the world, these audience rates are roughly equivalent for radio, and they are substantially higher for television. Because multiple listeners and viewers use each radio and television receiver, it is assumed that radio listening is nearly universal among the almost three hundred million Arabs, and that television reaches more than one hundred million of them.

Ownership and Control

When Arab television developed, it was a government monopoly almost everywhere except in Lebanon. During the 1950s, the Lebanese government gave television licenses to two groups of private businesspeople. During the civil war in the 1970s, several private groups and parties started their own unauthorized television stations, but by the 1990s the government had limited the television companies to four, each more or less representing one of the major Lebanese political-religious groups.

During the 1990s, Arab satellite television broadcasting emerged, and it has become the most powerful of all media instruments in the Arab world. In 1990 and 1991, during the Gulf crisis and Gulf War that resulted from Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, the U.S. satellite broadcaster CNN was very widely watched in the Arab world because it provided news and images of developments in the crisis quickly when everyone was eager to know what was happening. Yet CNN's broadcast was in English, and its reporting and editorial judgments presented from a U.S. point of view, and many Arabs wished they had such a service that presented news and events from an Arab point of view and in Arabic. Also, the cost of satellite dishes was becoming lower and therefore within reach of more people. A few wealthy Arabs therefore decided to invest in the creation of Arab satellite television systems; they were willing to invest large sums and to lose money for the prestige and political influence of the new media.

Electronic media density

	Population in millions	Radios per 1000	TVs per 1000
Algeria	30	244	110
Bahrain	0.7	580	472
Egypt	64	399	189
Iraq	23	222	83
Jordan	4.9	372	84
Kuwait	2.0	624	486
Lebanon	4.3	687	335
Libya	5.3	273	137
Morocco	29	243	166
Oman	2.4	621	563
Qatar	0.6	450	404
Saudi Arabia	20	319	260
Sudan	31	464	273
Syria	16	276	67
Tunisia	10	158	198
U.A.E.	2.9	318	292
Yemen	18	65	283

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

In 1991 Saudi Arabian investors established Middle East Broadcasting (MBC). It was the first private Arab satellite TV station that aimed primarily at a pan-Arab audience. It offered news and entertainment, and soon other investors started to imitate its success. In 1994 two other groups of Saudi investors established two other Arab satellite companies, the Arab Radio and Television Network (ART) and Orbit. MBC, like most of the others, was a free-to-air broadcaster that carried advertising to cover at least part of its costs, but ART and Orbit are fee-based broadcasters that used a coded system accessible only to subscribers. During the next three years, two groups of Lebanese private investors started the satellite stations named Future and Lebanese Broadcasting Company, respectively, and Syrian private investors started Arab News Network. During the same period, the Government of Qatar subsidized the start of a satellite station in

An Iranian reporter broadcasts live during the February 2000 elections. State-run Iranian television was broadcast from twenty-eight stations as of the late 1990s, reaching 4.61 million television sets across the country. In 1997 Iran also launched a satellite channel that covered Europe, parts of Asia, and other regions in the Middle East. © TOUHIG SION/CORBIS SYGMA. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

that country that was nominally private, called al-Jazeera, which became controversial and popular because its programming broke many Arab taboos. Al-Jazeera's discussions and call-in programs frequently include, for example, direct criticism of the policies and specific personalities of several Arab governments, to an extent not heard before in Arab media. In addition, the programs discuss religion and gender in ways rarely dealt with in public.

In the twenty-first century, eight more private satellite television stations have been created, including two owned by Lebanese, three by Egyptians, and one each by Tunisians, Algerians, and Saudis. Meanwhile, most Arab governments got into the act, creating their own satellite television systems alongside their existing terrestrial ones. Even the new satellite companies, although nominally private, tended to operate under some government influence because of legal reasons, financial necessity, and personal connections between owners and government officials.

Palestinian-controlled broadcasting is a special case. For years, Palestinian broadcasters only had access to transmitters outside Palestine and located in other Arab countries, using the government-owned and -controlled transmitters of those countries. During the 1990s, after the Palestinian-Israeli Oslo Accords, radio and television began under the auspices of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and by private individuals. Nevertheless, the PA often restricted the latter, and Israel restricted both.

See also COMMUNICATION.

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WILLIAM A. RUGH

ISRAEL

History of radio and television in Israel.

Broadcasting in Israel has accompanied the gradual weakening of state hegemony, the transition from a "melting pot" philosophy to a multicultural orientation, and the growth of privatization and market control. After its introduction by the British, broadcasting was a full government monopoly for some thirty years. The first radio station, the *Voice of Jerusalem,* went on the air in 1936 under the Palestine Broadcasting Service. Following a traditional British colonial policy of curbing nationalist content while allowing for some carefully monitored cultural expression, the government controlled the news tightly. Other programming was produced by the Jewish and Arab communities.

Renamed *Kol Yisrael* (the voice of Israel) when Israel was established in 1948, radio came under the direct control of the Ministry of the Interior, and later of the Prime Minister's office. Most programming was in Hebrew, some in Arabic and in the languages spoken by new immigrants. For many years, Israel's broadcasting system was monolithic and government-controlled, including *Kol Yisrael* and *Galei Tzahal,* the army station opened in 1950. Direct official control was justified by security challenges and by the need to stabilize the nation and to achieve immigrant acculturation. The government monopoly was abolished in 1965 in response to popular and political criticism and in an effort at satisfying increasing media needs. The Israel Broadcasting Authority (IBA) Law was enacted in the same year, introducing the IBA as a public, nongovernmental body broadcasting in Hebrew and Arabic.

Israel Television became part of the IBA shortly after its establishment in 1968. An educational television service set up in 1966 by the Rothschild Foundation was transferred to the Ministry of Education. Although formally modeled on the BBC, the IBA has never been entirely free from governmental influence. In the 1980s an "open skies" philosophy emerged, producing demands to increase the number of news channels and to upgrade cultural creativity. The broadcasting system underwent remarkable growth: Private cable TV appeared in 1989 and satellite services in 2002, two commercial television channels went on the air in 1992 and 2002, and regional private commercial radio stations started transmissions in 1996.

Media concentration, privatization, and incorporation reduced competition for entrance into and access to the market. Economic interests and government pressures have enhanced media conformism that favors government policies and powerful economic groups. Nevertheless, technological progress helped to empower some "voiceless" groups through a large number of pirate radio stations, such as the now defunct left-wing *Voice of Peace* and right-wing *Channel Seven*; low-powered ultraorthodox religious stations called "holy channels"; pirate radio and cable TV in Russian and Arabic; and an illegal industry of homemade audio- and videocassettes operated by Israeli-Palestinian partnerships. Also activist groups of the elderly, feminists, gays, greens, and others have gained access to community radio and television outlets, and to radio stations in schools and colleges.

Radio and television have always been important components of the political scene. In addition to their use for electoral purposes, they have served both to support the government and to criticize its policies and actions on issues such as war, occupation, peacemaking efforts, economic crises, and social integration.

The procedures that govern press censorship also apply to broadcasting. According to Israeli law, all broadcast materials must be submitted to the military censor, in a fashion similar to press censorship. Adopted from British Mandatory emergency measures, these laws have been adapted to the changing circumstances. Thus, an agreement between the government, the army, and the media provides a list of security-related topics that must be cleared, allowing for only a fraction to be submitted. Foreign correspondents work under strict control, particularly in the occupied territories.

See also NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ISRAEL.

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DOV SHINAR

TURKEY

Outline of Turkish state- and independent-media broadcasting developments.

Radio broadcasting in Turkey began in Istanbul in 1927, when there were roughly 5,000 radios in the country, and a few months later in the same year Ankara Radio began broadcasting. The value of radio as a vehicle for mass mobilization and education was immediately realized by the new Republican authorities, and programming consisted mainly of news bulletins, concerts, weather, and programs such as *Radio Gazete* (Radio Journal), presenting news summaries; *Evin Saati* (Home Hour), a homemaking show; and *Ziraat Takvimi Saati* (Calendar Hour on Agriculture), appreciated in rural areas. In 1942 around 60 percent of programming was musical, another 35 percent consisted of speeches and dis-

cussions, and the number of radios in the country had risen to more than 100,000, or around 4.1 per thousand people, with half concentrated in Ankara and Istanbul.

With multiparty politics in 1946 the Democrat Party came to power in 1950. Frustrated by newspapers' general support for the opposition, it began to pressure the radio to reflect its party views. In the wake of the coup of 1960 regional stations were established in İzmir, Adana, Antalya, Erzurum, Gaziantep, and Kars. With the expansion of radio and demand for television, the state Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) Corporation was established in 1964. In 1969 a radio station was established in Diyarbakir.

Television broadcasting began in 1968, transmitting from Ankara, then from İzmir in 1970 and Istanbul in 1971. Following the coup of 1971 the autonomy of the TRT was curbed, neutralizing its treatment of social and political issues; the 1980 coup temporarily narrowed again the range of discussion on TRT. By 1977 television transmissions reached about 60 percent of the population, and in 1981 selected programs began to be broadcast in color. TRT 2 (culture and art) was established in 1986, and 1989 saw the creation of GAP-TV, directed toward the southeast, and TRT 3. In 1990 the stations began broadcasting via satellite, greatly extending coverage, including TRT-INT for the Turkish population in Europe.

Satellite dishes became popular in the late 1980s for watching "pirate" channels broadcasting from Europe, including Turkish-language ones, and in the early 1990s for watching private stations in Turkey. The wider range and frankness of discussion, as well as the perceived drabness of TRT, combined with agreements to carry soccer matches on the new channels, led to their instant success. In 1993 the government closed all pirate radio and TV stations, to the public's strong objection, and then officially ended its monopoly of TV and radio broadcasting in 1994 and set up a High Council for Radio and Television (RTÜK) to handle licensing and infrastructure, but also to monitor broadcasts and mete out fines and suspensions.

In the late 1990s Turkey launched its own satellites, greatly expanding broadcast areas in Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. According to a 1996 survey, more Turkish households had television sets than had telephones, an indication of how profoundly TV has become a part of social life in the country. TV, and to a lesser extent radio, are now major economic sectors subject to market pressures, and play major roles in the formation of public opinion and popular culture.

See also NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY.

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BRIAN SILVERSTEIN

RAFI PARTY

See ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

RAFSANJANI, ALI AKBAR HASHEMI

[1935–]

President of Iran, 1989–1997.

Born in the southeast Iranian city of Rafsanjan, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani began his religious education at the early age of fourteen in Qom (Qum), where from 1958 onward he was a leading figure among the younger disciples of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. His first arrest for political activities against the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi came in 1964; he succeeded in escaping after undergoing two months of torture. He thereupon joined the ranks of the Allied Islamic Associations, and in January 1965, after the assassination of Prime Minister Hasan Ali Mansur by four members of this organization, he was jailed for four and a half months.

Resuming his clandestine organizational work in Qom, Rafsanjani next was jailed in 1967 for publicly opposing the shah's extravagant coronation ceremonies. In 1973 he was sentenced to eight years in prison on charges of collaboration with the Mojahedin-e Khalq guerrilla organization; he served four years of this sentence.

After the triumph of the Iranian Revolution in February 1979, Rafsanjani was appointed to the Council of Islamic Revolution, and when the government of Mehdi Bazargan resigned in November of that year, he was also appointed acting minister of the interior. A founding member of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), he was elected chairman of Iran's legislature, the Majles al-Shura—which was dominated by that party and its allies—on 20 July 1980. Through the skillful use of this office, he swiftly became one of the most visible and influential politicians in the country, a process that was accelerated when his senior colleagues in the IRP became victims of assassination. Also important in the growth of his popular appeal were the nationally televised sermons he frequently delivered for the Friday prayers at Tehran University. After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini on 3 June 1989, President Ali Khamenehi was elevated to the position of leader *(rahbar)* of the Islamic Republic, and Rafsanjani was elected the next president in August 1989. On 11 June 1993 he was elected to a second term with 63.2 percent of a turnout that represented 57.6 percent of the electorate. Once reputed to favor radical socioeconomic reform, Rafsanjani as president enjoyed the reputation of a pragmatist concerned above all with the reconstruction of the Iranian economy. After the end of his second term as president in 1997, Rafsanjani was appointed as chair of the influential Expediency Council, which has authority to revoke vetoes by the Council of Guardians.

See also Bazargan, Mehdi; Iranian Revolution (1979); Khomeini, Ruhollah; Majles al-Shura; Mojahedin-e Khalq; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza.

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Hamid Algar
Updated by Eric Hooglund

RAHNAVARD, ZAHRA
[c. 1947–]

Iranian artist and writer.

Zahra Rahnavard was born into a religious family in Tehran. After graduating from high school, she attended the Tehran Teachers' College, where she obtained a teaching certificate. In the late 1960s, she met Mir-Hosain Musavi, who opposed the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, as she did, and who shared her Islamic values; they married in 1969. Subsequently, she studied at and obtained a master's degree from Tehran University's department of arts. In the early 1970s, she joined the study circle around the Islamist philosopher Ali Shariʿati. In 1976, After Shariʿati was arrested, Rahnavard fled with her two children to the United States, where she became affiliated with the Confederation of Iranian Students, especially with its Islamist faction. She returned to Iran just before the success of the Iranian Revolution and became one of the influential women promoting the cultural, economic, and political programs of the new Islamic Republic, especially during her husband's tenure as prime minister, from 1981 to 1988.

Rahnavard is the author of a number of publications on art, literature, poetry, religion, and politics. Her writings have been translated into Turkish, Arabic, Urdu, and English. Her essays include "The Uprising of Moses," "The Colonial Motives for the Unveiling of Women," "The Beauty of the Veil, and the Veil of Beauty," and "Women, Islam, and Feminism in Imam Khomeini's Thought." Rahnavard has also held several exhibits of her art. Her large sculpture "Mother" is situated prominently in the middle of a busy Tehran square. In the first decade of the revolution, she used her considerable oratorical skills and her talent as a writer to propagate Islamist values in Iran and abroad. She was a founder of the Women's Society of the Islamic Republic and the Islamist Women's Society and editor of *Rah-i Zaynab,* a popular women's journal. In 1997, Rahnavard joined the reformist camp of President Mohammad Khatami and in 1999 she became president of the influential al-Zahra Women's College in Tehran.

See also Confederation of Iranian Students; Iranian Revolution (1979); Khatami, Mohammad; Musavi, Mir-

Hosain; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Shariʿati, Ali.

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Janet Afary

RAJAVI, MASUD

[1947–]

Leader of the Iranian Mojahedin-e Khalq since 1979.

Masud Rajavi was born in Tabas, in central Khorasan. He completed secondary school in Mashhad and studied political science at Tehran University. Because of his activities with the Mojahedin-e Khalq, he was arrested in 1971 and condemned to death, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He remained in jail until the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Following the revolution, Rajavi rebuilt the Mojahedin, attracting hundreds of thousands of supporters. Since a 1981 government crackdown, Rajavi has led the Mojahedin from exile. In 1985 he married Maryam Azodanlou, who took on Rajavi's family name. Maryam Rajavi was declared not only the co-leader of the Mojahedin but also the future president of Iran.

See also Iranian Revolution (1979); Mojahedin-e Khalq.

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Ervand Abrahamian

RAJUB, JIBRIL

[1953–]

Palestinian activist and senior security official in the Palestinian Authority.

Born in the West Bank village of Dura, Jibril Rajub joined al-Fatah as a youth. Imprisoned by Israel soon thereafter in 1968, he was released in a 1985 Israeli-Palestinian prisoner exchange. He had become one of al-Fatah's most senior figures in the West Bank when Israel deported him during the first intifada. In Tunis he served as an advisor to Palestine Liberation Organization chair Yasir Arafat, and helped to coordinate the first intifada as deputy to al-Fatah security chief Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad).

With the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, Rajub returned from exile to head the Preventative Security Forces (PSF) in the West Bank. Along with Gaza PSF chief Muhammad Dahlan, Rajub was one of the two most important security officials in the PA. He eventually ran afoul of Arafat, who dismissed him in April 2002. As part of the feud between Arafat and PA prime minister Mahmud Abbas in the summer of 2003, Arafat mended fences with Rajub and appointed him as his national security adviser, pitting him against his rival Dahlan, Abbas's minister of state for security affairs.

See also Abbas, Mahmud; Arafat, Yasir; Dahlan, Muhammad; Fatah, al-; Intifada (1987–1991); Palestinian Authority; Wazir, Khalil al-; West Bank.

Michael R. Fischbach

RAMADAN, TAHA YASIN

[1938–]

Iraqi politician.

Taha Yasin Ramadan, also known as Taha al-Jazrawi, was born in Mosul to a working-class Arabized Kurdish family. In 1959 he was dismissed from the army by the regime of Abd al-Karim Qasim, because of his leanings toward the Baʿth party. In 1966, he became a member of the Baʿth party's regional (Iraqi) leadership, and after the Baʿthist takeover in 1968, he supervised the purging of the army. Starting in 1969, Ramadan became a member of the Revolutionary Command Council and, starting in 1972, he commanded the Baʿthist militia. He was one of the ideological hard-liners among Saddam Hussein's entourage, always toeing Hussein's line. Between 1979 and 1991 he was first deputy prime minister, following which he was appointed vice president. Ramadan emerged from the Gulf Crisis of 1990 and 1991 as one of the most powerful individuals in Iraq outside of Hussein's own family, with his power base resting in the city of Mosul and in the party apparatus.

Following the U.S. occupation of Iraq starting in March 2003, Ramadan became a wanted figure. He was eventually captured in Mosul by Kurdish forces in August 2003, whereupon he was handed over to the U.S. forces.

See also BAʿTH, AL-; GULF CRISIS (1990–1991); HUSSEIN, SADDAM.

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AMATZIA BARAM
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

RAMALLAH

Palestinian city in the West Bank.

Located about 6.5 miles north of Jerusalem on the western side of the Nablus–Jerusalem road, Ramallah was an important urban center under the British Mandate. After Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950, Ramallah became part of the Jerusalem governorate. In the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, Ramallah was occupied by Israel. It was the site of many clashes between Israel's military authorities and Palestinians between June 1967 and December 1995, when Israel withdrew and the Palestinian Authority (PA) assumed control. The city underwent an economic boom during the mid-1990s when the PA established the town, unofficially, as its main West Bank administrative center. Many PA offices were built, as well as villas for returning emigres.

Ramallah was occupied by the Israelis several times after the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada in late 2000. It is noteworthy among Palestinian towns for its strong educational and professional heritage. U.S. Quakers established a girls' school in Ramallah in 1889, and nearby Bir Zeit University is one of the best Palestinian universities in the West Bank. In the last official census of 1997, the city's population stood at 17,851.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967); BIR ZEIT UNIVERSITY; PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY; WEST BANK.

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LAWRENCE TAL
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

RAMGAVAR AZADAGAN PARTY

Armenian political party of Lebanon.

The ultimate goal of the Ramgavar Azadagan party, founded in 1921, was the liberation of Armenia. It has oriented its activities toward preserving Armenian culture among Armenian communities throughout the world. After a period of dormancy, the party was revived in the 1950s, in the wake of the increasing conflicts between the Dashnak party and the Hunchak Party. The Ramgavar party presented itself as an alternative that avoided issues divisive to the Armenian community. During the Lebanese civil war of 1975, the Ramgavar party opposed what it considered to be the right-wing policies of the Dashnak party.

See also DASHNAK PARTY; HUNCHAK PARTY.

ASʿAD ABUKHALIL

RAMLA

Also called Er Ramleh; a town in Israel 12 miles southeast of Tel Aviv.

Ramla was founded in 717 C.E. to replace nearby Lydda as the region's capital under the Arab caliphate. It soon outstripped its neighbor in size and prosperity, thriving on trade and industry, particularly soap and olive oil. More than three-quarters of Ramla's 1946 population of 16,380 were Palestinian. In the 1948 Arab–Israel War, Israeli troops occupied the area and forced the evacuation of thousands of the town's Palestinian residents. The town grew again after the war with the arrival of Jewish immigrants. As of 1994, its population of 62,000 included fewer than 12,000 Arabs (similar to the nationwide balance between the two populations), half of whom lived in mixed neighborhoods and the other half in two rundown all-Arab sections. In 1993 Yoel Lavi, the newly elected mayor from the right-wing Likud Party and a son of Holocaust survivors, undertook a program to improve the

educational opportunities available to the town's Arab children, in cooperation with several Israeli-Arab town councilors.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Likud.

Elizabeth Thompson
Updated by Yehuda Gradus

RAMSES COLLEGE FOR GIRLS

An Egyptian school for girls from kindergarten through twelfth grade.

Ramses College for Girls (founded as the American College for Girls), located at Ramses Square in Cairo, Egypt, originated as a trilingual (English, Arabic, and French) missionary school of the United Presbyterian Church of North America. Founded by Ella Kyle, its first building was inaugurated in 1910 by former U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt. The student body included girls of various ethnicities—Armenian, Greek, Jewish, Abyssinian (Ethiopian), Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese, as well as girls from the Gulf states—many of whom attended as boarders. Dr. Helen T. Martin served as principal from 1923 to 1956. In 1960, with the nationalization of private schooling, its ownership was transferred to the Evangelical Synod of the Nile, an Egyptian Protestant organization. The school's cosmopolitan community gradually dwindled until it became entirely Egyptian. In 1967, following the Arab–Israel War and subsequent strained relations with the United States, the school's name was changed to Ramses College for Girls. From 1967 to 1992 the school's principal was Reda Salama of the legendary Salama sisters (her sister Mary was principal of Port Said School), who established an Institute of Secretarial Studies and a Department for Girls with Special Needs. The school's graduates include leading figures in social development, aviation, diplomacy, government, and education, such as Aziza Hussein, Lutfia Nady, Aida Guindi, and Nawal al-Tatawi. By 2003, more than two thousand girls were enrolled in the school.

Linda Herrera

RANIA AL-ABDULLAH (QUEEN RANIA)

[1970–]

Queen of Jordan and wife of King Abdullah II ibn Hussein.

Rania al-Abdullah became queen of Jordan in 1999, following the succession in the Jordanian Hashimite monarchy from her father-in-law, King Hussein ibn Talal, to her husband, Abdullah II ibn Hussein. Abdullah was the eldest son of Hussein, who had served as Jordan's monarch since 1953.

Born Rania al-Yasin, Queen Rania grew up in Kuwait in a well-known and well-to-do Palestinian family. She was educated in Kuwait and then went to Egypt to attend university, graduating in 1991 with a bachelor's degree in business administration from the American University in Cairo. She married then-Prince Abdullah in 1993. For some Jordanians, their Jordanian-Palestinian marriage symbolized hope for greater unity and opportunity for both groups within Jordanian society.

Since joining the Hashimite royal family, Rania has used her position to patronize causes of particular interest to her, including support for emerging small businesses. She shares with her husband an interest in economic development, in particular with developing information technology in the kingdom. She has also patronized programs supporting tourism and historic preservation. Her greatest interest, however, is supporting programs protecting women and children from domestic violence. She joined the campaign to prevent "honor crimes," or killings of women by male family members who suspect them of committing adultery or otherwise compromising "family honor." Queen Rania has called for the repeal of laws allowing leniency in sentencing the offenders. Her public role in Jordanian domestic politics and foreign relations steadily increased after she became queen in 1999. She serves on numerous boards and committees dedicated to supporting women, children, and family life, and her role in public life extends beyond Jordan. In 2002 she became a member of the board of the powerful World Economic Forum, the only board member from an Arab country. In 2003 and 2004, she served as president of the Arab Women's Summit, a forum of Arab first ladies, activists, and other professionals.

See also Abdullah II ibn Hussein; Jordan.

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Curtis R. Ryan

RASAFI, MAʿRUF AL-

[1875–1945]

Most prominent poet in Iraq between the world wars.

Maʿruf al-Rasafi was born in Baghdad into a family of Kurdish origin, and studied at the Rashidiyya school there. His knowledge of classical Arabic sources enabled him to teach Arabic language and literature in higher institutes of learning in Baghdad, Jerusalem, and Constantinople (now Istanbul). He represented Baghdad in the Chamber of Deputies in Constantinople, and after the establishment of the kingdom of Iraq, he was elected to parliament.

Although his poetry was composed in a classical language, Rasafi was regarded as a voice of the people who fearlessly attacked Iraq's social and political maladies.

A first edition of Rasafi's *Diwan* was published in Beirut in 1910. Subsequent editions in his lifetime appeared in 1925 in Cairo and in 1931 in Beirut. A five-volume annotated edition was published in Baghdad in 1986.

Rasafi published works on Arabic language and literature, including an important study on the modern dialect of Baghdad (serialized in al-Karmali's *Lughat al-Arab* in 1926–1928).

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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SASSON SOMEKH

RA'S AL-KHAYMA

Northernmost of the United Arab Emirates.

Raʾs al-Khayma's two separate territories cover some 650 square miles and have coastlines on both the Persian (Arabian) Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The emirate has greater topographical diversity than the other emirates, and its slightly greater rainfall makes significant agriculture possible. Raʾs al-Khayma has the largest oil and natural gas reserves of the small emirates north of Sharjah (the Northern Emirates). In addition, it utilizes the mineral resources of the Hajjar Mountains, exporting aggregate stones and producing cement, asphalt, and lime. Fishing is also important for the emirate's economy.

According to a 1997 estimate the emirate had 153,000 inhabitants, most of whom lived in the capital city of the same name. Nearly 90 percent of the population is indigenous.

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Raʾs al-Khayma's Qasimi rulers held sway along the shores of the lower Persian (Arabian) Gulf and the northern Indian Ocean until attacks on British shipping to India elicited a massive British campaign that resulted in the almost total destruction of the tribe's capital and fleet. The Qasimi rulers never regained formal power; this has given rise to resentment in modern times over the preeminence of the ruler of Abu Dhabi.

Upon its independence in 1971, Raʾs al-Khayma's ruler, Shaykh Saqr ibn Muhammad, angered by his state's limited political role in the new federation and expecting imminent discovery of oil in his territory, remained outside the U.A.E. federation for six weeks after its formation on 2 December 1971. (Modest oil deposits were not discovered until 1983.) At the same time, Iran seized the Tunb Islands from Raʾs al-Khayma, and it continues to occupy them, a circumstance that contributes to current strains between Iran and Persian (Arabian) Gulf Arab states.

See also QASIMI FAMILY OF RAS AL-KHAYMA, AL-; TUNB ISLANDS; UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.

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MALCOLM C. PECK
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL DÉMOCRATIQUE (RND)

Political party of Algerian president Liamine Zeroual.

The Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND) was created on February 1997, a few months before the June legislative elections. It received its official approval on April 1997. Called the "political party of President Zeroual," it is also the party of the Algerian administration. Since its creation, it has been directed by three men: Abdelkader Bensalah, former member of the National Council of Transition; Tahar Benbaibèche, former leader of the Organization of Martyrs' children; and Ahmed Ouyahia, the current prime minister and former minister of justice. According to analysts and diplomats in Algeria, the RND was founded by some defectors from the FLN (the National Liberation Front, once Algeria's sole party) who were opposed to its willingness to enter into a dialogue with Islamists. It was created as a vehicle to support President Zeroual's policies, to win the 1997 elections, and to punish the FLN for its involvement, two years before, in the Sant Egidio agreement.

In the legislative elections of June 1997, which were tarnished by massive irregularities, the RND arrived at the head of the list with 155 elected deputies (46.5% of the vote), gaining 80 seats of the 96 in the upper house. During the provincial and municipal elections of October 1997, it won 896 seats (of 1,779 seats) in the Provincial Popular Assembly (APW) and more than the half of 13,126 seats in the communal assemblies.

In the 2002 legislative elections the FLN won 199 seats at the National Popular Assembly (APN) and the RND lost its majority at all levels.

See also SANT EGIDIO PLATFORM.

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AZZEDINE G. MANSOUR

RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL DES INDÉPENDANTS (RNI)

Parliamentary grouping of independent supporters of Morocco's monarchy.

The Rassemblement National des Indépendants (RNI), founded in October 1978, projected a centrist liberal image representing landowners, senior civil servants, technocrats, industrialists, and businessmen, many from old established families. Initially, it held 141 seats in parliament, making it the largest single group there. It was led by King Hassan II's brother-in-law, Ahmed Osman (prime minister 1972–1979), and the king's cousin, Ahmed Alawi. In 1981 a breakaway group led by former trade union leader and labor minister Muhammad Arslane Jadidi and Abdel Hamid Kacemi, representing a group of rural landholding notables, formed the Parti des Indépendants Démocrates, later renamed the Parti National Démocratique (PND). Following the 1981 government reshuffle, the RNI was left out of the government in order to create a "loyal opposition." In the 1984 parliamentary elections the RNI lost 80 seats and was replaced by the newly formed Union Constitutionelle (UC) as the single largest party in parliament, although it subsequently was part of the governing coalition, and Osman was named speaker of parliament. In 1993 the party refrained from affiliating with the pro-palace Entente bloc, preferring to run alone in parliamentary elections. It suffered a further loss of 20 seats in the 1993 parliamentary elections and was left out of the newly formed government of technocrats. In 1997 it won 46 seats and joined the government led by the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) as a junior partner with six cabinet posts. In the 2002 elections it won 41 seats and again received six cabinet posts in the new government headed by the nonparty king's loyalist Driss Jettou.

See also MOROCCO: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; PARTI NATIONAL DÉMOCRATIQUE (PND);

Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP).

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

RASSEMBLEMENT POUR LA CULTURE ET LA DÉMOCRATIE (RCD)

The unique secular party in Algeria.

The Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD) was born from a split within the FFS (Socialist Forces Front), the traditional Kabyle political party headed by Hocine Aït Ahmed. This secular party was created in February 1989 during a meeting of the Amazigh Cultural Movement. Its aims include political pluralism, the abolition of the Family Code of 1984 that limits women's freedom, an official redefinition of the Algerian identity in its triple dimension (Amazigh, Arabic, and Muslim), social justice, modernization of the Algerian economy to include free enterprise, and the separation of politics from religion. Opposed to the country's forced Arabization, it also considers the use of the French language in Algeria a matter of cultural enrichment.

During the municipal elections of June 1990, the RCD won only 87 communes, mainly in Kabylia (as compared to the 900 won by the FIS). During the first round of legislative elections held in December 1991, it did not win a single Islamist seat in the Popular National Assembly (APN, the Algerian parliament). With the overwhelming FIS victory, Saïd Sadi, head of the RCD, supported the interruption of the electoral process that drove the country into civil war. A strong supporter of "eradication" policy, the RCD preferred to see the Algerian army rule Algeria rather than the Islamists. It organized resistance to Islamists in Kabylia and called for the formation of defensive groups against terrorism.

The RCD participated in the 1995 and subsequent elections and took part in different coalition governments. In the summer of 2000, however, it pulled out of the government in protest against the regime's policies toward the Kabyles. It boycotted the 2002 legislative elections.

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Azzedine G. Mansour

RATEB, AISHA

[1928–]

Egyptian diplomat, lawyer, and law professor.

Aisha Rateb (also A'isha Ratib) was educated in Cairo and Paris. At twenty-one, she applied for a position as judge on Egypt's highest administrative court, the State Council. After being rejected, she sued the government. One of its members later filed an opinion confirming that Egyptian law—and Islamic jurisprudence—did not prevent women from serving in the judiciary. The judge concluded the problem was societal. Rateb's struggle was supported by the media, the people, and by feminist leader Huda al-Shaʿrawi.

Rateb was the first professor of international law at Cairo University, and in 1971 she was the second woman to hold the post of minister of social affairs, where she remained until 1977. She was the first person responsible for two ministries—in her case, social insurance and social affairs. In 1978 she became the Egyptian minister of foreign affairs. She was the first Egyptian woman to be appointed ambassador for Egypt, serving in Denmark from 1979 to 1981 and in Germany from 1981 to 1984. Despite Egypt's history of women's participation in civil society since the turn of the twentieth century, it has been slow to open the doors of its judiciary to women. Rateb's efforts have helped to open this door to other women. Egypt appointed its first female judge to the Supreme Constitutional Court, Tahani al-Gebali (al-Jabali), in January 2003.

See also Egypt; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Shaʿrawi, Huda al-.

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MARIA F. CURTIS

RATEBZAD, ANAHITA

[1930–]

First Afghan female physician; Marxist politician.

Anahita Ratebzad was deputy head of state in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government from 1980 to 1986. She was the first Afghan woman to play an active role in government and one of the few Afghan women to become a medical doctor. Born in Guldara in Kabul province, Anahita Ratebzad attended the Malalai Lycée in Kabul. She received a degree in nursing from the Chicago School of Nursing and an M.D. degree from Kabul University. She became involved in leftist politics and was elected to parliament in 1965. A founder of the PDPA, she was active in the Parcham wing of that party. She served as ambassador to Belgrade (1978–1980), minister of social affairs (1978–1979), and minister of education (1979–1980). In 1986 President Najibullah replaced the Parcham government and Ratebzad fled to Moscow with her companion Babrak Karmal. They returned to Kabul in 1989, but were forced to flee to Moscow again in 1992 when the Najibullah government fell. After the fall of the Taliban government in 2001, they did not return to Kabul.

See also PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN.

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GRANT FARR

RATOSH, YONATAN

[1908–1981]

Hebrew-language poet and journalist.

Born in Russia as Uriel Halperin, Yonatan Ratosh was raised in a completely Hebrew-speaking environment. In 1921, he moved to Palestine, where he worked as a journalist for *Haaretz* and *ha-Yarden* and where he also wrote many books of poetry.

Ratosh is known for his belief in the existence of a Hebrew people who are distinguishable from the people living in Israel and from the people of many different cultures who follow the Jewish religion. According to his belief, the distinctive Hebrew people, who are the descendants of the Canaanite nation, developed a new national identity based on Hebrew culture.

See also LITERATURE: HEBREW; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ISRAEL.

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BRYAN DAVES

RAUF EZZAT, HEBA

[1965–]

Egyptian political scientist and Islamic thinker and activist.

Heba Rauf Ezzat (also Hiba Raʾuf Izzat) was educated in German Catholic schools and is at the point of receiving a Ph.D. in political science from Cairo University. Rauf has become a prominent spokesperson on gender issues in Egypt and on the Internet. From 1992 to 1997 she wrote a weekly column, "Women's Voice," for *al-Shaʿb,* the Islamist-leaning newspaper of the Egyptian Labor Party. She supports change from within to counter what she sees as secularization of the (Muslim) family. Conceptualizing the Muslim family as outside of history, she criticizes Western feminists for analyzing it within the framework of the rise of bourgeois and patriarchal social structures. Yet she gives more centrality to gender than do many Islamic activists, such as her mentors,

Zaynab al-Ghazali and Safinaz Kazim. Arguing from central texts of Islamic jurisprudence, she finds strong precedent for women's participation as leaders in public life as long as they are Islamically qualified. Although knowledgeable about Western political philosophy, in her polemics Rauf nevertheless expresses common misperceptions about European and American society. She tends to support monolithic notions of "Islamic" and "Western" societies as inevitably dichotomized. She rejects the label of "feminist" and sees feminism as a diversionary and unnecessary practice, irrelevant to those who work within an Islamic framework.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; GHAZALI, ZAYNAB AL-; *SHARIʿA*.

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MARILYN BOOTH

RAVIKOVITCH, DAHLIA
[1936–]

Israeli poet.

Dahlia Ravikovitch was born near Tel Aviv. Her father was killed by a drunken driver when she was six, a trauma that she describes in her collection of autobiographical stories, *Death in the Family* (1976), and that reappears in various guises throughout her work. Raised on a kibbutz and in Haifa, she studied at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and in England, and then worked as a teacher and as a journalist. The author of eight volumes of poetry and the recipient of several awards, among them the prestigious Israel Prize for Literature (1998), Ravikovitch also has published short stories, children's books, and Hebrew translations of English poetry.

Ravikovitch's poems are predominantly personal and written in high diction, finicky form, and idiosyncratic vocabulary, at times mythological or archaic. These properties merge, in her highly charged poems, with simple, almost childlike syntax, tone, and point of view, creating a unique simultaneity of dreamlike beauty and lurking danger, a perfect aesthetic expression of struggle. This tension is dominant in *A Love of an Orange,* Ravikovitch's first collection (1959), and is recognizable in works such as *The Third Book* (1969). Later volumes manifest a tendency toward simpler expression.

During the 1980s, the war in Lebanon sparked a poetic-political protest in which Ravikovitch took part. The voice of her poetry identifies with the vulnerable and speaks frequently of the feminine condition. Her retrospective collection, *The Complete Poems So Far* (1995), confirms her status as one of Israel's leading poets and its foremost woman poet.

See also LITERATURE: HEBREW.

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NILI GOLD
UPDATED BY ZAFRIRA LIDOVSKY COHEN

REAGAN PLAN (1982)

Plan for Arab–Israeli peace.

On 1 September 1982, U.S. president Ronald Reagan issued a policy statement in the wake of Israel's June 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the successful expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its estimated 15,000 fighters from that country, following extensive mediation by U.S. special envoy Philip Habib. In his speech Reagan expressed satisfaction that Lebanon's troubles were over and turned his attention to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Citing the Camp David Accords as its basis, the Reagan plan called for Arab recogni-

tion of Israel and negotiations over control of an undivided Jerusalem. The plan ruled out Israeli sovereignty or permanent control of the West Bank and Gaza, as well as an independent Palestinian state, favoring instead a confederation between Jordan and the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin rejected the plan and reiterated Israel's claim to the West Bank; Arab leaders were less categorical but hardly enthusiastic. The assassination of Lebanese president-elect Bashir Jumayyil two weeks later, the massacre of Palestinian civilians at Sabra and Shatila, the hasty return of U.S. Marines to Beirut, and an ongoing deterioration of the Lebanese situation refocused U.S. attention on Lebanon, however, and the Reagan Plan for Palestinian-Israeli peace fell by the wayside.

See also CAMP DAVID ACCORDS (1978); HABIB, PHILIP CHARLES; REAGAN, RONALD; SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRES.

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LAURA ZITTRAIN EISENBERG

REAGAN, RONALD

[1911–]

President of the United States, 1981–1989.

Born in Illinois, Reagan graduated from Eureka College. Beginning in 1937, he was a film and television actor in Hollywood. Reagan entered politics in 1966 when he was elected governor of California; he was reelected in 1970. He later served two terms as president of the United States, surviving a gunshot wound he received during an assassination attempt in March 1981.

Reagan's two terms in office saw him grappling with some important issues in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and engaging in policies that would affect future American involvement in the region tremendously. The most openly pro-Israeli U.S. president to that time, he announced a plan for Arab-Israeli peace on 1 September 1982, following Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the evacuation of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces from Beirut. The Reagan Plan called for establishment of Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in association with Jordan, on the basis of the Camp David Accords of 1978. Israel rejected the Reagan Plan, and the Arab states announced their own proposal, the Fez Plan, several days later. Reagan also ordered U.S. forces to Lebanon from 1982 to 1983, both to supervise the PLO withdrawal and to bolster the Lebanese government. In 1983, bombings destroyed both the U.S. embassy and the U.S. marine barracks in Beirut, leading to the ignominious withdrawal of American forces. Reagan was also plagued by the long captivity of several American hostages in Lebanon. As with the bombings, Hizbullah is generally considered to have been behind the kidnappings. The circuitous exchange of arms to Iran, via Israel, in return for the release of the hostages, led Reagan into the worst scandal of his presidency.

Reagan was also president during the bulk of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1988). His administration provided massive support to Islamic guerrillas fighting the Soviets, laying the basis for the country to become a haven for Islamic militants worldwide. Finally, his government's support for Iraq and Saddam Hussein during the long Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988) helped stem a possible Iranian victory and bolster Saddam to face the U.S. in later years.

See also CAMP DAVID ACCORDS (1978); GAZA (CITY); HIZBULLAH; HUSSEIN, SADDAM; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); WEST BANK.

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

REʿAYA

See GLOSSARY

RECAIZADE MAHMUD EKREM
[c. 1846–c. 1913]

Ottoman Turkish poet and literary reformer.

Mahmud Ekrem Recaizade was born in Istanbul during the Ottoman Empire and enrolled in the military academy. He later transferred to the Civil Service School where he met and became a disciple of Namik Kemal. He worked for many years as Kemal's assistant on the newspaper *Tasvir-i Efkar;* in 1867, after Kemal's flight to Paris, Recaizade became chief editor of the newspaper.

Recaizade was a member of the second generation of Tanzimat writers who created the New Literature school, which sought literary inspiration in everyday life. Recaizade also contributed to the *Servet-i Fünun* (Wealth of sciences) movement, which focused on the problems of the individual under the oppressive regime of Sultan Abdülhamit II. He is considered a transitional figure between the romanticism of Namik Kemal and the realism of Ömer Sayfettin. In addition to his poetry, his novels, and his plays, he published theoretical studies of literature that criticized traditional forms of artistic expression and created an environment for greater artistic experimentation.

See also NAMIK KEMAL.

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DAVID WALDNER

RED CRESCENT SOCIETY

Name of the International Red Cross in Muslim countries.

A humanitarian organization that maintains neutrality, the International Red Cross was established in 1864 at the behest of Jean-Henri Dunant, a Swiss citizen who had organized emergency medical aid for French and Austrian victims at the Battle of Solferino in 1859. In 1876, Ottoman officials requested that a red crescent, instead of a red cross, be used to mark their ambulances. The symbol, later accepted by other Muslim nations, was formally accepted by the society in 1929.

The Red Crescent Society is part of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. National societies have traditionally concentrated on natural disasters, while the International Committee of the Red Cross has concentrated on situations of conflict and warfare. Red Crescent societies have made an important contribution to the international organization, developing policies that are inclusive of non-Western traditions.

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VANESA CASANOVA-FERNANDEZ

RED LINE AGREEMENT

Part of the post–World War I reorganization of the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) as the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC).

TPC was formed in 1914, shortly before the outbreak of World War I. Fifty percent of TPC was owned by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later British Petroleum). A 5 percent beneficial interest was owned by the Armenian entrepreneur Calouste Gülbenkian, who had put together the TPC consortium. The remainder was split between the Deutsche Bank and a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell. The original TPC agreement included a clause pledging the principals to refrain from seeking additional concessions in the Ottoman Empire except through TPC.

At the San Remo Conference in 1919, the German share of TPC was transferred to France. The Americans, also victors in the war, demanded a share as part of their spoils and accepted 20 percent in 1922 (later enlarged to 23.7 percent). However, this

did not end the disputes impeding the company's reorganization. Gülbenkian insisted that the "self-denying clause" be retained in any new agreement. The French, with their 23.7 percent share, supported Gülbenkian; the other participants did not.

The final agreement establishing IPC was signed in July 1928 at Ostend, Belgium. It included the self-denying clause. However, the principals declared themselves unsure of the actual boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. Legend has it that Gülbenkian, then and there, took a red pencil and drew a line around what he meant by "Ottoman Empire"—the Red Line. With the exception of Kuwait and Iran, the Red Line encompassed most of what would become the great oil-producing areas of the region.

The Red Line, along with the As-Is Agreement, shaped the structure of foreign ownership and the tempo of development of Middle Eastern oil. For example, Gulf Oil (now owned by Chevron), an original party to the IPC agreement (it later dropped out), became an active contender for a share of the Kuwait concession, in part because its participation in IPC prevented it from seeking promising concessions elsewhere in the Gulf. Gulf's success in winning a share thwarted expectations that Anglo-Persian (APOC) would be able to monopolize Kuwait, then a British protectorate. The Red Line prevented APOC and the U.S. partners in IPC, chiefly Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon) and Standard Oil of New York (now Mobil), from seeking concessions in Saudi Arabia. The rich fields in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia were discovered by Casoc, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of California (now Chevron). Texaco purchased half of Casoc in 1936. Neither was a Red Line company.

The need for additional capital to develop the oil fields of Saudi Arabia led to the end of the Red Line. Once again, a world war provided the opportunity to reorganize oil concessions in the Middle East. After the Germans occupied France in 1940, the IPC holdings of Gülbenkian and the French were sequestered under British law. The IPC board in London was notified that the IPC agreement might have been invalidated by having become a contract with an enemy power. The IPC principals chose not to pursue this possibility during the war, but afterward, Standard of New Jersey's legal counsel brought the issue before U.S. officials, who joined the corporation in pressing for a revision of the IPC agreement to eliminate the self-denying clause. The successful conclusion of these maneuvers in 1947 ended the Red Line and allowed Standard of New Jersey and of New York to take shares in ARAMCO while retaining their shares in IPC.

See also AS-IS AGREEMENT; GÜLBENKIAN, CALOUSTE; ROYAL DUTCH SHELL.

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MARY ANN TÉTREAULT

REFAH PARTISI

Main Islamic-oriented political party in Turkey, 1984–1998.

The emergence of pro-Islamic parties in Turkey can be traced back to 1969, when a group of dissident parliamentarians in the Justice Party attempted to establish a new party focusing on their program called Milli Gorus (National Vision).

The National Order Party (NOP) was set up in January 1970 under the leadership of Necmeddin Erbakan, a mechanical engineer, former university professor, and former president of the Turkish Industry Chambers Union. The major aim of the party was to strengthen national industry and to restore Islamic teaching and morality. Following a military memorandum in 1971, the Constitutional Court investigated the party's antisecular program and closed it in 1972, and Erbakan left for Switzerland. At the end of the same year, a new party, the National Salvation Party (NSP) was founded by lawyer Süleyman Arif Emre.

The NSP, which Erbakan assumed leadership of, participated in several coalition goverments between 1974 and 1980, when a military coup led to the banning of all political parties. After the reopening of political life in 1983, the third pro-Islamic party, Refah Partisi (RP), was established in March 1984 under the leadership of Ahmet Tekdal. Following a referendum the same year, the restitution of polit-

ical rights to party leaders was accepted. This encouraged Erbakan, who once more assumed the leadership of RP. RP took positions against multinational corporations and European Union membership. The empowering factors were the new urban groups, Muslim intellectuals, and grass roots organizations in the large cities. The party targeted distinct social groups such as youth, women, workers, civil servants, professional cadres, retired persons, and disabled people. The Ladies Commission brought dynamism to the party. The intense activism that took place within the elaborate RP structure was carried out predominantly by religiously mobilized, very dedicated, industrious women. The female party members constantly stressed that they worked "for God's sake," meaning that they did not expect any rewards such as elective or appointive offices in return. In the rural areas of central and southeast Turkey the party included peripheral forces of local merchants and manufacturers, a majority of whom were practicing Muslims and Turkish nationalists. The party succeeded in obtaining the support of Kurds, who seemed to be searching for a political organization that was not part of the political establishment. RP opted to highlight Islamic solidarity more than ethnic or class distinction. RP's transnational character was crucial in securing financial contributions to the party. The large network of migrant associations in Germany supportive of the "National Vision" contributed large membership donations.

The municipal elections of March 1994, the national elections of 1995, and the local elections of June 1996 in which the RP took 33.5 percent of the vote, secured the mayorship of metropolitan cities such as Ankara and Istanbul, as well as the leadership of twenty-two provinces. Erbakan became prime minister in 1996. However, his controversial visits to Libya, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Iran led the military to exert pressure for the resignation of the RP coalition government in June 1997. The Constitutional Court banned the party in February 1998 on grounds of antisecular policies.

The RP leadership immediately established a new party, the Virtue Party (VP), under the leadership of Erbakan's closest collaborator, Recai Kutan. All the deputies of the dissolved RP joined the VP. The new party participated in the 1999 general elections but lost its previous leading position. With 21.3 percent of the general vote and 111 seats out of 550 in the parliament, it became the main opposition party. The Constitutional Court ruled that the VP was solely a continuation of the RP and dissolved it in June 2001.

Subsequently, the conservative wing of the dissolved VP founded the Felicity Party (FP) under the leadership of Recai Kutan. Claiming to be the only representative of the National Vision, the FP received only 2.49 percent of the vote in the general elections of 2002.

Following the dissolution of the Virtue Party, the reformist wing founded under the leadership of the former mayor of Istanbul, Tayyip Erdoğan, the Justice and Development Party (JDP). Although a novice among the competing eighteen parties, the JDP received 34.6 percent of the general vote and 363 seats in parliament. The JDP denied being an Islamist party and used moderate, rather than secular, discourse during the electoral campaign. The JDP does not emphasize the primacy of culture, as did the RP and VP; instead, it claims to represent the true essence and will of society and defines itself as a democratic conservative party.

See also Erbakan, Necmeddin; Milli Görüş Hareketi; National Salvation Party.

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Nermin Abadan-Unat

REFUGEES

This entry consists of the following articles:

Afghan
Balkan Muslim
Jewish
Kurdish
Palestinian

Afghan

Afghans who fled civil war in their country during the 1980s and 1990s.

The flight of refugees from Afghanistan began in 1978, driven by internal conflict caused by the takeover of Afghanistan by the Marxist-Leninist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and later by the Soviet invasion in December 1979. By the early 1980s, a large-scale resistance war was being waged and more than six million refugees had fled Afghanistan, most settling in the neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran, but many thousands also fleeing to India, Turkey, the United States, and Western Europe.

The Afghan refugees referred to themselves as *muhajarin,* from the Arabic root *hijra,* referring to the flight of the prophet Mohammed from Mecca to Medina, thus giving the refugees a religious status. Afghan refugee camps were established in Pakistan and Iran, assisted by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and other world relief agencies. Areas of Pakistan near the Afghan border, especially the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan, became crowded with Afghan refugees, creating local hostility among the Pakistanis. In Pakistan, most of the refugees were ethnic Pushtun from the southeastern provinces of Afghanistan, although some Persian-speaking refugees, especially Hazara, fled from central Afghanistan to the area around Quetta in Baluchistan. Most of the two million Afghan refugees who fled to Iran were Persian speakers from the western provinces of Afghanistan. These large refugee camps became centers of political activity and recruiting grounds for young men to fight in the Islamic insurgencies in Afghanistan.

Attempts at large-scale refugee repatriations occurred several times, beginning in 1992, only to be halted by renewed instability and the outflow of even more refugees. The first repatriation attempt occurred in 1992, after the mojahedin succeeded in ousting the Soviet-supported government in Kabul. (The Soviet Union had withdrawn its troops in 1990). More than 1.4 million refugees were repatriated in 1992 and 1993. However, the mojahedin, which was split into several antagonistic groups, was unable to develop a viable government, leading to internecine warfare and increased instability in Afghanistan. As a result, hundreds of thousands of refugees again fled Afghanistan in the mid-1990s.

In the midst of this chaos, the Taliban, a religious movement from the Kandahar region, gained control of most of Afghanistan. The Taliban government's strict Islamic codes, human-rights abuses, and bias against non-Pushtuns led to a steady refugee flight throughout the 1990s.

In addition to the political and economic instability in Afghanistan during the 1990s, Afghanistan also experienced a severe drought beginning in 2000, which created harsh conditions for millions of Afghans. In the year 2000 alone, over 172,000 Afghans fled to Pakistan because of the drought conditions or the political instability. Hundreds of thousands were displaced internally.

After the events of 11 September 2001, coalition forces began bombing the Taliban government in Kabul, and by November 2001 an interim government headed by Hamid Karzai had replaced it. Although this presented opportunities for refugees to repatriate, the immediate consequence of the allied bombing and the change in government was an increase in refugees. Even though Pakistan had closed its borders, over 160,000 Afghans crossed into Pakistan between 11 September 2001 and the end of the year. At the same time—the fall of 2001—the Iranian government, fearing a large exodus of Afghans into Iran, established two refugee camps just inside Afghanistan, which housed over 11,000 refugees.

By the spring of 2002, the refugees' situation began to change as the Karzai government brought some stability to Afghanistan. In addition, the United Nations and other relief agencies began large-scale repatriation efforts, which gave refugees who were willing to return grain and help with transportation. In total, 1.8 million refugees were repatriated during 2002. By 2003, the repatriation rate had slowed, in large part because most of those who wanted to return had already done so. Even with the massive number of refugees who returned, four million Afghans still lived outside of their home country as of the early twenty-first century. Many, maybe most, of these remaining refugees may never return.

See also Afghanistan: Overview; Baluchistan; Hazara; Karzai, Hamid; Pushtun; Taliban.

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Grant Farr

Balkan Muslim

People who have migrated and relocated from Bosnia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia, and other Balkan countries.

The Balkans—the area including parts of Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia—have been home to nations whose boundaries have been drawn and redrawn since Hellenistic times. The Balkans have been the site of significant and continued upheaval at least since the Ottoman conquest during the fourteenth century, which caused mass migrations of Muslims. As a result of the Russian–Ottoman War of 1877–1878, Muslims were forced from conquered areas in Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia. Later, the Balkan allies either exiled or caused the deaths of a majority of the Muslims from territories they conquered during the Balkan War of 1912–1913. Other Balkan Muslims became refugees in regions taken by Greece after World War I. Some 400,000 refugees came to Turkey during the Greco-Turkish population exchange of the 1920s. The collapse of the Soviet Union prompted several "breakaway" republics in southeastern Europe and sparked or reignited varied political, cultural, and religious clashes. The 1990s proved to be a difficult time, especially with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Roughly 800,000 Muslims left Bosnia after it declared independence from Yugoslavia and conflict with Serbia escalated in 1991. Significant numbers of Bosnian Muslims (around 50,000 at least) fled to Croatia, a predominantly Christian country. Continued fighting between Serbian government forces (Christian, led by Slobodan Milosevic) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (Muslim, generally ethnic Albanian) in the predominantly Muslim republic of Kosovo prompted a continued refugee situation as well, especially when fighting escalated in 1998. Despite ongoing international mediation, the Balkan Muslim refugee crisis is far from resolved.

See also Russian–Ottoman Wars.

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Justin McCarthy
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Jewish

Jews who fled from Arab and Muslim countries to Israel after 1948.

Following the 29 November 1947 United Nations resolution to partition Palestine, the establishment of Israel on 14 May 1948, and its subsequent victory over the armies of five neighboring Arab countries in the 1948 war, an estimated 800,000 Jews living in Arab and Muslim countries were subjected to anti-Jewish violence, abuse, and persecution, which led most of them to seek refuge in Israel. The government of Israel, working through the Mossad le-Aliyah Bet (a clandestine state institution for immigration) and the Jewish Agency, mounted airlift operations funded by the United Jewish Appeal through its subsidiary body, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.

In 1949 and 1950, 48,315 Jews were airlifted from Yemen and Aden in the Magic Carpet Operation, flying directly from Aden to Tel Aviv on chartered U.S. planes. In 1950, the Iraqi government permitted its 160,000 Jews to emigrate provided they renounced their Iraqi nationality and whatever properties and assets they could not sell. Iraq demanded total secrecy and insisted that the planes flying the Jews make a landing in Cyprus en route to Israel. Between 1950 and 1951, 123,370 Iraqi Jews were airlifted to Israel in Operation Ezra and Nehemiah (also known as Operation Ali Baba). Each was allowed 50 dinars on departure.

In 1948, some 100,000 Jews lived in Egypt; 16,000 fled to Israel between 1948 and 1951;

The Jewish community in Ethiopia, frequently referred to as Beta Israel, or the falashas (the alien ones), have been emigrating to Israel by the thousands since the late 1970s. By early 2003, eighty thousand Ethiopian Jews were living in Israel, frequently in the poorest sections of the country. © GIDEON MENDEL/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

17,500 settled in Israel between 1952 and 1956; and the majority came after the 1956 Arab–Israel War. Following the 1967 Arab–Israel War, 2,500 Egyptian Jews fled, the majority settling in Israel. Some 33,000 Jews from Libya settled in Israel between 1948 and 1960, the rest going to Italy; 2,678 Jews fled from Syria and 235 from Lebanon to Israel between 1948 and 1951, many of them walking across the border. An additional 2,700 came from those countries between 1952 and 1960. In 1991, on the intercession of U.S. president George H. W. Bush, Syria allowed 1,400 Jews to leave for Israel.

In 1948, some 600,000 Jews lived in French-controlled Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. As the struggle for independence from France intensified, the situation of the Jews deteriorated and Israel began to evacuate them, mainly by sea via France. Between 1948 and 1971, some 235,000 out of 400,000 Moroccan Jews emigrated to Israel. The rest went to France and other countries. Most of Algeria's Jews fled after that country gained its independence from France in 1962. The majority went to France, as they were considered French nationals; 20,000 immigrated into Israel between 1948 and 1971. During the same period, some 54,000 Tunisian Jews fled to Israel.

In recent years, the World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries has been registering Jewish-owned properties left behind in Arab countries in order, possibly, to make future demands for restitution or to offset Palestinian Arab demands for property left behind in Israel in 1948.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1948); ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967).

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KURDISH

People of Kurdistan, a territory inhabited mainly by the Kurds of five countries, who fled to escape repression and possible death.

In September 1925, more than 20,000 Assyrian Christians (Nestorians) and Kurds arrived in northern Iraq, fleeing the repression that came after the end of the Kurdish revolt in Turkey (1922–1925). This was the first time the international media mentioned the problem of Kurdish refugees.

More recently, thousands of Kurds sought asylum in Iran after the collapse of General (Mullah Mustafa) Barzani's independence movement in 1975. Kurds also fled to Iran and Turkey after the Iraqi Kurdish resistance in the aftermath of the Iran–Iraq War (1988). These were small flights compared to the huge refugee crisis caused in April 1991 by Saddam Hussein's attacks toward the end of the Gulf War (January–April 1991). Fearing for their safety after the failure of their uprising in March 1991, about 2 million Iraqi Kurds fled toward the Turkish and Iranian borders. The arrival of such a huge number of refugees, thousands of whom died of hunger and cold, internationalized the Kurdish problem and forced unwilling Western governments to extend their protection to the Kurds. While those who went to the Turkish border came back to Iraq after the creation of a safe haven, dozens of thousands of Kurdish refugees stayed for years in Iran, living in the cities or in camps. Most of them came back in the late 1990s after the stabilization of the Kurdish region. A small number of Kurdish refugees from Iran and Turkey live in camps in Iraq.

See also BARZANI FAMILY; HUSSEIN, SADDAM; IRAN–IRAQ WAR (1980–1988).

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CHRIS KUTSCHERA

PALESTINIAN

People of Palestine who fled or were driven out in 1948 and 1967; their repatriation remains a controversial issue.

A major consequence of the Arab–Israel War (1948) was the flight of approximately 700,000 members of the indigenous Arab population from their homes in those parts of Mandatory Palestine that became the new state of Israel, 30 percent of whose territory lay beyond the borders of the UN partition plan. Since 1948, the Palestine refugee problem has been one of the most important and controversial issues in the continuing conflict. It has appeared on the agenda of every UN session since 1948 and has been the subject of numerous UN resolutions calling for repatriation or compensation to the refugees, or sometimes both.

Refugees from Palestine travel to Gaza after being evacuated by the UN, 31 March 1949. The question of Palestinian refugees has been a core issue in the Arab–Israeli conflict since 1948. **© HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

Whereas the Palestinians, the Arab states, their supporters, and many Israelis assert that the refugees were forced by Israeli military or paramilitary units to leave their homes and property, the government of Israel has disclaimed responsibility, placing blame for the flight on Palestinian leaders and the surrounding Arab countries, which, Israel states, urged the refugees to leave. In recent years, several Israeli revisionist accounts have produced evidence that in many instances the Israeli military did force Palestinians to depart. Another cause of the flight was the breakdown of Palestinian Arab society during the war in Palestine, followed by chaos and the total disruption of civil society. The number of original Palestinian refugees is based on estimates rather than an accurate census. The UN estimated

in 1949 that more than 700,000 of Palestine's 1948 Arab population could be classified as refugees.

A second major exodus occurred following the June 1967 war, when over 300,000 Palestinians left the West Bank and the Golan area in Syria, many of them second-time refugees who had lived in camps since 1948. By 2003, those classified as refugees by the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) had increased to more than 2.4 million. UNRWA considers as refugees individuals and their direct descendants who lived in Palestine a minimum of two years preceding the 1948 conflict, who lost homes and means of livelihood, and who reside in areas where UNRWA services are available. According to this definition, nearly half the total number of Palestinians in the world were refugees in the 1990s.

The largest concentration is in Jordan, with over 1.5 million in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. More than 700,000 live in Jordan, more than 390,000 in Lebanon, and 400,000 in Syria. Initially most refugees lived in camps established by the UN. However, by 2003, 2.7 million lived in other places but received education, health care, and other social services from UNRWA. More than half of UNRWA expenditures were for education. Although the educational and social services provided by UNRWA are of relatively high quality, the area occupied by the refugee camps has not been greatly extended despite the rapid population increase. Thus the camps have become extremely overcrowded, and housing and other public facilities have become greatly overburdened.

In most areas, the internal affairs of the camps are run by the Palestinians themselves. Refugee frustration with low wages, poor living conditions, and their inability to return to their original homes has caused social and political unrest, with the result that some camps in Lebanon have become bases for Palestinian guerrilla activity. Political life in the camps is intense, and refugees are active in nearly every Palestinian political faction and paramilitary organization. On some occasions, the camps have become targets of non-Palestinian military forces—of the Israeli army and various local militias in Lebanon and of the royal army in Jordan—resulting in thousands of Palestinian casualties.

The refugee question has long been a focus of attempts to resolve the Arab–Israel conflict, beginning in December 1948 with UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), stating "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return."

The refugees and the Arab states have emphasized the right to return as fundamental in any peace settlement. However, Israel has opposed any large-scale repatriation, instead emphasizing resettlement in the surrounding Arab countries. Attempts at refugee resettlement have not been successful, largely because of refugee insistence on the right of return. By the 1990s, the right to return was interpreted by many refugees and some Arab states as return to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza rather than within the borders of Israel. Following the 1991 Madrid Middle East peace conference, one of the five multilateral groups established to deal with functional problems dealt with the refugee issue.

See also Arab–Israel Conflict; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Madrid Conference (1991); United Nations and the Middle East; United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

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Don Peretz

REJECTION FRONT

Grouping of Palestinian organizations (1974–1980) that opposed a diplomatic solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict.

The Rejection Front was formed in 1974 by Palestinian organizations opposed to the strategy under discussion within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that envisioned a negotiated, two-state solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict. The Rejection Front proposed instead to continue the armed struggle for the liberation of all Palestine. Led by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the front eventually included as well the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command, the Arab Liberation Front, the Palestine Liberation Front, and the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front. The front ceased functioning within the rubric of the PLO and was backed by the Baʿthist government of Iraq.

As the PLO's strategy changed after the 1978 Camp David Accords, and as Iraq reconciled with the PLO, the front's activities waned and had stopped altogether by 1980.

See also Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command.

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RENAISSANCE PARTY

See Nahda, al-

REPUBLICAN BROTHERHOOD

The Republican Brotherhood is one of the earliest examples of a reformist movement in Islamic societies that addressed issues of the status of women and non-Muslims in Islamic states.

The Jamhuriyin, as the Republican Brothers are known in Sudan, were founded by Mahmud Muhammad Taha in 1945 as the Republican Party, one of many parties struggling for independence from Great Britain. Although the party favored independence, it scored no electoral victories when independence was achieved in 1956. In 1958, Taha began campaigning for Islamic reform, after the 1964 broadly democratic popular October Revolution that overthrew the first military regime of Abboud. From its origins it has acted less like a party and more like a movement, and grew over the next two decades. Its youthful followers, female as well as male, engaged in public teaching and proselytizing on the streets of Khartoum and Omdurman, and at the universities. A parallel Republican Sisters branch was formed specifically for education and outreach to women, although Taha's seminars in his home were famous for being coeducational, with lively participation on the part of women.

The movement was unique in Islamic Africa and the Middle East at the time. Taha wrote a number of books and several hundred pamphlets dealing with the theological and philosophical bases of his reform program, which came to be known as the Second Message of Islam. The Republican Brotherhood was the popular name for what Taha called the New Islamic Mission, which was intended to develop a new Muslim consciousness with a modern vision of the faith of Islam and Islamic law, *shariʿa.* Taha's analysis was based upon historical and contextual analysis of the Qurʾanic texts revealed to the prophet Muhammad between 610 and 632 C.E. at Mecca and Medina. The earlier Meccan texts deal with religious belief and practice and are meant as a universal message for all humankind, whereas the later Medinan texts he saw as intended to reform Arab society through the newly enlightened community of Muslims. Taha argued that *shariʿa* and Muslim practice should be based upon the primary Meccan texts. His writings and teachings were circulated through more than 200 pamphlets, which ranged from the basic theological points of the Second Message to the reform of specific aspects of the *shariʿa* and the status of women. The Republican Brothers specifically called for reform of Islamic law in regard to women and Muslim marriage, seeking to reduce or eliminate expensive dower *(mahr)* and equalize the status of women and men in marriage. For example,

they argued for marriage contracts that pledged monogamy on the part of the husband and gave both partners equal rights to divorce. Republican egalitarianism extended to non-Muslims as well; their religious rights and freedoms would be protected equally with those of Muslims.

While the movement generally abjured direct involvement in politics, it nonetheless opposed the Sudan government's Islamization of law. In September 1983, General Muhammad Jaʿfar Numeiri declared that *shariʿa* would be comprehensively applied as state law, despite the fact that one-third of the population, especially in the south, is animist or Christian. This precipitated a resumption of civil war over the issues of autonomy and religious freedom, which had been negotiated in the Addis Ababa Peace Accords of 1972. The Republican Brotherhood launched a major campaign against this imposition of *shariʿa.* With the divisive effect of Islamic law apparent, the movement intensified its criticism of the regime in a leaflet of protest issued symbolically on 25 December 1984. In response, the government arrested five Republican leaders, including Taha, charging them with sedition, undermining the constitution, and inciting unlawful opposition to the government. By January 1985, all had been found guilty of apostasy and sentenced to death. All repented and received reprieves except Mahmud Taha, who, then in his mid-seventies, was executed by hanging. Within two months, a popular uprising overthrew the Numeiri regime; many of its opponents had been galvanized into action by Taha's death.

See also Numeiri, Muhammad Jaʿfar; *Shariʿa;* Sudan; Sudanese Civil Wars; Taha, Mahmud Muhammad.

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Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban

REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (RPP)

The Republic of Turkey's first political party, founded in 1923.

The Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), was founded by its first president, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), and its first vice president, Ismet Inönü Its major goal was the establishment of a national-territorial Turkish state. Until the late 1920s the RPP was ideologically eclectic, attempting to reconcile the views of conservatives and the supporters of progress. During its first years, the leadership focused on modernization. Denying social cleavages, the party refused to identify with any particular class. Kemalism was first proclaimed as a political doctrine at the second party congress in October 1927, when Mustafa Kemal delivered a six-day speech outlining the RPP goals: republicanism, meaning rejection of monarchy and dictatorship; nationalism, or the rejection of any dynastic, religious, or racial bases for statehood; secularism, or the separation of religion from the state; and popularism. After the economic crisis of 1929 the party added etatism (state economic enterprises) to its principles. At the third party congress in May 1931 the six principles of Kemalism were symbolized in the form of six arrows. The 1931 convention was a turning point for the RPP and for Turkey itself. With the strong emphasis on nationalism and secularism, the state was made arbiter of religious affairs, and the new definition of nationalism attempted to raise the Turkish nation to the highest level of civilization.

In 1935 the RPP merged with the bureaucracy. The minister of interior became, ex officio, the general secretary of the party. In 1937 the six principles of Kemalism were incorporated into the constitution. In 1938, after Mustafa Kemal's death, his successor, Ismet Inönü, became the national leader. The one-party regime lasted through six elections. Two efforts to form competing parties (in 1925 and 1930) ended in failure. In 1941 some democratic processes were permitted, including fielding independent candidates and nominating more candidates than available parliamentary seats. The end of one-party rule came in 1946, when the newly founded Democrat Party (DP) won all seats where its candidates were placed on the ballot. The opposition forced the government to change the existing electoral law. The new law in 1949 introduced secret

balloting, open counting, and judicial supervision. On 14 May 1950 the Democrats won 53.3 percent of the popular vote and 83.8 percent of the parliamentary seats. After a peaceful transfer of power, the two-party format lasted until 1960. However, relations between the government and the opposition deteriorated after 1953. The DP supported the more liberally inclined demands of business and catered to the peasant voters. Toward the end of the 1950s the DP became more authoritarian. In April 1960 the DP set up a parliamentary investigating committee that charged the opposition with subversive activities. The ensuing unrest lead to the military coup of 27 May 1960 and the dissolution of the Democrat Party.

In the framework of the Constituent Assembly, the RPP played a determining role in shaping the new constitution. However, the RPP did not obtain a majority in the 1961 elections, and their participation in coalition governments lasted only until 1963. The turning point in the history of the RPP occurred on the eve of the 1965 elections, when Inönü set forth the maxim "left of center" to describe the party's position. Bülent Ecevit was elected the party's general secretary in 1967. The new image of the party tried to provide a moderate-left alternative for the masses of underprivileged voters, with a strong emphasis on a liberal-pluralist social order, a mixed economy, land reform, and a strong cooperative movement. This required a realignment of Turkey's party system, by which the old center-periphery cleavage was replaced by a new functional cleavage. However, the election of 1973 brought the RPP only 33.3 percent of the vote, and the coalition governments headed by Ecevit did not last. The election of 1977 made the party, with 41.4 percent of the vote, the largest in the assembly, but the deadlock between the RPP and the main opposition party paralyzed the government. Civil strife, violence, and poor performance of coalition governments led to the third military coup, in September 1980.

The RPP was disbanded on 16 October 1981 by Turkey's National Security Council. The new constitution of 1982 brought a ten-year ban on all former politicians, but political parties were allowed to reopen under their traditional names. In 1993 the successor of the dissolved RPP, the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP), merged with the revived RPP. In the 1995 election the RPP, under a new leader, Deniz Baykal, won 10.8 percent of the vote. The fragmentation of the leftist vote had led to a new polarization between the nationalist and Islamic parties. In the 1999 election the RPP received only 8.6 percent of the vote and remained out of parliament. Although Baykal resigned from the party leadership in 1999, he was reelected in 2000 and was able to obtain 19.3 percent of the vote in the 2002 election.

The post-1993 ideological debate within the party has concerned the nature of secularization, the nature of state-society relationships, the role of the nation-state, the approach of the party to globalization, and minority rights and liberties. A new interpretation of secularism has been triggered by the debate around the Anatolian Left. This concept, initiated by Baykal in 2000, draws parallels between the two Muslim groups (Alevi and Sunni) as well as non-Muslims. Baykal argues that the RPP has to have a deeper and more correct analysis of Turkish culture and history. By returning to the Anatolian roots and claiming a nationally authentic flavor, the dichotomy between the elite and masses can be overcome. This implies a move away from a class analysis to a human-centered analysis. The RPP maintains good relations with some organized interest groups, such as trade unions, small business organizations, and secular women's associations. The RPP indicated its sympathy for the identity search among people of Kurdish origin, but maintains a clear distinction between ethnic separatism and identity politics. With regard to human rights, the RPP has made this issue its primary focus. During the 2002 electoral campaign, accountability of parliamentarians and transparency of the administration dominated its political rhetoric. On basic issues of a welfare state, the RPP proposes universal education, healthcare, and social security reforms. In the realm of economics, the RPP defends the role of the market economy but wants to control it with organized labor and consumer groups. The RPP actively supports Turkey's admission to the European Union and is a member of the Socialist International. The major weaknesses of the party are the domination of factionalism and the increasingly fierce intraparty competition due to the shrinking of the party.

See also Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Ecevit, Bülent; İnönü, İsmet; Kemalism.

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NERMIN ABADAN-UNAT

REUTER CONCESSION

See GLOSSARY

REVISIONIST MOVEMENT

See ZIONIST REVISIONIST MOVEMENT

REVOLUTIONARY ASSOCIATION OF THE WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN (RAWA)

Activist organization formed to advocate women's rights in Afghanistan.

The Revolutionary Afghan Women's Association (Anjoman-i-Enqilabi-i-Zanan-i-Afghanistan), known as RAWA, was founded in 1977 in Kabul by Meena Keshwar Kamal and a small group of close associates in opposition to the pro-Soviet Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW). RAWA opposed the fundamentalism of the radical Islamic groups as well as the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which had been the dominant political forces in Afghanistan since the mid-1960s. Despite deep ideological differences, the radical Islamists and the members of the PDPA both rejected RAWA as a Maoist organization. Due to violent threats from radical Islamists, RAWA was forced to operate underground. Working clandestinely, RAWA members were active in rallying female student protests in Kabul against the December 1979 occupation of the city by Soviet troops.

RAWA eventually moved its headquarters to Quetta, the border city inside Pakistan, where it became openly involved in the anti-Soviet movement and provided health care and education to refugee Afghan women and children. Its membership grew rapidly as many newly arrived educated, professional Afghan women joined its ranks. In 1981, Keshwar Kamal started the monthly *Payam-i-Zan* (Women's message) to encourage exiled women to fight for freedom, democracy, and social justice for all. After Kamal's assassination on 4 February 1987 in Quetta, RAWA once again became a clandestine organization. Rather than choose a single leader, the members elected a rotating governing council of twelve and continued to fight for freedom and social justice and to provide relief for women refugees.

After the fall of the pro-Soviet regime in 1992, RAWA protested the seizure of power by radical Islamic forces. It declared the day the fundamentalists entered into Kabul (28 April 1992) "the Black Day" in Afghan history, and condemned Pakistan and the United States for backing the fundamentalists. On 28 April 2002, the eighth anniversary of the rule by Islamic fundamentalist regimes in Afghanistan, RAWA organized protest rallies in Pakistan and in Washington D. C., demanding a free and democratic Afghanistan. The gathering in Washington was sponsored by the Feminist Majority Foundation and the National Committee of Women for a Democratic Iran.

Since 1997, RAWA has used the Internet to share its message with a global audience and has succeeded in bringing to world attention the plight of Afghan women, but its exceedingly harsh language and personal attacks drove away some of its early sympathizers.

See also AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET INTERVENTION IN; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; KASHWAR KAMAL, MEENA; SAMAR, SIMA; TALIBAN.

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SENZIL NAWID

REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL (EGYPT)

Egyptian political body formed in the summer of 1952.

The Free Officers movement formed the RCC following its overthrow of King Farouk (July 1952) and establishment of a military junta. Led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, the members of the RCC included Colonel Anwar al-Sadat, Major Abd al-Hakim Amir, Major Salah Salam, Major Khalid Muhyi al-Din, and other high-ranking officers. General Muhammad Naguib, an older and widely respected officer, was brought in as prime minister and, in June 1953, president of the newly declared Republic of Egypt. The RCC faced a series of challenges in consolidating power, that from the Muslim Brotherhood probably the most significant. A power struggle between Nasser and Naguib led to Naguib's ouster in November 1955 and was an important step in Nasser's rise to power. The RCC was officially dissolved in 1956.

See also FREE OFFICERS, EGYPT; MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON

REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL (LIBYA)

Leaders of Libya's 1969 revolution and subsequent government until 1977.

Following the overthrow of the Libyan monarchy on 1 September 1969, the central committee of the Free Unionist Officers movement designated itself the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in a December 1969 constitutional proclamation. Initially exercising both executive and legislative functions, the RCC took whatever measures it deemed necessary to protect the revolution. Even when the RCC later appointed outsiders to a council of ministers, it reserved supreme authority in all fields to itself.

The twelve members of the RCC shared similar backgrounds, motivations, and worldviews. Largely drawn from the lower middle class and minor tribes, most of its members graduated from the military academy in Benghazi at a time when a military career offered opportunities for upward socioeconomic mobility. The language of the RCC was the language of Arab nationalism, guided by precepts from the Qurʾan and strengthened by the conviction that the revolutionary government spoke for the masses.

Members of the RCC constituted the cabinet of the Libyan government until 2 March 1977, when the Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority stated that direct popular authority would be the basis for a new Libyan political system. At that point, Muammar al-Qaddafi was designated general secretary of the newly formed General People's Congress and the remaining four members of the now defunct RCC composed its general secretariat.

See also JAMAHIRIYYA; LIBYA; QADDAFI, MUAMMAR AL-.

RONALD BRUCE ST JOHN

REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS

Iranian military organization created in 1979 to protect the Islamic revolution.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or *Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Islami,* was formed in May 1979 as an ideologically committed force entrusted with protecting the political success of the Iranian Revolution from external and internal enemies. Initially, it comprised the several unofficial militias that had been organized spontaneously during the final weeks of the revolution in Tehran and other cities to protect demonstrators from the shah's security forces. These militias continued to grow after the revolution, taking on security functions and tracking down suspected counterrevolutionaries. Even though Iran's armed forces had declared political neutrality in February 1979, deep suspicions about military officers' loyalty to the revolution existed among the new revolutionary leaders. Consequently, the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan accepted the argument that the various militias should be organized into a centralized

force, the Revolutionary Guards, that could counter a potential military coup.

The Revolutionary Guards assumed a primary role in suppressing the armed autonomy movements among ethnic Baluchis, Kurds, and Turkmen in 1979 to 1980, the antigovernment demonstrations in Tabriz in December 1979, and the armed uprising by the Mojahedin-e Khalq that began in June 1981. They also had a central role in prosecuting the Iran-Iraq War, which Iraq initiated in September 1980 by launching an invasion of western Iran. Throughout the eight-year war, the Revolutionary Guards remained a separate and rival military force to the army, but after Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani became Iran's president in 1989, he implemented a policy of integrating the militaries as co-equal units of a National Defense Force with a unified command. In 2004 the Revolutionary Guards was a force of 120,000 men, the overwhelming majority of whom had elected to serve their compulsory 18-month military service in this branch of the armed forces.

The Revolutionary Guards has overall authority for the 40,000 volunteers of the paramilitary force known as the *Sepah-e Basij,* which was formed in November 1979. The impetus for organizing the Basij was a perceived need for a mobilized and armed population to confront a possible attack by the United States. At the time, there was widespread fear that the United States might attempt to overthrow the revolution and restore Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, as it had done in 1953. Any Iranian sixteen years and older could join the Basij and receive training in the use of small arms. Some women joined, and the Basij organized several women's units. The majority of volunteers, however, were young men from the lower urban classes or from rural backgrounds, and they constituted an important source of recruits—hundreds of thousands—during the war with Iraq. Since 1989, the Revolutionary Guards generally, and its Basij militia specifically, have seen their mission to be maintaining the ideological purity of the revolution. Given the lack of consensus among the political elite with respect to what policies are consistent or inconsistent with revolutionary ideals, these guardian organizations of the revolution risk becoming entangled partisans in the intense factional politics that have characterized Iran since the early 1990s.

See also Baluchis; Bazargan, Mehdi; Hostage Crises; Iranian Revolution (1979); Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Kurds; Mojahedin-e Khalq; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi; Tabriz.

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Eric Hooglund

RICHMOND, ERNEST T.

[1874–1974]

Archaeologist and architect in Egypt during World War I.

Ernest T. Richmond served the Mission to Palestine as consulting architect for the Dome of the Rock Mosque in Jerusalem (1918–1919). As assistant to chief secretary Wyndham Deedes and then to Gilbert Clayton (1920–1924), he was given control of the Political Department of the Secretariat as a result of high commissioner Herbert Samuel's desire to protect Arab interests and to restrain Zionist excesses. Members of the Arab Executive saw Richmond as virtually their only friend in the British administration of Palestine. He was strongly disliked by the Zionists for his sympathies with the Arabs of Palestine and his opposition to Zionism.

Richmond helped secure the appointment of al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni as mufti of Jerusalem and president of the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC). He sought to expand the powers of the mufti and the jurisdiction of the SMC and to promote the latter as a partial counterweight to the Jewish Agency. Richmond became chief adviser to the high commissioner on Muslim affairs. When he resigned, he was appointed to the nonpolitical position of director of antiquities, in which capacity he served until 1937.

Jenab Tutunji

RIDA, RASHID

[1865–1935]

Disciple and biographer of Egyptian religious reformer Muhammad Abduh; editor of the Islamic modernist magazine al-Manar.

Rashid Rida was born in the village of Qalamun, near Tripoli, in what was then the Ottoman Empire and is now Lebanon. Rida came from a family of local prominence and piety. He attended the local Qurʾan school and continued his education in Tripoli at an Ottoman state school and an Islamic school run by Shaykh Husayn al-Jisr. Although exposed to the Turkish and French languages, as well as to mathematics and Western science, Rida considered languages other than Arabic unnecessary for a scholar of Islam like himself. Inspired by the classic *Revival of the Religious Sciences* by Ahmad Abdullah al-Ghazali, Rida joined the Naqshbandi Sufi order. An encounter with the dance of Mevlevi dervishes, however, shocked him into publicly denouncing what he took to be the excesses of Sufism.

Al-Urwa al-Wuthqa (The indissoluble bond), the magazine that Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and his disciple Muhammad Abduh issued from Parisian exile in the 1880s, awakened Rida to his life mission of reviving Islam. He hoped to join al-Afghani, who was then residing in Istanbul under Sultan Abdülhamit II's surveillance and never received Rida's letter. Afghani died in 1897; Rida went instead to Cairo to join Afghani's erstwhile disciple Muhammad Abduh—whom he had met twice before. Rida became Abduh's inseparable disciple, founding the magazine *al-Manar* in 1898 to spread Abduh's reformist Islamic, or Salafiyya, message.

For thirty-seven years, until his death, Rida wrote much of *al-Manar* himself and published other religious works on the *al-Manar* press. His books in Arabic, usually serialized in *al-Manar* first, include the *Biography of the Master Imam Shaykh Muhammad Abduh* (3 vols.), *The Caliphate or Supreme Imamate, The Muhammadan Revelation,* biographies of the Prophet Muhammad and the caliphs Umar and Ali; with Abduh, an unfinished twelve-volume *Commentary on the Qurʾan.*

Like Afghani and Abduh, Rida made the Islamic *umma* (community) his central concern, asking why it had declined relative to the modern West and blaming the decline on medieval additions to Islam—such as the reverence for Sufi saints—which had obscured the pure religion of the ancestors (*salaf,* from which comes the name for the Salafiyya movement). He urged reformist *ulama* (Islamic leaders) to follow Abduh and himself in returning to the Qurʾan and the *sunna* (body of customs) and interpreting them afresh for the modern age. At first *al-Manar* concentrated its fire on the conservative *ulama* entrenched in the mosque-university of al-Azhar in Cairo. Rida blamed them for succumbing to the blandishments of the state, tolerating folk superstitions, and failing to mount a vigorous defense of Islam; by the 1920s, however, Rida had grown more conservative and came to see Western-inspired secularism and liberal nationalism as greater dangers. He drew nearer to the strict literalism of the Hanbali Law School, its fourteenth-century juridical theologian Ibn Taymiya, and their Muwahhidun proponents in Arabia. King Ibn Saʿud of Arabia responded with financial support for Rida's activities.

After his early years with Afghani, Abduh had retreated from overt politics, but Rida made frequent forays into Ottoman, Syrian, Arab, and caliphal politics. He saw Sultan Abdülhamit II's rule in Syria as repressive, and *al-Manar* published the attack of Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi on Abdülhamit II and his call for restoring the caliphate (held by the Ottoman Turks) to the Arabs. Hoping that changed circumstances after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 would allow him to open a school for Islamic propaganda and guidance, Rida spent a year in Istanbul. The authorities changed their minds, however, and Rida opened his school in Cairo in 1912, only to have it fall victim to World War I. Meanwhile, as a member of the Ottoman Decentralization Society, he protested the Young Turks' tightening grip on the Arab provinces. After the war, when Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) abolished first the Ottoman sultanate and then the caliphate, *al-Manar* published a series of studies on the caliphate and the possibility of its revival by an Arab ruler. Rida had a hand in the rival caliphal congresses in Mecca and Cairo in 1926, which unsuccessfully advanced the claims of King Ibn Saʿud of Arabia and King Fuʾad of Egypt for the office. In the mid-1920s, when Ali Abd al-Raziq denied the caliphate's Islamic legitimacy and Taha Husayn declared pre-Islamic Arabic poetry a later forgery, Rida found himself agreeing with the Azhari *ulama* in defending revered traditions. Rida had a final try at congress politics as a participant in the 1931 Islamic Congress in Jerusalem.

As a Syrian, Rida felt the tug of emerging Arab nationalism more than Iranian-born Afghani or Abduh, an Egyptian. *Al-Manar*'s publication of Kawak-

ibi and Rida's Decentralization Society activities had Arabist implications, and he was even chosen president of the Syrian Congress, which in 1920 declared the independence of the short-lived Syrian Arab kingdom under Faisal I ibn Hussein. After the French mandate over Syria was effected in 1921, Rida went to Geneva as vice president of a delegation to the League of Nations protesting the mandates granted to Britain and France in the Middle East as part of the peace settlements of World War I.

Rida's influence waned in the later years, and his death in 1935 attracted little notice. His most direct heir was Hasan al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928/29 and admired Rida's Islamic activism and his strict interpretation of the *shariʿa* (Islamic law). Banna put out a few issues of *al-Manar* after Rida's death, but it disappeared in 1940.

Rida displayed an unusual blend of timidity and combativeness. He lacked the charisma of Afghani and Abduh before him and Hasan al-Banna after him. Rida's works are not widely read today; nevertheless, he was an essential link in the chain of Islamic activism running from Afghani and Abduh to Banna and Sayyid Qutb—and the present-day Muslim Brethren and their more radical Islamist offshoots.

See also Abduh, Muhammad; Afghani, Jamal al-Din al-.

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Donald Malcolm Reid

RIF

Moroccan mountain chain.

Contiguous with the Jibala massif at the western end, the Rif mountains run along the Mediterranean coast of Morocco for a distance of nearly 200 miles (300 km) but are nowhere more than 50 miles (80 km) wide. Some peaks rise to a height of 6,600 feet (2,000 m). Heavily wooded until clearance began in the seventeenth century, the region now suffers from environmental degradation and drought, and its largely Berber-speaking inhabitants have a history of labor migration.

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C. R. Pennell

RIFAAT, ALIFA

[1930–]

Egyptian fiction writer.

Alifa Rifaat (also Rifʿat) was born in Cairo. She began her literary career under a pseudonym in 1955 with the publication of short stories in the magazine *al-Risala.* Her husband's opposition to her writing brought her literary career to a halt for over a decade. In 1972, she began publishing again, under her own name. A number of the stories Rifaat published in the 1970s and 1980s focus on women's fantasies and thoughts, exploring women's emotional lives and the psychological damage done to them by men, and also a system of social mores that does not take into account women's need for personal, sexual, and emotional fulfillment. Rifaat and other women writers who began publishing in the 1960s and 1970s were among the first to express feminist concerns in fictional form.

Deeply influenced by the Qurʾan and other religious texts, Rifaat couches her social critique within an Islamic framework. Echoes of her concern for women's emotional and sexual well-being are found in the works of prominent writers of the 1970s generation, including Salwa Bakr and Niʿmat

al-Bihayri. In 1981, Rifaat published her short story collection *Man yakun al-Rajul?* (Who will be the man?) and since then she has published four other collections in Arabic. A fifth collection, *Distant View of a Minaret,* was translated into English and published in 1983. Her first novel, *Jawharat Firʿawn* (Pharoah's jewel) was published in 1991.

See also BAKR, SALWA; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION.

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CAROLINE SEYMOUR-JORN

RIFAʿI, SAMIR AL-
[1899–1965]

Prime minister of Jordan during the period 1944 to 1963.

Born in Safed in Mandatory Palestine, Samir al-Rifaʿi was noted for his resourcefulness, subtlety, and intelligence. As prime minister in 1944 and 1945, he participated in negotiations to establish the League of Arab States and signed the charter on behalf of Jordan. As prime minister when King Abdullah I ibn Hussein was assassinated, he handed power over to the veteran Tawfiq Abu al-Huda in July 1951.

Al-Rifaʿi was asked to form a government on 9 January 1956, in the aftermath of anti-Baghdad Pact protests. He proclaimed martial law and decisively rejected the Baghdad Pact, refusing to sign "any new pacts." This allowed him to reject the Covenant of Arab Union at the same time. To prevent a rupture in ties with the United Kingdom and subsequent loss of British subsidies, al-Rifaʿi favored renegotiating rather than abrogating the 1948 Anglo–Jordanian treaty. But this stand was very controversial. He remained in office this time until October 1956, when Sulayman al-Nabulsi, who opposed the relationship with Britain, was asked to form a government.

Following the "royal coup" of 25 April 1957, which ousted al-Nabulsi's cabinet, Rifaʿi served as deputy premier and effective leader of the government in the cabinet of Ibrahim Hashim. He guided negotiations for Jordan's federation with Iraq, headed the regional cabinet in Amman during the federation, then continued as prime minister of Jordan after its breakup in 1958. Al-Rifaʿi steered King Hussein ibn Talal through that difficult period and helped him survive plots by Colonel Abd al-Hammid Sarraj, the interior minister of Syria, when it was the "northern region" of the United Arab Republic (UAR). Al-Rifaʿi also helped engineer Jordan's friendly ties with the United States and secured American subsidies, although Jordan never officially accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine. Unfortunately, al-Rifaʿi became too closely identified with Jordan's quarrels with President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the UAR. A break in ties with the UAR followed, and al-Rifaʿi resigned on 5 May 1959.

Al-Rifaʿi formed his sixth and last cabinet on 27 March 1963, with a mandate to improve relations with Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. When the three countries agreed to form an expanded United Arab Republic, however, public demonstrations favoring Jordan's participation in the union led to clashes with the army, notably in the West Bank. Al-Rifaʿi was on the verge of being denied a vote of confidence when he tendered his resignation. He went on to serve as president of the upper house of parliament, or Senate.

See also ABDULLAH I IBN HUSSEIN; ABU AL-HUDA, TAWFIQ; BAGHDAD PACT (1955); HASHIM, IBRAHIM; HUSSEIN IBN TALAL; LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES; NABULSI, SULAYMAN AL-; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (UAR).

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JENAB TUTUNJI

RIFAʿI, ZAID AL-

[1936–]

Jordanian politician.

Son of the prominent Jordanian politician Samir al-Rifaʿi, who was of Palestinian origin, Zaid (also Zayd) al-Rifaʿi was known as a boyhood friend and loyal confidant of Jordan's King Hussein ibn Talal. He held numerous positions in the Foreign Ministry before beginning service to the king in 1964, where he eventually rose to chief of the royal court (1969), political adviser to the king (1972–1973), prime minister/defense minister/foreign minister (1973–1976), and prime minister/foreign minister (1985–1989).

Jordan suffered a series of setbacks in the early 1980s as the effects of petroleum pricing in the Gulf states battered its once-booming economy. Jordan became more dependent on loans and struggled with high inflation. The al-Rifaʿi government introduced a series of austerity measures in November 1986 and March 1989, the latter in consultation with the International Monetary Fund. New taxes and sharp increases in consumer prices led to rioting in traditionally pro-regime districts, such as Maʿan and al-Karak, along with denunciations of corruption in the al-Rifaʿi government and calls for his resignation. After al-Rifaʿi quickly resigned, King Hussein announced that general parliamentary elections would be held in November 1989, for the first time since 1967. Al-Rifaʿi was later appointed to the Jordanian senate, and served as president.

See also HUSSEIN IBN TALAL; KARAK, AL-; RIFAʿI, SAMIR AL-.

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

RIF WAR

One of the most successful Moroccan attempts to resist an initial European invasion, 1921–1926.

The Treaty of Fes (1912), imposing a French protectorate over Morocco, assigned northern and southern zones to Spain. Until the end of World War I, the Spanish army and economy were not strong enough to take advantage of this. But, in 1919, the Spanish army began to push westward from Melilla into the Rif mountains, and a loosely organized coalition was formed to oppose it. In 1920 Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi took over leadership of the coalition and set about creating unity based on the strict imposition of the *shariʿa,* allied with European military techniques.

Led by Muhammad ibn Abd al Karim al-Khattabi, Moroccan tribesmen rebelled against Spanish rule in 1912. They inflicted many defeats on the Spanish before finally being overwhelmed by combined French and Spanish forces in 1926. Here, Moroccans man artillery in 1923. **© HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

By June 1921 Spanish military intelligence was warning that Abd al-Karim's supporters could resist further Spanish advances, despite the 25,000 troops in the eastern zone. The warnings were ignored, new advance garrisons set up, and on 2 June the Rifis attacked a post at Dahar Abarran. The garrison was withdrawn, but other posts came under attack. On 22 July, the main Spanish forward base at Anwal withdrew with heavy casualties. The retreat became a rout, and by 9 August all Spanish positions outside Melilla were lost and over 13,000 soldiers killed. Melilla was not occupied because Abd al-Karim, concerned that he might lose control, wanted to avoid the slaughter of civilians.

In little more than a year, Spanish forces had almost regained their old lines, but Abd al-Karim used the supplies they had abandoned to equip a regular army. He capitalized on the prestige of his

victory to institutionalize a bureaucratic government in the central Rif, staffed largely by members of his own family. He emphasized the *shariʿa,* both for ideological reasons and to ensure order. An infrastructure—roads and a telegraph system—was built to maintain control and better fight the Spanish. In February 1923 he received formal *bayʿas* (declarations of allegiance) from the central Rif tribes and established a Rifi state.

Abd al-Karim overcame such local opponents as Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Raysuni, a sharif of the Jibala mountains, and Abd al-Rahman al-Darqawi, head of the Darqawiyya *tariqa* whose headquarters at Amjutt were just over the figurative border of the French zone. Both of the local chiefs resented Abd al-Karim's growing authority, but in doing so came into conflict with the French and Spanish. The attack on isolated Spanish outposts in the Jibala began in August 1925, and in November Spanish forces withdrew from the town of Shawin. The Spanish army lost around 10,000 men.

Abd al-Karim was reluctant to attack the French zone. He did not want to have to fight two European armies. He agreed because he needed to secure food supplies and deal with the Darqawiyya and because of pressure from some of his commanders. The attack on Amjutt in April 1925 succeeded, and Rifi forces moved on Fez, overrunning many French positions. The French army held the Rifi attack, and in June 1925 a conference in Madrid agreed on a joint Franco-Spanish campaign to crush the Rifis.

In September 1925 Spanish landings at Alhucemas and French advances from the south were coordinated. By the winter, the Rif was surrounded and running out of food. The following April, brief peace negotiations at Oujda, in eastern Morocco, failed and Rifi resistance collapsed. On 15 May 1926, Abd al-Karim surrendered to the French.

See also Khattabi, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-; *Shariʿa.*

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C. R. Pennell

RISHON LE-ZION

Town in central Israel, seven miles southeast of Tel Aviv, stretching to the Mediterranean coastline.

Formerly known as Ayun Qara, Rishon le-Zion was founded in 1882 by ten Zionist settlers from Russia under the leadership of Zalman Levontin. They were soon joined by 100 additional pioneers. They experienced severe difficulties in the early years, including lack of funds and water resources, but financial support provided by Baron Edmond de Rothschild, who bought back the land from them and provided monthly stipends and funds to plant vineyards, culminated in 1889 in the opening of Carmel wine cellars. The first Hebrew kindergarten and elementary school opened in Rishon le-Zion during the 1880s; the first agricultural workers' association was founded there in 1887.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Rishon le-Zion became a cultural and social center, with its own orchestra and choir. The lyrics of the national anthem were written there by Naphtali Imber. The Jewish National Fund was founded there and the first telephone system and electrical generator were installed in Rishon. The town's urbanization began in the 1950s and by the 1970s Rishon had become a densely populated urban center. By the end of 2002, the population had surpassed 211,500 and the town was considered part of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area.

See also Levontin, Zalman; Rothschild, Edmond de; Tel Aviv.

Bryan Daves
Updated by Yehuda Gradus

RIYADH

Saudi Arabia's capital and largest city.

Riyadh is located in the southern Najd region. More correctly transliterated as *al-Riyad* ("the gardens"), the city is also the capital of a large province of the same name. Nearby are the ruins of al-Dirʿiyya, the original seat of the Al Saʿud family until an invading Egyptian army destroyed the village in 1818 and put an end to the first Saudi state. The Al Saʿud thereupon relocated at Riyadh, which became the capital of the second Saudi state of the mid-nineteenth century. With a second decline in

Saudi fortunes, Riyadh was lost to the rival Al Rashid dynasty of Haʾil in 1891. But in 1902, Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman (also known as Ibn Saʿud) infiltrated the town with a small band of followers. Launching a surprise attack on al-Musmak fortress, Abd al-Aziz succeeded in capturing the Al Rashid governor and restoring Saudi control over Riyadh.

Over the next two decades, the Al Saʿud used Riyadh as their base to extend their authority once again over all of Najd. From the late 1920s, Saudi Arabia had two capitals, with the king resident in Riyadh, the capital of Najd, but most of the ministries and embassies located in al-Hijaz. By 1955 most government ministries and head offices had moved to Riyadh. The Foreign Ministry and foreign embassies remained in Jiddah until 1985, when they too were required to move to the capital. Riyadh's population was estimated at only 169,000 in 1962, but the oil boom (beginning in 1974) dramatically transformed the city and caused its population to increase to over 1.5 million. By 2003 the capital's population was estimated at nearly 4.5 million. The skyline has been enhanced in recent years by two skyscrapers, the thirty-story al-Faysaliyya Center and the Kingdom Tower.

Very little of the old city remains intact; the old mud-brick fort of al-Musmak has been preserved and Ibn Saʿud's al-Murabbi Palace was restored during the country's centennial celebrations in 1999. Many buildings in the new diplomatic quarter, which is known as al-Dirʿiyya because of its proximity to the old village, imitate the traditional mud-brick architecture. Near this quarter are located the new King's Office Complex (al-Yamama Palace) and the headquarters of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Also nearby is the campus of King Saʿud University; founded in 1957, it is the country's oldest university. Imam Muhmmad ibn Saʿud University, one of the kingdom's three Islamic universities, is located in Riyadh as well. The city is the inland terminus of a railroad from al-Dammam on the Persian Gulf coast, and the previous international airport has become a major air force base. The government is the largest employer in Riyadh, although light industry and retail firms are also important.

See also Al Saʿud Family.

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J. E. Peterson

RIYADH ARAB SUMMIT

See Arab League Summits

RIYAD, MAHMUD

[1917–1992]

Egyptian diplomat and former secretary-general of the League of Arab States.

In 1939, Mahmud Riyad enrolled in the Egyptian Military Academy and obtained a master's degree in military sciences. In 1948, he headed the Egyptian delegation to the armistice talks with the Israelis in Rhodes. In 1955, he was appointed ambassador to Syria, and two years later he participated in the Syria–Egyptian unity talks. On 1 June 1972, he was elected secretary-general of the League of Arab States. As secretary-general he played an important role in mediating the conflict between the two Yemens (1972), the border conflict between Iraq and Kuwait (1973), and the Palestine Liberation Organization–Lebanese government clashes in 1973.

George E. Irani

RIYAD, MUSTAFA AL-

[1834–1911]

Egyptian official, cabinet minister, and three-time premier.

The origins of Mustafa al-Riyad, usually known as Riyaz Pasha during his lifetime, are obscure; he may have been Jewish. In Egypt, he began his career as a clerk in the foreign ministry and then in the army. Aide-de-camp for Abbas Hilmi I, he then held a succession of provincial governorships. Khedive Ismaʿil entrusted various ministerial portfolios to him. He contributed to Egypt's intellectual life by inviting Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and the editors of *al-Muqtataf* to settle there and also provided an endowment for the newly founded National Library. He backed Egypt's foreign creditors against Khedive Ismaʿil and helped write the 1880 liquidation law,

which reduced Egyptian government indebtedness by strictly limiting expenditures.

Riyad underestimated the strength of the Egyptian officers in his first term as head of Egypt's government. Having acceded to their demand to dismiss his war minister in February 1881, he had to resign after their Abdin demonstration in September of that year. He stayed in Europe as long as the followers of Ahmad Urabi held sway. He served again as head of Egypt's government from 1888 to 1891 and from 1894 to 1895. He was widely thought to oppose the British occupation and to support the establishment of Cairo's first Muslim-owned daily, *al-Muʾayyad.* He favored bringing in Western technology but resisted the growing power of Europeans over Egyptian finances, justice, and government.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

RIYAL

See GLOSSARY

ROCKEFELLER MUSEUM

Name popularly given to the Palestine Archaeological Museum in Jerusalem.

The museum, which opened in 1938, was funded by $2 million pledged by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to match an endowment fund. The building, designed by Austen St. Barbe. Harrison, stands on ten acres facing the Old City walls. In addition to exhibition space, there are study galleries, record offices, a library, an auditorium, and offices. An ancient cemetery, dating from the sixth and fifth centuries B.C.E., was discovered on the site and excavated.

Before the termination of Britain's Palestine Mandate in 1948, the building was turned over to an international board. In November 1966, Jordan nationalized the museum and took possession of the building and its contents. After capturing Jerusalem during the Arab-Israel War of 1967, Israel took over the museum, claiming it as captured Jordanian state property. It entrusted the museum to the Israeli Department of Antiquities, which invited the Israel Museum to operate the exhibition galleries. This move created controversy. For example, when the Israel Museum tried to include some items from the Rockefeller Museum in an exhibition in the United States entitled "Treasures from the Holy Land: Ancient Art from the Israel Museum" in 1985, the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City challenged Israel's acquisition of some of the items. The U.S. Smithsonian Institution then agreed to host the exhibit the following year, but objected to the inclusion of eleven artifacts from the Rockefeller Museum. Israel refused to change the exhibition, which consequently was not shown.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967); ARCHAEOLOGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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MIA BLOOM
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

ROGERS, WILLIAM PIERCE

[1913–2001]

American secretary of state, 1969 to 1973.

William Pierce Rogers was born in June 1913 in Norfolk, New York. He graduated from Colgate University in 1934 and received a law degree from Cornell University in 1937. He served three Republican presidents in a public career that lasted nearly fifty years: He was Dwight Eisenhower's attorney general (1957–1961) and Richard M. Nixon's secretary of state (1969–1973) and in 1986, under Ronald Reagan, he headed the investigation into the *Challenger* space shuttle disaster.

As secretary of state, Rogers promoted a cease-fire in the Middle East that lasted from 1970 until

the 1973 war. His 1970 Rogers Peace Initiative was an effort to implement the 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242, which put forth principles for peace negotiations between Arabs and Israelis, including the principle of land for peace. Rogers's objective was "to encourage the parties to move to a just and lasting peace." The initiative was one of the key efforts that contributed to peace between Egypt and Israel in 1979.

Rogers was a 1973 recipient of the U.S. Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian honor, and he received several honorary doctorates, including one his alma mater, Colgate. He died of congestive heart disease in January 2001.

See also United Nations and the Middle East; United States of America and the Middle East.

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Zachary Karabell
Updated by Ahmed H. Ibrahim

ROLO FAMILY

Sephardic Jewish family of businessmen who had settled in Alexandria by the mid-nineteenth century.

The Rolo family produced a number of well-known and influential businessmen, among them Ruben (b. 1820), and his sons Simon, Giacomo (1847–1917), Robert S. (b. 1869), and Robert J. (b. 1876).

Robert S. Rolo gained the strongest influence in Egypt's economy among the family's members, since he served as a legal advisor to Crown Prince Fu'ad and was later regarded as a close confidant of the king, serving as an indispensable intermediary between the royal court and the British residency. He also served as director of the Egypt National Bank for many years. Ruben, Simon, and Giacomo Rolo joined forces with other Sephardic families, notably the Suarès and Cattaoui, in promoting such economic enterprises as the Helwan Railway and in creating Kum Ombo, Egypt's well-known agricultural company. Robert J. Rolo served as the president of Alexandria's Jewish community between 1934 and 1948.

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Michael M. Laskier

ROMAN CATHOLICISM AND ROMAN CATHOLIC MISSIONS

Native Middle Eastern groups or individuals or those who established religious institutions there to convert people to Roman Catholicism.

The term *Catholic* is ambiguous in the Middle East. In Arabic, it refers to the Melkites; in English, it refers to Christians of the Latin rite, usually called Roman Catholics in the United States.

Since the Christian Church evolved in the Middle East, differences in theology and ritual that had existed for centuries between the eastern and western parts of the Roman Empire led to a schism in 1054. In the West (Europe) the Latin rite became basic to the Roman Catholic church. In the East (Byzantium) the Byzantine state church prevailed until the rise of Islam in the seventh century C.E. The expansion of Islam was rapid, with Muslims conquering North Africa and the Iberian peninsula by the eighth century and ruling until the fifteenth century. In 1009 Muslims destroyed the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem; in 1095 Pope Urban II called for a holy war to "rescue the Holy Land from the Muslim infidels." To do this, the First Crusade was organized in 1096. The Crusaders, under Godfrey of Bouillon, succeeded in conquering Jerusalem in 1099. Seven more Crusades followed, with successes and failures, until the Mamluks of Egypt conquered Acre in 1291, evicting the Crusaders.

The Roman Catholic Church was reestablished in the Middle East in 1099, when a hierarchy under a Latin partriarchate at Jerusalem was established. By the end of the thirteenth century, however, after the Crusaders were evicted from the region, only the Franciscan Brothers stayed on as custodians of the shrines. As the Crusader venture

collapsed, the pope's contacts with the Mongols in central Asia inspired the Franciscan and Dominican orders to work among them, in the Ilkhanate of Persia, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Then after the fall of Constantinople (now Istanbul) to the Ottoman Turks in 1453—which ended the Byzantine Empire—Franciscan, Capuchin, Dominican, Carmelite, and later, Jesuit missionaries went to the provinces of the Ottoman Empire under the protection of European powers to try to convert Eastern Christians to Roman Catholicism.

In the nineteenth century the Latin-rite presence in North Africa increased because of the French occupation of Algeria. The ancient see of Carthage was restored in 1876. Cardinal Lavigerie was named primate of Africa, with more than one million Catholics in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia—where he founded the White Fathers and White Sisters to work in the region.

In 1847 the Latin patriarchate of Jerusalem had been reestablished and numerous missionaries, engaged in education and nursing, had been sent to Ottoman Palestine. During the twentieth century, however, with the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire by the Allies after World War I and the post–World War II independence of Israel, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, the Roman Catholic presence dwindled both in North Africa and in Palestine.

In 1990 the number of Latin-rite Roman Catholics throughout the Middle East was estimated to be 1.3 million (about 35 percent are migrant workers from Sri Lanka, India, and the Philippines). Some 566,000 Roman Catholics are indigenous to Sudan and more than 60,000 live in the West Bank and Jordan. These discrete communities are unusual for the region; most of the other Catholics form small communities or are family groups who left other local Christian churches, especially one of the Eastern Orthodox (which include the Nestorian and the Monophysite churches—the Coptic, Ethiopian, Armenian, and the Mar Thoma of India) or Uniate churches.

Arabia and the Gulf

The jurisdiction of the apostolic vicar for Arabia extends to the countries of the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf, excluding Kuwait, which has its own vicar. There are few local Catholics, but there are large

Students study theology at the Camboni School in Khartoum, the capital city of Sudan. © Gilbert Liz/Corbis Sygma. Reproduced by permission.

numbers of Palestinian, Indian, Sri Lankan, and Filipino workers in the region. The *Annuario Pontificio* counts 470,000 for 1990. There are parishes in the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) and Bahrain and Catholic schools in the U.A.E. and in Kuwait. In Saudi Arabia chaplains for foreign workers are allowed to operate "clandestinely," although this provokes occasional troubles. In North Yemen the government has called in nursing sisters to staff hospitals, and there are a few priests to care for expatriate Catholics.

Egypt

The three vicariates in Egypt had been reduced to one at Alexandria. While the official count of Latin Catholics is only 8,000, there are some 200 men and 1,000 women members of Latin orders and congregations, mostly engaged in education.

Syria

Syria, with a vicariate at Aleppo, lists 12,000 Latin Catholics, with about 250 men and women engaged in social and apostolic work since Catholic schools were closed in 1967.

Iraq

Baghdad is an episcopal see with an archbishop, but Latins number only a few thousand, and since

Catholic schools were closed in Iraq, only a few Latin-rite religious orders remain, staffing a seminary, a parish, and a hospital.

Lebanon

Lebanon has a large number of Latin-rite religious orders and congregations, with about 250 men and over 1,000 women working in 150 Catholic schools, a university, several hospitals, and numerous social ministries. The community numbers about 20,000.

West Bank and Jordan

In the West Bank and Jordan a substantial Palestinian community of 60,000 Roman Catholics has its own patriarch and diocesan clergy (about 60) who celebrate the Latin rite in Arabic. There is a Catholic University at Bethlehem and over 270 educational establishments. As this region is the Holy Land, it is a center for several Catholic religious orders.

Sudan

The largest Middle Eastern indigenous Roman Catholic community is found in Sudan. Some 217,000 Roman Catholics are in Juba and some 348,000 are in Khartoum. Each city has its local ordinary with a growing diocesan clergy aided by a few hundred men and women in non-Sudanese orders. The famine in the south has caused the displacement of many Sudanese Catholics.

North Africa

Morocco has two residential sees, one in Tangiers and one in Rabat, caring for some 40,000 Catholics, including over 200 men and women in religious orders engaged in a variety of social and educational works.

Algeria has a metropolitan see at Algiers with suffragan bishops in Oran and Constantine ministering to over 40,000 Catholics. Men and women in religious orders number about 350, many engaged in secular roles. In both Morocco and Algeria the diocesan clergy is substantial (about 50 in each) but of European origin.

There has been a prelature in Tunis since 1964, when a Vatican accord with the government suppressed the see of Carthage and closed all but 7 of its 100 churches. Catholics number over 15,000, cared for by 15 priests. Over 200 men and women in religious orders work in a variety of apostolates, including the research institute and library of the White Fathers.

Libya has a vicar apostolic and about 30 women in religious orders working in hospitals. Four religious men and one diocesan priest care for the spiritual needs of the 30,000 or so expatriate Catholics.

Iran and Turkey

Iran has a bishopric at Isfahan and a few priests and nuns caring for the Latin-rite community of 2,000. Turkey has an episcopal see in İzmir and a vicariate in Istanbul for some 7,000 Catholics. The number of Roman Catholic expatriates fluctuates with economic conditions; still, their presence in the Middle East, which had been relatively stable, is now in decline. Missionary vocations are sparse, and the need for educational and social help from expatriates is narrowing. At the same time, the Vatican is concerned about the increased emigration from indigenous Latin communities that has been provoked by political constraint and the resurgence of pan-Islamic sentiment.

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JOHN J. DONOHUE

ROMANIZATION

Writing the Turkish language in the Latin alphabet.

Turkic peoples have used a variety of scripts in the course of their history, the earliest being the Orkhon script known through eighth-century inscriptions found in Mongolia. With conversion to Islam, the Turks adopted the Arabic script and used it over the centuries. On 9 August 1928, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), president of the new Republic of Turkey, announced its replacement by a Latin alphabet—essentially phonetic, omitting q, w, and x; adding ç

(=*ch*), ğ ("soft" g), and ş (=*sh*); and including eight vowels: a, e, i, ı, o, ö, u, and ü.

Dissatisfaction with the Arabic script was not new. Discussion of and experimentation in modifying it date from the Tanzimat. The script, ill-suited to the Turkish phonetic system and hard to read and write (or print), was thus a prime cause of illiteracy. It symbolized adherence to Islam and Arab–Persian culture, and at a time when he was leading Turkey toward a new, Western-oriented way of life, Atatürk considered it a major obstacle to progress.

As for the Latin script, Namik Kemal was among the first to mention it as a suitable alternative (1879). Articles favoring it appeared in the early twentieth century, and Atatürk himself demonstrated its possibilities in Turkish sections of letters (otherwise in French) sent to a friend after becoming military attaché in Sofia (1913). During World War I, however, Enver Paşa devised a modified Arabic script for the military, but this had little effect.

Discussion continued under the republic, but a proposal for Latin letters was rejected at the 1923 İzmir Economic Congress. Interest increased, however, with the announcement of a romanization policy for the USSR's Turkic languages (a policy later reversed in favor of Cyrillic). On 24 May 1928 the Grand National Assembly legislated the introduction of international numerals, and Atatürk determined to proceed with the alphabet. A commission studying the plan submitted its proposed alphabet on 1 August 1928. Eight days later Atatürk announced its adoption, admonishing everyone to learn it as a patriotic duty.

Atatürk also demanded a speedy transition, and on 3 November 1928 the Grand National Assembly approved the new script. Turks were required to prove ability to use it in place of the Arabic script by the beginning of 1929, passing an examination or attending "national schools" set up across the country. The assembly also decreed that printing in the old script was illegal, and by the middle of 1929 all publications were being printed in the new script.

Romanization coupled with language reform affected many aspects of Turkish life. By breaking with traditions of the Ottoman-Islamic past, it stimulated Turkish nationalism and secularization. It facilitated dissemination of information, improved education and the literacy level, speeded modernization and technology through increased interaction with the West, and helped lead Turks to ever greater social and political awareness.

See also Arabic Script; İzmir Economic Congress; Turkish Language.

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Kathleen R. F. Burrill

ROME, TREATY OF

French–Italian pact in which some Middle Eastern territory changed hands.

In an effort to obtain Italy's support against Nazi Germany, France's foreign minister Pierre Laval signed the Treaty of Rome with Italy's dictator Benito Mussolini on 7 January 1935. France conceded small amounts of land in North and East Africa to Italy and, according to some accounts, the negotiations involved an unwritten pledge by Laval to support Italian claims in Ethiopia. When World War II began in 1939, Italy was allied with Germany, and Germany occupied France, so prewar agreements were negated or renegotiated.

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Zachary Karabell

ROMMEL, ERWIN

[1891–1944]

German general (field marshal) in World War II.

Erwin Rommel (1891–1944), shown with a German officer in a car during inspection of German troops sent to aid the Italian army in Libya, North Africa, in 1941. Rommel, a German general, was called the "Desert Fox" for his brilliant military acts in World War II battles in North Africa. **© AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.**

Erwin Rommel, the Desert Fox, is best known as the commander of the Afrika Korps, which took North Africa during the early years of World War II. Assuming command in February 1941, Rommel reversed Italian setbacks and crossed North Africa from west to east, driving the British into Egypt by May 1942. Hitler ordered a drive on Cairo and the Suez Canal, which led to the defeat of the Afrika Korps at al-Alamayn in November 1942, while Rommel was on sick leave in Germany. With his troops in retreat from the British Eighth Army, Rommel retired to Germany in March 1943, disenchanted with war and Hitler's politics. Implicated in a plot on Hitler's life, he committed suicide by poison in October 1944.

See also Alamayn, al-.

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Daniel E. Spector

ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN DELANO

[1882–1945]

Thirty-second president of the United States.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt was born at Hyde Park, New York; he died of a cerebral hemorrhage at Warm Springs, Georgia. Born into a wealthy family (a distant cousin of President Theodore Roosevelt), he attended Groton, Harvard, and Columbia Law. In 1905, he married Anna Eleanor Roosevelt (another distant cousin), and in 1907 began a law practice in New York City.

Early Career

His political career began in 1910, with his election to the New York State Senate. An opponent of the Democratic party's machine in New York City called Tammany Hall, he soon gained a reputation for independence and progressivism within the Democratic party. He worked for Woodrow Wilson's presidential campaign and was made assistant secretary of the Navy in Wilson's administration from 1913 to 1920, becoming the Democratic nominee for vice president in 1920. When the Cox/Roosevelt ticket lost to the Republican Harding/Coolidge ticket, he returned to his law practice. In August 1921, infantile paralysis left his legs and lower abdomen paralyzed.

Through exercise and treatment, Roosevelt recovered some movement of his lower limbs and was able to continue his law practice and civic affairs. He supported the popular New York City Democrat Alfred E. Smith in the presidential races of 1924 and 1928, then reentered elective politics himself to win the governorship of New York State in 1928 and 1930. In 1932, during the worst of the Great Depression, he won the first of his four presidential elections. His New Deal helped him remain in office throughout the Depression and World War II—one of the most pivotal periods of the nation's history.

Presidential Career—Foreign Policy and World War II

During the 1930s, Roosevelt's foreign policy reflected the isolationist mood of the nation. Relations with Germany, Italy, and Japan cooled; neutrality prevailed after Italy's attacks in North Africa and Germany's on Poland (1939); and the Lend-Lease Program of March 1941 provided matériel to Britain and other nations at war before the United States formally entered World War II in December 1941, after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.

During World War II, Roosevelt cooperated closely with the Allies, including the Soviet Union.

He traveled to hold a series of conferences with the heads of state of the major Allied powers, in which he agreed that Europe would be the first priority, with a second front opened against Germany and Italy (the Axis) at the earliest time. This began with the invasion of North Africa by U.S. and British forces in November 1942 (against German and Italian troops), followed by landings on Sicily (a German-occupied Italian island in the Mediterranean) in July 1943, and culminating with the invasion of German-held Normandy (northern France) in June 1944. Crucial to the European theater was the support of Middle Eastern countries. During the December 1943 Tehran Conference, Roosevelt sponsored a communiqué recognizing Iran's contributions to the war effort and expressing support for Iran's independence and territorial integrity. Shortly thereafter, Roosevelt and Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill met in Cairo and requested that Turkey enter the war, a goal that had been pursued by the British since late 1942. Turkey agreed in principle, in exchange for arms support, but a British mission in early 1944 was unable to achieve much; Turkey finally declared war on Germany in February 1945.

Japan's forces were being steadily conquered in the Pacific islands and nations under their occupation and control, and Roosevelt insisted on a policy of unconditional surrender, with the formation of a United Nations to guide world peace in the postwar years. Although he did not live to see either, his vice president, Harry S. Truman, became president on his death, 12 April 1945; Truman had two atomic bombs (developed during the Roosevelt Administration) dropped on Japan in August 1945 and received Japan's unconditional surrender 14 August 1945; Germany had already surrendered in May 1945. Truman also appointed Roosevelt's widow, Eleanor, to join the U.S. delegation at the United Nations; there she headed the UN Commission on Human Rights and was influential in helping to settle the Palestine partition in 1947/48 that resulted in the formation of the State of Israel (1948), which Truman was the first to recognize and back with diplomatic relations.

Wartime Policies toward Refugee Jews and the Middle East

During the war years, victory had been Roosevelt's primary objective. By 1942, although it was clear



U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt met with Winston Churchill in Casablanca, Morocco, in 1943. Here they announced that they would accept only an unconditional surrender by the Axis nations. This conference set the basis and direction for the rest of the war. COURTESY OF THE FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT LIBRARY. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

that Hitler's program aimed at territorial conquest, it was also clear that total destruction of Europe's Jews was part of the Nazi plan. Advised by members of his administration that any increase in U.S. immigration would meet strong opposition and might affect a successful war effort, Roosevelt did not pursue that route of relief. He also declined to overcome the objections of the U.S. Department of State to ransoming Jews from Nazi-occupied Romania, Bulgaria, and France. He was told that using war matériel to move Jews to Palestine and/or North Africa might incite the Arabs or even cause vindictive action by the Nazis. As the war progressed, the role of petroleum-rich Saudi Arabia increased in importance to the United States.

Before 1940, the United States had no diplomatic representation in Saudi Arabia. The primary U.S. presence was the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), which had been operating a sixty-year oil concession since 1933. With the beginning of war, ARAMCO activities were curtailed and Muslim pilgrims ceased their pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina—both of which caused an economic crisis for Saudi Arabia. Although Germany and Japan would have welcomed the chance to provide assistance and gain an influential oil-rich ally, Saudi King Ibn Saʿud preferred to continue his alliance with the United States; in early 1941, he re-

quested a loan of thirty million U.S. dollars from ARAMCO to cover lost royalties and, when ARAMCO could not do this, applied to the U.S. government for assistance. Roosevelt was reluctant at first—he had no legislative authority to do this—but he soon managed to have loan monies that had gone to Britain partially diverted to Saudi Arabia, thereby averting that country's bankruptcy. By 1945, Britain had in this way provided some 2.5 million pounds sterling to Saudi Arabia (although after 1943 Lend-Lease was extended and included Saudi Arabia).

Roosevelt's policy on victims of Nazi oppression reflected the general mood of the United States. Fearing that immigration would bring foreign agents (who would cause trouble from within the U.S.) as well as an increase of unemployment (during what was still the Depression, before war work increased necessary jobs nationwide), his administration strictly enforced the very limited quotas of the National Origins Act of 1924. In 1939, he allowed some 27,000 German and Austrian refugees into the United States; this was after the *Anschluss* (German annexation of Austria), when 190,000 Jews were being expelled from Austria, most into countries that were soon to be occupied by Nazi troops. In 1939, Roosevelt also sponsored a conference of thirty-two nations to discuss the refugee problem—the conference was not able to achieve anything of substance, and Britain refused to discuss the possibility of immigration to Palestine. U.S. immigration actually decreased in 1939 to below the level allowed by the quotas, but this decline was attributed to the transfer of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice.

With regard to Jewish immigration to Palestine, Roosevelt was balancing an inclination to support Zionism with the realities of World War II and the consequent pressures from both his Arab and British allies. In 1943, he assured Abdullah I Ibn Hussein, amir of Transjordan, that the United States would not make decisions about Jewish immigration to Palestine that would be hostile to the Arabs. Meeting with King Ibn Saʿud after the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Roosevelt gave him similar assurances, recapping them in a letter on April 5th. At the same time, Roosevelt had also been expressing support for Zionism; in February 1944 a joint resolution was put before Congress (1) to support unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine and (2) for the development of Palestine as a Jewish commonwealth. The vote on this was postponed after General George C. Marshall expressed concern over the impact it might have in the Arab world. Instead, Roosevelt made a public statement in favor of Zionism.

A month earlier, in January of 1944, Roosevelt had agreed to a proactive policy toward refugees from Nazi Europe, including the Jews. This had been the result of a report by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., "On Acquiescence of This Government to the Murder of the Jews." Roosevelt established the War Refugee Board, with its charter to rescue those singled out for destruction. The board avoided the problem of U.S. immigration quotas by establishing emergency rescue shelters to house the refugees temporarily. The change in policy was too late for most of Europe's Jews, and it was not accompanied by a change in bombing policies—which might have been aimed at disrupting the rail lines and ancillary activities that led to the concentration camps.

Roosevelt's strength began to fail during the last year of the war, although his charisma and charm continued to be felt by his people, who championed his efforts with his allies and against his enemies. His personal leadership during the war was recorded on news film and broadcast on radio. Only many years after his death was his administration criticized with respect to its handling of the Middle East situation.

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Daniel E. Spector

ROOSEVELT, KERMIT

[1916–2000]

Theodore Roosevelt's grandson, who, as a CIA agent, became involved in Middle Eastern affairs.

Born in Argentina, Kermit Roosevelt graduated from Harvard University and, after a short teaching career, joined the Office of Strategic Services and, following World War II, its successor, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Roosevelt confirmed rumors that the 1953 coup in Iran that led to the downfall of the nationalist government of Mohammad Mossadegh and the restoration of the Pahlavi dynasty was staged by the CIA and, in his account of the events, supported by the U.S. government. Roosevelt was also deeply involved in the Suez Crisis of 1956, and some sources hold him responsible for the failure of the U.S. secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, to convince Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser to cancel an arms deal with the Soviet Union. They moreover accuse Roosevelt, and the CIA, of undermining the State Department by counseling Nasser to ignore Dulles. Roosevelt resigned from the CIA during the Eisenhower administration and, after working in the oil business, founded his own corporation in 1964. In 1975 the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee reported that Roosevelt had used his CIA contacts in Iran and Saudi Arabia to win government contracts for the Northrop Corporation, a major U.S. aircraft manufacturer.

In 2000 the *New York Times* obtained a copy of the CIA's secret history of the coup, which by most accounts was written by Donald Wilber, an Iranist and part-time CIA operative. The account expanded significantly on what Roosevelt had volunteered about the U.S. government's role in overthrowing the government of Mossadegh.

See also Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Dulles, John Foster; Mossadegh, Mohammad.

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Neguin Yavari

ROSHANFEKR

See Glossary

ROTHSCHILD, EDMOND DE

[1845–1935]

Jewish philanthropist active in Palestine.

Known as the Benefactor *(ha-Nadiv),* Edmond James de Rothschild, scion of the Rothschild banking family, was born in Paris. His concern in 1882 to give sanctuary to Eastern European pogrom victims was translated into a commitment for the development of a self-supporting Jewish homeland and finally a state. His assistance to the Jewish settlements of Rishon le-Zion and Zikhron Yaʿakov in Palestine (1883–1884) rescued them from financial collapse. Rothschild purchased land and equipped the colonies he established. He also supported the development of cash crops and industry. For example, after establishing a winepress at Rishon le-Zion in the early 1890s, he formed a company that began to market its wines in 1896.

Insisting that his support not be purely charitable, Rothschild was determined that the colonies be self-supporting. When the Jewish immigrants could not make them succeed, he appointed his own managers and staff, hired workers, and underwrote agricultural experimentation, to the chagrin of the Zionist socialists who, after the start of the twentieth century, began to dominate the Zionist enterprise.

Acceding to the wishes of the leadership of Hovevei Zion, Rothschild transferred the administration of his settlements to the Jewish Colonization Association, which had been established to administer philanthropic monies to Jews in need of economic support. In 1924, under the auspices of his son, James Armand de Rothschild, who had arrived in Palestine as a British soldier with General Edmund Allenby, the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (PICA) was established. It supported kibbutzim, moshavim, and Jewish settlements; swamp drainage; stabilization of sand dunes; agricultural

research; and educational and cultural institutions. PICA encouraged the development of industrial enterprises, and after 1948 bought and modernized flour mills, saltworks, and chemical enterprises, many of which were turned over to the State of Israel after the death of James de Rothschild and the termination of PICA (both in 1957).

Rothschild visited Palestine often, touring his settlements and assessing their progress. In 1929, he was made honorary president of the Jewish Agency. Rothschild is buried in Israel overlooking the colonies Zikhron Yaʿakov (named after his father) and Binyamina (named after himself; his Hebrew name was Avraham Binyamin), and the area near Caesarea where he had funded clearing of malarial swamps.

See also ALLENBY, EDMUND HENRY; JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE; JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION; RISHON LE-ZION; ZIKHRON YAʿAKOV.

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REEVA S. SIMON

ROYAL DUTCH SHELL

An Anglo-Dutch petroleum conglomerate.

The Royal Dutch Shell group of companies was created in 1907 from the merger of the Royal Dutch and Shell oil companies. More commonly known as Shell, the group is one of the largest oil companies in the world and is one of the Seven Sisters. Though headquartered in London, the company's main interests were in Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and Turkey until nationalization of oil resources by the Gulf countries. It had no sizable role in the oil industry of Saudi Arabia. In 2001, the company had 91,000 employees worldwide, sales of $135 billion, and net assets of $56 billion.

JEAN-FRANÇOIS SEZNEC

RUB AL-KHALI

Sand desert with an area of 200,000 square miles (518,000 sq. km) shared by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Yemen; one of the largest sand deserts in the world.

Rub al-Khali (the Empty Quarter) has no permanent settlements and is separated from populated areas by wide gravel plains devoid of vegetation. The northern part is watered by occasional winter rains, while the southern part is sometimes watered by spillover of monsoon rains from the Indian Ocean. Al-Murra and al-Dawasir bedouin frequent the northern parts of the Empty Quarter, where their camels feed on bushes and grasses that grow in the sand. Al-Manasir (of Abu Dhabi) and al-Duru (of Oman) tribes roam the eastern regions while the al-Kathir and al-Rawashid of Oman and the al-Manahil and Saʿar of Yemen use the southern and western reaches. The Rub al-Khali's boundaries have been mostly demarcated. In 1974 the borders between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. (Abu Dhabi) were agreed; in 1990 Saudi Arabia and Oman signed a border treaty; in 1992 Oman and the new Republic of Yemen reached an agreement; and in 2000 Saudi Arabia and Yemen finalized their land boundaries.

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ELEANOR ABDELLA DOUMATO
UPDATED BY J. E. PETERSON

RUBINSTEIN, AMNON

[1931–]

Israeli law professor and political leader.

Born in Tel Aviv, Amnon Rubinstein studied at the Hebrew University and became a member of the bar in 1963. He earned a Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics in 1966 and served as a professor (1961–1975) and dean (1968–1973) of the law faculty at Tel Aviv University. In 1974 he founded the centrist Shinui Party, which advocated free enterprise, electoral reform, and the formulation of a written constitution. In 1977 Shinui was part of the Democratic Movement for Change Party, but it broke away in 1978 and Rubinstein became its chair. In 1992 Shinui joined Ratz (Citizens' Rights Movement) and MAPAM (United Workers Party) to form Meretz (Vigor), and won twelve seats in the Knesset.

Rubinstein has served on many key Knesset committees, serving as chair of the Knesset Economic Committee and the Knesset Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee. From 1984 to 1988 Rubinstein was communications minister in a national unity government; from 1992 to 1996 he was minister of education and culture. Rubenstein is one of the best-known scholars in the Knesset, having written several books and many articles in the popular press and in academic periodicals on political and legal topics.

See also ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN.

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BRYAN DAVES
UPDATED BY GREGORY S. MAHLER

RUMELIA

The European part of the Ottoman Empire, in particular the Balkan peninsula.

Formerly written as *Rum-ili*, the word *Rumelia* has its origins in the medieval Muslim practice of referring to the Byzantine as Rum and their territory as Bilad al-Rum. With the arrival of the Turks in Anatolia and, in particular, with the advancement of the Ottoman Empire, the use of Rum to designate Western Anatolia survived and evolved eventually into Rumelia or Rumeli.

During the reign of the Ottoman sultan Murat I (1362–1389), Rumelia emerged as a name to designate Ottoman territories in Europe, governed as a separate military-administrative region under the rule of a beylerbeyi, the first such governorate of its kind in the Ottoman Empire. It was around this time, too, that the empire was officially divided into two large administrative regions straddling the Sea of Marmara: Rumelia and Anadolu (Anatolia). At first, each successive territorial conquest in Europe, up to the Danube, was added to the beylerbeyi of Rumelia. After 1541, with the establishment of the governorate of Budin and Bosnia, the number of beylerbeyis began to proliferate. In the nineteenth century, during the Tanzimat, the administrative divisions of Rumelia underwent further changes. Finally, in 1894, Rumelia was officially subdivided into the *vilayets* (provinces) of Edirne, Selanik, Qoskova, Yanya, Ishqodra, and Manastir.

Currently the word is generally understood to refer to the triangular region between Istanbul and Edirne and the peninsula of Gallipoli—all that remains of Turkish Europe. The word is, however, no longer used in official documents or atlases; rather Trakya, a Turkish variant of Thrace, is used instead. The last official recorded use of Rumelia was during the Turkish War of Independence in 1919.

Today it is used most commonly by the residents of Istanbul to distinguish the European side of the city from the Anatolian. It forms an integral part of many a place name on the European side, such as Rumelihisari and Rumelifenerai.

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KAREN PINTO

RUPPIN, ARTHUR

[1876–1943]

Sociologist and Zionist official.

Born in the Prussian province of Posen (now Poznan in western Poland), Arthur Ruppin became head of the Palestine office of the World Zionist Organization in 1908. Ruppin's leadership opened a new epoch of Zionist settlement in Ottoman Pales-

tine. The restoration of constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 created some opportunities for Jewish settlers. Ruppin, a technician and social theorist, negotiated the purchase of large tracts of land in the Jezreel valley and mobilized funds to add to Jewish neighborhoods in Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem. Through his official position and personal influence, he provided financial support for young Jewish pioneers, who developed the kibbutz and moshav as new types of collective agricultural communities.

Ruppin grew up in Europe during a period of rapid economic change that brought ruin to his family, forcing him to leave school at fifteen. Apprenticed to a grain merchant, Ruppin was quickly promoted to office manager. After completing secondary school, he studied law and economics at the universities of Berlin and Halle. A scholar and a man of action, Ruppin's *The Jews in the Modern World* (1904) laid the foundation for the study of the sociology of Jewry. He lectured in Palestine, in sociology at the Hebrew University, and directed Palestine's Institute for Economic Research. On behalf of the Jewish Agency (the liaison between Palestinian Jews and the British mandate authorities), he promoted policies to develop Jewish industry and agriculture. During World War I, he saved Palestine's Jews from starvation by supervising the distribution of American funds, even after he was exiled in 1916 to Istanbul. In the last decade of his life, he aided the absorption of German Jews fleeing the Nazis. A founder of Brit Shalom in 1925, Ruppin advocated, for a short time, the establishment of Palestine as a binational state. While he modified this view, he stressed the importance of Palestinian Jews reaching an agreement with Palestinian Arabs that would not compromise Zionist goals. He died in Jerusalem in 1943.

See also BINATIONALISM; JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE; JEZREEL VALLEY; KIBBUTZ; MOSHAV; PALESTINE LAND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO); YOUNG TURKS.

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DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

RUŞDIYE SCHOOLS

Ottoman secular primary schools.

The first *ruşdiye* primary schools were established in 1838 at the Süleymaniye and Sultan Ahmet mosques in Istanbul by Sultan Mahmud II, to prepare young men to attend his new technical schools. These schools slowly became an alternative to the religious education system, numbering sixty by 1853. Their graduates staffed the Ottoman Empire's expanding administration and military during the Tanzimat era and beyond. In the early years, students aged ten to fifteen years (and later even younger) studied languages, mathematics, science, history, and religion for four years. By the late nineteenth century, nearly every provincial town had a ruşdiye school. In 1895, more than thirty-five thousand students, about four thousand of them non-Muslim, attended the state-run ruşdiye schools. The first ruşdiye for girls was founded in 1858.

The military built its own system of schools beginning in 1855, and its ruşdiye schools enrolled eight thousand boys in 1895. İdadi (middle) Schools were added in the late nineteenth century. In addition, in 1895 a separate system of millet ruşdiye schools, run by various religious groups, enrolled seventy-six thousand non-Muslim students.

See also İDADI SCHOOLS; TANZIMAT.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

RUSK, DEAN

[1909–1994]

American secretary of state.

David Dean Rusk was born in Georgia. A Rhodes Scholar, he studied at Saint John's College, Oxford, and later at the University of California Law School in Berkeley. During World War II, Rusk served in the army in the China-Burma-India theater, rising

to the rank of colonel. He held key positions in the Department of State (1946–1952) and helped implement the Marshall Plan and U.S. Far East policy. From 1952 to 1961, he was president of the Rockefeller Foundation. He served as secretary of state (1961–1969) in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

He was a hawkish steward of American foreign policy during the Cold War, believing in the use of military action to combat communism. Rusk emphasized diplomatic efforts during the Cuban missile crisis and North Korea's seizure of the USS *Pueblo,* but advocated military escalation in the Vietnam War (1955–1975). On the Palestinian refugee issue, Rusk followed former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in hoping (in vain) that the U.S. administration would apply pressure on Israel to make a generous gesture regarding compensation and return. He cautioned against acceding to Israel's requests for a security guarantee on the grounds that it would harm American interests in the region without appreciably enhancing Israeli security. In the build-up to the Middle East crisis of 1967, he strongly endorsed plans for sending a U.S.-led multinational flotilla through the Strait of Tiran to challenge Egypt's blockade of Israel's southern port of Eilat, but he advised against President Johnson's giving the Israelis a yellow (or amber) light to proceed cautiously with a preemptive attack on Egypt. His post-1967 behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts paved the way for the 1969 Rogers Plan. Ending his years of government service, Rusk taught international law at the University of Georgia from 1970 to 1984.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Refugees: Palestinian.

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Charles C. Kolb

RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

From Catherine the Great's 1774 victory against the Ottoman Empire until the late twentieth century, Russian/Soviet policy was to rule the Black Sea and the lands around it.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Russia increased pressure on the Ottoman and Persian empires in an attempt to capture parts of the Black and Caspian seacoasts, as well as of the Caucasian interior. Persia's refusal to recognize Russia's 1801 annexation of Georgia led to a war (1804–1813) and a Russian victory. According to the Treaty of Golestan (1813), Persia lost a large part of the Caucasus, including Georgia, as well as parts of the western Caspian coast. Persia also recognized Russian naval preeminence in the Caspian Sea.

The next round for the control of the central Caucasus was fought between 1826 and 1828. It, too, ended in a Russian victory. Under the terms of the Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828), Persia relinquished to Russia part of Armenia and recognized the Aras River as the Transcaucasian boundary between the two states. In addition, Persia granted Russia important commercial concessions and extraterritorial privileges, enabling Saint Petersburg to establish a strong political and economic position in the Persian Empire. In the late 1850s Russia turned its attention to Transcaspian Muslim central Asia, conquering the Khanate of Khiva in 1873 and Kokand and Bokhara in 1876. The process was completed in the mid-1880s with the annexation of Merv and Panjdeh, situated near the Afghan border. In 1881 Persia agreed to the Atrek River as the Transcaspian boundary with Russia.

Russia's southward expansion alarmed Great Britain, for Russian control of the Turkish Straits would threaten part of the maritime lifeline of the British Empire. London was also alarmed at the steady Russian encroachment into Persia and, later, Afghanistan. If unchecked, these advances would ultimately bring the Russians to the border of India, the crown jewel of the British Empire. Hence, throughout the nineteenth century, London attempted to prevent Russia from overrunning the Ottoman and Persian empires and from making major inroads into Afghanistan. In the early twentieth century, however, fear of imperial Germany prompted Britain and Russia to reconcile their dif-



A meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow at which Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, pictured at right, sits across from Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin, and Anastas Mikoyan, pictured from left to right. Both the Russian and Middle Eastern leaders were critical of U.S. attacks on North Vietnam. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ferences in Asia. According to their 1907 treaty, Afghanistan became a British sphere of influence and Persia was split into three zones: Russia dominated the northern and Great Britain the southern parts of the country; separating them was a third, or neutral, zone. After the outbreak of World War I, the two allies concluded the Constantinople Agreement (1915), stipulating that after the war Russia would occupy the Turkish Straits. This dramatic reversal of long-standing British policy was dictated by the necessity of keeping Russia in the allied coalition.

Tsarist Russia did not survive to enjoy the fruits of victory over the Central powers. The communist regime, in power after November 1917, renounced the concessions secured by its predecessor, proclaimed itself an ally of the exploited masses, and, in 1921, concluded treaties of friendship and neutrality with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. Nonaggression treaties with Turkey and Afghanistan were signed in 1925 and 1926, respectively.

The Soviet Union and the Middle East, 1945 to 1991

During World War II, after Germany invaded the U.S.S.R. in 1941, Soviet and British troops occupied Iran to secure a safe supply route for the flow of Allied war matériel to the Soviet Union. The treaty of alliance concluded between Iran, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. in 1942 provided for the withdrawal of foreign forces not later than six months after the end of the war. By early 1946 the British had pulled out, but the Soviets remained. They left later in the year, after Tehran had signed an agreement permitting Soviet oil exploration in northern Iran (it was never implemented). More significantly, Washington exerted pressure on Moscow to abide by the 1942 agreement.

Stalin's refusal to leave Iran was but one of the perceived indications of his aggressiveness. As seen in the West, his ambitions in the Middle East complemented Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe and the Far East. In 1945 Stalin renounced the Soviet-Turkish nonaggression treaty and renewed tsarist claims to Turkish territory, including the Straits. He was also held responsible for efforts by Greek communists to topple that country's pro-Western government. Washington responded by promulgating the Truman Doctrine (1947), which assumed responsibility for the defense of Greece and Turkey. The U.S. Sixth Fleet was deployed in the Mediterranean in 1946 and its presence was later augmented by Strategic Air Command bombers based in Morocco, Libya, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Jupiter missiles followed in the 1950s and Polaris submarines in the 1960s. By means of the Eisenhower Doctrine (1955), Washington pledged to defend the Middle East against Soviet aggression, and the Baghdad Pact, consisting of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Great Britain, was formed during the same year.

The vast accumulation of U.S. power in and near the Mediterranean was seen in Moscow as a threat to its security. Hence, for much of the post-Stalin period the U.S.S.R. worked hard to neutralize the U.S. military presence in the vicinity of its southern border. As part of the general superpower competition, the Soviets made a major effort to establish a viable naval and air presence in the Middle East. A naval squadron was permanently deployed in the Mediterranean in 1964, but naval and air bases became available in Egypt only in 1970. Cairo withdrew these privileges later in the decade, but by then the Middle East had ceased to represent a major strategic threat to the U.S.S.R. Ironically, this was due not to Soviet countermeasures but to technological advances: Washington came to rely on land-based and submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles. Until 1991 the U.S.S.R.,

mainly for political reasons, maintained its Mediterranean squadron and had access to facilities in Syria, Algeria, Libya, and Yemen. The most dramatic projection of Soviet power in the post-1945 Middle East occurred in Afghanistan. To preserve a faltering communist regime, Soviet troops entered the country in 1979. They were withdrawn in 1989, leaving Afghanistan stalemated militarily and politically.

An early Soviet political objective was to undermine Western positions in the Middle East. The trend was set by Stalin's support of the partition of Palestine and of the State of Israel (1947–1948), and it lasted into the Gorbachev period. Western influence has declined from the peak reached in 1945, but this process was initiated by local actors, pursuing their own (not Soviet) interests. The U.S.S.R. played a part by lending moral and material support to regional leaders who were refused Western assistance or arms, but its role was facilitative and, therefore, secondary.

In addition, especially during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, the U.S.S.R. attempted to strengthen its own position and to gain U.S. recognition as a political equal in the Middle East. Efforts to improve Moscow's standing were crowned with some short-term successes. In the 1950s the Soviet Union established working relations with Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Algeria. Later, treaties of friendship and cooperation were signed with Egypt (1971), Iraq (1974), and Syria (1980). However, these apparent gains did not net the U.S.S.R. any permanent, long-term benefits.

Egypt abrogated its treaty in 1976. In 1980 Iraq attacked Iran without consulting the Kremlin. Moscow's ensuing attempts to maintain evenhanded relations with the combatants during their eight-year war led ultimately to a deterioration of both sets of relationships. Gorbachev's realization of the cost-ineffectiveness of the Kremlin's political involvement in the Middle East was partly responsible for his decision to disengage from the Soviet commitment to the Arabs in their conflict with Israel, an obligation that Moscow had maintained through the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods. Lastly, efforts to gain U.S. recognition of Moscow's political parity in the Middle East had also been unsuccessful.

One of the regional problems that the U.S.S.R. had used to advance its political interests in the Middle East was the Arab–Israel conflict. In 1953, in a major about-face, the Soviets abandoned Stalin's policy of support for the Zionist cause and sided with the Arabs. In the ensuing years Moscow extended Egypt and Syria large-scale military and economic assistance and adopted a strong pro-Arab and anti-Israeli position. With some modifications, this attitude was maintained well into the 1980s. Among other things, the U.S.S.R. recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the official representative of the Palestinian Arabs and backed the Arab states in the Arab–Israel wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973. In 1967 Moscow broke diplomatic relations with Israel. As noted, a major change in the Soviet position occurred in the late 1980s when "new thinking" in Gorbachev's foreign policy led the Kremlin to improve relations with Israel. Large-scale Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R. to Israel was accompanied by the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two states in 1991. As Moscow's policy became "evenhanded," to the chagrin of the Arabs, the U.S.S.R. ceased to play an important role in the Arab-Israel conflict.

Before 1970 the U.S.S.R. had no important economic interests in the Middle East. In the 1970s and 1980s the Soviets became heavily involved in selling arms to Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Iran. These transactions, worth tens of billions of dollars, ranked second to petroleum sales as the U.S.S.R.'s main earner of foreign currency. (The stunning superiority of Western arms over the Soviet weapons in the hands of the Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 has seriously eroded the market value of such Russian-made armaments for the foreseeable future.) In addition, the U.S.S.R. bartered various types of goods and services for Iraqi, Libyan, and Algerian oil and Iranian gas. Until its dissolution, the U.S.S.R. looked at the oil-rich Persian Gulf states as sources of capital in restructuring the Soviet economy.

On balance, between 1945 and 1991 the U.S.S.R. can be said to have improved its military position vis-à-vis the Middle East in the sense that no strategic threat to Soviet security emanated from the region. But the U.S.S.R. also suffered disappointments and setbacks, and its military and political gains usually proved temporary. In the 1990s the U.S.S.R.'s position was further weakened by the collapse of the Soviet economy and

Gorbachev's frantic efforts to revive it by normalizing relations with the Western powers, especially the United States. Given these priorities, the continuation of superpower competition in the Middle East made little sense from the new Soviet perspective. As contiguous states with a large Muslim population, however, Russia and the various independent republics that were formed from the Soviet Union in 1992 will inevitably remain interested parties in the regional affairs of the Middle East.

Relations with the Russian Federation States, 1991 to the Present

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, a weakened Russian Federation, no longer following the "anti-imperialist" foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. and increasingly concerned with economic development and protecting Russia's southern borders, focused its Middle East policy primarily on four countries: Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Iraq. Iran was the closest Middle East ally of post-Soviet Russia. Moscow was Iran's primary supplier of military equipment; the two countries cooperated diplomatically in a number of areas including Tajikistan, where they jointly arranged a cease-fire; TransCaucasia, where until 2001 they worked together against Azerbaijan; and Afghanistan, where they both opposed the Taliban. The centerpiece of the relationship was the nuclear reactor that Russia, despite strong U.S. opposition, was constructing for Iran at Bushehr. The one major area of disagreement was the demarcation of the Caspian Sea.

Economics also was a major factor in the Israeli-Russian relationship, with trade rising to over a billion dollars per year by 2002. The relationship was also marked by extensive cultural cooperation and the joint development and sale of military equipment. The major problem in the relationship was Russia's supply of the nuclear reactor to Iran, which Israel saw as a major enemy. Similarly, economics played an increasingly important role in the Turkish-Russian relationship. With trade rising to over $10 billion annually before the Russian economic collapse in 1998, Turkey became Russia's leading trading partner in the Middle East. There had been a rivalry between Turkey and Russia in Central Asia in the 1990s, as well as serious disagreements over ethnic issues, with Russia alleging Turkish aid to the Chechen rebellions, and Turkey alleging Russian assistance to the terrorist Kurdish Workers Party. But by 2000, with the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline being built to carry Russian natural gas to Turkey, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov could state that the Turkish-Russian relationship had moved from rivalry to partnership. Finally, in its relations with Iraq, Russia hoped to recover as much as possible of the $8 billion in debt owed to Moscow by the regime of Saddam Hussein, as well as obtain business opportunities for Russian companies such as LUKOIL. Despite opposing the Anglo-American attack on Iraq in 2003 that ousted the Hussein regime, and the subsequent military occupation of the country, Russia pursued business opportunities with the Iraqi Governing Council that was appointed by the United States, and Moscow held out the possibility of reducing the Iraqi debt in return for contracts for Russian companies.

See also Afghanistan: Soviet Intervention in; Baghdad Pact (1955); Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich; Communism in the Middle East; Turkmanchai, Treaty of (1828).

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Oles M. Smolansky
Updated by Robert O. Freedman

RUSSIAN–OTTOMAN WARS

Wars between the Russian and Ottoman empires over opposing expansionist policies.

During the nineteenth century, Russia's approach to the Ottoman Empire was governed by several distinct but interrelated considerations. In terms of military strategy, the Black Sea provided access to the rich Ukrainian plain, which became regarded as Russia's "soft underbelly," and entry into the Black Sea was possible only through the Turkish Straits, the gateway to and from the Mediterranean. Hence, control of the straits became an important Russian objective. As the European powers awakened to Russian ambitions, Russia modified its quest for annexation of Ottoman territory and attempted to establish protectorates in such regions as the principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia) and Bulgaria. Other Slavic nationalities struggling against Ottoman control also represented a political interest. Economically, trade in and beyond the Black Sea became an important concern, especially after the fertile lands along the northern shore were opened to cultivation. Reinforcing these interests, Russia's role as protector of Greek Orthodoxy in the Ottoman Empire added yet another dimension to the quest for dominance in the Black Sea region.

Europe's preoccupation with Napoléon Bonaparte early in the century enabled Russia to consolidate its position in the Black Sea area. The Treaty of Bucharest (1812) ended a six-year war by ceding to Russia Bessarabia and territory in the western Caucasus and extending privileges in the principalities. In 1829 Tsar Nicholas I (r. 1825–1855) used the Greek War of Independence as reason to declare a war against the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans lost and in the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) ceded to Russia the mouth of the Danube and additional territory in the Caucasus. The treaty also conferred autonomy upon the principalities, placed them under Russian protection, and, for the first time, guaranteed Russian merchant ships free passage through the straits.

In 1833 Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Hunkar-Iskelesi, one of only two treaties of mutual assistance entered into by the two states. (The first, directed against Napoléon, had been signed in 1805.) This unusual treaty resulted not from a war but from Russian assistance to Sultan

The Treaty of San Stefano was signed in 1878 between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans ceded to Russia parts of Armenia and the Dorbuja; agreed to pay a substantial indemnity; recognized the independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro; and increased the territories of Serbia and Montenegro. **© CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

Mahmud II, whose reign (1808–1839) was being threatened by Muhammad Ali, the rebellious pasha of Egypt. Once the Russian troops arrived, at the Sultan's invitation, they were, for the first and only time, in control of the straits area and Istanbul. They left later in the year after Mahmud II signed the Treaty of Hunkar-Iskelesi, which closed the straits to warships of all foreign nations. The establishment of a Russian protectorate over the Ottoman Empire proved unacceptable to Great Britain and Austria. The ensuing Treaty of London (1840), which sent Muhammad Ali back to Egypt, and the Straits Convention (1841) made the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire a common concern of Europe's great powers acting in concert.

As an outgrowth of Tsar Nicholas I's inability to resolve the Eastern (i.e., Ottoman) question to his satisfaction, the Crimean War (1854–1855) pitted Russia against the Ottoman Empire, which was allied with Great Britain, France, and the Kingdom of Sardinia. Russia capitulated after the allied troops landed in the Crimea and Tsar Nicholas died. Under the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1856) the Ottoman Empire regained the mouth of the Danube and southern Bessarabia and agreed to the demilitarization of the Black Sea; the principalities became a protectorate of the victorious European allies; and an international commission was established to as-

sure free navigation on the Danube. Russia also abandoned its claim to the protectorate of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire. In 1871, using the diplomatic upheaval caused by the Franco-Prussian War, Russia unilaterally renounced the Treaty of Paris.

The war of 1877 to 1878 grew out of the local disturbances in the Balkans. The Turks' brutal suppression of the Balkans, followed by the declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire by Serbia and Montenegro (1876), provided Russia with a pretext to intervene on their behalf. The defeat of the forces of Sultan Abdülhamit II (r. 1876–1909) prompted harsh terms in the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano. The last armed confrontation between the two empires occurred during World War I. The Russians had made some headway in the Transcaucasus, but the Communists, who had seized power in 1917, took Russia out of the war and renounced all imperial claims to Ottoman territory.

See also Bucharest, Treaty of (1812); Hunkar-Iskelesi, Treaty of (1833); San Stefano, Treaty of (1878); Straits Convention.

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Oles M. Smolansky
Updated by Eric Hooglund

RUTENBERG, PINHAS

[1879–1942]

Engineer and Yishuv leader; pioneer of hydroelectricity in Palestine.

Born in Romny, Ukraine, Pinhas Rutenberg became active in the Russian revolutionary movement and participated in the "Bloody Sunday" march—the start of the 1905 Revolution. From 1907 to 1915 he worked as an engineer in Italy. During this period he became interested in Jewish affairs and wrote a pamphlet titled "The National Revival of the Jewish People."

During World War I Rutenberg went to London to try to influence the Zionist leadership to establish Jewish military units to liberate Palestine from the Ottoman Empire. When he discovered that Vladimir Zeʾev Jabotinsky had similar interests, he contacted him to coordinate their efforts and traveled to the United States to spread the idea.

After Aleksandr Kerensky's March Revolution of 1917 overthrew the tsarist government of Russia, Rutenberg returned there to be appointed deputy governor of Saint Petersburg, in charge of civilian affairs. In November 1917, with the Bolshevik takeover, Rutenberg was arrested, spent six months in prison, and escaped to rejoin anti-Bolshevik groups. By 1919, perceiving antisemitism in the revolutionary movement, Rutenberg saw no future for himself in the new Soviet state and left for Palestine, where he joined a British team surveying Palestine's water resources, particularly the Jordan River.

Rutenberg drew up a far-reaching plan for creating a hydroelectric scheme to supply both sides of the Jordan with power and water for irrigation. From 1920 to 1923, Rutenberg worked to influence the British authorities to grant him a preliminary concession for his Palestine Electric Corporation Limited. In 1926 he was awarded the full concession over the use of the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers for supplying hydroelectricity to Palestine. He raised the money for the company mainly from Jews in the United States and Great Britain. In 1932 the first Jordan power station was opened in Naharayim, at the confluence of the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers. The station functioned until it was destroyed during the 1948 Arab–Israel War.

Rutenberg was an active Zionist and headed the Vaʿad Leʾumi (National Council) in the crisis year of 1929. During the 1936 disturbances, he joined with four other Yishuv leaders to propose a plan for Arab-Jewish coexistence. His water-development plans had already brought him into friendly contact with Abdullah ibn Hussein, the amir of Transjor-

dan, but nothing came of these efforts. Strongly concerned about infighting among Jews, Rutenberg also attempted unsuccessfully to mediate between David Ben-Gurion's MAPAI Party and Jabotinsky's Revisionists, who were constantly at odds. In 1939 Rutenberg again became the head of the Vaʿad Leʾumi, and served until he died in 1942. In secret wartime conversations with British officials in London, he discussed plans for assassinating the exiled mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni.

See also JABOTINSKY, VLADIMIR ZEʾEV.

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SARA REGUER
UPDATED BY NEIL CAPLAN

RUZNAME

See GLOSSARY

S

SAʿADA, ANTUN

[1904–1949]

Founder and leader of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.

Antun Saʿada was a charismatic leader and a revolutionary Arab thinker who in 1932 founded, and then headed the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) until his death in 1949. He was born in Shuwayr, Mount Lebanon, on 1 March 1904 to Eastern Orthodox Lebanese parents. His father, Khalil Saʿada, a product of the late-nineteenth-century Arab Renaissance, was a well-known physician, novelist, linguist, publicist, and political activist. Saʿada joined his father in Brazil in 1921. He was strongly affected by his father's modern views while they worked together publishing a newspaper and a journal throughout most of the 1920s. During this period, Saʿada's intellectual formation was solidified by his mastery of several languages and his involvement in political activism. In 1930 Saʿada returned to Lebanon determined to bring about change, and he secretly founded the SSNP in 1932. The party was initially called the Syrian National Party; Saʿada added the word *social* to the party's name in the 1940s to emphasize the social dimension of nationalism. Saʿada was accused of fascist leanings, but this continues to be debatable.

The secret organization, whose membership in its early days drew mainly on students from the American University of Beirut, where Saʿada was tutoring in German, mushroomed to more than 1,000 members in two years. French colonial authorities uncovered the party on 16 November 1935; Saʿada was arrested along with other party leaders and put in jail for six months. During his imprisonment, Saʿada finished his seminal work, *The Genesis of Nations.* The party continued to grow in size and influence, although Saʿada was detained again in 1936 and 1937 for a total of seven months. The oppression of Saʿada and the party by the French, rekindled by an arrest warrant in 1938, played a role in shifting his activities overseas, where his main goals were to organize Syrian emigrants and to promote his cause in international circles. But World War II and the French measures taken against him blocked

his return home, and he was exiled, mainly to Argentina, for several years.

Saʿada was received as a hero upon his return to Beirut on 2 March 1947. The newly independent Lebanese state quickly moved to curb his increasing influence, to no avail. Meanwhile, he succeeded in consolidating his power in the party and in solidifying the party's growth in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Jordan. An attack on the SSNP by the proestablishment Phalange Party in June 1949 in Beirut was followed by an aggressive government campaign. As a result, Saʿada mounted a rebellion against the Lebanese state on 4 July 1949. The Syrian president, Husni al-Zaʿim, to whom Saʿada turned for help, betrayed Saʿada's trust and turned him over to his foes. Saʿada was summarily tried without due process in Beirut and executed on 8 July 1949.

Saʿada saw the SSNP as an agent of change and progress. The party's goals included the revival, independence, sovereignty, and development of the "Syrian Nation" as part of the Arab World. This nation was partitioned by British and French colonial powers into new political entities after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. According to Saʿada, the Syrian Nation included Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Cyprus. The reform principles emphasized the abolition of feudalism and sectarianism and promoted secularism. The SSNP is historically characterized as well-disciplined and staunchly secular, with multiethnic and multiconfessional membership.

See also Greater Syria; Phalange; Syrian Social Nationalist Party; Zaʿim, Husni al-.

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Charles U. Zenzie
Updated by Sami A. Ofeish

SAADAWI, NAWAL AL-

[1931–]

Egyptian feminist, writer, and doctor.

Nawal al-Saadawi (also spelled Nawal al-Saʿdawi or Nawal el-Saadawi) was born in the village of Kafar Tahla in Egypt. She graduated from the faculty of medicine at Cairo University in 1955 and practiced medicine for ten years, becoming a vigorous opponent of the exploitation of women in Egypt and the Arab world. She was dismissed from her position as Egypt's general director of health education for having written *Woman and Sex* (1972), which discussed the sexual exploitation of women, including prostitution, clitoridectomy, incest, and sexually transmitted diseases. For instance, she discussed in detail the female sexual anatomy, especially the variation in hymen types. She also discussed the epistemology of psychological, physical, and social epidemics affecting sexual roles and relationships. She openly discussed taboos such as rape, women's submissive roles in the family and society, sexual repression, and inconsistent social and religious values. Between 1979 and 1980, she became the United Nations advisor for the Women's Program in Africa and the Middle East. Her literary and scientific writings resulted in her imprisonment in 1981. Upon her release in 1982, she founded the Arab Women's Solidarity Association International, which was closed down in 1991 by the Egyptian government. She and Dr. Sherif Hetata, her second husband, were members of the Commission of Inquiry for the International War Crimes Tribunal (1992), which investigated war crimes against Iraq. She also served on a mission to bring medical aid to Iraq in defiance of U.S. sanctions. In 2001, an Egyptian court dismissed a lawsuit filed against her by a religious extremist for having "scorned Islam."

The candor with which she has approached health, economic, political, and social problems has made her a radical and progressive activist, working against social injustice exercised in the name of religion, morals, and love. She has written more than thirty books, which have been translated into thirty languages and have reached both a popular and an academic audience worldwide. Her books in English include *Searching* (1991), *My Travels around the World* (1992), *Memoirs from the Women's Prison* (1994), *Woman at Point Zero* (1997), *The Nawal El Saadawi Reader* (1997), *Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Arab World* (1997), *The Innocence of the Devil* (1998), *Daughter of Isis: The Autobiography of Nawal El Saadawi* (1999), and *Walking through Fire: A Life of Nawal al Saadawi* (2002).

See also Arab Women's Solidarity Association International; Sanctions, Iraqi.

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David Waldner
Updated by Rita Stephan

SAADE, GEORGE

[1930–1998]

Lebanese politician.

Born to a Maronite Catholic family, George Saade completed his schooling in Lebanon. In 1955 he left for Spain, where he enrolled as a student at Madrid's Central University and completed degrees in literature and philosophy and Semitic languages. Elected to the Lebanese parliament in 1968, Saade was also appointed as minister in several governments. In 1945, while a student, he joined the Phalange Party (Hizb al-Kataʾib), in which he played important roles, including adviser for educational matters to the party founder, Pierre Jumayyil. In 1969, following clashes between the Lebanese army and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Saade was appointed to a joint dialogue group with the Palestinians. In the 1970s he played a key role in the Phalange Party's relationships with the Arab countries. In 1986 he was elected president of al-Kataʾib. In 1991 and 1992 Saade was a member of the Lebanese government until his resignation in September 1992. He died in November 1998.

See also Jumayyil, Pierre; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Phalange.

George E. Irani
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

SABA FAMILY

Prominent Palestinian/Lebanese business family.

The Sabas, Christians originally from Shafa Amr in Palestine, achieved prominence in the twentieth century through the extraordinary business and political career of Fuʾad Saba. In the 1920s, Fuʾad [1902–] founded the now-huge accounting firm of Saba & Co. In the 1930s, he helped establish the Palestinian National Fund and acted as secretary to the Arab Higher Committee. He was briefly exiled by the British in the late 1930s for his political activities.

Fuʾad relocated Saba & Co. to Beirut before the 1948 Arab-Israel War and started other enterprises there, including the al-Mashriq Financial Investment Company (1963), the Arabia Insurance Company, and the Middle East Society of Associated Accountants. His business boomed after signing contracts with the American oil firm of J. Paul Getty and a top American accounting firm, Arthur Andersen and Company. He lived in Beirut until his death in the late 1980s.

Fuʾad's son Fawzi, born in 1931 in Jerusalem, attended the American University of Beirut, as his father did. He became a partner in Saba & Co. and has been living in Saudi Arabia and Dubai. (The family is of no known relation to Elias Saba, the 1970s Lebanese finance minister from northern Lebanon.)

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Elizabeth Thompson

SABAH, RASHA AL-

[1950–]

Advocate for women's rights in Kuwait.

Rasha al-Sabah, a member of Kuwait's ruling family, was born 18 November 1950. She received a bachelor's degree from the University of Birmingham (U.K.) in 1972, and a master's degree and doctorate from Yale University in 1974 and 1977 respectively.

At Kuwait University she became the head of the University Language Center in 1977, a dean in 1982, and a vice rector for community service and information in 1985. Rasha is well-known as a champion of women's rights at home and as a spokeswoman for her country abroad. A cousin of Amir Jabir al-Ahmad, she is among his most trusted advisors. Currently she holds the position of undersecretary of higher education. She also served as Kuwait's deputy ambassador to the United Nations from 1990 to 1994. She was a prominent supporter of the amir's controversial May 1999 initiative to confer full political rights on Kuwaiti women and was openly disappointed when the National Assembly voted it down twice in November 1999. An innovative advocate of women's interests, she opened the first mixed-sex *diwaniyya* in Kuwait, where both women and men participate weekly in conversations at her home about the issues of the day. Rasha is the recipient of a number of honors, including a Doctor of Laws conferred in 1997 by Richmond University in London.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; KUWAIT.

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MARY ANN TÉTREAULT

SABAH, SUAD AL-

[1942–]

Poet, economist, publisher, activist in social change affecting women and children.

Suad Muhammad al-Sabah (also spelled Souad al-Sabah or Suʿad al-Sabah) was born in 1942 in Kuwait as a member of the ruling family. She graduated from the Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences at Cairo University in 1973. She obtained a doctorate in economics from Sari Guilford University in the United Kingdom in 1981. She later returned to Kuwait and established the Suad al-Sabah Publishing and Distribution House. She has published several books of poetry and established a literary prize that carries her name. She also has written hundreds of economic and political essays as well as popular articles in several Arabic local and international newspapers and magazines. Her poetry has been translated into many languages, including English.

Upon the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, al-Sabah campaigned against the war, writing newspaper articles and hosting radio programs, attempting to persuade Arab organizations to adopt firm stands against Iraq's aggression. In 1991 she published an anthology of ironic and bitter poetry on the Gulf War entitled *Will You Let Me Love My Country?* The poems delve into the spiritual crisis experienced by most Arab intellectuals in the new world order.

Al-Sabah is the director of Kuwait Stock Exchange and a member of the Higher Council for Education, the executive committee of the World Muslim Women Organization for South East Asia, and the board of trustees and the executive committee of the Arab Intellect Forum. She is also a founding member of the Arab Cultural Establishment, the executive committee of the Arab Human Rights Organization, and the Arab Council for Childhood and Development. Her poetry has captured the attention of popular artists as well as university researchers in many countries. Her literary publications include *Wamdatt Bakira* (Early blinks) and *Lahathat min Umri* (Moments of my life, 1961). Her scientific works in English include *Development Planning in an Oil Economy and the Role of the Woman* (1983) and *Kuwait: Anatomy of a Crisis Economy* (1984).

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RITA STEPHAN

SABBAGH, HASIB

[1920–]

Palestinian entrepreneur and philanthropist.

Hasib Sabbagh came from a Christian family in Safed in British Mandate Palestine, although he was born in Tiberias. He graduated from the Arab College of Jerusalem in 1938, and in 1941 gained a civil engineering degree from the American University of Beirut.

In 1943, with four other contractors, he established the Consolidated Contractors Company (CCC) in Haifa. Sabbagh left Palestine in April 1948 and moved to Lebanon. CCC was reestablished there in 1950, becoming the region's largest multinational and one of the largest contractors worldwide.

A longtime member of both the Palestine National Council and of its central council, Sabbagh provided crucial international contacts for Yasir Arafat during the 1970s and 1980s. Most controversially, his 1978 meeting with the Phalange, first agreed to and then denounced by Arafat, provoked condemnation from the Lebanese and Syrian governments as well as from Palestinian opposition groups. In 1988, his active support encouraged Arafat to steer the Palestine Liberation Organization firmly toward a renewed peace initiative.

Through the Diana Sabbagh Foundation, one of the largest Arab charitable foundations, Sabbagh has supported institutions of higher education across the Arab world and the West, and has influenced a range of dialogue initiatives, notably in the United States at the Council on Foreign Relations, the Carter Center, and the Center for Muslim–Christian Encounter, and in Palestine within the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH), under Hanan Ashrawi. He also cofounded the Welfare Association for Palestinians, chaired the Palestinian Students Fund, and has been on the boards of the Arab Bank and of many academic institutions and pro-Palestinian think tanks, such as the Institute of Palestine Studies.

See also ARAFAT, YASIR; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL.

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MOUIN RABBANI
UPDATED BY GEORGE R. WILKES

SABBAGH, SALAH AL-DIN AL-
[1889–1945]

Arab nationalist; Iraqi army officer who headed the Golden Square group that opposed the government and influenced politics from 1939 to 1941.

Born in Mosul of a Lebanese father and an Iraqi mother, Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh was educated in Mosul and the Ottoman Military College in Istanbul, graduating as an officer in 1915. During World War I, he served in Palestine and Macedonia and was taken prisoner, ultimately joining Amir Faisal I ibn Hussein, who became king of Iraq, to return to Iraq in 1921 to a position in the Iraqi army. His military education also included courses in Belgium and in Britain. Sabbagh became an instructor at the Baghdad Military College in 1924 and later taught at the Staff College. By 1940 he was assistant chief of staff of the Iraqi army.

Al-Sabbagh was an Arab nationalist and the head of the Golden Square, the group of army officers that from 1939 to 1941 influenced Iraqi politics from behind the scenes. An admirer of the Jerusalem mufti (chief Muslim jurist) Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, al-Sabbagh worked with him and with Rashid Ali al-Kaylani in their negotiations with the Axis powers for support of their pan-Arab goals. Al-Sabbagh backed Rashid Ali as prime minister in 1941 and was a major advocate of war with Britain in April and May. After the Iraqi defeat in the Anglo–Iraqi War of 1941, Sabbagh fled to Iran and then to Turkey, where he was extradited to Iraq and executed in 1945. His book *Fursan al-Uruba fi al-Iraq* (The knights of Arabism in Iraq), an autobiographical account of his pan-Arabism, was published posthumously in Baghdad in 1956.

See also FAISAL I IBN HUSSEIN; GOLDEN SQUARE; HUSAYNI, MUHAMMAD AMIN AL-; KAYLANI, RASHID ALI AL-.

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REEVA S. SIMON

SABBATH

The seventh day of the week; the day of religiously mandated rest.

In Judaism, the Sabbath (in Hebrew, *Shabbat,* or rest) was and is the holiest day of the week. Historically, no work of any kind could be done; hence, fire could not be made and, by extension, nothing that runs electrically or mechanically can be started up by observant Jews. Food is prepared in advance and special customs ensure rest and reflection on the past week, and thereby restoration of the soul for the coming week.

The Jewish Sabbath begins at sundown Friday and lasts twenty-five hours, until nightfall Saturday; the Christian Sabbath is usually celebrated on Sunday. In Israel on the Sabbath, public facilities are closed. Outside of Haifa, buses of the state cooperatives do not run, no El Al (Israeli) airliners take off or land, and no Hebrew newspapers are published.

Public observance of the Sabbath has been the source of some tension within Israeli society. Since the formation of the state, Orthodox and, in particular, *haredi* (ultra-Orthodox) Jews have been insistent that restaurants, movie theatres, and other "profane" public establishments remain closed in observance of the Sabbath. Although such closings have been common, increasing numbers of businesses are remaining open on the Sabbath.

There is no ban in Israel on the driving of private cars on the Sabbath, but *haredi* Jews, in an effort to enforce the religious prohibitions of the Sabbath, have periodically clashed with local authorities and drivers by demanding the closure to automobile traffic of public thoroughfares that pass near or through their enclaves on the holy day of rest. This has occasionally led to violent demonstrations, stone-throwing, and mass protests by Orthodox Jews against "desecration of the Sabbath." Although most of these demonstrations ultimately have led to the limitation or eventual halt of the flow of traffic on these thoroughfares during the Sabbath, the protests have also led to increased tensions between Orthodox and secular Israelis and often hostile debates about religious coercion in Israeli society.

SAMUEL C. HEILMAN

SABRA

Word ultimately derived from the Arabic for a variety of prickly pear found in Israel; also the name for a native-born Israeli.

Native-born Israelis are described as Sabras because their personality is often thought to be similar to the fruit of the plant: tough and prickly on the outside, sweet on the inside.

BRYAN DAVES

SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRES

Mass killing of hundreds of Palestinians in refugee camps, 16–18 September 1982.

Shortly after Israel invaded Lebanon on 6 June 1982, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) laid siege to Beirut. A cease-fire accord reached in August allowed the entry into West Beirut of a multilateral force, including a contingent of U.S. Marines. Following a U.S. pledge to protect Palestinian civilians, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters and officials departed the city, as did the multinational force. The day after the president of Lebanon, Bashir Jumayyil, was assassinated (14 September), Israel sent troops into West Beirut, where they surrounded two Palestinian refugee camps in violation of the cease-fire agreement. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan arranged for the Israel-supported Phalange militia to enter the camps to clear out what Sharon described as "2,000–3,000 terrorists who remained behind. We even have their names." The Phalange murdered hundreds of Palestinians, mostly women, children, and older men. Israel put the figure at 800; other sources estimated it at 1,500.

The international community condemned Israel's role in the mass killing, and up to 400,000 Israelis (8 percent of the population) demonstrated against the government of Menachem Begin and demanded a judicial inquiry. A three-man Israeli commission, headed by the president of the Supreme Court, Yitzhak Kahan, found that Israeli officials were "indirectly responsible" because they arranged for the Phalange, mortal enemies of the Palestinians, to enter the camps and, even though Israeli officers and government officials received reports about the atrocities, they ignored them and allowed the Phalange to extend their stay in the camps. The International Commission, chaired by Sean MacBride, former assistant secretary general of the United Nations, charged that under international law, Israel was directly responsible because the camps were under its jurisdiction as an occupying power and be-

cause the IDF planned and facilitated its ally's entry into and activities in the camps, prevented survivors from leaving the camps, and did not stop the mass killing after hearing about it. Despite the findings of both commissions, no one was prosecuted. In 2001, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International called for an investigation of Ariel Sharon for his role in the Sabra and Shatila massacres.

See also Arab–Israel War (1982); Eitan, Rafael; Kahan Commission (1983); Phalange; Sharon, Ariel.

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Philip Mattar

SABRA AND SHATILA REFUGEE CAMPUS

See Sabra and Shatila Massacres

SABRI, ALI

[1920–1991]

Egyptian military officer and politician.

Ali Sabri was educated at the Military Academy, taught at the Air Force Academy in 1949, and served as an air force officer. Though not a member of the Free Officers, he supported their movement and acted as liason to the U.S. embassy prior to the 1952 revolution in which the Free Officers overthrew King Farouk. Between 1957 and 1962, Sabri was minister of presidential affairs, giving him access to President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who appointed him to the Supreme Executive of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1962, a position he held through 1965, at which time he was appointed secretary-general of the union. Sabri is well known in Egyptian politics as perhaps the most influential leftist. His tenure in the ASU is closely associated with Nasser's shift to the left in the early 1960s. As head of the ASU, Sabri sought to make it the leading political body in Egypt by subordinating the public sector, the bureaucracy, labor unions, and professional syndicates to its control. On the death of Nasser, Sabri was one of the most powerful men in Egypt. He was responsible for naming Anwar al-Sadat president, under the mistaken assumption that he could control Sadat. In May of 1971, Sabri and his supporters publicly broke with Sadat. Sadat responded by arresting Sabri for plotting a coup. Sabri was sentenced to death, but this was commuted to twenty-five years in prison. Sabri was released from prison in 1981.

See also Arab Socialist Union; Free Officers, Egypt.

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David Waldner

SADAT, ANWAR AL-

[1918–1981]

President of Egypt from 1970 until his assassination in 1981.

Anwar al-Sadat was born 25 December 1918 in the village of Mit Abu al-Kum in the Lower Egyptian province of Minufiyya. His father, a mid-level government official, arranged for him to enroll in primary and secondary school in Cairo, from which he was graduated in 1936. That same year, admission in the national military academy was opened to young men from nonaristocratic families, and Sadat seized the opportunity to pursue a career as a military officer. He was graduated in 1938 and was posted to Manqabad in Upper Egypt, where he became friends with another ambitious young officer, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Transferred to the outskirts of Cairo in 1939, he immediately made contact with a range of underground political organizations working against the monarchy of King Farouk. They included the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) and a cell based in the signal corps

Anwar al-Sadat (1918–1981) was an Egyptian political leader and president (1970–1981). Muslim extremists, who were against his peace initiatives with Israel, assassinated him. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

sympathetic to Nazi Germany. Since World War II was raging in North Africa, his association with this cell led to his arrest in 1942 for conspiring against the British war effort (Britain maintained a protectorate over the Suez Canal and Egypt). Upon his escape from prison in 1945, he revived his contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood, taking part in a January 1946 plot to assassinate a prominent pro-British politician. He was arrested again in connection with this incident and spent two more years in prison awaiting trial. His longstanding connections with high-ranking but anti-British members of the armed forces won him reinstatement in the officers' corps in 1950.

Toward the end of 1951, Sadat was asked by Nasser to join the inner circle of the clandestine Free Officers movement. He played little direct part in the coup d'état headed by General Muhammad Naguib that overthrew the monarchy and brought the movement to power in July 1952, but he was chosen to broadcast the first announcement of the coup on the morning it occurred. He was thereafter editor of the newspaper *al-Jumhuriyya,* a member of the ruling revolutionary command council, and a minister of state.

As secretary-general of the ruling political party, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), Sadat assumed the role of faithful subordinate to Nasser, assisting him in moving first against the Muslim Brotherhood and then against his rivals within the Free Officers. When Nasser overcame Naguib to lead the ruling junta, he repaid Sadat's loyalty by appointing him first speaker of the reconfigured national assembly in 1962, one of four vice presidents in 1964, and then, in December 1969, vice president of the republic.

Nasser's unexpected death by heart attack in September 1970 precipitated eight months of intense jockeying for power at the highest echelons of the Egyptian regime. Proponents of continuing the government's socialist economic policies—led by the secretary-general of the ASU, Ali Sabri—faced firm opposition from advocates of a more liberal order, such as the editor of the semiofficial *al-Ahram* newspaper, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal. Sadat, who had been appointed provisional president by the cabinet shortly after Nasser's death, took advantage of his relatively insulated position in the national assembly to play these factions against one another, emerging as the regime's key figure when the cabinet of ministers tendered its resignation to the assembly in May 1971. He immediately charged the powerful minister of the interior with plotting to set up a police state and replaced him with a trusted ally, Mamduh Salim. He then moved to cultivate public approval by commissioning the national assembly to formulate a permanent constitution, pardoning most of the country's political prisoners and returning properties sequestered during the socialist era of the early 1960s to their original owners. At the same time, he attempted to undermine leftist influence by catering to those sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood through carefully choreographed displays of his own religiosity in the mass media and by tolerating the spread of Islamist political groups on university campuses.

These moves precipitated a wave of unrest among university students in January 1972 that persuaded

Sadat to initiate major shifts in Egypt's foreign policy as a way of consolidating his position at home. That July he ordered all Soviet military advisers out of the country and began planning for a campaign to recapture the Sinai peninsula, which Israel had occupied during the Arab–Israel War of 1967. While preparing to attack Israel's forces in the Sinai, Sadat effected a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and created a working alliance with Syria as well, which enabled the Egyptian armed forces to strike across the Suez Canal on 6 October 1973. Although the attack was, in the end, repelled and Israeli units drove deep into the Egyptian delta before a cease-fire was arranged on 23 October, the comparatively good showing made by Egyptian troops led Sadat to claim the honorific "the hero of the crossing" and invite U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to mediate an interim settlement with Israel. Two disengagement agreements negotiated under U.S. auspices in January 1974 and September 1975 laid the foundation for Sadat's 9 November 1977 surprise announcement that he intended to travel to Jerusalem to initiate peace talks with Israel's government. Ten days later he addressed the Israeli parliament, smashing what he called "the psychological barrier" to peace between the two states. He then took part in a series of face-to-face negotiations with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin that culminated in the September 1978 Camp David Accords, which in turn led to the signing of an Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty in March 1979. This document resulted in the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai in April 1982.

Sadat's unprecedented trip to Jerusalem was prompted by internal as well as external developments. In June 1974, the regime implemented an economic program designed to attract greater amounts of foreign investment into the country and provide new opportunities for local entrepreneurs, which came to be known as the policy of *infitah* (opening up). At the same time, competing factions within the ASU were encouraged to organize into separate political groupings *(manabir),* which by 1976 had become established as autonomous parties; the largest of these, the centrist National Democratic Party, continued to dominate the national assembly, while smaller rightist and leftist parties, the Social Democratic Party and the National Progressive Unionist Party, played the role of loyal opposition to the government. It was in these circumstances at the beginning of 1977 that the regime agreed to implement austerity measures demanded by the International Monetary Fund and cut state subsidies on a wide range of basic foodstuffs and other necessities. This decision sparked large-scale riots in Cairo, Alexandria, and other Egyptian cities, forcing the government to restore the subsidies. President Sadat immediately castigated the rioters as "thieves" and ordered wholesale revisions to the Parties Law of 1977 that substantially limited the activities in which political associations were permitted to engage. The subsequent electoral successes of the main prerevolutionary party, the Wafd, added to Sadat's displeasure with the new political order he had helped to create. In June 1978, he ordered the arrest of the Wafd's leadership; he supervised the de facto rigging of parliamentary elections a year later; and in September 1981, he issued new regulations that led to the imprisonment of virtually all opposition activists.

These measures added fuel to the smoldering popular discontent generated by Egypt's persistent economic difficulties and Sadat's unilateral peace treaty with Israel. The Camp David Accords failed to bring appreciably greater levels of U.S. assistance into the country, even as the policies associated with *infitah* steadily increased the gap between rich and poor. They did little better in persuading Israel to proceed with the direct talks concerning the future of the occupied territories that were envisaged as the second stage of the agreement. Furthermore, the very image affected by Sadat to win popular support in the United States—that of a benevolent patriarch, complete with sweater and pipe—grated on dissidents at home. Militant Islamist cells proliferated in poor neighborhoods, in the provinces of Upper Egypt and, most notably, within the armed forces. Members of one of these cells, al-Jihad, assassinated Sadat on 6 October 1981 as he reviewed a military parade commemorating the eighth anniversary of the attack across the Suez Canal. He was succeeded by his vice president, Husni Mubarak.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab Socialist Union; Begin, Menachem; Camp David Accords (1978); Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty (1979); Farouk; Free Officers, Egypt; Haykal, Muhammad Hasanayn; International Monetary

FUND; KISSINGER, HENRY; MUBARAK, HUSNI; MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD; NAGUIB, MUHAMMAD; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE UNIONIST PARTY; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES; SABRI, ALI; WAFD.

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FRED H. LAWSON

SADAT, JIHAN AL-

[1933–]

Egyptian feminist and political activist.

Jihan al-Sadat was born on Rawda Island in Cairo. Her father, Safwat Ra'uf, was Muslim and a civil servant in the Ministry of Health, and her mother was British. Although raised as a Muslim, Jihan attended a Christian missionary school. In 1949 she married Anwar al-Sadat, the future president of Egypt. Known as the First Lady of Egypt during her husband's presidency, she was an outspoken supporter of women's rights and peace with Israel. She founded the Talla Society, a cooperative that taught women various handicrafts so that they could support themselves, and *al-Wafa wa al-Amal* (Faith and Hope), which built the Middle East's largest hospital complex for disabled war veterans and their families. She represented Egypt at the International Women's Year Conference held in Mexico City in 1975. Two years later she founded SOS Children's Villages International for orphans. She later led the fundraising drive for the rehabilitation of Qasr al-Ayni Hospital. She earned B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees in Arabic Literature at Cairo University. Along with other prominent feminists, she helped to draft what became known as Jihan's Laws, which gave women the right to divorce, custody of children, and the right to the family home if their husbands took second wives (portions of this legislation were abrogated in 1985). Soon after President Sadat was assassinated in 1981, Jihan moved to the United States, where she lectures on women in developing countries and on Islamic culture. She has taught at the University of South Carolina, Radford University, American University, and the University of Maryland, where she has been an associate of its Center for International Development and Conflict Management since 1988 and has promoted the Anwar Sadat Chair for Population, Development, and International Peace. She has received at least eighteen honorary doctorates and numerous awards.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; SADAT, ANWAR AL-.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

SADAWI, BASHIR

[c. 1882–1957]

Libyan (Tripolitanian) politician.

Associated with the Tripolitanian republic after World War I, Bashir Sadawi was in exile for many years, during which he acted as adviser to the Saudi

Arabian monarchy of Ibn Saʿud. In 1947, with Arab League support, he founded the National Council for the Liberation of Libya in Cairo to promote the unity of the regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. In 1949, popular protests against Anglo-Italian trusteeship proposals for Libya prompted several political groups to form the Tripolitanian National Congress party under Sadawi's leadership. During the many years of international debate on Libya's future (1945–1949) and the subsequent preparations for independence under UN supervision (1949–1951), Sadawi emerged as Tripolitania's leading politician, consistently supporting a unitary Libyan state and Amir Idris al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sanusi as the sole leader capable of uniting the country.

Sadawi's political hopes were dashed, first by the decision that independent Libya was to be a federal kingdom under Idris, then with the failure of his National Congress party to win as many seats as expected in the first postindependence elections in February 1952. The government used postelection riots as an excuse to deport Sadawi, who returned to Saudi royal service.

See also Idris al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sanusi.

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John L. Wright

SADIQI COLLEGE

Secondary school in Tunis.

Sadiqi College was founded in 1875 and 1876 by Khayr al-Din. Its curriculum, which included modern sciences and languages, was taught in Arabic and French. In an effort to modernize the college, subjects such as translation, administrative law, and Islamic jurisprudence were added to the curriculum. During the French protectorate, French replaced Arabic as the language of teaching for most subjects. In 1892 the school acquired a French director.

Sadiqi attracted few students at first, but its enrollment increased steadily. As its popularity grew, it became very selective in the choice of its students, in contrast to Zaytuna University. Sadiqi graduated seventy-eight students in 1954.

The graduates of Sadiqi usually went to France for their higher education. As a result, they were criticized by those who considered the college an institution for bourgeois children and were accused of maintaining strong links with France and its culture.

Although Sadiqi was a model for many of the Franco–Arabic schools that arose in Tunisia during the French protectorate, it was only in 1911 that its diploma was officially recognized.

See also Khayr al-Din; Zaytuna University.

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Aida A. Bamia

SADI, SAID

[1947–]

Leader of the Algerian political party Rally for Culture and Democracy.

Said Sadi was born into a poor family in Aghrib in Kabylia. A charismatic psychiatrist, he began his militant activities for cultural and workers' rights while a student and joined the clandestine opposition party Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS; Socialist Forces Front). He strongly opposed single-party rule and called for Berber cultural rights. One of the leaders of the 1980 Berber Spring uprising, he demanded recognition of the Berber language and culture within a democratic state. He was jailed five times in the 1980s. He subsequently broke with the FFS and joined a group of militants devoted to human rights and to cultural and women's issues. In 1985 they founded the Human Rights League. In 1989 Sadi founded and headed the Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD; Rally for Culture and Democracy), an outgrowth of the Berber movement. Sadi has been a staunch critic of both

the regime and Algeria's Islamists. The RCD boycotted the 1991 legislative elections but participated actively in the November 1995 presidential election and the June 1997 legislative vote. Sadi obtained 10 percent of the votes in 1995. The RCD obtained 19 seats at the assembly in 1997. Sadi has equated Islamism with terrorism, which explains his support for the military against radical Islamism. Although he boycotted the 1999 presidential election, Sadi supported President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's program to reform the economy, justice and educational systems, and administration. Two members of the RCD served as ministers in the government. Sadi withdrew the RCD from the government because of the Kabylia crisis, triggered in April 2001 following the killing in Tizi-Ouzou of a youngster by the National Gendarmerie. The demonstrations and violence that developed following that incident revealed the regime's inability to provide adequate democratic institutions to represent the nation's diverse interests. Because of the acute crisis, the RCD boycotted the legislative and municipal elections in May and October 2002, respectively. Sadi has sided with the *aruch* (tribal councils) and called repeatedly for the end of repression.

See also ALGERIA; BERBER SPRING; BLACK SPRING; KABYLIA; RASSEMBLEMENT POUR LA CULTURE ET LA DÉMOCRATIE (RCD).

YAHIA ZOUBIR

SADR, MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-

[1931–1980]

Iraqi Shiʿite religious leader whose writings inspired and influenced the Islamic movement in Iraq.

Born in the Shiʿite district of Kazimiyya, Baghdad, to an Arab family from Lebanon, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr studied in Baghdad and al-Najaf. Among his teachers was Muhsin al-Hakim, the highest Shiʿite *Marja al-Taqlid* of the time. Sadr rose in the Shiʿite clerical hierarchy to the rank of ayatullah, becoming the only Arab of eight living *marja al-Taqlids.* He was placed under house arrest in June 1979, following the Shiʿite riots in al-Najaf and Karbala. On 8 April 1980 he was hanged, following assassination attempts on several officials earlier that month. He was accused of being the leader of the outlawed al-Daʿwa party, being the mastermind behind the assassinations, and plotting with Iran against Iraq's government. A prolific writer, Sadr published more than twenty books dealing with various subjects, including Islamic government and economy.

See also MARJA AL-TAQLID.

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AYAD AL-QAZZAZ

SADR, MUHSIN

[1871–1963]

Iranian politician.

Born to a clerical family from Mahallat, Muhsin Sadr entered the bureaucracy in 1907 as a clerk at the Ministry of Justice during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar. During the Constitutional Revolution, he sided with Mohammad Ali Shah and became chief interrogator after the bombardment of the *majles.* An opportunist, Sadr exploited his links to the Iranian aristocracy after the restoration of the Constitutionalists and resumed his service at the Ministry of Justice. He was appointed minister of justice five times, speaker of the senate twice, governor of Khorasan once, and prime minister once. Reza Shah Pahlavi removed him from the Ministry of Justice in 1936.

See also CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION; MOHAMMAD ALI SHAH QAJAR; NASER AL-DIN SHAH; PAHLAVI, REZA.

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NEGUIN YAVARI

SADR, SITT RABAB AL- (CHARAFEDDINE)

[1946–]

A social and human-rights activist and Shiʿite philanthropist.

Born in Iran, Sitt Rabab al-Sadr moved to Lebanon at the age of fifteen. She adopted and promoted the social vision of her brother, Imam Musa al-Sadr, who

encouraged her to join the Imam al-Sadr Foundation in Lebanon around 1960 and devote herself to social work and humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, she completed a B.A. in arts and an M.A. in philosophy in Lebanon. After the disappearance of Imam Musa in 1978 during a visit to Libya, Rabab became the president of the Imam al-Sadr Foundation, which consists today of six vocational schools and an orphanage. Al-Sadr oversees the girls' section of the foundation, providing much-needed economic assistance and social guidance to orphaned and dependent girls, regardless of their religious background. The foundation faced particular financial and organizational challenges after the dramatic increase in orphans due to the Lebanese war (1975–1991), the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon, and brutal attacks on civilians. She helped obtain a license for the foundation as a nonprofit organization in the U.S. in order to help gather contributions for widows, orphans, and poor children, mostly from South Lebanon. The schools sponsored by the foundation use modern technology and advanced educational methods and equipment.

Al-Sadr remains critical of the Lebanese government for abandoning South Lebanon and marginalizing it in state development policies. Following the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2001, the foundation launched two mobile medical clinics, which traveled to remote villages with no health facilities in order to offer preventive and curative medical services. Nearly 10,000 people benefited from these services. The foundation works to increase the attendance of orphans at primary schools, trains women for jobs, and runs day-long health centers. Al-Sadr strongly believes in the central role of education for women as a means for social change and personal growth. During numerous regional and international conferences on women's issues, she called on policymakers to acknowledge the need for gender equality and cooperation between men and women in the pursuit of a harmonious society. Her admirers and supporters urged her to run in parliamentary elections in Lebanon but she expressed her aversion to politics due to the restrictions it placed on social and family life.

See also AMAL; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1958); LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); LEBANON; SHIʿISM.

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"Sadr on Southern Lebanon." *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 20, no. 4 (May/June 2001): 90–91.

RULA JURDI ABISAAB

SAʿDUN, ABD AL-MUHSIN AL-

[1879–1907]

Leader of the Muntafiq tribe and Iraqi politician.

Son of Fahd Pasha al-Saʿdun, Abd al-Muhsin al Saʿdun was head of one of the two major branches of the ruling house of the Muntafiq tribe. He was graduated from the Ottoman Military College in 1905, became aide-de-camp to the sultan, but resigned his commission in 1909 and returned to Iraq. In 1910 and 1912 he was elected to represent the Muntafiq district in the Ottoman parliament. During the British mandate in Iraq, he headed al-Taqaddum (Progressive) party, which advocated termination of the mandate and independence through conciliation. President of the Constituent Assembly and twice president of parliament, Abd al-Muhsin held numerous cabinet portfolios and was four times prime minister. As principal Iraqi negotiator of the 1926 Anglo–Iraqi Treaty, he obtained important amendments regarding oil, military, and finance and shepherded its ratification. He was knighted in 1926.

See also ANGLO–IRAQI TREATIES; SAʿDUN FAMILY, AL-; TRIBES AND TRIBALISM.

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ALBERTINE JWAIDEH

SAʿDUN FAMILY, AL-

Ruling family of the Muntafiq in southern Iraq.

These are descendants of Mani, a sharif of Mecca who fled to the Euphrates around 1600 to escape a feud; won influence over the Muntafiq tribes by adjudicating their disputes; and was finally acknowledged as their ruler. The family name derives from Saʿdun, a great leader who led numerous raids against the Turks before being captured and beheaded in 1741. As rulers of the powerful Muntafiq, the Saʿdun were almost independent of Turkish rule until 1870 when the Ottomans made an attempt at regular land settlement. At the behest of their shaykh, Nasir Pasha, who founded the town of Nasiriyya and accepted high government office, the Saʿdun converted from tribute-receiving chiefs into regular landlords under Ottoman auspices. As a result of this "betrayal" to the Turks, the Saʿdun chiefs rapidly lost power over their tribes, whom they had reduced from landowners to tenants.

See also TRIBES AND TRIBALISM.

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ALBERTINE JWAIDEH

SAʿEDI, GHOLAMHOSSEIN

[1935–1985]

Iranian novelist, playwright, short-story writer, and scriptwriter.

Gholamhossein Saʿedi, who used the pen name Gowhar Morad, was born in Tabriz and was graduated from the medical school at Tehran University with a specialty in psychiatry. He was the first Iranian who seriously engaged in writing "village literature," representing a village and its population not as a romantic entity but showing its deprived and actual face. One of the most popular Iranian writers of the 1960s and 1970s in Iran, he produced several plays and collections of short stories. Saʿedi left Iran in the late 1970s for Paris, where he died. Much of his work is available in English.

See also LITERATURE: PERSIAN.

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PARDIS MINUCHEHR

SAFED

City located in the upper Galilee region of Israel.

Situated atop a mountain at an elevation of 2,780 feet (848 m), Safed (Hebrew, *Tzfat;* Arabic, *Safad*) is 25 miles (40 km) north of Tiberias and 30 miles (48 km) east of Acre. Safed is not mentioned in the Bible but was cited by the Roman historian Flavius Josephus as one of the cities he fortified. The Crusaders built a fortress in Safed, and the Mamluks made it an administrative center. Safed was one of the hills from which fires were built to signal the beginning of the lunar cycle and festivals. In the sixteenth century Joseph Karo, the author of the legal rabbinical work *Shulhan Arukh* (The set table), and Isaac Luria, founder of practical kabbala, turned Safed into a center for Jewish mysticism. In the late eighteenth century two large groups of Jews emigrated to Safed: Hasidim and their detractors, the followers of Rabbi Elijah, the Gaon of Vilnius. In 1837 an earthquake struck the area, killing 5,000.

In 1929, at a time when riots were breaking out throughout Palestine, Arabs attacked and destroyed the Jewish quarter of Safed; it was rebuilt in the 1930s. At the outbreak of the Arab–Israel War of 1948, the Jewish population in the city numbered only 2,000 out of a total of 12,000 inhabitants. When the British evacuated their position in Safed in April 1948, Arab forces attacked. Divisions of the Palmah counterattacked on 10 May 1948, putting to rout the Arab military units and the Arab population. Today the city is a center for artists and mystics.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1948); HASIDIM; PALMAH.

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BRYAN DAVES

SAFVETI ZIYA

[1875–1929]

Ottoman Turkish writer.

Born in Istanbul, Safveti Ziya attended the Galatasaray Lycée. He held various government posts, and in the early years of the republic, he became chief

of protocol in the Foreign Ministry. In 1896 he joined the French-influenced Servet-i Fünün literary movement. Safveti Ziya is best known for his novel *Salon Köşelerinde* (1910), a portrait of the cosmopolitan social life of Istanbul.

ELIZABETH THOMPSON

SAGUES, ALBERT

[1883–c. 1950]

Educator employed by Alliance Israélite Universelle.

Albert Sagues, born in İzmir, Turkey, was one of the most effective architects of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) schools, bolstering French cultural influence in Morocco and Tunisia. His efforts proved crucial for the spread of French language and culture among urban Jews. Sagues was a school principal for the AIU in Casablanca (1909–1912), Tunis (1912–1924), and Tangier (ca. 1925–post 1945). A firm advocate of the preservation of French colonial influence in the Maghrib, Sagues opposed political Zionism while favoring a modern Hebrew cultural renaissance.

See also ALLIANCE ISRAÉLITE UNIVERSELLE (AIU).

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MICHAEL M. LASKIER

SAHARA

World's largest desert.

The Sahara (in Arabic, desert) encompasses an area of 3.32 million square miles (8.6 million sq km), stretching across eleven countries and Western Sahara, and covering nearly the entire northern region of Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea hills. Parts of the Sahara reach all the way north to the Mediterranean; to the south, it extends nearly 1,500 miles (2,400 km). The two countries with the highest percentage of desert are Libya (99 percent) and Egypt (98 percent). Fifteen percent of the Sahara consists of sand "seas"; the rest is a mixture of *hammada* (barren rocky plateaus), coarse gravel, two mountain chains in the central regions (with the highest point being 11,204 feet [3,417 m] at the peak of Emi Koussi in Chad), low lands, depressions (the lowest point being 436 feet [133 m] below sea level at the Qattara depression in western Egypt), oases, and transition zones.

Hills and valleys of the El Oued Dunes, located in the Algerian Sahara Desert, Algeria. **© ADAM WOOLFITT/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

The Nile and Niger are its only two permanent rivers. Transition zones receive between 5 and 10 inches (12.7 and 25.4 cm) of rain per year; most of the rest receives fewer than 5 inches (12.7 cm). Large portions of the area receive no rainfall for years at a time. Its climate is among the most inhospitable—the highest evaporation rates, highest temperatures, and lowest humidity (a life-threatening 2.5 percent) have all been registered there. Extreme wind velocities and massive drops in nighttime temperatures, sometimes to subfreezing level, are also a regular feature of the Sahara.

Desertification has slowly encroached upon previous transition zones, such as the *sahel* belt of vegetation covering fossil sand dunes that separate the Sahara from Equatorial Africa; some also occurs in Arab North African countries. The reasons for the Sahara's continuing expansion range from climatic changes to some direct human influence, such as overgrazing by sheep herds and wood gathering for fuel. The most important minerals found in the Sahara include petroleum and natural gas fields, uranium, phosphates, iron ore, and a long list of other metals.

The four main ethnic groups of the Sahara are all predominantly Berber in origin: the Arabo-Berbers

in the north; the Moors (Maures), a mixture of Arab, Berber, and black African groups in the southwestern regions (encompassing parts of present-day Mauritania, Mali, and Western Sahara); the distinctive Twaregs, the most numerous of the four, of the south-central area; and the Tibu of the Tibesti area of Chad, who are also of Berber and black African mixture. Apart from livestock grazing, the old traditional economy included a profitable trade in gold and slaves from West Africa, salt from the desert, and cloth and other products from the Mediterranean coast. The camel, probably introduced in the second century B.C.E., was the backbone of trans-Saharan trade.

Before the prolonged droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, best estimates of the Sahara's population were approximately 2 million persons; about two-thirds were concentrated in oases; the rest engaged in seasonal movements and some were purely nomadic. In Arab North Africa, sedentarization had become almost complete, owing to the erosion of the pastoral economic base. Both "push" and "pull" factors were at work: desertification, which reduced livestock herds; displacement stemming from anticolonial struggles; the exploitation of oil and gas fields, which provided employment; and the extension of governmental authority, resulting in increased enclosure of land for farming, as well as expanded health and education services.

Historically, the Sahara was a large barrier to aspiring conquerors—Egyptians, Romans, Carthaginians, and Arabs. Islam spread steadily, however, in part from the activities of Muslim traders and scholars. Explorers from Britain and France began to penetrate the Sahara in the early part of the nineteenth century. French conquests began in 1830. Political boundaries in the Sahara were defined only in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Much was left imprecise by the French, who ruled over most of the region, resulting in a number of border disputes after decolonization, including those between Morocco and Algeria over the Tindouf area, and Libya and Chad with regard to the Aozou strip.

See also Aozou Strip; Berber; Deserts; Tindouf; Twareg; Western Sahara.

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

SAHARAN ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (SADR)

The official government-in-exile of POLISARIO.

The founding of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was proclaimed at Bir Lehlou, a town in northwestern Western Sahara, on 27 February 1976, one day after the departure of Spain's authorities from the territory, by a previously established Provisional Sahrawi National Council. Its constitution, adopted at the third POLISARIO (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia El-Hamra and Rio de Oro, a politico-military organization formed in 1973 to secure the independence of Western Sahara) congress in August 1976, proclaimed SADR to be a "democratic Arab republic," with a "republican political system." SADR was declared part of the Arab nation and Islam the state religion. Fundamental objectives included socialism, social justice, and the attainment of Maghrib unity as a step toward Arab and African unity. POLISARIO's executive committee was charged with presiding over SADR's executive organ until independence and sovereignty were attained. POLISARIO's August 1991 Congress adopted a new draft constitution for the future Saharan state, including provisions for a multiparty system, a free enterprise economy (with strategic resources controlled by the state), universal suffrage, a free press, and cooperative relations with Morocco. POLISARIO head Muhammad Abd al-Aziz was the first, and thus far the only, president of SADR. He was re-elected secretary-general, receiving 92 percent of the vote, at POLISARIO's 11th congress, held in October 2003 in Tifariti, the POLISARIO-controlled territory of Western Sahara.

SADR's main value for POLISARIO has been in the diplomatic sphere: At its peak, it attained recognition from more than seventy countries (the number had dropped to around sixty by 2003), and, after years of struggle, assumed its seat in 1984 as a full member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), triggering a Moroccan walkout. In contrast to the OAU, the League of Arab States (Arab League) kept SADR and POLISARIO at arm's length.

See also League of Arab States; Maghrib; Organization of African Unity (OAU); POLISARIO; Western Sahara.

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Pazzanita, Anthony G., and Hodges, Tony. *Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara.* Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1982.

BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMAN

SAHNOUN, AHMED

[1907–2003]

Islamic religious scholar and leader in Algeria.

Shaykh Ahmed Sahnoun, born in 1907 in Biskra, northeast of Algiers, was a highly respected religious figure and scholar viewed as the spiritual leader of the Islamists in Algeria. He was closely associated with the Islamic reformer Abdelhamid Ibn Badis (1889–1940) and the Association of Algerian Scholars, which was established in 1931 to resist the assimilationist policies of the French and reassert the Algerian Arabo-Islamic identity. During the struggle for Algerian independence, Sahnoun was imprisoned several times by the French for his anticolonial stance.

After independence, he refused to be associated with the state-controlled religious institutions, and continued preaching, promoting religious education, and establishing independent associations. In the 1960s he cofounded al-Qiyam (Values) Association to reassert Arab and Islamic identity in independent Algeria. Following violent clashes between Islamist and leftist students at the main campus at the University of Algiers in 1982, Sahnoun, along with Abbasi Madani and Shaykh Abdellatif Soltani, cosigned a fourteen-point statement that criticized the secular policies of the state and demanded the promotion of Islam in government and society. Due to his advanced age he was placed under house arrest rather than imprisoned, then released in 1984.

President Chadli Bendjedid met with Sahnoun, Ali Belhadj, and Mahfoud Nahnah following the massive riots of October 1988 and urged them to assist in restoring order. Sahnoun established the Association of the Islamic Call in 1989 to unite all the Islamic movements in the country, coordinate their activities, and prevent escalations of violence with the regime. Throughout the Algerian civil war, which began in 1992. Sahnoun refused to engage in dialogue with the military regime and demanded the release of the imprisoned leaders of the Front Islamique du Salut, Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj. Sahnoun suffered from health problems, and died in early 2003 at the age of 96.

See also ALGERIA; BENDJEDID, CHADLI; BOUYALI, MOUSTAFA; FRONT DE LIBERATION NATIONALE (FLN); FRONT ISLAMIQUE DU SALUT (FIS); SOLTANI, ABDELLATIF.

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EMAD ELDIN SHAHIN

SAʿID, AMINA AL-

[1914–1995]

Leading Egyptian feminist.

Amina al-Saʿid was born in Asyut and raised in Cairo. She is known as a leading feminist, journalist, writer, and activist in the period before and following the 1952 Egyptian revolution. In 1931 she was among the first women to enroll in Fuʾad I University, founded in 1908 and renamed Cairo University in 1952. As a protégé of Huda Shaʿrawi, she removed the veil early on and also advanced the cause of women's sports by daring to play tennis on the university campus. She enjoyed success as the author of novels, social tracts, biography, and travel writing. An avid pan-Arabist, she helped create the Pan-Arab Feminist Union and was also active in the Egyptian Feminist Union. Throughout her career she pressed for the reform of Islamic personal status laws. In the 1940s she became the first paid woman journalist to work for a mainstream publishing house, Dar al-Hilal, and became vice president of the Board of Press Syndicate in 1956. She wrote for *al-Musawwar* and founded and edited the pan-Arab journal *Hawa.* The burgeoning feminist movement underwent severe state repression following 1952, but al-Saʿid endured as the only major feminist from the previous generation to be supported by the government.

See also Egyptian Feminist Union; Gender: Gender and Education; *Hijab*.

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Nelson, Cynthia. *Doria Shafik, Egyptian Feminist: A Woman Apart.* Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2000.

Linda Herrera

SAID, EDWARD

[1935–2003]

Author, educator, and scholar.

Edward Said was one of the greatest public intellectuals, scholars, and writers of the twentieth century. He almost single-handedly created the fields of cultural studies and post-colonial studies with the publication of his book *Orientalism* (1978), which ranks as one of the most influential books of the twentieth century. He was a brilliant, multitalented thinker, speaker, writer, and musician, publishing widely in the fields of literature, Middle Eastern politics, orientalism, and music. In the latter field, for example, Said was an accomplished pianist, served as music critic for the *Nation* magazine, and with conductor and pianist Daniel Barenboim published *Parallels and Paradoxes: Explorations in Music and Society* (2002). He and Barenboim also co-founded East West Divan, an orchestra comprised of Arab and Israeli musicians.

Said was born in British Mandate Jerusalem to affluent Palestinian Christian parents. The family moved to Cairo early in his life and he attended Victoria College in Cairo, where his classmates included the future King Hussein ibn Talal of Jordan and the actor Omar Sharif. In 1951, Said was sent by his parents to the United States, where he attended Mount Hermon School in Massachusetts, and then Princeton University and Harvard University, where he received his Ph.D. in English in 1964 with a dissertation, *Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography* (published by Harvard University Press in 1966). Said became an instructor at Columbia University the year before he received his Ph.D. degree and became a full professor there in 1970. In 1977, he was appointed to an endowed chair at Columbia as the Parr Professor of English and Comparative Literature. There followed appointments as the Old Dominion Foundation Professor of Humanities and finally University Professor, Columbia's highest honor for a faculty member. Said died in New York City at the age of sixty-seven.

Said was deeply involved in the politics of the Middle East, particularly the Israel-Palestinian crisis, as well in as the politics of colonialism—the way that centuries of Western scholars, artists, administrators, explorers, and writers have used Western military, economic, and cultural dominance to stereotype, dominate, and subjugate Eastern (particularly Islamic Middle Eastern) peoples, all in the name of what was presented as an objective, nonintrusive, nonjudgmental process: orientalism. Said was for years a member of the Palestine National Council and helped write the Palestinian constitution in 1988. He broke with Yasir Arafat following the Oslo Accords of 1993 both because he felt that the Palestinians got a very bad deal out of the accords and because he came to favor a single Jewish-Palestinian state rather than the two separate states that the leaders on both sides continued to pursue.

Said was the author or editor of at least twenty-eight books, as well as countless scholarly articles, newspaper articles, and editorials. In addition to the books mentioned above, he will be remembered particularly for *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), which extends the themes whose exploration he began in *Orientalism; The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination, 1969–1994* (1994); *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (1997); and *Out of Place: A Memoir* (1999).

Said served as president of the prestigious Modern Language Association during 1999. At that time, Richard Poirier, president of the Library of America, stated that Said "is certainly the most influential critic in anything touching upon the cultural criticism of literature."

Throughout his career, Said served as a lightning rod for criticism from all sides, owing on the one hand to his fierce and unwavering support for the freedom and independence of the Palestinian people—which led him to withering denunciations

of Israel and of what he viewed as imperialist American support for Israel and projection of U.S. power in the Middle East—but also, in his later years, to his equally harsh denunciations of the violence, duplicity, and tyranny of Middle Eastern rulers and of their journalistic and intellectual supporters.

See also Arab–Israel Conflict; Arafat, Yasir; Orientalism; Orientalists, International Congress of; Oslo Accord (1993); Palestinian National Council.

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John M. Lundquist

SAʿID, NURI AL-

[1888–1958]

Frequent minister or prime minister of Iraq and one of Iraq's leading statesmen from 1921 to 1958.

Nuri al-Saʿid was born in Baghdad during the Ottoman Empire into a middle-class Sunni Islamic family of Arab Turkish stock. At an early age he was enrolled in primary religious school before going to the Ottoman military secondary school. Later he attended the military college in Istanbul, and was graduated an officer in 1906. He returned to Baghdad, where he worked in an army unit responsible for collecting taxes from tribesmen, a position that enabled him to travel, to gain intimate knowledge of the country, and to establish contacts with *shaykhs* (tribal leaders), which he later used to his political advantage. In 1910, Nuri returned to Istanbul to attend the Ottoman staff college. In 1912, the year he graduated, he saw action against Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars.

In his youth, Nuri believed in Arab nationalism and the modernization of the Ottoman Empire (along the lines of the principles of the Young Turks, who seized power in Istanbul in 1909). He was, however, disillusioned by their anti-Arab policy and in 1913 joined al-Ahd (the Covenant), a secret society supporting self-determination for Arabs. When the Turks became suspicious of his activities, Nuri, fearing arrest, fled to Cairo, Egypt, in the spring of 1914. From there he went to Basra (Iraq), where he aligned himself with Sayyid Talib Pasha al-Naqib, a well-known leader of the Arab cause and the head of a local important family.

Nuri was in a Basra hospital, recovering from an illness, when the British seized the city at the beginning of World War I. They arrested him as an Ottoman officer and sent him to India, where he was put under loose house arrest. Nuri was released in 1915 and left India for Cairo where, encouraged by the British, he joined the movement of Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca, who had called for Arab independence from the Turks. Nuri played a major military role in the revolt (which Sharif Husayn finally proclaimed) against the Turks on 5 June 1916.

With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, Nuri became chief of staff for Prince Faisal I ibn Hussein, one of the sons of Sharif Husayn. He went with Faisal to Paris and London as an adviser during the peace talks.

In 1920, the British were awarded a mandate over Iraq by the League of Nations and established an indigenous Iraqi government. Jaʿfar al-Askari, Nuri's brother-in-law, became minister of defense and called Nuri to Iraq, where he was nominated chief of staff of the army. The following year, Faisal became king of Iraq, an objective toward which Nuri had worked hard. In the years that followed, Nuri was active in building the Iraqi army and police.

In 1929, Nuri assumed the first of his many prime ministries. It was he who negotiated the Anglo–Iraqi treaty of 1930, which officially ended the British mandate over Iraq, but which allowed Britain military bases and an assured influence in Iraq until 1955. His ability to secure its passage through parliament led the British to appreciate Nuri's skills and personality. This act inaugurated his long career as Iraq's dominant politician and demonstrated his strong belief in collaboration with the British.

These British leanings met with strong opposition from nationalists, however, who wanted complete independence. In dealing with the opposition, Nuri used tactics for which he later became famous—censorship of the press, proroguing parliament, and manipulating elections.

In 1936, Jaʿfar al-Askari was killed in a military coup, and a number of the pro-British politicians were removed. Nuri left Baghdad for Cairo in self-imposed exile and did not return until October 1937.

King Ghazi ibn Faisal of Iraq, who inherited the throne in 1933, died in a 1939 automobile accident. His infant son Faisal II ibn Ghazi was declared king, and his uncle Abd al-Ilah ibn Ali became regent, with Nuri's blessing.

After his return to Iraq, Nuri began to associate with a group of rising Arab nationalist military officers, who became prominent after the 1936 coup. They frequently intervened in politics, with Nuri's connivance. The harmony between Nuri and these officers slowly dissipated, however, after the beginning of World War II. While Nuri advocated a pro-British stand during the war, the officers slowly shifted to a pro-Axis one. The tension between the two camps rose when the British, fearing direct intervention by Nazi Germany, landed troops in southern Iraq. The nationalist officers staged a coup in May 1941, and the regent and Nuri fled the country. After encountering some resistance, the British were able to quell the nationalist movement and gain control of Baghdad.

The regent then returned to Baghdad, and a pro-British government headed by Jamil al-Midfaʿi was formed. Nuri chose to stay in Cairo as ambassador but was called back in October 1941 to head a new cabinet as prime minister, a post he held until 1944. During that period Nuri worked closely with the British in prosecuting both nationalist officers and civilians; they were arrested, tried, and in some cases executed. These measures left a deep wound among Iraqis, who had considerable sympathy toward the nationalists. Soon, most of the Iraqis lost faith in Nuri and became critical of both his policies and his leadership.

Nuri kept Iraq quiet for the remainder of the war, but the war left its imprint on Iraq. A high inflation rate and the widening gap between poor and rich allowed the leftists, a small but aggressive group, to gain strength. They became a target of suppression by Nuri and his successors.

Nuri was the first to advocate a council or league of Arab States, even before the end of the war. He was successful in launching his idea when a protocol for the foundation of the Arab League (as it is also called) was signed in Alexandria, in 1944.

In the postwar period, Nuri's influence over Iraq was unchallenged; even when he did not hold office he was able to steer the body politic in the direction he desired. A pro-Nuri majority was assured in parliament—especially among rich landlords and shaykhs. Nuri used this position to gain support among the Shiʿa and the Kurds. When the Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani revolted in 1945, Nuri—with the backing of the British—crushed the revolt and compelled him to take refuge outside Iraq.

With the rise of petroleum prices and Iraq's increased oil income, Nuri turned part of his attention to the establishment of an economic development program. In 1950, he engineered the passage of a law establishing a development board, composed of Iraqi and foreign experts, to lay down a five-year development plan. Between 1950 and 1958, four such plans were passed, and some 70 percent of oil revenue was devoted to Iraq's long-term development.

In 1952, Nuri negotiated a 50–50 split of oil revenues with the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). Between 1951 and 1958, Iraq's oil revenues rose dramatically from 32 million to US$237 million. Iraq's dependence on oil revenues rose, too. By 1958, oil revenues accounted for 28 percent of gross national product and 60 percent of the budget. Increased oil revenues were not accompanied by a change in social structure; rich landlords and tribal shaykhs gained title to much of the arable land, while urban merchants grew increasingly wealthy on government contracts.

The development of Iraq's human resources also lagged behind its needs. Between 1950 and 1958, although higher-education institutions expanded, by 1958 they still graduated only a few thousand students a year, and secondary education remained

concentrated in urban areas. Opposition to the regime increasingly erupted in street violence. In 1952, when a riot broke out at the College of Pharmacy in Baghdad, it quickly spread throughout Iraq, so a military government was appointed to maintain order.

Between 1952 and 1958, regional Arab issues played a dominant role in internal politics. In 1952 a coup d'état in Egypt brought to power a group of Arab nationalist military officers, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. The fall of King Farouk's monarchy in Egypt and the anti-Western tone taken by the new Egyptian regime had broad effects in the Arab world—particularly in Iraq, where the regime was pro-West. These events helped to destabilize Iraq's regime and eventually led to its fall.

The 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty was due to expire in 1955, and Nuri was searching for a vehicle to replace it. Britain proposed what became known as the Baghdad Pact, which would include the northern tier of the Middle East—Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan—as a new shield against Communism. Nuri wanted to include Kuwait and even Egypt, but Nasser would have nothing to do with any instrument tied to the West. Nuri's most significant impact on Iraq was in foreign policy, since he tied Iraq to the Western alliance and the Baghdad Pact. This provided for a shield against encroachment from the Soviet Union but seriously isolated Iraq from its Arab neighbors. The group of agreements that constituted the Baghdad Pact was signed in 1955—among Iraq, Turkey, Britain, Iran, and Pakistan.

The Iraqi people virtually rejected the pact. Eventually, Nuri dissolved parliament and fostered the election of a majority that favored his policies. Thus was the pact effected. In 1956, Egypt's President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and England, France, and Israel attacked Egypt, taking the canal. Iraqi popular opposition to Nuri's regime then intensified and, faced with uprisings, he imposed martial law to bring about control.

In February 1958, Egypt and Syria announced the formation of the United Arab Republic. Popular support for this union was strong in Iraq and Jordan, but the governments of these two countries saw it as a serious threat to their regimes; a federation between Iraq and Jordan was then announced. Nuri's last post was that of the federation's prime minister—and one of his last political acts was an attempt to bring Kuwait into the federation.

In 1957, while Nuri was involved in foreign policy, four opposition parties—the Istiqlal (Independence), National Democratic, Baʿth, and Communist parties—joined together as a national front against the Iraqi government. Far more serious opposition to the regime came from the army, where junior officers were busy organizing military cells to topple the monarchy. Nuri downplayed as insignificant warnings of trouble in the army.

In May 1958, civil war broke out in Lebanon. The Jordanian government, fearing the war might spill over, asked its federation partner, Iraq, to send troops to Jordan. On 14 July 1958, they complied. Nevertheless, under the command of the Free Officers, Iraqi troops also occupied strategic points in Baghdad—the ministry of defense, the radio station, and the king's palace. The monarchy was abolished, and the Republic of Iraq was declared. The king and the regent were killed, and Nuri escaped from his residence—but the following day, fleeing in the streets disguised as a woman, he was shot dead. His only son, Sabah, was also killed during the coup.

The new Iraqi government under Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim dismantled much of Nuri's work, dissolved the federation with Jordan, and allowed Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact to lapse. Political ties with the Soviet Union, severed in 1954, were reestablished, and Iraq turned to the Soviet bloc for arms. Rapprochement with Egypt's Nasser was brief, and the revolution failed to eliminate the most lasting contributions of Nuri and the British—the Iraqi state and its two foundations, the army and the bureaucracy.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

SAʿID PASHA

[1822–1863]

Son of Muhammad Ali; viceroy of the semiautonomous province of Ottoman Egypt, 1854–1863.

Prince Saʿid commanded the Egyptian navy during the last years of the reign of his father, Muhammad Ali, and through the short reign of his nephew Abbas Hilmi I. Saʿid's childhood friendship with the French consul, Ferdinand de Lesseps, paved the way for the French concession to build the Suez Canal despite the opposition of the British and the viceroy's Ottoman overlord. European fortune-seekers flooded into the country under the Francophile Saʿid, who started Egypt down the road to ruinous foreign debt. Egypt's contribution of 20,000 troops to the Ottoman Crimean War effort also strained its resources. Saʿid rehabilitated Rifaʿa al-Tahtawi and other officials who had fallen into disfavor under Abbas. Saʿid's Land Law of 1858 attempted to extend central authority in economic affairs, and in 1858 he appointed Auguste Mariette head of what became the Egyptian Antiquities Service, but his capricious decisions and increasing European interference made institution building difficult. The viceroy gave more power to indigenous Egyptians in provincial administration and promoted them into the junior ranks of the officer corps at the expense of the Turkish-speaking elite. Port Saʿid, at the Mediterranean entrance to the Suez Canal, bears Saʿid Pasha's name. Historians have devoted relatively little attention to the reigns of Abbas Hilmi I and Saʿid compared to those of their flamboyant predecessor Muhammad Ali and their successor Khedive Ismaʿil.

See also CRIMEAN WAR; EGYPT; LESSEPS, FERDINAND DE; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; SUEZ CANAL.

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SAʿIDZADEH, SEYYED MOHSEN

[1958–]

Iranian legal scholar, writer, and outspoken clerical proponent of gender equality.

Seyyed Mohsen Saʿidzadeh was born in Qaʿen, Khorasan, Iran. He began his religious studies at age ten at the seminary in Qaʿen. In 1973 he moved to Mashhad to continue his studies, and in 1976 he moved to Qom. He was among the first graduates of the Qom Law School, set up in 1979 to train judges for the revolutionary courts. After graduation in 1983, he served as a judge in Kermanshah until 1986, when he resigned and returned to Qom to pursue advanced studies. He has certificates from fifteen ayatollahs attesting to his proficiency in Qurʾanic exegesis and *hadith* literature. In 1988, he began researching women's issues in Islamic jurisprudence and developing premises for the construction of equal rights for women within a *shariʿa* framework. He has written extensively on women's rights in Islamic law and tradition, but little of his work has been published so far; what has appeared in print is mainly in the feminist journal *Zanan,* sometimes appearing under pseudonyms. His unconventional views and his critique of patriarchal interpretations of the *shariʿa* dismayed traditionalists within the clerical establishment. In June 1998, following publication in the independent reformist newspaper *Jameʿeh* of an article in which he criticized misogynist traditions, Saʿidzadeh was arrested and tried in camera by the Special Clergy Court. He was released after three months but defrocked and banned from publishing.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); QOM.

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ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI

SAINT CATHERINE'S MONASTERY

Monastic complex in the Sinai Peninsula begun in the fourth century.

Saint Catherine's monastery sits near the foot of "God-trodden" Mount Sinai (Jabal Musa) in the middle of Egypt's southern Sinai Peninsula. In the mid-200s Christian hermits began to gather around the place where they believed God had spoken to Moses in the burning bush (Exodus 3:2–6). In 337 Helena, mother of Byzantine Emperor Constantine I, ordered the building of a small church and tower on that spot.

In 551 Emperor Justinian commissioned his favorite architect Stephanus of Ailae to erect high enclosure walls and to build a large church with monks' dwellings and gardens. In the 800s the "monastery of the bush" was renamed after Saint Catherine. The legend was that after her martyrdom in 305 in Alexandria, angels had borne her body to Mt. Sinai; five centuries later the monks discovered the holy relics.

This strong tradition was based on extant inscriptions (the debate about the dating being unresolved) that Muhammad himself protected the complex by an immunity decree. Guided by this tradition, later Muslim rulers in Egypt arranged for a tribe of bedouin mountaineers to protect—not always successfully—the monks from marauding nomads. The Frankish crusading Knights of the Sinai (from 1099 to 1270) and Napoleon (in 1798) also provided protection to the monks.

The monastery's library of more than 4,500 manuscripts (mostly Greek, but also Arabic, Syriac, Egyptian, and Slavonic) and its collections of more than 2,000 icons are uniquely precious. The isolation of the monastery preserved the earliest icons from being smashed by the imperial iconoclastic decrees of Leo III (726) and his successor Constantine V.

Foreign grants and the expertise of foreign scholars have ensured that the icon collections are catalogued, displayed, and safeguarded. Because Jewish, Muslim, and Christian pilgrims and tourists climb Mt. Sinai in ever increasing numbers, daily access to Saint Catherine's is limited to a few morning hours, except for those who stay in a well-managed, modest guest house.

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THOMAS STRANSKY

SAINT JOSEPH UNIVERSITY

Jesuit university in Lebanon.

Saint Joseph University, established in 1875, was administered by the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) and had strong ties to the University of Lyons in France. It had branches in Tripoli, Sidon, and Zahla. French is the primary language of instruction, although some courses are offered in English and in Arabic. The Department of Arabic and Oriental Studies is considered very strong. Faculties in 1994 included theology, medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, engineering, law and political science, economics and business administration, and letters and humanities.

ASʿAD ABUKHALIL

SAINT MARK'S CATHEDRAL

Seat of the Coptic patriarchate.

Built in the 1970s, Saint Mark's Cathedral provided a new seat of the Coptic patriarchate and a cultural and religious focal point for Egypt's Copts, one of the largest and most important Christian minorities in the Middle East. On 2 June 1968, the relics

of Saint Mark were returned to the Coptic church by Pope Paul VI with great fanfare. They are now interred beneath the main altar of Saint Mark's and lend the cathedral an enhanced importance and venerability. Located in the once-fashionable Abbassiya district of greater Cairo, the cathedral offers Coptic rite services in Arabic, English, and French.

See also COPTS.

RAYMOND WILLIAM BAKER

SAʿIQA, AL-

Pan-Arabist Palestinian guerrilla organization.

The Organization of the Vanguards of the Popular Liberation War—Forces of the Thunderbolt or al-Saʿiqa (Thunderbolt) was founded by pro-Syrian Palestinian Baʿthists in 1968, following a 1966 Baʿth Party resolution to create a Palestinian chapter. (The rival, pro-Iraqi Baʿthists later established the Arab Liberation Front.) Saʿiqa joined the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in February 1969, but relations with the PLO mainstream deteriorated after Syria's 1976 intervention in Lebanon, with Saʿiqa openly involved in Syrian attacks on the PLO. Saʿiqa was one of two factions that rebelled against Yasir Arafat in 1983, and it has since boycotted all PLO institutions in favor of a series of Syrian-sponsored anti-Arafat alliances (the National Alliance in 1984, the Palestinian National Salvation Front in 1985, and subsequently the Group of Ten).

A number of Saʿiqa's founders, including its first secretary-general, Dafi Jumani, were ousted in 1970 by the new Syrian regime of Hafiz al-Asad after Saʿiqa backed the losing side in a struggle for power within Syria. At Syrian insistence, Jumani was replaced by Mahmud Muʿayita and, in 1971, by Zuhayr Muhsin. Muhsin was assassinated in 1979 under circumstances that remain unclear, and was succeeded by Isam al-Qadi. The organization's publications include the weekly *al-Tali* (The Vanguards), first published in 1969, and an internal bulletin, *al-Saʿiqa.*

Throughout its existence, Saʿiqa has received political, military, and financial support from Syria, whose Palestinian refugee camps and whose own military provide most of the group's recruits. Saʿiqa's policies have been either dictated by Damascus or calculated to serve Syrian interests within the Palestinian movement. Syrian patronage once made Saʿiqa the second largest constituent member of the PLO, giving it a generous quota of seats in the Palestine National Council and the PLO Executive Committee. However, its presence in the Palestinian territories and other areas beyond Syrian control has been weak, and its role as a Syrian instrument is widely resented there. Saʿiqa contributions to the 1973 Arab-Israel War were confined to a supporting role in the Syrian Golan. Its support of Syria's intervention in Lebanon in 1976 led to mass defections and its total elimination from areas under PLO control. Saʿiqa's absence during the 1982 siege of Beirut and its open collusion with Syria in the latter's efforts to impose its hegemony over the PLO and Lebanon during the 1980s have strained its credibility further. In January 2003 an attempt at bringing Saʿiqa into the Cairo reconciliation process between the PLO and Palestinian opposition groups failed, despite insistence on their inclusion by HAMAS and Islamic Jihad.

Syria has also operated a distinct "Saʿiqa" force, which was particularly active in the 1970s and early 1980s in targeting U.S., Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian embassies, Jewish institutions, and other civilian groups around the region and across Europe.

See also MUHSIN, ZUHAYR; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); SYRIA.

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MOUIN RABBANI
UPDATED BY GEORGE R. WILKES

SAISON

Crackdown against Zionist dissident organizations by mainstream Zionist underground in British Mandatory Palestine.

The Saison, or "hunting season," was an operation authorized by David Ben-Gurion from November

1944 to March 1945 against dissident Jewish underground groups. In February 1944 the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi, led by Menachem Begin, initiated an armed revolt against the British authorities in Palestine in an attempt to secure Jewish independence. Their violent activities ran counter to the official policy of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) at the time and would not be tolerated. On 31 October, Begin was issued an ultimatum by Haganah leaders to cease and desist, which he rejected. On 6 November, Walter Edward Guinness, Lord Moyne, the senior British official in the Middle East, was assassinated in Cairo by LEHI, an Irgun splinter group. This provided an opportunity to conduct a sweeping crackdown on both extremist groups. Special units of Palmah and Haganah volunteers arrested and handed over approximately 1,000 suspected Irgun and LEHI members to the British, some of whom were tortured beforehand. Many religious Zionists and General Zionists opposed the operation, and the bitter rivalry between Labor Zionism and Revisionist Zionism gave the Saison political and ideological overtones. Begin ordered his forces not to retaliate, fearing a Jewish civil war. Irgun activities against the British ceased until after the end of World War II.

See also Begin, Menachem; Ben-Gurion, David; Guinness, Walter Edward; Haganah; Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi (IZL); Lohamei Herut Yisrael.

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Pierre M. Atlas

SAKAKINI, KHALIL AL-

[1878–1953]

Palestinian writer and educator.

Khalil al-Sakakini was born in Jerusalem to a Greek Orthodox family. His early life was devoted to Arab letters. In 1909, he founded the Dusturiyya school in Jerusalem, which developed an influential model for a secular, Arab curriculum. Also before World War I, he played a leading role in the Nahda Urthuduksiyya (Orthodox Revival) movement. During the mandate period in Palestine, Sakakini continued his advocacy of public education and became principal of the Dar al-Muʿallimin (Teacher's College) in Jerusalem. He is perhaps best remembered for his books on teaching Arabic to beginners, some of which are still used in the Arab world.

Sakakini also participated in the early Palestinian national movement, and his diaries are an important source for scholars of the period. He argued that Jewish immigration threatened to disrupt the unity of Arabic culture. An ardent pan-Arabist, he admired Faisal I ibn Hussayn, who led the Arab revolt of 1916 and, from 1921 to 1933, was King of Iraq. In 1923, Sakakini became secretary for the Arab Executive Committee in Jerusalem. He and his family fled to Cairo in early 1948, during the Arab-Israel War. His best-known book is *Kadha Ana Ya Dunya: Yawmiyyat Khalil Sakakini* (Such am I, O world).

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Elizabeth Thompson

SALAFIYYA MOVEMENT

Modernist Islamic intellectual movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which had some following among Sunni elites living in the Ottoman Empire.

The Salafiyya movement sought to engineer a religious revival and reform that would incorporate Western conceptions of modernity and assert the religious and cultural identity of Islam at the same time. The most prominent spokesmen of the movement were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935). The members of the movement (*salafis*) took the line that the values of early Islam were compatible with those of modern Europe. In so doing, they attributed to Islam mainly secular virtues such as rationalism, the encouragement of sciences, political power, and democracy. In this way they were

able to place blame for the relative decline of Islamic societies and power vis-à-vis the West on Muslims who over time had diverged from Islam's original teachings. For this trend, the *salaf* or "forefathers," had in fact two complementary meanings. One was the early companions of the Prophet Muhammad, who were perceived to have abided by the Qurʾan and the sunna (deed and/or utterance of the Prophet) as closely as possible. Using this conception of the salaf, the Salafiyya emphasized the return to the scriptures. The second meaning of the salaf denoted reverence for the founders of the Islamic schools of law and for particular medieval jurists, such as al-Ghazali, who influenced the Salafiyya in one way or another.

The central part of the Salafiyya program consisted of legal reform through reinterpreting Islamic law (the *shariʿa*) to make it compatible with Western and modern values. In fact, the Salafiyya became caught between two opposing trends: (1) a Westernizing trend, which wanted to adopt Western secular codes and legislate completely outside Islamic law, and (2) a traditional trend, which was perceived as adhering to rigid and premodern interpretations of the four jurisprudence schools of Sunni Islam. Striving to pursue a third alternative, the Salafiyya renounced the widespread nineteenth- and twentieth-century belief in Sunni circles that the gate of reinterpretation of Islamic law *(ijtihad)* had been closed at some point between the tenth and twelfth centuries. For the Salafiyya, *ijtihad* should be permissible in all aspects of transactions *(mu'amalat),* except where there is an explicit text *(nass)* in the Qurʾan or in an authentic sunna. The Salafiyya also called for unifying the interpretation of the *shariʿa* by employing two general principles. The first was the principle of public interest *(maslaha),* which was treated as one of the sources of Islamic law. The second principle was a combination *(talfiq),* whereby, for the interpretation of a religious precept in the field of transactions, the judge would not be confined to the opinion of one Islamic school of law but could make use of the interpretations of any school. The Salafiyya movement may also be regarded as a forerunner of Arab nationalism, since it emphasized Arab-based Islam and the Arabic language, albeit concurrent with modern sciences.

Politically, the Salafiyya produced two trends. One was the trend of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, which emphasized fighting the advance of Western imperialism into the East, in general, and in Muslim lands, in particular. This made al-Afghani validate several lines of political approach to mobilize various Muslim and non-Muslim groups against the West. He thus spoke in terms of both religious and secular nationalism. He called for healing the divisions between the Sunnis and Shiʿites by concentrating on the common religious basics among these two largest of Muslim sects.

The second trend was that of Muhammad Abduh. After working closely with al-Afghani for a short period, Abduh dissociated himself from his friend's politics, shunned political activism, and concentrated on the issues of Islamic religious reform through education and jurisprudence.

As for Rashid Rida, generally speaking, he followed Abduh's political line during the period preceding World War I; however, he shifted his position and adopted an anti-Western activist political line, akin to that of al-Afghani, after the war—as a reaction to the establishment of direct European rule in most of the core Arab-Islamic areas, namely Syria and Iraq.

In Morocco, as in the Arab East, the Salafiyya movement condemned the doctrines and practices of popular Sufi orders, which it regarded as having no textual basis in Islamic thought. Politically, the Moroccan Salafiyya championed the nationalist liberal anticolonial cause and gained popularity thereby, especially because the rival Sufi orders cooperated with the French, in one way or another, after France proclaimed Morocco a protectorate in 1912. As an intellectual reformist movement, however, the Salafiyya of Morocco, and especially one of its leaders, Allal al-Fasi, emphasized the need for internal reform in Muslim society and to that end pursued a social line of self-help.

See also ABDUH, MUHAMMAD; AFGHANI, JAMAL AL-DIN AL-; RIDA, RASHID; *SHARIʿA*.

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MAHMOUD HADDAD

SALAM FAMILY

Prominent Lebanese family involved in education, philanthropy, and politics.

Salim Ali (1869–1938). One of the major Sunni Muslim figures in Beirut during the late Ottoman period. In addition to his activities as a merchant, he served as mayor of Beirut and was a member of the Ottoman parliament.

Anbara (1897–1986). Daughter of Salim Ali. She was born in Beirut and became a leading author, translator, and feminist. She married Palestinian educator Ahmad al-Samih al-Khalidi and in 1929 moved first to Jaffa and then to Jerusalem. She participated in a women's political meeting that same year that marched to the British high commissioner to present their grievances.

Salim (1922–). Businessman. After completing his studies at the American University of Beirut in 1947, he worked for Middle East Airlines. He was chairman and chief executive officer from 1982 to 1992.

Tammam (1945–). Son of Saʾib Salam. He went into business in 1968. In 1974, he formed the Ruwwad al-Islah movement. As the heir to the Salam family's political leadership, he was first elected to the parliament in 1996.

Hala Salaam Maksoud (1943–2002). Granddaughter of Salim Ali. She studied at the American University of Beirut and earned a Ph.D. in political theory from Georgetown University. She taught at both Georgetown University and George Mason University. A leading personality in the Arab-American community, she served as president of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, the Arab Women's Council, and the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. She married Clovis Maksoud, former ambassador for the League of Arab States to the United Nations.

Ghida (1963–). Married Prince Talal bin Muhammad of Jordan, nephew of King Hussein ibn Talal, in 1991.

See also AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT (AUB); HUSSEIN IBN TALAL; KHALIDI, AHMAD AL-SAMIH AL-; SALAM, SAʾIB.

MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

SALAM, SAʾIB

[1905–2000]

Major Sunni politician in Lebanon.

Saʾib (also Saeb) Salam was born in Beirut to Saʿid Ali Salam, of the wealthy Salam Family. He attended the American University of Beirut and the University of London but received a degree from neither. Salam was first elected to parliament in 1943, shortly before Lebanon's independence from France. He later came to political prominence during the Lebanese Civil War of 1958, when he championed the cause of those who opposed the government of Camille Chamoun. Salam articulated the sentiments of "the Beiruti street" by emphasizing Sunni political support for Gamal Abdel Nasser. He was identified with the Wasat (center) political bloc during the 1960s and criticized the government of Fuʾad Chehab. In 1970, after the election of Wasat member Sulayman Franjiyya as president, he was appointed prime minister. He resigned in 1973 to protest the refusal of Franjiyya to dismiss the Maronite commander in chief of the Lebanese army, whom Salam held responsible for Israel's raid on Beirut that resulted in the assassination of three top Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leaders. Salam's views became consistently pro-Saudi, and his educational enterprises (such as al-Maqasid) received funding from the Saudi government. Salam opposed the right-wing militias during the war but was more opposed to the leftist coalition. In the summer of 1982, he arranged indirect talks between PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat and U.S. envoy Philip Habib, talks that led to the PLO's withdrawal from Beirut. Salam also helped formulate the 1989 Taʾif Accord that ended Lebanon's lengthy civil strife.

Salam is also noted for establishing Middle East Airlines, Lebanon's national carrier, in 1945. Following two assassination attempts, he left Lebanon and lived in Geneva, Switzerland, from 1985 to

1994. He died on 21 January 2000, four days after celebrating his ninety-fifth birthday.

See also American University of Beirut (AUB); Arafat, Yasir; Chamoun, Camille; Chehab, Fu'ad; Franjiyya, Sulayman; Habib, Philip Charles; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Salam Family; Ta'if Accord.

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As'ad AbuKhalil
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

SALANT, SAMUEL

[1816–1909]

Renowned scholar of traditional Jewish law and chief rabbi of Jerusalem.

Samuel Salant was born in Bialystok and studied in a number of yeshivas (Jewish religious schools) in Eastern Europe. He arrived in Jerusalem in 1841 and was soon appointed rabbi of the Ashkenazic community; he became Jerusalem's chief rabbi in 1878. In Palestine, Salant led the development of a vast network of Ashkenazic educational, medical, and social institutions. With Sir Moses Montefiore, he advocated the growth of the Jewish community in Jerusalem's Old City and in new areas beyond its walls.

Chaim I. Waxman

SALIH, ALI ABDULLAH

[1942–]

President of the Yemen Arab Republic, then of Yemen, since 1978.

Salih became a public figure in the mid-1970s as a military commander and a supporter of the reform policies of Ibrahim al-Hamdi (assassinated in 1977). Hamdi's successor, Ahmad Husayn Ghashmi, was also assassinated shortly thereafter (1978). A four-man presidential council was then formed, one of whose members was Salih. After intense political maneuvering, he was elected president by the People's Constituent Assembly (created by Ghashmi).

Salih's origins did not augur well for his success: he is a member of the Sanhan tribe, a minor element of the Hashid tribal confederation. Though this made him a part of one of the major political forces in the country, he was not able to draw immediately upon the support of any of its major constituent elements, and it was widely assumed that his tenure would be brief. He undertook no radical policy shifts and moved to develop his own basis of support within the military and in civilian society. By shrewdly exploiting North Yemen's very limited room to maneuver in the international arena (in view of Saudi Arabia's strong position and more developed international associations), and promoting economic development programs and the exploitation of Yemen's limited oil resources, Salih grew in stature and popularity.

Developing a broader basis of support and legitimacy for his rule required dealing with several foreign and domestic policy issues. In foreign policy, the two most important areas were relations with South Yemen (PDRY) and Saudi Arabia. Frictions with the government and personnel of the PDRY led to two wars in less than a decade (1972 and 1979). However, the demise of the Soviet Union, and some mutual issues that required resolution (e.g., borders, oil resources) led to the unification of North and South Yemen in 1990; Salih became president of the unified state. Tensions between Yemen and Saudi Arabia have remained high throughout Salih's regime, but increased at the time of the first Gulf War due to Saudi Arabia's fear of the power of the unified state of Yemen.

In the domestic arena, Salih tried to move away from his reliance on the military: after a series of organizations designed to provide a greater civilian role in government, Salih promoted the creation of a National Legislature, in which his own political party, the General People's Congress (GPC), played the major role.

Perhaps the greatest threat to his government was the outbreak of a civil war between the North and South, in 1994, in which the North decisively defeated the South. In its aftermath, some significant changes were made to the institutions of government. Tentative steps toward more democratic rule had begun with multiparty elections in 1993. However, the 1997 elections were boycotted by the

representatives of the South, allowing Salih's party and its allies to dominate the new legislature. In 1994 parliament abolished the old presidential council and replaced it with a one-man presidency. Under the new rules, it elected Salih to a five-year term. Then, in 1999, Yemen held its first direct elections to the presidency; Salih won with 96.3 percent of the vote. In 2000 several other changes to the constitution were approved; among them, the president's term was extended to seven years and he was granted several new powers. The next round of parliamentary elections was held on schedule in 2003. Once again, Salih's party, the GPC, completely dominated the outcome (winning 238 of 301 seats).

Most observers regard Salih's role in all these developments as crucial. Although it is clear that he enjoys genuine popular support, there are many critics (both secular and Islamist) of his policies, and there is little doubt that his regime is characterized by personalism, corruption, and nepotism (an example being the important role of his eldest son, Ahmad). But, there is also no doubt that his innate political shrewdness and ability to deal with the multitude of political, economic, and social interests found in (and around) the country are important reasons for the fact that he is among the longest-serving Arab rulers.

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MANFRED W. WENNER

SALIH, TEYIB

[1929–]

The most famous Sudanese novelist.

Teyib (also Tayyib) Salih was born in 1929 in the Northern Province of Sudan to an ethnic group known for the propagation of Islamic scholarship in the region. His primary education was religious, and he was a precocious scholar. By the time he entered secondary school in Khartoum, he had already studied prominent Arab authors such as Taha Husayn. He studied at Khartoum and London universities and has spent most of his life outside of his homeland. He studied in England before working at the British Broadcasting Corporation as head of drama in the Arabic Service. On his return to Sudan, he became the director of Sudanese National Radio. He later worked as a director-general of information in Qatar in the Persian Gulf; with the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris; and as UNESCO representative in Qatar.

Salih's major publications are the anthology *The Wedding of Zein and Other Sudanese Stories* (1969) and the novel *Season of Migration to the North* (1969). He has also written many short stories, which are among the best to be found in modern Arabic literature. Salih's novels have gained worldwide attention, especially *Season of Migration to the North.* His writing is drawn from his experience of communal village life and centers on people and their complex relationships. At various levels and with varying degrees of psychoanalytic emphasis, he deals with the themes of reality and illusion, the cultural dissonance between the West and the Orient, the harmony and conflict of brotherhood, and the individual's responsibility to find a fusion among his or her contradictions. These motifs and their contexts derive from both his Islamic background and the experience of modern Africa. He constructs an impervious unity of the social, religious, and political essence of the African or African Arab, holding that a harmony of existence is possible for individuals in a society of values and ethics. His books have been translated into several languages and *The Wedding of Zein* was made into an Arabic film that won an award at the Cannes Film Festival in 1976.

See also FILM; HUSAYN, TAHA; LITERATURE: ARABIC.

KHALID M. EL-HASSAN

SALIM, ALI

[1936–]

Egyptian dramatist.

After a successful career as a comic actor, Ali Salim turned to writing and became one of the major

comic dramatists in Egypt; he is well known for his satiric wit. His early plays are full of farcical situations and telling criticism of the idiocies of bureaucracy and the phobias of the common man; notable among these are *al-Nas Illi fi al-Sama al-Thamina* (1966; People in eighth heaven) and *Biʾr al-Qamh* (1967; The wheat well). *Madrasat al-Mushaghibin* (1971; School of troublemakers), in which a kind teacher reforms a class of rowdy teens, was one of his great popular successes. Salim has written several more serious works, of which *al-Buffeh* (1968; The buffet) and *Kumidiya Udib: Int Illi Qatalt al-Wahsh* (1970; The comedy of Oedipus: You're the one who killed the beast) have had considerable success on stage. The latter, which transports the Oedipus legend to Egyptian Thebes, provides Egyptian audiences contemplating the consequences of the Arab–Israel War of 1967 with a telling view of a nation ruled by an idealistic leader whose bold plans divert his attention from the fact that his security forces are terrorizing the nation.

Retired from the Ministry of Culture, he is also known for traveling to Israel after the Oslo peace talks. His best-selling account of the trip (*Rihla ila Israʾil,* 1994) takes to task those fearful of cultural invasion, rues the mental state of war besieging many of his compatriots, insists that the real battle is one of civil rights, and answers the curiosity of many Egyptians toward their Israeli neighbors. Salim was expelled from the Egyptian Writers Union for publishing the book. He continues to work for peace, and he has also returned to his first love, puppet theater.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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ROGER ALLEN
UPDATED BY NANCY BERG

SALIM HASAN

[1888–1961]

Egyptian Egyptologist.

The second Egyptian Egyptologist of note after Ahmad Kamal, Salim Hasan was educated in Cairo and Paris. He taught at Cairo University and reached the second highest post in the Egyptian Antiquities department, under its French director. Salim Hasan excavated extensively at Giza, site of the Sphinx and the great pyramids, worked at Saqqara, and published voluminously in Arabic, English, and French.

DONALD MALCOLM REID

SALIM, JAWAD

[1919–1962]

Iraqi sculptor and painter.

Jawad Salim, one of the two best-known sculptors in modern Iraq (the other is Khalid al-Rahhal), was born in Baghdad into a middle-class family. His father, his two brothers (Saʿud and Nizar), and his sister (Naziha) were avid painters. Jawad Salim's talents became apparent early in his life, and in 1938 he was sent by the government to study art in Paris. He moved to Rome in 1939, and toward the end of that year he returned to Baghdad, where he was appointed instructor of sculpture at the newly established School of Fine Arts. He was also employed by the Iraqi Museum in the restoration of Mesopotamian artifacts.

During World War II, Salim met a group of Polish artists who had fled to Iraq. Paris-trained post-Expressionists, they encouraged him to pursue an "Iraqi path" in his painting and sculpture but also awakened his enthusiasm for such artists as Cézanne, Renoir, and Goya. Around 1944, Salim befriended a British artist, Kenneth Wood, who was a diplomat in Baghdad. According to Salim's diary, Wood exerted significant influence on his development. During that period, Salim produced such sculptures as *al-Usta* (The master builder), which portrayed modern Iraqi masons but drew inspiration from Ibsen's play of the same title.

In 1946, Salim went to London to study at the Slade School of Art; he returned to Iraq some five years later. He was much impressed by such modern British artists as Henry Moore. In Baghdad, he both painted and sculpted, and established the Baghdad Group for Modern Art. After the fall of the monarchy in 1958, he was commissioned by the regime of Abd al-Karim Qasim to design and exe-

cute a massive monument titled *al-Hurriyya* (Freedom), consisting of fourteen bronze units. This work, placed in one of the main squares of Baghdad, consumed the last two years of his life.

See also Art; Qasim, Abd al-Karim.

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Sasson Somekh

SALLAL, ABDULLAH AL-

[1919–1994]

First president of the Yemen Arab Republic.

Abdullah al-Sallal was born in 1919 on the northern highlands of Yemen; he was from the lower class of barbers and butchers. He became a soldier and was one of the very important group of young soldiers sent by Imam Yahya to Iraq for training during the mid-1930s. He returned after about one year abroad and became a politically active officer. He was involved in planning the 1962 coup against the monarchy and became president of the Yemen Arab Republic from 1962 until 1967. Al-Sallal was coarse in manner and appearance, neither thoughtful nor visionary, and came to be seen as a puppet of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt; he was ousted and exiled in 1967 by a combination of factions opposing both the long civil war between the republicans and the royalists and the dependence of republican Yemen on Egypt. In 1982, the regime invited al-Sallal to return from exile. He died in Yemen in 1994, at the age of seventy-four, having enjoyed the role of elder statesman for more than a decade.

See also Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Yahya ibn Muhammad Hamid al-Din; Yemen Arab Republic.

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Robert D. Burrowes

SALNAME

See Glossary

SALONIKA

A principal city in the Ottoman Empire that has belonged to Greece since 1912.

Located at the head of the Gulf of Salonika, Salonika (also known as Salonica or Thessalonika) was captured by the Ottoman sultan Murad I in the late fourteenth century. The city flourished as a trade and cultural center through the seventeenth century and revived in the nineteenth century, becoming an industrial center and the seat of the political and cultural wings of the Young Turk movement. The founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was born in the city in 1881 and attended its military *rüşdiye* school from 1893 to 1895. In 1901 the modern port was opened, and in 1908 the Committee of Union and Progress launched its revolution there.

Greece captured Salonika from the Ottomans in November 1912, during the First Balkan War. Five years later, a fire destroyed much of the city. Its Jewish community was wiped out under German occupation (1941–1944). It is the second largest city in contemporary Greece.

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Elizabeth Thompson
Updated by Eric Hooglund

SALT, AL-

A small, picturesque town in Jordan.

Al-Salt is located about 20 miles (29 km) northwest of Jordan's capital, Amman, in the hills overlooking the Jordan valley to the west. It contains some beautiful examples of Islamic residential architecture. The archaeological evidence shows that Salt has been inhabited since about 3000 B.C.E. It was the principal town in Transjordan in the 1920s and one of the gateways from Palestine to Transjordan and countries further east and south. Salt suffered a

steady decline, as other population centers flourished in Jordan and routes to Palestine moved south or north. It has never fully recovered from this decline, although it is a regional capital (Balqa district) and boasts several "firsts": the first hospital and the first secondary school in Jordan. The latter lays claim to having educated many of Jordan's prime ministers, most of its ministers, and a large number of prominent members of Jordanian society. Salt also has a substantial Christian minority that enjoys cordial relations with the Muslim community. The population of al-Salt in 1994 was about 56,000.

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JENAB TUTUNJI

SAMARITANS

People claiming descent from the ancient Kingdom of Israel.

In the fourth and fifth centuries C.E., the Samaritans numbered about 1,200,000 persons dwelling in many cities and villages in the biblical Land of Israel (from southern Syria to northern Egypt). By 1917, centuries of harsh religious decrees, forced conversions to Islam and Christianity, slaughter, and persecution had thinned the Samaritan community to a bare 146 persons. During the 1930s, however, the community began to increase, and it has been gradually developing in all areas of life. By January 2003 its numbers increased to 654: 349 in Holon, near Tel Aviv, and 305 in the Kiryat Luza neighborhood, on the peak of Mount Gerizim overlooking Nablus.

Throughout their history, the Samaritans never lost their uniqueness as a people. They have their own writing, the ancient Hebrew script; they speak their own language, the ancient Hebrew dialect spoken by Jews until the beginning of the first millennium C.E.; and they are brought up in accordance with a unique, millennia-old tradition, dating back to the return of the people of Israel under Joshua, son of Nun, to its homeland.

The Samaritans are guided by four principles of faith: (1) one God, who is the God of Israel; (2) one prophet, Moses, son of Amram; (3) one holy book, the Pentateuch (the Torah handed down by Moses); and (4) one holy place, Mount Gerizim.

The Samaritans celebrate only those holidays mentioned in the Torah: Passover, the Feast of Unleavened Bread; the Feast of Weeks (Shavuot); the First Day of the Seventh Month; the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur); the Feast of Tabernacles (Sukkot); and the Eighth Day of Assembly and Rejoicing of the Torah (Shemini Atzeret, Simhat Torah). Unlike that of mainstream Judaism, the Samaritan New Year is celebrated fourteen days before Passover, and the eve of their Passover is marked by a sacrifice of lambs and male goats on Mount Gerizim.

Samaritans adhere to four symbols of identification: (1) living in the Land of Israel, (2) compulsory participation in the animal sacrifice on Mount Gerizim at Passover, (3) keeping the Sabbath as written in the Pentateuch, and (4) adhering to the laws of purity and impurity as written in the Pentateuch.

The Samaritans perform circumcision on the eighth day following a male birth. A boy or a girl who completes the reading of the Pentateuch is considered "Concluder of the Law." The attachment between a couple proceeds in three stages: consent, engagement, and marriage. Marriage with Jews outside the community is acceptable. Divorces are rare. Funerals take place on Mount Gerizim, or in the Samaritan section of the Kiryat Shaʾul cemetery in Tel Aviv.

The peace process between the government of Israel and the Palestinians, bringing Nablus under Palestinian administration, has led to a separation between the Samaritan communities in Holon and on Mount Gerizim.

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BENYAMIM TSEDAKA

SAMARRA

One of the oldest cities in Iraq, situated 65 miles (104 km) north of Baghdad.

There is evidence of a prehistoric Chalcolithic culture around Samarra, but the site was only sparsely populated in ancient times. The present city was founded on the east side of the Tigris River by the Abbasid caliph al-Muʿtasim in 835 C.E.; it was divided into quarters, based on business and profession. It served as the capital of eight Abbasid caliphs from 836 to 892, when Caliph al-Muʿtamid moved the capital back to Baghdad. During the Abbasid period, the caliphs were eager to make Samarra a beautiful city, with new palaces, lakes, and wide squares, and they brought in many types of plants from all over the Islamic world.

With its rich Islamic history, Samarra has many sites of historic and architectural interest. The most important is the al-Malwiyya Mosque with its spiral minaret, which is 171 feet (52 m) in height with a round room at the summit that is 19.6 feet (6 m) high. It was begun in 1443 by the Caliph al-Mutawakkil. Also of interest are the House of the Caliph, which contains three monumental staterooms, large residential complexes, and outdoor recreation facilities; the mosque of Abu Dulaf, with its spiral minaret; al-Mankur Palace; and many walls, especially al-Qadissiyya, Isa, Ashnas, and Shaykh Wali. A museum was established in Samarra for the artifacts found during excavations in the area.

Two apostolic imams, Ali al-Hadi and his son Hasan al-Askari, were buried in Samarra; therefore it is a holy city of Shiʿism, one of four in Iraq. The imams' shrine is visited by Shiʿa from all over the Islamic world. Part of the mosque marks the spot where, according to the Shiʿa, the twelfth and last apostolic imam, al-Mahdi, disappeared.

The majority of contemporary Samarra's population is composed of members of tribes from the surrounding countryside, who follow Sunni Islam. In 1992, the population was estimated at 150,000. Clan and political links tend to unite Samarra with the cities to its north and south, Tikrit and Baghdad. A road links it with both major centers. Under the republican regime, the city was governed by the *qaʾimmaqam* (chief of the administrative unit), who reported to the *muhafidh* (the representative of the central government in Baghdad). With the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority, following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Samarra came under the authority of a military commander directly appointed by occupation forces in late April 2003. It soon became a center of opposition to American forces in the region.

Samarra has a desert climate, with great temperature differences between day and night and between summer and winter. The high reaches 110°F (43°C), and the low is just above freezing. Annual relative humidity is 18 to 30 percent; annual rainfall ranges from 4 to 16 inches (10–40 cm). The area grows cereal crops, citrus fruits, apples, and many types of vegetables. The major industries are a pharmaceutical plant and an electrical power plant. Strong tribal connections to the governing authorities during the Baʿathist period contributed to the city's prosperity.

One vital project nearby is the al-Tharthar Dam, opened in 1956, which prevents the flooding of Baghdad by shifting the flow of the Tigris during its rise to the al-Tharthar Valley, a depression between Samarra on the Tigris and Hit on the nearby Euphrates.

See also BAGHDAD; SHIʿISM; TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES RIVERS; TIKRIT.

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NAZAR AL-KHALAF
UPDATED BY PAUL S. ROWE

SAMAR, SIMA

[1957–]

Physician, advocate for democracy and women's rights in Afghanistan, and Afganistan's Minister for Women's Affairs.

Sima Samar was born in Ghazni, Afghanistan. She received a medical degree from Kabul University in 1982. After the arrest and disappearance of her husband, she went to Quetta, Pakistan, and became a humanitarian relief worker and supporter of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA). In 1987, she received funding from the Church World Service and several

other organizations to establish a women's hospital in Quetta. In 1988, she organized the Shuhada Foundation to provide medical care and education for Afghan women refugees and their children in Pakistan. She received the Ramon Magsaysay Award for Community Leadership in 1989 and the John Humphrey Freedom Award in 2001 for her efforts to protect the rights of women in Afghanistan.

In late December 2001, she became minister for women's affairs in Hamid Karzai's interim government. She resigned in June 2002, when conservatives threatened her with a death penalty for allegedly questioning the relevance of Islamic law in an interview during a visit to Canada. She was acquitted of the charge of blasphemy by the high court of Afghanistan and given a new position as chair of Afghanistan's Independent Human Rights Commission.

See also AFGHANISTAN; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; KASHWAR KAMAL, MEENA; REVOLUTIONARY ASSOCIATION OF THE WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN (RAWA); TALIBAN.

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SENZIL NAWID

SAMMAN, GHADA

[1942–]

Syrian-Lebanese writer.

Ghada Samman was born and raised in Syria, moved to Lebanon in the 1960s, and has been living in France since 1984. She is one of the Arab world's most prolific female authors, having published more than thirty books in a variety of genres. Her work has been translated into many languages. She studied English literature at Damascus University and the American University of Beirut and began her career as a journalist. She writes a weekly column for the London-based *al-Hawadith* magazine. Among her books is *al-Raghif Yanbud ka al-Qalb* (1975), which exposes political corruption in the Arab world and attacks social inequality, especially the mistreatment of women. Her *al-Amal Ghayr al-Kamila* (1979) is a multivolume collection of fiction and nonfiction on her travels to various Arab and European capitals, with insightful comparisons on culture, society, and politics.

Samman is also known for her fiction. Her novel *Beirut '75* (1974) is a gripping urban narrative that touches upon class divisions, gender inequality, and the selfish rich. It prophetically anticipated the outbreak of violence in Lebanon the following year. *Beirut Nightmares* (1976) draws from the author's own experiences during the first year of the Civil War, when she was trapped for a week near the Beirut hotel district. A sequence of nightmares, from the mundane to the surreal, are told in a wrenching first-person voice. One of her collections of short stories, *The Square Moon* (1999), is set mostly in Paris and focuses on cultural conflict and the perspectives of exile.

For decades, she has given voice to Arab women: "The liberated woman is not that modern doll who wears make-up and tasteless clothes. . . . The liberated woman is a person who believes that she is as human as a man. The liberated woman does not insist on her freedom so as to abuse it," she wrote in 1961. In her many works of fiction and nonfiction, Samman has been a staunch supporter of Arab nationalism and has criticized Zionist and imperialist policies, but she has not shied away from critiquing repressive aspects of her own culture.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1958); LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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ELISE SALEM

SAMUEL, HERBERT LOUIS

[1870–1963]

First high commissioner in Palestine under the British Mandate, 1920–1925.

Herbert Louis Samuel was born to a Jewish banking family in Liverpool, England, in 1870. Educated at Balliol College, Oxford, he entered parliament as a Liberal in 1902 and in 1909 became the first practicing Jew to serve in a British cabinet. He rose to be home secretary in 1916 (and again in 1931–1932). During the First World War Samuel was the first person to raise with the cabinet the idea of British sponsorship of Zionism. In 1920 he was knighted and sent to Palestine as first head (high commissioner) of the British civil administration under a League of Nations mandate. His appointment was greeted with enthusiasm by Zionists but he disappointed them by his suspension of Jewish immigration in response to Arab anti-Jewish riots in May 1921 and by his appointment of an Arab nationalist leader, Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, as mufti of Jerusalem. Samuel was responsible for extending the border of the Mandate eastward to include Transjordan. He was the principal author of the Churchill White Paper of 1922, which established the criterion of "economic absorptive capacity" as the basis for limiting Jewish immigration.

Although Samuel's efforts to establish an elected legislative council proved abortive, he restored a measure of political calm from 1922 to 1925. His recognition of the Palestine Zionist Executive as the Jewish Agency,defined in article 4 of the Mandate, and his creation of the Supreme Moslem Council, headed by the mufti, laid the basis for the institutional partition of Palestine between Jews and Arabs. In the late 1930s, however, Samuel strongly opposed proposals for territorial partition. But his alternative proposals for an Arab-Jewish settlement, formulated with a Conservative MP, Earl Winterton, found little support. He was created Viscount Samuel of Mount Carmel and Toxteth in 1937.

See also Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-; Jewish Agency for Palestine; White Papers on Palestine.

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Bernard Wasserstein

SANʿA

Capital of the Republic of Yemen.

One of the world's oldest continuously inhabited sites, Sanʿa was the capital of the Yemen Arab Republic from 1962 to 1990, at which time it became the capital of the new Republic of Yemen. Over earlier centuries it had been the capital and chief city of a succession of political entities: the Hamid al-Din Zaydi imamate from the end of World War I to 1962; the two Ottoman occupation regimes during the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries; earlier Zaydi imams before and after the Ottoman occupation; and numerous other regimes, major and minor. Regardless of ruler, Sanʿa was for centuries the great Zaydi urban center in the highlands of North Yemen, surrounded by tribes that accepted and defended Zaydism. The city has been Islamic since the earliest days of Islam, and its major mosque is said to be built on the ruins of one that was built before the death of the prophet Mohammad. In recent decades, the city has been the stage for much of Yemen's highest political drama: the sacking of Sanʿa by the tribes as punishment for its role in the aborted 1948 revolution and the heroics of its citizens and republican defenders during the seventy-day siege of Sanʿa in early 1968.

Sanʿa is located at an altitude of about 7,500 feet in the geographical center of modern North Yemen, northeast of the port of Hodeida (al-Hudayda) and north of Taʿiz. Its barren setting conveys an austere, almost monastic aura, but it has a dry, temperate climate, marred seasonally by lip-cracking dryness and dust-filled winds. Wells and erratic rains in the spring and late summer allow for both irrigated and dry farming as well as extensive animal husbandry in the city's environs. Sanʿa is not a green place; people and factories have won out decisively over trees, grass, and flowers in the competition for water.

Guarded by the small, bald mountain of Jabal Nuqum, Sanʿa stretches across a wide, flat plain from the mountain's western flank. Before the 1962 revolution, Sanʿa had an hourglass configuration: the Jewish quarter (Qa al-Yahud) to the east separated by a half mile of gardens and the usually dry watercourse from the much larger, walled Islamic city at the foot of the mountain. This configuration was largely erased by the unplanned growth of the

A skyline view of Yemen's capital city, Sanʿa. © ABBIE ENOCK; TRAVEL INK/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

1960s and 1970s and, even more so, by the urban sprawl of the 1980s. Still, the old Islamic city remains one of the urban architectural treasures of the world. It was declared a World Heritage Site by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the early 1980s and has been the object of considerable restoration and preservation campaigns since then. In addition to its main gate, restored portions of thick wall, and dozens of slender minarets, the city is distinguished by the dense concentration of houses, many of them several stories tall, made of cut stone and of baked and sun-dried bricks. The domestic architecture of Sanʿa dates back at least two millennia and is a triumph of art and engineering. The city's ancient marketplaces still thrive; the most famous of these is at the core of the old city. These marketplaces house shops selling goods from all over the world and are also home to artisans and traditional manufacturers. In recent years, the new city and the outskirts have become the locale for modern stores, distribution centers, showrooms, and light industry. Sanʿa has also become a city of schools, most notably the Sanʿa University.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Sanʿa boasted handsome stone government offices and other public buildings, old and new, as well as many mosques, schools, and fine homes, but Taʿiz claimed to be the commercial and business center of North Yemen—the more modern city, more open to the ideas and practices of the outside world. By the 1980s, however, with a population of more than 500,000 and growing rapidly, Sanʿa had emerged as the undisputed center of political, cultural, and economic life in North Yemen. With Yemeni unification in 1990, government officials and supplicants flooded from Aden to Sanʿa, the political capital, and the preeminence of Sanʿa became even more apparent; it remains to be seen what ranking and division of labor will ultimately prevail between Sanʿa and Aden, the designated economic capital of unified Yemen. The cities, while similar in size, are wildly different in appearance and lifestyle, making them a complementary pairing. As they grow, both must cope with traffic congestion, water and electricity shortages, limited sewage facilities, great housing needs, and the inadequacy of other urban services. The great challenges of becoming a livable modern city in a poor, developing country were compounded in Sanʿa after 1990 by the deluge of unemployed workers expelled suddenly from Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the 1991 Gulf War. By the mid-1990s, Sanʿa's population had reached almost one million. For the first time rimmed by slums and replete with beggars, Sanʿa is nonetheless beginning to meet some of these challenges, and the old city survives as an urban treasure.

See also HAMID AL-DIN FAMILY; YEMEN; YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC; YEMEN CIVIL WAR; ZAYDISM.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

SANʿA UNIVERSITY

One of two universities in the Republic of Yemen.

For a long time Sanʿa University was the only university in the former Yemen Arab Republic. Since its founding in 1970, Sanʿa University has grown dramatically in the number of students and faculty, become diversified in the degrees and programs it offers, and improved the quality of its educational offerings. The university began on a modest, ad hoc basis with a teachers' college and a law school; the first external aid for the university was secured from

Kuwait during its first year, and Kuwait remained its biggest benefactor throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Its arts and science faculties underwent rapid growth during its first decade, and among the departments created during the 1980s were engineering, agriculture, and medicine. By 1990 it occupied two large, modern campuses in the city. Since Sanʿa University was funded over the years largely by Kuwait, modeled on and guided by Kuwait University, and staffed through the 1980s mostly by Egyptians, it tended for a long time to be something of a pale carbon copy of Kuwait University's carbon copy of Cairo University. Consequently, a theme at least since the beginning of the 1980s has been the struggle to make the university relevant to the nature and needs of Yemen through the Yemenization of its program, faculty, and administration. In addition, classes have been coeducational from the outset, making it a battleground between secular modernists and resurgent Islamic conservatives.

By the 1990s, Sanʿa University, while continuing to grow, was merely the flagship of a national university system that had smaller units in all major cities; indeed, with Yemeni unification in 1990, it had to share top billing with the large, long-established Aden University. More significantly, the failure of Yemen to join the international coalition during the crisis and war in the Persian Gulf during 1990 and 1991 led to the total loss of Kuwaiti funding, a loss that has not been made up since from other sources. The continuing growth in the demand for higher education and a regime that has not made meeting the need for higher education a top priority have led to an erosion of the quality of education at Sanʿa University and throughout the university system generally since the early 1990s. Class size increases, the need for new offerings goes largely unmet, and many current and potential faculty members are seeking employment in other countries and professions. Higher education in Yemen is in crisis, and not only at Sanʿa University.

See also Cairo University; Gulf Crisis (1990–1991); Kuwait University; Sanʿa; Yemen.

Robert D. Burrowes

SANCTIONS, IRAQI

Trade and financial restrictions imposed by the United Nations on Iraq between 1990 and 2003.

The nature and effects of the United Nations sanctions on Iraq are more complex than has often been supposed. In brief, the UN, largely at the instigation of Britain and the United States, declared comprehensive trade and financial sanctions against Iraq under UN Resolution 661, passed on 6 August 1990, four days after Iraq invaded Kuwait. That Iraq was in a position to attack Kuwait at all was largely due to the almost unanimous support, both material and moral, that it had received from the international community in the course of its war with the Islamic Republic of Iran between 1980 and 1988, a war Iraq had started with the tacit encouragement of the United States.

Early Sanctions

The Gulf War, whose stated and rapidly achieved objective was to remove Iraq from Kuwait, was launched under UN auspices on 17 January 1991 and ended with Iraq's surrender on 24 February of the same year. In the course of this period, Iraqi cities were repeatedly bombed and damage was done not only to military installations but also to the civil infrastructure. The damage included the destruction of water purification and pumping plants, much of the electrical system, and many oil installations.

In April 1991, UN Resolution 687 allowed Iraq to import foodstuffs and materials for "essential civilian needs," although oil exports were not allowed. All restrictions would be lifted if Iraq complied with four principal conditions: the identification and elimination of its weapons of mass destruction; the demarcation of its frontier with Kuwait, to be accompanied by acceptance of Kuwaiti sovereignty; the release of Kuwaiti and other nationals held in Iraq; and the establishment of a compensation commission, which would assess war damage and pay for it by a levy on Iraqi oil revenues. Until the U.S. invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003, Iraq only complied fully with one of these conditions: the recognition, in November 1994, of the frontier with and the sovereignty of Kuwait.

It had never been envisaged that the sanctions would still be in place some twelve years after their imposition. In fact, their severity was considerably reduced by the provisions of UN Resolutions 986 (14 April 1995; accepted by Iraq in January 1996) and 1153 (20 February 1998), which permitted Iraq,

An Iraqi woman sits at the bedside of her sick daughter. After the Gulf War, sanctions were eased regarding the amount of oil that Iraq could export, as well as what products could be imported under the enacted dual use restrictions, the flow of goods and money began to ease. Sanctions were lifted from Iraq in 2003. © AP/WIDEWORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

under UN supervision, to sell first $2 billion (Resolution 986) and then $3.55 billion (Resolution 1153) net worth of oil in exchange for food every six months; in October 1999, the UN Security Council raised the revenue cap to $8.3 billion.

Oil for Food

Attempts to introduce oil-for-food arrangements had begun on the UN side as early as 1991 but had been continually rejected by Iraq as an intrusion on its sovereignty. These earlier efforts had insisted on a considerable degree of on-site monitoring and also required Iraqi acceptance of the presence of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM, the UN weapons inspectorate), set up in May 1991. What Iraq held out for before January 1996 (when it reluctantly accepted Resolution 986), but could not obtain, was the comprehensive lifting of sanctions. This was not made more likely by continuing revelations of the extent of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons arsenals. The regime apparently felt this capacity was important enough to sacrifice the well-being of its people in order to maintain it.

The overriding argument against these and other sanctions—that their indiscriminate nature punishes the innocent and has little effect on the guilty (that is, the regime itself)—is persuasive. Various international organizations wrote heartrending reports on the effects of shortages of basic foodstuffs and medicines: The monthly food ration was reduced by 40 percent in October 1994, and severe malnutrition among young children was widely reported from 1991 by both internal and external observers. The provision of both education and health care deteriorated noticeably. In education, large numbers of teachers left the profession, with the result that fewer children went to school, while diseases associated with poverty, such as kwashiorkor, tuberculosis, and respiratory and digestive illnesses, reappeared after 1991 after having been virtually eliminated over the

previous decades. However shocking these developments may have been, allocating all blame for them on the sanctions is not entirely justified; at least equal blame must be placed at the door of the regime for not taking the necessary steps to ensure that they would be lifted. Historian Pierre-Jean Luizard, in his book *La question irakienne,* put it thus: "The regime . . . used the embargo to move Western politicians and intellectuals, as if it were not itself responsible for the tragic situation of the Iraqi population, and as if the embargo was not linked to its remaining in power" (p. 270).

The sanctions acted as a major obstacle to Iraq's economic recovery after 1991, but again it is certain from the evidence of both defectors and UNSCOM itself that the regime had been developing biological and chemical weapons in the late 1980s and was working toward the capacity to operate nuclear missiles. There is little doubt that it was no longer able to do so after the early 1990s, and it is not unreasonable to assume that the sanctions played a major role in this. Modification of the sanctions regime in such a way as to make it less onerous to the civilian population was certainly an option, but the oil-for-food arrangements, proposed five years before they were accepted, were intended to ease that particular burden. All in all, however, sanctions both in Iraq and elsewhere have often proved a blunt instrument, whose effect has sometimes been to rally the population around an offensive regime rather than to stimulate the population to overthrow it. In the case of Iraq after the brutal repression of Kurdish and Shiʿite resistance in 1991, a popular rising against the regime was never a realistic option in any case.

In the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the UN Security Council voted to lift the sanctions via Security Council Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003.

See also GULF WAR (1991).

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PETER SLUGLETT

SANE'I, YUSEF

[1927–]

Iranian reformist cleric.

Ayatollah Yusef Sane'i was born in 1927 to a clerical family in Neekabad, Isfahan Province. He entered an Isfahan religious seminary in 1946 and upon completion of preliminary studies entered a Qom seminary in 1951. In 1955 he became a student of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and obtained the degree of *ijtihad* (interpretation) in 1959, at the age of thirty-two. He started his teaching career in 1975 at the Haghani school, where he taught until 1994. His opposition activities under the shah were mainly sermons, lectures, statements, and participation in demonstrations. In 1980 Khomeini appointed Sane'i a member of the Council of Guardians. He resigned in 1982 to become a (successful) candidate for the Assembly of Experts from Tehran. Khomeini then appointed him public prosecutor, but he resigned this post in 1985. He was also Khomeini's representative at the High Council of Reconstruction of War Zones. Contrary to common belief, it is not Yusef Sane'i but his brother Hassan Sane'i who is the head of the Fifteenth of Khordad Foundation that offers a bounty for the killing of British author Salman Rushdie.

Ayatollah Sane'i is a reformist cleric who maintains that Islam and democracy are compatible, has warned against limitations of women's rights in the name of religion, and has criticized the misinterpretation of the Qurʾan. In his declarations and interviews with the women's press he has argued that Islam does not prohibit women from becoming judges *(mujtahids),* or political leaders, and that blood money should be the same for men and women. (Blood money is money paid by one who who has caused loss of life to the family of the victim. By law, this is a permissible alternative to imposing capital punishment. The blood money paid for women is half of that paid for men.) He argues that the women's struggle, continuation of the process of institutionalization of the rule of law, and the legitimacy of the public will lead to the strengthening of women's rights.

See also IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH.

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AZADEH KIAN-THIÉBAUT

SANJAK

See GLOSSARY

SAN REMO CONFERENCE (1920)

Post–World War I talks at which Great Britain and France were awarded mandates over Middle East countries.

In April 1920, the victorious World War I allies, with the exception of the United States, met in San Remo, Italy. At the conference, Britain was awarded mandates over Palestine and Iraq, and France was awarded mandates over Syria and Lebanon. Technically, a mandate held the territories in trusteeship for the League of Nations until the political systems of these territories were developed enough to warrant independence and admission to the League of Nations.

The San Remo Conference also discussed petroleum in Mesopotamia (now Iraq). France agreed to renounce its claims to the province of Mosul in return for a 25 percent share in the Turkish Petroleum Company. Italy was also promised access to this oil; but the issue of Mosul—whether it was to be an autonomous region of Kurds or a province of Iraq—was not decided until 1926, when it was officially incorporated into Faisal I ibn Hussein's new kingdom of Iraq.

A group photo of the leaders at the League of Nations Peace Treaty Conference in San Remo, Italy, 13 May 1920. The League of Nations was founded on the principles of universal peace based on social justice. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

SAN STEFANO, TREATY OF (1878)

Signed on 3 March 1878, this treaty concluded one of the major wars fought between Russia and the Ottoman Empire (1877–1878).

Among the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano were the following:

1. Serbia and Montenegro received their independence from the Ottoman Empire and were granted additional territory.
2. Independence was also gained by Romania, which lost southern Bessarabia to Russia but was compensated by the acquisition of the Black Sea province of Dobrudja.
3. Bosnia and Herzegovina were granted autonomy and were promised reforms, to be supervised jointly by Russia and Austria.
4. In addition to southern Bessarabia, Russia also acquired a substantial part of northeastern Anatolia, including the provinces of Batum, Kars, and Ardahan.
5. Unexpectedly, the treaty also called for the creation of Greater Bulgaria. Its territory extended from the Danube and the Black Sea

> to the Aegean Sea in the south and included much of Macedonia. Nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire, Greater Bulgaria was to be ruled by a Christian government and to possess a national militia. For the next two years, it was also to remain under Russian occupation—a clear indication of the direction in which Russia was moving: Bulgaria guards the northern access to the Turkish Straits.

It soon became obvious that the Treaty of San Stefano—a major gain in Russia's contest with the Ottoman Empire for supremacy in the Balkan-Black Sea region—would not be allowed to stand. Among the great powers, early concern was expressed by Great Britain and Austria-Hungary. Britain had long opposed Russia's aggrandizement at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and particularly the Russian drive toward the Turkish Straits. Austria-Hungary shared British apprehensions and was also perturbed by the creation of the Russian puppet state of Greater Bulgaria. Bowing to the British, Austro-Hungarian, and later German pressure, Russia agreed to submit the terms of the treaty of San Stefano to a great power congress—the Congress of Berlin.

The resulting Treaty of Berlin (1878) endorsed many of the provisions negotiated at San Stefano. Russia and Romania kept their territorial gains. Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro retained their independence, and the latter two retained much of the territory allocated to them. Bosnia and Herzegovina were, however, placed under Austrian control, and England was permitted to occupy Cyprus. Finally, despite Russian objections, the Congress of Berlin dismantled Greater Bulgaria. The latter was split into three parts: Bulgaria proper, located north of the Balkan mountains; East Rumelia, situated south of them; and Macedonia. All remained under Ottoman suzerainty but were granted autonomy and were promised reforms.

Great Britain was the main beneficiary of the Congress of Berlin. Supported by Austria-Hungary, Britain denied Russia the opportunity to become the sole arbiter of the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The congress also prevented Russia from becoming the patron of Greater Bulgaria. Great Britain also acquired Cyprus; strategically located in the eastern Mediterranean, the island was used four years later to effect the British occupation of Egypt.

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OLES M. SMOLANSKY

SANT EGIDIO PLATFORM

An attempt to defuse the bloody conflict between Islamists and the Algerian government through political dialogue; also known as the Rome Platform.

In 1994, members of the Algerian opposition approached the Roman Catholic lay movement Sant Egidio in Rome, suggesting that it attempt to broker a peace settlement on the model of the successful accord it had helped establish in Mozambique. A first meeting in November demonstrated the gulf between the government, represented by General Betchine, and the opposition parties, which for the first time since the breakdown of the Algerian democratic process in 1992 included the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in a multiparty forum. A wide range of opposition parties, representing some 80 percent of the votes cast in the 1991 elections, attended a second meeting in January 1995 and signed a national pact on 13 January, committing them to respect for both democracy and the Islamic traditions of the country and demonstrating the strength of a middle ground marginalized in the armed combat between the army and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Although the government immediately attacked the document as an attempt at "outside interference" with the government's efforts at drawing Islamists into the democratic process, the opposition parties claimed the agreement was proof that the government and not the Islamic parties had been responsible for obstructing the democratic dialogue. Hope briefly grew after 26 January, when the government announced presidential elections, but the spiral of violence thereafter demonstrated the powerlessness of the political opposition in the face of the intransigence of key forces in the security establishment and the extremist wing of the Islamist movement.

See also ALGERIA: OVERVIEW; ALGERIA: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; FRONT ISLAMIQUE DU SALUT (FIS).

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GEORGE R. WILKES

SANUSI, MUHAMMAD IBN ALI AL-
[1787–1859]

Muslim scholar and founder of the Sanusi order, 1837.

Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanusi studied Arabic and Islam in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, and the Hijaz of western Arabia. He quarreled with leading *ulama,* (Muslim scholars), became active in Sufi circles, and was successful among Muslim nomads. A follower of Sidi Ahmad al-Fasi, he moved to Cyrenaica, Libya, in 1838, which became the base for the spread of the Sanusi order.

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RACHEL SIMON

SANUSI ORDER

Islamic order founded in 1837 by Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanusi (died 1859); followed by Muhammad al-Mahdi (1859–1902), Ahmad al-Sharif (1902–1917), and Idris al-Sanusi.

Combining orthodoxy and Sufism, the Sanusi order aimed to unite all religious orders by returning to the sources. It called for closeness to the prophet Muhammad through study, training, and intention, but rejected ecstasy. It advocated a modest lifestyle and refraining from daily pleasures. Its main support was tribal (in Cyrenaica and central Africa). The Sanusi organization was based on a network of *zawiyas* (religious compounds), which were strategically located and served as centers of study and trade, to which neighboring affiliates contributed their *ushr* (tithe) and manpower. The Sanusi political power was recognized by the Ottoman Empire and by central African kingdoms. The order was a key factor in the resistance to Italian rule (1911–1933), which caused the death and exile of many Sanusi leaders and followers, the confiscation of *zawiyas,* and the de facto collapse of the order.

See also IDRIS AL-SAYYID MUHAMMAD AL-SANUSI; SANUSI, MUHAMMAD IBN ALI AL-; SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS.

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RACHEL SIMON

SANU, YAʿQUB
[1839–1912]

Egyptian nationalist playwright and satirical journalist.

Born into a Jewish family in Alexandria, Yaʿqub Sanu, also known as James Sanu, is considered the father of modern Arabic satire. He organized the first popular theater in Egypt, which presented plays in colloquial Arabic. Influenced by the Muslim reformer Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Sanu established a political newspaper, *Abu Nazzara Zarqa* (The man with the blue glasses). In 1877 or 1878, the royal court deemed his writings offensive and expelled him from Egypt. Settling in Paris, Sanu continued his campaign of attacking the members of Egypt's political establishment for collaborating with the colonial powers and betraying Egypt.

See also AFGHANI, JAMAL AL-DIN AL-; THEATER.

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DAVID WALDNER

SAPIR, PINHAS

[1907–1975]

Israeli Labor party leader, minister of finance.

Pinhas Sapir, born in Poland as Koslovsky, received a religious education as a child and later became a leader in the ha-Halutz movement.

In 1929 he immigrated to Palestine. From 1937 to 1947 Pinhas Sapir was Levi Eshkol's deputy at Mekorot Water Company. Later Pinhas Sapir served in a number of high government and cabinet positions including director general of the Ministry of Defense (1948–1953) and director general of the Ministry of Finance (1953–1955). He was minister of commerce and industry from 1955 to 1964 and again from 1970 to 1972. He also served as minister of finance from 1963 to 1968 and again from 1969 to 1974.

He was known to be a power broker within the Labor party and played an active role in uncovering the details of the Lavon affair (1960–1961). As finance minister after the Arab–Israel War of 1967, he expressed reservations about Moshe Dayan's proposals for integrating the occupied territories with Israel. He was suggested as a successor to Golda Meir, after her resignation as prime minister in 1974, but he refused the offer. He left the government in 1974 to become chairman of the Jewish Agency executive.

MARTIN MALIN

SARID, YOSSI

[1940–]

Israeli political leader and government minister.

Yossi Sarid, the son of a prominent educator, was born in Palestine. After a brief career as a columnist for *Haaretz,* Sarid became active in the Labor Party. He was close to Pinhas Sapir, the powerful, dovish minister of finance, and was responsible for the party's information drives in four election campaigns. In 1974, after the Arab–Israel War the previous year (also known as the October War), Sarid was elected to the Knesset, and has remained a member ever since. In 1982 Sarid was the only Labor member of the Knesset who opposed Israel's invasion of Lebanon. In 1984, in protest of the formation of the Peres-Shamir Unity Government, Sarid resigned from the party and joined Shulamit Aloni's Movement for Civil Rights and Peace (RATZ). In 1988 Sarid was one of the founders of Meretz, the left-wing party espousing social welfare policies and peace with the Palestinians, based on the principle of "two states for two nations." In 1992 Meretz joined the coalition government, formed by Yitzhak Rabin. Sarid was appointed minister of the environment. He strongly supported the Oslo Accord and was a member of the team of three senior ministers who negotiated its details.

In 1996 Sarid replaced Aloni as chairman of the party. When Ehud Barak formed his coalition government in 1999, Meretz joined once more and Sarid was appointed minister of education. He initiated many reforms in Israel's educational system, but could not complete them; Meretz had to quit the coalition to avoid its breakup during the dramatic negotiations with the Palestinian Authority on the "Final Status" arrangements, which eventually collapsed at the July 2000 Camp David Conference. In the 2002 elections, Meretz suffered the severe drawback of losing four of their ten Knesset members. Sarid took responsibility for the defeat and resigned from his position as head of the party, but remained in the Knesset as a veteran member of its Foreign and Security Committee. Sarid published hundreds of articles and two poetry volumes.

See also ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; OSLO ACCORD (1993).

BRYAN DAVES
UPDATED BY MORDECHAI BAR-ON

SARKIS, ILYAS

[1924–1985]

President of Lebanon, 1976 to 1982.

Ilyas Sarkis studied law at the Université Saint Joseph, then joined the audit office as a magistrate in Lebanon. His integrity and discipline brought him to the attention of Lebanon's President Fu'ad Chehab, who appointed him legal adviser in 1959 and director general of his cabinet in 1962. Chehab's successor, Charles Hilu, appointed him

chairman of the Banking Control Commission and, in June 1968, governor of the Central Bank.

As the major Chehabist contender in the presidential election of 1970, Sarkis lost by one vote to Sulayman Franjiyya, whose tenure developed into one of the contentious issues in the Lebanese Civil War (1975). The legislature then specifically amended the constitution to allow early presidential elections to permit the accession of Sarkis in May 1976. Considering him Syria's candidate, Kamal Jumblatt, the leader of the leftist forces and ally of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), tried unsuccessfully to disrupt the parliamentary session in favor of the candidacy of Raymond Eddé.

As prescribed by the Arab summit conferences at Riyadh and Cairo, Sarkis attempted, using a neo-Chehabist team, to disarm all the Lebanese militias with the help of the Syrian-dominated Arab Deterrent Forces (ADF). He was blocked in doing so by the Phalange and the National Liberal Party (NLP), who insisted that the PLO disarm first. Since Israel would not allow Syrian troops to descend south of the Litani River, PLO guerrillas remained in southern Lebanon, where raids and counterraids across the border finally led to Israel's invasion of the area in March 1978. Although United Nations peacekeeping troops were deployed in the wake of Israel's withdrawal, Israel would not allow Sarkis to send Lebanese army units to the southern border area, propping up instead the local Christian militias under Major Saʿd Haddad. In September 1978, tensions between the Maronite Christian militias and the Syrian troops of the ADF culminated in the bombardment of the Ashrafiyya quarter in east Beirut, bringing the president close to resignation.

Henceforth, all that Sarkis could do was maintain the status quo among the disparate armed groups and try to manage the crisis. In 1980, the rise of Bashir Jumayyil as the charismatic militia leader of the Maronite community forced Sarkis to mend fences. He ultimately persuaded the young Jumayyil to steer his course more toward the United States instead of relying exclusively on Israel. Toward the end of his term, Sarkis increasingly believed in the desirability of electing the strong Bashir to office. Sarkis refused suggestions that he remain for two more years as an extraordinary measure—even in the wake of Israel's 1982 invasion and after Bashir Jumayyil's assassination while president-elect.

Although accused by critics in the Maronite and leftist camps of being weak and vacillating, Sarkis was an honest and moderate president. He insisted that he had transferred power to his successor, Amin Jumayyil (Bashir's brother), with the government's apparatus still united and the economy strong despite the intermittent civil war. In retrospect, these were by no means negligible accomplishments.

See also Chehab, Fuʾad; Eddé, Raymond; Franjiyya, Sulayman; Haddad, Saʿd; Hilu, Charles; Jumayyil, Amin; Jumayyil, Bashir; Jumblatt, Kamal; Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); National Liberal Party; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Phalange.

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Bassam Namani

SARTAWI, ISSAM

[1935–1983]

Palestinian doctor and political activist.

Issam Sartawi was born in 1935 in Acre during the British mandate over Palestine, received his university and medical education in Iraq, and then went to Ohio University in the early 1960s to specialize in heart surgery. In 1968, he returned to the Middle East and joined his family in Amman, Jordan. That year he formed the Organization of Action for the Liberation of Palestine, which carried out clandestine attacks against Israel from Jordan. In 1970, after King Hussein's forces fought to keep the armed Palestinian guerrilla groups in Jordan from overthrowing the government that had given them sanctuary, Sartawi disbanded his small force and joined al-Fatah, the armed Palestinian group led by Yasir Arafat.

Later, he became an advocate of recognizing Israel and seeking Israeli-Palestinian peace on the basis of a directly negotiated two-state solution. He frequently advised Arafat, who was by then Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman, and was roving representative for the PLO, although not a member of the PLO Executive Committee. In addition, Sartawi served as informal liaison between

Arafat and the Israeli doves and Western leaders. Sartawi had to contend with mounting criticism within the PLO. This led to his resignation from the Palestine National Council in 1981, though Arafat refused to accept it.

In April 1983, against a background of failed negotiations between Arafat and King Hussein on whether the latter would take part in U.S.-sponsored negotiations representing the Palestinians, Sartawi attended a meeting of the Socialist International in Portugal. On 10 April, he was assassinated there by a gunman. Sabri al-Banna's (Abu Nidal) al-Fatah (Revolutionary Council), which had broken away from the PLO nine years earlier, took responsibility for the shooting.

See also Arafat, Yasir; Banna, Sabri al-; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

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Benjamin Joseph

SASSON, ELIYAHU

[1902–1978]

Israeli senior official, diplomat, and cabinet minister.

Eliyahu (Elias) Sasson was born in Damascus to a middle-class Jewish family that emigrated to Palestine in 1919. He followed in 1927, after immersing himself in the life and politics of Damascus, including its Arab nationalist activities. This provided the basis for a wide network of contacts, which he put to full use once he became head of the Arab section of the Jewish Agency's Political Department in 1934. When the Israeli state was established, in May 1948, he was appointed director of its Foreign Ministry's Middle East Department.

Both before and after 1948, Sasson played major roles in Zionist–Arab and Israel–Arab diplomacy, seeking to promote understanding and agreement. His history placed him in a unique position as a Zionist who had a genuine rapport with Arab nationalists. During the 1940s, he held secret meetings with Amir (later King) Abdullah and members of his entourage. In December 1947, he wrote to the secretary-general of the Arab League hoping to find a way to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. After the first Arab–Israel War, he was part of the Israeli negotiating team in the armistice talks with the Egyptians at Rhodes.

In the bureaucratic politics of the young Israeli state, he was identified with the accommodationist line of Moshe Sharett. But Sharett was no match for David Ben-Gurion, and the softer policies of Sharett's school were defeated by the harsh realities of Arab-Israeli relations. Sasson found himself removed from the center of policy making when he was appointed Israel's first head of mission (as minister) in Turkey in 1949. After 1952, he took up the post of Israel's ambassador to Italy yet continued to advise his colleagues in the Foreign Ministry about Arab affairs from his station in Rome. From 1961 to 1969, he served in various Labor-led cabinets as minister of posts and minister of police, representing the Mizrahi/Sephardic component of Israel's population.

See also Arab–Israel War (1948); Ben-Gurion, David; Sharett, Moshe.

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Neil Caplan
Itamar Rabinovich

SASSOON FAMILY

Family of international renown, which originated in the Jewish community of Baghdad.

Sassoon ben Salih (1750–1830) was a banker to the *vali* (provincial governor) of Baghdad. His son David (1792–1864) fled from a new and unfriendly *vali,* going first to the Gulf port of Bushehr in 1828 and then to Bombay, India, in 1832, with his large family. In Bombay, he built the international business called David S. Sassoon, with the policy of staffing

it with people brought from Baghdad. They filled the functions of the various branches of his business in India, Burma, Malay, and east Asia. In each branch, he maintained a rabbi. His wealth and munificence were proverbial, and his business extended to China and then to England.

His eight sons also branched out into many directions. Elias David (1820–1880), his son by his first wife, left the firm to establish E. D. Sassoon. Three of his other sons became prominent in England and were great friends of the Prince of Wales, later Edward VII. Of those who settled in England, Sir Edward Albert Sassoon (1856–1912) was a Conservative member of Parliament from 1899 until his death, and the seat was inherited by his son Sir Philip Sassoon (1888–1939) from 1912 until his death. Sir Philip served in World War I as military secretary to Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig and, during the 1920s and 1930s, as Britain's undersecretary of state for air. The English poet Siegfried Sassoon (1886–1967) is David's great-grandson. Intermarriage in England has caused the general loss of Judaism within this branch.

The branch that carried on the ancestral tradition has been represented by Rabbi Solomon David Sassoon (1915–1985), who moved from Letchworth to London and then to Jerusalem in 1970. He was the son of the David Sassoon who collected Jewish books and manuscripts and who catalogued them in *Ohel David,* in two volumes. This David was the son of Flora Abraham, who had moved from India to England in 1901 and established a famous salon in her London home.

SYLVIA G. HAIM

SATELLITE CITIES DEVELOPMENT

Egyptian satellite cities built on the outskirts of Cairo to reduce overpopulation.

Cairo is overwhelmed by a population estimated at 16 million, with some 90 percent of Egypt's 60 million inhabitants residing on only 4 percent of the country's territory. In 1976, as part of Anwar Sadat's "Open Door Policy," his government started building fourteen new cities to draw people away from Cairo to redirect urban growth toward the desert and away from the limited arable land. The plan encouraged foreign investment in Egypt largely banned since the country's 1952 socialist revolution under Gamel Abdel Nasser.

Bearing names that honor events in recent Egyptian history, the new cities have drawn industry away from the capital through tax exemptions for private investors, but have done little to alleviate Cairo's overpopulation. By the late 1990s, only 500,000 people had relocated to the new cities due to the poor quality of housing, lack of water and electricity, and their remoteness, characterized in the 1997 novel *Irtihalat al-Luʾlu* (The movement of pearls), by Niʿimat al-Bihayri.

The original plan focused on human habitability and an improvement in the quality of life. As the government was unable to fund the needs of these cities, their futures and the provision of human services fell on the shoulders of investors. Therefore, some towns have flourished, while others are virtual ghost towns. Greater Cairo's market in luxury housing absorbs a large portion of available investment capital and makes little contribution to needed housing for the general populace. Investors who choose to do so make infrastructural improvements to their developments; other developments are built under subpar conditions. The wealthy rim of Cairo's infrastructure is being rebuilt, while the city's center, and the poor populations who remain there, are neglected. In an attempt to reduce illegal squatting, the government has relocated some poor families to sites that function as public housing; some of these sites lack basic services such as water, electricity, and sewerage.

The satellite cities can be broken down into two general groups: residential, and a combination of industrial and residential. The residential areas invest in infrastructure that leads back into Cairo, while the idea behind the industry-based sites is to develop self-sufficient cities. While the following is not an exhaustive list, it provides an overview of development and success.

Residential

Madinat Nasr, or "Victory City," one of the largest and earliest of the desert development areas of the 1970s, is now a vast residential quarter. Approximately 50 percent of its residents are high-ranking

diplomats. Other luxurious residential areas (some gated communities), evoking Sadat's fascination with American cities like Los Angeles and Houston, are named Beverly Hills, Gardenia Park, Dreamland, and Hayy al-Ashgar (Treeville). Another area that is under private development in the northeast is called New Cairo.

Residential/Industrial

Sadat City relies on approximately 180 heavy industrial enterprises. It now has a new fee-paying primary school, built by its businessmen, who claim it is the most modern and well-equipped school in the country. Investors in Sadat City are funding a rail link that they estimate could be running by 2005. Sixth of October City is experiencing the fastest expansion rate. There are over 1,300 factories, as well as sports stadiums and cinemas. It has greatly benefited by the Twenty-sixth of July Overpass connecting it to Cairo. It is the home of the private October 6 University. Tenth of Ramadan City has thousands of small and micro enterprises, making products aimed at a range of markets, from tourists to heavy industry. It suffers from environmental waste problems despite laws passed in 1994 to protect the environment. Its problems provide a negative example of the free reign investors have had in the development.

Fifteenth of May City began as commuter city serving nearby factories. It is now showing some signs of development, although it is not developing as rapidly as other cities. Madinat al-Salam has had virtually no major investors show interest and remains underdeveloped.

A 1989 government report estimated the population in all the satellite cities at one-fifth of the original plan. New tax incentives, in some cases "twenty-year tax holidays," have caught the attention of investors. By 1996 many of Egypt's 400 state-owned companies had been sold to private investors, and the government has paved the legal and regulatory way for entrepreneurs. Taking Sadat's idea one step further, Husni Mubarak has pledged nearly $9 billion to build 18 new cities in remote desert regions of the Sinai, the Red Sea, and the New Delta, estimating the settlements will house 3.3 million Egyptians, create 70,000 new jobs, and support 75,000 acres of farmland.

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HANI FAKHOURI
UPDATED BY MARIA F. CURTIS

SAUDI ARABIA

Country in the Arabian Peninsula.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia occupies the greater part of the Arabian Peninsula, with a size of approximately 830,000 square miles (2,150,000 sq. km) and a population in 2002 of approximately 22 million. The country is bounded on the west by the Red Sea; on the north by Jordan and Iraq; on the east by the Gulf (also known as the Persian or Arabian Gulf) and the small states of Kuwait, the island state of Bahrain just off the Saudi shore, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates; and on the south by Oman and Yemen. The country forms a rough triangle, tilting from west to east. Al-Hijaz, the westernmost of the three principal regions, rises from a low, barren coastal plain to a craggy, mountainous spine before leveling out into a gravel plateau. As the birthplace of Islam, al-Hijaz contains Islam's holiest cities, Makka (Mecca) and al-Madina (Medina). It also contains Saudi Arabia's second-largest city, Jidda (Jedda), with the country's biggest port. The center of the country is occupied by the Najd, the historic center of modern Saudi Arabia and the location of its capital, Riyadh. The Eastern Province, lying between Riyadh and the Gulf, contains nearly all of the kingdom's massive oil deposits. Besides the conurbation of al-Zahran (Dhahran), al-Dammam, and al-Khubar (Khobar), the province also embraces the extensive and ancient oases of al-Ahsa (Hasa) and al-Qatif. Along the southeastern border, Saudi Arabia shares with Oman and Yemen the world's largest sand desert, al-Rub al-Khali (The empty quarter). In the southwest, the mountains of



MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

al-Hijaz grow higher as they proceed south across Asir into Yemen. The country is divided into thirteen provinces.

Nearly all of the country is desert, and the climate is generally very hot in the summer and humid along the seashores. Although the coastal plains are mild in winter, the interior desert can be cold. Small juniper forests exist only in several spots in the western mountains. There are no rivers or permanent bodies of water. Rainfall is sparse.

Economy

Traditionally, the majority of the people were engaged in pastoral nomadism, herding camels, goats, and sheep. Subsistence agriculture was practiced in the extensive oases of al-Ahsa (Hasa) and al-Qatif in the Eastern Province, as well as in other smaller oases across the country. Cultivation was also intense in the southwest highlands, and fishing was a feature along both the Red Sea and Gulf coasts, The west, particularly Mecca, Jidda, and Medina, relied on the hajj (the annual Muslim pilgrimage) for income. Trade was important throughout the country, but especially for the small ports along the coastlines and for transshipment centers such as Burayda and Unayza in the Najd.

Oil exploration began in the Eastern Province in the 1930s, and commercially exploitable reserves were discovered in 1938. The advent of the Second World War delayed large-scale production until the late 1940s. Production levels reached 0.5 million barrels per day in 1949, doubling by 1955, and rising to 3.5 million barrels per day by 1968. By the beginning of the 1980s, Saudi Arabia was produc-

ing about 10 million barrels per day. This declined to less than 4 million barrels per day as a result of the decline in world demand for oil, but at the beginning of the twenty-first century the kingdom was again producing over 8 million barrels per day and had become the world's largest crude oil exporter. Total reserves were estimated at 262 billion barrels in 2002, giving Saudi Arabia about 25 percent of the world's total. Other natural resources are negligible, although several small gold mines were put into operation in the early 1990s.

Oil completely transformed the Saudi economy. Prior to oil, the nascent Saudi kingdom was a poor state, highly dependent on hajj revenues for the government's income. Since then, Saudi Arabia has become a highly developed social welfare state. In the 1980s, it also embarked on a large-scale program of industrialization, emphasizing petrochemical industries and other energy-intensive industrial programs that could make effective use of locally refined oil or gas for fuel. The small ports of al-Jubayl on the Gulf and Yanbu on the Red Sea were selected as complementary sites for new industrial cities. Other industrial efforts have gone into import substitution and highly subsidized agricultural programs.



The Kaʿaba Stone is located in the Haram mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Millions of Muslim pilgrims walk around the Kaʿaba Stone each year at the end of the Hajj, which is a pilgrimage to Mecca. © CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Language, Religion, and Education

Nearly all Saudi citizens are Arab, although there has been considerable ethnic mixing in al-Hijaz as a result of centuries of immigration connected with the hajj. Arabic is the sole indigenous language, but English is widely spoken. All Saudis are Muslims and most are Sunni. The Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence predominates because of Wahhabism, a movement within Sunni Islam, founded in eighteenth-century Najd by Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, emphasizing the ascetic values of early Islam and widely followed within the kingdom (its adherents prefer to be known as Muwahhidun, or Unitarians). Saudi Arabia also perceives itself as having a special responsibility for the protection of the Islamic holy places. As many as 500,000 inhabitants of al-Qatif and al-Ahsa oases are Jaʿfari (or Twelver) Shiʿa, and small Shiʿite communities are to be found in Medina and Najran.

Great strides were made in education over the last half of the twentieth century, and about 62 percent of Saudi citizens are literate. The country has eight universities, the oldest of which dates from 1957. Three universities specialize in Islamic disciplines and the other five offer broader curricula. Several hundred thousand Saudis have received a university education abroad, notably in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Political Structure

Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, headed by a king drawn from the Al Saʿud royal family. The country's four monarchs since 1953 all have been sons of King Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman (r. 1902–1953): Saʿud (r. 1953–1964), Faisal (r. 1964–1975), Khalid (r. 1975–1982), and Fahd (r. 1982–). King Fahd also holds the title of prime minister. His half-brother Abdullah is heir apparent and first deputy prime minister. Because of King Fahd's poor health, Abdullah serves as the de facto head of government. Although the king holds enormous power, he is not

King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saʿud (1904–1975) is welcomed to the White House by President Richard Nixon and his wife Pat, during a 27 May 1971 state visit. During the 1960s and 1970s King Faisal positioned Saudi Arabia as the powerful supporter of the United States among the Middle East's Islamic nations. NATIONAL ARCHIVES, NLNP-WHPO-MPF-C6399(32A). REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

an absolute monarch, being required to rule according to Islamic precepts and tribal tradition. Important decisions are made only after gaining the consensus of an inner circle of male members of the royal family. Generally, the process of consensus-building also includes the rest of the family, other key families (such as collateral branches of the Al Saʿud and the Al al-Shaykh, descendants of Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab), the religious establishment, tribal shaykhs, senior government officials, and prominent merchant families.

The Council of Ministers was established in 1953 and its ranks have expanded so that the majority is made up of commoners, in addition to members of the Al Saʿud. The family continues to hold the key portfolios of defense, interior, and foreign affairs. The armed forces are divided into four services: army, air force, air defense, and navy. There is also a large national guard, which serves as a counterbalance to the regular armed forces and is said to be particularly loyal to the Al Saʿud. Saudi Arabia's orientation in foreign policy traditionally has been first to the Arab states and then to the Islamic world. Since the 1940s, the United States has been a key partner in oil exploitation, socioeconomic development, trade, and military and security matters. Staunchly anti-Communist, the kingdom established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union only in 1990 (earlier relations in the 1920s and 1930s were allowed to lapse).

History

The present kingdom is the third Saudi state established since an alliance was struck in 1744 between Islamic reformer Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud, then the head of the small town of al-Dirʿiyya in Najd. Imbued with the religious fervor of Wahhabism, Muhammad ibn

Saʿud and his successors were able to extend their authority over much of Arabia, thus creating the first Saudi state. However, their success, and especially the occupation of Mecca, aroused the anxiety of the Ottoman Empire, which instructed its viceroy in Egypt, Muhammad Ali, to send an army to Arabia to sack al-Dirʿiyya in 1818, and the Al Saʿud family's seat was subsequently moved to Riyadh, where it has remained ever since. Saudi fortunes revived in the mid-nineteenth century under Turki ibn Abdullah, who founded the second Saudi state, and his son Faysal ibn Turki, who regained many of the territories won by his predecessors and added new ones. However, another disastrous period in the late nineteenth century saw the Al Saʿud forced to surrender Najd to a rival family, the Al Rashid of Haʾil, and flee to Kuwait.

The origins of the third Saudi state lie in a surprise attack by young Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman on Riyadh in 1902. With Riyadh restored to Al Saʿud control, Abd al-Aziz (commonly known in the West as Ibn Saʿud) was able to conquer the rest of southern Najd and most of the Eastern Province before the First World War. After the war, the Saudi leader first absorbed the Al Rashid state and then conquered the Hashimi kingdom in al-Hijaz. At the beginning of 1926, Abd al-Aziz was able to proclaim himself King of al-Hijaz and Sultan of Najd. Over the next decade, he gradually extended his boundaries to their present limits, being prevented from further expansion on all sides by British-protected states (apart from Yemen, with whom a border war was fought in 1934). In 1932, the name of the country was changed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The later years of King Abd al-Aziz's reign witnessed the infusion of oil income into a traditional society and the waste of much of it on consumer goods and the palaces of the Al Saʿud. Breaking with tradition, which held that succession should go to the strongest, King Abd al-Aziz appointed his weak son Saʿud as his heir instead of the more capable son Faisal. The early years of Saʿud's reign brought the kingdom to the brink of financial disaster, and his flirtation with Egypt's socialist leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, did not prevent Egyptian intervention in Yemen in 1962. In 1964, an Al Saʿud family council, with the backing of the powerful religious establishment, deposed King Saʿud and named Faisal king. Faisal was able to continue the reforms

A skyline view of al-Balad Medina, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
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he already had instituted as prime minister and to lay the foundations of a modern government and social welfare system. Although he resisted Arab demands for a Saudi oil boycott of the West during the 1956 Arab-Israel War, he was unable to do so during the October 1973 war. The resultant shortage sent the price of oil soaring and put the kingdom in the center of the world stage.

In 1975, King Faisal was assassinated by a cousin, and his half-brother Khalid succeeded him, but Khalid left much of the day-to-day governing to his half-brother Fahd. When Khalid died in 1982, King Fahd inherited a country faced with much-reduced oil revenues and increasingly severe external challenges. The government suffered sixteen consecutive years of budget deficits before recording a surplus in 2000. The Iranian Revolution

Al-Mamlika center is a complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that houses retail, offices, and a five-star hotel. The center is an illustration of the country's modernization and prosperity due to oil revenues. © AP/WIDEWORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

(1979) and Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) had refocused both Saudi and Western assessments of the principal threat to the kingdom away from the Soviet Union to a resurgent Iran. Saudi-Iranian relations remained troubled through the 1980s but improved through the 1990s. An even more serious threat emerged in August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and raised fears that it had designs on Saudi oil fields as well. Riyadh invited Arab and Western governments to participate in a coalition to drive the invading forces out of Kuwait. Operation Desert Storm was launched from Saudi territory in early 1991 and accomplished the liberation of Kuwait and the destruction of much of Iraq's military and industrial capability. The kingdom participated fully in the subsequent economic sanctions against Iraq, although popular opinion increasingly turned against them.

The kingdom has relied heavily on its "special relationship" with the United States for more than fifty years. But ties were severely strained after the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001. Al-Qaʿida, a radical Islamist network established by a Saudi national, Osama bin Ladin, apparently orchestrated the attacks and recruited fifteen Saudis to be among the nineteen hijackers. In the following years, many in the United States claimed that the kingdom was not doing enough to stop the flow of funding to terrorist groups and that the country encouraged anti-American beliefs. The Saudi government strenuously denied these allegations and the Saudi and U.S. governments continued to have close official relations. A May 2003 terrorist attack on residential areas in Riyadh sparked a Saudi campaign to eradicate extremists in the kingdom, and a number of arrests and shootouts occurred over the succeeding months.

Riyadh's refusal to allow the United States to use military facilities in the kingdom during the 2003 war against Iraq prompted Washington to establish alternative bases in Qatar. By the end of that summer, all U.S. military detachments (apart from elements involved in training Saudi forces) were removed from the kingdom; this had been a key al-Qaʿida demand.

See also AL AL-SHAYKH FAMILY; AL SAʿUD FAMILY; BIN LADEN, OSAMA; MECCA; MEDINA; MUWAHHIDUN; PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS; PETROLEUM RESERVES AND PRODUCTION; QAʿIDA, AL-; SHIʿISM.

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J. E. Peterson

SAUDI, MONA

[1945–]

Jordanian sculptor and poet.

Mona Saudi (also Muna Saʿudi), born in Jordan, is one of the few Arab women artists to work primarily in stone, and especially to execute large-scale stone sculptures. Her sculptures have been produced in marble, granite, limestone, and other materials, and she has also done etchings to accompany them. She was educated at the Ecole Supérieure des Beaux Arts in Paris and was influenced by Brancusi, but her work also reflects an engagement with Islamic and ancient Middle Eastern artistic traditions. For example, many of her works are refined, abstract forms taken from Arabic calligraphy and Arabic words, or are done in the spirit of ancient Egyptian and Sumerian art. Saudi describes her pieces as already formed within the piece of stone and says her work is to draw them out through sculpting. Her work is also inspired by her reading and writing of poetry, and her poems have been translated in her collection *An Ocean of Dreams* (1999). Saudi is also an arts activist. She has published the drawings of Palestinian refugee children and organized arts exhibitions to support the Palestinian cause. She lives and works in Beirut, and her large-scale public sculptures can be found there, as well as in Jordan and at the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris.

See also Art; Gender: Gender and Education.

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Jessica Winegar

SAUNDERS, HAROLD

[1927–]

Senior U.S. official who helped to negotiate peace between Egypt and Israel, then launched a nongovernmental peace-through-dialogue program.

Harold H. (Hal) Saunders earned a Ph.D. in political history at Yale University before joining the U.S. Air Force and then the CIA as an analyst. He joined the National Security Council staff of the Kennedy administration in 1961, was involved in U.S. Mideast policy during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israel wars, witnessed the 1970 crisis in Jordan, and in 1974 joined the U.S. State Department as deputy assistant for the Near East and North Africa. From 1973 to 1975 he worked with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on scores of Mideast missions: in response to the oil embargo and the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon; helping to mediate three interim Egyptian-Israeli peace agreements; and restating U.S. policy to the Palestinians (in what was later known as the Saunders document of 1975). As assistant secretary of state for the Near East and South Asia, Saunders advised President Jimmy Carter at the Camp David talks of 1978, attracting criticism from both Israeli president Menachem Begin and some Palestinian leaders over U.S. policy regarding Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. He also helped to draft the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty of 1979, and, following the revolution in Iran, coordinated efforts to secure the release of U.S. embassy staff there.

Drawing on the early concept of a "peace process" that he helped to develop while working under Kissinger, Saunders became a leading advocate of "sustained" nongovernmental dialogues as an instrument of conflict resolution.

See also Camp David Accords (1978); Kissinger, Henry.

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George R. Wilkes

SAVAK

See Glossary

SAYGUN, AHMED ADNAN

[1907–1991]

Turkish composer.

İzmir-born Ahmed Adnan Saygun studied music in Turkey and at the age of twenty won a competition for a state scholarship to study in France. He was a member of the first generation of Turkish composers—known as "The Five"—who sought to add harmonic substructures to Turkish folk songs, which are pure melodies. Saygun and his colleagues also composed symphonies incorporating folk music. In 1934 Saygun composed the first important Turkish national opera, *Feridun,* based on a Perso-Turkish legend. Saygun also composed the operas *Kerem,* whose libretto narrated the love affair of a Christian girl and a Muslim boy, and *Köroğlu* (The son of the blind man), whose libretto tells the story of a chivalrous outlaw. Other compositions by Saygun include an oratorio, *Yunus Emre,* two string quartets, and piano concertos. His works have been performed in Paris, Moscow, New York, and Washington, D.C. Saygun also contributed to the training of the next generation of Turkish composers.

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David Waldner

SAYYAB, BADR SHAKIR AL-

[1926–1964]

One of the first Iraqi poets to write Arabic free verse.

Born in Jaykur, Iraq, and educated in Basra and Baghdad, Badr Shakir al-Sayyab wrote one of the earliest poems of *al-shiʿr al-hurr* (roughly, free verse). His was the first modernist attempt to develop complex, anti-traditional modes to explore the human condition, metaphysics, and social and political issues, as well as his own experience and feelings, in sharp contrast to the poetry that had dominated previous decades. Constructing a text as a closely interwoven whole, he embodies the organic nature of the quest for modernization in the Arab world.

Al-Sayyab remained closer to the spirit and tone of classical Arabic poetry than other *al-ruwwad* (pioneers) of al-shiʿr al-hurr, even when using modern techniques or myth and symbolism. Those poems that appear ambiguous use myth or symbolic treatment of contemporary political situations.

Highly ideological (for many years a Marxist), al-Sayyab wrote more confessional and intimate poetry during his final illness. His life reads like a tale of political involvement and struggle, imprisonment, and suffering. The poet Adonis, a well-known scholar of Arabic literature, described al-Sayyab's poetry as "a point of meeting between two worlds, one retreating, the other advancing—emerging out of the future."

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Kamal Abu-Deeb

SAYYID

See Glossary

SAYYIDA ZAYNAB MOSQUE

Modern structure honoring the Islamic saint.

The mosque of Sayyida Zaynab, a modern structure built on a venerable and revered site, honors one of the great Islamic saints of Cairo. Sayyida Zaynab was a historical person, most frequently identified as either the sister of Sayyidna Husayn or the companion of Sayyida Nafisa. The *mawlid* (feast day) of Sayyida Zaynab is one of the most colorful in Cairo, drawing thousands to celebrate her putative birthday.

Raymond William Baker

SAYYIDNA HUSAYN MOSQUE

A neo-Gothic structure just north of al-Azhar in the old bazaar quarter of Cairo.

Sayyidna Husayn mosque, which honors the prophet Muhammad's grandson, was built in 1792. Standing so close to al-Azhar and amid the beloved old quarters of the city, the mosque exerts a special hold on the imagination of Egyptians.

RAYMOND WILLIAM BAKER

SCHISTOSOMIASIS

See GLOSSARY

SCHOOL FOR HAKĪMĀT

Western-style medical school and hospital established in 1827 in Abu Zaʿbal, Egypt.

In 1832, Muhammad Ali, ruler of Egypt, opened a school for *hakımāt* (women physicians). In the 1820s Egypt was underpopulated, and endemic and epidemic diseases, including smallpox, syphilis, plague, cholera, as well as stillbirths, were decimating the population. To strengthen Egypt's military and industrial workforce and to improve public health, Muhammad Ali recruited a French physician, Antoine-Barthelemy Clot (Bey), to establish a Western-style medical school and hospital in Abu Zaʿbal. A number of physicians came from Europe to train Egyptian medical students and also health barbers, who customarily carried out minor surgical procedures such as bloodletting in addition to haircutting, to vaccinate the population against smallpox. However, the health barbers had limited access to women and children, who thus remained unvaccinated. In addition, the physicians believed that the high rate of stillbirths was caused by uneducated local midwives. To address these issues, as well as to control the spread of syphilis among his troops, Muhammad Ali also asked Clot (Bey) to establish a European-style medical school specifically to train women physicians (*hakımāt*), which opened at Abu Zaʿbal in 1832, and was subsequently moved to Qasr al-Ayni. Students for the first classes were Abyssinian and Sudanese girls purchased at the Cairo slave market and abandoned Egyptian girls living in a hospice for the poor. In later years, Egyptian military families also sent their daughters to the school.

In a six-year program, the students were taught to read and write Arabic, vaccinate against smallpox, bleed, perform obstetric maneuvers, treat and report cases of syphilis, register births and deaths, and conduct postmortems on female corpses. Upon graduation they received a military rank and were married to officers of similar rank. The *hakımāt* were familiar figures in the countryside where they were called in medical emergencies, in coroners' offices where they carried out postmortem examinations, in police stations where they conducted forensic procedures, and in court houses where they testified in criminal cases. Their working conditions, salary, and social status, however, remained low.

Nevertheless, control of the school gradually shifted to the *hakımāt.* The first director of the school was Madame Fery, who retired in 1836. Palmyre Gault, a graduate of the midwifery program and the maternity hospital in Paris, immediately succeeded her but died of plague in 1840. In 1844 a Coptic male physician became director, followed by two graduates of the school. Following the British occupation in 1882, the colonial authorities sharply limited enrollment in the medical schools and insisted that they use British textbooks and teach in English only. The school at Qasr al-Ayni became little more than a school for midwives.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND ECONOMY; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; MABARRAT MUHAMMAD ALI.

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NANCY GALLAGHER

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

With the notable exception of Israel, science and technology in the Middle East is at an embryonic stage, especially when compared to the West. Whether and how it develops will depend largely on politics and economics in each country and in the area.

The science and technology systems in most Middle Eastern countries are, with two exceptions, similar to those in other developing countries. Israel, whose system is akin to that of industrial countries, is the major exception. The other is Afghanistan, which has not yet established a scientific infrastructure.

Most Middle Eastern countries are primarily interested in applying science and technology for development. Some have sought to acquire capabilities in defense technologies but have been only partially successful. Israel alone has succeeded in applying technology for developmental and military purposes.

With the exception of Israel, information on professional manpower and science-related institutions in all countries is limited.

Manpower Development

Governments of the region have long recognized the importance of professional manpower to national development and have consequently devoted considerable efforts and resources to the provision of higher education. During the early 1950s, most countries except for Egypt and Israel suffered from shortages of professional manpower. These shortages have today been overcome everywhere in the region except Afghanistan.

Substantial numbers of engineers and scientists are now available. The Arab countries are in the lead, with a total of some 600,000 engineers. The figures on research and development (R&D) scientific manpower, though incomplete and fragmentary, are as follows: Egypt (1986), 21,000; Iran (1985), 3,200; Israel (1984), 20,000; Turkey (1985), 11,300. These countries also had a substantial number of university professors: Egypt (1988), 33,000; Algeria (1988), 14,000; Morocco (1989), 7,000; Iraq (1986), 4,600; Saudi Arabia (1988), 10,000; Syria (1986), 5,000; Iran (1988), 14,000; Turkey (1989), 31,000.

Graduate level education and postdoctoral specialization in the basic and applied sciences are still dependent on foreign study.

Despite large numbers of scientists and engineers, the science and technology systems in most countries suffer from a lack of articulation: higher education is not integrated with demand. Moreover, continuing and distance education is still underdeveloped. Consequently, there is an inability to adapt and upgrade manpower skills in an efficient and cost-effective manner.

Israel, by contrast, depends heavily on educated immigrants. Its universities are of high quality, and effective systems of continuing and distance education have been introduced.

Research & Development

R&D in Israel is at the same level as those of leading industrial countries. It publishes about 10,000 papers a year in refereed journals surveyed by the Institute of Scientific Information (ISI) in Philadelphia. Its per capita publication output compares favorably with that of the United States, and the profile of its publications is similar to that of other industrial countries.

Israeli researchers circulate in and receive funding and support from European and American research establishments. A considerable proportion of Israeli R&D is directed toward weapons systems; but Israel also has strong research programs in most scientific and technological fields of relevance to its economy. It devotes about 3 percent of its gross national product (GNP) to R&D, and currently has about 50,000 research scientists. Its heavy emphasis on military technology is, however, causing serious economic problems as a result of the current collapse of the world demand for weaponry.

The scientific output of the Arab countries can be compared favorably with that of Brazil and India, the leading developing countries. During the 1980s, the number of scientific publications per million inhabitants was 18 (Brazil), 16 (India), and 15 (the Arab world). The per capita output of the Arab countries is some 2 percent that of industrial countries. In 1990, there were more than 5,000 publications from 700 Arab institutions. Half of these were from 12 institutions, 11 of which were universities. Other institutions involved in publishing were hospitals and agricultural research stations.

R&D in the Arab countries is overwhelmingly of an applied nature. Thirty-eight percent of publications are in medicine; 20 percent in agriculture;

17 percent in engineering; 17 percent in the basic sciences; and 8 percent in economics and management. Even work that is classified as basic science is often of an applied nature. The three leading countries in order of research output are Egypt (37 percent), Saudi Arabia (20 percent), and Kuwait (12 percent). In 1990, Kuwaiti output had started to approach that of European countries.

Publications from Iran and Turkey are on a more limited scale; their output in 1990 was 161 and 1,300, respectively. The number of publishing institutions was 80 (Iran) and 155 (Turkey).

The profile of publications from Iran and Turkey, like that in the Arab countries, emphasizes traditional and applied fields such as medicine and agriculture; the proportion of publications in the basic sciences, molecular biology, information sciences, and other advanced areas is far below international levels.

The exact funding of R&D in the Arab world, Iran, and Turkey is not accurately known; it is estimated, however, to be below 1.0 percent (probably closer to 0.5 percent) of GNP throughout the region.

Institutional Framework

The capacity to apply science and technology is dependent on the prevailing institutional framework rather than on the actual number of professionals. Most of the countries have some form of institution to manage science and technology: ministries of science and technology or directorates, attached to the ministry of higher education, of planning, or to the prime minister, which are responsible for different aspects of science and technology.

But the pervasive nature of science and technology is still not recognized, and these institutions are generally bureaucratic and inflexible; they tend to regard science and technology as being restricted to R&D and manpower.

Once again, Israel is the exception; it has established an effective and comprehensive system of science policy planning and management.

The Application of Science and Technology

Some of the instruments through which science and technology are developed and applied are: consulting and contracting organizations, agricultural research stations, extension programs, hospitals, industrial firms, testing laboratories, information services, and others.

Most countries have organizations to provide these services that vary in competence and efficiency. A brief description follows of two strategic types of organizations.

Consulting organizations are critical instruments for planning and designing new projects and for adapting and transferring technology. A substantial number of state-run and private consulting firms have been established throughout the region. In fact, one of the largest international consulting firms in developing countries is Lebanese (Dar al-Hanadasa [Shair & Partners]). Large public-sector consulting firms are found in most countries of the region.

Consulting firms are heavily oriented toward civil engineering technologies, with the result that the region is still dependent on the importation of consulting services in industrial technology.

Contracting organizations bring together ideas, plans, materials, equipment, labor, and financing to produce the desired products within an agreed schedule and cost. The largest contracting firms in the region are in Turkey, whose government has provided them with the necessary financial, risk cover, and diplomatic support.

There are around 100,000 Arab contracting firms, but the Arab countries still depend on foreign firms for 50 percent of their requirements. This is largely due to the absence of appropriate public policies. The leading Arab contracting companies are privately owned and based in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.

National Science Policies

Israel is the only country in the region with the capacity to design and implement science and technology policies. In the rest of the region, national, regional, and international organizations have sought to promote the development of capabilities in science policy formation, but the results have been limited. This is due to the prevalence of preindustrial political cultures, which have made science policy formation difficult, if not impossible.

As of the mid-1990s there were increasing indications that Turkey would soon acquire an industrial political economy. When it does so, it will be capable of formulating and implementing science policies.

The colonial legacy of the region has led to the virtual elimination of intersectoral linkages and has resulted in the vertical integration of the components of a fragmented economy into foreign sources of technology. This situation has prevented the acquisition and accumulation of technological experiences, which in turn has reduced the chances of a transition to an industrial political economy.

The combination of underused capabilities and unexpected developments could lead the way to technology change. For example, the heavy bombing of Iraq, coupled with the stringent economic blockade, has forced the mobilization of Iraq's considerable capabilities in science and technology, which had previously been marginalized. A massive reconstruction of the country has consequently taken place. The same example applied to Iran during the 1980s.

Different countries in the region may discover how to mobilize their considerable professional scientific and technological manpower after other alternatives are no longer available. These challenges could induce changes in the political culture, which in turn could result in new attitudes toward science and technology.

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ANTOINE BENJAMIN ZAHLAN

SCOUTS

Worldwide youth movement that began in England in the early 1900s; it now has affiliates in virtually every country.

Except for Afghanistan, all Middle Eastern countries have scouting associations, affiliated with the World Organization of the Scout Movement. The oldest are in Lebanon (founded 1912), Syria (1913), Egypt (1918), Iraq (1921), Tunisia (1933), and Algeria (1934). The region's office of the World Scout Bureau is in Cairo, Egypt, for all Arab countries; in Geneva, Switzerland, for Turkey; and in Manila, Philippines, for Iran. In Israel, the girls' section belongs to the Asia-Pacific scout region (Manila), the boys' to the European (Geneva). Most countries have separate Boy Scouts and Girl Scout/Guide organizations.

As a youth movement in the Middle East, scouting revolves around camping and community service, including desert reclamation, medical aid, traffic control, tree planting, construction, helping pilgrims to Mecca, literacy activities, and disaster relief. Self-sufficiency and good citizenship are the goals, with volunteerism and outdoor activities stressed for health and positive attitudes toward society.

In 1990, the largest scout associations were in Iran (105,515), Egypt (73,275), Algeria (66,585), Tunisia (26,120), Israel (29,600), and Turkey (21,750). Total regional membership is some 450,000.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX

SEBASTIANI, HORACE

[1772–1851]

French general.

Horace Sebastiani was one of Napoléon Bonaparte's most trusted lieutenants. He traveled to Egypt and Syria in 1802/03 and reported favorably on the feasibility of a French reconquest. In 1806, Sebastiani became French ambassador in Constantinople (now Istanbul) and negotiated an informal alliance against Russia with the Ottoman sultan, Selim III. The re-

sulting conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire saw a radical increase in French power in Constantinople that undermined the authority of Selim III and thus paved the way for his deposition in 1807. As French foreign minister in 1832, Sebastiani was unable to halt the conflict between Sultan Mahmud II and Muhammad Ali. Seven years later, serving as ambassador in London, Sebastiani made a futile attempt to alert his government to Lord Palmerston's determination to humble Muhammad Ali. Having rejected Sebastiani's warnings, the French cabinet watched as an English coalition defeated Egypt without the aid of France. This diplomatic humiliation brought down the government of Adolphe Thiers and severely weakened French influence in the Middle East for years to come.

See also Mahmud II; Muhammad Ali; Palmerston, Lord Henry John Temple; Selim III.

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Zachary Karabell

SEBBAR, LEILA

[1941–]

Algerian novelist and essayist.

Leila Sebbar was born on 9 November 1941 in Aflou, Algeria, to a French mother and an Algerian father. She lives in Paris and writes in French.

Sebbar deals with a variety of topics, and either adopts a purely fictional approach or uses psychology to make her point. Many of Sebbar's novels express the frustrations of the *Beur*, the second generation of Maghribi youth who were born and raised in France and who have not yet integrated into French society. Her book *Parle mon fils, parle à ta mère* (1984; Talk son, talk to your mother), illustrates the absence of dialogue between two generations who do not speak the same language.

The events of several novels center around a young woman called Shérazade, a name very close to Scheherazade, the heroine of the classic collection of Arabian tales, the *Thousand and One Nights*. Shérazade is the protagonist of three novels: *Shérazade, 17 ans, brune, frisée, les yeux verts* (1980; Shérazade, 17, brunette, curly hair, and green eyes); *Les carnets de Shérazade* (1985; Shérazade's notes); and *Le fou de Shérazade* (1991; Crazy about Shérazade). Sebbar uses the implicit connection between Shérazade and Scheherazade to establish the contrast between the old and the new generations of Algerian women, drawing a nonconventional image of the female Beur.

Other themes in Sebbar's writings are the problems of emigration and the torments of life in exile. The latter is central to *Lettres Parisiennes, autopsie de l'exil* (1986; Parisian letters, the autopsy of exile), a correspondence with Canadian novelist and essay writer Nancy Huston. Sebbar's double affiliation to Algeria and France is evoked in two short essays: "They Kill Teachers," published in a collection of autobiographical narratives, *Une enfance algérienne* (1997; An Algerian childhood), and "D'abord, ce n'est pas la guerre" (Primarily, it is not war), in *Une enfance outremer* (2001; A childhood overseas).

See also Literature: Arabic, North African.

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Aida A. Bamia

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

See Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS)

SEDIQ, SOHAILA

Afghan female physician who promoted health care for women under the Marxist and Taliban governments.

Sohaila Sediq, Afghanistan's first female general and the minister of health during the interim government of Hamid Karzai, was born in 1941 in Kandahar, Afghanistan. She is a Durrani Pushtun and belongs to the Mohammadzai clan. She received

a medical degree in the Soviet Union and was promoted to the rank of military general by the Marxist regime of Babrak Karmal (1980–1986) in recognition of her service as a surgeon during the fighting between the Karmal regime and the mojahedin (Afghan freedom fighters). Although she received her medical training in the Soviet Union and worked closely with Soviet doctors in the military hospital in Kabul, there is no evidence to suggest that she joined the Afghan communist party (the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan). She was director of the Women and Children's Hospital in Kabul under the Taliban and an advocate for the protection of women, but she opposed the campaign in support of Afghan women led by Western feminists and Afghan women activists in exile; in her opinion, they were inadequately informed about conditions inside Afghanistan and attempted to use the plight of Afghan women to promote a Western feminist agenda. She is highly regarded by educated women inside Afghanistan.

SENZIL NAWID

SEFARETNAME

See GLOSSARY

SEFRIOUI, AHMED

[1915–]

Moroccan novelist and short-story writer.

Ahmed Sefrioui was born in Fez, Morocco. He studied at the Mulay Idris College in Fez, where he received a predominantly French education. He subsequently held posts at the Moroccan Office of Arts and Crafts, the Batha Museum in Fez, and the Office of Historic Monuments in Rabat.

Sefrioui's writings show his great interest in his country's folklore. *Le jardin des sortilèges ou le parfum des légendes* (1989; The garden of sorcery or the perfume of legends) is essentially a book of folktales. Other works, such as *Le chapelet d'ambre* (1949; The amber rosary) and *La boîte à merveille* (1954; The magic box), portray traditional Moroccan life and customs, which Sefrioui cherishes. Although they were written while Morocco was a French colony, Sefrioui's books ignore the foreign presence. His portrayals of his country's traditions are an affirmation of a threatened identity.

Sefrioui's approach is that of an ethnologist describing his society's customs and traditions and his religion's (Islam's) dictates. His novel *La maison de servitude* (1973; The house of slavery) provides a glimpse of traditional life in the city of Fez and of the teaching at the *qarawiyyin* (mosque university), paying special attention to details and using many Arabic terms to add an element of local color. Sefrioui's concern for the preservation of his culture is not unconditional and blind, however: He believes in the evolution of societies and the inevitability—and benefit—of change.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN.

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AIDA A. BAMIA

ŞEKER AHMET

[1841–1907]

Ottoman Turkish painter.

Ahmet Ali Paşa, known as Şeker Ahmet Paşa, was born and educated in the Uskudar district of Istanbul. While a student at the medical school, his talent for painting drew the attention of Sultan Abdülaziz, who sent him to Paris where he studied the academic painting of the period with French artists Boulanger and Gérôme. In 1870, he displayed his work in a Parisian exhibition, and in 1871, he returned to Istanbul. Şeker Ahmet Paşa organized and participated in a number of exhibitions in Istanbul and won many Ottoman and foreign awards for his work. The highly finished quality of his paints and the static linearity of his renderings call to mind French academic painters such as Daubigny and Courbet. His series of landscapes of the gardens and parks of Istanbul, as well as a variety of still lifes, reflects the conscious efforts of Turkish artists to develop Western techniques of painting.

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David Waldner

SELÇUK, MUNIR NURETTIN

[1899–1981]

Turkish singer and composer.

One of the most skillful and famous Turkish singers of the twentieth century, Munir Nurettin Selçuk was born in Istanbul during the Ottoman Empire, the son of an official in the Imperial Council. His aptitude for music and his beautiful voice became apparent when he was still a child, and he then began to take music lessons from the foremost teachers of the time.

He gave his first public concert at the age of eighteen. Throughout the 1920s, he continued to study music, including a period of piano study in Paris, and his first recordings date from this decade. Beginning in 1942, he served on the board of directors of the Istanbul Conservatory and became its chief in 1953. He composed more than one hundred pieces and was a founder of the Eastern Music Group, which was led by Ali Rifat Çagetay.

See also Music.

David Waldner

SELIM III

[1761–1808]

Twenty-eighth Ottoman sultan, 1789–1807.

The son of Mustafa III, Selim was allowed by his uncle Abdülhamit I an unusually free and liberal upbringing, on the assumption that he would succeed to the throne. Wars against Russia during the reigns of his father and uncle convinced Selim of the need to modernize the Ottoman army, and while still a prince he sought advice and assistance from King Louis XVI of France for this purpose.

When Selim succeeded his uncle in April 1789, the Ottoman Empire was again at war with Russia and Austria. Selim's first act, in May, was to convene a special assembly of leading statesmen to discuss the empire's military and financial problems,

A 1798 engraving of Selim III (1761–1808), sultan of the Ottoman Empire from 1789 to 1807. Selim's attempts to reform the empire angered conservatives and the Janissaries, who overthrew him in 1807 and then had him strangled. © Michael Nicholson/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

and to request detailed reports on how to proceed with reforms. The resulting New Order program accelerated and formalized the piecemeal military and educational Europeanization started earlier. A new army corps was formed, with a separate financial bureau to administer earmarked revenues to support the effort. Schools to train officers for the army and navy in the European manner were given new impetus. Another extension of a process begun earlier was in diplomatic relations with European powers. Ambassadors had been sent to leading

capitals to gather information on European politics and international relations, and to study recent military and technological advances; in 1792 the Ottoman government established permanent embassies in London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg so that the empire could be better informed about European relations and present its concerns directly.

With Europe increasingly preoccupied with French Revolutionary wars, Selim turned his attention to internal political problems, using his new troops to suppress provincial notables who controlled large areas of the empire's territories. They had some initial success, but from 1797 the empire was embroiled in the European war when France took an active interest in the eastern Mediterranean, culminating in Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798. The Ottoman Empire was thus forced to accept support from Britain and Russia against its traditional ally France. After Britain's navy and Selim's army turned Napoleon back from Palestine, France left Egypt in 1801, and Britain followed soon thereafter. Nevertheless, full Ottoman control could not be restored; the vice commander of the New Order army in Egypt, Muhammad Ali, eventually gained power.

In Arabia, Wahhabi doctrine had taken hold, and its Saʿudi champion rejected Selim's position as caliph of the Sunni Muslim community. In the Balkans, Russia's influence was growing, both in the Danubian principalities and in Serbia, where a revolt began in 1804. Since France's threat to the Ottoman territories had been lifted, Britain had assumed an active role in the eastern Mediterranean. After Napoleon's victories in central Europe, Selim, wishing to balance the influences of Britain and Russia, attempted to revive the alliance with France, but Russia's advance into Moldavia and Wallachia in October 1806 and Britain's naval activity near Istanbul in January 1807 prevented it.

Beset by foreign engagements not of his choosing; unable to establish authority in the provinces, where political, religious, and ethnic uprisings challenged his rule; and alienating large segments of Istanbul's population by what seemed to be an overhasty attempt to Europeanize while European powers dominated the empire's policies, Selim was deposed in May 1807 after a popular insurrection supported by palace attendants and out-of-favor officials. A year later, when provincial forces loyal to Selim marched on the capital, he was killed to prevent a countercoup.

Though a Europeanizing reformer, Selim was educated in the classical Islamic-Ottoman culture. He was a distinguished poet and a talented composer. He tried to regenerate the power of his empire through a European-style army, but in his political behavior he was a typical sultan. He helped develop policy and direction, but left government in the hands of viziers. To keep factionalism in check, he changed viziers and other statesmen frequently. His greatest misfortune was that his empire no longer could set its own course and go at its own pace. In the last decade of his rule, Selim found himself responding to foreign threats from rapidly shifting directions, desperately trying to keep in check external and internal forces that proved to be beyond his control.

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I. Metin Kunt

SEMITES

See GLOSSARY

SEMITIC LANGUAGES

A group of languages, previously categorized as the Semito-Hamitic family, that are now described as a branch of the Afro-Asiatic linguistic family.

Hebrew, Aramaic, Syriac, and Ugaritic are derived from the Northwest Semitic group; Arabic and the Ethiopic languages belong to the South Semitic branch. The character-defining feature of Semitic languages is the system of consonant roots. Most words are triliteral (three consonants separated by vowels), though bi- and quadriliterals are also common. Each root represents a distinct meaning; variations from that root are derived by set patterns of

vocalization, less important consonants, and prefixes or suffixes. The root sense of the verb is modified to express intensification, causation, reciprocity, etc., by vowel changes or prefixes. All members of the family have two genders, masculine and feminine, and, with the exception of Ethiopic languages, the adjective follows the noun and agrees with it in gender. Nominal sentences are ordered subject-verb-object, while verbal sentences are verb-subject-object.

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DAVID WALDNER

SEPEHRI, SOHRAB

[1928–1980]

Iranian poet and painter.

Sohrab Sepehri was born in Kashan and graduated from Tehran University's Faculty of Fine Arts. He founded a school of poetry resembling that of the French symbolists. Although commentators place him within the tradition of Iranian poetry, he created totally new metaphors in his verse. Sepehri's most famous piece, *Seda-ye Pa-ye Ab* (The sound of the water's footsteps, 1965), is an autobiographical narrative verse that many critics consider a masterpiece of contemporary Persian poetry.

See also LITERATURE: PERSIAN.

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PARDIS MINUCHEHR
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

SEPHARDIM

See GLOSSARY

SEPTEMBER 11TH, 2001

Day of al-Qaʿida terrorist attacks on the United States.

On 11 September 2001, two hijacked planes were flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center; a third hijacked plane was crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.; and a fourth crashed in Pennsylvania on its way to another target in Washington, D.C. (most likely the Capitol). The attacks, the work of Osama bin Ladin's al-Qaʿida, resulted in the deaths of about three thousand people, including the passengers and hijackers of the four planes and civilians from more than eighty countries. The Twin Towers, the tallest structures in New York City, collapsed to the ground after the explosion of the jet fuel, and the Pentagon sustained major damage to one wing. For the first time in U.S. history, the Federal Aviation Administration suspended all flight operations at the nation's airports.

It is still not clear whether bin Ladin intended to trigger a war between the United States and all Muslims, or whether these acts of violence were intended to terrorize the "enemy." While it has been established that bin Ladin's group was responsible for the attacks, conspiracy theories regarding the "real culprits" continue to fascinate and galvanize world public opinion. Many people in the Middle East are still skeptical about the U.S. version of the events, and a book by a French journalist that alleged that the U.S. government was behind the attacks was a best-seller in France.

In the United States, the attacks changed the political culture; a climate of fear spread throughout the country, and the Bush administration pushed for the passage of USA PATRIOT Act I, a series of legal changes that would augment the powers of the central government, in the name of security. Critics were concerned that the administration took advantage of the climate of fear to curtail the civil liberties of American citizens and of alien residents in the United States. Following the attacks, hundreds of citizens and residents were arrested by the Federal government, though many would not be charged with crimes; not one of the more than 1,200 arrested after 11 September has been linked

United Airlines flight 175 was the second hijacked plane flown into the World Trade Center in New York City on 11 September 2001. These attacks, which have been linked to the al-Qaʿida terrorist network, prompted the United States to military action against Afghanistan's Taliban leadership as part of its "War on Terrorism." © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

to the 11 September attacks. More than half of them were convicted on traffic or visa violations and were deported out of the United States. Around the world, 11 September signaled a new era of international relations with the inauguration of the Bush Doctrine, according to which the United States would claim the right to attack other countries, and to overthrow their governments, if those governments were perceived to pose a threat to the United States. The aggressive response of the United States, through the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the presence of U.S. troops in more than 120 countries, alarmed world public opinion, although Americans remained by and large supportive of U.S. efforts. In the Middle East, antipathy to the U.S. government seems to have increased after 11 September following the statements and actions of the White House, which remains convinced that its problem with the Muslim world is one of public relations, not politics. Toward that effort, the U.S. government has been spending millions to influence the opinions and politics of the Muslim world. It is certain that the events of 11 September (the subject of hundreds of books in many languages) will influence world affairs for years, if not decades, to come.

See also Bush, George W.; Qaʿida, al-.

As'ad AbuKhalil

SERASKER

See Glossary

SERI, DAN-BENAYA

[1935–]

Israeli author.

Seri was born in Jerusalem. His first novel, *Grandma Sultana's Salty Biscuits* (1980), was acclaimed for its originality in weaving folk motifs, psychological depth, and surrealism into a poetic prose rich in language and detail. His second book, *Birds of Shade* (1987), includes four novellas, one of which, "Siman-Tov's Thousand Wives," was made into a film.

Seri's works are set in Jerusalem and focus on its Sephardic (Mizrahi) Jewish communities. He creates bizarre plots of sexual perversion stemming from cultural mores, customs, and taboos, as well as individual eccentricity. The fictitious community featured in these works is oblivious to the surrounding world, lives by its folk traditions and lusts, and is controlled by the intensity of a pseudological progression of events. The gallery of characters created by Seri appears in all of his books, forming a fantastic-realistic world of consistent anomalies. His prose style is saturated with biblical and Talmudic references, often used out of their original context and meaning, thus producing a cunning modernistic irony.

Mishael, the protagonist of Seri's novel *Mishael* (1992), is a lonely widower who discovers that he is pregnant. As his body grotesquely transforms to that of a woman, Mishael sets out to find himself a new wife, all the while confronting his own sexual identity and the harassment of his community. The novel suggests childhood traumas and guilt as the grounds for this predicament, yet the hero's acceptance of the unnatural as reality is its main strength.

Zvia Ginor

SETIF

City southwest of Constantine in northeastern Algeria.

Setif is located at the site of the ancient Roman city of Sitifis. Near Setif in 1152 the Almohads defeated the Banu Hilal tribe. The city declined during the Ottoman Empire. During France's colonial administration, the city was the site of bloody riots and retributions (the Setif Revolt) in May 1945, which galvanized Algerian nationalism. The estimated population in 1998 was 212,000.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

SETIF REVOLT (1945)

One of the most violent incidents in the history of French colonialism in Algeria.

The May 1945 revolt in the city of Setif, Algeria, was caused by the deportation proceedings of Messali Hadj, the rising expectations for reform, and the agitations of nationalists. After the start of a parade celebrating Europe's victory over fascism, Muslims demonstrated carrying nationalist placards. This provoked the police, leading to rioting and the deaths of 103 Europeans. French retribution probably caused between 5,000 and 10,000 Muslim deaths (although some contend that the fatalities were in the tens of thousands).

This event convinced many younger nationalists that violence was the only recourse to French colonialism as disclosed by the 1947 formation of the Organisation Spéciale (OS) and in 1954 the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).

See also FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE (FLN); HADJ, MESSALI AL-.

PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

SETTLEMENT POLICY (ISRAEL)

See ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY (ISRAEL)

SEVEN SISTERS

See GLOSSARY

ŞEVKET, MAHMUT

[1856–1913]

Ottoman general and grand vizier.

Born in Baghdad the son of a provincial government official, Mahmut Şevket, known as Şevket Paşa, completed his studies in Constantinople (now Istanbul), where he entered military service. As part of a special commission for military purchases and training, he was sent to Germany for nine years. He was promoted to the rank of general in 1901. Between 1905 and 1909, he held several posts in Rumelia, achieving minor successes in easing tension in the region.

A year after the Young Turk revolution, Şevket Paşa achieved new prominence as commander of the Hareket Ordusu (operations army) that marched on Constantinople in April 1909, putting down the counterrevolution. In the new post of inspector general of Constantinople, he led the brutal represssion and punishment of the rebels under martial law for the next two years. In 1910, he became minister of war and advocated withdrawal of the military from politics. When the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) seized power in January 1913, it appointed him grand vizier. Six months later, he was assassinated by CUP opponents. His murder introduced a new period of violent repression by the CUP.

See also COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

SÈVRES PROTOCOL (1956)

Secret Israeli-British-French agreement.

The Sèvres Protocol was the product of secret negotiations among British, French, and Israeli leaders

at a villa in Sèvres, a Paris suburb, from 22 to 24 October 1956 to initiate war against Nasser's Egypt. The protocol reflects diverse grievances: Britain was concerned about loss of control over the Suez Canal; France was disturbed about Egyptian support for Algerian rebels; Israel was anxious about Egypt's active support for terrorist incursions, the blockade of its southern port, Elat, and massive arms purchases from Czechoslovakia. Interests coalesced during the summer of 1956, with the French serving as the essential intermediary between the British and Israelis, who were deeply suspicious of each other.

The protocol began with a plan for inaugurating an attack across Sinai by Israel on 29 October with the aim of reaching the Suez Canal a day later. The British and French were to issue an ultimatum to both sides on 30 October calling for a cease-fire and for separating the contending parties beyond a zone of ten miles on either side of the canal. Anticipating Egyptian rejection, Britain and France were to occupy that zone while Israel was to clear the Egyptian blockade of Elat by occupying the islands of Tiran and Sinafir at the southern end of the Red Sea. There was also a French annex to the protocol providing for an aerial umbrella and a naval presence to secure Israel proper from Egyptian attack. The protocol was signed by Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion, French foreign minister Christian Pineau, and British deputy secretary of state and chairman of the joint intelligence committee Patrick Dean. After the signing, the three governments fulfilled their obligations although they denied the existence of the negotiations and the protocol. Eager to hide evidence of this "collusion," British prime minister Anthony Eden shredded the document and the French misplaced it. Surviving copies are to be found in Israeli archives, where evidence of the first instance of cooperation with Western powers was treasured.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1956); SUEZ CRISIS (1956–1957).

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S. ILAN TROEN

SÈVRES, TREATY OF (1920)

Peace treaty signed by Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire after World War I.

World War I ended in the Middle East with the signing of the Mudros armistice by the Ottoman Empire on 30 October 1918; but the Middle East was only a small concern of the overall peace negotiations held in France in 1919—German issues took precedence.

Each nation and group came with its own agenda. British prime minister David Lloyd George, while mouthing all the proper slogans about goodwill to Middle Eastern peoples, was there to advance the interests of the British Empire. These included British-controlled sea and land routes to India and assurance that no other power be given important strategic areas. French president Georges Clemenceau, compensating for heavy French troop losses, adamantly adhered to each wartime agreement signed by the Allies that would give France a hold on Syria and southern Anatolia. He also hoped for dominance over the Turkish Straits and perhaps over what would become Turkey. U.S. president Woodrow Wilson came with his Fourteen Points.

In addition to the big three, representatives of other concerned nations and groups came to the peace negotiations, including the Hijazis, Armenians, Greeks, Italians, and Zionists. No permanent decision were made in 1919 in this atmosphere of claims and counterclaims.

At the end of 1919, British troops in Syria were replaced by French troops, giving the Arabs the impression that the Sykes–Picot Agreement would be upheld. In Palestine, anti-Jewish riots broke out. The Arab Syrian Congress elected Faisal ibn Hussein as king of Syria and his brother Abdullah I ibn Hussein as king of Iraq and tensions rose in Iraq and Egypt. Britain realized that a treaty for the Middle East could no longer be postponed and in April 1920 met with France in San Remo, Italy, to forge an agreement on their points of difference. This prepared the way for a peace settlement with the Ottoman Empire—and the Treaty of Sèvres was signed on 10 August 1920.

By this treaty, the Ottoman sultan recognized that his Arab provinces were cut off from his empire.

In August of 1920, at the end of World War I, Turkey and the Allies signed the Treaty of Sèvres, which dissolved the Ottoman Empire as well as the sovereignty of Turkey. © Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Control over the Straits went to an international commission. Arabia was recognized as independent and a British protectorate over Egypt was acknowledged. Syria and Iraq became provisionally independent under the newly created mandate system—with Syria to be under the French and to include Alexandretta, Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut; France could deal with King Faisal as it wished. The state of Iraq was formed under British tutelage, with the province of Mosul attached to those of Baghdad and Basra. Palestine, including both sides of the Jordan river, became a British mandate as well, and the (pro-Zionist) Balfour Declaration of 1917 was written into it. Germany's shares of the Turkish petroleum Company went to France, and Britain got oil-pipeline transit rights across Syria. Britain and France immediately moved into their respective spheres, although the League of Nations mandates did not become effective until 1923.

The Treaty of Sèvres, imposed on the Ottoman government, was never ratified—because of internal Turkish affairs—namely the rise to power of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the overthrow of the Ottoman sultan. Thus the treaty became obsolete and final arrangements were put off until the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923.

See also Balfour Declaration (1917); Lausanne, Treaty of (1923); Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916).

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Sara Reguer

SEYFIYYE

See Glossary

SEZER, AHMET

[1941–]

Tenth president of the Republic of Turkey.

Ahmet Sezer graduated from the Faculty of Law at Ankara University in 1962, and in the same year started his career as judge in Ankara. Following the completion of his military service in the Land Forces Academy, he served as a judge in the town of Dicle and later took up assignment as a supervisory judge at the High Court of Appeals in Ankara. He was elected as a full judge to the High Court of Appeals in 1983 and appointed by the president to serve on the Constitutional Court in September 1988. Sezer was elected chief justice of the Constitutional Court in January 1998. The Turkish Grand National Assembly named him the tenth president of the Republic of Turkey on 5 May 2000.

Sezer is known for his rigid views on secularism and legalism. He has stated that secularism is a necessary condition of democracy, and he gives priority to secularism over democracy. Turkey's liberal advocates of broader civil rights have expressed deep disappointment with Sezer.

See also Ankara University; Turkish Grand National Assembly.

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M. Hakan Yavuz

SFAR, BASHIR

[c. 1865–1919]

Tunisian journalist.

From an aristocratic family of Tunis, Bashir Sfar was one of four editors of Tunisia's news periodical *Al-Hadira* (The capital). Sfar was a leader of the reformist Young Tunisian movement, which brought together classically trained Tunisians from the Zaytuna mosque and modernly trained Tunisians from Sadiqi College in the middle years of the French protectorate. This was a precursor to the movement for independence from France.

LAURENCE MICHALAK

SFAR, TAHAR

[1903–]

Tunisian nationalist.

One of the early and most vocal leaders of the nationalist Destour movement, Sfar was educated at the Tunisian Sadiqi College and in France. Sfar became adjunct secretary-general of the Neo-Destour Party in 1934, during the Ksar Hellal Congress that consecrated the rupture between the Neo and Archeo sectors of the independence movement and delineated new guidelines in the struggle toward independence under the leadership of Mahmoud Materi, with Habib Bourguiba as secretary-general. In the late 1930s, faced with increasingly repressive measures by the French colonial administration and disillusioned with the militant stance adopted by Bourguiba and others, Sfar effectively withdrew from politics.

See also BOURGUIBA, HABIB; TUNISIA: OVERVIEW; TUNISIA: POLITICAL PARTIES IN.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON
UPDATED BY VANESA CASANOVA-FERNANDEZ

SFAX

Tunisian seaport on the northeast coast of the Gulf of Gabès.

Sfax (also Sfaqes or Safaqis) was a Phoenician trading center before it was settled in the eighth century by Arab invaders spreading Islam; they built a mosque in the mid-ninth century. It continued as an important seaport for the Mediterranean olive oil trade and was one of the few Tunisian towns to resist the French occupation after the protectorate of 1881, thus suffering bombardment. After Tunisia became independent in 1956, Sfax became the center of a governorate and the second-largest Tunisian city, with a population of some 232,000 (as of 1984).

Today it has a medical school, one of three appellate courts, a large prison, the regional radio station, an international airport and an air-force base, and a busy port that handles mainly phosphates and olive oil.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON

SFEIR, NASRALLAH

[1920–]

Lebanese Maronite patriarch.

Nasrallah Sfeir (Sufayr) was born in Rayfun, Lebanon, in 1920, and was ordained a priest in 1950. After a service as auxiliary Bishop of Antioch, he was ordained bishop in 1961. He was appointed and confirmed as a Maronite patriarch in 1986, and was elevated to cardinal in 1994. The intra-Maronite civil war in East Beirut and Kisrawan in the late 1980s affected Sfeir's leadership. In 1990 followers of General Michel Aoun chased the Maronite and publicly humiliated him before television cameras. Aoun was later ousted, and he sought refuge in France. The arrest and trial of Samir Geagea, the former commander of the Lebanese Forces), left the Maronite community eager for leadership and guidance, which was promptly provided by Sfeir. Sfeir's political role and influence expanded in the 1990s and in the early twenty-first century. He was largely quiet about the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, but became very vocal against the Syrian military presence in Lebanon after 2000. He also criticized what he saw as the misapplication of the Taʾif Accord, and he has never visited the Syrian capital in recent years despite several invitations. He chaired the Maronite bishop council and released overtly political statements on a monthly basis. His political influence within the Maronite community is supreme, and he receives a wide range of visitors every day.

See also Aoun, Michel; Maronites; Ta'if Accord.

As'ad AbuKhalil

SHABʿA FARMS

A group of farms near the convergence of Syrian, Lebanese, and (due to Israel's occupation of Syrian territory since 1967) Israeli territories.

Shabʿa Farms became a focus of international conflict in the summer of 2000, after Israel withdrew its forces from South Lebanon, ending a costly occupation that began in 1976. The fourteen farms that make up Shabʿa Farms are named after the village of Shabʿa, on the western slopes of Mount Hermon (in Arabic, Jabal al-Shaykh). The area of Shabʿa Farms encompasses approximately 6.5 square miles. Israel maintains that the farms are Syrian territory and thus argues that it should have rights over them. The Syrian government insists that the farms are part of Lebanese territory. Since the border in this area is not clearly demarcated, the United Nations has asked the Syrian government for documentation to back up its claim that the farms are not part of its territory. Hizbullah, which led the successful resistance movement against Israel's occupation of South Lebanon, argues that Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon will not be complete unless and until Israel withdraws from the farms. The Lebanese government supports this position. Israel has established a military post on one of the hills overlooking the area and has exchanged fire with Hizbullah forces. It is unlikely that the status of the farms will be settled before the issue of Israel's occupation of Syrian territories—that is to say, the Golan Heights—is resolved. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has recommended that all sides recognize the demarcation line drawn after the 1973 Arab–Israel war as a temporary measure. But Israel does not seem ready to leave the farms, and some reports have mentioned the settlement of Ethiopian Jews there.

Syria and Hizbullah may also be interested in keeping the issue of Shibʿa Farms alive as it grant them a reason, or excuse, to escalate or de-escalate, the level of tensions with Israel. However, there is certainly a nationalist basis for both Syria and Lebanon, which explains why every piece of land becomes important.

See also Annan, Kofi A.; Golan Heights; Hizbullah.

As'ad AbuKhalil

SHABBI, ABU AL-QASIM AL-

[1909–1934]

Noted Tunisian poet.

Born in the southern Tunisian oasis town of Tozeur, Abu al-Qasim al-Shabbi had a mobile childhood because of his father's judicial career. The constant traveling familiarized him with the Tunisian countryside and people and induced in him a profound and lifelong infatuation with both that permeated his later poetry. Studies at Tunis's eminent Zaytuna Mosque university and law school also influenced al-Shabbi, but they clashed with his penchant for European and Arabic literature and with his budding rebellion against the French colonial system and the restrictions of the Arab poetic tradition. His entire poetic career was compressed in a seven-year period that occurred between age eighteen, when he began publishing his poetry, and age twenty-five, when he succumbed to heart disease. The pressures of family obligations caused by his father's untimely death in 1929 and the additional responsibilities occasioned by his marriage are thought to have contributed to his early demise in October 1934.

New currents in Arab poetry from the Middle East and North America stirred al-Shabbi's imagination, as did the European Romantics. Al-Shabbi sought to break the bonds of convention and tradition and to revolutionize both poetry and society. Although he opposed the French colonial regime, he also castigated traditional Tunisian mores and called for social transformation, freedom, and progress. For this imaginative poet, the city contrasted unfavorably with nature, where he felt he could escape into a solitary utopia and indulge in his pursuit of idealized womanhood.

Al-Shabbi's revolutionary stance appealed to a later generation of Tunisian and Arab nationalists. Along with other Tunisians of his generation, al-Shabbi contributed to the literary renaissance of his country, at the same time that other Tunisians heralded a social renaissance (for example, Tahir al-Haddad in his epochal work on Tunisian women) and a political renaissance (for example, Habib

Bourguiba through his founding of the Neo-Destour party in the year of al-Shabbi's death). Al-Shabbi helped Tunisian poets break with traditional forms and find a more impassioned poetic expression that could help move the Tunisian people toward social awakening and a modern outlook. Many of his poems were set to music and became patriotic or popular songs. During October 1994, which marked the sixtieth-anniversary commemoration of the poet's death, celebrations were held in the towns al-Shabbi had visited or resided in, such as Tozeur (his birthplace and the site of his mausoleum), Majaz al-Bab, Gafsa, and Kebilli. Al-Shabbi is known as the "poet of life," after his most famous collection of poems, *Songs of Life.*

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LARRY A. BARRIE

SHAʿBI FAMILY

Prominent Yemeni clan.

Originally from al-Shaʿb, Qahtan and Faysal Abd al-Latif al-Shaʿbi were prominent in the origins of the Yemeni branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement as well as the National Liberation Front of South Yemen. Until deposed by more radical elements, Qahtan was president of the People's Republic of South Yemen (1967–1969), while Faysal served briefly as prime minister and foreign minister. Shortly thereafter, Faysal was assassinated.

Qahtan al-Shaʿbi died in 1976, but other members of the family have been prominent in Yemeni politics since then. Among them is Najib Qahtan al-Shaʿbi, who was elected to parliament in 1997 and ran as an independent in the presidential election of 1999.

MANFRED W. WENNER

SHADER, JOSEPH

[1907–1977]

Former Lebanese minister, deputy, and vice president of the Phalange party.

Born and educated in Beirut, Joseph Shader was a prominent Armenian Catholic lawyer who was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1951, when he became the first parliamentary representative of the Phalange party. In parliament, he joined Camille Chamoun, Kamal Jumblatt, Raymond Eddé, and others who sought to force President Bishara al-Khuri to resign. He successfully competed in every single parliamentary election held until his death in 1977 and was therefore a deputy for Beirut in the parliaments elected in 1953, 1957 (when he also became deputy speaker of the chamber), 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972. Under President Chamoun (1952–1958), he supported the government's pro-Western and anti-Nasser foreign policy, and in March 1958 he became minister of planning in a cabinet headed by Sami al-Sulh. A specialist of public finance, he once was president of the Parliamentary Commission for Finances. He held the vice presidency of the Phalange party for several years and is remembered as one of that party's most influential members.

See also CHAMOUN, CAMILLE; EDDÉ, RAYMOND; JUMBLATT, KAMAL; KHURI, BISHARA AL-; PHALANGE; SULH, SAMI AL-.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX

SHAFIʿI SCHOOL OF LAW

One of the four systems, or schools, of thought in Sunni Muslim law.

The Shafiʿi school of law was founded by Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafiʿi (died 820), a disciple of Malik ibn Anas (died 795) and Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Shaybani (died 805). Bringing about a synthesis between the rationalists and the traditionalists, Shafiʿi elaborated a system of positive law and a rudimentary legal theory that attracted a number of scholars who propagated his teachings, thus creating the first personal school of law *(madhhab)* in Islam. His two chief treatises that survived are *al-Umm,* a collection of treatises mainly concerned with positive law and disagreements among the early jurists, and *al-Risala* (also known as *al-Kitab,*) a work on legal theory with particular emphasis on Prophetic *hadith* (traditions) as a binding source of law.

The immediate students of Shafiʿi who were responsible for propagating his teachings, and thus for laying the first roots of the school, were al-Buwayti (died 846), Harmala (died 857), Muzani (died 878), al-Zaʿfarani (died 874), al-Karabisi (died c. 859), and al-Rabi ibn Sulayman al-Jizi (died 870). Al-Rabi ibn Sulayman al-Muradi (died c. 884) is known as the transmitter of most of Shafiʿi's extant works. Other scholars, such as Ibn Hanbal (died 854) and Abu Thawr (died 855), initially the disciples of Shafiʿi, became themselves the founders of independent law schools.

The widespread influence of the Shafiʿi school must be credited to the work of Ibn Surayj (died 918), significantly nicknamed the "Little Shafiʿi." He was responsible for harmonizing the teachings of the school and for training a generation of influential Shafiʿi scholars who guaranteed not only the survival of the school but indeed its success. Among the most important of these scholars are Abu Bakr al-Sayrafi (died 942) and al-Qaffal al-Shashi (died 948), who are considered two of the first major authors of complete works on Shafiʿite legal theory *(usul al-fiqh)*.

Among the many names that dominated the later history of Shafiʿism are: Abu Bakr al-Baqillani (died 1013), Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini (died 1015), Abu Muhammad al-Juwayni (died 1046) and his son Imam al-Haramayn (died 1085), Bayhaqi (died 1066), al-Mawardi (died 1058), Abu Ishaq al-Shirazi (died 1083), Ghazali (died 1111), Abu Bakr al-Shashi (died 1113), Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (died 1209), Rafiʿi (died 1226), Izz al-Din (b. Abd al-Salam; died 1262), Muhyi al-Din al-Nawawi (died 1277), and Suyuti (died 1505). The positive law *(furu)* treatises of Juwayni, Shirazi, Ghazali, Rafiʿi, and Nawawi became standard for the later period, whereas in legal theory, the works of Juwayni, Ghazali, and Razi gained popularity.

Today the Shafiʿi school has followers in Egypt—mainly in rural areas—as well as in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Hijaz, Bahrain, Yemen, Pakistan, Iran, India, and Indonesia.

See also Hadith; Hanafi School of Law; Hanbali School of Law; Maliki School of Law.

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Wael B. Hallaq

SHAFIQ, DURRIYYA

[1908–1975]

Egyptian writer and feminist.

Durriyya (also Doria) Shafiq was born in the town of Tanta in Egypt's Nile delta, where she was educated by Roman Catholic nuns. With the support of Huda al-Shaʿarawi, she received her doctorate from the Sorbonne in Paris, where she wrote a dissertation entitled "La femme Egyptienne et l'Islam." In 1945 Shafiq returned to Egypt, founded *Majallat Bint al-Nil* (The magazine of the daughter of the Nile), and in 1948 established the Union of the Daughter of the Nile, an association which called for political rights for women and female literacy. A later political party, which she founded in 1953, was banned in 1954. In the 1960s Shafiq's public opposition to President Gamal Abdel Nasser led to her being placed under house arrest. Among her writings are *al-Mar'a al-Misriyya min al-Faraʿina ila al-Yawm* (The Egyptian woman from the pharaohs until today) and *al-Kitab al-Abyad li Huquq al-Mar'a al-Misriyya* (The white paper for the rights of the Egyptian woman).

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David Waldner

SHAHADA, GEORGE

[1910–1989]

Lebanese playwright and poet.

Born in Alexandria, Egypt, of an old Lebanese family imbued with French culture, George Shahada completed his primary studies at the Jesuit school

in Beirut before moving to Paris, where he received most of his secondary education and all of his university training. After obtaining a French *licence* (bachelor of arts degree) in law, he returned to Beirut, where he first worked first as cultural attaché at the French embassy. He later became a professor and then the secretary-general at the Ecole Supérieure des Lettres, which had emerged as a center for the promotion of French avant-garde poetry in the region.

His first collection of poems, *Poésies I,* published in Paris in 1938, showed very clearly the influence of surrealism on his work and gained him the attention of French and international critics. Repeated stays in Paris enabled him to maintain a close friendship with André Breton, a leader in the surrealist movement, whom he had met during his student days. He also developed friendships with Jean Cocteau, Paul Eluard, St.-John Perse (pseudonym for Marie-René-Auguste-Aléxis St. Léger), Jules Supervielle, and other leading French intellectuals. By the early 1950s, Shahada already had established himself as one of the leading neosurrealist poets and the foremost representative of Lebanese poets writing in the French language. It was then that he started writing plays, which soon brought him more recognition than his poetry and indeed established him as the best-known French-language dramatist outside France.

During the 1950s and 1960s, Shahada wrote more than a half-dozen important plays; the best-known of these are *Monsieur Bob'le* (1951), *La soirée des proverbes* (1954; The evening of proverbs), *Le voyage* (1961; The voyage), and *L'emigré de Brisbane* (1965; The emigré from Brisbane). Although Shahada always wrote in French and spent a great part of his life in France, his work reflects his emotional attachment to his native land and an unmistakable Eastern influence. Its emphasis on magic and fantasy has even led some critics to compare it to Middle Eastern fairy tales and to describe Shahada as a storyteller in the tradition of Sheherazade. His heroes (for instance, M. Bob'le and Vasco) are usually good-natured, naive figures who were able to preserve a childlike innocence and the ability to wonder at the marvels of nature and life. They identify mysteries behind the appearance of the ordinary and are usually led from banal, everyday situations into increasingly unexpected, odd, and captivating adventures. Far less preoccupied with understanding the world than with experiencing its beauty, they are sometimes shown communicating not only with other human beings, but also with the animals and objects that surround them.

By placing such strange but charming characters at the center of his humorous plays, Shahada seeks to evoke the harmony that men and women can find with nature and each other. He invites the members of his audience to look for the mysteries of life, and to listen to their intuitions and dreams instead of being driven by their intellects. Shahada's plays thus constitute a plea for feeling before understanding, and they exhibit an unmistakable Middle Eastern sensitivity to the wonders of nature.

Although Shahada's suspenseful, funny plays highlight the comical, incongruous, and tragic aspects of the human condition and draw on technical devices that were used in the avant-garde theater of the 1950s, they nevertheless differ from the so-called Theater of the Absurd. Unlike plays by Eugène Ionesco or Samuel Beckett, for instance, they betray an optimistic outlook on life. Beckett's characters tend to feel helpless, frustrated, and bitter, and live only in their minds, whereas Shahada's heroes are spontaneous individuals who still display the simple happiness and purity of childhood. In sharp contrast to the way Beckett emphasizes the chaotic and meaningless aspects of life, Shahada invites his audience to appreciate what he sees as the intrinsic harmony and beauty of the world and to look at one's surroundings with the innocent, uncorrupted eyes of a child.

In 1973, Shahada returned to poetry. In December 1986—a year after his last collection of poems, *Le nageur d'un seul amour* (The swimmer of an only love) was published in Paris—the Académie Française awarded him the Grand Prix de la Francophonie during a summit of French-speaking countries held in Paris. By becoming the first recipient of this prestigious honor three years before his death, Shahada obtained well-deserved recognition of his unique place in the world of Francophone literature. He is remembered as the twentieth-century author who best blended Western surrealist literature and avant-garde dramatic techniques with the Eastern tradition of storytelling.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

SHAHBANDAR, ABD AL-RAHMAN

[1880–1940]

Syrian politician.

Born in Damascus, Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar attended the Syrian Protestant College (later the American University of Beirut). He received his medical degree in 1906 and became a professor of medicine. He was one of the most prominent nationalists in Damascus after World War I, serving Amir Faisal I ibn Hussein as chief liaison with Britain, and as an interpreter for the King-Crane Commission in 1919. Shahbandar was appointed minister of foreign affairs in 1920 by the newly crowned King Faisal. The French promptly disbanded this government, and Shahbandar fled to Egypt. He returned to Damascus under French amnesty in 1921 and founded the first nationalist organization in Syria, the Iron Hand. Shahbandar was arrested and sentenced to twenty years in prison for nationalist activities in 1922. The sentence was changed to exile, and after seeking support for Syria's independence in the West, with the help of his friend Charles R. Crane, he returned to Damascus in 1924.

In 1925, Shahbandar organized and led the People's Party, which played a central role in the revolt (1925–1927). He spent ten years in Cairo, then returned to Damascus in April 1937. His pro-Hashimite stance put him in direct confrontation with the ruling National Bloc, and he was placed under house arrest in 1938. Shahbandar's quest for Britain's support for a confederation of Syria, Transjordan, Palestine, and Lebanon under Amir Abdullah I ibn Hussein, and his denunications of his more hard-line nationalist rivals, led to his assassination in Damascus (June 1940). Ultimate responsibility for the assassination was never fixed, though National Bloc members may have been involved.

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CHARLES U. ZENZIE

SHAHIN, TANYOS

[1815–1895]

Leader of the Lebanese peasant revolt.

Tanyos Shahin was born into the Saʿada family in Rayfun, Kisrawan. When peasant protests against the feudal landlords swept parts of Mount Lebanon in 1858, Shahin was approached by armed peasants and asked to become a local leader in Rayfun; his influence quickly spread through the Kisrawan region. He succeeded Salil Sfayr, who feared the consequence of his role and resigned. Shahin articulated the grievances of the peasants to the Mashayikh (heads of Maronite landowning families) and was not reluctant to use violence to achieve his aims. The Maronite patriarch Bulus Masʿad accused Shahin of intensifying the conflict between the peasants and the landlords. When the landlords tried to ignore the demands of the peasants, Shahin made clear his willingness to use force. At one point he tried to arrest leading landlords who were meeting in a monastery, but the presence of clerics stopped him. Shahin called for the confiscation of property and crops owned by the landlords and in 1859 seized silk and wheat belonging to landlords and put it in his own house. His power allowed him to punish and reward individuals. By the spring of 1859, he had expelled all members of the Khazin family from Kisrawan. At the end of the year, the Maronite peasant rebellion had become interwined with the Maronite-Druze conflict, which led to the civil war of 1860. The appointment of a Mutasarrif in 1861 led to the defeat of Shahin, although he was allowed to remain in Kisrawan as local leader.

ASʿAD ABUKHALIL

SHAHIN, YUSUF

[1926–]

Egyptian film director.

Born in Alexandria, Egypt, to a middle-class Christian family, Yusuf Shahin studied at Alexandria

University before studying acting at the Pasadena Playhouse in California. He directed his first film, *Baba Amine,* in 1953, at the age of twenty-four. Considered to be one of the most important international film directors, Shahin is also one of the most eclectic, having directed everything from musicals to melodramas, autobiography to comedy, and neorealist to political films. His movies pushed the traditional boundaries of Arab cinema. *Alexandria Why?,* his most autobiographical film, innovated the use of first-person narrative, while other films, such as *Cairo Station,* explored issues of sexuality and madness for the first time. His more political films, such as *The Return of the Prodigal Son* (an adaptation of André Gide's novel), explored the social politics of the Arab-Israel War, while films such as *Once upon a Time on the Nile* concentrated a strong critical eye on the construction of the Aswan High Dam. His work has been included in international projects featuring famous directors, such as the Lumière Brother's anniversary compilation of shorts, as well as shorts about 11 September 2001. In 1997, he won the prestigious Cannes Film Festival's highest honor, the Palme d'Or, for his film *Destiny.* Shahin has directed more than twenty films and is the subject of numerous books and articles.

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DAVID WALDNER
UPDATED BY ROXANNE VARZI

SHALTUT, MUHAMMAD

[1893–1963]

Egyptian Muslim leader who emphasized combining modern science with religious studies

Shaykh Muhammad Shaltut studied and taught at al-Azhar University in Cairo, then became Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar in 1958. Shaltut advocated combining the modern sciences with traditional religious studies. As a result, his work is often cited in Egypt and the Arab world by Islamic modernists and moderates.

Early on, Shaltut actively served in cultural, legal, journalistic, and educational capacities within Egypt. In his religious role, his primary focus was to make the Islamic sciences accessible to Muslim laypersons and applicable to modern Muslim life. Indeed, Shaltut emphasized societal unity and faith, social justice, and independence as key manifestations of Islamic principles. He did not, however, offer detailed theories of "Islamic socialism," or advocate the creation of an Islamic state in Egypt. As a reformer, Shaltut held to the traditional tenets of Islam, but castigated religious thinkers and students for blindly following legal schools *(taqlid),* and failing to consider Islam within a modern context, vis-à-vis *maslaha* (public interest). On a practical level, many of Shaltut's years at al-Azhar were spent modernizing teaching methods, textbooks, and courses to reflect this approach.

Shaltut's arguably most influential contributions dealt with jihad and the agreement among legal schools *(al-taqrib bayna al-madhahib).* In 1940 Shaltut endeavored to reconcile the Qurʾanic verses of fighting with those of forgiveness in order to clarify the notion of jihad in Islam. He concluded that there is no basis in Islam for conversion through violence, and that in both the classical and contemporary periods, jihad was and is only permissible in self-defense. During his tenure at al-Azhar, Shaltut issued a groundbreaking legal ruling *(fatwa)* declaring the gate of *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) open. Therefore, jurists could legitimately draw from any of the Sunni or Shiʿite *madhahib* in order to gather the most sound arguments and evidence for their judgments. His efforts were formalized in the Islamic Research Academy in 1961, and with the implementation of courses in Shiʿism at al-Azhar.

See also AZHAR, AL-; JIHAD.

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RAYMOND WILLIAM BAKER
UPDATED BY CRYSTAL PROCYSHEN

SHALVI, ALICE

[1926–]

Leading Israeli religious feminist; founder of the Israeli Women's Network; academic and pedagogue.

Born in Düsseldorf, Germany, and educated in England at Cambridge University, Alice Shalvi was raised as an Orthodox Jew but her feminist conviction has led her into the more liberal Masorti (Conservative) movement. Shalvi headed English literature departments at Hebrew and Ben-Gurion universities and was the founder of Pelech, an experimental school for religious girls (1975–1990) and of the Ohalim movement of neighborhood associations (1973–1979); she was also founding director (later chairwoman) of the Israeli Women's Network (1984–2000). In the latter position, she was one of the most prominent feminist advocates in Israel, developing a program that covers most forms of discrimination and disadvantage faced by women in Israeli society. An important aim of her work was gaining acceptance of Israeli women's contributions in all sections and at all levels of the armed forces, since army service plays a significant role in Israeli economic, political, and social life. Shalvi has also argued that women in Israel are a distinctive force for peace, and she has engaged in a vigorous dialogue with Palestinian women. In 1997, she became the first female rector of the Schechter Institute of Jewish Studies in Jerusalem.

See also Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Israel: Political Parties in.

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George R. Wilkes

SHAMI, AHMAD MUHAMMAD AL-

[unknown]

Yemeni political leader.

A prominent member of a large family of Sayyid aristocrats in Yemen, Ahmad Muhammad al-Shami joined the early opposition to the Hamid al-Din imamate in the 1940s. As a founding member of the Free Yemenis in 1944, he was among those imprisoned in Hajja after the aborted 1948 revolution. After his release from prison in the 1950s he nonetheless did serve the Hamid al-Din imamate, and continued to do so until the death of Imam Ahmad a week before the 1962 revolution that replaced the imamate with the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). At the time, Shami did not cast his lot with the republicans; instead, he chose to serve young Imam al-Badr and the royalists as foreign minister during the long civil war that came quickly in the wake of the revolution and continued until 1970. Apparently less committed to the imamate than opposed to some of the republican leaders, their policies, and the great influence of Egypt on the republic, Shami strove for reconciliation even as he served as royalist foreign minister. In 1970, three years after the coup that brought the al-Iryani regime to power in the YAR, he led the moderate royalists into the republican-royalist reconciliation; he then joined the Republican Council, the newly created plural executive of the YAR. However, he withdrew from politics and left Yemen permanently in the mid-1970s, moving to London for medical treatment; shortly thereafter, he was seriously incapacitated by illness.

See also Free Yemenis; Hamid al-Din Family.

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Robert D. Burrowes

SHAMIKH, MUBARAK ABDULLAH AL-

[1950–]

Libyan official and former secretary of the General People's Congress of Libya.

Mubarak Abdullah al-Shamikh is a member of the Maghariba tribe, from Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, in the Ajdabya region. He received his primary and secondary education in Libya and a university degree in engineering in the United States. He was a member of the Revolutionary Committees before being appointed to the General People's Committee (cabinet, GPC) as secretary of communications and marine transport in 1985. He was out of office from 1989 to 1992, and his activities during this

period are unclear. In November 1992, Shamikh returned to the GPC as secretary of utilities, tourism, and communications, surviving a cabinet reshuffle in April 1993 in which he was designated secretary of utilities, public works, transport, and communications. The GPC was again reshuffled in December 1995, and Shamikh became the secretary of utilities and housing, a post he held until early 2000.

On 2 March 2000 Shamikh was named GPC secretary (prime minister) in a new Libyan minigovernment after the General People's Congress (parliament) labeled the previous government of Muhammad Ahmad al-Manghusha a failure, dismantling most of its ministries and transferring their functions to municipal councils. He was replaced as GPC secretary by Shukri Ghanim, secretary of economy and foreign trade, on 14 June 2003 in an effort to promote a policy of greater economic openness. Since June 2003 Shamikh has served the Qaddafi regime as head of the general planning council.

See also LIBYA; QADDAFI, MUAMMAR AL-.

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RONALD BRUCE ST JOHN

SHAMI, MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH AL-
[c.1890 –c.1964]

Senior administrator for Imams Yahya and Ahmad from the 1940s through the early 1960s.

Muhammad Abdullah al-Shami came from a prominent traditional family of judges, administrators, and teachers (a *qadi* family) from the town of Kawkaban, near Sanʿa. After a career as senior administrator in many large towns, he served Imam Ahmad as governor and frontier officer in the eastern border town of al-Baydha during the 1950s, a time when the British were pushing north from Aden into the hinterland and Yemen was resisting this push. He conducted repeated border negotiations with his British counterpart, Basil Seager, and he repeatedly encouraged tribal forays into territory disputed with the British and subverted South Yemeni tribes in those territories with money and arms. Later, when he was already more than seventy years of age, al-Shami successfully negotiated for the ailing Imam Ahmad a tentative end to the tribal revolt of 1960; he was senior administrator of Sanʿa at the time of the overthrow of the imamate in 1962. In the wake of the 1962 revolution, al-Shami was imprisoned, tried, and convicted. He was released after several months and retired to Kawkaban, where he died in about 1964.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

SHAMIR, MOSHE
[1921–]

Israeli writer and political activist.

Moshe Shamir was born in Mandatory Palestine, in Safed, and raised in Tel Aviv. From 1941 to 1947 he was a member of Kibbutz Mishmar ha-Emek. In 1944 he joined the Palmah, and he fought in the Arab-Israel War (1948). Shamir is a leader of the first generation of native Israeli writers and best known for his novels of the 1940s and 1950s, which depict in rich detail and glowing terms the development of the new state and the sabra character. *Hu Halakh Ba-Sadot* (1947; *He Walked through the Fields* [1959]), *Ad Elat* (1950; Until Elat), and *Kilometer 56* (1949) were all written in this vein. This adulatory attitude toward Israeli society metamorphosed into a critical one in the novels *ha-Gevul* (1966; The border) and *Yonah Be-Hazer Zarah* (1975; Pigeon in a strange yard). Shamir's early embrace of Marxism influenced the underlying themes of class conflict in many of his historical novels, such as *Melekh Basar Va-Dam* (1954; *The King of Flesh and Blood* [1958]) and *Kivsat ha-Rash* (1956; *David's Stranger* [1964]).

Following the 1967 Arab–Israel War, Shamir helped found the Greater Land of Israel movement, advocating the retention of all captured land west of the Jordan River. In 1973 he joined the Likud Party under Menachem Begin but then switched to the right-wing Tehiyah Party to protest the conclusion of a peace treaty with Egypt. He served as a member of the ninth Knesset (Israel's parliament) from 1977 to 1981.

While continuing to publish novels (*Playboys* [1986], *To the End* [1991], and *Ya'ir Avraham Shtern* [2000]), Shamir in recent years has also written critiques of Israeli literature (*Personal View* [1987], *The Seed Carriers* [1989], *For and Against* [1989], and *Filling the Gap* [1999]), of Israeli politics (*The Red Thread* [1987]), studies of Jewish identity (*Searchlight to the Depth* [1996]) and one book calling for a Zionist renaissance (*The Green Place* [1991]).

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ANN KAHN
UPDATED BY DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

SHAMIR, YITZHAK

[1915–]

Israeli prime minister, 1983–1984, 1986–1992.

Shamir, whose name means "hard stone," was born Yitzhak Yzernitsky in 1915 in Rozhnoï, eastern Poland, to leftist parents. He emigrated in 1935 to Mandatory Palestine, where he studied briefly at the Hebrew University. In 1937 he joined the Irgun Zva'i Le'umi (IZL) in Tel Aviv, where, under the code name "Nissan," he participated in terrorist attacks and reprisals against the Arab population and British interests. In 1940, after the IZL decided to stop all operations against the British and join them in their fight against Nazi Germany, Shamir joined the "IZL in Israel" (Hebrew: Etzel be-Yisrael; acronym: IZL Beth), a splinter group headed by Abraham Stern that rejected any cease-fire with the British occupation forces in Palestine. During that time, the group also tried unsuccessfully to establish relations with the Third Reich.

Shamir was captured by the British police in December 1941 and incarcerated in the Mazra prison camp, from which he escaped in August 1942. With the remnants of the IZL Beth, he created the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (Hebrew: Lohamei Herut Yisrael; acronym: LEHI) which he led with Natan Yellin-Mor and Israel Eldad. As chief of operations, Shamir organized several major terrorist attacks against British targets, notably, in September 1944 in Cairo, the assassination of Walter Edward Guinness, Lord Moyne, the British minister of state. Arrested again in June 1946, he was deported to a prison camp in Asmara, Eritrea, and a year later escaped to the colony of French Somaliland (now Djibouti), where he became a political refugee.

A former member of the Lohamei Herut Yisrael and the Mossad, Yitzhak Shamir became Israel's prime minister after the retirement of Menachem Begin in 1983. Shamir served a second term from 1986 until 1992, when his Likud Party was defeated in the general elections. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

In May 1948 Shamir returned to the newly proclaimed State of Israel where, with the disbanded

LEHI leaders and activists, he formed the political party "Fighters List"—but not before directing several LEHI operations in Jerusalem, including the assassination, in September 1948, of the UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte, which prompted David Ben-Gurion's government to outlaw the LEHI as a terrorist organization. This did not prevent the Fighters List from gaining one seat in the 1949 Knesset elections. During the party's convention in 1949, Shamir supported its nationalist platform, which contained also elements of a socialist-Marxist ideology. He later adopted liberal views.

Engaged in private business until 1955, Shamir was thereafter recruited by the Mossad as head of the Israeli intelligence agency's special operations in Europe. When Mossad director Isser Harel retired and was replaced by Meir Amit, Shamir left the service and returned to private business. In 1970, at age fifty-five, he joined the Herut party (later to become the Likud), becoming its director of organization. He was elected to the Knesset in 1974 and became chairman of the Likud in 1975. When the Likud under Menachem Begin came to power in 1977, Shamir became speaker of the Knesset. When Moshe Dayan resigned as foreign minister in March 1980, Shamir replaced him. The Kahan Commission, appointed in 1982 to investigate the massacres in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, reprimanded Shamir for not having attempted to verify the information about these events given him by the deputy defense minister.

With the retirement of Prime Minister Begin, Shamir was regarded as his natural successor, and he became prime minister on 15 September 1983. After the 1984 general elections, he formed a National Unity Government with the Labor party, which won by a narrow majority. As stipulated by the coalition agreement, he switched roles as foreign minister, deputy prime minister, and prime minister with Shimon Peres and, accordingly, served as prime minister from 1986 to 1988. In 1988 he won the elections on his own and became prime minister for four more years, again as part of a National Unity Government. The Labor party withdrew from the coalition in 1990 after a dispute with the Likud over the peace process. In 1992 the Likud party, led by Shamir, was defeated and his political career came to an end.

Shamir's tough ideological and political policies were reflected in his steadfast refusal to grant any territorial concessions to the Palestinians and in his support for increased Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. He was in favor of reaching peace agreements with Syria and Jordan but believed these treaties should be based on Israel's territorial gains after the 1967 War. Shamir led the Israeli delegation to the 1991 Madrid Conference, where direct peace talks were held between Israel and its Arab neighbors, including the Palestinians, but he firmly opposed the principle of exchanging land for peace. In a candid interview upon losing office in 1992, Shamir declared that he had displayed "the tactics of moderation" at Madrid, "but without conceding anything on the goal—the integrity of the [greater] Land of Israel." This remark led to accusations that he had been negotiating in bad faith.

Shamir's diplomatic accomplishments while in office included the renewal of diplomatic relations with many countries and the opening of relations with the Soviet Union and China. Shamir advocated using a strong hand against the 1987–1991 Intifada and refused to set limits on new construction of Israeli settlements, even at the risk of losing the U.S. loan guarantees that he needed to absorb the large numbers of Jewish immigrants coming from the Soviet Union. His policies as prime minister demonstrated both his determination to preserve the political status quo and his minimal concern with social and economic issues.

See also Begin, Menachem; Bernadotte Folke; Guinness, Walter Edward; Irgun Zva'i Le'umi; Kahan Commission (1983); Likud; Lohamei Herut Yisrael; Madrid Conference; Mossad; Stern, Abraham; Yellin-Mor, Natan.

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Yaakov Shavit
Updated by Charles Enderlin

SHAMLU, AHMAD

[1925–2000]

Leading Iranian exponent of the "new poetry"; editor and translator.

Ahmad Shamlu was born in Tehran in 1925, the son of a military officer. Although he never finished high school, he became one of Iran's foremost poets during the second half of the twentieth century. He also was the editor of several literary journals and translated some thirty-five works of poetry and prose into Persian. The late 1950s through the 1960s marked Shamlu's most productive years as a politically concerned, modernist poet. In his poetry, he comes close to rejecting the bases of Persian verse: rhythms and metrical patterns.

In 1977, exasperated with life under the regime of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shamlu left Iran for foreign exile. He returned to Tehran in early 1979, full of optimism about the new social order emerging in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. He founded a weekly called *Ketab-e Jom'eh,* which the Islamic republic banned a year later. His collected poems were published in Germany during the mid-1980s.

In April 1990, at the University of California at Berkeley during an extended stay in the United States for health reasons, Shamlu delivered a controversial lecture in the field of Persian literature. He attacked Ferdowsi (940–1020), author of Iran's national epic, the *Shahnameh* (Book of kings, c. 1010), as a feudal writer perpetuating royalist myths. Hundreds of responses to Shamlu's speech subsequently appeared in Persian publications throughout the world.

See also Iranian Revolution (1979); Literature: Persian; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza.

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Michael C. Hillmann
Updated by Eric Hooglund

S

(*Continued*)

SHAMMAR

See TRIBES AND TRIBALISM: SHAMMAR

SHAMMAS, ANTON

[1950–]

Israeli Palestinian novelist, poet, journalist, translator, and nonfiction writer.

Anton Shammas was born to a Christian family in Fassuta, Galilee; he defines himself as an atheist, as a Palestinian citizen of Israel, and as one who identifies with Islamic culture. He studied art history and English and Arabic literature at Hebrew University of Jerusalem from 1968 to 1972, edited the literary journal *al-Sharq* from 1970 to 1975, and produced Arabic television shows in Israel from 1976 to 1986 at the same time that he worked as a freelance journalist.

Shammas writes in Hebrew and English, and his works are characterized by an attempt to challenge the definition and test the tolerance of the Israeli discourse from within the Hebrew language. His highly praised first novel *Arabeshot* (1986; *Arabesques,* 1988) was written in Hebrew and deals with the residents of his native village and, more specifically, with the Shammas family. Interwoven with their lives are historical events and associations that highlight the conditions of the Arabs residing in Israel.

He moved to the United States in 1987 and has been teaching at the University of Michigan since 1988.

See also HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM.

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ANN KAHN
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

SHAPIRA, HAYYIM MOSHE

[1902–1970]

Israeli political leader; active in the Ze'irei ha-Mizrahi Zionist movement.

Born in Russia, Hayyim Moshe Shapira studied at the Grodno Yeshiva in Russia and at the Hildesheimer Rabbinical Seminary in Berlin. He attended the fourteenth Zionist Congress and later was elected to the Zionist General Council as a representative of ha Poʿel ha-Mizrahi. In 1925, he emigrated to Palestine, where he became a leader in the Zionist Executive.

After the Anschluss of Austria and Germany in 1938, Shapira went to evacuate Austrian Jews to Palestine. Throughout his life, he sought to facilitate the emigration of religious Jews to Israel. From the time the state of Israel was proclaimed in 1948 until his death, Shapira was a minister in the Israeli cabinet as part of the National Religious party.

BRYAN DAVES

SHARABATI, AHMAD AL-

[1905–]

Syrian politician.

Ahmad al-Sharabati, the son of nationalist Damascene merchant Uthman al-Sharabati, studied engineering at the American University of Beirut and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He started his career by running a tobacco factory for his father and later became involved in the import trade, especially of motor vehicles. His political career started in the early 1930s when he joined the National Action League, a pan-Arabist movement that was anticommunist. Harassed by the French Mandatory authorities in Syria, Sharabati fled to Transjordan (now Jordan), where he stayed for several years. In 1943, he became a member of the Syrian parliament, running as a nationalist. In 1945, he became minister of education and then minister of national economy in the ministry of Faris al-Khuri. After his resignation from the cabinet that year, in 1946 he was appointed minister of national defense in the cabinet of Jamil Mardam. In 1948 he resigned as a result of the poor performance of the Syrian army in the Arab-Israel War. In 1951, he was implicated in a conspiracy against Adib Shishakli, the military ruler in Syria, and was sentenced to two years and four months in prison.

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ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

SHAʿRAWI, HUDA AL-

[1879–1947]

Egyptian feminist.

A native of Minya, Huda al-Shaʿrawi was born to a prominent and prosperous politician-landowner and a Circassian mother. She was raised in an elite household, where domestic life was still centered on the cloistered *harim* (harem), although transitionally so during the late nineteenth century. She describes this experience in her memoirs, dictated to her secretary during the 1940s but published only in 1981; this section of the memoir has appeared in English as *Harem Years.* Shaʿrawi grew up studying with tutors at home, as was typical for elite girls of the time, and was taught in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and French. Her marriage to her much older cousin and guardian, Ali Shaʿrawi, also a prominent politician, was arranged by the family and took place when she was thirteen. Some seven years later she managed to obtain a separation. Her interest in women's issues developed gradually out of her experiences and her awareness of women's activism in Europe. She was one of the founders of the 1914 Intellectual Association of Egyptian Women. As a wealthy patron as well as an organizer, she was active in charity organizing, a province open to upper-class women. But Shaʿrawi was unusual in moving from behind-the-scenes work into a highly visible, public political role. She spearheaded the Wafdist Women's Central Committee (1919) and was a leader of the famous first women's nationalist demonstration in March 1919. However, disagreement over women's appropriate political roles and particularly over whether women's demands should be admitted to discussions leading to the Egyptian constitution caused a rift with the Wafd, Egypt's nationalist party. Shaʿrawi went on to found, with a group of women, al-Ittihad al-nisa'i al-Misri (Egyptian Feminist Union; EFU) in 1923. She presided over it until her death. The EFU founded two journals, the French-language *L'Egyptienne* (1925), for which Shaʿrawi wrote editorials, and *al-Misriyya* in Arabic over a decade later (1937), when a broader audience fueled the need for a journal in the in-

digenous language. Shaʿrawi's writing appeared here, too, though she probably played less of a role in the journal. Shaʿrawi and two colleagues attended the 1923 International Women Suffrage Alliance in Rome and was responsible for a famous symbolic moment when, on her return, she publicly lifted her veil at Cairo's main railway station. She gradually became more involved in regional and international feminist organizing, becoming vice president of the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship in 1935 and leading a move to found the Arab Feminist Union in 1945.

See also Arab Feminist Union; Circassians; Egypt; Egyptian Feminist Union; Gender: Gender and Education; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Wafdist Women's Central Committee.

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David Waldner
Updated by Marilyn Booth

SHAʿRAWI, MUHAMMAD MUTWALLI AL-

[1911–1998]

Egyptian cleric.

Muhammad Mutwalli al-Shaʿrawi was born in Daqadus, Egypt, in 1911. He originally wanted to devote his career to farming, but his father encouraged him to study in Cairo. In 1937 he joined the faculty of Arabic language of al-Azhar. He was active in student politics and served time in jail. Shaʿrawi came to prominence as a cleric during the presidency of Anwar al-Sadat. He was famous for his utilization of modern media (television, audio- and videocassettes, pamphlets, and books) to disseminate his religious message. He was a firm believer in Islamic fundamentalism, but did not address political questions directly for fear of embarrassing his friend and protector, Sadat. He served as minister of Waqf from 1976 to 1978, but he was more famous for his televised religious sermons. As minister, he was behind the establishment of the Faysal Bank, the first Islamic bank in Egypt. Shaʿrawi never wavered from his loyalty to Sadat, which led his critics to accuse him of serving as the "sultan's cleric." Shaʿrawi has been credited (or blamed) for convincing a few well-known Egyptian actresses and singers—most famously, Shadya and Shams al-Barudi—to veil themselves and withdraw from show business.

See also Sadat, Anwar al-.

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Asʿad AbuKhalil

SHAREF, ZE'EV

[1906–1984]

Israeli political leader.

Having emigrated from Romania in 1924, Ze'ev Sharef became secretary of the central committee of the Haganah. After Israeli statehood he served in various capacities in the government, including as secretary of the political department of the Jewish Agency, secretary of the Emergency Committee and the National Administration (which established the Israeli civil service), and secretary of the Cabinet from 1948 to 1957.

Sharef played a unique role in Israeli history by transporting the Proclamation of Statehood from the Jewish National Fund Building (where it was typed) to David Ben-Gurion at the Tel Aviv Museum on the afternoon the State of Israel was declared, 14 May 1948. After Ben-Gurion read the Proclamation Sharef read out the names of the members of the National Council to sign the document.

From 1948 to 1957 Sharef was the first secretary of the Israeli government. From 1957 to 1959 he was director general of the Prime Minister's Office. He served as director of state revenues, and administrator of the Weizmann Institute. From 1965 to 1974 he was a member of the Knesset, serving as minister of commerce and industry in 1966, as minister of finance in 1968, and as minister of housing from 1969 to 1974.

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Bryan Daves
Updated by Gregory S. Mahler

SHARETT, MOSHE

[1894–1965]

Israel's first foreign minister and second prime minister.

Moshe Sharett was born Moshe Shertok. His family migrated from Russia to Palestine in 1906. He attended school in Herzliyya and Tel Aviv, and after graduating in 1913, he entered the University of Istanbul to study law. When World War I broke out, he was drafted into the Turkish army.

At the end of the war, Sharett attended the London School of Economics, graduating in 1924. He returned to Palestine and became a journalist; from 1929 to 1931 he was editor of *Davar,* a daily newspaper in Tel Aviv.

In 1931 Sharett became political secretary of the Jewish Agency Executive. In 1935 he was named director of its political department, and began laying the foundations for what was later to become Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sharett had a long-time working partnership with David Ben-Gurion in the Jewish Agency Executive, and after 1948, in Israel's first cabinets.

In 1946 he participated unofficially in talks in London to negotiate Zionist goals. Sharett was a representative of the Jewish Agency in the 1947 negotiations with the United Nations (UN) Special Committee on Palestine. He sought UN support for the creation of an independent state for the Jews in Palestine. In December 1947 he was among Jewish leaders lobbying for American support in the UN.

Moshe Sharett (1894–1965) in the 1950s. Sharett was an influential member of the Zionist movement and played an important role in the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. He was Israel's first foreign minister, and in January 1954 became the second man to serve as premier. **© Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

In May 1948, Sharett (who had hebraized the name Shertok at the time of the creation of the state of Israel) was named foreign minister in the Jewish provisional administration. In that capacity he negotiated support for Israel's statehood with U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall.

Once the state of Israel was in existence, Sharett became its first foreign minister, a position he held until 1956. In that post he emphasized that proceeds from the sale of lands belonging to absentee Arabs would be applied to a fund to resettle the refugees elsewhere, not to repatriate them in Israel. He argued that the problems of the Palestinian refugees were just like the problems of refugees around the world. In that sense, there was no legal precedent requiring their repatriation to the lands they had occupied before the war.

In March 1949, Sharett introduced the "principle of nonidentification" to indicate that Israel

would not be aligned with either the East or the West. Israel's intention was to work with all nations to develop peaceful links and support for its existence. By 1951, however, it had become clear that the Soviet Union would support the Arab bloc against Israel, and Israel's foreign policy became clearly aligned with the West.

Prime Minister Ben-Gurion resigned in December 1953, and Sharett became prime minister. In June 1955 his cabinet was overturned by the withdrawal of the General Zionist Party from the coalition. He remained as acting prime minister until the scheduled elections for the third Knesset took place. After the elections, Ben-Gurion returned to the prime ministership with a new cabinet in November 1955.

In 1956 tensions increased between Ben-Gurion and Sharett over the appropriate response to Egypt's actions in and around the Suez Canal. Sharett argued that Israel should act with great restraint, while Ben-Gurion was in favor of a more provocative strategy. When Ben-Gurion felt that the tensions were growing too great, he asked for Sharett's resignation as foreign minister in June 1956, replacing him with Golda Meir.

See also Ben-Gurion, David; Jewish Agency for Palestine; Knesset; Meir, Golda; Newspapers and Print Media: Israel.

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Gregory S. Mahler

SHARIʿA

Arabic for "the trodden path leading to a water hole." In Islam, the regulations of God's law as transmitted through a prophet; the dominant law in Islamic societies.

Muslims, Christians, and Jews each have "a law *(shirʿa)* and a normative way to follow," the Qurʾan attests (verse 48). In the Middle Ages, Islamic discourse referred not only to this strict definition of *Shariʿa* as law but also to all that which Allah has revealed—whether it pertained to actual religious practice or to belief. In Islam, those aspects relating to practice belong to the province of law (*fiqh*); those that concern belief belong to theology *(ilm al-kalam or ilm al-tawhid).* Law, however, depends on theology, since the contents and validity of law rest on textual sources, whose divine origins and truth are known. Furthermore, all sciences that are used to attain a knowledge of law and theology are considered *Shariʿa* sciences, even if their subject matter is not legal or theological. Therefore, the Arabic language, *hadith* (verbal statements of Prophetic traditions), exegesis (interpretations), and even logic are deemed *Shariʿa*—even if designating logic this way has always been controversial.

The use of the term *Shariʿa* has actually, in practice, been restricted to the realm of law, and particularly to those aspects that bear upon the conduct of the individual in both worldly and religious matters. *Shariʿa* may be equated, therefore, with *fiqh* in both its components: (1) positive law *(furu)* and (2) legal theory *(usul).* Positive law delineates legal obligations, ranging from rituals to personal and penal law; contracts; sales; hunting; and more. Legal theory demonstrates how positive law is derived through legal reasoning and interpretation, which results in the law stipulating the legal and moral responsibility thrust upon Muslims.

The legal and moral elements in the *Shariʿa* are evident in the individual rulings classified in accordance with five norms *(ahkam)*: (1) the obligatory *(wajib),* (2) the recommended *(mandub),* (3) the permissible or indifferent *(mubah),* (4) the prohibited *(haram),* and (5) the repugnant *(makruh).* The obligatory represents an act whose performance entails reward and whose omission entails punishment. It is commonly divided into those acts that are binding on all and those that are binding on the Muslim community as a whole but which are discharged once a sufficient number of individuals perform them. The recommended act requires a reward for performance but does not involve a punishment for omission. In the permissible, both omission and commission are equally legitimate. The prohibited is an act that entails punishment upon commission. The repugnant act is rewarded when omitted but not punished when committed.

The nature of reward and punishment supports the permeating moral element in Islamic law. Reward is always bestowed in the hereafter; punishment—in rituals and in several other spheres of the law—is nothing but divine punishment to be meted out at the resurrection. As a comprehensive system of law, imbued with religious mores, the rules of the *Shariʿa* are not always enforceable.

As a system of legal rights and obligations that governs public and private life, *Shariʿa* has always been the dominant law in Islamic societies. No doubt secular organs of justice, such as the early and medieval *mazalim* courts and the *qanun* of the Ottoman Empire, have always supplemented *Shariʿa*; however, their jurisdiction was confined mainly to administrative and penal law, and they were, more often than not, run by *Shariʿa* judges and jurists.

Judges and jurisconsults (muftis) have played the central role of developing *Shariʿa* since the first century of Islam. Immediately after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 C.E., the Qurʾan provided the main source of the law that may be considered Islamic. To be sure, customary Arabian law and the later Umayyad dynasty's administrative practices supplemented Qurʾanic legislation, but these were not yet imbued with a religious character. The Prophet's *sunna* (his utterances and idealized practice as expressed in *hadith*) was to gain importance as a source of law only gradually. It was not until the end of Islam's first century (c. 700 C.E.) that his *sunna* became a source of law, supplementing the Qurʾan and the still prevailing popular and administrative practices of the Umayyads. Islam's second century (ending c. 800 C.E.) witnessed a gradual yet definite process whereby these practices were idealized as the consensus of the geographical schools—a consensus seen to reflect the ideal practice of the Prophet Muhammad and the early caliphs who succeeded him. Thus imbued with a religious element, these practices, expressed through verbal statements of *hadith,* were gradually and constantly projected back to the earlier generations until they have come to be connected with the Prophet himself. By the beginning of Islam's third century (the ninth century C.E.), the process of back-projection was virtually completed, and the law, now elaborated to its fullness, was recognized to have been exclusively derived from the Qurʾan and the *sunna* and sanctioned by the authoritative instrument of consensus *(ijma).*

By the eighth and ninth centuries, the body of *Shariʿa* law was elaborated by a variety of legal schools, ranging from those that resorted to free reasoning and expediency in elaborating their positive law—such as the Hanafi school of law—to those standing on the other end of the spectrum, such as the Zahiris, who interpreted the texts literally. Such radical tendencies and their schools, including the Zahiri, soon disappeared; but liberal tendencies were not sufficient to bring the Hanafi school to extinction. Nevertheless, they had to be rationalized and modified to be admitted by mainstream jurisprudence. A classical example of this process of adjustment may be seen in the concept of *istihsan,* which represented to the eighth-century Hanafis a means of formulating law on the basis of practical considerations, without being restricted by the imperatives of the religious texts. Whereas problems of law solved by *istihsan* were largely accepted, even in later centuries, the procedure of *istihsan* had to be, and indeed was, restructured by the likes of Dabusi and Sarakhsi—this was based on the proposition that the *sunna* and the Qurʾan were the ultimate sources of the law and that no human intervention can be allowed in the unraveling of divine law.

The Sunni schools of law thus came finally to acknowledge a common legal theory, though differences among them continued to exist—partly as a reflection of the legacy they inherited from their early development within differing geographical schools. Be that as it may, in addition to the Shiʿa schools, only four Sunni schools survive and they provide, in effect, a comprehensive system of *Shariʿa.*

Shariʿa continued to dominate the life of Muslims until the nineteenth century, when, because of influences and pressures from the West, changes in the law were deemed necessary. Formally, the most notable legal change was the introduction of the code system, which was foreign to *Shariʿa,* a law based on interpretation of religious doctrine. Substantively, several attempts were made to wholly substitute European codes for a number of *Shariʿa* laws. Thus, during the Ottoman Empire, commercial and penal codes based on their French counterparts were promulgated in 1850 and 1858, respectively. A more important codification of this period was the Mejelle (1876), which represented the first attempt ever to codify Islamic law. Selectively codified, Hanafi law was restricted to contracts, some

torts, and a law of procedure. The last part, however, was soon replaced by the Code of Civil Procedure (1880), again based on French law.

A more drastic set of reforms was adopted in Egypt in 1875. In addition to new penal, commercial, and procedural codes based on French law, a new court structure was introduced. It incorporated into the Egyptian court system the Mixed Courts, with a majority of non-Egyptian judges, one of whom presided over the bench.

In 1917, the first attempt at reforming family law was made by the Ottomans, without resorting to European codes. It promulgated the *Ottoman Law of Family Rights,* which regulated matters of personal status and was based on a comprehensive amalgamation of legal doctrines belonging to the Maliki, Shafiʿi, and Hanbali schools of law, and sometimes weak authorities from the Hanafi school. One of the main concerns in this promulgation was the improvement of the legal status of married women.

Legal reforms, introduced by national legislation, have become an ongoing process in the Muslim states since the beginning of the twentieth century (based on Sunni and Shiʿite principles). In these reforms, *Shariʿa* law was to some extent preserved in the area of family matters, but even here it was applied in a new system of courts and administered through a modern law of procedure. With these sweeping changes, the officials of the traditional court virtually disappeared, and the traditional role of the qadi (judge) has been drastically diminished.

See also Fiqh; Hadith; Hanafi School of Law; Hanbali School of Law; Maliki School of Law; Mixed Courts; Muhammad; Qanun; Qurʾan; Shafiʿi School of Law.

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Wael B. Hallaq

SHARIʿATI, ALI

[1933–1977]

Iranian Islamic ideologue, whose lectures and writings on secularly educated youth helped prepare the way for the Islamic Revolution of 1978/79.

Ali Shariʿati was born in the village of Mazinan in northeastern Iran but soon moved with his father, Mohammad Taqi Shariʿati, a reformist cleric of Islam, to the city of Mashhad. There he attended high school and teachers' training college as well as pursuing a religious education under the aegis of his father. He then began working as a teacher, studying at the same time at the Mashhad Faculty of Letters and beginning his long career of oppositional activity; his first arrest came in 1957. After a year's delay, he was permitted to travel to Paris in 1960 for his doctoral studies. While in France, he came under the influence of scholars and thinkers, such as Louis Massignon and Jacques Berque, became politically involved in the struggle for Algerian independence and the organization of Iranian students in Europe, and, most importantly, acquired the ideological orientation that was essential to his thought.

Immediately on his return to Iran in 1964, Shariʿati was arrested and detained for several months before being allowed to take up a post at the University of Mashhad. His tenure there was short-lived, and it was outside the academic environment that he exercised the greatest influence. Moving to Tehran, he began lecturing on Islam in a variety of settings, most importantly the Hosayniyeh-ye Ershad, a modernist religious institution established in 1969 that attracted large crowds to its functions. Shariʿati's name became virtually synonymous with the institution, and when it was closed by the government in 1973, he was arrested for a third time. Released in 1975, he spent two years under house arrest in his native village before being allowed to

leave for England. He died there on 19 June 1977, soon after his arrival, under circumstances that led to widespread suspicion of involvement by the Iranian secret police. His body was taken to Damascus for burial.

Central to Shariʿati's understanding and presentation of Islam were an emphasis on the social and civilizational functions of religion; an impatience with the niceties and abstractions of traditional Iranian Islamic culture; and a bold if often unconvincing use of themes and terms eclectically derived from non-Islamic sources. His legacy has been varyingly assessed in postrevolutionary Iran, being sometimes denounced for its syncretic nature and its implicitly anticlerical message.

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Hamid Algar

SHARIATMADARI, KAZEM

[1904–1986]

One of Iran's most important clerics.

Ayatollah Sayyid Kazem Shariatmadari, born in Azerbaijan, was a *marja al-taqlid* (source of emulation) from 1962 until his death in 1986.

Ayatollah Shariatmadari was not inclined to political activism. But throughout the Pahlavi period, the scholars affiliated with his Center for Islamic Study and Publication rivaled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's more activist followers. Shariatmadari was briefly imprisoned in 1963, following the June uprisings. In general, he viewed the Pahlavi regime as dictatorial and favored restoration of constitutional rule in Iran. With the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Shariatmadari again called for restraint and the rule of law, denouncing the revolutionary tribunals and summary executions of the early days of the revolution. He also confronted the regime on the issue of a referendum to decide the form of the post-Pahlavi state. Rather than a simple vote of yes or no on an Islamic republic, Shariatmadari, as well as most secular parties, supported at the least a choice between an Islamic, democratic, or just simple and plain republic. Shariatmadari was also associated with the Islamic People's Republican party (IPRP), the main contender to Khomeini's Islamic Republican party. The IPRP favored collective rule of the *ulama* (Islamic clergy), a more democratic constitution, and an elected rather than an appointed assembly of experts empowered to draft the constitution of the nascent Islamic republic. The IPRP was dissolved in 1980, over the first presidential elections, a victory for Khomeini and the Islamic Republican party.

Shariatmadari continued to oppose the excesses of the Khomeini regime and, in 1982, was implicated in a coup against the Islamic republic, organized by Sadeq Qotbzadeh, was stripped of his title of *marja al-taqlid,* and was placed under house arrest, where he remained a marginal player in the political life of his country until his death in 1986.

See also Khomeini, Ruhollah; Marja al-Taqlid; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza; Qotbzadeh, Sadeq.

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Neguin Yavari

SHARIF

An Arabic word that literally means "noble" or "illustrious," especially by virtue of one's lineage.

In the first few centuries of the Muslim era, *sharif* (pl., *ashraf* or *shurafa*) was used to refer to members of the prominent Arab families that made up the typically landed aristocracy of the expanding Muslim domains. Much like its rough equivalent *sayyid,* however, use of *sharif* as an honorific was gradually limited to scions of the clan of the prophet Muhammad (that is, the Banu Hashim), and eventually was further restricted to Muhammad's direct descendants through his grandsons Hasan and Husayn. In Mecca, Medina, and their environs, the custom developed of applying the title *sharif* almost exclusively to descendants of Hasan, with *sayyid* referring to descendents of Husayn. Under Ottoman rule the se-

nior member of the Arabian sharifs was recognized as the semiautonomous governor of Mecca and the keeper of its sacred sanctuary.

See also MUHAMMAD.

SCOTT ALEXANDER

SHARIF, AZIZ

[1904–]

Iraqi politician.

Born in Ana and educated at Baghdad Law College, Aziz Sharif founded the People's Party in 1943 and subsequently joined the Communist Party. He was a candidate member of its central committee (1958–1963), and secretary-general of the Partisans of Peace, a pro-Soviet umbrella organization. Sharif was minister of justice under the Baʿth government (1970–1971) and a key intermediary in the Baʿth-Kurdish negotiations. Sharif served as minister without portfolio until 1976.

MARION FAROUK-SLUGLETT
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

SHARIF-EMAMI, JAʿFAR

[1910–1998]

Iranian prime minister and statesman.

Jaʿfar Sharif-Emami was the son of Hajj Mohammad Hasan (known as Sharif), a member of the religious establishment who worked as an aide to Sayyid Mohammad Emami, the leader of Friday prayers in Tehran. Sharif-Emami attended college in Germany and worked at the Railroad Office of the Ministry of Roads. In 1943 the British forces accused him of belonging to a German fifth column in Iran and incarcerated him for one year. He was elected to the senate as a deputy from Tehran in 1953 and became minister of industries and mines in 1957 and prime minister in 1960. In 1961 he was made head of the Pahlavi Foundation, the largest corporation in the country; he amassed a great fortune in that capacity. In 1962 he also was appointed speaker of the senate. It was widely believed that Sharif-Emami led the German Freemasonry Lodge in Iran. In an effort to quell the Islamic Revolution by choosing a leader with some degree of credibility with the clerical establishment, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi reappointed him premier in August 1978. Sharif-Emami failed in his mandate, however, and the military government of General Gholam Reza Azhari was declared in November 1978. Sharif-Emami left Iran in 1979 and died in New York on 16 June 1998.

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NEGUIN YAVARI

SHARIFIAN DYNASTIES

Rulers of Morocco since the sixteenth century, when the modern principle was first established that they be sharifs—descendants of the prophet Muhammad, founder of Islam.

The cult of the Sharif was introduced in Morocco under Idris II in the early ninth century but went into abeyance. Sharifism became established in Morocco as a response to the crises of the sixteenth century—occasioned by Christian efforts to extend the *reconquista* (reconquest) of the Iberian Peninsula into Morocco; large-scale tribal migrations in North Africa; the fragmentation of the Moroccan polity following the decline of the Merinid dynasty; the rise of regional Sufi powers; and the conquest of Algeria in 1517 by the Ottoman Empire.

Both the Saʿdians (1548–1641) and the Alawi (1668–present) were Alids, and traced their descent to Muhammad through his son-in-law Ali, but they were Sunni rather than followers of Shiʿism. Both assembled powerful political coalitions that combined tribal solidarities, rural Sufism, and Sharifism. Both rose to power after first securing control over southern Morocco and then conquered the cities and Atlantic plains. Both were responses to the long-term crisis of legitimization caused by the fragmentation of Islam's power in the Maghrib (North Africa) and al-Andalus (Iberian province) and especially to the threat posed by the Spanish and Portuguese, who had driven the Moors from the Iberian Peninsula and unified their countries under Catholic monarchs.

The Saʿdians emerged in the period 1514–1548 as opponents of the Portuguese in southern Morocco

and revivers of Islam. Under Muhammad al-Shaykh, they defeated the reigning Wattasids, conquered Fez and Marrakech, and stabilized Morocco's frontiers at roughly their present borders. Under Ahmad al-Mansur (1578–1603), the state was reorganized along Ottoman principles, including notably a force of musketeers, financed by the production of sugar for export on royal estates. The conquest of Timbuktu in 1591 briefly gave Morocco direct access to the salt and gold of the sub-Saharan zone. With the help of an alliance with Elizabethan merchant adventurers, the Saʿdians were able to defeat the Iberians and confine them to a few coastal enclaves. Following the death of Ahmad in 1603, the Saʿdians went into a long decline, as the result of dynastic conflict, a resurgence of Iberian threat, and the reemergence of regional power centers of which the *zawiya* (community) of Dila in the Middle Atlas mountains and the Andalusian corsair republic of Sala were the most important.

The rise of the Alawis, cousins of the Saʿdians, took place under Muhammad al-Sharif and Rashid, who were able to defeat the Dila Marabouts and assert their control over Morocco by 1668. The consolidator of the dynasty was Ismaʿil (1672–1727), a remarkable ruler who by incessant warfare and systematic organization was able to bring the disparate regions of the state under control. Ismaʿil restructured the army around a contingent of musket-wielding black slaves, defeated the Sufi brotherhoods, and imposed a system of heavy taxation. He expelled foreign occupiers, notably the Spanish from Larache and the British from Tangier. Henceforth, Moroccan sultans styled themselves as "Commander of the Faithful," an implicit claim to the caliphate otherwise also claimed by the Ottomans. Following Ismaʿil's death, however, the army revolted, and power once again fragmented.

After the turbulent reign of Abdullah, who was deposed five times between 1727 and 1757, the state was reorganized under Muhammad III (1757–1790), the architect of "modern," that is, precolonial, Morocco. By de-emphasizing the tax on agricultural produce and increasing trade (and thus customs revenues), Muhammad III provided an alternate basis for the state finances without disturbing the potentially volatile rural populations. The port of Essaouira was founded in 1767 to place the foreign trade of the Atlantic coast of Morocco under government control.

By emphasizing the religious aspects of his leadership as sultan, caliph, and sharif, Muhammad III sought to counter the reassertion of the maraboutic forces in the countryside. By constant diplomatic negotiation with foreign powers and constant bargaining with local authorities, he devised a precarious balance for the Moroccan state. Its dependence upon foreign commerce made it vulnerable to foreign intervention, however, while the absence of a strong army deprived it of any means to reassert its control over the population.

Under Sulayman (1792–1822) and Abd al-Rahman ibn Hisham (1822–1859), Morocco entered into a precolonial phase, increasingly dependent upon foreign trade and increasingly vulnerable to European pressure, notably signing after 1856 a series of treaties granting most-favored nation status to leading European powers. In retaliation for Moroccan support of the Algerian resistance leader Abd al-Qadir, Moroccan ports were shelled by the French navy, and a Moroccan army was defeated at Isly in 1844. A war with Spain in 1859–1860 over the city of Tetuan was settled only after Morocco agreed to pay a sizable indemnity and make other concessions.

Hassan I (1873–1894) sought to reverse the decline, with mixed results. His military and administrative reforms failed to survive his death, although his adroit diplomacy managed to buy time for Morocco in the face of rising European imperialist ambitions. His successors Abd al-Aziz and Abd al-Hafid also sought to introduce needed reforms and to play off the European powers, but with less success. The Moroccan Question (1900–1912) marks a period of increase in European rivalries over Morocco. In 1912 the Treaty of Fes with France and the Spanish–Moroccan accords marked the formal end of Moroccan independence.

The protectorates of France and Spain lasted from 1912 to 1956. During this period, Moroccan sultans Mulay Youssef (1912–1927) and Muhammad V (1927–1961) were formally incorporated into the French colonial administration, their titles confirmed, but their powers largely alienated to the European occupiers and their local Moroccan agents

through a factional delegation. With the rise of nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s, Muhammad V began increasingly to show his sympathy for the nationalists. In 1946 he publicly broke with the French and assumed leadership of the nationalist movement.

Since 1956, independent Morocco has continued to be governed by the Alawite dynasty. The present sultan, Hassan II, assumed power in 1961 upon the death of his father.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn al-Hassan; Abd al-Hafid ibn al-Hassan; Abd al-Qadir; Abd al-Rahman ibn Hisham; Alawi; Alawite Dynasty; Fes, Treaty of (1912); Hassan I; Hassan II; Moroccan Question; Muhammad; Muhammad V; Sufism and the Sufi Orders; Suleiman, Mulay; Youssef, Mulay.

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Edmund Burke III

SHARIF OF MECCA

The local, hereditary rulers of Mecca from about 965 to 1916.

Although the sharifs never enjoyed complete independence from distant powers, their remoteness from the imperial capitals of Cairo and Constantinople (now Istanbul) helped them maintain effective rule in Mecca, as did their claimed descent from the prophet Muhammad. The last sharif, Husayn ibn Ali (1852–1931), tried to establish an independent Arabian kingdom, leading the Arab Revolt in 1916 against the Turks in the Hijaz, but he was overthrown by the Saudis in 1925. Founder of the modern Arab Hashimite dynasty, Husayn died in Amman, the capital of his son Abdullah, then ruler of Transjordan (now Jordan). His third son, Faisal I, founded the royal line of Iraq.

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Arab Revolt (1916); Faisal I ibn Hussein; Hashimite House (House of Hashim); Husayn ibn Ali.

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Khalid Y. Blankinship

SHARIF, OMAR

[1932–]

Egyptian movie star.

The son of a wealthy merchant of Lebanese descent, Omar (also Umar) Sharif was born Michel Chalhoub on 10 April 1932. Educated at Victoria College in Alexandria, he converted from Christianity to Islam and changed his name to Omar Sharif before making his Egyptian film debut in *The Blazing Sun* in 1953. Between 1953 and 1958, he appeared in twenty-four Arabic-language films. On the set of his first film, Sharif became bored during the long pauses between his scenes and took up the game of bridge to while away the time. Sharif became internationally known after playing a lead role in the film *Lawrence of Arabia,* a part for which he received an Academy Award nomination for best supporting actor. Sharif has appeared in many English-language films, including *Doctor Zhivago* and *Funny Girl.* He won the Golden Lion lifetime achievement award for fifty years in films in 2003 after a comeback in the film *Mr. Ibrahim,* in which he plays the role of an old Arab man in Paris who adopts a young Jewish boy. He also pursued his interest in bridge, becoming one of the world's leading authorities on the game and authoring several books on the subject.

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David Waldner
Updated by Roxanne Varzi

SHARJAH

One of seven shaykhdoms making up the United Arab Emirates.

Sharjah is the third largest emirate in the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), with an area of 1,000 square miles. Seventy-five percent of its 400,000 inhabitants (2001 estimate) live in the capital city of the same name on the Persian Gulf coast, just north of Dubai. Three exclaves on the Gulf of Oman coast—Dibba, Kalba, and Khor Fakkan—belong to Sharjah and make it the only one of the seven emirates to share borders with all the others. It has the extreme summer heat and aridity of its neighbors, but agriculture is possible in the Dhayd Oasis and in the exclave territories.

In the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Sharjah and its northern neighbor, Ra's al-Khayma, formed the most powerful state of the lower Gulf under the al-Qasimi family, which is still the ruling clan in each emirate. The al-Qasimi state was defeated by Britain in an 1819 naval battle. Subsequently, the al-Qasimi ruler signed the General Treaty of Peace (1820), which began the process by which the area became a protectorate of Britain. During the 1840s and 1850s the al-Qasimi gradually were eclipsed by the Banu Yas tribal confederation of Abu Dhabi—then, as now, led by the Al Nahayyan family. Following the death of Shaykh Sultan bin Saqr al-Qasimi, one of his sons set up an "independent" state at Ra'x al-Khayma; this state formally split from Sharjah in 1869, but it did not gain formal British recognition as a separate emirate until 1921.

Sharjah enjoyed moderate prosperity in the early twentieth century, boosted by the presence of a Royal Air Force base from the 1930s until 1955. In the early 1950s Sharjah's creek became silted, and with the decline of maritime commerce, it lost its position of importance in the lower Gulf. In 1971, on the eve of independence, Britain pressured Sharjah to agree to shared sovereignty with Iran of the island of Abu Musa. This agreement precipitated a coup attempt in Sharjah (1972) during which the ruler, Shaykh Khalid ibn Muhammad, was killed.

Oil and gas discoveries in 1973 and 1980 brought prosperity, as did the development of several factories in a specially created industrial zone in the western part of Sharjah city. Sharjah also has developed a successful tourist industry. Reflecting the academic bent of the ruler, who holds a doctorate from Exeter University, Sharjah leads the U.A.E. in the development of arts, literature, and museums.

See also Abu Musa Island; Qasimi Family of Sharjah, al-; United Arab Emirates.

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Malcolm C. Peck
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SHARM AL-SHAYKH

Strategic town opposite Tiran island, near the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula.

The cove and town of Sharm al-Shaykh control maritime access to the Strait of Tiran from the Gulf of Aqaba. In 1954 Egypt fortified the cove to block Israeli shipping from the port of Elat, but in the Arab–Israel War (1956) Israel captured it along with the rest of the peninsula. The United States later persuaded Israel to withdraw its forces in return for assurances of free passage through the Tiran Strait. When the Sinai was restored to Egyptian control in 1957, the United Nations Emergency Force was based at Sharm al-Shaykh until 1967, when Egypt asked it to leave. Its removal was one of the events precipitating the 1967 Arab–Israel War. Occupied by Israel during that conflict, the site became the Israeli naval and air base of Ophira. Restored to Egypt in 1982, the town has become a major tourist resort and frequently serves as the site of high-profile meetings of Middle Eastern and world leaders, notably the Antiterrorism Summit of 1996 and one phase of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in 2000.

See also Aqaba, Gulf of; Arab–Israel War (1956); Arab–Israel War (1967); Tiran, Strait of.

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Zachary Karabell
Updated by Arthur Goldschmidt

SHARON, ARIEL

[1928–]

Israeli prime minister and army commander.

Ariel Sharon was born on 27 February 1928 into a family of stubbornly independent pioneer farmers in Kfar Malal. He joined the Haganah in 1945 and took part in the 1948 Arab–Israel War as a platoon commander and intelligence officer. He served in Jerusalem and the northern Negev, making his mark as an inspirational leader. In 1952 he formed Unit 101, a special commando force geared for unconventional retaliatory operations in enemy territory. In 1953 it raided the Palestinian village of Qibya, destroying forty-five houses and killing sixty-nine villagers, half of them women and children. Unit 101 set the standard for the elite commando units of the Israel Defense Force (IDF). In 1954 it was integrated into the paratroop regiment, with Sharon as commander. In 1956 he was appointed to command a paratroop corps, which executed Israel's defense strategy of inflicting retaliatory blows more severe than the original provocations.

Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon (b. 1928) is a veteran of the Israeli military and achieved his first seat in government in 1973. He was elected prime minister in a special election on 6 February 2001. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Sharon's performance as military strategist during the 1956 Arab-Israel War earned him a reputation as one of IDF's most brilliant field commanders. At the same time, his activism made him a controversial figure and drew criticism from his superiors. He disobeyed orders and sent paratroopers into the Mitla Pass, deep in the Sinai desert. This ended disastrously, with thirty-eight Israelis dead. As a major general commanding an armored division during the 1967 Arab-Israel War, Sharon revealed a new talent for orchestrating huge, set-piece battles. In 1969 he was appointed chief of the Southern Command. He ruthlessly demolished thousands of homes in Gaza refugee camps to open roads for antiterror patrols, and deported hundreds of young men to Jordan and Lebanon. The number of sabotage attacks dropped dramatically.

Sharon retired from the army in June 1972 after he recognized that he was not going to be promoted chief of the general staff. He entered politics as a member of the Liberal party and was influential in merging it with the right-wing Herut and two smaller parties to form the Likud. He was called back to military service for the 1973 Arab–Israel War, during which he led Israeli forces in penetrating Egyptian defenses to cross the Suez Canal. During this period, in a bitter dispute with the military high command over tactics, he was accused of insubordination but was not relieved of his command. Elected in December 1973 to the Knesset, he resigned after a year to accept an emergency appointment with the IDF. From June 1975 to March 1976, he served as Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's special adviser on terrorism. He founded a new political party, Shlomzion, which gained two Knesset seats in the 1977 elections. Shortly thereafter, he rejoined the Likud, which had won the elections, and was appointed minister of agriculture.

Sharon spearheaded Jewish settlement expansion in the occupied territories. Yet he supported returning Sinai to Egypt under the 1979 peace treaty and initiated and administered the destruction of the Jewish settlements there. In 1981 he was

appointed defense minister in Menachem Begin's government. He planned and led Israel's invasion of Lebanon, which began in June 1982, and was accused of extending the war's objectives far beyond those originally approved by the government. The war destroyed the Palestine Liberation Organization's infrastructure and drove its leaders into exile in Tunis, but it left Israeli troops mired in guerrilla warfare in Lebanon for the next eighteen years. The Kahan Commission concluded that Sharon was culpable for not preventing the slaughter of hundreds of Palestinians by Israel's Lebanese Christian allies at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. As a consequence, he was forced to resign the defense ministry but allowed to remain in the cabinet. In 1984, and again in 1988, he was appointed industry and trade minister in a National Unity government. From 1990 to 1992 he served as housing and construction minister under Yitzhak Shamir and as chairman of the ministerial committee on immigration and absorption. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, he built homes for hundreds of thousands of immigrants.

When the Likud returned to office, Benjamin Netanyahu appointed Sharon national infrastructure minister in 1996, and foreign minister two years later. Following the election of Labor's Ehud Barak as prime minister in May 1999, Sharon succeeded Netanyahu as Likud leader. His visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem in September 2000 sparked Muslims riots, which grew into a second, more bloody, Palestinian intifada.

Sharon was elected prime minister in February 2001 following the collapse of Barak's peace policy and his failure to control the violence. After a suicide bomber killed thirty Jews celebrating Passover in a Netanya resort hotel in March 2002, Sharon invaded and reoccupied West Bank cities, destroying buildings and killing and capturing hundreds of Palestinian fighters. Although the bloodshed continued, albeit on a reduced scale, the voters endorsed his aggressive strategy and confirmed him in the premiership by a landslide in January 2003. Sharon declared the Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat "irrelevant" and isolated him in the ruins of his Ramallah headquarters.

Under United States pressure, Arafat appointed Mahmud Abbas as the first Palestinian prime minister. Sharon opened negotiations with him and accepted a "performance-based road map to a permanent two-state solution," drafted by the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations. Abandoning his earlier contention that "Jordan is Palestine" and that the Jews had a right to all of the land west of the River Jordan, Sharon surprised many observers when he labeled the West Bank and Gaza territories as "occupied" and declared that Israel could not go on ruling 3.5 million Palestinians. After Abbas was replaced by Ahmad Qurai, Sharon gave the new prime minister a chance to prove that he could curb the Palestinian militias and bring the two sides back to the negotiating table. Sharon showed himself more pragmatic than his party, but his premiership was shadowed by police investigations of alleged financial irregularities.

See also Abbas, Mahmud; Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arafat, Yasir; Begin, Menachem; Haganah; Israel; Israeli Settlements; Kahan Commission (1983); Likud; Qurai, Ahmad Sulayman; Sabra and Shatila Massacres.

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Yaakov Shavit
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SHARQI FAMILY, AL-

Ruling family of Fujayra, one of the members of the United Arab Emirates.

Fujayra's ruling family's Sharqiyyin tribe inhabits the Hajjar Mountains and the coastal region of the Shimailiyya district on the Gulf of Oman. The current ruler's family, the Sharqi, came to power in 1876 with the accession of Hamad ibn Abdullah al-Sharqi, who was part of the Qasimi tribal federation that ruled Sharjah. In 1902 the ruler declared independence from Sharjah and was recognized by

the other emirates, but not by Britain. Hamad's son Muhammad continued the family's rule and its insistence on independence, which the British finally recognized in 1952. The current ruler, Hamad ibn Muhammad al-Sharqi, came to power in 1974 after his father's death. Born in 1948, he was educated at Mons Military Academy and Hendon Police College.

See also FUJAYRA.

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SHARQI, HAMAD IBN MUHAMMAD AL-

See SHARQI FAMILY, AL-

SHAS

See ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

SHASHILIK

See FOOD: SHASHILIK

SHATT AL-ARAB

The narrow waterway that forms the southern border between Iran and Iraq.

The Shatt al-Arab, or Arvandrud in Persian, provides Iraq with its only means of access to the Persian Gulf. Issues of joint sovereignty over the waterway have long been a source of contention between Iran and Iraq. In 1975 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran and Vice President Saddam Hussein of Iraq signed the Algiers Agreement, which demarcated the *thalweg* (middle) line along the Shatt al-Arab as the border between the two states. In September 1980 Iraq launched an offensive against the Islamic Republic of Iran, declaring one of its intentions to be the restoration of the Shatt al-Arab to sole Iraqi sovereignty. Hostilities were brought to an end in 1988, but a peace agreement remains to be signed between the two countries. UN Resolution 598 has not been implemented other than to establish a cease-fire; sovereignty of and navigation rights in the Shatt al-Arab remain unresolved. Since Iraq's massive defeat at the hands of the United States in the Gulf War of 1991, borders have reverted to the 1975 demarcations, albeit unofficially.

See also ALGIERS AGREEMENT (1975).

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NEGUIN YAVARI

SHA'UL, ANWAR

[1904–1984]

Iraqi Jewish writer and journalist.

Anwar Shaʾul was born into a Jewish family in the city of al-Hilla in southern Iraq; they moved to Baghdad when he was in his early teens. He studied at the Alliance Israélite Universelle and later obtained a law degree. Between 1924 and 1938 he was a journalist, first editing the Jewish weekly *al-Misbah* (The lantern) and in 1929 launching his own weekly magazine, *al-Hasid* (The reaper).

Shaʾul's knowledge of foreign languages enabled him to translate literary works from English and French. A volume of original and translated fiction appeared in 1922 under the title *al-Hisad al-Awwal* (The first harvest). It was followed in 1955 by *Fi Ziham al-Madina* (In the crowded city) and in 1956 by a volume of poetry, *Hamasat al-Zaman* (Whispers of time).

Shaʾul stayed in Iraq after the mass exodus of its Jewish community in 1951 and 1952. In 1971 he left Baghdad and settled in Kiron, near Tel Aviv. In 1981 he published his collected poetry in *Wa Bazagha Fajr Jadid* (And a new dawn has risen). He also published an autobiography, *Qissat Hayati fi Wadi al-Rafidayn* (My life in Mesopotamia), in 1980.

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SASSON SOMEKH

SHAWA, LAILA

[1940–]

Palestinian artist and illustrator.

A native of Gaza, Laila Shawa (Layla Shawwa) is an oil painter, a silk-screen artist, and an illustrator of children's books who has also done sculpture. She studied in Cairo, at two arts academies in Rome, and in Austria with Oskar Kokoschka. She has also worked on United Nations children's art programs in Gaza. Shawa's famous silk-screen installation *Walls of Gaza* (1992–1995) exemplifies her ongoing interest in political struggle and oppression, and in children who live with war and deprivation. Her photographs of children and graffiti-laden walls in Gaza are juxtaposed on large panels to make the viewer confront the effects of conflict and violence on generations of children. Other works examine breast cancer as a metaphor for other eruptions and invasions, such as the 1991 Gulf War, and atomic bombs, linking the body with the land—a strategy adopted by other Palestinian artists. Shawa's paintings on a variety of subjects, including the restrictions on Middle Eastern women, are reminiscent of Henri Rousseau in style and color. Her works have been exhibited throughout the Middle East, in England, and in the United States.

See also ART; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION.

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JESSICA WINEGAR

SHAWARMA

See FOOD: SHAWARMA

SHAW COMMISSION

A British commission of inquiry into a 1929 disturbance in Palestine.

A commission of inquiry, led by Sir Walter Shaw, was sent to Palestine by the British government to investigate the August 1929 Western Wall Disturbances, which caused the deaths of 249 Jews and Arabs. The commission's report, issued in March 1930, stated that the fundamental cause of the political violence was "the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility towards the Jews consequent upon the disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future." The Palestinians feared that by "Jewish immigration and land purchases they may be deprived of their livelihood and placed under the economic domination of the Jews." The commission's report called for an explicit policy regulating land and immigration that would have, in effect, curtailed the Zionist program in Palestine. The British government, however, postponed consideration of any change in policy until after another commission, which it appointed in May 1930 under Sir John Hope-Simpson, had studied land settlement, immigration, and development.

See also WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES.

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PHILIP MATTAR

SHAWQI, AHMAD

[1868–1932]

Foremost Arab neoclassical poet.

In the course of his poetic career of forty years, Ahmad Shawqi both renovated the language of Arabic poetry and endowed it with the genre that had been missing in it, namely, the verse drama. After re-

ceiving a thorough Arabic and Islamic education in Cairo, he was sent by Khedive Tawfiq to France, where he spent three years, 1891 to 1893, during which he immersed himself in French literature, especially the Romantic Trio: Alfred de Musset, Lamartine, and Victor Hugo. This was the decisive influence on Shawqi—his window into Western literary art, through which he was able to rejuvenate modern Arabic poetry.

On his return to Egypt, he became in 1893 the court poet of Khedive Abbas Hilmi II. This marked the first phase of his poetic career, which lasted until 1914, when the First World War broke out. During this period, he composed odes on the khedive and the Alawi Dynasty and on Egyptian history, and he emerged as the poet of Islam and the Islamic Caliphate (then the Ottoman Empire). He also wrote a number of historical novels, perhaps inspired by his model, Victor Hugo. In 1898 he published his collected poems as a *diwan* titled *al-Shawqiyyat,* and this immediately established his reputation as the leading poet of his generation in the entire Arab world.

In 1914 his patron, the khedive, was deposed by Britain, and Shawqi was sent into exile. He chose Spain, where he spent the second phase of his poetic career, four years (1915–1919) in Barcelona, devoting his time to reading and contemplation. These four years witnessed the composition of splendid odes in which he remembered the glories of Spanish Islam.

The third phase of Shawqi's poetic career began in 1919 on his return to Egypt and lasted until his death in 1932. Shawqi was free from involvement with the court and court life, and with the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924, he became more interested in Arab nationalist aspirations, especially in Egypt and Syria, which inspired his memorable odes with pan-Arab overtones. It was also in this period that he composed his verse dramas, the most striking of which are *Majnun Layla* and *Masra Cleopatra.*

Shawqi did not limit his themes to the Arab and Islamic world. He is the poet of the Mediterranean par excellence and of pharaonic Egypt. His odes on both, hardly known in Europe and the United States, stand well in comparison with the best in world literature. Four years before his death, his preeminence as a poet was recognized when delegates from the Arab world travelled to Cairo, fêted him, and saluted him as *Amir al-Shuʿara* ("Prince of Poets").

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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IRFAN SHAHÎD

SHAYKH

A general title of respect.

The term *shaykh* (also sheikh), can be applied to an elderly man, a tribal chief, a ruler of a shaykhdom along the Persian Gulf, a village chief, a religious scholar, a senator, or a Sufi master. The early caliphs were known as shaykhs. Shaykh al-Islam was the title given to the chief *mufti* (jurist) of the Ottoman Empire, who had direct access to the sultan and served as the highest-ranking legal administrator.

See also SHAYKH AL-ISLAM.

MARILYN HIGBEE

SHAYKH AL-ISLAM

Honorary title for Muslim jurists.

Shaykh al-Islam (literally, Elder of Islam) is an honorific title that has been historically applied to prominent Muslim jurists, theologians, and spiritual masters in recognition of outstanding knowledge and/or piety. In the early medieval period (c. 800–1200), the title was quasi-official and conferred on an elite few through acclamation by disciples or peers. Over time, however, the title was adopted by certain highly trained jurists (that is, muftis, or "jurisconsults"), who could legitimately claim the authority to issue a formal legal opinion *(fatwa).* In fact, although the more elitist, quasi-official usage of this title has continued into the modern period (particularly in the form of posthumous conferral), the later medieval and early modern periods witnessed an increasingly widespread attachment of the title to official positions in state-controlled judicial administrations.

The office of Shaykh al-Islam seems to have reached its apex as part of the Ottoman imperial establishment. By the time of Süleyman I (ruled 1520–1566), the chief jurisconsult of Constantinople (now Istanbul) was designated as the unique Shaykh al-Islam and recognized as the highest-ranking and most powerful member of the extensive imperial judiciary with exclusive direct access to the sultan himself. In 1916, however, the Committee for Union and Progress transferred much of the power of the former Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam to a secular Ministry of Justice, and by 1924 the new Turkish republic completely abolished the office. It is important to note that the office of Shaykh al-Islam has been much more widely and systematically instituted in Twelver Shiʿa contexts than in Sunni contexts. It was first introduced into the Iranian Shiʿite judicial system by the Safavid Shah Abbas I (ruled 1588–1629) and remains today the official title of the presidents of municipal religious courts in the Shiʿa communities of Iran and the former Soviet Union.

See also Committee for Union and Progress; Shaykh.

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Scott Alexander

SHAYKH, HANAN AL-

[1945–]

Arab writer.

Hanan al-Shaykh is undisputedly one of the most important Arab women writers at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Born and raised in Lebanon, al-Shaykh first distinguished herself by writing prose fiction that exposed some of the repressive patriarchal traditions of her society. She did so by introducing characters, often women, who unabashedly explored themselves, their families, and their communities. She faced brief periods of censorship and occasional negative reviews. Although some of her fiction is set in the broader Arab world, two of her most prominent novels are situated in Lebanon during the Civil War of 1975 through 1990. Al-Shaykh has become an important voice in critical studies of the war itself. The renowned *Hikayat Zahra* (The Story of Zahra, 1980) is a relentless psychosexual drama that manages, primarily through its complex protagonist, to narrate an insane society in violent civil disarray. Al-Shaykh's stark imagery and gripping plot mesmerized readers. Her follow-up novel, *Barid Bayrut* (Beirut blues, 1992), structured as a series of letters by another memorable female protagonist, extends the depiction of the Lebanese wars and fortifies the ideology of nonpartisanship, as every militia, army, confessional (religious/ethnic), and national group is subject to critique and to ridicule. Al-Shaykh's focus is on nuanced reactions, complex relationships, and multiple points of view. Her war novels offered new ways of imagining Lebanon in this destructive era.

Al-Shaykh spent her early school years in Lebanon and Egypt and later lived in Saudi Arabia. Since the early 1980s, she has lived in London and has participated in local productions of her experimental plays. One of her publications, *Only in London* (2001), explores some of the issues of Arab émigrés in Europe. With a keen sense of humor and a fresh Arabic writing style, al-Shaykh's works have extended the possibilities for Arab women writers. Because of good translations into English and other languages, Al-Shaykh's readership is growing outside the Arab world.

See also Gender: Gender and Education; Lebanese Civil War (1958); Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanon; Literature: Arabic.

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Elise Salem

SHAYKHI

Follower of Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsaʾi (1753–1826), a Twelver Shiʿite Islamic thinker who emphasized the esoteric and intuitional aspects of the religion.

Shaykh Ahmad cultivated followers in al-Hasa in eastern Arabia, Bahrain, and Iraq, as well as in Yazd and Kermanshah in Iran. A separate school of Shiʿism did not coalesce around his name until after his death, when he was succeeded by Sayyid Kazim Rashti (d. 1844) in Karbala; for a time, esoteric Shaykhism offered a challenge to the scholastic orthodoxy of the Usuli school.

After Rashti's death, though many Shaykhis became Babis, important Shaykhi communities continued to exist in the Persian Gulf, and in Kerman and Tabriz. The Tabriz Shaykhis diminished their doctrinal and ritual differences with the majority Usuli school, and played a progressive role during Iran's Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911). The Kerman Shaykhis, led by the Qajar noble Karim Khan Kermani (1810–1871) and his descendants, remained esoteric. Some among the Qajar nobility, as well as Mozaffar al-Din Shah (r. 1896–1906), converted to this school. Kerman Shaykhism proved conservative and often was supported by local governors. This privileged position helped to provoke Shaykhi-Usuli riots in 1905.

In the twentieth century Shaykhism became marginalized as a Shiʿite sect and Shaykhis suffered persecution under the Islamic Republic of Iran after 1979. Shaykhi communities persist in Kerman and elsewhere. The Ihqaqi family (based in Kuwait but originally from Tabriz) now produces most Shaykhi publications and claims many followers in southern Iraq. The movement also has been prominent in recent decades in Pakistan, where debates have raged over its orthodoxy and a Shaykhi Institute was founded in Faisalabad.

See also BABIS.

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JUAN R. I. COLE

SHAZAR, SHNEOUR ZALMAN

[1898–1974]

Third Israeli president.

Shneour Zalman Shazar's last name is actually an acronym for Shneour Zalman Rubashov, his original name. Shazar was born in Minsk, Russia, and raised in Stabsty where he was educated in a Habad Heder, a Lubovitch Hasidic school. He joined the Poʿalei Zion (Labor Zionist) movement in 1905. In 1911, Shazar went to Palestine for the first time and worked on Kibbutz Merhavia, but he did not emigrate there until 1924. He became a member of the Secretariat of the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) and was on the editorial board of its newspaper, *Davar.*

In 1947, he served as a member of the Jewish Agency delegation to the United Nations. After statehood Shazar ran and was elected on the MAPAI (Labor) list for the Knesset in 1949 and served there until 1957. He was appointed to be the minister of education and culture in 1949, and two years later he became a member of the executive of the Jewish Agency. In 1963 he was elected Israel's third president, to succeed Yizhak Ben-Zvi, and served two terms.

See also BEN-ZVI, YIZHAK; HISTADRUT; ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE; KNESSET; LABOR ZIONISM; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ISRAEL.

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BRYAN DAVES

SHAZLI, SAʿD AL-DIN AL-

[1922–]

Egyptian military officer and opposition politician.

Saʿd al-Din al-Shazli (also Shadhili, Shazly) was educated at Cairo University and the Military and Staff colleges in Cairo, and received training at the infantry school at Fort Benning in the United States. Shazli was chief of staff of Egyptian armed forces during the 1973 Arab–Israel War. Al-Shazli broke with President Anwar al-Sadat over Sadat's 1977 peace initiative with Israel, and was sent as ambassador to the United Kingdom and to Portugal. In 1978, he called for the overthrow of Sadat. In 1980, he went into exile in Algeria, where he formed an opposition party. Al-Shazli has published books on military strategy and the Arab–Israeli conflict.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1973); SADAT, ANWAR AL-.

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DAVID WALDNER

SHEKEL

Name of Israeli currency.

The word *shekel* derives from biblical times, when coins were called shekels. *Shekel* was the term used by leaders of the Zionist movement to denote the price of membership. For the purpose of designating this cost of membership, attendees at the First Zionist Congress pegged the shekel to a fixed rate of certain major Western currencies.

Until 1970, the Israeli currency was called the lira or pound. In 1984, following a steep devaluation, the name of the currency was changed to the new Israeli shekel (NIS).

BRYAN DAVES

SHENHAR, YITZHAK

[1902–1957]

Hebrew writer.

Yitzhak Shenhar was born in Ukraine and became active in the ha-Halutz movement before moving to Palestine in 1921. He published his first poetry in 1924 and held a number of manual labor jobs until he began his literary career. In the 1930s, he worked as a writer, editor, and translator for the Schocken publishing house. He wrote short stories and poems about the life of Jews in Eastern Europe and in Palestine.

BRYAN DAVES

SHENOUDA III

[1923–]

Patriarch of the Coptic Orthodox Church.

Few Coptic patriarchs have had as much experience in both secular and ecclesiastical affairs prior to their election as Shenouda III. Born near Asyut and originally named Nazir Jayyid, he graduated from Cairo University in 1947 and fought in the 1948 Arab-Israel War. He earned a bachelor of divinity degree in 1950 from the Coptic Orthodox Theological Seminary. He became a leader in the lay-dominated Sunday School movement, editing its monthly magazine, and took holy orders in 1954. Within the church, he was successively a monk, a secretary to Cyril VI, and a bishop. He became a professor of Old Testament studies at the Coptic Seminary and the editor of its journal. Elected patriarch in 1971, Shenouda is the highest-ranking cleric of the Coptic Orthodox Church, the Middle East's largest Christian denomination. He has traveled frequently to North America, Europe, and Australia in order to maintain contact with expatriate Copts worldwide.

Shenouda was among the more than 1,500 Egyptians who were accused by President Anwar al-Sadat in September 1981 of extremist religious activity. Exiled and replaced by a council of five bishops, Shenouda fled to the desert monastery of Anba Bishoi in Wadi Natrun, northwest of Cairo. The reasons for his arrest and exile were unclear. Although religious turmoil had increased in the late 1970s and early 1980s (mainly instigated by Muslims opposed to Sadat's peace treaty with Israel), the president's charges, including those against Shenouda, could not be proven. Some Copts and Muslims punished by Sadat were active in religious

professions and thus superficially gave credence to his allegations, but others had secular occupations—lawyers, writers, journalists, broadcasters, politicians—and appear to have been guilty only of disagreeing with the president.

Sadat's actions may have been a delayed response to Shenouda's September 1977 protest against the proposed imposition of Islamic law *(shariʿa)* in Egypt. The proposal would have made apostasy—in this case, conversion from Islam—a capital offense. Shenouda had feared that the law would discriminate against Egyptian Christians and other non-Muslims. He succeeded temporarily, for Sadat's recommendation was withdrawn, only to be reintroduced in 1980. Because Muslim fundamentalists then unleashed a murderous round of terror against the Copts, Shenouda ordered a series of demonstrations that enraged many Muslims and caused them to accuse the patriarch of engaging in politics. Sadat turned down Shenouda's repeated requests for a meeting, and so in 1981 the patriarch refused to accept the government's Easter greeting, humiliating Sadat, who may have taken revenge by the September arrest. Some Copts believed that Shenouda's dismissal was a political move to balance Sadat's incarceration of many Muslims. Another possible explanation is that, during a 1980 meeting between Sadat and U.S. president Ronald Reagan in Washington, D.C., a group of Coptic expatriates staged a protest, which Sadat wrongly blamed on Shenouda.

The censure of Shenouda for "sectarian sedition" was both ironic and unfortunate. Although he had vigorously defended the Coptic Church and struck back against Muslim fundamentalists, he has never been antagonistic toward Islam per se. Throughout his career, he has been sympathetic to Muslim causes and to Egyptian national interests. Some of his theological writings, particularly his major 1967 work *al-Khalas fi al-Mafhum al-Urthuduksi* (Salvation in Orthodox understanding), are as critical of aspects of Protestantism as of Islamic fundamentalism. Shenouda has specifically denounced the intrusion of religion as a divisive force in political affairs. One result of his historic meeting with the Roman Catholic Pope Paul VI in May 1973 (the first visit by an Egyptian pope to his Roman counterpart since 325 C.E.) was a joint statement of concern about the Palestinian problem. In May 1986 Shenouda sent a representative to the funeral of a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Shenouda's plight improved slowly after Sadat's assassination in October 1981. However, in 1983 an administrative court upheld Sadat's actions against Shenouda and ordered the Coptic Orthodox Church to hold a new papal election; only in January 1985 did a decree from President Husni Mubarak allow Shenouda to regain his office.

Shenouda reaffirmed his policy against politicizing religion by opposing an initiative by the Ibn Khaldun Center to host a conference in 1994 on minorities in the Arab world and efforts by the U.S. Congress in 1997 to pass legislation that would have barred aid to Egypt as long as it allowed discrimination against Copts. He attacked Israel's administration of Christian holy places and vowed not to visit Jerusalem until it was freed from Jewish control. He also condemned U.S. policy toward Iraq. Generally, his strategy has been to align Egypt's Copts closely with their Muslim counterparts in the interest of preserving national unity. He received UNESCO's prize for tolerance in October 1995. He is a past president of the World Council of Churches and headed for many years the Middle Eastern Council of Churches.

See also CHRISTIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; COPTS; SADAT, ANWAR AL-.

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DONALD SPANEL
UPDATED BY ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

SHEPHEARD'S HOTEL

British gathering place in Cairo from 1841 to 1952.

In 1841 a British farmer's son named Samuel Shepheard built Shepheard's Hotel in Cairo. As Britain became more involved with the finances of khedival Egypt and especially after the establishment of an informal British protectorate in 1882, Shepheard's became the center of British social life in Cairo. Renovated in 1891, 1899, 1904, 1909, and 1927, the hotel was famous for its opulence.

British officers and administrators often retired to the bar at Shepheard's at the end of the day, and the Moorish Hall attracted tourists from Europe and America. After World War II, the relationship between Britain and Egypt deteriorated and, on Saturday, 26 January 1952, riots erupted in Cairo, which led to the destruction of numerous British and foreign establishments. Singled out by the crowd for particular attention was Shepheard's Hotel. The hotel was destroyed in an explosion, and although rebuilt on another site in 1957, it never regained its former stature.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

SHESHBESH

One of several names for a board game, known in the West as backgammon, played with two dice and thirty pieces (fifteen per side).

Sheshbesh pieces are usually black for one player and white for the other. The origins of the game are obscure; while some experts argue for its invention in Persia, others suggest that it originated in southwest Asia. In 1927, Sir Leonard Wooley discovered a board game in the ruined city of Ur that was marked off into elaborately inlaid squares (twenty in all) accompanied by two sets of dice and two sets of discs, seven white and seven black. This places sheshbesh variants in Sumeria as early as 2600 B.C.E. Although it is not known how this game was played, experts assume that movement of the pieces over the board was governed by rolling the dice. The Ur game appears somewhat related to modern ludo, which in turn is related to backgammon.

The traditional game consists of balancing the elements of skill and chance while playing on a board marked with twenty-four chevrons in alternating colors of black and white. The pieces, fifteen to a player, are arranged on the trays according to a specific pattern, or are held off the board. Entry or movement begins according to the roll of the dice. The pieces move the full distance around the board in a race to the home tray, and are then borne off. Most commonly, players try to prevent and delay one's opponent from bearing off. If a hit has been made the player will attempt to block the entry of the piece by making homes—covering a chevron with a minimum of two pieces. Shesbesh is known by a large variety of names. These include *takht-e nard* in Iran, *plakato* and *tawali* in Greece, *tric-trac* in France and Germany, tables *reales* in Italy and Spain, *mahbusa, yahudiyya farahjiyya,* or *tawlat al-zahr* in Syria and Arabia, and *bula* in Egypt.

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CYRUS MOSHAVER

SHIBERGHAN

City in northern Afghanistan.

The capital of the Afghan province of Jowzjan, Shiberghan is located approximately 80 miles west of Mazar-e Sharif. The city has about 30,000 inhabitants, but the number is only a rough approximation. The official 1979 census showed a population of 19,000, but by 2003 estimates held that it might be as high as 40,000. Most of Shiberghan's population is Uzbek, although the city also has a sizable Turkmen and Tajik population. After natural gas was discovered in 1931, Shiberghan was developed with Soviet aid into a modern city. The city became a focal point in the battle between the Taliban and Afghanistan's Northern Alliance. Shiberghan is the location of a prison used by the Northern Alliance, and it has been alleged that several hundred Taliban and al-Qaʿida prisoners were killed at the prison.

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GRANT FARR

SHID, NAHID

[1953–]

Iranian lawyer.

Nahid Shid was born in 1953. She graduated from Tehran University law school and pursued religious education with Ayatollah Marʾashi-Najafi. She has been an attorney since 1980, specializing in women's affairs, employment, and social insurance. She also is an expert at the Social Welfare organization and a consultant at the High Council of the Cultural Revolution. She initiated several amendments to the insurance law and divorce law, especially the principles of *ojrat-ol misl* and the reevaluation of dowry. The amendment to *ojrat-ol misl,* which was promulgated in 1993, stipulates that when a man files for divorce his wife can ask to be compensated for the housework she did during the marriage. The change to dowry, promulgated in 1996, stipulates that the amount of dowry should be calculated according to its current value, taking into account inflation. Shid argues that most religious laws should be changed because they are based on secondary principles and do not take account of social change. She maintains that blood money cannot be functional in a society in which women are medical doctors, university professors, and the like, and concludes that blood money should be the same for men and women. She presented her candidacy for the Fifth Parliament elections (1996) but was disqualified by the Council of Guardians.

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AZADEH KIAN-THIÉBAUT

SHIDYAQ, AHMAD FARIS AL-

[1804–1887]

Lebanese writer, linguist, and literary critic who played a leading role in the Arabic literary revival of the mid-to-late nineteenth century.

A Maronite who converted to Protestantism in 1826 after witnessing the Maronite clergy's persecution of his brother Asʿad, Faris al-Shidyaq was sent to Egypt by the American Protestant missionaries in Lebanon so that he could pursue his studies in Cairo. From 1834 to 1848, he taught at the American Protestant mission school in Malta, undertook a new Arabic translation of the Bible, and edited the publications of the American press there. For several years afterward, he traveled widely through Europe and the Near East, and worked as editor of the official Tunisian journal *al-Ra'id al-Tunisi* between 1854 and 1860. He converted to Islam during his stay in Tunis and adopted the name Ahmad Faris. In 1860, he relocated to Istanbul at the invitation of the Ottoman authorities. While there, he undertook his most important project: the publication of the Arabic-language newspaper *al-Jawa'ib,* a mouthpiece for Ottomanism which soon became a leading forum for the discussion of the political and cultural issues of the time and can be considered a pioneer of modern Arabic journalism. In addition to the many pieces of literary criticism that he wrote for this journal and others, Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq is also remembered for his own writings in prose and verse and for his travel writing. A writer whose influence was felt throughout the region, he was one of the architects of modern literary Arabic.

See also OTTOMANISM.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX

SHIHABI, ZLIKHA AL-

[1903–1992]

Palestinian women's activist.

Zlikha (also Zulaykha) Ishaq al-Shihabi was born in Jerusalem and educated at the Sisters of Zion School there. Her education was supplemented by private lessons. In 1929 she was a member of the Arab Women's Executive Committee, which convened the Palestine Arab Women's Conference in Jerusalem, and directed the Palestinian women's movement during the Mandate period. Shihabi was elected president of the Arab Women's Union (AWU) in Jerusalem in 1937, a position she held until her death. In the 1940s the AWU founded a sports club with its own playground and tennis courts, and in 1946 it opened a clinic near Bab

al-Zahira, a gate of the Old City of Jerusalem. She represented Palestinian women and spoke at the Eastern Women's Conference on Palestine (Cairo, 1938), and the Arab Women's Conference (Cairo, 1944), as well as other international conferences. In 1964 she was president of the preparatory committee that founded the General Union of Palestinian Women in Jerusalem, which was subsequently banned by both the Jordanian authorities and then the Israeli government after Jerusalem was captured in 1967. Because of her political activities the Israelis deported Shihabi to Jordan in 1969, but she managed to return to Jerusalem after a few months and continued her work with the AWU there until her death.

See also Gaza Strip; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; General Union of Palestinian Women's Committees (GUPWC); Jerusalem; Palestine; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); West Bank.

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Ellen L. Fleischmann

SHIʿISM

Branch of Islam that traces its leadership to Ali ibn Abi Talib, cousin of Muhammad.

The Shiʿa constitute the largest Islamic community after the Sunnis, numbering close to 90 million worldwide. Iran is the only predominantly Shiʿite country; significant Shiʿite minorities exist in Iraq, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, eastern Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and various Western countries. Shiʿism rests on a belief that the right of succession to political and religious leadership of the community belongs solely to the prophet Muhammad's cousin, Ali ibn Abi Talib, and his progeny. The Prophet was first succeeded by three of his companions—Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman—who ruled successively (632–656). Ali's rule (656–661) was almost immediately contested by Muʿawiyya, who succeeded him and founded the Umayyad dynasty. Upon Muʾawiyya's death, Ali's son Husayn revolted against Yazid, the successor and son of Muʾawiyya. For the followers of Ali, Husayn's death in battle at Karbala became symbolic of the hostility between them and those linked with Sunni Islam. The battle, especially the martyrdom of Husayn, continues to be commemorated by Shiʿa.

Origins

The assassination of Uthman in 656 opened a split in the Islamic community. Soon after the accession of Ali to the caliphate, Muʿawiya, governor of Syria, kinsman of Uthman, and among the last generation of companions of the Prophet, declared his opposition to Ali's leadership. His opposition soon gained support among tribal groups in Syria and Mesopotamia. In response, Ali moved the Islamic capital to Kufa (in southern Iraq) and engaged Muʿawiya in a protracted rivalry that ended in an armistice known as *al-Tahkim,* which left Muʿawiya sovereign in Syria, Egypt, and northern Mesopotamia, while Ali ruled the Arabian peninsula and the east. Those who supported Ali were known as *Shiʿat Ali* (the partisans of Ali); hence the name Shiʿism. Ali was assassinated in 661; subsequently, Muʿawiya consolidated his rule over the territories formerly under Ali and moved to make the line of political succession that of his family, the Umayyads. Since Ali's martyrdom the city of al-Najaf, where he is buried, has become a place of pilgrimage for Shiʿa.

Ali had two sons, Hasan and Husayn (or Hussein), from his marriage to the Prophet's daughter, Fatima. They quickly inherited Ali's leadership and attracted the loyalty of the Shiʿa. Exasperated by the political deadlock, Hasan abandoned his claim to succession, leaving Muʿawiya free to extend his control. Muʿawiya was succeeded in 680 by his son Yazid, who lacked the political acumen of his father. Yazid's hereditary route to power upset an Islamic community accustomed to having a strong consultative element in political election and viewing senior companions of the Prophet as worthier candidates to rule.

In 680 the residents of Kufa invited Husayn, who lived in Medina, to assert his right to succeed his father, and they pledged to support him. Husayn

left Medina with his family and close associates, but before he could reach Kufa, an Umayyad force attacked and killed him and most of his family. This unprovoked attack on the youngest of the Prophet's grandchildren increased opposition to the Umayyads.

The cause of Shiʿism then expanded to include other branches of the larger family of the Prophet, the Banu Hashim, or Hashimites. There were a number of Hashimite revolts, primarily in Iraq and the east. Pivotal revolts were those of Zayd ibn Ali ibn al-Husayn in Kufa (743), and of his son Yahya in Transoxiania. Zayd's movement formed an early current of Shiʿism that espoused political activity to further the Alid cause, and did not restrict the imamate to one particular branch of the Alid family. (The Zaydi sect still survives in Yemen.)

In 750 a broadly based movement originating in Khorasan toppled the Umayyad caliphate. Succession to the caliphate passed to the Abbasids, a Hashimite branch named after Abbas, an uncle of the Prophet. Feeling betrayed, the Alids staged several revolts, the most notable of which was the one in Medina by Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya (762), a descendant of Hasan. By then, however, the Abbasids had consolidated their control.

The Abbas Mosque, located in Kerbala, Iraq. © AFP/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Theology

Shiʿism originated as a political movement supporting the rights of Ali to the caliphate. Since leadership in the early Islamic community was associated to a great extent with religious merit, Ali was considered the rightful ruler not only because of his early conversion to Islam and close family ties to the Prophet, but also because of his religious knowledge. Shiʿite tradition states that the Prophet always referred to Ali as the preeminent expert on spiritual matters among his companions, and that at Ghadir Khumm, Muhammad reportedly declared to his companions that Ali was his *waliyy* (rightful and trusted successor) and blessed him with special prayers. The earliest concrete evidence of Shiʿism as a spiritual sect, however, did not appear until the 750s or 760s. In the era immediately following the revolution, a divergence emerged among those supporting the cause of Ali's family. Shiʿism came to be associated increasingly with descendants of Husayn, and in particular, the sixth descendant, Jaʿfar al-Sadiq.

Although little historical fact is known about Jaʿfar al-Sadiq, it is generally believed that it was during his time that the rudiments of Shiʿite theology were first formed. These consisted of the beliefs that the imam (presumably from the Husaynid line) holds the secrets of religious knowledge *(maʿrifa),* that he has the authority to pass on this knowledge to a designated successor through a process of investment known as *wasiyya,* and that the followers of the imam must not challenge the authority of the established state in support of the Alid imamate until the imam declares the historically assigned time for such a political revolution. From the time of Jaʿfar al-Sadiq, the Shiʿa became closely clustered around the line of his descendants. However, a significant division took place within his lifetime. Jaʿfar's son Ismaʿil was supposed to be the spiritual successor to his father, and thus began to attract followers. Either because Ismaʿil died during his father's lifetime or because during his last years Jaʿfar decided to transfer the succession to another of his

The Hussein Mosque, located in Kerbala, Iraq. **© Charles & Josette Lenars/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

sons, Musa, another group began to recognize Musa as his only successor.

This latter group continued to recognize the transmission of the authority of the imamate in a line of twelve successors, the last of whom, a child, is believed to have disappeared in the city of Samarra in 873. Shiʿa believe that the last of the twelve imams will one day reveal himself as the leading religious and political guide (the Mahdi), reestablish his leadership over the whole Islamic community, and usher in an age of justice and righteousness. Recognition of twelve descendants of Ali as imams led to this larger Shiʿite community being known as Twelver (also Ithaʿashar) Shiʿa, or Imamis. The other group, which refused to accept Musa as successor and maintained its religous loyalty to Ismaʿil, the seventh imam, is hence known as Ismaʿilis, or Seveners. Like the Twelvers, some Ismaʿilis believe in occulation *(ghayba),* but they consider Ismaʿil to be the vanished imam destined to usher in a righteous age.

The Growth of Shiʿism

In the late ninth century competing Shiʿite missions emerged. For some time, Ismaʿili *daʿwa* (mission, propaganda) had its strongest support in North Africa, where it was the religious affiliation of the Fatimid dynasty (909–1171), which came to rule North Africa, Egypt, Hijaz, and Syria. Establishing the city of Cairo (969) as their capital, the Fatimids hoped to turn Egypt into the center of Ismaʿili propaganda, and for this purpose they founded al-Azhar seminary. The Fatimids' religious enterprise had little success because the majority of their subjects adhered to Sunni schools of thought; Ismaʿilism became the ideology of the state and of a minority in society. Elsewhere in the Islamic world, the Buyid dynasty, which ruled Iran and Iraq between 932 and 1062, declared its loyalty to Shiʿism but chose to follow the Twelver branch. Although Shiʿism did not become the religious affiliation of the majority under Buyid rule, the dynasty did much to promote it. For example, Husayn's murder was commemorated with public ceremonies on the tenth of Muharram, the events at Ghadir Khumm were celebrated, and steps were taken to protect Shiʿism.

The next stage of substantial elaboration of Twelver Shiʿite thought occurred in the sixteenth century under the Safavid dynasty in Iran. Until their arrival, Iran had been primarily a Sunni region. Locked in a mortal conflict with two Sunni dynasties—the Ottomans to the west and the Uzbeks in Transoxiania to the east—Ismaʿil al-Safawi (1494–1524), founder of the dynasty, found it politically helpful to underline the ideological particularity of his government by adopting Shiʿism as the state religion. At the time, Safavid Shiʿism consisted largely of an affiliation to Sufi movements in Azerbaijan. Under Safawi's successor, Tahmasp (1524–1576), however, the state moved toward a more institutional and hierarchical structure guided by a clergy and an established law, rather than by the esoteric propensity of Sufi masters. This change fostered the alliance between the state and the clergy, the latter bolstering the legitimacy of the state and the former supporting Shiʿite propaganda. The Safavids sought to make Shiʿism the law of the land and the only religious affiliation in society. Under Abbas I (1588–1629) they built theological seminaries and attracted renowned scholars from Iraq, southern Lebanon, and Bahrain to help systematize Shiʿite learning. Sunni Islam was all but eliminated in the Safavid territories.

Shiʿite Scholars and Differences with Sunnism

The idea of the occultation of the imam deprived Shiʿism of binding authority in spiritual matters. This inevitably called for the presence of religious scholars who could guide the community. Kufa was the earliest center of Shiʿite thought, and in later times Qom in Iran emerged as a preeminent cen-

ter of Shiʿite learning. Among the most prominent of scholars in Qom were Abu Jaʿfar al-Kulayni (d. 941) and Ibn Babawayh al-Saduq (d. 991). Noted scholars in the later theological schools of Baghdad were Shaykh al-Mufid (d. 1022) and Sharif Murtada Alam al-Huda (d. 1067). The greatest Shiʿite scholar, however, was perhaps al-Majlisi (d. 1699), who contributed the most toward changing a Sufi form of Shiʿism to a dogmatic and formal legislative form. Beginning in the nineteenth century there was a debate between two main currents in Shiʿism: the Akhbari, which seeks to establish Shiʿite jurisprudence on the authority of tradition *(akhbar)*, and the Usuli, which emphasizes the primacy of rationalist principles *(usul)* and the need to exercise *ijtihad* (reasoned speculation). Since the debate has been resolved in favor of the Usuli current in the twentieth century, the authority of the *mujtahid* (expert scholar capable of exercising reasoned speculation) has taken on greater importance. Although Shiʿa and Sunnis agree on core matters of ritual, dogma, and law, they differ on details. Whereas Sunnis, for instance, permit the occasional practice of wiping the foot covering with water *(al-mash ala al-khuffayn)* during ablution, Shiʿa reject the practice. The institution of temporary marriage *(mutʿa)*, accepted under Shiʿite law, is rejected in Sunnism. The most prominent area of difference, however, remains historical. The Shiʿa's rejection of the caliphate of the first successors to the Prophet—viewed as equals according to Sunni historical reading—and their insistence on the sole right of Ali ibn Abi Talib to the succession has long formed the most visible difference between the two communities.

See also Akhbari; Azhar, al-; Islam; Ismaʿili Shiʿism; Karbala; Mahdi; Muhammad; Najaf, al-; Sunni Islam; Usuli; Zaydism.

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Tayeb El-Hibri
Updated by Roxanne Varzi

SHILLUK

Non-Muslim Sudanese people.

The Shilluk are a linguistic group belonging to the Western Nilotic subgroup of the Eastern Sudanic branch of the Nilo-Saharan family. They are concentrated along the west bank of the White Nile in southern Sudan. Because Shilluk political organization is centered around the king *(reth)*, the Shilluk have experienced greater unity than other tribes in the region. Enjoying access to good agricultural land along the Nile, the Shilluk are more settled than other tribes and rely more on cultivation and fishing than on cattle raising. The Shilluk numbered about 150,000 persons according to the 1983 census.

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David Waldner

SHILOAH, REUVEN

[1909–1959]

Israeli intelligence official, strategist, and diplomat.

Born Reuven Zaslani in Jerusalem, Shiloah served in the SHAI (the Haganah intelligence service) in

the 1930s and worked with the Jewish community in Iraq. He headed the Arab section of the political department of the Jewish Agency under Moshe Shertok (Sharett). He was liaison officer with British and U.S. intelligence services during World War II. Shiloah held many secret meetings with King Abdullah of Transjordan before and after the 1948 war.

He was the first director of the political department of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and headed the Israeli delegation to the Lausanne peace talks in 1949. He was also the first head of the Mossad (1949–1952), but was worn down by the disastrous collapse of the Israeli spy network in Iraq, by a serious road accident, and by constant feuding with Isser Harel, the first head of the Shin Bet and Shiloah's successor as Mossad chief.

Shiloah resigned his chairmanship of the intelligence services coordinating committee to serve under ambassador Abba Eban as a minister at the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C. (1953–1957). While there he forged close ties with the U.S. intelligence community.

As a senior adviser to Golda Meir, the foreign minister, Shiloah was instrumental in forging Israel's "periphery doctrine" of responding to the Cold War and Nasserism by seeking closer links with non-Arab regimes such as Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia. He attempted but failed to establish an Israeli relationship with NATO. Shiloah was widely described as a workaholic; this trait contributed to his poor health and his premature death.

See also EBAN, ABBA (AUBREY); HAREL, ISSER; MOSSAD; SHIN BET.

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IAN BLACK

SHIMʿUN, MAR

[1908–1975]

Patriarch of the Assyrian (Nestorian) community.

Ishai Mar Shimʿun XXIII was born in the Ottoman Empire (now Turkey) and educated in England in the 1920s. In 1918 and 1919, some 20,000 Assyrians (Nestorians) who had fled southeastern Turkey were settled in Iraq by the British authorities. Fearing the consequences of British withdrawal in 1932, the Mar Shimʿun attempted to set up a separate enclave for his people with himself as politico-spiritual leader. The Assyrians were told that they should either become assimilated as Iraqis or leave, and in a confrontation between the community and the Iraqi army in August 1933, at least 600 Assyrians were killed. The Mar Shimʿun left Iraq, eventually reaching the United States; though he returned briefly to Iraq in 1970, he died in the United States in 1975.

See also ASSYRIANS.

PETER SLUGLETT

SHIN BET

Israel's General Security Service (G.S.S. or Shabak), responsible for preventing hostile activity.

The Shin Bet was created in 1948 to counter espionage, subversion, and sabotage. Its early preoccupations were Soviet-bloc espionage and monitoring Israel's Arab minority. Its first head was Isser Harel, who was succeeded by Amos Manor in 1954.

The Shin Bet expanded greatly after the 1967 war, becoming the leading civilian agency for controlling the Palestinians in the newly occupied territories, recruiting informers and collaborators and working with the Mossad to penetrate resistance groups such as al-Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

The Shabak affair (1984–1986) brought unwelcome exposure of Shin Bet practices. Two Palestinians who hijacked an Israeli bus were said by the authorities to have died during the rescue. Photographs showed them leaving the bus alive, and it became clear that they had been deliberately killed by Shin Bet personnel while in custody. Israel's attorney general recommended that Avraham Shalom, head of the Shin Bet, be dismissed, but amid accusations of a cover-up, President Chaim Herzog pardoned Shalom and eleven other Shin Bet officers. A new committee investigated Shin Bet procedures, including interrogation methods that some human-rights experts said constituted torture.

The Shin Bet struggled to cope with the Palestinian uprising after 1987 and saw its effectiveness weakened when Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip and large parts of the West Bank after the Oslo Accords. Its reputation was damaged by its failure to prevent the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin by a right-wing Jew in 1995 and by the Palestinian suicide bombings that accompanied the second intifada that began in 2000.

See also HAREL, ISSER; MOSSAD; SHILOAH, REUVEN.

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JULIE ZUCKERMAN
UPDATED BY IAN BLACK

SHIRAZ

Ancient city and provincial capital in southwestern Iran.

Shiraz, the capital of Fars, probably dates back to Achemenid times (c. 550–330 B.C.E.). During the Sassanian dynasty (c. 226–642 C.E.), it developed into an important commercial center and military base, a position it has retained for more than 1,300 years. During the medieval period, two of Iran's greatest poets, Saʿdi and Hafez, lived in the city. Shiraz flourished in the late eighteenth century as the capital of the Zand dynasty (1750–1794).

During the nineteenth century Shiraz was an important center for the distribution of foreign trade, much of which passed through the Persian Gulf port of Bushehr (Bushire), about 125 miles west of the city. The development of ports in Khuzestan in the early twentieth century, and especially the building of the Trans-Iranian Railway, which bypassed both Shiraz and Bushehr, led to the decline of this trade. Beginning in the 1930s, however, modern industries were developed in Shiraz, initially textile factories, but increasingly more diversified manufacturing after 1965. Industrialization brought a major influx of rural migrants, and the city's population increased nearly sixfold in 40 years, from 179,000 in 1956 to 1,053,000 by 1996.

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NEGUIN YAVARI
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

SHIRAZI, MIRZA HASAN

[1815–1897]

Nineteenth-century Iranian cleric.

Born in Shiraz to a well-established clerical family, Mirza Hasan Shirazi embarked on vigorous religious training that took him first to Isfahan and then Iraq. He has become most notable for a religious decree *(fatwa)* in 1892 against the use of tobacco. The decree read as follows: "In the name of God the merciful, the usage of tobacco in any way is equal to denouncing God and fighting against the divinely guided messianic leader [that is, the Mahdi, the Imam of the Age]." Shirazi's decision to issue such a proclamation is said to have stemmed from the allocation of exclusive rights of tobacco production and sales to the British by Naser al-Din Shah and his prime minister. The effect of the decree was that the government was forced to annul its agreement with the British. It is said that even the wives of the shah refused to use and serve tobacco during the period of the decree.

See also TOBACCO REVOLT.

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FARHAD ARSHAD

SHIRAZ UNIVERSITY

A private university established in 1956 in Shiraz, Iran.

The Pahlavi University of Shiraz, Iran, was established by a special law passed by the parliament in 1956 as a nongovernment university under the trust of the king, the queen, and the crown prince. Its name was changed to Shiraz University after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. It began with nine colleges or faculties and by 1977 had 648 faculty members

and 5,129 students. It was one of the first Middle Eastern universities created on the U.S. model, offering courses in English and including among its faculty a number of foreigners. Its curriculum includes courses in literature, natural sciences, medicine, agriculture, and engineering. It had 12,600 students and 360 teachers in 2002.

PARVANEH POURSHARIATI

SHISH KEBAB

See FOOD: SHISH KEBAB

SHITREET, BEKHOR

[1897–1967]

Israeli Mizrahi leader.

Bekhor Shitreet (also Shitrit) was born in Tiberias into a family that had emigrated from Morocco to Palestine in the eighteenth century. He was educated as a rabbi and taught Hebrew, Arabic, and French in the Alliance (French) school system in Tiberias. An organizer of the police force set up in Palestine by the British in 1919, he later was a police commander in lower Galilee and head of the Tel Aviv police force in 1927. After the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, he was elected to the Knesset as a member of the MAPAI party and served as minister of police. During his lifetime Shitreet sought to improve relations between religious minorities in Israel.

See also ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; KNESSET.

BRYAN DAVES

SHLONSKY, AVRAHAM

[1900–1973]

Hebrew poet, literary critic, editor, and translator.

Avraham Shlonsky was the main leader and proponent of modern Hebrew poetry in the evolving Jewish community of British mandatory Palestine and the State of Israel. Born in 1900 in the tsarist Ukraine, he was sent at age thirteen by his Zionist parents to study at the prestigious Herzliya Gymnasia (high school) in Tel Aviv, but had to return to Russia during World War I. In 1921 he emigrated to Palestine and joined a new kibbutz and for a while worked as a *halutz* (pioneer) in road paving, construction, and agriculture. His early poems appeared in 1922, and he was soon drawn to the burgeoning cultural life in Tel Aviv. During a visit to Paris, Shlonsky was influenced by modern French poetry, especially by the symbolists and the expressionists, but also by the Russian avant-garde poetry that flourished during the Russian Revolution and in the early days of the Soviet Union.

During the 1920s Shlonsky became a leading figure in the literary revolt against the rhetorical-didactic style of Hayyim Nahman Bialik, the towering and authoritative king of early Hebrew and Zionist poetry. Shlonsky edited the literary pages of *Davar,* the daily paper of the labor movement, and from 1926 edited *Ketuvim* (Writings) and from 1933 *Turim* (Columns), the literary journals of the rebellious young opposition to the literary establishment. In the late 1930s he became active in the Marxist left wing of the labor movement (ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir and later MAPAM), founded its *Sifriyat ha-Poʿalim* (Workers Library) publishing house, and edited the party's literary supplements and journals. In the late 1940s and early 1950s Shlonsky edited *Orlogin,* the home for what was then called Progressive Culture, which sympathized with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. During the 1950s he was active in the Moscow-influenced World Peace Movement, but after the revelations of Stalin's antisemitic tendencies Shlonsky became critical of the attitude of the Soviet regime toward the Jews and Zionism.

Shlonsky was acclaimed for his agility with the Hebrew language. Beside his influential "serious" poetry, he was widely admired for his light poetry, satires, and children's verse. A prolific translator, he introduced the young Hebrew-speaking generation to the world classics (Shakespeare, Molière, Romain Rolland, De Coster) and in particular to Russian poetry and prose (Pushkin, Gogol, Chekhov, Mayakovsky, and Tolstoy). In addition to the nine major collections of poetry that he published, Shlonsky also translated more than seventy major European works into Hebrew. In 1967 Shlonsky was awarded the prestigious Israel Prize. He died in 1973.

See also BIALIK, HAYYIM NAHMAN; LITERATURE: HEBREW; NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ISRAEL.

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MORDECHAI BAR-ON

SHOCHAT, MANYA

[1879–1961]

Leading Zionist pioneer, advocate for Russian Jewry, feminist, mother of the kibbutz movement, and founder of the League of Arab-Jewish Rapprochement.

Born near Grodno, Russia, Manya Wilbushevitz Shochat (also Shohat) reacted to the Kishinev pogrom of 1903 by distancing herself from the Russian revolutionary movement in favor of Jewish self-defense and nonrevolutionary socialist movements. For supporting an attempt to assassinate the Russian interior minister, Shochat was imprisoned. She persuaded the secret police to release her, then fled when her police contact fell from office. Arriving in Ottoman Palestine in 1904, Shochat established the first collective, Kibbutz Sejera, and was a founding member of the Jewish self-defense movement, Ha-Shomer. She undertook a number of overseas fundraising missions on behalf of Palestinian Jewish workers and Russian Jewry and attempted to foster dialogue with local Arabs while also smuggling arms to Jewish communities, which led to her arrest by the Turkish authorities. Under the British Mandate in Palestine, Shochat was prominent in the kibbutz movement and the newly established Haganah (Jewish defense force). After rioting resulted in the death of Jews across the country in 1929, she helped to found the small League of Arab-Jewish Rapprochement while continuing to support Jewish immigration and defense efforts—a combination she pursued through the subsequent war, believing that respect could win peace while survival demanded self-reliance.

See also HAGANAH; HA-SHOMER.

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GEORGE R. WILKES

SHORFA

North African title for all descendants of the prophet Muhammad.

In Morocco, since the rule of the Idrisid dynasty, descent from the prophet Muhammad became a source of legitimacy for establishing political power. All the founders of the religious brotherhoods claimed such origin to gain authority and credit among disciples. A genealogical tree linking the shorfa to the Prophet would assess the claim. The Saʿdi (sixteenth century) and Alawi (seventeenth century to the present) dynasties that ruled or have ruled Morocco are considered shorfa dynasties.

See also ALAWI; IDRISIDS; SHARIF.

RAHMA BOURQIA

SHUF

Region of Lebanon.

The Shuf is the district (*qada*) located in southern Lebanon between the Jizzin and al-Matn districts, and between the Mediterranean Sea and the Biqa valley. It has more than 220 towns. The main city is the predominantly Druze town of Baʿaklin, which was, for a while, the seat of government for the Maʿnids. The Shuf was made part of the governorate of Mount Lebanon because a sectarian balance between Maronite Christians and Druze was desired. Historically, the electoral battles in the region were between the candidates of Kamal Jumblatt and those of Camille Chamoun, but the presence of a number of sects in the region forced both leaders to seek support among nonaligned sects to win the election. For example, the Shuf had a Sunni Muslim seat, and even the Maronite Chamoun had to field a Sunni candidate to win the election. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has been demanding the division of the Mount Lebanon governorate into two sections to achieve a degree of sectarian parity. He does not

feel he should have to seek support among the Maronites, who constitute a majority in the northern part of the governorate. By the early 2000s, however, Jumblatt—whose traditional pro-Syrian stance had shifted—began making political alliances with Christian candidates.

See also BIQA VALLEY; CHAMOUN, CAMILLE; JUMBLATT, KAMAL; JUMBLATT, WALID.

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AS'AD ABUKHALIL
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

SHUFMAN, GERSHON

[1880–1972]

Hebrew writer.

Born in Belorussia, Gershon Shufman received a traditional Yeshiva education and taught himself Hebrew and Russian. In 1902, he enlisted in the Russian army, which coincided with the publication of his first collection of short stories. From 1913 to 1938 he lived in Austria and from there emigrated to Palestine. His brief articles and short stories are his best literary creations. They describe life in Galicia, Austria, and in Israel, and focus on day-to-day experiences that, in turn, reflect reality.

Shufman's writings are considered forerunners of modern Hebrew literature. A four-volume revised version of his collected works appeared between 1946 and 1952, and a fifth volume was added in 1960. He received the Israel Prize for literature in 1957.

ANN KAHN

SHUKRI, MOHAMMAD

[1935–]

Moroccan novelist.

Mohammad Shukri was born in Beni Shiker in the Nadhor region of Morocco. He learned to read and write only at the age of twenty. He lives in Tangier.

Shukri's first autobiographical novel, *al-Khubz al-Hafi Sira Riwaʿiyya, 1935–1956* (For bread alone), details his difficult childhood and stirs the admiration of the reader for his efforts to overcome his circumstances. The extreme realism of Shukri's writings, reproducing the life of hunger, theft, drugs, and prostitution he experienced or observed around him, delayed the publication of his novel in Arabic for many years—the English translation by Paul Bowles, *For Bread Alone* (1973), appeared first. Shukri's collection of short stories *Majnun al-Ward* (1979; Enamored of roses) depicts city life in Morocco with the same harsh realism and a camera-eye technique; the words are even more poignant than the situations they describe, and have a stronger impact on the reader.

The second volume of Shukri's autobiography, *Zaman al-Akhta* (The time of mistakes) was published in 1992; its fourth edition has a different title, *Al-Shuttar* (2000; Streetwise). Abandoning the fictionalized narrative of *For Bread Alone,* Shukri stays closer to reality made vibrant through the use of the present tense, and the forthrightness in speech that characterized his earlier book reappears. Autobiographical information also figures in Shukri's fiction works such as *al-Suq al-Dakhili* (1985; The inner market), where he evokes with his usual blunt and uninhibited style the intimate details of day and night life in Tangier.

Shukri's oeuvre extends beyond the novel. His account of Jean Genet and Tennessee Williams's visit to Tangier was later translated into French by Mohammed el-Ghoulabzouri under the title *Jean Genet et Tennessee Williams à Tangier* (1992). His literary assessment of his contemporary Arab and Western authors (as well as his own work) is found in *Ghiwayat al-Shahrur al-Abyad* (1998; The seduction of the white sparrow). Shukri has also published two plays, *al-Talqa al-Akhira* (1980; The last bullet) and *al-Saʿada* (1994; Happiness).

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN.

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AIDA A. BAMIA

SHULTZ, GEORGE

[1920–]

U.S. secretary of state, 1982 to 1989.

George Shultz was born in New York City on 13 December 1920. He earned an economics B.A. from Princeton in 1942, and a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1949. During World War II he joined the Marine Corps Reserve. Shultz pursued an academic career at MIT, as a member of the U.S. Senate staff, and at the University of Chicago. In the late 1960s he started his political career as secretary of labor and then director of the Office of Management and Budget.

While secretary of the treasury in the administration of U.S. president Richard Nixon, George Shultz was confronted with the Oil Crisis. During a business career he established a solid economic knowledge of the Middle East. Following Alexander Haig as the second secretary of state of the administration of Ronald Reagan, Shultz had to tackle the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and the Israeli invasion within the Lebanese civil war. His time in office as secretary of state was marked by the final stages of the Cold War, from a deterioration of relations up to the beginning of the U.S.–Soviet honeymoon in the short period before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Despite Israeli–U.S. tensions that flared over the Reagan Plan, which linked Palestinian self-rule with Jordan, and escalated during the Lebanon invasion and the Pollard spy case, bilateral relations between Israel and the United States were largely improved as—due to the political wills of Shultz and Reagan—Israel was declared a strategic ally.

The Iran-Contra Affair and the clandestine U.S. involvement in the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan were not shaped by Shultz. New approaches in engaging an Arab-Israeli peace process were only possible shortly after his term in office, when the end of the Cold War and the Kuwait crisis profoundly reshaped the political landscape of the Middle East.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1982); REAGAN, RONALD.

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OLIVER BENJAMIN HEMMERLE

SHUMAYYIL, SHIBLI

[1850–1917]

Syrian medical scholar and intellectual.

Born in Syria to a Christian family, Shibli Shumayyil was one of the first graduates of the Syrian Protestant College's medical school in Beirut. He completed his medical studies in Paris and settled in Egypt to practice medicine and write numerous articles on medicine and on social and scientific theories. He was particularly influenced by Charles Darwin, using the evolutionist's ideas to formulate his ideas on the unity of being and natural laws in human society. He denounced despotism as unnatural and false. Also influenced by the thought of philosophers Herbert Spencer and Ludwig Büchner, Shumayyil criticized nationalism and all forms of exclusive solidarity because they divided human society. He preached universalism and liberalism and so gave measured support to the Young Turk movement. Like his contemporary, the Lebanese Farah Antun, Shumayyil sought the theoretical basis for a secular state that would promote a society where Christians and Muslims would be equal.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

SHUQAYRI, AHMAD

[1908–1980]

Diplomat, activist, and first head of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Ahmad Shuqayri was a Palestinian born in Tibnin, Lebanon, while his father, the Islamic judge Shaykh Asʿad Shuqayri, was living there in exile. Ahmad returned to the family's home town of Acre in 1916. After studies there and in Jerusalem, he entered the American University of Beirut in 1926 but was expelled by French Mandate authorities the following year for Arab nationalist activities. Following his return to Palestine, he studied law and wrote for a newspaper; after graduating from college, he went to work in the law offices of the nationalist figure Awni Abd al-Hadi and became involved in the pan-Arab nationalist Istiqlal Party. During the 1930s,

Shuqayri put his legal skills to work on behalf of Palestinians charged by the British with security offenses. He fled Palestine for Cairo following the end of the Palestine Arab Revolt, returning only at the end of World War II. During the late 1940s, he was appointed head of the Arab Higher Committee's Arab Information Office in Washington and later headed the central Arab Information Office in Jerusalem. He fled to Lebanon during the 1948 fighting.

In exile, Shuqayri rose to become a leading Arab diplomatic figure during the 1950s and early 1960s. He served in the Syrian delegation to the United Nations from 1949 to 1950 before being appointed assistant general secretary of the League of Arab States (Arab League) from 1950 to 1957. He then served the government of Saudi Arabia as minister of state for UN affairs and as its UN representative until he was dismissed in 1963 for disagreeing with the Saudis over Egyptian intervention in the first Yemeni Civil War. Shuqayri began to play a major role in Palestinian nationalist affairs in September 1963, when he was asked to serve as the representative of Palestine at the Arab League. At the Arab summit of January 1964, he was asked to begin investigating the possibility of creating a uniquely Palestinian organization. That February, Shuqayri called for the convening of a Palestine National Council in East Jerusalem. At that meeting the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created, with Shuqayri as its head. The PLO sought to mobilize Palestinians politically and militarily. It established offices in several Arab countries and worked to raise men to serve in the PLO's fighting force, the Palestine Liberation Army, brigades of which were attached to the armies of Syria, Iraq, and Egypt.

Shuqayri and the PLO remained close to Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Arab regimes. Far from a revolutionary organization, the PLO consisted of conservatives and nationalists willing to work with the regimes in liberating Palestine in coordination with overall Arab strategies toward Israel. Younger Palestinian militants, such as those in the al-Fatah organization, believed instead in a policy of independent, guerrilla-style struggle. Israel's massive defeat of Arab forces during the Arab–Israel War of June 1967 rendered the policies of the Arab states and the PLO bankrupt in the eyes of many Palestinians. For them, Shuqayri's elegant and sometimes heated rhetoric about liberation contrasted starkly with his failure and that of the established Arab elites. Associated with Nasser and the catastrophe of defeat, and facing criticism for his administration of the PLO, Shuqayri resigned on 24 December 1967.

He lived thereafter in Cairo until his opposition to the 1978 Camp David Accords prompted him to leave Egypt and move to Tunisia. He died in Amman, Jordan, while receiving medical treatment there on 25 February 1980, and was buried in the Jordan Valley just across the cease-fire line from his native country.

See also Abd al-Hadi Family; Arab Higher Committee (Palestine); Arab–Israel War (1967); Camp David Accords (1978); Fatah, al-; Istiqlal Party: Palestine; League of Arab States; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palestine National Council; Shuqayri Family.

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Michael R. Fischbach

SHUQAYRI, ASʿAD AL-

See Shuqayri Family

SHUQAYRI FAMILY

Prominent Palestinian family from Acre.

In the late nineteenth century, the Shuqayris emerged among the elites of Acre, one of the fastest-growing Palestinian cities of the time. They were landowners, Ottoman administrators, and religious officials. The family's prominence continued into the twentieth century. Asʿad Shuqayri (1860–1940), mufti of Acre, served on the Shariʿa Inquiries Court at Istanbul and as mufti for the Fourth Army during World War I. Opposed to the anti-Zionist

movement, Asʿad sold several hundred *dunums* of the family's land near Haifa to Zionists in the 1930s.

The family was associated with the Nashashibi-led National Defense party. Another member of the family, Dr. Anwar al-Shuqayri (?–1939), was assassinated by members of the opposing Husayni party in 1939. Asʿad's son Ahmad Shuqayri (1908–1980), a lawyer, edited the newspaper *Mir'at al-Sharq* for two years and was a founder of the Istiqlal Party in 1931. In the 1940s Ahmad became known as a feisty nationalist, taking on several leading political roles. In the 1950s he represented Syria and Saudi Arabia at the United Nations and in the 1960s was chosen Palestinian delegate to the Arab League. He founded the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964.

See also ISTIQLAL PARTY: PALESTINE; SHUQAYRI, AHMAD.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

SHURA

A consultative council.

The first recorded *shura* in Islamic history was called by Caliph Umar in 644 to choose his successor. The choice of later caliphs, although usually designated by their predecessor, was customarily ratified by a *shura* of family members and political leaders. The *shura* soon became generalized as an Islamic tradition of leaders consulting members of a community or family and asking them to reach consensus on troublesome issues.

The term *shura* has been used throughout the Middle East in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to confer traditional legitimacy on a variety of modern representative councils. The Ottomans applied the term to many of the administrative councils created by the nineteenth-century Tanzimat reforms. Political groups in twentieth-century Arab states, particularly around the Gulf, have based their demands for representative bodies on injunctions in the Qurʾan that men should conduct their affairs through *shura*, or consultation, with others.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

SHUSTER, W. MORGAN

[1877–1960]

Financial adviser to Persia in the early twentieth century.

W. Morgan Shuster, an American publisher, financier, and lawyer, was born in Washington, D.C. After attending Columbia College and Law School, Shuster worked for the War Department and the Cuban Customs Service from 1898 to 1901. He then served in a variety of posts in the Philippines from 1901 to 1909, after which he became a banker. From May 1911 to January 1912, he was treasurer general and financial adviser in Persia (now Iran). In 1915 Shuster became president of the Century Corporation in New York City, a post he held until 1933 when he became the president and chief executive officer of Appleton-Century-Croft. In an effort to rationalize Persia's finances, the Majles (legislature) hired Shuster upon the recommendation of the U.S. State Department and with the consent of Russia. Described by some as lacking in tact and courtesy, Shuster immediately organized a Treasury Gendarmerie to collect taxes, some from prominent Russian officials. Shuster chose Major C. B. Stokes, a devoted friend of Persia and former British military attaché, to head this new treasury police force. The Russian legation opposed this appointment, leading the British to post Stokes to India. Shuster's successful opposition to the Russian-supported restoration of Muhammad Ali as shah earned him additional enmity from that quarter.

The British also viewed Shuster's activities as hostile to Anglo-Russian understandings regarding

Persia, dating from the agreement of 1907. This opposition came to a head in November 1911 when Shuster ordered the confiscation of property owned by the former shah's brother, Shoa al-Saltana, then living in exile in Russia. The Russian consul general, claiming that Saltana's assets were owed to the Russian bank, sent an armed force often Russian-trained Persian cossacks to prevent Shuster from taking control of the property. Shuster responded with a larger force. This led to the Russian demand of 5 November for an apology; Persia apologized, but then Russia demanded Shuster's removal. For a time the Majles rejected this demand, and Persian nationalists attacked Russian troops in Tabriz and Rasht. There was also a boycott of Russian goods and the assassination of a pro-Russian minister. Russia responded with force, hanging a number of nationalists and sending troops to Tehran. In early December, the Majles again rejected the demand of Shuster's removal, but it finally yielded to Russian pressure and that of the powerful Bakhtiari tribe on 20 December. Shuster left Persia in January 1912 to pursue his other interests.

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR

SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY

See GLOSSARY

SIB, TREATY OF (1920)

Treaty between the sultanate and imamate in Oman.

A British-mediated undertaking signed 25 September 1920, by the rival sultanate and imamate governments in Oman. Ending seven years of warfare, it recognized both regimes' mutual autonomy and initiated a peace lasting until 1955. Subsequently, it was used unsuccessfully to justify the creation of a fully independent imamate in Oman's interior.

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ROBERT G. LANDEN

SIDARA

See GLOSSARY

SIDERA, ZINEB

[1963–]

London-based multimedia artist of Algerian origin.

Sidera's video installations and photographic work center on displacement and exile; they draw on her own experience being born in France to immigrant Algerian parents and moving to Britain. She trained at the Slade School of Art, Central Saint Martin's School of Art, and Royal College of Art in England, where she lives and works. Women, the veil, the gaze, and memory are some of the themes that emerge in her artistic exploration of the shifting subject positions that are part of the immigrant and exile experience, especially among Muslim and Arab women living in the West. Like many other artists from Arab countries living in exile, Sidera is particularly concerned with capturing the personal and political paradoxes and contradictions of living within and between cultures and finds the veil a useful way to do so. In many of her works, she examines the ways in which veiling has carried multiple meanings—from the history and legacy of the Algerian encounter with French colonialism to its place within individual and family life. Sidera also explores what she has called "the veiling of the mind"—the process of censorship and self-censorship within individuals and societies. Through photographs of herself veiled and veiling, or photographs of her own gaze (marked off by obscuring the edges of the work as if it were being seen by a veiled viewer), she challenges stereotypes of the submissive veiled woman while at the same time showing how the veil becomes a sign of backwardness and a vehicle of submission. The ambiguous meanings of visible and invisible veiling are a metaphor for her own restless experience of migration and exile, and for the complicated questions she has encountered therein.

See also ALGERIA: OVERVIEW; ART.

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JESSICA WINEGAR

SIDON

Syrian seaport city.

Sidon (in Arabic, Sayda, Saida, or Sayida) was an ancient Mediterranean seaport city founded by the Phoenicians during the third millennium B.C.E. and ruled in turn by Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Alexandrian Greeks, Syrian Seleucids, Egyptian Ptolemys, Romans, Arabs, Crusaders, and Ottomans. Located on the coast of present-day southwestern Lebanon, its name derives from *sayd* (*fishing* in Semitic languages), referring to murex marine snail *(Murex brandaris)* fishing, from which the famous purple dye was extracted. Sidon is mentioned in ancient writings, including the Egyptian Amarna letters, inscriptions in the city of Ugarit, and in Homer's *Iliad.* The city's golden age was during the seventeenth century C.E., under Amir Fakhr al-Din II, when Sidon became a dynastic capital and a center for the dyeing and silk industries. Fakhr al-Din built castles, gardens, and inns to house foreign tradesmen. During this period, religious coexistence among Christians and Muslims was marked, and it is still reflected in Sidon's Great Mosque of Umar and the Maronite church, whose foundations date to Roman times. Rebuilt after a disastrous 1837 earthquake, Sidon remains a commercial, fishing, and agricultural market center for citrus fruit and vegetables. A petroleum refinery plant, light industry, and fishing provide important sources of livelihood for Sidon's 140,000 inhabitants (as of 2000), the majority of whom are Sunni Muslims.

GEORGE E. IRANI
UPDATED BY CHARLES C. KOLB

SIDQI, BAKR

[1885–1937]

Iraqi soldier and government official.

Bakr Sidqi carried out the first military coup in the period between the two world wars in the Arab Middle East. Sidqi fought in the Ottoman army in World War I and joined the Iraqi army in 1921. In August 1933, he gained national prominence as the commander of an army unit that killed some six hundred Assyrian villagers in Sumayl.

Sidqi's ruthlessness and decisiveness in putting down the Rumaytha Rebellion in 1935 served to enhance his prestige further. At the same time, he formed a secret alliance between himself and Yasin al-Hashimi's main rivals, Jamaʿat al-Ahali, the Ahali Group, led principally by Hikmat Sulayman. This culminated in a coup d'état, organized by Sidqi and Sulayman, which forced Yasin's government out of office on 29 October 1936. Sulayman became prime minister and appointed a largely Ahali or pro-Ahali cabinet, while Sidqi remained the power behind the regime. However, Sidqi's dictatorial style gradually lost him the confidence of al-Ahali, most of whom had resigned by May 1937. By this time, Sidqi had also managed to alienate many of his colleagues in the army, who organized his assassination at Mosul in northern Iraq on 11 August 1937.

See also AHALI GROUP; HASHIMI, YASIN AL-; SULAYMAN, HIKMAT.

PETER SLUGLETT

SIDQI, ISMAʿIL

[1875–1949]

Egyptian politician and prime minister.

Ismaʿil Sidqi was born into a bourgeois family in Alexandria. His father was a high government official. Sidqi graduated from the School of Law in Cairo, and began a career in government. He was a colleague of Saʿd Zaghlul, the leader of the Wafd party favoring autonomy for Egypt, and was exiled with the other Wafdists in 1919, but soon broke with Zaghlul and joined the Liberal Constitutionalist party in 1924.

When King Fuʾad dismissed the Wafd government in 1930, Sidqi was asked to form a new government. Sidqi quickly renounced his membership in the Liberal Constitutionalist party, suspended parliament, instituted press censorship, and abrogated the 1923 constitution, replacing it with a more conservative constitution. He next formed his own

political party, al-Shaʿb (The People), which he used to run in the 1931 elections. The Wafd and other liberal parties boycotted these elections in protest of Sidqi's autocratic rule. Throughout Sidqi's term as prime minister, there were frequent protest by nationalist politicians demanding the restoration of the 1923 constitution. Sidqi's policies, combined with the effects of the 1929 depression, made his rule very unpopular in Egypt, but the lack of unity among his opponents kept him in office.

By 1933, King Fuʾad felt that he had sufficiently weakened the Wafd and strengthened his own power that he could rule without Sidqi. Sidqi stepped down in September of 1933 and immediately joined the National Front, which called for the reinstatement of the 1923 constitution.

In February of 1946, Sidqi was again invited to form a government, which lasted until December of 1946, when he resigned on the grounds of bad health. During this year, Sidqi conducted negotiations with Britain about troop withdrawals. These negotiations were widely condemned by nationalists, particularly with regard to the threat to Egypt's position in the Sudan.

DAVID WALDNER

SIDRA, GULF OF

A body of water on the coast of Libya.

The Gulf of Sidra is located on the Mediterranean cost of Libya. Its coastline, 310 miles (500 km) of barren desert, forms an important geographical boundary between Libya's two major populated areas: Tripolitania, the western coastal region that shares many historical features with the Maghrib, and Cyrenaica, the eastern coastal region that has been more closely associated with the Arab states of the Middle East. This gulf then provides an important dividing line for the culture of the Maghrib and that of the Mashriq.

See also MAGHRIB.

STUART J. BORSCH

SILK

Fiber taken from the wrapping of silkworm cocoons.

Silk became an important textile product and luxury commodity in the Middle East from antiquity. Silk textiles came into the Middle East by trade from India and China. While Indian and Arab merchants sailed the Indian Ocean, Chinese merchants sent the fine cloth along the famous 4,000 mile (6,400 km) Silk Road—through central Asia and northern Iran to Europe. (Except for a few traders, rarely did any travel more than a short distance of the entire route.)

In the sixth century C.E., the Byzantines smuggled Chinese silk cocoons to Istanbul to begin their own mulberry groves and silkworm industry. Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq cultivated mulberry trees and silkworms as well. Parts of the Ottoman Empire, Bursa and Mount Lebanon, were important centers of silk-cocoon farming, and their fine silk textiles were loomed throughout the empire for both trade and imperial use. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many Middle Eastern silk weavers lost their trade because of French intervention during the mandate period and the appearance of increasingly inexpensive silk goods that were being produced in the industrialized nations and in Asia for world markets.

See also OTTOMAN EMPIRE; TEXTILE INDUSTRY; TRADE.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

SILVER, ABBA HILLEL

[1893–1963]

American Jewish leader.

Abba Hillel Silver was born in Lithuania. He was brought to the United States as a small child and raised in New York City's Yiddish-speaking immigrant milieu. He later studied at the University of Cincinnati and the Hebrew Union College, the

seminary of U.S. Reform Judaism. In 1917, Silver assumed the pulpit of The Temple—Tifereth Israel in Cleveland, Ohio, a position he maintained until his death.

During the 1930s, Silver was among the first U.S. Jewish leaders to denounce the Nazi Party in Germany, and he joined with Rabbi Stephen S. Wise in organizing a countrywide anti-Nazi boycott. With the escalation of violence against the Jews of Central Europe, Silver emerged as a spokesman for U.S. Zionism's militant camp. He publicly challenged the Franklin Roosevelt administration to do more to intervene on behalf of European Jews. After the outbreak of World War II, he emerged as U.S. Zionism's undisputed leader.

Silver brought energy and vigor to Zionist lobbying efforts in Washington, D.C., during the 1940s. He campaigned tirelessly for bipartisan support of a Jewish state in postwar Palestine and skillfully deployed U.S. Jewry's political leverage to advance Zionist interests. His efforts to increase public pressure on the Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman administrations marked a dramatic shift in U.S. Jewish policymaking.

MIA BLOOM
UPDATED BY MARK A. RAIDER

SIMAVI, SEDAT

[1896–1953]

Turkish newspaper and magazine publisher.

Sedat Simavi, born in Istanbul, was the son of a governor of Samsun and was descended on both sides of his family from grand viziers of the Ottoman Empire. After graduating from Galatasaray Lycée, he worked as a teacher for a few years, then in 1917 made two of Turkey's earliest films, *The Claw* and *The Spy.* He began his publishing career in 1916, with magazines like the political-humor weekly *Hande* and, in 1919, the slick, progressive monthly women's magazine *Inci.* Simavi published a variety of popular magazines between 1918 and 1939 on women, fashion, health, humor, and cinema.

Simavi is best known for founding the daily newspaper *Hürriyet,* in 1948. The first of the boulevard-type newspapers, emphasizing slick style, sensation, and personal stories, it reached a circulation of 30,000 in its first year and by the 1950s was Turkey's largest paper (it had supported the winner—the new Democrat party—in the 1950 elections). While *Hürriyet*'s circulation approached 700,000 in the 1970s, it declined in the 1980s to about 450,000, with stiff competition from newer newspapers like Sabah and the Simavi-owned *Günaydin.* After Simavi's death, his son Erol became editor of the paper. With other family members, including grandson Sedat Simavi, he heads a publishing empire that includes several top daily newspapers and magazines.

See also HÜRRIYET.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

SINAI PENINSULA

Triangular peninsula between the Mediterranean and Red seas.

The Sinai is the desert area of northeast Egypt that forms the land bridge between Africa and Asia. In the north it is a flat and sandy dune sheet. Rugged mountains, including the al-Tih Plateau and Egma Escarpment as well as Sinai Massif surrounding Gabal Musa, dominate the central and southern regions. The peninsula is bordered on the east by the State of Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba and on the west by the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Suez. To the north it is bordered by the Mediterranean and in the south it comes to a point extending into the Red Sea. The Sinai is hot year round: it has average highs of about 90°F (32°C) and average lows of about 60°F (15°C), but temperatures tend to be lower in the mountains of the south.

The term *Sinai* is an ancient one, derived possibly from the name of the Semitic moon god Sin. The peninsula has generally come under Egyptian domination since ancient times. According to the Bible, it was the area in which the Israelites wandered for forty years after their deliverance from slavery in Egypt, and the site of Mount Sinai, where Moses received the Ten Commandments. During the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Justinian (527–565),

the Eastern Orthodox Monastery of Saint Catherine was built at the foot of the legendary Mount Sinai, known as Gabal Musa (Mount Moses), in central Sinai. It remains an important attraction for pilgrims and tourists.

During the Middle Ages, the area was settled primarily by nomadic Bedouin tribes and loosely controlled by successive empires. It fell under the Ottoman Turks from 1517 until 1840. After Muhammad Ali broke with the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of London gave Muhammad Ali control over Egypt, but the Sinai remained under Ottoman administration. The British Colonial Office exerted its own rule over Egypt from 1882 and clashed with the Ottomans over specific areas of the Sinai. They managed to establish the eastern boundary as a line from al-Arish or Rafah to Aqaba. A line from Rafah to Aqaba became the southern boundary of the British Mandate territory of Palestine from 1922 to 1948. It remained the international border between Egypt and the new state of Israel from 1949 through June 1967, when Israel occupied the Sinai. During Israel's occupation, Jewish settlements were established in the Sinai, two major air force bases were constructed, and the Alma Oil Field was discovered and developed.

Under the 1978 Camp David Accords, phased Israeli withdrawals were undertaken in 1980 and 1982. The territory of Sinai was divided between four demilitarized zones, three in Egypt and one on the Israeli side of the border. Under the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), headquartered in the area of al-Gorah in northeast Sinai, has been established to observe and verify force reductions in the eastern zone, and to ensure free navigation through the Strait of Tiran.

The Sinai is now primarily divided between the two Egyptian governorates of North and South Sinai, with portions of the region abutting the Suez Canal attached to the governorates of Bur Saʿid, Ismailiyya, and Suez. The population of the peninsula was estimated at about 38,000 in 1948, mainly Bedouin; it had grown to about 140,000 by 1970, with the development of petroleum and manganese deposits plus the influx of Palestinian refugees. By 1994 the population of the peninsula had grown to approximately 270,000. Aggressive plans for resettlement and development of the region, most importantly the Salam Canal project in the north, have contributed to a rapidly increasing population base.

Along the northeastern coast of North Sinai is the city of al-Arish, the largest settlement in the Sinai with a population of well over 75,000. Along the southern coasts, several small resorts have emerged as important local centers, including Taba, Nuwayba, and Dahab on the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba, and the port of Sharm al-Shaykh on the Red Sea coast at the extreme southern end of the peninsula. The latter has played host to several high-level negotiations and Middle East summits since the early 1990s. It is also renowned as a diving resort for its spectacular coral reef and variety of tropical fish. The environmental significance of the area was recognized with the creation of nearby Ras Muhammed National Park in 1983.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON
UPDATED BY PAUL S. ROWE

ŞINASI, İBRAHIM

[1826–1871]

Ottoman intellectual.

İbrahim Şinasi's father was an army officer for the Ottoman Empire, and Şinasi himself became an army scribe after completing elementary school. He learned French, and in 1849 he was sent to Europe by the leading Tanzimat reformer, Mustafa Reşid Paşa. There he was influenced by such luminaries as Ernest Renan and Albert Lamartine, but when he returned to Turkey, he was unable to advance in the government and devoted himself to literary endeavors. The author of several plays and books of poetry, he was also a prominent journalist and the editor of *Tasvir-i Efkar* (Description of ideas), which began in 1862 and acted as a clearinghouse for the liberal Young Ottoman ideas then in vogue. Like

many of the Young Ottomans, Şinasi found himself at odds with the more autocratic Tanzimat officials of the day, including Ali Paşa and Fuad Paşa, and he was forced to leave Istanbul in 1864. He remained in Paris until his return to Istanbul shortly before his death.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

ŞIRKET-I HAYRIYE

Nineteenth-century Istanbul ferryboat company for the Bosporus Straits.

This was the first substantial joint-stock company established in the Ottoman Empire. It was founded in 1849 with two thousand shares and sixty thousand Turkish lire in capital with the support of Mustafa Reşid Paşa, one of the leaders of the mid-nineteenth-century reforms called Tanzimat. Created to provide ferry transport on the Bosporus in Istanbul, the company bought its boats for seven thousand Turkish lire each from a British company.

The company was promoted by Reşid Paşa as an example of new economic forms. To demonstrate the security of joint-stock companies, he encouraged several other government officials to invest in the ferryboat firm. Similar companies were soon founded in the 1850s, including the Bank-ı Osmani, the Aydin-İzmir Railroad, and Şirket-i Osmaniyyesi.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

SIRRY, GAZBIA

[1925–]

Egyptian painter.

Gazbia Sirry (also Jadhbiya Sirri) is one of the most prominent and influential painters in Egypt. Sirry trained at the Faculty of Fine Arts in Cairo and received additional tutelage in Paris under Marcel Gromaire as well as at the Slade School of Art in London. A prolific painter as well as an art educator, she has held more than fifty solo exhibitions, received many prizes both in Egypt and abroad, and established a fund in her name to support young Egyptian artists. Throughout her career, she has been concerned with the fusion of the personal with the social or political, describing her work as embodying her "sensual relationship with color" and her "obsession with the human condition." Sirry was a member of the Group of Modern Art in the 1950s, which adopted the ideology of modernization. Sirry's contribution was to portray nationalist subjects (e.g., martyrdom against British occupation; peasant mothers) in a figurative style inspired by pharaonic representation and also international Expressionism. With the increasing problems of the Nasserist regime and the Arab defeat in the 1967 war, Sirry took on grim subjects such as imprisonment, grief, and racial discrimination. In the 1970s and 1980s, her concerns shifted to crowded urban environments and, in contrast, the sparse landscapes of the desert and the sea. The changes in Sirry's subjects and styles parallel the ebbs and flows in the general outlook of Egyptian intellectuals toward politics and society during her career.

See also EFFLATOUN, INJI; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION.

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JESSICA WINEGAR

SISCO, JOSEPH

[1919–]

U.S. diplomat at the heart of Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy.

Educated in Illinois, Joseph Sisco gained his Ph.D. (University of Chicago) between periods of service in the army (1941–1945) and in the CIA (1950–1951). From 1951 to 1968 he worked at the State Department on UN affairs, then was appointed assistant secretary for Near East and South Asian affairs in 1968 and undersecretary of state for political affairs in 1974. By that time, Sisco was Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's key adviser on the Middle East, and third in seniority in the State Department. From 1968 to 1976 Sisco played a key role in attempts to mediate between Israel and neighboring Arab states, notably the series of interim peace settlements reached through U.S. *shuttle diplomacy*—a term Kissinger attributed to Sisco underscoring the role of American mediators flying between enemies that refuse to meet.

Sisco had not served in the Middle East and did not speak Arabic, and he began his term as assistant secretary for Near East affairs with a personnel reshuffle that some saw as marginalizing its "Arabist" diplomats. Both Arab and Israeli critics claimed that Sisco's attempts to forge realistic interpretations of UN Resolution 242 were biased, but the shuttles nevertheless proved crucial in the 1974 and 1975 disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel.

Sisco later became a member of several company and university boards, president of American University, chairman of the American Academy of Diplomacy, and a partner in the management consultancy Sisco Associates. He coauthored a Trilateral Commission report on the peace process in 1981, and was a regular commentator on Mideast policy thereafter.

See also KISSINGER, HENRY.

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GEORGE R. WILKES

SISTAN AND BALUCHISTAN

Province in the southeast of Iran.

The formerly separate provinces of Sistan and Baluchistan united in 1959 to form one administrative unit (Baluchistan is also a contiguous Pakistani province). The region is fertile but has a hot, arid climate. The Helmand is the principal river and the source for agriculture in the region. Major cities include Zahedan (the capital), Zabol, and Iranshahr. Although each province has a separate but intertwined history, the ethnic groups residing in each are distinct. The population of Baluchistan is composed mainly of Baluchi tribespeople who speak Baluchi, a western Iranian language now heavily influenced by eastern regional languages. Standard Persian is more common in Sistan, but the eastern language known as Sistani is still spoken to some extent. According to the 1996 census, the population of the combined province was 1,722,579.

See also BALUCHISTAN.

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PARVANEH POURSHARIATI

SISTANI, ALI AL-

[1930–]

Leading Shiʿite cleric in Iraq.

The most senior Shiʿite cleric in Iraq by early 2004, Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani is actually an Iranian who, despite having lived in Iraq for decades, speaks Arabic with a heavy Persian accent. Al-Sistani was born in Mashhad, Iran, to a family of well-known Shiʿite religious figures. His father was Mohammad Baqir, and his grandfather was a famous cleric known as Sayyid Ali. Al-Sistani studied theology in Qom, Iran, and first traveled to al-Najaf, Iraq, in 1951 to continue his studies. He lived in al-Najaf for most of the rest of his life.

By 1960 he had been certified as a *mujtahid,* one of the few Shiʿa permitted to interpret Islamic practice. Al-Sistani eventually obtained the rank of grand ayatullah *(ayatullah uzma).* After the death of Grand Ayatullah Abu al-Qasim al-Kho'i (1899–1992)

in 1992, al-Sistani was the unquestioned leading Shiʿite in Iraq. He also became the sold surviving *marja al-taqlid* (source of imitation) for Shiʿa worldwide.

The breakdown of security in Iraq following the American invasion in March 2003 led to the death of two potential rivals for influence among Iraq's Shiʿa. Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (1939–2003), leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, returned from two decades of exile in Iran only to be killed in a massive bombing in al-Najaf in August 2003. Another potential rival was killed earlier in April 2003: Abd al-Majid al-Kho'i (1962–2003), son of the Grand Ayatullah Abu al-Qasim al-Kho'i.

The clear leading figure among Iraqi Shiʿa by late 2003, al-Sistani was in a position to influence the United States' attempt to politically reconstruct the country. Unlike some of his contemporaries, including Iran's late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, with whom he studied when they were both young, al-Sistani called for maintaining the separation of politics and religion. Although he made it clear that he wanted U.S. forces to leave the country as soon as possible, he urged the Shiʿa not to resist them. Since then he has pointedly refused to meet with U.S. government representatives, but has granted audiences to others from his secluded residence. It was his opinion that prompted the U.S. to allow the UN a greater role in Iraq's reconstruction as well as to allow a constitution to be written prior to elections (which he urged be held as soon as possible). Al-Sistani's influence was also what prompted a last-minute delay in the signing of the new, interim Iraqi constitution in early March 2004.

See also KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH; MARJA AL-TAQLID; NAJAF, AL-; QOM; WAR IN IRAQ (2003).

MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

SITRA

One of the thirty-three islands in the Bahrain archipelago.

Sitra lies in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, just off the northeast corner of Bahrain, the main island, to which it is connected by a short bridge. On Sitra are located the petroleum loading terminal and tank farm belonging to the Bahrain Petroleum Company, as well as a small number of date palm gardens and a limited amount of cropland at the northern end of its eleven square miles (28 sq. km).

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FRED H. LAWSON

SITT

See GLOSSARY

SIVAS CONFERENCE (1919)

Convened (4–11 September 1919) to resist plans of the Triple Entente to dismember the Ottoman Empire; a significant step in the progression of events leading to the Turkish revolution.

The official communiqué issued by the Sivas Conference was the first Turkish declaration against the partitioning of lands under Ottoman sovereignty that had taken place when the Mudros Armistice was signed. The same document summoned the sultan to call for a general election and announced the creation of the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, whose Representative Committee was designated to act as a provisional government in Anatolia until May 1920.

AHMET KUYAS

SIWA OASIS

Oasis in northwest Egypt.

The Siwa oasis, 186 miles (300 km) west of Marsa Matruh, had an estimated population of 23,000 in 2002. In ancient times Siwa was the seat of the oracle of Jupiter Ammon, visited by Alexander the Great in 331 B.C.E. It has historically served as both Egypt's western boundary and the easternmost area inhabited by Berbers. The spoken Siwan dialect is a Berber language heavily influenced by Arabic. In the nineteenth century it was one of the centers of the Sanusi Order, and some fighting took place there during World War I. The people of Siwa pride themselves on their differences from other Egyptians and

their ability to resolve disputes without resort to bloodshed. The oasis is a center for date palm agriculture. Formerly isolated, it has become accessible by motor transport and is now being developed for tourism. Siwa is also the name of a town in the southern part of the oasis.

See also SANUSI ORDER.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

SLAVE TRADE

The buying and selling of humans for servitude was an old tradition in the Middle East as in many other parts of the world.

Since antiquity, slavery was an integral part of the various societies that inhabited the Middle East. Men, women, and children were enslaved within these lands or imported into them from neighboring and faraway regions. From the early sixteenth to the early twentieth centuries, the Middle East was part of the Ottoman Empire, in which slavery was legal and the slave trade active. The traffic in slaves was substantially reduced toward the end of the nineteenth century, and slavery died out in most of the Middle East during the first decade of the twentieth. In certain parts of Arabia, the practice lingered on well into the second half of this century, and various forms of slavery continue to exist even today.

"Slavery" in Middle Eastern—and other—societies can be difficult to define. Some attempts to answer the question "who is a slave?" have resulted in "one whose labor is controlled and whose freedom is withheld," a person "in a state of legal and actual servility or [who is] of slave origins," or a "natally alienated and generally dishonored person" under "permanent, violent domination." In Islamic legal terms, slavery grants one person ownership over another person, which means that the owner has rights to the slave's labor, property, and sexuality and that the slave's freedoms are severely restricted. But in sociocultural terms, slavery sometimes meant high social status, or political power, for male slaves in the military and bureaucracy (Mamluks and *kuls*) and female slaves in elite harems. Even ordinary domestic slaves were often better fed, clothed, and protected than many free men and women. In any event, slavery was an important, albeit involuntary, channel of recruitment and socialization into the elite and a major—though forced—means of linking into patronage networks.

Slavery gradually became a differentiated and broadly defined concept in many Islamic societies since the introduction of military slaves into the Abbasid Caliphate in the ninth century. In the Ottoman Empire, military-administrative servitude, better known as the *kul* system, coexisted with other types of slavery: harem (quite different from Western fantasy), domestic, and agricultural (on a rather limited scale). While the latter types of slavery remained much the same until late in the nineteenth century, the *kul* system underwent profound changes.

From its inception, the *kul* system was nourished on periodical levies of the unmarried, able-bodied, male children of the sultan's Orthodox Christian subjects, mostly from the Balkans. This child levy was known as the *devşirme.* The children were reduced to slavery, converted to Islam, and rigorously socialized at the palace school into various government roles, carrying elite status. However, freeborn Muslims gradually entered government service, and the *kul* system evolved to accommodate this change. Ultimately, the child levy was abandoned during the seventeenth century, the palace school lost its monopoly on the reproduction of military-administrative slaves, and a new, *kul*-type recruitment-cum-socialization pattern came to prevail.

With the evolution of the *kul* system, the classification of *kuls* as slaves was gradually becoming irrelevant. Ottoman officials of *kul* origins and training held elevated, powerful positions with all rights, privileges, and honors, and cases in which the sultan confiscated their property or took their life became increasingly rare. Whereas *kuls* and non-*kuls*

were subject to the sultan's "whims" to the same extent, the intimacy and mutual reliance of the master-slave relationship often provided the *kul* with greater protection than that enjoyed by free officials. Harem women of slave origins were in much the same predicament, playing a major role in the reproduction of the Ottoman elite. Toward the nineteenth century, the servility of persons in the *kul*/harem category becomes more a symbol of their high status and less a practical or legal disability. All that has led some scholars to question the very use of the term "slaves" for such men and women. In any event, the Hatt-i Serif of Gülhane of 1839 freed government officials from the last vestiges of servility attached to their status.

In the Ottoman Middle East, and with local modifications also in other Muslim societies, there was a continuum of various degrees of servility rather than a dichotomy between slave and free. At one end of that continuum were domestic and agricultural slaves, the "real slaves" in Ottoman society, while at the other were officeholders in the army and bureaucracy, with little to tie them to actual slavery. In between, but close to officeholders and far from domestic and agricultural slaves, came officials of slave origins (*kul*-type) and then harem ladies of slave origins.

The overwhelming majority of the slaves living in the Middle East during the Ottoman period were female, black, and domestic; they served in menial jobs in households across a broad social spectrum. A smaller number of white female slaves also worked in similar circumstances, as did a number of black and white male slaves. African male slaves were employed in the Red Sea, Persian/Arabian Gulf, and Indian Ocean as pearl divers, oarsmen, and crew members in sailboats, in Arabia as agricultural laborers (in date, coffee, and other plantations) and outdoor servants, and in Egypt as cotton pickers in the 1860s. African men were used as soldiers in scattered instances in Yemen and other parts of Arabia, as in Egypt where the experiment of Muhammad Ali Pasha to recruit Sudanese slave soldiers failed. *Kul* and harem slaves were a relatively small minority among Middle Eastern slaves in the nineteenth century.

At the time, a fairly steady stream of about eleven thousand to thirteen thousand slaves per year entered the region from central Africa and the Sudan, from western Ethiopia, and from Circassia, Abkhazia, and Georgia. They were brought in by caravan and boat via the Sahara desert routes, the Ethiopian plateau, the Red Sea, the Nile river valley, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, the Black Sea, and the pilgrimage routes to and from Arabia. After raids, sales, and resales, they reached their final destinations in the great urban centers of the Middle East, where they were sold in markets or in private homes of slave dealers.

Whereas slaveholding was still legal at the beginning of the twentieth century, the slave trade into the region had already been prohibited by law for several decades. The traffic in Africans and Caucasians practically died down, although it would pick up from time to time on a small scale. Slavery was gradually being transformed into free forms of service-cum-patronage, such as raising freeborn children (mostly female) in the household, socializing them into lower- or upper-class roles—as talent and need determined—and later marrying them off and setting them up in life. Ottoman elite culture was articulating a negative attitude toward the practice and gradually disengaging from it on moral grounds. This was a significant development, given the fact that slavery enjoyed Islamic legitimacy and wide social acceptance in the Middle East and that, except for cases of cruelty and ill-usage, it was a matter over which no serious moral debate ever arose.

The profound change that occurred was part of a major reform program introduced into the Middle East during the nineteenth century. Much of this happened during the Tanzimat (loosely covering the 1830s to the 1880s), generally regarded as a period of change in many areas of Ottoman life, although it is not certain how deeply the reforms affected the over-whelming majority of the population or even the peripheral groups within the Ottoman elite. Visible changes in the army, the bureaucracy, the economy, law and justice, education, communication, transportation, and public health went along with the reinvigoration of central authority. This was the work of a strongly motivated, Ottoman-centered group of reformers, who implemented their own program and political agenda and were not merely the tools of Western influence. While the government came to possess more efficient

means of repression, its reforms also sowed the seeds of political change, giving rise to a strong constitutional movement, although the extent to which Western ideas—not just technology and fashion—were assimilated into Middle Eastern culture is still under debate.

Having abolished slavery by the end of the first third of the nineteenth century, the powers of Europe now turned their zeal to slavery in the Americas. But in the 1840s, the British government and public opinion were already beginning to take an interest in the abolition of slavery in the Ottoman Middle East. Attempts to induce Istanbul to adopt measures to that effect soon proved futile. Instead—and as an alternative method that would ultimately choke slavery for want of supply—a major effort was launched to suppress the slave trade into the region. The essence of that long-term British drive was to extract from the Ottomans, on humanitarian grounds, edicts forbidding the trade in Africans and Caucasians. The implementation of such edicts was then carefully monitored by British diplomatic and commercial representatives throughout the Middle East and reported back to London. In turn, London would press Istanbul to enforce the edicts, and so on.

This pattern yielded the prohibition of the slave trade in the Gulf in 1847, the temporary prohibition of the traffic in Circassians and Georgians in 1854–1855, the general prohibition of the African slave trade in 1857, the Anglo-Egyptian convention for the suppression of the slave trade in 1877, and the Anglo-Ottoman one in 1880. The campaign reached its climax in the Brussels Act against the slave trade, which the Ottoman government signed in 1890. From the mid-1850s onward, Caucasian slavery and slave trade were excluded from the realm of Anglo-Ottoman relations. In that area, the Ottomans initiated some major changes, acting alone and according to their own views.

One of the most important factors that shaped Ottoman policy toward Caucasian slavery was the large number of Circassian refugees—estimates run from 500,000 to 1 million—who entered Ottoman territory from the mid-1850s to the mid-1860s. That Russian-forced migration contained about 10 percent unfree agricultural population, which put the question of non-African slavery into a different perspective. Increased tensions between refugee owners and slaves, at times causing violence and disturbance of public order, induced the Ottoman government in 1867 to design a special program for slaves who wished to obtain their freedom. Using an Islamic legal device, the government granted the slaves the land they were cultivating in order to purchase manu-mission from their own masters.

In 1882, the authorities moved further in the same method to facilitate the conscription of Circassian and Georgian slaves. Such a step was necessary because only free men could be drafted into the army. Measures were also taken from the mid-1860s onward to restrict the traffic in Circassian and Georgian children, mostly young girls. Thus, by the last decade of the nineteenth century, the trade in Caucasian slaves was considerably reduced. The remaining demand was maintained only by the harems of the imperial family and the households of well-to-do elite members. The imperial harem at the time contained about 400 women in a wide array of household positions quite different from those consigned to them by Western fantasy. Those harems also continued to employ eunuchs, and as late as 1903, the Ottoman family alone owned 194 of them. In the nineteenth century, a perceived decline occurred in their political influence, both as individuals and as a distinct corps in court politics. Whether officially abolished by the 1908 revolution, or only later by the new Turkish republic, Ottoman slavery died piecemeal, not abruptly, with the end of the empire.

Except for the issue of equality for non-Muslims, the call for the abolition of slavery was perhaps the most sensitive and culturally loaded topic processed in the Tanzimat period. Although it was rarely debated in the open, this was a matter of daily and personal concern, for both the public and private spheres of elite life were permeated by slaves on all levels. Faced with British diplomatic pressure to suppress the slave trade into the Middle East and with the zeal of Western abolitionism, Ottoman reformers and thinkers responded on both the political and the ideological planes. However, that response came when slavery was already on the wane, doomed to disappear with other obsolete institutions.

See also MAMLUKS; TANZIMAT.

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EHUD R. TOLEDANO

SMILANSKY, MOSHE

[1874–1953]

Israeli author, peace advocate, and agricultural pioneer.

Moshe Smilansky was born in Kiev province in Russian Ukraine to a family of farmers. He emigrated to Palestine in 1891 and helped to found the Hadera settlement, farming in various places before settling in Rehovot in 1893. There he spent the remainder of his life as a citrus plantation owner, writer, and agricultural leader (heading the Histadrut ha-Ikarim, or Farmers' Association). A disciple of Ahad Ha-Am, he took issue with Theodor Herzl's political Zionism and sought coexistence with Arabs throughout his career, gaining prominence among the binationalists after the 1936 Arab uprising.

Smilansky's Hebrew stories depicting Arab life, written under the pseudonym Khawaja Musa, were collected in a single volume entitled *Benei Arav* (1964; Arab sons). Through his writing, Smilansky hoped to show the benefits of cooperation between Arabs and Jewish pioneers. His most famous works on the pioneers are the six-volume *Perakim be-Toledot ha-Yishuv* (1959; Chapters in the history of the Yishuv) and the four-volume *Mishpahat ha-Adamah* (1943–1953; Family of the soil). His works were highly criticized at the time, but have had greater impact on students of Hebrew literature since. His son is the noted writer S. Yizhar.

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ANN KAHN
UPDATED BY GEORGE R. WILKES

SNEH, MOSHE

[1909–1972]

Israeli politician and statesman.

Born in Poland where he became an active Zionist, Moshe Sneh emigrated to Israel in 1940. He was active against British anti-Zionist policy, and was chief of the Haganah high command from 1941 to 1946. Between 1945 and 1946 Sneh was a member of the Jewish Agency's executive committee, but he resigned in 1946 when they decided to refrain from further sabotage against the British occupation forces in Palestine. He served as director of the Jewish Agency's European office from 1946 to 1947. Sneh was also a physician active in the Zionist movement in its early years, and later in the MAPAM party. From 1949 to 1965 he was a member of the Knesset from Maki, the Israeli communist party, and editor of its daily newspaper. In the Knesset Sneh advocated self-determination for the Palestinian nation and recognition of Palestinian rights to a state of their own. After being out of the Knesset from 1965 to 1969 he was reelected in 1969 and served until his death in 1972.

See also ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN.

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WALTER F. WEIKER
UPDATED BY GREGORY S. MAHLER

SOBOL, YEHOSHUA

[1939–]

Israeli playwright.

The plays of Yehoshua Sobol reflect common Israeli themes, including the Holocaust, the Zionist state-building enterprise, and the Arab-Israel conflict. A graduate of the Sorbonne in Paris, Sobol has worked as artistic director of the Haifa Municipal Theater since 1984, and most of his plays have premiered there. His most famous work is *Ghetto* (1984), one of three related plays about the Vilna ghetto. Other works include *Soul of a Jew* (1982), *The Days to Come* (1971), and *Shooting Magda,* or *The Palestinian Girl* (1985). Sobol has made it his artistic mission to explore the problematic roots of the Zionist project, as he did most forcefully in his 1977 production, *Night of the Twentieth,* and to show the consequences for both Jews and Arabs of succumbing to political interests rather than fulfilling nationalist ideals. Many of his later plays, such as *Kefar* (1996), have also probed the difficulties of trying to assimilate personal lives into paradigms created by historical developments. Looking at history as a way of examining contemporary Israeli society, Sobol is particularly interested in the intersection between the personal—even the emotional—and the political. His plays emphasize that while Zionist ideals could not extinguish personal desires, they did complicate the formation of strong, secure individual identities. *Almah* (1999) extends his focus on individual personality by meditating on the life of Alma Mahler Gropius Werfel and her torturous efforts to form an authentic, creative public life. Sobol's plays, always sensitive to the morally problematic compromises imposed upon by history and circumstance, have been produced all over the world and in many languages.

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JULIE ZUCKERMAN
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SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN

Political party in Iranian Azerbaijan.

The Firqa-ye Ijtimaʿiyun-e Ammiyun (Social democratic party), also called *Mujahid,* was active mainly in Iranian Azerbaijan. It may have been an offshoot of the Adalat (Justice) party, a nominally social democratic, but actually anticolonial, organization formed in 1904/05 by Azerbaijanis in Baku (on the Caspian Sea) who were involved in the social democratic party Hümmet (Endeavor). Adalat was created for workers from Iran employed in the Baku petroleum industry.

In August or September 1906, members of the founding committee of the party established a "secret center" in Tabriz, then cells in Ardebil, Rasht, and Enzeli; these organizations apparently remained under the direction of a central committee in Baku. The party program demanded a constitution in Iran, ministerial responsibility to the Majles (Iran's legislature), establishment of universal suffrage, and civil liberties. It pointed to Qurʾanic precedents and the example of "every civilized state of Europe and Asia."

The party was apparently suppressed around 1909 but served as a model to the later Communist Tudeh Party.

See also ADALAT PARTY; TUDEH PARTY.

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AUDREY L. ALTSTADT

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY

Center-left political party in Turkey, 1985 to 1998.

The Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçi Partisi, or SHP) was formed in November 1985 as a result of the merger of two left-of-center parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), founded in 1983 by Erdal İnönü, and Necdet Calp's Populist Party, which also was founded in 1983. In the parliamentary elections of November 1983 the Populist Party had won the second largest number of seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The SDP had been banned from participating in those elections, but the National Security Council did allow it take part in the 1984 local elections, and it emerged at the local level as the main opposition to the ruling Motherland Party of Turgut Özal. The Populist Party received less than 10 percent of the vote in the local elections and thus won no seats on the municipal councils, although it remained the main opposition to the Motherland Party within the National Assembly. Because they espoused a similar political ideology and appealed to the same voting constituency, the two parties joined to form the SHP. İnönü became the chair of the SHP, which presented itself as an heir to the Republican People's Party (CHP), which had been founded by his father, İsmet İnönü, and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In the 1991 parliamentary elections the SHP emerged as the third largest party in the National Assembly, with 88 seats. Subsequently, it joined with the True Path Party of Süleyman Demirel as the junior partner in a coalition government. The SHP's participation in this coalition became controversial because a small group of SHP deputies charged that the True Path Party sanctioned civil-rights abuses, especially in the Kurdish areas, and that these violations compromised democratic practices and also Turkey's chances for membership in the European Union. Most prominent among these dissidents was Deniz Baykal, who left the SHP in 1992 and announced that he was reactivating the CHP. Although several of its deputies in parliament defected to the CHP, the SHP remained in the coalition government until the 1996 parliamentary elections, when it lost many seats. Subsequently, the SHP entered into negotiations with the CHP and merged with it following the February 1997 "soft coup" by the military against the Refah Party–dominated coalition government of Prime Minister Necmeddin Erbakan.

See also Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Demirel, Süleyman; Erbakan, Necmeddin; İnönü, Erdal; Motherland Party; National Security Council (Turkey); Özal, Turgut; Refah Partisi; Republican People's Party (RPP); True Path Party; Turkish Grand National Assembly.

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Frank Tachau
Updated by M. Hakan Yavuz

SOCOTRA

Largest island of Yemen.

Measuring 1,200 square miles, Socotra (also Suqutra) Island is located in the Arabian Sea, about 500 miles from Aden and less than 200 miles from Somalia. The sparsely populated island has a mountainous interior and most of its population engages in farming or fishing; the most striking feature of this isolated place is its biodiversity and the great number of unique flora and fauna. The ruler of the Mahra Sultanate of Qishn and Socotra resided there under British rule during much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The island became a part of South Yemen in 1967 and, with Yemeni unification in 1990, it became a part of the Republic of Yemen (ROY). Given its location near the sea lanes, Socotra was long thought to be of strategic value by Western imperial powers. During the latter half of the Cold War, South Yemen allowed the Soviet Union to maintain a submarine base and other military facilities there; Russia continues to maintain a modest naval presence. During the late 1990s there were rumors about a deal between the United States and the ROY over military facilities on the island, but the complicated, if not strained, relations between the two countries, beginning with the bombing of the U.S.S. *Cole* in Aden in 2000, squelched this talk. The considerable activities regarding Socotra now focus on its development as a tourist destination featuring and protecting its unique biodiversity.

See also Yemen.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

SOHEYLI, ALI

[?–1954]

Iranian politician.

Ali Soheyli was born in Tabriz and studied at the military school in Tehran. After several cabinet positions, he was named minister of foreign affairs in 1937 and served three times as prime minister during the tenure of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. In 1947, because of pressure from the parliamentary faction loyal to Mohammad Mossadegh, Soheyli, a royalist, was put on trial. He was charged with mishandling of public funds, illegal intervention in elections in the south of the country, disrespect for the constitutional provision of free speech and a free press, and conspiracy against the nationalist government. After being acquitted of all charges, Soheyli resumed political activity as a minister without portfolio. Famous for his skill in handling foreign diplomats in Iran, he enjoyed amicable relations with both the Russian and the British legations in Tehran. In 1953, he sought appointment as prime minister but failed to get it. The shah appointed him ambassador to Britain, where he died of leukemia.

See also MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD; PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA.

NEGUIN YAVARI

SOKOLOW, NAHUM

[1859–1936]

Hebrew journalist, author, Zionist diplomat and leader.

Born and educated in Poland, Nahum Sokolow was a journalist for the Hebrew language newspaper *ha-Tzfira,* becoming editor in 1885. Sokolow published numerous books on the sciences, Hebrew literature, and the historical roots of Zionism, among other topics, writing in six languages. He was a strong supporter of Theodor Herzl and a principal spokesman for Zionism in eastern Europe. He was appointed secretary-general of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) in 1906, whereupon he established the WZO's official newspaper, *ha-Olam.*

In 1911 Sokolow was given the political portfolio on the Zionist Executive, and he traveled extensively as a diplomat for the Zionist cause, meeting with leaders throughout Europe and with Arab leaders in Lebanon and Syria. He chaired the committee that drafted the Balfour Declaration in 1917, and in 1919 led the Zionist delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. In 1929 he became chairman of the expanded Zionist Executive. At the 17th Zionist Congress in 1931, Chaim Weizmann was defeated in his reelection bid for the presidency of the WZO after a bitter challenge from Vladimir Jabotinsky and the Revisionists. Sokolow, a broadly respected Zionist leader, took Weizmann's place and was reelected president at the 18th Congress in 1933. When the Revisionists withdrew from the WZO in 1935, Weizmann resumed the presidency. Sokolow died in London the following year.

See also BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917); WEIZMANN, CHAIM; WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO).

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PIERRE M. ATLAS

SOLTANI, ABDELLATIF

[1904–1983]

Islamic religious scholar in Algeria.

Shaykh Abdellatif Soltani was a highly respected, independent religious scholar and a staunch critic of the socialist orientation of the postindependence Algerian regime. Soltani was born in 1904 in Biskra, northeast of Algiers, and received a religious education at the Zaytouna mosque in Tunisia. He became closely associated with the Islamic reformer Abdelhamid Ibn Badis, the founder of the Association of Algerian Scholars, which was established in 1931 to promote Arabic and Islamic teachings and to reassert the Algerian identity. Soltani worked as an educator and as an imam in a number of mosques that became bastions of Islamic activism. He taught religious subjects to young Algerians, some of whom later became leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front, the main Islamic opposition party in Algeria.

In 1974 Soltani published a book, *Mazdaqism Is the Origin of Socialism,* that was published in Morocco and banned in Algeria, in which he scathingly criticized the country's ruling elite and secular intellectuals for their deviation from the true Islamic principles and for their adoption instead of foreign ideologies. He also criticized the regime for its intolerance of dissent and defended the country's scholars against attempts to marginalize them. His other two books were *Arrows of Islam* and *Toward Islamic Doctrine.*

Following the eruption of violent clashes in 1982 between Islamist and communist students at the main campus of the University of Algiers, Soltani, along with Abbasi al-Madani and Ahmed Sahnoun, issued a statement, "The Statement of Advice," in which they criticized the secular policies of the state and demanded the promotion of Islam in government and society. Soltani was placed under house arrest until his death in 1983.

See also Algeria; Arabization Policies; Bendjedid, Chadli; Bouyali, Moustafa; Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN); Front Islamique du Salut (FIS); Sahnoun, Ahmed.

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Emad Eldin Shahin

SOMIKH, ABDULLAH

[1813–1880]

Iraqi rabbi.

Somikh, one of the most venerated rabbinic authorities in Baghdad in the nineteenth century, was instrumental in renewing Jewish religious studies in that city. In 1840 he established its first modern rabbinic seminary, Bet Zilkha. He wrote a commentary on Shulhan Arukh and a number of volumes of responsa that often addressed problems arising from the incursion of technology and modern education into the life of the Mizrahi (Jews of Middle Eastern, North African, and Western Asian origin) —for instance, whether a telegraphic message can be used as evidence in a Torah court. Somikh often dealt with religious questions addressed to him by Iraqi Jews who had settled in India, China, and other Far Eastern nations. In the 1860s, when the Alliance Israélite Universelle was established in Baghdad, he sent his son to study there, ignoring the protestations of conservative rabbis who strongly disapproved of secular education. Somikh died in Baghdad during a plague epidemic.

See also Adot ha-Mizrah; Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU).

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Sasson Somekh
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

SONATRACH

Holding company for the state's interests in Algeria's hydrocarbon sector.

In the events leading up to the independence of Algeria in 1962, the French government attempted to create a number of arrangements for continued access to Algerian oil, which had been discovered in the Sahara regions of the country a few years earlier. As part of its strategy to put the proceeds from oil sales into industrialization, the government of Algeria formed SONATRACH (Société Nationale de Transport et de Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures). It was headed initially by Abdessalam Belaid, who would become the country's head of centrally guided industrialization—a strategy in which SONATRACH was seen as the financial cornerstone.

The initial difficulty faced by SONATRACH was that all production and marketing of hydrocarbons in the country had been geared toward the requirements of France's economy, a goal now incompatible with the socialist and inward-oriented new development strategy of the Algerian government. Initially restricted to pipeline development and marketing abroad in an effort to break the French monopoly, SONATRACH eventually branched out into all aspects of oil exploration, refining, and marketing, often entering into joint ventures with foreign oil companies for exploration and production. By the early 1970s SONATRACH had become a giant state enterprise and the single largest employer

in the country. It not only exercised control over the recovery of oil but managed the major refineries in Algiers, Arzew, and Skikda, and it was the domestic distributor for Algerian oil. In addition, the state enterprise also controlled a large number of oil-related subsidiaries that fueled much of the country's industrialization drive.

Because Algeria was estimated to possess the fourth-largest gas reserves in the world, the Algerian government under President Houari Boumédienne (1965–1978) attempted to index the price of natural gas to that of petroleum. At the same time SONATRACH increased its exploration activities substantially, at a time when the world demand for Algerian natural gas was stagnant or declining. The strategy necessitated heavy investments, among other items, in liquefaction plants built on the Algerian coast, for which the country borrowed extensively on the international market, starting in the mid-1970s. Neither the indexing nor the investments proved sound decisions, and by the early 1980s SONATRACH was forced to renegotiate most of its major contracts and accept lower prices for its natural gas exports. By 1970 SONATRACH directly controlled an estimated 30 percent of Algerian oil production, which accounted for some 34 percent of the country's gross domestic product. By 1977, after a series of nationalizations that ended in 1971, its participation had increased to approximately 75 percent.

The death of President Boumédienne in 1978 brought to a halt the socialist experiment that Algeria had adopted after independence. The June 1980 party congress, guided by the new president, Chadli Bendjedid, stressed the need for increased privatization and liberalization in the Algerian economy. Bendjedid advocated a reorganization of the huge national enterprise to make it more competitive and efficient. A decentralization process thus began, and the giant company was divided into smaller companies, each of which would compete for clients.

Since the early 1990s international companies have been allowed to work in existing oil fields, but the state-owned company still controls the industry. A new hydrocarbon investment law was drafted in 1991, but SONATRACH's complete privatization stalled as it faced staunch opposition from trade unions and, most important, from certain factions within the regime that resisted losing control over the most valuable resource of political and economic power in Algeria. As of 2003, SONATRACH continued to provide the Algerian economy with over 90 percent of its foreign currency revenues.

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Dirk Vandewalle
Updated by Ana Torres-Garcia

SOROUSH, ABDOLKARIM

[1944–]

Iranian religious reformer and author who became internationally known during the 1990s for his liberal interpretation of Islam.

AbdolKarim Soroush was born Farajollah Dabbagh in Tehran in 1944. After being educated at a religious high school and at Tehran University, he went to England for graduate studies in pharmacology and philosophy. Returning to Iran in 1979, he became a vocal advocate of the newly inaugurated Islamic Republic of Iran. Adopting the name *Soroush* (meaning angel, especially the archangel Gabriel, in Persian), he became a major promoter of Islamic ideology, mainly writing against and debating Marxists, who were seen as ideological rivals. In the early 1980s Soroush was involved in the Cultural Revolution, a project that imposed "Islamic" curricula on Iranian universities and purged them of dissidents—mostly leftist students and professors—many of whom were imprisoned or executed.

However, as the Islamic Republic faced mounting problems in its second decade, Soroush emerged as a leader in a movement of loyal dissidents calling themselves "religious intellectuals." In numerous books, essays, and public lectures, he argued against turning religion into a political ideology and urged that Islam was open to a plurality of interpretations. Eclectically drawing on philosophy of science, modern hermeneutics, rationalist theology, and mysticism, Soroush holds that humans are able to understand and appreciate revelation according to their rational faculties and cultural limitations. His

constant challenge to the clergy's claim to binding religious authority thus prompts some to portray him as something of a Muslim "Protestant." Similarly, his controversial proposal for a "democratic religious government" is a challenge to the Shiʿite clergy's hold on political power in Iran.

Soroush's ideas gained further attention during the first presidential term of another "religious intellectual," Mohammad Khatami (1997–2001). However, during Khatami's second term (2001–present), the limitations of "Islamic democracy" as envisioned by Soroush and his like-minded colleagues became more evident as clerical hard-liners contained the movement to reform the Islamic Republic from within.

See also Iranian Revolution (1979); Khatami, Mohammad.

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Afshin Matin-asgari

SOUSSE

Northeast coastal town in Tunisia on the Gulf of Hammamet.

Sousse (also Susa; ancient Hadrumetum) was founded as a Phoenician commercial post and became the center of Sousse province under French colonialism (after the protectorate of 1881). After the independence of Tunisia in 1956, it was made the center of the Sousse governorate. In 2002, its estimated population was 177,450. It is a busy port, handling mostly phosphates and olive oil, and the tourist trade centers on a well-preserved medieval Islamic fortress.

Matthew S. Gordon

SOUSTELLE, JACQUES

[1912–1990]

French statesman.

A faithful adherent of General Charles de Gaulle, Jacques Soustelle was governor-general of Algeria (1955–1956), where he combined social reforms with harsh repression of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front). He broke with de Gaulle in 1960 over concessions to the FLN, and following the failed army coup of 1961, Soustelle left France under the threat of arrest because of his hard-line *pied noir* sympathies. He remained in exile until 1968.

See also De Gaulle, Charles; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).

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Zachary Karabell

SOUTH ARABIAN ARMED FORCES

Short-lived army of the Federation of South Arabia.

The armed forces of the ill-fated Federation of South Arabia were created by the merger of the Federal National Guard and the Federal Regular Army in mid-1967, on the eve of South Yemen's rushed independence. By this time, however, the national struggle had rendered these forces unreliable, and they were to play no real part in the collapse of the federation and the transfer of power from the British to the National Liberation Front (NLF).

Robert D. Burrowes

SOUTH ARABIAN LEAGUE

Group promoting independence of Britain's protectorates in southern Arabia.

The South Arabian League was the oldest (founded 1950) of the major nationalist groups created to change the status of Britain's possessions in southern Arabia. Its goal was to unite the various principalities of Aden and the Protectorate States into an independent state, to be called South Arabia.

The league's politics tended to be reformist and conservative, and it received much of its support from Saudi Arabia during the 1960s, when the conflict over the future of the protectorates and Aden became a major issue. In 1967, they became part of South Yemen.

See also YEMEN.

MANFRED W. WENNER

SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA PROJECT

A massive integrated regional development scheme for the Euphrates and Tigris river basins in Turkey (in Turkish, Güney Anadolu Projesi, or GAP).

The project area covers about 27,000 square miles (70,000 sq. km) in six provinces of the Anatolia region of Turkey, lying between the Anti-Taurus mountains and the border with Syria: Adiyaman, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Mardin, Sanliurfa, and Siirt. The project is designed to create economic, social, and spatial changes through the construction and integration of dams, hydroelectric power plants, and irrigation projects, and infrastructural improvements in transportation, health, education, and nonagricultural employment opportunities. Estimated completion is in 2013.

GAP is composed of thirteen subprojects, of which seven are on the Euphrates and six on the Tigris. These comprise fifteen dams, fourteen hydroelectric power stations, and nineteen irrigation projects. The completed project will also incorporate the already completed Keban Dam and will vastly increase the extent of irrigated land in what has been the most economically depressed region of Turkey. As of the early 1990s, only some 315,000 acres (about 127,000 ha) were irrigated in this region—or about 4 percent of the total irrigated land in Turkey. Upon completion, almost 5 million acres (some 2 million ha) will be irrigated. The project will also double Turkey's electrical output by generating 22 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity each year.

The World Bank refused to provide project loans until an agreement had been reached with Syria and Iraq on sharing the water of the two rivers. Because foreign currency has been in great shortage in Turkey, international contractors who had been awarded contracts were replaced by Turkish firms. Since Turkish firms have proven themselves capable of completing the project, international financial circles have been persuaded to make loans. In 1985, the Export-Import Bank of New York and Manufacturers-Hanover Trust lent Turkey 111 million U.S. dollars for the Atatürk Dam, and European banks are providing another 440 million dollars for equipment purchases.

GAP has caused friction with Turkey's neighbors. The Euphrates and Tigris rivers are important sources of water for both Syria and Iraq, and the governments of both countries have expressed reservations about the project. The official Turkish position is that year-long regulation of the flow of the rivers will increase the amount of water available to Syria and Iraq. In July 1984, Turkey and Iraq signed a protocol guaranteeing a minimum flow of 654 cubic yards (500 cu. m) per second, which did not include Syria. In July 1987, a similar agreement was signed with Syria, and further negotiations were held in March 1991. The agreements have not ended the political tensions created by GAP: Turkish forces stood guard in January of 1990 when the Euphrates river was cut to divert water into the reservoir for the Atatürk Dam, which reduced the flow of water into Syria and Iraq by 75 percent.

A number of problems have delayed completion of the project. Because the dam sites are located in remote mountainous areas, roads, worker accommodations, and other infrastructure services must be provided. There are also shortages of skilled labor and engineers. Finally, the reservoirs created by the two Karakaya and Atatürk dams alone will force the relocation of an estimated seventy thousand people, with more relocations to come in the future.

See also WATER.

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DAVID WALDNER

SOUTH LEBANON ARMY

Israeli-supported militia in southern Lebanon.

Renegade Lebanese army Major Saʿd Haddad founded the Free Lebanon Militia (FLM) to combat the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in southern Lebanon during Lebanon's civil war (1975–1990) and made common cause with Israel when it invaded Lebanon in March 1978 to drive PLO guerrillas away from the Israeli border. Israel withdrew from Lebanon in June 1978 and turned over to Haddad a buffer zone three to six miles (5 to 10 km) wide along the Lebanese side of the border. Israel funded and trained Haddad's renamed South Lebanon Army (SLA) in return for SLA efforts to prevent the return of elements hostile to Israel to the area.

Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon to rout the PLO deepened the relationship between the Israel Defense Force (IDF) and the SLA. Headquartered in Marjayoun, Lebanon, the SLA's twenty-five hundred fighters were Maronite Christians (40%) and Shiʿa Muslims (60%), although Christians predominated among the officers. Haddad died in January 1984 and General Antoine Lahad replaced him. In 1985 Israel withdrew from Lebanon, leaving behind a small force to advise the SLA. The rise of Hizbullah, a Shiʿite militia created to liberate southern Lebanon from Israel and its SLA client, provoked SLA-Hizbullah battles and drew IDF troops back into Lebanon. By the late 1990s IDF fatalities in Lebanon led to an Israeli grass-roots campaign for a unilateral withdrawal. When the IDF withdrew from Lebanon suddenly on 24 March 2000, the SLA disintegrated, and its members either surrendered to Hizbullah or to the Lebanese army, returned quietly to their villages, or sought emergency refuge, along with their families, in Israel. Military courts in Beirut sentenced hundreds of SLA members to prison terms ranging from months to years for collaborating with the enemy, while SLA commanders tried in absentia received death sentences. SLA families struggled to adjust to Israeli society; most returned to Lebanon or moved to other countries within several years of the SLA's collapse.

See also HADDAD, SAʿD; LAHAD, ANTOINE.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON
UPDATED BY LAURA ZITTRAIN EISENBERG

SOUTH PERSIA RIFLES

British-organized paramilitary unit in Iran during World War I.

The South Persia Rifles was a largely indigenous, paramilitary force of about 8,000 men trained and paid by Britain. Its headquarters was in Shiraz, with secondary bases in Abadeh and Kerman. Britain dispatched Major (later Brigadier General) Sir Percy Molesworth Sykes (1867–1945) to southern Iran in 1916 to organize a military force to counter the presumed pro-German sentiments of the Swedish-officered gendarmerie in Fars and Kerman provinces. It thus could protect British interests—southern Iran was adjacent to British India—from perceived threats by agents of Germany, Britain's enemy during World War I (1914–1918). The reluctance of the Iranian government to recognize the South Persia Rifles encouraged the largest and most militarily powerful tribal confederation in southern Iran, the Qashqaʾi, to attack the force in May 1918. Sykes and his troops were besieged for several weeks at Shiraz before they finally defeated the Qashqaʾi tribesmen. Following the 1921 coup d'état in Tehran, Minister of War Reza Khan, the future Reza Shah Pahlavi, ordered the disbanding of the South Persia Rifles.

See also PAHLAVI, REZA.

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JACK BUBON
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

SPAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The Kingdom of Spain, located in southwest Europe, has ties with the Middle East and North Africa that go back to the early medieval period.

Between 711 and 1492, the Iberian Peninsula witnessed the growth of several Islamic administrations, which ruled over a multiethnic and multireligious population in a space that would be known as *al-Andalus.* The arrival of Berber troops under Arab leadership in 711 was followed by the establishment of a governorate dependent on the Umayyad caliphate based in Damascus (711–756). With the onset of the Abbasid revolution in the east, the Umayyad Abd al-Rahman I established an independent emirate based in Cordova (756–929). In 929, Abd al-Rahman III proclaimed himself caliph and turned Cordova into the most important cultural and intellectual center of Western Europe (929–1008). Cordovese splendor lasted for a century, after which the Christian kingdoms of the north began pushing southward, conquering Muslim territory while taking advantage of the weakness of the petty kingdoms (1031–1086). An invasion by North African Berber tribes (Almoravids and Almohads; 1086–1232) temporarily halted the Christian advance. The Nasrid kingdom of Granada (1232–1492), last Muslim stronghold in the peninsula, fell in 1492 to the armies of the Catholic monarchs of Castile and Aragon, Isabella and Ferdinand. The monarchs decreed that Iberian Jews must either convert or be expelled; in 1502, Castilian Muslims were forced to convert to Christianity, and Aragonese Muslims were forced to do so in 1525. Zealous religious authorities were suspicious of the fidelity of new Christians (Jewish *conversos* and Muslim *moriscos*), who fell under the scrutiny of the Inquisition. Morisco rebelliousness against the abuses of the old Christian settlers led to the uprising of the Alpujarras (1568–1571). In 1609, Phillip III decreed the mass expulsion of the remaining *moriscos.* Throughout the sixteenth century, the rivalry between imperial Spain and the Ottoman Empire led to the Spanish occupation of several North African ports—Oran, Budjia, Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis—under Charles V. The diminution of the rivalry with the Ottoman Empire, the economic crisis that affected the Spanish Empire in the seventeenth century, and Spain's colonial enterprise in the Americas put a hold on Spanish incursions in North Africa.

In 1859–1860, Spain waged war against Morocco. Franco-Spanish rivalry in North Africa led to the establishment of a Spanish protectorate in northern Morocco (1912–1956) and the Western Sahara (1884–1975); Spanish troops fiercely repressed the Berber liberation movement of the Rif region (1921–1927). After the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), General Francisco Franco maintained an official policy of "friendship" toward Arab countries. In 1975, King Hassan II of Morocco organized the Green March toward Western Sahara and occupied the former Spanish protectorate. The signing of the Madrid Agreements (1975), in which Spain ceded the territory to Morocco and Mauritania, ignored the wishes of the inhabitants of the region and was opposed by POLISARIO; almost thirty years after the signing of the Madrid Agreements, the Saharan conflict is pending resolution under UN supervision. Upon joining the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) in 1986, Spain—then under a democratic socialist government—established diplomatic ties with Israel. In 1991, the socialist government supported the international coalition against Iraq. That same year, Spain hosted the Madrid Peace Conference. Subsequently, Spain became an important mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century, Spain and Morocco maintained a bitter contest over the sovereignty of the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla and over fishing rights along the Moroccan coast.

Under the Conservative government of Prime Minister José María Aznar (1996–2003), Spain aligned itself with the policies of the United States. In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, Aznar was a staunch ally of U.S. policies in the Middle East and became one of the international anchors of the war against Iraq in 2003. Despite widespread popular opposition—90 percent of the population opposed military intervention in Iraq—the Spanish government supported the U.S. occupation and stationed troops in the Diwaniyah region.

See also Green March; POLISARIO; War in Iraq (2003); Western Sahara.

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VANESA CASANOVA-FERNANDEZ

SPANISH MOROCCO

Portions of northwest Africa held by Spain from the 1500s until 1975.

The presence of Spain along the coast of northwest Africa was initially manifested during the 1400s and 1500s—after centuries of Muslim rule in the Iberian Peninsula had been overturned by warfare and the Moors retreated to North Africa. The Mediterranean port cities of Melilla and Ceuta came under Spanish rule in 1496 and 1578, respectively, and remain so today, as do three tiny islands off the Mediterranean coast of Morocco. In the late nineteenth century, Spain joined the European scramble for overseas territories. Spain expanded its Ceuta and Melilla enclaves, asserted itself militarily in the Rif mountains, and temporarily occupied Tetuan in 1860; an 1860 treaty committed Morocco to ceding land along its southern coast for the establishment of Spanish fisheries, eventually resulting in Spain staking claim to Ifni. Further south, Spain established coastal trading stations at Villa Cisneros (Dakhla), Cintra, and Cape Blanca. In December 1884, a Spanish protectorate was declared along the Saharan coast, a claim recognized by the Berlin Conference in 1885.

Spanish holdings in both the north and south were expanded by three treaties between Spain and France, the last in 1912. Spain then nominally held full sovereignty over Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Spanish Sahara, now Western Sahara), 102,703 square miles (266,000 sq km) of territory, below the twenty-seventh parallel, wedged in between the Atlantic Ocean and what are today the internationally recognized boundaries of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. Implementation of Spanish authority came in stages: Control of Tarfaya, north of the twenty-seventh parallel, was taken in 1916; La Guera, in the extreme south of Rio de Oro, in 1920; the 580-square-mile (1,502 sq km) Ifni zone, between Tarfaya and Agadir, in 1934; and Smara, in the Saharan interior, also in 1934. Spanish Sahara and the Ifni and Tarfaya areas were governed between 1934 and 1958 as parts of Spanish West Africa, whose military governor was based in Ifni.

Part of the "Green March" moves into Spanish Morocco in November 1975. During the Green March, hundreds of thousands of Moroccan civilians marched across their border into Spanish Morocco at the behest of King Hassan II, as part of an effort to assert Morocco's claim to the territory. **© ALAIN NOGUES/CORBIS SYGMA. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

The Spanish protectorate in the north, established in 1912, was one-twentieth the size of the French zone. Tangier was made part of the Spanish zone from 1940 to 1945, but then reverted to its previous international regime. The Spanish zone's population in 1955, including Europeans, was about one million, nearly 10 percent of Morocco's total population. Economic resources were few and the area underwent little development, constituting an economic liability to Spain.

Spain was both a competitor and sometimes junior partner of France, often working in tandem politically and militarily—the latter during the Rif rebellion led by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi from 1921 to 1926; in the southern campaigns in 1934; and again in 1957–1958 against the irregular Moroccan Army of Liberation, following Morocco's achieving independence in 1956. Nonetheless, Spanish rule was both weaker and often less

dominating than that of France. Spain returned Tarfaya and its surroundings to Morocco in 1958 and the Ifni enclave in 1969.

Phosphates were first discovered in Spanish Sahara during the 1940s, and proved to be of high grade and large quantity. Exports began in the early 1970s. By 1975, exports stood at 2.6 million tons (2.36 million metric tons), the sixth largest in the world. In 1974, the Spanish presence numbered just over 26,000; a 1974 census of the native Sahrawi population counted 73,497 persons, most of whom had been sedentarized from their nomadic life.

In 1973, Spain decided to introduce internal self-government, to deflect international pressure for decolonization. But by mid-1974, following the collapse of Portugal's Africa empire, Madrid promised to implement United Nations calls for a referendum in the territory during the first half of 1975. In September 1975, Spain's foreign minister and POLISARIO representatives agreed on a mutual release of prisoners and the principle of an independent Sahrawi state in return for fishing and phosphate concessions to Spain. But following Morocco's Green March in the Western Sahara War, and with Spain's Generalissimo Francisco Franco on his deathbed, Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania signed a tripartite agreement in Madrid on 14 November 1975, administratively dividing the region into Moroccan and Mauritanian zones and setting up a transitional tripartite administration. The final Spanish departure from its Saharan colony came on 26 February 1975.

See also Green March; Khattabi, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-; POLISARIO; Rif War.

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

SPECIAL FORCES OF THE LEVANT

Military group under the French mandate in Lebanon.

After France gained control of Lebanon through the mandate from the League of Nations, it formed the Troupes Spéciales du Levant, which recruited Lebanese and Syrian soldiers and was commanded almost exclusively by French officers. It was devised to legitimize French police and military activities in the region and to give the impression of local rule. The percentage of officers who were Lebanese or Syrian increased over the years although the power of command and control remained in French hands. By 1945, 90 percent of the officers in the 14,000-strong Special Forces were Arabs.

During World War II, Lebanese Special Forces troops were ordered to fight on the side of the Vichy French against the British and Free French. When the Vichy forces in the Middle East surrendered in 1941, volunteers from the Special Forces were recruited by the Free French to fight actively in North Africa, Italy, and southern France. In 1945 three thousand Lebanese troops in the Special Forces formed the nucleus of the Lebanese Army.

As'ad AbuKhalil

SPHINX

Mythological human-headed lion carved from rock at the pyramids of Giza.

The Sphinx is 190 feet (27 m) long and 66 feet (20 m) tall at its highest. It probably represents the pharaoh Khafre (c. 2550 B.C.E.), whose pyramid is nearby. Arabs called it Abu al-Hawl, "father of terror." Like the pyramids, it has become a symbol of Egypt, first appearing on postage stamps in 1867 and replacing the bust of King Farouk (1936–1952) on coins in the 1950s.

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Donald Malcolm Reid

SPRINZAK, JOSEPH

[1885–1959]

Israeli political leader.

Born in Moscow, Joseph Sprinzak was one of the founders of Tze'irei Zion in Russia (1905) and was a delegate to Zionist Congresses.

He began medical school at the American University in Beirut but then settled in Palestine in 1908, where he was an early activist in the Labor movement. He was a founder of the Histadrut and the MAPAI party and served in leadership positions in both organizations. Unanimously elected speaker of the first Knesset in 1949, he served in that capacity until his death. He also was acting president of Israel while Chaim Weizmann was ill and after Weizmann's death (1952), until the election of Yizhak Ben-Zvi.

See also HISTADRUT; ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN.

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BRYAN DAVES

SRVANTZIANTS, GAREGIN

[1840–1892]

Armenian ecclesiastical leader, ethnographer, and folklorist.

Garegin Srvantziants was born in Van and educated in local parochial schools. He became a teacher and was ordained a celibate priest in 1867. While assigned ecclesiastical responsibilities in Van, Erzurum, Bitlis, and Harput, he organized a number of schools and was the assistant prior of the Armenian monastery of Surp Karapet (Holy Precursor), one of the most hallowed sites of Armenian religious pilgrimage, at Moosh. After his investiture as a bishop in 1886, he was appointed prior of Surp Karapet. A fervent preacher and exponent of Armenian emancipation, he was removed from office and placed under surveillance in Istanbul.

Well before his confinement to the Ottoman capital, Srvantziants had published what in the aggregate may be considered the most important ethnographic data on the Armenians yet gathered at the time. As an associate of Mkrtich Khrimian, he had traveled with the later catholicos through the Armenian provinces in 1860 and 1861. Recognized much like his mentor for the kinship he felt with his own people, Srvantziants was instructed by the Armenian patriarch of Istanbul, Nerses Vazhapetian, to investigate and report on the condition of the Armenian communities in eastern Anatolia after the Russian–Ottoman War of 1877 and 1878, while Khrimian prepared to plead the Armenian cause at the Congress of Berlin.

During these trips, and at all other opportunities, Srvantziants tirelessly recorded the folklore of the Armenian rustic population. He released the results of his expeditions in a series of works issued in the 1870s and 1800s. In *Grots u brots* (The written and the spoken, 1874), he published popular Armenian folk stories and traditions. In *Hnots yev norots* (From the old and the new, 1874), he published Armenian stories from manuscript records. *Manana* (Manna, 1876) included proverbs, riddles, songs, and epigraphs from the Van region. In *Hamov-hotov* (The flavorful and the colorful, 1884), he described the topography, climate, and monuments of Armenia. The most significant of his discoveries was the first cycle of what was later recognized as the Armenian national folk epic *Sasna Tsrrer* (The daredevils of Sasun), more popularly known by the name of its hero. Srvantziants recorded the section called "Sasuntsi Davit kam Mheri tur" (David of Sasun, or the Gate of Mher). Srvantziants also published important studies on the subjects he recorded and was elected an honorary member of the Imperial Academy of Antiquities in Saint Petersburg. He died in Istanbul.

See also BERLIN, CONGRESS AND TREATY OF; KHRIMIAN, MKRTICH; RUSSIAN–OTTOMAN WARS; VAZHAPETIAN, NERSES.

ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

STACK, LEE

[1868–1924]

Governor-general of the Sudan and sirdar (commander) of the Egyptian army.

Sir Lee Stack was assassinated in Cairo as part of an Egyptian nationalist campaign to gain complete independence from Great Britain. He had joined the Anglo-Egyptian army in the Sudan in 1899 (when it became an Anglo-Egyptian condominium after its conquest, 1896–1898). As governor-general, he contributed to the economic and political development of the Sudan.

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OLES M. SMOLANSKY

STANHOPE, HESTER
[1776–1839]

English aristocrat and traveler.

Hester Stanhope was the eldest of three daughters of Charles, third earl of Stanhope, and Lady Hester Pitt, sister of William Pitt the Younger. She emerged in London society as hostess and private secretary to her uncle, the prime minister, and was known for her satiric tongue. After Pitt's death in 1803, dissatisfied with a quiet life in London, she tried Wales but left for the eastern Mediterranean in 1810. By 1818 she had settled in Lebanon, befriending the Druze Amir Bashir al-Shihabi, whom she later opposed. She built an elaborate manor with lush tropical gardens on a hilltop above the village of Jun (7 miles northeast of Sidon), where she maintained a large pool of servants and a camel caravan to supply the manor with drinking water. Known as *al-Sitt* (the lady), she was both imperious and generous to the local population; some believed her to have special spiritual powers. She seems to have had considerable influence, since Ibrahim Pasha, about to invade Ottoman Syria in 1832, is said to have wanted her to declare neutrality.

Stanhope visited mosques in Damascus dressed as a young male Arab and organized a lavish procession to Palmyra, where the Bedouin apparently called her "the second Queen Zenobia." To maintain her estate, she fell into heavy debt to local moneylenders, despite the pension the British government had given her after Pitt's death, and she died poor. She was buried on her estate but her remains were transferred to a British cemetery near Beirut in 1989. Not only her own memoirs but remembrances by Charles Kingslake and Alphonse de Lamartine enhanced her notoriety; early twentieth-century Arab feminists memorialized her as a negative exemplar.

See also BELL, GERTRUDE; COLONIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION.

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MARILYN BOOTH

STARK, FREYA
[1893–1993]

British author and explorer.

Born in Paris into an expatriate English family and raised largely in Italy, Freya Madeleine Stark moved to England in 1911 to study English and history at Bedford College. When World War I interrupted her studies, she returned to the Continent, where she volunteered as a nurse. After the war, Stark studied Arabic in London, followed by a more intensive course in the Levant. The Arab world became her passion, and in 1927 she began extensive travels in the region, publishing newspaper articles in the *Baghdad Times* and elsewhere about the Middle East.

Stark's visit to the remote castles of the Assassins in western Iran in 1930 and 1931 led to the publication of her first book, *The Valleys of the Assassins* (1934). It brought instant recognition, together with financial success; its photographic observations set the style for her future work. Stark next journeyed south to Arabia in 1935, which resulted in the publication of *The Southern Gates of Arabia* (1935), followed by *Winter in Arabia* (1940). Stark spoke English, French, German, and Italian in addition to Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. Her knowledge of languages greatly facilitated her travels across the eastern Mediterranean and over much of the Asian continent.

Stark's remarkable life spanned almost the entire twentieth century. She mapped remote regions

of the Arab world, and her cartographic accomplishments were honored by the Royal Geographic Society. However, it is as an author that she is most remembered. Freya Stark was the most gifted and widely read female travel writer of her time. She published more than thirty books, most of which were highly personal travel adventures and many of which remain in print.

See also Bell, Gertrude; Colonialism in the Middle East; Gender: Gender and Education; Stanhope, Hester.

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Ronald Bruce St John

STAR OF NORTH AFRICA

The first Algerian political movement to call openly for independence.

The Star of North Africa, also known as the Etoile Nord-Africaine (ENA) was founded in 1926 in Paris by Hadj Ali Abd al-Qadir and Messali al-Hadj. With a base in the large Algerian immigrant community that was influenced by the Communist-dominated French labor movement, it also propounded a leftist social and economic agenda.

The movement was banned in 1929 but grew clandestinely until it reappeared in reorganized form in 1933. Messali al-Hadj returned to Algeria in the summer of 1936 to address the Algerian Muslim Congress that was designing a program of reforms within the Colonial framework. Before that audience, he became the first individual to speak openly of independence within Algeria itself. He then turned to organizing ENA cells across the country. Authorities in January 1937 banned the ENA. Its successor was the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA), which was outlawed, in its turn, in September 1939.

See also Hadj, Messali al-.

John Ruedy

STATE PLANNING ORGANIZATION (SPO)

Organization set up in Turkey in 1960 to administer national economic development.

Turkey first experimented with central planning in the 1930s, but with the focus only on industrialization. Between 1950 and 1960, the Democratic Party governments were criticized for their opposition to any kind of economic planning. The agricultural sector was virtually tax exempt. After the military intervention of May 1960, planning became a priority. Accordingly, the principle of indicative, not compulsory, planning was written into the 1961 constitution. The State Planning Organization (SPO) was created to draw up five-year plans covering all aspects of economic development, as well as long-term plans and annual programs. The institutional structure of the SPO was designed to create a degree of independence and security for the technical experts charged with preparing the plans and to facilitate cooperation between them and political authorities. The final authority was supposed to lie with the High Planning Council.

During the discussion of the first five-year plan, there were differences of opinion between planners and military bureaucrats. In contrast to the planners' liberal-productive conception of the state, the military bureaucrats remained loyal to an etatist patrimonial tradition that gave priority to social justice and full employment over economic growth and efficiency. With the transition to civilian rule in October 1961, the climate changed radically. The Justice Party viewed the SPO as a political tool of a military-cum-bureaucratic elite, to which they were opposed by both interest and instinct. Although the party had to implement the constitutional requirement, the party leadership was anxious to limit the planners' power.

After 1965 representatives of the private sector, who had been virtually excluded from the preparation of the first plan, were fully consulted on the second, which was to run from 1967 to 1972. The new constitution of 1982 endorsed planning, and a decree of 1984 reorganized the SPO and attached it to the office of the prime minister.

The SPO is headed by an undersecretary. It consists of eight departments: Economic Planning; Social Planning; Coordination; Priority Regional

Development; Relations with the European Union; Credit Allocation; Foreign Capital Investment; and Evaluation of Yearly Programs. The SPO also maintains permanent representatives in international economic organizations and major foreign capitals. In spite of its elaborate organizational structure and its constitutionally defined task, the state bureaucracy regards the suggestions and recommendations of the SPO as a hindrance to its administrative tasks.

The most important achievement of the SPO is the realization of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP). This project is a multisector and integrated regional development effort approached in the context of sustainable development. The project covers nine administrative provinces established in the basin of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. The program envisages the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydraulic power plants and irrigation of 1.7 million hectares. The total cost is estimated at $32 billion (in 1997 prices). The GAP represents a major part of the Eighth Five-Year Development Plan (2001–2006). The SPO also is involved in the preparation of the pre-accession structural changes required by the European Union.

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NERMIN ABADAN-UNAT

STERN, ABRAHAM

[1907–1942]

Jewish underground leader during the British mandate of Palestine.

Abraham Stern (nicknamed Yaʿir) was born in Poland but spent many of his formative years in Russia. He moved to Palestine in 1924 where he studied Latin and Greek at Hebrew University and later began to study for his doctorate in Florence, Italy. Stern served in the Haganah starting in 1929 but broke off in 1931 to form the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi (IZL), through which he smuggled weapons into Palestine and established contacts with the Polish military. In 1934 he gave up his academic interests to devote himself fully to the underground.

Stern returned to Palestine in 1939, following the publication of the British White Paper, to organize resistance to the British. He was detained by the British for ten months, until his friends in the Revisionist movement arranged for his release. In 1940 he broke with the Irgun and its leader, David Raziel, and formed a new group, Lohamei Herut Yisrael, also known as Lehi, or the Stern Gang, because he did not feel the Irgun was militaristic enough. His ideological manifesto, "Eighteen Principles of Renaissance," included many controversial ideas, including that the new Zionist goals should be a land of Israel extending from the Nile to the Euphrates Rivers.

During World War II, unaware of the realities of the Holocaust, Stern sought links with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, although they did not result in anything. Stern, who appeared on British "wanted" posters for bank robbery and murder, was found and killed by British policemen in 1942.

See also HAGANAH; HOLOCAUST; IRGUN ZVAʾI LEʾUMI (IZL); LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL; WHITE PAPERS ON PALESTINE.

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JULIE ZUCKERMAN

STOCK MARKET

Middle Eastern stock markets are small and often closed to foreign investors.

The stock markets of the Middle East tend to remain relatively small relative to the respective economies of each country, and except in Turkey and Israel are not used by entrepreneurs to fund their operations.

Even in countries where economic liberalism is embedded in the economic life, such as Saudi Arabia, capital markets are heavily regulated and have not had any major influence in helping non-government firms raise capital from the public at

large. Exchanges suffer from a lack of reliable information on and from the companies, insider trading is often a problem, and accounting practices are not reliable enough for private investors and funds to make adequate judgment on the value of the companies. Governments tend to interfere with the markets, either to limit their expansion through overregulation or to limit the losses in downtrends, as was the case in Kuwait in 1982. In most countries the markets have little depth and are closed to foreign investors. Since 1998 there have been some efforts to use the markets to improve privatization efforts. Foreign investors have been welcomed in some bourses, such as those of Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel. However, most other markets have limited foreigners to investment through small mutual funds managed by local banks, as in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi market has the largest capitalization of the Arab world, at about US$100 billion.

Major stock markets within the Middle East, 2003

Country traded	Number of companies	Capitalization (in millions of U.S. $)
Israel	617	40,900
Turkey	262	33,800
Saudi Arabia	68	100,000
Kuwait	93	35,100
Jordan	76	1,664
Iran	324	65,000
Egypt	1,110	18,400

SOURCE: Zawya, online at http://www.zawya.com; Tehran Stock Exchange, online at http://www.tse.or.ir; Istanbul Stock Exchange, online at http://www.ise.org; Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, online at http://www.tase.co.il; *Middle East Economic Survey*; Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, online at http://www.sama.gov.sa

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Bahrain

The market in Bahrain is still very small and highly regulated. However, it is beginning to open up to foreign investors if they reside in Bahrain. Each foreign investor is limited to a maximum 1 percent stake in a company. If markets become more deregulated in Bahrain and if Saudi Arabia—the main center for private industrial ventures—approves, this stock market could become an important place for Persian (Arabian) Gulf industries to raise capital.

Iran

In the liberalization of 1992 the Iranian stock market was expected to be the transmission belt between Iranian capital at home and abroad and the companies to be denationalized. Foreign capital was permitted to buy minority positions. However, the move toward liberalization seems to have stalled, and the market is not very active.

Israel

The Israeli stock exchange is located in Tel Aviv. It lists about 654 companies and has a capitalization of US$41 billion. The market is open to foreign investors. Technically, the market is quite advanced, with computer support similar to that of U.S. markets. However, volumes traded are relatively low, in the average range of $36 million per day in 2002. The market tends to be somewhat volatile due to the low number of buyers and sellers. The progress of the markets is marked by the TASE index.

Jordan

The Jordanian market, which was started in 1977, is still small in terms of volume but has a good reputation among investors. Foreign investors need to be approved by the government, which greatly limits the liquidity of the shares and the potential growth of the market.

Kuwait

Until 1982 the Kuwaiti capital markets were the largest in the Middle East. After the crash of the Suq al-Manakh, the government enforced old regulations and introduced new ones. The number of brokers, the number of companies eligible to be traded, and the daily volumes are limited. The 1991 Gulf War, which caused many industrial companies to disappear, limited the number of tradable issues to the financial institutions. Kuwaiti-owned companies based in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Gulf also are traded. No foreigners are allowed to trade in Kuwaiti shares, except Gulf Cooperation Council nationals.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia, despite having the largest volume of shares traded in the Gulf, does not have a stock exchange or trading floor. All shares are exchanged

The Istanbul Stock Exchange was established in 1986 and is an autonomous organization that provides trading in equities, bonds and bills, revenue-sharing certificates, private sector bonds, foreign securities, real estate certificates, and international securities. © AP/WIDEWORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

and cleared through the banks. To have shares traded, companies must be registered as Sharikat al-Musahama, a registration somewhat similar to a U.S. Corporation C. To obtain this status, companies must be vetted by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and, until 1992, also needed approval by the king. Only firms not involved in defense or oil are allowed to register. Thus, Saudi firms have a very difficult time raising money directly from the public through the stock market. No foreign capital is allowed to trade in Saudi shares, except in limited circumstances if originating from within the Gulf Cooperation Council. Since 11 September 2001, the Saudi stock market index has become more popular. The number of shares traded has increased from 691 million in 2001 to 1736 million in 2002. In an overall declining world market, TASI, the Saudi stock exchange index, increased 5.7 percent between 2001 and February 2003.

Turkey

The stock exchange in Turkey got its impetus from a 1989 law on investments. The law strongly restricts insider trading, provides for proper financial reporting by companies, and authorizes foreigners to invest. By 1993 the Turkish market had become one of the leading emerging markets, with investments from many U.S. and European mutual funds.

JEAN-FRANÇOIS SEZNEC

STORRS, RONALD
[1881–1955]

British colonial official.

After studying classics at Pembroke College, Cambridge, Ronald Storrs served as Lord Horatio Kitchener's Oriental secretary in Egypt prior to and during World War I. In this capacity, he met with Amir Abdullah ibn Hussein in April 1914, one of the Hashimites' early attempts to determine Britain's attitude toward their ambitions. Storrs later played an important role in the Anglo–Hashimite dialogue and the Arab Revolt, traveling from Egypt to the Hijaz on several occasions in 1916, including a journey with T. E. Lawrence, to cement Britain's relationship with the Hashimites.

In December 1917, Storrs was appointed the first military governor of Jerusalem after Allied troops entered the city. He believed that the role of Britain's military government in Palestine was simply to administer the country, not to introduce fundamental social or political changes. Britain, however, had pledged to support Zionist settlements in Palestine through the Balfour Declaration. In April 1918, Storrs formally received the Zionist commission, headed by Chaim Weizmann, which had traveled to Jerusalem to begin making arrangements for implementing the Balfour Declaration. He felt that the commission's dismay at the negative attitude displayed toward it and Zionism in general betrayed a fundamental naïveté about the Palestinians and their understanding of Zionism.

Palestinian nationalist frustrations were manifested in the Nabi Musa disturbances (April 1920). As governor of Jerusalem, Storrs subsequently dismissed the mayor of Jerusalem, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, for his role in the affair. Husayni went on to become the senior Palestinian nationalist figure in the 1920s, as head of the Arab Executive.

Storrs took an interest in cultural preservation in Jerusalem, forming the Pro-Jerusalem Society to restore historic monuments in the city. He arranged for Armenian artisans to produce tiles for the Islamic shrines at the Haram al-Sharif as part of these efforts.

Following the introduction of civil rule in Palestine in the mid-1920s, Storrs was Jerusalem's

first civilian governor. After leaving service in Palestine, he became governor of Cyprus in 1926 and of Northern Rhodesia in 1932. He retired from colonial service in 1934.

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Balfour Declaration (1917); Haram al-Sharif; Husayni, Musa Kazim al-; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Lawrence, T. E.; Nabi Musa Pilgrimage; Weizmann, Chaim.

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Michael R. Fischbach

STRAITS CONVENTION

International agreement, signed in 1841, on access to the Black Sea; it denied passage in peacetime to non-Ottoman warships through the Straits connecting the Mediterranean and Black seas.

Until 1774, when the Russian Empire under Catherine the Great acquired territory on the north shore of the Black Sea, there was no question concerning passage of ships between the Black and Mediterranean seas because the Black Sea was essentially an internal Ottoman sea. After 1774 access to the Straits presented a persistent problem in international affairs. Russia sought to ensure its right to passage while opposing similar rights for other maritime powers; Britain, in particular, wanted to restrict Russian access to the Mediterranean as a threat to its aspirations in the Levant. The Ottoman Empire considered its control of the Straits essential to its sovereignty and a guarantee of its security and independence.

The Straits Convention of 1841 resulted from internal Ottoman problems and imperial rivalries. The Ottoman Empire had been wracked by the aspirations of Greece for independence and the threat posed by Muhammad Ali of Egypt in his efforts to establish control over Syria and possibly to replace the Ottomans as head of the empire. Russia and most other European powers supported the Greek cause. France supported Muhammad Ali in hopes of reaping benefits as his ally. Russia wanted unhampered access to the Mediterranean and acknowledgment of its claim of protection over Christian Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Britain and Austria-Hungary were suspicious of Russian designs.

Muhammad Ali originally supported the Ottomans in their struggle against the Greeks seeking independence; he sent his son Ibrahim ibn Muhammad Ali with an army to help the Ottomans subdue the Greeks in 1825. The venture was not successful, and by 1828 Ibrahim's army had withdrawn from Greece. Muhammad Ali then turned his attention to Syria in an attempt to expand his control of the eastern Mediterranean, launching an army led by Ibrahim against the Ottomans in the first Syrian war (1831–1833). France tacitly supported this effort; Britain, distracted by other international problems (particularly Belgium), did not; the Russians supported the Ottomans. Ibrahim's forces came within 150 miles of Constantinople, but in February 1833 Russia sent a naval force and troops to support the Ottoman defense of the city. France and Britain, fearing the prospect of Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire, called for mediation. The Convention of Kütahya (8 April 1833) conceded Ottoman Syria to Egypt but prevented Egyptian control of the empire as a whole. Because of its support, Russia retained its position as the Ottomans' principal ally. This was reflected in the Treaty of Hunkar-Iskelesi (8 July 1833), in which Russia and the Ottoman Empire pledged mutual support in any future conflict. The treaty also called for closure of the Straits to any naval forces threatening Russia.

The agreements of 1833 did not last long. In 1839 Sultan Mahmud II decided to deal with Muhammad Ali's threat by sending a military force against his son, Ibrahim, in Syria; thus began the second Syrian war. In spite of a force developed by Helmuth von Moltke of Prussia, the Ottomans were defeated at Nesib on 24 June and the Ottoman fleet defected to Egypt. Fearing that the breakup of the Ottoman Empire would not be in the best interests of Britain, Lord Palmerston, foreign minister and later prime minister, called for talks with Russia, Austria, and Prussia in London in 1840. In July the ambassadors of the four powers persuaded the Ottomans to recognize Muhammad Ali as hereditary

pasha of Egypt and grant him control of Palestine (southern Syria) in return for a cease-fire within ten days. France, although now under a government more favorable to Britain, was noncommittal, and Muhammad Ali refused the compromise. The British, with help from Austria, occupied Beirut and Acre in October and November and helped the Ottomans defeat Ibrahim's forces in Syria. Muhammad Ali, no longer counting on French help, was forced to accept Egypt as a hereditary domain and return the Ottoman fleet to the control of Constantinople.

Russia, Austria, Prussia, Britain, and France then signed the Treaty of London on 13 July 1841, ratifying these agreements. Appended to the treaty was an agreement on the Straits question: "Warships of foreign powers have always been forbidden to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosporus." Lord Palmerston had succeeded in strengthening Britain's position in the Middle East, preventing France from gaining influence in Syria, and containing Russian advances in the Ottoman Empire. That empire was thus preserved for a time, its existence now guaranteed by the five major European powers. Muhammad Ali remained in control of Egypt, with special rights in the Sudan. Although all parties seemed to have gained something, the stage was set for continued jockeying for position in the Middle East.

See also HUNKAR-ISKELESI, TREATY OF (1833); IBRAHIM IBN MUHAMMAD ALI; KÜTAHYA, PEACE OF; MAHMUD II; MOLTKE, HELMUTH VON; MUHAMMAD ALI; PALMERSTON, LORD HENRY JOHN TEMPLE; STRAITS, TURKISH.

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR

STRAITS, TURKISH

A strategic 200-mile (320 km) natural waterway that joins the Black and Aegean seas.

Less than 30 percent of the length of the Straits—the Bosporus, starting in the Black Sea, and the Dardanelles, ending in the Aegean—are natural straits; between them lies the inland Sea of Marmara. So long as the Black Sea was Ottoman and the only approaches flowed through the sultan's domain, he alone decided what ships might visit what parts of his realm. Foreign naval vessels did not enter Ottoman inland waters except on calls of courtesy or for repairs—unless in time of war they sought to breach the sultan's naval defenses. At the Straits and in the Ottoman-dominated river mouths of the Black Sea, attempting such a breach would have entailed over-whelming risks. The fact that at its southern end the Bosporus divided the imperial capital between Europe and Asia enhanced the Ottoman security planners' sensitivity to the movement of foreign vessels through the Straits. By the eighteen century, commercial ships arriving from the Mediterranean were permitted into the Sea of Marmara only as far as Constantinople. From that point north, all trade with Black Sea ports moved on Ottoman ships.

MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

Once Russia captured primary river outlets to the Black Sea (such as the Dnieper and the Don—the latter connected to the Black Sea by the Sea of Azov), and thus could validly claim riparian status, the situation changed. The Treaty of Kuçuk Kaynarja, which in 1774 ended a six-year war with the

Ottoman Empire, opened all water lanes with outlets on the Black Sea to Russian commercial shipping. The Ottomans subsequently bestowed the privilege of free merchant navigation through the Straits upon other seafaring powers of Europe and even the United States. This was done by separate act for any Western state enjoying capitulatory (extraterritorial) privileges that requested it. The Ottoman government in 1822 notified all powers that "the passage of the Bosporus is closed to the ships of nations to whom the Porte never accorded the right of entry to . . . [the Black] sea." Not until the Treaty of Paris in 1856 was commercial freedom conferred on all flags.

The transit of war vessels was also resolved by international agreement, starting with the Straits Convention, signed in London on 13 July 1841. Article 1 expressed the sultan's firm resolve "to maintain . . . the principle . . . [whereby] it has . . . been prohibited for the Ships of War of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits . . .; and . . . so long as the Porte is at peace . . . [to] admit no foreign Ship of War into the said Straits." In the same article the powers of Europe pledged "to respect this determination." In Article 2 the sultan reserved "to himself . . . to deliver f[e]rmans [edicts] of passage for light vessels under flag of war . . . employed . . . in the services of the Missions of foreign powers."

The defeat in World War I of the Ottoman imperial government ended the 1841 agreement. Under the Armistice of Mudros in 1918, the victors (chiefly Britain, France, and Italy) imposed a naval occupation on the Sublime Porte, and in 1922 on its successor, the Republic of Turkey. The powers of Europe assumed the role of Straits traffic regulator until the ratification in 1923 of the Treaty of Lausanne. For a dozen years, an International Straits Commission oversaw the flow of all Straits traffic. In 1936 the Montreux Convention restored sovereign authority to the Republic of Turkey.

In conferences with Britain and the United States at Tehran in 1943 and at Yalta in 1945, the Soviet Union declared the Montreux Convention prejudicial to its security interests. It acknowledged that in wartime Turkey had acted with goodwill in defense of the Straits. Nevertheless, Moscow demanded revision of the 1936 convention to assure its warships free movement through the Straits at all times.

When the issue was reviewed at Potsdam in mid-1945, the Western powers agreed that each of the Big Three would hold talks with the Turkish government on revising the 1936 instrument "to meet present-day conditions." After a year of diplomatic exchanges, Moscow's insistence on sharing in the defense of the Straits led to a stalemate in August 1946. The Soviet Union refused to modify its demands, and Britain and the United States gave full support to Turkey. Seven months later, President Harry Truman promulgated the U.S. strategy for the global containment of the Soviet Union "and international communism" thereby marking the formal start of the Cold War.

See also Capitulations; Lausanne, Treaty of (1923); Montreux Convention (1936); Straits Convention.

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J. C. Hurewitz

STRUMA

Ship on which Jewish World War II refugees died, in part because of Britain's wartime refugee policy.

In October 1941, the 180-ton Romanian coastal vessel *Struma,* which normally carried one hundred passengers, sailed for Haifa with almost one thousand Jewish refugees. The ship broke down at Istanbul on 16 December because of overloading, a leaking hull, and defective engines. Turkey would not permit the passengers to land without British certificates for Palestine, but the British refused to issue them.

Since the refugees could not go forward and could not return to Romania, the *Struma* remained in port for ten weeks. The British refused the appeal of the Jewish Agency to permit the refugees entrance to Palestine—if only for later transport to Mauritius, an island in the Indian Ocean. On 24

February, Turkey towed the *Struma* with its passengers out to sea, where six miles from shore it sank; it is not known whether it capsized, struck a mine, or was hit by a torpedo. Some 70 children, 269 women, and 428 men drowned—only 2 swam to safety.

This event became the symbol for the Jewish community in Palestine (the Yishuv) of Britain's unrelenting World War II policy toward the Jewish refugees of Nazi-occupied Europe.

See also YISHUV.

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MIRIAM SIMON

STUDENTS IN THE LINE OF THE IMAM

An organization of Iranian students that held U.S. hostages for over one year.

Students in the Line of the Imam was a militant group formed after the Iranian Revolution (1979). It advocated radical policies that its members insisted were supported by the revolution's leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whom they called *imam.* The group acquired domestic and international attention when it seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and announced that captured U.S. diplomatic personnel would be held until the United States extradited the deposed shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to Iran for trial. This action began the most dramatic of regional hostage crises, one that would not be resolved for 444 days. During the crisis, the students pasted together shredded secret documents pertaining to U.S. policy that they found in the embassy compound. They published the U.S. documents in several volumes and also used the material in the documents to discredit moderate politicians mentioned in them. Although the Students in the Line of the Imam group gradually was relegated to the margins of Iranian politics after the hostage crisis was resolved in January 1981, several of its leaders subsequently played important roles. Abbas Abdi, for example, became an influential editor and champion of the reform movement in the 1990s. Maryam Ebtehar, media spokesperson for the Students in the Line of the Imam, became Iran's first woman vice president in 1997.

See also HOSTAGE CRISES; IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH; PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA.

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NEGUIN YAVARI
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

SUARÈS FAMILY

Prominent Sephardic family, influential in Egyptian society and economy.

The Suarès family settled in Livorno, Italy, then went to Egypt during the first half of the nineteenth century. Menachem Suarès della Pegna settled in Alexandria while his brother Isaac settled in Cairo. In the mid-1870s Isaac's sons—Joseph (1837–1900), Félix (1844–1906), and Raphael (1846–1902)—created the Banque Suarès, which until 1906 served as mediator for European capital investment in Egypt. Given Raphael Suarès's connections with British industrial investors, he channeled British investments into such enterprises as the construction of the first Aswan Dam, the National Bank of Egypt, and the khedivial estates *(al-da'ira al-saniyya).* The Suarès family was not only involved in banking and finance but also transportation, establishing in Cairo the first public transportation company and building railway lines between Cairo and Helwan, Qina and Aswan. Members of the family owned real estate in the heart of Cairo where Suarès Square bore Félix Suarès's name (Maydan Suarès was renamed, in 1939, Maydan Mustafa Kamil).

One family member, Edgar Suarès, was involved with a major shareholders' company. Owing to his initiative, vast areas of land—several thousand *feddan* (a *feddan* is approximately one acre)—were purchased in Upper and Lower Egypt. Edgar Suarès reclaimed them and introduced modern irrigation facilities

for large-scale agricultural development. He subsequently sold the land as small holdings to rural Egyptians at low prices and long-term credit. The Suarèses were not very active in Jewish communal affairs; only Edgar Suarès served very briefly as president of Alexandria's Jewish community during World War I. Their influence in Egyptian society and the economy declined after the 1930s.

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MICHAEL M. LASKIER

SUBLIME PORTE

Residence/office of the Ottoman sultan.

In the Ottoman Empire, the sultan would appoint a grand vizier to head the government. Just as the prime minister of Great Britain resides at 10 Downing Street, the grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire lived and worked in the Sublime Porte. This term is a French translation of *al-Bab al-Ali,* which means literally "the High Door." In the nineteenth century, it became common to refer to the entire Ottoman government as "the Sublime Porte," as it is common today to refer to the U.S. government as "the White House."

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ZACHARY KARABELL

SUDAN

A country in northeast Africa located south of Egypt on the Nile.

Known in the past as *bilad al-sudan* (the land of the black people), Sudan is the largest country in Africa, covering one million square miles. Its nearly thirty million residents, who live scattered across the wide expanse, differ along lines of ethnicity, language,



Omdurman is the largest city and chief commercial center of Sudan. It is located across the White Nile from Khartoum, the country's capital. **© CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

and religion. The country's political instability is, in part, a result of this diversity. Moreover, given its geostrategic location astride the Nile, it has been vulnerable to foreign pressure.

Peoples

Sudan contains more than fifty ethnic groups, which are subdivided into at least 570 tribes. The principal groups in the north are Arab, Beja, Nuba, Nubian, and Fur. Nearly half the population identifies itself as Arab, generally meaning peoples who speak Arabic and reflect its cultural heritage. The Arabs along the northern and central Nile valley tend to dominate Sudanese political and economic life. The Beja, who comprise 6 to 7 percent of the population, are concentrated in the east along the Red Sea and coastal mountain ranges; they are Muslim but speak a distinct language. The Nuba, residing in the Nuba mountains of southern Kordofan, are 5 percent of the population and also speak their own



MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

languages, not Arabic; some are Muslim, others Christian or adherents of traditional African religious beliefs. About 3 percent are Nubians, who traditionally lived along the northern reaches of the Nile, merging into Egypt. In the early 1960s, many Nubians were relocated to Khashm al-Ghirba in central Sudan when the construction of the Aswan High Dam flooded their homes. They speak their own ancient languages; they were early converts to Christianity but converted to Islam several centuries ago. The Fur, 2 percent of the population, live in the far west; like the Nubians, they have a tradition of independent kingdoms. The Sultanate of Fur lasted from the fifteenth century until the early 1890s. Many other non-Arab peoples live in villages in the west, notably the Berti, Zaghawa, Borgu, and Massalit.

In the southern third of Sudan, the Dinka are 40 percent of the population, or 12 percent of the Sudanese as a whole. The Nuer are 5 percent of the whole Sudanese people, and the Shilluk are 1 percent. None of those groups are homogeneous, and they compete for territory, cattle, and trade routes.

The numerous groups that live in Equatoria, the southernmost area, differ in language, customs, and religion. Overall, the ethnic fragmentation in the south is greater than in the north.

In addition to those indigenous groups, 6 percent of the Sudanese are migrants from West Africa who settled in western and central Sudan in search of employment or on their way to or from Mecca, the most important site for Muslim pilgrims. Known by the pejorative term *fellata,* they lack many of the legal and economic protections accorded to full Sudanese citizens.

Language overlaps with ethnicity as a basic distinguishing trait among the Sudanese. Half the population speaks Arabic as its native tongue. At most, half the adults are literate (far fewer than that in the wartorn south and Nuba Mountains), and indigenous languages remain important. Arabic serves as the lingua franca among the educated classes in the north. Although residents of the south resisted learning Arabic and were taught English in the missionary schools, Arabic has made inroads there in recent decades.

Religion also divides the population—65 to 70 percent are Muslim, 20 to 25 percent follow traditional beliefs, and 5 to 10 percent are Christian. The north is overwhelmingly Muslim, with pockets of Christians in the Nuba Mountains and in urban areas. Many Muslims belong to the networks of Sufi *tariqas* (brotherhoods) that formed around holy men and serve economic, social, and political as well as religious functions. The brotherhoods cut across tribal and ethnic allegiances: For example, many Beja belong to the Khatmiyya order, which is led by the Arab riverain Mirghani family. Otherwise, most of the divisions reinforce cleavages, particularly the Arab/Muslim separation from the African/non-Muslim.

Geography and Economy

Sudan is predominantly rural, with a third of the population living in urban areas. (That share is growing as people flee famine in the outlying provinces.) Two-thirds of the labor force works in agriculture or herding, and a third of the gross national product was derived from agriculture until the advent of oil exports in 1999. Northern Sudan is largely flat savannah and desert where cattle, camels, and sheep are raised, sorghum and sesame are grown, and gum arabic is harvested. Meat and grains are sold in large amounts to oil-rich states in Arabia, and gum arabic is exported to Europe and the United States for use in soft drinks. Along the Blue and White Nile, south of Khartoum, cotton and peanuts are grown for export on large-scale agricultural holdings called *schemes.* Rains are heavier in the tropical south than in the north, but development in the south has been hampered by civil war and difficult conditions, such as the vast swamp known as the Sudd (barrier). The north suffers from severe deforestation: The forest cover diminished annually by one percent in the 1980s and 1990s due to overgrazing, charcoal burning, and drought.

Men in Rashayda build a mud hut. In many areas of Sudan, there is little building material to work with other than what nature has provided. Even some government facilities, such as immigration and customs centers, are wattle-and-daub structures. **© CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

Industry is based on agriculture, and its products are consumed within the country. Manufactures include sugar refining, flour milling, vegetable oil processing, canning, and textiles. Cement, tire, and cigarette production is also important for the domestic market.

There are substantial untapped deposits of copper and other minerals in Sudan. Chinese and French joint ventures export gold from the Red Sea Hills. Oil has now become the most important resource.

In 1979 the Chevron Oil Company discovered oil in Bentiu (Upper Nile) and Muglad (southern Kordofan). Extraction was blocked by the civil war

that resumed in 1983. Chevron sold out its share to the Sudanese government in 1984. In the mid-1990s the government resumed exploration, utilizing the skills of a consortium of Canadian, European, Chinese, and Malaysian oil companies. Export began in August 1999, when the pipeline to Port Sudan was completed. Since then Sudan has become self-sufficient in oil. It exports increasing amounts of crude and refined oil, particularly to East Africa and Asia. The Canadian Talisman company sold its share to the Indian state oil company in 2002 after widespread protests by human-rights groups against the government's expulsion of Nuer from Upper Nile in order to ensure central control over this vital resource.

Oil exports have enabled Sudan to have a positive balance of trade for the first time in decades and to start to reduce its heavy debt burden. That burden is estimated at $23 billion, most of which is long in arrears. U.S. government sanctions, imposed in November 1997, ban U.S. companies from conducting transactions in Sudan, with the exception of those for gum Arabic.

Urban Areas

The urban population is centered in the Three Towns—Khartoum, Omdurman, and Khartoum North—which serve as the political and economic capital and together house at least 1.2 million people. Port Sudan (pop. 300,000), built by the British in 1910, remains the only port on the Red Sea, although efforts have been made to revive the historic port at Sawakin. Kassala (pop. 235,000) and Qadarif (pop. 190,000) are the main towns in the grain-growing east, and Wad Madani (pop. 220,000) is the capital of the cotton-growing Gezira area. In the west, al-Ubayyad (pop. 230,000) serves as the capital of Kordofan, and al-Fashir—on the border with Chad—is the capital of Darfur; both are important trading centers. Juba (pop. 115,000), the capital of Equatoria, was the capital of the south when it was unified from 1972 to 1983; it has been isolated from the surrounding countryside by the rebel forces of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) since 1985.

History since 1821

The territory that now comprises Sudan was not unified until the Turco-Egyptian invasion of 1821, which imposed centralized control over most of the north relatively quickly. The Turco-Egyptian forces did not conquer Darfur until 1874 and never subdued the southern tribes. Their raiders seized gold, ivory, and slaves from the south, deeply alienating those African peoples.

The indigenous politico-religious movement called the Mahdiyya overthew the Turco-Egyptian government in 1885 and ruled until 1898. Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abdullah called himself the *mahdi* (messiah) in 1881, gathering his followers on Aba Island (White Nile) and later in Kordofan, from which he launched attacks against the Turco-Egyptian army. The mahdi died shortly afterward. His successor *(khalifa)* Abdullahi al-Taʿisha consolidated control over northern Sudan and attempted to seize territory from Ethiopia and Egypt. He established a religious-based government that continued to raid into the southern areas, seizing slaves and promoting Islam.

British forces, marching south from Egypt, overran the country in 1898 to 1899 and imposed the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. Messianic anticolonial revolts broke out in the west and center, and were finally subdued in 1912. Sultan Ali Dinar was not defeated in Darfur until 1916. In the early 1920s nationalist outbreaks called for Sudan's independence, or for its linking with Egypt: Those two strands persisted in the northern nationalist movement until Egypt renounced its claim to Sudan in the 1950s. One enduring legacy of British rule was the virtual separation of the south from the north; from 1922 to 1946 the southern provinces and Nuba Mountains were isolated from the rest of the country. Meanwhile, considerable economic and educational development took place in the north, centered on the Gezira agricultural scheme (opened in 1925) and Gordon Memorial College (opened in 1903). In 1938 the graduates formed the Graduates Congress, which lobbied for independence during World War II. By then, several northern political parties also competed for influence. Britain established a legislative assembly in 1948; this led to self-government in 1952 and the election of the first parliament in the next year. Sudanization of the army and administration began in 1954. Those measures primarily benefited the north; the south was compelled to accept a subordinate position at the Juba Conference (1947) and hardly benefited from Sudanization.

When Sudan gained independence on 1 January 1956, parliamentary rule was established. The two leading religious orders—the Ansar and the Khatmiyya—predominated in the new governments, although secular nationalists, communists, and southerners gained token positions in the parliament. The democratic institutions had not had taken root by the time General Ibrahim Abbud instituted military rule on 17 November 1958. His rule lasted until November 1964, when a popular uprising led to a renewed democracy. That, too, proved unstable as the traditional politicians jockeyed for power, were challenged from the religious right by Hasan al-Turabi's Islamist Party, and failed to deal with the rebellion that had accelerated in the south during Abbud's era.

Young officers led by Muhammad Jaʿfar Numeiri launched a coup d'état on 25 May 1969 and crushed the traditional political groups. Numeiri turned against his left-wing allies in 1971 but mollified the south by granting regional autonomy in 1972. He instituted major economic development programs in the mid-1970s, backed by the party, the Sudan Socialist Union. Economic development remained hampered by poor planning, high-level corruption, and skyrocketing oil prices. In 1977 to 1978 Numeiri sought to widen his base of support by reconciling with the traditional and fundamentalist religious forces. That led to the gradual Islamization of the political system. Numeiri instituted Islamic criminal punishments in September 1983, which he enforced against widespread opposition by draconian emergency measures. By spring 1985 Numeiri's support was confined to Turabi's Islamic movement—northern secularists, the banned political forces, and the southerners (who resumed their civil war in 1983 under the banner of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement) actively sought to overthrow him.

In April 1985 a popular uprising led to a bloodless coup and the installation of a one-year Transitional Military Council. Elections were held in April 1986, and northern religious-oriented political movements won 85 percent of the seats. Turabi's National Islamic Front (NIF) won 20 percent of those seats. African (southern and Nuba) and northern secularist (communist) parties controlled only 15 percent of the parliamentary seats. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party and the Ansar religious order, became prime minister. Despite his pledges to institute a liberal government and to negotiate an end to the fighting, he failed to cancel Numeiri's Islamic laws. Instead, he announced that he would not enforce them in the south, a move that alienated the southerners as well as northern secularists. Mahdi's rival Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani, leader of the Khatmiyya Sufi order and head of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), won acclaim for reaching an agreement with the SPLM to freeze the Islamic laws pending the convening of a constitutional conference. Mahdi and Turabi joined to force the DUP out of the government, but the senior army officers then compelled Mahdi to endorse Mirghani's agreement and negotiate with the SPLM.

On 30 June 1989, hours before the government could finalize the freezing of Islamic law, Brigadier Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir overthrew the government. The coup d'état was orchestrated by Turabi's NIF, which vehemently opposed the annulment of Islamic law. Once again, constitutional institutions were banned: Bashir closed the parliament, banned political parties and trade unions, and shut down independent newspapers. The government accelerated the fighting in the south and in the Nuba mountains. The civil war was redefined as a jihad (holy war) against infidels and apostates. The regime instituted Islamic legal codes in 1991 and an Islamic constitution in 1999. In the late 1990s it reintroduced carefully controlled parliamentary elections and a direct presidential election, which Bashir won handily. In late 1999 Bashir and Turabi had a major falling-out after Turabi sought to sideline Bashir. Bashir, using his power as president and commander of the military and security services, decreed emergency rule and closed down the parliament. From early 2001 until late 2003, Bashir kept Turabi either in jail or under house arrest.

The political and trade union groups that had benefited from the short-lived parliamentary system formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in October 1989. NDA members inside Sudan attempted to mount protests and petitions, which were crushed by the military regime. Most of the leaders fled into exile, from which they continued to try to overthrow the government and reinstitute democracy. The NDA attempted to mount military operations in eastern Sudan, but it lacked

the strength to bring down the regime either militarily or politically. The government even attracted Mahdi back to Khartoum in 2000, but it failed to provide him with a significant political position.

Sudan Today

The geostrategic location of Sudan contributes to its sociopolitical instability. Located astride the Nile River, which flows north from Ethiopia and Uganda into Sudan and through Egypt to the Mediterranean Sea, Sudan has been the object of contention by those neighbors as well as external powers. Egypt cannot tolerate the presence of a hostile government in Khartoum, because the Egyptian economy depends on the Nile waters. Sudan and Egypt worry that Ethiopia might dam the Blue Nile and deprive them both of water. Sudan also borders the Red Sea, a major artery of international trade, and adjoins nine countries (Egypt, Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea). Lacking the capacity to police its remote desert borders and its lengthy coast along the Red Sea, Sudan is vulnerable to incursion. Refugees from neighboring civil wars and famines find haven in Sudan, and hostile governments support rebellious Sudanese groups. Sudanese governments have meddled in the politics of such neighbors as Ethiopia, Chad, and Uganda, although those countries can easily undertake reprisals.

Some view Sudan as a *terra media,* lying between and linking Africa and the Arab world; others see it as lying on the fault line between the two peoples, torn between them and unable to unite. Nearly fifteen years after achieving independence, Sudan's national identity and political system are still violently contested.

See also Abbud, Ibrahim; Ansar, al-; Beja; Dinka; Khartoum; Kordofan; Nubians; Nuer; Numeiri, Muhammad Jaʿfar; Omdurman; Shilluk; Sudanese Civil Wars; Turabi, Hasan al-; Umma Party.

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Ann M. Lesch

SUDANESE CIVIL WARS

Two wars fought since the independence of Sudan in 1956.

There have been two prolonged civil wars in Sudan since independence in 1956. The first lasted from August 1955 to March 1972, and the second began in May 1983. Although both wars have been fought largely in the southern third of the country, their aims have diverged. The first aimed at independence, or at least autonomy for the south, whereas the second primarily aimed at restructuring the central political institutions and devolving power on marginalized areas. Secession is the fallback position should restructuring fail.

The background for the wars lay in the tension between north and south Sudan, the former largely Arabic speaking and Muslim and the latter home to diverse African peoples who adhered to traditional religions or converted to Christianity. Southern peoples had resisted Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist slave raids in the nineteenth century; the British did not manage to subdue them until the 1920s. Britain then imposed the Closed Districts Act (1925) and other measures that banned northern traders and Muslim preachers from the south and even banned Arab-style dress and the use of the Arabic language

in government offices and schools. Britain failed to promote education and economic development in the south, leaving it far behind the north when the two parts were merged at independence under a centralized system that placed power in the hands of northerners. Many southerners felt that they had not gained independence but had, instead, exchanged one foreign ruler for another.

First Civil War, 1955–1972

The first civil war was triggered by the Torit mutiny (August 1955) of the Southern Defence Force and was heightened by the northern politicians' rejection of federalism. Under the parliamentary system (1956–1958), the south was marginalized politically. Under the military rule of General Ibrahim Abbud (1958–1964), the religious and ethnic norms that predominate in the north were imposed on the south: Arabic became the language of government and education, Islam was promoted and Christianity repressed, and increasingly harsh military means were used to quell the revolt. The return to civilian rule in late 1964 did not, in itself, end the conflict. Although the Roundtable Conference of March 1965 examined southern grievances, the ruling northern political parties still sought to establish an Islamic state, which was anathema to southerners and northern secularists. Only after Muhammad Jaʿfar Numeiri seized power in May 1969 was an effort made to recognize the inherent ethnic and religious diversity in Sudan and negotiate with the Anya-Nya rebels. The Addis Ababa Accord of 27 February 1972, which ended the first war, was implemented through the Regional Self-Government Act for the Southern Provinces (promulgated on 3 March 1972) and incorporated into the permanent constitution of 1973. The three southern provinces became one large region with its own regional assembly and High Executive Council (HEC). The south gained considerable autonomy in the social and economic fields. Religious discrimination was prohibited, and English was recognized as the principal language in the south because it had been the common language used in schools. Efforts were made to reintegrate the refugees who had fled the country during the seventeen years of fighting and to absorb the Anya-Nya into the regular armed forces.

Despite constitutional safeguards against altering provisions of the Addis Ababa Accord, Numeiri interfered continually in the implementation of the accord. At times, he dissolved the regional assembly, dismissed the HEC, and tried to prevent potential oil revenue from accruing to the south. Finally, he decreed on 5 June 1983 the redivision of the south into its three original provinces. That illegal action completed the dismemberment of the accord. By then, members of the absorbed Anya-Nya forces had engaged in sporadic mutinies, culminating in mutinies in Bor and Pibor in spring 1983. When Numeiri sent troops to crush the mutineers, they fled to the bush, where they were joined by Colonel John Garang de Mabior, head of the army research center in Khartoum.

Second Civil War, 1983

By midsummer 1983 Garang had molded the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) into a militant force that supported the continued unity of Sudan, but on a new basis, requiring proportional sharing of power among the various peoples and regions; special attention to the socioeconomic needs of the deprived east, west, and south; and nondomination by any one religious or racial group over the others. The SPLM gained support as Numeiri's policies led to economic ruin and his institution of Islamic law in September 1983 alienated a wide array of citizens. Numeiri's overthrow in April 1985 did not, however, end the rebellion. The transitional government (April 1985 to April 1986) and the elected government under Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi (May 1986 through June 1989) failed to respond to the underlying demands of the SPLM and SPLA. The governments sought to modify, rather than annul, Islamic laws, and they treated the SPLM merely as a southern movement. Nonetheless, in spring 1989 the high command of the armed forces compelled the politicians to negotiate an accord with the SPLM that involved canceling Islamic laws until a constitutional conference could resolve the issue of the legal basis of rule. By then, the SPLA controlled nearly 90 percent of the countryside in the south and had made inroads into areas in the north. Fighting had spread into the Nuba Mountains and the southern Blue Nile Province, where the Ingessana people held economic and political grievances against their Arab overlords.

The Sudan People's Liberation Army fought for a unified Sudan during the country's second civil war. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

That effort to negotiate a solution was undermined abruptly by the coup d'état on 30 June 1989—the coup's leaders rejected the agreement to hold the constitutional conference and insisted that Islamic laws be retained. A comprehensive Islamic legal system was instituted in the north and the south was fragmented into ten provinces. After the coup, the SPLM aligned with the exiled opposition National Democratic Alliance in March 1990 and gained the support of the ousted high command of the armed forces in September 1990. The SPLM became the most militarily active element in the nationalist opposition to the Islamist military government. By 1991 the SPLA controlled nearly all the south. However, the fall of Mengistu's government in Ethiopia, which had provided essential support for the SPLA, deepened internal tensions inside the SPLA. Commanders in Upper Nile defected in August 1991, thereby enabling the armed forces to recapture many garrisons and to put the SPLA on the defensive.

Prospects for a negotiated solution seemed to vanish. At negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria, in 1992 and 1993, the SPLM proposed establishing a confederal system, just short of secession, but the government responded that "secession will come at the barrel of the gun" (Wondu and Lesch, p. 51). The Organization of African Unity's East African Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) initiated negotiations in 1994. IGADD called for the formation of a secular state in Sudan; absent a secular, democratic system, the south should have the right to secede. This position pleased the SPLM but infuriated the government in Khartoum. Only in 1997 did the government allow the issue of self-determination to be an agenda item in the negotiations. Soon after, Khartoum's incentive to negotiate diminished: The export of oil from Upper Nile, which began in August 1999, enabled the government to double its arms purchases within two years and establish military industries. The expulsion of the indigenous (largely Nuer) population from the oil fields area accelerated in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This deepened the already severe humanitarian crisis on the south.

After 11 September 2001, the government began to respond to U.S. pressure to negotiate. It reengaged in negotiations (the African body having been renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development—IGAD) and signed a potentially breakthrough accord with the SPLM at Machakos (Kenya) in July 2002. This accord called for the formation of a confederation between the north and south that would last for a transitional six years. Negotiations during the winter of 2002 to 2003 over the specifics of power and resource sharing and the relation of religion to the state remained acrimonious and it remained uncertain whether a fundamental accord was possible. The future status of the other marginalized areas also remained uncertain.

The two civil wars sought to deal with the underlying problem of Sudan—how to build unity in a multiethnic and multireligious country. The first war proposed regionalism as the means to give each community a degree of autonomy; the second war proposed restructuring power in the center so that regional autonomy could be secure. Sudanese politicians still grapple with that fundamental problem.

See also Abbud, Ibrahim; Garang, John; Numeiri, Muhammad Ja῾far; Sudan.

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Ann M. Lesch

SUDANESE WOMEN'S UNION

Women's-rights organization.

The Sudanese Women's Union (SWU), an affiliate of the Sudanese Communist Party and an heir of the Educated Girls' Association and the Association of Sudanese Women as well as other organizations of the 1940s, was founded in 1952. Its first executive committee was composed of Fatima Talib, Khalda Zahir, and Fatima Ahmed Ibrahim.

The SWU was active during the late nationalist period (1952–1956). It reached its zenith in 1965, when it had branches throughout the country and a successful monthly publication, *Sawt al-Mar᾽a* (Woman's voice), and had made gains in women's rights such as suffrage, equal pay, and maternity leave. In addition, its president, Fatima Ibrahim, was the first woman elected to parliament. Under Ibrahim's leadership, the SWU gained prominence as one of the largest and most effective women's organizations on the African continent, boasting some 15,000 members at its peak.

Political repression under successive military governments took a toll on the SWU. Ultimately, with the Islamist military coup d'etat in 1989, the SWU was forced underground and Ibrahim into exile in London. Nonetheless, in the 1990s Amnesty International and the United Nations presented the SWU with human-rights awards for its history of struggle and its efforts in exile.

See also Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Ibrahim, Fatima Ahmed; Sudan; Sudanese Civil Wars.

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Sondra Hale

SUDD

Great swamps of the Upper Nile.

Sudd (in Arabic, *sadd,* or barrier) was the word used by European and Arab merchants to describe the largest swamps in the world, which are situated on the Upper Nile in Sudan. It had prevented passage up the Nile River until 1841, when Salim Qapudan, acting on the orders of Muhammad Ali Pasha, viceroy of Egypt, was the first person to pass through its labyrinthine channels. Although open to navigation, the Sudd continues to present a formidable barrier to the passage of water from the equatorial lakes to Sudan and Egypt. Its size expands and contracts depending on the amount of water from the

lakes, and its slope, only a few inches per mile, spreads any additional water across the Nilotic plain. The average annual amount of water flowing into the Sudd in the twentieth century is 33 billion cubic meters, of which only half, some 16 billion cubic meters, leaves the Sudd for Sudan and Egypt. In 1976 the French Compagnie de Constructions Internationales (CCI) began the excavation of the Jonglei Canal to permit water from the Lake Plateau to bypass the swamps. The excavation of the 225-mile canal past the Sudd threatened to disrupt the seasonal movement of livestock and the migrations of great herds of African wildlife. When the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by John Garang de Mabior, revolted against the Sudan government in May 1983, his forces terminated the canal's construction at mile 166. It has never been resumed.

See also NILE RIVER.

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ROBERT O. COLLINS

SUEZ CANAL

Channel built from 1856 to 1869 that links the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea.

Several early rulers of Egypt constructed canals for the passage of seagoing ships, usually linking the Nile River to the Gulf of Suez. The followers of Saint-Simon, the French utopian socialist (Claude Henri de Rouvray, Comte de Saint-Simon, 1760–1825), proposed building a canal linking the Mediterranean to the Red Sea in the early nineteenth century. The entrepreneur who actually carried out this scheme was Ferdinand de Lesseps, a former French diplomat who was on friendly terms with Muhammad Saʿid Pasha. As soon as Saʿid became Egypt's viceroy in 1854, de Lesseps described to him his plan for constructing and financing this waterway, which would be the largest public-works project in Egypt since the pyramids. Saʿid consented, but it took some time for de Lesseps to secure approval from the sultan of the Ottoman

The Suez Canal was inaugurated on 17 November 1869. The waterway, which extends one hundred miles and has been enlarged twice since its completion, is used to transport 41 percent of goods and cargo that reach the Persian/Arab Gulf ports and 14 percent of total world trade. **© BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

Empire and the European powers (Britain was strongly opposed to a canal that might imperil its defense of India) and to raise the necessary capital.

The construction cost, estimated at more than 450 million French francs (worth about $100 million at that time), was borne mainly by Egyptian taxpayers and by thousands of unpaid or underpaid Egyptian peasants who were forced into corvée labor until the European powers and the Ottoman government enjoined the Universal Maritime Suez Canal Company to stop this practice.

When the 100-mile waterway was opened in 1869, it was 30 feet deep and 100 feet wide, adequate for most oceangoing vessels at the time. It soon became a main trade route for steam-driven passenger and cargo ships because it reduced travel time between Europe and East Africa, South Asia, China, Japan, and the East Indies. The canal was supposed to be open to ships of all nations in war or peace, but Britain made sure that it was closed to shipping for Germany and its allies in both world wars, and Egypt barred its use to Israel and to other countries' ships carrying goods for Israel until 1975. The canal was administered by the Canal Company until it was nationalized by Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1956. Since then it has been admin-

Suez Canal

	No. of transits 2000	No. of transits 2001	Net ship tonnage in thousands of tons 2000	Net ship tonnage in thousands of tons 2001
Tankers	2,563	2,764	105,237	117,014
Other vessels	11,578	11,222	333,725	339,099
Total	14,141	13,986	438,962	456,113

SOURCE: MEES 45:18, 6 May 2002.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

istered by the Suez Canal Authority. It was closed from 1956 to 1967 and from 1967 to 1975 because of the Arab-Israel conflict.

The canal was enlarged from 1960 to 1964 and from 1975 to 1980 to accommodate larger oil tankers, which have become its main users; in 1992, it was 590 feet wide at its narrowest point and had a maximum draught of 53 feet. Transit time is now 15 hours, and 80 ships can transit per day. The Suez Canal is a major route for transport of crude oil from the Persian Gulf. In 2000 the northbound tankers from the Gulf carried 28.2 million tons of crude oil (about 580,000 barrels per day) and in 2001 28.8 million tons (about 592,000 barrels per day).

The transit rates are established by the Suez Canal Authority. They are computed to keep the canal transit fees attractive to shippers. For example, in January 2002, the fee for the transport of crude oil for very large tankers was $1.21 per ton above the first 30,000 tons. Such a rate would amount to approximately $190,000 for a 150,000-ton oil tanker.

See also LESSEPS, FERDINAND DE; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; SAʿID PASHA; SUEZ CRISIS (1956–1957).

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT
UPDATED BY JEAN-FRANÇOIS SEZNEC

SUEZ CANAL UNIVERSITY

Public university founded in Ismaʿilia, Egypt, in 1976.

Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat (1970–1981) founded Suez Canal University as part of his plan to rebuild and symbolically reclaim the war-damaged Suez Canal cities. In 1975 he had reopened the canal, which had been blocked since the June 1967 Arab–Israel War. With five colleges in Ismaʿilyya and two each in al-Arish and Suez, the university has a teaching staff of 638, 12,312 undergraduates, and 1,588 graduate students.

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DONALD MALCOLM REID

SUEZ CRISIS (1956–1957)

The British and French challenging of Egyptian President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, also involving Israel, and ending in the achievement of control of the Canal by Egypt.

On 26 July 1956, before 100,000 Egyptians in the main square of Alexandria, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser announced his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company. This came as a rebuff to the recent withdrawal of the United States and Great Britain from their pledge to finance the construction of a high dam across the Nile River near Aswan. The Suez Canal lay formally under Egyptian sovereignty, but the implementation of these sovereign rights was regulated by an international convention agreed upon by Egypt and several maritime powers in 1888 in Constantinople. The revenue and daily administration of navigation through the canal were handled by an international company based in Paris and owned mainly by British and French shareholders. There was nothing illegal in the act of nationalization, since Nasser promised to

compensate the shareholders faithfully and ensure there was no disruption of navigation. But Great Britain and France saw in Nasser's act a defiant blow to their prestige and political standing in the Middle East and North Africa.

Within hours the British and French decided jointly to make every effort, including the use of military action if necessary, to regain control of the Canal. They ordered their chiefs of staff to plan an invasion of Egypt. Under the command of British general Sir Charles Keightley and French admiral Pierre Barjot, a large force assembled in several Mediterranean ports and operative plans were laid out for an operation code-named "Musketeer." The U.S. administration, while in agreement on the need to ensure the international nature of the Canal, made clear from the outset its strong objection to the use of force for this purpose. Also, considering the support Nasser was allegedly giving to Arab rebels in Algeria, French public opinion supported its government's hard-lined intention. Public opinion in Britain, even within the ruling Conservative Party, was, however, divided.

In order to overcome these difficulties and save the time needed for the preparation of the military operation, some preliminary diplomatic measures had to be taken. While British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden and French Prime Minister Guy Mollet interpreted these measures as preparation of the military operation, American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles took them as an opportunity to calm his allies and forestall any resort to force. As expected, the Soviet Union and several "neutral" states led by India unequivocally supported Egypt's position. A conference was held between 18 and 23 August in London, at the end of which a resolution signed by eighteen of the participating maritime states was presented to President Nasser by Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies. The resolution demanded that Egypt agree to the empowerment of a new international agency that represented the interests of the canal users and took over the administration of canal affairs.

The French and British, having almost completed their military preparations, were ready to take the next diplomatic step of bringing the issue before the United Nations (UN) Security Council. But Dulles feared that such a move would lead to an impasse and precipitate the use of force. He persuaded his allies and several other maritime states to convene once more on 19 September for a second conference in London. On 21 September the group announced the formation of a Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA), which was supposed to deal with matters of finance and administration of the canal on a practical level and uphold the users' rights. But SCUA was stillborn, since in the meantime Nasser had replaced all the old company's navigators and arranged for uninterrupted operation of the canal under Egyptian management. Prudently, Nasser decided at this stage not to force the issue of payments for the passage in the canal, rendering SCUA nothing more than a paper declaration.

At the end of September Britain and France, becoming restless as their assembled invasion force began to exact a heavy burden, filed a formal complaint in the Security Council. Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN secretary-general, tried to mediate a compromise in private meetings with foreign secretaries Selwyn Lloyd (Great Britain), Christian Pineau (France), and Mahmud Fawzi (Egypt), and formulated a six-point draft proposal to be elaborated at a later stage. But France and Great Britain were not looking for a compromise in defeating Nasser. Despite the fact that the Security Council voted favorably on Hammarskjöld's "Six Points," Lloyd and Pineau insisted on another formal Security Council resolution that would condemn and nullify the nationalization act. This proposal was defeated by a Soviet veto and the council disbanded without a practical solution to the crisis.

From the British and French standpoint, by the middle of October 1956 all diplomatic measures were exhausted and the time was ripe for the "Musketeer" operation. But in view of the smooth operation of the canal, mounting opposition inside Britain, and repeated warnings of the American administration against the use of force, Eden procrastinated. It seemed that he had lost a clear and compelling casus belli.

From the beginning of the crisis the British, knowing of the warm relations developing between France and Israel over recent months, had insisted on a strict separation between their quarrel with Nasser and the Arab–Israeli conflict. Israel, Britain

maintained, should be left outside the imbroglio. Despite having many grievances against Egypt and despite the disruption of the balance of power introduced in September 1955 by a huge Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, Israel preferred to concentrate all its energies on absorbing the large quantities of armaments acquired from France since the end of June. The French, on the other hand, whose part in "Musketeer" was to operate on the east bank the Canal, sought to examine the possibility of getting tactical assistance from Israeli forces, if they could press the Egyptians in the Sinai Peninsula from the east. By the end of September, recognizing Eden's hesitations, the French had begun to consider triggering the entire situation by inducing Israel to take the initiative and attack Nasser first.

Invited by the French, Golda Meir, Israel's minister of foreign affairs, together with General Moshe Dayan, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) chief of staff, and Shimon Peres, the director-general of the Ministry of Defense, arrived in Paris on 30 September for exploratory talks. The St. Germain Conference did not yield any definitive military plans, however, since the situation at the UN was not resolved and Britain's position remained unclear. Under the assumption that Israel might be invited at some point to participate in the war, further French armaments were rapidly shipped to Israel and a group of high-ranking French officers, headed by Major General Maurice Challe, proceeded to Tel Aviv to explore operations possibilities. Having become better acquainted with Israel's capabilities, Challe conceived a new plan: Israel would initiate an assault on the Sinai, and the French and British would issue an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt to withdraw so that French and British forces could occupy the canal and assure free and secure navigation. Assuming that Nasser would reject the demand, the road for "Musketeer" was open.

Eden was persuaded to join in this collusion, under the strict condition that it not look as if Great Britain had invited Israel's attack, and that Great Britain appeared to be reacting to a new situation provoked by Israel. Prime Minister of Israel David Ben-Gurion considered the proposal humiliating; he also did not trust the British intention to fulfill their share of the "scenario." To unravel the complex situation, a highly confidential meeting took place between 20 and 23 October at a small private villa in Sèvres, outside Paris. A series of meetings involving Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan, and Shimon Peres from Israel; Guy Mollet, Christian Pineau, and Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, the French minister of defense, and briefly also involving Selwyn Lloyd of Great Britain, took place. After the group reached agreement on slight changes in the Challe scenario, and the French assured Israel of military reinforcement, the Sèvres Protocol was signed by Ben-Gurion, Pineau, and Patrick Dean, a senior British official.

On 29 October, an Israeli parachute battalion was dropped east of the Mitla Pass, about forty miles east of Port Suez, and Israeli armor and infantry began to push west into the heart of Sinai. In accordance with the Sèvres Protocol, the next day an appeal was made jointly by the French and British governments demanding that the belligerent parties clear the canal zone. Israel, not intending to reach the banks of the canal anyway, acceded to the request. Nasser, as expected, declined. Thirty-six hours later, on the evening of 31 October, the British and French launched heavy air attacks on Egyptian airports and other military and supply installations, operating from their bases in Cyprus and from aircraft carriers off the shore of Egypt, and started the six-day naval voyage of their invasion forces from Malta, Toulon, and Algiers.

The thinly disguised deception and the unwarranted attack on Egypt incensed President Eisenhower who started, in concert with the Soviet Union and almost the entire international community, to put pressure on the colluding parties. Because British and French vetoes would be used to stymie the Security Council, a special emergency session of the General Assembly convened under the "Uniting for Peace" formula (which had been used during the Korean crisis in 1950). On 5 November French and British paratroopers dropped near the towns of Port Said and Port Tawfiq at the northern edge of the canal, while Israel had by this point already completed the conquest of the entire Sinai Peninsula. The landing from the sea of further troops the next day completed the capture of Port Saʿid, but their advance was arrested about thirty miles to the south. The mounting pressure of the UN, threats of the Soviet Union, and heavy pressure of public opinion in Great Britain opposing the war, were all factors that moved Eden to order a cease-fire.

Following a proposal devised by Lester Pearson, the Canadian minister of foreign affairs, the UN established a special Emergency Force (UNEF) under the command of Canadian general E. L. M Burns. The invading parties now succumbed to international pressure and withdrew their forces from the Canal on 22 December, assuming that UNEF would take responsibility for the management of the areas they evacuated. But, acting on their sovereign prerogatives, the Egyptians immediately took over those territories and UNEF moved eastward into Sinai to shadow the gradually retreating Israeli forces. By the middle of February 1957, after the IDF completed the evacuation of almost the entire peninsula, a crisis developed because Israel had hoped to hold on to the Gaza Strip and to the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba (Elat) at Sharm al-Shaykh. Heavy American pressure and the threat of UN sanctions moved Ben-Gurion to withdraw Israeli forces to the old armistice demarcation lines by 6 March 1957. The UN force was newly deployed along the Egyptian side of the Egyptian-Israeli frontier, but the Egyptians refrained from returning to the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip with more than token forces. Both these measures put an end, at least for the following ten years, to the many frictions that had inflamed relations along those frontiers before the war, and left the Straits of Tiran open to Israeli navigation.

The 1956 Suez War is commonly considered a major blunder in modern international relations and a watershed leading to the final demise of British and French colonialism. Within a few years both Great Britain and France lost their positions in the Middle East and North Africa, and their status as first-rate powers waned while dependence on U.S. power grew. The Eisenhower Doctrine of January 1957 gave a symbolic imprimatur to the evolving new situation in the Middle East. The main winner of the entire affair was President Nasser, who not only achieved nationalization of the Suez Company and expelled the last vestiges of British presence along the canal, but also emerged as the uncontested leader of the Arab people and became, along with India's Jawaharlal Nehru and Yugoslavia's Josef Broz Tito, one of the outstanding leaders of the neutralist bloc of nations.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1956); LONDON CONFERENCE (1956); SÈVRES PROTOCOL.

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MORDECHAI BAR-ON

SUEZ–MEDITERRANEAN PIPELINE

Pipeline linking the Red and Mediterranean seas.

The Suez–Mediterranean Pipeline (SUMED) was opened in 1977. It consists of two pipelines 210 miles long and 42 inches in diameter. It has a capacity of 2.4 million barrels per day. SUMED allows the Persian Gulf oil-producing states to bypass the Suez Canal, which cannot accommodate tankers larger than 200,000 tons. The pipeline can provide an alternative route to Gulf exporters if the Suez canal is blocked, as happened in 1973. Half of the pipeline is owned by the Egyptian General Petroleum Company. The balance is divided among PETROMIN of Saudi Arabia, the Abu Dhabi Oil Company, and the Qatar General Petroleum Company.

SUMED is designed to allow easy transshipment and dispatch to numerous destinations with minimal disruption. It can transport different grades of crude oil with minimal contamination. The terminals at Ayn Sukhna, on the Red Sea, and at Sidi Krayr, near Alexandria, can accommodate both very small tankers and those over 500,000 tons. Many tankers too large to use the Suez Canal can unload

a portion of their oil in Ayn Sukhna, sail through the canal, and reload in Sidi Krayr.

Seventy-three percent of the oil transported by SUMED is destined for Europe. The pipeline has more than forty clients. The main ones are the major oil companies, Arabian American Oil Company, and the National Iranian Oil Company.

See also PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS; PETROMIN.

JEAN-FRANÇOIS SEZNEC

SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS

Islamic mysticism.

The word *Sufi* is generally assumed to derive from *suf* (wool), in reference to the simple clothing of the early ascetic mystics. It refers to the practice and philosophical tradition in Islam that relates to spiritualism and mysticism.

Theological and Philosophical Basis

Mysticism in Islam has two distinct origins. The first is the Qurʾan itself, which postulates an intensely personal and direct relationship between the individual and God. This fervent devotion was expressed in the early practice of Hasan al-Basri (d. 728) and the poetry of Rabiʿa al-Adawiyya (d. 801) and gave rise to spiritual Sufism. Practiced by preachers who embraced a simple—almost ascetic—life, it also included celibacy and extensive religious worship and contemplation carried out individually or, more often, in a *halaqa,* or circle of devotees.

The second source is the mystical doctrines of other religious traditions, including gnosticism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism, and Hinduism, which converts to Islam brought into their new faith, giving rise to theosophical Sufism. These traditions had elaborate theosophical doctrines, at the heart of which lay the concept of the unity with the divine, the ultimate goal of the mystic. However, the principle of *tawhid* (divine unity), the cornerstone of orthodox Islamic belief, establishes God's absolute unity and absolute transcendence, thereby precluding any possibility of the creature joining with the Creator.

Theosophical Sufism eventually resolved this contradiction through the elaboration of a number of paradoxical concepts that maintain at once unity and difference, annihilation of self into the divine *(fana)* and self-persistence *(baqa),* presence and absence, intoxication and sobriety. The analogy of seeing God in a mirror image of oneself is often used to explain this unity with the divine. The reinterpretation of *tawhid* as unity of being, according to which the mystic could claim unity with divine existence or attributes while preserving the transcendence of divine essence, allowed Sufism to claim adherence to fundamental orthodox Islamic dogma and gave Islamic mysticism its distinctive flavor.

Idris I (1889–1983) became king of Libya in 1951, when the country declared its independence. He ruled until 1969, when he traveled to Turkey for medical treatment and Muammar al-Qaddafi overthrew the monarchy. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

On the basis of this new interpretation, divine truth *(haqiqa)* became the ultimate object of the Sufi gnosis, which was called *maʿrifa* (intuitive knowledge) to set it apart from the rational and exoteric discourse of the law; the law itself became secondary—either a mere step to reach unity with the divine or a hindrance that could be dismissed after a certain level of illumination. Knowledge of the divine

Iraqi Sufis practice a mystical form of Islam that focuses heavily on enlightening the soul through internal holiness, rather than external surroundings. Pictured is a group of Sufis praying at their shrine in Baghdad. © BENJAMIN LOWY/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

nature was called *kashf* and was considered to be infallible, a characteristic that in orthodox Islam is attributed only to Prophetic revelation. The concept of the unity of being was tied to the Hellenistic understanding of God as a First Intellect from whose self-contemplation the world emanates, and that was reinforced by the Greek-inspired Muslim philosophers, who adopted that understanding against the dogma of the Muslim theological schools. The articulation of theosophical Sufism and its harmonization with the *shariʿa* (Islamic law) was carried out by Muhyi al-Din ibn al-Arabi (d. 1240), who systematized a sainthood hierarchy that culminated in a "seal of sainthood" parallel to the Qurʾanic "seal of prophecy" that he attributed to himself.

Although at first fought by the orthodox, this process of presenting the theosophical concepts in Islamic terms and justifying them through the esoteric interpretation of the Qurʾan eventually made Sufism legitimate. The process was furthered by the elaboration of a body of Sufi prophetic sayings *(hadith)* that justified Sufi practice (although that led to the elaboration of anti-Sufi *hadith.*) The full adherence by theosophical Sufism to the *shariʿa* and the nominal adherence to the concept of *tawhid* met the main legal requirement of the faith. In addition, the materialism that accompanied the economic, technological, and cultural expansion of the Islamic empire in Umawi and Abbassid times, as well as the tendency among literalist jurists and theologians to

reduce the law and the faith to a numbing amalgam of rules and rituals, helped the spread of Sufism by causing a popular reaction against these trends. In the eleventh century, Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali (d. 1111), who dominated the orthodox movement with his powerful intellect, strongly defended the spiritual dimension in Sufism against the impoverished literalist views of its most vocal opponents and integrated it into the theological expression of the faith; and although he opposed the unity of being and the asceticism and withdrawal preached by some Sufis, the stature of al-Ghazzali helped validate Sufism. Sufism could now spread unimpeded in all its various expression, although any unambiguous claim of having achieved unity with the divine met with retribution or persecution from the orthodox theologians (as happened to Husayn bin Mansur al-Hallaj, executed for heresy in 922.)

Sufi Orders

Partly because orthodox resistance precluded its integration in the theological disciplines and partly because of its very nature, Sufism did not become an organized discipline and came to refer to anything from intense piety to specific devotional steps to mystical philosophy. Most often, however, a Sufi cell (called *tariqa* or *zawiya* or *ribat*) was formed around a teacher, and spiritual doctrine and practice could vary widely from one cell to another. Generally, the Sufi experience centers on a number of practices (including *dhikr* or recitation of the Qurʾan, contemplation, prayer, singing, dancing, and fasting) prescribed by the Sufi shaykh, who determines the progress of the disciple through the *maqamat* (stages of spiritual development, codified by Dhu Nun, d. 859.) Sufism contributed greatly to Islamic art in poetry (that of Jalal al-Din al-Rumi, d. 1273, is the best known in the Muslim world as well as in the West) and in literature and music.

By the middle of the ninth century, Sufi orders had established schools throughout the Muslim world. Since any teacher could establish a cell, these were innumerable. However, the main Sufi schools established a *silsila* (chain) through which the master's teachings were transmitted from teacher to disciple, and a loose lineage was traced back either to Abu al-Qasim al-Junayd (d. 910) in the Arab world or to Abu Yazid al-Bistami (d. 874) in Central Asia and Iran. Within the Arab tradition, the Rifaʿiyya (Ahmad al-Rifaʿi, d. 1182), became know for some wild practices and spread widely until overtaken in the fifteenth century by the Qadiriyya (Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, d. 1166), whose orthodox bent and more flexible teachings became popular. Less famous because of its emphasis on strict mystical discipline was the Suhrawardiyya (al-Suhrawardi, d. 1168), which gained favor with the upper classes. Within Central Asia and Anatolia, were the Mawlawiyya (also Mevlevis; Jalal al-Din al-Rumi, d. 1258), an introspective order known for its use of chanting and its dancing dervishes, the nomadic Yasawiyya (Ahmad al-Yisavi, d. 1166), and the powerful and orthodox Naqshbandiyya (Muhammad Bahaʾ al-Din al Naqshabandi, d. 1389), which was popular with the elite in India and Central Asia. Also popular in the Indian subcontinent was the Chishtiyya (Muʿin al-Din Chishti, d. 1236). In Africa, the Badawiyya in Egypt (Ahmad al-Badawi, d. 1276) and the Shadhiliyya (Abu al-Hassan al-Shadhili, d. 1258) had emerged from the Rifaʿiyya, though the latter was more insistent on following the Sunna (tradition of the Prophet) and discouraged asceticism. The Tijaniyya (Ahmad al-Tijani, d. 1815) became very active in fighting European colonization in Northern Africa in the nineteenth century. Amongst the Shiʿa, the most popular orders were the Safawiyya (Safiy al-Din, d. 1334), which originally had been a Sunni movement, and the Niʿmatullah (Niʿmatullah bin ʿAbdullah, d. 1431). The orders shared the same general structure, an initiation ceremony during which the disciple (or the affiliate) was inducted in a similar path, marked with individual and collective rituals that focused on total obedience to the Sufi master.

These orders contributed greatly to the spread of Islam and often served as social protest movements, through their association with craft and commercial guilds, against state authority and abuses of power. But the veneration of the saints and the belief in their power to perform miracles (a claim that was eventually sanctioned by orthodoxy) slowly degenerated in popular practice into a muddle of saint worship, fatalism, superstition, and magic and cultic practices. This was accentuated by the excesses of the more extreme Sufi organizations, which demanded profession of faith in the saints as part of the *shahada* (Muslim creed); other organizations allowed followers to use illicit

substances and disregard the law in the pursuit of the loftier goal of achieving knowledge of the divine; still others preached extreme asceticism and withdrawal from the world. Such excesses had always met with strong disapproval from orthodox jurists, although all of the jurists accepted the spiritual dimension of Sufism, but it was not until the reform movements of the eighteenth century that a reaction against these excesses took place. Building on the criticism of theosophical Sufism by Taqiyy al-Din ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) introduced a strict return to the pristine sources of Islam, namely the Qurʾan and the *Sunna* (the Prophet's tradition), and condemned the morally lax practices and quasi-worship of the saints and the Prophet that were practiced by Sufis.

In India and North Africa, reform was also under way, although for different reasons. The Sufi movements, whose active preaching had brought massive conversions to Islam in those areas, had adopted beliefs and practices from their converts that were at times clearly in opposition to Islamic belief and to the *shariʿa.* Alarmed by this syncretism, Sufi masters including Muhammad al-Baqi Billah and Ahmad Sirhindi in India and Muhammad ibn Idris in North Africa initiated a move to restore orthodoxy and in the process reinterpreted the Sufi concepts and shifted their content from unity of being to unity of witnessing God *(wahdat al-shuhud)* and from a traditional Sufi path *(tariqa)* centered on a saint to a *tariqa Muhammadiyya* (the Prophet's *tariqa*) centered on the emulation of the Prophet through strict and active observation of the *shariʿa.* But the threat that European colonialism posed to the Muslim movements transformed their efforts from religious and social reform to a national jihad against the invaders, which only hastened the disintegration of a Sufi worldview based on otherworldliness and ascetic withdrawal. Modern Muslim movements facing many of the same political challenges have generally been critical of Sufism and have espoused more and more a legalistic interpretation of the faith. However, despite the decline of the Sufi orders in recent history, many of the Sufi rituals and traditions survive today in individual and communal practice.

The Muslim world's understanding of its faith has constantly oscillated between the poles of excessive spiritualism and legalistic interpretation, although the existence of these poles has kept Islam from falling permanently into one or the other extreme, in the one case by preserving the spiritual dimension of the faith and preventing the reification of religious consciousness and in the other by grounding the faith in textual sources and moral activism. The great jurists and theologians have attempted to maintain a balance between these two dimensions of Islam, and despite opposition to certain elements in it, Sufism is generally seen as part of normal religious commitment. Thus, it was considered perfectly acceptable during the 1980s for the vice president of Cairo University, a noted scholar in Arabic-Islamic philosophy, to serve as the leader of Sufi circles in Egypt. Popular religion, however, has generally swung from one extreme to the other.

See also Hadith; Mevlevi Brotherhood; Naqshbandi; Qadiriyya Order; Qurʾan; *Shariʿa;* Sunna.

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Maysam J. al Faruqi

SUISSA, ALBERT

[1959–]

Israeli author.

Suissa was born in Casablanca, Morocco, and emigrated to Israel in 1963. He grew up in Jerusalem, where he studied in an Orthodox school. Later he moved to Paris and studied mime, taught theater, and performed with a mime troupe. He now lives in Paris and Jerusalem.

Akud (The bound, 1990), Suissa's only book, consists of novellas that cumulatively form a variation of a bildungsroman. The protagonist is a child of an immigrant North African family uprooted and replanted on the outskirts of Jerusalem—for that matter, on the margins of Israeli society. Rich with ornamental details, fantasy, and ethnic authenticity, the novel relates the development of a child whose

disintegrating family has had its very foundations undermined by its transplantation. Pitted against the slogans of Eastern European Zionism and mainstream Israeli culture, the impotence and irrelevance of the family is portrayed boldly. Both the original home and the new home seem to be driven by violence and oppression, which breed a devastating alienation. Suissa's language and the structure of the novel are arabesque in pattern and logic, baroque in style, and modern in psychological sensitivities.

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ZVIA GINOR
DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

SULAYMAN, HIKMAT

[1889–1946]

Iraqi government official.

Hikmat Sulayman held various senior administrative positions and ministerial posts in Iraq in the 1920s and 1930s. Associated first with Yasin al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali al-Kaylani, he fell out with them in 1935. His friendship with Bakr Sidqi led to his becoming prime minister after the latter's coup in October 1936, a post he held until Sidqi's overthrow in August 1937.

PETER SLUGLETT

SULAYMANIYA

Town in northeastern Iraq, capital of Iraqi Kurdistan.

A market town in Kurdistan, Iraq, 60 miles (96.5 km) east of Kirkuk, Sulaymaniya is bounded on the east and south by Iran. Its name was linked to Süleyman Paşa, *wali* of Baghdad when the town was founded in 1781. Surrounded by mountains, the town has cold winters and mild summers. It has archaeological sites (some in caves) that date to about fifty thousand years ago.

Most of the population are Kurds. Dokan Dam, 37 miles (60 km) northwest of the town, has a hydroelectric station.

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NAZAR AL-KHALAF

SULEIMAN, MULAY

Alawi sultan of Morocco, 1792–1822.

Heir to the badly divided government of his brother and predecessor, Mulay Yazid (ruled 1790–1792), Suleiman also faced provincial unrest and a weakened tax base. He brought much of coastal and central Morocco under *makhzan* control, although his capture and subsequent release by Berber forces in the central Atlas mountains in 1819 underscored the limits of the crown's control over large provinces of Morocco. Suleiman is also known for his bid to suppress popular Sufism and other local socioreligious activities. In the face of growing European pressures, Suleiman adopted a generally hostile and insular stance.

See also ALAWI; SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS.

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MATTHEW S. GORDON

SULH, KAZEM AL-

[1909–1977]

Lebanese politician, diplomat, and journalist; former ambassador to Iraq; member of parliament, 1960–1964.

Kazem al-Sulh (also al-Solh) was born into a prestigious Sunni family that was active in the Arab nationalist movement at the turn of the century. He emerged in the 1930s as one of the most articulate advocates of an independent, sovereign Lebanon

that would be free from French control but would also remain separate from Syria. In defending the territorial boundaries that the French mandatory power had established, he went against the dominant opinion of people in his community, who still favored reintegrating into Syria those regions the French had annexed to Mount Lebanon in 1920.

Unlike many of his Muslim contemporaries, Kazem al-Sulh understood very early on that independence from France could only be gained by reaching out to moderate Christians, particularly Maronites. He argued that the Maronites would more easily loosen their ties to France and join the nationalist cause if they could be reassured that independence would not be followed by absorption into Syria, or by policies that would undermine Lebanon's political autonomy vis-à-vis other Arab countries. He aspired to create an independent Lebanon based on Muslim-Christian accommodation. It would be possible to achieve this goal, he believed, if the Sunnis agreed to a historic compromise: if they would shed their traditional demand for reunification with Syria in exchange for the Maronites' abandoning their call for a Christian Lebanon and renouncing French protection and interference in Lebanese affairs.

To promote these ideas, Kazem al-Sulh created a group called al-Nida al-Qawmi (The National Appeal), which attracted moderate Sunnis and became a political party in 1945. Although it never was able to develop a mass following, the group played an important role in mobilizing Sunni support for an independent Lebanon. It also strengthened the hand of Maronite leaders like Bishara al-Khuri who were arguing within their own communities for the very kind of cross-confessional compromise that Kazem al-Sulh and like-minded Sunni notables and intellectuals were advocating. Some measure of the influence of Kazem al-Sulh and groups such as al-Nida al-Qawmi can be gotten by noting that the aspirations they articulated were eventually embodied in the 1943 National Pact. Kazem and his brother Taki al-Din are usually credited with facilitating the conversion of their first cousin Riyad al-Sulh to the cause of an independent, sovereign Lebanon managed through a Maronite-Sunni partnership.

Although his ideas had a critical impact on the course of Lebanese history, Kazem al-Sulh played only a marginal role in post-independence Lebanese politics. Although he was a gifted writer and political thinker, he never was a particularly effective politician. By the late 1950s, al-Nida al-Qawmi had ceased to function, a victim to the rising tide of Arab nationalism. Kazem al-Sulh's politics had always been based on compromise, tolerance, and conciliation, and this approach had become increasingly inappropriate in the context of an Arab world that, caught in the ferment of the 1950s and 1960s, witnessed the radicalization of the Sunni masses. Kazem al-Sohl served as Lebanese ambassador to Iraq during the 1940s and 1950s, and he was criticized by pan-Arab intellectuals and politicians for the part it was alleged he played in designing the ill-fated Baghdad Pact. Thanks to Christian votes, he was elected a Sunni representative from Zahle to the parliament (1960–1964). Kazem al-Sulh ended his career as a relatively uninfluential politician, largely discredited within his own community.

See also BAGHDAD PACT (1955); NATIONAL PACT (LEBANON); SULH, RIYAD AL-.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX

SULH, RASHID AL-

[1926–]

Lebanese politician; prime minister, 1974–1975 and 1992.

Rashid al-Sulh (also Solh), born into a minor branch of the prestigious Sunni Sulh family, was brought up in the house of former prime minister Sami al-Sulh. After studying at the College of the Christian Brothers and al-Maqasid College, he received his LL.B. from Saint Joseph University in Beirut and became a lawyer and a judge. Elected deputy for Beirut in 1964 and 1972, he inherited the political mantle of Sami al-Sulh following the latter's death in 1968. Considered a moderate among Sunni leaders in the 1970s, Sulh nevertheless devel-

oped a reputation as a champion of the working class and maintained a close relationship with Kamal Jumblatt. While still a relative newcomer among Sunni political bosses, he was chosen as prime minister by President Sulayman Franjiyya in October 1974; he held the premiership until May 1975, when he resigned. He thus presided over the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War, which he was unable to prevent or stop. Before stepping down, Sulh denounced the inertia of Lebanon's society and the political and administrative corruption and nepotism that, he claimed, had thwarted the implementation of his reforms. He warned that unless the entire political system was overhauled, the country was headed toward political chaos and disintegration.

In May 1992, Sulh became prime minister again, following the demonstrations and riots that brought down the government of Umar Karami. He held the position until October, when he was replaced by Rafiq Hariri. During his short tenure, he was frequently criticized for subservience to Syria. In particular, his insistence on proceeding with parliamentary elections in the summer of 1992 alienated many Lebanese, who opposed the timing of these elections. Beirut's electorate severely punished him for this and other decisions that were seen as bowing to Syria's wishes. The electoral list he headed was soundly defeated by that led by Salim al-Hoss. Although he managed to win a seat in parliament, Sulh received the fewest votes (11,428) of any Sunni elected, and no other Sunni on his list was elected (three Armenian Orthodox candidates and one Armenian Catholic were).

See also Franjiyya, Sulayman; Hariri, Rafiq Baha'uddin al-; Hoss, Salim al-; Jumblatt, Kamal.

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Guilain P. Denoeux
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

SULH, RIYAD AL-

[1894–1951]

Lebanese politician; prime minister, 1943–1945 and 1946–1951.

Riyad al-Sulh (second from right) was the first prime minister of independent Lebanon. He played an instrumental role in ending French control of the region and in establishing Lebanon's sectarian political system. He is shown here at a meeting of the Arab League in Aley, Lebanon, 1947. © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Riyad al-Sulh (also al-Solh) was born into a prominent Sunni family that had played a major role in the Arab nationalist movement during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. Unlike many other aristocratic families in Beirut, whose concerns revolved around parochial issues, the Sulhs were known for their cosmopolitanism, sophistication, and wide-ranging contacts throughout the empire. His father, Rida, had served as governor *(mutasarrif)* in Salonika and in 1909 had been elected one of Beirut's two representatives in the Ottoman parliament at Constantinople.

Sulh studied law at the University of Istanbul and at St. Joseph University in Beirut. After World War I, he and his father were elected to the National Congress of Syria, which proclaimed Amir Faisal king of an independent Syria. Following the military defeat of Faisal by France in July 1920, and the establishment of Greater Lebanon two months later, he became a vocal opponent of France's mandate. Forced to flee Lebanon, he was sentenced to death in absentia and spent most of the 1920s in exile, primarily in Paris and Geneva, where he worked closely with other Arab nationalists. In 1929, Sulh was allowed to return to Lebanon after Emile Eddé intervened on his behalf with the government of Charles Dabbas. From then on, except for another

brief period of exile in 1935, he lived in Beirut. By the early 1930s, he had become one of the most influential Arab nationalist politicians, despite France's efforts to contain his power.

In the late 1930s, Sulh was progressively converted to the concept of an independent Lebanon that would be free of France's control and separate from Syria. This position, which he adopted in part under the influence of his cousins Kazem al-Sulh and Taki al-Din al-Sulh, reflected the growing recognition among large segments of the Sunni community that their interests lay in the preservation of existing boundaries and an alliance with moderate Maronite leaders.

The outbreak of World War II made possible the Christian-Muslim alliance that Sulh had advocated. The war weakened France's influence and prestige in Lebanon and thus undermined those in the Maronite community, led by Eddé, who insisted on a Christian Lebanon closely aligned with France. By the same token, it strengthened the hand of those Maronites, led by Bishara al-Khuri and his Constitutional Bloc, who called for an independent and sovereign Lebanon based on Muslim-Christian accommodation. Taking advantage of this changing balance of power within the Maronite community and of active support for Lebanese independence by Britain and the United States, Khuri and Riyad al-Sulh formed an alliance that led the movement for an end to France's mandate.

After parliament elected him president of Lebanon in September 1943, Khuri immediately chose Sulh as his prime minister. The two quickly concluded the informal agreement known as the National Pact, which embodied the "historical compromise" between Muslims and Christians that they had supported for some time. Because of his role in the National Pact, which became the backbone of postindependence politics in Lebanon, Sulh can be regarded as one of the founding fathers of independent Lebanon. His pragmatism and tolerance made him ideally suited to play a leading role in designing a system based on interconfessional accommodation, while his charisma, dynamism, and political skills ensured that he could deliver the support of his community. His vision of a secular, sovereign Lebanon based on a cross-confessional understanding and open to the outside world continued to inspire generations of Lebanese politicians long after his death, and despite its shortcomings, it permitted Lebanon to experience several decades of political stability, remarkable economic growth, and rapid modernization. It is important to note that Sulh appears to have been aware of the limits of the political formula embodied in the National Pact, which called for the distribution of positions in the government and the bureaucracy among the country's various sects. He saw this confessional system as only a temporary expedient that would have to be eliminated in the long run. He once described political sectarianism as "an obstacle to national progress, impeding the representation of the national will and poisoning the good relations between diverse elements of the Lebanese population."

One of the first decisions of Sulh's government was to abrogate the parts of the 1926 constitution that limited Lebanon's sovereignty to the benefit of France. The mandate authorities responded by arresting Khuri, Sulh, and all but two members of the cabinet. Strikes and widespread demonstrations and riots ensued; together with pressure by Britain and the United States on the government of Free France, they forced the latter to reverse its policy and reinstate Khuri and Sulh on 22 November 1943. This date effectively marks the emergence of independent Lebanon.

Until the beginning of Khuri's second term in 1949, Sulh maintained a close working relationship with the president. Between 1943 and 1951, he headed six cabinets for a total of some sixty-five months. For most of his tenure as prime minister, he was involved in all important decisions and was widely seen as almost an equal of Khuri, for whom he was a precious ally because of the weight his opinions carried with the Sunni masses. Following Khuri's reelection, however, strains developed between the two men, largely as a result of the president's increasing tendency to bypass the cabinet and rely instead on a group of cronies, influence peddlers, and advisers headed by his brother Salim. Sulh resigned on 14 February 1951. He was assassinated on 16 July by a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), who killed him at the airport in Amman, Jordan, in revenge for Lebanon's 1949 execution of Antun Saʿada, the SSNP's founder and leader.

See also Eddé, Emile; Khuri, Bishara al-; National Pact (Lebanon); Sulh, Kazem

AL-; SULH, TAKI AL-DIN AL.; SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONALIST PARTY.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX

SULH, SAMI AL-

[1890–1968]

Lebanese Muslim politician.

Sami al-Sulh (also al-Solh), born to a prominent Sunni Muslim family, studied in Beirut and earned a law degree from Istanbul. He went to France to obtain a doctorate in law but returned to Lebanon before completing his studies. He claimed that while in Istanbul he had joined Arab secret societies working against the government of the Ottoman Empire, but no documentation supports his claims. He is accused of having supported the Ottoman government when other educated Arabs were struggling for Arab independence. He was a judge from 1920 to 1942, and, with French support, he was appointed prime minister in 1942. He represented Beirut in the Chamber of Deputies from 1943 to 1960 and from 1964 to 1968 and was prime minister seven times between 1945 and 1958.

The most controversial aspect of al-Sulh's political career was his support for Camille Chamoun. During the 1958 civil war he refused to criticize Chamoun, opposing the tide of Muslim public opinion. Al-Sulh was seen as a weak prime minister who did not stand up to President Chamoun. Chamoun used al-Sulh as a token Muslim because al-Sulh did not object to Chamoun's pro-Western foreign policy. His close association with Chamoun earned him the wrath of the Muslim masses, and his house in Beirut was burned down. He fled Lebanon for several months, then settled in the predominantly Christian area of Beirut. Al-Sulh surprised all those who had prematurely written his political obituary by returning to public life in 1964 after winning a parliamentary seat from Beirut. Christian support in his district of course helped make his victory possible, but within a few years he was able to win the backing of some Muslims who had declared him a traitor in 1958. He spent the rest of his life defending his position in 1958, writing two memoirs to vindicate himself. He claimed that he never opposed President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and that he was a staunch defender of the Palestinian cause. He blamed Nasser's supporters in Lebanon for the anti-Nasser reputation that was associated with his name after 1958.

Being the oldest deputy made al-Sulh president protem of the parliament. Members of the Christian establishment saw al-Sulh as demonstrating how Muslim politicians should conduct themselves. His support for Chamoun was viewed by the Phalange party, which supported him, as evidence of his patriotism. He was nicknamed Abu al-Faqir (Father of the Poor) because he championed the common people.

AS'AD ABUKHALIL

SULH, TAKI AL-DIN AL-

[1909–1988]

Lebanese journalist and politician.

A first cousin of Riyad al-Sulh, Taki al-Din al-Sulh (also al-Solh, Taqi al-Din or Takidedine) was born in Beirut and educated at the American University of Beirut, where he studied literature and history. During the 1930s, he worked as a journalist, literature teacher, and director of the Ministry of Information. With his brother Kazem, he founded the al-Nida al-Qawmi (The National Appeal), a group of moderate Sunni politicians and intellectuals who advocated a free and sovereign Lebanon, independent from the French and separate from Syria. A traditional, nonideological politician, al-Sulh proved either unwilling or unable to build a strong political machine and consequently did not develop a wide base of popular support. He nevertheless—because of his connection to a prestigious family—occupied several important political positions in the 1960s: he was a member of parliament (1964–1968) and a minister of the interior (1964–1965).

Al-Sulh's early career reached its zenith in July 1973 when President Sulayman Franjiyya called upon him to become prime minister. During his fifteen months in office, he was unable to prevent Lebanon's slide toward political disintegration. His tenure was marked by economic crisis and political turmoil, student and labor unrest, a growing rift between Muslims and Christians, repeated clashes between the Lebanese army and Palestinian commandos, and numerous Israeli raids in southern Lebanon. He resigned in September 1974 and was replaced by Saʾib Salam, but served as prime minister again in 1980.

See also American University of Beirut (AUB); Franjiyya, Sulayman; Salam, Saʾib; Sulh, Riyad al-.

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Guilain P. Denoeux
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

SULTAN

Title implying political power; a king or sovereign, especially of a Muslim state.

The title of sultan came to prominence around 1000 C.E., after the political position of the caliphate (office of the leader of Islam) had eroded around the time of the establishment of the Seljuk sultanate. Turko–Iranian dynasts used the title as an equivalent of the Eurasian steppe title khan. Later, it was used generally in Islamic lands by many states large and small. In some cases, for example, in Persia (now Iran), from 1500 on, the term was further devalued to denote a governor, not even a petty ruler.

In the Ottoman Empire, sultan, along with *padishah* and khan, was one of the titles of the sovereign (for example, Sultan Süleyman Khan), as well as the other members of the ruling family. The ruler's sons and grandsons, who served as governors and thus shared political power in the steppe manner, were all styled sultan. In the case of the female members of the ruling house, the title followed the personal name of the main designation—for example, Hürrem Sultan, *valide sultan* (dowager queen), *khasseki sultan* (favorite consort), or Mihrimah Sultan, who was a princess. The sultanate of the Ottoman Empire was abolished in 1922, just before the Republic of Turkey was founded.

I. Metin Kunt

SULTAN AHMET MOSQUE

Ottoman mosque.

Popularly known as the Blue mosque because of the predominantly turquoise-colored faience tile panels that embellish its vast prayer hall, the mosque of Sultan Ahmet I (1590–1617) stands next to Istanbul's Hippodrome. Supporting a domed, cruciform superstructure and six slender minarets, it is the major work of the architect Sedefkar Mehmet Ağa.

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Aptullah Kuran

SULTAN HASAN MOSQUE

One of the finest examples of Arab Egyptian architecture; situated below the citadel in Cairo.

Sultan Hasan mosque was built for the Mamluk Sultan Hasan al-Nasir in 1356–1363. The ground plan of the mosque takes the form of an irregular pentagon and occupies 9,450 square yards (7,800 sq m). It boasts a 267-foot (88 m) minaret in its south corner, the tallest in Cairo, and a massive main door at the north corner that is almost 85 feet (26 m) high. The exterior walls echo an ancient Egyptian temple, with large expanses of stone that are relieved by blind niches and double round arched windows. Stalactitic cornices, heavily restored, crown the facades. The mausoleum, which extends from the southeast wall, carries a 180-foot-high (55 m) dome of the Arab Turkish style that was almost completely rebuilt in the eighteenth century.

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RAYMOND WILLIAM BAKER

SULTANI SCHOOLS

Ottoman intermediate schools.

Sultani lycées were higher secondary schools funded by the sultan's personal treasury. The first and most famous of these was Lycée Galatasaray (also called Mekteb-i Sultani), founded in 1868 in Istanbul and modeled on the French lycée. An 1869 educational reform law provided for one sultani lycée in each provincial capital. In an expansion of the humanist education offered at these schools, in 1908 ten former İdadi schools, whose curriculum had partly overlapped that of the lycées, were renamed sultani schools. By 1914 there were 8,380 students, mostly from elite backgrounds, enrolled in twenty-four sultani schools across the Ottoman Empire.

See also İDADI SCHOOLS.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

SUMUD

Principle adopted by the Palestinian national movement of clinging to the soil of the homeland.

The Sumud (Steadfastness) Fund was established at the Baghdad Arab Summit in 1978 to discourage Palestinian emigration from the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. The annual budget of $150 million was to be administered by the Joint Committee, composed of members from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the government of Jordan. Funds were distributed to Palestinian leaders, trade unions, universities, newspapers, and cooperatives. Sumud paid unemployment benefits and pensions for retirees and granted interest-free housing loans. In the early 1980s, about $87 million per year was transferred to the occupied territories. Funds dried up in the mid-1980s as oil-rich Arab countries defaulted on their contributions.

In the late 1980s, the principle of *sumud* was revived in an altered form by Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and West Bank who resented their passive role as welfare recipients. Under the leadership of Dr. Hisham Awartani, an economist at al-Najah University in Nablus, *sumud* was transformed into a call for Palestinian residents to think and act for themselves.

See also BAGHDAD SUMMIT (1978); PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO).

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

SUNAY, CEVDET

[1899–1982]

Turkish military officer and politician; president of Turkey, 1966–1973.

Cevdet Sunay was born in Trabzon, the son of a village effendi in the Ottoman Empire. He attended the Küleli military high school and fought in Palestine in World War I. In the Turkish War of Independence (1921–1922), Sunay fought on the Maraş, Gaziantep, and Western fronts, finally chasing enemy armies to İzmir. He became a staff officer for the new Republic of Turkey in 1930, after completing studies at the War Academy; he was promoted to general in 1958. In 1961, he was appointed chief of staff, following the military coup, although he apparently did not play a direct role in the plot against Adnan Menderes.

Sunay resigned his office to become president of Turkey in 1966 in an alliance between the Justice party and military interests. He served as president through the 1971 coup, in which some observers said he played a key role. Sunay's presidency ended in 1973, when his bid for an extended term fell one vote short in the assembly. His term in office is associated with the continued penetration of the military into Turkish politics.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

SUN LANGUAGE THEORY

A 1930s movement that claimed Turkish was the mother of all languages.

H. F. Kvergic is credited with inventing this theory in 1935, although numerous others contributed to its general formulation. The theory draws its name from Kvergic's initial proposition that a Turkish man was first inspired to create language while looking at the sun. Others, such as Ibrahim Necmi Dilmen, presented charts of concept groups drawn from the sun—for example, light/beauty, fire/excitement, and motion/time. Supporters of the theory held that since Turks inhabited the so-called cradle of civilization, central Asia, their language was the origin for later languages, such as those of the Hittites, Arabs, and Europeans.

Although criticized for fantastic speculations, the theory attracted interest in the mid-1930s for several reasons. Some supporters, including Atatürk, used it to stem the drastic expurgation from the modern Turkish language of foreign words by language reformers. Supporters argued that since foreign words were derived from Turkish, they should remain in use. Others found in the theory justification for radical nationalist Turkist ideologies in their vaunting of the Turks' ancient heritage. They also used its link to the Hittites to establish a long history for the Turks in Anatolia. By World War II, interest in the theory faded, although Atatürk's support of it is occasionally evoked today by opponents of the direction of Turkish-language reform.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

SUNNA

Literally, trodden path, *meaning* norm *or* practice.

The *Sunna* refers to the divine physical and moral laws set out in the universe and in the Qurʾan. However, the term is used most commonly in reference to the example and customary practice of the prophet Muhammad. The Prophet's *Sunna* has more than one usage in Muslim tradition. As a technical term used in the *shariʿa* (Islamic law), it refers to the binding rules derived from the Prophet's sayings, or *hadith.* The *Sunna* then represents the laws that can be extracted from the *hadith.* As such, it is the second most important source of law after the Qurʾan. In a more general meaning, often used by jurists and theologians, the *Sunna* refers also to all the customs and habits of the Prophet, including his everyday life practices, that are not considered by the *shariʿa* as obligatory. Hence the term *Sunna* is often used in the sense of *recommended* or *good practice.* Examples of this are the supererogatory prayers and fasting the Prophet performed over and above the prescribed rituals. These are referred to as *Sunna* prayers or *Sunna* fasting. Certain very strict Muslim movements make the nonbinding *Sunna* obligatory, and extreme Muslim parties have, at times, after seizing power, imposed it on all Muslims and made practices such as wearing beards mandatory, although the enforcement of any practice that is not legally binding is considered illegitimate in Islamic law.

See also HADITH; MUHAMMAD; QURʾAN; *SHARIʿA.*

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SCOTT ALEXANDER
UPDATED BY MAYSAM J. AL FARUQI

SUNNI ISLAM

The largest branch in Islam, sometimes referred to as "orthodox Islam"; its full name is ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamaʿa *(the people of* Sunna *and consensus), and it represents about 90 percent of the world Muslim population.*

The Sunni movement can be identified in terms of its differences with the second largest division of Islam, the Shiʿite, with whom it shares the fundamental creed of Islam. After the death of the Prophet, the political issue of how leadership was to be chosen split the new community. The Shiʿa of

Ali (literally, the party of Ali) insisted that the Prophet had intended for his cousin Ali to succeed him, while the majority of Muslims maintained that the caliph should be elected and did not have to belong to the Prophet's family. The Sunnis maintained that since the Prophet had not clearly designated a successor, his *Sunna* (example, custom), by which they were to abide (hence their name), mandated elections. Of course, the Shiʿa also consider the *Sunna* of the Prophet as binding and second only to the Qurʾan in authority, but they differ on the actual content of the *Sunna* in regard to the matter of the divinely appointed leaders from the Prophet's family (imams), who in their view are the legitimate rulers. In addition to the concept of divinely appointed leadership, the Sunnis also reject the notion of a *mahdi* (messiah) as an integral part of the creed, and they emphasize exoteric interpretation of the Qurʾan over the esoteric approach followed by the Shiʿa.

The Sunni Schools of Law

In addition to the Qurʾan and the *Sunna* as primary sources of Islamic law, Sunni jurists also admit *ijma* (consensus) and *qiyas* (personal parallel reasoning) as legitimate sources for legal judgment. *Qiyas,* the fourth source of law, is a form of *ijtihad* (exercising personal judgment in legal interpretation). All schools of law generally admit *ijtihad,* but with different definitions and restrictions. At first, *raʾy* (personal opinion issued without justification) was exercised, but its unrestricted use was deemed too arbitrary and it was eliminated in favor of *qiyas,* a form of reasoning that identifies an *illah (ratio legis)* parallel or similar to another already established by the Qurʾan or the *Sunna.*

Ijma, or consensus, constitutes the third source of law and it takes precedence over *qiyas.* There was disagreement among the Sunni schools of law as to the nature of consensus. While all jurists accept the consensus of the companions of the Prophet, the more liberal schools will also admit of the consensus of the schools of law at any given time. The more conservative schools will only accept a global community consensus, which cannot be easily achieved, so in effect the Sunni schools of law did build the legal system on the basis of juristic consensus. However, the right to dissent *(ikhtilaf)* was scrupulously maintained by all schools. In contrast, the Shiʿa eschew *ijma* in favor of the *ijtihad* of the imam or his representative. That the Sunnis consider the law to be a matter of consensus (whether juristic or communal) is underscored in their name, *ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamaʿa.*

Over time, the various Sunni schools of law coalesced into four major schools: the Hanafi (founded by Abu Hanifa, d. 767), the Maliki (founded by Malik ibn Anas, d. 795), the Shafiʿi (founded by Shafiʿi, d. 820) and the Hanbali school (founded by ibn Hanbal, d. 855). The most widespread is the Hanafi, which was favored by various Muslim governments, most notably by the Ottomans, since it was not as strict as the other schools in its acceptance and use of less rigorous tools of legal interpretation. The Hanafis can be found throughout the Muslim world, while the Malikis are mostly found in Egypt and North Africa, the Shafiʿis in Southeast Asia, and the Hanbalis in the Arabian Peninsula.

Historical and Modern Developments

Tensions between Sunnis and Shiʿa (especially with the sectarian movements derived from the Shiʿa, such as the Ismaʿilis) were very high in early Muslim history as Shiʿite groups tried to destabilize the Sunni caliphate and ensure leadership to the followers of the imams. The problems subsided after the decisive victory of the Ayyubids over the Shiʿite regimes of Egypt and the Near East in the late twelfth century and the subsequent coming to power of the Ottoman Turks, who had always been staunch Sunnis. Tension still exists between local Sunni and Shiʿite groups, although most of it is due more to ethnic and tribal strife than to religious divisions, as can be seen in Lebanon and Pakistan. However, the rise among the Sunnis of strict reform movements (such as the Wahhabi movement), which came to oppose any deviation from their interpretation of the Islamic creed, has exacerbated existing tensions with the Shiʿa in the Persian Gulf area and wherever Wahhabism has spread.

The theological and juristic views on which the four major Sunni schools agree are considered to form the core of orthodox Islam. Although some of these views have coalesced into dogma, others have been subject to changes of interpretation through the years. Specifically, the eventual reliance by

Sunni jurists on *taqlid* (imitation or continuation of established past consensus) led to a reification of thought and law that gave rise to reform movements in the eighteenth century. Taking a stand against past consensus and building on the thought of the Hanbali ibn Taymiyya, the reform movements (the Wahhabis of Arabia, the Sanusis of North Africa, and the followers of Sirhindi in India), rejected *ijma* and emphasized *ijtihad,* considering themselves *ghayr muqallidin* (against imitation) and underscoring the need for new thought in Islamic law. Today, however, and after most Muslim countries have adopted the secular constitutions imposed on them by colonial powers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the major concern of the various contemporary Sunni Muslim movements is how to restore Islamic law and make it compatible with the demands of modern life.

See also ISLAM; MUWAHHIDUN; SANUSI ORDER; SHIʿISM.

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TAYEB EL-HIBRI
UPDATED BY MAYSAM J. AL FARUQI

SUPHI EZGI

[1869–1962]

Turkish composer and musicologist.

Suphi Ezgi was born in Istanbul and attended the Military Medical Academy. At the same time, he was studying music with Turkish masters like Dede Zekai. Between 1913 and 1920, Suphi Ezgi, along with Sadeddin Arel and Rauf Yekta Bey, created modern Turkish musicology. Suphi Ezgi was also an accomplished singer and tanbur player and composed more than seven hundred pieces. The most important of this fourteen books on musicology is the five-volume *Nazari ve ameli Türk musikisi* (Turkish music in theory and practice).

DAVID WALDNER

SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL

Muslim institution in Palestine, 1921–1948.

During Ottoman rule in Palestine (1516–1917), Muslim *waqf* (plural, *awqaf*) and *shariʿa* courts were headed by the Shaykh al-Islam, and in the nineteenth century they were administered by the Ministry of Awqaf in Constantinople (now Istanbul). The British occupation of Palestine, which started in 1917, severed all ties with Constantinople, and these Muslim institutions were placed under British officials. Palestinian Muslims were alarmed at the prospect of their religious affairs being controlled by a Christian power headed by Zionists: Sir Herbert Samuel, the first high commissioner, and Norman Bentwich, legal secretary in charge of the *awqaf* and *shariʿa* courts. The Muslims complained of religious discrimination and demanded control over their affairs. Anxious lest the 1921 anti-Zionist disturbances recur and wanting to provide the Palestinians with autonomous institutions that the Zionists were granted, Samuel proposed that the Muslim secondary electors to the last Ottoman parliament choose a higher body that would control the affairs of the Muslim community.

Samuel issued an order in December 1921 establishing a Supreme Muslim Council (SMC) constituted for "the control and management of Moslem awqaf and Shariʿa affairs in Palestine." It was to consist of a president and four members, two of whom were to represent the district of Jerusalem and the remaining two to represent the districts of Nablus and Acre. All were to be paid from government and *awqaf* funds. In the first election, held on 9 January 1922, the mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, was elected president; his budget was 50,000 British pounds.

Husayni initiated an Islamic cultural revival in Palestine in the 1920s. Through the SMC, he established an orphanage, supported schools, expanded welfare and health clinics, and renovated religious buildings. The most ambitious and impressive project was the renovation of the two dilapidated mosques within the Haram al-Sharif, the third holiest shrine of Islam. The restored structures enhanced the importance of Jerusalem in the Muslim and Arab worlds and asserted Jerusalem's centrality within Palestine. By the end of the decade, the mufti had consolidated his religious power and had increased his po-

litical influence throughout Palestine. He used his enhanced political position to advocate Palestinian self-determination. After he led the Palestine Arab Revolt (1936–1939), however, the British dismissed him and dissolved the SMC in 1937.

See also Bentwich, Norman; Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-; Palestine Arab Revolt (1936–1939); Samuel, Herbert Louis; *Shariʿa*; Waqf.

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Philip Mattar

SURSOCK, LADY COCHRANE

Lebanese cultural official.

Yvonne, Lady Cochrane Sursock is the daughter of Alfred Bey Sursock, a Levantine aristocrat who came to Lebanon from Turkey at the beginning of the twentieth century, and Donna Maria Theresa Serra diCassano, daughter of Francesco Serra, seventh Duke of Cassano. She is the wife of Sir Desmond Cochrane, whom she married in 1946. She has played an active public role in Lebanon since her young adulthood, particularly in the arts. She was president of the committee and general manager of the Nicolas Sursock Museum in Beirut (1960–1966) and founder and president of the Association for the Protection of the Natural Sites and Ancient Buildings (APSAD; Association pour la protection des sites et anciennes demeures) in Lebanon (1960–2002). She is currently involved in projects to stem the exodus of Lebanese by rerooting them in their villages of origin and creating jobs in the fields of agriculture, textiles, and handcrafts. Lady Cochrane has been a pioneer in the protection of the environment and in developing Lebanese citizens' awareness of the unique architectural and cultural heritage of Lebanon.

See also Architecture; Art; Gender and Education; Hariri, Rafiq Bahaʾuddin al-; Lebanese Civil War (1958); Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990); Lebanon.

Mona Takieddine Amyuni

SURSUQ FAMILY

Prominent Lebanese landowning business family.

One of the wealthiest Greek Orthodox families in Beirut, the Sursuqs (also Sursock or Sursok) benefited from the 1858 Ottoman land reform to acquire large tracts of fertile land in northern Palestine. They were also bankers who controlled cotton and grain trade in Acre. The family was associated with controversial land sales to Zionists before and after World War I.

Various family members were active in Beirut politics before World War I, with Albert Sursuq a leading member of the Beirut Reform Society and Michel Sursuq a member of the Ottoman parliament. After the war, the family became a target of anti-Zionist criticism when their land sales to Jews in the Jezreel valley and at Lake Hula displaced hundreds of peasants. The family remained prominent among Beirut's Europeanized elite after World War II. In the 1960s, the family villa was turned into the Nicolas Sursuq Museum.

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Elizabeth Thompson

SUWAYDI FAMILY

Iraqi family prominent in religious affairs and politics.

The Suwaydi family of al-Karth district of Baghdad traces its origins to Abbas, the uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, whose descendants founded the Abbasid dynasty that ruled Baghdad from 750 to 1258. A well-known member was Shaykh Abdullah al-Suwaydi, a Sunni jurist who took part in the famous theological conference at al-Najaf in 1773 that sought to bring about reconciliation between the Sunni and Shiʿa sects.

The Suwaydi family also has played a leading role in the affairs of modern Iraq. For example,

Yusuf Suwaydi (1854–1925), a *shar'ia* (religious) judge, played a leading role in the Arab movement against the Ottoman Empire. He was imprisoned in 1913 and 1914 for his political activities and later released. He also was involved in the revolt against the British in 1920.

Two of Yusuf's children, Naji and Tawfiq, completed their legal training in Istanbul in the early part of the twentieth century and helped to draft Iraq's constitution. Both of them were elected deputy and senator, and both served as prime minister. Naji advocated pan-Arabism and resented British interference in Iraq. He participated in the 1941 uprising against the British. When the uprising failed, he was exiled to Rhodesia, where he died in 1945. Tawfiq was a pro-British activist. After the revolution of 1958, he was sentenced to life imprisonment but was released in 1962. Tawfiq moved to Lebanon where he died in 1968.

See also SUWAYDI, TAWFIQ AL-.

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AYAD AL-QAZZAZ

SUWAYDI, TAWFIQ AL-

[c. 1889–1968]

Iraqi politician.

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, a pro-British moderate, was born in Baghdad to an influential Sunni family. His origins trace back to Abbas, the uncle of the Prophet Muhammed, whose descendants established the Abbasid dynasty that ruled Baghdad from 750 to 1258. Suwaydi attended school in Baghdad and studied law in Istanbul and France. He was elected to parliament and served in various government capacities: minister of education (1928), ambassador to Iran (1931), minister of justice (1935), and minister of foreign affairs (1934, 1937, 1941). Suwaydi was prime minister three times (1929, 1946, 1950). During his second term he legalized previously banned political parties. In his last term, he initiated negotiations for a new oil agreement, established the Board of Development to improve economic conditions, and enacted a law permitting Iraqi Jews to leave the country, provided they gave up their citizenship and property. In the aftermath of the 1958 revolution, Suwaydi was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1962 he was permitted to leave Iraq for Lebanon, where he died.

See also SUWAYDI FAMILY.

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AYAD AL-QAZZAZ

SUWAYDIYA OIL FIELDS

Largest oil field in Syria, with a yearly output of 1 million tons (907,000 t).

The first Suwaydiya oil well was discovered toward the end of 1960 by the German company Concordia at a depth of 5,617 feet (1,712 m). This well is located southeast of Qarah Shuk in al-Jazira plateau in northeastern Syria. It was the second oil field to be discovered in Syria after the Qarah Shuk field, which was discovered in 1958 and contained nine wells. Between 1960 and 1962, the Concordia Company's field showed minimal progress. Three more wells were drilled in the Suwaydiya field, capable of production from the upper Cretaceous rock layer, with average depths of 5,000 feet (1,525 m). But the heaviness of the crude oil produced was discouraging, unless it was blended with lighter crudes from Iraq, in which case the Homs refinery could handle it. At that time, the Suwaydiya reserves were assessed at about 35 million tons (31.7 million t). The Suwaydiya fields were then thought capable of producing 12,000 barrels per day. In 1964, Concordia, which had begun a deep test-well a year earlier, had its license suspended when the Syrian government nationalized the oil industry. The Syrian Petroleum Authority, which was attached to the Ministry of Industry, undertook drilling with assistance from Soviet geophysicists and drillers.

In 1965, the Suwaydiya oil fields were considered commercial. Toward the end of 1974, a ministry for oil and mineral resources was established

in Syria. It became responsible for concerting efforts with foreign oil companies for oil drilling, which has intensified since then. Compared with the Qarah Shuk, the Rumayla, and the Tayyim oil fields, the Suwaydiya fields are the largest, with an established reserve of 410 million tons (372 million t) and a yearly output of 1 million tons (907,000 t).

See also HOMS; PETROLEUM, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS; SYRIA.

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ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

SUWAYHLI, RAMADAN AL-

[?–1920]

Tripolitanian nationalist.

Ramadan al-Suwayhli was a member of a prominent Arab family from the eastern Tripolitanian coastal town of Misurata. They opposed the interests of the other leading family, the Muntasirs.

Suwayhli had been tried and acquitted of murdering Abd al-Qasim Muntasir shortly after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, when Tripolitania was part of the Ottoman Empire. Suwayhli had played a vital role in supporting the Ottomans against Italian and Sanusi incursions. After the Treaty of Ouchy (1912), which ended the war between Italy and the Ottoman Empire, Suwayhli sought an independent Tripolitania. He had been instrumental in founding the short-lived Tripolitanian republic in 1917, which had not been recognized by Italy but was tolerated (even after the laws of 1919, the *Legge Fondamentale,* when alternative administrative structures were established). Its members, including Ramadan al-Suwayhli, were paid large stipends by the Italian authorities until the structure of the republic collapsed. Italy then connived in Suwayhli's death, at the hands of the Muntasir family (who still held him responsible for Abd al-Qasim's murder) and Abd al-Nabi Bilhayr, leader of the Warfalla (who had fallen out with him concerning the republic).

See also MUNTASIR FAMILY; TRIPOLITANIA.

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GEORGE JOFFE

SYKES, MARK

[1879–1919]

British soldier, orientalist, politician, and emissary.

An artistocrat, Mark Sykes first visited the Ottoman Empire as a boy and returned there as a Cambridge undergraduate. As an honorary consul in Constantinople who was sympathetic to the old Ottoman regime, he rode on horseback through many regions that the British would occupy after defeating the Turks in World War I. Sykes served as an officer in the Boer War. In two books and several articles, he revealed his preference for the religious, rural, and traditional elements of the East over the materialism and cosmopolitanism he so disliked in its cities. Sir Mark became a conservative member of Parliament in 1911.

After serving briefly on the Western front in World War I, Sykes was attached to the general staff of Lord Kitchener. Kitchener sent Sykes to the Middle East and India, where he found poor communication and little coordination among British officers and officials. To deal with these problems, he founded the Arab Bureau in Cairo after he returned to London and then made comprehensive plans for the postwar Middle East. Sykes advocated a large, loose Arab confederation under Husayn, the Sharif of Mecca, except for an international area around Jerusalem, holy to Christians, Muslims, and Jews. Sykes and his French counterpart, François Georges-Picot, negotiated a secret wartime agreement that was signed by tsarist Russia, but later repudiated by the Bolsheviks. Sykes was deeply impressed by Zionism in Russia, where he believed Jews would fight for Zion if not the tsar.

In the last two years of the war, when Sykes was attached to the War Cabinet Secretariat, he drafted various statements for the British entry into Jerusalem,

Baghdad, and Damascus that were in line with the anti-imperialism and self-determination favored by the United States, which had not declared war against the Turks. His third wartime mission to the Middle East failed to get any consensus among Arabs, Armenians, and Jews. Sykes then attended the peace conference at Paris, where he contracted influenza and died.

See also Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916).

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Zachary Karabell
Updated by Roger Adelson

SYKES, PERCY MOLESWORTH

See South Persia Rifles



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SYKES–PICOT AGREEMENT (1916)

World War I document of 1916 that would have divided the Middle East into British and French spheres.

The Sykes–Picot Agreement was one of the pivotal diplomatic documents of World War I concerning the Middle East. It was negotiated in secret at the end of 1915 by Sir Mark Sykes of Great Britain and Georges François Picot of France, with full knowledge by their respective foreign ministries. It provided for a partition of the Middle East into French and British spheres.

The French were to have direct control of Syria, Lebanon, and Cilicia plus a zone of influence extending east from Damascus and Aleppo through Mosul. The British were granted direct control of the Mesopotamian provinces (now Iraq) of Baghdad and Basra as well as a zone of influence extending from Basra to Palestine. Palestine was itself to be placed under international administration.

Under the subsequent Anglo–Russian–French Agreement of 1916, the Russians adhered to Sykes–Picot after extensive discussions between Sykes and the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Sazanov. In return for their support, the Russians were granted direct control over much of eastern Anatolia. In a successful attempt at embarrassing the coalition, the terms of the Anglo–Russian–French Agreement were made public by the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1918. The Arabs claimed that Sykes–Picot contradicted promises made to them by the Hussein–McMahon Correspondence, and the Jews claimed that it contravened the Balfour Declaration. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson wished to annul Sykes–Picot, and even Sykes soon repudiated the agreement. Nonetheless, though the French renounced their claim to Mosul and Britain won control of Palestine, the Middle East treaties framed at the Paris Peace Settlements after World War I closely mirrored the Sykes–Picot Agreement.

See also Balfour Declaration (1917); Husayn–McMahon Correspondence (1915–1916); Paris Peace Settlements (1918–1923); Sykes, Mark; Wilson, Woodrow.

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ZACHARY KARABELL

The world-renowned Great Mosque was constructed in the eighth century, when Damascus was the seat of the Umayyad dynasty. Most Syrians are Sunnis, with far smaller numbers of other Muslims as well as a sizable minority of Christians, primarily Greek Orthodox and Armenian Gregorian. Islamic fundamentalists are active but not in a position of power; the socialist Baʿth Party violently suppressed an uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982. © CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

SYRIA

Formally, the Syrian Arab Republic (al-Jumhuriyya al-Arabiyya al-Suriyya).

Syria's 71,500 square miles include a narrow plain along the Mediterranean between Turkey to the north and Lebanon to the south, which contains the ports of Latakia and Tartus; fertile highlands between the capital, Damascus, and the border with Jordan, called the Hawran (Hauran); an extensive central plain, in which are situated the cities of Homs, Hama, and Aleppo; the Euphrates River valley, in which are the cities of al-Raqqa (Rakka) and Dayr al-Zawr; an eastern plateau bounded by Turkey to the north and Iraq to the east, whose major centers are al-Hasaka and al-Qamishli; and a large southeastern desert adjacent to Iraq and Jordan, whose oases contain the ruins of ancient fortifications and trading posts.

Syria has three major rivers. The largest, the Euphrates, enters from Turkey and is joined by the Khabur and the Balikh before crossing into Iraq southeast of Al Bu Kamal. The Euphrates system is regulated by the Euphrates Dam at Tabaqa, just west of al-Raqqa, which stores water for use in irrigation and power generation. Running south from mountains in the pre-1920 Syrian province of Iskenderun (now the Turkish province of Hatay), through the fertile Ghab basin and past the cities of Hama and Homs, is the Orontes river (Nahr al-Asi). The Yarmuk river, across which small irrigation dams were constructed during the 1980s, defines the border between Syria and Jordan. At current rates of use, Syria's groundwater reserves are expected to run dry by 2010, leaving the country entirely dependent on river water.

Population

The total population is estimated to be 17.6 million (2002) with Damascus and Aleppo the major population centers. Population growth averaged over 3 percent annually for much of the second half of the twentieth century but then slowed to 2.45 percent (2002). On the other hand, the death rate plunged from 21 deaths per 1,000 during the early 1950s to 5 per 1,000 in 2002. Several thousand Armenians moved to Syria from the Soviet Union in 1945–1946, and founded a sizable community in Aleppo. After the establishment of the state of Israel, virtually all of the Syrian Jewish population emigrated, and about 100,000 Palestinians fleeing Israel's takeover of the Galilee in 1948 ended up in camps on the fringes of Damascus.

Muslims make up 85–90 percent of the population; approximately 75 percent of this number are Sunnis, 13–15 percent are Alawis, about 1 percent are Ismaʿilis, and less than 1 percent are Twelver Shiʿites. Some 3 percent of Syrians are Druze, a sect



MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

that follows a mixture of Christian and Shiʿa doctrines. Isolated pockets of Yazidis exist in the hills outside Aleppo and northeast of al-Qamishli. About 10 percent of the population are Christians, divided among at least a dozen sects. The Greek Orthodox and Armenian Gregorian communities are the largest and most influential.

Administration

Syria's governmental structure is highly centralized and strictly hierarchical, concentrating power primarily in the hands of the president and secondarily with the top leadership of the Baʿth party. This system was developed after March 1963, when military supporters of the Baʿth overthrew the parliamentary order that had reappeared following the dissolution of the union with Egypt in 1961. In November 1970, Gen. Hafiz al-Asad, minister of defense and head of the Baʿth party's military wing, seized power. He served as head of state, commander in chief, and secretary-general of the Regional (Syrian) Command of the Baʿth until his death in June 2000. Shortly after coming to power, the new regime appointed a representative body, the People's Council, to draft a permanent constitution. This document, approved in March 1973, provides for a seven-year presidential term of office; it empowers the president to appoint and remove the vice presidents, the prime minister, and other cabinet ministers. In addition, it grants the president the authority to dissolve the People's Council and call national plebiscites to ratify legislative measures not adopted by the parliament. Upon the death of Hafiz al-Asad, his second son, Bashshar al-Asad, was elected president in July 2000.

Syria consists of thirteen provinces, each administered by a governor. Each governor is advised by a provincial council, one-fourth of whose mem-

bers are appointed and the remainder of whom are elected by popular balloting. Since 1970, these councils have exercised little decision-making autonomy. Municipal councils provide public services, license businesses, and supervise the collection of local taxes. Each municipal council is headed by a mayor. Damascus city constituted a separate governorate until 1987, when it merged with the surrounding province of Damascus to form a single administrative unit.

Economy

Syria's economy expanded dramatically during the 1940s, due to a combination of restrictions on imports and heightened spending by British and French occupation forces. The Korean War perpetuated the boom by creating greater demand for Syrian cotton on world markets. Private enterprise provided the main impetus for economic growth until the union with Egypt in 1958, when state officials introduced an extensive program of land reform, nationalization of industry, and regulation of commercial transactions. The short-lived parliamentary regime that seceded from the union in 1961 attempted to resurrect the private sector, but the Baʿth-affiliated officers who overthrew the civilian regime in March 1963 gradually extended government control over most sectors of the economy. State intervention peaked with the nationalization of industry, banking, and trade that began in January 1965. Under the regime of Salah Jadid (1966–1970), extensive state control accompanied the establishment of a network of production and distribution cooperatives, state farms, and Baʿth-affiliated popular-front organizations.

By the end of the 1960s, Syria's public-sector enterprises were experiencing severe financial difficulties. The government responded by relaxing restrictions on the activities of private business, particularly in construction and trade. Private enterprise quickly moved into agriculture and manufacturing as well, supported both by the return of large amounts of local capital that had fled the country during the late 1950s and by an influx of investment from the oil-producing Arab Gulf states. Government spending jumped from around 29 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1972 to some 37 percent of GDP in 1987. This rise was not matched by an increase in current revenues, resulting in large budget deficits. The shortfalls resulted primarily from sharp increases in military spending; by 1987, support for the armed forces accounted for 39 percent of total state outlays. With an imbalance of this magnitude sustainable only through heavy reliance on the Communist bloc and Arab oil states, the implosion of the Soviet Union during the early 1990s forced the Syrian government to take austerity measures.

The economy grew at a rate of more than 9 percent per year during the 1970s, slowed to around 2.2 percent during the 1980s, rebounded to more than 5 percent during the 1990s, and continued to grow at an annual rate of 2.5 to 3.5 percent during the early years of the twenty-first century. Income per capita was approximately $1,000 (2002). With the growth in population approximating 2.5 percent, the World Bank has estimated that Syria would need real economic growth of more than 5 percent to improve the welfare of its people. Major distortions contribute to the overall weak performance of the Syrian economy, including multiple exchange rate and exchange controls, restrictions on private sector activity, price controls, major agricultural subsidies, an inefficient state-owned financial system, and the dominance of state-owned enterprises.

The Syrian government implemented limited economic reforms after 2000, permitting Syrians to hold foreign currency and licensing the first public banks, an essential step in modernizing the state-dominated economy. However, the far-reaching economic reforms required to modernize the economy were put on hold for fear that widespread economic change could lead to calls for concomitant political reform and democratization. As a result, sweeping economic reform remains the number one priority in the Syrian domestic agenda.

Education

Since 1967, Syria's schools, technical institutes, and universities have been supervised by the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Higher Education. Successive Baʿth regimes have expanded the education system, and have taken steps to reduce illiteracy by establishing adult and women's education programs. Elementary education is free and compulsory. Secondary education, which consists of three years of preparatory school and three years of high school, is free but not compulsory. The great

majority of children attend public schools; several private schools in Damascus serve foreign nationals and the elite. The Ministry of Education regulates textbooks, curricula, and teacher certification.

Syria has four universities. The largest and most prestigious is Damascus University, founded in 1923, which had some 60,000 students by 2002. The University of Aleppo, chartered in 1958, serves around 30,000 students. Tishrin University in Latakia and al-Baʿth University in Homs offer limited curricula. The University of Aleppo operates a faculty of agriculture in Dayr al-Zawr. Technical institutes are scattered throughout the country. The language of instruction is Arabic, although English and French are required as second languages by many faculties.

History

Syria's modern history began with the end of the Egyptian occupation (1831–1840). After the reassertion of Ottoman control, European manufactured goods flooded the country, ruining the textile industry and leading urban merchants to invest in agricultural land. The trend toward private estate ownership was reinforced by the Ottoman land law of 1858, which allowed landholders to convert nominally state-owned communal lands in the villages into private property. At the end of the nineteenth century, French enterprises won numerous concessions in exchange for loans to the Ottoman authorities. French firms invested in ports, railroads, and highways, opening the cities of the interior to the outside world. As manufacturing continued to contract, to the evident benefit of Syria's well-connected minority communities, anti-Christian and anti-European riots, like the 1860 massacres in Damascus, erupted. These drew European governments into local politics, and growing outside interference generated rising disaffection with Ottoman authority among Syria's Arab elite.

During the 1890s, clubs advocating Syrian independence formed in Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut. These coalesced into political parties after the 1908 revolution that brought the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to power in Constantinople (now Istanbul). Members of an underground CUP branch in Damascus led popular demonstrations in support of the coup, prompting prominent religious notables to form an organization of their own, the Muslim Union. Candidates sympathetic to the latter won the parliamentary elections of 1909. Liberal opponents of the CUP openly denounced the regime in Constantinople, setting the stage for new elections in 1912, which were rigged to ensure that only CUP supporters won seats in parliament.

Following the balloting, influential Syrian liberals emigrated to Cairo, where they formed the Ottoman Party of Administrative Decentralization to seek greater autonomy for the empire's Arabic-speaking provinces. The publication of its program accompanied widespread anti-CUP agitation orchestrated by secret societies including the Constantinople-based Qahtan society, the Paris-based Young Arab Society (al-Fatat), and the Iraq- and Syria-based Society of the Covenant (Jamʿiyyat al-Ahd). The seeds of Arab nationalism germinated among these societies prior to World War I.

Nationalist sentiment blossomed during the war, and when Faisal I ibn Hussein of the Hijaz led an Arab army into Damascus in October 1918, he was welcomed as a liberator and Damascus declared itself an autonomous Arab administration for the whole of greater Syria. Faisal attempted to consolidate popular support by calling elections in mid-1919, but CUP sympathizers won most of the seats representing Damascus. Members of the Young Arab Society dominated the rest of the assembly, and in the fall of 1919 this organization formed the Committee of National Defense to resist Faisal's alleged willingness to capitulate to French demands. Faisal responded by forming the National Party, whose platform called for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy with French assistance. The assembly, led by Hashim al-Atasi of Homs, acclaimed Faisal king of an independent Syria. His acquiescence in the declaration led France to occupy Damascus in 1920, establishing a tutelary regime that governed the country for the next quarter-century.

After independence in 1946, the armed forces became a major means of advancement for Syria's minority communities, particularly poorer Alawis and Druze, who entered the military academy in rapidly growing numbers. There they encountered radical political ideas, including those of the Baʿth and the local communist party. Rising disaffection within the ranks prompted the military high com-

Markets remain a focus of life in Syria. Agriculture, like construction, trade, and manufacturing, has benefited from an influx of private capital since the 1960s. © CORY LANGLEY. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

mand to champion social reform programs and solidarity with nationalists in neighboring Arab states. Popular and parliamentary discontent over Syria's defeat in Palestine persisted through the winter of 1948–1949, and in March 1949 a clique of commanders led by Col. Husni al-Zaʿim overthrew the elected government. Zaʿim abrogated the 1930 constitution, suppressed all political parties, and ruled by decree. That June he was assassinated by rival officers, who restored civilian rule and called for elections to a popular assembly to frame a new constitution. The assembly fragmented along regional lines, and in December a group of junior officers led by Col. Adib Shishakli seized power. Shishakli's regime adopted a revised constitution in 1950 but soon resorted to severe tactics to control the resurgent labor unions and peasant movement, and was ousted in 1954.

The new military-civilian coalition restored the 1950 constitution and held parliamentary elections, in which the Arab Baʿth Socialist party won a substantial number of seats. Leftist forces were unable to form a coalition cabinet, and the liberal People's party took over the government. This development sparked renewed militancy among workers and peasants, convincing the cabinet to implement wide-ranging agricultural and industrial reforms. Startled by the reforms, as well as by demands for greater change from the Baʿth and the communists, conservatives in parliament mobilized support for former President Shukri al-Quwatli, who won the presidency in 1955. By 1957 escalating tensions among pro–United States, pro-Egypt, and Syrian nationalist politicians led to a postponement of local elections while military intelligence officers uncovered an elaborate plot by agents of Iraq to undermine the government. These developments sent Chief of Staff Afif al-Bizri to Cairo to request immediate union with Egypt. In 1958 President Quwatli announced the creation of the United Arab Republic.

Downtown Damascus shows clear signs of Syria's efforts since the 1980s to modernize its economy, with some additional reforms taking effect after 2000. Many sectors of the economy, however, have long been run by the state; the country has been firmly under the centralized, hierarchical control of the Baʿth party, with the backing of the military, since 1963. © AP/Wideworld Photos. Reproduced by permission.

Efforts to unify the two countries eventually provoked widespread unrest in Syria. When the cabinet nationalized and redistributed the assets of private enterprises during the summer of 1961, largely in response to problems in Egypt, merchants and tradespeople in Syria's cities agitated for dissolution of the union. A group of military officers and civilian politicians orchestrated secession that September. Over the next two years, Syria's politics consisted of jockeying among socialists, who favored continued state control over key sectors of the economy; large landholders and rich merchants, who advocated the restoration of private property and parliamentary rule; and moderates, including a wing of the Baʿth party led by Michel Aflaq, who supported maintaining a mixed economy. In 1962, a compromise government supported by the military high command took steps to dismantle the public sector and remove doctrinaire socialists from the armed forces, moves that precipitated both resistance among Baʿth and communist officers and growing Islamist opposition. Spurred by threats to the position of radicals within the military and by burgeoning popular unrest, members of the military committee of the Baʿth carried out a coup in 1963, ushering in a period of Baʿth party–military rule.

Gen. Hafiz al-Asad, who played a major role in the 1963 coup, was promoted to commander of the air force in 1964, serving also as a senior leader in the Baʿthist military command. Mastering the survival techniques necessary in the factional politics plaguing Syria, he seized control of the government in November 1970, dismissing or purging opponents and initiating three decades of rule. Characterized by internal political stability and continuity, the Asad regime ushered in a new chapter in both

domestic and foreign policies. On the domestic front, it stressed the need for reconciliation and national unity, built stable state institutions, and courted disenchanted social classes with measures of economic and political liberalization. At the same time, it tolerated no opposition, attacking the Muslim Brotherhood and viciously suppressing an uprising in Hama in February 1982. In addition to the army, the institutional pillars of the regime were a multilayered intelligence network, formal state structures, and revitalized Baʿth party congresses.

In foreign policy, the Asad regime succeeded in transforming Syria into a regional middle power out of all proportion to its size, population, and economic resources. The regime began by moving quickly to end Syrian isolation in the Arab world, focusing on Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Accepting UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, it agreed to a May 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israel War, but then worked to kill the 1983 Israel-Lebanon accord. Syrian military power expanded steadily in this period; by 1986, it had a very large military force for a state of its size. Personal animosity, together with geopolitical rivalry and a Baʿth party schism, separated Asad's Syria from Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Syria sided with Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and adhered to the Western-led anti-Iraq coalition during the Gulf War. A new entente with Egypt, and Syria's subsequent involvement in the U.S.–sponsored Middle East peace process that started with the Madrid Conference in October 1991, led the Syrian government for the first time into face-to-face negotiations with Israel. Stalled in 1996, talks with Israel again foundered in 1999. However, the positions of the two protagonists were closer than ever before, and a future agreement seemed possible.

President Hafiz al-Asad died of natural causes on 10 June 2000 and was replaced by his son, Bashshar al-Asad, on 17 July 2000. Dual themes of continuity and change characterized the early policies of the new regime. Bashshar al-Asad cautiously promoted limited socioeconomic change to stimulate the economy and generate popular support, but delayed broader economic reforms out of fear they would cause political destabilization. In foreign affairs, he maintained his father's commitment to a just and lasting Middle East peace in which Syria would regain all occupied lands. However, the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and Syria's uncertain place in the war on terrorism combined to limit Bashshar al-Asad's scope for regional and international initiatives.

See also Aflaq, Michel; Asad, Bashshar al-; Asad, Hafiz al-; Baʿth; Damascus; Hama; Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Jadid, Salah; Muslim Brotherhood.

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Fred H. Lawson
Updated by Ronald Bruce St John

SYRIAN DESERT

A huge stretch of mostly barren land covering parts of four countries: Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

Known in Arabic as *Badiyat al-Sham* after the nomadic bedouin (Badu, hence Badiya) who roam its parts in search of pasture, it is also known as the Greater Badiyat al-Sham (Badiyat al-Sham al-Kubra) because it extends between the desert of al-Nufud on the Arabian peninsula and the Euphrates river. Badiyat al-Sham covers about two-thirds—about 52,000 square miles (130,000 sq. km)—of the overall area of Syria. It is divided into two parts: the first, in the northeast, is called Badiyat al-Jazira, and the second, in the southeast, is called al-Shamiyya or Badiyat al-Sham, that is, the Syrian desert. This desert begins at the Syro-Jordanian border, skirts the frontier of settlement toward the north at a line east of Jabal Druze, al-Ghuta oasis of Damascus and its *marj* (meadow), then up along the Qalamun mountains, then east of al-Jabbul, the finally ends at Meskene on the Euphrates.

The Syrian desert, in turn, is divided into two parts, which differ in their surface structure. The first, a plateau in the southwest, is more elevated than the other part and also much drier. The part to the northeast starts at lower elevation in the south—2,208 feet (673 m)—and ends at 623 feet (190 m) in the north. This part is dry and has dry river channels (wadis) exposed to flooding. These wadis range in length from 93 to 186 miles (150–300 km) and in width from 0.3 to 0.6 miles (0.5 to 1 km). Annual precipitation in the Syrian desert does not exceed 5.85 inches (150 mm).

The few plants and animals of the Syrian desert are of the type that can withstand a subtropical climate. The nomads raise sheep and camels, and they move according to the seasons, from one region to the other across political frontiers seeking pasture. Phosphates, oil, and butane gas have been discovered in this desert, and modern network of roads and railways makes the exploitation of the desert much easier than before.

ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONALIST PARTY

Political party established in Lebanon in 1932 with the aim of uniting the Syrian nation.

Syrian Social Nationalist Party militia watch over the streets of Beirut. After decades of division and weakness, the radical party reached a more pragmatic accommodation with the Syrian government of Hafiz al-Asad in the 1980s. © SAMER MOHDAD/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) was founded in Beirut by Antun Khalil Saʿada, a Greek Orthodox intellectual, in November 1932. He served as the party's leader until his death in 1949, and the organization reflects his personality and ideas. The SSNP had a strong political influence on the twentieth-century history of the two states, Lebanon and Syria, where it was the most active. It was the first political party in the region to embrace radical, secular ideas which later had an impact on virtually every radical group organized in the two countries, especially the Baʿth Party. The SSNP offered minorities, particularly Greek Orthodox Christians, a vehicle for political action. Its ideology also influenced the development of Pan-Arabism, defining inter-Arab relations in the Levant.

The party's ideology, as defined by Saʿada, was grounded in three related tenets: radical social reform along secular lines, fascist-style rituals and organization, and a Pan-Syrian doctrine. Best known for its Pan-Syrian approach, emphasizing Syrian history and culture but opposing Arab unity, the SSNP called for the creation of a "Greater Syria," encompassing Cyprus, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine, in addition to Syria. In one of his publications, Saʿada wrote: "[The] Syrian homeland is that geographic environment in which the Syrian nation evolved. It has natural boundaries which separate it from other countries, extending from the Taurus range in the north-west and the Zagros in the

northeast to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea in the south and including the Sinai peninsula and the Gulf of Aqaba, and from the Syrian Sea (Mediterranean) in the west, including the island of Cyprus, to the arch of the Arabian desert and Persian Gulf in the east. (This region is also called the Syrian Fertile Crescent, the island of Cyprus being its star.)" While this Pan-Syrian emphasis was the most prominent aspect of SSNP ideology, its appeal and influence also stemmed from its fascist qualities and emphasis on radical social reform.

Saʿada argued that Lebanon did not constitute a separate entity but was instead part of the Syrian nation. This philosophy led to clashes with Lebanese authorities. In 1949 Saʿada declared an armed revolt against the government and called on his supporters to carry weapons and attack police stations. With the help of Syrian leader Husni al-Zaʿim, Lebanese authorities retaliated and arrested Saʿada. He was executed in July 1949. Saʿada's death led to the overthrow of Zaʿim in Syria and to increased popularity for the SSNP in the 1950s. The killing of a major Baʿth party official and the adversarial relationship between SSNP members and Arab nationalists later caused the party to lose its support in Syria.

In the Lebanese upheaval of 1958, the SSNP allied itself with President Camille Chamoun against pro-Arab nationalist forces in Lebanon. Under attack in Syria, the leaders of the SSNP rightly feared that a victory of the government's opponents would close Lebanon to them. At the end of 1961, the SSNP was involved in an unsuccessful coup against the Lebanese government. As a result, the party was banned in Lebanon as well as in Syria. Many of the party leaders were arrested, and the other party members dispersed or left the organization.

During the Lebanese civil war (1975–1976), the SSNP regained some strength but remained a divided party. One faction retained Saʿada's original ideology. Another group, led by Inʿam Raad, believed it possible to combine Marxist doctrine with the ideology of the SSNP. This group also considered violence a legitimate means of achieving political aims. Raad and his group split from the original SSNP and joined the Lebanese National Movement. In September 1977 a third splinter of the SSNP was formed for the purpose of unifying the party.

Militia members of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) in Beirut, Lebanon, birthplace of the movement in 1932. The party, whose radical secular ideology is centered around the concept of a "Greater Syria," comprising not only Syria and Lebanon but also Cyprus, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Palestine. **© Samer Mohdad/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad's government later co-opted Pan-Syrianism into what has been characterized as Syro-centric Arabism, and the Baʿth Party and SSNP cooperated as never before. Several factors helped to explain the reconciliation that took place. Asad grew up in a time and place in which SSNP ideology enjoyed great strength; the family of his wife had close ties to the party; and Asad saw practical, political advantage in accommodating the SSNP. Following decades of competition, they thus reached a mutually beneficial accommodation in which the SSNP became a client of the Syrian state. Even though it remained discredited in its pure, ideological form, a reborn, pragmatic Pan-Syrianism became more significant during the 1980s and after than at any time since the 1920s. For example, in the 1990 and 1994 elections, an SSNP member was elected to the Syrian parliament, albeit standing formally as an independent.

The Syrian Social Nationalist Party has had a profound impact on politics in Lebanon and Syria, introducing a variety of new ideas to the region, including the ideological party, fascist leadership, complete political secularism, and the destruction of existing borders between states. Its repeated challenges to the Lebanese state also served to undermine the power and prestige of the Beirut government. Finally, it led the way in the use of violence to destroy the existing political order, with virtually

every radical group in the region adopting aspects of its program.

See also ASAD, HAFIZ AL-; PAN-ARABISM; RAAD, INʿAM; SAʿADA, ANTUN.

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RONALD BRUCE ST JOHN

SYRKIN, NACHMAN

[1867–1924]

Early Socialist Zionist.

Nachman (also spelled Nahman) Syrkin wrote a brochure in German, "The Jewish Problem and the Socialist Jewish State," under the pseudonym Ben Elieser, in Switzerland in 1898. The pamphlet was his considered opinion on solving the Jewish problem with Socialist Zionism. Born a Russian Jew who subsequently went to the West for an education, Syrkin drew on his experience of both Russian socialism and the misery and suffering of Russian Jewish life. He was one of the first to do so.

He attended the first Zionist Congress in 1897 and remained in the World Zionist Organization until 1905, when at the seventh Zionist Congress it was clear that the British offer of Uganda as a place for a Jewish state was impossible. He moved to the United States in 1907 to continue as an official of the Labor Zionist movement and worked as a territorialist (a member of Israel Zangwill's Jewish Territorial Organization [ITO], willing for the Jewish people to settle any unpopulated area). He also wrote and edited journals in Yiddish and Hebrew in support of his views.

Syrkin's socialism was utopian and ethical, not Marxist. At the base was his view that the common people would realize a Jewish state, not the successful or wealthy; and the state was necessary, since even a new socialist order would not integrate the Jewish minority. He reasoned that modern antisemitism was different from historical forms that had been unleashed in earlier eras, since it stemmed from dislocations of modernization.

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DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

SZOLD, HENRIETTA

[1860–1945]

Founder of Hadassah, the largest Jewish women's organization.

Henrietta Szold was the daughter of a modernist rabbi from Baltimore. After visiting Palestine in 1909, she resolved to bring modern medical care and hygiene to the area and to establish a health-care system to meet the needs of the Jewish community there. Szold was the first director of the Youth Aliyah.

See also YOUTH ALIYAH.

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MIA BLOOM

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TABA

A piece of land disputed by Egypt and Israel.

Taba is a 250-acre patch of land that juts into the Gulf of Aqaba, a dozen miles south of Elat. When the Israeli and Egyptian governments finalized terms on 19 January 1982 for the return of the entire Sinai peninsula to Egypt, Israeli negotiators claimed that Taba should remain within Israel. They based their claim on alleged ambiguities in the physical description of Taba in the 1 October 1906 accord that demarcated the administrative border between Palestine and Egypt. Israel reinforced that claim by constructing two hotels, after spring 1982, within the Taba zone. Article 7 of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979 provided for mediation or arbitration of such differences if direct negotiations failed to resolve them. Egypt urged the formation of an international arbitration team, but the Israeli cabinet did not agree to the principle of arbitration until 13 January 1986. The membership and terms of the arbitration team were agreed upon by 12 September 1986. The three-person panel was empowered to decide on the location of the boundary pillars as of 1948, the end of the Palestine Mandate, and its rulings were final and binding on both parties. On 29 September 1988, the panel ruled in favor of Egypt. Israel evacuated Taba on 15 March 1989. Egyptian sovereignty was restored over Taba and over the hotels that Israel had constructed. However, Israelis could visit the enclave without obtaining an Egyptian visa, and Israel continued to supply Taba's water and electricity from Elat. The Taba accord was a rare example of the resolution of a contentious issue through judicial means.

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ANN M. LESCH

TABA ACCORDS

See TABA; TABA NEGOTIATIONS (1995, 2001)

TABA NEGOTIATIONS (1995, 2001)

Two separate Israeli-Palestinians negotiations that led to an accord on interim arrangements in 1995, and to bridging differences on the final status issues in 2001.

The Taba resort in Egypt was the site of the Israeli-PLO negotiations that concluded with the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank–Gaza Strip, also known as the Taba Accords or Oslo II, which was signed in Washington, D.C., on 28 September 1995. The agreement dealt with such issues as civil affairs, economic relations, legal matters, the Palestinian election of an 88-member Palestinian Legislative Council, and security arrangements. The West Bank was divided into areas A, B, and C. In area A, Israel was to redeploy from six cities, whose overall security would be placed in Palestinian hands. In area B, Palestinian towns and villages, Israel would be responsible for security and the Palestinians for public order. In area C, unpopulated areas, Israel would maintain full control. Negotiations for permanent status of the territories were to begin in May 1996, but were delayed for four years.

Five years after the first Taba negotiations, President Bill Clinton convened a summit on 11 through 24 July 2000 at Camp David between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat and their teams to negotiate the final status issues, but the parties failed to reach an agreement. More negotiations took place, especially at Bolling Air Force Base in December 2000; these ended on 23 December with Clinton issuing what became known as the Clinton proposals or parameters. These meetings and Clinton's intervention set the stage for the last Israeli-Palestinian meeting of the Oslo peace process, which took place at Taba between 21 and 27 January 2001.

Thanks to the Clinton proposals the two parties at Taba were able to narrow their differences on final status issues, though, since there was no official note taking, there are conflicting accounts about the extent of the progress. Both sides made unprecedented concessions. The Israelis reportedly agreed to withdraw from 100 percent of the Gaza Strip and 92 percent of the West Bank, coupled with a 3 percent land swap. The Palestinians accepted Israeli annexation of clusters of settlements but were seeking sovereignty over 98 percent so as to have maximum contiguity in the West Bank. These figures are in dispute, since both sides do not agree on how to calculate withdrawal percentage, especially on whether East Jerusalem, parts of the Jordan Valley, and other parts should count as part of the West Bank. When these parts are counted, the withdrawal figures are smaller than those cited above. On Jerusalem, the Palestinians conceded the Jewish Quarter, including the Western Wall, and Israel agreed to return noncontiguous parts of East Jerusalem. The parties discussed the return of 100,000 to 150,000 Palestinian refugees, out of some 3.7 million, to what is now Israel, but they remained apart on this and other issues.

While the Israeli offer was far-reaching, it was not enough for the Palestinians, because it would not have allowed for a contiguous capital in East Jerusalem, the settlement clusters that Israel wanted to annex would have reduced contiguity in the West Bank, and Palestinian inability to control their borders and air space would have negated Palestinian sovereignty. The two sides needed more time to bridge their differences, but time ran out. The negotiations were interrupted by the departure from office of Clinton on 20 January 2001, and by the defeat of Barak in the Israeli elections of 6 February 2001. But the narrowing of differences at Taba in 2001 had been significant and was hailed by several of the negotiators as representing the closest the two sides had ever come to an agreement.

See also CLINTON, WILLIAM JEFFERSON; OLSO ACCORD (1993).

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PHILIP MATTAR

TABAQA DAM

Dam on the Euphrates river built to irrigate Syria.

Started in 1968, the dam was finished in 1973 with Soviet assistance, at a total cost of US$600 million. It forms Lake Asad on the Euphrates, above Raqqa, Syria. It is intended to irrigate 1.5 million acres (640,000 ha) by the year 2005 and produce six

hundred megawatts of electricity. By the mid-1980s, only about 187,500 acres (75,000 ha) were under irrigation and five of the eight power generators were not operating.

When all projects are completed, the dam will take seven billion cubic meters of the thirty billion cubic meters of water that once entered Iraq each year. Iraq complains of this and that the upstream irrigation projects lower Iraq's water quality by raising salinity levels. Turkey also has ambitious irrigation projects under way at Keban and Karababa, which will reduce Iraq's share to eleven billion cubic meters. Syria has protested to Turkey about excessive use of Euphrates water and tried in 1984 to block Arab oil states from making loans to Turkey for construction of the Karababa dam. No treaty exists for sharing the flow, thus this serious dispute has no foreseeable prospect of resolution.

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John R. Clark

TABATABAʾI, MOHAMMAD

[1841–1920]

Persian religious scholar; one of the principal leaders of the Constitutional Revolution, 1905–1909.

Born in Karbala in 1841 to a family with illustrious scholarly antecedents, Mohammad Tabatabaʾi spent his early childhood in Hamadan in the care of Aqa Sayyed Mehdi, his paternal grandfather, before moving to Tehran, the capital, where his father, Sayyed Sadeq, was firmly established as a leading religious authority. There he studied jurisprudence with his father and other prominent scholars, philosophy with Mirza Abul-Hasan Jelve, and—most significant for his political activity in later years—ethics with Shaykh Hadi Najmabadi, many of whose opinions were regarded as subversively liberal. At the same time, through reading newspapers and closely questioning returning travelers, Tabatabaʾi began taking an interest in the affairs of Europe, which was atypical for the religious scholars of his time.

In 1882, Tabatabaʾi set out from Tehran with the intention of making the pilgrimage to Mecca. He took a circuitous route, traveling via Russia, Anatolia, and Istanbul, meeting new scholars and men of state wherever he alighted, and he arrived in Mecca too late for the pilgrimage. Cholera was raging in the Hijaz, so he left promptly for the area that is now Iraq, where he joined the circle of the great scholar Mirza Hasan Shirazi in Samarra. He spent more than ten years with Shirazi, perfecting his command of Shiʿite jurisprudence and acting as the trusted adviser of his teacher in political matters. It was in this capacity that he was addressed a letter by the celebrated Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (Afghani), then resident in London, calling on him to make greater political use of Shirazi's prestige, which had been inaugurated by the Tobacco Revolt and boycott of 1891.

Despite the oppositional tendencies that Asadabadi correctly perceived in him, Tabatabaʾi's return to Tehran was due to an initiative of Naser al-Din Shah. The monarch wished to create in Tehran a counterweight to Mirza Hasan Ashtiani, a cleric whose prestige had grown considerably in the course of the tobacco boycott, and he accordingly suggested to Shirazi that he should send one of his prominent disciples to Tehran. Shirazi selected Tabatabaʾi, who arrived back in Tehran in the fall of 1893. His father had died almost a decade before, but Tabatabaʾi fell heir to his influence in the Iranian capital with little difficulty. The shah's expectations of Tabatabaʾi were disappointed; not only did he establish cordial relations with Mirza Hasan Ashtiani, but he also emerged as an implacable critic of the corruption and tyranny of the court. Indeed, in 1911 he claimed to have begun working for the cause of constitutional government immediately after his return from Samarra, preaching from the pulpit on the need for establishing a consultative assembly. On another occasion, he stated frankly that he and his colleagues in the clerical class had no direct acquaintance with the concept of constitutionalism, having learned of it from those with experience of Europe. During the decade leading up to the Constitutional Revolution he deepened both his understanding of con stitutional government and his contacts with secular intellectuals working for the same goal.

The beginnings of the revolution may be dated to an alliance concluded by Tabatabaʾi with another leading cleric of Tehran, Sayyed Abdollah Behbahani,

on 23 November 1905, initially for the purpose of obtaining the dismissal of Ayn al-Dowleh, the prime minister. Soon thereafter, the two clerics joined a group of bazaar merchants who had taken sanctuary in the Shah Mosque in Tehran to protest government policies. After Tehran's *imam jomeh* (the highest-ranking paid government-appointed cleric) had the group forcibly evicted from the mosque, Tabataba'i and the clerics led a migration of their colleagues and supporters to the shrine of Shah Abd al-Azim, south of Tehran, where they formulated the demand for an *adalat-khaneh* (house of justice) as a condition of their return. Their demand was formally accepted, and on 12 January 1906 Tabataba'i and Behbahani returned to the capital in triumph. Ayn al-Dowleh remained in office, however, and he stalled implementing the royal decree for convening a house of justice. The tensions that persisted between him and the constitutionalists led to a new and more significant migration of Tabataba'i, Behbahani, and their associates, this time to Qom, on 15 July 1906. They demanded the dismissal of Ayn al-Dowleh, in addition to the establishment of a consultative assembly. Their demands were accepted, and on 18 August 1906 Tabataba'i and Behbahani were able to reenter Tehran. Tabataba'i exercised great influence in the *majles* (assembly) that was convened soon thereafter, attempting to preserve the alliance of personalities and interests that had made possible the introduction of constitutional government. His success was limited, however, and the majles was in a state of chronic dissension when its debates were brought abruptly to an end by the royal coup of 23 June 1908. Tabataba'i was arrested and taken in chains to the garrison at Bagh-e Shah. After a spell of imprisonment, he lived in seclusion in Shemiran, north of Tehran, before being banished to Mashhad. He returned to Tehran on 24 August 1909, one month after the restoration of the constitution, but thereafter tired of direct political involvement. He spent the rest of his life in Tehran, with the exception of a journey in 1917 to the shrine cities of Iraq.

Tabataba'i stands out above all as the most prominent religious leader of his time to have understood fully and accepted the far-reaching implications of constitutionalism for Iranian society, recognizing, for example, that it required a modernization of the educational system. This broadness of outlook may have been connected to the Freemasons' affiliations he had inherited from his father, which led him also to join the Masonic Lodge Reveil de l'Iran, the first Iranian lodge officially affiliated to the Grand Orient of France.

See also Afghani, Jamal al-Din al-; Shirazi, Mirza Hasan.

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Hamid Algar
Updated by Eric Hooglund

TABATABA'I, ZIYA

[c. 1889–1969]

Anglophile Iranian politician and journalist.

Born in Iran, in the southeastern city of Yazd, Ziya Tabataba'i began his public career as a journalist in Shiraz, publishing a series of newspapers—*Islam Sharq* (The east), and *Barq* (Lightning)—in which he supported the causes of constitutional government and social reform. He next moved to Tehran, where during World War I he published *Ra'd* (Thunder), a journal staunchly supporting British policy in Iran. This earned him favorable standing with the British, enabling him to act as a go-between for Iranian notables who wanted their checks cashed by the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia, which in turn gained for him considerable influence in Tehran society. In 1919, Tabataba'i traveled to Baku (in Azerbaijan) to negotiate on behalf of Iran a political and commercial treaty with the temporarily independent states of the south Caucasus, taking advantage of the opportunity to impress other members of the delegation with his political acumen. In 1920 and 1921, he was active in the Anjoman-e Pulad (Steel Committee), a reformist political committee that was the offshoot of a similar organization established by the British in Isfahan and sought to bring together politicians and military officers to initiate change. At the same time, he maintained close links with the head of the British military mission in Iran. These relations with the British enabled him, together with Reza Khan (later Reza Shah

Pahlavi), then a commander of the Iranian Cossack Brigade, to launch a coup d'état on 21 February 1921, that resulted in the appointment of Tabataba'i as prime minister.

The real significance of this coup was that it marked the first stage in the rise of Reza Khan to supreme power and the replacement of the Qajar dynasty by the Pahlavis, and the premiership of Tabataba'i did not last long. He began energetically enough, banning newspapers hostile to his government and imprisoning many of the titled landowners for whom he nurtured a lifelong enmity. He then concluded a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union and formally abrogated the already moribund Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919. His intention, as he privately informed the British minister in Tehran, was to "throw dust in the eyes of the Bolsheviks and native malcontents" (*Documents on British Foreign Policy,* 1919–1939, London, 1963, vol. 13, p. 731). However, differences soon arose. Over the objections of Tabataba'i, on 6 May 1921, Reza Khan succeeded in bringing the gendarmerie under the control of the Ministry of War and then, some two weeks later, in obtaining the dismissal of the British officers who had been seconded to the Iranian army. The swift erosion of Tabataba'i's position became fully apparent on 24 May, when most of the enemies he had had arrested were released without his permission; the following day he went into exile.

Tabataba'i spent the next nine years in Switzerland, moving in 1930 to Palestine, where he lived for thirteen years under the protection of the British mandate government. In the course of World War II Reza Khan was deposed by the Allies (1941), and in September 1943 Tabataba'i was able to return to Iran—in the face of strong objections from the Iranian court, the Soviet Union, and the United States, which were overcome only by the energetic representations of the British.

Embarking on the second half of his political career, Tabataba'i first aligned himself with the Patriotic Caucus (Fraksiun-e Mihan), a pro-British grouping in the Majles (Iran's legislature). Soon, however, he founded his own party, the Fatherland party (Hezb-e Vatan), which early in 1944 was reorganized along authoritarian lines and renamed the National Will party (Hezb-e Erade-ye Melli). He launched yet another newspaper, *Ra'd-e Emruz* (Today's thunder), in which he denounced the remnants of the military dictatorship established by Reza Khan, the continued hold on national life of the landowning oligarchy, and the growing influence of the communist Tudeh party. Tabataba'i's views won him the support of many bazaar merchants and guild leaders, as well as some lesser-ranking religious scholars, but his National Will party did not contest parliamentary elections. Nonetheless, he was elected to the Majles as deputy from Yazd, under the auspices of the Patriotic Caucus. He opposed a whole series of prime ministers, including most notably Qavam al-Dowleh, who had him arrested for several months in 1946, probably to placate the Soviet Union, the patron of the Tudeh party. Despite his rooted aversion to the Tudeh party, Tabataba'i sided with it in 1948 when efforts were under way to wrest control of the army from the shah. This tactical alliance did not last long, and it was in part because of a growing dependence on the Tudeh party that Tabataba'i opposed the government of Mohammad Mossadegh from 1951 onward (his continued alignment with the British was, no doubt, a more important factor in this regard).

Tabataba'i appears to have withdrawn from active political involvement even before the royalist coup of August 1953 that restored full-fledged autocracy to Iran. He spent the remaining years of his life in the village of Sa'adatabad, dying there in 1969. Notwithstanding his earlier hostility to the Pahlavis, he is said to have become a trusted consultant of the shah during the last phase of his life, meeting with him regularly at least once a week.

See also PAHLAVI, REZA.

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HAMID ALGAR

TABBULA

See FOOD: TABBULA

TABRIZ

Provincial capital in northwestern Iran.

Tabriz, the capital of East Azerbaijan, is Iran's fourth largest city, with 1,191,000 inhabitants according to the 1996 census. The city dates back to the Parthian period (approximately 238 B.C.E. to 224 C.E.). The Blue Mosque, built in the fifteenth century, and the Rubʿe Rashidi, constructed by the famous Mongol vizier Rashid al-Din Fazl Allah, are among its archaeological sites. In 1295 the Mongol ruler Ghazan Khan made Tabriz the capital of his empire. In the fourteenth century Tamerlane conquered Tabriz. The Safavid Shah Ismaʿil I made it his capital in 1501. At that time, Tabriz, with a population estimated at 250,000, was one of the world's largest cities. Most of the city was destroyed in the massive earthquake of 1721, which left it devastated, and according to some accounts, caused 80,000 to 100,000 casualties. In the Qajar period (between 1779 and 1925) Tabriz was the seat of the crown prince and a major military headquarters against the Russian frontier. During the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911) it was a site of antigovernment activity, and Russians occupied the city from 1911 to 1917. Soviet troops occupied the city in 1941 and in 1945 supported the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan, a secessionist movement headed by Jaʿfar Pishevari. The Soviets withdrew in 1946, and subsequently Iranian forces occupied Tabriz and put an end to Pishevari's government. As an important commercial center, Tabriz also played a prominent role in the revolution of 1979.

Tabriz is one of Iran's most important centers for manufacturing industries, producing chemicals, metals, machinery, and textiles. Hand-knotted carpets made in the city have had an international reputation for quality and design for more than a century. Agricultural products from the Tabriz region include wheat, barley, potatoes, and onions; this region is also a considerable producer of fruits and nuts exported from Iran. The variety of agricultural products has contributed to Tabriz becoming a major food-processing center.

See also AZERBAIJAN.

NEGUIN YAVARI

TABRIZ UNIVERSITY

University in Tabriz, Iran.

Established in 1949 as the University of Azerbaijan, the University of Tabriz had 5,187 students by 1970. It includes schools of literature, agriculture, science, and engineering, as well as an institute for advanced studies. The faculty of literature and philosophy publishes a journal with a solid reputation. According to the university's own statistics, the total student population in 2002 exceeded 10,000, and the faculty numbers about 500, with some 900 administrative personnel.

PARVANEH POURSHARIATI

TAGGER, SIONEH

[1900–1988]

Israeli artist.

Sioneh Tagger was born at the turn of the century in Jaffa to Sephardic Jews who had settled there in the nineteenth century. Her parents helped to found the modern city of Tel Aviv. She studied art at the Herzliya Gymnasium in 1919/20 with a Russian sculptor, Joseph Constant, who introduced her to cubism and European modernism. In 1921 she moved to Jerusalem to study at Bezalel on condition that she live with her grandfather's family, who were religious people. Her works from this period include drawings of elderly Jews and "Oriental types" of Jews, as well as decorative metalwork and painting of miniatures. In 1924 she went to study in Paris, where she learned to build her drawings based on simple geometric structures. Tagger was influenced by several painters from the Jewish School of Paris, as well as by André Derain and Picasso, whose influence can be seen in *Clown* (1925) and *Harlequin* (1901). Later in life, Tagger painted on plexiglass, inspired by memories of glass paintings decorating quotations from the Qurʾan hanging in Arab homes in Jaffa (she, though, used Jewish themes).

JULIE ZUCKERMAN

TAHA, MAHMUD MUHAMMAD

[c.1909–1985]

Founder of the Republican Brotherhood.

Mahmud Muhammad Taha was born in Rufaʿa, in central Sudan, in either 1909 or 1911. He graduated from Gordon Memorial College (now the University of Khartoum) in 1936 and practiced agricultural engineering in the Gazira, where his interest

in local and nationalist politics grew. Taha founded the New Islamic Mission or Republican Brotherhood in 1945. His first arrest was in 1946, for leading a demonstration for the release of a midwife detained for performing a circumcision on a young girl just after the British had outlawed the practice. Taha's point was that the colonial authorities had no legitimacy to legislate morality that could only change with the equality of women in society.

Taha was both theologian and political leader. The Republican Brotherhood movement was one of the many nationalist movements that agitated for the independence of Sudan from British colonialism. In addition, Taha's "second message" of Islam was among the earliest of the liberal Muslim reformist movements now called "progressive Islam." He argued for a scientific understanding in Islam rendering it capable of resolving the problems of modern life. He argued against the application of the *hadd* punishments of amputation for theft as a violation of *shariʿa* and of Islam because their imposition presupposes a level of education and social justice that are lacking in today's society. He also argued for equal rights for women in marriage in Islamic law. The community of "Republicans," which included significant numbers of women, put into practice the egalitarian ideas of the movement. The movement was also notable for its emphasis on the rights of non-Muslims in predominantly Muslim Sudan, especially recognizing the oppressed southern masses whose resistance has been manifested in decades of protracted civil war.

Taha and the Republican movement opposed the imposition of *shariʿa* as state law in September 1983 because it divided Muslims from the large non-Muslim Sudanese population and thus was contrary to national unity. They argued that non-Muslims should enjoy full rights as citizens and called for repeal of the "September laws." As a result of this protest, Taha was tried by the Islamist government of Jaʿfar Nimeiri for apostasy. He was found guilty and hanged by the regime on 18 January 1985.

See also Gender: Gender and Education; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Numeiri, Muhammad Jaʿfar; *Shariʿa;* Sudan; Sudanese Civil Wars.

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Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban

TAHA YASIN RAMADAN

See Ramadan, Taha Yasin

TAHINA

See Food: Tahina

TAHIR, KEMAL

[1910–1973]

Turkish novelist.

The son of a naval officer, Kemal Tahir was born Ismail Kemalettin Demir in Istanbul and attended the prestigious Galatasaray Lycée (secondary school), though he did not graduate. In 1932, he began writing for newspapers and periodicals, as well as historical novels that glorified the Ottoman past. Between 1938 and 1950, he was imprisoned, along with the poet Nazim Hikmet, by the government of Turkey because of his ideological views and political convictions. During his incarceration, Tahir collected the observations of villagers who were in prison with him; he used these as the basis for a series of novels that authentically depicted the mentality, social structure, and mode of life in the villages of central Anatolia. He was released from prison in 1950 as part of a general amnesty.

Tahir's novels and his political-cultural theories influenced many Turkish authors, known collectively as Tahiris. His influence spread beyond the realm of literature into cinema, inspiring filmmakers to create films rooted in popular Turkish culture, not Western masterpieces. One of Tahir's last novels, *Mother State,* which took as its subject the founding of the Ottoman Empire in the thirteenth century, signaled a transition in Turkish literature

from portraying social realities to searching for new models for change.

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DAVID WALDNER

TAHTAWI, RIFAʿA AL-RAFI AL

[c. 1801–1873]

Egyptian writer and educator and the founder of the translation movement; precursor of modern Arab secular thought.

Rifaʿa al-Rafi al-Tahtawi was born in Tanta, in upper Egypt, into a family of rural notables with a religious learning tradition, whose genealogy went back to al-Husayn ibn Fatima, grandson of the prophet Muhammad. In his early childhood, his family was exposed to pecuniary difficulties following the confiscation by Muhammad Ali of the *iltizamat* (tax farms).

Education

He was educated in al-Azhar in the traditional range of religious and linguistic studies, but was exposed there to the influence of the unconventional Shaykh Hasan al-Attar who advocated a broader out-look to *ilm* (knowledge) than the range to which al-Azhar was confined. His career was further inspired in Paris (1826–1831), where he was attached to the first mission of students from Egypt, initially as an imam (prayer leader) but soon as the mission's only translation student. Tahtawi read in a wide range of subjects, became acquainted with French liberal tradition, established direct contacts with leading French orientalists and noted the institutionalization of Arabic studies in L'Ecole Spéciale des Langues Orientales Vivantes. He also followed closely the 1830 revolution, studied the structure of the French political system and keenly observed Parisian social life and manners. He provided in great detail the first documented Arabic account of modern encounters with Western life and society in his *Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz* (The extraction of gold in the summary of Paris, 1935).

Institutional Career

Tahtawi's institutional career thrived during the reigns of Muhammad Ali and Ismaʿil in two distinct and separate phases. In each phase, he held several positions, all at the same time. The first of these phases (1837–1849), started toward the end of Muhammad Ali's expansion of education and continued up to the large-scale closure of schools at the time of Abbas (1848–1854). During that phase, Tahtawi directed the newly established *Madrasat al-Alsun* (School of languages), then founded and headed *Qalam al-Tarjama* (Translation department) and became chief editor of *al-Waqa'i al-Misriyya* newspaper in 1842. The second phase (1863–1873), corresponds to the reign of Ismaʿil (1863–1879), during which new activity in translation and education was initiated. In this second phase, Tahtawi headed the reinstated Qalam al-Tarjama, participated in *Qumisyun al-Taʿlim* (a central commission for educational planning), and was chief editor of a new fortnightly *(Rawdat al-Madaris al-Misriyya).* He continued to hold these positions until his death in 1873. During the long interlude between these phases (1849–1863), a general trend of reductions in education, and hence translation, prevailed under Abbas (1848–1854) and Saʿid (1854–1863). Tahtawi, virtually exiled to the Sudan for four years (1850–1854), was kept from institutional channels of influence, not-withstanding a relatively short-lived assignment to run a new military school with wide-ranging departments from its opening in 1855 to its closure in 1860.

Educational Agenda and Influence

Tahtawi practically founded the translation movement in Egypt. Works translated by Tahtawi and his pupils into Arabic and Turkish number more than two thousand, many of them geared to a wide variety of educational and general policy requirements. As an educator, he was equipped to run an integrated syllabus of studies. When initial contractions in Muhammad Ali's military establishment forced retrenchments in education, several schools were amalgamated in 1842 into a single institute under Tahtawi's directorship. He ran in that expanded do-

main the first curriculum that offered a combination of Islamic studies—including law—and European studies, in an educational milieu which had been characterized by strict dualism. These orientations earned Tahtawi the resentment of the *ulama,* whose traditional positions (that is, as judges) were being threatened by his pupils. During the reign of Ismaʿil, Tahtawi cosubmitted a project *(Makatib al-Milla)* for the establishment of a new educational administration to promote and supervise an integrated syllabus in existing elementary schools of traditional learning *(Katatib),* and to sponsor the opening of a network of similarly oriented government elementary schools.

Towards the end of his life, Tahtawi articulated prescriptive reformist views on knowledge, education and the political order in *Manahij al-Albab al-Misriyya fi Mabahij al-Adab al-Asriyya* (The paths of Egyptian minds to the joys of modern manners, 1869) and *al-Murshid al-Amin fi Tarbiyyat al-Banat wa al-Banin* (The honest guide in the upbringing of girls and boys, 1874). Within the context of a dominating traditional heritage, Tahtawi challenged traditional notions on knowledge and education in effective support for state-managed change. He preached that any branch of learning which contributed to human welfare fell within the realm of necessary ilm, that civilization had a material component acquired through adoption of rational sciences from advanced sources in Europe by appropriately prepared calibers, and that education should therefore be aimed at producing new men of knowledge capable of making such adoptions. On these premises, the existing state of al-Azhar *ulama* was criticized and education reforms were advocated, including girls' education, a call that coincided with the opening of the first girls' school in Egypt at the time of Ismaʿil.

Political Perspective

Tahtawi's prescriptions for political reform involved a blend of traditional Islamic and modern secular orientations. He referred to Egypt as a distinct and historically continuous entity, and perceived of the community in terms of a social and political order pertinent to a territorial nation *(watan)* whose members were bound by the common tie of nation-hood and were equally entitled to freedom of belief. He recognized that the social order could be organized on the basis of a man-made law equally applied to all members in the national community *(al-jamʿiyya),* that the political order involved three distinct functional organs, including a legislative organ, and that its role in binding the community made it a necessity to include basic political education in schools' syllabi. But the inherent secular and liberal orientations were constrained by traditional premises and dimensions. Religion was maintained as a determinant within the political community by the perception that a common religious law was among the binding elements for a nation and by preaching equal civil rights of non-Muslims on an appeal to tolerance and justice based on *shariʿa* (Islamic law) rather than on the implications of equality inherent in nation-hood. The absolute authority of the monarch was maintained by requiring that absolute obedience was due to him, that he was not held accountable to his subjects, and that the parliamentary organ's functions were only consultative and supportive. It is on the basis of his general exposure of the Arab mind to reform issues, rather than on the specific positions taken on each, that the origin of modern Arab secular thought is identified with Tahtawi.

Analysis of His Role

His role through state-sponsored institutions, as well as the congruence and timing of specific elements of his thought with specific policy measures, prompted a perception of him as an etatistic ideologue. The mix of reformist and conservative notions in his writings is interpreted accordingly by Israel Altman. Based on this perception, Tahtawi's thought is seen to have reflected a blend of vested interests in educational reform, intellectual commitment to the cause, and self-assertion vis-à-vis the Turco-Circassian bureaucratic superiors, all characteristic of Egyptian officials who participated in state reform policies between 1830 and 1880.

The Western influence on Tahtawi is generally emphasized. However, the contention that his thought was largely a process of acculturation to the West was recently challenged, and it was shown that Tahtawi's work involved "the reestablishment of direct contact with certain elements of classical Islamic [rationalist] tradition." The genuine and indigenous elements in Tahtawi's thought, and in the Arab "renascence" in general, are accordingly highlighted and emphasized.

Tahtawi produced over thirty publications of translations and original works, including Fénelon's *Les aventures de Télémaque* (1867), the first translation into Arabic of a work of Western literature. Among his other important original writings were two attempts made to simplify the teaching of Arabic grammar, the second of which, *al-Tuhfa al-Maktabiyya li-Taqrib al-Lughat al-Arabiyya* (The bookshelves' [or library's] Antique [*sic*] for the Simplification of Arabic Language, 1869) involved a departure from the prose-memorizing method applied then to the presentation of rules in a tabulated and systematic form. As chief editor of *al-Waqa'i al-Misriyya,* he introduced the newspaper article as a new genre of writing through various commentaries on current affairs. He wrote in serial form, in *Rawdat al-Madaris al-Misriyya,* the first sira (prophet's biography) in modern times, later published as *Nihayat al-Ijaz fi Sirat Sakin al-Hijaz* (The ultimate brief on the biography of the resident of Hijaz, 1876).

Notwithstanding the specific differences in interpreting his role and in classifying his political thought, Tahtawi's contributions to the policies and notions of cultural change, as well as his contributions to Arab secular thought, continue to be recognized. More than a century after Tahtawi's death, he remains relevant to contemporary endeavors. During Nasser's era, the widely circulating Egyptian daily *al-Ahram* used his words as epigraph for its opinion page: "Let the watan, the fatherland, be a place for our common happiness, which we build with freedom, intellect, and factories."

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ABDEL AZIZ EZZELARAB

TAʾIF ACCORD

Agreement ending the civil war in Lebanon, 1989.

In July 1989, the Arab Tripartite Committee (Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria) made recommendations to resolve Lebanon's civil war: expanded Lebanese sovereignty, a pullback of Syria's forces, and formalization of Syria and Lebanon's relationship with Israel. Syria promptly rejected them. In September, in the city of Taʾif, Saudi Arabia, representatives of the various Lebanese factions accepted a new National Unity charter. Under it, Syria would restrain Shiʿite groups backed by Iran in exchange for recognition of its dominance in Lebanon and the isolation of the Christian military figure Michel Aoun; vacant parliamentary seats would be filled by the new government before holding elections; Syria was empowered to become involved in reconstituting national governmental authority; redeployment of its forces left Syria firmly in control of territory strategically important for access to Beirut; and the governments of Syria and Lebanon were permitted to conclude secret agreements. The Taʾif Accord came under heavy criticism because several of its clauses were never implemented. Foremost was the issue of Syrian troops' presence in Lebanon. In 2002 and 2003, the Syrian regime implemented symbolic minor withdrawals from some areas in Lebanon, including Beirut. As of today, there are still more than 25,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon.

BRYAN DAVES
UPDATED BY GEORGE E. IRANI

TAʾIF, AL-

A highland city in Saudi Arabia's al-Hijaz region.

Al-Taʾif is about 75 miles southeast of the holy city of Mecca. Although located on a sandy plain, it possesses plentiful water, making it an important agricultural center serving Mecca and Jidda. Many inhabitants are immigrants or the descendants of immigrants from throughout the Islamic world, especially Yemen, the Indian subcontinent, and central Asia. Al-Taʾif was the first city of al-Hijaz to fall to the Al Saʿud in 1924, and the Ikhwan armies that first entered the city plundered it and massacred many of its inhabitants. It has long served as a

summer residence for kings and wealthy Meccans, who are a mainstay of its economy, along with several Saudi military bases. Estimates in the early twenty-first century placed its permanent population at about 350,000, with a seasonal increase to 500,000. The nearby district of al-Shafa is a popular summer resort.

See also Al Saʿud Family; Ikhwan; Saudi Arabia.

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J. E. Peterson

TAʾIF, TREATY OF AL-

Treaty that concluded the 1933–1934 border war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

The treaty that ended the border war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen and set up a framework for peaceful relations was signed in al-Taʾif (Hijaz) in May 1934. After Saudi Arabia's occupation of the port city of Hodeida, Yemen—and under pressure from Great Britain and Italy, which were wary of the extension of Saudi Arabia's power nearer their colonies (Aden and Eritrea, respectively)—King Abd al-Aziz (Ibn Saʿud) and Imam Yahya agreed to settle the border issue. Yemen recognized Saudi Arabia's sovereignty over Asir and the towns of Najran and Jizan and agreed to pay Saudi Arabia an indemnity of 100,000 pounds sterling in gold. In exchange, Saudi Arabia evacuated its forces from Hodeidah and other areas of Yemen it had captured. The border area was to be demilitarized, and its demarcation was outlined from the Red Sea coast to just east of Najran; beyond that point it was undefined. A committee was to be established in order to work out the limits of tribal areas. In addition, the treaty called for the renewal of its terms in twenty years. Its terms were reaffirmed and expanded in a June 2000 international border treaty between the two countries.

See also Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud; Hodeida; Yemen.

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Updated by Anthony B. Toth

TAʿIZ

Province and largest city in the south of North Yemen.

Taʿiz Province is, along with Ibb Province, the heart of the Shafiʿi south of North Yemen. It embraces the Hujariyya region, and the city of Taʿiz is its soul. The southern uplands of Taʿiz Province, at a few thousand feet, have a more temperate climate and more rainfall than do the northern highlands, and the agriculture of the province has in the past supported a larger, denser population than that of provinces farther north. In the past, the city of Taʿiz was an important center of power in North Yemen, especially under the Rasulids from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-fifteenth centuries; more recently, Imam Ahmad insisted on residing there between 1948 and 1962. Linked since the late nineteenth century to British Aden by an increasing stream of workers, merchants, and students, and then linked through Aden to the outside world, Taʿiz became a part of world commerce and was in touch with the modern world and its ideas far more than was Sanʿa; by the 1940s, it had become the hotbed of modernist, republican, and even revolutionary ideas in the Yemen ruled by the imams. Thus, through the 1970s, Taʿiz was compared favorably to Sanʿa, and especially by many southerners.

By the 1980s, however, Sanʿa had outstripped it in size and political importance and Hodeida had outstripped it in commercial importance; its basic infrastructure—including electricity, water, and roads—was allowed to degrade. Still, Taʿiz remained in the 1990s and thereafter a major center of business and light industry; its links to Aden, and the new economic role of the latter, may enhance the position of Taʿiz in unified Yemen, or unification may lead to a bypassing of Taʿiz. In any case, the Taʿiz of old is no more. Within defining walls and highlighted by great whitewashed mosque minarets and domes, its back pressed against the cloud-topped mountain named Jabal Sabr, which towers over it, the old Taʿiz

was a jewel of a small Arab Islamic city. The Taʿiz of today has burst its walls, and unattractive modern construction has replaced, crowded out, and hidden most of the old. The population of Taʿiz and the villages it has absorbed is about 700,000.

See also SANʿA; YEMEN; YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

TAJIKS

People of Central Asia; the original Iranian population of Afghanistan and historic Turkistan.

The Tajiks are Muslim people of Central Asia living in the countries of Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Their population is thought to be about 10 million, with more living outside of Tajikistan than within. About 3.5 million live in Afghanistan. Although their history is not well known, Tajiks are thought to be the original inhabitants of Central Asia, perhaps the direct descendants of the ancient Aryans. Their language, Tajiki, is a dialect of Persian.

Tajiks in Afghanistan live primarily in the northern and western provinces, where they are mainly settled farmers and landowners. Most Tajiks in Afghanistan, like most Afghans, identify with their local village or valley and are not always aware of their ethnic name. In fact, *Tajik* is sometimes used to describe any Persian speaker in Central Asia, whether or not the people themselves so identify.

In Afghanistan the Tajiks played an important role in the civil war of the 1980s and 1990s, especially those in the Panjsher Valley. The famous Afghan resistance leader Ahmad Shah Masoud was a Panjsher Tajik.

Although historically the Tajiks have not played an important role in the governance of Afghanistan, their position changed after 11 September 2001. The Northern Alliance, which had strong Tajik leadership, took control of Afghanistan in November 2001. Tajiks occupied a number of key Afghan ministries in the government of Hamid Karzai, including foreign affairs and defense. They have continued to play a dominant role in the Karzai government.

See also AFGHANISTAN; KARZAI, HAMID.

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GRANT FARR

TAJIN

See FOOD: TAJIN

TAKFIR WA AL-HIJRA, AL-

Egyptian Islamic fundamentalist organization.

Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra is one of the most notorious radical Egyptian fundamentalist organizations. Its real name is the Society of Muslims (Jamaʿat al-Muslimin). The group was formed in 1969 by Shukri Mustafa, who had been arrested in 1965 and served prison time with the influential Sayyid Qutb (an Egyptian who came to be considered the most radical fundamentalist thinker in the Arab world). Mustafa argued that the Egyptian society is living in a corrupt, decadent, and non-Islamic state of paganism *(jahiliyya).* His solution for the group was to withdraw itself from society and forge a new, purely Islamic society, in the unpopulated hinterland off the Nile River Valley. Though the group did spend some time living in caves, for most of its existence members lived in shared apartments in the poor neighborhood of Cairo. When the government arrested and detained several members in 1977, the organization responded by kidnapping, and ultimately murdering, a former minister for religious endowments. After a large-scale shootout with the police, several hundred members of the group were arrested and tried. Shukri Mustafa and four other leaders were sentenced to death, and others received prison sentences ranging from five to twenty-five

years. Today, the group is considered to be part of the Arab Afghans and is led by Ahmad al-Jazaʾiri.

At the ideological level, Mustafa delineates two stages for the organization: First, the stage of weakness *(istiddʿaf),* during which the group builds itself; and second, the stage of action *(tamkin),* during which the group attacks the *jahili* society. Hence the group's popular names *al-takfir* (excommunication) and *al-hijra* (migration). Furthermore, the group rejects mainstream doctrines accepted by traditional scholars and moderate fundamentalists. Thus, it does not believe in the validity of consensus *(ijma)* or independent reasoning *(ijtihad)*—it only believes in the literal validity of the Qurʾan and the *Sunna* of the Prophet, which are the basis of constructing divine governance *(hakimiyya)* and destroying worldly paganism. The group adheres to a militant view of jihad (holy war) and makes the whole world its enemy; thus, the United States, the United Nations, and Israel as well as the Islamic states are viewed as illegitimate systems of government that should be toppled.

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TAKVIM-I VEKAYI

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

TALABANI, JALAL

[1934–]

Kurdish leader.

Leader of one of the two main Iraqi Kurdish political parties, Jalal Talabani was born in 1934 near Koi Sanjaq, in Iraqi Kurdistan. The son of a Qadiri (Sufi) *murshid* (teacher) belonging to a very famous Kurdish family, Talabani studied law in Baghdad. In 1962 he joined General Mustafa Barzani in the armed struggle of the Kurds against the Arabs. The bright leftist intellectual Talabani could not get along with the more traditional, conservative Barzani, and from 1966 until 1970 Talabani led a group of government mercenaries *(jash)* fighting against the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). After the 11 March 1970 autonomy agreement between General Barzani and Iraq's then vice president Saddam Hussein, Talabani lived in exile in Beirut and Damascus. After the collapse of Barzani's movement (caused by the Algiers Agreement in March 1975), Talabani founded in 1977 the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Since then he has competed with Masʿud al-Barzani (the general's son) for the leadership of the Iraqi Kurdish movement. After the Gulf War (1990–1991) and the formation of the Kurdish Autonomous Zone, Talabani shared power with Masʿud al-Barzani from the elections of May 1992 until May 1994, when fighting resumed between the two leaders. In 1996 Talabani established his own Kurdish Regional Government in Sulaymaniyya. Since the Washington Agreement of September 1998, Talabani has coexisted with Barzani, and on 8 September 2002 he signed the agreement of Sari Rash, which paved the way for the first full session of the Kurdish Parliament on 4 October 2002 and the normalization of the relations between the KDP and PUK. In 2003, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Talabani was appointed a member of the Iraqi Governing Council.

See also BARZANI FAMILY; KURDISH AUTONOMOUS ZONE; PATRIOTIC UNION OF KURDISTAN (PUK).

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CHRIS KUTSCHERA

TALAL IBN ABDULLAH

[1909–1972]

King of Jordan who, during his brief reign, encouraged democracy.

Talal ibn Abdullah assumed the duties of king at a critical period of transition in Jordan's history. When King Abdullah I ibn Hussein was assassinated

Talal ibn Abdullah, crown prince of Jordan, stands to the left of his father King Abdullah bin Al-Hussein in the Palace Gardens of Amman, Jordan, 1948. Talal became king on 5 September 1951 after the assassination of his father, but due to his poor mental health he was forced to abdicate in favor of his son on 11 August 1952. © Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

on 20 July 1951, a group of Jordanian royalists determined that King Abdullah's chosen successor, his grandson Prince Hussein ibn Talal, was too young to govern. The only way to ensure the legitimacy of transition to Hussein was for Crown Prince Talal, who suffered from acute depression and paranoia, to be crowned king. The alternatives were either to crown Prince Na'if, the regent and Talal's half-brother, or to accede to some form of union with Iraq, in which case a member of the Iraqi branch of the Hashimite dynasty would succeed to the Jordanian throne. Hence, Talal was considered an interim figure, yet he became significantly more during his tenure.

On 5 September 1951, the cabinet proclaimed Talal king, and the newly elected parliament confirmed Talal on the throne on receipt of a medical report by Minister of Health Jamil Tutunji. Prince Na'if, the regent, flew to Switzerland to escort his brother home.

The most notable legacy of King Talal's brief reign was to transform Jordan into a true democracy. Under Talal's instructions, the veteran prime minister, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, won a vote of confidence in parliament on 24 September 1951. A new constitution was promulgated, declaring the people the source of all power. Citizens were guaranteed individual liberty and equality before the law. The constitution was approved by the lower and upper houses and was signed by King Talal on 1 January 1952. It enshrined the freedom of opinion, the right to hold public meetings and form political parties and trade unions, the freedom of conscience and worship, compulsory free education, as well as the right to own property. The new constitution made the cabinet collectively and individually responsible to parliament. Ministers could be impeached. The king could dissolve parliament, but new elections had to be held within four months, otherwise the old parliament would be reinstated. According to Article 93, parliament could override the king's veto over legislation by a two-thirds majority. Parliament was empowered to ratify treaties and could assemble without being called to do so by the king, but the king could declare martial law by decree with the consent of the cabinet.

The king's foreign minister declared in September 1951 that Jordan was not seeking union with Iraq. In December 1951, the king visited Saudi Arabia and made clear his desire for good relations with the house of Saʿud. He was skeptical of Western alliances, and in January 1952, he led Jordan into acceptance of the Arab Collective Security Pact.

Despite his popularity, after eight months the king's psychological troubles returned. While vacationing in Europe in May 1952, the cabinet transformed the Regency Council into a Crown Council, which exercised the powers of head of state for the rest of Talal's reign. On 11 August 1952, parliament deposed him and proclaimed Prince Hussein king. King Talal accepted gracefully. The duties of king were assumed by a Regency Council until Hussein came of age.

The deposed king moved to Egypt then took up residence in Turkey, where he died twenty years

later. Talal was the first king of Jordan to graduate from the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, an English school, and while there had absorbed democratic ideals. Sir John Bagot Glubb recalls in his memoir, *A Soldier with the Arabs*: "The tragedy of King Talal seemed to be rendered more poignant by the fact that, apart from his insanity, he appeared so ideally fit to be king. . . . He was of acute intelligence, outstanding personal charm, faultless private morals, and inspired by a deeply conscious wish to serve his country and his people, with no selfish motives."

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Abu al-Huda, Tawfiq; Glubb, John Bagot; Hussein ibn Talal.

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Jenab Tutunji

TALAT, MEHMET

[1874–1921]

Turkish statesman.

Born in Edirne, Mehmet Talat Bey became chief administrator of the telegraph and postal office in Salonika in the Ottoman Empire. There, he became part of the secret Committee for Union and Progress. After the Young Turk revolution, he went to Istanbul in December 1908 to assume a leading position in the Young Turk government, rising to minister of interior. After 1913 and until the Ottoman defeat in World War I, Talat Paşa, Enver Paşa, and Cemal Paşa comprised the unofficial triumvirate that controlled the Ottoman Empire. While Enver was a military leader and Cemal was famous for his ruthlessness, Talat was a sophisticated diplomat and a consummate politician. In February 1917, Talat became grand vizier and held that position until 8 October 1918, just before the armistice of Mudros, which signaled the Ottoman surrender to the Allies. On 2 November, three days after the armistice was signed, Talat left Istanbul on a German ship and was murdered in Berlin in 1921.

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Zachary Karabell

TALEQANI, AZAM

[1943–]

Iranian advocate for women's rights, social justice, and democracy.

Azam Taleqani, daughter of the radical cleric Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, was born in 1943 in Tehran. She obtained her B.A. degree in Persian literature and was a schoolteacher and principal. She was politically active before Iran's Islamic Revolution and a political prisoner under the shah. After the revolution she was elected to the first parliament (1980–1984). Her quest for social justice led her to focus on the plight of women. In 1979 she founded the Iranian Islamic Women's Institute and started publishing a magazine, *Payam-i Hajar,* which has been closed down temporarily several times. Along with the members of her institute, she assists urban poor and rural women, providing them with legal advice, organizing conferences on women's problems, and creating jobs for women carpet weavers, tailors, and the like. *Payam-i Hajar* was the first journal to publish an article (in 1992) that refuted the legal basis of polygyny and men's superiority and proposed a new interpretation of the Qurʾanic verse *al-Nisa* (Women) founded on Iranian social, demographic, and cultural realities. Taleqani registered to run as a candidate in the 1997 presidential elections in order to challenge the traditional views on women. She and seven other women candidates were disqualified by the Council of Guardians, which provided no reason for their disqualification. She also was disqualified in the 1999 municipal elections. She criticizes personal enrichment on the part of the power elite and the widening gap between the rich and the poor, and continues to advocate social justice and democracy.

Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut

TALFA, ADNAN KHAYR ALLAH

[1940–1989]

Iraqi government official; relative of Saddam Hussein.

Adnan Khayr Allah Talfa was Saddam Hussein's brother-in-law and a maternal cousin; Saddam is married to Talfa's sister Sajida. Talfah was born in Tikrit and combined military and political careers in Iraq. In 1977, when still a colonel, through Saddam Hussein's pressure he became a member of the Regional Leadership of the Baʿth party and of the Revolutionary Command Council, as well as minister of defense. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), he played a major role in mediating between the civilian leadership and the military. In 1988 his relations with Saddam Hussein became strained through a family dispute. In May 1989 he was killed in a helicopter crash amid rumors of foul play on the part of Saddam.

See also HUSSEIN, SADDAM.

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AMATZIA BARAM

TALIʿA, AL-

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES

TALIBAN

Islamic fundamentalist group in Afghanistan.

The Taliban appeared in Afghanistan in late 1994. In September 1996 they took Kabul and hanged Najibullah, Afghanistan's Soviet-sponsored president. Subsequently, they banned female access to education and employment, and imposed draconian Islamic laws that called for severe punishments, including the stoning to death of proven adulterers and the amputating of thieves' hands and feet. The Taliban's Islamic fundamentalism was a kind of transnational street force that had the potential to topple established governments through agitation, or to terrorize even much larger nations. Increasingly, fear of Islamic fundamentalism replaced the old dread of communism in the United States.

The term *taliban* is derived from the Persian and Pashtun plural of the Arabic word *talib* ("seeker of knowledge"). Before 1947, Afghan religious students studied in India, and when it was partitioned, they went to Pakistan. Their favorite *madrasa* in India was the Dar al-Ulum (House of Sciences) of the University of Deoband in Uttar Pradesh, which was established in 1862. It was known for its anti-Western orientation and stood for the independence of a united India. The Deoband Dar al-Ulum trained young, working- and lower-middle-class Muslims, who received a traditional religious education and joined the ranks of "big" and "small" mullahs in *masajid* (mosques).

Intellectually, the Taliban are heirs to the traditional affinity between the Deoband Dar al-Ulum and the Afghan *ulama* (Islamic scholars). After 1947, *ulama* in Pakistan established Houses of Science (Diyar al-Ulum) in all the provinces of Pakistan. The number of graduates of different levels of education from these institutions, especially from 1982 to 1987, was impressive. The Taliban leaders were the product of these theological seminaries. Their education is frozen in time: All Sunni theological institutions' curricula are based upon the curriculum established by the eighteenth-century scholar Mullah Nizam-ud-Din, who flourished during the period of Aurangzeb (d. 1707). This curriculum comprises:

1. Arabic grammar;
2. syntax;
3. rhetoric;
4. philosophy of logic;
5. dialectical theology *(ilm al-kalam)*;
6. Qurʾanic exegesis *(tafsir)*;
7. Islamic jurisprudence *(fiqh)*;
8. roots of Islamic jurisprudence *(usul al-fiqh)*;
9. accounts of sayings and deeds by the Prophet and immediate followers *(hadith)*; and
10. some mathematics.

The Taliban's educational system emphasized *taqlid,* the following of traditional Islam, which neglected modern scientific training. They divided the world into *Dar al-Islam* (the Muslim states, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan,

which had recognized their rule) and *Dar al-Harb* (the non-Muslim states, which were projected as the enemies of Islam and Muslims). This bifurcation of the world into external enemies and permanent friends generated an exceptionally intolerant mind-set, which distinguished the Taliban's educational system.

The Taliban's political structure was based, according to them, on that of the four "rightly guided" caliphs (632–662) who succeeded the prophet Muhammad. The Taliban were "committed to establishing an exemplary Islamic rule" for the world, and especially for the Muslim states. Emulating the early caliphate, the Taliban created a supreme council (Majles al-Shura) of twenty individuals. Almost 1,500 Sunni *ulama* who represented various ethnic tribes elected young Mullah Muhammad Omar *amir al-muʾminin* ("commander of the faithful"). The majority of the council members were Pashtuns; fourteen of them had suffered corporeal loss while fighting against the Soviet Union (Mullah Omar, for example, lost an eye). Because of the Pashtun ethnic origin of the Taliban, their jihad became a struggle for power against the Tajiks in the Panjsher Valley and the Uzbeks in the north.

During the 1980s, Osama bin Ladin established guerrilla warfare bases in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, bin Ladin turned his attention to the United States. On 11 September 2001 his terrorists attacked the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C. In retaliation, the United States invaded Afghanistan, eliminated the Taliban's rule, and destroyed bin Ladin's terror infrastructure.

See also Afghanistan; Bin Ladin, Osama; Dar al-Ulum; Najibullah; Omar, Muhammad (Mullah); Sunni Islam.

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Hafeez Malik

TALLAL, CHAIBIA

[1929–]

Moroccan painter.

Chaibia Tallal is a self-taught painter who was "discovered" and encouraged by Pierre Gaudibert, director of the Museum of Modern Art in Grenoble, France. She gained recognition in Europe and in the Arab world for her bright paintings, done in what has been called a naive style. Chaibia (who is known by her first name) was born in the village of Chtouka and came to the suburbs of Casablanca as a girl but counts her experience in the village as formative. Her memories of being unusual in her community, of making things with flowers and covering herself with them, and of a dream that motivated her to paint help explain how a woman who was not born into the urban life of art and intellectuals came to be an internationally celebrated artist. Chaibia is primarily a colorist who has been described as capturing the vibrancy of Moroccan life and landscape. Like Matisse's Moroccan work, her paintings feature human figures and flora and fauna rendered in expressive, often broad, brushstrokes and fields of rich color. Chaibia has exhibited throughout Europe, mainly in Paris, and also participated in the Havana Biennial. In 1984 one of her paintings served as the poster for the Contemporary Women's International Art Exhibition in France.

See also Art; Gender: Gender and Education; Morocco.

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Jessica Winegar

TALL AL-ZAʿTAR REFUGEE CAMP

Refugee camp in East Beirut, Lebanon.

Built in 1950 by UNRWA (United National Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East), Tall al-Zaʿtar's Palestinian and South Lebanese population exceeded thirty thousand refugees by the early 1970s. In perhaps the bloodiest battle of the Lebanese Civil War that started in

1975, members of the Christian Phalange laid siege to the camp 22 June 1976. Thousands of residents are believed to have been killed during the siege and the mass killings that followed the Phalangist victory 12 August. The remaining population of the camp was transferred to West Beirut. The Phalangists' intent is believed to have been the expulsion of all non-Christians, and particularly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), from East Beirut. The Christian militias had largely avoided direct confrontations with the PLO until the Syrian army entered the war in Lebanon on the Christian side 31 May 1976. The PLO defended the camp for fifty-two days before it fell with the help of Syrian artillery.

See also PHALANGE.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

TALL, MUSTAFA WAHBI AL-

[1899–1949]

Jordan's most famous poet.

Mustafa Wahbi al-Tall's use of colloquial expressions in his poetry plus mentions of geographical places helped establish a unique Jordanian literary tradition in the Arabic language. Despite numerous positions in the government of Jordan, his populist politics and anti-establishment behavior landed him in prison or exile on several occasions. He is also the father of the Jordanian politician Wasfi al-Tall.

See also TALL, WASFI AL-.

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

TALL, WASFI AL-

[1920–1971]

Prime minister of Jordan (1962–1963, 1965–1967, 1970–1971).

Wasfi al-Tall was born in Irbid, in northern Jordan. After being educated at the American University of Beirut, he served as an officer in Britain's army (1942–1945), then joined Jordan's civil service, rising to the rank of ambassador to Iraq (1961–1962). Tall was expelled from Baghdad for alleged subversive activities against the regime of Abd al-Karim Qasim; he was also channeling funds to the anti-Nasser Syrian Social Nationalist party in Lebanon.

Tall formed his first cabinet in January 1962 and embarked on an efficiency campaign in the civil service and attempted to promote economic development. He also launched a policy designed to show that Jordan was the true repository of Palestinian aspirations; it was a failure.

A Jordan–Saudi Arabia summit in August 1962 resulted in an agreement to coordinate foreign policy. When a coup took place in Yemen in October 1962, resulting in the proclamation of the Yemen Arab Republic, Jordan and Saudi Arabia backed the insurgents under Imam al-Badr. In November 1962, Tall supervised parliamentary elections in which political parties were banned. Baʿathist coups in Baghdad in February 1963 and in Damascus in March 1963 led Iraq and Syria to launch unity talks with Egypt. A shift in policy was required, so Tall resigned at the end of March.

In February 1965, Tall began his second term as prime minister. He helped King Hussein ibn Talal reactivate the entente with Saudi Arabia, and on 9 August 1965, a treaty was signed delimiting borders between the two countries. Jordan joined an alliance of Islamic states organized by Saudi Arabia and directed against Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.

Al-Fatah raids into Israel began. Under pressure from the Arab League, Jordan agreed to set up "summer camps for military training and moral guidance" for Palestinian recruits. In June 1966, King Hussein said there could be no cooperation with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Tall prevented elections for the PLO National Council.

Tall closed the PLO office in Amman and expelled Ahmad Shuqayri, head of the PLO. In retaliation for an operation by al-Fatah guerrillas supported by Syria, Israel launched a raid against

Jordan, demolishing the village of Sammu on 13 November 1966. Residents of the West Bank and refugee camps hated Tall because of his disbanding of the National Guard, which had been stationed in frontier villages. Under the press law of 1 February 1967, instigated by Tall, all existing papers and periodicals were closed down, and newly licensed publications had to have 25 percent government ownership. Tall resigned in March 1967 and was appointed chief of the royal court, in which position he tried unsuccessfully to keep Jordan out of the Arab–Israel War of 1967.

Tall began his third term as prime minister on 26 September 1970. The following day, King Hussein and PLO chairman Yasir Arafat signed an agreement in Cairo that called for the withdrawal of Palestinian guerrillas from the cities but allowed them to continue the battle against Israel from the countryside. Tall and the military, however, devised a plan to drive the guerrillas out of Amman, Irbid, Jarash, and Ajlun. It was all over by 18 June 1971. In revenge, during a visit to Cairo in September 1971, Tall was assassinated by the Black September Group.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Arafat, Yasir; Black September; Fatah, al-; Hussein ibn Talal; Jordanian Civil War (1970–1971); League of Arab States; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Qasim, Abd al-Karim; Shuqayri, Ahmad.

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Jenab Tutunji

TALMUD

The Jewish teachings of the sages.

The Pentateuch *(Torah),* Prophets *(Nevi'im),* and Hagiographa *(Ketuvim)* constitute the written law of Judaism. Over the years, that law was discussed, interpreted, and transferred. These teachings of the sages are known as the oral law. Eventually, the oral law *(torah she-b'al peh)* was written down and formed the basis of the Talmud. While *torah* refers only to the written law and *talmud* to the oral law, both terms essentially carry the same meaning: teaching or study. Since it is incumbent upon the children of Israel to follow the path of their ancestors, it is necessary for the Jewish people to continually teach and study the law until they understand and follow it completely.

Scholars differ as to when the Talmud began to be written down and whether it was based on notes or recorded upon its completion. It is generally accepted that Rabbi Yehuda ha-Nasi (170–219 C.E.) compiled and edited the first section of the Talmud, the Mishnayot (pl. of *mishna,* or teaching, to distinguish it from Torah) from a multitude of manuscripts, perhaps in different dialects and languages.

The Mishnayot are organized into six sections, or *sedarim,* each dealing with a particular subject. The sections are then subdivided into tracts (or *mesekhtot,* singular *mesekhta*) that deal with matters relating to those sections. The sections are: Seeds (or *Zera'im,* which includes laws relating to vegetables; offerings; tithes; and *shmitta,* the sabbatical year); Festivals (or *Mo'ed,* holidays; the Sabbath; and more general laws affected by the festivals); Women (or *Nashim,* including marriage and divorce); Damages (or *Nezikin,* laws of property; penalties; and morals); Sacred Things (or *Kodashim,* sacrifices; laws of the first born; and slaughtering); Purifications (or *Tohorot,* defilement and purification in general; and defilement of vessels, tents, and menstruating women).

The Mishnayot were imparted with a degree of sanctity that dictated that nothing could be added to or subtracted from them. Upon their completion, religious colleges were established in Palestine and Babylonia to explain their meaning and to extrapolate the laws that emanated from them. This task was complicated by contradictory Mishnayot and by

the discovery of new texts that had not been incorporated in the Mishnayot. The body of knowledge that developed from the discussions and the explanations of the Mishna came to be called *Gemara* (Aramaic for *teaching*). The tractates of the Gemara are arranged like the sections of the Mishnayot. The Mishna opens the tractate and is followed by the Gemara. The Mishna and the Gemara together constitute the Talmud.

At the time of Rabbi Yehuda ha-Nasi's death, the Roman-dominated Middle East was characterized by political strife, which led many Jews to leave Galilee for Persian-ruled Babylon. The development of the Talmud continued there. The Palestinian Talmud, also known as the Jerusalem Talmud *(Talmud Yerushalmi),* was finalized in about 400 C.E. (although it might have been much later). The Babylonian Talmud (*Talmud Bavli,* which might have developed without its formulators knowing about the Jerusalem Talmud) was finalized in about 500 C.E. Although the Jerusalem Talmud includes more tracts (thirty-nine to the Babylonian's thirty-seven), it is considerably smaller (about one-fourth the size) and less elaborate, especially in the field of religious law *(Halakhah).* It is stronger in *Aggadah,* a collection of legends and stories, proverbs, parables, and mystic and veiled religious wisdom. The Babylonian Talmud, with its emphasis on religious law, became the dominant focus of study. This was partially determined by the political situation, which allowed the Jews in exile to study the Talmud to a greater degree than Jews could in Palestine. It is the Babylonian Talmud that continues to dominate today.

Talmudic rulings have served as the basis for religious law in Judaism throughout the generations. A vast rabbinic literature now exists based on discussions and analyses stemming from Talmudic discourse. Whereas elementary school education includes the study of the Pentateuch and Prophets, advanced religious education in higher *yeshivot* (Torah seminaries) concentrates on the study of the Talmud. Religious traditionalists reject the scientific approach to the study of the Talmud, which has developed in the university. Many similarly reject the desire of a small but increasing number of Orthodox women who wish to take part in intensive religious study, believing that only men are allowed to learn this sacred text.

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BENJAMIN JOSEPH
UPDATED BY EPHRAIM TABORY

TAMI

See ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

TAMIMAHS

Paramount shaykhs of larger Omani tribal groupings.

Tamimahs are selected from an elite family within the tribe, and their main functions are to resolve disputes and provide a focus of leadership among lineages within the tribe. The title implies complete or total authority to the extent that the bearer has the power to impose the death penalty on a tribesman, although this is rarely the case at the tribal level in Oman.

CALVIN H. ALLEN, JR.

TAMIMI, AMIN AL-

[1892–1944]

Palestinian politician.

Born to a Muslim family in Nablus, Palestine, Amin al-Tamimi studied in Istanbul, where he encountered Arab literary and political circles before World War I. After the war, he served as an adviser to the regime of the Syrian king, Faisal I ibn Hussein, in Damascus and joined delegations to Istanbul and to Lausanne in 1922 to seek Turkish support for Arab independence. He was a leader of the Nablus Muslim–Christian Association, and a member of the Supreme Muslim Council of the *mufti* (interpreter of the law of Islam) in Jerusalem from 1926 to 1938.

Tamimi went to Iraq in 1939 and participated in the 1941 Rashid Ali al-Kaylani revolt of pan-Arabism against Britain. The British then interned him in Rhodesia, where he died. He was proclaimed a martyr in the streets of Jerusalem. His son Adnan, an Iraqi citizen, was a United Nations official until 1983.

See also Faisal I ibn Hussein; Kaylani, Rashid Ali al-; Pan-Arabism.

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Elizabeth Thompson

TAMIR, SHMUEL

[1923–]

Israeli politician and attorney.

Shmuel Tamir was born in Jerusalem as Shmuel Katsnelson. He was influenced by the 1929 Hebron massacre, during which sixty Orthodox Jews were murdered by Arab rioters. The rioters were themselves reacting to a demonstration by Jews who demanded access to the Western Wall in Jerusalem, At age fifteen he joined Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi. He was arrested in 1947 and deported to Kenya, where he was allowed to take his final law examinations. Returning to Israel after it became a state, he changed his name to Shmuel Tamir (his underground name) and was active in the Herut movement, where he was viewed as a natural heir to Menachem Begin.

He established a reputation as an outstanding attorney and was involved in some well-known cases, including the Kasztner trial in 1954, in which Reszo Kasztner brought suit against Malkiel Grunwald, who had accused Kasztner of being a traitor and causing the deaths of many Jews by negotiating with the Nazis. As Grunwald's attorney, Tamir framed the trial as being about Kasztner rather than Grunwald. The judge, Benjamin Halevi, accepted most of Tamir's arguments and accused Kasztner of having "sold his soul to the devil." Before the verdict was handed down, Kasztner was murdered by nationalist extremists who took Halevi's words literally. In the end, the court exonerated Kasztner on all charges except that he had helped Nazis escape from justice.

Tamir was a member of sixth through ninth Knessets, representing several different parties, including Gahal, the Free Center, Likud, and the Democratic Movement for Change. In 1977, when Tamir joined the Democratic Movement for Change, he was appointed minister of justice under Begin. In 1981, he left politics and returned to his legal practice.

See also Begin, Menachem; Irgun, Zvaʾi Leʾumi (IZL); Israel: Political Parties in; Likud.

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Julie Zuckerman
Updated by Gregory Mahler

TAMMUZ, BENYAMIN

[1919–1989]

Israeli novelist and journalist.

Benyamin Tammuz was born in Kharkov, in the Ukraine, and emigrated to Palestine in 1924. Throughout his life he worked for various newspapers, including *Haaretz.* Tammuz was a founding member of the Canaanite movement, which advocated the creation of a Hebrew, rather than a Jewish, state in Israel. This association undoubtedly influenced his earlier works, which were republished as *Angioxyl, Terufah Nedirah* (1973; A rare cure, 1981). He left the movement following a stay in Europe, which brought him into close contact with European Jews. Tammuz served as cultural attaché at the Israeli embassy in London in 1971.

In his works, Tammuz criticizes Israeli society's loss of soul and its lack of normalcy. *Requiem Le-Naʿaman* (1978; Requiem for Naʿaman, 1982) is considered his most forceful work. He deals with the seemingly intractable Arab-Israel conflict in his metaphorical *Ha-Pardes* (1971; The orchard, 1984)

and in *Taharut Sehiya* (1952; Swimming race, 1953). In his *Mishlei Baqbuqim* (1975, Proverbs of bottles), Tammuz addresses Israel's lack of spirituality, while in *Pundaqo Shel Yirmiyahu* (1984, Jeremiah's inn), he satirizes the involvement of the ultra-orthodox in Israeli politics.

ANN KAHN

TAN

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

TANBURI CEMIL

[1871–1916]

Ottoman Turkish musician and composer.

Tanburi Cemil was born in Istanbul into a family of musicians. He enrolled in the Mulukhiyya but left before finishing his studies and began to study music. By his death at the age of forty-five, he was considered the foremost Turkish virtuoso. Although he was most well known for playing the *tanbur* (guitar), an instrument he had mastered as a child, Tanburi Cemil was equally proficient on the *kemençe* (a small three-stringed violin) and the *lavta* (lute). Tanburi Cemil's compositions, characterized by a refined sensitivity, are considered among the masterpieces of Turkish music. Among his best-known works are *Ferahfeza Saz Semaisi, Mahur Peşrevi, Muhayyer Saz Semaisi,* and *Hicazkar Saz Semaisi.*

DAVID WALDNER

TANER, HALDUN

[1916–1986]

Turkish writer.

The son of a university professor, Haldun Taner was born in Istanbul, where he attended Galatasaray Lycée. He studied political science at Heidelberg University in 1938 and later studied literature in Istanbul. He then taught literature and art history for a number of years at the Journalism Institute and at the Ankara Language, History, and Geography School. Taner became popular in the 1950s for his short stories about the urban middle class, which have been translated from Turkish into more than a dozen languages. He worked as a journalist and in 1960 became editor-in-chief of the Istanbul daily *Tercüman.*

Taner also made his mark in the theater world, joining a young generation of playwrights in the 1950s who addressed the tensions between traditional values and the demands of modern life. He drew on the epic traditions of Turkey for his play *The Ballad of Ali from Keshan,* which was also made into a film. He won a prize with Orhan Kemal in 1957 for their screenplay *Ferhat, the Mountain Lover.* Taner also founded a private theater, the Devekusu Kabare Tiyatrosu.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

TANGIER, TREATY OF

Franco-Moroccan agreement of 10 September 1844.

The Treaty of Tangier followed the defeat of the Moroccan army at the Battle of Isly by a French force pursuing the Algerian resistance leader Abd al-Qadir, who had frequently sought refuge in Moroccan territory. The treaty obligated the Moroccan government to consider Abd al-Qadir an outlaw and to offer him no assistance.

See also ABD AL-QADIR.

KENNETH J. PERKINS

TANIN

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

TANPINAR, AHMED HAMDI

[1901–1962]

Turkish professor and author.

The son of a *qadi* (judge), Ahmed Hamdi Tanpinar was born in Istanbul and moved with his father to various cities of the Ottoman Empire. He graduated from the Antalya secondary school and studied at the Faculty of Literature, where he was a student of Yahya Kemal. After graduating in 1923, he taught at secondary schools, including the Fine Arts Academy, until 1939, when he was appointed professor of modern Turkish Literature at Istanbul University.

He wrote a major volume on post-Tanzimat-era Turkish literature, a monograph on Tevfik Fikret, and a series of critical essays.

Tanpinar also wrote poetry, novels, and short stories. In his novels, he studied the era from the Crimean War (1854) to World War II (1939), portraying developments within Turkish society and the fate of traditional ties in a modernizing society. In 1942, Tanpinar was elected to the parliament, representing Maraş.

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David Waldner

TANTAWI, MUHAMMAD SAYYID AL-

[1928–]

Shaykh of al-Azhar.

Born in Suhaj in Upper Egypt, Muhammad Sayyid al-Tantawi earned a Ph.D. in Qur'anic Exegesis and *Hadith* (sayings of the Prophet) from al-Azhar University in 1966. In 1976 he became a professor; ten years later he became dean of the Islamic and Arabic Studies faculty and was appointed the grand mufti, Egypt's highest religious juristic authority. In 1996 he was appointed shaykh of al-Azhar, making him the forty-third shaykh of al-Azhar. Muslims seek his advice on new controversial matters.

As a mufti, Tantawi issued opinions representing the views of the government. His *fatawa* (legal opinions) have mostly been at odds with those of al-Azhar. But once he became shaykh of al-Azhar, he began oscillating between the opinions he issued as mufti and pronouncements more faithful to al-Azhar. He is under constant pressure from religious scholars to follow al-Azhar's conservative line of thinking. Many civil and human-rights organizations welcomed the appointment of this liberal shaykh to the top religious post in Egypt, but his *fatwa* prohibiting the boycott of U.S. goods brought about major protests by Christians as well as Muslims. The powerful and conservative Front for the Scholars of al-Azhar, founded in 1946, had been critical of Tantawi since he became mufti, challenging him on his giving permission to deal with banks based on interest, his prohibition of suicide attacks committed by HAMAS in Palestine, his meeting the chief rabbi of Israel, and his reduction of secondary education to three years. He was able to get the government to dissolve the Front in 1998, and he fired many outspoken scholars from al-Azhar.

On the touchy issue of female circumcision, Tantawi, as the mufti, argued against its validity. However, as shaykh of al-Azhar he gave in to the Azharite establishment. Later, when the Ministry of Health banned the practice, Tantawi changed his view again. Also, as a mufti, Tantawi viewed the *hijab* (head cover) as a woman's choice, but as shaykh, he upheld the Azhar view that it was mandatory. But on the issue of organ transplants, he held to his original position, and promised to donate his own organs after his death. On the political level, when Tantawi became shaykh, his political views became more obvious. For instance, he asked Muslims to launch jihad (holy war) against Israel to prevent the Judaization of Jerusalem, and to defuse religious sectarian tensions in Egypt, he met with Pope Shenouda III and other Christian personalities. These changes of opinion seem to be the result of both political expediency and an attempt to serve the interests of the Egyptian government.

See also Azhar, al-.

Ahmad S. Moussalli

TANZIMAT

Mid-nineteenth-century Ottoman reform movement.

The Tanzimat-i Hayriye (Auspicious Reorganization) was a series of governmental reforms between 1839 and 1876 that sought to centralize and rationalize Ottoman rule and capture more tax revenues for the military defense of the empire. The Tanzimat period is usually associated with particular personalities in the central government: the sultans Abdülmecit II and Abdülaziz, and the high-ranking bureaucrats Mustafa Reşid Paşa, Ali Paşa, and Fuad Paşa. The Tanzimat was preceded by earlier reform efforts since the eighteenth century, particularly by Abdülmecit I and Abdülaziz's father, Mahmud II,

between 1808 and 1839. And it would be followed by reforms in the early reigns of Abdülhamit II and the Young Turks.

Order and Justice

The thirty-seven years of the Tanzimat period are significant in this long process for establishing the basic principles and the governmental apparatus of reform. The bywords of the movement were justice and order, which were seen as prerequisites to effecting substantial social and economic change. The major product of the movement was a huge increase in the power of the central state. The major edicts of the Tanzimat significantly enlarged the scope of government activity by creating new fiscal, legal, and administrative instruments. For example, the edict that inaugurated the Tanzimat, the 1839 Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane, proposed replacing inefficient tax farms with a centralized revenue service and establishing a new imperial council, the Meclis-i Vala, to formulate and direct reform policy. Subsequent edicts sought to promote justice and confidence in government, such as those of 1840, 1850, and 1870 to 1876 that laid out uniform codes of law for commerce, civil transactions, and criminal cases. A series of provincial reforms culminating in the 1864 Vilayet Law regularized the structure of local government and strengthened lines of authority to Constantinople (now Istanbul). And in the capital itself, government was reorganized into formal departments and specialized ministries. During the Tanzimat period, the Ottoman state also began to intervene in society in new ways. The 1839 Gülhane edict and other laws expanded military conscription. And the state established new elite secular schools. The 1869 Regulation of Public Instruction introduced an empire-wide school system intended to produce bureaucrats and military officers at every level of government equipped with the skills necessary to implement policy.

Defense and International Affairs

But the Tanzimat was not solely a project of administrative reform. Its goals of order and justice were often ancillary to other, more immediate goals. The 1839 Gülhane edict was issued when the Ottomans were fighting to regain territory captured by Egypt in 1832. Greece had already won its independence in 1839, and in the Crimean War (1853–1856) the Ottomans would again go to war with Russia. Hence, the 1839 edict would promise to continue the military buildup begun by Mahmud II to defend the empire from external threats. The military was reorganized in 1842 and 1869, producing a larger, more unified structure under the *serasker,* a combined chief of staff and war minister. And many other reforms were explicitly intended to raise more revenue for defense.

Tanzimat goals were further complicated by international affairs with the growing influence of France and England in the empire. The Ottomans sought European alliances for protection against Russian and Egyptian invasions. This alliance was bought at a price. For their own domestic reasons, and to further their interests in the empire, France and England pushed another set of often contradictory goals. While the Europeans advocated equal rights and democratic participation in the empire, they also acted to protect the privileges and separate status of non-Muslim millets. So, while the Gülhane edict and the 1856 Hatt-i Hümayun proclaimed equality of all citizens regardless of religion, and new secular courts were established to offset any prejudice in *shariʿa* (Islamic law) courts, in fact, society remained divided by religion in subcommunities with separate legal and social institutions.

Economic Concerns

Missing from the great initiatives of the Tanzimat was serious fiscal and economic reform. Roger Owen explains the neglect of economic reform thus: "Limited financial resources, the lack of competent administrators, the growing technological gap between Europe and the rest of the world, and the constraints imposed by Turkey's social structure and weakened international position all combined to set strict limits on the types of economic politics pursued" (Owen, p. 116). Restricted in their development of policy, the Ottomans were also plagued by the misfortune that they were attempting reform precisely during a period of economic boom in France and England.

The Tanzimat coincided with the first wave of industrial imperialism. France and England used their diplomatic influence in Constantinople to facilitate imperialist expansion at the expense of economic reform within the empire. For example, the

1838 Anglo-Turkish commercial convention, which preceded British support in fighting Egypt, promoted the spread of European imports in Ottoman markets. In the 1850s and 1860s, the British and French established new kinds of investment banks equipped to funnel domestic savings into overseas loans and projects. These banks played no small part in encouraging Ottoman indebtedness. The first foreign loan was taken out in 1854, for 3 million British pounds, to pay war expenses. Twenty years later, the Ottoman government would devote more than half of its budget to servicing foreign loans totaling 242 million British pounds.

The Tanzimat reforms had not yet produced a government apparatus capable of mounting an economic defense. For example, attempts to increase collection of taxes (and avoid foreign loans) faltered without trained personnel until well after 1859, when the Mekteb-i Mülkiye school to train bureaucrats was established. And although the 1858 land code sought to encourage more efficient exploitation of agriculture by promoting private land ownership, poor administration derailed it. In many areas, wealthy absentee landowners succeeded in registering large tracts of land, taking control away from the peasants who, if they had owned the land, might have found incentive to improve efficiency in cultivation. Instead, sharecropping discouraged investment in the land.

This is not to say that there was no effort at economic development, but rather that these efforts were overwhelmed by external factors. The Tanzimat period saw the first boom in building roads, ports, and other economic infrastructure that facilitated the transport of goods. But the tariff structure made the new transport more profitable to foreign traders than domestic merchants. While Ottoman exports increased nearly 500 percent between 1840 and the 1870s, these exports represented less than 10 percent of total production in the empire and were largely in the form of raw agricultural materials sent to England and France. In the meantime, the empire's terms of trade with Europe actually worsened. Ottoman industry, especially textiles, was undermined by unprecedented foreign competition. Although Ottoman officials established an industrial reform commission in the 1860s, they produced no significant industrial policy. So while Ottoman port cities boomed in this period, producing the first bloom of bourgeois culture, their wealth came from the profits of international trade, not from local production. The empire still relied overwhelmingly on an agricultural economy, and peasants remained as destitute as ever. And despite pockets of prosperity, the empire as a whole would sink so far into debt that it would declare bankruptcy in 1875.

It would be misguided, however, to conclude that the Tanzimat was the handmaiden of European imperialism. Older theories that it was primarily European pressure that forced the Tanzimat on the "sick man of Europe" have been substantially revised. Scholars like Shaw and Ortayli have suggested that the main impetus for reform came from bureaucrats, most prominently Mustafa Reşid Paşa, author of the 1839 edict. They acted from alarm at internal corruption and weakness, as well as from the desire to advance their own interests and protect their rights against the power of the sultan. Hence the 1839 edict abolished the sultan's right to confiscate property, commonly practiced on bureaucrats. Disenchanted bureaucrats led a second reform movement, the Young Ottomans, who in the 1860s and 1870s advocated liberalization and curtailment of the sultan's power. This led to a coup in 1876 that established a short-lived constitution and parliament.

European Influences and Internal Motivations

European influence, while not a primary motive of reform, was nonetheless significant. French and British diplomats repeatedly contributed to drafts of the various Tanzimat reform edicts, particularly those issued in times of war, as in the 1839 expulsion of the Egyptians and in 1856, at the end of the Crimean War. And Ottoman reformers often turned to European institutions for inspiration, as in the 1864 restructuring of provincial administration, the 1868 Council of State, and the 1869 Education Law, all modeled on French institutions.

Finally, a motive for reform came from the peoples of the empire. Dissatisfaction with Ottoman military weakness and a growing perception of alternatives to the current regime promoted unrest. This included not only the often cited Balkan nationalist movements, but smaller intermittent outbreaks, like the 1860 riots in Mount Lebanon and

in Damascus that grew out of economic upheaval. Religious leaders, too, organized protest, as in the 1859 Küeli Incident in Constantinople. And religious minorities agitated against the oppressive and often corrupt rule of their state-sponsored patriarchs, leading to reform of the millets in the 1860s. Provincial notables used the local councils established in 1840 as a forum for protest and as a vehicle for negotiating the path of reform.

Design and Implementation of Efforts

In assessing the success of the Tanzimat, it is important to recognize that it was not a coherent, prefabricated plan; the Gülhane proclamation was not a blueprint. The Tanzimat took shape through efforts in Constantinople and in the provinces of Ottoman officials and notables to reconcile the many pressures on the empire. In Istanbul, the Meclİs-İ Vala, in concert with the grand vizier and sultan, had to weigh a variety of simultaneous and often conflicting interests, including military challengers like the Russians, Egyptians, and separatist movements in the Balkans; entrenched interests like those of landowners and the religious hierarchy; and the expanding aims of France and England. In the provinces, local representative councils and governors faced their own spectrum of interests to satisfy: landowners, *ulama* (Islamic clergy) who resented the new secular courts and schools, artisans hurt by European imports, and peasants who could not pay the new taxes.

Tanzimat goals were thus formulated and implemented through bargains made among opposing forces. Policy steered between the simultaneous aims of central control and provincial autonomy, between the ideal of a universal and equal Ottoman citizenry and reality of divisive religious social structures and nationalist particularisms, between the need to appease international challenges and the need to protect domestic interests, and between the efficacy of autocratic, top-down reform and the equally necessary participation of the public in effecting change.

Summary of Accomplishments

In the end, the reform program succeeded most in its goal of order: reorganizing the central and provincial bureaucracy, restructuring the military, and building infrastructure for trade and transport. Less auspicious was its progress toward justice; while law codes were rationalized and venality in office reduced through improved salaries, economic inequalities increased and political participation remained minimal. The concentration of power in Constantinople lent itself to abuse. The Tanzimat period would conclude with a far more effective administrative and legal apparatus, but one that would be commandeered by an autocratic sultan, with the accession of Abdülhamit II in 1876. And in some ways, the Tanzimat was too little, too late. Efforts to strengthen the military and to integrate a population riven with religious and ethnic differences would not proceed quickly enough to avert the dismemberment of the Balkan provinces and the disastrous Russo-Turkish War of 1877/78.

The Tanzimat was, however, a bold and often impressive attempt to restructure the Ottoman polity; it simply did not have the time or opportunity by 1876 to effect significant social and economic change. Much of what the Tanzimat started, however, would bear fruit under Abdülhamit, who continued the Tanzimat's pursuit of order. And while Abdülhamit would leave behind other significant aspects of the Tanzimat, like justice and political participation, these would be taken up again with the rise of a new generation trained in the Tanzimat's schools and the 1908 constitutional revolution.

See also MILLET SYSTEM; YOUNG OTTOMANS.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

TAQLA, PHILIPPE
[1915–]

Lebanese politician and banker.

Philippe Taqla was born into a well-established Greek Catholic family with a long history of involvement in Lebanese politics. His father, Salim Taqla, was a minister in the cabinet that amended the Lebanese constitution and was, as a result, jailed by the French on 8 November 1943. He was released on 22 November 1943. A member of Bishara al-Khuri's Constitutional Bloc party, Philippe Taqla became a minister for the first time in 1946, the year his father died. In 1947, he was elected to parliament, and he held several ministerial positions between 1946 and 1952. His opposition to President Camille Chamoun (1952–1958) kept him out of power for several years, although he was again elected to parliament in 1957.

Under presidents Fu'ad Chehab (1958–1964) and Charles Hilu (1964–1970), he was minister of foreign affairs in eight separate cabinets, for a total of some fifty-seven months—a record by Lebanese standards. From 1965 to 1966, he was head of the Bank of Lebanon. In 1967, he became the permanent representative of Lebanon to the United Nations, and from 1968 to 1971 he was the ambassador to France. During his public career, which spanned the three decades from 1946 to 1976, he belonged to more cabinets than any other Lebanese politician except the late Prince Majid Arslan. From 1975 to 1976, he was a member of the Syrian-sponsored National Dialogue Committee, which unsuccessfully sought to put an end to the civil war that had just broken out. The war ended Taqla's public career. Since the end of the Lebanese civil war, Taqla has been serving on the board of one of Lebanon's largest commercial banks, BLOM Bank (Banque du Liban et d'Outre-Mer).

See also CHEHAB, FU'AD; CONSTITUTIONAL BLOC; HILU, CHARLES; KHURI, BISHARA AL-; LEBANESE CIVIL WAR (1975–1990); LEBANON.

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GUILIAN P. DENOEUX
UPDATED BY KHALIL GEBARA

TAQLID

See GLOSSARY

TARBUSH

See CLOTHING

TARHAN, ABDÜLHAK HAMIT
[1852–1937]

Turkish poet, diplomat, and politician.

Abdülhak Hamit Tarhan was born into a wealthy Istanbul family; his grandfather was physician to the sultan of the Ottoman Empire. He was privately tutored, then enrolled in a French school, and after a tour of Europe became one of the first Muslim students to enroll at Robert College (now part of Bosporus University). In 1871, he married into an aristocratic family and served in the empire's embassy in Paris. In 1878, his play *Nestren* was deemed subversive, and he was dismissed. In 1881, he was readmitted to the Ottoman foreign service and was posted abroad (in Paris, Bombay, London, and Belgium) until 1921. This was also his most active period of literary production. In 1922, he returned to Turkey, where he was soon elected to represent Istanbul in the new Turkish Grand National Assembly.

Tarhan was a major writer of the Tanzimat era. His participation in the *Servet-i Fünun* (Wealth of Sciences) movement, with its concern for technique and its valorization of art for its own sake, helped to prepare an environment for the flowering of modern literature in Turkey. The sheer extent of his output—the drama *Finten* is five hundred pages—is more remarkable than the quality of his prose,

with its mixed meters and bombastic language. Tarhan is not widely read today.

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DAVID WALDNER

TARIKH TOLANA

The Afghan Historical Society.

Tarikh Tolana (Long History) is the Afghan name for the Historical Society of Afghanistan. Tarikh Tolana was founded in 1941 by Zahir Shah to promote the historical study of Afghanistan. Tarikh Tolana produced many publications, including the journals *Aryana* and *Afghanistan. Aryana* appeared in Pushto and Dari from 1942 to 1985, and *Afghanistan,* also in Dari and Pushto, from 1945 to 1975. The society later became part of the Afghan Academy of Science. The society fell into disarray as Afghanistan disintegrated in civil war in the 1980s and although it has never officially been disbanded, it no longer functions.

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GRANT FARR

TARIKI, ABDULLAH

[1919–]

Cofounder of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and prominent Saudi government minister during the 1950s and 1960s.

Born in 1919 in the Najd town of Zilfi and educated in Cairo and at the University of Texas, Abdullah Tariki was a prominent figure among Saudi Arabia's first generation of technocrats. He became head of the Directorate of Oil and Mining Affairs in 1955 and was instrumental in guiding Saudi domestic and international oil policies. In 1959, Tariki met with Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso of Venezuela and representatives of Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait in order to establish a consultative commission designed to regulate oil prices, establish national companies, and oppose the fifty-fifty participation agreements with Western oil companies that characterized oil concessions of the day. This informal group coalesced into the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on 14 September 1960, after Western oil companies initiated a price cut without consulting with nationals of the oil-producing countries.

Because of his opposition to the often overbearing and exploitative practices of U.S. oil companies in Saudi Arabia and his strong support for Arab nationalism, including that of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, Tariki's detractors called him "the Red Shaykh." In 1962, Crown Prince Faisal replaced him with Ahmad Zaki Yamani. From 1962 to 1976, Tariki remained politically active, writing articles and serving as a consultant for petroleum-producing countries, including Muammar al-Qaddafi's Libya. His nationalism and populism led him to denounce Western oil companies and urge Arabs to take full control over their natural resources so they could better advance their societies.

See also NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC); QADDAFI, MUAMMAR AL-.

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LES ORDEMAN
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

TASHILHIT LANGUAGE

Berber dialect spoken in the south of Morocco.

The Berber language as a whole is composed of three dialects: Tashilhit, used in the region of Agadir and

Sous (southwest of Marrakech); Tamazight, widespread in the Middle Atlas and High Atlas mountains in the heart of Morocco; and Tarifit, spoken in the Rif, a region in the north of Morocco. *Tifinagh* is the name given to the writing of Tashilhit.

RAHMA BOURQIA

TAURUS MOUNTAINS

Major mountain chain of southern Turkey.

The Taurus chain is composed of several parallel limestone ranges rimming and reaching the Mediterranean, for about 930 miles (1,500 km), from Muğla in the west to Lake Van in the east. The summits often exceed 10,000 feet (3,000 m), the highest nonvolcanic peak being 12,323 feet (3,756 m)—the Aladağ—north of Adana. The average width of the range is 95 miles (150 km), and it forms a barrier to the Anatolian plateau but provides a valuable source of water for irrigation, forest products, and summer pasture. The most important pass is north of Tarsus, called the Cilician Gates. To the northeast is the extension of the range, called the Anti-Taurus.

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JOHN R. CLARK

TAX FARMING

Means of managing agrarian revenues, as well as of financing governmental programs.

Similar to the contemporary concept of privatization, tax farming is a poorly understood phenomenon in Middle Eastern history. It is often linked to the abuse of state power and debates on the institutional causes of the fall of premodern Islamic states. In essence, however, tax farming refers to any type of tax collection conducted by private individuals rather than salaried state personnel. These individuals acquire the right, often by auction, to collect a defined revenue for a specific period of time. From the Umayyads onward, Islamic states contracted out collection of taxes in proximate and more distant provinces. Tax farming allowed administrators a degree of flexibility and an opportunity to strike a compromise between the old and the new. Indeed, the earliest Islamic administrators of Egypt awarded contracts to Copts and women. Although the powers of tax farmers were contingent on the type of revenue collected, the status of taxpayers, and the degree of state oversight, Islamic governments found ways to curb abuse and default of contract by requiring financial guarantors and subdividing responsibilities. As this form of collection falls under the legal notions of contract, Islamic lawyers usually separate the discussion of tax farming from the actual fiscal responsibilities of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects in terms of alms *(zakat),* tithes *(ushr),* and poll taxes *(jizya).*

There are few comprehensive studies of tax farming during the period between the Abbasids and the Mongols, though Middle Eastern states contracted out to private agents many types of taxes, both those that were Islamically recognized and those that were not. More than an institutional or legal question, tax farming may be regarded as a window on the evolving structure of premodern Islamic states and its relation to society. Because most of the Islamic schools of law regarded conquered land of non-Muslim populations *(kharaj)* to be, effectively, state land, tax farming was utilized alongside the *iqta* or tax fief, a form of resident administration, as an important means of managing agrarian revenues. Pending further research, one may speculate that the alternation between military and privatized forms of tax collection preceding and after the thirteenth-century Mongol invasions was not only the result of corruption of institutions or abuse of office, as the private auction of tax fiefs during the later Mamluk period in Egypt suggests, but also a means of coping with the dislocation of agrarian populations, greater demand for cash revenues, and changing land-use patterns.

Although the forms of tax farming in the Middle East after the sixteenth century have similar legal bases, the practices coincide with new worldwide trends, namely the escalating costs of warfare and expanding global trade. In the Ottoman Empire, for example, tax farming before the sixteenth century had been largely limited to certain commercial revenues and tariffs, and many of the tax farmers were non-Muslims. But as participants in the "gunpowder revolution" and the battle for Europe and

West Asia, the Ottomans required ever greater sources of cash to pay their infantries. Auctions of revenue contracts were a means of borrowing: They allowed the state to anticipate future tax receipts, albeit at a certain loss. Although the Ottoman state continued to administer many taxes directly, over the seventeenth century, many Muslim Ottoman officers and civilians bid for rights to collect taxes on the extensive crown and vizierial domains, tariffs, and manufacturing and tribal taxes, as well as to hold certain offices. A 1695 decree gave Muslim tax farmers the right to hold contracts for life *(malikane mukataa)* and to pass these holdings on to male heirs. Although this extensive use of tax farming produced many problems, it also reinforced the loyalty of Muslim tax farmers, if only by dint of self-interest, to the state, which awarded and recognized these rights.

Since the French Revolution, social scientists have tended to regard fiscal decentralization as one of the ancien régime's greatest evils as did the Ottoman state planners who tried to restrict and then eliminate tax farming in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Despite good intentions, Middle Eastern reformers were frustrated by chronic fiscal shortfalls and lack of administrative staff. No such compunctions about modern statecraft burdened the French colonial regime in Algeria, however. Well into mid-century, French imperialists continued to adapt an older tax-farming system to new political and fiscal purposes.

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Ariel Salzmann

TCHERNICHOVSKY, SAUL
[1875–1943]

Hebrew poet, translator, and physician.

Saul Tchernichovsky (also Tsharnikhousky) was born in Mikhailovka, a village bordering on the Ukraine and Crimea. The most versatile of Hebrew poets, he was instrumental in the development, both in form and content, of Hebrew poetry. He published his first poem, *Ba-Halomi* (1892; In My Dream), at seventeen in the U.S. Hebrew paper *Ha-Pisgah.* His first book of poetry, *Hezyonot U-Manginot* (1898; Visions and Melodies), is romantic in style and deals with love and nature. From 1899 to 1906, he studied medicine in Heidelberg and Lausanne. During this period he wrote the first of his "Greek" poems—an indictment of Judaism's weakness vis-à-vis the vitality of Greek culture. The most powerful of these poems is *Lenokhah Pesel Apollo* (In the Presence of Apollo's Statue). In 1906 he returned to Russia, and until World War I, he held various positions as a doctor. The turbulent period in Russia following the war is described in his collection *Sonnetot Krim* (Crimean Sonnets). His *Lashemesh* (To the Sun), a series of sonnets written beginning in 1919, is in stark contrast to the surrounding darkness. In 1922 he left Russia but, failing to reach Palestine, he settled in Berlin where he translated such classical writers as Goethe, Molière, Shakespeare, and Homer. In 1929 he began to publish a ten-volume jubilee edition of his poetry, short stories, plays, and translations.

In 1931, at the invitation of Dr. A. M. Masie's family, Tchernichovsky arrived in Palestine to complete and edit a medical dictionary begun by the deceased doctor. The result was a trilingual work in Latin, English, and Hebrew, *Sefer Ha-Munahim Li-Refuah U-Lemadaei Ha-Tev'a* (1934, A Book of Terminologies in Medicine and the Natural Sciences). Tchernichovsky first resided in Tel Aviv and then moved to Jerusalem, where he wrote his final works of poetry. In 1937 he published *Kol Shirei Shaul Tcher-*

nichovsky (The Poems of Saul Tchernichovsky). In 1942 the Tel Aviv municipality established a prize in his name for translations of classics and world classical literature with Tchernichovsky as its first recipient. Once in Palestine, his poems became strongly nationalistic, and in the resettlement of Eretz Yisrael, he saw the redemption and rejuvenation of pre-exilic Judaism. He expressed all these sentiments in ballad form, such as in *Amma Dedhahaba* (1943; The Golden People). Tchernichovsky died after a long illness and was buried in Tel Aviv's old cemetery.

ANN KAHN

TEA

A drink for social occasions and after meals.

In the Middle East, tea is a popular drink brewed with the leaves and water in a kettle (although tea bags are becoming more common). Hot tea is strained into small glasses, often set in decorative metal holders, and served with various additions depending on region and personal taste. These include sugar, honey, lemon, apple flavoring, and mint. (Mint tea is also a very popular digestive drink; it is made solely from mint leaves of the genus *Mentha,* which grow throughout the Mediterranean region and Eurasia.)

Tea is imported to the Middle East from the Asian tea plantations of China, Japan, India, Sri Lanka, and islands of the East Indies. It is also cultivated along Iran's Caspian Sea coast and Turkey's Black Sea coast. Originally it came into the region by way of ancient caravan routes along the Silk Road (from China to Iran to the Black Sea and Constantinople) or ship routes from the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean into the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea.

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CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

TEBU TRIBE

See TRIBES AND TRIBALISM: TEBU TRIBE

TECHNION-ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Israeli university.

The Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, located in Haifa, was founded because of the lack of opportunities for technical studies for Jews in places such as Russia. This void meant that Jews were excluded from technical professions and pushed into urban commercial occupations. While the cornerstone was laid in 1912, World War I delayed the opening. The first classes were held in 1924. Hebrew became the language of instruction only after a long "language conflict" over whether German or Hebrew should be used.

There are faculties and departments in aeronautical engineering, agricultural engineering, architecture and town planning, chemical engineering, chemistry, civil engineering, electrical engineering, food and biotechnology, general studies, industrial and management engineering, materials engineering, mathematics, mechanical engineering, mechanics, nuclear sciences, physics, and teacher training. The number of undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in 1999/2000 was 12,700.

MIRIAM SIMON

TEHIYA

See ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

TEHRAN

Capital of Iran since the late eighteenth century.

In 1800, Tehran was a small city with an estimated population of 20,000; it was surrounded by twenty-foot mud walls with four gates. The wall was encircled by a moat, which was up to 40 feet wide and between 20 and 30 feet deep. Although several new buildings were constructed during the reign of Fath Ali Shah Qajar (1797–1834), the first major expansion of Tehran dates from the reign of Naser al-Din Shah (1848–1896), the third Qajar monarch. The old walls were pulled down, plans for an octagonal wall on a French model were followed, and twelve gates were built. New grounds were added to the city compound, as well as large boulevards and imposing

public and private buildings, designed with many European features. The city had a small railway leading to a place of pilgrimage in the south, and the summer resorts in the Alborz Mountains in the north were developed and became popular with richer Tehranis. In 1852, a first census and a count of all the buildings were made, which show how small the city still was: It had only 12,772 buildings, 8,697 houses, and 4,220 shops. The second census, prepared in 1869, gave the population as 150,000.

Tehran's second phase of development dates to the reign (1926–1941) of Reza Shah Pahlavi, founder of the Pahlavi dynasty. The city was expanded outside its old walls, especially to the north and the northwest. A notable feature was the neoclassical buildings, designed mainly by European architects, especially exiles fleeing the Russian Revolution but also Iranians who had studied abroad. Houses began to be built facing outward, to the street, instead of inward, to the courtyard, and streets were planned for the passage of automobiles. The ornate gates, a special feature of old Tehran, were pulled down, as were many buildings of the Qajar dynasty period.

Tehran's third phase of development dates to the early 1950s, when a new generation of Iranian architects and technocrats, who had studied in U.S. universities, returned to erase many of the remaining features of the old city. Tehran began expanding rapidly and haphazardly, because of the petroleum industry, oil-induced construction, and the industrialization boom of the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1956 and 1976, the city's population tripled, from 1.5 million to 4.5 million. Despite the economic, political, and social upheavals caused by the Iranian Revolution (1979) and the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), Tehran's population continued to grow at an average annual rate of 3.5 percent from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s. Thereafter, population growth declined by about 1 percent per year within the city, but nearby towns and rural areas experienced rapid growth as they were developed as suburban communities to the east, south, and west of Tehran. According to the 1996 census, a total of 6,759,000 people lived in the city of Tehran; more than 1.3 million lived in suburbs, including the densely populated communities of Islamshahr and Karaj.

See also Fath Ali Shah Qajar; Iranian Revolution (1979); Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Naser al-Din Shah; Pahlavi, Reza.

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Mansoureh Ettehadieh
Updated by Eric Hooglund

TEKELI, ŞIRIN

[1940–]

A feminist activist in Turkey.

Şirin Tekeli is the foremost feminist author and activist of second-wave feminism in Turkey. Born in 1944, she is the only child of two philosophy teachers. She received her high school education in Ankara and completed her college education in political science in Lausanne University, Switzerland. She studied the work of David Easton for her Ph.D. in political science in Istanbul University, where she was employed as an assistant professor. The thesis she wrote in 1978 for promotion to associate professor was on women's political participation, and prompted her feminist activism. Published in 1982 as a book called *Kadınlar ve Siyasal-Toplumsal Hayat* (Women and political-social life), this study was the first serious and comprehensive discussion of women's marginalization in sociopolitical life written in Turkish and from a predominantly Marxist perspective. Her interviews with Turkish women parliamentarians, which she included in the book, exposed their striking marginality and problems in political life. The book was widely read, moving beyond a narrow academic circle, and had immediate and long-lasting influence in shaping a feminist culture in Turkey.

Tekeli resigned from her position as an associate professor in 1981 and began her career as a feminist activist, translating and editing books. She engaged in organizing consciousness-raising groups and feminist publication circles in early 1980s and initiated the founding of the Kadın Eserleri Kütüphanesi ve Bilgi Merkezi (Women's Library and Information Center) and Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınağı (Purple Roof Women's Shelter) Foundations with her friends in 1990. She worked as a volunteer in the Women's Library between 1990 and 1996 and helped the institution develop into a vital organ of feminist dialogue. In 1997, she responded to the hunger strikes that were staged in prisons by deciding to work for women's entry into the parliament. She founded KADER, Kadın Adayları Destekleme ve Eğitme Derneği (Association to support and educate women candidates) in 1997 and served as its president between 1997 and 1999. The French government presented her with the award of *Officier* of *l'Ordre des Palmes Academiques* in 1996.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; TURKEY; WOMEN'S LIBRARY AND INFORMATION CENTER.

YEŞIM ARAT

TEKKE

Local headquarters for Sufi orders.

Tekke is the Turkish word for the local meeting and living center of a Sufi fraternity. The Persian equivalent, *khangah,* is commonly used in most non-Turkic contexts, while *zawiya* (Arabic) functions as a distinctively North African synonym.

The late tenth and eleventh centuries saw a rise in the popularity of Sufi teachings and charismatic leaders, as well as the concurrent evolution of various Sufi organizations or "fraternities." As they expanded, these fraternities began to establish special living quarters for their members, as well as space for the various ritual, scholarly, and social service activities conducted by the local chapters of what gradually grew into international Sufi orders. In different contexts, either the state or private citizens endowed a vast network of tekke and khangah complexes designed to serve as regional headquarters for the fraternities. Many of these were composed of residence cells, a large kitchen-refectory for members and guests, a Qurʾan school for local youth, a library for advanced study, a tomb-shrine of a deceased spiritual master, and a mosque. Partly because the money used to endow tekkes and khangahs was often invested in local business and agriculture, a number of them throughout the late medieval and early modern Muslim world (c. 1200–1900) functioned as important economic, cultural, and political centers. In fact in some regions—particularly southern Asia, western North Africa, and the Balkans—tekkes and khangahs played a role in the Islamization of local peoples and cultures. Although the institution of the tekke generally flourished under Ottoman patronage, the stridently secularist vision of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his regime led to the 1925 closing of all the great Anatolian tekkes—including that of the Mevlevi Brotherhood (the famed "whirling dervishes") in Konya—and the subsequent abolishment of nearly all institutional Sufi activity in the new Turkish republic.

See also SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS.

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SCOTT ALEXANDER

TEL AVIV

Coastal city founded in Ottoman Palestine in 1909; capital of Israel, 1948–1950.

Tel Aviv is a sprawling metropolis surrounded by suburbs; it was the first city to be established by Jews in the modern era. As numerous Jewish settlers arrived in Palestine in the late nineteenth century, they had increasing difficulties finding accommodations at affordable prices in the overcrowded residential areas of Jerusalem and Jaffa. In both cities, Jews began to purchase land and build new suburbs.

Jaffa is adjacent to, and today part of, Tel Aviv because Ahuzat Bayit, the building society, purchased beachfront property and underwrote the construction of Tel Aviv's first sixty houses in 1909—initially intended as a new suburb of Jaffa. Important differences between this project and other suburbs could be immediately discerned. Architects and engineers helped design the arrangement of houses

and streets; individual land grants were large; all connecting roads and streets were paved; and running water was supplied to each house. Ahuzat Bayit became the most spacious and comfortable suburb in all Palestine. The building society changed the name to Tel Aviv in 1910, marking both a biblical text (Ezekiel 3:15) where the name appears and mention in Nahum Sokolow's translation of Zionist leader Theodor Herzl's *Alteneuland* (The Old New Land). Initially planned as a residential suburb, all of Tel Aviv's first settlers worked in Jaffa. Many of Tel Aviv's founders had private capital; they owned businesses and worked in the free professions. Jewish engineers and contractors built the city's first houses with supplies furnished by Jewish factories. Symbol of the New Yishuv (Jewish community), Tel Aviv's relatively rapid expansion paused during World War I, but resumed and intensified during the British mandate (1923–1948).

Although Zionism stressed agricultural settlement, and donated funds subsidized the cost of collective and communal settlements, most immigrants chose to live in cities and many selected Tel Aviv. By 1935, the population had grown from 2,000 to 120,000 and Tel Aviv became the political, economic, and cultural center of the Jewish National Home. Factories and businesses stood alongside the Histadrut (Jewish Labor Federation) and military headquarters. Publishing firms, major newspapers, several dance and theater companies, the symphony, and an important museum were founded. Transport and roads radiated out to other cities and the countryside.

In May 1948, David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the independence of the State of Israel at a meeting held in the Tel Aviv Museum. In 1950, the commercial port city of Jaffa was incorporated with Tel Aviv, forming the twin city of Tel Aviv-Jaffa. Tel Aviv-Jaffa has benefited from Israel's rapid economic growth, today numbering more than 350,000 residents. (The population of Tel Aviv and its outskirts numbers 2.5 million.) The Histadrut headquarters no longer dominates the skyline or the city's economy. Art, music, and drama flourish in galleries and theaters, and there is an impressive array of shops, cabarets, and restaurants (both kosher and non-kosher). Much of Tel Aviv's cosmopolitan core now remains open on the Jewish Sabbath, presenting an urban profile that differs in scale and tone from that projected by Jerusalem.

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Donna Robinson Divine

TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY

Israeli university.

In 1953 the city of Tel Aviv founded the university to meet the higher education needs of the populous, developing area.

The university offers programs in the arts and sciences within the nine faculties of engineering, exact sciences, humanities, law, life sciences, management, medicine, social sciences, and visual and performing arts, as well as schools of dental medicine, social work, education, and environmental studies. In 2002 the student population was approximately 26,000.

Miriam Simon

TELEVISION

See Radio and Television

TEL HAI

Pioneer Jewish settlement in Palestine that became a national symbol.

Tel Hai is a Jewish settlement founded in 1918 in Galilee, on the northern frontier of Palestine, as an attempt to influence the drawing of the boundary between British and French colonial possessions. After the British gave up responsibility for Syria and Lebanon at the end of World War I, and before the French Mandate began, a hiatus in authority led to

irregular warfare endangering Jewish settlements in the undefined upper Galilee/northern border area. Many Zionist leaders, among them Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky, advised the small number of settlers at Tel Hai to withdraw because a reasonable defense could not be mounted. They remained, and six Jews died in the final attack in 1920, among them the military hero Yosef Trumpeldor, who had been sent to organize their defense. Tel Hai became a national symbol of the determination of Zionists to hold on to settlements at all costs and a metaphor for the principle that Jewish national life in Palestine required personal sacrifice.

See also TRUMPELDOR, YOSEF.

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DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

TELL

See GLOSSARY

TEMPLARS

German evangelical settlers in Palestine in the late nineteenth century.

The Temple Society (Tempelgesellschaft) was founded in the mid-nineteenth century in the Kingdom of Württemberg. Pietistic Evangelicals, the Templars criticized the church and decided at first to settle and found colonies and, later, to improve the land in Palestine as they awaited the imminent Kingdom of Heaven. They established a colony in Haifa in 1868 and brought modern European methods of agriculture. They also established the carriage trade from Jaffa to Jerusalem, exported wine, and established settlements in Jaffa, Haifa, Sarone (part of modern Tel Aviv), Jerusalem, Wilhelma, Galilen Bethlehem, and Waldheim. Individuals settled in Jerusalem and founded a German colony there that, although denied official support by the German government, numbered some 1,200 people by 1914.

Deported as enemy aliens by the British from 1917 to 1918, as German nationals they kept a low profile after they were permitted to return during the Palestine Mandate. Their religious fervor had decreased by the third generation and, as Germans, many were receptive to National Socialism, even though there was no official advocacy of support for the Nazi Party. Many sympathetic members were allowed to join the party; they also enlisted their children in the Nazi Youth and disseminated Nazi propaganda. With the outbreak of World War II, there were approximately 1,500 Germans of Templar origin who were interned, and afterward they were repatriated to Germany in exchange for Palestinians who had fallen into German hands. Some were deported to Australia. In 1948 their property was taken over by the Israeli government and placed under the Guardian of German Property; it was later taken into account during the negotiations over Nazi Holocaust reparations conducted by the World Jewish Congress and the West German government.

See also GERMANY AND THE MIDDLE EAST; HAIFA; JAFFA; JERUSALEM; WEST GERMAN REPARATIONS AGREEMENT.

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REEVA S. SIMON
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TEMPLE, HENRY JOHN

See PALMERSTON, LORD HENRY JOHN TEMPLE

TEMPLE MOUNT AND HARAM AL-SHARIF

See HARAM AL-SHARIF

TEMPORARY MARRIAGE

See ZIWAJ MUTʿA

TERAKKI

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

TERCÜMAN-I AHVAL

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

TERCÜMAN-I HAKIKAT

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

TERRORISM

Violence directed primarily and randomly against civilians with the aim of intimidating them, achieving political goals, or exacting revenge for perceived grievances.

Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks that destroyed the twin World Trade Center skyscrapers in New York City and killed nearly 2,800 persons, terrorism arising out of conflicts in the Middle East has been a focus of international media attention. Concern about violence undertaken by groups and states it considered to be terrorists prompted the United States to declare a war on terrorism, two manifestations of which have been the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite this close association of terrorism with the Middle East, with the notable exception of the year 2001, the majority of terrorist incidents committed worldwide and the majority of victims of terrorism have been outside of or unrelated to political conflicts in the Middle East. Nevertheless, it is true that civilians somewhere in the Middle East have been victims of politically motivated violence every year since at least 1992.

Defining Terrorism

In trying to assess the significance of terrorism, the most difficult problem is the lack of an agreed-upon understanding of what the word *terrorism* means. Political scientists tend to restrict terrorism to acts of violence carried out by nonstate actors against civilians. Historians, sociologists, and experts in international humanitarian law, however, tend to use a broader definition that includes all premeditated acts of violence against civilians, whether carried out by nonstate political groups or by states. Governments—especially those confronting armed opposition groups—and the media generally use the political-science definition of terrorism, often expanding it to include violent acts against military as well as civilian victims. In contrast, the nonstate perpetrators of violence consider their actions to be legitimate forms of resistance to state terrorism aimed at suppressing self-determination, even though they may be directed against civilians (Kimmerling, p. 23). The notion of a legitimate right to resist state oppression is controversial, and no international legal convention addresses this matter. Nonstate groups generally cite the 1960 United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as recognizing their right of resistance. Indeed, that resolution declares, "forcible resistance to forcible denial of self-determination . . . is legitimate," and it says that nonstate groups may receive external support from other governments.

Giving a measure of international legitimacy to resistance struggles has complicated the problem of defining terrorism because it essentially has become a political decision whether a nonstate actor is deemed a terrorist or a genuine national liberation movement fighting for independence from foreign control or occupation. During the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States (1947–1991), such decisions tended to be based more on ideological factors than on objective assessments of the goals and motives of particular nonstate groups. For example, the Soviet Union provided clandestine support for the South Yemen independence movement (1963–1967) and for the Dhufar liberation movement in Oman (1965–1971) primarily because both areas at the time were under the control of Britain, a major U.S. ally. Similarly, the United States provided covert assistance to the Kurds in Iraq (1970–1975) and the Mojahedin in Afghanistan (1979–1989) primarily because in both cases the nonstate groups were fighting for independence from Soviet client regimes. The Soviet Union and the United States condemned as

Social worker Farida Djefel (right) comforts Khalti Taous at the offices of the National Association for the Families of Terrorism Victims in Algiers, Algeria, in 1999. Taous's son, a policeman, was killed by suspected Islamic militants in 1994. © AP/Wide World Photos. Reproduced by permission.

terrorists those nonstate groups that were fighting against regimes the other country favored, and they praised as national resistance heroes those groups fighting against governments they opposed.

Over time, a special vocabulary of terrorism emerged. For instance, the term *state terrorism* came to be used for violent acts used by disfavored states to suppress resistance movements. The Soviet Union used this term to describe the policies of two U.S. allies: Israel, for the repression of Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip after 1967; and Turkey, for the repression of its Kurdish minority after 1984. The United States, in turn, used *state terrorism* as early as the mid-1970s to describe the repressive domestic policies of states it considered to be Soviet allies, such as Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen. During the 1980s another term, *state sponsor of terrorism,* emerged to describe the support for nonstate groups provided by countries that clearly were not allied to either the Soviet Union or the United States. Iran and Libya were identified as the main state sponsors of terrorism, the former because of its assistance after 1982 to Hizbullah in Lebanon. In the case of Libya, the United States accused that country of supporting Palestinian groups that targeted U.S. and Israeli interests in Europe and of assisting several terrorist groups operating in north and central Africa.

Origins of Terrorism in the Arab–Israel Conflict

The superpower rivalry in and rhetoric about the Middle East tended both to obscure the local origins of terrorism and to frustrate efforts to address the multifaceted consequences of violence. This problem is best revealed in the Arab–Israel conflict, which began in 1948 separately from but in tandem with the Cold War and still continues unresolved even though the superpower conflict has ended. One significant legacy of the Cold War relationship to the Arab–Israel conflict has been a great volume of partisan literature, especially in the years after the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964. The Israeli–Palestinian struggle

over pre-1948 Palestine (which became Israel plus the territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1948) is the core of the Arab–Israel conflict. The literature on this aspect of the conflict illustrates the controversies in trying to achieve any relatively objective consensus on what groups merit designation as terrorists and what kinds of violent acts constitute terrorism. For this reason, it is a useful case to study.

For nearly thirty years prior to the signing of the Oslo Accord in September 1993, the State of Israel proclaimed the PLO and the various Palestinian resistance groups that comprised its membership to be terrorist organizations. Inevitably, there emerged a body of writings that supported the Israeli position, not just in Israel but also in Europe and North America. Although some of these studies were sophisticated and scholarly analyses of the PLO's goals and methods, other accounts were merely polemical denunciations of PLO tactics. Beginning in 1968 and continuing for more than a decade, armed Palestinian groups known as *fida'iyyun* (guerrillas) carried out numerous, violent operations that resulted in the deaths of civilians. Many of their actions were sensational incidents that attracted considerable media attention—a PLO objective, as the guerrillas hoped publicity would further their cause. The several international airplane hijackings, for example, culminated in September 1970 (known as Black September) with the hijacking of four planes in as many days, precipitating a civil war between the PLO and the army of Jordan. Attacks on Israeli interests abroad culminated in the seizing of Israeli athletes as hostages at the 1972 Olympic games in Munich, an incident that left eleven athletes dead. Sporadic cross-border raids into Israel (from Jordan and Lebanon) culminated in the temporary seizure of buildings in the northern Israeli towns of Kiryat Shmona and Maʿalot (April and May 1974) and the deaths of thirty-eight civilians, including many children. Rather than winning sympathy for the Palestinians as the perpetrators expected, such incidents created and reinforced a public image of the PLO as a terrorist organization.

In contrast to the official Israeli and U.S. views, the PLO saw itself as a national liberation movement dedicated to achieving Palestinian rights and resisting what it termed Israeli state terrorism. Its fighters were lauded as heroes and martyrs, and its operations against Israeli civilians were justified as defense of, or reprisals for, Israeli attacks on Palestinian refugee camps and assassinations of PLO leaders. The Soviet Union, the primary international backer of the PLO after 1968, tended to remain silent about many of the more sensational acts of violence by Palestinian guerrillas, but it continued to promote the PLO as a national liberation movement. Soviet support was especially significant after 1974 when Moscow encouraged diplomatic recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Quite separate from the Soviet backing for the PLO, a few academic studies and advocacy articles appeared that were sympathetic to Palestinian claims and rights. Although these writings were scarcer than the volumes of pro-Israeli literature and never achieved a similar impact on the mainstream U.S. media, they did have some influence on intellectuals in Africa, Asia, and Europe.

The Israeli–PLO conflict affected both regional and international politics by the late 1970s. This is because the PLO used Lebanon, where a large number of Palestinian refugees had lived since 1948, as a base for operations against Israel throughout the 1970s, and Israel responded with retaliatory raids against what it termed "terrorist nests"—suspected PLO facilities in refugee camps. Many Lebanese and Palestinian civilians died in these raids, and their deaths were described officially as "collateral damage" in a larger operation against "terrorist infrastructure." The PLO condemned Israeli air strikes as further evidence of state terror and also cited them as justification for its own continuing attacks across the Lebanon-Israel border. The escalating cycle of attacks and reprisals contributed to the civil war in Lebanon (1975–1989) and also led to an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978. Israeli forces occupied a 6-mile-wide security strip, ostensibly to prevent attacks into Israel; this occupation lasted until 2000. A second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 resulted in a war with the PLO, its forced withdrawal from Lebanon under international protection, and the Israeli occupation of Beirut and all of southern Lebanon. However, almost as soon as the threat from the PLO seemed to be contained, Israel faced a new source of terrorism that stemmed directly from its occupation of Lebanon (which lasted until 1985).

A Lebanese group, Hizbullah, was formed in late 1982 with the initial aim of expelling Israeli forces from Lebanon. Hizbullah's tactics, which included suicide bombings against French and U.S. military forces in 1983 and, beginning in 1984, the kidnapping of European civilians to use as hostages for the release of its members held in Israeli jails, earned it an international reputation as a terrorist organization. Hizbullah, however, neither sought nor received any support from the Soviet Union. Like the revolutionary government that assumed power in Iran in 1979, Hizbullah was equally hostile to Soviet and U.S. policies in the Middle East. Although its objectives were first and foremost political, Hizbullah also was inspired by its own interpretation of Shiʿite Islam. Its frequent use of religious rhetoric to explain or to justify its actions tended to alienate the Soviet Union even more than its direct criticisms did. Thus, Hizbullah became one of the first major nonstate groups in the Middle East to lack a superpower patron. Despite or perhaps because of this status, Hizbullah succeeded in establishing a permanent presence in Lebanon's politics and in becoming a nonstate group whose actions Israel neither could control nor ignore.

Meanwhile, the removal of the PLO to Tunisia did not end its political influence among Palestinians, and when an intifada (uprising) erupted in December 1987 among Palestinians living under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the PLO gradually emerged as a main coordinating force for the resistance. New groups unaffiliated with the PLO also emerged during the intifada, principally HAMAS and Islamic Jihad. Unlike the PLO, which claimed to be inspired by secular ideas, HAMAS and Islamic Jihad cited religious ideals and percepts as at least partial justification for their resistance against Israeli rule. Concern about the increasing influence of groups such as HAMAS and Islamic Jihad may have prompted the leaders of Israel's Labor Party to begin negotiations with the PLO to end the long conflict. The political rapprochement between Israel and the PLO in 1993 not only was unexpected, but it also necessitated a re-evaluation of the negative ways each side had depicted the other. However, the years of intellectual and emotional investment in the terrorism paradigm made it difficult for some people on both sides to view formerly hated terrorists as legitimate partners in peace negotiations. Thus, from the outset of the Oslo peace process, some Israelis and Palestinians were skeptical of the agreement and even were determined to overturn it. The assassination of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 (by an Israeli opposed to the Oslo Accord) and the first suicide bombings undertaken in 1996 by HAMAS were significant terrorist incidents that led to multiple actions and reprisals that cumulatively undermined popular support for the peace process among both Israelis and Palestinians.

A 1999 wanted poster for Osama bin Ladin, leader of the al-Qaʿida terrorist network. The poster depicts the carnage from bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998, an act that the United States blamed on bin Ladin. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 would bring far greater infamy to bin Ladin in the future. © CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

It was in this increasingly tense atmosphere that Israeli politician Ariel Sharon intervened in a manner that would have the effect (albeit at the time,

unforeseen) of overturning the peace process. Sharon was one of those Israelis who distrusted and even opposed the Oslo Accord, and it is plausible that he never had changed his conviction that the PLO was a terrorist organization. When in September 2000 he led a group of Knesset members, under armed escort, into the Muslim religious complex in Jerusalem known as al-Haram al-Sharif, his intention was to assert Israeli sovereignty over a site that Jews claim is the Temple Mount—the location of their ancient temple destroyed by the Romans more than 2,000 years ago—and thus to prevent its possible return to Palestinian sovereignty, which had been proposed by some members of the Labor Party. The incident provoked clashes with Palestinian worshipers, and the next day Israeli police killed four protesting Palestinians as they emerged from Friday prayers at the al-Aqsa Mosque in al-Haram al-Sharif complex. The situation escalated rapidly as Palestinian policemen, in an effort to protect civilians, clashed with Israeli soldiers at checkpoints in the West Bank. The al-Aqsa intifada thus began, and subsequently its characteristic features included targeted assassinations of suspected Palestinian resistance leaders by Israel and retaliatory Palestinian suicide bombings at crowded civilian sites inside Israeli cities. By early 2001, Israel and its supporters were labeling all acts of violence from the Palestinian side as terrorism.

The U.S. "War on Terrorism"

Middle East terrorism, except for incidents such as the attack at the Munich Olympic games in 1972, generally has stayed within the region. However, Middle East–related terrorism acquired a global dimension with the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States by nineteen members of the al-Qaʿida network. Al-Qaʿida is a political organization founded by Saudi Arabian national Osama bin Ladin, and its objectives after 1991 were to attack the United States and its interests because it viewed the U.S. government as the main sponsor of regimes that it defined as "unjust," oppressive, and illegitimate. Ironically, bin Ladin collaborated with U.S. officials during the 1980s when he and the United States shared the same goal of forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. But when the United States dispatched troops to Saudi Arabia in 1990, bin Ladin viewed this development as being no different from the situation of Soviet troops in Afghanistan—in both cases the army of an "imperialist" superpower occupying a weaker and Muslim country. Furthermore, the presence of U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia meant that a non-Muslim army for the first time in more than 1,400 years was occupying the religiously sacred land in which were located Islam's two holiest sites, the cities of Mecca and Medina. Even though bin Ladin believed and practiced a very conservative interpretation of Sunni Islam, his primary objectives vis-à-vis the United States are political, not religious. Beginning with the bombing in the underground parking garage of the World Trade Center in 1993, persons close to his al-Qaʿida organization were implicated in several terrorist attacks. The most sensational incidents included suicide bombings outside the barracks housing U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and outside two U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998. The 2001 attacks prompted the United States to declare a "war on terrorism," and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan became the first target because it provided sanctuary to al-Qaʿida and rejected requests for the extradition of bin Ladin and other leaders.

Its war on terrorism policy led the United States to focus on groups it designated as terrorist to an unprecedented extent. One consequence of this new preoccupation was that after 2001 Washington accepted the argument of Israeli prime minister Sharon that PLO chairman and Palestinian Authority president Yasir Arafat was condoning terrorist actions by groups such as HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, and his own Al-Fatah movement. When in spring 2002 the Israeli army reoccupied West Bank towns and villages that were supposed to be under the control of the Palestinian Authority, the United States effectively did not protest. Thus, the peace process between Israel and the PLO, seriously ailing since fall 2000, became an indirect but fatal casualty of the war on terrorism.

The war on terrorism is cause for concern among legal experts in the field of international humanitarian law, especially because states identified as sponsors of terrorism, such as Iraq, become legitimate targets for attack because they are thought to possess weapons of mass destruction that they might provide to terrorist groups. The experts believe that civilians, who have been the primary vic-

tims of violent conflicts since the early 1990s, will be the main victims again, and they cite statistics that demonstrate that this has been the case in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The phenomenon of terrorism has prompted the drafting of several conventions, most notably the Rome Statute, that would make the intentional killing of civilians a war crime, no matter who is responsible (i.e., a government or a nonstate group). The intent is to criminalize violence against civilians so that individuals can be prosecuted. The European Union generally, and its member states such as Belgium specifically, have made the most progress in terms of accepting the idea that violence against civilians, whether undertaken by a state or nonstate organization, is terrorism and needs to be punished. Other states, including major countries such as China, Israel, Russia, and the United States, reject categorically the notion of state terrorism and insist that international laws pertaining to terrorism must limit definitions to nonstate groups that target civilians. Ultimately, one of the most effective ways of reducing terrorism is for states to identify and remove the causes that motivates terrorists, such as the denial of freedom and political participation, repressive political occupation, and poverty and despair.

See also AQSA INTIFADA, AL-; ARAFAT, YASIR; BIN LADIN, OSAMA; BLACK SEPTEMBER; FIDAʾIYYUN; HAMAS; HIZBULLAH; HOSTAGE CRISES; ISLAMIC JIHAD; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; QAʿIDA, AL-.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

TETUAN

Provincial capital of Morocco's northern Rif region.

Tetuan, with a population of about 466,000 (projection for 2001 based on 1994 census number of 363,813), was founded (1306–1307) by the Maranid sultan to serve as a base for attacks against Ceuta. It was destroyed by Henry III of Castile in 1400, and rebuilt around 1492. Tetuan was occupied by Spain on 6 February 1860, after they had defeated the Anjar tribesmen.

As the first part of Morocco to be occupied by Europeans in two centuries, Tetuan symbolized the threat from Christian Europe. Pressure by Britain and rethinking within Spain's leadership resulted in Spain's agreement to evacuate the city (2 May 1862) in return for a lower indemnity payment. In 1906, Spain was given responsibility for policing the port of Tetuan by a thirteen-nation conference called to maintain the balance of power between European states in Morocco, and to institute economic reforms and an open door policy. Three years later, Spain began its conquest of northern Morocco and built road links to Tetuan. It was made the capital of the Spanish protectorate in 1913, and remained so until Morocco attained independence in 1956 and Spain evacuated the area.

BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMAN

TEVFIK FIKRET

[1867–1915]

Ottoman Turkish poet and editor.

Tevfik Fikret, the son of a bureaucrat in the foreign service, was born Mehmet Tevfik in Istanbul. He studied literature at the prestigious Galatasaray lycée,

where his teachers included Muallim Naci and Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem. At the age of fifteen, he published his first poetry in the newspaper *Tercüman-i Hakikat* under the name Nazmi. He entered the civil service but later resigned, drawing public attention when he donated his salary to the refugee commission, saying that it was "a disgrace to accept so much money for so little work." In 1896, he became the editor of *Servet-i Fünun,* the main journal of the new literary movement. At this time, he became known as Tevfik Fikret. Under the influence of the French Parnassian school, his pre-1901 poetry emphasizes art for its own sake, preferring form and technique over content, and poetry over prose. Generally written in the *aruz* meter, Fikret's poetry draws from scenes of everyday life, as in the poems "Hasta çocuk" (The sick child), "Balikçilar" (The fishermen), and "Bir içim su" (A drink of water). In 1899, Fikret became professor of literature at Robert College. Following the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, he joined with Hüseyin Cahit Yalçin in establishing the newspaper *Tanin* (The echo).

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DAVID WALDNER

TEXTILE INDUSTRY

Production of fibers, filaments, and yarns used in making woven or knitted cloth for domestic or foreign trade is widespread in the Middle East.

The oldest textile materials produced and used in the Middle East—linen and wool—go back to remote antiquity. Cotton and silk, which originated in India and China, respectively, came into the region during the Roman Empire, in the early centuries of the Christian era. By the early Middle Ages, quantities of flax (for linen) were exported to Europe, chiefly from Egypt; of raw cotton from Syria and Egypt; of silk thread from Iran, Syria, and the Bursa region (northwest Turkey); and of mohair from Turkey. Flax and silk fibers and fabrics were traded to Europe for many centuries, but flax was gradually produced in many European nations, and the silks of India, China, and Japan competed with Middle Eastern silks and cottons as well as with cottons from the newly colonized Americas and from India. In the nineteenth century, however, the introduction of long-staple cotton made Egypt an important producer, and in the twentieth century, Egypt was joined by Turkey, Syria, Sudan, and Israel. In the 1990s, the Middle East produced 75 percent of the world output of long-staple cotton but only about 8 percent of the total world output of all cottons.

Although the preeminence of the Middle East in the manufacture of handloomed textiles goes back to antiquity, by the late Middle Ages, European products—woolens, fine silks, and linens—were fine enough to be imported by the Middle East. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, the Middle East continued to export cotton cloth and yarn to Europe, but European protective tariffs soon restricted even that trade. With the Industrial Revolution, European machine-loomed fabrics overwhelmed Middle Eastern handmade products and local markets. The number of Middle Eastern handlooms and

Textiles are the major export for the Turkish economy. Pictured is a Turkish woman weaving a carpet. © JOSÉ F. POBLETE/ CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

their total output declined sharply; for example, in Bursa, output of cloth fell from 20,000 pieces in 1843 to 3,000 in 1863. In Aleppo and Damascus combined, the number of looms dropped from about 12,000 in the 1820s to some 2,500 in the 1840s. Middle Eastern weavers were able to recover by using improved looms, importing cheaper and better European yarns, concentrating on inexpensive products, and drastically reducing wages. Handcrafted fabrics continued to form a large proportion of the textile output until after World War II. In Syria, in the 1930s, there were some 40,000 handweavers, and in Egypt in the 1940s, some 50,000. In Turkey and Iran, carpetmaking was greatly stimulated by rising foreign demand, lower freights that reduced export costs, and some foreign capital investments in the industry. Just before World War I, in 1913, Turkey exported 1,500 tons of carpets, then worth three million U.S. dollars, but the subsequent world wars devastated the industry. Persian carpet exports in 1914 were then worth five million U.S. dollars, and by the 1950s Iran's rugweaving and carpetmaking employed some 130,000 people—with exports of 5,000 tons, then worth twenty-five million U.S. dollars, the carpets accounted for 16 percent of Iran's non-oil exports.

Mills

Textile factories, or mills, were first used in the Middle East in the 1830s, in the modernizing program of Muhammad Ali's Egypt. The mills exported large amounts of cotton textiles, but they did not survive his death. A few small factories were also set up in Turkey in the nineteenth century, and by World War I, several textile centers had been developed in Turkey—notably in Adana, İzmir, and in the Salonika region. Egypt also had cotton-spinning mills in Alexandria and Cairo. Iran had a small spinning mill in Tehran, but other unsuccessful mills had closed. In Syria, one small mill, founded in Damascus in the 1860s, was operating, but two others, in Beirut and Antioch, had failed. Some two hundred small silk-reeling factories were set up in Lebanon, with others in Bursa, İzmir, and other silk-growing regions of Turkey. In Iran, there was a mill in Gilan.

After World War I, the textile industry wove rayon as well as cotton and wool and expanded greatly, especially after the tariff reforms. Table 1 shows the situation in the cotton industry in 1939, at the outbreak of World War II. By then, textile factories had been built in all the main towns and cities of the Middle East, and local production of cotton yarn and fabrics met 35 to 50 percent of total domestic demand within the larger countries.

During World War II, the region's textile industry expanded by about 50 percent, and the expansion continues—with several additional countries,

Middle East cotton industry in 1939

	Spindles (thousands)	Power looms (thousands)	Output of yarn (thousands of metric tons)	Output of cloth (million square meters)
Egypt	250	15	24	100
Iran	188	4	—	—
Iraq	—	1	—	—
Lebanon	14	1	1	—
Palestine	12	2	1	4
Syria	10	4	1	—
Turkey	189	6	23	152
Total	**663**	**33**	**50**	**256**

SOURCE: United Nations, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–52* (New York, 1953).

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Middle East textile output in 1987

	Cotton		Wool		Silk
	Yarn[2]	Fabrics[3]	Yarn[2]	Fabrics[3]	Fabrics[3]
Egypt	251	694	19	24	5
Iran[1]	88	140	16	26	—
Israel	16	—	4	—	—
Jordan	—	2	—	—	—
Syria	39	180	2	1	—
Turkey	332	399	51	27	1
Total	**726**	**1,415**	**92**	**78**	**6**
World	15,091	47,360	2,223	3,484	2,248

[1]1981
[2]In million metric tons
[3]In million square meters

SOURCE: United Nations. *Industrial Statistical Yearbook* (New York, 1988).

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

with diversification, and with improvement in quality, especially in the finishing processes. Foreign investments have been gradually taken over, and the industry is now owned mainly by the state or local citizens. Turkey, Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon now export significant textile lots to worldwide markets. The second table shows recent figures.

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CHARLES ISSAWI

THAALBI, ABD AL-AZIZ

[1874–1944]

Tunisian political leader and founder of the Destour party.

Abd al-Aziz Thaalbi's father was a notary whose family had emigrated to Tunis following the French occupation of Algeria in 1830. During his studies at Zaytuna University, Thaalbi became conversant with Salafiyya concepts. For a year following his graduation from Zaytuna in 1895, he published a religious journal called *Sabil al-Rashid* (the Proper Path). When the French authorities suspended the journal, Thaalbi left the country and traveled in Libya, Egypt, and India until 1902. Soon after his return to Tunis, he was imprisoned by a beylical tribunal for making a reformist attack on the local saints, who formed an important part of popular religious practices. In 1904, he published, in both an Arabic and a French edition, *L'esprit libérale du Coran* (The liberal spirit of the Qurʾan), which criticized the religious establishment. At this time, Thaalbi established links with the Young Tunisians. He became the editor of the Arabic edition of its newspaper, *Le Tunisien,* in 1909 and participated in all of its political activities until his expulsion from Tunisia in 1912. He returned to the country at the start of World War I.

At the end of the war, Thaalbi joined a delegation of former Young Tunisians that went to Versailles to petition the Allies for a relaxation of French control. Frustrated by France's unwillingness to make concessions, Thaalbi wrote *La Tunisie martyre* (Tunisia martyred) in early 1920. In this book, he stressed the need for restoration of the Tunisian constitution of 1861, the creation of an elected assembly and an independent judiciary, the development of education, and the safeguarding of individual liberties. He also urged that the establishment of the protectorate had stalled Tunisian development. Thaalbi was arrested and brought back to Tunisia. Upon his release in 1921, he assumed the leadership of a group of middle-class merchants, artisans, and lower level *ulama,* many of them formerly affiliated with the Young Tunisians, that had evolved into a political party, the Destour, based on the program elaborated in *La Tunisie martyre.*

In response to Destour demands, France introduced a series of limited reforms in 1922. Thaalbi guided Destour's rejection of these changes, arguing that they fell too far short of Tunisian requirements to merit consideration. The death in 1923 of the Tunisian ruler Nasir Bey, who had sympathized with Destour, and the growing impatience of the protectorate authorities with the party convinced Thaalbi that his political activism would not be tolerated much longer, and he fled the country in the same year.

After fourteen years of exile in Egypt, Iraq, and India, he returned in 1937, when the relative liberalism of the French Popular Front government created a more congenial atmosphere for the expression of nationalist grievances. By that time, however, the remnants of Thaalbi's Destour party had given way to the Neo-Destour, whose youthful, dynamic, and secular leaders had little use for Thaalbi or for the traditional Arab-Islamic values he stressed. Finding support among only a small segment of the population and encountering opposition from Neo-Destour militants who disrupted his public appearances, Thaalbi attempted to revive Destour but failed miserably, though the party survived in moribund form until his death in 1944.

See also SALAFIYYA MOVEMENT.

KENNETH J. PERKINS

THALWEG LINE

See GLOSSARY

THARTHAR PROJECT

Reservoir constructed in eastern Iraq to control flooding and provide irrigation.

The Wadi al-Tharthar is a vast natural depression forty-two miles (68 km) southwest of Samarra and one hundred miles (160 km) north of Baghdad between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The Iraqi Development Board, on the recommendation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, created an enormous storage reservoir in the Wadi al-Tharthar depression to drain runoff from the Tigris and thereby protect Baghdad from flooding. Staged construction of the reservoir, the largest earth-moving project of its kind in the Middle East, began in 1952. A regulator built on the Tigris near Samarra diverted excess water into the reservoir, which was also connected by a channel with the Euphrates. By 1972, with a capacity of 110 billion cubic yards (85 billion cu. m) when filled to a height of 200 feet (60 m) above sea level, the water contained in the reservoir could be used to irrigate nearly half a million acres (200,000 ha) of land.

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Albertine Jwaideh

THARWAT, ABD AL-KHALIQ

[1873–1928]

Egyptian politician.

A graduate of the School of Law in Cairo, Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat was one of the first Egyptian nationalist leaders and a founder of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party. His negotiations with Britain's high commissioner for Egypt, Edmund Allenby, led to the declaration of Egyptian independence from Britain in 1922. Tharwat supported the declaration, even though it guaranteed the maintenance of British influence in Egypt, because he believed that it made possible the drafting of a constitution and the establishment of parliamentary politics. He formed the first government following the declaration and helped to draft the post-independence constitution. Tharwat was opposed by Sultan Fuʾad, who objected to being reduced to a constitutional monarch, and by the Wafd party, which objected to the preservation of British control. Tharwat resigned as prime minister in November 1922. He formed a second ministry in April 1927, but again confronted opposition from Fuʾad—who had taken the title of king in 1922—and the Wafd. He resigned in February 1928.

See also Liberal Constitutionalist Party.

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David Waldner

THAWRA, AL- (IRAQ)

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

THAWRA, AL- (SYRIA)

See Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries

THEATER

Overview of the region's numerous traditional and indigenous dramatic art forms and performances.

The Middle East comprises four regions: The Arab world (22 countries), Iran, Turkey, and Israel. This area did not know theater (in the Western sense of a space containing stage and auditorium, and dramas with the three unities of time, space, and plot) in its pre-modern periods. However, the whole region had numerous traditional and indigenous dramatic art forms and performances. Through colonialism and cultural exchanges with Europe in the early nineteenth century, theater as a space and a mode of writing and presenting found its way into the various Middle Eastern cultures. In the modern period, as a form of cultural identity, many Middle Eastern theater artists have tried to honor their traditional art forms and rituals by incorporating aspects of them with their stage events. This endeavor is a prevalent feature, and an ongoing trend, in Middle Eastern theater.

Arab Theater

The ancient Arab literary tradition did not encompass dramatic texts; however, the countries that constitute today's Arab world have always incorporated

dramatic and mimetic arts within their performance and literary traditions. Among the various Arab performance arts that thrived throughout the premodern periods are *al-hakawati* (storytellers), dance, ritual reenactments, shadow plays, puppetry, poetry recitations, *maqama* (outdoor dramatic enactments in poetry and prose), street performance by traveling troupes called *al-muhabizun,* and *al-samir* (village gatherings that included dramatizations). Many of these art forms continue, albeit in a state of decline, but others have died away as a result of competing modern entertainment.

In the nineteenth century, contact with the European theatrical tradition through colonialism, educational exchanges, and translations sparked a theatrical movement in the Arab world. In 1848, the Lebanese writer Marun al-Naqqash (d. 1855) mounted in his own home performances of plays based on Molière's dramas as well as adaptations of tales from *A Thousand and One Nights.* This process was continued in Damascus by Abu Khalil al-Qabbani (d. 1902), whose attempts to stage dramatic performances aroused the opposition of the religious establishment. Al-Qabbani moved to Egypt, where artists were able to exercise more freedom.

In Egypt, Yaʿqub Sanu (d. 1912), considered by many the father of Egyptian theater, formed a troupe of actors and in 1870 opened the first Egyptian playhouse under the auspices of the khedive. Sanu wrote and directed his own plays and introduced women to the Egyptian stage for the first time. His theater was an immediate success but was closed down by the authorities in 1873 on the grounds that his plays were politically subversive.

By the turn of the century, many theater troupes were presenting musicals, dramatic adaptations, and Arabizations of world drama, but no original plays in Arabic. A number of Egyptian poets wrote verse dramas; among them was the poet laureate of Egypt, Ahmad Shawqi. However, those plays were not stage successes, since their poetic merit exceeded their dramatic construction.

The towering figure of prose drama in Egypt and the Arab world is Tawfiq al-Hakim (1898–1986). His family sent him to France to obtain a doctorate in law. Instead, he spent his time there learning the Western theater tradition. When he returned to Egypt, he took up writing for the stage. His dearest wish was to establish a modern Egyptian dramatic tradition based on Western notions of the unity of space, time, and action. He spent five decades of his life working to enrich the Arab dramatic tradition, and enrich it he did. He wrote more than seventy plays of exceptional variety, experimenting with dramatic form and offering various dramatic styles. He also presented a variety of dramatic themes, some of which he categorized as the theater of ideas, the theater of social themes, and the theater of the absurd.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, many young playwrights emerged, theaters were built, and theater troupes were established around the Arab world. The 1960s is regarded as the golden age of Arabic theater for its impressive theatrical movement, which gave rise to great playwrights, actors, and directors throughout the region, including Nuʿman Ashur, Yusuf Idris, Alfred Farag, Mikhaʾil Ruman, and Najib Surur in Egypt; Saʿdallah Wannus, Walid Ikhlassi, and Yusuf al-Ani in Syria and Iraq; Isam Mahfuz and Roger Assaf in Lebanon; and Izz al-Din al-Madani, Ahmad al-Ilj, and al-Tayyib al-Siddiqi in the Maghrib.

In Palestine, under the watchful eye of the Israeli armed forces, theater troupes like the Balalin and Hakawati have produced highly experimental dramas that comment on the plight of their fellow countrymen. Alongside the male dramatists, directors, and critics, a large number of Arab women have contributed to the modern Arab stage, including playwrights Fathiyya al-Assal, Nehad Gad, Andre Chided, and Nawal al-Saadawi; director Nidal al-Ashqar; and critic Nehad Selaiha.

Israeli Theater

The Israeli theater is essentially modern; whereas pre-1960s theater was heavily influenced by Russian social realism, in the 1960s it diverged and presented experimental drama. Until the early 1970s, most of the theatrical repertoire in Israel continued to be European classics and modern plays. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, playwrights focused more on the contemporary Israeli's predicament and identity. From the 1980s onward a shift became noticeable in the Hebrew stage, from a commitment to the ideology of the Jewish national

The courtyard and entrance to the Jerusalem Center for the Performing Arts in Jerusalem, Israel. © DAVE G. HOUSER/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

movement to debates over secularization and cultural identity.

After the 1948 war, two Israeli playwrights rose to prominence in the newly established state. In 1949, Moshe Shamir wrote *Hu Halah Basdot* (He walked in the fields), and Yigal Mossinsohn produced *Be'arvot Hanegev* (In the plains of the Negev). The first is a stage adaptation of a novel—a prevalent practice in late 1940s and 1950s Israel due to the limited number of playwrights. The second is a war story that tries to uphold the ideals of the new Israeli society; its success was based more on audience reaction then than on artistic excellence.

In the 1950s, Israeli theater focused on realism and produced plays concerned with the social realities of Israel after the 1948 war. One of the major themes that preoccupied dramatists was the realities of coexistence between early and new immigrants, and between Palestinians and Israelis. Some of the playwrights who tackled these issues were Ephraim Kishon, Yigal Mossinsohn, and Hanoch Bar-Tov.

In the 1960s, Israeli theater departed from realism and created a non-mimetic experimental theater, opening itself to the influence of modern European drama as well as to new themes, forms, and theatrical devices. Using techniques from the Theater of the Absurd, Israeli playwrights set out to depict the grotesque and absurd in their society. Without reference to particulars, their criticism was conveyed through abstractions, symbolism, and distancing techniques. Among the most talented playwrights of that decade are Nessim Aloni (b. 1921), Ben-Zion Tomer (b. 1928), Yosef Bar-Yosef (b. 1933), and A. B. Yehoshua (b. 1936). Their efforts propelled Israeli theater away from a provincial outlook to universal themes.

In the 1970s, Israeli theater became self-reflective and began expressing doubts about the means of

realizing the Zionist dream. For some, those were introspective years of self-reevaluation. Two new stars became the focus of the Israeli stage: Yehoshua Sobol (b. 1939) and Hanoch Levin (b. 1943). Sobol's writing style is naturalistic. Some of his earlier works are semifictitious and based on documentary material. Levin, on the other hand, is famous for his biting satire and tendency to break taboos. He continues to be one of the most provocative and controversial figures in Israeli theater.

The following decades show a variety of dramatic themes and approaches, from social and political disillusionment, as many Israelis call for an alternative to war, to fears about the demise of the Zionist dream. Common themes include nationhood, selfhood, and secularization. In addition, many theaters continue to present world classics and modern comedies. At the top of the list of thriving theater companies in Israel are the Habima (also ha-Bima), the Cameri, and the Haifa Municipal Theaters.

Persian Theater

Persian theater can be divided into three categories: traditional, which comprises ritual reenactments, puppetry, and improvised street theater; modern, which is primarily modeled on Western paradigms; and diasporic, which laments the separation from the homeland after the 1979 revolution.

The most famous traditional Persian theater is Taʿziyeh, which encompasses cycles of passion plays intended not for entertainment but rather to console the devout Shiʿite population by reenacting the events that led to the martyrdom of their beloved imam (spiritual leader) Husayn, grandson of the Prophet. The house of Husayn in its entirety was decimated in the city of Karbala, in Iraq, by Muʿawiyah, the governor of Syria, who the Shiʿa believe usurped the throne from Ali, Husayn's father, closest cousin and confidant of the Prophet. The suffering and death of this holy family is the central theme of elaborate mourning rites, in Iran and wherever there is a considerable Shiʿite population. Those rites take place on the tenth day of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic calendar.

Two categories of Taʿziyeh plays deal with the tragic events of Karbala, and others refer to those events indirectly. However, those dealing with the martyrdom of Husayn and his family are the most popular and moving. Taʿziyeh is written in verse by anonymous writers and its stagecraft is extremely simple, with virtually no scenery. Settings are indicated symbolically, and men play the women's roles. The most important component of these plays is the music: Players chant and sing, and musical instruments are used to heighten the mood. Although professional Taʿziyeh players exist, the plays are frequently presented by amateurs as an act of piety.

By the turn of the twentieth century, and as a result of Western impact, Taʿziyeh went into a decline. Today, there is a great deal of interest in the performance and study of Taʿziyeh, both inside and outside of Iran.

During the early nineteenth century, Western drama found its way into Persian culture in the form of translations of European and Turkish plays. This was followed by a period of Persian dramatic and satirical composition that took reform as its main subject matter. During the first half of the twentieth century, a number of didactic dramas upholding the modernizing and educational efforts of Reza Shah Pahlavi were on the rise. Among the most popular playwrights of this period are Sayyed Ali Nasr (1893–1965), who founded and headed the Komedi-e Iran in 1918, and Sadegh Hedayat (1903–1951).

The second half of the twentieth century was characterized by severe censorship, which led playwrights to find refuge in symbolism, Theater of the Absurd, and psychological themes. Gifted playwrights emerged during this period and produced exciting works. Among them are Ali Nasirian, Gholamhossein Saʿedi (working under the pseudonym Gowhar Morad), and Bahram Beyzai.

After the 1979 revolution, a number of artists, disillusioned by the new regime, left the country with no intention of returning. Living in exile, they write dramas that are inherently Iranian and intensely nostalgic for the homeland. Among those is Parviz Sayyad, who continues to produce plays that have been categorized as theater of diaspora.

Turkish Theater

The first Western-style Turkish play performed in Istanbul was *Vatan yahut Silistre* (Fatherland), by Namik Kemal, in 1873. From that date onward theater in

Turkey following the Western paradigm was a vital element in the country's cultural life.

Turkey has been home to a wide array of popular performance arts and entertainments since the thirteenth century, including dances, peasant plays, pageants, rites, processions, mock fights, festival acts, acrobatics, mime, puppetry, marionette performances, clowning, juggling, and magic. The most dramatic and popular of all are the *meddahs* (who are panegyrists, storytellers, and comedians), *karagoz* (shadow plays), and *ortaoyunus* (improvised plays). *Meddahs* were solo performers who told traditional tales of heroism and religious narratives. *Karagoz,* have the longest history and continued to be practiced until the 1940s. They are being resurrected in many contemporary plays. They were essentially a one-man act. The presenter manipulated flat leather figures behind a linen screen and played all characters. *Ortaoyunu,* the indigenous Turkish theater-in-the-round, is the most mimetic premodern performance art form. It borrowed many of its basic plots and characters from the *karagoz,* and the actors performed in the middle of a circle of spectators. The characters were presented as stereotypes, depending on wordplay and comic situations. All three ancient art forms had declined severely by the early twentieth century due to competition from Western-style theater and cinema.

The second half of the nineteenth century introduced Western theater into Turkey. A number of local theater troupes were created, mainly by Armenians, and they presented European plays in both their original languages and in translation. The first Turkish play published was *Shair Evlenmesi* (The poet's marriage, in 1860), by Ibrahim Shinasi, and the first produced on stage was *Fatherland.* In spite of the quick strides that playwrights made by the late nineteenth century, severe censorship by the sultan slowed the progress of Turkish drama. However, theater was given new vigor in 1908 by an era of political freedom under a constitutional government. Until 1923, Turkish theater featured a variety of new naturalistic and satirical plays reflecting social problems and expressing a need for political reform. One of the most celebrated playwrights of that period was Abdulhak Hamit (1852–1937), who produced verse and history plays. In 1916, the government-subsidized City Theater in Istanbul was established; it remained a vital core of Turkey's theatrical scene until the 1950s.

With the founding of the Turkish Republic under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, theater received greater government support and funding. Mushin Ertuğrul, artistic director of the City Theater, shaped the modern theater movement in Turkey by creating a children's theater, encouraging young playwrights, and establishing a network of regional theaters. In 1936 the State Conservatory for Music and Drama was inaugurated, and in the 1940s the State Opera. Since the 1960s Turkey has established twenty-six state theaters in sixteen provinces, and state theaters are continually opening in Istanbul. In the 1950s and 1960s a number of private theaters were established in both Istanbul and Ankara.

In the 1960s, a number of excellent playwrights contributed to the Turkish stage, including Turan Oflazoglu, Necati Cumali, Gunger Dilmen, and Haldun Taner. In the 1970s and 1980s, the varying strengths and weaknesses of the Turkish theatrical scene reflected the political and economic situation. During the following two decades Turkish theater witnessed a rising number of experimental plays by a younger generation wishing to explore new ground and possibilities.

See also Hakim, Tawfiq al-; Hedayat, Sadegh; Idris, Yusuf; Ikhlassi, Walid; Saadawi, Nawal al-; Saʿedi, Gholamhossein; Sanu, Yaʿqub; Shamir, Moshe; Shawqi, Ahmad; Sobol, Yehoshua; Taner, Haldun.

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DINA AMIN

THEATER, ARAB

See THEATER

THEATER, ISRAELI

See THEATER

TIBERIAS

Town located on the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias (also referred to as the Sea of Galilee or Kinneret) in northern Israel.

The town of Tiberias was founded by Herod Antipas (c. 20 C.E.) and named for the Roman emperor Tiberius. It was an important center of Jewish learning, law, and religion from the second through fifth centuries. Over the course of its history, Tiberias was controlled by Arabs, Crusaders, and Ottoman Turks. Early Zionist pioneers set up kibbutzim in this area around the turn of the twentieth century. The city's population quadrupled after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. In the 1948 Arab-Israel War, fighting broke out with an Arab attack on Jews in the older sections of the town. Jewish fighters were able to push out their Arab adversaries, and eventually the Arab inhabitants fled.

Tiberias, which has a relatively warm climate in winter, is a favorite tourist site, featuring boating, lakefront hotels, and a hot springs spa. Its 2004 population was about 43,000, the majority of them immigrants from North African and Eastern European countries.

BRYAN DAVES

TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES RIVERS

River systems that join to drain into the Persian Gulf.

The Tigris (Arabic, *Shatt Dijla*; Turkish, *Dicle*) rises in a lake in the mountains north of Diyarbakir, in southeastern Turkey. It picks up major tributaries, the Zab rivers, downstream from Mosul, then the Diyala, just past Baghdad—flowing some 1,180 miles (1,900 km). It ends at the confluence of the Euphrates, in southeast Iraq, to form the Shatt al-Arab, which empties into the Gulf. With its short tributaries flowing directly from the mountains, it floods in April, about one month before the Euphrates, and with about 50 percent greater flow.

The Euphrates (Arabic, *Furat*; Turkish, *Firat*) also originates in Turkey, from a spring in the Taurus mountains. It flows for 1,740 miles (2,800 km), passing through northern Syria and providing that country with an important water source. In 1973, Syria completed construction of the large Euphrates Dam. From Syria, the Euphrates flows into Iraq, where it joins the Tigris.

Since the Sumerian era (3500 B.C.E.), canals have connected tributaries to the Tigris-Euphrates confluence area, although the lower course was farther west at that time. The capitals of great empires—Ashur, Nineveh, Seleucia, Ctesiphon, and Baghdad—were built on or near its banks. In 1990, Turkey completed the Atatürk Dam, the first of twenty-two dams, as well as a series of hydroelectric power stations, planned for the Tigris and Euphrates. Turkey's huge diversion of water may pose serious problems for countries such as Syria and Iraq. Most of Iraq's future irrigation schemes rely on Tigris water.

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JOHN R. CLARK

TIKRIT

Iraqi city on the Tigris River northwest of Baghdad, on the main road to Mosul.

Tikrit (also Takrit) is located in north-central Iraq, some 100 miles north-northwest of Baghdad. The fortress around which the city was built was constructed by a Sassanid Persian king as a border post against the Byzantines. The first dwellers of the city belonged to the Banu Iyad tribe of Christian Arabs, and its name is believed to have honored the tribal chief's daughter. It was conquered by Muslims in the mid-600s C.E. Tikrit's population is now mainly Sunni Arab, with some Kurds. The Kurdish Muslim hero Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi (Saladin, 1137–1193) was born in Tikrit.

With the decline in sales of *kalak*s (rafts of inflated skins), for which the city was noted, many people moved to Baghdad during the nineteenth century. Under the monarchy, some entered the military academy with the help of an influential Tikriti. After the 1968 coup by the Baʿth party, Tikritis became the single most powerful group in Iraq's senior officer corps and in the civilian flank of the party. Both Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein were from Tikrit, so they invested large sums in modernizing the city. In 2003, its population numbered about 30,000.

See also BAKR, AHMAD HASAN AL-; BAʿTH, AL-; HUSSEIN, SADDAM.

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AMATZIA BARAM
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

TIKRITI FAMILIES

Iraqi families from Tikrit.

The Tikriti trace their origins to the city of Tikrit in Iraq. Tikrit is located on the Tigris River halfway between Baghdad and Mosul, and has a rich history that goes back to the Assyrian empire. The famous Muslim leader Saladin, who defeated the Crusaders, was born in Tikrit. In recent history, Tikrit was a small, sleepy town with a few thousand inhabitants.

The military coup of 1963 temporarily brought to power a few people who were born in Tikrit. Hasan al-Bakr, who became prime minister, and Hardan al-Tikriti, who became a defense minister, were born in Tikrit. The coup of 1968 brought to power more people from Tikrit, who controlled and shaped Iraqi politics from 1968 until the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

The most prominent one was Saddam Hussein, who dominated Iraqi politics after 1968, and was born on 28 April 1937 in the small village of al-Awja, a village that belongs to the city of Tikrit. Like many other Tikritis, he belonged to the Al Abu Nasir tribe. He was vice president of Iraq until 1979, when he became president. He was removed from office when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003.

Hussein relied heavily on his immediate family, close relatives, and members of his tribe to govern the country, putting them into top positions in the bureaucracy, the armed forces, the police forces, and the local governments. In most cases, they were chosen mainly for their loyalty rather than for their skills and qualifications. During the Hussein regime, Tikrit was transformed into a large modern city with a university, modern facilities, and services. It also became the capital of the newly established province of Salah al-Din in the early 1980s.

See also BAKR, AHMAD HASAN AL-; HUSSEIN, SADDAM; TIKRIT; TIKRITI, HARDAN AL-.

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AYAD AL-QAZZAZ

TIKRITI, HARDAN AL-

[1925–1971]

Iraqi military officer and official of the Baʿth party.

Born in Tikrit to the family of a Sunni Arab police officer, Hardan al-Tikriti graduated from both flight and staff academies. He also joined the Baʿth party in 1961. After the Ramadan Revolution, from February to November 1963, he commanded the Iraqi air force. After the second Baʿthist coup of July 1968, he served as deputy commander in chief of the armed forces, deputy prime minister, minister of defense, and member of the Revolutionary Command Council. In 1970, after a power struggle with his two distant relatives, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein, he was dismissed from his posts and promoted to the ceremonial position of vice president. He was then formally dismissed and exiled. He was assassinated in Kuwait in 1971 by Hussein's agents.

See also BAKR, AHMAD HASAN AL-; BAʿTH, AL-; HUSSEIN, SADDAM.

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UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

TIMAR

Land rights earned in exchange for service to the Ottoman state.

The *timar* system began under Murad I (1359–1389), who granted land rights as payment to his military officers. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries timars became the primary means of financing the Ottoman military. The typical timar holder was a provincial cavalry officer who contributed troops and supplies when called up for battle. He financed these through his timar, a state grant of nonhereditary rights over land, usually in the village where he lived. The officer kept a set amount of the tax revenue as his salary and delivered the remainder to the central state.

With economic and technological change in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, tax farms gradually supplanted timars. The state confiscated timars from officers who died or could no longer afford to send troops, and reassigned them to notables who would contract to collect taxes in exchange for monetary compensation. Although they contributed less and less to imperial tax revenues, timars continued to exist on a small scale through the nineteenth century.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

TINDOUF

A strategically important Saharan town in western Algeria, situated near large mineral deposits.

Tindouf is close to Algeria's borders with Mauritania, Morocco, and Western Sahara. It was an administrative outpost built largely by the French colonial government and became a political and economic hub in the years after Algeria gained independence from France in 1962. Rich deposits of phosphates and iron ore dominate the region, particularly at Gara Djebilet, 93 miles (150 km) to the southeast. Tindouf became the capital of the Western Saharan government-in-exile after Morocco's invasion of what was then the Spanish Sahara in 1975 and 1976. Both Algeria and Libya assisted POLISARIO (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro) in its bid for an independent state, which froze relations between Algeria and Morocco throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Since then, oil and natural gas deposits discovered nearby have increased Tindouf's importance in regional politics and economic development. The Algerian government signed exploratory agreements with major European energy companies in the early 2000s for the Tindouf basin, and Morocco signed similar agreements with American energy companies for Western Sahara. This heightened competition over natural resources threatened what had been improving relations between Algeria

and Morocco as well as the fragile cease-fire agreement between Morocco and POLISARIO.

The 1998 Algerian census estimated Tindouf's population at 27,000. However, this figure does not include the nearby refugee camps, which are estimated to house 180,000 Reguibat refugees from Western Sahara.

See also ALGERIA: OVERVIEW; ARAB MAGHREB UNION; POLISARIO; WESTERN SAHARA; WESTERN SAHARA WAR.

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DAVID GUTELIUS

TIRAN, STRAIT OF

A strategic strait connecting the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea.

The Strait of Tiran is barely 2.5 miles wide at one point; it provides narrow passage for ships traveling from the Red Sea to the Jordanian port of Aqaba and the Israeli port of Elat. Near the coast of the Sinai Peninsula at the mouth of the strait are several islands, including Tiran and Sanafir, that Saudi Arabia permitted Egypt to claim in 1949. Egypt subsequently asserted that its territorial waters extended across the strait, and closed the passage to ships bound for Elat on two occasions as part of its political and military conflict with Israel. The first instance, in the early 1950s, was one of the reasons for Israel's attack on the Sinai in 1956. The second blockade was established in May 1967 and precipitated the 1967 War. Israel occupied the islands and reopened the straits to its ships after the war. As a result of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979, the Strait of Tiran was recognized as an international waterway. Israel relinquished the islands to Egypt in 1982 as part of its withdrawal from the territories it had occupied in the Sinai in 1967.

See also SUEZ CRISIS (1956–1957).

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ANTHONY B. TOTH

TISHRIN

See GLOSSARY

TIWIZI

See GLOSSARY

TLAS, MUSTAFA

[1932–]

Syrian military officer and politician.

Born in al-Rastan, near Homs, Mustafa Abd al-Qadir Tlas attended Syria's military academy in Homs (1952–1954). Commissioned in the tank corps, he served in Egypt (1959–1961) during the period of the United Arab Republic.

Tlas joined the Baʿth Party in 1947. The Baʿthist military committee that overthrew Syria's government in 1963 brought him into its ranks after the coup. Tlas was granted important positions through which he proved his loyalty to the party and the military committee. He was elected to the Regional Council of the Baʿth Party in 1965 and headed courts trying persons accused of plotting against the regime, including the regime established following the 1964 anti-Baʿthist violence in Hama. As commander of the garrison at Homs in 1965, Tlas was associated with the "radical" faction of the Baʿth during the period of growing intra-Baʿthist friction. Removed from his post in December 1965 after trying to dismiss officers loyal to President Amin al-Hafiz, Tlas returned to the military after Salah Jadid's "radical Baʿth" coup in 1966.

Tlas's most important contribution in Syrian history, however,lies in his long-standing and loyal association with the powerful Baʿthist figure Hafiz al-Asad. Tlas and Asad studied together in the military academy and came from similar backgrounds. Although Tlas was a Sunni Muslim and Asad an Alawi, both were of humble village origins and both supported the secular, pan-Arab socialist ideology of the Baʿth. As Asad's confidant, Tlas quickly rose to high positions in the military and the regime. While defense minister, Asad appointed Tlas chief of staff and deputy defense minister (1968). When Baʿthist rivals tried to depose the two in 1970, Asad seized power, and he appointed Tlas defense minister in 1972. Tlas has been Syria's defense minister

since then, overseeing tremendous growth in the size and technological sophistication of the nation's military through Soviet assistance in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1972, he attended staff training at Voroshilov Academy in Moscow. Elected to the Baʿth central committee in 1980, he remained a key member of the Asad regime until Asad's death in 2000, after which he continued as defense minister under Syria's new president, Asad's son Bashshar.

Tlas is known as an outspoken hard-liner in Syria's frosty relationship with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its chairman, Yasir Arafat, since the mid-1970s. Tlas and Syria's military had assisted guerrillas from Arafat's al-Fatah movement in the 1960s and during the PLO's conflict with Jordan in 1970, but he became increasingly hostile to Arafat after Syria intervened against the PLO in Lebanon's civil war in 1976 and the bitter Syria-PLO relations that followed.

Tlas runs a publishing house, Dar al-Tlas, in Damascus, and has written numerous books on military science, literature, and other topics.

See also ALAWI; ARAFAT, YASIR; ASAD, BASHSHAR AL-; ASAD, HAFIZ AL-; BAʿTH, AL-; FATAH, AL-; HAFIZ, AMIN AL-; HAMA; HOMS; JADID, SALAH; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); SUNNI ISLAM; UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (UAR).

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MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

TLATLI, MOUFIDA

[1947–]

Tunisian film director, editor, and screenwriter.

Moufida Tlatli was born in 1947 in picturesque Sidi Bou Said, Tunisia. Following her graduation from the Institut des Hautes Etudes Cinématographiques (IDHEC) in Paris, Tlatli worked as a writer and production manager for the Office de la Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (ORTF) from 1968 to 1972. Returning to Tunisia, Tlatli edited and wrote screenplays for a number of important Arab films, such as Allouache's *Omar Gatlato,* Ben Ammar's *Aziza,* Louhichi's *L'ombre de la terre,* and Boughedir's *Halfaouine.* Tlatli's own award-winning first film, *Les Silences du palais* (Samt al Qusur, 1994), which takes place on the eve of independence from the French in the 1950s, traces the systemic and internalized oppression suffered by generations of servant women working in the kitchens of the Bey's relatives. Like *Silences,* Tlatli's second film, *La saison des hommes* (2000), set on the island of Djerba, focuses on mothers and daughters confronting patriarchal traditions, now exacerbated by economic pressures that have made their husbands internal migrants who come home one month a year. Tlatli's rich, sensuous imagery, slow rhythms, and retrospective narrative structures translate unspoken feelings of isolation and desire into the body language of women who long to emancipate themselves—not from Tunisian men or Arab culture, but from the everyday practices and social systems, both local and global, that entrap them.

See also FILM; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION.

LAURA RICE

TLEMCEN

City near the Moroccan border in eastern Algeria.

Situated on a high ridge of the Little Atlas mountains thirty miles (50 km) inland from the Mediterranean Sea, Tlemcen has a population of 155,000 (1998). The Almoravids founded Tlemcen in the eleventh century, on an ancient Berber, Phoenician, and Roman site. It was an important trade and political center in the Middle Ages, as capital of the Arab sultanate, and was Abd al-Qadir's capital from 1837 to 1842, when it came under French colonial rule. Tlemcen had received many of the Moors expelled from Spain after 1492. The city came under the Ottoman Empire in 1555 and was attached to Algeria in 1942.

LAURENCE MICHALAK

TLILI, MUSTAFA

[1937–]

Tunisian novelist.

Mustafa Tlili was born in Fériana, Tunisia. He attended the *madrasa* (traditional school) in his native

city and later received a bilingual education at the Sorbonne, where he received a *diplôme d'études supérieurs de philosophie.* He also studied at the UN Institute for Training and Research and worked for almost thirteen years at the UN offices in New York. He moved to France in 1980, and he was made a Knight of the French Order of Arts and Letters.

Tlili has published four novels, all written in French. Each reflects in its own way the writer's preoccupation with life's meaning. He is determined to denounce corruption, especially among the aristocracy, whether in the Arabian Peninsula, as revealed in *Gloire des sables* (1982; Glory of the sands); in Paris, as described in *La rage aux tripes* (1975; Visceral anger); or in New York, as in *Le bruit dort* (1978; The noise sleeps). Tlili's fourth and last novel, *La montagne du lion* (1988; Lion mountain), centers on corruption in Tunisia. Tlili's language reflects a playful anger and humorous cynicism toward the upper classes of society.

In spite of Tlili's global outlook, he remains strongly linked to the Maghrib. His multilingual and multicultural background enhances his novels and reflects a new trend among Maghribi writers who write in French: Instead of being confined to two cultures—Arabic and French—as their predecessors were, they are expanding their horizons. With Tlili it is possible to speak of the beginning of the cultural liberation of the French-educated Maghribi writers.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN.

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AIDA A. BAMIA

TOBACCO REVOLT

A popular rebellion (1891–1892) in Iran that defeated a tobacco monopoly granted to British interests.

One of the most controversial concessions that Iran's Qajar monarchy granted to foreign nationals in exchange for monetary compensation was a complete monopoly on the production, domestic sales, and export of tobacco. This was granted to Major G. F. Talbot of Britain and was registered in March 1890 as the Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia. Talbot agreed to pay 25,000 pounds immediately for the concession and to provide an annual payment of 15,000 pounds to the Imperial Treasury. This payment was to be accompanied by a 25 percent share of the net profits after deduction of a 5 percent shareholder's dividend. The arrangement was to be maintained for a period of fifty years.

Beginning in the spring of 1891 the implications of the monopoly became apparent to merchants and the Iranian population at large, the majority of whom consumed some form of tobacco on a daily basis, arousing nationalistic fervor. The void in leadership prompted the politicization of the intellectuals and the clergy. As the events of 1891 unfolded, the *ulama* (the clergy) successfully mobilized crowds against the government and its foreign policies. Under the leading *ulama,* protests began in Shiraz and Tabriz, principal market centers for domestic tobacco production, and then spread throughout the rest of the country. In Isfahan two leading *ulama,* Aqa Najafi and his brother Shaykh Muhammad Ali, pronounced the use of tobacco unclean as their followers took to the streets and broke all visible water pipes in the bazaars. In December the most prominent *mujtahid* (expert on Shiʿite Islamic law), Mirza Muhammad Hasan Shirazi, who resided in Ottoman Iraq, issued a *fatwa* (legal opinion) forbidding all forms of smoking until the tobacco concession was abolished. Shops throughout the bazaars closed and smoking was completely abandoned, even in the shah's own palace.

The value of the shares paid to the Imperial Bank was reduced by 50 percent. On Christmas Day, placards were hung throughout the Isfahan bazaar threatening a jihad against Europeans. Three days later, the shah announced the conditional withdrawal of the tobacco concession and requested that the population resume smoking. The suspicious crowds awaited word from Shirazi that the *fatwa* had been rescinded, but it did not arrive. The agitated shah, Naser al-Din, sent a personal letter to Tehran's leading *mujtahid,* Mirza Hasan Ashtiani, demanding that he immediately resume smoking or leave the country. As the news of the shah's message spread through the capital, the enraged crowds occupied the streets surrounding the shah's palace.

Fearing for the safety of the shah, the government's troops opened fire on the rioters, killing seven people, including the *sayyid* who originally had led the crowds. With the help of the merchants, Ashtiani and other *ulama* sent a strong message to Naser al-Din Shah and his prime minister, Amin al-Soltan. Realizing the severity of the situation, the shah in January 1892 abolished the concession completely, agreed to pay compensation to the families of those killed, and pardoned all leaders of the revolt. Shirazi telegraphed a few days later to say that Muslims could resume smoking.

See also SHIRAZI, MIRZA HASAN.

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ROSHANAK MALEK
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

TOBRUK

Small Libyan seaport west of the Egyptian border; scene of fierce fighting during World War II.

Tobruk had been occupied by General Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps but fell to British forces under General Archibald Wavell on 22 January 1941 during World War II. In April 1941, Rommel's counteroffensive left Tobruk under siege until December, when it was retaken by the British. Rommel's drive into Egypt in May 1942 led to the surrender of 25,000 troops at Tobruk on 21 June, after a one-day assault. Tobruk remained in German hands until liberated by General Bernard Law Montgomery's Eighth Army, after Britain's successful conclusion to the battle of al-Alamayn in November 1942.

In the 1960s, port facilities in the town were expanded to provide links to nearby oil fields. The population of Tobruk in 2004 was estimated at 157,800.

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR

TOMAN

See GLOSSARY

TOPKAPI PALACE

Governmental seat of the Ottoman Empire.

The New Palace (Saray-Cedid), now known as the Topkapi Palace (in reference to the eighteenth-century royal summer residence next to the seaside Cannon Gate), occupied the site of Byzantium's ancient acropolis in what was then the city of Constantinople (now Istanbul). Enclosed by protective walls, the Topkapi Palace stood in the middle of a vast woodland. It served for nearly four centuries as the principal center of governance for the entire Ottoman Empire.

The administrative functions of the government were located in the outer *(birun)* court of the fortress-palace, and the inner *(enderun)* court included space for the royal pavilions and the palace school. The quarters for the sultan's pages surrounded the inner court; the harem quarters were behind its northern wall, overlooking the section of Istanbul known as the Golden Horn.

The Topkapi Palace lost its importance when the court moved to the Dolmabahçe Palace in 1854. After that date, aside from certain ceremonial occasions involving the holy relics of Islam (kept in the privy chamber), it hardly ever was used. Since its renovation in the 1930s, the Topkapi Palace has been a museum.

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APTULLAH KURAN
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

TOUMI, KHALIDA

[1958–]

One of the pioneers of the feminist movement in Algeria.

Khalida Toumi was known as Khalida Messaoudi before she reclaimed her maiden name. She was born in 1958 in Sidi Ali Moussa, a village in the Kabylie region, and entered the University of Algiers in 1977 to pursue a degree in mathematics. After graduating from the École Normale Supérieure, she taught mathematics until 1993. In 1981, she founded the Collectif féminin (Women's Grouping) not only to oppose the ministerial interdiction on Algerian women leaving the country unless accompanied by a male family member, but also to oppose state endorsement of the discriminatory Family Code, which the National Assembly eventually adopted in 1984. Following the adoption of this code, Toumi presided over the Association for Equality between Men and Women, founded by a group of Trotskyite militants. In 1985, she cofounded and became a member of the executive committee of the Algerian League of Human Rights. She later distanced herself from the Trotskyite militants and in 1990 founded the Independent Association for the Triumph of Women's Rights. She staunchly opposed Islamist ideology and endorsed cancellation of the January 1992 legislative elections, which the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was poised to win. She considered the FIS to display "absolutely all the classic ingredients of totalitarian populist movements." During the years of terrorism in Algeria, she traveled to Western countries to provide an anti-Islamist perspective. A member of the Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD), she won a seat in the assembly and served as the RCD's national vice president for human rights and women's issues. After profound disagreements with the RCD's president Said Sadi, she severed relations with the RCD in January 2001, at the peak of the crisis in her native Kabylie; she was subsequently expelled from the RCD. In May 2002, she became minister of culture and communication, as well as the government's spokesperson, the first woman ever to hold that job. Khalida Toumi has in recent years lost her credibility as a staunch proponent of democracy because of her loyalty to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, harshly criticized today for his authoritarianism and alliance with Islamists. The independent press and most advocates of democracy do not wish to see Bouteflika re-elected in April 2004.

See also Algeria: Overview; Gender: Gender and Politics; Kabylia; Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD); Sadi, Said.

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Yahia Zoubir

TOURISM

An economic and social activity that has widely varying manifestations in the Middle East and North Africa.

Since the rise of civilization, the Middle East has been rich in notable sights and sites, and people have been visiting them for millennia. The Great Pyramids, the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, and places of religious significance such as Jerusalem and Mecca were drawing visitors long before the invention of the word *tourism*. And while travel for the purpose of seeing religious sites or carrying out religious obligations may be rightly termed "pilgrimage," the social and economic effects of this sort of travel are essentially indistinguishable from travel for purely secular reasons. If one accepts a broad definition of tourism, then it has been going on for centuries, on a large scale, to the region's many religious destinations. If one defines tourism more narrowly, as secular travel for the purposes of sightseeing and leisure on a scale large enough to be economically significant, then tourism, especially by Europeans, became important in the region only in the second half of the nineteenth century, when transportation methods improved and leisure time increased along with disposable income.

Europe's interest in the region historically had a religious component: Its Christians and Jews were keenly aware of the Holy Land, and much of the literature of European travelers to Palestine is intertwined with religious themes. Colonialism also drove European curiosity. The French and British occupations of parts of Egypt brought a flood of information about the land of the pharaohs. And with

Tourists take in the sights of Istanbul. Tourism is Turkey's second-largest source of foreign currency earnings, bringing in approximately US$10 billion a year. Upwards of thirteen million people typically visit Turkey annually, though recent terrorist activity in the country has severely curtailed those numbers. © David Keaton/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

the coming of steamship travel and the wealth and leisure generated by the industrial revolution in Europe, tourism as an organized industry spread from Europe to the Middle East. The first tours of Egypt from England were organized by Thomas Cook in 1868, and the first editions of Baedeker's guides for Palestine, Syria, and Egypt were published a few years later, first in German and later in French and English.

Early tourists were drawn by the region's sites of religious and historical importance, and today many still flock to such world treasures as the Great Pyramids at Giza, the Blue Mosque of Istanbul, and the old medina of Fez. As modern governments and private investors attempt to increase tourism revenues, they are adopting new strategies to attract visitors and keep them entertained. Egypt, Syria, Morocco, and some Persian Gulf countries have been developing waterfront resorts. Turkey, long a summertime destination for many Europeans, has begun to develop mountain areas for winter tourism. Bahrain expanded its International Exhibition Centre in 1999 and plans to construct facilities for international-caliber formula-one auto racing. Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, has for years been hosting international tennis and golf tournaments. Several countries have built large exhibition and convention facilities, new sports venues, and a variety of resorts, from Tunisia's Saharan winter resorts to beach complexes on the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean coasts.

Turkey has the largest volume of annual tourist arrivals in the region, with about 11.6 million visitors recorded in 2001. Tunisia also has an active tourism sector, with an average of about 5 million visitors between 1999 and 2001. Morocco, where tourism is important in the country's development strategy, averaged more than 2 million arrivals between 1999 and 2001. Countries with the least tourist activity were Algeria, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, and Yemen.

The political and security situations in a country can have a markedly negative impact on tourism. Periods of prolonged conflict can cut the number of visitors drastically, even in places where tourism often is encouraged. For example, despite a highly developed and well-funded tourism infrastructure and an active Ministry of Tourism, tourist arrivals in Israel dropped from 2.3 million in 1999 to 1.2 million in 2001, due in large part to continuing violence. The fact that arrivals in Algeria, a country with tremendous tourist potential, numbered fewer than 200,000 between 1998 and 2000 can be attributed in large part to the unsettled security situation there. Violent groups sometimes attempt to make a political statement by attacking tourists or other foreigners. This was the case in Egypt when Islamists carried out a number of deadly attacks in the late 1990s. The government responded by increasing security measures, including the hiring of special "tourist police." In Yemen it has been the

practice of some tribes to put pressure on the government by taking hostages, often foreign tourists. After the events of 11 September 2001, security became more perilous as the government, in cooperation with the United States, attempted to capture or kill al-Qaʿida members and sympathizers.

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ANTHONY B. TOTH

TRACHOMA

See DISEASES

TRADE

The geographical position of the Middle East has made the region part of far-flung trade networks, as both market and supplier, since antiquity.

The Middle East is the cradle of civilization, the place where agriculture and urban life are thought to have originated. The region was economically vibrant and a center of trade in early antiquity, and it connected far-flung markets across the Eastern Hemisphere during Roman times. The collapse of the Roman Empire fragmented governing institutions in northwestern Europe, dividing its markets from the rest of the world. The rise of Islam during the seventh century C.E. and its subsequent diffusion spread Arabic and a common legal system *(shariʿa)* across the southern Mediterranean and as far east as what now is Indonesia. Trade was reinvigorated and, following the Mongol conquest and consolidation in east and west Asia, overland trade between the Middle East and China along the Silk Road also thrived.

Trade before the Modern Period

Before the modern period, the Middle East exported mainly high-quality manufactured products to Europe and Africa, with which it generally enjoyed a trade surplus. Raw materials and manufactured products went to Asia but, like others trading with this region, Middle Eastern merchants often ran deficits with their east Asian partners.

The area around the Indian Ocean was a main market and supplier of goods to the Middle East. Pepper and spices came from the East Indies and were re-exported as well as consumed locally. Teak for ship construction and other tropical woods were imported from India; porcelain and silk came from China. After silkworms were smuggled out of China during the sixth century C.E., the Middle East also became a producer and exporter of silk cloth. Arab and Iranian shipping dominated the Indian Ocean as far as the Straits of Malacca, where Chinese junks took over, sailing to Guangzhou (Canton) and other Chinese ports to sell carpets, linens, cotton and wool fabrics, metalwork, iron ore, pearls, and ivory.

Overland trade with the Baltic region went via the Volga and other Russian rivers. Along these routes, Middle Eastern traders exchanged manufactured goods for furs, wax, amber, and slaves. The ancient sea trade with East Africa expanded greatly with the spread of Islam and with the establishment of branches of family trading concerns by Arabs and Iranians down the East African coast. Middle Eastern traders exchanged cloth, glassware, weapons, and trinkets for Africa's wood, ivory, palm oil, and gold. Slaves were sent from Africa to the Middle East in large numbers, most remaining in the countries bordering the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, but some going as far as India and China. The trans-Sahara trade blossomed following the introduction of caravans between Egypt, North African ports, and tropical Africa, exchanging African gold, ivory, pepper, and slaves for salt, weapons, copper, textiles, glassware, and trinkets.

Trade with Europe eventually would come to dominate Middle Eastern exchange relations, but Europe's lagging development following the sack of Rome confined most European exports to the Middle East to raw materials such as wood, iron, furs, and slaves. In exchange, Europeans received the high-quality manufactures for which the Middle East had long been famous: glassware, metal goods, and fabrics. As corruption eroded Egypt's competitive position during the fourteenth century, manufactures brought by Venetian traders began to displace local products. During the first half of the sixteenth century, Portugal invaded and took control of the Indian Ocean trade, constructing fortifications in ports like Bahrain and charging protection rents to merchants for allowing their goods to pass. The Dutch then displaced the Portuguese from much of their empire, and Portuguese interference with

Dubai, the chief commercial center of the United Arab Emirates, boasts the world's largest man-made harbor, Jabal Ali Port. It is the most frequented port outside of the United States, with sixty-seven berths and an impressive dry-dock facility. © PETER BLAKELY/CORBIS SABA. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

local shipping waned. Shipbuilding thrived in the Persian Gulf during the eighteenth century, and merchant families grew rich from pearling and long-distance trade. Gulf-based merchants carried a wide variety of goods—including live horses—east to South Asia and west to the African coast. Their predominance in their own region was challenged and gradually eroded during the nineteenth century. In mid-century, competition from British steam-powered ships began taking business from Arab shippers who relied on wind-powered dhows and boums. Near the end of the century, the British navy established protectorates over the smaller emirates near the mouth of the Gulf and soon dominated that sea.

During the nineteenth century, the terms of trade between the Middle East and Europe gradually shifted as Europeans penetrated Middle Eastern markets and pressed governments for changes favoring imports over articles produced locally. High value-added products (i.e., manufactured or processed goods rather than raw materials) increasingly came from Europe rather than being produced at home. For example, Morocco had been famous for its refined sugar, but its Middle Eastern markets were overtaken by sugar from southern Europe and by sugar from the New World that had been refined in Europe. A similar displacement occurred later with respect to coffee. Manufactured goods were similarly displaced as fine silk and woolen fabrics, high-quality paper, and glass, which formerly had gone from the Middle East to Europe, began to flow from Europe to the Middle East. New European products, such as clocks, spectacles, and weapons, entered Middle Eastern markets without local competition. Although yarn exports to Europe continued until the end of the eighteenth century, it was clear by the time of the industrial revolution that the Middle East was becoming a peripheral actor in world trade, exporting mostly primary products and importing mostly manufactured and processed goods from the industrializing European core.

Shifting trade patterns accelerated during the nineteenth-century era of globalization, which ended with World War I. Total world trade rose from some $1.7 billion in 1800 to $42 billion in 1913. During this period, the share of world trade going to the Middle East was halved, falling from about 3 percent in 1800 to 1.5 percent in 1913. The slope of the upsurge in trade reflected European investment in steamships and railroads, and what economists like John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson called "the imperialism of free trade": in the name of open markets, Britain forced weaker trading partners to abolish monopolies and local trade regulations and to adopt low uniform tariffs on imports. Referred to as *capitulations,* these institutional changes ensured that the market effects of competition from an industrializing Europe on artisan production in the Middle East (and elsewhere) would not be moderated by the state. This virtually guaranteed that the region would be incorporated into the global trading system as a dependent exporter of raw materials: tobacco, dried fruits, and cotton from Turkey; silk and opium from Iran; wheat, barley, and dates from Syria and Iraq; silk from Lebanon; oranges from Palestine; and coffee beans from Yemen.

Foreign investment and loans were key elements changing the terms of trade and fostering trade dependency. Egyptian overinvestment in cotton production during the U.S. Civil War displaced local food production and, when cotton prices collapsed, increased Egypt's foreign debt. The protection of foreign creditors served as a justification for imposing on the Egyptian government a joint British-French commission in 1876. Britain used this

Sacks of figs being prepared for shipping from Smyrna. Turkey is one of the world's leading exporting countries of dried figs, raisins, and dried apricots. © Underwood & Underwood/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

opportunity to take control of the Suez Canal and, in 1882, of Egypt itself. Trade deficits combined with heavy foreign borrowing caused the Ottoman Empire to declare bankruptcy in 1875 and, six years later, led to the establishment of the Ottoman Debt Commission. This essentially parallel ministry of finance represented the interests of the Ottoman Empire's creditors, and imposed an early version of conditionality (i.e., the surrender of control over fiscal policy to an agent of foreign creditors) to ensure that they would be repaid.

The Modern Period

The discovery of oil in Iran at the turn of the twentieth century confirmed the position of the Middle East as a supplier of raw materials, defining its position in world trade for the next century. Competition between France and Britain for control of Iraqi oil influenced the way the defeated Ottoman Empire was divided into mandates governed by these two victors after World War I. During the interwar period, oil was found in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, while the Iraqi oil industry became the balance wheel regulating the development of production capacity in the region via the Red Line Agreement of 1928. During World War II, trade volume declined regionally and globally owing to blockades, dangers to shipping, and shut-in oil production. Afterward, the production and sale of petroleum came to dominate interregional trade. Starting in 1960, the Organization of Petroleum

Foreign trade of some Middle East Countries *

	1938	1948	1963	1977	1984	2000
Egypt						
Imports	190	700	900	4,800	10,300	14,010
Exports	150	600	500	1,700	3,200	4,641
Israel						
Imports	56	300	700	4,700	8,400	35,750
Exports	29	40	300	3,000	4,900	31,404
Turkey						
Imports	120	300	700	5,700	10,800	53,499
Exports	115	200	400	1,800	7,100	26,572
Iran						
Imports	—	200	500	13,800	11,500	14,296
Exports	—	500	900	24,200	13,200	28,345
Iraq						
Imports	50	—	300	3,900	19,900	n/a
Exports	—	—	800	9,700	9,800	n/a
Kuwait						
Imports	—	—	300	4,500	8,300	7,157
Exports	—	—	1,100	9,800	10,600	19,436
Saudi Arabia						
Imports	—	—	—	14,700	39,200	30,237
Exports	—	300	1,100	43,500	46,900	77,583
United Arab Emirates						
Imports	—	—	—	4,600	9,400	38,139
Exports	—	—	—	9,500	14,400	n/a
Total						
Imports	**400**	**1,500**	**4,300**	**58,500**	**123,400**	**179,687**
Exports	**400**	**1,500**	**5,700**	**106,000**	**119,700**	**268,495**
Middle East as percentage of the world						
Imports	1.6	2.4	2.6	5.2	6.2	2.9
Exports	1.7	2.6	3.7	9.4	6.3	4.4

* In millions of U.S. dollars, rounded.

SOURCE: United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook* (New York: United Nations, 1986); for 2000, United Nation, *Statistical Yearbook* (New York: United Nations, 2003), 667-677.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Exporting Countries (OPEC) struggled to reverse the unfavorable terms of trade that had beset its Middle Eastern members since the nineteenth century by halting and then reversing the incipient decline in real oil prices that threatened to erode oil-exporter income.

Oil exports altered economic positions intraregionally. Until 1948, Egypt and Turkey accounted for the majority of Middle Eastern trade. After that, the oil-producing countries captured an enormous proportion of total regional trade, especially exports. Attempts to foster intraregional trade through common markets and regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council mostly foundered on the shoals of economies deformed by dependent development—that is, development strategies emphasizing oil and gas production rather than goods and services aimed primarily at domestic and regional markets. Local industrial development also was affected by what is sometimes called "Dutch disease" (because the same situation affected Holland during the heyday of its exploitation of the riches of the East Indies), oil export–induced monetary inflation that decreased the competitiveness of local goods as compared to imports. Dutch disease makes domestic production uncompetitive, even at home, further discouraging economic diversification.

The Arab League trade boycott, imposed against Israel after its creation in 1948 and still in effect in a number of Arab countries, was another factor retarding the development of local industries in Arab countries; it also deprived Israeli farms and

factories of a nearby market for their products and increased Israel's already massive dependence on foreign assistance. Together, these outcomes increased the power of government over civil society, both in Israel and in the Arab states, by diminishing the capacity of domestic business interests to exercise checks on the state. The boycott also aggravated a conflict that all the region's governments used to their advantage to discourage if not repress domestic dissent.

Middle Eastern trade oscillates in response to political crises and wars, many connected to the Arab–Israeli conflict. In general, crises tend to depress Middle Eastern oil exports, either through oil embargoes or as a result of war-induced oil price increases. For example, the global position of Arab oil exporters was gravely damaged by consumer efforts to find other sources of hydrocarbon imports following the 1973 Arab-Israel war and the Arab oil embargo, which enabled OPEC to raise crude oil prices to what then were unheard-of levels. Ten years later, the volume of oil exports from OPEC countries was half what it had been in 1973. (Oil income did not fall in proportion because of further oil price increases during that period.) Other conflicts, such as the revolution in Iran and the subsequent U.S. trade sanctions against it, and the three Gulf Wars in which Iraq was a major belligerent (1980–1988; 1990–1991; and 2003), also affected regional trade. The first Gulf War, between Iran and Iraq, was fought in part with oil exports. Iraqi exports were occasionally halted by Iranian attacks but Iraq continued to receive oil income from Saudi and Kuwaiti sales of oil from the former Neutral Zone. Meanwhile, Iran suffered under U.S. trade sanctions, which depressed its export income.

As regards the balance of trade overall, oil-exporting-country revenues usually have exceeded the cost of imported goods and services. Non-oil exporters, such as Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, and Turkey, ran trade deficits, some incurred to pay for oil imports. The deficits were covered by foreign aid and loans, leading to large foreign debts. These macro-level effects mask significant changes in non-oil-exporting economies. For most, the composition of exports has changed. Traditional raw-material exports like cotton and grain have declined owing to greater processing and consumption at home. A growing export trade in manufactured goods, such as high-tech equipment and finished textiles, is bringing new trade income to Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. On the import side, rising incomes from oil exports have trickled down to non-oil-exporting neighbors via labor migration and, prior to the collapse in oil prices in 1986, through intraregional foreign aid. This allowed imports of foodstuffs, durable consumer goods, industrial and transport machinery, and raw materials to rise.

The most disturbing component of Middle Eastern trade is armaments. Higher oil prices in the 1970s were offset by the aggressive marketing of weapons to Middle Eastern Muslim countries. The motives of arms buyers were diverse. Some, such as Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, sought arms from external patrons as a way to assert their political and religious authority in the region. Others felt themselves to be at a disadvantage as compared to their neighbors, especially Israel, with its virtually First World military industries and its ability to acquire weapons and advanced military technologies, mostly free, from the United States. The overall decline in the world economy following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war made trade-surplus oil exporters attractive targets of marketing efforts by arms exporters from throughout the world. Britain, France, China, and Russia joined the United States in building arms export markets in the Middle East. Beginning in the 1980s, when U.S. policy shifted toward greater marketization of supporting strategic industries by encouraging them to market weapons abroad, then expanding during the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, even materials for so-called weapons of mass destruction became widely available for import into the Middle East and elsewhere.

See also Gulf Cooperation Council; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Red Line Agreement.

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CHARLES ISSAWI
UPDATED BY MARY ANN TÉTREAULT

TRAD, PETRO

[1876–1947]

Lebanese politician.

Petro Trad was born to a Greek Orthodox family in Beirut and received a law degree from the University of Paris. Known for his eloquent presentations, he was one of a handful of wealthy lawyers who monopolized law practice in Beirut. Trad was also involved in politics; he was one of six signatories to a petition presented to the French Foreign Ministry in 1913 on behalf of Christian sects in Beirut, that demanded an end to Ottoman control of Syria (including Palestine and Lebanon) and called for a separate entity run by "French specialists." This petition so angered Cemal Paşa against Arabs in general and Christians in particular that he asked the War Council in Alayh to execute the six signatories. They fled Lebanon.

After the World War I, Trad returned to Beirut as an ally of the French and founded the League of Christian Sects, which comprised the elite of Beirut society and demanded a French mandate over Syria and Lebanon. His law firm attained fame throughout the region, partly because he would defend poor persons who could not afford his fees. He was elected deputy from Beirut in 1925, with both Arab and French support. Trad served in the parliament for much of the 1920s and 1930s, either elected or appointed by the French authorities. He was a member of the parliamentary committee that worked on the French-Lebanese treaty of 1936. The French rewarded his support by appointing him speaker of parliament in 1937, a post he held until September 1939.

Trad could not stay neutral in the political feud between the staunchly pro-French Emile Eddé and the moderately pro-French Bishara al-Khuri. In his memoirs al-Khuri accuses Trad of supporting Eddé. In fact, Trad believed that both al-Khuri and Eddé were incapable of winning the presidency. He promoted himself as a consensus candidate.

Trad became president by default. He was briefly appointed by the French government, to oversee the election of a new president by members of an appointed parliament. The election of al-Khuri made it clear to him that his chances of winning the presidency were nil. He died in Beirut.

See also CEMAL PAŞA; EDDÉ, EMILE; KHURI, BISHARA AL-.

AS'AD ABUKHALIL

TRANS-ARABIAN PIPELINE

Pipeline transporting crude oil from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean.

The Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) was constructed by the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) to carry crude oil from Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia, to the Mediterranean coast. As originally conceived during World War II, the line was to follow a great circular route running northwest through Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which would have located the Mediterranean terminus at Haifa, then part of the British Mandate of Palestine. The postwar conflict over the disposition of Palestine ended in the Arab–Israel War (1948) that put Haifa in the new state of Israel. Tapline's route, more than 1,000 miles long, was altered to run through Syria and site its western terminus a few miles south of Sidon, Lebanon.

The construction of Tapline was hastened by the end of the Red Line Agreement, which brought a new infusion of capital into ARAMCO as the result of the removal of the restriction preventing Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon) and Socony Vacuum (now Mobil; both combined as Exxon Mobil) from joining the partnership then composed of SOCAL (now Chevron) and Texaco. Capital was not the only requirement in short supply. Steel was also scarce following the end of World War II, and its allocation was controlled by the U.S. government. A second important factor speeding the construction of Tapline was support from the administration of U.S. president Harry S. Truman, which regarded Middle Eastern oil as crucial to the success of the Marshall Plan.

When Tapline was built, it was the world's largest privately financed construction project. At the peak

of construction, it employed more than sixteen thousand men. Towns were constructed at Qaysumah, Rafha, Badana, and Turayf, where the four main pumping stations in Saudi Arabia were located. Initial capacity was 320,000 barrels per day. In 1957 auxiliary pumping stations were installed, raising capacity to 450,000 barrels per day. Tapline's capacity in 2003 was 500,000 barrels per day.

Tapline increased ARAMCO's capacity to export crude oil and reduced its oil-transport expenses. This prompted the government of Saudi Arabia to demand 50 percent of Tapline's profits under the fifty-fifty profit-sharing agreement that governed oil production. ARAMCO argued that transport was not covered under the profit-sharing agreement and claimed that Tapline was not an affiliate of ARAMCO but a separate company. After years of negotiations, the company agreed in 1963 to pay Saudi Arabia half the difference, after costs were deducted, between the price of petroleum at Ra's Tannūrah and the price at Sidon. The agreement, retroactive to 1953, netted the government $93 million in arrears.

Tapline and other pipelines in the region not only reduce transport costs and increase oil-export capacity but also provide alternatives to shipping from the Persian Gulf or through the Suez Canal. However, pipelines have security problems. Syria halted the passage of oil through Tapline for twenty-four hours in October 1956 during the Arab–Israel War, and in Syria a tractor ruptured Tapline in May 1970, just as Libya was restricting the production of Occidental Petroleum during the early days of the "squeeze." This blocked the transit of 500,000 barrels of crude from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean, triggering an immediate threefold rise in oil-tanker rates. The vulnerability of Tapline was highlighted by several incidents of sabotage in 1973, including an armed attack on the Sidon terminal and attacks on the pipeline itself in Syria and in Saudi Arabia.

In order to counter some of the strategic liabilities of relying so heavily on Tapline for pipeline transport, Saudi Arabia constructed a 720-mile crude-oil pipeline, Petroline, from the eastern oil fields to Yanbu, on the Red Sea, in 1981. A parallel line, connected to a spur running from Iraq's southern oil fields, was constructed to enable Iraq to export oil from Saudi Arabia during its war with Iran. This line was closed under United Nations sanctions following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The Saudis seized ownership in June 2001. Petroline, located entirely within Saudi Arabia, carried a maximum of 5 million barrels per day at its peak. In 2003 utilization was about half this capacity to accommodate the conversion of the line to carry natural gas. Like Tapline, Petroline increases the kingdom's export flexibility and demonstrates its commitment to a secure supply of hydrocarbon fuels to consumers.

See also Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO); Petroleum, Oil, and Natural Gas; Petroleum Reserves and Production; Red Line Agreement.

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Mary Ann Tétreault

TRANS-IRANIAN RAILWAY

North-south railroad completed in 1938, which links Caspian ports in the north to Tehran and Persian/Arabian Gulf ports in the south.

The Trans-Iranian railway, one of the great engineering feats of the twentieth century, was commissioned by Reza Shah Pahlavi after his consolidation of power in Iran in 1925. Preliminary planning and construction efforts were contracted with KAMPSAX, a Scandinavian syndicate, in 1933. With the hub at Tehran, single tracklines were laid north and south through mountain and desert terrain to newly constructed ports on the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf coasts. The 865-mile (1,392-km) railroad became operational in 1938, with 190 tunnels, totaling 47 miles (76 km), and traversing mountain passess higher than 7,000 feet (2,135 m).

The railway symbolized the new regime's goals of nationalism, independence, and modernization. To avoid foreign exploitation, particularly from English and Russian interests, it was financed by taxes on the popular subsistence items of tea and

sugar. Ironically, during World War II, the railroad was commandeered by the Allies as a major supply route to the Soviet Union.

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JACK BUBON

TRANSJORDAN FRONTIER FORCE

Military group established to defend Palestine and Transjordan (1926–1948).

The Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF) was organized by the high commissioner for Palestine to fulfill Britain's responsibility under terms of the mandate treaty. The TJFF should not be confused with the Arab Legion, from which it was entirely separate.

Confusion arose out of the TJFF's having a name identifying it with Transjordan but being a part of the imperial forces in Palestine and thus a Palestinian responsibility. In the end, the British treasury agreed to have Palestine pay five-sixths of the cost of the TJFF and Transjordan pay one-sixth, following the line of reasoning that security in Transjordan contributed to security in Palestine.

Further disagreement arose over the need for a force to undertake responsibilities many believed could be handled by the Arab Legion. The high commissioner for Palestine, Lord Plumer, considered that the frontiers with Syria and Saudi Arabia were vulnerable. The latter frontier was regarded as particularly open to the possibility of expansion efforts by Abd al-Aziz ibn Saʿud Al Saʿud, who had proclaimed himself king of the Hijaz in January 1926 and conceivably would seek to expand into areas controlled by the Hashimites, particularly Transjordan. The TJFF proved incapable of patrolling the desert of Transjordan and retired across the Jordan river to Palestine in 1930 when John Bagot Glubb created the Desert Mobile Force, which became the nucleus of the Arab Legion, and took over responsibility for the frontiers.

When the TJFF was formed, its recruits came from the disbanded Palestine gendarmeries, including noncommissioned officers and enlisted men who had had five years of experience. Some 70 percent of the recruits were Arabs from Palestine, mainly literate fallahin from the villages. In addition, there was a camel company of Sudanese enlisted men; it was replaced in 1933 by a mechanized unit. Some Jews and town Arabs served in administrative and technical services. Before 1935, about 25 percent of the force were Circassians.

The TJFF was under direct control of the high commissioner in Jerusalem, and above him the War Office in London. Non-British officers were not to attain command positions that gave them seniority over British personnel. Therefore, the officer corps and squadron commanders (majors or above) were British. Troop commanders (captains) and below included Palestinians, Syrians, Sudanese, Circassians, and a few Jews.

Initially the TJFF had three squadrons of two companies each, plus one camel company. In 1930, a mechanized company was added, bringing the total to eight companies. After the camel corps was replaced by a mechanized company, the TJFF consisted of three squadrons and two mechanized companies until the TJFF was disbanded.

All in all, there were some one thousand officers and men in the TJFF. Command headquarters, al-Zarqa, near Amman, was headed by a British lieutenant colonel. By 1935, there were twenty-four British officers in command of the TJFF: the commanding officer, seven majors, and sixteen captains. This complement remained more or less constant.

See also ABD AL-AZIZ IBN SAʿUD AL SAʿUD; ARAB LEGION.

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JENAB TUTUNJI

TRANSPORT

Ships, caravans, railroads, and pipelines carry Middle Eastern goods to market.

Until the twentieth century, and in many places until the middle of that century, people, animals, and

water were the primary modes of transport in the Middle East.

Shipping

Waterways are few and not always navigable, but coastal navigation has always been important. Of the various river systems, only two were navigable—the Nile and the Tigris and Euphrates system. All were used for irrigation as well as transport, and canal systems were built to extend their benefits. The Nile runs north through East Africa, emptying across a broad delta into the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The longest river in the world, it flows from Lake Victoria through Uganda, Sudan, and Egypt. Since the prevailing winds are northerly, boats without motors can sail upstream and float downstream. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers are less suited to navigation, since their currents are swifter, their levels vary, and they often change course before merging into the Shatt al-Arab, which drains into the Persian Gulf. Because of these means of access to the sea, both areas have long transported bulk goods by water and built seaports that accommodated goods from other coastal trading areas, such as Turkey and Syria. Since antiquity, the coastal people of the Mediterranean have traded, traveled, and warred among themselves over the riches of one another's lands.

Caravans

For the local movement of goods to rivers or seaports, and even for long-distance overland journeys, caravans were relied on. Caravans of mules and, especially, camels, took over from wheeled traffic at the end of the Roman era. Camel loads varied, generally ranging from 550 to 660 pounds; the speed of a caravan was 2.5 to 3 miles per hour; the usual daily stage was 15 to 20 miles. Caravans differed greatly in size, depending on need and the availability of people and animals: In 1820, before the Suez Canal was built, the Suez caravan had about 500 camels; in 1847, the Baghdad–Damascus caravan had some 1,500 to 2,000 camels; and the Damascus–Baghdad caravan, some 800 to 1,200. During the 1870s, some 15,000 pack animals made three round trips a year on the Tabriz–Trabzon route (Iran to Turkey), carrying the equivalent of the contents of seven or eight sailing ships each way. Boats and pack animals were adequate for the relatively small volume of traffic under traditional conditions before the advent of the industrial revolution and the expansion of European trade and imperialism into the Middle East.

After an agreement was negotiated between French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps and the Egyptian government, construction of the Suez Canal began in 1859 and continued for ten years. The canal links two oceans and two seas, and transports 14 percent of total world trade. © Peter Turnley/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Steamships

During the nineteenth century, transport was revolutionized. During the 1820s and 1830s, regular steamer lines linked the Middle East with Europe

In the 1830s, the East India Company began to use steamships to travel between Bombay and Suez. In these early days, ports were inadequate for loading and unloading, and cargo had to be ferried out to the ships in smaller boats. © Jack Fields/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

across the Mediterranean, with Russia and Austria across the Black Sea, and with India through the Red Sea. Later, services were established in the Caspian Sea and the gulf. By the closing decades of that century, the bulk of the region's foreign trade was carried on steamships, and freight costs were drastically reduced. Starting in the 1830s, steam tugs and steamboats were used on the Nile and on the Euphrates, soon carrying a large portion of domestic trade. Since no port improvements had occurred since Roman times, the steamers were loaded and unloaded by lighters, which were boats used to carry cargo from ships to ports. The first modern port facilities were installed in Alexandria in 1818 (followed by later improvements), at Suez in 1866, in İzmir in 1875, in Aden in 1888, in Beirut in 1895, and in Istanbul in 1902. Except for Alexandria and Suez, all these harbors were built with European capital. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 by a French company was a major advance for world navigation.

Railroads

The first railway in the Middle East was begun in 1851, at British insistence, to link Alexandria with Cairo and Suez, speeding transport on the Mediterranean–India route. Like all Egypt's main lines, it was financed by the government. Soon after, British capital built two lines from İzmir in Turkey to the countryside. The Ottoman Empire, however, wanted a railroad that linked Istanbul with their provinces of Anatolia, Syria, and Iraq; following the completion of the Vienna–Istanbul line in 1888 (which became the Orient Express), it gave a concession to a German company for an Istanbul–Ankara line, later extended to Basra. This Berlin–Baghdad Railway aroused much international controversy, which was settled just before the outbreak of World War I. When the war ended in 1918, the line reached Aleppo in northern Syria, and a small stretch had been built in Iraq. Other foreign-owned short lines were built in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. The Hijaz Railroad (1903–1908), linking Damascus, in Syria, to Medina, in western Saudi Arabia (near Mecca), was financed by contributions from Muslims throughout the world. During World War I, the British army built extensive rail lines in Iraq and Palestine and put the Arabian section of the Hijaz railroad out of service. In Iran, the Russians built a line to Tabriz. After the war, Turkey doubled its mileage and Iran built a railroad between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Since then, important lines have been built in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Table 1 shows the length of rail lines built from 1870 to 2000. Rail service reduced both the time and costs of transport. On the Ankara–Istanbul route, the rate per ton-mile fell from 10 cents to 1 cent; on the Damascus–Beirut line, from 4.5 cents to 1.5 cents; the journey from Damascus to Cairo was reduced from 25 days to 18 hours. In some areas, telegraph lines accompanied or preceded the railroads.

Length of rail service (in kilometers)

Country	1870	1890	1914	1939	1948	1975	2000
Egypt	1,400	1,797	4,314	5,606	6,092	4,856	8,600
Iran	—	—	—	1,700	3,180	4,944	6,600
Iraq	—	—	132	1,304	1,555	2,203	2,000
Jordan	—	—	—	332	332	420	700
Lebanon	—	—	—	232	423	417	200
Palestine/Israel (as of 1948)	—	—	—	1,188	1,225	902	n.d
Saudi Arabia	—	—	800	—	—	612	700
Sudan	—	—	2,396	3,206	3,242	4,556	5,000
Syria	—	—	—	854	867	1,761	2,400
Turkey	230	1,443	3,400	7,324	7,634	8,138	10,300
Total	**1,630**	**3,240**	**11,042**	**21,746**	**24,550**	**28,809**	**36,500**

SOURCE: *The International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Who, 2003.* East Grinstead, U.K.: CSA, 2002. *Africa South of the Sahara, 2003.* London: Europa Publications, 2002. *The Middle East and North Africa, 2003.* London: Europa Publications, 2002. *Statistical Yearbook 1999.* New York: United Nations, 2002.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Modern means of transport, as of 2003

	Paved Roads (thousands of km)	Passenger Motor Vehicles (thousands)	Commercial Motor Vehicles (thousands)	Ships (thousands of grt/tons)*	Airlines (millions of passenger/km)
Egypt	39.0	1,154	554	1,350	8,036
Iran	93.5	1,793	235	3,943	8,539
Iraq	39.9	773	323	240	20
Israel	16.5	1,460	371	611	12,418
Jordan	5.5	245	112	42	4,065
Kuwait	3.8	747	140	2,291	6,207
Lebanon	6.2	1,299	92	301	1,504
Saudi Arabia	47.3	2,762	2,340	1,133	18,820
Sudan	3.9	285	53	43	148
Syria	43.3	138	322	498	1,410
Turkey	62.6	4,539	1,590	5,896	n.d.
United Arab Emirates	3.3	346	89	746	15,633

* grt is gross registered tons
Note: The dates for the figures in this table range from 1993 to 2001. n.d. = no data available.

SOURCE: *The International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Who, 2003*. East Grinstead, U.K.: CSA, 2002. *Africa South of the Sahara, 2003*. London: Europa Publications, 2002. *The Middle East and North Africa, 2003*. London: Europa Publications, 2002. *Statistical Yearbook 1999*. New York: United Nations, 2002.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Modern Services

From the mid-1900s on, the Middle East has been served by an extensive network of telegraph and telephone lines, which extend to all cities and towns, and to almost all villages. Computer, electronic mail, and Internet and fax services exist in main centers as well.

Modern roadways were first built during the late nineteenth century; except for those in northern Iran and Lebanon, they played no significant role in the transport system of the period. After World War I, and then again after World War II, they were greatly expanded and improved. Motor vehicles, which came to the Middle East before World War I, carry the bulk of inland transport. Air transport has a similar history: every country has its own airline and the region has become a hub of air traffic, connecting North America and Europe with Africa, India, and Asia.

Because of the Suez Canal, the Middle East plays an important part in world navigation. Just before Egypt nationalized the canal in 1956, it carried 13 percent of world shipping but 20 percent of oil tankers. The canal has been repeatedly enlarged and deepened to accommodate increasingly larger tankers and supertankers. During the 1990s, most petroleum producers maintained a large fleet of tankers, and oil-refining and consumer nations had sizeable merchant and tanker fleets; still, the share of the Middle East in world shipping was only 1 percent, and its share in world tankers only 3 percent. Nationalization of all transport facilities has been a fact of Middle Eastern life, beginning with Turkey's railways during the 1920s.

Oil has brought another form of transport to the region: pipelines. The first, opened in 1934, carried Iraq's oil to the Mediterranean. Since then, far longer and larger pipelines have been built to transport Saudi Arabian and Iraqi oil through Syria to the Mediterranean, as well as Iraqi oil through Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Many pipelines no longer operate due to various political conflicts. Oil-producing countries also have extensive networks of internal pipelines that transport crude petroleum to refineries.

See also BERLIN–BAGHDAD RAILWAY; HIJAZ RAILROAD; PERSIAN (ARABIAN) GULF; SHATT AL-ARAB.

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CHARLES ISSAWI
UPDATED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

TRANS-TURKEY PIPELINE

Oil pipeline connecting fields in Iraq and Turkey.

The Iraq-Turkey pipeline connects the rich oil fields around Kirkuk, Iraq, to the Mediterranean port of Yumurtalik in Turkey. It consists of two parallel pipes, 584 miles (941 km) long (398 miles or 641 km in Turkey), with a total capacity of 14 million barrels of crude oil. The first line was opened in 1977; the second, in 1987. It is operated jointly by the national oil companies of Iraq and Turkey. Oil flows through the pipeline ceased in 1991, in accordance with UN sanctions against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait.

NIYAZI DALYANCI

TREATY OF 1815

Agreement between the United States and the ruler of Algiers that ended U.S. annual tribute payments.

In 1815, after the *dey* (ruler) of Algiers had declared war on the United States and began to tolerate corsair attacks on American shipping in the Mediterranean Sea, Washington dispatched to the area a ten-ship squadron under the command of naval hero Stephen Decatur (1779–1820). Decatur's objective was to punish Algiers and to assert freedom of the seas for trade. Decatur defeated the Algiers fleet and threatened to bombard the city unless the dey signed a new treaty promising to protect American ships and seamen from corsairs. The treaty signed on 30 June 1815 abolished U.S. indemnity payments, freed all U.S. prisoners without any ransom, and granted U.S. ships trading privileges in ports that recognized the suzerainty of Algiers.

See also CORSAIRS.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

TREATY OF PROTECTION (1886)

British treaty made with south Arabian rulers.

This formal treaty of friendship and protection between Britain and the rulers of Qishn and Socotra in 1886 was followed by similar treaties with the rulers of the other states along the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula and with the major tribal shaykhs of the interior that were deemed crucial to the security and commerce of Aden. Designed to end growing threats posed by the Ottoman Turks in North Yemen and by other European imperial powers, these treaties were a major step toward the creation of the Aden Protectorates and the binding of Aden to the interior territories in modern times. The local rulers traded control of foreign policy for British protection and modest subsidies. Between 1886 and 1895, Britain signed treaties with the Aqrabis, Lower Aulaqis, Fadhlis, Hawshabis, Alawis, Lower Yafais, and some of the Wahidis.

ROBERT D. BURROWES

TRIBALISM

See TRIBES AND TRIBALISM

TRIBES AND TRIBALISM

This entry consists of the following articles:

ARABIAN PENINSULA
BUTAYNA TRIBE
DAWASIR TRIBE
FADAN KHARASA TRIBE
GUISH TRIBES
HASSANA TRIBE
MATAWIRAH TRIBE
MUNTAFIQ TRIBE
MURRAH, AL-

Mutayr Tribe
Qashqa'i
Quraysh Tribe
Shammar
Tebu Tribe
Utayba Tribe
Yazidis
Yemini

Arabian Peninsula

In the peninsula, a tribe is a group defined by perceived descent from a common male ancestor.

The word *qabila* (tribe) refers not only to a kinship group but also to a status category: *qabili* families claim descent from one of two eponymous Arab ancestors, Adnan or Qahtan, and feel themselves to be distinct from and superior to the nontribal *khadiri,* freeborn people who cannot claim such descent. The *khadiri* included most of the tradesmen, artisans, merchants, and scholars of pre-oil Arabia.

People of *qabili* status divide themselves into superior and inferior tribes, with the former able to claim purity in blood and origin *(asl).* The most prominent of the superior tribes of Arabia are the Aniza, Shammar, Harb, Mustayr, Ajman, Dhafir, Banu Khalid, Banu Hajir, al-Murrah, Qahtan, Utayba, Dawasir, Sahul, Manasir, Banu Yas, Sibay, Qawasim, Banu Yam, Za'ab, and Banu Tamim. The main tribes considered inferior are the Awazim, Rashayda, Hutaym, Aqayl, and Sulubba. The Sulubba, who traveled the desert as tinkers and metalworkers in service to the more affluent bedouin, were at the bottom of the tribal social scale.

Marriage between individuals of *qabila* and *khadiri* status, and between individuals of superior and inferior tribes, is frowned upon. Since the *qabili* claim to status is dependent upon purity of descent through the paternal line, the children of such a marriage would suffer the taint of mixed blood and reflect on the status of the tribe as a whole. These status barriers to marriage are beginning to break down in contemporary Saudi Arabia as access to education and economic advantage have created new status categories, which are beginning to compete with tribal affiliation and are undermining its importance in the social hierarchy.

The proportion of the population of Saudi Arabia that claims a tribal affiliation is unknown. Nearly all nomadic people are organized in tribal associations, and in 1950 Saudi Arabia's nomadic population was estimated at 50 percent. Since, historically, branches of tribal groups have lived in agricultural settlements at least part of the year or were permanently settled in towns, an estimate (according to a study done in the late 1970s) that the proportion of the population who claim a tribal affiliation could be as high as 80 percent would seem reasonable. A more recent study, however, suggests that the bulk of the settled population in Najd were nontribal *khadiri,* many of whom intermarried with the *abd,* or black slaves. Since the major cities of the Hijaz—Jidda and Mecca—and the towns of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf have long attracted foreigners, it is likely that the proportion of the contemporary Saudi population claiming a tribal affiliation is far smaller.

Structurally, nomadic tribal groups are organized by patrilineal descent, which unites individuals in increasingly larger segments. The smallest functional unit is the *hamula* (lineage), which consists of three to seven generations of one family related through the paternal line. Since lineage members are patrilineal cousins, the *hamula* is also referred to as one's *ibn amm* (father's brother's son), or *ahl* (people). The residential unit within the lineage is the *bayt* (house or tent), usually consisting of members of a nuclear family, including wife or wives and children.

Members of a single lineage usually camp close to one another and herd their animals as a unit. The lineage shares joint responsibility for avenging wrongs suffered by its members and pays compensation for any caused by its members. Although tribes may differ in status, all lineages within a given tribe are considered equals. Water wells, aside from the newer deep wells drilled by the government, are held in common by lineages. Among nomads, lineage membership is the basis of summer camps, and all animals, though they are owned by individual households, bear the lineage's brand. In terms of social relationships, access to government bureaucracy, and economic well-being, connection with the lineage is the most important relationship for the individual member of a tribe.

Bedouin nomads gather to eat at a camp in the Sahara Desert of Tunisia. © CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Above the level of lineage there are larger segments that together make up the tribe. The *fakhd* (thigh) consists of a number of lineages that together control pasture and wells in the tribal area, while the *ashira* (plural *ashaʾir*) consisting of numerous *fakhds,* is the largest segment below the tribe. While the system allows lineages to locate themselves genealogically relative to other groups in the same tribe, in general the larger the tribal segment, the smaller its function in the daily life of the individual.

In eastern Arabia, there is a recognized division among tribal groups based on perceived origin: the Yamani (or Qahtani) who predominate in Oman are believed to have emigrated in ancient times from Yemen in the south, while the Adnani (or Nizari) tribes—settled in northern Oman, the Trucial coast, Bahrain, and Qatar—are believed to have come from the north and are considered racially less "pure" than those from the south. Most of the tribal groups in Qatar, despite their common origin, are also located throughout eastern Arabia. The ruling family of the State of Qatar are the Al Thani, originally part of the Banu Tamim tribe of central Arabia who arrived in Qatar in the early seventeenth century. The Manasir, one of the most widespread tribes of eastern Arabia, are mostly bedouin and range from the al-Buraymi oasis across the United Arab Emirates to Qatar and al-Hasa in the west, with some residing in Sharjah and Raʾs al-Khayma, and in the al-Shafra and al-Liwa oases in western Abu Dhabi. Some sections of the formerly powerful al-Naʿim tribe of Oman reside in Qatar as well as in the rest of eastern Arabia. The Quabysat section of the Banu Yas Tribe tried unsuccessfully in the early twentieth century to settle at Khawar al-Udayd, a marshy inlet at the eastern base of the Qatar peninsula.

In Saudi Arabia, a new national consciousness to compete with tribal identities is starting to emerge as the centralized state undercuts tribal autonomy, sedentarization undermines the economic benefits of tribal organization, and children are exposed to a common government-imposed school curricu-

lum. Tribal affiliation, however, especially for nomadic people, plays a pivotal role in relations between individuals and the central government. Since the mid-1980s, the central government has assumed the right to officially designate tribal leaders who may act as representatives on behalf of tribal members' interests. These leaders are expected to work through district amirs and governors and to deal with such issues as education, agricultural development, assistance in legal matters, transportation and communication improvement, welfare and social assistance, and helping to attain citizenship privileges.

For many tribal groups such as the al-Murrah, the National Guards have institutionalized tribal solidarity and strengthened tribal ties to the central government. Membership in individual National Guards units is based on tribal affiliation, and leadership of each tribal unit can be synonymous with traditional tribal leadership. Through the National Guards, former nomads receive training and the potential for higher-level careers, instruction in military sciences, housing, and health and social services for dependents and families.

For those tribal people who continue to live as bedouins, the government also provides water taps; market areas in cities, towns, and villages that are used in marketing livestock; veterinary services; subsidized fodder; and buildings for storage. It has been estimated that only 5 percent of the Saudi population today remain wholly nomadic.

Most tribes are affiliated with the House of Saʿud through marriage ties as the product of Ibn Saʿud's deliberate policy of cementing ties between himself and the tribal groups. Today the political alliance between tribe and state is being reinforced through marriage between tribal women and government officials as well as Saudi princes. Among the al-Saʿar bedouin in southern Arabia, for example, these marriages are encouraged by tribal leaders as a means of ensuring ongoing access to governmental leaders.

See also ABD AL-AZIZ IBN SAʿUD AL SAʿUD; AJMAN; AL THANI FAMILY; NAJD.

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ELEANOR ABDELLA DOUMATO

BUTAYNA TRIBE

One of two major factions within the Sibaʿa (also Asbiʿa) tribe of Syria.

The Sibaʿa is a major tribe of the Anaza confederation of tribes. The other faction is al-Abda tribe. Both factions were divided into clans. Those clans spend the summer season north of al-Salamiyya in Syria, to the east of Hama, and also east of Homs.

The Sibaʿa tribe as a whole numbered about 4,000 households *(bayt)* in the early 1930s. A *bayt* or *khayma* (tent) numbered about 5 persons, according to the Ottoman *Salname* (yearbook). Thus the Sibaʿa would total 20,000 persons. It is not known what percentage of this total the Butayna tribe represented.

ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

DAWASIR TRIBE

A sharif tribe of central Saudi Arabia, centered in the Wadi al-Dawasir south of Riyadh.

The Dawasir are notable for their great success as landowners and oil contractors and for their maintenance of tribal solidarity. The Al Sudayri family is the most famous to have come from the tribe; through it the tribe's influence has been felt throughout Saudi Arabia.

See also AL SUDAYRI FAMILY.

ELEANOR ABDELLA DOUMATO

FADAN KHARASA TRIBE

Kharasa is one of two factions of the Fadan, which is a major tribe in the Anaza confederation of tribes.

The other faction is the Fadan Waʿad. The Kharasa numbered 1,500 *bayt* (household) or *khayma* (tent) in the early 1930s. According to the Ottoman *Salname,* which gives the size of the *khayma* as equal to about five persons, the total number of the Kharasa would have been 7,500 inhabitants. The Kharasa spread in the summer season along the Balikh and the Euphrates rivers in Syria; they are not allowed by the Syrian authorities to cross both rivers to the west. In winter, they go eastward into Iraq, especially during the years of drought. The Kharasa are divided into smaller clans, and they are on the whole warlike tribes.

ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

GUISH TRIBES

Tribes in the military service of the Makhzen in precolonial Morocco.

The most important of the Guish tribes were the Sherarda, Sheraga, and Udayay. Guish tribes were distinguished from the Naiba tribes, which were occasionally recruited to serve the Makhzen militarily. They lived on a plot of land offered by the sultan and did not pay taxes. Most of the administrators of the Makhzen were recruited from the Guish tribes.

RAHMA BOURQIA

HASSANA TRIBE

A major tribe of the Anaza confederation of Arab tribes who were known for their bravery.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Hassana tribe headed towards Syria from Najd, pushed by the Wahhabis. They reached the confines of Homs and Hama and clashed with the Mawali bedouin in control there. The weakened Mawali relinquished their positions and retreated towards Salamiyya and Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman. The Hassana numbered 400 *bayts* (households), that is, about 2,000 persons (the *bayt* or the *khayma* [tent], according to the Ottoman *Salname,* included about five persons). The Hassana additionally had 300 *bayts* of followers.

ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

MATAWIRAH TRIBE

One of four major tribal confederations into which the Alawite community of Syria is divided.

The other three Alawite confederations are the Khayyatin, the Haddadin, and the Kalbiyya. Each of these confederations is made up of a number of clans, each of which carries a specific name. A case in point is the Numaylatiyya clan, which is part of the Matawirah tribe.

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ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ

MUNTAFIQ TRIBE

A tribal confederation in southern Iraq.

Muntafiq designates a 300,000-member tribal confederation of settled, seminomadic, and nomadic tribes, including the Ajwad, Bani Malik, Bani Saʿid, Dhafir, and Jashaʿam. They occupied the banks of the Euphrates from Chabaish to Darraji, and the Shatt al-Gharraf as far as Kut al-Hay. Led by the al-Saʿdun family, they were independent from the Ottomans, who relied upon them to defend lower Iraq against the Wahhabis and the Persians. Before and during the Mamluk period (1749–1831), they contested the court of Baghdad for power over Basra. After 1831, the policy of Iltizam, which required tribal shaykhs to collect government duties and revenues, eroded tribal relationships as the leaders demanded ever-increasing taxes on behalf of the government. When the Saʿdun became Ottoman landlords and government officials in 1870, reducing their tribes from landholders to tenants, the intense sense of betrayal further undermined their authority and weakened tribal power.

See also MAMLUKS; SAʿDUN FAMILY, AL-.

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ALBERTINE JWAIDEH

MURRAH, AL-

A bedouin tribe of Saudi Arabia.

The al-Murrah inhabit the Empty Quarter (Rub al-Khali), southern Najd, south-central al-Hasa, and as far west as the Najran oasis. Considered to be a Sharif tribe (one claiming noble descent), they are renowned both for their utilization of the Empty Quarter for grazing camels and for skills of desert tracking, and have therefore been called the "nomads of the nomads." Although the majority still remain nomadic, in recent years al-Murrah households have begun to build permanent housing near traditional watering places, replacing camel herding with herding sheep and goats, and to derive part of their income from urban occupations and service in the Saudi National Guard.

See also RUB AL-KHALI; SHARIF.

ELEANOR ABDELLA DOUMATO

MUTAYR TRIBE

A tribe of northeastern Arabia.

The Mutayr cover an area that ranges from Kuwait in the north to al-Dahna, the sand belt in the south. The Mutayr were active in the Ikhwan movement in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Among the first to be induced to settle under the movement's influence, Mutayr tribespeople in 1912 built al-Artawiya, an Ikhwan settlement that achieved fame for its zealotry in attempting to create a religious community living by God's laws, and for trying to convert others to the same goal. Some of the Mutayr, such as Faysal al-Duwish, led the Ikhwan rebellion against King Ibn Saʿud in 1929/1930.

See also IKHWAN.

ELEANOR ABDELLA DOUMATO

QASHQAʾI

Turkic-speaking (western Oghuz Turkic) tribal people of the southern Zagros Mountains of southwestern Iran, in the vicinity of the city of Shiraz.

The Qashqaʾi form a historically important tribal confederacy that originated in the late eighteenth century. Until the 1960s, the majority of Qashqaʾi were nomadic pastoralists. In the 1990s, many Qashqaʾi continue to rely on nomadism (increasingly by motorized vehicles) for a livelihood. Many have settled in villages, some for part of the year, and agriculture plays an increasingly important economic role.

Qashqaʾi territory is ecologically rich and diverse. Low-altitude winter pastures near the Persian Gulf and high-altitude summer pastures to the north and northeast are separated by hundreds of miles, and the migrations of spring and autumn each last from two to three months. The people follow Shiʿism and numbered approximately 600,000 in 1990. The Qashqaʾi have a strong sense of ethnic and national-minority identity, especially because of periodic repression of them by Iranian state rulers.

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LOIS BECK

QURAYSH TRIBE

The tribe of the Prophet Muhammad and the leading tribe of Mecca in the Prophet's time.

Before being converted to Islam, the Quraysh provided the strongest opposition to Muhammad, because the monotheism preached by the Prophet appeared to undermine tribal wealth derived from the pilgrimage to the Kaʿba, then a house of idol-worship. In classical theory it was held that the leadership of the Muslim *umma* (community) should be held only by a descendant of the Quraysh tribe, and this idea has been used by political opposition groups in contemporary Saudi Arabia to challenge the legitimacy of the Al Saʿud family, who are of the Anaza tribe. It has also been used to strengthen the legitimacy of the Sharifian dynasty of Morocco, which claims descent from the Quraysh.

See also KAʿBA.

ELEANOR ABDELLA DOUMATO

Shammar

A tribe of north-central Saudi Arabia.

The Shammar are a sharif tribe (a tribe claiming noble descent), centered in northern Najd in the region of Haʾil, Jabal Shammar, and the Nafud. The Shammar are led by the Al Rashid family, former rulers of Haʾil who captured Riyadh in 1891 and were ousted by Ibn Saʿud in 1902. Divided into four sections—Abda, Aslam, Al Sinjara, and Tuman—the Shammar tribe was primarily camel-herding bedouin. Some few lineages live in farming villages. Many of their lineages, including the ruling Al Rashid, were seminomadic, maintaining oasis gardens during part of the year and grazing their animals in the desert in the wake of winter rains. In the nineteenth century, the Al Rashid were active proponents of the Muwahhidun reform movement, though they opposed the extension of Al Saʿud family rule into their territory, encouraged Qurʾanic education for boys and girls, and required Friday attendance in the mosque by men. In the twentieth century, the Shammar intermarried with the Al Saʿud family and benefit today from the patronage of the ruling family, although they have been generally excluded from governing posts.

Eleanor Abdella Doumato

Tebu Tribe

Group of black Africans of unknown origin centered in the Tibesti mountains of the Sahara.

The Tebu are located in both southern Libya and northern Chad. Their language is part of the Nilo-Saharan family. The Tebu are Muslims, their form of Islam strongly influenced by the Libyan Sanusi movement of the nineteenth century. Their economy is a combination of pastoralism, farming, and date cultivation.

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Stuart J. Borsch

Utayba Tribe

The most powerful tribe in central Arabia.

The Utayba (also Otayba) were wealthy in camels and horses, which were sold on the international market, and strong in arms. In nobility, the Utayba were second only to the Anaza tribe of the Al Saʿud, and they ranged from the eastern Hijaz to central Najd. In the nineteenth century, there were settled villages of Utayba as well as large, fully nomadic confederations. The Utayba joined the Ikhwan in the early years of the twentieth century, with some sections of the tribe settling in Artawiya and Ghatghat, the most fervent of the Muwahhidun religious settlements. The religious zealot who led the attempt to seize the Grand Mosque at Mecca in 1979, Juhaiman al-Utaybi, was a member of the Utayba.

Eleanor Abdella Doumato

Yazidis

Kurdish tribe.

A Kurdish tribal group of nomadic clans numbering 60,000 to 70,000 persons indigenous to the area of northern Iraq (Mosul) and eastern Turkey (Diyarbekir), they practice a heterodox religion incorporating Islamic, Christian, Jewish, and pagan elements. These include baptism, dualism, the prohibition of certain foods, circumcision, fasting, pilgrimage, interpretation of dreams, and transmigration of souls. Though they possess two sacred books—*Kitab al-Jilwa* (Book of revelation) and *Mashaf Rash* (Black book)—written in Arabic, they are not accorded the status of Ahl al-Kitab (protected minority status).

The Yazidis (the name does not seem to be related to *Yazid* but probably to the Persian word *ized* or angel) refer to themselves as Dasin or Dawasin (possibly from the name of an old Nestorian diocese). They believe themselves to be a unique people; not, for instance, descended directly from Adam and Eve like the rest of humanity. They practice a form of dualism between God and the peacock angel, with whom Shaykh Adi (to whose tomb annual devotional pilgrimages are made) was united through transmigration. Figures of peacocks made of bronze or iron are ritual devotional objects. There is a hierarchy of clerics, tribal shaykhs, and lesser priests, headed by a religious chief shaykh and a lay leader, Mirza Beg.

Pejoratively labeled "devil worshipers" or associated with the Caliph Yazid, they were branded as heretics, and numerous unsuccessful attempts by Turks and Kurds were made to convert or completely annihilate them.

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REEVA S. SIMON

YEMINI

Yemeni tribes, rather than being mere vestiges of the past, are vital forces that continue to play determinant roles in the political, social, and cultural spheres.

Despite the tendency to characterize the highlands of Northern Yemen as "tribal" and southern Yemen as "peasant," tribes and tribalism are part of the cultural, social, and political landscape of nearly all regions of Yemen, even the Tihama coast and Wadi Hadramawt. For centuries, however, what has distinguished the northern highlands from the other regions of the country is the importance of the tribe as a unit of identification and action and the great extent to which tribes can be mobilized and organized into larger confederations when the interests of the tribe or tribal system are at stake. Although many residents of the southern uplands and the Hadramawt claim a tribal lineage, this often seems to be less important as a basis of personal identity than does place of origin—a village, valley, or region—or some other attribute. By contrast, many men of the highlands define themselves primarily in terms of their tribes, and many of these northern highland tribes with their present names were in existence at least a thousand years ago.

The majority of tribesmen in most parts of Yemen are sedentary farmers who grow sorghum, but the sparsely populated arid land on the edge of the Rub al-Khali (Empty Quarter) and the Ramlat al-Sabatayn is home to nomadic tribes principally engaged in animal husbandry. These bedouin populations have declined in recent years, in part because they were forced to give up their traditional roles as guardians and pillagers of the old trade routes, and now constitute a tiny portion of the total population of unified Yemen.

ROBERT D. BURROWES

TRIPARTITE DECLARATION (1950)

Declaration issued by the United States, Britain, and France guaranteeing borders in Middle Eastern states.

On 25 May 1950 the United States, Britain, and France jointly issued the Tripartite Declaration, which guaranteed the territorial status quo determined by Arab–Israeli armistice agreements and stipulated close consultation among the three powers with a view to limiting the Arab–Israeli arms race. The aim of the Western powers was to contain the Arab–Israeli conflict in order to focus the attention of the states of the Middle East on anti-Soviet defense plans.

In June 1952 the Western powers set up the Near East Arms Coordinating Committee (NEACC), through which they coordinated their arms sales to all parties in the conflict. In fact, the United States sold virtually no arms in the Middle East, leaving those markets to Britain and France. Despite fierce Anglo-French competition, the NEACC functioned reasonably well for more than three years. Both Britain and France periodically withheld arms from the rivals in the Arab–Israeli dispute, primarily when those states took action that threatened British or French regional interests. The Czech arms deal of September 1955, by means of which the Soviet Union agreed to sell Egypt $250 million worth of modern weaponry, made irrelevant Western efforts to limit the flow of arms. In April 1956 France began to transfer large quantities of modern arms to Israel.

See also ARMS AND ARMAMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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ZACH LEVEY

TRIPARTITE TREATY OF ALLIANCE

Agreement regulating Allied occupation of Iran during World War II.

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the British and Soviet governments jointly demanded that Iran, which bordered the southern Soviet Union, expel an estimated 2,000 Germans working on various projects there. Dissatisfied with the pace of Iran's response, British and Soviet military forces jointly invaded Iran on 25 August 1941, routed its armed forces within days, and occupied the country. To harmonize the occupation with the aims of the Atlantic Charter, which had been promulgated by Britain and the United States less than two weeks before the invasion, Britain and the Soviet Union signed a Tripartite Treaty of Alliance with Iran on 29 January 1942. Under the terms of this agreement, the Allies pledged to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Iran, and to withdraw all their military forces from the country within six months after the cessation of all hostilities.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

TRIPOLI

City on the Mediterranean coast of northwest Libya.

Tripoli is the capital, largest city, and chief seaport of Libya. The city was founded by the Phoenicians on a small, rocky promontory. Known by the Romans as Oea, it formed (with Sabrata and Leptis Magna) the *tripolis* (Greek, three towns) from which its modern name derives. (In Arabic Tripoli is known as *Tarablus al-Gharb*—Tripoli of the West—to distinguish it from Lebanon's Tripoli.) Tripoli owed its preeminence to a fair harbor on the short sea route to Malta, Sicily, and Italy; to good water supplies and a moderately productive oasis and hinterland; and to domination of the northern ends of the shortest trade routes from the Mediterranean to central Africa via Fezzan.

After a history of foreign and local rule, prosperity declined by the end of the nineteenth century with the demise of Barbary Pirates and Mediterranean corsairing as well as the collapse of the trans-Saharan trade system. In 1911, the population was estimated at some 20,000, when Tripoli was the prime objective of the Italian invasion. It remained in Italian hands throughout the varying fortunes of Italy's presence in Libya. Under Italian rule, and especially during the post-1922 Fascist era, Tripoli was developed outside the walled Old City and acquired modern municipal services and the appearance of an Italian provincial town. In 1934, it became the capital of the colony of Libya, combining Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. During World War II, Tripoli fell, with little damage, to the invading British Eighth Army in January 1943 and became the seat of the British military administration that ruled Tripolitania until Libya's UN-supervised independence in 1951. On independence, Tripoli became joint capital of the Libyan federal kingdom, with Benghazi.

The oil boom of the 1950s and 1960s brought commercial expansion and increased population, with development into the outlying villages of the oasis. Shantytowns—which housed migrants from the countryside—proliferated on the outskirts. The United States had a large air base at Wheelus (al-Mallaha) to the east of the city, and the international airport was developed at the Royal Air Force base at Idris, near Gasr ben Gashir to the south. After the 1969 revolution, Tripoli became the sole capital of Libya and, following expulsion of its remaining Italian and Jewish communities, took on a more overtly Arab and Muslim character. Shanty towns were cleared and large public-housing schemes and commercial developments spread in a six-to-ten mile (10–15 km) radius from the city center. The population doubled between 1973 and 1984.

Attempts by the royalist regime to create a new capital at Baida and move the central administration to the central Libyan oases did little to diminish Tripoli's political, commercial, and social preeminence. It dominates one of Libya's main agricultural and industrial regions, and its port, airport,

and roads to Tunisia, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica make it a key communications and transshipment center.

In 1986 the United States bombed Tripoli because of Libya's involvement in international terrorism. Some of the city was destroyed. Its population in 2003 was estimated at 1,775,000.

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JOHN L. WRIGHT

TRIPOLI CONFERENCE (1977)

Conference of Arab leaders in Tripoli, Libya.

The Tripoli Conference was convened 2 December 1977 in response to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem the previous month. It established the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front to oppose Sadat's peace initiative toward Israel. The front was joined by all of the attending heads of state, from Libya, Syria, Algeria, and South Yemen, and by leaders of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) factions.

Iraq, which sent a minor delegate, refused to join. On 5 December, Sadat broke diplomatic relations with all countries that attended the conference. A second result of the conference was the brief reunion of feuding PLO factions under Syria's sponsorship.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

TRIPOLI PROGRAMME (1962)

Document representing the first comprehensive endeavor to define an identity and direction for independent Algeria.

At the end of the Algerian War of Independence, the Tripoli Programme, one of the most important documents in modern Algerian history, was introduced, the product of the meeting in Libya of Algeria's Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN). This occasion in June 1962 marked the last time the wartime FLN convened before the intraelite conflict of that summer, which established the new government under Ahmed Ben Bella.

The program proposed a "socialist option" for Algeria's development. According to its chief authors, Redha Malek, Mohamed Bedjaoui, and Mohamed Benyahia, the quest for democracy necessitated class conflict and economic transformation. It projected the nationalization of foreign interests, the establishment of an industrial economy, and the inauguration of agricultural cooperatives. Stridently anticolonial, the program viewed the recently signed Evian agreements with France as neocolonialist. The Tripoli Programme was complemented in April 1964 by the Algiers Charter and by Algeria's National Charter (1976; 1986).

See also ALGIERS CHARTER.

PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

TRIPOLITANIA

A region in Libya.

The three historic North African regions of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan combine to make up the modern state of Libya, which is officially known as the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Tripolitania is the most populous of the three regions, with almost 80 percent of the country's five million people. It is located in the northwestern part of the country and covers an area of approximately 140,000 square miles (365,000 sq. km). Bordered on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, its boundaries stretch east to the Gulf of Sidra and Cyrenaica, west to Tunisia, and south into the Saharan Desert, where it adjoins the Fezzan.

In classical times, three ancient cities, Leptis Magna, Oea, and Sabratah, flourished on the northern coast of Tripolitania. Founded by Phoenician colonists, each was situated at the end of a long caravan route winding south into the heart of sub-Saharan Africa. All three cities enjoyed naturally safe harbors; lying at the end of ancient routes to the south, what began as primitive trading posts soon turned into flourishing caravan centers.

During the Roman period, Leptis Magna developed into one of the finest examples of an African city. A key factor in its development was its location on the Mediterranean Sea, sheltered by a promontory at the mouth of the Wadi Lebda, and near the relatively well watered hinterland of Tripolitania. Leptis, over time, became much more important as a commercial center than either Oea or Sabratah. Leptis Magna is the most impressive archaeological site in Tripolitania, and in Libya as well. The Severan Arch, erected in honor of a visit from Emperor Septimius Severus in 203 C.E., and the Hadrianic Baths complex are particularly noteworthy.

Tripolitania shares a common history and close ties with the Maghrib, the western Islamic world traditionally comprising Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. It is a part, both geographically and culturally, of the Maghrib and is sometimes included in descriptions of that region. Libyan migration from Tripolitania to Tunisia, in particular, has been commonplace for centuries. Cross-border migration was especially heavy during the Italian occupation, which began in 1911, as many Tripolitanians fled Libya to escape the Italian invaders. In consequence, many Tunisians are of Libyan descent, and related families are often found on opposite sides of the Libya-Tunisia border.

At the outset of the twentieth century, the Italian occupation of Libya stimulated political consciousness throughout Tripolitania. Consequently, it was from this region that the strongest impulses supporting unification with Cyrenaica and the Fezzan developed. The ill-fated Tripoli Republic, proclaimed in the fall of 1918, was the first republican government formally created in the Arab world. However, the creation of the Tripoli Republic, together with a declaration of independence and subsequent attempts to promote Libyan independence at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, stirred little enthusiasm among the major powers of the world. By 1923 the Tripoli Republic had disintegrated.

Following World War II, a wide variety of political groups and parties were formed in Libya, and especially in Tripolitania. All of them favored a free and united Libya with membership in the Arab League. However, they differed widely in their choice of leadership for an independent Libya. When the foreign powers charged with determining Libya's future were unable to reach agreement, the traditional elites in Tripolitania, together with their peers in Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, agreed in 1950 to form a federal government, known as the United Kingdom of Libya, under the leadership of King Idris I. The monarchy was later replaced by a revolutionary government headed by Muammar al-Qaddafi in September 1969.

Located on the site of the ancient city of Oea, Tripoli is the capital of Tripolitania as well as the de facto capital of Libya. The area surrounding Tripoli as far south as the Jabal Nafusa is rich agricultural land with large groves of fruit and olive trees as well as date palms. Much of Libya's food comes from this region. South of the Jabal Nafusa, the desert begins, providing spectacular scenery most of the way to the Fezzan. Tripolitania also includes limited oil reserves and scattered iron ore deposits.

See also LIBYA; MAGHRIB; QADDAFI, MUAMMAR AL-; TRIPOLI.

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RONALD BRUCE ST JOHN

TRUCIAL COAST

Colonial precursor of the United Arab Emirates.

The Trucial Coast was known to Europeans as the Pirate Coast in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the powerful federation of the Qawasim, operating primarily from the port of Ra's al-Khayma, ravaged shipping in the lower Persian (Arabian) Gulf. The government of British India sent several expeditions against them, finally subduing them in 1819. In the following year, Britain through the General Treaty of Peace, imposed a truce that condemned piracy and implied Britain's obligation to maintain peace in the Gulf. Subsequent treaties (truces) made the agreements

more explicit, and the territories ruled by the shaykhs who were signatories to them became, in European usage, the Trucial Coast. The terms "Trucial States" and, confusingly, "Trucial Oman" were also used.

Fear of European rivals led Britain to establish "exclusive agreements" with these shaykhs in 1892. These engagements made Great Britain, through the colonial government in Delhi, responsible for the foreign relations of these shaykhdoms and, by implication, for their protection. The British, interested primarily in the security of the Gulf, kept their involvement on land to a minimum. Their intervention however, tended to freeze political relationships. This situation remained essentially unaltered until the interwar period, when the British government forced the rulers to deal only with prospecting oil companies of which it approved. Britain's simultaneous establishment of an air route across the Gulf began to open the area to the outside world, especially Sharjah, where an Imperial Airways airfield was established. Moreover, oil concession agreements created the need for the novel concept of fixed borders, which the British began to establish.

After World War II, Britain was much more fully involved in the affairs of the Trucial States. After 1947, with India's independence, the states became the responsibility of the Foreign Office in London. Britain's representative in the Trucial States was a permanent political officer assigned to Sharjah in 1948 (upgraded to political agent in 1953), and several state institutions were established. In 1951 the Trucial Oman Levies, a small force with British officers, was created to keep order in the Trucial States. Expanded and renamed the Trucial Oman Scouts in the mid-1950s, it became the nucleus of the United Arab Emirates, armed forces in 1971. In 1952 the Trucial States Council was created; though limited to a consultative role, it provided the first forum in which the rulers of the seven shaykhdoms could discuss common concerns. From 1965 until independence a Development Office, operating under the aegis of the Council, carried out infrastructure projects financed through a development fund to which Britain, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi contributed; Abu Dhabi carried the lion's share as its oil income expanded from the mid-1960s.

In December 1968, Britain's Labor government, beset by a balance-of-payments crisis, decided to withdraw military forces and relinquish responsibilities in the Gulf by the end of 1971. Though some of the rulers viewed Britain's withdrawal with alarm, Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and Shaykh Rashid of Dubai, the wealthiest of the seven Trucial States, agreed, as early as February 1968, to form a federation that would include Bahrain and Qatar. Despite British encouragement of this venture, it had foundered by early 1971. On 2 December 1971, a few months after Bahrain and Qatar had become separately independent, Sharjah, Umm al-Qaywayn, Ajman, and Fujayra joined Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the federation of the United Arab Emirates. In February 1972, Ra'ʾs al-Khayma belatedly joined the United Arab Emirates.

See also SHARJAH; UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.

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MALCOLM C. PECK

TRUE PATH PARTY

A major centrist political party in Turkey from the late 1980s to the end of the 1990s.

The True Path Party (Doĝru Yol Partisi, or DYP) was founded in 1983 by former members of the Justice Party. The military's National Security Council had banned former Justice Party chair Süleyman Demirel from active participation in politics until 1987; nevertheless, he was the behind-the-scenes driving force for the organization of the DYP. After his political activity ban had been lifted, Demirel became DYP's chair and led it to victory in the 1991 parliamentary elections. DYP won the largest number of seats, but not an absolute majority, and so formed a coalition government with the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP). Upon the sudden death of President Turgut Özal in 1993, the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted for Demirel to

be the new chief of state, and he resigned as the party's chair. DYP then chose Tansu Çiller as its leader, and she subsequently formed a new coalition government with SHP as Turkey's first woman prime minister. DYP lost its parliamentary plurality to the Refah Party in the 1995 elections. It formed a brief coalition with its rival, the Motherland Party, in early 1996, then joined Refah in a coalition from June 1996 to June 1997. Nevertheless, DYP's appeal continued to erode, and in the 1999 parliamentary elections it secured just 15 percent of seats. In the 2002 elections DYP fared even worse, receiving less than 10 percent of the overall nationwide vote and thus no seats in the parliament.

See also Çiller, Tansu; Demirel, Süleyman; Justice Party; Motherland Party; National Security Council (Turkey); Refah Partisi; Social Democratic Populist Party; Turkish Grand National Assembly.

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Frank Tachau
Updated by M. Hakan Yavuz

TRUMAN, HARRY S.

[1884–1972]

Thirty-third president of the United States.

At the end of World War II, the Middle East was not among the United States' strategic priorities. Even after the Iranian crisis of 1945 and 1946 and following the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the American administration seemed reluctant to involve the United States in an area that had been part of the British, and partially French, sphere of influence. Indeed, Truman and his assistants hoped that, even after the British withdrawal from Greece and Turkey, London would be able to retain control of the Middle Eastern "inner core" and to resist any threat of Soviet infiltration into the area. Although members of the Truman administration held negative opinions about the effects of British (and French) colonialism on emerging Arab nationalism, nevertheless geostrategic necessities led the United States to favor some continuation of British influence in the region.

This inconsistency also applied to American policy on the "Zionist question." The foundation of a Jewish state in Palestine became one of the main issues of Truman's worldview, although the U.S. president was annoyed by Zionist importunity and influenced by the State Department's negative opinion. However, advised above all by his special counselor, Clark Clifford, and by David Niles, Truman believed that the birth of Israel would represent a strategic asset for Washington's Middle East policy. So the United States favored the new Jewish state, with the negative repercussion that its relations with the Arab Middle East became problematic. Fearing that some Arab countries would be drawn into the Soviet orbit, Truman tried to implement a policy of appeasement toward the Arabs. In this connection, he attempted to find a solution (via the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine) to the question of the Palestinian refugees of the 1948 Arab-Israel War. This issue was not resolved and, along with other unresolved questions, became the inheritance of Truman's successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

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Antonio Donno

TRUMPELDOR, YOSEF

[1880–1920]

Zionist leader and military organizer in Palestine.

Born in the northern Caucasus in Russia, Yosef Trumpeldor served in the tsar's army during the Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905). He was wounded

and lost an arm but returned to combat, which earned him decorations and promotion as the first Jewish officer in the Russian army.

Ardent about Zionism and an advocate of agricultural settlements, he organized Jewish self-defense groups in Russia (for emigration) and later in Ottoman Palestine, where he immigrated. During World War I he lobbied for the creation of a British-backed Jewish Legion, serving as second-in-command in what became the Zion Mule Corps. After the war he was affiliated with ha-Halutz (the agricultural pioneers) and encouraged Russian Jewish youth to go to Palestine to create agricultural and industrial settlements. Just before the British and French mandates took effect in the Middle East, he was sent to organize the defenses of Tel Hai, a pioneer Jewish settlement in northern Galilee. He died defending it on 1 March 1920. His last words, reported as "never mind, it is good to die for our country," initially became the motto of a nationalist myth and more recently have been material for humorous subversions of the legend that both signify and contribute to the erosion of classical Zionist ideology in Israel.

See also HA-HALUTZ; JEWISH LEGION; TEL HAI.

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DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

TSEMEL, LEAH

[1945–]

Israeli lawyer and human rights activist.

Leah Tsemel was born in Haifa in 1945. Her mother and father were Jewish émigrés from Russia and Poland, respectively. Tsemel graduated from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem with a degree in criminal law in 1968. While at university she joined Matzpen, a radical left group a of the 1960s and 1970s that opposed Zionism and occupation.

Her distinguished legal career reflects a passionate and uncompromising commitment to human rights and progressive political positions, including support for establishing an independent state of Palestine with the 1967 Green Line as its borders, a unified Jerusalem as the capital of both Israel and Palestine, and the recognition in principle of the right of return of Palestinian refugees.

Since the 1970s, Tsemel has represented Palestinians in legal cases involving identity card confiscation, family reunification, house demolitions, deportations, political prisoners and administrative detainees, accused suicide bombers, and land confiscation. Her efforts to contest the use of torture on Palestinians are internationally recognized. In 1996, she received the Human Rights Award of the French Republic on behalf of the Public Action Committee against Torture in Israel. Tsemel was instrumental in a landmark Israeli Supreme Court decision of 6 September 1999 prohibiting the use of torture in interrogations by the Israeli General Security Services.

In 1972, Tsemel married Michael Warshavsky, a journalist and peace activist. They have two children.

See also GREEN LINE; REFUGEES: PALESTINIAN.

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MONA GHALI

TUBI, TAWFIQ

[1922–1994]

Israeli Palestinian politician.

Born in Haifa, Tawfiq Tubi was educated at the Mt. Zion school in Jerusalem. He joined the Palestine Communist party in 1941 and later was one of the founders of the League for National Liberation, which originally opposed partition of Palestine but later came to accept it, after the Soviet Union indicated that it would support partition. After the state of Israel was proclaimed (1948), he became a member of the Knesset on the Maki (Israel Communist

Party) list and a member of the Central Committee. In 1976, he was elected secretary general of the Hadash political faction. He was also the editor of *al-Ittihad.*

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BRYAN DAVES

TUDEH PARTY

The main orthodox Communist organization in contemporary Iran.

The Tudeh Party (Hezb-e Tudeh-ye Iran; the Party of the Iranian Masses) was formed in 1941 in Iran by members of the famous Fifty-three, who had been arrested in 1937 but were released immediately on the British-Soviet occupation of Iran during World War II. The Fifty-three were predominantly young, university-educated Marxist intellectuals from middle-class and Persian-speaking families. The Tudeh Party quickly grew to become the organization of the masses in reality as well as in name. It did so in part because its labor unions mobilized a significant portion of the wage-earning population; in part because it attracted many civil servants, professionals, and intellectuals; and in part because it successfully portrayed itself as the champion of patriotism and constitutional liberties against foreign imperialism and the threat of royal dictatorship. By 1945, the list of Tudeh sympathizers read like a Who's Who of Iran's intelligentsia.

After 1945, however, the Tudeh suffered a series of setbacks. Its patriotic credentials were undermined when it supported the Soviet-sponsored revolt in Azerbaijan, echoed the demands of the Soviet Union's Josef Stalin for an oil concession, and failed to give full backing to Mohammad Mossadegh's campaign to nationalize the petroleum industry. Its constitutional and democratic credentials were brought into question once it declared itself a Marxist-Leninist party and became a formal member of the Soviet-led Communist movement. Moreover, its ability to function was drastically curtailed—first in 1949, when the party was banned after an attempt was made on the life of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi; and second after the 1953 coup, when SAVAK, the secret police, helped by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, vigorously unearthed its underground network. Over forty Tudeh members were executed in the 1950s.

The Tudeh was further weakened by two major internal disputes. In the aftermath of the Azerbaijan revolt, a number of intellectuals left the party and in later years joined Mosaddegh's National Front (Jebhe-ye Melli). In the 1960s, at the height of the Sino-Soviet dispute, a number of younger activists, denouncing the Tudeh leadership as reformist and revisionist, formed their own pro-Chinese Sazman-e Engelab-e Hezb-e Tudeh-ye Iran (Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh Party of Iran).

By the time of the Iranian Revolution (1979), little remained of the Tudeh within Iran. Despite this, the party tried a comeback; it instructed its cadres to return and elected as its first secretary Nur al-Din Kianuri, the proponent of an alliance with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The previous first secretary, Iraj Iskandari, had favored the secular liberals, especially the National Front. From 1978 until 1983, the Tudeh supported the Islamic Republic of Iran, even when much of the left denounced the regime as a medieval theocracy.

This support ended abruptly in 1983, in the midst of the Iran–Iraq War, after Khomeini ordered Iranian troops to cross the border into Iraq. As soon as the Tudeh criticized this action, most of the party's leaders and cadres were arrested and tortured into confessing that they were "spies and traitors plotting to overthrow the Islamic Republic." The most extensive recantation came from Ehsan Tabari, a member of the Fifty-three and the most important intellectual in the Tudeh leadership. Tabari died in prison from heart failure, but 163 of his colleagues were killed—some under torture, others by hanging. A few party leaders escaped to Western Europe, where they continue to be active. They publish a biweekly, *Nameh-ye Mardom* (People's newsletter) and a periodical, *Donya* (The world), and run a clandestine radio station. They held a party congress in 1998 in Germany and often send delegates to international communist meetings.

See also AZERBAIJAN CRISIS; IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); IRAN–IRAQ WAR (1980–1988); KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH; KIANURI, NUR AL-

DIN; MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD; NATIONAL FRONT, IRAN; PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA.

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ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN

TUHAMI AL-GLAWI

[1879–1956]

Pasha of Marrakech under the French protectorate in Morocco, 1912–1956.

The younger brother of Madani al-Glawi, who established the power of the family, Tuhami ibn Muhammad al-Mazwari al-Glawi first served as pasha of Marrakech under Morocco's Sultan Abd al-Hafid from 1908 to 1911. He then benefited from Madani's alliance with the protectorate government of France in 1912, and following Madani's death in 1918 Tuhami was named pasha of Marrakech. A staunch supporter of the French protectorate and a wily politician, he accumulated enormous wealth and power as viceroy of southern Morocco and gained a reputation of being greedy and oppressive. His leadership of the movement to depose Sultan Muhammad V (1953), part of a pro-French effort to prevent the collapse of the protectorate, gained him much notoriety among Moroccan nationalists. He died in 1956, after the independence of Morocco.

See also GLAWI FAMILY, AL-.

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EDMUND BURKE III

TUMAN BEY

[1473–1517]

The last independent Mamluk sultan of Egypt.

After the death of Qansuh al-Ghuri al-Ashrafi in the battle of Marj Dabiq near Aleppo (August 1516), the Mamluks selected his viceroy, Tuman Bey, to continue the struggle against the invasion of Sultan Selim the Grim.

Superior Ottoman tactics and weaponry forced the Egyptian ruler to hurriedly manufacture cannons and raise an infantry corps that used muskets similar to those used by the janissaries. He rejected an offer to submit to Ottoman suzerainty in exchange for being allowed to remain governor of Egypt. The two armies met in Raydaniyya, near Cairo, on 22 January 1517. The Mamluk cavalry again suffered defeat, and Selim entered the capital in triumph. On 28 January, Tuman Bey launched a surprise night attack against the Ottomans in Bulaq. The battle raged for four days, with both sides displaying extreme ferocity, but the Mamluks finally withdrew to the haven of Upper Egypt. There, Tuman Bey raised an army composed of a combination of Arab bedouins and Mamluks, and he returned, on 2/3 April, to attack Selim near Giza. After another defeat, Tuman Bey escaped north to a village near Damanhur, where he was captured by Ottoman troops. He was hanged a fortnight later in Cairo.

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BASSAM NAMANI

TUNB ISLANDS

Islands near the entrance to the Persian Gulf that are controlled by Iran and claimed by the United Arab Emirates.

The Greater and Lesser Tunbs are two small islands in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf close to the Strait of Hormuz. Greater Tunb, 17 miles (27 km) southwest of the large Iranian island of Qeshm, has a total area of about 3 square miles (7.5 sq. km). There are no permanent freshwater sources on the island and historically no permanent settlements, although it was occupied seasonally. Lesser Tunb, about 5 miles (8 km) east of Greater Tunb, is less than 2 square miles (5 sq. km) in area and has no fresh water or inhabitants.

Historical evidence for the ownership of the Tunbs prior to the mid-nineteenth century is sketchy, but by the mid-1880s, both Iran and the shaykhdom of Raʾs al-Khayma were claiming sovereignty over the islands. Raʾs al-Khayma was a British protectorate, and in 1904 Britain sided with its dependency by expelling the Iranian customs officers from Greater Tunb. Iran protested the action and periodically asserted its claim to the Tunbs, most notably in 1968 after Britain announced that it would recognize the full independence of its Persian Gulf protectorates. Britain mediated an agreement for shared sovereignty over the nearby island of Abu Musa, but the ruler of Raʾs al-Khayma declined to accept such an arrangement for the Tunbs. Consequently, one day before the British treaty of protection with Raʾs al-Khayma was due to expire, Iran forcibly occupied the Tunbs (30 November 1971); Britain took no action. After the shaykhdom joined the new United Arab Emirates (UAE), the dispute with Iran remained dormant for twenty years. The UAE raised the issue of Iran's occupation in 1992, in conjunction with the dispute over Abu Musa. Since then, the Tunbs have been a source of contention between Iran and the UAE.

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MALCOLM C. PECK
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

TUNIS

Capital of the Republic of Tunisia.

Tunis is the largest city in Tunisia. The population of the greater Tunis urban area is estimated at 2,083,000 (2001), more than one-quarter of the country's total population of 9,673,000. (In 1984 the population of the city itself was estimated at about 600,000.)

In 1160, Tunis became the provincial capital of the Moroccon-based Almohad dynasty. The Almohads built the *qasba* (citadel) that remained the seat of political power in the city until France's protectorate (1881). In the thirteenth century, under the Hafsid dynasty, Tunis became the national capital, a distinction it has retained ever since.

Tunis had only one congregational mosque, that of al-Zaytuna, until 1252, when the mosque of al-Tawfiq was constructed. Subsequently congregational mosques were built throughout the city. Following their seizure of Tunis in 1574, the Ottomans converted the mosques of the qasba and al-Qasr to follow the Hanafi usage, the school of Islamic law to which they adhered. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Tunis skyline was altered by construction of new mosques, including those of Yusuf Dey (1612), Hammuda Pasha (1655), and Sidi Mahriz (1692), and the New Mosque of Husayn (1726).

Corsair wealth of the deys and beys transformed Tunis into a cosmopolitan complex dominated by mosques, madrasas (Islamic secondary schools), *zawiyas* (Islamic mystic centers), palaces, and elegant homes. The Turks also constructed a *maristan* (hospital) in the seventeenth century.

Prior to 1858, Tunis was organized into a quarter system centered on major mosques. The gates between quarters were locked at night and whenever public disturbances occurred. Each quarter was self-sufficient, with its own bread ovens, markets, bathhouses, wells, cisterns, Qurʾanic schools *(kuttab),* and prayer mosques *(masjid).* Daytime security was provided by the *dawlatli* (a position directly descended from the dey). The *shaykh al-madina* (chief guild leader, akin to city mayor) controlled nighttime security patrols.

This loose administration ended in 1858, when Muhammad Bey established the City Council *(al-majlis al-baladi).* He appointed the shaykh al-madina to head this council of fifteen members. Today the shaykh al-madina is president of the City Council and is appointed by the country's president.

France's protectorate (1881–1956) brought changes to Tunis. A deep-water channel was constructed that made it possible for oceangoing vessels to dock in the port of Tunis, near the modern city's downtown area. A causeway beside this channel connects Tunis and its suburbs of La Goulette (now Halq al-Wadi), Carthage, Sidi Bou Said, and La Marsa. France also drained the swamp that sep-

arated the walled old city from the Lake of Tunis and built there a new European-style city with parks, broad avenues, cathedrals, an embassy, and modern housing.

In the twentieth century, Tunis became the major destination of rural-to-urban migration because of its being the political, social, educational, economic, and entertainment center of Tunisia. It is the seat of the national government and the national headquarters of the government party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (Ralliement Constitutionel Démocratique; RCD), and the site of the national university.

LARRY A. BARRIE

TUNISIA

This entry consists of the following articles:

TUNISIA: OVERVIEW
TUNISIA: PERSONAL STATUS CODE
TUNISIA: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

OVERVIEW

Arab republic in central North Africa.

Tunisia is bordered by Algeria on the west, the Mediterranean on the north and east, and Libya on the southeast. It includes the Kerkenna Islands off the east coast and the island of Djerba in the southeast. In 1993, Algeria and Tunisia settled a border dispute that had been under negotiation since 1983.

Geography and Climate

Tunisia's landmass comprises 59,984 square miles (155,360 sq. km); the total area is 63,170 square miles (163,610 sq. km). The country has three distinct regions: the northern Tell or high plains; the central steppes; and the arid south, characterized by date palm oases and numerous *shatts* (salt marshes), the largest of which is the Shatt al-Jarid.

The Dorsale massif, an extension of the Atlas Mountains, limits rainfall on the central steppes. The highest point in the chain is Mount Chambi (1,544 meters; 5,066 feet). The mountains enter Tunisia northwest of Fernania and veer northeast across Cape Bon before plummeting into the Mediterranean near El Haouaria.

One of Tunisia's few perennial rivers, the Medjerda, rises in Algeria, crosses northern Tunisia, and empties into the Gulf of Tunis. Most other Tunisian streams, except the Miliana, dry up during the summer. Since antiquity the Medjerda valley has contained Tunisia's richest farmland.

The central steppes are high near the border with Algeria and low near the coast, then merge into the Sahel (coast), an area lying between Hammamet (near Cape Bon) and Sfax. Farther south lies the Sahara.

The north and the Sahel are the most urbanized and most densely populated regions of Tunisia. Tunis is the largest city and the national capital. The second largest city, Sfax, has half as many inhabitants as greater Tunisia (2 million). Other important cities are Qairawan (an important religious center and the first Arab town in the country, founded in 670 C.E.), Sousse, Gafsa, and Bizerte.

Tunisia's natural resources include phosphate mines near Gafsa and a developing natural gas and petroleum industry. Foreign companies compete for oil concessions and continue to explore for new fields. Tunisia also produces small quantities of iron ore, lead, zinc, and salt. The Sahel region is a rich olive-growing area, and the southern oases contain extensive date-palm groves.

Northern Tunisia has a Mediterranean climate with cool, damp winters and warm, humid summers. Precipitation declines south of the Dorsale along the coast and is minimal in the interior steppes and Sahara, where winter days are mild but nights can be bitterly cold. Summer daytime temperatures in the interior steppes and southern desert can be very high. Temperatures at Tunis range from 6°C (43°F) to 33°C (91°F). Precipitation averages 60 inches in the north and 8 inches in the Sahara.

The People, the Language, and Religion

Tunisia's 8.4 million people are concentrated in the north, in the Sahel, and in regional urban centers such as Qairawan and Gafsa. More than half the population lives in the northern Tell and the Sahel, on about 20 percent of Tunisia's total land surface. About 53 percent (4,452,000) of Tunisians live in cities. Population density is 133 persons per

square mile. Family planning programs in the 1970s and 1980s managed to lower the population growth rate from over 3 percent to about 2.1 percent by 1992; 38 percent of Tunisians were under age fifteen in that year. Many Tunisians engage in agricultural pursuits, but a growing number are in the tourist industry, humanities and professions, commercial sector, and government.

Map by XNR Productions, Inc. The Gale Group.

Tunisia's ethnic base is primarily mixed Arab-Berber or Arabized Berber. There are a few Berber speakers in isolated regions of the south. A tiny Jewish minority still exists; most Tunisian Jews left the country after 1957. Some European Christians live in Tunisia, primarily in the capital.

Tunisia's national language is Arabic (the first language of at least 98 percent of the people); French is the major second language as well as the dominant language of commerce and education. Although the print and audiovisual media use standard Arabic, most Tunisians speak their own dialect, which has three variations: an urban dialect, a rural village and small-town dialect, and a Bedouin dialect. Knowledge of the Egyptian dialect has been increasing since the 1970s because of Egypt's domination of the Arab cinema and television soap operas.

Islam is the official state religion. At least 98 percent of the population are Sunni Muslims. The island of Djerba harbors many Khariji Muslims. In the 1980s the Islamic Tendency Movement (Mouvement de Tendance Islamique; MTI) was formed, with Rached Ghannushi and Abdelfattah Mourou as its ideological leaders. Observance of Islamic rituals increased considerably in Tunisia during the 1980s and early 1990s. In recognition of this fact, and to thwart the designs of Islamists, the government sought to control all mosque appointments and to encourage moderation in religion. The government has grown more outwardly Islamic, following such traditional practices as waiting for the new moon before announcing the start of the Ramadan fast, and the firing of cannon to herald the first and last days of Ramadan.

The Economy

Tunisia's economy has improved due to good harvests (since 1990), economic restructuring, a growing manufacturing industry, a developing oil and gas sector, remittances from expatriates (an estimated 400,000 Tunisians work overseas), and a healthy tourist trade. Economic growth since 1988 has averaged about 4.2 percent, peaking at 8.6 percent in 1992. Unemployment ranges from the official 15 percent to a high of 20 to 50 percent in informal sectors of the economy. High rural unemployment has caused many young people to mi-

Habib Bourguiba is carried on the shoulders of his supporters as they celebrate the signing of the Franco-Tunisian Common Protocol in 1950. **© CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

grate to urban centers in search of work, causing deterioration of public services and the taxing of city resources, especially in Tunis.

Tunisia's gross domestic product is about US$10 billion, and per capita income is about US$1,235. Agriculture comprises some 16 percent of the gross domestic product, and industry accounts for about 38 percent. The workforce is estimated at 2,250,000, with 34 percent in industry, 26 percent in agriculture, and 40 percent in services. Women make up just under 25 percent of the workforce (probably a much higher percentage of the rural "informal" sector). Labor unions have organized between 11 and 20 percent of the working class. The General Union of Tunisian Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens; UGTT), headed by Ismail Sahbani, collaborates closely with the government and the Tunisian Union of Industrialists, Businessmen, and Artisans (Union Tunisienne des Industrialistes, Compagnies, et Artisans; UTICA).

History

Tunisia's geographic openness has made its history one of periodic invasions. Berber peoples settled the country in the fifth and fourth millennia B.C.E. The first outside civilization to make an impact came from Phoenicia, when émigrés from Tyre founded Carthage in 814 B.C.E. Carthage developed a maritime empire in the western Mediterranean and in the third century B.C.E. confronted Rome for control of the western Mediterranean. Three conflicts ensued that came to be known collectively as the Punic Wars. In the final battle of the Second Punic War (Zama, 202 B.C.E.), Rome's Scipio Africanus defeated Carthage's Hannibal. Rome now supplanted Carthage as mistress of the Mediterranean and dominated North Africa until the Vandal invasion of 429 C.E. Following the Vandals, the Byzantines in 533 extended their hegemony over Tunisia.

The most enduring historical legacy for Tunisia derives from the Arab invasions of the late seventh

century. From 643 until 698, the Arabs struggled to defeat the Berbers and impose the Arabic language and Islam upon them. Qairawan was the capital for most medieval Tunisian dynasties. Founded in 670, it survived for centuries as the main garrison town and political and religious center.

The Aghlabid dynasty (800–909) ruled from Qairawan. The Shiᶜite Fatimids (909–969) moved their capital to Mahdiya, then Egypt, founding a new imperial capital at Cairo. They left their lieutenants, the Zirids, in charge of North Africa. In 1049 the Zirids broke with the Fatimids who, in retaliation, unleashed the Banu Hilal nomads. They disrupted the countryside, intensified the renomadization of the steppes, and introduced a new dialect. Their defeat at Haidaran in 1052 and the sack of Qairawan in 1057 led the Zirids to move to Mahdiya.

The Almoravids, a Tuareg puritanical religious group, swept out of the western Sahara in the eleventh century. In the middle of the twelfth century, the Berber Almohads came down from the High Atlas and extended their domains into Tunisia.

By 1250, Almohad power had waned to such a degree that a successor dynasty, the Hafsids, emerged in Tunisia to rule for the next three centuries with Tunis as their capital. In 1574, an Ottoman Turkish fleet under Sinan Pasha landed forces at La Goulette (now Halq al-Wadi). Following a brief siege, those forces seized Tunis and laid the foundations for Ottoman control that continued until the imposition of a protectorate by France in 1881. To collect taxes and to maintain security, the Ottomans established a rudimentary administration. Initially an Ottoman *bulukbash* (commander) was placed in charge of the janissary garrison *(ocak)*. In 1590, rebel janissaries formed a government dominated by the deys, who ran the country through the *diwan* (council). After 1640, an important tax-collecting official, the bey, emerged, and the powerful

Tunis, the capital of Tunisia. Tunis is built near the site of Carthage, an ancient enemy of Rome that was later incorporated into its empire. Buildings that date back to Carthage's time as one of the major cities of the Roman Empire can be seen here on Byrsa Hill. **© Laure Communications. Reproduced by permission.**

Muradid family exercised considerable control over the government. During a civil war from 1702 to 1705, Ibrahim al-Sharif seized power. In 1705 an associate of al-Sharif, Husayn ibn Ali Turki, proclaimed himself bey of Tunis. In 1710 the Ottoman sultan officially recognized Husayn and legitimized his rule. The Husaynid dynasty ruled the country independently until 1881, and thereafter under France's control until 1956.

In the nineteenth century, the Husaynids accepted the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire while pursuing their own reform agendas and independent foreign policies vis-à-vis Europe. Misguided military reforms in the 1840s, financial mismanagement in the 1860s, and increasing pressures from Europe in the 1870s culminated in France's protectorate based on the treaty of Bardo (1881) and the La Marsa Convention (1883).

The protectorate authorities speeded up the economic development of Tunisia, built a physical infrastructure, reformed the educational system, and imposed a political administration while retaining the bey as figurehead ruler. Simultaneously they heeded settler demands for land, sweeping aside informal tribal and village ownership agreements. Arabs were excluded from participation in politics. French settlers dominated the political structures, the courts, and the media.

Although there had been armed resistance to the French occupation from southern tribal elements, most of it was crushed by the end of 1883. The first stage of Tunisian nationalism was an intellectual elitist movement known as the Young Tunisians, which aimed to assimilate to the civilization of France so they could eventually rule their own country. They agitated for equal treatment because of their accomplishments, but the French did not take them seriously. A more serious stage in protonationalist agitation occurred just before and just after World War I in a movement led by Abd al-Aziz Thaalbi. The third stage came in the 1930s when a young lawyer, Habib Bourguiba, broke with the Destour Party and proclaimed the Neo-Destour.

World War II slowed the development of nationalism in Tunisia. After the war, however, Bourguiba followed a staged process, arguing that its cumulative effect would result in political independence. By late 1955, Algeria violently challenged France's rule through a war of national liberation. France therefore agreed to Tunisia's autonomy in 1955 and to its independence in March 1956. In 1957 the Republic of Tunisia proclaimed Bourguiba its first president.

In Tunisia's first decades of independence, continued dominance of the Neo-Destour, which became the Socialist Destour in 1964, and the government's antireligious attitude tarnished the nation's image. Police intimidated those who sought to chant the Qur'an in public, often beating and imprisoning them. In protest, pious intellectuals organized the Society for the Preservation of the Qur'an and, in the early 1980s, created the MTI.

Bourguiba's anti-Islam policies led to Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali's palace coup of 7 November 1987. Ben Ali tried to co-opt the Islamists for the promised elections of 1989. To demonstrate his piety, he appeared on television participating in Ramadan rites at al-Zaytuna mosque in Tunis. In the spring of 1989, however, Ben Ali hedged on his promise to recognize the MTI if they removed religious terminology from their name. As the April elections approached and MTI changed its name to the Renaissance party, the government refused to recognize it.

Ben Ali's regime considers the Islamists to be the major challenge to its survival, equating them with terrorists. Ben Ali announced in late 1993 that national elections would be held in March 1994. He promised that seats would be set aside for minority party candidates. Ben Ali then announced his candidacy for a second presidential term.

Tunisia's "regime of change" has tamed the Islamist movement for the moment, has modestly improved its human-rights and democratic credentials, and has continued economic restructuring and privatization. The economy is functioning reasonably well, harvests continue to be good, tourism has rebounded dramatically, and the immediate prospects for the future appear good.

See also Ben Ali, Zayn al-Abidine; Berber; Bizerte; Bourguiba, Habib; La Marsa Convention; Qairawan; Sfax; Sousse; Sunni Islam; Thaalbi, Abd al-Aziz; Tunis; Union Générale des Travailleurs

TUNISIENS (UGTT); UNION TUNISIENNE DES INDUSTRIALISTES, COMPAGNIES, ARTISANS (UTICA).

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LARRY A. BARRIE

TUNISIA: PERSONAL STATUS CODE

Set of family laws that reduced gender inequality in Tunisia.

On 13 August 1956, less than five months after the proclamation of independence from French colonial rule, the Republic of Tunisia promulgated the Code of Personal Status (CPS). A set of laws regulating marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance, the code profoundly changed family law and the legal status of women. Together with the Turkish civil code of 1926, the Tunisian CPS of 1956 represented a pioneering body of legislation that reduced gender inequality before the law in an Islamic country.

A reform from above, the CPS was initiated by the political leadership in the absence of a feminist grassroots mass movement. Although it expanded women's rights, the CPS should not be seen as a response from the state to pressures from women's protest groups. Individual women had participated in the struggle for national liberation and espoused a nationalist ideology, but no women's mass movement defending women's causes had developed in Tunisia in the 1950s. The initiators of the CPS described it primarily as an instrument of change, a way of bringing about a transformation in kinship patterns and family life, which they saw as a necessary condition for broader social, political, and economic changes.

The Tunisian code is called the *majalla* in Arabic. Several amendments further equalizing the legal status of men and women have been made and the text has been regularly updated since 1956. The CPS altered regulations on marriage, divorce, alimony, custody, adoption, and to a lesser extent inheritance, leaving few, if any, aspects of family life untouched. The best known and most daring reforms embodied in the CPS concern polygamy, or the man's right to have as many as four wives, and repudiation, or the unilateral right of the husband to end the marriage at will. The *majalla* outlawed polygamy altogether. It stated unequivocally that polygamy was forbidden. An attempt at marrying again while one was still married was punished with imprisonment of a year and a fine of approximately $500, which represented the equivalent of a year's income for many Tunisians when the CPS was promulgated in 1956. The CPS also abolished repudiation and changed regulations on divorce in fundamental ways. A divorce could now only take place in court. The wife and husband were equally entitled to file for divorce, and they could do so by mutual consent. One of them could also file alone, in which case the judge would determine whether compensation should be given by one spouse to the other and what the amount ought to be. A woman was liable to pay compensation to her husband if the judge estimated that it was the husband who had been wronged.

Among other innovations, the CPS made the wife responsible for contributing to the expenses of the household and to the financial support of children, if she had to means to do so. It expanded the right of mothers to have custody of their children. It made the registration of marriages and divorces mandatory, something that was not systematically the case earlier. It made adoption legally valid. It somewhat modified the rules on inheritance by fa-

voring the spouse and female descendants over male cousins in some specific kinship configurations.

The CPS gave women greater rights by increasing the range of options available to them in their private lives. It also gave them greater obligations, as for example in the case of divorce and with respect to the financial responsibility for the household. Some aspects of the CPS overtly maintained gender inequality, however. The code left unaltered the general rule according to which women inherit half as much as men. The 1956 text required a wife to obey her husband; this was later debated and changed in the 1990s.

The reforms of the CPS can be seen as an effort to reshape kinship in Tunisian society in the aftermath of independence from colonial rule. The CPS replaced the vision of the family as an extended kinship group built on strong ties crisscrossing a community of male relatives with the vision of a conjugal unit in which ties between spouses and between parents and children are prominent. The elite in power in the 1950s treated family law reform as part of the transformation of society necessary for the development of a modern state.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW.

MOUNIRA M. CHARRAD

TUNISIA: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

Tunisia has eleven active political parties.

There are eight legal political parties in Tunisia, including the government party. There are also three parties that have not been authorized: the Popular Unity Movement (Mouvement de L'Unité Populaire; MUP), a socialist party founded by Ahmed Ben Salah, former planning minister who fled Tunisia in 1973; the Tunisian Communist Workers Party (Parti Ouvrier Communiste Tunisien; POCT), a Maoist group; and the Renaissance Party (Hizb al-Nahda in Arabic), the party of Islamists, founded by Rashid Ghannushi. The legal parties are the Constitutional Democratic Rally (Ralliement Constitutionnel Démocratique; RCD), the Movement of Socialist Democrats (Mouvement des Dèmocrates Socialistes; MDS), the Popular Unity Party (Parti D'Unité Populaire; PUP), the Movement of Renewal (Harakat al-Tajdid), the Progressive Democratic Party (Parti démocrate progressiste; PDP), the Unionist Democratic Union (Union Démocratique Unioniste; UDU), the Socialist Liberal Party (Parti Socialiste Liberale; PSL), and the Democratic Forum for Labor and Freedoms (Forum démocratique pour le travail et les libertés; FDTL).

Tunisian president Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali (b. 1936) came to power in 1987 when previous leader Habib Bourguiba was dismissed on grounds of failing mental capabilities. Once in power, Ben Ali changed the Destourian Socialist Party to the Democratic Constitutional Rally, and he easily retained his office in the country's first free elections in 1989. © AFP/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

RCD

The RCD has dominated all governmental institutions since Tunisia's independence in 1956. The party was founded by Habib Bourguiba and others in 1934 as the Neo-Destour. They broke away from the Destour (Constitution) Party, established by Abd al-Aziz Thaalbi in 1920. Bourguiba's group felt that the Destour had become too elitist and sought to build a grassroots party that could appeal to the rural and small-town folk that the Destour failed to represent. In 1964 the party changed its name to Socialist Destour Party (Parti Socialist Destourien; PSD). The party's final name change occurred in 1988, when the party congress adopted the name Constitutional Democratic Rally. This expressed the new direction of the government party following a coup that replaced Bourguiba with Zayn al-Abidine

Ben Ali. Moderate and pragmatic, the RCD has opened up the political system to multiple parties and has attempted to refashion a market economy to replace the earlier centralized socialist planning system. President Ben Ali is party president, and Ali Chaouch occupies the post of secretary-general. The party claims over 1.5 million members, distributed in thousands of cells nationwide. It controls the national parliament (Chamber of Deputies).

MDS

Ahmad Mestiri, formerly a member of the ruling party, founded the MDS in 1978 and welded the new party into the largest opposition to the RCD. With its forty thousand members, the MDS offers almost the same program as the RCD, except that it is more Arab nationalist and socialist. Ismaïl Boulahya is secretary-general.

PUP

Headed by Mohamed Belhaj Amor, the PUP offers a nationalist and socialist program. It splintered off from the MUP in 1981 and in 1985 it was renamed the Parti d'Unité Populaire (PUP). Amor was succeeded in 2000 by Mohamed Bouchiha.

Movement of Renewal

Secretary-General Mohamed Harmel is a longtime Communist Party activist. The Movement adopted the name Mouvement Ettajdid (Arabic, Harakat al-Tajdid) in 1993, dropping the name Tunisian Communist Party (Parti Communiste Tunisien; PCT). It now follows a leftist, non-Marxist ideology that offers an alternative for leftists and intellectuals. It remains a small party whose membership numbers somewhere in the low thousands.

PDP

Nejib Chebbi, a lawyer, heads the Progressive Democratic Party, the former Socialist Progressive Rally (RSP), which has a nationalist and socialist emphasis. PDP leaders are willing to accommodate all nonviolent political viewpoints in national elections. The PDP seeks a broader role for Tunisia in Arab politics. Regarded as the most critical of the opposition parties, it did not gain any seats to the Chamber of Deputies in the legislative elections of 1999.

UDU

Abderrahmane Tlili founded the Unionist Democratic Union (UDU). It has close ties with the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), the country's largest labor union. A high concentration of union members makes up UDU's constituency. UDU espouses both Arab nationalism and Israel-PLO peace talks.

PSL

In 1993 the Social Party for Progress (PSP) became the Socialist Liberal Party (PSL). Led by Mounir Beji, a lawyer, the PSL supports liberalism, economic privatization, and American foreign policy interests in the region. Despite being considered the weakest legal party, it obtained two deputies in the 1999 legislative elections.

FDTL

Founded in 1994, the Democratic Forum for Labor and Freedoms (FDTL) was legalized in 2002. Its secretary-general, Mustapha Ben Jaafar, a former leader of the MDS, defines its ideology as social-democratic.

Since 1993, new laws have been implemented aimed at encouraging political pluralism. Accordingly, and as of 2003, the legal opposition parties share 34 seats, out of 182, in the Chamber of Deputies. The results of the legislative elections of 1999 were as follows: RCD, 148 deputies; MDS, 13; PUP, 7; UDU, 7; Ettajdid, 5; PSL, 2; PDP, 0.

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LARRY A. BARRIE
UPDATED BY ANA TORRES-GARCÍA

TUNISI, BAYRAM AL-

[1893–1961]

Egyptian poet.

Born into a small merchant family in a popular quarter of Alexandria, Bayram al-Tunisi studied at religious schools but learned the form of poetry called *zajal* by memorizing oral poetry. In 1919, he began to publish poetry critical of Egypt's monarchy and of the British occupation, in the journal *Issues,* leading to a long period of exile in France and Tunisia. After his return to Egypt in 1938, al-Tunisi published poetry in various Egyptian newspapers.

DAVID WALDNER

TUQAN, FADWA

[1917–2003]

Palestinian poet.

Fadwa Tuqan was born to the eminent Tuqan family of Nablus, one of the leading traditional families of central Palestine, which produced several notable figures in Palestinian education, literature, and politics. Like her elder brother, Ibrahim, she became one of the most influential poets in modern Palestinian literature, publishing her first collection of poetry, *Wahdi ma al-Ayyam* (Along with the days), in 1952.

Her work is noted for having broken with traditional Arabic poetic styles, introducing, for example, free verse into modern Arabic poetry. Tuqan's poetry is also noteworthy for discussing sensual themes, as well as for depicting the social conditions facing Palestinians, especially Palestinian women. Her 1985 autobiography, *Rihla Jabaliyya, Rihla Saʿba* (A mountainous journey, a difficult journey), provides a forceful discussion of the plight of women in Palestine prior to the first Arab–Israel War and the creation of Israel in 1948. Starting with the Israeli occupation of her native West Bank in June 1967, Tuqan also began writing poetry with nationalist themes. Some of her poems were printed in the underground nationalist publication *Filastin* in the mid-1970s. Israeli general and politician Moshe Dayan once remarked that the power of just one of her poems, like her famous "The Freedom Fighter and the Land," was equal to that of several Palestinian guerrilla fighters. She was not above participating in secret Arab-Israeli contacts, however. Dayan met with her twice in late 1968, when he was Israel's defense minister, as part of his secret effort to strike up a dialogue with Arab leaders. Tuqan once passed along a message from Dayan to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and offered to contact Yasir Arafat, leader of the al-Fatah movement.

In 1990 she was awarded the Palestine Liberation Organization's Jerusalem Award for Culture and Arts, as well as the Honorary Palestine Prize for Poetry in 1996. Fadwa Tuqan died in Nablus, where she had lived all her life, on 13 December 2003. A line from one of her poems sums up her wish to be buried in her native Palestine: "Enough for me to die on her earth, be buried in her, to melt and vanish into her soil."

See also ARAFAT, YASIR; DAYAN, MOSHE; FATAH, AL-; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; WEST BANK.

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ABLA M. AMAWI
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

TUQAN FAMILY

Prominent Palestinian family from Nablus.

Descended from an ancient Arabian tribe, the Tuqans settled in Nablus during the twelfth century. Through the nineteenth century, they were associated with other Qaysi tribes in rivalry with the local Yemeni federation. By the 1800s they had amassed great wealth, owning an imposing palace as well as a number of villas in Nablus. They shared the post of governor with the Abd al-Hadi family and used their land and tax-farm wealth to build up Nablus's famed soap and olive oil industries. Their political dominance in Nablus lasted through the

1970s as various family members gained posts under the rule of Jordan.

Prominent family members include Hafiz, a late-nineteenth-century banker; Ahmad (1903–1981), a Cambridge University graduate who was prominent in education under the British Mandate and Jordanian rule; Sulayman (1893–1958), mayor of Nablus from 1925 to 1948 and a leader of resistance to Zionism; Fadwa (1917–2003) and Ibrahim (1905–1941), sister and brother who became noted poets; Qadri (1911–1971), an educator and writer who sat in the Jordanian parliament from 1951 to 1955 and became Jordan's foreign minister in 1964; Baha al-Din (1910–1998), a historian and politician in the Jordanian government; and Aliya (1948–1977), daughter of Baha al-Din who became the third wife of Jordan's King Hussein ibn Talal from December 1972 until her death in a helicopter crash in February 1977.

See also ABD AL-HADI FAMILY; HUSSEIN IBN TALAL; NABLUS; TUQAN, FADWA.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON
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TURABI, HASAN AL-

[1932–]

Fundamentalist Islamic thinker.

Born in the city of Kasla in Sudan to a family of religious learning and traditions, Hasan al-Turabi earned a B.A. in law from the University of Khartoum, an M.A. in law from the University of London, and a doctorate in constitutional law from the Sorbonne in Paris. He became dean of the University of Khartoum Law School in 1964, then attorney general in 1979, and a member of the Sudanese parliament in 1965. In 1977 he became a minister of justice.

Turabi is the leader of the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was transformed into the National Islamic Front (NIF) in 1985 under his leadership. In 1988 the NIF joined the coalition government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, and Turabi served first as minister of foreign affairs and later as deputy prime minister. He was the ideological power behind the military regime of Hasan al-Bashir in Sudan in 1989. In 1996 Turabi became the speaker of the parliament, and his influence spread throughout the state organization and political parties. He fell out of favor with President al-Bashir's regime and since 2000 has been either in prison or under house arrest. However, Turabi's importance lies not in his statesmanship, but in his intellectual and ideological developments as well as his impact on Islamism in North Africa in particular and the Arab world in general.

Turabi is a fundamentalist Islamic thinker because he views Islam as the ultimate ideological and political authority for both the state and society. He views Islam as containing all the necessary elements for the creation of a viable and modern civilization and culture. Rather than a return to earlier Islamic social and political practices, Turabi advocates a progressive Islamic revival that incorporates into Islam the best of traditional Islam and Western culture. He argues that the state's only purpose is to set rules to enable society to conduct its affairs, and that it must allow society, the primary institution in Islam, to freely pursue its interests. The *shariʿa* and the Islamist jurists ensure that the role of the state remains limited. Because any society has the right to exercise *shura* (consultation) and *ijma* (consensus), and because this requires producing *ijtihad* (opinions), pluralism is necessary to enable society to identify which policies best serve its interests. As such, Turabi argues, *democracy* is simply a Western term identical to Islam's *shura* and *ijma.* Although ultimate sovereignty belongs to God, practical and political sovereignty belong to the people. Society, therefore, always remains free to choose its rulers and representatives. In this fashion, Islam can bring the best of its own civilization along with other civilizations.

Turabi distinguishes the conditions of contemporary life from those present during the rise of Islam in the seventh century. Because Muslims are living in a world much different from the one that Islamic jurisprudence legislated, they must look toward radical social and political reforms in order to

In 1964, Hasan al-Turabi participated in a revolt in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, fighting for the formation of an Islamic government. He fought alongside, and became the leader of, the Muslim Brotherhood. He helped the group grow and gain power, and it eventually became the National Islamic Front. Turabi would then go on to help install President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, who vowed to rule the country under Islamic law. **© AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

bring about the necessary Islamic revival. The historical development of Islamic jurisprudence must be rejected in favor of a process that depends on free thinking, and the state must establish a new circle of *ulama* (Islamic clergy) while continuing to derive its jurisprudence from the people. Any democratic developments in Islam must extend to the institutions of society and the family, each segment of which must work to further Islamic revival in both public and private life. Political freedom is an original part of creed and nature because freedom is what distinguishes man from animal. This includes the freedom of expression, which is stipulated in the *shariʿa.*

As for the individual, Turabi notes that man is not forced to worship God, but chooses to do so. Individual freedom is essential and cannot be taken away by the state, institutions, or society. This freedom, he argues, must be embodied in a constitution to ensure that the strength of any political leader may be checked by representative councils. Because institutionalization of freedom inevitably leads to its destruction, individual freedoms are bound and protected by Islam.

Turabi's views and writings on Islam seem to place him in the category of moderate Islamist thinkers, but the practice of his authority in Sudan suggests otherwise. Although he has called for freedom of association and multiparty representative bodies, the current Sudanese government has systematically destroyed most civic associations and remains one of the most oppressive regimes and egregious human-rights violators in the Middle East.

See also SUDAN.

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JILLIAN SCHWEDLER
UPDATED BY AHMAD S. MOUSSALLI

TURABI, WISAL AL-MAHDI

[?–]

Supporter of women's rights in Sudan.

Wisal al-Mahdi Turabi, a member of the large landowning al-Mahdi aristocracy, is the wife of Hasan al-Turabi, founder of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood and architect of the National Islamic Front (NIF) takeover of Sudan by military coup d'etat in 1989. Her brother, Sadiq al-Mahdi, is a leader of the influential Umma Party who has twice been prime minister of Sudan. Although the Umma Party and the NIF have been rivals, they both support Muslim women's activism, in which Wisel al-Mahdi has played a prominent role.

When the NIF seized power in 1989, the activist band of Islamists mobilized its female adherents. Wisal al-Mahdi became a spokeswoman for NIF policies such as mandatory veiling and the removal of women from "humiliating" public jobs, such as

waitresses and gas station attendants. She upheld the right of women to hold high-status positions, such as judges and government ministers, and she supported *shariʿa* as state law.

Although a trained lawyer, Wisal al-Mahdi has not practiced law and appears to adhere to a conservative Muslim role for women, maintaining a proper *Shariʿ* home and providing support for her husband's national and international roles as a leading figure in the global Islamist movement. Nevertheless, some of her public comments reveal a radical Islamist feminism, blaming Arab patriarchy for the oppression of women in Sudan and elsewhere.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; SUDAN; TURABI, HASAN AL-.

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CAROLYN FLUEHR-LOBBAN

TURBAN

See CLOTHING

TÜRKES, ALPARSLAN

[1917–1997]

Turkish military officer and leader of the ultrapatriotic National Action Party.

Alparslan Türkes was born in Cyprus and graduated from the Turkish military academy. Due to his involvement in pan-Turkish propaganda during World War II, he was arrested in 1944 but released after an investigation. During the 1950s he served on the general staff and with NATO. He emerged as a key player in Turkey's 1960 military coup, and in its aftermath he was a member of the National Unity Committee (NUC) that was in charge of the government. Due to his radicalism, he was removed from the NUC in November 1960 and sent to New Delhi as a military attaché. After his return to Turkey in 1963 he became active in politics, eventually becoming the leader of the Republican Peasants Nation Party in 1965. He developed the doctrine of Nine Lights, which stressed nationalism and order in society. Under his leadership, the party transformed itself into the ultrapatriotic Nationalist Action Party (1969–1980). He served as vice-premier in Süleyman Demirel's National Front governments of 1975 and 1977. After the 1980 coup, Türkes was arrested and the party was banned; he reentered the political arena in 1983, became the leader of the Nationalist Worker Party, and entered parliament in 1991.

See also NATIONALIST ACTION PARTY.

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FRANK TACHAU
UPDATED BY M. HAKAN YAVUZ

TURKEY

Modern republic formed from the central regions of the Ottoman Empire.

The Republic of Turkey (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti) was established in 1923. Its government was an authoritarian, one-party state until 1946, when the first competitive elections were held. In subsequent decades there have been three military coups, and one instance of military pressure that forced a civilian government to resign.

According to the 2000 census, Turkey's population was 67,844,903, an increase of 18.34 percent over the population of 56,473,035 enumerated in October 1990. In 2000 the population distribution was 65 percent urban and 35 percent rural.

The total area of Turkey is 300,948 square miles (779,456 sq. km). The Asian portion of Turkey, Anatolia (historically Asia Minor), comprises 291,773 square miles (755,693 sq. km), or about 97 percent of the total; the section located on the European continent totals 9,175 square miles (23,763 sq. km). The European portion of Turkey is separated from the Asian by the Sea of Marmara, which in turn is connected to two larger bodies of water by two narrow straits. In the northeast, the Bosporus Strait connects the Sea of Marmara to the Black Sea, while in the southwest, the Dardanelles Strait connects it to the Aegean Sea. Turkey borders the Aegean Sea and Greece on the west, Bulgaria on the northwest, the Black Sea on the north,

Georgia on the northeast, Armenia on the east, Iran and Iraq on the southeast, and Syria and the Mediterranean Sea on the south.

The capital of Turkey, Ankara, is located in the central Anatolian plains; a small market town in 1923, Ankara today is home to more than 3.5 million people. The largest city, Istanbul, straddles the European and Asian sides of Turkey and has a population of 9.1 million. An important historical city, Istanbul (formerly Byzantium, then Constantinople) was first the capital of the Byzantine Empire and later the capital of the Ottoman Empire. Today, it is the cultural and business capital of Turkey. The third-largest city is İzmir (English, Smyrna), a major industrial center with a population of 2 million. Other major cities, each with populations over 1 million, include Adana, Bursa, and Konya.

Geographically, Turkey consists of a ring of mountains that enclose a series of plateaus that lie between 2,625 and 6,560 feet (800 and 2,000 m) above sea level. The highest mountains are in the east, with Mount Ararat reaching 16,945 feet (5,165 m). In the west, the highest mountain, Mount Erciyas, reaches 12,800 feet (3,900 m). The coastal regions on the south, west, and north are extremely narrow. Most of the coastal regions receive adequate rainfall; as much as 100 inches (254 cm) falls annually on the eastern Black Sea coast, and almost as much on the Aegean coast. The central plateau, on the other hand, is sheltered by its ring of mountains and receives little rainfall, generally under 10 inches (250 mm) annually. There are extensive expanses of arid steppe and even desert. Turkey's two major rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, are both in the east. There are many lakes, both salt and freshwater; the largest is Lake Van, which covers 1,100 square miles (2,850 sq. km). Climate in the central plain ranges from severe winters with temperatures often dropping to minus 22 degrees Fahrenheit (minus 30 degrees Celsius) to hot and dry summers, with temperatures ranging from highs of 85 to 110 degrees Fahrenheit (30 to 43 degrees Celsius) in the southeast. In the western region, winters are relatively mild, hovering around freezing, and summers are hot. The Aegean coast is mild in winter and temperate in summer.

Turkey is divided into seventy-three provinces, each administered by a governor. According to the 1982 constitution, legislative power is vested in a unicameral Grand National Assembly composed of 400 deputies elected by universal adult suffrage and serving five-year terms. In 1987 the number of deputies was raised to 450. Executive power is vested in the office of the prime minister and in the office of the president, who is elected to a seven-year term by the assembly. Although the prime minister heads the government, the president has the power to appoint a prime minister, senior civil servants, and senior members of the judiciary; submit constitutional amendments for popular referenda; challenge the constitutionality of laws by submitting them to the constitutional court; call for new elections; declare martial law; and order the armed forces into action domestically or internationally. In addition, the National Security Council—composed of the president; prime minister; chief of staff; heads of the army, navy, air force, and police; and

Suleimaniye Mosque is one of the highlights of Istanbul. Turkey is overwhelmingly Muslim, but the military has determinedly kept religion out of government. Istanbul, formerly Constantinople, Turkey's largest city was the capital of the Eastern Roman, or Byzantine, Empire for more than 1,000 years and then of the Ottoman Empire for another 450 years. **© Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

The ancient city wall still stands in Alanya, southern Turkey, along the Mediterranean Sea opposite Cyprus. A significant link between Europe and Asia, Turkey has roots dating back many millennia. © CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ministers of interior, foreign affairs, and defense—has the power to present compulsory orders to the government in matters of national security.

There are no official census data on the ethnic, religious, and linguistic composition of the population of Turkey. The majority of Turks are native Turkish speakers. Ethnically, they trace their roots back to central Asia, although many Turks are Caucasians, particularly Circassians and Georgians. There is also a significant population of Kurds, a people of Indo-European descent who speak Kurdish, a language closely related to Persian. Kurds comprise an estimated 15 to 20 percent of Turkey's total population. Kurds are concentrated in the east and southeast and along the Syrian and Iraqi borders, but significant numbers have migrated to major cities in western Turkey. A large number of Arabs inhabit the region of Hatay, a small territory formerly part of Syria but ceded by the French to Turkey in 1939. The large populations of Greeks and Armenians in the nineteenth century were reduced by war and deportations during and after World War I to relatively small numbers living in Istanbul: roughly 6,000 Greeks and 60,000 Armenians. The vast majority of Turkish citizens are Muslim. Most Kurds and Turks are Sunni Muslims, but an estimated 20 to 30 percent of the population are Shiʿite Muslims, primarily of the Alevi sect. There are also small numbers of Jews (22,000), Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Assyrian Christians.

Agriculture and Industry

Turkey's major agricultural products are cereals, cotton, tobacco, grapes, figs, olives, hazelnuts, oilseeds, and tea. Until 1980 agricultural products, particularly cotton, provided the bulk of exports. Despite continued government attention to raising agricultural output, growth has been slow, limited by the lack of irrigated land and the low rainfall on the central plateau. Only about one-third of all land is cultivated, mostly on family-size plots, with larger farms in the coastal regions. Agriculture provides about 20 percent of the gross national product.

The Turkish government initiated a strategy of state-led industrialization in the 1930s, when a series of public enterprises were established. After 1950 increasing support was given to the private sector, so that by 1970, private-sector industrial output and investment was almost equal to that of the public sector. In 1980 the government launched a program of liberalization, designed to diminish state economic intervention and increase the role of market forces. Since 1987 the government has been privatizing some state economic enterprises, though progress has been slow. The largest industry is textiles, providing about one-third of output and export earnings. Turkey's production and export of iron and steel have increased rapidly, as has production of cement and paper products. Motor vehicle production began in the 1950s but consists mostly of assembly industries; because production has been spread out over a large number of small plants, production costs are high and exports have been negligible. Turkey's petrochemical industry produces fertilizers and a range of industrial inputs.

MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

Other manufacturing industries include tobacco, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, glassware, and engineering.

Turkey has a large mining industry, mostly in the public sector, employing over 200,000 workers. Important mineral resources include bauxite, borax, chromium, copper, iron ore, manganese, and sulfur. The center of coal mining is at Zonguldak, on the Black Sea coast. Oil was discovered in 1950 in the southeast, but production is limited, accounting for about 10 percent of domestic consumption; the remainder is imported. In 1990 petroleum products accounted for about 15 percent of all imports. Of Turkey's natural mineral resources, only borates and petroleum products are exported, in small quantities.

Imperial History

Urban culture in Asia Minor dates to the second millennium B.C.E. In 330 C.E., the Roman emperor Constantine founded the city of Constantinople (now Istanbul), which became the capital of the Eastern Roman, or Byzantine, Empire. In the eleventh century, Ghuzz Turks who had established the Seljuk empire in the area that is today Iran and Iraq began to migrate into Anatolia, conquering territory from the Byzantine Empire. By the thirteenth century, independent princedoms were established in Anatolia, including the principality of the House of Osman, or Othman, in the northwest. Over the next several centuries, the Ottoman (from Othman) Empire conquered all of the Byzantine Empire, capturing Constantinople in 1453, as well as much of eastern Europe and the Middle East.

By the year 1800, however, several European states as well as the Russian Empire had become stronger than the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the nineteenth century, the government undertook various reform efforts to strengthen the Ottoman military, administration, political organization, and economy in order to meet the competition presented by rivals.

In the course of the nineteenth century, a middle class emerged in the Ottoman Empire. Educated in the new schools of the empire, members of the middle class had a vision of a liberal society ruled by a constitutional government and formed movements to achieve their goal, such as the Young Ottomans and later the Young Turks. These groups alternately were supported by reformist governments or suppressed by autocratic governments. In 1908, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) overthrew Abdülhamit II and restored the constitution. The CUP government initially enjoyed widespread popular support. But subsequent opposition to its modernizing reforms, combined with foreign wars, led the CUP to establish its own dictatorship. In 1914 the CUP formed an alliance with the Central Powers and entered World War I. After four years of fighting a bitter defensive war against the Allies on many fronts, the empire was defeated; Allied armies captured the Middle Eastern territories of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq; and Allied forces occupied Istanbul. On 30 October 1918 the Turks signed an armistice at Mudros.

Birth of the Modern Republic

On 15 May 1919, Greek forces invaded western Turkey, triggering the formation of a new Turkish army that would defeat the Greeks and then establish the modern Turkish republic. The leader of the Turkish war of liberation was Mustafa Kemal, later given the name Atatürk (Turkish: "father of the Turks"). On 23 July 1919 Kemal convened a nationalist congress in Erzurum, delegates to which later issued the National Pact (Mithaq al-Watani), a declaration calling for the dissolution of the empire and control over non-Turkish provinces, the end of foreign occupation, and the independence of all areas inhabited by Turks. Pulling together an army, the independence movement succeeded in defeating the Greek army and negotiating a withdrawal of Allied forces. The Treaty of Mudanya recognizing Turkish sovereignty was signed on 24 July 1923. On 29 October 1923 Turkey was declared a republic with Kemal as its first president and Ankara as its capital.

Modernization

The next two decades were years of reform, as Kemal and his associates attempted to complete the now 100-year-old project of modernizing Turkey. The 1924 constitution created an elected parliament as the sole repository of sovereignty and a presidency exercising executive power. In practice, however, Kemal's government was a dictatorship. A single party, the Republican People's Party (RPP), was formed as the agent of central government rule and control. In 1924 the caliphate, the highest religious office, was abolished, and in 1928 Turkey was declared a secular state. The old legal codes were annulled and replaced with civil and criminal codes adopted from Europe. The fez, the trademark Ottoman headgear adopted in the nineteenth century, was considered a symbol of the old order and was declared illegal, while the Arabic alphabet was replaced with a Roman one.

In 1929, with the onset of the Great Depression and the lapsing of the Treaty of Lausanne, which had imposed a laissez-faire trade policy on Turkey, Kemal launched a program of state-led economic development. Influenced by the Soviet experiment with its five-year development plans, in 1934 the government formulated its own five-year plan for industrial investment. Completed in 1939, the plan introduced heavy industry into Turkey while allowing the country to weather the depression with a trade surplus.

During the 1930s Kemal transformed the RPP on the model of European fascist parties. The distinction between party members and government officials was blurred, as all public officials were expected to work to implement the new ideology of the party. This ideology, officially adopted in 1931 and known as Kemalism, emphasized six themes: republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and *devrimçilik,* which was interpreted by moderates as reformism and by radicals as revolutionism. In 1938 Kemal Atatürk died and was replaced as president by his lieutenant, Ismet Inönü. Although Inönü kept Turkey neutral during World War II, a number of government policies on resource mobilization created widespread economic austerity, alienating large sectors of the population including those businessmen who opposed the policy of state-led economic development.

Political Reforms and Military Coups

The post–World War II period was a new era for the Turkish republic. Responding to the dissatisfaction

of wartime economic policies and feeling the need to win American support against Soviet encroachments, Inönü announced the resumption of multiparty politics and competitive elections. There had been two experiments with a second party in the 1920s, but in both cases the opposition party was closed down after a short life. This time, the commitment to political pluralism was greater, and in the general elections of May 1950, the chief opposition, the Democrat Party (DP), won an overwhelming victory. The DP had campaigned on a platform of economic and cultural liberalism and increased political freedoms. Its new economic policies, based on import-substituting industrialization and the encouragement of agriculture, increased the standard of living of wide sectors of the population, particularly peasants. The DP permitted more freedom of religion than the Kemalists, who were militantly hostile to religion. But the DP increased the role of the state in the economy instead of reducing it; as the 1950s passed, the party showed signs of becoming dictatorial. A combination of incipient economic crisis and antidemocratic measures prompted a military coup on 27 May 1960.

Mustafa Kemal (who later took the name Atatürk, or "father of the Turks") led the Turkish war of independence in 1919, marking an end to the long-declining Ottoman Empire and the birth of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. As its first president, Kemal forcefully transformed the Islamic country into a modernized, secular, authoritarian state before his death in 1938. **© Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permisison.**

The new military rulers formed a thirty-seven-member National Unity Committee (NUC) and convened a constitutional convention, dominated by supporters of the RPP. A new constitution was promulgated in 1961, and it included several liberal provisions. The NUC also allowed political parties to resume their activities. The two principal parties, the RPP—still led by Inönü—and the Justice Party (JP), the successor to the DP, formed a series of short-lived coalition governments, first together, and later between the RPP and several smaller parties, and then the JP with smaller parties. In October 1965 the JP, led by Süleyman Demirel, won a majority. The Turkish economy, now supervised by the State Planning Organization, which issued five-year development plans, grew at a rapid rate during the 1960s. But political instability came from two sources: numerous defections of members from existing parties and the proliferation of smaller parties; and the eruption of street violence as radical students and organizations on the left clashed with extremist students and organizations on the right.

On 12 March 1971 the military leadership accused the government of allowing the country to slip into anarchy and called for the creation of a stable government. The Demirel government resigned, and subsequently martial law was declared. After martial law was finally lifted in September 1973, Turkey was ruled by a series of weak coalition governments as economic conditions deteriorated. By the end of the decade, the economy was in critical condition; beginning in 1978, political violence once again erupted in the streets. On 12 September 1980 the military intervened for the third time in two decades. All existing political parties were banned, and their members prohibited from engaging in politics. A new constitution, promulgated in 1982, reversed some of the liberal measures of the 1961 constitution by enhancing the authority of the president and the cabinet vis-a-vis parliament and placing restrictions on political activity.

Party Politics

In 1983 elections were held among three new parties. The winning party was the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi; ANAP), led by Turgut Özal, a technocrat who had designed the January 1980 measures. Özal formed a new government and

accelerated the strategy of economic liberalization and encouraging exports. Despite some success at economic liberalization, persistent government deficits resulted in high inflation and eroded popular support for the government. New parties emerged to rival ANAP: the True Path Party (TPP; Doğru Yol Partisi), a continuation of the Justice Party, led by Süleyman Demirel after 1987; the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti; SHP), a continuation of the RPP under the leadership of Erdal Inönü, the son of Ismet Inönü; and the Refah Party, the continuation of the National Salvation Party. In 1989 Özal was elected president. In the 1991 elections ANAP, now led by Mesut Yilmaz, came in third, and the top two parties, the TPP and the SHP, formed a coalition government. On 17 April 1993 Özal died, and Demirel replaced him as president. On 13 June 1993 Tansu Çiller, an American-trained economist and former professor at Bosporus University, became the new head of the TPP and prime minister. Çiller was the first woman to serve as prime minister of Turkey.

In the 1995 parliamentary elections, the Refah Party obtained the largest number, but not a majority, of parliamentary seats, the first time an avowedly religious party had done so well since the establishment of the republic more than seventy years earlier. In 1996 Necmeddin Erbakan formed a coalition government, but the military effectively forced him to resign one year later. During the next five years, a series of coalition governments that purposefully excluded Refah and its successor failed to implement programs to deal with the country's economic problems. In the fall 2002 elections, the Justice Party and the Development Party, one of the successor parties to Refah, won an overwhelming majority of parliamentary seats in an election that saw the virtual elimination of ANAP and TTP from politics.

See also ABDÜLHAMIT II; ADANA; ALEVI; ANATOLIA; ANKARA; ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL; BURSA; ÇILLER, TANSU; COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS; DEMIREL, SÜLEYMAN; DEMOCRAT PARTY; ERBAKAN, NECMEDDIN; ERZURUM; INÖNÜ, ERDAL; INÖNÜ, İSMET; ISTANBUL; İZMIR; KEMALISM; KONYA; KURDS; NATIONAL UNITY COMMITTEE (TURKEY); ÖZAL, TURGUT; YOUNG OTTOMANS; YOUNG TURKS.

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TURKI, FAWAZ

[1940–]

Palestinian writer.

Fawaz (also Fawwaz) Turki was born in Haifa, Palestine, but grew up as a refugee in Beirut after his family fled Palestine during the Arab–Israel War of 1948. He later worked in Saudi Arabia, has taught in Europe and in Australia, and has traveled widely in India, the Middle East, and the United States. Turki has written several personal accounts dealing with aspects of Palestinian struggle and identity, including his acclaimed *The Disinherited: Journal of a Palestinian in Exile.* His later book, *Exile's Return,* was noteworthy for its criticism of Palestinian society.

His style is noteworthy for his exceptional and forceful command of English, and his ability to offer a penetrating view of Palestinian life for an English-speaking audience. His writings include poetry and newspaper columns as well as novels.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC.

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Turki, Fawaz. *Exile's Return: The Making of a Palestinian American.* New York: Free Press, 1994.

JENAB TUTUNJI
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TURKISH–AFGHAN TREATY (1928)

Agreement between Turkey and Afghanistan designed to secure their independence from Soviet and British influence.

The Turkish–Afghan treaty, signed 28 May 1928, was the third in a series of bilateral agreements between Turkey and Afghanistan, non-Arab Muslim states bordering the Soviet Union. While the treaty did not include a mutual defense pact, it did proclaim peaceful relations between the two countries, barred either party from entering into a hostile alliance against the other, and called for mutual consultations in the event of threat of aggression from third parties.

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DAVID WALDNER

TURKISH FILM

See FILM

TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The legislative body of Turkey.

The first parliament in Ottoman/Turkish history was convened in 1876 and was short lived. The second attempt, in 1908, also lasted for only a brief period. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi) was founded on 23 April 1921, at the outset of the Turkish War of Independence; it proclaimed the republic on 29 October 1923. The assembly functioned as a legislature with one party until 1946; a transition to multiparty politics was initiated by the original party, the Republican People's Party (RPP; or Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP).

Two-Party Politics

According to the constitution, the assembly represented the expression of national sovereignty. Its function was to legislate, control the executive via the budget, and elect the head of state. From 1950 to 1957 the assembly was headed by the Democrat Party. In the 1950, 1954, and 1957 elections, the two major parties collectively received more than 90 percent of the total votes and controlled 98 percent of the parliamentary seats. The traditional center-periphery or elite-mass cleavage that the Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire shaped the emerging political dualism. The Democrat Party projected the image of representing the interests of the periphery, including their religious aspirations, while the RPP was identified with the elitist and secularist orientation of the political center. Institutional factors also proved to be important. The simple plurality electoral system with multi-member districts worked to the advantage of the two strongest parties.

Financial and economic crises and the electoral losses of the Democrat Party in 1957 led to the adoption of authoritarian policies and laws, which brought about the military coup of 1960. The activities of the assembly were suspended for a year; all the deputies and cabinet members of the Democrat Party were prosecuted and parliament was dissolved.

1961 Constitution

The 1961 constitution, drafted by a constituent assembly, placed importance on the division of powers and broadened civil liberties. Broadcasting and higher education were granted autonomy. Numerous checks and balances were introduced, aimed at controlling arbitrary executive rule. A bicameral legislature was formed. The lower house, the National Assembly (Millet Meclisi), had 400 members elected for four-year terms. The upper house, the Republican Senate (Cumhuriyet Senatosu), consisted of 150 members elected for six-year terms, plus fifteen additional senators appointed by the president of the republic on the basis of merit, a varying number of ex-officio life members who belonged to the National Unity Committee of the interim military government, and former presidents of the republic. The legislative powers of the Senate remained limited and subordinate to the National Assembly. Joint sessions of the two assemblies constituted the new Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). After the military coup of 1980, the Senate was abolished. On 12 September 1980, the legislature was dissolved and all political parties banned. The interim regime lasted two years. An appointed consultative assembly prepared a new constitution.

Yalim Erez (in the background, at left), the minister for industry and an independent deputy in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, formed a new Turkish government in 1998. It was one of several coalition governments established between 1996 and 2002 in an effort to deal with serious economic problems. © ABC Ajansi/Corbis Sygma. Reproduced by permission.

1982 Constitution

The 1982 constitution was approved by a referendum on 9 November 1982. It vests legislative power in a unicameral assembly, elected by universal adult suffrage (the age at which one could vote was at first twenty-one but in 1995 was lowered to eighteen) for a maximum of five years. By-elections are to be held once between elections unless the number of vacancies reaches 5 percent of the parliament. The president of the republic is elected by the TGNA from among its members or from among candidates who have a higher education and are over forty. The president serves for a single term of seven years; a successor must be elected within thirty days. If no successor can be elected by the fourth ballot, parliament must dissolve itself. After the presidencies of Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel, in 2000 the TGNA elected Ahmet Necdet Nezer, former chair of the Constitutional Court. The prerogatives of the president are more extensive than in the previous constitution; they include the power to dissolve parliament. The 1987 elections enlarged the membership of the TGNA from 400 to 450; in 1995, the number of seats was raised to 550. The main functions of the TGNA are enacting, amending, and repealing laws; supervising the Council of Ministers; authorizing the Council of Ministers to issue governmental decrees that have the force of law; approving the budget; declaring war; ratifying international agreements; and proclaiming amnesties and pardons. Legislators exercise control in the form of written questions, investigation, and interpellation. Members of parliament are granted parliamentary immunity with regard to freedom of speech and, under certain circumstances, freedom from arrest.

As of 1993, constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority. If no quorum is achieved, the president of the republic can return the amendment

to parliament or refer the amendment to a popular vote. The state monopoly on television was eliminated, opening television to national and international channels; the right of government officials to organize unions was granted; prisoners were given the right to vote; political parties were permitted to establish women's and youth branches; discretionary power was allocated to the executive to declare early local elections or to postpone them. In the summer of 2002, new amendments legalized Kurdish-language radio and television, private-school education in Kurdish, and the abolition of capital punishment.

Under the current electoral rules, a party must receive 10 percent of the vote to gain representation in parliament. After 1987, this threshold was increased by adding a district-level quota (calculated by a simple proportion of the valid votes) to the parliamentary seats per district. This practice left a number of parties out of parliament. The Kurdish parties were eliminated despite their high regional return because their nationwide vote was less than 10 percent. Parties that do receive 10 percent of the national note win a proportionally higher share of parliamentary seats. For example, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) under the leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan received 34.2 percent of the votes but 363 seats, eliminating all competing parties with the exception of the RPP, which received 19.3 percent of the votes and 178 seats. With the phasing out of sixteen political parties, 45.3 percent of the voters remained without representation. This brought Turkish politics back to a dual party system. In parliament, 89 percent of the members were newcomers. More than 80 percent of the parliamentarians had a higher education; they were predominantly lawyers, engineers, businessmen, and economists. The representation of women registered a slow gain. Despite the active support of women's organizations, the number of women parliamentarians registered only a slight increase, from 23 in 1999 to 24 in 2002.

Realignment

Looking at the political composition of the TGNA, a significant voter realignment can be seen, and high volatility in Turkey's major parties. Beginning in the 1980s and continuing in the 1990s, the moderate right parties registered a steady decline. Özal's party, the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi), winner of the 1983 elections, fell from having 292 representatives in 1987 to having 88 in 1999. On the moderate left, a similar phenomenon took place. The RPP was left out of parliament in 1999 with 8.7 percent of the votes and returned in 2002 with 19.3 percent; Bülent Ecevit's party, the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi), gained 22.2 percent in 1999 but was eliminated with 1.2 percent in 2002.

This realignment pushed the extreme right, exemplified by the ultra-right-wing Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) and the much smaller nationalist Great Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi), into the political spectrum. The Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and its successor the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) also benefited from this realignment. The coalition governments of the 1990s were dominated by these political groups. The results of the 2002 election indicate that the center-periphery cleavage has lost its determining relevance. Instead, protest voting seems to have gained ascendancy.

The performance of Turkey's parliamentary system offers an important example of how electoral processes have played a critical role in opening the political system after each military intervention. Another new aspect of Turkish political life is the growing importance of local elections. With the increasing weight of large cities and metropolitan areas, urban problems influence electoral choice at the local and national level. The recent electoral success of the Justice and Development Party is partly due to the reputation Erdoğan, the former mayor of Istanbul, acquired. Major conflicts in national politics, such as those over secularism, affect voting patterns at both levels. Although Turkey's democratization started during the late 1940s, democracy has not been fully achieved, but the country's relatively long and continuous experience with democratic politics in twenty-two national elections represents a significant achievement.

See also AKP (Justice and Development Party); Demirel, Süleyman; Democrat Party; Erdoğan, Tayyip; Motherland Party; Nationalist Action Party; Ottoman Empire; Özal, Turgut; Refah Partisi; Republican People's Party (RPP).

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NERMIN ABADAN-UNAT

TURKISH HEARTH ASSOCIATION

Group formed to promote Turkish nationalism.

Toward the end of the Ottoman Empire, Ziya Gökalp and other Turkish intellectuals founded the Turkish Hearth Association (Türk Ocaği) in 1911 to promote nationalism, especially Gökalp's synthesis of Turkism, Islamism, and modernism. The association provided the Union and Progress political party with ideological direction. With government support, this private association sponsored nationalistic publications, speeches, sports, health, and economic development projects. By 1930, the association had 254 branches in cities and towns across Turkey. In 1931/32, the Republican People's party dissolved the association, took over its property, and established the People's Houses *(Halk Evleri)* in its place.

See also GÖKALP, ZIYA; PEOPLE'S HOUSES.

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TURKISH HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Academy dedicated to the study of Turkish history.

The forerunner to this society was the Turkish Historical Committee of the Turkish Hearth (Türk Ocaği Türk Tarih Heyeti) formed on 4 June 1930. This committee was reorganized as the Society for the Study of Turkish History (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti) on 12 April 1931 (officially recognized on 15 April 1931), and renamed the Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu) on 3 October 1935. On 7 November 1982, the society was made subordinate to the Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu that now oversees the cultural, linguistic, and historical societies. The society has convened historical congresses (the first one, held 2-10 July 1932), publishes the journal *Belleten,* as well as monograph series devoted to all periods of the history of Turkey from the civilizations of ancient Anatolia to the modern day. It also serves as an academy for historical sciences honoring Turkish and foreign scholars.

ULI SCHAMILOGLU

TURKISH–ITALIAN WAR (1911–1912)

War launched by Italy against Turkey for control of Libya.

The Turkish–Italian War (29 September 1911 to 8 October 1912) was initiated by Italy in Libya as a step toward acquiring a modern empire. The diplomatic ground for this move was prepared by reaching secret bilateral agreements with Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, all of which gave Italy a free hand in Libya in exchange for reciprocity elsewhere. This was in violation of the Congress and Treaty of Berlin (1878), in which the European powers guaranteed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Italy sent an ultimatum to the Ottoman government on 26 September 1911, declaring that it would occupy Libya within twenty-four hours unless the Ottoman Empire undertook immediate measures to protect the security of Italian citizens residing in Libya and also their property. Italy also said that Istanbul's dispatch of weapons to Libya was a provocation because these would be used against "peaceful" Italian colonists. When its demands were not met, Italy declared war against the Ottoman Empire (29 September), placed a blockade on the Libyan coast, and started landing in Tripoli (4 October). The conquest of the coastal towns was swift: Tripoli (12 October), Derna (18 October), Benghazi and Khoms (21 October), and the smaller towns soon after.

The Ottoman military force in Libya was small and much below standard. When war broke out, the Ottomans could not forward military support to

Libya due to the Italian sea blockade and the decision of Britain and France to prevent the passage of military reinforcements to the belligerents through Egypt or Tunisia.

As a result of these conditions, the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul allowed volunteers to infiltrate into Libya. (Among them were Enver Paşa, who later became the minister of war, and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish republic.) They left the actual direction of the war to the Ottoman military command in Libya, which decided to retreat from the coast—where the Italians had a clear military advantage owing to the size and quality of their forces. An Ottoman-Libyan force was established, composed of tribal soldiers, Ottoman professionals, and a mixed Ottoman-tribal command, which in Cyrenaica was connected with the Sanusi leadership and network of *zawiyas* (religious compounds).

The Italian invading forces were the first to make military use of airplanes (for reconnaissance and bombing). They made no meaningful gains after their initial conquests because they attempted to fight a trench war against the resistance, which engaged in guerrilla warfare and took advantage of the hilly or desert terrain and the support of the population. Failing to advance into the hinterland, the Italians widened the scope of the war to the eastern Mediterranean to put more pressure on the Ottomans. During April and May 1912, Italy occupied the Dodecanese islands, tried to enter forcibly the Dardanelles channel connecting Istanbul to the Aegean Sea, and bombarded some Ottoman ports, including Beirut. These operations caused the Ottomans heavy damage, aroused strong apprehension among the European powers, and provoked international efforts to solve the crisis.

In the Balkans, increasing unrest led to the outbreak of the first Balkan War on 8 October 1912. Unable to fight on two major fronts, and perceiving the Balkans as more important to the empire than Libya, the Ottoman government decided to end the war in Libya. The Treaty of Peace, concluded in October 1912, stipulated that Ottoman forces were to depart Libya, but that the Ottomans could send Muslim religious representatives there. The Ottoman withdrawal was to be followed by an Italian evacuation of the Dodecanese. The issue of sovereignty was not settled conclusively: Although Italy regarded Libya as part of the Italian homeland following its declaration on the extension of Italian law over Libya (5 November 1911, only one month after the war had started and before any peace treaty had been concluded), the Ottomans told the local population that they were being granted autonomy under Ottoman rule. Most Ottoman forces left Tripolitania, but many remained in Cyrenaica, and reinforcements also were sent later, especially during World War I. Until then, Italy managed to occupy most of Tripolitania and prevented the functioning of the Ottoman-chosen religious representation.

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RACHEL SIMON
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

TURKISH LANGUAGE

Türkçe; official language of the Republic of Turkey.

Turkish is one of the Turkic languages of the Altaic language family, one of the world's major language families. Turkic, Mongolian, and Manchu-Tungus constitute the Altaic language family, which originated around the Altai mountain ranges in central Asia, straddling Mongolia, China, and Russia. Altaic languages usually are grouped with the Uralic languages—for example, Samoyed, Finnish, and Hungarian. Debates continue about whether the typological and lexical similarities between the two language families signal a common ancestor language or prolonged contact.

The Turkic Languages

The Turkic language group includes most of the languages and dialects spoken along a wide Eurasian belt that extends from eastern Siberia to eastern Europe and the Balkans. The major representative Turkic languages are (starting in the east) Yakut, Altai, Khakas, Uygur, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, Uzbek,

Turkmen, Bashkir, Tatar, Chuvash, Azeri, and Turkish. With the exception of Turkish, all of these languages are spoken in the republics and territories of the former Soviet Union or in northwestern China.

Turkish, Azeri (also referred to as Azerbaijani Turkish), and Turkmen are the major members of the southwestern, or Oghuz, branch of the Turkic languages. In demographic terms, this branch is the most important Turkic group. The Azeri language is spoken in the Republic of Azerbaijan and in northwestern Iran. Turkmen is spoken in the Republic of Turkmenistan and in adjoining territories in northern Iran and Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq. Lesser-known members of the southwestern branch are Gagauz, spoken in the Balkan states of Bulgaria and Moldavia, and Qashqaʾi, spoken in parts of southwestern Iran. The languages of this branch are closely related and have a relatively high degree of mutual intelligibility. What interferes with the complete comprehension of written material is mainly vocabulary, which was developed or acquired by each language while functioning in different historical and cultural spheres, and the different alphabets they use (Arabic and Latin). In oral communication, differences in pronunciation slow down comprehension.

Turkish was introduced to the Middle East with the westward migration of various Turkish tribes, who had converted to Islam by the ninth century, from the western regions of central Asia. By the end of the eleventh century, these Muslim Turks had conquered Asia Minor, and the Turkish language began to be established in Anatolia. As the official administrative language of the Ottoman Turks, Turkish spread further with the continuing Ottoman conquests, into the Balkans and central Europe to the north and into the Arab lands and North Africa to the south. Turkish became the lingua franca in many of these regions, and the impact of Turkish on the indigenous languages after centuries of contact is clearly discernible today.

Old Anatolian, Ottoman, and Modern Turkish

The earliest written Anatolian Turkish materials are in Arabic script and date from the thirteenth century. Three basic periods are recognized for the historical development of the Turkish language, based on written data: (1) Old Anatolian Turkish for the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries; (2) Ottoman Turkish for the fifteenth through the early twentieth centuries; (3) Modern Turkish since 1928. The linguistic base remained remarkably stable, particularly for the spoken language, so that some poetry, including early hymns of Sufism and Sufi orders from the fourteenth century still can be understood and appreciated by a general audience. However, in the process of adapting to Islam and the Arab-Persian culture, Turkish gradually acquired many words and some syntactic elements from Arabic and Persian. As the Ottoman Turks became the standard-bearers for the Islamic world, borrowings from both Arabic and Persian accelerated to such an extent that by the nineteenth century an official or literary Ottoman Turkish text could be understood only by an educated elite conversant in Turkish, Persian, and Arabic.

By the start of the twentieth century—and hastened by the post–World War I disintegration of the Ottoman Empire—nationalistic notions about a distinct Turkish identity inspired moves to rid the language of excessive foreign elements. The Alphabet Reform of 1928 abandoned the Arabic script and mandated a phonetic Turkish script based on the Latin alphabet; this was a crucial factor in the emergence of Modern Turkish. The new writing system was tailored exclusively to the vowel-rich Turkish sound system, eventually setting up a well-defined modern national standard for Turkish based on the dialect of Istanbul, the old capital of the Ottoman Empire and the educational, cultural, and intellectual center of the country.

The Turkish language shares a core vocabulary with the other Turkic languages and exhibits characteristic common features: vowel harmony, agglutination, and, on the syntactic level, left-branching. Turkish has eight vowels, four pairs with corresponding front/back, high/low, and rounded/unrounded sounds, which form the basis for vowel harmony. According to vowel harmony rules, vowels of suffixes must have the same properties as the vowel in the last syllable: either front/back or rounded/unrounded. Twenty-one letters represent the consonants. Agglutination in Turkish takes the form of suffixes attached to the end of a word, whether noun or verb. Suffixes add to the word's

meaning and/or mark its grammatical function. Turkish does not have a definite article, nor does it have gender pronouns (one word signifies *he, she, or it*). Sentence construction follows the subject-object-verb pattern. As a left-branching language, all modifiers precede the element modified.

A lexical inventory of Modern Turkish clearly shows that the Turkish language has enriched itself by borrowing freely from other languages and continues to do so. In 1931 the Turkish Linguistic Society undertook reforms that effectively resulted in eliminating Arabic and Persian words not fully assimilated into the Turkish language. However, these words were replaced with neologisms or borrowings from European languages.

See also ANATOLIA; AZERI LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE; ISTANBUL; LITERATURE: TURKISH; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS; TRIBES AND TRIBALISM: QASHQA'I; TURKISH LINGUISTIC SOCIETY; TURKISH SCRIPT.

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ERIKA GILSON
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TURKISH LAW ON THE PROTECTION OF THE FAMILY (1998)

Turkish law to protect women.

The Law on the Protection of the Family primarily aims to improve the handling of domestic violence cases. Before its enactment, such cases were tried in accordance with the Criminal Code, thus requiring victims to appeal to the police and to obtain a report from a state hospital. Women's organizations have claimed that such requirements inhibit women's appeal to legal recourse, because police and doctors are usually more interested in the "reconciliation" of spouses than in initiating legal action. With the introduction of the law, the complaint of the victim or the decision of the public prosecutor suffices to order immediate removal of the abuser from the domicile or imprisonment for up to six months.

The issue of domestic violence is central to Turkey's post-1980 feminism, and the enactment of the law illustrates a successful collaboration between activists and the state. Among many others, three organizations—the Purple Roof Foundation, the Altındağ Women's Solidarity Foundation, and Women for Women's Rights—have closely worked with the General Directorate on the Status and Problems of Women to secure support from parliamentarians, jurists, and the media.

The impact of the law on social attitudes is, however, questionable. The number of reported cases of domestic violence did not decrease significantly in the five years after passage of the law, and, according to a study conducted among college students, most males still approve of wife beating.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; TURKEY.

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BURÇAK KESKIN-KOZAT

TURKISH LINGUISTIC SOCIETY

Organization devoted to the study of Turkish and the Turkic languages.

The Society for the Study of the Turkish Language (Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti) was founded on 12 July 1932, on the model of a similar society that already existed for the study of Turkish history. In 1934, its

name was updated to the Türk Dili Araştirma Kurumu reflecting the society's interest in purging the Turkish Language of its numerous borrowed Arabic and Persian words. In 1936, the name was changed again to the Turkish Linguistic Society (Türk Dil Kurumu). On 7 November 1982, the society was made subordinate to the Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu that now oversees the cultural, linguistic, and historical societies. The society has convened linguistic congresses (the first congress opened in 1932), publishes the journal *Türk Dili,* and publishes dictionaries and other works related to Turkish and all the other Turkic languages. In contrast to other such societies in Turkey, the activities of the Turkish Linguistic Society have not been led by scholars of the Turkish language, and one result has been that the society's activities have assumed a populist character. The society has also been at the center of recurring and intense national debates over language reform, most recently over the degree to which vast numbers of neologisms (new words or word forms adopted from foreign words) should be introduced into the Turkish language (often over the objections of many politicians and scholars).

See also TURKISH LANGUAGE.

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ULI SCHAMILOGLU

TURKISH NATIONAL PACT

A resolution that stated the goal of political independence for Turkey.

This resolution adopted by the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul on 17 February 1920, declared support for the demands of the nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk). It included: the integrity of all territories inhabited by "an Ottoman Islamic majority"; popular plebiscites to determine the future of territories whose status was in doubt (Kars, Ardahan, and Batum in the Caucasus; western Thrace; and areas with Arab majorities); "protection" of the city of Istanbul and the Sea of Marmara and negotiation regarding trade and commerce in the Bosporus and the Dardanelles; recognition of minority rights provided reciprocal rights were extended to Muslim minorities in other countries; and recognition of full independence and sovereignty for "the country." This was essentially the program implemented in the wake of the defeat of the Greek army in western Anatolia and the withdrawal of British power from Istanbul and its environment in 1922. Functionally, the national pact served as a declaration of independence by nationalist Turkey.

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FRANK TACHAU

TURKISH NEWS AGENCY

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

TURKISH SCRIPT

Latin alphabet used predominantly in Turkey to write Turkish.

Contemporary Turkish is written in the Roman alphabet; the Turkish script is composed of eight vowels and twenty-one consonants, which are marked by various diacriticals. The first writings in Turkic language date to about 700 C.E. and use a runic alphabet. Later, Turkish came to be written in the Arabic alphabet. The earliest writings of Turkish in the Arabic script date to the thirteenth century and show strong Arabo-Persian linguistic influences. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries show a boom in textual production. The literary Ottoman Turkish of this period was far removed from the spoken language. Beginning in the eighteenth century, with the decline of the Ottoman Empire, movements in favor of a language with stronger Turkish and less Ottoman characteristics gained momentum. In 1909, the Turkish Club began promoting a simpler Turkish, comprehensible across social strata. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk later founded the Turkish Language Academy. As part of Atatürk's sweeping reforms, the Turkish script was officially switched from the Arabic to the Roman alphabet in 1928.

See also Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Turkish Language.

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Noah Butler

TURKISH WORKERS PARTY

Turkish political party, 1961–1971.

This first avowedly socialist group to make a significant impact on the Turkish party system was founded in February of 1961. Its emergence signified the relative liberalism of the political order in the wake of the military intervention of 27 May 1960. The party competed successfully in the elections of 1965 and 1969, polling about 3 percent of the vote and gaining fifteen seats in the former and two in the latter election (the difference is attributable to changes in the electoral law). Its presence on the scene may have pulled the centrist Republican People's party (RPP) to the left. The party was subject to official and mob harassment, including violent attacks on its facilities and members. It was dissolved by order of the constitutional court in July 1971 on grounds that its leaders had encouraged communism and ethnic divisiveness (specifically, Kurdish separatism).

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Frank Tachau

TURKISM

Political and cultural movement that emerged in the late nineteenth century and helped to form the new Turkish republic.

A movement of many tendencies, Turkism evolved largely in response to European nationalism and to the perceived failure of Ottomanism, as the empire was rocked by minority nationalist movements in the Balkans and Armenia. Sentiments of Turkish nationalist feeling can be traced to historical writings of the mid-nineteenth century, such as those of Ahmet Vefik Paşa (1823–1891). The first Ottoman Turcologist was Necib Asim (1861–1935). Politically, Turkism was most prominently expressed by the Young Turk movement, first in exile in the 1890s in Europe and Egypt and later in Anatolia after the 1908 Young Turk revolution. Competing tendencies included Anatolian nationalism, which traced Turkish roots in the territory to ancient times, and pan-Turkism, espoused especially by Turkish refugees from Russia and central Asia. The political manifesto of pan-Turkism is considered Russian-born Yusuf Akçura's 1904 essay, "Üç Tarz-i Siyaset" (Three Kinds of Policy), which rejected Ottomanism and Islam as bases of national identity and policy.

A major Turkish literary movement appeared in the early twentieth century, with groups like the Genç Kalemler (Young Pens) founded in 1911 in Salonika and the Türk Deneği (Turkish Society) founded in 1908 in Constantinople (now Istanbul). These and other groups were devoted to reviving Turkish folklore, studying the roots and branches of the various Turkic languages, and purifying the Ottoman language of non-Turkish words. The most important ideologue of the Young Turk era was the pan-Turkist writer and sociologist, Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), who developed a populist vision of the rebirth of Turkish society. Eventually, Anatolian-based Turkism would prevail, with Mustafa Kemal's revolution and war of independence, beginning in 1919.

See also Ahmet Vefik; Genç Kalemler; Gökalp, Ziya.

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Elizabeth Thompson

TURKMANCHAI, TREATY OF (1828)

Treaty by which Iran ceded its territories in the Caucasus to Russia.

The Treaty of Turkmanchai concluded a war between Iran and Russia that Iran initiated in 1826

with the aim of recovering territory in the Caucasus region that it had lost to Russia in 1813. The war went very badly for Iran, which was forced to accept unfavorable peace terms in the treaty signed in the village of Turkmanchai, about 80 miles southeast of Tabriz, on 21 February 1828. Under the treaty, Iran ceded its remaining provinces north of the Aras River (Yerevan and Nakhichevan) to Russia; extended preferential trade rights to Russian subjects; recognized Russia's exclusive naval rights in the Caspian Sea; accepted the application of Russian law to Russian subjects in Iran involved in civil or criminal legal cases; and agreed to pay Russia an indemnity of 20 million rubles.

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TURKMEN

See GLOSSARY

TURKO–IRANIAN WAR (1821–1823)

The final war between the Qajar Persians and the Ottoman Turks.

This conflict began in 1821 when the Persian governor of Erzerum gave protection to tribes fleeing Azerbaijan. Actually, the conflict was instigated by Russia, which was anxious to weaken the Ottoman position in the Greek Revolution. The Russians induced Abbas Mirza, son of Fath Ali Shah Qajar, to invade Ottoman Turkey. He did, occupying Kurdistan and all the districts adjacent to Azerbaijan. As a counter move, the Ottoman viceroy of Baghdad invaded Persia but was defeated and chased back to Baghdad. In retaliation, Fath Ali Shah Qajar's oldest son, Mohammad Ali Mirza, laid siege to that city; his illness, and later death, lifted the siege, and the action shifted to the north. In the battle of Erzurum (1821) Abbas Mirza's army of 30,000 men defeated an Ottoman army of over 50,000. An epidemic of cholera precluded further action in the south, and the two powers ended hostilities with the Treaty of Erzurum on 28 July 1823. This treaty involved no change in territorial borders, but it did guarantee Persia access to the holy places in Iraq and Arabia; Ottoman suppression of Kurdish raids on Persian territory; release of the possessions of Persian merchants in Turkey; and an exchange of ambassadors.

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR

TURKOLOGY

The academic study of the languages and civilization of the Turkic peoples with a traditional emphasis on sources written in Turkic languages.

The modern Turkic languages include Turkish, Uzbek, Kazakh, Azeri, Kazan Tatar, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Chuvash, Bashkir, Karakalpak, Yakut, Kumik, Crimean Tatar, Uighur, Tuvan, Gagauz, Karachay, Balkar, Xakas, Noghay, Altay, Shor, Dolgan, Karaim, and Tofalar. Native scholars have been writing descriptions of the Turkic dialects since the eleventh century. In the West, the earliest works on Turkey appeared in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the first descriptions of the Turkish language were published in the seventeenth century. The formal study of Turkish and other Turkic languages was introduced in Europe in the eighteenth century, and by the end of the nineteenth century, there were prominent centers of Turkology at universities in Paris, Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Kazan, Budapest, and Vienna. Today Turkology is widely taught in modern political units representing individual Turkic peoples: the Turkish republic, the Turkic republics of the former USSR, and the Uighur Autonomous Region in the People's Republic of China, where it is synonymous with the study of the local national culture. Turkology is also offered at major universities in Europe and North America, though the study of the language and civilization of the Turkish republic is far better represented than the study of the Turkic peoples as a whole.

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ULI SCHAMILOGLU

TURKS

Ethnic group living in Turkey; also used to refer to Turkic-language speakers in Central Asia.

Turks are an ethnolinguistic group living in a broad geographic expanse extending from southeastern Europe through Anatolia and the Caucasus Mountains and throughout Central Asia. Thus Turks include the Turks of Turkey, the Azeris of Azerbaijan, and the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tatars, Turkmen, and Uzbeks of Central Asia, as well as many smaller groups in Asia speaking Turkic languages. In a legal sense, however, *Turks* refers only to citizens of Turkey, even those (up to 20% of the population) who are not ethnically Turkish.

Nomadic Turks began infiltrating into Iran from Central Asia as early as the eighth century. Although the initial contacts generally were peaceful, by the tenth century large groups of Turks were invading Iran, and in the eleventh century they began invading Anatolia. First the Seljuk Turks and subsequently the Ottoman Turks established kingdoms in Anatolia. The Ottomans conquered the Byzantine imperial capital Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 1453, and this city then became the center of the Ottoman Empire, which at its height in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries spanned three continents. Although the Ottoman Empire was multiethnic, Europeans often referred to its subjects as Turks and used "Ottoman Empire" synonymously with "Turkey."

During the nineteenth century, some Ottoman/Turkish intellectuals began to advocate pan-Turanism, a movement to unite all Turkic-language peoples under the Ottoman Empire. After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the government rejected pan-Turanism as an official policy. Nevertheless, interest in the cultural, if not political, unity of Turkic peoples has been a strong current among intellectuals in Turkey and has been revitalized since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence in Central Asia of several new Turkic-speaking countries.

See also ANATOLIA; ISTANBUL; TURKEY; TURKISH LANGUAGE.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

TÜRK YURDU

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

TWAREG

Berber-speaking people of the Sahara, mostly in Algeria.

Twareg is an apparently non-Berber plural; the singular is *targui* or *targi.* Twareg (also Tuareg) call themselves, according to the region, *amahagh, amaiagh,* or *amashagh,* all reflexes of *amazigh,* the term more widely used for Berber in the rest of North Africa. It is estimated that there are 400,000 to 500,000 Twareg-language/dialect speakers. Most are fair-skinned Europids, although many are descendants of or mixed with negroid populations (of whom most were slaves). Twareg traditionally distinguish socially between the "noble" clans, camel nomads who in the past could range far and wide, wage war, and claim a share of the resources of groups they dominated (and whose protection they assured), and "vassal" clans, also nomadic but essentially herdsmen (mainly goats, but also camels belonging to the nobles, and cattle in some places), subjects of the noble clans. Other groups often are counted as Twareg, notably sedentary former slave populations (now primarily agriculturalists in the oases and artisans).

The requirements of modern states—fixed borders, schooling of children, control of territory and citizens—and the industrial exploitation of resources

have placed extreme pressures on the nomadic existence and traditions dear to the Twareg. They nonetheless maintain such traditional cultural traits as a strong matrilineal principle (in much of their inheritance of property, succession to chieftainship, rights and obligations toward vassal groups, etc.) and the strict veiling of men (women, however, typically are not veiled).

See also BERBER.

THOMAS G. PENCHOEN

TWAYNI, GHASSAN

[1926–]

Lebanon's best-known journalist and publisher; former minister, ambassador, and representative from Lebanon to the United Nations.

A Greek Orthodox born in Beirut, Ghassan Twayni (also Tueni) has been one of the most influential figures in post–World War II Lebanon. His impressive and multifaceted career as academic, journalist, businessman, politician, diplomat, and man of letters has made him a prime shaper of public opinion in his country and one of the most respected commentators on Lebanese and Arab affairs throughout the United States and Europe.

He received a bachelor of arts degree in philosophy from the American University of Beirut (AUB) in 1945 and a master of arts degree in political science from Harvard University in 1947. After a year as a lecturer in political science at AUB (1947–1948), he became editor in chief of the daily newspaper *al-Nahar* in 1948, a position he occupied until he turned it over to his son, Jubran, in December 1999. He worked in journalism and publishing most of his life, and was active as the founder and chairman (from 1960 onwards) of Press Cooperative S.A.L. publishing group, editor-publisher of the *al-Nahar* S.C.P.A. Publishing Company after 1963, publisher and editor in chief of the French-language dailies *Le jour* (1965) and *L'orient-Le jour* (1970–1991), and chairman of the board of the Société Générale de la Presse et d'Edition (1985–1991).

In 1951, embarking on a political career, Twayni won a parliamentary seat after running successfully in Mount Lebanon as a candidate of the Socialist National Front, a loose coalition of politicians headed by Camille Chamoun and Kamal Jumblatt that called for the resignation of President Bishara al-Khuri, whose second term in office had become tainted with charges of nepotism, administrative corruption, and heavy-handed tactics. Twayni was reelected in 1953 and 1957, both times as a representative for Beirut, and was deputy speaker of parliament between 1953 and 1957. By then, he had established himself as one of the most prominent and competent members of a new generation of young, well-educated, reform-minded professionals who had become active in politics in an effort to modernize the Lebanese state. It was this reputation that led to his appointment in October 1970 as deputy prime minister and minister of information and education in President Sulayman Franjiyya's first cabinet (the so-called Youth Cabinet, headed by Saʾib Salam and composed predominantly of young technocrats recruited from outside parliament). Twayni resigned in January 1971, however, in protest against the president's and the prime minister's unwillingness to support the educational reforms he had proposed. He was subsequently appointed minister of labor and social affairs, tourism, and industry and oil in a cabinet headed by Rashid Karame (July 1975 to December 1976).

After the 1960s Twayni frequently represented his country abroad, both in official and unofficial positions. Following the Arab–Israel War (1967), he was ambassador-at-large and personal representative of President Charles Hilu on a special mission to the United States. In December 1976 he was President Ilyas Sarkis's special emissary to Washington, D.C. His diplomatic skills and achievements eventually led to his appointment in September 1977 as ambassador and permanent representative of Lebanon to the United Nations, a position he held until September 1982. Between 1982 and 1988 he served as special adviser to President Amin Jumayyil. His responsibilities during this period included coordinating negotiations for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. In the early 1990s he was president of Balamand University, and he remains on the board of trustees of AUB. He continues to shuttle back and forth between Lebanon, Europe, and the United States.

See also AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT (AUB); ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1967); CHAMOUN, CAMILLE; FRANJIYYA, SULAYMAN; HILU, CHARLES; JUMAYYIL, AMIN; JUMBLATT,

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX
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TWIN PILLARS POLICY

U.S. policy to promote Iran and Saudi Arabia as local guardians of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region.

The decision by Great Britain in the late 1960s to withdraw its military forces from the Persian Gulf and to grant independence to its ten protectorates along the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula confronted the United States with a strategic dilemma. It was the height of Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, and the United States was deeply involved in Vietnam. Consequently, the United States decided instead of direct intervention to build up its two regional allies, Iran and Saudi Arabia, as local powers that could protect the region from the spread of Soviet influence. As the "twin pillars" of U.S. policy, both countries were encouraged to acquire billions of dollars of the most advanced arms during the 1970s. Iran embraced the twin pillars policy more enthusiastically than Saudi Arabia and intervened militarily, with U.S. approbation, in Iraq and Oman. The policy collapsed suddenly in 1979, when the shah (king) of Iran was overthrown in a revolution that brought to power a republican regime opposed to U.S. influence in the region.

See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

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ZACHARY KARABELL
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TYRE

Historic coastal city in south Lebanon on the Mediterranean Sea.

Throughout its history, Tyre (now Sur), which is located fifty-two miles (83 km) from Beirut, has known several invasions and occupations. In the eighth century B.C.E., Tyre rebelled against the Assyrians, and in the sixth century B.C.E., the population of Tyre organized a revolt against the Chaldeans. In 333 B.C.E., following his defeat of the Persians, Alexander the Great was welcomed by all Phoenician cities with the exception of Tyre.

Tyre has also had a golden age (especially under the Romans) because of its flourishing glass and purple dye manufacturing. It was under the Romans that Christianity reached Tyre in the person of Saint Paul, who visited the city and stayed for ten days. In 638 C.E., Tyre fell under the control of the Fatimids, where it remained until 1124. In that year Tyre was besieged by the Crusaders and was incorporated in the kingdom of Jerusalem, as a part of which it grew prosperous. The city was recaptured and destroyed by the Mamluks in 1291.

Oranges, citrus, bananas, and sugar cane are the major fruits and vegetables produced in Tyre. Some of the inhabitants of the city and the surrounding region also make their living as fishermen. The old Phoenician city today has a large number of banks and financial institutions, several educational and humanitarian institutions, and hospitals and health centers to serve its population of 30,000 (1996). In a city that also has an active sport life, soccer clubs are especially popular.

GEORGE E. IRANI

TZOMET

See ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN

U

UGANDA PROJECT

Proposal for a Jewish state in British territory in East Africa.

In 1902 Theodor Herzl petitioned the Royal Commission for Alien Immigration in London for assistance in alleviating the plight of Jews. In the summer of 1903, the British colonial secretary informed the World Zionist Organization of Great Britain's agreement in principle that East Africa could serve as a potential Jewish homeland. The apparent motivation for this plan, which became known as the Uganda Project or Uganda Scheme, was a desire to help the Jews as well as to develop the area for further colonization and perhaps to minimize further Jewish immigration to Great Britain.

The Sixth Zionist Congress met shortly thereafter, and Herzl presented the Uganda Scheme (it was actually Kenya), urging its acceptance as a temporary measure. Max Nordau, Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, Nachman Syrkin, and Rabbi Yitzhak Yaacov Reines supported it, whereas Menachem Ussishkin and Ber Borochov, as well as Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky, staunchly opposed it. The proposal became the subject of one of the fiercest debates in Zionist history. When Herzl won, and the Congress voted, 295 to 178, in favor of a proposal to investigate the plan's viability, the opposition stormed out and agreed to return only after Herzl assured them of his allegiance to Palestine as the ultimate objective of Zionism.

In spring 1904 the British government withdrew its offer. Herzl died before the Seventh Zionist Congress, in 1905, at which the scheme was overwhelmingly rejected by a majority of the 497 delegates.

See also Herzl, Theodor; World Zionist Organization (WZO).

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Chaim I. Waxman

ULAMA

Muslim religious scholars.

The term *ulama* literally means those who possess knowledge (*ilm*), particularly of Islam. The *ulama* emerged as the first interpreters of the Qurʾan and transmitters of *hadith,* the words and deeds of the prophet Muhammad. These scholars also became the first to outline and elaborate the basic principles of Islamic law *(shariʿa).* The *ulama* were central to Islamic education in the premodern Middle East. They regulated instruction at all levels and were instrumental in the process of training Islamic scholars in *madrasas* (residential colleges), which were established by the eleventh century. These medieval institutions developed a rigorous curriculum centered around instruction in the law, training future jurists, theologians, and state functionaries. This system of higher education was the first in a series of successful attempts to link the *ulama* to political authority in the Islamic world. Members of the *ulama* might also participate in Islamic mysticism as members—even leaders—of organized Sufi fraternities.

Now under the leadership of Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, the Shiʿite *ulama,* or cultural elite acting as guardians and interpreters of Islamic faith, have exercised unequaled political as well as religious authority in Iran since the revolution of 1979. This is in contrast to the deep divides over the authority of the *ulama* in the Sunni world. © AP/Wideworld Photos. Reproduced by permission.

The *ulama* are often defined as a class when in fact the socioeconomic status of their membership remained quite varied. Lawyers and judges were key members of the *ulama*; their legal skills were critical to the regulation of Islamic society in social and commercial matters such as wills, marriage, and trade. The *ulama* also included theologians, prayer leaders, and teachers, many of whom continued to participate in the economy as traders or artisans. Until the mid-nineteenth century, state bureaucracies in the Middle East employed members of the *ulama* as tax collectors, scribes, secretaries, and market inspectors. The *ulama* formed a cultural elite and retained the admiration and respect of the Muslim masses because they, not the rulers, were perceived as the true guardians and interpreters of the Islamic faith. As long as the *ulama* remained independent of state control, they continued to represent a base of potential support or opposition to ruling elites.

The advent of secularism and nationalism in the Middle East aroused the resistance of the *ulama,* who, increasingly, were perceived as obstacles to modernism and reform. The traditional power of the Sunni *ulama* over law, education, and bureaucracy was stripped away in the nineteenth century throughout the Ottoman Empire and in Egypt. Confiscation of *Waqf* properties, the traditional means of economic support for the *ulama,* increased their reliance on government authority for economic maintenance and served to compromise the group's independent religious and political influence. In the late nineteenth century individual members of the *ulama,* such as Muhammad Abduh, directed their influence in educational and religious reform through Egypt's famed Sunni theological center al-Azhar. More recent twentieth-century Islamic political movements in Egypt, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, successfully circumvented what was perceived as the compromised model of the traditional *ulama.*

The problem for the contemporary Sunni *ulama* rests in the definition and scope of their authority. Challenges to the sole Sunni legal authority of al-Azhar have arisen in Saudi Arabia with its state-sponsored Permanent Council for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions. Hanbali jurists who issue *fatawa* (sing.: *fatwa*) through this medium are able to affect much of the Arabic-speaking world through the power of electronic communication. The tendency toward such authoritarian discourses in the Sunni world has been challenged by individuals who wish to assert the egalitarian possibilities of a more accessible *ulama.* Sudanese President Hasan al-Turabi has argued that the *ulama* should consist of all devout, educated Muslims, not only those strictly trained in legal and theological matters. Such populist assertions undermine premodern precedent and underscore the deep divide within Sunni Muslim society today over the definition of religious and legal authority. The continued power and legitimacy of the *ulama* as leaders for the Sunni Muslim majority worldwide remains a matter of heated debate.

In contrast, the role of the *ulama* in Shiʿite Iran has reached new heights of political and religious authority since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Under the weak Safavid and Qajar dynasties the strength of the *ulama* increased. Beginning in 1925, despite the Pahlavi regime's attempts at secular government and bringing the *ulama* under state control, the scholars remained a potentially potent source of opposition. The *ulama* assumed leadership in the organized resistance to the shah, which culminated in the 1979 revolution and the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Shiʿite *ulama* in Iran successfully utilized their religious prestige as the only legitimate interpreters of Islam as a revolutionary weapon against a modern secular government.

See also ABDUH, MUHAMMAD; AZHAR, AL-; IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD; *SHARIʿA*; SHIʿISM; SUNNI ISLAM; WAQF.

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DENISE A. SPELLBERG

UMAR, MADIHA

[1908–]

Syrian painter.

Madiha Umar was born in Syria. She is widely regarded as a pioneer in using the abstract elements of Arabic calligraphy in modernist painting. This innovation, turning an element of historical Islamic art into a recognized modernist form, was later to emerge as a major trend in contemporary art throughout the Arab world and in other majority-Muslim countries. Although some artists have focused on the Arabic word as communicative of spiritual power (a concept in Islam), Umar concentrates on the beauty of individual letters, including their formal possibilities and their figurative associations. This interest in letters originally stems from her early fascination with the Arabic calligraphy on mosque domes and minarets. During the 1930s, Umar trained in England and also spent time in Iraq, taking classes and teaching. She completed her M.F.A. at the Corcoran School of Art in Washington, D.C. Her works were exhibited in the United States as early as the 1940s.

See also ART.

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JESSICA WINEGAR

UMAYYAD MOSQUE

Mosque established in Damascus by the Umayyad Caliph Walid ibn Abd al-Malik (705–715).

To construct and decorate the mosque, Walid employed the best craftsmen from Constantinople (now Istanbul) and from the Umayyad Empire. The design included a large open courtyard, a covered area on the side closest to the *qibla* (the direction of Mecca), and walls covered with elaborate mosaics. The mosque was one of the spectacular results of

the building program of the Umayyads, who made Damascus the capital of their empire. The Umayyad mosque is one of the most monumental artistic structures in modern Syria.

MUHAMMAD MUSLIH

UMMA

See GLOSSARY

UMM AL-QAYWAYN

The emirate in the United Arab Emirates with the smallest population.

Umm al-Qaywayn lies south of Raʾs al-Khayma, the northern-most emirate, and north of Sharjah on the coast of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf. It possesses the second-smallest territory, approximately 300 square miles, and its population was estimated in 1997 to be about 39,000. The capital town of the same name, which contains most of the emirate's population, was established on a sand spit for physical security. Only Abu Dhabi shares Umm al-Qaywayn's advantage of being located in a single contiguous territory.

Along with Ajman and Fujayra, Umm al-Qaywayn is one of the poorest of the United Arab Emirates and is heavily dependent on development funds from Abu Dhabi. It has very modest gas production, and few industries, the most important being cement production. Like Dubai, the emirate has established a free zone to attract overseas investment in manufacturing and trade. Nonetheless, much of Umm al-Qaywayn's population engages in the traditional pursuits of fishing and shipbuilding.

The ruling family is the Muʿalla, sometimes referred to as the Al Ali. The current amir, Shaykh Rashid ibn Ahmad, has ruled since 1981, when he succeeded his father, Shaykh Ahmad ibn Rashid al-Muʿalla, whose rule had begun in 1929.

See also MUʿALLA FAMILY, AL-; UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.

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MALCOLM C. PECK
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UMM AL-QURA UNIVERSITY

Saudi Arabian university.

King Abd al-Aziz University was founded in Jidda in 1967 as a private college. Later taken over by the Saudi state, it opened branches in Mecca and Medina; the former became independent as Umm al-Qura ("The Mother of Villages," a name for Mecca) University in 1979. It opened another campus at al-Ta'if in 1981. Umm al-Qura University offers programs in the sciences, Islamic studies, Arabic language, education, and agriculture. Student enrollment numbers more than 20,000. King Abd al-Aziz University employs more than 2,000 teachers and has a student population of more than 39,000.

KHALID Y. BLANKINSHIP

UMMA PARTY

Political party in Sudan founded by Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi in 1945.

Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi (1885–1959), the posthumous son of Muhammad Ahmad Abdullah al-Mahdi (1848–1885), used his wealth acquired by his loyalty to the British during World War I and his religious influence as the leader of the Ansar to enhance his political ambitions by launching a newspaper, *al-Umma.* Then, in February 1945, he mobilized his followers, the Ansar, to establish the Umma political party. The name refers to the community of Islam *(umma).* Its political platform, however, promotes a Sudan for the Sudanese, evoking

the legacy of the Mahdist State, founded by his father, which was hostile to the imperial ambitions of Egypt. The founding members included prominent Mahdists. Although Abd al-Rahman publicly remained aloof, he provided the funds and spiritual guidance for the party, which alienated many non-Mahdist Sudanese who were deeply suspicious that he was using the party to further his monarchical ambitions. The opposition gravitated to the Ashiqqa (Brothers) Party founded by Ismaʿil al-Azhari (1900–1969), which advocated the union of the Nile Valley with Egypt.

Frequent attempts to reconcile the unionists and the Umma failed when Azhari broadened his narrow political base to found the National Unionist Party (NUP) with Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani and his Khatmiyya Brotherhood, bitter rivals of the Ansar and historically pro-Egyptian. The Umma lost the elections in 1952 to the NUP, and Azhari declared the Sudan independent on 1 January 1956. The Umma Party continued to play a powerful role in the first parliamentary government (1956–1958) and even under the military regimes of Major-General Ibrahim Abbud (1958–1964) and Colonel Muhammad Jaʿfar Numeiri (1969–1985), when political parties were officially proscribed. It sustained an intense rivalry with the Democratic Unionist Party (the former NUP), whose patrons, the Mirghani family, played a role similar to that of the descendants of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman—his son Siddiq al-Mahdi and grandson Sadiq al- Mahdi—in the Umma Party.

The Umma Party was not without internal rivalry, particularly among the more conservative Ansar, who were led by Imam al-Hadi until he was killed in the suppression of the Ansar by Numeiri in 1970. Since then, Sadiq al-Mahdi, the great-grandson of the Mahdi, has led the Umma Party. He served as prime minister in all the coalition governments between 1986 and 1989, after which he was placed under arrest by Brigadier Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, who seized control of the government in his coup d'état of June 1989. Although all political parties except Bashir's National Islamic Front (NIF) were proscribed, the organization of the Umma Party in the Sudan remained in place and its leadership joined the other opposition parties in exile who had formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in Asmara, Eritrea.

In December 1996 Sadiq made a spectacular escape from house arrest to join the NDA in Asmara. Thereafter, he played an ambiguous role, seeking control of the NDA on the one hand and a rapprochement with the Bashir government on the other, both of which weakened the authority of the NDA. He failed to dominate the NDA; but when President Bashir permitted political parties to once again be openly active in Sudan, Sadiq signed the Djibouti Agreement with President Bashir in November 1999 and was able to return to lead the Umma as an opposition party. Although a body of the Umma leadership defected from the Umma to join the government, Sadiq remained in Khartoum and was confirmed leader of the opposition Umma Party in April 2003 at its first general conference in fifteen years.

See also ANSAR, AL-; AZHARI, ISMAʿIL; *MAHDI*; MAHDIST STATE; SUDAN.

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ROBERT O. COLLINS

UMM KULTHUM

[c. 1904–1975]

The most famous Arab singer of the twentieth century.

Umm Kulthum performed for more than fifty years, beginning in the villages and towns of the Egyptian delta in the early twentieth century and continuing until her final illness in 1973. In the course of her long career, Umm Kulthum recorded over three hundred songs and appeared in six films. She performed throughout the Arab world and is often considered the most accomplished singer of her time.

The Egyptian singer Umm Kulthum, photographed in Cairo in 1968, enjoyed immense popularity throughout the Arab world from the 1920s until her death in 1975. She supported Arab culture through her performances of populist songs derived from Arab music and poetry, as well as by speaking out for government support of such music and the musicians who played it. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

She was born in the Egyptian village of Tammay al-Zahayra in the province of Daqhaliya to Shaykh Ibrahim al-Sayyid al-Baltaji (died 1932), the imam of the village mosque, and his wife, Fatima al-Maliji (died 1947). Her father augmented his income by singing religious songs for local celebrations. Umm Kulthum learned the songs while listening to him train her brother Khalid as his accompanist. Impressed with the power of his young daughter's voice, Shaykh Ibrahim eventually included her along with Khalid and their cousin Sabr in his performances.

The young girl with the very strong voice became the family's star attraction. To protect her reputation, the father had her wear a boy's coat and head covering, and he conducted all business on her behalf. By 1917, the family began to consider a serious singing career for Umm Kulthum and in about 1922 they moved to Cairo to launch her in the commercial music business. In Cairo, Umm Kulthum was not an immediate success. Compared with the women already established as successful performers and recording stars, including Munira al-Mahdiyya and Fathiyya Ahmad, she was viewed as unsophisticated and countrified. She engaged music teachers and endeavored to copy the manners of the elite women in whose homes she sang. Like other aspiring performers, she was aided and schooled by a number of mentors, including singer Shaykh Abu al-Ilah Muhammad, poet Ahmad Rami, and the amateur musician Amin al-Mahdi. By 1928, she surpassed the popularity of her competitors and remained at the top of musical society for the remainder of her career.

Umm Kulthum began to make commercial recordings in 1924. Although recording companies were usually conservative and disinclined to take a chance on an unknown singer, they vied with each other for the largest possible share of the market; as a result the relatively unknown Umm Kulthum was recruited by Odeon Records and recorded fourteen songs in 1924 and 1925. These were immediately successful, for, as she later explained, her long years of performing in the delta provided her with a larger audience outside Cairo than most other singers. This experience awakened Umm Kulthum to the nature of her potential audience. During the late 1920s and the 1930s she began her lifelong involvement with the mass media: commercial recording (1924), radio (1934), film (1934), and television (1960). Commercial recordings had been circulating in Egypt since about 1904 and, despite the relatively high cost of phonograph players and records, were widely accessible. They were installed in public places, such as coffee houses, where even those who could not afford the equipment could hear the records. (Later, radios, televisions, and cassette players were similarly shared.) From 1937 until her final illness, her concerts on the first Thursday of each month were broadcast live to an ever growing audience. These concerts were certainly her best-known professional activity and allowed Umm Kulthum to count among her audience

millions of listeners beyond the ticket-buying audience in Cairo.

She started with a repertoire of traditional, predominantly religious songs as a child; in the late 1920s and 1930s, she began to sing new virtuosic songs, often composed for her by Muhammad al-Qasabji on the romantic poetry then in vogue by Ahmad Rami. During her golden age in the 1940s and 1950s, she sang colloquial songs of populist expression written by Zakariyya Ahmad and Bayram al-Tunisi and serious neoclassical songs by Riyadh al-Sunbati and Ahmad Shawqi; these have become her best known. In the late 1950s and 1960s, she commissioned new love songs by younger poets and composers and finally collaborated with her colleague and rival, Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab; they produced ten songs, which retain great popularity to the present day.

In her later years, she was recognized as an important public figure, in general, and a symbol of authentically Egyptian and Arab culture and art. She served seven terms as president of the musicians' union and as a member of the selection committee for radio and of several national commissions on the arts. After the Egyptian defeat in the Arab-Israel War (1967), she initiated a series of benefit concerts in Egypt and throughout the Arab world designed to replenish the Egyptian treasury. She appeared in Morocco, Libya, Sudan, Lebanon, Abu Dhabi, and Tunisia, and her trips to these countries took on the character of diplomatic visits.

Health problems that had plagued Umm Kulthum for much of her life worsened as she aged, and she spent most of the last year of her life under medical treatment. She died on 3 February 1975.

See also ABD AL-WAHHAB, MUHAMMAD; MUSIC; SHAWQI, AHMAD.

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VIRGINIA DANIELSON

UMM NAʿSAN

Second largest of the thirty-three islands in the archipelago that constitutes the State of Bahrain.

Umm Naʿsan occupies some 8.5 square miles (22 sq. km) and lies approximately 2.5 miles (4 km) off the western coast of the main island of Bahrain, the largest in the archipelago. It is reserved for the private use of the ruler. Several small springs provide water for a limited pastureland, and date palm gardens grow along its western shore, gardens planted and stocked with deer and gazelle by Shaykh Hamad ibn Isa Al Khalifa during the 1930s. Ruins dot the surface of the island, lending credence to local legends that it was the seat of the ancient rulers. The causeway from Saudi Arabia to the main island, Bahrain, passes through Umm Naʿsan.

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FRED H. LAWSON

UNION DÉMOCRATIQUE DU MANIFESTE ALGÉRIEN (UDMA)

A moderate Algerian organization whose goals changed from autonomy within the colonial system to full independence.

The Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA; Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto) was founded by Ferhat ABBAS during the spring of 1946 and ceased to exist in April 1956 when Abbas, in Cairo, announced his alliance with the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front). It grew out of the moderate wing of the Algerian political spectrum, which in the 1930s had sought reform within the colonial system. When the colons refused such reform, it moved in the 1940s toward Algerian autonomy.

Winning eleven of the thirteen Algerian seats in the second French Constituent Assembly in 1946, Abbas proposed an autonomous Algeria within the framework of the French Union. When this program failed to carry, the party was diminished considerably in influence. Representing mainly educated, middle-class levels of society, the party had some three thousand members by 1950 and participated actively in the Algerian Assembly established by the Organic Law in 1947.

After joining the FLN, Abbas and other UDMA leaders served in the Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne (CNRA; National Council of the Algerian Revolution) and subsequently in the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne; GPRA).

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JOHN RUEDY

UNION GÉNÉRALE DES ÉTUDIANTS TUNISIENS (UGET)

See GENERAL TUNISIAN UNION OF STUDENTS (UGTE)

UNION GÉNÉRALE DES TRAVAILLEURS MAROCAINS (UGTM)

Moroccan labor union.

The Istiqlal Party founded the General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM) in 1959 to compete with the Moroccan Labor Union (Union Marocaine du Travail, UMT), then associated with the National Union of Popular Forces (Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, UNFP). The UGTM represents the labor branch of the Istiqlal Party, which emphasizes nationalistic, pro-Islamic, and pan-Arab policies. The UGTM takes a pragmatic stance toward the government, not hesitating to support its policies. This was particularly true when the Istiqlal Party was represented in the cabinet (1977–1984). During the 1980s the UGTM gained ascendancy within various sectors, but especially in the rural milieu and agriculture.

The UGTM competed with the UMT in the 1970s and with the Democratic Confederation of Labor (CDT), created in 1978, in the 1980s. However, in the 1990s the UGTM joined forces with the CDT. The socioeconomic situation of the country had been steadily worsening since the 1980s, and both unions called for strikes during the 1990s to force the government into a dialogue with labor representatives. Similar tactics were repeated in 2002 under the government of Abderrahmane Youssoufi. The strikes concluded the following month with a social pact negotiated by the government, the employers, the CDT, and the UGTM.

As of 2003, the modification of the current Labor Code, which could represent a limitation on the right to strike, is an issue of great concern to both unions. UGTM's secretary general is Abderrazak Afilal.

See also UNION MAROCAINE DU TRAVAIL (UMT); YOUSSOUFI, ABDERRAHMANE.

LARRY A. BARRIE
UPDATED BY ANA TORRES-GARCIA

UNION GÉNÉRALE DES TRAVAILLEURS TUNISIENS (UGTT)

Tunisian labor union.

The Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (General Union of Tunisian Workers) is the strongest labor union in Tunisia. Founded in 1946 by Ferhat Hached, the union was the first indigenous attempt to organize Tunisia's workers. Hached broke with the French, communist-led General Confederation of Workers (*Confédération Générale des Travailleurs*; CGT). The new union worked closely with the nationalist movement in Tunisia. Consequently, members of the French resistance organization Red Hand assassinated Hached in 1952.

From 1952 until 1969, the union was under the influence of Ahmed Ben Salah and his socialist economic policies. The fall of Ben Salah in 1970 led to its reorganization and reemergence in 1976 under the charismatic leadership of Habib Achour, who dominated the UGTT until 1989. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, the union exerted a fierce opposition to the government. The UGTT tended to oppose economic liberalization because this

would lessen its control of the labor movement and adversely affect workers. Achour signed the Social Contract of 1977, which stipulated that the union would control labor unrest. Deteriorating economic conditions, however, caused Achour to break this pact. A wildcat work stoppage at Qsar Hellal in October 1977 led to a confrontation between the army and striking workers, the first time the government had used the army to suppress labor. In early January 1978, the UGTT issued a resolution extremely critical of the economic policies of Habib Bourguiba's regime. On 26 January 1978, called "Black Thursday," a bloody clash left 150 people dead. The government declared a state of emergency and arrested UGTT leaders. Achour was tried for sedition and sentenced to ten years in jail. The regime imposed a new executive bureau on the union and weakened it as a force of opposition to the government's economic policies.

Pardoned in 1981, Achour returned to the post of UGTT president, with leftist Taieb Baccouche as secretary-general. Privatization measures of the mid-1980s eroded the UGTT's clout. In January 1984, riots broke out as a result of an increase in the price of bread. The ensuing violence led the union to harden its stance toward the government. By 1985, the UGTT had again run afoul of the government by threatening to strike if the decline in workers' real wages was not reversed. In December, the government again disbanded the union and jailed its leadership on various charges.

The 1987 palace coup of Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali led to improved relations between the government and the UGTT. Internal dissent, exemplified by the split that in the early 1980s created the National Union of Tunisian Workers (*Union Nationale des Travailleurs Tunisiens;* UNTT), had weakened the organization as the main opposition force. The union, therefore, started to lose its role as the country's leading social movement to the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LTDH).

In 1989, encouraged by the government, the reunification of the UGTT and the UNTT was made official and the union leaders were substituted. Achour was replaced by Ismail Sahbani and Ali Romdhane. In late December 1993, Sahbani consolidated his position and expelled his chief opponents from the UGTT's executive bureau.

The union's nineteenth congress, held in April 1999, elected Sahbani as secretary general for the third time. There was, however, increasing discontent among the UGTT membership over his authoritarian leadership style and his conciliatory attitude toward the regime. Forced to resign, Sahbani was replaced by Abdessalem Jerad in September 2000.

See also ACHOUR, HABIB.

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LARRY A. BARRIE
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UNION MAROCAINE DU TRAVAIL (UMT)

Morocco's oldest trade union.

The Moroccan Labor Union (Union Marocaine du Travail, UMT) was formed in 1955 with the help of the nationalist Istiqlal Party. It reportedly had a membership of over 600,000 in the early years of Morocco's independence, becoming the nation's largest labor organization. It enjoyed a monopoly of Moroccan unionism until the Istiqlal Party founded the General Union of Moroccan Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains, UGTM) in 1959, which took over 10 percent of its membership.

Although affiliated with the National Union of Popular Forces (Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, UNFP) from 1959 to 1962, the UMT declared its autonomy from political parties at its Third Congress (1963). In the 1960s the government declared a state of emergency, during which political and union activity was restricted for several years. During this period the UMT saw its membership decline sharply. The state of emergency ended in July 1970, prompting a rapid rise in labor unrest soon afterward. Nevertheless, the UMT remained weak, affected by organizational and leadership problems.

By the mid-1970s internal dissent had emerged within the organization. Some criticized the union

leadership for inaction and subordination to the state. Mahjoub Ben Seddiq has been its secretary general since 1955. In 1978 the USFP founded the Democratic Confederation of Labor (Confédération Démocratique du Travail, CDT), an organization that soon attracted former UMT union members. In the 1990s UMT's political activism was surpassed by the CDT, which, in alliance with the UGTM, has become the leader of trade union militancy in Morocco.

See also Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains (UGTM).

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Bradford Dillman
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UNION NATIONALE DES ETUDIANTS MAROCAINS (UNEM)

Originally left-wing opposition group in Morocco that came to be dominated by Islamists in the 1990s.

The Union Nationale des Etudiants Marocains (UNEM), originally supported by teachers and high school students, was involved in extralegal and radical activities against the monarchy and its governments during the 1960s and 1970s, when it was associated with the progressive faction of the Istiqlal Party and the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP). Its agenda was redress of political, social, economic, and educational grievances. In July 1963 Hamid Berrada, secretary-general of the UNEM, was condemned to death for allegedly plotting against the state in support of Mehdi Ben Barka. He fled the country and, with Ben Barka and Muhammad al-Basri, initiated a campaign to denounce the monarchy. One year later, UNEM's president, Muhammad Halaoui, was arrested for having criticized Berrada's sentencing. Between 1963 and 1973 UNEM leaders were repeatedly arrested and imprisoned for organizing strikes and engaging in subversion. The peak of the government's crackdown came in April 1972 with a mass trial of eighty-one student leaders on charges of treason. Twenty-eight received long jail sentences.

The UNEM was dissolved in 1973 and reconstituted in 1978. The new leadership initiated a number of demonstrations between 1979 and 1981 that resulted in further clashes with the authorities, but in general the political calm in Morocco during the 1980s was reflected in the UNEM's relatively low profile. In 1991 clashes on university campuses between leftists and Islamists were related, in part, to their respective attempts to gain control of the UNEM. Mostly affiliated with Jamiʿat al-Adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Charity Group), the leading Islamist extraparliamentary movement, Islamist students came to control most of the country's student organizations by the end of the decade, including the UNEM, and found themselves in periodic confrontations with the authorities.

See also Ben Barka, Mehdi; Istiqlal Party: Morocco; Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP).

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UNION NATIONALE DES FORCES POPULAIRES (UNFP)

One of Morocco's leading leftist political parties.

The Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (National Union of Popular Forces, UNFP) was founded in December 1959 by progressive and leftist elements of the Istiqlal Party, Morocco's most important nationalist force. Among its founders were Mehdi Ben Barka; Abdullah Ibrahim (prime minister from 1959 to 1960); Mahjoub Ben Seddiq (secretary-general of the Union Marocaine du Travail [Moroccan Labor Union], UMT); Abderrahmane Youssoufi; Mohamed Fqih Basri; and Abderrahim Bouabid. Following two failed coup attempts in 1971 and 1972, the government arrested many UNFP members and placed them on trial. In 1972, internal disputes led to the emergence of two blocs within the party: the Casablanca group led by Ibrahim, and the Rabat section led by Bouabid. During 1973, a series of detentions forced the Rabat group to put its activities on hold for a period of four months. The political turmoil led to severe

divisions within the party, causing the UNFP section in the city of Rabat to split from the party and found a new party, the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (Socialist Union of Socialist Forces, USFP), in 1974. Because most of the UNFP's members joined the USFP, the remnant UNFP headed by Ibrahim became an insignificant party under the guidance of the UMT. The UNFP boycotted the 1977 elections and the municipal and parliamentary elections of 1983 and 1984.

The ideology of the UNFP was socialist, calling for a transformation of the social structure, nationalization of the means of production, greater rewards for workers, and land reform. It consistently opposed the leadership of King Hassan II and called for the creation of a representative democracy. In the international arena, the UNFP supported Arab unity within a socialist democratic framework, favored developing nation revolutionary movements, and opposed Western involvement in the national economy. Strongly nationalist, the party and its successor, the USFP, unconditionally supported the government line in Western Sahara and refused to agree to any form of settlement that would relinquish Moroccan sovereignty rights over the territory.

Ben Barka served as the UNFP's general secretary until his assassination in France in 1965. The party's principal leadership structure consisted of a central committee, an administrative commission, and a general secretariat. In 1967, the UNFP created a political bureau composed of Bouabid, Ibrahim, and Ben Seddiq, which the party's administrative commission dissolved in 1972. The leadership of the UNFP was often divided. The party held its second and last national congress in 1963. The UMT provided most of the party's infrastructure at the local level.

After briefly heading the government in 1959 and 1960, the UNFP joined the opposition. At the height of its power during the early 1960s, it won 414 out of 765 seats in the 1960 local elections and 28 out of 144 seats in the 1963 parliamentary elections. Severe repression after 1962 and a split with the UMT caused it to lose much of its strength during the late 1960s.

The UNFP had a diverse membership united more by a commonality of interests than a common ideology. Second-generation nationalists from the Istiqlal with modest family backgrounds and French educations held top positions. Professionals, teachers, and government workers composed much of the party's middle-level hierarchy. Rank and file members were largely trade union members and students. Wealthy members of the UNFP provided most of its financing. It had a diverse constituency, attracting its greatest support from workers living in Atlantic coast cities and from government cadres, students, and traders in the Sousse region.

See also Ben Barka, Mehdi; Bouabid, Abderrahim; Ibrahim, Abdullah; Istiqlal Party: Morocco; Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP); Youssoufi, Abderrahmane.

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Bradford Dillman
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UNION OF TUNISIAN WOMEN

The largest and oldest women's organization in Tunisia.

In 1956, L'Union Nationale des Femmes Tunisiennes (Union of Tunisian Women; UNFT) was formed with the explicit goal of elevating the cultural, social, economic, and political status of Tunisian women. As a women's auxiliary of the national Neo-Destour Party, the UNFT was primarily responsible for communicating, supporting, and implementing the Neo-Destour Party's initiatives and policies. Among its early initiatives were literacy and education campaigns and awareness-raising programs about the personal status code and women's rights. The UNFT became a prominent organization in the years after independence, with nearly 14,000 members in 1960 and more than 38,000 in 1969. By 2000, the UNFT had grown to a membership of more than 135,000, with regional offices and regional delegates in each of Tunisia's twenty-three governorates.

The UNFT has been primarily dedicated to women's advocacy at the national level, urging the

implementation of state-sponsored programs. With the goal of promoting women's interests in all areas of society, the UNFT has sponsored and implemented projects relating to business, culture, science, health, and education. The social condition of women and the elimination of poverty continue to be of particular concern to the organization, and the UNFT works with both governmental and nongovernmental organizations to address women's needs and represent women's interests.

See also Gender: Gender and Education; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Tunisia.

Angel M. Foster

UNION SOCIALISTE DES FORCES POPULAIRES (USFP)

Moroccan Socialist political party.

The Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (Socialist Union of Popular Forces, USFP) was formed in 1974 by a large breakaway faction of the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (National Union of Popular Forces, UNFP) led by Abderrahim Bouabid. A member of the Socialist International and strongly nationalist, the USFP supports the Moroccan government's stand on Western Sahara and it has consistently opposed the United Nations referendum plan for the region. The position of general secretary has been held by Bouabid (1974–1992) and Abderrahmane Youssoufi (1992–). Most of its members—primarily teachers, students, and government workers—come from urban middle-class backgrounds. During the 1990s the party, which in the past had a strong constituency among students, workers, and the unemployed, lost ground in favor of Morocco's Islamist parties, mainly the moderate Justice et Développement Party (Justice and Development, PJD) and the now illegal Al-Adl wa'l Ihsan (Justice and Charity Organization) headed by Abdessalam Yassine. The USFP is closely allied with the Democratic Labor Confederation, one of Morocco's leading trade unions.

Following the establishment of a bicameral system in 1997 and the elections that took place amid wide accusations of fraud, King Hassan II appointed Youssoufi prime minister in February 1998. Together with the Istiqlal Party, the USFP formed the core of the new government. The USFP won the legislative elections of 27 September 2002, which were marked by low participation (51.5%) and the success of the Islamist PJD. After the elections, the USFP announced that it would not form a cabinet with the PJD but would instead resuscitate its alliance with the Istiqlal Party. Despite the victory of the USFP, the king appointed Driss Jetou of the Istiqlal Party prime minister in October 2002, amid protests from the USFP and other parties. Differences over the USFP's role after 1998 have caused strains in relations with other member parties of the national democratic bloc, or Kutla. In the municipal elections of September 2003, which took place in the aftermath of bomb attacks that killed forty-five people in Casablanca and severely restricted the participation of Islamist parties, the USFP ranked second after the Istiqlal party, winning 14.2 percent of the vote and 3,373 of the total 23,689 local council seats.

See also Istiqlal Party: Morocco; Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP); Western Sahara; Youssoufi, Abderrahmane.

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Vanesa Casanova-Fernandez

UNION TUNISIENNE DES INDUSTRIALISTES, COMPAGNIES, ARTISANS (UTICA)

Tunisian federation of employers.

The Tunisian Union of Industrialists, Businessmen, and Artisans (UTICA) was created during the third congress of the Neo-Destour Party on 17 October 1948. Initially called Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie et du Commerce (Tunisian Union of Industry and Commerce) and later the Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, du Commerce, et de l'Artisanat (Tunisian Federation of Industry, Commerce, and Handicrafts), the union represents the interests of Tunisian employers as signatories of pacts regarding wages and work conditions in the Tunisian market. As of 2003, Hédi Djilani became the president of the union.

UTICA regularly negotiates wages and working conditions with the government and the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (General Union of Tunisian Workers; UGTT). Based on these negotiations, the government sets annual wages for the labor force. The 1956 labor code guarantees a minimum wage, provides for arbitration to settle disputes, authorizes union membership, sets the work week and other labor standards, and provides for social security and disability insurance payments. The government also seeks to ensure that wages do not lag behind inflation. In May 1999, the Tunisian government increased minimum monthly wages in the public and private sectors by between 3.3 percent and 3.7 percent. Amendments to the labor code in 1994 and 1996 allowed firms to consider an employee's productivity when evaluating salary, to set working hours according to their needs, and to base part of an employee's salary on productivity; it also allowed layoffs based on economic or technological needs.

Since 1986, Tunisia's economic restructuring program has led to the privatization of a number of public conglomerates, the reduction of food subsidies, and a general liberalization of the economy. Tunisia's economic liberalization is linked to structural adjustment policies under the patronage of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, upon which the country depends for financial support. The liberalization of Tunisia's economy has taken place within the framework of a structural adjustment program (1986); adherence to the General Agreement on Terms of Trade (GATT) in 1989 and membership in the World Trade Organization since 1994; and the signing of a free-trade agreement with the European Union in 1995.

UTICA supported the construction in 1999 of the Elgazala Technology Park in Ariana (a city north of Tunis). The union views the transfer of technology and automation to Tunisia as a key to the country's economic diversification and a necessary step toward attracting foreign investment.

In the international sphere, UTICA has become prominent in strengthening economic ties between the Tunisian government and other developing nations. In March 2003, UTICA signed a series of agreements with its Moroccan counterpart, the Confédération Générale des Enterprises du Maroc (General Confederation of Enterprises in Morocco), to promote the integration of both economic regions. The two organizations called for the implementation of the Moroccan-Tunisian free-trade agreement, the creation of a databank of joint industrial projects, and the deregulation of customs duties. Outside the Arab world, UTICA has played a prominent role in the strengthening of commercial ties between Tunisia and Pakistan. In October 2002, UTICA signed an agreement with its Pakistani counterpart to set up a joint business council between their respective national chambers of commerce.

See also UNION GÉNÉRALE DES TRAVAILLEURS TUNISIENS (UGTT).

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Federation of seven shaykhdoms at the southern end of the Persian Gulf.

The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) is bounded on the north by a small portion of Qatar, the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, and a detached segment of Oman. The country shares a long, undefined border with Saudi Arabia (west and south) and Oman (east). It has an area of just over 32,000 square miles, about the size of the state of Maine. Abu Dhabi occupies nearly 87 percent of the total; Dubai, less than 5 percent; and Sharjah, just more than 3 percent. The emirates of Ra's al-Khayma, Fujayra, Umm al-Qaywayn, and Ajman occupy the remainder. The country has a flat coastal plain; an interior desert, part of the Empty Quarter (Rub al-Khali); an elevated plateau; and the Hajar Mountains, shared with Oman. Principal oasis regions are Liwa and Buraymi. Rainfall is highly seasonal, localized, and scanty. Summer temperatures often reach 115°F on the humid coast, and higher in the dry interior. From October to March the weather is mild and pleasant.

The U.A.E.'s population has risen from about 180,000 in 1968 to approximately 3.1 million in 2000; the influx of expatriate workers and their dependents account for most of the growth and some 80 percent of the total population. The U.A.E. is overwhelmingly urban, and the largest cities are (in descending order) Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and Ra'ʾs al-Khaymah. Nearly all U.A.E. nationals and expatriates are Muslims; significant exceptions include some Indians, Filipinos, and Westerners. Sunnis account for about 85 percent of all Muslims. Tribal affiliation remains very important among Emiratis, whose rulers are drawn from the leading families of the dominant tribes.

History

Most of the current ruling families took power in the early part of the nineteenth century when Great Britain imposed a general truce after a series of violent clashes with the Qawasim seafaring forces who had opposed Britain's military and commercial ascendancy in the lower Persian Gulf. A series of treaties between these rulers and Britain codified Britain's predominant position and gave rise to the region being called the Trucial Coast or Trucial Oman. The area was known as Sahil Oman (Oman Coast) by Arabic-speakers. These treaties had a tendency to reinforce the leading role of the local rulers and create a powerful political status quo. However, local politics, mainly in the form of family disputes and alliances, have resulted in some changes. For example, Dubai became independent of Abu Dhabi in 1833, Raʾs al-Khayma seceded from Sharjah in 1869, and Fujayra gained independence from Sharjah in 1952. A treaty in 1892 further codified British power in the region, prohibiting rulers from engaging in diplomacy with non-British powers or ceding their territories to outsiders without British approval. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, fishing, pearling, trade, and agriculture were the main sources of income for the inhabitants of the emirates. However, the world depression of the 1930s and the collapse of the Persian Gulf pearl market plunged the region into great poverty, forcing many to migrate elsewhere.

Traditions, including camel races in the desert, and tribal affiliations remain important elements of life in the United Arab Emirates, even as this federation of seven shaykhdoms experiences widespread change thanks to its oil wealth. © Alain Le Garsmeur/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

Britain instigated the first efforts at federation when it established the Trucial Council in 1952, an administrative body made up of the seven rulers. However, rivalries and philosophical differences prevented the rulers from joining in federation until 1971, when all but Raʾs al-Khaymah formed the U.A.E. (Raʾs al-Khaymah joined the federation the following year.) The ruler of Abu Dhabi, the largest and wealthiest emirate, Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan al-Nahayyan, became president of the U.A.E., and Dubai's Shaykh Rashid ibn Saʿid al-Maktum became vice president. While much of the political history of the emirates has revolved around relations among the ruling families, it also has been affected by interactions with regional powers such as Oman, the rulers of Najd (later Saudi Arabia), Bahrain, Qatar, and Iran. At its inception Abu Dhabi's dispute with Saudi Arabia and Oman over the Buraymi (al-Ayn) Oasis remained unresolved; traditional rivalries among the seven amirs threatened the federation's viability; and Iran coerced Sharjah into a joint occupation of Abu Musa island (which contributed to a coup attempt that took the life of Sharjah's ruler, Shaykh Khalid ibn Muhammad), and forcibly seized the Tunb Islands from Raʾs al-Khayma.

Economy

Since the early 1960s, when Abu Dhabi began exporting oil, the U.A.E. economy has been dominated by this sector. The country's proven oil reserves, 94 percent of which were located in Abu

Dubai, the largest city in the United Arab Emirates, has undergone considerable and almost continuous transformation since this late 20th-century photograph along Dubai Creek. Although Abu Dhabi has by far the most land and greatest amount of oil and natural gas reserves of the U.A.E.'s seven shaykhdoms, Dubai has a vital function with its extensive port facilities and free-trade zone. © CHRISTINE OSBORNE/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Dhabi emirate, amounted to some 98 billion barrels in 2001, more than 9 percent of the world's total. Dubai possesses 4 billion barrels; Sharjah, 1.5 billion; and Ra'S al-Khayma, 100 million. Abu Dhabi also has the bulk of the country's 212 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. The gap in economic development between Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah, on the one hand, and the rest of the emirates is considerable, though it is moderated by federal government spending on infrastructure, with most of the funding from Abu Dhabi. Dubai, long the major trading center of the lower Gulf, is the region's leading entrepôt with the most extensive port facilities. Its Jabal Ali free zone has helped expand the U.A.E.'s nonoil sector to 60 percent of total GDP. Promotion of traditional economic activities, including agriculture and fishing, has created employment opportunities in the poorer emirates and achieved significant import substitution.

Government and Politics

The U.A.E.'s constitution provides for federal legislative, executive, and judicial institutions. The political system is a mix of presidential and parliamentary features, with the greatest power in the executive Federal Supreme Council, whose members are the rulers of the seven member states. Zayid has been president since independence, and Rashid served as both prime minister and vice president, posts assumed by his son Maktum in 1986, following Rashid's incapacitation. The legislature, called the Federal National Council, has only consultative powers, despite being given a somewhat greater role in the 1990s. Its forty members are appointed by the rulers: eight each from Abu Dhabi and Dubai,



MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

six each from Sharjah and Ra᾽s al-Khayma, and four apiece from the remaining emirates. Real legislative authority resides in the Council of Ministers, which initiates most laws, oversees implementation of federal laws, and prepares the federal budget.

Considerable powers are left to the individual emirates, each governed in an essentially traditional manner by a hereditary ruler. Even in foreign affairs, defense, and finance, theoretically federal concerns under the constitution, the individual emirates act autonomously. Each emirate has pursued its own oil policy. Dubai and Sharjah maintained business as usual with Iran while the federal government tilted toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). Zayid has championed a centralized U.A.E., whereas others, especially his former rival, Rashid, have favored the loose federal arrangement.

Foreign Relations

The U.A.E. maintains generally friendly relations with its neighbors, although these can be complicated by the independent actions of various emirates. It has played an active role in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which promotes economic and security ties to the other five conservative Gulf Arab states. Zayid has assumed a major role in the Arab world as a force for moderation, as in his efforts to promote Egypt's reintegration into the Arab League. Relations with the United States have been friendly, though sometimes strained because of what is seen as a one-sided American policy toward the Arab-Israel conflict. The United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom are the U.A.E.'s major trading partners. After the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the U.A.E. cooperated closely with the United States and other members of the anti-Iraq coalition. However, during the late 1990s the country modified its stance, sending food and medicine to Iraq, and opposing a U.S. attack on the country. In a dramatic break from precedent among countries in the Arab League, the U.A.E. suggested in early 2003 that Saddam Hussein step down as leader of Iraq as a way to avoid imminent war with the United States.

See also ABU DHABI; AJMAN; BURAYMI OASIS DISPUTE; DUBAI; FUJAYRA; RA᾽S AL-KHAYMA; RUB AL-KHALI; SHARJAH; TRUCIAL COAST; UMM AL-QAYWAYN.

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MALCOLM C. PECK
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UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (UAR)

Union of Syria and Egypt, 1958–1961.

By the late 1950s, Egypt was the most powerful Arab state. Many Arabs were enamored of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's advocacy of pan-Arab unity under Egypt's leadership. Syria, which shared Egypt's anti-Western stance, was considerably weaker, facing both external threats and an unstable internal political situation. For some Syrians, particularly members of the Baʿth party, union with Egypt offered hope for resolving a host of problems. As early as November 1957, Syria's National Assembly called for union with Egypt. Nasser agreed, but only on his terms: full union (not a federation) under his leadership. On 1 February 1958, he joined Syria's president, Shukri al-Quwatli, in announcing the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR). A referendum on union and Nasser's presidency was approved on 21 February.

New governmental institutions were created in March 1958. Four vice presidents were appointed: two Egyptians (Abd al-Hakim Amir and Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi) and two Syrians (Akram al-Hawrani and Sabri al-Asali). Amir also was commander of the joint UAR military. A regional council of ministers was established for each province, as was a unified cabinet (whose members were appointed in October). In March 1960, a new National Assembly was created. Nasser appointed its delegates—a higher proportion of whom were Egyptians—who first met that July. He also imposed Egypt's one-party system on Syria. Only the National Union, established in Egypt in May 1957, was allowed to function.

Formation of the UAR threatened the West with the prospect of Arab unity under Nasser's leadership. That the UAR immediately tried to draw in other states furthered this perception. In March 1958, the United Arab States was forged with Yemen and would last until December 1961. More significantly, cooperation talks were held between the UAR and the government that came to power during the July 1958 revolution in Iraq. Although the two never unified, Britain and the United States were unsettled by the prospect. Formation of the UAR, the civil war in pro-Western Lebanon, and the revolution in Iraq, formerly the West's leading Arab client, prompted the dispatch of U.S. troops to Lebanon and British troops to Jordan in July 1958, to bolster anti-UAR Arab governments.

Syria soon became disappointed with the UAR. Baʿthists were angered at being barred from power in a union that some Syrians felt more closely approached Egypt's occupation of Syria. By late 1959, major Baʿthists had been dismissed from the government. The powerful Syrian bourgeoisie was alienated by Nasser's state-managed economic policies, especially limits on landholdings and the 1961 socialist decrees. In August 1961, Nasser strengthened his centralized control by abolishing the two councils of ministers and the cabinet, and adding three new vice presidents, for a total of seven (only two of whom were Syrians).

Syria's units of the UAR army in Damascus launched a secessionist coup on 28 September 1961. Following limited fighting, Nasser decided against enforcing union militarily. The breakup of the UAR was a tremendous blow to Nasser's prestige and the dream of pan-Arab unity. Egypt used the name United Arab Republic until 1971, when it became the Arab Republic of Egypt.

See also Amir, Abd al-Hakim; Baghdadi, Abd al-Latif al-; Baʿth, al-; Hawrani, Akram al-; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; National Union (Egypt); Quwatli, Shukri al-.

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Michael R. Fischbach

UNITED JEWISH APPEAL (UJA)

The main organization through which U.S. Jews support Jews abroad.

In 1939 the United Palestine Appeal joined with the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the National Refugee Service to form the United Jewish Appeal (UJA). Most of what it raises goes to what is now called the United Israel Appeal, which operates through the Jewish Agency in Israel. Funds

are also given to support Jewish communities in other parts of the world. The UJA operates through hundreds of federations and welfare funds in the United States.

Between 1939 and 1967 the UJA raised an estimated $1.925 billion, including $147 million in 1948, the year that the state of Israel was created, and $250 million in 1967, when the 1967 War occurred. Nearly $1 billion was distributed to the UJA and its predecessor, the United Palestine Appeal (UPA).

In 1999 the UJA, the United Israel Appeal (UIA), and the Council of Jewish Federations merged to form the United Jewish Communities (UJC). In the same year the UJC was reported to have raised $524 million, making it the seventh-largest charity in the United States. The UJA Federation of New York was reported to have raised $157 million.

See also JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE.

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PAUL RIVLIN

UNITED NATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The United Nations (UN) has played a prominent role in the Middle East, passing resolutions, facilitating negotiations, and organizing peacekeeping operations.

The world organization's most important contributions since 1948 are discussed in chronological order.

Arab–Israel War (1948)

The problem of Palestine was brought before the United Nations in April 1947. In May, the General Assembly set up the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. In its August report, the majority recommended a plan of partition. On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly adopted one and decided that the British Mandate over Palestine should be terminated not later than 1 August 1948. The Jewish Agency accepted the partition plan, but the Arab Higher Committee and all Arab states rejected it.

On 14 May 1948, the British Mandate over Palestine expired. The Jewish Agency proclaimed the State of Israel on the territory allotted to the Jewish community under the partition plan. On the following day, the Arab states instituted armed action in Palestine. On 21 May, the Security Council appointed Folke Bernadotte the United Nations mediator for Palestine.

Fighting ended in June with a truce, which was followed by the dispatch of a military observer mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the first UN peacekeeping operation. Bernadotte's mediation activities were cut short when he was assassinated in Jerusalem on 17 September 1948 by the Stern gang (LEHI). His work was immediately resumed by Ralph Bunche. On 11 December 1948, the General Assembly set up the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (France, Turkey, and the United States).

Between February and July 1949, Israel concluded armistice agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria under Bunche's auspices; he was awarded the 1950 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. The agreements gave temporary control of the Gaza Strip to Egypt; of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, to Jordan; and of the remaining parts of Palestine to Israel. With three of the four armistice agreements signed, Israel was admitted to the United Nations on 11 May 1949.

In December 1949, the General Assembly established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to provide assistance to Palestinian refugees. The Trusteeship Council drafted a statute for the internationalization of Jerusalem in April 1950; it was rejected by Israel and Jordan.

After the conclusion of the armistice agreements, the responsibility for promoting a final settlement of the Palestine problem fell on the Conciliation Commission, but no progress was achieved. Despite the efforts of UNTSO, the situation along the armistice demarcation lines remained tense. Palestinian *fida'iyyun* (freedom fighters) carried out frequent raids against Israel, which were invariably followed by harsh retaliation by Israel's armed forces.

Suez Crisis

Tension in the region rose to a critical level in 1956, when Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, which was controlled by British and French interests. While UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld endeavored to work out a compromise solution, Israel's troops invaded Egypt on 28 October 1956 and within a few days occupied the Gaza Strip and most of the Sinai Peninsula, while an Anglo-French force landed in the Suez Canal Zone. To help resolve the crisis, the Security Council established the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces along the Gaza and Sinai frontiers.

Six-Day War

On 18 May 1967, UNEF was withdrawn at Egypt's request. Three weeks later, war broke out. Hostilities started on the Egyptian front on 5 June and soon thereafter spread to the Jordanian and Syrian fronts. The war ended on 10 June with a cease-fire. By that time, Israel had taken Sinai and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.

On 22 November 1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242, known as the land for peace resolution, which remains the basis for a negotiated settlement. It called on the parties to seek a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East and stipulated that the establishment of a just and lasting peace should be based on the withdrawal of Israel's armed forces from territories occupied in June 1967 and the recognition of the right of all states in the region to live in peace within secure boundaries. Gunnar Jarring, special representative of the secretary-general, began a mediation mission in December 1967, but little progress was made. The mission lapsed in early 1973.

October 1973 War

War broke out on 6 October 1973, when Egypt's and Syria's forces launched simultaneous attacks against Israel's posts in the Suez Canal Zone and on the Golan Heights in order to liberate their occupied territories. As fighting intensified, especially on the Egyptian front, the Security Council met on 22 October and adopted Resolution 338, which called on belligerents to cease fighting and begin negotiations to establish a just and durable peace on the basis of Resolution 242.

Count Folke Bernadotte (1895–1948) was sent by the UN, in 1948, to the newly formed nation of Israel, in order to assist in mediating the conflict between Israel and surrounding Arab countries. While in Israel, Bernadotte was assassinated by Jewish terrorists. © NATIONAL ARCHIVES/USHMM PHOTO ARCHIVES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

But the fighting continued. At the request of President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt, the Soviet Union agreed to send troops to the area, a move that the United States strongly opposed. On 25 October 1973, the Security Council ordered an immediate cease-fire and established the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) to supervise it.

A peace conference convened in Geneva under U.S. and Soviet sponsorship in December 1973. Chaired by UN secretary-general Kurt Waldheim, it was attended by Egypt, Israel, and Jordan. Syria refused to participate, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was not invited. The conference lasted only two days, but it paved the way for U.S. mediation, which led to military disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and Syria.



Map by XNR Productions, Inc. The Gale Group.

The Camp David Accords and the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty

The peace process was revived in November 1977, when President Sadat traveled to Jerusalem. His visit was followed by direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel under U.S. auspices, which led to the Camp David Accords in September 1978 and the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in March 1979. Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin shared the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize.

It was the clear intention of the parties to the peace treaty to use UNEF II and UNTSO military observers for peacekeeping along the border, but the Soviet Union, which strongly opposed the peace treaty, made it clear that it would veto an extension of UNEF II. The Security Council therefore decided to let the UNEF's mandate lapse. The U.S. later organized and financed the Multinational Force and Observers to carry out the peacekeeping functions that the UNEF II had been expected to perform.

Israel's Invasions of Lebanon

Although relations between Egypt and Israel were normalized with the peace treaty, other aspects of the Arab–Israel conflict deteriorated after Israel's invasion of Lebanon in March 1978, following a terrorist raid against Israel by PLO fighters based in southern Lebanon. On 19 March, the Security Council called on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon's territory and established the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm the withdrawal process. UNIFIL was unable to fulfill its mandate, however. In 1982, Israel again invaded Lebanon. In 1985, Israel's forces withdrew from most of the occupied territory but continued to hold a border area known as the security zone. UNIFIL remains in southern Lebanon.

Resumption of the Peace Process

The Madrid Peace Conference on the Middle East was convened in November 1991 by the United States and the Soviet Union to promote a comprehensive settlement of the Arab–Israel conflict on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. On 13 September 1993, Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles for interim self-government for the Gaza Strip and Jericho. Although the agree-

ment is known as the Oslo Accord because of the secret negotiations held there, the PLO and Israel actually signed the text in Washington. The Oslo Accord was renegotiated in 1995 (known as Oslo 2). The United Nations played a marginal role in negotiating and implementing these agreements, but the world body's ability to continue virtually came to a halt during the second intifada early in September 2000 (see below). It has, however, been active in international assistance supporting the implementation of the declaration of principles.

The United Nations maintains three peacekeeping operations in the area: the UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights, UNIFIL, and UNTSO. UNRWA assists about 3.2 million Palestinian refugees in Gaza, the West Bank, and neighboring Arab states.

The Rebellion in Lebanon

In May 1958, a rebellion by armed Muslims broke out in Lebanon when President Camille Chamoun, a Christian Maronite, announced his intention to seek a constitutional amendment that would enable him to stand for a second term. Lebanon's government brought the matter before the Security Council, charging that the United Arab Republic (formed temporarily by the union of Egypt and Syria under Nasser) was supporting the rebellion.

By Resolution 128 of 11 June 1958, the Security Council decided to dispatch the UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). By August 1958, General Fu'ad Chehab, the Maronite commander of the army, had been elected president of Lebanon, effectively removing the question of a second term for Chamoun. In November 1958, Lebanon's government informed the Security Council that cordial and close relations had been reestablished between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic. UNOGIL was terminated the following month.

Yemen

In September 1962, a rebellion led by the army overthrew Imam Muhammad al-Badr and proclaimed the Yemen Arab Republic. Following his overthrow, the imam rallied the tribes in the northern part of the country and, with financial and material support from Saudi Arabia, the royalists fought a fierce guerrilla war against republican forces. At the beginning of October 1962, Egyptian troops were dispatched to Yemen at the request of the revolutionary government. After the 1962 session of the General Assembly, UN Secretary-General U Thant undertook a peace initiative. In April 1963, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Yemen Arab Republic accepted his disengagement plan. Saudi Arabia would terminate all support to the Yemeni royalists and Egypt would withdraw its troops from Yemen. A demilitarized zone would be established on each side of the border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and impartial observers would monitor the disengagement.

The UN Observation Mission in Yemen (UNYOM) began operations in July 1963. Following the conference of Arab heads of state at Cairo in mid-January 1964, relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia improved markedly. UNYOM was withdrawn on 4 September 1964.

Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)

On 9 August 1973, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 1818 established the Economic Commission for Western Asia as the successor to the United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut to facilitate development within and outside the region. Largely because of the awkwardness of excluding Israel from the "region," this was the last UN regional commission to be created (the first began in 1947), and on 26 July 1985 ECOSOC added social aspects to the commission's work and changed its title to the Economic and Social Commission for Western Africa (ESCWA). As a result of insecurity, the headquarters were relocated temporarily from Beirut to Amman, and then to Baghdad in 1982. After the beginning of the Gulf War, the headquarters were relocated to Amman once again in 1991. In July 1994, the General Assembly decided that the commission would return to Beirut; and UN secretary-general Kofi Annan inaugurated the permanent headquarters in March 1998.

Cyprus

Following the outbreak of fighting between the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus in December 1963, the conflict was brought before the

The United Nations grants admission to Israel, 1949. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Security Council. By Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964, the council established the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to prevent a recurrence of fighting and to return normal conditions to the island. UNFICYP became operational on 13 March. After August 1964, quiet was restored, and it lasted until July 1974, when supporters of *enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece) staged a coup d'état against the Cyprus government. Turkey launched an extensive military operation on the island. The fighting ended in August 1974. By that time, Turkey's army controlled about 38 percent of northern Cyprus. To prevent a recurrence of fighting, UNFICYP established a zone across the island between the Cyprus National Guard to the south and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces to the north.

Resolution 186 also asked the UN secretary-general to appoint a mediator to promote a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem. The first mediator, Galo Plaza Lasso, reported in April 1965 that a settlement could best be achieved on the basis of a unitary government with adequate protection and guarantees for individual and minority rights. His report was rejected by the Turkish side and Plaza Lasso resigned in December 1965. Intercommunal talks began in 1968 under the auspices of the UN secretary-general, but they made little progress.

In February 1975, the Turkish Cypriot leadership announced the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in the northern part of the island. Known after 1983 as the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, it failed to receive international recognition. UN-sponsored intercommunal negotiations finally resulted, in February 2004, in an agreement to have a unified island become a member of the European Union in May 2004. UNFICYP, whose mandate has been repeatedly extended, continues to deploy military personnel.

Bahrain

Bahrain, which until 1970 had "special treaty relations" with the former colonial power, Britain, was claimed by Iran because the island had been under its sovereign jurisdiction before 1783. Britain announced its intention to withdraw from East of Suez in 1968, and in early 1969 Iran and Britain asked Secretary-General U Thant to help resolve the disputed territory. Following nearly one year of negotiations, an agreement was reached under which U Thant would appoint a personal representative to ascertain the wishes of the people of Bahrain.

A resulting April 1970 report affirmed that the overwhelming majority of the people of Bahrain wished it to be a fully independent and sovereign state. On 11 May 1970, the Security Council endorsed the findings. Shortly thereafter, Bahrain gained its independence; it became a UN member in September 1971.

Afghanistan

On 27 December 1979, the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan to assist the communist-led government in its fight against insurgent movements. It was soon embroiled in a guerrilla war with the fighters of the Afghan resistance, known as Mojahedin, who received substantial financial and material support from Pakistan and the United States. During the hostilities, some 3 million refugees fled to Pakistan and about 2 million to Iran.

On 14 January 1980, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. In February 1981, UN secretary-general Kurt Waldheim appointed Javier Pérez de Cuéllar as his personal representative to deal with the situation. When Pérez de Cuéllar succeeded Waldheim as secretary-general in January 1982, the mission was taken over by Diego Cordovez.

Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed in 1982 to engage in indirect negotiations, with Cordovez as intermediary. Those negotiations led to the conclusion, in Geneva, of the April 1988 Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation relating to Afghanistan. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan undertook not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other state, and the Soviet Union and the United States agreed not



MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The agreements also provided for a phased withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan by 15 February 1989 and for the establishment of the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), which was set up at the end of April 1988, to monitor implementation. Besides monitoring the withdrawal of the Red Army, UNGOMAP assisted in the voluntary return of refugees to Afghanistan. The final withdrawal of the Soviet Union's 100,300 troops was completed on 12 February 1989. UNGOMAP was terminated in March 1990.

The civil war continued after the Soviet withdrawal, and the two superpowers continued to send weapons until January 1991. In May 1991, the UN secretary-general proposed a peace plan that called for free and fair elections leading to the establishment of a broad-based government. In April 1992, the communist regime collapsed with the defeat of the government forces, but this did not stop the civil war; fighting continued between rival Mojahedin factions.

In September 1996, the Taliban, a group comprised of Afghans trained in religious schools in Pakistan and former Mojahedin fighters, captured Kabul with the stated aim of setting up a pure Islamic state. Following an American attack (see below), the Taliban was ousted from power on 17 November 2001, and in December the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) was established after a number of prominent Afghans met under UN auspices in Bonn, Germany, led by Special Representative of the Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi. The AIA was inaugurated on 22 December 2001, with a six-month mandate, to be followed by a two-year transitional authority.

Iran–Iraq War

On 22 September 1980, the armed forces of Iraq invaded Iran and soon occupied a sizable portion of its territory. By Resolution 479 of 28 September 1980, the Security Council called upon Iran and Iraq to refrain from further use of force and to settle their dispute by peaceful means, but Iran rejected the resolution as one-sided. On 11 November, Secretary-General Waldheim appointed Olof Palme as his special representative to promote a peace settlement. Palme made some initial progress, but a peace settlement remained elusive.

During the initial phase of the war, Iraq's forces advanced inside Iran. In December 1980, Iranian forces stopped the advance, and by late 1982 they had pushed the Iraqi troops back in some areas beyond the border. Then fighting settled into a stalemate. Both parties engaged in frequent air attacks against military and oil installations and urban civilian areas.

Facilitated by the waning of the Cold War, on 20 July 1987 the Security Council adopted Resolution 598, which demanded that Iran and Iraq observe an immediate cease-fire and withdraw their forces to the international border. Intensive diplomatic negotiations lasted until 8 August 1988, when both parties formally accepted the cease-fire arrangements.

The next day, the Security Council established the UN Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) to supervise the cease-fire and the withdrawal process. The mission began operations in mid-August with 400 military observers and about 500 military support personnel. After the cessation of hostilities, Iran and Iraq began direct talks to settle outstanding issues. On 15 August 1990, shortly after its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq lifted its claim over the Shatt al-Arab, thus removing a major cause of conflict with Iran. UNIIMOG was terminated on 28 February 1991.

Following the war, Pérez de Cuéllar used the close relationship he had developed with Iran's leaders to obtain the release of hostages in Beirut. After securing Iran's cooperation in 1989, he asked Giandomenico Picco to deal with this matter in a one-man secret mission. Almost four years later, the mission resulted in the release of eleven Western hostages detained in Beirut and of ninety-one Lebanese held by kidnap groups.

Western Sahara

In 1985, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar and the chairman of the Organization of African Unity sought to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Morocco and POLISARIO (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia al-Hamra y Río de Oro) over Western Sahara. In August 1988, the two warring parties accepted the settlement proposals in principle. Those proposals envisaged a

The United Nations tours the Jenin refugee camp in Palestine, surveying the damage from an Israeli military strike. © AP/WORLD WIDE PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

cease-fire followed by a referendum that would enable the people of Western Sahara to choose between independence and continued union with Morocco.

In April 1991, the secretary-general submitted to the Security Council a detailed plan for implementing the settlement proposals. It provided for the establishment of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and contained a tentative timetable for the operation, according to which the referendum would be held twenty weeks after the ceasefire. On 29 April 1991, the Security Council approved the implementation plan and established MINURSO, and on 24 May the secretary-general announced that the cease-fire would enter into effect on 6 September 1991. As an interim measure, military observers were sent to Western Sahara to monitor the ceasefire.

MINURSO's Identification Commission was established in May 1993, and registration of voters began in August 1994 and was completed in December 1999. A crucial issue in the process involved the identification of applicants from three contested tribal groups. Although divergent views still exist between the parties and elections are yet to be held, the situation in Western Sahara has been generally quiet.

The Gulf Crisis and its Aftermath

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, quickly occupied the country, and annexed it. On the same day, the Security Council condemned the invasion and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraq's forces. When Iraq failed to comply, the council met again on 6 August and imposed economic sanctions. On 29 November, it adopted Resolution 678, which authorized member states cooperating with Kuwait to use all necessary measures to implement its resolutions if Iraq failed to withdraw by 15 January 1991.

On 16 January 1991, coalition forces led by the United States launched military operations against Iraq. The United Nations was on the sidelines during the Gulf War, but it played a key role again after the military operations were suspended on 28 February. At that time, coalition forces had driven Iraq's troops from Kuwait and had occupied southern Iraq.

On 2 March 1991, the Security Council demanded that Iraq implement all its resolutions and specified the measures to be taken to end the hostilities. The next day, an informal cease-fire was signed by military commanders in the field. On 3 April 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which laid down in detail the specific terms that Iraq must accept in order to obtain a formal cease-fire. After receiving Iraq's official acceptance, the Security Council established the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission to supervise the cease-fire and monitor a demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Kurdish population in northern Iraq and the Shiʿites in the south rebelled against the government, which took harsh actions to suppress the rebellions. By Resolution 688 of 5 April 1991, the Security Council demanded that Iraq immediately end the repression and give international humanitarian organizations access to all those in need of assistance within its territory. A UN humanitarian operation to provide food and essential relief supplies in all parts of Iraq, especially in the northern Kurdish area, was launched. Indeed, this was the first in a series of military interventions in the 1990s to foster humanitarian values as the theme of "sovereignty as responsibility" gained resonance.

Sanctions were not lifted by the Security Council until May 2003 (see below) because Iraq under Saddam Hussein never fully complied with the conditions of the initial resolutions to end the war or with the thirteen subsequent ones passed by the Security Council between 1991 and 2002. The negative impact of sanctions on the lives of Iraqis became controversial even after the institution of an oil-for-food program. An innovation approved by the Security Council in Resolution 687 was the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), which from 1991 to 1998 sought to find and eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Iraq's lack of compliance and the eventual rejection of UNSCOM would later become an issue in the United States–United Kingdom invasion of Iraq in March 2003 (see below).

After 11 September 2001: Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq

The attack by al-Qaʿida operatives on the World Trade Center and on the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 altered substantially the security equation in the Middle East and around the world. On 12 September, the Security Council adopted the strong condemnatory Resolution 1368, which termed these assaults a threat to international peace and security and referred to the right of self-defense. Later that same month, Resolution 1373 obliged member states under Chapter VII of the UN charter to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and also created the Counter-Terrorism Committee. Also in September, the General Assembly condemned the devastating attacks. Citing the provisions for self-defense under UN Charter Article 51, the United States began military operations against Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 and overthrew the Taliban government in November (see above). With the United Nations playing a substantial role in helping to rebuild political structures, almost 10,000 U.S. troops remained in the country along with the UN-approved International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under NATO auspices. ISAF maintained security around Kabul but resisted pressures to deploy elsewhere until late 2003, when a decision was made to do so. At the same time, the security situation remained tenuous, with al-Qaʿida's leader, Osama bin Ladin, apparently at large.

In the fall of 2002, the United States opened a new front in its war on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction with an attack on the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. In December 1999, the Security Council had created the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM; in October 2002, resolution 1441, which had unanimous support, granted UNMOVIC unconditional and unrestricted access to locations in Iraq, including those previously termed sensitive sites. UNMOVIC's mandate was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and to mon-

A United Nations convoy travels through Lebanon. © AFP/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

itor conformity with its obligations not to reacquire the weapons prohibited by the Security Council. Citing Iraq's lack of compliance with UN resolutions, the United States and the United Kingdom went to war in Iraq on 23 March 2003 without Security Council approval. They had withdrawn a draft resolution following a heated debate that reflected divisions not only among Western states but throughout the world. One of the main points of contention was the need to permit more time for inspections. Saddam Hussein's regime fell on 9 April 2003 and U.S. president George W. Bush declared victory on 1 May, although substantial resistance continued.

Security Council Resolution 1483 brought the United Nations back into the picture and led to the end of sanctions and the beginning of the world organization's involvement on the ground. U.S. insistence on maintaining political and military control inside occupied Iraq prevented a more diverse international presence. The attack on the UN's Baghdad headquarters on 19 August 2003 led to the highest death toll in the history of the organization, killing twenty-two people, including the special representative of the secretary-general, Sergio Vieira de Mello.

The United States and the United Kingdom returned to the United Nations in the hope of securing more international military and financial support for the war's aftermath. The Security Council passed Resolution 1511 on 16 October 2003, which appeared to have been helpful in securing modest financial pledges at a donors' conference held shortly thereafter in Madrid. However, the resolution did not secure substantial military forces from other states, which sought a clearer role for the United Nations. At the outset of 2004, there was still no evidence that Iran had either weapons of mass destruction or links to al-Qaʿida, which were the main reasons the administrations of U.S. president George W. Bush and U.K. prime minister Tony Blair had cited for going to war.

Ongoing Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

The second armed intifada, or uprising, began in September 2000 after a near-breakthrough in the final days of the administration of President Bill Clinton, who had sought to bridge the divide between Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak and Palestine Authority president Yasir Arafat. Following the election of Ariel Sharon as prime minister of Israel, violence involving Palestinian suicide bombings of Israeli civilians and harsh Israeli repression and assassinations continued and worsened. A suicide bombing at a Netanya hotel during the Passover holiday led to a massive Israeli attack against the Jenin refugee camp in April 2002, and a fierce battle ensued. In response to Palestinian accusations of a massacre, the Security Council asked the United Nations to investigate the events in Jenin, but Israel, after having initially agreed to permit access, did not do so. Under pressure after widespread criticism of its unilateral approach to Iraq and to international relations more generally, in April 2003 the Bush administration published a "road map" to encourage a break in the violence and eventual political negotiations for the creation of a Palestinian state. The road map was created by a quartet, whose members were the United States, the United Nations, Russia, and the European Union.

See also Afghanistan: U.S. Intervention in; Annan, Kofi A.; Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab Higher Committee (Palestine); Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab–Israel War (1973); Bahrain; Bernadotte, Folke; bin Ladin, Osama; Bunche, Ralph J.; Fidaʾiyyun; Gulf Crisis (1990–1991); Hammarskjöld, Dag; Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Jewish Agency for Palestine; Mandate System; Oslo Accord (1993); Pakistan and the Middle East; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Partition Plans (Palestine); Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier; POLISARIO; Qaʿida, al-; Sanctions, Iraqi; Suez Crisis (1956–1957); Taliban; United Nations Emergency Force; United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon; United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 1947 (UNSCOP); War in Iraq (2003); Western Sahara War; Yemen Civil War.

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F. T. Liu
Updated by Thomas G. Weiss

UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE (UNCCP)

Commission appointed to deal with the problem of dislocated Palestinians and to help reach a comprehensive peace settlement after the 1948 Arab–Israel War.

Following debate on the Bernadotte report, a UN General Assembly resolution on 11 December 1948 established the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, instructing it "to take steps to assist the parties concerned to achieve a final comprehensive peace settlement of all questions outstanding between them" and to facilitate the repatriation or resettlement with compensation of the Palestinian refugees. The commission was composed of repre-

sentatives from France, Turkey, and the United States. The commissioners began with a round of shuttle diplomacy in Middle Eastern capitals, held a conference with Arab representatives in Beirut, and then convened a major conference, meeting separately with Arab and Israeli representatives, in Lausanne between April and August 1949. These meetings, along with a further series of discussions in Geneva in 1950, produced little apart from declarations of good intention (including the Lausanne Protocol), preparations to unblock frozen Arab bank accounts in Israel, and a scheme for family reunification.

At a conference of Arab and Israeli delegates in Paris in late 1951, the commission tried but failed to achieve agreement on specific proposals for a peace settlement. After the breakdown of the conference, the commission, convinced that the parties were not yet prepared to make peace, confined its efforts to dealing with the Palestinian refugee problem. Even then, it was able to make only limited progress, mainly on background studies of the technical aspects regarding future compensation. Despite the lack of progress, the commission still exists and the General Assembly still continues to pass annual resolutions calling on it to continue its efforts to carry out its original mandate.

See also Lausanne Conference (1949).

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Fred J. Khouri
Updated by Neil Caplan

UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC SURVEY MISSION (1949)

Mission to recommend effects of 1948 Arab–Israeli war and origins of UNRWA.

On 23 August 1949 the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) established the Economic Survey Mission, instructing it to recommend a program to assist in the recovery of the countries affected by the 1948 Arab-Israel War. The principal impetus for the creation of the mission was the failure of the UNCCP to make progress toward a political solution of the Palestinian refugee problem, but the UNCCP appointed Gordon R. Clapp, former director of the U.S. Tennessee Valley Authority, to chair the mission, thus focusing instead upon fostering the economic conditions requisite to a peace settlement. Within three months the mission concluded that the large-scale undertakings it hoped would fully reintegrate the refugees, such as Arab-Israeli cooperation in a development project for the Jordan River, were politically unfeasible.

In mid-November 1949 the mission recommended that the United Nations General Assembly both adopt a more circumspect program of public works as a first step toward rehabilitating the refugees, and assist needy individuals. On 8 December 1949 the General Assembly responded by passing Resolution 302, thereby creating the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. The agency coordinated its activities with the local governments and allocated $49 million for eighteen months of operations, but it continued to function after that in order to prevent a further deterioration of the refugees' conditions.

See also United Nations and the Middle East; United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

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Zach Levey

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

Peacekeeping operation established during the Suez crisis.

The Suez crisis, during which Israel, France, and Britain invaded Egypt and occupied sizable portions of its territory, was brought before the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in early November 1956. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld submitted a plan for setting up an emergency UN force to supervise the cessation of hostilities on 5 November. The General Assembly then authorized the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the first UN peacekeeping force.

UNEF was composed of contingents provided by member states. Troops from the five permanent members of the Security Council and any countries that might have a special interest in the conflict were excluded. UNEF's establishment in the conflict area required the consent of all parties concerned. Its soldiers had light defensive weapons but were not authorized to use force except in self-defense.

UNEF, operational by mid-November 1956, initially had about 6,000 troops from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. Its first commander was Major General E. L. M. Burns of Canada. As the troops were deployed to supervise the cease-fire, negotiations were being carried out for the withdrawal of the occupation forces. A phased withdrawal began under the supervision and with the assistance of UNEF. The withdrawal of Britain's and France's forces was completed by 22 December 1956, and that of Israel's forces in March 1957.

After the withdrawal, UNEF was deployed along the Egypt–Israel border and maintained a post at Sharm al-Shaykh, which controlled access to the Gulf of Aqaba. By 1967 UNEF had been reduced to about 3,400 troops.

In May 1967, as tension arose again to a critical level in the Middle East and, despite Secretary General U Thant's appeal, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt requested the withdrawal of UNEF. UNEF therefore discontinued its operations on 18 May 1967. Three weeks later there was a new war in the Middle East.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1956); HAMMARSKJÖLD, DAG; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL; SUEZ CRISIS (1956–1957); UNITED NATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

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UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

UN force in Lebanon to confirm Israeli withdrawal and assist the Lebanese government with restoring order and security.

Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon in March 1978, at a crucial stage in negotiations between Egypt and Israel, caused the United States to insist on rapid United Nations Security Council action. Resolution 425 of 19 March called on Israel to withdraw its forces and established a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm Israel's withdrawal, restore peace and security, and assist the Lebanese government in regaining its authority. The force, initially 4,000 strong, later increasing to 6,000, began to arrive in early April 1978.

UNIFIL had no mandate to deal with the various Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) groups and Israel's proxy South Lebanon Army, irregular forces that dominated the region. The Lebanese government had no wish to reestablish its authority in the area. Southern Lebanon was a peacekeepers nightmare.

Despite humiliations, including being swept aside during Israel's 1982 invasion, and sustaining almost 250 casualties, UNIFIL remained in place because it provided some measure of security, stability, and humanitarian protection in an extremely volatile border area. When Israel finally withdrew in May 2000, UNIFIL deployed to the border. The Lebanese government, deaf to all exhortations, left the radical Shiʿite movement Hizbullah in control of the border area, and many incidents resulted. In

2002 UNIFIL was restructured as a 2,000-strong armed observer force with contingents from France, Ghana, India, Italy, Nepal, Poland, and Ukraine. Its mandate ran to July 2003.

See also Hizbullah; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); South Lebanon Army; United Nations and the Middle East.

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As'ad AbuKhalil
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UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA)

Organization that aids Palestine refugees.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was created by UN General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) on 8 December 1949, with the mandate to provide humanitarian assistance and emergency relief to Palestine refugees who had lost their homes and livelihood as a result of the Arab–Israel War of 1948. Palestine refugees within the purview of UNRWA are persons whose normal residences were in Palestine for a minimum of two years before the 1948 war, and their descendants. In 1949 UNRWA extended assistance to some 750,000 refugees, practically all of them Palestinian Arabs. By 2001 UNRWA had 3,874,738 registered refugees on its rolls, and was present in 59 refugee camps in the Middle East.

UNRWA's humanitarian activities have centered on three major programs: an educational program that ran 647 elementary and preparatory schools and vocational centers with 457,349 students in 1999; a health program with a network of units and medical staff that registered 7,163,056 patient visits in 1999; and a relief and social services program to assist disadvantaged groups. UNRWA also has set up special programs to improve the living conditions in refugee camps, especially housing and environmental sanitation, and to respond to emergencies. UNRWA has often had to carry out its mission in the midst of civil strife and military conflict. During the Arab–Israel War of 1967, more than 350,000 Palestinians fled from the territories seized by Israel; these included 200,000 refugees from the 1948 war, who were displaced for a second time. Later, the 1970 fighting between Jordan's army and the armed elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) stationed in Jordan, another Arab–Israel War (October 1973), the Lebanese civil war that started in 1975, Israel's invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and in 1982, the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) and Israel's response to it, and more recently, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf Crisis (1990–1991) all had serious effects on the conditions of Palestine refugees and the work of UNRWA. The organization was long headquartered in Beirut, but due to the Lebanese civil war it moved to Vienna in 1978. In 1994 it announced that it was moving to Gaza, to territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority. The move was completed by July 1996.

UNRWA's budget is funded 95 percent by voluntary contributions. In 2002 the UN General Assembly approved a cash and in-kind budget of $326.2 million, of which UNRWA actually received $305.9 million. With the significant increases in costs associated with the wide-scale destruction wrought during the al-Aqsa Intifada that began in October 2000, the agency's budgetary needs have increased considerably. Yet the shortfall had to be made up by cutbacks. Actual expenditures during 2002 were $293.8 million, $32.3 million less than had been budgeted for by the General Assembly. By early 2003, UNRWA was facing a dire financial situation, and had made six emergency appeals for additional funding within a year.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Arab–Israel War (1948); Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab–Israel War (1973); Gaza (City); Gulf Crisis (1990–1991); Intifada (1987–1991); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palestinian Authority; Refugees: Palestinian.

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UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION (UNSCOM)

Commission charged with eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

After the end of the first Gulf War (1991), the United Nations Security Council passed several resolutions concerning Iraq. Resolution 687, which was passed on 3 April 1991, was the most important one. It set forth the continuation of the sanctions and the embargo on Iraq until it dismantled its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, which included all ballistic missiles with a range of 90 miles (150 km), and all chemical, biological, and nuclear facilities. Resolution 687 also banned the development of such weapons in the future. A related resolution, 715, adopted on 11 October 1991, called for the establishment of a long-term comprehensive monitoring system covering all current and future facilities related to weapons of mass destruction.

The United Nations Security Council created a special commission, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which it charged with eliminating Iraq's nonnuclear WMD covered by Resolution 687. Also, UNSCOM would assist with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in the nuclear area. UNSCOM was given sweeping powers to do on-site inspections of Iraq's biological, chemical, and missile capacities, to remove and render harmless all chemical and biological weapons, to supervise the destruction of all ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 90 miles (150 km), and to verify Iraq's compliance with Resolution 687.

With a great deal of reluctance, the Iraqi government accepted Resolution 687 in May 1991. The government did not have much choice, as the resolution had passed the Security Council unanimously. Furthermore, the United States and Britain were ready to implement it and they were willing to use force if necessary.

UNSCOM operations lasted about eight years. The commission was first chaired by Rolf Ekeus, a Swedish career diplomat. From the beginning, the relationship between UNSCOM and Iraq was strained and shrouded in suspicion. On many occasions, Iraq acted in bad faith by delaying and hesitating to fulfill both the letter and the spirit of Resolutions 689 and 715. When Iraq tried to prevent UNSCOM inspectors from using their aircraft for security and political reasons, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 707 on 15 August 1991, calling for Iraq to give full access to UNSCOM inspectors, full disclosure of weapons programs, and full disclosure of all suppliers' names. UNSCOM team members came from various countries, but the majority of the members were American and British.

The tension continued between Iraq and UNSCOM throughout the commission's operation in the country. Several confrontations between the parties prompted the United States to launch short military operations against targets inside Iraq. In July 1997 Ekeus was replaced by Richard Butler, an Australian disarmament expert who lacked diplomatic finesse, and who began to work more closely with the U.S. government. After a series of confrontations in 1997 and 1998 between Iraq and UNSCOM, the United States launched Operation Desert Fox in December 1998. The operation lasted for four days and consisted of aerial bombardments of military targets. It put an end to UNSCOM inspections, because Iraq refused further cooperation. The United Nations Security Council struggled for a year to come up with a new arms inspection formula that was acceptable to the members of the council. In January 2000 the UN adopted Resolution 1284, which formed a new commission, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). For two years Iraq refused to deal with the new commission.

Both Iraq and UNSCOM were responsible for confrontations. To Iraq, Resolution 687 and the commission it created impinged on Iraqi sovereignty, because Iraq's weapons program was one of the mainstays of Saddam's power, both domestically and regionally. Iraq accused the inspectors of trying to strip the nation of its industrial and technological capacity, and it objected to UNSCOM's intrusive and confrontational approach. In addition, Iraq accused the United States of using and

subverting UNSCOM to gather intelligence in order to change the government in Iraq.

UNSCOM, on the other hand, allowed itself to be used by the United States government to collect intelligence data by the U.S. members of the inspection teams, according to Dilip Hiro (pp. 97, 107, and 119). The United States started to subvert UNSCOM operations as early as 1992 by using its intelligence agents and technicians trained in handling communications and bugging devices to intercept microwave transmissions sent by the Iraqi military. In the aftermath of Operation Desert Fox, several damaging revelations appeared in the U.S. press about the infiltration of UNSCOM by U.S. intelligence agencies.

By 1998, despite the tension between Iraq and UNSCOM, the commission had accomplished most of its job of discovering WMD, destroying them, and establishing a comprehensive remote monitoring system. According to Scott Ritter, the bulldog of UNSCOM, Iraq no longer possessed any meaningful quantities of chemical or biological agents, if it had possessed any at all (*New York Times,* 3 July 2000). In the spring of 2003 U.S. armed forces invaded and occupied Iraq; despite intense searching, as of the following spring they had failed to discover any weapons of mass destruction.

See also Gulf War (1991); Iraq; War in Iraq (2003).

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Ayad Al-Qazzaz

UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE, 1947 (UNSCOP)

Committee created in 1947 to deal with the future government of Palestine.

Following the end of World War II the Arab-Zionist conflict in Palestine was internationalized, and greater efforts were made to resolve it. After a few unsuccessful Anglo-American endeavors, in February 1947 the British handed over the Palestine problem to the United Nations.

In May 1947 the UN General Assembly created a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) with eleven members—Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden (chair), Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. It was mandated to investigate all matters relevant to the Palestine problem and to submit a report, including proposals for a solution, to the General Assembly.

The committee visited Palestine and heard testimonies from Jewish representatives, and it witnessed the dramatic capture by the British of the ship *Exodus,* which carried 4,500 European Jewish refugees. The Palestinian Arab leadership refused to testify, but the committee nevertheless met in Lebanon with representatives of the Arab states. Members of the committee also met Jewish inmates of displaced persons camps in Europe.

The UNSCOP Report, submitted on 31 August 1947, unanimously supported the termination of the British mandate in Palestine. The representatives of Iran, India, and Yugoslavia supported a federal solution (known as the minority plan) that envisaged Arab and Jewish regions within a federal union with Jerusalem as its capital. The representatives of the other states (except Australia) favored a partition into two separate independent states (the majority plan) with Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum* under an international regime.

On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, based on the UNSCOP majority plan, by a 33–13 vote, with 10 abstentions. The Jewish Agency accepted the resolution, and the Arab Higher Committee rejected it.

See also *Exodus* (1947).

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UPDATED BY JOSEPH NEVO

UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (UNTSO)

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping machinery in Israel and neighboring Arab countries.

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was created through several UN resolutions to oversee the Security Council truce agreement between Israel and the Arab states that went into effect on 11 June 1948. Unarmed UN military observers were first sent to Cairo and throughout Palestine. After hostilities in the 1948–1949 Arab-Israel war ended, UNTSO was expanded and charged with overseeing the signatories' application of the four armistice agreements. Its observers were stationed along armistice lines between Israel and Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Observers remained in the region through the 1956 Suez crisis and were supported by the new and more broadly empowered UN Emergency Force. In June 1967 UNTSO demarcated the cease-fire lines between Israel and Syria, supervised the cease-fire, and oversaw renegotiations for observers along the Suez Canal. UNTSO observers assist other armed peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, such as the UN Interim Force in Lebanon. In March 1996 UNTSO had 178 observers, down from its maximum strength of 572 observers in 1948; 28 have died in service since 1948. UNTSO is headquartered in Jerusalem and has offices in Beirut and Damascus.

See also ARAB–ISRAELI GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS (1949).

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CHARLES U. ZENZIE
UPDATED BY NEIL CAPLAN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The Middle East has been an area of vital interest to the United States since World War II.

Although U.S. interest in the Middle East can be traced to the early years of the American republic, the region has been a principal focus of U.S. foreign policy since World War II. Oil investments and the special U.S. relationship with Israel were the chief reasons for U.S. involvement in that area of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

U.S.–Middle East Relations

U.S. contacts with the Middle East started in about 1800 in North Africa. U.S. naval forces defeated the Barbary pirates in 1816, but most relations in the nineteenth century were educational and commercial in nature. Protestant missionaries established several schools, medical facilities, and colleges in Egypt, Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon.

In 1919 President Woodrow Wilson sent the King–Crane Commission to inquire into the wishes of the Syrian and Palestinian people as to their political future. In the 1920s and 1930s U.S. oil companies invested heavily in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. During World War II, the United States participated in the Allied battles for North Africa and established the Persian Gulf Command to transport lend-lease materials from the Gulf, through Iran, to the Soviet Union. By 1945 several U.S. air bases, supply depots, and transportation facilities were operating throughout the Middle East. From the end of World War II until the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s, a major objective of U.S. foreign policy was to prevent Soviet penetration of the Middle East. When British political and military commitments in the area diminished, several Middle Eastern countries signed agreements with the United States, and the region became the recipient of the greatest portion of U.S. military and economic aid.

Soviet pressure on Turkey and Iran marked the beginning of the Cold War, and the Truman Doctrine of 1947 represented one of the first efforts in the new "containment" policy to halt Soviet expansion. Responding to feared Soviet encroachments

in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, the United States, under the Truman Doctrine, sent $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey, and helped modernize Turkey's armed forces. U.S. advisers were also sent to Iran.

Founded in 1948 with U.S. support and, by the 1960s, viewed as an important strategic asset, Israel became the largest single recipient of U.S. economic and military assistance. Close ties with Israel were reinforced by humanitarian impulses inspired by knowledge of the Holocaust. The assistance to Israel made it difficult for the United States to establish closer ties with the surrounding Arab nations. During the 1950s Egypt refused to join a Middle East defense organization proposed by the United States, Great Britain, and France. Instead, the Northern Tier or Baghdad Pact, which was based on a military alliance between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, was devised. The pact was linked with other containment alliances through Turkey's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the West and Pakistan's affiliation with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in the East.

Efforts by Western countries to keep Soviet influence out of the Middle East were undermined by the events leading up to the Arab–Israel War of 1956. Attempts by the United States to cultivate better relations with Egypt were subverted when the United States refused to provide Egypt with aid to construct the Aswan High Dam; as a consequence, President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956. Despite the strain in relations between the two countries, the Eisenhower administration strongly opposed the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel in October 1956, and joined the Soviet Union in condemning the attack.

Following the war, unrest throughout the Middle East and the spread of nationalist doctrines that the U.S. government perceived as leftist led in January 1957 to the Eisenhower Doctrine, whereby military and economic assistance was dispensed to the Middle East and the use of U.S. forces was provided to protect countries in the region "against overt aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism." The doctrine was tested in April 1957 when the U.S. Sixth Fleet was sent to the eastern Mediterranean to support Jordan's King Hussein. After the 1958 revolution in Iraq, Lebanon's

U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright listened in as Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat talked with President William J. Clinton by telephone from Arafat's office in Gaza in September 1999. Despite initial progress toward final settlement of disputes about Palestine, Clinton's efforts to achieve Camp David Accords of his own in summer 2000 ultimately collapsed and were soon followed by a new and bloody Palestinian uprising against Israel. **© Reuters NewMedia Inc./Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

President Camille Chamoun also called on the United States for assistance to protect his regime from revolutionary forces, and President Eisenhower responded by sending 14,000 marines. They were withdrawn a few weeks after a truce was arranged, through intervention of the United States, between the various conflicting Lebanese parties.

The United States's efforts to resolve the Arab–Israel dispute during the Eisenhower administration centered on the Arab refugee problem and projects intended to achieve the economic reconstruction of the Middle East through cooperative development of the region's water resources. Although he was successful in achieving a de facto regional water-sharing accord, Eric Johnston, Eisenhower's special representative, failed to obtain agreement for proposals to resettle the refugees. During 1955 and 1956 the United States also joined Britain in a secret operation, code-named "Alpha," which was designed to coerce Egypt and Israel into direct talks. The operation ended in failure when another Eisenhower emissary, Robert Anderson, returned to Washington in March 1956 after a fruitless round of shuttle diplomacy. The Kennedy administration sought to promote good relations with

U.S. deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz, addressing a pro-Israel rally on 15 April 2002 in front of the U.S. Capitol, expressed President George W. Bush's "solidarity" with Israel. The United States supported the creation of Israel in 1948 and developed closer ties, including large amounts of economic and military aid, beginning in the late 1960s—which in turn often strained its relationship with Arab nations. © AFP/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

"progressive" Middle Eastern countries concerning containment. Kennedy also approved the first U.S. sale of a major weapons system to Israel.

UN Resolutions

After the Arab–Israel War of 1967 between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, UN Security Council Resolution 242, drafted with U.S. help, became the basis for U.S. policy in the Arab–Israel conflict. Its requirement that Israeli forces withdraw from territories occupied during the war hinged on the achievement of a comprehensive peace settlement. The Nixon administration's Rogers Plan, which was based on Resolution 242, called for Israel to withdraw to its pre-June 1967 borders (with minor exceptions). After the 1967 war, Egypt and Syria were rearmed by the Soviet Union, with whom they signed defensive alliances. In 1968, when the British announced their planned withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, the United States decided to build up the military forces of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Ties between Israel and the United States were greatly strengthened after the 1967 war when Israel demonstrated its potential as a strategic ally by shipping great quantities of captured Soviet-made weapons to the United States for close analysis. Ties were also aided by a strong pro-Israel lobby that influenced Congress, the White House, and the media. During the Reagan administration a memorandum of understanding was signed between Israel and the United States calling for cooperation to "deter all threats from the Soviet Union to the region." The pact provided for joint military exercises and working groups for cooperation in development and in the defense trade. In 1987 the U.S. Congress formally designated Israel a "major non-NATO ally." Israel was considered a special case in U.S. efforts to curb the expansion of nuclear powers and was not pressured to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

During the 1973 October War between Israel and Egypt and Syria, U.S.–Soviet relations worsened. Moscow and Washington provided their respective clients with billions of dollars in arms; a threat by the Soviets to send troops to assist Egypt and nuclear alert by the United States brought the two countries to the brink of war. After the outbreak of the war in late October, the Arab oil-producing nations imposed an oil embargo that created an energy crisis in the United States and Western Europe. A peace conference at Geneva in December 1973 broke up after two days without settling the conflict, but Secretary of State Henry Kissinger subsequently initiated step-by-step negotiations that resulted in disengagement agreements between Israel, Syria, and Egypt and provided for Israel's withdrawal from parts of Sinai and the Golan area.

Relations between Egypt and the United States improved after 1973 as Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat shifted from relying on Soviet aid to being receptive to U.S. influence. Hoping to capitalize on the improved diplomatic climate, President Jimmy Carter attempted to reconvene the Geneva Peace Conference in 1977, but Sadat flew to Jerusalem in November to start direct negotiations with Israel.

U.S. president Jimmy Carter (center) engaged in intensive diplomacy with President Anwar al-Sadat (left) of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel in 1978 to bring about the Camp David Accords, for which the two Middle Eastern leaders were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The agreement resulted in the Israeli return of the occupied Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and Egyptian recognition of Israel, but it did not lead to an overall settlement of the Arab–Israel conflict. COURTESY OF JIMMY CARTER LIBRARY.

Sadat's dramatic initiative began a new peace process based on direct bilateral contacts between Egypt and Israel. When bitter disagreements between the two adversaries threatened to disrupt negotiations, Carter intervened personally. He invited Sadat and Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin to Camp David, where two frameworks for peace were hammered out—one dealing with Egyptian–Israeli relations and the other with the Palestinian issue. Under Carter's guidance, the Camp David Accords were shaped into the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty that was signed in Washington, D.C., in March 1979. At the Camp David summit Carter persuaded Begin to include establishment of a Palestinian "self-governing authority" in the final accords. "Palestinian homeland" and "Palestinian rights" were accepted for the first time as legitimate concepts by the U.S. government.

Elsewhere in the Middle East, Carter's policy of containing Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf was undermined when his close ally Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the shah of Iran, was overthrown in 1979. The president's efforts to obtain the release of U.S. hostages held by the new revolutionary government in Tehran took over a year to resolve successfully, and this delay was a factor in his loss of the 1980 presidential election.

An American soldier in Baghdad, Iraq, looks for the enemy after a rocket-propelled grenade hit a U.S. Army vehicle, killing three other soldiers and a translator. U.S., British, and other forces rapidly took control of Iraq and ousted Saddam Hussein as its ruler in April 2003, but the occupation was marked by numerous daily attacks on American and coalition troops, as well as civilian supporters and aid workers, which continued after the capture of Saddam in December. © AP/WIDEWORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush continued the containment policies of their predecessors and also became deeply involved in the Arab–Israel conflict. During the Lebanese war in 1982, Reagan sent the Sixth Fleet and the U.S. Marines to Beirut as part of a multinational peacekeeping force. Lebanese militias attacked the marines, inflicting heavy casualties, and the marines were withdrawn soon after. The Reagan plan for Middle East peace envisioned "self-government by the Palestinians . . . in association with Jordan" as the "best chance for a durable, just, and lasting peace." Bush's attempts to continue negotiations based on the Reagan plan and Resolution 242 were stymied until 1991, when the Madrid Conference convened. Cosponsored by the United States and Russia, the new peace process provided for bilateral talks between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegations. It also included a series of multilateral meetings on such substantive issues as security, environment, economic development, water, and refugees.

President Bush involved the United States in its largest foreign military operation since Vietnam when in 1991 he sent U.S. forces to drive Iraq from Kuwait. From a military perspective, the operation was a success because the United States and the allied forces sustained only minor casualties. Bush was sharply criticized, however, because Iraq's President Saddam Hussein remained in power despite his defeat on the battlefield.

Post–Cold War Policy

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, a new phase of U.S. foreign policy began; containment was no longer the principal objective. Instead, Russia and the United States cooperated in regard to the Middle East. As Soviet influence in the region declined, the United States became the dominant power, and its influence was paramount. This situation greatly facilitated Washington's goal of maintaining the political status quo through its support of friendly regimes. It also made it easier to intervene when U.S. concerns such as assured access to oil and the security of Israel appeared to be threatened.

Initial attempts by President William J. Clinton to resolve the Arab–Israel conflict seemed encouraging, but the failure of an Israeli–Palestinian summit at Camp David in July 2000 contributed to a second Palestinian intifada (uprising) against Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. By 2003 hostilities degenerated into a low-intensity war between Israel and Palestinians that threatened U.S. policies aimed at maintaining stability in the region through support for the status quo.

An attack by Middle Eastern terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center in New York and severely damaged the Pentagon in Virginia on 11 September 2001, resulting in thousands of casualties. The September attack intensified President George W. Bush's war on terrorism, leading to a U.S.-led attack on Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan resulted in expulsion of the Taliban government in Kabul and establishment of a new regime allied with the United States. Bush renewed efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein in 2002 and 2003, charging that he was a threat to international peace and that he had developed weapons of mass destruction in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. U.S. forces were assembled in surrounding countries, and invaded Iraq in March 2003.

See also Camp David Accords (1978); Camp David Summit (2000); Gulf Crisis (1990–1991); King–Crane Commission (1919); Madrid Conference (1991); Twin Pillars Policy; War in Iraq (2003).

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Don Peretz

UNITY PARTY

Turkish political party, active in the 1960s and 1970s.

The Unity party came to be identified with the Shiʿite Alevi minority community. It changed its name to the Turkish Unity party in November of 1971, perhaps to overcome this image. With the outlawing of the Turkish Workers Party, eight of its former members were allowed to run as independents on the Unity party's election list in 1973, giving it a distinct leftist inclination. It polled only 1 percent of the vote and gained only one seat, however, compared to nearly 3 percent and eight seats in 1969. In 1977 it did even less well, failing to win any seats at all.

See also Alevi; Turkish Workers Party.

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Frank Tachau

UNIVERSITY OF JORDAN

The main public university in Jordan.

The University of Jordan was established in 1962 on a picturesque hillside in the western outskirts of Amman that formerly was the site of an agricultural research station. The university comprises eighteen faculties, including arts, sciences, economics and commerce, *shariʿa* (Islamic law), medical sciences (including general medicine, nursing, and pharmacy), education, agriculture, engineering and technology, law, and physical education, and as of 2003 boasted 961 faculty members. It awards both undergraduate and graduate diplomas, and also has a teaching hospital. As with all public universities in Jordan, students pay nominal tuition and are able to buy books and materials at subsidized prices. In 2003, the university student population stood at 25,000, eighty-eight percent of which came from Jordan.

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Jenab Tutunji
Updated by Michael R. Fischbach

UNIVERSITY OF KHARTOUM

A Sudanese institution established in 1902.

Horatio Herbert Kitchener, Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, established the Gordon Memorial College in the memory of the British general Charles George Gordon, who died at Khartoum in 1885, to establish a formal seat of learning in the Sudan. Kitchener opened the college on 8 November 1902. During the first half of the twentieth century, Gordon Memorial College was transformed from a secondary school to a college with a more sophisticated curriculum and a more renowned faculty. Most graduates during these years became civil servants in the British administration of the Sudan.

Its function as a vocational training institute was substantively changed when the college was affiliated with London University in 1945 to grant equivalent degrees; in 1951 the Gordon Memorial College and Kitchener School of Medicine were combined to create the University College of Khartoum. Upon Sudan's independence in 1956 the University College abandoned its connections with the University of London to become the University of Khartoum. Since then it has expanded to include numerous research institutes and a variety of schools.

As the campus lies in the heart of Khartoum, the university's faculty, staff, and particularly its students have played a significant role in the political life of Sudan. Its graduates organized and led the Graduates' General Congress in 1938, which played a dynamic role in the evolution of Sudanese nationalism and in Sudan's governments after independence. After the coup d'état of 30 June 1989 by Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, the National Islamic Front (NIF) government reoriented the university's curriculum and purged the Western-educated Sudanese and expatriate faculty, replacing them with instructors more suitable to the NIF's Islamist ideology. At the same time the government launched a dramatic expansion of the university, so that in 2002 there were 17,000 undergraduates, 6,000 graduate students, and an academic staff of more than 1,000.

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ROBERT O. COLLINS

UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN

The first modern university in Iran.

In May 1934, the Majles (national assembly) passed a law to incorporate five existing public colleges as a new University of Tehran. The original faculties included law, literature, medicine, science, and technology (engineering). Reza Shah Pahlavi officially inaugurated the University of Tehran in February 1935 by laying the foundation stone for its campus in an area northwest of the then new administrative and commercial district. Subsequently, faculties of agriculture, fine arts, and theology were added, as well as a printing press and a central library.

In 1943, the university became independent of the ministry of education and a board of directors was organized. Elected by the faculty, the new governing body also elected the dean. This independence was undermined after 1953, when the election of the dean became a formality, since the new dean had to be approved by the shah. By the late 1960s, the shah was making appointments from among politicians instead of academics, further undermining the university's academic integrity. These efforts at political control, however, did not prevent the University of Tehran from becoming the nurturing ground for all the opposition movements against Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's regime, including the opposition that eventually led to the Iranian Revolution (1979).

The 1979 revolution and the Iran–Iraq War slowed the development of the university, but since 1989 it has continued to develop and expand, adding several new faculties and institutes. Despite the establishment of other universities in both Tehran and other Iranian cities, the University of Tehran has an unrivaled reputation in the country for academic excellence. During the early 2000s, the annual enrollment was about 30,000 students, over 60 percent of whom were female; the faculty exceeded 1,500. The administration of the university is still based on the pattern established during the previous regime.

See also IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); IRAN–IRAQ WAR (1980–1988); PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA; PAHLAVI, REZA.

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MANSOUREH ETTEHADIEH
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

UQBI, TAYYIB AL-

[1888–1960]

Prominent member of the Algerian Association of Reformist Ulama.

Born near Biskra in Algeria, Tayyib al-Uqbi (also Tayeb el-Okbi) studied in Medina and was influenced by the Muwahhidun movement of Islam. He was known as an eloquent and controversial Islamic scholar. In 1936 al-Uqbi was accused of planning the murder of the *mufti* (canon lawyer) of Algiers but was acquitted in 1939. Al-Uqbi criticized Shaykh Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis's political involvements and left the association in 1938; he preferred discussion of religious and spiritual questions as disclosed by his journal, al-Islah.

See also MUWAHHIDUN.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

URABI, AHMAD

[1841–1911]

Egyptian nationalist leader and army officer.

Ahmad Urabi, the son of a village shaykh of Iraqi Arab origin, studied for two years at al-Azhar in Cairo and then entered the Cairo military academy at the behest of Saʿid Pasha in 1854/55 and soon earned his commission. After the deposition of Khedive Ismaʿil in 1879, he is said to have supported the emerging National Party of Egypt, but his first proven act was to represent a group of discontented ethnic Egyptian officers who were protesting against the favoritism shown to Turkish and Circassian officers by War Minister Uthman Rifqi. Khedive Tawfiq and Prime Minister Riyadh intended to dismiss Urabi and his group for insubordination, but other Egyptian officers seized control of the war office and rescued Urabi in February 1881. Subsequently, the khedive agreed to replace Rifqi with Mahmud Sami al-Barudi as war minister. On 9 September fearing a khedival counterplot, the Egyptian officers surrounded Abdin Palace, confronted Tawfiq, and obliged him to set up a constitutionalist government with Muhammad Sharif as prime minister and to increase the size of the Egyptian army.

As Britain and especially France—concerned about the safety of the Suez Canal, their investments, and their citizens in Egypt—became increasingly hostile to the Urabist movement, the Nationalists replaced Premier Sharif with Mahmud Sami al-Barudi in February 1882, and Urabi became war minister. The Nationalists continued to fear a khedival counterplot and took steps to weaken the Turks and Circassians within the officer corps, also stirring up popular feeling against the European powers. Riots broke out in Alexandria in June 1882, and many European residents fled. Britain and France threatened military intervention to support the khedive (whose relationship with the Nationalists seems to have been ambivalent) and to protect their citizens. They demanded that the Egyptian army remove all fortifications from Alexandria, and, when Urabi did not comply quickly enough, British ships began bombarding them, leading to the outbreak of fires in Alexandria. British troops (unaided by France, which had withdrawn because of a ministerial crisis) landed at Alexandria and later at Isma'ilia to restore order. Urabi and the Egyptian army continued to resist the British, even after the khedive had gone over to their side, until their crushing defeat at al-Tall al-Kabir on 13 September 1882. Once the British entered Cairo, Urabi surrendered, was put on trial for treason against the khedive, but was not executed. He was exiled to Ceylon—until he was allowed by Khedive Abbas Hilmi II to return in 1901. He played no part in the later National party of Mustafa Kamil, died in obscurity, and was generally scorned by educated Egyptians until the 1952 revolution. Since then he has been rehabilitated by Gamal Abdel Nasser and his fellow officers—whose occupational and class backgrounds paralleled his own. Now he is generally considered a patriot who resisted the British, the

khedive, and the aristocracy in favor of constitutional government and the welfare of Egypt's common people.

His writings include *Kashf al-Sitar an Sirr al-Asrar,* published in two volumes (Cairo, 1925).

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

URBANIZATION

The growth of cities and the social and physical transformations arising from this phenomenon.

The Middle East is home to the world's first cities as well as some of its most notable ones. The first cities, which developed in southern Mesopotamia (now in Iraq) about 3500 B.C.E., had small populations by modern standards—not exceeding about 20,000 inhabitants. By 3000 B.C.E. cities also grew along the Nile in Egypt. From these early centers, urban life spread throughout the world.

Until about 1800 most of the great cities such as Babylon, Alexandria, Ctesiphon, Constantinople (now Istanbul), Baghdad, and Cairo could grow large because they had access to water transport and income from an imperial tax base. Industry and trade were the main sources of income for smaller cities, including Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, Carthage, Tabriz, Palmyra, and Mecca. The development of some cities was heavily influenced by their religious significance; these include Jerusalem, Karbala, Mashhad, Mecca, Medina, and Qom. The proportion of the total population living in cities in what became known as the Middle East seldom exceeded 15 percent before the nineteenth century.

New factors contributed to the growth of cities after 1800, including modern transportation, new trade patterns, and European penetration. Following World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, nationalist regimes were established, first in Iran and Turkey, later in Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. These focused development inward. East of Libya, the capitals of the large countries are all inland (Ankara, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Riyadh, Sanʿa, Tehran) and since their development policies were statist, these cities expanded. After World War II, rail and road networks that centered on the capitals were extended, facilitating migration to them. At the same time, rapid rural population growth and the mechanization of agriculture, largely implemented after 1945, pushed farmers from the land. Millions of people in the region moved to cities in search of jobs, education, and other services.

Israel was established in 1948 after a period of conflict, and its urban growth—mainly Tel Aviv and Haifa—was fueled by an influx of Jewish immigrants. Palestinians left or were expelled by Israeli forces in 1948, swelling cities in neighboring countries including Lebanon (Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut), Jordan (Amman), and Kuwait, as well as the territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Oil boomtowns (Abadan, Abu Dhabi, Dhahran, Kuwait City) grew rapidly for short periods, but they never became as large as the major political and commercial centers. In the larger countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Morocco, Turkey) close to 50 percent of the population was urban by the mid-1990s. In some of the smaller countries (Israel, Lebanon, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates) the proportion is as high as 90 percent.

See also URBAN PLANNING.

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JOHN R. CLARK
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URBAN PLANNING

Effect on city organization of colonialism and petroleum wealth.

In the modern period two major influences have shaped contemporary urban planning in the Middle East: colonialism and petroleum. These two influences, and a host of other minor factors, have had different roles during three phases of constructing urban landscapes: the colonial period (c. 1800–1945), a transitional period (c. 1945–1972), and the oil-boom era (post-1972). Within these three stages, urban planning has shifted from being primarily involved in physical planning and urban design to integrating socioeconomic and physical planning.

The Colonial Period (1800–1945)

Although not all countries in the Middle East were colonized at the same time or in the same pattern, a common thread connects the urban-planning process. Europeans used urban planning successfully to establish and maintain the colonial extractive system. Physical segregation was the main tool used in implementing this policy. Urban planning in this period was dominated by physical land-use planning and urban design, which chiefly concerned the arrangement of urban infrastructure and land use. The colonial use of physical planning established and maintained a trading network and facilitated a suitable living environment for European colonial administrators, workers, and their households.

European colonialists built port cities to collect and ship goods (for example, Aden, Casablanca, Tunis, Suez, Hormuz, and Port Saʿid). They also built interior towns to serve as military centers, local administrative capitals, or collection points for regional resources, and they built infrastructure, such as roads and railways, to connect interior cities to ports. This trade-related settlement system became the new colonial urban hierarchy that is still common all over the Middle East.

Urban planning then played its second major role in this period by maintaining and servicing the influx of European military personnel, administrators, businesspeople, settlers, and fortune seekers. Planning was utilized to build the segregated city, in which a European, upper-class quarter was separated from the rest of the city. French Morocco offers the most vivid example of this kind of city planning: European quarters were built separate from the old medinas; important urban cultural sites were preserved; and the European part of the city utilized the most up-to-date urban-planning techniques. Similar practices were followed in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. These urban plans segregated Europeans, along with some local resident minority groups (such as Coptic Christians and Jews) and a small community of the native rich, from the indigenous population, resulting in a dual city. A parallel but noninstitutionalized development in Palestine was the building of Tel Aviv as a Jewish city adjacent to Arab Jaffa.

In the dual city, a disproportionate share of the urban revenue was spent on the European quarters, even though taxes were raised mostly from the native quarters. As a result, the European neighborhoods had large residential plots, low densities of population, and broad tree-lined roads and streets. They were also better connected to urban amenities like water, electricity, and sewage facilities. These low-density residential quarters with their superior facilities and other urban benefits provided healthier environments for their residents. In addition, they provided the Europeans with a culturally familiar environment, making them more interested in working in colonies and thus maintaining the colonial system.

In countries where local rulers had more autonomy or colonialism was not officially present, rulers tried to copy European styles of design and urban planning. In Egypt before British control began in 1882, Khedive Ismaʿil (r. 1863–1879), influenced by his visit to Paris, tried to follow for Cairo the urban plans of Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann. Later, in Iran, Reza Pahlavi Shah (r. 1925–1941) promoted a grid design for Tehran and constructed wide avenues through the old quarters of the city, and a "modern" city along the lines of the European model was built in north Tehran, where the rich began to reside. It was thought that

copying Western urban form would lead to modernization, but the end result was the growth of dual cities similar to those that developed in colonized countries. Indeed, the internal structure of most Middle Eastern cities still can be traced back to this period.

The Transitional Period (1945–1972)

Urban planing assumed a lesser role in the Middle East during this politically active period. Since most of the countries in this region either had just become politically independent or were in the process of becoming so, urban planning was less important than ongoing political struggles and social movements. In the immediate postcolonial period, a spontaneous population movement occurred within some major Middle Eastern cities. In particular, the space formerly occupied by Europeans was taken over by the indigenous elites. In countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, this transition occurred in a peaceful and orderly fashion, but in a few countries, most notably Algeria, the rapid exodus of foreign settlers resulted in more diverse economic classes taking over the quarters formerly occupied by colonialists. Nevertheless, most Middle Eastern cities maintained their dual character.

Major concerns for urban planners were to provide housing for new migrants from rural areas and to bridge the gap between the former European and traditional quarters. To consolidate power, new rulers provided various social groups with land, housing, and urban amenities in return for their political support. In Israel, for example, the Labor Party provided temporary housing in the 1950s for Jews immigrating from postwar Europe and from other areas of the Middle East. Later, these immigrants were resettled in new urban neighborhoods and in newly established development towns in less populous areas.

Urban planning also began to develop in a new direction, emphasizing company-town building, master-plan technique, and economic development. This aspect was particularly evident in the Persian Gulf states of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. The steady growth of oil revenues beginning in the late 1950s encouraged governments to devise long-term economic development plans or to invest in industrial projects. These policies had a major impact on developing urban planning into an integrated physical-economic approach.

U.S. and British oil companies also established company towns for their workers. The Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO), for example, used Western planners and engineers to lay out company towns such as Dhahran and Abqaiq using a system of blocks with a grid pattern. Similarly in Iran, British planners modeled the city of Abadan on the landscape of suburban England. Middle Eastern countries depended on the West for qualified planners and consultants to carry out urban planning. Consequently, a planning technique then common in the West, the master plan, was imported to the Middle East and soon became ubiquitous throughout the region. Most plans were end-state master plans, in that the ultimate look of the city in the future was already predetermined. Most plans were also unclear about the process of city planning or procedures for implementation. Additionally, the plans were usually static and design-oriented, with little consideration for the social and economic needs of the majority. Although very few master plans actually were implemented, the process of designing master plans proved to be a positive development for urban planning.

The Oil-Boom Era (1973 to the Present)

In the 1970s the role of urban planning underwent a rapid transformation, particularly in the oil-producing countries, where the rise in oil revenues enabled governments to embark on a variety of grandiose urban projects. A major focus was on comprehensive planning, which involved the private sector and considered spatial development concerns. The construction of new towns absorbed considerable investment. Three major goals prompted the building of new towns: to relieve the population pressures on the major cities by drawing migrants away from already overcrowded cities; to accommodate the growing population of industrial workers and to facilitate industrialization; and to accommodate military bases throughout the region. Primarily, Western firms have undertaken the planning of these new towns, especially those in oil-rich countries. Although efforts to incorporate aspects of indigenous culture into the design of these towns have been made, such efforts have not been fully successful. Most of these towns have used zoning to isolate

economic activities, in contrast with the mixed-use tradition in the region, and their layouts are designed for the use of the automobile.

With the oil wealth–fueled economic growth of the Persian Gulf countries serving as a catalyst, the rejection of end-state master plans soon became common all over the Middle East in favor of new city plans that give more consideration to social and economic factors. In addition, the new plans were integrated into broader regional and national planning strategies based on large urban centers in such countries as Egypt, Iran, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. The new dynamic style of planning is also evident in the use of Integrated Urban Development Projects (IUDPs) among local planners and planning consultants. The emphasis of IUDPs is on the sectoral and spatial integration of projects, operating alongside, although often effectively replacing, comprehensive master planning. For example, the IUDP for Baghdad consisted of three integrated plans for central Iraq, greater Baghdad, and Baghdad the city. Three models—urban corridors, growth poles, and dispersed settlements—were used to develop comprehensive alternative strategies based on future scenarios. After evaluating the scenarios, a hybrid of all three models applicable to Iraq's needs was adopted.

Although the focus of making plans had changed, the tools for implementing them remained inadequate in most Middle Eastern countries. The reasons include a lack of cooperation among decision makers, a lack of enforcement legislation, and the conflict between the beautification and modernization of the city and the meeting of basic needs of the inhabitants. Thus, urban planning in the Middle East still is grappling with numerous problems. One major issue in large cities of oil-rich countries is how to allocate resources between immigrants and the native population. These immigrants, often from other Middle Eastern countries, are not granted citizenship or the right to own property, placing a heavy burden on the rental markets. In addition, a new form of segregation is taking place: Housing estates are planned so as to minimize contact between immigrants and the indigenous population. For example, in the new towns of Jubail (Saudi Arabia) and Umm Said (Qatar), dormitory-style housing for single expatriate workers secludes them from the native population.

Perhaps the most important issue for city planning is rapid population growth and urbanization. At approximately 3 percent per annum, the region's population growth rate is higher than the figure for any other world region with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa. The urbanization rate, at more than 4.5 percent for most countries in the Middle East, is also among the fastest in the developing world. Most large cities of the region suffer from overcrowding; squatter settlements; housing shortages; poverty; unemployment; lack of adequate urban infrastructure, services, and amenities; and escalating environmental degradation, including unbearable pollution. These and other urban problems are placing increasing stress on the budgets, resources, and planning capacities of municipal governments, forcing planners and policy makers to seek new ways of managing urban growth. In fact, this need to cope with many intertwined urban problems often has led to planning being used as a tool to anticipate future problems and merely manage current ones, rather than solve them. A more preventive approach to urban planning must take the place of the existing curative approach.

See also ARCHITECTURE; COLONIALISM; URBANIZATION.

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HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI
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URF

See GLOSSARY

URWA AL-WUTHQA, AL-

Anti-British Muslim newspaper.

Edited from Paris by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* was published between March and October 1884. The title, meaning "the firmest bond," alludes to the Qurʾan; it had been used by Afghani in 1883 to refer to the pan-Islamic caliphate of the Ottoman sultan. After eighteen issues had appeared in 1884, the paper suddenly ceased publication, probably owing to lack of funds. (The closing is usually atributed to the British banning the paper from entering India and Egypt, but since it was distributed free throughout the Muslim world, this measure should not have stopped it.) The financing of *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* is unclear, although documents suggest that a Tunisian general, probably Wilfrid Blunt, and possibly the former Egyptian Khedive Ismaʿil were involved. Subsidization afforded wide distribution, which helped to enhance the reputation of the paper and its editors.

Most of the political articles in the paper championed the struggle against British imperialism in Muslim lands. The more theoretical articles were mainly devoted to an activist reinterpretation of Islamic ideas and to a call for unity among Muslims. *Al-Urwa al-Wuthqa,* which contributed to the fame of its editors in the Muslim world, was the first forum in which Afghani stressed Muslim unity, or pan-Islam, the ideology with which he is most associated.

See also ABDUH, MUHAMMAD; AFGHANI, JAMAL AL-DIN AL-.

NIKKI KEDDIE

UŞAKLIĞIL, HALIT ZIYA

[c. 1866–1945]

Turkish novelist, journalist, and poet.

Halit Ziya Uşakliğil was born in Istanbul, the son of a businessman from a prestigious İzmir family. When he was fourteen years old, the family returned to İzmir, where in 1884 he published the city's first daily newspaper, *Nevruz.* He started up other İzmir newspapers while working in Istanbul as a French teacher and bank employee. In the 1890s, he became active in the Servet-i Fünun (Wealth of Knowledge) literary movement and began writing novels. In 1909, he became a professor of literary history and aesthetics at Istanbul University.

Uşakliğil is considered a top Turkish novelist who bridged the nineteenth-century Tanzimat (reform) and twentieth-century republican periods, combining the complex storylines and heightened rhetoric of the former period with the cosmopolitan tastes and psychological realism of the later one. In the 1920s, he turned from novels to other forms, particularly short stories, and published about two hundred. He also published poetry, several plays, literary studies, and memoirs.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

ÜSKÜDAR

The oldest and largest district of Asian Istanbul.

Situated across the Bosporus from the walled city of Constantinople, Üsküdar was called Chrysopolis in ancient times and Scutari in the Byzantine era. In the period of Ottoman rule, Üsküdar became more integrated into the life of the capital city, as it became the center of several dervish orders and tekkes, military barracks, and, in the nineteenth century, textile and other factories. In the 1860s, it was formally incorporated into the municipal government of Constantinople (now Istanbul). It was in Üsküdar that Florence Nightingale set up her famed hospital during the Crimean War (1853–1856). And in

the late nineteenth century, Russian Turks established the first center of Turkic studies in the empire in an Üsküdar *tekke.* The district, known for its fine gardens, in recent years has become a large residential quarter of the city with a population over 200,000.

See also TEKKE.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

USS *COLE*

See *COLE,* USS

USSISHKIN, MENAHEM

[1863–1941]

Zionist leader.

Menahem Ussishkin, engineer and leader of the Russian-based Zionist movement Hibbat Zion, was a spokesman for a practical Zionism favoring land settlement, diaspora activities to aid distressed communities, and cultural autonomy, even after the World Zionist Organization insisted on suspending such actions until a political charter recognizing Jewish national rights in Palestine was secured. Ussishkin replaced Chaim Weizmann as head of the short-lived Zionist Commission after the end of World War I and later served as chairman of the Jewish National Fund until his death in 1941. A fervent advocate of expanding Jewish land ownership as a tool for strengthening Zionism's political claims, he was equally passionate about reviving Hebrew as a spoken language and expanding educational institutions in Palestine.

See also HIBBAT ZION.

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DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

USS *LIBERTY*

See *LIBERTY,* USS

U.S.S.R.

See RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

USTADH

See GLOSSARY

USULI

Philosophy of Islamic law.

The Usuli school of Shiʿite jurisprudence, developed in contrast to the Akhbari (traditionalist) school, argues for the primacy of the *ulama* as interpreters of Islamic law and prophetic and imami traditions. The Usulis favor the legitimacy of reasoning (*aql*) and interpretation (*ijtihad*) of traditions of the Prophet and the imams as sources for the derivation of Islamic law. Thus, they allow for the emulation of prominent Shiʿite *ulama* by the believers, who are incapable themselves of interpreting the Qurʾan or the teachings of the Prophet and the imams. In addition, the Usulis believe in critical readings of the contents of major Shiʿite compilations of prophetic and imami traditions. They also prohibit the emulation of past masters of religion, so that the centrality of living *ulama* as interpreters of Shiʿite jurisprudence is preserved. Rivalry between the two schools heightened in the Safavid period, with the Usulis emerging as the ultimate victors by the eighteenth century.

Shiʿite *ulama* were able to play a prominent role in the constitutional movement of Iran (1905–1911), drawing on elements of Usuli thought to justify both the ratification of the constitution and the participation of clergymen in political affairs. The evolution of the Usuli doctrine of a hierarchical clerical establishment made for the creation of clerical ranks such as *hujjat al-islam, ayatollah,* and the *marja al-taqlid* (source of emulation) in contemporary Shiʿism. In addition, Usuli discourse made for the legitimation of the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih,* or governance of the jurisconsult, in post-1979 Iran.

See also SHIʿISM.

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Neguin Yavari

UTAYBA TRIBE

See Tribes and Tribalism: Utayba Tribe

UTAYBI, JUHAYMAN AL-

[c. 1940–1980]

Saudi ideologue and leader of the Mecca insurrection, 1979.

Utaybi was born in a bedouin settlement at Qasim in central Saudi Arabia. It is unclear whether he received any formal education during his childhood. Utaybi served in the National Guards for about eighteen years, and toward the end of this period he studied at the Islamic University in Medina.

The year 1974 seems to have marked Utaybi's break with formal state institutions. The circumstances under which he left the National Guards are unknown; his departure from the university resulted from his disagreement with his teachers' applied interpretation of Islamic law in relation to the Saudi regime. He began a period of self-education and preaching, drawing a circle of followers. His first *risala* (treatise), "Al-imara wa al-bayʿa wa al-taʿa" (Rulership, allegiance, and obedience), appeared in 1974. Utaybi was arrested with ninety-eight others in 1978; all were released without trial.

At least eleven *risalas* by Utaybi were printed between 1974 and 1979. His writings combined a strict application of the Wahhabi (Muwahhidun) doctrine with widely accepted traditions having a messianic dimension. He accused the Saudi rulers of doctrinal deviation, greed, and corruption. He also accused the religious establishment of complicity and preached that it was the duty of Muslims to combat the evils of the regime.

Utaybi anticipated that the regime would pursue and persecute its puritan opponents, whose sole and ultimate refuge would be the Kaʿba (the holy shrine inside the Grand Mosque at Mecca). There, the *mahdi's* (messiah's) appearance would be established, armed resistance would start, and the Muslims would be victorious in the Arabian Peninsula and beyond. On 22 November 1979 Utaybi led a heavily armed group, estimated at between 500 and 2,000, who seized the Kaʿba. They were ousted two weeks later. For their crime, Utaybi and sixty-two others were beheaded on 9 January 1980.

See also Ikhwan; Muwahhidun.

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Abdel Aziz EzzelArab
Updated by Eric Hooglund

UTHMAN, MUHAMMAD ALI

[c. 1908–1973]

North Yemen political leader.

Muhammad Ali Uthman was a Yemeni nationalist and republican, a strong supporter of both the 1962 revolution that resulted in the Yemen Arab Republic (YAP) and the 1967 coup that replaced the al-Sallal regime with that of Qadi Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani. He was a member of the Republican Council, the plural executive created by the al-Iryani regime, from 1967 until his assassination in 1973. His murder, the result of a local dispute, was at the time attributed wrongly to leftist dissidents supported by the revolutionary regime in South Yemen; it was seized upon by the government as an excuse to crack down on leftists. Uthman was a traditional local notable and landowner, and a Sunni Muslim of the Shafiʿi sect, with much influence in part of the Hujariyya, Jabal Sabr, and the lower elevations south of Taʿiz City. He is memorialized in a very

good English-language school in Taʿiz (grades 1 through 12), which was named after him shortly after his death.

See also PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN; TAʿIZ; YEMEN; YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

UTHMAN, UTHMAN AHMAD
[1917–1999]

Egyptian civil engineer, construction magnate, and cabinet minister.

Born in Ismaʿiliyya and educated at Cairo University, Uthman Ahmad Uthman founded a civil engineering company soon after graduation instead of entering government service. But he quickly discovered that the booming oil industry in Saudi Arabia offered him better opportunities for advancement than did Egypt. His construction firm, the Arab Contractors, founded in 1940, expanded until it was able to bid on multimillion-dollar projects in the United Arab Emirates (then called Trucial Oman), Iraq, Kuwait, and Libya. Although his company was sequestered by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1961, Uthman remained in control and played a major role in constructing the Aswan High Dam.

He became highly visible in Egyptian public life during the period of the Infitah policy of Anwar al-Sadat, building a new bridge across the Nile River and various traffic flyways in downtown Cairo. His firm also deepened the Suez Canal and built the Dhahran International Airport, the Kuwait Municipal Building, the Benghazi (Libya) sewer system, the Kirkuk (Iraq) feeder canal, and a first-class hotel in Khartoum (Sudan). He became minister for reconstruction in 1973, adding housing to his portfolio in 1974. His son married one of Sadat's daughters.

During the Sadat era, Uthman accumulated power and wealth in ways that aroused widespread suspicion, in part by being both a minister who could issue tenders on contracts and a contractor who could bid on them. Under Husni Mubarak he became vulnerable to criticism by journalists, the Engineers' Syndicate, and even his son, but his firm has remained prominent in Egypt, other Arab states, and other African countries. Although he was a fervent advocate of free-enterprise capitalism, Uthman's personal success depended on his political connections as much as on his intelligence and hard work.

See also ASWAN HIGH DAM; INFITAH.

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ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

UZBEKS

A Central Asian people.

In the 1920s and 1930s, before the Soviet Union implemented language and nationalities policies, the Uzbek language, an eastern Turkic language of the Altaic family generally known as Turki (Chaghatai), was written in Arabic script and was the principal literary language for all Turkic-speaking central Asians. When they were forced to adopt Cyrillic script (i.e., the Russian and Slavic alphabet), Uzbeks and other central Asian Turks were denied easy access to their rich literary heritage, which dates to the fifteenth century.

Uzbeks practice Islam; they are Sunni Hanafi Muslims. Originally pastoral nomads, by the early part of the twentieth century they were predominantly sedentary subsistence farmers, herders, or

inhabitants of small towns engaged in producing and marketing crafts. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the Uzbeks were politically the preeminent force in the region. From the 1860s to 1991, the Uzbeks and other central Asian Muslims suffered colonial occupation of their lands by czarist Russia and its successor, the Soviet Union. As of 2001, Uzbeks constitute more than 80 percent of the population of the independent state of Uzbekistan; about 15 million Uzbeks speak the Northern Uzbek language. Uzbeks are also one of the larger ethnic minority groups in neighboring Tajikistan and in the northern part of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, where Southern Uzbek, a related but distinct language, is spoken.

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M. Nazif Shahrani

UZI

See GLOSSARY

V

VAʿAD LEʾUMI

National Council of the Jews in Mandatory Palestine.

The Vaʿad Leʾumi (VL) was the supreme executive authority and representative organ of the Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) between 1920 and 1948. Functioning much like a cabinet, each Vaʿad Leʾumi was composed of members of an Asefat ha-Nivharim (elected assembly), and its day-to-day operations were largely in the hands of a chairman and a smaller executive committee. For most of the Mandate period the executive was headed by a praesidium of Yizhak Ben-Zvi, Yaakov Thon, and David Yellin.

One of the main functions of the VL was to act as official representative for the heterogeneous, highly politicized Jewish community in Palestine. The VL served as a high-level public forum for debating the divergent viewpoints and conflicting interests of religious versus secular Jews; farmers and employers versus organized labor; and native versus newly arrived immigrant groups having differing traditions (e.g., Sephardim versus Ashkenazim). The Palestine Royal Commission Report (1937) credited the VL and its local educational system with counteracting these divisive forces by the forging of a "national self-consciousness of unusual intensity."

The VL was frequently beset by organizational difficulties and jurisdictional squabbles with the Palestine Zionist Executive and the Jewish Agency Executive (both responsible to the World Zionist Organization). While most matters of high policy were decided by Zionist leaders and organs in Palestine and abroad, the VL was able to exercise its autonomy mainly in the spheres of education and local communal affairs. After 14 May 1948 the functions and departments of the VL and those of certain sections of the Jewish Agency came under the authority of a provisional state council of the State of Israel.

See also Ben-Zvi, Yizhak.

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NEIL CAPLAN

VAKA-I HAYRIYE

Turkish for "the beneficial event"; the end of the janissary corps in 1826.

The term *vaka-i hayriye* has been used by Turkish historians to describe the government-ordered destruction of the Ottoman Empire's military unit, the janissary corps, on 15 June 1826. This momentous event resulted in considerable bloodshed (6,000 dead, according to conservative estimates) and was received with dismay and mixed emotions by large segments of the populace. In an attempt to gain public approval, Mahmud II's regime, using the services of the *ulama* (Islamic scholars), presented the incident as unavoidable and necessary to protect the very survival of Islam and the Ottoman Empire. Immediately following the destruction of the janissary corps, Mahmud II ordered the court chronicler, Mehmet Esad Efendi (c. 1789–1848), to record the official version of events, *Üss-i Zafer* (Foundation of victory), which was printed in Istanbul in 1828 and served as the main source for every other Ottoman account of this period.

See also JANISSARIES; MAHMUD II.

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AVIGDOR LEVY
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VALENSI, ALFRED

[1878–1944]

Tunisian Zionist.

Alfred Valensi, a member of the Sephardic Jewish elite, was one of the founders and leaders of the Tunisian Zionist Federation. While still a law student in France, he became a disciple of Max Nordau. Valensi was a contributor to major European journals.

A brilliant theoretician and organizer, he represented Tunisian Zionists at international gatherings in London and Carlsbad with his associate Rabbi Joseph Brami. In 1926, he settled in Paris, where he was later arrested and transported by the Nazis in 1944 to his death.

See also NORDAU, MAX.

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NORMAN STILLMAN

VALI

See GLOSSARY

VANCE, CYRUS

[1917–2002]

U.S. lawyer and government official.

Cyrus Vance, born in Clarksburg, West Virginia, received a bachelor of arts degree from Yale University in 1939 and a law degree in 1942. After serving as a junior naval gunnery officer in the Pacific Theater in World War II and practicing law, he served in a number of government positions, including general counsel for the Department of Defense (1961–1962), secretary of the army (1962–1963), deputy secretary of defense (1964–1967), and secretary of state (1977–1980). He continued to be active in international affairs after his resignation in 1980. His work with Middle Eastern and Eastern European problems included service as President Lyndon Baines Johnson's special representative on Cyprus in 1967, helping to ensure that Greece and Turkey would not be drawn into war over the conflict. He received the Medal of Freedom from the U.S. president for his work. Before returning to federal service, Vance and Daniel Yankelovich founded the respected Public Agenda, a nonprofit and nonpartisan research organization in New York. His most prominent role in the Middle East was as secretary of state under President Jimmy Carter, during which he had a leading role in the Camp David Accords: He held extensive consultations with Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat at Camp

David, Maryland, which led to the September 1978 peace agreement between the two countries. Vance resigned from the Carter administration in 1980 because he disagreed with the president's decision to use force to rescue the U.S. citizens held hostage in Teheran. Widely respected for his integrity and range of international contacts, Vance worked with the United Nations to secure the cease-fire in Croatia in 1991, and later helped to resolve creditor claims in a real estate case in New York in 1993. Vance died in 2002 after an extended bout with Alzheimer's disease.

See also CAMP DAVID ACCORDS (1978).

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR

VAN, LAKE

Salt lake in eastern Turkey.

Lake Van is the largest lake in Turkey, some 5,600 feet (1,600 m) above sea level, with a surface area of 1,400 square miles (3,700 sq. km). Having no outlet, its waters evaporate and concentrate salts, including carbonates and sulphates of soda; the resulting blue-green color creates a startling, austere beauty. Lake Van is stocked with darek, a herring-like fish consumed locally.

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JOHN R. CLARK

VANUNU AFFAIR

A controversy over divulging Israeli nuclear information to a British newspaper.

In October 1986, Mordechai Vanunu (1954–), a former employee of the Dimona nuclear reactor in Israel, provided the *Sunday Times* of London with information and photographs of the plant, claiming Israel was producing nuclear arms and that it had stockpiled between one hundred and two hundred nuclear weapons. Israel denied the charges and stated that it did not possess nuclear weapons and would not be the first Middle Eastern country to introduce nuclear arms to the region.

Vanunu was kidnapped in Italy by the Mossad and returned to Israel, where he underwent a seven-month-long secret trial for treason and espionage against the state. The three-judge court's sixty-page verdict was almost completely classified; only one sentence was made public: "We decided the defendant is guilty on all three counts." The three counts involved espionage, the unauthorized transmission of information, and helping Israel's enemies in a time of war.

Vanunu was widely portrayed in the Israeli press as a traitor and as mentally deranged. His prison sentence at times included solitary confinement, and his cause was taken up by human rights and disarmament groups and scientists around the world. European disarmament groups claimed that he was a hero and he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. World opinion was that the bulk of Vanunu's story and data was accurate, demonstrating that Israel did indeed have a substantial nuclear arsenal.

See also DIMONA; MOSSAD; NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND NUCLEAR ENERGY.

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JULIE ZUCKERMAN
UPDATED BY GREGORY S. MAHLER

VARLIK VERGISI

Capital tax levied in Turkey during World War II.

Adopted in November 1942 to finance Turkey's emergency military expenditures during World War

II, the Varlik Vergisi was heavily criticized as confiscatory and discriminatory. It was abolished in March 1944. Justified as a social equalization measure against those who profiteered during the war, up to 75 percent of net profits were collected as tax from trade companies. Istanbul merchants and non-Muslims were taxed far more heavily than Muslims and farmers. The tax produced long-term political effects in the fear of government as a threat to private property and in highlighting the dangers of one-party rule.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

VATAN

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

VATICAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The Roman Catholic Church struggles to maintain its presence in the Middle East.

The presence of the Roman Catholic Church in the Middle East goes back to the Roman and Byzantine empires, to the Crusades, and to European imperialism and colonialism. Following the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), Vatican diplomacy in the Middle East focused on three goals: preserving Christianity and a Christian presence in what Christians term the Holy Land, fostering peace with justice between Israel and the Palestinians, and maintaining Lebanon as an example of coexistence between Christians and Muslims.

The Vatican faces problems of demographic changes in the Middle East, especially in Jerusalem and the West Bank, where Christian Arabs are leaving because of their minority status; the resurgence of Islamic and Jewish fundamentalisms; and unstable economic and political situations. The relationship between the Vatican and Israel is a mixture of theological prejudice and political pragmatism. In recent years, however, the Holy See has established diplomatic relations with Israel (December 1993) and with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (April 1994), and in 2000 the Vatican signed a Basic Agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This agreement called for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of the various relevant UN resolutions. In March 2000 Pope John Paul II undertook a historic trip to Israel and the Palestinian-controlled territories, only the second time since 1964 that a sovereign pontiff set foot in the Holy Land. Throughout the Oslo peace process and the al-Aqsa Intifada the Vatican used its influence to ensure that the papacy's concerns and interests in Jerusalem and Christian holy sites were taken into consideration by U.S. president Bill Clinton, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, and PLO chairman Yasir Arafat.

The Lebanese Civil War (1975–1989) was a major challenge to the papacy. Several mediation missions were dispatched by both Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul II, and in 1995 the latter convened in Rome a synod of Roman Catholic bishops, with Muslim and Orthodox Christian observers, for the express purpose of addressing the Lebanese situation. It is clear that if Lebanon were to fail as an example of coexistence, the Vatican's position in the region would be weakened.

See also CHRISTIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; HOLY LAND.

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GEORGE E. IRANI

VAZHAPETIAN, NERSES

[1837–1884]

Armenian patriarch of Istanbul, 1873–1884.

Born in Istanbul, Nerses Vazhapetian spent his entire life in or near the Ottoman capital. Although deprived of a formal education at the age of fifteen after the death of his father, Vazhapetian became a teacher and joined the clergy of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Anointed a celibate priest in 1858, he was a bishop by 1862. Active in the administrative affairs of the Armenian Millet, Vazhapetian had a hand in drafting the so-called Armenian national

constitution by which the Armenian Church and millet were regulated in the Ottoman Empire. In 1873, at age thirty-seven, he was elected Armenian partiarch of Istanbul.

The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, partly waged over the Armenian-populated provinces of eastern Anatolia, brought the issue of the Armenians to the fore of the diplomatic contest for influence in the Ottoman Empire. When the extent of the Kurdish predations over the Armenian communities became known, Vazhapetian, who had issued an encyclical supporting the Ottoman war effort, was authorized by the Armenian national assembly to appeal to Grand Duke Nicholas at San Stefano for consideration of local self-government in the areas of Armenian concentration. In the formal Treaty of San Stefano, signed on 3 March 1878, by the Ottomans and Russians, Article 16 provided for reforms and security under Russian trusteeship in the so-called Armenian provinces.

While Russian withdrawal from these areas was conditional on implementation of the reforms, the Congress of Berlin revised the terms of the treaty. The Armenian delegation sent by Vazhapetian to Berlin received no hearing, and Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, signed 13 July 1878, provided only for reforms as those territories were returned to the Ottomans. Still Armenians expected an international treaty to prove more binding on the Ottomans than mere promises. The failure of the European powers to require Sultan Abdülhamit II to proceed with reforms became the source of disillusionment. By the time of Vazhapetian's death in Istanbul, small groups of provincial Armenians had began to resort to self-defense in the face of continued insecurity in what became known as the Armenian Revolutionary Movement.

See also ARMENIAN MILLET; BERLIN, CONGRESS AND TREATY OF; SAN STEFANO, TREATY OF (1878).

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ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

VAZIR AFKHAM, SOLTAN ALI KHAN

[1867–1918]

Iranian courtier of the Qajar period.

Soltan Ali Khan was in the service of Mozaffar al-Din Qajar from the time the latter became crown prince in Tabriz. Upon the shah's ascension to power, Soltan Ali Khan was first appointed head of the Royal Correspondence Office and then minister of revenues, and in 1901 he received the title Vazir Afkham. In 1907, he was made prime minister and minister of interior under Mohammad Ali Qajar and headed the first Iranian cabinet after the Constitutional Revolution. Opposed by the Constitutionalists, he was deposed in 1909 and died in 1918, the same year his oldest son was killed in a romantic feud.

See also CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION; MOHAMMAD ALI SHAH QAJAR; MOZAFFAR AL-DIN QAJAR.

NEGUIN YAVARI

VAZIRI, QAMAR AL-MOLUK

[1905–1959]

Considered the first professional female singer in Iran.

Qamar al-Moluk Vaziri was born to a middle-class family in the city of Kashan, Iran, in 1905. Raised by her grandmother, a religiously inclined woman who performed as a eulogist in women's gatherings, Qamar accompanied her to these events, where she herself also performed eulogies. She later studied under masters of Persian classical music and acquired fame as a singer. Numerous recordings were made of her songs. The singer died in 1959 from heart disease and was buried in Dhahir al-Dowleh cemetery in northern Tehran.

PARVANEH POURSHARIATI

VELAYAT-E FAQIH

Theory of governance in Shiʿite Islam.

From the Arabic term for "the authority, or governance, of the jurist," the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* was associated particularly with Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. It holds that those scholars of Shiʿite Islam most qualified in terms of piety

and erudition are to exercise the governmental functions of the Twelfth Imam during his major occultation (absence from the terrestrial plane), which began in 939 C.E. and still continues. Even before the occultation, the imams would delegate certain of their functions, particularly in the judicial sphere, to qualified members of the Shiʿite Islam community as a matter of practical necessity. It was therefore natural that after the beginning of the occultation, other executive functions of the imam also should be assigned to the Shiʿite jurists, including, for example, the collection and disbursement of religiously mandated taxes *(zakat* and *khoms),* but not the waging of offensive jihad (holy war) or (according to some jurists) the holding of Friday prayers. This led to the crystallization of the theory of the *niyabat-e amma* (general deputyship) of the jurists, a process that was complete by the middle of the sixteenth century. Already in the Safavid period (1501–1702) the general deputyship occasionally was interpreted to include all the prerogatives of rule that in principle had belonged to the imams, but no special emphasis was placed on this. Similarly, although *velayat-e faqih* began to be discussed as a distinct legal topic in the nineteenth century, against a background of enhanced social authority for the Shiʿite jurists, no concrete political conclusions were drawn from the concept.

It was left to Ayatollah Khomeini to claim, in typically radical and comprehensive fashion, the right or even duty of the leading Shiʿite scholars to rule. He did this in his first published work (*Kashf al-Asrar,* 1944), again in a technical work on Shiʿite jurisprudence, and most fully and importantly, in a series of lectures delivered in 1970 during his exile in Iraq; these lectures were published under the title *Hokumat-e Islami* (Islamic government).

Khomeini's arguments in the lectures are both scriptural and rational, traditional and revolutionary. Asserting that Islamic government differs from all other forms of rule by being based on the implementation of divine law, Khomeini attributes the disarray of the Islamic world in general and Iran in particular to the prevalence of arbitrary rule and its concomitant man-made laws. He then demonstrates the centrality of government to the Islamic worldview and ridicules the opinion that the validity of the laws contained in the Qurʾan (the holy book of Islam) and other sources should have been restricted to the first few centuries of the Islamic era. Next, he reviews in great detail the Qurʾanic verses and traditions of the prophet Muhammad and the imams, which, in his estimation, support the thesis of *velayat-e faqih*; cites the opinions of previous, mostly recent, Shiʿite scholars on the subject; and reaches the conclusion that "the same governance that was exercised by the Most Noble Messenger and by the Imams is also the prerogative of the jurists" (Khomeini).

In the last of the lectures, Khomeini laments the prevalence of the "pseudo-saintly" in the religious institution, and it was indeed several years before a sizable number of Khomeini's colleagues came to accept his thesis. It was the repressive policies of the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (ruled 1941–1979), that impelled the religious scholars to conceive of broad and radical aims and enabled them to gain a favorable response from much of the Iranian public. Nonetheless, although by the autumn of 1978 a clear majority of Iranians had come to favor the institution of an Islamic government under the leadership of Khomeini, it cannot be said that *velayat-e faqih* was a prominent slogan of the Iranian Revolution. Khomeini himself made no mention of it in the proclamations he issued during the revolution.

Not until the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was elaborated by the Assembly of Experts that convened in the fall of 1979 did *velayat-e faqih* emerge as the pillar of the new order. It was enshrined in the preamble to the constitution in Article Five ("During the Occultation of the Lord of the Age [that is, the Hidden Imam], the governance and leadership of the nation devolve upon the pious and just jurist who is acquainted with the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability; and recognized and accepted as leader by the majority of the people"); and in Articles 107 to 112, which specify the procedure for selecting the leader and list his constitutional functions.

Khomeini's own view was that these provisions did not do justice to *velayat-e faqih,* and in February 1988 he propounded the theory of *velayat-e motlaqa-ye faqih* ("the absolute authority of the jurist"). He declared obedience to the ruling jurist to be as incumbent on the believer as the performance of prayer, and his powers to extend even to the tem-

porary suspension of such essential rites of Islam as the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). Although this formulation of the theory might appear to be an ideal prescription for theocratic absolutism, in fact, Khomeini was not seeking to extend his control of Iranian affairs (which in any event was far less than absolute). Rather, he was seeking to provide theoretical justification for government attempts to break the stalemate on controversial items of social and economic legislation.

The actual implementation of *velayat-e faqih,* moreover, was destined to change in a quite different direction. When Ayatollah Hosainali Montazeri was compelled in March 1989 to resign as designated successor to Khomeini, none of the other senior religious scholars seemed qualified for the position. When Khomeini died on 4 June of the same year, it was therefore Hojjat al-Islam Ali Khamenehi—a relatively junior figure in the religious hierarchy, despite his political prominence—who was chosen as leader of the Islamic Republic. This necessitated the modification of Article 109 of the constitution to remove scholarly seniority from the qualifications of the leader, a change that was approved in a referendum held in August 1989. It has been argued credibly that the resulting disjunction of political leadership from seniority in the learned hierarchy of Iranian Shiʿism effectively brings the implementation of *velayat-e faqih* to an end. If this is true, *velayat-e faqih* must be designated as a theory that was, to a degree, workable only because of the unique qualities and appeal of Khomeini, and that falls short of being a permanent solution to the problem of governance in a Shiʿite Muslim society.

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HAMID ALGAR
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

VELAYATI, ALI AKBAR

[1945–]

Foreign minister of Iran, 1981–1997.

Born in Tehran in 1945, Ali Akbar Velayati received a doctorate in pediatrics from Tehran University in 1971. After completing postgraduate work, he left for further studies in the United States, where he joined the Organization of Iranian Moslem Students. Returning home, he taught at his alma mater and was appointed deputy health minister in the first government appointed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979. He also served in the first parliament in 1980.

Before the Iranian revolution, Velayati was a member of the Hojjatieh group, an anti-Bahai conservative group that eventually challenged the dominance of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP). He left the group in 1983 when Khomeini denounced its activities, and he joined the Jamʿiat Motalefeh Islami (Islamic Society, or JME), a group very close to the conservative *ulama* and bazaari merchants. In 1980 the IRP and JME unsuccessfully had pressed Iran's current president, Abolhasan Bani Sadr, to appoint Velayati as a foreign minister. In 1981 President Hojatoleslam Seyed Ali Khamenehi nominated Velayati for premier but could not win support from the parliament. Khamenehi accepted the parliament's choice of Mir Hossein Mousavi as prime minister if Velayati were appointed as foreign minister—a position Velayati held for more than sixteen years and through four administrations until 1997.

Velayati is a conservative pragmatist who helped to move Iran out of its revolutionary isolation and temper its adventurist foreign policies of the early 1980s. However, he opposed ties with the United States as an archenemy of the Islamic Republic and regards Israel as an illegitimate state in the heartland of Islam. He helped Iran to join international organizations and favored developing ties with Europe and developing countries.

Internally, his tenure in the foreign ministry has been criticized for putting more emphasis on loyalty than on professional qualifications. He is regarded as a nonclerical protégé of the religious elite who owes his long presence in Iranian politics to his loyalty to the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenehi. In 1997 he was named by a German court as a member of the Special Operations Committee that approved the 1992 assassinations of three Kurdish

Democratic Party leaders in the Mykonos Restaurant in Berlin.

Since his departure from the foreign ministry, Velayati has been a member of the Expediency Council, serves as an adviser on international affairs to Ayatollah Khamenehi and conducts foreign policy assignments, and continues to teach in the university and write articles and books on the history of Iran and the Iranian revolution for government publication. He also serves as the secretary-general of the Ahlul Bayt World Assembly—a religious institution named after the descendants of the prophet Muhammad and established to advance the Shiʿite cause around the world.

See also Iranian Revolution (1979); Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Khamenehi, Ali; Khomeini, Ruhollah.

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Ali Akbar Mahdi

VERSAILLES, TREATY OF (1920)

Treaty ending World War I; it established the mandate system for the governance and eventual independence of the Central Powers' former colonies.

The armistices of October and November 1918 ending hostilities in World War I were followed by the Conference of Paris at which World War I victors and associated powers determined the terms for dealing with Germany and her allies during the war. The conference, which officially began on 18 January 1919, resulted in five treaties. The Treaty of Versailles, signed on 28 June at Versailles, France, and ratified on 20 January 1920, addressed the terms of peace with Germany. The treaties of Sèvres, Neuilly, St. Germain, and Trianon dealt with the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria, Austria, and Hungary, respectively. Besides setting forth the terms for dealing with Germany after World War I, the Treaty of Versailles established the League of Nations and the mandate system for governing territories surrendered by Germany. This treaty included the Covenant of the League of Nations as Part I, with Article 22 giving the league the power to supervise mandated territories consisting of former German colonies. The other treaties included the covenant in their texts.

The armistice with Germany and the Conference of Paris were both predicated on U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points for peace enunciated in his address to Congress on 8 January 1918. In addition to his vision of a League of Nations, these included an adjustment of all colonial claims giving equal weight to the interests of colonial populations and to those of countries with colonial claims. This led many to believe that the peace conference would lead to the independence of the Arab portions of the Ottoman Empire. Based on this, Prince Faisal I ibn Hussein arrived in Paris in January 1919 as head of the Hijaz delegation and with the objective of securing an independent Arab state. At first the French opposed recognition of the Hijaz delegation based on the fact that the Hijaz was not one of the Allied belligerent states. The British, however, intervened, and the Hijaz delegation was recognized. On 29 January Faisal submitted a statement to the conference defining Arab claims. He requested recognition as "independent sovereign peoples" for those Arab-speaking peoples of Asia from the Alexandretta–Diyarbekir line south to the Indian Ocean. Essentially, this included what is now Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, and Iraq. Faisal exempted the Hijaz as already independent, as well as British Aden. The prince addressed the conference on 6 February, stressing the principle of the consent of the governed. He then proposed a commission to visit Syria and Palestine and ascertain the wishes of the populace. The French were not inclined to support this, but pressure by Wilson resulted, on 25 March, in the approval of a commission, later known as the King–Crane Commission.

Despite the sincere desires of Wilson to forge a new world in which all peoples would be the ultimate determiners of their national destinies and the eloquent arguments of Faisal and others on behalf of the Arabs, the Conference of Paris yielded to the imperial interests of Britain and France and, to a lesser extent, to those of Italy and Japan. The colonial territories of Germany and the Arab portions of the Ottoman Empire were assigned to members of the League of Nations under the mandate system

established in the covenant. In the case of the Middle East, agreements made during World War I played a large role in distribution of mandates. The secret Anglo–Franco–Russian agreement of 16 May 1916, commonly known as the Sykes–Picot Agreement, divided the Arab dominions of the Ottoman Empire between Britain and France. Britain received the areas that are now Iraq, Jordan, and Israel; France got what is now Syria and Lebanon. The Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, also played a role in the disposition of Arab territories by the Conference of Paris. This was a letter from Lord Balfour, British foreign secretary, to Lord (Edmond de) Rothschild, a prominent British Zionist, that supported the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. These two documents, more than anything else, shaped the fate of the Middle East in the post–World War I era. The San Remo Conference of April 1920 awarded Syria, including Lebanon, as a Class A mandate to France; Iraq and Palestine, including Transjordan, became Class A mandates under British supervision. The mandate for Palestine endorsed the provisions of the Balfour Declaration. In 1921 Britain separated Transjordan from Palestine, exempting it from the provisions of the Balfour Declaration. As Class A mandates, all three were to be given independence when it was determined that they were able to stand on their own. In the case of Iraq and Transjordan, Arab dignitaries were given royal status in preparation for the eventual independence of these areas. Prince Faisal became the king of Iraq, and Prince Abdullah I ibn Hussein became the amir of Transjordan. The League of Nations confirmed these mandates in 1922, some of which outlived the international organization under which they were formed. The first mandate to obtain independence was Iraq, in 1932, followed by Syria and Lebanon in 1941. Transjordan, now Jordan, gained its independence in 1946. Palestine, much of which is now Israel, gained independence in 1948.

See also Abdullah I ibn Hussein; Alexandretta; Balfour Declaration (1917); Diyarbakir; Faisal I ibn Hussein; Hijaz; King–Crane Commission (1919); Rothschild, Edmond de; San Remo Conference (1920); Sèvres, Treaty of (1920); Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916); Wilson, Woodrow; World War I.

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Daniel E. Spector

VICTORIA COLLEGE

British-style public school in Alexandria, Egypt.

Victoria College was founded in 1901 on the initiative of eight resident merchants, bankers, and shipping magnates, six of whom were British, one Syrian, and one the Austro-Hungarian president of the Jewish Community of Alexandria. The makeup of the entering classes of 1902 reflected the cosmopolitanism that was to characterize the institution up to the mid-1950s—eight of the students were Syrian, including George Antonius and his three brothers, three were Greek, three were Egyptian Muslims, one was English, and ten were identified in the language of the time as "Israelite." In those early decades the language of instruction was English, but the study of Arabic and French was mandatory. The school also placed a strong emphasis on cricket, soccer, and hockey. Under the leadership (1901–1922) of its first headmaster, Charles Lias of King's College, Cambridge University, Victoria adopted the Oxford and Cambridge Joint Board Examination, the qualifying exam for English medical and engineering schools as well as for Oxford and Cambridge. Victoria boys obtained outstanding exam results, and the school became a breeding ground for university education in England and elsewhere. For example, between 1908 and 1913, thirty-three Victoria graduates attended European or U.S. universities, including nine at Cambridge, four at Toulouse, and one at the University of Edinburgh Medical School.

In 1906 the campus moved from downtown to the city's eastern suburbs. There its stately buildings and spacious playing fields stood out as an Alexandrian landmark and were the envy of other, less privileged schools. For more than half a century, Victoria College played an important role in providing a first-rate European education along British public-school lines to successive generations of well-born Egyptians—Muslims, Copts, and Jews—as well as foreign residents in Egypt, whatever their

race, color, or creed. Primary identification with the school blurred ethnic and religious differences and created an atmosphere of tolerance within the tightly knit student body. The school's prestige extended well beyond Egypt under its second headmaster, R. W. G. Reed of Oxford, and it began to attract the scions of the English-speaking ruling elite in the rest of the region: Thus, King Hussein ibn Talal of Jordan and his brother, Prince Hassan; the last Hashimite king of Iraq, Faisal II ibn Ghazi, and his uncle, the regent Abd al-Ilah; the former sultan of Zanzibar; and the king of Albania were students at Victoria.

Along with all other foreign schools, Victoria was nationalized by Gamal Abdel Nasser in the wake of the Suez War in 1956 and now survives as a pale reflection of its former self, under the label of Victory College. In the 1990s, as a coeducational institution, its 6,000 students were jammed into a campus originally built for 500.

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ALAIN SILVERA
UPDATED BY WILLIAM L. CLEVELAND

VILAYET

See GLOSSARY

VILLAGE INSTITUTES

Turkish institutes for training primary-school teachers.

The Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri) of Turkey represented a short-lived (1940–1950) but highly innovative experiment in primary-school teacher training. In the 1930s, over 75 percent of Turkey's people lived in some 35,000 villages, and over 80 percent of these villagers were illiterate. Only a small proportion of villages had primary schools, and most of their urban-born teachers had difficulty coping with rural conditions. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and his ruling Republican People's Party (RPP) planned to design a national system of compulsory secular education to enculturate a new generation of Turks in the principles of modern science and Turkish nationalism. Educational reform and a cadre of new, secular teachers were to spread Kemalism and lift the masses from the depths of poverty and ignorance. While impressive educational gains were achieved in the cities, most villages remained without schools.

Ismail Hakki Tonguç, the director general of primary education, and his colleagues designed a plan they hoped would produce teachers capable of living in the villages and able to make a comprehensive impact on them. The plan called for creating special teacher-training institutes, recruiting village students to them, teaching these students general subjects plus useful village technology, and then sending them back to the villages to teach in five-year primary schools.

Shortly after the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed the necessary legislation in 1940, fourteen Village Institutes opened their doors to eager recruits. Actually, many of the institutes' facilities were incomplete, so teachers and students worked side by side building classrooms, dining halls, and dormitories. In the process, students acquired useful carpentry, masonry, and other construction skills.

The ministry of education intentionally located the institutes in rural areas, so that students could practice farming, plant orchards, develop water and sanitation systems, and generally confront typical village problems with modern skills and science. Youths of both sexes, between the ages of twelve and sixteen, who were graduated by a five-year village primary school, qualified for admission to a village institute. The government offered this education free to students who pledged to teach in an assigned village for twenty years after graduation.

Twenty-five percent of the Institute's five-year curriculum was devoted to agriculture (crop production, zootechnology, apiculture [beekeeping], and silkworm culture); 25 percent was devoted to technology (carpentry, construction, blacksmithing, health, and childcare for female students); and 50 percent dealt with general education (the Turkish language, history, literature, geography, math, bi-

ology, and civics). In 1950, the curriculum was expanded to six years. As village teachers, institute graduates were expected to teach general education subjects to children, adult-literacy classes, scientific farming and animal husbandry, and handicrafts; they were obligated to play a central role in the community and generally awaken the civic conscience of the rural population.

The institutes provided some of the most idealistic and dedicated rural teachers in Turkey's history. These young men and women inspired many villagers to continue their educations beyond primary school; some even went to the university. A number of village teachers, such as Mahmut Makal (author of *Bizim Köy,* translated as *A Village in Anatolia*), became famous writers who pioneered a new literary genre that focused on peasant life.

From their inception, however, the Village Institutes were subject to controversy. Political opponents described them as indoctrination agencies of the ruling party. Some educators claimed they failed to prepare students adequately for their exhaustive duties as rural teachers. Very conservative villagers complained that institute graduates preached revolutionary and antireligious ideas in their villages. More extreme opponents accused the institutes of teaching communism.

When the new opposition party, the Democrat party (DP), came to power in 1950, they removed institute supporters from the ministry of education and abolished the twenty-one existing institutes by transforming them into ordinary teacher-training schools. Before their demise, the institutes had graduated 15,767 men and 1,395 women.

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PAUL J. MAGNARELLA

VIZIER

See GLOSSARY

VOICE OF LEBANON

See RADIO AND TELEVISION: ARAB COUNTRIES

VOICE OF PALESTINE

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: ARAB COUNTRIES; RADIO AND TELEVISION: ARAB COUNTRIES

VOLPI, GIUSEPPE

Governor of Libya from 1922 to 1925, after a short period as governor of Tripolitania.

Giuseppe Volpi abandoned the policy of trying to govern Libya through Libyan representatives in the aftermath of the first Italo–Sanusi War. This had involved recognizing a Sanusi amir in Cyrenaica or trying to use the leaders of the Tripolitanian republic in Tripolitania.

Instead, Volpi gave a free hand to the military commanders on the spot, Rodolfo Graziani and Pietro Badoglio. His new policy was enthusiastically endorsed by the Fascists when they came to power in October 1922. It had been signaled the previous April, when he sanctioned an attack on Misurata, and achieved its fullest expression with the outbreak of the second Italo–Sanusi War in early 1923.

Volpi's three-year tenure as governor also marked the introduction of an intensive colonization scheme. He sought to increase the amount of state funds made available for it, alienated to the state all uncultivated land and all rebel-held land, once it was conquered, and provided tax-relief schemes to attract investment funding. By doing this, he prepared the way for the legislation introduced by Emilio de Bono, who actually began the process of large-scale Italian peasant migration into Libya.

See also GRAZIANI, RODOLFO; ITALY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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GEORGE JOFFE

VOZUQ AL-DOWLEH, MIRZA HASAN KHAN

[1873–1950]

Iranian politician.

Mirza Hasan Khan was the nephew of Mirza Ali Khan Amin al-Dowleh, the famous prime minister under Mozaffar al-Din Qajar, and he was also the brother of Ahmad Qavam al-Saltaneh. In 1892, he replaced his father as tax collector of Azerbaijan, and four years later he was granted the title Vozuq al-Dowleh. He was elected to the first parliament from Tehran (1906), and, after holding several ministerial posts, he was appointed prime minister and minister of foreign affairs (1916). In 1918, he was reappointed prime minister for the purpose of forming a cabinet, and he headed the ministry of the interior. It was during his tenure as premier that the infamous Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919, transforming Iran into a British protectorate, was ratified. Following the conclusion of the agreement, Vozuq al-Dowleh received 60,000 pounds from the British government, but he was forced to return the sum to the Iranian government after Reza Shah Pahlavi took office. In 1921, Vozuq al-Dowleh was appointed minister of finance by the prime minister. After Reza Shah was forced by the Allied powers to abdicate in 1941, Vozuq al-Dowleh returned to private life as a land speculator.

See also Amin al-Dowleh, Mirza Ali Khan; Anglo-Iranian Agreement (1919); Mozaffar al-Din Qajar; Pahlavi, Reza.

Neguin Yavari

W

WADI

See GLOSSARY

WADI HADRAMAWT

Great valley in eastern Yemen.

Wadi Hadramawt is a 400-mile-long (640 km), well-watered valley east of Aden that constitutes one of the most agriculturally rich areas in Yemen. It produces millet, cotton, wheat, qat, and a variety of fruits and vegetables. The wadi dissects and drains the high plateau of eastern Yemen and is at the center of the Hadramawt, a distinctive geographic and sociopolitical region that was a famous trading state in ancient, pre-Islamic times.

See also HADRAMAWT.

ROBERT D. BURROWES

WADI NATRUN

Principal site of Coptic monasteries in Egypt.

Wadi Natrun is an elongated valley in Egypt's western desert near the Cairo-Alexandria road. As many as 500 Coptic monasteries, once housing up to 50,000 monks, were built there beginning in the fourth century, Four are currently in use: Dayr al-Baramus, Dayr Abu Maqar (St. Macarius), Dayr Anba Bishoi, and Dayr al-Surian. Dayr Anba Bishoi was the site of the enforced exile of Pope Shenouda III by President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981; he was released in 1985. Dayr Abu Maqar has witnessed a revival of Coptic monasticism since it was reopened by a dozen hermit monks in 1969. Since that date, rising numbers of Egyptian Christians have elected to spend part of their lives at Wadi Natrun's monasteries. Several are also open to tourism.

See also COPTS; SHENOUDA III.

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RAYMOND WILLIAM BAKER
UPDATED BY ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT

WAFD

Major Egyptian nationalist party organized in 1919.

The Wafd Party took its name from the delegation (in Arabic, *wafd*) composed of Saʿd Zaghlul and other notables who called for the complete independence *(istiqlal tamm)* of Egypt from the British immediately after World War I. When Britain refused to negotiate with the Wafd and exiled its leaders, Egypt launched a full-scale rebellion in 1919. A sophisticated network of organizers in key cities and villages allowed the Wafd to dominate the political scene.

Mustafa al-Nahhas (right), seen here with President Giuseppe Motta of Switzerland at a conference in 1937, was president of the Wafd Party, which fought for years after World War I to achieve Egyptian independence from Great Britain. He became prime minister in 1941, but the Wafd lost popular support as he worked with the British during World War II. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

The Wafd did not become a formal political party until 1924, six years after its inception. The party was organized along hierarchical lines, with an executive council. Although the party enjoyed the support of a cross section of the Egyptian populace, its leaders were predominantly urban, upper- and middle-class, modern, and secular. The highly charismatic Zaghlul served as its president until his death in 1927. The Wafdist leadership also included both Muslims and Copts, notably Makram Ubayd. Women, particularly Zaghlul's wife, Safiyya, and Huda al-Shaʿrawi, became leaders in the struggle for women's voting rights, acting on the principle that the struggle against imperialism had to be accompanied by a similar struggle for gender equality. Between the two world wars, the Wafd engaged in a three-way struggle with the British and the Egyptian monarchy. Seeking to undercut Egypt's demands for independence, Britain unilaterally declared Egypt independent in 1922 and promulgated a constitutional monarchy in 1923. As the only party to enjoy widespread popular support for its anti-British stand, the Wafd won the 1924 elections and all subsequent elections that were not manipulated or rigged by King Ahmad Fuʾad or his son Farouk.

Following Zaghlul's death, Mustafa al-Nahhas became president of the party and continued its struggle against the British. In 1936 he signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which formalized Egyptian and British relations but permitted both the continuation of a British military presence along the Suez Canal zone and British control over the Sudan.

This failure to secure complete independence, coupled with allegations of nepotism and corruption within the party, undermined some of its popular support. In the 1930s many Egyptian youths joined various fascist and radical groups, and the Wafd countered by creating the Blue Shirts, a paramilitary youth organization. In 1941, fearing a pro-Nazi Egyptian government, Britain's ambassador Miles Lampson (later Lord Killearn) forced King Farouk to accept Nahhas as prime minister. Nahhas's willingness to work with the British throughout

World War II further undercut the Wafd's credibility as a nationalist and anti-imperialist party.

Following the 1952 military coup that deposed Farouk, the Wafd was formally disbanded (1953); some of its leaders were then tried for corruption and crimes against the state. In 1976, when Anwar al-Sadat announced the return to a multiparty system, the Wafd was revived under the leadership of Fuʾad Siraj al-Din. The New Wafd called for a parliamentary, multiparty system and the dismantling of socialist measures that had been enacted under Egypt's former president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. In a short time, the Wafd gathered a notable degree of support, particularly among Copts and in the richer urban areas. The Wafd voted to disband in reaction to Sadat's political crackdown in late 1978, but it was revived after Sadat's assassination by Islamists in 1981. In the 1984 elections the New Wafd cooperated with the Muslim Brotherhood and won 58 seats in parliament. By 1990 the New Wafd opposed the government and the continuation of the state of emergency, and it boycotted the 1993 elections. Its newspaper, *al-Wafd,* remained one of the few opposition publications. Following Siraj al-Din's death in 2000, Nʿuman Jumaʿa, a university professor, was elected the new leader in a notably open and transparent election. Representing the new generation, Jumaʿa pushed for political and economic changes; but without grassroots support, the Wafd remained a minority party in parliament.

See also NAHHAS, MUSTAFA AL-; NEW WAFD; SHAʿRAWI, HUDA AL-; ZAGHLUL, SAʿD.

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JANICE J. TERRY

WAFDIST WOMEN'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Egyptian women's committee of the early Wafd party.

Early in the twentieth century Egypt took steps toward forming a *wafd,* or delegation, to demand independence from British rule. In 1910 the National Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) held a congress in Brussels, where Inshirah Shawqi's appeal for independence was read by a man because Egyptian gender conventions prevented her from speaking publicly. Later, Indian nationalist Bhikaji Cama confronted the Wafdist men on the issue of women's participation in the Egyptian nationalist movement. Women's participation in Egyptian civil society became a mobilizing component of the fight for independence, a struggle in which women played a key role.

As women began to enter the Egyptian public sphere, so too did they begin to enter the realm of politics. Wafd members' wives and other women took up the national cause and established the Wafdist Women's Central Committee (Lajnat al-Wafd al-Markaziyya lil-Sayyidat, WWCC) on 12 January 1920 in a meeting at St. Mark's Cathedral. When Wafd leader Saʿd Zaghlul was deported to the Seychelles in 1921, the WWCC continued to work for the nationalist cause in his absence. They coordinated embargoes against British goods and managed the financial side of the nationalist movement. Huda al-Shaʿrawi was elected president of the committee, and other founding members included Ulfat Ratib, Regina Habib Khayyat, Wissa Wasif, Ahmad Abu Usba, Sharifa Riyad, Ester Fahmi Wissa, Louise Majorelle Wasif Ghali, Ihsan al-Qusi, and Fikriyya Husni. Most came from large land-owning families, although some were middle-class Cairenes. The WWCC solidified links between various women's associations in Cairo in the nationalist cause, such as the New Women Society (Jamʿiyat al-Marʾa al-Jadida, founded by Shaʿrawi in 1919), the Society of the Renaissance of the Egyptian Woman (Jamʿiyyat Nahdat al-Sayyidat al-Misriyyat), and the Society of Mothers of the Future (Jamʿiyyat Ummuhat al-Mustaqbal). In addition, women from the WWCC helped to found women's organizations outside Cairo in Minya, Asyut, and Tanta.

Before the WWCC was a year old, members were bitterly disappointed when Saʿd Zaghlul and other Wafdist men did not consult them on a proposal for independence. They published a critique of the Wafdist men's actions and eventually founded the Egyptian Feminist Union (al-Ittihad al-Nisaʾi al-Misri). When Shaʿrawi left, other Wafdist women renamed their group the Committee of Saʿdist Women (al-Lajna al-Saʿdiyya lil-Sayyidat) and remained loyal to Zaghlul. Shaʿrawi and other women

went on to dedicate their efforts to the feminist movement while the Wafd Party's role of serving as a vehicle for women's concerns diminished.

See also EGYPT; EGYPTIAN FEMINIST UNION; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; SHAʿRAWI, HUDA AL-; WAFD; ZAGHLUL, SAʿD.

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MARIA F. CURTIS

WAHDA DAM, AL-

See MAQARIN DAM

WAHHABI

See MUWAHHIDUN

WAHRHAFTIG, ZERAH

[1906–2002]

Israeli legal expert and politician.

Zerah Wahrhaftig (Warhaftig) was born in Belorussia and emigrated to Israel in 1947 via Poland, Lithuania, Japan, and the United States. Before his death in September 2002 at age 96 he was one of the last two living signers of the Israel's Declaration of Independence. As a young man he was active in the National Religious Front. He was a member of the Provisional Council of State, and after being elected to the first Knesset was continuously reelected to the Knesset through the ninth Knesset in 1981. Wahrhaftig served as deputy minister of religious affairs from 1952 to 1958 and as minister of religious affairs in three governments, from 1961 to 1974. He was a member of the National Religious Party's moderate wing.

Wahrhaftig was an expert on the legal and constitutional system of Israel. As chairman of the Knesset Committee, he helped to draft legislation creating rabbinical courts and religious councils, enforcing sabbath law, the Israel Lands Law, and the 1950 Law of Return, which allowed Jews to settle in Israel. After the 1967 war, Wahrhaftig wrote a decree guaranteeing religious autonomy for Jews, Muslims, and Christians in the newly Israeli-administered Jerusalem, and drafted a constitutionally binding edict protecting respective holy sites.

See also ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN.

BRYAN DAVES
UPDATED BY GREGORY S. MAHLER

WALLACH, YONA

[1944–1985]

Israeli poet.

Yona Wallach was born in Kiryat Uno, near Tel Aviv, to a veteran pioneer family. Her father was killed in the War of Independence when she was four, a trauma that haunted Wallach throughout her short life. Her widowed mother owned the only local cinema, where the impressionable Wallach absorbed the new-wave films that later echoed in her writing. A misfit in her small town and a high school dropout, Wallach, who wrote her first poem when she was seven, studied art, joined the Tel Aviv Circle of Poets, and published in their avant-garde periodicals.

Seeking relief from her emotional unrest, she turned to mental institutions and drugs, diving uninhibitedly into intense experiences. Life and writing became one, and when her first book, *Devarim* (Words, or Things, 1966), appeared, it shook the Israeli literary world with its inner demons, imaginary and absurd situations, surreal connections, bold depictions of sexuality, and fluid, violent, and seemingly unstructured diction.

In the five books that followed, Wallach took on the feminine revolution in Hebrew writing. She subverted religious and national preconceptions unprecedentedly and often used sexual encounters as the arena for examining issues of social injustice. Her poems blur boundaries between female and male, conscious and subconscious, horror and beauty, sensuality and spirituality. The self is shattered, and its components become separate entities.

Wallach, a precursor of postmodernism, led Israeli literature to uncharted lands. She died of cancer at the age of forty-one.

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NILI GOLD

WAQF

An Islamic endowment created by its founder to dedicate specific property for the benefit of a particular public good (waqf khayri) *and/or the donor's family* (waqf ahli).

A *waqf* (Arabic plural, *awqâf*) may be composed of any kind of durable property whose use or income provides communal benefits, including mosques, hospitals, libraries, schools, canals, roads, and water fountains. The donor will write the charter for the administration of the *waqf* and appoint its initial trustees. The *kaʿba* in Mecca, the center of the Muslim pilgrimage, is the archetype of a *waqf.*

The first *waqf* established by Muhammad's community was the mosque at Quba in Medina. Charitable *waqfs* were established soon after when Muhammad dedicated seven orchards inherited from a follower to provide for the poor and needy. During the caliphate of Umar some donors established family *waqfs,* dedicating the income from their estates first to provide for their own descendents, with the surplus going to the poor. In the classical period of Islamic civilization the *waqfs* were an integral part of the economic and civil society infrastructure.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, after the colonial powers had, to varying degrees, marginalized the *waqfs,* the secular states that succeeded them dismantled or appropriated them to a significant degree throughout most of the Muslim world. Motivations were partly economic (that the permanent nature of *waqfs* tied up resources that might be more effectively reallocated), but mainly political, aiming to increase state function, authority, and wealth at the expense of the civil (especially, the religious) sector. After appropriation of *waqf* lands for the benefit of multinational corporations by the shah of Iran, for example, migration of evicted tenant farmers to the cities contributed to the discontent leading to the revolution that established the Islamic Republic in 1979.

Despite the diminution in their properties, size, and autonomy, the *waqf* remains a significant element of Islamic society. In recent years they have experienced a resurgence, especially in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, and Algeria.

See also KAʿBA.

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DENISE A. SPELLBERG
UPDATED BY IMAD-AD-DEAN AHMAD

WAR IN IRAQ (2003)

Controversial U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq.

During the decade following the Gulf War of 1991, U.S.–Iraqi relations remained tense. At issue was the extent to which Iraq was cooperating with international monitors looking for evidence that the country was free of any weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, nuclear weapons). The United States was the leading force within the UN Security Council urging that the crippling international economic sanctions against Iraq that had been in place since August 1990 be continued until the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) could certify Iraqi compliance. Several times during the administration of U.S. president William J. (Bill) Clinton, the situation deteriorated into crisis, including the December 1998 U.S. attack on Iraq known in the United States as Operation Desert Fox. Shortly thereafter, Iraq announced that UNSCOM's mission was over altogether.

Hardening of U.S–Iraq Relations under George W. Bush

The administration of President George W. Bush brought about a marked hardening of U.S. attitudes toward Iraq once he took office in January 2001. Bush, son of former president George H.W. Bush,

who had led the 1991 Gulf War against Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, filled his administration with many veterans of his father's war with Iraq. These included Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who had been chairman of the joint chiefs of staff of the U.S. military at the time of the Gulf War, and Vice President Richard Cheney, who had been secretary of defense for the elder Bush. The attacks carried out by al-Qaʿida on 11 September 2001, and Bush's decision to invade Afghanistan in October 2001, only hardened his resolve to confront Iraq. In his 30 January 2002 state of the union address, Bush included Iraq along with Iran and North Korea in what he called an "Axis of Evil." He pointed to what he claimed was evidence of Iraq's noncompliance with UN Security Council resolutions calling for disarmament, including a document purporting to show that Iraq had attempted to purchase 500 tons of uranium from Niger in 2000 (the International Atomic Energy Agency later proclaimed the document to be counterfeit). After months of claiming that Saddam Hussein constituted a clear threat to the United States, Bush convinced the U.S. congress to authorize him to use force against Iraq. The U.S. media offered no serious challenge to the administration's agenda.

Iraq agreed to allow UN weapons inspectors to return in September 2002, but an international debate over how to proceed ensued. The Bush administration encountered significant difficulties when it tried to convince other nations to support the use of force against Iraq if it failed to comply fully with UN resolutions. Not only did Bush face opposition from traditional rivals such as Russia and China, but he also had problems with longstanding U.S. allies within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including Germany and France. Those four nations, all of which sat on the UN Security Council at that time (Russia, China, and France as permanent members), remained adamant that the weapons inspectors be allowed to resume their activities before they would countenance any talk of war. Among U.S. allies, only Britain and Spain offered their full support to the U.S. hard line.

On 8 November 2002 the UN Security Council finally passed Resolution 1441, which demanded that Iraq allow the return of weapons inspectors. Iraq accepted, and officials of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), created in December 1999 to replace UNSCOM, began their work on 27 November. In a 27 January 2003 report, chief inspectors Hans Blix and Muhammad El Baradei generally praised Iraqi cooperation and noted that they had not uncovered any evidence of weapons of mass destruction in the approximately 300 inspections that UNMOVIC had carried out to that date. The United States and Britain continued to make the case that Iraq had such weapons and constituted an immediate threat. On 3 February British prime minister Tony Blair posted a document on his official Web site that he claimed showed Iraqi weapons violations, based in part on British intelligence (parts of the document were later shown to have been plagiarized from open sources, not intelligence reports). U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell addressed the Security Council five days later, using props such as intercepted audiotapes of Iraqi military commanders' conversations, to convince the council that Iraq continued to disregard the international community. The U.S. administration also shifted its rationale for war during late 2002 and early 2003, mentioning banned weapons, then discussing possible Iraqi links to the al-Qaʿida network, then discussing the need to liberate Iraqis from Saddam's Hussein's dictatorial rule.

During the weeks of this debate there was unprecedented popular global opposition to waging war against Iraq. Demonstrations were held on all seven continents in early 2003, including at the McMurdo scientific research station in Antarctica. It has been estimated that 30 million people worldwide participated in antiwar demonstrations in 600 cities in dozens of countries during a weekend of global protest from 14 to 16 February. Countries whose governments supported the war—Britain, Spain, Italy, and the United States—were the scenes of what were perhaps their nations' largest ever public rallies. Huge demonstrations were held in Italy, where Pope John Paul II appealed for peace from the hawks. A January 2003 demonstration in freezing temperatures in Washington, D.C., was called the largest demonstration in the United States since the era of the Vietnam war protests.

Undeterred by such massive global opposition, including from longstanding U.S. allies, the United

States tried twice, in late February and early March, to convince the Security Council to adopt a resolution stating that Iraq had failed to comply with Resolution 1441 and calling for "serious consequences." These attempts failed. On 15 March UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan weighed into the debate by saying that an attack on Iraq absent a new resolution would constitute a violation of the UN charter. Bush, however, gave a televised speech the following day in which he demanded that Saddam Hussein and his sons Uday and Qusay leave Iraq within 48 hours or face attack. They refused. In Britain, the House of Commons voted two days after that, on 18 March, to support war.

The war commenced on 20 March with aerial bombing of Baghdad. Ground forces of a U.S.-led coalition invaded from Kuwait the next day while airborne troops based secretly in Jordan captured air bases in western Iraq. In addition to 255,000 Americans, this coalition eventually included 45,000 British troops, 2,000 Australians, and 200 each from Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Fighting was fierce, but Iraqi forces were doomed from the start. By 6 April U.S.forces had captured Karbala and British troops had entered Basra. By 9 April U.S. forces had entered Baghdad as Saddam's regime crumbled. There were scenes of wild jubilation in parts of Baghdad at Saddam's downfall, as, for example, when crowds (and a U.S. tank) pulled down a huge statue of the deposed leader that had stood in Firdaws Square in downtown Baghdad. Tragically, the looting that swept through the city spread to some of Iraq's most important archaeological museums. The National Museum in Baghdad was sacked between 9 and 12 April, and both common pilferers and professional art thieves stole nearly 15,000 artifacts, some of them priceless treasures. Working with INTERPOL, U.S. officials worked to track down stolen artifacts that had been smuggled out of Iraq. By September 2003 more than 3,400 items from the National Museum had been recovered in Iraq, Jordan, Italy, and elsewhere. There was at least one case in which members of the U.S. forces themselves took an artifact from an Iraqi museum: The helmet of an Israeli aviator shot down over Iraq in June 1967 was taken from a display in a Baghdad military museum and given to Israeli authorities in Jordan in August 2003.

In the north, Kurdish forces joined the fight and helped to capture Mosul and Kirkuk. Saddam Hussein and other leading Iraqi officials went into hiding. The fighting was largely over by 16 April, and Bush declared on 1 May that "major combat operations" were over. At that point, U.S. and British military deaths in combat totaled 120. Iraqi deaths during that time, both civilian and military, were much more difficult to ascertain; estimates range from between 5,000 to 7,000 civilians killed, and 4,800 to 6,300 Iraqi soldiers. Saddam Hussein's sons Uday and Qusay were killed in a shootout with U.S. troops in Mosul on 22 July. Saddam himself was eventually captured by U.S. forces near Tikrit on 14 December.

Occupation of Iraq

To administer the occupied country, the United States created the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. On 21 April 2003 former U.S. army general Jay Garner (1938–) was appointed as its head. Garner served as the civilian governor of occupied Iraq until he was replaced on 6 May by former U.S. State Department official L. Paul Bremer III (1941–). Bremer was named the administrator of the new Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA; in Arabic, Sultat al-I'tilaf al-Mu'aqqata), a division of the U.S. Department of Defense. As a result, Bremer became the civilian head of a U.S. military occupation administration. Through Security Council Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003, the UN formally recognized the United States and Britain as occupying powers and lifted the sanctions imposed on Iraq, even though UNMOVIC had not yet certified Iraqi disarmament, as required by the sanctions resolutions. U.S. officials stated that the occupation was costing the United States approximately $1 billion per week, although some of those costs included items such as military salaries that would have been paid anyway. The United States also dispatched former secretary of state James Baker on an international campaign to convince Iraq's creditors to forgive the country's debts that had been accumulated by Saddam.

On 13 July 2003 Bremer created the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) as an advisory body. The IGC included representatives from Iraq's main ethnic and religious groups, opposition politicians such as the Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and Masʿud

Barzani, and returned exiles such as former diplomat Adnan Pachachi and Ahmad Chalabi, founder of the Iraqi National Congress. The IGC was allowed to form a cabinet, but final authority lay with Bremer, who retained veto powers over the IGC's decisions.

Armed resistance to the occupation escalated in the summer of 2003, as did attacks on a variety of Iraqi political and religious figures and foreign officials. On 19 August a car bomb at UN headquarters in Baghdad killed the top UN envoy to Iraq, Brazilian Sergio Vieira de Mello (1948–2003). Ten days later, on 29 August, leading Shiʿite cleric Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (1939–2003) was assassinated in a massive bomb explosion in al-Najaf. By early 2004 guerrillas were carrying out increasingly more sophisticated bombings and other attacks on U.S. and other occupation troops, which had expanded by early 2004 to include combat and noncombat forces from thirty additional countries besides those that originally participated in the war. These attacks became an almost daily occurrence, not so much in the Shiʿite and Kurdish regions of Iraq as in the "Sunni Triangle" north of Baghdad, near towns such as Falluja and Tikrit. In addition, numerous car bombings killed scores of Iraqi civilians and officers of the reconstructed Iraqi police. On 2 March 2004, over 140 Iraqi Shiʿa were killed during attacks in Baghdad and Karbala that came during the important Shiʿite religious celebration of Ashura. By late February 2004, 548 U.S. soldiers had died in Iraq since the beginning of the war, 337 as a result of hostile activity. Iraqi civilian deaths since the war began ranged somewhere between 8,000 and 10,000.

Controversy continued to swirl after the onset of the occupation. Although the presence of weapons of mass destruction was the major ostensible reason for going to war, by early 2004 occupation authorities had still not found any such stockpiles, a situation that eventually led President Bush, in January 2004, to call for a formal inquiry into prewar U.S. intelligence failures. In late 2003 in Britain, Prime Minister Blair was also engulfed in a controversy over the accuracy of his government's handling of intelligence. Paul Bremer was adamant by early 2004 that the CPA would turn over "sovereignty" to the Iraqi people on 30 June 2004, although coalition troops would remain in the country. There were conflicting opinions about the shape of the new governmental system. Bremer's proposals for regional caucuses as the basis for constructing a new Iraqi legislature and interim government were rejected by most Iraqis, and he backed away from the idea in mid-February 2004. The leading Shiʿite cleric, Ayatullah Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani (1930–), wanted direct elections held as soon as possible. Iraq's Shiʿite Arabs and Kurds were much better organized politically than other ethnic and religious groups, including Sunni Arabs, Turkmen, Assyrians, and others, who were fearful that such quick elections could produce a Shiʿite-dominated country. In addition, the fact that al-Sistani is originally an Iranian (who came to Iraq decades ago) has raised some Sunni suspicions about Iranian influence. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan sent special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to Iraq to produce a recommendation for how to proceed, and stated in late February that it was not feasible to hold direct elections prior to the handover of sovereignty on 30 June. Fearing the possibility that Iraqis might draft a constitution that proclaimed *shariʿa* to be the basis for legislation in the new Iraq, Bremer announced on 16 February that he would veto any such proposal coming from the IGC. On 8 March 2004, the IGC signed a provisional constitution for a federal Iraq that granted the Kurds a considerable voice in government. The constitution also called *shariʿa* "a source" of legislation, as opposed to "the source."

See also Annan, Kofi A.; Baker, James A.; Barzani Family; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Bush, George Walker; Chalabi, Ahmad; Clinton, William Jefferson; Gulf Crisis (1990–1991); Gulf War (1991); Hussein, Saddam; Iraq; Iraqi National Congress; Powell, Colin L.; Qaʿida, al-; Sanctions, Iraqi.

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WARNIER LAW

Law passed by France's National Assembly in 1873 to establish individual titles on previously undivided lands held by families and tribes in Algeria.

The Warnier Law greatly facilitated land purchases by European settlers and appropriations by the state domain. It also hastened the appearance of small and dispersed properties insufficient to support the indigenous rural population.

Peter von Sivers

WAR OF ATTRITION (1969–1970)

Egypt's unsuccessful campaign to drive Israel back from the Suez Canal.

After the Arab–Israel War in 1967, fighting continued along the borders of the new territories captured by Israel, particularly along the Suez Canal. Violations of the cease-fire proliferated in September 1968, when Egypt concentrated some 150,000 troops along the west side of the canal. Heavy fighting took place on 8 and 9 March 1969, causing the death of Egypt's chief of staff, General Abd al-Munʿim Riyad. On 23 July of that year, President Gamal Abdel Nasser formally declared a war of attrition. He stated that, although his country was incapable of regaining the Sinai Peninsula by force, it could and would wear Israel out—hoping that Egyptian artillery barrages would make Israel withdraw its troops from the Suez Canal. Israel responded by building a system of thirty strongholds along the canal, known as the Bar-Lev Line.

On 31 October 1968 Israel had destroyed a power station at Naj Hamadi in upper Egypt, but it was not until July 1969 that it began regular aerial attacks that devastated Egyptian cities along the canal and turned their residents into refugees. In early 1970 Egypt received substantial amounts of Soviet military aid, including surface-to-air missile batteries that could down Israeli aircraft. After a number of aerial battles between Israeli planes and Russian-flown MiG fighters, the United States introduced its Rogers Plan and pressed Egypt and Israel for a new cease-fire, which went into effect on 7 August 1970.

Some controversy exists among military scholars as to which country actually won the war of attrition. Israel certainly proved its military superiority, especially in aerial dogfights with Egyptian pilots, but Egypt gained a diplomatic victory in persuading the Soviet Union to provide military assistance and in moving SAM missile batteries, which Egypt used in the 1973 Arab–Israel War, close to the Suez Canal. The long-term effect of the war of attrition has been to make Israel more suspicious of international peace proposals and Egypt more precise in its strategic military planning.

See also Arab–Israel War (1967); Arab–Israel War (1973); Bar-Lev, Haim; Rogers, William Pierce.

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Benjamin Joseph
Updated by Arthur Goldschmidt

WATER

Because of its scarcity, water plays a central role in Middle Eastern politics and society.

Nowhere in the world is water more important than in the Middle East and North Africa. In no other region do so many people strive so hard for economic growth on the basis of so little water: here is found 5 percent of the world's population but only 1 percent of its fresh water. Of the ten nations with the least water per capita, six are in this region. No wonder that both Jewish and Muslim scriptures are full of references to water.

The Dead Sea is the lowest point on earth and the culmination of the Jordan River. Its high concentration of mineral salts makes this body of water lifeless but also makes its visitors buoyant, creating a popular tourist attraction along the border between Israel and Jordan. © RICHARD T. NOWITZ/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Role of Climate

The more heavily populated parts of the Middle East are semiarid, with rainfall of 10 to 29 inches (250 to 750 mm) per year. However, low rainfall is less of a problem than variability in rainfall. The great bulk of the rain falls in four winter months, with none falling during the rest of the year. Rainfall also changes rapidly with distance, from more than 20 inches (500 mm) on the coast of Lebanon to 8 inches (200 mm) in the Biqa, only an hour away by road but across the Lebanon mountains.

Seasonal and spatial variations in rainfall are sharp but predictable. What makes planning difficult is the sharp variation from one year to the next. Reliable flow in the rivers (the flow that can be expected nine years out of ten) is only 10 percent of the average. In northern latitudes, water planning can be built around statistical averages; here, it must be built around extremes.

This already difficult water situation will likely get worse. Population growth rates are high, and most climate change models suggest higher temperatures, lower rainfall, and more frequent droughts for the region.

Role of History

Development in the Middle East and North Africa has always been more dependent on water than on any other resource, including oil. By the fourth millennium B.C.E., the Sumerians had built a paradise in what is now Iraq through intricate canals for irrigating crops; two millennia later it had largely collapsed because of salinization of the soil. Ancient cities, such as Palmyra in Syria, were possible only because of carefully engineered tunnels, called *qanats* (*foggaras* in Iran), to bring water from springs tens of kilometers away.

Over the years, the peoples of the Middle East have made water a preoccupation, and each nation has a central agency, typically a full ministry, to deal with water. Many of the principles for good water management were worked out in the Middle East—although just as often they were ignored for political, financial, or social reasons.

Water Sources

The Middle East includes two of the mightiest river systems in the world. The Nile has two main branches: The White Nile originates in Uganda, and the larger Blue Nile (together with the Atbara) originates in Ethiopia; they join near Khartoum and flow northward through Egypt to the Mediterranean. The Tigris and Euphrates both originate in Turkey and flow south-southeastward through Syria and Iraq before joining and flowing into the Persian Gulf via the Shatt al-Arab, at the Iranian border.

The region also includes numerous medium-sized rivers, such as the Jordan, which flows from three springs through the Sea of Galilee (one of the few natural lakes in the region) and into the Dead Sea, 415 meters below sea level. Only Turkey has an

Atatürk Dam, built across the Euphrates River in southeastern Turkey and in use since 1990, is one of the largest dams of its kind (earth and rock fill) in the world. Dams such as these are not only expensive but are also costly in terms of reducing the flow of water to countries lying downstream, contributing to a growing shortage of fresh water in much of the region. © Ed Kashi/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

abundance of river water, but its big rivers are only found in the eastern part of the nation. Finally, there are small coastal rivers (many of them ephemeral), and a few major wetlands, such as the marshlands in southern Iraq and the Sudd swamp in southern Sudan.

The construction of new dams and pipelines to deliver water from major rivers in the Middle East will cost two or three times as much per unit of water as current supplies, and if construction occurs in upstream countries, such as Ethiopia and Turkey, it will reduce flows downstream. Therefore, the region will increasingly shift toward the use of underground water, which has the great advantage of not evaporating. (Lakes and reservoirs in the region lose meters of water per year to evaporation.)

Historically, underground water was tapped by shallow wells dug in unconsolidated materials to get small flows of water. Today, much larger volumes of water are extracted from wells drilled tens to hundreds of meters into aquifers, which are rock layers with pores that contain water. Renewable aquifers are replenished (generally slowly) by rainfall; nonrenewable, or fossil, aquifers contain water trapped in sediments laid down millions of years ago.

Just more than 10 percent of the water supply for the region comes from aquifers, but in Israel and Jordan the share approaches 50 percent, and in Kuwait and parts of the Arabian Peninsula it approaches 100 percent (apart from desalination). Libya's Great Man-Made River pumps water from fossil aquifers in the south of the country and moves it 930 miles (1,500 km) to farms and cities in the north.

The third most important source of water in the Middle East is recycled sewage, which is treated and reused, mainly for irrigation. Despite common

Lake Van, a salt lake in eastern Turkey near the border with Iran, is the largest lake in the country. Turkey is the source of the Tigris and Euphrates as well as numerous lesser rivers, and it is one of only a handful of nations in the region where water is abundant. © ADAM WOOLFITT/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

belief (shared by both Muslims and non-Muslims), there is no objection in Islamic law to the reuse of sewer water provided it is properly treated.

More than half of the world's desalination capacity is found in the region, mainly in the oil-producing nations of the Arabian peninsula with lots of by-product natural gas that was formerly flared. (Desalination is an energy-intensive process.) Costs for desalination have fallen to a level that makes it feasible as a source of potable water but still too expensive for irrigation.

Other sources of water are individually small but collectively provide sizable amounts of water. Water harvesting gathers rain that falls over a wide area and directs it to one field through small channels and micro-barrages. The technique can allow crops in areas where rainfall is only 4 inches (100 mm) per year. Rainwater is also collected from rooftops and stored in cisterns. If handled carefully, rooftop water can be used for drinking.

Uses of Water

By far the largest share of water in the region goes to agriculture—as much as 90 percent of total water use in some countries, and 60 percent in the more industrialized countries.

Drinking requires only a relatively small volume of water, but it must meet higher standards than that used for irrigation. Thirty liters of potable water per person-day is generally regarded as the minimum for drinking, cooking, and washing.

Industrial water use is low. Food and beverage processing are the largest industrial consumers. More is withdrawn for cooling but most of this water is recycled or returned to the watercourse.

A hidden but critical amount of water must be left in place to support fisheries and hydropower, as well as to protect habitat. This use is typically neglected by governments when they drain swamps, canalize rivers, or extend land. As a result, not only has the environment been degraded, but fish catches have declined and the salinity of groundwater has increased.

Problems

The nations of the Middle East all face three overlapping sources of stress in their water management: 1) quantity, which has been a source of stress since history began; 2) quality, which is a newer stress but increasingly important; and 3) equity, which occurs when the same water is subject to competing demands.

Quantity. Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria, and Turkey are fairly well endowed with water, with more than 1 million cubic meters (Mcm) per capita; Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, and Palestine form a middle group; and Jordan, Libya, Tunisia, and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula are least well endowed, with less than 500 Mcm per capita. However, water availability is declining in every nation, which means that current patterns of water use are not sustainable. Some projections for the Jordan River basin suggest that by 2025 household and industrial uses will require all the fresh water, leaving none for farmers. Most nations are also drawing down their renewable aquifers and mining fossil ones. Some have annual water deficits of several thousand Mcm.

Water quantity problems in the region can be resolved in small part by exploiting additional

Freshwater withdrawals by country and sector

Estimates for 2000

Country	Total	Per capita	Use (%)	(cubic km/a)		% with safe (cubic m/p) drinking water
				Domestic	Industry	
Afghanistan	26.1	1,020	1	0	99	13
Algeria	4.5	142	25	15	60	94
Bahrain	0.2	387	39	4	56	100
Egypt	55.1	809	6	8	86	95
Iran	70.0	916	6	2	92	95
Iraq	42.8	1,852	5	3	92	85
Israel	1.7	280	36	11	51*	100
Jordan	1.0	155	22	3	75	96
Lebanon	1.3	393	28	4	68	100
Libya	4.6	720	11	2	87	72
Morocco	11.1	381	5	3	92	82
Oman	1.2	450	5	2	94	39
Saudi Arabia	17.0	786	9	1	90	95
Sudan	17.8	597	4	1	94	75
Syria	14.4	894	4	2	94	80
Tunisia	3.1	313	32	8	60	99
Turkey	31.6	481	16	11	72	83
Yemen	2.9	162	7	1	92	69

* Percentage by sector adjusted by author on basis of estimates by the Planning Department of the Israeli Water Commission. All data for Israel based on estimates by the author.

SOURCE: Gleick, Peter, et al, ed. *The World's Water: The Biennial Report in Freshwater Resources, 2002–2003* (Washington, D.C., Island Press, 2002).

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

sources of supply but in much larger part by better use of the water that is already available. People in the region use less water than those elsewhere in the world, but as a result of poor management and misguided economic policies conservation here (as in most other parts of the world) remains far short of its potential. Many nations lose half the water put into municipal systems to leaks, and they typically deliver piped water at low (or no) price. Cost-effective savings of 25 to 50 percent are possible in most uses.

Moreover, every country in the region provides water to farmers at highly subsidized prices. Under the influence of higher prices, Israeli scientists developed drip irrigation systems that have cut water use per hectare by 40 percent. However, drip irrigation is expensive and not appropriate for all crops. Lower-cost sprinkler systems, used at night to minimize evaporation, can also increase irrigation efficiency, as can irrigating only at times critical to plant growth.

Most analysts find that water is tens of times more valuable in industrial or household uses than in agriculture. Therefore, crops grown in the region will gradually be replaced by imports. It takes roughly a thousand tons of water to produce one ton of wheat. Using that ratio, Middle Eastern nations already import grains with a virtual water content equal to the flow of the Nile.

Quality. Much of the limited fresh water in the Middle East is polluted from growing volumes of human, industrial, and agricultural waste. Three problems stand out: 1) Overpumping of wells causes a decline in the water table—by as much as a meter a year in some areas. This decline adds to pumping costs and permits lower-quality water (or, if near the coast, seawater) to flow inward and contaminate the aquifer. The only way to avoid the problem is to match pumping rates to inflow. 2) Agricultural runoff is the major non-point source of water pollution—mainly sediment, phosphorus, nitrogen, and pesticides. Better farming methods, such as conservation tillage, contour planting, and terracing can control soil erosion and cut pollution by half or more. 3) Urban sewage systems have either begun to deteriorate or cannot handle the growing

loads placed on them. Large investments are needed to improve their physical infrastructure.

Equity. Most of the larger rivers in the region cross an international border—some cross several borders—or form a border. No tabulation exists for aquifers that underlie national borders, but there are many.

Despite many statements suggesting that the next war in the Middle East will be over fresh water, there is little evidence for this. Not a single war has been fought over water for hundreds of years, but many treaties dealing with water have been signed. Water will be a source of conflict, but the conflicts will mainly be intranational rather than international. Likely sources of conflict include rural and urban users contending for the same water and rising demands from poor farmers, who are often disadvantaged in their access to water, and from women, who typically want more water for their households while men prefer to use it to grow cash crops. Israeli control of water in the West Bank is contentious, but even here experts have shown that compromise is feasible.

None of the three stresses on water in the Middle East will be easily resolved. Most of the nations in the region have already reached or are fast approaching the limits of their indigenous water supplies. Although higher prices for water and technological advances may defer the crisis, the only long-term solutions involve much greater efficiency in use, full reuse of wastewater, and gradual shifts of water from agriculture to other sectors. All of the nations of the Middle East and North Africa must revise their water policies to provide for a sustainable future, and they must find equitable ways to share water within and between nations.

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DAVID B. BROOKS

WATTAR, AL-TAHER

[1936–]

Algerian novelist, short-story writer, and journalist.

Al-Taher Wattar (also spelled Tahar Ouettar and Tahir Watter) was born in Sedrata (department of Souk Ahras, eastern Algeria). His studies, exclusively in Arabic schools, took him to the Ibn Badis Intitute of Constantine and then to the Zeitouna University of Tunis in 1954. In 1955–1956 he published his first short stories in newspapers and joined the Civil Organization of the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale). After the war, he edited two periodicals in Tunisia and Algeria: *al-Jamahir* (The masses) from 1962 to 1963 and *al-Ahrar* (Free people) from 1972 to 1974. He also served as a civil servant of the FLN and general director of Algerian Radio. Since 1989, Wattar has served as president of *al-Jahidhiya,* the Algerian literary and cultural association. An important figure in Algerian literature, he is one of the few novelists who have attempted to

make up for the lack of conventional types in the Arabic novel.

His writings present a panorama of Algeria's postindependence history, with a look back at the Algerian War of Independence and a subtle treatment of postcolonial Algerian politics, culture, and society. His nationalistic works defend the socialist ideology and the role played by the communists in the Algerian War of Independence. His novel *L'As* (1974; The genius), in particular, reveals the communists' involvement in the fighting; Wattar used this book as a first step to indict those in power for their many failures. His *al-Shamʿa wa ad-Dahalib* (1995; The candle and dark tunnels), addresses the fall of the Soviet Union and its aftermath.

The symbolic novel *al-Hawwat wa al-Qasr* (1980; The fisherman and the palace) reveals the disappointments of the people with the political agenda of independent Algeria. Another controversial subject Wattar raises is the abuses by the opportunists who benefited from both war and peace. His novels *al-Zilzal* (1974; The earthquake) and *Urs Baghl* (1978; A mule's wedding) are primarily allegorical writings with a deep vein of satire and provide insight into Algerian culture, politics, society, and psychology. His novel *al-Wali al-Tahir yaʿud ila Maqamihi al-Zaki* (1999; Saint Tahir returns to his holy shrine), deals with the Islamic renaissance. Wattar's *al-Shuhada Yaʿudun Hatha al-Usbu* (1980; Martyrs come back this week), a collection of seven linked short stories, dramatically portrays the national betrayal of the memory of the martyrs of the War of Independence.

The novel *al-Ishq wa al-Mawt fi al-Zaman al-Harrashi* (1980; Love and death in the Harrashi time) expresses Wattar's great optimism during the rule of President Houari Boumedienne. But changes on the political scene ended his dreams, and the novel *Tajribatun fi al-Ishq* (1994; An experience in passion) is the cry of a disappointed man.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN.

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AIDA A. BAMIA
UPDATED BY AZZEDINE G. MANSOUR

WAUCHOPE, ARTHUR

[1874–1947]

British high commissioner in Palestine and Transjordan, 1931–1938.

Sir Arthur Grenfell Wauchope, a Scotsman, was a professional soldier who served in the Second Boer War and, from 1903 to 1914, in India. During the first two years of World War I he served on the western front. In 1916 he was transferred to Mesopotamia in command of the Highland Battalion and was wounded at the battle of Shaykh Saʿd. After the war he served in Germany, Great Britain, and Northern Ireland. He retired from the army as a lieutenant-general in 1931 and was appointed high commissioner of Palestine and Transjordan. The prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, said that Wauchope was "a general who does it with his head, not his feet." As high commissioner, Wauchope compared the difficulty of dealing with the Arabs and Jews to that of a circus performer riding two horses at once. The early years of his tenure were marked by unprecedented levels of Jewish immigration and by growing political tension. Wauchope's proposal in 1935 for the establishment of an elected legislative council was rejected by Arabs and Jews as well as by the British parliament. In 1936 the three-year-long countrywide Palestine Arab revolt broke out. At first Wauchope urged restraint, but when clashes between British forces and Arab rebels intensified, he recommended the use of large-scale armed force to quell disorder. He retired on grounds of ill health in February 1938, before completing his second five-year term.

See also PALESTINE ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939).

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KAREN A. THORNSVARD
UPDATED BY BERNARD WASSERSTEIN

WAVELL, ARCHIBALD PERCIVAL

[1883–1950]

Commander in chief of British forces in the Middle East; British general in World War II; Viceroy of India, 1943–1947.

Archibald Percival Wavell was born in Colchester, England, and graduated from Sandhurst, the British military academy. He served under General Edmund Allenby in Palestine in World War I. In 1937 he was again sent to Palestine to deal with the unrest between the Arabs and Jews. He successfully quelled the Palestine Arab Revolt and returned to Britain in 1938. In 1939, he became commander in chief for all British forces in the Middle East, where he defeated the Italian forces in North and East Africa (1940–1941). He was not successful in preventing the fall of Greece and Crete, and when he succumbed to General Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps in 1941, he was reassigned to Southeast Asia. Wavell concluded his career as viceroy of India (1943–1947), the last viceroy before Lord Mountbatten, who helped ease India into independence from the British Empire.

See also PALESTINE ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939).

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DANIEL E. SPECTOR

WAZIR, INTISAR AL- (UMM JIHAD)

[1941–]

Palestinian political figure.

Intisar al-Wazir was born in 1941 in Gaza city. In 1965 she married Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) a cofounder of al-Fatah and leader of the first Palestinian uprising, who was assassinated by Israeli commandos in Tunisia in early 1988. In 1965 she also participated in founding the General Union for Palestinian Women (GUPW) to support Palestinian women socially, economically, and legally. She served as the secretary-general of the GUPW between 1980 and 1985.

Al-Wazir founded numerous centers for women that focused on literacy training and rehabilitation, including the Social Affairs Committee, the Martyrs' Families Organization, and the Committee for Prisoners and the Injured. Upon the creation of the Palestinian Authority, al-Wazir served as the first Palestinian minister for social affairs between 1996 and 2003.

In addition to her prominent role in social activism, al-Wazir has held important political positions since the early days of her public career. She joined al-Fatah in 1959 as its first female member. She has been a member of the Palestinian National Council since 1974 and a member of the Fatah Central Committee since 1987. In 1983 she served as the deputy secretary-general of the Fatah Revolutionary Council.

Al-Wazir lived in exile for thirty years, returning to the Gaza Strip in 1995. She was elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in 1996.

See also WAZIR, KHALIL AL-.

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KHALED ISLAIH

WAZIR, KHALIL AL-

[1935–1988]

Also known as Abu Jihad, one of the founding members of al-Fatah.

Khalil Ibrahim al-Wazir was born on 10 October 1935 to a Palestinian Sunni Muslim shopkeeper in Ramla in Mandatory Palestine. When its inhabitants were summarily expelled by Israeli forces in July 1948, al-Wazir made his way to Gaza City, where he resumed his education at a United Nations Relief and Works Agency school.

Al-Wazir first became politically active in 1953, covertly receiving military training in the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip. Probably affiliated with

the Muslim Brotherhood at this time, he formed his own commando unit, whose activities led to his brief imprisonment by the Egyptian authorities in 1954. In 1954 he also first met the future Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman, Yasir Arafat, beginning a lifelong partnership and friendship, which, in association with future PLO deputy chairman Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), was to form the resilient core leadership of the contemporary Palestinian national movement.

After completing his studies in Cairo, where he had moved in September 1956, al-Wazir left in 1957 for Kuwait as a schoolteacher. His meeting there with Arafat that fall, a meeting of minds regarding the need to establish an independent, armed Palestinian movement, sowed the seeds for the formation of the Palestine National Liberation Movement (al-Fatah) in 1959. Al-Wazir would serve on its Central Committee and the subsequently established Revolutionary Council for the rest of his life.

Among al-Fatah's founders, al-Wazir alone had prior experience in forming a guerrilla organization and played a leading role in its development. In 1963 he went to Algiers to open al-Fatah's first diplomatic mission and organize military training for its recruits. He used this post to establish relations with China (al-Fatah's first non-Arab source of arms), North Korea, and Vietnam; meet guerrilla theoretician Che Guevara; and participate in the 1964 Palestine National Council, which founded the PLO. During this period he also remained, with Arafat, the leading advocate within al-Fatah's Central Committee for an immediate start to military operations. When the debate was resolved in late 1964, al-Wazir was appointed deputy commander in chief of al-Fatah's military wing, al-Asifa (The Storm).

After the PLO came under the control of al-Fatah and other guerrilla organizations in 1968–1969, al-Wazir additionally assumed the post of deputy commander in chief of PLO military forces. Although this position gave him only limited authority over non-Fatah forces, al-Fatah's preponderance within the PLO ensured that he played a central role in PLO military affairs until his death. He firmly believed armed struggle was legitimate and consistently sought to escalate it. He also did not hesitate to attack or retaliate against civilian targets



Khalil al-Wazir (right) with George Habash at the 16th Palestinian National Council Meeting in 1983. Al-Wazir was one of the original members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and played an important role in many of its operations up until his assassination in 1988. **© Alain Nogues/Corbis Sygma. Reproduced by permission.**

when he thought this necessary but opposed the use of violence outside the region.

Al-Wazir, who furthermore directed al-Fatah's Department of the Occupied Homeland, was also among the first of his colleagues to grasp the importance of complementing armed struggle in Gaza and the West Bank with political mobilization. Particularly after the PLO's evacuation from Beirut in 1982, he worked hard to develop al-Fatah's political infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, thus helping prepare the ground for the popular uprising, or Intifada, which erupted in December 1987. It was primarily on account of his leading role in assisting the uprising's clandestine leadership and channeling support to the West Bank and Gaza that he was assassinated by an Israeli commando squad (which filmed the event) in Tunis on 16 April 1988. His death precipitated the most serious disturbances the West Bank and Gaza Strip had witnessed since 1967, and his funeral in Damascus was attended by hundreds of thousands, including representatives from all Palestinian factions. He is survived by his wife, prominent Fatah militant Intisar al-Wazir, and four of their five children.

Along with Khalaf, Khalil al-Wazir was the most important PLO and Fatah leader after Arafat and,

in internal debates, consistently Arafat's closest ally. The achievements and failures of these organizations and of the Palestinian people generally during his time are therefore equally his.

A straightforward nationalist whose mind was attuned to practical action and organizational matters, al-Wazir was among Palestinians respected in life and venerated in death. Though denounced as a reactionary by more radical elements during the 1970s for his conservative positions, he enjoyed extensive contacts among other factions and later emerged as a prominent mediator. As with all Palestinian nationalist leaders during his lifetime, he was viewed by Israel as a terrorist, and Israel rejected his support of a negotiated settlement.

Neither an intellectual nor an orator, al-Wazir does not have any writings to his name and gave fewer press statements than his colleagues.

See also Arafat, Yasir; Fatah, al-; Intifada (1987–1991); Khalaf, Salah; Muslim Brotherhood; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Wazir, Intisar al- (Umm Jihad).

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Mouin Rabbani

WAZZANI, MUHAMMAD HASSAN AL-

[1910–1978]

Moroccan nationalist.

In the early 1930s, Muhammad Hassan al-Wazzani, a native of Fez, was a leader of the Comité d'Action Marocaine (CAM). He was elected secretary-general of the Bloc d'Action Nationale in October 1936, but the following year founded the Parti Démocratique Constitutionnel (PDC). Wazzani was imprisoned for nine years (1937–1946) on political charges. Periodically, he cooperated with the Istiqlal, and from 1953 to 1954, he and his followers joined the National Front. Wazzani was named minister of state without portfolio in King Hassan's 1961 coalition government. He was among those wounded in 1971 in the attempted coup against the king.

See also Parti Démocratique Constitutionnel (PDC).

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

WEIZMAN, EZER

[1924–]

Israeli politician and soldier; president of Israel (1993–2000).

Born in Haifa, Ezer Weizman is the nephew of Chaim Weizmann, Israel's first president. In 1942 Weizman joined the Royal Air Force and served in Rhodesia, Egypt, and India. In 1946 and 1947 he studied aeronautics in Britain. From 1946 to 1948 he was a member of the prestate underground Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi.

Weizman was one of the founding fathers of the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Following the United Nations vote to partition Palestine, he worked in the Air Service, the IAF's predecessor, and during the 1948 war he commanded an IAF squadron. In 1950 he became IAF chief of operations, and in 1956 commander. In 1967 he became chief of the general staff.

In 1969 Weizman entered politics. He served as leader of the GAHAL Party and was minister of transportation in Levi Eshkol's Government of National Unity. He resigned from the government in 1970 and went into private business, but continued on the Herut Executive Committee. In 1977, when the Likud (formed from the merger of Herut, Gahal, and other right-of-center parties) won its first national election, Weizman was campaign manager.

Having been appointed minister of defense by the new prime minister, Menachem Begin, Weizman supervised the invasion of Lebanon in 1978; he also was a moderating influence in the Camp David peace talks in September 1978. Although he was perceived as a hawk when he joined the Begin government, Weizman increasingly argued for a more moderate approach; this led to conflicts with other members of the Likud. In May 1980 he resigned from the cabinet; six months later he voted

against the government on a no-confidence vote, charging that Begin was intentionally frustrating the peace process.

In 1984 Weizman's political party, Yahad, won three seats in the Eleventh Knesset. Following the elections, Weizman was appointed minister of science in a National Unity government. In 1986 Yahad officially joined the Labor Party. In 1987 Weizman was the first member of the Labor Party in the Knesset to call for negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In 1990 he was accused of undertaking secret meetings with PLO officials (illegal at the time), but charges were never filed. He resigned his seat in the Knesset before the 1992 election, ostensibly because he was frustrated with the slow pace of peace negotiations, and in March 1993 the Labor Party nominated him as its candidate for president. He became the president of Israel on 14 May 1993 and was reelected to a second term as president in 1998.

Weizman introduced the modern presidency to Israel, breaking from the traditional model in which "nonpolitical" presidents avoided partisan politics. He was unapologetic about taking controversial positions, and on several occasions his actions caused political disruption. He resigned his presidency in July 2000. An investigation by the attorney general found that Weizman had received more than $300,000 from a French Jewish businessman between 1987 and 1993; the scandal resulted in his being the first Israeli president to be the subject of police investigation, and the first president to resign.

See also ISRAEL: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; WEIZMANN, CHAIM.

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GREGORY S. MAHLER

WEIZMANN, CHAIM

[1874–1952]

Zionist leader; first president of Israel, 1948–1952.

Chaim (also Hayyim) Weizmann was born in the Jewish community of Motol, near Pinsk, in Belorussia, part of the Pale of Settlement, the region into which Jews were largely confined by the Russian empire. His father, a moderately prosperous timber merchant, educated his twelve children in the modern style. Chaim went to a Russian secondary school in Pinsk, studied in Germany, and earned his doctorate in chemistry in Geneva in 1899. From 1900 to 1904 he taught at the University of Geneva.

From his earliest youth Weizmann was a convinced Zionist. Committed to the promotion of Haskalah (secular modern Hebrew literature and culture), he encouraged a group of young Zionists, called the Democratic Fraction, to challenge the cautious policies of established Zionist leadership. Their initial project, the creation of a Jewish university in Palestine, widened the rift between secular and religious Zionists. In 1904 Weizmann took a position at the University of Manchester in England. He continued to participate in Zionist activities and, in the course of election campaigns in Manchester, met Arthur Balfour and Winston Churchill.

The outbreak of World War I dislocated the World Zionist Organization (WZO). Weizmann accepted a government appointment to supervise the synthetic production of acetone, a vital necessity for the production of mortar shells. As the war progressed, Weizmann's professional and political standing grew. Helped by C. P. Scott, editor of the *Manchester Guardian* and a sympathizer with Zionism, he met David Lloyd George, Herbert Samuel, and other Liberal ministers. Without the formal authorization of any official Zionist agency, Weizmann was instrumental in persuading British politicians to support Zionist aims. He argued that a British-sponsored Zionist entity in Palestine would enhance British strategic interests in the Middle East and secure imperial lines of communication to India. The Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, which promised British support for the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Home, was Weizmann's great diplomatic achievement and a turning point in modern Jewish history.

Chaim Weizmann (right) stands with U.S. president Harry Truman, holding the Torah, at the White House on 25 May 1948. Weizmann, serving as the president of the New Jewish State of Israel, met with the U.S. president to discuss Palestinian affairs. **© Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

In 1918 Weizmann headed the Zionist Commission, which visited Palestine and established a basis for cooperation with the British military administration there. He led the Zionist delegation to the Paris Peace Conference signalling the end of World War I 1919 and helped to secure confirmation of the British Mandate for Palestine. The terms of this document, which he negotiated in 1920 to 1922, established the legal basis for the Jewish National Home in Palestine. As president of the WZO from 1920 to 1931 and 1935 to 1946, Weizmann championed policies that strengthened the Jewish presence in Palestine without antagonizing the British. He called the alliance between Zionism and Britain the "Rock of Gibraltar" of his policy.

In spite of his diplomatic achievements, Weizmann was disappointed by the slow pace of Zionist development in Palestine in the 1920s. His energy was dissipated in quarrels with other Zionist leaders, in particular Louis D. Brandeis and Vladimir Zeʾev Jabotinsky, as well as in fundraising to meet the chronic financial difficulties of the WZO. Weizmann's Union of General Zionists adopted a moderate, centrist position on most issues. Although he was not a socialist, Weizmann formed an alliance with the more militant socialist-Zionists in Palestine. He promoted pioneer agricultural communities as an effective way of attracting Jews to Palestine.

Increasingly concerned with the need to broaden the basis of the Zionist movement, Weizmann pushed through a proposal in 1929 to include leaders of non-Zionist organizations in the Jewish Agency, the official liaison with British authorities in Palestine. The Palestine riots of 1929 and the subsequent wavering in British support for Zionism led Weizmann to resign in protest from his joint presidency of the WZO and the Jewish Agency, but his skillful lobbying in London induced the prime minister, J. Ramsay MacDonald, to issue a clarifying letter in 1931 that reaffirmed Britain's commitment to the Balfour Declaration. Weizmann failed, however, to be reelected president of the WZO, which was headed from 1931 to 1935 by his close colleague Nahum Sokolow.

Weizmann returned to leadership of the movement in 1935. In the following year he gave powerful evidence to the Palestine Royal Commission, headed by Earl Peel. Weizmann's testimony and his subsequent private discussions with the commission helped bring about its recommendation for the partition of Palestine. In 1937 he succeeded in persuading a majority within a reluctant Zionist Congress to accept partition in principle. But the British government, which had initially approved the concept, changed its mind and in May 1939 issued a White Paper strictly limiting Jewish immigration and land purchase in Palestine.

Britain's shift in policy away from Zionism, and the consequent growth of Zionist hostility to Britain, weakened Weizmann's authority and diminished his stature. After the outbreak of World War II, the Palestinian labor-Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion superseded him as the dominant figure in the movement. By the end of the war Weizmann's paramount influence with the British and within Zionist circles was all but spent. His stern denunciation of Jewish terrorism earned him many enemies in the movement. Weizmann's tenure as president of the WZO ended in 1946, but out of respect for him no successor was named. He remained politically active and helped to persuade U.S. president Harry S. Truman to support the establishment of Israel upon the termination of the British Mandate in 1948. Weizmann served as first president of Israel, but he

was frustrated by the largely ceremonial nature of the position. He lived on the grounds of the scientific institute at Rehovot, which was later named after him, until his death in November 1952.

See also BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917); CHURCHILL, WINSTON S.; HASKALAH; JABOTINSKY, VLADIMIR ZEʾEV; JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE; LLOYD GEORGE, DAVID; PEEL COMMISSION REPORT (1937); SAMUEL, HERBERT LOUIS; SOKOLOW, NAHUM; WHITE PAPERS ON PALESTINE; WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO); ZIONIST COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE.

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BERNARD WASSERSTEIN

WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE

A center of scientific research and graduate study in Israel.

Founded in 1934, the Weizmann Institute of Science is located in Rehovot, Israel. Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a world-renowned chemist, was the first president of the institute and later became Israel's first president. He organized the institute to pursue "pure" science while also dealing with practical problems facing the country and its economy. In the 1930s, Weizmann started work on projects relating to the citrus industry, dairy farming, and medicine. The institute was formally dedicated 2 November 1949.

The Weizmann Institute has nineteen departments grouped into five faculties: biology, biochemistry, chemistry, physics, and mathematics and computer science. It also encompasses several multidisciplinary research centers and institutes. In 2002, 2,500 scientists, technicians, and students were engaged in study and research at the Weizmann Institute.

See also WEIZMANN, CHAIM.

MIRIAM SIMON

WEST BANK

Territory disputed between Israel and the Palestinians, demarcated by the Green Line to the west and the Jordan River to the east.

The West Bank refers to the territory situated west of the Jordan River that was not included as part of Israel following the establishment of the state after the Arab–Israel War of 1948. The West Bank's total area is 2,270 square miles (5,880 sq. km), smaller than the area that was originally allocated to a future Arab state by the United Nations partition resolution of November 1947. It is demarcated by the Green Line (the armistice line set by the 1949 Jordanian-Israeli talks at Rhodes) in the west and the Jordan River in the east.

The West Bank occupies a place in the international consciousness far larger than its geography would suggest. The term acquired greater political significance and only came into common usage after the 1967 Arab-Israel War, when the area was separated from the rest of the Kingdom of Jordan (the East Bank). Many Israelis—and in particular the settlers—use the biblical term "Judea and Samaria" (Hebrew, Yehuda ve Shomron) to describe this region.

King Abdullah I ibn Hussein annexed the area to Jordan in April 1950 but, with only Great Britain and Pakistan recognizing this move, the region has remained without any clear status in international

At an Israeli checkpoint, Palestinians are held back while attempting to cross from Bethlehem into Jerusalem. © SHAUL SCHWARZ/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

MAP BY XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC. THE GALE GROUP.

law. During the 1967 Arab-Israel War, Israel captured the region, occupying it fully until 1994, and parts of it thereafter. Since 1994, parts of the West Bank have been transferred to the Palestinian Authority under the terms of the 1993 Oslo Accord. The region forms the core of a possible future sovereign Palestinian state.

According to international law, Israel has administered the West Bank since June 1967 as a belligerent occupant. On 7 June 1967 Israel's area commander for the West Bank issued a military proclamation declaring the assumption by the Israel Defense Force (IDF) area commander of all governmental, legislative, appointive, and administrative power over the region and its inhabitants. Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank continued until 1995 to be ruled under this system of military government. Municipal governments and village councils administered local services. As the occupying power, Israel both permitted and canceled scheduled elections for local governments and appointed and dismissed elected and appointed Palestinians as officials.

The region has been subject to widespread Israeli settlement activity since 1967. The settlements are administered under a municipal system separate from that of the Palestinian towns and villages. In 1992 the Israeli settlement of Maʿale Adumim, with a population of 15,000, became the first Israeli city in the West Bank.

On 27 June 1967 Israeli law, jurisdiction, and public administration were extended over a 28-square-mile (73 sq. km) area of the West Bank, including the 2.3 square miles (6 sq. km) that had constituted the municipal boundaries of East Jerusalem under Jordanian rule. This de facto annexation placed East Jerusalem and its Palestinian inhabitants under Israeli sovereignty. East Jerusalem is now considered by Israel an indivisible part of its capital city. Palestinians view East Jerusalem as the capital of their future state.

Other cities in the West Bank include Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, and Jericho. The total population of the region in 2003 consisted of some 2 million Palestinians in the West Bank, with a further 180,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Over 200,000 Israeli settlers lived in the West Bank and a further 170,000 Israelis in East Jerusalem.

In 1967 the Palestinian population of the region was largely agricultural, but under Israeli rule many left agriculture to find employment in the Israeli cities as menial laborers. Following the onset of the first intifada in 1987, most of the Palestinians were excluded from the Israeli labor market, giving rise to widespread unemployment and severe poverty. In early 2003 the economic situation of the population was worse than it had ever been since 1967.

In September 1993 the signing of the Oslo Accord marked the beginning of a transition to Palestinian self-rule. The West Bank was divided into Areas A, B, and C, with the Palestinian Authority taking over full administration in Area A, including all of the major urban centers, and partial control in Area B, including most of the Palestinian villages, while Israel retained full control in Area C, including most of the Jordan Valley, the areas in

close proximity to the Green Line boundary, and around Jerusalem. Following the al-Aqsa Intifada, which began in September 2000, the Sharon government sent the IDF to reoccupy some Palestinian towns. The status of the West Bank was still awaiting resolution when a package of proposals, known as the "Road Map," was drawn up and sponsored by "the Quartet"—the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations—in 2003.

See also ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS; PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY.

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GEOFFREY ARONSON
UPDATED BY DAVID NEWMAN

WESTERNIZATION

The relatively uncritical adoption of first European and then North America cultural and sociopolitical attitudes and practices on the part of the non-European and non–North American world.

Westernization is sometimes inaccurately equated with modernization, and by extension with modernization theory, a construct very much in vogue in "development" and foreign aid circles between the 1950s and 1970s. In spite of a certain estrangement in the early modern period, and because of its geographical location, the Middle East never entirely lost the contacts that it had had with Europe in the high Middle Ages. However, the Arab, Iranian, and Turkish world did not experience the European humanist Renaissance, or any equivalent of the European Reformation, and by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had lost most of the preeminence in science and technology that it had enjoyed earlier.

More regular contacts between the West and the Middle East were reestablished at the end of the eighteenth century, partly as a result of Napoleon's expedition to Egypt in 1798, although the Ottoman Empire was probably as much if not more affected by the territorial losses inflicted upon it by Austro-Hungarian and Russian military superiority earlier in the century. By this time, the West was clearly "ahead" in economic, material, political, and scientific terms, so that the relationship became one of dependency, by the Middle Eastern "periphery" on the Western "center." Between 1798 and 1914, much of the region became politically subject to Britain and France (and to a lesser extent to Italy, Russia, and Spain), and the areas that were not directly colonized became part of the "informal empire," that is, part of the orbit of the capitalist West.

In the course of the nineteenth century, many of the states in the region, particularly Egypt, Qajar Iran, the Ottoman Empire, and Tunisia, underwent programs of administrative, educational, judicial, and finally constitutional reform. To some extent these programs reflected pressures from Europe and incorporated deliberate borrowings from European models, but they were also responses to widely felt local needs to achieve greater administrative efficiency and consistency, to reduce arbitrariness and despotism, and to introduce concepts of legal equality and citizenship into public life. Thus the *Hatt-i Şerif* of Gülhane of November 1839, one of the key texts of the Ottoman *Tanzimat* reforms, declares that all Ottoman subjects should have complete security for life, honor, and property, and that they shall be taxed and conscripted fairly and equitably, but also that "these imperial concessions extend to all our subjects, of whatever religion or sect they may be."

The extent and speed of the changes that took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries often introduced considerable confusion into the lives

and thought of those involved. For example, the growing secularism of late nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe has not been easily transposed to the Middle East, with the result that the relationship between Islam and modernity, or the West, has never been satisfactorily worked out. It has proved almost impossible for believing Muslims to apply the same critical-historical methodology to Islamic history as most Christians or Jews would apply to discussions of Christian or Jewish history. At the same time, some Western social attitudes, especially those concerned with consumerism, dress, the consumption of alcohol, and the social mixing of the sexes, have either been vigorously embraced or equally vigorously rejected by Middle Easterners. The Persian author Jalal Al-e Ahmad coined the phrase *Gharbzadagi,* or "Westoxification" to describe this awkward and often disturbing ambiguity. In general, the notion that the Middle East simply copied everything from the West is too simplistic; the reality is far more complex and nuanced.

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PETER SLUGLETT

WESTERN SAHARA

Former Spanish colony in northwest Africa; once called Spanish Sahara.

This area of some 102,700 square miles (266,000 sq km) is bordered by Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and the Atlantic Ocean. It has been the subject of a dispute involving the POLISARIO (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro; Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro) independence movement, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and Libya. In 2003 Western Sahara remained the last colonial territory on the African continent whose political status had not been definitively determined and legitimized by the international community. To rectify this, the United Nations has been attempting since 1986, when the Western Sahara War was still raging, to negotiate and implement a referendum among the inhabitants.

Geography and Population

The Western Sahara territory is part of the Sahara desert and consists of *hammada* (mostly barren rocky plateaus), coarse gravel, and sandy plains. It is extremely arid, receiving an average of less than 2 inches (5.1 cm) of rainfall annually, but rich in natural resources such as phosphates, minerals, and coastal fishing grounds. It is sparsely populated—Spain's 1974 census counted 73,497 persons, which was probably an underestimate; a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency publication placed the 1991 population at 196,737, including, presumably, the tens of thousands of Moroccans who have settled there since 1976. The annual growth rate was put at 2.6 percent. The capital is Laayoune (El-Aiun or al-Ayun).

The indigenous Sahrawi population is a mixture of Berber tribes (whose presence in the region dates from at least the first century B.C.E.) and thirteenth-century Arab migrants from southern Arabia. Until the twentieth century, social organization was tribal, along the lines of confederations, factions, and subfactions. Linguistically, the Hasaniyya dialect of Arabic, brought by the Arabian tribes, gradually supplanted Berber dialects. Economically and socially, the tribes were entirely nomadic. Calling themselves the "sons of the clouds," the Sahrawis roamed constantly in search of grazing land and water for their herds, traded with neighboring sedentary groups, engaged in livestock raiding from one another, and participated in the trans-Saharan caravan trade. Since the nineteenth century, the Reguibat have been the largest tribal grouping.

The nomadic way of life did not fit comfortably with European-introduced notions of fixed terri-

torial delimitations. When coupled with twentieth-century events—prolonged droughts, fighting against French and Spanish colonialism, gradual sedentarization, economic change, and, finally, the outbreak of war following Spain's departure—probably as many Sahrawis came to live in neighboring countries (whose boundaries were themselves of twentieth-century origin) as within Western Sahara.

Political History

The political status of the area was rarely defined, since it belonged to what is known in Moroccan history as *bilad al-siba,* the lands of dissidence, as opposed to *bilad al-makhzan,* the areas of central, sultanic authority. (Ironically, the Almoravid Empire, the first dynasty to unite Morocco during the eleventh century, originated in Western Sahara and Mauritania.) Political linkages and affiliations with Moroccan sultans in the north varied, depending on the relative strength of the sultan and the various tribes, the relations between individual tribes and the government in the north, and relations among the tribes themselves.

Spain proclaimed a protectorate over part of the region in 1884. The Moroccan nationalist movement, which first emerged in the 1930s, claimed the area as part of its natural patrimony (along with Mauritania and parts of Algeria and Mali as well). The area's status was changed by Spain in 1958 from colony to overseas province. From the late 1950s, the newly emerging state of Mauritania also claimed it, partly to deflect Morocco's threat against Mauritania itself. POLISARIO's emergence in 1973 linked for the first time the notions of decolonization and independence for the territory, setting the stage for conflict. Spain agreed to relinquish the area in 1975, and it was divided between the two neighboring claimants, Mauritania and Morocco. Mauritania gave up its claim in 1979. Morocco has occupied the bulk of the territory since then.

In 1976, the POLISARIO established the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and organized a government-in-exile. During the following years, with Algeria's support, dozens of states, mainly developing and nonaligned countries, recognized the republic. After war broke out between Morocco and the POLISARIO, between 50,000 and 150,000 Sahrawi refugees fled to the Algerian Tindouf region, and as of 2003 remained there under the administration of the POLISARIO.

King Muhammad VI visited Western Sahara in 2001 to reassert Moroccan authority in the region. Morocco has occupied most of the disputed territory since Mauritania relinquished its claim on the southern portion in 1979. **© AP/Wideworld Photos. Reproduced by permission.**

From the mid-1970s on, in his effort to fully integrate the Saharan provinces into Morocco, King Hassan II launched investment projects aimed at promoting the economic development of the territory and attracted settlement with special incentives. Civilian and military expenditures related to Western Sahara represented a considerable burden for Morocco's state budget, particularly from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s.

Morocco's claim over the Saharan territory helped King Hassan II build a national consensus in a period of internal instability. At the regional level, however, it has severely affected Moroccan relations with neighboring Algeria, which was a staunch supporter of the Sahrawis' right to self-determination. Consequently, the process of regional integration, which had been inaugurated with great fanfare in 1989 with the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), remained stalled as of 2003.

Toward a Negotiated Settlement

It was not until 1991 that the parties officially accepted a UN-sponsored ceasefire, allowing it to set up MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara). Besides monitoring the ceasefire, the objective of this UN mission was to prepare a list of people eligible to vote in the referendum on self-determination, which it would oversee, that would put an end to the conflict. According to the original settlement plan, the referendum should have taken place in 1992. Morocco and the POLISARIO, however, disagreed over voter eligibility criteria.

The situation remained deadlocked until 1997, when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in an attempt to break the stalemate, appointed former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker as his personal envoy to try to settle the differences between the parties in conflict. After four rounds of negotiations, Baker managed to get an agreement between Morocco and the POLISARIO to resume the voter identification process, as well as a code of conduct to govern the parties during the referendum campaign.

However, the voter identification process still encountered serious difficulties, forcing continued postponement of the referendum and a continued presence for MINURSO in the disputed territories. When in early 2000 the UN mission finally made public the official list of voters, Morocco expressed its disagreement because a low percentage of its proposed candidates was accepted. The ensuing appeals process again delayed the referendum. The UN secretary-general subsequently concluded that the settlement plan was not a viable solution and suggested exploring other ways of ending the dispute.

Overall, the incompatibility of Morocco's discourse on territorial integrity and the POLISARIO's defense of the Sahrawi right to self-determination, coupled with geopolitical developments, had, as of 2003, left the dispute unresolved. Baker's latest UN-sponsored plan was to establish a transitional autonomous regime over a period of five years, at the end of which a referendum on self-determination would be scheduled. Participation was to include at least some of the Moroccans who had settled in the area. After considerable Algerian prodding, POLISARIO accepted the plan. Morocco, however, rejected the idea, fearing that its claim to sovereignty would be undermined.

See also BAKER, JAMES A.; POLISARIO; WESTERN SAHARA WAR.

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BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMAN
UPDATED BY ANA TORRES-GARCIA

WESTERN SAHARA WAR

Conflict over control of Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony in northwest Africa.

Contention over the control of Western Sahara began on the eve of Spain's withdrawal in February 1976. The main protagonists were Morocco, which claimed the territory as an integral part of its historical patrimony, and the Algerian-backed POLISARIO independence movement. Algeria's patronage of POLISARIO was rooted in its larger geopolitical and ideological clash with Morocco. The dispute poisoned their bilateral relations and for a time held out the specter of Algerian–Moroccan fighting. Mauritania, the weakest of the states bordering Western Sahara, initially occupied part of the territory as well but was forced to disengage and then maintain a vulnerable neutrality.

Internationally, both the United States and France had strong strategic, political, and economic interests in North Africa. The conflict did not become an arena for Cold War competition because the Soviet Union adopted a low, pragmatic profile. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was actively involved in attempting to mediate the dispute between 1976 and 1981 but then became an additional arena for it, resulting in temporary organizational paralysis. Beginning in the late 1980s, successive UN secretaries-general energetically pro-

moted a diplomatic solution, albeit without success, as of 2003.

Outbreak of War

The parameters of the conflict took shape in the fall of 1975. The International Court of Justice issued an advisory ruling regarding the legal status of the territory that was ambiguous, but tilted away from Morocco's position. In response, Morocco's King Hassan II seized the initiative by dispatching hundreds of thousands of unarmed Moroccans in a great spectacle of nationalist and religious fervor across the Moroccan–Spanish Sahara frontier. This "Green March" catalyzed the transfer of Spanish control of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania, enshrined in the tripartite Madrid Accords of 14 November 1975. Spain's formal termination of control came on 26 February 1976. Moroccan troops immediately completed their takeover of the northern two-thirds of Western Sahara, and Mauritania took the southern third.

Meanwhile, fighting had already begun between Moroccan forces and POLISARIO units. On one occasion, Algerian forces assisting POLISARIO clashed with Moroccan troops. Concurrently, there was a large-scale civilian exodus (35–65% of the population) to camps in the Tindouf region of Algeria.

Militarily, POLISARIO's small units could not hope to block Morocco's advance. POLISARIO thus redirected its military efforts to focus on Mauritania, the weaker of its adversaries. Between 1976 and 1979, POLISARIO attacks helped to destabilize the regime of President Mokhtar Ould Daddah, who was overthrown in July 1978. After renewed pressure, the new Mauritanian military junta agreed in August 1979 to cede their portion of Western Sahara, Tiris al-Gharbia, to POLISARIO. However, the Moroccan army immediately preempted POLISARIO and took control itself.

The next few years witnessed fierce fighting. Morocco was on the defensive against highly motivated and tactically superior POLISARIO mobile units, which conducted a war of attrition against Moroccan forces within Western Sahara and southern Morocco. POLISARIO's goal was to render the economic and political cost too great for Morocco to bear. Morocco responded by tripling the size of its armed forces to approximately 150,000, stationing more than half of them in Western Sahara, and conducting large-scale sweeps of its own. It also threatened to invoke, but never implemented, the right of hot pursuit against POLISARIO sanctuaries situated in both Algeria and Mauritania.

In the fall of 1980 Morocco began constructing a system of defensive sand walls (berms) studded with fortified positions, observation points, and early warning equipment. By 1987 the sixth wall was completed, the network ran over 2,000 miles in length, and POLISARIO had been effectively closed off from 80 percent of the territory. No longer could its Land Rovers traverse the trackless territory from Algeria to the Atlantic; POLISARIO was increasingly limited to sporadic raids along the wall. Concurrently, Morocco poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the region, building schools, hospitals, and telecommunications facilities, staffed by tens of thousands of Moroccan civilians. Morocco's consolidation of its presence was made possible by generous military and civilian aid from France, the United States, and Saudi Arabia.

Whereas POLISARIO's military fortunes declined by the mid-1980s, politically it achieved a number of successes: diplomatic recognition from more than seventy countries for its government in exile, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), and full membership in the OAU. On the other hand, Algeria gradually reduced its aid to POLISARIO and retired to a mere supporting role for the UN secretary-general's renewed diplomatic efforts. The overall result by the late 1980s was a stalemated conflict, with neither side able to impose its will. By the beginning of 1990 POLISARIO was almost completely dependent on the UN-sponsored process. As of 2003 more than ten countries had withdrawn their earlier diplomatic recognition of SADR.

During the first years of the conflict POLISARIO had believed that time was on its side, and therefore refused to countenance any solution that fell short of full independence. King Hassan II, for his part, had staked his throne on the issue, making it the glue by which he consolidated and reinforced his political authority at home. Strategically, he never wavered in his goal to incorporate Western Sahara into his kingdom. Tactically, he showed great

A refugee camp, located at Polisario, houses 40,000 Sahrawi refugees. These people seek protection after having been displaced from their homes during the Western Sahara War. © NOGUES ALAIN/CORBIS SYGMA. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

flexibility and skill. For example, in 1981, operating from a position of relative weakness, he demonstratively accepted the principle of a referendum among the Sahrawi population during an OAU summit at Nairobi and thus bought much-needed time. By 1990, while still negotiating the details of the proposed UN-sponsored referendum, Morocco was operating from a position of strength, as regional and international constellations had shifted in its favor.

UN Efforts at Diplomacy

In April 1991 the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of a combined military and civilian force, the United Nations Mission for t he Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO), to organize and implement a referendum process between September 1991 and January 1992. Eligible Sahrawis were to choose between independence for the territory, necessitating immediate Moroccan withdrawal, and union with Morocco, necessitating the disbanding of POLISARIO. The 6 September 1991 cease-fire called for in the UN plan came into effect, but the timetable for full deployment of MINURSO and implementation of the referendum was repeatedly delayed. This was due to continuing disagreement over the question of voter eligibility. The Spanish census of 1974 served as the basis for the voter registration list—numbering around 74,000—prepared by UN officials. Morocco, however, insisted on major changes to include up to 150,000 persons who it said belonged to Western Saharan tribes but had migrated north during previous decades for economic or political reasons. POLISARIO wanted small-scale modifications to include more of its supporters.

The efforts of the UN secretary-general's personal representative, former U.S. secretary of state James Baker, generated renewed diplomatic momentum. In 1997 Baker hosted four separate

rounds of talks between Moroccan and POLISARIO representatives, the last in Houston, Texas in September. A number of outstanding issues pertinent to the organization of the referendum were resolved, and the laborious process of identifying eligible voters was reinvigorated. However, by the beginning of 2000, hopes for holding the long-delayed referendum faded. The provisional list of eligible voters was approximately 90,000 only, while 140,000 other applicants, nearly all from the Moroccan side, had been rejected. Morocco, fearing electoral defeat, was determined to block the referendum and therefore insisted on appealing the rejections, a lengthy process that would take years. The UN Security Council, led by France and the United States, was unwilling to force Morocco to accept a UN *diktat.* Consequently, Baker floated variations of an old-new "third way" proposal that would bypass the referendum and create an autonomous Saharan entity federated to Morocco in all or part of the territory, or, alternatively, postpone the issue of sovereignty for anywhere between five and thirty years. The protagonists continued to meet periodically under Baker's good offices and even engaged in occasional confidence-building measures such as the release of prisoners of war. But as of 2003 a solution remained out of reach. SADR's political successes internationally had not paved the way to independence, marking a major departure from prevailing patterns of decolonization in developing nations. Morocco still desired de jure legitimation of its incorporation of Western Sahara, but its de facto rule there seemed to be accepted as unalterable by a large portion of the international community. The unresolved question continued to be the single most divisive issue between Morocco and Algeria.

See also Baker, James A.; Daddah, Mokhtar Ould; Green March; Organization of African Unity (OAU); Western Sahara.

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

WESTERN WALL

The extant part of the retaining wall surrounding the Temple of Solomon; a Jerusalem landmark and a holy prayer site for Jews.

The Hebrew Ha-Kotel Ha-Maʿaravi refers to the western retaining wall surrounding Jerusalem's Temple Mount. Sometimes called the "Wailing Wall," since Jews pray and cry near it, it is built of large limestones hewn for the Second Temple, which was enlarged during the reign of Herod (37–4 B.C.E.), king of Judea. It was destroyed by the Romans in 70 C.E.

Since then, the remaining wall has stood as a reminder and symbol of lost glory and the redemption to come; Jews turn toward it when they pray. By tradition, notes to heaven are placed in its cracks. During the British mandate, Jews had limited access in bringing religious appurtenances, which had to adhere to certain rules (e.g., using a curtain to separate men and women) or else were banned. During Jordanian rule, Jews' access to the wall was denied. After the reunification of Jerusalem in 1967, the area was excavated and became again a place of public prayer and assembly. The surrounding plaza is also the site of many national assemblies and civil religious events.

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SAMUEL C. HEILMAN

WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES

A September 1928 dispute over Jewish religious rights at the Western Wall that led to political violence in August 1929.

The Western, or Wailing, Wall has been holy to Muslims because it is the western part of the Temple Mount and Haram al-Sharif where, Muslims believe, the prophet Muhammad tethered his "fabulous steed," al-Buraq, while on a nocturnal journey to heaven. The wall is also the holiest shrine of Judaism because it is the remnant of the western exterior of the Temple of Herod, built on the site of Solomon's temple. Jews placed a screen at the wall to separate men and women on 23 September 1928, the eve of the Day of Atonement. The Palestinians protested that the screen violated the status quo ante; the British authorities agreed and forcibly removed it. The incident was politicized by both communities over the next few months, a response that led to tensions and events such as a Revisionist Zionist demonstration on 15 August 1929 and a Palestinian counterdemonstration the following day.

Violence began in Jerusalem on 23 August when Palestinians attacked Jews in Meah Sheʿarim. The rioters attacked the largely non-Zionist religious communities of Hebron and Safed, killing sixty-four and twenty-six people, respectively. Jewish rioters in turn killed Palestinians in a number of cities, but most were shot—some of them indiscriminately—by British troops and police suppressing the disturbances. The violence took the lives of 133 Jews and at least 116 Palestinians.

The Shaw Commission, which investigated the disturbances, determined that the immediate cause of the riots was the Jewish and Arab demonstrations of 15 and 16 August and that the ultimate cause was Palestinian fear that Jewish immigration and land purchase would lead to Jewish domination.

See also HARAM AL-SHARIF; SHAW COMMISSION; WESTERN WALL.

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PHILIP MATTAR

WEST GERMAN REPARATIONS AGREEMENT

Accord with Israel following World War II.

In September 1945 Chaim Weizmann, on behalf of the Jewish Agency, asked the governments that occupied Germany at the end of World War II—the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France—to secure financial compensation for the Jewish people.

On 10 September 1952 the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) agreed to pay 3.45 billion German marks ($845 million) in the form of goods to Israel, in installments between 1953 and 1966. The Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany was to allocate 450 million marks ($110 million). Thirty percent of the funds were allocated for the purchase of oil in the United Kingdom and 70 percent for goods bought directly by the Israeli government. These funds played an important role in the development of Israel's economy in the 1950s.

The agreement was the result of an Israeli claim for US$1 billion in compensation from West Germany (and a claim for $500 million from East Germany, which was never submitted because the powers occupying Germany refused to deal with the claim) to cover the cost of absorbing 500,000 victims of Nazi persecution, estimated at US$3,000 each.

The signing of the agreement led to serious political divisions in Israel; riots broke out on 7 to 9 January 1952 in Jerusalem outside the Knesset. The government favored a pragmatic policy toward Germany that would bring much-needed foreign currency to Israel; the opposition, led by Menachem

Begin, was ideologically opposed to reconciliation with Germany.

See also GERMANY AND THE MIDDLE EAST; WEIZMANN, CHAIM.

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PAUL RIVLIN

WHEELUS AIR FORCE BASE

U.S. Air Force base located near Tripoli, Libya.

Wheelus was established as an American military installation in 1954. In return for base rights, the regime of King Idris received military assistance grants and the right to purchase excess stocks of U.S. weapons.

In 1964, Arab nationalism and anti-Western sentiment forced King Idris to call for a withdrawal of Britain's and America's forces. Following the overthrow of Idris in 1969, the United States completed its planned withdrawal and turned the facility over to Libya on 11 June 1970. Libyan pilots subsequently trained there under the guidance of French instructors. Since 1970, 11 June has been a national holiday in Libya.

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STUART J. BORSCH

WHITE FLAG LEAGUE

Sudanese nationalist movement founded in 1924.

Ali Abd al-Latif founded the White Flag League when the Sudan was governed by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement. The group consisted of about 150 minor officials and junior officers in the Egyptian army. Representing an alliance of Sudanese and Egyptian nationalists, it advocated the union of the entire Nile valley under the Egyptian crown.

The White Flag League was largely responsible for the 1924 revolt against the British. Events reached a crisis following the assassination of Sir Lee Stack in Cairo; Britain's Field Marshal Edmund Allenby demanded the immediate withdrawal of Egyptian units from the Sudan. Refusing to obey the order to evacuate, the Egyptian and Sudanese league troops mutinied in Khartoum. When Egypt ordered its units to withdraw, however, they complied. The Sudanese were left to confront the British on their own; their defeat marked the end of the revolt and also that of the White Flag League.

See also CONDOMINIUM AGREEMENT (1899).

KENNETH S. MAYERS

WHITE PAPERS ON PALESTINE

British policy statements about mandatory Palestine issued from 1922 to 1939.

The British government, which ruled Palestine from 1917/1918 to 1948 under a League of Nations mandate, issued periodic policy statements called white papers that related to the tensions and recurring violence between the Arab and Jewish communities there.

Two precursors to the series of white papers on Palestine were the Palin Commission Report (1 July 1920) and Haycraft Report (Command 1540, 21 October 1921), which concluded that the Palestinian Arabs' feelings of "hostility to the Jews were due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration and with their conception of Zionist policy" as leading to a Jewish state in which Palestinians would be subjugated.

Subsequently, the Churchill White Paper of June 1922 (Command 1700) attempted to placate both communities. It stated that the Jewish national home existed by right, but that the Palestinians should not be subordinated to the Jewish community. It declared that all Palestinians were equal before the

law and described the Jewish national home as simply "a center in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride." Jews would have the right to immigrate to Palestine, but their immigration must not exceed "the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals." Moreover, London aimed to establish full self-government in Palestine in "gradual stages" and would hold elections for a legislative council. The white paper thus reassured Arabs that they would have a political role and that Jewish im migration would be limited. Nonetheless, the Arab Executive objected to the reaffirmation of the Balfour Declaration (1917), which had supported the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine, and rejected the legislative council as not guaranteeing majority rights. The World Zionist Organization criticized the limits on immigration and the proposed legislative council, which it wanted to postpone until the Jewish population was larger.

The colonial secretary issued the next white paper (Command 3229) on 19 November 1928, as Muslim-Jewish tension escalated over mutual claims at the Western (Wailing) Wall in Jerusalem. The white paper affirmed that no benches or screens could be brought to the wall by Jews, since they had not been allowed during Ottoman rule. Tension escalated, leading to Palestinian attacks against Jews at the wall and in several other towns in August 1929.

Four white papers issued in 1930 tried to defuse the conflict. The Shaw Commission of Inquiry (Command 3530, 30 March 1930) found that Jewish immigration and land purchases were immediate causes of "the Arab feeling of disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future," and that these were the underlying causes of the violence. The report declared that the government must issue clear statements safeguarding Arab rights and regulating Jewish immigration and land purchase. Another white paper (Command 3682, 27 May 1930) reaffirmed those findings, welcomed an investigation by an international commission of the conflicting claims to the Western Wall, and recommended appointing a special commission to assess the problems facing landless Palestinian peasants and the prospects for expanded agricultural cultivation.

Sir John Hope-Simpson's report, dated 30 August 1930 (Command 3686), was published simultaneously with the Passfield White Paper (Command 3692) of 21 October 1930. Hope-Simpson recommended a drastic reduction in the volume of Jewish immigration because of insufficient cultivable Palestinian land and widespread Palestinian unemployment. He criticized the Jewish National Fund, the Zionist Organization's land-purchasing agency, for forbidding Jews from reselling land to Arabs and banning Arab laborers on Jewish farms. The white paper concurred that stricter controls should be placed on Jewish immigration and land purchase, and asserted—for the first time—that the British government had obligations "of equal weight" to both communities and that it must renew the effort to establish the legislative council proposed in 1922.

The Arab Executive was pleased with these British policy recommendations because they acknowledged Arab concerns. But Chaim Weizmann, head of the Jewish Agency, resigned in protest when the Passfield White Paper was issued. London then backtracked. Zionist officials helped to draft a letter, signed by Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, to Weizmann on 14 February 1931 that expunged all damaging aspects of the Passfield White Paper and upheld the primacy of the government's promises to the Jewish community. Mollified, Weizmann withdrew his resignation, but the MacDonald "Black Letter," as it became known, infuriated the Arabs.

The white paper of 17 May 1939 (Command 6019) followed three years of Arab rebellion. The Peel Commission had recommended on 7 July 1937 that territorial partition between Arab and Jewish states was the only solution because Arab and Jewish aspirations were irreconcilable. Nonetheless, the Woodhead Partition Commission concluded on 9 November 1938 that partition was not feasible. The British government then convened the London Conference, which brought together the Jewish Agency, Arab governments, and Palestinian Arabs in lengthy but fruitless discussions. Afterwards, London issued a white paper that repudiated partition and proposed to create self-governing institutions over a ten-year period. Authority over the eventual independent state would be shared by its Arab and Jewish citizens. The white paper limited Jewish immigration to 75,000 over five years; sub-

sequent immigration would require Arab approval. Jews' purchase of land would be limited in some parts of Palestine and forbidden in others.

Jewish and Palestinian Arab nationalisms were too intense and too antagonistic for this plan to succeed. The Zionists viewed the Balfour Declaration as a pledge to establish a Jewish state. When the white paper of 1939 withdrew the Peel Commission's partition proposal, their reaction was strongly hostile, particularly because the restrictions on immigration occurred just as Jews sought to flee Nazi persecution in Europe. Palestinians were relieved that London had set aside partition and would restrict Jewish immigration and land purchase, but were skeptical that London would fulfill its pledges. The MacDonald white paper remained mostly unimplemented, apart from the enforcement of immigration restrictions.

See also CHURCHILL WHITE PAPER (1922); HAYCRAFT COMMISSION (1921); MACDONALD, RAMSAY; PALIN COMMISSION REPORT (1920).

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ANN M. LESCH

WHITE REVOLUTION (1961–1963)

Program of reforms initiated by the shah of Iran in 1963.

Iran's ruler, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1941–1979), in January 1963 launched a series of reform policies that he called the White Revolution. The domestic aim was to undermine the political appeal of an influential but diffuse opposition movement by appropriating programs such as land tenure reform that it long had advocated. There also was an international objective: to win favor with Iran's principal foreign ally, the United States, which then was a major source of economic and military assistance. During the administration of John F. Kennedy (1961–1963), U.S. policy supported economic and social reforms in countries such as Iran as a means of undercutting the appeal of antiregime movements that were perceived as being allied with the Soviet Union. Thus the major element of the shah's White Revolution was a land reform program (actually begun a year earlier) that eventually would redistribute about one-half of private agricultural land to peasants holding traditional sharecropping rights (approximately one-half of all village families).

Five other programs also comprised the White Revolution at its outset. These included the nationalization of forests; sales of shares in (some) government-owned industries; plans for workers to share in profits of large factories; voting rights for women; and the formation within the army of a literacy corps of draftees assigned to villages as teachers. Later, the literacy corps model was extended to a health corps (for draftees who had college-level training in medicine) and a development corps (for college graduate draftees). By the mid-1970s the White Revolution comprised a total of eighteen programs.

The results of the White Revolution were mixed. On the positive side, about half a million peasants obtained adequate land under the land reform program to engage in profitable farming, primary schools were established in several hundred villages that previously had none, and small towns and rural areas benefited from various government development initiatives. On the negative side, perhaps the most serious deficiency of the White Revolution was the raising of popular expectations that remained unfulfilled. With respect to land reform, for example, one-half of all rural families received no land at all; among those obtaining land, about 73 percent got less than six hectares, an amount sufficient only for subsistence farming. The net result was the creation of widespread disillusionment in villages. This pattern—some benefits accruing to a minority but overall disappointment for the majority—characterized many of the White Revolution programs by the early 1970s. At the same time, a class devoted to the White Revolution became part of the

required curriculum in Iran's high schools. Criticism of the White Revolution—or any other policy of the shah—came to be regarded as a punishable political offense. As expressing praise for the White Revolution came to be associated with professing loyalty to the shah's regime, and, conversely, criticizing it came to be associated with opposition, any objective assessment of its actual achievements and failings in the years leading up to the 1979 Iranian Revolution became virtually impossible.

See also Iranian Revolution (1979); Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Land Reform; Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza.

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Eric Hooglund

WIFAQ, AL-

An organization formed in Morocco to cultivate Muslim–Jewish relations.

Al-Wifaq (French, *Entente*) was an organization founded under the aegis of the Istiqlal Party in Rabat in January 1956 to promote Muslim–Jewish rapprochement on the eve of Moroccan independence. The organizers included a number of Moroccan Jewish political activists, among them Marc Sabah, a protégé of Mehdi Ben Barka, and Albert Aflalo, Sabah's nephew and an employee of the U.S. embassy.

The movement enjoyed little success because of the indifference of the Muslim elite, the apprehensions of the Jewish community at large, and increased tensions caused by events in the Middle East.

See also Ben Barka, Mehdi; Istiqlal Party: Morocco.

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Norman Stillman

WIJDAN

See Ali, Wijdan

WILLIAM FOXWELL ALBRIGHT INSTITUTE FOR ARCHEOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN JERUSALEM

See Archaeology in the Middle East

WILSON, ARNOLD T.

[1884–1940]

British soldier, explorer, colonial administrator, oil company executive, author, and politician.

Sir Arnold Talbot Wilson spent the first part of his career in the Persian/Arabian Gulf and Mesopotamia (now Iraq), transferring from the Indian Army to the Indian Political Department in 1909. He was British consul in various parts of southwest Persia (now Iran) between 1907 and 1914 and carried out the earliest cartographic surveys of the area *(South-West Persia: A Political Officer's Diary, 1940).* He was also a member of the commission to delineate the frontier between the Ottoman Empire and Persia in 1913–1914.

For most of the next six years, Wilson was an administrator in Mesopotamia, first as deputy chief political officer to the Indian Expeditionary Force, then as deputy civil commissioner, serving under Sir Percy Cox in both capacities. In Cox's absence in Tehran between 1918 and October 1920, Wilson was appointed acting civil commissioner in Mesopotamia and the crown's political resident in the Gulf. Comparatively young for such responsibilities, Wilson proved an energetic and tireless administrator and inspired intense loyalty in his subordinates (although not in the Civil Commission's oriental secretary, Gertrude Bell). Nevertheless, a combination of temperament and political inclinations made it difficult for him to accept that Britain could not continue to exercise direct colonial control over Iraq as part of any postwar settlement. His refusal to make any concessions to nationalist sentiment was an important, though by no means the only, factor in precipitating the Iraqi revolution against British rule in the summer and autumn of 1920.

Wilson resigned from his post in Baghdad just before Cox's return to the city in October 1920 and spent the next twelve years working for the Anglo–Persian Oil Company, first in Persia and then in London. He was elected to Parliament as a Conservative in 1933 and 1935 and chaired several parlia-

mentary committees. He published two books about his experiences in Iraq (*Loyalties: Mesopotamia, 1914–1917* [1930] and *Mesopotamia, 1917–1920: A Clash of Loyalties* [1931]). They were colored by his anger at what he saw as the failings of British policy and perhaps as the betrayal of his own ideals.

See also ANGLO–IRANIAN OIL COMPANY; BELL, GERTRUDE; COX, PERCY.

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PETER SLUGLETT

WILSON, WOODROW

[1856–1924]

U.S. president, 1913–1921.

Woodrow Wilson led the United States into World War I with his Fourteen Points as war aims. Among them was the promise of self-determination for the peoples of enemy states, including the Ottoman Empire. Self-determination reflected American idealism, but it conflicted with the imperial ambitions of Britain and France, the nation's wartime allies.

At the Paris Peace Conference held in 1919, the Hashimite leaders of Arabia sought a sovereign Arab state (including Palestine). This had been promised to them by the British in return for their revolt against the Turks. This state was supported by U.S. Protestant missionaries who had been resident for decades in the Ottoman territories. Also, the leaders of the Zionist movement sought access to Palestine for Jewish immigration based on a promise (the Balfour Declaration) made to them by the British in return for wartime support.

President Wilson led the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. There he came under pressure from both Zionists and those supporting an Arab state. One result of this situation was the creation of the King-Crane Commission, the mission of which was to determine the popular will of the people of "Greater Syria." At the same time the president came under pressure to modify his support for self-determination so as to accommodate the imperial designs of his allies. The compromise realized here was a "mandate system" under the auspices of the League of Nations. It was Wilson's belief in the "backward" nature of non-European populations that allowed him to accept the mandate system. The King-Crane Commission report was shelved, leaving imperialism triumphant in the guise of mandates.

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ZACHARY KARABELL
UPDATED BY LAWRENCE DAVIDSON

WINGATE, CHARLES ORDE

[1903–1944]

British military officer who supported Zionism.

A Scot fluent in Arabic, Charles Orde Wingate was sent to Palestine in 1936 as an intelligence officer in the British army, where he translated his Protestant millenarian sentiments into support for Zionism. Ordered by the commander of British forces in Palestine, General Sir Archibald Wavell, to train mixed British and Zionist units in night fighting and guerrilla tactics during the Arab revolt (1936–1939), Wingate implemented the doctrine of "active defense." His "special night squads" were organized to protect the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline. They inflicted casualties on the rebels and attacked guerrilla villages in Syria and Lebanon.

Heroic to the Zionists and ruthless to the Arabs, Wingate's actions appeared to cement a British–Zionist alliance. Wingate was removed from Palestine in 1939 by the British, who considered his Zionist sympathies an embarrassment. During World War II he served as a brigadier in Ethiopia and Burma. He died in an airplane crash in Burma.

See also IRAQ PETROLEUM COMPANY (IPC); PALESTINE ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939); WAVELL, ARCHIBALD PERCIVAL.

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REEVA S. SIMON

WINGATE, REGINALD

[1861–1953]

Sirdar (commander in chief) and governor-general of the Sudan, 1899–1916; high commissioner in Egypt, 1916–1919.

Sir Francis Reginald Wingate was educated at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, England, and attained the rank of general in the British army. He served in India and participated as director of military intelligence in the campaign led by Lord Kitchener to conquer the Sudan (1896–1898).

During his seventeen-year term as governor-general of the Sudan, Wingate, who spoke Arabic and had detailed knowledge of the country, earned a reputation for competence and hard work. He was an ardent supporter of the Arab Revolt (1916) during World War I and consistently urged additional British monetary and military aid for the effort. In 1916, he was appointed high commissioner in Egypt.

With his extensive knowledge of the country, Wingate recognized the rise of Egyptian nationalism, caused in part by increased British military presence and controls during the war. Even before it ended, he advised the British Foreign Office and the British government to make some conciliatory gestures toward Egyptian nationalist feelings. After meeting with the nationalist delegation (Arabic, *wafd*), in November 1918, Wingate recommended that Wafd members be allowed to travel to London for direct negotiations; but Wingate lacked sufficient influence, and his recommendations were curtly rebuffed.

In the face of mounting violence and nationalist demonstrations in Egypt, Wingate was hastily removed from office while vacationing in Britain in 1919; he was replaced by the popular war hero Field Marshal Viscount Edmund Allenby.

See also ALLENBY, EDMUND HENRY; ARAB REVOLT (1916); KITCHENER, HORATIO HERBERT; WAFD.

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JANICE J. TERRY

WISE, STEPHEN S.

[1874–1949]

U.S. Jewish leader.

Stephen S. Wise was born in Hungary and was brought to the United States as a small child. He received rabbinical training from Adolf Jellinek in Vienna and earned a doctorate at Columbia University. At the turn of the century, Wise was among a handful of card-carrying Zionists in the United States. In 1898 he served as a delegate to the Second Zionist Congress and subsequently helped to establish the Federation of American Zionists (later renamed the Zionist Organization of America [ZOA]). In 1907 Wise founded the Free Synagogue in New York City. Thereafter, his political activity brought him into close contact with U.S. Progressives and the left wing of the Democratic party. He developed close ties to Woodrow Wilson, Louis D. Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Wise's public activity included the cofounding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (1909); the establishment of the American Jewish Congress during World War I; securing U.S. support for the Balfour Declaration of 1917; serving as a Zionist spokesman at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I; cofounding the American Civil Liberties Union (1920); leading the ZOA, the United Palestine Appeal, and the American Zionist Emergency Council during the 1930s and 1940s; founding the Jewish Institute of Religion (1922); creating the U.S. anti-Nazi boycott of the 1930s and the World Jewish Congress (1936); and co-founding the American Jewish Conference (1943).

During World War II, Wise emerged as a champion of Roosevelt's wartime strategy. At Roosevelt's request, he even suppressed initial reports of the Holocaust. Wise's stance conflicted with Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, a right-wing U.S. Jewish leader who advocated Zionist militancy and immediate U.S. intervention on behalf of European Jewry. In 1943 the Wise-Silver clash reached a climax, and Silver displaced Wise as American Zionism's undisputed leader.

See also Silver, Abba Hillel.

Mark Raider

WIZO

See Women's International Zionist Organization

WOLFF, HENRY DRUMMOND

[1830–1908]

British mission head who gained economic concessions from Iran.

Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was the head of a special British mission sent to Iran (then Persia) after 1881, when, under a conservative government, the British started actively to support concessions. He was instrumental in obtaining important economic and financial concessions from the Persian government and was sent to Persia in 1888 as British envoy. As a result of Wolff's pressure, the Qajar dynasty monarch, Naser al-Din Shah, opened Persia's only navigable river, the Karun, to international navigation. Wolff, with Baron Julius de Reuter's son, was instrumental in settling claims to the Reuter Concession obtained in 1872. One concession granted by Persia was the right to establish a national bank, the Imperial Bank of Persia, which gave the concessionaires exclusive rights to issue bank notes and other negotiable papers. In 1890, Wolff obtained from the shah for British financiers a monopoly over the production, sale, and export of Iranian tobacco. This concession triggered one of the first successful mass demonstrations in the modern history of Iran, the Tobacco Revolt, and so the concession was abandoned.

See also Tobacco Revolt.

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Parvaneh Pourshariati

WOMEN AND FAMILY AFFAIRS CENTER

An independent Palestinian women's organization.

In 1988, empowered by the Palestinian women's movement during the first Intifada, the Women's Affairs Center was established at the initiative of the novelist Sahar Khalifa. Other independent women's organizations followed, staying outside the control of Palestinian political parties. The center's founding committee included Rita Giacaman, Rema Hammami, Islah Jad, Sahar Khalifa, and Amal Nashashibi. The board include some prominent educated women, mainly from Nablus city. The center was established as a women's research and training organization. In 1991, it opened a branch under the same name in Gaza City. In 1994, the steering committee formally separated the two centers and the Nablus center became the Women and Family Affairs Center. Another branch was opened in Amman (Jordan) but did not last long. The center produced a few issues of a journal, *Women's Affairs,* before it ceased publication. The center works to promote women's rights and gender equality within Palestinian society, and its main mandate is in the city of Nablus. It has no relations with Israelis. It focuses on training and advocacy to promote women's rights. It is difficult to measure the impact of its efforts due to the political instability of the times. The center coordinates some of its activities with other nongovernmental organizations in Nablus, but it has no formal links with the Palestinian Authority and depends on external funding.

See also Gaza Strip; Gender: Gender and Education; Intifada (1987–1991); Oslo Accord (1993); Palestine; Palestinian Authority; West Bank.

Islah Jad

WOMEN IN BLACK

Israeli movement in support of the first Intifada (1987–1991), promoting a network of women's peace activities in Israel, the Occupied Territories, and the world.

In 1988, a small group of Israeli women responded to the outbreak of the first Palestinian Intifada by protesting in the streets of cities and towns across the country, dressed in black as a sign of mourning. Their regular vigils have inspired protest groups across the Western world. The Women in Black have worked together with other feminist and nonfeminist peace groups in protests against all aspects of the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and have given their name and support to groups of women opposed to engagement in other military conflicts as well. In Israel, they are opposed by Women in Green and other right-wing settler movements riled by the apparent success of the women's peace movements in capturing public attention.

The first Jewish Women in Black movement was organized against the oppression of Soviet Jews in the 1970s; it was, in turn, inspired by South African women who stood silently, wearing black sashes, in protest against apartheid. Both the Jewish and the South African groups, often made up of middle aged and middle-class women, successfully demonstrated the power of activism by women's groups standing against the compromise and complacency of the largely male establishments in South Africa and the Jewish community.

Israeli women's groups have drafted a series of peace platforms, formed committees to monitor the treatment of civilians, and engaged from the outset—at first illegally—in dialogues with Palestinian women. The Israeli Women in Black have sought to maintain the spontaneous nature of their demonstrations, aiming to draw together women of different political beliefs and from different organizations. Their efforts were reinvigorated in the late 1990s by the success of the Four Mothers movement in shifting public opinion in favor of Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon. The Four Mothers movement was founded by four Israeli mothers who had sons serving in Lebanon in 1997, after a helicopter crash in that country that left seventy-three soldiers dead.

See also Gaza Strip; Intifada (1987–1991); West Bank.

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George R. Wilkes

WOMEN'S AFFAIRS CENTER (GAZA)

A Palestinian women's organization in Gaza.

The Women's Affairs Center is a Palestinian nongovernmental research and training center that promotes women's rights and gender equality within Palestinian society. It was established in Gaza City in August 1991; the founding committee included (alphabetically) Rita Giacaman, Rema Hammami, Sahar Khalifa, Islah Jad, I'timad Muhanna and Amal Nashashibi. In 1994, the center separated from a similar organization in Nablus and a change in the board followed to include prominent educated men and women, mainly from Gaza. In 1995, another change in board membership took place. The center aims at empowering women in Gaza through advocacy and research, and through training women in professional and technical skills in research, media, and management. Its goal is gender equity. It is difficult to assess its impact on women, but the center has managed to train some women in research and media skills. The center has no formal links with the Palestinian Authority and has wide networks of relations with other women's organizations in Gaza, the West Bank, and the Arab world; it has no relations with Israelis. The center depends on external nongovernmental funding and since the second Intifada, in September 2000, has faced financial difficulties.

See also Aqsa Intifada, al-; Gaza Strip; Gender: Gender and Education; Intifada (1987–1991); Palestine; West Bank.

Islah Jad

WOMEN'S CENTRE FOR LEGAL AID AND COUNSELING

Women's organization based in Jerusalem.

The Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling was established in 1991, during the first Intifada, as a unit of the Women's Action Committee, a branch of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, at the initiative of Siham Barghouthi, Amal al-Juaʿaba, and Zahira Kamal. A board was formed, including Lamis Alami, Siham Barghouthi, Rawda el-Basir, Arham el-Damen, Samar Hawash, Zahira Kamal, Rana Nashashibi, Mukarram Qassrawi, and Lamia Quttineh. After a split with the

Popular Front, the center became an independent organization in 1992. It is based in Jerusalem, with one branch in the Old City of Jerusalem and one in Khalil/Hebron. It works to advance the legal and social status of Palestinian women through programs advocating women's legal rights, and through research and advocacy based on the international principles of human rights. The center's activities encourage the Palestinian Authority to adopt the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The center has a wide network of relations with local, regional, and international organizations, including Israeli organizations, as well as with the Palestinian Authority.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; INTIFADA (1987–1991); POPULAR FRONT; WOMEN AND FAMILY AFFAIRS CENTER; WOMEN'S AFFAIRS CENTER (GAZA).

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ISLAH JAD

WOMEN'S FORUM FOR RESEARCH AND TRAINING (YEMEN)

A women's forum in Yemen.

The Women's Forum for Research and Training (Multaqa al-marʾa lil-dirasat, wa al-Tadrib, WFRT) was established in 2000 to mobilize women's and human-rights organizations to work together for empowering women. The forum's main objective is to advance the rule of law regarding women's issues and rights and to build consensus in society at large on the urgency of incorporating gender dimensions in all fields of development and law. The forum's work recognizes that even though Yemeni legislation on human rights is among the best in the Arab world, women's rights are regularly violated and women lack knowledge of their rights. To accomplish its goals, the forum works on several levels, including arranging workshops for state officials, introducing human-rights issues to key figures in nongovernmental organizations and development agencies, and arranging training courses for grassroots activists. The forum has its office in Taʿiz, and its staff includes very young people. The initiator and manager of WFRT, Suʿad al-Qadasr is one of the most prominent Yemeni human rights activists. Prior to founding WFRT she was the chairperson of the Yemeni Women's Union Taʿiz branch and a leading figure in Human Rights Information and Training Centre. WFRT publications include research and surveys (*Street Children Phenomenon in Yemen,* 2003), the periodical *Multaqa* (Forum), and the leaflet "Suʾal wa jawab" (Questions and answers). WFRT is located on the Internet at <www.geocities.com/taralws/wfrt.htm>.

SUSANNE DAHLGREN

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

Organization founded to address the needs of women immigrants in Palestine.

Established in London on 11 July 1920 by the Federation of Women Zionists of the United Kingdom, the Women's International Zionist Organization (WIZO) focused on agricultural training for women immigrants in Palestine, and on these women's role as citizens and as primary providers of education to children. The founders and leaders of the movement were Vera Weizmann, Edith Eder, Romana Goodman, Henrietta Irwell, and Rebecca Sieff, who served as the first president of WIZO until her death in 1966.

Initially headquartered in London, the organization established a network of federations throughout the world (except in the United States and the USSR). A member of both the World Zionist Organization and the World Jewish Congress, WIZO is now based in Israel, where it supports numerous institutions, such as baby homes for children of preschool age, youth clubs, summer camps and kindergartens for schoolchildren, secondary and agricultural schools, and community centers in border settlements and development towns.

See also WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO).

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SHIMON AVISH

WOMEN'S LIBRARY AND INFORMATION CENTER (ISTANBUL)

Istanbul foundation established for the preservation of the history of women.

The Women's Library and Information Center (Kadin Eserleri Kütüphanesi ve Bilgi Merkezi) was established in Istanbul as a foundation by Asli Davaz Mardin, Sirin Tekeli, Jale Baysal, Füsun Akatli, and Füsun Ertug-Yaras. It opened on 14 April 1990 in a historic building owned by the Istanbul municipality and overlooking the Golden Horn. The foundation declaration stated that the purpose of the library was "to gather knowledge about the history of women, to present this information in an organized way to those who do research today, and to preserve the written documents of the past and of today for future generations." A general board administers the library and an executive board, elected annually, directs its activities. The library has a collection of more than 8,500 books written by or about women; Ottoman, Turkish, and some foreign-language periodicals on women; more than 1,300 articles in women's studies; a collection of newspaper clippings since 1990; a collection of ephemera; a special collection to preserve the personal documents of women, including those presented by Hasene Ilgaz, Müfide Ilhan, and Süreyya Agaoglu; a collection on women artists and their works; a collection on women authors; an audio-visual collection; and an oral-history collection.

The library operates as a center of feminist activism, organizing women's exhibitions and special events, and cultivating international links to extend its feminist networks. It has helped to legitimize and institutionalize second-wave feminism in Turkey. In 1991 the library organized the First International Symposium of Women's Libraries in Istanbul. It has generated projects on women's oral history and women's publications.

The library is financed by donations made by its members and by the sale of its publications and annual diaries. It has cultivated amicable relations with different political parties that came to power in the Istanbul municipality, including the pro-Islamists, and has received some support on certain projects from the Turkish government and the Global Fund for Women.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; TEKELI, SIRIN; TURKEY.

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YESIM ARAT

WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION OF IRAN (WOI)

Iranian women's activist organization.

The Women's Organization of Iran (WOI) emerged in 1966, reflecting decades of Iranian women's activism. During the 1950s, as their awareness of progress elsewhere grew, Iranian women formed numerous organizations and sought the right to vote. Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, the shah's sister, bolstered these organizations, forming a committee in 1959 to prepare the articles of association for the High Council of Women's Organizations in Iran. An umbrella group, the high council coordinated the election of a 5,000-member assembly of women representatives approving the WOI's charter on 19 November 1966 in Tehran. A nonprofit institution run mostly by volunteers, the WOI had local branches receiving charitable donations and benefited from national fundraising. By 1975, the International Year of the Woman, the WOI had established 349 branches, 120 women's centers, and a center for research. The centers provided literacy classes and vocational training, family-planning information, and legal advice. The WOI supported the international feminist movement, formulating a national plan of action that resembled the United Nations General Assembly's World Plan of Action. Although anxious to avoid conflict with the religious authorities, the WOI with its successes nevertheless alienated senior clerics. Ironically, the political awareness gained through WOI projects enabled increased and effective women's participation in the Islamic revolution, which ultimately undid the WOI.

See also IRANIAN REVOLUTION (1979); PAHLAVI, MOHAMMAD REZA.

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HALEH VAZIRI

WOMEN'S PEOPLE'S PARTY (1923)

The first and the only women's party founded in the Republic of Turkey.

The Kadinlar Halk Firkasi (Women's People's Party) was founded on 16 June 1923 in Istanbul. Among its founders were the leading feminists of the time, including Nezihe Muhittin (president), Nimet Remide (vice president), Şüküfe Nihal (general secretary), and Latife Bekir (party spokesperson). The Istanbul Provincial Administration rejected their petition for authorization, stipulating that women did not have the right to vote and hence could not establish a political party. The real reason for the rejection, however, was preparation for the Kemalist Republican People's Party (RPP), which was then being formed and which ruled the country single handedly until 1950.

Undiscouraged, the women established the Kadinlar Birliği (Women's Federation) on 7 February 1924, with the same leadership and objectives but a less political name, which did not intimidate the Kemalists. The federation intended to ameliorate rural women's conditions and, more importantly, to achieve woman suffrage. The latter was very much contingent upon the Kemalist cadre's wishes and did not happen until the eve of the twelfth congress of the International Women's Union, which was held in 1935 in Istanbul. Ten days after the congress, the federation dissolved itself under strong pressure from the RPP that it had fulfilled its primary task.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; TURKEY.

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BURÇAK KESKIN-KOZAT

WOMEN'S RELIGIOUS RITUALS

In addition to observing their formal religious duties, women of various religious communities have developed their own rituals to meet their spiritual needs and personal aspirations.

Traditionally, women in all the major religious communities in the Middle East and North Africa have had less access to religious learning than have their male counterparts; they have been excluded from the formal clerical hierarchy, and their active role in official and public communal rituals has been, to different degrees, limited. Muslim women's access to the mosque has been restricted, as has that of Jewish women to the synagogue, and these restrictions are sometimes more the result of tradition than of religious law. At the same time, women have created their own rituals, which allow their active involvement in gender-segregated settings, often in the private sphere.

Rituals at Home and outside the Home

One woman-dominated activity is visiting neighborhood shrines and other holy sites—a practice common among Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians. Women use these occasions to pray, ask intercession, and find support from other pilgrims. Some of these shrines are dedicated to female holy figures, such as Rachel's tomb in Bethlehem and the shrine of Zaynab in Damascus; a number are guarded by women and visited solely by female believers. In North Africa, the veneration of *marabouts,* holy men and women, living and deceased, plays a central role. Their graves and their descendants are frequented by women for blessings *(baraka)* and guidance.

Many women's rituals take place at home, transforming domestic spaces into places of worship. In addition to individual prayers of petition *(duʿa),* Muslim women sponsor collective rituals, like prayer meetings of gratitude or entreaty, and gatherings to

Women in chadors pass in front of a mosque in Iraq. As with other monotheistic religious faith communities in the Middle East, Muslim women—whose access to mosques have been restricted—have developed a variety of rituals, performed in the home and elsewhere. **© PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

read the Qurʾan, chiefly during the month of Ramadan. The Prophet's birthday is celebrated with the chanting of poems about his life. Shiʿa women especially partake in a great variety of religious rituals. The days of birth and martyrdom of the imams, as well as significant dates in the lives of some of their female relatives, are commemorated with either festive gatherings or recitals about their sufferings and ritual crying. Women from Iran and Central Asia also prepare and offer a *sofreh,* a ritual meal dedicated to a holy figure.

For Christian women in the Arab world, the month of May is a special time of religious devotion, processions, prayer services, and reflection. This is the month of the Virgin Mary, a period during which women ask special favors, make pledges *(nadhr),* and attend daily prayer gatherings and special masses in church. May is also a time of religious processions to shrines to Mary, in which members of other faith communities frequently participate, as in the procession to the church at Harissa in Jounieh, Lebanon.

Food and cooking play a central role in women's ritual activities throughout the Middle East. In addition to the religious obligation of lighting the Sabbath candles, Orthodox Jewish women are responsible for kosher cooking. Zoroastrian women prepare the food offerings for the religious ceremonies, and during Ramadan Muslim women prepare special meals for their families and guests to share after sunset to break the daily fast. A common ritual is the distribution of votive dishes.

Vows, Cults, and Holy Women

Vows are an integral part of women's religious rituals. In personal or collective prayers, they ask God for favors, or petition a saint to intercede with God on their behalf, promising to fulfill some kind of return service—for example to help the poor. The assistance of supernatural forces is sought for problems over which women have little control: illness, infertility, the lost love of a husband, financial problems, or worries about children. In times of crisis women also contact local ritual experts—religious authorities, holy women and men, healers, midwives—for amulets, divination, and cures. Many rituals concern the individual life cycle. Prayers, recitations from the holy book, and amulets serve to ensure a quick conception, a safe pregnancy, or an easy delivery, or to ward off evil influences harmful to the mother and newborn child or to a newly married couple. Muslim women gather at weddings, chanting religious songs. They gather for the formal naming of a child and for a circumcision. They perform the lament for deceased family members at home and recite prayers for their souls.

Particularly in North Africa, Egypt, Sudan, the countries around the Persian Gulf, and Yemen, Muslim women also take part in spirit possession and healing cults, most commonly referred to as *zar.* Ritual masters, who are often women, try by means of trance and dance to pacify the spirits that have afflicted the women who consult them. They are sometimes also consulted by Christian women. By claiming to be possessed by a malevolent spirit, women can overstep the boundaries of acceptable behavior and demand, in the name of the spirit, concessions from their husbands.

Women may also become members of Sufi orders. Especially in North Africa, Turkey, and Pakistan the *zikr* (remembrance of God) includes ecstatic chanting, dancing, and drumming. These rituals are sometimes connected to a healing cult.

In addition to their religious importance, rituals serve to gain merit for a woman in the next

world and to secure the well-being of women and their family members—living as well as deceased. The women sometimes perform the ritual in the name of a male relative or a child, acting as representatives to the supernatural. In all Middle Eastern religious communities, women have played a central role as preservers and transmitters of faith. Further, at collective rituals, women can establish emotional and supportive bonds with others not family members. For traditional women, these rituals often represent the only socially accepted activity outside the house. Excluded from the male religious hierarchy, women find in rituals the possibility of acting as religious experts, thereby gaining esteem, income, and mobility.

Women have developed a great variety of rituals, which differ from country to country and change with historical circumstances. Some are performed by women as well as men, others exclude men. Urban women generally have developed a richer religious life than village and nomad women. Popular rituals are the sphere in which the boundaries between the different religions are most fluid. Zoroastrian women display *sofreh* like Shiʿa women, and in Egypt and Lebanon Muslim women may in times of crisis visit a church or consult a priest. Many women's religious rituals have an ambiguous status and are dismissed by the religious orthodoxy. In Saudi Arabia under the Wahhabis, most Muslim women's rituals have been forbidden. In Soviet Central Asia, women's domestic rituals played an important role in the survival of religious beliefs. With increasing literacy and access to religious learning, women have begun to renegotiate their role within the religious tradition and their activities have become more visible. At the same time Muslim women's less orthodox traditional rituals have become a point of attack by Islamic revivalists, male as well as female, who regard them as superstition.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; MARABOUT; MUWAHHIDUN; SUFISM AND THE SUFI ORDERS.

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SABINE KALINOCK

WOMEN'S RENAISSANCE CLUB

The first women's association in Iraq.

The Women's Renaissance Club was established on 24 November 1923, mainly by wives of leading politicians and women from socially prominent families. Its aim was to promote women's welfare by emphasizing charity, education, and the arts. The club worked to increase the number of schools for girls, raise women's educational levels through literacy and sewing classes, and provide for the education and care for orphans. It worked to "combat unacceptable customs that are rejected by all God's precepts, and social customs that violate honor and goodness, and hinder the economy of the country."

The club was essentially a charitable organization to assist less fortunate women. Although it did not fight for the removal of the veil, it considered the veil an issue that could be resolved by social education. This incurred the wrath of conservatives, particularly Muslim conservatives, who felt that the club would corrupt family morals and bring Westernization. Although it was no more than a social club for upper-class women, its advocacy of education for girls was enough that it was forced to close in 1925 under pressure from conservatives.

See also Arab Nationalism; Art; Gender: Gender and Education; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics.

Jacqueline Ismael

WOMEN'S SERVICES

Services available to women in Turkey.

The Turkish parliament's confirmation of the United Nations convention against discrimination based on sex in October 1980 formed the legal basis for the government's providing services to women. It started with the establishment of a Women's Unit within the State Planning Organization in 1985. It was followed by the creation of the General Directorate of Women's Affairs (Kadının Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü) within the Ministry of Labor and Social Security in 1990. This directorate was to collect data concerning the status of women in Turkey and their major problems. It was transferred in 1991 to the office of the prime minister.

In 1993, an independent undersecretary for women's affairs and social services (Başbakanlik Kadin ve Sosyal Hizmetler Müsteşarlığı) was created within the office of the prime minister, and the general directorate came under the supervision of this undersecretary. In 1991, the directorate had a staff of five; in 1994, the staff had grown to forty-two. The provincial network has not yet been established. In 1994, its budget was about 0.002 percent of the national budget.

Special women's units have been set up in the ministries of Health, Labor and Social Security, and National Education. In 1993 the State Statistical Institute created a data bank for women's issues.

Several Turkish universities have established women's studies centers that offer graduate courses and M.A. degrees:

1. Istanbul University Women's Studies Center (Istanbul Üniversitesi Kadin Sorunları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi), in 1990
2. Marmara University Women's Labor Force and Employment Center (Marmara Üniversitesi Kadın İşgücü İstihdamı Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi), in 1990
3. Ankara University Women's Studies Center (Ankara Üniversitesi Kadın Sorunları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi), in 1993
4. The Middle East Technical University Women's Studies Graduate Program (ODTÜ Kadın Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı), in 1994

In 1980 local governments started to sponsor literacy courses, legal-advice centers, and occupational orientation services for women. However, these programs remained confined to municipalities in the metropolitan areas. In 1993 labor unions began to establish women's commissions in order to acquaint female workers with their legal rights. Almost all major political parties also have women's commissions as well.

Nongovernment organizations concerned with women's issues number 211. Their major endeavors have been to increase women's visibility on the national level and create favorable public opinion regarding legislative and administrative initiatives that benefit women. They are instrumental in raising consciousness and establishing various types of platforms, particularly combating sexual harassment and violence in the family. The Women's Library and Data Bank (Kadın Eserleri Kütüphanesi ve Bilgi Merkezi Vakfi), which is supported by a foundation and the city of Istanbul, has been active in collecting oral histories of women leaders and artists and creating an archive for historical records.

Nermin Abadan-Unat

WOMEN'S STUDIES CENTER (JERUSALEM)

A women's organization in Jerusalem.

The Women's Studies Center was established at the initiative of the Women's Action Committee (the women's branch of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) in 1989. The founding members were Siham Barghouthi, Penny Johnson, Amal el-Juaʿabeh, Zahira Kamal, Randa Siniora, and Lisa Taraki. In 1992, the center declared itself an independent nongovernmental organization. It works to promote women's rights and improve their social status through research, training, advocacy,

and media research and training. The center has a wide network or relations with local, regional, and international women's organizations and was the coordinator for the Arab Women's Network for many years. It has no relations with Israelis. The center depends on external funding. Due to financial problems it was in the process of being integrated into the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees in 2003.

See also GAZA STRIP; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; INTIFADA (1987–1991); OSLO ACCORD (1993); PALESTINE; PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY; WEST BANK.

ISLAH JAD

WOODHEAD COMMISSION (1938)

British investigatory commission to Palestine.

The commission, led by Sir John Woodhead, was formed in March 1938 in response to dissension within the British government over the July 1937 Peel partition plan for Palestine and the re-ignition of the Arab revolt that had followed its promulgation. The new commission was instructed to gather evidence from the various parties and to recommend boundaries for two self-sufficient states, one Arab and one Jewish, to replace the British Mandate.

The Arab and Jewish positions were irreconcilable. All Palestinian Arab factions and the surrounding Arab states were unified in their opposition to partition and demanded the creation of an independent Arab state on the entire Mandate territory. The Jewish Agency proposed an increase in the territory designated for the Jewish state by Lord Peel. On 9 November 1938 the Woodhead Commission issued its report, which stated that two independent states would be impracticable on financial and administrative grounds. It called for a conference of all relevant parties in London to work out a compromise. The parties met at the St. James Round Table Conference in February/March 1939, which ended in deadlock. In order to enhance its security and improve its position with Arab states on the eve of war, the government then issued the MacDonald White Paper of 17 May 1939.

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BENJAMIN JOSEPH
UPDATED BY PIERRE M. ATLAS

WORLD BANK

The international organization lends to developing countries of the Middle East.

The World Bank is based in Washington, D.C. It includes the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Agency (IDA). IBRD has two affiliates, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

IBRD was established in 1945 and is owned by 152 countries. The bank's resources come from its capital, retained earnings, and very large loans from the world financial markets (US$8.9 billion in 1994). Its high creditworthiness allows it to borrow

Statement of subscriptions to the capital stock and voting power of Middle Eastern countries

Country	Capital subscribed*	Capital paid*	% of vote
Algeria	1,116.10	67.10	0.59
Bahrain	133.10	5.70	0.08
Egypt	857.50	50.90	0.46
Iran	2,857.42	175.80	1.48
Iraq	338.70	27.10	0.19
Israel	573.00	33.20	0.31
Jordan	167.40	7.80	0.10
Kuwait	1,602.00	97.40	0.84
Lebanon	41.00	1.10	0.04
Libya	945.80	57.00	0.50
Morocco	599.90	34.80	0.32
Oman	188.30	9.10	0.11
Qatar	132.20	9.00	0.08
Saudi Arabia	5,404.80	335.00	2.79
Syria	265.60	14.00	0.15
U.A.E.	287.70	22.60	0.16
Total	**15,539.50**	**926.60**	**8.20**

*In millions of dollars.

SOURCE: *World Bank Annual Report, 2001*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Loans to Middle East Countries by the World Bank in 2001

Country	IBRD† loans	IBRD loan amounts*	IDA‡ loan amounts*
Algeria	2	41.70	
Egypt	0	0	
Jordan	1	120.00	
Lebanon	1	20.00	
Morocco	2	97.60	
Tunisia	3	75.90	
Yemen			142.30
Total	**9**	**355.20**	**142.30**

*In millions of dollars
†International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
‡International Development Association

SOURCE: *World Bank Annual Report, 2001*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

Relative voting strength on the World Bank board of Middle East countries

Members on the executive board	% Votes in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	% Votes in International Development Association
Algeria	.51	.21
Saudi Arabia	2.79	3.57
Kuwait	.84	.59
Total	**4.14**	**4.37**

SOURCE: World Bank, February 25, 2003.

TABLE BY GGS INFORMATION SERVICES, THE GALE GROUP.

at the most competitive rates. IBRD lends to the more advanced developing countries on creditworthy and productive projects. Pricing is based on the cost of funds to the bank. Loans are made to governments or are guaranteed by governments. Total IBRD loans made in 1994 totaled US$20,836 million. IFC, established in 1956, and MIGA, established in 1984, deal with the private sectors of the developing countries. MIGA is mandated to encourage private equity investments by providing noncommercial risk guarantees. IDA lends interest free to the very poor countries with an annual per capital GNP of US$650 or less per year. The loans have very long maturities and up to a ten-year grace period.

The World Bank's executive board is responsible for the general operations of the bank. The board approves projects, funding programs, and general management of both the IBRD and the IDA. The board is composed of twenty-four members. Each member represents and votes for his country as per its percentage contribution to the capital of either IBRD or IDA. Certain countries also will represent blocs of smaller members and vote on their behalf. The largest vote belongs to the United States, which contributes 17.42 percent of IBRD capital and 15.67 percent of IDA capital. Saudi Arabia has the largest single Arab state representation on the World Bank board with 2.79 percent of the votes of the IBRD.

In the Middle East, the World Bank's stated goals are "to emphasize sustained commitment to operations and analytical work, to promote employment-led growth, to foster human resources development, and to improve natural resource management." The bank provides support to countries that agree to implement stabilization and structural reform. These conditions imply substantial efforts to reduce budget deficits, cut subsidies, allow currencies to reach their market levels, and privatize the economy.

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JEAN-FRANÇOIS SEZNEC

WORLD FEDERATION OF SEPHARDI COMMUNITIES

Organization to support Sephardic settlement in Palestine/Israel.

The organization was founded at a conference of Sephardic communities in Vienna in 1925, prior to the Fourteenth Zionist Congress. The creation of Sephardic settlements at Kfar Hittim, Tzur Moshe, and Bet Hannan followed. After the establishment of the State of Israel, the Sephardi World Congress was convened in Paris in 1951 to renew the organization's activities on behalf of the Sephardic population in Israel, in the areas of education, housing, welfare, and preservation of their heritage. A second congress was held in Jerusalem in 1954. Now

known as The World Sephardi Federation, its activities in Israel have been concentrated in education and in helping economically underprivileged Sephardic communities. It also works to promote the bond between Diaspora and Israeli Sephardic communities.

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MIA BLOOM

WORLD ORGANIZATION OF JEWS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES (WOJAC)

International organization created in 1975.

WOJAC's charter states that Jews from Arab lands can and should form a bridge of understanding between the Arab countries and Israel. Its spokesmen stress that United Nations Resolution 242, which spells out "the necessity for a just settlement of the refugee problem," refers to all refugees, Jews and Palestinian Arabs alike; thus the legitimate rights of post-1948 Jewish refugees from Arab countries will be acknowledged. These Jews or their descendants would then be entitled to indemnification for immovable assets they left behind in their former lands.

WOJAC credits the State of Israel for its efforts to absorb the Jews from Arab lands, despite the difficulties and discriminatory policies these refugees encountered, socially and economically, during their integration processes. On the other hand, it claims that, whereas Israel solved the problem of Jewish refugees from Arab lands, the Arab states are to be faulted for failing to rehabilitate the Palestinians after 1948, rendering the latter eternal refugees as well as political pawns in inter-Arab politics.

Until 1992, when Syria finally allowed Syrian Jews to emigrate freely, WOJAC actively supported Israel's and the Jewish Agency's position that the regime permit all Jews who wished to emigrate to do so. This was in accordance with the promise made by the late Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad to then–U.S. president Jimmy Carter at Geneva in 1977.

See also BEN-PORAT, MORDECHAI.

MICHAEL M. LASKIER

WORLD WAR I

War involving the Central powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire) against the Allies (Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Greece, Romania, Italy, Portugal, Serbia, Montenegro, Japan, and the United States).

World War I (then called the Great War) began on 28 July 1914, when Austria declared war on Serbia (ostensibly because a Serbian nationalist assassinated the heir to the throne, Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife on 28 June); on 1 August, Germany declared war on Russia; on 3 August, Germany declared war on France; on 4 August, Germany invaded Belgium.

In retaliation and to aid an ally, Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August. The Russians crossed their western border at the Ukraine to enter Austro-Hungarian Galicia and pressed on to battle Germany, losing the Battle of Tannenberg (26–30 August), on what came to be called the Eastern Front. Germany marched on France in late August but was stopped in the First Battle of the Marne (6–10 September) on what came to be called the Western Front; here trench warfare ensued until March 1918.

In the Middle East, the leadership of the Ottoman Empire was divided among those who desired neutrality, those who wanted to join the Allies, and those who preferred to join the Central powers. The last group, led by Minister of War Enver Paşa prevailed. The Ottoman cabinet signed a secret alliance with Germany on 2 August. The next week the Ottomans purchased the German cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau,* replacing two Turkish ships (being built by Britain but confiscated by Britain at the outbreak of war). Renamed *Sultan Selim Yavuz* and *Midilli,* they shelled Sevastopol and Odessa, Russian cities on the Black Sea, 28 October, bringing the Ottoman Empire into the war; Russia declared war on the Ottomans 4 November; Britain and France declared war on them 5 November. Germany dominated Ottoman military actions, with General Otto Liman von Sanders directing the army and Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, the navy.

In November 1914, a British naval contingent bombarded the entrance to the Dardanelles, and in January 1915 the British organized to break through

An Australian soldier carries a wounded comrade to a field hospital on the beaches of Gallipoli, Turkey, during World War I (1914–1918). The Allies began an assault on the Gallipoli Penninsula in April 1915, as the first step in a plan to overtake the Ottoman Empire's capital, Constantinople. The plan failed and the Allies were forced to evacuate Gallipoli by the end of the year. © Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

the Turkish Straits (from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea at the Bosporus and Dardanelles). Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill convinced the war cabinet that an amphibious attack could accomplish this, thereby taking the Ottomans out of the war and opening a supply route to Russia. Britain's War Secretary Lord Kitchener sabotaged the plan by refusing to send the necessary land troops. Britain's navy unsuccessfully attacked in February and March; in April an Anglo-French army landed on the Gallipoli peninsula, where the Ottoman Turks caused heavy casualties to the Allies, which by then included Italian forces. The British-French-Italian forces almost broke through twice, but the lack of cooperation by the Russians at the Bosporus end of the Straits, faulty intelligence and, most of all, skillful tactics by the Turks and Germans led to a stalemate. The Allies withdrew from the Straits in January 1916.

Another area of major Middle Eastern hostilities was Egypt, under British protection since 18 December 1914. Khedive Abbas Hilmi II was deposed, and the British appointed Sharif Husayn ibn Ali to be sultan of Egypt. Cemal Paşa, Ottoman minister of marine, took over the Fourth Ottoman army—thereby controlling Syria, including Palestine. He sent his forces to make a surprise attack on

the Suez Canal in February 1915; they crossed the Negev desert without detection. The Turkish forces could not hold the eastern bank of the canal and retired to the Sinai desert, maintaining bases in Maʿan, Beersheba, and Gaza. Cemal continued to raid the Suez Canal by air, forcing the British to keep a large force there, but in the end the British prevailed. A second assault on the canal was delayed until the summer of 1916 and failed totally. The Turco-German forces were on the defensive there until the end of the war, although in March and April 1917 they withstood a heavy British attack at Gaza, and moved to the offensive in the Yilderim Operation commanded by General Erich von Falkenhayn. But the Turko-German forces were defeated by a combination of factors, including the troops of British General Edmund Allenby (commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force), failure of some of their transport, and sabotage.

Major battles were fought in Russia, where in late 1914 the Turks attempted to take Kars and Batum. In the battles of 1915 and 1916 the Russians took Erzerum, Van, Trabzon, and Erzinjan. They were aided by Armenians—revolutionaries and irregulars. In 1916, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), commander of the Second Ottoman Army, joined the Third Army on the Caucasus front, but little was accomplished due to scarce ammunition, impossible conditions for transportation, and rampant disease. The two revolutions in Russia also affected the Caucasus front, as the Russian troops (except the Armenian and Georgian divisions) withdrew and went home to attend to domestic affairs in 1917. The Turks then occupied Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, but Georgian and German forces retook Batum. A Bolshevik-Armenian coup in Baku and the killing of ten thousand Turks there produced a Turkish drive to recapture the city in September 1918 and to kill many Armenians. At the end of the war, the Caucasus became the Allies' problem.

Iraq was the scene for the major hostilities of the Mesopotamia Campaign. British forces from India seized Basra before Turkey declared war. Traveling up to the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the Anglo-Indian forces under General Sir Charles Townshend took Kut al-Amara in 1915. In November, his army was defeated south of Baghdad and surrendered to the Sixth Turkish Army at Kut al-Amara in April 1916. Halil Paşa erred in allowing the Anglo-Indian forces to remain in the south, for they reestablished their hold there, built a railroad, and under Britain's General Sir Frederick Stanley Maude, retook Kut al-Amara in March 1917. Baghdad fell immediately after, and the Anglo-Indian forces headed north to Mosul (on the west bank of the Tigris), which they failed to reach by the time of the Mudros Armistice (30 October 1918).

Enver Pasha, Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman military during World War I (1914–1918). Enver Pasha was instrumental in bringing the Ottoman Empire into the war on the side of the Central Powers, a decision that eventually led to his downfall and the end of the Ottoman Empire. COURTESY OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

Two national groups within the Ottoman Empire openly aided the enemy during the war: the Arabs and the Armenians. The Armenians followed the orders of the head of the Armenian Orthodox Church (who lived in Yerevan in the Caucasus) that

the Russian czar was the protector of all Armenians. Some Armenians rebelled; in the region of Van and Erzurum, Armenians openly battled the Turks proclaiming an Armenian government in Van, April 1915—which touched off the Armenian deportations and the massive killing of Armenian civilians by the Turks in 1915/16.

Cemal Paşa's actions in Syria—in arresting and hanging about thirty Arabs in Beirut and Damascus 1915/16, many from prominent families, as well as his refusal to share grain with the starving Lebanese in 1916—pushed many Arabs to desire independence from Ottoman Turkey. This desire was furthered by the proclamation of Arab independence by Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of the Hijaz in June 1916. Husayn's action was part of the outcome of the secret Husayn-McMahon Correspondence.

Another secret negotiation over the division of the Arab Middle East was the Sykes-Picot Agreement between France, Britain, and Russia. An open negotiation between the Zionists and the British had led to the issuance of the November 1917 pro-Zionist Balfour Declaration, concerning a "Jewish national home" in Palestine.

The failure of the German-Turkish campaigns led to the buildup of British troops in Egypt and their move into Palestine. General Allenby led his Egyptian Expeditionary Forces west of the Jordan river, and Jerusalem fell to them in December 1917. Joined by French military detachments, he moved north to take Lebanon, while Hijazi forces, aided by Colonel T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia), Colonel C. C. Wilson, and Sir Reginald Wingate, paralleled Allenby's actions east of the Jordan River. Damascus fell in October 1918—and although Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and the Seventh Turkish Army held Aleppo, the armistice at Mudros ended all fighting, 30 October 1918.

Four years of war had devastated Ottoman Turkey, and the old order died. A new period for the Middle East began with the peace treaties, the rise to power in Turkey of Mustafa Kemal, the fall of empires, and the creation of new nation-states and spheres of influence.

See also BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917); HUSAYN–MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE (1915–1916); SYKES–PICOT AGREEMENT (1916).

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SARA REGUER

WORLD WAR II

War involving the Axis (Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) against the Allies (Britain, France, the United States, the Soviet Union, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, and Yugoslavia).

When World War II began on 1 September 1939, the Middle East consisted of independent, semi-independent, and colonial states. From east to west they included the following: Iran and Turkey were independent, with Iran under Reza Shah Pahlavi and Turkey a republic. Syria and Lebanon were republics but under French control. Transjordan and Iraq were monarchies but under British control. Palestine was a League of Nations mandate under British control. The Arabian peninsula consisted of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, both independent, and Oman and a variety of Persian/Arabian Gulf states within the British sphere of influence. Egypt (with the strategic Suez Canal) and the Sudan were nominally independent but really under British control. Libya was an Italian colony. The French effectively controlled the rest of North Africa—Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco—except for the western regions under Spanish rule.

In World War II, Britain and France were allied against Germany and Italy. All except Germany had significant imperial holdings and interests in the Middle East. Germany wanted not only the defeat of Britain and France, but German gains in this region. As the war began, the Axis powers controlled only a small part of the Middle East—Libya and some other Italian territory taken during the Ethiopian annexation in 1935. The fall of France to Germany in May 1940 and the establishment of the quasi-independent Vichy republic in June 1940 dramat-

British soldiers salute as the Union Jack is raised over Benghazi, Libya, after its capture from the Italians in 1943. North Africa was the scene of heavy fighting during the middle stages of World War II (1939–1945). © CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ically altered the balance of power: In addition to Italy's territories being in their sphere of influence, the Axis powers had acquired France's territories.

North and East African Campaigns

The British initiated their first military action in the Middle East by an attack on French naval vessels at Oran, Algeria, 3 July 1940—which crippled the French fleet there (and resulted in 1,300 French dead). This was part of an effort to ensure that the Axis powers could not use the French fleet; the French squadron at Alexandria was disarmed while two French submarines in British ports joined the Free French forces fighting with the British. The next day, Italian forces from Ethiopia occupied border towns in the Sudan, and within six weeks they penetrated British Kenya and seized British Somaliland. On 13 September, Italian forces under Rodolfo Graziani invaded Egypt; they penetrated some sixty miles (90 km) within a week, and dug in along a fifty-mile (80 km) front from the coast to Sidi Barrani.

Since the threat to the Suez Canal was of primary importance, the British countered first against Graziani's army of 200,000. General Sir Archibald Wavell launched a surprise attack with an army of 63,000 on 6 December and drove through the Italian lines at Sidi Barrani, capturing 40,000 Italian troops by 12 December. The campaign continued for two months, ending with Italian surrender at Benghazi, Libya, on 7 February 1941. With advance units at al-Agheila, the British had advanced about five hundred miles (800 km), captured 130,000 Italian soldiers, and taken four hundred tanks and one thousand guns.

On 15 January 1941 the British launched an attack against Italian forces in East Africa, from the Sudan. Mogadiscio, capital of Italian Somaliland, fell on 26 February, followed by Neguelli in southern

Ethiopia on 22 March; the capital, Addis Ababa, fell on 6 April.

These British successes were soon to be reversed. Germany had not yet committed her forces to Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia (22 June 1941), and in February and March was able to reinforce the Italians in western Libya with two divisions under General Erwin Rommel. In the meantime, the British had turned their attention to the defense of Greece, diverting troops from North Africa.

Rommel opened his attack on 3 April, and the British retreated from their recent gains in Libya. The Axis forces drove the British back to the Egyptian frontier by 29 May. The tables then turned when Germany diverted troops from North Africa for the invasion of Russia. The British launched an offensive on 11 December and were able to drive into Libya as far as Benghazi by 25 December. A reinforced Rommel was able to begin a drive on Egypt on 22 May 1942 that did not end until checked at al-Alamayn (El Alamein), just eighty miles (127 km) from Alexandria. General Montgomery's offensive from al-Alamayn began on 23 October, resulting in expulsion of Axis forces from Egypt by 12 November and the end of the threat to Egypt and the Suez Canal.

General Erwin Rommel with soldiers of the 15th Panzer Division in 1941, in Libya between Tobruk and Sidi Omar. Rommel earned the nickname "the Desert Fox" for his skillful leadership of Axis forces in North Africa during World War II (1939–1945). NATIONAL ARCHIVES—STILL PICTURE REFERENCE (NWCS-STILLS REFERENCE) NWDNS-242-EAPC-6-M713A. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

At about the same time, on 8 November, a British-American force under U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower began Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa. Allied forces disembarking in French Morocco and Algeria faced some opposition from Vichy forces, but by 11 November, the two sides had reached an armistice. Pressed by Montgomery's Eighth Army in Libya and the new threat from the west, Rommel concentrated the Axis forces in Tunisia. Into 1943, bitter fighting continued, particularly at the Kasserine Pass, but by 12 May all German and Italian resistance had ended. The Axis powers had 950,000 men dead or captured and had lost 8,000 aircraft and 2.4 million tons of shipping.

Southwest Asia and Turkey

While the significant fighting of World War II in the Middle East was in Africa, the British still faced serious threats in Southwest Asia. The regimes in both Iran and Iraq flirted with support of the Axis powers as a means of diminishing British influence over their affairs. On 2 May 1941, pro-Axis sympathizers in Iraq tried to seize power. British forces intervened and put down all resistance by 31 May. Fearing that Reza Shah Pahlavi might take Iran into the German camp in the summer of 1941, British and Soviet forces entered Iran in late August and forced him to abdicate in favor of his son, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, on 16 September. These actions effectively secured Iraq and Iran for the Allies.

The fall of France in June 1940 threatened to bring Syria and Lebanon into the Axis sphere of influence. Quick action by the British and Free French forces prevented this. On 8 June these forces occupied Syria and Lebanon. On 16 September Syria was proclaimed an independent nation, as was Lebanon on 26 November. Both remained loyal to the Allies during World War II, but soon after the end of hostilities they were able to assert their independence and obtain the withdrawal of Allied forces from their territory.

World War I had led to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the Turkish

republic under Kemal Atatürk. Turkey then faced pressure from both sides and from within as World War II loomed on the horizon. Atatürk and his successor, İsmet İnönü, favored the British as the power they believed would ultimately win. Other Turks feared Britain's ally, the Soviet Union, as a traditional enemy and realized that by June 1941 German troops were within 100 miles (160 km) of Istanbul. Still others remembered the disastrous decision of October 1914, when the Ottomans joined the Central Powers in World War I.

Shortly after the beginning of World War II, on 19 October 1939, Britain and France concluded a fifteen-year mutual assistance pact with Turkey. German success in 1940 and the invasion of Russia in 1941, however, led many Turkish leaders to favor the Axis. Thus, on 1 November 1940, İnönü declared it to be Turkish policy to remain a nonbelligerent in the war, while maintaining friendly ties with both Britain and the Soviet Union. The Allies, of course, continued to pressure Turkey for support, and on 3 December 1941, just before the United States declared war, the American Lend-Lease program was extended to Turkey. İnönü still pursued a neutral course but by 1943 realized that the Axis would lose. In August 1944, Turkey broke diplomatic relations with Germany, and on 23 February 1945 it formally declared war to comply with requirements for participation in the UN conference to be held in San Francisco in April.

Palestine

The Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine greeted World War II with mixed emotions. Neither was content with British rule. The Arabs resented the rule of their country by a European power pledged to uphold the Balfour Declaration (sanctioning Palestine as a haven for persecuted Jews from all parts of the world). The Jewish population, the Yishuv, suspected British commitment to the Balfour Declaration, especially since the British banned Jewish immigration into Palestine after 1939.

In light of the antisemitism of Nazi Germany and its extermination of European Jewry as a matter of state policy, the Yishuv had little recourse but to support the Allies. The resources of the Jewish community in Palestine were put at the disposal of the British, and efforts (often resisted by British authorities) were made to raise Jewish military units to support the war effort. Early in the war the Yishuv devised the Carmel Plan, to create a Jewish enclave on the Palestine coast, near Haifa, to resist a German landing and occupation. Fortunately, this never became necessary.

A small minority of Jews did continue to resist British control of Palestine. The LEHI (Stern Gang), under Abraham Stern, urged rebellion against the British and even approached the German representatives in Vichy-controlled Syria with an offer of support against the British in Palestine. Even after this offer was rejected and Stern killed in confrontation with British authorities in early 1942, this splinter group continued to resist the British; other Jewish groups then began to oppose the British as the war progressed, since British support of the Zionist cause seemed less than enthusiastic.

Some Arabs viewed Germany as an instrument to rid themselves of British rule. The mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, lent his support to the Nazi cause, and when fleeing from Jerusalem in 1937 and from Beirut in October 1939 to Baghdad, he established contact with the German ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen, offering Arab support. After an anti-British revolt in 1941, the British reestablished control of Iraq in May 1941. Hajj Amin, who participated in the revolt, left for Turkey and later for Rome and Berlin to support the Axis powers after they promised to free the Arab world and support its independence and unity. He was able to generate some support for the Axis among the Arabs, but the defeat of the Italians and Germans in North Africa prevented this from becoming a factor in the war.

The War's Effect on the Middle East

World War II ended with British and French control of most of the Middle East. The war did, however, shatter the aura of the invincibility of their arms. Consequently, rapid changes occurred in the region—Arab states asserted their independence, and the Jewish population of Palestine declared the State of Israel in 1948. Iran and Turkey insisted on full partnership in the international community. The European powers would no longer have undisputed control over the fates of the peoples in this region.

With the end of the war the United States emerged the premier Western power, but the challenge of the Cold War with the Soviet Union would soon have its own impact on the oil-rich Middle East.

See also Alamayn, al-; Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Husayni, Muhammad Amin al-; İnönü, İsmet; Montgomery, Bernard Law; Pahlavi, Reza; Rommel, Erwin; Stern, Abraham; Wavell, Archibald Percival; Yishuv.

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Daniel E. Spector

WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO)

Organization that transformed the Zionist idea of establishing a Jewish state into reality.

Founded in 1897 by Theodor Herzl at the first Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland, the Zionist Organization, as it was originally known, was created to serve as the organizational framework for the Zionist movement. It was to be composed of "all Jews who accept the Zionist program and pay the shekel (a nominal membership fee, differing from country to country)."

The Zionist Congress was established as the supreme governing body of the WZO. Before 1948 congresses were held in many European cities; thereafter, beginning with the twenty-third congress in 1951, all congresses were held in Jerusalem. At first they were held every one or two years; more recently they have been convened every four years. Herzl, the first president of the WZO, chaired its first five congresses. After his death in 1904 the movement was headed by lackluster figures until the election of Chaim Weizmann as its president in 1920.

Between congresses, the movement was guided by a Greater Actions Committee, or General Council, and a Smaller Actions Committee, or Executive. Under the aegis of the WZO, the Jewish Colonial Trust was formed at the second Zionist Congress to serve as the bank of the Zionist movement. The Jewish National Fund was initiated at the fifth Zionist Congress to act as a land-purchasing agent in Palestine for the Jewish people.

Membership in the World Zionist Organization was initially on a regional basis, but as ideological differences emerged the membership structure splintered along ideological lines. Distinct political parties were formed, of which the most important were the Labor Zionists, the General Zionists (liberal centrists), the Mizrahi (religious Zionists), and (after 1925) the Revisionists (right-wing nationalists). The latter, led by Vladimir Zeʾev Jabotinsky, split from the WZO altogether in 1935 and formed the New Zionist Organization.

During the period of British mandatory rule in Palestine between 1920 and 1948 the WZO assumed many of the powers of a quasi-government of the Jewish community in the country. Article 4 of the Mandate provided for the establishment of a Jewish Agency, which "shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the administration of Palestine in such economic, social, and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine." Until 1929 the WZO acted as the Jewish Agency for Palestine; thereafter, the agency was enlarged to include non-Zionists, but the WZO remained the dominant power within the new body. The political department of the Jewish Agency functioned, in effect, as the foreign ministry of the WZO throughout this period.

After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 the WZO gradually evolved into a foreign propaganda and political mobilization arm of the Is-

raeli government. Many of the WZO's functions were assumed by the new government, but the Jewish Agency was not dismantled. In 1952 the Law of the Status of the WZO-Jewish Agency was promulgated whereby primary responsibility was assigned to the Jewish Agency for the development and settlement of the land and for the absorption of immigrants. In 1960 the WZO adopted a new constitution under which individuals were denied eligibility for membership, which was thereafter reserved for organizations.

See also Herzl, Theodor; Jabotinsky, Vladimir Ze'ev; Jewish Agency for Palestine; Jewish Colonial Trust; Jewish National Fund; Labor Zionism; Weizmann, Chaim.

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Bernard Wasserstein

Y

YA'ARI, ME'IR
[1897–1987]

Israeli political leader.

Born in Galicia, Me'ir Ya'ari was educated at the Vienna Academy of Agriculture and the University of Vienna. During World War I, he served as an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army. In Vienna, he was a leader of the ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir youth movement before emigrating to Palestine in 1919. Founder of the first kibbutz of ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir and the Histadrut, Ya'ari was also an early leader of the Kibbutz Artzi of the ha-Shomer ha-Tzaʿir movement in Israel and abroad. He was elected to the first Israeli Knesset, in which he remained until 1973, and served as general secretary of MAPAM. A prolific writer on Zionist ideology, Ya'ari was a principal intellectual force in the MAPAM movement.

See also Israel: Political Parties in.

Bryan Daves

YACINE, ABDESSALAME
[1928–]

Islamic intellectual and spiritual leader in Morocco.

Abdessalame Yacine is one of the foremost Islamic intellectuals in Morocco and the spiritual leader of the al-Adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Charity) movement. A former teacher and school principal, Yacine became an Islamic activist in the early 1970s after having been religiously awakened by an encounter with Sufism. Following his bold criticism of King Hassan II in an open letter entitled "Islam or the Deluge" in 1974, Yacine was jailed on a few occasions, and ultimately put under house arrest between 1989 and 2000. Besides this clash with the monarchy, he has mostly distinguished himself through a prolific literary production and the originality of his philosophy. Deeply influenced by his short Sufi experience, Yacine developed a nonviolent Islamism based on spiritual regeneration. His major works in Arabic and French underline the importance of spiritual guidance (*tarbiya*), proper companionship (*suhbah*), and prayer. In doing so, Yacine invites Muslims to reach a higher stage of

consciousness called *ihsan* in order to become truly benevolent and build a better society. Yacine thus wishes to instill justice, honesty, and responsibility within various spheres, from family life to politics. His emphasis on spiritual growth, which he attempts to reconcile with the dryness of Islamic law, sets him apart from the more rigorist Islamists in Morocco and elsewhere. Nevertheless, al-Adl wa al-Ihsan, officially founded in 1987, is currently one of the most important Islamic organizations in the country. Although Yacine continues to criticize the Moroccan monarchy and government within acceptable limits, he has so far eschewed direct political involvement.

See also Adl wa al-Ihsan al-; Hassan II; Morocco: Overview; Morocco: Political Parties in; Muhammad VI.

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Henri Lauzière

YACOUBI, RACHIDA

[1946–]

Moroccan writer.

Rachida Yacoubi's first novel, *Ma vie, mon cri* (My life, my scream; 1995) described the poor condition of women in Moroccan society and caused a shock both in Morocco and abroad. Based partly on her own experience, the book tells the story of a woman whose husband is an alcoholic. She divorces him to stay alone with four children in a shantytown. This was almost the first time that a story so violently against male domination of society was published in Morocco. It was a great success and Yacoubi was invited to Europe on many occasions to speak about the condition of women.

Before Yacoubi's book, the condition of women in Morocco had been addressed only by male novelists (Tahar Ben-Jelloun, Driss Chraibi, Abdelhak Serhane) or by researchers (Souad Filal, Fatima Mernissi, Soumaya Naamane-Guessous). Following the publication of Yacoubi's novel, other Moroccan women published books about gender issues in Morocco. They include Halima Benhaddou (*Aïcha la rebelle,* 1982), Leila Houari (*Zeida de nulle part,* 1985), Nafissa Sbaï (*L'enfant endormi,* 1987), and Fatiha Boucetta (*Anissa captive,* 1991). In 2002, Yacoubi published an essay about the time she spent in prison ("Je dénonce"; I denounce), showing the inequality of men and woman before the judicial system in Morocco

See also Hassan II; Morocco: Overview; Morocco: Political Parties in; Moudawana, al-; Muhammad VI.

Rabia Bekkar

YADIN, YIGAEL

[1917–1984]

Israeli archaeologist, general, and politician.

Born in Jerusalem, the son of the archaeologist E. L. Sukenik, Yigael Yadin studied archaeology and Semitic languages at Hebrew University (1935–1945), later earning his Ph.D. (1955) studying the Dead Sea Scrolls. He joined the Haganah and adopted the personal code name Yadin, which later became his surname. Yadin was chief operations officer in the 1948 war and later chief of staff (1949–1952); he is credited with creating the principles of Israel's citizens' army reserve system. He resigned from the chief-of-staff position in 1952 because of budgetary disputes and joined the Hebrew University faculty in 1953, where he was appointed professor of archaeology in 1963. In 1976 he was a founder of the centrist Democratic Movement for Change, and from 1977 to 1981 he was a member of the Knesset and deputy prime minister. In 1981 he returned to Hebrew University. Yadin followed his father in studying the Dead Sea Scrolls. With Nahman Avigad, he published *Genesis Apocryphon* (1956), *Ben Sira from Masada* (1965), and *Temple Scroll* (1977). His most important archaeological achievements were the large-scale excavations at Hazor, the Cave of Letters in the Judaean desert, Masada, Megiddo, and Bet Sheʾan.

See also Archaeology in the Middle East.

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Mia Bloom
Updated by Gregory S. Mahler

YAD MORDEKHAI

Kibbutz that was the site of an important battle in the Arab–Israel War (1948).

Yad Mordekhai, named for Mordekhai Anilewitz, commander of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, is located between Gaza and Ashkelon on the road to Tel Aviv. Founded in 1943, the kibbutz was attacked by Egypt's army on May 19, 1948. It held out for four days without relief; on the fifth day, the survivors broke through Egypt's lines to the settlement of Gvar Am. The attackers suffered 300 casualties.

Today the kibbutz has 700 inhabitants. The kibbutz supports itself through agriculture; industry, especially bee products from its apiary; and tourism, with visitors to a reconstructed battlefield from the 1948 war and a museum devoted to the Holocaust, Jewish resistance in Europe, the immigration of Holocaust survivors to Palestine during the British Mandate, and Israel's War of Independence.

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Jon Jucovy

YAD VASHEM

The Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority, as well as a site in Israel dedicated to commemorating the Jewish victims of Nazi persecution and extermination.

Established on the authority of the 1945 London Zionist Congress, Yad Vashem (from Isaiah 56:5) includes a museum of the Holocaust, facilities for conferences and memorial gatherings (Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremonies are held there on 27 Nisan), and a research institute. Yad Vashem is a feature of foreign dignitaries' official visits to Israel.

Yad Vashem's task is to perpetuate the legacy of the Holocaust to future generations so that the world never forgets the horrors and cruelty of the Holocaust. Its principal missions are commemoration and documentation of the events of the Holocaust; collection, examination, and publication of testimonies to the Holocaust; the collection and memorialization of the names of Holocaust victims; and research and education.

See also Holocaust.

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Jon Jucovy

YAHYA IBN MUHAMMAD HAMID AL-DIN

[1867–1948]

Imam of Yemen, 1904–1948; king of Yemen, 1918–1948.

Yahya ibn Muhammad Hamid al-Din took the patronymic al-Mutawakkil ala Allah on becoming imam in 1904. He succeeded to the imamate upon the death of his father Muhammad ibn Yahya, who had inaugurated a new period of rebellion against the rule of the Ottoman Empire in the highlands of Yemen in 1891.

Although Yahya was sometimes amenable to concessions and negotiations with the Ottoman authorities, he approved of the desire of the Zaydi people to be free of Ottoman rule. When Yahya received the *bayʿa* (oath of allegiance), he immediately called for a full-scale revolt against the Ottomans; his major motivation appears to have been the May 1904 boundary agreement about Yemen's southern borders, signed between the Ottomans and British, since he considered himself to be the legitimate ruler of both "north" Yemen and the territories held by the British in "south" Yemen.

Imam Yahya continued to lead the revolt against the Ottomans throughout the period before World

War I. His political shrewdness as well as his ability to wage irregular war against the Ottoman state forced it to negotiate with him, most importantly in the Treaty of Da'an in 1919, which granted most of his demands and gave him an almost free hand in matters of taxation, religious affairs, and judicial appointments.

During World War I, however, the imam sided with the Ottomans as fellow Muslims—the only Arab regime to do so. At the end of the war, the Ottomans departed Yemen and officially recognized Yahya as ruler there. For Imam Yahya, however, this was only the first step in creating the Yemen he perceived to be the patrimony of the Zaydi imams.

Yahya's primary policy objectives in the postwar period appear to have been: (1) to bring all of Yemen under his direct control; (2) to make Yemen completely independent of the influence and/or control of other states (to have complete autarky); (3) to weaken the cohesion and power of the tribes (to prevent them from developing a common front against the central government and resisting its policy objectives); and (4) to establish the ascendancy of Islamic law *(Shariʿa)* throughout Yemen.

The methods Yahya employed to bring about his goals were diverse, and some were, in today's light, brutal. At first he paid subsidies and bribes to various tribal elements; later, when the treasury could clearly not support the demands of these payments, he sent military units to quell uprisings against his decisions, and also employed a traditional Yemeni technique—he took hostages from the tribes, typically the sons of the tribal Shaykhs. These hostages were kept in the imam's fortresses (where they were also educated) to guarantee the good behavior of their own tribes or tribal alliances. Yahya was assassinated in 1948.

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MANFRED W. WENNER

YAMANI, AHMAD ZAKI

[1930–]

Saudi official influential in world petroleum politics in the 1960s and 1970s.

Born in Mecca in 1930, Ahmad Zaki Yamani was educated at Cairo, New York, and Harvard universities. He began working for the government of Saudi Arabia in 1958 and rose to become minister of petroleum and mineral resources in 1962, a post he held until 1986. He is noted for his success in asserting Saudi control over the country's oil resources, helping to establish the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), and increasing the profits of oil-producing countries through asserting their rights to set production and pricing policies. He was instrumental in establishing the General Petroleum and Mineral Organization (PETROMIN), a Saudi company created to develop oil resources, and the College of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran. In response to Israel's victory in the October 1973 War, Yamani succeeded in leading an embargo of oil shipments by Arab producers to the United States and other supporters of Israel. He served as secretary-general of OAPEC in 1968 and 1969 and was seen as a prominent voice for moderation in the organization. In 1986 he established the Centre for Global Energy Studies.

See also ORGANIZATION OF ARAB PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OAPEC).

ANTHONY B. TOTH

YANBU

A port on Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast.

Located in the Hijaz region, Yanbu traditionally served the city of Medina. Originally Yanbu was divided into the port itself, Yanbu al-Bahr, and the inland agricultural settlement of Yanbu al-Nakhl. In the 1970s, along with al-Jubayl on the Persian Gulf, Yanbu became the center of a massive industrial development scheme that included oil refining, petrochemical industries, and heavy manufacturing complexes based on hydrocarbon fuels. Yanbu was planned as the smaller of the two sites, with two petroleum refineries, a natural gas processing plant, a petrochemical complex, other light industries, an industrial port, and a new city of 100,000 inhabitants. Energy for these projects was to be supplied via oil and gas pipelines from the Eastern Province, and the terminus of the Iraqi pipeline across Saudi Arabia was located nearby; the Iraqi pipeline was closed after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, but

the capacity of the Saudi east-west pipeline was later increased to nearly five million barrels per day. By 1999 Yanbu's population was about 70,000.

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J. E. PETERSON

YARIV, AHARON

[1920–1994]

Israeli career officer, cabinet minister and defense analyst.

Born in Russia in 1920, Aharon Yariv moved to Palestine at the age of fifteen and joined the Haganah in 1939. During World War II, Yariv fought in the British army, helping to liberate concentration camps. He was the first Israeli to attend the French Military Command and Staff School.

Yariv served in many positions in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), including commander of the IDF Command and Staff School (1954), head of Central Command (1956–1957), commander of the Golani Brigade (1960–1961), and most significantly as chief of the Intelligence branch (Aman; 1964–1973) during which he provided the intelligence information responsible for the Israeli victory in 1967. From 1957 to 1960, he served as military attaché in Washington, D.C. Yariv left the Intelligence branch shortly before the 1973 Arab–Israel War, although he served as head of the Israeli delegation during the Kilometer 101 disengagement talks.

Elected to the eighth Knesset on the Labor Alignment ticket, Yariv became minister of transport under Golda Meir and later minister of information under Yitzhak Rabin. Together with another minister, Yariv wrote a formula for peace negotiations that recommended Israel carry out negotiations with any Palestinian faction that would recognize Israel's right to exist and that would not engage in terrorism. Yariv founded the Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University in 1977 and served as its head until his death.

See also ARAB–ISRAEL WAR (1973); HAGANAH; KNESSET; MEIR, GOLDA; RABIN, YITZHAK.

JULIE ZUCKERMAN

YARMUK RIVER

Tributary of the Jordan river.

The Yarmuk river forms boundaries between Jordan, Syria, and Israel, all of which have contested its use as a water source. About fifty miles (80 km) long, the Yarmuk rises in southern Syria and flows westward through a deep gorge along the Jordanian border of the Golan Heights region of Syria annexed by Israel in 1981. It empties into the Jordan river four miles (6.4 km) south of the Sea of Galilee. Although much smaller than the Euphrates (in Turkey, north Syria, and Iraq) or even the Litani (in Lebanon), the Yarmuk supplies up to 50 percent of the water flow in the lower Jordan river.

The Yarmuk shares a long and storied past with the Jordan river valley, as recounted in archaeological evidence, holy scripture and medieval chronicles. A Roman fortress town was built at the junction of the two rivers, and ruins of Roman- and Byzantine-era synagogues have been found nearby. In the early seventh century, it was through the Yarmuk gorge that Arab armies invaded the Jordan valley.

The Yarmuk's strategic importance has continued into the modern era. Today, it is the only undeveloped tributary of the Jordan river, in a region that now exploits the maximum capacity of existing water sources. Its only significant exploitation has been Jordan's East Ghawr Canal, built in 1964 to irrigate thirty thousand acres (12,150 ha) of farmland east of the Jordan river. Jordan plans to extend the nearly 50-mile (80-km) canal and build a 328-foot (100-m) dam at Maqarin to store the Yarmuk's waters for agriculture and for the cities of Irbid and Amman. Syria plans a series of small dams on the upper Yarmuk to benefit agriculture in the Hawran region.

But these plans require agreement from all parties enjoying riparian rights to the river—not just Syria and Jordan, but also Israel. Israeli interest in the Yarmuk began shortly after World War I, when Chaim Weizmann, later Israel's first president, proposed borders for Palestine that would include the river. In 1932, the Palestine Electric Corporation (now the Israel Electric Corporation) built a hydroelectric generating plant at the junction of the Yarmuk and Jordan rivers. It was destroyed by the Arab Legion in the 1948 war, but Israel has

continued to claim the water rights to the Yarmuk granted by the British mandate.

Since 1948, the contest for the Yarmuk has at times been violent. Efforts in the 1950s to coordinate joint use of the Jordan river basin, like the 1953 Johnston Plan, failed to gain agreement from all sides. While Jordan pursued its unilateral East Ghawr Canal, Israel, between 1953 and 1964, built its National Water Carrier, which diverts the Jordan's water from north of the Sea of Galilee to Tel Aviv and the Negev desert. In response, the Arab League in 1960 coordinated a plan to develop the Yarmuk for the benefit of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. The project, begun in 1964, was to divert the Jordan's northern headwaters to the Yarmuk, where a dam on the Syrian-Jordanian border would also be built. In 1965 and 1966 Israel attacked bulldozers and facilities at construction sites in Syria. Israel's 1967 occupation of the Golan Heights put a final halt to the project. In 1969 Israeli raids destroyed part of Jordan's East Ghawr Canal, which was subsequently repaired.

After years of opposition, in 2003 Syria finally agreed to allow Jordan to begin construction of the Maqarin dam.

See also Johnston Plan (1953); Maqarin Dam; Water.

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Elizabeth Thompson

YARMUK UNIVERSITY

A public university in Jordan.

Established in 1976 on the outskirts of Irbid in northwest Jordan, Yarmuk University was the kingdom's second public university, opened in response to the rapidly increasing demands for higher education. The main campus of the university was built over a fifteen-year period and includes faculties of arts, economics, education and fine arts, engineering, Islamic studies, law, science, and an institute for archaeology and anthropology, as well as centers in various disciplines. At its inception, Yarmuk University pioneered new programs, including a center for Jordanian studies, a department of communications and journalism, a department of continuing education, a school for public health, and a department of computer science. In the 1999/2000 academic year, student enrollment was 17,800.

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Jenab Tutunji

YARMULKE

See Glossary

YASAR KEMAL

[c. 1923–]

Long despised by Turkish intellectuals, who considered his "popular frescoes" as second-rate literature, Yasar Kemal is today Turkey's most famous living fiction writer.

Yasar Kemal's family was from Ercis, a small town near Van, in the Kurdish region of Turkey. During World War I, his father settled in the plain of Tchukurova, near Adana, where Yasar was born around 1923. He does not know his exact date of birth, but it was probably after 1923 because he was named Mustafa Kemal, after the founder of the Turkish Republic. During his childhood, he experienced considerable violence—an atmosphere that permeates his books, which are full of bandits and honor killings. Yasar Kemal's maternal uncle was one of Turkey's most renowned bandits, and Yasar Kemal himself was hardly five when his father was murdered in a mosque by his adoptive son.

After his father's death, his family was destitute and Yasar Kemal went to work on other people's land. During this time he observed nature, which he describes at length in his books. The land and

its transformations as the seasons change are an important part of his novels. He also describes the poor peasants' fight for land that has been confiscated by rapacious *aghas* and *beys* (landowners)

At seventeen, Yasar Kemal became a leftist political activist. He was introduced to Marxism by Arif and Abidine Dino, two brothers who had been exiled to Adana, and he later became a member of the Central Committee of the Turkish Communist Party. After many menial jobs, he became a journalist, working for *Cumhuriyet* from 1951 to 1963 while writing his first three novels. From 1963 onwards he earned his living as a novelist, writing full-time.

Among his more than twenty-five books, the most famous are *Murder in the Ironsmith Market; Iron Earth, Copper Sky; The Wind from the Plain; The Undying Grass*; and his most famous, *Memed, My Hawk.* Most of them were translated into English by his wife, Thilda. During the early years of the twenty-first century, Yasar Kemal worked on a trilogy about the 1923 exchange of Greek and Turkish populations after the dismembering of the Ottoman Empire, and on his memoirs.

Although many of the secondary characters in his novels are Kurdish, Yasar Kemal used to deny that he was a Kurd. Since the 1990s, however, he has claimed his Kurdish identity, saying, "I am writing in Turkish, I never wrote a line in Kurdish, but I am a Kurd."

See also KURDS; LITERATURE: TURKISH.

KATHLEEN R. F. BURRILL
UPDATED BY CHRIS KUTSCHERA

YASHMAK

See CLOTHING

YASIN, AHMAD ISMAʿIL

[1936–2004]

Founder of HAMAS.

Ahmad Ismaʿil Yasin was born in 1936 in the village of al-Jurah, south of Gaza. His family moved to the Gaza Strip after the 1948 Arab–Israel War. He had an accident in his youth (while playing sports) that resulted in his paralysis. He studied Arabic language and religion, became a teacher in both fields, and rose in prominence as a militant preacher in the mosques of Gaza. He headed the Islamic-oriented al-Mujamma al-Islami. In 1983 Yasin was arrested and charged with possession of weapons, then was released in 1985 during a famous prisoner exchange between Israel and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command.

Yasin was the key founder and leader of HAMAS (acronym for the Arabic name of the Islamic Resistance Movement), which was officially begun in 1987. HAMAS's ideology is a militant and more violent version of the Muslim Brotherhood, and it analyzes the Arab–Israeli conflict in purely religious terms. Palestine is seen as a religious waqf land that belongs to Muslims, and enmity is expressed toward Jews. The movement calls for armed struggle, but unlike the secular Palestinian organizations of the 1960s and 1970s, it considers this struggle to be obligatory jihad. HAMAS played a key role in the Palestinian Intifada of 1987, and Yasin was arrested in 1989 and sentenced to life in prison. He was released in 1997, when Israel had a deal with Jordan's King Hussein after a failed assassination attempt in Jordan against the head of the Political Bureau of HAMAS, Khalid Mishʿal. Despite Yasin's feeble physical state, he provided a strong leadership for the movement. He had a weak voice and a variety of ailments (some resulting from torture and mistreatment in Israeli jails), but he could inspire the masses. Although he left military decisions to the military branch of HAMAS, he legitimized the suicide attacks that characterized the second (al-Aqsa) Intifada of 2000. Yasin succeeded in turning HAMAS into the second most important Palestinian organization after Yasir Arafat's al-Fatah movement. His militancy did not prevent him from reaching pragmatic agreements with Palestinian organizations, including Marxist groups, and he had a large following in the Persian Gulf region, where he raised much of the money for HAMAS before U.S. pressures led Gulf governments to curtail fundraising for the movement. In 2003 Yasin survived an Israeli bomb attack on a house he was thought to inhabit. Yasin was assassinated outside a Gaza mosque on 22 March 2004 by a missile fired from an Israeli helicopter.

ASʿAD ABUKHALIL

YATA, ALI

[1920–1997]

Moroccan journalist and left-wing politician.

Ali Yata was the first Muslim secretary-general of the Moroccan Communist Party. He served until it was banned in 1959. Later he established the party of Liberty and Socialism (1968) and the party of Progress and Socialism (1974, as its secretary-general). He also founded the newspaper *al-Bayane.* Yata was elected deputy in the 1977 elections saying that democratic progress had begun, but he demanded annulment of the 1983 local elections alleging fraud. He participated in the 1984 legislative elections. Yata supported Moroccan claims to the Sahara in the 1960s and to the Western Sahara in the 1970s and 1980s.

See also COMMUNISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

C. R. PENNELL

YAZD

Ancient Iranian city located in an oasis in the central desert region.

Yazd is the name of a province and its capital city in central Iran. The province, which extends over an area of 27,027 square miles (70,000 sq km), is largely desert, with the great salt desert known as the Kavir in the north merging into the great sand and stone desert (the Lut) of southeastern Iran. The province has lead and zinc deposits, many of which are sites of major commercial mining operations.

The city of Yazd was an important Zoroastrian religious center during the Sassanian dynasty (226–642 C.E.) and has remained a stronghold of Zoroastrianism up to the present, although adherents of this faith comprise less than 10 percent of the city's population. In the early 2000s, about one-half of all Zoroastrians in Iran lived in Yazd, and the fire temples there and in some surrounding villages had become historic pilgrimage sites. Between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries, the city was internationally renowned for its silk, cotton, and woolen textiles, but these handicrafts declined dramatically after 1850 as the volume of European manufactured textiles imported into Iran increased. By the mid-twentieth century, entrepreneurs had established modern cotton and woolen textile mills in the city, and Yazd gradually recovered its status as a regional commercial and production center. The railroad from Tehran to the Gulf of Oman port of Bandar-e Abbas, completed in 1995, passes through Yazd; its construction helped stimulate development in and migration to the city. Between 1976 and 1996, the population of Yazd increased more than 140 percent (an average of 7 percent per annum), from 135,925 to 326,776.

See also ZOROASTRIANISM.

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ERIC HOOGLUND

YAZDI, IBRAHIM

[1931–]

Iranian politician.

Born in Qazvin, where his father made his living as a retailer, Ibrahim Yazdi studied pharmacology at Tehran University and emerged as one of the leaders of the Muslim Student Association. In 1952 he galvanized student support in favor of Mohammad Mossadegh's oil nationalization platform. He co-edited two journals, *Forugh-e Elm* (The resplendence of knowledge) and *Ganj-e Shayegan* (The magnificent treasure), and was employed at the Worker Social Security Organization. Following the CIA-sponsored coup that ousted Mossadegh in 1953, Yazdi joined the newly formed National Resistance Movement. The movement was effectively crushed in 1957 but resurfaced in 1960 as the National Front, of which the Liberation Movement of Iran (formed in 1961 by the more religiously minded members of the original nationalist coalition) was a splinter group. Yazdi was a member of the nascent Liberation Movement of Iran, and after he left Iran for the United States in about 1960 was instrumental in organizing its opposition activities abroad, both in the United States and elsewhere. He also studied for his doctoral degree in the United States.

In 1978 he frequented Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's headquarters in France. When he returned to Iran in 1979, he was appointed deputy prime minister, and in 1980 he became foreign minister in the cabinet of Mehdi Bazargan's provi-

sional government. He was among the group of Bazargan's friends who constituted the nonclerical, moderate figures in the Islamic movement and who cooperated closely with the Revolutionary Guards. He also headed the nationalized Kayhan Publishing Group, which produced a daily newspaper whose circulation rate exceeded that of all the other Tehran dailies. He was elected to the Islamic parliament as a deputy from Tehran (1980–1984). In the falling-out between the moderates and the more radical Islamic Republican Party affiliates (1979–1981), the latter won. After falling from political favor, Yazdi devoted his energies to revitalizing the Liberation Movement of Iran, which now functioned as the only tolerated—albeit eventually officially banned—opposition party in the political landscape of Iran.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Yazdi's activities consisted primarily of criticizing the government's economic policies and its failure to deliver the political rights promised by the revolutionaries in 1979. Taking advantage of the liberalizing policies of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Yazdi in this period advocated—in various speeches, articles, and manifestos—fiscal reform, equitable distribution of income, and the normalization of ties with the United States. In 1995, after the death of Mehdi Bazargan, Yazdi emerged as the leader of the Liberation Movement of Iran. In 1996, he made an unsuccessful bid in the parliamentary elections as the Liberation Movement of Iran candidate for a seat from Tehran. In 1997 he was arrested for a short while after signing a letter protesting maltreatment by Ayatollah Khamenehi, the leader of Iran, of Grand Ayatollah Hosayn Montazeri, Ayatollah Khomeini's designated successor until he fell out with the regime in 1989, shortly before Khomeini's death. The judiciary arrested all senior members of the Liberation Movement of Iran in 2000, but Yazdi escaped arrest because he was in the United States undergoing treatment for prostate cancer. He was charged with antigovernment activity when he returned but was allowed to remain free after posting bail. His trial was still continuing at the end of 2003, although there were periods of several months' duration during which no court sessions were scheduled.

See also BAZARGAN, MEHDI; KHAMENEHI, ALI; MONTAZERI, HOSAYN ALI; MOSSADEGH, MOHAMMAD; RAFSANJANI, ALI AKBAR HASHEMI; REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS.

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NEGUIN YAVARI

YAZIDIS

See TRIBES AND TRIBALISM: YAZIDIS

YAZIJI, IBRAHIM

[1847–1906]

A leading figure in the Arabic literary revival of the nineteenth century.

Ibrahim Yaziji was a Greek Catholic poet, grammarian, and man of letters from Mount Lebanon. Following in the footsteps of his father, Nasif, who had done pioneer work in rediscovering the Arabic literary heritage, he made a significant contribution to the Arab cultural and political awakening of the late nineteenth century. Like his father, he maintained a close relationship with the American and British Protestant missionaries in Beirut and played an important role in the revitalization of Arabic as a literary language. A member of the Syrian Scientific Society, an early secret society made up of Arab intellectuals and military officers who agitated for Arab independence from the Ottoman Empire, Yaziji is best remembered for an ode, first recited at a secret meeting of the society, which called upon Arabs to remember their past greatness and shake off Turkish rule. This ode and several other poems of his were memorized by a generation of Arab nationalists and inspired the incipient political movement for Arab independence.

See also ARAB NATIONALISM.

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Guilain P. Denoeux

YAZIJI, NASIF
[1800–1871]

Lebanese Christian scholar and author.

Nasif Yaziji played a significant role in revitalizing Arabic literary traditions. He was employed by Bashir Chehab, the amir of Lebanon, and moved to Beirut in 1840 to help U.S. missionaries prepare Arabic text-books for use in Christian mission schools. Yaziji appreciated classical Arabic literature and campaigned to eliminate the corruptions that had been absorbed into the language. His writings helped revive practices of classical scholarship and made classical literature important in contemporary Arab culture.

Mark Mechler

YEHOSHUA, AVRAHAM B.
[1936–]

Israeli novelist, essayist, and professor of literature.

Avraham Yehoshua was born in Jerusalem into a fifth-generation Sephardic family and now lives in Haifa, where he teaches literature at the University of Haifa. A peace activist and a staunch defender of the Zionist project in his essays, he is best known as one of Israel's foremost novelists. Although he has published both plays and collections of short stories, the latter in his early writings, his greatest works are his seven novels, all of which have been translated into English. His novels are complex, full of humor and compassion, at times highly innovative in style, steeped in the classical modernist tradition, and always crafted with the highest literary skill. Recurrent themes in his novels are love and identity, history and choice, dialogue, and desire, all of which are embedded in the drama of the Jewish people and modern Israel. His masterpiece, *Mr. Mani,* highlights his skill at its finest, rivaling the best of world literature produced in the twentieth century. Israel's equivalent of U.S. novelist William Faulkner, Yehoshua has been the recipient of many prizes: the Brenner Prize in 1983, the Alterman Prize in 1986, the Bialik Prize in 1988, and the American Prize for the Best Jewish Book in 1990 and 1993. He was the inaugural winner of the Israeli Booker Prize in 1991 and in 1995 he received Israel's highest literary honor, the Israel Prize. His books have been translated into many languages. They have also been made into movies and adapted for the stage, television, and radio.

See also Literature: Hebrew.

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Ann Kahn
Updated by Stephen Schecter

YELLIN-MOR, NATAN
[1913–1980]

Israeli underground leader.

Born Nathan Friedman-Yellin in Grodno, Poland, Yellin-Mor was an activist in the Polish branch of Betar and the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi. He was coeditor, along with Abraham (Yair) Stern, of *Di Tat,* the Irgun's Polish newspaper. He followed Stern to Palestine and became a major figure in Stern's virulently anti-British underground, Lohamei Herut Yisrael (LEHI: Freedom Fighters of Israel). In December 1941 he attempted to reach neutral Turkey via Syria to negotiate with Nazi representatives for a mass release of Jews from Eastern Europe in exchange for LEHI's cooperation in fighting Britain.

Upon his return he was imprisoned by the British but escaped in 1943. After Stern's death, Yellin-Mor became a member of the LEHI triumvirate, along with Israel Eldad and Yitzhak Shamir. In 1949 he was tried and convicted for the September 1948 assassination of United Nations emissary Count Folke Bernadotte, but the sentence was commuted in exchange for an oath to desist from any further violent activities. He led the left-wing faction of both LEHI and its post-statehood political entity, the Fighters Party, and he was elected to the First Knesset (1949–1951). In the ensuing years he moved increasingly to the left. He renounced Zionism and advocated a pro-Soviet foreign policy and the creation of a single Arab-Jewish socialist state in all of what had been Mandatory Palestine.

See also BERNADOTTE, FOLKE; SHAMIR, YITZHAK; STERN, ABRAHAM.

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BRYAN DAVES
UPDATED BY PIERRE M. ATLAS

YEMEN

A state on the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula.

The Republic of Yemen was created in May 1990 as a result of the merger of the two previous states that used the name Yemen: the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR; often called North Yemen) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY; often called South Yemen). The merger brought together two disparate political systems: the North had been governed by a military/tribal elite, which supported a free-market economy, whereas the South had been governed by a Marxist-Leninist political elite, which had introduced one of the most centrally directed economies in the modern world. After a transition period, the president of the North, Ali Abdullah Salih, was made president of the new unified state.

Population

In 2000, the population was estimated at 17.5 million, not including an indeterminate number of Yemenis living and working abroad, primarily in Arabian Peninsula states. Yemen has one of the highest birthrates in the world, as well as a high infant mortality rate; the net rate of annual increase is estimated at 3.6 percent.

Area and Borders

Since Yemen is one of the few states in the modern world without completely demarcated borders, it is not possible to give a precise figure for its total area. The northeast and east still have no internationally (or even locally) accepted borders. This has led to numerous border disputes and even wars between Saudi Arabia and both of the previously existing Yemens since the 1920s. The border with Saudi Arabia was demarcated as far as the Najran oasis after the Saudi-Yemeni War of 1934; this conflict also gave control of the Asir region to the Saudi state through a treaty renewed every twenty years, creating continued difficulties in relations between the two states. In the northeast, the generally recognized end of Yemeni sovereignty lies east of Maʾrib; with the discovery of oil and gas deposits in this area, however, new conflicts over the border between the two states arose in this area in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The demarcation of the border with Oman was officially completed in 1995, but despite repeated memoranda of agreement with Saudi Arabia in the 1990s, as well as a contract with a German firm to undertake its delineation in 2001, that process has yet to be completed. In the mid-1990s, a new set of border disagreements arose; these involved numerous islets in the Red Sea, the ownership of which was disputed with Eritrea as well as Saudi Arabia. A UN arbitration panel awarded the islands to Yemen in 1999, but the agreement specifically avoided defining the maritime boundary in a way that would offend the claims of Saudi Arabia. To the south, Yemen lies on the Gulf of Aden. The old border between the North and South—created by the Ottoman and the British empires in the early years of the twentieth century and technically abolished as a result of the union of 1990—nevertheless continues to be of some political importance.

Major Cities

Sanʿa is the most important, largest, and probably the oldest city in Yemen—it is mentioned in the Bible under its old name, Uzal. By 2000, its population was considerably more than 1 million. It has been the capital city of Yemen for most of the past

two millennia (with the exception of the reign of Imam Ahmad, 1948–1962, in which he moved the capital to Taʿiz) and became the administrative (political) capital of the new republic after unification. Its old city has been placed on the list of World Heritage Sites because of its unique architecture and historical importance; many of the buildings are more than 800 years old.

Aden, the capital of the former PDRY, has the best port on the Arabian Peninsula. For more than a century, until the late 1960s, it was a major British military and commercial possession. After unification, it was made the economic and commercial capital of the country, but its role in the civil war of 1994 and subsequent events caused it to lose some of its significance.

Hodeida (al-Hudayda) is the major port of the former North Yemen. Its facilities were extensively modernized by the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Consequently, it grew rapidly from a sleepy Red Sea fishing port handling primarily local trade to a major metropolitan area.

Taʿiz, the major city of the southern highlands of the former North Yemen, is located in one of the richest agricultural areas. Its population, predominantly of the Islamic Shafiʿi sect, had the longest and best-developed contacts with the outside world during the reigns of Imams Yahya and Ahmad in the twentieth century.

Although the country has a few smaller cities (e.g., Ibb, Dhamar, Saʿada and Zabid in the north, and Mukalla, Tarim, and Shibam in the south), the vast majority of the population lives in villages, each with an average population of fewer than 200 people. Yemen probably has the most decentralized population of any contemporary state.

Geography and Climate

Yemen's location, combined with its geographical characteristics, gives it the most favorable climate and agricultural resources of any country on the Arabian Peninsula. The country is divided into a number of relatively clear zones: The first of these, along the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea coasts, is hot and humid; from there, the land slopes upward into the first range of hills and low mountains, where the climate is considerably more temperate; eventually, after a series of high plains, the peaks of the cen-

Map by XNR Productions, Inc. The Gale Group.

The Qubbat Talha Mosque, which sits in Yemen's capital city of Sanʿa. © CHRIS LISLE/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

tral massif reach between 11,000 and 13,000 feet (3,355–3,965 m). These mountains have been terraced from time immemorial, and a vast array of fruits, vegetables, and grains (and the infamous qat plant) can be raised in the many microclimates created by this geography. In the central mountains, the humidity is low and the temperatures moderate, although in the winter it is not unusual to find temperatures below freezing and the occasional snow or ice storm. Over the centuries, the Yemenis have developed plant strains to occupy the many microclimates. On the other side of the central massif and away from the monsoons, which deliver the rain that makes extensive agriculture possible on the westward side, the land slopes away into the great central desert of Arabia, the Rub al-Khali, broken only by the great Hadramawt Valley, the home of numerous towns exploiting the limited water resources found there. The rainfall that the various mountain ranges wring out of the prevailing winds varies widely—from less than 3 inches (7.62 cm) per year in the deserts and northern reaches of the country to about 38 inches (96.52 cm) per year in some of the areas around Taʿiz—about the same as in Seattle, New York, or Chicago.

Political Subdivisions

Administratively, the two preunification Yemeni states varied considerably. The units into which the two states were organized were frequently modified, sometimes as the result of political expediency and at other times due to the nature of the personnel available for major administrative duties. For example, in the PDRY, the first administrative reorganization sought to get rid of the old tribally organized political entities, which had been called the protectorates. Later, the state undertook to recreate some of these entities under new names to regain popular support. In the North, after the revolution, the number of administrative units (governorates) rose with the growth in the population as well as with the increasing number and variety of

demands for governmental services. In the immediate aftermath of reunification, the number and characteristics of the administrative subunits within the two separate entities were largely retained. On the other hand, electoral districts have been substantially increased and modified over the years.

The Economy

The natural resource base of Yemen has begun to be developed, largely because it was not until the 1960s that either the North or the South had the opportunity to assess that base or attempt its development. The most important contemporary resources are oil and gas deposits, which were discovered in both North and South Yemen prior to unification and which contributed significantly to the push for unification. The majority of the population of Yemen continues to be employed in the agricultural sector, although productivity is not adequate to the requirements of the population. The multiplicity of microclimates makes it possible to grow just about any fruit or vegetable, from the citrus fruits, bananas, and cotton of the hot coastal plain, through the coffee, grains, and qat (a small tree valued for the alkaloids contained in its leaves) of the middle highlands, to the pears, grapes, and nuts of the high mountains.

Although industrial development has been a priority in both North and South Yemen since independence, it has not reached the stage where industry is a significant factor in the economy of either region. In fact, Yemen operates a monumental deficit in its current accounts because it has few exportable resources. Until 1991, the most important positive element in its balance of payments was the remittances of its large workforce in the various Gulf states and in other countries. Following the 1991 Gulf War, however, the majority of Yemenis abroad were forced to return home (some 800,000 from Saudi Arabia alone), creating a massive social and economic problem. Since then, a variety of international loans and development assistance funds have helped to ameliorate the continuing economic problems.

Culture

The population of Yemen is ethnically Arab, although of different origins. The majority is descended from the ancient south Arabian peoples, and the remainder immigrated from the Fertile Crescent area more than a thousand years ago.

Arabic is the official language. Although everyone speaks it, there are substantial differences in dialect from region to region. In some of the more remote areas of the island of Socotra (located in the Gulf of Aden) Mahri is still spoken.

The overwhelming majority of Yemenis are Muslims. They are, however, divided into different sects: In the northern areas, the Zaydis, members of a branch of Shiʿism, predominate; in the southern areas, the Shafiʿis, who follow a branch of Sunni Islam, are in the majority. There are, in addition, Ismaʿilis, members of another branch of Shiʿism, in the northern mountains; in and around Saʿada there are also small settlements of Jews.

The educational infrastructure is in a state of flux. Until the revolution of 1962, an insignificant number of people received any formal education. After the revolution, the government embarked on a major program to establish educational institutions, from primary schools to universities, of which there are several, including those at Sanʿa, Taʿiz, and Aden; these were, in the overwhelming majority of cases, coeducational. In the 1990s, however, Islamists gained increasing political power and began to impose their views on the educational establishment. Owing to several incidents in which the government saw the hand of Islamic extremists, the government began to implement earlier legislation intended to bring independent religious institutions under the control of the Ministry of Education, closing many, eventually even the private al-Iman University, operated by perhaps the most extreme Islamic leader in Yemen, Shaykh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, and considered the center of Islamic extremism.

Government

Yemen is governed under a constitution that was approved by the parliaments of the two Yemens in 1990 and by popular referendum in 1991. This constitution declares Yemen to be a parliamentary democracy, with an executive appointed by and responsible to the parliament (the Council of Deputies). In 1994, Ali Abdullah Salih was elected by the coun-

A woman carries a child through an alley in Sanʿa, Yemen. © CHRIS LISLE/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

cil to a five-year term as president. In 1999, due to changes in the law, the first direct elections to the presidency were held; Salih was overwhelmingly elected to a seven-year term. His only real opponent was the son of the former leader of the PDRY, Najib Qahtan al-Shaʿabi, although there were two additional candidates.

Elections to the new parliament were held in April 1993, with some eight parties and a sizable number of independents taking seats. Three parties dominated the outcome: the General People's Congress (GPC), formerly dominant in the North and associated with Ali Abdullah Salih; the Islah, now commonly referred to as the Yemeni Islah Party (YIP), a coalition of tribal and Islamic interests led by the second most influential political figure in the country, Shaykh Abdullah al-Ahmar of the Hashid Tribal Confederation; and the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), formerly dominant in the South and led by Ali Salim al-Baydh, who had become vice president of the new state. Other parties exist, including a Nasserist party. The second election to the Council of Deputies took place in 1997; the aftermath of the 1994 civil war, however, meant that the role and influence of the YSP was considerably reduced, and the YSP boycotted the elections (al-Baydh went into exile). Consequently, the GPC gained 187 of the 301 seats, with its only serious competition, the YIP, gaining only 53. In the next round of elections, in April 2003, the GPC's margin of victory increased to 238 of 301 seats; the YIP could only manage 46 seats, and the YSP was reduced to 8 seats.

History

Some 2,000 years ago, Yemen (known as Arabia Felix to the Roman geographers) was famous and its city-states (e.g., Saba/Sheba, Maʿin), grew powerful and wealthy due to their monopoly over the trade in frankincense and myrrh. Once this monopoly was

broken, Yemen retreated from the world stage. It was not until coffee became an important international trade commodity in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries that Yemen once again achieved renown. However, its early monopoly over coffee was broken by foreign traders and governments, and it once again became a little-known province of various empires on the Red Sea.

The contemporary state of Yemen was created by two states with different historical experiences during the past two centuries. Although occasionally united in the past, they had not been so since 1728. Developments in the nineteenth century, however, are most important to an understanding of the events that led to the reunification of North and South Yemen in 1990.

In 1839, the British took the city of Aden in South Yemen in order to have a major port in the western Indian Ocean and to forestall further expansion by other parties in the Arabian Peninsula. Over the years, British interests continued to grow, and they eventually established extensive links with the multitude of principalities located in Aden's (Yemeni) hinterland.

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire, which had occupied Yemen for a variety of strategic and economic reasons but which had departed in the early seventeenth century, decided to return. One motive was to play a role in the Red Sea trade, as it had in the past, although there were other factors; this goal increased in importance with the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869. Eventually, British and Ottoman interests in southwestern Arabia clashed; the two powers decided to negotiate a frontier between their zones of influence and interest. Beginning in 1902, they agreed to demarcate a border between them; the agreement that was eventually signed in 1914 created the frontier between the Ottoman possession that became the Kingdom of Yemen (North Yemen) after World War I and the British Aden Protectorates, which became South Yemen.

Under the reigns of Imams Yahya and Ahmad (1918–1962), North Yemen remained largely cut off from the rest of the world, while Aden and the protectorates in the south received British subsidies and Aden developed into one of the world's busiest ports. Both states, however, had political movements that sought change. In 1962, a revolution broke out in North Yemen, which sought to create a republic and remove the conservative Zaydi imam(s) from power. After an eight-year civil war, the two major factions compromised and created the Yemen Arab Republic. Imam Muhammad al-Badr, the titular head of the effort to restore the imamate, fled to Saudi Arabia and eventually died in exile in Great Britain. Shortly after the revolution broke out in North Yemen, various groups in South Yemen began to work for independence from Great Britain. After a lengthy and often violent conflict, the British agreed to withdraw from Aden and its protectorates in 1967. The group to which they ceded power, the National Front for the Liberation of South Yemen, created the People's Republic of South Yemen (later the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen).

Although both Yemens spoke of the goal of reunification, relations between them were often extraordinarily poor, due largely to their different economic and political systems. The North was governed by a military elite, which was tied to the West and permitted an almost unrestricted, though underdeveloped, capitalist economy to operate; in the South, a Marxist-Leninist political elite took power and tied the country to the communist bloc. Relations between the two states deteriorated into two separate wars—in 1972 and 1979.

In the late 1980s, oil (and later natural gas) was discovered in both Yemens; more importantly, it was found in the disputed border areas between them. The effort to develop these deposits without wasting further resources in fruitless wars largely overlapped with the decline of the Soviet Union (and some of its satellites that had provided important assistance to South Yemen). As a result, the potential benefits of a unified effort to develop their oil and gas deposits overcame the mutual suspicions and frictions that had characterized the previous twenty-five years, leading to the unity agreement of 1990. Friction between the North and the South did not disappear, however. Disputes within the original coalition government of the General People's Congress and the Yemeni Socialist Party led to a civil war from May through July 1994. The South suffered a complete defeat, which resulted in the forced exile of its leaders and the concomitant ascent of the Islah Party (YIP).

Perhaps the most important development of the 1990s, however, was the increase in Islamist sentiment and support. Fearful of its growing influence, the GPC (and Salih) undertook various measures to limit Islamist power, including seeking a rapprochement with a truncated YSP. The growing influence of the Islamists in Yemen was most dramatically illustrated by the attack, in 2000, by allies and supporters of al-Qaʿida against the USS *Cole* while it was refueling in Aden. Numerous incidents of political violence involving previously unknown groups (e.g., the Sympathizers of al-Qaʿida) heightened fears in Yemen and the West that the country had become a major breeding and training ground for radical Islamist groups. Salih's government had to walk a fine line between recognizing the increased Islamist sentiment in the population and accommodating the interests and concerns of its grantors of financial and political support, including the United States. The fact that the government did not control all of its territory and that its borders were porous did nothing to assuage the fears of the United States and Europe.

See also Aden; *Cole,* USS; Hadramawt; Hodeida; Ismaʿili Shiʿism; Maʾrib; People's Democratic Republic of Yemen; Qaʿida, al-; Salih, Ali Abdullah; Sanʿa; Socotra; Taʿiz; Yemen Arab Republic; Yemen Civil War; Yemen Dynasties; Zaydism.

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YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

The official name of North Yemen from 1962 until its 1990 merger with South Yemen.

The emergence of North Yemen as a single political unit in modern times was largely a function of both the reoccupation of the country by the Ottomans in 1849 and the Yemeni resistance to this presence that coalesced around the imamate near the turn of the century. Defeat in World War I forced the Ottomans to withdraw in 1918, and a resurgent imamate state seized the opportunity. From 1918 until 1962, Yahya ibn Muhammad Hamid al-Din and his son Ahmad ibn Yahya Hamid al-Din acted to forge a monarchy much as the kings of England and France had done centuries earlier. The two imams strengthened the state, thereby securing Yemen's borders and pacifying the interior to degrees rarely known over the past millennium.

The imams used the strengthened imamate to revive North Yemen's traditional Islamic culture and society, this at a time when traditional societies around the world were crumbling under the weight of modernity backed by imperial power. They were aided in their efforts to insulate Yemen by the degree to which its agricultural economy was self-contained and self-sufficient. The result was a "backward" Yemen, though a small but increasing number of Yemenis exposed to the modern world wanted change and blamed the imamate for its absence. This produced a fateful chain of events: the birth of the Free Yemeni movement in the mid-1940s; the aborted 1948 revolution that left Imam Yahya dead; the failed 1955 coup against Imam Ahmad; and, finally, the 1962 revolution that yielded the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR).

Major Eras

In retrospect, the history of the YAR can best be divided into three periods. (1) The Sallal era (1962–1967), the wrenching first five years under President Abdullah al-Sallal, was marked by the revolution that began it, the long civil war and Egyptian



The Dar al-Hajar, or Rock Palace, in Wadi Dhahr, Yemen. This palace was built for Imam Yahya in the 1930s. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Imam Yahya assumed control over North Yemen. His family ruled the country until revolutionaries ended their authoritarian rule and created the Yemen Arab Republic in 1962. © EARL & NAZIMA KOWALL/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISISON.

intervention that quickly followed, and—above all—the rapid and irreversible opening of the country to the modern world. (2) A ten-year transition period (1967–1977) was marked by the end of the civil war, the republican-royalist reconciliation under President Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, and the attempt by President Ibrahim al-Hamdi to strengthen the state and restructure politics. (3) The Salih era (1978–1990) is identified with both the long tenure of President Ali Abdullah Salih and the change from political weakness and economic uncertainty at the outset to relative political stability, the discovery of oil, and the prospect of oil-based development and prosperity in more recent years.

Of the many important changes that took place in the YAR since its birth in 1962, most of the positive ones have been compressed into the years since its fifteenth anniversary in 1977. Nevertheless, the previous decade was important, a transition in which much-needed time was bought by a few modest but pivotal acts and, most important, by economic good fortune. Global and regional economic events over which the YAR had no control facilitated a huge flow of funds into the country in the form of both foreign aid and remittances from Yemenis working abroad. This period of transition was necessary because the changes that had buffeted Yemen in the five years following the 1962 revolution had left it both unable to retreat into the past and ill-equipped to go forward. The ability to advance rapidly in the 1980s seems very much the result of the possibility afforded for a breather in the 1970s.

Establishing Sovereignty

Given the isolation and the decentralized nature of North Yemeni society, much of the YAR's first quarter-century was taken up with the effort to establish sovereignty over the land and people. The Yemenis who made the revolution in 1962 were preoccupied from the outset with the need to create a state with the capacity to maintain public security and provide services. The long civil war that came on the heels of the revolution both increased this need and interfered with meeting it. Yemeni state-building was more hindered than helped by the fact that the new state was largely built and staffed by Egyptians and by the fact that Egyptian forces did most of the fighting on behalf of the Yemenis.

The balance of power between the tribal periphery and the state at the center tipped back toward the tribes during the civil war. As a result, the reach of the YAR extended little beyond the triangle in the southern half of the country that was traced by the roads linking the cites of Sanʿa, Taʿiz, and Hodeida (al-Hudayda).

State-Building Efforts

The YAR created in 1962 lacked modern political organization. A major theme of its first twenty-five years consisted of attempts to fashion the ideas and organization needed to channel support and de-

mands from society to the regime and, conversely, to channel information, appeals, and directives from the regime to society. The civil war strained and even deformed the new republic, deferring any major effort at political construction under President al-Sallal. Egypt's heavy-handed tutelage left little room for Yemeni national politics and politicians to develop.

As with other late-developing countries, the tasks of state-building in the new YAR went beyond the maintenance of order and security to include the creation of a capacity to influence, if not control, the rate and direction of socioeconomic change. The wrenching effects of the sudden end of isolation and of virtual self-sufficiency made it obvious that state-building in all of its aspects was desperately needed. No less than the viability and survival of Yemen in its new external environment depended upon it, just as the civil war and the political weakness of the YAR made it unlikely.

The Egyptian exodus in 1967 led to the quick overthrow of President al-Sallal and the republican-royalist reconciliation that finally ended the civil war in 1970. Some state-building of importance was achieved thereafter by the regime headed by President al-Iryani. A modern constitution was adopted in 1970, and some of the ministries and other agencies erected after the revolution were strengthened. Economic needs as well as political constraints caused Yemeni leaders during the al-Iryani era to focus on financial and economic institutions; only halting first steps were taken toward reform of the civil service and the armed forces, matters of great political sensitivity. President al-Hamdi, who forced President al-Iryani into exile in 1974, believed in the modern state and worked to realize it. He promoted efforts to build institutions at the center, initiated the first major reform and upgrading of the armed forces, and fostered the idea of exchanging the benefits of state-sponsored development for allegiance to the state.

The results of efforts by the Iryani and Hamdi regimes at political construction were modest. The price of the reconciliation was the first-time granting of office and influence in the state to leading tribal shaykhs and the expulsion of the modernist Left from the body politic—prices that weakened the position of all advocates of a strong state. The result was the narrowly based center-right republican regime, which, with changes, persisted from the late 1960s until at least the early 1980s. The chief institutional focus of politics during the Iryani era was the Consultative Council, which first convened after elections in early 1971. However, political parties were banned and, in the absence of explicit organizational and ideological ties, the council functioned as an assembly of local notables, especially the shaykhs.

President al-Hamdi was unable to strengthen his position by translating his great popularity into political organization. Indeed, his major political achievement actually narrowed the political base of his regime and shortened the reach of the state. Aware that the shaykhs were using their new positions to protect the tribal system, al-Hamdi moved swiftly to drive them from the Consultative Council and from other state offices. To this end, he dissolved the council and suspended the 1970 constitution. The tribes responded with virtual rebellion. Al-Hamdi's efforts to make up for this loss of support by reincorporating the modernist Left were hesitant. In addition to maintaining ties to old leftist friends, he launched both the Local Development Association (LDA) movement and the Correction movement. Despite their initial promise, al-Hamdi seems to have had second thoughts and to have pulled back from efforts to use these two initiatives as bases for a broad, popular political movement. His subsequent plans for a general people's congress ended with his assassination in 1977. Frustrated by his failure to grant them reentry into the polity, several leftist groups in 1976 created the National Democratic Front (NDF), which a few years later became the basis of the rebellion that challenged the Salih regime.

Socioeconomic Development of the 1970s

The civil war finally behind it, the YAR in the 1970s did undergo significant socioeconomic development based upon the rapid creation of a modest capacity to absorb generous amounts of economic and technical assistance from abroad and, most important, from the massive inflow of workers' remittances that fostered unprecedented consumption and prosperity. Whereas the remittances largely flowed through the private sector, the modest strengthening of state

institutions and the increase in their capacities were the critical factors in Yemen's ability to absorb significantly increased foreign aid. By the late 1970s, work on a broad array of state-sponsored, foreign-assisted infrastructure, agricultural, and human resource development projects existed side by side with high levels of remittance-fueled consumption and economic activity in the private sector.

The Salih Regime

President Salih's long term in office, beginning in 1978, was witness to major gains in state-building. After a shaky start, the Salih regime slowly increased the capacity of the state in the provinces as well as in the cities, for the first time making the republican state more than just a nominal presence in the countryside. The armed forces were upgraded again in 1979 and, more recently, in 1986 and 1988. Modest efforts were made to improve the functioning of the civil service, ministries, and other agencies.

The Salih regime increased its dominance over lands controlled by the tribes, especially the large area that fans out north and east from San'a, the capital. However, the best evidence of the growing ability of the YAR to exercise power within its own borders was the political-military defeat of the NDF. With its origins in the expulsion of the Left from the republic in 1968, the NDF rebellion had finally burst into flame over a wide area by early 1980. This uprising was extinguished in 1982, and the state was able at last to establish a real presence in lands bordering South Yemen.

In 1979, the Salih regime had little political support outside the armed forces. After the failure of ad hoc efforts to change this, the regime put in place an impressive program of political construction during the first half of the 1980s. This phased, sequential program began in early 1980 with the drafting of the National Pact. The pact then became the subject of a long national dialogue and local plebiscites orchestrated by the National Dialogue Committee. Elections to the General People's Congress (GPC), and its several-day session, were held in mid-1982 to review and then to adopt the National Pact. This done, the GPC declared itself a permanent political organization, which would be selected every four years, meet biennially and be led by a seventy-five-member Standing Committee headed by President Salih.

The key to the success of the Salih regime's political effort lay in the flexible, step-by-step process by which it moved the Yemeni polity from where it was in 1979 to the holding of the GPC in 1982. By design and a bit of luck, moreover, this sustained initiative also provided a political process largely managed by the regime into which elements of the Yemeni left could be safely incorporated when, in 1982, the NDF rebellion was quelled. Two dialogues, the one between the regime and the NDF as well as the more public one between the regime and the rest of the nation, converged in a structure that facilitated a second national reconciliation.

Although President Salih insisted that the GPC was not a political party, its activities were clearly aimed at consensus-building, guidance, and control—typical functions of a party. In fact, the GPC did become an umbrella party, a loose organization of organizations in a society that was not well organized politically for many of the tasks of the modern world. The Salih regime was also buttressed by constitutional change during the 1980s. The 1970 constitution, suspended by al-Hamdi in 1974, had been reinstated confusingly in 1978 without its centerpiece, the Consultative Council, and with an amendment that formally created the presidency. Clarity and closure on a number of issues were not achieved until July 1988 when a new Consultative Council was finally chosen in accordance with the constitution. The council elections, the first since 1971, were hotly contested and relatively fair and open; despite the ban on parties, much partisanship was in evidence. In mid-July, the new council elected President Salih to a new term and then gave approval to the composition and program of the new government. As a result, for the first time since the Iryani regime was ousted in 1974, the head of state and the government were selected in accordance with the 1970 constitution, that is, by a properly chosen Consultative Council.

Oil and the Economy

The modest prosperity that the YAR enjoyed after the mid-1970s was paralleled by the modern sector's increasing vulnerability to negative economic and political forces, domestic and external. Politi-

cal uncertainty early in the Salih era threatened the limited capacity of the state to foster and manage development, and this was followed by the fall in oil prices and worldwide recession that led to sharp drops in aid and remittances to Yemen. Faced with economic crises, the regime in the early 1980s adopted austerity measures, and these had some success in forcing the country to live within more modest means in a less generous world.

The YAR's long-term development prospects improved abruptly when oil was discovered in commercial quantities in 1984. This event also placed severe demands on the still very limited capacities of the state. With the oil find, the twin tasks facing the Salih regime were to maintain the new discipline and austerity of the past few years and to gear up to absorb efficiently the oil revenues that were expected to start flowing in late 1987. Despite the politically difficult combination of rising expectations and continued hard times, the regime during this period of transition was able to limit imports and government expenditures. Changes in organization and the appointment of top technocrats to key posts contributed to the modest success of the transition. Although oil for export did begin to flow in late 1987, the regime was forced in 1989 to reimpose austerity measures that it had relaxed prematurely the previous year. Nevertheless, at the same time that it wrestled with these politically hard choices, the government proceeded as fast as financing would allow with development of the oil and gas sector as well as with key infrastructure and agricultural projects.

Development in the 1980s

In the 1980s, the increasing capacity of the Yemeni state for development also helped it to perform its more traditional functions and was partly understood and justified in these terms. This was especially the case when the regime stepped up efforts to extend its reach into NDF-influenced and tribal areas. Certain development efforts made the periphery more accessible and made possible the delivery of basic services to places where the state was regarded with suspicion or scorn. Hence the emphasis on pushing roads into such areas as soon as they were pacified. President Salih came to justify development efforts in terms of nation-state building—in terms of national integration—as well as economic gains. The development activities of the second half of the 1980s, as well as the content of the third Five-Year Development Plan adopted in 1988, reflected the continuing influence of these ideas.

This third period of YAR history, spanning the 1980s, ended with the creation of the Republic of Yemen, headed by President Salih. It was the political and economic turnaround of the YAR after the 1970s, as well as the sudden weakening of South Yemen in the late 1980s, that made possible the YAR-initiated merger.

See also Ahmad ibn Yahya Hamid al-Din; Free Yemenis; Yahya ibn Muhammad Hamid al-Din.

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YEMEN CIVIL WAR

The long, bitter, and costly struggle in North Yemen fought by the republicans and royalists between 1962 and 1970.

The Yemen Civil War began with the 1962 revolution and dragged on intermittently until 1970. The second half of the war coincided with a long drought, and the two forces in combination caused hunger, economic hardship, social dislocation, and many deaths in most parts of the country. Without a doubt, the struggle remains as one of a few defining memories of one if not two generations of Yemenis.

In addition, the civil war forced the deferral of most major efforts at political and socioeconomic

development in what would become the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) until the 1970s. Indeed, it was not until after reconciliation that the Yemenis could really begin to take the destiny of Yemen into their own hands. At the height of the struggle, the republicans, who were committed to creating a modern state and using it to overcome the weakness and "backwardness" of Yemen, controlled little more than the third of the country defined by the triangle formed by the roads connecting Sanʿa, Taʿiz, and Hodeida (al-Hudayda)—and much within the triangle was outside their effective control. Another third was controlled by the royalists and their tribal allies, and the last third by tribes and others either concerned with their own autonomy or willing to go either way if the price were right. If anything, the balance between the tribes and the state during these years was more in favor of the former than had been the case under the imamate just before the revolution.

The young imam Muhammad al-Badr survived the revolution on 26 September 1962, escaped from Sanʿa, and went on to rally many of the northern tribes and other allies of the imamate for an assault upon the new republic. The civil war was quickly regionalized when Egypt came in strongly on the side of the republicans and Saudi Arabia sided with the imam and the royalists; it was internationalized when the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe supported Egypt and the new YAR, and the United States and the United Kingdom deferred to the Saudis and their interests. As a result, the Yemen Civil War became a microcosmic battleground for the "Arab cold war" between revolutionary Arab nationalist republicans and conservative monarchists and, to a lesser extent, between the Soviet Union and its socialist bloc and the Free World.

The Egyptians, who clearly saved the republic in those first years, took control of fighting the civil war and came to look over time more and more like an occupier; bogged down, they came to call the Yemeni civil war "our Vietnam." Seen as a puppet of Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the regime headed by President Abdullah al-Sallal lost credibility and legitimacy. When Nasser withdrew his forces from Yemen on the occasion of the Arab-Israel War of 1967 (the Six-Day War), the Sallal regime collapsed in a matter of weeks, opening the way to the republican-royalist reconciliation that took another two years to consummate.

Although it put much state-building as well as socioeconomic development on hold and exacted a terrible price in human suffering, the civil war did open up an isolated and insulated Yemen to a flood of new ideas, institutions, and practices. The Yemen of the 1970s and later was able to grasp and utilize many of these new elements in a way that was impossible in the 1960s.

See also BADR, MUHAMMAD AL-; YEMEN; YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC.

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YEMEN DYNASTIES

Ruling families of the area known today as Yemen.

The Zaydi imamate in Yemen has its origins in 897, when al-Hadi ila al-Haqq Yahya became the first Zaydi imam (with his seat in Saʿda). His fame as an intellectual as well as a leader led to the invitation to Yemen; there he developed a multitude of policies that eventually became the basic guidelines for the religious as well as political characteristics of Yemeni Zaydism.

Yahya, however, was not able to consolidate his rule in all of Yemen; there were revolts as well as segments of the population that did not accept his pretensions to religio-political rule. Although he did not succeed in establishing any permanent administrative infrastructure, Yahya's descendants became the local aristocracy, and it is from among them that the imams of Yemen were selected for the next one thousand years.

Yemen throughout most of that period was only rarely a unified political entity; in fact, what was included within its frontiers varied widely, and it has not been governed consistently or uniformly by any single set of rulers. It existed as a part of a number of different political systems/ruling dynasties between the ninth and sixteenth centuries, after which it became a part of the Ottoman Empire.

After Imam Yahya's death, a multitude of smaller dynasties and families established themselves in the Tihama (the low coastal plain) as well as in the highlands. Among the better known of these are the Sulayhids, the Hatims, the Zuray'ids, and the Yu'firids. It was during this period, when the Fatimid state was influential, that a portion of the population was converted to Isma'ili Shi'ism.

Beginning with the conquest of Yemen by the family of Salah al-Din ibn Ayyub (Saladin) in 1174, a series of dynasties exercised a modicum of control and administration in Yemen for roughly the next 400 years; these are, in chronological sequence, the Ayyubids, from 1173/74 to 1228; the Rasulids, from 1228 to 1454; the Tahirids, from 1454 to 1517; and the Mamluks, from 1517 to 1538, when the Ottoman Empire took the Yemeni Tihama.

During most of this period, the dynasties and their rulers were primarily engaged in familial, regional, and occasionally sectarian disputes. Ironically, the Sunni Rasulids, who eventually concentrated their rule in southern Yemen for precisely that reason, were the dynasty under which the region experienced the greatest economic growth and political stability.

Very little is known about the Zaydi imams and their efforts to establish themselves and develop some form of administration (including tax collection), or their success in promoting Zaydi goals during this period. From the available evidence, there was very little continuity and a great deal of competition among the Zaydi families and clans. For example, in a presumably representative two-hundred-year period from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, there appear to have been more than twenty different candidates for the imamate, representing more than ten distinct clans.

Eventually, as the Europeans entered the Middle East, specifically the Portuguese and then others in the effort to control the Red Sea trade, Yemen and its Zaydi imams were increasingly unable to maintain their independence. It was not until the ascendancy of Imam Qasim ibn Muhammad and his son al-Mu'ayyad Muhammad in the early seventeenth century that the Zaydi Yemenis were able to resist the Ottoman Empire's forces and become an independent political entity.

See also Isma'ili Shi'ism; Zaydism.

Manfred W. Wenner

YEMEN HUNT OIL COMPANY

U.S. company that first discovered and developed oil in Yemen.

The Yemen Hunt Oil Company (YHOC), a subsidiary of the Hunt Oil Company of Dallas, was the first foreign company to discover and develop oil in North Yemen; the location was the Ma'ib al-Jawf basin, on the edge of the desert in the eastern part of the country, and the year was 1984. Partnering with Exxon and a Korean oil company, the company rapidly developed the production-for-export capacity of that basin and built a pipeline to a terminus on the Red Sea; crude oil began to flow in 1987. YHOC also discovered very sizable natural gas deposits in the area, as yet undeveloped. In addition, it was the operator in another consortium that discovered, developed, and then began producing oil during the 1990s in what, prior to Yemeni unification, was the neutral zone between the Ma'ib al-Jawf basin in North Yemen and the Shabwa region of South Yemen. Called the Jannah field, this area became an important contributor to oil production in unified Yemen. Hailed from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s as the ally and economic savior of Yemen, the YHOC in recent years has become something of a whipping boy over such issues as "Yemenization" and allegedly questionable accounting procedures.

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YEMENI SOCIALIST PARTY

Yemeni political party.

Created in October 1978 as the "vanguard party" required by Marxist-Leninist theory, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) superseded the United Political Organization of the National Front, which in

turn had replaced the National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (the National Front), created in 1963. The latter, which was made up of seven smaller groupings, including the Arab Nationalist movement, eventually emerged as the strongest and best organized of the various groups competing for leadership of Aden and the protectorates in opposition to the British presence.

As the sole party in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), it was the organization that arranged the union of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen with the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in 1990. Thereafter, it became one of the three major parties in the unified state. However, the elections of 1993 led to a civil war between the former PDRY and YAR, with the leaders of the YSP declaring a new Democratic Republic of Yemen in the South in May 1994. Soundly defeated by the central government, the party's leaders went into exile. Thereafter, the party's northern branch elected a new leadership, none of whose members had participated in the Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Tensions between the other two major parties in the unified Yemen, and the YSP's continued significant support in the South, resulted in a desire to return the YSP to some role in the central government in the late 1990s. Although the YSP boycotted the 1997 elections, some of its members were elected as independents. By the time of the 1999 presidential election, northern members of the YSP had been reintegrated into the political system, and although the actual head of the YSP was disqualified as a candidate, Najib Qahtan al-Shaʿabi, the son of the first president of South Yemen, was approved. In 2000, the YSP joined a bloc of opposition parties to create the Supreme Opposition Council, and in 2003 it participated in the parliamentary elections, gaining 8 percent of the seats.

See also PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN; YEMEN; YEMEN CIVIL WAR.

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MANFRED W. WENNER

YEMENI WOMEN'S UNION

Oldest women's organization in Yemen.

The Yemeni Women's Union (YWU; Ittihad Nisa al-Yaman) is the oldest women's organization in Yemen, with roots in the preindependence era. The present organization was formed in 1990 by combining the northern and southern branches following the unification of Yemen. In the north, the Yemeni Women's Association (YWA) was established in 1965 with branches in the biggest towns. Without official recognition, the main task of the YWA was to promote literacy and job skills among women. In the south, the General Union of Yemeni Women was formed in 1968 to continue the work of two women's organizations (the Arab Women's Club and the Aden Women's Association) established during the British colonial era. It played a vital role in empowering women and promoting the politics of women's emancipation. Soon after unification, the YWU lost official backing, its funding was minimized, and it faced problems in harmonizing its activities. Whereas the southern branch was dominated by socialists, the Sanaa branch in the north was run by women from the Islah Party. The membership of the united organization is around 4,000. The YWU aims at attaining rights and legitimacy for women, gender equity, and women's advocacy. The union has played an important role in promoting women's increased participation in elections. YWU branches are found today in most governorates, with projects funded by foreign donors. These include microcredit schemes, basic health-

care services, and job-skills training for women. The union is an active participant in fighting violence against women, the goal that unites most Yemeni nongovernmental organizations.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; GENDER: GENDER AND POLITICS; YEMEN.

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SUSANNE DAHLGREN

YENI MECMUA

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

YESHIVA

A school in which the Talmud, Jewish legal codes, and rabbinic literature and commentaries are the primary subjects of study.

Although *semikha* (rabbinic ordination) may be an outcome of yeshiva study, yeshivas are institutions intended for all Jewish males who wish to advance their study of Judaism. Originally, it was the local place to sit and study texts. Yeshivas became places where scholars gathered, where each famous and learned teacher attracted his own students. In eighteenth-century Lithuania, where the modern form was developed, yeshivas drew students from a variety of European localities and provided the students with a formal curriculum, a place to stay, and often a stipend as well.

Yeshiva education consists of endless hours of vocal and intensive review of texts with fellow students *(khavruseh).* Usually once a day, after posting a bibliography and a series of textual glosses that students must explore in advance, a teacher will give a *shiur* (lesson in Talmud). Some modern yeshivas include secular studies as well (they are often called day schools in North America and *yeshivot tikhoniyot* in Israel).

In Israel, yeshivas are numerous; some embrace the ideals of religious Zionism, and some deny them. The former encompass *hesder* yeshivas, whose students combine military service with study; the latter have students who are exempted from military service. Among the most prominent of the former are the Etzion Yeshiva, Merkaz ha-Rav Kook, and Kerem b'Yavneh. Among the latter are the Ponovez Yeshiva, in B'nei B'rak, and the Mir Yeshiva, in Jerusalem. The greatest growth has been in yeshivas connected with Sephardim.

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YIDDISH

A vernacular language used by Ashkenazic Jews.

A language based on Germanic dialects infused with Hebrew and loanwords from areas in Europe in which it was spoken, Yiddish is the vernacular used by Ashkenazic Jews since the European Middle Ages. As Hebrew became primarily the language of liturgy and religious scholarship, Yiddish, by the end of the eighteenth century, emerged as the vehicle for the expression of secular literature, drama, poetry, and popular literature. By the nineteenth century, Yiddish was established as the la nguage of a secular European Jewish culture found mainly in Eastern Europe.

The Zionist ideology that stressed the return to Palestine and the use of Hebrew as the language of the Jewish nation was instrumental in the revival of Hebrew. In the language controversy that ensued in the early part of the twentieth century, Hebrew gained prominence over Yiddish and became the official language of the Yishuv and, later, the State of Israel. Yiddish increasingly became identified with Jews and Jewish culture of the diaspora. In response to the Holocaust and the liquidation of Yiddish culture under Soviet rule there has been a resurgent interest in the Yiddish language both in Israel and in North America. As a spoken language Yiddish has become the established vernacular of Orthodox Haredi and Hasidic Jews.

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Updated by Neil Caplan

YILDIRIM ARMY

Special Ottoman strike force, also known as the Thunderbolt, or Seventh Army.

The army was organized in early 1917 by Enver Paşa to defend the Eastern Front in World War I. It comprised fourteen Ottoman divisions headed by German General Erich von Falkenhayn and included six thousand German soldiers and sixty-five top Ottoman officers, including General Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). Enver Paşa had originally planned this special army to recapture Iraq but, in March 1917, sent it to block the new British and Arab campaign in Palestine, where they joined the Fourth Army at Gaza and won an initial victory.

The Ottoman-German effort, however, was weakened by conflicts over jurisdiction, by Turkish nationalist dissent toward the German leadership, and by matériel disadvantages. In the autumn of 1917, the British and Arab offensive forced an Ottoman withdrawal to Damascus, with heavy losses on 27 December. The Allied drive resumed the next autumn, and, on 1 October 1918, British General Edmund Allenby and the Arab nationalist revolt forced the Ottomans to evacuate the Syrian capital. Allenby's troops, aided by French forces landing at Beirut, nearly annihilated the Yildirim Army as the Ottomans were driven back to Alexandretta within two weeks. General Otto Liman von Sanders gave command of the Yildirim to Mustafa Kemal after the Mudros Armistice took effect 31 October, and Kemal surrendered at Adana on 13 November 1918.

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Elizabeth Thompson

YISHUV

The Jewish community in Palestine from the Ottoman period through the British Mandate.

Yishuv refers to the Jewish population—including the pre-Zionist Jewish community known as the Old Yishuv—living in Palestine before the State of Israel was proclaimed in 1948. The Old Yishuv had its roots in a religious revival among Jews in Eastern Europe at the end of the eighteenth century, which inspired increasing numbers to journey to Ottoman Palestine and settle in what they deemed the holy cities of Tiberias, Safed, Hebron, and Jerusalem. Motivated by a desire to observe Jewish religious commandments, scholars and pious men came to pray and study as preconditions to salvation. Palestine's Jewish population steadily increased from approximately 4,200 in 1806 to 26,000 on the eve of the first Zionist-sponsored immigration in 1882.

The Old and the New Yishuv

Concerned Jews in Europe sent financial aid to these pious communities as a way of sharing in the holiness of living and studying in the land of Israel. The collection and distribution of this aid (in Hebrew, *halukkah*) to support pious Jews and their religious institutions in Palestine was institutionalized in 1810 by a wealthy Dutch Jew, Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Lehren, who founded the Pekidim and Amarkalim of Eretz Yisrael (Officials of the Land of Israel) in Amsterdam.

Even with a sophisticated system of external funding, as the numbers of Jews in the Old Yishuv increased, their economic lot deteriorated. A few enjoyed economic security, but most lived in poverty. The religious schools *(kollelim)* provided their own subsidies, sometimes offering rent, health care, and support for widows and orphans, but all charitable services depended on budgetary circumstances and on the intellectual status of the scholars, with those from the wealthiest diaspora communities receiving the highest payments.

By 1882, Zionism had emerged in Europe, and Zionists began to sponsor immigration into Ottoman Palestine. Their goal was a self-supporting secular, egalitarian society based on productive labor and a Hebrew cultural renaissance; they named their community the New Yishuv. Proclaiming the need for social change, economic transformation, and

A ship filled with Jewish refugees docks in Haifa Port in 1945. Between 1945 and 1948, 69,000 Jews relocated from Europe to Palestine. Many did not successfully complete the journey and ended up in British detention camps in Cyprus. © PHOTOGRAPH BY ZOLTAN KLUGER. GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE (GPO) OF ISRAEL. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

political reform, Zionist activities ruptured traditional patterns of pious Jewish life in Palestine and triggered intense competition for diaspora charity.

In Zionist historiography, the differences between Old and New Yishuv have been described as immense. In fact, there was some overlap. A generation of Jews who matured in Jerusalem during the Ottoman reform era of the 1860s responded to the challenge of meeting daily needs as well as to the spirit of the age by calling for the creation of a productive Jewish economy. Yosef Rivlin, Yoel Moshe Salomon, and Israel Dov Frumkin, prominent cultural and religious figures, became builders of new neighborhoods and founders of a new Jewish infrastructure. Among the housing projects outside the

Old City that they developed or supported were Nahalat Shiva, Mea Sheʿarim, Mishkenot Israel, Kiryah Ne'emana, and Bet Yaʿakov. By 1880, 2,000 Jews lived outside the Old City and 16,000 lived within the walls. A similar impulse drove Jaffa's Jewish leaders to establish the new suburbs of Neve Shalom, Yefe Nof, and Ahva. Some also advocated educational reform and contributed to the revival of Hebrew.

As for the Zionists, some came from traditional backgrounds and never gave up their faith or observance of religious ritual. Permanent alliances across the two communities were generally short lived, however; they often split over religious stipulations constraining the establishment of a modern Jewish society.

Zionism

Although immigrants driven by piety continued to arrive alongside Zionists, it was the Zionist vision that created Palestine's new institutions. Between 1882 and 1948, the Zionist movement established about 250 towns, villages, and cities designed by a corps of planners and officials pursuing national political goals. Schools, libraries, newspapers, workshops, and cultural and commercial enterprises were established—even in Jerusalem, the heart of the Old Yishuv.

After World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the British, under a mandate from the League of Nations, ruled Palestine. British doctrine recognized the Yishuv as one of Palestine's religious communities but in practice provided it with the opportunity to operate national-style institutions. Zionists brought their political parties with them to Palestine. From the early years of the twentieth century, a number of Zionist-Socialist parties (Poʿalei Zion, ha-Poʿel ha-Tzaʿir, Left Poʿalei Zion) as well as Mizrahi, the religious Zionist movement, had adherents and activists in Palestine. Political parties opened employment offices and founded agricultural collectives, soup kitchens, loan funds, newspapers, and schools. They provided recreational and cultural activities for members. Many of these activities were absorbed in 1920 by the Histadrut, which became one of the central vehicles of state-building for the Yishuv. Histadrut operations—labor exchanges, construction companies, and an underground army—were crucial in helping Jewish immigrants find work and community in their new homeland. The Histadrut became the base of power for David Ben-Gurion, who used his position as secretary-general to bring together several of labor's political parties in 1930 to form MAPAI, dominant in Yishuv politics and eventually in the World Zionist Organization. With backing from both the Histadrut and MAPAI, Ben-Gurion was able to outmaneuver political rivals such as Vladimir Zeʾev Jabotinsky and Chaim Weizmann.

Palestine's Jewish community organized itself in explicitly political structures, beginning with an assembly (Knesset Yisrael) elected by people who were more than twenty years old and had at least three months' residence in the region. Between sessions, the assembly delegated its powers to the Vaʿad Leʾumi (National Council), appointed from its ranks. The council nominated from among its members an executive charged with the actual administration of the community. Policies generated by the self-governing institutions of the Yishuv covered matters of health, social welfare, defense, and education. Without the authority to tax, however, Knesset Israel and its constituent institutions had limited power. Its funding depended on allocations from the World Zionist Organization. Some of Palestine's Orthodox Jewish residents remained aloof from the organization and did not participate in elections, since they objected to female suffrage and to the secular aims of Zionism. They insisted on their organizational separateness and retained an allegiance to the principles of the Old Yishuv.

Palestine was governed as a colony, but significant policies were often formulated by England's highest elected officials, including the prime minister and parliament. Yishuv politicians such as Ben-Gurion understood the pressing need to influence policymakers in London as well as those implementing regulations in Palestine. Hence, much power was assigned to international Zionist agencies and to their leaders, who attained global stature (e.g., Weizmann).

Until the creation of an expanded Jewish Agency in 1929, the Zionist executive's political department was also the central mechanism for creating contacts with Arab leaders within and outside of Palestine. Founded and directed by Chaim Kalvaryski, this de-

partment initiated contacts with Palestinian personalities willing to sit with Jews in institutions established on the basis of the Mandate's political framework. The department extended funds to village shaykhs, municipal leaders, newspapers, and movements deemed moderate on the issue of a Jewish national home in Palestine. In 1929, the Jewish Agency and the National Council set up the Joint Bureau to handle relations with the League of Nations and with Britain in both London and Palestine.

Two developments in the 1930s augmented the authority of Yishuv institutions. The first was an increase in the number of Jewish immigrants, who were now fleeing fascist Europe. This increased the number of people who participated in elections and other voluntary political activities. The second was the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in 1936 and the need for a larger Yishuv defense force. The Yishuv assumed responsibility for helping fund such a force through a voluntary tax levy. Yishuv institutions still drew their authority primarily from the networks created with various political movements and the leadership of the Jewish Agency, but as the legitimacy of these institutions strengthened they also began to function more effectively on their own.

When British rule began in Palestine, there were 56,000 Jews in a total population of 640,000. By the end of Britain's political tenure, the Jewish population had increased to 650,000, with substantial immigration occurring in the Mandate's last decade. Undoubtedly, the rise of Nazism and the threat of war expanded both interest in immigration and the actual numbers of Jewish immigrants, despite Britain's attempts to control the number of Jews entering Palestine.

The outbreak of the war in 1939 and the genocidal policies of the Nazis created enormous difficulty for the Yishuv. On the one hand, these policies substantiated the Zionist claim that diaspora Jewry lived in fragile, untenable conditions; on the other hand, by slaughtering the movement's potential population, they threatened the possibility of achieving the Zionist dream of sovereignty. However, World War II ended with the beginning of the Cold War, and the dramatic shift in the balance of world power helped the Yishuv win the international support necessary for Jewish statehood, especially from those interested in the dismantling of Great Britain's empire.

See also Ben-Gurion, David; Eretz Yisrael; Histadrut; Israel: Political Parties in; Weizmann, Chaim; Zionism.

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YIZHAR, S.

[1916–]

Israeli novelist.

The grandnephew of Israeli author Moshe Smilansky (1874–1953), S. Yizhar was born in 1969 in Rehovot, Israel. Yizhar's most famous novel, *Yeme Ziklag* (1958), is considered a work of great literary distinction. It describes seven days of battle during the Arab–Israel War of 1948 and underscores the burdens imposed on a society trying to fulfill the Zionist mission. His language and detailed descriptions of the land have influenced all subsequent generations of Israeli writers. His later novel, *Mikdamot* (Foretellings, 1992), views the Zionist pioneering enterprise through the eyes of a child. Yizhar served

in the Knesset from 1949 to 1967 as a representative of the mainstream labor movement and also taught school for many years.

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YÖN

See NEWSPAPERS AND PRINT MEDIA: TURKEY

YOSEF, OVADIAH

[1920–]

Israeli religious and political leader.

Ovadiah Yosef, Israel's most prominent Mizrahi religious leader, was born in Baghdad but has lived in Palestine since infancy. He was educated at the Sephardic Porat Yosef yeshiva in Jerusalem, and he was recognized as a brilliant scholar with a phenomenal memory from an early age. A rabbi by the age of twenty, he was deputy chief rabbi of Cairo when the state of Israel was founded in 1948. He returned to Israel in 1950, where he became a religious judge. In 1968 he was appointed chief rabbi of Tel Aviv. He served as the Sephardic chief rabbi of Israel from 1973 to 1983—a tenure marred by bickering with the Asheknazic chief rabbi, Shlomo Goren. His religious authority and personal charisma led his followers to continue to accord him higher status than that given to the Sephardic chief rabbis who followed him in that post. His weekly Saturday night talks are broadcast by satellite around the world. These talks are followed closely by Israeli journalists, who are eager to report his often provocative and colorfully worded statements and rulings. These included his declaration that the six million Holocaust victims were "reincarnations of the souls of sinners. . . They had been reincarnated in order to atone."

Yosef's biography includes a series of frustrations and personal slights. He was never invited to join the Ashkenazic Council of Torah Sages of the Agudat Israel party—then the highest political and spiritual authority in the ultra-Orthodox world. In Ashkenazic circles he was dismissed as a person who memorized texts rather than an original thinker. His own religious mentor, Rabbi Eliezer Schach, announced that, because they still needed to follow Ashkenazic guidance, "the time has not yet come for Sephardim to take positions of leadership." Yosef was thus induced to support the first ultra-Orthodox Sephardi SHAS (derived from *Sephardim Shomrei Torah,* or Sephardi Torah Guardians) party, founded in 1983 by disaffected members of the Ashkenazic dominated Agudat Israel party. SHAS won 11 of the 120 parliamentary seats in the 2003 elections (down from 17 in 1999). Yosef's intended purpose is to restore the "crown of glory" to Sephardic Judaism—to reestablish the dominance of the Halakhah in accordance with Sephardic custom in Israel. He is now the ruling force behind the SHAS party, instructing the elected Knesset members how to vote in parliamentary issues.

Yosef's most famous work, *Yabiah Omer,* deals with halakhic problems in daily life. His religious rulings have been original, but also at times controversial, as when he recognized Ethiopian Jews as being fully Jewish during the 1970s. His leniency in religious ruling is sensitive to the diversity of religious observance among Sephardic Jews. He generally seeks accommodation rather than confrontation in Jewish-Arab issues, even as he sometimes uses abusive language (for example, "beasts of prey") to describe his enemies and those of Israel.

See also ADOT HA-MIZRAH.

JULIE ZUCKERMAN
UPDATED BY EPHRAIM TABORY

YOUNG ALGERIANS

A group of French-educated men who, early in the twentieth century, became the first Algerians to attempt reform within the colonial political system.

Estimated to number between 1,000 and 1,200, the Young Algerians *(Jeunes Algériens)* included intellectuals, members of the liberal professions, and individuals who had succeeded within French business

circles. Most prominent among the group's members were Dr. Benthami Ould Hamida, Omar Bouderba, Fekar Ben Ali, Chérif Benhabylès, and—beginning in 1913—Khaled ibn Hashimi ibn Hajj Abd al-Qadir, grandson of Algerian patriot Abd al-Qadir.

While there were differences in the emphases of the Young Algerians, most were attempting to win for themselves rights approximating those of Frenchmen. Their agenda, before World War I, included exemption of at least some Algerians from the exceptive Code de l'Indigénat, more equitable distribution of taxes, easier access to French citizenship, and greater political participation for the educated. The agenda also included programs for the masses, including greater access to education, opening of grazing and forest lands, protections for property, and more careful monitoring of government abuse.

Despite support from many liberals in France, attempts to negotiate concessions failed in 1913 and 1914, largely because of colon opposition. During World War I, when thousands of Algerians served in the French armed forces, a grateful Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau promised reform. The resulting Jonnart Law of 4 February 1919, however, was viewed by most Young Algerians as being very far from what they had been promised. For a few years after the war, Khaled ibn Hashimi ibn Hajj Abd al-Qadir continued to lead the movement for reform within the system, but, by 1923, he gave up the effort and went into exile in the Near East.

See also CODE DE L'INDIGÉNAT.

JOHN RUEDY

YOUNG EGYPT

A patriotic association of Egyptian youth established in October 1933.

In 1937, Young Egypt (Misr al-Fatat) became a formal political party in Egypt; in 1940, the name was changed to the Islamic Nationalist party (al-Hizb al-Watani al-Islami); in 1949, it became the Socialist party of Egypt (Hizb Misr al-Ishtiraki).

The dominant figure in Young Egypt throughout its history was the lawyer/politician Ahmad Husayn. In the 1930s, the movement's program combined a vehement, anti-British Egyptian nationalism, an antiparliamentary outlook, an emphasis on the paramilitary training and mobilization of youth, and a call for greater social justice. Politically opposed to the Wafd, Young Egypt aligned itself with the anti-Wafdist forces centered around the Egyptian palace; its paramilitary squads of Green Shirts periodically fought with the Blue Shirts of the Wafd.

Although it was suppressed during World War II, it afterward dropped its paramilitary features while retaining, but relabeling, much of its prewar populism. Like all Egyptian political parties, it was abolished in January 1953, after the Free Officers, led by General Muhammad Naguib, seized power from the monarchy of King Farouk.

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JAMES JANKOWSKI

YOUNG OTTOMANS

Ottoman intellectuals and bureaucrats who constituted the first organized opposition to the pro-West modernizing elite of the Tanzimat.

Members of the group called themselves New Ottomans, while contemporary European observers referred to them as Young Turks. The latter term came to be used more specifically in reference to the next generation of liberal opponents of Sultan Abdülhamit as distinct from Young Ottomans, which has become the synonym of New Ottomans.

The Young Ottomans began their activities in Constantinople (now Istanbul). They faced repression and were forced into exile in Europe and other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Prominent Young Ottoman leaders were Namik Kemal (1840–1888), İbrahim Şinasi (1824–1871), Agha Efendi (1832–1885), Abdülhamit Ziya Paşa (1825–1880), and Ali Suavi (1838–1878). The group received important financial and moral support from a disaffected member of the Egyptian khedival family who had entered the Ottoman service, Mustafa Fazil Paşa (1829–1875). While these leaders were united in their opposition to the Tanzimat elite, and to the

autocratic ministry of Paşas Fu'ad and Ali, they had hardly been bystanders to the Tanzimat. They had matured intellectually and professionally during the Tanzimat period. Many had served in the Translation Bureau, a breeding ground for Tanzimat bureaucrats. Some were stimulated by the frustration of their career ambitions under the Tanzimat regime.

The Young Ottomans differed in social and professional background. Ziya Paşa, the oldest in the group, was a writer and poet and had served as third secretary to Sultan Abdülmecit II. Namik Kemal, also poet and writer, came from a distinguished bureaucratic family. Şinasi, an army captain's son who held a post in the imperial arsenal before he was sent to Paris to study finance, was the most innovative and versatile from a literary point of view. Ali Suavi was a middle-school teacher and a religious-minded writer, even agitator.

The forerunner of the group was the Alliance of Fidelity or Patriotic Alliance, a loose group consisting of literary men and functionaries, which first met in Constantinople in June 1865. Organization was secret and conspiratorial, apparently modeled along the Carbonari of Italy, Spain, and France and led by a French-educated agitator, Mehmet Bey. The group did not publicize a program. The members were motivated by recent Ottoman setbacks in the Balkans and Lebanon and fear of disintegration. They felt constitutional government was necessary to preserve the empire and to ward off Europe's economic domination and diplomatic interventions. The group's expanding membership included bureaucrats, *ulama* (Islamic clergy), and army officers.

In 1866/67 Namik Kemal and Ali Suavi published newspapers *(Tasvir-i Efkar* and *Muhbir)* in which they vehemently criticized the government's policy regarding the insurrection in Crete and the impending surrender of Serbia. They published an open letter from Mustafa Fazil, who had left the empire over issues pertaining to his political ambitions in Egypt, which addressed the sultan and amounted to a liberal manifesto. The government ordered Namik Kemal, Ziya, and Ali Suavi to domestic exile and closed their newspapers. Instead, they accepted an invitation from Mustafa Fazil Paşa and fled to Paris. At this time, the government also uncovered the group's contacts with top security officials in preparation for a coup against Abdülaziz that was organized by Mehmet Bey.

The regrouping of the liberal-minded elements of the Patriotic Alliance as New Ottomans occurred in exile at the end of May 1867. In Paris and later London, they published the newspaper *Hürriyet,* edited by Namik Kemal and Ziya Paşa with financial support from Mustafa Fazil. They promoted liberal political principles and demanded a parliament. At the same time, they denounced liberal economic policies and advocated measures to buttress indigenous trade and to promote industry.

Despite considerable variation in their outlook on politics, society, and religion, the Young Ottomans projected an Islamic modernist synthesis. They opposed Western political and economic interference and wholesale adoption of Western thought and culture. Nevertheless, they were sympathetic to Western political institutions. Their thought was premised on the existence in Islamic political traditions of the concepts and institutions fundamental to a liberal political system based on representative principles. The Young Ottomans reinterpreted and popularized the concept of *watan* (homeland) to advance a political allegiance to the Ottoman state. They sought a contractual relationship between the subjects and the ruler, based on the Islamic principles of *shura* (consultation) and *ijma* (consensus), within the framework of an Ottoman watan. These views represented the first systematic expression of Islamic modernist ideas in the Muslim world.

The Young Ottoman movement was not the first expression of political protest against the Tanzimat. As early as 1859, a group of *ulama* and army officers had led a coup d'état aimed at Abdülmecit in resentment of Tanzimat policies that enhanced the status of the non-Muslim minorities vis-à-vis the Muslims, and—perhaps more importantly—had left the payment of officers in arrears (the Küleli Incident). The Young Ottomans constituted the first opposition group that attempted to offer alternative programs, inspired by Western thought but consistent with Islamic political ideals.

The movement signifies the beginnings of a campaign for social mobilization and the forging

of a public opinion in the Ottoman Empire, even though the group's propaganda remained restricted to a literate Turkish-speaking intelligentsia. Their ideas appealed to disfranchised Westernized groups, students, Muslim commercial associations, and religious conservative opponents of the Tanzimat. They propagated their views through newspapers and literature utilizing a simplified Ottoman-Turkish. They were influenced by contemporary Turkish discoveries, which reinforced the Islamist and anti-imperialist outlook, especially in the pen of Ali Suavi.

The Young Ottomans pioneered journalism and introduced new genres and themes to Ottoman literature. Indeed, future members of the group began their oppositional activity in the first privately published Ottoman journals that appeared in the early 1860s (such as *Tercüman-i Ahval* and *Tasvir-i Efkar*). They introduced the genres of the novel and the drama to Ottoman literature, popularized them, and effectively used them as vehicles of political propaganda. The pioneer in this journalistic and literary activity was Şinasi. The Young Ottomans also translated into Turkish the works of European Enlightenment philosophers and authors such as Rousseau, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Molière, and Lamartine.

The Young Ottomans did not constitute a party organization despite their espousal of political propaganda and promotion of political agendas. After the early 1870s, the group lost its cohesion. Ideological and personal differences led to estrangement in European exile. Several leaders, including the benefactor Mustafa Fazil Paşa, accepted Abdülaziz's amnesty offer to return to Constantinople. Following the death of their nemesis, Ali Paşa, in 1871 the movement went into disarray in the capital. However, under the duress of the political and financial crises of the 1870s, progressive Ottoman statesmen started to look with favor upon Young Ottoman ideas about constitutional government. Midhat Paşa, known as the architect of the Ottoman constitution and parliament, emerged as the leading proponent of change and set out to give concrete expression to Young Ottoman ideas on constitutional government, drawing also on the services of Young Ottoman leaders. Namik Kemal and Ziya Paşa were members of the committee that drafted the Ottoman constitution of 1876. Namik Kemal's long struggle to promote the Young Ottoman cause, his refusal to compromise, his passionately patriotic poetry and drama, and his lucid political writings stressing the notion of popular sovereignty gave him a reputation as the most influential Young Ottoman activist and author, as well as making him a source of inspiration for later constitutionalists.

Due to the absence of a party organization and their dependence on literary forms for the propagation of their ideas, the Young Ottomans had no direct impact on non-Turkish-speaking parts of the empire. For instance, their Islamic modernist ideas did not have an appreciable influence on later and similar currents in the Arab-populated areas. The Young Ottoman movement, however, was the ideological forerunner and inspiration of the later and more broadly based Young Turk movement. The Young Ottomans may not have offered a coherent political philosophy, but they were the precursors of most modern intellectual and political movements in the Middle East.

See also Ali Suavi; Mustafa Fazil; Namik Kemal; Şinasi, İbrahim; Tanzimat; Young Turks; Ziya, Abdülhamit.

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Hasan Kayali

YOUNG TUNISIANS

Tunisian reform movement that championed Tunisian rights during the French protectorate.

The imposition of the French protectorate over Tunisia in 1881 propelled a group of reform-minded urban elites, known as the Young Tunisians, to challenge the traditional order that it blamed for the country's economic and political misfortunes. The Young Tunisians initially acquiesced to French oversight as a practical step toward the modernization of state and society, but they were also intent on reforming native institutions in order to maintain and renew the Muslim heritage and identity of

Tunisia, and to this end, they founded the Khaldunniyya School in 1896. The nucleus of the Young Tunisian movement thus included modernists from the religious notability, such as Abd al-Aziz al-Thaalbi, as well as graduates of French universities or of the European-inspired Sadiqiyya College, such as Bashir Sfar, Ali Bash Hamba, and Hassan Gallati. By 1900, however, growing frustration with their political and economic marginalization was leading many Young Tunisians to intensify their criticism of the protectorate and its various forms of discrimination.

In 1907 Sfar, Bash Hamba, and al-Thaalbi launched French and Arabic editions of the journal *Le Tunisien* to promote and champion indigenous rights. The movement was radicalized further between 1911 and 1912 by the Italian invasion of Libya, and by the Protectorate's use of disproportionate military force against civilian demonstrators in November 1911 (the Jallaz Incident), and again in February 1912 against striking tramway workers. The authorities accused the Young Tunisians of instigating popular unrest, and deported al-Thaalbi, Sfar, Gallati, and Bash Hamba. Thus, on the eve of World War I, the Young Tunisian movement had been effectively decapitated and driven underground, but its popular anticolonial platform was soon resurrected in the 1920s by the Destour Party and its calls for Tunisian self-determination.

See also BOURGUIBA, HABIB; KHALDUNNIYYA; THAALBI, ABD AL-AZIZ; TUNISIA: POLITICAL PARTIES IN.

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O. W. ABI-MERSHED

YOUNG TURKS

Name given to groups in Ottoman society who demanded and strove for political and social change in the last several decades of the Ottoman Empire.

"Young Turk" is an expression coined in Europe that invokes three distinct phases of the Ottoman constitutionalist movement: the anti-Tanzimat current better known to historians as the "Young Ottoman" movement; the constitutionalist opposition to Sultan Abdülhamit; and the Second Constitutional Period introduced by the reinstitution of the constitutional regime in 1908. There was at no point a distinct organization called the Young Turks; nor did the groups recognized as Young Turks generally embrace this name. Nevertheless, historians identify the last three decades of the empire in reference to Young Turks, while "the Young Turk period" corresponds more precisely to the decade of their political predominance from 1908 to 1918.

Young Turk activity began in the late 1880s. Until the revolution of 1908, their opposition to Abdülhamit manifested itself both within the empire and abroad. The two spheres of activity were linked together only loosely. When a group of medical students in Constantinople (now Istanbul) founded in 1889 the secret cells of what would develop into the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), individual intellectuals in exile had already launched a political and journalistic campaign against the Hamitian regime. The best known in the latter group was Khalil Ghanim, a Syrian Christian, who published a journal called *La jeune Turquie (Young Turkey).*

The Constantinople secret committee spread rapidly in the capital's higher schools and soon became known to the authorities. Reprisals forced many to exile, whereupon an expatriate liberal opposition came together around Ahmet Riza, a French-educated official in the Ministry of Agriculture. Influenced by European positivists, he failed to return from a mission in 1889 and turned into a vocal critic of the Hamitian regime. In 1895, he joined Khalil Ghanim, Alber Fua (a Jew), and Aristidi Paşa (a Greek) to publish *Meşveret,* which became the leading voice of Young Turks.

The next year, a member of the Constantinople secret committee, Murat Bey, fled to Cairo and later to Geneva. A Russian Turk who taught at the influential Mülkiye (civil service) school, Murat Bey was better connected with the liberal currents in Constantinople. His *Mizan* outshone *Meşveret,* both of which were smuggled into the empire. Murat was an Islamist-Turkist revolutionary, in contrast to Ahmet Riza's elitist and gradualist outlook. The two men were united in their anti-imperialism and de-

nunciation of the Hamitian autocracy. Murat, however, joined Abdülhamit in 1897. Rivalries within the Young Turk movement in exile continued with the publication in Geneva of *Osmanh* by İshak Süküti and Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, founding members of the CUP in Constantinople. As repression increased in the empire, Young Turk activity shifted almost entirely to Europe and Egypt for a decade. The flight of Damad Mahmud Paşa, the brother-in-law of the sultan, to join the Young Turks in Europe opened a new phase in Young Turk activities.

Under the moral guidance and financial support of ailing Mahmud Paşa and the presidency of his son Sabahettin, the Young Turks held a conference in Paris in February 1902, which crystallized the divisions within the movement. Representatives of all major religious groups in the empire attended. The meeting revealed the separatist inclinations of Christian factions, while two groups around Ahmet Riza and Sabahettin divided over the suitability of centralist versus decentralist policies in achieving the ultimate aim of preserving the integrity of the empire. Subsequently, Sabahettin formed the Society of Administrative Decentralization and Private Initiative, modeled along the teachings of economist Frédéric Le Play and Edmond Demolins and as a rival to the CUP. A second conference in 1907 aimed at a reconciliation failed to bring Greek, Albanian, and some Armenian factions to the table.

Meanwhile, domestic opposition and conspiracy against the Hamitian regime regrouped in Macedonia. Different oppositional groups coalesced to revitalize the CUP, which in 1907 contacted the Ahmet Riza group in Europe. However, the exile communities had no role in the immediate circumstances that led to the Young Turk Revolution. If international events like the Japanese victory over Russia and the Russian and Iranian revolutions energized Young Turks everywhere, the nationalist activity among the Balkan peoples and the perceived threat to the empire by enhanced relations between Britain and Russia impelled the unionists in Salonika and Monastir to action.

Due to the role they played in the revolution, leaders of the Macedonian branches of the CUP eclipsed the other factions after 1908. They were, however, too inexperienced to take the helm of government and too insecure to embrace other Young



Ahmet Riza circa 1910. Riza was one of the leaders of the Committee for Union and Progress, one of several groups that collectively came to be known as the Young Turks. The Young Turks sought to reform and modernize the Ottoman Empire. They succeeded in taking control of the government in 1908 but fell from power after defeat in World War I (1914–1918).
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Turk groups, including the CUP leadership in Europe. The differences within the Young Turk movement were now expressed in multiparty politics. The decentralists under Sabahettin formed the Liberal party before the 1908 elections. Even though they failed to block the election of a large majority of CUP candidates to parliament, the decentralists became an increasingly more potent opposition to the CUP, supported by autonomy-minded minority groups. Other parties that formed in 1910 and 1911 soon merged in the Ottoman Liberty and Entente party. The CUP's attempts to manipulate the elections to retain power undermined parliamentary rule, eliciting an ultimatum from a group of military

officers called Saviors. Coupled with foreign preoccupations such as the Italian and Balkan wars, the Young Turk governments gave way to governments led by old-school politicians in 1912. In 1913 the CUP wrested power with a coup d'état. Despite conciliatory measures to the liberals, the CUP remained as that faction within the Young Turk movement that dominated Ottoman politics until the end of the empire.

The Young Turks promoted the ideology of Ottomanism in an attempt to foster in all peoples of the empire a commitment to the Ottoman homeland within the framework of a constitutional government. There were organizational similarities, some ideological continuity, and shared political goals between the Young Ottomans and Young Turks. Despite what the ethnocentric term "Young Turk" suggests, the movement represented ethnically and religiously a much more diverse group than the Young Ottomans.

The Young Turk movement embraced varied ideological orientations (Westernism, Islamism, Turkism, positivism, centralism, decentralism), socio-economic backgrounds (lower middle-class students and officers, high officials, members of Ottoman and Egyptian royal households), and ethnic-religious affiliations. It was unified in the conviction for the necessity of reform designed to preserve the empire. The Young Turks were responsible for instituting the beginnings of modern politics in the Middle East, for expanding education and journalism, and for realizing economic, social, and administrative reforms. The movement provided the political nuclei for the successor states of the Ottoman Empire.

See also Ahmet Riza; Committee for Union and Progress; Ottomanism; Tanzimat; Young Ottomans.

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Hasan Kayali

YOUSSEF, MULAY

Alawi sultan of Morocco, 1912–1927.

The ouster by France of Youssef's predecessor, Mulay Abd al-Hafiz, signaled the subordination of the Moroccan sultanate to French colonialism and a serious loss of prestige by the Moroccan ruling house. Mulay Youssef's reign was marked largely by the implementation of the Treaty of Fes (March 1912) and the aggressive administration of French rule by the resident general, Marshal Louis Lyautey, who held office from 1912 to 1925. The period of Youssef's reign also witnessed several significant movements against colonial rule, the most important of which was that of Abd al-Karim (al-Khattabi) in the Rif region from 1919 to 1926.

See also Fes, Treaty of (1912); Khattabi, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-; Lyautey, Louis-Hubert Gonzalve.

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Matthew S. Gordon

YOUSSOUFI, ABDERRAHMANE

[1924–]

Moroccan prime minister, 1998–2002.

Abderrahmane Youssoufi was the first opposition politician to occupy the position of Moroccan prime minister since 1958. Born into a Berber- and French-speaking family from the international zone of Tangiers, Youssoufi joined the Istiqlal Party when it was founded in 1944. His European education led him to cultivate personal and ideological ties with Mehdi Ben Barka and the leftist wing of the Istiqlal. In 1959, along with Ben Barka, Youssoufi became one of the founders of the socialist-oriented National Union of Popular Forces (Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, UNFP). Arrested in 1963 during the first major wave of repression against leftist militants, he served eighteen months in prison for his alleged participation in a plot against the monarchy. Pardoned, he left Morocco after the murder of Ben Barka in 1965. During his fifteen-year exile in

France, Youssoufi was a particularly active advocate for human rights. He returned to Morocco in 1980, resumed political action within the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires, USFP), which was created in 1975, and became its secretary-general in 1992. To enhance the credibility of the kingdom's reforms, Hassan II named Youssoufi prime minister in 1998. Youssoufi uneasily presided over a coalition government whose key ministries were reserved for the king's collaborators. Such restrictions limited Youssoufi's capacity to further the democratization process and to address social issues. Priority was given to the creation of a suitable environment for private investors, particularly through a campaign against the corruption of civil servants and court officials. Accused of lacking initiative and compromising with the palace, Youssoufi was replaced by Driss Jettou in November 2002.

See also Ben Barka, Mehdi; Hassan II; Morocco.

Henri Lauzière

YOUTH ALIYAH

Organization that benefits immigrant youth in Israel.

Even before Hitler became Germany's chancellor in 1933, Youth Aliyah (in Hebrew, *Aliyat ha-Noar*), a project that brought Jewish children to Palestine and provided them with vocational training, had been established by Recha Freier in response to the deteriorating condition of Jews in Germany. It was organized in Palestine by Henrietta Szold, with the cooperation of the Jewish Agency, the Vaʿad Le'umi (National Council), and the kibbutz movement. Originally, parents paid for their own children's transportation to Palestine and their room and board. For a number of years, British authorities did not count these children in the official immigration quota for Palestine.

During the mid-1930s the organization expanded its activities and rescued increasing numbers of children from Nazi Germany and later from Austria. Starting in 1939 with the outbreak of World War II, Youth Aliyah brought children from the battle zones to Great Britain, Scandinavia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and even Palestine (such as the Polish children called "the Tehran children," who traveled in 1943 via the Soviet Union and Iran). From 1945 to 1948, Youth Aliyah located orphaned children of the Holocaust and brought some 15,000 to Palestine as "illegals." With the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Youth Aliyah focused on rehabilitating needy immigrant children from countries of the Middle East and on helping adolescents in distress and/or in dire poverty. Youth Aliyah programs, mostly financed by the Jewish Agency, have helped integrate more than 300,000 children into Israeli society.

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Donna Robinson Divine

YOUTH MOVEMENTS

Social and political groupings and organizations formed for Middle Eastern adolescents and young adults.

Youth movements have played an important role in Middle Eastern politics and society. Until the late nineteenth century, the defense of neighborhoods was frequently ensured by *futuwwa* and other informal associations of young men operating as local militias. These "gangs" provided internal order and protection against outside threats and were often engaged in welfare and charitable activities; however, they sometimes preyed on the people instead.

Although in the twentieth century most of these groups disbanded, new kinds of youth movements developed that transcended residential loyalties. Between the two world wars, scouting and Young Men's Muslim associations made their appearance in many Middle Eastern countries. These nonpolitical youth groups frequently provided the nucleus from which full-fledged political movements developed. Initially, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood relied heavily on the scouting movement to spread its religious message.

In the 1930s, several Middle Eastern countries spawned right-wing paramilitary youth associations and sporting clubs that were inspired by Hitler's

Germany, Mussolini's Italy, and Franco's Spain. These intensely nationalistic groups recruited primarily among newly educated middle-class students disillusioned with Western-style liberal democracy. They drew their appeal from an admiration of fascist discipline, unity, militancy, organization, and power—and from the hope that Germany and Italy might eliminate Franco-British influence in the Middle East. Members of these groups wore uniforms and followed rituals patterned after those of the Hitler Youth and Franco's Falange. The Phalange party (al-Kata'ib) and the Helpers (al-Najjada), in Lebanon, and Young Egypt (Misr al-Fatat) developed out of such paramilitary groups. The youth groups called Betar, which played an influential role in the development of revisionist Zionism in Europe and in Palestine under the British mandate, were also influenced in their organization and methods by the fascist youth movements.

In Palestine, from 1922 until the early years of the State of Israel, youth movements affiliated with the major Zionist political parties, the National Religious party (NRP) and the Histadrut (Israeli Federation of Labor Unions), played key roles as vehicles of socialization and integration into the Zionist polity and as agents of elite recruitment. Ha-Halutz (The Pioneer), a Zionist farming organization, trained young European Jews to join the agricultural movement in Palestine. The role of the youth branches of Israel's major political parties declined after the mid-1950s, except for B'nei Akivah, the NRP's youth branch, whose regular expansion since 1960 has contributed to the growth of religious nationalism in Israel.

In other Middle Eastern countries, governments have tried to prevent the development of autonomous youth movements. In one-party regimes, the ruling party usually has its own youth section. The most developed example of this is probably the Federation of Iraqi Youth, attached to the Iraqi Baʿth party. Under the auspices of athletic and cultural activities, the federation (which is itself divided into several programs catering to specific age groups) tries to diffuse the party's views among Iraq's younger generation.

Throughout the region, youth movements fueled by rapid population growth have played a leading role in antiregime activities. Student activism was a recurrent feature of political life in the 1970s and 1980s in countries as different as Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, Sudan, and Tunisia, where student associations sometimes joined forces with other social groups to participate in riots against the government. In particular, through a variety of Marxist and Islamic-leftist organizations, young people were actively involved in the 1979 downfall of the shah of Iran. More generally, the Islamic resurgence of the 1970s and 1980s has been primarily a movement of disaffected youth (particularly high school and university students of provincial origins and middle- and lower-middle-class backgrounds) who have organized themselves through informal religious associations.

Youth associations also contributed to the turmoil of the 1970s in Turkey, where the ultranationalist far-right National Action party used youth groups to spread its message and carry out its actions. Similarly, some of the organizational roots of the Intifada, the uprising of Palestinians that broke out in December 1987 in the Israeli-occupied territories, can be found in youth clubs formed in the 1970s and 1980s. These groups were initially created for cultural, social, and athletic activities, but they rapidly developed into a political movement of resistance to Israel's administration. Youth associations enabled a new generation—often the youth of Palestinian refugee camps, who had known only Israeli rule but who, unlike their elders, could no longer bear to live under such control and felt they had little to lose—to vent its anger, frustration, and hatred.

Middle Eastern youth movements also include scouting and Young Men's/Women's Christian associations in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Israeli-ruled territories. In Israel, a Young Men's/Women's Hebrew Association is similar. In the 1970s, a Young Men's and a Young Women's Muslim Association were formed in the West Bank. Like scouting, these associations are concerned with organizing social, cultural, self-help, charitable, skill-training, and athletic activities.

See also FUTUWWA; MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD; PHALANGE; YOUNG EGYPT.

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GUILAIN P. DENOEUX

YÜCEL, HASAN ALI

[1897–1961]

Turkish educator, publisher, and writer.

Born in Istanbul, Hasan Ali Yücel obtained a degree in philosophy from Istanbul University in 1921. After teaching philosophy for a few years, he worked in the new Republic of Turkey's education directorate and published poetry and books on Turkish literature in the late 1920s and 1930s. He also joined the Turkish language-reform movement and eventually became a protégé of Atatürk. Yücel served as minister of education between 1938 and 1946, when he became known as an active reformer and supervised the publication of hundreds of translations of world classics. He also fostered the development of Village Institutes, which trained local teachers. President İsmet İnönü promoted his strict and controversial language reforms in school text-books.

In 1946, Yücel was accused by retired general Fevzi Çakmak of harboring communists in the Village Institutes. Although Yücel's name was cleared by a libel suit, during the trial accusations by Islam's religious right—that he supported subversive literature—cast a pall of self-censorship over public debate, and his successor undid many of his reforms. In the 1950s, Yücel worked for a publishing house and returned to writing, producing poetry and books of prose on citizenship, England, and Cyprus.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

YÜKSEK ÖĞRETIM KURULU (YOK)

The Turkish Council of Higher Education, a policy-making and planning body.

The Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu originally was established in 1973, but in 1975 Turkey's Constitutional Court found its mandate to be incompatible with academic freedom and in conflict with the administrative autonomy of the universities. However, constitutional amendments after the 1980 military coup enabled its resurrection. Since then it has served as a liaison among the state, government, and universities. Its primary functions are to coordinate all resources allocated to higher education and to regulate academic activities. Its chairperson and some of its members are directly appointed by the president of the republic. The remaining members are appointed by the president from among candidates nominated by the government, the chief of the general staff, and the university senates.

Both in 1973 and much more urgently in 1981, the bureaucratic-military elite felt the need to depoliticize higher education. To this end, YOK ended the tradition of individual university senates electing deans and rectors. Instead, YOK gives the president a list of candidates it deems appropriate. Many political party leaders criticize YOK as an antidemocratic organization that restrains academic freedom, both directly and indirectly. Since the mid-1960s, numerous pieces of proposed legislation have sought to curb YOK's authority to intervene in academic issues.

YOK sought to standardize higher education in the early 1980s by determining the curricula to be followed in all universities, and soon became the target of widespread protests. Its position on the practice of veiling on university campuses also met with vociferous criticism. In 1983, it introduced the first nationwide prohibition against female students attending classes and taking examinations while wearing the veil. The Parliament overruled this ban in 1988 with a law that allowed "the covering of the head and the body on the basis of religious faith," but this law was annulled by the Turkish Constitutional Court. When the escalating Islamist mobilization in the 1990s rendered secularism the most crucial issue, and YOK its most reliable vanguard, the Council's authoritarian decisions went unobjected to by the state elites, despite vehement social opposition.

With the pro-religious Justice and Development Party's accession to the government in November

2002, a proposal to reform YOK's mandate was reinvigorated. This proposal endorsed a maximum of four years of service for Council members and rectors; selection of the chairperson by the Council; appointment of rectors by the President upon the recommendations by the university senates; nullification of all disciplinary charges against the faculty and students; and pardoning of students that dropped out because of academic absence. In this respect, the proposal attempted to restrict the YOK's administrative powers and to restore educational rights to veiled students who had been dismissed from the university. Although almost all social groups agree on the democratization of YOK's mandate, the proposal is regarded, especially by secularists, as hastily prepared and as an attempt to expel its current chairperson, Kemal Gürüz, rather than to initiate real reform.

See also TURKEY.

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I. METIN KUNT
UPDATED BY BURÇAK KESKIN-KOZAT

YUNIS JABIR, ABU BAKR
[1940–]

Libyan general.

A brigadier general and de facto chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir was born in 1940. Educated at the military college in Benghazi, he was a classmate of Muammar al-Qaddafi and a founding member of the Free Unionist Officers movement. Yunis Jabir participated in the September 1969 coup that overthrew King Idris and was one of the original members of the Revolutionary Command Council (1969–1977). He has served the Qaddafi regime in a variety of military positions since 1969, most recently as chief military commander.

See also LIBYA; QADDAFI, MUAMMAR AL-; REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL (LIBYA).

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RONALD BRUCE ST JOHN

YURDAKUL, MEHMET EMIN
[1869–1944]

Turkish poet and politician.

Known as the "national poet" for his patriotic verses (he published a famous collection in 1897, *Türkçe Şiirler*), Mehmet Emin Yurdakul was born in Istanbul during the Ottoman Empire, the son of a ship captain. He entered the civil service and was appointed governor of the Hijaz.

In 1912, Mehmet Emin was a founding member of Türk Ocaği (Turkish Hearth), and during World War I he joined the National Turkish party. After the war he became a member of parliament in the new Republic of Turkey, taking the surname Yurdakul (slave to the homeland). Although he was an admirer of Atatürk, Mehmet Emin expressed several disagreements with the ideology of the new government. His poetry, still memorized today by Turkish schoolchildren, was characterized by an unadorned style and unabashed praise for the Turkish nation.

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DAVID WALDNER

YUSUFIAN, BOGHOS
[1775–1844]

Armenian minister of commerce and foreign affairs in Egypt in the 1820s and 1830s.

Boghos Yusufian, better known as Boghos Bey, was born in İzmir to a family well connected to the Ar-

menian merchant class involved with overseas commerce. He made his money in Egypt as a customs official and trader. He was skilled in languages and served the British as an interpreter in the campaign against the French. He was first hired by Muhammad Ali as an interpreter and rapidly progressed to the position of personal secretary. Consolidating his rule in Egypt, Muhammad Ali found in Boghos an instrument for pursuing policies independent of his Ottoman sovereigns. Having earned Muhammad Ali's trust during his service in the palace in Cairo, Boghos was made minister of commerce in 1826. He ran his office from Alexandria and proved an adept intermediary between Egyptian economic policy and European commercial interests. In a reorganization of the government in 1837, Muhammad Ali created the joint ministry of commerce and foreign affairs and appointed Boghos Bey head of the department, leading many foreigners to assume that Boghos was the "prime minister" of Egypt.

To help modernize the administration of the country and improve its economy, Muhammad Ali became a great patron of the Armenians. In his early bid for power in Egypt, Muhammad Ali, then a small tobacco merchant of no military repute, had found an Armenian, Yeghiazar Amira, who was willing to give him a loan. Muhammad Ali repaid Amira many times over. He also encouraged Armenian settlement in Egypt. With Boghos Bey as its leading figure, the Armenian community in Egypt grew from a few dozen to two thousand. Among them were many relatives of Boghos whom he had brought over from İzmir, including the Nubar and Abro families. Arakel Bey Nubar (1826–1859) followed in his uncle's footsteps and became Egypt's minister of commerce. Boghos Bey's more famous nephew, however, was Nubar Pasha, who served three terms as prime minister of Egypt in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Dicran Pasha d'Abro was minister of foreign affairs in the 1890s.

Among his many assignments, Boghos had also been entrusted by Muhammad Ali with training new and capable administrators. Charged with sending the most promising to Europe for further education with the approval of the pasha, Boghos also sponsored the education of the sons of many Armenian merchants in the service of Muhammad Ali. Among them was his successor to the ministry of commerce and foreign affairs, Artin Chrakian (1804–1859), whom Muhammad Ali appointed upon Boghos's death. It is reported that Boghos Bey died a man of modest means, all his resources having been placed in the service of his master.

See also CHRAKIAN, ARTIN; MUHAMMAD ALI.

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ROUBEN P. ADALIAN

YUSUF, YUSUF SALMAN

[1901–1949]

Secretary-general of Iraq's Communist party, 1941–1949.

Yusuf Salman Yusuf, known as Comrade Fahd, was a Chaldean Christian. He attended the KUTV in Moscow (1935–1937). On his return to Iraq in 1938, he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist party; he became its secretary-general in 1941. In 1947 he was condemned to death, but the sentence was commuted to penal servitude. He ran the party from prison until his retrial and execution in February 1949.

MARION FAROUK-SLUGLETT

YZERNITSKY, YITZHAK

See SHAMIR, YITZHAK

Z

ZAB RIVERS

Great Zab of Turkey and Iraq and Little Zab of Iran and Iraq; major tributaries of the Tigris river.

The Great Zab rises in the mountains of southeast Turkey and runs for 260 miles (420 km), flowing southwest into the Tigris below Mosul, Iraq. The Little Zab rises in the Zagros mountains and flows for about 230 miles (368 km) southwest into the Tigris, some 50 miles (80 km) below the Great Zab. Their violent seasonal spring flow contributes about half the flood crest of the Tigris.

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JOHN R. CLARK

ZABUL

Afghan province.

Zabul is the name of both a province in Afghanistan and an Iranian city. The Afghan province of Zabul is located in southeastern Afghanistan, bordering Pakistan on the south and the province of Kandahar on the west. Zabul province has a population of approximately 200,000, most of whom are Pushtun, though some Hazara live in the north. The provincial capital is Kalat, which lies along the main highway from Kabul to Kandahar. Zabul, which is famous for its almonds, is in a very dry and windy region, where agriculture is limited to a few irrigated valleys. The drought of the late 1990s and early 2000s hit this area particularly hard. Many of the tribes in Zabul province were strong supporters of the Taliban movement, and security remains problematic in this area.

The Iranian city of Zabul is in the Sistan-Baluchistan province and is situated near the Afghan border across from the Afghan city of Zaranj. The population of Zabul in 2001 was 126,000.

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GRANT FARR

ZACH, NATAN

[1930–]

Israeli poet and critic.

Zach, one of the best known Israeli poets abroad, has been called "the most articulate and insistent spokesman of the modernist movement in Hebrew poetry." He had a profound influence on Israeli poetry and literature during the 1950s and 1960s. Zach was born in Berlin and emigrated to Palestine in 1935. He studied at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and later at the University of Essex, England, where he wrote his doctoral dissertation. After returning to Israel, he lectured at Tel Aviv University and was later appointed professor at Haifa University. He also served as chairman of the repertoire board of two of Israel's leading theaters, the Ohel and the Cameri. In addition to his poems, Zach published critical essays and edited several literary publications. Nationally and internationally acclaimed, Zach was awarded the prestigious Bialik and Israel prizes as well as the Feronia Prize (Rome).

In 1967, together with the late Palestinian-Israeli poet Rashid Husayn, he assembled and translated the first collection of Palestinian folk poems. Individual poems of his have been published in Afrikaans, Arabic, Czech, Dutch, English, Estonian, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, Spanish, Yiddish, and Vietnamese.

One of Zach's most instrumental contributions to the national literature was his conscious rejection of the national symbolism and ethnic sentimentality of mainstream Israeli poetry prior to 1948. Zach's early poems, *First Poems* and *Different Poems* (in Hebrew), exhibit a marked disassociation with the specifics of time and place, expressing instead the voice of the individual. Through emphasizing the more morbid aspects of human existence, Zach sought to undermine both the form and content of traditional Israeli poetry. To achieve that, he introduced new and unique poetic forms into Hebrew, including rhythm, rhyme, language, and metaphor. Other hallmarks of Zach's poetry are its intellectual detachment, emotional restraint, and subtle irony, all of which are employed against the excessive sentimentality and pathos of his predecessors. Zach influenced Hebrew poetry as well through his articulate and vociferous writings on its behalf. He published numerous essays promoting his modernist literary agenda both as a critic and as literary editor.

Zach's publications (in Hebrew) include *First Poems* (1955), *Other Poems* (1960), *All the Milk and Honey* (1966), *Northeasterly* (1979), *Anti-erasure* (1984), *Dog and Bitch Poems* (1990), *Because I'm Around* (1996), and *Death of My Mother* (1997).

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YARON PELEG
UPDATED BY ADINA FRIEDMAN

ZAGHLUL, SAʿD

[1857–1927]

Egyptian nationalist and leader of the Wafd, the nationalist party founded in Egypt in 1919.

A lawyer by profession, Saʿd Zaghlul served as Egypt's minister of education (1906), earning the praise of Lord Cromer. As vice-president of the Legislative Assembly (1913), Zaghlul attracted attention with his charismatic oratory. His wife, Safia, known in Egypt as "Mother of the People," was the daughter of Egypt's wealthy and pro-British prime minister, Mustafa Fahmi.

After World War I, Zaghlul led a delegation (Arabic, *wafd*) to Cairo to ask Britain's High Commissioner Reginald Wingate for permission to argue the case for Egypt's independence directly before the British government in London. Britain refused and in 1919 deported Zaghlul and other leading members of the wafd to Malta. The deportations precipitated the 1919 uprisings, when Egyptians of all classes, throughout the nation, boycotted British goods and sometimes violently attacked British in-

stallations and personnel. In an attempt to halt the rioting, the British reluctantly permitted Zaghlul and others to present the Egyptian nationalist case to the great powers attending the Paris Peace Settlements.

Although he enjoyed the support of the vast majority of Egyptians, Zaghlul failed to achieve independence from the British in these and subsequent negotiations. When he continued to demand the abolition of the protectorate over Egypt and nationalist agitation increased, the British deported Zaghlul again in 1921. The deportations only strengthened the Wafd and contributed to Zaghlul's popularity.

After the British had unilaterally declared the independence of Egypt in 1922 and King Fu'ad had signed the new constitution in 1923, Zaghlul was permitted to return to Egypt where he promptly resumed leadership of the Wafdist nationalist forces. Following the Wafd's overwhelming victory in free elections, Zaghlul became prime minister in 1924.

Zaghlul's triumph was short-lived, for in November 1924 Sir Lee Stack, *sirdar* (commander in chief of the Egyptian army) and governor-general of the Sudan, was assassinated while visiting Cairo. The assassination, coupled with Britain's demands for apologies and reparations, precipitated a government crisis and forced Zaghlul's resignation. Although Zaghlul remained the most popular Egyptian leader, he was prevented by the British from becoming prime minister in subsequent governments. In 1927, he died quietly in his home.

See also PARIS PEACE SETTLEMENTS (1918–1923); WAFD.

JANICE J. TERRY

ZAGROS

Mountain range in Iran.

The Zagros mountain range is the largest in Iran, stretching for 1,400 miles (2,253 km) from Armenia in the former U.S.S.R. in the northwest to the Persian Gulf in the south, and thence eastward to Baluchistan. It consists of a number of parallel ranges, the highest peak of which rises to 14,000 feet (4,270 m). It separates the Iranian plateau from the plains of Mesopotamia and Iraq in the west and the Persian Gulf in the south. Together with the Elburz (also known as Alborz) ranges in the north, the Zagros was formed from the Paleozoic to the Pliocene period.

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PARVANEH POURSHARIATI

ZAHAWI, JAMIL SIDQI AL-

[1863–1936]

Prominent Iraqi poet, philosopher, and educator, known for his defense of women's rights.

Jamil Sidqi al-Zahawi was born in Baghdad. During the Ottoman era, he held numerous positions: as a member of the Baghdad education council, where he championed education for women; as editor of the only newspaper in Baghdad, *al-Zawra*; as a member of the Supreme Court in Yemen and in Istanbul; as a professor of Islamic philosophy at the Royal University; and as a professor of literature at the College of Arts in Istanbul. After Iraq's independence in 1921, he was elected to parliament twice and appointed to the upper chamber for one term.

He was one of the leading writers in the Arab world, publishing in the major newspapers and journals of Beirut, Cairo, and Baghdad. Describing his life in a collection of his poems, he wrote, "In my childhood I was thought of as eccentric because of my unusual gestures; in my youth, as feckless because of my ebullient nature, lack of seriousness, and excessive playfulness; in my middle age as courageous for my resistance to tyranny; and in my old age as an apostate because I propounded my philosophical views" (Najim, p. 173, translated by author). In the 1930s, because of his political views, he was marginalized by the political establishment.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; IRAQ.

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JACQUELINE ISMAEL

ZAHEDAN

Main city of southeastern Iran and administrative center of Sistan and Baluchistan province.

Zahedan occupies an upland plateau (4,718 ft./ 1,438 m in elevation) north of Mount Taftan, an active volcano in southeast Iran. It is just south of the area where the borders of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan meet and 60 miles (96 km) northwest of Mirjaveh, the Iranian customs and passport control checkpoint on the border with Pakistan. Zahedan is a modern city that developed in the twentieth century. During the nineteenth century, the agricultural village of Duzhab occupied the site, one of the few areas in extremely arid Baluchistan with adequate groundwater for irrigated cultivation. During World War I, when Pakistan was part of British India, the British extended the imperial railway from Calcutta to Quetta westward to Duzhab. Later, during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1926–1941), the village was officially renamed Zahedan after the medieval capital of Sistan, which had been destroyed by the Mongols, and the administrative center for Sistan and Baluchistan was moved here from Khash.

Zahedan had developed into a small town of 17,500 inhabitants by 1956. After Iran and Pakistan joined the U.S.-sponsored Central Treaty Organization in 1958, Zahedan, as a frontier town, became a site for military facilities and related infrastructure projects that spurred rapid growth. By 1976 the population had quintupled to 93,740. However, the ethnic composition of the population also changed, from a majority of local Baluchis and Persian-speaking Sistanis to a majority of migrants from the central areas of Iran. In the 1980s thousands of refugees from Afghanistan resettled in the city. By 1996 Zahedan's population had reached 419,500.

Population growth has spurred the establishment of small and medium-size businesses, including cotton textile manufacturing, woven and knotted carpet production, reed mat and basket making, leather processing, food processing, livestock feed production, ceramics, brick kilns, and grain milling. Zahedan is a large market for foreign goods, a significant proportion of which are smuggled over the border with Pakistan. Zahedan also is believed to be a major center for the illegal processing of opium—smuggled into Iran from Afghanistan and Pakistan—into illicit narcotics.

See also BALUCHIS; CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION (CENTO); SISTAN AND BALUCHISTAN.

ERIC HOOGLUND

ZAHIR SHAH

[1914–]

King of Afghanistan, 1933–1973.

Born in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, Zahir attended Habibia and Istiqlal schools (1920–1924), then accompanied his father, Mohammad Nadir Khan, to France, where he continued his studies. Zahir's father was the second eldest and most influential of five Musahiban brothers, members of the Muhammadzai royal clan of the Barakzai Pashtun tribe, who enjoyed considerable power in court during the 1910s and 1920s. During the turbulent rule of the modernizing King Amanullah Barakzai (1919–1929), the Musahiban brothers fell into disfavor. In 1929, when popular rebellions forced Amanullah's abdication, followed by a nine-month interregnum of rule by a rural Tajik, Amir Habibullah, Zahir's father returned to eastern Afghanistan from France. With assistance from the British in India, Pashtun tribesmen, and religious leaders, Nadir Khan claimed the Afghan throne, declaring himself Muhammad Nadir Shah on 15 October 1929—thereby establishing the Musahiban dynasty.

Zahir returned to Kabul in October 1930 and attended the Infantry Officers School for one year. In 1931, he married the daughter of Ahmad Shah, a court minister. The only surviving son of Nadir Shah, Crown Prince Zahir at age seventeen was appointed assistant war minister (1932), then minister of education (1933). On 8 November 1933, following the assassination of his father, he was proclaimed King Mohammad Zahir Shah, with the religious title al-Mutawakkil ala Allah (he who puts his faith in Allah). To ensure the continuation of Musahiban rule, his accession to the throne was unopposed by his three surviving uncles. For the next thirty years, Zahir Shah simply reigned while two of his strong-willed and autocratic uncles held actual power as prime ministers—Sardar (Prince) Muhammad Hashim Khan (1933–1947) and Sardar Shah

Mahmud Khan (1947–1953), followed by Zahir Shah's cousin and brother-in-law, the dictatorial prime minister Sardar Muhammad Daud (1953–1963). During this period, although Afghanistan was officially a constitutional monarchy, power and decision making were monopolized by a few elder members of the Musahiban oligarchy; they maintained family unity through intermarriage, assuring continuation of their rule by stifling liberal expression and political freedoms with an oppressive police state.

Following a rift with Daud and his resignation as prime minister, Zahir Shah took power into his own hands in 1963 by appointing a nonrelative as prime minister. He then launched his program of Demokrasy-i Now (New Democracy)—a period of experimentation with democratic liberalization that lasted for a decade. During this decade, he encouraged the development of a new liberal constitution, supported relatively free elections, extended freedom of the press, and tolerated the formation of many political movements with diverse orientations. Indecisiveness and inaction on the passage of legislation governing political parties and his inability to prevent government interference by family members and friends undermined the democratic experiments. In 1973, while receiving medical treatment in Europe, Zahir Shah was overthrown in a military coup led by his paternal cousin (and sister's husband), Daud. Zahir Shah remained in foreign exile in Italy with his family, and Daud established a republic.

Zahir Shah is considered a mild-mannered, soft-spoken kindly gentleman who lacks energy and is devoid of initiative. He abdicated his throne and passively watched the people's struggles opposing Soviet occupation, communist rule, and civil strife that began in Afghanistan in 1978. Zahir Shah's written statement welcoming the initial fall of Mazar-e Sharif to Taliban in 1997 deeply saddened the peoples of northern Afghanistan. However, some of his former associates and officials also living in exile advocate his return to Afghanistan and possible restoration of the monarchy especially after the fall of the Marxist regime in 1992 and again after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. One of Zahir Shah's delegates to the Bonne Conference (December 2001), Hamid Karzai, was appointed chairperson of the interim post-Taliban government. In April 2002 he ended his exile in Rome and returned to his palace in Kabul, renouncing all claims to the throne. The emergency Loya Jerga of June 2002, which he officially opened, gave him the title of "Father of the Nation." His title was reaffirmed by the Constitutional Loya Jerga of December 2003.



Zahir Shah in his residence in Rome, 2001. Zahir was the last king of Afghanistan, reigning from 1933 until he was deposed in a bloodless coup in 1973. After more than 25 years in exile, he acquired a reputation as an elder statesman and was given the symbolic title "Father of the Nation" upon his return in 2002. **© Reuters NewMedia Inc./Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

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M. Nazif Shahrani
Updated by Eric Hooglund

ZAHLA

The capital of Lebanon's Biqa valley and the center of its economic activity.

Under the mandate, Zahla (also Zahleh) was a small town growing silkworms for export to France; it has developed into a major economic hub for the Biqa Valley, with a population of 55,000 (2002). The city's geographic location makes it an important station for commercial trucks coming into or leaving Lebanon. Zahla's main economic activity centers around the farming and poultry industries.

See also BIQA VALLEY.

GEORGE E. IRANI

ZAʿIM

See GLOSSARY

ZAʿIM, HUSNI AL-

[1894–1949]

Syrian military officer and politician.

Born in Aleppo to a Kurdish business family, Husni al-Zaʿim was captured by the British while serving in the Ottoman army and later joined the Troupes Spéciales in the French Mandate forces. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1941, he was charged with embezzlement by the Vichy government and was later arrested by the Free French. He was promoted from director of public security to chief of staff of the army in May 1948. As a precursor to his coup d'état, al-Zaʿim defied President Shukri al-Quwatli's order to arrest Col. Antoine Bustani, the scapegoat of a minor scandal, and gave him a position in the defense ministry instead. In the spring of 1949, Colonel al-Zaʿim overthrew the government of Khalid al-Azm and arrested President al-Quwatli.

Encouraged by the local representatives of U.S. intelligence in Damascus, and supported by the future Syrian president Adib Shishakli, the Zaʿim coup marked the first comprehensive takeover by the military in regional politics. The Syrian military would never be far from control of the political institutions. Al-Zaʿim's short rule sought to forcibly strip many traditional customs that appeared to inhibit progress. He even tried to explore the possibility of achieving a peace agreement with Israel. But his inconsistent foreign and domestic policy cost him the support of neighboring Arab regimes and of Syrian public opinion. His regime was overthrown on 14 August 1949 by Sami al-Hinnawi, and al-Zaʿim was executed. It is believed that Zaʿim paid with his life for his betrayal of Antun Saʿada, the leader of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, whom al-Zaʿim backed at first but then handed over to the Lebanese authorities, who sentenced him to death in July 1949.

See also SAʿADA, ANTUN.

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CHARLES U. ZENZIE
UPDATED BY EYAL ZISSER

ZAKAT

See GLOSSARY

ZAMIR, ZVI

See MOSSAD

ZAMZAM

The famous well of Mecca.

According to Muslim legend, Zamzam was opened by the angel Gabriel to provide for Hagar and Ismaʿil, who were in danger of dying of thirst after Abraham deposited them in what was then an unpopulated desert valley. History suggests that it was the coexistence of this well and the adjacent shrine (Kaʿba) that led to the emergence of Mecca as an important commercial and cultural center in pre-Islamic Arabia. For centuries Muslims have cherished the brackish water of Zamzam as sacred and have sought to benefit from its reputed blessings. To this day, pilgrims to the Meccan sanctuary descend the enclosed staircase to the well and either

draw water for themselves to drink, or bottle it and take it home for a relative or friend who is ill.

See also KAʿBA.

SCOTT ALEXANDER

ZANA, LEYLA

[1961–]

Kurdish member of Turkey's parliament sentenced to jail for defending the rights of the Kurdish people.

Leyla Zana was born in 1961 in a Kurdish village near the town of Silvan in eastern Turkey. When she was fourteen her father married her to his cousin, Mehdi Zana, a political activist. In 1976 the couple moved to the Kurdish city of Diyarbakir, where Mehdi was elected mayor a year later. Arrested during the 1980 military coup d'état, he was sentenced to thirty years in prison.

Defending the rights of her husband as a political prisoner, Zana became an activist, and organized other women visiting their jailed family members. Meanwhile, she studied on her own, obtained a high school diploma, and engaged in journalistic and human rights activism, which led to her arrest in 1988.

In 1991 she became the first Kurdish woman elected to the parliament, and the first to break the ban on speaking in Kurdish in the parliament. She advocated in her native tongue for fraternal relations between Kurdish and Turkish peoples. Declared a "separatist," "traitor," and member of an illegal party, she was tried, convicted, and sentenced to fifteen years in jail in 1994. Since her imprisonment she has received several peace awards, including the European Parliament's Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, and was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize. In 1998 she was sentenced to two more years in jail for writing an article about the Kurdish new year *(Newroz).* In April 2003, a retrial convened under pressure from the European Union (which Turkey aspires to join) did not lead to her release.

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SHAHRZAD MOJAB

ZANAN MAGAZINE

An independent Iranian women's magazine.

The first issue of the monthly magazine *Zanan* (Women) appeared in February 1992 under the editorship and management of Shahla Sherkat. Fired after ten years of working in the editorial board of *Zan-i Ruz* (Today's woman) because of her "growing modernist, Western, and feminist tendencies" (Sherkat, 2003, p.4), Sherkat launched *Zanan* as an independent feminist journal. Although initially produced in a small room borrowed from the office of *Kian,* a reform-oriented journal, and with limited resources and the cooperation of only a couple of journalists, *Zanan* has grown into a professionally produced magazine with about thirty staff members and several freelance contributors; it has its office in an independent office building. *Zanan*'s survival (104 issues published as of December 2003) against financial odds and political pressures is a remarkable record of success in the history of Iran's usually short-lived independent publications in general and of its women's publications in particular.

Zanan represents a gradual shift among numerous Muslim women activists from radical Islamism or conservative patriarchal traditionalism to a liberal spiritualism and modernist egalitarian reformism that is described by some as Islamic feminism. This evolution, occurring within the context of widespread ideological disillusionment with militant and totalitarian Islamism, represents the gender dimension of a growing reform movement toward democracy, pluralism, secularism, and civil rights in Iranian society at large.

Zanan has played a pioneering role in Islamic women's rethinking of gender and reconstruction of womanhood. With significant contributions by Muslim feminist theologians such as Seyyed Mohsen Saʿidzadeh and secular lawyers such as Mehrangiz Kar, *Zanan* began challenging the patriarchal presuppositions that have shaped the dominant interpretations of Islam and the construction of *shariʿa* law and policy concerning women's rights, male-female relationships, sexual mores, and gender roles under the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Believing that *ijtihad* (reasoning from faith) is an obligation of every responsible adult, *Zanan* has expanded the domain of modern Islamic interpretation. It has embarked on a thorough and radical

project aimed at "decentering the clergy and placing woman as interpreter and her needs as ground for interpretation" (Najmabadi, 1998, p. 71).

Zanan's agenda has not been limited to the reinterpretation of the Islamic canon. Each issue includes sections addressing social problems and contentious issues; theoretical debates, interviews, and cultural studies; critique of law and legal advice; feminist critique of literature and films; health issues, sports, and leisure; and new books and news. It also carries advertisements, which are not always free of stereotypical marketing techniques geared toward modern homemakers. Some *Zanan*'s writers, especially the younger ones such as Parastu Dokoohaki, Shadi Sadr, and Roya Karimi-Majd, have produced courageous and provocative reports highlighting not only oppressive and sexist traditions but also modern social ills affecting girls and the younger generation of women, including poverty, prostitution, drug abuse, addiction, and violence. Although it is circulated in different parts of Iran and in some diaspora circles, *Zanan*'s readers are primarily in the modern middle class and for the most part are middle-aged urban women.

In the 1997 presidential elections and the subsequent parliamentary elections, *Zanan* played a considerable role in mobilizing women's votes for Mohammad Khatami and moderate candidates for the Iranian parliament, the majlis. Yet through its critical monthly reports on the works of the majlis deputies and the policies of Khatami's government, and especially through challenging interviews and panel discussions, *Zanan* also took the reformers to task by highlighting their shortcomings and failures to safeguard women's rights and achieve progress on gender issues.

Adopting a nonviolent, spiritual, Sufi-like language in its editorials, *Zanan* has emphasized "autonomy and choice as the first pillar of freedom" (Sherkat, 1992, pp. 2–3). By inviting contributions from Iranian secular and Islamic feminists, living inside as well as outside the country, *Zanan* has provided a nonsectarian and inclusive forum for dialogue between secular and faith-based feminists. Its openness, however, is constrained by censorship as well as by the ideological and political constraints imposed by the regime. By introducing feminist theories, reports on women's status and movements in other parts of the world, and translations of Western feminist literature, *Zanan* has avoided a reactive gender conservatism and a phobia about Western ideas, weaving textual, artistic, and intellectual connections between Muslim women and Western feminism. *Zanan* has altered the terms of the debate and dialogue not only among Islamic women activists, but also between Islamic and secular feminists.

See also Kar, Mehrangiz; Saʿidzadeh, Seyyed Mohsen; *Shariʿa.*

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Nayereh Tohidi

ZAN-E RUZ

See Newspapers and Print Media: Iran

ZANGWILL, ISRAEL

[1864–1926]

British novelist and playwright; early Zionist.

Israel Zangwill was a sophisticated British wit whose reputation was established with his novel *Children of the Ghetto* (1892), which depicted Jewish immigrant life in the East London ghetto. He joined in the Zionist cause of Theodor Herzl in 1895, arranging for Herzl a series of community meetings with prominent members of English Jewish society. He introduced Herzl to the Maccabeans, a society of Jewish authors, artists, and professionals, and helped organize the Maccabean Pilgrimage to Palestine in 1897. He also helped and employed the wandering Hebrew poet Naphtali Herz Imber, author of the

Zionist anthem "Hatikvah," during his stay in England (1889–1892) and made him famous as a character in his writings.

During the period of the Uganda Project, Zangwill founded and led the Jewish Territorial Organization for the Settlement of the Jews within the British Empire (1905–1925); it pursued the possibility of an East African province for a Jewish settlement, a so-called provincial Palestine. Zangwill felt that "any territory which was Jewish [and] under a Jewish flag, saves the Jew's body and the Jew's soul." Many Zionists broke with him over this issue, since his group did not acknowledge any organic connection between Zionism and Palestine.

During the early 1900s, Zangwill scored tremendous success as a playwright in England and in the United States. He also continued to write novels and produced his last play, *We Moderns* (1924), in New York City.

See also Herzl, Theodor; Uganda Project.

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Miriam Simon

ZANZIBAR

Islands and coastal land in East Africa.

From the tenth century, many Arabs emigrated to Zanzibar, the 640-square-mile (1,658 sq. km) island of that name (also neighboring islands and the adjacent coast of East Africa). In 1698 Oman seized Zanzibar from the Portuguese, and in 1841 Oman's ruler, Shaykh Sayyid Saʿid, permanently moved his capital there from Muscat. Wealthy Omanis established an extensive plantation economy centered on clove production using African slave labor. After Saʿid's death in 1856, contention between his sons led to Britain's Canning Award (1861), splitting Oman and Zanzibar into separate sultanates. The latter declined, partly because of British suppression of the slave trade in 1873, and became a British protectorate in 1890.

Following Zanzibar's independence (1963) and union with Tanganyika (1964), the Arab population was severely mistreated by the Africans. Several thousand emigrated, mostly to the capital area of Muscat in Oman, after the accession of Sultan Qabus in 1970. In Zanzibar in 2000 and 2001, political tensions and violence followed elections that observers denounced as irregular. The major political parties signed an agreement in October 2001 calling for electoral reforms.

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Malcolm C. Peck

ZAQAZIQ UNIVERSITY

University in the eastern Nile delta.

Zaqaziq University was founded in 1974 in Zaqaziq, the capital of the eastern Nile delta province of Sharqiyya, from branch faculties of Ain Shams University in Cairo. In 2001, on its main campuses in Zaqaziq and its branch campus at Banha, the university had nearly 6,000 teaching staff and assistants and 146,816 students.

See also Ain Shams University.

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Donald Malcolm Reid

ZARANIQ CONFEDERATION

Tribal grouping on North Yemen's largely nontribal coastal desert, the Tihama.

The Zaraniq, the largest and most formidable tribal grouping of the Tihama, stood in the way of efforts by Imam Yahya to extend control of the imamate state and were compelled to submit to the imam only after a savage two-year campaign in the late 1920s. An important part of the history of the Tihama for many centuries, the Zaraniq were known in the past

as the Maʿaziba tribe and, like other tribes on the Tihama, claimed descent from the Akk tribe.

See also YAHYA IBN MUHAMMAD HAMID AL-DIN.

ROBERT D. BURROWES

ZARQA, AL-

Jordanian city.

Lying some 14 miles (23 km) northeast of Jordan's capital, Amman, al-Zarqa is Jordan's second-largest city (pop. 421,000 in 2002). The village witnessed tremendous growth beginning in the 1950s through the presence of a major military base, the development of industry and a free trade zone, and the influx of Palestinian refugees (who constitute some 60 to 70 percent of the population).

ABLA M. AMAWI

ZAWIYA

See GLOSSARY

ZAYDAN, JURJI

[1861–1914]

Early pan-Arab nationalist, author, and publisher.

Jurji Zaydan (also spelled Gurgi Zaidan) was born into a poor Greek Orthodox family in Beirut and, through self-education, obtained entry to the Syrian Protestant College in 1881. After a year in the medical school, he participated in a student strike and was expelled. As did many of his contemporaries, he went to Cairo, where he embarked on a career as a journalist, publisher, novelist, scholar, and pronationalist intellectual. He was a major contributor to Arab literature. During the thirty years of his life in Cairo, he produced twenty-one historical novels dealing with Arab history; a five-volume history of Islamic civilization (*Tarikh al-Tamaddun al-Islami,* Cairo, 1901–1906); a four-volume history of Arabic literature (*Tarikh Adab al-Lugha al-Arabiyya,* Cairo, 1910–1913); and a dozen other books on history, language, and literature. In 1892, he founded the magazine *al-Hilal,* which he authored, published, and distributed for the next twenty-two years practically single-handedly. With *al-Muqtataf,* it became the most important forum of the Arab Nahda (Renaissance) for the discussion of history, nationalism, secularism, modern sciences, and political institutions. In addition, Zaydan was also the author of the first autobiography in Arabic, *Mudhakkirat Jurji Zaydan.*

At the end of the nineteenth century the European presence in the Middle East became ubiquitous and overwhelming in all its cultural, intellectual, political, and economic aspects. The task of the Arab intellectual was to respond to a twofold challenge: to adapt to life in the modern Europe-dominated world while continuing to assert the independent identity and viability of Arab society. It was exactly this twofold challenge that Zaydan made his life task to tackle. Less the political activist than the educator of the nation, he aimed at informing his Arab compatriots about the modern world as well as about their own past and national identity. Even as he familiarized his Arab readers with modern Europe and introduced them to European thought, he established the foundations for a pan-Arab national identity. He was the first to try in a scholarly and systematic fashion to reconstruct a history of the Arabs separate from Islamic history. By incorporating pre-Islamic Arabian and even Babylonian history into Arab history, Islam became only one phase. This perspective also made possible a future for the Arab nation independent from Islam. On the popular level, he tried to spread this idea along with national identity through his historical novels—a genre that he introduced to Arabic literature.

In addition to history, language assumed a central place in Zaydan's thinking. It was the symbol of national identity, a means of achieving such identity, and an expression of one's national culture and heritage. For him, the vitality of the language meant the viability of the nation. Drawing on concepts of evolution and progress, he attacked the classicist ideal and the religious rigor of archaic literary Arabic and insisted that developments and changes in the language were positive, proving its vitality. Especially through his magazine, *al-Hilal,* he contributed greatly to the simplification in style of formal literary Arabic and popularized new terms and concepts that reflected modern thought and knowledge.

His unceasing and successful effort to establish an Arab national identity defined by history and

language created the foundations of political pan-Arab nationalism as it arose after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

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THOMAS PHILIPP

ZAYDISM

The sect of Shiʿite Islam that prevails in the northern highlands of North Yemen and the political system that has existed to defend and advance that sect almost continuously since the late ninth century.

The Zaydi sect takes its name from Zayd ibn Ali Zayn al-Abidin, the fifth Shiʿite imam and the grandson of Husayn, who was one of the two sons of Ali and Fatima, the cousin and daughter of the prophet Muhammad. (Because Zayd was the fifth imam, Zaydis are sometimes called Fiver Shiʿa.) The doctrine of the sect as developed by Zayd and his followers was pragmatic, rational, and open to extension by critical examination and interpretation; and it rejected such features of other Shiʿite sects as the ideas of a "hidden" imam, an occult explanation of the Qurʾan, systematic dissimulation, and mysticism. Often referred to as the "fifth school" of Sunni Islam, Zaydism differs from Sunni orthodoxy primarily in its insistence on the institution of the imamate and the right of the descendants of Ali and Fatima to rule the world of Islam through that religio-political institution.

The founder of the Zaydi imamate in Yemen was al-Hadi ila al-Haqq Yahya ibn Husayn. He did so in the year 897 after being invited by tribes in the area around Saʿda to come from his native Medina to mediate their disputes and govern them. Al-Hadi's fourteen-year reign established in the highlands of North Yemen the Zaydi imamate, a state and political system that was to persist with numerous changes of fortune and breaks in continuity for over one thousand years into the 1960s, all the while maintaining many of the features that he and his immediate successors had decreed for it. The strong imams of the first decades of the twentieth century, Imam Yahya and his son, Imam Ahmad ibn Yahya, served as the spiritual leaders, temporal rulers, and defenders of the community of Islam much as had their predecessors a millennium earlier. The Zaydi imamate was abolished on the occasion of the 1962 revolution that created the Yemen Arab Republic, but northern Yemen, and Saʿda in particular, is still known for its Zaydi population.

See also AHMAD IBN YAHYA HAMID AL-DIN; QURʾAN; YAHYA IBN MUHAMMAD HAMID AL-DIN.

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ROBERT D. BURROWES

ZAYTUNA UNIVERSITY

Prominent university in Tunis.

Built as a mosque in the eighth century, Zaytuna was enlarged by the Aghlabids in 864 when the Abbasid caliph al-Muʿtasim ordered the addition of a wing. It continues to serve as a school mosque and houses a huge library that in the fourteenth century was administered by the Malikite theologian Muhammad ibn Arafa. One of Zaytuna's students was Abd al-Rahman ibn Khaldun, the well-known Arab historian and philosopher. In modern times alumni include the leader of the Tunisian Destour party, Abd al-Aziz Thaʿlabi. In addition many Zaytuna graduates staffed the cadres of the Neo-Destour party.

Although at first traditional, teaching at Zaytuna was gradually modernized. The last reform came in 1933, at the hands of its students. Upon Tunisia's independence the Zaytuna became the *shariʿa* (Islamic law) school of the University of Tunis.

In 1945, Zaytuna had five branches in various cities of Tunisia and three thousand students in the secondary and college levels combined. The regional branches were not very active, and their ties

with Tunis were very weak. With the appointment of al-Taher ben Ashour as the director of Zaytuna, new branches were opened in Tunisia and even in Algeria, raising their number to twenty-five. All became very active. The number of students in the main and the regional branches jumped to 20,000.

The growing national role of Zaytuna University in opposing French colonialism and the leadership of its graduates in the nationalist movement, caused it to become the target of the French colonial government. The university gradually found itself at odds with the political powers, and its activities were curtailed. The great cultural support Tunisia received from the Arab League allowed it to pursue the spread of Arabic culture and language teaching through Zaytuna University as well as other centers of learning, thus counteracting the colonial cultural policy of promoting French at the expense of Arabic. Zaytuna University was instrumental in safeguarding Arabic culture in Tunisia and also helped its neighbor Algeria, a country that did not have a similar cultural center.

See also League of Arab States.

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Aida A. Bamia

ZAYYAT, LATIFA

[1923–1996]

Egyptian university professor, literary critic, political activist, essayist, and fiction writer.

Latifa Zayyat was a cultural icon of nationalist and feminist commitment. Born in the Delta city of Dimyat (Damietta), she received her university education and in 1957 her doctoral degree in English literature from Ain Shams University, Cairo. She taught there from 1952 until her retirement and was briefly director of the Arts Academy in Cairo during the 1970s.

Throughout her life she remained politically active. Involved in nationalist and student politics in the 1940s, she was a leader of the National Committee of Students and Workers. From 1979 until her death she chaired the Committee for the Defense of National Culture, formed to counter the possible cultural effects of Anwar al-Sadat's normalization policy toward Israel and his *infitah* ("Open Door") economic policy; along with many other activist intellectuals, Zayyat was arrested in 1981—not her first experience as an Egyptian political prisoner.

The activism of the 1940s forms the historical backdrop to her novel *al-Bab al-maftuh* (*The Open Door,* 1960), a landmark work of Arab feminist literature, narrating the physical, social, and political awakening of a middle-class Egyptian girl. After a long hiatus, Zayyat published additional novels, short stories, and a play; her short story collection *al-Shaykhukha wa qisas ukhra* (Old age and other stories, 1986) was notable for its focus on aging and its cross-genre formal experimentation. She also published critical studies in Arabic and English, and translations into Arabic of T. S. Eliot's essays and other texts. In 1992, she published a controversially frank memoir, *Hamlat taftish: Awraq shakhsiyya* (Arrest/search campaign: personal papers). She was awarded Egypt's State Prize for Literature in 1996, a few months before her death.

See also Bakr, Salwa; Gender: Gender and Education; Gender: Gender and Law; Gender: Gender and Politics; Literature: Arabic.

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Zayyat, Latifa al-. *The Open Door,* translated by Marilyn Booth. New York; Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2000.

Marilyn Booth

ZBIRI, TAHAR

[1930–]

Algerian officer.

Born in the Annaba region, Tahar Zbiri supported Messali al-Hadj before joining the Armée de Libéra-

tion Nationale (ALN). He had a distinguished record during the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), participating in the initial attacks of 1 November 1954, escaping with "historic chief" Moustafa Ben Boulaid from the French, and breaching the Morice Line in 1960. Although he served as chief of staff of the Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP) under President Ahmed Ben Bella, Zbiri's loyalties were to Houari Boumédienne, and he arrested Ben Bella during the June 1965 coup. Zbiri remained chief of staff but opposed Boumédienne's increasing authoritarianism. In 1967 he organized a military revolt that failed, resulting in his arrest and exile. President Chadli Bendjedid pardoned Zbiri in 1980 and he returned to Algeria. Immediately after the suppression of the October 1988 riots, Zbiri and other prominent veterans and ex-ministers urged Bendjedid to convene a national conference to organize a new, democratic Algeria. The president rejected this proposal and Zbiri aligned with the anti-Bendjedid faction within the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). Zbiri was selected to preside over a commission to monitor the parliamentary elections of May 1997. He is also identified with Algeria's liberalizing economy as a supporter of the private Khalifa group, a controversial conglomerate that collapsed in 2003.

See also ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; BOUMÉDIENNE, HOUARI.

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PHILLIP C. NAYLOR

ZEID, FAHRALNISSA

[1901–1991]

Turkish artist.

Fahralnissa Zeid was the daughter of a prominent Turkish general. Like many Middle Eastern artists of the early twentieth century, she came from an elite family of politicians and intellectuals. Zeid studied under Namik Ismail at the Academy of Fine Arts in Istanbul and then at the Académie Ranson in Paris, starting in 1927. She later returned to Turkey to join the famed D Group of contemporary artists, who attempted to develop Turkish art along the European model in line with the new Turkish republic. Zeid married the Hashimite ambassador to Turkey and assisted him in diplomatic posts throughout Europe. She was one of the first Middle Eastern artists to show her work in the West, including exhibits in London, New York, and the Salon des Réalités Nouvelles in Paris as early as the 1940s. In the 1970s she went to Amman and founded the Fahralnissa Zeid Institute of Fine Arts, thereby influencing generations of future Jordanian and Palestinian artists. Zeid's work was influenced by Byzantine portraiture, medieval stained glass patterns, and the tradition of Turkish miniature paintings. Her cubist-inspired abstract art was the first art of its kind to gain wide exposure in Jordan, as her openings garnered extensive media coverage. She also did fanciful scenes and portrait painting, working in oil, collage, and stained glass.

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JESSICA WINEGAR

ZELDA

[1914–1984]

Israeli poet.

Born Zelda Shneurson and also known as Zelda Mishkovsky, she signed her poems with her first name only. A devout Hasidic Jew, she was well versed in ancient sacred and traditional Jewish texts. In 1926 she emigrated to Israel from her native Ukraine. Her first book, *Leisure,* was published in 1968. Zelda published six other volumes of poetry: *The Invisible Carmel, Be Not Far, Neither Mountain nor Fire, Tiny Poems, The Spectacular Difference,* and *Beyond All Distance.* Her work is acclaimed by secular Israeli readers for its gentle, transcendental, mystic quality. Her poem "Each Person Has a Name" describes the characteristics acquired by individuals through the names assigned them and has been embraced by Israelis as an expression of their own collective and personal experiences with trauma and loss. The melancholy underlying her worldview is lightened by a sense of acceptance, a faith in the possibility of glory, and an enchantment with the beauty and sanctity of life.

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ZVIA GINOR
UPDATED BY DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

ZELL AL-SOLTAN, MASʿUD MIRZA

[1850–1918]

The eldest son of Persia's Naser al-Din Shah.

Masʿud Mirza Zell al-Soltan (Shadow of the Sovereign) was excluded from succeeding Naser al-Din because his mother was not of the Qajar dynasty. He became governor of Isfahan in 1874 and from 1881 to 1887 was the powerful and oppressive ruler of much of southern Iran. He had a large private army and kept the local tribesmen under control, killing an important Bakhtiari chief in 1882. He had contempt for the *ulama* (Islamic clergy). The rival of his half-brother and future monarch, Mozaffar al-Din, governor of Azerbaijan, Zell al-Soltan was opposed at court in Tehran by Ali-Asghar Amin al-Soltan. In 1888, because of his excesses, his power was restricted to Isfahan. During the Constitutional Revolution, he hoped to replace Mohammad Ali as shah and, consequently, aided the revolutionaries by supplying some financial support.

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LAWRENCE G. POTTER

ZEROUAL, LIAMINE

[1943–]

President of Algeria, 1994–1999.

Born in Batna, Liamine Zeroual (also al-Amin Zirwal) joined Algeria's National Liberation Army (ALN) at the age of sixteen. Later he attended a military school in the Soviet Union and France's Ecole de Guerre. Upon his return, he took over the military school of the National Popular Army (ANP) in Batna. Zeroual held various operational jobs within the ANP, including that of commander of the prestigious Military Academy in Cherchell. He earned the rank of general in 1988 and commanded the Land Forces. Zeroual resigned from the ANP in 1989 because of a conflict with President Chadli Bendjedid about the restructuring of the military. He was appointed ambassador to Romania in 1990. In 1991 he retired to Batna.

After Bendjedid was deposed in 1992, Algeria was ruled by the High State Council. In 1993 General Khaled Nezzar, a powerful member of the Council, called Zeroual back from retirement as his replacement as minister of defense. In January 1994, with the dissolution of the Council, Zeroual was appointed president of Algeria. In November 1995 he was elected president with 60 percent of the popular vote in the country's first pluralist presidential election. His mission was to reestablish peace and security, to build legitimate state institutions, and to break with the old regime. Zeroual was able to build an institutional edifice. A political party, the Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND), was created in February 1997 to support his policies. The party obtained the majority in the June 1997 legislative elections. In a surprise move, Zeroual announced on 11 September 1998 that he would step down in February 1999. In April 1999 Abdelaziz Bouteflika, following a controversial election, became his successor.

See also ALGERIA: OVERVIEW; ALGERIA: POLITICAL PARTIES IN; BENDJEDID, CHADLI; BOUTEFLIKA, ABDELAZIZ; HIGH STATE COUNCIL (ALGERIA).

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MIA BLOOM
UPDATED BY YAHIA ZOUBIR

ZIADEH, MAY

[1886–1941]

Poet, translator, orator, essayist, and critic.

Marie Ziadeh (also Ziyada) was born in Nazareth to a Lebanese father and a Palestinian mother. After her family emigrated to Cairo in 1908, Ziadeh be-

gan her writing career, which was facilitated by her father becoming editor of the Cairo weekly *al-Mahrusa.* After initially writing under pseudonyms, she changed her name from Marie to May (or Mayy), and quickly distinguished herself as a prolific poet, translator, orator, essayist, and critic. She studied at the Egyptian University, mastered five languages, cooperated with early feminist groups such as the one led by Huda Shaʿrawi, and as early as 1913 started a literary salon in her parents' house.

Ziadeh's early work is characterized by romanticism, but increasingly her writing took on sociopolitical themes relating to socialism, colonialism, freedom of the press, and especially women's rights. Among her groundbreaking publications are her biographical accounts of the pioneer women writers Warda al-Yaziji, Aʾisha Taymur, and Bahithat al-Badiya. Ziadeh was also associated with the *mahjar* (émigré) Arab writers, particularly Kahlil Gibran, with whom she had an intense, lengthy correspondence. Although they never met, there has been much speculation on the nature of their relationship, and much written about her as his muse. Her articles on Gibran were widely read in the Arab world and helped make him famous, while also establishing her as a critic.

Ziadeh is most famous for her literary salon, which met weekly for over twenty years. Unlike other salons, hers was open to men and women of mixed religious, national, and social backgrounds. It drew some of the most prominent intellectuals of Egypt and provided her with a platform for both social acceptability and intellectual opposition.

After her parents died, the salon dissolved, and Ziadeh's final years were enmeshed in accusations of insanity and conjecture about her enigmatic life. In recent years, her work has received considerable attention, and she is now acknowledged to be one of the Arab world's most prominent emancipators.

See also EGYPT; GENDER: GENDER AND EDUCATION; LITERATURE: ARABIC; SYRIA.

ELISE SALEM

ZIKHRON YAʿAKOV

Village located 19 miles (31 km) south of Haifa.

In 1882, Romanian Jews founded Zikhron Yaʿakov, one of the early settlements of the Hovevei Zion (Hibbat Zion) movement. Financially supported in part by the Baron Edmond de Rothschild, the settlement, shortly after its founding, was given its present name in memory of the baron's father, Jacob (Zikhron Yaʿakov means "The Memory of Jacob"). Baron de Rothschild promoted the planting of grapes, and vineyards were established in the settlement as well as one of the largest wine cellars in Israel. In 1954, Baron de Rothschild and his wife were buried in Zikhron Yaʿakov. Located in the foothills of Mount Carmel, the village (pop. 12,000 in 2002) is a tourist site that draws visitors to the Rothschild mausoleum, botanical garden, and winery.

See also HIBBAT ZION.

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BRYAN DAVES

ZILI, RIDHA

[1942–]

Tunisian poet and photographer.

Ridha Zili was born in Monastir, Tunisia. He received a bilingual (Arabic and French) education but writes in French only. Zili's writing is greatly influenced by his work as a photographer, especially in his concept of the image. His only published collection of poetry, *Ifrikiya, ma pensée* (1967; Africa in my thoughts), describes his love of peace and his search for happiness. Zili rejects sadness and the nonsensical violence in the world and values his Tunisian African roots.

See also LITERATURE: ARABIC, NORTH AFRICAN.

AIDA A. BAMIA

ZIONISM

Movement for the establishment of an independent state in Palestine for the Jewish people.

Zionism may be seen as a national liberation movement for a Jewish homeland based on a nineteenth-century European political model. It defined Jews as a nation whose collective future depended upon the establishment of a national territorial entity in

Eretz Yisrael (in Hebrew, "the land of Israel"), from which most Jews had been dispersed by the Roman Empire at the beginning of the second century C.E. The movement's name was coined by the Viennese Jewish writer Nathan Birnbaum in 1885 and derives from *Zion,* one of the biblical names for Jerusalem, the focus of worldwide Judaism.

Zionists believed that antisemitism was endemic to the diaspora; thus, the achievement of national and civil rights in host nations, while desirable, was insufficient to secure economic and cultural interests for Jews in the long run. Few Zionists believed that the diaspora would be swept away (as was attempted a century later by Hitler's Nazi Germany), but a Jewish homeland—which would serve as a cultural and political model and as a magnet for its finest sons and daughters—could help to secure a future for Jews.

Foundations of Zionism

Through the centuries of exile, ritual, prayer, and the study of sacred texts preserved for Jews the knowledge that Judaism had developed in Eretz Yisrael and Zion. In nineteenth-century Europe during the Haskalah (the Jewish Enlightenment), revival of the Hebrew language as a nonreligious, literary medium transmitted secular works and secularized versions of sacred histories to assimilated generations losing faith in religion and religious authority. If Zionism were to ensure the survival of the Jewish people, it could do so only by going through the modern European Jewish experience, not by denying it. Zionists were Jews who believed that only in Zion could Jewish culture and the Jewish people be re-established and secure. At that time, however, Zion was located in Palestine, within the Ottoman Empire, and was populated by Arabs under Ottoman jurisdiction.

A "proto-Zionism" had existed in fact before it was fully defined or before the word itself was coined. As a way of helping the indigent and scholarly Jewish populations in Ottoman Palestine, Western European philanthropists such as Edmond de Rothschild and Sir Moses Montefiore proffered aid to projects that later would come to be associated with the Zionist movement—the purchase of land for settlements, farms, and businesses from Ottoman officials and Arab landlords; the building of schools for vocational training; and the opening of medical facilities.

Jewish emigration to Eretz Yisrael also antedated the emergence of a Zionist movement. Jewish religious leaders had always endorsed the idea of living in the Holy Land as a means of discharging religious duties, and had actively promoted the expansion of Jewish communities in Safed, Tiberias, Hebron, and Jerusalem, creating financial mechanisms to meet the immigrants' material needs.

The wave of pogroms that followed the assassination of Russia's Czar Alexander II in 1881 turned an attachment for Zion into an ideology embraced by some of Russia's secular Jewish leaders and intellectuals. Newly promulgated regressive legislation and the resuscitation of antisemitic rhetoric dashed the hopes of those who had believed Russia's polity would evolve into a democracy, with basic rights granted to its population and the ideals of tolerance espoused. Although emigration to the United States and Britain was a popular way of escaping the immediate disabilities imposed by Russian policies, some educated Jews saw that moving to another land would neither end antisemitism nor secure a Jewish future. They argued that only a purposeful immigration with the goal of establishing a Jewish majority in a territory would achieve international respectability for Jewry and help protect Jews everywhere against discrimination. For those who called on Jews to liberate themselves, the Zionist idea supplanted the ideal of assimilation. Zionism was presented as resolving the Jewish problem by normalizing the conditions of Jewish existence.

Development of Zionist Organizations

Although many rabbinical authorities opposed Zionism for its secular and humanistic principles, many rabbis—most notably Samuel Mohilever and Isaac Jacob Reines—welcomed Zionism; they affiliated with Hibbat Zion, the first international Zionist organization to be founded, partly because they reasoned that in Eretz Yisrael a social and cultural environment could be created that was conducive to religious observance.

The Orthodox rabbinate did not, however, establish an entirely harmonious relationship with the secular leadership in Hibbat Zion. Many Orthodox

Theodor Herzl addresses a meeting of the Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland. The Zionist Congress was dedicated to establishing institutions necessary for the support of a Jewish state. **© ISRAEL GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE (GPO) OF ISRAEL. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.**

rabbis could not abide the dynamics of a political struggle that effected compromises between the demands of Zionism's secular and religious constituencies. Nor were the Orthodox entirely comfortable in an organization that did not acknowledge the primacy of religious law and rabbinic authority. The first nonsecular Zionist group, the Mizrahi, opened its office in 1893, but most rabbis, though comfortable with the nationalist claims of Zionism, were unwilling to accede to Zionist demands to share power and resources in local Jewish communities. As a consequence of the frustrating handicaps under which Hibbat Zion labored in the 1880s and 1890s, Zionism was at an impasse when Theodor Herzl undertook to lead the struggle for a Jewish state.

Unaware of developments in Eastern Europe, Herzl, a Viennese journalist, championed the idea of Jewish nationhood in response to the outbreak of antisemitism in France during the fraudulent espionage trial of Alfred Dreyfus (1894–1895). In 1896 Herzl published *Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State),* a book that set forth the argument that both the world and the Jews needed a Jewish state. In 1897 Herzl succeeded in drawing together representatives from the local and regional Hibbat Zion organizations in eastern Europe and Jews from western Europe, establishing and becoming president of a new Zionist framework, the World Zionist Organization (WZO). Authorized by the WZO to secure international recognition for Zionist political goals, Herzl pursued in the capitals of Europe and in the Ottoman capital, Istanbul, official sanction for Jewish colonization in Palestine, but his efforts, albeit feverish and intense, were unsuccessful. The Ottoman sultan Abdülhamit II was not persuaded that a larger Jewish population in Palestine was consistent with his imperial political objectives or that such a population would promote economic development.

Theodor Herzl (1860–1904) was the founder and first president of the World Zionist Organization, a group whose purpose was to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. © LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Herzl's leadership did broaden the popularity of Zionism in western and eastern Europe and enlarge its Orthodox membership. Herzl focused the activities of the WZO on diplomacy and finances. This approach mobilized the support of a number of Orthodox rabbis concerned with easing the economic hardships in Palestine for eastern European immigrants and hopefuls, as well as with the creation of a hospitable political climate there. By permitting groups to shift the mode of their representation from regional affiliation to ideological, the WZO was also used advantageously by the Orthodox to influence the direction of policies and, for a number of years, to exclude Jewish culture from the scope of Zionist activities.

Zionism's preoccupation with political solutions and stratagems triggered opposition. Against the political orientation associated with the leadership of Hibbat Zion, the writer Ahad Ha-Am argued that the purpose of Zionism ought to be to revive a modern Jewish culture through the medium of the Hebrew language and a renewed interpretation of classic religious texts; a new Jewish state could only be founded with new artifacts of Jewish culture. Cultural Zionist Ahad Ha-Am's insights on the problems besetting the Jewish people and the Zionist movement helped to inspire a group opposing Herzl's leadership and political Zionism—the Democratic Faction. This group, led by the scientist Chaim Weizmann, did not repudiate political methods or consider them insignificant; rather, they insisted that just as legal titles (to land) could facilitate resettlement, so could settlement lead to concrete political gains. Insisting that the structure of the WZO must be reformed to increase popular participation and broaden its agenda, the Democratic Faction defined its own priorities as the investigation of the physical, political, and social conditions of Palestine for purposes of increasing Jewish immigration.

Creating a Jewish community in Palestine was not simply the solution to continuing antisemitism but also the opportunity to establish a whole and vigorous modern Jewish life. In the early years of the twentieth century, efforts to create a youth movement and to popularize Zionism among the young led several Zionist leaders to synthesize socialism with Zionism. No longer would Jews have to choose between socialism (popular in Russia and in the Pale of Settlement) and Zionism. Some Socialist-Zionists promoted a non-Marxist socialism, emphasizing social welfare and justice; others insisted that even the Marxist version of socialism could be combined with Zionism. Branches of the first Labor Zionist party, Poʿalei Zion, founded in 1906, opened in many towns and cities of eastern Europe, attracting many educated Jewish teenagers. Ha-Halutz, the young pioneer farm movement, was nonpartisan and attracted many capable Austro-Hungarian Jewish youth, especially when it was funded by the WZO after World War I.

Before the conclusion of World War I, Zionists were unable to engage openly in mass mobilization in many countries. In the United States and western Europe, where organizations could operate freely, Zionism did not hold the imagination of most immigrants, who were struggling to work their way

out of grinding poverty. In Russia, where the majority of Jews presumably felt sympathy with Zionist aims, Zionist activities were hobbled by the Russian Revolution, Soviet dictatorship, and persecution.

Establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine

With the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and the Sèvres Treaty of 1920, Britain became formally committed to the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish national home. This gave Zionism its first major political victory. World War I had changed the map of Eastern Europe as well as that of the Middle East, thereby providing Zionists an opportunity to engage in grassroots political organization among previously isolated Jewish communities. Youth groups expanded, and camps were created to offer vocational and Hebrew-language training to prepare Jews for life and work in Palestine.

Throughout its history, the Zionist movement has had to make crucial choices among several options: Eretz Yisrael (Palestine) versus another territory, such as Uganda, Canada, Australia; a national home versus a cultural center for world Jewry; a Jewish nation-state versus a binational state in which Jews and Arabs might share political power; neutrality during World War I versus pro-British cooperation; high political profile versus quiet political lobbying; and uniformity versus diversity in political goals. Each decision was made after great debate during and outside of Zionist congresses, often triggering enmity, hard feelings, and the creation of new splinters and factions. One of the most serious splits occurred when Vladimir (Zeʾev) Jabotinsky left the WZO to create his own Revisionist Zionist movement.

With increasing knowledge of the extent of the Holocaust during World War II, the Zionist movement chose Jewish survival over acquiescence in British restrictions on immigration, which resulted in an anti-British militancy aimed at gaining free entry for Jewish refugees into Palestine from 1944 until 1948. With the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, the fulfilment of one of Zionism's goals was endorsed by international consensus—majority support at the United Nations, official recognition by many of the world's nations, and acceptance by most Jews (religious Jews excepted). The Arab and Muslim world remained outside this consensus. Post-1948 Zionism evolved into a movement dedicated to immigration (aliyah) for as many Jews as possible, land purchase for continued settlement, and political and economic support for Israel through institutionalized activity. Despite the recent "post-Zionist" intellectual trend that urges a redefinition of Israel as an inclusive state for all its citizens and detaches it from its special diaspora Jewish connections, many Jews continue to consider themselves Zionists in affirming this connection and the importance of Israel in sustaining their Jewish identity.

See also Abdülhamit II; Ahad Ha-Am; Aliyah; Antisemitism; Diaspora; Dreyfus Affair; Eretz Yisrael; Ha-Halutz; Haskalah; Herzl, Theodor; Hibbat Zion; Holy Land; Jabotinsky, Vladimir Zeʾev; Jerusalem; Labor Zionism; Mizrahi Movement; Mohilever, Samuel; Montefiore, Moses; Pogrom; Rothschild, Edmond de; Weizmann, Chaim; World Zionist Organization (WZO); Zionist Commission for Palestine; Zionist Organization of America; Zionist Revisionist Movement.

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DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE
UPDATED BY NEIL CAPLAN

ZIONIST COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE

Official representative of the World Zionist Organization in Palestine until 1921; a precursor of the Jewish Agency Executive.

The Zionist Commission was an informal group established by Chaim Weizmann as president of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) to advise the British on policies regarding the establishment of the Jewish national home. It carried out initial surveys of Palestine and aided the repatriation of Jews sent into exile by the Ottoman Turks during World War I.

It expanded the WZO's Palestine office (established 1907) into small departments for agriculture, settlement, education, land, finance, immigration, and statistics. In 1921, the commission became the Palestine Zionist Executive, which acted as the Jewish Agency, designated to advise the British mandate authorities on the development of the country in matters of Jewish interest.

See also JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE; WEIZMANN, CHAIM; WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO).

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DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

U.S. organization supporting Zionism.

The Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) traces its origins to the 1898 founding of the Federation of American Zionists (FAZ) one year after Theodor Herzl created the World Zionist Organization (WZO). The FAZ sought to mobilize support for Herzl's plan "to create for the Jewish people a national home in Palestine secured by public law" (Basle Program, 1897). At first, the U.S. Zionist organization encountered great difficulty in attracting adherents within a mainly immigrant community concerned about its own integration into mainstream America. Indeed, in its early years, the FAZ, forerunner of the Zionist Organization of America, was perceived as a minor, fringe organization within the U.S. Jewish community. However, during World War I, a combination of factors—the plight of two-thirds of world Jewry in war-torn zones; the decision of the prominent U.S. Jew Louis Brandeis to head the FAZ; and the issuance of Great Britain's Balfour Declaration, which "view[ed] with favour the establishment in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people"—enabled the ZOA (FAZ's successor) to increase its membership from less than 12,000 in 1914 to 180,000 in 1918.

After unsuccessfully challenging the leadership and direction of the World Zionist Organization immediately following the war, the ZOA continued U.S. Zionists' erstwhile policy of loyally supporting the policies of the world Zionist movement and, since 1948, the State of Israel. At times, however, leaders emerged who challenged the policies and directions of the Zionist movement and Israeli government. During the Holocaust, ZOA leader Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver urged the WZO to stop trying to reach a modus vivendi with the British Mandate for Palestine and to seek instead to replace the Mandate Authorities with a Jewish State.

Led by its president Morton A. Klein, in 2003 the ZOA had 50,000 members in more than twelve local chapters. It actively advocates for Israel by combating what it views as "the anti-Israel bias of the media" and by promoting pro-Israel legislation on Capitol Hill. Sometimes, however, the Zionist Organization of America finds its advocacy at odds with the Israeli government itself; it opposes, for instance, former prime minister Yitzhak Rabin's signing of the Oslo Peace Process Agreement and Ehud Barak's negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.

See also BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917); HERZL, THEODOR; SILVER, ABBA HILLEL; WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO); ZIONISM.

BRYAN DAVES
UPDATED BY JERRY KUTNICK

ZIONIST REVISIONIST MOVEMENT

The political party that represented the revisionist oppositional trend in Zionism; led by Ze'ev Jabotinsky from the 1920s through the 1940s.

The Zionist Revisionist Movement sometimes referred only to the political party (Ha-Zohar; Union of Zionist-Revisionists) and sometimes to various subsidiary bodies and institutions that expressed the revisionist ideology and accepted the leadership of Vladimir Zeʾev Jabotinsky, in particular the Betar youth movement, an avant-garde mass movement of youth and incipient army founded in 1923. Hence, a distinction must be made between, on the one hand, any discussion of the political history of the union and, on the other hand, the history of Betar, the National Labor Federation, and Brit ha-Hayyal (a union of Polish army veterans)—all of which were part of the Revisionist Movement (although they preferred to regard themselves as belonging to the "national movement" or to the "Jabotinsky movement").

The union itself was founded in 1925 in Paris by a group of veteran Zionists, most of them Russians, to propose a "revision" in the aims of Zionism, which basically meant a return to the principles of political Zionism espoused by Theodor Herzl. It found its greatest support among the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe (Poland and the Baltic states), but it had branches worldwide. It grew rapidly; in the elections for the 1927 Zionist Congress, it drew 8,446 votes and in the 1933 elections, 99,729 votes. Consequently, its representation grew at the Zionist Congress and in the Asefat ha-Nivharim (the parliament of the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine), and it became the major opposition party, taking on the image of the Zionist Right or even Zionist fascism, from the end of the 1920s. This electoral growth and development of revisionist institutions led to a number of controversies between the revisionists and the labor movement and the "official" Zionism. This division was often expressed in acts of violence, leaving a deep imprint on the political history and political culture of Zionism and the Yishuv. An internal conflict also existed between moderate elements that wanted to remain within the Zionist Federation and those that demanded that the union break away. It was resolved in 1933 when the moderates seceded from the union and founded a small independent party called the Jewish State Party.

Zeʾev Jabotinsky (bottom right) meets with Betar leaders in Warsaw, Poland, 1936. Jabotinsky founded the Zionist Revisionist Movement and its related organizations such as Betar in order to bring greater pressure to bear on Great Britain and mainstream Zionists to create a large and well-defended Jewish state in Palestine. © GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE (GPO) OF ISRAEL. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

A specific point of controversy with official Zionism was the union's "independent diplomacy." This was expressed in various activities, primarily in attempts to obtain the support of European countries, in particular of Poland, to pressure Britain in the Mandate Council of the League of Nations in Geneva. In 1934 the union organized a mass petition denouncing British policy, and after the rise of the Nazis to power, it organized a boycott against German goods. From the mid-1930s, it began disseminating propaganda (and engaging in clandestine activity) to encourage a mass emigration of 700,000 to 1.5 million Jews from Europe to Palestine within a ten-year period (the Evacuation Plan and the Ten-Year Plan). It also was active in organizing illegal immigration to Palestine.

In 1935, the union broke away from the Zionist Federation and set up the New Zionist Federation (NZO) that met with wide popular support. In 1945, it rejoined the Zionist Federation. The union maintained an extensive organizational system with

centers in Paris, London, and Warsaw. In Palestine, the Ha-Zohar was the second-largest political party. After establishment of the state, the Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi (IZL) founded an independent party while veteran members of the union had their own Revisionist Party, which never attained any representation, so most of its members finally joined the new party.

The movement's platform reflected Jabotinsky's program and ideology: the future establishment of a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan river under Jewish sovereignty. As an interim measure, a colonization regime would be set up to create the conditions necessary to achieve a demographic Jewish majority—a prerequisite for a state. For this purpose, it called on the mandatory government to adopt an economic and settlement policy that would foster Jewish immigration and settlement. It also demanded that the Jewish Legion be reinstated, i.e., that Jewish military units be activated as an integral part of the British garrison in Palestine.

The official program relating to socioeconomic matters was a combination of etatism (state socialism) and liberalism: on the one hand, support for the private sector and on the other a demand for involvement by the mandatory government and the Jewish Agency in the creation of infrastructure, in providing assistance to the private sector, and in setting up legal arrangements to prevent strikes. The union viewed Palestinian Arabs as citizens with equal rights, on condition that they do nothing to impair the national character of the Jewish state. The revisionists believed that cooperation with the mandatory government and with Britain was essential. But to prevent Britain from reneging on its commitments, they thought it necessary to bring political and propaganda pressure to bear on Britain. In their view, the strategic cooperation in Palestine and Britain's readiness to help Europe's Jews in their distress were the basis for such cooperation. The party was not monolithic, and various views came to the fore. In the 1930s, its dominant mood was that of the "radical nationalists," who called for a more activist policy toward the British, beginning in 1930 but in particular after the events of 1936 (the revisionists opposed the partition plan recommended by the Peel Commission Report in July 1937).

As a result of the internal disputes, there was a great deal of tension in the movement, particularly between the union and Betar and various maximalist groups. This internal strife led to the creation of new organizations, weakly linked organizationally to the union (in particular, the IZL).

See also Herzl, Theodor; Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi (IZL); Jabotinsky, Vladimir Zeʾev; Jewish Agency for Palestine; Jewish Legion; Peel Commission Report (1937); Yishuv; Zionism.

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Yaakov Shavit

ZIWAJ MUTʿA

Temporary marriage.

Temporary marriage *(ziwaj mutʿa),* which was practiced in early Islamic Arabia, is a contract between a man and an unmarried woman for a particular duration of time. A man can marry numerous temporary wives in addition to his permanent wife or wives. Umar (r. 634–644), the second caliph, outlawed temporary marriage, but Shiʿites did not find his position legally binding because the Prophet and the Qurʾan permitted *mutʿa* marriage. Even a few Sunni societies continued to practice certain forms of *mutʿa* marriage.

Social and economic circumstances shaping modern Shiʿite societies led to the emergence of new and at times arbitrary forms of temporary marriage. After the rise of the Iranian Islamic Republic in 1979, temporary marriage became popular, particularly among the urban lower classes. It also surfaced in Lebanon and other Arab Shiʿite com-

munities. Shiʿite jurists debated several conditions relating to temporary marriage, but the law remained vague and ambivalent about women's rights. It is rare for a woman to negotiate a share of her husband's inheritance. A man is expected to provide for his children from a temporary marriage, but there are no institutional guarantees. A temporary marriage can be terminated by mutual consent before the end of the stipulated period. Overall, men have greater legal rights and control over the conditions of *mutaʿa* than women.

See also GENDER: GENDER AND HEALTH; GENDER: GENDER AND LAW; *SHARIʿA;* SHIʿISM.

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RULA JURDI ABISAAB

ZIYA, ABDÜLHAMIT

[1825–1880]

Young Ottoman writer.

The son of a customs clerk, Ziya Paşa was educated in one of the first secular Ruşdiye schools in Istanbul. He began work in the translation office and, through the support of Tanzimat reformer Reşit Pasa in 1854, became a secretary to Sultan Abdülmecit I. He lost his palace job in 1861 with the accession of Sultan Abdülaziz and held several minor posts in the 1860s. By 1866 he had joined the Young Ottoman Society in Europe and, with Namik Kemal and İbrahim Şinasi, became a leading intellectual of the period. Under Abdülaziz's rule, Ziya's political satires and other writings were banned as seditious, and he was posted as governor of Syria, in virtual exile.

Ziya Paşa's greatest influence was through his writings. He warned against blind imitation of Europe and criticized autocracy and poor policies such as the growing Ottoman debt. In 1868 he wrote a famous article, "Poetry and Prose" (Şiir ve Inşa), in which he criticized Ottoman literature as mere imitation of Arabic and Persian traditions and called on writers to seek inspiration in Turkish folk literature.

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ELIZABETH THOMPSON

ZOHAR, URI

[1935–]

Israeli actor and comedian who became a rabbi and teacher.

Uri Zohar began his professional acting career in 1953 and quickly rose to fame as a satirist and humorist. He starred in Israeli films in the 1960s, including *A Hole in the Moon* and *Every Bastard a King.* He was the first cinema artist to win the Israel Prize (which he refused), in 1976.

In the 1970s he became a sectarian Orthodox Jew and a rabbi and teacher in a yeshiva (religious school). He is active in the movement to attract secular Jews to religious orthodoxy, and uses his entertainment skills to promote this objective. He wrote an account of his religious transformation, *Ubaharta bahaim,* (1983)—which was subsequently translated as *Waking Up Jewish* (1985)—as well as several other volumes that espouse his views on secular Israeli society. In 1999 Zohar directed a widely distributed videotape and CD, titled *Ani Me-ashim* (I accuse) in which the former Shas political party leader Arye Deri alleged that the fraud charges of which he was accused (and for which he was imprisoned) were an Ashkenazic-elitist conspiracy against not only him but also the Sephardim as a group.

CHAIM I. WAXMAN

ZOHRAB, KRIKOR

[1861–1915]

Armenian writer and deputy in the Ottoman parliament.

Krikor Zohrab, also known as Grigor Zohrap, was born in Istanbul. He was educated in his birthplace

and practicing law by 1883. He distinguished himself as an attorney who defended cases against the government until he was deprived of his license in 1905 and went abroad to France and Egypt. With the end of the Hamidian autocracy and the restoration of the Ottoman constitution, Zohrab returned to Istanbul. From 1908 to 1915, he was a member of the Armenian National Assembly. He also was elected a deputy to the Ottoman parliament where he defended the cause of universal social justice and gained distinction as an orator. Shocked by the 1909 mass killings of Armenians in Adana, he published his findings in Paris under the pseudonym of Marcel Leart as *La Question Arménienne à la Lumière des Documents.*

Zohrab also earned fame as an author of short stories and novellas in the realist style. The subjects of social inequality, injustice, and prejudice preoccupied him. His more important works include *Anhetatsads Serunt Me* (A vanished generation, 1887), *Khghjmdanki Tzayner* (Voices of conscience, 1909), *Kyanke Inchpes Vor e* (Life as it is, 1911), and *Lur Tsaver* (Silent sorrows, 1911). He also published essays on literature, politics, and the Armenian community. Before his own demise, he protested to Talat, the Young Turk minister of the interior, the summary arrest on the night of 24 April 1915, and subsequent execution of the Istanbul Armenian community leaders. His own immunity as a parliamentary deputy did not spare him from being arrested on 3 June, deported, and killed near Diyarbekir.

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Rouben P. Adalian

ZONNENFELD, YOSEF HAYYIM

[1849–1932]

Rabbi; leader of ultra-Orthodox Jerusalem community.

Yosef Hayyim Zonnenfeld was born in Verbo, Slovakia, and educated in the yeshiva in Pressburg. Settling in Jerusalem in 1873, he actively opposed secular Zionist educational activities and became a leader of the Old City Jewish community, assisting in the founding of the Meah Sheʿarim community and others. A staunch sectarian, he opposed all cooperation between the Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jewish communities. He was one of the founders of the separatist rabbinic court in Jerusalem, and in 1920 he was elected rabbi of the separatist Orthodox community of Jerusalem. He was also a founder of the Agudat Israel in Palestine. Despite their warm personal relationship, he opposed Rabbi Abraham Isaac Hacohen Kook as rabbi in Jerusalem and, subsequently, as chief rabbi of Palestine. Nevertheless, Zonnenfeld was a strong supporter of Jewish settlement in Eretz Yisrael.

See also Agudat Israel; Eretz Yisrael; Kook, Abraham Isaac Hacohen; Meah Sheʿarim.

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Chaim I. Waxman

ZOROASTRIANISM

Pre-Islamic religion founded by the Iranian prophet Zarathushtra (Zoroaster).

Founded as early as 1400 to 1200 B.C.E., Zoroastrianism spread from central Asia to Iran around the ninth century B.C.E., where it was propagated by priests called the *magi*, or *mobeds.* Zoroastrianism remained the major faith in Iran until the Sassanian state fell to the Arabs in 651 C.E. Thereafter, the religion lost many followers through conversion to Islam between the eighth and the thirteenth centuries. Zoroastrianism reached India in the tenth century, when some Zoroastrians migrated from Iran to avoid adopting Islam. Descendants of these immigrants are called the *Parsis* (Parsees). Those who remained behind sought refuge from Islam by moving to sparsely populated regions in central Iran. By the thirteenth century, extensive contact between Parsis and Persian Zoroastrians had recommenced. In 1854, when the Parsis sent an emissary to the Qajar court, the poll tax levied on Iranian Zoroastrians by the Muslim state was abolished. The community in India flourished, and in the mid-1990s it numbered around 72,000.

Zoroastrians in Iran encountered less success, though there was a respite from financial hardship

and pressure to practice Islam during the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1979). Since the Iranian Revolution, despite being recognized as an official minority of about 30,000, Zoroastrians are offered little protection from their Muslim neighbors, and many have fled Iran. International dispersion during the twentieth century has produced Zoroastrian communities in Pakistan (3,700), England (7,000), Australia (1,000), the United States and Canada (10,000), and other countries. By the early 1990s, low birthrates together with widespread nonacceptance of converts contributed to an overall decline in the number of Zoroastrians.

The faith's central canon is the Avesta (Pure instruction), a scripture that includes the Gathas (Songs), which were probably composed by Zarathushtra himself. Prayers recited by the laity in daily religious observances are compiled in a text known as the Khorde Avesta (Shorter Avesta). Next in importance are religious exegeses written in Pahlavi, a Middle Iranian language; among these are the Zand, a commentary on the Avesta, and the Bundahishn (Book of creation). There are more recent Zoroastrian texts in the New Persian, Gujarati, and English languages that transmit tenets of the faith and the meanings of rituals to believers who no longer understand the Avestan and Pahlavi languages.

The religion proposes an ethical dualism—which later became a cosmic dualism—between righteousness and falsehood, personified by a pair of primal spirits: Ahura Mazda (Ohrmazd), the Lord Wisdom, and Angra Mainyu (Ahreman), the Destructive Spirit. Ahura Mazda, the supreme deity, is believed to have created the spiritual and material worlds completely pure. Evil, disease, pollution, and death are attributed to Angra Mainyu, the devil. According to Zoroastrianism, Ahura Mazda created six *amesha spentas,* or beneficent spiritual beings, and other minor good spirits to assist him in protecting the material creations. Angra Mainyu produced numerous *daevas,* or demons, to defile the spiritual and material worlds. Zoroastrian texts claim that human beings were created by Ahura Mazda as allies in the struggle against Angra Mainyu, and that humans entered into a covenant with their creator to combat the forces of evil through daily good deeds.

Between the ages of seven and twelve, each Zoroastrian child undergoes initiation into the religion.

A Zoroastrian priest in London officiates at an initiation ceremony for children between seven and twelve years old. Founded more than 3,000 years ago in central Asia, Zoroastrianism was the major religion in Iran until the emergence of Islam. During the past 200 years, thousands of its adherents have established communities in India and, in much smaller numbers, in the West. **© Tim Page/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.**

The ritual, which symbolizes a spiritual rebirth, is termed *sedra pushun* in Iran and *navjote* in India. Every initiate dons a white undershirt called the *sedra,* or *sudra,* and ties a sacred girdle known as the *kashti,* or *kusti,* around the waist. The girdle, which most Zoroastrians continue to wear, should be untied and retied with the recitation of prayers on awakening each morning, and prior to performing worship. Many rituals, such as the *jashan,* or thanksgiving ceremony, are conducted within buildings known as fire temples. Fire is one of the seven sacred creations; the others are water, earth, metal, plants, animals, and human beings. Moreover, fire is believed

to destroy evil, and thus it became the religion's icon. Sacred fires burn constantly in altars at major temples at Sharifabad, near Yazd, in Iran and at Surat, Navsari, and Bombay in India. Smaller temples in Iran and India and elsewhere do not maintain constantly burning fires; rather, a fire is lit in an altar prior to acts of worship. Because impurity is thought to arise from evil, Zoroastrians undergo elaborate rituals to ensure their spiritual purity. In addition to rituals of worship and purification, other acts of devotion include seven feasts, such as that celebrating Nav Ruz, the new year.

Zoroastrian doctrine holds that earth, fire, and water are polluted if a corpse is buried, cremated, or placed in water. Consequently, corpses are washed, then placed in a *dakhma* (funerary tower), which is open to the sky and accessible to birds of prey. Thereafter, the bones are collected and disposed of. Exposure of corpses has been phased out in Iran since the 1940s, replaced with interment (burial), but many Parsis in India and Pakistan continue the tradition of exposing bodies in funerary towers, particularly at Bombay and Karachi. Most Zoroastrians elsewhere follow their Iranian coreligionists' adaptation. Certain Zoroastrian communities, particularly those in North America, now perform cremation. Zoroastrians believe that after death each individual's soul is judged by a triad of gods—Mithra, the keeper of covenants; Rashnu, the judge; and Sraosha, the messenger—at the Bridge of the Separator, which connects earth to heaven over the pit of hell. If the soul's good deeds are greater than its evil deeds, it is led across the bridge into paradise. When its evil deeds outweigh the good, the soul is cast into hell until the day of universal judgment. In cases where a soul's good and evil deeds are equal, it is consigned to limbo. The faithful believe that at the end of time a savior *(saoshyant)* will resurrect the dead. Thereafter, Ahura Mazda will descend to earth and separate the righteous individuals from the evil ones. Each sinner will be purified of his or her transgressions and granted immortality. Then Angra Mainyu will be forced back into hell, and the world will become free of evil and impurity forever.

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JAMSHEED K. CHOKSY
UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND

ZUBAYRI, QA'ID MUHAMMAD MAHMUD AL-

[1919–1965]

Yemeni political reformer.

Born in Sanʿa, Qaʾid Muhammad Mahmud al-Zubayri left North Yemen after a brief career as a government official. With Ahmad Muhammad Nuʿman, he began his lifelong effort to reform Yemen's imamic government. He participated in the founding of the Liberal party and the Free Yemeni movement. At this time, his poetry, in particular, earned him a literary reputation. Zubayri strongly supported the revolution of 1962 but quickly became disillusioned with the policies of Abdullah al-Sallal. He founded the "Third Force" as an alternative to the royalists and republicans but was assassinated in 1965.

MANFRED W. WENNER

ZUʿBI, MAHMUD AL-

[1938–2000]

Syrian politician and long-serving prime minister.

Hailing from a Sunni family in the southern village of Khirbat al-Ghazala, al-Zuʿbi was a Baʿth party member in high school and studied agronomy in Cairo. He ascended in the party's agricultural bureaucracy to become head of the general authority for development of the Euphrates river basin from 1973 to 1976 and, from 1980 to 1981, director of the *maktab al-fallahin* (the peasants' office). In January 1980 he became a member of the Baʿth Regional (Syrian) Command. Al-Zuʿbi was continually responsive to agrarian concerns in his capacity as he

rose in government, both as speaker of parliament (1981–1987) and, later, as long-time prime minister (1987–2000) during the presidency of Hafiz al-Asad. He was dismissed in March 2000 and accused of corruption, after which he committed suicide on 31 May 2000.

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CHARLES U. ZENZIE
UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

ZURAYK, CONSTANTINE

[1909–2000]

Syrian intellectual and educator.

Constantine Zurayk (also Qustantin Zurayq) was born in Damascus. He received a B.A. from the American University of Beirut (AUB) in 1928, an M.A. from the University of Chicago in 1929, and a Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1930. He was an assistant professor of history at AUB (1930–1945) and later distinguished professor (1958-1977). He also served as counselor to the Syrian legation and then as minister to the United States (1945–1947), AUB vice president (1947–1949, 1952–1954), rector of the Syrian University in Damascus (1949–1952), and AUB acting president (1954–1957).

Zurayk, a prominent Arab intellectual, wrote *Maʿna al-Nakba* (1948; The meaning of the disaster), the first substantial critique of Arab society in light of the 1948 defeat in Palestine. An advocate of rationalism, scientific and cultural progress, and secular nationalism, he produced many other influential works, including *Nahnu wa al-Taʾrikh* (1959; Facing history), *Fi Maʿrakat al-Hadara* (1964; In the battle for civilization), and *Nahnu wa al-Mustaqbal* (1977; Facing the future), as well as translations and editions of European and Arabic works on cultural history. In 1963 he helped found the Institute for Palestine Studies, and served as its chairman until 1984. Zurayk died in Beirut on 12 August 2000.

See also AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT (AUB); DAMASCUS; INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES.

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The synoptic outline of entries provides a general overview of the conceptual scheme of the encyclopedia. Because the section headings are not mutually exclusive, certain entries are listed in more than one section.

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Khyber Pass
Mazar-e Sharif
Omar, Muhammad (Mullah)
Pushtun
Refugees: Afghan
Shiberghan
Tajiks
Uzbeks

COUNTRIES: ARABIAN PENINSULA

Abu Dhabi
Abu Musa Island
Aden
Ajman
Al Bu Saʿid Family and Tribe of Oman
Anglo–Omani Treaties
Anjoman
Arabian Horses

Arabian Mission
Arabian Peninsula
As-Is Agreement
Ayn, al-
Baharina
Bahrain
Bahraini–Qatari Wars
Bahrain Order in Council
Bubiyan Island
Buraymi Oasis Dispute
Dammam, al-
Dhahran
Dhufar
Dhufar Rebellion
Doha
Dubai
Fao Peninsula
Free Officers, Yemen
Fujayra
Grand Mosque
Gulf Crisis (1990–1991)
Gulf of Oman
Hadramawt
Hamid al-Din Family
Hasa, al-
Hijaz
Hijaz Railroad
Hodeida
Jabal al-Akhdar, Oman
Jabal Shammar
Jazeera, al-
Jidda
Jubayl, al-
Khubar, al-
Kuwait
Kuwait City
Manama
Maʾrib
Maritime Peace in Perpetuity, Treaty of (1853)
Masira Island
Matrah
Mecca
Medina
Muharraq
Muscat
Nafud Desert
Najd
Neutral Zone
Oman
Persian (Arabian) Gulf
Protectorate States
Qatar
Raʾs al-Khayma
Riyadh
Rub al-Khali
Saudi Arabia
Sharjah
Sib, Treaty of (1920)
Sitra
Socotra
South Arabian League
Taʾif, al-
Taʾif, Treaty of al-
Tiran, Strait of
Trans-Arabian Pipeline
Tribes and Tribalism: Yemeni
Trucial Coast
Tunb Islands
Umm al-Qaywayn
Umm Naʿsan
United Arab Emirates
Wadi Hadramawt
Yanbu
Yemen Arab Republic
Yemen Civil War
Yemen Dynasties

COUNTRIES: CENTRAL ASIA

Hindu Kush Mountains
Pamir Mountains

COUNTRIES: EGYPT

Alexandria
Alexandria University
American University in Cairo (AUC)
Aswan High Dam
Azhar, al-
Cairo
Cairo University
Coptic Museum
Damanhur
Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya
Dar al-Ulum
Delta Barrages
Egypt
Egyptian Museum
Gezira Sporting Club
Infitah
Institut d'Égypte
Mahmudiyya Canal
Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab
Nasser, Lake
National Party (Egypt)
New Wafd
Nile River
Nubians

People's Assembly
Pharaonicism
Philae
Port Saʿid
Pyramids
Qusayr, al-
Saint Catherine's Monastery
Saint Mark's Cathedral
Satellite Cities Development
Sayyidna Husayn Mosque
Sharm al-Shaykh
Shepheard's Hotel
Sinai Peninsula
Siwa Oasis
Sphinx
Suez Canal University
Suez–Mediterranean Pipeline
Takfir wa al-Hijra, al-
Victoria College
Wadi Natrun
Wafd
Waqf
War of Attrition (1969–1970)
Zaqaziq University

COUNTRIES: IRAN

Abadan
Ahvaz
Algiers Agreement (1975)
Anglo–Iranian Agreement (1919)
Anglo–Iranian Oil Company
Anglo–Persian War (1856)
Anglo–Russian Agreement (1907)
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan Crisis
Bakhtiari
Baluchis
Baluchistan
Bisitun
Constitutional Revolution
Cossack Brigade
Golestan Palace
Hamadan
Iran
Iran–Contra Affair
Iranian Revolution (1979)
Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)
Iran Novin Party
Isfahan
Jangali
Jehad-e Sazandegi
Kerman
Kharg Island
Khorasan
Khuzistan
Kurdistan
Kurds
Lurs
Mashhad
Persian Cats
Qom
Revolutionary Guards
Shatt al-Arab
Shiraz
Sistan and Baluchistan
Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan
South Persia Rifles
Students in the Line of the Imam
Tabriz
Tehran
Tobacco Revolt
Trans-Iranian Railway
Tripartite Treaty of Alliance
Turkmanchai, Treaty of (1828)
Turko–Iranian War (1821–1823)
White Revolution (1961–1963)
Yazd
Zabul
Zagros
Zahedan

COUNTRIES: IRAQ

Abd al-Ilah ibn Ali
Ahali Group
Askari, Jaʿfar al-
Assyrians
Aziz, Tariq
Baghdad
Barzani Family
Basra
Baʿth, al-
Bitar, Salah al-Din al-
Chalabi, Ahmad
Churchill, Winston S.
Cox, Percy
Gulf Crisis (1990–1991)
Hashimi, Taha al-
Husari, Sati al-
Husayn ibn Ali
Hussein, Saddam
Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)
Iraq
Iraqi National Congress
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC)
Jamali, Muhammad Fadhil al-
Kurdish Autonomous Zone

Mosul
Muhammad, Aziz
Najaf, al-
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
Ramadan, Taha Yasin
Refugees: Kurdish
Saʿid, Nuri al-
Salim, Jawad
Samarra
Sanctions, Iraqi
Sharif, Aziz
Somikh, Abdullah
Sulaymaniya
Talabani, Jalal
Tikrit
Tikriti Families

Countries: Israel

Acheson, Dean
Aliyah
Allon, Yigal
Alpha, Operation
Alterman, Natan
American Israel Public Affairs Committee
American Jewish Committee
American Jewish Congress
Amichai, Yehuda
Amit, Meir
Arab Boycott
Arab–Israel Conflict
Arab–Israeli General Armistice Agreements (1949)
Arab–Israel War (1948)
Arab–Israel War (1956)
Arab–Israel War (1967)
Arab–Israel War (1973)
Arab–Israel War (1982)
Ard, al-
Arens, Moshe
Avnery, Uri
Barak, Ehud
Bar-Ilan University
Bar-Lev, Haim
Begin, Menachem
Ben-Aharon, Yitzhak
Ben-Gurion, David
Ben-Porat, Mordechai
Benvenisti, Meron
Ben-Zvi, Yizhak
Bialik, Hayyim Nahman
Black Panthers
Burg, Avraham
Burg, Yosef
Burla, Yehuda
Cohen, Geʾula
Dayan, Moshe
Eban, Abba (Aubrey)
Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty (1979)
Eitan, Rafael
Entebbe Operation
Eretz Yisrael
Flapan, Simha
Galilee
Galilee, Sea of
Gilboa, Amir
Golan Heights
Goldberg, Leah
Goldmann, Nahum
Greenberg, Uri Zvi
Guri, Chaim
Gur, Mordechai
Gush Emunim
Haifa
Haifa University
Hammer, Zevulun
Harel, Isser
Hareven, Shulamit
Harkabi, Yehoshafat
Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzaʿir
"Ha-Tikva"
Hazaz, Hayyim
Hebrew
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Herzl, Theodor
Herzog, Chaim
Herzog, Yaʿacov David
Heskayl, Sasson
Hillel, Shlomo
Histadrut
Hoffman, Yoel
Holocaust
Hula Swamps
Intifada (1987–1991)
Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi (IZL)
Israel: Overview
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Israel: Overview of Political Parties in
Israeli Settlements
Jaffa
Jerusalem
Jewish Agency for Palestine
Jewish National Fund
Jews in the Middle East
Johnston Plan (1953)
Joint Distribution Committee
Jordanian Option
Joseph, Dov
Kafr Qasim

Kahan Commission (1983)
Kahane, Meir
Kaniuk, Yoram
Karp Report (1984)
Keinan, Amos
Kenaz, Yehoshua
Keren Hayesod
Kessar, Israel
Kibbutz
Kimche, David
King David Hotel
Kiryat Arba
Knesset
Kollek, Teddy
Kol, Moshe
Kook, Zvi Yehuda
Kovner, Abba
Labor Zionism
Land Day
Lavon Affair
Lavon, Pinhas
Law of Return
Leibowitz, Yeshayahu
Levinger, Moshe
Levin, Hanoch
Levy, David
Liberty, USS
Litani Operation (1978)
Litani River
Literature: Hebrew
London Conference (1956)
Luz, Kadish
Lydda
Maʿa lot
Maʿbarah
Madrid Conference (1991)
Magen David Adom (MDA)
Magic Carpet Operation
Maimon, Yehudah Leib Hacohen
Masada
Matzpen
Meah Sheʿarim
Meged, Aharon
Meir, Golda
Michael, Sami
Mimouna Festival
Minz, Benjamin
Modaʾi, Yitzhak
Moshav
Mossad
Nahalal
Namir, Mordekhai
National Water System (Israel)
Nazareth
Neʾeman, Yuval
Negev
Netanyahu, Benjamin
Neturei Karta
Newspapers and Print Media: Israel
Nissim, Isaac
Oslo Accord (1993)
Ouziel, Ben Zion Meir Hai
Oz, Amos
Oz ve Shalom (Netivot shalom)
Pagis, Dan
Palestinian Citizens of Israel
Palestinians
Palmah
Partition Plans (Palestine)
Peace Now
Peled, Mattityahu
Peres, Shimon
Petah Tikvah
Pollard Affair
Potash Industry
Raab, Esther
Rabin, Yitzhak
Radio and Television: Israel
Ramla
Ravikovitch, Dahlia
Refugees: Jewish
Rishon le-Zion
Rubinstein, Amnon
Sabra
Safed
Samaritans
Sapir, Pinhas
Sarid, Yossi
Sasson, Eliyahu
Seri, Dan-Benaya
Sèvres Protocol (1956)
Shamir, Moshe
Shamir, Yitzhak
Shammas, Anton
Shapira, Hayyim Moshe
Sharef, Zeʾev
Sharett, Moshe
Sharon, Ariel
Shaʾul, Anwar
Shekel
Shiloah, Reuven
Shin Bet
Shitreet, Bekhor
Shlonsky, Avraham
Silver, Abba Hillel
Sneh, Moshe
Sobol, Yehoshua
Suez Crisis (1956–1957)

Suissa, Albert
Taba
Tamir, Shmuel
Tammuz, Benyamin
Technion-Israel Institute of Technology
Tel Aviv
Tel Aviv University
Tel Hai
Terrorism
Tiberias
United Jewish Appeal (UJA)
United Nations and the Middle East
United Nations Emergency Force
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)
Vaʿad Leʾumi
Wahrhaftig, Zerah
Weizman, Ezer
Weizmann, Chaim
Weizmann Institute of Science
West Bank
Western Wall
West German Reparations Agreement
World Federation of Sephardi Communities
World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries (WOJAC)
World Zionist Organization (WZO)
Yadin, Yigael
Yad Mordekhai
Yad Vashem
Yariv, Aharon
Yehoshua, Avraham B.
Yellin-Mor, Natan
Yishuv
Yizhar, S.
Yosef, Ovadiah
Youth Aliyah
Zach, Natan
Zelda
Zikhron Yaʿakov
Zionism
Zionist Organization of America
Zohar, Uri

COUNTRIES: JORDAN

Abdullah I ibn Hussein
Abdullah II ibn Hussein
Abu al-Huda, Tawfiq
Amman
Aqaba
Arab Legion
Basma bint Talal
Churchill, William
Circassians
Hussein ibn Talal
Hussein, Saddam
Irbid
Islamic Action Front
Jordan
Jordan River
Karak, al-
Majali Family
Muasher, Marwan
Petra
Rifaʿi, Zaid al-
Salt, al-
University of Jordan
Yarmuk River
Yarmuk University
Zarqa, al-

COUNTRIES: LEBANON

AMAL
American University of Beirut (AUB)
Antun, Farah
Aoun, Michel
Aql, Saʿid
Baʿalbak
Beirut
Berri, Nabi
Biqa Valley
Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)
Eddé, Raymond
Franjiyya Family
Franjiyya, Sulayman
Geagea, Samir
Hariri, Rafiq Bahaʾuddin al-
Hilu, Pierre
Hirawi, Ilyas al-
Hizbullah
Hobeika, Elie
Hoss, Salim al-
Husayni, Husayn al-
Jumayyil, Amin
Jumayyil, Bashir
Jumblatt Family
Jumblatt, Walid
Lahad, Antoine
Lahhud, Emile
Lebanese Forces
Lebanese University
Lebanon
Malik, Charles Habib
Nasrallah, Hasan
Parliamentary Democratic Front
Phalange

Phoenicianism
Progressive Socialist Party
Raad, Inʿam
Saʿada, Antun
Saade, George
Salam Family
Salam, Saʾib
Sfeir, Nasrallah
Shahada, George
Shuf
South Lebanon Army
Special Forces of the Levant
Sulh, Rashid al-
Sulh, Taki al-Din al-
Syrian Social Nationalist Party
Taʿif Accord
Twayni, Ghassan
Tyre
Yaziji, Nasif
Zahla

Countries: Sudan

Khartoum
Nuer
Omdurman
Sudan
Sudanese Civil Wars
Sudd
Umma Party
University of Khartoum

Countries: Syria

Akkad, Mustafa
Asad, Bashshar al-
Asad, Hafiz al-
Atasi, Nur al-Din al-
Bakdash, Khalid
Baʿth, al-
Bitar, Salah al-Din al-
British–French Oil Agreement
Chehab, Bashir
Chehab, Fuʾad
Circassians
Damascus
Damascus Affair (1840)
Damascus University
Dayr al-Zawr Province
Hafiz, Amin al-
Hama
Hananu, Ibrahim
Husayn ibn Ali
Jadid, Salah
Khaddam, Abd al-Halim
Kudsi, Nazim al-
Latakia
National Bloc
National Progressive Front (Syria)
Qabbani, Nizar
Saʿada, Antun
Shahbandar, Abd al-Rahman
Syria
Syrian Social Nationalist Party
Tlas, Mustafa
Zuʿbi, Mahmud al-
Zurayk, Constantine

Countries: Turkey

Alexandretta
Anatolia
Ankara
Ankara, Treaty of (1930)
Antakya
Ararat, Mount
Armenian Genocide
Armenian Millet
Black Sea
Bodrum
Bogazköy
Bursa
Caylak
Cilicia
Diyarbakir
Edirne
Ege University
Erzurum
Erzurum Congress (1919)
Euphrates Dam
Gecekondu
Genç Kalemler
Hacettepe University
Hürriyet
Istanbul
İzmir
İzmir Economic Congress
Justice Party
Kemalism
Konya
Kurds
Lausanne, Treaty of (1923)
People's Houses
Rumelia
Sivas Conference (1919)
Social Democratic Populist Party
Southeastern Anatolia Project
Trans-Turkey Pipeline

Turkey
Turkish–Afghan Treaty (1928)
Turkish Grand National Assembly
Turko–Iranian War (1821–1823)
Üsküdar
Van, Lake
Varlik Vergisi
Village Institutes

Countries: Yemen

Islah Party
National Democratic Front (NDF)
National Front for the Liberation of South Yemen
People's Socialist Party
Perim
Sanʿa
Sanʿa University
Tribes and Tribalism: Yemeni
Yemen
Yemen Hunt Oil Company
Yemeni Socialist Party

Culture and Society

Abu Zeid, Layla
Adham, Soraya
Adnan, Etel
Adot Ha-Mizrah
Agriculture
Akhavan-Saless, Mehdi
Akkad, Mustafa
Al-e Ahmad, Jalal
Algerian Family Code (1984)
Ali, Wijdan
Alizadeh, Ghazaleh
Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU)
Al-Suswa, Amat al-Alim
Alterman, Natan
AMAL
Amichai, Yehuda
Amrouche, Fadhma At Mansour
Ani, Jannane al-
Anis Al-Jalis Magazine
Antisemitism
Arab College of Jerusalem
Arab Nationalism
Archaeological Museum (Istanbul)
Archaeology in the Middle East
Architecture
Art
Ashkenazim
Attar, Nejat al-
Attar, Suad al-
Avnery, Uri
Aya Sofya
Azeri Language and Literature
Baʿalbak
Baʿalbakki, Layla
Bahar, Mohammad Taqi
Baʿth, al-
Badr, Liana
Baghdad University
Bahithat al-Lubnaniyyat, al-
Bakkar, Jalillah
Bani-Etemad, Rakhsan
Banking
Baraheni, Reza
Bazaars and Bazaar Merchants
Behar, Nissim
Behbehani, Simin
Behrangi, Samad
Beirut College for Women (BCW)
Ben-Aharon, Yitzhak
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Ben-Yehuda, Eliezer
Berlin–Baghdad Railway
Bethlehem
Bialik, Hayyim Nahman
Bir Zeit University
Biret, Idil
Birth Control
Bitton, Simone
Brenner, Yosef Hayyim
Buber, Martin
Burla, Yehuda
Cairo Family Planning Association
Caland, Huguette
Camels
Ceramics
Chédid, Andrée
Chubak, Sadeq
Circumcision
Clothing
Colonialism in the Middle East
Crimes of Honor
Dance
Daneshvar, Simin
Dead Sea Scrolls
Dhow
Diaspora
Diseases
Djebar, Assia
Dönme
Dowlatabadi, Mahmoud
Economic and Military Aid
Economics
Education

Efflatoun, Inji
8 Mars Newspaper
Elites
Eskinazi, Roza
Ethiopian Jews
Faqir, Fadia
Farrokhzad, Forugh
Farès, Nabile
Fayruz
Female Genital Mutilation
Film
Fish and Fishing
Gamal, Samiyah
Gecekondu
Gender: Gender and Education
Ghoussoub, Mai
Gilboa, Amir
Giza
Goldberg, Leah
Golshiri, Houshang
Government
Greenberg, Uri Zvi
Guri, Chaim
Ha-Cohen, Mordechai
Haifa
Hajji Baba of Ispahan
Halukka
Hanafi School of Law
Hareven, Shulamit
"Ha-Tikva"
Hatoum, Mona
Haza, Ofra
Hazaz, Hayyim
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Hebrew
Histadrut
Holocaust
Human Rights
Imperialism in the Middle East and North Africa
Incense
Industrialization
Infitah
Iranian Languages
Islamic Countries Women Sport Solidarity Games (1992 and 1997)
Israel: Overview of Political Parties in
Israel: Overview
Jababdi, Latifa
Jacir, Emily
Jewish National Fund
Jews in the Middle East
Joint Distribution Committee
Kaʿba
Kanafani, Ghassan
Kaniuk, Yoram
Kenaz, Yehoshua
Keren Hayesod
Kessar, Israel
Khal, Helen
Khalidi, Ahmad al-Samih al-
Khalidi, Walid
Khalifa, Sahar
Kibbutz
King David Hotel
Kovner, Abba
Law, Modern
Lata'if al-Musawwara Magazine
Lebanese University
Levin, Hanoch
Literature: Hebrew
Literature: Persian
Literature: Turkish
Luxor
Maʿbarah
Magen David Adom (MDA)
Magic Carpet Operation
Magnes, Judah
Majles al-Shura
Makdashi, Hesna
Malaʾika, Nazik al-
Maliki School of Law
Marʿi, Mariam
Maronites
Marriage and Family
Masada
Masri, Mai
Medicine and Public Health
Meged, Aharon
Mernissi, Fatema
Michael, Sami
Military in the Middle East
Mimouna Festival
Minz, Benjamin
Moshav
Musa, Nabawiyya
Nabi Musa Pilgrimage
Nasir, Hanna
Nasrallah, Emily
Nasruddin Hoca
National Water System (Israel)
Nazareth
Neʾeman, Yuval
Negev
Newspapers and Print Media: Arab Countries
Newspapers and Print Media: Iran
Newspapers and Print Media: Israel
Newspapers and Print Media: Turkey
Nissim, Isaac

Nuun Magazine
Ordinances on Veiling
Orientalism
Oz, Amos
Pagis, Dan
Palestine Exploration Fund
Palestine Land Development Company
Palestine
Palestinian Citizens of Israel
Palestinians
Persian Script
Persian
Pharaonicism
Potash Industry
Protocols of the Elders of Zion
Pyramids
Qaʿwar, Widad
Qabbani, Nizar
Qurʾan
Raab, Esther
Radio and Television: Arab Countries
Radio and Television: Israel
Radio and Television: Turkey
Ramses College for Girls
Ratosh, Yonatan
Ravikovitch, Dahlia
Refugees: Jewish
Rockefeller Museum
Romanization
Ruppin, Arthur
Rutenberg, Pinhas
Sabbagh, Hasib
Sabbagh, Salah al-Din al-
Sabra
Saʿedi, Gholamhossein
Safed
Saint Catherine's Monastery
Saint Joseph University
Salim, Jawad
Samaritans
Saudi, Mona
Sayyidna Husayn Mosque
School for Hakīmāt
Seri, Dan-Benaya
Shaʾul, Anwar
Shamir, Moshe
Shamlu, Ahmad
Shammas, Anton
Sharif
Shawa, Laila
Shaykh
Shekel
Shin Bet
Shlonsky, Avraham
Sirry, Gazbia
Slave Trade
Smilansky, Moshe
Sobol, Yehoshua
Suez Canal University
Suissa, Albert
Sultan Ahmet Mosque
Sultan Hasan Mosque
Sursock, Lady Cochrane
Tammuz, Benyamin
Tax Farming
Tea
Technion-Israel Institute of Technology
Tel Aviv University
Templars
Textile Industry
Theater
Tlatli, Moufida
Tourism
Trade
Transport
Tuqan, Fadwa
Turki, Fawaz
Turkish Historical Society
Turkish Language
Turkish Script
Turkism
Turks
Umar, Madiha
Urban Planning
Urbanization
Waqf
Water
Weizmann Institute of Science
West German Reparations Agreement
Westernization
Women and Family Affairs Center
Women's Affairs Center (Gaza)
Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling
Women's International Zionist Organization
World Federation of Sephardi Communities
World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries (WOJAC)
Yad Vashem
Yehoshua, Avraham B.
Yeshiva
Yiddish
Yishuv
Yizhar, S.
Youth Aliyah
Zach, Natan
Zanan Magazine
Zaqaziq University
Zayyat, Latifa

Zelda
Ziadeh, May
Zionist Organization of America
Ziwaj Mutʿa
Zohar, Uri

ORGANIZATIONS

Advisory Council (Palestine)
Afghan Women's Council
Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, al-
AISHA: Arab Women's Forum
Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU)
Al-Suswa, Amat al-Alim
AMAL
American Council for Judaism
American Israel Public Affairs Committee
American Jewish Committee
American Jewish Congress
Anglo–American Committee of Inquiry (1946)
Anglo–Iranian Oil Company
Ankara University
Arab Boycott
Arab Bureau (Cairo)
Arab Feminist Union
Arab Higher Committee (Palestine)
Arab League Summits
Arab Socialist Union
Arab Women's Association of Palestine
Arab Women's Congress
Arab Women's Executive Committee
Arab Women's Solidarity Association International
Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO)
Ard, al-
Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche et le Développement (AFTURD)
Association for the Protection of Women's Rights (Afghanistan)
Atatürk University
Awakened Youth
B'nai B'rith
Baʿth, al-
Baghdad Pact (1955)
Bahithat al-Lubnaniyyat, al-
Bahrain Nationalist Movement
Bar-Ilan University
Beirut College for Women (BCW)
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Ben-Zvi, Rahel Yanait
Bilkent University
bin Ladin, Osama
Black Panthers
Bludan Conferences (1937, 1946)
Boğaziçi (Bosporus) University
Bouhired, Jamila
Brichah
Bund
Cairo Family Planning Association
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)
Centre de Recherches, d'Études, de Documentation et d'Information sur la Femme (CREDIF)
Committee for Defense of Freedom and Human Rights
Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights
Confederation of Iranian Students
Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions
Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)
Dar al-Fonun
Dar al-Moʿallamin
Democrat Party
Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (1965)
Democratic Party of Azerbaijan
Democratic Party of Kurdistan (Iran; KDP)
Democratic Women's Association (Tunisia)
Egyptian Feminist Union
Fatah, al-
Fedaʾiyan-e Khalq
Fidaʾiyyun
Foreign Office, Great Britain
Free Officers, Egypt
General Federation of Iraqi Women
General Union of Palestinian Women's Committees (GUPWC)
General Women's Union of Syria
Gezira Sporting Club
Gozanski, Tamar
Grossman, Haika
Gulf Cooperation Council
Gush Emunim
Haganah
Ha-Halutz
Haifa University
HAMAS
Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzaʿir
Ha-Shomer
Hibbat Zion
Histadrut
Hizbullah
Husseini, Rana
İdadi Schools
Institut d'Égypte
Institute for Palestine Studies
International Monetary Fund
Iranian Bureau of Women's Affairs
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC)
Iraqi Women's Union
Irbid

Irgun Zvaʾi Leʾumi (IZL)
Isfahan University
Islah Party
Islamic Action Front
Islamic Countries Women Sport Solidarity Games (1992 and 1997)
Islamic Jihad
Islamic University of Medina
Israel: Overview of Political Parties in
Istanbul Technical University
Istanbul University
Jehad-e Sazandegi
Jenin
Jewish Agency for Palestine
Jewish Legion
Jewish National Fund
Joint Distribution Committee
Kabul University
Kamal, Zahira
Karak, al-
Keren Hayesod
KGB
Khaled, Leila
Khalil, Samiha Salama
Kibbutz
King Saʿud University
Knesset
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
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Yahia Zoubir
Phillip C. Naylor (1996)

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (1996)

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

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Ana Torres-Garcia
Matthew S. Gordon (1996)

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John Ruedy (1996)

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (1996)

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

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Avi Shlaim (1996)

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Zachary Karabell (1996)

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Chaim I. Waxman (1996)

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Chris Kutschera

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Larry A. Barrie (1996)

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Christopher Reed Stone
Zachary Karabell (1996)

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Mordechai Bar-On

Peake, Frederick Gerard
Jenab Tutunji (1996)

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Fred H. Lawson (1996)

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Ann M. Lesch

Peled, Mattityahu
Mordechai Bar-On
Bryan Daves (1996)

Pelt, Adrian
Ronald Bruce St John

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Raymond William Baker (1996)

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Grant Farr (1996)

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Robert D. Burrowes (1996)

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Paul J. Magnarella (1996)

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Manfred W. Wenner

Pera
I. Metin Kunt (1996)

Peres, Shimon
Gregory S. Mahler

Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier
Ronald Bruce St John
Bryan Daves (1996)

Perim
Robert D. Burrowes

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Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

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M. A. Jazayary (1996)

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Eric Hooglund
Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

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Eric Hooglund

Persian Script
Roxanne Varzi

Petah Tikvah
Chaim I. Waxman

Peter VII
Donald Spanel (1996)

Petra
Peter Gubser (1996)

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Jean-François Seznec
Mary Ann Tétreault (1996)

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Mary Ann Tétreault

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Jean-François Seznec

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Jean-Francois Seznec (1996)

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Michael R. Fischbach
As'ad AbuKhalil (1996)

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James Jankowski (1996)

Pharaon, Rashad
George R. Wilkes
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John Lundquist
David Waldner (1996)

Philby, Harry St. John
Neil Caplan
Benjamin Braude (1996)

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As'ad AbuKhalil (1996)

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Karim Hamdy

Pinsker, Leo
Martin Malin (1996)

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Jenab Tutunji (1996)

Plumer, Herbert Charles Onslow
Ann M. Lesch (1996)

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Jon Jucovy (1996)

Point Four
Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

Politi, Elie
George R. Wilkes
Michael M. Laskier (1996)

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Ian Black

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Jenab Tutunji (1996)

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Charles U. Zenzie (1996)

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Maria F. Curtis
Mouin Rabbani (1996)

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George R. Wilkes
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Malcolm C. Peck (1996)

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Paul Rivlin
Justin McCarthy (1996)

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Charles C. Kolb
David Waldner (1996)

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Donald Malcolm Reid

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Chaim I. Waxman
Peter Gubser (1996)

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Zachary Karabell (1996)

Powell, Colin L.
Michael R. Fischbach

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Isis Nusair

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As'ad AbuKhalil
George E. Irani (1996)

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Robert D. Burrowes (1996)

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Eleanor Abdella Doumato

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Michael R. Marrus
Jane Gerber (1996)

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Eric Hooglund
Ashraf Ghani (1996)

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Donald Malcolm Reid

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Michael R. Fischbach
Bassam Namani (1996)

Qaddafi, Muammar al-
Ronald Bruce St John
Lisa Anderson (1996)

Qaddumi, Faruq
Michael R. Fischbach

Qadi
Scott Alexander (1996)

Qadiriyya Order
Laurence Michalak (1996)

Qafih, Yihye ben Solomon
Michael M. Laskier (1996)

Qaʿida, al-
As'ad AbuKhalil

Qairawan
Matthew S. Gordon (1996)

Qajar, Abdullah Mirza
Mansoureh Ettehadieh (1996)

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Qajar Dynasty
Eric Hooglund
John Foran (1996)

Qalqiliya
Michael R. Fischbach

Qanun
Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

Qaradawi, Yusuf al-
Abdin Chande

Qaramanli Dynasty
Rachel Simon (1996)

Qarawiyyin, al-
Rahma Bourqia (1996)

Qasim, Abd al-Karim
Louay Bahry (1996)

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Anthony B. Toth

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Anthony B. Toth

Qassam, Izz al-Din al-
Philip Mattar

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Anthony B. Toth
Malcolm C. Peck (1996)

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Anthony B. Toth
Mary Ann Tétreault (1996)

Qaʿwar, Widad
Laurie King-Irani

Qawuqji, Fawzi al-
Ann M. Lesch (1996)

Qiyomijian, Ohannes
As'ad AbuKhalil (1996)

Qom
Parvaneh Pourshariati

Qotbzadeh, Sadeq
Neguin Yavari (1996)

Queen Surraya
Senzil Nawid

Qurai, Ahmad Sulayman
George R. Wilkes
Mouin Rabbani (1996)

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Maysam J. al Faruqi
Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

Qusayr, al-
Donald Malcolm Reid
Arthur Goldschmidt (1996)

Qutb, Sayyid
Ahmad S. Moussalli
Jean-Marc R. Oppenheim (1996)

Quwatli, Shukri al-
Muhammad Muslih (1996)

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Michael R. Fischbach
George E. Irani (1996)

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Donna Lee Bowen (1996)

Rabbani, Burhanuddin
Grant Farr

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Samuel C. Heilman (1996)

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Aida A. Bamia

Rabin, Yitzhak
Gregory S. Mahler

Rabiyya Ali, Salim
Robert D. Burrowes

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William A. Rugh

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Dov Shinar

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Brian Silverstein

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Eric Hooglund
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Janet Afary

Rajavi, Masud
Ervand Abrahamian

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Michael R. Fischbach
Lawrence Tal (1996)

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As'ad AbuKhalil (1996)

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Yehuda Gradus
Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

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Linda Herrera

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Curtis R. Ryan

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Anthony B. Toth
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Azzedine G. Mansour

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

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Azzedine G. Mansour

Rateb, Aisha
Maria F. Curtis

Ratebzad, Anahita
Grant Farr

Ratosh, Yonatan
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Rauf Ezzat, Heba
Marilyn Booth

Ravikovitch, Dahlia
Zafrira Lidovsky-Cohen
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Laurie Z. Eisenberg

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Michael R. Fischbach

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Vanesa Casanova-Fernandez

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Mary Ann Tétreault (1996)

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Nermin Abadan-Unat

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Grant Farr

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Noah Butler
Justin McCarthy (1996)

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Meron Medzini
Michael M. Laskier (1996)

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Chris Kutschera

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Philip Mattar
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Michael R. Fischbach
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Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban

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Nermin Abadan-Unat

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Senzil Nawid

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Matthew S. Gordon (1996)

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Ronald Bruce St John

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Eric Hooglund

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Jenab Tutunji (1996)

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Donald Malcolm Reid (1996)

Rif
C. R. Pennell (1996)

Rifaat, Alifa
Caroline Seymour-Jorn

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C. R. Pennell (1996)

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Yehuda Gradus
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J. E. Peterson

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George E. Irani (1996)

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Michael R. Fischbach
Mia Bloom (1996)

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Ahmed H. Ibrahim
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Eleanor Abdella Doumato (1996)

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Gregory S. Mahler
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Karen Pinto (1996)

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Donna Robinson Divine (1996)

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Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

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Charles C. Kolb

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Robert O. Freedman
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Eric Hooglund
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Neil Caplan
Sara Reguer (1996)

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Sami A. Ofeish
Charles U. Zenzie (1996)

Saadawi, Nawal al-
Rita Stephan
David Waldner (1996)

Saade, George
Michael R. Fischbach
George E. Irani (1996)

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Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

Sabah, Rasha al-
Mary Ann Tétreault

Sabah, Suad al-
Rita Stephan

Sabbagh, Hasib
George R. Wilkes
Mouin Rabbani (1996)

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Reeva S. Simon (1996)

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Samuel C. Heilman

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Bryan Daves (1996)

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Philip Mattar

Sabri, Ali
David Waldner (1996)

Sadat, Anwar al-
Fred H. Lawson (1996)

Sadat, Jihan al-
Arthur Goldschmidt

Sadawi, Bashir
John L. Wright (1996)

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Aida A. Bamia (1996)

Sadi, Said
Yahia Zoubir

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Ayad al-Qazzaz (1996)

Sadr, Muhsin
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Rula Jurdi Abisaab

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Pardis Minuchehr (1996)

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Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

Sagues, Albert
Michael M. Laskier (1996)

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzmann (1996)

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

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Emad Eldin Shahin

Saʿid, Amina al-
Linda Herrera

Said, Edward
John M. Lundquist

Saʿid, Nuri al-
Louay Bahry (1996)

Saʿid Pasha
Donald Malcolm Reid

Saʿidzadeh, Seyyed Mohsen
Ziba Mir-Hosseini

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Thomas Stransky

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As'ad AbuKhalil (1996)

Saint Mark's Cathedral
Raymond William Baker (1996)

Saʿiqa, al-
George R. Wilkes
Mouin Rabbani (1996)

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Pierre M. Atlas

Sakakini, Khalil al-
Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

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Mahmoud Haddad (1996)

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Michael R. Fischbach

Salam, Saʾib
Michael R. Fischbach
As'ad AbuKhalil (1996)

Salant, Samuel
Chaim I. Waxman (1996)

Salih, Ali Abdullah
Manfred W. Wenner

Salih, Teyib
Khalid M. El-Hassan

Salim Hasan
Donald Malcolm Reid (1996)

Salim, Ali
Nancy Berg
Roger Allen (1996)

Salim, Jawad
Sasson Somekh (1996)

Sallal, Abdullah al-
Robert D. Burrowes

Salonika
Eric Hooglund
Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

Salt, al-
Jenab Tutunji (1996)

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Benyamim Tsedaka

Samarra
Paul S. Rowe
Nazar al-Khalaf (1996)

Samar, Sima
Senzil Nawid

Samman, Ghada
Elise Salem

Samuel, Herbert Louis
Bernard Wasserstein

San῾a
Robert D. Burrowes

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Robert D. Burrowes

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Peter Sluglett

Sane'i, Yusef
Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut

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Oles M. Smolansky (1996)

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George R. Wilkes

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Rachel Simon (1996)

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David Waldner (1996)

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Martin Malin (1996)

Sarid, Yossi
Mordechai Bar-On
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Sarkis, Ilyas
Bassam Namani (1996)

Sartawi, Issam
Benjamin Joseph (1996)

Sasson, Eliyahu
Itamar Rabinovich
Neil Caplan

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Sylvia G. Haim (1996)

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Maria F. Curtis
Hani Fakhouri (1996)

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J. E. Peterson

Saudi, Mona
Jessica Winegar

Saunders, Harold
George R. Wilkes

Saygun, Ahmed Adnan
David Waldner (1996)

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Kamal abu-Deeb (1996)

Sayyida Zaynab Mosque
Raymond William Baker (1996)

Sayyidna Husayn Mosque
Raymond William Baker (1996)

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Nancy Gallagher

Science and Technology
Antoine Benjamin Zahlan

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Guilain P. Denoeux (1996)

Sebastiani, Horace
Zachary Karabell (1996)

Sebbar, Leila
Aida A. Bamia

Sediq, Sohaila
Senzil Nawid

Sefrioui, Ahmed
Aida A. Bamia

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Selçuk, Munir Nurettin
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I. Metin Kunt (1996)

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Eric Hooglund
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Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

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S. Ilan Troen

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Sara Reguer (1996)

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M. Hakan Yavuz

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Laurence Michalak (1996)

Sfar, Tahar
Vanesa Casanova-Fernandez
Matthew S. Gordon (1996)

Sfax
Matthew S. Gordon (1996)

Sfeir, Nasrallah
As'ad AbuKhalil

Shabʿa Farms
As'ad AbuKhalil

Shabbi, Abu al-Qasim al-
Larry A. Barrie (1996)

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Manfred W. Wenner

Shader, Joseph
Guilain P. Denoeux (1996)

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Wael B. Hallaq (1996)

Shafiq, Durriyya
David Waldner (1996)

Shahada, George
Michael R. Fischbach
Guilain P. Denoeux (1996)

Shahbandar, Abd al-Rahman
Charles U. Zenzie (1996)

Shahin, Tanyos
As'ad AbuKhalil (1996)

Shahin, Yusuf
Roxanne Varzi
David Waldner (1996)

Shaltut, Muhammad
Crystal Procyshen
Raymond William Baker (1996)

Shalvi, Alice
George R. Wilkes

Shami, Ahmad Muhammad al-
Robert D. Burrowes

Shamikh, Mubarak Abdullah al-
Ronald Bruce St John

Shami, Muhammad Abdullah al-
Robert D. Burrowes

Shamir, Moshe
Donna Robinson Divine
Ann Kahn (1996)

Shamir, Yitzhak
Charles Enderlin
Yaakov Shavit (1996)

Shamlu, Ahmad
Eric Hooglund
Michael C. Hillmann (1996)

Shammas, Anton
Michael R. Fischbach
Ann Kahn (1996)

Shapira, Hayyim Moshe
Bryan Daves (1996)

Sharabati, Ahmad al-
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Shaʿrawi, Huda al-
Marilyn Booth
David Waldner (1996)

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Gregory S. Mahler
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Wael B. Hallaq (1996)

Shariʿati, Ali
Hamid Algar (1996)

Shariatmadari, Kazem
Neguin Yavari (1996)

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Scott Alexander (1996)

Sharif, Aziz
Michael R. Fischbach
Marion Farouk-Sluglett (1996)

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Neguin Yavari

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Roxanne Varzi
David Waldner (1996)

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Eric Hooglund
Malcolm C. Peck (1996)

Sharm al-Shaykh
Arthur Goldschmidt
Zachary Karabell (1996)

Sharon, Ariel
Eric Silver
Yaakov Shavit (1996)

Sharqi Family, al-
Anthony B. Toth
M. Morsy Abdullah (1996)

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Neguin Yavari

Shaʾul, Anwar
Sasson Somekh

Shawa, Laila
Jessica Winegar

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Philip Mattar (1996)

Shawqi, Ahmad
Irfan Shahîd

Shaykh
Marilyn Higbee (1996)

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Scott Alexander (1996)

Shaykh, Hanan al-
Elise Salem

Shaykhi
Juan R. I. Cole

Shazar, Shneour Zalman
Bryan Daves (1996)

Shazli, Saʿd al-Din
David Waldner (1996)

Shekel
Bryan Daves (1996)

Shenhar, Yitzhak
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Shenouda III
Arthur Goldschmidt
Donald Spanel (1996)

Shepheard's Hotel
Zachary Karabell (1996)

Sheshbesh
Cyrus Moshaver (1996)

Shiberghan
Grant Farr

Shid, Nahid
Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut

Shidyaq, Ahmad Faris al-
Guilain P. Denoeux (1996)

Shihabi, Zlikha al-
Ellen L. Fleischmann

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Roxanne Varzi
Tayeb El-Hibri (1996)

Shilluk
David Waldner (1996)

Shiloah, Reuven
Ian Black

Shimʿun, Mar
Peter Sluglett (1996)

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Ian Black
Julie Zuckerman (1996)

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Eric Hooglund
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Shirazi, Mirza Hasan
Farhad Arshad (1996)

Shiraz University
Parvaneh Pourshariati

Shitreet, Bekhor
Bryan Daves (1996)

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Mordechai Bar-On

Shochat, Manya
George R. Wilkes

Shorfa
Rahma Bourqia (1996)

Shuf
Michael R. Fischbach
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Shufman, Gershon
Ann Kahn (1996)

Shukri, Mohammad
Aida A. Bamia

Shultz, George
Oliver Benjamin Hemmerle

Shumayyil, Shibli
Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

Shuqayri, Ahmad
Michael R. Fischbach

Shuqayri Family
Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

Shura
Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

Shuster, W. Morgan
Daniel E. Spector (1996)

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Robert G. Landen (1996)

Sidera, Zineb
Jessica Winegar

Sidon
Charles C. Kolb
George E. Irani (1996)

Sidqi, Bakr
Peter Sluglett (1996)

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David Waldner (1996)

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Stuart J. Borsch (1996)

Silk
Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

Silver, Abba Hillel
Mark A. Raider
Mia Bloom (1996)

Simavi, Sedat
Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

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Paul S. Rowe
Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

Şinasi, İbrahim
Zachary Karabell (1996)

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Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

Sirry, Gazbia
Jessica Winegar

Sisco, Joseph
George R. Wilkes

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Parvaneh Pourshariati

Sistani, Ali al-
Michael R. Fischbach

Sitra
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Siwa Oasis
Arthur Goldschmidt

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Ehud R. Toledano (1996)

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George R. Wilkes
Ann Kahn (1996)

Sneh, Moshe
Gregory S. Mahler
Walter F. Weiker (1996)

Sobol, Yehoshua
Donna Robinson Divine
Julie Zuckerman (1996)

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Audrey L. Altstadt (1996)

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M. Hakan Yavuz
Frank Tachau (1996)

Socotra
Robert D. Burrowes

Soheyli, Ali
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Sokolow, Nahum
Pierre M. Atlas

Soltani, Abdellatif
Emad Eldin Shahin

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Michael R. Fischbach
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Ana Torres-Garcia
Dirk Vandewalle (1996)

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Afshin Matin-asgari

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Matthew S. Gordon (1996)

Soustelle, Jacques
Zachary Karabell (1996)

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Robert D. Burrowes (1996)

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Manfred W. Wenner (1996)

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David Waldner (1996)

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Laurie Z. Eisenberg
Elizabeth Thompson (1996)

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Eric Hooglund
Jack Bubon (1996)

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Vanesa Casanova-Fernandez

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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (1996)

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As'ad AbuKhalil (1996)

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Donald Malcolm Reid (1996)

Sprinzak, Joseph
Bryan Daves (1996)

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Rouben P. Adalian (1996)

Stack, Lee
Oles M. Smolansky (1996)

Stanhope, Hester
Marilyn Booth

Stark, Freya
Ronald Bruce St John

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John Ruedy (1996)

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Nermin Abadan-Unat

Stern, Abraham
Julie Zuckerman (1996)

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Jean-François Seznec

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Daniel E. Spector (1996)

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J. C. Hurewitz (1996)

Struma
Miriam Simon (1996)

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Eric Hooglund
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Ann M. Lesch

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Ann M. Lesch

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Sondra Hale

Sudd
Robert O. Collins

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Roosevelt, Kermit

Sadr, Muhsin
Shariatmadari, Kazem
Sharif-Emami, Jaʿfar
Shatt al-Arab
Shiraz
Soheyli, Ali
Students in the Line of the Imam
Tabriz
Tabriz University
Usuli
Vazir Afkham, Soltan Ali Khan
Vozuq al-Dowleh, Mirza Hasan Khan
Yazdi, Ibrahim

M. Hakan Yavuz
University of Utah
AKP (Justice and Development Party)
Erbakan, Necmeddin
Erdoğan, Tayyip
Evren, Kenan
Gülen, Fetullah
İnönü, Erdal
Milli Görüş Hareketi
Motherland Party
Nationalist Action Party
National Security Council (Turkey)
Nursi, Said
Sezer, Ahmet
Social Democratic Populist Party
True Path Party
Türkes, Alparslan

Shibolet Zait
Columbia University
Raab, Esther

Muhammad Zakariya
Arlington, VA
Calligraphy

Mamoon A. Zaki
LeMoyne-Owen College
Baban Family
Hashimi, Yasin al-
Mandaeans
Najaf, al-
Pachachi, Muzahim al-

Naomi Zeff
Somerville, MA
Mauritania
Nouakchott
Ould Sidʾ Ahmed Taya, Maʿouiya

Ronen Zeidel
Haifa University
Osirak

Charles U. Zenzie
U.S.-Indonesia Society, Washington, DC
Popular Front
Saʿada, Antun
Shahbandar, Abd al-Rahman
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)
Zaʿim, Husni al-
Zuʿbi, Mahmud al-
Zurayk, Constantine

Steven Zipperstein
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Ahad Ha-Am

Eyal Zisser
Tel Aviv University
Zaʿim, Husni al-

Yahia Zoubir
Thunderbird Europe/Centre Universitaire
Bennabi, Malek
Islamic Salvation Army (AIS)
Kateb, Yacine
Parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste (PAGS)
Sadi, Said
Toumi, Khalida
Zeroual, Liamine

Julie Zuckerman
Jerusalem, Israel
Goldmann, Nahum
Idris al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sanusi
Netanyahu, Benjamin
Pagis, Dan
Shin Bet
Sobol, Yehoshua
Stern, Abraham
Tagger, Sioneh
Tamir, Shmuel
Vanunu Affair
Yariv, Aharon
Yosef, Ovadiah

Genealogies

In the following genealogies and lines of succession, an asterisk preceding a name indicates that the Encyclopedia contains an entry for that individual. The names of those who ruled are indicated by boldfaced type. The following genealogies are not exhaustive, including only well-known figures and those in the direct line of succession. Where possible, the existence of additional family members has been indicated with arrows. With a few exceptions, female descendants are not included because they are typically denied inheritance of a throne and, consequently, little information is available about them.

FIGURE 1



FIGURE 2



FIGURE 3



FIGURE 3 (*continued*)



Note: Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa'ud Al Sa'ud (1880–1953) fathered forty-five sons and as many daughters by at least twenty-three different women. His wife Hassa gave birth to seven sons known as the Sudayri Seven, a reference to Hassa's descent from the Al Sudayri tribe. The descendants of Muhammad ibn Sa'ud, the founder of the Al Sa'ud dynasty, number in the tens of thousands and include the current king, Fahd, one of the Sudayri Seven.

FIGURE 4



FIGURE 5



FIGURE 6



FIGURE 7



FIGURE 8



FIGURE 9



FIGURE 10



Twelve Imams of Shiʿa Islam

Ali ibn Abi Talib (d. 661, al-Najaf)
Hasan (d. 669, Medina)
Husayn (d. 680, Karbala)
Ali Zayn al-Abidin (d. 712, Medina)
Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 731, Medina)
Jaʿfar al-Sadiq (d. 765, Medina)
Musa al-Kazin (d. 799, Baghdad)
Ali al-Rida (d. 818, Mashhad)
Muhammad al-Taqi al-Jawad (d. 835, Baghdad)
Muhammad al-Naqi (d. 868, Samarra)
Hasan al-Askari (d. 873, Samarra)
Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Muntazar (the Hidden Imam, 873)

Glossary

A

Abd: *Arabic for "slave."* Abd means slave. It is also often seen as part of Islamic male names. In such cases, "abd" is always followed by one of the 99 names of God, and denotes "servant of." For example, Abd al-Rahman ("servant of the Forgiving One"), or Abd al-Jabbar ("servant of the Almighty"). Abdullah means "servant of God."

Abu: *Form of the Arabic word* ab *("father").* When it is followed by a first name—usually, the name of a man's first-born son—it means "father of ___." "Abu so-and-so" is used in lieu of calling a man by his first name.

Agha: *Socio-political title of authority.* Agha ("chief," "master") was associated with certain administrators in the Ottoman empire. It is also used in other settings, such as among Kurds.

Allah: *Arabic word for "God."* Allah is simply Arabic for "God"; It is not the name of God. Both Christian and Muslim Arabs use the word Allah in their scriptures.

Amir: *Political title.* Amir (also emir) is derived from the Arabic word *amara* ("to command"), and is a title given to a person of high political rank. It is often translated as "prince."

Ashur: *Islamic tithe.* Also called zakah or zakat, ashur (from the Arabic word for "ten") is a charitable tithe prescribed in Islam. In North Africa, ashur also denotes the tenth month of the Islamic calendar, Muharram.

Ayatullah: *Shiʿite religious title.* Ayatullah (also ayatollah) is a title denoting a very high level *mujtahid* cleric. It is the highest rank a Shiʿite cleric can attain. See also "mujtahid."

B

Baraka: *Arabic, "blessing."* Baraka means a blessing from God, and can also refer to good luck in general. It is also the spiritual benefit that can be bestowed on someone by a saintly figure, and can also refer to a donation to some charitable institution.

Bedouin: *Arab nomads.* The term comes from the Arabic word *badu,* meaning "those who live in the *badiya,* (desert)." Bedouin formerly lived as pastoral nomads in the desert regions of the Arab world, although by the twentieth century, few true nomads remained. The term is still used, however, to denote those tribes and families who are of bedouin origin.

Bey: *Political title.* Bey is a Turkish term often translated as "prince." In the Ottoman empire's administration and military, it was given to mid-level officers. In modern Turkey, it is often used as a suffix to a man's first name as a polite form of address.

Bilharzia: *See Schistosomiasis.*

Bint: *Arabic, "girl."* Female children in the Arab world sometimes are referred to by making reference to their father. Thus, "so-and-so, bint [daughter] so-and-so." See also "ibn."

C

Casbah: *Old quarters of an Arabic city.* From the Arabic *qasaba* ("divide," "cut up"; also, "citadel" or "capital"), it is a term often used by Europeans to denote the older, native quarters of a town, as distinct from the newer areas in which foreigners lived.

D

Derb: *Street or neighborhood.* Moroccan cities were made up of various streets and neighborhoods. Each of these was referred to as a derb, from the Arabic *darb* ("street" or "path").

Dey: *Political title.* The Turkish word for maternal uncle, the position of dey originally was military, but came to denote administrative power in as well. Deys were found in North Africa, especially Tunisia and Algeria, from the late seventeenth through the early nineteenth centuries.

Dinar: *Monetary unit.* Dinar is derived from the Greek "dinarion" and the Latin "denarius." During the early Islamic period, it was a type of gold coin. Currently it serves as the currency of Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Tunisia, and parts of the former Yugoslavia.

Dirham: *Monetary unit.* During the early Islamic period, the dirham was a type of silver coin. Currently it is used in Morocco, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan.

Dunum: *Unit of surface area.* The dunum is used to measure surface area in parts of the Fertile Crescent. During the late Ottoman period, it equaled 919 square meters. In the 1920s, it was enlarged to 1,000 square meters (about 0.25 acre) in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan. In Iraq, the dunum is 0.618 acre.

E

Effendi: *Honorific title.* The origins of this title are Greek, and refer to a man of property or education. During the late Ottoman period, it was used as a sign of respect for middle class males as well as for some bureaucratic positions. Another form of the word, effendum, is still used in Egypt to mean "mister" or "sir."

F

Feddan: *Unit of surface area.* Deriving from an Arabic term for a yoke of oxen, it referred to the amount of land such animals could farm. Thus the actual surface area called a feddan varied from region to region. In Egypt, where it remains the standard unit of surface area today, it equals 4,200.883 square meters, slightly more than one acre.

Fellagha: *Term denoting outlaws.* Fellagha (also fallak) derives from colloquial Tunisian Arabic. It was widely used by the French press to refer to Tunisian guerrilla groups fighting colonial rule, and was eventually used by the fighters themselves. It was also used in reference to anti-French fighters during the early days of the Algerian war of independence.

Fellah: *Peasant.* Fellah (also fallah; plural: fallahun, but more commonly fallahin following colloquial usage) derives from the Arabic verb *falaha* ("cultivate"). It refers to small scale, subsistence level cultivators in Arab countries, but can be used, often derisively, by urbanites to refer to the rural population generally.

G

Ghazel: *Type of poetic form.* The word is Arabic (ghazal; "flirtation" or "love poem"), and is also seen as gazel or ghazal. A lyrical poetic mode often expressing romantic love or eroticism, the form passed into Turkish, Persian, and Urdu poetry as well.

Ghorfa: *Arabic for "room."* The Arabic *ghurfa* refers to a room. In southern Tunisia, seminomadic peoples, usually Berbers, built fortress-like, multistoried structures to store grain. Examples still exist near Tataouine, Ksar Haddada, and Médenine.

H

Hajj: *Islamic pilgrimage.* Hajj (with a short "a" sound) is one of the "Five Pillars of Islam," and refers to a Muslim's obligation to make a pilgrimage to the holy sites in the cities of Mecca and Medina, in today's Saudi Arabia. Islam requires all Muslims who are physically and financially able to make the hajj at least once in their lifetime. The title "hajj" or sometimes "hajji" (with a long "a" sound) is the title given to a man who has completed the hajj. The female equivalent is "hajja."

Halal: *Arabic for "lawful."* In Islamic usage, it refers to aspects of life that are religious acceptable or lawful. It is especially used to refer to meat that has been slaughtered and prepared in accordance with Islamic law. See also "haram."

Haram: *Arabic for "forbidden."* Haram refers to aspects of life, including acts, food, etc., that are forbidden by Islamic law. See also "halal."

Hezbollahi: *"One of the Party of God."* It comes from an Arabic term *hizbullah,* found in the Qurʾan that stems from *hizb* ("party") and *Allah* ("God"). In Iran, a hezbollahi came to mean a zealous and sometimes violent supporter of the concept of an Islamic state.

Hoca: *Honorific title.* Hoca is a Turkish word derived from the Persian *khwaja.* In the Turkish speaking parts of the Ottoman empire, it denoted religious scholars and certain administrative bureacrats. It is still used in modern Turkey to refer to teachers and religious scholars. See also "khawaja."

Hosainiyeh: *Place of a certain type of religious ceremony.* In Iran, it is a place where the martyrdom of the Imam Husayn ibn Ali is commemorated, especially on Ashura, the tenth day of the Islamic month of Muharram. It refers to the death of Husayn, grandson of the prophet Muhammad, in 680 at the hands of the Umayyads at Karbala, in Iraq. Traditionally, a hosainiyeh was a different structure than a mosque, and was a populist institution rather than one under the control of the Islamic clerics.

I

Ibn: *"Son."* Male children in the Arab world sometimes are referred to by making reference to their father. Thus, "so-and-so, ibn [son] so-and-so." See also "bint."

Iltizam: *Tax farm.* The Arabic term *iltizam* refers to a duty or obligation. During the Ottoman empire, it referred to a type of taxation whereby the authorities auctioned the rights to collect taxes to an individual, who became known as a *multazim.* The multazim paid the auction amount to the government, and was free to extract as much in taxation as possible from those living within the iltizam. It usually denoted the right to collect taxes from a specific area, but sometimes referred to taxes collected from a certain trade or profession. It was also called *muqataʿa* in some areas. The Ottoman government tried on several occasions in the late nineteenth century to abolish the practice, but it remained in parts of the empire until the early twentieth century.

Imam: *Religious title.* The term derives from the Arabic *amma,* "to lead." Among Sunni Muslims, and imam refers to the leader of the prayers in a mosque. For Shiʿite Muslims, however, the term refers to the legitimate leader of the Muslim community, a position extending back to the first imam, Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad who also became the fourth caliph. Following Ali's death, the imamate devolved to his sons Hasan and Husayn, and thereafter to their descendants.

The Shiʿite concept of imam involves considerably greater power and influence than for Sunnis, for the Shiʿite imams possessed special spiritual powers to interpret the will of God.

Imamzadeh: *Persian term referring to the descendant of an imam or the tomb of such a person.* Among Twelver Shiʿa in Iran, the term is used to denote the descendant of one of the first eleven imams, as well as the tomb built over the burial place of such a person. Visiting such tombs is considered a meritorious act than can impart a special spiritual blessing, or baraka, to the visitor. See also "baraka."

Inqilab: *Revolution or uprising.* In modern Arabic political usage, the term inqilab is usually used to connote a sudden seizure of political power, often via a military coup d'état. In Persian, the term means "revolution," such as the 1979 revolution in Iran.

Izlane: *Berber songs.* The singular is izli. These are short (usually no longer than two lines) poetic songs among Berbers in the Middle Atlas mountains. The songs are sung at festive occasions, accompanied by drums and clapping, and often speak of love. They are also a vehicle for social and political commentary.

J

Jihad: *"Struggle" in the service of Islam.* Jihad derives from the Arabic verb *jahada,* "to struggle" or "to endeavor." In Islam it can refer to a number of sacred endeavors, from an individual's personal attempts to live his/her life properly according to Islamic principles, to armed struggle in the defense of Islam or Islamic territory. The term mujtahid derives from *jahada* as well. See also "mujtahid."

K

Karakul: *Afghani sheep.* Karakul is the name of a breed of short-tailed sheep raised in northern Afghanistan, largely by Turkmen and Uzbeks. The fleece is used for making hats.

Kaza: *Ottoman administrative unit.* Kaza is a Turkish word derived from the Arabic *qada.* By the late Ottoman empire, a province (*vilayet*; Arabic: *wilaya*) was divided into governorates called *sanjaks* (Arabic singular: *sanjaq*) or *livas* (Arabic singular: *liwa*). These in turn were divided into smaller units called kazas. Kaza can also refer to the judgment of a *qadi,* or judge. See also "liwa," "qaʾimmaqam," and "vilayet."

Khan: *Highway inn for travelers, or a warehouse for merchandise.* Khans were built as rest stops for travelers and caravans. A khan was also an urban complex for storing merchandise and hosting merchants.

Khanjar: *Type of Arabic dagger.* A khanjar usually refers to a slightly curved, double edged dagger that tapers to a point. The hilt is often decorated.

Khatib: *Islamic preacher.* A khatib is the religious official who delivers the sermon during Friday prayers in a mosque, usually from a raised pulpit called a *minbar.* See also "minbar."

Khawaja: *Honorific title of Persian origin.* In Egypt and parts of the Fertile Crescent, khawaja was a title used to denote a non-Muslim, both foreigners as well as native Christians and Jews. The term comes from the Persian *khwaja.* See also "hoca."

Khawr: *Natural harbor; also part of place names.* The term is used in the Persian/Arabian Gulf region.

Khedive: *High-level title used in Egypt from 1867–1914.* Khedive is a Persian word for a high prince that was used by the governors of Ottoman Egypt from 1867–1914 to replace the title "pasha" carried by other governors in the empire. It was first used by Ismaʿil Pasha, grandson of Muhammad Ali, who secured this right from the Ottoman sultan in order to differentiate and elevate himself from other provincial governors. The term was replaced with "sultan" by the British, who occupied Egypt starting in1882. See also "pasha" and "sultan."

Koran: *See Qurʾan.*

Kochi: *Afghani pastoral nomads.* Derived from the Pushtu term koch ("pack"), kochi referes to pastoral nomads, mostly Baluchis and Pushtuns, in Afghanistan.

Komiteh: *Armed Islamic revolutionary group in Iran.* Prior to merging with the official armed forces in 1991, the Komitehs (Islamic Revolutionary Committees) developed out of mosque-based revolutionaries in Tehran in 1978. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini gave them official status in 1979, as did the Iranian majles (legislature) in 1983. The Komitehs served as a type of police force, combating drug trafficking, "immoral" behavior, as well as working against groups opposing the new regime.

L

Laz: *Ethnic group in Turkey.* The Laz live on the Black Sea, near Turkey's border with Georgia. The Laz language belongs to the Kartvelian language family, and is related to Georgian.

Lazma: *Plot of land in Iraq.* Tribes living in Iraq would distribute irrigated land to cultivators, called lazma, who then obtained prescriptive rights to that land by virtue of their ongoing cultivation of it. This came despite the fact that the land was not formally registered to the tribe.

Leff: *Type of political coalition in North Africa.* Coming from the Arabic word *laffa* ("to wrap"), a leff refers to political coalition whose members assist one another during disputes with other leffs. It is also called *saff* in some parts of North Africa and the Fertile Crescent.

Lira: *Ottoman monetary unit.* The lira, or pound, was named after an Italian silver coin, and was the currency used in the Ottoman empire. Modern Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon continue to use the lira as their national currencies.

Liwa: *Ottoman administrative unit.* During the late Ottoman empire, a province (*vilayet*; Arabic: *wilaya*) was divided into liwas (called liva in Turkish). A liwa was also called a *sanjak* (Arabic: *sanjaq).* These in turn were divided into smaller units called qadas or kazas. See also "kaza," "mutassarif," and "vilayet."

Luti: *Term implying deviation from moral standards.* In Iran during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the term originally referred to a member of a chivalrous brotherhood. It later assumed more negative connotations implying drunkenness and moral deviation. In parts of the modern Arab world, luti is a term used for a homosexual. Some surmise that the term derives from the biblical figure Lot, son of Noah.

M

Madrasa: *Arabic for "school."* Madrasa is the Arabic word for school. In Sunni Islam it referred to a school for teaching Islamic law, or shariʿa. It retains that meaning in parts of the contemporary Islamic world, although in modern Arab countries, the term is more broadly used to denote schools in general.

Majles: *Legislature or parliament.* Majles is the Persian form of the Arabic *majlis* (in Turkish, *meclis*), which is derived from the verb *jalasa* ("to sit"). It can mean a meeting, or sitting, in a number of senses, both private and public. In the public realm, it became the term used for legislatures in the Middle East and North Africa once these began to emerge in the nineteenth century. It can also refer to an appointed consultative body.

Malik: *"King" in Arabic.* Malik derives from the Arabic verb *malaka* ("to own"). It has been used in the modern Arab world to mean king.

Maʿpalim: *Illegal Jewish immigrants to Palestine.* Maʿpalim (Hebrew, "the daring ones") were Jewish immigrants who entered Palestine in violation of immigration quotas established by the British Mandate in Palestine, especially after the 1939 White Paper. The Zionist community in Palestine established the clandestine organization Mossad le-Aliyah Bet in 1938 to assist Jews fleeing Nazi persecution in Europe in reaching Palestine. British forces intercepted many maʿpalim and interned them in camps in Cyprus, including the 4,515 passengers aboard the ship *Exodus,* whose detainment in 1947 helped turn international sentiment against British rule in Palestine.

Mellah: *Jewish quarter of Moroccan towns.* Mellah derives from the Arabic word for salt. It stems from the forced resettlement of the Jewish community in Fez to an outlying saline area, and came to denote Jewish areas throughout Morocco. In urban

areas, mellahs were gated quarters of cities. In rural areas, they were separate Jewish villages.

Minbar: *Pulpit in a mosque.* In a mosque, the sermon (*khitab*) is delivered by the preacher (*khatib*) from a raised pulpit called a minbar, derived from the Arabic *nabara* ("to raise the voice"). See also "khatib."

Mizrahim: *Jews from Islamic countries.* Mizrahim means "the easterners" in Hebrew. It is a term used in modern Israel to denote Jews whose origins extend back to North African, Middle Eastern, and West or South Asian Jewish communities. Some of these communities were quite ancient, especially those in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Yemen. Most of these communities moved to Israel after its creation in 1948. The term Mizrahim has started to replace "Sephardim," which for a long time was loosely used to denote all Jews who were not European ("Ashkenazim"), but which in a strict sense only refers to the Jews who were expelled from Spain in 1492. See also "Sephardim" and the encyclopedia entry "Adot ha-Mizrah."

Moslem *See Muslim.*

Muezzin: *The one who calls Muslims to pray.* A muezzin (Arabic: *muʾadhdhin)* calls the Muslim faithful to pray, usually from a minaret. The call to prayer must be in Arabic, even though most of the world's Muslims do not speak Arabic.

Mufti: *Type of Islamic cleric.* A mufti is an expert in Islamic law empowered to given religious opinions on various matters. Such an opinion is called a fatwa. See the encyclopedia entry "fatwa."

Mujtahid: *Type of Shiʿite Muslim cleric.* A mujtahid is a Shiʿite religious scholar who is authorized to practice *ijtihad,* or interpretation. While the "door of interpretation" was closed for Sunni Muslims approximately 1,000 years ago, high level Shiʿite clerics called mujtahids still practice *ijtihad.*

Mukhtar: *Chief or headman.* Deriving from the Arabic word *khatara* ("to choose" or "select"), a mukhtar ("selected one") was an official appointed by the Ottoman authorities to serve as a go-between between the government and a tribe, village, or urban quarter. The function was part of the Ottomansʾ centralization efforts, efforts that included attempts to undercut traditional religious figures who had maintained levels of local influence. The position is still found in parts of the Arab world.

Mulai: *Title and form of address.* In Arabic, "my lord." Also mawlai, mawlay. A form of address formerly used when speaking to a king, sultan, or caliph. It is still used in Morocco when referring to the crown prince.

Muslim: *Follower of the Islamic religion.* Muslim (sometimes rendered Moslem) is someone who follows the religion of Islam.

Mutasarrif: *Ottoman provincial official.* A mutasarrif was the recipient of taxes from sub-provincial governorates in the Ottoman empire. By the late Ottoman era, the term denoted the government-appointed head of a governorate, or sanjak (also liwa). See also "liwa."

N

Narghila: *Water pipe.* A narghila (also called *arghila, qalyan,* and *shisha)* is a water pipe used in the Middle East and North Africa to smoke tobacco, usually flavored tobacco called *tombac.* They are commonly seen in all-male coffee houses.

O

Oasis: *Watered area surrounded by desert.* An oasis is a fertile area, watered by wells, that is found in the midst of a desert. They can be small or large.

Oglu: *Turkish for "son of."* When used as part of a male name, it means "son of. . ." For example, Süleimanoglu ("son of Süleiman"). In 1935, the Turkish government obliged Turks to adopt Western-style last, or family, names. Many Turks used this form to create family names.

P

Pasha: *Ottoman administrative and military title.* The Ottomans introduced the title "pasha" (modern Turkish, *paşa)* in the fourteenth century. It was used for the governors of sanjaks, or liwas, but

later was bestowed upon other men of high military or governmental rank. With the reorganization of the Ottoman administration in 1864, governors of provinces (vilayets) were given the title pasha. The term remained in use in Turkey and some Arab countries, although it was banned in most of these in the twentieth century. It is still sometimes used, but only to refer to a man in an honorific fashion. See also "liwa" and "vilayet."

Pesh Merga: *Kurdish, "those who face death."* Modern term used to denote armed Kurdish fighters. It first appeared during the Kurdish war against the Iraqi government that began in 1962.

Q

Qaʾid: *Arabic for "leader."* Arabic term denoting political leadership.

Qaʾimmaqam: *Ottoman provincial official.* The term itself is Arabic, and was the title given by Ottoman authorities to the official appointed to head a subgovernorate called a kaza (also qada). See also "kaza," "liwa," and "vilayet." It was also used to denote a low ranking military officer.

Qanat: *Canal.* A qanat (also qana) can mean an underground water channel for irrigating fields, but can also denote a surface level canal, both small and large (such as the Suez Canal).

Qat: *Plant with mildly stimulant effect.* The leaves of the qat (also khat) plant, Catha edulis, are chewed in southwestern Arabia and eastern Africa for their mildly stimulant effect. Similar to the stimulant qualities of caffeine, qat is chewed in the company of others as an important form of social gathering. In this regard, gathering together to chew qat is akin to gathering in a coffee house to drink coffee or tea. Qat chewing is a major activity in Yemen, whose economic as well as social impact on the country is profound. It is also chewed in African countries like Somalia.

Qibla: *Direction of Islamic prayer.* The qibla is the direction in which Muslims must pray. The first qibla was Jerusalem, but this was quickly changed in the seventh century to the direction of Mecca. Muslims around the globe all pray in the direction of Mecca.

Qirsh: *Monetary unit.* The Arabic word qirsh, and Turkish word ghurush or kuruş, is translated as piastre, itself the Italian name for the medieval peso duro. The qirsh was introduced into the Middle East in the early seventeenth century and became a unit of Ottoman currency equivalent to one-hundredth of a lira. It is still used as a small unit of currency in parts of the Middle East.

Qurʾan: *Holy book of Islam.* The Qurʾan (also Koran) is the holy book of Islam. It consists of *suras* (roughly, chapters) containing *ayas* (verses), and is believed by Muslims to be the literal word of God, as revealed in Arabic to the prophet Muhammad through the medium of the Angel Gabriel. The Qurʾan was redacted within several generations of the Prophet's death in 632, and is read and revered by Muslims worldwide as God's final and definitive message (Arabic: *risala*) to humanity.

R

Reʿaya: *Subjects of the Ottoman government.* Ottoman society was divided into two segments: rulers and ruled. The latter were called the reʿaya, from the Arabic word denoting "flock." The ruling institution—the sultan and his government—were obliged to protect the reʿaya, who in return paid taxes.

Reuter Concession: *Exclusive economic concession proposed by the Shah of Iran to Baron Julius de Reuter.* In July 1872, Nasir al-Din Shah, ruler of Iran, granted Baron Julius de Reuter, a British subject, a sweeping and exclusive seventy-year concession to carry out a number of business ventures within Iran. Among these were the construction of a railroad linking the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, construction of streetcar lines, and operation of mines, among other ventures. Reuter, owner of a news agency, would have been granted an amazingly large amount of economic power with Iran. Opposition to the deal grew, both within Iran and in Europe (particularly Russia, which also had interests in Iran), and the concession was withdrawn in November

1873. Reuter did eventually maintain certain mining and banking rights in Iran, which led to the creation of the Imperial Bank of Persia.

Riyal: *Monetary unit.* The word *riyal* is of Spanish and French origin. The coin was introduced into the Ottoman empire in the nineteenth century, and first used in Iran in 1930, where it was popularly known as the kran. It is the basic currency unit of several Middle Eastern countries today, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman, Yemen, and Qatar.

Roshanfekr: *Persian word for intellectuals.* Roshankekr (Persian, "enlightened thinker") is the Persian word for intellectual.

Ruzname: *Ottoman treasury offices and its registers.* The term comes from the Persian words *ruz* ("day"), and *name* ("book"). The Ottoman government used to term to denote a financial journal or ledger, and referred both to these and the Ottoman treasury offices as ruzname.

S

Salname: *Ottoman government yearbook.* Salname comes from the Persian words *sal* ("year"), and *name* ("book"). Salnames were statistical, geographical, and biographical yearbooks that were first published by the central Ottoman government in 1847 and later, beginning in 1865, by provincial authorities as well. Salnames contained information on population, expenditures, and education. They were discontinued after1922.

Sanjak: *See liwa.*

SAVAK: *Imperial Iranian intelligence agency.* SAVAK was the Persian acronym for the State Security and Intelligence Organization, and was formed by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, in 1967. SAVAK was originally designed to ferret out communist activity, but grew to monitor all forms of internal dissent and external opposition and to censor the press. It was attached to the prime ministry. SAVAK became a feared organization within Iran and among Iranian exiles abroad, and was abolished after the 1979 revolution.

Sayyid: *Arabic word for "master," "lord," "chief," or "mister."* Prior to the coming of Islam, *sayyid* (plural: *sada* or *asyad*) was used in Arabia to denote a tribal chief. After the coming of Islam, it assumed a particular meaning: descendants and certain relatives of the prophet Muhammad. The term *sayyid* thereafter came to denote the direct descendants of the Prophet through his two grandsons, Hasan and Husayn, the sons of the union of the Prophet's daughter, Fatima, and his son-in-law (and cousin), Ali. In some part of the Arab world, notably in the Hijaz region of Arabia and parts of the Fertile Crescent, *sayyid* came to denote those who were part of the lineage of Husayn, while the term *sharif* denoted those descendant from Hasan. *Sayyids* were held in high social esteem. However, the terms *sayyid* or *sid* (also, "sidi": "my lord") have also been used in a variety of Islamic societies as a form of address for holy men and religious figures. It also is the modern Arabic equivalent of "mister." See also the encyclopedia entry "sharif."

Schistosomiasis: *Disease carried by small worms.* Also called bilharzia, the disease is spread by a small worm, known as the blood fluke, that attaches onto snails. Countries such as Egypt have witnessed the spread of the disease thanks to the development of dams, irrigation canals, and other such developmental projects. The medication that kills the snails that carry the disease is both expensive and unsuitable for use without close medical scrutiny. The result is that the disease has spread considerably, and constitutes one of the modern world's most significant parasitic infections.

Sefaretname: *Ottoman diplomatic report.* Derived from the Arabic word *safara* ("trip" or "journey") and the Persian word *name* ("book"), a sefaretname was a report written by an Ottoman diplomat upon his return from a foreign assignment.

Semites: *Members of the Semitic language family.* Semite (adjective: semitic) stems from the Hebrew *Shem,* the name of one of the sons of the Biblical figure Noah. Semites are peoples in the Middle East and Africa who speak one of the Semitic languages, which are branches of the Afro-Asiatic family. Examples of such languages are Amharic, Arabic, Aramaic, and Hebrew.

Sephardim: *Jews in medieval Spain and their modern descendants.* The term comes from the Biblical Hebrew word *Sepharad,* which while probably referring to the city of Sardis in Asia Minor, came to refer to the Iberian peninsula by the time of the Dark Ages in Europe. Sephardim thus referred to the Jews of Spain, who participated in the glittering civilization of Islamic Spain. However, with the Roman Catholic conquest of the final remaining Islamic part of Spain, Granada, in 1492, the Sephardim expelled or forced to convert. The exiles settled in a number of places, including the New World, European regions such as Italy and the Netherlands, and the Ottoman empire. In the latter, they established communities in the Balkans, Egypt, the Fertile Crescent, and North Africa. In their exile, they continued to speak Ladino, a form of medieval Castilian Spanish written in Hebrew letters. The term Sephardim eventually came to be used in an imprecise manner to mean all non-Ashkenazic Jews (Yiddish speaking Jews from central and eastern Europe), including those in Islamic regions like Iraq, Yemen, and Iran, whose ancestors never had lived in Spain. Increasingly, the term "Mizrahim" is being used to denote the Jews of North Africa, the Middle East, and west and south Asia, some of whom were descendants of the Spanish exiles but most of whom were not. See also "Mizrahim" and the encyclopedia article "Ashkenazim."

Serasker: *Highest Ottoman military rank in the nineteenth century.* Created in 1826, the officer of serasker represented the head of the Ottoman military. During the Tanzimat reorganization of government from 1839–1876, the serasker became a powerful figure, in control of his own treasury. The power of the serasker was reduced by Sultan Abdülhamit II, and was renamed minister of war in the early twentieth century. See also "seyfiyye."

Seven Sisters: *Group of Western oil companies in the Middle East.* The Seven Sisters were a cartel of Western oil companies that dominated the Middle Eastern oil industry from 1930–1970. They were: Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon), British Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron, Texaco, Mobil, and Gulf Oil. They increasingly lost power starting in the 1950s and 1960s as Middle Eastern countries began nationalizing their oil industries. With the merger of Chevron and Gulf in 1986, the number of "sisters" dropped to six, which remain important companies in the fields of oil refining and distribution.

Seyfiyye: *Ottoman military bureaucracy*. Derived from the Arabic term *sayf* ("sword"), the Ottomans used the term seyfiyye, "men of the sword," to refer to the various types of troops in the Ottoman military. The seyfiyye was replaced by the serasker in 1826, who unified the various types of military forces (with the exception of the navy). See also "serasker."

Shah: *Persian word for "king."* Shah is a title used by several different dynasties that ruled Iran.

Shuttle Diplomacy: *Term denoting a diplomatic intermediary shuttling back and forth between countries in an effort to arrange an agreement among contending countries.* The term was first raised to the level of public discourse to describe the efforts of American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to bring about a disengagement of forces after the October 1973 Arab–Israeli war. Kissinger had to shuttle back and forth between the capitals of Egypt, Syria, and Israel, carrying his proposals, because the parties could not agree to meet together.

Sidara: *Type of cap used in Iraq.* The sidara was a type of cap introduced in Iraq in the 1920s that resembled a Western military cap that is called a variety of names, including side cap, for-and-aft cap, or overseas cap. Commonly black velvet, it became the emblem of the Iraqi governing and professional classes. It is no longer in use in Iraq, although a similar type of black cap is used by Muslims elsewhere, especially in south and southeast Asia.

Sitt: *Arabic for "lady."* Sitt is often used in female royal titles.

T

Taqlid: *Islamic legal term.* In Sunni Islam, the term taqlid came to mean "deference" or "imitation," in the sense that religious jurisprudents were obliged to defer to the doctrinal precedents of their respective schools of law (the

Shafiʿi, Hanbali, Hanafi, and Maliki schools). This, then, reduces the realm of individual interpretation (*ijtihad*). In Shiʿite Islam, however, the position of marja al-taqlid is quite different, and denotes an elite jurist who is spiritually empowered to employ *ijtihad.* See the encyclopedia article "Marja al-Taqlid."

Tariqa: *Sufi order or brotherhood.* Tariqa is an Arabic word derived from the term meaning "the way." It is used to denote sufi mystical orders. See the encyclopedia entry "Sufism and the Sufi Orders."

Tell: *Hill or mound.* The Arabic word *tall* means a hill, and is used to describe such geographical features. In archeological parlance, however, it refers to a mound containing ancient archeological remains. Finally, it also refers to a large region of North Africa from Morocco to Tunisia.

Thalweg Line: *Maritime boundary.* The thalweg principle of international law, whereby a river or some other body of water constitutes an international border, was most notably used in the Middle East in the case of the border between Iraq and Iran. While at one point in history, the thalweg of the Shatt al-Arab river between the two left the entire river in Iraqi hands, a 1975 treaty moved the thalweg to the midpoint of the river. Overturning this treaty was one of the motivating factors that led Iraq to attack Iran in 1980.

Tishrin: *Arabic term for the tenth and eleventh months of the Gregorian calendar.* In the modern Arab world, Tishrin al-Awwal ("First Tishrin") refers to the Gregorian (Western) month of October, while Tishrin al-Thani ("Second Tishrin") refers to November. Some Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia, do not use the Gregorian calendar but only the Islamic (hijri) calendar. It is also the name of a newspaper in Syria, named after the initial Arab victories in the October 1973 Arab–Israeli war.

Tiwizi: *Community agricultural support in Berber societies.* Tiwizi is a principle whereby Berbers provide agricultural workers to assist families who need more hands in the fields, and is a socially-mandated obligation.

Toman: *Iranian monetary unit.* Toman is a word of Tatar origin referring to a military unit of 10,000 men, and refers to a gold coin worth ten silver krans (riyals), or 10,000 dinars. It first appeared in Iran ca. 1600. See also "dinar" and "riyal."

Turkmen: *Turkic peoples in Turkmenistan, Iran, and Afghanistan.* The Turkmen are speakers of Western Oghuz Turkic, and were originally pastoral nomads. They lived east of the Caspian Sea and west of the Amu Darya (Oxus) River. In addition, Turkmen minorities today reside in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.

U

Umma: *Arabic word for community, especially the Islamic community.* The Arabic word umma, derived from *umm* ("mother"), is a term used in Islam to denote the worldwide community of the faithful. In the twentieth century, the term was sometimes used by Arabs to mean "nation" in a political sense, both in global terms (the pan-Arab umma) and local terms (a specific nation).

Urf: *Arabic customary law.* Urf refers to largely unwritten tribal or customary codes that govern social relations, in contradistinction to Islamic law (*shariʿa*) or state legal codes (qanun).

Ustadh: *Arabic for "teacher" or "master."* This term (also ostad or ustaz) is used to denote a teacher or professor, but can also be used as a polite form of address for any educated person.

Uzi: *Type of Israeli firearm.* The uzi is a short submachine gun designed by the Israeli army office Maj. Uziel Gal, after whom it is named.

V

Vali: *Ottoman provincial governor.* The term vali is the Turkish and Persian rendition of the Arabic *wali,* referring to someone who has been deputized to exercise authority. It meant "governor." The Mamluks assigned valis to their smallest administrative units, whereas in Iran and later in the Ottoman empire, a vali was the governor of the largest type of administrative unit. In the Ottoman empire, a vali was head of a *vilayet,* or province. See also "kaza," "liwa," and "vilayet."

Vilayet: *Ottoman Turkish term for province.* A vilayet, from the Arabic word *wilaya,* was the largest administrative unit within the Ottoman empire. See also "vali."

Vizier: *Type of government official; "minister."* Under the Ottomans, the vizier (Arabic: *wazir;* Turkish: *vezir*) served as a government minister. The vezir-i azam, or grand vizier, was the functional equivalent of a prime minister under the sultan. The Ottomans replaced the term with *vekil* (Arabic: *wakil*) in the 1830s, although *wazir* is still in use to denote a government minister in the Arab world.

Y

Yarmulke: *Jewish skullcap.* Jewish males have long worn a skullcap to indicate their submission to a higher authority, that is, God. The very religious wear one at all times, while more secular Jews only don them for religious ceremonies. The Hebrew term for this cap is *kippa.* Some speculate that the term yarmulke is an acronym for *yarai mʾElohim,* "one who is in awe of God."

Z

Zaʿim: *Arabic for "boss" or "leader."* Usually used in an informal manner to denote a strong leader. It is also used as a military rank in some Arab countries.

Zakat: *Islamic tithe, or almsgiving.* Zakat (also zaka) is one of the "Five Pillars of Islam," and is an important religious obligation for Muslims. It requires the giving of an individual's wealth. Historically, it was levied in Islamic countries as a tax upon adult Muslims.

Zawiya: *Islamic religious compound.* From the Arabic word for "corner" or "place of seclusion," a zawiya refers to the compound housing a Sufi brotherhood or the residence of a prominent Sufi master. See the encyclopedia article "Sufism and the Sufi Orders."

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